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THE HOUSE OF SELEUCUS

VOL. II

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVI

ACHAKUS	PAGE 1

CHAPTER XVII

THE RECONQUEST O F THE EAST	14

CHAPTER XV111

THE CONQUEST O F PALESTINE	29

CHAPTER XIX

THE ADVANCE I N THE WEST	39

CHAPTER XX

THE WAR IN GREECE	72

*

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR IN ASIA	88

CHAPTER XXII

THE INTERVAL O F PEACE	115

CHAPTER XXIII

ANTIOCHUS IV AND THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT	126

CHAPTER XXIV

ANTIOCHDS THE GOD MANIFEST	148

CHAPTER XXV		PAGE
ANTIOCHUS AND THE JEWS		162
CHAPTER XXVI		
ANTIOCHUS EUPATOR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF LYSIAS		
' CHAPTER XXVII		178
DEMETRIUS THE SAVIOUR		
CHAPTER XXVIII		188
ALEXANDER I AND THE PTOLEMAIC ASCENDANCY		
CHAPTER XXIX		212
THE CRETAN TYRANNY		
CHAPTER XXX		223
ANTIOCHUS SIDETES		
CHAPTER XXXI		
THE LAST CONVULSIONS		247
CHAPTER XXXII		
GOVERNMENT, COURT, AND ARMY		269
APPENDICES		295
INDEX		307
ANTIOCHUS 111, PROFILE (<i>from, a bust in the Louvre</i>)	<i>Frontispiece</i>	
PLATE II	<i>To face page 60</i>	
„	111	124
„ IV.		220
MAP OF THE THEATRE OF THE WAR IN GREECE		75

NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

USED IN THE FOOTNOTES

POLYB.—I cite Polybius according to the arrangement in the edition of F. Hultseh (Berlin).

JOSEPH.—The sections in citations from Josephus are those which appear in the editions of Niese (Berlin) and of Naber (Teubner, Leipzig).

PLIN.—The *Naturlis Historic* of Pliny the Elder is cited by the sections in the edition of D. Detlefsen (Berlin).

Eus.—Eusebi *Chronicorum Libri Duo*, A. Sehoene (Berlin). Vol. i. contains a Latin version of the Armenian translation of the lost work of Eusebius.

TSIDOR.—Τὸ *Σταθμὸν Παρθικὸν* of Isidore of Charax (Muller's *Geographi Graeci Minor*, es, vol. i. p. 244 f.).

MALALAS, SYNCCELL.—The *Clironographia* of John Malalas and that of George Syncellus are cited by the pages in the *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae* (Bonn).

F.H.G.—Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (Didot, Paris).

C.I.G.—Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*.

C.I.A.T.—The *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*.

J.U.S.—*Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

Bull. corr. hell.—*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*.

Ath. Mitth. — *Mittheilungen des kaiserlichen deutschen archäologischen Instituts zu Athen*.

DROYSSEN.—J. G. Droysen, *Histoire de l'Hellénisme*, traduite de l'allemand sous la direction de A. Bonche'-Leclercq. [I quote from the French translation, because it represents this work in its completest form.]

NIESE.—Benedictus Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chéronée*.

SCHÜRER.—Emil Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*. The pages in vols. ii. and iii. are those of the last edition (the third) of 1898, in vol. i. of the edition of 1901.

MICHEL.—Charles Michel, *Recueil d'Inscriptions Grecques* (Paris, 1900). I cite from this collection, wherever possible, as containing the largest number of important inscriptions. It gives the number of every inscription in other well-known previous collections. The edition of Dittenberger's *Sylloge*, which has appeared subsequently, has itself a register which enables any one using it to identify an inscription by its number in Michel.

BABELON.—Ernest Babelon, *Les Rois de Syrie, d'Arménie et de Commagène*.

PAULY-WISSOWA.—Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung herausgegeben von Georg Wissowa.

Sitzungsb. Berl.—*Sitzungsberichte der könig. kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*.

CHAPTER XVI

ACHAEUS

OF all the potentates who bore the name of king in Asia Minor, Achaeus was now the most powerful.¹ He had recovered from Attalus the territory which had belonged to the Seleucid house before its unhappy divisions. His wife, Laodice, was a daughter of King Mithridates, sister therefore to the Laodice who was the queen of Antiochus.² She was the princess who had been placed in the hands of Antiochus Hierax, and had by him been confided to the care of Logbasis the Selgian.³ Once more there was a king who could invite the cities to look to Sardis, rather than to Pergamos, for the strong rule which should curb the forces of disorder.

But Attalus, though overborne, was not crushed. His armies had been driven out of the regions they had lately commanded. Except Pergamos nothing was left him. But in Pergamos he maintained himself.⁴ And the glamour of his glorious Gallic wars still invested him in the eyes of the Greeks; his influence was too well grounded to disappear even now. When Byzantium was on the point of a war with Rhodes it solicited the help of *both* princes.⁵ It was, however, really Achaeus in these days who counted; and the idea of his supporting the Byzantines was so alarming to the Rhodians

¹ βαρύτατος ἦν τότε καὶ φοβερώτατος τῶν ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Ταύρου βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν, Polyb. iv. 48, 12.

² Polyb. viii. 22, 11.

³ Polyb. v. 74, 5.

⁴ εἶχεν δὲ βραχεῖαν τότε ῥοπήν ὥς ἂν ὑπ' Ἀχαιοῦ συνεληλαμένοι εἰς τὴν πατρίαν ἀρχήν, Polyb. iv. 48, 2. τὸν μὲν Ἀτταλὸν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ Πέργαμον συνέκλεισε, τῶν δὲ λαοῶν πάντων ἦν ἐγκρατής, *ibid.* 11.

⁵ Polyb. iv. 48, 11.

that they stretched their influence at the Ptolemaic court to the utmost point in order to procure the release of his father, Andromachus, who had been taken prisoner in one of the late wars. By this move they purchased Achaëus' neutrality.¹

Attalus, so long as he retained the nucleus of his power, continued to be a menace to Achaëus. Nor did Achaëus find an ally in the Bithynian king. Ziaëlas, whose daughter Antiochus Hierax had married, had been murdered at the time of the Gallic wars by some Galatians in his service;² the present King, his son Prusias, was little friendly either to Achaëus or Attalus. The complete victory of either would, he knew, leave him face to face with a strong Hellenic king who would be a most inconvenient neighbour. Meantime, he was extremely glad to see the two Hellenic kings pitted against each other. He was furious with the Byzantines because they had tried to reconcile them.³ And what Prusias felt was also felt by every petty dynast who ruled in this or that corner of the hills; should Achaëus succeed in framing a strong kingdom in Asia Minor, it would be an evil day for the smaller powers.⁴ The Greek cities were devoted to Attalus. Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas and ilion openly maintained his cause.⁵ Smyrna, so faithful in former days to the house of Seleucus, now showed the same fidelity to the Pergamene king, and only yielded to the overwhelming power of Achaëus. Among the other cities which had been constrained to submit to Achaëus, but longed for Attalus, mention is made of Cyeme, Phocaea, Teos and Colophon.⁶ These circumstances may help to explain why Achaëus did not venture to leave Asia Minor even when the situation in Syria seemed to give him so excellent an opportunity.

In the summer of 218, whilst Antiochus was campaigning in Palestine, Achaëus extended his power in a new direction.

¹ Polyb. iv. 51.

² Trog. *Prol.* xxv11. ; Phylarch. ap. Athen. ii. 58 c; Polyb. v. 90, 1.

³ Polyb. iv. 49, 2 ; cf. v. 77, 1.

⁴ *πάσι δ' ἦν φοβερὸς καὶ βαρὺς τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Ταύρου κατοικοῦσι*, Polyb. v. 77, 1. ⁵ Polyb. v.. 78, 6.

⁶ *Ibid.* 77, 4 f. Ephesus, the Greek cities of Caria, and to a large extent the southern coast were, it will be remembered, subject to Ptolemy, who, as the negotiations after Raphia show, was friendly to Achaëus.

He was perhaps determined to be king of Asia Minor indeed, and to deal resolutely with those problems which the disturbed Macedonian rule, no less than the old slipshod Oriental, had hitherto neglected. A serious attempt to subjugate the southern hills was at last made. The opportunity to intervene was given Achaëus by a petty war between Selge and Pednelissus. Selge was the most powerful of those Pisidian mountain-states who waged perpetual war not only with the kings of Asia, but with each other. Pednelissus, finding itself straitly besieged, appealed to King Achaëus. His general, Garsyeris, was at once sent to its relief, and was joined on his appearance by the other communities which were of the anti-Selgian faction in Pisidia, such as the Greek city of Aspendus. Side, on the other hand, held aloof, "partly in order to gain favour with Antiochus, but chiefly because of their enmity with Aspendus."¹ After a chequered struggle among the hills Garsyeris succeeded in driving the Selgian bands from Pednelissus, and presently laid siege to Selge itself.

There was still living in Selge at this time the man who had been the friend of Antiochus Hierax, and under whose roof the queen of Achaëus had grown up, Logbasis. He was now chosen by his fellow-citizens to open negotiations with the besiegers. In supposing him to be a *persona grata* with the people of Achaëus they were not wrong; they had, however, mistaken his own inclinations. So soon as he was closeted with Garsyeris he offered to betray the city into the hands of Achaëus.

Garsyeris immediately sent swift messages to bring Achaëus to the spot. And meanwhile he amused the city with deceptive negotiations. Achaëus arrived, and the attempt was made to seize the city by a sudden attack, in which Logbasis and his accomplices had been instructed to co-operate from within. But at a moment as critical as this, the splendid promptitude of the Selgians foiled the plot. The escape nevertheless had been so narrow that they felt the wisdom of coming to terms. They consented to buy peace with a heavy fine and release the Pednelissian prisoners.

It was now that Achaëus spread the terror of his arms

¹ Polyb. v. 73, 3.

through the mountain region between Lyeia and Cilieia, breaking the immemorial independence of the warlike tribes. He established his authority over Milyas and the greater part of Pamphylia. But the campaign which extended his power in one direction also showed on what insecure foundations it rested, how ill he could afford to be absent for a moment from his seat of government. His back had hardly been turned when Attalus issued out of Pergamos with a new-come band of Gauls, and was received by the Greek cities generally with open arms. Cyme, Smyrna and Phoeaea were the first to join him. Aegae and Temnus did not dare to resist. Teos and Colophon sent their envoys. Attalus made a triumphant promenade through the kingdom of Aehaeus, taking on his way the fortress of Didyma-Teiche, which Themistoeles, the commander put there by Aehaeus, delivered into his hand.¹ He was encamped on the afternoon of September 1, 218 B.C. (as we should reckon) near the river Megistus (probably the same as the Maeestus), when the moon was darkened by an eclipse which, as the shades of evening deepened, became total.² The Gallic bands, who had already been grumbling at the labour of a march which involved lugging their women and children along with them in waggons, were terrified. They clamoured to be allowed to return to Europe, and Attalus was obliged to promise that they should be conducted to the Hellespont. If he had had any design of proceeding farther, it had to be abandoned. He returned to Pergamos. His expedition had at any rate dealt a blow to the power and prestige of Aehaeus in the north-west.

When Aehaeus returned with fresh laurels from the Pisidian hills the war between Sardis and Pergamos was resumed, and went on without a break till the Seleueid King at last appeared in the land to claim his own.

¹ Although Polybius gives us several names, *Μυσῶν κατοικίαι*, Carseai or Carseis, Didyma-Teiche, Peleas, the river Megistus, their identification is still to seek, and we cannot consequently trace the course of Attalus. The bold theory of Radet, *Revue des Universités du Midi*, nouv. sér. ii. (1896), p. 1 f. will probably commend itself to few. It is combated by Niese (ii. p. 391, note 6), and by Holleaux, *Revue des Univ. du Midi*, iii. p. 409 f.

² Niese ii. p. 779.

In the summer of 216 ¹ Antiochus led across the Taurus the army he had spent the last year in preparing. It was the first time that he stood as king in this land which his house had striven so long to possess, but which, as he found it now, was parcelled out among five kings, a number of smaller dynasts, the house of Ptolemy, the free Greek cities, and the mountain tribes. *In the person of Antiochus III the house of Seleucus makes its crowning attempt to master Asia Minor.* It was at Aehaeus alone that for the present his attack was directed. And in making it he had two things mainly in his favour. One was the hold which the Seleueid name had upon the Macedonian soldiery. The other was the mutual hostility of those powers which had divided the Seleueid inheritance amongst them. When the last Seleueid king, Antioehus' brother, had crossed the Taurus, Attalus was the enemy; to-day Attalus and Antioehus were ready to combine against Aehaeus.² Aehaeus apparently had no friend but Egypt, and Egypt under Ptolemy IV was more the broken reed than ever. " Their strength is to sit still."³

Of the course of the war no record is preserved. When the darkness breaks Aehaeus has been driven from the field. Sardis alone remains to him. To this almost impregnable city Antioehus is laying siege (214). Then the story acquires for a moment peculiar vividness.

An incessant series of skirmishes, assaults and stratagems had led to no result. The besiegers were resigning themselves to the distant prospect of reducing the city by starvation. But the general discouragement was not shared by Lagoras the Cretan. He was convinced that a way could be found of entering the city. Its very strength would put the defenders off their guard, and its most precipitous points be the most remissly guarded. With this fixed idea his eyes day by day studied the ramparts. There was at one place a ravine, into which the besieged shot their refuse, and the Cretan observed that when the birds rose from it they habitually settled upon

¹ Niese ii. p. 392, note 1.

² That Attalus and Antioehus co-operated we know, but the terms of their alliance are impossible to discover. See Niese ii. p. 392, note 3.

³ Isaiah 30, 7.

the rocks and masonry above; *there* then was no neighbourhood of men. At night he would clamber about those rocks, scrutinizing every spot where foot or ladder could hold. At last his scheme was complete, and he carried it to the King. Antioehus approved the enterprise, and allowed him to take as his associates in command Theodotus the Aetolian and Dionysius, the commander of the *hypaspistai*.¹ A night was chosen when there would be no moon in the hours before dawn. Fifteen men had been picked in the evening from the whole army to go up with the three and set the ladders. Another thirty had been chosen to wait a little way below. As soon as the fifteen had cleared the wall they were to beset a certain door from within; the thirty were to rush up and hack at the hinges and lintel without. A third body of 2000 men were to hold themselves in readiness still further in the rear to dash through the door as soon as it was opened, and occupy the theatre. In order that these dispositions might not set the camp talking it was given out that, according to intelligence received, a reinforcing body of Aetolians would shortly attempt to enter the city by one of the ravines, and it was necessary to have special pickets on the alert.

By night, as soon as the moon was down, the several parties took their stations under the cliffs. When morning broke, the camp observed no change in the ordinary routine: the outposts were relieved as usual and the army assembled for parade in the hippodrome outside the city. But as Lagoras and Dionysius mounted their ladders they came into view of those below, although not of those above, and soon the figures on the dizzy cliff attracted general attention. The excitement in the camp, the upward stare, were observed by the watchers in the city, but Aehaeus was only mystified and uneasy. He nevertheless detailed a body of soldiers to reinforce the wall at the part pointed at, but the passage thither being steep and narrow, it took a long time to reach it.

Meanwhile Antioehus, apprehensive that the stir among the troops might betray the design, made a diversion by attacking the "Persian Gate" on the opposite side of the city. And

¹ Aetolians, like Cretans, would be born mountaineers; the *hypaspistai* were regularly employed by Alexander for steep places.

the movement succeeded. Aribazus, the governor of the city, drew his garrison thither to meet it, manned the wall, and made a sortie to engage the attacking columns. Then the door on the cliff was forced ; the two thousand occupied the theatre. Aribazus was taken between two enemies; in his haste to re-enter the city he could not prevent the body which he had engaged entering with him. The Persian Gate was captured, and soon through the neighbouring gates as well the besiegers were pouring in. There was, of course, no hope now of saving the town; Aribazus and his troops withdrew, after a short struggle, into the citadel. Once more in its history Sardis was given up to massacre, pillage and devastation.

Aehaeus still held out with a handful of troops in the citadel. But he was in a trap. His only hope lay now in the chance of getting through the lines of the besiegers by surprise or stealth, and making good his escape to the hills or to Egyptian territory. Egypt, though it would not take overt action to save him, was still not indifferent to his fate.

A little while after the capture of the lower city of Sardis two men were closeted in a chamber in Alexandria. One was the prime minister of Egypt, Sosibius; the other was a Cretan *condottiere* in the service of King Ptolemy, called Bolis. Sosibius had for some time been narrowly observing his man. His examination had satisfied him ; now he spoke. " My friend, your fortune with the King is made if you can get Aehaeus out of his predicament. The means would be left to your own contrivance. Will you undertake it ?" When Bolis answered, it was to ask for time to turn it over. Then the two men separated.

In two or three days they were again together. Bolis undertook the adventure. He then went on to tell Sosibius of a promising circumstance. Cambylus, who commanded the Cretan corps in the army of Antioehus, was not only the countryman of Bolis, but his intimate friend. The prime minister caught eagerly at the possibilities conveyed. He congratulated himself on his choice of an instrument. " If there is any one," he exclaimed, " who can extricate Aehaeus, I have him here!"

It remained only to arrange certain details. For money,

Bolis must understand the Egyptian court would see to that; here were ten talents out of hand, and unlimited sums to follow. Certain letters he would have to carry with him. Sosibius held in his hand the thread of old negotiations between Sardis and Alexandria. The letters would put Bolis into connexion with one Nieomachus in Ehodes, and with Melaneomas in Ephesus. These men had been the confidential agents of Aehaeus in former days. Nieomaehus was believed to love him as a son. All was soon settled. With an assured heart Sosibius saw his instrument launched upon his dark errand.

Bolis disembarked at Ehodes, concerted plans with Nicomaehus, and proceeded to Ephesus. Here he duly came into touch with Melaneomas. The next step was to communicate with Cambylus, the commander of Antioehus' Cretans. Bolis wished to meet him in absolute secrecy. A subordinate therefore whom he had with him, called Arianus, was dispatched to the camp before Sardis. He was to tell Cambylus that his friend Bolis had just landed at Ephesus on a recruiting commission for King Ptolemy, and that there were one or two matters he should like to discuss with Cambylus privately. Arianus reached Sardis to find that Cambylus and the Cretan corps, by what seemed an extraordinary piece of luck, had been detached to guard one of the approaches of the citadel where the ground did not admit the regular barricades. He delivered his message. Cambylus lent a ready ear. Certainly, if Bolis would come to such and such a place at such an hour of a night he named, Cambylus would be there to meet him. This Arianus carried back.

The night came, and two Cretan captains talked in secret together under the citadel of Sardis. One was the agent of Ptolemy, the other in the employ of Antioehus, but in solitude together they made light of such transitory engagements, and remembered only that they were Cretans, whose business in life was simply to do the best for themselves. Bolis revealed the whole lie of the business to his friend, showed him the letter he bore from the Egyptian court, and put it plainly to him to consider how they could best turn the immense issues which lay in their hands to their own profit. They would act together—that was understood. The only question was, should

Bolis betray Ptolemy and Aehaeus, or should Cambylus betray Antioehus ? The fate of kings and the destiny of nations was being decided that night by the whispers of the two *condottieri* under the stars.

It was decided that the richest harvest could be reaped by immediately sharing the ten talents given by Sosibius, and then making Antioehus the offer to possess him of the person of Aehaeus. Cambylus was to explain things to Antioehus ; Bolis was to open communications with Aehaeus. The way in which Bolis intended to proceed was, first to send his subordinate Arianus into the citadel to carry to Aehaeus letters in cypher from Nieomaehus and Melaneomas. Cambylus, of course, was to see to it that Arianus passed safely to and fro through the Seleueid lines. If Aehaeus put faith in these letters he would reply, and then Bolis would tender his services and lure him into the snare. Such was the arrangement.

Each of the Cretans now set about his part. Cambylus obtained an interview with Antioehus and told him what was on foot. To Antioehus it seemed too good to be true. Of course, if they captured Aehaeus, no reward would be too great, but he suspected something tricky in the business and probed every detail of their designs. It all held together. At last Antioehus doubted no more, and was simply beside himself with impatience to see the astonishing plan carried through.

Meantime Bolis had gone back to Melaneomas at Ephesus, radiant. He and Nieomaehus would be delighted to hear that Cambylus was quite willing to join them. Bolis proposed to send Arianus at once into the citadel to apprise Aehaeus that his deliverance was at hand. Only he must carry credentials from the men whom Aehaeus trusted. Nieomaehus and Melaneomas made no difficulty about that. Letters were drawn up in cypher which informed Aehaeus who the bearer was, and told him that he might have complete faith in Bolis and Cambylus.

These letters Arianus carried through, Cambylus conveying him. It had been thought prudent not to tell Arianus the real plot, but allow him to suppose that he was being employed in the original design of rescuing Aehaeus. He was shown into the presence of Aehaeus and delivered his letters. Aehaeus read them through. This man who brought them

was strange to him; the men to whom he was asked to commit his person and life were no friends of his; one of them was actually in the service of his enemy; but here beyond doubt were the hands of Nieomaehus and Melaneomas. Aehaeus cross-questioned Arianus narrowly. And having been employed by Bolis from the beginning, and being himself innocent of treachery, Arianus was able to face Aehaeus with self-possession and give a full and satisfactory answer to all his interrogations. The issues were too tremendous for rashness, and Aehaeus was not new to the world, but the unexpected door of hope seemed worth trying further. Aehaeus would correspond with his friends without. So Arianus carried back an answer. This was replied to, and Aehaeus wrote again, Arianus being still the intermediary. At last Aehaeus came to a decision. He would put himself into the hands of these men. It was, at any rate, his only chance left. His idea, if he could once escape from the toils, was to make a dash upon Syria and call the Greek and Macedonian colonies to revolt. He conceived that in Phoenicia, Coele-Syria and in Antioeh itself there would be many to welcome his **appearance**.¹

Aehaeus wrote finally to Melaneomas. Let Bolis and Arianus present themselves on a certain night he named, when there would be no moon, and he would commit himself to them. Before that night came Bolis was again with Cambylus under the stars at some lonely spot near the Seleueid camp. They had now to arrange every detail of the capture. Their plan was as follows. If Aehaeus came out of the citadel alone, or with a single attendant, it would be simple; he would fall an easy prey. But if he came with a retinue—*there* was the problem. Antioehus made a great point of his being captured *alive*. It was therefore arranged that in descending the path from the citadel Arianus should go first, since he had been over the ground so often, Aehaeus next, and Bolis immediately behind him. Then, when the spot was reached where Cambylus would be waiting with an ambush, Bolis would leap upon Aehaeus and hold him fast, so that he should not dive into the scrub and slip away, or, supposing he were desperate, throw himself down the cliff.

¹ See vol. i. p. 320.

It was still dark when Cambylus returned to the tents, bringing Bolis with him. He was now to be presented to the King. They went together, and no fourth person was admitted to the interview. When they came out of the royal tent it was not the fault of Antioehus if Bolis had failed to conceive the immensity of the rewards which awaited him. As it grew near dawn Bolis went up with Arianus and entered into the citadel.

Aehaeus at last saw his deliverer, and he gave him a suitable welcome. A little converse left him no doubt as to the calibre of this Cretan captain as a man of action. And his hopes rose wildly as the time approached. Then again there were moments when the horrible magnitude of his hazard swept over him. If Bolis were false? Two strong wits were indeed matched, and Aehaeus had yet to make a move on which Bolis had not calculated. Bolis was suddenly informed that Aehaeus found it after all impossible for him to leave at the time arranged; he wished, however, to send certain of his friends, some three or four men, with Bolis, in order that they might communicate with Melaneomas. After that Aehaeus would prepare to come himself. In this way did Aehaeus strive, as Polybius says, to "out-Cretan a Cretan."

The night came. Aehaeus ordered Bolis and Arianus to go on ahead and wait outside the door from which the precipitous path ran down; the friends he was dispatching would duly present themselves. All this time Aehaeus had kept his intended venture from his wife Laodice. He had now to break it to her and take his leave. His last moments in the citadel were spent in the terrible farewell, in his endeavours to soothe and encourage the queen, who was naturally beside herself with the shock. Then he started for the gate with four companions.

After Bolis and Arianus had waited some time outside, five men issued from the gate. They were all in common garments. One spoke for the rest and explained that his four attendants were barbarians and did not understand Greek. Then they all began the descent, Arianus leading and Bolis bringing up the rear.

For this Bolis had not been prepared. Was Aehaeus of

the party or not? He had scrutinized the faces of the five, but it was too dark to distinguish any features. The whole success of Aehaeus' plan now hung upon his keeping Bolis mystified till they had reached safety. The fault of his companions betrayed him. When they came to very steep and breakneck places in the descent, some of the men instinctively gave their king a hand or grasped him from behind. These momentary movements did not escape the lynx eyes which watched from the rear. Suddenly Bolis whistled. Cambylus and his party leapt from their ambush. Bolis threw his arms about Aehaeus, clothes and all, so that he could not free his hands from his cloak. He had indeed a knife girt upon him, ready in case of capture. Even this Bolis had guessed.

Antioehus had spent an evening of impatient suspense. His suite had been at last dismissed and he sat alone in his tent, only two or three of the bodyguard in attendance. Suddenly the party of Cambylus came softly in out of the darkness and set a man upon the ground, tied hand and foot.

"The suddenness and strangeness of it so overwhelmed Antioehus that for a long time no voice came. At last, touched in some human fibre, he broke into tears. And his emotion, I take it, was inspired by seeing how impossible to guard against, how incalculable, are the surprises of destiny. This Aehaeus was the son of Andromaehus, who was brother to Laodice, Seleucus' queen; he was the husband of Laodice, the daughter of Mithridates the King, and he had held in his hand the whole country this side of the Taurus. And now at a time when all his forces and the forces of his enemy believed him to be lodged in the strongest place of the world, he sat bound upon the earth, the sport of his foes, whilst no single creature as yet knew the truth, except those who had had a hand in the deed."¹

When the "Friends" assembled at daybreak, according to custom, in the royal tent, they were no less overwhelmed than the King had been at the sight that met them—the bound man upon the ground. Antioehus held a council on the doom of the rebel. His first generous emotion did not hold, or he

¹ Polyb. viii. 22, 9 f.

was overborne by his advisers. Aehaeus, in accordance with the Council's vote, was first mutilated, then beheaded. The head was sewn up in the skin of an ass, the trunk hung upon a cross. In the punishment of rebels the Seleueid King kept, as in the case of Molon, to the Oriental tradition.

In the citadel no one but Laodiee knew of Aehaeus' going forth. Next day the tumult and signs of rejoicing descried in the enemy's camp told her that the venture had failed. Presently a herald presented himself, announced her husband's fate, and ordered her to make immediate dispositions to evacuate the citadel. It was the first intimation that the defenders of the citadel had that their king was gone. A great cry ran through the place, a cry less of grief than horror at the terrible unexpectedness of the blow. But the demand for surrender was repelled. Laodece held desperately on. It was, of course, only a question of a short time. Factions broke out among the defenders. A party headed by Aribazus, the old governor of the city, refused to obey the queen. Then each party surrendered, lest the other should be beforehand in doing so (213). The Seleueid King held the western capital of his ancestors.

The ancient historian cannot avoid moralizing on the fate of Aehaeus. "In two ways he is a not unprofitable lesson for times to come; we are taught first to be slow to put our trust in any one; secondly, not to glory in prosperity, but to be ready for all chances, remembering we are but men."¹

¹ Polyb. viii. 23, 10.

CHAPTER XVII

THE REGONQUEST OF THE EAST

WITH the end of Aehaeus a great cloud falls upon Seleueid history. Antioerhus has regained Asia Minor, or at any rate that strip through the middle of it which the Seleueid court considered it of first importance to control. But the Pergamene king remains to be dealt with. He was the original enemy whom Seleueus III and Aehaeus set out to subdue. Circumstances had made him since then, it is true, the ally of Antioerhus III, and his services in that capacity were entitled to recognition. Some arrangement must, of course, have been come to between the two kings after the fall of Aehaeus, but what frontier was agreed upon between the Pergamene and Seleueid realms we cannot say.¹ Whatever the arrangement was, it could not be more than a temporary one. Inevitably with the removal of Aehaeus the old antagonism between Pergamos and the Seleueid house revived. It was impossible for the latter to forget that Attalus had once supplanted it in all its territory beyond the Taurus, or, remembering it, to regard him as inoffensive. The situation in Asia Minor remained one of uneasy balance.

The destruction of Aehaeus marks a period in the restoration of the Seleueid Empire by Antioerhus III. Its extent at the present moment was roughly what it had been in the latter years of Antioerhus II. Since the fearful shock given by Ptolemy Euergetes to the Empire, the Seleueid strip of Asia

¹ At Ketshi-Agyl, two kilometres south of Cape Hydra (Litza Burnu), the words "Ὀροὶ Περγαμηνῶν" have been found engraved upon the rock, *Bull. corr. hell.* v. (1881), p. 283. But it is not known to what date the words apply.

Minor, the provinces of the Euphrates and Tigris, and Nearer Iran had never till now been firmly reunited with Syria under a single hand. And this extent of territory is just that which the house of Seleueus was resolved to govern directly, to treat as the essential body of the Empire. The countries beyond this limit, which the Macedonians had never really conquered, or which had fallen away from the Seleueids before the death of Antioehus II, were put (for the present at all events) in a different category. It was recognized that to attempt to hold them in the same way as Lydia or Media would overtax the strength of the central government. In these countries the Seleueids were content to see subordinate dynasties, Greek or Asiatic, bearing rule. Their policy took the line of binding these other houses to themselves by alliances and royal marriages, and, where they had at any moment sufficient power, compelling an acknowledgment of their overlordship. In a sense, then, these countries form an outside sphere of the Seleueid Empire, although from the nature of the case the relations fluctuate with the momentary distribution of actual strength. In the treatment allotted to the vanquished we see this distinction of the outer and inner sphere marked. Molon and Aehaeus are treated with the extreme rigour shown by the Oriental tradition towards rebels. In the outer sphere we see the vanquished admitted to terms, and peace, if possible, sealed by a royal marriage.

Antioehus, having achieved the restoration of the inner sphere, went on to restore the outer. Unfortunately the cloud covers the whole of this process, except for a few rifts. And yet it was his exploits in this direction which were his chief glory in contemporary eyes, and won him the title of "Great King."

In Asia Minor the situation as regards the subordinate dynasties did not call for any immediate readjustment. A *modus vivendi* had been found with Attalus, the two Persian houses of Pontic and Southern Cappadoeia were friendly and allied; the Bithynian king would be drawn to the house of Seleueus by the fear of Attalus. It was in Armenia, where Xerxes of Arsamosata had ceased to pay tribute, it was in Further Irân, that the Seleueid authority most needed reassertion.

It seems to be in the year **212**¹ that we get the first rift in the cloud. Antioehus has penetrated into the mountain region of Armenia. Xerxes has shut himself up in his capital **Arsamosata**,² and Antioehus, sitting down before it, makes preparations for a siege. At an early stage of the operations Xerxes escapes to some corner of the hills; then, as the siege goes on, he begins to fear that the fall of Arsamosata will entail the loss of his whole kingdom. He therefore sends messengers to Antioehus begging for a personal interview. Some of the royal Council urge Antioehus to seize the occasion in order to make Xerxes a prisoner, and advise that as soon as the town has fallen, Mithridates, the son of Antioehus' sister, should be put in Xerxes' place.³ Antioehus, however, prefers to follow the policy of attaching Xerxes to his house by friendly alliance. He grants the interview, and remits a large proportion of the arrears of tribute due from Xerxes and his father. The demand which Xerxes is obliged to meet is for 300 talents, 1000 horses and 1000 mules. The affairs of the kingdom are regulated in the Seleueid interest, and Xerxes, who is still young, is given Antioehis, the sister of Antioehus, to wife. The generosity of this treatment wins Antioehus the hearts of the Armenians.⁴ So far Polybius; the sequel to the story puts the Seleueid policy in a somewhat different light. Xerxes gave fresh dissatisfaction to his overlord, and his wife Antioehis was employed to make away with him.⁵

The expedition into Armenia seems to have immediately

¹ The eighth book of Polybius, to which the fragment belongs, does not seem to go later than 01. 141, 4.

² This seems to be the right form of the name, not Armosata, as the MSS. read in Polybius.

³ He is called υἱὸς τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. This has led Blau (*Zeitsch. f. Num.* vii. p. 35) and Babelon (*Rois de Syrie*, p. cxv) to regard him as the natural son of Antioehis, in our sense of the word. But this, as Niese points out (ii. p. 397) is an error. The expression *Kata φύσιν* in Greek is not natural as opposed to legitimate, but as opposed to adoptive, *Karà dtaw*. Mithridates was actually the son of the sister of Antioehus, but by adoption he was the son of somebody else. Of whom? It is not said, but this very silence suggests that it was of Antioehus himself. I suspect that he is the same Mithridates who is mentioned as the son of Antioehus in Livy xxxiii. 19, 9.

⁴ Polyb. viii. 25.

⁵ John of Antioch, *F.H.G.* iv. p. 557. See Appendix A.

followed the reduction of the trans-Tauric provinces. How long an interval separated it from the great expedition into Further Irân it is impossible to say. The appearance of fresh euneiform tablets might decide the question. Antioehus III seems at the time of his leaving Syria to have associated his son Antioehus, a child of about ten years, with himself on the throne. This was obviously, as in the case of Antioehus IV and Antioehus Eupator under similar circumstances, a measure to prevent a dangerous vacancy, should the reigning king meet with any fatal mischance at a distance from the seat of government. We may therefore conclude that so long as Antioehus III is given as sole king in legal documents the expedition is still future. Unfortunately, no documents have been found of the years between 100 aer. Sel. (October 212-October 211 B.C.) and 104 aer. Sel. (208-207 B.C.); in the former Antioehus III is sole king, in the latter his son is already associated with him.¹

The two chief independent powers which had sprung up in the East were, of course, the Arsaeid dynasty in Parthia and the Greek kingdom in Baetria. It is convenient that the openings in the cloud are so arranged that we have a glimpse of each of the struggles thus entailed upon Antioehus in asserting the Seleueid supremacy. In 210 the army of Antioehus descends the Euphrates by boat.² By the summer of 209 Antioehus has pushed as far as Media.³ That province, still governed apparently by the Diogenes who had replaced Molon, was the outpost of Seleueid power towards the East. Beyond it was the waterless plateau of central Irân and Parthia.

The visit of Antioehus III to the Median capital was marked by the first known instance of a practice to which the house of Seleueus was afterwards repeatedly pushed by its financial necessities with disastrous consequences—the spoliation of temples. That Antioehus resorted to it now is an indication how severe a strain the maintenance of its outlying

¹ *Zeitsehr. f. Assy.* viii. p. 109.

² Polyb. ix. 43, 6.

³ According to the chronological system of Polybius the time in question falls into 01. 142. 3 = July 210-July 209. Since the visit of Antioehus to Eebatana is at the beginning of a campaign, it must be in the latter year.

dominion put upon the Seleucid court, or rather, considering what vast resources it had, in Babylonia for instance, how ill-regulated, in view of the demands put upon it, the financial administration of the Empire had already become.¹ Eebatana, though still offering a majestic spectacle, had lost much of its ancient splendour. The immense palace, with its colonnades of cedar and cypress wood, was still to be seen, a memorial of vanished empire, but the gold and silver plates which had once covered them had been stripped off and turned into coin during the stormy times which passed over Asia after Alexander's death. Its treasures had, of course, long been empty. Only on the temple of the goddess Aine (Anai'tis ?) had the Macedonian chiefs feared to lay sacrilegious hands; they had spared the gold plating of its columns, its silver bricks and tiles. Antioehus III now appropriated all this precious metal, and realized in coin the sum of nearly 4000 talents. The action was calculated to embitter native opinion against the house of Seleueus as nothing else could have done, and it may be questioned whether this consequence in a province bordering on the Parthian sphere, did not more than outweigh the momentary advantage which the sacrilege procured.²

By this time the third Arsaees³ had succeeded to the throne. He was naturally watching the eastward advance of Antioehus with anxiety. He did not, however, believe that the expedition would proceed farther than Media. The waterless tract would oppose an effectual obstacle to so large a force. To his dismay, however, he learned that Antioehus was really about to cross it, relying on the numerous wells which were supplied artificially from the Median hills by underground conduits. Arsaees knew that against the gathered strength of the house of Seleueus his own kingdom could not yet make head. He sent some horsemen in haste

¹ This is, no doubt, accounted for by the anarchy succeeding the Egyptian invasion, and shows how the evil consequences of that invasion dogged the house of Seleueus to the end of its history.

² Polyb. x. 27. Babelon suggests that a class of gold coins of Antioehus III of exceptional size represents the spoils of Eebatana (*Rois de Syrie*, p. lxxxix). [Mr. Maedonald does not think that this theory will work out]

³ His personal name is not known.

to block the wells in the enemy's line of march, and himself evacuated his capital, Heeatompylus, and fell back upon Hyreania. Antioehus detached a body of horse under Nieomedes of Cos, who dispersed the Parthians at the wells and secured the road. The Seleucid army advanced without hindrance across the wilderness and quietly took possession of Heeatompylus.¹

After halting to rest the army in the Parthian capital, Antioehus determined to follow up the retreating foe into Hyreania itself. He first moved to Tagae. There he learnt from the natives the enormous difficulties of a march through the mountains. But his resolution held. In the force he had at his disposal were Cretans and Aetolians, accustomed from childhood to mountain warfare. He knew that among the narrow gorges and defiles the valuable arm would be, not the heavy phalanx, but the light troops, archers, javelineers, slingers, who could scale precipices inaccessible to the heavily armed soldier, and by irregular attacks dislodge the enemy from the posts which commanded the passage. These troops he formed into an advanced guard under Diogenes, the satrap of Media. They were to be supported by 2000 Cretans, whose armament was something between that of the light skirmishers and the phalanx (they carried small shields), under the command of a Rhodian exile, Polyxenidas, of whom more is heard by and by. Last of all were to come the heavy troops under Nieomedes of Cos and an Aetolian Nieolaus.²

The difficulties of the road proved even greater than the King had expected. "It wound for the most part through deep gorges, into which many boulders and trees had fallen, making the passage painful."

Up on the rocks above, too, were perched the barbarians, with piles of stones and trunks at all convenient places to roll down upon the labouring train below. Their calculations were, however, disconcerted by the tactics of the light skirmishers. The troops of Diogenes could scale the "white face of the cliff" itself, and the barbarians in their ambush suddenly found themselves exposed from unexpected quarters to a hail of stones and darts. As soon as a post had been

¹ Polyb. x. 28,

² *Ibid.* 29,

occupied by the light troops it was a short matter for the engineers to make the road for the heavy troops below. In this way the ascent was successfully, though slowly, accomplished. Post after post of the barbarians was driven back. At the pass of Labus, which marked the summit of the mountain barrier, they determined to make a stand. In eight days from beginning the ascent the army reached the pass, and here the phalanx came for the first time into action. In a pitched battle, however, the barbarian mountaineers could do it little harm, and the light troops had secretly before dawn crept round and occupied strong posts in the enemy's rear. At the discovery of this the barbarians broke and fled. The King was concerned to prevent an incautious pursuit, and soon sounded a halt. With closed ranks and imposing order the Seleucid army descended into Hyreania.¹

Tambræa was first occupied, a city considerable enough to contain one of the residences of the Parthian king. It was unfortified, and the inhabitants, after Antioehus' victory on the pass, had mostly taken refuge in the neighbouring Syrineia, "the royal city as it were" of Hyreania. Unlike Tambræa, Siryneia was a place of exceptional strength and included a Greek population. Antioehus proceeded to invest it, and against the highly developed siege tactics of the western race the defenders could not maintain themselves. As soon as a breach was made, there was a massacre of the resident Greeks and a stampede. They were, however, driven back again by the mercenaries under Hyperbasas, and, giving up all hope, surrendered.²

And now the cloud falls again. Of the subsequent course of the war we know nothing. The end was probably a victory of the Seleucid arms, after which Antioehus, following the same policy as in Atropatene (Lesser Media) and Armenia, demanded only a recognition of his supremacy and a payment of tribute, and received Arsaees into favour. So much at least may be gathered from the loose statement of Justin³ that Arsaees fought with extraordinary valour against the overwhelming numbers of Antioehus, and was finally admitted to an alliance.

¹ Polyb. x. 30-31, 4.
² *Ibid.* 31, 5 f.

xii. 5, 7.

In the year following the invasion of Hyreania (209-208) Antioehus moved upon Baetria. Diodotus, the son of the original rebel, no longer reigned there. His house had been overthrown by another upstart, Euthydemus, a man from one of the Magnesias. It was he who now bore the name of king. The high-road to Baetria crossed the river Arius (mod. Harâ-Rûd), and Euthydemus encamped at some place¹ on his own side of the river and detached a large body of his excellent Baetrian cavalry, 10,000 strong, to defend the fords. The intelligence of his position was carried to Antioehus whilst he was still three days' march from the river. He at once pressed forward, and with a select body of cavalry, light-armed troops and peltasts, reached the river before the third day dawned. The main part of the enemy's cavalry had retired from the bank during the night, as their habit was, leaving only a few patrols. Antioehus was thus able to throw the majority of his detachment across before he was discovered. Of course, daybreak brought the enemy's cavalry to the attack, and an engagement ensued. This battle on the Arius did more than anything else to make the reputation of Antioehus III for personal courage. The King himself headed the troop of horse which received the brunt of the leading Baetrian squadron, and fought in the thick of it till relieved by Panaetolus. After a hot action the Baetrian cavalry was beaten off with severe loss, and only a remnant of the force made its way back to the camp of Euthydemus. A large number remained as prisoners in the hands' of the victor. The King himself had had his horse killed under him, and received a blow in the face which knocked out several teeth. His detachment bivouacked the following night on the field, awaiting the arrival of the main body. Euthydemus, without risking a second encounter, withdrew upon his capital Zariaspa.²

Of the further course of the war we know only that the siege laid to Zariaspa or Baetra (Balkh) by Antioehus was a famous episode which popular historians loved to embroider.⁸ Before the summer of 206 was out, both belligerents were

¹ TATOTPIANMS., Ταῖς ὁπῖω Hultseh, Ταῖς ὁπῖω Gutsehmid.

² Polyb. x. 49.

³ Ibid. xxix. 12, 8.

anxious for peace. To the Baetrian Greeks indeed the war must have seemed something like a civil war in the face of the alien foe. Surrounded as they were by barbarians, the outposts of Hellenic civilization against the hordes of the great wilderness, they realized intensely their solidarity with the Hellenism of the West. The man who was king in Central Asia still felt himself a Magnesians, still thought of some city 2000 miles away as his home. A fellow-countryman of his, the Magnesians Teleas, was among the persons of influence about Antiochus. Euthydemus besought his good offices to effect a reconciliation. What indeed, he urged, was his offence? It could not be rebellion. The Seleucid power had already ceased to be effective in Further Iran when he made himself a kingdom. It was the rebellious house of Diodotus, not the ministers of the Great King, whom he had replaced. Or was it his crime to have assumed the royal name? For justification he had but to point eastwards, to the innumerable shifting peoples of the wilderness, who loomed like an ominous cloud over Iranian Hellenism. There could be no vacancy in Hellenic sovereignty here without hazarding such an irruption from that quarter as would without question submerge the country in barbarism (*ἐκβαρβαρωθήσεσθαι τὴν χώραν ὁμολογουμένως*). The Baetrian kingdom was a dam, which the interests of Antiochus should impel him, not to weaken, but to make as strong as possible.¹ These representations, conveyed by Teleas to the ears of Antiochus, were not without weight. He had long desired to be rid of the Baetrian entanglement, protracting as it did his absence from the West to a dangerous duration. Teleas was now entrusted with the conduct of the negotiations, and a satisfactory settlement was reached. Euthydemus, no doubt, recognized the Seleucid suzerainty; he ceded at any rate to Antiochus his elephants of war and furnished supplies for the army. Antiochus, on the other hand, authorized Euthydemus to bear the title of king. The other points at issue were determined in detail by a written treaty, and a

¹ There is nothing in the text of Polybius to imply, as Gutschmid (*Ieseh. Ircms*) seems to have understood, that Euthydemus *threatened to call* the Nomads into the country as his allies.

formal alliance was concluded. This happy result was greatly facilitated by the favourable impression made upon Antioehus by the person and bearing of Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus. Antioehus promised him the hand of one of his own daughters. This was the Demetrius who was to be known one day as the conqueror of western India.

From Baetria the imperial army moved south. Antioehus crossed the Hindû-Kush and descended the Kabul valley. Once more a Macedonian king at the head of his army stood at the door of India. The great Asoka was no longer alive, and his death had been followed by the break-up of the realm. No certain knowledge of the period of confusion can be got from Indian sources, nor do we know with which of the kings they mention, if with any, the Sophagasenus spoken of by Polybius is to be identified, or whether he belonged to the house of Asoka. With this Indian ruler, whoever he was, Antioehus III had to do. Sophagasenus recognized the superior power of the Seleucid. He gave Antioehus more elephants and provisions for his army. He also promised a large quantity of treasure. Antioehus now turned homewards. Androsthenes of Cyzicus was left to convey the treasure when Sophagasenus had collected the required amount. The King went by way of Araehosia, across the Erymanthus (mod. Hilmend), and thence through Drangiana (mod. Seistân) to Carmania, where he encamped for the winter (206-205). He thus passed south of the great Iranian desert, not by the ordinary trade-route, which went north of it, and by which he had come.¹

In the following year he was once more in the eastern capital on the Tigris.²

Like Alexander when he had completed the circuit of his Empire, Antioehus III, as soon as he had returned to Babylonia, turned his thoughts to the still unattempted Arab country to the south. The principal commercial centre of the nearer part of Arabia was the town of Gerrha, a point in the great caravan route from the spice regions beyond, from

¹ Polyb. xi. 34.

² Niese (ii. p. 401) ascribes to Antioehus III at this moment the restoration of Alexandria (Charax), which I follow Gutsehmid in giving to Antioehus IV, though it is true there is very little evidence to support either view against the other.

which tracks branched off to Mecca, Medinah and Petra, and which was in close connexion with the harbours of the Persian Gulf. The Gerrhaeans were the great merchantmen of that part of the world. By caravan through the desert or boats along the coast, they went to and fro between Babylonia and the Arabian interior, and were to be met in the market-places of the cities on the Euphrates and Tigris, carrying frankincense and myrrh.¹ Antioehus went with a fleet from the Tigris along the Arabian coast, and made as if he would bring this place of merchandise under his hand. But a view of the country made him abandon the idea of a permanent occupation. When therefore a letter from the Gerrhaean chiefs was brought him, which, being interpreted, ran, "Destroy not, O King, those two things which have been given us of the gods—perpetual peace and freedom" he contented himself with receiving a large present, part in silver and part in precious gums, and sailed away, first toward the island of Tylos,² and then back again to Seleueia-on-the-Tigris (205-204).³

The eastern expedition of Antioehus III, blurred as it now is by the mists of time, took a large place in the field of his contemporaries' vision. After all the years of ruin and humiliation, the house of Seleueus had renewed its youth. Antioehus had resumed the glorious tradition of Alexander and Seleueus Nieator. He had vindicated his right to bear the same titles as they; it was as the *Great King* that he was henceforth known in the west, as Antioehus Nieator in the East.⁴ If already in the western Mediterranean a power was growing up which vexed Greek statesmen with a new problem and peril, there seemed at any rate to be still a counterpoise in the Macedonian Great King. It was not only the kingdom, the office, the resources of Antioehus which had

¹ Strabo xvi. 766 f.; Diod. iii. 42; Plin. vi. § 147; Agathareides, *F. Geog. G.* i. 177, 189; Ptolemy vi. pp. 7, 16. See Speck, *Handels-geschichte*, i. p. 566.

² Modern Bahrain, the centre of the pearl fishery in the Gulf, now British.

³ Polyh. xiii. 9.

⁴ Babelon, p. xlii. denies that Antioehus III is the Antioehus Nieator of the Baetrian coins. The Baetrian kings would not have cherished, he says, "la mémoire d'un prince qui . . . a toujours dû être odieux à ce pays." But he forgets that the relations between Antioehus and Euthydemus ended by being extremely cordial.

been magnified, but his personal character—his military ability, his courage, resolution and energy, his magnanimity to the vanquished.

Men recollected how the Seleueid Empire at his accession had touched the nadir of its decline, whilst now by nearly twenty years of incessant fighting Antioehus had won back well-nigh all that his grandfather and father had lost. The figure of the young King, in the glamour of his success, imposed itself upon the imagination of the Greek world; he became a hero of the market-place. And in this way events in one half of the Empire reacted, as they always did, upon the other. Just as the blows received by Antioehus II and Seleueus III in the West destroyed their authority in the East, just as the defeat of Antioehus III himself later on at Magnesia undid the work of his great eastern expedition, so now the success of that expedition made the position of Antioehus for the time stronger than ever in the West. The accession of resources, and still more of prestige, put a new complexion upon Seleueid rule in Asia Minor. The vassal princes became unusually submissive and well-disposed. The somewhat indefinite sovereignty of the Seleueid house over the Greek cities of the coast became more stringent. And beyond the limits of the Empire altogether, that influence in Greece itself upon which the Macedonian houses set such store was secured in a new degree. It was whispered in some circles that the ideal of Alexander, the whole Greek world united under a single sceptre, might yet be realized.

Regarded from the sober standpoint of history, what had Antioehus achieved? He had not, of course, established Seleueid rule on any permanent basis in the outer sphere of the Empire, in the principalities, that is, of Pergamos, the two Cappadoeias, Armenia, Atropatene, Parthia and Baetria. It is obvious that wherever the subordinate dynasties had been left in possession, at the first opportunity, the first shortening of the suzerain's arm or the ability to do without him, those dynasties would forget their allegiance. The Seleueid rule only existed so long as the Great King was prepared to enforce it by a fresh military expedition from the seat of government. And yet Antioehus was wise in stopping short

where he did; it was no generous folly. *For the time* no better plan was possible. He might, of course, have fought till he had dethroned the princes in possession and substituted for each of them a satrap appointed by himself. But he would not have gained much by so doing. The new satrap would be just as likely as the old dynast to improve the occasion to revolt. By using his victory magnanimously, by uniting the dynasts by ties of marriage with his own house, Antioehus really did secure their loyalty—for a time. He might have quartered troops in the outlying provinces. But even supposing such garrisons remained loyal, they would be locked up in distant places when he wanted them badly elsewhere, and the difficulty of relieving them, should they be exposed to attack in detail, might be enormous.

The fundamental obstacles to a permanent settlement—the dependence of the central government upon mercenaries, the difficulty of communication between different parts of the Empire, the financial embarrassment—all these could be overcome only by time, by the development of the richer provinces, a sound administration, a thorough reorganization of the government machinery, and a wise expenditure on public works. For all these things were prerequisites of the only efficient contrivance for holding together such an Empire, in its essence artificial, without basis in nationality—a system of extensive and centralized military occupation. A statesman, regarding the problem from the Seleucid point of view, would necessarily have put such a system before himself as the ultimate end, but some temporary expedient would be required to maintain the authority of the Great King till that was possible. And as such an expedient the dispositions made by Antioehus were unexceptionable.

Looked at in this light, the achievements of Antioehus, which won him so much glory, did not amount to a conquest of Iran, but were only a step in the process of conquest, the necessary first step. Whether they remained a splendid but idle *tour de force*, or whether the process was carried on to a practical conclusion, depended largely on the character and political talent of Antioehus. Antioehus came to be something of a puzzle even to his contemporaries; there seemed

such discrepancy between his character as it appeared in his early struggles and his character as it appeared in the latter part of his reign, when he strove with Rome. A difficulty of this kind, felt by those who knew far more of the circumstances than we do, it would be vain to try to smooth away.

But we may legitimately examine closely the record of either period and let the earlier Antioehus and the later each throw what light he can upon the other. The qualities displayed by the Antioehus of the earlier period are described by Polybius as “daring and indefatigable (τόλμη καὶ φιλοπονία).¹ Now as to physical courage, the courage of the soldier, that was inherent in the stock from which Antioehus sprang, and there is no reason to suppose that he was ever unwilling to adventure his person on the field. It was rather his political nerve which seemed to fail; it was the contrast between the energy with which his earlier political plans and campaigns were carried through and the hesitation, rashness, and puerile trifling of his war with Rome. We are thus brought to look more closely into the sort of energy displayed by Antioehus in his earlier period, and see whether there are no signs of those failings which were afterwards set in so damning a light. That Antioehus did on occasion show pertinacity and vigour is undeniable, in his repeated forcing of the gates of Coele-Syria, for instance, or in his passage of the Hyrean hills: a considerable degree of “indefatigableness” is implied in the mere fact that from the time of his accession in 223 he was almost continuously engaged in the personal conduct of war. But there appears at times a singular lack of thoroughness in his operations—his allowing the Ptolemaic army to reoccupy the passes into Coele-Syria when he had already once forced them and established posts on the farther side, his remissness in preparing for the encounter with Ptolemy, which lost him the battle of Raphia and undid the work of two campaigns. We observe that his is that energy which shows itself rather in bursts, when confronted by an obstacle, than in the deliberate and resolute provision of the means toward the end in view, which marks the true practical genius.

¹ xi. 34, 15. In xv. 37 he is described as *μεγαλεπίβολος καὶ τολμηρὸς καὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐξεργαστικός*.

It is displayed (to judge by the war with Ptolemy Philopator) rather in the beginnings of an enterprise, when the difficulties and dangers appear most formidable, and languishes with success. It is the energy of impulse, not of reason. It is evoked by the prospect of a showy triumph rather than by the more prosaic but more solid labour of organization. We are well able to understand that energy of this kind might show increasingly conspicuous cessations, as the man passed into middle age, in an environment of ease and flattery, his vanity and self-confidence fostered by all the artifices of a court. And if this is a right view of the character of Antioehus, we may question whether his eastern expedition formed part of any large and statesmanlike design for the reconstruction of the Empire on a firm basis, whether, in fact, the puerility which appeared in his conflict with Rome was not already patent in the gratification he found in romantic but elusive triumphs.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE

ANTIOCHUS had extorted a formal recognition of his sovereignty in all those countries which had fallen away under separate rulers from the Empire. To make that formal recognition something solid and durable would be in itself a work demanding all his energies and resources. But he was hurried on by his ambition to grasp at the other territories which the house of Seleueus regarded as its rightful property—those which were held, not by rebellious satraps or insurgent chiefs, but by a foreign power. They included that region in which, from its geographical union with the Empire's base, the Seleueids felt a special interest—Coele-Syria, a region which the ancestors of Antioehus III had never indeed possessed, but only consistently coveted. Antioehus had not ceased since his repulse at Raphia to burn for a renewal of the contest with the house of Ptolemy. The enterprise, in which he had first drawn his sword, in which he had twice met with a mortifying repulse, might be renewed with better prospects by the conqueror of Asia.

The Egyptian Empire in the eastern Mediterranean had suffered little diminution even under Ptolemy Philopator. Seleueia-in-Pieria had been won back by the Seleueid, but the harbour-cities of southern Phoenicia, Tyre and Sidon, as well as Cyprus, gave Ptolemy a maritime base in Syrian waters. Thence the Egyptian stations extended all along the coasts of Asia Minor as far as Ephesus.¹ They dotted the Aegean and dominated the Hellespont and Thraean coast.²

¹ Soli is the most easterly named by Livy (who had Polybius before him). Jerome (on Daniel 11, 15) makes Antioehus capture Mallus in 197.

² Niese (ii. p. 406, note 4) thinks that the Ptolemaic protectorate of the

It could hardly be expected that Antioehus the Great King should permanently acquiesce in such power being concentrated to his own prejudice in the feeble hands of the King of Egypt. And he was not the only one whose desires were excited by the Egyptian possessions. The house of Antigonus in Macedonia was now represented by a man as ambitious and energetic as Antioehus, Philip the son of Demetrius. What Coele-Syria was to the house of Seleueus, Thrace and the Hellespont were to the Antigonids. Philip was no more likely to rest than Antioehus so long as a valuable province geographically united with his own territory was in the hands of a Ptolemy.

It was therefore inevitable from the nature of the case that the Egyptian Empire should before long be assailed. During the reign of Ptolemy Philopator indeed relations between Egypt and the two rival powers continued formally friendly. Antioehus and Philip both tendered their aid to Ptolemy, on the occasion, probably, of a native rising.¹ Negotiations were begun for a marriage between the royal houses of Egypt and Macedonia. But in 205-204 Ptolemy Philopator died. The succession devolved on a child of four years, Ptolemy V Epiphanes. The favourites who held the reins of power at the King's death now tried to avert the catastrophe by sending an embassy to Antioehus to remind him of his treaty engagements, and an embassy to Philip to clinch the marriage project and to enlist his support, in case Antioehus attacked. Seopas, the ex-president of the Aetolians, who after his fall had taken service under Ptolemy, was at the same time sent to raise a new mercenary army in Greece.² The favourites, however, were soon hurled from power by a popular rising in Alexandria. An understanding was come to between the courts of Antioeh and Pella with a view to the partition of the Ptolemaïc Empire (202).

As to the terms of this pact we have, as is not surprising

Cyelades had ceased, but the evidence he adduces is far from decisive. We know that Samos was still Egyptian (Polyb. iii. 2, 8); the case of Lesbos is problematical (Niese ii. p. 357, note 1). [Delamarre brings forward evidence to show that Macedonia had displaced Egypt in the Cyelades, *Revue d. Philol.*, xxvi. (1902), p. 301 f.]

¹ Polyb. xv. 20, 1 ; cf. v. 107, 1.

² Polyb. xv. 25, 13 f.

in the case of a transaction by its nature secret, no exact information. Appian gives it as a popular story that, according to its stipulations, Antiochus was to get Cyprus and Egypt itself (including, of course, Coele-Syria), and Philip Cyrene, the Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, and the Ionian sea-board.¹ But it is extremely unlikely that there was any intention to interfere with the African dominions of the Ptolemies. On the other hand it is true that the western sea-board of Asia Minor (or part of it) was made over to Philip. This is proved, not by Philip's invading it—since Polybius distinctly states that the two kings did not keep to their compact²—but by the fact that *Philip's claim to be supported in that invasion by the Seleucid power was admitted?*

What is the meaning of this strange abandonment to the house of Antigonos of regions in which the house of Seleucus was itself interested? To explain it one has first to recognize that neither party to the agreement meant it honestly. It was only meant to last till the Ptolemaic power was swept from the field. The conquest of Coele-Syria was the most important part of the whole to Antiochus, and to secure that he was willing to see Philip make a diversion in Asia Minor. As a matter of fact, he did not intend to give him serious support.⁴ Secondly, one must take account of the actual situation in Asia Minor. The alliance of the two kings was levelled not at Egypt only. Seleucid rule was threatened in Asia Minor by a more dangerous foe than Philip would prove, by the Pergamene king. Egypt and Pergamos both belonged to a group of powers which was more or less closely united by common sympathies and aims, and embraced beside themselves Rhodes, the Aetolian League, and, looming in the background, Rome.⁵ Three of the powers—Pergamos, Egypt and Rhodes—were established in Asia Minor, and their mutual friendship corroborated the bar to Seleucid ambitions. We see then why it might seem desirable that a power antagonistic to the group⁶ should take the place of Egypt in Asia Minor.

¹ App. Mac. 4.

² παρασπονδούντων μὲν ἄλλήλους, Polyb. xv. 20, 6.

³ Polyb. xvi. 1, 8.

⁴ Ibid. 1, 9.

⁵ In 220 Rhodes and Pergamos had been hostile (Polyb. iv. 48, 2).

⁶ Attalus had been allied with the Aetolians against Philip in the Social War.

The inevitable conflict between Philip and Attalus would wear down both powers, and the house of Seleueus would reap the benefit.

The compact concluded, Antioehus attacked Coele-Syria once more. And here again it is brought home to us how capriciously time has dealt with the ancient authorities. Whilst we have comparatively full information as to the campaigns of 219-217, we are left almost entirely in the dark as to the campaigns which really did lead to the transference of Coele-Syria from Ptolemy to the Seleueid.

The state of affairs in Egypt during the minority of Epiphanes—the court torn into rival factions, the natives rebelling—contributed largely to the success of Antioehus.¹ How soon the conquest followed 202 we do not know.² As to its completeness it extended at any rate to Judaea. By 199 Antioehus seems to have considered the conquest achieved and to have turned his attention to Asia Minor.

In that quarter the compact had meanwhile led to startling results.

Philip had flung himself immediately after its conclusion upon the Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace and the Asiatic shores of the Hellespont. In a few months his garrisons were in Lysimachia, Sestos and Perinthus, and Cius had been razed to the ground. In the following year (201) he appeared with a strong fleet in the Aegean and turned the people of Ptolemy out of Samos. Then Rhodes and Attalus allied themselves to stop him, for in Egypt there was no power to resist. Philip landed on the Pergamene coast, and, while the forces of Attalus retired behind the walls of the cities, wasted the open country with barbaric recklessness. Zeuxis, the Seleueid satrap of Lydia, gave him lukewarm support.³

¹ "Tantae enim dissolutioms et superbiae Agathoeles fuit, ut subditae prius Aegyptio provinciae rebellarent, ipsaque Aegyptus seditionibus vexaretur." Jerome on Daniel 11. Agathoeles himself perished in 203, but the discords in the Alexandrian court continued.

² Seleueid coins were struck at Tyre as early as 112 aer. Sel. =201-200 B.C., Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, p. lxxxv. Niese (ii. p. 578) gives the date 201.

³ Polyb. xvi. 1, 8. There is little doubt that this is the Zeuxis who has left a trace of himself in an inscription found at Mazyn - Kalessi (the ancient Amyzon). Ἰδρυεὶς Ἐκατόμυρου ἀνέθηκε· Ζεῦξις Κυράγων Μακεδῶν τοῦ ἀγροῦς τῶν θεῶν . . . ἀνοικατέστησε], *SÜzungs. Berl.* 1894, p. 916.

When Philip was got to sea again and making for Samos, a combined Rhodian and Pergamene fleet overtook him between Chios and the mainland. Attalus himself was on board. A battle of doubtful event followed—on the whole adverse to Philip. But a second sea-fight off Miletus between Philip and the Rhodians went in his favour. And the result was that Caria was left exposed to invasion. Miletus made haste to seek Philip's friendship. Myus, Prinassus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Euromus and Stratonicea fell into his hands. The last was one of the possessions of Ptolemy. Presently, however, Rhodes and Attalus recovered the mastery of the sea and cut Philip's communications with Macedonia. He was now hard put to it to provision his army in Caria. The supplies furnished by Zeuxis were found to be very short.¹ He was reduced to such expedients as purchasing food with the territory he had won. Myus he made over to Magnesia-on-the-Meander in exchange for a consignment of figs. To extend his conquests in Caria was out of the question. He left garrisons here and there, and slipped through the enemy's fleets home to Macedonia.

Next year (200) Philip rounded off his conquest of the Thraean coast. Aenus and Maronea were still held by Ptolemaic garrisons, but these now fell before Philip's attack, beside a number of smaller towns. Then he crossed over and laid siege to Abydos.

But now the eyes of men were turning to the West. Within the lifetime of men living, the Greek world had watched the rise in the Italian peninsula of one of the "barbarian" states to a position of world-wide importance. Rome had come out of its war with Pyrrhus, seventy-five years before, the leading state of the peninsula, and the other Italian communities south of the country of the Gauls were soon in more or less direct subjection to the city on the Tiber. Since then its wars with Carthage had enormously raised its prestige and spread its influence. To Hellenism the new power was no less earnest to show its devotion than the Macedonian had been. On the first appearance of Roman armies east of the

¹ Polyb. xvi. 24.

Adriatic in 229-228 the barbarian stigma had been to some extent removed from the Romans when they were allowed to participate in the Pan-Hellenic games of the Isthmus.¹ Like the Macedonian houses, Rome rendered its homage to the Greek culture, and professed its adherence to the sacred principle of Hellenic autonomy. And to those among the Greeks who regarded the cause of freedom as having been under a cloud since the rise of Macedonia there seemed a promise of better days in the appearance of a great state in the West, which, whatever its nationality, was piously phil-Hellenic and a republic.

Now therefore that the Macedonian king was displaying a new activity, it was the voices of those powers whose Hellenism was the purest—of Athens, of Rhodes, and of Attalus—which called upon Rome to intervene in Greece. Philip was still besieging Abydos when he received the Roman ultimatum. Soon after that the strained relations reached breaking point. Rome declared war and two legions crossed the Adriatic.

In this way Rome was drawn into all the quarrels which Philip had with his neighbours, and these included the question in which the house of Seleueus was so nearly concerned of the Ptolemaic possessions in the Levant. Antioehus could not look with indifference upon a struggle which brought a collision between Rome and himself within measurable distance.

What dealings there had hitherto been between the house of Seleueus and the Republic of the West is a matter of question. There* is a statement in a late writer that after the first Punic war, in 240, Rome offered help to Ptolemy against "Antioehus (*sic*) king of Syria."² It was the moment when Seleueus II was recovering Syria from Ptolemy III. That the statement in its present form is erroneous is obvious; that it has *no* historical basis it appears to me that we are not justified in asserting. Again we are told that the Emperor Claudius in writing to the Ilrians cited an old Greek letter of the Roman Senate and People to "King Seleueus" promising him the

¹ Polyb. ii. 12, 8.

² "Finito igitur Punieo bello . . . Romani iam clarissima gloria noti legatos ad Ptolomaeum Aegypti regem miserunt auxilia promittentes, quia rex Syriae Antioehus bellum ei intulerat. Ille gratias Romnnis egit, auxilia MOD aecepit; iam enim fuerat pugna transaeta." Eutropius iii. 1.

friendship and alliance of Rome, on condition that he granted the Ilians immunity from tribute.¹ There is no improbability, as it seems to me, in the statement;² on the other hand, the authority for it is certainly bad.

It is in this year (200) that we hear of the first certain communication between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom. The embassy which left Rome for the East to carry the ultimatum to Philip was also charged to visit the Ptolemaic and Seleucid courts in order to make peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy.³ This is probably the embassy meant by Justin.⁴ It is represented as warning Antiochus after his conquest of Phoenicia and Coele-Syria to hold his hands from the Ptolemaic realm, which had been specially placed by the dying appeal of Ptolemy Philopator under the protection of Rome. Antiochus naturally disregarded an injunction which Rome was not in a position to back up by force, in view of the Macedonian complication. What attitude would he maintain in regard to that struggle?

He might throw Philip over and come to a frank understanding with Rome and Attalus. Or he might move to the assistance of his ally. Or, thirdly, he might observe a careful neutrality. The most essential thing was that he should clearly make up his mind what line to take and concentrate his powers on pursuing it. Destiny was putting the statesmanship of Antiochus III to the test by bringing him face to face with a situation which demanded the venture of a decision. But Antiochus had not the courage and grasp of mind which could steadily confront a problem of such large elements and on which such enormous issues hung. It was easier, as it was fatal, to waver, to try half-measures, to catch the suggestions of the moment, without looking ahead. His hopes were with Philip, but he was not prepared to provoke the hostility of Rome, his relations with the Republic being

¹ Suet. *Claud.* 25.

² Niese rejects it absolutely (ii. p. 153, note 4), but other instances in which cities seek to secure privileges or help by enlisting the advocacy of other powers, e.g. Smyrna and Seleucus II, Lampsacus and Massalia, Antiochus III and Teos, seem to me to show a far-reaching diplomatic activity of this sort which we should not gather from the historians alone.

³ Polyb. xvi. 27, 5.

⁴ xxxi. 1, %

still (in the diplomatic sense) "friendly." ¹ And yet he could not bring himself to preserve correct ^{neutrality}.

The conquest of Coele-Syria set him free to resume the Seleucid ambitions in Asia Minor. And a time when Attalus, the great rival of his house in that region, was away in Greece with the forces of the Pergamene kingdom offered too tempting an opportunity to be neglected. In the winter (199-198) Antioehus invaded the undefended territory of Pergamos. Even if the movement was not made on an understanding with Philip, it was obviously a breach of neutrality at a moment when Attalus was actually co-operating with the Roman and Aetolian forces against Philip. As a diversion in Philip's favour nothing could be more effectually contrived. But yet so little resolution had Antioehus to strike a bold blow for Philip, that when Rome, at the instance of Attalus, protested, as Antioehus must have known it would, he immediately withdrew.²

The Roman protests, however, were not the only cause of this retreat. News of a disconcerting kind reached the King from Coele-Syria. Antioehus seemed at one moment to be about to go through the experience of 217 again, to conquer the province only to see it wrested from his grasp. The man who was able to retrieve so signally for a time the Egyptian fortunes was the Aetolian Seopas, one of the prominent figures of his time. He had been *strategos* of the Aetolian League, the chief magistrate of the most powerful state in Greece, but, being thrown from power, had left his country and entered the Ptolemaic service. Such a man could hold no inferior position; he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Egyptian forces, drawing pay at the rate of ten minas (£40) a day. He had recently levied a force of 6000 foot and 500 horse in Greece, and almost cleared his native state of men in

¹ Antioehum, soeium et amieum populi Romani, Li v. xxxii. 8, 13.

² Liv. xxxii. 27, 1. Niese (ii. p. 607, note 4) pronounces the whole story of this attack on Pergamos to be fiction, but (it appears to me) without sufficient grounds. His grounds are (1) that Antioehus was fully occupied in Cade-Syria, (2) that friendly relations between Attalus and Antioehus were never interrupted. But the first seems disposed of if Antioehus believed himself to have completed the conquest of Coele-Syria, and the second has the appearance of a *petitio principii*.

doing so.¹ He now invaded Coele-Syria, drove out the Seleueid garrisons, and recovered the province for King Ptolemy.²

But Antioehus was soon on the march to reassert his authority in the contested region. He passed the defiles between the Lebanon and Antilibanus, and at the entry of the land, where the sources of the Jordan were marked by the precinct of a deity, in whom the Greeks recognized Pan,—the *Panion*,³—he came into collision with Seopas. From the criticisms made by Polybius upon Zeno's fanciful account of the battle we can gather only the two facts—that a son of Antioehus, bearing the same name, was present, and that the elephants (of which Antioehus had brought back a fresh supply from India) figured conspicuously.⁴ The result at any rate was a complete and decisive victory for Antioehus. *The battle is the landmark denoting the final and definite substitution of Seleueid for Ptolemaïe rule in Palestine.* Seopas shut himself up with the remainder of his force, 10,000 men, in Sidon, which Antioehus proceeded to invest. Egypt made an effort to relieve it, but without effect. Sidon was obliged by famine to capitulate, Seopas being permitted to withdraw unhurt.⁵ Antioehus took formal possession of the land. The region of Greek cities east of the Jordan (Batanea, Abila, Gadara), as well as Samaria and Judaea, became incorporate with the Seleueid empire.⁶

Jerusalem, or the bulk of its population, as we shall see when we come to speak of the Jews, received Antioehus with open arms. The Philistines were found, as usual, on the opposite side to the Jews. The great city of Gaza held, even in this day of disaster, by the house of Ptolemy. Their fidelity to the old allegiance provoked the admiration of the contemporary Greek.⁷ The siege which the city underwent till it was at last stormed by Antioehus was reckoned one of

¹ Liv. xxxi. 43, 5.

² Polyb. xvi. 39.

³ Paneas (mod. Banias) was the name of the city afterwards built there. It is the Caesarea Philippi of the Gospels.

⁴ Polyb. xvi. 18 f.

⁵ Jerome on Dan. 11, 15.

⁶ Polyb. xvi. 39, 3. Coele-Syria had thus to be conquered *twice* by Antioehus subsequently to Raphia. This is the real fact at the basis of Josephus' statement (*Arch.* xii. § 131) that Antioehus conquered it *before* the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Josephus makes a hasty inference from his knowledge that Seopas **had** found the country in Seleueid occupation.

⁷ Polyb. xvi. 22³.

the great episodes in the military history of the time. It furnished an appropriate theme for the rhetorical historian.¹ But of all the writing which it created nothing is preserved. Antioehus retired at the end of the summer of 198, the reduction of Palestine complete, to winter at Antioeh and make preparation for the much more formidable business which awaited him in the West.² But he was still careful to preserve the forms of amity with Rome, and sent a complimentary embassy during the winter. The Senate, whose diplomacy likewise aimed at keeping on good terms with Antioehus whilst there was a danger of his uniting with Philip, received the embassy with studied courtesy, and passed resolutions in honour of Antioehus which left nothing to be desired in the matter of fair words.³

With Egypt after the conquest of Coele-Syria the relations of Antioehus are difficult to define. There was no longer technically a state of war between the two powers. Cleopatra, in fact, the daughter of Antioehus, was now betrothed to the young Ptolemy. No doubt the betrothal was one of the articles in the treaty of peace which Antioehus imposed.⁴ At the same time Antioehus pursued next summer his conquest of the Ptolemaïc possessions. It was this ambiguous state of things which made it possible for the Roman embassy in 196 to demand a cessation of hostilities against Ptolemy and for Antioehus to reply that peace already existed.

¹ Polyb. xvi. 18, 1 ; xxix. 12, 8. ² Liv. xxxiii. 19. ³ *Ibid.* 20, 8 f.

⁴ Jerome on Daniel 11, 17.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ADVANCE IN THE WEST

IN the spring of 197 Antioehus launched his forces upon Asia Minor. The land forces were sent by the direct road over the Taurus under the command of the King's sons, Ardys and Mithridates,¹ to Sardis, where they had orders to await his arrival. Antioehus himself went with the fleet along the coast. The immediate object indeed of the expedition was to seize the possessions of the house of Ptolemy, and these were all on the coast. Was there an ulterior design? Had Antioehus at last made up his mind to intervene openly in the struggle going on in Greece? On the rumour of his advance this was believed—with what ground can never be known.² As he passed along the coast of Rugged Cilicia he summoned all the towns and fortresses subject either to local dynasts or to Ptolemy to surrender. And one after another—Soli, Coryeus, Zephyrium, Aphrodisias, Anemurium, Selinus—they obeyed the summons without resistance.³ Antioehus met with no check till he reached Coraesium, the strongest place along that rugged coast. The steep isolated hill of Alaya, which reminds modern travellers of the Rock of Gibraltar, still shows the masonry, of every date, by which the

¹ I have suggested on p. 16 that this is an *adoptive* son of Antioehus, the son *Kara φύσιν* of his sister mentioned by Polybius.

² Liv. xxxiii. 19, 9 f.

³ Jerome (on Daniel 11) includes Mallus among the towns taken by Antioehus on this expedition. The fact that no mention is made of this by Livy, who had Polybius before him, as well as the nearness of Mallus to Syria, seem to me to make it probable that Mallus had been recovered by Antioehus at an earlier date.

successive masters of the place, down to the Middle Ages, have laboured to make it impregnable. The determination to reduce it brought the King to a halt, and he was still lying before it when the situation was modified in a disagreeable way.

First an embassy from the Rhodian Republic presented itself. It brought him the astonishing declaration that should he attempt to pass the Chelidonian promontory—the point assigned in the old days of Athenian supremacy as the bound for the Great King's ships—the Rhodians would oppose his advance with an armed squadron. They justified this action by accusing Antioehus of a design to join Philip. Antioehus had the self-command to return a polite answer; he assured them that their imputation was quite groundless, and promised an embassy which should dissipate the suspicions entertained of him in Rhodes. The embassy went, and by a strange chance, at the very moment when its spokesman was addressing the Rhodian Assembly, a post arrived with the disconcerting intelligence that the war was over. Philip had met with a final defeat at Cynos-cephalae in the Thessalian plains.¹

The hesitating policy of Antioehus had thus let the opportunity of joining his forces with the Macedonian power, before it was crushed, go by, whilst it had at the same time awaked the suspicions of Rome. But the overthrow of Philip was not altogether unwelcome to Antioehus. All the time that Philip had been an ally, his other character, the rival, had peered through. It was plain that the king of Macedonia would now have to relinquish that share in the spoils of Ptolemy made over to him by the late compact, and Antioehus would stretch his hand over the whole.

But the imaginations kindled in the Seleucid court by the humiliation of the Antigonid reached farther than Asia Minor and Thrace. Those unfortunate memories of the first Seleueus could never be charmed to sleep; his successors had acquiesced perforce in seeing the European part of Alexander's heritage occupied by the houses of Ptolemy and Antigonus, but now a moment was come when the house of Ptolemy had sunk into the extreme of impotence and the house of Antigonus

¹ Polyb. xviii. 41^a; Liv. xxxiii. 20.

had been bruised in the conflict with a remote power. Alone of the three, the house of Seleueus seemed to have renewed its youth and still to possess the secret of conquest. Wild hopes and heated language grew rife in the congenial atmosphere of a court; it was soon no secret that Antioehus meditated appearing in Greece as the heir of Alexander and Seleueus Nicator.¹

It was natural under these circumstances that Philip should not on his part feel any good-will towards his late ally, who had not only left him to go down unaided, but who was preparing to seize the prizes in Asia Minor and Thrace which he himself was compelled to drop, and even dreamed of supplanting him in the domain where the house of Antigonus had been predominant for four generations. From the time of Philip's defeat the alliance between the two kings was replaced by complete estrangement.

The Rhodians, after the news of Philip's defeat reached them, had no further ground for opposing the advance of Antioehus. But they did their best to prevent his obtaining possession of the cities of Caria and the neighbouring islands. After more than a century of Macedonian domination, during which the Greek ideal of separate independence for every Greek state, whether city or league, had suffered violence, it seemed as if that ideal were now at last to be realized. The great Italian republic had stood forward as its champion. In breaking the Macedonian power Rome had inscribed the liberty of Greece upon its banners. The victor of Cynoscephalae, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, was a phil-Hellene of the most enthusiastic type, and the circle of choice spirits among the Roman aristocracy whom he represented were as genuinely eager to create a free Greece as the phil-Hellenes at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was not the duplicity of Roman statescraft but the hard facts of the world which made these visions futile. After Cynoscephalae, however, liberty was in the air. Rhodes had borne a part in the struggle and was in a high degree animated by the ideal. But from the practical point of view Rhodes was more nearly concerned in the cessation of Macedonian rule over the cities of the neighbouring

¹ Polyb. **xviii.** 45, 10 f. ; **Dio Cass.** frag. 60.

coast and islands than in the emancipation of Greece itself. The Ptolemaïc rule here was ready to vanish away ; Rhodes was anxious that the Seleueid should not take its place.

Antioehus addressed himself to the conquest of the coast of Asia Minor from Cilieia to the Troad. Of his operations we know very little. We are not told whether he ended by reducing Coraeesium or what were the remaining events of that year. Some of the states succeeded, with the help of Rhodes, in throwing off their present yoke and defying the efforts of Antioehus to impose another. Caunus, Haliearnassus; Myndus and Samos are mentioned as recovering their liberty at this moment.¹ In the case of Caunus the Rhodians seem to have understood "liberty" in the sense most congenial to their own ambition\; the transaction consisted apparently in their paying down a sum of 200 talents to the Ptolemaic commanders as the price of their withdrawal and then annexing the city to their own dominions.² In the Cyclades also a Rhodian supremacy seems to have now superseded the Ptolemaic or Antigonid.³

Beyond Coraeesium westwards Antioehus would come to the coast of Pamphylia. The interior had mostly been conquered by Aehaeus,⁴ and perhaps the coast as well. If so it would have already passed in 216 under the sway of Antioehus. It is at any rate occupied by his forces seven years later, when we find him maintaining a garrison in Perga.⁵

Lyeia, the next country along the Asiatic coast, yielded at onceto the summons of Antioehus. Jerome speaks of the capture of Andriaee (the harbour of Myra), Limyra, Patara and Xanthus. Antioehus certainly had a garrison in Patara in 190.⁶ The Seleueid cause, in fact, seems to have been popular with the Lycians, probably because it was antagonistic to Rhodes.⁷

In Caria Antioehus already touched the sphere which had been by the compact assigned to Philip. The political situation which Philip left there on his retirement in 201 had been a

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 20, 12. Jerome makes Antioehus conquer Rhodes (!) and Samos.

² Polyb. xxxi. 7, 6.

³ *Bull. corr. hell.* x. (1886), pp. 111 f. ; Delamarre, *Revive de Philol.* xxvi. (1902), p. 324,

⁴ Polyb. v. 72.

⁵ *Ibid.* xxi 44.

⁶ Liv. xxxvii. 16, 7.

⁷ See Appendix B.

confused one. Some of the cities still obeyed Ptolemy; in Caunus at any rate we saw that there remained a Ptolemaic garrison. Other cities had been annexed by Philip; the headquarters of his army of occupation were at Stratonieea, and he had garrisons in Pedasa, Euromus, Bargylia and Iasus.¹ A third category is made by cities like Alabanda and Mylasa, which maintained their independence alike of Macedonia, Egypt and Rhodes. Shortly before Cynos-eephalae the Rhodians had struck to recover their Peraea from Philip's forces, and Alabanda seems to have made common cause with them. A battle had taken place near Alabanda between the Macedonian troops under Dinoerates and the Rhodians. The result was a complete victory for Rhodes, which was followed up by their recovery of a number of small townships and fortresses, but the larger towns occupied by Philip they were unable to reduce. Dinoerates, who had in the first instance fled to Bargylia, succeeded in entering Stratonieea, and the city defied all the efforts of the Rhodians to capture it.²

Except, however, for the cities who asserted their freedom or were annexed by Rhodes, Antioehus appears to have brought Caria under his dominion without difficulty. From Ptolemy, even if his garrisons had not already all disappeared before the invasion of Philip and the active diplomacy of Rhodes, no opposition was possible. Philip was certain to be compelled, when Rome dictated the definite terms of peace, to evacuate everything he had occupied in Asia. The field was left empty for Antioehus. Only for a time in P>argylia, and perhaps in some other places, Philip's garrison was left in possession.³ At Iasus the garrison of Philip was soon replaced by that of Antioehus, and the anti-Seleucid party driven into exile.⁴ Towards Rhodes the King adopted a most conciliatory attitude. He acquiesced apparently in the occupation of the mainland, and not only so, but after taking over Stratonieea, either by the expulsion of Philip's garrison or its withdrawal, he placed the city at the disposal of Rhodes.⁵

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 30, 3; Polyb. xviii. 44, 4.

² Liv. xxxiii. 18.

³ Polyb. xviii. 48, 2; 50, 1; Liv. xxxiii. 35, 2; 39, 2.

⁴ Liv. xxxvii. 17, 5.

⁵ Liv. xxxiii. 18, 22; cf. Polyb. xxxi. 7, 6: *Στρατονίκειαν ἑλάβομεν ἐν μεγάλῃ χάριτι παρ' Ἀντιόχου καὶ Σελεύκου*. The view of Beloeh (*Histor. Zeitschr.*

In Ionia we find the Greek cities at this time in the possession of a high degree of freedom. Twenty years before, when Aehaeus and Attalus had fought for mastery over them, the cities had not been merely passive. And since then the wars between Aehaeus and Antioehus, and the diversion of the Seleueid strength to other quarters, while it was represented in this region since 216 by the comparatively inoffensive satrap of Lydia, had allowed the independence of the cities to grow more substantial. Philip, although he had subjugated the Ionian Samos, had left the Ionians of the mainland undisturbed. The greatest indeed of all these cities was an exception. In Ephesus there still remained a body of armed men which took its orders from King Ptolemy. This was the splendid prize towards which the thoughts of Antioehus were directed. It was the "citadel which commanded, both by land and sea, Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, the most convenient base from which the master of Asia could direct operations against Europe."¹ Before the close of 197 the capture of Ephesus had crowned the work of the year.² It was in Ephesus that Antioehus took up his quarters for the ensuing-winter.⁸ Now that his attention is directed to the West, Ephesus, on the coast, seems to replace inland Sardis as the capital of the Seleueid King.

From Ephesus Antioehus undertook during the winter the restoration of Seleueid rule over the cities of northern Ionia and the Hellespont. A detachment had already gone north to occupy Abydos on Philip's withdrawal,⁴ with a view to the passage of Antioehus the following year into Thrace. In both the Ionian and the Hellespontine group of free cities there was one pre-eminent in power and influence, Smyrna in Ionia, Lampsaeus on the Hellespont. Their example would be of immense consequence in determining the action of the rest. Unfortunately for Antioehus, this very position of dignity made them less willing to accept a yoke, however much disguised in

lx. p. 501 f.) that this refers to Seleueus II has not found acceptance. We must understand the Seleueus who shortly after this plays a prominent part under his **Σελεύκου**. Unless with Niebuhr (followed by Hultseh) we emend **Αντίοχου** to **Αντίοχου**, *ibid.* xviii. 41^a, 2.

² "Ad extremum Ephesos," Jerome on Daniel 11.

³ Liv. xxxiii. 38, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* 38, 4.

phrases. Not only so, both had ranged themselves heartily with the Pergamene power, which seemed to embody the purest Hellenic tradition.¹ Antioehus tried to bring force and persuasion simultaneously to bear. While it was still winter a royal force appeared under the walls of Smyrna, and the main part of the garrison of Abydos was moved upon Lampsaeus. At the same time within the walls his envoys stood before the citizens and spoke at large of the handsome treatment which awaited them, even the complete bestowal of liberty, if they would return to allegiance. But the citizens persisted in thinking their strong walls a better guarantee of freedom than the King's promises.² Under pressure from Antioehus, Lampsaeus took a step which holds a definite place in the series of events which brought about the collision we are soon to see. It appealed to Rome.

The history of this embassy, headed by Hegesias the Lampsaeene, of which the historians say nothing, is preserved for us by an inscription. It throws many interesting lights upon the relations of that time. In the first place, it was not easy for Lampsaeus to find among its citizens those who would face the inconvenience of the immense journey (*τὸ μέγεθος τῆς κομιδῆς καὶ τῆς ὀχλήσεως*) and its serious dangers, for it was intended that the envoys should go as far as Massalia (mod. Marseilles). Lampsaeus and Massalia were both colonies of Phoeaea, and the sentiment begotten by a common origin was in those days a really operative factor in politics. Lampsaeus could now appeal to it in order to enlist the advocacy of the Massaliots, which was known to have weight with Rome. Even the mythical origin of Rome from a Trojan stock could be made seriously the ground for Lampsaeus to urge the claims of kinship. Many of the citizens elected for this task excused themselves; Hegesias undertook it. He first proceeded with his fellow-envoys to Greece and had an interview with the commander of the Roman fleet, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus.

Arrived at last in Massalia, the Lampsaeene envoys came before the Assembly of Six Thousand and put before them the predicament of the sister-state in Asia. The Massaliots at once sent an embassy of their own to support the Lampsaeenes

before the Roman Senate. What is still more curious, they delivered to Hegesias, in virtue of their relations with the Gauls of the Rhone valley, a letter to the "*demos* of the Tolistoagioi Galatai" of Asia Minor, recommending to them the cause of Lampsacus. The Senate received the double embassy favourably, promised to include a declaration of the freedom of Lampsacus in the treaty of peace with Philip, and for the rest referred Hegesias to Titus Flamininus and the ten commissioners who were gone to settle the affairs of Greece. Hegesias proceeded to Corinth and once more pleaded the cause of Lampsacus before the ten commissioners. From them he obtained letters to the kings of Asia expressing the desire of Borne to see the freedom of Lampsacus respected.¹ The result of the mission lay so far only on paper; its value was exactly according as Rome was prepared to follow up words by deeds.

But the other cities of Asia Minor seem to have been too weak, with the exception of Alexandria Troas, to follow the example of Smyrna and Lampsacus. They yielded with little difficulty to Antioehus.

A restoration of the condition of things under the first kings of his house was the formula of Antioehus' policy—of the old order, as we have seen it, with the cities on the one hand subservient to the kings, and the kings on the other hand liberal patrons of the cities. As of old, it was as the champion of liberty and autonomy that the King lent his arm to elevate in each city the party favourable to himself to power, and crush the party opposed to him. An inscription of Iasus² gives us the official view of thiugs. Antioehus has written repeatedly to the *demos*, declaring his devotion to the great principles of democracy and autonomy. In this he is following the example of his house, which has shown itself zealous to do good to the Hellenes. The city has been vexed by factions; Antioehus has addressed to it paternal admonitions on the excellence of concord. He has been reinforced by the voice of the god of Branehidae—the "divine ancestor of his family." Concord restored, the *demos* are filled with gratitude, and so on in the usual strain. That the admonitions of

¹ Michel, No. 529.

² *Ibid.* No. 467.

Antioehus were also reinforced by his setting a garrison in the citadel and driving the faction opposed to him into exile the inscription does not betray.

We have evidence dating some years before of the favour shown by Antioehus to Magnesia-on-the-Meander. It was when that city was sending round to all the Greek kings and cities asking to have its festival of Artemis recognized as of Panhellenie standing. Its envoys found Antioehus in Persis on his return from the East (in 205), and his letter in answer promises to do all he can in the matter, and states that he is ordering the provincial governors to see to it that the cities under Seleueid influence give the required recognition to the Magnesian festival.¹

In the cases of the Carian Antioeh² and Teos we see again how opportunities to gratify the cities in ways which did not affect his supremacy were seized by the King. They are cases precisely parallel to that of Smyrna under Seleueus II—cities desiring to obtain a recognition of their sanctity from foreign powers (see vol. i. p. 188). Antioehus instructed his own ambassador to Rome to undertake the cause of Teos with the Senate, and backed the envoys of the Teians in other places (Rhauea and Eleutherna in Crete) by an envoy, whom he himself sent on a peace mission in one of the eternal Cretan wars.³ The presence of an envoy of Antioehus in Crete shows that even lands altogether outside the Seleueid sphere came to know Antioehus as a good friend of the Hellenes.

At the very moment when Seleueid rule was being restored in the coast regions of Asia Minor a notable figure passed from the scene. Attalus of Pergamos, whilst addressing the assembly of the Boeotian League in the interests of Rome, had suddenly fallen under a paralytic seizure. He had been carried home to Pergamos, and had there died, an old man of seventy-two, on the threshold of a new time (197). He was succeeded by Eumenes, the eldest of his four sons; the other three, Attalus, Philetaerus and Athenaeus, remained, as Strabo says, "private persons." The family concord continued undisturbed; the brothers of Eumenes, without share in the royal title, were

¹ O. Kern, *Inschrift v. Magnesia*, No. 18. ² Michel, No. 252.
³ *Ibid.* Nos. 51, 53, 57.

ready to serve under him as ambassadors and commanders. They had some power and wealth of their own, which they used as benefactors of the Greek cities.¹

During this first winter that he spent in Ephesus (197-196) Antioehus sent another embassy to remove the suspicions of Rome. His ambassadors, Hegesianax² and Lysias, went this time, not to Rome itself, but to Titus Flamininus and the ten commissioners, who had come to Greece to settle finally the conditions of peace with Philip and declare the will of Rome in the East. They were present at the historic Isthmian games, at which Flamininus proclaimed the freedom of the Hellenes, and they witnessed the scenes of wild enthusiasm, laughter and tears, which followed the proclamation. It was not a moment which made their task of justifying the conquests of Antioehus easy. Flamininus and the Ten gave them audience as soon as the festival was over. Full of the glow of disinterested benevolence, the Romans condemned with zest the aggressions of Antioehus. They required him to abstain from hostilities against any free city of Asia, and to evacuate those which had been before in the possession of Philip or Ptolemy. A declaration of the freedom of the Hellenes of Asia, as well as those of Europe, had indeed been included in the terms of the peace. Further, they cautioned Antioehus against crossing into Europe to disturb that reign of tranquillity and freedom which they had established, and announced their intention of deputing some of their own body to carry the King their mandate.³

But before that deputation, or even his own returning ambassadors, could reach Antioehus he was on European soil. At the beginning of spring (196) he had sailed with the fleet to Thrace. The land forces were directed to move from Sardis to Abydos, and thence pass the straits into Europe, meeting the fleet at Madytus. This was effected, and Madytus itself—one of those towns which had thought to regain its liberty on the defeat of Philip—was brought to surrender. The submission of the other towns of the Chersonese followed.⁴

¹ See Appendix C.

² Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas had some reputation as a man of letters; he is quoted several times by Athenaeus. See Susemihl, *Geseh. d. griech. Lit. in d. A lex.* ii. 31 f.

³ Polyb. xviii. 47 ; Li v. xxxiii. 34.

⁴ Liv. xxxiii. 38, 8 f.

Thrace was one of those regions where Hellenic civilization was continually menaced by the neighbourhood of barbarism, whilst its position between East and West made it of peculiar importance for the traffic of the Greek world. As the country passed from one to the other of the great Macedonian houses, barbarism pressed forward upon the Hellenic frontiers. The capital of Lysimachus, once the centre of a strong kingdom which had been a dam against the Thraeian onsets, had at last itself succumbed to the encroaching flood. Abandoned by Philip after his defeat,¹ it had been seized by the Thraeians and given to the flames. Lysimaehia stood an abandoned ruin. In these regions Antioehus was able to present himself with some reason as the saviour of Hellenism. He designed to restore the kingdom of Lysimaehus as an appendage of the Seleueid crown, and make his second son, Seleueus, king or viceroy. Without delay he set about the rebuilding of Lysimaehia. The old inhabitants were in slavery, or scattered through the neighbouring country. These he took pains to find and restore to their homes; at the same time he sought for new settlers. Half his land force and all the fleet was told off for the work of construction; with the remaining troops he made a foray into the country of the Thraeians.²

These magnificent designs were calculated to give offence in two quarters. The king of Macedonia could not but feel that geographical position and the traditions of his kingdom alike entitled him to be the protector of Hellenism on the Thraeian marches; the revival of the kingdom of Lysimaehus was probably the last thing that he desired. Secondly, Rome regarded with settled hostility the progress of Antioehus westward.

Antioehus was still in the field against the Thraeians when Hegesianax and Lysias reached Lysimaehia. About the same time a mission under Lucius Cornelius, which had been dispatched from Rome to make peace between Antioehus and Ptolemy, landed at Selymbria, and with its arrival coincided the appearance in Thrace of Publius Lentulus, who had come from Bargylia, where his business had been to expel the

¹ Before -202 it had belonged to the Aetolian League, Polyb. xv. 23, 8.

² Liv. xxxiii. 38, 10 f. ; App. Syr. 1.

garrison left by Philip, and of the two deputed out of their number by the ten commissioners, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius. All these Antioehus found waiting for him at Lysimaehia on his return, as well as envoys from Lampsaeus and Smyrna.

The distinguished Romans found the Seleucid King a charming host till they proceeded to business. It was then apparent how little the situation admitted a peaceful issue. Rome had now two grounds of quarrel with Antioehus—first, the subjugation of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had already been the subject of protest to his ambassadors in the Isthmus; and, secondly, the step he had since taken of entering Europe. The grounds on which objection was taken to his subjugation of the Greek cities varied, as the different cities in question had been, before his attack, in the possession of Ptolemy, or in that of Philip, or free; in the case of the first, Lucius Cornelius, who acted as spokesman, based the objection of Rome on its benevolent interest in the Ptolemaic kingdom; in the case of the second, on the right of conquest which gave the spoils of Philip to Rome; in the case of the third, the Romans assumed the rôle of the champions of Hellenic freedom. The inconsistency between these several positions is sufficiently obvious. Then as to the King's passage into Europe, Cornelius asserted that it could have no meaning except a hostile design against Rome.

The audacity of these representations is difficult to realize when later history has invested Rome, to our thinking, with the birthright of indefinite empire. It was then only the most powerful state of the western Mediterranean—and that pre-eminence was but of yesterday—whose dealings with Asia had, up to the war with Philip, been limited to an embassy sent in a matter of religion to the king of Pergamos, and perhaps a few other transactions of a like kind. The fact that Philip had been not only a European but an Asiatic power as well, now indeed gave them an opening in that region, and the compact which had made him such was now bearing bitter fruit for the other party to the bargain.

When the Roman envoy had wound up his indictment, the demeanour of Antioehus expressed the liveliest astonish-

ment. What possible *locus standi*, he asked, had Rome in these matters? How did the conduct of the king of Asia in regard to purely Asiatic questions concern them? He might as well, he exclaimed, meddle in the affairs of Italy! In answer to their sinister construction of his presence in Thrace he had but to indicate his hereditary title to that country, based on the conquest of Lysimaehus by Seleueus Nieator. How did any menace to Rome lie in his restoration of Lysimaehia, after its unfortunate destruction, to be his son's residence? As to the free cities of Asia, if the Romans were the champions of Hellenic liberty in Greece, it was for him, not for them, to assume that part in Asia, and by the concession of freedom to those cities reap their gratitude. As to Ptolemy, the solicitude of the Romans was quite superfluous; relations between the two courts were already friendly, and Antioehus was even about to cement that friendship by a marriage alliance.

At the instance of the Romans, the envoys from Lampsaëus and Smyrna were called in. Emboldened by the countenance of the Romans, they arraigned the proceedings of Antioehus with great freedom. This was too much for the King. He cut short Parmenio, the Lampsaeene envoy, with an angry command to be silent, adding that when he chose to submit the differences between himself and cities to the arbitration of an outside power, it was not to the Romans but to the Rhodians that the appeal should lie. With this stormy close the sitting broke up.¹

Before the conference could be brought to the shaping of any *modus vivendi* it became abortive by an unexpected change in the situation. The rumour ran through Lysimaehia that the young king of Egypt was dead. In that case a great estate in which both parties to the conference were closely interested lay vacant. Neither thought it safe to avow a knowledge of the report, but Lucius Cornelius suddenly discovered that the duties of his mission required his immediate departure for Egypt, and Antioehus, leaving the land-forces with Seleuces in Lysimaehia, sailed south with all possible

¹ Polyb. x'viii. 49, 2-52, 5; Liv. xxxiii. 39 i.; App. syr. 2 f.; Diod. xxviii. 12; Just. xxxi. 1, 3.

expedition. From Ephesus he sent another embassy to Flamininus to assure the Romans of his pacific intentions, and continued his voyage along the coast. At Patara in Lycia the intelligence encountered him that the report of Ptolemy's death was false. This suspended the race for Egypt, but Antioehus, baffled in one ambition, only bethought him how he could use the strong naval force at his disposal to realize another. Of the Ptolemaïc possessions over-seas Cyprus only was left, in such tempting proximity to the Asiatic mainland as even to be visible in clear weather from the hills of Eugged Cilieia. Antioehus resolved at once to strike for Cyprus, and with this end in view pursued his precipitate course along the coast. But he had barely rounded the Chelidonian promontory and reached the plain about the mouth of the river Eurymedon when the rowers, exasperated doubtless by the unrelaxed speed of these many days, mutinied. A vexatious delay was the consequence. But worse was to follow. Off the beach, where the river Sarus runs through the Cilieian plain to the sea, the Seleueid armada was shattered by a storm. The loss of life and vessels was enormous, some of the great persons of the realm being among those who perished. After this all possibility of attacking Cyprus was gone; the King brought the remnants of his fleet home to Seleucia.¹

It was now past the season for active operations. During this winter (196-195) the King resided in Antioeh. Since he had set out thence a year and a half before he had accomplished much; his rule had superseded that of Ptolemy on the Asiatic sea-board and in Thrace; but, on the other hand, Smyrna and Lampsaeus were still contumacious, and the kingdom of Pergamos, touching the sea at Elaea, was driven through his empire like a wedge. More than this, the reconquest of his ancestral dominion in the West had brought him into collision with the advancing power of Rome. The winter was marked by a family event of importance in the Seleueid house. The King celebrated the marriage of his son, Antioehus, with his daughter, Laodicee. This is the first instance to our knowledge of the marriage of full brother and

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 41 ; App. Syr. 4.

sister in the house of Seleueus. It was, of course, in accordance with the practice both of the old Persian and of the old Egyptian kings, and had become the rule in the house of Ptolemy.¹

It was either in this year or the year before² that the world was thrilled by the news that the eastern King had been joined by no less a person than Hannibal. The great Phcenieian, since the end of the war with Borne, had taken an active part in the internal politics of Carthage. He had endeavoured to correct some of those abuses in its constitution which sapped its strength, and had so come into conflict with the persons whom those abuses nourished. They accused him to their Roman friends of being in correspondence with Antioehus. When Rome sent a mission of inspection he was obliged to fly, and made his way, not without narrow escapes, to Tyre. The mother-city of Carthage received him as became one of the greatest of her children. A few days after his landing he took the occasion of one of the festivals celebrated by the court of Antioeh at Daphne to present himself to the young Antioehus. Then he proceeded to Ephesus, and placed his genius and experience at the service of the Seleueid King.³ The conjunction of the conqueror of Spain and Italy with the conqueror of the East seemed of portentous significance.

There was a general feeling in the summer of 195 that a great war was brewing. But Antioehus himself, for all his victories and his empire, still faltered before its possibilities. If he held his hand at the point he had now reached, it might be avoided or indefinitely postponed. Rome was not likely to force a quarrel on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks, or even of Thrace, in itself; the interests there were too remote. But Rome was determined to maintain its ascendancy in Greece, or, at any rate, safeguard the neutralization of that country. It would be a *casus belli* if the Seleueid King set foot there; even if he gave Rome ground for believing he contemplated

¹ App. Syr. 4.

² According to Livy in 195, according to Appian and Nepos in 196. Niese (ii. p. 671, note 2) speaks confidently for 196.

³ Liv. xxxiii. 45, 6-49, 7; App. Syr. 4; Nepos, *Hannibal*, 7; Justin xxxi. 1, 7 f.

doing so, he might be attacked. Antioehus might perhaps avoid war by a frank acceptance of the existing position. But to this the heir of Seleueus could not reconcile himself. Greece had been a century before the prize for which the rival Macedonian houses fought; for a moment Seleueus Meator had thought himself its master. And now the house of Seleueus saw its old rivals reduced to impotence, but Rome coming as an interloper among their family quarrels to take the coveted possession to herself. She could hardly do so unchallenged.

At Rome itself the report which the ten commissioners delivered that spring (195) represented the prospects of peace as gloomy. They averred their belief that had not Antioehus been turned aside the preceding year by the report of Ptolemy's death, Greece would have been already ablaze. They called attention to the combustible material which existed in that country, where the most powerful of the Greek states, the Aetolian League, whose mountains the Macedonian conquerors had never been able to subdue, and whose alliance in the late war had been of substantial service to Rome, was profoundly dissatisfied with the terms of peace and in a dangerous frame of irritation.¹

About the same time that the ten commissioners were delivering their pessimistic report in Rome, the ambassadors of Antioehus—those presumably whom he had sent the previous autumn from Ephesus—had audience of Flamininus at Corinth. A great conference, to which all the Greek states in alliance with Rome sent delegates, had just been held in that city, under the presidency of the Roman proconsul, and had served to make plain the angry mood of the Aetolians. Their suspicions were roused by the Roman garrisons which continued to occupy Demetrias, Chaleis and the Corinthian citadel—the "fetters of Greece"²—a measure which was in fact inspired by the apprehension of an attack on Greece by Antioehus.³ To the ambassadors Flamininus declared himself unable to say anything without the ten commissioners, and referred them to the Senate in Rome.⁴ Instead of proceeding

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 44, 5 f. ; 49, 8.

⁸ Liv. xxxiii. 31, 6.

² Polyb. xviii. 11, 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxxiv. 25, 2.

thither the ambassadors seem to have returned to report the answer of Flamininus to the King.¹

A year passed, and the summer of 194² was employed by Antioehus in completing the conquest of Thrace. He broke the yoke of the barbarians from the neck of the Greek cities. Byzantium had suffered heavily from the "eternal and grievous war" with the Thraeian tribes,³ and had been accustomed to see its richest harvests carried off under its eyes. It now found itself the object of the King's especial solicitude. He courted with lavish favours the good-will of a city in whose hands it was to open and shut the gate of the Black Sea. The Gallic tribes settled during the last century in the country he also tried to win by his largess, in order to enrol under his standards more of these large-limbed men of the North. The following winter (194-193) he was once more in Ephesus.⁴

It was in 194 that the evacuation of Greece was actually carried out by the Romans. After another conference of the Greek states, held at Corinth in the spring of that year under Titus Flamininus, the Roman garrisons had been withdrawn from Demetrias, Chaleis and the Corinthian *akra*. The phil-Hellene enthusiasts at Rome could now exult in the spectacle of a Greece really and absolutely free. Macedonian domination was a thing of the past; the days of Pericles would be restored. But Rome had yet to learn, as other nations with an imperial destiny have had to learn, that the process of expansion cannot be checked by creating a vacuum, that in such cases the alternatives for a conquering state are to assume the dominion itself, or to see it assumed by others. It was, in fact, an absurdity to declare it worth a war to prevent any foreign power establishing itself in Greece and at the same time to withdraw from the defence of its coasts. If, indeed, the Romans in retiring had left a united nation, devoted to Rome, and resolved to act together in excluding any third power from Greek soil, it might have been a practical, if not a magnanimous,

¹ A fresh embassy is sent by Antioehus to Rome after the second campaign in Thrace.

² Or, if the date given by Livy for Hannibal's coming to Ephesus be right, the summer of 195. If the earlier date be right for Hannibal's coming, we are uninformed as to where Antioehus spent 195.

³ ἡ πόλις καὶ διανεμένη πολλοῖσι Pnlv i v. 45, 5,

⁴ App. Syr. 6.

policy for Rome to maintain Greece as an independent "buffer-state" on its western frontier. But, as a matter of fact, the jealousies and hatreds between the various Greek states were as violent as ever; two of the most powerful, Aetolia and Sparta, were anything but well disposed towards Rome, the one her late ally smarting under a grievance, the other an enemy with whom she had just concluded an uneasy truce. So far from helping to defend the frontier, the Aetolians were ready to welcome Antioehus, or their old foe the king of Macedonia, as a deliverer. When, thanks to the hesitation of Antioehus and the prudence of Philip, the departure of the Roman legions was followed by no immediate breach of tranquillity, the Aetolians set to work of their own accord to stir up trouble. Their envoys incited Philip and Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, to break the peace; Dicaearehus, the brother of the Aetolian *strategos*, Thoas, was sent to Antioehus (end of 194).¹

The common object of all these envoys was to bring about a great anti-Roman alliance of the houses of Antigonos and Seleueus, Aetolia and Nabis. Dicaearehus endeavoured to impress upon Antioehus in what fierce earnest the Aetolians would act by enlarging upon their grievances; he magnified the Aetolian power; it was they who held the western door of Greece; they to whom Rome owed her late triumphs; and he paraded the great alliance before the dazzled eyes of the King, glozing the fact that it existed so far only in the heated brain of Greek intriguers.²

The influence of Hannibal at the seleucid court was, of course, thrown into the scale of war. He saw a prospect of matching himself once more with the hated oppressor of his race, of renewing that struggle which had so nearly ended fatally for Rome. It is said that he began to urge upon Antioehus a plan of campaign, of which the outlines were that he should take himself 100 ships of war, 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, and with these effect a landing in Italy, while the King should simultaneously invade Greece, and Carthage should rise in rebellion. No telling blow—on this he insisted—could be dealt Rome so long as her base was secure; only when the adversary wrested to himself those

¹ Liv. xxxv. 12,

² *Ibid.* 12, 15 f.

resources which Italy yielded her could Rome be really straitened. And who was there that knew the ground in Italy so well as the framer of this plan ?¹

In pursuance, at any rat, of some such schemes, the secret agent of Hannibal, a Tyrian named Ariston, was dispatched from Ephesus to Carthage in the course of 194 to concert plans with the popular faction, whose leader Hannibal had been.² But Antioeus had not yet brought his resolution or preparations to the point of an open rupture—not even when the suggestions of Hannibal were reinforced by the envoy of the Aetolians.

In the winter of 193-192³ Antioeus was in Syria, and the marriage which he had announced in 196 to the Rman envoys at Lysimaeia between his daughter Cleopatra and the young Ptolemy Epiphanes now took place. Antioeus escorted Cleopatra in person to the frontier. At Eaphia they were met by the bridegroom, and the nuptial ceremonies were performed. Antioeus returned to Antioe, and Egypt knew the first of the famous Cleopatras. That name henceforward supersedes Arsinoe and Berenice as the characteristic name of a Ptolemaic queen.⁴

Spring (192) was hardly yet come when Antioeus was on the move to Ephesus. He went this time by land across the Taurus, accompanied by the younger Antioeus, who, however, was sent back almost immediately to Syria to hold, as before, the place of king in that country. The elder Antioeus, with a view of consolidating his authority in the trans-Tauriecountry and securing the communications between Syria and Ionia, turned upon the immemorial foes of Asiatic empires, the Pisidians.⁵

In the spring of the preceding year (193) ambassadors from Antioeus had been given a hearing in Rme.⁶ They

¹ Liv. xxxiv. 60; App. Syr. 7; Just. xxxi. 3, 5 f.; Nepos, *Hannib.* 8.

² Liv. xxxiv. 81, 1 f.; App. Syr. 8; Just. xxxi. 4, 1.

³ Strack, *Dynastie der Ptolemdes*, p. 196.

⁴ See Appendix D.

⁵ Liv. xxxv. 13, 4 f.

⁶ This was probably the embassy mentioned by Appian (Syr. 6) as having been dispatched from Ephesus after the second campaign of Antioes in Thrace (i.e. latter part of 194 according to Niese's reckoning). Livy (xxxiv. 57, 6) mentions Menippus and Hegesianax as the chiefs of the embassy; to those Appian adds Lysias" As Appian confuses similar occasions readily, Lysias very **possibly**

were among the embassies from all parts of Greece and the East who thronged to Rome for the moment when Titus Flamininus should submit to the Senate for ratification the measures he had framed in concert with the ten commissioners. The Senate did not feel itself possessed of enough special knowledge, as a body, to engage the King's envoys in debate, and therefore deputed Flamininus and the original ten commissioners to hear them separately and to speak for Rome.

It was ostensibly the object of the embassy to obtain a renewal of those friendly relations between the Seleucid court and the Republic which had been broken since the conference of Lysimachia, when Antiochus had repelled the Roman demands for the evacuation of Thrace and the liberation of the Greek cities of Asia. The real object of the mission was to ascertain how far Rome was prepared to go in sustaining these conditions. From the answer which Flamininus returned to the representations of Menippus it was plain that whilst only a sentimental interest was felt in the Asiatic cities, Rome was seriously concerned in dislodging Antiochus from Thrace. Flamininus intimated that if Antiochus evacuated Thrace, the other question would be suffered to drop. "The King contends that we have no right of interference in Asia; then let him keep his hands off Europe." It was not difficult for the King's envoy to point out the logical flaw in such an argument; the cases were not parallel; Antiochus had claims to Thrace, based both upon hereditary right and the sacrifices he had made to recover it from barbarism; the Romans such claims in Asia. Only it happens that such questions are not determined by formal logic. The newly-acquired ascendancy of Rome in Greece was threatened by the occupation of Thrace; in the face of this fact the legal reasonings of the Seleucid envoys missed the point. So long as the Seleucid court was obstinate on the Thracian question, Rome found it convenient to champion the liberty of the Asiatic cities. The orators of the Senate paraded this attitude to the assembled ambassadors from Greece and the East, contrasting the liberating policy of Rome with the tyrannic aggressions of the Seleucid King.

appears here only because he was coupled with Hegesias in the embassy of two years before.

Menippus lifted a voice of protest. He entreated the Romans in the name of the peace of the world, to pause, and reiterated the pacific disposition of his master ; diplomacy might still find a solution of the deadlock. The Senate on its side was not anxious to precipitate the conflict, and resolved to send an embassy to the King. For this office the persons chosen were Publius Sulpieus, Publius Vilius (who had confronted Antioes at Lysimaeia) and Publius Aelius.¹

These emissaries were instructed first to visit the court of Pergamos and ascertain the leanings of Eumenes. Antioeus had indeed been doing his utmost to induce the powers of Asia Minor to oppose a solid front to the Roman aggression. On Prusias of Bithynia he could count, Prusias, the foe of Pergamos, and the ally of Philip before he had been humbled. Ariarathes IV of Cappadoeia Antioehus essayed to bind to himself in the same way as he had bound Ptolemy ; he had other daughters to give.

We last heard of the Cappadoeian court when Antioehus Hierax took refuge with Ariamnes about 230. Since then it had continued its tranquil existence aloof from the broils of the world. Ariamnes, celebrated for the warmth of his domestic affections, had died after an uneventful reign of about forty years at a date probably not far removed from the visit of Hierax. His son, Ariarathes III, who had already borne the name of king during his father's lifetime, then reigned alone. It was this Ariarathes whose wife was a Seleueid princess, Stratoniee, the daughter of Antioehus Theos, and aunt therefore of Antioehus III. The reign of Ariarathes III, like that of his father, is wrapped in complete obscurity. Only his coins bear witness to the Hellenic influence at work in his court. It is no Oriental potentate, with beard and tiara, that here is shown, but a king of the regular Hellenistic type, clean-shaven, with short hair and the simple diadem. On the reverse of his coins the barbarian goddess of Cappadoeia is replaced by a

¹ Liv. xxxiv. 57 f. ; Diod. xxviii. 15. Appian and Justin make Publius Seipio chief of this embassy, and Livy mentions this as being related in the History of Acilius. Nissen (*Kritisch. Unters.* p. 167 f.) thinks that Seipio really did go to Asia on a *later* embassy which Appian has confused with that of Sulpieus. On the whole I think it most probable that the embassy of Seipio is a fable. His interview with Hannibal made a dramatic situation.

classical Athena copied from the money of Lysimaehus. Already under Ariamnes, it will be remembered, Greek had superseded Aramaic for the legend. Ariarathes III had died about 220, and the son who succeeded him, Ariarathes IV, was at that time quite an infant.¹ He inherited the family characteristics of simplicity and affection, so far as we can judge by the little told us. He is the first of the dynasty for whom a surname appears, the modest one of *Eusebes*, the Pious.² In an evil day for himself he received the Great King's daughter Antioehis to wife. He was no mate for one of those tigress princesses whom the old Macedonian blood continued to produce.³

Antioehus had yet a third daughter, and by means of her he did not despair of even overcoming the hostility of Eumenes, of bringing Pergamos into line with the other Asiatic courts. Together with her hand he offered the restoration of the cities which had once obeyed Pergamos and indefinite services in the future.⁴ But Eumenes was shrewd enough to refuse the splendid bribe. It was the policy of his house to ally itself with the more distant against the nearer power, and the wars, in which Attalus had fought side by side with the Romans, had led the Pergamene court to form a true estimate of the strength and persistency of the Republic; so that now, when their old confederates, the Aetolians, were estranged, Pergamos stood stoutly by the Roman alliance as the soundest speculation.⁶

Sulpicius and his colleagues touched in 192 at Elaea, the harbour-town of Pergamos, and thence went up to the capital. They found Eumenes a strong advocate of war; he knew that a decisive conflict must come sooner or later between Pergamos and the Seleucid power, and grasped at the chance of entering into it side by side with Rome. In such a contingency he saw the prospect, not only of safety, but of aggrandizement, of recovering that dominion in Asia Minor which his father had held for a moment amid the broils of the Seleucid princes. He now used all his influence, as Hannibal was doing on the other side, to force on hostilities.⁶

¹ Diod. xxxi. 19, 6 ; Poty. iv. 2, 8 ; Justin xxix. 1, 4.

² Reinaeh, *Trois royaumes*, p. 36.

³ Diod. xxxi. 19, 7 ; A pp. Syr. 5.

⁴ Polyb. xxi. 20, 8.

⁵ App. Syr. 5.

⁶ Liv. xxxv. 13, 6 f.




PLATE II

Hannibal indeed was the element in the situation which at Rome induced the most qualms. There was no other man who affected the Roman heart with the same emotions of inextinguishable resentment and dread. The feeling of those days could never be forgotten when he had come so near possessing their altars and homes. It was only the insufficiency of his resources which had saved the Republic out of his hand, and now his genius was united with the resources (fabulously conceived) of the East. Soon after the Roman ambassadors had left for Asia, the emissaries of the oligarchic party at Carthage brought to Rome the report of his far-reaching activity, of the contemplated invasion of Italy, of the intrigues of Ariston with the popular faction at Carthage. The fact that Ariston was a Tyrian, not a Carthaginian citizen, had saved his skin, since violence done to her citizen Tyre might have avenged by reprisals on Carthaginian traders, but the suspicions of the Carthaginian government had obliged him to leave the city. He did his best before leaving to compromise the oligarchs with Rome—an inconvenience they sought to remedy by reporting all their conjectures to the Roman Senate.¹

According to Nepos, Hannibal himself in 193, the fourth year of his exile, had made an attempt to raise Carthage by landing with five vessels on the Cyrenaïc coast. It was at a moment when his great plan of campaign had apparently been accepted by Antioehus, and this was his part in it. He summoned his brother Mago to join him. Mago did so. But the Carthaginian authorities did not waver; they passed the same sentence of banishment upon Mago as upon Hannibal. It became apparent that the attempt had failed, and Hannibal returned to Antioehus.²

The Roman ambassadors on their part did what they could to shake the position of Hannibal at the Seleucid court. Its weak point, they knew, was in the jealousies and suspicions of the autocrat who employed him, and of this they did their best to take advantage. He was at that moment at Ephesus,

¹ Liv. xxxiv. 61 ; A pp. Syr. 8 ; Just. xxxi. 4, 1 f.

² Nepos, *Hannib.* 8. This is the only place, I believe, where there is any allusion to this episode.

separated from the King, who was still fighting among the Pisidian hills, and when the ambassadors understood this favourable juncture, although their chief Sulpicius was too ill to leave Pergamos, Villius hurried on to Ephesus. There the Roman engaged Hannibal, so far as he could, in familiar converse, and, whilst making a show of generosity, contrived to awake in the mind of Antioehus the suspicion that his great ally was playing a double game.¹

Antioehus, as soon as he learnt the arrival of Villius at Ephesus, suspended operations against the hill folk and came down to Apamea, the Phrygian capital. The ambassador proceeded from the coast to the same city. The old arguments were gone through on either side once more, with as little result as ever. Then the conference, like the previous one at Lysimaehia, was brought to a premature close by sudden tidings. The young Antioehus, the heir-apparent to the Seleucid throne, who had now shared the royal title for about seventeen years, was unexpectedly deceased in Syria. Whispers of foul play, how far justified we cannot know, ran abroad; it was the jealousy of the King at his son's popularity, or his preference for the younger Seleucus. At any rate, the court at Apamea abandoned itself to mourning, and diplomatic propriety made Villius take his leave and return to Pergamos. Antioehus, without resuming the subjugation of the Pisidians, moved to Ephesus. At Ephesus the King continued to hold himself withdrawn from public intercourse. He was continually closeted with Minnio, the chief of the "Friends" (*prineeps amieorum*), whose *chauvinistic* proclivities were known—an indication of the drift of the royal policy. Presently the Roman ambassadors were invited from Pergamos to a discussion with Minnio of the questions at issue.² The King himself did not appear. Again the barren controversy as to Smyrna and Lampsacus, which did not really touch the ground of quarrel, was agitated. Minnio pressed the point that the Romans, who set up to be the champions of Hellenic liberty in Asia, themselves held the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily—Naples, Tarentum and Syracuse—in subjection. This the Roman envoys evaded by a new distinction; their sovereignty over the Greek cities

¹ Liv. xxxv. 14, 1 f. ; Polyb. iii. 11, 1 f.

- Liv. xxxv. 15.

of the West had been uniform and continuous; the Greek cities of Asia in question had passed long ago from Seleueid rule to Ptolemy or Philip, or had in some cases acquired *de facto* independence. The distinction hardly removed the inconsistency; if it was lawful to keep Greek cities in subjection, it could hardly be outrageous to reconquer them. Then, as before at Lysimaehia, the ambassadors of Smyrna and Lampsaeus were called in. They had been drilled for their part by Eumenes, and with the encouragement of the Romans talked somewhat wildly. The conference ended in noisy words, and the Roman ambassadors, without having accomplished anything, returned home.¹

This diplomatic trifling served, at any rate, to convince either side that war was now inevitable. It was spoken of at Rome as an ultimate, if not an immediate, certainty. At Ephesus the more fiery spirits began to clamour for it in the council of the King. Adventurers from Greece, like Alexander the Aearnanian,² talked excitedly of what would happen when Antioehus appeared on the other side of the Aegean, of the simultaneous rising of the Aetolians, Nabis the tyrant of Sparta, and, above all, Philip. Alexander had once been a familiar of that king's, and recounted how he had heard him again and again pray the gods during his war with Rome for the co-operation of his Seleueid ally. Did it occur to any one to reflect that, if this was true, the discovery that his Seleueid ally left him after all in the lurch might have had some effect upon the sentiments of Philip?³

It is indeed hard to see what issue the situation could have had but war. And that, although war was by no means

¹ Liv. xxxv. 16-17, 2. According to Appian (Syr. 12), Antioehus engaged (either at Apamea or through Minnio) to respect the autonomy of Rhodes, Byzantium and Cyzicus. This statement is confirmed by the recorded dealings of Antioehus with the two first-named states. The narrative of App. is extremely careless. He confuses the conference of the Romans with Antioehus at Apamea and the conference with Minnio at Ephesus; he also makes the news of the death of the young Antioehus not reach his father till immediately before his departure for Greece in the autumn.

² Among the *πρόξενoi* at Delphi for the last half of 194 appear Alexander, the son of Antioehus the Aearnanian, and his sons, Philip and Antigonus (Michel, No. 655). It was obviously a family which affected the names of the Macedonian royal houses. •

³ Liv. xxxv. 17, 3-18, 8.

desired by either of the principals: Rome had hoped against hope to avert it by diplomacy. Flushed as the Romans were with the victories over Carthage and Macedonia, a contest with the Seleucid King would involve them with the unfamiliar East, with an adversary seen in the glamour of illimitable dominion and exhaustless treasures. Before the unknown entanglements of such a struggle the homely sense of the Roman fathers recoiled.¹ They were, nevertheless, resolved to maintain the Roman influence in Greece even at the cost of war. Antioehus on his part felt his nerve fail, as is shown by his long hesitation, at the prospect of trying issues with the legions; he was not disposed to declare war; at the same time he was informed that measures, which presented themselves to him as steps in the resumption of his legitimate inheritance, were regarded by Rome as hostile acts. Neither party in fact, desirous as they were of peace, could renounce its colliding ambitions. It may, however, be that had Rome and the house of Seleucus been the only agents in the matter, the caution of either side might have led to such an adjournment of the crisis as ultimately to make a *modus vivendi* possible; Antioehus might have relinquished Greece and Rome acquiesced in the occupation of Thrace. But there were those among the subordinate agents who exerted all their force to push the two great powers to a conflict. Hannibal saw in war a chance of avenging his country upon the oppressor; Eumenes of Pergamos a chance of aggrandizing his kingdom; above all, the mass of the Aetolians were eager to stir up trouble. A situation so delicately balanced was at the mercy of the subordinate agents.

The antagonism between Rome and the Seleucid King was a cleft which extended to the whole family of Greek states. The cleft was not so much between state and state as between the two factions of oligarchs and democrats, rich and poor, into which every Greek state was divided. The Roman party coincided in most cases with the oligarchical, the party favourable to Antioehus with the democratic.² Even among the Aetolians many persons of influence were opposed to a

¹ App. Syr. 15; cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 63. "Non Philippum Athenieisibus, non Pyrrum aut Antioehum populo Romano perinde metuendos fuisse."

² Liv. xxxv. 34, 3 f.

rupture with Rome.¹ The reason of this connexion lay deeper than the mere policy of the Roman aristocracy to foster oligarchical institutions in the states to which its influence extended. That policy itself was based upon a natural alliance between the well-to-do classes everywhere and Rome. The Roman ascendancy on the one hand violated the imaginative ideal of the Greeks—Hellas completely free from barbarian control; on the other hand it gave, when once established, a novel guarantee for social stability. Now the propertied classes would at once be far less affected by sentimental considerations than the people, and would lose instead of gaining by disturbances of the *status quo*. To impose upon sentiment and imagination, the Seleucid King was more favourably situated than Rome. All that the name of Great King had evoked for generations, to the inhabitants of the Greek lands, of splendour and riches belonged to him, all the memories of the Greek conquest of the Persian Empire illuminated his diadem; upon him the glories of Xerxes and of Alexander converged. He could appear too to the Greeks, as the Romans could not, in the light of a compatriot. Whatever taint of barbarism had attached before Alexander to the Macedonian princes, the courts of his successors were Greek in their language and intellectual atmosphere, Greek to a large extent in blood and manners. One must add to this the personal lustre which had invested Antiochus III since his eastern expedition, the vision of the Indian elephants, of the mountains of gold, of the innumerable chivalry of the East which were conjured up by those who came from his court. The democracy of the Greek cities was ready, so soon after it had sobbed with emotion at the grant of freedom by phil-Hellenic Rome, to welcome Antiochus as the saviour of Hellenism. In the struggle of the two factions within the various states the war between Antiochus and Rome was already in a sense begun.

The ambassadors returned to Rome in 192 soon after the consuls for that year had entered upon their office. Their report showed the senate that no *caus belli* had as yet arisen,² but the presentiment of war grew daily stronger. The air

¹ Liv. xxxv. 33.

² *Ibid.* 22, 1.

was thick with rumours. Attalus himself, the brother of the reigning Eumenes of Pergamos, brought the assurance that Antioehus had already crossed the Hellespont with an army, and that the Aetolians were ready to spring to arms at his arrival in Greece.¹ The Senate took vigorous defensive measures. One Roman squadron had already early in the year sailed for Greek waters under the praetor Atilius to overawe Nabis ; under the impulse of fresh alarms some legions were stationed under another praetor, Marcus Baebius, at Tarentum and Brundisium, ready to cross at a moment's notice to Greece; a squadron of twenty ships was set to cruise off Sicily, where an attack of the Seleueid fleet was apprehended ; and the governor of Sicily was instructed to levy fresh forces and maintain a strict watch along the eastern shores of the island. The force under Baebius was before long moved across the Adriatic and concentrated at Apollonia. The construction of fresh ships of war was pushed busily forward.²

But the preparations on either side during the earlier part of 192 were not only military and naval. Diplomacy had still a work to do. That work, however, was now no longer to obviate a collision between Antioehus and Rome; it was to secure the adherence to the one side or the other of that country where the first encounter would take place, to prepare the ground in Greece. The connexions of Antioehus were naturally closest with the Aetolians. No less responsible a person than Thoas, the *straiegos* of the Aetolian Confederation, had been deputed as the intermediary in these transactions at the Seleueid court.³ In the course of 192 he returned to Greece, bringing Menippus, the late ambassador to Rome, with him. There was still a party among the Aetolians who advocated peace, and it was thought that the representations of Menippus would be useful in confirming the warlike temper of the majority. The Romans on their side were equally busy in bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon the mobile Greeks. Titus Flamininus himself, the great phil-Hellene whose influence in Greece was paternal, was sent in 192, with Villius and other colleagues, to remind the Greek states of their engagements.⁴

¹ Liv. xxxv. 23.

² *Ibid.* 24.

³ Polyb. xxi. 31, 13.

⁴ The letter of Titus to the Thessalian Cyretiae (Michel, No. 44) granting the

Nabis had already taken up arms and was involved in a war with the Achæan League, which the Romans left to take its natural course, seeing in it a guarantee of Achæan fidelity. Chaleis and Demetrias, the two "fetters" of Greece, were visited. At both the authority of Flamininus sufficed to drive the head of the anti-Roman party into exile.¹ In Aetolia, on the other hand, Flamininus failed to make any impression upon the excited people, now more than ever inflamed by the gorgeous descriptions of Menippus. The Great King was bringing enough gold with him to buy up Rome. Amid great popular effervescence the Federal Assembly passed a decree which called on Antioehus to liberate Greece and decide the controversy between the Confederation and Rome. Flamininus himself was not present on the occasion, and when he asked Damocritus, who was now *stratcgos*, to give him a copy of the decree, the hot-headed Greek bade him wait for his answer *till the Aetolians were encamped on the banks of the Tiber*.²

The rupture between the Aetolians and Rome was thus complete. It now became a matter of immediate necessity to the Aetolians to occupy the points of vantage against the coming of the Great King. Thoas was commissioned to secure Chaleis with the help of the anti-Roman party in the city and a merchant-prince of Cius, Herodorus, whose connexions there were considerable. Another Aetolian, Dioles, was sent on a similar errand to Demetrias. A third was to seize Sparta, where Nabis was now hemmed in by the victorious Aehagans. Of these enterprises that of Dioles alone met with success. An Aetolian garrison occupied Demetrias, and the friends of Rome were put to the sword. At Chaleis the attempt of Thoas was repulsed by the Roman party, thanks to the help of Eretria and Carystus. In Sparta the Aetolian force, after they had treacherously assassinated Nabis, was cut to pieces by the indignant Lacedæmonians. Demetrias, however, was securely held, and the anti-Roman magistrates refused to admit Villius when Flamininus sent him to recover the city, if it might be, by his earnest representations. The main door of Greece,

city Certain properties, which the Romans had confiscated, may belong to the diplomatic manoeuvres of this time.

¹ Liv. xxxv. 31.

²

Ibid. 32.

which the Romans had evacuated two years before, was now held open for Antioehus. Thoas hastened to Asia to carry him the tidings.¹

Whilst his agents had been working against the Roman cause in Greece, Antioehus himself had not been idle. Now that all attempts to compose by diplomacy the differences between himself and Rome had been dropped, Antioehus had with the campaigning season of 192 resumed his efforts to subjugate, as a preliminary to his invasion of Greece, the independent cities of Asia by force of arms.² Smyrna and Lampsaeus, however, to which we now find the name of Alexandria Troas added, were still unsubdued when Thoas arrived with the news that Dernetrias was secured. He found Antioehus still full of hesitations. The King was not only unwilling to start for Greece till the reduction of the cities had secured his base, but he could not make up his mind what to do with Hannibal. A fleet of open vessels, with which the exile was to make a diversion in Africa, was, after long Oriental delays, at last ready. But Antioehus had developed by then a reluctance to entrust the great Carthaginian with an independent commission. Hannibal had been able in some degree to reassure him as to his sincerity after the doubts aroused by the attentions of Villius early in the year.³ But his great abilities still showed to the masterful and jealous King in the light of a disqualification for service. Upon this posture of affairs Thoas supervened, and prevailed upon the irresolution of the court by his decision, assurance and boundless mendacity. The highly-coloured picture he gave Antioehus of the situation in Greece was as false as the picture which he and his friends had given his wavering countrymen of the apparition of the Great King. His counsels were at the same time determined by the separate interests which the war-party in Aetolia intended a conflict between the two great powers of East and West to promote, and pointed therefore to the concentration of the King's forces upon Greece. Thoas thus found himself opposed to Hannibal, whose outlook upon the war was of

¹ Liv. xxxv. 84-39.

² Smyrna had already in 195 erected a temple to the goddess Roma, Tac. Ann, iv. 56.

³ Polyb. iii. 11 ; Liv. xxxv. 19.

wider reach, and who saw in the invasion of Greece only a detail in a large scheme of attack, of which the telling stroke was the invasion of Italy. Thoas, much more than Hannibal, had the King's ear, and under his influence the well-considered plan of action in the western Mediterranean was dropped and Hannibal reduced to the inoffensive *role* of unheeded adviser.¹

The invasion of Greece—this now occupied all the thoughts of Antioehus. The favourable opening given by the capture of Demetrias must not be let slip. The great project, so long the theme of courtiers, was at last come near accomplishment. As a solemn inauguration of the enterprise, Antioehus made the short voyage to Ilion, and sacrificed to the ancient Athena, as Xerxes had done before he invaded Europe, and Alexander when he invaded Asia. On his return to Ephesus, although the year was advanced, the forces destined for the invasion of Greece put out to sea—40 decked ships, 60 open, and 200 transports.²

Passing by Imbros and Seithos, the armada touched the Greek mainland at Pteleum, on the left side of the entrance of the Pagasaean Gulf. Here the King was received by Euryloehus and others of the party now dominant among the Magnesians and escorted the following day to Demetrias.³

Antioehus was really on Greek soil at last! It was, however, characteristic of his procedure that, in spite of the years during which his hand had hovered to strike, the blow in the end was hurried and feeble. No adequate force was ready for the enterprise; instead of the looked-for myriads, the ruler of Asia had brought with him only 10,000 foot, 500 horse, and 6 elephants—"a force hardly large enough for the bare occupation of Greece, to say nothing of the strain of a war with Rome."⁴ He had crossed incontinently, when the winter gales were already beginning, and although he had escaped with a buffeting, his little army was cut off from reinforcements till the following spring. In such a position he depended entirely upon the energy of the Aetolians, as

¹ Liv. xxxv. 42.

³ *Ibid.* 43, 4 f.

² *Ibid.* 43, 1-3.

⁴ *Ibid.* 43, 6.

indeed it had been in reliance upon the assurances of Thoas that he had taken his resolve.

On the news that the Great King was landed, a wave of excitement swept over Greece, not unmixed with disappointment at the meanness of his following. The political situation his presence created was to some extent ambiguous. He still professed innocence of any purpose hostile to Rome. He had not come to conquer Roman territory, but to achieve the very thing which the Romans declared to be their object—to emancipate Hellas from foreign control. If the Romans were sincere in recognizing Greek independence, what objection could they raise to the presence of a friendly king on these shores? If the Greeks were free, why might they not be friends with Rome and Antioehus alike? It cannot be denied that the glowing language of the phil-Hellenie party in Rome gave some hold to such contentions.¹

But the phrases of neither side could now conceal from anybody the real fact that what each power meant by the freedom of Greece was the predominance in every state of the faction subservient to itself—in fine, its own supremacy.

Immediately after the arrival of Antioehus at Demetrias a meeting of the Aetolian Federal Assembly was held at Lamia (in Aetolian possession for the last century),² confirming the previous invitation to Antioehus. The King appeared in person. He was received with a storm of applause. Under the circumstances his speech was necessarily somewhat apologetic, but he promised that the spring should really show Greece those colossal armies and fleets of which they had heard so much; and meanwhile—well, he would thank the Aetolians to provide supplies for the troops which accompanied him. The Roman party among the Aetolians, reduced to futilities, were for an impossible compromise, by which, instead of war being declared with Rome, the services of Antioehus should be requested, as arbitrator only.³ It happened that the president of the year belonged to this party,

¹ Liv. xxxv. 46, 5 f.

² Niese i i. p. 8.

³ The party of wealth among the Aetolians was more than proportionately represented in the Council, Brandstädter, *Gesch. des Aetolisch. Landes*, p. 308.

but even his influence was overwhelmed by the popular feeling. Antioehus was elected Commander-in-Chief of the Confederation, and a body of thirty, chosen from among the Inner Council, the *Apokletoi*, was appointed to assist him with its advice.¹

¹ Liv. xxxv. 43, 7-44, 9 ; Polyb. xx. 1. Appian (Syr. 12) puts the election of Antioehus as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* before the mission of Thoas to Asia.

CHAPTER XX

THE WAR IN GREECE

THE Great King was in Greece. He and his Aetolian allies were confronted by a twofold problem—how to make themselves masters of the country, and how to parry the consequent attack of Rome. They must proceed at once to the accomplishment of the first part of their task if there was to be any chance of their succeeding in the second. Greece lay before them derelict, left by the expulsion of the Macedonians and the retirement of Rome to its own caprices and powers of defence. The sudden move of Antioehus in entering Greece at that late season of the year, with many drawbacks, had one advantage. It had taken Rome by surprise. Rome had absolutely no troops on the east of the Adriatic except the force of Baebius at Apollonia—two legions with auxiliary contingents—which could not cross the mountains of Epirus till the spring, and the 3000 Roman and Italian infantry on the vessels of the praetor Atilius. Titus Flamininus and his fellow-commissioners had to depend almost entirely for stopping the progress of Antioehus upon the levies of the Greek states themselves, the states friendly to Rome. Upon these, however, they could count only so long as the states themselves did not veer, and there was, we have seen, in all or most of them, a party favourable to Antioehus. A series of not unlikely changes of government, if one may use the modern phrase, might put Antioehus *ipso facto* in possession of Greece. The only body of troops not drawn from the country itself which the Romans had at their disposal, beside the 3000 with Atilius, was the Pergamene

force brought up at a fortunate moment by King Eumenes. His squadron had appeared in the Euripus just after the attempt of the Aetolians upon Chaleis had failed, and whilst Eumenes proceeded himself to Athens he had dropped in Chaleis, by the request of Flamininus, a garrison of five hundred.¹ Only two years before the great Liberator had drawn the Roman garrison from that critical post with every circumstance of disinterestedness and magnanimity.

Antioehus and the Aetolians immediately put forth all they commanded of material force or diplomatic address to win over the cities and states of Greece. The Roman envoys, on the other hand, brought their moral weight to bear to keep the states faithful. There ensued everywhere simultaneously an intense trial of strength between the two parties.² The Boeotian League soon began to trim.³ Even the favoured Athens showed signs of unrest, and Flamininus was called in by the Roman party to drive the popular leader Apollodorus into exile, whilst at the Piraeus.⁴

At Aegium, before the Achaean Assembly, the envoys of Antioehus and Flamininus met face to face. In answer to the royal envoy's imposing catalogue of the nations which his master would bring into the field—Kurds, Parthians, Medes and Elamites—the Roman propounded a homely parable. It reminded him, he said, of a friend of his who set what seemed every variety of flesh and game before his guests, and in the end it turned out to be all culinary disguises of the common pig! All these formidable names cloked the same miserable breed of Syrians!—a statement of a fine free boldness in ethnology. Of the Achaean Antioehus had thought it unwise to ask more than neutrality; but here the Roman influence was so strong that even this proposition was rejected and the Achaean militia placed at Flamininus' disposal.⁵

Chaleis, of course, was the point of the most immediate

¹ Liv. xxxv. 39.

² Niese (ii. p. 692, note 4) points out that the elder Cato was sent from Rome at this time to co-operate with Flamininus, and was active in Corinth, Patrae, Aegium and Athens, Plutarch, *Cato Major*, 12.

³ Liv. xxxv. 50, 5; Polyh. xx. 2.

⁴ Liv. xxxv. 50, 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 48 f.; Plutarch, *Titus*, 17.

consequence to Antioehus. His first attempt to seize it had been conducted in person, as the initial step in that plan of campaign which he had concerted with the Aetolians. But the Roman party in power, led by the magistrate Mieythion,¹ resisted his overtures, encouraged, no doubt, by the Pergamene force within their walls. It could not fail to come now to an exertion of force, on the one side to capture, on the other to retain, the important city.²

Antioehus, after his rebuff, had withdrawn to Demetrias to gather troops, and an advanced detachment under Menippus of 3000 was soon on its way, supported by the Seleueid fleet under Polyxenidas. This man, the King's admiral, is the same Rhodian exile of whom we heard seventeen years ago as the commander of a Cretan corps in Parthia. Antioehus himself followed with the main body—6000 of his own troops and a hastily levied body of Aetolians whom he picked up at Lamia. The opposite side, on their part, hurried up reinforcements. Eumenes sent on an addition to the Pergamene garrison under Xenoelides, one of the chiefs of the Roman party in Chaleis ; the Aehaeans, at Flamininus' suggestion, a body of 500 men, and a third body of 500 Romans (drawn doubtless from the ships of Atilius) followed at an interval. All these bodies were racing for the Euboean Straits. The Aehaeans and the men of Eumenes arrived first and threw themselves into the city. Next came Menippus, and by occupying Hermaeum, the embarking-place near Salganeus, cut off the Roman force from the passage. The latter, on finding this, moved to Delium, twelve miles along the coast, in order to cross thence. War, in spite of all the diplomatic contention and the manoeuvring of troops, had not been declared, but Menippus could now only preserve the forms of peace by allowing the Roman force to proceed. With this alternative he fell upon them suddenly, in the very sanctuary of Apollo, cut down the majority, and took fifty prisoner; only a handful escaped. The first blood was drawn in the quarrel. For the moment the sudden stroke was brilliantly successful.

¹ *Μικυθίων Μικυθίωνος Χαλκιδεύς*, Michel, No. 655, 1. 230. Appian (Syr. 12 makes him a general of Antioehus, confusing him with Menippus !

² Liv. xxxv. 46.

When the King moved up to Aulis the Roman party in Chaleis were cowed and the city opened its gates. Micythion, Xenoelides and their partizans fled. The Achæan and Pergamene forces, as well as the survivors of the Romans, entrenched themselves in the little towns on the mainland opposite, but were compelled to evacuate them on the King's promising to let them depart unmolested. The fall of Chaleis was immediately followed by the submission of the whole of Euboea.¹

The Roman commissioners were now unable to prevent the movement in Antioehus' favour spreading like fire throughout Greece. Elis, by tradition associated with Aetolia and hostile to the Aehæans, notified him of its adherence. The Epirots thought it prudent to secure themselves on both sides by offering their alliance, but offering it on condition that Antioehus should move into their country.² Boeotia ranged itself definitely at last on his side and received him at Thebes with popular acclamations.³ His statue was erected by the League in the temple of Pallas Itonia at Coronea.⁴

A more useful ally than any of these Greek states Antioehus had in Amynander, the king of the Athamanians, one of the semi-barbarous peoples, akin to the Hellenes, who inhabited the mountain regions on the confines of Aetolia and Thessaly. Amynander was now to a large extent under the influence of an adventurer, who played a somewhat conspicuous part in the events of that time, a certain Philip of Megalopolis. This man was of a Macedonian family settled in Arcadia, and he made no less a claim than to be descended from Alexander himself.⁵ His sister, who bore the royal name of Apama, was married to Amynander, and Philip accompanied her to the Athamanian court as a convenient place whence he could

¹ Liv. xxxv. 50, 5 f. ; App. Syr. 12 ; Diod. xxix. 1.

² Liv. xxxvi. 5, Polyb. xx. 3.

³ Liv. xxxvi. 6 ; Polyb. xx. 7.

⁴ Liv. xxxvi. 20, 3.

⁵ Niese (ii. p. 693, note 2) suggests that his reputed ancestor was Heracles, the illegitimate son of Alexander. It is equally possible that it was the young Alexander. When princes are secretly made away with, it is almost the rule for stories to go abroad that they really survived unknown. Is it not the case that to-day in France there is some one who induces 2 number of people to believe him the descendant of Louis XVII ?

blazon his pretensions to the Macedonian throne. Even if he was not taken altogether seriously by the world at large, Antioehus and the Aetolians thought it worth while, in order to secure the co-operation of Amynder, to encourage Philip's ambition. If they still had any hopes of the real King Philip's help, this was hardly the way to make him their friend.¹

The King's heart was lifted high by these successes. He was of too unsteady a judgment to feel how unsubstantial they were. He had seized the object of his ambition in the* absence of the competitor; the real bout would not begin till Rome turned to recover what it had lost. The adhesion of Eleans and Boeotians, in the moment that he possessed the field, meant little. Their co-operation was a feeble quantity, even if it were assured, and it would be assured only so long as it seemed to pay. To achieve the first part of the task, to occupy Greece (and even that Antioehus had done so far very imperfectly), was futile in the extreme, unless the second part of it, the repulse of Rome, was to be achieved in its turn. A commander of any sense in the position of Antioehus would have subordinated every consideration to that of checking the Roman attack which must come with the opening spring.

The natural barriers which defended Greece on the side of Rome were, first the sea, and secondly the mountains of Epirus, in conjunction with the dominions of Philip. Instead of using every effort to gain command of these, Antioehus called a council of his allies at Demetrias to form plans for the occupation of Thessaly. Hannibal, since the influence of Thoas had been in the ascendant with Antioehus, had been relegated to the background. On this occasion, however, our account says, the King asked his opinion. Then amidst the extravagances of courtiers a sane voice made itself heard. Hannibal tried to open the King's eyes; it was with Rome he had to do. The plan he proposed included the establishment of a naval base at Coreyra, to command the sea on the west; the occupation in strength by the King himself of the valley of the Aous, to prevent the Romans throwing troops

¹ Liv. XXXT. 47 ; App. Syr. 13.

across the mountains of Epirus from Apollonia, and, above all, an alliance with Philip, without which the Romans could move troops from Apollonia into Greece by way of western Macedonia. The alliance of Philip would be the greatest weight in the scales; and if it could not be procured, Philip must at least be rendered harmless by the King's son, Seleueus, making a diversion on his Thraean frontier. Besides this, since Antioehus had, against Hannibal's advice, chosen as the battle-ground between himself and Rome a country such as Greece, which could furnish him but poorly with provisions or troops, he must remedy these disadvantages by importing men, material and food on a large scale from Asia, and use all the naval force available for keeping the army in Greece in touch with its source of supplies. The only part of this scheme which the Seleueid council thought fit to adopt was the dispatch of Polyxenidas to bring up reinforcements from Asia.¹

Whether an alliance with Philip, as Hannibal advised, was really a practicable policy may be questioned. Hannibal, looking at the situation solely in reference to a conflict with Rome, was, of course, perfectly right from his point of view—the strategical. But the political difficulties of such a course were probably insuperable—that is, if Antioehus intended to retain an ascendancy in Greece. The house of Antigonos could never do anything to help the house of Seleueus to that. It seems that Philip afterwards asserted that Antioehus had at one time offered him as the price of his alliance 3000 talents, 50 decked ships, and *all the Greek states* which he had formerly dominated.² If this was true it was certainly not disinterested attachment to Rome which made Philip refuse the offer.³ But whilst Antioehus was debarred from an alliance, to induce Philip to remain a passive spectator was probably possible by careful management. A difficulty was, no doubt, constituted by Philip of Megalopolis. To countenance him perhaps appeared necessary in order to retain the Atha-

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 6 f. ; App. Syr. 14.

² Liv. xxxix. 28.

³ As Flathe (*Geschichte Macedoniens*, ii. p. 424, note) observes, it is difficult to believe, "dass Antioehos seine Bedingungen in der That so, wie Philipp sagt, gestellt hat. Was werden dazu alle Griechen und die Aetoler gemeint haben !"

manian alliance; but he could not be countenanced without serious offence to King Philip. It may have been that Antioehus felt he had to choose between the active co-operation of the Athamanians and the neutrality of Macedonia, and preferred to sacrifice the latter. Prudence, at any rate, directed that, if the claims of Philip of Megalopolis were supported, he should be dissuaded, as far as possible, from flaunting them in such a way as to goad King Philip into active hostility. This Antioehus failed to do. The pretender was allowed to inter with ostentatious ceremony the bones of the Macedonian soldiers, which King Philip had been obliged to leave whitening the field of Cynos-eephalae. It was an outrageous blunder. Before Antioehus had been many months on Greek soil, the King of Macedonia was offering himself, heart and soul, to the Roman praetor, Marcus Baebius, at Apollonia.¹

When the funeral of the fallen Macedonians was celebrated, the army of Antioehus was already encamped by the Thessalian city of Pherae. Thessaly, surrounded on all sides by mountains, is again divided by a line of hills which run through it north and south into an eastern and a western plain. It was in the former that the three great cities of Thessaly, Larissa, Crannon and Pherae, were placed. The Romans, after wresting this country from the dominion of Macedonia, had formed the Thessalians into a distinct confederation, setting the seat of the federal government at Larissa.

Antioehus, moving from Demetrias and crossing the rim of hills which surrounds Thessaly by the pass now called Pilav-Tepeè would descend immediately upon Pherae. The whole distance between Demetrias and this town is not more than twelve miles. As soon as he had been joined by the Aetolians and Athamanians, the work of capturing the Thessalian towns began. The government friendly to herself, which Rome had installed at Larissa, sent reinforcements in vain. First Pherae was summoned to embrace the cause of Antioehus, and when the authorities within refused, it was reduced by force. The surrender of Seotussa, across the jagged hills which here divide the two plains, immediately followed. Then Crannon fell—all within ten days of the

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 8; App. Syr. 16.

King's appearance in Thessaly. At Craunon Antioehus was only ten miles from Larissa.¹ But before approaching the capital of the League the allied forces turned back to subjugate the western plain, and received the submission of Cierium and Metropolis (near mod. Karditsa). We can perhaps trace the impatience of the Aetolians and Athamanians to possess themselves of this region neighbouring their own mountains. The northern parts of the plain were, at any rate, after conquest made over specially to the Athamanians: Aeginium (mod. Kakbaka), commanding the pass through the mountains to the north-west where the Peneus breaks through into the Thessalian plains; Gomphi, commanding another pass farther south; Triea (mod. Trikkala, the principal town of western Thessaly), on a spur of the northern wall above the Peneus—all these and other places of less importance are found the following year in Athamanian hands. When Antioehus sat down before Larissa the rest of Thessaly was already conquered. There were some exceptions—Pharsalus in the south, Atrax, the stronghold which commanded the road along the Peneus from Larissa to the western plain, and Gyrtion. Pharsalus, however, before the winter closed in voluntarily espoused the King's cause, and whilst Antioehus paraded his phalanx and elephants before Larissa, the Athamanians and Menippus with an Aetolian force were operating separately in Perrhaebia and the hills on the north-western corner of Thessaly. Pellinaeum, about ten miles above Atrax on a tributary of the Peneus, received a strong Athamanian garrison.

Antioehus, before threatening force against Larissa, had exhausted every means of conciliation. He had argued with the city's envoys and dismissed unhurt the contingent of Larissaeans captured in Seotussa. Neither persuasion nor intimidation had availed; it was late in the season to begin a siege. Now, however, Antioehus began to taste the fruits of his alienation of Philip. The cordial *entente* between Philip and the Romans opened the way from Apollonia into Greece through Macedonia. In the country of the Dassaretæ above Apollonia, Philip had a personal conference with Baebius, and while Antioehus was winning his easy laurels in Thessaly a

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 9-10, 1.

Roman detachment under Appius Claudius was making its way through the defies of Macedonia, and one night the army at Larissa descried its watch-fires on the crest of the hills to the north near Gonni. Appius disposed his little force so as to give it the appearance of a large army. Antioehus still shrank, in spite of the unfortunate incident of Delium, from overt hostilities with Rome. He immediately abandoned the idea of a siege and retired to Demetrias, alleging the advance of winter as a reason for suspending the campaign. Garrisons, Seleueid or Athamanian, were left in the conquered towns. Larissa was saved to the Romans. They retained, thanks to Philip, the northern gate of Greece.¹

In the early winter months of 191, as soon as the new consuls, Publius Seipio and Manius Aeilius Glabrio, had assumed office, the Roman Republic, with all religious and formal circumstance, declared war on King Antioehus.² For his part, the King employed the winter in contracting a new marriage. He had been seized with a passion for the daughter of a citizen of Chaleis, Cleoptolemus, and insisted on making her his queen, styling her Euboea, as if she were the patron goddess of the island. The display and indulgence with which it is the fashion of Asiatic courts to celebrate a royal marriage were strange to Greece, and the spectacle, combined with the inequality of rank and age between the King and his bride, and the grave circumstances of the hour, caused wide scandal.³ Discipline was relaxed, and the taverns of the Eub?ean towns were filled with the King's soldiery.⁴ As soon, however, as the season allowed, the King took the field. The allied forces met at Chaeronea. It was determined as the first step of the campaign to conquer Aearnania. That this movement had a place in any rational scheme of strategy is improbable. Aearnania adjoined the country of the Aetolians ; for ages it had eluded their grasp; it was the only country in northern Greece which had not made its submission to Antioehus and his allies. This was probably all; and meanwhile Greece lay open on the north, and no attempt was made

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 10 ; App. Syr. 16.

² Liv. xxxvi. 1.

³ *Ibid.* 11 ; App. Syr. 16 ; Polyb. xx. 8 ; Diod. xxix. 2 ; Just. xxxi. 6, 3.

⁴ Plutarch, *Philop.* 17.

to reduce Larissa or shut that door against the advance of the legions.

Antioehus inaugurated the campaign, as he had done that of the previous year, by sacrificing at a historic shrine. He had now access to the central shrine of the Greek race, to Delphi itself, and there he endeavoured to win the favour of the patron god of his house, and display himself to the world as the consecrated champion of Hellenism. The expedition into Aearnania brought, after all, little credit. Antioehus did indeed occupy Medeon, but this was only through the treachery of an Aearnanian notable, Mnasiloehus, and Clytus, the *strategos* of the Aearnanian Confederation. The island of Leueas, the seat of the federal government, was held in awe by the fleet of Atilius, a section of which watched events from Cephallenia close by. A few other petty towns beside Medeon were occupied, but Antioehus was still defied by Thyrraeum when tidings came which rudely disturbed his dreams of conquest.¹

The Romans after declaring war had taken energetic measures. They did not, like Antioehus, leave to hazard the vital question of supplies. The praetor of the past year in Sicily was ordered to stay on in the island with his successor and be responsible for the transport of corn from that great granary to the army in Greece.² A commission was sent to Carthage to supervise the shipment of African corn to the same destination.³ Meanwhile the other states of the Mediterranean were offering their services—Carthage, Masinissa, and even Antioehus' own son-in-law, Ptolemy Epiphanes.⁴ Most momentous of all was the intimation that the King of Macedonia was at their command. Antioehus found no independent support outside Asia and Greece—an indication how his chances, after the flourish of his campaign in northern Greece, seemed to stand. Rome on her part would not let even that admission of weakness escape her which might seem

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 11 ; App. Syr. 16.

² Liv. xxxvi. 2.

³ *Ibid.* 3.

⁴ Niese (ii. p. 696, note 1) pronounces this embassy of Ptolemy's a fiction, on the ground that, if he had offered help, the Romans would have accepted it. But do we know all the considerations which would be present to the mind of the Romans in such a matter ?

implied in her accepting help from without. She would take nothing from the African powers but the grain of Carthage and Numidia, and that for a just price. Of Philip she only required that he should second the Roman commander.¹

On the 3rd of May 191 the consul, Manius Aeilus, left the city in the garb of war. An army of 20,000 foot, Roman and Italian, and 2000 horse was concentrated at Brundisium by the 15th of the same month.² But Baebius and his two legions had taken the offensive before the arrival of the consular army upon the scene. Baebius had been content the previous year, and justly so, with the relief of Larissa; as soon as the spring came he took advantage of its possession. In conjunction with King Philip and a Macedonian army, the propraetor descended upon Thessaly. The rumour of this advance, carried by Octavius, one of the subordinates of Flamininus, to Leucas, caused Antioehus to throw up the conquest of Aearnania and retire in trepidation to Chaleis.

On entering Thessaly, Baebius and the Macedonians turned in the first instance westwards. Their object was, no doubt, to free the passes so important for Roman communications. The Perrhaebian towns which Menippus had taken the preceding year were speedily recaptured, and the Athamanian garrisons ejected from the places which they held. Pellinaeum, held by the flower of the Athamanian soldiery under Philip of Megalopolis, offered a more stubborn resistance. Baebius was sitting before it, and King Philip before the neighbouring Limnaeum,³ when the consul Aeilus appeared in the Macedonian camp. His legions had still to enter Greece by way of Macedonia and Larissa; the consul had pressed on in advance with the mounted troops, either by the same route or more directly across the hills. Limnaeum, with its garrison of Seleucid and Athamanian troops, at once surrendered; Pellinaeum soon after.⁴ The Roman and Macedonian forces then separated; Philip carried the war into Athamania itself

¹ Li v. xxxvi. 4 ² *Ibid.* d, 13.

³ *Ibid.* 13.

⁴ Philip of Megalopolis now fell into the hands of King Philip, who lowered himself to mock the sorry pretender. He ordered his troops to receive him with the royal salute, and himself greeted him as "brother," "hand sane deoro maiestati suae ioco."

and annexed the country, Amynder flying over the borders. The consul moved to Larissa to concentrate the Roman troops, and thence, after the men were reposed, began the march south.

The flimsy fabric of Seleucid rule in Thessaly instantly collapsed. Antiochus, still short of troops, could give his garrisons there no hope of relief. Even before Aemilius had reached Larissa, Cierium and Metropolis had advised him of their return to allegiance; Crannon, Seotussa, Pherae, Pharsalus delivered up their garrisons on his approach. These garrisons, composed, of course, largely of mercenaries, were, to the number of one thousand men, willing to exchange the service of Antiochus for that of Philip.

Without turning aside to attack Demetrius, the Roman commander struck straight for the ridges of Othrys, which separate Thessaly from the valley of the Spercheus. It was in that valley that Lamia, the capital of the Aetolian League, lay; through it ran the road to central Greece. The Othrys range was another defensible barrier between Antiochus and the Romans. But as the Romans advanced they met no force of the King's. The road over Othrys, about six miles from Pharsalus, passes close under the fastness of Proerna. This yielded to Aemilius. Another six miles farther on, where the road begins to climb, was the strong town of Thaumaci.¹ Its inhabitants tried to harass the Roman advance by guerilla tactics, but got severe punishment. The next day the Romans descended the southern slope of Othrys. They began wasting the fields of Hypata in the Spercheus valley, about twelve miles above Lamia.²

It was not cowardice which restrained a king of the Seleucid stock from confronting the enemy; it was the hopeless slipshod of his military organization. Antiochus had placed no troops upon Othrys because he had none to place. The great hosts from Asia, upon which everything hung, had never arrived. As soon as the Romans entered Thessaly he gave up that country for lost, and removed his base from Demetrius to the safer distance of Chaleis. He had indeed

¹ This is the Domokó, about which we heard in the late Greco-Turkish war.

² Liv. xxxvi. 14.

at one moment hoped to arrest the Romans on Othrys; some scanty reinforcements which had at last straggled across the Aegean kept the force at his disposal at its original figure of 10,000 foot and 500 horse, in spite of the loss of his garrisons in Thessaly.¹ He summoned the Aetolians to muster at Lamia; their levy, added to his own force, would make, if Thoas had spoken the truth, a respectable total. At Lamia disillusionment awaited Antioehus; some Aetolian notables presented their insignificant bands; these were all, they assured him, their utmost endeavours had succeeded in raising. The young men nowadays, they added lamely, were not what they used to be. Antioehus now understood the real character of the high-flown Greek patriotism on which he had counted. He finally abandoned Thessaly, Othrys, the Spercheus valley; his only hope lay in checking the Romans at the next barrier, the Oeta range, which narrows the entrance into Central Greece to the road between mountain and sea at Thermopylae. If he could hold up the Romans at that historic passage till the expected reinforcements came!²

Antioehus took up a position on the inner (east) side of the pass, and laboured to supplement its natural difficulties with barricade and trench and wall. Time had brought about strange revenges when the post of Leonidas was occupied by a Hellenic Xerxes, professing to fight in the cause of Greek freedom. Aetolian bands to the number of four thousand by this time joined him. These Antioehus told off to hinder the advance of the Romans by protecting the territory of Hypata from their ravages and occupying Heraealea. That city was conveniently placed to command the tracks which led across the back of Oeta. When, however, the consular army advanced steadily, and took up a position at the west end of the pass, Antioehus grew uneasy. History furnished him with both

¹ According to Livy (xxxvi. 14, 5) the garrisons in the towns captured before the separation of the Roman and Macedonian armies amounted to 4000 men. The parallel passage in Appian (Syr. 17) says: *εἶλον δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀνγιο-
χείων ἐς τριαχιλίους*. Niese supposes that the 4000 in Livy consist of 3000 Seleucid troops and 1000 Athamanian and miscellaneous. The garrisons captured by the Romans in their advance from Larissa were disarmed and conveyed to Demetrias, except the 1000 who voluntarily took service under Philip. Of course, only a moderate degree of reliance can be placed upon the figures.

² Liv. xxxvi. 15; App. Syr. 17.

an encouragement and a warning. It had not been found possible to break through the pass if it was resolutely held, but over and over again the position of the defenders had been turned by the mountain tracks. Antioehus sent a message to the Aetolian force in Heraelea to occupy the heights. Only half their number thought good to obey this order of their Commander-in-Chief.¹

When the main body of the Romans assaulted the pass they were unable to make any impression. Antioehus had posted his phalanx, with its huge Macedonian spears, across the way, protected on its right, where the beach formed a sort of morass, by the elephants, while the heights on its left were lined with archers, slingers, and javelineers, who enfiladed the Roman column with a galling rain of missiles from the unshielded side. Even when the stubborn fury of their attack made the phalanx give ground they were brought to a stand by the fortifications behind which it retired to renew the fight at an incontestable advantage. Then history repeated the old drama of Thermopylae. The attention of the Seleucid troops was caught by a body of men moving far up on the heights above them. It must be a reinforcing party of Aetolians. As they descended nearer, as their standards and equipment became distinguishable, they were known for Romans.² The consul had detailed a part of his infantry under the consulars, Lucius Flaeus and Marcus Cato, to force the mountain tracks. Two of the Aetolian stations had been unsuccessfully attempted by Elaeus, a third had been surprised sleeping off its guard by Cato and overpowered. It was his force which the defenders of Thermopylae now saw taking them in the rear. All that was left was flight. In a moment the pass which had bristled with *sarissae* was choked with a stampede — men, horses, elephants flying *pèle-mèle*. The King, wounded in the mouth, did not draw rein till he reached Elatea. The Romans followed, hacking at the confused mass which blocked their way, as far as Searphea, and would have carried the pursuit farther had there not been the royal camp to pillage. But the respite was short.

¹ Li v. xxxvi. 16.

² According to App. the Aetolian fugitives were first sighted.

Next morning before dawn the Roman cavalry was again scouring the roads, cutting down the bewildered fugitives right and left. The King himself eluded capture. When the pursuers reached Elatea he had made off with 500 men, the relics of his 10,000, to Chaleis.¹

The Greek expedition of Antioehus would have failed even had the Aetolians on Callidromus not slept at their post. No tactical skill on the field of battle could have compensated for the insecurity of his communications with Asia, an insecurity which could only be remedied by a far more systematic organization of transport and convoys than it was in the nature of an Oriental court to provide. About the time of the battle of Thermopylae a large fleet of transport vessels had been caught by the Roman admiral Atilius off Andros, and the corn destined for the invaders carried in triumph to the Piraeus and distributed to the Athenian people.²

Antioehus did not stay long at Chaleis. He made haste to set the breadth of the Aegean between himself and the Romans, and, together with his queen Euboea, regained Ephesus in safety. The return of the King did not of course necessarily mean the end of the conflict. The Seleucid army in Greece, it is true, was annihilated, but the Aetolians were still in arms, and to their envoys, who followed him to Ephesus, Antioehus dispensed money and showed his arsenals humming with the preparations for a gigantic war. There were still Seleucid garrisons dispersed among various towns—at Elis, for example,³ and Demetrias. A royal squadron of ten vessels was in the harbour of the latter town; it had touched at Thronium whilst the battle in the pass was going on, and when Alexander the Aearnanian had come aboard mortally wounded, bringing the tidings of disaster, it had sailed to Demetrias seeking the King.⁴

But any plans Antioehus may have formed for maintaining the struggle in Greece by his subsidies till he could throw a fresh army into the country were futile. All the Greek states which had joined him, Boeotia, Euboea, Elis, hurriedly

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 17-19; App. Syr. 18-20; Plutarch, *Cato Major*, 13 f.; Justin xxxi. 6, 5. ² Liv. xxxvi. 20. ³ *Ibid.* 31. ⁴ *Ibid.* 20.

made their peace with the Romans. His garrisons in Chaleis and Elis had, of course, to be withdrawn. Demetrias threw open its gates to Philip and the leader of the anti-Roman party committed suicide. By the terms of surrender the Seleucid troops there returned under Macedonian escort to Lysimaehia, and the ships in the harbour were allowed to depart unharmed.¹ The Aetolians, left to themselves, rapidly succumbed to the combined attack of the Romans and Philip. The siege of Naupaetus brought them to extremities, and they secured, by the good offices of Flamininus, an armistice in which to negotiate for peace at Rome.

Thus ended the crowning effort of the house of Seleueus to seize the Macedonian inheritance in Greece. One by one, after what seemed dissolution, had Antioehus III, during thirty years of fighting, restored (in appearance at least) the severed limbs to the body of the Empire. He had annexed the long-coveted Coele-Syria. At the end of the previous year he had, in addition to his dignity as Great King, made good to a large extent his title to be, as Alexander had been, the Captain-General of the states of Greece. At his accession the Empire had touched the lowest point of decline; last year it had touched its zenith. But Antioehus seemed born too late, when already a new competitor had entered the field. In the moment of its apparent triumph the house of Seleueus had received a terrific blow. So far, it is true, the King's recoil left the situation externally what it had been before his last venture, but he was confronted by an antagonist, victorious, resentful, and hard to turn from his slowly made resolves.

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 20 f.; 31, 3 ; 33, 6 ; Plutarch, *Titus*, 16.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR IN ASIA

ANTIOCHUS, we are told, did not at first understand the import of what had happened. He had struck a blow for Greece; the blow had failed; that was all; the *status quo*, which the Romans had wished to preserve, was restored. It was mortifying, but he must wait for another occasion. Our account goes on to say that it was Hannibal, now once more listened to with respect, who enlightened him as to the true position. Thoas also and the Aetolian envoys, instead of thwarting Hannibal as before, spoke to a similar effect. Antioehus felt himself to have retired to Asia Minor only as to a vantage ground, from which to spring again on Greece. But the Romans were not the people to submit to such a menace; Antioehus must expect to be struck at nearer home. Last year the problem before him had been to make sure the defences of Greece; now the problem was to make sure those of Asia.¹

It must be recognized that the position of Antioehus for defence, in spite of the catastrophe in Europe, was a strong one. The circumstances to which his defeat in Greece had been due, the difficulty of procuring reinforcements and supplies, did not exist on the eastern side of the Aegean. If the Romans had beaten him, it had been so far with the superiority of numbers on their side. It would be the Romans who would feel the difficulty of transport in undertaking a war in Asia. They had never yet sent an army so far from home, and, as a matter of fact, regarded the necessity

² Liv. xxxvi. 41.

of doing so with considerable apprehension. Even if their soldiers were better than the levies of Asia, they were confronted with the initial difficulty of getting them to Asia at all. The Asiatic dominions of Antioehus could be approached by water only; it was obvious that the first question to settle was the command of the sea. At one point indeed—the Hellespont—Asia almost touched Europe, but both shores of the Hellespont were in Seleueid occupation. The passage of an army through Thrace was under no circumstances easy; Antioehus by a prudent defence could make it almost impossible. The possession of Thrace was a great addition to his strength,

As soon as Antioehus realized the imminence of a Roman attack he took measures to secure both the sea and the Thraean Chersonese. To the latter he himself repaired with the ships in readiness, in order to superintend with his own eyes the dispositions for defence. Sestos and Abydos were strengthened; Lysimaehia was made a great depot. The guard of the sea was committed to the royal admiral, Polyxenidas of Rhodes, who was ordered to mobilize the rest of the fleet and actively patrol the islands (latter part of 191).¹

A dispatch from Polyxenidas soon called the King back to Ephesus; it announced that a Roman fleet was at anchor in the harbour of Delos.

The Romans were already about to take the offensive at sea. To do this was not only a prerequisite to an eventual invasion of Asia; so long as Antioehus threatened another descent on Greece it was an urgent measure of precaution. They needed to be masters of the sea, not only in order that they might reach Antioehus, but that Antioehus might not reach them. It must be remembered that when Gaius Livius arrived in Greek waters in the summer of 191 to supersede Atilius in command of the Roman fleet, the war in Greece was still going on. The Aetolians were making their stand at Naupactus, and rumours were flying of the King's preparations. Livius set out from the Piraeus to operate on the coasts of Asia.²

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 41 ; App. Syr. 21.

² Liv. xxxvi. 42.

For a naval war in that region the attitude of the islands and coast cities would be an important consideration. Even that part of Asia Minor which the house of Seleueus called its own was imperfectly subjugated. The coast had been conquered by the present King, after nearly half a century of separation, within the last twenty-five years, some of it within the last four. It was not a region where a long unbroken period of Seleueid rule had made its roots deep and its authority venerable. It did not confront an assailant as a compact whole. The cities, of course, differed in their actual status. Some, like Smyrna and Lampsacus, or the cities which had been freed by Rhodes since 197—Caunus, Myndus, and Iliarnassus—openly asserted their independence. Some, on the other hand, like Ephesus and Abydos, were completely at the King's disposal and filled with his troops. Between these two extremes were perhaps various grades of dependence. The majority of cities seem to have had no Seleueid garrison, but from prudence or inclination to have bowed to the King's control. With the appearance of a Roman fleet in this quarter we shall see a new situation created. The cleft of sympathies between the well-to-do classes and the populace, which had been so marked in Greece, then shows itself in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The cities sway between the two opposing forces. Some espouse the Roman cause with zeal; others change according to the circumstances of the hour. We hear of none, except those with royal garrisons, which dare to refuse their harbours to the Roman ships when these come near to demand them.

The case of the island states was different. To these the conquests of Antioehus had not yet extended. But they had, no doubt, felt themselves threatened, and they embraced the Roman alliance as an opportune protection. Among these states Rhodes had the pre-eminence. The policy of Rhodes had showed some uncertainty in the last few years. It had offered bold defiance to Antioehus in 197 as an ally of Rome. Since then Antioehus had courted its friendship not altogether in vain. When the Roman ships first appeared in the East, the Rhodian statesmen, conscious perhaps of the dangers to Greek liberty from either quarter, hesitated for a space to

commit themselves.¹ But they soon made up their minds to give the Roman admiral their co-operation, and, once ranged on that side, left no room for reproach in the matter of zeal. Samos, one of the states which had recovered its independence by means of Rhodes in 197,² Chios and Mitylene³ were also ready to throw in their lot with Borne. Delos, whose harbour had received the fleets of Livius, followed, as far as it could, a policy of neutrality, or rather of friendship with all the powers. It drew honours and presents from all parts of the Hellenic world, and would have been glad to alienate none of its benefactors. The gift of a chalice from King Antioehus is recorded in the registers of the Temple.⁴ But with the advent of the Roman forces it receives gifts year by year from their commanders.⁵

It need not be pointed out how great an advantage it was to the Roman fleet to have these islands as points of support in operating on the coast of Asia. It gave them both protection and posts of observation close to the enemy's positions. Chios became the main depot for the grain and other stores on which the Roman army depended.⁶

But it was the Pergamene kingdom upon which the Romans counted above all else. Eumenes was, of course, an energetic ally. He was to Asia what the traitor within the walls is to a beleaguered city. His local knowledge, his influence in the Greek cities, would be invaluable to an invader. His harbour-town, Elaea, would give them a foothold upon the mainland. His dominion cut off Antioehus from direct communication by land with the region of the Hellespont. Even for maintaining his position in Asia Antioehus depended upon his command of the sea.

The fleet of Livius counted eighty-one decked vessels, including the twenty-five taken over from his predecessor, and

¹ "Nee commissuros Rhodios ut iterum morarentur," Liv. xxxvii. 8, 2. "Rhodii, quo magis cessatumpriore aestate erat, eo," etc., *ibid.* 9, 5.

² See p. 42.

³ Liv. xxxvi. 43, 11; xxxvii. 10; 12, 5.

⁴ *Bull. corr. hell.* vi. (1882), p. 36, 1. 67.

⁵ Homolle, *Bull. corr. hell.* viii. (1884), p. 85. See von Schoeffer, *Pauly-Wissowa*, iv. p. 2484.

⁶ "Id erat horreum Romania, eoque omnes ex Italia missae onerariae derigebant cursum," Liv. xxxvii. 27, 1.

a large number of smaller craft. Carthage had sent a contingent of six ships; King Eumenes, voyaging home, accompanied the fleet with three.¹ Livius was being detained at Delos by contrary winds when the patrolling ships of Polyxenidas got tidings of him. Antioehus, as soon as the news reached him, hurried back to Ephesus. At a council of war it was decided, on the advice of Polyxenidas, to engage the enemy before he was joined by the allied fleets of Pergamos and Rhodes. The Romans, it was anticipated, would make for Pergamos, and to intercept them the Seleueid fleet, with King Antioehus on board, sailed northward. This fleet was less numerous than the Roman, comprising only seventy decked vessels, and the ships were smaller, but Polyxenidas put great confidence in their handier build and greater mobility and in the local knowledge of his seamen. The enemy's vessels were known to be carrying large cargoes of food, and so to be heavier in the draught. On reaching Phocaea the King's fleet got intelligence that the enemy was somewhere in the neighbourhood. Antioehus had no desire for personal experience of a fight at sea, and was put ashore. Polyxenidas then moved south again to Cissus, near Erythrae, hoping to catch the enemy, but his manoeuvring completely failed of its end. The Eoman commander slipped past on the outside of* Chios and got to Phoeaea unchallenged. Phoeaea was the first Greek town in the King's country which the Romans touched. It did not dare to offer them any opposition.² It was then a short matter for Eumenes to proceed to Elaea and bring up the Pergamene fleet. The united strength of Romans and Pergamenes in decked vessels reached 105. Livius, having successfully effected the junction, was as eager for an engagement as Polyxenidas.³ The King's admiral waited for the enemy in battle order off Cissus, his right wing resting on the shore. The engagement opened with the capture of a Carthaginian ship by two of the King's. But it soon became apparent that the mobility to which Polyxenidas trusted availed little against the Roman tactics. An attacking ship found itself grappled by the iron claws of the ponderous Roman and the fight was transformed to a hand-to-hand encounter. The

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 42.

² App. Syr. 22.

³ Liv. xxxvi. 43.

Seleueid left, where Livius directed the attack, was first broken, and the King of Pergamos, who was waiting in reserve, then flung his weight upon the right.¹ The Seleueid fleet was soon in full rout. Thanks to its lightness it escaped with the loss of only twenty-three vessels, thirteen of which were captured. The result aimed at by Livius was completely obtained; the Seleueid fleet, if not annihilated, was beaten off the sea. When the victors, now further strengthened by a Rhodian squadron of twenty decked ships under Pausistratus, made a demonstration off Ephesus, the King's admiral did not dare to go out to battle.² Erythrae almost immediately after is found to have joined the Roman alliance.³ The season for active operations closed, leaving the Romans masters of the Aegean. The allied fleets separated. The Romans, after visiting Chios and leaving five vessels at Phoeaea to secure its loyalty, beached their ships at Canae on the Pergamene coast and sat down to wish for the spring.⁴

But although the operations of war were suspended, the leaven of disaffection probably worked strongly among the Greek cities of the Seleueid "alliance." Cyme and the Aeolian cities generally, Colophon and Clazomenae had before long declared for the Romans. The ships of Cos came to fight alongside of the ships of Rhodes.⁵

Antioehus saw that every nerve must be strained during the winter if the campaign of 190 was to stem the progress of the Roman arms. He directed his own energies to the massing of the land-forces of his kingdom. The point of concentration was fixed at Magnesia, about thirty-five miles up the Hermus valley, out of sight of the Roman fleet, but not so far inland as Sardis, which lay in the same valley another thirty miles farther up. Antioehus went himself for the winter to Phrygia, to supervise the movement of troops. All Asia felt the strain of effort. Every province from the Mediterranean to Central Asia sent its choice of fighting men. Along all the

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 44.

² The Ephesian harbour lay *inland*, fully four miles from the open sea, with which it was connected by canal and the Caÿter.

³ Liv. xxxvii. 8, 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxxvi. 45 ; App. Syr. 22.

⁵ Cyme, Liv. xxxvii. 11, 15 ; Colophon, *ibid.* 26, 6 ; Clazomenae, Polyb. xxi. 48, 5 ; Cos, Liv. xxxvii. 11, 13.

roads companies of horse and foot in every variety of habit were moving to a common centre; men of nations that had long ago ruled in Asia, Assyrians, Medes, Lydians; men of the Greek and Macedonian stock that ruled since yesterday; half-savage peoples of steppe, desert and mountain—nomads of the Caspian, Arabs from the south on their camels, yellow-haired Galatians, whose fathers had descended from the forests of central Europe. Once more Asia with its medley of nations was uniting to repel an invader from the West, as it had united a century and a half before to repel Alexander under the hand of the last Persian king.¹

But the great host gathering on land loomed still in the background. It would not feel the impact of the legions till the way was opened by the conquest of the sea. The war was still among the ships. The Romans had, it is true, the upper hand at sea already. They had driven the Seleueid fleet into its harbour. They had convenient naval bases in the friendly islands, like Chios and Samos, or in the coast cities, like Phoeaea and Erythrae. They cut off the King's forces from the critical region of the Hellespont. But the King had not yet abandoned the contest. His fleet, if penned up, was not annihilated. The corsairs, who made common cause with him, might still prey upon the Roman corn-ships.² And Antioehus was determined to make a supreme effort to recover the sea. Such an effort implied in the first place a great increase in the fleet. Hammers and axes were busy all that winter in the docks of Ephesus, old vessels being repaired and new bottoms laid down. This work was done under the eye of Polyxenidas. But it was still, as in old Achaemenian days, the Phoenician cities from which the Great King mainly drew his naval strength. And the task of bringing up reinforcements from that quarter was appropriately confided to Hannibal. In the second place, it was important to dislodge the Romans from the footholds which they had on land, or at any rate prevent them from acquiring any more. The islands, whilst the Romans held the sea, were out of reach, but the cities of the mainland might be coerced, conciliated or overawed. The King's son Seleueus was stationed with a force in Aeolis, to

¹ Livr. xxxvii. 8; App. Syr. 21.

² *Ibid.* 14, 3; 27, 4.

wait for an opportunity to drive the Romans out of the places they had already won, and to counteract their solicitations in the case of cities which were still wavering.¹

Such were the preparations on the Seleucid side. The Romans improved the inactive season by a raid, made about mid-winter in concert with Eumenes, into the country about Thyatira—an expedition which proved lucrative enough in the matter of loot. When spring drew on, Livius thought himself already in a position to achieve the great object of all his naval operations, to secure the Hellespont for the passage of the legions. On his way north he landed in the Troad, and, like Antioehus, went up to sacrifice to the Athena of Ilion. The petty towns of the Troad—Elaeus, Dardanum and Rhceteum—put themselves into his hand. When the Roman squadron moved to the place where the transit of a bare mile of sea separated Sestos on the European, from Abydos on the Asiatic, shore, he proposed to reduce both towns. The Seleucid government depended for its hold in this quarter upon the strong garrison in Abydos. Sestos seems to have been undefended, and now, cut off as it was from the garrison opposite by the Roman ships, it first deputed the eunuch-priests of the Great Mother, the *galloi*, to deprecate an attack, and then formally capitulated.² The reduction of Abydos was naturally a much more difficult affair. It was, even so, pressed by the Roman commander to a point when the King's officer allowed the city to treat. But the siege was suddenly raised; tidings reached Livius of a grave sort.³

He had not in moving north left the rest of the Aegean denuded. The main part of his fleet was still at Canae. The Rhodians, when Livius launched his thirty ships, were already stirring. A squadron of thirty-six sail under Pausistratus, a bluff and ingenuous sailor, was put to sea. But now, in the absence of Livius, a great blow was struck on the side of the King. The hand was that of Polyxenidas, and the stroke did him little honour. He secretly conveyed to Pausistratus the intimation that he was ready as the price of his return to his native country (he was, it will be remembered, a banished

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 8.

² *Ibid.* 9 ; App. Syr. 23 ; Polyb. xxi. 6, 7.

³ Liv. xxxvii. 12.

Rhodian) to betray the King's fleet to the enemy. He was to neglect preparations and give Pausistratus the signal to attack. The crews indeed of the ships disappeared in a curious manner from Ephesus, and such a device as their being moved to the neighbouring Magnesia was remote from the simple mind of Pausistratus. He slipped into an easy confidence, and only waited at Panormus on the Samian coast for the signal of Polyxenidas. There he was, one morning, taken in front and rear simultaneously by Polyxenidas, and only five of the Rhodian ships escaped destruction or capture. Pausistratus himself perished in the attempt to break away in his flag-ship to the open sea.¹

The success, however shabby in its method, was substantial in its result. It was not the only one. Phoeaea had been made the previous winter the station of five ships of the Roman fleet. The place was of importance to Rome from its neighbourhood to Magnesia-on-Sipylus. It was also required to furnish its quota of corn to the Roman forces and a tale of 500 gowns and 500 tunics. These burdens, coming at a time of scarcity, raised murmurs among the townsfolk, and gave an advantage to the popular party, which here, as elsewhere, was less inclined to Rome than the governing class. The withdrawal of the ships when the ferment was once at work, instead of allaying it, only removed restraint. The presence of Seleueus in the neighbourhood gave the King's party, the *Antioehistai*, courage. In this predicament the city magistrates sent an urgent request to Seleueus to withdraw, declaring that the city's policy was to remain neutral and await the event. The message only made Seleueus hasten forward to use his opportunity. A gate was opened by the *Antioehistai* and Seleueus took possession of the city. It was at once secured by a strong garrison. Several of the Aeolian towns, including Cyme, transferred their allegiance to the King.²

Polyxenidas could filch a victory by the arts of an intriguer, but he could not use it. The annihilation of the

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 10 f. ; App. Syr. 24 ; Polyb. xxi. 6.

² Liv. xxxvii. 9, 14 ; 11, 15 ; App. Syr. 25 ; Polyb. xxi. 6. The acquisition of Samos at this time by Antioehus, asserted by Appian and Jerome, is a fiction (Niese ii. p. 727, note 2).

Rhodian fleet gave him an opportunity to fall upon the bulk of the Roman fleet at Canae before it could be got down to the sea or Livius come to its rescue. This, in fact, was what Livius feared he would do, and evacuated the Hellespont with all speed to hasten south. But he reached Canae, and Eumenes Elaea, without seeing the enemy. The beached ships had not been molested. The incident was nevertheless an awkward demonstration that the King's fleet, while it could hold itself out of reach, could keep the Romans and their allies to the strain of a close watch. Livius determined to remove his station to Samos, which was nearer Ephesus. There he was to meet a second Rhodian fleet of twenty sail, under Eudamus. On his way along the coast he made a descent upon Aeolis, and seized what he could of slaves or substance, in punishment of its desertion. He rallied his fleet, now joined by King Eumenes, in one of the harbours of Erythrae for the passage to Samos.¹ Polyxenidas was on the watch. But again, although a storm separated the Roman ships, he allowed the scattered portions to slip through his maladroit hands and regain Corycus (the Erythraean harbour) in safety. After this fiasco he retired to Ephesus; the Romans crossed to Samos unopposed, and effected a junction in a few days with the Rhodians.²

Things were now come to a deadlock. The allied fleets shut up Polyxenidas in Ephesus, but they themselves could not move away. And meanwhile the Hellespont was still in the King's hands, and a base for the cruisers which swooped down upon the Roman commissariat vessels. The Phoenician fleet was coming up from the east. Not to remain altogether inactive Livius landed a party of troops to pillage the country round Ephesus, but Andronicus, the commander of the garrison, drove them back by a successful sortie, with the loss of their plunder, to the ships.³ Livius now formed the naïve project of imprisoning the royal fleet in the harbour of Ephesus by sinking hulks at the entrance.⁴ He had not time

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 12.

