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CULTURE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Longmans' Social Science Series

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CULTURE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

BY

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LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
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FOLSOM

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To My Parents

REVEREND JOSEPH FULFORD FOLSOM
BELLE KIRK FOLSOM

FOREWORD

One of the needs of the social sciences today is unity. There are too many fence builders in the academic world, too much reverence for the conventional boundaries which have been drawn between economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, and the other human sciences. Counteracting this situation there has developed a healthy movement in our colleges to organize general introductory courses in social science. To be sure, there must be subdivision and specialization, and no one can be master of the entire field. But it is not at all certain that this subdivision always will be along the lines existing at present. And in any case there is much to be gained from certain bird's-eye views of the whole. To open such a view is one aim of this book.

Another need of the social sciences is to free themselves from the deadly academic language in which they are so often concealed. The betterment of human life requires the *popularization of science.* It means making true science interesting. This book is written not only for college students, but also to give the general reader an understanding of the foundation principles of social betterment.

Its focus point is human welfare. It accepts frankly the principle that pure science exists for the sake of applied science. The purpose is to bring together the various lines of present-day thought in the social sciences, and to show how they bear on the central problem of making life happier. The book therefore has a strong ethical slant. One of its aims is to show that there are certain ethical principles which, because of the very nature of man, and of his environment, must always hold good, and to point out what these principles

are. It will doubtless administer sundry rude shocks to those who still think only in terms of the "old-fashioned" morality, and at the same time it may irritate those who fancy themselves emancipated from morality altogether.

I believe there is a growing demand among students and other young readers for a straightforward statement, tentative though it be, of the *new morality* which is slowly taking shape in the minds of thinking people. I believe they will not be content to pick the universe to pieces and watch idly by while it drifts to perdition. They want not only the facts of modern social science, but also some kind of positive and ethical interpretation of those facts. Whither do the facts lead? To answer this demand is another aim of the present work.

The material presented here forms the basis of the second semester's work in my course in introductory sociology. It is preceded in the first semester by a descriptive and historical survey of the major social institutions, such as economic organization, the family, government, and religion; and of the general development of civilization.

I am especially indebted to my father, Reverend Joseph Fulford Folsom, for his painstaking reading of the manuscript and helpful literary advice. I wish to express my gratitude also to Dr. Lorine Pruette and to Professor Douglas Fryer for valuable criticisms and other assistance, particularly in relation to the psychological chapters, to Professor Ernest R. Groves, Editor of the Series, to my wife for important suggestions concerning many chapters, and to the various authors upon whose ideas and research I have drawn in making this book.

JOSEPH K. FOLSOM

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CULTURE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION—MAN'S CONQUEST OF NATURE

Little man, least of all,
Among the legs of his guardians tall,
Walked about with puzzled look,
Him by hand dear Nature took,
Dearest Nature, strong and kind,
Whispered, "Darling, never mind!
To-morrow they will wear another face,
The founder thou; these are thy race!"
—RALPH WALDO EMERSON, "Experience"

What essentially is a human?—Man, we are told, is the reasoning animal. It is his capacity to think that has made him the conqueror of nature. The difference between man and the other animals is one of degree and of kind.

Modern science, however, turns upon this popular view a somewhat different light. Intelligence, which is man's chief mark of superiority, is the capacity to learn by experience, and in this capacity man excels his fellow creatures only in degree. He has a larger and more elaborate brain, but it is not essentially of a different character. Also from other bodily characteristics he derives advantages giving him superiority. The greater complexity of his vocal organs makes it possible for him to produce a richer variety of

sounds, providing the basis for language. His upright posture relieves his hands from the labor of locomotion, takes him off all fours, so to speak, and leaves him free to handle the objects in his environment. This manipulation further is facilitated by his opposing thumb, which gives to his hand its dexterous flexibility, equipping him particularly with the ability to make and use tools. But, after all, these peculiar and superior characteristics of man, setting him above his fellow creatures, are differences of degree and not of kind.

On the other hand, man may differ *in kind* from the other animals, but the difference is shown not in what he is, but in what he does. What he is belongs to capacity and *degree,* what he does differentiates him in kind and discriminates his humanity. This distinction between being and doing, between degree and kind, might be made clearer by an illustration. The water of a mill pond might consist of any quantity, from a mere puddle to three-fourths of the pond's full capacity. The level, however, is yet not high enough for flowing through the race and turning the machinery of the mill. There is yet not the slightest trickle falling upon the dry wheel. The machinery stands motionless, the workmen idle and the corn unground. Now, without changing the character of the mill pond, or the water it holds, the spring freshet suddenly descends and adds more water to the pond. The level now rises, the dry bed of the race becomes a rushing stream, a cataract with dashing spray plunges over the lately silent spillway, the great wheel begins to turn, the grain is ground into flour and workmen load it upon wagons to feed hungry mankind. Through the adding of a few more cubic feet of water a wholly new process of life is begun.

This process was something different *in kind* from anything that took place before; while the driving force behind it, the augmented water, was different only *in degree,* or amount, from the lesser volume which previously had lain in the bed of the pond.

What, then, does man do that is different *in kind* from anything done by the lower animals? What is the new process, or phenomenon, which distinguishes human life from all other life?

Man a maker of tools and symbols.—If we compare man's handling of his environment with the methods used by other animals, we find that man is distinguished by the making of *tools*. A tool is an intermediate object between man's body and the environment he wishes to manipulate. We find, furthermore, that man is distinguished by the use of *conceptual symbols* or true *language*. If a crow is frightened by the presence of an enemy he can signal to his fellow crows, by means of certain kinds of cries, that this danger is present. But man is able to communicate to his fellows facts about situations or objects which are not actually present to the senses. He can relate an experience which happened to him a year ago, and his hearers can act upon the facts he relates just as if those facts were immediately before them. Symbols are, in fact, *mental tools*.

Sometime and somewhere in man's history his bodily structure, including, of course, his brain, reached a telling stage in its gradual development. Before that stage was reached only animal existence without tools or language was possible. Beyond that stage it became possible to go forward to an ever-increasing control over nature.

This stage of ability was reached before man reached his present biological form.

The remains of at least four distinct human forms other than modern man have been found. The earliest of these was Pithecanthropus who lived, it is believed, about 1,000,000 B.C. and who had a skull capacity of about 900 c.c., which is larger than that of the highest apes but not so large as that of present man. The next was the Heidelberg man who lived about 500,000 B.C., then the Piltdown man, about 100,000 B.C., and then the Neandertal man living perhaps from 50,000 to 25,000

B.C. These had progressively larger skull capacities, that of the Neandertal form being almost if not quite as large as our own.

The history of human achievement.—In or near the geologic strata in which the remains of the Piltdown man were found, we find for the first time stones shaped in such a way that we are compelled to believe they were made artificially. The unusual number of these *artifacts,* the usefulness of their form for cutting or splitting, and the numerous chip marks on them, make it impossible to believe that they were the accidental products of nature. For the first time in the world's history we have evidence of *tools.* There begins man's conquest of nature. Unfortunately we have no such imperishable records to tell us just when conceptual language symbols began to be used.

THE STAGES OF MAN'S CONQUEST OF NATURE

Development of Symbols	*Economic Life*	*Material Tools*	*Estimated Dates for Europe*
Pre-literate or primitive (No writing or permanent records. Hence prehistorical)	Pre-agricultural "Savagery" (Collectional economy)	Lower Paleolithic	100,000–25,000 B.C.
		Upper Paleolithic	25,000–10,000 B.C.
		Early Neolithic	10,000–6,000 B.C.
	Agricultural "Barbarism" (Cultural Nomadic economy) (Village economy)	Full Neolithic	6000–3000 B.C.
Literate or "civilized" (Writing and permanent records)	Pre-scientific pre-mechanical (Town economy)	Bronze Age (Egypt, Sumer, Crete)	3000–1500 B.C.
		Iron Age (Greece, Rome)	1500 B.C.–A.D. 400
		European Middle Ages	A.D. 400–1500
	Scientific–mechanical (Metropolitan economy)	Age of science and machinery	A.D. 1500–

The history of man's conquest of nature has been divided by scholars into a series of ages or epochs. The characteristics of these ages, and the lines dividing them, can only approximately be stated. The preceding chart at least is introductory and explanatory.

1. The lower paleolithic, or earlier part of the Old Stone Age, brought forth as its principal achievements the making of rude stone picks, scrapers, knives, and so on, by a process of chipping and retouching; probably wooden handles; the use of fire; and the burial of the dead with useful articles, from which we infer the existence of a religion. In this period the biological form was the Neandertal man, and in the earlier part of the period, possibly the Piltdown.

2. The upper paleolithic, or more recent part of the Old Stone Age witnessed the arrival of *homo sapiens,* or modern man, in the forms known as the Cro-Magnon, Grimaldi, and Brünn races. Man's biological evolution had by this time reached the stage it still occupies today. No important change in the human body has taken place since then. The Cro-Magnon man had a skull capacity greater than that of the average modern man. There is no reason to believe that there has been any increase in mental ability since that day. To be sure the Cro-Magnon man did not do most of the things that we do today, but it is more logical to attribute this simplicity of life to his lack of experience than to any lack of native ability. The psychological tests show that people do not gain in mental ability after about sixteen years of age, although they do gain enormously in experience and knowledge. So, although the physical size of the skull hardly seems to be a safe index of intelligence, yet when comparing whole races with each other, it is a more logical index of intelligence than is the degree of achievement. We simply accept the most probable theory and hold our minds open to the results of further investigation.

In this period the achievements which had already been

made continued. The principal new achievements were: certain improvements in the technique of making stone tools (but with chipping and retouching continuing to be the only methods), the first stone lamps, wooden handles, bone implements (awls, dartheads, paint tubes, necklaces, chisels, harpoons, spear throwers, needles), carving, etching, painting, and burial of the dead with bodies painted and in flexed position. The presence of needles indicates that clothing must have been used and that it was sewed. Among the most remarkable finds of this period are the many-colored paintings found on the walls of caves in several places in western Europe. These paintings represent animals in very realistic form and posture, and were made by the Cro-Magnon men toward the end of the upper Paleolithic period. This age is sometimes called the *reindeer age* because reindeer were then common in central Europe, and their bones and horns were much used by man.

3. In the early neolithic, or early part of the New Stone age the new achievements were pottery, the bow, the domestication of the dog, and the hewn stone ax. Food continued to be secured as previously through *collectional economy:* that is, hunting, fishing, grubbing and gathering, but not cultivation. To a greater extent bone tools replaced those of stone. It was during this period that the *kitchen-middens* (heaps of shells piled up by mollusc-eating people, containing also remains of their implements) were formed on the coasts of the Baltic Sea. It was also during this period that the broad-headed Alpine race, coming from Asia, first appeared in Europe, and that man first appeared in America. No proven Paleolithic remains are found anywhere in America. The earliest inhabitants seemed to have had the dog and the bow, which are Neolithic traits. From this it is inferred that man first came here, probably by way of Bering Straits, and also possibly by way of Greenland, at the beginning of the Neolithic period.

4. The full neolithic age persists among isolated peoples even until today. The American Indians of eastern United States were in this general stage of development when first discovered by the white man. In this period, cattle, sheep, goats, and swine were domesticated in Europe. Agriculture was now practiced for the first time; in Europe barley, wheat, millet, pease, and lentils, in America maize and beans, and in southeast Asia, rice, were cultivated. With agriculture and domestic animals came new systems of food-getting. At first we have the *cultural nomadic* economy. This consists of moving about from place to place with animals, or even while practicing only plant cultivation, as did many tribes of American Indians when they cultivated a field for a year and then moved on after harvesting the crop. Some peoples continue to this day in the cultural nomadic economy, especially in the desert regions. Others, in the more fertile regions, began way back in this Full Neolithic period to practice *village economy*, that is, they settled down permanently on their cultivated lands and built themselves permanent dwellings.

In this period stone tools were made by grinding and polishing instead of by chipping, a slower but surer process. Dwelling houses now were made by digging out the sides of hills and roofing with timber. The famous lake dwellings of Switzerland were constructed about this time. In other places huge monuments were made by piling up large blocks of stones, evidently for religious purposes and in memory of the dead.

During this period pottery was often decorated, and weaving and plaiting were invented. Log rafts and canoes were made. *Shamans* or medicine men became important in the life of the tribe. Among the Aryan peoples the large patriarchal family, living, all together, a semi-nomadic life under the leadership of the elder male or patriarch, was typical. With them the patriarch performed the religious ceremonies and was custodian of the family gods.

In the Mediterranean region this Full Neolithic culture became specialized into a type known as the Heliolithic (or sunstone) culture. This was distinguished by circumcision, the couvade (the custom of sending the father to bed when the child is born), the practice of massage, the making of mummies, huge stone monuments, artificial deformation of the heads of the young by bandages, tattooing, religious association of the sun and serpent, and the use of the symbol known as the swastika for good luck. Elliott Smith found many of these practices present in widely separate regions, but all in a tropical belt extending from the Mediterranean eastward to India and Polynesia, and westward to Brittany and across the Atlantic to Brazil. These traits were absent, however, among the peoples of northern Europe, among the Mongolians, and in Africa south of the equator. Smith inferred from this that by canoes and other means there had been a gradual spread of this culture clear around the world within this semi-tropical belt. Others prefer to explain the distribution by saying that the customs originated *independently* in two or more different places.

5. The Bronze Age corresponds roughly to what we call the beginning of civilization. With it came for the first time brick, masonry, the arch, architecture, walled towns, sculpture on a large scale, huge temples, greater and more perfect monuments to the dead, such as the Egyptian pyramids, the plow, the wheel, the chariot, the domestication of the horse, the potter's wheel, the use of milk, irrigation, oars and sailboats. In the Bronze Age first developed a true art of writing, calendars and astronomy, and as the name implies, the use of bronze tools and ornaments. It was the use of metal tools in place of stone that made possible most of these other material developments.

Now, tribal society, based upon kinship, gave way to civil society, based upon organized rule over a definite *territory*. City states, and then kingdoms extending over a wide terri-

tory, developed. A specialized *priesthood* replaced the informally chosen medicine men and the family patriarchs who administered religion during the Neolithic.

Not all peoples adopted this complete bronze culture. Only those which were situated in favorable regions could develop the dense and permanently settled populations necessary to this mode of life. In less favorable regions tribes took over the use of bronze itself and such other elements as they could use, but continued otherwise to live in the previous manner. In the semi-arid regions of the world, such as Palestine, Arabia, and Persia, some of these peoples developed a more specialized, advanced, but still nomadic type of life, while their neighbors in the fertile river valleys were building towns and monuments.

In the Bronze Age began a new type of economic system, called *town economy* by Gras in "An Introduction to Economic History." A town as distinguished from a village is a place where some persons give their entire time to trade as distinguished from agriculture. The retailer here first comes into existence. The town becomes a central trading station for many villages round about. It is frequently fortified and becomes a center of religion and government as well as of trade.

There were six great Bronze Age civilizations: Egypt, Sumer, the Aegean (Cretan or Minoan), India, China, and Middle America (the region from Mexico to Peru). The first three began about 3000 B.C. or earlier, and being near together probably somewhat influenced each other. Egypt is known for its hieroglyphic writing, its invention of an almost perfect calendar, which began in 4241 B.C., its intense belief in immortality, its making of mummies and elaborate monuments to the dead, such as the pyramids, its stone buildings, glassware, simple costume, and characteristic head-dress. Sumer was distinguished by its somewhat earlier use of bronze and of the horse, its adobe brick architecture, its cuneiform

(wedge-shaped) script, its irrigation, its long-gowned mitre-capped costume, and its greater mixture of peoples resulting from successive conquests. The Aegean civilization was distinguished by its polychrome painted pottery, naturalistic art, games, labyrinth, plumbing and shipping; its unique costume with the padded shoulders, wasp waist, tight boots, and exposed breasts, which exaggerated the human form rather than concealed it as did Sumerian dress. Middle American civilization, which started later than the previously mentioned three, devised a unique calendar of its own, a system of counting based upon twenty rather than ten, buildings erected upon truncated stone pyramids, and a religious cult requiring human sacrifice.

Between the three bronze civilizations of the Mediterranean region, which we might call *pre-ancient,* and the Greek and Roman iron civilizations, which we usually call *ancient,* there intervened a gap similar to that gap of the "Middle Ages" which separated Roman from modern civilization. During this earlier gap civilization seems to have declined. Egypt, Sumer, and Crete weakened and fell a prey to the newer and more primitive peoples who came upon the scene. These barbarians who overran pre-ancient civilization were the Greeks, Romans, and Persians. The Homeric literature represents the experiences of the barbarian Greeks, just emerging from a Neolithic culture, coming south, discovering and plundering the advanced bronze culture of Troy, Mycenae, and Crete. Julius Caesar could look back upon the building of the pyramids (2800 B.C.) as an event much more remote from his times than is Julius Caesar from the present day.

These risings and fallings of civilization, however, were superficial. It is true that in Europe the more obvious human achievements, such as government, highways, commerce, and town life, have experienced at least three flood tides (culminating about 1500 B.C., A.D. 100, and A.D. 1900) separated by two ebb tides (about 1000 B.C. and A.D. 800). But under-

neath all this there was going on a continuous upward development of material culture and practical knowledge. Relatively few, if any, important human arts have ever been invented and then lost.

6. The Iron Age began about 1500 B.C. in Sumer, and about 900 B.C. in central Europe. Iron made possible the more nearly perfect cutting of stone, iron beams, better wheels, and better vehicles. In the Iron Age came widespread road-building, coinage, the *widespread* use of horses and of wheeled vehicles (first used during the Bronze Age), cement, the brick arch, crop rotation and fertilizers, palaces and public buildings as distinguished from temples, distant commerce enabling town populations to be fed with grain brought from far distant points, centralized government, and the first world empires. Town economy once more gained over village economy, as it had done at the height of the Bronze Age, but this time it went much further. In the Iron Age came the first *alphabetic* writing, all previous writing having been based on the pictorial and rebus systems, such as that used by the Egyptians. Religion became over-developed and "stale" in places, and in Greece arose the first known critical philosophy, with its skepticism concerning religion in general. Governmental authority gained strength at the expense of religious and parental authority. The methods of warfare became more effective than ever before, but there never was anything beyond weapons thrown by the human hand or by devices using the principle of the lever, not that of explosion. Greece, Rome, and Persia were the chief Iron Age civilizations.

7. The European Middle Ages.—From A.D. 400 to A.D. 1500 was an ebb period in European history. At the same time, however, China was plodding steadily forward, and there was a great development of civilization in the Near East, India, and northern Africa, under the influence of Mohammedanism. The "Dark Ages" were a strictly European experience. During this period of so-called darkness

came changes more significant than most of the events which happened during the glorious days of Rome. In particular, gunpowder, the mariner's compass, paper of uniform texture suitable for printing, and the art of printing itself, all originating in China, were brought by way of the Arab-Mohammedan civilization to Europe. Coal and gas heating also came from the Orient. Gunpowder changed the methods of warfare and helped to overthrow the feudal system, that loose agglomeration of local, agricultural, uncentralized authorities which had replaced the centralized Roman government. Printing made possible, as Wells has stated in "An Outline of History," the first true "liberation of the human mind" from superstition and ignorance (and also its enslavement by propaganda and advertising).

8. The age of science.—The achievements of man since A.D. 1500 are so numerous that only a few of the most outstanding can be mentioned. For the first time world-wide navigation, owing to the compass, became possible, and the entire earth was exposed to the influence of that civilization which happened to have progressed the farthest. The whole world became a source of wealth and aggrandizement for European peoples. Europe, which since the fall of Rome had lagged behind China and the Mohammedan realm, soon pushed far ahead of them.

With the discovery of the circulation of the blood, and of bacteria as the cause of infection, in the seventeenth century, true medical science began, if we exclude certain abortive developments which occurred in Alexandria and among the Arabs. In the same century the invention of the pendulum clock, thermometer, telescope, and microscope, made it possible to observe or accurately measure facts which could not be measured or observed before. Then in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries came electricity, the steam engine, the blast furnace, which made possible the production of iron in unprecedented quantities, the telegraph and telephone, the

reaper, the gas engine, the sewing machine, the phonograph, anaesthetics, photography, the radio, and the airplane. But if it be asked what single thing produced the most fundamental change in human life, the answer is power-driven machinery. The application of steam, electricity and gas to movable machinery gave world-wide rapid transportation; their application to stationary machinery made it possible for one pair of hands to produce from five to one hundred times as much food, clothing, shoes or houses as before. The result of this increased productive power, coupled with rapid transportation, was a sudden, unprecedented increase in population. It had taken Europe since the days of the Neandertal man until 1750 to reach a population of 150 million souls. But it took only the next 150 years to raise that population to 465 million.

With the age of science arose *metropolitan economy*, a system of economic life in which the large metropolis becomes the trading center for many towns, just as did the towns formerly for the villages. This system is distinguished also by *wholesale* trade in addition to retail, by the separation, through banks, of the financial from the physical operations of trade, and by the extension of country-wide into world-wide markets. *National* government now replaced the *localism* of the feudal system, and also the religious *internationalism* of the church. The individual became free from church, parent, landlord, and master, and now finds the only genuine authority in *government*. The lower ranks of citizens obtained a voice in the government. Wars today continue, and with the use of explosives become more devastating, but they are now wars *between states* with definite boundaries, rather than between clans, creeds, classes, and factions.

Looking backward upon this history of achievement well may man complacently say: "I have conquered nature."

Summary.—Man's essential difference from the lower animals is his ability to master his environment. This mastery

is due to his ability to make tools and symbols. The other animals manipulate their environment directly; man does it through the medium of tools of his own construction, which give him enormously greater power to modify environment to suit his needs. Symbols, which include language, are mental tools. They enable man to represent and to deal with things that are not immediately present to the senses. Man's power to make tools and symbols comes from his more complex brain structure, his flexible hand, his upright position, and the elaborate development of his vocal organs.

Man's conquest over his natural environment began before he had reached his present biological form. But by far the greater part of his conquest over nature has been achieved after he had reached, in the Cro-Magnon type, essentially the same physical form and brain development he has today. His principal steps forward in civilization have been effected without any corresponding steps forward in biological structure or innate mental ability. The history of man's achievement is divided roughly into eight great stages or eras. These can be grouped into three larger periods: first, the primitive or pre-literate period, including everything up to the Bronze Age; second, the period of pre-mechanical, pre-industrial civilization, including the Bronze and Iron Ages, in which man wrote, used metals, and built towns; and third, the period of mechanical, scientific civilization, beginning about A.D. 1500 in Europe, which is marked by the use of power-driven machinery and the elaborate development of scientific knowledge.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS CULTURE?

Civilization and culture.—Civilization is the name we often give to this human conquest over nature. But what word in the dictionary is more carelessly used? "Back to civilization," cries the traveling salesman who has just returned from a trip in the rural districts. "How barbarous, how uncivilized!" exclaims the member of the women's study circle when she hears how the Aztecs in ancient Mexico sacrificed human beings to their gods. A little later she is surprised to learn that this people had the highest civilization of all the American Indians, much higher in fact than that of the eastern woodland Indians who did not practice human sacrifice. Obviously "civilization" is a relative term; the difference between the civilized and uncivilized being a difference of degree and not of kind.

What shall we name this thing which all mankind possesses in some degree, but which we call civilization only when it reaches a certain level, or when it meets with our approval? Modern science calls it *culture*. So far as we know there were never any human beings without some culture. Culture is the sum total of all that is artificial. It is the complete outfit of tools, and habits of living, which are invented by man and then passed on from one generation to another. It does not include any of the inborn biological characteristics of man. There are three levels of facts or phenomena in the world of nature: (1) inorganic, (2) organic or vital, (3) superorganic or cultural. When we see a stalagmite rising from the floor of a cave, we know it came to

be there through inorganic processes; a tree trunk similarly projecting from the ground is explained by organic or vital processes; and a polished stone column could have gotten there only by superorganic or cultural processes.

It is important to note that this term culture as used by modern science has a meaning quite different from its everyday sense. In that more conventional sense, culture means the fine arts. It is a term of praise rather than of description. A person equipped with genteel manners and some knowledge of music, painting, or classic literature, is known as "cultured." Educators still speak of "cultural education" as distinguished from vocational education. But from the standpoint of anthropology and sociology, culture means all of the fine arts and the useful ones as well. The painting of The Last Supper by Leonardo de Vinci is a part of culture; and so is the whitewashing of farmer Jonathan's corn crib.

Original human nature everywhere the same.—The Plains Indians had a highly developed system of rewards for bravery. In order to get a vision which would assure him distinction in battle, it was common for the young man to fast and to drag buffalo skulls fastened to his punctured shoulder muscles. There were four great exploits which gave a man honor in the group: to steal a horse from a hostile camp, to take an enemy's weapon in a hand-to-hand encounter, to touch the person of an enemy, and to lead a victorious war expedition. Anyone who had accomplished all four of these feats was entitled to be called "chief." Social prestige was based entirely upon bravery as demonstrated by these achievements, rather than upon age, wisdom, magic powers, noble birth, or wealth, as it is in various other primitive societies. So greatly did this ideal of personal courage overshadow all other values of life that the tradition arose that "old people are bad," and that "it is proper to die young," as Lowie points out in "Primitive Society."

The Eskimos, on the other hand, are among the most peaceful of all primitive peoples. They fight but seldom, and their punishments are mild in character. A common method of settling a dispute is for the aggrieved party to challenge the offender to a satirical song contest. Each party composes and sings songs ridiculing the other, and the one who gets the better acclaim from the audience is considered the victor.[1]

It is quite natural to infer from these facts a difference in personal character between the Eskimos and the Plains Indians. The one, you will say, is a brave, fierce, warlike people, lacking in caution and prudence. The other, you will say, is a mild, peaceful, and cautious people.

But right here the sociologist will break in on your conversation. "Do you mean the *people* are different, or that their customs are different?" Both, you will say, for do not warlike customs indicate an impetuous people, and peaceful customs, a gentle people? "Then," replies the sociologist, "you mean that the character of the people *is* the character of their customs." But no, you are not satisfied with that. You say that there must be certain *inner* characteristics of peoples, of which their customs are merely reflections. It is this inner character in which you are chiefly interested. But when you try to describe this inner character you cannot do so except in terms of customs or behavior. "Inner character" becomes a mere abstraction, a vague will-of-the-wisp. But here the sociologist comes to your aid. "You mean, perhaps, that the Plains Indians have a somewhat different inborn temperament, a different set of instincts: either their pugnacious instincts are stronger or their fear impulses are weaker." Yes, this is what you had in mind. "Now," says the sociologist, "I know what you mean but you are probably wrong. Anthropologists have studied the customs of peoples all over the world. They have found these customs to differ strik-

[1] Goldenweiser, "Early Civilization," Chap. 1.

ingly from place to place, but they have never been able to lay the finger upon any fundamental differences in temperament or instincts that would account for these differences in customs. Their habits and customs are too full of inconsistencies."

The Plains Indians certainly would show less courage than the Eskimos in navigating an icy sea. Many a primitive man showing the utmost courage in battle, behaves like a coward when threatened by some magical device, as when, for example, the Malay learns that a wax image of himself is being burned by his enemy. Some peoples observe strict chastity before marriage and none afterwards, some do just the reverse. There are tribes in which the men wear clothes and the women do not; and other tribes in which the opposite is observed. The Chinese is more kindly and courteous in every-day life, and more pacifist in his international attitudes than we; but yet when enraged over some trifle, or engaged in punishing some criminal he can become so cruel as to fill us with abhorrence. We think of the Anglo-Saxon as a greater liberty lover than the Latin, yet the Anglo-Saxon more readily submits to the economic discipline and cooperation so necessary to big business.

Modern anthropology and psychology tend to confirm the truth of an old saying. With minor variations, "Human nature is the same the world over." But human nature includes much less than it was formerly thought to include. The only real human nature, the only real inner character for which you have been groping seems to consist of certain elementary reflexes and groups of reflexes closely connected with the bodily physiology. Everything else is acquired, by education, imitation, experience.

Acquired human traits.—There are three ways in which a human trait may be acquired.

(1) It may be acquired *universally*. For instance, it is believed by modern psychology that there is no inborn fear

of knives or other sharp objects, when such objects are merely *seen.* And yet it may safely be said that practically every human being from the Bronze Age until today would shudder and feel fear when he saw a sharp object moving near or toward his body. The fear *reaction* itself is instinctive or inborn, but it is not an inborn trait that this reaction is aroused by the mere sight of the sharp object. Knives were unknown in the animal world, where all our true instincts were evolved by natural selection, and the inexperienced baby's reaction toward the sight of a knife is no different from his reaction toward the sight of a rubber ball. But, without being instinctive, the fear of knives may become universal in men, because, first, practically every person experiences in childhood the pain of being cut, second, these cutting —pain—experiences practically always include the sight of the object that did the cutting, and third, the anticipated pain, or fear, consequently becomes mentally connected with the *sight* of the knife as well as with the skin sensation.

If Dr. William Coolidge's cathode ray tube ever becomes adopted as a weapon, then human beings will come to be as much afraid when glass tubes are pointed at them as they now are afraid when they look down the muzzle of a gun. In that day, some old-fashioned psychologist, if there be any then remaining, will probably theorize that the fear of glass tubes is an instinct.

Love of companionship with one's fellow men, love of offspring, and the erotic preference for the opposite sex rather than for one's own, are also examples of acquired universal, but *not inborn,* human traits. A universal trait may be acquired from experience with (a) features of the natural environment, such as rivers, wind storms, insects, darkness, (b) from cultural objects, or artifacts, which are common to *all* cultures, such as weapons, and (c) from features of the social environment which are common to all peoples and independent of any particular culture, such as children, the

opposite sex, conflicts with weaker and stronger individuals, etc. These latter features might be called the *sub-cultural social environment.* We shall designate as universal any trait which is practically or nearly so, ignoring those few locations where because of exceptional conditions it may have failed to develop.

(2) A trait may be acquired *personally.* Thus there are certain individuals, probably among all peoples, who are afraid of dogs, because they happen to have been bitten or badly frightened by dogs in circumstances which caused deep and permanent impressions to be left upon their nervous systems. But most of us have not had such an experience, or if we have, it has been neutralized by other and more pleasant experiences with dogs. There is no people, so far as we know, where fear of dogs is a tradition. It is a trait which does not go with particular peoples or cultures; it occurs rather in particular individuals among all peoples. It is an acquired personal trait.

Likewise, leadership, or the tendency to put one's self forward in the group, is a trait acquired by some individuals in all cultures. But there is no human group, unless it be a mere temporary assemblage of generals or big executives, where *all* are leaders. The very nature of leadership requires that there be many followers.

(3) A trait may be acquired *culturally.* Such a trait will be practically universal in all persons living under a given culture, but will be absent in other cultures. For example, all Americans find sitting in a chair the most comfortable way to eat dinner, but all Japanese prefer squatting on the floor. A Euro-American husband is practically always jealous of the amours of his wife, but the Eskimo will gladly lend his wife to a guest. Such traits are transmitted from one generation to the next, by the process called *tradition* or *social heredity,* and they change very slowly. They are often assumed by the group which possesses them to be

instinctive, but a little common sense will often reveal the error of this assumption. For example, American white people commonly believe that they have an inborn repulsion toward race mixture and toward close personal association between the races; but white children, before they learn the tradition from their parents or from older children, show no such repulsion toward the little black children with whom they associate. The French people, although in large part of the same Nordic stock as the Anglo-Saxon, show this race feeling in a much lesser degree.

The big differences between one people and another are differences in culturally acquired traits. There is no inner, essential difference between Germans and French that makes the one people stand for music and the other for painting. The accidents of cultural history simply made them that way. It is no more reasonable to ascribe the German musical pre-eminence to an innate musical faculty than to ascribe their love of sausage and beer to an inner sausage-and-beer faculty of mind.

All human traits then are either:

A. Inborn	1. Uniform 2. Showing individual or racial variations.
B. Acquired	3. Universal (sub-cultural) 4. Personal 5. Cultural.

The stuff of which culture is made.—We have talked much *about* culture but what is it? Is it objective or subjective? Is it the tools and utensils that man makes and uses, or is it the customs, the *acquired cultural* traits of character which are in man's self?

It is both of these, and both can be studied as objective,

that is, physical phenomena. Obviously it is through the external products that we know the culture of past ages. The archaeologist will talk mainly about those material *artifacts* which he is able to dig from ancient ruins, while the sociologist will talk more about human habits, activities and organization, but both are talking about *culture.*

In general, culture consists of six kinds of elements, six kinds of tissue, we might say, if we were talking in terms of anatomy:

(1) *Material elements:* tools, utensils, buildings, etc., used for controlling the environment. Material culture consists of the artificial arrangement of matter and space relations. What, for example, is an automobile except iron and wood arranged in certain forms and spatial relationships, quite different from any arrangement of which nature is capable?

(2) *Elements of social structure* (i.e., forms of human relationship): such as the laws of property, the structure of government, the relationships within the family, the game of bridge, etc. These elements are matters of social relations rather than of space relations. You can draw an organization chart to show how the American government system differs from the French system but the chart is symbolic only. The real relations you are trying to describe are not space relations, but *social* relations of authority, representation, election, etc., between persons.

(3) *Sentimental* elements or social values: such as our approval of personal cleanliness, our disapproval of nudity, our disgust toward grave-robbing, our admiration for diamonds and for movie heroines, the Chinese preference for sedentary amusement rather than athletic sports. These sentimental elements are the emotional *attitudes* which people living under a given culture take toward various things, which attitudes they have been led to take by culture rather than by universal or individual experience. These attitudes are objective, physical phenomena as much as are weapons

and tools. An attitude is a physiological reaction of glands and muscles, effected through the nervous system.

Most important among these sentimental elements are the *mores,* or morality. The *mores* are the unwritten code of rules and values which governs personal behavior, and maintains certain institutions as sacred and authoritative. The monogamous family, for example, considered as a form, or an organization of persons, is a structural element. But the fact that this organization is held sacred and inviolate, and that no one may modify it, as he may modify the form of a business organization, without social condemnation, is a part of the *mores.*

(4) *Activity elements* or *skills:* consisting of particular forms of movement of the human body: dancing, throwing a boomerang, kicking a football, etc., which are transmitted from generation to generation as a part of culture. These elements usually are closely connected with material or structural elements and by themselves are not important.

(5) *Symbolic elements:* language, gesture, drawing, writing, the alphabet, mathematics, telegraphic codes, and other means for representing, symbolizing, or measuring the outside world. The purpose of symbols is to bring the world of reality under more effective, more cooperative and more permanent control. They are non-material tools. For example, consider the purpose of an architect's blueprint. First, the architect can more *effectively* plan a building by using a drawing to symbolize the various details, than if he were compelled to carry them all in his mind. Second, through the drawing he can make known these details to other minds, and thereby secure their *cooperation* in putting up the building. The success of this of course depends upon all his coworkers understanding the same set of symbols. Third, the architect's plan is thus *permanently* recorded and can be carried out even after his death without the necessity of recreating it.

(6) *Beliefs, knowledge or intellectual elements:* such as the germ theory of disease, the science of hydraulic engineering, the belief in transmigration of souls, the science of chemistry, etc. There is perhaps no sharp distinction between symbols and knowledge. To know a thing is essentially to be able to symbolize it and thereby control it or adapt oneself to it. But belief is a higher step in symbolization. It is essentially a theory of cause and effect. For instance, the census volumes do not really create any knowledge about the population of the United States. They are merely symbolizing devices. The *facts* already were known to various individuals, although not all of them to any one individual. What the census did was simply to collect these facts and to present them through symbols, in a form that makes them all available to one individual in one place and at one time. But when the research man, by using these symbols, arrives at some theory of the *cause* of the declining birth rate or of the increasing unpopularity of domestic service, he is adding an intellectual element to our culture. He is engaged in *discovery,* rather than mere symbolization. Again, the coining of the word "germs" or "bacteria" to designate minute living forms, and even the photographing of these forms under the microscope is symbolization, but the discovery that these germs rather than the night air are the cause of colds is an element of true science.

Beliefs may be magical, religious, or scientific. The difference lies in the sort of experience upon which the belief is founded. If it is founded upon the careful, unprejudiced observation of all available relevant facts, it is a scientific belief. But this does not necessarily make it true. The line between magic and science is not always clear. Many beliefs that are science to us may seem magic to a future generation which may have instruments for making observations as yet unknown to us. Beliefs, whether true or false, always have

a certain definite role to play in human culture. We have not attained, and perhaps never will attain absolute truth. The best we can do is to guide ourselves by those beliefs which seem the *most probable* truth.

Of these six kinds of elements, sentiments, *mores*, activities, and beliefs seem, at first sight, to be peculiarly *inside* man himself, matters of *human behavior*. But every element of culture involves or implies human behavior, and most elements also involve some external product or record which can be observed after the men who created it are gone. When we speak of a *cultural trait of personality*, such as fondness for bagpipe music, we are thinking of the *human behavior*—the reactions of individual nervous systems, that are part of the culture trait. But we may also speak, in a broader sense, of the *culture trait* of bagpipe music, meaning the behavior, the musical instrument itself, the printed musical composition, if any, all together. It is quite unnecessary, from the standpoint of sociology, to dwell upon the distinction between what goes on inside, and what outside, the human body. It is all part of the culture process.

Biological versus cultural evolution.—Evolution means change, not a chaotic change punctuated by sudden special creations, but an orderly process following definite laws, by which one thing gradually develops into another thing. There is evolution in each of the three realms of nature. In the inorganic realm, for example, a level plateau evolves after many ages into an area of mountains and valleys. In the organic realm, we can trace the gradual development of Eohippus into the modern horse. In the superorganic realm, the rolling log probably evolved into a two-wheeled chariot, then into a wagon, and then into an automobile. The Latin language evolved into modern Italian and French. From the ruins of the past we dig up not only fossils of the human body but also fossils of the mind. Not, of course, fossilized

brains, but tools, pottery, hieroglyphics and other preserved products of mental activity which represent different stages in the development of these products.

Examination of the fossils of the human body taken from the upper Paleolithic Age, estimated as 25,000 to 10,000 B.C., shows that there has been little if any physical change in man since that time. Skulls from that age indicate a brain as large as or larger than the average human brain of today. By 8000 B.C. the plant and animal life of the globe had become similar to what it is now. Biological evolution either reached its limit at that time, or else, what is more probable, it takes place so slowly that there has not been enough time since then for any considerable changes to occur. The missing links which connect man with the apes all lived in the vast ages before that time, somewhere from 1,000,000 to perhaps 25,000 B.C. But most of our *cultural* evolution has occurred *since* 10,000 B.C. Yet the brain of late Paleolithic man at that time was, as far as indications go, sufficiently developed to understand and to use all of modern civilization, that is if there had been anyone there to teach it to him. Brains are essential to a high culture, but they do not automatically produce it. Culture comes by steps, each little discovery or invention depending upon previous ones, and no amount of mental genius can produce a new development in culture until conditions are ripe for it.

There is no definite correspondence, then, between man's biological and his cultural evolution. Practically the whole course of cultural evolution has been run in the last 10,000 years, which is only a moment in the vast period of biological development. During this brief moment biological evolution has made practically no advance whatever. This fact ought to be better known than it is. It would do away with a lot of jejune philosophy which is inflicted upon the public by men who are experts in their own fields, but who do not seem to know their *A B C*'s in social science. Eighteen

years ago in "The Threshold of Music" William Wallace wrote a very inspiring but fallacious interpretation of the history of music. He finds that music, unlike the other fine arts, was crude among the ancients and has reached within the past 200 years a far higher development than it ever before had known. Therefore, he infers, music must be the product of a sort of new brain area or faculty, which has only recently begun to develop, and which, as it continues to develop, may cause music to take a much more important place in human life. It would be just as logical to hold that electricity was not used until the nineteenth century because the electrical area of man's brain did not begin to develop until that time.

Culture evolves by laws of its own which have nothing to do with the laws of biological evolution. To be sure, a race of Anthropoid apes or of feebleminded men probably could never have invented the airplane. But given the necessary degree of *general* brain development, culture may develop in any direction whatever, slowly or rapidly, quite regardless of particular brain areas or particular inborn mental traits. Just how it will develop depends upon the conditions of culture itself. A dirigible first passed over the North Pole in 1926 not because any faculty of aviation, or exploring instinct, of man had come to a certain stage of development in 1926, but because the *accumulated experience* in aviation and geography in that year first reached a stage to make such a trip possible.

Why study culture *in general*?—You may begin to suspect that this "culture" which makes up all the talk of many anthropologists and sociologists is not a new idea at all. Is it not merely a lumping together under one term of a lot of things you have been accustomed to think about under separate heads: art, music, language, literature, transportation, manufacturing, house building, sex morals, manners and etiquette, religion and what not? Is not sociology merely

"the science of everything in general"? If it could be substituted for all the other courses in school it might save us time, but as a mere addition to them, what is its value? Why re-hash in general a lot of things that we are obliged to learn in particular?

Our previous illustration of the music theory suggests one good answer to this question. The music expert, of course, is better fitted than the sociologist to teach the technique, the history, and the appreciation of music. But to analyze what music really is takes the physicist, to show why it affects the human nervous system as it does takes the psychologist. By the same token, to interpret the history of music and to assign it its rightful place among the other departments of human activity takes the sociologist. The musician is not qualified to do these things unless he is also trained in physics, psychology and sociology. By studying the principles of cultural evolution *in general,* one gets rid of that mystical halo with which he is apt to surround the particular branch of culture in which he specializes, and is enabled to see it in its true relation to other things.

Another reason for studying culture in general is that it helps us to form a more correct estimate of the true welfare enjoyed by our community or by our generation. The librarian might pronounce a very serious diagnosis on a community that has a very low circulation of books, but the sociologist might find this defect largely compensated by a large use of educative periodicals, lectures, and motion pictures.

Another reason for studying culture in general is that it helps us to plan more intelligibly for the future of our own community, or of some other part of humanity in which we are interested. If we really understood the principles of cultural development, we should not try to Americanize our immigrants by the methods now commonly used, nor should we waste so much money on certain types of foreign missions.

Culture geography and culture history.—Any particular element of culture is known as a *culture trait.* For example, painted pottery, the eating of rice by the Chinese, the Phoenecian alphabet, the game of baseball, the salute to the flag. A group of related culture traits that go together is known as a *culture complex* or *trait complex.* For instance, the whole set of practices and utensils which go with the use of Indian corn, and which were learned with it from the American Indian, such as the planting in hills instead of in rows, the grinding in mortars, the making of hoe cake, etc., is known as the "maize complex." Similarly the whole system of athletic sports in the United States, including the newspaper sporting pages, might be called a culture complex. When an entire region or people, such as Europe, China, the African Bushmen, or the Jews, displays a distinct combination of culture traits and complexes, we speak of a *culture type,* or simply, *a culture.* Thus the Plains Indian culture of pre-white America was characterized by the hunting of the buffalo, the tipi, the travois, the conical tent, the camp circle, and a unique system of honors for bravery. The area in which a given culture type dominates is known as the *culture area,* and that point in the area where the given culture exists in its purest form, and from which it seems to have spread out in all directions is known as the *culture center.* Thus all Europe and the European-settled parts of the Americas, with Australia and South Africa, belong to the great area of Euro-American culture, which is characterized especially by the use of machinery. One might say that the culture center of this greatest and most advanced of the world's culture areas is England, although that center is perhaps shifting toward our side of the Atlantic.

We may study culture by making comparisons. These may be of two kinds. When we compare the dress, sports, and manners of the younger generation with those of their grandparents we are making a *temporal* or historical com-

parison. When we compare our culture with that of the Chinese we are making a *spatial* or geographical comparison.

Geographical comparison leads us to mark off the world into culture areas. It is not fully agreed as to just how these cultural boundary lines should be drawn, but it is certain that they very frequently do not correspond to geographic, political, or language boundaries. North China is culturally entirely different from South China and is thought by Kroeber to be originally more closely related to Europe than to South China. The Canadian-United States border is not a cultural boundary but the Rio Grande is. The Magyars of Hungary speak a language which is entirely different from that of the Germans and the Slavs about them, and which allies them with the Turks and the Mongols, but their culture is part and parcel of the general European culture which surrounds them. Tentatively the world might be divided into culture areas somewhat as follows:

I. The major cultures
   Euro-American
   Mohammedan
   Chinese (centering in North China)
   Hindu

II. Minor and primitive cultures
   14 distinct culture areas of pre-European America, such as the Plains, Southwest Pueblo, Mexican, Northwest coast, etc.
   10 culture areas of Africa [1]
   South-East-Asiatic-Indonesian (originally including South China)
   Australian (pre-European)
   Polynesian
   Tibetan
   Various Siberian and central Asiatic cultures.

[1] Herskovitz. *See* Bibliography.

Most of the world is now covered by the few large major cultures. These of course might be subdivided. Thus there are several distinctive traits that set off the Mediterranean countries from Central Europe, and we are all familiar with some of the ways in which continental Europe in general differs culturally from England and from the United States. Yet all these regions belong to one great culture type characterized by machine industry, railroads, Christianity, "European" dress, and at least attempts toward universal education and democracy. In Asia and Africa these traits are all lacking except where they rather recently have been introduced by Europeans.

Culture geography is a new and promising science. It is nothing new to learn that our ways are different from those of the Chinese, nor to learn what the conspicuous points of difference are. But scientific comparison, point by point, of the different cultures with each other, showing what features really are different and what features of human life are the same throughout the world, is just in its infancy. When we have made such a world-wide survey we may be able to plan a culture which combines the best elements of each, and which will be superior to any culture of today. To take for granted that our own culture is the best in all respects, merely because it has shown the greatest power to grow and spread, is the acme of human conceit.

Culture history is an older science than culture geography, but is still far from being anything like an exact science, if in fact it ever can become such. In his "Ancient Society," Morgan expressed the belief that all peoples had to pass through several fixed and uniform stages of development described as savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Such a simple law is no longer accepted. The course of cultural evolution has been different in different parts of the world. In Africa, for example, the Bronze Age was skipped entirely, and culture passed directly from the stone to the Iron Age.

Roughly speaking, however, the development of our Euro-American culture can be described in terms of the stages mentioned in the first chapter of this book.

Culture patterns.—We cannot understand a culture simply by enumerating the various traits and trait complexes of which it is composed. It is most important to know how these elements are put together. "Every civilization," says Willey, "is a unified whole in which all of the complexes fit together and adjust to each other. . . . These peculiar and characteristic combinations of all of the complexes of any civilization give what the anthropologists and sociologists call 'the patterns of the civilization.' . . . Civilization may be somewhat aptly compared to a beautiful rug. There are one or two major motives, each of which is composed of any number of lesser design elements. Each trait is a thread; these threads combine into complexes, which are the minor designs in the fabric; and these lesser complexes are then balanced and adjusted to give the major impression that one gains with the first hasty glance at the rug."[1]

The culture pattern has a selective influence. New traits that fit readily into the existing pattern are accepted; traits that do not fit are rejected. A new trait, borrowed from another culture, will be modified somewhat so as to make it fit the borrowing culture.

The horse was accepted by the Plains Indians, but was hitched to a travois, a triangular carrying frame, which was already part of the Plains culture. The Indians refused to adopt the wheel, which was utterly foreign to their experience. The Dog Society of the Crow Indians was found to have been borrowed from the Hidatsa Indians. With the Hidatsa the Dog Society is one of a graded series of military societies, to which entrance is by purchase. New members are

[1] Willey, Malcolm E., chapter on "Culture Patterns," p. 533 of Davis, Barnes, and others, "An Introduction to Sociology, New York, D. C. Heath & Co., 1927.

admitted only in groups, consisting of men of about the same age. But with the Crow, military societies are not graded nor is there any entrance fee. New members are admitted gratuitously, upon election, the initiative being taken by either the candidate or the society. The invitation may arise from the desire of certain members to have a vacancy filled by some relative. Again, the Dog Society, among the Crow, involved occasional police duties, because the Crow culture pattern was to give these duties to all organizations in turn. But with the Hidatsa police duties fell exclusively to the Blackmouth Society. Thus the Dog Society, although as an element it was common to the two cultures, was fitted by the Crows into a pattern of life quite different from the pattern of the Hidatsa.[1]

Culture patterns are more rigid than the single traits of which they are composed. They change very slowly. As Willey points out, our American resistance to the economic ideas of the Bolsheviki is due to the fact that they do not fit into our culture pattern. They could not be introduced as single traits, but only by fundamentally revolutionizing the pattern.

We shall use the word "pattern" sometimes to refer to "the" whole pattern of a given culture, or even to the "universal," subcultural pattern on which all cultures are based. At other times we shall use the word to refer to "a" pattern which is a part or subdivision of "the" whole pattern of a culture. Just which is meant will be clear from the context.

Summary.—Modern social science uses the word "culture" to designate everything in human life that is artificial or super-biological. It is frequently used in place of the word "civilization." Civilization is merely culture which has reached a certain stage of development, roughly the stage of writing and using metals. This use of the word culture is

[1] Lowie, "Ceremonialism in North America." *See* Bibliography.

to be sharply distinguished from the more popular use of the word, which signifies the fine arts, good manners, and genteel education.

Although there are great differences between *individual* human beings in their inborn natures, yet when we compare *whole peoples* with each other, these individual inborn differences tend to be lost in the general average. As between peoples, races, countries, original human nature is essentially the same, and the outstanding differences are differences of culture.

The bulk of our human behavior is acquired or learned rather than inborn. Some of our traits are acquired universally, as the result of certain universal experiences and conditions, others are acquired personally, as the result of experiences peculiar to individuals, and others are acquired culturally, as a result of the particular culture in which we have been reared.

Culture consists of this culturally acquired behavior plus the material objects and social relations which go with it. Culture is both inside and outside of man himself. The various elements of culture may be classified as material tools; social structure; sentiments, values, attitudes, and *mores;* activities or skills; symbols; and beliefs or intellectual elements.

Culture has an evolution of its own which is independent of biological evolution.

The essential thing about cultural anthropology and sociology is that they study culture *as a whole,* instead of allowing it to remain under separate departments of study. This attempt to see human life whole gives us a clearer understanding of it than we have had in the past, and offers greater promise of making that life better. Culture may be studied by historical and by geographical comparisons. In making these comparisons we analyze culture into simple elements or traits (to be distinguished from, although usually connected

with, the mental traits of individual human beings). These traits are grouped together in trait complexes. Finally, the way in which several traits and complexes are put together is called a pattern of culture.

Surveying the world as a whole, we find that culture varies from region to region, and may be roughly divided into several great culture areas, each characterized by a more or less distinct culture type, having its distinctive traits and patterns. The greatest of these world areas is that of our own Euro-American culture or civilization, including most of North America, Europe and those other portions of the world which are settled mainly by Europeans. This area, however, could be subdivided into several sub-culture areas.

CHAPTER III

HOW CULTURE CHANGES

The causes of variations in culture.—We shall see that in some respects human culture is always and everywhere the same. But in other respects it varies from time to time, and from place to place. Both the uniformities and the variations require explanation. If man ever is to learn how to guide his culture, he must understand the *causes* of its variations. Why is Ireland Catholic and Hungary half Protestant? Why did the highly centralized Roman Empire decay and give place to loosely organized feudal principalities? Is modern civilization headed for a downfall as was Rome?

Explanations in terms of physical environment.—A favorite theme has been to explain culture variations by geographic environment. Miss Semple says, "Back of the Massachusetts passionate abolition movement it [geography] sees the granite soil and the boulder strewn fields of New England, back of the South's long fight for the maintenance of slavery, it sees the rich plantations of tidewater Virginia and the teeming fertility of the Mississippi bottom lands."[1] Buckle attributed "a highly wrought imagination and gross superstition to all people, like those of India, living in the presence of great mountains and vast plains, knowing nature only in its overpowering aspects, which excite the fancy and paralyze reason. He finds on the other hand an early predominance of reason in the inhabitants of a country like ancient Greece, where natural features are on a small scale,

[1] Semple, Ellen Churchill, "Influences of Geographic Environment." New York, Holt, 1911, p. 11.

more comprehensible, nearer the measure of man's self."[1] Ellsworth Huntington thinks the center of civilization has shifted northward because of changes in climate. Egypt, he thinks, was once climatically favorable to hard work and hard thinking, but now the best conditions for human activity are found in a more northerly zone. Kant said "Geography lies at the basis of history."

But there are too many cases in which this sort of explanation does not work. The Arabs of the desert dress in wool robes, yet the natives of cold Patagonia have only shields to protect very partially their bodies from the wind. The Indians never used coal or iron, although these materials were as abundant in North America as in Europe. The Hopi and Navajo Indians of the south-western United States live practically in the same physical environments, but the Hopi cultivate cotton, build houses of terraced sandstone, and have a highly developed art of making pottery, while the Navajo have none of these things. The German and the Spanish stocks in Chile preserve their different ways of life in spite of the common Chilean environment. The Alaskan Eskimos live in the same sort of environment as the Chuckchi across the straits in Siberia, but they never have learned to domesticate the reindeer as have the Chuckchi, and their culture differs greatly in consequence.