² *Ibid.* 13, 1-7.

³ *Ibid.* 13, 8-10. App. (Syr. 25) mentions the pirate-captain Nicander as the repeller of this foray.

⁴ Liv. xxxvii. 14; Suidas, sub voc. *ἐρμα*.

to make the experiment. Lucius Aemilius Regillus, one of the praetors of the new year (190) arrived in Samos to take over the command. The next bout in the struggle, opened by his arrival, is characterized by an unsuccessful attempt on either side. *The attempt of the Romaiis was to establish a post in Lycia*¹

Such a move was prompted, so far as the Romans were concerned, by the necessity of intercepting the reinforcements from Phoenicia; but there was another motive at work. Just as the Aetolians had used the alliance of Antioehus to advance their own ambitions, so the allies of Rome sought to use her power for their separate ends. The Rhodians cherished the hope of adding Lycia to their dependencies on the mainland and designed to engage the Roman forces in the conquest. It was a Rhodian captain who suggested the move. In the unprofitable situation the suggestion was accepted by the Roman admiral.

Patara the capital of the Lycian Confederation, was the place chosen.² But Patara was held by a Seleueid garrison, and the townsfolk offered so fierce an opposition that Livius, who commanded the expedition, now as a subordinate of Aemilius, abandoned the enterprise and, sending his squadron to Rhodes, himself sailed away home. The expedition had incidentally the result of evoking a demonstration of zeal for the Roman cause on the part of the cities of Caria—Myndus, Halicarnassus, Cos,³ Miletus and Cnidus—of which the first thrée certainly, and the last two probably, had been for some time independent. Alabanda mentions in an inscription the services it rendered to the Roman armies, and these probably went back to the time before Magnesia.⁴ Mylasa also declared against Antioehus while the event of the war still hung in the balance.⁶

The crux, of course, in the position of the allies was,

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 14. The reinforcements said by Livy to have been brought by Aemilius" scheinen auf dem Papier geblieben zu sein," Niese ii. p. 729, note 3.

² Liv. xxxvii. 15.

³ Halicarnassus and Cos had already given help to the allied fleet before this expedition, Liv. xxxvii. 10, 11; 11, 13.

⁴ *Bull. corr. hell.* x. (1886), p. 301; cf. Liv. xxxviii. 13, 2.

⁵ Polyb. xxi. 48, 4.

shortly put, that the fleet was wanted in three places at once—before Ephesus to watch Polyxenidas, in Lycia to arrest Hannibal, and in the Hellespont. It could not be separated without setting Polyxenidas at large to harass the friends of Rome and attack the divisions of the fleet in detail. Polyxenidas understood the position and abided his time. However, after the failure of Livius the new admiral must do something. He felt that anything was better than to sit still in Samos, especially when another attack he had made on Ephesus had broken down. Accordingly, even at the cost of letting Polyxenidas loose, he determined to move the united fleet on Patara. The gathering of ships glided away from Samos sailing south. But the liberation of Polyxenidas would tell more heavily upon the people whose land was exposed to his ravages than upon the Romans. And the move of the commander was widely criticized by the subordinate officers, who reflected on the importance of retaining the good-will and confidence of their Asiatic allies. Aemilius was shaken in his resolution by these murmurs. The fleet got no farther than Loryma in the Rhodian Peraea. Then it returned after a mere waste of time to Samos.¹ *The Roman attempt to obtain a lodgment in Lycia had definitely failed.* There were seen to be no alternatives between dividing the fleet and lying idle in front of Ephesus.

The attempt on the part of Antioehus which corresponded in time with these events *was to crush the Pergamene kingdom.* Seleueus first made a dash with the force he had under him in Aeolis upon Elaea. Finding it prepared for defence, he at once moved, pillaging the country as he went, upon Pergamos itself. Simultaneously Antioehus left his winter quarters in Apamea and advanced upon the Pergamene territory by way of the Sardis-Thyatira road. The motley host which he had spent the winter in collecting was soon encamped about thirty miles from Pergamos near the sources of the Caïeus. In the absence of Eumenes, the government and defence of the kingdom were in the hands of his brother Attalus. But before the attack of the two Seleueid armies he could do no more than shut himself up in the walls of the

¹ Liv. xxxrii. 17.

capital and abandon the country to devastation. This was the posture of things reported to Eumenes on his return with the Romans to Samos. He at once hurried home and slipped through the besiegers' lines into the city. A few days after, the fleet of the allies, still united, made the port of Elaea. The danger of his chief ally had seemed to Aemilius a justification for again relaxing the blockade of Polyxenidas.¹

All this while the legions were drawing closer. The nominal command was held by the consul Lucius Cornelius Seipio, but the real direction was in the hands of his great brother Publius, the victor of Zama, who accompanied him with practically proconsular power.² There were the two legions of Aemilius which the Seipios had taken over in Greece, and they had brought with them from Italy two legions more—a force (Roman and Italian) of 13,000 foot and 500 horse.³ In Greece they had found the Aetolians, after a vain attempt to make terms at Rome, still in arms; but in order not to be diverted from their main object, the Seipios encouraged them to renew negotiations. An armistice was arranged for, which allowed the Roman army to press forward to Macedonia. And in this way the hopes which Antiochus had built upon the Aetolian resistance collapsed. The march through Macedonia and Thrace was made as easy as possible by the zeal of Philip, who had repaired the road, bridged the rivers, and laid up stores of provisions against the coming of the Romans. The Seleucid occupation of Thrace since 196 seems to have rested upon the garrisons in Aenus, Maronea, and Lysimachia.⁴ But these places remained apparently on the defensive; no opposition was offered to the Roman advance. The real difficulties, it was apprehended, would begin when the Hellespont was reached. A check there might threaten the Roman camp with famine.⁵

The rumour of their approach, as well, no doubt, as the consciousness that his attack on Pergamos was a failure, made the King lose all stomach for the war. He came down from the hills to the low country about Elaea, and

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 18 f.

² Niese ii. p. 721, note 1. ³ Liv. xxxvii. 6, 2. ⁴ *Ibid.* 60, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* 7, 8-16; 31, 2; App. Syr. 23; *Maced.* 9, 5.

leaving his infantry upon a neighbouring eminence, approached the city with his clouds of horse and asked to treat.¹ The answer, inspired by Eumenes, was that there could be no negotiations before the arrival of the consul.²

Behind the walls of Pergamos and Elaea the enemy was out of the King's reach. There was no time for a siege such as had given him Sardis, and Bactra, and Gaza in the glorious years of his reign. He could, of course, sweep the open fields, and his hordes in that spring of 190 made the gardens of the Pergamenes and Elaeans a desolation. Thence he passed to the plain of Thebe behind Adramyttium, the richest part of the kingdom of Eumenes, and gave it up to the will of his troops.³ Adramyttium itself he failed to take, Eumenes and Aemilius moving round into its harbour.⁴ Antioehus next went on to waste the territory belonging to the island city of Mitylene, which had joined the Romans—its possessions on the mainland—and having taken some obscure townships (Cotton, Corylenus, Aphrodisias, Prinne), returned the way he came to Sardis.⁵ Seleueus also withdrew from Pergamos to the Aeolian sea-board—a movement caused, says the account which emanates from the Achaean historian, by the damaging sorties made by a body of Aehaeans whom the League in virtue of its alliance with Eumenes had sent under Diophanes, a disciple of Philopoemen.⁶ But if Antioehus failed to capture Pergamos, the Romans equally failed to regain possession of Phoeaea. Reinforcements thrown into the city by Antioehus saved it. And the Romans resorted to as base a consolation as Antioehus—they wrought havoc among the shrines and works of art with which the neighbouring Baeehium was filled.⁷ In a word, neither side had succeeded in materially modifying the situation, as it had been when Aemilius first arrived, except that Hannibal on the one side, and Seipio on the other were come nearer.

Aemilins was reduced at last to divide the fleet. Eumenes and the Pergamene contingent were first detached to convey

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 18.

² Polyb. xxi. 10.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Liv. xxxvii. 19.

⁵ *Ibid.* 21, 4 f. (See Meischke, *Symbolae ad Eumenis historiam*, p. 89 f.)

⁶ *Ibid.* 20, 1-21, 4; App. Syr. 26; cf. Polyb. xxi. 9; Michel, No. 1220.

⁷ Liv. xxxvii. 21.

from Elaea to the Hellespont the material necessary for the passage of the consular army. The Roman and Rhodian fleets returned south to Samos. There a further division took place. The Rhodian fleet was sent to encounter Hannibal, and the Roman was left alone confronting Polyxenidas.¹

Eudamus, the commander of the Rhodian fleet, departed from Samos with the thirteen Rhodian vessels, one Coan and one Cnidian. On reaching Rhodes he found that the authorities at home had already anticipated the order of the Roman admiral, and had sent out a squadron under Pamphilidas. Their action had no doubt been accelerated by the fact that the Seleucid forces in Lyeia were becoming aggressive and had beset Daedala, the frontier fortress of the Rhodian Peraea, and others of their towns. Eudamus hastened to join his ships with those of Pamphilidas. When he came up with him, Pamphilidas was off the island of Megiste, twenty miles beyond Patara, having successfully relieved the frontier towns. Eudamus took command of the united squadrons and proceeded to Phaselis, where he intended to lie in wait for the Phoenician fleet.² But the year being at its hottest and the place malarious, the sickness which broke out among the crews compelled him to move on. The mountains of Pamphylia, unlike those of Lycia and Rough Cilicia, on either side of them, retreat from the coast, leaving a crescent-shaped plain between their feet and the sea. Towards the western extremity of this plain were the two Greek towns of Aspendus and Side, the former some few miles up the river Eurymedon, the latter twenty miles to the west on the coast. Each was distinguished by its steadfast enmity towards the other. In the quarrels which affected that region they were sure to be found on opposite sides. In the present instance Side was strong for the Seleucid cause; it furnished a redoubtable contingent to the King's fleet,³ being ranked in naval prowess with the Phoenician towns; Aspendus, of course, held by Rhodes and Rome. When Eudamus reached the Eurymedon the Phoenician fleet was already in the harbour of Side. The Aspendians gave him the intelligence. On the following day

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 22, 1.

² *Ibid.* 22, 2 f.

³ *Ibid.* xxxv. 48, 6.

the thirty-six Rhodian ships (thirty-two quadriremes and four triremes)¹ moved along the coast in a long column, the flagship of Eudamus leading. As they rounded a headland before Side the anxiously-expected Phoenician fleet came into view. It lay before them in line of battle, forty-seven sail, among them three great ships of seven banks of oars, and four of six. Its right was commanded by a nobleman of the court, Apollonius, and on its left was Hannibal. Eudamus immediately accepted the challenge, and stood out from shore so that the ships in rear might form into line on his left. Before there was room for the Rhodian left to come up into line, the right was engaged by Hannibal.² In spite of this initial disadvantage, the nimble seamanship of Rhodes gained the day. One of the towering giants of the King's fleet was disabled in a moment by the blow of a Rhodian vessel half its size. Where Hannibal was, indeed, the Phoenicians pressed Eudamus hard, but they were compelled to retire when their right was broken for fear of being cut off from the shore. Under some circumstances the Rhodian victory might not have been final; more than twenty ships of Hannibal's fleet were uninjured; the Rhodians, owing to the sickness which their rowers had contracted at Phaselis, could not press the pursuit effectively; the Phoenicians had the friendly Side and the Cilieian coast behind them as a refuge. But Hannibal could no longer hope to get his fleet in time past the victorious enemy, who henceforth lay to intercept him off Lyeia. All that was necessary for the purposes of the war had been done*; the Phoenician reinforcements on which the King counted were paralyzed.

The battle of Side spoilt the chance of Antioehus.⁸ Had fortune inclined the other way, the Phoenician fleet would have joined the fleet under Polyxenidas at Ephesus, and

¹ Its composition was as follows :—

(1) The squadron Eudamus had brought from Samos		13 ships
(2) Open ships added to his squadron in Rhodes		6 „
(3) Squadron of Pamphilidas		13 „
(4) Guard-ships from Carian coast		4 „

36 ships

² Liv. xxxvii. 23.

³ *Ibid.* 24 ; Nepos, *Hannib.* 8.

together they would have given battle to the Romans with an overwhelming superiority. And the command of the sea regained, the Hellespont would oppose an insuperable bar to the consular army, and place before it the alternatives of retreat or starvation. The land-forces of Koine, which could pierce to the interior of his kingdom, these were the enemy which exercised Antioehus; the naval war, wherever its battles might be fought, was in reality a struggle for the Hellespont.

The King's defences at the critical point were further weakened about the time of the disaster at Side by a diplomatic defeat not less galling and not less momentous. Prusias of Bithynia, after being beset with the solicitations of either side, at last somewhat unexpectedly ranged himself with the enemy. The letters of the Seipios had laboured to show him how enviable was the lot of those princes who were clients of the Republic. And their force had been carried home by Gaius Livius in person, who, after returning from the fleet to Rome, had been sent out again as special envoy to the Bithynian king.¹

There was now nothing for Antioehus to do but to make a supreme effort with the fleet of Polyxenidas. The enemy's forces at any rate were still divided, the Pergamenes in the north and a number of the Rhodian ships about Lycia. The King himself came down from Sardis to Ephesus that the encounter might take place under his own eyes. To draw the Romans from Samos, Polyxenidas moved out and attacked Notium, now a dependency of Colophon, and in fact its port. Colophon was the nearest to Ephesus of the cities which held by Rome. Antioehus brought up a force to Notium and threatened the town on the landward side. Aemilius had all this time been growing more and more impatient in Samos, and since Polyxenidas did not come out to engage him, had talked of going off to the Hellespont. When the cry of the Colophonians reached him he saw an opportunity for action at last.² He did not, however, proceed straight to Notium, but northwards, intending to revictual at Chios and punish Teos on the way for promising the King's fleet 5000 jars

¹ Polyb. xxi. 11 ; Liv. xxxvii. 25.

² Liv. xxxvii. 26.

of wine.¹ The wine dispatched from Italy to his own fleet had, he heard, been delayed by bad weather, and it seemed a happy thought to extort from the Teians those jars which they had collected for the King. Teos, on the neck of a rocky foreland, had a harbour on its northern as well as on its southern side. The Roman fleet sailed into the northern one and addressed their demands to the city.² Polyxenidas was informed of the enemy's movements. He knew the northern harbour of Teos to have a narrow entrance, and thought he had the Roman fleet in a trap. Immediately the King's fleet of eighty-nine sail, counting two ships of seven banks and three of six, made for Teos and concealed itself in a small island close by.³ Unfortunately the Romans had already removed to the other harbour, and instead of taking them in a trap, Polyxenidas found himself committed to another battle in the open. The Romans, on learning the neighbourhood of the royal fleet, got to sea with some confusion, Eudamus and the Rhodian contingent in the rear. Between the promontories of Myonnesus and Coryeus the hostile fleets came within each other's view. Polyxenidas was advancing in a column in double file. The Romans and their allies counted nine ships less than the King's admiral, and he at once tried to turn this numerical superiority to account by deploying so as to outflank the Roman right. This device was foiled by Eudamus and the Rhodians, who came up with disconcerting speed to the threatened flank.⁴ The fleets after this were locked in a general grapple. Then the royal centre gave and broke; the victorious Romans passed through the enemy's line and attacked the rear of his left, with which the Rhodians were engaged in front. The royal right, seeing what had occurred and the flag-ship of Polyxenidas in flight, abandoned the hopeless contest and spread their sails for Ephesus. A naval fight in ancient times was made up entirely of ramming and boarding; in the art of manoeuvring, necessary for the former, no seamen in the world could compare with those of Rhodes; in

¹ Niese (ii. p. 736) supposes that hitherto the Romans had respected the religious inviolability of Teos, which they had agreed to recognize some years before (see p. 47).

² Liv. xxxvii. 27.

³ *Ibid.* 28.

⁴ *Ibid.* 29.

boarding, it was man against man, the Roman against the Asiatic, Greek or Syrian. The Rhodian fire-ships had also materially contributed to the victory. On the King's side the loss was thirteen ships taken and twenty-nine burnt or sunk; the loss of the allies was only three, two Roman and one Rhodian. The King himself, his elephants and cavalry displayed about him, had watched the action from the shore.¹

After this third and decisive battle *the naval war was ended in favour of Rome*. That war had been to Antioehus all along a struggle for the Hellespont; with his final defeat he gave up the Hellespont for lost. It must come at last, he saw, to a battle of the phalanx and the legion, and with his impulsive precipitancy he abandoned everything but preparations for that encounter. His instinct was to draw his forces about him; Lysimaehia, in spite of the entreaties of the citizens, was evacuated and its garrison recalled to Asia; the siege of Colophon was raised. For a time the garrison in Abydos was retained; then that too was withdrawn.² The King sat down in Sardis, and sent his messengers to bring up troops from Cappadoeia and from wherever else they could be found. He could not even spare a force for the relief of Phoeaea, which the Romans soon after their victory had proceeded to besiege. The city, on being promised good treatment, capitulated, and its harbour was chosen as the station of the Roman fleet for the winter, which was now close at hand.³

The evacuation of Lysimaehia was an agreeable surprise to the Seipios, since the city could have sustained a long siege and created a difficult delay. In his haste Antioehus had even omitted to remove or destroy the stores of which it was full, and they were a godsend to the Roman soldiers. No enemy appeared to trouble their passage of the Hellespont; all the necessary material had been prepared by Eumenes and was waiting for them. With unlooked-for ease the Romans found themselves encamped on Asiatic soil.

Antioehus at his former overtures for peace had been told to await the arrival of the consul. While the Romans were

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 30 ; xl. 52 ; App. Syr. 27.

² Liv. xxxvii. 31 ; App. Syr. 28 ; Diod. xxix. 5.

³ Liv. xxxvii. 32.

still, for reasons connected with the religious calendar,¹ halted on the shores of the Hellespont, Heraelides, a Byzantine, appeared in their camp as envoy from the King. He was instructed to approach Publius Seipio especially, both because of his reputation for magnanimity, and because his son had at some time during the war been captured by Seleueus, and was being treated with every sort of consideration at the royal court.² Antioehus was prepared to make large concessions. The Thraeian question, his envoy said, no longer existed, since Antioehus had already evacuated his European province;³ on the question of the Greek cities of Asia also he would give way, recognizing the independence of Smyrna, Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas, and all the cities which had allied themselves with Rome. That is to say, *Antioehus surrendered the whole original ground of quarrel*. But besides this he would pay an indemnity amounting to half the costs of the war.⁴ These overtures of the King were seconded by the city of Heraelea, which had been forward to confirm its friendly relations with Rome on the advance of the legions, and now endeavoured to mediate between the belligerents.⁶ Possibly other of the Greek states acted in concert.⁶

But at this stage the Romans could not be thus satisfied. "When the horse is bitted and the rider set, there is no easy parting." They required not only to see the past aggressions of the Seleueid King cancelled, but to secure themselves against their repetition at any future conjuncture. Their demands were the whole costs of the war and the evacuation of all the country north of the Taurus. The attempts of the envoy to obtain a modification of these terms by an appeal to Publius Seipio's private interests, whether by the offer to release his son or more vulgar forms of bribery, met with such an answer

¹ See Niese ii. p. 738, note 3.

² Polyb. xxi. 13; Liv. xxxvii. 34; Just. xxxi. 7, 4; Dio Cass. frag. 62.

³ There were still garrisons in Aenus and Maronea (Liv. xxxvii. 60), but by the evacuation of Lysimaehia cut off from connexion with the Seleueid court.

⁴ Polyb. xxi. 14; Liv. xxxvii. 35; App. Syr. 29.

⁶ Memnon 26 = *F.H.G.* iii. p. 539.

⁶ Byzantium, which was closely associated with Heraelea, gave the Romans help in this war, according to Tacitus, *Ann.* xii. 62; but the passage is confused. The fact that Heraelides was a Byzantine is no indication of the policy of his native city.

as showed that the ways of a Roman aristocrat were not yet those of an Oriental official.¹

On learning the answer to his proposals, Antioehus made up his mind to fight. The Roman army was soon in motion. It advanced along the shore of the Troad, whose towns had surrendered to Livius in the spring, and now received the western invader with profuse friendliness. At Ilion the Romans believed themselves to have come to the cradle of their race; it was a meeting of long-sundered kinsmen.²

But the Romans were not come to Asia to indulge in sentiment; the season was advanced, and the Seipios were anxious to strike a decisive blow before winter should bring the war to a standstill. They marched straight for the upper Caïcus, whence Sardis could be reached by the same road which Antioehus had used in his attack on Pergamos a few months before, the road which led up from the Caecus valley over the watershed between the Caieus and the tributaries of the Hermus to Thyatira, and thence to Sardis in thirty straight miles. In the Caieus valley the consul halted till the troops were fully provisioned. Eumenes, who had been left behind with his ships in the Hellespont and now overtook the Roman army, was sent to Pergamos to bring up the corn he had stored in readiness. The consul, Lucius Seipio, was at this moment deprived of his brother's direction;³ Publius had been stricken down with a sickness which compelled him to be carried to the sea, and he lay ill at Elaea. Antioehus, when he heard it, with a magnanimity that was showy rather than interested, sent him his captive son without ransom.⁴ From his arrival Seipio began to mend. His thanks to the King took the form of a piece of advice—not to risk a battle till he had returned to the camp.

This message caused Antioehus to retire to Magnesia in the southern part of the Hyreanian plain. Near that city he took up a position on the left bank of the Phrygius, a tributary of the Hermus, and surrounded himself with such works as

¹ Polyb. xxi. 15 ; Liv. xxxvii. 36 ; Diod. xxix. 8.

² Liv. xxxvii. 37 ; Just. xxxi. 8.

³ His brother's place was taken by Gnaeus Domitius, App. Syr. 30.

⁴ Diod. xxix. 8, 2.

would defy attack till Publius Seipio returned to his brother's side.¹ The consul, believing Antioehus to be still at Thyatira, crossed from the Caieus to the northern extension of the Hyreanian plain, and then finding he had moved, followed him along the opposite bank of the Phrygius, and pitched less than four miles away, the river between the two camps. A skirmish took place on his arrival between the Roman outposts and a body of light horse, Gallic and Central-Asian, which the King threw across. Then after two days of inactivity the consul transferred his camp to the left bank, bringing it to about a mile and a half from the King's. Antioehus did not defend the river, but harassed the enemy without much effect whilst the new camp was being made. After that each day, for four days, the two armies deployed under their ramparts, but neither attacked. On the fifth the Romans came to within 350 yards of the King's defences.² Still Antioehus did not move. The consul, urged by the wish to bring matters to a decision before the winter, on the third day after again deployed his line in the plain. Antioehus was now obliged by the fear of demoralizing his troops to accept battle.³

On the Roman side the four legions formed the bulk of the line, to the right of which were the Greek auxiliaries, Achaean and Pergamene, the Roman and Pergamene horse, and a body of missile-shooters, Cretan and Trallian (Illyrian). On the left, which was protected by the river, were only four squadrons of horse. A contingent of Macedonian and Thraeian volunteers was detailed to guard the camp. The few African elephants were stationed in the rear of the legions. On the side of the King the phalanx, with its complement of elephants, occupied the centre, flanked on the right by Gallic, on the left by Cappadoeian foot; beyond these were the various bodies of horse, covered on the left by the scythed chariots, and the missile-shooters, as usual, at the two extremities. The King himself commanded on the right, Seleueus and the King's nephew, Antipater, on the left, Minnio,⁴ Zeuxis and Philip the *elephantarchos* in the centre. The day opened in a wet

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 37; App. Syr. 30.

³ *Ibid.* 39, 1-6; App. Syr. 30.

² Liv. xxxvii. 38.

⁴ In Appian, Myndis.

mist, which had an ill effect on the Asiatic bows and thongs. When the armies engaged, Antioehus was once more betrayed by his characteristic impetuosity. The charge of the Irânian cavalry, which he commanded in person, drove in the weak body of horse on the Roman left, and Antioehus, just as he had done under similar circumstances twenty-six years before at Raphia, at once dashed forward in pursuit, taking no thought for the rest of the field. Whilst the King was following the routed squadrons up to the Roman entrenchments a fearful collapse was taking place on the other wing. Here the scythed chariots—a species of terrorism in which the armies* of Asia found it hard not to believe—had been easily repelled by a shower of missiles under the direction of Eumenes. Their flight disordered the bodies of cavalry behind them, and, on the charge of the Roman and Pergamene horse, corps after corps broke and fled till the flank of the Cappadoeian infantry was exposed. The Cappadoeians fled. Then the shock of the Roman onset reached the phalanx. But the stampede of the left had already entangled the phalanx, and the Roman foot, when it came to close quarters, had little to do but butcher's work. On the right also the Romans rallied, and turned the victory of the royal wing into flight. For a while as much of the great army as succeeded in gaining the camp held it against the conquerors. Then the camp was stormed, and its storm followed by fresh carnage. The King's army was practically annihilated.¹

That night the King passed through Sardis, flying, his face toward the east. He had come only to take up Queen Euboea and his daughter, and before dawn he was on the road to Apamea. Seleueus and a number of principal men had fled to Apamea from the field. From Apamea, Antioehus on the following day pursued his course to Syria, leaving his generals to rally the fugitives.² In the regions upon which the King turned his back his rule instantly ceased; the cities sought

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 39, 7-43, 11 ; App. Syr. 31-36 ; Just. xxxi. 8, 5 f. According to the Roman official account, whose numerical accuracy must not be strained, the Seleueid loss was—killed 50,000 infantry and 3000 horsemen ; prisoners 1400 and 15 elephants with their mahouts. Against this the Romans had lost under 300 infantry, 24 Roman or Italian troopers, and 25 Pergamene troopers killed, and a few wounded.

² Liv. xxxvii. 44, 5 ; App. Syr. 36 f.

with all possible speed to make their peace with Rome. Magnesia-on-Sipylus and the neighbouring Thyatira surrendered the day after the battle. Next a deputation came from Sardis itself, even the soldiers of the garrison advocating surrender, in spite of the new commandant and the new satrap of Lydia, whom Antioehus had installed in his passage through the city.¹ When the news of the battle reached Ephesus, Polyxenidas immediately took the fleet to Patara—as far as he dared, because of the Rhodian squadron at Megiste—and there left it, himself making for Syria overland. Ephesus threw its gates open to the Romans.²

To Antioehus after the battle of Magnesia there was no longer any course open except to accept whatever conditions the Romans determined to impose. As soon as the consul reached Sardis and was joined there by his brother Publius, now sufficiently recovered, Musaeus, the King's herald, presented himself and asked leave for his master to send ambassadors. This was granted, and in a few days the ambassadors came. They were Zeuxis, who had lately resided as satrap in the very place to which he now came as a suppliant, and Antipater, the King's nephew. The conditions announced by the Roman generals were no more than they had been before the battle: (1) the Taurus to be the frontier of the Seleucid Empire, and the King's hands to be held off Europe; (2) an indemnity covering the total costs of the war, estimated at 15,000 Euboic talents, of which 500 was to be paid at once, 2500 when peace was ratified, and the remainder in twelve annual instalments; (3) a supplementary indemnity to Eumenes of 400 talents, besides the arrears of a debt for corn supplied to the Seleucid government by the late King Attalus; (4) the delivery of twenty hostages, to be selected by Rome; (5) the extradition of Hannibal, Thoas and certain other obnoxious persons; (6) the regular supply to the Roman army of a fixed amount of corn till the conclusion of peace.³

The instructions of the royal envoys were to secure peace

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 44; Polyb. xxi. 16. Tralles and Magnesia-on-the-Meander followed suit.

² Liv. xxxvii. 45.

³ Polyb. xxi. 16; Liv. xxxvii. 45; Diod. xxix. 10; App. Syr. 38; Just. xxxi. 8, 8.

on any terms that could be had. It was accordingly the next step to send an embassy to Rome to obtain the ratification of the consul's conditions. In the following winter (190-189) the embassy, headed by Antipater, came early to Ephesus, where the consul had fixed his headquarters, bringing with them the required hostages, and amongst them a younger son of the King's, called, like his dead brother, Antioehus. They were conducted to Rome under the escort of one of the consul's aides-de-camp.¹

The terms of peace, as outlined by Seipio, were ratified that winter by the Senate and the People, and a provisional treaty made with Antipater.² The definitive peace was, of course, to be drawn up on the spot by the usual ten commissioners. The Taurus to be the frontier—that was the main principle. Beyond that Rome refused to interfere, even on behalf of the older Greek cities. When the Rhodian envoys raised the question of Soli in Cilicia, the Senate showed itself so disinclined to urge its emancipation upon Antioehus, that the Rhodians let the matter drop.³

During the following year (189), the ten commissioners not having yet arrived in the East, we find the Seleucid court supplying corn, according to the compact made with Scipio, to the Roman army in Asia. Seleucus, the King's son, himself conveyed it to Antioeh-on-the-Meander. Lucius seipio had returned home, and had been rewarded for his victory by the surname of Asiaticus. His place was now taken by the consul Gnaeus Manlius, who, when Seleucus reached him, was just setting out on an expedition against the Galatians. Manlius insisted that the compact should be so interpreted as to include his Pergamene allies.⁴

In the winter (189-188) Musaeus appears at Ephesus as the King's ambassador. Antioehus is ordered to send his tale of corn, as well as the 2500 talents now due, to Pamphylia in the spring. The position of Pamphylia was somewhat ambiguous, since the irregularity of the mountain formation made it doubtful on which side of the Taurus it should be

¹ Polyb. xxi. 17, 11; Liv. xxxvii. 45, 20; App. Syr. 39.

² Polyb. xxi. 24; Liv. xxxvii. 55.

³ Polyb. xxi. 24, 10; Liv. xxxvii. 56.

⁴ Liv. xxxviii. 13, 8.

held to be. Antioehus still maintained a garrison in Perga. When the spring came, Manlius moved across the mountains from Apamea into Pamphylia. The corn and the bullion were being brought from Syria overland in waggons and on oxen. After the consul had waited three days the long train wound into sight, having found more delays upon the journey than had been taken into account.¹

Manlius now required the garrison in Perga to surrender the city. The commander begged for a respite of thirty days, in order that he might ascertain the King's will. To this Manlius agreed, and within the given time an order had come from court for the surrender. And now the ten commissioners had landed at Ephesus and were proceeding up country. The consul returned with his army to meet them at Apamea.²

The Peace of Apamea made the new basis on which the Seleueid house was to deal with the peoples of the West. Its main provisions were the abandonment by Antioehus of all the country beyond the Taurus and the payment of the war indemnity to Rome and Eumenes. How exactly the new frontier was drawn is obscure.³ The indemnity still due to Rome, 12,000 talents of silver, was to be paid, as arranged, in twelve annual instalments; and besides the money indemnity Antioehus was to supply 90,000 *medimni* of corn. There were important provisions intended to disable the Seleueid power utterly for offensive action in the West. The whole fleet was to be delivered up, and no more than ten decked ships of war to be kept in the future; these, moreover, were not to sail farther west than the promontory Sarpedonium, except when conveying instalments of the indemnity, ambassadors, or hostages. The war elephants of the Seleueids were to be all surrendered and no more to be kept. No recruiting officers were any more to set foot in the sphere of Roman dominion to raise mercenaries for the Seleueid service. Certain persons peculiarly obnoxious to Rome, such as

¹ Polyb. xxi. 43 ; Li v. xxxviii. 37, 8; Diod. xxix. 13.

² Polyb. xxi. 44; Liv. xxxviii. 37, 11.

³ The crucial sentence is fallen out of Polybius, and is corrupt in Livy: "excedito urbibus agris vieis castellis eis Taurum montem usque ad Tanaim amnem et ea (a *Paris.*) valle Tauri usque ad iugum (ab iuga *Bamb.*) qua in Lyeaoniam (Lyeaonia *Bamb.*) vergit." See the article of Mommsen cited below.

Hannibal and the Aetolian Thoas, were specified for extradition, if they could be caught; but besides these, Antioehus bound himself to deliver up any subjects of Rome or Eumenes found in the ranks of his army. Other clauses regulated various minor matters, such as the protection of Rhodians trafficking in the Seleueid realm and their property. Twenty hostages were to be given by Antioehus, who could, with the exception of the young Antioehus, be changed every other year,¹

The consul swore to the Peace on behalf of Rome. His brother and *legatus* Lucius Manlius went with one of the ten commissioners to Syria to exact the King's oath and take security for the fulfilment of his obligations. The clause relating to the royal navy Manlius lost no time in carrying into effect. Polyxenidas, it will be remembered, had left his fleet at Patara. Quintus Fabius Labeo, by the consul's order, now sailed to that harbour and gave fifty ships of war to the flames.²

The hundred years' struggle of the house of Seleueus for Asia Minor had come to an end.

¹ Polyb. xxi. 45; Liv. xxxviii. 38; App. Syr. 39; Mommsen, *Römische Forschungen*, ii. p. 511 f.; E. Meyer, *Rhein. Mus. Neue Folge* xxxvi. (1881), p. 120 f.

² Polyb. xxi. 46; Liv. xxxviii. 39.

CHAPTER XXII

THE INTERVAL OF PEACE

THE history of the Seleucid dynasty up to the battle of Magnesia has been one of almost continuous war. "At the return of the year, at the time when kings go out to battle," says the record of the old Hebrew monarchy,¹ and in the Seleucid kingdom too it had come to be the normal thing for the King to march out at the end of every winter and spend his summer in the field. For the first time this activity is suspended after the stunning fall given Antioehus III by the adversary with whom he had rashly closed. For fourteen years after Magnesia there is a lull. Then new commotions begin, and cease only with the ceasing of the dynasty. It is the negative quality of these fourteen years which makes them remarkable.

It has hitherto been misleading to speak of the Seleucid kingdom as "Syrian." Till the time of Seleueus I I Kallnitikos, Asia Minor, as we saw, was the land where the kings were most at home, and although by the division in the family itself the court of the elder king, Seleueus II, was fixed east of the Taurus, the Seleucid house was always straining towards the west, and in the last years before Magnesia we saw Antioehus residing as much in Ephesus as in Antioeh. But now Asia Minor was barred against the house of Seleueus for ever; the empire, which had almost been the empire of Alexander, was become the kingdom of Syria. Let us see in what environment this kingdom found itself, with what neighbours it would have to do.

¹ 2 Samuel 11, 1.

But in the first place we should observe that although the long wars of Antiochus III ended in the collapse of Magnesia, they were not altogether without fruit. Two provinces, which at his accession were politically separate from Syria, he left united with it—Cilicia and Coele-Syria (Palestine). The realm had thus to some degree gained in compactness what it had lost in extent. It embraced the whole country of Aramaic speech.

Asia Minor had passed from Seleucid rule, but the Seleucid kingdom must still be affected by its fortunes and maintain close relations with the powers that ruled there. For some time after Magnesia no one knew what the outcome of the battle would be. The Seleucid power had been thrust back across the Taurus; but Rome did not immediately intimate what she intended to do with the vacated territory. The following winter (190-189) was one of a great diplomatic scramble. From every part of Asia Minor envoys hastened to Rome. All the states interested were eager to put their particular views before the Senate.

After the Peace of Apamea (188) the ten commissioners who had fixed its conditions proceeded to make the great territorial settlement in Asia Minor, which lasted with slight modifications till the extinction of the Pergamene dynasty sixty years later. *Borne took nothing for herself*; she trusted to influence rather than direct sovereignty. The net result of her arrangements was to put Eumenes of Pergamos in the place of the Seleucid King; almost the whole of the Seleucid domain fell to him as King of Asia.¹

It was not quite the whole of the Seleucid domain which Eumenes got. In the first place, Caria south of the Meander and Lyeia were made subject to the other great ally of Koine, to Rhodes; the seaport of Telmessus only, on the confines of Lyeia and Caria, was made over to Eumenes.² In the second

¹ Asia was the official designation of the kingdom of Eumenes. Ἀττάλῳ τι χαλεπήρας τῷ βασιλεῖ τῆς Ἀσίας τῆς περὶ τὸ Πέργαμον τὴν γῆν ἐδῆου τὴν Ἀσιάδα, App. Mith. 3. "Ex Asia . . . redierunt legati, qui renuntiarunt Eumenem in ea, Antiochum in Syria, Ptolemaeum in Alexandria sese convenisse," Liv. xlii. 26.

² As an *enclave* in the Rhodian domain? or did it communicate with the inland possessions of Eumenes by Milyas?

place, the Romans, having come to Asia with such high professions of freeing the Greeks, were bound to do something to make them good. They could hardly take away from Eumenes the cities which were his, and to satisfy at once his claims as an ally and the claims of the cities as Greek states was not a simple matter. The Romans found a practical way out of the difficulty by deciding that all those cities which formed part of the inherited domain of Eumenes should continue tributary to the Pergamene king.¹ To these were to be added those cities which had held by Antioehus till after the battle of Magnesia. This "enslavement" of them could be justified as a punishment, although in many cases it must probably have been known that the city had had little choice in the matter, shaping its policy under the eyes of a garrison. All those states which had renounced their allegiance to Antioehus before the battle of Magnesia were to be free. Even so the new realm of Eumenes included some of the most illustrious cities of Asia Minor—Sardis, the old capital; Ephesus, the great harbour and commercial centre; Magnesia under Sipylus, Tralles, and Telmessus. Pamphylia, which the Seleucid court maintained to lie on the southern side of the Taurus, was ultimately assigned by the Senate to Eumenes.²

There are now then four kingdoms in Asia Minor with whom the Macedonian houses of Seleueus and Antigonus have to treat on a footing of equality—the kingdom with its capital at Pergamos, the kingdom of Bithynia, the kingdom of Pontic Cappadoeia, and the kingdom of southern Cappadoeia. Besides the territories ruled by these four kings there are the continental domain of Rhodes, the territories of the independent Greek cities, certain petty principalities, and the lands held by barbarian tribes, such as the Pisidians and Gauls.

These last still constituted a danger for civilization. It was the Gauls who had furnished Antioehus with the most formidable part of his armies. In the year following Magnesia (189) the consul Gnaeus Manlius had made an expedition

¹ ὅσαι δ' Ἀττάλις σύνταξιν ἐτέλουν, Polyb. xxi. 48, 2. It is noticeable that to the payment exacted by the Pergamene king the term *σύνταξις* is here applied—the euphemism (as we saw, vol. i. p. 106) by which an attempt was made to cloak the ugly fact of a Greek city paying tribute.

² Polyb. xxi. 48; Liv. xxxviii. 39; cf. Strabo xiv. 667.

into Pisidia and the Galatian country, and inflicted upon the Gauls defeats so severe and sanguinary as must keep them quiet for some time to come. This was part of the necessary work of pacification which the Romans must do before they left Asia Minor to their allies.

Farther east also, the battle of Magnesia introduced a new state of things. We have seen before how events at one end of the Empire reacted upon another. And such a blow destroyed the prestige upon which the supremacy of the Seleucid house in all outlying lands rested. Already at the time of the repulse of Antioehus from Greece a great fear, according to the Ptolemaic envoys in Rome, had run through Asia Minor and reached even to Syria.¹ And now to all the whispering multitudes under him the King was disgraced. "A commander had caused the reproach he offered" to the strong people of the West "to cease ; sevenfold had his reproach been requited."² The Empire which Antioehus had spent his life in re-forming instantly dissolved.

In Armenia at the time of the battle Artaxias or Artaxas was ruling over one part of the country and a certain Zariadris over another part. They ruled as the *strategoi* of Antioehus, and had evidently replaced the old Armenian dynasty, which had used the style of kings,³ and claimed, like the other royal houses of Iranian origin, to be descended from one of the Seven. Xerxes, to whom Antioehus had given his daughter in 212, had been afterwards assassinated at the instigation of the Seleucid court.⁴ The old line came to an end, according to Strabo, in an otherwise unknown Orontes.⁵ Kings were replaced by *strategoi*—a sign that Armenia had been brought into straiter subjection. Whether Artaxias and Zariadris were native Armenian chiefs or whether they had

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 3, 10.

² Daniel 11, 18.

³ Diodorus speaks of Ardoates about 315 as king (xxx. 19, 5). Ziaëlas flees about 250 *πρὸς τὸν Ἀρμενίων βασιλέα* (Memnon 22). The extract from Polybius is introduced with the words "Ὅτι Ἐλέξου βασιλεύοντος πόλεως Ἀρμόσατα (Polyb. viii. 25). None of these passages are of such a kind that their language could be pressed, but in this point they are confirmed by the coins (Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, p. cxci. f.

⁴ See page 16.

⁵ An Orontes was satrap of Armenia in 317 (Diod. xix. 23, 3). If he was the father of the line of kings in Armenia, one need not be stumbled by the recurrence of the name in the dynasty ; it is only what one would expect.

come in from elsewhere by the appointment of Antioehus, we do not know. Their names at any rate show them to have been Irânians by race or culture. *Magnesia made them renounce the Seleucid supremacy.* They declared themselves friends of Rome, and the *strategoi* in their turn became kings. Northern Armenia formed the kingdom of Artaxias, the southern region, called Sophene, that of Zariadris. Artaxias built a new city in the valley of the Araxes, calling it, after his own name, Artaxata, to be the capital of his realm. According to the general belief, the site had been chosen and the laying out of the city directed by the great Hannibal, who in his wanderings after the defeat of Antioehus had come as far as the court of the new Armenian king.¹

In Irân itself Magnesia probably at once undid the work of Antioehus twenty years before. About the same time that Antioehus was making his last stand in Asia Minor, the Parthian king upon whom he had imposed his suzerainty, Arsaees III, was succeeded by Arsaees IV Phriapatius. The change of ruler perhaps meant a fresh declaration of independence.²

Antioehus, hurled back from Asia Minor, turned his thoughts once more to the field of his old glories, the East. It was thence he had drawn the riches and the renown which he had dissipatea in the war with Rome. And now that his coffers were empty and his armies broken, was it impossible that from the East he might again renew his strength, as Antaeus did from repeated contact with the earth?³ •

As soon as the peace with Home had been finally concluded and sworn to (summer 188), Antioehus left Seleueus in Syria as joint-king⁴ and plunged into the East. The Mediterranean lands never saw him again. The tidings came back to Antioeh

¹ Strabo xi. 528, 531 ; Plutarch, *Lucull.* 31. There is nothing unnatural in itself in Hannibal's residence in Armenia. But it is inconsistent with the supposition that Artaxias was at that time a friend of Rome.

² There are coins struck by an Arsaees with a sign which Professor Gardner understood as the date 125 aer. Sel. = 188-187 B.C. Upon this fact Gutsehmid built the theory that the Greek city of Apamea in Media had been captured at that date by the Parthians. But these coins are now put by Mr. Wroth about 125 B.c., *Num. Chron.* 3rd series, vol. xx. pp. 181-202.

³ Stark's happy metaphor, *Gaza*, p. 428.

⁴ *Zeitschr.f. A83yr.* viii. p. 109.

that he had adventured himself with a body of troops in the Elymaean hills (mod, Lûristân), where the temple of some native god promised great spoil of silver and gold, and had been overwhelmed by the fierce tribesmen. That was the generally received version of his end.¹ "He shall turn his face toward the strongholds of his own land: but he shall stumble and fall, and shall not be found"² (187).³

Seleueus IV Philopator, who now reigned as sole king, was not without experience of affairs. He had borne an active part in the war with Rome. The rôle which he inherited could hardly be a dazzling one, but it might be not unhonourable—to preside over the slow recovery of the kingdom from the day of Magnesia. The most serious consequence of that defeat was the empty coffers. It was an evil which could only be cured by time; and that it might be cured, a period of rest and the avoidance of all complications was absolutely necessary. The inaction of Seleueus Philopator's reign has led to his being regarded as a weak ruler; hardly justly, since an ambitious policy would have been madness just then.

Anxious eyes in Syria watched every turn in the politics of the Mediterranean states; the Seleueid court continued to catch all whispers from Asia Minor, from Macedonia, from the Greek republics. It was a time when the thoughts of men were agitated by a great transition. The paramount city of Italy had interfered with a strong hand in the eastern Mediterranean. Rome had come in as the ally of some states, as the enemy of others, as the champion of Hellenic autonomy, but not ostensibly as a conqueror. It had annexed no territory east of the Adriatic. But now in the lull after Magnesia men became aware of the real significance of the clash of arms that they had witnessed. The allies, as well as the enemies of

¹ Diod. xxviii. 3; xxix. 15; Strabo xvi. 744; Eus. p. 253; Just. xxxii. 2, 1. This account no doubt is derived from Polybius. There is another story given by a late author: "a sodalibus quos temulentus in convivio pulsaverat oeeisus est," Aurel. Vict. *De vir. ill.* 54. Whether this goes back to any contemporary source we do not know. Under the circumstances it is easily intelligible that different stories should get afloat in Syria as to an event happening in a recess of the hills of Lûristân.

² Daniel 11, 19.

³

Niese, *Kritik der Makk.* (1900), p. 79.

Rome, began to feel the impalpable bands grip them faster than the acknowledged supremacy of Macedonian kings. And with the feeling a great revulsion swept through the Greek world, a nightmare agony to escape the thing that was closing upon them before all power of resistance was gone.

This feeling was common to both the allies and the enemies of Rome, but it was not enough to do away the old division. It was alloyed in the enemies of Rome by nothing but the fear of Rome's vengeance; in the allies of Rome it was alloyed by the desire for Rome's continued support. They could not refrain under the pressure of the moment from carrying their quarrels to the Senate and soliciting Rome's word on their behalf, although by so doing they wound themselves deeper and deeper in the toils.

Certainly at no previous moment could any one who stood forward as an antagonist of Rome have counted on such general sympathy in the eastern Mediterranean. And before long the eyes of men began to turn to the king of Macedonia. Philip was filled with resentment at the inadequate reward he had got for his help against Antioehus, and it became known that he was preparing on a vast scale for another fight. He died in 179, but his plans and preparations were carried on by his illegitimate son, Perseus, who succeeded to the Macedonian throne.

In such a time no one found himself in a more delicate position than King Eumenes. There was too much shrewdness at the Pergamene court for the inconveniences and dangers of the Roman patronage to be ignored. He could not, of course, do without it; he must not suffer his staunchness as the main ally of Rome to be clouded; but he saw the importance of giving Rome as little opportunity as possible to interfere in Asia.

On this principle Eumenes seems to have made his ideal *a state of family concord between the Asiatic kings*. Magnesia left him in a somewhat chill isolation. He alone among the kings was the friend of Rome. No sooner, therefore, was the house of Seleueus reduced to a position in which it ceased to threaten him, than Eumenes was ready with the hand of friendship. The envoys of Antioehus who came to the Roman

camp after Magnesia were astonished to discover that the Pergamene king had apparently blotted all trace of past soreness from his mind.¹ But the great diplomatic success of Eumenes was in Cappadoeia. Ariarathes IV, linked both by his mother and his wife to the Seleucid house, had not only sent his troops to fight with those of Antiochus at Magnesia, but had even in the following year supported the Galatians against Manlius.² After the Roman victory he made his submission, and was amerced in 600 talents of silver.³ Now Eumenes saw his opportunity. He offered the Cappadoecian king his friendship, and asked the hand of his daughter Stratonice.⁴ On condition that he complied, Eumenes undertook to use his influence to get the fine reduced. Ariarathes was probably glad enough to close with such terms. Eumenes married Stratonice. The fine was lowered to one-half of the original amount. Ariarathes and the Cappadocian people were received among the friends of Rome.⁶

But the pacific policy of Eumenes was frustrated in other quarters. It was indeed almost a hopeless task to keep in with Rome and with the enemies of Rome at the same time. In proportion as the feeling against Rome in the Greek world grew stronger, more odium attached to the Pergamene house, which had served the alien with such zeal.

Presently it appeared that in Asia Minor also there was a power which might form the nucleus of an anti-Roman group. Since Antiochus III had fetched his bride from northern (Pontic) Cappadocia in 222 we have heard nothing of that kingdom. Its history during the rest of the reign of Antiochus III is for us a blank. Mithridates II, who appears to have died about the time of the battle of Magnesia, after a reign of some sixty years,⁶ is not mentioned as taking any part in the broils of his son-in-law, the Great King. But those unrecorded sixty years may have been years of steady internal consolidation. In 183, five years after the Peace of Apamea, the Greek world was horrified by the news that Sinope had been

¹ Polyb. xxi. 16, 5.

² Liv. xxxviii. 26, 3.

³ *Ibid.* 37, 5.

⁴ Called, of course, after her Seleucid grandmother, Stratonice, whose grandmother again was Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius Poliorcetes.

⁵ Polyb. xxi. 47; Liv. xxxviii. 37, 5; 39, 6; Strabo xii. 540.

⁶ Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*, p. 34.

suddenly attacked and seized by Pharnaees, the son and successor of Mithridates. This was rapidly followed by fresh conquests along the northern coasts, till even Heraelea felt itself insecure. Pharnaees was thought to cherish large designs of aggression. He had found an ally in Mithridates, the "satrap" of Lesser Armenia.¹ Asia Minor was at once divided into two camps. Eumenes, Ariarathes, and even Prusias II of Bithynia—the allies of Rome—took up arms in defence of the *status quo*.

All these developments on either side of the Aegean had been watched by the Seleucid court. An incidental notice shows us that Seleucus IV, if debarred from active interference in the west, was at any rate concerned to maintain close diplomatic relations with the states of Greece. Polybius describes a meeting of the Achaean Assembly held in the year following Seleucus' accession, at which his ambassadors presented themselves to renew the amity subsisting between the Achaean and the Seleucid house, and to offer them a present of ten ships of war² (in the year 187-186). The amity was renewed but the ships declined.³ It is only the deficiency of our records, no doubt, which prevents us from seeing similar embassies at work to sound their master's name in the ear of the other Greek states.

There could be no question that the sympathies of the house of Seleucus were with the antagonists of Rome. And as the anti-Roman movement defined itself more and more in the years following Magnesia, it was not an impossible contingency that Seleucus might compromise his neutrality. When the war between Pharnaees and the other three kings broke out in Asia Minor (183-179), Seleucus seemed at one moment about to intervene on the anti-Roman side. He

¹ What the relations of this Mithridates were (1) to the Seleucid King, (2) to Artaxias, we do not know. Although called satrap, he appears to act with Pharnaees as an independent power. That he is identical with Mithridates, the nephew of Antiochus III, as Reinach (*Mithridates*, p. 41, note) thinks probable, appears to me unlikely, since so far from saying that Antiochus put in this nephew as dynast, Polybius expressly says that he *rejected* the advice of his friends to do so (*ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ προσέσχε*), Polyb. viii. 25. The name Mithridates was, of course, as common among the Irânians of that age as the corresponding Apollonius among the Greeks.

² Were these ten ships which the Seleucid court might no longer keep after the Peace of Apamea? ³ Polyb. xxii. 10, 4; 12, 13; Diod. xxix. 17.

marched with a considerable force towards the passes of the Taurus, but his nerve failed before he had taken the decisive step.¹ He suffered Pharnaees to go down unaided before Eumenes and his allies. It was about this time that Titus Flamininus came in the quality of ambassador to the Seleueid court, and we may connect his presence there with the abortive schemes of Seleucus.²

The hopes of all in the Greek world who wished to be rid of the Roman incubus were fixed, as has just been said, upon Macedonia, and in Perseus, who succeeded his father Philip in 179, it may have seemed that the hour had brought the man. Macedonia had armed to the teeth, and Perseus worked unremittingly at amassing all the means of victory. There was, of course, no overt hostility to Rome, but everybody knew for what cause Perseus stood. It was therefore significant of the general temper in the eastern Mediterranean when Seleueus Philopator made haste, upon the accession of Perseus, to press upon him the hand of his daughter Laodice, and when the Rhodians escorted the new queen of Macedonia with a great display of their ships.³


It was perhaps in consequence of the suspicions which were entertained of Seleueus in Rome that his brother Antioehus, who had been kept since 189 as a hostage, was exchanged before 175 for his son Demetrius.⁴ The name Demetrius, we may stop to notice, now appears for the first time alongside of Seleueus and Antioehus in the Seleueid family. It was, of course, a declaration of its consanguinity with the house of Antigonus through Stratonicee, the daughter of the great Demetrius. The adoption of the name by the Seleueid house might have two objects. It might be intended as a mark of *friendship* to their cousin in Macedonia at an

¹ Diod. xxix. 24.

² He was dispatched from Rome as ambassador to Prusias and Seleueus in 183, Polyb. xxiii. 5. It was on this visit to Prusias that he contrived the death of Hannibal, who was still living under the protection of the Bithynian king.

³ Liv. xlii. 12 ; Polyb. xxv. 4, 8 ; Michel, No. 1298.

⁴ App. Syr. 45, Eus. I. p. 253. I do not know that there is anything to date this exchange by, except that in the year of Seleueus' death (176-175) Antioehus was living at Athens. Appian speaks certainly as if the residence of Antioehus at Athens was a brief one on his way to Syria, but since he apparently took a part in Athenian public life, it is possible that it was really longer.



hour when the two houses must draw together against the foreigner; or it might be a notice to the world, when the reigning Antigonid king had only one legitimate son, that the kings who reigned in Antioeh were the next heirs by blood.¹

Of the internal administration of Seleueus Philopator we know only that the necessities of the time made its first object *the replenishing of the empty treasuries*. The war indemnity paid by annual instalments to Rome was a continuous drain. The country had now to pay the bill for the grandiose enterprises of Antioehus III, and it was squeezed at a time when it had not even the imaginative compensation of seeing its king in the lustre of military glory. For the first time the inhabitants of Syria saw the Seleueid King sitting, year in, year out, at home. Such a king was not worth paying for, and yet he made them pay more heavily than they had ever paid before. "And there shall rise up in his (Antioehus III's) place an exactor, who shall cause the royal dignity to pass away, and in a few days he shall be broken, but not in battle array or in war."²

The government appeared to be merely a vast machine for expressing money, and the working of it was in the hands of the chief minister Heliodorus the son of Aeschylus, a citizen of Antioeh. An inscribed base declares that the statue once upon it was that of Heliodorus, put up in Delos by a mercantile association of Laodieea in gratitude for his benefits.³ This may show that the administration of Heliodorus was adroit in encouraging commerce; it may, of course, only mean that the merchants sought to win his favour by such honours. A Jewish work gives us a picture of him making a progress through the cities of Palestine, accompanied by his bodyguards (*δορυφόροι*).⁴ His great position tempted Heliodorus to aspire still higher. He formed a conspiracy against the King, and in 176-175 Seleueus Philopator was suddenly murdered in the quiet of his kingdom.⁵ With Seleueus the quiet also came to an end.

¹ Demetrius, the son of Seleueus. was born about 185, and at that time Demetrius, the legitimate son of Philip, was still alive.

² Daniel 11, 20; cf. *Σελεύκου* . . . *ἀπράκτως ἄμα καὶ ἀσθενῶς (βεβασιλευκός)*, App. Syr. 66.

³ Bull. corr. hell. i. (1877), p. 285.

⁴ 2 Mace. 3.

⁵ App. Syr. 45.

CHAPTER XXIII

ANTIOCHUS IV AND THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT

IT is probable that after assassinating Seleueus Philopator, Heliodorus proclaimed the infant son of Seleueus king. He intended, of course, to wield the whole royal power himself, and he would have lost more than he gained by assuming the diadem.¹ The real heir was Demetrius, the elder son of Seleueus, now a boy of some nine years, growing up as a hostage in Rome. And there was yet another member of the royal house to be reckoned with.

Antioehus, the brother of Seleueus Philopator, was in Athens when the news of the *coup d'état* in Syria reached him. He had betaken himself thither on being set at liberty, and had not only become an Athenian citizen, but had even been elected to the chief magistracy (that of *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα*).² Then whilst playing at being the successor of Pericles the prospect suddenly opened before him of being the successor of Seleueus Nieator. It was not from Syria only, but from Pergamos that the call came to him.

The situation created by the murder of Seleueus jumped well with the policy of Eumenes. The action of Seleueus

¹ Of the proceedings of Heliodorus we have no direct information, but it is incredible that, had he assumed the *diadem*, he would have left the infant son of Seleueus alive. I should propose to see this infant son in the problematic child of the coins (Plate II. No. 5). His resemblance to Seleueus IV is striking. Mr. Maedonald prefers to regard the child of the coins as the eldest son of Antioehus III, but *that* Antioehus was already about ten when associated with his father, and the child of the coins looks younger.

² There are Athenian coins for the year 175 with his name and the Seleueid elephant. See Reinaeh, *Rev. d. Études Grecques*, 1888, p. 163 f.

during the war with Pharnaees shows that the hopes of Eumenes to heal the quarrel with the Seleueid house had so far been vain. But the irreconcilable sovereign was now gone, and instantly Eumenes saw his chance of securing that the vacant throne should be held by a friend. He offered Antioehus the help of the Pergamene arms in seizing the inheritance.

Antioehus left Athens and crossed over to Asia Minor. He had probably at this moment no resources. But everything was provided. Eumenes and his brother Attalus escorted him with a Pergamene army along the eastern road to the frontier of the two realms. At their expense Antioehus was furnished with the externals of royalty. A solemn treaty of friendship between the Attalid and the new Seleueid king was made with sacrifice, and, surrounded by the troops of Eumenes, Antioehus descended upon Syria.¹

The position of Antioehus in Syria does not seem to have been at first an easy one. We have no exact information as to the sort of opposition he met with, but we can see that not only would Heliodorus confront him., but that his manifest usurpation, while children of Seleueus lived, would set against him many loyal adherents of the Seleueid house. We also gather that in southern Syria there was a faction at work for the restoration of the province to Egypt. Antioehus seems to have proceeded with a mixture of calculated mildness and equally calculated bloodshed.² “ And there shall arise in his (Seleueus IV’s) place a contemptible man, upon whom they have not conferred royal dignity, but he shall come in unawares, and shall seize the kingdom by guile. And forces shall be utterly overwhelmed before him. . . . He shall practise fraud, and shall rise and become strong with (but) few men. And by stealth he shall assail the mightiest men of (each) province, and he shall do what his fathers have not done, nor the fathers of his fathers. Spoil and plunder and riches shall he scatter among them, and against strongholds shall he devise his devices.”³

Whatever those manoeuvres were which we can no longer

¹ App. Syr. 45 ; Michel, No. 550.

² Jerome on Daniel 11, 21.

³ Daniel 11, 21 f. (my brother's translation, involving some correction of the text).

trace, Antioehus succeeded in bringing all his brother's kingdom under his authority. The opposition melted away. Heliodorus is no more heard of. Apollonius, one of the persons of greatest influence with the late king, retired to Miletus.¹ The Jew Hyreanus, who had made himself a petty prince in the country east of Jordan, committed suicide.² To get rid of the infant son of Seleueus, Antioehus resorted to the familiar device of employing an agent, whom he afterwards disowned. The child was assassinated at Antioehus' word by Andronieus; Antioehus then turned upon Andronieus and put him to death.⁸

The man who had set himself upon the Syrian throne had for his contemporaries, and has for us, the fascination of enigma. No other king of his house had been such as he. We must take into account, of course, that no other king had had the same sort of education. Instead of growing up in a palace among eunuchs and courtiers, he had grown up in Rome. There was already in Rome the beginning of that corruption which reached such fearful proportions later on, but the tradition of a purer time had not lost its power. Nowhere else was there found the same proud and ordered freedom, and the political morality of the Republic was still (in comparison with that of his native land) the admiration of the contemporary Greek. The young Macedonian prince was received on friendly terms by the youth of the Roman aristocracy, and became intimate with many of the men in whose hands the destiny of the world rested.⁴ The effect of such surroundings can be traced in the character of Antioehus IV. He had come into contact with a political system more vigorous and effective than that of Asiatic monarchy, and a new vigour and *dan*, as we say, marked his rule. He had consorted as an equal with equals, and his character acquired a republican bent, his manner scandalized the court by its unceremonious freedom, its undignified familiarity. He had, besides that, violently caught the fashionable Hellenism with

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 21, 3.

² Joseph. Arch. xii. § 236.

³ Diod. xxx. 7, 2; John of Damascus, frag. 58 {F.H.G. iv. p. 558}. In 2 Mace. Antioehus is, of course, represented as pntting Andronieus to death in punishment for the murder of Onias.

⁴ Liv. xlii. 6; Just. xxxiv. 3, 2.

its republican ideals and shibboleths. We have seen that on being set at liberty he had at once gone to the metropolis of Hellenic culture, to Athens, and entered upon the life of a citizen.

These influences acting upon some temperaments might have made it tell powerfully in the world to valuable ends. But in Antioehus they were thrown away, owing to the incurable superficiality of his character. That quality in his father which had made him to be affected by the external aspect of things rather than by their real import, by what was showy rather than by what was sound—this was reproduced more saliently in Antioehus IV. His imagination and sentiment outran his reason. Pageantry, theatrical display were his delight. The reign of his quiet brother looked tame beside his, with its spirited movement and bold action, but it was Seleueus Philopator who amassed the money, and Antioehus Epiphanes who left the kingdom bankrupt.

Antioehus had something, I think, of the "Bohemian" in him, an unsubstantialness of mental frame, to which the common prose of life is too ponderous, which needs to be continually gratified with new colour and sensation. While therefore he loved the splendour of royalty, its gold and purple, its fanfares and grandiloquent titles, the restraint and solemnity of court etiquette he found intolerable boredom.

At night, when the great city hummed around his palace with the murmur of obscure revelry, he was often drawn forth by a craving to share in the free life that went on in those populous streets. He would give his courtiers the slip and plunge down into the alleys with one or two intimates. Often some party of young men drinking late together might hear the noise of a fresh company of revellers drawing near with horns and psalteries and be startled by the sudden apparition of the King. Sometimes at mid-day he would be seen, flushed with wine, tossing money by handfuls into the street. People had met him, crowned with roses and habited in cloth of gold, wandering on some unknown quest; it was not advisable to follow him; from such curiosity he was capable of defending

himself with stones!¹ Even the life of grooms and porters had a curiosity for him, and any one of the cosmopolitan crowd which flowed through Antioeh might find that he had the King for a boon-companion. He bathed in the public baths, and once, when his slaves brought the unguents which furnished the royal toilet—precious gums for which Asia was ransacked—some fellow of the crowd called out, "You kings are lucky people to use such things as that and smell so good!" Antioehus marked him, and the next day ordered a vessel of choice myrrh to be broken upon the man's head. There was a general rush to wallow in the spilt unguent, a scrimmage and tumble on the slippery floor, in which among shrieks of laughter the King joined.

It was the formality, the routine of life against which Antioehus warred. With all his republican bonhomie he had fundamentally the nature of the tyrant. He would suffer no conventional restraint upon his impulse. He loved to do the unexpected. To some grave councillor he would ceremoniously present a handful of knuckle-bones or dates; at another time he would catch a chance man in the street, to bestow upon him a thing of price; in both cases for the pure delight of watching their faces. His caprices ran near insanity. Or again, his engaging geniality might be assumed to cover some deadly purpose. His incalculable vein had its sinister aspect. He felt no difficulty in pleasantries with the man at whom he designed to strike. There was something horribly dangerous and panther-like in his caresses.²

In such a nature one might expect to find, with all its defects, some aesthetic sensibilities. And Antioehus was an enthusiastic virtuoso. When he escaped from the palace he was most commonly found among the workers in gold and silver, the engravers and jewellers, discussing with passionate intensity some nice point of *technique*. On a larger scale he gratified his love of art in his sumptuous building, in the adornment of his cities; Greek artists thronged to Antioeh from all parts; new temples and public buildings rose under his eye.

¹ Our authority for the throwing of money and stones is the memoirs of King Ptolemy Euergetes II (ap. Athen. x. 438 e). Ptolemy had no reason to love his uncle, and is not likely to have spared his eccentricities.

² Granius Licinianus xxviii,

Bearing in mind the general character of Antioehus, we can form some estimate of the quality of his Hellenism. It was the temples and external glories of the Greek states, the consecrated forms of their religious and civil life, which by their visible grace or their historic associations possessed his mind. One who looked deeper might have seen that Greek religion, its mythology and its ritual, however much it had received some stamp of beauty and comeliness from the people among whom it took shape, was yet one of the least distinctive things in Hellenic civilization, a legacy from days when there was as yet no antithesis between Hellene and barbarian. Or again it might have been felt that the forms of the republican state had a value beyond the academic, only when they were the vehicle of a certain spirit. To Antioehus the forms themselves were dear. Antioeh was compelled sometimes to enact the comedy of being Rome. The King himself appeared in the Roman toga, and canvassed in public places for the office of aedile or tribune. Being duly elected, he took his seat upon the regular eurule chair and adjudged the disputes of the market-place with solemn concentration and care. Even so ugly and coarse a feature of Roman life as gladiatorial combats this apostle of Hellenism must introduce into Antioeh. It was held to be a triumph when the Antioehene crowd was gradually accustomed, first to the sight of wounds, and then of butchery.¹

We have only to divine that Antioehus united to all his extravagances and enthusiasms some undefinable charm of boyish high spirits, of happy recklessness—some curious beauty of face I think one gathers from the coins—in order to understand the perplexity of contemporary opinion concerning him.² There seemed no reconciling the strange contradictions of his personality.³ Was he a creature of splendid and effectual energy, princely in the scale of his undertakings and his large

¹ Polyb. xxvi. 1; Liv. xli. 20; Diod. xxix. 32.

² Of his general popularity 1 Mace. 6, 11 is a remarkable testimony. A hostile account makes him reflect upon his death-bed: "I was gracious and beloved in my power."

² (ὡς ἑκαστον) ἀπιστεῖν εἰ περὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν τοσαύτην ἀρετὴν καὶ κλκικλν ὑπάρχει δυνατόν ἐστιν, Polyb. xxxi. 4, 9.

munificence ?¹ or a man of profound and devilish guile, a "king of fierce countenance and understanding dark sentences" ?² or a simple child of nature ?³ or a fantastical madman ?⁴ Moderate men really did not know what to say of him.⁵

Having made himself master of Syria, Antioehus, says our authority, ruled with a strong hand.⁶ What we are told of his internal administration does not, it must be confessed, show it in a good light. His chief counsellors were two youths, brothers, Heraelides and Timarehus of Miletus, who had obtained his favour in the vilest of ways; Heraelides was made minister of finance (*ἐπὶ ταῖς προσόδοις*) and Timarehus governor of the eastern provinces.⁷ Again, the principal cities of Cilicia, Tarsus and Mallus, found themselves made over to the King's mistress, Antioehis, and as a consequence Antioehus soon had an insurrection in that quarter upon his hands.⁸

But there were certain forms of patronage which the cities of the realm no doubt found that the new king was

¹ Ἀντίοχος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἦν καὶ πρακτικὸς καὶ μεγαλεπίβολος καὶ τοῦ τῆς βασιλείας ὀνόματος ἀξίος, Polyb. xxviii. 18. ἡ τοῦ τότε βασιλεύοντος μεγαλοψυχία διάδηλος ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, *ibid.* xxix. 24, 13. "In duabus tamen magnis honestisque rebus vere regius erat animus," Li v. xli. 20.

² Daniel 8, 23.

³ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφελῆ τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον, Polyb. xxvi. 1, 7.

⁴ Ἐπιφανὴς μὲν κληθεὶς Ἐπιμανῆς δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὀνομασθεὶς, Polyb. xxvi. 1, 1.

⁵ ἐξ ὧν εἰς ἀπορίαν ἦγε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, Polyb. xxvi. 1, 7. With these diverse judgments of antiquity it is interesting to compare the opinions of modern authorities within the last twenty years.

"Der hoehbegabte Antioehus IV Epiphanes, der eine Klare Einsicht in die Sehäden hatte, an denen das Reich krankte," Gutsehmid, *Irân*, p. 40.

"Ce qu'il comprenait le moins, c'était le pays où il regnait," Renan, *Histoire du peuple d'Israil*, iv. p. 302.

"Er war eine eehte Despoten-Natur . . . grausam und tyranniseh, wie sein Verfahren gegen Judäa uns zeigt," Sehürer, *Gesch. d. jüd. Folk*, i. p. 191.

"Eine interessante Charaeteristik dieses origenellen Marines giebt Polybios . . . Die vom Hass verzerrte Caricatur des A. in der jüdischen Litteratur (Makkabaerbücher, Bueh Daniel u. s. w.) ist für die Beurtleilung A.s natürlich vollig werthlos," Wileken in *Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2476.

And we speak of the "verdict of posterity" !

⁶ Συρίας καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἐθνῶν ἐγκρατῶς ἥρχε, App. Syr. 45.

⁷ σατράπην μὲν ἔχων ἐν Βαβυλῶνι Τίμαρχον, App. Syr. 45. His government included the nearer Irânian provinces. He is called *σατράπης Μηδίας*, Diod. xxxi. 27 a. The seat of government for the eastern part of the kingdom was, of course, the Babylonian Seleucia.

⁸ 2 Mace. 4, 30.

ready enough to give. The pomp and display of a great civic festival would attract his interest. Tyre celebrated a festival with games every fourth year—a periodic principle almost certainly showing imitation of such Greek institutions as the Olympic games and the Panathenaea. And at the first of these, which came round after the accession of Antiochus, he himself was present, and caused the other communities of Palestine to send contributions to the expense of the games and the great sacrifice to Heracles (Melkarth).¹

The foreign policy of Antiochus during these early years had of course for its chief question the line to be pursued in view of the general anti-Roman movement of which King Perseus of Macedonia was the centre. There was this difference in the situation of the Seleucid court under the new king, that it had now a close understanding with Pergamos. Pergamos, Cappadocia and Syria formed a sort of triple alliance in the East. The policy of the three powers was pronouncedly philo-Roman, and yet the mere fact of their alliance (as they all were well aware) put a certain check upon Rome, so that, although no handle for complaint was given, Rome was profoundly annoyed and visited Eumenes later on with conspicuous displeasure.²

Antiochus observed a studiously deferential attitude to the Western power. The instalments of the war indemnity fell indeed into arrear during the first years after 176, years in which no doubt Antiochus was occupied in making his throne secure. But in 173 one of the chief persons of the court, a certain Apollonius, of apparently marked Roman sympathies, was sent at the head of an embassy to bring all that was owing, and beg for the confirmation of Rome's friendship to the new king. The embassy was well received and a formal renewal of amity accorded.³

But it was well understood that the Seleucid King was at heart no friend to Rome. Perseus did not despair of his alliance. There had been goings to and fro between Pella and

¹ 2 Mace. 4, 19; see Grimm's note. Tyre struck coins with the head of Antiochus in 175 (Babelon, p. cix.), and may therefore have been one of the places which declared for him early.

² Polyb. xxxi. 6, 5.

³

Liv. xlii. 6.

Antioech of which Rome did not fail to get intelligence. Yet Antioehus was able to convince the Roman mission which visited Antioeh in 173-172 that he had been deaf to the tempter, and was absolutely at the command of Rome.¹ And meanwhile he was quietly contravening the stipulations of the Peace, and new ships of war were being built in the Phoenician docks.² There were still elephants, which we hear of in 170,³ stabled at Aparnea.⁴

Before it had come to actual war between Macedonia and Rome the thoughts of Antioehus were occupied in another quarter. When he had established himself in Syria, Egypt was being governed by his sister Cleopatra, the widow of Ptolemy Epiphanes who had died in 182; she was regent for her young son, Ptolemy Philometor. This circumstance relieved him of all anxiety on his southern frontier; but in 173 Cleopatra died. Then the anti-Seleueid party, represented by Eulaeus the chief eunuch, and Lenaeus, a native of Coele-Syria, came to the helm.⁵ Already Apollonius the son of Menestheus, whom Antioehus sent to represent him at the inaugural festivities of the young Ptolemy,⁶ reported the temper of the Alexandrian court as menacing. An immediate attack was apprehended. Antioehus advanced promptly with a force to repel an invasion, as far at any rate as Joppa. After satisfying himself that things were safe for the moment, he returned north.⁷ Yet the danger was only deferred. The party which now ruled Egypt had never acquiesced in the loss of Coele-Syria. It had been wrested from the kingdom at a moment of weakness; but the question which for a hundred and thirty years had been the standing ground of quarrel between the rival houses should not be closed to the dis-

¹ Liv. xlii. 26.

² 2 Mace. iv. 20.

³ 1 Mace. 1, 17.

⁴ The Parthian kingdom must have cut off the Seleueids from getting a fresh stock of elephants from India.

⁵ Diod. xxx. 15.

⁶ The expression of 2 Mace. 4, 2 *πρωτοκλίσια* r (as variously read) *πρωτοκλήσια* is supposed to be another name for what are called in Polyb. xxviii. 12, 8, *ἀνακλητήρια*, and are described as *τὰ νομιζόμενα γίνεσθαι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ὅταν εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθωσιν*.

⁷ 2 Mace. 4, 21.

advantage of the Ptolemaïc. Preparations for renewing the appeal to arms were vigorously pressed forward in Egypt. Antioehus could not be expected to wait quietly till they were completed; but if he were the first to open war he feared setting Rome against him. And now the storm in the West, which had been gathering so long, at last burst. In 171 actual war between Rome and Perseus began, and the Macedonian kingdom entered upon its supreme struggle for existence. The ambassador Meleager, whom Antioehus sent to lay before the Senate the aggressive attitude of Egypt and justify his own measures of defence,¹ found that Rome at that moment was fully engaged elsewhere.

Early in 169 another embassy of Antioehus was in Rome. It was headed, like the former one, by Meleager. He was accompanied by Heraelides, the insinuating, unwholesome minister of finance, who knew to perfection how to touch the palm of every venal Senator.² The mission of the embassy was to convince the Senate that in the conflict which was impending, or had even now begun, Egypt, not Antioehus, was the aggressor. Its work in Rome was watched by an embassy from Alexandria. But till the Macedonian business was decided, the Senate would give neither party a definite answer. It would put upon Quintus Mareius, the consul, who was about to sail for Greece, all responsibility for expressing the will of Rome to King Ptolemy.⁸

Egypt about the same time took the offensive (170-169). The regents, Eulaeus and Leneus, marched out with an army to invade Cœle-Syria. Before they left Alexandria they delivered a harangue to the populace. They would make short work with the enemy; they would do a great deal more than barely win back the lost province; they would make the whole Seleucid realm an appendage of the Egyptian crown. A strange accompaniment to the army were waggons of bullion, of gold and silver plate, of jewels and rich feminine attire, even furniture from the palace. These, the regents explained, were the means by which they would prevail over the constancy of Seleucid cities and strongholds.

Not many days had passed before the Egyptian army was

¹ Polyb. xxvii. 19.

² Diod. xxxi. 27^a.

³ Polyb. xxviii. 1.

in headlong rout and the Seleucid King stood at the doors of the land.

Antioehus had gathered a large army¹ with the purpose of proceeding beyond the defensive. It is now that we find his son Antioehus, a child of three or four years, associated in the throne,² a measure which implies that he expected to be engaged in warfare at a distance from the capital.³ He had already nearly crossed the desert between Palestine and Egypt, had passed Mount Casius and almost reached the frontier-fortress of Egypt, Pelusium, when the army of Eulaeus and Lenaeus were encountered on their way. The battle which ensued was a crushing defeat for the generals of Ptolemy. The news threw Alexandria from its vain confidence into unreasoning panic. Although Pelusium still blocked the way of the invader, all was given up for lost. The young king⁴ was hurriedly packed on board ship to escape, if he could, to the sacred island of Samothraee.⁵ It was a foolish step. Ptolemy was intercepted by the Syrian vessels, and fell into the hands of Antioehus.

The Alexandrian people showed in this crisis more spirit than the boasters who had so lightly entered into the war. They determined on resistance, and, since their king had deserted them, called his younger brother to the throne, a boy of about fifteen.⁶ He was given the auspicious surname of Euergetes, to which clung memories of that earlier Ptolemy who had marched victoriously through the heart of the Seleucid realm.⁷

¹ Jerome (on Dan. 11) says "cum modico populo," and this is followed by Mr. Mahaffy {*Umpire of the Ptolemies*, p. 333), with whose view (on page 494 of his book) I am gratified to discover my way of understanding these Egyptian campaigns in the main coincides. But Jerome's phrase, Mr. Mahaffy does not seem to have noticed, comes from a misapplication of the Hebrew of verse 23.

² *Zeitschr.f. Assy.* viii. p. 110.

³ 2 Mace. 9, 23. The mother of this child, whom Antioehus IV must have taken as his queen in 175, was called Laodice (Michel, No. 1096). Whether she was a sister or a princess of some other dynasty we do not know.

⁴ According to John of Antioch, frag. 58 (*F.H.G.* iv. p. 558) he had been present at the battle, but Polybins says *ἐκτὸς γερόμενον τῶν δεινῶν καὶ τοσούτων τόπον ἀποστάντα τῶν ἐχθρῶν* (xxviii. 21).

⁵ Polyb. xxviii. 21 ; Diod. xxx. 17.

⁶ *ἥδη γὰρ συνέβαινε τότε τὸν νεώτερον Πτολεμαῖον ὑπὸ τῶν δχλῶν ἀναδεεῖσθαι βασιλεῖα διὰ τὴν περίστασιν*, Polyb. xxix. 23.

⁷ Eus. I. p. 161.

These measures, however, Antioehus, having got Ptolemy Philometor into his hands, could turn to his own account. He now represented himself as the champion of the legitimate king against the usurping brother.¹ He had a specious pretext ready to hand for an invasion of Egypt.² But first there was the obstacle of Pelusium to be surmounted. And the new government in Alexandria, alive to the emergency, sent a fleet to secure the frontier city. But it was engaged by the Seleueid ships, and the naval battle went, as the land battle had done, against the Egyptians.³ To win Pelusium, Antioehus trusted not less to subtility than to arms. He had already half-won the hearts of those who served King Ptolemy. In the first battle near Mount Casius, when the horror of flight was upon the Egyptian army, Antioehus had suddenly appeared riding amongst them as an angel of deliverance and ordering his troops to hold their hand. The impression thence conceived of him made for his advantage. Many of those who "ate of the meat" of King Ptolemy deserted to the invader.⁴ The garrison of Pelusium listened to his overtures, and then swiftly, without violating the letter of any agreement, Antioehus seized the city. It was an incident in his career which his admirers did not like to reflect upon.⁶

The way into Egypt now lay open. A bridge was rapidly constructed over the Pelusiae branch of the Nile, and the Syrian army poured into the Delta.⁶ Lower Egypt was soon entirely in the hands of Antioehus, except Alexandria, which still held out for Ptolemy Euergetes. Antioehus fixed the seat of the rival government, for which Ptolemy Philometor was to serve as figure-head, at Memphis.⁷

¹ καὶ ὁ μὲν Πτολεμαῖος αὐτὸν προσδεχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων προσφεύγει τῷ γαμβρῷ (really, of course, uncle) Ἀντίοχῳ, John of Antioch, frag. 58.

² Diod. xxxi. 1. Wilcken (*Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2473) argues that this invasion of Egypt must be a *second* invasion because Antioehus had Philometor already in his hands before making it (Liv. xlv. 11, 8). The view here taken of the chain of events makes this supposition unnecessary. Till after the battle near Mount Casius the Egyptians were the aggressors; Antioehus was acting on the defensive. The premature flight of Philometor now took place, and Antioehus then changed to the offensive, invading Egypt.

³ Liv. xlv. 19.

⁴ Dan. 11, 26.

⁵ Diod. xxx. 14; 18; Polyb. xxviii. 18.

⁶ Liv. xiv. 19.

⁷ What position did Antioehus himself arrogate? Jerome (Dan. 11, 21 f.)

At Alexandria the formal life of the court went on unbroken. Euergetes espoused, as a matter of course, the royal sister Cleopatra whom his brother had left behind.¹ He entered upon his majority with the usual ceremonies (*ἀνακλήτηρια*).² Memphis was shut off from the larger world, and it was the king at Alexandria who was King Ptolemy to foreign states. The Achaean League sent an embassy to obtain from him a confirmation of the privileges accorded to its citizens (early summer 169).³ His patronage was solicited for the festivals in the various states of Greece. A second embassy from the Aehaeans came in the matter of the Antigonea, and Athens sent no less than three for similar purposes.

But it was certain that Antioehus would not leave Alexandria unmolested, and it must look to its defences. The administration was conducted for the young king by Comanus and Cineas. They formed a consultative board from the most distinguished officers in the Egyptian service. Campaigns were no longer to be conducted after the notions of eunuchs and clerks. It seemed also advisable to try what could be done by negotiation with the invader, and the happy thought occurred of using the services of the foreign ambassadors, who were certain to command the respect of the phil-Hellenic king. Antioehus had already sent on an envoy to state his demands and was advancing on the city.⁴

The missions just mentioned from Athens and from the Aehaeans were in Alexandria at the moment, and besides these there were envoys from Miletus and from Clazomenae. All these, accompanied by ambassadors from the Alexandrian court, took boat up the Nile to meet Antioehus. Their

says that he had himself solemnly made king at Memphis with the traditional Egyptian rites ("ex more Aegypti regnum aeeipiens"), and we know that coins were struck in Egypt in his name (Babelon, page c). On the other hand, in the narrative of Polybius he always poses as the champion of Ptolemy Philometor. Even the evidence of the coins is ambiguous, for it is remarkable, as Mr. Mahaffy points out, that although they bear his superscription, he seems to have avoided putting his image upon them (*Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 336).

¹ Li v. xlv. 19. See Strack, *Dynastie der Ptolemaeer*, p. 197.

² Polyb. xxviii, 12. In maintaining that the Ptolemy referred to must be Philometor, Niese (*Kritik der Makk.* p. 90) appears to me to beg the question.

³ Polyb. *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, xxviii. 19.

reception was gracious and magnificent. On the second day after their arrival Antioehus gave them a polite hearing. He learnt that the Alexandrian court fully admitted that Egypt had been in the wrong in opening war, but the blame for that wrong lay with the party, now fallen, of Eulaeus and Leneus, and the voices of the Greek ambassadors appealed to Antioehus not to visit the transgressions of those wretched men upon his sister's son, one little more than a boy. It seemed from the King's response that the kindly emotions to which the ambassadors appealed needed no quickening; he more than assented to all they said. And then he dexterously shifted to the question of Cœle-Syria, and went into the arguments on the Seleucid side with great convincingness.

But the ambassadors were uncomfortably conscious that this was wide of their mission. The Cœle-Syrian question no longer held the field; that had been stopped by the defeat of Eulaeus; the Alexandrian court no longer justified the attack; it was the Seleucid occupation of Egypt which was in question. Antioehus, in the best diplomatic manner, had given the envoys an elaborate answer which was no answer at all.

The ambassadors remained in the company of Antioehus as he pursued his way down the river. At Nauaratis, the old Greek city of Egypt, every citizen who could show his Hellenic nationality received a gold piece from Antioehus.¹ And he still gave the ambassadors no real answer. He detained them till his own envoys to Alexandria, Aristides and Theris, should return; he wished, he said, to take Hellas in the person of the ambassadors to witness as to the righteousness of his cause.²

The demand which Antioehus had addressed to the Alexandrian court was, no doubt, the recognition of Philometor instead of Euergetes as king. Such a demand could only

¹ It has occurred to me that similar largesses in other [daces may account for the Egyptian coins which Antioehus struck in his own name, while apparently he professed to regard Ptolemy Philometor as the king. It is conceivable that he may have had a special sort of money made for his largesses or the payment of his troops which should by its superscription commemorate the donor. All the existing coins are in bronze, but the Nauaraites in receiving gold may have been specially favoured,

² Polyb. xxviii. 20.

meet with a refusal. Accordingly the great city had for the first time in its existence to experience the pains of a siege. Alexandria besieged! It was an event which shook the whole commercial world. At Rhodes the tidings caused especial dismay. Not only mercantile considerations, but that growing dread of Rome which led the maritime republic to desire above all things concord between the Greek kings of the East, made the Rhodians forward to negotiate peace. They sent an embassy to Antioehus, and urged upon him their friendship with both belligerents, his own affinity with the Ptolemies, and the interest which both powers had in peace at such an hour as this. To all this Antioehus had a ready answer. *Peace existed already between himself and the king of Egypt*; nay, more, they were good friends and allies. Let the capital open its gates to the real king and he would have nothing further to say.¹

The distress in that populous city, now that it was cut off from the interior, although its communications with the sea were still open, soon became acute. Of course it appealed to Rome. "Unwashed and unshaven, with olive branches in their hands, the ambassadors came before the Senate and flung themselves upon the ground; and piteous as their appearance was, their words were more lamentable still." Within a little Antioehus would possess himself of all the riches of Egypt. An embassy—only let Rome send an embassy, and he would not refuse to go away.²

An embassy indeed was all that could be expected of Rome so long as the Macedonian war was on its hands. Whether the effect of an embassy at that moment was not rather overstated by the Alexandrian envoys may be a question. But suddenly Antioehus, after vainly attempting to take the city by storm, raised the siege and evacuated Egypt!³ The meaning of this abrupt move (dependent upon

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 23.

² Liv. xlv. 19. Livy puts this plaintive mission in 168. This is admitted to be impossible, since by then the reconciliation of Philometor and Euergetes had changed the face of things (Bandelin, *Be rebus inter Aegyptios et Romanos intercedentibus*, Diss. inaus. Halis Saxonium, 1893). Either, then, the account of the mission must be altered in nearly all its particulars or the date changed. The latter is the less violent correction.

³ Liv. xlv. 11.

the secret history of the times or the impulses of a strange nature) is dark to us. It is easy to invent hypotheses. He had at any rate the satisfaction of leaving the kingdom in a state of civil war, Ptolemy Philometor reigning at Memphis in opposition to his brother at Alexandria. Antioehus also took the precaution of keeping the door unbolted against his return by leaving a strong garrison in Pelusium.¹

Antioehus, when he returned to Syria in 169, was in a different situation from that of the year before. He was covered with the glory of conquering the country which had exalted itself over his ancestors. He had burst the treasures, which since the days when it repulsed Perdiseas and Antigonus the Ptolemaïc house had gone on securely filling. He had come back laden with spoil. The Seleueid kingdom was in the giddy position of some one who, after living on the verge of bankruptcy, suddenly acquires a fortune. Moreover, Antioehus had changed the balance in the East, not only without the consent of Rome, but against its liking. Even though Rome sent a special embassy to Antioeh under Titus Numisius to make peace between Antioehus and the Alexandrian court, it returned, with fair words doubtless, but with nothing else.² Perseus in the deadly grapple conceived new hopes of his alliance. He sent a last appeal to the Seleueid from the Antigonid to intervene as mediator or ally before it was too late.³

But Antioehus still saw his advantage in honouring Rome the more, that his actions ran contrary. Fifty talents of his new wealth would, he conceived, be not unprofitably spent in a "crown" to be presented to the Romans. It was carried by the same ambassadors, Meleager, Heraelides and Sosiphanes,

¹ The alliance of Antioehus with Ptolemy Philometor seems to have been embodied in an instrument drawn up by the historian Heraelides, nicknamed Lembos (*F.H.G.* iii. p. 167 ; Susemihl, *Geseh. d. griech. Lit.* i. p. 501.

² Polyb. xxix. 25. I take this embassy to have been sent before the reconciliation of Philometor and Euergetes, or before it was known in Rome, since Antioehus seems to have struck quickly after the reconciliation, and there would, therefore, hardly be time for the news of his reconciliation to reach Rome, for Numisius to reach Antioeh, stay till he was convinced of the hopelessness of his mission, and then leave, and finally for the news of his failure to reach Aehaea before the attack of Antioehus was delivered.

³ Polyb. xxix. 4, 9.

who had gone the year before. They also carried a hundred talents more to bestow upon various Greek cities which they took on their way.¹

But the triumph of Antioehus was soon crossed by disappointment. Ptolemy Philometor, as the rest of his life shows, was not apt for the part of puppet. He had been under no illusions as to the real purport of his uncle's friendliness, and the suavity had been equally hollow on both sides. "And as for both these kings, their hearts shall be to do mischief, and they shall speak lies at one table."² The Seleucid garrison at Pelusium now made further doubt impossible, No sooner was Philometor left to himself than he sent an emissary into Alexandria to Cleopatra, his sister and but recently his wife, to feel after a reconciliation. It soon appeared that while the people who had called Euergetes to the throne would not desert him, they were willing to receive back Philometor as joint-king. Cleopatra reverted to the elder brother. On these terms Philometor re-entered Alexandria and the schism in the kingdom was at an end.³

At this unexpected break-down of his plans Antioehus was instantly strung for swift and deadly action. He was in an awkward position for retaining his hold on Egypt. He had proclaimed to the whole Greek world that his interference in Egypt had been solely in order to support the legitimate king. His letters to this effect were in the archives of numerous cities. But all that was now thrown to the winds. He flung his dõoops upon Cyprus, and in the spring of 168 led an army south to invade Egypt a second time. Greek public opinion last year had justified him; in his present designs it was against him. Polybius regards the second invasion of Egypt as an instance of virtue breaking down under temptation.⁴

The attack of Antioehus was exactly what Ptolemy Philometor had expected when he reconciled himself with Euergetes. He had bestirred himself to meet it. Envoys had come during the winter in the name of the two brother-

¹ Polyb. xxviii. 22. A story of doubtful source says that Antioehus also supplied the Romans with Indian elephants for the Macedonian war. Polyæn. iv. 21 (20).

² Dan. 11, 27.

³ Liv. xlv. 11 ; Polyb. xxix. 23.

⁴ Polyb. xxix. 26.

kings to the Peloponnesus to invite *condottieri* like Theodoridas of Sieyon to raise bands for the Ptolemaic service. They approached the Achaean League with a request for 1000 foot and 200 horse under the command of Lyeortas and his son Polybius (the historian who tells the tale). Polybius warmly supported the appeal and carried the people, he assures us, with him, till the party who favoured inaction circumvented him by producing a letter—which they had forged—from Mareius, the consul commanding against Macedonia, wherein he requested the Aehaeans to remain neutral and second the Roman efforts at mediation. Instead, therefore, of the troops asked for, only another useless embassy embarked for Alexandria.¹

Nothing adequate seems to have been accomplished for the defence of Egypt when Antioehus early in 168 again marched south. At Rhinocolura, on the desert-road between Palestine and Egypt, he met the envoys of Ptolemy Philometor. With a careful correctness they thanked him in the name of their king for the support which had restored him to the throne of his fathers, and then proceeded to remonstrate against his warlike demonstrations, which had the less reason in that any desires he might express to the Alexandrian court would be considered in the friendliest spirit. The only answer of Antioehus was an ultimatum demanding the formal cession of Cyprus and Pelusium within a fixed time.

The demands, we must allow, would not have been outrageous had they been preferred before. After the unprovoked aggression of Egypt, Antioehus had, when victorious, every right to exact guarantees for his kingdom's peace. Pelusium in Seleucid occupation would lock the door against an attack by land, whilst Cyprus would be the base for a naval attack on Syria. But in that case the demands should have been made before Antioehus concluded peace with Philometor. The official contention of the Seleucid court had been last year that Antioehus made peace with the king of Egypt at the time when Ptolemy fell into his hands, or, as the Seleucid version seems to have had it, sought refuge in the camp of his uncle. Antioehus had no longer any right to raise fresh demands without a fresh offence.

¹ Polyb. xxix. 23 f.

The time specified in the ultimatum expired, and Antioehus again advanced. Once more his armies crossed the Egyptian frontier, and, as on the former occasion, seem to have struck first for Memphis. The natives had come to hate the Macedonian dynasty, and an invader gathered adherents as he went. Then Antioehus turned north and slowly drew down upon Alexandria.

But while the Seleucid king was moving among the ancient cities and luxuriant fields of the Delta, the last fight of the house of Antigonos was fought out. The battle of Pydna (22nd June 168) ended the struggle of Perseus and extinguished Macedonia as an independent state for ever. This entirely altered the situation; Rome was now free to act strongly in Egypt. Gaius Popillius Laenas, the chief of the embassy which had been sent out early in the year to induce Antioehus to retire, was awaiting in Delos the issue of the Macedonian war when he received the news of Pydna. He immediately set sail for Egypt. Antioehus had almost reached Alexandria; he had crossed the Canobie branch of the Nile at a place called Eleusis, and was encamped in the sandy region to the east of the city when the Roman mission arrived. The historic scene which followed was one which Roman pride never allowed to be forgotten. Antioehus was prepared to receive Popillius—whom he had known in Rome—with that easy familiarity which belonged to him. As soon as he saw the ambassadors approaching he greeted Popillius in a loud glad voice and held out his hand as to an old friend. But the Roman came on with a grim and stony irresponsiveness. He reached the King a little tablet which he carried in his hand, and curtly bade him first read that through. Antioehus looked at it; it was a formal resolution of the Senate that King Antioehus should be required to evacuate Egypt. Then there sprang to his lips one of those diplomatic phrases which came so readily to him, something as to laying the matter before his Friends. But the Roman was determined he should not wriggle free. To the amazement of the courtiers, he drew with his walking-stick a circle in the sand all round the King: Yes or No before he stepped outside of it! Such methods were certainly

a new sort of diplomacy, and Antioehus collapsed. When he got his voice, it was to say that he would agree to anything. The next minute he found the Romans shaking his hand and inquiring cheerfully how he did.¹

Within a limited time prescribed by the ambassadors Antioehus withdrew completely from Egypt. "Groaning and in bitterness of heart" he retraced his way along the coast of Palestine.² The "ships of Kittim had come against him, and he was grieved and returned"³ And meanwhile the Roman ambassadors proceeded to Cyprus, where the forces of Antioehus were carrying all before them. Ptolemy Macron, the governor of the island, had gone over to the Seleucid.⁴ But the appearance of the Roman ambassadors changed all this. They did not leave the island till they had seen the last Seleucid soldier out of it. It was shown that Rome set as strict a limit to the Seleucid dominion on the side of the Ptolemaïc realm as on that of Asia Minor. The humiliation of Eleusis was in a way worse than the humiliation of Magnesia.

After inflicting it upon Antioehus the Senate may have apprehended that he would feel some soreness. Not in the least! so they were assured by his ambassadors, who presently came to bring his congratulations on the victory over Perseus. The satisfaction of pleasing the Senate was so great that no conquest seemed to Antioehus worth grasping at in comparison ; orders delivered him by Roman envoys were equivalent to divine commands. The Senate replied that he had done well.⁵

But if Antioehus had been robbed of the substance of triumph, he could still rejoice in its outward circumstance. In the following year (167) Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia, celebrated triumphal games at Amphipolis, to which the whole Greek world was invited.

¹ Polyb. xxix. 27 ; Liv. xlv. 12 ; Diod. xxxi. 2 ; Vell. Pat. i. 10 ; App. Syr. 66 ; Just. xxxiv. 3, 1 f. ; Valer. Max. vi. 3.

² Polyb. xxix. 27, 8.

³ Daniel 11, 30.

⁴ 2 Mace. 10, 13. He is apparently the Ptolemy of Megalopolis mentioned in Polyb. xviii. 55, 6, and xxvii. 13. He is not to be confused with the Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus, who goes on an important mission to Rome in 203 (Polyb. xv. 25, 13), and is mentioned, as well as Ptolemy of Megalopolis, in Polyb. xviii. 55.

⁵ Liv. xlv. 13.

In this department Antioehus would not be bettered by a Roman. His envoys soon came in the track of those of Aemilius, bidding the Greeks to the great spectacle which a Greek king, the conqueror of Egypt, would display in Daphne, the paradise of Antioeh. The invitation drew immense crowds from all shores of the eastern Mediterranean.

The procession is described for us in some detail. Its first part was a military display, men of many nations in all sorts of gorgeous armour, gold, silver, and wonderful embroideries, horses of the purest Nisæan breed with bridles and frontlets of gold, mailed Scythian cavalry, Indian elephants, gladiators. And then followed the civil procession—the *epheboi* of Antioeh with golden crowns, a thousand oxen dressed for sacrifice, nearly three hundred sacred legations from the Greek cities, ivory tusks, statues of every conceivable god or demi-god gilt or in cloth of gold, allegorical figures, splendid vessels, painted women who flung perfumes from golden jugs or were carried in litters with golden feet. It was an astounding profusion of treasure. Dionysius, the secretary of state (*ἐπιστολογράφος*), was represented by a thousand slaves who bore silver vessels, none of which weighed less than a thousand drachmas.

The festivities—games, gladiatorial shows, wild beast fights—went on for a month. The chief city fountain sometimes ran with wine.¹ Choice unguents were served from golden jars to the people in the gymnasium without price. At the palace, couches were laid for a thousand or fifteen hundred guests.

Antioehus was in his element. He outdid himself in indiscriminate familiarity. Functions which would naturally have been left to subordinates he insisted on performing himself—riding up and down the procession, shouting orders, standing at the palace door to usher in the guests, marshalling the attendants. He was up and down among the banqueters, sitting, standing, declaiming, drinking, or bandying jests with the professional mummers. The crowning moment was one evening towards the end of a feast, when the company had begun to grow thin. The mummers brought in a swaddled figure and laid it upon the ground. Suddenly, at the notes of

¹ Hdiodorus, frag. 6, *F.H.G.* iv. p. 425.

the *symphonia*, it started from its wrappings and the King stood there, naked. The next moment he whirled away in the fantastic dance of the buffoons. The banquet broke up in confusion.¹

The festivities were hardly over and Antioch clear of the mob of revellers when the ominous face of the Roman envoy thrust itself upon the scene. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus headed a mission which came, after all this blare of trumpets, to see what was really going on. They were on the watch for some sign of ill-will in the Seleucid King, some coolness in their entertainment. But never had Antiochus been more genial and charming. He put his own palace at their disposal, he surrounded them with the state of kings. They returned declaring that it was incredible that this man could be cherishing any serious designs. There were few who could cover so deadly a hate with such disarming manners.²

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 3 ; Diod. xxxi. 16.

² Polyb. xxxi. 5 ; 6, 7.

CHAPTER XXIY

ANTIOCHUS THE GOD MANIFEST

WHILE Borne circumscribed the activity of Antioehus as a conqueror, he had great scope left him as the radiant champion and patron of Hellenism, both within his own dominions and abroad. He sustained this character abroad by bestowing magnificent presents upon the old seats of Hellenism in Asia Minor and Greece, and by throwing open to their artists and craftsmen lucrative employment in Syria. We may question whether any principal city did not look on some new embellishment, a temple, an altar, a colonnade, which declared continually the glory and the munificence of King Antioehus. The beloved Athens was, of course, chosen for special honour. To the south-east of the Acropolis stood the noble beginnings of a temple of Zeus Olympius, which Pisistratus had planned some 360 years before and left unfinished. Antioehus undertook to replace it by a new and more splendid fane. On his commission the Roman architect Deeimus Cossutius began the construction of a gigantic temple surrounded by a double colonnade of Corinthian pillars, not in stone, like those of Pisistratus, but in Pentelie marble—"one of the largest Greek temples in the world," whose remaining columns, standing in bare isolation, make even to-day a principal feature of Athens. But Antioehus also did not live to finish what he began. His temple too stood for 300 years incomplete, the marvel of the world, till it was finished and opened by the Emperor Hadrian (130 A.D.).¹ Another conspicuous gift of Antioehus

¹ Polyb. xxvi. 1, 11; Liv. xli. 20; Vell. Patere. i. 10; Paus. i. 18, 6 Vitruv. iii. 2, 8; vii. praef. 15, 17. See Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. ii. p. 178 f.

in Athens was the gilt Gorgon's head upon a golden aegis, which flamed upon the southern wall of the Acropolis above the theatre.¹ In Syria special privileges were conferred upon Athenian citizens.²

Of the gifts of Antioehus elsewhere the following are recorded ; at Delos, some statues about the altar ;³ at Olympia, a curtain of Oriental embroidery;⁴ at Megalopolis, a wall (not completely carried out) about the city; at Tegea, a marble theatre (also not finished); at Cyzicus, golden plate for one of the tables in the public hall.⁵

Within his own dominions the activity of Antioehus in the cause of Hellenism could be more various. Besides lavishing his treasure upon the adornment of existing Greek cities, he could create new ones. He could also adjust the constitutions and forms of city life more closely to the Hellenic ideal.

The capital naturally received a great share of his attention. He added a new quarter, Epiphanea, which climbed the slopes of Mount Silpius behind the older Antioeh, and included within its wall precipitous places and rushing torrents. This made Antioeh to be a complex of four cities, a *tetrapolis*, each city being divided off from the rest by an inner wall, while one outer wall embraced the whole complex, scaling the steep sides of the mountain and spanning the ravines.⁶

The theatre, whose remains can still be traced, was in this region. It had perhaps existed before the time of Antioehus Epiphanes, only without the city. Here too was the Senate-house, erected doubtless by Antioehus, and perhaps already adorned with the porticoes and pictures described by Libanius.⁷ High up in the new city, near the "Citadel," which tradition asserted to be the site of the pre-historic Greek settlement,⁸ Antioehus reared a temple of Jupiter Capitolinus—at once gratifying his passion for splendour and advancing his policy.

¹ Paus. i. 21, 3 ; v. 12, 4.

² 2 Mace. 9, 15.

³ Polyb. xxvi. 1, 11. Whether Livy's Delon *arts insignibus statuarumque eopia ornavit* (xli. 20) is more than a loose translation of Polybius may be doubted.

⁴ Paus. v. 12, 4. It has been conjectured that this was the Veil from the Temple in Jerusalem which Antioehus carried away.

⁵ Liv. xli. 20.

⁶ Strabo xvi. 750. See Müller, *Antiquit. Antioeh.* p. 54; FÖrster, *Jahrb. d. kaiserl. deutsch. archäol. Instituts*, xii. (1897), p. 117 f.

⁷ *Orationes* (Reiske), vol. iv. pp. 1048, 1057.

⁸ See vol. i. p. 212.

It was in keeping with his other sumptuous works, and had not only the usual gilt ceiling, but the walls covered with plates of gold.¹

There are evidences that of all the Greek deities it was Zeus Olympius who called forth the most enthusiasm in Antioehus. Not only was it for him that Antioehus built the vast temple in Athens, but this god now reappears upon the coins, where he had ceased to figure since the days of Seleueus I. At Daphne, in the temple of Apollo, there was an image of him which Antioehus set up² It was a close copy in form, material and size of the great chryselephantine work of Phidias at Olympia. The Nike, which it carried in its hand, was of gold.³ Daphne, of course, like Olympia, was a place for athletic contests; the *siadion* seems to have been close under the temple, and it would be as the dispenser of victory that Zeus would be worshipped.

On the cliffs above the city one can still trace the outlines of a sculptured colossal bust, feminine seemingly, with a mystic head-gear and lappets falling over the shoulders. This is the remains of a group of sculptures which was known as the *Charonion*. According to Malalas,⁴ it was made by Antioehus Epiphanes as a charm against pestilence.⁵ Nothing is left of any of the other works with which Antioehus embellished his capital—such as the statue of a man quelling a bull, which represented, according to the local tradition, Antioehus himself subduing the robber tribes of the Taurus.⁶

¹ Liv. xli. 20; Gran. Liein. xxviii. It has occurred to me that the mysterious expression in Daniel 11, 38, the "god (or goddess) of fortresses," may point to a worship of the goddess Roma in connexion with Jupiter—the goddess having, of course, as her emblem a *mural crown*.

² The origin of this image is not absolutely certain. Ammianus Mareellinus ascribes it to Antioehus Epiphanes, "rex ille iraeundus et saevus" (xxii. 13, 1); so does Gran. Liein. (xxviii.); but Malalas (p. 307) to Diocletian. Babelon, on the other hand, thinks it was already put up by Seleueus Nieator, because Zeus Olympius is a regular type on his coins, and that it was only restored or replaced by Antioehus IV (*Rois de Syrie*, p. xev.).

³ Just. xxxix. 2, ft.

⁴ *Chron.* p. 205.

⁵ Mr. Frazer (*Pausanias*, ii. p. 229) conjectures that the golden Gorgon at Athens, put up by Antioehus, was "intended to serve as a charm against the evil eye." I do not know whether he has observed the curious confirmation offered by the *Charonion* at Antioeh, which is ascribed to the *same Antioehus*.

⁶ Libanius, *Orat.* (Reiske), i. p. 311.

Besides adding to the material splendours of Antioeh, Antioehus gave its political institutions, in accordance with a plan which we shall see extended to other of the cities of the kingdom, a form which corresponded more nearly to the autonomy required by Hellenic theory. Now first do bronze coins appear, issued, not in the name of the King, but of Antioeh-near-Daphne. Only the head of Antioehus appears as that of a patron-deity, invested with rays. *It is significant that the Senate-house (βουλευτήριον) was in the new city which owed its origin to him.* It may be owing to him that the Athenian model was copied in Antioeh. The people (δῆμος) assembled in the theatre to pass decrees.¹ Antioehus perhaps introduced the names of the Athenian months.² Antioeh even had a body of citizen cavalry, like the Athenian "knights." They rode in the procession at Daphne with crowns of gold and silver.³

The extension of the freedom of Antioeh appears, it has just been said, as part of a general scheme by which Antioehus adjusted the *status* of the cities of the kingdom. In many cases it involved the adoption by the city of the name of Antioeh or Epiphanea. In Cilieia, Adana becomes Antioeh-on-Sarus, and Tarsus Antioeh-on-Cydnus, and both issue coins in their new name.⁴ Oeniandus became Epiphanea.⁵ Mopsu-hestia strikes with the head of Antioehus and the name of Seleueia-on-Pyramus;⁶ Castabala with the head of Antioehus and the name Hieropolis.⁷

In Syria, not only the capital, but the other principal

¹ Tac. *Hist.* ii. 80. The decree of a city found at Pergamos (Michel, No. 550) is ordinarily thought to be a decree of Antioeh. If so, its formulae closely resemble the Attic (Niese, *Kritik d. Makk.* p. 30). But I think that Holleaux is probably right in his suggestion that the city whence the decree issues is Athens, *Rev. d. Études Grecques*, xiii. (1900), p. 258 f.

- Niese *loc. cit.*

³ Polyb. xxxi. 3. The 3000 *πολιτικοὶ ἱππεῖς* probably included "knights" from the other Greek cities of Syria.

⁴ Babelon, p. ci., cii.

⁵ Plin. v. § 93; App. *Mith.* 96. Steph. Byz. mentions an Antioeh in Lydia, called after Antioehus Epiphanes. This is highly improbable, but it is not absolutely impossible, considering the relations of the Seleueid and Pergamene kingdoms, that Eumenes should have allowed the name to be taken by a city in compliment to his ally.

⁶ Babelon, p. cvi.

⁷ Imhoof-Blumer, *Zeitseh.f. Num.* x. pp. 267, 286.

cities now strike bronze—Seleueia, Apamea, Laodicea-on-the-sea, Alexandria (mod. Alexandretta), Hieropolis, all in their own names, but with the radiate head of Antioehus and a type connected with Zeus upon the reverse.¹ In all these cases the existing name was safe from change, but in other places new Antioehs and Epiphaneas appeared. The ancient Hamath in the Orontes valley (mod. Hamât), the rival of Damascus in the time of David, became Epiphanea; an Antioeh and an Epiphanea are mentioned close together on the Euphrates.² In the country conquered from Ptolemy by Antioehus III, Gadara bore for a time the names of Antioeh and Seleueia.³ In the same region there was an Antioeh-near-Hippus. Ptolemaïs strikes bronze of a similar type to that already mentioned, calling itself Antioeh-in-Ptolemais.⁴ Lastly, Jerusalem, when reconstructed as a Greek city, took rank among the Antioehs.

The coins (bronze) which the Phoenician cities and Asealon strike with the radiate head of Antioehus differ from those before mentioned in having not only the image of the King, but the superscription **Βασιλέως Ἀντιόχου**. Does this correspond to any difference in their status, any imperfection in their Hellenic character? The superscription of the city usually appears in addition to that of the King, sometimes in Greek—**Τυρίων, Σιδωνίων, Τριπολιτῶν, ΑΣ** (i.e. Ἀσκαλωνιτῶν)—sometimes in Phoenician—" (Coin) of Gebal the Holy," "Of Tyre, Mother of the Sidonians," "Of Sidon, Mother of Chamb (Carthage), Hippo, Cheth (Citium in Cyprus), Tyre," "Of Laodicea which is in Canaan."⁵

In Mesopotamia the two chief cities strike bronze with the head of Antioehus. Nisibis had probably already the name of Antioeh-in-Mygdonia. Even Edessa, where the Aramaean element was so strong, is now Antioeh-on-Callirhoe.⁶

¹ Babelon, p. 81 f. ² Plin. v. § 86. ³ Steph. Byz. ⁴ Babelon, p. 79.

⁵ Babelon, p. 83 f. Some of the coins of Tripolis have the head of Athena instead of the King's. This Laodicea is identified by Rouvier with Berytus (*Rev. Numism.* 189G, pp. 377-396); see also Clermont-Ganneau in *Rev. Archéol.* xxx. (1897), p. 301.

⁶ Babelon, p. cii., ciii. We must be on our guard against supposing that the legend on many of these coins, "Of the Antiochenes in" such and such a place, implies that a new colony was introduced by Antioehus

But the Hellenism which Antioehus propagated went further than political forms, or even real political privileges. It extended to the sphere of social and private life, to the manner of thought and speech, to religious practice. "And king Antioehus wrote to his whole kingdom, that all should be one people, and that each should forsake his own laws."¹ Beneath the naïve phrase of the Hebrew writer there lies the truth that the transformation which he saw going on around him in the life of the Syrian peoples was forwarded by the active encouragement of the court. It worked in with a policy deliberately adopted by those that ruled. Imaginative and sentimental Hellenism was no doubt in part the motive which governed Antioehus, but there were considerations of policy as well. Some principle was needed to unite and fuse a realm whose weakness was that it had no national unity. And Antioehus, like Alexander, of whom indeed he often reminds us—an Alexander run wild—sees such a principle in a uniform culture, resting upon a system of Greek cities, and obliterating or softening the old differences of race and tradition. It was not exactly a new idea, but it no doubt revived with a new sort of splendour, it stood out more distinctly as an imposing ideal, in the glow and colour it took from the strange fire of Antioehus the Fourth.

Perhaps we are in some danger of misconceiving this process of Hellenizing. We think of it chiefly in connexion with the peculiar case of the Jews, or with the opposition of "Oriental conservatism" to "Western ideas" in our own day, and are inclined to picture Antioehus as forcing at the point of the sword an alien civilization upon an unwilling people. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is no trace of opposition to Hellenism from the Orientals generally. "All the nations agreed according to the word of the King."² The conversion to Hellenic cities was not something which the King compelled ancient communities to undergo, it was from outside, and that they formed a peculiar body of "Antioehenes" in the city. The example of Jerusalem proves that this was not so. The whole citizen-body of a city called Antioeh were Antioehenes; according to the Greek idiom *'Αντιοχείς οἱ ἐν Πτολεμαίδι* means "citizens of Antioeh-in-Ptolemais." A new colony might or might not be introduced.

¹ 1 Mace. 1, 41.

² *Ibid.* 1, 42.

something which he conceded as a favour.¹ Envoys from such communities were seen about the court, petitioning that it might be allowed them "through the King's authority to set up a gymnasium and form a body of *epheboi*, and to register the inhabitants of the city as *Alltioehenes*." ² There was enough force and attraction in Hellenism itself to render compulsion, had Antioehus contemplated it, superfluous.

It must be taken into account that Hellenism, as understood by Antioehus and the Syrian cities, was not the Hellenism of the great days of Greece. That had implied some sterner virtues—reverence for the ideal of Law, sacrifice for the ideal of the City, self-respect, honour, sobriety. Without these qualities perhaps Hellenic culture had never grown, but, once grown, it yielded certain products, certain political and religious forms, articulate ideas, intellectual methods, which might be imparted without the moral strength of the old Hellenic character. The reception of this easy Hellenism put no demand upon the will and offered gratifications to self-conceit. Between Hellenic religion and the religion of the heathen Syrians there was no incompatibility. The Phoenician had no objection to celebrating fourth-year festivals after the Greek manner, or to calling Melkarth Heracles when he spoke Greek, and the Seleucid court did not object to the ancient Phoenician script appearing on the same coin as the head of the deified Antioehus.

The deified Antioehus ! For this later Hellenism could not only supply the kingdom with a uniform culture but with a common cult. And here again Antioehus did no more than accentuate what he inherited from his predecessors. The worship of the Macedonian kings in the Greek cities goes back, as we saw, to the time of Alexander.³

But undoubtedly Antioehus IV lays more stress upon his deity than former kings. His surname Theos Epiphanes declares him to be an effulgence in human form of the Divine, a god

¹ No doubt a Hellenic city enjoyed certain privileges, and a non-Hellenic community could not therefore constitute itself a Hellenic city without royal authority,

² Mace. 4, 9.

³ Documentary evidence of such a cult in Syria before Antioehus Epiphanes is furnished by the inscription of Seleueia-iu-Pieria, belonging to the reign of Seieueus IV {C.I.G. No. 4458}.

manifest in flesh. Now first the addition of Theos is put upon the money, and the head which appears on the new coinage of the cities is crowned with rays.¹ There is even ground to believe that Antioehus identified himself with the Supreme God, with Zeus; he sometimes adds to his surname the epithet *Nikephoros*, which distinguished the Nike-bearing Zeus of Olympia.² It was no doubt in part his love of theatrical pomp, of what kindled the imagination, which made Antioehus "magnify himself above all gods,"³ but he was also acting consistently with his great plan. It seemed natural to the ancients that every association—the family, the club, the city, the nation—should be bound together by some common worship, and when a number of communities and peoples were brought under a single sceptre, the unorganized medley of religions presented a serious difficulty. Merely to Hellenize them superficially by identifying the various deities with this or that Greek god hardly met the case; the Zeus of this place remained as different from the Zeus of that place as when they had had no common name. Hellenic religion in itself was too unorganized to be a means of organization.

But the God-King gave a fixed object of worship among the chaos of local cults. His worship, regarded in one way, agreed with the rationalistic tendencies developed in later Hellenism; while, on the other hand, if there were circles in which it was mingled with any real faith, it might so far supply the need which, now that the barriers of the old societies were done away, the world was feeling—the need of a God. And his worship corresponded with the actual facts, for if, as has been said, in antiquity "Church and State were one," and the monarchical state with no bond of union but the subjection to one man had to find its religious meeting-place, the identification of God and King was not far to seek.

¹ I doubt whether it is more than an accidental coincidence that according to the Iranian idea a halo of light (*qarêuo*) was supposed to distinguish the true-born king (Spiegel, *Eran. Altertums*. ii. p. 44).

² I have argued for this identification in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xx. (1900), p. 26 f. It is perhaps worth remarking that Joseph ben Gorion represents Antioehus as setting up images of himself in the several lands as objects of worship (Wellhausen, *Der arabisdte Josippus*, p. 13). But, of course, a statement from that quarter has very little historical value.

³ Daniel 11, 37.

Nor do we hear of any opposition to this worship on the part of the peoples of Syria generally. Had their national worships been suppressed by it, there might have been trouble, but their gods were not jealous gods, and tolerated the new deity in their midst quite comfortably. One may see on a coin of Byblos, the "holy Gebal," its ancient Oriental deity, with his six wings and branching head-dress, on one side, and on the other side Antioehus with his crown of rays.¹ Even the Samaritans, if the letter in their name is genuine, addressed him as the Manifest God.²

That a point of union was consciously sought in this worship the new coinage of the cities immediately suggests, struck in different places from Adana to Asealon, but all with the same glorified head. And the uniformity extends beyond the King's head. Nearly all have for their reverse type a form of Zeus.³ But if Antioehus identified himself with Zeus, this further uniformity receives a clear explanation. The identification, again, with Zeus, over and above the abstract claim to deity, may have had some motive in policy. We find in Egypt that the Ptolemies turned their deity to profitable account by diverting religious revenues from the temples to their own treasury.⁴ And although the case of Egypt, where the deification of kings was traditional and taken seriously, differs from the case of Hellenistic cities, we may still suspect that the identification of the King with Zeus in Syria gave him a pretext for appropriating the funds of the temples. And, that this was so is borne out by what we are told of the actual dealings of Antioehus. He identified the God of the Jews with Zeus Olympius⁵ and he took the treasures of the Temple.⁶ At Hieropolis, where the deity was feminine, but identified with Hera,⁷ he claimed the temple treasures as his

¹ Babelon, p. 85, No. 671.

² Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 258. Niese defends the genuineness, *Kritik d. Makk.* p. 107.

³ Antioeh, Hieropolis, Seleueia and Alexandria have a common form of Zeus, which Babelon holds to be that of an image put up by Antioehus in Antioeh, copied from the Zeus Stratios of Nicomedia, Babelon, p. cxii. Here again is something which may be a clue to the אלה זעניא of Daniel.

⁴ Grenfell and Mahaffy, *Revenue Laws*, p. 119.

⁵ 2 Mace. 6, 2.

⁶ 1 Mace. 1, 21 f.; 2 Mace. 5, 15 f.

⁷ Lueian, *Be Syria Dea*.

wife's dowry.¹ His spendthrift magnificence drove him to perpetual necessity, and before the end of his reign he had laid hands on the riches of nearly all the temples in Syria.²

The regeneration of what remained of the Seleucid Empire by means of Hellenism was perhaps joined in the thought of Antiochus Epiphanes with the restoration of it to something of its former extent. He knew himself not strong enough, as he was, to break with Rome, but in the north and east the field was held only by native powers, and, once conqueror of the East, he might face the western situation with quite another countenance. Where Rome forbade him he would not yet intrude, but in Asia Minor at any rate he disappointed Rome of its advantage by his alliance with the ruling courts.

In Cappadocia his sister Antiochis was queen, and seems to have had her mild husband, Ariarathes IV Eusebes, completely in her hands. It was afterwards said (with what truth we cannot judge) that the two elder sons, with whom she presented him, Ariarathes and Orophernes, were supposititious; it was at any rate the youngest, called at first Mithridates, upon whom his parents fixed their affections. The two elder were sent to be educated away from Cappadocia, Ariarathes at Rome, and Orophernes in Ionia. Mithridates was designated for the throne.³ Perhaps it was already during the life of Antiochus Epiphanes that Antiochis came with one of her daughters to Syria. Whether it was merely on a visit to her brother that she came, or to reside in her old home, we do not gather. But that she died in Antioch we may infer from the fact that her bones were there in 163.⁴

In Armenia, it will be remembered, Artaxias in the northern country, and Zariadris in Sophene, had declared themselves independent kings after Magnesia. Later on their example had been followed in a region as near to the capital as Commagene, whose governor, Ptolemy, renounced his allegiance to the Seleucid court, and tried to wrest from

¹ Gran. Liein. xxviii. In this passage the goddess is called *Diana*.

² Polyb. xx xi. 4.

³ Diod. xxxi. 19, 7 f.

⁴ Polyb. xxxi. 17, 2.

Cappadoeia the district of Melitene across the Euphrates. In this he was foiled by Ariarathes Eusebes.¹

In the summer of 166 or 165² Antioehus marched out from Antioeh at the head of an army for the reconquest of the North and East. He left behind him his child Antioehus Eupator, who had been associated in the throne since 170, and Lysias to be guardian and regent. He was propelled not only by the desire of glory, but by the urgent necessity of money, since neither the savings of Seleueus Philopator, nor the spoils of Egypt, nor the treasures of the Syrian temples had been able to meet his reckless expenditure, and it was no longer possible to do without the tribute from the revolted provinces.³

His first attack seems to have fallen upon Armenia. It was a brilliant success. The defence of Artaxias collapsed. But Antioehus, in accordance with the policy of his father in this region, did not remove him. He contented himself with the acknowledgment of fealty, and, still more important no doubt, the payment of tribute.⁴

From Armenia Antioehus moved to Iran. But in doing so he moves, as Seleueus Nicator and Antioehus III did, out of our field of vision.

The most serious part of his task would be to try conclusions with the house of Arsaees, now represented by the able Mithridates I (Arsaees VI, 171-138)⁵ Already his father Phriapatius or his brother Phraates had torn from Media the northern region about Ehagae before his accession;⁶ the southern Media with Eebatana still obeyed the Milesian Timarehus who ruled the eastern provinces for King Antioehus. There were also other princes of lesser power with whom Antioehus would have to reckon, such as the king of Lesser Media (Atropatene), or the ruler of Persis, not to speak of the petty chiefs of the hills. Persis had probably already broken away under a native dynasty on whose coins are emblems of the

¹ Diod. xxxi. 19^a.

² 1 Mace. 3, 37.

³ Polyb. xxxi. 11, 1; 1 Mace. 3, 28 f.

⁴ App. Syr. 45; Diod. xxxi. 17^a.

⁵ The operations of Antioehus in the east are described by Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 8, as "Parthorum bellum."

⁶ Just. xli. 5, 9; Isidor. 7.

Zoroastrian religion and the title "Lord of lords."¹ Their forces even set foot on the opposite Arabian coast, and were engaged there by Numenius, the Seleucid satrap of Mesene.²

The attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes to reconquer the East was one of several attempts made by the house of Seleucus in the last century of its rule. And it is important to realize once for all the existence of the element there which gravitated towards union and gave the Seleucid kings an immense advantage—if they were able to use it. In the provinces which passed under barbarian rule the Greek cities planted by Alexander, Seleucus and Antiochus Soter continued to exist; yes, and to form, we may be sure, the centres of the life, the commerce and the energy of the lands in which they were. But the barbarian yoke only made them more passionately Hellenic; they turned with a sort of national sentiment to the house of Seleucus, the mightiest and most glorious representative of Hellenic supremacy in the East. We have seen that at the time of Antiochus III's invasion of Hyrcania his adversaries had thought it necessary to put the Greek population of Sirynea to the sword. But the Arsacid kings were too shrewd to think of exterminating the Greeks; they tried hard to conciliate them. To what extent Hellenism had penetrated the Parthian court at this time we do not know, but it is obvious that the Arsacids were fain to present themselves to their Greek subjects as sympathetic protectors. The money of the kingdom was stamped exclusively with Greek legends, and from the time of Mithridates I they commonly added to their other surnames that of "Phil-Hellene."³ But they were unable to make the Greeks overlook the difference between a barbarian and a western dynasty; the cities of the Parthian kingdom were always ready to make common cause with a Seleucid, and later on with a Roman, invader.

¹ Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 696 ; cf. Strabo xv. 736.

² Plin. vi. § 152. He is "ab Antiocho rege Mesenae propositus," and Gutschmid understands Antiochus IV, *Iran*, p. 40.

³ If the arrangement of Professor P. Gardner be maintained, one should say from the time of Phriapatius. But the coins with "Phil-Hellene," which, according to Professor Gardner's system, are earlier than Mithridates, are put by Mr. Wroth later (*Num. Chron.* third series, vol. xx. p. 181 f.).

This condition of things was a conspicuous justification of the colonizing policy of Alexander and his successors. It made the reconquest of the East by Oriental dynasties enormously more difficult and slow, and with a stronger Hellenic power than the later Seleueid, or a nearer than Roine,¹ might have saved Western Asia for Hellenism.

Bearing all this in mind, we see that an important part of the task of Antioehus Epiphanes in the East would be the strengthening of the Greek cities. And in fact there are indications that he did not neglect it. Eebatana exchanged even its old and famous name for Epiphanea, perhaps on receiving a new Greek colony.² The Alexandria on the lagoon between the Tigris and Eulaeus, which had been destroyed by floods ("an indication that the canal-system of Babylonia had been allowed again to fall out of repair")³ he restored as an Antioeh.⁴ Antioehus also resumed the work of Alexander in having a survey made of the coast westward from this Antioeh,⁵ and it was not improbably in accomplishing this that Numenius, the satrap of Mesene, came into collision with the Persians.

In contrast with measures which have every appearance of wise policy is the fresh attempt of Antioehus to get the treasures which were heaped up in the Elymaean temples into his hands. He tried to break into a temple of some native goddess, Istar or Anaitis, and fared so far better than his father that he escaped with his life. Against a people filled with religious frenzy the royal mercenaries could not make head. The same thing was appearing, as we shall shortly see, in other fields.⁶

It was soon after this repulse, in the midst of his hopes

¹ Rome, of course, counts as a Hellenic power in relation to the East.

- Steph. Byz. 'Αγβαρνα,³ Gutschmid, *Irân*, p. 41.

⁴ Plin. vi. § 138.

⁵ *Ibid.* § 147.

⁶ Polyb. xxxi. 11; App. Syr. 66; 1 Mace. 6, 1-4; 2 Mace. 9, 1 f. The passage in 2 Mace. 1, 12 f. is ordinarily taken as referring to Antioehus IV; Niese (*Kritik d. Makk.* p. 19) refers it to Antioehus VII (Sidetes). It must be admitted that it would exceed all bounds of probability that the same event should be actually repeated a third time, and it certainly compels us to suppose an astonishing lack of imagination in those who clothed the end of Antioehus VII with circumstances which already belonged to the ends of Antioehus III and Antioehus IV.

and projects, that Antioehus Epiphanes was seized by a fatal malady—epilepsy, perhaps, or something which affected the brain.¹ He died at Tabae in Persis in the winter of 165-164.²

¹ Polyb. gives it as a report that he was supernaturally deranged (*δαιμονίῃσας*), and the story in 2 Mace. 8, 7, that he fell out his chariot may be true, as it does not fit in naturally with the sensational description of his disease as a corruption of the flesh. if the story is true, it would point to epilepsy. One cannot help thinking that there was a vein of madness in Antioehus IV all through his life.

² Niese, *Kritik d. Makk.* p. 78 f. A curious detail is added in one source—whether historical may be questioned. "Corpus eius cum Antioehiam portaretur, exterritis subito iumentis in fluvium abreptum non comparuit," Gran. Licin. xxviii.

CHAPTER XXV

ANTIOGHUS AND THE JEWS

WE have followed the career of the fourth Antioehus apart from that special appearance which he makes in the history of Israel, and with which his name is pre-eminently associated in the ordinary thought of Christendom. It seemed that we should in this way best gain an independent point of view from which to consider that episode—an insignificant one in his life, it must have appeared to himself, incomparably the most momentous we see it to be, in its effect on the destinies of man.

There are few gaps in history which we can so ill put up with as that which comes in the history of Israel between the time of Ezra and Nehemiah and the time of Judas Maceabaeus. It is an almost unrelieved blank. To fill it in, Jewish writers, after the Maceabaeon epoch, had nothing but the fables they spun out of their imagination. They knew no more about it than we do to-day. And yet it was a period of great importance in the history of Israel, if not rich in political events, yet a period in which much germinated and much took shape, institutions, beliefs, characteristics, which made the later Jew what he was, and thereby are of eternal interest for those peoples who owe it to the Jew that they are what they are. It is a period which, although dark for us, is not altogether dumb, for in the Old Testament there are perhaps many voices which come to us from it, psalms familiar to our lips, cries out of unknown hearts in unknown troubles and conditions, voices out of the darkness.

Nehemiah left a little community gathered about the

Temple of Jehovah in the restored Jerusalem, and there we still find the community about the Temple, with the High-priest for its chief ruler, 260 years later, under a Seleueid king. The country round Jerusalem was inhabited and tilled by Jews to a radius of some ten to fifteen miles.¹ The Jewish state had been involved in the struggle of Seleueid and Ptolemy for Cœle-Syria. Jerusalem had been taken by Ptolemy I on the Sabbath day and dismantled.² After Ipsus the High-priest had paid tribute regularly to the house of Ptolemy.³ It was no doubt because the Jews hated the yoke which they were actually bearing that they inclined to the Seleueid cause in the war between Antioehus III and Ptolemy Epiphanes. They were subjugated by Seopas for King Ptolemy in 199-198, and a Ptolemaic garrison lodged in Jerusalem. After the battle of the Panion they declared for Antioehus, just when Gaza, found naturally on the opposite side to Jerusalem, held out to the last for Ptolemy. Antioehus, relieving them of the garrison, appeared in the light of a deliverer.⁴

The administrative system which had obtained in Cœle-Syria under the Ptolemies seems to have continued under the Seleueids. The province was still under a single *strategos*;⁵ it included (whether regularly or only occasionally is not clear) Phœnicia as well.⁶ In an inscription the *strategos* of Cœle-Syria and Phœnicia is also high-priest—that is, he presides over the provincial worship of the King.⁷

Under the eye of Greek and Macedonian officers the old cities of the land, Canaanite, Phœnician, Philistine, had taken on the aspect and the ways of Greek cities, and had in many cases actually received large bodies of European settlers.

¹ On the north, Lydda, Ramathaim (mod. Bait Rîrna ?), and Aphaerema (five miles north-east of Bethel) were outside the Jewish territory; on the west, Gazara; on the south, the frontier was about Beth-sur.

² Agathareh. frag. 19 (REM. iii. p. 196); App., Syr. 50.

³ The statement that the Jews paid 300 talents annually to Seleueus I (Sulpie. Sever. Hist. Sac. ii. 17, 4) is not supported by any good authority.

⁴ Polyb. xvi. 39. See Appendix E.

⁵ Under the Ptolemies some one is described as ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ Κοίλης Συρίας (Polyb. v. 40, 1), and the title *strategos* is given in Polyb. v. 87, 6.

⁶ Κοίλης Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης στρατηγὸς πρῶταρχος, 2 Mace. 10, 11. See Appendix attached to next note.

⁷ See vol. i. p. 177 and Appendix F.

Samaria, for instance, in the middle of the lan^{was} Greek and pagan, having been already colonized with Macedonian by Alexander in 331. Only the country villages were inhabited by "Samaritans," with their religious centre on Mount Gerizim.

And while the world was changing all round the little Jewish state, what action and reaction went on between the Jews and the other peoples under Macedonian government? There are few questions in history it would be more important to have answered, and there are few to which there is less chance of getting any answer, except a very doubtful one. The question practically resolves itself into two, (1) to what extent had the Diaspora come to exist before Maccabaeae times—that is, was there any general dispersion of the Jews among the nations? (2) to what extent had the Jews, in Judaea or out of it, been affected by contact with Hellenism?

The dispersion of the Jews, whenever it came to pass, was a circumstance of immense moment to Judaism, because through these scattered members, influences from every quarter reached the main body. The Jews, for instance, who absorbed Hellenism abroad, would be the most potent conductors of it to their brethren in Judaea. But it would also be a circumstance of great moment to the world at large. The existence of a community everywhere, diffused yet never losing contact between its several parts, would be an important factor in the problem which vexed the Macedonian kings—how to bind together a heterogeneous empire. The influence, again, of a Jewish Dispersion in the sphere of religion would be a not negligible force in the inner life of the times; its power later on was enormous till it was transmitted to the Christians and all the nations flowed to Zion. A figure of capital significance in the history of antiquity, Mr. Hogarth is fond of telling us, is the Hellenized Jew. That we should confess ourselves unable to say how far he existed at all before the Maccabaeae age is to confess how very ignorant we really are of the life of those times, of anything outside the dynastic game of kings.

The *admitted* evidence bearing on a Jewish Dispersion is, I think, as follows :—

1. Communities of *other* Orientals—Phœnicians and Egyptians—are proved in the great Greek trading centres, Athens and Delos, before the time of the Maccabees; in Athens as early as the fourth century B.C.¹

2. Clearchus of Soli, a disciple of Aristotle, introduced in one of his dialogues a “Jew from Cœle-Syria, Hellenic not in speech only, but in mind,” representing him as having come in his travels to Asia Minor, and there conversed with Aristotle.² There is, of course, no reason to suppose any greater foundation of fact to the dialogue than underlies the dialogues of Plato. But that Clearchus should introduce, even as an imaginary character, a Hellenized Jew in Asia is noteworthy.

3. There were large numbers of Jews who did not take part in the Return, and whose descendants continued to form a Jewish population in Babylonia.

4. In Syria, in the days of Judas Maccabaeus, there were bodies of Jews settled in Galilee (then, of course, pagan) and east of the Jordan, but small enough to be capable of being transported *en masse* to Judaea.

5. In Egypt the *papyri* prove the presence of Jews and Samaritans under the earlier Ptolemies in sufficient numbers for villages predominantly Jewish or Samaritan to exist.³

It will be seen that the evidence of admitted genuineness does not take us very far. And accordingly it is the view of some scholars that *there was practically no Dispersion before the Maccabæan age*. On the other hand, if we accept the statements of later Jewish writers, we must form a very different picture of the condition of things. Masses of Jews, including the High-priest himself, were transported to Egypt by Ptolemy I.⁴ In Alexandria the Jews were given full citizen-rights by Alexander.⁵ In the new cities which sprang up in Syria and Asia Minor under Seleueus I a colony of Jews was regularly found who were given equal rights with the other citizens.⁶ At Antioch in particular Seleueus is said to have given them the full citizenship, and in Asia Minor,

¹ Sehurer iii. p. 56 f.

² Joseph. *Con. Ap.* i. § 176.

³ The references are given in Sehurer iii. pp. 23, 24; Biichler, *Tobiaden und Oniaden*, p. 213.

⁴ Pseudo-Hecataeus ap. Joseph. *Con. Ap.* § 187 f.

⁵ Joseph. *Can. Ap.* ii. § 35; *Bell.* ii. § 487. ⁶ Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 119.

"Ephesus and the rest of Ionia" is mentioned as a region where the Jews had been put on a level with the native Greeks by "the Successors."¹ Antioehus III ordered 2000 Jewish families to be transported from Mesopotamia and Babylonia into Lydia and Phrygia.²

It will be seen how much turns upon the view taken of these statements of Josephus and the documents he adduces to support them. As it appears to me the state of the case is this. On the one hand there is nothing impossible in the statements themselves; in fact, supposing the Diaspora existed, we can very well see how policy might lead Alexander and his successors to make a great point of securing the loyalty of the Jews. On the other hand, the statements are made in an age of prolific forgery among the Jews, of reckless mendacity as to their past. And not only so, but the romances put forth as history and the forged documents have largely for their object this very thing, to persuade the heathen how specially favoured the Jews had been by the great kings of former days.³ In a word, the evidence *for* the Diaspora is very bad, but there is no real evidence *against* it. Under such circumstances what is left us but to admit our ignorance?⁴

To the first part of our question, that concerning a pre-Maeabaeian Diaspora, we have not got a very satisfactory answer; in coming to the second part, how far the Jews had admitted Hellenic influence, we again stumble into controversies.⁵

¹ Joseph. *Con. Ap.* ii. § 39.

² *Ibid. Arch.* xii. § 148 f.

³ *Kg.* the Rescript of Cyrus (Joseph. *Arch.* xi. § 12 f.), the romance of Alexander and Jaddua (*ibid.* § 306 f.), the Pseudo-Aristeas.

⁴ Of the view which accepts the statements of Josephus in their entirety the chief representatives are Sehürer and Ramsay; of the other view, H. Willrich in *Juden und Griechen* (1895) and *Juxhiiea* (1900). The rescripts of Antioehus III are discussed in Biöhler, *Tohiaden und Oniaden* (1899), p. 143 f. His decision is against their genuineness. Niese (ii. p. 579) speaks of their genuineness as "strongly suspicious." See also Schlatter, *Jason von Kyrene* (1891).

⁵ The controversy turns mainly upon the questions as to the historical basis underlying the story of the Tobiad Joseph, the Aristeas legend of the origin of the Septuagint, and the personalities of Aristobulus (2 Mace. 1, 10) and Eupolemus. The works already cited (Sehürer, Willrich, Schlatter, Biöhler), and Wellhausen *Isr.-jud. Geschichte*, 3rd edition, furnish the literature of the controversy. The reality of Eupolemus' mission to Rome is maintained by Niese (*Kritik d. Makk.* p. 88).

Without losing ourselves in their mazes we may, I think, arrive at some more or less shadowy facts. The Jews before the Exile, as we know from the prophets, had shown no want of readiness to assimilate themselves to the nations round about them. Under the Exile the work of the prophets bore fruit in the formation of a stricter and more disciplined Judaism, which saved the people of Jehovah from being merged in the heathen among whom they dwelt. But even so there were lapses from the ideal of complete separation. In the community at Jerusalem at the end of the fifth century B.C. Ezra and Nehemiah had once more to repel the encroachments of the heathen environment and make the fence of the Law yet more strong. And their labour was not lost. The little people dwelt separate in their hill country and, while wars rolled past them and kingdoms clashed and changed, nursed the sacred fire and meditated on the Law of the Lord. Strange among the nations, a people apart, bound in all their practice by a mysterious rule, they were taken by Greek writers of the fourth century not so much for a nation or a political organism as a sect of "philosophers," who stood to the other Syrians as the Brahmins did to the other Indians—in fact, they were no doubt an offshoot of the Brahmins.¹ Then in 332 the Jews came under the political supremacy of the Greeks.

Hellenic rule, as we have seen, penetrated far deeper than the old superficial Babylonian and Persian Empires. Hellenism was a force which partly by a deliberate policy, partly by its inherent power, changed the East as nothing had changed it before. The fourth kingdom "shall be diverse from all the kingdoms, and shall devour the whole earth, and shall thresh it and break it in pieces."² If the Jews had hardened themselves in a more rigid exclusiveness than in their early days, they had on the other hand never been exposed to so overpowering an ordeal.

That the temptation to conform with the fashion of the world should not have been felt in Judaea is impossible. The new stateliness of the Hellenized cities, the magnificence of Alexandria and Antioch would beset the peculiar people with

¹ Clearelms ap. Joseph. ² *Con. Ap.* § 179; Megasthenes, frag. 41 (*F.H.G.* i. p. 437).
Daniel 7, 23.

the lust of the eyes and the pride of life. The temptation would, of course, appeal to the rich, to the dwellers in Jerusalem, rather than to the poor and the countryside. And if we can say anything of the history of the Jews in the days when Antioehus IV came to reign in Syria, it is that a part of the Jerusalem aristocracy were ready enough to make friends with the rulers of the world. One family above all was marked out by its riches and its worldly propensities—the house of Tobiah.¹

It is a cardinal fact to be grasped in estimating the policy of Antioehus Epiphanes that *the initiative* in the Hellenizing of Jerusalem was not on the side of the King, but of the Jews themselves. Soon after the accession of Antioehus a deputation of principal men of the Jews came to the court begging for leave to convert Jerusalem into an Antioeh and erect that essential mark of a Hellenic city, the gymnasium.² There was of course a party among the Jews vehemently opposed to the innovations, and the conflict of principles was complicated, as usually happens, with a conflict of persons. Onias, who had been High-priest in the reign of Seleueus IV, seems to have been looked to as their leader by the party faithful to the old way. He was no longer in Jerusalem when Antioehus took the diadem. The broils which had distracted the Holy City during the preceding reign had driven him to withdraw to the Seleueid court to represent his cause personally to the King. Antioehus on his accession replaced Onias by his brother Jesus. The reason is alleged to have been that Jesus

¹ For the controversies as to the pre-Maonabaeen history and the part played in it by the house of Tobiah I must refer to the German works already named. The passages upon which *all* our knowledge of the house of Tobiah rests are 2 Mace. 3, 11; Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 1G0 f.; 239 f.; *Bell.* i. § 31 f.

² 1 Mace. 1, 11 f.; 2 Mace. 4, 7 f. On this cardinal point the two books of the Maccabees are at one. In what follows, 2 Mace, is our only authority, except the cursory statements of Joseph. *Bell.* i. § 31 f.; *Arch.* xii. § 237 f. The two statements of Josephus differ from each other and both from 2 Mace.; hence infinite scope for conjecture and reconstruction. The Second Book of Maccabees has, of course, recently experienced a great turn of fortune. After sinking to the very lowest opprobrium, so that even when one was obliged to draw from it, one did so with a contemptuous reference, it has lately found no less a champion than Niese (*Kritik der beiden Makkabäerbücher*, 1900), and will be given the place of honour in the next volume of his *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten*. It is an edifying disturbance of "accepted opinion."

undertook to pay a larger tribute. This is likely enough. The Seleucid court would concern itself little with the internal affairs of Judaea, and consider mainly who would rule there on the terms most favourable to the royal coffers. It is the ordinary principle of the Oriental court.

The new High-priest threw himself into the Hellenizing movement. He had transformed his Hebrew name Jesus (Yeshua) into the Greek Jason. It was he who obtained the King's leave to make Jerusalem an Hellenic city. The conservative party were overborne by the torrent. The gymnasium was built and soon thronged with young priests, pursuing the Hellenic ideal of bodily strength and beauty. The Greek hat, the *ptasos*, was seen about the streets of Jerusalem. Everything must have seemed to Antiochus happily arranged. He himself visited the new Antioch-Hierosolyma, and was "magnificently received by Jason and the city, brought in with torches and shoutings."

But there were some who looked with grief and horror at the transformation. Those who were zealous for the tradition of the fathers, who regarded all yielding to foreign influence as apostasy from the Lord, had drawn together as a band resolutely set against the prevailing current. They were known as the Hasîdim, the Pious or Godly Ones, who refused to stand in the way of sinners, and meditated day and night in the Law. But now the ground seemed giving way under their feet. Wealth, influence, political power, perhaps numbers, were against them. "Help, Lord, for the godly man (*hasîd*) ceaseth; the faithful fail from among the children of men."¹

It is a moment of profound significance for all future time—this first trial of strength between the religion of Israel and Hellenic culture. The principles engaged are so vast that our sympathies to-day, when we consider that first moment of conflict, cannot be determined by mere historical criticism. The conflict is still with us, in modern society, in our own minds. Our estimate of the conduct of the Hellenizers, of the Hasîdim, must be determined by our belief as to the value of that for which either party stood; and there belief depends upon our attitude to the world and to life, as a whole.

¹ Psalm 12, 1.

But the historian may raise at any rate this inquiry—whether that part of Jewish belief and practice which, as being of absolute value, is maintained in combination with Hellenism by Christian Europe was assailed by the innovations of Jason. Did the Hellenizers, for instance, forsake Monotheism or introduce the immoralities of the heathen? The question, of course, with our very imperfect records can only be very doubtfully answered. Jason himself was evidently a man of low ambition, and the moral tone of the new *epheboi* may, for all we know, have justified the evil names fixed upon them by the Hasîdîm. It is, however, remarkable that in a work which holds the Hellenizers up to abhorrence it should be specially stated that the envoys of Jason to the games at Tyre were unwilling to contribute to the sacrifice to Heracles, and obtained leave to divert the money they carried to a secular purpose.¹ And if any overt immoralities were connected with the new institutions, it is surprising that the writer should omit to let us know them. The chief charges brought against the Hellenizers are that they conceived a zeal for athletic exercises and that they wore Greek hats.² But even if we were able to acquit the Hellenizers of formal transgressions, we should not necessarily condemn the Hasîdîm. The temper of the new society might still be incompatible with the Spirit who moved in Israel as that people's distinctive heritage.

New rivalries were not slow to break out in the dominant Hellenistic party. Menelaus, a Benjamite, supported by the house of Tobiah, intrigued at court against Jason, and induced Antioehus to make him High-priest in Jason's stead. He did not even belong to the priestly tribe. He was instated by a royal garrison, now lodged in Jerusalem, and Jason fled over Jordan into the Ammonite country.

This provoked a more violent agitation than the appointment

¹ They were more scrupulous than "Nicetas the son of Jason of Hierosolyma," who contributed to a Dionysiae festival in Caria about the middle of the second century, Le Bas and Waddington, iii. No. 294.

² The exercises of the Greek gymnasium involved, of course, complete nudity—an offence to Oriental feeling (Thuc. i. 6, 6), but not to the modern European code. The wearing of a European hat is to-day a great abomination to the Moslem; one of the worst imprecations in Cairo is "May God clothe thee with a hat!"

of Jason had done. Menelaus may have feared that it would end in the return of Onias. On the occasion of a journey he made to Antioeh he bribed Andronieus, whom Antioehus had left at the head of affairs during his absence in Cilicia, to make away with the old High-priest, in spite of his having taken sanctuary in the precinct of Apollo at Daphne.

It is curious that our account does not represent Antioehus himself as hostile at this time to any section of the Jews. So far from being the inhuman monster we expect in a book written to glorify the Maccabean revolt, he is depicted as weeping at the death of the inoffensive Onias, and when later on at Tyre Menelaus is accused before him by the Jewish *gerusia*, he is only talked over to the side of Menelaus at the last moment by one of his councillors, Ptolemy the son of Dorymenes, with whom Menelaus had tampered. But not only was Menelaus acquitted; the Jews who had appeared against him were put to death. Perhaps Ptolemy had already brought Antioehus to construe enmity to Menelaus as disloyalty to the house of Seleueus.

The definite quarrel of Antioehus with the Jews—or, as he perhaps regarded it, with the faction among the Jews opposed to the High-priest and to the great Jewish families who supported the High-priest—began when the intelligence reached him during one of his campaigns in Egypt¹ that Jerusalem had risen for the house of Ptolemy in his rear. Jason had suddenly (on a false report that Antioehus was dead) come back from the Ammonite country with a band he had got together and possessed himself of Jerusalem, except the citadel, where Menelaus had taken refuge. Those whom Jason found of the party of Menelaus—from the Seleucid point of view, the loyal party—were put to the sword. It was not Antioehus who drew the first blood in Jerusalem.

The defection of Jerusalem at a critical moment determined the King to visit it with signal chastisement. A city so near the Egyptian frontier must be made sure beyond question. We can well believe that the passionate and wilful nature of Antioehus took a direction of strong vindictiveness

¹ See Appendix G.

towards the treacherous city. On his return from Egypt he turned aside, and came to Jerusalem with a fierce countenance to wreak vengeance. That the people generally, whose religion had been outraged by the high-priesthood of the Benjamite Menelaus, and still more by his manner of exercising the office, had given a welcome to Jason we can hardly doubt. Jason, before the arrival of Antioehus, had already played the part of the hireling shepherd; he was safe once more across the Jordan, and upon the people the punishment fell. It shows, of course, not that Antioehus was a fiend, but that he was of that order of statesmen who would repress disaffection by unscrupulous violence without ascertaining whence it springs. Once more blood ran in the streets of Jerusalem, and the Syrian soldiery told off for the work of massacre were probably no more merciful than those whom the Ottoman Sultan sets upon the Armenian Christians.

It was not in blood only that Antioehus made the Jews pay. Their rebellion had given him the excuse to take into the royal treasury the precious things of the Temple of the Lord, as, on one pretext or another, he appropriated the riches of the other Syrian temples. With unspeakable horror the Jews saw him enter within the holy doors which might be passed by the priests alone. And the Lord withheld His hand!

Antioehus had not yet declared war on the Jewish religion. He had but chastised Jerusalem as another rebellious city might have been chastised. The further development of his policy did not manifest itself till after an interval.¹ Since Antioehus could no longer after 168 protect the Cœle-Syrian province by holding any Egyptian territory, its internal consolidation became imperative in the first degree. The weak spot was Jerusalem. What the Seleucid court believed it saw there was a loyal party, readily accepting the genial culture which was to harmonize the kingdom, on the one hand, and on the other a people perversely and dangerously solitary,

¹ "Two full years" (i.e. in 168-167, after the second invasion of Egypt) according to 1 Mace. 1, 29. Niese, in accordance with his view that the robbing of the Temple took place in 168, puts the next event a year later, *Kritik d. Makk.* p. 93.

resisting all efforts to amalgamate them with the general system, and only waiting the appearance of a foreign invader to rebel. And on what ground did this people maintain its obstinate isolation? On the ground of an unlovely barbarian superstition. Very well: the religion of Jehovah must be abolished. The Hellenization of Jerusalem must be made perfect. If part of the population took up an attitude of irreconcilable obstruction, they must be exterminated and their place filled by Greek colonists.

Apollonius, the commander of the Mysian mercenaries, was charged with the first step of effecting a strong military occupation of Jerusalem. His errand was concealed; he went with a considerable force, ostensibly in connexion with the tribute from southern Syria, and seized Jerusalem by a *coup de main*. A fresh massacre, directed probably by Menelaus and his adherents, cleared Jerusalem of the obnoxious element. A new fortress of great strength was built on Mount Zion, and a body of royal troops, "Macedonians," established in it to dominate the city.

But now came the second part of the process, the extinguishing of the Jewish religion. It was simple enough in Jerusalem itself. Jehovah was identified with Zeus Olympius, and Zeus Olympius, it would appear, with Antioehus. The ritual was altered in such a way as to make the breach with Judaism most absolute. A Greek altar—the "Abomination of Desolation"¹—was erected upon the old Jewish altar in the Temple court, and swine sacrificed upon it. The High-priest partook of the new sacrificial feasts, of the "broth of abominable things." To partake was made the test of loyalty to the King. The day of the King's birth was monthly celebrated with Greek rites. A Dionysiac festival was introduced, when the population of Jerusalem went in procession, crowned with ivy. That everything might conform to the purest Hellenic type, the framing of the new institutions was entrusted to one of the King's friends from Athens.

At the same time that the transformation was accomplished in Jerusalem, the other temple built to Jehovah in Sheehem,

¹ 1 Mace. 1, 54.

the religious centre of the Samaritans, was constituted a temple of Zeus Xenios.¹

To purge Jerusalem of all trace of Judaism was comparatively easy; it was another matter to master the country. In the country villages and smaller towns of Judaea the royal officers met with instances of extreme resistance. Their instructions were to compel the population to break with the old religion by taking part in the ceremonies of Hellenic worship, especially in eating the flesh of sacrificed swine, and to punish even with death mothers who circumcised their children. The books of which the Jews made so much were destroyed, if found, or disfigured by mocking scribbles, or defiled with unholy broth.

There can be no question that these measures threw the bulk of the Jewish people, who had perhaps wavered when there seemed a possibility of combining Judaism with Hellenism, into definite antagonism. But immense force was brought to bear upon them. Antioehus did not omit to have the reasonableness of Hellenism put in a friendly way to those who would hear, and he punished without mercy those who would not. And under the stress of those days numbers of the Jews conformed; those who held fast generally forsook their homes and gathered in wandering companies in desolate places. But there also shone out in that intense moment the sterner and sublimer qualities which later Hellenism, and above all the Hellenism of Syria, knew nothing of—uncompromising fidelity to an ideal, endurance raised to the pitch of utter self-devotion, a passionate clinging to purity. They were qualities for the lack of which all the riches of Hellenic culture could not compensate. It was an epoch in history. The agony created new human types and new forms of literature, which became permanent, were inherited by Christendom.

¹ The correspondence between the Samaritans and Antioehus (Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 258 f.) is thought by many to be a "poisonous forgery" of the Jews. Its genuineness is defended by Niese (*Kritik d. Makk.* p. 107). In speaking of the Samaritans it seems to be often lost sight of that they were no doubt, equally with the Jews, divided into two parties. The letter given by Josephus might have been sent by the Hellenizing party without the whole Samaritan community being involved. A similar letter would be quite credible from Menelaus and his friends.

The figure of the martyr, as the Church knows it, dates from the persecution of Antiochus; all subsequent martyrologies derive from the Jewish books which recorded the sufferings of those who in that day "were strong and did exploits."¹

The resistance was at first passive. The people of the country villages, if they did not flee and join the roving bands, either conformed, which was probably the most common, or underwent martyrdom. The roving bands were without any general leader or clear principles of action. When one band had been overtaken on the Sabbath by a party from the *akra* in Jerusalem, they allowed themselves to be butchered without resistance, that they might not profane the holy day but rather "die in their simplicity."²

It was when the Hasmonaean family came forward that all this was changed. The passive resistance passed into a revolt. But the beginnings of the Maccabean revolt are wrapped in a certain degree of uncertainty. The origin of the name Hasmonaean is a question.³

The personality and the *role* of Mattathiah, which the First Book of Maccabees presents to us, have been recently pronounced a fiction.⁴ Our two accounts of the first conflicts with the Seleucid power do not easily admit of reconciliation. But this much may be taken for history. Before the persecution had continued long, a certain family among the refugee bands marked itself out by its gifts of leadership, the children of Hashmônai, of the priestly tribe, with their home in the little town of Modin (mod. al-Madya). They made a nucleus round which the scattered bands drew together, and

¹ Daniel 11, 32.

- 1 Mace. 2, 29 f.

³ Ace. to 1 Mace. 2, 1, Judas was the son of Mattathiah, the son of John, the son of Symeon, and Josephus (*Arch.* xii. § 265) makes Symeon the son of Asamonaus (Hebrew, Hashmônai). Wellhausen (*Israel. u. jüd. Gsch.*³ p. 253) thinks that the Symeon of 1 Mace. is really himself Ashmôn, disguised by a mistranslation. This makes Asamonaus the *great-grandfather* of Judas. In another place (*Bell.* i. § 36) Asamonaus is represented by Josephus as the father of Mattathiah and the *grandfather*, therefore, of Judas. Finally, Niese, suppressing Mattathiah or identifying him with Asamonaus (as Schlatter, *Jason v. Kyrone*, p. 10) makes Asamonaus the *father* of Judas (*Kritik d. Makk.* p. 43 f.).

⁴ Niese, see preceding note. Sehürer in the last edition of his work (1901) professes himself unconvinced by Niese's argument (p. 202, note 42).

they were strengthened by the adhesion of the Hasîdîm.¹ It was resolved to fight, even on the Sabbath day, and thereafter the towns and villages which had settled down comfortably to a Hellenic *régime* found themselves suddenly visited by bands of fierce zealots, who repaid massacre for massacre, circumcised the children by force and destroyed the emblems of Hellenic religion.

Naturally the Seleucid government was concerned to protect the new order of things from such disturbance. But it had not sufficient force on the spot to cope with the mobile irregular bands. Some collisions between the local forces and the Jewish insurgents took place, with the result that the royal troops were swept away by the furious onset, or found the enemy upon them in dark nights before they were aware.²

In these encounters the people of Israel learnt that the Lord had raised up a man to lead and deliver them as of old. Of the five Hasmonaeen brethren it was Judas, surnamed Maeabaeus, who bore the military command and became surrounded with the halo of a popular hero.³ The effect of his successes was to rally to the cause all those who had only unwillingly and from fear accepted Hellenism, and these, together with the refugees, made the mass of the population of Judaea. The country towns and villages resumed their Jewish complexion; those who loved Hellenism, or were too deeply compromised, fled to the Greek cities. Jerusalem was still held by the Macedonian garrison in the *akra*, but the rest of Judaea was won back for Judaism. So long as Jerusalem continued a heathen city, Mizpeh, where there had been "a place of prayer aforetime for Israel"⁴ was the

¹ 1 Mace. 2, 42.

² This phase of the struggle is briefly indicated in 2 Mace. 8, 5-7. In 1 Mace, it is elaborated in greater detail in the defeats of Apollonius and of Seron (*ἀρχὼν τῆς δυναμείας Συρίας*). It is impossible to make out the official position of either. The title of Seron is taken from the Old Testament, 2 Kings 5, 1 (*καὶ Ναυμὰν ὁ ἀρχὼν τῆς δυναμείας Συρίας ἦν ἀνὴρ μέγας* = נָאֻמָּן סֵרֹן אֲדָרְכִי, See Appendix H.

³ According to 1 Mace. 2, 2, he was the third of the five; according to Joseph. *Bell.* i. § 37 he was the eldest, and this Niese thinks the most probable. The surname of Maeabaeus is generally believed to be from מַעֲבָה, a hammer.

⁴ 1 Mace. 3, 46; cf. Judges 20, 1; 1 Samuel 7, 5; 10, 17.

national centre. What had been scattered bands were now organized under Judas as a national army.

Things had perhaps not reached this stage when Antioehus left Syria for his expedition in the North and East. It was thenceforth upon Lysias, the guardian of the young Antioehus, that the responsibility for restoring order in southern Syria fell. How Antioehus himself construed the revolt we do not know, or if he divined its gravity, but the letter given in the Second Book of Maccabees, if genuine, throws light on his attitude.¹ The letter is addressed, not as Jason of Cyrene would have us think, to the insurgent Jews, but to the Hellenizing Jews of Jerusalem, whom Antioehus regards, or affects to regard, as the Jewish people. He addresses them, in well-understood contrast to the other part of the nation, as the *loyal Jews*.² He describes himself as their fellow-citizen and *strategos*³ He writes from the East, mentioning his illness⁴ and stating his hope of recovery, but requesting the Jews, in the event of his decease, to remain loyal to the young Antioehus. *The hands of Judas are ignored.*

¹ 2 Mace. 9, 19. Niese defends its genuineness (*Kritik d. Makk.* p. 30). See Appendix I.

² τοῖς χρηστοῖς Ἰουδαίοις. The use of the word *χρηστός* in a political sense for the approved party is familiar; Pseudo-Xen. *De repub. Ath.*, *passim*; ὀλίγων τὸ χρηστόν, *Ar. Frogs*, 783.

³ Niese in his suggestion that Antioehus had been elected honorary *strategos* in the Atticized city of Jerusalem seems to me very happy.

⁴ The translation of our Bibles "noisome sickness" is unwarranted if understood in any other sense than "dangerous." The Greek does not imply that it was offensive to other people's senses.

CHAPTER XXVI

ANTIOGHUS V EUPATOR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF LYSIAS

WHEN Antioehus Epiphanes left Syria in 166-165 the government of the West was confided, as has been said, to Lysias, one of those who held the rank of Kinsmen.¹ It was in the early days of his administration that the first attempt of any importance was made to quell the Jewish insurrection. The matter having proved too great for the troops on the spot, the forces of the Cœle-Syrian province had to be concentrated to deal with it. Under the authority of the *strategos* of Cade-Syria and Phoenicia, Ptolemy the son of Dorymenes, an army was launched upon Judaea, commanded by Nicanor and Gorgias. Such complete confidence was felt in the Gentile cities as to the result of the expedition that the force was followed by a great company of merchants, alert to buy up the numbers of Jewish prisoners who would be thrown upon the slave-market.² The way of approach chosen was one of the western valleys which run down from the Judæan upland to the Philistine plain. At Emmaus, in the valley of Ajalon, the force encamped before making the ascent.

It was the first great ordeal through which the new Jewish army was to pass, and many lost heart as the crisis approached and slunk away. Judas with those who remained took up a position on the slopes to the south of Emmaus.

¹ 2 Mace. 11, 1.

² As a matter of fact Delphian inscriptions of this time show us Jewish slaves there. In one (Wescher-Foucart, *Inscriptions recueillies à Delphes*, No. 364) we read *σῶμα ἀνδρείον ᾧ ὄνομα Ἰουδαῖος (= 'Ιούδας ?) τὸ γένος Ἰουδαίων*.

It was resolved in the camp of Nicanor, our account says, to avoid one of those surprises, in which the Jews—irregulars fighting in their own country—had shown themselves so deft, by the royal forces effecting a surprise themselves. Gorgias was detached with about an eighth of the entire force to make a night attack on the enemy's encampment. Men from Jerusalem were ready to act as guides. Judas, however, got wind of the design, and moving out by the hill-paths, evaded the attacking force. Gorgias reached the camping-place to find it deserted. He then committed the indiscretion of pressing on into the hills, whither he conceived the enemy had retired, without ascertaining his real whereabouts. Judas suddenly flung himself at daybreak on the main body at Emmaus, which, taken completely unawares, fled down past Gezer into the Philistine plain. Gorgias was still wandering about in the hills when the columns of smoke rising from Emmaus told their tale. He at once withdrew his men, without risking an engagement, to join the fugitives in the plain. The Jews fell upon the deserted camp, and "got much gold and silver and blue and sea-purple and great riches." They returned up the valley, intoning the ancient burden of their psalms, "Because He is good and His mercy endureth for ever."¹

The provincial forces had proved inadequate to the task of suppressing the Jewish revolt.

The regent Lysias must now take the matter into his own hands. In 165 he moved from Antioch at the head* of a larger army than had yet been put into the field against the Jews.² Lysias resolved to attack from the south where the Judean upland falls by gentle degrees towards Hebron. These slopes as far north as Beth-sur were peopled, not by Jews, but by Idumaeans, and at Beth-sur the edge of the plateau was already gained. Beth-sur itself seems to have been held by a company of Jews. It was attacked by the royal forces.

¹ 1 Mace. 3, 38-4, 25 ; 2 Mace. 8, 8-29.

² It is, however, noteworthy that according to the figures of 1 Mace, which are, of course, exaggerated, the proportion of cavalry in the army of Lysias was smaller than in that of Nicanor. The experience of the former expedition may have shown the unsuitability of this arm to warfare in the rocky Judean hills.

The engagements which took place between the troops of Lysias and the insurgents are represented in the Books of the Maccabees in the guise of a notable victory of Judas. But in view of the ease with which even distinct defeats are seen to be transfigured in the imagination of the Jewish writers into victories, it may be questioned whether much damage was inflicted upon the regent's army. Before, however, any decisive result was reached, it was known in Antioeh and in the camp of Lysias that Antioehus Epiphanes was no more. It was possibly this material change in the situation which inclined Lysias to make terms with the nationalist Jews.¹

Nor were the nationalists unwilling to avail themselves of a way of escape from the predicament in which the presence of such an army as the regent's had placed them. Their envoys, John and Absalom, carried to Lysias a written statement of their desires. At the same time they entreated the good offices of some Roman commissioners who were in the neighbourhood—on their way presumably from Alexandria to Antioeh.² The requests of the insurgents were referred to the court at Antioeh, and supported, it appears, by the Roman commissioners. Possibly Lysias himself, who had on his own authority made some concessions, advised conciliation. At any rate, the policy of Antioehus Epiphanes was now definitely renounced by the Council of the boy-king, Antioehus Eupator. The rescript sent in reference to the questions submitted by Lysias conceded to the Jews full liberty for the exercise of their ancestral religion, the restoration of the old Jewish institutions in Jerusalem, and amnesty for all those returning to Jerusalem within a given time. But the nationalists do not seem to have had it all their own way. They were probably obliged to agree to some *modus vivendi* with their fellow-countrymen who had attached themselves to Hellenism and the Seleucid house. It is remarkable that Menelaus, who of all men was most odious to the nationalists, remained in power. Seeing how things were tending, he had made himself

¹ See Appendix J.

² The names of the commissioners in our text are corrupt. Niese conjectures that the last mentioned was Manius Sergius, who was sent out on a mission with Gaius Sulpicius in 165, *Kritik*, p. 73.

the spokesman of Jewish feeling at Antioeh, and was deputed by the court to direct the work of pacification. The garrison, of course, remained in the *akra*.

These rescripts mark the end of the first phase in the Maceabaeen struggle. The ban was now taken off the Jewish religion; the cause for which the nationalists had hitherto been fighting, the liberty of Judaism, was won. Thenceforward, when they took the sword, it was to fight, not for religious, but for political, freedom.

The Hasmonaeen family and the people who followed them had now access to Jerusalem. The refugees returned to their homes. In the following December (164) the restoration of the old worship in the Temple ensued. The altar of Zeus was broken up and the stones cast into an unclean place. The old altar of burnt offering, upon which the heathen altar had been erected, could not be used again. Its stones were put away in a place on the Temple hill, "until there should come a prophet to give an answer concerning them." A new altar was made, and on the 25th of Chislev the smoke of the first sacrifice went up from it to the Lord—on the very day when the profanation had taken place some years before. For eight days the ceremonies of rededication went on. It was a moment to be remembered, and in years to come the anniversary was celebrated by Israel in the Feast of the Dedication.¹

By the death of Antioehus Epiphanes the young Antioehus Eupator, now a boy of nine years, became sole king. The administration was, of course, in the hands of those whom the ill-regulated favour of Antioehus Epiphanes had raised to power, wretched men like Heraelides of Miletus and his brother Timarehus under whose extortionate rule the eastern provinces groaned. The drastic policy of Antioehus Epiphanes was given up; the kingdom entered on a period of inertia and abasement. This result was contemplated with extreme satisfaction at Rome, and there was no relaxing of the grasp which held the rightful heir to the Seleucid throne, Demetrius the son of Seleucus, a prisoner.²

¹ Called *iyKaivta* (John 10, 22) or *פֶּסַח* (Joseph. Arch. xii. § 325); in rabbinical Hebrew *חַגֵּה* (Psalm 30, heading). The feast was similar in character to the Feast of Tabernacles.

² App. Syr. 46; Polyb. xxxi. 12.

The history of those days in Syria is preserved for us only in so far as the Jews are concerned. They show us the new military power created by the Hasmonaean brethren engaged in conflict with all the neighbouring peoples. In the picture we get of southern Syria the power of the Seleucid court seems to be of a shadowy kind. Only in the Philistine plain is it substantial; there Gorgias, the captain unsuccessful at Emmaus, holds Jamnia (on the great road north of Azotus) with a royal garrison. The Idumaeans (Edomites), the peoples between Jordan and the eastern wilderness, the Arab tribes, appear practically independent.

Nearly all these races, however, are united in sympathy with the Seleucid government by their common hatred of the Jews. *The division in this conflict is not between Hellene and Asiatic, but between Israel and the nations.* It is true that the zeal with which the heathen nations of Syria adopted the Hellenic culture focussed in the new cities may have had something to do with their hatred of the race who remained stubbornly "barbarian." It is noteworthy that the Nabataean Arabs, who had perhaps been the least affected by the Hellenistic movement, were friendly to the Jewish rebels.¹ But in the cities of Syria the successes of the nationalists, and above all the restoration of the old ritual, roused a flame of anti-Jewish rage. The little communities of Jews who resided among the heathen found themselves in danger of massacre. In the district of Tob, beyond Jordan (= mod. Tayziba, opposite Beth-ahan ?) a massacre actually took place. In Idumaea an outbreak occurred, and parties of Jews were besieged in the fortresses where they had taken refuge. Travelling companies of Jews were cut up on the road by the marauding tribe of the Beni-Baian.²

But Judaism did not lack a champion. The Hasmonaean brethren made a series of avenging raids into the surrounding countries. The chronology of these "Neighbour Wars" is perplexed. They possibly began before the return of the nationalists to Jerusalem.³ But their character is more

¹ 1 Mace. 5, 25.

² *Ibid.* 5, 1 f.

³ Fights with Timotheus, a dynast of the Ammonite country, are made in 2 Mace. 8, 30 f. to follow immediately upon the defeat of Nicanor and Gorgias.

plain. In contrast with later Hasmonaean wars their object is the concentration, not the expansion, of Judaism. Jewish colonies are not established in the Gentile lands, but the Jewish communities actually residing in them are brought back *en masse* to Judaea. Gentile communities which had not shown any hostility to the Jews do not seem to have been molested. The case of the Nabataeans has been mentioned. The Greek colony of Seythopolis (Beth-shan) protected the resident Jews and received the thanks of Judas when he passed with his bands that way.¹ On the other hand, wherever the Jews had been persecuted, scenes of frightful carnage took place. At Bosra and Maspha it is expressly stated that Judas put all males to the sword.²

While the King's peace was thus broken in southern Syria by the agitation against the Jews and the sanguinary reprisals, the nationalists and the friends of the Seleucid government were not living happily together in Jerusalem.

The former had the upper hand and things went hard with their adversaries. It was now the turn of the nationalists to persecute. Those guilty of Hellenizing were put to death and their possessions seized by the dominant party. The remnant of the Hellenizing party fled. Some took refuge in the *akra*. Others were received in the strongholds of Idumaea.³ Their cries reached the court of Antioch. Were the loyalists to be abandoned to the vindictiveness of the rebels? The Seleucid court was bound in honour to protect those who maintained its cause.

It was obvious that the concordat arranged by Lysias had broken down, and the court was angry with Menelaus, who had been more or less responsible for it. Nor was it only for the sake of the loyalists that the Seleucid government must take action. The garrison in the *akra*, its one hold left in Judaea, was hard pressed by Judas. He had begun a regular siege, and held the garrison strongly invested.

In 163⁴ an army greater than the last moved out from Antioch, complete even to the corps of elephants. It was led

¹ 2 Mace. 12, 29 f.

² 1 Mace. 5, 28 ; 35.

³ 2 Mace. 10, 15.

⁴ In 1 Mace. 6, 20, year 150 = 163-162 B.C. ; in 2 Mace. 13, 1, year 149 = 164-163 B.C.

by Lysias, and accompanied by the boy-king himself. The line of attack chosen was again by the south, and once more the frontier fortress of the Jews, Beth-sur, was besieged. Judas came as in former years to battle. But against the real force of the kingdom his bands could not make head. He was defeated at Beth-Zaehariah near Beth-sur. His brother Eleazar was among the slain. Eleazar had fallen, the story says, in an attack upon one of the elephants, which he supposed to carry the King. Judas fell back, leaving the way open, to the neighbourhood of Gophna. The King and Lysias advanced to Jerusalem and laid siege to the nationalist fortress on Mount Zion, while part of the royal army was left to prosecute the siege of Beth-sur. There was a great scarcity of food in Judaea, both because of the number of refugees brought in during the last years, and because at that moment a Sabbath year was in course.¹ Beth-sur was compelled by famine to surrender, and a royal garrison took the place of the Jewish one.²

But once more the nationalists were saved from a desperate predicament by outside events. A certain Philip who had been with Antioehus Epiphanes in Persis, and received from the dying king, it was said, the diadem and seal which carried the chief authority in the kingdom, now set himself up against Lysias in Antioeh. It was imperative for Lysias to come to terms quickly with the Jews. What the terms of the agreement were it is impossible to make out precisely. Liberty for the Jewish worship had been already conceded in 164, and the question since then had been whether equal liberty was to be given by the nationalists to Hellenism, or whether the Hasmonaeans were exclusively to possess the state. It would appear that Lysias must now have abandoned the Hellenizers and offered the friendship of the Seleucid government to the Hasmonaeans, if they on their part would recognize the Seleucid supremacy. Judas was to hold the chief power in Judaea, but hold it as the King's *strateg's*.³ Menelaus,

¹ This Sabbath year is calculated to have extended from autumn 164 to autumn 163.

² 1 Mace. 6, 20 f. ; Joseph. *Bell* 1, § 41 f.

³ 2 Mace, 13, 24. *ηγεμονιδην* is probably corrupt, not the name of the *strategos*.

the head of the Hellenizing party, the old instrument of the Seleucid court, Lysias made haste to destroy. He had presented himself in the royal camp with the petition to be reinstated in the high-priesthood. Instead of this, after the compact with the Hasmonaeans, Lysias took him back with the army on his return, and at Berea in northern Syria (Aleppo) he was cast into the fiery furnace.¹

The Seleucid King entered Jerusalem as a friend and made an offering in the Temple. But the garrison was left in the *akra*, and before he departed the nationalist fortress in Jerusalem was dismantled. The situation now created there—the Hasmonaeans in power, but trammelled by an irksome allegiance and overlooked by a garrison—had no promise of stability. And now we turn away our eyes for a while from Judaea to northern Syria.

As soon as Lysias returned with the King to the north, a trial of strength took place between him and Philip. In this Philip was worsted, and, flying to Ptolemy Philometor, disappears from history.² The palace gang to which Lysias belonged were now absolute. How reckless their administration was is shown by the fact that they committed some crime (perhaps the murder of queen Antioehis whilst she was residing in her old home), which utterly alienated the Cappadoecian court, and undid the alliance which had been part of the policy of Antiochus Epiphanes.³

In Home it was resolved to take advantage of the weakness of the Seleucid kingdom to cripple it still further. A mission was dispatched in 164,⁴ soon after the death of Antiochus

¹ 2 Mace. 13, 8 f. ; Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 383 f.

² 2 Mace. 9, 29. According to Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 386, he was captured and put to death.

³ A fragment of Polybius (xxxi. 17) tells us all we know about this mysterious occurrence. The young king of Cappadoecia, Ariarathes V, sends to Antioch to recover the bones of his mother and sister. In order that he may not provoke Lysias and so fail of his desire, he does not recriminate as to the "abominable crime which had been perpetrated." This suggests that Antiochis and one of her daughters had been murdered in Antioch by the palace gang. It may well be that Antiochis, who was a masterful woman, after the usual fashion of Macedonian princesses, had mingled in the politics of Syria ; perhaps she had supported Philip or tried in some way to rescue her nephew from Lysias and his confederates.

⁴ Niese, *Kritik*, p. 83.

Epiphanes was known, consisting of Cnaeus Oetavius, Spurius Lucretius and Lucius Aurelius, to "regulate the affairs of the kingdom." By regulating its affairs the Senate understood the destruction of the newly-formed fleet and the corps of elephants, both of which contravened the provisions of the Peace of Apamea. It was believed that the gang would agree to anything, however disastrous or dishonourable to the kingdom, so long as they might hold their places and be secured against the thing they dreaded—the return of Demetrius.¹ The mission moved slowly, looking into other matters in the eastern countries on its way. In 163 apparently they had come to Cappadoeia, and now the fruits of the fatuous policy of Lysias showed themselves. The throne was held no longer by Ariarathes IV Eusebes, but by his son Mithridates, who had taken the name of Ariarathes on his accession, Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator. He threw himself heart and soul into any project for humiliating the Seleucid court. He drew a lively picture of the misgovernment and weakness of Lysias and the gang, and offered military support to the Roman envoys. So mean an opinion, however, had the envoys of the present government in Syria that they thought military support quite unnecessary.²

Their estimate was right as far as Lysias and his associates were concerned. They raised no objection to the destruction of the fleet and elephants. But Oetavius had left out of account the popular feeling, which was stirred to frenzy at the sight. And he paid the penalty. At Laodicea, whither the envoys had come (to destroy the ships in the harbour or embark on their further journey to Egypt), Oetavius, while taking his exercise in the public gymnasium, was set upon by a citizen, called Leptines, and killed. The man instantly became a hero, and went about Laodicea declaring that he had acted under divine inspiration. Among the loudest voices raised in his glorification was that of Isoerates, a professor of letters from Greece, who was now swept by the wave of popular excitement into politics. He began to clamour that the other envoys should share Oetavius' fate. He gave voice to all that bitterness against Rome which had become general

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 12.

² *Ibid.* 13.

among Greek idealists. But the colleagues of Octavius made good their escape (163-162).¹

The government, of course, was horror-struck at the tragedy. Ostentatious honours were shown to the body of the murdered envoy, and ambassadors went in haste to Borne to assure the Senate that the court was entirely innocent of any share in the crime. But the Senate was not in a hurry to acquit. It maintained that impressive reserve (often the consequence of ignorance or indecision) which so puzzled and frightened the Greeks. It was not, however, from the Senate that the doom of Lysias and the gang came.²

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 6 ; App. Syr. 46.

² Polyb. xxxi. 19, 1 f.

CHAPTER XXVII

DEMETRIUS THE SAVIOUR

ALL this while the boy who had been growing up in Italy had not lost the hope of coming to his own. When the news of his uncle's death arrived in Rome (164) he had approached the Senate with fair words, begging to be possessed of his inheritance. The Senate need have no doubt that a friendly king would sit upon the Seleueid throne; Demetrius assured them that he actually felt one of themselves, that he looked upon the Senators as his fathers and the young Roman nobles as his brothers. The Senate, Polybius says, was made uncomfortable by this appeal; they had a bad conscience, but they thought they understood Roman interests better than Demetrius, and preferred a powerless child and a palace camarilla to an active prince, however friendly. So the mission was sent to destroy the ships and the elephants.¹

Demetrius at that time was twenty-three years old. He bore his captivity impatiently. But it had been a magnificent school. As in the case of Antioehus Epiphanes, to have been educated in Rome, not in a Syrian palace, meant a great deal to the ruler of a kingdom. It was not only that he had grown up in contact with the finest aristocracy and the most vigorous political system of the world, but there met in Rome—as captives, ambassadors, teachers—the greatest of the contemporary Greeks. The circle of Scipio Aemilianus comprised the philosopher Panaetius and the historian Polybius. For the friendship of Demetrius with Polybius we have the authority of Polybius himself. The Achaean statesman and the Seleueid

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 12.

prince were both enthusiastic sportsmen, and this in the first instance had drawn them together. How much Demetrius owed to his intercourse with this man, the widest observer of contemporary politics, the most original historian since Thucydides, we can only speculate. Something the younger man, spirited and sanguine, must have gained from the manifold experience, the matured reflection of the elder—from long conversations as they rode or drove home together through the declining afternoons from hunting the pig in the woods of Anagnia.¹

Another acquaintance whom Demetrius made in Rome was his cousin, the best of the Ptolemies, Philometor. In 163 Philometor came to Italy as a suppliant. For the double kingship established in Egypt since the invasions of Antiochus Epiphanes had not worked well, and Philometor had now been driven out by his brother Euergetes. He landed with three slaves and a eunuch only. People arrived in Rome with the news that they had seen the King of Egypt tramping along the road on foot with this poor attendance. Impulsively Demetrius hurried to meet him, with royal apparel and a magnificent horse, richly caparisoned. He was received with a smile. He must not spoil a calculated stage effect. Ptolemy begged his cousin to wait with his horse and royal robes in one of the towns on the road; he himself proceeded as he had begun, entered Rome, a pathetic figure, and took up his lodging with a penurious Greek painter in an attic. He was restored after this by Roman authority to Egypt, although he was obliged to surrender Gyrene to Euergetes.²

It was only a short time after the visit of Ptolemy Philometor that the startling news of the murder of Octavius came to Rome, and was immediately followed by the ambassadors sent from the court at Antioch (162). How would this affect the disposition of the Senate to the existing government and to Demetrius? Polybius tells us that Demetrius came to him in high excitement. Would not Polybius advise him to approach the Senate once more? "Polybius told him," the historian writes of himself, "not to stumble twice at the same stone." Demetrius would never induce the Senate to

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 22, 3.

² Diod. xxxi. 18; Valerius Max. v. 1.

move in his favour, but if he took the matter into his own hands and acted boldly, the hour was favourable. Demetrius understood, but he said nothing. Presently he consulted a friend of his own age, Apollonius, who had, Polybius explains, an innocent and childlike belief in the part played by logic in practical politics, and, since it was unreasonable for Demetrius to be a hostage for the son of Antiochus Epiphanes, advised him to try the Senate again. Demetrius did. The Senate showed a disconcerting impassivity to argument—as Polybius had foreseen.¹

The resolution of the young prince, who had plenty of high courage and determination, now began to rise to the pitch of independent action. The man who had nurtured him in boyhood, Diodorus, had recently returned from Syria, whither he had gone to spy out the situation. Demetrius took him into confidence, and the report of Diodorus confirmed his purpose. The incidents of the Roman mission and the murder of Octavius had led to a profound breach between the people and the palace gang. The people mistrusted Lysias, and Lysias the people. Let Demetrius appear there, were it but with one attendant, and the kingdom would be his! This clinched his resolve. Polybius received a summons to come and see him, and was then asked to deliberate on ways of escape.

It occurred to Polybius that the man who must help them was Menyllus of Alabanda. Menyllus was now in Rome as the ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor; Polybius knew him well, and trusted him absolutely. He introduced him to Demetrius, and Menyllus was let into the plot. The ambassador soon had a plan ready. He went down to Ostia and found a state-vessel of Carthage, carrying the customary offering to the gods of the mother-city, Tyre, in the harbour. Menyllus saw the captain, told him he was shortly returning to Alexandria, and made arrangements for himself and his party to be taken on board.

Before the ship sailed, Diodorus was sent on ahead to Syria to watch the drift of public feeling in the great cities. Demetrius made his final preparations. The only persons in the plot beside Polybius and Menyllus were Apollonius and

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 19.

two sons of that older Apollonius who had been of influence in the court of Seleueus IV, called Meleager and Menestheus.¹

The night came, in which the escape was to be made. Demetrius dined that afternoon with one of his friends, not at his own house, where he always kept a large table, and the presence of numbers would be inconvenient. It was given out that the prince would hunt next day at Anagnia, and a tent was pitched for him that night without the city; those in the plot had already sent on their slaves to make preparations. Only one slave was to accompany each of them in the voyage. The arrangement was that on leaving the banquet they should proceed with all secrecy and speed to the ship.

At this critical moment Polybius was confined to his bed by an illness. It was a great annoyance to him to be cut off from participation in the action, but Menyllus came regularly to his bedside to report every fresh development. On the final evening he knew that Demetrius was making merry with his friends; he knew also that Demetrius had all the buoyant carelessness of youth and drank freely in his convivial hours. The thought of possible indiscretions which might wreck the enterprise tormented him. He lay fretting on his bed, lest Demetrius should drink too deep into the night. At last he took a tablet, wrote upon it a few words, sealed it, and gave it to a slave to carry to the house where the feast was going on. It was now growing dark. The slave had orders to ask at the door for the prince's cup-bearer, and deliver him the tablet to give Demetrius, but he was on no account to say who he was or from whom he came. In the tablet were no compromising names; nothing but certain proverbial verses from the poets :—

He that acts carries away the prize from him that tarries.

Night bringeth the same to all, but they that adventure get more profit of it.

Make a venture, hazard, act, fail

Or succeed—anything rather than let thyself be carried by chance.

Be sober and remember to mistrust: these are the hinges of the soul.

¹ One would naturally think that Apollonius, the son of Menestheus, of 2 Mace. 4 was the father of this Menestheus, but how can we reconcile this with the statement of Polybius that Apollonius retired to Miletus on Antiochus' accession?

The tablet was soon in the hands of Demetrius, and he recognized the sententious tone of his old friend. Presently he rose, said that he felt sick and left the house. His friends escorted him to the tent. There he chose the slaves to take the nets and the dogs to Anagnia for to-morrow's sport. The *rendez-vous* was appointed them and they were sent off. Some others of his friends, including Nieanor, were now admitted to the plot. They were all instructed to go to their several places of abode, send off their slaves to join the others at Anagnia, and change their dining garb for such clothes as men wore hunting—or on a journey. Having done this they were to return each one to the tent.

At last all were assembled, and in the dead of night the party hurried down to Ostia. Menyllus had been before them with a story to satisfy the people of the ship. A communication, he said, had just come from King Ptolemy which would cause him to prolong his stay in Borne, but he wished to dispatch some trusty young men who would take secret intelligence to Alexandria concerning the movements of Euergetes. The young men would present themselves about midnight. All that the people of the ship cared about was the passage money, and when Menyllus assured them that the original sum stipulated for would still be given, they asked no more questions. Everything on board was in readiness for departure. Towards the end of the third watch Demetrius and his company appeared, eight men, five grown slaves and three boys. There was some talk with Menyllus apart; then he showed them the provisions got ready for the voyage, and introduced them with earnest words to the captain and the crew. In the grey of the dawn the vessel loosed her moorings and glided out to sea. The steersman had no inkling whom he carried; he never doubted but they were soldiers in the Egyptian service going to King Ptolemy.