Explanations in terms of inborn racial qualities.— Others find the main explanations in the hereditary quality of peoples. The Middle Ages were "dark" they say, because the intelligent people of Europe had gone into the monasteries and failed to reproduce themselves, leaving the continent to be inhabited by, relatively speaking, a race of morons. New England owes her intellectual leadership to the fact that she was settled by people seeking religious freedom, and who therefore must have been mentally superior persons, and have

[1] Semple, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

transmitted their superiority to their descendants even to this day. Africa is backward because its people are mentally inferior, and "the glory that was Greece" must have been due to some unusual combination or selection of brainy stock. A favorite variation of this theme is the theory of a superior or "chosen race." The leadership of western Europe is explained by the native superiority of the tall, long-headed, blonde race that we call Nordic. Ellsworth Huntington gives us a very interesting interpretation of history which combines heredity with environment. In his view, a harsh environment, or the hardships of migration, weed out the inferior strains of a population and thus bring about a superior people. This people then because of its innate superiority accomplishes great things. He thinks that the remarkable Khmer civilization for example, which has left its ruins in Indo-China, was at its highest soon after the first arrival of the people who made it, because these people had been *selected* by the hardships of a long migration. The later temples and palaces which were built upon the same ground were inferior because, he says, this mental quality of the first settlers gradually petered out through admixture with their inferior neighbors.[1]

There is perhaps much truth in some of these explanations. But it is very difficult to put them to a scientific test. To say that a people were innately superior because they made superior achievements, or inferior because they did not make such achievements, is to beg the whole question. One must have some way of measuring mental ability independently of cultural achievements. Only recently has psychology given us tests by which this can be done. We can only guess at the inherited mental endowment of the Greeks. There are many facts which throw great doubt upon all of these explanations in terms of heredity. World leadership only recently

[1] Huntington, "The Character of Races," p. 10 ff.

has belonged to the Nordic race. It was not they, but the darker skinned, shorter Mediterraneans, who built the first great civilizations; and through all the Middle Ages the "backward" and supposedly inferior Chinese were culturally far ahead of Europe. Modern science does not hold that all races are equal in ability. They may in fact be very unequal, but such inequalities as science has been able to discover are not sufficient to explain their great differences in culture. Judging innate ability by race achievement is like trying to judge the potential speeds of various trains by their times of arrival at a certain station, without considering when and where they started or by what delays they were held back.

Explanations in terms of population densities.—Perhaps it is not so much the *kind* of physical environment or the *kind* of people which counts, but rather the *quantity* of population in relation to the resources. Professor Edward A. Ross in "Outlines of Sociology" has pointed out that the course of history is often changed by processes which use up natural resources vital to the life of a people. Density of population is a quietly working and unnoticed force which will change a people's culture in spite of all their protests against such change. It compels countries to make housing regulations and rent laws, to confiscate large estates, and in many ways to violate the principles of personal liberty which they avow and cherish. In China the dismal fact of over-population is a stumbling block to every effort toward social betterment. On the other hand, the efforts of Canada to build railroads to develop her northern territory are impeded by under-population.

We are growing skeptical, however, concerning these theories. Population changes are the results as well as the causes of cultural changes. We used to think that a population arriving at a certain density in proportion to its resources would inevitably seek an outlet through war or emigration. "Overpopulation" was regarded like excess pressure in a

steam boiler. If you knew the strength of the boiler and the rate of increase in the pressure you could predict just when it would blow up. But now we realize that some of the countries which have the most serious overpopulation are the least inclined to burst forth in aggressive war or wholesale migration. They may suffer for centuries in silence, and allow starvation and disease to carry off their surplus population. China and India are examples. As A. M. Carr-Saunders says: "War has now merely become a mode of action whereby an organized state tries to achieve certain political ends. It is within the power of mankind to renounce this mode of action. There is nothing in the nature of man or of social organization which renders war inevitable." [1]

Explanations in terms of culture history.—The tendency of modern social science is to put less emphasis upon all of the previous types of explanation. It is rather to explain each culture change or variation by some previous *culture* event. For example, perhaps the Chuckchi in Siberia domesticate the reindeer while the Eskimos in Alaska do not, not because of any peculiarity in Chuckchi brains, blood, or population, or Chuckchi natural environment, but because there happened to be at some time just the right density of population, way of living, and attitude of tolerance to new ideas, to make the reindeer experiment possible. Among the Eskimos this fortunate combination of circumstances merely did not happen, and there has not been enough communication across the straits for them to learn the art from the Chuckchi.

Imagine at this point that we shuffle a pack of new, clean, blue-backed playing cards and that we deal you a hand consisting of the first four cards off the top. Your hand proves to be an ace of spades, a queen of diamonds, a three of clubs, and a ten of hearts. We then take a pack of old, dirty, pink-backed cards, arranged at the outset in the same way,

[1] Carr-Saunders, A. M., "The Population Problem," Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1922, p. 307.

and after shuffling them we deal ourself a hand of four cards. Our hand turns out to be a four and a jack of hearts, an eight of diamonds, and a king of clubs. Now how shall we explain the differences between the two hands? The fact that your cards are blue on the back while ours are pink, the fact that yours are new and clean while ours are worn and dirty, can be explained in terms of the packs from which the cards came. The explanation of these facts is simple, in terms of fundamental characteristics of the cards, and can be compared to the explanations of culture by heredity, environment and population.

But how shall we explain the much more important facts that you have an ace of spades and we a jack of hearts? We cannot explain these facts in any such simple manner. We can find no differences in the nature of the cards or the environments to which they have been subjected, that would have any bearing whatever upon the problem. You will say that the explanation is simply chance. That is simply a word to cover our ignorance and our inability to observe and follow the complex train of events which led to your receiving these particular cards. If we could have observed in detail every movement in the shuffling process we should have a complete scientific explanation. Your hand of cards must be explained by a very complex *combination* of many causes, instead of some simple type of cause.

Now the explanation of the events of history, and of other cultural facts is usually of this sort. One must study the entire situation which leads up to the given event. This situation consists of two kinds of factors. First, there is the previous cultural situation, that is to say, the existing tools, technique, social organization, *mores,* beliefs and knowledge of the time. Second, there are "accidental" or unique factors, such as great personalities, unique combinations of men and things, which never happened the same way before, and which start things moving in a new direction. These unique

combinations of circumstances play the same part that mutations do in biological evolution. They are analogous to a hand containing three aces in our card-playing illustration.

In the history books of twenty and thirty years ago the "great man interpretation of history" was popular. This interpretation holds that it is particular individuals who are responsible for the great changes in human affairs, and that if these great men had not lived things would have been different. More recently there has been a tendency to belittle this interpretation. Some go so far as to hold that if George Washington or Napoleon, for example, had not lived, the circumstances inevitably would have made somebody else a George Washington or a Napoleon. Circumstances make the man, they say, but the particular man does not make the circumstances. But this view probably errs in one direction, as the great man theory erred in the opposite direction. The personalities of great leaders are among those unique combinations of circumstances or "accidents" which may often help to start history in new directions. But at the same time great men are products of their times, and their power is limited by the existing state of culture.

Thomas and Znaniecki in "The Polish Peasant" say that "the cause of a social phenomenon is always a combination of a social and an individual phenomenon." The social cause is the culture of the time. The individual cause is the unique reaction of some individual. But these unique factors can never be predicted beforehand. They can be used only as explanations, after the event has taken place.

Directive versus limiting factors in cultural change.— The nature of cultural change will seem clearer if we distinguish between directive and limiting causes. We might call them positive and negative causes. Do the size and shape of a stage determine the performance which shall take place upon it? The stage will of course determine certain performances that you *can not* have. You can not get a

chorus of a hundred on a stage built to hold about ten. Nor can you satisfactorily present a play with changing scenery on a stage without a curtain. But within these limitations there are a thousand performances that you *can* give, and your choice of one out of this thousand will have nothing to do with the character of the stage. The stage is a limiting factor but not a directive factor

The physical environment and climate of New York State will not allow you to grow cotton or bananas there, but there are a hundred crops you *can* grow, and your choice of five or ten out of this hundred will depend upon the practices of your neighbors, the market, and other cultural factors. If our clothing were determined in a directive sense by our environment, we should wear practically nothing in summer, and men would dress as lightly as women. But all that environment says is that we can not go unclothed in winter, and leaves all the details of what we *shall* wear to be determined by culture itself. Environment is merely a limiting or negative factor in the development of culture.

Likewise heredity is only a limiting factor. Perhaps very few African Bushmen are mentally capable of inventing the spinning jenny, but the vast majority of peoples have among them plenty of individual intellects which are capable of so doing. Only in England, however, in the eighteenth century did cultural conditions become such as to make that invention possible. These conditions were that the rapidly developing cotton industry was being held back temporarily by the slowness of the spinning process, and that many minds for some time had been thinking over the problem.

In short, the procession of human affairs has certain doors closed against it by unfavorable environments, by lack of sufficient quality in man himself, or by over-population or under-population. But there are a thousand other doors left open, and which one shall be taken depends upon conditions in the procession itself.

Culture explained in terms of culture.—But does this increasingly popular explanation of culture in terms of itself lead us to anything useful? Does it not simply push the mystery farther into the background? The arrival of woman suffrage is explained not by any change in the native quality of women, or in the natural environment, but by another cultural change: the economic independence of women. But then you must explain the economic independence of women. You can do so by going back to still other cultural changes: the narrowing down of the economic functions of the home, and that again is explained by the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution is explained as being due to certain mechanical inventions, such as the steam engine, and the spinning mule, to the state of peace in England, to the large number of skilled workman in England, to English priority in exploration and colonization. Here the explanation subdivides into many chains of events too numerous to follow. But what good does it do us to know that the invention of the steam engine was one remote cause of woman suffrage? Is there anything in the knowledge of this fact that will help us to predict the future of human society? Is the history of culture, it might be asked, simply a series of "accidental" events that could not possibly be predicted in advance? Is there any law or science to it?

Does cultural evolution follow definite laws?—There have been several attempts to formulate such laws. Morgan thought that when you observed a people in a state of "upper barbarism" you might predict that they would next proceed to a stage of "lower civilization" and would be obliged to go through *that* stage before they could get to the next and so on. This theory, as we have seen, is invalidated by the ever present fact of the diffusion of traits from neighboring cultures. Other writers have propounded theories which make certain kinds of cultural events primary and others secondary. The "economic interpretation of history," for example, holds

that the primary or dynamic causes of cultural change are the changes in the organization of wealth production. That is to say, changes in the economic system, such as the Industrial Revolution, are usually the causes of changes in government, law, the family, religion, and morals, but on the other hand changes in these latter spheres do not often cause changes in the economic system. The only way to change anything in society is to make an economic change, and then the other changes will follow from that. Then there is the idealistic interpretation of history, which says that changes in ideas are usually the primary causes from which other changes follow.

Again there is the physiographic interpretation of history and the biological interpretation of history, which we have already discussed under the headings *physical environment*, *inborn human qualities*, and *population density*. There is a martial interpretation of history which holds that the most fundamental causes are to be found in the changing methods of warfare and the types of weapons.

To modern social science the most plausible of the above interpretations of history seem to be the economic interpretation and one form of the idealistic interpretation, namely that form which asserts that *scientific* knowledge and ideas are the primary causes of social change. There is still hope of discovering definite laws governing cultural evolution, and anthropologists and others are collecting facts from all over the world and from all periods of history, with this end in view. The laws which are being slowly worked out seem to gather about certain fundamental processes of culture: invention, diffusion, etc. Our knowledge about these processes may be briefly outlined as follows.

1. Invention.—The really fundamental changes of culture come as a result of material invention and discovery. In other words, material culture elements and scientific elements are primary to the other elements of culture. They are the

dynamic, the moving things in history. Culture always is moving slowly, but it *jumped* when iron was first discovered, when the horse was first domesticated, and when the steam engine was invented. It was gunpowder rather than any change in the desire for freedom or democracy which started the destruction of the feudal system. So it may be the automobile rather than any change of inner character or moral ideas, which is primarily responsible for the changing habits of youth today.

Inventions quite commonly are independently made by two or more men at about the same time. They are seldom duplicated however in remote parts of the world or at other periods of time. Once an invention occurs, the chances are that the knowledge of it will spread to all the regions which can make use of it, *before* any other part of the world will come to the point of making independently the same invention. Professor Ogburn, to be sure, in his "Social Change" gives a list of 148 inventions and discoveries made relatively independently by two or more persons. Most of these cases occurred because a number of minds were led by circumstances to work upon the same problem at the same time. Under such conditions it is quite likely that several inventors will succeed before the success of any one of them is so well demonstrated and published that it stops the efforts of the others. But the instances where the same invention has been made in two different parts of the world or at two different periods of history are rarer than we have thought. Whenever any culture trait does independently thus arise in two or more different places anthropology calls it *parallelism.* The *couvade,* a custom by which the father goes to bed at the birth of his child, seems to have arisen in the Mediterranean countries, and also independently among the Indians of Brazil. The Mayas in Mexico invented a calendar quite independently of the Egyptians. Elliott Smith, an extreme diffusionist, tries to prove in "Migrations of Early Culture"

that even these cases can be explained by ancient migrations and contacts between these widely separated areas of the world. But the bulk of opinion holds that they are cases of true parallelism.

The creation of any genuinely new culture trait is an invention. It need not be a material trait or a scientific discovery, although these kinds are the most common. Social structure and symbol systems may also be invented. The game of basketball and the parliamentary form of government, for example, were inventions. So was the alphabet.

The time and the place of an invention are determined by the cultural conditions rather than by the personality or ability of inventive persons. A Robert Fulton living in central Australia might have become the most skillful man of his tribe, he might have become a great magician, or a great leader, but he never would have invented the steamboat. On the other hand, if the circumstances are ripe for an invention, there is pretty sure to be found among the varied minds and personalities of the group some individual who is capable of being the inventor.

In order to have an invention you must have a felt *need*, secondly the proper *cultural base*, and thirdly your culture must be free from certain obstacles which might hinder the invention. Illustrating respectively these propositions, it is submitted that household machinery is not so likely to be invented where domestic service is cheap and plentiful as where housewives have to do their own work. That, secondly no matter how great the need, an electric washing machine could never have been invented until the principle of the electric dynamo had already been discovered. That, in the third place, the Chinese, as widely claimed, have been slow to invent a simplified system of writing not because of any lack of need or lack of cultural base, but because their social traditions and sentiments were obstacles to any such innovation.

2. Accumulation.—Another general principle is that culture *accumulates.* It does not keep eliminating its own waste portions and thereby preserving its characteristic original form, as does a plant or animal. Almost everything that is added to culture tends to stay there, so that our culture becomes more and more complex with every generation. To be sure some elements are from time to time weeded out after they have outlived their usefulness, but this weeding out process does not occur so fast as the accumulating process.

3. Diffusion or imitation.—Like the ripples spreading from the point where a stone falls into a pond, so does any newly invented culture trait tend to diffuse to wider areas of mankind. Anthropologists have discovered that a certain myth, known as the story of the Magic Flight, is known in some form or other by primitive peoples in all parts of the world except South America. They believe that it originated in one place, probably in Asia, and spread from there to Europe, to Africa, and to North America, but has not yet had time to reach South America through the slow channels of primitive communication.

Proverbs are known among both the primitive and advanced peoples throughout Asia, Europe, and Africa, but the anthropologists have been unable to find a single proverb in the speech or folklore of the American Indians, even of the most advanced tribes. From this it is inferred that proverbs are not a spontaneous and inevitable creation of the human mind, but a unique invention, in the domain of language, which probably occurred only once in history. Proverbs are spread over the old world simply because they have had time to *diffuse* that far from the point of origin, but have not had time to get any farther. It is not so much the degree of advancement which determines whether a people shall have proverbs or not, but rather, it is their distance from the source of the idea.[1]

[1] Kroeber, "Anthropology," pp.196–198.

It follows that the *geographic distribution of a culture trait often reveals its history.*

Diffusion does not require, as we are accustomed to think, the migration of peoples, taking their tools and their arts with them. Even though every tribe remains settled in its own territory, yet there are sure to be occasional contacts with neighbors on all sides, in connection with trade, travel, warfare or ceremony, and it is largely through these contacts that the knowledge of new arts and new ideas is transmitted.

In a uniform world, culture traits would spread in circles, like the ripples on the pond. But conditions are never uniform. Eskimo culture spread rapidly along all the coasts where the natural environment favored it, but a few miles inland different conditions prevailed and the culture did not spread in that direction. Egyptian culture spread up and down the Nile long before it spread an equal distance back into the desert. So culture areas are seldom circular but mostly irregular in shape.

When a people deliberately tries to spread its culture to other peoples, we have *organized diffusion.* This is illustrated by the German attempt to spread "Kultur," by missionary work, and by Russian Bolshevist propaganda.

When two peoples having somewhat different cultures live together in the same or adjacent territory, there are several processes which may take place. The two may simply *tolerate* each other, each preserving its own culture intact, as is the case with the different castes and religions in India. Or there may be *compromise,* as between Austria and Hungary during the past half century. Or there may be *accommodation,* in which one group gradually takes over the culture of the other as the Gauls did that of Rome. Finally, when the peoples mingle biologically as well as culturally, as our older immigrant stocks are now mingling with the Anglo-Saxon stock, we have *amalgamation.*

One law of diffusion is that single traits tend to travel

faster than whole complexes. The larger complexes of culture tend to be rooted more or less to particular territories, while single elements from a complex may quickly be transported to a great distance. An example is the diffusion of Indian corn. Our American settlers took over from the Indians not only the maize plant itself but also the Indians' methods of planting it, grinding it, making it into hoe cake, and so on.

The original maize complex of the Indians still remains as a characteristic part of the life of our Southern rural territory. But when Europe took over maize, it took only the plant itself. Europeans plant it in rows like other grain, not in hills, and use it in an entirely different fashion.

As noted at the end of the last chapter, the pattern of a culture wields a selective influence over the new traits that are borrowed by the culture. Those traits which fit the pattern are readily adopted, others are not. This makes trait diffusion irregular.

4. Adhesion versus functional relation.—If a child has an ordinary cold and also a case of pink-eye, it is important to know whether the one disease is the cause of the other, or whether the two diseases were acquired independently from two different waves of contagion in the community. If the first were true we should have a case of functional relation between the two diseases, while if the second were true we should have a case merely of adhesion, that is, two things just happening to go together, but without any direct relation to each other. In culture it is important to find out what traits go together because of some inner functional connection, and what traits are merely adhesions one to another.

Clark Wissler, describing in "Man and Culture" the wild rice culture complex of the Ojibway Indians says: "While it is obvious that rice could not be served unless it was gathered, it is not altogether clear that this process should be

accompanied by specific ceremonies." The gathering of the rice must be functionally related to the eating of the rice, but the practice of the ceremonies may be merely an adhesion to the complex. It is true that tailored skin clothing is found roughly among the same peoples as dog traction. No one would assert that there was anything in the use of dogs for pulling sledges that would necessitate the use of tailored skin clothing. More likely it is a case of adhesion, both traits being due either to the cold climate and snow, or to the fact that they were invented in the same general region.

It has been found that among primitive peoples the custom of a man's avoiding his wife's mother goes with the custom of the husband's residing at the home of his wife's parents, twice as frequently as could be explained by mere chance. Here we may have also a case of adhesion, but the statistical fact just mentioned gives some reason to believe that there is a functional relation between the two customs. It well might be that the mother-in-law relationship is universally a difficult one, because of psychological reasons quite independent of any particular culture (i.e., sub-cultural causes). If this is true then the custom of living with one's mother-in-law might inevitably lead to some mentally defensive custom, such as this attitude of avoidance.

5. Cultural inertia.—Culture traits tend to persist long after they have outgrown their usefulness. Professor Ogburn says, "Sometimes culture does not spread very quickly, when it would be expected to if judged on the basis of contact through geographical location. For instance, the cultures of the Hopi and of the Navajo though in daily contact show little tendency to merge. A people will migrate from the sea coast inland and will continue to carry certain figures of the sea in their mythologies. Boas cites from Bogoras the case of the Chuckchee who became nomadic and instead of developing

the light tent, continued to use quite clumsily a complicated structure resembling their former permanent dwellings." [1]

6. Cultural lag.—Ogburn has developed the theory of cultural lag. As we have seen, some elements of culture tend to change more rapidly than others. In particular, material traits move faster than immaterial traits. Ogburn has divided all culture into three classes: first, the material traits, which change first; second, the adaptive, non-material traits, which are then forced to change in order to adapt themselves to the material changes; and third, non-material, non-adaptive traits, which do not need to change at all. Between the material changes and the adaptive changes there is a delay which is called the cultural lag. This is the cause of some of our greatest social problems.

In the early part of the nineteenth century our economic system changed from small workshops to large factories with power driven machinery. But at the same time there was no change in the laws governing industries. Workmen began to be injured by the thousands by machinery, and because of the antiquated legal system they seldom were able to get compensation for their injuries. Here was a cultural lag. Finally, the workmen's compensation laws were passed, years after they should have been passed, enabling injured workmen to collect with speed and certainty. The legal branch of culture had at last caught up, in that particular matter, with the material branch of culture.

The Indians adopted our equestrian arts and our firearms almost at first sight. Their utility was obvious. But they were slow to adopt Christianity, the English language, and representative government. Now often a new material element requires certain immaterial elements that need to go with it in order to make it safe. One should not give a child a gun unless he can at the same time give him a wholesome

[1] From "Social Change" by William Fielding Ogburn. New York. The Viking Press, copyright, 1922, by B. W. Huebsch, Inc.

fear of the weapon, and inculcate careful habits of handling it. In certain European cities they have acquired the automobile but have not yet acquired traffic regulations. The cars rush through crowded streets in a way that would not be tolerated here.

If this theory of cultural lag were pushed a little farther, we might find that there is a lag between structural changes and the *mores,* as well as between material changes and all other changes. Just as the factory system preceded workmen's compensation laws, so workmen's compensation laws tend to precede any change in our popular moral sentiments concerning responsibility for accidents. It will be some time yet before the having of needless accidents in one's factory will be looked upon as a moral sin like the sins of murder or theft or adultery. But such a change is likely to come. We now look with a certain scorn and disgust at the person who allows unsanitary conditions to prevail about his premises, but this scorn and disgust did not arise until long after the causes of disease were found, and sanitary laws and public health agencies were established. "Woman's place is in the home" continues to be a part of our *mores* long after the economic organization has made it a dead letter for a considerable per cent of our women. The sacredness of private property continues to be worshiped while it is being steadily undermined by government regulation of all sorts, however beneficial or detrimental. It might be said that the *mores* are the last elements of culture to change.

7. Social invention and cultural adjustment.—It is not hard to get people to adopt new material traits. Any wide awake go-getter of a salesman is interested in a new mechanical invention if it offers possible profit. But only a few public spirited citizens can be interested in the follow-up work which we might call *cultural adjustment* or *reshaping.* It is for this reason that much social work is difficult and often thankless. Whenever some new scheme or form of

organization is devised in this work of cultural adjustment, we may call it a *social invention.* As Professor Ross in his "Outlines of Sociology" says, "Caesar was a social inventor when he established the principle that insolvency shall not cost the debtor his freedom." The game of basketball was a social invention. Most games grew, this was suddenly invented. It arose out of certain needs. There was a large gymnasium floor unused during the time that men were working at apparatus around the walls. The game was devised to make use of the idle floor space during that particular period. The community center also was a social invention growing out of the overspecialization of city life and consequent lack of local neighborhood activities. Social inventions have not broken new paths of cultural advance so much as have mechanical inventions; their function seems to have been rather that of adjustment.

But there are some who think that we shall soon reach a slowing up of mechanical advance and that the greatest advances of the future will be due to the invention of new social arrangements. Certainly mechanical development alone is not a safe and sure road to greater welfare. It may lead to greater misery, as it will if the invention of the implements of large scale warfare goes on without a corresponding development of international organization. *Social invention* is the only sure road to progress.

Summary.—Culture varies from place to place and changes from time to time. Men have long speculated about the causes of these variations. In the past it has been common to explain the variations of culture by variations in the physical environment, by variations in the inborn qualities of races and peoples, and by variations in the density of population. The modern view is that these three types of explanation hold good only in a negative or limiting sense: they explain why certain cultures *cannot* develop certain characteristics, but they do not explain why the cultures do develop

certain other characteristics. The tendency of social science is toward the *historical* type of explanation. That is to say, each culture change must be explained in terms of other cultural changes that went before it. History is not a matter of regular stages following simple and uniform laws. But rather every historical situation is unique, and can be explained only in terms of the unique combination of circumstances that led up to it. Great personalities are among these unique circumstances that may affect the course of history, but they are nevertheless products of their times and their power is limited.

Nevertheless we are discovering certain general laws, processes, principles, by which the evolution of culture can be interpreted and explained, although perhaps never predicted as we predict astronomical events. These include the laws and processes of invention, parallelism, accumulation, diffusion or imitation, organized diffusion, adhesion and functional relationship, cultural inertia, cultural lag, the selective influence of culture patterns, cultural adjustment or social invention. The only hope of making culture surely better for man, as distinguished from more complex, is through social invention.

CHAPTER IV

THE MECHANISM OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Does culture depend upon human nature?—After reading the last two chapters you will say "Something is wrong with this picture you have painted of the development of human culture. You have left out the most essential feature of all, and that is human nature. Here you have pictured culture as dancing merrily along its own way, with man as a mere spectator, having no will or voice in the process. May it not be that Ireland is Catholic simply because individual Irishmen *want* it to be so? Is it not possible that China is backward because the Chinese people are naturally of a conservative and unadventurous disposition? Is not culture after all a product of the human brain? The Minoan pottery unearthed in Crete, the form of government devised by our American forefathers, the athletic sports pursued in our colleges, were they not all devised and created by individual men? Must not culture be explained in terms of human nature?"

Culture is indeed the product of human nature, but not of human nature alone. It is the result of human nature interacting with the environment. Yet this statement does not really help us to understand the problems that puzzle us. What we want to know is this: In what respects are all cultures universally the same, and why are they the same? In what respects do cultures differ the one from the other, and why do they differ? Can human nature explain these likenesses and these differences?

The true student of social science will not expect that such questions can be answered in a few words. He must be will-

ing to consider them step by step, and then, when he is finished, he will really understand.

First of all we must understand what is meant by *human nature*. The biologists use the expressions *nature* and *nurture*, nature meaning all that is born in us, and nurture all that we acquire later from our environment and training. To avoid all possible confusion, then, let us call human nature the *original* or *inborn* nature of man. We may be surprised to find that a lot of things we have been accustomed to call "human nature" are really nurture, or acquired characteristics.

Man, an adaptive mechanism.—Man, like every other animal, has, and in fact *is* an *adaptive mechanism*, as Crile has expressed it in a book of this title. His function is to live, and to reproduce his kind, that the race may go on living though individuals may die.

A plant does not know what is good for it. Even if it did, it could not do very much about it. It is rooted to one spot, and with the exception of certain limited powers of moving toward sunlight, etc., it has to take whatever comes to it in that spot. If the water, air, and minerals and sunlight happen to come in right quantities and proportions, the plant thrives. If not, it is dwarfed or dies. An animal, however, is an organism made to go out after the conditions which are good for it, and to get away from the conditions that harm it. Put a pail of water on one side of a plant and a scorching fire on the other side, and the plant will not get very far away from the fire or toward the water. The animal does. Of course you will say that it is the animal's power of locomotion which enables it to go. But this power alone would be useless. The animal would be just as apt to move toward the fire as away from it. There must be some mechanism which enables it to make the *right movement* at the right time and under the right conditions. This mechanism, in all but the simplest animals, is the nervous system.

The nervous system, we say, enables the animal to *react* properly to its environment. We must get accustomed to using this word "react." People used to say: "How do you *feel* toward this person or thing, how do you *like* it?" Modern psychologists say: "How do you *react* to this person, this thing, this proposition?"

Introspection and behaviorism.—Volumes have been written about this difference in point of view between old-fashioned and modern psychology, and many "schools" of psychology have grown up, bitterly fighting each other about mere differences in terms and viewpoints. All of this is very confusing to the student. To put the whole matter in a nutshell, all psychology is the study of human (sometimes animal) *reactions* or *behavior*. But there are two ways of making this study. First, the subject's reactions may be observed by an outside observer, who may use all kinds of instruments, stop-watches, cameras, and so on, to record just what happens. Of course this is the only way in which animal reactions can be studied. It is known as *objective* or *behavioristic study*. The other method is for the subject to observe his own reactions and describe them in words, as they appear or "feel" to him. This is known as subjective observation or *introspection*.

Both methods are useful. Modern psychology lays stress on behavior study. But introspection is also useful. The trouble with introspection, which has caused some extreme behaviorists to ridicule it and to discourage its use altogether, is that it used to be tied up with a very unscientific philosophy. Namely, the introspectionists thought they were observing things that belonged to a different world from the world observed by the behaviorist. For example, a behaviorist might study the reactions of fear in me by various instruments. He would find that under fear I had a rapid heart beat, high blood pressure, upraised eyebrows, retarded digestion, increased blood sugar, etc. These and other reac-

tions *are* fear. But the old-fashioned introspectionist would say that fear was *my inner feeling, my experience,* which *accompanied* these reactions, and not the reactions themselves. The reactions, he would say, belong to the material world of physiology, but my *feeling* of these reactions belongs to the psychic (or spiritual) world. According to him, mind is a series of inner experiences, such as sensations, images, perceptions, ideas, feelings, consciousness, which *go with* physiological processes, but which *are* processes of a different world order. Of course, to be logical, the observation of any process is not the process itself. But it is misleading to make them two different worlds of reality. We do not say that the behaviorist's record of my heart beat on his recording paper belongs to a different world from that of the heart beat itself. Fear *is* a set of reactions, many of which may be observed and described from two different points of view, objective and subjective, but which *are* one and the same process.

The mechanism of animal behavior.—All animal behavior follows this plan:



FIGURE 1.

Let us imagine that a thirsty horse sees a pool of water. These conditions in which the animal finds himself, namely thirst and the presence of the water, are called the *situation* (1). Note that the total situation includes the conditions both inside and outside the animal's body. In this case it is the thickening of his blood and the drying out of his tissues, plus the pool of water not far away. If the water were

there without the thirst, or vice versa, the situation would be an entirely different one and would have different results.

From the *situation* arise certain physical and chemical forces which the animal's sense organs have power to *register*. These forces are known as *stimuli* (2). Thus the pool of water gives out light waves which register on the retina of the animal's eye. The parched condition of his tongue and lips registers upon minute sense organs located in the mucous membrane. The eye and these other sense organs which register these stimuli are called *receptors* or *sense organs* (3).

The sense organs are hitched up to *afferent neurons* (4), long delicate fibers through which the stimulus is transmitted in the form of a nervous impulse (acting somewhat like an electric current) inward toward the brain or spinal cord. Somewhere in or near the brain or spinal cord this nervous impulse is transferred to one or more *central neurons* (5), whose ends touch but are not continuous with ends of the afferent neuron. The brain is composed mainly of these central neurons. The junction point between the end of one neuron and the beginning of the next is called a *synapse*. The nervous impulse may pass through several central neurons and across several synapses, but it finally is transmitted to one or more *efferent neurons* (6), which convey it outward toward the *effectors* (7). An effector is either a muscle or a gland.

In this case the effectors are muscles. The animal's leg muscles, receiving this nervous impulse, contract in such a way as to carry him toward the pool of water; then his neck and mouth muscles receive impulses which cause them to lower the head and to drink. These acts performed by the muscles are called *responses* or *reactions* (8).

Finally, these *reactions* bring about a change in the situation. The animal, having drunk, has changed the condition of his tissues. The parched condition of the membranes no longer exists and the stimuli that came from this condition

have ceased. A *new situation* (9), now exists: distention of the stomach, moist tongue and lips, etc., in place of the old one, causing a new set of stimuli and nervous impulses which lead the animal to do something else. He will now stop drinking and perhaps turn his attention toward a nearby patch of grass. The animal has *behaved* in such a way as to *change the situation* to his own advantage.

Receptors and effectors.—The receptors or sense organs of a human being, or any other mammal, are as follows:

1. *Interoceptors,* or *organic* sense organs, located in the walls of the stomach, heart, and other *viscera* and reporting conditions inside the body.

2. *Proprioceptors,* or kinaesthetic sense organs, located in the muscles, tendons, joints, and labyrinth of the inner ear, and reporting the position of the body and limbs, the direction of up and down, the tension of the muscles, and the movements of the body.

3. *Exteroceptors,* located on the surface of the body, and reporting conditions outside the body. These include (a) the *contact* ceptors which register stimuli from objects in actual contact with the body; taste buds on the tongue, and the warm, cold, pressure, and pain sense organs in the skin; and (b) *distance* ceptors which register stimuli from objects at a distance; the eye, ear, and nose.

The effectors are of three kinds: (1) skeletal or striped muscles which move the limbs and the external portions of the body, and which in fact make up a large part of the entire bulk of the body, (2) the visceral or smooth muscles which control the internal organs, including the blood vessels, and which are only indirectly under brain control, and (3) the glands, whose only possible response is to secrete more or less of their respective fluids. A response made by the skeletal muscles is often called a *somatic* response, or somatic behavior, while a response made by the *visceral muscles* or *glands* is called *visceral* or *internal* behavior.

Reaction patterns.—Not many of our reactions are single and isolated movements. Most of them are combinations, or *patterns,* of many movements put together in certain definite ways. We saw in Chapter II that the culture, or the social activities of a group of persons, can be described as a set of patterns. So also the behavior of the individual man is made up of various patterns.

Sometimes the pattern consists of having two or more specific reactions occur at the same time. Thus in eating, the mouth must open at the instant the hand brings the food to the lips. If the two movements are not timed accurately, the purpose of the reaction is not accomplished.

Most reaction patterns involve *successive* or series reactions. Thus the biting off of a piece of food is followed by mastication, this is followed by swallowing, and the closing of the wind pipe, this again by movements of the œsophagus, and then by movements of the stomach. If the various movements did not occur in exactly the right order our bodily mechanism would not be adapting itself properly, would fail to perform the function of living. A slight error in the timing of the closing of the wind-pipe might cause us to choke to death. The machinery of a successive reaction works on the principle that each little reaction in the series acts as the stimulus to the next. Every reaction means a change in the position or condition of some part of the body; and this change registers upon sense organs in that part, usually proprioceptors, which then send up the message for the next reaction. If you are trained as most children, you can say the alphabet very rapidly. Each letter, as you speak it, produces stimuli in the lips, tongue, and other speech organs, which stimuli then bring about the reaction of speaking the next letter. But now try to omit every alternate letter. Your habit series is broken, and you get through only by slow and hesitating steps, taking about three times as long to say thirteen letters as you did to say twenty-six.

Now in practice we often ignore the many small successive steps of stimulus and reaction which take place in such a series. By "the stimulus" we mean the first stimulus which sets the whole series into operation, often called the *driving stimulus,* and by "the reaction" we mean the *whole series* of reactions which follow.

Inborn and learned behavior.—Some portions of human behavior are inborn. Others are acquired. The main difficulties of psychology and sociology have resulted from our uncertainties in distinguishing these two.

One great cause of confusion is to say that some *reactions* themselves are inborn, others acquired. If you mean the simple, elemental reactions, then all of them are inborn. A baby at birth *can* make practically every isolated movement that an adult can. Every muscle contracts at some time or other. But he makes most of them at *random.* He does not put them into useful patterns or combinations, nor does he make them at the right time to accomplish any useful purpose. He can reach and grasp—but he cannot time his reaching and grasping movements to catch hold of an object which he sees.

The distinction between inborn and acquired behavior applies, (1) to reaction *patterns,* and (2) to the *connections* between reactions and the stimuli which provoke them, but not to the elemental reactions themselves.

The question is asked, for example, "Is the fighting reaction born in us, or acquired?" The question itself is ambiguous. It requires four answers. First, the *simple muscular contractions* which make up fighting, or any other form of behavior, are part of our *inborn* equipment of random movements. Second, a small, rudimentary part of the *pattern* in which these movements occur is inborn. Violent struggling movements of the arms, crying and screaming, biting, increased heart rate and respiration, secretion of adrenalin and blood sugar, and some other reactions are more

or less associated, by original nature, into a pattern which is inborn. Floyd H. Allport in his "Social Psychology" calls this pattern the "struggle reflex." This reaction pattern is provoked into action the first time, and every time, the infant's limbs are tightly held for some little time, so as to restrain his random movements. But third, this inborn pattern is only a small and rudimentary part of "fighting." The use of fists or weapons, the art of self defense, and all the numerous movements of developed fighting, have been added to the pattern by *learning*. One cannot say that "fighting" as such is inborn, but it has an inborn nucleus or core. Fourth, the connections between the struggle pattern and the stimuli which provoke it are mostly acquired. Only one stimulus seems to have an inborn connection with it, and that is the restraint of movements previously described. All other stimuli which provoke fighting, such as blows, insults, taking away of possessions, etc., have to *acquire* that provocative power by training.

Reflexes and instincts.—A *simple* reaction that has an *inborn connection* to some *definite stimulus* is called a *reflex.* Withdrawing the hand from a hot stove, for example, is a reflex. The stimulus registers on the sense organs in the skin, and immediately a nervous impulse goes in from them to the spinal cord, and out again to the muscles of the arm, causing the hand to jerk back. No training is required for this: it is inborn. Other examples are the eye wink when an object approaches the eye, the pupillary reflex to a bright light, the knee jerk, the drawing away of the foot when tickled, starting and clutching when one begins to fall, the sucking movements of the baby's mouth when it touches an object, etc.

A reaction *pattern* which has an *inborn connection* to some *definite stimulus* is called an *instinct.* An instinct is a "complex reflex." It is usually a successive reaction, sometimes called also a *chain reflex.* Walking, struggling, eating, vomiting, fear and flight, the sex act, are illustrations. Pro-

fessor William McDougall believes the *primary* tendencies of human nature, or emotion-instincts, are reducible to seventeen:[1]

> Bodily exercise, food-getting, fear, disgust, sex, parental tenderness, gregariousness, positive self-feeling (self-assertion or mastery), negative self-feeling (submission), pugnacity-anger, rivalry, curiosity-wonder, acquisition, construction, surprise, humor, and grief.

Another thoroughgoing list of instincts is given by Thorndike in his "Educational Psychology." He calls them the "original tendencies of man."

W. I. Thomas and his disciples find the mainsprings of human behavior to be four fundamental *wishes:* the desire for fresh stimulations or new experience; the desire for response, including sex; the desire for recognition, mastery, or the "will to power"; and the desire for security, based on fear.[2] These "four wishes" could, of course, be analyzed into hundreds of specific reflexes.

Opposition to the term "instinct."—Among psychologists today there is a great deal of opposition to the use of the term "instinct." This is partly because the term has been so abused that it is difficult to tell what it really means.

L. L. Bernard, by reading through some 500 books treating human nature found 5684 different specific instincts assumed by these various writers. Anything which to a writer seems fundamental in human behavior is forthwith dubbed an "instinct." One psychologist tells the story of a little boy who was persistently questioning his father about the behavior of a turtle. "What makes the turtle crawl, father?" "Instinct," replied the father. "What tells him to stick out his head?" "Instinct tells him that." "What tells him to put in his head and close his shell?" "Instinct," again

[1] McDougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," Chaps. III and IV.
[2] Thomas and Znaniecki, "The Polish Peasant," pp. 72, 73. See also Thomas, "The Unadjusted Girl."

replied the father. "Father," asked the boy finally, "is instinct another little turtle?"

To read some of the modern psychologists one might think that instincts are forever abolished. But some other term is substituted for instinct, such as "drive," or Allport's "prepotent reflex" or "prepotent group of reflexes," or Thorndike's "original tendency," or Thomas's "wish."

How the newer views of instinct differ from the old.— But with this growing objection to the term "instinct" there goes a radical change in our views as to what things are really instinctive. It is not merely a change in the use of words. That is, even if we retain the use of the term "instinct," modern psychology would apply it to a much more limited class of reactions.

Professor John B. Watson and his school of "behavioristic" psychologists have studied with great care the behavior of animals and children. They worked especially on infants in the first few months of life. Even the young child, they assumed, has had a chance to learn many things, his behavior has been modified by culture and other experience, so that he does not give us a true picture of original human nature. The results of these studies were revolutionary. It was found that most of the alleged instincts were not present at birth, and that they could be much more easily explained as *learned,* acquired activities than by assuming them to be ready made by nature. The "instincts" of parenthood, gregariousness, self-assertion, rivalry, acquisition, construction, went by the board. They are now regarded as habits, learned by experience.

In others of the supposed instincts, such as anger, fear, sex, disgust, and food-getting, there were found to be truly inborn reaction patterns. But these inborn elements were found to be much cruder and simpler than previously was supposed. Moreover, they were found to be connected to only the crudest and simplest stimuli; and not at all to the many

situations which formerly were supposed to provoke instinctive behavior. It was learned, for example, that the baby was not instinctively afraid of dogs, rats, dark rooms, and other supposedly terrifying objects. The only stimuli which aroused his fear were loud noises, the sudden withdrawal of bodily support, as by letting him drop a few inches when holding him over a bed, and sudden pulls and pushes. All other fears had to be *acquired*. The only stimulus which would arouse rage was restraint of the infant's bodily movements. The only stimuli which would arouse pleasure or "love" responses, such as gurgling, cooing, cessation of crying, etc., were stroking or rubbing the skin, rocking, riding on the foot, etc. All the evidence was against any theory of inborn love for the opposite sex, or inborn parental or gregarious instinct.

The new theory of instincts or inborn tendencies thus differs from the older view in two important respects. First, we have discovered that the truly inborn parts of the reaction patterns are much simpler, more rudimentary, than we formerly believed. The other parts are acquired or learned. Second, the range of stimuli which have inborn power to provoke these reaction patterns is much narrower than formerly was supposed.

"Instinct" implies a biologically adequate stimulus.—A stimulus which has the power, without training, to evoke a *definite* reaction is known as a *biologically adequate* stimulus. If it has not such inborn power, it is a *biologically indifferent* stimulus.

It is important to know just what stimuli are biologically adequate and what are biologically indifferent. Everything depends on this. Two general principles can be laid down.

(1) *All biologically adequate stimuli are crude "sensations," not objects or situations.* Psychology tells us that an object or a situation has to be *perceived*. That is to say, numerous sensations have to be combined and organized through the brain before the object is recognized. Thus from

a dog the infant may get the crude sensations of "whiteness," "rapidly moving object," "loud noise," "wetness on face" (from being licked), "being pushed against," "smooth surface next to skin." Whether he will make any definite reaction to the dog will depend upon whether any one of these stimuli is biologically adequate. The push, or the bark, if sufficiently vigorous, may provoke the fear reaction. But the infant does not yet perceive the object "dog"; he does not react to the dog as such. He cannot distinguish it from a cat, or from any other object which produces some of the same sensations. And he reacts in the same way to any push, or any loud noise, whether caused by a dog or by something else. Only after repeated experiences with these "dog sensations" do the sensations become organized into a unit, the "perception of dog." Perception is never inborn; it requires experience. This is true of a concrete *object* such as "dog"; it is also true of an abstract *situation*, such as "injustice." There can be no instinctive resentment against injustice because only by experience do we come to recognize "injustice" when we see it.

(2) With a few exceptions, such as loud noises, crude flashes of light, and possibly moving objects, all biologically adequate stimuli act either through the skin senses or the internal sense organs (i.e., through interoceptors, proprioceptors and contact ceptors; but not distance ceptors). With the exceptions noted, the infant has been found by experiment to respond only to things which actually touch him, or disturb the internal equilibrium of his body. To all that he sees, hears, and, probably, smells, unless it stimulates him by its sheer intensity or rapid change, he is absolutely indifferent. He has inborn reactions to being pushed, pulled, dropped, tightly held, to being stroked, tickled, patted, or rubbed in the sensitive zones of his body, to an electric stimulation of his skin, to the touch and taste of milk or sugar in his mouth, and to all kinds of disturbances inside his body.

He reacts to these stimuli by fear, rage, withdrawing movements, sucking, swallowing, crying, or pleasure, as the case may be. But he has no inborn reactions to the dark, nor to any kind of animal, so long as it does not touch him or make rapid movements, nor is his first reaction different with different persons. Soft music and his mother's voice, at the outset, are no more pleasing to his nervous system than a distant beating on tin pans or barking of dogs. Our emotions and other reflexes are born in us, but they are born blind and deaf. Only by the conditioning process, which we shall describe shortly, do some sights and sounds become pleasant and others unpleasant.

Distance stimuli are biologically indifferent.—The eye, ear, and olfactory organs in the nose, are sometimes called distance sense organs, or *distance receptors;* because they register stimuli from objects at a distance, as distinguished from the contact and internal receptors which report conditions inside the body or touching its surface. There is a reason, other than the experimental evidence, for believing that distance stimuli are in general biologically indifferent. It is the very nature of the stimuli themselves. The distance stimuli to which we actually react, whether by birth *or by training,* are not single stimuli, but *combinations.* We show few definite reactions to red, green, light, shade, largeness, smallness, motion, to single tones in music, to various pitches and intensities *as such.* It is only when these sense impressions occur in familiar combinations, meaning to us specific objects, that we respond. Thus we *do* show definite reactions to the sight of persons, animals, buildings, and to the sounds of words and familiar noises, or familiar combinations of musical notes into musical compositions. But take these very same stimulus elements that make up persons, animals, buildings, language, and musical compositions, and arrange them in different patterns and combinations, as you do when you look at the landscape with head upside down, or listen to a

foreign language or a piece of Chinese music, and they will mean little or nothing. With inverted head you will have difficulty in distinguishing, at some little distance, your best friend from a grazing cow.

With the skin and internal senses exactly the opposite is the case. The order and combination of stimulus elements makes little difference, it is the single elements themselves to which we respond. An itch two inches from my right ankle is always an itch two inches from my right ankle, whether it is combined with a group of sensations indicating "mosquitoes," or a quite different group indicating "ivy-poison," and the response is always the same. The feeling of cold is always the feeling of cold, and tends to produce shivering, whether it is due to the wind on a wintry night, or to a plunge in cold water on a summer day. Dizziness is always dizziness whether caused by riding on a merry-go-round or overindulgence in alcohol. Only blind persons use their skin senses for the recognition of *objects;* most of us use them only to determine single characteristics of objects, such as wetness, roughness, temperature, weight.

To distinguish warm from cold requires a very simple nervous mechanism which will work in any situation. All you need is two separate sense organs, one specially constructed to receive the warm stimuli and the other to receive the cold. Man himself constructs thermometers and other registering devices which will do practically this same thing. To distinguish light from dark is also simple. The retina responds to light, and does not respond to the absence of light. The principle involved is that of a *selective* receiving device. It is essentially the same principle as that used in the radio selector, and which is adjusted to receive only certain wave lengths, and to ignore all others. Such discriminating mechanisms can be pre-formed in the nervous system, before birth and experience. as easily as the structure of the

body itself can be pre-formed. But we cannot possibly conceive of any such simple selective mechanism which will distinguish the image of the form of a dog, falling on the retina of the eye, from the image of the form of a human being. Such discrimination can take place only through a very intricate mechanism, like a combination lock complicated to the *n*th power, requiring the use of many pathways in the central neurons of the brain. If nature were to prepare such a set of pathways in advance it would very likely fail to work, for each individual gets his first impression of dogs and of human beings in a somewhat different way, and builds up his perceptions through different nervous pathways.

Again, we learn just as readily to recognize and to respond to objects like the rifle, the airplane, the locomotive, which are quite new in the experience of the race, as we do to clubs and knives and trees and other age-old objects which would have had time to form inborn impressions on the human nervous system, if such an inborn impression were possible. If our responses to the former objects are easily learned by experience, there is no reason why the same method is not sufficient for *all* objects. Logic compels us to accept an explanation in terms of *known* processes, wherever it will work, rather than in terms of the unknown. It compels us to believe, in the absence of further evidence, that *all distance stimuli,* except simple elements like light, color, loudness, pitch, which could be selected by specific kinds of nerve endings, are *biologically indifferent.* The social significance of this conclusion will appear in the next chapter.

Approaching and avoiding reactions.—Before going on to show how biologically indifferent stimuli may *acquire* power to evoke reactions let us consider further the reactions.

Allport has boiled down the chief inborn reaction patterns, or instinctive tendencies, of man, into six great groups. He calls these groups "prepotent reflexes." Each group serves

a definite biological purpose. Each group consists of a set of somatic reactions (of the striped or skeletal muscles), and also a set of visceral reactions, or *emotions* (glands and internal organs). When the driving stimulus is but momentary, the visceral reactions do not always function. They act rather as reserve forces to be called out when the stimulus is prolonged or intense.

GENERAL NAME, USUALLY INDICATING THE EXTERNAL OR SOMATIC MUSCULAR REACTION	NAME OF THE EMOTIONS OR VISCERAL REACTIONS WHICH OFTEN ACCOMPANY	CHIEF BIOLOGICALLY ADEQUATE STIMULUS
1. Starting and withdrawing	Fear	Falling, loud voice, sudden push
2. Rejecting	Discomfort, nausea, disgust, itching ...	Noxious substances in mouth or on skin
3. Struggling	Rage or anger	Restraint of movements
4. Hunger reflexes (sucking, etc.)	Hunger	Empty stomach, conditions in tissues
5. Sensitive zone reflexes	Pleasure, laughter, love, thrill	Tickling, skin contacts
6. Sex reflexes	Sexual excitement, lust, love	Friction on or distention in sex organs

The first three of these reaction patterns are called *avoiding* reactions, because their general tendency is to get the body away from some harmful situation, either by removing the situation itself, or removing the body from it. Avoiding reactions include spitting disagreeable substances out of the mouth, removing insects from the skin, withdrawing the hand from a hot stove, running away from a danger, fighting against an enemy or obstacle, averting the face from a noisome odor, groaning or weeping over an irreparable loss, blushingly retiring from an embarrassing situation, rubbing a painful

spot on the skin. Some of these are inborn, others are learned reactions based upon inborn. They do not always succeed, but they all are efforts to *avoid, escape, remove,* or *discontinue* the stimulus. The stimuli which evoke these avoiding reactions might be called *repellent,* or *unpleasant* stimuli.

The last three of these reaction patterns are called *approaching* reactions, because their general tendency is to move the body toward some beneficial situation or to maintain and continue that situation. Approaching reactions include seizing, chewing, and swallowing food, secretion of digestive juices, stomach movements of digestion, sexual behavior, fondling or caressing children or the opposite sex, or otherwise seeking contact with the "sensitive zones" of the skin, following or watching something with interest, and laughter. They all are efforts to *approach, develop, repeat,* or *continue* a stimulus. The stimuli which provoke these responses might be called *attractive* or *pleasant* stimuli.

Emotional reactions.—The emotions are visceral reactions, that is, reactions of the glands and internal organs, which usually are linked up with external reactions of a definitely approaching or avoiding tendency. The subject, observing his own emotions by introspection, reports them as "strong internal feelings," usually connected with an impulse to perform some definite overt act. A visceral reaction such as digestion, which cannot be observed or "felt" by the subject, is not called an emotion.

It has been discovered that nearly all avoiding behavior, at least when it becomes sufficiently vigorous, is accompanied by a certain characteristic set of these internal (visceral) reactions. Approaching behavior is accompanied by a different set of these internal reactions. These two sets of visceral responses are antagonistic to each other, and each is controlled by a separate portion of the nervous system.

The nervous system is divided into two main parts, the

cerebro-spinal, which controls our "voluntary" movements, and the *autonomic* system, which only indirectly is connected with the brain. It is this autonomic system which controls visceral behavior. This autonomic nervous system is further subdivided into two portions, the *cranio-sacral,* and the *sympathetic.* The cranio-sacral system, when excited, causes secretion of saliva and other digestive juices (the "mouth waters," we say), the vigorous digesting movements of the stomach, greater flow of blood into the internal organs, contraction of the pupil of the eye, slowing down of the heart, slow regular respiration, a general relaxation in the muscles, relaxation of the walls of the arteries and sometimes more or less excitement in the sex organs. On the other hand, the sympathetic system, when excited, causes stoppage of the digestive functions and of the secretion of digestive juices (the mouth is dry), withdrawal of blood from the digestive organs and the sex organs and the sending of that blood into the muscles, general constriction (narrowing) of the blood vessels, thereby forcing the blood under higher pressure into the muscles and limbs, dilation of the pupil of the eye, secretion of adrenalin by the adrenal glands (small glands lying near the kidneys, whose fluid has the power to neutralize fatigue and to call forth extra bodily energy, and to accelerate the heart), speeding up of the heart and lungs, and the pouring forth of sugar into the blood by the liver.

Now it is this cranio-sacral pattern of bodily changes which functions during approaching behavior, and this sympathetic pattern of changes which functions in company with avoiding behavior. These internal bodily reactions are the *emotions.* The cranio-sacral responses are found more or less in all the pleasant emotions, such as appetite, love, thrill, laughter; and the sympathetic responses are found more or less in the unpleasant emotions, such as anger, fear, grief, pain.