For some time Demetrius was not missed. His friends in Rome thought him at Anagnia; his servants at Anagnia thought him on the way from Rome. But on the fourth day his disappearance became patent. On the fifth day a meeting of the Senate was called to consider the matter. But by that

time Demetrius must have passed the Straits of Messina. To try to arrest him and fail would, they thought, be undignified. In a few days they had fallen upon the inevitable expedient of a mission—an expedient which always deferred the trouble of a decision. Tiberius Gracchus and two colleagues were chosen to go and watch events in the East.¹

In this first-hand narrative, which stands out in ancient literature for its vividness and authenticity, we are brought close to the actors and know them for persons of flesh and blood. It is a moment of life long ago handed down still living to our own day. But the illumination ends. Once more we perceive through bad or fragmentary records only the outline of events; the person of Demetrius recedes, becomes doubtful; the warm-blooded youth who hunted at Anagnia and drank carelessly with his friends we feel we know, but the King is far removed ; we can see the general figure of his public action, but what heart he now bears beneath it we are too far off to discern.

The Carthaginian vessel touched at Tripolis on its way, and here Demetrius and his friends left it. In this Phoenician city Demetrius published his advent and assumed the diadem. The news travelled rapidly over Syria, and it soon appeared that Diodorus had not exaggerated the unpopularity of the present government. Everywhere the people rose for Demetrius. Almost automatically, and without, it would seem, a blow struck, he found himself master of the country. In Antioeh the troops declared for him. They seized the sons of Antiohus Epiphanes² and Lysias, and set off to deliver them up to Demetrius. Fresh from the open-hearted convivialities of his life in Rome, the young man had to begin the life of kingship with a deed of blood. There could be no question, from the point of view of the worldly politician, that the boy who had usurped the name of King Antioehus and the minister who had supported him must be put out of the way. Demetrius wished at any rate to have the thing done before he had any personal contact with his cousins. He sent a message to the

¹ Polyb. xxxi. 20-23.

² τοὺς Ἀντιόχου τέκνους, Polyb. xxxi. 12, 4. Antioehus Eupator must have had a brother whom Alexander Balas afterwards claimed to be.

troops who were bringing their prisoners, "Show me not their faces." "And the army slew them. And Demetrius sat upon the throne of his kingdom," 162.¹

In Syria the old *régime* collapsed instantly on the appearance of Demetrius, but in the eastern provinces Timarchus the Milesian, although unpopular, was not so easily displaced. When the system to which he belonged broke up, he followed the precedent of Molon and took the diadem.

Whatever success Demetrius had won, he was dogged by the displeasure of Rome, an impalpable disability, but one which counted for a great deal in the East. Timarehus, on the other hand, reckoned upon Home's friendship, not only because he was a counterpoise to Demetrius, but because he had often gone with his brother as ambassador to Rome in the days of Antioehus Epiphanes, and not a few of the Senators had swallowed his golden baits. Demetrius was hardly established in Syria when Timarehus appeared in Rome. He had come now to ask for a kingdom, to be recognized by Home as King of the Medes. The Senate graciously handed him a piece of paper which announced that "as far as Rome was concerned Timarehus was King."² That was enough; Timarchus went back happy with his piece of paper to display it to the other Eastern powers. Artaxias of Armenia, whom Antioehus Epiphanes had compelled a few years before to do homage to the Seleucid throne, gave Timarehus his alliance. The new King multiplied his forces. He subjugated many of the surrounding peoples.³

Demetrius, who had set out in defiance of Rome, was not frightened by Timarehus' piece of paper, nor even by his military establishment. It would seem that Timarehus was advancing to the invasion of Syria, making for the Zeugma upon the Euphrates, when Demetrius encountered him. And once more at the advent of the Seleucid the ground gave way

¹ 1 Mace. 7, 1-4 ; 2 Mace. 14, 1 f. ; Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 389 f. ; App. *Syr.* 47 ; Eus. i. p. 253 ; Liv. *Epit.* xlvi.

² *Τιμαρχὸν ἔνεκεν αὐτῶν βασιλεὺς εἶναι*, Diod. xxxi. 27^a.

³ Perhaps the Persians, the Elymaeans, or the hill peoples of western Iran are meant. Coins of Timarehus are found with his head, diademed and smooth-shaven, after the Greek, not the Oriental, fashion, and the legend **ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΜΕΤΑΛΟΤ ΤΙΜΑΡΧΟΤ**, Babelon, p. exv,

under the feet of the rebel. Timarehus, who had followed the example of Molon, shared his fate. In Babylonia, Demetrius was received with transports of joy. After the tyranny of the base man, Seleucia hailed the true King with the shout of Saviour. It is the surname by which he is known (about 160).¹

While Demetrius was fighting Timarehus, he also laboured to rid himself of the ban fastened upon him by Rome. Its practical inconvenience was seen when he attempted to renew the alliance with the Cappadoecian court. Ariarathes V had been alienated by Lysias, and it might be thought that he would be ready to welcome the overthrower of that criminal administration. He was a man of whom our authorities speak highly, as having inherited from his mother Antioehis a love of Hellenic culture without her unscrupulous ambition. The Cappadoecian court now for the first time attracted Greek men of letters. Ariarathes himself seems to have studied philosophy, and even applied its precepts to his practice. When discord broke out in the family which ruled Sophene—the house of Zariadris—the rival claimants betook themselves to the two neighbouring kings—Mithrobuzanes to Ariarathes, and the other to Artaxias of Armenia. Ariarathes brought back Mithrobuzanes into the principality with a Cappadocian army. Artaxias now proposed to him that they should each make away with his *proégé* and divide Sophene between them. Ariarathes rejected the suggestion with loathing. Nay, more, his representations were so powerful with Artaxias, that the young man whom Artaxias had proposed to murder found himself treated with more courtesy than before.²

Demetrius, soon after coming to Syria, made overtures to his cousin, the king of Cappadoecia. He offered him the hand of his sister. But Ariarathes thought to win the favour of Rome by repelling these advances. He refused the Seleucid princess. Naturally, any possibility of friendship between the two courts instantly vanished.³

¹ Diod. xxxi. 27^a; Trogus, *Prol.* xxxiv.; App. Syr. 47. There is a Babylonian inscription dated under Demetrius in the year 151, i.e. from April 161 to April 160, *Zeitsehr.f. Assy.* viii. (1893), p. 110.

² Diod. xxxi. 19, 8; 22; Polyb. xxxi. 17, 5 f.

³ Diod. xxxi. 28; Just. xxxv. 1, 2.

Demetrius left nothing undone to conciliate Roman opinion. The embassy, headed by Tiberius Gracchus, dispatched in 162 after his flight, arrived, perhaps not till the following year, in Cappadoeia. It was here met by Menoehares, the ambassador of Demetrius. Menoehares was probably instructed to ascertain its intentions, and he returned to Antioch to report the result of his interview. Could Demetrius win the commission to his cause? Fortunately Gracchus himself was well disposed to him, and Demetrius plied the envoys with fresh deputations before they reached Syria. They were met in Pamphylia, and again in Rhodes, with assurances that Demetrius would do everything to meet the wishes of Rome. Let only Rome utter the word "King Demetrius"! The friendship of Gracchus stood Demetrius in good stead. His report was favourable, and the momentous word was uttered. But Demetrius, although recognized as King, had not yet won confidence. In fact the Senate could not have confidence in any possessor of the Seleucid throne unless he were a nonentity.¹

Envoys of Demetrius could now be received in Rome, and immediately on his recognition (160) Demetrius sent Menoehares to convey a "crown" of 10,000 gold pieces—a "thank-offering" for his nurture—and the slayer of Oetavius. Beside Leptines, who had done the deed, there was sent the unhappy rhetorician, Isoerates, who had glorified it. Leptines maintained the calm confidence of the fanatic to the end. He had presented himself to Demetrius soon after his accession, begged him to hold the city of Laodicea in no wise responsible for what had occurred, and stated that he was perfectly ready to go and convince the Senate that he had been inspired. His enthusiasm was so evidently genuine that it was deemed superfluous to fetter or guard him. Isoerates on the other hand was put into a wooden collar and chains, and abandoned himself to despair. Polybius, who describes the arrival of the pair in Rome, writes no doubt of what he saw. Isoerates had hardly eaten for months. He made a marvellous *figura*. For more than a year he had not washed or cut his hair or his nails. Through the matted growth which covered his head his eyes glared and rolled strangely. "A man who has lost

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 4.

his humanity," the sententious historian observes in this connexion, "is more frightful than a beast." Leptines was still quite happy; he felt quite sure that the Senate had only to hear him to set him free.

The Senate was thrown into some embarrassment by the embassy, as they did not want to make up their quarrel with the Seleueid King. They decided, however, to receive the gold, but they refused the murderer. They did not at all want to seem, by executing justice, to have settled their score. They returned Demetrius a frigid answer: "he would meet with consideration if his conduct were satisfactory to the Senate."¹

This was high language; it might be thought to argue that the days of independent states in the eastern Mediterranean were already numbered, that Syria was practically a province of Rome. But, as a matter of fact, we see in the period of nearly a hundred years, which opens with the return of Demetrius, a great waning of Roman influence. In 162 Rome by its commissions dictated to Cappadoeia, destroyed the material of war in the Seleueid kingdom, apportioned the dominions of the Ptolemies. It seemed on the point of assuming the formal sovereignty in these regions. But from the return of Demetrius its overt domination ceases. The eastern powers are once more left for the most part to their own devices. The family quarrels of the houses of Seleueus and Ptolemy are fought out with no interference from Rome, no repetition of the diplomacy of Popillius.

The cause of this retrogression is the change which passed over the ruling aristocracy. In the day of adversity, when Hannibal was at the door, the Roman aristocracy had showed inflexible resolution; it was rapidly becoming corrupt and indolent in the day of prosperity. No settled policy could coexist with the corruption which became every day more flagrant. Decrees of the Senate could be procured by the highest bidder; an offender against the majesty of Rome could buy himself off. The prestige of Rome was impaired when it was found to issue declarations which it did not enforce. It had given its countenance, if not its friendship, to Timarchus; he had perished unsupported and unavenged. It had refused

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 6 ; Diod. xxxi. 29 and 30 ; App. Syr. 47.

its countenance to Demetrius, and he had established himself without it. When Rome once more imposed its will upon the nations, the power was wielded by the aristocracy no longer. It was then in the hands of this or that great general, who used his legions for his own ends. It was the state of things which became regularized in the monarchy of the Caesars.¹

But even during the period of oligarchic misrule Rome maintained a certain influence in the East, and that in two ways. In the first place, much of the prestige it had acquired by the overthrow of Antiochus III and of the Macedonian kingdom kept its hold upon the minds of men. The world is always ruled half by imagination. In the second place, the functions it had come to exercise as universal arbitrator and regulator gave it a commanding position for diplomatic intrigue, and without any overt intervention it could play off one potentate against another, promote all elements of intestine discord, and in fine make it very unpleasant for any one who had incurred its ill-will. Naturally this subterranean influence of Rome may often be suspected rather than proved.

The Senate continued therefore to trade upon the terror of the Roman name, to issue decrees and send out interminable commissions to arbitrate the affairs of the nations. Its countenance and favour continued to be worth seeking, and the ambassadors of eastern princes did not cease to bring their crowns of gold and elaborate flatteries. But at home the same princes took their own way with little restraint.

Demetrius, with the friends of Rome looking askance upon him, was thrown upon his own resources. But his resolution was only stiffened by his isolation. Was it impossible for a strong ruler to restore even now the Seleucid kingdom to strength, independence and glory?

The internal government of Demetrius Soter we can gauge by what took place in Judaea. An unstable compromise was what we saw result in that quarter from the feeble administration of Lysias; the Hasmonaean party had been left in power.

¹ The point of transition from the aristocratic to the personal system is marked by the Jugurthine War, where the oligarchy definitely fails to protect the commercial interests or uphold the prestige of Rome, and the work is taken out of its hands and carried through by Marius.

But it was quite obvious that the Hasmonaean house, stimulated by the glory it had won in the war for religion, would rest short of nothing but its own absolute supremacy within the Jewish state, and the emancipation of that state from any outside control. From the point of view of a statesman whose object was to hold together the Seleucid kingdom, the Hasmonaean house must certainly be deposed. A statesman would, of course, spare in every possible way the religious sensibilities of the Jews, but to leave the Hasmonaean house in power would be blind folly. His task would be the easier in that the object for which the Hasmonaeans now contended—their own supremacy—did not command the same passionate adherence on the part of the more earnest spirits of the nation that the cause of religion had done. The Hasîdîm were satisfied if the Law was safe.

These considerations perhaps hardly needed to be pressed upon Demetrius by the man who soon after his accession presented himself in Antioch. He called himself Aleimus, after the sound of his Hebrew name Jakim. He belonged to the priestly tribe, the house of Aaron, and he was come to claim the high-priesthood from King Demetrius. According to one account he had already at some period in those days of confusion officiated as High-priest.¹ But he had associated himself with the Hellenists, and since the Hasmonaeans had got the upper hand had been driven out of the country together with every other prominent person of that party. Aleimus had a long story of all that the friends of the Seleucid government had suffered at the hands of their countrymen; it was easy for him to convince the King that a government which abandoned its adherents was not likely to serve its own cause. Baehides was charged to instate Aleimus as High-priest in Jerusalem by military force.²

Aleimus came to Jerusalem as the legitimate High-priest of the family of Aaron. Possibly the functions had been usurped of late by the Hasmonaean brethren. If so, it would account for the fact that their old associates, the Hasîdîm, had been stumbled by this violation of the Mosaic order, and were

¹ 2 Mace. 14, 3.

² See Appendix K.

prepared to receive the Aarome High-priest with good-will.¹ Their only stipulation was that the blood-feud between the two parties should not now be continued by reprisals upon those faithful to the Law. This condition Aleimus thought it politic to agree to, and equally politic to violate soon after. He thought the opposition would be broken by a fresh proscription. Eaeehides also did some killing on his own account before leaving.² The anti-Hasmonaeen party, who had been scattered abroad, flocked home again.³

Judas and the nationalists had been driven out of Jerusalem, but they had not been crushed. They were still at large, and their flying raids made them a terror in the open country. It became unsafe for the partizans of the High-priest to vent are outside the walled towns. Aleimus felt the scale turning against him, and within twelve months of his instatement carried a fresh appeal to Antioeh.⁴

The task of crushing the Hasmonaeans was entrusted by Demetrius to Nianor, whom one seems to see through the more or less distorting medium of our Jewish records as a bluff, outspoken, simple-hearted man.⁵ He began by inviting Judas to a personal interview; and when the Jewish patriot and the Macedonian captain came face to face, the result was that the two men became friends. In Jerusalem, Nianor gave the nationalists his favour. His idea seems to have been that if they were not worried, the Hasmonaeen brethren would follow his advice to settle down in quiet domestic life, and everything would go happily. He dismissed the levies from the neighbouring countries whom he had gathered about him. Judas showed himself openly in Jerusalem by Nianor's side,

¹ 1 Mace. 7, 13. Needless difficulties, as it appears to me, have been made as to the seeming contradiction of 2 Mace. 14, 6, where Aleimus identifies the Hasîdîm with the Hasmonaeen party. They *had* attached themselves to the Hasmonaeen party in the religious war, and such an association naturally would not come to an end suddenly, but by a gradual estrangement which caused for some time a certain ambiguity in their position.

² 1 Mace. 7, 19.

³ 2 Mace. 14, 14.

⁴ 1 Mace. 7, 21 f.

⁵ He may very probably have been the Nianor who commanded the expedition against the Jews in 166-165. According to Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 402, he was the Nienetrius who had shared in Demetrius' flight from Rome. But one suspects that Josephus had nothing to go upon, except that he knew from Polybius that a Nianor had been on that occasion with Demetrius.

and indeed, we are told, took a wife, as Nieranor wished, and began family life.¹

The turn things were taking could not but be very disquieting to Aleimus. It can hardly be doubted that he was justified in questioning the possibility of "killing home rule by kindness." On his representations to the court an order came to Nieranor to apprehend Judas and send him a prisoner to Antioeh. This was hard on Nieranor, but he was a soldier and knew his duty. He was, however, too transparent for Judas not to divine at once by his manner what had happened. Judas instantly vanished, and Nieranor found himself placed in an ugly position with regard to the court. He had no idea of how to attain his object except by direct vehemence, and he felt sure that the priests were secretly in league with Judas. He knew at any rate that it was through the Temple and the sacred ritual that the Jews' most sensitive point could be reached. To the Temple he went, and ordered the priests, whom he found officiating, to deliver Judas into his hands. Naturally he was only answered by blank looks and protestations of ignorance. He believed that this was all cunning, and then took place that scene which stamped itself upon the recollection of the Jews—Nieranor standing in the Temple court, his arm stretched out toward the House of the Lord, and protesting that if the man were not given up he would lay it even with the ground and erect in its place a temple to Dionysus.

Meanwhile Judas was gathering his forces in the country, and Nieranor presently learnt that the man he was ordered to seize was surrounded by his armed bands. There was nothing for it but to go out and engage him in battle. But Nieranor had dismissed a great part of his troops; he was obliged to rely to a certain extent upon the Jewish levies who followed him by constraint. And these were an obstacle rather than a help. They refused to attack when ordered to do so on the Sabbath, and talked to him about the Sovereign in heaven. "And I," cried the plain man in extremity, "am a sovereign on earth, who command you to take up your arms and do the King's business."

¹ 2 Mace. 14, 12 f.

With such forces as these Nieranor closed with the bands on Judas at Adasa (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-east of Beth-horon) on the 13th of Adar (March) 161. The victory of Judas was signal and complete. Nieranor was found on the field "lying dead in full armour." His head and the arm which he had stretched out against the Temple were cut off and carried by Judas in triumph to Jerusalem to be hung up over against the sanctuary. It was the last victory of Judas, and, in respect of the high standing of Nieranor, his greatest. The anniversary of the battle was kept as a day of rejoicing. It is only within the last few centuries that the Jews have forgotten "Nieranor's day."¹

It was significant of the transference of the nationalist struggle from the plane of religious enthusiasm to that of worldly policy that Judas now looked about for a foreign alliance. And, like Timarchus, he looked to Rome. Koine had not yet in 161 recognized Demetrius as King. Eupolemus and Jason, two members of the nationalist party who had nevertheless learnt to speak Greek, were sent to declare to the Senate the desire of the Jewish people for separation from the Seleucid kingdom, and to invoke the influence of Rome on their behalf. The Senate, welcoming at this moment any opportunity of furthering the disintegration of the kingdom of Demetrius, concluded an alliance with "the nation of the Jews," which yet was so framed as to leave Rome a loophole of escape from its obligations should they prove inconvenient.²

Before, however, the effect of the Jewish embassy could be known in Syria, Demetrius had disconcerted all the designs of the nationalists by his promptitude of action. There was now a government which was not put off its purpose by a single check. No sooner was the news of Nieranor's disaster come to Antioch than an adequate army under Baehides was sent to deal with the situation. About a month after the battle of Adasa, Baehides was in Jerusalem (April 161). The nationalists were perfectly aware of the different character of this expedition, and their self-confidence deserted them. When Baehides established his camp in Berea (Bi'r-az-Zait, north-west

¹ 1 Mace. 7, 33 f. ; 2 Mace. 14, 26 f. ; cf. Niese, *Kritik*, p. 85 f.

² See Appendix L.

of Gophna ?) the bands of Judas began to melt awry. The tactics of the King's general reduced him to the alternative of flight or the risking of an immediate battle. Judas, in spite of the entreaties of his friends, disdained the former, and with forlorn heroism his little band charged the royal army. At the end of the day Judas himself lay dead upon the field of Eleasa. His last followers were scattered in flight. Demetrius had taken speedy recompense for Nieranor.¹

Aleimns, who since the battle of Adasa had fled to Antioeh, was now once more restored to power in Jerusalem. The anti-Hasmonaeen party came again into the ascendant. But the vital problem—that of subjugating the country districts, where the Hasmonaeen power had its roots—required more drastic measures than had hitherto been used. The organization of the country in the government interest must succeed the dispersion of the rebels, and the wandering remnants of the bands of Judas be cleared out of it. Baehides chose members of the party of the High-priest to rule in the country with the King's authority, and to track down on the spot the adherents of the Hasmonaeans.² Jonathan, Simon and John, the brothers of Judas, were still alive to take the place of the fallen leader. They drew off with their followers into the wilderness of Tekoah, the bare pastoral country by the Dead Sea, and mingled in the petty warfare of Arab or Ammonite tribes, which went on without interference from the government in these regions. The Jewish bands raided, and were themselves raided, by turns; they lost one of their leaders, the Hasmonaeen John, in some obscure affray. Baehides attempted to follow them up and exterminate them, but they escaped across the marshes where the Jordan falls into the Dead Sea. The wilderness has in all ages limited the success of the royal governments in Asia.³

But Judaea at any rate Baehides cleared of rebels, and he adopted the only measure likely to ensure permanent tranquillity—planting strong posts around all its approaches. The *akra* in Jerusalem, Gezer and Beth-sur, where garrisons already sat, were furnished with fresh supplies and strengthened. New posts were fixed at Bethel, on the northern entrance into

¹ 1 Mace. 9, 1 f.

² *Ibid.* 9, 23.

³ *Ibid.* 9, 28 f.

Judaea from Samaria, at Emmaus and Beth-horon to guard the western defiles, at Jericho to command the ascent from the Jordan valley, and in certain other places whose sites cannot be identified.¹ As an additional security the sons of the principal men were lodged in the *akra*. Baehides then returned home. The aspect of Judaea with its chain of military posts itself declared the difference between the government of Demetrius and that of Lysias.

As for Aleimus, he did not enjoy his elevation long. He died, just before Baehides left Judaea, of a paralytic stroke. His countrymen saw in this a judgment for his impiety in beginning some alterations in the Temple buildings which involved a disturbance of the "works of the prophets."²

In 160, as we saw, Demetrius obtained the recognition, though not the favour, of Koine. The principle once given him by Polybius, "Do boldly, and Home will acquiesce in the accomplished fact," seemed to have been justified by its success. And if he had got his kingdom in spite of Koine's veto, it was possible that the veto might be as safely disregarded in an attempt to restore the Seleucid influence in lands whence it had been excluded since Antioehus the Great King. On the north the Cappadoecian kingdom adjoined the Seleucid across the barrier of the Taurus. To make Cappadoecia once more a vassal state would be a great step towards the recovery of Asia Minor. Beside this, Demetrius had to show Ariarathes that a Seleucid princess could not be slighted with impunity even by a friend of Home. The situation in Cappadoecia soon of itself invited interference.

If there is one characteristic feature of this final period of decline in the kingdoms of the Nearer East which were formed out of the break-up of Alexander's Empire it is the universal domestic quarrels. We have just seen how the quarrel of Philometor and Euergetes in Egypt gave an opening for Roman interference. The domestic wars of a kingdom are

¹ The conjectures are given in Srhurer's note i. p. 224.

² 1 Mace. 9, 50 f. ; Sehürer (i. p. 225, note 6) points out that the offence lay in his removing the wall which severed the inner court from the common ground outside.

invariably used at this time by its neighbours for their own advantage. A principal weapon one power employs against another is a rival claimant.

A quarrel broke out in the royal house of Cappadoeia. Ariarathes V had, as we saw,¹ two elder brothers, or putative brothers, one of whom, Orophernes, had been educated in Ionia. Demetrius entered into an agreement with Orophernes to set him instead of Ariarathes upon the Cappadoeian throne for the sum of 1000 talents.² Once more, therefore, a Seleueid army appeared north of the Taurus and drove the king of Cappadoeia from his throne. Orophernes was successfully instated in his place.

Ariarathes carried his cry to Rome, but there also came ambassadors from Orophernes and ambassadors from Demetrius to tell a very different story from that told by Ariarathes to the Senate. The Senate, of course, had no means of judging what was true, but the multitude of voices told more forcibly than the one, and the fugitive King made but a poor figure to the gorgeous ambassadors (157 B.C.). The Senate decided haphazard that Ariarathes and Orophernes should divide the kingdom between them. And even so it does not appear to have done more than issue a paper decree.³

Demetrius had reached the zenith of his fortunes. The eyes of the eastern kings began to be fixed with alarm upon the resuscitated power. There was once more a man on the throne of Seleucus who did as he would in the East, who helped more effectually than Rome, and against whom the protection of Rome availed nothing. There were many men living who remembered the days of Antioehus the Great King before Rome had intervened in the East, and now that the vigour of Rome seemed to be waning, was it impossible that the grandson of Antioehus might yet again restore the Seleucid empire?

But no personal ability and vigour in Demetrius could compensate for some of the essential weaknesses in his position. Philip of Maedon could make a strong state because he had the hardy Macedonian stock to build upon as a foundation; but what empire could be based upon the hybrid population

¹ Page 157. ² App. Syr. 47. ³ Polyb. xxxii. 24 ; App. Syr. 47.

of Syria, pleasure-loving and fickle, in whom Greek lightness and Oriental indolence were combined? Demetrius had none of the unfastidious bonhomie of his uncle Antioehus. He was not, as we saw in Rome, averse to conviviality, but he made distinctions as to his company. He despised the race which was found in Antioeh and the Syrian cities, and did not take pains to conceal what he felt. Naturally this did not make him popular. Antioehus Epiphanes had been a typical representative in his character and manners of Syrian Hellenism; the Antioehenes had felt him one of themselves, but Demetrius withdrew from contact with them; he built himself a square tower outside Antioeh, wherein he sat inaccessible to brood over schemes of conquest. His eagle face, rarely shown, his *hauteur*, his demand upon them for serious national effort, vexed the Syrians and made them ripe for revolt.¹

There was also another circumstance against him, that the neighbouring kings, however much they may have disliked their position as vassals of Rome, much preferred it to being vassals of the Seleucid King. Borne was farther off and apparently growing indolent. In proportion as Demetrius grew strong there was added to disaffection at home hostility abroad. Orophernes only might be counted his ally, and had Fate given him in Orophernes an ally of any worth, things might have taken a very different course. But Orophernes proved a ruler of the worst kind. He wrung all the money he could from the country by the most violent extortion, and lavished what he got upon favourites and strangers. His manners, acquired in Ionia, outraged the feelings of the Cappadocian barons. He trampled upon their religious and moral traditions, and they were shocked to see him following wild and dissolute cults unknown to their fathers. It was impossible that the *protégé* of Demetrius should hold his throne long.²

In Pergamos the interference of Demetrius in Cappadocia had been very ill received. Eumenes³ at once struck a blow

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 35 f.; Diod. xxxi. 32^a; Just. xxxv. 1, 8; xxxvi. 1, 1.

² Polyb. xxxii. 25; Diod. xxxi. 32.

* Diod. says Eumenes, and the reception of Alexander by Zenophanes is explained by his friendship to Eumenes, as if he were still alive. Considerations

on his own account. We have seen that one of the chief weapons with which a king was attacked was a rival claimant. The world soon learnt that the second son of Antiochus Epiphanes, Alexander, had been secretly conveyed away when Eupator was put to death, had been discovered by Eumenes in Smyrna, brought to Pergamos, and there crowned with the diadem as the genuine Seleucid King. On the other hand the court of Antioch asserted, and many well-informed persons believed, that it was a trick of Eumenes, who had bethought him of supplying the required claimant artificially, and had picked out some good-looking boy of fourteen who bore an accidental resemblance to the late King of Syria.¹ Eumenes sent the boy on to Cilicia, placing him under the protection of Zenophanes, a chieftain friendly to himself who maintained in the hills his independence against the Seleucid government. Here Alexander was like the sword of Damocles over the head of Demetrius. Zenophanes industriously circulated the report that the son of Antiochus was about to cross the Amanus to claim his own. The expectation served to keep alive the unrest in Syria. At the same time, should any outbreak occur, Alexander was at hand.²

Almost immediately after his elevation of Alexander, Eumenes died (159). But his brother, Attalus II Philadelphus, who succeeded him,³ prosecuted his plans against Demetrius with vigour. When it appeared two years later that Koine was not prepared to give Ariarathes anything but platonic benevolence, Attalus invited him to return to Asia and avail himself of a more effectual champion. Ariarathes was glad enough to do so. But his journey home was not unattended with danger. The ambassadors of Orophernes dogged him from Rome, and in Coryra formed a design to kill him; but Ariarathes was beforehand with them, and they were dead men

of chronology make modern writers unhesitatingly write Attalus for Eumenes in the beginning of the passage of Diodorus. Eumenes died in 159; it was not till 158 that Ariarathes arrived in Rome (Müller, *F.H.G.* ii. p. xii. note). But it does not appear to me impossible that the invasion of Cappadocia by Demetrius may have taken place before Eumenes died in 159, and the recognition of Alexander have been one of the last actions of his life.

¹ See Appendix M.

² Diod. xxxi. 32^a.

³ Wilcken in *Pauly-Wissowa*, ii. p. 2171, 8.v. "Attalos, No. 10."

before their plot had come to a head. Again at Corinth agents of Orophernes were about him, and he had a hair's-breadth escape.¹

Attalus escorted him with Pergamene troops to Oappadoeia, the Senate perhaps blessing the enterprise from afar.² The power of Orophernes was already tottering. Not only had he alienated his subjects, but he had no money left, after his lavish expenditure, to pay his mercenaries. They were on the brink of mutiny. In this extremity he pillaged the great temple of the Cappadoeian Zeus on Mount Ariadne, which had been inviolate from time immemorial. On the attack of Attalus his defence collapsed. He fled to Antioeh and Ariarathes was reinstated in the kingdom.³

Demetrius had encountered an ominous check in Asia Minor. Two fragments of Polybius throw a momentary light upon his schemes in another direction. The island of Cyprus, long coveted by the Seleueid kings, was about this time the battle-ground of the two brother Ptolemies. Demetrius sent a secret offer to Arehias, who commanded there for Philometor, of 500 talents and high honours at the Seleueid court if he would put the island into his hands (154). Arehias consented, but before the arrangement could be carried out, the plot was discovered by Philometor, and Arehias was arrested. He hanged himself with the rope of a curtain. Demetrius had turned another cousin into an enemy.⁴

The smouldering discontent in Syria was receiving fresh fuel. We have a record of one of the incidents which served to increase it. Among the *condottieri* in the King's service at Antioeh was a certain Andriseus of Adramyttium, who professed to be the son of Perseus,⁵ called himself Philip, and expressed his hope of being restored by Demetrius, "his

¹ Diod. xxxi. 32^b.

² "Ariarathes, Cappadoeiae rex, consilio Dexnetrii regis Syriae et viribus pulsus regno, a senatu (!) restitutus est, Li v. *Epit.* xlvii.

³ Diod. xxxi. 34; Polyb. iii. 5, 2; xxxii. 22, 8; Just. xxxv. 1, 2.

⁴ Polyb. xxxiii. 5.

⁵ Wilcken holds that his alleged mother was Laodice, the sister of Demetrius, and reads accordingly "ex Laodice" for "ex pellice" in Liv. *Epit.* xlix. His ground appears to be that Andriseus claimed the help of Demetrius *5t& rb ytvos* (Zonaras ix. 28). But there were earlier connexions between the houses of Antigonos and Seleueus, as Demetrius by his Antigonid name bore witness.

kinsman," to the throne of his fathers. He roused a strong sensational interest in the populace of Antioeh, and calls began to come to Demetrius from the "Macedonians" of the street that he should set King Philip in the ancestral kingdom. It was not the defect of Demetrius to lack enterprise, but he treated this demand with the contempt it deserved. Then the clamour grew; crowds surged about the palace doors. A cry arose that Demetrius must restore his cousin or give up the pretence of being a king. Demetrius saw he must take drastic steps. He caused Andriseus to be seized at night and sent to Rome (about 151-150).¹

The isolation of Demetrius became daily more patent. Even Orophernes, residing at Antioeh under his protection, conceived the idea of turning the general sedition to his own profit and supplanting his patron. He entered into secret negotiations with the leaders of the Antioehene mob. Demetrius penetrated his designs, and put him under close guard at Seleueia, upon the loyalty of which town he could perhaps better depend. As the rival claimant to Cappadoeia he might again be useful some day, and was therefore not put to death.²

But already the danger from Alexander, the would-be son of Antioehus, had taken a far more menacing form. He was no longer threatening from the Cilieian hills. In the summer of 153 he had appeared in Rome with Laodice, the daughter of Antioehus. They were conducted by the old intriguer, Heraelides of Miletus, who had now the grateful task of damaging his brother's destroyer. For a long time the party resided in Rome, making such a figure as was best calculated to impress public opinion before Heraelides thought the psychological moment come to approach the Senate. Nor did he during that time forget the old art by which he had made his way in Rome. At last the two children of Antioehus were brought before the Senate. Alexander spoke first—a formal speech about the cordial relations which had subsisted between his father and Rome, and so on. Then Heraelides

¹ Diod. xxxi. 40^a; Liv. Epit. xlviii. xlix.; Zonaras ix. 28. See Wileken, *Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2142, s.v. "Andriskos, No. 4."

² Just. xxxv. 1, 3 f.

made a moving oration. He began with an encomium of Antioehus Epiphanes, went on to denounce Demetrius, and finally delivered an appeal in the lofty name of Justice for the restoration of the true-born issue of the late King. It was all beautifully staged, and the Senate was immensely impressed. Only a few of the shrewder heads, Polybius says, saw through the business. A decree was made to the effect: "Whereas Alexander and Laodice, the children of a king who was sometime our friend and ally, have approached the Senate and represented their cause, the Senate has given them authority to return to the kingdom of their father, and has decreed that they shall receive assistance, as they have required." It was a triumph for Heraclides. He returned to Asia with his charges, and fixed his headquarters at Ephesus, to prepare for the invasion of Syria. The *condottieri* of most renown in the Hellenic world received a summons to take service under a king approved by Rome.¹

The children of Antioehus would not want for allies. The policy of Demetrius had brought about a coalition against him of his three neighbour kings, Attalus, Ariarathes and Ptolemy Philometor. Alexander was "girt with the might of all the (Nearer) East."² And Demetrius had no security at home. Antioeh was almost in open rebellion. That he knew how desperate the struggle was which lay before him is shown by his sending two of his sons, Demetrius and Antioehus, out of the country.

'The first move in the attack was for Alexander to make a descent upon the coast town of Ptolemaïs. It was held by the garrison of Demetrius, but they had been infected by the prevailing sedition and opened to Alexander.³ Alexander had thus got a footing in his "paternal realm," and in Ptolemaïs he set up his rival court till his cause should have made further progress. There were now two kings in the country, each bidding for the support of its various communities and races.

¹ Polyb. xxxiii. 18. Reinaeh supposes that it was the Laodice in question here, a genuine daughter of Antioehus Epiphanes, who afterwards married Mithridates Euergetes of Pontus, and was the mother of the great Mithridates (*Mithridate Eupator*, p. 51, note 1). Mithridates, the grandson of Antioehus Epiphanes ! It makes an interesting question of heredity.

² Just. xxxv. 1, 9.

³

1 Mace. 10, 1 f. ; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 35.

Our scanty authorities do not permit a connected narrative of the war. The Book of Maccabees and Josephus, who follows it, make no mention of the allied kings at all. But the expressions of Justin, Appian and Eusebius imply that the allied kings took a principal part.¹ In the first battle, Justin says, Demetrius was victorious. Possibly Alexander risked a battle with his mercenaries before his allies arrived upon the scene.² In the final battle Demetrius had, no doubt, the whole forces of the coalition against him. Undaunted to the end, he was still able to make a good fight. His left wing routed the enemy's right, and pursued it for a long way, inflicting heavy loss. Even the camp of the enemy was sacked. But the right, where Demetrius himself was, gave way. He found himself almost alone among the enemy. In those days of close fighting, a single expert horseman could do some damage. But, charging hither and thither, Demetrius rode his horse into some boggy ground, where it plunged and threw him. Then the enemy made a ring about him, and he became the mark for missiles from all sides. Showing no sign of surrender, he sank at last full of wounds, dying worthily of the race of fighters from which he sprang (150).³

¹ Just. xxxv. 1,6; App. Syr. 67; Ens. i. p. 255.

² This seems borne out by Justin's "regions belium restituentibus."

³ Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 58 f.; Just. xxxv. 1, 10 f. The original source of both accounts was not improbably Polybius. The year in which Alexander Balas succeeded Demetrius is proved by the coins to have been 162 aer. Sel., since there are coins of both kings with that date. The year mentioned goes from October 151 to October 150, and the campaign would hardly have begun till the spring of 150.

CHAPTETR XXVIII

ALEXANDER I AND THE PTOLEMAÏC ASCENDANCY

THE chief part in overthrowing Demetrius and bringing in Alexander had been taken by Ptolemy Philometor.¹ It had been shown abundantly how dangerous to the Egyptian realm an ambitious and enterprising Seleueid king was likely to be. Philometor had therefore supported Alexander with the design of having upon the Seleueid throne some one entirely subservient to himself, of establishing a dominant interest in Syria. Attalus and Ariarathes, who simply wished to secure themselves from aggression on the side of Syria, were probably quite agreeable to a settlement which left the country in this sort of informal dependence upon the Ptolemaïc crown. Immediately Alexander was in his seat, Philometor caused him to marry his daughter Cleopatra. Just as her grandmother, the Seleueid Cleopatra, had been married half a century before to Ptolemy Epiphanes in order to promote the Seleueid interest in Egypt, so she was now sent to the Seleueid court by the son of Ptolemy Epiphanes to confirm his ascendancy over Syria. And her rôle in the country would indeed be a principal one some day, for in the person of the young princess Destiny was introducing the Erinyes of the house of Seleueus. She was received by the bridegroom at Ptolemais, whither she had been escorted by her father. There the marriage was celebrated "with great pomp, as the manner of kings is."²

As for the Syrians, they hailed a new king with delight. The handsome, genial youth of twenty-three was a happy exchange for the eagle face and proud aloofness of Demetrius.

¹ App. Syr. 67.

² 1 Mace. 10, 51 f.

He would not turn a dark brow upon their easy, festive life, or harass the country by bringing it into continual collisions with its neighbours. His relations with all the powers were extremely friendly. The three neighbour kings had been his supporters. Koine had smiled upon his enterprise.

So Alexander, whoever he was, sat as king upon the throne of Seleueus. He bore the surnames of Theopator Euergetes. For these two we sometimes find Epiphanes Nicephorus, those of his (alleged) father, or Eupator, the surname of his brother.¹ But the name by which he was known in the mouth of the people was *Balas*²

It is impossible to gauge the extent or form of the Ptolemaïc ascendancy. It seems to be implied that the seat of the Seleucid court was now usually at Ptolemais,³ where it would be in closer touch with Alexandria. The silver money minted in the King's name in the Phoenician cities was assimilated to the standard of Egypt⁴ instead of to the Attic, which was the ordinary standard for Seleueid money, and it bore for emblem the Ptolemaïc eagle.⁵

As a ruler Alexander proved himself utterly worthless. He fell under the dominion of mistresses and favourites,⁶ while the government was abandoned to the prime minister Ammonius,⁷ who made himself detested by his crimes. The minister's jealousy raged like lire in the court. All possible rivals among the Friends were removed by a series of murders. Among

¹ Babelon, p. cxxiv. Babelon expresses a doubt whether ETIIATOP02 on the British Museum coin has been correctly read, and opines that it is a disfigured 0EOIIATOPOS. Mr. G. F. Hill has showed me the coin; ETIIATOPOS is plain enough. Mr. Hill tells me the reading is beyond question.

² Schürer (i. p. 227, note 11) thinks that this was his original name, citing Just. xxxv. 1, 6, "subornant propalam [leg. Balam] quendam, extremæ sortis iuvenem." But if Balas is a name of Syrian origin, it is surely more likely that it was given Alexander in Syria.

³ 1 Mace. 10, 68. Alexander returns to Antioeh. Josephus in his paraphrase says *ἐκ τῆς Φοινίκης* xiii. § 87).

⁴ The "Phoenician" standard.

⁵ Babelon, p. exxv. Ptolemy struck money in his own name at Ptolemais in 161, aer. Sel. = 152-151 B.C. [*ibid.* p. exxvi]. But this does not imply the assumption of sovereignty in the country. Antioehus Epiphanes, as we saw, struck money in his own name in Egypt while supporting the claims of Philometor.

⁶ Just. xxxv. 2, 2.

⁷ His name suggests an Egyptian origin.

his victims were Laodice, either the queen of Antiochus Epiphanes (and therefore the putative mother of Alexander) or the queen of Demetrius, and Antigonus, one of the sons of Demetrius, whom he had not sent out of Syria.¹ The government of Antioch itself was given over to two favourites, Hierax and Diodotus.²

A page from the lost work of Athenaeus which dealt with the Seleucid kings³ gives a momentary vision of the court of Alexander Balas. Among the royal favourites was a certain Diogenes, from the Babylonian Seleucia, who had some standing as an exponent of the Epicurean philosophy. The King, who amused himself with philosophic discussion, preferred the doctrine of the Stoics (!). But he found Diogenes very good company, for the man had a daring, pungent wit, and did not spare even the royal family when he could make matter for a jest. One day Diogenes told Alexander that he was resolved to be the priest of Virtue (his life, of course, was outrageous), and he asked leave to wear in that character a crimson vestment and a golden crown with a figure of Virtue in the middle of it. Alexander was charmed with the idea, and himself made Diogenes a present of the crown. In a few days the philosopher had given the things away to a singing girl, his latest passion. It came to the ears of Alexander. He at once made a banquet for philosophers and men of note, and invited Diogenes. When he presented himself, the King begged him to put on his vestment and his crown before taking his couch. Diogenes made some vague excuse, and at that the King waved his hand. Instantly a troop of players came in, and among them the singing girl, crowned with the crown of Virtue, and wearing the crimson dress. A shout of laughter went up from the company, but the philosopher was not put out of countenance. The more the company laughed, the more he faced them out with the girl's praises.⁴

But this life of laughter—with the sinister background of murder—could not go on long when stronger hands than Alexander's were ready to seize the inheritance. In three years the Syrians were tired of him, and they hated Am-

¹ Liv. *EpiU* 1.

³ *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλευσάντων.*

² Diod. xxxiii. 3.

⁴ Athen. v. 211 a.

moniu⁸. They began to want a genuine king again. Alexander was thoroughly popular only in one quarter—with the Jews. The Jews liked him because he left them alone.

We must observe what had happened in Judaea since we last saw it, subjugated by Baehides and pegged down with strong military posts.

Two years after that date (*i.e.* in 158) the Seleucid government had withdrawn its ban from the Hasmonaeen party. This change in its attitude is so impolitic that we want some further explanation than that given by the Jewish book which is our only authority.¹ It is there represented as due to the vexation of Baehides, who had been called in by the Hellenistic party to seize the Hasmonaeen leaders, which they assured him could be easily done—only to find that he was involved in the fruitless siege of some stronghold in the wilderness.² Whatever the motive of the change of policy, the government apparently, in the person of Baehides, made peace with the Hasmonaeans, granted them an amnesty, and liberated those of their adherents (except, of course, the hostages) whom they held prisoners. Jonathan, Simon and their followers were allowed to return to Judaea, although Jerusalem and the chain of fortified towns remained in possession of the government. But when once the brothers of Judas were back in the country and countenanced by the government, the party grew daily in strength, commanding as it did the sympathy of the mass of the people. It came to be once more—*de facto*, at any rate—the dominant power in the Judaeen countryside. With his headquarters at Miehmas, Jonathan steadily advanced his power at the expense of the Hellenizing Council which sat in Jerusalem. The formal deficiencies of his position—his lack of recognized title, his exclusion from the capital—were nevertheless sensible. Jonathan could not feel his object attained till he ruled as High-priest in Jerusalem.³

Quite new prospects opened out for the nationalist Jews in 152, when there were two rival kings in the land. This condition of things will recur over and over again, and we shall now see the Hasmonaeen power growing, not so much by

¹ Josephus, of course, simply paraphrases 1 Mace.

² 1 Mace. 9, 58 f.

³ *Ibid.* 9, 71 f.

its own strength, as by the favours of those who bid against each other for its support. *Its growth is the work of the Gentile kings themselves.* The conditions will be entirely different from those under which Judas fought and died.

Jonathan, who had become by 152 the real ruler of Judaea, found both Demetrius and Alexander willing to give almost any price for his support. The two immediate objects of the Hasmonaeans were the recovery of Jerusalem and the acquisition of the high-priesthood. Demetrius, beforehand with his offers, conceded the first. Jonathan was authorized to take possession of Jerusalem, the *akra* excepted, and to form a Jewish army. The hostages in the *akra* were restored. In the stress of the war between the two kings the garrisons were withdrawn or fled from all Baehides' chain of posts, except the *akra* and Beth-sur, where a number of the Hellenizers had taken refuge.

Jonathan used the concession of Demetrius to the full, and at once set about refortifying the city. Again a nationalist stronghold confronted the *akra*¹

Alexander proceeded to outbid Demetrius by conceding the second point. He authorized Jonathan to assume the supreme office, the high-priesthood. At the Feast of Tabernacles in Tishri (October) 152,² Jonathan appeared for the first time in the robes of his sacred office. At last the brother of Judas Maceabaeus had attained the coveted prize—as the gift of a heathen king! Jonathan was also admitted by Alexander to the order of Friends.³

When the marriage of Alexander and Cleopatra was celebrated in Ptolemais, and the town gave itself up to festivity at the presence of two kings, the Jewish High-priest was among those who came bringing gold to Alexander and Ptolemy and the great men of their suites. The Hellenistic party made a desperate attempt to get the new King's ear, but Alexander would not listen to them, and treated Jonathan with marked

¹ 1 Mace. 10, 3 f.

² I follow Wellhausen in thinking that we should understand the Feast of Tabernacles in 152, as it seems to me improbable that the seizure of Ptolemais by Alexander was as early as 153. This involves a correction of the chronology of 1 Mace, since the October of 152 falls in the year 161 aer. Sel.

³ 1 Mace. 10, 15 f.

consideration, clothing him in a crimson dress of honour. He was raised to the rank of the First Friends. His position as High-priest and ruler of the nation was fitted into the general system of the kingdom by constituting him *stratcgos* of Judaea for the King.¹

Thenceforward under King Alexander the Hasmonaean High-priest ruled without interference. The Hellenistic party melted away. Only the garrison of Gentile soldiers remained in the *akra*. But nothing occurred to impair the good-will of the Jews to the King, who was too indolent to be troublesome.

A curious picture of the relations of the cities of the realm to the Seleueid government under Alexander is given us by the story of Aradus and Marathus. Marathus, on the mainland, was formally more subject to the Seleueid King than the island Aradus, but it was not burdened with any royal garrison. Aradus wished to see Marathus blotted out—one supposes commercial rivalry or some such reason. To compass its end it intrigued in the usual way at the court; 300 talents came into the hands of Ammonius as *bakshish*, and it was agreed that a royal force was to enter Marathus under false pretences and then put the Aradians in possession. *But Marathus refused to admit the Kings men*, and, believing Aradus friendly, sent an embassy to entreat their mediation; their influence at the court was well known. The Aradians murdered the envoys and cunningly sent back letters to Marathus in the envoys' name and stamped with their signets, announcing that Aradus was sending troops—the city had troops of its own—to help Marathus against the royal force. The plan failed because there was a fisherman in Aradus, a "just man," who swam the channel, all boats having been seized by the Aradian authorities, to warn Marathus what was toward.² The noteworthy thing from our point of view is the large degree of independence with which the cities act, how loose an organization of the kingdom is displayed.

While Alexander was wantoning in the palaces of the Seleueid kings, the two sons of Demetrius in Asia Minor were

¹ 1 Mace. 10, 59 f., *στρατηγὸς καὶ μεριδάρχης*, which Schürer thinks equivalent to military and civil governor. See Appendix F.

² Diod. xxxiii. 5.

growing to manhood. In 148-147, when the elder, Demetrius, can have been at the most fourteen years old,¹ those who had the boy in their keeping thought the time ripe for attempting to set the true King upon the throne. The first step, of course, was to get a body of mercenaries, and Crete, with its interminable petty wars, was the best recruiting ground. A noted Cretan *condottierc*, Lasthenes, was ready enough to undertake the management of the expedition. With an army drawn from Crete and the Greek islands, and commanded by Lasthenes, Demetrius set foot in "the land of his fathers."²

The presence of the young Demetrius in the kingdom came as a rude shock to break upon the voluptuous paradise of Alexander Balas. He hurried north³ to Antioeh, which was known to be disaffected.⁴ But the peril of insurrection was not confined to Antioeh. Apollonius, the governor of dele-Syria, declared for Demetrius as soon as Alexander had turned his back. Immediately the adherents of the respective kings came to blows in Palestine, as they were perhaps doing in other provinces of the kingdom—if Alexander had elsewhere friends as devoted as the Jews. The Hellenized Philistine cities, who had seen with great displeasure Alexander's patronage of the Jewish leader, followed their governor zealously in striking for the cause of Demetrius. But in a battle near Azotus (Ashdod) the Jews gained a decisive victory. The defeated army of Apollonius fled into Azotus, and crowded for safety into the temple of Dagon. Jonathan entered after them and burnt the temple over the heads of the living mass. Soon the smoke was going up, not from Azotus only, but from the neighbouring villages of the plain. Only Asealon by timely obsequiousness bought immunity.

Alexander might congratulate himself at this critical

¹ If Demetrius Soter married in 162 and Demetrius II was born in 161, he would be fourteen in 147. But the Antigonus murdered by Ammonius was not improbably the eldest son of Demetrius I.

² See Appendix N.

³ Presumably from Ptolemaïs, 1 Mace. 10, 68 ; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 87.

⁴ According to Malalas, p. 207, the year 148 was that in which Antioeh was visited by the first great earthquake in its history. If so, the consequent misery would no doubt have fanned the flame of political discontent. Rut the notice in Malalas is open to suspicion. He says that the earthquake occurred under a king *Antioehus*, see Müller, *Antiq. Antioeh.* p. 14.

moment on the friendship of the Jews. They had destroyed, without his lifting a finger, the revolted army which menaced his rear. He lost no time in confirming their loyalty. He raised Jonathan yet another step in rank, sending him the golden clasp which distinguished the King's Kinsmen. He granted to him and his heirs the town of Ekron and its territory for personal possession.¹

But the disturbers of the existing settlement in Syria would have to reckon with the virtual suzerain, the King of Egypt. Ptolemy Philometor could not look on while his nominee was thrust aside. He was soon upon the scene in commanding force. The government of Alexander Balas had convinced him that the veiled and informal ascendancy he had designed to keep over Syria was not enough. An enterprising and independent Seleucid king menaced Egypt, a weak and dependent one was unable to hold the country in the Ptolemaïc interest. Philometor therefore now determined to assure his supremacy in a more direct and open way. He crossed into Palestine with an imposing army, while his fleet moved up along the coast. In each of the principal cities of the sea-board, as he went north, he dropped a garrison of his own (perhaps in 147). At Azotus the inhabitants showed him the appalling relics of the Jewish visitation—the blackened shrines and heaps of charred corpses. Ptolemy reserved his judgment. He had not yet repudiated Alexander, and the Jews were ostensibly fighting on the same side. Jonathan himself came to meet the King of Egypt at Joppa, and accompanied him as far as the river Eleutherus (mod. Nahr-al-Kebir), the frontier of the Coele-Syrian province.²

When all the coast cities as far as Seleueia were occupied by Ptolemy's garrisons, the alliance between Ptolemy and Alexander was severed by an open quarrel. Ptolemy asserted that whilst he had been at Ptolemais³ he had detected an attempt upon his life on the part of Ammonius, Alexander's

¹ 1 Mace. 10, 69. f. Josephus in his paraphrase mistakes the situation.

² *Ibid.* 11, 1 f.; Strabo xvi. 753.

³ This tends to show what was inferred above, that Ptolemais was the seat of the court of Alexander. Ptolemy also already has his daughter, Queen Cleopatra, in his hands. Alexander, one supposes, had left her and the people of the court, including Ammonius, at Ptolemais when he hurried to Antioch.

prime minister. Ammonius had fled to Alexander at Antioeh, and Ptolemy demanded that he should be given up for execution. Alexander evaded the demand, and Ptolemy renounced his alliance.

But he did not intend even now to take formal possession of the Seleueid kingdom. To leave the kingship and government to a king of his own making, married to his daughter, was more convenient, and now that he held the coast cities in his own hands, seemed safe. He therefore proffered his support and the hand of Cleopatra to Demetrius.¹

Demetrius, or rather the people who directed his action, naturally accepted the offer. Cleopatra was to take as her second husband a boy of fourteen or less. Alexander's position was hopeless. It must have been now, if not earlier, that he sent Cleopatra's child, Antioehus, to the Arab chieftain Yamlik, to be reared in the wilderness.² Soon he was unable to hold down the discontent of Antioeh. Even Hierax and Diodotus, who had been his instruments for governing the city, went over to the majority; they used their position to expel Alexander from the city. He fled to the Cilician hills, where, if anywhere, there was a chance of his getting together bands to retrieve his fortunes. Ammonius was left exposed to the vengeance of the Antioehenes. He tried to escape in feminine attire, but the hated face was recognized, and he was done to death.³

Antioeh was now at a stand. It had expelled Alexander, but it had also a short time before risen against Demetrius Soter, and apprehended what would follow the return of his son. A solution of the difficulty seemed for Ptolemy Philometor to take himself the inheritance of Seleueus. He was an able statesman, and a man of gracious and lovable character; he was also a Seleueid on the mother's side. When he came to Antioeh, citizens and soldiers alike called upon him to ascend the throne; they were for binding two diadems upon his head, those of Egypt and Asia.

¹ See Appendix 0.

² 1 Mace. 11, 39; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 131; Diod. xxxiii. 4^a. In Diod. xxxii. 9^d the Arab chief to whom Alexander had confided his child is called Diodes.

³ Diod. xxxii. 9^e; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. §§ 108, 112.




PLATE IV

But Ptolemy saw his interest too clearly to be dazzled by the temptation. He urged the Antiochenes to receive Demetrius, and gave his word for it that there should be no reprisals for their infidelity to Demetrius I. So Demetrius entered his capital, and was acknowledged as Seleucid King. Only Cœle-Syria, as one might have expected, he was obliged to give back to the house of Ptolemy, and the Egyptian garrisons continued to hold the Phœnician coast. Immediately on the return of Demetrius his marriage with Cleopatra was consummated.¹

By 145² Alexander had collected in Cilicia a force which seemed adequate for renewing the contest. He crossed the Amanus and descended into the plain of Antioch, which he began to devastate. Ptolemy advanced to meet him, and the two armies closed on the river Oenoparas.³ Alexander was routed, but the battle was not without disaster for the victorious side. The King of Egypt had mingled in the thick of the fighting, where his horse had taken fright at the trumpeting of an elephant and thrown him. Instantly Alexander's Cilicians had flung themselves upon him and rained down blows. He was rescued by the royal body-guard and carried off alive, but his skull was fractured and he had lost consciousness.

Meanwhile Alexander fled for his life eastwards, to Abae in the wilderness, with five hundred followers. He hoped to find shelter with the friendly Arab chief to whom he had confided his son. But his little company contained traitors. Some of his Greco-Syrian officers contrived to send back a message to Demetrius, offering to assassinate Alexander as the price of their own pardon. The promise was given in the King's name, and Alexander was murdered. An Arab chief called Zabdiel cut off his head and sent it to Ptolemy.

On the fifth day after the battle Ptolemy recovered consciousness. The ghastly relic was shown him of the man who had been his son-in-law. Three days later he died under

¹ 1 Mace. 11, 13; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 111 f. ; Diod. xxxii. 9^e ; Just. xxxv. 2, 3 ; Liv. *Epit.* lii.

² Niese, *Kritik*, p. 81.

³ One of the streams discharging into the lake of Antioch ; *which* is uncertain, Strabo xvi. 751.

the hands of the surgeons, while they were trying to adjust the broken bone (early summer 145)¹

The position of Ptolemy Philometor just before his death had been the most commanding held by any king of his house since Ptolemy III. He was practically supreme in Syria; the Seleucid King was little more than a puppet in his hands. But at his unexpected death all this fabric of power melted away. Egypt was confronted with a doubtful succession, for Philometor left an infant son in the charge of his sister and wife Cleopatra (II), whilst his brother, Ptolemy Euergetes, who now reigned in Cyrene, had been even during the life of Philometor a rival claimant for the Egyptian throne. The Ptolemaic forces in Syria were a helpless body without master or direction, and at the court of Demetrius, now swayed by Lasthenes, the Cretan adventurer, it was resolved to destroy them before a new government was consolidated in Egypt. A massacre of the Ptolemaic troops was ordered in the name of Demetrius, and the population of the coast-towns rose to annihilate their garrisons. Crowds of fugitives, who had once been part of the grand army, made their way back to Alexandria. The elephants remained in the hands of Demetrius. There was no longer any question of retroceding Palestine. The ascendancy of the house of Ptolemy in Syria had vanished like a dream.²

¹ Diod. xxxii. 9^d and 10; 1 Mace. 11, 14 f.; Joseph. xiii. § 116, f.; Liv. *Epit.* lii.

² 1. Maec. 11, 18; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 120.

CHAPTER XXIX

TEE CRETAN TYRANNY

ALEXANDER BALAS had perished and the hand of Egypt was removed, but the throne which Demetrius ascended as Demetrius Theos Nieator Philadelphus¹ was nevertheless a tottering one. It was only the influence of Ptolemy which had prevailed on Antioch to receive him. He could not trust the soldiery drawn from the native Greeks and Macedonians. The frequent revolutions had set up an agitation in the public mind which was favourable to further change. The one remedy would be a firm and considerate government to allay by degrees the dangerous unrest—at once to reconcile the people to their ruler and give a confidence in the stability of the existing *régime*. Such considerations were, however, far from the minds of the Cretan captains who now dominated the Seleucid throne. To them the kingdom they had seized was simply a source of gain. The ambitious foreign policy of Demetrius Soter was not to be resumed; they were simply to settle upon the unhappy land and subordinate everything to the one end of gaining power and leisure to drain it. They had no permanent connexion with the land or interest in its well-being. It was the government of pirates.

How ready they were to agree with any adversary quickly, in order to enjoy their prey undisturbed, is shown by what took place in Judaea. Jonathan, we saw, had gained under Alexander a supremacy in Judaea which was infringed by nothing but the garrison in the *akra*. He seized the occasion of the times to assail this last relic of

¹ See Appendix P.

the Seleucid government, and subjected the *akra* to a close blockade. The court made some show of protest. But Jonathan understood the temper of the new government so well that when the young King came to Ptolemaïs he presented himself before him with rich presents, although the siege of the *akra* still went on. He received not only pardon, but a confirmation of his honours. He was placed in the order of First Friends at the new court. His request was granted that a sum of 300 talents should be accepted in discharge of the annual tribute, taxes, and customs due from Judaea to the King.¹ At the same time the Judæan territory was extended on the north by the addition of the three "toparehies" or "nomes" of Lydda, Aphaerema and Ramathaim, which had hitherto belonged to Samaria.² Jonathan probably on his part agreed to leave the *akra* alone.³

So the Cretans addressed themselves with a secure mind to the business of plundering the country. All pretence of conciliation was given up, and the government orders became more atrocious and flagrant every day. Outrageous penalties were laid upon all who had been the partizans of Alexander. Antioch revenged itself by pasquinade, and the Cretan soldiery punished the sharp words by spilling blood in the streets. The home-born troops regarded the strangers and their puppet king with bitter displeasure. As these troops might give trouble, and they were no longer necessary when the court did not dream of going to war, it was resolved to disband them. An order was issued which removed all the army from the active list, except the mercenaries from overseas, and the pay usually

¹ This was a lump sum paid down in composition for all the future. Ace. to Joseph. xii. § 158, the annual tribute paid by the High-priest to the Ptolemaïc government had been 20 talents. The statement of Sulpicius Severus (*Hist. Sac.* ii. 17, 4), *Judæi annum stipendium trecenta argenti talenta regi (i.e. to Seleucus I) dabant,*" is of no value.

² Lydda (mod. Ludd) was the important town which commanded the road from Jerusalem to the coast by the Beth-horon valley. There had probably been a settlement of Jews there since the early days of the Return (Neh. 11, 85). Aphaerema (= Ephraim, John 11, 54) was about five miles north-east of Bethel. Ramathaim is Samuel's city in Mount Ephraim (1 Sam. 1), and perhaps the Arimathea of the Gospels; its exact site is conjectural.

³ 1 Mace. 11, 20 f. "Le gouvernement se réconciliant avec le rebelle qu'il a poursuivi jusque-là est un des faits les plus ordinaires de l'histoire quotidienne de l'Orient" Renan, *Hist. du peuple d'Isr.* iv. p. 397.

given to men in reserve was diminished for the benefit of the aliens. It was an unprecedented action, since all former kings had considered their interest deeply involved in binding the military class to their cause, and had usually been punctual in their payment even in times of peace. Nor were they only disbanded; they were also to be disarmed. The measure met in Antioeh with the liveliest resistance; riots ensued in the streets, in which blood flowed freely. Recalcitrants were cut down in their houses, together with their women and children. Antioeh was the theatre of a hideous intestine war.¹

The people, maddened, fought desperately. They barricaded the streets, and a yelling crowd of many thousands beat upon the palace doors. The mercenaries who attempted a sortie were driven back. But the crowd could not face the storm of missiles which presently fell upon them from the palace roof. They gave back, and the King's men set the buildings adjoining the palace, which the people had held, on fire. The flames spread rapidly along the narrow wooden streets, and soon a great part of Antioeh was in a blaze. A terrified stampede took place; every one pressed on to rescue his family and property, while the mercenaries charged the jammed, helpless mass through the cross allies, or, leaping along from roof to roof, shot into the thick of them below. The spirit of resistance did not survive such horrors. Antioeh was cowed for the time. A band of Jewish fighting men, trained in the wars of the Lord, were among the King's auxiliaries. They had been picked and sent by Jonathan. They returned home laden with the spoils of the great Gentile city, to tell in the courts of the Lord's house the delight of that wild pursuit along the roofs, the unlimited massacre of panic-driven heathen, mad to save their children from the fire. The Book of Maccabees would persuade us that a hundred thousand persons were killed by the Jews alone.²

The suppression of the revolt was followed in Antioeh by a red reign of terror. A proscription of those supposed to be implicated was instituted, and their property flowed into the royal coffers. Executions and confiscations were everyday events.

¹ 1 Mace. 11, 38 ; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 129 f.; Diod. xxxiii. 4.

² 1 Mace. 11, 41 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 133 f.

"Many of the Antiochenes were driven by fear or detestation to quit their native city, and were scattered as wanderers over all Syria, waiting for an occasion against the King."¹

They had not long to wait. Diodotus—we have already become acquainted with him as one of the two men who ruled Antioch under Alexander Balas—read his opportunity in the disaffection of the home-born soldier class to the new *régime*. He probably was in closer touch with that class in that he was a citizen of Apamea, the military centre of the kingdom, having been born at Casiani, a village or small township dependent upon that great city. He had himself risen through the army.² Within a few months of the death of Ptolemy Philometor, Diodotus betook himself to the wilderness, to the chieftain Yamlik, to fetch his old master's son and proclaim him king. The Arab had a conscience as to his trust, and was somewhat suspicious of the Greek intriguer. But at last he consented to put the son of Alexander into Diodotus' hands.³

Diodotus showed himself with the boy in the region of Apamea. Here he proclaimed Antiochus Theos Epiphanes Dionysus king, and he called on the military colonies of the region to join his cause. His headquarters were first at Chaleis toward the wilderness, where the free Arabs, like Yamlik, could give him support from their strongholds. Soon the important town of Larissa, with its population of Thessalian horsemen, the proudest of the home-born troops, joined him. Demetrius—that is, of course, Lasthenes the Cretan—refused at first to regard Diodotus (who now assumed the name of Tryphon) as more than a common bandit, and haughtily sent some soldiers to arrest him. But the court at Antioch had soon so far to lower its dignity as to send a regular general with an army against him. The war went unfavourably for Demetrius. Tryphon got possession of the province of Apamea, with all its royal arsenals and the elephants of war.⁴

¹ Diod. xxxiii. 4.

² 'AXe^dpfyou TIS arpar^ybsy Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 131. That he had been a slave in the royal house, as Appian says (Syr. 68), is almost certainly untrue.

³ 1 Mace. 11, 40; Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 131 f.

⁴ Diod. xxxiii. 4^a; Strabo xvi. 752. The elephants were presumably the African elephants which had belonged to Ptolemy. All the Indian elephants had been houghed by Octavius in 162.

How long it took Tryphon to consolidate his position in the province of Apamea we do not know. But the first proclamation there of Antioehus Dionysus was only a few months after the death of Alexander. Coins are found with the name and childish head of Antioehus which are dated the year 167 aer. Sel., i.e. before October 145. So that it was with this formidable rebellion growing that the atrocities were committed at Antioeh in the name of King Demetrius.

The consequence, of course, was that when Tryphon assailed Antioeh, the city was ready to welcome him with rapture. It had expelled Alexander Balas shortly before, but an experience of Cretan rule had convinced it that King Log was after all preferable to King Stork. So Antioehus VI entered Antioeh in triumph.¹

The possession of Antioeh and Apamea made the cause of Antioehus preponderant in Syria. But Tryphon was not strong enough to drive out the legitimate king altogether. The court of Demetrius was transferred to Seleueia on the coast, where the traditions of loyalty to the rightful line were firmer than at Antioeh, or where they had not perhaps been put to so severe a test.² And again, with two rival kings in the land, a confused civil war went on in the various provinces. It is naturally impossible to say how the two parties lost and gained in its vicissitudes. Roughly speaking, the power of Tryphon seems to have been firm in the Orontes valley from Apamea to Antioeh, the central region, politically, of the kingdom. On the other hand, the outlying provinces—those away from the scene of the Cretan misrule—were faithful, as far as can be traced, to Demetrius. For Cilicia there is the evidence of a coin struck at Mallus, but it is not dated.³ But Tryphon had some footing in Cilicia, since we hear that he made the strong sea-side fortress of Coracesium a base for piratical expeditions against the Syrian coast, that in fact it was from the pirate body at his command that the great pirate power of the next seventy years grew.⁴ All the Syrian coast

¹ 1 Mace. 11, 56 ; Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 144.

² Liv. Epit. lii. ; Wileken, *Hermes*, xxix. p. 436 f. ; Eus. i. 256. In Joseph, xiii. § 145, read **Σελεύκεια** for **ΚΙΧΙΚΛ**.

³ Babelon, p. 119, No. 929

⁴ Strabo xiv. 668. Berytus was temporarily destroyed, Strabo xvi. 755.

from Seleueia to the Lebanon, Demetrius held. We hear of him at Laodicea.¹ The coins prove the continuance of his authority in Tyre and Sidon.² In Mesopotamia and Babylonia³ also we have proof that Demetrius was the recognized king.

In Cœle-Syria, on the other hand, the cause of Antioehus Dionysus prevailed. The Jews had lent their services to Demetrius for slaughtering the Antiochenes, but they were soon discontented when they found he did not remove the garrison from the *akra*. They were ready therefore to respond to the appeal of Tryphon to support the son of their old friend Alexander Balas. In the name of Antioehus, Tryphon sent to Jonathan the crimson robe and golden clasp of the King's Kinsmen, and his brother Simon was made the *strategos* of Antioehus in the whole province "from the Ladder of Tyre to the borders of Egypt," i.e. of Cœle-Syria *without* Phœnicia, which held by Demetrius.⁴

Jonathan now, as the King's man, had royal troops as well as the Jewish levies at his disposal, and he was very active in the cause of Antioehus, moving about from city to city of Cœle-Syria and summoning them to acknowledge the son of Alexander. Gaza offered stubborn resistance, but Demetrius had no means of relieving it, and it succumbed to a siege. Jonathan's operations extended as far as Damascus. The power of Demetrius ceased altogether for a time in the south of the kingdom.⁵

Some collisions took place in Galilee⁶ between Jonathan and the generals of Demetrius, one by the sea of Merom in the plain of Hazor, and another farther north near Hamath, but as we have no account of them except the Jewish one⁷ their true description is unknown.

¹ Diod. xxxiii. 9.

² Babelon, p. 123 f. Coins are struck with the name of Demetrius at Tyre in the years (aer. Sel.) 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173. But there are traces of Tryphon in Aradus and Byblos. Rouvier, *Journ. intern.* 1900, p. 148; 1901, p. 44.

³ See p. 233.

⁴ 1 Mace. 11, 57 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 145 f.

⁵ 1 Mace. 11, 60 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 148 f. Coins of Antioehus are struck at Ptolemaïs in 143-142 B.C. (Babelon, No. 996). But a coin of Demetrius dated 173 (140-139 B.C.) is assigned by Babelon to Gaza (No. 979). If the attribution is right it shows that Gaza at any rate was recaptured by Demetrius.

⁶ Galilee was, of course, at this time a *heathen* district, with no Jewish population or an insignificant one.

⁷ 1 Mace. 11, 63 and 12, 24 f.

But while the Hasmonaeen leaders were warring in the name of King Antioehus, they were improving the occasion for other ends than those for which authority had been lent them. Simon, having compelled the Gentile garrison to withdraw from Beth-sur, replaced it by a Jewish one.¹ He also fortified Adida, which commanded the road from Joppa to the Judaeen upland, as a Jewish stronghold.² In Joppa itself, ostensibly to guard it against being occupied by Demetrius, Simon put a garrison of Jews.³ The blockade of the *akra* was resumed and drawn close. The fortifications of Jerusalem were repaired and strengthened.⁴

At the same time the Jewish community began to act as an independent state toward foreign powers. Jonathan, as High-priest, sent envoys to Rome to regain the patronage which had been momentarily won by Judas in 161. The envoys were also to establish friendly relations between the Jewish state and some of the Greek states, notably Sparta, on their way.⁵

All these proceedings on the part of the Jewish leaders did not naturally find favour at Antioeh. Tryphon, who had risen to power as the representative of a national Greco-Macedonian movement, could hardly show himself less eager than former rulers to vindicate the Macedonian supremacy in Judea. He determined to strike a sudden and stealthy blow before it was too late. He moved with a force to Seythopolis (Beth-shan), and Jonathan came to meet him as a friend with a great following of Jewish troops. Tryphon received him with full honours and persuaded him to dismiss his army and accompany him with a thousand men only to Ptolemaïs. When once the gates of Ptolemaïs had shut upon Jonathan, his thousand men were suddenly massacred and he himself made prisoner.⁶

The news of what had happened caused absolute panic at Jerusalem. But Simon rose to the occasion and caused the people to feel that they had yet a leader left.⁷ Instead, there-

¹ 1 Mace. 11, 65 f.

² *Ibid.* 12, 38.

³ *Ibid.* 12, 33 f.

⁴ *Ibid.* 12, 35 f.

⁵ *Ibid.* 12, 1 f.

⁶ *Ibid.* 12, 39 f.

⁷ According to 1 Mace. 2, 65, Simon had been chief counsellor among the Hasmonaeen brethren from the beginning, the brain of the movement of which Judas had been the arm. Of course, if we accept Niese's view of 1 Mace, this representation of things is to be rejected.

fore, of giving way to despair, the Jews pushed forward the defences of Jerusalem and took strong action at Joppa. It was already held by a Jewish garrison; now the whole population was turned out neck and crop, and their place taken by Jewish families.¹

Tryphon advanced upon Judaea, bringing Jonathan with him. He demanded 100 talents, said to be due from Jonathan in his capacity of royal officer, and his two sons as hostages. Simon, lest his motives should be misconstrued, was obliged to comply. Needless to say, Jonathan was not released. Tryphon did not accomplish the invasion of Judaea. He marched round the upland, while the garrison in the *akra*, now at starvation point, sent him a bitter cry. But the ways were blocked, that on the west by the prudent fortification of Adida, and that on the south, from Adora, by an unusual fall of snow. He drew off to the other side of Jordan, and at Baseama (site unknown) put Jonathan to death. Thence he returned north. "And Simon sent and took the bones of Jonathan his brother, and buried him at Modin, the city of his fathers." The great monument of the Hasmonaeon house there could be descried from the ships at sea.²

In 143-142³ it was given out at Antioch that the young Antiochus had contracted an internal disease which required an operation. It was next declared that the operation had ended fatally. In after days nobody doubted but that Tryphon had tampered with the surgeons and that the boy had been murebred.⁴ His study of the situation in Syria, at any rate, had convinced Tryphon that he might now safely venture on a bolder step than that of removing the child of Alexander Balas; he believed the time was come when *the house of*

¹ 1 Mace. 13, 1-11; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 194.

² *Ibid.* 13, 12 f.; *Ibid.* xiii. § 203 f.

³ Babelon, p. exxxviii.

⁴ Liv. *Epit.* lv.; 1 Mace. 13, 31; A pp. Syr. 68; Just, xxxvi. 1, 7; Diod. xxxiii. 28; Joseph. *Arch.* § 218. The view of Josephus which places the death of Antiochus VI after the capture of Demetrius is disproved by the coins. The statement of Livy (*Epit.* lv.) that Antiochus was ten years old is certainly wrong, since Alexander was not married to Cleopatra till 150, and the boy cannot therefore have been more than seven at the outside. In *Epit.* lii. one reading is "bimulo admodum," according to which Antiochus would be about four at his death.

Seleueus might be set aside. It had—so he read the times—lost its basis in the popular will, the will of the “Macedonian” people of Syria, and that will could now raise another to the place which the degenerate heirs of Seleueus had forfeited. He offered himself as the national king. A decree of the people or of the army¹ was necessary to make his royal authority valid. This he exerted himself by the usual arts of the popular leader to procure, and an assembly at Antioeh or Apamea which purported to be the Macedonian soldier-people elected Tryphon king. It was to be the beginning of new things. In the title of the new monarchy *Autokrator* was added to *Basileus*.² The old era, which dated from the accession of the Seleueid line, was naturally dropped and a new era begun.³ The emblem of King Tryphon was the national helmet of the Macedonians.

But to give respectability in the eyes of the world to a new dynasty, the recognition of Rome was highly desirable. Tryphon thought he had discovered an ingenious means of getting a favourable decree of the Senate. He sent as a present to Rome a golden figure of Victory. The religious Senators would shrink from so ill-omened an action as to reject Victory, even if the splendour of the bribe (for the gold in the statue was equivalent to 10,000 gold pieces of money) did not overcome them. But the Senate was more ingenious than the adventurer. It accepted the gift certainly, but it inscribed as donor, not Tryphon, but the murdered boy-king Antioehus.⁴

In Cœle-Syria the immediate result of Tryphon's action was that the Jews made the final step to practical independence. They had definitely broken with Tryphon at the seizure of Jonathan; the disappearance of the son of Alexander Balas removed the only link which bound them to the cause he represented. Simon sent envoys to effect a reconciliation with Demetrius, and the rival court, glad enough to detach them from Tryphon, was ready to grant anything. In the

¹ “Substitui a populo laboraverat,” Just. xxxvi. 1, 7, τοὺς δὲ φίλους . . . διέπεμπε πρὸς τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἐπαγγελλόμενος αὐτοῖς χρήματα πολλὰ δώσειν εἰ βασιλεῖα χειροτονήσουσιν αὐτόν, Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 219.

² See Appendix Q.

³ The coins.

⁴ Diod. xxxiii. 28^a.

name of King Demetrius peace and a general amnesty were conceded to the Jews, but, more than that, all arrears of taxes were remitted, and for the future the Seleueid renounced any right to claim tax or tribute from the Jewish state. The new fortifications in Judaea were sanctioned. What remained to the Seleueid King of suzerainty was of a very shadowy and indefinite kind.¹

Another province was gone from the kingdom to make an independent state ! The Jews regarded the King's rescript as the beginning of freedom. " The yoke of the heathen was taken away from Israel"—the yoke that had been upon their necks since Josiah fell at Megiddo 466 years before. Jerusalem began a new era, and documents were dated " In the Year *One*, Simon being High-priest and General and Ruler of the Jews."² In the following year (171 aer. Sel. = 142-141 B.C.) the garrison in the *akra*, decimated by famine, at last surrendered. On the 23rd of Ijjar (May) 141 the victorious nationalists entered " with praise and palm branches and with harps and with cymbals and with viols and with hymns and with songs." Even before the citadel fell, the fate of Joppa had overtaken Gazara (Gezer), another place which commanded the approaches of Judaea on the west. Simon made a triumphal entry, with hymns to the One God. The houses of the idols were cleansed, and the heathen population expelled to make room for the " keepers of the Law." John, the son of Simon, who was given the post of commander of the forces, had Gazara for his headquarters.⁸

In 140 a surprising departure was taken by Demetrius. He had then, perhaps, reached the age of twenty, and was old enough for his own personality to assert itself in distinction from the ministers who had given his reign such a bad name.⁴ And now, while the central region of Syria was held by a rival king, Demetrius set out to recover the lost provinces of the East from the Parthian!

In the East, as Antioehus the Great King had found, and as Antioehus IV had hoped to find, lay fresh sources of

¹ 1 Mace. 13, 34 f.

² *Ibid.*, 13, 41 f.

³ *Ibid.* 13, 43 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 215 f.

⁴ See Appendix R.

strength and replenishment when those in the West were failing. There the supremacy of the house of Seleueus was grounded firmly in the hearts of the Greek and Macedonian population. To that quarter it would be of no use for the upstart Tryphon to appeal. But possessed of these resources, the Seleueid King might turn and overwhelm the adventurer who had risen up in the West. Something of this sort must have been the rationale of the bold move of Demetrius.

Demetrius had not to appeal to the eastern Greeks; it was they who appealed to him. Men from the distant provinces were constantly arriving at the court on the Mediterranean coast, all carrying the same cry from their countrymen, all telling the same story of hatred to the barbarian conqueror, of impatience to see the banners of the old house, of readiness to rally to its cause. The young man, lately become his own master, saw visions of military glory, of assured conquest, of renewed empire, and exhaustless treasuries.¹

Accordingly in 140 Demetrius set out for the East. During his absence the war in Syria against Tryphon was to be prosecuted by his generals. Queen Cleopatra was left at Seleueia under the protection of Aesehrion.² At an earlier stage it might have been unsafe to leave that strong-willed woman to her own devices, it might have been questionable whether she would not prefer the cause of her son to that of a husband united to her by a loveless political marriage. Now Tryphon was not only her husband's enemy, but her son's murderer.

How far the Parthian conquests extended when Demetrius II moved to the East may be matter of doubt. Mesopotamia we know was his; it was held for him by Dionysius the Mede.³ Babylonia is proved by a cuneiform inscription to have been his in 144.⁴ But if the phraseology of our

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 184 f. ² Diod. xxxiii. 28. ³ *Ibid.* xxxiii. 28.

⁴ *Zeitschr. f. Assyriol.* viii. (1893), p. 111. An inscription published by Kugler in the *Zeitschr.* xv. (1901), p. 192, is dated in the third year of Ni-i-ka-a. . . . This Kugler takes to be the beginning of *Nieator*. One would like to be assured that this is certain. No other cuneiform tablet, as far as I know, gives the *surname* of the king, or dates from his accession instead of from the Seleueid era. If the tablet really belongs to the third year of Demetrius II, it proves that Babylon was his as late as 143-142.

inferior sources can be pressed, Babylonia had in the interval between that date and the expedition of Demetrius been conquered by the Parthians.¹

Of course, if Babylonia had really been conquered, Media must have been conquered first. But as to Media we have no direct evidence.²

The Arsaeid throne was still held by the able prince Mithridates I, against whom Antiochus Epiphanes had marched a quarter of a century before. Since then Mithridates had extended the Parthian power on the East at the expense of the Greek dynasties of Baetria.³

Demetrius crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia and marched on Babylonia. His appearance in the East was the signal for a great rising, and he was received with enthusiasm wherever he came. Not only the Greeks of the Babylonian and the Median provinces rose, but all who felt menaced by the growing Parthian power were ready to make common cause with him—the Baetrian kings, the little kings in the mountains of Kurdistan, the new principality in Persis (mod. Ears). In a series of battles Demetrius defeated and drove back the armies of Mithridates. But when all seemed to promise fair, the successes of Demetrius came to a sudden end. By a treacherous peace (if our account can be trusted) the Parthians contrived to lay hold of his person. Demetrius became a prisoner; his great army disappeared.⁴

The captive Seleueid was shown publicly in the cities under Parthian sway to teach the Greeks in whom they had trusted. But this lesson taught, Mithridates did not use his prisoner ill. Demetrius was conveyed to Hyreania, a favourite residence of the Arsaeid court, and, while closely guarded, was given the attendance and consideration which befitted his rank.⁵

The Parthians were soon after this masters in Babylon.⁶

And now that Demetrius was gone, Tryphon seemed to

¹ *στρατεύσας δὲ ἐπ' Ἀρσάκης εἰς Βαβυλῶνα*, Eus. i. p. 256.

² See Appendix S.

³ Justin xli. 6, 1 f.

⁴ Joseph. *Arch.* § 184 f.; Just, xxxvi. 1, 8 f.

⁵ Just. xxxvi. 1, 5 f.

⁶ An inscription of the year 174 (April 138-April 137 B.C.) gives Arsaees as the king, *Zeitschr. f. Assyriol.* viii. (1893), p. 111.

command the situation in Syria. He spurned, we are told, the arts of conciliation by which he had mounted. Probably he had also underestimated the hold which, in spite of everything, the Seleueid name had upon the Macedonians of Asia. His soldiers deserted in numbers to the legitimate side; Seleueia lay only some twelve miles from Antioeh.¹

Of the war, as it went on during those days, we know only one incident. Sarpedon, one of the generals of Demetrius, made an attempt to wrest the city of Ptolemaïs from Tryphon, but was defeated and compelled to retire. After the victory the soldiers of Tryphon were marching along the shore, when they were overtaken by an enormous wave and drowned. The wave also deposited a quantity of fish, so that when the forces of Sarpedon returned, they found dead men and fish in mingled heaps. "The corpses of their enemies were a pleasant sight, and they carried away great abundance of fish. They sacrificed to Posidon Tropaios in the suburbs of the city."²

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 220 f.

² Posidonius ap. Athen. viii. 333 b = frag. 10 *F.H.G.* iii. p. 254; Strabo xvi. 758.

CHAPTER XXX

ANTIOCHUS SIDETES

THE tedious circle in which the later history of the Seleucid kingdom runs—the rival claimant ousting the King in possession by the favour of the army and people, then making himself unpopular, and being in turn ousted by the oscillation of the people's favour to another claimant—was about to fulfil itself in the case of Tryphon.

But the new claimant was not a man like the other ineffectual personalities who flit across the stage in that time of ruin and confusion. One more man capable of rule and of great action, one more luminous figure, the house which had borne the empire of Asia had to show the world before it went out into darkness.

Antiochus, the younger surviving son of Demetrius I, had grown up in the Pamphylian city of Side.¹ Its people were among the boldest seafarers of that coast; their naval contingent had formed a principal element in the fleet of Antiochus the Great King.² And that the seafaring tradition was maintained is shown by the fact that in the last century B.C. the people of Side were prominent among the pirates, and Side was a great pirate stronghold and mart.³ It was in close touch with the hill-peoples behind, who, as we have seen, were ready to join any adventure which promised fighting and loot. Such an environment might not be an ideal one for the education of a prince, but it was incomparably better than a Syrian palace, and wild seafaring men were better comrades than eunuchs and panders.

¹ Eus. i. p. 255.

² Liv. xxxv. 48, 6.

³ Strabo xiv. 664.

The young prince, now about twenty,¹ was in Rhodes when the news that his brother was a captive in Iran reached him.² He at once made ready to step into the breach and rescue the heritage of his house from strangers. The mercenaries were got together and a fleet, prepared no doubt in the docks of Side. He sent letters to the various communities of Syria announcing his purpose, and summoning them to give him their allegiance. If the document in the Book of the Maccabees can be trusted, he already assumed in these letters the title of king.³ But the coast cities of Cœle-Syria, overawed by the garrisons of Tryphon, refused to open to him.⁴ Nor does he seem to have anticipated a favourable reception in those which acknowledged Demetrius.⁵

But it was impossible for the party of the legitimate house to continue the struggle against Tryphon without a head. Even at Seleueia there was a movement to deliver up the city to Tryphon. The councillors of Queen Cleopatra at last told her that there was no course left but to call in Antioehus to take the place of Demetrius, both as king and as her (third) husband. Thus was entrance into the kingdom opened for Antioehus. He arrived at Seleueia in 138,⁶ married Cleopatra and assumed the diadem as King Antioehus Euergetes.⁷

Antioehus was in Seleueia! At the tidings the star of Tryphon finally declined. Another king of the old house, whose record was as yet unstained, of whom men might hope anything—the news awoke all the old loyalty, and the soldiery

¹ Wilcken calls him sixteen (*Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2478). Since, however, he has just given 164 as the year of his birth, sixteen is either a slip in arithmetic or a misprint for twenty-six. But the year 164 cannot have been that of his birth (see p. 232, with Appendix R).

² App. Syr. 68.

³ 1 Mace. 15, 1 f.

⁴ Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 222.

⁵ Else why should he not simply have landed at Seleueia or in one of the Phœnician ports?

⁶ 1 Mace. 15, 10; Joseph. Arch. § 222. Coins are struck in the name of Demetrius in 173 aer. Sel. = 140-139 B.C., at Tyre and Gaza (Babelon, p. 127), in that of Antioehus at Tyre in 174 aer. Sel. = 139-138 B.C. (*ibid.* p. 137 f.).

⁷ *Sidetes* is, of course, only his popular nickname. Perhaps it is hardly necessary to say that such nicknames must be distinguished from the official surnames, but a general reader may be confused from the fact that by common practice in modern books some of the kings are described by their official surnames and some by their nicknames.

upon whom Tryphon relied were soon flocking to Seleueia. Tryphon was left with only a remnant. He was rapidly driven from northern Syria, and Antioehus entered the capital.¹

Tryphon fell back upon the southern coast, the region with which his relations, like those of Alexander Balas, had been close,² and shut himself in the strong town of Dora. Antioehus pressed his flight³ and invested the place both by sea and land. At last, reduced to extremities, Tryphon slipped out of the harbour in a boat and reached Ptolemaïs.⁴ But it was not safe apparently for him to stay there, for he went on to Orthosia,⁵ and thence crossing the hills into the Orontes valley, made his last stand in the place where he had been bred and had first built up his power, Apamea. In some fortress of that region he was again besieged and finally captured. Antioehus would not, of course, allow him to live, but he permitted him to be his own executioner.⁶ With the disappearance of Tryphon there were none left to claim the Syrian throne but the children of Demetrius Soter.

The vigorous spirit and the ability of his father had been inherited by Antioehus "of Side." He addressed himself with success to remedy the frightful disorganization which the double kingship had produced in Syria. Communities which had broken away from all superior authority were taught that they were once more members of a kingdom. Among such communities was the Jewish state.⁷

Already while Antioehus was sitting before Dora there were ominous signs of his intention to regulate this quarter of the kingdom. The immunity and internal freedom conceded to the Jews he did not revoke, but he could not pass over the complaints brought him by those who had been driven from their homes or subjected to forced contributions by the Jewish bands in the regions round Judaea, nor the seizure of places

¹ 1 Mace. 15, 10; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 223.

² Asealon seems to have been the chief minting-place of Tryphon at the end of his reign, Babelon, p. 137.

³ A story is told in Frontin ii. 13, 2, that Tryphon on some occasion delayed the pursuit of Antioehus by scattering money behind him.

⁴ Charax, frag. 40 (*F.H.G.* iii. p. 644).

⁵ 1 Mace. 15, 37.

⁶ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 224; Strabo xiv. 668.

⁷ Just, xxxvi. 1, 9.

beyond the Jewish border, such as Gazara and Joppa. For the injury done to his subjects he demanded from Simon an indemnity of 500 talents, and for the places he had seized 500 talents more—a perfectly rational and, as far as we can judge, moderate demand.

Athenobius, one of the Friends, was sent to convey the King's requisition to the High-priest. Simon, according to the custom of the East, tried to bargain, and started low down with the offer of 100 talents. But the King's officer had had an opportunity to observe the great wealth already accumulated by the ruling family of the Jews, and he met Simon's attempt to bargain with stony silence.¹

Antioehus, on receiving his report, instructed Cendebaeus, the governor of the Philistine coast,² to apply force. He himself was occupied for the time with the pursuit of Tryphon. But the attempts of Cendebaeus to enter Judaea were unfortunate. Simon was now too old to take the field in person, but his sons, Judas and John, commanded the Jewish forces and drove Cendebaeus back into the plain.³

As soon as Antioehus had settled more pressing concerns he himself undertook the reduction of the Jews to order. This was not till the fourth year of his reign (in the spring or summer of 134).⁴ By then the last of the brethren of Judas was no more. Simon had ended his life a year before (February 135) by a family tragedy. His son-in-law, Ptolemy the son of Abub, designing to secure the first place in the Jewish state for himself, had invited Simon to a carousal in the fortress of Dok, and then fallen upon the old warrior while he was in his cups. But Ptolemy's design failed owing to the promptitude of John, the son of Simon, who at the time of the murder was in Gazara.⁵ Before Ptolemy could seize Jerusalem, John was already there installed in the room of his

¹ 1 Mace. 15, 26 f.

² ἐπιστράτηγον (or, according to another reading, στρατηγὸν) τῆς παραλίας, 1 Mace. 15, 38. The Greek of 1 Mace. does not give the officials' titles with exactness, and we do not therefore know whether Cendebaeus was *strategos* of all Cœle-Syria or commanded in one district of it only.

³ 1 Mace. 15, 38 f.

⁴ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 236. See Schürer, i. p. 259, note 5.

⁵ 1 Mace. 16, 1 f.

father as High-priest and head of the state.¹ It was in the first year of John, surnamed Hyrcanus, that Antioehus took the subjugation of Judaea in hand.

The King came with a strength sufficient for the task before him. He had a just appreciation of the mixture of force and conciliation required to meet the case. To put down the religion of Israel, to trample upon Jewish prejudice were ideas that he was too good a statesman to entertain. But till the supremacy of the Seleucid government had been asserted there could be no talk of compromise, and Antioehus, when he struck, struck home. The Jewish forces were driven from the field into Jerusalem and a business-like siege of the city begun. Seven camps hemmed it in. The pinch of famine was soon felt, and Hyrcanus was embarrassed by the great population of non-combatants. He tried to expel them, but they were not allowed to pass the besiegers' lines, so that they wandered starving under the walls of the city. The feeling which the spectacle awoke in the city overbore the plans of Hyrcanus, and when the Feast of Tabernacles (October 132 ?) came round, he was compelled to receive the miserable people back. Antioehus showed his conciliatory spirit by granting a truce during the sacred season. He even sent in on his own account a splendid offering of victims and incense to the Temple. This wise consideration on the point where the Jews were most sensitive effected as much as his victorious arms. Hyrcanus sent to ask for terms. The short-sighted councillors of the King now urged him to follow the policy of his great-uncle Antioehus and break down Jewish exclusiveness by the forcible violation of its sanctities. Now that the Jewish state was at his feet, let him take the opportunity to make away with it once and for ever. The character of Antioehus VII emerged above the influences which surrounded him. He would not even attempt to re-impose the financial burdens, whose remittance he had promised, before coming into the kingdom, to confirm, or interfere with the internal affairs of the Jews. But he insisted that the besieged should surrender their arms, that a rent or tribute should be paid for the places occupied by the Jews outside Judaea, like Joppa

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 229.

and Gazara, and that the city should admit a garrison. To this last condition, however, the Jews showed such repugnance that Antioehus accepted their alternative proposal that they should pay 500 talents of silver and give hostages, amongst whom was to be the brother of Hyreanus himself. Antioehus also, before he retired, saw the strong ring-wall built by the Hasmonaeans around Jerusalem pulled down (132).¹

Antioehus had attained a satisfactory result with the minimum of irritation. Respect had been won for the Seleucid power and the Jewish state rendered inoffensive, whilst its religious and internal liberty was left unimpaired. It is a remarkable testimony to the greatness of Antioehus as a statesman that he, the very prince who broke the Jewish power and took Jerusalem, should have got from the Jews the surname of *Eusebes*, the Pious.²

It is regrettable that we cannot trace the reorganizing and adjusting work of Antioehus in the other provinces of the kingdom besides Judaea. Now those who had been true to the house of Seleucus in the day of adversity received their reward. Seleucia, the faithful city, appears as "sacrosanct and inviolable" (*ἱερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος*) from the accession of Antiochus VII.³

About 134 the ambassadors of Antioehus were in Rome. It is recorded that they were charged with splendid presents for Scipio Aemilianus, who was then besieging Numantia in Spain, presents which, instead of receiving in secret, as other Senators did in like cases, he publicly made over to the state.⁴

In 130⁵ Antioehus considered that the reorganization of Seleucid rule in Syria was sufficiently complete for him to take in hand the recovery of the Eastern provinces.

Demetrius was still a captive at the Parthian court in Hyrcania. He had become more or less transformed into a Parthian prince. His beard had been allowed to grow, as the fashion was among barbarian kings. Mithridates had even,

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 237 f. ; Diod. xxxiv. 1 ; Just. xxxvi. 1, 10 ; Eus. i. p. 255.

² Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 244.

³ Wilcken, *Hermes*, xxix. (1894), p. 442.

⁴ Liv. *Epit.* lvii.

⁵ *Ibid.* lix. ; Julius Obsequens 28 ; Oros. v. 10, 4. See Babelon, p. cxl., cxlv.

before he died in 138, caused him to establish a new household, and had given him his own daughter Rhodogune for wife; he used to talk to his captive about one day driving out Tryphon by the Parthian arms and restoring Demetrius to his throne. We are already familiar with such promises given to an exiled king, and know in what sense they were intended to be carried out. Mithridates was succeeded by his son Phraates II. After this Demetrius made attempts to escape. He was helped by the most faithful of his friends, a certain Callimander, whom, when he went to the East, he had left behind in Syria. When later on the news came of his capture, Callimander resolved, however difficult it might be, to join him. He had found some Arabs willing to conduct him for a sum of money to Babylon by the desert tracks, and when the party arrived in Babylon, Callimander was disguised as a Parthian. Thence he had made his way to Hyreania and revealed himself to Demetrius. His experience on this adventurous journey he thought to turn to account by making it, together with Demetrius, in the reverse sense. The two set out, but before reaching the frontier they were headed off by the horsemen sent in pursuit and brought back to the Parthian king's presence. For Callimander, Phraates had nothing but praise, and he rewarded so signal an instance of fidelity substantially; but Demetrius he reprimanded severely, and sent him back to his Parthian wife. His confinement was made stricter. When, however, Rhodogune had borne him children he was thought to be rooted, and the guard was relaxed. But again Demetrius made the attempt with Callimander, and again they were dragged back from the frontier. Phraates sent Demetrius in mockery the present of some golden dice, to give interest to a life which he apparently felt irksome. But Demetrius' possible usefulness as a tool in Syria preserved him from worse treatment.¹

Whatever the intentions of Antiochus with regard to his brother may have been, it was of prime necessity to get him out of the Parthians' hands. He set out with an army of 80,000, drawn in great part from Syria itself—a visible sign and outcome of its restored unity. Even the Jews furnished their contingent, commanded by the High-priest Hyreanus

¹ Just. xxxviii. 9; App. Syr. 67.

himself.¹ The army, according to the bad custom of the East, was accompanied by women and children of the royal house: Antioehus had at any rate his young son Seleueus with him in 129, and a daughter of Demetrius.²

The appearance of Antioehus proved, as that of Demetrius had done, a signal for all the discontented elements under Parthian supremacy to rally. Petty kings and chieftains with their various followers continually arrived in his camp, eager to range themselves against the house of Arsaees. Antioehus seems to have encountered opposition at an earlier stage than Demetrius. Three battles had to be fought before he was master of Babylonia.³ In one of them he defeated the Parthian general Indates on the river Lyeus⁴ (mod. Greater Zâb)—the region where Alexander had won his crowning victory at Gaugamela over the Persians. The Parthians evacuated Babylonia, and their general Enius—the Parthian satrap presumably of Babylonia—found a frightful end at the hands of the people of Seleueia.⁵ Antioehus pressed the enemy's retreat into Iran. Instantly the rebellion against their rule became universal. When the winter of 130 closed in, Nearer Iran had once more been joined to the Seleueid kingdom. The Arsaeid dominion, which was in fact mere military occupation, had ceased, except in the northern valleys which constituted Parthia. A greater result could not possibly have been desired for the first campaign.⁶ Antioehus, as conqueror of the East, began to be styled, like his ancestor, Great King.⁷

But what the campaign had achieved the winter rest was fated to undo. The problem of housing and feeding the great army and its still greater following during the winter months was no doubt a difficult one. Antioehus adopted the expedient of quartering his troops in dispersed bodies on the several cities. It was to put too great a strain upon their loyalty. One of his generals, Athenaeus, aggravated the burden by wanton annoyances.⁸ The adherence of the Greek cities had

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 250 f.

² See page 245.

³ Just. xxxviii. 10, 5 f.

⁴ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 251.

⁵ Diod. xxxiv. 19.

⁶ Just. xxxviii. 10, 6.

⁷ Michel, No. 1158 ; ef. "*magnus haberi cœpit*," Just. xxxviii. 10, 6.

⁸ Just. xxxviii. 10, 8; Diod. xxxiv. 17, 2,

given Antioehus his advantage; their alienation turned the scale against him.

The spring of 129—the Median spring with its transitory burst of greenness and beauty—opened under clouded circumstances for Antioehus. Phraates understood that the position of the conqueror had changed for the worse, and tried negotiation. But Antioehus had come to restore the Empire, and he would entertain no terms which did not make Arsaees tributary. His authority in Parthia Antioehus would allow Phraates to retain, but he was immovable on the three conditions—(1) that the Arsaeid king must abandon everything outside Parthia; (2) that he must pay a regular tribute; and (3) deliver up Demetrius. Phraates threw up the negotiations and prepared to renew the fight. That, in spite of the change of mood in the cities, he felt the conflict a redoubtable one, is shown by the fact that in order to raise complications for Antioehus in the rear, he let so valuable a tool as Demetrius go. Demetrius was sent westward with a Parthian escort to re-establish himself in Syria.¹

Before the army of Antioehus was concentrated for the new campaign, Phraates dealt his blow. The scattered detachments were suddenly and simultaneously attacked by the population of the various Median cities. It was a plan arranged by the secret agents of Phraates. When the intelligence was carried to Antioehus—living too jovially, one fears, in the palace of Eebatana—he hastened out with the troops he had by him to support the nearest of the bodies attacked. The confused fighting which followed we cannot trace, but the last scene can be reconstructed. It was in some place near the hills that Antioehus, marching along with his own column, became aware that the main Parthian army, commanded by Phraates himself, was coming down upon him. His staff besought him not to risk an engagement; the Parthians had only to withdraw into the steep places behind them to baffle the Syrian cavalry. But Antioehus would not hear of retiring. Were the Macedonians to show weakness in the face of barbarians whom they had beaten again and again? He ordered a stand. The Parthians came on and closed, and Antioehus

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 15; Just. xxxviii. 10, 7; App. Syr. 68.

fought where the fight was hottest. Presently the barbarians gave back into the hills. Antioehus and the Syrians imprudently followed. They found themselves caught in a narrow gully. Athenaeus, the general who had vexed the Greek cities, was the first to flee, and the panic was infectious. Antioehus was left almost alone, and he saw that the end of all his ambitions was come. But it was only the dead body of the Great King of which the Arsaeid was allowed to become master.¹

The great army which Antioehus had brought to the East was made captive. How much of it survived to become the slaves of the Parthian we do not know. We are only told of the fate of the traitor Athenaeus. He came as a starving fugitive to those villages which he had afflicted in the day of his authority. No one would now receive him or give him a morsel to eat, and he died outcast by the wayside.² Phraates also got possession of those members of the royal house who had come in Antioehus' company. But to offer indignity to the imperial house of the East would not have been according to the Parthian king's view of what was fitting. The body of Antioehus he had treated with all possible honour. The son of Antioehus, the boy Seleueus, was brought up at the Parthian court as a son of kings.³ The daughter of Demetrius was taken into the royal harem.⁴

But the generosity of Phraates, shown as that of a king to kings, did not extend to those whom he held rebellious subjects. He remembered against the city of Seleueia what it had done to his officer. "When it sent envoys to implore forgiveness, they were taken to a place where an eyeless man was sitting upon the ground. He was a Greek, perhaps a Seleueian, on whom the Parthian government had set the mark of its displeasure. The envoys were ordered to go and tell the Seleucians what happened to rebels.⁶ We hear of the city soon after suffering days of horror under the rod of Himeros or Euemerus, a vile favourite of Phraates, to whom

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 15 f.; Just. xxxviii. 10, 9 f.; Eus. i. 255; Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 253; App. Syr. 68.

² Diod. xxxiv. 17, 2.

³ Eus. i. p. 257. This young Seleueus is generally thought to be intended in Posidonius, frag. 19, *F.H.G.* iii. p. 258.

⁴ Just. xxxviii. 10, 10.

⁵ Diod. xxxiv. 19.

he delivered the kingdom during his expedition against the Scythians. The Greek cities had cause to regret their desertion of Antioehus.¹

In Antioehus Sidetes it was not only an individual who perished. It was the death-blow of the Seleueid dynasty. The last great king of that house was gone; for the last time it had stood before the world as the imperial house of the East. It had no more revivals. And the last real king whom it produced embodied in a striking way the typical qualities of his race—impulsive energy, a high and generous courage, the old Macedonian delight in wassailing and war. Like his predecessors, Antioehus VII drank freely in his convivial hours. “Boldness and wine,” Phraates is recorded to have said, “these, Antioehus, were thy destruction! Thou didst think to drink up the kingdom of Arsaees in thy large cups.”² But his success in dealing with the Jews—the only case where we can observe his political action—seems to argue a degree of adroit statesmanship more than belonged to the majority, if to any, of his predecessors. On the other hand, it is perhaps characteristic of the history of his house that its ultimate fall was due to neglect of the dull work of organizing the winter quarters and commissariat of troops which on the field of battle the king would lead with such splendid *dan*. Here we perhaps touch the weakness which rendered so much of the brilliant ability of Antioehus VII, so much of the shining qualities of the Seleueid dynasty as a whole, ultimately frustrate.

¹ Just. xlii. 1, 3; Diod. xxxiv. 21; Posidonius, frag. 21 (*F.H.G.* iii. p. 259); Trog. *Prol* xlii.

² Athen. x. 439 c.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE LAST CONVULSIONS

His victory made the Parthian king sorry that he had let Demetrius go, and horsemen were sent in desperate pursuit to overtake him, but Demetrius was already beyond the reach of his arm.¹ Phraates meditated an instant move upon Syria itself before the new government was established. Had he carried it out, the Parthian dominion might have touched the Mediterranean within the next year. But a mutiny of his Scythian mercenaries—hordes from the steppes of Central Asia—made him instead march east. What remained of the army of Antioehus was compelled to go along with him, but they only waited for the battle with the Scythians to turn their swords against the Parthian, and by the irony of fate the army which Antioehus had led against Phraates did thus in the end destroy him.²

To the Syrian cities the disaster in the East came as an appalling calamity. It was not only to the Greco-Macedonian population a national humiliation. There was hardly a house without its private bereavement, for nearly 300,000 men were taken away at a blow. Antioeh was filled with the noise of women's lamentation. For days it was given up to mourning.³

Nor was there anything about Demetrius to console the people of Syria for the loss of the well-beloved Antioehus—this foreign figure with the long beard and the manners of a Parthian. With how much affection Cleopatra returned to her former husband the event shows. The second surviving son of

¹ Just. xxxviii. 10, 11.

² Just. xlii. 1; Diod. xxxiv. 18.

³ *Ibid.* xxxix. 1, 1; Diod. xxxiv. 17.

Antioehus VII,¹ called also Antioehus, she sent hurriedly out of the country under the charge of the eunuch Craterus to be reared in Cyzicus, at the other end of Asia Minor.²

Demetrius in his former reign had been in leading-strings. He had now an opportunity of showing his true quality. The thing most needful for Syria was a period of absolute rest, a time for recuperation, for filling the empty places of 300,000 men. No sooner, however, was Demetrius in the seat than he was elaborating plans for the conquest of Egypt! His mother-in-law, Queen Cleopatra of Egypt,⁸ had come to Syria, driven out of Egypt by her brother, Ptolemy Euergetes. She now urged Demetrius to restore her, and promised him that, if he did so, he would certainly add Egypt to his dominions.⁴ Demetrius actually marched out to do so, but he got no farther than Pelusium, for there his way was barred by the forces of Euergetes, and Syria, the moment his back was turned, sprang into insurrection behind him. Antioeh and Apamea had already renounced Demetrius—the same regions which had before broken away under Tryphon.⁵ The disaffection was found to extend to the army which Demetrius had with him.⁶ He was obliged to turn back to restore order in his own kingdom.

Nothing save the rival claimant was wanting to complete the situation; but negotiations on this subject had already passed between Antioeh and the king of Egypt. Euergetes

¹ He had five children by Cleopatra; two daughters, both called Laodice, and an elder Antioehus died young; two sons survived, Seleucus, whom Phraates had captured, and this Antioehus, Eus. i. p. 257.

² Eus. i. p. 257; App. Syr. 68; Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 271. At Delos the base of a statue of this Craterus has been found; he is described as *Τῷ Θεῷ Ἀντίχου Φιλοπάτορος, τῶν πρώτων φίλων βασιλέως Ἀντίχου καὶ ἀρχίατρος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος τῆς βασιλίσσης*, Michel, No. 1158.

³ It is difficult to know how to express the horrible tangle of Ptolemaic relations in the ordinary terms of affinity. This was Cleopatra II, the daughter of Ptolemy Epiphanes and the Seleucid Cleopatra (I). By her elder brother, Ptolemy Philometor, she was the mother of Queen Cleopatra of Syria and of Cleopatra III. She was now officially the wife of her second brother, Ptolemy Euergetes; but Euergetes had also married her daughter, Cleopatra III.

⁴ Just. xxxix. 1, 2.

⁵ The phraseology of Justin xxxix. 1, 3, can only mean that on this occasion, too, the leader of the rebellion was called Tryphon, but one suspects a confusion with the former rebellion.

⁶ Eus. i. p. 257.

was only too willing to put in a creature of his own, to counteract the machinations of his sister in Syria. He chose a youth who was given out to be of the Seleueid stock¹ and the adopted son of the beloved Antioehus: he was really, according to the hostile account, the son of Protarehus, some Egyptian Greek of the commercial class.² He was accepted by Antioeh, and installed with the support of an Egyptian force as King Alexander. The people added the nickname, derived from the native Aramaic, of Zabinas, the "Bought-one."³ The situation was once more very much what it had been before the captivity of Demetrius, the legitimate king holding the coast, with his base at Seleueia, and the usurper holding Antioeh and the middle Orontes. But although the Jews were adherents of Alexander, he was not so strong in Cœle-Syria as Tryphon had been. Ptolemaïs, for instance, Demetrius retained.

In Judaea, of course, the work of Antioehus VII was immediately undone by his death. Hyrcanus had returned to Jerusalem before the fatal spring of 129. When the news of the catastrophe came he once more felt himself an independent prince, and resumed the schemes of aggrandizement which the Hasmonaeans, their independence once secured, had come to form. He pushed out the frontiers of the Jewish state in all directions, across Jordan by conquering from the Nabataeans the plateau north of the Arnon dominated by Medeba, in central Palestine at the expense of Samaria, taking even the rival sanctuary on Mount Gerizim, whilst in Idumaea he not only seized fresh territory, but compelled the conquered to embrace Judaism or go. It was the beginning of that expansion of Israel over Palestine by forcible proselytism which was one of the great works of the Hasmonaeian princes.⁴

The decisive battle between Demetrius II and Alexander

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 267.

² The statement of Eus. i. p. 257, that he was represented as the son of *Alexander Balas*, is probably a confusion.

³ In Aramaic ~~ܙܒܝܢܐ~~. The Greek form, Zabinas (Diod., Eus.), is attested by an inscription. Letronne, *Recueil des Inscriptions grecques de l'Égypte*, ii. p. 61. In Josephus it is Zebinas. The form given by Trogu, Zabbinaeus, seems a corruption. See Appendix Z.

⁴ Joseph. *Arch.* xii. § 254.

Zabinas was fought near Damascus—on one of the roads of communication between the Orontes valley, where Alexander was established, and Cœle-Syria, which seems still to have been held (so far as it was not independent) by Demetrius. Demetrius was badly beaten and retreated to Ptolemaïs, where he had left Cleopatra and his children. But Cleopatra had had enough of him, and shut the gates in his face. The Seleucid King found himself an outcast in Syria, not even his life safe. He designed to take sanctuary in the temple of Heracles (Melkarth) at Tyre, but while on board a ship in the harbour of Tyre he was cut down by order of the governor of the city. It is almost certain that the governor was himself acting on the directions of Queen Cleopatra¹ (126-125).²

She had lost all patience with the wretched creature under whom the Seleucid kingdom was going to pieces. She herself was the daughter of Ptolemy Philometor and had in her the blood of the Seleueids, and among the crowd of ineapables she aspired to take the power into her own hands. Seleueus, the elder of her two sons by Demetrius, assumed the diadem on his father's death without bowing to her superior authority, and she had him promptly assassinated.³ From her girlhood she had been treated as a thing whose heart did not come into consideration, a mere piece in the political game. What wonder that she became a politician whose heart was dead?

Whether she reigned for any time in her own name alone we do not know.⁴ But before many months at any rate from the death of Demetrius were elapsed she had associated with herself the second of the sons of Demetrius, Antioehus, nicknamed Grypos, the "Hook-nosed," who had been educated at Athens.⁵ His functions, of course, were to be purely subordinate. His name and hers appear together on the coins, and

¹ App. Syr. 68 ; Eus. i. p. 257 ; Just. xxxix. 1, 7 ; Joseph. xiii. § 268.

² Babelon, pp. cxlv., cliii.

³ App. Syr. 69 ; Eus. i. p. 257 ; Just. xxxix. 1, 9 ; Liv. Epit. lx.

⁴ Tetradraehms are found which bear her name and effigy alone, and are dated the same year as the last coins of Demetrius II (187 aer. Sel. = 126-125 B.C.). She appears as **Βασίλισσα Κλεοπάτρα Θεᾷ Εὐεργετία.**

⁵ App. Syr. 68.

her head is sometimes placed with his, and *in front*¹ Antiochus VIII was at this time about sixteen years old.²

The war between the legitimate house and Alexander went on. And, like these later Seleucid wars as a whole, it was complicated with the family wars of the house of Ptolemy. In both kingdoms, the last survivors of the Macedonian monarchies, the same disease of family strife was working doom. Alexander had been the tool of Euergetes, but after the death of Demetrius, Euergetes was reconciled with his sister Cleopatra, and allied himself with Cleopatra of Syria. He sent his daughter Tryphaena to be the young Antiochus' wife, and supported the legitimate house with his own troops.⁸

That Alexander's power after the death of Demetrius extended beyond the Orontes valley is shown by the coins struck for him between 126 and 123 in Asealon.⁴ We hear of his capturing a Laodicea,⁵ and this may be Laodicea-Berytus, of which coins are found with his name.⁶

Alexander Zabinas was a jovial, easy-going youth, the sort of king sure to be popular in the streets of Antioch.⁷ There is a kind of happy *gamin* impudence in the face which appears on his coins. Soon after his entry into Antioch the body of Antiochus Sidetes was sent home by the Parthian king in a silver coffin. It was received in the cities through which it passed with marks of impassioned affection. Alexander sought to give credit to his impersonation by paying it ostentatious honour. The tears which he shed over it publicly much edified the Antiochene people.⁸

The establishment of Alexander Zabinas (129-128) was a fresh blow to the unity of the Seleucid kingdom. The line of Seleucus was indeed fallen from its high estate. Sixty years before, the battle of Magnesia had reduced the heirs of Seleucus from being practically emperors of the East to being kings of Syria. The battle in Media left them not even that. They were now mere captains of mercenary bands, who, in the anarchy to which the East was fallen, were one moment

¹ Babelon, p. cliii. See Appendix T.

² Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 365.

³ Just. xxxix. 2, 1 f.

⁴ Babelon, p. cl.

⁵ Diod. xxxiv. 22.

⁶ Babelon, p. cli.; Rouvier, *Journ. intern. d'arch. numism.* iii. (1900), p. 269.

⁷ Diod. xxxiv. 22.

⁸ Just. xxxix. 1, 6.

strong enough to keep a prodigal court in one of the ancestral palaces and to devour some part of the country, and the next moment were wandering over-seas to get together new bands of desperados. They were fighters to the end; in the ceaseless battles of the rival claimants the remnant of that energy which had once governed Asia frittered itself away. And the inheritance over which they fought naturally itself dwindled in the process. All who were strong enough broke away from connexion with any part of the kingdom, and in the absence of any one central authority, the cities¹ and the numberless local tyrants came more and more to the front as independent agents. Except for the peculiar character which the Greek or Hellenistic cities give to the scene, we have the ordinary phenomena of the break-up of an Oriental Empire.

But with the help of Ptolemy the legitimate house prevailed. The tide of desertion set in its favour. In 123-122 Alexander sustained a shattering defeat. He fell back upon Antioeh. There he set about robbing the temples. He first took the golden Nike which stood upon the outstretched hand of Zeus at Daphne. Zeus, he said to the Antioehenes jestingly, had given him victory. But when he gave orders for the image of Zeus itself to be removed, a storm of popular indignation drove him from the city. He fell into the hands of Antioehus and took poison.²

After the disappearance of Alexander Zabinas, Antioehus became more and more impatient under his mother's dictation. Cleopatra saw her supremacy imperilled. On a day when the King came in heated from exercise, she tendered him a cup. But her designs had been betrayed, and Antioehus insisted on her drinking the potion herself (121-120).³

Antioehus VIII (Grypos) was now in sole possession of all

¹ That Demetrius II dissolved the federation of the *adelphoi demoi*—Antioeh, Seleueia, Apamea, and Laodicea—as a punishment in 128-127, as Kuhn (p. 13) suggests, seems to me impossible. The federation could not but cease when Antioeh and Apamea were in the possession of Alexander, and Seleueia of Demetrius.

² Just. xxxix. 2, 5 f.; Eus. i. p. 257; Diod. xxxiv. 28 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 269. The story told of Antioehus Cyzienenus (Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* 4, 52) that he replaced a golden colossus of Zeus by one only gilt may be an echo of the doings of Zabinas.

³ App. Syr. 69; Just. xxxix. 2, 7.

that remained to the house of Seleueus in Syria.¹ He reigned in Antioeh, dissipating in gorgeous feasts at Daphne the scanty treasure of the kingdom,² or composing verses on a theme that had a morbid fascination for the verse-writers of that age—that of poisonous snakes.³

About 116 came the attack of Antioehus IX, the son of Sidetes and Cleopatra, whom his mother had sent in 129 to be educated at Cyzicus—whence his nickname, Cyzicenus. He had, of course, no legal right to the throne, but an attempt of Grypos to have him poisoned (real or alleged) gave him an excuse to attack his half-brother. In his favour was the memory of his great father, which his surname of Philopator put forward. It was the expectations founded on his parentage probably which inclined the hearts of men to Antioehus Cyzieenus. But the Syrians were soon disillusioned. He had enough of the physical courage of his race, being a bold and splendid hunter, but as a ruler he was worthless; far more keenly interested in mimes, conjuring tricks, and ingenious mechanical toys than the affairs of state. He had also, without inheriting his father's greatness, inherited to the full his propensities to hard drinking.⁴

A new dynastic war now blazed up over the Seleueid realm in Syria and Cilieia.⁵ It was again complicated with the feuds of the Ptolemaïc house. Ptolemy Euergetes died in 117, and the power was seized by his widow, Cleopatra III. But like her sister, Cleopatra of Syria, she was obliged to associate her son, Ptolemy Soter II, in the throne. There were instantly two parties in Egypt, that which supported the Queen-mother, and that which was opposed to her, more or less openly. To the latter the King in his heart belonged, but he was outwardly subjected to his mother's will. His younger brother,

¹ His surnames are Epiplianes Philometor Kallinikos, Babelon, p. cliv.; *Bull. corr. hell.* vii. p. 346.

² Posidonius, frag. 17 and 31, *F.H.O.* iii. pp. 257, 263.

³ Plin. xx. § 264. Specimens of the poetry (very prosy stuff) are given in Galen (Kühn) xiv. p. 185.

⁴ Diod. xxxiv. 34. One cannot help being struck by the resemblance of the description given by Diodorus of Antioehus IX to what we are continually hearing of the ways of Oriental princes to-day—the zeal with which they buy up bicycles, photographic apparatus, and such things.

⁵ Trog. *Prol.* xxxix.; lav. *Epit.* .xii,

on the other hand, Ptolemy Alexander, who governed Cyprus, was his mother's partizan. Ptolemy Euergetes had been allied, as we have seen, with Grypos against Zabinas, and these relations seem to have been maintained by Cleopatra. The opposite party in Egypt were therefore on the side of Cyzicenus.

These dispositions were expressed in act, when Cleopatra III, detecting antagonism to herself in her daughter Cleopatra, whom Soter had married, compelled him to divorce her and marry another of his sisters, Selene. The younger Cleopatra was at once bent on revenge, and acted in the spirit of her class. She would give her hand to Cyzicenus, and procure his triumph over the ally of the Alexandrian court, Grypos. She did not come to him without a "dowry"; she came leading after her a royal army. They were troops which, by her own boldness and address, she had succeeded in bringing over from the service of Ptolemy Alexander in Cyprus and persuading to follow her.¹

Grypos, it will be remembered, had married Ptolemy's daughter, Tryphaena. "While, therefore, the two rival kings in Syria were half-brothers, their wives were now sisters. But this only increased the ferocity of the strife. Cyzicenus was master of Antioeh, and when he went campaigning, Cleopatra was left in occupation of the palace there. After some defeat he was driven from the neighbourhood, and Grypos, who had Tryphaena with him, proceeded to lay siege to Antioeh. When the city fell, Tryphaena asked to have Cleopatra put into her hands; she wished to triumph over her sister in her captivity, and aggravate her humiliation. Grypos was shocked and demurred. Then Tryphaena suspected him of a guilty passion for Cleopatra, and her vindictiveness was whetted by a furious jealousy. Cleopatra had taken sanctuary at Daphne, but Tryphaena on her own authority sent soldiers to take her life. When they entered the temple to drag her outside the sacred precinct, Cleopatra grasped the image of Artemis

¹ The reading in Just. xxxix. 3, 3, varies between "*exercitum Cypri*" and "*exercitum Grypi*" The former reading has not only the better MS. authority but is supported by 3, 6: "*turn peregrinos exercitus in certamina fratrum adductors,*"

with a determination over which the ruffians could not prevail. Then they struck through her wrists with their swords. The princess died, calling curses upon her murderers. Shortly after, by a turn of fortune, Tryphaena fell into the hands of Cyzicenus, and he did not spare to avenge.

In 113-112 the position of Grypos in Syria had become so weakened that he retired to Aspendus, in Pamphylia, to raise fresh bands. There were places in Syria where his cause was maintained during his absence, notably the loyal Seleueia. In about two years he came back (111-110) and recovered some part of the kingdom. It is curious that he made the year of his return a new era for the official dating. The war after this seems to have languished, either king acquiescing in his rival's occupation of a certain sphere, without formally making peace, "like athletes who give up a trial of strength, but being ashamed to retire, protract the contest by indolence and repose." The power of Antiochus Grypos lay in the north of Syria, and he seems to have won the countenance of Koine;² that of Cyzicenus in Palestine³ and Phoenicia.⁴

Of course the feud of the two Seleucid brothers was taken advantage of by all within the realm who hankered after independence, and all outside of it who wished to cut off portions for themselves. Even the kings were obliged to further the work of disruption by conceding independence, where they thought that they could, by so doing, retain at any rate the good-will of a community. Tyre had been already given its freedom by Cleopatra in 126-125, perhaps

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 327.

² *Bull. corr. hell.* viii. (1884), p. 105 ; *Hermes*, xxix. (1894), p. 436 f.

³ Eus. i. p. 260. It is somewhat of a stumbling-block that a coin of Ascalon, dated 201, i.e. 112-111 B.C., should have the head of *Grypos*. Numismatic data are, of course, liable to be misleading. There is, for instance, a coin certainly struck under Cyzicenus, because it bears his name, which yet has the effigy of Grypos (Friedländer, *Zeitsch.f. Num.* vii. (1880), p. 227). In the case of Ascalon, coins of Cyzicenus are struck there in 200 = B.C. 113-112 and 202 = B.C. 111-110 (Babelon, p. clxiv.). We may, I think, unhesitatingly reject, on historical grounds, Babelon's attribution of a coin of Grypos to *Jerusalem!* (No. 1448). That the capital of Cyzicenus was Damascus, as Babelon affirms (p. clxi.), is quite possible, though I have not been able to find on what the affirmation is based.

⁴ Tripolis belongs to Cyzicenus about 108 (Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 279). Coins of Cyzicenus struck at Tripolis, Babelon, p. 191.

as a reward for the part taken by the city in the killing of Demetrius I I¹ and Balanea in 124.² Sidon, where CyziEenus coined as late as 113-112, attained its freedom in 111,⁸ Tripolis in 105.⁴ In 109-108 Grypos conceded autonomy to SeleuEia, as the reward of its steadfast loyalty to the legitimate king; his letter conveying notice of it to his ally Ptolemy Alexander is preserved in a Cyprian inscription.⁵ Asealon, where coins of Cyzieenus were struck in 109-108,⁶ dates its freedom from 104.⁷

The Jewish state advanced by great strides. Hyrcanus about 108⁸ besieged the great Greek city of Samaria. This was in the region dominated by Cyzieenus. But his attempts to relieve Samaria were futile, although in Egypt the party friendly to his cause was now in the ascendant, and Ptolemy Soter, able at last to show his inclinations, sent him 6000 men. So strengthened Cyzieenus raided Judaea, but Samaria fell nevertheless after a year's siege. The Jews effaced all mark of it, and turned the water-courses over its site. Soon after, by the venality of Antioehus' general, they acquired Scythopolis. Antiochus on his side was for the moment strong enough to seize Joppa and put in a garrison, as well as to wrest some other important places, such as Gezer and Pegae from the Jews. But the Jews procured from Koine a decree of the Senate, bidding him restore them, and his occupation was transient⁹

John Hyrcanus died in 104, but the advance of the Jewish state in power and dignity did not cease. Aristobulus, his son (104-103), assumed the title of king—the Jewish monarchy restored! but not, to the vexation of the Pharisees, in the house of David. Under Aristobulus the Galilee which we know in the Gospels was created. Inhabited by the heathen Ituraeans—a people of (perhaps) Arab stock but Aramaïc speech—it was now conquered by the Jews, and the population given the choice of expulsion or circumcision. The majority seem to have preferred the latter, and became merged in the community of Israel.¹⁰

¹ Head, p. 675.

² *Ibid.* p. 659.

³ *Ibid.* p. 673.

⁴ Rouvier, *Journ. asiatique*, 1898, p. 26.

⁵ Wilcken, *Hermes*, xxix. (1894), p. 436 f. ⁶ Gardner, *Seleucid Kings*, p. 91.

⁷ Head, p. 679.

⁸ Sehurer, i. p. 268, note 22.

⁹ See Appendix U.

¹⁰ The population amongst which Christ worked, and from which perhaps most of the apostles were drawn, was largely of non-Jewish descent.

In 103, owing apparently to a recrudescence of hostilities between Grypos and Cyziceus,¹ the Seleucid authority had so far disappeared in Palestine that the Greek cities, when attacked by Alexander Jannaeus (Jonathan), the king of the Jews, who succeeded his brother Aristobulus in that year, turned for protection to Ptolemy Soter. Cleopatra had driven Soter out of Egypt and called Ptolemy Alexander home. Soter was therefore now in Cyprus, as his brother had been before. He was induced by the appeal of Ptolemais to intervene on behalf of the Greek cities, and Cleopatra promptly led an army to the support of the Jews. The ensuing war in Palestine only concerns the Seleucid house in that it brought home to Cleopatra how dangerous the alliance which still subsisted between Ptolemy Soter and Antiochus Cyziceus might prove. She feared that they might make a combined attack on Egypt. Accordingly she helped Grypos in a substantial way, supplying him with the troops which his depleted treasury could no longer procure. She also sent him Selene, whom she had compelled Soter nearly twenty years before to marry, but whom he seems on withdrawing from Egypt to have left behind. These developments must have taken place before 102-101, the year in which Cleopatra falls from power.

It was not the Jews only who pressed in where the Seleucid power gave way. The Nabataeans became about this time a considerable power under Erotimus. He is the first ruler of the Nabataeans, so far as we know, who bore the name of king; and the rise of the Nabataeans, with whom we found the Jews associated in the days of Maeeabaeus, runs thus closely parallel to that of the Jews. The expeditions conducted by Erotimus and the 700 (*sic*) sons, whom his extensive *harem* brought him, swept the lands which lay along the desert on the confines of Syria and Egypt.²

In the North the province which adjoined Armenia, and which we already saw under a rebel dynast in the days of Antiochus IV,³ Commagene, now formally took rank as an

¹ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 325 ; Liv. *Epit.* lxxviii.

² Just. xxxix. 5, 5-6. See Sehürer, i. p. 728 f.

³ See p. 157.

independent kingdom.¹ The dynasty which ruled it was of Iranian, and professedly of Persian, origin, like the neighbouring houses of Cappadoeia and Pontus. But King Mithridates Kallinikos, who ruled Commagene in the earlier part of the last century B.C., married Laodice the daughter of Antiochus Grypos, and in this way obtained an affiliation of the dynasty to the Seleucid house. Of their Macedonian parentage the kings of Commagene were still more proud than of their Persian; they regarded themselves as continuing the Seleucid line. Antiochus was adopted as the dynastic name, till the little kingdom was extinguished in 72 A.D. by the Romans.²

While the peoples of the East were reasserting themselves in regions which had once obeyed the Macedonian kings, in the West the outposts of Roman rule already touched the realm of Antiochus Grypos. Rome had become one of the Asiatic powers in 133 by taking over, as the province of Asia, the kingdom bequeathed it by the last Attalus. In 102, some permanent military and naval stations were fixed in Cilicia, as bases for action against the pirates whose nests were in the mountains to the west. The command of these stations constituted the Cilician "province." The Seleucid King did not lose his Cilician territory, with which the Roman stations on the coast probably interfered little, but their presence was a sign.³

Antiochus Grypos married Selene about 102. But he was not destined to live with her long. Among those who stopped highest at court was Heraclion of Beroëa. From a fragment of Posidonius⁴ we may infer that he was at the head of the war department and a strict disciplinarian. "He made the soldiers take their dinner in divisions of thousands, lying upon the ground in the open air. Each man's dinner

¹ The coins of a certain King Sames are supposed by numismatists to belong to Commagene, and to be earlier than those of Mithridates Kallinikos, Babelon, p. ccviii.

² Mommsen, *Mith. d. Inst. in Athcn.* i. (1876), p. 27 f.; Babelon, *Rots de Syrie*, p. ccviii f.; Wilcken in *Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2487 f. The great inscription of Nimrud-Dagh, put up by Antiochus I of Commagene (? 70-37? B.C.), is No. 735 in Michel.

³ Mommsen, *History of Rome* (English Translation, 1894), iii. p. 382; Marquardt, *Römische Staatsmrw.* i p. 379.

⁴ Frag. 36, *F.H.G.* iii. p. 265.

was a large loaf and a piece of meat, and the drink, wine of the common sort mixed with cold water. The serving was done by men with knives, and strict silence was imposed." HeraEleon's ambition urged him in these unsettled times to look higher than the office of King's minister. In 96 he murdered Grypos and seized the throne.¹ Queen Selene fled, to give herself to Cyzicenus.

Heraeleon cannot long have maintained himself in the place of the King, since Seleueus the son of Antioehus VIII is spoken of as succeeding, without any interval being mentioned. But we gather that Heraeleon detached the north-eastern region of Syria, including his native Berœa, Bambyee-Hieropolis and Heraelea, as a separate principality.²

Grypos left five sons, of whom the eldest succeeded him as Seleueus Epiphanes Nieator.³ He was a man of stormy vehemence. He infused a new spirit into the war against Cyzicenus, and took the field with a strong army. City after city was lost to Cyzicenus. In the year following Grypos death (in 95) Seleueus defeated his uncle in a pitched battle, and Cyzicenus came to his end.⁴

But Seleueus was not suffered to take possession undisturbed. Antioehus Cyzicenus had left a grown-up son, who almost immediately (still in 95) proclaimed himself king in Aradus, as Antioehus Eusebes Philopator (Antioehus X). He also took over his father's recent wife, Selene, who, since she married her first husband, her brother Ptolemy Soter, in 116, must now have been of some years.⁵ According to one account,⁶ Seleueus would have succeeded in taking his life, as well as that of his father, had he not been saved by a courtesan who loved him for the beauty of his person. So the dreary circle came round again. Seleueus was beaten, and had to abandon Syria to Antioehus Eusebes, withdrawing to Cilieia.

¹ Eus. i. p. 259 ; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 365 ; Trog. *Prol.* xxxix.

² This is suggested by Strabo xvi. 751.

³ He is generally reckoned Seleueus VI, Seleueus V being the son of Demetrius II assassinated by Cleopatra in 125.

⁴ According to Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 366, Seleueus captured him and put him to death. According to Eus. Cyzicenus was run away with by his horse into the enemy's lines, and, seeing capture inevitable, slew himself. See Appendix V.

⁵ See Appendix W.

⁶ App. Syr. 69.

Here he fixed his temporary capital at Mopsu-hestia, but had soon fallen foul of the citizens, who found that unlimited demands were made upon their property by a king who had sunk to be a mere captain of bandits. Insurrection followed, and Seleueus VI perished in the flames of his residence (95).¹

Then the remaining sons of Grypos took up the quarrel. Antioehus XI Epiphanes Philadelphus and Philip, whose name shows that the Seleueid princes still cherished the memory of their Antigonid blood, were probably with their brother Seleueus in Cilieia. They made haste at any rate to avenge his death by letting their bands loose upon Mopsu-hestia and pulling down the houses. Perhaps they were twins, as they were called; Antioehus took precedence, but Philip also had the title of King, and his head appears behind that of Antioehus on some coins. Together they crossed the Amanus to attack Antioehus Eusebes in Antioeh. But a battle near the city went against them, and in the flight Antioehus Philadelphus rode his horse into the Orontes and was drowned. Philip, however, as King Philip Epiphanes Philadelphus, continued the war. At the same time (in 95) another son of Grypos, Demetrius III, established himself as Demetrius Theos Philopator Soter in central Syria. He was living in Cnidus, when Ptolemy Soter, who was still excluded from Egypt and reigning in Cyprus, offered him troops to try his fortune in Syria. Demetrius made Damascus his capital. He is generally distinguished by his nickname Eukairos.

Within a few months, therefore, of the death of Antioehus Grypos there were three separate Seleueid kingdoms in Syria. Antioehus Eusebes was pressed both on the north and south by the two sons of Grypos, Philip and Demetrius, who seem at this time to have acted in concert. What happened to him in this chaos we cannot make out. Demetrius before 88-87 had possession of Antioeh. But Antiochus Eusebes was still holding his bands together in some part of Syria or Cilieia and calling himself Seleueid King.

Demetrius III is the last Seleueid who interferes in the

¹ This is the version of Appian and Josephus ; Eusebius says that he learnt the Mopsuestians intended to set fire to the palace and anticipated his fate by committing suicide.

affairs of the Jews. His help was asked by the people themselves, who were disaffected to their king, Jannaeus Alexander. Jannaeus had surrounded himself, like the other princes of the time, with foreign mercenaries—wild men from the highlands of the Taurus; the Jews rose against him and sent to Damascus for help. Demetrius came himself with an army, and at Sheehem joined the national army of the Jews. There seemed at that late date a prospect of the Jews by their own act restoring Seleueid supremacy to escape from the Hasmonaeen king! But when Jannaeus had been driven to the hills, they thought better of it, and Demetrius was too insecure to entangle himself in a war with the Jews.

About 88 a war broke out between Philip and Demetrius. Philip was allied with Strato, who ruled the little principality which had recently been constituted with its centre at Berœa.¹ Philip himself was in Berœa when Demetrius laid siege to the city. Then Strato appealed to a neighbouring Arab chief, called Aziz, and to Mithridates the Parthian governor (of Mesopotamia?).² They answered to his call, and the besieger Demetrius was besieged in his turn. He was cut off from his water-supply and obliged to capitulate. The Antiochenes in his camp were sent home without a ransom, but Demetrius was taken a prisoner to the Parthian court. Mithridates the Great, who then held the Arsaeid throne (he died about 86), treated his captive with the respect paid by the Parthians to the other members of the Seleueid house who had fallen into their hands. In such honourable captivity Demetrius III ended his days.

Yet a fifth son of Grypos now appears to wrangle over the fragments of the heritage, Antioehus XII Dionysus Epiphanes Philopator Kallinikos. Philip got possession of Antioeh, and Antioehus established himself in Damascus.³ Philip watched his opportunity to strike him there, and when Antioehus was engaged in an expedition against the Nabataean Arabs, he suddenly appeared before the city. Miliesius, who

¹ What were the relations of Strato to Heraeleon, and Dionysius the son of Heraeleon?

² Tigranes conquered Mesopotamia from the Parthians a year or two later, Reinaeh, *Mithridate Eupator*, p. 311.

³ His coins are dated 227 = 86-85 B.C.

held the citadel for Antiochus, opened the gates. Philip, however, had soon given this man offence, and when he went to see some races in a hippodrome outside the city, Milesius shut the gates and returned to his old allegiance. Antiochus Dionysus hurried back on hearing what was on foot, and Philip had to retire. But almost immediately Antiochus started away again on a fresh expedition against the Nabataeans. This time he went by way of the Philistine coast, now dominated by the Jews. Jannaeus tried in vain to stop him by a great line of works from Chapharsaba (mod. Kafar-Sâbâ) to Joppa. Antiochus broke through, and entered the country of the Arabs. Here he fell by a chance stroke in an affray when victory was already inclining to his side.

It was obvious that chaos could not go on for ever in Syria. The house of Seleucus was on the point of extinction, self-consumed by its own disordered energies. But what would take its place? Gradually, ever since the death of Seleucus Nicator, two hundred years ago, it had been relinquishing to the barbarian dynasties the territories it had inherited from Alexander the Great. Mesopotamia had been lost to the Parthian before 88; Commagene had a king Mithridates; southern Syria had fallen to the Arabs and the Jews. Only its territory beyond the Taurus the house of Seleucus had ceded a hundred years before, not to a barbarian power, but to the house of Attalus, from whom it had been inherited in 133 by Rome.

But between 90 and 80 B.C. it seemed questionable whether the whole of Asia was not about to revert to the rule of Orientals. Two of those dynasties, whose first beginnings we have watched in the days when the Seleucid house was great, were now risen to an imposing strength—the house of Mithridates in Pontus, and the house of Artaxias in Armenia. Mithridates Eupator now sat on the Pontic throne. In 88 he occupied nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and put the resident Romans to the sword, and in the following year flung his armies upon Greece. True, the campaigns of Sulla made Mithridates give back, but the peace signed in 84 was an uneasy one, and left Mithridates in a position to renew the fight. In Armenia the king of the house of Artaxias was

Tigranes, who had first suppressed the rival dynasty in Sophene, and then extended his conquests outside Armenia at the expense of the Parthians. Before 83 he had conquered Mesopotamia, and was ready to cross the Euphrates into Syria.

In 83 the Armenian armies overflowed Syria. The men who called themselves kings—Philip the son of Grypos, and Antioehus Eusebes the son of Cyziceenus—are no more heard of.¹ In utter weariness of the dynastic feuds, the Greek cities of Syria acquiesced with relief in the rule of the Armenian King of kings. His governor Magadates now sat in the palace of Antioeh, and coins were struck there in his name. The Cilieian plain, as part of the Seleucid realm, Tigranes also took in possession, and emptied its Greek cities to make the population of the huge Tigranoeerta, which he began to create in Mesopotamia.² Only here and there some stronghold maintained itself against the Armenian, notably Seleueia in Pieria, so long distinguished for its loyalty to the legitimate Seleucid King, and now defying all the efforts of Tigranes to enter its walls.³ About 75 B.C. the young sons of Antioehus Eusebes appeared in Rome, and were recognized as "the Kings of Syria." They stayed nearly two years in Rome, and showed no signs of impoverishment. They maintained a royal state, and were served with such gold and silver plate as beseeemed a king's table. It is also stated that they came from Syria, returned to Syria, and were in possession of the Syrian throne. We can hardly doubt that it was in Seleucia that they still had a court and treasury.⁴

The object of the visit of King Antioehus and his brother to Rome was to ask to be installed as kings of *Egypt*. They

¹ The end of Antioehus Eusebes is variously reported. According to App. Syr. 49 and 70, he was driven out of his kingdom by Tigranes. According to Eus. i. p. 261, he had fled some years before to the Parthian court. According to Joseph. Arch. xiii. § 371, he had died before this a brave man's death, righting against the Parthians in the cause of Laodice, Queen of the Sameni.

² Strabo xi. 532; Plutarch, *Lucull.* 21; Solin. 38, 9.

³ Strabo xvi. 751; Eutrop. vi. 14, 2.

⁴ The evidence of Cie. Verr. Act II. iv. 27 f., seems to me preferable to that of Justin xl. 1, 3, that the son of Antioehus during the rule of Tigranes had "lain hid in a corner of Cilieia." This is followed by Kuhn and Wilcken, but it appears irreconcilable, not only with the language of Cicero, but with the figure which the young princes are able to make in Rome.

claimed through their mother Selene, who was still living in Syria. The Ptolemaïc kingdom was also suffering from a confused succession. They naturally got nothing from Rome, and one of them was robbed of some of his choice plate by Verres when he stopped in Sicily on his way home.

The arms of Tigranes did not reach the south of Syria. Queen Selene was still residing in 69 in Ptolemaïs; but in the land as a whole the Arabs, the Ituraeans of Chaleis, and the Jews had it all their own way, except in so far as they fought with each other. Damascus soon after the death of Antioehus Dionysus (about 85) put itself into the hands of the Nabataean king Haretas III, to escape the worse fate of falling into the hands of the Ituraean dynast.¹ The Ituraeans overran the Phoenician coast between Sidon and Theu-prosopon, wasting the fields of Byblos and Berytus.² On the seaboard between Phoenicia and Egypt, the cities where Hellenic culture had lately flourished, Gaza, Strato's Tower, Dora, were ruinous solitudes—monuments of the vengeance of the Jews. The peoples of the desert and its fringes, of regions like Idumaea, drifted into the country to efface the marks of the Greek, like the desert sand which submerges forsaken cities. The mixed population, Jewish for the most part in manners though not in origin, came to be classed indistinguishably under the name of Idumaeans. Government there was none. Ordered society gave place to bands of robbers and pirates. The homeless inhabitants of the towns which had been destroyed, the defeated factions of cities which still stood, took to brigandage as their living, or joined the great pirate confraternity.³

Only a few cities like Asealon, which had saved itself from the Jews by a timely subservience, still nursed in this region the seeds of Hellenic life.

Was the work of Alexander and the Greek kings undone? was all the land once more from Central Asia to the Mediterranean to go back to the Oriental? At that moment there wanted but little for the whole to be once more in the possession of native races and kings. Yes; but even the conquests of an Oriental house did not bring about the state of things

¹ Joseph. xiii. § 392.

² Strabo xvi. 755.

³ *Ibid.* xiv. 669; xvi. 759.

which had existed before the battle of Granieus. In the first place, these conquering dynasties had themselves, while retaining their native names and memories, assimilated to a greater or less degree the penetrating culture of the Greeks. Maedonian blood ran in the veins of princes who bore the names of Mithradata or Ariorath. Greek was spoken at their courts ;¹ they prided themselves on being the champions of Hellenism. Even the kings of the Jews and of the Arabs took the surname of Phil-Hellene.

This consideration would, no doubt, tend to make the Greeks look upon the return of Oriental rule more favourably. At Antioch there had existed a party before 83 who were for calling in Mithridates of Pontus: Tigranes actually came in response to an invitation.² But, with all that, the prevailing feeling among the Greeks was one of antipathy to the Oriental dynasties. Do what they might to show their phil-Hellenism, they were in the eyes of the Greeks barbarians still. Tigranes had been welcomed in Syria, but before long "the rule of the Armenians was intolerable to the Greeks."³ Perhaps the Greeks were right in their feeling that Hellenic culture and Oriental despotism could not in the long run subsist together.

In the second place, the existence of this great Greek population all over the Nearer East made the situation in 80 B.C. in reality utterly different from the situation in 333. The Romans found this people, their natural allies, waiting for them when they came to take possession. It was a true instinct which led Alexander and his successors to make the foundation of their work a system of Greek cities. Their dynasties perished, but their cities remained. The Romans had not to begin the work over again. They had but to carry on a work which the disruption of the Greek dynasties had brought to a standstill.

It was in 73 that the Romans put forth their strength a second time to roll back the power of Mithridates. *We may regard that year as the date when the tide of barbarian advance*

¹ It will be remembered that the Parthian court, when the news of the defeat of Crassus arrived in 53, was watching a performance of the *Baechae* of Euripides.

² Just. xl. 1, 2 f.

³ Plutarch, *Lueull.* 21.

which since the death of Seleueus I had, with an occasional reflux, yet increasingly prevailed, turned before the advance of Rome. The last great general who was a sincere servant of the oligarchy, Lucius Lucullus, drove back Mithridates from Cyzicus, marched victoriously through Pontus, and in 69 invaded Armenia, where Mithridates had sought refuge.

Tigranes was at the moment pushing his conquests further south. He was already master of the Phoenician coast, and had taken Ptolemais, where Queen Selene had held out against him, when the news reached him that Lucullus was in Armenia. He hastily retired north, taking Selene with him, who by the fall of Ptolemais had come into his hands. At Seleucia on the Euphrates opposite Samosata she was imprisoned, and after some time put to death.¹ The successes of Lucullus in Armenia brought about that or the following year the complete evacuation of Syria by the Armenian armies.²

Now the dethroned descendants of Seleucus saw their chance again. The son of Antiochus Eusebes, he probably whom we saw robbed by Verres some six years before, showed himself in Syria, and was hailed by Antioch as the lawful king.³ Lucullus gave his sanction. So once more a Seleucid king reigned in Antioch, Antiochus XIII, nicknamed Asiaticus, from some temporary residence in Asia Minor.⁴ True to the character of his race, he was soon fighting, with whom we are not told, probably the neighbouring Arabs. The Arabs had now pushed into the Orontes valley itself. Emisa (mod. Horns) was the seat of a chieftain called Shemash-geram (Sampsigeramus), who had also possession of Arethusa (mod. Ar-rastan).⁵ With him, however, Antiochus was friendly, and it was probably with the rival chief Aziz that Antiochus had come to blows. About 65 he suffered a defeat, which so damaged his credit at Antioch that there was a movement to drive him out again. Antiochus, however, was strong enough to quell it, and the ringleaders fled. A son of the late King Philip of the other Seleucid line was living in Cilicia, and the refugee Antiochenes persuaded him to try his chances in Syria. He made a compact with Azîz, and

¹ Strabo xvi. 749.

² App. Syr. 49.

³ *Ibid.* 49 and 70.

⁴ Wileken gives ground for believing that his official surname was that of his father, Eusebes.

⁵ Cf. Strabo xvi. 753.

was set, as a dependant of the Arab chiefs, upon the Seleucid throne. Antioehus placed all his hopes on the support of Shemash-geram, and the ruler of Emisa moved in fact down the Orontes with his bands. He asked Antioehus to come and confer with him in his camp. Antioehus, of course, went and was instantly made a prisoner. Shemash-geram had secretly arranged with Azîz that they should each make away with his Seleucid ally and divide the inheritance between them. Before, however, Aziz had carried out his part of the undertaking, Philip got wind of it and escaped to Antioeh.¹

When in 64 Pompey, having hunted Mithridates out of Asia, appeared as conqueror in Syria, to settle its affairs in the name of Rome, he received an application from Antioehus XIII, entreating to be restored to his throne.² But Pompey had a consciousness of what Rome was come into Asia to do—to establish a strong government which would protect the centres of Hellenic life from barbarian dominion. It was that which the cities expected from Rome, and the restoration of such Seleueids as were now to be had was the last thing they wanted. According to one account, Antioeh gave Pompey large sums to refuse the application of Antioehus.³ The account is probably untrue, but it truly represents the attitude of Antioeh. Pompey gave Antioehus a scornful answer. The man who had lost Syria to Tigranes was not the man to save it from Arabs and Jews.⁴ Syria, except cities which were given their freedom or the districts left to native dynasts under Roman influence, was now made a Roman province and put under the direct rule of a Roman governor. The kingdom of the house of Seleueus was come to an utter end (64).

What became of the surviving members of the royal house is lost in darkness. Antioehus XIII was sooner or later killed by Shemash-geram. Another of them was invited by envoys

¹ Diod. xl. 1^a and 1^b.

² Was Antioehus at this moment a prisoner of Sampsigeramus? Kuhn thinks that he was; Wilcken thinks this improbable. That he was before is certain, that he was afterwards is equally so, since Sampsigeramus had him killed. Wilcken ingeniously suggests that Sampsigeramus wished him to be made king to obviate Syria becoming a Roman province, and therefore gave him his liberty in order that he might make his application, and that, when Pompey refused, he again imprisoned him. Where King Philip II was all this time we have no idea.

³ Eus. i. p. 261.

⁴ Just. xl. 2, 3 f.

from Alexandria in 58 to come to Egypt and marry Berenice, the daughter of Ptolemy Auletes, who reigned there during a temporary expulsion of her father. "He, however," says the account, "fell sick and died." If he is identical with the person nicknamed Kybiosaktes by the Alexandrians,¹ what happened is that the unhappy man accepted the invitation and was incontinently strangled by Berenice. Philip II, the last Seleueid king, reappears for a moment in 56, when he also received an invitation from Alexandria to come and be king in Egypt, but was forbidden by Aulus Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, to go. Then he, and with him the house of Seleueus, finally disappears.²

There were still people for many generations who prided themselves on having in their veins the blood of the imperial house. A priestess of Artemis at Laodicea-on-the-sea, in the beginning of the second century after Christ, tells us in her funeral inscription that she is sprung "from King Seleueus Meator."³ The dynasty of Commagene vaunted it, and after the dynasty was brought down, the last members of the family. One of them, Gaius Julius Antioehus Philopappus, put up the well-known monument at Athens about 115 A.D. with a statue of Seleueus Meator, his great ancestor.⁴ Another of them, a lady in the train of the Empress Sabina, the wife of Hadrian, visited the Egyptian Thebes in 130 A.D., and left upon the colossal "Memnon," the image of King Amenhotep III, some Greek verses, legible to-day, which record the praises of her mistress and her own royal descent.⁵ It is as if here, upon this monument of the dead empire of the Dawn, the powers of later fame would leave a register of their passage, a remembrance of names which in their hour were great, they also, in the earth.

¹ Strabo xvii. 796.

² Eus. i. p. 261. There is a special monograph on the Seleueids subsequent to the death of Antioehus Sidetes by Adolf Kuhn (*Beitrage zur Geschichte der Seleukideii*, Altkireh 1891).

³ C.I.G. No. 4471.

⁴ C.I.Att. iii. No. 557.

⁵ C.I.G. Nos. 4725-4730.

CHAPTER XXXII

GOVERNMENT, COURT, AND ARMY

THE kingdoms of Alexander and his successors show a mingling of several distinct traditions, which they did not succeed in altogether happily reconciling. We may distinguish three. (1) There was the Oriental tradition, the forms and conceptions which the new rulers of the East inherited from the "barbarian" Empires which went before them; (2) there was the Macedonian tradition; and (3) the Hellenic.

In the political constitution of the realm the Oriental tradition was predominant, for the kings were absolute despots. There was the same sort of government machine that there had always been since monarchy arose in the East, with the sovereign at the head of it and a hierarchy of officials who derived all their authority from him—satraps and district governors, secretaries, and overseers of taxes. Seleueus Nieator had publicly adopted the principle of despotism that the will of the King overrode every other sort of law.¹ We have seen the Seleueid kings following in their practice the barbarian precedent—in the punishment of rebels (Molon and Aehaeus).

But with all this, the successors of Alexander made a pride of distinguishing themselves from their barbarian predecessors—Pharaohs, Babylonians, and Persians. They would have the world remember that they were Macedonians.² They avoided the use of titles which had an Oriental colour. "King of kings," for instance, no Seleueid is found to call himself.

¹ See vol. i. p. 64, and Mitteis, *Reichsrecht u. Volksrecht*, p. 9.

² Pausanias says of the Ptolemies: *ἔχαιρον γὰρ δὴ Μακεδόνες οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλούμενοι βασιλεῖς, καθάπερ γε ἦσαν*, x. 7, 8. Cf. vi. 3, 1.

"Great King" was a title borne only when there was some special reason to emphasize the Oriental dominion, as in the case of Antiochus III¹ and Antiochus Sidetes.²

It is noteworthy that the inscription put up at Delos in honour of Antiochus III by the courtier Menippus, while giving him the title of Great King, qualifies it by describing him as "a Macedonian."³

Did anything of old Macedonian custom survive in the constitution of the Seleucid realm? In Macedonia, as we saw, before Alexander, while the King was supreme and apparently unfettered by any legal form, he was practically restrained both by the hereditary nobility and by the will of the people as expressed in the assemblies of the national army. The state of things was thus closely analogous to what we find among the Romans in the days of the kingdom.⁴ Do either of these forms of restraint appear in the Seleucid realm?

We certainly find a nobility, but it was not such a nobility as could restrict the King's power. It was not a nobility of great families with a power resting on landed domains and local influence—such a nobility of barons as the old Macedonian kings, like the Persian kings and the kings of England, had to deal with: it was a nobility of court creation, the standing of whose members consisted in a personal relation to the King. We shall look more closely at it when we come to consider the court. In the train of the chiefs who made themselves kings after Alexander's death there must have been many representatives of the old Macedonian aristocracy: they and their descendants after them may have been persons of influence at the new courts, but they had, of course, by being severed from their ancestral soil, lost any independent power as against the King, and must have soon been merged in the new nobility, consisting of those whom the King's favour elevated. Such a family, we may divine, was that of Aehaeus, of whom came the mother of Attalus I and the queen of Seleucus II.

As in old Rome, so in the Macedonian kingdom under Philip the father of Alexander, the idea of *people* and *army*

¹ Michel, NOB. 467, 1229.

² *Ibid.* No. 1158.

³ *Ibid.* No. 1297.

⁴ Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, p. 22.

had coincided. The army acted as the Macedonian people assembled under arms. And during the career of Alexander we find it by no means passive: it judges the Macedonians accused of treason: its will, even when informally expressed, is a factor with which Alexander has to reckon.

The Roman popular assembly came into action especially at a transference of the royal power, for the election of a new king. So at Alexander's death we find the Macedonian army electing Philip Arrhidaeus. In the first years of confused struggle we hear repeatedly of the army acting as a political body. The Regent Perdieas brings a question before the "general assembly of the Macedonians."¹ Ptolemy is accused by Perdieas before the Assembly and acquitted.² After the death of Perdieas, it is the Macedonian army which, on the proposition of Ptolemy, elects Pithon and Arrhidaeus to take his place.³ Then it passes sentence of death upon Eumenes and others of the adherents of Perdieas.⁴ When Pithon and Arrhidaeus lay aside their power at Triparadisus, they do so before an Assembly, and "the Macedonians" choose Antipater as Regent.⁶ In the days that followed, the Macedonian army ceased to be a unity. It was broken up among the different chiefs. But we still find Antigonos following the old practice in 315 and assembling his Macedonian troops before Tyre to hear his accusation of Cassander and vote him a public enemy.⁶

Does the Seleucid realm show any trace of a similar assembly? Even if we had no reference to such a thing, we could not use the argument from silence, where our sources are so imperfect. But as a matter of fact, we have several

¹ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων πλῆθος, Diod. xviii. 4, 3.

² κατηγορήσας δὲ Πτολεμαίου κακεῖνον ἐπὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἀπολυόμενον τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δόξας μὴ δίκαια ἐπικαλεῖν, ὅμως καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους οὐχ ἐκόντος πολεμεῖ, Arr. Τὰ μετ' Ἀλέξ. 28. ³ Diod. xviii. 36, 7. ⁴ Ibid. xviii. 37, 2.

⁵ συνήγαγον ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀπέειπαντο. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες ἐπιμελητὴν εἵλοντο Ἀντίπατρον αὐτοκράτορα, Diod. xviii. 39, 2.

⁶ αὐτὰς δὲ συναγαγὼν τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν παρεπιδημούντων κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, κατηγορήσας Κασσάνδρου . . . συναγανακτούντων δὲ τῶν ὀχλῶν, ἔγραψε δόγμα καθ' ὃ τὸν Κάσσανδρον ἐψηφίσατο πολέμιον εἶναι . . . ἐπιψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τὰ ρηθέντα, διαπέστειλε πανταχῇ τοὺς κομούντας τὸ δόγμα, Diod. xix, 61, 3. See Niese i. p. 277, note 3; Köhler, "Das Reich des Antigonos," *Sitzungsb. Berl.* 1898, p. 834.

references which seem to point to a survival of the practice, and just on the occasions we should expect from what has gone before—where a transference or delegation of the royal authority is in question. Seleucus I, having resolved to make his son Antiochus king of the eastern provinces, calls together the “army,” or, as Plutarch puts it, an “Assembly of all the people” (πάνδημος ἐκκλησία), to give its approval.¹ It is the army which calls Antiochus from Babylon to ascend the throne, on the murder of Seleucus III.² The guardians of the child Antiochus V are said to have been given him “by the people.”³ Tryphon, when he would make himself king, to the exclusion of the Seleucid dynasty, solicits election at the hands of the “soldiery”⁴ or “the people.”⁵

We see from all this that at important conjunctures an assembly of “the army” or the “people” was still called into action. But it is less clear of whom precisely the army in question consisted. The place of assembly can hardly have been anywhere but Antioch, the seat of government, but it is difficult to suppose that the Assembly which determined the government of the Empire was identical with the popular assembly, the *demos*, of the city Antioch. Although the military headquarters were at Apamea, there must have been a camp near the King's person at Antioch. And the soldiers who formed it consisted no doubt mainly of “Macedonians” i.e. the descendants (real or professed) of the Macedonians settled by Alexander, Antigonus, and Seleucus I in the East. On them, we may believe, the old customary rights of the Macedonian army devolved. There was apparently a large proportion of Antiochenes in the home-born army, and to that extent the people who voted in the civic assembly of Antioch as members of a Hellenic *demos* would also, we must suppose, take part in the imperial assembly of the Macedonian army. *There was in this way a real popular element in the Seleucid realm.* The Roman Empire also was a military despotism, but there was this difference, that the Roman troops who disposed of the

¹ App. Syr. 61; Plutarch, *Dem.* 38.

² Eus. i. 253; Jerome on Daniel 11, 10.

³ Justin xxxiv. 3, 6.

⁴ Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 219.

⁵ Justin xxxvi. 1, 7.

imperial throne were largely barbarians from the outlying provinces or beyond, whilst the Seleucid army was mainly home-born. The attempt of the Cretan mercenaries under Demetrius II to get rid of the home-born army provoked, as we have seen, a national rebellion.

In the political frame Oriental despotism and Macedonian popular kingship were thus combined; the Hellenic tradition was opposed in principle to monarchy, and could therefore hardly find a place in the constitution.¹ But it was seen in the policy and spirit of the administration. It was as Hellenic rulers that the kings created city-states in every quarter, and dealt tenderly with the popular forms, the "ancestral constitution" (*πατρία πολιτεία*) in the older Greek cities. There was, as has been said, a fundamental incompatibility between the desire to rule over Greeks and the desire to be a patron of Hellenism. But how far a Seleucid king could go in the latter direction we see in the case of Antiochus Epiphanes. Again, the intelligence and progressiveness which belonged to the intellectual part of Greek culture showed itself in the scientific exploration of the realm, the attempt to open new ways, the Hellenic *ἐπιμέλεια*, which marked Seleucid rule, when it got a little respite from the sequence of war on war. But being above all things fighters, the Seleucid kings had less scope to show their Hellenic quality than Ptolemies and Attalids. As benefactors of the states of Greece they had, before Antiochus Epiphanes, been behind their rivals.² The Macedonian in them seems to the end to predominate over the Hellene.

The *régime* of the palace we should probably at first sight pronounce to be Oriental. There was the army of chamberlains and cooks and eunuchs. There was the display of crimson and gold, the soft raiment, the stringed instruments, the odours of

¹ It is of course true that monarchy was a common phenomenon in the Greek city states in the form of *tyrannies*, but tyrannies were regarded as violations of right. It is also true that Greek philosophers had sought a rational basis for monarchy, and depicted the ideal monarch (Kaerst, *Studien zur Entwicklung der Monarchie im Altertum*), but their theories were not in sympathy with the ordinary ideas of the market-place, the main current of Greek feeling and practice, which was still republican.

² Polyb. xxix. 24, 13.

myrrh, aloes, and cassia. But here again we shall see the Macedonian and the Hellenic tradition taking effect.

As we cast round our eyes, we should have observed that while material and colour were of an Oriental splendour, the form was Greek. By the fashion of column and doorway, the painted walls, the shape of candelabrum and cup, the dresses of men and women, we should have known ourselves in a Greek house. The King wore as the symbol of his royalty a band tied about his head. This use of the *diadem* was Oriental. But here again the form was Greek. The diadem of the Oriental kings was an elaborate head-dress; the diadem of the Greek kings was such as was common in Greece, as a sign, not of royalty, but of victory in the games—a narrow linen band. The royal dress was the old national dress of the Macedonians glorified. That had not been like the garb worn by Greek citizens in the city, but such as was worn for hunting and riding, and was therefore characteristic of the Northern Greeks and Macedonians, who lived an open country life. It consisted of a broad-brimmed hat, a shawl or mantle brooched at the throat or shoulder and falling on either side to about the knees in “wings” (the *chlamys*), and high-laced boots with thick soles (*κρηπίδες*). Of these three parts—the hat, the *chlamys*, and the high boots—the royal dress of a Ptolemy or a Seleucid king was to the end composed.¹ But it was gorgeously transfigured. The peculiar Macedonian hat, the *kausia*, had apparently no crown; it was a large felt disc attached to the head, and suggested a mushroom to the Athenian mocker.² As worn by the kings, it was dyed crimson with the precious juice won by immense labour from the sea,³ and the diadem was in some way tied round it, or under it, its ends hanging loose about the neck. The diadem itself was inwrought with golden thread. The *chlamys* was no less splendid. That made for Demetrius Poliorettes, when King in Macedonia, is described to us. It was of the darkness of the night-sky, covered with golden stars—all the constellations and signs of the Zodiac. The boots of the same king were of crimson felt, embroidered with gold.⁴

¹ Plutarch, *Anton.* 54.

² Plaut. *Trinum*, iv. 2, 9.

³ *Kaviaiv alovpyq*, Atheu. xii. 536.a.

⁴ Athen. *loc. cit.*; Plutarch, *Bern.* 41.

We are told of Alexander that he wore on occasion the peculiar insignia of this or that deity, sometimes the horns and Egyptian shoes of Ammon, sometimes the bow and quiver of Artemis, or again the garb of Hermes, which, being that of a young man on travel, was not unlike the Macedonian dress—a crimson chlamys, an under robe striped with white (*χιτὼν μεσόλευκος*) such as, according to Persian custom, none but the King might wear,¹ and a *karnsia* with the diadem—only on giving audience in state the more distinctive emblems of Hermes, winged sandals and *ca'dueus*, were also assumed; or at other times Alexander appeared as Heracles, with the club and lion-skin.² This statement is generally discredited as the gossip of a later generation, and unworthy of Alexander; but even if not true of Alexander, it points perhaps to a practice of impersonating deities at the courts of the successors. We hear of Themison, the favourite of Antiochus II, masquerading as Heracles, and the last Cleopatra of Egypt as Aphrodite or as Isis.³ In other cases, therefore, the royal dress was possibly modelled on the conventional garb of some god, and such emblems as horns and wings, which appear on the heads in coins, *may* have been actually worn. If so, the unfortunate suggestion of the theatre, which the Greeks found even in the gorgeous chlamys and high-boots of the kings, must have been doubly accentuated.⁴

The special emblem of the Seleucid house was the anchor, which appears on many of their coins. Various stories were current in later times to explain it—that Laodice, the mother of Seleucus, dreamed she had conceived of Apollo, and that the god had given her a signet with the device of an anchor, and just such a ring she actually found next day, which her son always wore;⁵ that his mother had given him the ring because she had been told in a dream that in whatever place it was lost, there he should be King; that when Seleucus was in Babylon he stumbled over a stone; the stone was raised and an anchor was found underneath, signifying that he was come

¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 3, 13.

² Ephippus ap. Athen. xii. 537 e.

³ Plutarch, *Anton.* 26 ; 54.

⁴ See the articles on "Causia," "Chlamys" and "Crepida" in Daremberg and Saglio.

⁵ Just. xv. 4.

to remain.¹ As the anchor is already found on the coins which Seleueus strikes as satrap of Babylon (before 305), it was obviously a device belonging to his family before he had risen to empire. In that case its origin goes back into obscurity, and while the later stories are rejected, we are not likely to gain any result by guessing in the dark. The belief is noteworthy that all the descendants of Seleueus were born with the anchor marked upon their thigh.²

The language of the court and government was, of course, Greek. That a Seleueid king knew the language of any of his native subjects—Aramaic or Phoenician or Persian—is highly improbable; it was thought a wonder in the last Cleopatra that she could speak Egyptian. How far Macedonian survived we do not know; it seems to have been thought the proper thing for a Ptolemy or a Seleueid to keep up the speech of his fathers, but some of them, we are told, omitted to do so.³ The intellectual atmosphere of the court was Greek; its degree would depend upon the individual king. In literary brilliance the Seleueid court did not compete with the Ptolemaic or the Pergamene; but a goodly number of Greek men of letters, philosophers and artists must always have been found at the King's table. Aratus of Soli lived for a time at the court of Antioehus I and made an edition of the *Odyssey* on the King's order.⁴ The poet Euphorion was made by Antioehus III librarian of the public library in Antioeh, and ended his days in Syria.⁵ Antioehus IV was, of course, exceptional in his Hellenic enthusiasm, and made Antioeh for the moment the chief centre of artistic activity in the Greek world. A recently deciphered papyrus from Herculaneum throws a curious light upon the relations of this King with philosophers. The papyrus is a life of the Epicurean philosopher Philonides. Antioehus Epiphanes did not regard that school with favour, and Philonides went to the Syrian court with a large body of literary men to convert him. After Antioehus had been plied with a battery of no less than *one hundred and twenty-five tracts* he succumbed. He embraced the Epicurean doctrine and

¹ App. Syr 56. - Justin *loc. cit.* ³ Plutarch, *Anton.* 27.

⁴ Knaack, art. "Aratos, No. 6" in *Pauly-Wissowa*.

⁵ Suidas.

made admirable progress as a disciple. Later on Demetrius Soter treated Philonides with great consideration; he insisted on having the philosopher continually with him, that they might discuss and read together. Hence Philonides acquired great influence, which he did not use, his biographer throws in, reflecting on what other philosophers did under such circumstances, to be given a voice in the Council or a place in embassies and such like, but for helping the necessities of Greek cities like Laodieea-on-the-sea.¹ Even Alexander Balas dabbled in philosophy and professed himself a Stoic. That Seleucid kings retained contact with Hellenic culture almost to the end of the dynasty we may infer from the places where some of the later kings were brought up—Antiochus Grypos at Athens, Antiochus IX at Cyzicus. Antiochus Grypos was even, as we saw, himself an author.

The letter of a King Antiochus cited by Athenaeus shows a very different attitude to philosophers. The official to whom it is addressed, Phanias, is instructed to suffer no philosopher to be in "the city" or its territory, as they did the young men such harm. The philosophers are to be all banished, all young men caught dealing with them to be *hanged*, and their fathers subjected to strict inquisition. Radermaehrer, who has discussed this odd document,² shows that its Greek is of a popular kind, and he suggests that it is a Jewish forgery intended to discredit the Seleucid kings. That any Seleucid king wished to drive all philosophers *out of the kingdom*, as Athenaeus understands the letter, is certainly incredible. But it does not seem to me impossible that they might have been banished from a particular city, even from Antioch, if they were supposed to be instilling a dangerous republicanism. We must remind ourselves once more that there was a radical inconsistency in the position of a Seleucid king as a patron and defender of Hellenism and as a lord over Greek city-states. Which aspect was prominent depended on the circumstances of the moment, and during the last tumultuous years of the dynasty we see a strong movement towards independence in the Greek cities of Syria and Cilicia. And it was just these last kings, sunk to be almost captains of bandits, who

¹ See Appendix X.

² *Rhein. Mus.* N.F. lvi. (1901), p. 202 f.

might be expected to show as poor a Hellenism in their literary style as in their coins. The letter therefore seems to me a possible one. from an Antioehus of the generation of Philadelphus or Asiatieus. But that the hypothesis of Radermacher is equally possible I should not attempt to deny.

The ceremonial of the court I should judge to be much freer than in the Iranian kingdoms. There is, for instance, no record of any Seleueid attempting to introduce the Oriental practice of prostration (*proskynesis*), as Alexander had done. No doubt the main recreations were hunting and feasting, both of which had taken a large place in old Macedonian, as in old Persian, life.¹ We have indications that the ancestral passion for hunting did not die out in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic houses. Demetrius I, we saw, Polybius knew as a keen sportsman, and even in the last degeneracy of the house Antiochus Cyzicenus was noted for his daring and skill in the field. The same thing is told us of Ptolemy V Epiphanes.²

In the royal banquets the splendour and abundance of gold and silver plate, the profusion of choice wines, seemed to show Oriental luxury;³ but at no time more than in his convivial hours was the difference between the Macedonian King and the Oriental Great King thrown into prominence. The seclusion and unapproachableness of the Oriental monarch were among his essential characteristics.⁴ On the other hand, even Alexander, for all his assumption of the Great King, maintained to the end the old Macedonian way of good-fellowship and familiarity over the wine-cup. The abandonment of all dignity at such hours which the Macedonian King permitted himself was an offence even to the more correct Greeks, and the stories told us of Antioehus Epiphanes are to some extent explained by Macedonian manners. For we hear that at the court of his father, Antioehus the Great King, the armed dance was gone through at dinner not only by the King's Friends, but by the

¹ No man, according to old Macedonian custom, might recline at table till he had killed his boar, Hegesander ap. Athen. i. 18 a. For the Persian love of hunting see Spiegel, *Eran*, Alt. iii. p. 673.

² Polyb. xxii. 3, 8.

³ Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν πρῶτων ἤδη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον νενεωτέριστο, A. Anab. iv. 8, 2. For the Seleucid banquets, Posidonius, frags. 30, 31 F.H.G. iii. p. 263).
⁴ Hdt. i. 99.

King himself.¹ And it is noteworthy that for the chief to dance a war dance after a feast is a custom shown us by Xenophon among the neighbours of the Macedonians, the Thraeians.²

When we turn to the Seleucid queens we see a curious mingling of all three traditions. The Hellenic is traced in the fact that the Seleueids and Ptolemies were so far monogamous that they had at one time only one legitimate or official wife. For the old Macedonian kings, like the Oriental, were polygamous;³ and they were followed in this respect by Alexander, who was more inclined than his successors to preserve the fashion of Oriental courts.⁴ The monogamy was official only, for the kings kept mistresses at their pleasure, some of whom, like the mistress of Antioehus Epiphanes, might be openly invested with power.⁵ On the other hand, in the choice of their wives Ptolemies and perhaps Seleucids followed the Oriental practice in a way which outraged Greek morality by marrying their sisters. The practice had been allowable in Egypt, and among the ancient Persians was not only allowable, but specially pleasing to God. It must be admitted that there is no *certain* instance of the marriage of full brother and sister among the Seleueids; that of Antioehus, the eldest son of Antioehus III and Laodice, is probably such, but Laodice *may* have been only his half-sister, as Laodice, the mother of Seleueus II, was of Antioehus II.

It was in the character and action of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic queens that the Macedonian blood and tradition showed itself. Both dynasties exhibit a series of strong-willed, masculine, unscrupulous women of the same type as

¹ Demetrius of Scepsis ap. Athen. iv. 155 b.

² Xen. *Anal.* vii. 3, 33.

³ Niese i. p. 43.

⁴ Possibly the first generation of Successors were also polygamous; Demetrius Poliorcetes at any rate had more than one wife at the same time. I do not think we can press the phraseology of a hieroglyphic inscription which speaks of Ptolemy II and his "wives" (Straek, p. 67). Arsinoë, the daughter of Lysimachus, the mother of Ptolemy III, was alive when he married Arsinoë Philadelphus. But Arsinoë I seems to have been *divorced*, in which case it was not really a case of bigamy, *Schol. ad Theoc.* 17, 128.

⁵ See page 132. The mistress of Seleueus II, vOI. i. p. 195.

those who fought and intrigued for power in the old Macedonian kingdom. The last Cleopatra of Egypt is the best known to us, but she was only a type of her class. There was no relegation of queens and princesses to the obscurity of a harem. They mingled in the political game as openly as the men. It was in the political sphere, rather than in that of sensual indulgence, that their passions lay and their crimes found a motive. Sometimes they went at the head of armies. We have seen one of them drive, spear in hand, through the streets of Antioch to do vengeance on her enemies. It is only in the intensity and recklessness with which they pursue their ends that we see any trace of womanhood left in them.

The King was surrounded by the nobility of the court, who bore the title of Friends (**φίλοι**). To their body¹ the great officials of the kingdom, the ministers of the different departments, the higher officers of the army belonged. They furnished a Council (**συνέδριον**), which regularly assisted the King with its advice on matters of state.² The Friends were distinguished by the wearing of crimson, just as the nobility of the Achaemenian kingdom had been, and similar names were current among the Greeks to describe them.³ This is explained by the custom, both among the Persians⁴ and among the Macedonians,⁵ for the kings to make presents of costly dresses to their friends; according to Xenophon,⁶ no one at the Persian court might wear such dresses and golden ornaments except those who had received them as a gift from the King. We have an indication that the same rule held good in the Seleucid kingdom.⁷ In modern Persia the giving of a rich dress is an ordinary mark of the Shah's favour.

¹ **φίλων συντάγμα**, Polyb. xxxi. 3, 7.

² It is perhaps unwise to regard the Council or its name of Friends as a borrowing of any particular tradition, although close parallels can be found (for instance in old Egypt, see Erman, trans. Tirard, p. 72), since such a Council must exist in every monarchic state, and would naturally at its start be formed of the King's friends.

³ **φοινικιστῆς βασιλεως**, Xen. *Anab.* i. 2, 20; "purpurati," Liv. xxx. 42, 6; xxxvii. 23, 7, etc.

⁴ Hdt. iii. 84.

⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 8.

⁶ *Cyrop.* viii. 2, 8.

⁷ 1 Mace. 10, 20; 62; 89; 11, 58; Athen. v. 211 b.

Within the body of Friends we find a variety of grades. So far as the few notices relating to the Seleucid court take us, they show a close analogy to the system revealed by the papyri at the Ptolemaic court in the second century B.C., and Straek, in his article on the Ptolemaic titles,¹ advances the theory that the system was borrowed under Ptolemy V Epiphanes from the court of his great father-in-law, Antiochus III. The order of these classes is not clearly fixed by existing data; it is certain that the highest was that of the Kinsmen (*συγγενεῖς*).² In writing to a Kinsman the King addresses him as "brother" or "father."³ Next to the order of Kinsmen came, in Egypt, a set of people described as *ὁμότιμοι τοῖς συγγενέσιν*, to which we cannot yet prove a parallel at the Seleucid court; nor have the *ἀρχισωματοφύλακες* or the *διάδοχοι* yet been discovered in a Seleucid document. But the *πρώτοι φίλοι* of the Ptolemaic system are mentioned.⁴

It is important to observe, as Straek points out, that these titles did not carry *office* with them, although they were, of course, regularly conferred upon those who held high positions in the government or army or court. Their nearest analogy in our world is the honorary *orders* of European courts.

Just as the Friends as a whole were distinguished by the crimson of their apparel, so it would seem that there was a graduated scale of splendour for the different grades. We hear of the golden brooch which it was customary to give to the King's Kinsmen⁵—some badge which makes the analogy with our orders still closer.

Admission to the class of Friends depended entirely upon the King's will; the standing of the nobleman was not any-

¹ *Rhein. Mus.* N.F. lv. (1900), p. 161 f.

² 1 Mace. 10, 89; 11, 31; 2 Mace. 11, 1.

³ Straek, *op. cit.* p. 170; Joseph; xii. § 148; 1 Mace. 11, 32; 2 Mace. 11, 22. The same form of address was usual between one king and another (*Hermes*, xxix. (1894), p. 436). If the letter in 1 Mace. 10, 18, has any real document at the base of it, it is surprising that Jonathan should be addressed as "brother" when he is apparently only made a Friend.

⁴ *τῶν πρώτων φίλων*, 1 Mace. 10, 65; 11, 27; Michel, No. 1158. In Livy we hear of a "princeps amicorum" (xxxv. 15, 7), which one suspects to be a mis-translation of *τῶν πρώτων φίλων*. Honorary *σωματοφύλακες* under Antiochus I, Athen. i. 19 d.

⁵ 1 Mace. 10, 89.

thing he possessed in himself or could transmit to his heirs ;¹ it consisted in a personal relation to the King. It ceased when the diadem passed to a stranger.² No qualification, except to have pleased the King's fancy, was necessary in order to be classed with the Friends. Any one of the crowd of parasites whom the chances of lucre or honour drew to the royal courts might be invested with the rank, whether his native place was within the King's dominions or beyond, whether he was Greek or barbarian.³

Of the great officers of state the highest is he who is described as *ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*.⁴ His position corresponds to that of a *grand vizir* in a Mohammedan kingdom. When the King is a minor, he is at the head of the administration, and combines with the office of prime minister that of regent or guardian (*ἐπίτροπος*).⁵ He probably in most cases, if not all, held the rank of Kinsman.⁶

We hear also of an *ἐπιστολογράφος*, Secretary of State." Dionysius, who holds the position under Antiochus IV, is able to put a thousand slaves into the procession at Daphne, each carrying a piece of silver plate of one thousand drachmae or over.⁷ Bithys, the *ἐπιστολογράφος* of Antiochus Grypos, puts up a statue of that king at Delos, on the basis of which he gives his title of Kinsman.⁸

Another of the principal offices was that of minister of

¹ The titles were not hereditary, Strack, *op. cit.* p. 178. But perhaps they might be so in special cases by the King's decree. Cf. 1 Mace. 2, 18, *vvv odv . . . ποιήσον τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ βασιλέως . . . καὶ ἔσῃ σὺ καὶ ὁ οἰκὸς σου τῶν φίλων τοῦ βασιλέως*. The context, however, perhaps suggests that this only means that the family as a whole would be remembered by the King for good.

² Jonathan, who had been *τῶν πρώτων φίλων* of Demetrius II, is admitted, as a new thing, into the order of the Friends of Tryphon (1 Maec. 11, 57 ; cf. v. 27).

³ Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas was made a Friend of Antiochus III for reciting a poem in honour of the King. Demetrius ap. Athen. iv. 155 b.

⁴ *ὁ προεστὼς τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων*, Polyb. v. 41. *τὸν . . . ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τεταγμένον*, Bull. corr. hell. i (1877), p. 285. *κατέλειπεν Λυσίαν . . . ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῦ βασιλέως*, 1 Macc. 3, 32. *τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων*, 2 Mace. 3, 7 ; 11, 1 ; 13, 2. *τὸν προεστηκότα τῆς βασιλείας*, Diod. xxxiii. 5. *πράγματα* = *βασιλεία*. Cf. [*πίστεως καὶ εὐνοίας*] *τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ πράγματα*, Philologus xvii. p. 345.

⁵ 2 Mace. 11, 1.

⁶ Lysias, Lasthenes.

⁷ Polyb. xxxi. 3, 16.

⁸ Bull. corr. hell. viii. (1884), p. 106.

finance (*ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων*), which Antioehus Epiphanes gave to his favourite Heraelides.¹

Of the functionaries of the court we get a notion from a Delian inscription² in honour of Craterus the eunuch. He combines the offices of chief physician (*ἀρχίατρος*) and "lord of the Queen's (*ἐπὶ τοῦ κοιτῶνος τῆς βασιλίσσης*); his rank is that of the First Friends. Two of the men who were connected as court physicians with the house of Seleueus left their mark in the history of Greek medicine, Erasistratus, the physician of Seleueus I, and Apolophanes of Seleueia, whom we saw at the court of Antioehus III.³

A custom found in Persia⁴ of bringing up children of nobles at the palace together with the children of the royal house seems to have been followed both in old Macedonia and in the courts of the Successors. One gathers this from the frequency with which persons of high station are described as "foster-brothers" (*σύντροφοι*) of the King.⁶ Under the Seleueids we have Philip, the foster-brother of Antioehus III,⁶ Heliodorus of Seleueus IV,⁷ Philip of Antioehus IV,⁸ Apollonius of Demetrius I.⁹ Whether the children were all regularly under the eye of a *τροφεύς*, or whether it is only due to the peculiar circumstances of princes brought up away from home, when we find some one described as *τροφεύς*,¹⁰ I do not know that we can say.

¹ App. Syr. 45. I have found no other mention of it. The inscription of Eriza (*Bull. corr. hell.* xv. (1891), p. 556) seems to refer to a provincial, not an imperial, official.

² Michel, No. 1158.

³ In the inscriptions relating to the Pontic court an analogy with the Seleueid can be traced in certain particulars, i.e. the mention of a *σύντροφος*, an *ἀρχίατρος*, and of *πρῶτοι φίλοι* as an order, and probably the correspondence would be seen to be much completer did we know more. The offices mentioned beside that of *ἀρχίατρος* are (1) *ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπορρήτου*; (2) *ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγχειριδίου*; (3) *ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων βασιλέως*; (4) *ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων* (*Bull. corr. hell.* vii. p. 354 f.).

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* i. 9, 3.

⁵ In the old Macedonian kingdom Marsyas of Pella is called a *σύντροφος* of Alexander (Suidas), and a reflection of the custom may be found in the expression of 1 Mace. 1, 6, describing Alexander's generals, *τοὺς συνεκτρόφους αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ νεότητος*.

⁶ Polyb. v. 82, 8.

⁷ *Bull. corr. hell.* i. p. 285.

⁸ 2 Mace. 9, 29.

⁹ Polyb. xxxi. 21, 2.

¹⁰ Diodorus of Demetrius I (Polyb. xxxi. 20, 3), Craterus of Cyzicienus (Michel, No. 1158).

From the sons of nobles grown old enough to bear arms a corps of attendants on the King was formed with the name of *βασιλικοὶ παῖδες*.¹ They figure more than once in the wars of Alexander, and we saw that Seleueus I was perhaps at one time their commander. The institution continued at the later Macedonian courts. And it still apparently served the purpose for which it was intended, that of a "seminarium dueum praeceptorum." Myiscus, who commanded a division of the elephants at Raphia, is mentioned as having been promoted from the corps of *παῖδες*.² They appear as a body, six hundred strong, in the pomp of Daphne.³

We come now to consider the army of the Seleueid kingdom.⁴ As is implied in the nature of a military despotism, its part was a very important one. Its will might make and unmake kings. Its disposition is given a significant place in the factors which enable Antioehus I to surmount the difficulties which confront him on his father's murder.⁵ Military service was one of the chief ways by which men could rise to power and greatness.⁶

The nucleus of the army was the *phalanx*, recruited from the "Macedonians" of Syria. It was a standing body. All the troops of this kind are spoken of together as "the phalanx."⁷ The name of "foot-companions" (*πεζῆταιροι*), which had been

¹ Arr. *Anab.* iv. 13, 1 f.; Curtius, viii. C, 6; Suidas, s.v. *paaLXeioi waldes*.

² Polyb. v. 82, 13.

³ *Ibid.* xxxi. 3, 17. For the *βασιλικοὶ παῖδες* in the Antigonid kingdom see Liv. xlv. 6, 7.

⁴ The chief works dealing with the armies and warfare of the Greek world are KÖchly and Rüstow, *Gesch. d. griechisch. Kriegswesens* (1852); H. Droysen, *Heerwesen u. Kriegführung d. Griechen* (1889); A. Bauer, "Die Kriegsalterthümer" in Iwan von Müller's *Handbueh d. Klass. Alt.* (1893); H. Liers, *Das Kriegswesen d. Alten* (1895); H. Delbrück, *Gesch. d. Kriegskutist*, vol. i. (1900). We are, of course, expecting the volume of Mr. Oman's *Art of War*, which will deal with this period.

⁵ λαβὼν ὁ μόνον τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ διαγωνίσασθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῦ προθύμως ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον εὖνον καὶ σύνεργον, Michel, No. 525, 1. 9; cf. 1. 16.

⁶ 1 Mace. 10, 37.

⁷ οἱ ἀποταχθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος, Michel, No. 19, 1. 103. τὸ δέξιον κέρας is spoken of as a standing division of the army, 1 Mace. 9, 1.

in use in the army of Philip, the father of Alexander, was still current to describe the Syro-Macedonian pikemen.¹

The phalanx was armed with the huge pike or *sarissa*, twenty-one feet long, and the men of the phalanx were known indifferently as *phalangitai* or *sarissophoroi*.² They also wore swords, and were protected by a helmet, greaves, and a shield.³ The last must have been held by an arm-ring, since both hands were required for grasping the *sarissa*.⁴ When drawn up for battle the phalanx stood in a solid mass of sixteen ranks (*ζυγά*). The first five ranks stood with their sarissas at "the charge," making the front a bristling hedge of steel.⁵

At Raphia the numbers of the phalanx were 20,000 ; at Magnesia only 16,000. If this figure is right, the diminution may be accounted for partly by the enormous loss suffered the year before in Greece, partly by the heavier drain on the royal forces for garrison purposes since the extension of the Empire. In the pomp of Daphne the phalanx again readhes 20,000.