The basic emotions may be briefly listed as follows:

EMOTIONS	CORRESPONDING "PREPONENT REFLEXES" ACCORDING TO ALLPORT
I. Negative or unpleasant (tending to avoid, withdraw from, or destroy the stimulus).	
1. Anger—irritation	Struggling, rejecting
2. Fear—anxiety	Starting and withdrawing
3. Pain—grief (anguish)	Withdrawing, rejecting
4. Disgust—repulsion	Rejecting
5. Boredom	Any of avoiding reflexes in mild degree; often caused simply by failure to satisfy approaching reflexes
II. Positive or pleasant (tending to approach, continue, repeat the stimulus).	
1. Sex pleasure	Sex reflexes
2. Hunger	Hunger reflexes
3. Thrill — interest — pleasurable attention	Probably sensitive zone reflexes
4. Laughter	Probably sensitive zone reflexes

There are, of course, numerous sub-varieties and combinations of these emotions.

The biological functions of the emotions.—Now these emotional reactions have a very definite usefulness to the human body. The unpleasant emotions are just the things which are needed in order to prepare the body to avoid harmful and dangerous situations. When our remote ancestors were attacked by enemies, those who were best able to summon every ounce of energy at the critical moment were the ones who stood the best chance of escaping and surviving. Those who could not do so, prematurely perished, and of course lost the honor of becoming our ancestors. In order to mobilize the needed bodily energy, it is helpful to stop all unnecessary activities. Digestion is in the long run a necessary activity, but it is never *immediately* necessary. It can and must wait until the more immediate need of escaping danger is taken care of. Hence when danger threatens, all digestive activities are automatically stopped. We all know from personal experience what happens to our appetite when we are frightened, angered, or disgusted while sitting at the

table. For the same reason, any irritation or fear during sexual excitement will immediately put an end to such excitement.

In order to meet the emergency the heart and lungs are speeded up in advance, so that the necessary blood will be already present in the muscles before they begin their struggle with the enemy. The blood vessels are constricted so that the blood may flow under higher pressure. The secretion of the adrenal glands, and the pouring forth of blood sugar, also help to prepare the muscles for action. We know from experience that a sudden fright or enragement will destroy all sense of fatigue and make us ready for action. This is thought to be due to adrenalin and blood sugar. It has been discovered also that during anger and fear some substance is poured into the blood which causes it to coagulate more quickly, in order that bleeding from wounds may be less dangerous. In short, the unpleasant or avoiding emotional reactions are nature's mobilization for war.

Now, on the other hand, when not danger, but food, is present, it is desirable that the body should be put into a condition that will best enable it to digest and assimilate that food. The larger muscles are discouraged from activity by withdrawing blood from them and by lending them no extra aid or comfort, a relaxed languorous condition pervades them, and the blood is called into the internal organs. Certain smaller muscles such as the diaphragm may be stimulated, causing laughter. The digestive glands are stimulated to pour forth their juices, and the stomach muscles vigorously contract. During love behavior, there is more or less excitation in the sex organs and perhaps less in the digestive organs, but in general the pattern of internal behavior is much the same as in digestion. This same pattern of behavior takes place in mild degree, when we are tickled, amused, caressed, or even resting in a supremely comfortable position. During all of these states the vital functions of digestion, assimila-

tion, growth, the building up of the tissues, etc., are going on at their best. During periods of unpleasant emotion these vital functions are temporarily stopped.

The unpleasant emotions.—The main types of unpleasant emotion are fear, anger, anguish, shame, and disgust. These types seem to us quite different experiences, but all of them, except perhaps disgust, have the same fundamental pattern of visceral responses. Their differences are found in the facial, vocal, and other bodily (somatic) responses that go with them. For instance fear and anger are practically the same thing in their internal characteristics. In both we have a speeding up of the heart and the lungs, adrenalin, stoppage of digestion, dry mouth, neutralization of fatigue, etc. In fear the muscular tendency is toward running away or remaining motionless, "paralyzed with fear." The eyebrows are raised and the eyes opened wide, the jaw dropped, and there is a characteristic cry of fright. The pattern belongs to Allport's class of "starting and withdrawing" reflexes. In anger, on the other hand, the muscular tendency is to struggle or to strike a blow. The eyebrows are pulled down and slant inwards, there is a frown, the nostrils are slightly raised, and the jaw is set forward, the teeth are bared for biting, while the voice gives snarls or growls. This is Allport's "struggle" pattern. It is because the *external movements* of fear *feel* different from the external movements of anger that we are able to distinguish the two emotions.

Grief or sorrow is practically the same thing as the response to bodily *pain*. The eyes are partly closed, and sometimes are so tightly squeezed by the facial muscles that tears flow to protect the eyeballs, the head is lowered, the jaw dropped, the hands clutch at things, and various muscles in the body are tensed. We feel that "sore" feeling in the pit of the stomach, which probably indicates retarded digestion and other inner disturbances. We differentiate by calling these responses "pain" when they are provoked by some

physical stimulus inside or on the surface of the body, and "grief" when they are provoked by thought or imagination.

Shame is a mild type of fear characterized especially by the dilation of the blood vessels on the surface of the body, giving rise to a "blush."

In disgust the responses are of a rather different pattern from the other avoiding emotions. Here the characteristic thing is the tendency to vomit or spit, accompanied by a marked raising of the nostrils, a protrusion of the lower jaw, a guttural grunt, a separation of the tongue from both the upper and lower portions of the mouth as if to stop a bad taste. The circulatory and respiratory disturbances seem to be largely absent.

The various unpleasant emotions readily change from one into another. Thus anger quickly becomes fear when one finds the enemy stronger than he thought, while fear in the cornered animal turns into anger. Both anger and fear, when unsuccessful in removing the unpleasant situation, turn to anguish. Pain-grief, or anguish, seems to be the ultimate resort of the unpleasant emotions. The animal which fails to conquer or escape his enemy suffers pain. By the same token in mental life, after we have worried (fear) and struggled (anger) unsuccessfully over a disagreeable situation, the more active anger and fear responses weaken, and we settle into the more passive but prolonged state of grief. It is obvious why grief is unhealthy. To be sure it may occur without there being any physical disorder, but the responses are the same as if there were such disorder. These responses put the bodily machinery into the same abnormal condition as when it is coping with a severe illness.

We have all kinds of mixtures of the various unpleasant emotions. The sight of a snake produces in many people mingled fear and disgust. A child whose toy has been taken away by an older child experiences mingled anger and grief. These five fundamental "unpleasant" emotions are also mixed

with various states of *attention* behavior, producing still other shades of emotion. (Attention involves reactions of the head and face, such as raising the head and opening wide the eyes.) Thus when the *facial* responses of fear are emphasized, the stimulus being more unusual or puzzling than actually dangerous, we have the emotion known as "astonishment."

These emotions exist in both acute and chronic forms. For instance, a mild chronic form of anger is called irritation or annoyance. It would be physically impossible for the acute condition of *rage* to last very long, as it is too great a strain upon the system. Therefore one of three things soon happens; either the annoying stimulus is completely removed, changing the rage into a more or less pleasant response, or the rage passes into grief, or it passes into a mild but prolonged state of irritation. Fear in its chronic state is anxiety. There are also mild chronic states of disgust and grief. Depression or melancholy is a chronic state of grief.

The pleasant emotions.—The principal types of pleasant emotions are hunger satisfaction, sex excitement, love, mirth or laughter, and elation or thrill. These emotions are not sharply distinguished and they occur in many mixed combinations. Certain elements are more or less common to all, such as smiling, half closing the eyes, a relaxed tone in the muscles, a readiness toward laughter, and the tendency to utter characteristic vocal ejaculations, of which the syllable "ah" is most typical. These are in addition to the common visceral responses, such as flow of saliva, which we have described before. The expression "my mouth waters" measurably describes all the pleasant emotions, for saliva tends to flow freely in love and in mirth, as well as in hunger. In the emotion of thrill, however, there seems to be a somewhat variant pattern. Here are sensations from the chest and the stomach which faintly suggest those of fear. The eyes are apt to be wide open, and the whole body on the alert rather

than in the languorous condition which accompanies the other pleasant emotions. This experience is called by different names, as enthusiasm, interest, ecstasy. In general we can say it is pleasure linked with close *attention* to outside objects or situations, whether actually present, or imagined. It is pleasure produced by the distance senses rather than by the contact and internal senses.

When unpleasant emotions occur.—We already have said that these unpleasant emotions take place when the *somatic* behavior is of the avoiding type. That is, they follow all kinds of harmful stimuli: as bodily injury, internal disorders, irritation to the skin senses, foul odors, repulsive sights, enemies, obstacles, insults, high places and other dangers, loud sounds, and dazzling lights. The emotions, however, are not aroused immediately upon the first appearance of such stimuli. They occur only after the somatic response has tried for a time unsuccessfully to remove the disagreeable situation. Thus when the hand touches a hot object the reflex withdrawing movement probably will remove the stimulus (or remove the hand from the stimulus, which is the same thing) before any emotion is aroused. In order for the emotions to be provoked, messages must get through to the autonomic nervous system, which only indirectly is connected with the rest of the nervous system, and accepts, as it were, only emergency messages. The emotional responses are like reserve forces which are used only to help the body deal with the more serious and prolonged harmful situations.

When pleasant emotions occur.—As already shown, the pleasant emotions accompany approaching behavior. But they seem also to occur, in greater or less degree, when any bodily function is successfully and normally performed. A rest when tired, a warm fire after one has come in out of the cold, a warm bath, and also vigorous exercise when the body is prepared for it, are not merely indifferent or neutral experiences. They are definitely pleasurable.

There is still another sort of occasion when pleasant emotions appear. How about the pleasure of triumph? Is it not one of the sweetest joys human nature knows? Yet it comes from the repellent situation of *struggle* rather than from an attractive situation. And how about the joyful thrill of those who ride on the roller-coaster? Is it not the sense of danger, the *fear*-inspiring descent which yields the pleasure? But note that it is only after the real fight or the real danger is over that the pleasure comes. It is not the fight but the victory; not the fall but the salvation at the bottom that thrills. Pleasant emotion is produced whenever avoiding behavior *suddenly* ceases owing to a quick removal of the disagreeable stimulus. The experience of relief from any unpleasant situation is in itself a pleasure. It is because of this mechanism that a great deal of human joy is *relative*. We get many of our pleasures not from situations which originally in themselves are pleasure-provoking, but which are in striking contrast with the unpleasant situations which preceded them. Thus solitude, at first merely an indifferent escape from the cares of a busy person, may become a source of pleasure in itself.

Joy and suffering.—Let us call all the pleasant emotions *joy* or *enjoyment* and all the unpleasant ones *suffering*. We might of course use the familiar words pleasure and pain, but pain is sometimes used to mean all unpleasantness, and at other times to mean only that particular kind of unpleasantness which occurs when the body is injured or diseased.

Philosophers and psychologists, by the way, have spent much time trying to find out just what joy or pleasure really *is*. The introspective psychology thinks it is an elementary mental state, like one of the elements of chemistry, which can not be further analyzed. Some of the behaviorists think that it is simply the various visceral responses we previously have described. Others think that pleasure is not the particular visceral responses, but simply is the bare fact that

the body is trying to *approach, continue,* or *repeat* a situation. Likewise they say suffering or unpleasantness is nothing more than the fact that the body is trying to *avoid, remove, escape,* or *discontinue* a situation. As the philosopher might put it, "pleasure" (or "suffering") is not any specific substance, process, activity, stimulus, reaction, or mental "state." It is a generalized *relation,* such as "over-ness," "underneath-ness," "inside-ness," or "before-ness."

Learned or acquired behavior.—We now have reached some understanding of the inborn nature of man. But we know that the great bulk of our behavior is not inborn, but acquired through training, or learning. We need to understand also this process by which new reaction patterns are acquired and by which reactions are connected to new stimuli.

The conditioned reflex the key to the learning process.—The term *conditioned reflex* bids fair to become more prevalent and important in the social sciences than were ever the Freudians' "libido" or "complex." It designates a simple and fundamental process of the nervous system, a process which is the key to our understanding of many things.

The essence of the conditioned reflex is this. If two stimuli act upon the nervous system at the same time, and one of them *Sa,* already has a connection with a definite response *R,* while the other stimulus *Si* is indifferent or has only weak connections, then *Si* will tend to connect itself also with the response *R.*

This principle, though long known in a general sense, was first revealed in a specific manner by J. P. Pavlov's experiment. Briefly, Pavlov found that the sound of a bell was, as one might expect, an indifferent stimulus to a dog. That is, the stimulus, though of course sensed by the dog's ears, aroused in him no very definite response. Among other things it failed to have any influence on the dog's salivary glands. Food, however, did at the very outset provoke a secretion of saliva. Pavlov presented food to the dog and at the same

moment rang the bell. This he repeated several times during the course of a few days. Then he tried the bell alone. Saliva then flowed just as if food were present. In the dog had been established a *conditioned reflex.* The *response* in this case is salivary secretion. The taste of the food is a *biologically adequate stimulus,* that is, it has inborn power to evoke the response. The sound of the bell is a *biologically indifferent stimulus,* but by repeated association with the adequate stimulus it becomes a *conditioned stimulus;* that is, it acquires the power to evoke through itself alone the response.



FIGURE 2.

Now the conditioning process works in two ways.

The conditioning process causes substitution of stimuli. —First, it causes new stimuli to be substituted for the original stimuli which were biologically adequate to provoke given reactions. Thus consider the case of the struggle reaction pattern. The only biologically adequate stimulus seems to be physical restraint of movements. Yet if the parent habitually uses certain words of prohibition, "no, no," "don't," while physically restraining the child, these words may become conditioned stimuli to anger. Again, restraint of movements is usually followed by failure to get some thing which the child is seeking. This experience of failure, or balked desire, then becomes a conditioned stimulus to anger. Balked desire frequently is caused by the inattention of other persons to one's presence or request. So "inattention of other persons to

oneself'' may become a conditioned anger stimulus. Each stimulus, already conditioned, may act as a bridge to carry over the emotion to a new stimulus. Any subtle situation, any complex set of circumstances, may become an irritator if it is often enough associated with some other stimulus which already was irritating.

The conditioning process modifies the reaction pattern itself—trial and error learning.—Second, the conditioning process helps to change the *reaction pattern itself,* so as to make it more successful in accomplishing its biological purpose. This changing of the reaction pattern is known as trial-and-error learning.

Let us say that the baby is frequently provoked to struggling reactions by somebody's holding its limbs or using some *conditioned* stimulus, such as the taking away of a toy, which has been substituted for that restraint. The struggling reactions themselves will gradually change, as well as the stimuli which provoke them. Sooner or later the crude struggling will become skillful ''fighting.'' This learning is made possible by the fact that the inborn reaction pattern itself is never absolutely rigid. It always contains a variety of movements. If one does not succeed, nature tries another. If the irritating stimulus continues long enough, the baby will have used many different kinds of movements in his effort to free himself.

By chance when he gets older and stronger he hits upon certain random movements which are more often successful than others in getting rid of the hampering person or object. It may be certain arm movements, it may be biting or scratching. Out of the numerous responses that are tried, the most successful become established as habits, and the unsuccessful eliminated. At a certain stage biting and loud screaming may be the most effective methods, but later these are punished away, and then fist punching becomes the method most likely to lead to a satisfactory victory or relief. Still later the

punching may be inhibited by punishment, and weapons or words may come to be the habitual methods of combat.

Now why does the successful reaction become fixed as a habit, the unsuccessful responses eliminated? First, because the successful reaction, since it *must* occur in *every* trial in order to finish that trial, is the most *frequent* reaction. There are many unsuccessful reactions, and, not any one of them is likely to occur in *every* trial. Second, the successful reaction, since it brings the trial to a close, is always the most *recent,* and hence the more easily remembered. But there is a third reason which probably is even more important. Here is where the conditioning process comes in. That is, the successful reaction produces pleasure, while the others do not. Some of the unsuccessful reactions, in fact, may bring pain. There is much disagreement among psychologists as to the relative importance of frequency, recency, and pleasure in the learning process.

As we have seen, every reaction, by its effect upon the sense organs in the muscles, becomes a stimulus. The subject feels his own reaction. But also as we have seen, every *success* in escaping a repellent stimulus, or in approaching an attractive one, produces pleasure or enjoyment. So when we make a successful reaction, two stimuli come to our sense organs at the same time, the "feeling of success," and the "feeling of the reaction we have just made." The "feeling of success" already has the power to evoke pleasure. The "feeling of the last reaction" therefore becomes conditioned by that pleasure, and acquires the power to evoke pleasure through itself alone.

Now pleasure is certain emotional reactions coupled with a tendency to repeat or continue the situation. When, therefore, a "feeling of a certain reaction" becomes pleasant, we tend to repeat that reaction in preference to other reactions. Hence, as some psychologists say, pleasure "stamps in" the successful reaction. Likewise, the relative pain or discom-

fort which goes with failure tends to "stamp out" or inhibit the reactions which produced that failure. When a cat after much experimentation escapes from a cage by pressing a certain lever, his behavior includes, besides the movements of going out of the cage, some sort of pleasant emotional response. This response, *R*, as shown in the diagram, was provoked by the stimulus *Sa*, escape from a disagreeable situa-



FIGURE 3.

tion. But at the same moment there was present the stimulus *Si*, "sensation of my paw pressing on *that* lever." *Si* becomes attached also to *R*, so that in the future the sensation of "my paw on that lever" becomes pleasant in itself. With the cat several repetitions are necessary before he is able to pick out the lever immediately upon being put into the cage. In the same way the biting or punching response in struggle behavior, if it proves successful, is selected from the other

responses by the pleasure response which accompanies and conditions it.

The original reflex: *S* (restraint of movements)—*R* (stiffening and crying, etc.) is transformed, by this double barreled process of trial-and-error and stimulus-substitution, into an acquired habit, such as: *S* (inattention of another person to oneself)—*R* (speaking of insulting words). In this manner we learn, or form habits. The pathways in the nervous system that are used more frequently become well worn, and the nervous impulses are much more likely to pass over these pathways than others.

Symbolizing reactions in human behavior.—The learning of the lower animals is based entirely upon these two processes of stimulus-substitution and trial-and-error, both of which, as we have seen, depend upon the conditioning process. But the story of *human* learning, which most concerns us here, is not yet complete.

Among the numerous reactions of human beings are speech, gesture, writing, drawing, reading, listening, thinking. These reactions are not *directly* adaptive, and they do not *directly,* as a rule, bring us much pleasure or pain. Their function is to deal with the environment indirectly. You will say of course that their function is to communicate with our fellow men. True, but communication is based on the more fundamental process of *symbolization.*

Suppose, for example, that a man sees a tree. How may he react to this stimulus? He may ignore it completely, he may cut the tree down for firewood, he may run to it for shelter, or climb it to escape a wild animal, or shake it to bring down fruit. All these are reactions having some direct utility. But there is still another type of reaction he may make. He may simply say the word "tree"; or think "tree," or draw a picture of the tree, or make a gesture indicating the form of the tree. These are *symbolizing reactions;* they do not directly affect the tree or make use of it, but they

represent it, stand for it, symbolize it. The word "tree," whether it be written, printed, spoken, or merely thought of, is in any case a *symbol* of the object tree, and the symbol is made by a human reaction pattern.

Behavioristic psychology has shown that *thinking* is simply abbreviated and concealed speech, or something equivalent. It is not some mysterious process carried on in the brain alone, but is a series of very delicate stimuli and reactions. These reactions must take place in muscles. The brain itself is merely a switchboard. We think with our muscles. Try to *think* of a bubble with your mouth open. Your difficulty in doing this helps to show that the very thought itself requires the use of the lips as well as the brain. To *think* "bubble" is merely to make in abbreviated and outwardly invisible form the same muscular movements and tensions that you may when you *say* "bubble." However, you will perhaps succeed in thinking *about* the bubble even with your lips held apart. Here you are forming a "visual image"; you see the bubble in your "mind's eye," but that image too, the behaviorist claims, consists of certain minute movements and tensions in certain small muscles, in this case muscles of the head and eyes. All mental activity is behavior.

Symbolizing reactions effect tremendous short cuts in the trial-and-error process. They make possible man's mastery over nature, and are responsible for the existence of culture. Thus a rat, trying to escape from a burning building, would need to go through the whole process of *overt* trial and error. He would need to carry out each method of escape in actual practice before he could know which method was successful. But a man, knowing the building, or buildings in general, makes many symbolizing reactions. He can symbolize each method of escape—that is—carry it out in his imagination. Finally he hits upon an idea which his symbolic reactions pronounce as probably successful. He tries it then in practice—and probably it proves successful. The man has been

going through the whole process of trial and error while standing in one spot, thinking, while the rat was running about wildly from one place to another.[1]

Summary.—Culture is of course a product of human nature. Human nature, strictly speaking, consists only of the *inborn* characteristics of man.

Every animal, including man, is an adaptive mechanism. Except in the lowest forms this adaptation is made possible through a nervous system, which connects the receptors (sense organs), by a series of simple and complex pathways, to the receptors (muscles and glands). The nervous system makes it possible for the animal to make the right reaction (that is, the one which will be favorable to its life and growth) to the right stimulus. All behavior, or mental life, may be described in terms of stimuli and reactions. Reactions are organized into patterns which are used in certain definite situations to fulfill certain biological purposes. The simple reaction elements themselves, and a few reaction patterns, are born in us. These are called reflexes and instincts. The newer view of instincts differs from the old in two respects. First, the truly inborn portions of the reaction patterns, the truly instinctive parts, are much simpler and more rudimentary than was originally believed. Second, the instincts are provokable at birth by only a few simple stimuli, mostly contact and internal stimuli. Only by training does the animal or human being come to connect his instinctive reactions to *objects* and *situations* perceived through sight and hearing.

Reactions may be classed as approaching and avoiding, according as whether their general tendency is to approach, continue, develop, or repeat the driving stimulus; or to escape, discontinue, or remove it. With the approaching reactions commonly go pleasant emotions, which consist of certain reactions in the internal organs (viscera). With the avoiding reactions commonly go unpleasant emotions, which consist of

[1] Allport, "Social Psychology," pp. 55–56.

a different and opposite set of reactions in the internal organs. The emotions have an important biological function. They reinforce the outward reactions of approach or avoidance, helping the body to prolong the attractive situation, or to escape more effectively the harmful and repellent situation. Pleasant emotions favor digestion, assimilation and growth; unpleasant emotions are unfavorable to these functions and to the general health, but are necessary evils, for use in emergencies. Pleasant emotions, or enjoyment, are not only signals of beneficial conditions, but are in themselves beneficial to bodily health. Unpleasant emotions are not only signals of harm or danger, but are in themselves, if long continued, injurious to the body.

Most of our behavior is acquired, or developed through learning. The nucleus of the learning process is the mechanism called the conditioned reflex. This works in two ways. First, it causes new, previously indifferent stimuli, to be substituted for the biologically adequate stimuli to which we were able to respond at birth. Second, it helps to reward the successful reaction by connecting it to pleasant emotions and approaching behavior, and to weed out the unsuccessful reactions by connecting them to more or less unpleasant emotions and avoiding behavior. Thus by trial and error our inborn reaction patterns are modified into the more skillful and successful behavior of adult life. Finally, the learning process in human beings is hastened and abbreviated by means of symbolizing reactions, known as language and thinking.

Human nature interacts with the environment, by the processes described above, thereby producing modified or acquired patterns of behavior in place of and in addition to the inborn patterns. Some of these acquired reaction patterns are the foundations of culture. Thus culture is the product of human nature, but not of human nature alone. It is a result of the interaction between human nature and the environment.

CHAPTER V

HOW HUMAN BEHAVIOR PRODUCES CULTURE AND IS THEN GOVERNED BY IT

Man trained by his environment.—The greater part of human behavior is the product of environment. Man's original nature, exposed to environment, becomes *trained,* learns new reaction patterns. This environment may be divided into three parts: first, the *physical* environment, such as mountains, desert, cold, fertile valleys, etc.; second, the *sub-cultural social* environment; and third, the *cultural* environment. These last two may require fuller explanation.

The subcultural social environment consists of those features of the behavior of one's fellows which are natural or spontaneous, and are independent of any particular culture. For instance the hungry individual, whether man or animal, will find that his neighbors also are trying to get food. His own behavior will be modified by theirs; he will develop habits of cooperative hunting, or of competitive eating, which otherwise he would not have developed. These habits are not human *nature* for they are not inborn.

The cultural environment consists of the tools, social organization, symbols, values, beliefs, knowledge, skills, which make up the culture of the group. They are the artificial or standardized parts of the social environment, not arising with sudden spontaneity but evolving slowly and passing down from generation to generation. For instance, the *rule* that seal meat must not be eaten at certain seasons is a part of the cultural environment of every Eskimo.

Now a *trait* is any group of reactions, or connections be-

tween stimuli and reactions, which we wish to consider. As we have seen in Chapter II, man's environment develops in him three kinds of acquired traits, universal, personal, and cultural. The universal traits are the products of universal features of the natural and subcultural environments acting upon man's original nature. They help to shape culture, they are primary to it. The cultural traits, on the other hand, are the *results* of culture itself working upon man's original nature. They differ from region to region as cultures differ. The personal traits occupy an intermediate position. They are the products of natural, subcultural, or cultural influences or all of them together, working upon man's original nature. But they are always unique—they are the results of *combinations* of forces which are peculiar to the experience of given individuals. These personal traits, in leading personalities, are often among the important causes of cultural change, but always of "accidental," unpredictable change.

The universal pattern of culture or subcultural pattern. —Let us turn our attention for a moment to a fact quite aside from our subject. There are so many kinds of insects in the world that it is difficult for the layman to understand why they all are called by that same name. But the biologists have discovered that underlying all of the extreme variations there are certain universal features common to all. There is a universal insect-pattern. Among other features it includes six legs, four wings, a three-segmented body, and an external rather than internal skeleton.

Likewise the facts gathered from all over the world concerning present and past peoples lead anthropologists to the belief that there are certain universal features of all cultures. Wissler calls these features the "universal pattern of culture."[1] It might be better to call them the *subcultural* pattern of human social life, upon which all cultures are based.

[1] Wissler, Clark, "Man and Culture," New York. Crowell, 1923, pp. 73, 74.

This "universal pattern" is outlined by Wissler as follows:

THE CULTURE SCHEME

1. Speech
   Languages, writing systems, etc.
2. Material Traits
   a. Food habits
   b. Shelter
   c. Transportation and travel
   d. Dress
   e. Utensils, tools, etc.
   f. Weapons
   g. Occupations and industries
3. Art. Carving, painting, drawing, music, etc.
4. Mythology and Scientific Knowledge
5. Religious Practices
   a. Ritualistic forms
   b. Treatment of the sick
   c. Treatment of the dead
6. Family and Social Systems
   a. The forms of marriage
   b. Methods of reckoning relationship
   c. Inheritance
   d. Social control
   e. Sports and games
7. Property
   a. Real and personal
   b. Standards of value and exchange
   c. Trade
8. Government
   a. Political forms
   b. Judicial and legal procedures
9. War

How original nature determines the subcultural pattern: the instinct theory.—Wissler says: "So while the historical method" (the method of explaining culture changes in terms

of other culture changes) "can account for the concrete content of tribal cultures, it fails completely when confronted with the culture pattern. . . . A human being comes into the world with a set, or bias, to socialization, according to a definite pattern, and . . . this bias is firmly rooted in the germ plasm. . . . The human pattern therefore is a part, if not the whole, of man's inborn behavior."[1]

By what process does human nature cut and stamp the subcultural pattern? Is this pattern merely a large scale reflection of the pattern of original human nature, in the same way that the picture on the cinema screen is a reproduction of the little film in the projecting machine? Or is it a totally different thing, as the pattern of the oak tree is different from the structure of the acorn out of which it grows?

Thirty years ago the tendency was to answer this question by the first alternative. Each element of the subcultural pattern was accounted for by some corresponding element of human nature. These elements of human nature were called *instincts.* Sometimes they were referred to as desires, or fundamental motives, or "springs of action," but the idea was essentially the same. Human nature, it was thought, was composed of so many primal, inborn tendencies; each tendency requiring or wanting something for its satisfaction, and to satisfy these needs some special division of culture was created. Thus hunger produced hunting and agriculture, the sex instinct led to mating and marriage, the parental instinct led to the family, the instinct of jealousy produced the tendency toward fixed rules of mating and finally toward monogamy, and the fighting instinct was the source of weapons and war. Men were universally religious because they were born with a religious instinct, they universally acquired property because of their instincts of acquisition and possession, they practiced art because of a decorative instinct, science because

[1] Wissler, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

of curiosity. Sports and games were the result of the play instinct, speech of the instinct to communicate, morality of the "moral instincts," philanthropy of the instinct of kindness or pity. The very existence of social groups and community life was explained by a gregarious or "herd instinct."

Simple explanations like this are the first usually hit upon by the human mind in its effort to account for things it does not understand. But such theories later give place to others more scientific, founded upon more careful observation. The fact is that up to the last generation there had been little or no real *observation* of human behavior. What had been observed was only culture. Man had noticed that his organized and sophisticated activities took certain forms, such as agriculture, religion, art, and government; and from these well developed activities he merely *inferred* the character of his original inborn behavior. The "instincts" were not matters of observation at all, but only hypotheses. They might prove to be useful hypotheses, like the "elements" of chemistry, or they might prove entirely misleading, like the "bumps" which phrenology assumed as indicating mental qualities, and the "spirits" or "gods" which primitive religion invented to explain the several forces of nature. This theory of instincts in social life was parallel with the tendency to exalt heredity in the domain of biology.

The instinct theory modified by scientific observation.— Then arose psychologists who observed human behavior more closely and without preconceptions. They observed especially young children and animals. They concluded that many of the alleged instincts were not true instincts at all, but complex activities *founded upon many instincts.* Religion, for instance, they found too complex to be accounted for by any one instinct. It satisfies curiosity, love, self assertion, relieves fear, and caters to several other primary wants. The pattern of social life does not correspond in any such photographic way to the pattern of man's original nature.

Many of the reaction patterns that we used to call instincts can better be understood as universal acquired traits, or universal habits. Allport calls them "prepotent habits."

A most significant example is gregariousness. Psychologists always have observed that except for abnormal individuals, human beings are universally sociable, enjoy the company of their fellows, and like to assemble in crowds. McDougall suggests, in "An Introduction to Social Psychology," that the huge English throngs which gather to see royal processions do so less from their interest in royalty than from their fundamental instinct of gregariousness. Trotter calls it the "herd instinct" and makes it one of the four great instincts of the human race. He contrasts the behavior of the dog, which he thinks also has a herd instinct, with that of the cat, which seems to lack it.

Now modern psychology has another explanation for the difference between the dog and the cat. The dog, let it be observed, is built to run fast and far, but not for stealth or concealment. He has a noisy apparatus by which he probably communicates numerous shades of meaning to his fellows. The cat with his shorter, weaker legs, padded flexible paws, feelers, and other bodily adjustments, is built for sudden dashes and springs and for stealthy approach. The dog's efforts to get food will result in experiences quite different from those of the cat. The dog will soon discover that he cannot surprise his prey, but must rely upon running it down, which, he discovers, is more often successful with the noisy cooperation of other dogs than when undertaken alone. The cat discovers that he succeeds best by stealth, and that his aim is best accomplished when there are no other cats around to spoil the game. The dog succeeds in satisfying his hunger most frequently in social situations; the cat most frequently in solitary situations. The pleasure reflexes condition the stimuli which are present during the pleasurable experiences of feeding. Consequently, "company" comes to

be a relatively pleasant situation to the dog, "solitude" relatively pleasant to the cat. The dog's more gregarious habits are due to his physical structure interacting with the environment, and with the habits of other dogs. It is quite unnecessary to attribute them to some mysterious, generalized "herd instinct."

Many universal traits are not inborn.—Since only *simple* stimuli, mostly to the skin and internal sense organs, have inborn connections to responses, it follows that *any* response whatever can by training be connected with *any* object, or situation, which is perceived through sight or hearing. If every time a child were cut or pricked the instrument which injured him were concealed beneath a red cloth, he habitually would wince or shudder at the sight of a red cloth but *not* at the sight of a sharp object.

But because such a connection can be made under artificial conditions, it does not follow that it actually will be made in the real world. In that world stimuli occur, by the very nature of things, in certain more or less universal associations. Cutting sensations usually are accompanied by the sight of sharp objects, and only rarely and accidentally by the sight of red cloths. The various pleasant sensations of food and comfort usually are accompanied by the sound of familiar voices, and the sight of familiar human faces; while attacks, beatings, and other painful experiences are more likely to be accompanied by growls, curses, less familiar faces, animals, and other characteristic sights and sounds.

Because all sights and sounds are indifferent at birth, it does not follow that our eyes and ears are entirely at the disposal of *culture*. We do not see everything through cultural spectacles and hear everything through cultural earphones. The physical environment, and the spontaneous, subcultural human environment also must be reckoned with. Not all of our environment is culture.

Here is an important disagreement between the older

psychology and the new. Even so modern a psychologist as Woodworth sometimes appears to suggest that universality is the chief test of *inborn* traits. He thinks such a thing as sex attraction is probably not an acquired taste because it is universal. In his "Psychology" Professor Woodworth says: "When all individuals having the same descent show a trait in common, that trait is to be regarded as belonging to their native constitution—unless evidence can be brought forward to the contrary." Again, in "Man and Culture" Wissler says: "It seems reasonable to suppose that what all men have in common is inherited. Hence, in so far as their behavior is uniform, we may expect it to be grounded in original nature." On the other hand the view here presented is that all traits are to be regarded as acquired unless through the simplicity of the reflex pattern, or actual observation of young infants, there is evidence to show that they are inborn. Universality is not even good *prima facie* evidence of inheritance. It may simply prove that all human beings have been subjected to some universal experience, because of certain universal characteristics of their environments; that their reflexes have similarly conditioned some universal stimulus.

How the subcultural pattern arises from man's original nature and the environment.—Let us see how subcultural patterns arise from the interaction of man's inborn nature with the environment. Let us consider, for illustration, only a part of the general pattern. There is present in practically all societies some kind or conception of *rank:* that is, certain individuals are recognized as being on a plane of social prestige or privilege above that of others. To be sure there are enormous variations in the form, ranging all the way from the comparative democracy of many American Indian tribes to the caste system of the Hindus. But it is doubtful that complete equality anywhere exists, and we practically may consider rank as part of the universal pattern of culture. Now under the older psychology we should attempt to explain

this universal presence of rank by assuming certain instincts such as mastery and submission, emulation, and the like. But the new psychology obliges us to go deeper. Mastery and submission are complex patterns of behavior, and to suppose that nature provides them ready-made before birth is to ascribe to nature a needlessly great and mysterious power of design.

To explain the psychological origin of rank, we may start with the struggle-rage "prepotent reflex," or inborn reaction pattern described by Allport in his "Social Psychology." This may be symbolized as follows:

STIMULUS	RESPONSE
Restraint of the random movements which any young animal is continually making, by holding the limbs, etc.	Stiffening of whole body, screaming, temporary cessation of breathing, reddening of face, secretion of adrenalin by adrenal glands, extra liberation of blood sugar, acceleration of heart, vigorous contractions of muscles with some tendency to vary the response: that is, to try new struggling movements at random until success in freeing self is attained.

Now this reflex behavior develops into the learned behavior we call pugnacity or fighting, through the processes of stimulus substitution and trial and error previously described.

Each individual has acquired a personal list of grudges and enemies, that is, *conditioned anger stimuli.* But by trial and error he learns that it does not work well to use the same fighting habits against all the objects of his anger. These objects have their "comebacks." When he allows himself to show the fighting reaction against persons who are physically stronger, or against those who customarily are aided by allies, the ultimate consequences to himself are painful. A few such painful experiences connect the idea of such fights with the fear-withdrawal reflexes, and inhibit the anger-struggle reflexes. On the other hand, there are persons whom he may attack with success and victory. But these weaker persons, finding that they are weaker, try to avoid combat by retiring,

submitting to his will, or avoiding giving any provocation. To pursue such persons and compel them to fight requires an expenditure of energy which usually is not so pleasant as the quiet contemplation of their submission. They, on the other hand, do not run away from the stronger person after they learn easier methods of avoiding his ire. Through the desire to economize energy, to seek the easiest way out of a situation, fighting and fleeing behavior become transformed respectively into the patterns of mastery and submission.

Mastery commonly includes a throwing out of the chest, strutting, heightened muscular tonus, conspicuous and vigorous movements. Submission includes a general relaxation of the muscles, slinking, quivering voice, hesitant movements, and bodily attitudes designed to make oneself as inconspicuous as possible. The mastery pattern consists of abbreviations and symbols of the responses which follow a victorious combat; while the submission pattern consists of abbreviations and symbols of the responses following defeat. These patterns are further modified by culture. Sharp, direct commands, staring, or sometimes conspicuous ignoring of others, become conventional symbols of masterly attitude, while standing at "attention" or saying "sir" may become symbols of submission. An interesting military rule is that only officers from majors up fold their arms when reviewing a procession. The result is that overt conflict is rare among persons who know each others' powers. Each person habitually assumes a mastering attitude toward certain persons, and a submissive attitude toward others. He finds his place in the social hierarchy and recognizes his superiors and his inferiors. The boyish attitude of "we'll see who is boss" is transformed into the adult attitude of "we know who is boss, and we'll save the trouble of contesting it."

Even among animals we see evidences that physical struggle is largely replaced by mastering and submissive bodily attitudes. The aggressive, threatening dog seldom has to

engage in actual combat to prove his superiority, and the humble dog who slinks by, with his proverbial tail-between-his-legs, escapes many a fight. This phenomenon of *rank,* for that is what it amounts to, is a universal trait of culture. Its universality, however, is not explained by worldwide diffusion from one or more sources. It seems to be subcultural, that is, it probably would develop spontaneously in any group of men or animals even were there no traditions learned from previous generations. For this reason the term "subcultural" seems to describe, more completely than the word "universal," most of the elements of Wissler's "universal pattern."

In such manner most if not all of the universal or subcultural pattern might be explained by the conditioning of individual reflexes, and the interaction of the conditioned reflexes of one individual with those of others.

The subcultural pattern arises automatically in each social group.—The essential thing about a subcultural trait or pattern, which distinguishes it from true culture, is that it would automatically reconstitute itself with the younger generation if this generation were cut off from all the teachings and traditions of the past. The social organization of animals is probably subcultural. Among dogs, for example, we find mastery and submission, cooperative hunting, competitive eating, continual seeking and following of one dog after the group, hostile reactions toward strange dogs and men, and various playful reactions. Among birds we find definite flight formations, leadership, posting of sentinels. Some psychologists hold that traditions exist even among animals and account for much behavior of this sort. This is an open question. But certainly many features of animal society automatically develop, without tradition, among groups of young animals reared without any contact with older individuals. If we could separate a group of one-year-old children from all contact with adults, save those who would satisfy their physical needs in some concealed, mechanical fashion, and then

transport them to a desert island, they would undoubtedly develop, as they matured and lived together in association, certain of the features of our society. These automatically developing features would be the universal subcultural pattern of social life. Wissler implies that they would include all the elements in his "universal pattern." Perhaps some, like war, would be missing, but we need not dispute now over the details of what would be included.

Social psychology is the science which explains how these subcultural patterns of social life develop out of the inborn nature and the universal acquired traits of individuals. The reader is referred to Allport's "Social Psychology" as giving one of the best explanations of this sort. But to explain the evolution of *culture* requires in addition *cultural anthropology* or *sociology.*

But culture is passed down by tradition.—In actual human life we have a factor which is largely if not entirely absent in animal life and in the above mentioned imaginary human situation on the desert island. That factor is *tradition.* Tradition is the passing down of experiences, reactions, from one generation to another. It is made possible by man's power of *language* and his other symbolizing reactions. Animals merely *do* things, men not only do them, but *talk* about them, and make records of what they do. From talking follows the silent, internal talking that we call *thinking* or *reflection.* Every generation receives from the past a fund of skills, knowledge, beliefs, sentiments, *mores,* which we call the *social heritage.* The subcultural pattern of human life does not need to be redeveloped with each generation—it does not have a full chance to be redeveloped. It is symbolized, talked about, written down, and by symbols is passed on to the next generation before they have opportunity to work it out for themselves. The subcultural pattern thus becomes a part of true *culture.* It is difficult to tell where the subcultural stops and culture begins. There are probably many

features of human society which *are* maintained by tradition, but which also spontaneously would develop in the absence of tradition.

The established social pattern of rank acts directly upon the behavior of the rising generation. The boy or girl learns by a process of symbolic trial-and-error, carried on in the imagination with the help of formal education, the proper attitudes toward various persons. He does not need to learn by actual experience that it is useless to struggle against the policeman or the judge. His attitudes are formed by a culture which has been transmitted from the past.

Culture develops independently according to its own laws.—Now culture, being passed down through symbols by tradition, is subject to changes and variations that could not occur in the case of a subcultural pattern redeveloped by each generation. The variations in that subcultural pattern would be chiefly those due to variations in the natural environment. But culture undergoes striking variations which are due to the "accidents" of history, to the influence of unique combinations of traits in leading personalities, etc. Thus a single great flood, or the incident of a great warrior killing three enemies single-handed while he happened to be wearing a necklace of horses' teeth, might so affect the *mores* and religious beliefs of a human society as to start its culture moving in a new direction. Such events would cause no permanent change in the subcultural social life of animals. Culture thus acquires a momentum of its own: it cuts loose more or less from man's inborn nature, from his universal acquired traits, and from the natural environment, and varies independently.

In human society men *reflect* upon the social pattern of rank and thus it becomes conventionalized or stereotyped, a part of culture. In some cultures it happens to get attached to physical prowess, in some to age, in some to supposedly supernatural powers, in some to the fact of having been born in a certain class or caste. With us Americans it attaches

largely to wealth. Persons of certain occupations, family, or appearance, come to be respected at the outset without ever having been forced to demonstrate their worth. The peculiar form which rank takes cannot be explained by social psychology alone. It is explicable only by history. Only the subcultural pattern, the fact that rank or social stratification of *some* sort exists, as a universal characteristic of social systems, can be explained by psychology.

Culture differences not explainable by inborn differences between peoples.—One of the commonest fallacies of popular thinking is to explain the differences between two cultures by *group differences* in the inborn traits of the two peoples. Thus, because Chinese civilization is very different from our own, it is concluded that the Chinese must be very different from us in their original nature. The common man says that Chinese civilization is conservative because the Chinese people are conservative. He puts the cart before the horse. This conservatism of Chinese individuals is not an inborn trait which *produces* a conservative culture, but an *acquired* trait which is the result of the conservative culture.

To be sure the Chinese may be, in their original nature, somewhat different from us. They certainly differ from us in head form, skin color, resistance to typhoid fever, and other biological traits. It is reasonable to suppose that they may differ from us also in certain qualities of the brain, nervous system, and glands. But these physiological differences have little if anything to do with their difference in civilization. If you could interchange Chinese and American babies at birth, until the two peoples had completely changed places on the earth's surface, both civilizations would probably carry on much as before in their present locations, but with interchanged personnel, save for higher death rates due to the exposure of both peoples to unaccustomed diseases and physical

To be sure, there are inborn differences as well as inborn environments.

similarities between men. One of these of course is general intelligence. We already have shown that innate mental ability acts as a limiting factor upon culture. A people falling short of a certain average degree of intelligence may be unable to develop certain culture traits requiring superior skill and brains. But it does not follow that every people having the requisite ability will therefore develop all culture traits of which it is mentally capable.

But are there not inborn variations of *temperament* as well as of intelligence? Is not one man born with a greater tendency to fight, or to explore, or to work, or to be cheerful, than another? May not a race be born on the average more cheerful, more industrious, or more passionate than another? And if so do not these individual and race differences in temperament account for cultural differences? Are there not industrious and lazy cultures, light-hearted and serious cultures, passionate and frigid cultures?

Anthropology answers these questions tentatively as follows:

(a) Inborn individual differences in temperament *do exist.* The most promising theory is that these temperamental differences are due to differences in the glands. A deficiency in some gland function may produce undue fatigue, or melancholy, while some excessive gland function may cause hyperactivity and restlessness. In 1919 Sir Arthur Keith expressed his belief that the physical differences between races are due to gland differences. If so it is quite possible that temperamental differences between the races are also due to glands.

(b) The differences between races or peoples, however, can not be nearly so great as the differences between individuals. Each race contains individuals of opposite extremes. The American soldiers are on the average five inches taller than the Japanese soldiers, but within each group there is a range of fourteen inches from the tallest to the shortest. Wherever you find a whole large group of human beings you

will find plenty of samples of all types of human personalities, in which the extremes tend to lose themselves in the great Average.

(c) But this still leaves us with the possibility of substantial *average* differences between peoples. The stolidity of the Indians and the Chinese, the cheerfulness of the Negroes, are proverbial. It has been noted that the Papuans, a negroid people, are of a strikingly more cheerful disposition than the Malay people who live on neighboring islands. It seems to be a difference in physical temperament quite apart from any difference in their institutions or manner of life. But it is difficult to see how these temperamental differences can have any relation to the differences in human cultures. As soon as we begin to reason from temperament to culture we begin talking about traits which are not temperamental at all. The racialists say, for example, that the blonde Nordic is of practical and adventurous temperament, while the brunette Mediterranean is of meditative and philosophical temperament. But psychology has never shown that adventurousness, practicality and meditativeness are matters of temperament at all. They simply are words for rather complex activities. The Viking who goes exploring on the high seas may be no more physically active or restless than the Mediterranean shepherd who walks for miles every day following his flock. And he may spend just as much time in meditation. Furthermore only a limited per cent of the Nordic population could wander in search of adventure and only a small per cent of the Mediterraneans could devote their time to philosophy. The great majority always must devote themselves to a variety of humdrum occupations. Each race must, in fact, follow all the principal types of occupations.

The temperamental theory becomes still more doubtful when we note that it is only during the last thousand years or so that the Nordics have been the explorers and the discoverers. In ancient times it was the Mediterranean Phoeni-

cians who led the world in adventure. In short, it is much easier to explain the different activities of peoples by their physical environments and their cultural histories than by differences in temperament. We have actual observations to prove that environment or culture accidents can determine a people's activity, and we accept the explanation that is more probable.

Ellsworth Huntington has made a great deal of the temperamental theory. In "The Character of Races," he has shown statistically that during the last few centuries the eminent men of Ireland and Greece, and of certain other outlying regions of Europe, have been more commonly political leaders, statesmen, or military men; while the talent of Germany and central Europe is more given to the things of the intellect. But it is in central Europe that intellectual achievement has been most called for and best rewarded; elsewhere it found meager opportunity. Culture rather than temperament determines the direction of mental effort.

The variations of language illustrate how human characteristics influence culture. Without vocal cords and tongues and lips and a complicated brain which permits the making of a wide variety of sounds with those organs, there could of course be no language. The existence of language depends upon the human physiology. Moreover it is quite possible that one group of people, born with an active cheerful temperament owing perhaps to super-active thyroid glands, might talk a great deal *more* than another group of people born with a phlegmatic temperament. But the difference between the guttural, consonant-filled speech of the Germans, and the nasal, vowel-stressed language of the French, can not be explained by any difference between German and French lips, tongues, vocal cords, emotions, personality or any other personal characteristics. Nor can it be explained by differences between German and French climate or geography. The difference is simply due to the "chance" events (i.e. individ-

ual variations) by which language developed. Perhaps from a mere whim the original Indo-Europeans who went to south Europe began speaking their language with certain affectations and variations. We in our playful moments do the same thing with our language. We tire of customary expressions, devise slang, modify our pronunciation, add or subtract syllables. Now perhaps the Indo-Europeans who went to the north of Europe, starting with the same language as their fellows who went southward, just happened to modify that language in a slightly different way. After many centuries, in which the two groups had no contact with each other, the languages grew so far apart that one was finally Latin and the other Teutonic.

To put it briefly, human nature determines the universal subcultural pattern and the limits of human culture, but the *variations* of culture are not accounted for by any corresponding differences in human nature.

Culture often conflicts with human nature.—So great is the power of culture to perpetuate itself through social control that it sometimes works against the original nature of man, and against the universal acquired traits of man.

Culture can go to the most outlandish extremes. It induces Japanese to commit suicide for the glory of their country, European political prisoners to starve themselves to death. It painfully bound the feet of Chinese women, it leads Hindu religious fanatics to make long journeys by crawling or "measuring their length" upon the ground.

It is quite possible that culture indirectly could cause a people to destroy themselves through warfare, and even through celibacy.

There is probably a limit to these extremes. We know of no culture which has been able to "fool all of the people all of the time" into starving themselves voluntarily, giving up all sexual satisfaction, or enduring without resistance all abuse and outrage. There comes a point where human nature says

to government and religion: "Thus far shalt thou go but no farther."

The universal acquired traits, as well as original nature, help to fix the subcultural pattern and to keep culture within certain bounds. A culture without social gatherings for pleasure, for example, would be well nigh impossible, not because men are instinctively gregarious, but because they universally and inevitably acquire gregariousness. However, the bounds within which the course of human life is held by original nature and universal habits are very wide.

To be sure, Ireland is Catholic because individual Irishmen want it so, but what makes them want it so? Not their human nature, but their cultural traditions, which are passed along from one generation to the next, and kept alive by constant teaching. If every Irish child were to be transferred at birth to a Mohammedan family in Persia, he would desire just as fervently to be Mohammedan. To be sure the Arabian nomads lead a warlike existence because the individual tribesmen have warlike personalities, but what made them warlike? Not their human nature, but their cultural traditions.

Culture becomes a part of man's environment and moulds his behavior.—Culture, once established, becomes a part of man's environment. It trains and moulds the character of the individual just as do the physical and subcultural environments.

As culture accumulates, it becomes an ever increasing part of the environment, while the physical and subcultural environments become relatively less important. Therefore, it might be thought, man becomes more and more a self-directing animal, for he becomes less dependent on physical surroundings and more upon the artificial products of his own intelligence. It is very doubtful, however, that he has become more self-directing. To return to a previous illustration, the universal pattern of rank among one people comes to be associated with

personal merit, among another people with permanent social castes.

These tribal differences in the form which rank takes profoundly influence the character of the individual tribesmen. In the first people we shall have the personal traits of independence and democratic feeling, among the second slavishness and caste feeling. It now looks as if there were some fundamental inborn difference of temperament between the two, and as if this difference of temperament were responsible for the difference in culture. But the reverse is the case: the difference in culture is responsible for the difference in personal attitudes. A difference in temperament may exist, but it will have no definite relation to the traits in question.

The net result of man's culture-building intellect is to make him somewhat less a creature of his physical environment, and instead, to make him to a large extent a creature of his own culture. Culture, although the creature of man, has been substituted for nature as the master of man.

Why culture's mastery of the individual is now more fully recognized.—It is no new theory that the individual is moulded and controlled by the cultural environment around him. In the eighteenth century Rousseau recognized how completely convention and custom ruled in education, and protested against this rule, advocating a new system of education which would be based on the individual nature of the child. But our knowledge of culture's domination today is fraught with a significance it never had before. And as a result it opens up possibilities which never before were clearly seen.

As long as we believed in complex instincts we felt reasonably secure against cataclysmic changes in human affairs. At the same time we were skeptical of any fundamental reform. "To do so and so you have got first to change human nature, and that is a slow process," was the gist of our philosophy. War, it was thought, could never be eliminated because there was a fighting instinct in human nature. On the

other hand, war would never annihilate any large per cent of the population because the instinct of self preservation would stop it when it became too bad. Race suicide was regarded as an improbable danger because the instincts of sex and of parenthood would automatically take care that the bulk of normal people reproduced themselves. Socialism could never succeed because of the instincts of acquisition and possession, which demanded private property. Free love never could go very far because the instinct of jealousy, supposed to be particularly strong in the male, would not tolerate it. Instincts were a sort of guarantee of the cultural *status quo*.

But since the psychologists have shown how crude and elementary the true "instincts" are, and the anthropologists have shown to what extremes human nature can be distorted by custom, the bedrock of our complacent faith has been shattered. When you have nothing to start out with but a reflex, whose only biologically adequate stimulus is something on the skin or inside the body, you have something much more subject to change than if you started with a full fledged "instinct." By bringing to bear the right stimuli at the right times you can make a reflex, through the conditioning process, into almost anything. To mention only things which actually have been done by large groups of persons in human history, you could make suicide fashionable, pervert the sex desires toward one's own sex, or toward children, instead of letting them seek the opposite sex, induce people to fast and to undertake painful and deadly pilgrimages. A widespread custom of amputating fingers, for magical reasons, was once followed in many quarters of the globe. A sharp division of a group into leaders and led may at some time have been useful in preserving the discipline necessary to overcoming enemies or accomplishing difficult migrations. But erroneous reflection may crystallize this division into a permanent stratification by birth, a caste system, which will tend to persist after it has become not only useless but positively harmful.

Culture may make life much better or much worse.—Culture may modify behavior in beneficial or in harmful directions. It may help the individual to carry out harmoniously the purposes which spontaneously grow out of his human nature, or it may crush some of these purposes for the sake of others. Certain culture elements may make life easier and happier, others may make it difficult, unhealthful, miserable. As we have noted human nature places certain limits upon the idiosyncrasies of culture, but there is no guarantee that culture shall be any better than the worst that these limits permit.

The possibilities of cultural evolution are more varied and disturbing than we ever have realized. There may be more things, good and bad, in the future of human life, than were ever dreamed of in the philosophy of the past.

War may wipe out Euro-American civilization. On the other hand, a world without war is possible. If the fighting instinct is a constant factor in human affairs, as formerly believed, then it is hard to see why our fathers' generation got along without participating in any great war such as gratified the instincts of our grandfather's and of our own generation. It is also hard to understand why the whole continent of North America above the Rio Grande gets along without fortified boundaries, and settles sectional disputes without thought of war, while a much smaller area in Europe is divided by numerous borders bristling with bayonets.

When the so-called instinct of acquisition is resolved into its elements, it seems quite possible to substitute some other reward for financial profit as an incentive to labor, and to bring about an economic system based upon production for use.

It now seems highly possible that birth control and the growing desire for personal comfort and freedom may triumph over the alleged "instinct" of parenthood. Race sui-

cide may become a genuine reality, although as yet there is no immediate danger of such a catastrophe.

When the alleged instinct of jealousy is reduced to its component reflexes, the exclusive monogamous family no longer appears to be an inevitable product of human nature. A husband might find his prestige enhanced and his egotism gratified through the popularity of his wife with other men, instead of through his exclusive possession of her, if culture should happen to take that turn.

As Sumner has pointed out in "Folkways," there is no guarantee that even slavery will not be reintroduced into human culture if and when the sources of mechanical power are exhausted.

How culture controls the individual.—Culture controls the individual in two ways; first, by direct suggestion, second, by rewards and punishments. In the first case, the individual has several courses of possible action open to him, no course being especially more attractive than another. Culture, by setting a model for him to imitate, makes his choice for him. In this way, for example, the individual chooses which of many possible forms of head gear he shall wear.

But in the second case, the individual has a strong bent, because of his original nature or acquired traits (other than cultural), leading him in some direction rather than another. Culture then forces him into a different direction by means of reward or punishment.

Rewards and punishments as the instruments of culture's control.—In a psychological sense any pleasure is a reward, and any pain is a punishment. When the child eats ripe apples, bread, or other healthful food, his environment rewards his act by giving him immediate satisfaction. He is thereby encouraged to seek these articles again. But if he tries to eat sand or bitter weeds or decayed matter, the stimuli in his mouth will cause an unpleasant spitting or vomiting re-

flex. The physical environment thus punishes his act and discourages its repetition. By trial-and-error he learns what is good to eat and what is not. Likewise his subcultural social environment rewards and punishes him. For instance, he learns not to attack those stronger than himself.

In both of these cases the rewards and punishments were the direct results of the acts themselves. They were automatic. The harmful consequences of eating sand were the same thing as the punishment for eating sand. But culture gives rewards and punishments which are separate from the direct consequences of the acts themselves. The child who eats sand is perhaps given a whipping or scolding in addition to the unpleasantness of the sand-eating experience itself, and the one who eats good food not only enjoys food and health itself, but also the praise of his parents. But suppose, now, that the child overeats of sugar, or that he breaks a window. Here there is no immediate automatic punishment by which he can be trained. The sickness that follows his over-indulgence in sugar may not come soon enough to become mentally connected with the act which caused it, and hence will not discourage that act. In the case of the broken window, the harmful consequence will fall upon someone else and hence can have no training effect on the child. The only possible punishment is an artificial one, something separate from the automatic consequences of the act itself.

One of the peculiar characteristics of culture is its use of artificial rewards and punishments for controlling the behavior of the individual. It is not certain that animals ever have advanced sufficiently to include artificial social control. For aught we know, there is nothing to prevent a dog's killing one of his fellow dogs, except the fact that his hunting habits are directed toward other animals and are cooperative with his fellows, so that there seldom is anything to impel him to commit such a murder. Animals are controlled entirely by their physical and their subcultural social environments.

A system of artificial rewards and punishments would seem to give a society which possessed it a tremendous advantage in the struggle for existence over a society which lacked it. Without such a system, the only check upon the selfishness of each individual is the like selfishness of his neighbors. With it, all can be compelled to cooperate for the common good. Conflict within the group is eliminated, and all energy saved thereby can be used to struggle against outside enemies and circumstances.

The rewards and punishments used by culture may be listed as follows:

REWARDS	PUNISHMENTS
Prestige { praise; promotion and social power	Death
Flattery	Maiming
Miscellaneous advantages	Pain or torture
Financial rewards	Imprisonment
	Banishment
	Labor
	Boycott
	Demotion
	Fines
	Ostracism
	Petty annoyances
	Humiliation { gossip; satire, laughter } ridicule; calling names; censure
	Conscience
	Fear of punishment in a future world

These controls may be applied by two sorts of *agencies,* first *organized* institutions such as government, the church, the school, the family, or the business firm, and second, by *unorganized* pressure from the social group. The unwritten, unorganized sources of control are called moral codes, custom, convention, fashion, the *mores,* the folkways, etiquette, etc.

There is an indistinct borderline between this unorganized sort of cultural control and subcultural social control. Thus when one man strikes another, and is immediately struck in

retaliation, the return blow may be considered as an automatic result of the first. It is the sort of thing that occurs on the subcultural plane of animal societies. If the second man, instead of striking back, makes a complaint to the police, and gets his assailant jailed for assault, that clearly is an artificial, cultural punishment. But suppose he is unable to do either, and that the punishment consists entirely in scorn, censure, or perhaps physical chastisement inflicted by the onlookers. This might be considered either as an automatic, subcultural punishment, or as an unorganized cultural punishment. We shall consider it, and all similar doubtful cases, as the latter. This view seems the more logical because it is a punishment which would not have occurred unless there had been certain established customs or social values among the onlookers, and these things are a part of culture. Such punishment would not have occurred among animals.

But this system of rewards and punishments is not an unmixed good. If culture can artificially punish an act which does not immediately and automatically react harmfully upon the doer, it also can punish an act which does no harm at all. If it can reward an act which does not automatically benefit the doer, it can reward an act that does no benefit at all. It may reward acts that are harmful and punish acts that are beneficial. And it frequently does, as we shall see.

Culture and happiness.—Only remotely and loosely does man's original nature limit the course of cultural evolution. There is therefore no certainty that the development of culture will lead to greater individual happiness. It may make human life more complex but not necessarily more worth while. Happiness means simply a minimum of suffering and a maximum of enjoyment. The important thing for us to remember is that joy and suffering are definite mechanical or chemical events inside the human body. They are not mystical attributes of the soul, or eternal principles floating about in thin air. They are matters of animal physiology.

Physical and mental enjoyment and suffering.—We speak of "physical" suffering, as if it took place in the body, while "mental" suffering took place in the mind. There is no such distinction. All suffering consists of the visceral reactions described in Chapter IV, plus the general bodily attitude of avoidance. The difference between physical and mental suffering is simply a difference in the *stimuli* which provoke the suffering. In general, when the unpleasant emotion is aroused by a *biologically adequate* stimulus, we call it *physical* suffering; if by a *conditioned* stimulus, we call it *mental* suffering. A burn on the hand, a bitter taste, indigestion, a deafening noise, a dazzling light, having the limbs manacled and chained to prevent free movement: these all are physically unpleasant. But confinement in a jail where there is room to move, losing one's job, tearing one's best clothes, being insulted, failing to accomplish what one sets out to do: these are unpleasant only mentally. The distinction between physical and mental enjoyment can be similarly stated.

The distinction between physical and mental suffering has a very great social significance. It is this, that the physical suffering cannot be prevented excepted by removing the stimulus, or using anaesthetics, while the mental suffering can be prevented by *reconditioning* the stimulus. Thus if a child suffers from a pin prick the only thing to do is to remove the pin. You cannot possibly make it pleasant. But if he suffers from a dark room you can train him not to dislike the dark room. Possibly some of these conditioned reflexes become so firmly established that no retraining can hope to break them up, but if the proper training had been begun earlier, it would have been possible to prevent them.

Mental sufferings and enjoyments, like other acquired traits, can be grouped as universal, personal, and cultural. Confinement in prison, the death of a loved one, and the burning down of one's home are perhaps universal stimuli to suffering. The circumstances of life are such that all men in

all cultures will connect these situations to unpleasant emotions. Having to live in the open country, the sound of a hurdy-gurdy, failure to finish one's work are personal sufferings, unpleasant to some individuals, not to others. To an American, the necessity of wearing patched clothing, to a Chinese, the failure to raise a large family, are cultural stimuli to suffering. Being praised by one's fellows is a universal joy, swimming in the middle of a large lake a personal joy; wearing diamonds or silver bracelets, attending a sun-dance, a ball game, a bull-fight, are, to various peoples, cultural joys.

Good and evil.—The terms "good" and "evil," as applied to humanity, may be used in three senses, biological, psychological, and cultural. A biological "good" is anything which favors the life, growth, and reproduction of the body, such as proper food, rest, or shelter. A psychological "good" is anything which *feels* good to the person who experiences it, in other words, anything which stimulates the approaching reactions and pleasant emotions. Psychological "good" is simply enjoyment or pleasure; cultural "good" is anything which satisfies cultural standards, or promotes cultural values.

The view of this book, as we shall see later, is that cultural "good" deserves no recognition by man as an independent value, but should be wholly subservient to, and determined by, *man's* biological and psychological good. Man should no more seek the welfare *of his culture* as such than he should seek the biological welfare of some lower species of animal, or the chemical "good" of some inorganic substance. If culture should happen to be evolving in the direction of a system of efficient slavery, anything that contributed to that development would be culturally "good," but not good for man.

So all that deserves our consideration is man's (1) biological and (2) psychological good.

Roughly, these two "goods" correspond, as do also their corresponding evils. Food is good for man's body, and it

also gives him pleasure. Being chased by a bull is likely to become, aside from the very obvious inconvenience, a very bad thing for the human body. The emotion of fear, which nature provides as a protection to the body against such situations, is, correspondingly, an *unpleasant* emotion. Roughly, biological good brings pleasure, and biological harm or danger brings suffering.

If you ask how things came to be this way, the answer is simply natural selection. Animals which did not enjoy and approach the conditions that were good for them, and which failed to suffer from and to avoid the conditions that were harmful to them, perished long ago and left no offspring. Roughly stated, the only type of animal which could survive in this world of nature is one whose joy corresponds to his physical good, and whose suffering corresponds to his physical harm.

But we seem to find so many exceptions to this general rule. We enjoy some things that are biologically bad for us, and conversely dislike some things that are biologically good.

This seeming lack of correspondence between pleasure and biological good is due partly to the imperfections of nature. To eat freely of sugar is immediately pleasant but later it produces suffering. But remember that nature could not prepare us for every possible condition under which we might have to live. She prepared us for only those usual conditions which most animals have to face in the natural world. In that world food usually is scarce. In order to construct an animal which would have the best chance of surviving, it would be necessary to put into that animal a powerful tendency to make use of every available bit of food coming within its reach. Only in rare cases would there be such a surplus that animals might injure themselves by overeating. But pure sugar is an artificial product and does not occur in the world of nature. Nature could not provide an instinctive caution against it any more than she could provide an instinct

to beware of sticks of dynamite. So the child, prepared by nature to live in an animal world, will of course gorge himself upon sugar because such sugar as *was* available in the natural world is really good for him. It is only by artificial training that he can be protected against the dangers of an artificial world.

But man, reasoning crudely from such unusual cases as this, often has come to the false conclusion that "good" is something independent of pleasure. Knowing too little science to determine just what was biologically good, he established a cultural standard of "good" to be achieved independently of biological welfare or of pleasure. Sometimes he has gone to the extreme of making his ideal of "good" the very opposite of pleasure, every joy being regarded as *ipso facto* an evil. This extreme policy we call *asceticism.* But the moderate policy of making "good" simply independent of pleasure is equally mistaken.

Man has overlooked the fact that in cases such as our sugar episode above, *in the long run* it is always suffering, and not pleasure, that goes with biological harm. The pleasure was of very short duration. Likewise, anything which is biologically good will yield pleasure *in the long run,* if not immediately.

Mental enjoyments the chief source of human happiness. —The above discussion seems to imply that biological good is the goal and that psychological good, or pleasure, is merely a means to that end. The biological good is of course the most *essential,* since without it we should perish altogether. But the most important points in the whole discussion have not yet been touched.

First, the psychological good, or pleasure, is a part of the biological good. The distinction we have made between them was only a logical distinction, to help us in our thinking up to this point. But we have seen that pleasure is essentially a general approaching attitude of the body, linked with

a set of visceral reactions which favor the life and growth of the body. Pleasure is in itself healthful.

By the same token, suffering is unhealthful, biologically evil. But it is not an arbitrary evil imposed by nature. It is simply a necessary evil. It is better for the normal bodily functions to be sacrificed temporarily than for life itself to be destroyed by a dangerous object or condition. Suffering is a lesser bodily evil imposed upon us to save us from the still greater evils which would befall us if we did not have the capacity to suffer in threatening situations.

Second, the great bulk of human pleasure is produced, through *conditioned stimuli,* by situations which, *originally,* were neither biologically good nor biologically harmful. But when these situations become *conditioned* on to pleasant emotions, they thereby become biologically as well as psychologically good. The only real distinction is not between biological good and pleasure, or psychological good, but between two classes of psycho-biological good. These two classes are (1) situations originally and mechanically beneficial to the body, which are usually also biologically adequate stimuli to pleasure, and (2) situations, originally indifferent, which have become *conditioned* stimuli to pleasure, and therefore also indirectly beneficial to the body.

It is of no particular biological advantage, for example, to see a beautiful sunset. Neither is it a disadvantage. Yet the sight of sunsets is apt to occur simultaneously with free movement, fresh air, exercise, cessation of work, pleasant words spoken by our fellow men and other stimuli which already have become pleasant for reasons quite unconnected with the sunset itself. Through many such mental connections it may become one of the most intense pleasures in all our experience.

This pleasure is a mere by-product of biological evolution. Yet it is mainly the experiences of this class which make human life worth while, in a larger sense than other animal

life is worth while. The chief value of mental enjoyment is not in the physical good it does, but in itself. As John Stuart Mill puts it in his "Essay on Utilitarianism," "the sole evidence that it is possible to adduce that a thing is desirable is that people actually do desire it."

The greatest joys of human life arise not from isolated stimuli, but from the satisfaction of complex sentiments, tastes, and interests. These traits are unique in every individual. Although culture can and does keep individuals within certain bounds, it can not act with sufficient uniformity upon all to make their tastes and interests exactly alike. These varying sentiments, tastes, and interests are the *personal acquired* traits of man.

Sentiments, tastes, and interests, as we shall see in Chapters XI and XV, become organized into patterns. Each individual develops his own unique pattern. His enjoyment depends not merely on getting certain experiences, but on getting them in a particular sequence and combination.

The conflict of culture with personal sentiments and tastes.—A sentiment, says psychology, is a group of emotions which cluster about a particular object or situation. In behavioristic terms, it is a group of emotions to which this object or situation has become a conditioned stimulus. Any or all of the emotions may be involved, according to the circumstances; but the significant thing is the object or situation which is the stimulus. Thus I may perceive a certain house, may recognize it when seen from any angle, may remember it in great detail, may even be able, if I am an architect, to reconstruct it from memory. But all of this awareness of "house" is not yet a sentiment. If however the house arouses in me various emotions, love at the thought of it, fear at the thought of danger to it, anger when someone speaks disparagingly of it, shame when certain of its defects are mentioned, then I have a sentiment. Substitute for "house" the "American flag," "my own reputation," "the doctrine

of the Virgin Birth," and we have other illustrations of sentiment. There are repellent as well as attractive sentiments, such as "dirty tenement houses," "the Kaiser" (in 1919), "Bolshevism," (in 1921). Sentiments may be established by (1) universal experience, (2) personal experience, or (3) culture, but are never inborn. The culturally established sentiments are the same thing as the social *values* which we noted in Chapter II as one of the kinds of culture elements. When we regard them from the individual point of view we call them sentiments or social attitudes, from the collective point of view, values.

The *complexes* about which the Freudian psychology talks so much are sentiments. They are mainly sentiments established by experiences peculiar to the individual rather than by culture, and they usually are in conflict with cultural sentiments, by which, according to the Freudian theory, they are "repressed into the unconscious." The Freudians have made them unduly mysterious.

A mild form of sentiment, attaching particularly to articles of diet, dress, or of other utility, objects of art, and habits of daily living, is often called a *taste*. Tastes also may be universal, personal, or cultural.

When the pleasure is derived from the exploration, the prolonged examination with eye or ear of some object or situation, rather than from occasional or intermittent observation, we call the sentiment an *interest*. Interests may be universal, personal, or cultural.

But to arouse any sentiment, taste, or interest to its highest degree, to make it yield the maximum of enjoyment, usually requires a very specific combination of stimuli which is unique and *personal*. The personal acquired tastes and interests of man are the key to the highest and fullest happiness. Yet they are frequently in conflict with cultural sentiments.

Thus an individual's sentiment of personal friendship may

become fixated upon some person whose companionship, because of age, sex, marital status, color, occupation, or religion, is socially "tabu." Such a personal taste may arise from a great variety of causes. Some experience in childhood days may have conditioned the subject's emotional reactions toward a person of the long ago, resembling the forbidden companion of today. But the subject is obliged to give up his friendship, which may mean acute mental suffering, or else suffer the ridicule, ostracism, or disgrace, that follows the violation of a cultural tabu. Either way he faces suffering.

This, to be sure, is a small matter if we consider only that one case. But the next individual may have some different personal tastes which he must sacrifice to culture. Perhaps with him it is a matter of costume, or of recreation, and so on. Because these personal tastes are all different, because there is no one upon which any considerable number of persons can agree, there is no chance of their winning out against a cultural standard. Every one of us has harmless personal tastes and desires which he is compelled by culture to forego. The sum total of conflict and unhappiness is large.

But culture not only represses personal sentiments and desires; it also represses at many points man's inborn nature and his more or less universal desires. So great is the needless suffering inflicted, so many are the opportunities destroyed for harmless enjoyment, that we may well look upon culture as a tyrant dominating over man.

Culture helped man to conquer nature. Then culture conquered man.

Summary.—The bulk of human behavior is acquired through experience with the environment. The environment consists of (1) the natural environment, (2) the sub-cultural social environment and (3) culture.

Man's acquired behavior or habits may be classified as (a) universal, (b) personal, (c) cultural traits.

All cultures are based upon a universal, subcultural pat-

tern which is the same for all mankind. This subcultural pattern is the product of man's original nature interacting with environment, plus the universal acquired traits which grow out of this interaction. The older theory wrongly attributed this fundamental pattern to original nature alone, assuming some definite "instinct" as the basis of each fundamental human activity or institution.

Many traits that seem to be inborn, because they are universal, are not inborn. They are universal habits, resulting from the interaction of inborn nature with certain universal features of human environment.

The fallacy of this older theory lay in the fact that it implied that man's inborn nature had tendencies to react to specific *objects* of the environment. The newer psychology shows that even where definite reaction patterns (instincts) are inborn, they are connected at birth to only very simple stimuli, mostly internal and contact sensations, never to the sight or sound of particular objects. All *perceptions* have to be acquired.

The development of rank is described to illustrate how man's inborn and universal acquired traits give rise to various parts of the subcultural pattern.

In the case of man this subcultural pattern does not have to be redeveloped from the inborn nature and experience of each generation, as it probably does with animals. Once established, it is passed down by tradition (symbolizing reactions). It is now a part of true culture.

A culture pattern, being passed down by tradition, is subject to changes and variations that could not occur with a subcultural pattern redeveloped by each generation. These variations are due to the "accidents" of history, to the unique combinations of traits in leading personalities, to changes in other parts of culture. Culture thus acquires a momentum of its own, and may vary independently of man's original nature or universal acquired traits.

Culture variations can not be explained by differences in the inborn nature of peoples.

Culture becomes a part of man's environment, and moulds the behavior of the individual just as do the natural and subcultural environments. With the development of culture, its

THE RELATION OF CULTURE TO HUMAN TRAITS AND THE ENVIRONMENT



FIGURE 4

influence in moulding the behavior of the individual becomes greater, and the influence of the natural and subcultural environments becomes less. Although man was originally the creator of culture, yet he becomes in large part its creature.

Culture may develop in extreme and unexpected directions, and often conflicts to a large extent with man's original nature and universal habits. The course of human events,

activities, and relationships is held within very loose and remote bounds by man's original nature and universal traits. Hence culture may make human life very much happier or very much more miserable than it otherwise would be.

Culture controls the individual by means of rewards and punishments.

Individual happiness consists in the satisfaction of man's original nature, plus his universal, personal, and cultural acquired tastes and desires. The most prolonged enjoyments of human life are the satisfaction of personal tastes and interests.

Culture promotes individual happiness in many ways. But it also conflicts with individual happiness. This conflict occurs especially where cultural standards, tabus, rigid social structures, developed out of the vicissitudes of history, more or less independently of human nature, are opposed to personal tastes and interests developed more directly from the interaction of each individual's nature with his environment. So greatly has culture in the past interfered with individual happiness and fullness of life, that we are justified in speaking of culture's conquest of man.

CHAPTER VI

CULTURE'S CONQUEST OF MAN

Stranger! I saw electric lights come to Spoon River
Without a protest.
But when I inaugurated kerosine lamps for the streets
You opposed me,
Saying it was an interference with the divine plan,
Which had ordained darkness for the night;
And that lighted streets would cause people
To remain out late,
Producing rheumatism and immorality;
And that thieves would be emboldened,
And horses frightened.
You were wrong about all these things,
But you never learn anything.
You are still obstructing
The lighting of streets of thought and life
With your ideas about the divine plan,
And your ideas about morals.
—EDGAR LEE MASTERS, "Epitaph of George Masterman" [1]

Culture becomes an end in itself.—The Great Pyramid of Cheops not only is a monument to an Egyptian king, but is also one of the greatest and most ancient monuments to man's conquest of nature. As a gigantic piece of engineering it rivals the works of our own day. But at the same time it is a most terrible monument to culture's conquest of man.

Back there in Egypt man wasted his substance and his

[1] "The New Spoon River," by Edgar Lee Masters, published by Boni and Liveright, 1924.

energy; year after year he bowed under heavy loads of stone and the cut of the taskmaster's whiplash. And to what end did he sweat and bleed? Not in order to satisfy any inborn or any universal desire of human nature. Other peoples have proved that it is possible to live just as happily without erecting megalithic monuments to their dead rulers. The Egyptians toiled and perished to satisfy a religious belief, a national ideal, which was merely the artificial and unique product of their particular culture. They were behaving very much as we should behave if we employed a million men to pile up in New York harbor an artificial mountain one thousand feet high, and set a monument to liberty on top, in the belief that liberty would thereby better be preserved.

The statement that culture is the master of man is of course a metaphor which in itself means nothing definite, and cannot be logically proved or disproved. The idea back of the statement, however, is momentous and deserves further examination.

First, there is a very material sense in which man is a *product* of his own culture. G. P. Garrett, in "Ouroboros," imagines a celestial visitor coming down to observe life on this earth. The visitor would notice that England, with her modern mines and factories, now supports thirty-five million people whereas two hundred years ago, without mines and factories, she had a population of only about ten million, which was all that could secure its living from agriculture. It would be quite as logical for the visitor to conclude that the factories and mines had *created* this extra twenty-five million human beings, as to conclude that the population had created the mines and factories. The reproductive power was essential for the producing of offspring, but the means of livelihood were equally essential. In other words, man, when he lives in dense populations, is dependent upon capital. He could not live without the material tools he uses. But this dependence is nothing to complain about. There is perhaps

nothing in the universe that is not dependent on something else. Is it any worse to be dependent upon his tools and equipment than to be dependent upon raw nature as he would be, if, like the lower animals, he had no tools?

It is not this kind of dependence which is meant when we speak metaphorically of culture's mastery over man. It is rather the fact that man forgets the original purpose for which tools were constructed and gradually comes to regard them as ends in themselves. Many a youth wants *money* as a means to freedom and amusement. Later he forgets the freedom and amusement and seeks to pile up the money for its own sake. By his conditioned reflex process he comes to worship the means and forget the ends. He goes on working with his nose to the grindstone when he could afford to enjoy extended vacations and the pursuit of his hobbies. Other persons may criticize him for thus sacrificing the greater ends of life to what is a mere tool, an instrument. But the chances are that his critics also are doing the same thing in another way. They may not be worshiping money or physical tools, but they may be worshiping institutions or social values. One of them perhaps is slaving away his time for a decaying rural church which might better be abolished or consolidated with some other church.

Institutions like physical tools are merely instruments to man's happiness. But through the ages men have been educated in such a way as to conceal this fundamental truth. They are brought up to believe that culture exists by some supernatural sanction of its own. Culture *trains* men as surely as man *trains* his dogs and horses.

Does culture make man any happier?—The usual answer is yes. Obviously there is a greater variety of *enjoyments* to be had in modern civilization than in the societies of our primitive ancestors. But the keener philosophers in all ages have had their doubts. Their reason for doubt has been that culture introduces additional suffering into human life as well

as more varied enjoyments; and it is difficult to measure which is the greater. Perhaps the best statement that can be made is to say that culture enormously enlarges the possibilities both for good and for evil, and that certain cultures have made human life, within certain areas and social groups, unquestionably more worth while. But that the advance of culture has brought any regular increase of happiness for the mass of mankind is not certain.

Cultural advance has reduced typhoid, smallpox and yellow fever, but at a certain stage it increased tuberculosis, and now seems to be increasing nervous diseases. Dense populations and indoor living have often undone much of the good work of drainage and medical attention. Famine has been temporarily reduced by transportation and regularity of food supply, but unless the birth rate is reduced, famine on a vastly greater scale will return to vex mankind when the world reaches its population limit, which, according to Professor East, in "Mankind at the Crossroads," will at the present rate of growth be only a century or two hence. Culture's advance has eliminated wolves and tigers in many regions, but has substituted machines and automobiles as killers. It has relieved the misery of the beggar and the cripple, but at the same time has encouraged the multiplication of hereditary defectives, who will be more or less miserable under any civilization. It has stopped tribal feuds but replaced them by war on an unprecedented scale. It may have abolished head flattening and lip piercing, but it gave us, in modern times, the wasp waist and the tight shoe. It has given us machinery to save labor, and at the same time given us additional wants, so that we must work almost as hard as before. It has relieved the physical suffering of absolute poverty, but has replaced it with the mental suffering of relative poverty, which consists simply in being poorer than somebody else. For the struggle for existence it has substituted a struggle for "respectability."

While we cannot gauge the relative importance of these various cultural changes, we can make certain tentative generalizations about their nature. (1) In general culture's advancement seems to have reduced physical suffering. (2) It tends to add new forms of mental suffering. (3) It tends to substitute *chronic* mental sufferings, such as prolonged anxiety, irritation, sorrow, and boredom, for *acute* mental sufferings such as violent fear, rage, and grief. (4) For all the other types of suffering it tends in a certain measure to substitute boredom, in the form of the monotonous labor which is necessary for procuring the wherewithal to relieve the more severe forms of distress. In earlier times a man was obliged to bear his illness; now he burdens himself with debt and extra labor to pay the expenses of curing it. (5) Culture tends to increase the number and variety of mental enjoyments, but at the same time it partially neutralizes this gain, in the following manner: (6) namely, culture tends to standardize the forms of enjoyment and to make them competitive, with the result that (a) many simpler enjoyments, nearer the physical level, are tabooed or neglected, and (b) that the mere failure to secure a certain particular enjoyment causes mental suffering.

For example, suppose modern urban culture to be suddenly introduced among a remote rural population. The moving picture, the automobile, the radio, organized baseball and many other things are added to the simpler amusements of the past. But jolly old parlor games, informal picnics, long Sunday walks on country roads, wadings and splashings in the stream, tend to disappear, not because they have been replaced by something really more enjoyable but because they are no longer fashionable. To indulge in them now invites ridicule or lowers prestige. Incidentally a large number of our people gave up the bicycle long before they personally acquired automobiles. The free and easy hospitality that once prevailed now becomes competitive and standardized. Mrs.

Jones of the remote section, preparing for guests, is now anxious and worried over what they will think about her table service. She suffers mentally because she cannot afford a car, although this gave her no suffering in the days when nobody had one.

The cost of culture.—When we were young we were told by our parents and teachers that "you cannot get any good thing without paying for it." Unfortunately most of us believed it. It sank in so deep that we view all life as a sort of give and take of equivalents, in which no real gain is possible. No wonder that philosophers are pessimistic.

The fundamental aim of life is to get without paying. The highest civilization is not that one which merely gives the greatest number and variety of satisfactions, but that one which gives these satisfactions at minimum cost. What civilization needs is a cost accounting system.

The cultural cost consists of those sufferings or annoyances which are imposed upon us not by the natural environment, but by culture itself. Thus when a community adopts vaccination, culture is alleviating the physical suffering due to smallpox germs; but at the same time the labor, pain, and inconvenience of the vaccination is a cost, though a small one, that must be set against the gain. In other cases, the cost of a culture trait sometimes exceeds the gain. For instance, the social climber is aware that she suffers much from anxiety, overwork, nervousness, and from heartrending disappointments. But she accepts these as the necessary evils of life in *general.* She charges them to life's overhead; but they really are a direct cost chargeable to the particular mode of satisfaction she has chosen, namely prestige through competitive dressing and entertaining. She fails to realize that equal satisfactions can be obtained by other methods at much less cost; even this specific satisfaction, prestige, can be obtained in less costly ways.

We shall study "culture's conquest of man" according to

the various types of elements (*see* Chapter II) of which culture is composed: beliefs, social structure, symbols, material culture, and social values.

The tyranny of beliefs.—In past ages culture's enslavement of man has been effected largely through the erroneous beliefs it fostered. These beliefs have compelled men to deny themselves food which was healthful and plentiful, to deny themselves normal and healthful pleasures, to give up their children to be slain on the altar of the gods, to mutilate their own bodies and to tear the bodies of others asunder on the torture rack, to waste their hard-won means of existence in costly funerals and monuments to the dead, to burn to death their fellows who disagreed with them on questions whose very subject matter was a pure figment of the imagination.

Sumner says that during the Middle Ages it was the custom to engage in theological controversies on such questions as whether Jesus and his apostles lived on beggary, with the full understanding that the loser was to be burned at the stake by the winner. To mention only one out of thousands of cases, a woman of seventy-four was put upon the rack and stretched to death merely because she refused to take an oath. Persons maimed and crippled by religious authority were a common feature in the life of the past.

These horrors were committed in the sincere belief that they were necessary to the welfare of the group. The cruelty of the ages is not to be attributed to the selfishness of individual human nature but to the mistaken belief that such cruelty was necessary to avert some terrible danger that threatened the life and welfare of the group. From their physical environment, or on the subcultural plane of the animals, men never could have learned to do such things. Man's group-thinking, group loyalty, conscience, when based upon erroneous beliefs, are far worse than the selfish individualism of the hog. It was because men thought that individual happiness did not matter, but should be sacrificed for the sake

of some collective, cultural ideal, that such atrocities were possible.

Such cruelties have been a feature of many cultures from the most primitive times. It is significant, however, that it was in the advanced civilizations of the Bronze and Iron Ages that they became most highly organized and popular. It is significant that they reached perhaps their highest development in connection with religions which were supposed to lead mankind into the paths of peace and brotherhood. It was in Mexico, Babylon, India, and mediaeval Europe that human sacrifices and tortures became exalted into a leading trait of culture, and not among the simpler and more primitive peoples. During most of human history, so-called intellectual advancement has consisted largely in the enlargement and refinement of error. Only in comparatively recent times has it consisted in the replacement of error by truth.

Negative truth is valuable as well as positive. If science taught nothing positive at all, but merely tore down erroneous notions, it would for that alone be immensely valuable to mankind. If we learn that certain things *cannot* be done, that certain things are still *unknown,* our time and our mental energy are thus set free for use upon the things which thought and effort *can* help. It would spare the population of our country much wasted time, effort, money, anxiety, and stupid conversation, if every child in the schools could learn once for all that the moon has nothing to do with the weather, that the personality of a child cannot be influenced by its mother before birth, that character cannot be read from the shape of the head or face, that organic diseases cannot be cured by faith healing, that there are no lucky or unlucky days, that the cause and cure of cancer is still not definitely known, that there is no magic road to health or success that can be bought for a few dollars, that a country's wealth cannot be increased by printing more money, nor by diverting trade from its naturally most advantageous channels, that it

is not known what race has the greatest mental ability, that there is no one occupation for which each person is uniquely fitted, nor some "affinity" of the opposite sex for whom he or she is specially designed, that it is impossible to determine beforehand whether a given marriage will be congenial and successful. The attitude of science is that agnosticism is better than a false or an untestable theory. The first step toward knowledge is a recognition of our ignorance.

Erroneous beliefs are the basis of magic. Magic uses a false theory of cause and effect, based upon a very incomplete or inadequate observation of the facts. It does not necessarily involve any belief in personal agencies, but may be based simply upon ideas of impersonal forces and influences. It is illustrated by the primitive belief that you can injure a man by making an image of him and then destroying the image, or by burning the peeling from the banana he has just eaten. The first case illustrates imitative magic, or influencing things by means of something that resembles them; the second case illustrates contagious magic, which holds that objects once in contact with each other continue to influence each other.

The world is by no means yet free from the tyranny of false beliefs. Among the more backward peoples, of course, illustrations are easy to find. Comparatively recently, twenty-five Wahhabis, members of a Mohammedan religious sect, went to their death in the streets of Mecca simply because they believed Allah did not like music. They charged a cortege of Egyptian soldiers whose brass band was playing music in the holy city, and were fired upon. In India religious ascetics still sit on beds of thorns, spend long periods on top of pillars or balanced on wires, hold their arms in abnormal positions till they become withered and useless, with the long finger nails often piercing the flesh of the clenched hand.

But even in our own country, although physical pain for religious purposes has well nigh disappeared, other forms

of enslavement of man to his false beliefs continues. Pregnant women worry, and abstain from this and that, in order that the child may not be come birthmarked, or in order that it may be a boy or a girl. It is reported that the students in a denominational college destroyed books, magazines, pictures, rouge, lipsticks, and other harmless articles of enjoyment under the influence of a revival meeting. State legislatures forbid the teaching of evolution. Farmers are still found who will plant potatoes only during the waxing moon; gamblers, actors, ball players, and many others allow themselves to be put to considerable inconvenience by their pet superstitions. Even as we write there is a concern which by elaborate advertising is trying to persuade us to waste three dollars on a book which will tell us certain newly discovered secrets of mental science, of "personal magnetism," by which we can get or be anything we may want. A preacher told his Bible Class in 1916 that the European War was God's way of getting the evil out of Europe. He was letting the nations fight it out, he said, in order that His Kingdom might come later. There is not much hope of preventing war as long as the intellectual leaders of their communities think in such terms. You can find magic and supernaturalism among the foremost leaders of the nation. A former U. S. cabinet officer (not Mr. Bryan) once told the author, in all seriousness, that the inferiority of the negro was the result of God's curse upon Ham.

It is a sign of progress, of partial emancipation from culture's tyranny, that in modern civilization men have to endure only mental and not physical suffering for their beliefs. Social ostracism and dismissal from one's pulpit or professorial chair are great improvements upon burning at the stake.

Yet it is to be feared that our complete emancipation is delayed by the uncritical admiration we still hold for the devoted martyrs of the past. We still teach our children that about the noblest thing one can do is to die for one's beliefs,

even though it is no longer necessary to die. But this view perpetrates a false notion as to the proper role of beliefs in human culture. To die for a belief merely as such is as useless as to persecute for a belief. Like fighting and wagering over beliefs, it suggests that truth itself can somehow be influenced by physical force or strength of mental conviction. Belief is something which should be allowed to grow spontaneously out of the evidence, and which is subject to change if the evidence changes. To hold a belief so firmly that you would die for it suggests that you consider it inflexible and that you yourself, perhaps, might be willing to persecute somebody else for holding the opposite. The praiseworthiness of the martyrs lay in their willingness to die, not for some particular belief, but for the *right* to express without persecution, *any* belief to which anyone's honest reasoning might lead. Unless this element was present in a martyr's motive, he was no more worthy of admiration than were his persecutors.

The tyranny of social structure.—With the development of modern science, the tyranny of beliefs is on the wane. Not so with the tyranny of social structure. In advanced groups the cry of "heretic" no longer frightens or enrages; the cry of "traitor" still does. From the very first men have lived in social groups. These primitive hordes, becoming larger and larger with the natural increase of population, had to separate and subdivide. For a time the various offshoots of the parent group retained their sense of unity, their common language, and recognized their blood relationship with each other. They all still belonged to one *tribe,* or people. But eventually subdivisions wandered far away and lost for centuries all contact with their kinsmen in the country of their origin. Their language and customs gradually changed. The next time they met their ancient kin, they regarded them as strangers and enemies. The very largeness of the world, and the impossibility of maintaining, with only primitive culture, any regular intercommunication between different re-

gions, had destroyed the original unity of mankind. A stranger was now *ipso facto* an enemy. Men wasted their lives and their substance in fighting each other. If they had fought only as the lower animals fought, when there was an actual shortage of food, there would be no ground for criticism. If one must die, it is better to die in battle than of starvation. The animal struggle for existence is not an unbeautiful thing. It is nothing more than the weeding out of the surplus units of life in order that the rest may live a fuller existence. But man with his superior but erring brain, developed a culture which compelled him to fight *when there was no physical need for it.* The human group anticipated trouble far in advance. More than that, *it created trouble.* It did not wait for its actual food supply to be threatened, but fought as soon as its hunting grounds were trespassed upon, or its gods insulted. It developed traditions of fighting for fighting's sake. Among the Plains Indians social prestige rested entirely upon prowess in battle, there was an elaborate system of rewards for bravery, and the tradition even grew up that men who live to an old age are to be suspected of cowardice.

1. Nationalism.—By conquest and by the modern technique of communication, the many small groups of primitive times have been welded into a few large groups. Within these large groups strife is fortunately eliminated, but on the border lines between them it becomes more intense. For example, the petty wars between German princes and states gave place to one big and terrible war between all Germany and all France. The supreme form of social organization, to which all others must bow, is now the *nation* or the *state.* State worship is supremely typified by Italian Fascism. Without mincing words, Mussolini proclaims that personal liberty is out of date, and the only worth-while goal is the glory of the state itself.

Dr. Wm. A. Hutchins in his "Children's Morality Code" caps the climax of his appeal for good citizenship with the

argument "that our country may become ever greater and better."

We have been brought up to think of mankind as being divided primarily into *nations* rather than into colors, creeds, languages, ages, sexes, occupations or economic districts. In spite of our lip service to God and humanity, we say when the test comes, "my country, right or wrong." There have been times when this was not so. In the Middle Ages there was a strong loyalty to the local lords and princes, and also a loyalty to the international church, with little loyalty to any intermediate body such as would take the place of the nation. Now the nation is so strong as to override both intellectual and material interests. Languages spoken by a few million people are zealously guarded for no other reason than to maintain the distinctiveness of that people. Trade is switched from its normal channels, and continents made so much the poorer, in order that each separate country may maintain a somewhat wider variety of industries.

The sentiment which today makes men willing to fight and die for their countries is however the same sentiment that in the past led them to sacrifice themselves for their tribes, their cities, their religions. The sentiment is the same; the form of social *organization* to which it attaches is different. We may call this sentiment *patriotism* or *group loyalty*. Trotter calls it "herd instinct." Nowhere perhaps can patriotism be found in such extreme degree as in Japan. There suicide, as a symbol of loyalty to emperor or country, has become a high social value. It is said that in the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese armies upset all European experience as to the intensity of fire that a line would stand without retreating. The Commander of the fleet before Port Arthur, it is said, compelled his ship commanders to walk in solemn procession past a tray on which was displayed a disemboweling knife, as a reminder of what he should expect of them in case they lost the battle.

We are proud of our own country, and we believe our culture to be superior to that of Japan. Do we realize that if this be true, one of the main reasons for its superiority is that an American is less willing to die blindly and unquestioningly for his country than is a Japanese?

2. Familism.—An Associated Press despatch tells us of a father, who, worrying over the birth of a child to his unwed daughter, killed his entire family, burned his house, and perished in the flames. Such incidents as this indicate that many persons still consider the integrity of the family as an institution as of more importance than life itself. There are still eminent philosophers, as witness Count Keyserling, who see in the family a universal purpose which has nothing to do with individual happiness. His view is well stated by one of his reviewers:

> "Marriage, taken formally, is an independent category of reality and has an a priori value. Marriage is not the union of two persons, it is a separate entity, a separate unit. Because it is created and conditioned by two separate individuals it is a 'relationship,' but a relationship with an absolute value of its own.
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> "Love, the instinct of propagation, social obligation—they are elements in the marriage relationship, but they are not, to the metaphysician's eye, essentials. The cosmos is tragic tension. Perfect marriage, by establishing a tragic tension, puts itself—there is no getting away from it—in tune with the infinite. Happiness exists within Count Keyserling's perfect marriage, but it is not the happiness of the egoistic part of the individual. It is the happiness of the entire ego who can only realize himself through perfect harmony with the cosmic purpose." [1]

[1] Strunsky, Simeon, in *New York Times Book Review Supplement*, Nov. 7, 1926, III : 1 : 1, reviewing "The Book of Marriage," edited by Count Herman Keyserling, Harcourt. Quoted with permission of the *New York Times*.

Yet the cold facts are that the family is held less sacred as time goes on. In the older civilizations the family ruled the individual with a rod of iron. In early Rome the father had the power of life and death over his children. In the Hindu culture before British control the only proper course left for a widow was to die on the funeral pyre of her husband, and if she did not, her relatives took care to make life miserable for her. She was forbidden remarriage.

There was a time during the Middle Ages when it was permissible for a husband to kill his wife caught in adultery. Long after that time had passed away, it was still impossible to get a divorce except for adultery. Now most of our states recognize cruelty as ground for divorce, and the more progressive states have extended that notion to include "mental cruelty." But in our law, even in the most liberal states, divorce is in theory always a remedy to be granted to the innocent party as against the guilty party, and the agreement of the two parties to cooperate in getting the divorce always acts as a barrier to getting it. In Sweden, Russia, Yucatan and elsewhere the law goes much farther; it admits a principle which is so far unknown in American or English law, namely that divorce may be granted for the simple reason that *both parties want it.* Little by little there is growing a belief that institutions should be adjusted to individual happiness, and not the individual dedicated to the permanence and inviolability of institutions. Moderate reformers are advocating sex education and training in psychology in the schools as a preventive of unhappy marriages. It is impossible, however, under our present system to advise young people about marriage without a certain grave inconsistency. For on one hand, we tell them that they should not marry until they have come to know the prospective partner intimately enough to see whether there will be compatibility. On the other hand, the chief problems, upon whose solution the happiness of a marriage depends, do not arise until after the marriage; and no

couple can be said to know each other intimately until they have had to face those problems together. What is to be done?

Eventually we shall work out a solution, provided we are all driving at the same goal—the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the long run. But the trouble is that many people, both conservative and radical, are not really driving at this goal at all. They have never thought it out in those terms. Their real motive is their belief in certain absolute standards of right and wrong independent of human happiness. They think of culture as an end in itself and not as a means toward the ultimate happiness of individual men and women. They are the living embodiments of culture's conquest of man.

It has long been possible to make a living hell out of the family life without ruffling public opinion, and it is now permissible in art, fiction, and drama, to make all manner of fun of the conventional family, and to paint adultery in attractive colors (so long as this is supposedly neutralized by a good "moral" lesson at the end). But let a teacher or publicist take the matter seriously (and what is more serious than human joy or suffering?) and raise his voice for some actual readjustment in the marriage system itself, and he is swept over by an avalanche of horror.

3. Other tyrannies of social structure.—We have also sentimental attitudes toward business firms, legal procedure, schools, communities, social clubs, churches, and other kinds of social organizations. These we often cherish for their own sakes long after their utility has passed away. We struggle to preserve a church that ought to consolidate, or a club that ought to disband. We are more interested in the structure itself than in the function it performs. The result of this sentimentalism is to delay the process of adjusting institutions to human needs. Especially does it delay consolidations, and divisions of labor, in the interests of efficiency.

Our courts cling to an antiquated legal procedure which

means needless cost. Thus a typical grand jury indictment must read as follows:

> Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the County of New York. The People of the State of New York against Maria Holohan. The People of the State of New York, by this indictment, accuse Maria Holohan of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, committed as follows: The said Maria Holohan late of the Borough of Manhattan of the City of New York, in the county of New York aforesaid, on the 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord, One thousand nine hundred and seven, at the Borough and County aforesaid, one teapot of the value of $50.00, of the goods, chattels and personal property of one Silas Appleboy, then and there being found, then and there feloniously did steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace of the People of the State of New York and their dignity.

This could be stated in twenty-seven words instead of one hundred and sixty-two, thus:

> The grand jury of New York County charge Maria Holohan with stealing the silver teapot of Silas Appleboy on April 1, 1907.[1]

One of the major problems discussed by sociologists is "Urban congestion and rural depletion." It is assumed almost unconsciously that it is a *bad thing* for a rural community to lose its population to the city and to fall into the sort of decay pictured in Goldsmith's "Deserted Village." Eureka, here is one of the great social evils that we must proceed to cure. And the applied sociologist proceeds to tell us how to keep boys on the farm and how to revitalize the rural community. When we study this problem from the standpoint of true welfare we start out by asking: is this

[1] Train, Arthur C., "The Prisoner at the Bar." Scribner's.

decay of the rural village really a bad thing, and why? When we look into the problem from this angle, we find that the people in the depopulated farm country of New England are today living much fuller and richer lives than in the days when their villages were teeming with population and their youngsters "kept time to the click of the mill." Since the West opened up it is no longer necessary or profitable to cultivate many of these rugged hillsides. Part of the population moved west or to the cities; the remainder stayed home to build up a prosperous dairy industry. Both parts gained by the change. The farmers now have automobiles and radios; they have lost some of their old-time immediate community activities, but they go frequently to the movies and various meetings in nearby towns. The fancied "evil" often turns out to be no evil at all. Instead of suffering farmers we have found only the sentimental tears that are shed whenever conditions change. We have mistaken the decay of the village itself for the decay of its inhabitants. The real problem becomes, not how to prevent the depopulation of the village, but how to adjust things to that depopulation where it must occur.

Dr. W. L. Anderson, speaking of consolidated schools, in "The Country Town," says: "The social consequences of this new method in education are here to be pointed out. The *town itself* gains dignity and importance as a political institution. . . . A town-meeting gains more elevation from a discussion of schools than from a discussion of roads. . . . Here is cooperation of the finest kind, giving the people a common thought, a common object of devotion, and a common spirit of sacrifice."

G. W. Fiske, in "The Development of Rural Leadership," speaking of the urbanization of country life, says, "It is to be hoped that this urbanizing will not destroy the unique social consciousness of rural civilization and make it simply imitative of the city."

In these passages *community consciousness* is idealized as an end in itself. But this is of value only in so far as it conduces toward the better aggregate satisfaction of individual needs. Where these needs can better be satisfied by some more central organization, the community spirit may prove a detriment rather than an advantage. Local merchants, for example, play upon this community sentiment to maintain their trade where automobile shopping in the nearby city may be really more advantageous. We are told to patronize the neighborhood grocer and boost the home town. A growing population usually means prosperity to local business men, because the volume of business tends to increase faster than the overhead expenses, and the number of persons among whom the profits are to be divided. Their cooperation, through chambers of commerce and otherwise, is hence readily enlisted for many schemes of community development. But the thinking citizen will be on his guard against identifying this spirit with genuine welfare. In some matters we need more localism, in others less. It is to be hoped that the community movement, which is a valuable solution for many of our present day social problems, will not, however, make the local community a fetish.

The tyranny of symbols.—H. G. Wells lays the backwardness of Chinese civilization to its system of writing, which is so complicated that only a small per cent of the population can hope to learn it, and thus become educated. It is difficult to estimate the human energy that is wasted each year because we insist on retaining two sets of printed characters, capitals and minuscules, when, as the telegraph practice shows, one set would do as well. Our resistance to abbreviations, phonetic spelling, the metric system, and to a common international language, are responsible for great waste.

The tyranny of material wealth.—It is possible that the tyranny of social structure as well as that of beliefs is beginning to wane. But there is another part of culture to

which man is becoming even more subservient than he was in the past. This is material culture. The term "materialism" has an ugly sound. The sort of materialism which is so vigorously opposed by philosophers is the theory that the universe can be reduced entirely to material terms, and that what we call spirit is simply a phase or a relationship of matter. But the sort of materialism which we really need to fear is not any metaphysical theory, but the sentiment which regards portions of our material culture as *ends* in themselves. In short it is the worship of wealth. Wealth may be considered under two heads: first our more or less permanent equipment or *capital,* such as buildings, railroads, tools and machines; and second our consumption goods, such as food, clothing, articles of ornament and of amusement.

Capital worship.—That our Euro-American civilization is capitalistic is admitted both by its apologists and its critics. But there are at least three distinct senses in which it is capitalistic. First, we are dependent upon capital. But this is a sort of capitalism which even the most radical communists would not abolish. Even in a soviet republic goods would continue to be produced by the same factories and machines, and society would continue to be dependent upon them.

The second sense is that the people who own the capital dictate how the production shall be carried on, while the place of those who do the work and of those who furnish the technical brains is merely to obey. It is capitalism in that sense which the socialist wants to abolish.

But there is still a third sense. Namely, we take for granted that the growth of capital in its familiar forms is an end in itself, to which we unconsciously sacrifice, a little here and a little there, the more primary ends of life. Only the keenest minded of the socialists have seen this aspect of the matter.

An illustration may make this clearer. Among the ancients, who knew not modern machinery or mechanical power, ac-

cumulated wealth took the form of great buildings. To them the volume of their piled-upon masonry was the chief visible indication of their national prosperity and power. These structures were far larger than physically necessary for any conceivable purpose to which they might have been put. Architecture originated in the physical needs for shelter and fortification, but came to exist for its own sake. The traveler still can see today the huge masonry with which the Romans walled up the cliffs at Sorrento, and he wonders to what end it was done. If it could have been done with moderate voluntary labor it should not be regarded as useless any more than the child's construction of play bridges and tunnels for his own enjoyment. Anything that gives pleasure, without consequent suffering, is for that reason alone valuable.

But from what we know of ancient life much of this work was done under cruel compulsion, and by persons who could have had no personal interest in the project. It meant *physical* suffering for many, and only a *mental,* sentimental satisfaction for the ruling classes. This satisfaction they might have obtained, had their reflexes been otherwise conditioned, in some cheaper and less oppressive manner. Where the work was not done under physical compulsion it must have been done under the stimulus of false beliefs and irrational standards of value, as it was when the priests convinced their people that their gods, or their dead ancestors, required this labor. It would seem that they could have done better to have studied the Cretans who preceded them and have laid drainage systems, or have built more and better roads, or have experimented more with ships. Even had there been no other pressing tasks upon which this labor could have been employed, it would seem that pure idleness, leisure for discussion and contemplation, would have yielded more happiness than piling stones.

Of the pyramids of Egypt Thoreau says in "Walden": "Most of the stone a nation hammers goes toward its tomb

only. It buries itself alive. As for the pyramids, there is nothing to wonder at in them so much as the fact that so many men could be found degraded enough to spend their lives constructing a tomb for some ambitious booby, whom it would have been wiser and manlier to have drowned in the Nile, and then given his body to the dogs."

While the direction which our modern productive effort takes may be more utilitarian than that of the ancients, yet our popular philosophy of economic production is still far from rational. The idea that consumption is the end is unobtrusively put forth in dull language in the textbooks, while the irrational sentiment of production for production's sake is blazoned from the housetops.

Thus an economic handbook of Australia praises the virtues of efficiency and production, in order that Australia may pay off her state debt, and "achieve a place in the world." Just how is Australia's "place in the world" going to make happier the lives of the individual citizens of Australia? It is quite a needless and empty gesture to exhort the citizens of a country to work harder or save more in order that the country itself may achieve a place in the world. If the harder work and saving does add to their individual happiness, they will do so anyway. If, however, they have come to the point where increased happiness is to be gained through more leisure, rather than through the production of more wealth, then they are deluded if they be led astray from the path of happiness by any abstract idea of "national greatness."

Evans Clark, reviewing Mr. Garrett's "Ouroboros," says:

> Mr. Garrett begins at the beginning. He sees the object of man to regain the Garden of Eden: "a state of existence free from the doom of toil"; the symbol of this deep desire is Ouroboros, the fabulous snake who swallowed its own tail, the fulfilment of one's wish by the easy ways of magic. Strange

to say, it was the very people who refused to give up the myth, who still seek the paradise of plenty and leisure on earth, that have cursed the world with "progress." The Oriental mind, "in weariness of wisdom," gave up the quest and sank back in contemplation of its inner self. The Europeans invented the machine. By the magic of mechanism they thought to abolish drudgery and toil. Far from abolishing it, the machine has multiplied it and the people who must submit to it a hundred thousand fold. Even the Orientals themselves are now being whipped into the terrible line. . . .