A lighter description of infantry than the phalanx were those who carried the round Macedonian shield, smaller than the old Greek shield, and decorated in a peculiar way with metal crescents.⁶ This light infantry, the *hypaspistai*, played a principal part in the campaigns of Alexander. Their *corps d'élite* was the celebrated Silver Shields, who ended by betraying Eumenes. The term *hypaspistai* is seldom found in our accounts of the Seleucid armies.⁷ But we hear of a corps which had shields covered with bronze or silver;⁸ and these, it may well be, are *hypaspistai* under another name.⁹

¹ Plutarch, *Titus*, 17.

² Liv. xxxvii. 40, 1 ; xxxvi. 18, 2.

³ Polyæn. iv. 2, 10.

⁴ Delbrück (p. 363) thinks that only the front rank or front ranks had the shield.

⁵ Polyb. xviii. 29. The question of the *length* of the *sarissa* has much exercised scholars, see H. Droysen, p. 159 ; Bauer, p. 477 ; Delbrück, p. 369.

⁶ Represented on the coins of some of the Macedonian kings.

⁷ τῶν ἡγεμόνα τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν (at the siege of Sardis by Antiochus III), Polyb. vii. 16, 2 ; μετὰ τῆς ἐταιρικῆς ἰπποσύνης τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν (the Panion), xvi. 18, 7.

⁸ Polyb. v. 79, 4 ; xxxi. 3, 5 ; Liv. xxxvii. 40, 7.

⁹ Bauer, p. 446, contends that both the Silver Shields of Eumenes and these Silver Shields were *phalangites*, but this seems to me very improbable. If the *phalangites* carried shields at all, they were insignificant ones (see Delbrück, *loc. cit.*).

They were the *Guards* of the Macedonian army, who specially attended upon the King's person,¹ and stood to the infantry as the Companions did to the cavalry²—the corps in which it was proudest to serve. At Raphia, although they were armed in the Macedonian manner, they were not apparently Macedonian in blood, but picked men drawn from all provinces of the Empire—an indication that here again the policy of Alexander to bring young Orientals under the Macedonian drill-sergeant and close to his own person was not abandoned.⁸

A still lighter infantry were those who carried, not the Macedonian shield, but the unmetalled *peltc* (originally a Thraean weapon), which had come into common use in Greece in the fourth century.⁴ It was as peltasts that the Greek mercenaries in the armies of the Eastern kings served, and it was to supply this arm that the recruiting officers of Ptolemy and Seleucid (*ξενολόγοι*) were continually going up and down Greece. Aetolians, we gather, were the branch of the Greek race who figured most largely in this line, till by the Peace of Apamea Antioehus was cut off from his source of supply and forbidden to recruit any more in the Roman sphere. Certain of the races of Asia Minor also furnished peltasts—the semi-hellenized Lycians, the Pamphylians and Pisidians.⁵

Next in order of lightness to the peltasts came the Cretans, who formed a very important element—especially for mountain warfare. Crete seethed in chronic broils of one little state against another; the Cretans were born to arms, to ambusnes in steep places and stealthy clambering. When they were not lighting at home they went to fight abroad in the service of foreign kings. They were found in all the armies of the time, ranged indifferently on both sides in the great battles.⁶

With the Cretans are classed at Magnesia the Carians and

¹ Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander*, p. 55 ; cf. Polyb. xv. 25, 3.

² τὸ κάλλιστον σύστημα . . . καὶ τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππέων, Polyb. xvi. 19, 7.

³ Polyb. v. 70, 4. The numbers of the shield-bearers is 10,000 at Raphia, 5000 "and others" in the pomp at Daphne, Polyb. xxxi. 3, 5.

⁴ Bauer, p. 356.

⁵ Liv. xxxvii. 40.

⁶ The Cretans are distinguished from the other Greek mercenaries, the peltasts, Polyb. v. 53, 3 ; 65, 3 f.

Cilieians.¹ The Cilieians are described, both at Raphia and in the Daphne procession, as “armed in the manner of men girt for running (*εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐζώνων τρόπον καθωπλισμένοι*)—that is, everything was sacrificed to rapidity of movement on broken ground. The condition of things in Cilieia was very much the same as in Crete; both peoples made the strength of the great pirate power in the last century before Christ.

Some of the tribes of the Balkan peninsula, Thraeians and Illyrians, also took service in the same capacity as the Cretans.² In the Daphne procession there are 3000 Thraeians.

The missile-shooters, those whose weapons were of long range—archers, slingers, javelineers—were drawn from non-Hellenic races in various parts of the world. We hear of Thraeian slingers (Agrianes),³ of Mysian bowmen,⁴ Lydian javelineers, Elymaean, Median and Persian bowmen,⁵ slingers from the hills of the Kurds (Kyratioi, Kardakes).⁶

But none of the peoples of Asia were more dreaded as enemies or valued as allies than the Gauls. Their large limbs, wild hair, enormous shields (*θυρεοί*)⁷ and swords, the chanting, howling, and dancing with which they moved to battle, the deafening rattle of their shields, all contributed to strike terror.⁸ Perhaps from the time when the house of Seleueus was excluded from Asia Minor it became harder and harder to get Gaulish mercenaries. We hear of none in the later wars whose theatre was Syria. But Antiochus IV was still able to show 5000 in the Daphne procession.

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 40 ; App. Syr. 32.

² At Raphia there were 1000 Thraeians ; at Magnesia a body of 3000 light-armed, of whom part were Cretans and part Trallians ; another body of 1500 Trallians is mentioned separately. Polyb. v. 79, 6.

⁴ 2500 Mysians at Magnesia (Liv. xxxvii. 40, 8), 5000 in the Daphne procession (Polyb. xxxi. 3, 4). Apollonius, the commander of the Mysians, is mentioned in 2 Mace. 5, 24. He is, no doubt, a Greek or Macedonian of Syria, so that the Mysian guard would be under the command of a royal officer. Demetrius is represented as offering the Jews, as a special privilege, to allow them to serve under Jewish officers, 1 Mace. 10, 37.

⁵ At Raphia and Magnesia the bow appears as the national Iranian weapon.

⁶ The tribes of Zagrus (*Κορσαῖοι, Κορβρῆναι, Κάρχοι*) were held *διαφέρειν πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρεῖας*, Polyb. v. 44. Molon put his chief trust in his Kurdish slingers, *ibid.* 52, 5.

⁷ H. Droysen, p. 159, note 3, conjectures that the *θυρεαφόροι* of Polyb. x. 29, 6, were Gauls.

⁸ Liv. xxxviii. 17, 3 f.

The cavalry, by the Macedonian tradition, took a higher rank than the infantry.¹ The name of Companions, which belonged to the old Macedonian nobility who followed the King on horse, was still borne by part of the Seleucid cavalry,² but the relation of the different bodies is hard to make out. The *kralpoi* and the Royal Squadron (*Βασιλικὴ ἰλη*, regia ala) are expressly distinguished from the *age-ma*;³ and yet the same description is given of both, that they were the *corps d'élite* of the cavalry.⁴ The Royal Squadron was the corps which surrounded the King in battle;⁵ it was probably the first squadron of the Companions.⁶ The *agema*, according to Livy,⁷ was composed of the chivalry of *Irân*. The Iranians were, no doubt, horsemen born; but still one suspects some confusion, as we are told that the Thessalians of Larissa in the Orontes valley served in the "first *agema*"⁸

Another division of the cavalry was, if not drawn from Iran, at any rate formed on an Iranian model⁹—the "mailed horse" (*ἡ κατάφρακτος ἵππος*). Both horse and man were covered with armour. There were 3000 *kataphraktoi* at Magnesia,¹⁰ and 1500 appear in the Daphne procession.¹¹ But this arm was not so important in the Seleucid armies as in the Parthian.

The cavalry hitherto mentioned were, no doubt, armed with lances. The cavalry lance called the *xystos* is spoken of, but whether it was a sort of lance peculiar to certain corps, or whether whenever a cavalryman had a lance it was a *xystos*, I do not know.¹² But there were other mounted troops whose

¹ A royal letter begins *Βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος στρατηγοῖς, ἡπάρχαῖς, πεζῶν ἡγεμόσι, στρατιώταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις χαίρειν*, J.H.S. xvi. (1896), p. 231.

² Polyb. v. 53, 4; xvi. 18, 7; xxxi. 3, 7.

³ Liv xxxvii. 40; A pp. Syr. 32; Polyb. xxxi. 3.

⁴ The *ἑταιρικὴ ἵππος* is called τὸ κάλλιστον σύστημα τῶν ἰππέων, Polyb. xvi. 19, 7; the *agema* is described as τὸ καλούμενον ἄγγμα, ἐράτιστον εἶναι δοκοῦν σύστημα τῶν ἰππέων, *ibid.* xxxi. 3, 8. ⁵ Polyb. v. 84, 1; cf. x. 49, 7.

⁶ Cf. Liv. xxxvii. 40, 11, and App. Syr. 32.

⁷ xxxvii. 40, 6.

⁸ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάτορος βασιλεῦσι γεγονότας συμμάχους κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἄγγμα τῆς ἰππικῆς δυνάμεως, Diod. xxxiii. 4^a. This looks as if there were more than one *agema*.

⁹ Xen. *Cyrop.* vi. 4, 1; vii. 1, 2.

¹⁰ Liv. xxxvii. 40, 11.

¹¹ Polyb. xxxi. 3, 9.

¹² From the way in which Polybius (v. 53. 2) speaks of οἱ ξυστοφόροι ἰππεῖς, I should rather gather its use distinguished certain corps.

weapons were of a different sort. We hear of "Tarentines"—a kind of cavalry which had come into vogue since the Macedonian conquest; their peculiarity was that each man led a spare horse and was armed with javelins.¹ There were also the Scythian horsemen from the steppes of the Caspian, the Daae, who fought with bows and arrows, like the cavalry employed by the Parthians which gave the Romans so much trouble, when—

quick they wheel'd and, flying, behind them shot
Sharp sleet of arrowy showers against the face
Of their pursuers, and overcame by flight

We hear of them in the armies of Antioehus III,² but after this time the Parthian power must have prevented more Central-Asian horsemen reaching the Seleucid King. From the South Antioehus drew Arabs, who formed a camel corps at Magnesia, and were armed with bows and immense swords, six feet long.³

The elephants were a feature of the Seleucid armies, of which the kings made a great deal. For from the days of Seleueus Nieator they alone, of all the Western kings, could procure fresh supplies from India. The elephant became one of the Seleucid emblems upon the coins. To make up for their deficiency, the Ptolemies and Carthaginians caught and trained African elephants, but they were held inferior to the Indian ones.⁴ The elephant was tricked out for battle with frontlets and crests; beside the Indian *mahout* who bestrode his neck, he carried upon his back a wooden tower with four fighting men.⁵ It would seem that before a battle the elephants

¹ Bauer, p. 451. In the Seleucid army at the Panion (Polyb. xvi. 18, 7), and at Magnesia (Liv. xxxvii. 40, 13).

² Polyb. v. 79, 3; Liv. xxxvii. 40, 8; App. Syr. 32.

³ At Raphia, Polyb. v. 79, 8, they are under a *sheikh* of their own, Zabdibel. At Magnesia, Liv. xxxvii. 40, 12.

⁴ Polyb. v. 84, 4 f.; Liv. xxxvii. 39, 13. These statements are to some extent mistaken. The African elephant is not smaller than the Indian; on the contrary, he is larger. But Delbrück suggests with great probability that the traditional method of training in India was superior to the experiments of the people of Ptolemy (p. 212).

⁵ Liv. xxxvii. 40, 4. The *thirty-two* fighting men of 1 Mace. 6, 37, is a ridiculous exaggeration.

were shown an imitation of blood made from the red juice of fruit,¹ either to excite them or prevent their being alarmed by the real bloodshed.² All the Indian elephants of the Seleueid kingdom were destroyed by Octavius in 162, but Demetrius II got possession of the African elephants of Ptolemy Philometor. These, we saw, Tryphon captured, and that is the last we hear of the elephants of the Seleueid army.

Lastly, the Seleueids as late as Magnesia used the futile device of scythed chariots (*δρεπανηφόρα ἄρματα*), in which the Persian kings had put faith.³ But it may be questioned whether after the experience of that day they were used again.

These statements as to the composition of the Seleueid army belong to the time of the dynasty's greatness. As its dominion contracted it could no longer draw on such distant fields. The army probably became more exclusively Syrian, although the Taurus still furnished wild fighting men; and we have seen the Cretan mercenaries of Demetrius II take possession of the kingdom. But that the mass of the army of Antioehus Sidetes was drawn from Syria we are distinctly told; there was hardly a household unaffected by its loss.

The armies of the Greek kings of the East were distinguished both from the older Greek armies and the Roman by their external magnificence. The commanders and the Macedonian cavalry wore, like the King, the national dress—*kausia*, *chlamys* and high-boots—which was, in fact, a sort of military uniform. “ Nothing anywhere but high-boots, nothing but men with the *chlamys* ! ” exclaim the Syraeusan ladies who go to see a procession of troops in Alexandria.⁴ The *kausia* of the officers was crimson.⁵ The cloaks were in many cases gorgeously embroidered.⁶

We remember that the foot-guards had shields covered with silver or burnished bronze. Even their high-boots, we

¹ αἶμα σταφυλῆς καὶ μύρων, 1 Mace. 6, 34.

² Armandi, *Histoire militaire des éléphants*, p. 259. A terra-cotta figure of an elephant trampling on a Gaul has been found (*Bull. corr. hell.* ix. p. 485); it relates perhaps to the victory of Antioehus I over the Gauls, and may not improbably reproduce some actual statue.

³ In the army of Seleueus I, Diod. xx. 113, 4 ; Plutarch, *Dem.* 48. In the army of Molon, Polyb. v. 63, 10. At Magnesia, Liv. xxxvii. 41.

⁴ Theoc. *Id.* xv. 6.

⁵ Plutarch, *Eum.* 8.

⁶ Polyb. xxxi. 3, 10.

are assured—it is hardly credible—had nails of gold.¹ The bits of the principal cavalry corps were of gold.²

A Seleucid army set out with an immense following of non-combatants—cooks and merchants. They were nearly four times as many as the combatants in the expedition of Antioehus Sidetes to Iran.³ But though this seems to have provoked the censure of the Greek historian whom Justin echoes, the proportion is not really very extravagant for Oriental warfare. The English at one time followed the fashion in India.⁴

In the order of battle certain stereotyped rules can be observed. The phalanx made the centre; light infantry, especially those who fought with missiles, and cavalry composed the wings. The battles opened with skirmishes between the wings; these prepared the way for the decisive shock of the heavy-armed infantry.

We have many descriptions of the extraordinary effect of these royal armies as they stood or moved forward in line of battle. In external show the Roman armies made but a poor figure before them. They were a blaze of gorgeous uniforms, of silver and gold, and moved with the precision of men who had spent their lives on the parade ground. The “phalanx looked like a solid wall; the elephants like the towers of it.”⁵ “When the sun shone upon the shields of gold and brass, the mountains glistened therewith and shined like lamps of fire. . . . They marched on safely and in order. Wherefore all that heard the noise of their multitude and the marching of the company, and the rattling of the harness were moved”⁶ “They went a little forward, and suddenly, as they surmounted

¹ Just. xxxviii. 10, 1; Valer. Max. ix. 1, cxt. 4.

² Polyb. xxxi. 3.

³ Just. loc. cit.; Diod. xxxiv. 17.

⁴ In connexion with Justin's description of the setting forth of Antioehus it is interesting to compare Kaye's description of the start of the ill-fated Afghan expedition of 1837, in which the camp followers were *four times* as numerous as the combatants. “So marched the army of the Indus, accompanied by thousands upon thousands of baggage-laden camels and other beasts of burden, spreading themselves for miles and miles over the country, and making up, with the multitudinous followers of the camp, one of those immense moving cities which are only to be seen when an Indian army takes the field and streams into an enemy's country” (Kaye, *War in Afghanistan*, book iii. chapter i.),

⁵ App. Syr. 32.

⁶

1 Mace. 6, 39 f.

some height, they came in view of the enemy descending into the plain. The golden armour flashed in the sun from the extremities of the *agema*. They moved in perfect order. There were the towers of the elephants on high, and the crimson housings with which they were dressed for battle. When the sight of it broke upon those who went in front, they stood still."¹ A description of the army of Perseus would fit that of Antiochus. "First marched the Thraeians, the sight of whom, Aemilius says, made him blench more than any other thing—men of great stature, armed with white-shining shields and greaves, black tunics underneath, javelins resting on the right shoulder, uplifted for the throw. Next the Thraeians the Greek mercenaries were stationed, with all sorts of gear, and Paeonians mingled amongst them. Third after these came the *agema*, the flower of the army, the choice of the Macedonians themselves for valour and person, ablaze in gilt armour and new crimson cloaks. And as these took their post, the battalions (φάλαγγες) with bronze shields emerged from the trench and filled the plain with the flashing of steel and the shining of bronze, and all the hills round with a noise and the shouting of commands. So boldly and swiftly they came on, that those who first fell dead were only two stades from the Roman entrenchment."² Or take the description of the Pontic army. "The other generals overbore Arehelas; they drew up the army in line and filled the plain with horses, chariots and shields, great and small. The cries and shouting were more than the air could contain when so many nations got into their ranks together. The bravery and splendour of their sumptuous equipment was not idle or without its moral effect; the flashing of armour brilliantly chased with silver and gold, the wonderful colours of Median and Scythian vesture, mingled with the gleam of bronze and steel—as it all shifted and moved hither and thither, the effect was really dazzling and overpowering. The Romans shrunk behind their palisade, and nothing that Sulla said could bring back their heart"³

I do not propose to discuss the strategy or tactics of the

¹ Plutarch, *Eum.* 14.

² *Ibid.* *Aemil.* 18.

³ *Ibid.* *Sulla*, 16.

Seleueid battles. That would belong more properly to a study of the warfare of that age, and it is hoped that we shall soon have from Professor Oman something to throw a new light upon this domain. I should merely like to point out the persistence with which the tradition was adhered to—the brave folly—that the Kings themselves should fight in the thick of the battle. It was, of course, fatal to any proper direction of the battle, for the King had no idea what was going on in the rest of the field. In both the Seleueid battles described to us with any detail this was the main cause of defeat. Antioehus had ridden away in pursuit with the cavalry of the right wing when the critical moment came. And yet how characteristic it was of Seleueid rule as a whole!

We have tried to get some idea in outline of the constitution and fashion of the Seleueid realm. To do so is interesting, not so much as calling up the picture of things long passed away, but as studying a phase in the tradition which has come down even to us. For when Rome became an Empire with a monarchic court and system, it followed to a large extent, both in its inner principles and its external forms, the Greek kingdoms which it superseded. A real continuity of tradition bound the court and government of the Caesars to the court and government of Seleueid and Ptolemy, and the tradition sanctioned by the authority and majesty of the Roman name continued as a sort of ideal in the Middle Ages, shaping institutions which in their turn have gone to making the modern world. If by our custom classical literature is the main part of a liberal education, not so much for its inherent excellence as because it is the *origin* of our own culture, we may with equal reason trace the far-off ancestry of our systems of government in those kingdoms where the Greek first took in hand to rule in the seats of ancient monarchy.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A (p. 16)

Coins of this Xerxes have been found with the Greek legend **Βασιλέως Ξέρξου**, and showing a bearded head with the Armenian tiara (Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, pp. cxcv. 212). According to Marquart (*Philologus*, liv. p. 505) the Greek Xerxes represents in this case, not the Persian Kshayarsha, as it ordinarily does, but the Armenian Shaüareh. The theory which makes the Antioehus in question Antioehus Epiphanes may be dismissed. It is astonishing that Babelon should find any difficulty in there being three princesses with the same name Antioehis. As if there were anything more characteristic of these royal families than the recurrence of the same names !

APPENDIX B (p. 42)

A fragment quoted by Athenaeus as from the *Europaïca*, of Agatharchides of Cnidus (527 f. ; *F.H.G.* iii. p. 194) is thought by Meyer (*Gesch. ties Pontos*, p. 53, note) and Niese (ii. p. 640, note 5) to refer to this moment. The fragment runs—**Ἀρυκανδεῖς, φησι, Λυκίας, ὄμοροι ὄντες Λιμυρεῖσι, διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσωτίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν κατάχρεοι γινόμενοι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀργίαν καὶ φιληδονίαν ἀδυνατοῦντες ἀποδοῦναι τὰ δάνεια, προσέκλιναν ταῖς Μιθριδάτου ἐλπίσιν, ἄθλον ἔξεν νομίσαντες χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς.** The Mithridates referred to is supposed to be the son of Antioehus, who had been sent at the head of the land-forces to Sardis. It seems to me more likely that there is some mistake in the attribution of the passage to Agatharchides, and that it refers to the time when Asia Minor was convulsed by the conquests of the great Mithridates in 88 B.C. The expression **ταῖς Μιθριδάτου ἐλπίσιν** does not appear to fit negotiations in which a Mithridates acts as a mere subordinate (especially since there is nothing to show any activity of this Mithridates at all in Lyeia, and Antioehus was present in person), but rather points to the great expectations raised by the appearance of Mithridates Eupator in 88 as the saviour of Greek society.

APPENDIX C (p. 48)

Strabo xiii. 624 ; Michel, Nos. 291, 550. Niese (ii. p. 642) propounds the theory that a treaty by which Antioehus had recognized the rights of Attalus over the Ionian and Hellespontine cities lapsed with his death, and that the recovery of them by Antioehus had to do with this circumstance. As has been pointed out, the whole question of what the arrangement between Antioehus and Attalus after the fall of Aehaeus was is quite obscure. The comparison of Polyb. v. 77, 1, with iv. 48 would rather suggest that Aehaeus won back from Attalus much that the latter seized during Aehaeus' absence in Pisidia, so that we do not know whether, on the advent of Antioehus, Attalus stood possessed of anything outside his *πατρώα ἀρχή*.

APPENDIX D (p. 57)

Liv. xxxv. 13, 4. This Cleopatra was distinguished as *the Syrian* (App. Syr. 5). " And he (Antioehus) shall set his face to come with the strength of his whole kingdom, but (first) he shall make an equitable pact with him (Ptolemy), and he shall give him the daughter of women, to work ruin," Daniel 11, 17. What the terms of this equitable pact were was already a matter of controversy fifteen years after. The court of Alexandria contended that they included a retrocession of Cœle-Syria to Egypt as Cleopatra's dowry ; this the Seleueid court denied (Polyb. xxviii. 20, 9). The retrocession certainly did not take place. Most modern historians have accepted the explanation of Josephus (Arch. xii. § 155) that a *part of the taxes levied on Cade-Syria were granted to Egypt*. The difficulty in accepting this explanation lies in the fact that Poly bins, in passages dealing with the controversy, *shows no knowledge of such an arrangement*, whilst the statement of Josephus is accounted for by his having to find some way out of the contradiction in which his chronological confusion has involved him. He places the story of Joseph, who collects taxes for the *Egyptian* government, a generation too late. See Wellhausen, *Isra. u. jüd. Gesch.* (ed. 2), p. 232, *note*.

APPENDIX E (p. 163)

I incline to doubt, with Willrich (*Judaïca*, p. 58) and Böhler (*Tobiaden u. Oniaden*, p. 143 f.), the genuineness of the letters of Antioehus III, given by Joseph. Arch. xii. § 138 f., not so much because of any impossibility in them (which I do not think Willrich or Böhler succeeds in making out), but because of the readiness with which such documents were forged in post-Maccabæan times (see Willrich, *Juden u. Griechen, Judaïca*, *passim*). If, however, they are not genuine, they are forged by some one familiar with the history of the time and the style of such rescripts. He knew of Zeuxis, the governor of Lydia (perhaps from

Polybius), and Ptolemy, the son of Thraseas, the governor of Cœle-Syria. (In objecting that Ptolemy was made governor in 218, *Juden u. Griechen*, p. 40, Willrich is thinking of the date in which he was in the Egyptian service, Polyb. v. 65, 3. That he deserted to the Seleucid in 218 with Ceraeas and Hippolochus, Polyb. v. 70, 10, is a conjecture only. When he was made governor of Cœle-Syria there is absolutely nothing to show.) He is also right in exhibiting the Jews as friendly to Antiochus. The detail of the Egyptian garrison, not mentioned in our fragments of Polybius, may therefore be taken as true. That Antiochus should in such circumstances have shown some favours to the Jews and made presents to the Temple is in itself extremely likely.

APPENDIX F (p. 163)

The inscription is Michel, No. 1229. **Πτολεμαῖος Θρασέυ | στραταγὸς καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς Συρίας Κοίλας καὶ Φοινίκας | Ἑρμῇ καὶ Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ || βασιλεῖ μεγάλῳ Ἀντιόχῳ.** There are also traces of smaller administrative divisions, that, for instance, of the country this side of Jordan into Cœle-Syria (= Galilee ?), Phoenicia, Samaria and Judaea (Joseph. *Arch.* xii. §§ 154, 175 ; cf. Strabo xvi. 750). Idumaea is mentioned as a separate *eparchia* in 311, and for *eparchia* (equivalent to *hyparchia*, the subdivision of a satrapy) the term satrapy is sometimes loosely substituted (Diod. xix. 95, 2; cf. *ibid.* 98). We hear in the Maccabees of a *strategos* of Idumaea (2 Mace. 12, 32). Whether *meridarches* (1 Mace. 10, 65) is equivalent to *eparehos* is a question. Then we have the Egyptian term *nome* used for districts of Samaria—perhaps a legacy of the Ptolemaic rule (1 Mace. 11, 34 = Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 127). And this word is in Josephus exchangeable with **τοπαρχία** xiii. § 125). Judaea (under the Romans, but in accordance, no doubt, with an old system) is divided in 10 or 11 **τοπαρχίαι**. *Bel.* iii. § 54 ; Plin. v. § 70), to which again the term **κληρουχίαι** is applied. Gorgias is **στρατηγὸς τῶν τόπων** (2 Mace. 10, 14). It would obviously be hopeless to attempt to reconstruct the official organization from *literary* authorities ; they were not concerned to burden their readers with the precise use of each term, or give them clearer notions than an ordinary Englishman has of the Lieutenant-Governors, Magistrates, Collectors, Deputy Commissioners, etc., of the Anglo-Indian system).

APPENDIX G (p. 171)

According to 1 Mace, (followed by Sehürer) it was his *first* campaign of 170-169; according to 2 Mace, (followed by Niese) his "second expedition to Egypt" (*ΤΙΧΗ 8ε rov Kcupov TOYTOY ΤΙΤΩ Strepav a<f>o8ov 6 Ἀvrloxos ets Atyi>7nrov 60"ΤέτXaro, 5, 1*). This is generally taken to mean the expedition of 168, and, if so, there is, of course, an irreconcilable contradiction between the two books of the Maccabees. But I submit

that the expression of 2 Mace, may mean "second" in reference to the apparently abortive expedition of a few years before mentioned in ch. 4, 21. At that time Antiochus heard that Egypt was preparing war and came south with a force. (The force is proved by the word **κατεστρατοπέδωσεν**.) Antiochus therefore might perhaps be described as setting out in 170-169 for his second **ἀφοδος εἰς Αἴγυπτον**; it was the second time that Cœle-Syria had experienced the passage of an army led by the King against Egypt, although the first time that he actually attacked Egypt.

APPENDIX H (p. 176)

The accounts of the great victories won by the Jewish bands in these early days over superior numbers of the King's troops one might be inclined to attribute to the self-glorification of the Jews. But indeed men filled with religious enthusiasm are likely to perform prodigies against merely professional soldiers. The story of the rise of Mahdism echoes strangely the Maccabæan story. On the first signs of revolt, the Governor-general of the Sudan sends two companies to capture the Mahdi. The two captains quarrel, and the force is set upon by the bands of the Mahdi and killed *with nothing but simple sticks* (July 1881). A few months later the Mudir of Fashoda advances against the Dervishes. He is drawn into a forest and his whole force massacred, before they have time to alight from their camels. Then the Egyptian government (March 1882) sends a serious expedition from Khartum to co-operate with another from El Obeid. They effect a junction, but their camp is suddenly surprised in the early morning by the Mahdists, and only a few escape. And so on, till Gordon meets the fate of Nicanor (*Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp*). Nor was it only against the Egyptian soldiery that the Mahdists won their successes. Englishmen will not need to be reminded that, in spite of the disparity of arms, they were able to "break the British square."

APPENDIX I (p. 177)

Personally I think the case for this document a very strong one. One can imagine no possible reason for forging it. If a Jew had forged it he would have given some indication that Antiochus repented of his persecution—it is in fact adduced by Jason of Cyrene to prove this—but so far from doing so, Antiochus refers with satisfaction to his conduct in the past as having been beneficent.

Modern writers are apt to lose sight of something which the ancient Jewish writers did all they could to cover with oblivion—this Hellenizing Jewish community. It is one of the most interesting facts which Niese's *Kritikhns* brought out that in representing Jerusalem as desolate and the Temple courts overgrown with wild shrubs in 165, the writer of 1 Mace is intentionally making a vacuum where really there was a Hellenistic

population. The two accounts of what happened to the Temple, (1) that it was given over to heathen worship, (2) that it was forsaken, are in fact inconsistent.

APPENDIX J (p. 180)

The order of events in this part of Maccabaeen history is notoriously doubtful. A great deal, of course, turns upon whether the documents given in 2 Mace. 11 are genuine. I follow Niese in supposing that they are. But if so, certain things follow. (1) When they were written, in 165-164, at the end of the first invasion of Judaea by Lysias, the death of Antiochus Epiphanes was already known in Syria, and 1 Mace. is therefore wrong in putting the death of Antiochus in 164-163, after Lysias had returned to Antioch. (2) But it also follows that at the time when they were written *the insurgent Jews had not yet recovered possession of Jerusalem and the Temple*. The rescript of Antiochus Eupator to Lysias orders that the Temple shall be restored to them, and even if this might mean that their *de facto* possession of it shall be acknowledged, the next rescript, that to the Jewish *gerusia*, makes it plain that the nationalists had not yet re-entered the city. It grants them permission to do so, promising an amnesty to those who do so before the 30th of Xanthicus. And here the First Book of Maccabees comes in corroboratively, placing the recovery of Jerusalem and cleansing of the Temple *after* the expedition of Lysias. It may well be that it is also right in representing Lysias as *setting out* before the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. The most serious difficulty is that as to the date of the cleansing of the Temple, which is given in 1 Mace. 4, 52, as the 25th of Chislev, year 148, i.e. in December 165 B.C. Can the documents of 2 Mace. 11 have been written in one of the preceding months of the year 148, which only began by the government reckoning in the autumn? Three of the documents are dated exactly; the letter of Lysias to the Jews is dated Dioskorinthios 24, but the month signified is absolutely uncertain; the letter of the Romans, Xanthicus 15, but here Niese shows a corruption. Neither of these therefore helps us. The rescript of Antiochus V to the Jews remains, and this is dated Xanthicus 15. But here also there is surely some mistake, for the rescript gives the 30th of Xanthicus as the date *before which* the Jews must return in order to profit by it—a date ostensibly fifteen days only after it was given under the King's hand at Antioch! But in any case, if the nationalists returned to Jerusalem in consequence of the negotiations with Lysias, and Lysias began these negotiations after the death of Antiochus was known, and his death took place at the *earliest* in the autumn of 165, the cleansing of the Temple can hardly have come about as soon as December 165. We must therefore put it a year later, in December 164. The month and day (Chislev 25) are fixed by the annual celebration, but the celebration would not give the same guarantee for the correctness of the traditional year.

APPENDIX K (p. 199)

Bacchides is described as *κυριεύων ἐν τῷ πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ* (1 Mace. 7, 8). If this means that his province was east of the Euphrates, i.e. Mesopotamia, as Josephus understands the expression (*Arch.* xii. § 393), Judaea lay outside of it. Wellhausen points out that in the official language of the old Persian Empire "the country beyond the river" was the ordinary designation of Syria west of the Euphrates (i.e. from the standpoint of Babylon). That the old phrase in this sense continued to be used by a writer in Hebrew or Aramaic of the Maccabaeon age is, of course, *possible*, but hardly probable, seeing that it was inappropriate *both* from the writer's point of view, *and* from that of the government whose seat had been west of the Euphrates for 150 years. There are other apparent instances under the Seleucids of governors being employed outside their provinces on special business; we find Diocles, the governor of the Parapotamia, commanding a division of the army of Antiochus III in Phoenicia (Polyb. v. 69, 5), and Diogenes, the satrap of Media (?), commanding under the same Antiochus in Hyrcania (Polyb. x. 29, 5; cf. v. 54, 12).

APPENDIX L (p. 202)

The question of the alliance of Judas with Rome is a controverted one. It resolves itself into two separate questions: (1) Did Judas have any friendly dealings with Rome? and (2) Is the treaty, as given in 1 Mace. 8, genuine? In regard to the first, Niese (*Kritik*, p. 88) and Schürer i. (1901), p. 220, note 32, maintain against Willrich and Wellhausen the view that Judas did enter into negotiations with Rome and secure the friendship of the Republic (Niese doubts an *alliance*). In regard to the second, the genuineness of the document (as a re-translation into Greek from a Hebrew translation of the original) is defended by Schürer (*loc. cit.*); it is regarded by Willrich (*Judaica*, p. 71 f.) as a genuine document, but relating not to Judas Maccabaeus, but to Judas Aristobulus (Aristobulus I); it is regarded by Niese as a forgery of the author of 1 Mace. (*Kritik*, p. 89).

APPENDIX M (p. 207)

Our Greek sources all speak of Alexander as an impostor, and this came to be the general opinion. Polybius evidently pronounced the business a fraud, and he was the main source from which later historians drew. As the line of Alexander came to a speedy end, the opinion maintained under the later Seleucids, descendants of Demetrius, was naturally adverse to Alexander. On the whole, it seems to me probable that Alexander was an impostor, but unless we have reason to believe

that later on some one concerned in the deception (e.g. Attalus or Ptolemy Philometor) made an avowal, I do not see that we can speak positively. As to the age of the boy, since Eupator was born in 174 or thereabouts, the real Alexander cannot have been born before 173, and would therefore be, at the oldest, fourteen in 159.

APPENDIX N (p. 218)

1 Mace. 10, 67 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 86. Josephus paraphrases the ἦλθεν . . . εἰς τὴν γῆν τῶν πατέρων αὐτοῦ of 1 Macc. by κατέπλευσεν εἰς Κιλικίαν. If this is right and Josephus is supplementing 1 Mace, from some other source, Demetrius was presumably taken to Cilicia that he might there threaten Alexander from the safety of the hills, as Alexander had threatened Demetrius I, and at the same time raise more mercenaries in Cilicia, where the condition of things was like that in Crete. On the other hand I cannot help suspecting that ΚΙΑΙΚΙΑΝ is here also a copyist's error for ΣΕΑΕΥΚΕΙΑΝ, as it probably is in § 145. Josephus may then have put in the name simply as an inference from what he knew from 1 Mace, that Demetrius came to his father's kingdom but did not immediately get Antioch; Seleucia was the natural place to land. If so, the later relations of Seleucia and the legitimate house bear out the inference.

APPENDIX O (p. 220)

1 Mace. 11, 8 f.; Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 106 f.; Diod. xxxii. 9^c; Liv. *Epit.* lii. Josephus is here following another source beside 1 Mace. He is the only authority who mentions Ammonius in this matter and Ptolemaïs as the scene of the alleged plot. This source is the same as that followed by Diodorus; cf. Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλομήτωρ ἐπικληθεὶς . . . εἰς Συρίαν ἦκε, συμμαχήσων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ. γαμβρὸς γάρ ἦν αὐτοῦ. Joseph. *loc. cit.*, and ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλομήτωρ ἦκεν εἰς Συρίαν, συμμαχήσων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διὰ οἰκειότητα. Diod. *loc. cit.* περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας συντιθέμενος τὴν τε θυγατέρα δώσειν αὐτῷ ὑπὸ σπονδύμενος γυναῖκα, Joseph., and τὴν μὲν θυγατέρα Κλεοπάτραν ἀνίγαγε πρὸς Δημήτριον καὶ συντιθέμενος φιλίαν ἐνεγύρῃσεν αὐτῷ ταύτην, Diod.

APPENDIX P (p. 223)

The point of his being given the surname of Nicator, or the God Nicator, is fairly obvious. After the usurpation of the impostor, the true line signalizes its return by the surname which belonged to the Founder of the House. The point of Philadelphia is much harder to see. It sometimes points to the marriage of brother and sister, but Demetrius' wife was Cleopatra of Egypt. The younger brother of

Demetrius, Antiochus, was still in Asia Minor, and does not appear upon the scene till later. I can only suggest that the brother pointed at is Antigonus, who had been murdered under Alexander, and that the name was intended to give the reprisals upon the party of Alexander the colour of a pious duty. If Antigonus was the eldest son and heir-apparent, the second son, whom his untimely fate raised to the throne, might with decency commemorate the dead brother in his surname.

APPENDIX Q (p. 321)

The title **Αὐτοκράτωρ** is not found on the coins of any other Greek or Macedonian king. (Later on it is borne by some of the Arsacids after 77 B.c, Wroth. *Num. Ghron.* 1900, p. 193.) Its meaning is somewhat problematical, as it is used in various connexions—often in the classical writers of ambassadors or generals *given full discretion*. It cannot but have some reference here to the peculiar circumstances of Tryphon's elevation. Its distinctive use as a translation of the Latin "imperator" would hardly occur in Syria till later. But it is found in one connexion which seems to throw light on its use here. The Macedonian kings (Philip, Alexander, Antiochus III) who were elected as "captains-general" of the free states of Greece bore in that capacity the title of **στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ** (Diod. xvi. 89; Arr. *Anab.* vii. 9, 5; App. *Syr.* 12). Tryphon may have intended to assimilate his position to theirs, as having been elected by the free Greco-Macedonian states of Syria.

APPENDIX R (p. 232)

He would be older, if his younger brother Antiochus was born in 164, as Wilcken (*Pauly-Wissowa*, i. p. 2478) concludes from the statement of Eus. i. p. 255 that Antiochus was thirty-five at his death in 129. But the statement is certainly mistaken, since we may be sure that Demetrius I did not take his official wife till after his accession in 162-161. I should bring into connexion with the assumption of the government by Demetrius II personally, on his attaining manhood, the words of Eus. i. p. 255, 256, "regnabatque clx olompiadis anno **χειροῦται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔτη γ΄**. 01. 160, 1, is 140-139 B.c.; this date would exactly fit the hypothesis that Demetrius was born about 160. The unreflecting phraseology of our sources, which speak of the abominations of the early reign of Demetrius as if they were the outcome of his own tyrannic nature, blind even modern writers to the fact that we are dealing with a mere boy, who politically can have done neither good nor evil.

APPENDIX S (p. 234)

We hear of a war between the Parthians and Medes about this time, in which the Medes are spoken of as an independent people, Just. xli. 6, 6.

But it is possible that the Medes of Lesser Media (Atropatene) are intended. Gutschmid's proof of the independence of Media from Dionysius the Mede and his inference "Das kann nur ein Sohn des Timarchus gewesen sein" (*Irân*, p. 52) seem singularly inconclusive. That Dionysius was an independent ruler of Media is nowhere said; on the contrary, he is called a general of Demetrius. The employment of a Mede (a Greek from one of the colonies in Media?) in Mesopotamia no more bears upon the relations between the Seleucid King and Media than the employment of the Milesian Heraclides and Timarchus upon the relations of Antiochus Epiphanes with the city of Miletus.

APPENDIX T (p. 251)

There is something very suspicious about the strong Oriental cast of the head of Antiochus Grypos. In the case of a woman like Cleopatra the doubts expressed by Swift as to royal pedigrees cannot be dismissed as incredible. But it may be urged for Grypos being true-born that the hook nose at any rate appears in his uncle Antiochus Sidetes and in a less pronounced degree in his grandfather Demetrius Soter. How it came into the family has never, so far as I know, been discovered. The wife of Antiochus III was a Pontic princess, but neither of his sons shows an aquiline nose. The wife of Seleucus IV (Laodice) *may* have been an Oriental; so may the wife of Demetrius Soter.

APPENDIX U (p. 256)

It will be seen that I refer the two documents given by Joseph. *Arch.* xiii. § 260 and xiv. § 247 f. to the conflicts between Cyzicenus and the Jews. The question has gathered about it a voluminous controversy; the references will be found in Schürer i. p. 263. Schürer himself takes the view that the documents refer to the conquests of Antiochus *Sidetes* before his taking of Jerusalem. The objections to this view are (1) that it requires us to suppose that "Antiochus the son of Antiochus" in the second document is a blunder for Antiochus the son of *Demetrius*, and (2) the war spoken of in the first document is *over*, τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκεῖνον λεηλατηθέντα. This last objection seems to me conclusive against Schürer's view. On the other hand, neither of the objections against the view here adopted seems to me insurmountable. They are (1) that Josephus represents the encounters between Cyzicenus and the Jews as resulting in uniform *defeat* for Cyzicenus. But Josephus was a Jewish historian! (2) A Seleucid king of this age would not have been strong enough to make such conquests. But this is a *petitio principii*. It is true that the power of the Seleucid princes was *politically* tottering, but this does not prevent their having, as captains of mercenary troops, moments of military strength, when they might make a successful *coup*.

APPENDIX V (p. 259)

With regard to the coins assigned to Antiochus Cyzicenus, I may observe that Professor Oman has expressed to me a doubt whether they all belong to one king. They appear to him, especially those in his own collection, to show two distinct types of face. If this can be proved, we should have either to assign one of these portraits to Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, or suppose the existence of another King Antiochus, which is, of course, quite possible, and would be borne out by the difficulty of reconciling the statements as to Antiochus Eusebes (p. 263, note 1) and Antiochus Asiaticus (p. 263, note 4). But on a numismatic question of this kind I feel unqualified to give any independent opinion.

APPENDIX W (p. 259)

If we combine the notices of our authorities, there is one Selene whose husbands are (1) Ptolemy Soter, Just. xxxix. 3, 2; (2) Grypos, "hostis prioris mariti," *ibid.* 4, 4; (3) Cyzicenus, App. Syr. 69; (4) Antiochus X Eusebes, *ibid.* Now her son by this last husband, Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, is a boy in 75 (Cic. Verr. Act II. iv, 27 f.). He may therefore have been born about 90. If Selene was fifteen, let us say, when she married Soter in 116, this would make her *at least forty* in 90 B.C. Under the circumstances, I suspect that there is a confusion in our authorities between two Ptolemaic princesses called Selene, though at what point we are to divide the single personality given us by our sources I do not know.

APPENDIX X (p. 277)

The fragments were published by Cronert in the *Sitzungsb. d. Berlin. Akad.* (1900), p. 943. See also Usener in *Rhein. Mm.* N.F. lvi. (1901), p. 145 f. The most important passages for our purpose are the following, CrÖnert, p. 947, καὶ ἀνέβαιν' ἐς τὴν αὐλὴν, ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ φιλολόγων πλῆθος ὡς προσώπῳ μόνον διαλάσσον· ὁ δὲ ἐξῆς τῆς σχολῆς περιέχεσθαι ἤδη καὶ προκοπὴν μεγίστην ποιέσθαι . . . ; p. 953, τοῦ Ἐπιφάνους ἡλλοτριωμένου πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν Φιλωνίδης αὐτὸν αἵρετιστὴν τῶν λόγων ἐπόησεν, συντάγματ' ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι πέντε ἐκδεδωκώς καὶ ἐνέχους ὑπομνηματισμούς . . . ; p. 953, ὁ βασιλεὺς Δημήτριος ἐχαρίσατο Φιλωνίδει, ἐφ' ᾧ συνδιατρίψει αὐτοῦ καὶ συνσχολάσει. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις καλῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως καὶ ἐνδόξως ἀνεστράφη. εἰς μὲν γὰρ συμβούλιον καὶ πρεσβείαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἀπλῶς αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔδωκεν, . . . ἦσε δὲ . . .

APPENDIX Y (to Chapter xxxii).

I purposely abstain from attempting to deal with the question of the Seleucid financial system. The details of such a system are of any human interest only when the system can be known with some completeness, and its relation to the life of the people and to other systems made out—as, for instance, the papyri allow us to do to a large extent in the Ptolemaic kingdom. Our data for the Seleucid realm are fragmentary at the best, and utterly uncertain. The principal documents which bear on the subject are the letters of Demetrius I and Demetrius II in 1 Mace. 10, 25 f. and 11, 32 f., which show points of contact with the Ptolemaic system (Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka*, vol. i.), but the genuineness of the letters is questionable (Willrich, *Judäira*, p. 55 f.). The treatise called *Oeconomica*, and wrongly ascribed to Aristotle, is thought in ii. 1, where the βασιλικὴ οἰκονομία and the σατραπικὴ οἰκονομία is distinguished, to reflect the Seleucid system, but here again the description is slight and the interpretation doubtful, even if the reference to the Seleucid system were certain. Of course, further discoveries may throw such light on the subject that these data may acquire new value. But at present it seems to me waste of time to construct a theory which must be imperfect and highly conjectural.

APPENDIX Z

(THE ARAMAIC NICKNAMES)

Three perhaps of the Seleucid kings bore nicknames of an Aramaic origin; two certainly did, Alexander *Balas* and Alexander *Zabinas*; the third is Demetrius II, who after his return from captivity was called, according to the Armenian Eusebius, *Siripides*. The latter name is currently explained, after Niebuhr's conjecture (*Kleine Schrift.* i. p. 298), as derived from an Aramaic word ܚܝ (Hebrew חַי, meaning a *chiin*).

In explanation of these names I have received from my brother a letter, which I cannot do better than give in its own words. "It seems to me very likely that *Balas* is the Semitic Ba'lâ (which might be either Aramaic or Phœnician), but I do not see how such a name could be given as a *nickname*, and therefore I cannot help thinking that Schürer is right in supposing that Alexander was so called originally. Ba'lâ. is an abbreviation of some compound proper name, in which Ba'l meant the deity. Proper names formed with ܠܐ are very common in Phœnician, and also occur in Aramaic. Compound names are often shortened by substituting a termination, such as -a, for the second word, just as in Greek we find 'Ερμάς, 'Απολλῶς, etc., for 'Ερμογένης, 'Απολλόδωρος, or some such forms. I believe that these abbreviated forms were particularly common as the names of *slaves*, and therefore a name like *Balas* might certainly be borne by a slave or freedman of Semitic extraction even at a place

such as Smyrna." [Might not just this servile association make its use as a nickname intelligible?—E. R. B.]

"*Siripides* 1 cannot explain, but it is very improbable that it has anything to do with the Hebrew שִׁירָה, as the *p* would then have no *raison d'être*.

"*Zabinas* is זַבִּינָא, *i.e.* 'bought,' a well-known Aramaic proper name which occurs in the Old Testament (Ezra 10, 43). Originally it must have meant 'bought from the Deity,' by means of prayers, sacrifices, etc."

INDEX

- Abae*, in Arabia, ii. 221
'Abd-susin, i. 80
Abila, i. 317 ; ii. 37
Aborra., river, i. 221.⁵ See *Chaburas*
Absalom, Jewish envoy, ii. 180
Abydos, besieged by Lysimachus, i. 117 ;
 by Philip, ii. 83, 34 ; occupied by Antiochus III, 4.4, 45, 48, 89, 90 ; besieged by the Romans, 95 ; evacuated by Antiochus, 106
Acamania, ii. 80-82
Acesines, river, i. 294
*Achaean*s, the, at war with Nabis, ii. 67 ; co-operate with Rome against Antiochus III, 73, 74 ; their contingent at Pergamos, 101 ; at Magnesia, 109 ; embassy of Seleucus IV to A., 123 ; Achaean embassy to Alexandria, 138 ; Ptolemy VII asks the A. for troops, 143
Achaemenes, house of ; its rise to power, i. 4, 241 ; residences of the kings, 41, 241, 258 ; their home in Persis, 42, 47 ; the diadem their symbol of royalty, i. 57 ; ii. 274 ; their hoards, i. 63 ; their supremacy threatened by provincial nobility, 89 ; their *paradisois*, 158¹ ; they profess Zoroastrianism, 259 ; their palace in Ecbatana, i. 264 ; ii. 18 ; their relations with Bactria, i. 275 ; the Arsacids claim affiliation to them, 286 ; their tradition continued by the Seleucids, i. 308 ; ii. 269 f. See also *Persian Empire*
Achaeus (1), father-in-law of Seleucus ii, i. 157, 202, 204, 269 ; ii. 270
 — (2), grandson of preceding, assumes government on death of Seleucus III, i. 300 ; given full powers in Asia Minor, 301, 325 ; his loyalty suspected, 302 ; assumes diadem, 311 ; allied with Egypt, 315 ; his rule in Asia Minor and his end, ii. 1-13, 295
Achaia, city in Aria, i. 269
Achats, city in Media, i. 265
Acilius Glabrio, Manius, ii. 80, 82-85
Ada, princess of Caria, i. 92
Adana, ii. 151
Adaraksh, i. 263
Adar-GusJuisp, i. 263
Adam, battle of, ii. 202 .
Adida, \l. 229, 230
Adirra, ii. 230
Adravnjtium, i. 117 ; ii. 101
Adali, i. 186
Aegae (in Aeolis), ii. 4
Aegiumm, ii. 79
Aegium, ii. 73
A elitus, Publius, ii. 59
Aemilius Paullus, Lucius, ii. 145
Aemilius Regillus, Lucius, ii. 98, 99 ; moves to Elaea, 100 ; divides the fleet, 101 ; goes to Teos, 104 ; defeats Polyxenidas, 105
Aenus (1), on the Euphrates, i. 220
 — (2), in Thrace, ii. 33, 100
Aeolis, *Aeolian*, i. 104,³ 105,³ 203 ; Seleucus Philopator in Aeolis, ii. 94, 96, 97, 99, 101
*Aeschri*on, general of Demetrius II, ii. 233
Aethiopian elephants, i. 186 ; ii. 289, 290
Aetolia, *Aetolians*, coins of Antiochus I with Aetolian emblem, i. 127² ; League mediates between Ptolemy and Antiochus III, 314 ; its place in grouping of powers, ii. 31, 36 ; includes Lysimachia, 49¹ ; embittered towards Rome, 54, 56 ; action of Aetolians before Antiochus' invasion, 66-68 ; receive Antiochus, 70, 71 ; co-operate with Antiochus in Greece, 78-85 ; maintain war after flight of Antiochus, 86, 87 ; granted armistice, 100
Aetolian mercenaries, ii. 286 ; in Hyrcania, ii. 19. See *Timarchus* (1), *Theodotus* (2), *Nicolaus*, *Dorymenes*, *Scopas* (2), *Thoas*, *Dicaearchus*, *Damocritus*
Agathocles (1), son of Lysimachus, i. 65-67, 70, 71, 120, 130
 — (2), *eparch* of Persis (?), i. 286⁵
 — (3), favourite of Ptolemy IV, ii. 32¹
Agathon of Pydna, i. 245
Agasilaus, Spartan king, i. 8
Ahuramazda, i. 259, 260
Ajalon, valley of, ii. 178
Alabanda, i. 166 ; ii. 43, 98. See *Menyllus*
Alcaeus, the poet, i. 8, 240
Alcetas, brother of Perdicas, i. 95
Alcimus, the High-priest, ii. 199-201, 203, 204

Alcomenac, i. 40

Alexander (1) the Great, nature of his conquests, i. 22, 23, 24; his death, 28, 250; his Oriental proclivities, 29, 42, 262; the marriage at Susa, 31; he transports Greeks to Bactria, 32; money promised by him, 36; he appoints Stamenes to Babylonia, 37²; his relations with Peucestas, 42; he builds ships in Babylon, 45; his diadem put on by Seleucus, 69; Paphlagonians send an embassy to him, 81; his policy with regard to native races of Asia Minor, 91-93; he dispossesses Mithridates of Cius, 96; his policy with regard to the Greek cities, 100-110, 161; tradition of his founding Smyrna, 116⁵; Alexandria Troas named after him, 120; his salutation by the Ammonian oracle, 121¹; he receives divine honours, 126, 177; Antiochus 1 sees him in a dream, 143; tradition of his erecting altar at Apamea, 215; perhaps the founder of Nicopolis, 219; and of Nicephorium, 220; he re-founds Haran as Carrhae, 222; his siege of Tyre, 229; he develops navigation in Babylonia, 243; his conquest of Babylon, 245; his last days in Babylon, 246, 247; he consults Babylonian soothsayers, 256; appoints Atropates to Media, 263; founds cities in Media, 264, 265; founds Alexandropolis in Nisa, 266; colonizes Aria, 268; Margiana and Drangiana, 270; Arachosia, 271; coast of Indian Ocean, 273; enters India by Khaibar pass, 273, 274, 292; founds Oadrusi, 274; meets with resistance in Bactria, 275; colonizes Bactria and Sogdiana, 276; appoints Tlepolemus to Carmania, 278; has the Empire measured, 281; his treasurer, 282; he orders the exploration of the Caspian, 282; represses Zoroastrian customs, 2y0; Chandragupta and Alexander, 295; altars erected by A. beside the Hyphasis, 296; his influence on India, 298; colonizes Samaria, ii. 164; his relations with the army, 271; story of his wearing divine insignia, 275; his attempt to introduce *prosl-yues* *Is*, 278; A. polygamous, 279

- (2), son of Alexander the Great, i. 33-35, 37, 50, 57, 93
- (3), son of Cassander, i. 64
- (4), son of Lysimachus, i. 71, 128¹
- (5), son of Antiochus I, i. 169, 193, 324, 325, 327
- (6), name of Seleucus III before his accession, i. 204
- (7) 11 of Epirus, i. 299³
- (8), brother of Molon, i. 301, 308
- (9), the Acarnanian, ii. 63, 86
- (10) Balas, brought forward by Eumenes,

209; in Rome, *ib.*; establishes himself in Ptolemaïs, 210; defeats Demetrius, 211; his reign, 212-221; question of his identity, 299

Alexander (11) Zabinas, his reign, 249-252

— (12) Jannaeus, king of the Jews, ii. 257; the Jews rebel against him, 261; he tries to stop Antiochus XII, 262

Alexandria (1) in Egypt; its value as harbour, i. 146; its medical schools, 179; its degeneracy, 223; its literary movement, 230; university, 231; preparations in A. to meet attack of Antiochus III, 314; popular rising in A., ii. 30; people elect Ptolemy Euergetes II, 136; A. besieged, 140; A. invites Seleucid princes to Egypt, 268

— (2) Troas, i. 120, 160, 199; ii. 2, 68, 107

— (3) in Syria, i. 216; ii. 152

— (4) on the Eulaeus, i. 247, 255⁹; ii. 23⁹; restored by Antiochus IV, 160

— (5) in MeBene, i. 247, 255⁹

— (6) in Aria, i. 268, 269,¹ 270

— (7) in Margiana, i. 270

— (8) in Arachosia, i. 268, 270, 271, 273, 329

— (9) among Oritae, i. 273, 279, 330

— (10) in Macarene, i. 273

— (11) "on the Caucasus," i. 274, 279

— (12) Eschate, i. 276, 279

— (13) Oxiana, i. 277

— (14) near Baetra, i. 277

— (15) in Carmania, i. 278

*Alexandropoli*s) i. 266

A htopia, i. 321

Amanus, mountain, i. 67, 68, 209, 219, 230

Amardns, river, i. 263

Amániris (=Amestris), i. 134, 135

Amcstris, niece of Darius Codomannus, i. 117, 119

Amisus, i. 80, 104,³ 111, 112

A mitrochades. See *Biadusdra*

Ammon, ii. 275

Ammonian oracle, i. 121

Ammonite country, ii. 171, 172, 182²

Ami nonius, minister of Balas, ii. 213-215; bribed by Marathus, 217; accused by Ptolemy, 219; his death, 220

Amnias, river, i. 96, 154

Amphilochus, mythical hero, i. 230

Amphimachus, satrap of Mesopotamia, i. 44, 47

Amphipolis (1), in Macedonia, ii. 145.

See *Apollodorus* (3), *Metrodorus*

— (2) on the Euphrates, i. 220

Amyce, plain of, i. 211

Amynatder, king of the Athamanians, ii. 75, 76, 83

Amyntas, general of Antigonos, i. 97

Anagnia, ii. 189, 191, 192

- Anahila*, *Anaitis* (*Nanaea*), i. 2(50); ii. 18, 160=Artemis Persike, i. 226
- Anaximbrotes*, satrap of Phrygia, i. 177
- Anayra*, i. 141, 154²; battle of A., 194, 195, 198, 285, 288
- Andragoras*, dynast of Partliia, i. 284, 287, 288
- Andrixice*, ii. 42
- Andriscus* of Adramyttinm, ii. 208, 209
- Androinachus*, i. 202, 204²; ii. 2
- Andron*, pirate captain, i. 118
- Andronims* (1), commander in Ephesus, ii. 97
- (2), agent of Antiochus IV. ii. 128, 171
- Andros*, the island, i. 113; ii. 86
- Androsthene*s of Cyzicus, general of Antiochus III, ii. 23
- Anemurium*, ii. 39
- Antalcudas*, Peace of, i. 88, 101
- Antigenes*, Macedonian chief, i. 34, 35, 43, 46, 247
- Antigouia* (1) in Syria, i. 63, 211-213
- (2)—Nicaea, i. 115
- (3)=Alexandria Troas, i. 115
- Antigonas* (1) the One-eyed; A. and the Cossaeans, i. 23²; satrap of Phrygia, opposes Perdiccas, 33 f.; at Triparadisns, 36, 37; conquers Asia, 40-49; his war with Cassander, Lysimacinius, Ptolemy and Seleucns, 51-60; battle of Ipsns and death of A., 59, 60; his treatment of the Phrygians, 91; his action with regard to the unsubdued races of Asia Minor, 94-97; with regard to the Greek cities, 106, 111-117; receives divine honours, 126; Doeimus, his lieutenant, 130; his capital, Celaenae, 151, 164; respects freedom of Erythrae, 161; embassy of Ilian Body to A., 162²; his foundation of Antigouia in Syria, 211, 212; guided by warning of the Chalciaaeus, 256; his action in the eastern satrapies, 271, 274, 277, 278; joined by Pithon the son of Agenor, 294; relations of A. to the army, ii. 271
- (2) Gonatas, in Central Greece, i. 128; attacks Ptolemy Keraunos, 129; checked in Central Greece, 132; his war with Antiochus I, 135; of. 324; becomes king in Macedonia, 144; marries Phila, 145; battle of Cos, 150; left guardian of children of Niomedes, 156, 173; defeats Sophron, 188¹
- (3) Boson, i. 205
- , *house of*, takes root in Macedonia, i. 145. For the Antigonid kingdom see *Macedonia*
- (4), son of Demetrius Soter, ii. 214, 300
- Antilibanus*, mountain, i. 23, 207, 216
- Antioch* (1), on the oroutes ("near Daphne"), cradle of first Gentile church, i. 20; Seleucus I at Antioch, 63, 64, 69; chief capital of the Empire under Antiochus I (?), 151; court of Antiochus II and Berenice fixed there, 179; Berenice at Antioch, 181-183; A. captured by Ptolemy III, 185, 186; Seleucus II has his seat of government at A., 191; satrapy of A., 208; A. accessible to ships, 210; description of A., 211-214; route from A. to the East, 217; magistrates of A., 223¹; its literary standing, 225; temple of Artemis Persike, 226; custom of Aramaean population, 228¹; its rise in dignity under Seleucus II, 236; rebellion of Stratonice, 237; inscription of A. (1) 254⁴; Zoroastrian temple, 291; Antiochus III at A. 303; party favourable to Acliaeus, ii. 10; residences of Antiochus III at A., 38, 52, 57; Roman customs introduced by Antiochus IV, 131; *epheboi* of A., 146; additions of Antiochus IV, 149-151; A. clamours for restoration of Andriscus, 209; governed by Hierax and Diodotus, 214; rebels against Balas, 218; first great earthquake, 218⁴; oilers diadem to Ptolemy, 220; receives Demetrius II, 221; Cretan oppression, 221; A. rebels, 225; receives Tryphon, 227; captured by Antiochus Sidetes, 238; its bereavement after battle in Media, 247; rebels against Demetrius II, 248; receives Zabinas, 249; arrival of the body of Sidetes, 251 rises against Zabinas, 252; federation of *adelphoi dnooi*, 252¹; Grypos reigns there, 253; held by Cyzicenus and recaptured by Grypos, 254; attacked by Antiochus XI and Philip, 260; captured by Demetrius III, ib; by Philip, 261; in possession of Tigranes, 263, 265; receives Antiochus XIII, 266; receives Philip II, 267; opposes restoration of Selacids, *ib.*; assembly of A. and assembly of army, 272; public library of A., 276; lake of A., i. 211, 212
- A idior.h* (2) in Pieria, i. 216
- (3) Lamotis, i. 148
- (4) near Cragus (perhaps identical with preceding), i. 148
- (5) *7rapdio?*, i. 148⁷
- (6) on the Meander, i. 165; ii. 47, 112
- (7) in Pisidia, i. 165
- (8) *irl rf* Tatfpy, i. 219
- (9) Arabia, i. 222^o
- (10) in Sittacene, i. 255
- (11) in Persis, i. 265, 280
- (12) in Margiana, i. 270
- (13) in Scythia, i. 277
- (14) in Lydia, ii. 151⁵
- (15) on the Euphrates, ii. 152
- (16) near Hippus, ii. 152

- Antioch*, also name of Adana, Alabanda, Alexandria (5), Cebrene, Edessa, Gadara, Jerusalem, Nisibis, Nysa, Ptolemais, Tarsus, Tralles (**g.v.**)
- Antiochis* (1), daughter of Achaeus, i. 157, 199
- (2), sister of Antiochus III, ii. 16
 - (3), daughter of Antiochus III, queen of Cappadocia, ii. 60, 157, 185
 - (4), concubine of Antiochus IV, ii. 132
- Antiochus* (1), father of Seleucus I, i. 30, 321
- (2) I Soter; with Seleucus at Ipsus, i. 59; viceroy of the eastern provinces, i. 64, 69, 70; ii. 272; his marriage with Stratonice, i. 64; Seleucus intends to resign Asia to him, 72; his gift to Miletus, 121; his accession, 74, 75; his reign, 127-170; receives divine honours, 177; A. and cities of Syria, 210, 233, 234, 236; his inscription in Babylon, 255; encourages Berosus, 256; A. as city-builder in Irân, 265, 268, 269, 270, 279, 280; his correspondence with Bindusâra, 297; his war with Antigonus Gonatas, 324; patron of Aratus, ii. 276
 - (3) II Theos, associated as co-king with his father, i. 150,³ 169; his reign, 171-180; foundation of Themisonium, 166; concedes autonomy to Aradus, 236; rise of Arsacid power goes back to his reign, 285, 286
 - (4) Hierax, 179, 181,¹ 191-203, 236
 - (5) III, "the Great King," in eastern provinces during reign of his brother, i. 204; his reign, i. 300—ii. 120; exacts tribute of the Greek cities, i. 160; his work in Antioch, 213; appoints High-priest at Daphne, 214; his cult at Antioch-in-Persis, 280; his title of Great King, ii. 270;] patron of Euphorion, 276; he dances the armed dance at dinner, 278; mates Hegesianax a Friend, 282³; his compact with Attalus, 295
 - (6), eldest son of Antiochus III, ii. 17, 37; marries his sister Laodice, ii. 52, 279; receives Hannibal, 53; sent back to Syria from Asia Minor, 57; his death, 62
 - (7) IV Epiphanes; taken as hostage to Rome, ii. 112, 114; exchanged for Demetrius, 124; his reign, 126-177; his relations with Philonides, 275
 - (8) V Eupator, associated in the throne, ii. 136; left in charge of Lysias, 158; his reign, 178-187; his death, 193, 194
 - (9) VI Dionysus, confided to Yamlik, ii. 220; proclaimed by Tryphon in Apamea, 226; received by Antioch, 227; murdered by Tryphon, 230
 - (10) VII Euergetes (Sidetes), sent out of Syria by his father, ii. 210; his reign, 236-246; his body sent to Antioch, 251; his title of Great King, 270; his army, 291
- Antiochus* (11) VIII Philometor (Grypos); educated at Athens, ii. 250, 277; his reign, 250-259; his **ἐπιστολογράφος**, 282; whence his nose? 301
- (12) IX Philopator (Cyzicenus), sent out of Syria by Cleopatra, ii. 248; his reign, 253-259; his conquests from the Jews, 302
 - (13) X Eusebes, ii. 259, 260; his end, 263¹
 - (14) XI Philadelphus, ii. 260
 - (15) XII Dionysus, ii. 261, 262
 - (16) XIII (Asiaticus), in Rome, ii. 263; in Syria, 266, 267
 - (17) I of Commagene, ii. 258²
 - (18) Philopappus, Gaius Julius, ii. 268
 - (19), Friend of Ptolemy III, i. 189, 189⁵
- Antipater* (1), governor of Macedonia for Alexander the Great, i. 32-37, 43, 62, 106, 128,¹ 144
- (2), son of Cassander, i. 64, 65
 - (3), nephew of Cassander, i. 128,¹ 144
 - (4), governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, i. 137
 - (5), Stoic philosopher, i. 231
 - (6), nephew of Antiochus III, i. 320; ii. 109, 111, 112
- Anyta* of Tegea, i. 139
- Aous*, river, ii. 76
- Apama* (1), daughter of Spitamenes, wife of Seleucus I, i. 31, 64, 164
- (2), daughter of Antiochus I, wife of Magas, i. 146, 169, 178, 183
 - (3), wife of King Amyndander, ii. 75
- Apamea* (1) on the Axius (Orontes), founded by Seleucus I, 68, 214, 215; dependent towns, 216; war with Larissa, 224; base of Antiochus III's attack on Cœle-Syria, 305, 306, 311, 312; family of Hermias stoned there, 311; A. strikes money under Antiochus IV, ii. 152; Antiochus VI proclaimed there, 226; last stand of Tryphon, 238; rebels against Demetrius II, 248; one of the *adelphoi demoi*, 252¹
- (2), on the Euphrates *zeugma*, i. 32,⁴ 220, 221
 - (3) Kibotos (Celaenae), i. 164, 165, 168; Antiochus III at A., ii. 62, 99; Seleucus Philopator flees thither • after Magnesia, 110; Peace of A., 113
 - (4) Dama, i. 32,⁴ 99
 - (5) in Mesene, i. 255
 - (6) in Sittacene, i. 255
 - (7), Rhagiana, i. 265; ii. 119²
- Apaorteni*, i. 289
- Apasiacae*, the, i. 289
- Apaturius*, the Gaul, i. 205, 300
- Aphaerma*, ii. 224

- Aphrodisias* (1) in Cilicia, i. 39
 — (2) in Aeolis, ii. 101
Aphrodisium, the, i. 198
Aphrodisius, i. 122, 123
Aphrodite, ii. 275; of Praxiteles, 155²;
 A. Stratoniceis at Smyrna, i. 177, 188, 189
Apollo, i. 139; ii. 74; of Daphne, i. 209, 214; ii. 150, 171; of Xanthus, i. 84; Didymaeon, i. 53, 110, 121, 184, 283; ii. 46; see *Branchidae*; Antiochus I worshipped as Apollo, i. 142; A., divine ancestor of Seleucids, 121, 285; ii. 275
Apollodorus (1) of Tarsus, i. 232
 — (2), father of King Philocles, i. 235
 — (3) of Amphipolis, i. 245
 — (4) of Artemita, i. 256
 — (5), satrap of Susiana, i. 309
 — (6), Athenian popular leader, ii. 73
Apollonia (1) in Phrygia, i. 108²
 — (2) in Sittacene, i. 255; Apolloniatis, i. 255, 303, 307, 308
 — (3) in Illyria, ii. 66, 72, 79
Apollonides, friend of Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 68
Apollonis, queen of Pergamos, i. 199, 200
Apollonius (1), commander of fleet, ii. 103
 — (2), friend of Seleucus IV, ii. 128, 191
 — (3), envoy of Antiochus IV to Rome, ii. 133
 — (4), son of Menestheus, ii. 134, 191⁷
 — (5), identical with preceding?, ii. 176²
 — (6), commander of the Mysians, ii. 173
 — (7), friend of Demetrius, ii. 190, 283
 — (8), governor of Coele-Syria, ii. 218
Apollophanes (1) of Antioch, i. 225
 — (2) of Seleucia, i. 225, 310-312; ii. 283
Appius Claudius, ii. 80
Arabia i. 25; Arabian desert, i. 25, 26, 207
Arabs (Bedawin), Alexander's plans with regard to them, i. 24; A. tribes beyond Jordan allies of Antiochus III, 317; A. in army of Antiochus III, ii. 289. See *Aziz*, *Shemashgeram*, *Yamlík*, *Zabdibel*, *Zabdiel*
 — Gerrhaeans, ii. 23, 24
 — Nabataeans, attacked by Antigonos, i. 55; use of Aramaic as official language, 228; friendly to the Jewish nationalists, ii. 182; lose Medeba to the Jews, 249; become an important power, 257; attacked by Antiochus XII, 261, 262. See *Haretas*
Arachosia, i. 262, 263, 270, 329; ii. 23
Arachotus, river, i. 271
Aradus (Arvad), i. 229; favours of Antiochus II and Seleucus II, 236; renews alliance with Antiochus III, 315; tries to destroy Marathus, ii. 217; Antiochus X proclaimed there, 259
Aramaean, the, i. 27, 206, 225 f.
Aratus of Soli, i. 145, 232; ii. 276
Araxes, river, ii. 119
Arbela, battle of, i. 245
Arbies, the, *i. 272
Arbis, river, i. 330
Arceuthus, river, i. 211
Archedemus of Tarsus, i. 231
Ardielaus (1), king of Macedonia, i. 13
 — (2), the dancer, i. 171
Archias, governor of Cyprus, ii. 208
Archon of Pella, i. 37, 38, 248
Ardoates, Armenian king, i. 97
Ardys (1), general of Antiochus III, i. 312
 — (2), son of Antiochus III, ii. 39
Aretas. See *Haretas*
Arethusa, i. 216; ii. 266
Argos, i. 113, 212, 230
Aria, i. 47, 262, 266, 268-271
Ariadne, Mount, ii. 208
Ariamnes, king of Cappadocia, i. 154, 172, 200
Arianus, agent of Bolis, ii. 8-11
Ariarathes I of Cappadocia, i. 80, 81, 93, 96⁵, 97; house of, see *Cappadocia*
 — II, i. 96, 97, 99, 153
 — III, i. 172, 194; ii. 59, 60
 — IV Eusebes, marries Antiochis, ii. 59, 60; allies himself with Pergamos and Rome, 122; war with Pharnaces, 123, 124; allied with Antiochus IV, 133; his children, 157; keeps Melitene from Ptolemy, 158
 — eldest son (suppositious?) of preceding, ii. 157
 — V, Eusebes Philopator, called Mithridates before accession, ii. 157; alienated by Lysias, 185,³ 186; refuses the sister of Demetrius, 195; expelled by Demetrius, 205; reinstated by Attalus, 207, 208; in the coalition against Demetrius, 210
Aribazus (1), governor of Cilicia, i. 185, 235, 291
 — (2), governor of Sardis, i. 291; ii. 7, 13
Arienei, the, i. 99
Ariobarzanes (1), satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, i. 90, 108, 153
 — (2), king of Pontic Cappadocia, i. 135, 154, 172, 193, 194
Aristarchus, physician of Berenice, i. 183
Aristides, envoy of Antiochus IV to Alexandria, ii. 139
Aristobulus (1), the Jewish Hellenist, ii. 166⁵
 — (2), king of the Jews, ii. 256
Aristocles, Ptolemaic commander, i. 185
Aristodicides of Assos, i. 159
Ariston, of Tyre, agent of Hannibal, ii. 57, 61
Aristophanes, i. 232
Aristotle, i. 15, 246; ii. 165
Aristus, favourite of Antiochus II, i. 171

- Arius*, river, i. 268, 269; ii. 21
- Armenia*, Armenians, i. 25, 26, 77, 97, 178, 201; invaded by Lucullus, ii. 266.
See *Ardoates*, *Arsames*, *Xerxes* (2), *Artaxias*, *Zariadris*
- Arnon*, river, ii. 249
- Arrhidaeus* (1), Macedonian chief, i. 35, 36, 37, 43, 110, 111
— (2), *oikonomos* of Laodice, i. 162³
— *Philip*. See *Philip* (2)
- Arsaces* (1), name of Artaxerxes II, i. 286
— (2), dynastic name of kings of Parthia
— I, i. 285, 286
— II Teridates, i. 284-289
— III, his war with Antiochus III, ii. 18-20; his death, 119
— IV Phriapatius, ii. 119, 158
— V Phraates I, ii. 158
— VI Mithridates I, ii. 158, 159, 234, 241, 242
— VII Phraates II, his war with Antiochus VII, 242-246; his end, 247; sends home body of Sidetes, 251
— VIII Mithridates II ("the Great"), ii. 261
- At'sacia*, i. 264⁵
- Arsames*, Armenian king, i. 201, 202
- Arsamosata*, ii. 15, 16
- Aminos* (1), daughter of Lysimachus, wife of Ptolemy II, i. 71; ii. 279⁴
— (2), daughter of Ptolemy I, wife first of Lysimachus, then of Ptolemy II, i. 62, 70, 72, 119, 128, 130, 148, 175²; ii. 279⁴
— (3), sister and wife of Ptolemy IV, i. 318
— town (properly Arsinoea?) (1), in Cilicia, i. 148
— (Arsinoea?) (2), temporary name of Patara, i. 148
- Arsinoëa*, temporary name of Ephesus, i. 119
- Artabazanes*, dynast of Atropatene, i. 303, 309, 310
- Artaxata*, ii. 119
- Artaxerxes* (1) II Mnemon, i. 286
— (2) Ochus, i. 229
- Artaxias* of Armenia, ii. 118, 119; conquered by Antiochus IV, 158; allied with Timarchus, 194; dissuaded from seizing part of Sophene, 195
- Artembases*, Lycian dynast, i. 86
- Artemis*, ii. 275; of Ephesus, i. 105, 109, 175; Artemis Brauronia, i. 226; at Laodicea, i. 226; ii. 268; Leuophryene, i. 280; ii. 47; Persike, i. 226; Artemis of Daphne, ii. 254
- Artmtta*, i. 255, 256
- Artemon*, i. 181
- Articoana*, i. 268, 269¹
- Arycanda*, ii. 294
- Amok*, i. 285
- Asander*, satrap of Caria, i. 111, 112
- Ascalon*, ii. 152; conciliates the Jews, 218; mint of Tryphon, 238²; coins money of Zabinas, 251; of Cyzicenus, 255; obtains its freedom, 256; survives as Hellenic state, 264
- Ascanian Lake*, i. 115, 120
- Asclepiodorus*, Macedonian officer in Babylon, i. 245
- Asia* (=realm of Eumenes), ii. 116; becomes Roman province of Asia, 258
- Asidates*, Persian noble, i. 90
- Asnavanta*, mountain, i. 263
- Asoka*, Indian king, i. 298; ii. 23
- Aspendus*, i. 105, 106, 131; ii. 3, 102, 255
- Asshur*, i. 239
- Assos*, i. 159
- Assyria*, Assyrians, i. 27, 76, 229, 230, 239, 240, 252, 255, 261
- Astabene*, i. 285
- Astacus* (1) in Propontis, i. 81, 82, 95, 119, 155
— (2) in Syria?, i. 222⁶
- Asterusia*, i. 274
- Atabyrium*, i. 316, 317
- Atargatis*, i. 218, 226
- Athamanians*, the, ii. 75, 78, 79, 80, 82
- Athens*, i. 84; ii. 60, 152
— of Ilion. See *Ilion*
— Polias of Priene, i. 109
— of Megarus, i. 232
- Atlienaëus* (1), son of Athæus, ii. 47
— (2), general of Antiochus VII, ii. 243, 245
- Athenobius*, officer of Antiochus VII, ii. 239
- Athens*, older history (before death of Alexander), i. 81, 82, 84, 85, 88, 101, 102, 153, 196, 212, 226; later history, its appearance in Roman times, i. 15; the Lamian war, 32; calls Antigonos king, 57¹; pressed by Cassander, 58; annoyed by Demetrius Poliorcetes, 65; its influence on Alexander, 102²; its worship of Antigonos, 126; favours of Attalus, 200; Cilician men of letters in A., 231, 232; invokes Rome, ii. 33; unrest during invasion of Antiochus III, 73; captured corn given to A., 86; Antiochus IV at A., 126; Athenian embassies at Alexandria, 138; favours of Antiochus IV, 148, 149; decree relating to Antiochus IV, 151. Oriental communities in A., 165; Jerusalem reorganized by an Athenian, 173; Antiochus Grypos educated at A., 250, 277; Philopappus monument, 268; Athenian colonists in Lemnos, i. 118, 130
- Atlius*, Roman admiral, ii. 66, 72, 81, 86, 89
- Atrux*, ii. 79

Atropatene (Adharbaijān) = Lesser Media, i. 263, 264, 266,⁶ 303; invaded by Antiochus III, 310

A tropates, satrap of Media, i. 263, 264

AttaŪa, i. 167, 167⁴

Attalus (1), father of Philaetærus, i. 130⁵

— (2), brother of Philaetærus, i. 157

— (3) I of Pergamos, i. 196-205, 303; hard pressed by Achæus, ii. 1, 2; his expedition through domain of Achæus, 4; allied with Antiochus III, 5; the *modus vivendi*, 14; relations of Pergamos to other powers, 31; war between A. and Philip, A. invokes Rome, 32-34; A. attacked by Antiochus, 36; his death, 47; supplies corn to Seleucid government, 111; his compact with Antiochus III, 295

— (4) II Philadelphus, ii. 47, 66; defends Pergamos, 99, 100; escorts Antiochus IV to Syria, 127; succeeds Eunienus II, 207; in the coalition against Demetrius, 210

— (5) III Philometor bequeathes his kingdom to Rome, 258

Aulis, ii. 75

Aurelius, Lucius, ii. 186

Avesta, the, i. 260, 290; the Vendidad, 266, 268, 269

Axius, river, in Macedonia, i. 321

— river (Orontes, q.v.), i. 208

Aziz, Arab chief, ii. 261, 266, 267

Azor, i. 50

Azotus, ii. 218, 219

Baal, Gazîr, i. 80; B. Markod, i. 227

Babylon, Babylonia, 238-257; ancient monarchy in Babylonia, i. 3; king of Babylon employs Greek mercenaries, 8; character of Babylonia, 26, 40, 76; death of Alexander in Babylon, 28; Partition of Babylon, 30, 263, 274; Babylonia given to Seleucus, 37-40; Seleucus in Babylon, 42-46; Seleucus flees from Babylon, 48; Seleucus returns, 53, 54; raid of Demetrius Poliorcetes, 55, 56; Antiochus Soter established in Babylon as viceroy, 64, 128¹; Seleucid era used in Babylonia, 147²; Seleucus, son of Antiochus, viceroy in Babylon (?), 169; Babylonia still held by Seleucus III, 203; routes from Babylon to the Mediterranean, 207, 211, 221; degeneration of Macedonians in Babylonia, 223; Persian satrap of Babylonia, 261; Antiochus III in Babylonia before his accession, 300; Zeuxia, satrap of Babylonia, 303; Babylonia occupied by Molon, 305; Jews in Babylonia, ii. 165, 166; Demetrius I welcomed by the Babylonians, 195; Babylonia held by Demetrius II, 228, 233; conquered by the Partitions, 234;

recovered by Antiochus VII, 243; re-conquered by the Parthians, 245; **legend** of the anchor found in Babylon, 275

Bacchides, general of Demetrius I, ii. 109, 200; subjugates Judæa, 202-204, 300

Bacchium, the, ii. 101

Bactra (Zariaspa), i. 273, 277; its siege by Antiochus III, ii. 21

Bactria, i. 32, 262, 275-278, 286-288, **290**; invaded by Antiochus III, ii. 21, 22; Bactrian kingdom curtailed by the Parthians, 234

Bæbius, Marcus, ii. 66, 72, 78, 79, 82

Bætocæce, i. 227

Baian, Beni-, Arab tribe, ii. 182

Balacrus, satrap of Cilicia, i. 92

Balanea, i. 256

Bambyce (Mabog, Hieropolis), i. 217, 218, 220, 221, 226; ii. 152, 156, 259

Barbelissus, i. 217, 218

Bardesan, the Gnostic, i. 228

Bargylia, i. 162, 163; ii. 33, 43, 49

Barsine, mother of Heracles, i. 29

Bas, Bithynian chief, i. 92, 95

Bascama, ii. 230

Batanea, ii. 37

Batnae, i. 221

Bedawin. See *Arabs*

Bel, i. 256

Bdclias, river, i. 221

Berea, ii. 202

Berenice (1), wife of Ptolemy I, i. 70

— (2) of Cyrene, wife of Demetrius the Fair and of Ptolemy III, i. 178, 183, 323

— (3), daughter of Ptolemy II, wife of Antiochus II, i. 178, 179, 181-184, 190

— (4), high-priestess, i. 175,² 178

— (5), daughter of Ptolemy Auletes, ii. 268

Berenice, town, i. 147

Beræa (in Syria), i. 217, 218; ii. 185, 259, 261

Berosus, Babylonian historian, i. 256

Berytus (Laodicea), i. 313, 315; ii. 152,⁷ 251, 264

Bethel, ii. 203

Beth-horon, ii. 204

Beth-sur, ii. 179, 184, 203, 216, 229

Beth-zacJariah, ii. 184

Bindusdra, Indian king, i. 297, 298

Bithynia, i. 81, 100, **137**, 154, 198. See *Dædalsus*, *Bas*, *Zibcetes*, *Nicomedes*, *Ziaelas*, *Prusias*, *Menas*

Bithys, **ἐπιστολαγράφος** of Antiochus **Grypos**, ii. 282

Blitor, satrap of Mesopotamia, i. 47

Boeotian League, the, ii. 47, 73, 75, 86

Bolts, the Cretan, ii. 7-12

Borsippa, i. 250, 251, 255

Bosphorus, the, i. 44, 50, 82, 88, **111**, **115**, 135, 137, 155

Basra, ii. 183

Botrys i. 315

- Branchidae*, i. 149, 159, 191. See *Apollo*, *Didymaeae*
- Brochi*, i. 305, 313
- Brundisium*, ii. 66, 82
- Bryaxis*, Athenian sculptor, i. 214
- Buddhism*, i. 298
- Byblos* (Gebal), ii. 152, 156, 264
- Byzantium*, helps Calchedon against the Bithynians, i. 81; welcomes Antigonus, 111; member of anti-Seleucid League, 123, 175; vexed by the Gauls, 137; among guardians of children of Nicomedes, 173; mediates between Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III, 314; quarrels with Rhodes, ii. 1; tries to reconcile Attalus and Achaeus, 2; favours of Antiochus III, 55, 63¹; helps Romans, 107⁶; Heraclides of B.; see *Ilcracrides* (3)
- Cabalis*, i. 83, 93
- Cadrusi*, i. 274
- Caeneus*, Antiochene magistrate, i. 182
- Caïus*, river, i. 167, 198; ii. 99, 108
- Calamus*, i. 315
- Galas*, satrap of Hellesjontine Phrygia, i. 92
- Calchedon*, i. 81, 82,² 95, 111, 123, 127,² 137²
- Callatis*, i. 112, 127, 176.¹
- Callidromus* (part of Mount Oeta), ii. 86
- Callimander*, friend of Demetrius II, ii. 242
- Callinicon*. See *Kallinikan*
- Callnus*, the poet, i. 136
- Caliope*, i. 266
- Callipolis*, i. 222.⁶
- Callonitis*, i. 308
- Calycadnus*, river, i. 148
- Calyrna*, i. 160
- Cambylus*, Cretan *condottiere*, ii. 7-13
- Cambyses*, king of Persia, i. 64
- Camus*, i. 317
- Ganachus*, Athenian sculptor, i. 121
- Ganae*, ii. 93, 95, 97
- Capharsaba*, ii. 262
- Cappadocia*, i. 59, 66, 78, 79, 80, 87, 91, 99, 141,⁸ 151; satrapy of Eumenes, 30, 43, 93; C. Seleucus, 99; realm of Ariarathes, 97, 154, 164, 172, 194; C. contingent at Magnesia, ii. 109, 110; C. people becomes friend of Rome, 122; Roman mission in C, 186; another mission in C, 196
- Pontic, i. 96, 98, 111, 172, 193, 303; ii. 266
- Capreatae*, i. 99
- Caprus*, river, i. 307.²
- Cardia*, i. 71. See *Eumenes* (1), *Hieronymus*
- Carduchi*, i. 79.⁵. See *Kurds*
- Carta*, i. 13, 65, 77; native dynasty in fourth century, 86; under Alexander, 91, 151; satrapy of Asander, 111, 112; Ptolemaic rule, 146¹ 148, 149, 154² 184, 196; Seleucid rule, 152¹ 166, 325; defeat of Antiochus Hierax in C, 202; Philip invades O., ii. 33, 42, 43; Romans in C., 98; C. given to Rhodes, 116; Carian mercenaries, 286; Hermias the Carian; see *Hermias*
- Carians*, Villages of the (in Babylonia), i. 44
- Garmania*, i. 262, 278, 303.²; ii. 23
- Carrhae*, i. 53, 222
- Garseae*, ii. 4¹
- Cartana*, i. 274
- Carthage*, i. 229, 240; ii. 33, 53, 57, 61, 81, 92, 190
- Carystus*, ii. 67
- Casiani*, i. 215; ii. 226
- Casius* (1), mountain in Syria, i. 209-211
- (2), mountain on border of Egypt, ii. 136, 137
- Caspian*, the, i. 25, 266, 267, 281, 282, 284
- Gassander*, son of Antipater, i. 37, 43, 50, 51; king in Macedonia, 57-59, 61, 63-65, 96, 106, 113, 128¹; ii. 271
- Cassandra*, i. 126.⁴
- Castabala*, ii. 151
- Castorion* of Soli, i. 232
- Cataonia*, i. 66, 79, 99, 172, 323
- Cato*, Marcus, ii. 73.² 85
- Gaunus*, i. 61, 67, 112, 113, 118, 149, 166; recovers its liberty, ii. 42, 43, 90
- Cebrene*, i. 115, 168
- Celaenae*, i. 38, 139, 151, 164, 168. See *Apamea* (3)
- Cndeabaeus*, general of Antiochus VII, ii. 239
- Centaretus*, Gallic chief, i. 203
- Geos*, Cleombrotus of C. See *Cleombrotus*
- Cephalenia*, ii. 81
- Ceraeas*, *condottiere*, i. 317
- Chaboras*, river, i. 222
- Chaeronea*, ii. 80
- Ghalcis* (1) in Eubcea, ii. 54, 55, 67, 73, 74; captured by Antiochus, 75; his marriage there, 80; 82, 83, 86; evacuated by Antiochus, 87
- (2) on the Lebanon, i. 216; ii. 264
- (3) on the Chalus, i. 218; Chalcidice, 218
- (4) in the territory of Apamea, ii. 226
- Chaldaeans*, i. 239, 251, 256
- Chaldaei* (tribe in Asia Minor), i. 79.⁵
- Chalep*. See *Beraea*
- Chalus*, river, i. 217
- Chalybes*, i. 79.⁵
- Chandragupta*, Indian king, i. 295-297
- Chaonia*, i. 219
- Charis*, i. 269
- Charonion*, the, ii. 150
- Chelidonia*, i. 165
- Chelidonian Promontory*, i. 88; ii. 40, 52
- Chersonese* (1), Thracian, i. 71, 120, 127,¹ 137; ii. 48, 89

- Chersonese* (2) Syrian, i. 68
Chinese, the, i. 277
Chios, i. 104, 105, 106, 107,⁴ 150⁴; ii. 33;
 dep&xt for Roman forces, 91, 93, 104
Choaespes, river, i. 244
Chrysa, i. 115
Chrysippus of Soli, the Stoic philosopher,
 i. 231, 256
Cibyra, i. 93, 166
Cierium, ii. 79, 83
Cierus, i. 134, 137²
Cilicia, i. 26, 27; Perdiccas in C, 38;
 Eumenes in C, 43; Demetrius appointed
 to hold C, 52; C. given to Plistarchus,
 61; Demetrius seizes C, 62, 63, 232,
 233; Seleucus occupies it, 65; Demetrius
 in C. again, 66, 67; Balacrus, satrap of
 C, 92; Seleucid and Ptolemaic fight for
 C, 148, 179, 184, 186; Ptolemaic opera-
 tions in C, 185; Antiochus, governor of
 C, 189; Seleucus II in C, 195; C. and
 Hellenism, 230-232; Mazaeus, Persian
 satrap of C., 245; Harpalus and C, 246;
 Antiochus III conquers coast of C, ii.
 39; Antiochus IV in C, 171; Alexander
 Balas in C., 207; Balas flees to C. again,
 220; troops drawn from C. by Balas,
 221; authority of Demetrius II in C,
 227; erection of Roman province, 258;
 Seleucus VI in C, 259, 260; C. in pos-
 session of Tigranes, 263; Philip II in C,
 266; Cilician *etifavoi*, 287
Gilician Gates, i. 69, 79, 82, 83, 93, 163,
 207
Cimiata, i. 96
Cimmerians, the, i. 136
Cimon, the Athenian, i. 85
Cineas, regent of Egypt, ii. 139
Gissus, i. 92
Citium, i. 231
Cius, i. 90, 91, 96, 111, 127,² 173; ii. 32;
 Herodorus of C.; see *Herodorus*
Clazomenaeii, 107, 117, 150⁴; ii. 93, 138
Glearchus (1), tyrant of Heraclea, i. 119
 — (2) of Soli, disciple of Aristotle, ii. 165
Gleombrotus of Ceos, the physician, i. 179
Cleopatra (1) I, daughter of Antiochus III,
 betrothed to Ptolemy Epiphanes, ii. 38;
 married, 57; governs Egypt as regent,
 134; cf. 296
 — (2) II, daughter of Ptolemy Epiphanes,
 wife of Philometor, transferred to Euer-
 getes, ii. 138; reverts to Philometor,
 142; left in charge of infant Ptolemy
 VIII, 222; expelled by Euergetes, 248;
 reconciled to Euergetes, 251
 — (3), daughter of Ptolemy Philometor,
 queen of Syria, married to Alexander
 Balas, ii. 212; given to Demetrius
 Nicator, 220, 221; left at Seleucia, 233;
 marries Antiochus Sidetes, 237; sends
 his son out of Syria, 248; assassinate
 Demetrius and seizes the throne, 250;
 allied with Ptolemy Euergetes, 251; her
 end, 252; gives Tyre its freedom, 255
Cleopatra (4) III of Egypt, daughter of
 Ptolemy Philometor and Cleopatra II,
 wife of Ptolemy Euergetes II, 248³;
 seizes the chief power in Egypt, 253;
 compels Soter to marry Selene, 254;
 helps the enemies of Soter in Syria, 257
 — (5), daughter of Euergetes and Cleopatra
 III, wife first of Ptolemy Soter, then of
 Antiochus IX, ii. 254, 255
 — (6) VI, daughter of Ptolemy Auletes, ii.
 275, 276, 280
Cleoptolemus, citizen of Chalcis, ii. 80
Clitus, Macedonian chief, i. 43, 44, 111-113
Clytus, *strategos* of the Acarnanians, ii. 81
Cnidus, i. 112, 155²; ii. 98, 102, 260
Code, i. 127
Code-Syria, See *Syria*
Castae, the, i. 79⁵
Golchi, i. 79⁵
Goloë, Lake, i. 202
Coloniae, i. 115
Colophon, i. 117, 119, 150⁴; ii. 2, 4, 93,
 104, 106
Comanus, regent of Egypt, ii. 139
Commagene, i. 208, 219, 220, 233; ii. 157,
 257, 258
Cophen, river, i. 262. See *Kabvl*
Copratas, river, i. 244
Coracesium, i. 148; ii. 39, 42, 227
Corbiane, i. 329
Corcyra, ii. 76, 207
Corinth, i. 103¹; ii. 46, 54, 55, 73,² 207
Corndius, Lucius, ii. 49-51
Coronea, ii. 75
Corupedion, battle of, i. 71, 72, 97, 99, 122,
 127, 323
Corycus (1) in Cilicia, ii. 39
 — (2), Erythraean, ii. 97, 105
Corylas, Paphlagonian chief, i. 79-81
Gorylenus, ii. 101
Coryphaeus, mountain, i. 209
Cos, i. 113, 149, 150; ii. 93, 98, 102; Nico-
 medes of C.; see *Nicomedes* (2)
Gossaeans, the, i. 23²
Cossutius, Decimus, architect, ii. 148
Cotton, ii. 101
Cotyaïum, i. 71
Crannon, ii. 78, 79, 83
Grantor of Soli, philosopher, i. 231
Craterus (1), Macedonian chief, i. 32-35, 117
 — (2), eunuch, ii. 248, 283
Crates of Mallus, philosopher, i. 231
Crete, *Cretans*, Cretan element in popula-
 tion of Antioch, i. 212; colony in
 Hindû-Kush, 274; activity of Antiochus
 III in C, ii. 47; state of Crete, 286
Cretans, as mercenaries, i. 313; ii. 5, 7,
 19, 109, 286; in the service of Demetrius
 Nicator, 218, 223-225