Once more is man grievously disappointed. Toil he has not escaped. The machine that was to have been a labor-saving device becomes an engine of production that must be served. It is as if you could not save labor at all—as if you could make it only more productive, thereby achieving an abundance of things with no effect whatever upon the necessity to perform monotonous labor. . . . Industrial civilization, having created to its unknown ends a race of mechanical drudges, requires, nevertheless, a contribution of human toil more intense, more exacting, more irksome than ever.[1]

Professor Carver speaks in "The Religion Worth Having" of the workbench versus the pig-trough philosophy of life. His choice of terms tells us which he admires. The work-bench philosopher produces for the sake of producing and accumulating wealth for the nation. The pig-trough philosopher produces that he may consume. Now it is all right to admire surplus production at a particular time—if one shows that it conduces to greater productive power and hence more *consumption in the future.* But ultimately it is the pleasure from consuming which is the end. Let us not be afraid of Professor Carver's epithet; the "pig-trough philosophy" is the only rational philosophy of life. The work-bencher represents culture's conquest of man.

[1] Clark, Evans, in *New York Times Book Review Supplement,* Feb. 21, 1926, reviewing Garrett's "Ouroboros." Quoted by permission.

The "standard" of living.—When consumption and not production is recognized as the goal, we have made a step forward, but we are not yet completely emancipated. Consumption itself is standardized according to a definite cultural pattern which the individual is bound to observe under pain of ridicule or social ostracism. This pattern is called the standard of living.

Perhaps most persons do more or less consciously recognize the tyranny of *fashion.* They even occasionally resent it. Yet it seldom occurs to them that something might be done about it, as about war, political graft and other social problems.

But this tyranny of fashion is only a small part of the entire tyranny. Because fashion is that part of the standard of living which changes every year, it is easy for the simplest mind to see that its dictates are capricious and arbitrary, not absolute and authoritative. But it takes deeper insight to see that our *customs* and *conventions* in the use of the goods, which change only very slowly, are likewise arbitrary and tyrannical. Sometimes *fashion* is more rational than the underlying custom, upon which it is superimposed, as when it permits in summer time the leaving off of men's coats or the substitution of loose cotton for tailored wool suits. It is no worse to sacrifice two years' service of a durable garment on the altar of fashion, than to sacrifice several months' income on the altar of a custom which says that expensive monuments of granite are necessary to prove our love for the departed, or which says that a diamond is the only fitting symbol of betrothal.

A great deal of our modern standard of living is based upon the same idea as the religous sacrifices of early civilization; the idea that some mysterious mental good is to be obtained through material waste, by denying ourselves the use of choice portions of the fruits of our toil. It recalls also the potlatch custom of the Northwest Indians, who accumulated blankets, food, coins and other wealth merely to give

it away and sometimes to destroy it at lavish feasts. His ability to *waste* was the measure of the man. With us, complete waste by destruction is rare. The expensive garment, monument, jewel, or piece of furniture is "used" for something, for even ornament is a *use*. But it is partly wasted if used for some single purpose, such as adornment, symbolization, or some special occasion, when it might have been turned into a form that would serve these purposes and *many other purposes as well*. As Veblen points out in "Theory of the Leisure Class," a lawn with a cow grazing on it would be as beautiful as one that is trimmed by a lawn mower; but our *mores* will not permit economy to "spoil" beauty. Beauty with us is largely a matter of expensiveness. The beautiful object must *not* be useful for other purposes. It must be parasitic upon man's life and labor. As Bernard Shaw says, "man is the only animal that esteems itself rich in proportion to the number and voracity of its parasites."

There are persons in this country, of the most radical turn of mind, persons who flatter themselves on their intellectual emancipation, who have analyzed to death all of the religious, patriotic, and sexual *mores*, and who yet can not be happy unless they are able to spend a cool thousand a year on personal clothing, or entertain lavishly at the most expensive restaurants, or get rid of fifty dollars at one session in some night club. The worship of ostentatious luxury may prove to be the last stand of culture's conquest of man. It is the most subtle form of tyranny and the most difficult to prove to the average mind. As for the modern college student who comes from the comfortably situated business man's family, he or she is less resentful of a criticism of religion, the American form of government, or the monogamous family, than of a criticism leveled against fur coats and luxurious automobiles. It would seem that you might shake their faith in God more easily than you could shake their faith in the inherent value of diamonds and Newport mansions. They

seem more receptive to the doctrines of Ingersoll or Karl Marx than to Thorstein Veblen's "Theory of the Leisure Class."

These people set the standards that are slavishly followed by the rest. The discontent of our poorer classes is chiefly based on a desire to have these same luxuries themselves, and unfortunately, not on any rebellion against the artificial standard which gives such luxuries their only value. In fact, it is not at all certain that the lower classes do not sacrifice more, relatively speaking, for the sake of mere display than do the richer classes.

It would seem, however, that Continental European culture differs from Anglo-Saxon culture in having this trait in much less extreme degree. On the continent the manual workers, domestic servants, and peasant classes do not imitate the bourgeoisie in dress as they do in England and America. They have distinctive costumes of their own. In England the workman must appear in a business suit, be it ever so old and shabby; in France he is more often content with a simple suit of denims. In New York the servant girl dresses in cheap and envious imitation of the stenographer; in Prague or Budapest she walks contentedly in her kerchief and bare feet through a street full of office girls in their Paris hats and high heels. Dr. Hermann Levy, studying English culture from a German point of view, remarks especially upon the monotony of the English middle class homes, whose ruling *motif* is to imitate the standards of the aristocracy rather than to cultivate individuality or to make class standards of their own.

But after hearing all the above analysis, you might still reply: "What of it? Was it not pointed out at the end of the last chapter that the bulk of human enjoyment is of the mental sort, depending on conditioned responses, and bringing no physical good except the favorable influence of the pleasant emotions themselves? Mental enjoyments are capricious,

arbitrary, inconsistent, but none the less valuable. But if people actually do desire diamond rings and ostentatious mansions, if they enjoy expensiveness for its own sake, and prefer beauty when it is separated from practical utility; and are willing to work for such ends, is this not proof that these things are actually desirable? Should not each individual, being the best judge of his own personal enjoyment, be left free to spend his money as he sees fit?

Indeed he should. The point is that culture does not allow him to spend his money as he sees fit. A great deal of his expenditure is compulsory. If these habits of consumption were due to *personally acquired* tastes, little would be gained, and much might be lost, by interfering with them. But for the most part they are not due to individual tastes any more than to physical or universal necessity. They are *culturally acquired tastes,* requirements arbitrarily imposed by culture.

Evidence for this statement is the *uniformity* of the habits in question. Wherever personal taste is free to express itself, you have variety. No two individuals' *experiences* are alike. As soon as you get beyond the inborn and universal traits of men, variety is inevitable. And in these days of specialization and varied opportunity, variety of individual taste is greater than ever before. Hence wherever you strike a plane of uniformity you have evidence of culture. But you must look further into the nature of this uniformity. If it is the sort of uniformity that saves labor or suffering, such as the custom of passing to the right, or the custom of using some standard article which can be secured more cheaply because of quantity production, then man is using his culture rationally for his individual good. He is accepting uniformity in minor matters for the sake of the greater time or money set free for gratifying his personal tastes in other matters. But if the uniformity is of the sort which yields no advantage, it can be charged to culture's conquest of man. Such a uniformity, for example, is that all men in cities *must* wear hats, neckties, tailored

suits, long trousers, sox, and shoes; but yet not sufficiently alike in detail to give the full advantages of quantity production which we get with soldier's uniforms. A man thinks he wears a necktie because he likes to; put him in a camp or on the farm and see how quickly he dispenses with it. The enjoyment of wearing the necktie in the city is only the feeble reverse side of the mental suffering that would ensue from leaving it off.

The standard of living enslaves us in two sorts of cases, (1) where it makes the consumption of certain goods compulsory, whether by law or by the pressure of social custom, and (2) where it makes consumption *competitive*. But competitive consumption is also compulsory in effect, for those who are drawn into it. It is consumption not for the sake of the inherent satisfaction derived from the goods, but for the sake of outdoing somebody else.

Mankind as a "Frankenstein."—In Mrs. Shelley's classic novel, the hero, Frankenstein, discovers the secret of creating life artificially. He creates a living monster, human in its characteristics, which then proceeds to harass and torment its creator. Mankind is a Frankenstein, and civilization is the monster.

Summary.—The environment which trains the individual is, in the civilized periods of history, largely a cultural environment. Culture, although originally a product of man, and an instrument for man's conquest of nature, comes to be regarded by man as an end in itself. It is not at all certain that the evolution of culture has made for progressively greater human happiness. Although it has saved man from many sufferings, it has introduced new forms of suffering in their place. Such advantages as culture has brought us have been purchased at enormous cost. In conquering nature, man has become enslaved to the tools and weapons with which he made his conquest. Man's conquest of nature becomes culture's conquest of man.

This enslavement of man to his own culture can be observed in many phases of cultural life. Man is enslaved by his beliefs, by the social organizations and relationships he has created, by his material wealth. Some forms of culture's tyranny, such as magic and supernaturalism, are passing away. But other forms, such as our worship of material luxury, our competitive and ostentatious consumption, are stronger than ever.

CHAPTER VII

THE TYRANNY OF CULTURE IDEALS

Culture governs man mainly through sentiments.—From thousands of platforms our graduating classes will hear next June this baccalaureate message: "What the world needs today is idealism." But to one who has intelligently read the history of human culture there comes the strong suspicion that the world is suffering from misleading idealism rather than from lack of idealism. The fallacy of most idealism is not that it believes certain things are worth striving for. It is rather that it assumes standards of perfection which are independent of human, or animal happiness, that it considers some things to be *inherently* "higher" or "lower" than others.

But even if we are careful to choose as our ideals only those things which are conducive to human happiness, there still lurks a danger. It is the danger that these idealized forms of enjoyment will be striven for at the expense of other forms which we have not idealized. Thus both beauty and comfort are sources of pleasure. But if we idealize the beauty, and fail to idealize the comfort, which is very often the case, in our dress, for example, we may purchase our pleasant eye sensations at an enormous price of unpleasant skin sensations. With idealism always goes the notion of sacrifice; we must be willing to sacrifice much, if not everything, for our ideal. And all too frequently the sacrifice is not worth while.

Ideals belong to that class of culture elements we have called social sentiments or the *mores*. Sentiment, which as we have seen, consists of conditioned emotional reactions,

furnishes the motive power for the tyranny of beliefs, organization, symbols, and material culture. These other elements of culture are in themselves powerless to dominate the individual against his will. They exert their authority only by means of penalties attached to their violation. One of the most widely used penalties is that semi-automatic disapproval by one's fellow men, or by one's ideal self, which is a reflection of one or more fellow men. The individual would be quite free to criticize a belief or attack a social institution unless there were this disapproval or some other penalty. In fact many traits of our culture do not have sentiment connected with them and are freely discussed on their merits.

In the popular mind the only form of tyranny is class or group tyranny, the domination of one social group by another through force or through the possession of other instruments of power. "Culture's conquest of man" could mean, in that view, only the forcing by one group of its culture upon another, as the Germans wished to force their Kultur upon Europe. In that view all that is needed to free us from culture's mastery is democracy and the self-determination of peoples. But this is only one phase of human slavery and oppression. One can be a slave of his own national culture under a democracy as surely as he can be enslaved to a foreign culture by his conquerors. Man will become truly emancipated only when he frees himself from his own sentiments and prejudices, and learns to regard them as objective things, as he would regard an alien group.

While any element of culture may have an ideal associated with it, we may conveniently divide our ruling ideals into four classes:

(1) Beauty, or esthetic ideals, which have to do with the appearance of things.
(2) Virtue, or ideals of personal morality, which have to do with individual behavior.

(3) Truth, which means the correspondence of symbols and beliefs with reality.
(4) Ideals of the general perfection of culture as such.

1. Beauty

Beauty mostly a matter of conditioned responses.—Man is ruled throughout a large part of his daily life by certain ideals of how things should "look" or "sound." The common man does not always agree with the trained artist or esthete, but it is the common man's standards which we must chiefly consider. We are not interested here in the question of whether one esthetic standard, one school of art, is "higher" or better than another. We shall not attempt, like the U. S. customs inspectors in the case of a recently imported iron statue, to say what is a work of "art" and what is simply a ton of cast iron. We are interested simply in the part which esthetic standards in general play in the drama of human life.

It is a most instructive thing to go through an art gallery or any other collection of things that are accepted as beautiful, and to notice the *classes of objects* which appear. A little thought will reveal that it is more important to have certain classes of *objects* than to have certain abstract combinations of *form* and *color*. If beauty were chiefly a matter of ideal color combinations, we should be as much interested in samples of wall paper as in paintings of landscapes and sunsets. If it were chiefly a matter of ideal forms, such as curved lines, which are usually regarded as a primary element of beauty, then we should get as much satisfaction from looking through a textbook in geometry as from looking at sketches of Greek vases and human figures.

Now upon what classes of objects does art specialize? Are they always objects which because of their peculiar combinations of form and color, best satisfy certain universal canons of beauty? It appears not. One of the principal objects treated by art is the human body, with or without various

forms of decoration. Buildings, animals, and certain utensils are also common. Art must do more than fulfill rules of form and color. It must be *interesting;* it must portray things which, for other than artistic reasons, have become important objects of attention. And these objects must be presented in such a combination as to recall *pleasant experiences.* Imagine a pretty girl with a neat white bandage about her head, resting in an immaculate white iron hospital bed, with a case of polished surgical instruments and a handsome white aproned doctor in the background, and a vase of brilliantly colored flowers on a neat table. Altogether a beautiful sight, if you judge beauty by form, color, and neatness. But how often does such a situation become a subject of art? On the other hand, put any ragged, disheveled girl in a situation suggesting relaxation, leisure, or sex attraction, and you have artistic possibilities that are abundantly developed.

Why is the horse a much more common object in our art galleries than the hog? Because the horse, you will say, is intrinsically a more beautiful animal. But what evidence is there to prove that he is? In the form of the horse there are certainly more irregular and angular contours than in that of the hog. According to the universal canons of esthetics, if such there be, it is the forms which can be followed by the smoothest and simplest motions of the eye, which are most beautiful. It is also worth noting that the form of automobile which people most like to see today resembles the hog much more than it does the horse. We no longer prefer the high set vehicle, with its graceful curving lines about the hood and the fenders, but rather the compact, low slung, straight-lined vehicle, built to cut the air, and without noticeable projections. If we go back to our psychology of the conditioned reflex, in Chapter IV, we shall suspect that perhaps the horse owes his supposed beauty to the fact that he always has been associated with victory, prestige, athletic exercise, aristocratic leisure, and other such pleasant situations, while the pig owes his

supposed ugliness to the fact that he has always been associated with dirt, foul odors, uninteresting chores, bad table manners, and other more or less disagreeable situations. A lady ceased to enjoy paintings of Venice after she had smelled the canals at low tide.

To be sure the trained artist or psychologist can separate in his mind these associated reactions from his reactions to the pure visual impression itself. He will often admit a thing to be beautiful although he personally dislikes it for other reasons. But it seems doubtful that the average man does make this separation. He is more apt to judge the total reaction as a unit, and to pronounce as esthetic anything, within certain conventional limits, which gives him pleasure to look at or listen to and as ugly that which produces an unpleasant emotion.

Is there an absolute standard of beauty?—Beauty, however, as viewed by the artist, is not a matter of particular objects so much as of generalized forms, colors, rhythms, melodies. Now if there are any absolute standards of beauty, as claimed by many psychologists, they must belong to the class of universal sentiments (universally acquired traits) or biologically adequate stimuli. Let us see whether there are any types of form, color, and so on, which enter universally into men's experience in such a way as to become attractive. In the matter of form Santayana has explained in "The Sense of Beauty," why certain things might be universally, and possibly innately, more pleasant than others. His explanations are based entirely on eye movements. Equal intervals on a façade cause the eye muscles to stop at regular, expected stopping points, thus producing a minimum of conflict in the muscular tensions. Bilateral symmetry is beautiful because the eye tensions to the right and to the left are balanced. It would seem to be through proprioceptors (sense organs in the eye *muscles*) rather than distance ceptors (the eye itself) that we get these perhaps inborn satisfactions.

Why are bright colors usually considered beautiful? For one thing they are always seen by sunlight, when the conditions are favorable to food-getting and various exploring activities, while gray and black are seen by night, which often produces fear and impediments to food-getting. Moreover, when the eye does not see clearly, it performs fruitless efforts toward better focus, which result in straining the eye muscles, and this is biologically disagreeable. So in general visual exploration tends to be most pleasurable in clear bright sunlight when the colors stand out. It is not remarkable then, if bright colors come universally to be considered more attractive than grays and browns and blacks.

In music harmony is caused by sounding together notes whose vibration frequencies have a large common denominator, so that the "beats" are not too many.

Much is yet to be learned about these things, and it seems quite probable that there are certain absolute standards of beauty based upon inborn reflexes and upon universally acquired experiences. But it also seems that these universal standards are very weak in their power to give pleasure and pain as compared with the personal and cultural standards which determine the great bulk of our esthetic judgments. After all, what is a little more or less relaxation to the eye muscles compared with a powerful conditioned response which makes a woman hate all rural landscapes because they remind her of unpleasant solitude, or one which makes her thrill at the sight of Gothic architecture because she was courted by her lover in the sight of a Gothic church?

Personal esthetic tastes.—In a certain community the clearing up of the shrubbery from the shores of a pond was regarded as a great esthetic improvement. To the writer it was the reverse. He likes wild, tangled shrubbery, and hates trimmed lawns and borders. He once tried to psycho-analyze himself to find out the reason. It seems that trimmed park-like landscapes suggest to him several disagreeable experiences

of boyhood. For one thing, he often went into such places when dressed in his Sunday clothes or in company with older people, or with other children who prevented him from doing just what he wanted to do. Also the sight of strolling well-dressed crowds against a background of green lawns and neat hedges was a common Sunday afternoon experience, when he frequently experienced also indigestion and headache resulting from the Sabbath surplus of good food and deficiency of exercise. On the other hand, wild unkempt nature suggests Saturday mornings when he used to go wandering in the woods and fields with a sense of freedom and of good digestion. His attitudes toward these visual situations, "trim park" and "wild nature," are conditioned reflexes based upon certain biologically adequate stimuli from the stomach and the muscles.

Some might say that his esthetic tastes are romantic rather than classic. This would not explain the matter at all. When it comes to household interiors, he always has preferred neat simplicity to the "den" type of room which was much in favor in his college days. His tastes in this respect are the exact opposite of his tastes for landscape. And this is probably because the cluttered room suggests lost papers and mislaid articles, for which he has a violent antagonism.

Cultural esthetic standards.—But we also have esthetic tastes in which all our neighbors seem to agree with us. These seem to us to be universal canons of taste which "any person with an ounce of refinement would share." But most of these tastes can be shown to be culturally acquired. Smacking the lips at meals is not to us a beautiful sound. But some primitive peoples consider it an essential courtesy to one's host. We are not charmed by irregular blotches of color on wall paper or clothing, for they suggest stains, but in a sunset we regard them as beautiful. As Thorstein Veblen says, we admire the gloss on a gentleman's silk hat but not a similar gloss on a threadbare sleeve. By the same token, we like to

see a shining surface on the hood of an automobile, but we prefer a dull finish on a lady's nose. We regard a cheap red painted frame house as an ugly blot on the landscape. We do not feel that way about the farmer's barn because nobody lives in it.

A native of Tibet is reported as saying:

> Westerners are not good looking, according to our standards. Your noses are too big and often stick out like kettle spouts; your ears too large, like the pig's ears; your eyes blue, like children's marbles; your eyesockets are too deep and eyebrows too prominent, too simian.

Professor William Z. Ripley thinks that the Basques of the Pyrenees foothills in France have developed their triangular-shaped faces through social selection. That is to say, persons having that type of face were more likely to be preferred in marriage because the type was a national esthetic ideal. This view is strengthened by the fact that they deliberately emphasize the triangular form by shaving the chin and allowing side whiskers to grow. The Andalusians, not far away in Spain, seem to admire the broad type of chin, which they accentuate by wearing broad heavy beards.

Esthetic education.—The artist will say that true esthetic appreciation would enable us to cut loose mentally from these tastes which are built upon personal experiences and upon cultural traditions, and to judge and enjoy the things which satisfy the absolute standards of beauty. This is quite true, and there is no doubt that our schools ought to train every child in esthetic appreciation. But on the other hand if we were to guide our tastes entirely by what the artists tell us, our esthetic joys would be impoverished in another way. Some of these masters of esthetic taste talk as if they would, if they could, prevent us from enjoying a great many of the things we do enjoy today. The musician is frequently quite

contemptuous of the simple melodies and harmonies which because of their associations thrill the heart of the average man. It is desirable no doubt that we "low-brows" should learn to appreciate the pure beauties taught us by the expert, but there is no reason why we should give up that enjoyment which comes from a mixture of one-tenth pure beauty and nine-tenths sentimental association, provided the enjoyment does nobody any harm. The proper function of esthetic education is to create a *wider variety* of appreciations but not to destroy appreciations that already exist.

The artists themselves always have been under the narrow limitations of the culture in which they live. Apparently the Egyptian could not see beauty in the human form as it really was, but always had to conventionalize it by the broad headdress and shoulders, the narrow waist, the stiff limbs, and so on. Not always and everywhere has the artistic world been strongly impressed by the beauties of nature. It is only recently that artists have begun to see beauty in factory towns and railroad yards. Unless art is free from conventional limitations and permitted to seek beauty in all things, man is the slave of his own esthetic standards.

How esthetic ideals block progress.—We have seen that almost anything can be beautiful and almost anything ugly, if our personal experience or cultural training makes it so. Since beauty is so flexible a standard, it must give the right of way to the more inflexible requirements of health and efficiency. When the street car passes the auto bus, it is the latter which must give way, not because it is less important or carries fewer passengers, but because it alone *can* give way. Esthetic tastes block progress not because they are too high or too low but because they try to be inflexible in the face of other demands which are necessarily inflexible. Beauty is purchased at the expense of health and comfort. The tight waist, ear-rings and nose-rings, festoons of coins, tattooing, flattened skulls, bound feet, starched collars, stiff shirts, high-

heeled shoes, the docked tails of horses and dogs, are only a few examples of the various cultural standards of beauty which have been bought at the price of suffering. These esthetic standards could give way to substitutes, and indeed, some already have done so. You can get beauty without bound feet, but you cannot avoid pain *with* them.

Little by little "beauty" is yielding to health and comfort and yet there is just as much beauty as before. Today the main conflict is between beauty and leisure (or economy). Women slave away their time and that of their male supporters in order to be dressed in the style they consider attractive. But the standards they follow are only those of fashion, subject to change without notice. They could be just as beautiful at one-fourth the expense. The artist himself reveals the hollowness and inconsistency of those standards. He represents woman in the nude or in classic robes. Look at the old fashioned tin-type photographs, of men and women wearing their hats. Not so many years ago these were "beautiful."

In our homes and their furnishings we often purchase so-called beauty at an enormous price. We might have made the house just as attractive, with cheap painted furniture, as with expensive overstuff, barring the cultural prejudice. The money thereby saved could be used for extra vacations and trips to see nature's beauty. In fact why should we pay anything for beauty when we can have all we want of it free, by looking at the landscape and the sunset?

In the use of language there are esthetic standards which cripple efficiency. Most of a college preparatory course consisted, until recently at least, in studying the proper use of words in some language or other. And yet with all this careful attention to language we never have been allowed by our English teachers to use the slang, the abbreviations, and the short cut expressions which would convey meaning with so much less effort. We may not even use the much needed pro-

noun meaning "he or she." Such things are not in "good taste."

We are in fact, in many departments of life, slaves of "good taste."

All this is not to be considered as an attack upon the enjoyment of beauty. The more beauty we can perceive and enjoy, the more worth while is life. We need an education that will teach us to see beauty in many of the things we now overlook. The thing that does the harm is not the desire to see and appreciate beauty, but the sentiment that some *particular standard* of beauty shall be rigidly observed in some particular department of life, at the expense of comfort, convenience, or economy. If we had a larger appreciation of beauty, we should find it in so many places that we should not have to seek it at the expense of these other values.

2. Virtue

When our emotions attach themselves to the contemplation of various characteristics of personal behavior, we have sentiments of moral virtue. With the weakening hold of religion upon the minds of many people there seems to be a growing interest in morality. In 1917 the Character Education Institution conferred a prize of $5000 upon Dr. William A. Hutchins, now President of Berea College, for writing the best code of morality for children between nine and fourteen years of age. Business associations are formulating codes of ethics and more and more the pulpit is becoming a source of moral exhortation rather than of theological teaching.

Moral virtues are devices of social control.—Let us analyze a simple moral situation such as is used pedagogically by every school teacher and parent. Johnny, aged 12, helps a feeble old lady across the street. Tommy hits her with a snowball. On the sidewalk stands an old gentleman who

moralizes on the situation. This observer will remark that Johnny is a good boy and Tommy a bad boy. Now the *good* and *evil* are in the experiences of the old lady. If she was a normal old lady, certain pleasurable reflexes functioned within her when she was helped, while painful reflexes functioned when she was struck. Good and evil were not inherent in the acts themselves, nor in the actors. They were both normal boys following normal impulses. The good and evil were in the experience of the person acted upon.

But, since we are all interested in promoting acts that bring joy and preventing those that cause suffering, we devise methods of controlling the actors. Society has to punish Tommy and reward Johnny. Punishment, as we have seen in Chapter V, is an artificial, additional evil applied to the actor who causes harm to others. The punishment must be some repellent stimulus, which will provoke in him a withdrawing response. Then the act for which he is punished, being associated (either through simultaneous occurrence or through indirect mental connection) with the repellent stimulus, becomes a conditioned stimulus to his withdrawing behavior. In the future, that is, he will avoid doing that act. Moreover by symbolic conditioning, other boys, even though they have not directly experienced the punishment, will be deterred from similar conduct. A reward, on the other hand, is some artificial and additional good (an attractive stimulus), applied to the well-doing actor, to reinforce that particular act in his nervous system and to encourage it in others.

Now if every Tommy could automatically be caught and spanked, then and there, by some ingenious machine, and every Johnny rewarded by a piece of candy dropped into his hand, there would be no need for conscience, for virtues, or for moral education. But under existing conditions society could not pay for the huge squad of policemen that would be necessary to catch all the Tommys and for the candy necessary to reward all the Johnnys. So the problem is to devise

some mechanism of reward and punishment that shall be cheap and practical and yet effective.

The remarkable thing is that society has developed just such a mechanism. It is a mental mechanism. It consists in the sentiments of virtue and sin. Our mechanism inflicts mental joy and mental pain instead of physical. But as we have seen in Chapter V mental joy and pain are the same as physical; the difference lies only in the stimuli which provoke them. The mental stimuli are not inborn, but have to be conditioned. Let us see how this is accomplished.

Teachers and parents practice forms of behavior known as *approval* and *disapproval.* Approval consists in pats, smiles, soft tones, certain words like "good," "bully," "that's the boy." Disapproval consists of frowns, harsh tones, and a set of scolding and scornful words. To the young child this approving behavior is given by the parent in company with food, caresses, relief of discomfort and the granting of wants. Disapproval is applied to the child in company with physical chastisement or the withholding of various wants. Thus the parents' approval and disapproval, at first meaningless, become conditioned as attractive and repellent stimuli. Later, instead of this personal approval and disapproval, we substitute, by the same conditioning process, more abstract words and phrases; "right," "good," "decent," "wrong," "dirty," "low-down," "sinful." These words or their equivalents are used in all social groups, and come gradually to have the force of social authority. Attractive and repellent power is now exercised by words alone, whether spoken or printed.

Having perfected this cultural mechanism, all we need to do in order to control Tommy and Johnny is to hurl the proper words at them. Tommy needs only to read or to overhear that a boy who snowballs an old lady is "mean," "low-down," "dirty," and the memory of his act will tend to become repellent to him. The system does not work perfectly, but it is remarkable that it works as well as it does. Where

more direct controls are not practicable this notion of virtue and sin, which we often call "conscience," is an inexpensive and effective method of social control.

How virtue becomes an end in itself.—These notions of virtue and sin are applied to the actors and their acts, but in the meantime the person acted upon, the old lady, with her joy and her suffering, has faded from the picture. In concentrating our attention on Johnny and Tommy we have forgotten all about her. We begin to analyze the alleged motives of the actors. Did Tommy do this intentionally, or only through carelessness? Did Johnny perform his act out of real kindness of heart, or only to "show off"? This analysis of motives takes still more of our attention away from the old lady. Pretty soon we begin to theorize that it is the motives that count and not the results. Standards of conduct develop, expressed in terms of the nature of the conduct itself, quite regardless of its results. To yield your seat to a woman in a crowded street car, if you do so from "unselfish motives," is always equally meritorious, regardless of how much she needs the seat and regardless of what claims your own time and comfort may have. To lie is always equally sinful, regardless of the circumstances and results. And finally, the sinner's own soul (or his character if you wish), rather than the victim of the sinful act, becomes the chief object of our solicitude!

Thus in forgetting the victim and his suffering, the beneficiary and his pleasure, we have forgotten what morality "is all about." It comes to be merely a "big show," in which we applaud or boo the actors and their motives. Personal character becomes an end in itself. There is no longer any guarantee that morality will be used to maximize joy and to minimize suffering. It may become merely a set of arbitrary rules of conduct.

The language of moral education furnishes many illustrations of this worship of personal character as an end in itself.

"To do this is being sensual and contrary to self-respect." "Be *loyal to purity* of life." "Don't invite immodest thoughts to yourself." "Don't go around with dirty shoes, they look bad and *show carelessness.*" "Be worthy to be called men." We are being continually exhorted to behave thus and so, not in order to contribute to the general well-being, but in order to display certain traits of character which the moral sages consider pleasant to look upon.

Now what society needs is behavior that contributes to the general welfare. It should be interested in the *results* of the behavior, and not in behavior as an expression of inner virtues. If one's behavior is consistently social throughout his life, it makes no difference just what are the inner motives which lie back of it. The result of character worship is that we treat our neighbor's acts by an utterly false scale of values. We judge wrong not by the amount of harm done but by the esthetics of the act itself. With faint condemnation we dismiss many acts which are really dangerous to public health and safety, such as reckless driving, leaving obstacles on stairways, breaking quarantine, neglect of children's wounds. Yet if someone does a much less harmful act, which however violates our ingrained ideals of personal conduct, we can not find words to express our horrification.

The concepts of virtue and sin are simply means of reward and punishment. To keep one's own character unsullied, "unspotted from the world," is a motive just as selfish as to keep one's self out of jail. Both motives are socially useful. The first motive seems more worthy simply because it can be used more universally, cheaply, and effectively; it costs no services of police or detectives.

Personal ethics versus social ethics.—When it was suggested that moral education ought to be treated simply as a form of social control, one sociologist replied that in order to secure the cooperation of the child, it would be better to have the child conceive the process as personal character

development rather than as a process of being controlled by society. Is it necessary, in order to secure socialized behavior, to deceive the individual somewhat as to the object we are driving at? Must we fool him into believing that there is something intrinsically valuable in certain forms of personal conduct, when all we are trying to do is to get him to cooperate with his fellowmen?

Now perhaps it is this very element of deception which makes our moral education weak. Granting that it may not be possible to explain to the minds of very young children the rational grounds for the rules of behavior that are imposed upon them, yet we could begin this rational explanation much earlier than we do. Here is a sample of the "moral wisdom" which one moral educator would hand out to twelve-year-old children.

> All girls and boys know that they ought to be good. They can be good only by always doing what is right and by never doing what is wrong. . . . Good children always tell the truth. It is only bad children who tell lies. Everybody despises bad children. Keep your promises; to break them is almost as bad as to tell lies. . . . Do not injure or destroy anything that belongs to another; to do so would be almost as bad as to steal it. . . . To win a game by fair play is honorable; to win it in any other way is to cheat, and cheaters are almost as wicked as thieves. . . .
>
> The least theft is moral suicide. Picking one pear is as bad as robbing a whole orchard. . . . Cleanliness is the symbol of inner purity.

Is it any wonder that the younger generation has no respect for the moral wisdom and intelligence of its elders? They have discovered the original purpose of living, unperverted by centuries of moral philosophy. They speak unblushingly of the "kick" they wish to get out of life. The answer to that is simply: "So live that you will not deprive your fellows of *their* kick."

It may be useful to retain the sentiments of personal virtue and sin, but these sentiments must continually be checked up by thinking of results. Two students let us say, are tempted to steal books from a college library. One checks himself in this fashion: "If I should do this, I should be dishonest, and I was brought up to be honest, my character would be lowered, besmirched. A stigma of dishonor would rest upon me and shame me." To this society might reply: "We are glad you feel that way about it. Your *personal conscience* is very useful, it saves us the use of an extra library guard."

The other student thinks: "If I should do this I should cause anxiety to the librarian. I should cause extra and unnecessary labor. Others might imitate me in their fear of not getting books they needed, then it would become necessary to change the library rules, making it more difficult for all. Extra assistants would have to be hired, more time would be wasted waiting for books, the whole community would be getting less service for more effort." To him society might answer: "We are glad you think that way, your conscience is useful, and also *realistic.* You can be depended upon to cooperate intelligently, *even under changed circumstances.* You have a *social conscience.*"

Joy and not virtue the ultimate goal of life.—Our blindness to the true end and object of life pervades philosophy as well as everyday thinking. Confucius said, "The highest study of all is that which teaches us to develop those principles of purity and perfect virtue which heaven bestowed upon us at our birth." John Fiske said, "In a sinless and painless world the moral element would be lacking; there goodness would have no more significance in our conscious life than that load of atmosphere which we are always carrying about with us. . . . Clearly, for strong and resolute men and women, an Eden would be at best but a fool's Paradise."

A leading exponent of moral education was once discussing a certain pacifist movement which was proclaiming as its

slogan: "Less of armament and no war." The educator referred to this as a very "wishy-washy" program. "Why such contempt for it?" his companion replied; "to be sure it is a Utopian proposal, but is it not a move in the right direction, and do not its supporters, however impracticable may be their aim at the present time, deserve credit for keeping the aim before our eyes?" "My objection to it," the educator replied, "is on the grounds of personal character. To give allegiance to an impossible program is degrading to character." Here the philosophy of the personality-worshiper stands out in all its nakedness. By that token the test of every social movement is to be not its welfare value, but its supposed effect upon the personal character of its participators!

In practice the thinkers above criticized would probably desire and work, most of the time, for the same objects as would the utilitarian philosopher. But the danger is, that if the aims of life are viewed in terms of personal character, occasions will arise when the followers of such a view will be seriously misled. Personal character is a supremely worthy, but only an intermediate, or proximate aim of life. The ultimate aim is the happiness of all. Unless we keep our eyes focused on the ultimate aim, we are likely at any moment to go astray, to become the slaves of our moral culture, instead of using our moral culture as a tool to produce happiness.

For example, in a desert there can be no higher or more essential virtue than economy in the use of water. But suppose a desert people, having established this ideal in their *mores* after centuries of desert life, should move into a well-watered region. What was formerly the highest virtue is now quite unnecessary, and in fact may become a vice. Yet the people, if their habits of thought are of the type illustrated by Confucius and John Fiske, will probably continue to idealize and live by that virtue long after the necessity for it has passed. If on the other hand they had trained themselves

to think of virtue as simply a means to happiness, they would adapt quickly to the new situation. It is because of such irrational habits of thought, that so many American farmers continue to arise at four o'clock in the morning, and to live an independent, uncooperative life, long after conditions have arrived which would make cooperation and a short work day more satisfactory.

It is doubtful whether we gain anything by substituting a philosophy of personal virtue or "character" for the doctrine of personal salvation, as do some modern religious cults. In fact we may be led by it even farther astray from the path of human progress. Jesus did not preach personal perfection so much as he did humility, mercy, understanding. His teaching often is more socially interpreted by the more eastern peoples than by the egotistic, personality-loving Anglo-Saxons. Our social vision might be inspired and helped by recalling that He said: "I am come that they might have" (not perfection of character but) "*life*, and that they might have it more abundantly."

3. Truth

Even the ideal of Truth sometimes misleads us. If one will but look over a typical list of doctors' theses being prepared in our universities, he will find men doing years of research work on such subjects as the life history of some obscure insect, or the use of the dative case in early Latin, which cannot seem to the greatest stretch of imagination to have any practical utility in solving the problems of human life. The young scholar is taught the ideal of truth for truth's sake with almost the same dogmatic fervor that was used in teaching the Westminster catechism. When we ask why the scholar should pursue pure science without thought of its practical applications, we are told that many of the practical discoveries of the past have come from seemingly useless investigations. In other words, it is admitted that the ultimate

end is practical utility to human life. Would anything be lost by frankly recognizing this ultimate aim at the outset? While no research should be prohibited, it is well to select and encourage especially those investigations which give some faint hope of usable results. I do not mean merely results that can be *commercialized,* but all which might aid in the struggle for human welfare.

4. Ideals of the General Perfection of Culture

There is a fourth type of ideal which has to do not with appearances, nor with the personality of the individual, but with the general organization of culture as such. Included under this would be our ideals of justice, of democracy, of law and order, of social efficiency, of community activity and growth, of cultural purity. These ideals are less apt to mislead than the other types, but they too must be regarded merely as means to ends.

(1) Democracy.—Democratic forms of social organization are gaining in the world today, and this tendency is on the whole desirable. Democracy, however, is not a physiological condition in man's body, but simply a form of social structure. As such it is no more inherently desirable, or undesirable, than is monarchy, or aristocracy, or the subdivision of a country into provinces of equal population, or uniform hats for persons of the same occupation, or any other cultural form or pattern. The lovers of democracy have made it a fetish; they have averred that nothing else matters. Some of them would rather see a people living in democratic misery than in comfort based on the rule of benevolent and farsighted leaders. They have a blind faith that somehow democracy will be sure to come out right in the end.

The point of view of this book is that it is the life experience of the individual that matters. In general we shall probably find that democracy is desirable, but our approval

thereof will rest upon an entirely different foundation from that of many ardent democrats. It will rest upon the judgment that democracy is a surer safeguard of individual happiness in the long run than is any system of class domination *so far invented.* The experience of history is that benevolent despotisms sooner or later lose their benevolence, and when they do that, there is no way to restore it save by revolution with all the suffering that implies. With our cultural base, the safest way of insuring each individual's welfare seems to be to give him the power to check up upon those who control him, on the theory that no man can completely be trusted to look out for another.

(2) Social harmony.—A preacher condemned most vigorously the schism between fundamentalists and modernists; not the beliefs of either party, but the fact that they were quarreling. They were behaving just as badly, he said, as the disputants of the Middle Ages who burned their opponents at the stake. Now the point is that modern theological battles are fought with words, which is immeasurably superior to fighting them with weapons of physical torture. The mediaeval disputants are not to be condemned for disputing, but for inflicting *physical suffering.* If a dispute can be conducted without serious suffering and without undue waste of effort, there is no reason why it should be condemned at all. In fact the airing of differences of opinion is worth a certain moderate amount of *mental* suffering and of labor. But this preacher failed to point out this greater ethical principle that lay in his illustration. He was wrapped up in the contemplation of *order* and *harmony* as abstract values.

(3) Cultural purity.—We once admired a very ornate building in an East European city. Our companion, who knew architecture better than we, was disgusted. On being asked why, he replied that the building was a mixture of all types of architecture. It was inconsistent, it expressed no one idea. Oswald Spengler admires the Gothic architecture and the

spirit of mediaeval civilization which it represents; a pure culture type, logical in itself, valuable for its own sake, and not marred by concessions to "utility" or individual desires. Language purists for the same reason resent slang, abbreviations, technical terms, words borrowed from foreign tongues. They behave as though a language had some intrinsic value in itself outside of its function of conveying information and occasionally, pleasing the senses. "Americanism" illustrates a similar attitude. It is possible to arouse the popular hatred against many a good thing by labeling it "un-American" or even "European." Thereby one appeals to the sentiment that there is a pure American culture which must not be defiled by foreign intrusions. But in literal truth, the only truly American traits of our culture are such things as tobacco, the potato, maize, the birchbark canoe, and the names of Maine lakes. Such sentimental admirations should be enjoyed as much as possible, but they should never be allowed to stand in the way of any program which would substantially lessen human suffering or human toil. In the future, all culture, like architecture, will probably become more *eclectic;* it will select one element from here and another from there as reason dictates. The pure types will have to be preserved, like rare wild animals and plants, in museums and reservations.

Bertrand Russell says:

> Among writers of sociology and political theorists generally, a very common way of judging the social structure is by whether it constitutes a pleasant pattern to contemplate. . . . They think of the state as something having a good of its own, quite distinct from the good of the citizens, and what they call the good of the state is usually, unconsciously to themselves, what gives them a certain esthetic or moral satisfaction. . . . It is intolerable to the industrially minded to think of lazy populations sitting under banana trees, eating the fruit as it drops, and being happy in unproductive idleness. Some forms

> of socialism are not free from this defect: they aim rather at creating the kind of state which is pleasing to theoretical contemplation than the kind that will suit the temperaments of its citizens. . . . Whoever wishes to be a social theorist should daily remind himself . . . that a state is something in which people have to live, and not merely something to be . . . contemplated as we contemplate the view from a mountain top.[1]

(4) Cultural development, or human development.—It is said by some that our aim should be not happiness, but the development of humanity. Just what "development" means to these thinkers is hard to say. Is it the biological development of man, or the development of man's culture? In either case, in what direction is "development" desirable, unless toward that condition which permits a greater enjoyment of life?

Military life illustrates culture as an end in itself.—One of the best ways to see the difference between the individual as an end and culture as an end, is to compare civilian with military life. In civil life, a large part of culture is, relatively speaking, frankly regarded as a means to individual happiness. Only certain major institutions and ideals are worshiped for themselves. But in the army individual happiness is completely subordinated to the functioning of the army as a machine. The individual is not allowed to sleep, to eat, or even to stand in the place his individual desire or judgment dictates. He is assigned a place. He must stand in line in a fixed posture, not deviating therefrom so much as an inch. His personal comfort is nothing compared with the importance of symmetry and regularity in the appearance of the line. When a green top sergeant, the author posted a guard who had lost his hat. Comfort that night did not require a hat, and to his mind this was a far less important

[1] Prospects of Industrial Civilization, Century, pp. 147-149. By permission.

detail than several others that he had to attend to in order to get the guard posted on time. The sergeant-major said to him: "I guess you have not been in the army very long. Get a hat from some man not on guard duty, substitute another man, do anything, but never post a guard without a hat."

The sick soldier is well cared for, but only in order that he may be restored to duty. The surgeon takes no interest in the patient's personal feelings about his illness; often will not answer questions that might relieve anxiety, but simply gives him orders. He is not being treated for his own sake but for the sake of the army. The soldier must express himself to his superiors in standardized forms of language. While doing so he must stand at attention, thus repressing all initiative or individuality of thought and inhibiting all gesture. The soldier may have no work for days at a time, but must nevertheless be present five or six times a day at different roll calls and reviews. He is called from his personal meditations or amusements to assembly as a mere matter of formality, and then dismissed. At other times he is given work to do whose main value is to keep him busy. Cleaning and polishing, sweeping, sanitary work, must be done to a standard of perfection which goes way beyond practical utility and rests on mere appearances. For instance, after the ground about a barracks is thoroughly cleaned of all debris, say at the price of an hour's labor, it is often required to spend two hours more raking every square inch of it into fine regular furrows, merely in order that the cleanliness and order may be more apparent to the eye. Sometimes this ideal of orderly appearance triumphs over the more essential principle of sanitation, as when the men are ordered to keep damp towels in their lockers so that the inspector's eye shall not be displeased by seeing them hanging out to dry.

Private property in reality does not exist. The soldier's principal possessions are assigned to him and may be taken away at any time, or changed, at the order of his superior.

There is an iron-clad system of accounting for every article, which requires much red tape and often seriously delays the issue of needed articles to the men.

In battle, of course, the important thing is the organizations as such, not their personnel. As soon as one individual falls another is ready to take his place. In military countries, governments encourage a high birth rate to make good the losses. The individual is "cannon-fodder."

If there is a social mind, a collective personality in which all individual personalities are merged and lost, as the cells of the human body are integrated into a unit organism, we come the nearest to it in the military formation at evening parade. A thousand individual soldiers, inhibiting all personal impulses, present arms in perfect unison, as the colors, the visual symbol of unity, are lowered, and the national anthem, that auditory symbol of unity, resounds, under the rays of a setting sun. This procedure, and in fact a large part of military activity, has no physical utility whatever. It simply helps to condition the reflexes of individuals to the collective purpose, and to train inhibition of all individual habits, not only those actually hostile to the military purpose, but even those that are neutral and useless to it.

Such training is, in large part at least, necessary in any social group, such as an army, which is devoted to an overruling collective purpose. But many phases of it were common also in the civilian life during the era of pre-scientific civilization. To use Herbert Spencer's term, there was a *military-religious* stage of civilization, reaching its height perhaps during the Middle Ages, in which not only the army, but society itself was regarded as having some great collective purpose of its own. Now that we are beginning to realize that society's only possible purpose lies in the individual lives and happiness of the members who compose it, these military attitudes are passing away. Perhaps the greatest thing that can be said for our Anglo-Saxon culture is that it has gone

farther than any other in recognizing that there is no great collective purpose, but only millions of individual purposes to which army, state, and church are merely instruments.

But even with us there will be no complete escape from the tyranny of culture until we develop an education which enables men at every step to hold in mind the true ends of human life. What we need is not more attention to personal virtue and sin, but a heightened sensitiveness to human suffering in all its forms, and a determination to abolish it. And we do need ideals—not ideals for which we would sacrifice happiness—but ideals which will enable us to enlarge happiness.

It may seem a distressing anti-climax to many readers to realize that the great goal toward which all human activity is directed consists simply in secreting more saliva and less adrenalin, in having more upturned mouth corners and less down, more vibrations of the diaphragm, lower blood pressure, and fewer groans, snarls, cries, and tears. Yet such is the conclusion to which they come who study life without prejudice. The author fails to see why this description of our goal in physiological terms should take anything away from the value and desirability of that goal. If the sweetness of the rose is spoiled by learning the chemical formula for its perfume, or the microscopic structure of the organs of smell, that is the fault of the unrealistic education which our culture has given us in childhood.

Summary.—The central control lever of culture's mastery over man consists of cultural sentiments, values, or ideals. These cultural ideals have a strong hold upon the human mind. They may be classified as esthetic ideals, personal virtue ideals, ideals of truth, and ideals of the general perfection of culture. The ultimate goal, human happiness, is forgotten and these ideals come to be pursued by man for their own sakes. Hence they become misleading ideals.

Absolute standards of beauty, if they exist, must be of a

very general sort, depending upon the physiological mechanisms of sight and hearing. Most of our esthetic tastes are products of our personal associations or of the arbitrary standards of our particular culture. These cultural standards limit our ideas of beauty and often force us to seek it at great expense when it could be obtained without the sacrifice of other values.

Ideals of personal virtue or personal morality are useful devices of social control. They restrain the selfishness of the individual for the sake of the group welfare. They often prove misleading, however, for they come to be worshiped for their own sakes, regardless of the actual results. They come to imply the view that the most serious consequence of sin is to the sinner. On the other hand common sense would seem to suggest that the most serious, the primary consequence of sin, is to the victim or to society, and that the consequences to the evil-doer are secondary and artificial, imposed upon him by society to deter him and others from sinning. Progress demands the development of a social conscience, which will appraise and guide our conduct in the light of its results and the needs of the time, rather than according to rigid and formal standards. The happiness of all is the ultimate goal and virtue is only a means to this happiness.

Democracy, social harmony, cultural purity, the development of culture, are commonly looked upon as the aims of human effort. As such they are misleading ideals. The ultimate goal is not to be found in culture at all but in the personal lives of individuals, and can be described in terms of physiology.

The difference between military and civilian life illustrates in a measure the difference between culture as an end in itself and the individual life as an end.

CHAPTER VIII

MAN'S REVOLT AGAINST CULTURE

Man's revolt against culture.—There are signs that man is not permanently enslaved to the civilization that he himself has created. There are signs that the individual human being has discovered himself and is revolting against the machine. There are signs that he is beginning to suspect that culture exists for him, and not he for culture.

These signs, however, are not to be discerned where we usually look for them. We are not talking about what Lothrop Stoddard calls the "revolt against civilization." He is thinking about our modern radicalisms, which may or may not turn out to be an enfranchisement from culture. They may be simply the imposition of a new master in place of the old.

Neither are we talking about the crime wave, which some people regard as a revolt against our institutions.

Rebellion probably is much older than recorded history. Time and time again men have rebelled against the authority imposed upon them. Most of these revolts, however, have been merely struggles of an oppressed group against a dominating group. Only rarely, and only recently, as measured by the whole course of human development, has there appeared anything which could be called a rebellion against the existing culture *as such.* A revolt against a whole culture must be peaceful and intellectual; it must consist primarily of new ways of thinking. It requires the insight to see that it is the culture system itself, and not the people who happen to be in power, which is to be blamed for the ills of the oppressed and the discontented. Man's revolt against culture must be discovered then in the realm of philosophy.

Ancient criticisms of culture.—As far as we know, philosophy first reached the point of criticizing culture in Athens in the fifth century B.C. The Sophists distrusted existing knowledge and conventions, but taught their disciples how to use these culture traits for individually selfish advantage. Then arose Socrates, the great Sceptic, who, without material reward, made it his business to convince wise men of their ignorance, and to undermine the existing sentiments. For this activity he was put to death on the charge that he had "corrupted the youth" of Athens. In a sense Socrates may be considered as starting man's revolt against culture.

After Socrates followed Aristippus of Cyrene who taught that pleasure is the highest good. Not cultural rules or forms, but individual enjoyment, he considered the test of true value. Epicurus developed further this same idea and founded the school of thought whose name remains to this day a by-word for pleasure-seeking. Yet it is only through ignorance and misunderstanding that some people scorn Epicureanism as a swinish, sensuous philosophy. It stood for the pursuit of the "higher" pleasures as well as the "lower." To behavioristic psychology, "higher pleasures" mean simply pleasures obtained through the distance senses of sight and hearing, and through imagination based upon those senses, as distinguished from the contact, internal, and kinaesthetic senses. Epicurus regarded justice, friendship, and good fellowship as important virtues because they are necessary to individual happiness. It is his recognition of this individual happiness, not the virtues themselves, as the *goal,* that makes him an outstanding figure in man's conquest of culture.

In the meantime Plato, another disciple of Socrates, had been writing up his plan for an ideal society, the "Republic." In this he gave the world its first Utopia. Plato however accepted as necessary certain cultural institutions of his own time, such as slavery, which we now regard as a serious blot upon civilization.

Guatama Buddha (sixth century B.C.) and Jesus may also be regarded as contributors toward the revolt against culture. Both criticized the existing order of things in certain respects, but the main burden of their teachings was to show the individual how to get peace and happiness in a world of troubles through a certain inner spiritual detachment from the culture about him. To Guatama the key to happiness was Nirvana, the everlasting denial of all personal desires, the cultivation of a sublime indifference. To Jesus, at least as interpreted by his followers, it was the temporary postponement of satisfaction until the next world.

During the later days of Rome the individual obtained a certain freedom from institutions, and philosophers like Horace, Pliny the younger, Lucretius, taught an Epicurean philosophy. But then, with the Fall of Rome, all human thought fell under the spell of religion. Able men and women gave up the things of this life and retired to the monasteries. For ten centuries all philosophy was in terms of other-worldliness. From Oswald Spengler's point of view, this was an ideal condition. It was an indication of cultural vitality and growth. In his opinion, modern times, like those of the Roman Empire, are decadent. But in those Middle Ages, he thinks, when men went on murderous and unsanitary crusades, when they built huge and costly Gothic cathedrals of questionable utility, to express great communal sentiments, when they worshiped ideals *as such,* and forgot individual comfort and happiness, then civilization was vigorous and promising. Spengler's whole idea of value is in terms of civilization itself. He seems to think that a flourishing and vigorous culture, whatever that may be, is the ultimate aim of human existence. Man is the means and culture the end. This is exactly the opposite of the view we are maintaining, and Spengler's appraisement of different ages simply furnishes us with additional illustrations of culture's conquest over man,

Rousseau and the happy savage doctrine.—With the Renaissance and Reformation patriotic nationalism somewhat replaced international religion as the cultural master of mankind. But there was a new dawn of light. Roger Bacon, Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, Francis Bacon, Newton, and other *scientists,* began to free the human intellect from magic and superstition, and thus to prepare it for a revolt against the mastery of culture. Locke in his philosophy laid the foundations of the idea of democracy. But the *general* revolt against culture was slumbering until it broke forth once more in Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). His "Contrat Social" which begins: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," helped to make the French Revolution. But his doctrine of "Trust to nature," his rebellion against the *conventions,* his plea for nature, love, and passion, set the world thinking along even more fundamentally rebellious lines. His "Emile" in which he pleads against the formal, conventional education of the child, and urges that we trust to the natural unimpeded growth of body and mind, is a landmark in pedagogical history.

Edward Carpenter, a belated follower of Rousseau, pictured civilization as a disease whose cure is to go "back to nature." He claimed that savages, without government, are healthier and more honest than we.

There is, however, a great error in the Rousseau-Carpenter type of revolt against culture. It is in the idea that man can free himself by going back to a more primitive existence. The fallacious doctrine of the "happy savage" held sway from the times of Rousseau until modern anthropologists discovered that savages actually are more tightly restrained by their cultures than are we. But even if it were possible to overthrow all culture, an existence in a pure state of nature would probably be worse than any we now know.