Ctesiphon, Athenian poet, i. 200

— (on the Tigris), i. 255, 304

Cyclodes. See *Nesiotae*

Cyinda, i. 43, 62

Cyme, ii. 2, 4, 93, 96

Gynos-cephala, battle of, ii. 40, 41, 78

Cyprus, Phoenicians of C, i. 13; Seleucus in C, 52; Antigonos wrests C. from Ptolemy, 58; C. held by Demetrius after Ipsus, 61; Ptolemy regains C, 65, 146, 184; starting-point for expedition against Syria, 185; Cypriot element in Antioch, 212; Antiochus III designs to seize C, ii. 52; C. occupied by Antiochus IV, 142; its cession demanded, 143; forces of Antiochus ejected, 145; attempt of Demetrius on C, 208; governed by Ptolemy Alexander, 254; by Ptolemy Soter, 257. See *Aristus*, *Themison*, *Zeno* (1), *Stasanor*, *Stasander*

Gypsela, i. 176

Cyrene, revolts from Ptolemy II under Magas, i. 146, 147; recovered by Ptolemy and lost again, 178; Berenice of C. marries Ptolemy III, 183; C. visited by Buddhist missionaries, 298; Hannibal in Cyrenaica, ii. 61; C. given to Ptolemy Euergetes II, 189

Cyreschata, i. 275

Cyretiae, ii. 66⁴

Cyrrhестice, i. 67, 208, 217-219, 233, 306, 311

Cyrrhus, i. 219

Cyrus, the Persian king, i. 12, 80, 241, 261 —, river, i. 282, 283

Cyzicus, maintains its freedom after Peace of Antalcidas, i. 88; its standing, 101; Arrhidæus attempts to introduce garrison, 110; C. relieved by Antigonos, 111; favours of Philetaerus, 156; road, *Cyzicus-Thyatira*, 167; Apollonis of C, 199; mediates between Ptolemy and Antiochus HI, 314; ii. 63¹; gifts of Antiochus IV to C, 149; Antiochus IX reared there, 248; Mithridates driven from C, 266; Androsthenes of C.; see *Androsthenes*

Daae, the, i. 284; in army of Antiochus III, ii. 289

Daedala, ii. 102

Dagon, temple of, ii. 218

Damascus, i. 55; Greek magistracies at D., 223¹; taken by Antiochus I, 234; reached by expeditions of Jonathan, ii. 228; battle between Demetrius II and Zabinas, 249; capital of Cyzicenus?, 255; of Demetrius III, 260; of Antiochus XII, 261; gives itself to Haretas, 264

Damocritus, *strategos* of the Aetolians, ii. 67

Damuras, river, i. 315

Danaë, daughter of Leontion, i. 187

Daphne, the nymph, i. 209

—, near Antioch; Berenice besieged in the palace, i. 182; its legend, 209; description of D., 213, 214; young Antiochus celebrates festival at D., ii. 53; procession at D. under Antiochus IV, 146, 284-288; temple robbed by Zabinas, 252; feasts of Grypos, 253; Cleopatra takes refuge there, 254. See also *Apollo*

Dara, i. 289

Dardannm, ii. 95

Darius, (1) Hystaspis, i. 41, 243

— (2) Codomannus, i. 31, 91, 92, 101, 117, 219, 245

Dassaretæ, the, ii. 79

Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, i. 80, 82

Deimachus of Plataea, ambassador to India, i. 282, 297

Deioces, the Mede, i. 4, 259

Ddium, ii. 74

Delos, gifts of Seleucus I and Stratonice, i. 121, 122; records laid up there, 158; Roman fleet at D., ii. 89; D. trims between the rival powers, 91; statue of Heliodorus, 125; Popillius in D., 144; gifts of Antiochus IV, 149; Oriental communities in D., 165; inscription of Menippus, 270; of Bithys, 282; in honour of Craterus, 283

Delphi, i. 121, 136, 151,³ 189; Antiochus III at D., ii. 81

Demetrius, ii. 54, 55, 67; Antiochus III at D., 69, 74, 76, 78, 80; Antiochus moves his base from D., 85, 86; D. surrenders to Philip, 87

Demetrius (1) Poliorcetes, defeated at Gaza, i. 52, 54; raids Babylonia, 55, 56; besieges Rhodes and conquers Greece, 58; at Ipsus, 59, 75, 169; his power after Ipsus, 61; from Ipsus to his death, 62-70, 232, 233; his friend Mithridates, 96; his love of Athens, 102²; secures Halicarnassus and attacks Ptolemy, 113; D. in Asia Minor before Ipsus, 117; after Ipsus, 118; receives divine honours, 126; his son Antigonos Gonatas, 128¹; his royal dress, ii. 274; D. polygamous, 279⁴

— (2) II of Macedonia, i. 173, 205, 236

— (3) the Fair, son of Demetrius Poliorcetes, husband of Berenice of Cyrene, i. 178, 183

— (4), son of Euthydemus, ii. 23

— (5), son of Philip V, ii. 125¹

— (6) I Soter, of the Seleucid line, sent as hostage to Borne, ii. 124; his escape from Rome, 188-193; his reign, 193-211; his concessions to the Jews, 216; his intercourse with Philonides, 277

- Demetrius II Nicator*, sent out of Syria by his father, 210; returns, 218; instated by Ptolemy Philometor, 220, 221; Egyptian forces annihilated in his name, 222; his first reign, 223-234; his attempts to escape, 241, 242; sent back by Phraates, 244; his second reign, 247-250; chronology, 301
- III Philopator (Eukairos), ii. 260, 261
- Democrates*, *epistates* of Seleucia or Antioch(?), i. 254
- Demodamas* of Miletus, i. 162, 281-283
- Demosthenes*, the Athenian orator, i. 7, 14
- Dicaearchus*, the Aetolian, brother of Thoas, ii. 56
- Didym-TeicJie*, ii. 4
- Dinocrates*, general of Philip V, ii. 43
- Diodes* (1), the Aetolian, ii. 67
- (2), governor of Parapotamia, ii. 300
- Diodorus* (1), general of Seleucus I, i. 99
- (2), *τραπεζης* of Demetrius I, ii. 190, 283¹⁰
- Diodotus* (1) 1, king of Bactria, i. 287, 288
- (2) II, i. 288, 289; ii. 21
- (3). See *Tryphon*
- Diogenes* (1) of Tarsus, Epicurean, i. 231
- (2), the Babylonian, Stoic, i. 256
- (3) of Babylon, Epicurean, ii. 214
- (4), satrap of Susiana, i. 304, 305; satrap of Media, 309; ii. 19, 299
- Diognetus*, admiral of Antiochus III, i. 303, 312, 313, 315, 316
- Diomedon*, governor of Babylonian Seleucia, 305
- Dion*, Ptolemaic commander in Damascus, i. 234
- Dionysiades*, Cilician poet, i. 232
- Dionysius* (1), tyrant of Heraclea, i. 104,³ 117, 119
- (2), ambassador to India, i. 297
- (3), commander of *hypaspistai*, ii. 6
- (4), *επιστολογράφος*, ii. 146, 282
- (5), the Mede, governor of Mesopotamia, ii. 233, 303
- (6), tyrant of Bercea, ii. 261¹
- Dionysus*, ii. 201; Dionysiac festival in Caria, ii. 170¹; at Jerusalem, 173
- Dionytas*, Seleucid official in Phrygia, i. 177
- Diophanes*, Achaean general, ii. 101
- Diospege*, i. 222⁶
- Diphius*, general of Antigonus, i. 54
- Ditzele*, queen of Bithynia, i. 173
- Macedonian chief, i. 38, 130, 248
- Doedalsus*, Bithynian chief, i. 81, 82, 92, 95, 155
- Dok*, ii. 239
- Doliche*, i. 219, 227
- Dora*, i. 314; ii. 238, 264
- Dorian* Body, the, i. 149
- Dorymenes*, Aetolian commander in Ptolemaic service, i. 313
- Drangae*, the, i. 270
- Drangiana*, i. 262, 263, 268, 270, 329; ii. 23
- Drynametum*, i. 142
- Dura* (1) on Euphrates, i. 220
- (2) on Tigris, i. 307
- Ecbatana*, i. 41, 47, 48, 121, 241, 246,¹ 263, 264; Antiochus III in E. ii. 18; called Epiphanea, 160
- Ecchecrates*, Thessalian *condotture*, i. 319
- Edessa* (Orhoë, Antioch *μικροβάβυλος*, or on Callirhoë), i. 220-222, 228; ii. 152
- Egypt*, the land, i. 26, 30, 40, 145, 146, 207; attacked by Perdiccas, 34, 35; Seleucus flees to E., 49; E. attacked by Antigonus, 58; invaded by Antiochus IV, ii. 137-141; second invasion, 142-145; Jewish villages in E., 165; the ancient kingdom, i. 4, 5, 8, 10; ii. 268, 280²; under Persians, 243; the Ptolemaic kingdom, see *Ptolemy*, *house of*; the natives under Macedonian rule, ii. 30, 32, 144, 156; elephants brought to E. from Aethiopia, i. 186; E. market for Syrian wine, 216; Egyptian pantheism, i. 260; Egyptian communities at Athens, ii. 165; custom of kin-marriage, 279; Ptolemaic throne claimed by sons of Antiochus X; ii. 263, 264
- Ekron*, ii. 219
- Elaea*, ii. 52, 91, 92, 97; attacked by Seleucus, 99; 100, 101. 102; Scipio ill there, 108
- Elaeus*, ii. 95
- Elam*, i. 27, 240, 244, 247
- Elatea*, ii. 85, 86
- Eleasa*, battle of, ii. 203
- Eleazar*, brother of Judas, ii. 184
- Eleusis* (in Egypt), ii. 144
- Eleutherna*, ii. 47
- Eleutherus*, river, i. 208; ii. 219
- Elis*, ii. 75, 86, 87
- Elymais*, *Elymaeans*, i. 329; ii. 120, 160, 287
- Emisa*, ii. 266
- Emmaus*, ii. 178, 179, 204
- Enius*, Parthian governor, ii. 243
- Eordaea*, i. 40
- Ephesus*, Demetrius flees to E. after Ipsus, i. 61; embassy of Nicagoras, 63²; commotion in E. after Corupedion, 72; Syrphax, tyrant of E., 89²; temple of Artemis, 89,² 109, 158, 159, 175; action of Alexander at E., 104,* 105, 107; Ionian festival transferred to E., 110; E. captured by Antigonus, 111; intimidated by Lysimachus and recaptured by Demetrius, 117; captured again by Lysimachus, 118; refounded by Lysimachus as Arsinoëa, 119; Gauls at E., 139; takes part in embassy to Antiochus

- I, 150⁴; under young Ptolemy, 174; royal residence under Antiochus II, 176, 177; Antiochus dies there, 179; Arrhidaeus honoured by B., 162³; road to E., 164, 165; seat of Laodice's government, 181, 183, 185; Sophron, governor of E., 187; E. captured by Ptolemy III, 184, 188, 196; Melancomas, ii. 8; E. captured by Antiochus III, 44; 48, 52, 53, 55, 57, 62, 68, 69; Antiochus returns to E. from Greece, 86; 89, 90, 92; fleet blockaded in E., 93, 94, 96; E. attacked, 97; 104, 105; E. surrenders to Rome, 111; 112, 113; in realm of Eumenes, 117; Heraclides prepares in E. for invading Syria, 210
- Epigenes* (1), Ptolemaic officer, i. 185
— (2), Seleucid general, i. 300-302, 306
- Epiphanea*, (1), Haraath, ii. 152
— (2), on the Euphrates, ii. 152. See *Ecbatana, Qeniandus*
- Epirus*, i. 298; ii. 75; Epirot queen of Demetrius II, i. 236. See *Pyrrhus, Alexander* (7)
- Ertmstratus*, physician of Seleucus I, i. 64, 179²; ii. 283
- Erech*, i. 250, 251
- Eresus*, i. 105¹
- Eretia*, ii. 67
- Eridu*, i. 238
- Erim*, i. 166, 177, 325
- Erotimus*, king of the Nabataeans, ii. 257
- Erymanthus*, river, i. 271; ii. 23
- Erytkrae*, i. 105, 108, 117, 139, 150, 159, 161, 162, 176, 177, 326; ii. 93, 97
- Esagila*, i. 249, 255
- Etazeta*, queen of Bithynia, i. 173
- Euager*, satrap of Persis, i. 54
- Euagoras*, satrap of Aria, i. 271
- Eubæa*, island, ii. 75, 86
— queen of Antiochus III, ii. 80, 86, 110
- Eudamus* (1), brother of Pithon, i. 42, 267
— (2), commander in India, i. 46, 294
— (3), Rhodian admiral, ii. 97, 102, 103, 105
- Euemerus* (Himerus), favourite of Phraates II, ii. 245
- Euitus*, satrap of Aria, i. 271
- Eulaeus*, chief eunuch of Egypt, ii. 134-136
—, river, i. 244, 247
- Eumenea*, i. 267
- Eumenes* (1) of Cardia, i. 30, 33-35, 37, 43-46, 93, 94, 96, 271; ii. 271
— (2), brother of Philetaerus, i. 134, 135, 156
— (8) I of Pergamos, son of preceding, i. 157, 172, 196
— (4) II of Pergamos, his accession, ii. 47; refuses daughter of Antiochus, 60; 63, 73, 74; his value to Rome as ally, 91; co-operates against Antiochus, 92, 93, 95, 97; returns to Pergamos, 100, 101; goes to Hellespont, *ib.*; rejoins Romans on Caicus, 108; at Magnesia, 110; gets indemnity, 111, 113; his realm after Peace of Apamea, 116, 117; position and policy, 121, 122; war with Pharnaces, 123, 124; establishes Antiochus IV in Syria, 127; allied with Antiochus, 133; raises Alexander Balas against Demetrius, 207
- Euphorion*, the poet, ii. 276
- Euphrates*, river, i. 3, 23, 26, 40, 53, 64, 164, 208, 217-221, 234, 238-240, 248, 253; Antiochus III on E. ii. 17
- Eupolemus*, Jewish Hellenist, ii. 166, 202
- Euripides*, the poet, i. 13, 232
- Euromus*, ii. 33, 43
- Eur opus* (1) in Macedonia, i. 321
— (2) on the *Zeugma*, i. 220
— (3) = Dura, on Euphrates, i. 220
— (4) in Media, i. 264
- Eurydice* (1), wife of Philip Arrhidaeus, i. 36, 50
— (2), daughter of Antipater, wife of Ptolemy I, i. 118, 128¹
- Eurylochus*, the Magnesians, ii. 69
- Eurymedon*, river, ii. 52, 102
- Euthydermis*, king of Bactria, ii. 21-23
- Eutychides* of Sicyon, sculptor, i. 213
- Ezida*, i. 255
- Fabius Labeo*, Quintus, ii. 114
- Flaceus*, Lucius, ii. 85
- Flamininus*, Lucius Quinctius, ii. 45
— Titus Quinctius, ii. 41, 46; receives envoys of Antiochus III at the Isthmian games, 48; 52, 54, 55; answers envoys from the East in Rome, 58; his attempts to secure Greece, 66, 67, 73, 74; his subordinate Octavius, 82; intercedes for Aetolians, 87; ambassador to Seleucus IV, 124
- Gabine*, i. 329
- Gabinus*, Aulus, proconsul of Syria, ii. 268
- Gadara*, i. 225, 317; ii. 37, 152. See *Meleager* (3)
- Galatians, Gauls*, their coming to Asia, i. 135-144; afflict Cyzicus, 156; contributions to G. war, 160; G. in Thrace, 176; G. wars of Attalus, 196-198; Antiochus Hierax killed by Gauls, 203; G. in army of Ptolemy II, 146³; of Mithridates I, 154; of Ziaëlas, 173; of Berenice, 182 of Antiochus Hierax, 193, 195; of Ariobarzanes and Mithridates II, 194; of Seleucus III, 205; of Ptolemy IV, 319; of Ziaëlas, ii. 2; of Attalus I, 4; Thracian G. enrolled by Antiochus III, 55; G. in army of Antiochus at Magnesia, 109; expedition of Manlius, 112, 117, 118; Gaulish mercenaries, 287; figure of elephant and Gaul, 290²

- Galilee*, ii. 228, 256
Gandara, the, i. 274
Ganges, river, i. 296
Gangra, i. 155
Gariana, i. 274⁶
Garsyeris, general of Achaeus, ii. 3
Gaugamela, battle of, i. 245; ii. 243
Gam, battle of, 52, 54; *boule* at G., 223²; 315, 317-319; its siege by Antiochus III, ii. 37; taken by Jonathau, 228; coins of Demetrius II, 237⁶
Gazaca, i. 263
Gazara. See *Gezer*
Gaziura, i. 80
Gebal. See *Byblos*
Gedrosia, i. 262, 263, 272
Genneus, Antiochene magistrate, i. 182
Gephrus, i. 317
Gerizim, temple on Mount. See *Samaritans*
Gerrha, i. 305, 313
Gezer (Gazara), ii. 179, 203, 232, 239, 241, 256
Gindarus, i. 219
Gomphi, ii. 79
Gonni, ii. 80
Gophna, ii. 184
Gordium, i. 77, 92
Gorgias, Seleucid general, ii. 178, 179, 182
Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, ii. 147, 193, 196
Granicus, battle of, i. 108
Greece, the land and people, i. 6; rising in G. after Alexander's death, 32; G. conquered by Cassander, 50; by Demetrius, 58; Antigonos abandons G., 59; Demetrius recovers G., 64; Demetrius in Central G., 65; invasion of G. by Xerxes, 88; conquest of G. by Philip and Alexander, 103; Antigonos Gonatas in Central G., 128,¹ 129, 132, 144; Gallic invasion, 136; Ptolemaic influence in G., 146; Scopas raises mercenaries in G., ii. 30; affairs of G. settled after Cynoscephalae, 46; G. evacuated by Romans, 55; movements in G. before invasion of Antiochus, 66, 67; war of Antiochus in G., 69-87. See *Acarnanians*, *Achaeans*, etc.
Gryneum, i. 201¹
Gyrton, ii. 79
Hadrian, the Emperor, ij. 148, 268
Hadrianu-therae, i. 167⁵
Hatuarnassus, i. 86, 113, 146,¹ 149; recovers its liberty, ii. 42, 90; 98
Haly, river, i. 79, 96, 141
Hamactyon, commander of Royal Squadron, i. 195
Hamaxitus, i. 115
Hannibal, flees to Antiochus, ii. 53; his plan of campaign, 56; his interview with Scipio, 59¹; his action at the Seleucid court, 61, 62; mistrusted, 68, 69; his advice for Greek campaign, 76, 77; warns Antiochus, 88; sent to bribe up Phoenician fleet, 94; commands against Rhodians, 103; his extradition demanded, 111, 114; legend of his designing Artaxata, 119; his death, 124²
Haran. See *Carrhae*
Haretas III, king of the Nabataeans, ii. 264
Ilarmuza, i. 278
Harpagus, son of, (Lycian), i. 84, 85
Harpalus, chief treasurer of Alexander, i. 246, 247
Hasidim, the, ii. 169, 176, 199
Hasmonaeon house, the, ii. 175. See *Judas*, *Jonathan*, *Simon*, etc.
Hazor, plain of, ii. 228
Hecatompylus, i. 266; ii. 19
Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas, ii. 48, 49, 282³
Hegesias of Lampsacus, ii. 45, 46
Heliodorus, minister of Seleucus IV, ii. 125-127, 283
Hellespont, i. 117, 137, 141,³ 167, 186; ii. 4; Ptolemaic possessions assailed by Philip, ii. 32, 44; H. held by Antiochus, 89, 97, 104; evacuated, 106
Hephaestion, friend of Alexander, i. 273, 322
Hera (of Bambyce), i.e. Atargatis, ii. 156
Heraclea (1) on the Black Sea, raided by Bithynians, i. 99; II. under Dionysius and Amestris, 117; Lysirachus and H., 119; Seleucus and H., 122, 123; contingent from H. in fleet of Ptolemy Keraunos, 129; Hermogenes and H., 131; H. allied with Nicomedes, 134, 135; helps Byzantium against the Gauls, 137; among guardians of the children of Nicomedes, 173; supports Byzantium against Antiochus II, 176; helps Mithridates II against the Gauls, 194; attempts mediation between Rome and Antiochus III, ii. 107; threatened by Pharnacea, 123
— (2) on Latmus, i. 149
— (3) in Pieria, i. 216
— (4) near Bercea, i. 217; ii. 259
— (5) in Media, i. 265
— (6) in Greece, ii. 84, 85
Heracleon of Bercea, ii. 258, 259
Heracles (1), the god, i. 123, 139; ii. 276; Tyrian H. (Melkarth), ii. 133, 170, 250. See *Themison*
— (2), son of Alexander, i. 29, 57
Heraclides (1), agent of Arsinoe, i. 119, 122
— (2) of Tarsus, i. 231
— (3) of Byzantium, ii. 107
— (4) of Miletus, minister of Antiochus IV, ii. 132; in Rome, 135, 141; in Rome with Alexander Balas, 209; pre

- 184, 185; first rule of Alcimus, 199-201; Hasmonaeans regain J., 202; Bacchides recovers J., 202, 203; Hasmonaeans return, 216; siege of J. by Antiochus Sidetes, 240, 241
- Jews*, the, pre-Maccabaeon history, ii. 162-168; their devastation of the sea-board, 264. See *Judas*, *Jonathan*, *Simon*, etc.
- John* (1), Jewish envoy, ii. 180
- (2), the brother of Judas, ii. 203
- (3), the son of Simon. See *Hyrchanus*
- Jonathan*, in the wilderness of Tekoah, ii. 203; becomes *de facto* ruler of Judaea, 215; High-priest, 216; *strategos* of Balas, 217; destroys army of Apollonius, 218; meets Ptolemy Philometer, 219; obtains concessions from Demetrius II, 224; sends Jewish force to support Demetrius, 225; is active in cause of Antiochus VI, 228; made prisoner by Tryphon, 229; put to death, 230
- Joppa*, ii. 134, 219; garrisoned by Simon, 229; colonized with Jews, 230, 239, 240; seized by Cyzicenus, 256
- Jordan*, river, i. 207; ii. 203
- Joseph*, the Tobiad, ii. 296
- Josiah*, king of Judah, i. 8; ii. 232
- Judaea*, conquered by Antiochus III, ii. 32; for later history see *Judas Maccabaeus*, etc.; J. eparchy (?) of Ccele-Syria, 297
- Judas* (1) Maccabaeus, first successes, ii. 176; defeats Nicanor and Gorgias, 178, 179; engagements with Lysias, 180; "Neighbour Wars," 183; repulsed at Beth-Zachariah, 184; King's *strategos* in Jerusalem, *ib.*; expelled by Bacchides, 200; escapes from Nicanor, 201; battle of Adasa, 202; battle of Eleasa, death of J., 203; his dealings with Rome, 300
- (2), son of Simon, ii. 239
- Jupiter* Capitolinus, temple of, at Antioch, ii. 149, 150
- Kabul*, river (Cophen), i. 273, 274; ii. 23
- Kadesh*, lake of, i. 216
- Kai-Khosru*, mythical irānian king, i. 263
- Kattinikon*, i. 190,² 220
- Khaibar* Pass, the, i. 273, 292
- Kissioi*, the, i. 244
- Kurds*, the, i. 41, 264; in army of Molon, 388; ii. 287
- KyUosaktes*, ii. 268
- Labu*s*, Pass of, ii. 20
- Lagoras* (1), Cretan in Ptolemaic service, i. 313
- (2), Cretan in Seleucid service, ii.
- Lagus*, father of Ptolemy I, i. 30
- Lamia*, ii. 70, 74, 83, 84; L. war, i. 32
- Lampsacus*, i. 117, 199; ii. 2, 44; sends embassy to Rome, 45, 46; 50, 51, 63, 68, 90, 107
- I Lamus*, river, i. 148
- Laodice* (1), mother of Seleucus I, i. 215; ii. 275
- (2), daughter of Antiochus I, wife of Antiochus II, i. 158, 162,⁸ 169, 177, 179, 180; war of L. 181-192; 193, 201; end of L., 328
- (3), daughter of Achaeus, wife of Seleucus II, i. 199, 203
- (4), daughter of Mithridates II, wife of Achaeus, i. 201, 327; ii. 1, 11-13
- (5), daughter of Mithridates II, wife of Antiochus III, i. 303, 309
- (6), daughter of Antiochus III, ii. 52, 279
- (7), daughter of Seleucus IV, ii. 124
- (8), wife of Antiochus IV, ii. 136³
- (9), daughter of Antiochus IV, mother of Mithridates Eupator, ii. 209
- (10), wife of Demetrius I (?), ii. 214, 303
- (11), daughter of Antiochus Grypos, wife of Mithridates of Commagene, ii. 258
- (12), queen of the Sameni, ii. 263¹
- Laodicea* (1) on the sea, i. 208, 215, 216; its Artemis, 226; mercantile association at Delos, ii. 125; strikes money, 152; Octavius murdered there, 186; Demetrius II resides there, 228; federation of *adelphoi demoi*, 252¹; 268, 277
- (2) on Lebanon, i. 216, 229
- (8) Katakekaumene, i. 164, 168
- (4) on the Lycus, i. 164, 166, 311
- (5) in Sittacene, i. 255
- (6) in Media, i. 265
- (7) in Persis, i. 265
- (8), name of Berytus (*q.v.*)
- Laranda*, i. 92, 94
- Larissa* (1) in Thessaly, ii. 78-83
- (2) in the Troad, i. 115
- (3) in Syria, i. 215, 224; ii. 226, 288
- Lasthenes* the Cretan, ii. 218, 222, 282⁶
- Latmian* Bay, i. 150
- Lebanon*, i. 146, 207, 216
- Lebedus*, i. 114, 119, 150⁴
- Lemnos*, i. 112, 118, 130
- Lenaes*, minister of Ptolemy Philometor, ii. 134-136
- Lentulus*, Publius, ii. 49
- Leonnorius*, Gallic chieftain, i. 186, 137, 139, 142
- Leontius*, commander of Ptolemaic garrison, i. 312
- Leptines*, murderer of Octavius, ii. 186, 196, 197
- Lesbos*, ii. 29.² See *Mitylene*
- Leucas*, ii. 81, 82
- Libyan* desert, the, i. 26
- Limnaeum*, ii. 82
- Limyra*, ii. 42
- Limyrus*, river, i. 83
- Lissa*, i. 149²

- 184, 185; first rule of Alcimus, 199-201; Hasmonaeans regain J., 202; Bacchides recovers J., 202, 208; Hasmonaeans return, 216; siege of J. by Antiochus Sidetes, 240, 241
- Jews*, the, pre-Maccabean history, ii. 162-168; their devastation of the sea-board, 264. See *Judas*, *Jonathan*, *Simon*, etc.
- John* (1), Jewish envoy, ii* 180
- (2), the brother of Judas, ii. 208
- (8), the son of Simon. See *Hyrchanus*
- Jonathan*, in the wilderness of Tekoah, ii. 203; becomes *de facto* ruler of Judaea, 215; High-priest, 216; *strategos* of Balaa, 217; destroys army of Apollonius, 218; meets Ptolemy Philometer, 219; obtains concessions from Demetrius II, 224; sends Jewish force to support Demetrius, 225; is active in cause of Antiochus VI, 228; made prisoner by Tryphon, 229; put to death, 230
- Joppa*, ii. 134, 219; garrisoned by Simon, 229; colonized with Jews, 230, 239, 240; seized by Cyzicenus, 256
- Jordan*, river, i. 207; ii. 203
- Joseph*, the Tobiad, ii. 296
- Josiah*, king of Judah, i. 8; ii. 232
- Judaea*, conquered by Antiochus III, ii. 32; for later history see *Judas Maccabaeus*, etc.; J. eparchy (?) of Coele-Syria, 297
- Judas* (1) Maccabaeus, first successes, ii. 176; defeats Nicanor and Gorgias, 178, 179; engagements with Lysias, 180; "Neighbour Wars," 188; repulsed at Beth-Zachariah, 184; King's *strategos* in Jerusalem, *ib.*; expelled by Bacchides, 200; escapes from Nicanor, 201; battle of Adasa, 202; battle of Eleasa, death of J., 203; his dealings with Borne, 300
- (2), son of Simon, ii. 239
- Jupiter* Capitolinus, temple of, at Antioch, ii. 149, 150
- Kabul*, river (Cophen), i. 273, 274; ii. 23
- Kadesh*, lake of, i. 216
- Kai-Kkosru*, mythical Irânian king, i. 263
- Kallnikon*, i. 190, 220
- Khaibar* Pass, the, i. 273, 292
- Kissioi*, the, i. 244
- Kurds*, the, i. 41, 264; in army of Molon, 388; ii. 287
- Kybiosaktes*, ii. 268
- Latnls*, Pass of, ff 20
- Lagoras* (1), Cretan in Ptolemaic service, i. 818
- (2), Cretan in Seleucid service, ii.
- Lagus*, father of Ptolemy I, i. 30
- Lamia*, fi. 70, 74, 88, 84; L. war, i. 32
- Lampsacus*, i. 117, 199; ii. % 44; sends embassy to Rome, 45, 46; 50, 51, 63, 68,
- Lamus*, river, i. 148
- Laodice* (1), mother of Seleucus I, i. 215; ii. 275
- (2), daughter of Antiochus I, wife of Antiochus II, i. 158, 162, 169, 177, 179, 180; war of L. 181-192; 193, 201; end of L., 328
- (3), daughter of Achaeos, wife of Seleucus II, i. 199, 203
- (4), daughter of Mithridates I I, wife of Achaeos, i. 201, 327; ii. 1, 11-13
- (5), daughter of Mithridates I I, wife of Antiochus III, i. 303, 309
- (6), daughter of Antiochus III, ii. 52, 279
- (7), daughter of Seleucus IV, ii. 124
- (8), wife of Antiochus IV, ii. 136³
- (9), daughter of Antiochus IV, mother of Mithridates Eupator, ii. 209
- (10), wife of Demetrius I (?), ii. 214, 303
- (11), daughter of Antiochus Grypos, wife of Mithridates of Commagene, ii. 258
- (12), queen of the Sameni, ii. 263¹
- Laodicea* (1) on the sea, i. 208, 215, 216; its Artemis, 226; mercantile association at Delos, ii. 125; strikes money, 152; Octavius murdered there, 186; Demetrius II resides there, 228; federation of *adelphoi demoi*, 252¹; 268, 277
- (2) on Lebanon, i. 216, 229
- (3) Katakekaumene, i. 164, 168
- (4) on the Lycus, i. 164, 166, 811
- (5) in Sittacene, i. 255
- (6) in Media, i. 265
- (7) in Persis, i. 265
- (8), name of Berytus (*q.v.*)
- Laranda*, i. 92, 94
- Larissa* (1) in Thessaly, ii. 78-83
- (2) in the Troad, i. 115
- (3) in Syria, i. 215, 224; ii. 226, 288
- Lasthenes* the Cretan, ii. 218, 222, 282*
- Latmian* Bay, i. 150
- Lebanon*, i. 146, 207, 216
- Lebedus*, i. 114, 119, 150⁴
- Lemnos*, i. 112, 118, 130
- Lenaes*, minister of Ptolemy Philometor, ii. 134-136
- Lentuhts*, Publius, ii. 49
- Leonnorius*, Gallic chieftain, i. 136, 187, 139, 142
- Leontius*, commander of Ptolemaic garrison, i. 812
- Leptnes*, murderer of Octavius, ii. 186, 196, 197
- Lesbos*, ii. 29.² See *Mitlene*
- Leucas*, ii. 81, 82
- Libyan* desert, the, i. 26
- Limmaeum*, ii. 82
- Limyra*, ii. 42
- Limyrus*, river, i. 88
- Lissa*, i. 149*

- Illânt*, A1-, river, i. 207
Living, Gaius, ii, 89; his naval operations in Aegean, 91-97; subordinate of Aeiui-lius, 98; envoy to Prusias, 104
Logbasis of Selge, i. 201; ii. 3
***Loryma*, ii. 99**
Lucretius, Spurius, ii. 186
Lucullus, Lucius, ii. 266
Lutarius, Gallic chieftain, i. 136, 137, 142
Lycaonians, the, i. 83, 811
Lycia, i. 13, 77; L. before Alexander, 83-87; Ptolemaic influence in L., 148, 149, 184; 151, 157; yields to Antiochus III, ii. 42; attempt of Romans on L., 98, 99; L. given to Rhodes, 116; Lycian peltasts, 286
Lycortas the Achaean, ii. 143
Lycus, general of Lysimachus, i. 118
—, river (1) in Lydia, i. 167,⁴ 168
—, river (2) in Phrygia, i. 66, 164, 166, 168
—, river (3) in Assyria, i. 307²; ii. 243
—, river (4) in Syria, i. 315
Lydda, ii. 224
Lydia, Clitus, satrap of L., i. 43, 111; Demetrius in L., 65; 77, 87; Alexander and L., 91³; 116, 151, 168, 325; battle between Seleucus II and Hierax in L., 193; battles between Hierax and Attalus in L., 202; ii. 32; last Seleucid satrap, 111; Lydian javelineers, 287
Lypedrum, mountain, 132
Lysias (1), ambassador of Antiochus III, ii. 48, 49
— (2), regent for Antiochus V, ii. 158, 178-187, 190, 193, 299
—, town in Syria, i. 216
Lysimachia, i. 73, 74, 120; seized by Gauls, 137; held by Philip, ii. 32; destroyed by Thracians and restored by Antiochus III, 49; conference of L. 50, 61; 87; made depôt, 89; 100; abandoned by Lysimachus, 106
Lysimachus, satrap of Thrace, i. 30; 31, 34; allied with Cassander and Ptolemy against Antigonus, 51; adopts style of king, 57; attacks Antigonus in Asia, 59, 60; 61, 62; divides Macedonia with Pyrrhus, 65; 66, 67, 69; receives Ptolemy Keraunos, 70; Corupedion, 71, 72; L. and native powers in Asia Minor, 97-99; 112; L. and Greek cities of Asia, 116-120; receives divine honours, 126; his sons, 128,¹ 144; L. and Philaetærus, 130; "Ptolemy the son of Lysimachus," 175²; his grand-daughter (?) Berenice, 178
Lysippus, the sculptor, i. 213
***Macbog*. See Banxhybe**
***Macarcne*. See Mckrân**
Macedonia, under Philip II, i. 12-14; cavalry and infantry, 29; under Antipater, 33, 38; under Polyperchon, 43; conquered by Cassander, 50, 51; the Macedonian kingship, 57; the children of Cassander, 64; Demetrius conquers and loses M., 65; M. under Lysimachus, 69; Seleucus intends to make M. his special kingdom, 72; Clitus flees to M., 111; M. seized by Ptolemy Keraunos, 128, 129, 132; Gallic invasion, 136; Antigonus Gonatas conquers M., 144, 145; relations of Antiochus I with Antigoniid kingdom, 145; Antiochus II and M., 173; Demetrius the Fair goes to Cyrene, 178; Antigonus Doson, 205; Stratonice leaves M., 236; Romans traverse M., 100; Macedonian volunteers at Magnesia, 109; M. extinguished as independent state, 144; political constitution of old Macedonia, 270; national dress, 274; the passion for hunting, 278; custom of Kings giving costly dresses, 280; custom of bringing up children at the court, 283
Macrones, the, i. 79⁵
***Madytus*, ii. 48**
Magadates, Armenian governor of Syria, ii. 263
Magas, ruler of Cyrene, i. 146, 147, 169, 178, 299³
Magnesia (1) on Sipylus, 183,¹ 188, 326; ii. 93, 96; battle of, ii. 108-110, 285-290; surrenders to Rome, 111, 117. See *Simonides*
— (2) on the Meander, i. 160, 165, 183,¹ 196, 280; ii. 33, 47, 111,¹ 117
Magnesians, the (of Greece), ii. 69
Mago, brother of Hannibal, ii. 61
Mallians, city of the, i. 42
Mallus, i. 230-232; ii. 29,¹ 39,³ 132, 227
Malusius of Ilion, i. 162²
Matdus, Gnaeus, ii. 112-114, 117
—, Lucius, ii. 114
***Maracanda*, i. 276**
Marathus, i. 229; ii. 217
Marcus, Quintus, ii. 135, 143
Mardi, the, i. 267
Margiana, i. 269, 270
Margus, river, i. 269
***Marmareis*, the, i. 94²**
Maronea (1) in Thrace, ii. 33, 100
— (2) in Syria, i. 218
Marsyas, river, i. 139, 164, 168
— (Massyas), valley, i. 208, 216, 305
Masinissa, king of Numidia, ii. 81
***Maspha*, ii. 183**
***Massabatice*, i. 329**
***Massalia*, ii. 45, 46**
Mattathiah, father of Judas, ii. 175
Maussottus, dynast of Caria, i. 86, 87¹
Maxaies, river, i. 273
***Mazabda*, i. 226**
Maeus, Persian satrap, i. 37,² 245

- Meander*, river, i. 164
Mecca, ii. 24
Medeba, ii. 249
Medeon, ii. 81
Media, the country, i. 41, 262-265; old Median kingdom, 4, 239, 259, 261, 266⁶; satrapy of Pithon, 30, 32, 37, 41, 42; Antigonos in Media, 46, 47; Nicanor, satrap of M., 54; M. conquered by Seleucus, 56; Antiochus in M. as viceroy, 70; revolt in M., 290; Molon, satrap of M., 301; M. given to Diogenes, 309; Antiochus III in M., ii. 17, 18; partly conquered by Parthians, 158; question of its further conquest by the Parthians, 234; cf. 301; Antiochus VII in Media, 243, 244; Medes in Seleucid army, 287; the "Median" wall, i. 248, 252
Medinah, ii. 24
Megalopolis, ii. 149. See *Philip* (9), *Ptolemy* (4)
Megara (in Syria), i. 215
Megarsus, i. 232
Megasthenes, ambassador to India, i. 271, 282, 297
Megiste, island, ii. 102, 111
Megistus, river, ii. 4
Mekrân, i. 272, 273
Melancomas, agent of Aehaeus, ii. 8-10
Meleager (1), son of Ptolemy I, i. 128¹
 — (2), Seleucid governor, i. 152⁴
 — (3) of Gadara, poet, i. 225, 228
 — (4), ambassador of Antiochus IV to Rome, ii. 135, 141
 — (5), friend of Demetrius, ii. 191
Meleagru-charax, i. 216
Melander, Athenian commander, i. 85
Melitene, ii. 158
Memphis, i. 3, 314; ii. 137, 138, 141, 144
Menas, the son of Bioëris, Bithynian, i. 323
Menelaus (1), brother of Ptolemy I, i. 52
 — (2), the Jew, ii. 170-173, 180, 181, 185
Menestheus, friend of Demetrius, ii. 191
Menippus, courtier of Antiochus III, in Rome, ii. 57,⁶ 58, 59; as envoy in Greece, 66, 67; as commander, 74, 79; monument put up by him in Delos, 270
Menneas, petty dynast in Syria, i. 317
Menochares, ambassador of Demetrius I, ii. 196
MenyUu8 of Alabanda, ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor, ii. 190-192
Mermnad dynasty, the, i. 77
Merom, Sea of, ii. 228
Mesembria, i. 127¹
Mesene ("Red Sea" province), i. 252, 304, 305, 309; ii. 159
Meshech, i. 78
Mesopotamia, i. 219-222; Amphimachus, satrap of M., 44; Antigonos in M., 45; Amphimachus replaced by Blitor, 47; Seleucus in M., 53; Demetrius traverses M., 55; M. invaded by Hierax, 202; M. under Mazaeus, 245; how divided from Babylonia, 252; invaded by Molon, 305; traversed by Antiochus III, 307; held for Demetrius II, ii. 228, 233; conquered by Tigranes from the Parthians, 261,² cf. 262
Methone (in Persia), i. 265
Metrodorus of Amphipolis, physician of Antiochus I, i. 170
Metropolis (1) in Thessaly, ii. 79, 83
 — (2) in Phrygia, i. 165
Michmas, ii. 215
Micythion, magistrate of Chalcis, ii. 74, 75
Mieza, i. 42
Milesius, commander of Antiochus XII at Damascus, ii. 261, 262
Miletus, i. 150⁴; garrison of Asauder expelled, 112; Demetrius at M., 118; relations of Seleucus with M., 121; M. and the Gauls, 139; M. won by Ptolemy, 149; M. and Prieno, 162⁵; M. under Timarchus, liberated by Antiochus II, 174; M. loyal to Seleucus II, 183; won by Philip, ii. 33; welcomes Romans, 98; 128, 138. See *Branchidae*, *Demwlmnas*, *Heraclides* (4), *Timarchus* (1)
Miltiades, the Athenian, i. 7
Milyas, i. 83, 92, 93; ii. 4
Mimas, promontory, i. 108
Minnio, Friend of Antiochus III, ii. 62, 109
Mithrapatati, Lycian, i. 85
Mithridates (1), son of Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, i. 90, 96, 153
 — (2) I of Pontic Cappadocia ("the Founder"), conquers Paphlagonia and valley of the Iris, 96; allied with Heraclea, 123; assumes name of king, 153; employs Gallic mercenaries, 154; date of his death, 172, 193
 — (3) II, i. 194, 201, 303, 327; ii. 122
 — III Euergetes, ii. 210¹
 — (4) IV (Eupator), ii. 262, 265-267, 295
 — (5), nephew of Antiochus III, ii. 16
 — (6), son of Antiochus H1, perhaps identical with preceding, ii. 39, 295
 — (7), satrap of Lesser Armenia, ii. 123
 — (8). See *Ariarathes* V
 — (9) I of Parthia. See *Arsaces* VI
 — (10) II of Parthia. See *Arsaces* VIII
 — (11), Parthian satrap, ii. 261
 — (12) Kallinikos, of Coramagene, ii. 258
Mithrobuzanes, claimant to the throne of Sophene, ii. 195
Mitylme, i. 103,¹ 106; ii. 91, 101
Mizpehy ii. 176
Mnasilochus, Acarnanian notable, ii. 81
Modin, ii. 175, 230
Molon, satrap of Media, i. 301-309; ii. 290³
Moon-god, the (Men), i. 165

Mopsu-hestia, i. 231 ; ii. 151, 260
Mopms, the mythical hero, i. 230
Morzas, Paphlagonian dynast, i. 155
Moschi, the, i. 78
***Mossynceci*, the, i. 79⁵**
Musaeus, herald of Antiochus III, ii. 111, 112
***Mycale*, i. 110**
Mygdon, river, i. 222
Mygdonia (in Mesopotamia), i. 222
***Myiscus, elephantarchos*, ii. 284**
Mylasa, i. 86, 89 ; ii. 43, 98
Myndus, i. 113 ; ii. 42, 90, 98
Myonnevus, promontory, ii. 105
Myra, ii. 42
Myrus, river, i. 83
Mysians, the, i. 77, 87, 323 ; ii. 287 ;
 M. guard of Antiochus IV, ii. 175, 287⁴ ;
***Μυσῶν καρούκλαι*, i. 4¹**
Mysta, concubine of Seleucus II, i. 195
Myus, i. 150⁴ ; ii. 33

Nabataeans*, the. See *Arabs

Nobis, tyrant of Sparta, ii. 56, 66, 67
Nabopolassar, king of Babylon, i. 239
Nanda, Indian king, i. 295
***Naples*, ii. 62**
***Naucratis*, ii. 139**
***Naupactus*, ii. 87, 89**
***Neandrioy*, i. 115**
Nearchus, Macedonian chief, i. 243, 273, 278
Nebo, temple of, i. 255
***Nebuchadnezzar*, i. 38, 239, 247**
Nehemiah, ii. 162, 167
Nemeses, temple of the, i. 116
Neolaus, brother of Molon, i. 308
Nesiotai, Federation of the, (the Cyclades), i. 113,² 146, 184 ; ii. 29,² 42
Nestor of Tarsus, philosopher, i. 231
Nicaea, daughter of Antipater, wife of Lysimachus, i. 120
 —, city in Asia Minor, i. 120, 155
Nicagoras of Rhodes, ambassador of Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 63,² 118
Nicander, pirate-captain, ii. 97³
Nicanor (1), satrap of Media, i. 54-56
 — (2), murderer of Seleucus III, i. 205, 300
 — (3), commander of expedition against the Jews, ii. 178, 179
 — (4), friend of Demetrius I, ii. 192
 — (5), general of Demetrius, identical with one of the two preceding (?), 200-202
Nicarchus, captain in service of Antiochus III, i. 315-317
***Nicatorum*, the, i. 210**
***Nicatoris*, i. 220**
***Nicephoriim*, i. 220, 221**
Nicetas, a Jew, ii. 170¹
Nicias kinsman of Menneas, i. 317
Nicolaus (1), Aetolian *codottiere* in service of Ptolemy, i. 313-316

I *Nicolaus* (2), Aetolian captain in service of Antiochus III, ii. 19
NicoThachus, agent of Achaeus, ii. 8-10
Nicomedes (1) 1, king of Bithynia, i. 134, 137, 155, 156, 173
 — (2) of Cos, captain in service of Antiochus III, ii. 19
***Nicopolis*, i. 219**
Nile, river, i. 3, 35, 179
Nimitti-Bel, wall of Babylon, i. 248
Nineveh, i. 4, 221,¹ 239
Nisa, i. 266
Nimean horses, ii. 146
Nisibis (Antioch in Mygdonia), i. 221, 222, 307 ; ii. 152
***Nora*, i. 43**
***Notium*, ii. 104**
***Numantia*, ii. 241**
 I *Numenius*, satrap of Mesene, ii. 159, 160
 | ***Numidia*, ii. 82**
Numisius, Titus, ambassador to Antiochus IV, ii. 141

Oborzus, Persian captain in Seleucid (?) service, i. 291
Octavius (1), lieutenant of Flamininus, ii. 82
 — Gnaeus (2), ambassador, 186, 187
Oeniandus (Epiphanea), ii. 151
Oenoparas, river, ii. 221
Oeta, mountain, i. 136 ; ii. 84
Olgassys, mountain, i. 96
Olympia, i. 155 ; ii. 149, 150 ; O. Games, i. 107
Olympias, mother of Alexander, i. 33, 43, 50
Omanes, Persian captain in Seleucid service, i. 291
Onias, the Jewish High-priest, ii. 168, 171
***Orestes*, i. 209**
***Orestis*, i. 29**
***Oricus*, i. 308**
Oritae, the, i. 272, 273
Orætes, satrap of Lydia, i. 90
Orontes, Armenian king, ii. 118
 —, river, i. 36,⁴ 203, 207-217 ; ii. 260
Orontobates the Mede, satrap of Media, i. 54
Orophernes, ii. 157 ; instated as king by Demetrius, 205 ; his rule, 206 ; attempts to have Ariarathes assassinated, 207 ; expelled, 208 ; conspires at Antioch, 209
Oropus*. See *Europus
Orrhoë*. See *Edessa
Orthosia, i. 190, 236 ; ii. 238
***Ortospana*, i. 273**
Ostia, ii. 190, 192
Othrys, mountain, ii. 83, 84
***Oty*, i. 80**
Oxathres, tyrant of Heraclea, i. 119
Oxus, river, i. 262, 275
Oxyartes, Iranian noble, father of Roxane, i. 31, 274, 275, 293⁴

- Pactye*, i. 71
Pakhtûn, the, i. 271
Palestine. See *Code-Syria*
Pallas Itonia, ii. 75
Palmyra, i. 55,² 228
Pamir, the, i. 24, 277
Pamphilidas, Rhodian captain, ii. 102
Pamphylia, i. 83; Ptolemaic influence in P., 148; 152,¹ 157; P. recaptured by Ptolemy III, 179, 186; conquered by Achæus, ii. 4, 42; question of its cession by Antiochus, 112, 118; given to Eumenes, 117; 196; Pamphylian peltasts, 286
Panaetius, Stoic philosopher, ii. 188
Panaetolus, condottiere, i. 313; ii. 21
Panion, battle of the, ii. 37
Panionion, the, i. 110
Panormus, ii. 96
Paphlagonia, i. 79-81; P. and Alexander, 92; satrapy of Eumenes, 93; Mithridates in P., 96; 141³; Morzias, 155
Paradisiis, i. 35⁴
Parapotamia, i. 252, 305; ii. 300
Parikanioi, the, i. 272
Parium, i. 117
Parmenio, envoy of Lampsacus, ii. 51
Parni, the, i. 284
Paropanisidae, i. 262, 274
Paropanisus. See *Hindû-Kush*
Paroreia, i. 164, 165
Partfienius, river, i. 79
Parthenon, the, i. 10
Parthia, i. 42, 262, 266, 267, 284-289. See *Arsaces*
Pasargadae, i. 42
Pasitigris, river, i. 47
Pataliputra, i. 296, 297
Patara, i. 148, 149; ii. 42, 52; assaulted by Romans, 98, 99; 102, 111
Patrocles, friend of Seleucus I, i. 55, 66, 131, 132,¹ 133, 281-283, 324
Paurava king, the. See *Porus*
Pausistratus, Rhodian admiral, ii. 93, 95, 96
Peda-sa, ii. 33, 43
Pednelissus, ii. 3
Pegae, ii. 256
Pelecas, ii. 4¹
Pella (1) in Macedonia, i. 246, 321; Archon of P., see *Archon*
 — (2) in N. Syria, i. 214
 — (3) in Decapolis, i. 317
Peliinaeum, ii. 79, 82
Pelusium, i. 314, 318; ii. 136; taken by Antiochus IV, 137; garrisoned. 140; its cession demanded, 143; 248
Peneus, river, ii. 79
Perdiccas, prince of Orestis, Regent of the Empire, i. 28-39, 41, 93, 94, 130, 322; ii. 271
Perga, i. 93, 113
Pergamos, i. 90, 130, 200; ii. 1; P. assailed by Philip, 32; by Antiochus and Seleucus, 99-101; Pergamene contingent at Magnesia, 109. See *Philetærus*, *Attaius* (3) and (4), *Eumenes* (3) and (4)
Pericles, Lycian king, i. 84-86
Perigenes, i. 315
Perinthus (1) in Thrace, ii. 32
 — (2) in Syria?, i. 222⁶
Perrhaebia, ii. 79, 82
Persepolis, i. 42, 241
Perseus, king of Macedonia, ii. 121, 124, 133, 135; appeals to Antiochus IV, 141; his final defeat, 144
Persian Empire, the, absorbs preceding empires, i. 4, 77; employs Greek mercenaries and pays the Greek states, 12; limitations of Persian rule, 23; its relations with the native races of Asia Minor, 78-87; with the Asiatic Greeks, 87-89; the provincial nobility, 89, 90; Mithridates of Cius, 96; the Peace of Antalcidas, 101; the tribute of Aspendus, 105; Clazomenae removed to an island, 107; diminution of the Ionian Body, 110; relic of Persian Empire left at Heraclea, 117; custom of granting cities to individuals, 119; image of Apollo carried off from Branchidae, 121; Sardis the seat of government for Asia Minor, 151; Cilicia during Persian Empire, 230; Babylon under the Persians, 241-244; custom of kings giving costly dresses, 280; of bringing up children at the court, 283. See also *Achaemenes*, house of
Persians, the, in time of Cyrus, i. 12, 241, 260; typical Persian nobleman, 259; Alexander wishes to fuse the Persian and Macedonian aristocracies, 42; Persian bowmen in Seleucid army, ii. 287; Artemis Persike, i. 226. See also *Irânians*
Persian dynasties in Asia Minor. See *Mithridates*, *Ariarathes*
Persis, i. 42, 47, 54, 55, 262, 265, 291, 301, 308; ii. 47; separate principality, 158, 159; Antiochus IV dies there, 161; dynasty in Persis allied with Demetrius II, 234
Petra, ii. 24
Peucestas, satrap of Persis, i. 42, 47, 265
Phanias, Seleucid official, ii. 277
Pharaoh-Necho, i. 8
Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, i. 82, 90
Phamaces I, king of Pontic Cappadocia, ii. 123
Pharsolus, ii. 79, 83
Phaselis, i. 92, 113; ii. 102, 103
Phasis, river, i. 82
Pherae, i. 78, 83
Pherecles, governor of *eparchy* in Bactria (?), i. 286

Phidias, the sculptor, ii. 150

Phila (1), daughter of Antipater, wife of Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 62, 63, 128, 144

— (2), daughter of Seleucus I and Stratonice, wife of Antigonos Gonatas, i. 145, 173

Philetaeria, i. 167

Phihtaeus (1), the eunuch, i. 130, 131, 156, 157

— (2), the son of Attalus I, ii. 47

Philip (1) II of Macedonia, i. 13, 14, 29, 30, 33, 64, 103, 123

— (2) III (Arrhidaeus), i. 29, 33-37, 50

— (3) IV, son of Cassander, i. 64

— (4) V, son of Demetrius, succeeds his father as infant, i. 205; his attack on Ptolemaic Empire in alliance with Antiochus III, ii. 30-33; at war with Rome, 34 f.; his defeat, 40; solicited by the Aetolians, 56; desires Seleucid alliance, 63; question of alliance, 77; co-operates with Romans against Antiochus, 79-83; facilitates passage of Romans through Macedonia and Thrace, 100; his death, 121

— (5), son of Antipater, i. 128¹

— (6), son of Lysimachus, *ib.*

— (7), satrap of Parthia, i. 42, 267, 277

— (8), satrap in India, i. 293, 294

— (9), of Megalopolis, ii. 75, 76, 78, 82

— (10), the *elephantarchos*, ii. 109; foster-brother of Antiochus III, 283

— (11), *ff6vTpo<po\$* of Antiochus IV, ii. 184, 185, 283

— (12) I Philadelphus, of the Seleucid line, wars against Antiochus X, ii. 260; quarrels with Demetrius III, 261; attempts to seize Damascus, 262; disappears from history, 263

— (13) II, ii. 266-268

Philomelum, i. 165

Philonides, Epicurean philosopher, ii. 276, 277

Philopocemen, ii. 101

Philoteria, i. 316

Phocaea, i. 150⁴; ii. 2, 4, 92, 93; taken by Seleucus, 96; attacked by Romans, 101; surrenders to Romans, 106

Phoebus of Antioch, i. 225

Phoenicia, before Alexander's death, i. 228, 229; Eumenes in P. 43³; Ptolemaic influence in P., 184, 235; Seleucid power in P. before Antiochus III, 190, 236; Hellenism in P. 229, 230; partially disaffected to Antiochus III, ii. 10; Phoenician fleet of Antiochus, 94; fleet defeated by Rhodians, 102, 103; government of P., 163, 297; P. communities at Athens, 165; P. held by Cyzicenus, 255; ravaged by Ituraeans, 264; conquered by Tigranes, 266. See *Aradus*, *Tyre*, *Sidon*, *Tripolis*, *Byblos*, *Berytus*, etc.

Phoenix of Colophon, i. 119

Phrada, i. 270

Phriapatius. See *Arsaces IV*

Phrygia, i. 151; satrapy of Antigonos, 33, 37, 38; operations in war between Seleucus and Lysimachus, 71; affinities of Phrygians, 77; Persian rule effective in P., 87; P. under Macedonian rule, 91; part of P. occupied by Gauls, 141; Seleucid satrap of P. (?), 151, 177; Apamea, capital of P., 164; Phrygian cult at Antioch in Pisidia, 165; P. ceded to Mithridates (?), 194; Hierax in P., 195; Seleucus III murdered in P., 205; assignment of P. after Ipsus, 323; >P. under satrap of Lydia, 325; Antiochus III in P., ii. 93

Phrygia (Hellespontine), i. 151; satrapy of Arrhidaeus, 37, 43, 110; satrap of P. under the Persians, 82; family of Pharnabazus, 90; Calas satrap, 92; P. occupied by Antigonos, 111; Aphrodisius in P., 122; battle between Attalus and Hierax in P., 198

Phrygius river, i. 323; ii. 108, 109

Physcus, river (in Caria), i. 166

Pieria (in Syria), i. 208, 210, 216

Piraeus, ii. 73, 86, 89

Pisidians, the, i. 83; chastised by Alexander, 23, 92; adherents of Perdiccas among P., 38, 95; P. under Alexander, 93; Perdiccas begins to subjugate P., 94; Seleucid colonies planted to control the P., 165, 166; Hierax and P., 201; attacked by Achaeus, 311; partially subjugated by Achaeus, ii. 3; attacked by Antiochus III, 57, 62; by Manlius, 118; Pisidian peltasts, 286

Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens, ii. 148

Pissuri, the, i. 284³

Pitanc, i. 156, 158

Pithon (1), son of Cratcuas, satrap of Media, i. 30, 32, 35-37, 40-44, 46, 47

— (2), son of Agenor, i. 54, 293, 294

Platanus (1), i. 216

— (2), on the coast, i. 315, 316

Plato, i. 9, 153³

Plistarchus, brother of Cassander, i. 61-63, 232

Polemaeus, general of Antigonos, i. 95

Polemon of Iliion, i. 200

Polybius, the historian, supports Ptolemy's application for troops, ii. 143; his intercourse with Demetrius in Rome, 188-191

Polyperchon, Macedonian chief, i. 43, 50, 57, 58

Polytelia, i. 222⁶

Polytimetus, river, i. 276

Polyxenidas of Rhodes, ii. 19, 74, 77; patrols islands, 89; fights off Cissus, 92, 93; prepares new fleet, destroys

- Rhodian fleet, 95 ; blockaded in Ephesus, 97 ; attacks Notium, 104 ; defeated off Corycus, 105 ; flees to Syria, 111
- Pompey*, ii. 267
- Popillius Laenes*, Gaius, ambassador to Antiochus IV, ii. 144, 145
- Porphyreon*, i. 315
- Porus* (Paurava), Indian king, i. 31, 292-294
- Posidium*, i. 185
- Position*, Tropaios, ii. 235
- Posidonius* of Apamea, i. 224
- Praxiteles*, the sculptor, i. 155³
- Prepelas*, general of Lysimachus, i. 116, 117
- Priene*, 150,* 89,⁵ 106, 118, 126,⁴ 159 ; war with Magnesia, enslaved by Antiochus I, 160 ; quarrel with Samos, 162, 175,⁴ 189⁵ ; 162⁵
- Prinassus*, ii. 33
- Prinne*, ii. 101
- Proerna*, ii. 83
- Prophthasia*, i. 270
- Protarchus*, Greek merchant in Egypt, ii. 249
- Prusias I*, King of Bithynia, ii. 2, 15, 59 ; deserts Antiochus, 104
- II, ii. 123, 124²
- Pieleum*, ii. 69
- Ptolemais* (1), in Pamphylia, i. 148
- (2) = Ace, in Syria, delivered to Antiochus III, i. 313 ; 316, 317 ; called Antioch, ii. 152, 330 ; seat of Alexander Balas, 210, 212, 213, 219 ; Demetrius II at P., 224 ; Tryphon seizes Jonathan there, 229 ; attacked by Sarpedon, 235 ; Tryphon takes refuge there, 238 ; retained by Demetrius II, 249 ; Cleopatra refuses to admit Demetrius, 250 ; Selene in P., 264 ; captured by Tigranes, 266
- Ptolemy* (1), dynastic name of the Macedonian kings of Egypt:—
- house of, in 281 B.C., 128¹ ; growth of its possessions over seas, 146 f. ; its use of native religion, ii. 156
- I Soter I, becomes satrap of Egypt, i. 30 ; 31, 33, 34 ; repulses Perdiccas, 35 ; Seleucus flies to P., 49 ; the war with Antigonos till the battle of Gaza, 51-53 ; P. becomes king, 57 ; war with Antigonos till Ipsus, 58, 59 ; P. annexes Cœle-Syria, 61, 62 ; 63, 65 ; P. abdicates, 70 ; P.'s action on the coasts of Asia Minor, 113 ; 118 ; receives divine honours, 126 ; takes Jerusalem, ii. 163 ; accused before army, 271
- Keraunos, flies to Lysimachus and then to Seleucus, i. 70 ; murders Seleucus, 78 ; accepted by the army, 74 ; attacked by Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochus I, 128, 129 ; sells body of Seleucus, 131 ; makes peace with Antiochus, 132 ; killed by the Gauls, 136 ; his Illyrian war, 324
- Ptolemy II Philadelphus*, made king, 70 ; marries daughter of Lysimachus, 71 ; destroys Gallic band, 142 ; his war with the Seleucids, 145-150, 173-175, 234 f. ; 156, 169¹ ; makes peace with Antiochus II, 178, 179 ; his death, 183 ; 232, 235, 297 ; P. polygamous ?, 279
- , commander at Ephesus, i. 174, 175
- III Euergetes I, his accession, i. 183 ; his invasion of the Seleucid realm, 184-190, 287 ; makes peace with Seleucus II, 192 ; kills Laodice, 201, 328 ; has Hierax imprisoned, 202 ; his relations with Seleucus III and Antigonos Doson, 204, 205 ; his power in Cilicia and Phœnicia, 235, 236
- IV Philopator, his accession, i. 302 ; his governor repels attack of Antiochus on Cœle-Syria, 306 ; his court alienates Theodotus, 313 ; defence of realm against Antiochus, 314-317 ; battle of Raphia, 318, 319 ; peace with Antiochus, 320 ; influence of Rhodes at his court, ii. 2 ; attempt to rescue Achæus, 7 ; relations with Antiochus III and Philip till his death, 30
- V Epiphanes, his accession, ii. 30 ; relation to other powers, 31 ; his dominions attacked by Antiochus III and Philip, 32-44 ; betrothed to Cleopatra, 38 ; his relations with Antiochus "friendly," 51 ; his marriage, 57 ; offers help against Antiochus, 81 ; his death, 134 ; his reputation as a hunter, 278 ; borrows court hierarchy from Seleucids (?), 281
- VII Philometor, the war with Antiochus IV, ii. 134-136 ; becomes puppet of Antiochus, 137-142 ; joint-king with Euergetes, 142 ; attacked by Antiochus, 143-145 ; receives Philip, 185 ; driven out by Euergetes and restored by Rome, 189 ; his ambassador Menyllus, 190 ; detects attempt of Demetrius on Cyprus, 208 ; sets up Alexander Balas in Syria, 210-212 ; re-enters Syria with an army, 219 ; invited to assume Seleucid diadem, 220 ; his death, 221
- VIII Philopator II, infant son of preceding II, 222
- IX Euergetes II, elected by Alexandria, ii. 136 ; his reign in Alexandria, 137-142 ; joint-king with Philometor, 142, see *Ptolemy Philometor* ; gets Cyrene, 189 ; expels Cleopatra II, 248 ; marries Cleopatra III, 248² ; supports Alexander Zabinas, 249 ; reconciled with Cleopatra II, supports Grypos, 251 ; his death, 253

Ptolemy X Soter II, associated with his mother in the throne, 253; sends help to Cyzicenus, 256; intervenes in Palestine, 257; sends Demetrius III to Syria, 260

— *XI Alexander I*, governs Cyprus, ii. 254; ally of Grypos, 256; called by Cleopatra III to Egypt, 257

— *XIII (Auletes)*, ii. 268

— (2), the son of Lysimachus, i. 128,¹ 144; perhaps identical with the father of Berenice the high-priestess, 175,² 178

— (3), son of Agearchus, ii. 145⁴

— (4) Macron, of Megalopolis, ii. 145

— (5), governor of Commagene, ii. 157

— (6), son of Dorymenes, ii. 171, 178

— (7), son of Abub, ii. 239

— (8), son of Thrasesas, ii. 297

Pydna, i. 50; battle of P., ii. 144

Pyrrhus of Epirus, i. 65, 69, 128, 133; ii. 33

Pythagoras, Ptolemaic captain, i. 185

Pythiades, governor of the Red Sea" province, i. 304, 305, 309

Pythian Games, the, i. 189, 214

Rabbath-Ammon (Philadelphia), i. 317

***Ramathaim*, ii. 224**

Rambatia, i. 273, 330

***Ramitha*, i. 226**

Raphia, i. 317; battle of R., 318, 319; ii. 57, 284-287

Rhagae, i. 263, 264; ii. 158

***Rhanda*, i. 291**

***Rhauca*, ii. 47**

***Rhinocolura*, ii. 143**

Rhodes, its artistic school, i. 15; expels Macedonian garrison, 32, 106; allied with Antigonus, 112; attacked by Demetrius, 58, 113; its *synoikismos* voluntary, 114; R. and Seleucus II, 195; R. mother-city of Soli, 230; mediates between Ptolemy and Antiochus III, 314; is quarrel with Byzantium, ii. 1, 2; Nicomachus, 8; place of R. in grouping of powers, 31; with Attalus against Philip, 32, 33; invokes Rome, 84; opposes advance of Antiochus III, 40; policy of R. after Cynoscephalae, 41, 42; action of R. in Caria, 43; arbitration of R., 51; 63¹; its policy in 191, 90, 91; co-operates with Romans, 93, 95-99; the fight with the Phoenicians, 102, 103; the fight off Corycus, 105, 106; R. asks for liberation of Soli, 112; Rhodian traders protected, 114; R. escorts Laodice to Macedonia, 124; attempts to mediate between Antiochus IV and the Ptolemies, 140; mission of Gracchus in R., 196; Antiochus Sidetes in R., 237, See *Nicagoras*, *Pclyxenidas*, *Theodotas*, etc.

Rhodbates (?), i. 153³

***Rhodogwne*, ii. 242**

***Rhaetum*, ii. 95**

Rhossus, i. 63, 213

Riblah, i. 36⁴

Rome, its rôle in the history of Hellenism, i. 14, 15; overwhelmed by the Gauls 136; group of powers to which R. belongs, ii. 32; its appearance in the East, 33, 34; its war with Philip, 34-40; Lampsacus appeals to R., 45, 46; ambassadors of Antiochus III in R., 57-59; oligarchs in Greek states favourable to R., 65; the war with Antiochus, 72-114; embassies from the East after Magnesia, 116; position of R. in the East after Magnesia, 120, 121; embassy of Apollonius, 133; Roman mission to Syria, 134; war with Perseus, 135, 142,¹ 144; embassy from Alexandria, 140; R. makes Antiochus evacuate Egypt, 144; embassy from Antiochus, 145; embassy of Gracchus, 147; son (?) of Ariarathes IV educated in R., 157; Roman mission in Palestine, 180; mission of Octavius, 185-187; embassy from Lysias, 187; Demetrius in R., 188-193; second embassy of Gracchus, 193; R. recognizes Timarchus as king, 194; embassy from Demetrius, 196; waning of Roman influence, 197, 198; alliance of R. with the Jews, 202, cf. 300; appeal of Ariarathes V, 205; Demetrius sends Andriacus to R., 209; Alexander Balas in R., 209, 210; embassy from Jonathan, 229; embassy from Tryphon, 231; embassy from Antiochus Sidetes, 241; R. sides with Grypos, 255; orders Cyzicenus to restore his conquests from the Jews, 256; advance of R. in Asia Minor and Cilicia, 258; sons of Antiochus X in R., 263; R. drives back barbarians from Asia Minor and Syria, 265-267

Roxane, the queen of Alexander, i. 29, 31, 32

Sabina, the Empress, ii. 268

Sagalassus, i. 92, 93, 166

Salamis, in Cyprus, i. 185

Salbacus, mountain, i. 168

***Salganeus*, ii. 74**

Samaria, i. 317; ii. 37, 164, 224, 249, 256, 297

Samaritans, the, ii. 156, 164, 174, 249

Sameni, the, ii. 263¹

Sames, king of Commagene, ii. 258¹

Samqs, i. 149, 150,⁴ 162, 175,⁴ 189⁵, ii. 29²; Ptolemaic forces ejected by Philip, 32; 83; recovers its liberty, 42; friendly to Rome, 91; station for fleet, 96, 97, 102, 104

- Samosata*, i. 219, 220
Samothrace, i. 126,⁴ 159; ii. 186
Sampsigcratnus. See *Shemash-geram*
Sandrocottus. See *Chandragupta*
ScrrdanapaMus, Assyrian king, i. 230
Sardis, taken by Demetrius, i. 65; by Seleucus, 71; Alexander and S., 91³; Lysimachus at S., 119; capital of Asia Minor, 151, 159, 325; Eumenes I defeats Antiochus I near S., 157; roads to Sardis, 164 f.; court of Laodice and Hierax at S., 192, 193; court of Achaeus, 311; besieged by Antiochus III, ii. 5-13; 39, 48, 93, 101, 104, 106, 110; surrenders to Rome, 111; in realm of Eumenes, 117
Sarpedon, general of Demetrius II, ii. 235
Sarpedonium, promontory, ii. 113
Scrus, river, ii. 52
Scarphea ii. 85
Scepsis, i. 112, 115, 119, 126
Scythos, ii. 69
Scipio Aemilianus, Publius Cornelius (Africanus the younger), ii. 188, 241
— Africanus, Publius Cornelius, ii. 59¹; consul for 191, ii. 80; accompanies his brother to Asia, 100; approached by Heraclides, 107; ill at Elaea, 108; receives envoys at Sardis, 111
— Lucius Cornelius, commands against Antiochus as consul, ii. 100; writes to Prusias, 104; operations in Asia, 108-111; returns home as Asiaticus, 112
Scirtus, river, i. 221
Scopas (1), the sculptor, i. 87
— (2), the Aetolian, ii. 30, 36, 37, 163
Scotussa, ii. 78, 79, 83
Scylax of Caryanda, i. 243
Scythia, i. 24, 276, 284; S. cavalry in Daphne procession, ii. 146; Scythian mercenaries of Phraates, ii. 247; of Antiochus III, 289
Scythopolis, i. 316; ii. 183, 229, 256
Selene, daughter of Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleopatra III, marries Ptolemy Soter, ii. 254; marries Grypos, 257; marries Cyzicenus, 259; marries Antiochus Eusebes, *ib.*; holds out in Syria, 264; captured and killed by Tigranes, 266; a confusion of two Selenes?, 304
Seleucia (1), in Pieria, i. 208-210; captured by Ptolemy, 185; its magistrates, 223¹; its city cults, 226; Stratonice at S., 237; recaptured by Antiochus III, 312, 314; ii. 52; strikes money, 152; inscription relating to cult of kings, 154*; Orophernes imprisoned there, 209; Demetrius II fixes his court there, 227, 233; Antiochus Sidetes at S., 237; S. *ἑρὰ καὶ δούλος*, 241; federation of *adelphoi demoi*, 252¹; loyal to Antiochus Grypos, 255; given autonomy, 256; maintains itself against Tigranes, 263; Apollophanes of S. See *ApoUophancs* (2)
Seleucia (2) on the Tigris, i. 253-255; capital of eastern provinces, 64; S. during rebellion of Molon, 303-305; its punishment by Hermias, 809; Antiochus III in S., ii. 23, 24; its treatment of the Parthian governor, 243; punished by Phraates, 245. See *Diogenes* (2) and (3)
— (3) on Calycadnus, i. 148, 185, 235
— (4) in Pamphylia, i. 148
— (5) Sidera, i. 165
— (6) on Zeugma, i. 220, 303; ii. 266
— (7) on Hedyphon, i. 255
— (8) on "Red Sea," *ib.*
— (9) on Eulaeus, *ib.*
— (10) on Pyramus, ii. 151
— (11), temporary name of Gadara (*q.v.*)
— (12), temporary name of Tralles, (*q.v.*)
Seleucis (Cappadocian), i. 99
— (Syrian), i. 208, 216, 219,⁸ 233
Seleucobelus, i. 216
Seleucus (1) I Nicator, his history till Alexander's death, i. 30-32, 321; chiliarch, 34, 322; takes part in killing Perdiccas, 35; at Triparadissus, 36; satrap of Babylonia, 37-39, 42-48, 247, 248; escapes to Egypt, 49; acts as officer of Ptolemy, 52; regains Babylonia and conquers the East, 53-57; Ipsus, 59, 60; from Ipsus till death of S., 61-73; S. and native powers in Asia Minor, 99; S. and Greek cities of Asia Minor, 120-123; receives divine honours, 126; his power in Europe (?), 127; Philaetærus and S., 130, 131, 156; Phila, daughter of S., 145; legend of his founding Seleucia on Calycadnus, 148; respects freedom of Erythrae, 161; claimed as founder of Thyatira, 167; founds the four cities of the Seleucis, 209-216; calls Bambyce Hieropolis, 218; his foundations on the Euphrates, 220; in Mesopotamia, 221, 222; presents Laodicea with Artemis Brauronia, 226; founds Selencia-on-the-Tigris, 252, 253; consults Babylonian oracle, 256; colonizes Media, 264; Parthia, 266; Aria (?), 269³; his foundations not distinguishable from those of Antiochus I, 279; causes Caspian and Jaxartes to be explored, 281-283; his invasion of India, 296; friendship with Chandragupta, 297; theory of his multiplying the number of satrapies unproved, 325
— (2), son of Antiochus I, i. 150,³ 169
— (3) II Kallinikos, his reign, 181-203; 158,³ 179, 326, 327; adds to Antioch, 213; founds Kallinikon (?), 220; re-

- bellion of Stratonice, 236, 237 ; invasion of Irân, 288, 289
Seleucus (4) III Soter, i. 203-205
 — (5) IV Philopater, designated for king of Thrace, ii. 49, 51 ; operates in Aeolis, 94, 96 ; attacks Pergamos, 99-101 ; his capture of young Scipio, 107 ; at Magnesia, 109 ; flees to Apamea, 110 ; conveys corn to Caria, 112 ; left as joint-king in Syria, 119 ; his reign, 120-125
 — (6) V, son of Demetrius II, ii. 250
 — (7), son of Antiochus VII, ii. 243, 245
 — (8) VI Epiphanes, his reign, ii. 259, 260
 — (9), the Babylonian mathematician, i. 256
Selge, i. 93, 201 ; ii. 3
Selinus, i. 148 ; ii. 39
Sdyrrvbria, ii. 49
Sennacherib, Assyrian king, i. 252
Seron, general of Seleucid forces, ii. 176²
Sestos, ii. 32, 89, 95
Shechem, ii. 173, 261
Shemash-geram (Sampsigeramus), Arab chief, ii. 266, 267
Shushan, See *Susa*
Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, i. 271, 272
Sicily, ii. 66, 81, 264
Side, ii. 3, 102 ; battle of S., 103 ; 236
Sidon, before Macedonian conquest, i. 6, 229 ; held by Demetrius Poliorcetes, 61, 63, 232 ; under Ptolemy, 235 ; refuge for Ptolemaic forces, 316 ; taken by Antiochus III, ii. 37 ; coins under Antiochus IV, 152 ; held by Demetrius II, 228 ; obtains its freedom, 256
Sigeum, i. 117
Siles, Seleucid commander in Persis, i. 290
Silpius, mountain, i. 211, 212, 214, 291
 "Silver Shields," the, i. 34, 43-46, 247 ; ii. 285
Simon, the Hasmonean, in the wilderness of Tekoah, ii. 203 ; *strategos* of Cœle-Syria, 228 ; garrisons Beth-sur and Joppa, 229 ; succeeds Jonathan, 230 ; makes friends with Demetrius II, 231 ; beginning of independence, 232 ; demands of Antiochus Sidetes, death of S., 239
Simonides of Magnesia, epic poet, i. 142
Sinope, i. 80, 153 ; ii. 122
Sippar, i. 250, 251
Sirynga, i. 267 ; ii. 20
Sittaoe (Sittacene), i. 255
Smerdis, the False, i. 4, 286
Smyrna, refounded by Antigonus, i. 116 ; added to by Lysimachus, 120 ; member of Ionian Body, 150¹ ; 158,³ 160, 177, 183¹ ; S. and Seleucus II, 188, 189, 326 ; changes its allegiance to Attaius, 199 ; ii. 2, 4 ; defies Antiochus III, 45, 50, 51, 63, 68, 90, 107 ; Alexanoe Balas discovered at S., 207
Sogdiana, i. 262, 263, 274-277, 286
Soli, i. 185, 230, 231, 232, 235 ; ii. 39, 112
Solyimi, the, i. 83
Sophagasenius, Indian king, ii. 23
Sophene, ii. 119, 195, 263
Sophron, governor of Ephesus, i. 187, 188
Sophytes, Indian king, i. 295
Sosibius, prime minister of Ptolemy IV, i. 320 ; ii. 7
Sosiphanes, ambassador of Antiochus IV to Rome, ii. 141
Solira, i. 269
Sparta, i. 88, 101, 222 ; ii. 67, 229. See *Nobis*
Spercheus, river, ii. 83, 84
Spitamenes, Irânian noble, father of Apama, i. 31
Stamenes, satrap of Babylonia, i. 37²
Stasander, satrap of Aria, i. 270
Stasanor of Soli, satrap of Aria, transferred to Bactria, i. 268, 270, 277
Stasis, i. 265
Strato, tyrant of Beroea, ii. 261
Strata's Tower, ii. 264
Stratonice (1), daughter of Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 62-64, 69, 121, 133, 145, 169, 177, 227, 323
 — (2), daughter of preceding and Antiochus I, i. 169, 173, 236, 237
 — (3), daughter of Antiochus II, i. 172, 202, 327
 — (4), daughter of Ariarathes IV, ii. 122
Stratmiicea (1) in Caria, i. 166 ; ii. 33, 43
 — (2), on Caïcus, i. 168
 — (3) *πρὸς τῷ Ταύρῳ*, i. 167¹
 — (4) in Mesopotamia, i. 222⁶
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius, ii. 262
Sulpicius, Publius, ii. 59, 60, 62
Susa, i. 31, 43, 44, 46, 48, 226, 244, 245, 305, 309
Susiana, i. 27, 46, 48, 55, 247, 251, 304, 305, 309, 329
Syennesis, Cilician chief, i. 230
Syracuse, ii. 62
Syria, 206-237 ; 25, 27 ; Macedonian army in S. after death of Perdiccas, 35 ; S. held by Antigonus, 51, 52, 58, 59 ; annexed by Seleucus, 61 ; Seleucid era used in S., 147² ; Seleucid kings not "Syrian," 151 ; operations of Ptolemaic force on Syrian coast, 185, 186 ; S. recovered by Seleucus II, 190 ; S. under Mazaeus, 245 ; authority of Harpalus extends to S., 246¹ ; Seleucid Empire becomes kingdom of Syria, 115 ; Syria becomes Roman province, 267
 —, Cœle, in narrow sense (Al-Bikâ), i. 207 ; (= Galilee?), 297

- Syria*, Cœle (Palestine), invaded by Ptolemy in 312 B.C., i. 52; reoccupied by Antigonus, 55; controversy between Seleucus and Ptolemy, 61, 62, 328; invaded by Seleucus II, 191; frontier dividing it from Seleucid Syria, 208; invaded by Antiochus I (?), 234; controversy reopened by Hermias, 302; attacked by Antiochus III, 305; attacked again, 313; conquered and evacuated, 313-320, 330; party favourable to Achæus there, ii. 10; conquered again by Antiochus III, 32; Egyptian party, 127; Cœle-Syrian question reopened by Egypt, 134, 135; organization of province, 163; governors of Cœle-Syria, 178, 218, 228, 297; under authority of Cyzicenus, 255; disappearance of Seleucid authority there, 257; was it Cleopatra's dowry?, 296
- Syrphax*, tyrant of Ephesus, i. 89³
- Sysinas*, son of Datames, i. 80
- Tabae*, ii. 161
- Tabor*, mountain, i. 316
- Tagae*, ii. 19
- Tambraca*, ii. 20
- Tape*, i. 267
- Tapyrî*, i. 267
- Tarentum*, ii. 62, 66
- Tarsus*, i. 66, 230-232; ii. 132, 151
- Taurus*, mountains, as frontier, i. 76; ii. 111, 112; mountain tribes, i. 66, 79, 93, 94, 157, 185; ii. 150, 261, 290; end of Taurus in Rough Cilicia, i. 148; orographical relation of T. to Northern Syria, 208; Mesopotamia watered from T., 219, 221
- Tavium*, i. 141
- Taxila*, i. 294
- Taxiles*, Indian king, i. 292, 293
- Tectosages*, the, i. 141, 198
- Tegea* (1) in Greece, ii. 149
- (2) in Mesopotamia?, i. 222⁶
- Tekoah*, wilderness of, ii. 203
- Teles*, courtier of Antiochus III, ii. 22
- Telesarchus*, commander in Seleucid service, i. 136
- Telmessus*, i. 84; ii. 116
- Temnus*, ii. 4
- Tempt*, i. 208, 211
- Ten Thousand, the, i. 8, 82**
- Tenedos*, i. 103¹
- Tern*, *synoikismos* with Lebedos, i. 114, 115; surrenders to Prepelaus, 117; *synoikismos* abortive, 119²; 150, 163; inclines to Attalus, ii. 2, 4; courted by Antiochus III, 47; 105
- Teredon*, i. 247
- Tereus*, Lucius, ii. 50
- Teridates. See Arsaces II**
- Termessus*, i. 93, 95
- Teutamus*, commander of the Silver Shields, i. 43
- Thales*, the philosopher, i. 231
- Thapsacus, i. 220**
- Thaumaci, ii. 83**
- Thebe*, plain of, ii. 101
- Thebes* (1), Boeotian, i. 13; ii. 75
- (2), Egyptian, ii. 268
- Themison*, favourite of Antiochus II, i. 171
- Themisonium*, i. 139, 166
- Themistocles* (1), the Athenian, i. 7
- (2), officer of Achæus, ii. 4
- Theodoridas* of Sicyon, *con dottiere*, ii. 143
- Theodotas* of Rhodes, captain in service of Antiochus I, i. 143
- Theodotus* (1), "One-and-a-half," i. 302, 312, 315
- (2), the Aetolian, i. 306, 313-316, 318; ii. 6
- Theris*, envoy of Antiochus IV to Alexandria, ii. 139
- Thermopylae*, defence of T. against Gauls, i. 136, 324; battle of Antiochus at T., ii. 84-86
- Thespias*, Persian notable, i. 290
- Thessalonice*, daughter of Philip II, wife of Cassander, i. 57, 64
- Thessaly*, Demetrius attacks Cassander in T., i. 59; possessed by Lysimachus, 69; its conquest by Antiochus III, 78-80; recovery by Rome, 82, 83
- Thessalian colonists* in Asia, i. 215
- *condottieri*, i. 317, 319
- Theu-prosopon*, i. 315
- Thoas*, *strategos* of the Aetoliaus, ii. 56, 66-69, 88, 111, 114
- Thorax* of Larissa, friend of Antigonus, i. 60
- Thrace*, satrapy of Lysimachus, i. 30, 51; traversed by Gauls, 137; Antiochus II in T., 176; Seleucid domain in T. conquered by Ptolemy II 184, 186; Hierax in T., 202; Ptolemaic domain in T. assailed by Philip, ii. 32, 33; campaigns of Antiochus III in T., 48, 49, 55; 89; Romans traverse T., 100; Thracian mercenaries employed by Calchedonians, i. 81; by young Ptolemy at Ephesus, 174; settled in Further Iran, 280²; in army of Siles, 291; Thracian contingent in India, 294; in Ptolemaic army, 319; in army of Lysimachus (?), 323; in Roman army, ii. 109; in Seleucid armies, 287; in army of Perseus, 292; Thracian custom of dancing at feasts, ii. 279
- Thronium*, ii. 86
- Thuis*, prince of Paphlagonia, i. 80
- Thyatira*, i. 167, 168; ii. 05, 111
- Thynians*, the, i. 81, 134, 137
- Thyreum*, ii. 81

Tibareni, the, i. 78, 79⁵

Tigranes, king of Armenia, conquers Mesopotamia, ii. 261²; occupies N. Syria, 263

Tigris, river, i. 26, 27; Eumenes on T. 45; Assyrian country along T., 239; = Parapotamia, 252; founding of Seleucia, 253; fighting with Molon on T.. 303-305

Tigranocerta, ii. 263

Timarchus (1), the Aetolian, tyrant of Miletus, 174

— (2) of Miletus, governor of eastern provinces, ii. 132, 158, 194, 195

Timotheus, petty dynast in Syria, ii. 182²

Tios, i. 130, 134, 137²

Tissaphernes, Persian satrap, i. 90

Tob, land of, ii. 182

Tobiah, house of, ii. 168, 170

Tolistoagii, the, i. 141, 173, 198; ii. 46

Tmlles, i. 112, 165, 166; ii. 111, ¹ 117

Trallians, the (of Illyria), ii. 109

Trapezus, i. 153

Tricca, ii. 79

Trieres, i. 315

Triopian promontory, the, i. 149

Triparadisus, i. 35; Partition of T., 37, 41, 42, 46, 267, 268,¹ 270, 274, 277

Tripolis, in Phoenicia, ii. 152, 193

Triptolemus, the Attic hero, i. 209, 212, 230

Troad, the, i. 115, 166, 168, 200; Livius in the T., ii. 95; Scipios in the T., 108; Hellespontine cities, 296

Trocmi, the, i. 141

Troglodyte country, the, i. 186

Tryphaena, daughter of Ptolemy Euergetes II, wife of Antiochus Grypos, ii. 251, 254, 255

Tryphm (Die lotus), governor of Antioch, ii. 214; turns against Balas, 220; proclaims Antiochus VI in Apamea, 226; gains possession of Antioch, 227; shows favour to Jonathan, 228; makes Jonathan a prisoner, 229; attempts to invade Judaea, 230; elected king, 231, 272; war against T. prosecuted after departure of Demetrius, 233, 235; T. driven to his death by Antiochus Sidetes, 238; his title, 302

Tubal (people of Asia Minor), i. 78

Tychon, *arehigrammateus* of army of Antiochus III, i. 309

Tylis, i. 176

Tylos, island, ii. 24

Typhon, i. 209

Tyre before Macedonian conquest, i. 6; its destruction by Alexander, 229; held by Demetrius Polioreetes, 61, 63; lost by

Demetrius, 233; under Ptolemy, 235; delivered to Antiochus, 313; 316; strikes Seleucid coins by 200 B.C., ii. 32²; receives Hannibal, 53; festival of Heracles, 133, 170; coins struck under Antiochus IV, 152; trial of Menelaus at T., 171; offerings sent to T. from Carthage, 190; T. held by Demetrius I I, 228, 237⁶; Demetrius assassinated there, 250; T. given its freedom, 255. See *Ariston*

Tyre, Ladder of, ii. 228

Ur, i. 238

Urhai. See *Edessa*

Uruk, i. 238

Uxii, the, i. 23

Verres, ii. 264

Vesaspes, i. 263

ViUius, Publius, ii. 50, 59, 62, 66, 67

Xanthii, the, i. 284

Xanthippus, Ptolemaic governor of the eastern provinces, i. 189, 287

Xanthus, river, 83; city, i. 84, 85, 94,² 148; ii. 42

Xcnarius, the architect of Antioch, i. 212

Xenocles, treasurer of Alexander, i. 282

Xenocrides, party leader in Chalcis, ii. 74, 75

Xenoctas, Achaean *condottiere*, i. 304

Xenon, general in service of Antiochus H I, i. 302, 303

Xcnophilus, warden of Susa, i. 46, 48

Xenophon, i. 79, 82, 262

Xerxes (1), the Persian king, i. 88, 108, 136, 241

— (2), Armenian king, ii. 15, 16, 295

Tamluk, Arab chief, ii. 220, 226

Zabdihel, Arab chief, ii. 289³

Zabdiel, Arab chief, ii. 221

Zadracarta, i. 267

Zagrus, mountains, i. 76, 308

Zariadris, ruler of Sophene, ii. 118, 119, 195

Zariaspa. See *Bactra*

Zeno (1), founder of Stoicism, i. 231

— (2), of Tarsus, i. 231

Zenodotium, i. 220

Zenodotw of Mallus, philosopher, i. 231

Zenophanes, Cilician chief, ii. 207

Zephyrium, ii. 39

Zeugma on Euphrates, i. 220; ii. 194

Zeus, i. 121,¹ 209

— Bottiaean, i. 215

— Cappadocian, ii. 207

- Zeus Caslis*, i. 210, 226
 — *Chrysaoreus*, i. 86, 166
 — *Doliehenus*, i. 227, 232
 — *Herkeios*, i. 108
 — *Kerannios*, i. 226
 — *Olympius*, ii. 148, 150, 155; at Jerusalem, 173, 252
 — *Stratios*, ii. 156³
 — *Xenios*, ii. 174
Zeuxis (1), satrap of Babylonia, i. 303-305, 307, 308, 312
 — (2), satrap of Lydia (perhaps identical with preceding), ii. 32, 33 ; at Magnesia, 109 ; envoy to Romans, 111
Ziaëltas, king of Bithynia, i. 173, 201 ; ii. 2
Zibaties (1), son of Bas king of Bithynia, 95, 98, 99, 123, 132-134, 153
 — (2), son of preceding, i. 134, 137
 — (3), son of Nicomedes I, i. 173
Zibmtium, i. 132
Zoroaster, i. 263
Zoroastrianism, i. 259, 260, 263, 275, 290, 291. See *Avesta*

THE END