The true revolt against culture will be not achieved

through any violent or wholesale overthrow, but through mastering culture and using it as an instrument of man. When we learn to discriminate, to preserve the elements of our culture which are truly worth while, and to discard those which are burdensome and unnecessary, then we shall be free. A hunter, returning from an all too brief vacation in the north woods, exclaims with a sigh, "Back to Civilization!" He forgets that his rifle, his camera, his compass, and the topographic maps which enabled him to enjoy his vacation are just as much the products of culture as is the stiff collar in which he must now again encase his neck, and the dingy brick walls to which he must return.

Another weakness of all the philosophy of rebellion up to this time has been the assertion that each individual is responsible only for his own individual happiness. The revolt against custom and convention overlooked the fact that individual happiness itself requires certain compulsory forms of cooperation.

Utilitarianism and modern sociology.—A logical philosophy of man's relation to culture was lacking until there arose the English school of Utilitarianism. This is represented by Hutcheson, Bentham, Paley, Austin, and John Stuart Mill. Previous advocates of the pleasure philosophy, such as Epicurus, Hobbes, Locke, and even the Christian teachers of future happiness, had held up before each individual the goal of *his own* happiness-in-the-long-run, whether in this or another world. But with the Utilitarians came the view that each individual should act for the *greatest happiness of the greatest number.* That aim is not our happiness today, but our happiness in the long run, not the general welfare of society or civilization as a collective organism, but the individual happiness of all individuals in the long run, secured through cooperation and self-denial where necessary, but otherwise through complete personal liberty. As ex-Governor Gifford Pinchot said concerning the object of his forest con-

servation program, our aim should be the greatest happiness for the greatest number for the longest time.

Meanwhile Buckle, Comte, and Herbert Spencer had been laying the foundations of the modern science of sociology. It remained for Lester F. Ward, however, the father of American sociology, to formulate the *purpose* of all sociological study, and effort for social reform. He showed that pure sociology, like any other pure science, is valuable only as a means to applied sociology. Applied sociology, which in his view is practically the same thing as ethics, is the science of producing the greatest possible amount of human happiness.

Has culture any purpose?—Ward wrote before the day when anthropological terms began to be used freely in sociology. What we call culture he called *achievement*. The great question which burdened his mind was: Does achievement mean improvement? Does the accumulation of culture itself, which obviously has taken place, mean that men are happier? Ward thought that happiness was not advancing so rapidly as culture, but he believed that it might be made to do so. He believed that man might become conscious of his culture, take hold of it, and guide it so as to bring every individual less suffering and more enjoyment.

Many of our social scientists have become so wrapped up in their investigations of cultural processes and history that they have lost interest in the question of purpose. They profess a certain indifference to the ultimate values of life. Others, whatever be their inner attitudes, dismiss the question with statements like this: "The foremost philosophers are not agreed as to the ultimate ideals to be sought through social existence."[1] Another says, "the ultimate values of life are the concern of philosophy and religion and not of economics."[2]

But if we would make social science a means to man's

[1] Lowie, "Primitive Society," p. 438.
[2] Atkins and Lasswell, "Labor Attitudes and Problems," p. 501.

mastery over culture, we must keep alive the spirit which continually asks, "What is it all for?"

What is purpose?—We must distinguish between an *aim* and a *purpose*. An aim is the *direction* in which any process is tending. We might say the aim of rivers is the sea. A purpose however is an aim which is *symbolized* beforehand, so that the symbol acts as one of the causes in bringing about the realization of the aim. When we see the river flowing into the sea, we cannot say it had any purpose of doing so. But when we see bricks and boards assembled into a house, we know that their assembling in that form was the result of a purpose. We know this because we can find a *symbol* of that house which existed before the house itself, and which functioned in bringing the house into existence. That symbol is, namely, the architect's drawing. But if there were no drawing on paper, but only a set of muscular tensions in the architect's muscles, organized through his brain, by which he was able to image the house he wanted to build, this, his symbolic behavior, would do just as well. We should still have *purpose*. It is not necessary that the symbol resemble the final reality in form or substance. Printed black spots on black lines are the symbols used in producing musical harmony, words as well as sketches and maps may be used to symbolize a piece of land.

Now the human brain is the only known mechanism in all nature through which symbols can be produced. It is the only mechanism which can by symbols represent a situation before that situation exists, and then use the symbols to bring the actual situation into existence. In other words it is only through the human brain that it is possible to entertain a *purpose*. All the other processes of the universe, so far as we know them, have only *blind* aims.

The aim of nature and the purpose of man.—The apparent aim of nature is "to convert as large an amount as possible of inorganic into organic and organized matter." Nature

does not care with what form of life she populates the earth; she merely keeps on trying out different forms, and the more successful forms kill off the unsuccessful. Manifestly the most successful form of life is the one which can eat up the greatest amount of inorganic matter and of other organisms, and transform this matter into the substance of its own body. Man has been an eminently successful animal because his intelligence has enabled him to develop culture, and with culture he has conquered the other forms of life. But nature cares nothing about man or his intelligence. If a race of insects should come along, with the power to eat up man and all his works, and use all of that material to form an even greater bulk of living matter in their own bodies, nature would be just as well pleased.

But when nature, in the course of millions of blind experiments, evolved the human brain, something happened which, we might say, nature had neither intended nor expected. It was something in fact which worked at cross purposes with her previous aims. For the first time true *purpose* had come into existence. For the first time existed something which could see and plan in advance whither it was going. That something which entertained a purpose, was not man taken collectively, not man's culture, but the *individual* man. All purposes are the purposes of individual human beings.

Now culture grew up as the result of individual men's trying to fulfill their individual purposes. Each tool was contrived for the purpose of securing some result that a man foresaw and wanted. Originally and fundamentally, the function and purpose of culture is to satisfy individual wants.

But as culture developed abstract beliefs and sentiments as well as material tools, it misled man into thinking that purpose resided somewhere else than in himself. Because man himself was able to experience a purpose, he inferred in his ignorance that nature herself entertained purposes that were even greater and more important than his. He guessed

at what nature's purposes were, personified them as gods and devils, and then tried to guide his own life by these imaginary "higher" purposes. Later it came to be culture, rather than the lower orders of nature, in which these transcendental purposes were supposed to reside. The church, the state, civilization, as such were thought to be working toward some higher goal to which the individual must subordinate himself.

Now once more after centuries of being thus misled men are beginning to glimpse the only knowable purpose of culture. They are beginning to suspect that this purpose does not lie in Nature beneath or in culture above. They are beginning to suspect that the "cosmic purpose" for which they have sought is nothing other than their own aggregate individual happiness. And they are beginning to realize that this happiness is not some mystical substance, but a matter of certain physiological processes in the nerves, muscles, glands, and viscera of the human body.

Survival versus happiness.—The brain grew larger because it had survival value. That is, those individuals with somewhat better brains were better able to overcome obstacles and hence they survived in larger proportions and left more offspring. Those with less developed brains more frequently perished, and left fewer offspring. Thus with each generation, by this process of *natural selection,* brains became a little larger. Education had nothing to do with it.

But when the brain developed to that stage where it was possible to invent tools, it became possible also to do other things which were not necessary to survival. An animal with sufficient brain to enable him to cultivate beans for food, can use the same brain to cultivate flowers for beauty, and, given sufficient leisure, will do so. Consequently, to culture, and to individual behavior independently of culture, were added a lot of activities which were not essential for survival but which increased the enjoyment of life and were pursued for their own sakes. These non-essential activities, such as

play, esthetic and intellectual interests, are merely by-products of organic evolution, yet nature's by-products become a part of man's main purpose. So beauty, for example, acquired value because it contributed to man's purpose of enjoying life. Before the advent of man beauty as such had no value. Joy, whether it comes from satisfying food and sex cravings, or through satisfying the "higher" non-essential conditioned reflexes, is the aim of life.

Value and its measurement.—Wherever there is an aim or a purpose, there is *value.* Those things which help toward the realization of the aim are called *good* or given a positive value; those things which work against the realization of the aim are called *bad* or given a negative value. Since some good things are more helpful than others, and some bad things interfere more than others, we have a *scale of values.* Value is not a property of a thing itself but is its relation to some aim or purpose.

In a world devoid of men there would be no generally accepted scale of values. What was good for pond lilies would be bad for cactus plants, and so on. But with human life, which alone has true purpose, comes a definite scale of values superior to all others. What promotes human happiness is good, and what hurts it is bad.

Man devises various yardsticks by which his values can be measured. Our most universally used scale of human values is economic value, and its measuring stick is money. In your grade school arithmetic you learned that you cannot add six peaches and five jackknives. You can add only those things which have a common denominator. Now money is a common denominator which permits us to add or subtract the values of apples, house lots, automobiles, and almost any objects of our material culture.

But given money, what is it that enables us to measure various articles in its terms? Can a college athlete state for example, the money value of his swift legs? He cannot do so,

but he can state the money value of his running shoes. The difference is that his shoes are *exchangeable,* the legs are not. Articles get their economic values through the process of exchange. Each article is worth what it will fetch in the market, no more and no less. In economics we learn how this process of exchange works. Articles find their true values by trial and error. If we try to sell a supply of oranges at too high a figure, the buyers who come are too few, and the stock spoils on our hands. If the price is too low, the eager purchasers quickly take all we have and clamor for more, so that next day we raise the price.

The economic process is the most realistic of all methods of determining values. Value is the power to satisfy human wants, and what better test could there be than to observe how much human beings are willing to pay for the goods in question? The value of a theatrical performance is determined not by the arguments of the dramatic critics but by the ticket sales at the box office. As John Stuart Mill, in his "Essay on Utilitarianism," says, "The sole evidence that it is possible to adduce that a thing is desirable is that people actually do desire it."

Ethical value and economic value.—But are not the most important values of life those which cannot be exchanged, and therefore cannot be economically calculated? What, for example, is the value of your good health, of your honesty, of the public school system of your community, of the treaty of Versailles, of the abolition of slavery in the United States?

There is a type of person who breeds perpetual contempt for what he terms the "sordid" economic values of life, and continually glorifies the so-called higher moral values. He is quite right that the moral values are difficult to measure in economic terms. But he is wrong in supposing them to belong to a different and higher realm of creation. All the great institutions and moral excellencies derive their value from the same fact as do oranges and picture shows, namely, the fact that they contribute to human joy or mitigate suffering.

There are in fact several points in our social order where ethical values are being translated into economic values, and *vice versa.* We ordinarily regard scenery, health, and a feeling of safety as quite outside the realm of money values. But yet the rent of a house is affected by these factors, so that it is possible to compute roughly how much the tenant is paying for his so-called higher value. In superstitious communities an active ghost in a house can reduce its rental value to zero, or even below zero, making it necessary to pay people to stay there. In breach of promise, libel, and some other cases, our civil courts award money damages not only to repay material expenses, but also to compensate the *mental anguish* that cannot be repaired in kind. The glory of holding public office or of winning a game, the privilege of escaping a jail term, are among the values that through bribery have been bought for a money price. "To sell one's honor" is an everyday expression.

M. F. Bower has written a book on the "Economic Waste of Sin."[1] He says that "The destructiveness of sin is not merely a theological truth but a tremendous, overwhelming economic fact." After painstaking study of many sources of statistics, he estimates the total economic waste of sin per year in the United States to be as follows:

	BILLION DOLLARS
Crime	3.3
War	3.8
Disease	1.5
Poverty	.4
Loss of life and energy	2.5
Alcohol	.8
Prostitution	.5
Narcotics	.4
Total	13.2

[1] Copyright 1924. By permission of The Abingdon Press.

To most persons who contemplate the economic waste of sin, this waste is merely an *additional* evil. To them it furnishes an argument against sin quite aside from the moral and religious arguments. Our point of view is that the economic argument is part and parcel of the moral and religious arguments. What makes sin sinful is that it tends to cause human suffering or to reduce human enjoyment. Anything which does not have such a tendency is not wrong. Much of this suffering takes the very mild but prolonged form that we call boredom. For boredom is increased by needless labor, and needless labor is the result of economic waste.

Why, for example, is stealing wrong? First it causes acute mental anguish and occasionally real material hardship to the few who happen to be victims, or are afraid of becoming victims. Second, it affects the whole community. The more theft there is in a community, the higher the theft insurance rates, the more taxes have to be raised to pay for more policemen, watchmen, detectives, courts of justice; the greater the expense for locks, keys, combination safes; the greater the doctors' bills for people whose health has been impaired by anxiety about their property. Being forced to spend more for protection against loss, the people have less to spend for positive enjoyment, and hence the whole community is less happy than it might have been. Lying is wrong because it makes people waste their efforts upon false assumptions. If we lived in a magic world where every loss could be instantly replaced by a mere wish, and where every secret could be revealed by putting on a pair of magic glasses, stealing and lying and forgery would be no more evil than a game of hide-and-seek.

In short all immorality boils down to economic waste or to suffering, and in the last analysis all to suffering. Conversely, all economic waste is immoral. Man's revolt against culture requires that we get rid not only of magic and superstition,

but also of those habits of scientific and philosophical thought which would preserve within sacred and separate precincts the values of economics, sociology, ethics, philosophy, and religion. What we need is a general science of welfare, call it ethics if you will, in which economic welfare, social welfare, moral welfare, physical welfare, personal welfare, group welfare, and all the other kinds of welfare are reduced to their common denominator and treated as one and the same thing.

Cultural evolution versus cultural progress.—Evolution does not necessarily mean progress. It means merely change. Progress means a change for the better. Has there been real progress in culture, or only evolution?

If you accept the theory that culture in itself can become better or worse, by some cultural test independent of happiness, then you will recognize several ways in which culture obviously has progressed. First, it has become larger in quantity. One of the laws of culture, as we have seen, is accumulation. Second, culture has become more complex. The fabric of our modern civilization differs from that of Neolithic culture much as the pattern of an Oriental rug differs from the pattern of kitchen linoleum. Third, culture has progressed by the test of population quantity. The mechanical revolution in industry made it possible for Europe to triple her population within a century and a half. If we measure the value of a culture by the number of human beings it enables to subsist on a given territory, then of course there has been more progress in the last century than in all the preceding centuries of man's history.

But this, in our sense of the word, is not progress. It looks simply as if blind nature merely were realizing her aim to produce the greatest possible quantity of living flesh. The vital question is: Are these five hundred million Europeans any happier than the one hundred million who were there before?

In reply we can say, at least, that the five hundred mil-

lion have more material wealth *per capita* than did the one hundred million before them. We Americans of today enjoy, *per capita,* more clothing, more household equipment, more amusements, than did our grandfathers. It seems that population, although it has grown rapidly, has not grown fast enough to take up all the slack provided by the improvement in material culture. The poor are not getting absolutely poorer, but are better off than before.

But does this greater material wealth give us greater happiness? In Hamilton's "Current Economic Problems" a Cape Cod fisherman is reported as saying, "My father wanted fifteen things. He didn't get 'em all. He got about ten and worried considerable because he didn't get the other five. Now, I want forty things, and I get thirty, but I worry more about the ten I can't get than the old man did about the five he couldn't get." Has not the greater material wealth brought with it cultural lags that can never be taken up: unsatisfied cravings, mental anxieties and irritations, embittered social relationships, that suck our very souls dry of any happiness that might have been gained? Is Clarence Darrow right when he says: "There is neither purpose in existence nor a goal in living. . . . People are no happier than they were years ago"?

The need for a barometer of welfare.—We can not answer this question unless we have some means of measuring happiness. It would be difficult to devise any test that could be applied in the same way at two different dates many years apart. Historical comparisons are difficult to make with any accuracy. There is much more hope of our making geographic comparisons of happiness. A corps of trained observers might study human life in several different countries, in rapid succession, and publish their findings in comparative form. If they found that the general happiness was demonstrably greater in some countries than in others, we might then seek

cultural progress by turning to those superior countries for guidance.

Summary.—There are signs that man is revolting against his enslavement to his own culture. With the Greek philosophers began a criticism of all accepted cultural ideals and standards, and a tendency to look beyond them, to individual happiness, as the supreme goal of life. This critical tendency was submerged in the Middle Ages but appeared again during the age of science and machinery. It is outstanding in the philosophy of Rousseau. Rousseau and others, however, made the error of condemning culture in general and recommending a return to nature. True progress consists not in abolishing culture, and not necessarily in simplifying it, but in taking control over it so that it may serve as an instrument to man's happiness, and not as an end in itself.

Cultural evolution is merely change, and does not necessarily mean progress. Progress is change for the better. This "betterness" can be measured only in terms of human happiness. All human values can be reduced to the common denominator of happiness. Ethical values and economic values do not belong to separate worlds, but ultimately can be translated into each other. We need a general science of human welfare, an applied sociology, which will enable us to determine what cultures, what modes of life, are really better, and will teach us to promote them. We need a barometer of human welfare.

CHAPTER IX

CULTURE UNDER THE ECONOMIC MEASURING ROD

Two general methods of measuring welfare.—There are two ways in which we might construct a barometer of welfare. One method, which we shall describe in this chapter, is to begin with the measuring rod already given us by economics, namely, *money value.* We shall see that this has many defects and requires many corrections. The other method, which we shall reserve for the next chapter, is based chiefly on social and vital statistics rather than financial data.

Money income as a barometer of welfare.—Since in the long run a people spends about what it earns, or at least nine-tenths thereof, the per capita income is roughly, except during periods of unusual saving, also the per capita expenditure or consumption. It is a measure of the average standard of living. In 1914 the average per capita income for the principal nations was as follows:[1]

United States	$335
Australia	263
United Kingdom	243
Canada	195
France	185
Germany	146
Italy	112
Austria Hungary	102
Spain	54
Japan	29

[1] Estimates summarized by Josiah Stamp, *Journal of Royal Statistical Society,* July, 1919.

The average American had an annual income of twice that of the German and ten times that of the Japanese. Now what does this mean? Does it mean that the American consumed twice the physical quantity of goods and services as did the German? Did he on the average have twice as much food, clothes, visits to the theater, and so on? Perhaps not, you will say, for prices are different in the two countries. But this answer, at first sight, seems to conflict with the fundamental laws of economics. Remember that the German figure was originally in marks, and was translated into dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange, which is about 23 cents per mark when both countries are, as they were then, on a gold standard. A mark is worth 23 cents because it stands for the same amount of gold as 23 cents. This gold is readily transportable, and is continually being shipped from one country to another. Now if prices were really lower in Germany, we should have German merchants trying to sell most of their goods in the United States and Americans trying to buy in the cheaper market of Germany. This would cause gold to drift from America to Germany, and this pouring of gold into Germany would increase the amount of money there and hence raise German prices, until they came back into line with the prices in other countries. So in the long run prices in terms of gold tend to remain roughly equal throughout the commercial world. So the rate of exchange between dollar and mark is approximately the ratio between the purchasing power of a dollar and that of a mark. A mark will buy roughly what 23 cents will buy.

So far we can see no error in translating the German income into dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange and comparing it with the American. We would get the same result if we translated both into pounds sterling. The German of 1914 certainly enjoyed less than half as much in terms of recognized *international values,* as the American.

International versus local commodities.—But this is only part of the truth. We have overlooked another phase of the question. What are these goods which merchants always try to buy in the cheapest country and sell in the dearest, thereby forcing their prices toward a dead level throughout the world? Are they *all* kinds of goods? Obviously no, but only those goods which can be readily transported from country to country. We might call them *international commodities.* If a bale of some standard grade of cotton costs twice as much in America as in Egypt, British importers will buy Egyptian cotton in preference to American, until the demand for it becomes so great as to force its price up and the American price down, until both are once more equal. But if the price of a house in America is three times the price of a similar house in Germany, no enterprising merchant attempts to build houses in Germany and then move them to America to sell them at a 200 per cent profit. And if the price of a theater ticket in Germany is one-third the price of a similar quality of entertainment in America, not many Americans will be thereby persuaded to go to Germany to take advantage of this bargain. In short, the mechanism of international trade, which we described in the previous paragraph, has no leveling influence upon the prices of *local* goods and services which cannot be transported. There is a movement of tourists toward those countries where such things can be enjoyed at cheaper prices, but this amounts to nothing compared with the great mass of people who must remain at home and purchase the local goods and services of the place where they happen to live.

The theory is confirmed by the everyday experience of travelers. Thus in Czechoslovakia in 1921 the Czechoslovak crown could be bought on the exchange at about eighty crowns per dollar. Yet it was the common experience of those who lived in Czechoslovakia that year that we could buy for 80 crowns far more meals, hotel accommodations, domestic ser-

vice, railway transportation, or real estate than we could buy for one dollar in the United States. For 25 cents American money we could buy a square meal, or a night's lodging at a good hotel. Railway fares, first class, were about a cent per mile, second class about half a cent. Domestic service could be obtained at three dollars per month and board, a suite of three rooms at $8 per month. Some travelers jumped to the conclusion that all prices were less than in the United States. But when we priced a pair of shoes equivalent to those we used in America, a typewriter, an automobile, we found them costing almost as much and sometimes more than in the United States. The merchants who tried to buy a bushel of wheat, a ton of steel, a bale of cotton, a hundred pounds of wool, paid the world price, which was the same in Europe as in the United States, except for little differences due to transportation charges and tariffs.

Czechoslovak-American price ratios.—Let the reader not think that these were abnormal phenomena due to the war. To be sure, currency depreciation made them more noticeable, but even before the war, the normal cost of local food, service, and shelter, was less in continental Europe than in the United States. As evidence for this, the author ascertained the prices of several kinds of commodities in 1913–1914 in both Czechoslovakia and in the United States. Most of the data were secured from government statistics,[1] some from personal observation and interviews. While many of the data are only approximate, and not strictly comparable, the general arrangement they take brings out very well the principle above stated. For each commodity or service, we computed the ratio which the Czechoslovak price (Austrian crowns translated into dollars at the par exchange rate, 20.3 cents per crown, which prevailed in 1913–14) bore to the American

[1] *Monthly Labor Review*, August, 1925, pp. 15–61, and other issues. Government Printing Office, Washington. Statistická Příručka Republiky Československé II, published by Státní Úřad Statistický. Prague, 1925.

price of the same quantity of an equivalent commodity. The results are as follows:

TABLE I

RATIO OF CZECHOSLOVAK (AUSTRIAN) TO AMERICAN PRICE, 1913–14

	PER CENT
Raw silk	135
Sugar	132
Pig iron	122
White flour	115
Calico cloth	115
Lead	107
Men's Shoes	100 (?)
Bricks	89
Pork	78
Beef	76
Hard Coal	72
Butter	69
Soft coal	67
Men's suits	60 (?)
Street care fare	56
Skilled labor	51
Men's hats	50 (?)
Potatoes	50
Average income of office worker's family	50 (?)
Milk	48
Eggs	47
Average income of worker's family	46 (?)
Clerk's salary	40
Haircut	40
Wages of unskilled labor	36
Rent of worker's family	16 (?)

The author has been able to find no estimate of the national income of Czechoslovakia. But since this country was the most industrialized and prosperous portion of

Austria-Hungary, and bordered upon Germany, it seems reasonable to estimate its per capita income as midway between that given for Germany and that given for Austria-Hungary in Josiah Stamp's summary. This would make it $124. This is 37 per cent of the per capita income of the United States in 1914, $335. To estimate it in another manner, the average daily wage of unskilled male labor in 1914 was in the United States about $1.80, in Czechoslovakia about $0.64.[1] The Czechoslovak wage was thus 36 per cent of the United States wage, thereby tending to confirm our first estimate of the Czechoslovak per capita income as being 37 per cent of the American. (Roughly, the wages of labor are proportional to the general income of a country, as the bulk of the people are laborers.)

Now the thing that stands out from this table is this: international commodities tend to cluster about the 100 per cent ratio; while perishable foods, and goods and services composed largely of local labor, tend downward toward the 37 per cent ratio, finally becoming 36 per cent in the case of pure labor itself. (The rent figure is based upon total rents paid by workers' families, but is probably too low because in Czechoslovakia it represents living quarters of smaller size and poorer quality than in the United States. The rent per room is not given.)

We also compared Czechoslovak with American prices of 1921 (taking the average for the year where possible, otherwise July of the year). Some of these data are more accurate, as the author personally was present to observe them. The ratios were as follows:

[1] National Industrial Conference Board: various research reports on Wages and Statisticka prirucka *op. cit.*

TABLE II

RATIO OF CZECHOSLOVAK TO AMERICAN PRICES AT AVERAGE RATE OF EXCHANGE, 1921

	PER CENT	
Calico Cloth	110	
Lead	107	
Pig Iron	103	
Flour	83	
Men's Shoes	68	(?)
Sugar	64	
Men's Suits	60	
Butter	54	
Meal at first class Hotel	48	
Hard Coal	45	
Pork	37	
Soft Coal	36	
Bricks	35	
Eggs	32	
Board and Room	31	
Beef	31	
Potatoes	29	
Milk	27	
Hair Cut	19	
Railway fare	18	
Skilled Labor	16	
Rent	13	
Unskilled Labor	12	
Hotel room	9	
Street car fare	9	
Wages of locomotive Engineer	5	(?)

Czechoslovak prices in 1921 were in terms of paper crowns, which had depreciated below the gold standard, and were worth only 1.25 cents instead of 20.3 cents per crown. There also was a real impoverishment of the country due to the war, so that the average wage, and presumably the per capita income, was only 12 per cent of the American level, instead of 37 per cent. The ratios all tend to be lower, ranging down

to 12 per cent. But it is significant that the most distinctly international commodities, calico, metals, wheat flour, continue to maintain prices near the American level. Raw cotton, machines, and other international goods likewise maintained prices at or near the world level.

First correction: regional differences in purchasing power.—Now, to return to our original question, is the per capita income of a country an accurate index of its true standard of living? We see that it is not, because even in normal times there is a big difference between countries, as regards the prices of local non-transportable goods and services; and the standard of living is made up partly of these local goods.

We have seen that before the war the Czechoslovak per capita income was about 37 per cent of the American. Let us estimate how the real Czechoslovak standard of living compared with the American. According to Engel's investigations of German pre-war family budgets, the expenditures of an average family in his middle group ($450 to $600 annual family income) were as follows:

TABLE III

	WEIGHTS (PER CENT OF EXPENDITURE)	ESTIMATED RATIO OF CZECHOSLOVAK TO AMERICAN PRICE (for each class of goods and services)
Food	55	70
Clothing	10	80
Lodging	12	37
Fuel and light	5	80
Education and Religion	3.5	37
Legal Protection	2	37
Health	2	37
Comfort and Recreation	2.5	70
Weighted average ratio	.....	66

It is not likely that the distribution would be much different for Czechoslovakia. Now lodging, education and religion, legal protection, and health are composed almost entirely of locally produced goods and services, in other words labor, whose price was about 37 per cent of the American price. The other items are composed partly of local goods and services, and partly of international commodities. Estimating roughly from the ratios given in Table I and from other observations made by the writer, the total food supply of the family must have cost about 70 per cent of the American price for the same or equivalent articles. The corresponding ratios for clothing would be 80 per cent, and for the other items as noted. Now weighting these estimated ratios in column 1, we get an average ratio of about 66 per cent—the ratio of the total *cost of living* of the average family in Czechoslovakia to the *cost of an equivalent scale of living* in America. The Austrian pre-war crown, although equal on the international exchange to 20.3 American cents, actually went half again as far in purchasing power over those goods which actually make up a standard of living, because the cost of the goods was only two-thirds as much as in America. The true ratio of the Czechoslovak to the American standard of living was not $\frac{\$124}{\$335}=37\%$, but $\frac{124}{335}\times\frac{100}{66}=56\%$. We were not quite twice as well off as they, instead of nearly three times as well off as at first appeared.

By a similar calculation for 1921, the Czechoslovak cost of living was about 43 per cent of the American, and the actual standard of living about 28 per cent of ours, not 12 per cent as the average money wages would indicate. The war had reduced theirs by about half, while ours had remained about the same.

We have now made the *first correction* necessary to make *per capita money income* a true barometer of welfare. Such a correction should be applied not only in comparing two

countries, but also sometimes in comparing different regions in the same country. Thus the per capita income of the farm population in California was $726 in 1921 while that of the farm population of Virginia was $124.[1] The non-farm population of New York had a per capita income of $805, the non-farm population of North Carolina $351. But unskilled male labor can be hired in the South at 2 dollars a day: in the North it is 3 to 4 dollars. In consequence domestic and personal service and many other forms of service are cheaper in the South. Food and fuel are also cheaper. So the sectional differences in money income reflect less extreme differences in real income or real standard of living.

Comparing the United States with Oriental countries, these differences are and for many years have been even more extreme. Enough eggs, rice, and other local food to keep a man alive in China cost far less than in the United States, and in India a competent servant could, some years ago at least, be hired for five cents a day.

Why internal prices are low in poor countries.—The reason why labor and local commodities and services are so much cheaper in the poorer countries is that labor there is less productive in the industries which compete in the international markets. To produce 100 yards of cotton cloth in India takes several times as much labor power as to produce the same amount of the same kind of cloth in America or England. This is because of limited machinery, sometimes limited resources, tedious hand work, poor organization, low skill, and inefficient working habits. Naturally the worker earns much less. British coal mines produce only 200 or 250 tons per man per year as against an American figure of 700, partly because of worked-out mines. The English coal miner earns consequently much less than the American.

The general level of a country's wages, in terms of inter-

[1] Leven, Maurice, "Income in the Various States," National Bureau of Economic Research, N. Y., 1925.

national gold money, is fixed by the productivity of labor in those goods which reach the international markets. But its productivity in the things upon which local existence depends may be much nearer our own than these money wages indicate. That is the answer to the enigma presented by the poorer Chinese families in Peking living upon $100 per year when social workers find $1300 necessary for the "bare subsistence" of a family in New York.[1] The real Chinese standard of living may be as low as a third or even a fourth of ours; but it is certainly greater than one thirteenth. Similar corrections must be made for Japan and Spain, and the other low income countries in Table 1.

Second correction: changing price levels.—When per capita incomes at two different periods of time are compared, a second correction is necessary. The correction is made necessary by the fact that the value of money itself does not remain constant, but goes up and down with changes in the production of gold, changes in the use of bank credit, and changes in business conditions. Thus our per capita national income in 1914 was $335, but in 1918 it was $586. Everyone knows that the prices of practically all goods rose between 1914 and 1918 and that wages and incomes went up also. This was due to an abnormal increase in credit stimulated by the war, which meant more circulating currency, while the physical amount of goods and services for which money was paid did not greatly change. More currency, same goods, necessarily means higher prices, according to a well known economic law.[2]

Using 1914 as a base, the index number of general prices in the United States was 161. That is, prices, on the average, of all goods, were in 1918 about 61 per cent greater than in

[1] Gamble and Burgess, "Peking, a Social Survey."

[2] The equation of exchange: $MV = PT$, where M = the quantity of money and credit in circulation, V = its velocity of circulation, P = the general level of prices, and T = the volume of goods and services exchanged.

1914. Dividing $586 by this index number of 161 we get $372, which was the average per capita income of 1918 when expressed in terms of 1914 prices. This we see is just a little higher than the 1914 figure.[1]

It is the practice of many business concerns and other institutions to publish financial figures showing a great increase in business, profits, and so on, as time goes on. The reader should be on his guard against such comparisons, and before putting any stock in them he should find out whether the big figures have been properly "deflated," as the economist says, by dividing by the index number of general prices.

Third correction: incomes in kind and self service.—A clergyman who receives 3000 dollars salary does not seem quite so badly underpaid when it is noted that he receives also the free use of a home, for which on the market he would have to pay at least 1000 dollars rent. In computing statistics of farmers' standards of living, the Department of Agriculture has allowed for incomes in kind. The food the farmer supplies to his own table is estimated, and charged to his expenses at a price midway between the retail price of the same food and the price he would get for it if he sold it. If he owns his house, he is charged with a theoretical rent equal to one-tenth the value of the house. In this way his expenditures are made comparable with those of the city worker, who has to buy all his food and to pay rent for his home. But there are other things, following the same principle, for which the statisticians have not allowed. A part of every family's standard of living is made up of unpaid services rendered by the household to its own members. This we might call self-service. To make a complete and accurate picture of the economic life of a community, the services of the homemakers should be added, at their market value, to the total income of the community.

[1] See "Income in the United States," Vol. I, by the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1921, Harcourt, pp. 69–81.

Theoretically an increase in money incomes and money expenditures could be due entirely to an increase in *specialization,* without any change in the real standard of living. For instance, suppose that a family has been in the habit of baking its own bread, doing its own laundry, cooking, and sewing, without the assistance of any hired servants. The husband, we will say, has also helped by shopping, and buying at cash and carry stores. He has pressed his own suits, shined his own shoes, and made minor repairs about the house. Suppose now that the wife and older daughter, who have been working in the home, go out into a factory, that the husband continues to work in his shop at the same hourly rate of pay but works more hours. The family now hires a servant to do all the work, sends its laundry out, buys bakery bread and prepared breakfast foods; the husband sends his clothes to a tailor, patronizes the shoe shine parlors, and all buying is done by order and delivery from a few regularly patronized stores at somewhat higher prices. Mechanics are called in to make all household repairs. Let us say for simplicity that the family just earns enough money by its extra outside work to pay the additional expenses, and that the total time spent in labor of all kinds is just the same as before. Now clearly the total money income of the family will be greater than before, and its total expenditures correspondingly greater. Its actual standard of living however is the same. The difference in money value is due solely to the fact that a lot of work formerly done for one's self or one's own family and therefore without pay, is now done by outside specialists at a money price. The family has changed the character of its own labor; devoting all its time to paid, specialized labor, and none to self-service; it has not changed the total amount of its labor nor has it changed the amount of goods and services consumed.

As there is one home-maker in the United States for every two persons engaged in gainful occupations, it follows that about one-third of the total labor even in this advanced, highly

specialized country, is unpaid self-service, not counted in the national income. In less advanced countries the proportion of self-service may be much greater, and this may account *in part* for their lower money incomes. Particularly in agricultural regions are there many items of self-service, such as building, repairing, home sewing, baking, cooking, which even the careful statistics of the Department of Agriculture would fail to include.

In Czechoslovakia one sees passengers carrying their own heavy baggage which in the United States would be entrusted to express companies. More than here, laundry work is done at home. Less use is made of bakers' bread and factory prepared foods. Among the rural people home sewing replaces to a large extent the clothing industry, and in the more remote regions even spinning is done at home. Housewives spend more time shopping about for small purchases, and higgling on the market is common. The stores have no regular delivery service. These items would make the money income lower than it would be if specialization were carried as far as it is with us, and hence their real standard of living, as compared with ours, should perhaps be raised above the 56 per cent obtained after the first correction.

But on the other hand, servants are employed by a larger proportion of families than with us, households on the average are physically smaller and require less labor to maintain, and among the laboring classes more wives work outside the home than with us. These facts work in the reverse direction; toward specialization or paid service. They therefore would tend to *lower* our estimate of the Czechoslovak real standard of living. Whether they would neutralize the effect of the items in the previous paragraph, we cannot say without a more detailed investigation.

Real income as a barometer.—If we make these three corrections above, for (1) differences in local purchasing power, (2) changing price levels, and (3) income in kind and self

service, we get what the economist calls *real income*: that is, the total value of economic goods and services actually consumed, measured in terms of a fixed standard money, which assigns to any given commodity in any country the same value that it assigns to an equivalent commodity in any other country. It might seem that this real income, if it could be ascertained—and it could be with fair accuracy—would be an ideal barometer of a people's welfare. But it is not, for reasons that we presently shall see. To get a true barometer we shall have to make several further corrections.

Fourth correction: leisure and interesting labor.—If two countries have an equal standard of living as measured by real income, but the average inhabitant in A works 2400 hours per year while in B he has to work only 2000 hours, obviously B's standard is purchased at a lesser cost. This is equivalent to saying that B's is the higher standard, for it includes 400 extra hours per capita per year of leisure to enjoy the fruits of labor. We have no adequate data to hazard even a guess as to whether the average person works longer hours in the United States or in Czechoslovakia. In general the customary hours of wage labor are shorter over there. An eight-hour law for men as well as women is enforced in most industries there, while in the United States the constitution hinders such legislation. Also they have many religious holidays that we do not celebrate. But the Czechoslovak women appear to work harder and longer than American women, and children are pressed into household service and odd jobs when in the United States they would be playing.

Incidentally, in China and Japan, to judge by the ways of their people who have come to California, daily labor is more prolonged than with us. At a recent international conference the Japanese refused to accede to Western standards of the industrial working day, and they continue to work even their women and children long hours. These facts would require a downward correction in their per capita income to

make it a true barometer of welfare. But on the other hand, where hours are long, there is often much leisure interspersed during the day's work. The pace may be slower and the work itself thereby less fatiguing. These factors are difficult to measure.

When actual enjoyment is derived from one's job, we have an item which should be added to the standard of living. Certainly life is better for the worker who enjoys four hours of his eight-hour day than for the one who with equal work and equal wages, spends the whole day longing for quitting time. Comparing classes, this item would make big differences. The farmer and the garage mechanic can be said, for this reason, to enjoy a higher standard than the equally paid and equally worked cotton mill machine tender; and the professor or clergyman probably enjoys a higher standard than the equally paid clerk or minor executive. The average American farmer's work is probably more interesting today than fifty years ago; the average industrial laborer's work possibly less so. But comparing whole nations or communities, it is impossible to say with our present data that the labor of one is on the average more or less interesting than that of another.

Fifth correction: free and multiple utilities.—Italy enjoys as free goods a climate and a variety of scenery which add something to her welfare. In tropical countries there is much food to be picked up free. When a commodity gives service to many persons at the same cost as would otherwise be required for its service to only one person, we speak of *multiple utility.* Thus an expenditure of 100 dollars for a victrola would yield much more satisfaction if it could be moved about from home to home according to needs than if it lay idle most of the time in one home. A hundred dollars' worth of books will render much more utility when kept in a public library than when on the shelves of individual owners.

In general Czechoslovakia seems to show greater use of multiple utilities than the United States. Theaters are owned

and operated by government bodies and their services rendered at relatively cheap rates to the people. Public parks, baths, art galleries, etc., seem to play a larger role in the life of the people. We have not the data, however, for any reliable comparison. But if appearances are reliable in this case, Czechoslovakia deserves an upward correction in its standard of living.

The distribution of expenditures.—So far we have been considering various items that would add to, or subtract from, the standard of living, as measured by money income or by real income. But there is another sort of correction that must be applied before we get our true barometer of welfare. These corrections depend upon the way expenditure is distributed. Imagine three neighboring families, equal in size and in all the other respects previously considered in this chapter, each having an annual income and an annual expenditure of $3000, distributed as follows:

FAMILY	A	B	C
Food	$ 500	$ 700	$ 900
Rent	300	600	900
Clothing	600	400	700
Health and medical service	0	100	300
Misc. necessities	100	100	100
Recreation, education	1500	1100	100
	$3000	$3000	$3000

Do these families really enjoy equal degrees of welfare?

The household economist will tell us that $500 is too little to feed adequately a family of five. Family A probably suffers therefore from inferior food. On the other hand $900 is more than necessary. C may be wasteful, or unduly whimsical, or because of health defects may require special foods. In any case this $900 does not all represent real welfare, but

in part waste or personal handicaps in the enjoyment of life. In rent, A is obviously skimping and living in quarters which are cramped and possibly unsanitary or dirty. These produce irritation and discomfort, and prevent the fullest development of personal tastes and personal freedom, which cannot be had without adequate space. Family C on the other hand is spending more for rent than its income warránts, 20 per cent being the normal figure. Four hundred is adequate to clothe a family in health, decency and comfort, though not enough to permit any competition for prestige or any special pleasure from clothing. No family will ever suffer any physical pain or hardship on 400 dollars' worth of carefully chosen clothing. Families A and C, by spending more, are not buying any extra comfort, but are gratifying whims or trying to compete with others. In medical expenses B is about normal. That A spends nothing for medicine and health does not indicate that it is unusually healthy. It probably means a neglect of health that is leading to eventual suffering and hardship. On the other hand, a family like C, which spends $300 for this item, is probably compelled to do so by the misfortune of having poor health.

In short, B is probably enjoying more real utility for its money than either A or C. In recreation and education, the real luxuries of life, A has the most. But A's recreation and education are purchased at the expense of neglected health, irritating home conditions and poor feeding. On the other hand C has sacrificed recreation and education almost entirely, partly on account of its health misfortunes, but mostly on account of its extravagance in clothing and rent, and its whimsicality and wastefulness with food.

Necessities and luxuries.—All utilities have been classified into necessities and luxuries. But most of the things we call necessities are not essential to life itself. Without clothing of the conventional forms, we should not die. We should not even suffer any *physical* discomfort. We could clothe

ourselves in summer in a simple cotton tunic, and in winter, like the Chinese coolie, in thick padded cotton pajamas. The true *subsistence* minimum for clothing is nearer to $30 per family than to the $300 allowed by social workers. What we mean by necessity is something *we feel we must have,* in other words, something whose absence would cause *some kind of suffering,* mental or physical. By luxury we imply that the presence of a commodity gives us pleasure but that its absence does not produce suffering.

Now there is one point which economics has failed to emphasize sufficiently. That is, that there are mental as well as physical necessities. We have shown in previous chapters how, by the conditioned reflex process, many objects, biologically indifferent, become pleasant. Some of them not only become pleasant, but their absence becomes painful. Such an object is a mental necessity. Mental or psychological necessities may be based upon universal, personal or cultural sentiments or tastes. Physical necessities, of course, are based upon original human nature. (See Chapters II and V.)

We might classify all utilities as follows:

1. Physical necessities: needed to prevent death or physical suffering.		
2. Psychological necessities: needed to prevent mental suffering; that is, to satisfy acquired wants which have become *imperative.*	A. Universal B. Personal C. Cultural	These goods yield negative or *relief-utility*
3. True luxuries: not needed to prevent suffering at all, but increasing the positive enjoyment of life.		These goods yield positive or *pleasure-utility*

To be sure, this classification is easier in the abstract than

in the concrete. It will be difficult to pigeonhole many commodities in this scheme, but it will be possible to say, roughly, that certain kinds of commodities tend to fall largely into certain of the above classes.

Physical necessities would include food, fuel, shelter, some protection for the skin, and medical service, as far as these things are necessary to preserve perfect health and physical comfort. The greater part of clothing, and a large part of household goods are psychological, mostly cultural necessities. Their absence would produce no ill health nor physical discomfort, but would produce shame, owing to cultural standards. With the well-to-do classes, evening dress, six-cylinder cars and elaborate entertainment of guests are not so much true luxuries as they are psychological, cultural necessities. The mental pain of not having them would be greater than the actual pleasure derived from having them. Recreational goods, amusements, travel, and goods collected as hobbies, are to a large extent true luxuries.

As we shall see later, the most important and serious of the psychological necessities are group 2C, the *cultural* necessities. The true luxuries might also be subdivided into those based on universal, personal, and cultural tastes. But the most significant are probably those based more or less on *personal* tastes, because universal and cultural tastes tend to become imperative and hence to enter the class of psychological necessities.

Sixth correction: unsatisfied physical necessities.—Now let us go back to the 3000 dollar families we were studying. The reason for the inferiority of A's standard was that physical necessities were not fully met. It satisfied psychological necessities and luxuries at the expense of proper feeding and care of health. Eventually such a family will suffer pain that will greatly detract from any pleasure they get from their other utilities. Hence before we put a final rating on any standard of living, we must ascertain whether any physical

necessities are left unsatisfied for the sake of catering to other wants. If so, the standard must be marked down. In Czechoslovakia high disease rates and infant mortality showed that there was insufficient expenditure on health. Her people might have been better off in real welfare to have cut still more on clothing and recreation and to have supported more physicians, public health officers, nurses, hospitals, and health resort facilities. The seemingly highest standard of living is worth nothing at all when sickness prevents all enjoyment of life. Lack of dental attention is, even in our own country, one of the greatest weaknesses in the average standard of living. Another weakness is poorly balanced diet.

Sometimes culture puts a tabu upon the full satisfaction of physical necessities. It is more of a physical necessity to be warmly dressed in winter than to be dressed in style, because failure to keep warm causes physical pain, while failure to dress in style does not. Yet women suffer cold legs in winter and men perspire in the summer for the sake of convention. Ventilation and cooling apparatus in summer, comfortable chairs, quickly accessible drinking water and comfort stations, are far more necessary in a physical sense than neckties, stockings, rugs, and table linen. Yet society scorns him who fails to have the latter, and also scorns him who makes too much fuss about the former. To be fussy about the finer details of table service is considered a sign of good breeding, but to be equally fussy about the temperature of a room or the tightness of a shoe is often regarded as a sign of undue nervousness. Civilized as well as primitive men have their pet discomforts from which it is bad form to seek relief.

American culture is superior to European in discovering and satisfying these minor physical needs. Europeans ridicule us because we seem to care more for the plumbing, lighting, and ventilation of a building than for its architectural style. If we do, it is one respect in which we are more rational than they.

Seventh correction: psychological necessities.—Family C had an abnormal expense for medical service. This was due to ill health. A family afflicted by this burden has abnormally high physical necessities. A larger sum of money is required to keep such a family from physical suffering than a normal family. Consequently they have less money to spend for true luxuries. But C also showed abnormal expenses for rent and clothes. These were not due, however, to physical necessity. In part they reflected a certain amount of positive enjoyment, through the satisfaction of more elaborate tastes, and to that extent they may be considered true luxury expenses. These enjoyments can be considered as partial substitutes for the greater recreation enjoyed by A and B. Family C may have chosen to take its recreation in *having* rather than in *going* or *doing* or *using*. If such a choice were *free*, it would not detract from welfare. But in our culture such a choice usually is not free. Skimping on dress or dwelling house brings with it a social disapproval that does not follow skimping on recreation or education. What one *has* is more easily observed than what one *does*, and becomes more readily a subject of competition. Once competition enters, then mental suffering enters as the penalty for defeat. Family C evidently had been drawn into this competition more than the others. Its large expenses for clothing and rent reflected not entirely the free choice of pleasures, but partly the compulsion of *psychological necessities* which the other families did not feel.

We create an artificial difficulty, such as that of enjoying one's self at certain social functions without evening dress, and then say to ourselves: "It will cost me about sixty dollars and a few visits to the tailor to get out of this difficulty, but it will be well worth the price." Meanwhile we forget that if the difficulty had not existed, that sixty dollars could have been spent toward making easy situations still more pleasant. It is well for the motorist to be thankful that it

cost him only ten dollars to be pulled out of the ditch, but also well to remember that if he had not gotten into the ditch, the ten dollars would have carried him 300 miles farther toward his destination.

The satisfaction of all kinds of necessities may be called negative or *relief utility*. The other kind of utility may be called positive or *pleasure utility*. A pleasure utility is derived from a service whose presence gives pleasure but whose absence gives no suffering. With pleasure utility it is a case of pure gain, with relief utility it is merely the avoidance of loss. The only true luxuries of life are the things which give us pleasure utility; they are the things we can freely and individually choose without any feeling of pressure or necessity. Contrary to a common notion, the aim should be to have as much luxury as possible. And this is to be accomplished not only by having more income but also by keeping necessities at a minimum, both physical and psychological.

Increased necessities reduce welfare.—When an epidemic strikes a community it is easy to see that its welfare is reduced. To be sure the doctors are earning more money, and many women formerly occupied in their homes may go forth to serve as paid nurses. In fact, the money income and the real income may remain the same as before. But the community welfare is reduced because the income is spent in a less satisfying manner. Money (in the last analysis labor-time) that formerly could be spent with more or less freedom of choice, for travel, amusement, or what not, *must* now be spent for medical services. Luxuries have given place to a necessity. For this reason alone, disregarding the suffering due to the sickness, the community's welfare is reduced.

If it were a serious crime wave rather than a disease which struck the community the same thing would be true. Everybody might be working as hard and earning as much as before, but an increased amount of labor would go into detective and police work, legal activity, the making of locks and keys,

the guarding of buildings, and so on. This labor would have to be paid for by the citizens, and this would mean so much less money available for things of free choice.

But suppose now that the community were to be struck by a new fashion, a fashion that required the scrapping of thousands of dollars' worth of only half-worn clothing and the buying of new garments. Would the newspapers blazon forth with headlines like those they used in the case of a recent blizzard, "Fashion causes $100,000 damage in Thomasville"? Yet it would be damage just as truly as that done by the epidemic, the crime wave or the blizzard.

Perhaps the difficulty which the average man, or woman, has in seeing this point is due to the fact that fashion brings opportunities for a pleasure which is more obvious on the surface than is the accompanying damage and loss. There is a satisfaction in changing your costume, and in competing with others in the effort to attract favorable attention to your personal appearance. But there is also enjoyment to be gained from rebuilding your house after a fire, or from nursing the sick and wounded, or from shoveling your sidewalk after a snowstorm. Every great calamity brings with it the heroism and pleasurable excitement of rendering emergency service. But it rather spoils this pleasure if you have an inner hunch that you might have prevented the calamity's occurrence. And as man learns more about the mysteries of his own culture, he may learn to control its course, and then he will derive scant satisfaction from paying tribute to a parasite he might have eradicated.

The multiplication of wants a questionable sign of progress.—Most economists teach that welfare is increased by the expanding and varying of human wants. They tell us that the Mexican peon, the African negro, produce little because their wants are few. To improve their condition, we must stimulate their wants. Imbued with this philosophy, the salesman goes into foreign lands with the feeling that he is a mis-

sionary, a harbinger of joy and happiness to a backward and soul-starved people. This is true only in so far as the stimulated wants consist in a better knowledge of physical necessities, such as the means of curing disease, and in true luxuries, such as recreational goods. But when we teach the poor benighted savage to feel a *necessity* for something, such as tobacco, alcohol, European clothing, shoes, without which he was healthy, happy and comfortable, we do him only harm.

How psychological necessities are created.—We seem to have blamed culture for creating the *unnecessary necessities* of life. But do they not arise equally out of personal tastes? When a person learns to smoke, for example, he at first adds a new pleasure utility to his life, a true luxury. But as soon as he has formed the habit, he begins to be uncomfortable without his tobacco. Its absence may give him as much suffering as its presence gives him enjoyment. His pleasure utility is partly offset by a psychological necessity; he is no longer free to choose how he shall spend that five dollars per month; and his net welfare is reduced. The tobacco habit is of course a part of culture, but it is a personally acquired trait in the sense used in this book, for it is acquired only by certain individuals and not by all who live under a given culture. There are also other personal tastes which acquire an imperative quality, so that they *must* be satisfied under pain of disappointment or some other mental suffering. Again, some psychological necessities may be *universal,* as suggested in the classification a few pages back. Is it not, then, human nature, rather than culture, which is responsible for attaching to every joy of possession a corresponding sorrow of non-possession?

We think not. Everyone knows from his own experience that he enjoys many personal pleasures which are purely optional. If he is not in position to get them, he takes something else as a substitute and suffers no unhappiness. The imperative quality that attaches to others usually could be

removed by medical or psychiatric treatment. If the feeling of "must have" comes from within yourself, you may cure it by personal philosophy. But if it comes from the attitude of your fellow men it is a different matter. The most important and serious of our psychological necessities are the *cultural* necessities, rather than those which are universally or personally acquired. They become necessities through the fact that punishment is applied to the non-conformist. This punishment may take the form of ridicule, ostracism, scorn, or petty persecution, but in any case it is punishment. The little bell that tinkles outside some hatshops after September 15, when a man goes by wearing a straw, is an amusing symbol of a cultural tyranny which in the aggregate is enormous.

Competitive consumption a prominent feature of Anglo-Saxon culture.—Going back to our comparison between Czechoslovakia and the United States, should we make any correction in the welfare ratio on account of any difference in psychological necessities? Measurements are lacking, but general observation suggests that there should be an upward correction for Czechoslovakia. Although there is over there a class which feels strongly the urge for respectability, the masses of the people seem freer from competitive and compulsory consumption than the masses in the United States. This seems generally true of continental Europe. We remember an incident which illustrates although it alone does not prove our point. One Sunday afternoon we saw a lively ball game of some sort on a tennis court in one of the better residential sections of Prague. The court was evidently owned by some private club, and men and women, presumably of middle class extraction, were playing together. Some were dressed in the regular street costume of any European city, and looked as if they might have just come from church. Others were in workaday trousers, or nondescript house dresses, several were barefooted, and one of the men was stripped to the waist. In America these same people probably

would have felt it impossible to appear on a playing court without some "respectable" sport costume. They would have regarded sport as primarily something to be looked at.

We have seen that Czechoslovakia in 1914 had a per capita income of about 37 per cent of that of the United States. The first correction raised our estimate of her welfare to 56 per cent of the American level. The second correction would not apply, the third is uncertain, the fourth and fifth probably upward, the sixth downward, and seventh certainly upward. If we could measure all these factors, we might find that Czechoslovakia enjoyed a degree of welfare as high as 70 per cent of the American standard.

With the growth of economic prosperity and the decline of costs, will not all countries be drawn into the maelstrom of competitive consumption? In a caste-bound society each class is content with its own standard of living and has no urge to imitate its superiors. But once let the lines between classes be broken down, and the whole society is thrown into a desperate struggle to appear equal to the pace setters. Will Central and Eastern Europe follow the Anglo-Saxon world in this mad scramble for respectability?

For the answer it may be suggestive to watch Russia. There is a possibility that a very new pattern of culture is building there. The nature of this pattern is faintly suggested by pictures we occasionally see, showing that men can dress in plain working clothes and at the same time run the affairs of a great state. If Russia can destroy competition in the consumption of wealth, she will have made an invention far more epochal in the history of human culture than was her doing away with competition in the production of wealth.

Summary.—As far as it goes, the most accurate measuring stick of human values is money. The per capita money income of a given country furnishes some indication of that country's general welfare as compared with other countries. This comparison can be made more accurate by applying sev-

eral corrections: corrections for regional differences in the internal purchasing power of money, for changing price levels, for incomes in kind and self service, for leisure and the interestingness of labor, for free and multiple utilities, for unsatisfied physical necessities, for psychological necessities. The high money incomes of western countries, especially America, probably overestimate our true welfare, because of the great expense to which we are subject for competitive consumption. The weakness of our standard of living does not lie in our true luxuries, that is, enjoyments freely chosen by the individual, but in the vast amount of artificial necessities created by our culture.

CHAPTER X

A PROPOSED BAROMETER OF WELFARE

Social and vital statistics as indices of welfare.—In the previous chapter we suggested how the usual economic yardstick could, after numerous corrections, be used as a barometer of welfare. In this chapter we shall attack the problem from a little different angle. Roger Babson publishes every month his barometer of general business activity. He makes this by combining into one composite index statistics of steel production, bank clearings, numbers of men employed, etc. Our barometer of welfare likewise will be constructed by combining several kinds of statistical data. It will take a great deal of further research to decide just how, and in what proportions, these indices should be combined. But we can suggest here the elements that should go into such a barometer:

A. Biological Welfare

1. An index of *longevity,* obtained from birth rates, death rates, and insurance statistics on the expectation of human life.
2. An index of *health* and physical soundness obtained from statistics of illness, accidents, disablement, from physical examinations made by insurance companies, army examiners, the Life Extension Institute, and other agencies.

B. Mental Welfare

3. An index of *mental adjustment or mental health,* obtained from statistics of crimes, suicides, insanity, pauperism, unemployment, from facts about social insurance, etc.

4. An index of *leisure time,* obtained from statistics of the hours of labor, figures on commuting, etc.
5. An index of per capita *consumption* of true luxuries, obtained from statistics of production, imports, exports, or consumption, of *certain kinds* of commodities.
6. An index of *recreational variety,* obtained from statistics of amusements, books and magazines, athletic games, passenger travel, tourist automobile traffic, social gatherings, shifts of population during vacation periods, etc.
7. An index of *individual liberty,* obtained by a study of the laws and customs of the people, with a special view to discovering needless coercions.

Obviously not all of the required statistics are now available, though most of them could be obtained. A nation capable of putting through the colossal undertaking of our census could gather the information necessary to construct this barometer of welfare. To be sure certain radical measures would be necessary. The entire medical profession would need to come under a system of supervision and report making more elaborate than that of today. It would be well worth while for the government to pay for a certain amount of clerical assistance for every physician in the country, in order to secure this information. Clergymen, lawyers, social workers and school teachers might also be required to make certain reports.

1. Longevity.—Dr. Norman Bridge says, "The average length of life is the one and only sure index of whether the world is growing better; it is the unemotional but inexorable measuring log of real social progress that can be told in figures." Better a short life and a happy one, say some; but other things being equal, it is axiomatic that long life means greater happiness. The greatest joys of living depend upon filling out individual patterns of personal experience, built upon acquired personal tastes. In these patterns pleasure

is obtained by combining new experiences with a rich memory of past experiences. This requires time. The first twenty years of life must be devoted to the simpler joys and to preparation and to learning what "life is all about." Not until the age of thirty is it possible to gain in large measure those more complex intellectual pleasures which depend upon wide knowledge and past experience. Furthermore, the more complex our culture, the longer the time necessary to gain the power to appreciate it.

It seems a biological necessity that each individual life must some day disintegrate, transmitting as best it can to younger lives those memories and experiences that are most worth preserving. But obviously it is better that this replacement and transmission occur at intervals as *long* as possible, so that the time devoted to true living may be large in proportion to the time devoted to preparation and transmission.

Furthermore the fact that people independently of any competition or cultural prejudice, universally do desire to live as long as possible is in itself proof that long life is desirable.

Longevity is a fundamental test of welfare for still other reasons of less direct character. One reason is the tremendous economic waste of working and caring for children in those years when they are of necessity social parasites, only to have them die before they get the chance to use the preparation they have received. Another is the fact that a rapid turn-over of population means more frequent experiences of grief, more frequent funerals, and all that goes with them.

In China, with an annual birthrate of fifty per thousand of the living population, and a death rate practically the same, the average person lives 1000/50 or twenty years. In the United States we have now a birth rate of about twenty-three and a death rate of twelve. This means a *natural increase* of population of eleven per thousand (1.1%) per year, in addition to the increase from immigration. Now an increasing population means a young population. More children are

born each year than are enough to replace their dying grandparents. It follows that such a population will contain a much larger proportion of youthful persons than will a population where there are just enough births to replace the deaths. The death rates in youth are low, and hence our general death rate, 12, is lower than it will be after our population becomes stationary. In the future we must expect our death rate to increase somewhat, but this will not necessarily mean a lessening of average longevity. The death rate is an index of longevity only when we *correct* it. That is to say we must figure what our death rate *would be* if our birth rate were reduced until it balanced the death rate. In France, whose population has been stationary for some years, the death rate is nineteen. This does not mean that the French are shorter lived than Americans, but that, being a stationary population, they have a larger per cent of old persons.

Professor East, in "Mankind at the Crossroads," thinks it reasonable to expect that by applying all present medical knowledge we could keep our death rate to sixteen even with a stationary population. If this were the case it would mean an average longevity of 1000/16 or sixty-six years. The average longevity in the United States today is fifty-three years. If it could be raised to sixty-six as East thinks, it would mean of course a great many more people living to be ninety than we have today.

In any case it is obvious that the average Western child has much more to anticipate than the average Chinese child, and that his life is more worth while.

2. Health.—Health already has been roughly measured by our longevity index. But that index gives us no certain indication of the extent of non-fatal diseases, injuries, and bodily defects which make up a large part of human suffering. It is estimated that at any given time about three per cent of the population of the United States is ill, and that each gainfully occupied person loses on the average eight

working days per year because of illness. In addition there is a large percentage of persons who, though able to work, are below par in health and whose existence consequently is one of more or less suffering. At least they fail to get the full joy out of life.

Physical defects and disabilities should not count so heavily per day as periods of active sickness. Except on occasions there may be little or no physical pain. The evil of being crippled is largely mental suffering, which nevertheless is great. The patient compares his present state with the past, or with what might have been, and thereby suffers a mental anguish from which a crippled animal would be free. In modern society this anguish is somewhat alleviated by financial compensation, by the kindly attitude shown toward handicapped persons, and by the provision on their behalf of special opportunities.

The draft boards discovered that about 29 per cent of our young men were unfit for full military service. Seven per cent had conditions preventing full mobility. Only 50 per cent were without blemish worth recording.

We are better off, however, than most countries in respect to health. It is estimated that the general sickness rate in Mexico is three times as great as with us.

Accident rates would occupy an important place in our barometer.

Dr. William Osler said: "Measure as we may the progress of the world, there is no one measure which can compare with the decrease of physical suffering in man, woman, and child when stricken by disease or accident."

3. Mental adjustment or mental health.—At first sight it might seem that one of the best indices of the amount of mental suffering in a country would be the *suicide rate*. While only a very small per cent of unhappy persons take their lives, yet it might be thought that the number who reach that acute state of unhappiness bears a constant though small ratio to

the number who suffer the lesser degrees of misery. But there are such unexplained differences in the suicide rate from country to country that it seems a quite unreliable index. Thus from 1901 to 1910 suicide rates per 100,000 population were as follows:

United Kingdom	9
Prussia	20
Saxony	33
France	22
Belgium	14
Italy	7
Denmark	10
Sweden	15
Norway	5

The rates of the year 1900 for the American population varied according to the nativity of the mother of the suicide, as follows:

MOTHER'S BIRTHPLACE	RATES FOR AMERICAN-BORN CHILDREN
France	22
Germany	19
England and Wales	10
Ireland	6
Russia and Poland	6
Italy	5

A comparison of these two tables will show that the rates for the various peoples are strikingly maintained by their American offspring. In 1922 the rates for the registration area of the United States were 12.6 for whites and 4.3 for colored; 14.3 for cities and 9.5 for rural districts.[1]

[1] Mayo-Smith, "Statistics and Sociology." See also article on "Suicide," New International Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 647, 2d Edn., 1918, Dodd, Mead & Co., N. Y.

It seems clear that suicide is a culture trait which varies greatly with nationality and region, but is not determined by physical environment, race, or population density. It seems to be a matter of diffusion. In general it is higher with advanced peoples and in cities, but this does not explain why England, the most highly industrialized nation of all, has a rate so much lower than Germany and France.

It seems like a wild guess to conclude that Germans are two or three times as unhappy as Englishmen. Suicide is only one of many possible reactions to unhappiness. In Japan, and to a certain extent in Germany, there is something in the *mores* which encourages it. It is a more or less approved way of getting out of an intolerable situation, carrying with it a certain prestige, which in other countries is lacking. Thus we remember a German moving picture drama which seemed quite typical of much that is German. It ends with the hero, after getting into a bad scrape, killing himself to "save his honor."

Likewise rising *divorce rates* were once thought to indicate increasing unhappiness in the home. They may mean nothing of the kind. They may indicate merely that a door formerly closed upon unhappy prisoners is now open.

Suicide and divorce are nevertheless *protests* against conditions which cause mental suffering. If we could get the combined statistics of *all kinds* of protests, those which register themselves at the police station, at the lawyer's office, the court, the insane hospital, the physician's office, and those which register upon the ear of the clergyman and the social worker, we might have a roughly accurate index.

Especially promising for this inquiry are statistics of *crime* and juvenile *delinquency*. A crime indicates mental suffering in a double manner. It is usually the *result* of some kind of mental maladjustment on the part of the criminal, and it is also the *cause* of mental suffering to the victim. It is to be hoped that the various commissions now studying

crime will work out a uniform system of criminal statistics, by which reliable comparisons can be made between one place and another, and between one time and another. Probably only certain classes of crime should be used in our index.

But here again caution is necessary because crime rates may vary greatly owing to cultural diffusion without any corresponding variation in the adjustments of human nature to its environment.

Crime may become fashionable and it may go out of fashion. This would destroy its value as an index of the maladjustment from which it resulted, but not as an index of the suffering caused to the victims.

It would be helpful if we could get community statistics on certain kinds of *minor offenses* not reported to the police, and which legally might not be crimes at all. School teachers and clergymen might supply such information. The number of trespasses and other *torts, civil complaints* and *damage suits,* would also be partial indices of mental suffering.

The *insanity rate* might become one of the most accurate indices. It is free from the influence of cultural diffusion, and depends upon the biological heredity of individuals plus the actual stress and strain of life. If heredity were equally good in two districts, the insanity rates would seem to be excellent indicators of the amount of this stress and strain. The difficulty here is that it does not always take the same degree of mental disease to put a person in the hospital. The number of mental disease patients in institutions in the U. S., per 100,000 population, rose from 204 in 1910 to 220 in 1920. This rise might be due to an actual increase in mental disease, or to the fact that mental disease is now more readily detected and sent to the hospital. The rate of first admissions of insane per year, per 100,000 population, was recently 70 for the urban and 38 for the rural districts of the U. S. This might indicate actually greater insanity in the cities, or the fact that in the city the insane patient is more dangerous and more dif-

ficult to care for privately. These uncertainties may be cleared up by further research. There is, however, a strong opinion that city life actually does cause greater insanity, because it provokes more acute mental strain and suffering,

In European countries which have unemployment insurance, the amount of *unemployment* is a valuable index. Its effect upon health, and the standard of living, is measured by other indices, but aside from these considerations it has a very direct effect upon mental health. It means anxiety, boredom, disappointment, mental anguish. It is for this reason that we would include it among our indices. But not all classes of unemployment should be included. It is hardly fair to say that the total number of 6,000,000 potential workers whom Stuart Chase estimates to be idle in the United States represents mental suffering. He includes, for example, hoboes and idle rich, who prefer to be idle. He includes also 2,400,000 man-years of intermittent and seasonal unemployment. But many of these workers find quite satisfactory ways of using their time during the off season. Many work on farms, or in homes, where their labor does not appear in the statistics. Some unemployment is regularly expected, and is enjoyed as leisure. What we need to discover is the amount of unemployment suffered by those who really need and want to work. Social evils do not lie in mass statistics but in individual lives. Roughly this genuine evil would include cyclical unemployment, loss of time in moving from job to job, and unemployment due to strikes, lockouts, accidents, and sickness, amounting altogether, in Chase's estimate, to a constant average of about 3,000,000 workers.

The rate of *pauperism* and the number of cases requiring charitable relief would be also indicative of the amount of mental suffering.

4. Leisure.—The per capita hours of true leisure would be one of the most direct and unequivocal measures of a community's welfare. It is possible to estimate with fair accuracy

the average weekly hours of industrial or commercial labor. The Census shows that in 1914 only 12 per cent of our manufacturing wage earners worked in establishments where the prevailing hours were 48 or less per week. In 1919 this percentage had increased to 49, showing a marked reduction in working hours throughout the country. There are no such statistics, however, on the working time of farmers or of homemakers. Moreover there are no statistics on the time gainfully occupied workers spend in service to self or family after they come home from their outside labor. And there are no statistics on the time spent in going to and from work. All of these items would need to be deducted from the 168 hours in the week before we find any time for true leisure. But it would be quite possible to study the habits and conditions in any given community in such a way as to get a fairly true estimate of these various items. At the University of Chicago, Dartmouth, Mount Holyoke and other colleges detailed questionnaire studies have been made to determine how the students use their time. While probably it would be impossible to "questionnaire" a whole community, enough representative persons might be induced to cooperate in order to yield results which would be typical for the community as a whole. A study of the use of time by homemakers would be a worth while undertaking for a woman's club interested in social problems.

The average per capita leisure is not sufficient, however. We need to know something about the distribution of leisure. There are overworked and underworked classes. Roughly, it seems that in America children and middle-class women are relatively underworked. This is far from advocating child labor in the factories. Rather it is strongly to suggest that more means might be found for children to assist in minor services in or about their own homes and communities, and that more real productive service might be rendered, incidentally to education, in the schools. There is also, as Dr.

Lorine Pruette has pointed out, a great need for part time jobs for married women.[1] Among the overworked classes are farmers, homemakers of the poorer classes who have several children, all mothers within the first year or two of a child's life, women who are both industrial workers and homemakers, farmers' wives, many groups of professional and business men and some industrial workers.

5. Consumption of true luxuries.—We do not need an index of the consumption of necessities, because this already is measured by longevity, health, and mental health. If there is an underconsumption of physical necessities it will show itself in higher death rates, greater sickness or injury, or some form of physical suffering which should be measured directly. If there are no such evil results, then the goods in question are not physical necessities. When we try to measure the consumption of necessity goods, we never know when the point of true sufficiency has been reached. Before that point increased consumption means increased welfare; after that point a further increase in consumption may mean stationary or decreasing welfare, because income that might have been used for gratifying free individual tastes is diverted to the purchase of goods of which there is already enough. We must measure the satisfaction of man's *needs* by the results obtained, not by the quantity of goods used to produce those results. To judge a family's welfare by the quantity of goods consumed is like judging the value of a factory's output by the quantity of raw materials that go into it, regardless of the manner in which those materials are used.

After the point of complete physical health and comfort is reached, the addition of further food, clothing, furnishings, and stimulants to a family's scale of living represents in large part, as noted in the previous chapter, the satisfaction of purely *psychological necessities* that need not have been created.

[1] Women and Leisure, pp. 89–96.

Quantity of consumption is, however, a possible index of welfare in the case of *true luxury goods*, goods whose presence gives enjoyment but whose absence produces no suffering. It is impossible to draw a sharp line between true luxuries and psychological necessities. What is a necessity to one person may be a true luxury to another. But, in general, we think we can define certain general classes of goods. Clothing and household furnishings, for example, are so much subject to competitive expenditure that we might better omit them from our index of welfare. All narcotics should be omitted for they represent habit cravings or personal psychological necessities. On the other hand, most recreational goods, labor-saving devices, musical instruments, pleasure vehicles, books and magazines, and personal hobby goods should be included.

But even among these goods the element of competition enters in the form of elegant appearance. We might get rid of this element however by using quantity rather than value statistics. That is, one hundred Ford cars would count just as heavily, or nearly so, in our barometer of a community's welfare, as one hundred Lincolns, although their money value might be only a tenth as much. Moreover, we should omit, if it were possible to refine the statistics sufficiently, articles of luxury which are possessed in surplus quantity by the wealthier families. The better index would not be the number of cars per capita, but the percentage of families having *some* car. In this way the extra cars owned by the rich would not count at all in the index of welfare.

The reader who is interested in the relation between goods and welfare should read Mr. Stuart Chase's "Tragedy of Waste," especially the two chapters on "Illth."

Mr. Chase quotes the estimate made by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1919 of the total expenditures for luxuries in the United States.[1] It is as follows:

[1] Chase, "The Tragedy of Waste," Macmillan, by permission.

	MILLIONS OF DOLLARS (000,000 OMITTED)
Jewelry	500
Musical instruments	250
Toilet soaps, etc.	400
Automobiles and parts	2000
Perfumery and cosmetics	750
Servants and luxurious services	3000
Luxuries in hotels and restaurants	750
Luxurious food	5000
Candy	1000
Soft drinks and ice cream	600
Cakes and confections	350
Cereal beverages	230
Chewing gum	50
Cigarettes	800
Cigars	510
Tobacco and snuff	800
Cigar and cigarette holders	1
Furs	300
Luxurious clothing, carpets, rugs	1500
Liveries	3
Hunting garments	7
Fire arms and shells	50
Sporting goods	25
Yachts	1
Art works	15
Electric fans	8
Admissions and dues	800
Resorts, races, joy rides, etc.	3000
Total	22,700 = $22,700,000,000

Since the national income in 1919 was $66,000,000,000, this means that about 33 per cent of our national income was spent for luxuries. But, as Chase admits, "probably less than half of the $22,000,000,000 would come under the head of genuine

illth in the form of super-luxuries. The majority of the items include a large share of what can only be classed as reasonable comforts, well within the area of normal and legitimate wants." He finally estimates that about 15, not 33 per cent of the national income, or in other words about 6 million man power, goes into "superluxuries."

But Mr. Chase gives us no test for deciding what is a superluxury, and what is the satisfaction of a normal and legitimate want. His terms in fact are misleading. From our point of view, true luxuries, yes, superluxuries, are not waste but welfare. Their welfare value is, to be sure, much reduced when they are used by a wealthy class which already is surfeited with many pleasures. But in general they represent free choice of enjoyment and hence welfare. A superluxury may be very "abnormal" in the sense that few persons have that particular want, but may nevertheless be worth while.

The welfare value of a so-called luxury good depends upon whether the commodity is *mechanically,* or only *culturally,* necessary to satisfy the want. In other words, whether the satisfaction comes from the commodity itself, or from the prestige which culture attaches to its possession. For example, a $1000 camping equipment, including a specially constructed automobile, mosquito netting, camera, field glasses, botanical collecting apparatus, and so on, would be a superluxury. It seems to the average mind even more "super" than a $1000 piece of jewelry. But in the first case, the goods in question produce a new type of personal experience, and they are *mechanically* necessary to getting that experience in its full comfort and completeness. Without adequate tires one cannot motor in rough country, without a sleeping bag he cannot camp out comfortably on cold nights, without an expensive camera he cannot get certain kinds of pictures which his personal tastes require. There is no social pressure which requires his having this equipment. In fact he is not required

to engage in that form of recreation at all. He will gain from it no social prestige, but the satisfaction of a *personal interest,* growing freely out of his individual experience pattern. The fact that he is willing to spend all this money for an equipment which no social standard requires proves that the pleasure gained thereby must, as a rule, be greater than the cost.

But in the case of the jewelry, the satisfaction it yields is not a new type of personal experience, nor is the jewelry mechanically necessary to produce it. It is only *culturally* necessary. What we have here is competitive social prestige, posing in the guise of an esthetic taste. Such a satisfaction could be and is obtained in many other ways at much less cost. There are times and places where prestige better is obtained without jewelry. It is only through an arbitrary and changeable dictate of culture that the satisfaction desired must be purchased at such a cost. It is sheer waste, chargeable to culture. Here the cost may be much greater than the pleasure obtained, for the pleasure represents in large part the merely negative joy of escaping from the suffering which would ensue from not having the thing which the standard of one's social class demands.

As Mr. Chase points out, it is difficult to express a judgment on the relative value of luxuries without being accused of letting one's own personal preferences interfere. But to the present writer it seems that we have an inkling of certain principles with the help of which we shall be able to work out a really impersonal test. For example, Thomas' fourfold classification of human wishes offers a clue. The four wishes, he says, are the desires for security, new experience (or adventure), recognition (or mastery), and response (including love and friendship). Goods bought to satisfy the wish for security may be regarded primarily as necessities, for their function is to prevent suffering. Goods or services purchased to satisfy the adventure motive are more or less mechanically

required to satisfy that motive. Some may get sufficient adventure through their imaginations, but for most of us that new experience inevitably seems to require a wide range of *places*, and a wide variety of combinations of external stimuli. Musical instruments, the theater, the movies, Coney Island, sporting equipment, the radio, and, above all, the means of transportation are in this class of goods which provide new experiences, whether they be of "high" or of "low" order. Goods of this class may be considered as luxuries that are worth their cost.

On the other hand, the desires for recognition and for response are satisfied through personal relationships rather than through material goods and services. True love, true friendship, worthy prestige, *can* be achieved independently of material wealth. Hence when we find large expenditures of wealth for the sake of prestige, respectability, social standing, and personal friendship, we may well regard such expenditures as quite artificial necessities created by culture, and not inherent in the needs of the situation itself. Socially, such goods and services cost more than they are worth. For what they buy could, under a different culture, be had free of charge.

The principle of using true luxuries by themselves as an index of welfare is being followed in many studies by social scientists. There is an increasing number of social surveys, especially of rural communities, which base their estimates of welfare not so much on money figures, as on things like the following:

Number of rooms per person.
Percentage of families having separate dining rooms.
Percentage of homes with porches.
Percentage of families who take magazines.
Percentage of families having cars, radios, victrolas, musical instruments.

Average number of books per home.
Percentage of families going away for summer vacation.

In some states there have been county welfare contests in which the welfare of various counties was measured on a scale made up partly of items of this kind.

In the farmers' standard of living studies now being made by the Department of Agriculture, the *percentage* of expenditures going toward "advancement," regardless of the total amount of expenditure, is used as one index of welfare. Advancement includes education, reading matter, music, indoor games, cameras, telephones, automobile operation, apparatus and supplies for amateur scientific work, physical recreation and sport, church, social functions, amusements, vacations and pleasure trips. This principle was worked out by Dr. E. L. Kirkpatrick.

It might be practically helpful to introduce into our barometer an index of the *distribution of income* among families. In a region where great inequalities exist, welfare would be lower than in another region having the same per capita income, but distributing it more equitably. Theoretically, however, most of the results of the distribution of income would be measured in the other indices. If a large group of the population were in absolute poverty, it would show up in the indices of health and pauperism. The excess wealth of the rich would be discounted by keeping their surplus consumption out of the index of true luxuries as suggested above. And it is not certain that *equal* distribution would yield the maximum happiness. A distribution according to native intelligence, or intelligence plus education, with an upper limit of say $20,000 per family per year, might be much better.

6. Recreational variety.—The quantity of leisure already has been measured by index No. 4. The quantity and distribution of material goods available for recreational purposes

has been measured roughly by index 5. If unhealthful or dangerous recreations are followed, the extent of these evils should appear in indices 1 and 2. But the recreational life of a community depends not only upon these things but also upon the social structure of the community. Many recreations require little or no physical equipment. The important thing is *education,* and some arrangement for the *collective use* of such equipment as may be necessary. The aim should be not to promote any particular recreation, but to provide the maximum opportunity for every person to choose his enjoyments from a wide range of possibilities. The individual is more likely to secure full satisfaction under these conditions than if he were compelled by ignorance or lack of facilities to choose from a few stereotyped and standardized pleasures.

Just how this index should be constructed is a statistical problem we need not fully consider here. It would be based somewhat more upon statistics of participation than upon statistics of attendance or "onlookerism," but due credit would be given to passive amusements as well as to active ones. The weighting of the various recreations would require unbiased and careful judgment. It would not follow our conventional scale of "high" and "low" amusements. The main question to be answered would be: how wide a variety of recreations is made possible by the education and the recreational organization of the community? Thus a community in which ten million person-hours of leisure time were used as follows: idleness, 4 million; conversation, 1 million; baseball, 1 million; dances, 1 million; movies, 2 million; riding, 1 million; would be rated lower on the index than a community where the time was divided among the items on a longer list.

The percentage of illiteracy, and the amount of education for leisure given in the schools of the community, might be useful indices if we could not get at the facts more directly.

It could be assumed that the well educated person has a better chance to vary his recreational life, and to find the things that best satisfy him, than has the illiterate or the narrowly educated.

7. Personal liberty.—A community may rate high in longevity, health, leisure, true luxury goods, and variety of available recreations. There may be a considerable degree of equality, and each social class may seem to have a fair share of the opportunities. Yet happiness may be seriously impaired by the fact that particular opportunities are not available to the particular individuals who most want them. You may have an ideal *system*, with many individuals out of place in the system. To give a simple illustration from the field of recreation, one hundred persons playing cards and one hundred dancing, assuming each person freely chose his activity, means a certain amount of enjoyment. But if a third of the dancers would rather play cards, but are "dragged" into the dance by spouses or companions, and vice versa, the result is a much lesser degree of enjoyment.

This lack of fit between the individual and his social environment is partly due to ignorance. But after that is taken care of, we still have to deal with *needless restraint.* This restraint may take the form of a law or of a social convention. It is to be assumed that if the individual *knows* the various forms of "work, play, love, and worship" that are socially and economically available to him, he can be trusted to choose that combination which best will suit his individual tastes; unless he is prevented therefrom by some artificial and needless restraint. Such restraints always have existed, and many still remain. To learn their magnitude, we must study the laws and the *mores* of the peoples involved.

To construct an index of personal liberty for any given country or people, we might ask questions such as the following:

Is there compulsory military service, and for how long?

Is there freedom of residence and migration, or are certain classes of persons limited to certain places?

Is emigration or immigration forbidden?

Is the individual completely free in choosing his occupation, or is he bound by law or by family tradition?

Is the individual completely free in choice of mate, or is he bound by his family or by custom?

Is the individual completely free in the use of Sunday or other special days and times, so long as he does not interfere with others?

Is he free to express himself in any sort of language that suits his individual taste and mood?

Is he free to express any opinion?

Is he free to discuss any subject?

Is there complete freedom and secrecy of written and oral communication?

Are women bound to the home or limited to certain occupations by anything except economic convenience?

Are there social restraints against personal friendship between persons of opposite sexes, or of different races, religions, occupations, social status?

Are adults ridiculed for indulging in "childish" games and amusements?

Are there prescribed amusements for specified ages, sexes, and social classes, or is each individual free to choose any harmless amusement without suffering ridicule or ostracism?

Are costumes prescribed so rigidly for specified occasions that the individual feels uneasy when convenience or comfort leads him to violate these rules?

Are men prevented by ridicule from doing women's work when such is convenient?

Are there any foods, stimulants, or narcotics forbidden to particular classes of persons except for clearly demonstrated reasons of health? Are there any general food tabus which are unnecessary?

Is hospitality surrounded by rigid rules and tabus which prevent the best individual self expression?
Is there imprisonment for debt?
Can specific performance of labor contracts be enforced?
Is there slavery, serfdom, or peonage, in any form?
Are individuals denied the use of any public facilities because of race or color?
Are there any magical beliefs or superstitions which put needless restraints upon personal conduct, such as avoiding thirteen at a table?
Is there complete freedom of worship for the individual, as distinguished from the family or the community?
Is any kind of education barred to any class of persons, except on proof of individual incapacity?
Is the use of any language restricted?
Is any form of dress or undress prohibited?

It will be noted that all these questions deal with individual liberty, not with the liberty of institutions or groups or business organizations. The only true liberty is individual liberty. It will be further noted that the freedom to commit murder, theft, counterfeiting, or other universally recognized crimes is not included in this list of liberties. Only those liberties are included which are or might become *harmless.*

It may be seriously questioned whether all of the liberties in the above list are really harmless. There are several that we should be loath to see granted. But there is no great error in including such questionable liberties in our index of welfare. If they actually result in harm, that harm will appear in the sickness, accident or crime rates or in some of the other indices of welfare we have already mentioned, and the total welfare will be thus graded down. But if welfare in all other respects remains the same, then every liberty that can possibly be added is a gain. If two communities have exactly the same degree of mental and physical health, but one forbids the sale of alcohol, and the other is able to

achieve the same health without such prohibition, then the second community has the greater welfare. Freedom is itself an important value.

The reason why liberty is valuable is two-fold. First, the obvious restraint of liberty always causes mental suffering. It is a universally acquired stimulus to anger and irritation. Anybody knows that from childhood to old age one of the chief causes of resentment is to be balked in one's efforts by an outside obstacle, especially when that obstacle is placed there deliberately by our fellow men. The young child cries and screams perhaps as frequently from being forbidden something, as from being frightened or hurt. Hence the burden of proof always rests with him who would prohibit. The prohibition will surely cause some suffering, and can be justified only by proving that it prevents a still greater suffering.

Second, where the restraint of liberty is not obvious and hence does not provoke resentment, it nevertheless detracts from welfare because it prevents the maximum possible enjoyment. If some of the doors to enjoyment are needlessly locked, there is less chance of each individual's finding the pattern of life best suited to give him the most complete satisfaction.

What should be omitted from the barometer of welfare? —We have indicated the kind of statistics and other facts that need to be collected if we would judge whether the world is improving, or whether life is better in some places than in others. But unfortunately a large part of man's statistical efforts have been devoted to quite other matters. He has been so busy collecting facts to help him in business and government and the other *means* of life that he has neglected the statistics that deal with the *ends* of life.

In most surveys of social welfare, the two kinds of statistics are indiscriminately mixed. For example, in a typical county survey, "Forsyth County, Economic and Social,"

Siewers finds among the "things to be proud of in Forsyth," that she stands first of all the counties of the state in wealth and increase of wealth, first in population and in increase of population, first in rural population density, first in the world in manufacture of tobacco products, etc. Causes for pride, no doubt, but not even the surveyors themselves would claim that these facts are in themselves credits to true welfare. Neither is it, necessarily, any debit to her welfare to say, under the caption "where Forsyth lags," that she has an unusually high divorce rate or an unusually large bill for imported food and feed supplies. On the other hand her death rate, infant mortality rate, sickness rate, crime rate if it could be discovered, would be direct indices of true illfare.

Here are some of the things we would omit from our barometer because of their uncertain bearing on welfare.

Quantity of population, birth rates, population increase.
Density of population.
Most economic statistics. Exceptions: per capita incomes, hours of labor, production of particular commodities as noted in index 5.
Variety or specialization of industries.
Savings.
Home ownership.
Numbers of institutions and organizations.
Church attendance, unless it is combined with statistics of attendance at many other places as well.
Membership in clubs, fraternal orders, etc., except as part of a much more general index of social participation.
School attendance, unless there is no better way to measure the true preparation for life obtained in the community.
Divorce rates.

Some of these facts might have to be used for want of something better. School attendance is an example. But wherever possible we should try to measure actual results as they appear in individual lives, rather than the processes

which supposedly produce those results. Some others of the above facts do not even indirectly measure welfare.

What are the absolute ethical values?—From much that already has been said in this book the reader will conclude that all values are relative. Morals, in particular, change from time to time and from place to place. Indeed our most sacred institutions and standards: private property, Christian *doctrine,* monogamous marriage, parliamentary government, decent concealment of the body, are fairly subject to criticism and perhaps to radical change. But we are now in position to see that there are other standards which are universally valid. Long life and physical health are such absolute values. They are desirable in every age and among all peoples. They are independent of culture. The only reason they have not always seemed of first importance is that culture has given some of its artificial ideals priority over them. Their relative submergence was a part of culture's conquest of man. With man's conquest of culture they obtain the importance and recognition they deserve. The same may be said for the other criteria of welfare we have outlined in this chapter. A good community will always be a community which has a minimum of mental suffering, a maximum of leisure, a maximum variety of recreational opportunity, and a maximum of personal liberty consistent with the other aims.

Bertrand Russell in "Prospects of Industrial Civilization" says there are four great tests of the excellence of any civilization: instinctive happiness, friendly feeling, enjoyment of beauty, and knowledge. Essentially his tests are in harmony with those we have suggested, though perhaps less comprehensive. His instinctive happiness is a matter of physical health, plus leisure, plus liberty to seek the simple physical joys and comforts of life without interference by convention. His friendly feeling is one, perhaps the most important, condition for the removal of mental suffering. A great deal of anxiety, irritation, and mental anguish is produced directly

by the hostile, competitive, or oppressive behavior of human beings toward each other in their everyday, face-to-face groups. Mental suffering is only partly due to the more remote and intangible conditions in the social order. If our culture could stress friendly attitudes more, and competition and prestige less, there would be less suffering. This was the central aim and spirit of Jesus of Nazareth, as conceived by the most modern Christians. But it must be observed that this friendly feeling cannot come directly through a change of heart in individual men, while the social structure remains the same. There must be changes in the social structure which will make it no longer profitable for men to be hostile, competitive, and cruel toward one another.

The enjoyment of beauty and the appreciation of pure science, desired by Russell, would be increased through the promotion of leisure, of varied education and opportunity for the use of leisure time, and of personal liberty. It is hardly to be expected that all persons would make science or art their primary interest. But many more would be interested in these things, and all might learn to appreciate, if we could free our culture from the needless work and compulsory-competitive consumption, which today occupy so much of our time.

Summary.—Another kind of welfare barometer could be constructed out of vital and social statistics. We have not at present all the statistics necessary to make such a barometer accurate, but in time they probably will be secured. They would include statistics of longevity, health, accidents, crimes, suicides, insanity, pauperism, unemployment, labor hours, commuting hours, consumption of selected classes of goods, recreation and travel. In addition some statistical index of personal liberty would need to be devised.

The various components of our welfare barometer might be translated into a set of universal and absolute ethical values, which are independent of any particular culture.

Many classes of statistics which are commonly used in business or in social work to reveal the size and characteristics of various communities, enterprises, activities, etc., would have no place in the barometer of welfare. Only those which bear on the happiness of the individual life should be included, and the direct indices of happiness always should be used, where available, in place of indirect indices.

CHAPTER XI

MAN'S RECONQUEST OF CULTURE

It matters not how strait the gate,
  How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate:
  I am the captain of my soul.
—WILLIAM ERNEST HENLEY, "Invictus"

1. THE OBJECTIVES

The first great step in man's progress, as we have shown, was the conquest of nature. But in conquering nature he became enslaved to the culture he had created. The second great step must be to free himself from the *tyranny* of culture and to reduce it to its proper place as an instrument to his welfare. If man is to accomplish this step, he must guide himself by some such barometer of welfare as we have outlined in the last chapter. Otherwise he never will know whether he is going forward or backward.

His progress will be measured by the extent to which he abolishes suffering, attains leisure, and fills that leisure with joy-giving experiences. He must keep these objectives constantly in mind and never allow himself to be distracted from them by the pursuit of mystic ideals and cosmic purposes. Some cosmic purpose there may be, but until it reveals itself to man in some unmistakable fashion he may with good conscience leave it to its own fortunes.

Man's conquest of culture must be made of course with cultural weapons. He must use culture to conquer culture

as he used it to conquer nature. It is really a case of playing one part of his culture against another.

Man's conquest of *nature* must continue. When we think of the ravages of the late influenza epidemic we realize how far we still have to go. But the struggle against nature has become so interwoven with the struggle against culture that it is convenient to consider them both together. Nearly every achievement of control over nature involves some readjustment of culture to make it effective. The conquest of nature is a matter of material invention or discovery. But discovery may be hastened or retarded by social organization and cultural sentiments. A discovery may work good or ill according to how it is embodied in the existing culture pattern. It is possible, then, to view the whole of human progress as a constant and intelligent *reshaping* of *culture* in the interests of man.

Individual and collective effort.—A part of the task of promoting human welfare can be left to the individual. Each individual can be depended upon to seek pleasant experiences if they are available. No collective, social, effort is needed to urge him to do so. In fact the fundamental pleasures of life could be obtained without any culture at all. Hunger, sex, play and the exploring impulse are probably well satisfied in the spontaneous animal societies living on the subcultural plane. Many sociologists have struck a false note in emphasizing culture as primarily a means of producing positive enjoyment. But the major tasks of man's reconquest of culture can be accomplished only by collective or social effort. They require that we work together.

The primary task of social effort is to prevent suffering.—In general it is always more important to *do something* to prevent suffering than it is to do something to produce enjoyment, even when that enjoyment seems greater, as joys go, than the suffering. The reason for this is that suffering is biologically dominant over joy; it has priority in the nervous

system. The nervous system is built to avoid trouble first, and seek pleasure afterwards. Any irritation, anxiety, or pain will immediately stop digestion, love, laughter, or curiosity. But the normal stimuli to pleasure fail to produce real pleasure as long as any single painful stimulus of any account remains present. Suffering stimuli are like a string of Christmas tree lights arranged in series; let any one bulb go bad, and all light is extinguished. Enjoyment stimuli resemble lights arranged in parallel; if one goes out the others continue to burn. It is much more important to protect from damage any one "series" bulb than to protect any one "parallel" bulb.

But if suffering is so much more imperative, why cannot the individual be trusted to take care of it even more than enjoyment? Why should suffering be the special problem of society?

The first reason is that suffering often comes to the individual as an unexpected consequence of his actions. It may follow some time after the act which caused it, so that he is unable to trace the steps by which it came. On the other hand joy comes either immediately after the act which causes it, or, if not, then by a series of steps which the individual readily learns, so that joy is usually *anticipated.* It is easier for an animal to learn to get *out* of a cage than to learn to avoid *all* the situations which might get him into it.

The second reason is that the individual has a much greater capacity to cause suffering in *other* human beings than to cause them enjoyment. And if his enjoyment, as commonly happens, does bring suffering to others, *their* suffering will not deter him. Social control of his behavior is necessary.

(2) Social effort must reduce labor and promote leisure. —Labor, which is mostly boredom, and therefore a very mild but prolonged form of suffering, must for these same two reasons depend upon social effort for its reduction. Society's

second task then is to promote leisure, which is to be accomplished by reducing labor and making it as interesting as possible. The claims of leisure, however, since its absence produces such a very mild form of suffering, are not so imperative as those related to other suffering. So leisure must be balanced against the production of the means of enjoyment. Leisure can become so great, as in the tropics, as to result in a shortage even of those material goods necessary to prevent suffering. But on the other hand the urge to produce the means of enjoyment may become so great as not to allow enough leisure time to enjoy what has been produced. This nice balance of leisure against production, so as to get the maximum total satisfaction, we may call *social efficiency.* It includes economic efficiency, or maximum production with minimum effort, and also the efficient choice of the goods to be produced, and the efficient consumption of goods. In short, it means the best possible use of time.

(3) Social effort must enlarge the opportunity for enjoyment.—In promoting enjoyment society has a task much more indirect than those previously mentioned. This task is simply to provide the maximum opportunity. The individual can be depended upon to make good use of it. To provide this maximum opportunity requires two things: first, to enlarge the *variety* of enjoyments available, and second, to give the individual the maximum *liberty* of choice among those enjoyments. To make an enjoyment available society must first put the physical means of securing it within reach of the individual, and second, give him a knowledge of its existence and of the means of securing it. The play movement and community organization help to provide the means; "cultural" education or "education for leisure" provides the knowledge.

(4) Social effort must promote personal liberty.—But a source of enjoyment may be physically within reach, and also within the knowledge and experience of the individual, and

yet he may be unable to make use of it. The stumbling block will be some needless restriction that prohibits his using it. It may be a law, or a religious prejudice, a superstitious belief, or a social convention. One of the main tasks of collective effort is to guarantee to each individual, so long as he does not conflict with others, the unhampered choice of his own enjoyments. After society has cleared away suffering and needless labor, and the handicaps of ignorance and lack of opportunity, the last and greatest thing it can do for the individual is to leave him alone. If there ever comes a Utopia on this earth it will not be a place where enjoyment is organized and scheduled, except through flexible, voluntary groups. It will be a place where each is free to develop his own unique pattern of individual tastes to a degree now undreamed of. It is not a problem of finding the right proportion between different pleasures. One person may get his maximum satisfaction from a well distributed variety of activities, another may get his by specializing on one overpowering hobby. There will be no psychologist prescribing doses of this and that recreation as the dietitian prescribes a balanced diet. It will not be the Greek ideal of harmonious proportion, but the English utilitarian ideal of liberty, that will guide in that sphere.

The reason for this is simple. As we noted in a previous chapter, every individual at birth begins to form conditioned reflexes from his own individual experience. He develops a unique set of tastes and desires. To satisfy these requires a unique set of activities and new experiences. These tastes and their satisfying experiences are not isolated, but organized into a pattern. One can see these patterns developing in the child. When one father takes his four-year-old daughter walking she insists upon going by a certain route and returning by a certain other route. The next day she demands a somewhat different course. He can devise no formula that will satisfy her. The only way to give her full

satisfaction is to follow her desires in complete detail. She evidently has conditioned pleasure responses to certain spots along the pathway, but not only to particular spots, but also to sequences and combinations of those spots. For a time she preferred to pass by the buttonball tree *after* she had visited the dairy but not before. Her playthings will commonly be found in the most absurd and disorderly arrangement, but let an adult try to improve or reorganize this arrangement and the response is a violent protest. When she gets older these taste-patterns will lose their importance but others will develop. She may develop a strong taste for dining at a hotel where there is music, but may be quite bored by going to a concert, or by dining at a hotel without music. There is no logic in these whims. But there is a great deal of *psychology* in them. Most persons learn to suppress their whims on occasion for the sake of cooperation with others. But they cannot suppress *all of them all the time* without serious loss of enjoyment.

There seem to be only two alternatives leading to the maximum happiness. First we may try to standardize the training of children to such a minute degree that their personal taste patterns will fit exactly into the pattern of activities we provide. But if we cannot do this we shall have to leave the individual free to alter the activity pattern to suit his unique taste pattern. For the fit must be exact. The failure of one small part to fit may cause mental suffering that subtracts much from the enjoyment of life. It seems obvious that the first plan of *perfect standardization* is impossible. The only alternative is *perfect liberty,* in those spheres of life, of course, where liberty is possible without interfering with the like liberty of another.

The objectives of cultural adjustment.—Man's conquest of culture, so far as it is a collective or social enterprise, requires the taking of four great objectives:

(1) The prevention of suffering { physical / mental

(2) The elimination of needless labor or waste, and the promotion of the maximum leisure possible without interfering with the other objectives.

(3) The enlargement of the number and variety of the sources of enjoyment.

(4) The promotion of the maximum personal liberty in the choice of enjoyments.

This adventure will move along the following lines and be successively considered as to chapters as follows:

CHAPTER — OBJECTIVE	INDEX (IN CHAPTER 10), BY WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED
XII. The elimination of physical suffering	1. Index of longevity 2. Index of health and physical soundness
A. War B. Sickness C. Accident D. Cruelty E. Physical Want	
XIII. The prevention of mental suffering Subjective causes and remedies Objective causes and remedies	3. Index of mental health 7. Index of personal liberty
A. Repulsive physical surroundings B. Economic insecurity C. Group injustice D. Personal conflict in primary groups E. Crime	

XIV. The abolition of waste, or needless labor	4. Index of leisure time 5. Index of consumption
XV. The enrichment of leisure.	6. Index of recreational variety
XVI. Personal liberty	7. Index of personal liberty

The functional view of social problems.—There is a structural view of social problems which is concerned with the development and breakdown of institutions in themselves. We hear frequently about the disorganization of the family, the depletion of the rural community, the decay of the rural church, the disappearance of popular arts and crafts. There is among many social reformers a sentimentalism that wants to preserve institutions merely for their own sakes. In contrast with this, the view here presented is the functional view. That is to assert, it matters not how, or by what agency, things are done, provided that society's essential functions are performed toward providing a happy life for its individual citizens. Hence we have classified social problems in this book in a somewhat unusual way. Instead of taking them up according to the institutions involved, we have classified them according to the great objectives of man's conquest of culture.

It is interesting to study trends in the evolution of culture. It is interesting, for example, to note that the family has lost little by little most of the functions it originally had, and that these functions are taken over by other institutions. Also, by the way, it is interesting to note that electric household machinery and the radio tend to exert a checking influence on this general trend. But we can set up no ultimate goals of cultural evolution, and measure progress by the approach to such goals. Not order, nor democracy, nor justice, nor unification of culture, nor diversity of culture, nor specialization of institutions, nor complexity of culture, nor

equalization, nor professionalization, nor any process or form of *culture* itself, can be set up as a test of progress. True progress is to be found rather in a certain formlessness and flexibility of culture which allows greater freedom to the individual to develop a life plan in accordance with his personal interest pattern.

2. The Strategy

Prejudices regarding the methods of cultural reshaping.—The battle for human welfare must be fought under officers who see clearly the objectives to be gained, and whose strategy is not hampered by prejudices. In the past those leaders who have had the general welfare most at heart, clergymen, social workers, editors, statesmen, have been hindered by the prejudices which they shared with the masses of the people. Sociology is not sufficiently advanced to give us a precise technique for solving every social problem. We still must rely on our judgment to meet each situation as it arises. But sociology is sufficiently advanced to clear away many false beliefs and scruples which cloud this judgment.

We shall get rid of many of these prejudices by applying the general laws of cultural evolution outlined in Chapter III.

1. The "only solution" prejudice.—*Culture is the product of culture, and is affected in only a negative or limiting way by physical environment, racial qualities, population density, and human nature.* The practical effect of this law will be to make us less fatalistic in our attitudes toward social problems. We shall be less apt to discourage efforts to improve the life of the negro, on the ground that he is mentally incapable of a high culture. We shall not be content to explain the poverty of the southern farmer by the exhaustion of the soil, but will keep looking for possible cultural causes, such as the tenant system, and the traditional sentiment that a gentleman does not work with his hands. We shall co-

operate more heartily with efforts to prevent war, when we realize that war is not an inevitable result of overpopulation, but that countries can and do solve the problem of overpopulation in different ways according to their cultural traditions. And we shall not be discouraged in trying to uproot political bribery, on the ground that it is human nature to give and reward personal favors. We shall not condone lynching, as one Senator did, because "race is deeper than law."

This law will clear away the dogma, often used in propaganda, that there is just one solution, one alternative, in every problem. Emigration is the only solution, think many Italians, to their expanding population. But other nations have met the problem temporarily by intensifying agriculture, developing manufactures, or permanently by birth control.

2. The "booster's" fallacy.—*Culture traits accumulate more rapidly than they are discarded.* In other words, culture through additions becomes more and more complex, and may continue to do so indefinitely. On the other hand, the number of hours in a day does not increase with the complexity of culture. It follows that any given individual cannot participate in so large a section of his culture as previously. He must perforce specialize. Increasing specialization in *work* is a well recognized truth. It is not so clearly realized that there must be increasing specialization in play, learning, appreciation. This does not mean that the individual must have a lesser variety of experience than before. On the contrary, it will be greater. But he will need to be content with a *lesser proportion* of the sum total of possible experiences.

This truth needs to be grasped especially by educators, community workers, and others who are promoting activities. The time will come soon, if it has not already come, when you cannot promote one activity without diminishing something else. If you are thinking to put in community dramat-

ics, you also had better be thinking over what can be weeded out to make room for it. In our less active communities there is probably still plenty of reserve time spent in loafing and idle conversation, which might be devoted to the new activity. But it is not at all certain that the time demanded will be taken from that idle reserve rather than from some other activity. And probably a certain residual amount of loafing is necessary and desirable.

So we must get over the polite prejudice in favor of "boosting" and against "knocking." We must have the courage to drop organizations and activities as well as to add to them. What to drop should be left wherever possible to the free choice of the individual. But there are times when the choice has to be made by a whole group, as in deciding whether or not to abandon a certain social club. The things to be dropped may not always be the crap games and loafing, and the cheap movies and lewd exhibitions, which presumably were to be used as arguments for starting the community dramatics. They may sometimes include grand opera and fraternal orders and lectures. But if we believe that culture is for man and not man for culture, we shall not be frightened by such an event, but go forward with our program nevertheless.

3. The anti-foreign prejudice.—*Most culture traits are acquired by diffusion or imitation rather than by local invention, and the most advanced peoples have been those which had rich contacts with other peoples, the most backward those that were isolated.* We should, therefore, encourage contacts between peoples and the sympathetic study of foreign cultures. We should not waste time figuring out some local solution of a problem that can be solved by adopting a method already invented elsewhere. Nor should a stigma any longer be cast upon that which is imitated from abroad. But at the same time we should encourage invention in those problems which are not yet satisfactorily solved by anyone.

4. The all-or-none fallacy.—*The association of two culture traits may be a mere adhesion, or it may be due to some functional relation between the two.* Our treatment of a problem must depend upon which of these things is the case. Now most of our culture traits can be subdivided into smaller units. These lesser units, again, may go together because of adhesion or of functional relationship. But functional connection is a matter of degree. The two traits may be bound together by threads of silk or by clamps of iron. The application of this principle would help to rid us of a certain "all-or-none" prejudice which clouds our thinking on so many questions. It is illustrated by the member of a religious discussion group who kept insisting, in reply to all arguments, that the Bible must either be accepted from cover to cover, or totally rejected.

Another illustration of the same attitude is our feeling toward books in a more physical sense than the above. To most of us Americans the idea of a book is inseparable from the idea of cloth bindings and neat library shelves. We once suggested to the representative of a publishing house that the American people would be better educated if they could buy many cheap paper covered books, as people do in Europe, and read them, rather than a few expensively bound volumes to be displayed in dignified looking book cases. In many American homes one finds no literature except current magazines plus a few luxuriously bound encyclopedias, works of Dickens, and what not, in expensive mahogany cases whose glass doors serve not only to keep out the dust they would otherwise accumulate but the possible reader as well! Our suggestion insinuated, in short, that we cease to consider "books" as an indivisible element of culture, but that we subdivide it into "contents" and "binding," and that we economize on the binding in order to have more of the contents. But the book man was indeed shocked at our proposal. He came back at us with the usual exhortations about the

"good taste" of the American people, about "things of beauty," etc. As far as he was concerned the American people should have "books" as they are conventionally accepted in American culture, or do without them altogether.

When Congressman Clark of Florida in 1918 introduced a bill in Congress abolishing the required salute of enlisted men to officers below the rank of general, not belonging to their own organizations, he showed that he considered the military salute as a mere adhesion to military culture, and not an indispensable part of it. But the Army and Navy Journal thought otherwise: "If enlisted men are relieved from the necessity of showing proper respect to officers of a regiment other than their own, they would not respect their own officers and would soon become inattentive and slouchy. . . . Such a bill shows lack of knowledge of the foundation of military discipline and gives evidence of the socialistic spirit. . . ." This is typical of the reasoning which goes with the all-or-none prejudice. It is full of "would-happens" based on false theories of human nature and of culture. The journal would have made out a better case if it had simply argued that at such a time it was unwise to attempt to change the habits of a million men in a matter of minor importance. Ultimately the best light on the subject would have to be sought in the experience of other armies where saluting rules are different. It is probable that the salute is "essential" to discipline only in the cultural sense that a bathing suit is essential to swimming. There is a functional relation, but it is not an essential, ironclad relation. It would permit of substitution.

This all-or-none prejudice sometimes leads us to look upon an entire culture as an inseparable whole. Many Americans fear that the adoption of a single socialistic measure would lead to the acceptance of socialism, root, stock, and branch. Perhaps they do not realize how nearly President Coolidge approached Moscow when he approved the District of Co-

lumbia maximum rent laws, in lieu of granting higher salaries to government clerks.

We discuss whether Japan will adopt western civilization as if "western civilization" were some elemental thing that must be either accepted or rejected as a whole. In practice cultural change takes place piecemeal. Japan has accepted our railroads, our telegraph, our factory system. She has not yet accepted western individual liberty, or republican government, or our religions, and one cannot infer that because she has accepted the former group she will accept the latter.

A traveler reports from Japan the most ludicrous, to him, combinations of Western garments with oriental gowns and pajamas. Even the dress coat is sometimes worn without the accompanying trousers. But this alleged ridiculousness is one of the best signs of impending progress. For it means *eclecticism*, that is, the selection of certain traits and the rejection of others without any sentimental effort to preserve type. When a people thus learns to analyze and select, it has hope of developing a culture which will be better than either its own or the one it is imitating. Progress may come not only through the invention of new traits, but also through the breaking up and recombining of old ones.

Germany, though handicapped by a belated start, was nearly able to catch up with England in economic development. This she accomplished, according to Thorstein Veblen, in his "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," by imitating the British system of large scale industry, but at the same time refusing to imitate English *laissez-faire*, and the English customs of wasteful luxury and expensive sports. The test of the new Russia will be her ability to adopt the efficiencies of Western capitalism without its inefficiencies. Can she establish the Taylor system of scientific management in the factory, and at the same time prevent the factory's market from dancing a jig to the tune of fad and fashion?

Can she make workmen *work* while they work, but also let them decide how long their hours will be? Can she establish bourgeois habits of business responsibility, but at the same time prevent bourgeois habits of competitive and ostentatious consumption? If so she can claim that she has established a new social order.

The conquest of culture requires a reshuffling of traits.—Here is a list of useful inventions made simply by putting old elements into new combinations. In fact, possibly all *social* invention is of this sort. There may be nothing new under the sun, except new combinations:

Artificial swimming pools and skating rinks.
Block dances.
Indoor baseball.
Boy Scout activities, combining individual hobbies with certain parts of military culture.
Labor union banks.
Rest rooms in stores.
Sale of houses by mail order catalog.
Swimming pools, open forums, and moving pictures in churches.
The auto bus.
Domestic science practice in schools and colleges.
Wardrobe trunks.
Outdoor drama.
Water polo.
Insurance and medical service by schools and industries.
Hamlet in modern costume.
Cafeterias and automats.
Hardwood or glass-covered tables without table linen.
Student government associations in schools and colleges.
Public comfort stations.
College classes seated about round tables.
Roofless observation railway cars in the Rocky Mountains.
The school or church community center.
The playground equipped with apparatus.
Marriage in which wife continues her former work.

Here is a list of useful arrangements that might be developed under the same principle:

Rest rooms and roof gardens in factories.
Day nurseries for middle class or professional families.
Houses with fenced yards and playrooms specially built for families with young children.
Complete electric control of doors, windows, lights, and heat of a house from one central station.
Dwelling-houses with specially built storerooms, following factory principles.
Pleasure automobiles built for the convenient carrying of baggage and camping equipment.
Hiking clothes with extra large pockets as substitute for knapsack.
Regular half-time jobs for married women and adolescents.
Decoration of homes with photographs, maps, and hobby objects rather than with conventional paintings and bric-a-brac.
Establishment of school near City Hall, library, or leading industry, for practical social education.
Parking space in arcades under city buildings, to relieve street.
Community kitchens.
Insurance policies protecting the beneficiary against sickness and dependency.
Adult social gatherings centering about vigorous outdoor games rather than cards or dancing.
Tennis in bathing suits.
Story telling about campfire in suburban communities.
Reading rooms with continuous music.
Optional rainy day summer costumes with bare feet instead of overshoes.
Clean accommodations for cheap travel.

5. The piecemeal fallacy.—But sometimes we err in the opposite direction from this all-or-none prejudice. We sometimes insist on considering a trait by itself when it needs rather to be considered in connection with other traits. There

has been a great deal of opposition to the McNary-Haugen farm relief bill on the ground that it is class legislation. If this is a good objection, then let us consider all class legislation together. How about the protective tariff, the ship subsidy proposals, the guarantee of railway profits in the Esch-Cummins Law? Are they not also class legislation? By the same token, we cannot solve the problem of strikes without considering at the same time lockouts and the employer's right to discharge, with which traits the strike has a close functional relation.

6. The anti-materialistic prejudice.—*Changes in material culture cause other cultural changes more frequently than such changes cause material changes.* The material elements are the dynamic elements in culture. Failure to realize this truth is responsible for a very common prejudice. We might call it the idealistic prejudice. Those who have it flatly refuse to believe that problems involving personal character, moral attitudes, spiritual ideals, can be solved by any simple material adjustment.

A college class in criminology was discussing the so-called crime wave. Education, religion, control of the "movies" and of the press, better police systems, simplified court procedure, were all accepted seriously as possible remedies. But when it was suggested that control over the sale of revolvers might furnish a key to the situation, the class displayed a most skeptical attitude. Take away the revolver, they said, and the criminal would find some other weapon. The criminal impulses are the fundamental thing that must be controlled, the material means of committing the crime is secondary. Moreover, the revolver is needed as a defense against the criminal.

These students failed to see what most beginners in social thinking fail to see, that material changes are primary. It was gunpowder rather than any change in the *mores,* or in the organization of fighting, which overthrew the feudal sys-

tem. The peculiar and serious danger in the present crime situation lies not in any increase of criminal impulses, for such, like the poor, we have always with us. It lies rather in the use, both by criminals and their enemies, of a peculiarly convenient and *fatal* weapon. Every use of the revolver by either party causes it to be used still more in defense by the other, until finally we may reach a condition where everyone goes armed and any queer or suspicious act may bring a bullet.

If we want to promote physical cleanliness among a group of people, we might get along faster by putting on a bath tub sales campaign, and by getting them interested in the material apparatus of cleanliness, than by trying to work directly on the *mores* through lectures on the virtues of cleanliness. Modern advertising and salesmanship though anti-social when they are used to promote an article which is only another brand of what people already have, may have tremendous social value when used to push a trait which means a real increase in health or comfort.

A problem arose in regard to a college dormitory. How could quiet be preserved for study and at the same time freedom given for sociability, music, and other pleasures which make life worth while? One solution was schedule: certain hours for quiet, others for freedom. But this did not work well. Proctors were appointed to enforce the rule. This did not entirely succeed. The problem was treated as a moral problem, involving obedience, self-control, honor, cooperation, and other virtues and vices. Now if sound-proof doors and partitions could be installed in building such a dormitory, all the virtues and vices of that particular situation would be wiped away.

Many family quarrels are caused by one member's going somewhere, or doing something on a sudden impulse, without leaving information as to his purpose or whereabouts. Often he tells a third party to tell the others, and this party fails

to do so for some very good reason. The question then arises who is to blame, which is of course, from the standpoint of our idealistic prejudice, *the* important question. But if we had a little more "crass materialism" in our *mores*, we should build into the wall of the entrance room of the home a slate bulletin board and attach thereto a crayon. But I have heard things like this objected to on the ground that they would not be in good taste.

7. The "proper method" fallacy.—There is a great deal of useless argument among social reformers about what ought to be done first, and what cannot be done until something else is done. We are told that we must educate the public before we can have legislation. Very well then, let us educate the public, but when we observe a desirable law proposed in the legislature, with some chance of its passing, let us take that as a signal that the educational process is nearly finished and the legislative process about to begin. Let us not oppose the law on the ground that "people are not ready for it."

Any group of related cultural changes, as we have seen, tends to function in this order: first, changes in material culture; second, changes in economic organization; third, changes in other social organization; fourth, changes in the *mores*. But communication, education, propaganda are going on continually through all four stages of the process. When we are considering any particular change, we cannot always tell whether it is an early step in some new series of changes, or a late step in some previous series. We shall have to be guided by a careful study of the particular case.

8. The moralistic prejudice.—*Changes in the social structure, especially in the economic part of it, more frequently cause changes in the mores than vice versa.* The wise social reformer will keep his eye on business organization. He who would improve the *mores* of a people will rely less upon free lance uplift preaching and more upon organizing groups to influence legislation. He will use the methods of the Anti-

Saloon League, the Lord's Day Alliance, the British Labor party. If we want world peace it is a great mistake to oppose or discourage international organization on the ground that international morality is not ready for it. On the contrary, the very existence of the League of Nations helps to create that international morality. Sanitary legislation commonly precedes sanitary *mores*. The fee system of paying public servants must be abolished before a high code of professional ethics can be expected of them. The dependence of the newspaper upon advertising must somehow be modified before we can expect impartiality of news and opinion. It is barely possible that the organization of editors and reporters into a professional union might help the situation. If the tyranny of fashion ever is overthrown, it probably will be through voluntary *agreements* of influential persons to limit their expenditures, or through changes in the control of industries producing fashion goods. It will not come through unorganized preaching and protest.

Now there is a lot of experience which seems to contradict this principle that moral changes can be brought about by first making structural changes through legislation. The prohibition law, for example, has failed to make alcohol immoral. Neither has legislation succeeded in reducing sexual irregularity. We are told that morals cannot be legislated into a people and that a change of heart must occur before there can be a change in the social system. Does our principle, then, stand contradicted? Or are there two entirely different kinds of problems, which require two different types of solutions? Can we say, for example, that the remedy for war is primarily to change the social organization, personal attitudes being secondary, while the remedy for vice is to change personal attitudes or character, social organization being secondary?

9. Pleasure problems versus pain problems—the emotional outlet fallacy.—Let us consider once more the original

nature of man. We noted that there are two great classes of emotions, the approaching or pleasant, and the avoiding, defensive, or unpleasant. The function of the first is to secure conditions favorable to life, of the second to escape or remove conditions harmful to life. As the original reflexes become conditioned by the training and experience of life, the variety of these favorable and these harmful stimuli is enormously increased. Situations, which biologically were neither favorable nor harmful, become associated with the biologically adequate stimuli in such a way that they also acquire the power to do us good or harm, through their effects on our emotions. Thus a situation like uncertainty of employment, which has become a conditioned fear stimulus, becomes psychologically harmful, although it perhaps never materializes into any physical hardship. The very fact that it keeps fear in operation is bad for our bodily health and is immediately recognized as unpleasant or evil. On the other hand the sound of beautiful music, though doing us no original biological good, becomes a conditioned stimulus to thrill, love, or other pleasant and healthful emotions, and therefore beneficial. The psychological goods and evils of life are far more numerous, though less imperative, than the original biological goods and evils. It is the psychological enjoyments which give *human* life its unique worth as compared with other forms of life.

Now one of the greatest fallacies of social thinking is to consider the approaching and the avoiding reactions as both requiring, in the same sense, satisfaction or "outlet." The satisfaction of an approaching reaction consists in giving it the positive thing it wants and letting the reaction continue to develop. The satisfaction of an avoiding reaction consists in removing as quickly as possible the stimulus which caused it, and thus stopping the reaction. The pleasant emotions are nature's efforts to get and continue a state of affairs, the unpleasant emotions are nature's efforts to stop some state of

affairs. How then can some psychologists regard the unpleasant emotions as constant factors in human society, always requiring a certain amount of satisfaction or outlet? Their satisfaction consists in doing away with them. Because the human body requires a definite amount of food each day, hunger is a more or less constant factor in any society. Also, because it is stimulated from within as well as from without, sexual desire may be counted upon as a more or less constant social factor. But it cannot be inferred from this that the avoiding emotions: anger, fear, disgust, and pain-grief, are constant. These emotions are of entirely different character; they are emergency functions, to be used *when needed*—but not absolutely necessary to be used at all. The notion that they are always present and must have a certain amount of outlet, arises from a false conception of their nature. It is no more necessary to social welfare to provide opportunities for anger than it is necessary to have a certain number of fires each week in order to give the fire department something to do.

A veteran of the World War recently described his experience at the front on the day of the armistice. He said the unit was up at four to go forward, and were waiting the command, keyed up to fight, when the news of the armistice arrived. Then, he said, the men went wild with joy. The reaction suddenly changed from one of patriotic, *rendezvous-with-death,* fervor to one of peace and good will to all men.

William James proposed a "moral substitute for war." We do not need any substitute for war, except for its adventurous and pleasant features. But we do need substitutes for the saloon, and for every other pleasure-yielding institution we would abolish, however "high" or "low."

The essential question about any social problem then is: whether it is a matter of removing conditions which stimulate these unpleasant, defensive emotions, or a matter of pleasant, approaching emotions being satisfied through methods that

are injurious in their after effects. Obviously war is a problem of the first alternative, vice of the second. In the case of the first alternative, the essential problem is to change the social organization or material conditions so that the unpleasant emotions will no longer function. It is not a matter of giving those emotions an outlet. The *mores* will then adjust themselves to the new social organization.

Most changes in the *mores* are in a rational direction; they are resisted at first because of man's worship of culture as such, but after the changes are accomplished people find their net happiness increased. When law stops feuds and dueling, people are glad to be rid of the *mores* which formerly compelled them to fight. They gain more happiness through the new sense of peace and safety than they lose through not being allowed to shoot each other. One might say that in the bottom of their hearts they wanted the change anyway, but could not get it except through some general form of control which would put away all the guns at the same time. For the same reason there is hope of international organization's stopping war. The individual man does not want to go to war anyway, but under the old system of national sovereignty he is compelled to do so by the fear that the other nation will "beat him to it." Likewise sanitary laws bring more happiness through reducing disease, and the fear of disease, than they bring inconvenience.

But when you come to the elimination of "vice," you have a problem of the other alternative. In this case you have pleasant emotions, at least temporarily, and any solution which attempts to do away with these pleasant emotions is no solution at all. The object is to enable the same emotions to take place, but without the harmful after-effects. If you merely try to remove the pleasure, without giving any adequate substitute, then you are working against human nature and neither a change in social organization nor a change in moral attitudes will be effective. It is for this reason that

legislation and reorganization in the field of vice often fail to change the *mores,* while they may change the *mores* in other fields.

The solution of the problems arising from pleasure-seeking must be a solution that recognizes the pleasure as good in itself, but makes adjustments which will minimize the harmful after-effects. We need better mental care of children to prevent the formation of abnormal and perverted tastes, we need psychiatric examination and treatment, we need substitutes for the saloon. Perhaps we can find substitutes for alcohol, or can train the people to satisfy those cravings with lower percentages of alcohol content. In the sex life there must be a substitute for everything that is taken away. Early marriage may help. Sex may be sublimated somewhat by athletic and creative activities, friendships, dancing, and so on. But it can never be entirely abolished, nor is it desirable that it should be. For, leaving aside its reproductive function, the sex instinct in its various manifestations is one of the chief sources of human happiness. Its evil by-products may eventually be eliminated through the campaign against venereal disease, the use of contraceptive measures, the elimination of commercialized prostitution, and education for successful marriage.

Summary.—After man's conquest of nature and his subjection to culture, the next great step in evolution may be a reconquest of culture by man. This means a conscious reshaping of culture by man himself in his own interests. If such a step ever is achieved, it will mean a much greater degree of welfare or happiness than could ever be counted upon from the unguided evolution of culture. The reshaping of culture must be guided by a barometer of welfare, as suggested in Chapter X.

In this task of consciously promoting human welfare, individual desires can be relied upon to take advantage of most opportunities for happiness. Where collective, social

effort is needed is in the creation of the opportunities themselves, by removing the negative factors of suffering, labor and needless restraint. The major objectives of man's reconquest of culture may be stated as the elimination of suffering, the elimination of needless labor or waste, the enlargement of the number and variety of the sources of enjoyment, and the promotion of the maximum personal liberty.

The situations where culture is especially out of adjustment with human welfare, and requires reshaping, are often called social problems. Social problems will be solved better if we regard them from a functional rather than a structural viewpoint. That is, the mere rise and decay of institutions does not matter; what matters is that society's functions be performed toward making individual happiness.

Social reform, or cultural reshaping, is handicapped by a number of fallacies and prejudices which need to be eliminated. These might be stated as the only solution prejudice, the booster's prejudice, the anti-foreign prejudice, the all-or-none fallacy, the piecemeal fallacy, the anti-materialistic prejudice, the proper method fallacy, the moralistic prejudice, the emotional outlet fallacy.

The greatest hope of progress does not lie in the preservation of any existing type of culture in pure form, but in the mixture and recombination of culture traits from many sources. A truly progressive culture is eclectic.

There is hope of changing our *mores* in the direction of eliminating strife and conflict and other sources of unpleasant emotion, without substitutions, but little hope of changing them so as to eliminate an existing source of pleasure, unless an adequate substitution for that pleasure be found.

CHAPTER XII

THE PREVENTION OF PHYSICAL SUFFERING

Physical suffering mainly arises from five long recognized causes: war, sickness, accident, cruelty, and want.

1. War

War a major cause of suffering.—Mars, as an all round handy man of his Satanic Majesty, has few if any equals. War is responsible for physical, and, of course, mental suffering of all kinds, for enormous waste of labor, and for curtailing the variety and liberty of human pleasures. It is thinkable that we might excuse many of its evils as incurred for the sake of greater good to be achieved later. But if one tries to picture in plain realistic colors the volume of sheer *physical suffering* that results from war, it appears greater than any demonstrated good that war ever has accomplished.

The normal death rate in the United States, of males between 25 and 34 years of age, is about 6.5 per 1000 annually. In France the rate is not materially different. But during the war the mortality in the mobilized forces of France, assuming the total mobilized forces of 8,410,000 to be under arms during the entire period, was something like 37 per 1000 per year. The rate based upon the men actually under arms at any one time would be greater than this. For all the warring countries there were 65,000,000 men mobilized, and 8,500,000 of them died or were killed during the period, making a rate of 33 per 1000 per year. 21,200,000 were wounded, according to the World Almanac.

It spells great progress that we now take care of our wounded men by skillful surgery and antisepsis, that we use anaesthetics, that we inflict no deliberate tortures in war, nor kill or wound wantonly. But these alleviations of suffering are more than made up for by the deadliness of our weapons and the tremendous scale on which war is conducted.

Causes of war.—The causes of war are mentioned as overpopulation, economic competition for markets and for raw materials, monarchical dynasties, secret diplomacy, ignorance, chauvinistic education, propaganda by munition makers, military training, standing armies of professional warriors, newspapers, language differences, the ever-present "fighting instinct," "oppression," and the spirit of nationalistic patriotism. Merely to enumerate causes, however, does not help us much to understand the situation. One can pick out almost any one of these causes and show cases where it led not toward, but away from war, or can show that it is often neutralized by counteracting forces.

Overpopulation in the Orient leads to passive starvation rather than to war. The economic competition between countries for markets and raw materials is partly neutralized by the fact that the competing countries also trade with each other, and are loath to cut off this profitable trade by declaring hostilities. In the Bagdad Railway case secret diplomacy was about to fix up an arrangement between England and Germany so that the capitalists of each might share the investment in the railway, but when these secret negotiations were suddenly exposed English public opinion cried "thumbs down," with the result that the whole affair was left to Germany, and one more cause of Anglo-German hostility thus established.[1] As to ignorance, the people of warlike Europe probably know more about neighboring peoples and countries than do people in the more peaceful continents. More busi-

[1] Earle, "Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway," Chap. 8.

ness men stand to gain by peace than by war; the munition makers have no monopoly of the means of propaganda. The arguments for a professional army and the arguments for universal military training leave us in doubt as to which really tends most to encourage war. Switzerland maintained neutrality in a sea of European conflict in spite of the military training of her people. If there is a universal fighting instinct one wonders why certain generations, and certain regions, are comparatively free from war, while others have an overdose. Certainly human nature does not vary so greatly from time to time nor from people to people. If nationalism causes a few big wars, it may also be said that it eliminates a lot of petty warfare which used to take place within the boundaries of what is now the nation.

Wissler makes war a part of his universal pattern, and thereby implies that it is a subcultural and inevitable phenomenon. But this seems doubtful, because there are and have been human groups, such as the Eskimo, practically free from war. It seems safer to say that group egotism, or, as we call it in its more approved phases, patriotism, and not war, is the subcultural trait. Men inevitably live in groups. Because they are fed and otherwise gratified while in the company of their own group, they come to love that group, while their fear, becoming universally conditioned to the strange and new, comes to be fixated on strangers. Everyday communication prevents the formation of groundless fears of one's neighbors, but there is nothing to neutralize the false rumors which are sure to get started now and then about people at a distance, with whom one cannot communicate. It is universal to love one's own group above all others and to think it superior to all others. But whether or not this group egotism will lead to war depends upon the particular turn culture has taken. It must be remembered that war is not simply the spontaneous use by individuals of fists and teeth and weapons against persons who have aroused their

anger. It is an organized technique. It requires a definite social structure.

Four conditions are necessary to bring about war: (1) The emotions of anger and fear, usually combined in a way we call hatred, must be aroused; (2) that hatred must be conditioned to *persons* as stimuli; (3) the hated persons must, by and large, belong to the "out group," not the "in group"; (4) there must be some cultural technique by which the hatred resolves itself on occasion into acts of organized violence against the hated. Original nature provides the first condition, the subcultural social environment the second and third, but it takes culture to provide the fourth.

Why war continues in spite of cultural progress—industrialism versus nationalism.—Bertrand Russell has attempted to show, in "Prospects of Industrial Civilization," why modern culture, in spite of the growth of sympathy and humane feeling and the great reduction of suffering in most lines, nevertheless stimulates war in seemingly greater degree than ever before. He explains this phenomenon in terms of two great cultural tendencies, industrialism and nationalism. Industrialism tends to organize the whole world as an economic unit. It is continually extending across international boundaries the lines of trade and of business control. The French, German, and Belgian steel industries, for example, are essentially the same big producing area and are tending to unite. As far as this factor goes, industrialism tends to destroy nationalism and to bring about internationalism.

But on the other hand, there are three factors in industrialism which encourage nationalism. First, there is the tendency of capital to overbuild, to create excess plant capacity. Business is irregular. In those times and places where it is on the "boom," it tends to build more factories and machines than will be needed to turn out the supply of goods that normally can be marketed. So at any given time there is an excess of plant capacity and of overhead cost in

most industrial lines. The countries which are producing manufactured goods, which require large overhead, are eager to make their production as great as possible, thereby reducing the burden of this overhead and making greater profit. Consequently they are always on the aggressive, seeking markets for their goods. On the other hand, the countries which produce mainly raw materials and food do not have such large overhead costs. It is not for them relatively so great an advantage to increase their sales. They are not aggressive salesmen.

There are not enough educated consumers in the raw material countries to buy all the goods which the manufacturers would like to sell. There is, therefore, keen competition between manufacturers. Whenever you have many individual units in conflict they tend to unite into a few larger units. This seems to be a universal, subcultural phenomenon. Certain competitors will assume that they have a sufficient community of interest with certain others to unite with these others against third parties. Along what lines will these groups crystallize? Naturally, along the lines already formed by differences in geography, language, religion, nationality. In short, individual competition becomes national competition. Your English cotton manufacturer of Manchester has his market limited just as much by the competition of another English manufacturer in Liverpool as by his German competitor. But he will combine with his Liverpool competitor under the British flag, and with the use of the English language, to resist efforts of the German manufacturer to get a little more of the market. He takes the other Englishman as an ally, the German as an opponent, although they are both equally his competitors. The free-for-all scramble among thousands of individuals becomes an organized struggle among a few large nations. But it is a scramble for something of which there is not enough to satisfy everybody. After the struggle has been won, the members of the winning

group (and there is such a victory only in a relative sense) will fall to scrambling among themselves for the division of the proceeds.

Now if the main lines of human division were religious instead of territorial, war would not be so likely to result from such competition. You would have Jewish and Protestant and Catholic manufacturers all over Europe uniting each with his own religious group to get as much as possible of the market. But since the Jew and the Catholic and the Protestant would be largely next-door neighbors scattered over the continent, and not segregated in separate territories, it would be difficult for them to organize war against each other. Their struggles, if violent, would be in the nature of riots and guerrilla battles rather than true war.

The second factor in industrialism which encourages nationalism is the shortage in certain raw materials, and the geographic concentration of several vital materials, which puts most countries at the mercy of the country which is fortunate to have the coveted resource within its borders. This gives rise to a competition for control of raw materials. Especially in backward countries not sufficiently organized to develop their own resources, each of the big capitalistic countries vies with the others in its efforts to get concessions and agreements by which *it* may be the one to invest the money and to control the material. Then there is the ever-present fear of getting into a quarrel with the country which holds the material and having the supply shut off for political reasons.

According to Bertrand Russell, this competition for raw materials will play in the future a more important role in causing war. Even socialism and democracy, he points out, if adopted by all the nations, would be powerless to prevent this competition for those raw materials, such as oil, which are not plentiful enough to go round.

There is still a third way in which industrialism encour-

ages nationalism. By machinery the means of transportation and communication have been so developed that it is possible at a moment's notice, by sending out a dispatch to hundreds of newspapers with circulations of millions of copies, to weld the whole nation into a mental unit. And all too frequently this mental unit is a mob aroused by some incident, clamoring for war. It is machine printing and the telegraph, creatures of industrial society, which make this possible. Industrialism thus aids in raising the spirit of nationalism to the *n*th degree.

If industrialism were to develop to its full capacity by sending out more and more international lines of control, and by uniting together people having like economic interests in different countries, as it does when it creates international chambers of commerce, international federations of steel manufacturers, international federations of labor, international medical societies; then its influence *against* nationalism eventually would overcome its influence in favor of nationalism; and we might hope for world peace, brought about by that very culture which now leads us into war. Perhaps, then, the cure for war is to encourage the full development of industrialism.

But as Russell points out, nationalism here exerts a checking force upon this full development of industrialism. So far we have discussed how industrialism affects nationalism, now conversely we see how nationalism works upon industrialism. Nationalism allows industrialism to develop fully within national borders, but it checks and hinders it where it tends to cross these borders. How does this happen?

First, nationalism, by tariffs, makes it relatively easier to sell at home and relatively harder to sell abroad than would be otherwise the case. It dams up trade behind tariff walls. Second, nationalism hinders industrialism by corporation laws and business laws. Nationalism requires a business organization to incorporate separately in each country in which it operates, to pay separate taxes, and thus greatly multiplies

the burden of its overhead and hinders its efforts to operate on an international basis. Third, the jealousy which each people has of its own language hinders efforts toward an international language, and multiplies, through the necessity of translation, the work which must be done when business crosses national borders. Fourth, by different currencies, the work of exchange between countries is complicated. Fifth, the nation always holds over the head of the business organization the power to cut off traffic across the border at any moment. This action is at the discretion of a government which represents *territorial* interests, to whose sovereign will all *functional* or *industrial* interests must bow.

Remedies for war.—The remedies for war may be classed as auxiliary and fundamental. The auxiliary remedies help to remove various excuses for war, they help to create peaceful attitudes, they slow down the process of declaring war and give more time for peaceful councils to prevail. They include such things as:

Education as to the horrors of war.
Unbiased teaching about foreign countries.
Correspondence of school children in different countries, as promoted by the Red Cross.
Pictures like "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," or drama like "What Price Glory."
Democratic government.
International travel.
Limitation of births.
International student associations.
History standardized by international agreements of educators, as suggested by H. G. Wells.
More emphasis on physical training, and more democratic spirit, in armies.
Open diplomacy.
Requirement of a referendum before declaring a war of offense.
The World Court.
The League of Nations Covenant.

Separate arbitration and neutrality treaties between nations.
Athletics, exploration, dangerous occupations, and other "moral substitutes" for war as suggested by William James.

But there is little hope of preventing war without measures of a more fundamental sort. This does not mean that the auxiliary remedies are unimportant. They may in fact be necessary as first steps before anything else can be done. But in order to be effective, they must be directed toward the accomplishment of these fundamental remedies. These more fundamental remedies must consist either in new developments of material science, which we cannot predict, or in very radical changes in the social structure.

Material culture remedies.—To take first the material changes, it frequently has been pointed out that if there should be an especial development of defensive rather than offensive weapons, this would greatly reduce the danger of war. As Professor Ross shows in "Social Trend," human history has been much affected by the swinging of the pendulum of warfare, now toward stronger offense and now toward stronger defense. If fortifications and coast guns could be made three times as effective, while battleships, airplanes, and movable artillery remained the same, nations would not so often take the aggressive and wars would be less frequent.

There is a longing in humanity for some revelation of science to make aggressive warfare impossible. This often appears in fiction. For example, in Charles Figdor's "Queen of the World" the hero invents a giant radioactive machine which can melt metal at a distance, so that its possession by any nation would render useless the artillery and the battleships of its enemies. He proposes to internationalize his invention. In the story, which was written by a Continental author, this beneficent plan is foiled by Great Britain, whose secret agent destroys the machine and the inventor, only to be repudiated shortly thereafter by his government which sud-

denly turns socialist and at last joins the world movement for peace.

The reader of this fantastic story will realize of course that the invention of a machine for the wholesale *killing* of human beings at a distance by rays of some sort is nearer the realm of present possibility than a machine for *melting* metal at a distance. As Professor Ross points out, there is little hope of our inventing artillery that will go off when it is on home soil but cannot be fired when resting on foreign soil. Most of the weapons of warfare can be used for both defense and offense. The newer inventions of the airplane and poison gas tend to strengthen the offense. If we look over the whole history of invention since primitive times, we see that the development of the means of killing has been much more rapid than the invention of protective devices. The invention of firearms made shields and breastplates practically useless. A fleet of airplanes can be built and operated at less expense than would be required to construct any effective system of protecting a city from air raids. As far as nature and *material* culture go, the main hope of survival with men, as with animals, is through having such great *numbers,* and such a high birth rate, that the population can quickly be replenished from those reserve portions which happen to escape the killing agency. That is the way of nature, but it is not the way of human progress.

William English Walling during the Great War proposed the very interesting theory that the way to discourage war was to help the Allies, because an Allied victory would mean, relatively speaking, a triumph of sea power over land power, and sea power is usable mainly for defense, while land power is aggressive. The argument, however, has been vigorously refuted. Of course naval power, at first sight, seems aggressive more especially toward coastal regions, and tends to spread its aggression out to various strategic points all over the world, rather than concentrating it against large masses

of inland population. But the Great War demonstrated how naval power can affect also large inland populations by means of blockades and submarines.

The geographical structure of empires seems rather to be the primary factor in determining their proneness to war; whether they use land or sea power depending upon that. From one point of view naval warfare is much to be preferred to land warfare. In naval warfare a larger part of the participating population must devote itself to the labor of producing the costly equipment used, and a smaller per cent are available for the actual fighting. In land warfare, with less equipment per man, the proportion of fighters to workers can be greater. By the same reasoning of course, modern capitalistic land warfare is better than old fashioned land warfare with hand weapons. War thus becomes to a greater extent a problem of economic waste, and relatively less a problem of actual physical suffering. But this distinction disappears when these costly capitalistic weapons come to inflict physical suffering upon the civilian population as by blockades and air raids. However, it is not a distinction that can much console us for the tremendous suffering that in any case must ensue.

Necessity of reorganization of world social structure.— The only hope then of abolishing war seems to lie in *reorganizing the social structure in such a way as to remove the temptation to use the material technique of wholesale killing* which man always will have in his possession. We cannot expect that technique to be its own check and limitation, nor can we expect that man will ever give up a technique he has once acquired. There are two lines of development toward this reorganization: first, the combining of existing national units into larger federations, and second, the weakening of all national, or territorial interests in general by the growth of *functional* interests cutting across territorial lines.

The final outcome of the first movement might be a world

federation of states by which all national sovereignty would be limited. Such a remote possibility will be reached gradually. As Russell shows, the most hopeful approach to it seems to be through the organization of large territorial blocks. There might be, for example, a United States of Europe, long before there was any union between Europe and America. Russell thinks that it would be better for these large federations to be territorial rather than maritime, like the British Empire, which spreads its tentacles all over the globe without controlling the intervening territory.

The great effectiveness of the blockade, and the desire for territorial economic independence, which shows itself in protective tariffs all over the world, would make it difficult to maintain an octopus organization like the present British Empire. Its outlying parts are too vulnerable, too much in danger of being cut off by the enemy from communication with the mother country. Such an empire requires therefore great expense to defend, and the huge machinery necessarily maintained for its defense is a constant menace to peace on many fronts. On the other hand a large territorial empire like America, supposing it to include the whole continent, would be self-sufficient economically. It would have all the materials it needed within its own borders. It would have no great material reason for going to war with any other great empire, and if it did go to war, the ocean would be the battle front. With such fronts neither side could get very far in the invasion of the other's territory. If the war were between Russia and Western Europe, there would be a single and permanent land battle front where *defensive* weapons probably would become relatively stronger than on the smaller and shifting battle fronts of the late war. It would pay to erect two lines of powerful permanent fortifications which could outrange any movable artillery and at the same time be so far apart that they could not demolish each other. Russell thinks there might be four great empires, America,

Western Europe with Africa, Russia, and China. England would need either to ally herself with America, or else join with Europe and leave Canada to America.

In the meantime, however, there might be a steady development of worldwide international power of which the League of Nations is a mere beginning. There are many who ridicule the League and say that it has no real power to prevent war. They point out how Italy took direct action in the Corfu incident, and how she insists that Albania is not a proper subject for League settlement, and how the United States refuses to be dictated to regarding her immigration policy. They are prone to insist that war and patriotism are rooted in human nature, which can not be changed by international organization or treaties. But these people lack the long-sightedness of the cultural anthropologist. They fail to see that culture has power to alter the ways in which human nature shall manifest itself, that war is a part of culture, and that international organization might well become a part of world culture and bring about a substitute for war. They fail to see that the mere fact that international organization is started, even though at the beginning it is very weak, may be the cultural turning point which begins a new trend in human affairs.

What can international government do? It need not interfere with the self government of each nation or each local region, save in those few matters which provoke international conflict. Trade, tariffs, the rationing of raw materials, migration, and armaments would be among the matters to come under international control. Already we are getting a certain measure of international regulation of these matters by means of voluntary treaties between nations. These treaties are a feeble first step toward a more permanent and certain control by a body of several nations.

Counter-irritants to nationalism.—But as we have mentioned, there is another line of development which limits the

sovereignty of nations in a different way. This is the tendency to form international organizations of labor and capital, and also of other special interests. The Roman Church once performed the same function, before it gave way to the power of growing nationalism. Every individual has certain interests which he shares not with all his compatriots, but with citizens of foreign countries who occupy positions in life similar to his own. By international functional associations (industrial, professional, agricultural, labor, capitalistic, etc.) these interests are organized, and they begin to compete in the individual's mind with his loyalty to his country. It is the tendency of our prevailing culture to despise and persecute the citizen who puts any other loyalty above his loyalty to his country. If there is anything that nationalism loathes it is that uncertain loyalty. Although in practice the issue is evaded and camouflaged, the plain truth is that modern nationalism insists that loyalty to country be put before even loyalty to God. So long as God means merely the tribal deity of some people or of some special religion, the national loyalty is no worse and perhaps better than the religious loyalty. But when God comes to represent the common aspiration of all nations toward human welfare, then it will be well to have patriotism take second place.

Contacts between German and American intellectuals probably hindered in slight degree our going to war against Germany. The presence in America of millions of citizens of German birth, and somewhat divided sympathies, certainly did so. Fraternization between German and Russian soldiers on the Eastern front helped to break down morale and perhaps to bring the World War to an earlier termination. When the army of the reactionary Korniloff in 1917 marched upon Petrograd to oust Kerensky's troops, and undo the work of the Russian revolution, it was met, not by bullets, but by huge signs which read, "You will not shoot your brother workmen!" This propaganda caused Korniloff's men to go

over to Kerensky. In the recent Chinese civil war propaganda to secure the cooperation and sympathy of large masses of people in the enemy's territory has played a large role. Do we not have here a new departure in human culture?

The cause of peace would be advanced if a nation could be compelled to pause, when about to declare war, and to consider whether the cause is sufficient to win to itself the loyalty of all its citizens, as against their loyalty to various other interests. If the socialist party of Germany had been a little stronger, if it had had somewhat closer affiliation with the socialist parties of France and Belgium and Russia, the bloodshed of the Great War might possibly have been avoided. More recently British laborers have refused to load munitions for Poland to fight Russia, and Austrian workmen have refused to transport war materials across Austria. The working classes of Europe could by a general strike stop any European war which they might agree to stop. When the monarchists tried to come back into power in Germany in 1920 under von Kapp, civil war was averted by a general strike of the workers. The capitalists could do likewise if they were so minded.

We must not, however, overestimate the permanence of this method of preventing war. Radicals are usually internationalist, and they think that if their doctrines can be spread all over the world war will thereby cease. But as Russell points out, this internationalism may be merely a passing phase in the development of the socialist movement, a means of getting more strength for its fight against capitalism. If all countries were socialist, there still would be causes for war between them, especially when there is a shortage of natural resources. Communist Russia is in fact exceedingly nationalist in tendency, and it is partly by playing upon the nationalism of the Russian peasant that the Bolsheviki have secured his cooperation.

One of the greatest causes of war in recent times has been

the lack of correspondence between the political boundaries and the boundary lines of race, language, and culture. The World War did remedy this to some degree. The treaty of St. Germain has sacrificed the economic unity of the Danubian region for the sake of relieving the "oppression psychoses" (*see* Chap. XIII) of the various national groups of that region. The task of the future is to invent some form of federation which will give the fullest freedom to each nationality in matters of language, religion, education, criminal procedure; and at the same time weld them into geographically sound units for defense and for economic life.

How cultural diffusion makes for peace.—The world-wide similarity of culture which seems gradually approaching through our modern communication and transportation gives another hope of reducing war. Namely, peoples are less likely to fight each other for culturo-sentimental reasons, such as religious differences, insults to dynasties, violation of sacred objects, eating of forbidden foods, national insults. There was a time when the mere fact that a neighboring people insulted one's gods was sufficient reason for wholesale slaughter. But as the modes of thinking become more rational, as magic and superstition are eliminated, it becomes increasingly difficult to insult the gods. We may hope that the idea of "national honor" which now replaces that of the national deity, will go the same way. We may hope, in other words, that in the future a nation will consider itself insulted only when some tangible injury is done to its welfare, and not when some other nation fails to fire the conventional salute of guns to its representatives, or gets the better of it in the mere technicalities of diplomacy. When nations go to war only for downright materialistic reasons, there will be less war than in the past when they fought for "ideals." Unless an ideal is something that can be resolved into the physiological welfare of individual men and women, as outlined in our chapter on the Barometer of Welfare, and can be agreed

upon by all nations, it is, like Germany's ideal of spreading her superior "Kultur," a dangerous thing. Wells' plan of a "Bible of Civilization," which would harmonize the intellectual elements of culture throughout the world, would help pave the way for peace.

2. Sickness

The evil of sickness.—Out of our 60 billion dollars of national income, it is estimated that 1½ billion is wasted through sickness. About three million of our population are at any one time sick enough to be unable to work, and the average worker loses eight to nine working days per year because of sickness. We are interested here, however, not in the economic waste involved, but in the physical suffering.

Death in itself is not a great cause of physical suffering. Its main evils are the mental suffering it causes to surviving friends and relatives, and the economic loss of premature death. But most deaths involve a preliminary period of suffering. Moreover, we have accurate statistics of deaths but very inaccurate figures on the amount of non-fatal illness. We use death rates, therefore, as a rough measure of the amount of sickness and the suffering caused thereby.

Progress in health.—We have made great progress in the campaign against illness. In 1885 the average expectation of life in the United States was about 40 years. In 1920 it was 55 years. This improvement, however, has been effected largely through the saving of infants, and to a somewhat lesser extent through the prevention of the diseases of middle life. But when the modern individual has come to the age of 65, his average expectation of further life is about ten years, which is no greater than it was in the 17th century or in Egypt during the Roman period. The improvement has come through enabling more of the people to live their allotted span, and not through lengthening that span. The normal limit

of human life seems to be about 100 years, and there is no evidence to show that this limit has either increased or decreased with the passage of the centuries.[1]

Judging by death rates, there has been during the past twenty years in the United States a great reduction in typhoid, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and enteritis of infants, and most of the contagious diseases (influenza being a marked exception). But on the other hand, great alarm has been caused by the increase in death rates from cancer, heart disease, and apoplexy. This increase is partly accounted for by the fact that they are diseases of old age which must of course take an increasing toll as the diseases of younger life are eliminated. As thus viewed the increase might be deemed a hopeful sign of progress in the same sense as would an increase in the death rate from the disease of "old age." But the situation is not entirely accounted for in this way, for these diseases show an increasing rate when we consider the old people alone.

Space does not permit us to discuss the various causes of sickness, and the numerous lines of medical effort pursued for the improvement of health. We need only mention such things as quarantine, food and milk inspection, pure food and drug laws, anti-narcotic laws, baby clinics, free dispensaries, nutrition clinics, physical examinations in schools and industries, the movement to make periodic physical examinations universal, physical training and culture, health insurance with its provision of free medical service, the prohibition of poisonous materials in industry, such as phosphorus matches, the movement for scientific diet and more healthful clothing, state distribution of anti-toxins, state inspection of drinking water, seats and rest rooms for employees in factories and stores, the regulation of child and woman labor, the work of state, county, and city departments of health.

[1] See East, Chap. 7, Groves, pp. 227-228, and Kelley, "Conservation of Health," *Scientific Monthly*, April, 1923, p. 402.

Professor East in "Mankind at the Crossroads" divides medical advance into four headings in the order of their probable significance: first, general sanitation; second, serum treatment; third, prevention of infection; and fourth, surgery. Internal medication has in his opinion advanced to a much lesser degree.

But our main interest here is to note the *social* changes required to make these medical measures effective. There is a cultural lag between the progress of medical discovery, and the progress of making the new discoveries socially effective.

The socialization of medicine.—In general these social measures can be described under one term, the "socialization of medicine." One phase of this is the *public health movement.* It means that the achievements of medicine are being made more and more available to all the people at the collective expense, as are the services of education, or public roads, or justice. There is in the United States about one physician for every 750 persons. This is twice the ratio of England and France and three times the ratio of Germany and Austria. But the services of these physicians are very unevenly distributed. The city enjoys them in far greater proportion than the country, and the rich far more than the poor. They are distributed on a more or less commercial basis, according to the ability to pay. According to our conventional notions that is assumed the proper mode of distribution. Those who can or will pay more for medical service should have more of it. But a new conception is gaining. It is that health service should be a first charge upon the community, to be distributed according to needs, to be paid for out of taxes or philanthropic contributions. The basic idea is that the prevention of pain should take priority over the promotion of pleasure; that while pleasure must be earned according to individual ability, freedom from pain is the right of every human being regardless of ability or merit.

Of course it can be said on the other hand, that this

socialization of medicine already is accomplished in part by the old practice of physicians of giving free services to the needy, and of charging different rates according to wealth. The doctors on the whole are an unselfish and public-spirited group. If we should put them entirely under government pay, however, and stop their private fees, we should lose the financial incentive which seems more or less necessary to stimulate some of the most skillful medical efforts and the most intensive training. Nobody proposes, however, that private practice be forbidden, but only that an increasing proportion of our health service be socialized. This socialization is achieved on a large scale by the health insurance systems of England and Germany. In those countries there are lists of "panel" doctors, as they are called, who are paid by the insurance funds, and who are obliged to treat free of charge cases coming under the system. It is protested that these panel doctors are not always the best men, and do not always give their best attention to the free cases. In Czechoslovakia there was a strike of insurance physicians, who, though not withholding treatment, refused, till higher fees should be forthcoming, to sign the certificates of sickness which the workers needed in order to get their sickness compensation money.

In the United States we socialize medicine to a certain degree whenever a factory or a school hires a doctor to take care of the employees or students. The service is given to each according to his needs, and not according to his ability to pay. The student who never has a sick day pays as much toward the salary of the school doctor as does the student who is sick half the time. As a measure of social justice we shall consider this principle under other headings. We are interested in it here because it has the effect of bringing medical service to so many people who sorely need it but who would be apt to neglect it if they had to pay the fees. At least one western town has offered to hire at a fixed salary a town

physician to take care of its citizens, with opportunity for private practice in his spare time.

Of outstanding importance is the movement to employ county public health nurses, which is gaining favor rapidly in our rural communities. The nurse examines school children, advises expectant mothers, reports diseases and unsanitary conditions, persuades and helps those who need treatment to go to a physician, and in many other ways promotes the county health. She is paid out of county funds; or sometimes, where the county treasury is poor, part of her salary may be raised by a private philanthropic organization.

It may not be long before health is not only a public service, but, like education, a service which the citizens are *compelled* to use. Health is not one of those matters which come under the principle of personal liberty which we shall discuss in Chapter XVI. The health of each is the concern of all.

The new cultural attitude toward health.—This changing attitude toward health is well named by a recent report which calls health "the new chivalry." The socialization of medicine is a fundamental change in our culture, but fortunately it is not resisted so violently as some other changes. This is partly because we have had a century of humanitarian education which has raised the prevention of physical pain to a higher level in our scale of values. It is partly because there is an already existing pattern in our system of public education, to which the new departure can be accommodated without seeming a too radical innovation.

Such a revolution has taken place in our attitude toward health, that even venereal diseases, until lately regarded as unspeakable punishment for sin, are now treated from the same medical viewpoint as any other diseases. One physician suggests, however, that we are not giving so much effort to discovering anti-toxins for those diseases as for others, and there is still a great deal of resistance to the teaching of preventive measures irrespective of chastity. There is no such

resistance, however, to the use of drugs preventive of indigestion on the ground that they might encourage people to overeat. Until we are willing to put at the free public disposal every known method of preventing or curing disease, as well the methods that require less personal self control as those that require more, it cannot be said that health has quite reached its proper place at the top of our scale of moral values.

Public health versus eugenics.—There is a difference of opinion as to how far public health measures are responsible for our recent decrease in illness. Karl Pearson, on the basis of many years of careful statistical investigation, thinks that the falling off of tuberculosis is due more to the dying off of the susceptible stocks of our population than to curative or preventive treatment. Some disease germs are so ubiquitious that immunity through natural selection seems to be the only solution. Objections are raised to our general public health movement on the ground that it saves the weaklings. If we let the weaker children die off, as they do in China, then those who survive to maturity will be those of tougher constitution who can go through adult life with less sickness and less need of medical care. But on the other hand, experience has shown that natural selection may make a people immune to certain diseases, as it has made the Chinese immune, relatively speaking, to septicemia and typhoid, and yet some new disease may hit them and kill them off like flies. And this same rough treatment which weeds out the weakling babies will also cause the survivors to suffer much more illness than they would suffer in a sanitary environment. The desirable robustness of constitution may be secured by denying the weaklings the right to reproduce, but not the right to live. That is the only method which fits in with the rest of our program for the betterment of human life.

Health education.—Not the least in importance is the increasing time devoted to health education in the schools.

Physical health and development is, according to Professor David Snedden, one of the four great aims of education. The Federal government is active in distributing health bulletins and other educational material. Emphasis is placed upon measures, such as the care of the teeth, whose relation to health is not obvious, but has been discovered with greater certainty than the relation of more obvious factors such as fresh air and various types of diet.

3. Accidents

The extent of accidents.—About 83,000 persons in the United States die violent deaths, other than suicide, every year. It is estimated that about 35,000 or more of these result from work accidents and about 20,000 from automobile accidents. About 6 per 1000 of our population are cripples during normal times. Besides the deaths industrial accidents cause 260,000 cases per year of serious injury and about 3,000,000 cases of slight injury. Nine per cent of the gainfully occupied population suffers some injury during the course of the year from accidents in their occupations.

The attitude toward accidents.—While most accidents may be traced to some act of individual carelessness, there is a growing tendency to place the responsibility upon society itself for permitting or encouraging such carelessness to exist. The problem is a social problem. The technical science of the thing is much simpler than in the case of sickness; most physical measures to prevent accidents are obvious to the mind of the layman, and the main problem is the social problem of getting these measures used.

Safety devices in factories and on railroads play a large part. It seems unbelievable today that it was necessary to use compulsion to get the railroads to adopt automatic couplers, thereby protecting the trainmen from the dangers formerly incurred in standing between the cars and coupling by

hand. It seems unbelievable that many factories formerly had no guard rails on their stairways and no safeguards against revolving saws and blades, and that boys habitually were expected to board street cars while in motion.

Workmen's compensation laws put the responsibility for accidents upon the employer, and thus encourage anything he can do to reduce them. Building codes, school inspection, required state approval of school building plans, fire escapes, play streets and playgrounds, closed vestibule cars, roadside warnings, traffic control, speed laws, block signals, air-brakes, educational "safety" posters in public places, and the control of fireworks and explosives are among the measures we are using to fight this great source of human suffering. Only twenty years ago it was the accepted thing for boys to spend the Fourth of July exploding giant firecrackers and dynamite caps, without stint or limit save that of the parents' pocketbooks. Mothers shuddered throughout the day but did not dare to oppose the popular custom. But while old sources of danger are being removed, new ones appear. Motor vehicles and aircraft replace the dangers of the past.

One thing that makes this change of culture seem fundamental is the fact that there seems to have gone with it a distinct change of attitude. The writer can remember when it was regarded as somewhat cowardly for a boy or man to take various precautions for his personal safety now looked upon as the proper thing. Old time baseball players, who used to catch behind the bat without any protection, looked at the introduction of gloves, mits, and masks with a kind of scorn, as being babyish. The new attitude, however, it must be said, has not been applied to the driving of automobiles so much as to some of our older activities. So one may still wonder whether there is any general cultural change, or only a change in the attitude toward each specific mechanical invention when it reaches a certain stage of popular use. The

fact is that our cautious attitudes are determined by our fears as gained from culture and from individual experience, and not by any real knowledge of the extent of our danger. Skiing, because of the rapid motion, *seems* a very dangerous sport to many people who do not hesitate to ride a frisky horse, but there is reason to suspect that in the order of actual danger, the two situations are reversed. Only a study of accident statistics, keeping novices separate from experts, would tell.

4. Cruelty

The disappearance of physical cruelty in modern civilization.—In the very highest of ancient civilizations it was an accepted principle that limited groups of persons might justifiably be set aside and compelled to suffer in order to add to the pleasure or security of the majority. Such victims as exemplified by Rome's gladiators, were considered as outside society, having no rights. They were regarded much as we today regard the animals which we imprison, butcher, or vivisect for the advancement of our human purposes.

This does not mean that cruelty was ever the usual thing in everyday life. Kindness, rather than cruelty, has probably been the general rule in human relationships at all times. Cruelty is always practiced under exceptional circumstances. It is limited to criminals, or captives of war, or unruly children, or adulterous wives, or heretics, or persons of a different race or color, or "undesirable" citizens. But the significant thing is that these exceptions have become fewer and fewer, until finally in modern Euro-American culture, except for occasional mob outbursts and the acts of psychopathic individuals, physical cruelty has practically disappeared. It may be said that the change is due to the discovery that better results can be obtained without cruelty, that our institutions can be preserved without using physical pain upon

the non-conformist. But there are signs that something even more hopeful than that discovery has occurred. Namely, a doubt has arisen as to *whether institutions that require cruelty to preserve them are worth preserving.* The abolition of pain has risen in our scale of values, and the sacredness of institutions *per se* has gone down.

Whatever the interpretation be, this practical disappearance of deliberate cruelty during the past 200 years in the more advanced countries is a change whose significance for human welfare may be even greater than that of the industrial revolution. One can see in Europe today the dungeons, the thumbscrews, and the torture racks that only a few hundred years ago were used to preserve our sacred beliefs. In early nineteenth century England, the writings of Charles Dickens represented the rising tide of humane feeling. Undoubtedly mankind has been able to feel pity in all ages. But this age made pity socially effective in a way it never had been effective before.

We note the refinement of pugilism, the abolition of corporal punishment in the schools, the laws against wife beating, the cessation of the old custom of beating apprentices, the *gradual* humanization of our jails, the softening down of college hazing. In the colonial days of the United States it was customary to punish criminals by death, whipping, stocks and pillory, and other measures of physical cruelty. The prison system, which substitutes prolonged mental suffering for briefer physical pain, is comparatively recent.

Danger of the humane movement's becoming sentimentalism.—There is reason to fear that we are overreaching a bit here in the effort to outlaw physical pain. Professor Harry E. Barnes' chapter on "How Prisons Punish the Human Mind" suggests this question. We cannot be sure that certain physical punishments such as the whipping post, which do no permanent injury, are not to be preferred in many cases to the prolonged mental suffering of imprisonment.

Something is to be said for shortening and intensifying pain, so long as it does no permanent injury, also in order to save economic waste.

The opposition to capital punishment also suggests the danger that true progress may degenerate into cultural sentimentalism. There is practically no physical pain involved in modern capital punishment, and it is doubtful that the mental suffering of a few months of anticipating execution is as great as the mental suffering of a lifetime of imprisonment. Capital punishment will have to be judged by its actual influence upon crime. Its irrevocability in case of a possible mistake in justice is also a strong argument against it. But the argument that it is brutalizing is unproved. It looks like another case of cultural adhesion, rather than any essential connection between capital punishment and brutality in other departments of life. Radicals as well as conservatives have their cultural idols and fetishes. What we want is reduction of genuine suffering, not the mere preservation of some sacred "principle" for its own sake.

In another way there is a tendency to overreach a little. The anti-cruelty movement is extending to animals, being represented by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. But in the anti-vivisection movement it goes to a dangerous extreme. We shall do well not to make this humane attitude toward animals a fetish that prevents our realizing other objects, one of which is the prevention of pain to human beings. The great objective is the welfare of humanity, not the welfare of animals except in so far as this is consonant with human welfare. There are backward Oriental cultures, particularly in India, which have pushed the ideal of kindness to animals way beyond anything in our own culture. Members of some of their cults refuse to kill any living thing. They will permit cobras and tigers to prey upon the people before they will destroy those animals. In some countries it is regarded as a virtue to allow insects to feast undisturbed

upon the human body. Certainly this is not progress, but culture's conquest of man.

5. Physical Want

Physical want, due to a shortage of the true physical necessities of life, is one of the chief causes of suffering in backward countries. In our country it is rare, occurring only among the poorer workers, mainly in cities, and in occasional emergencies like the Mississippi floods. Physical want cannot be said to exist merely because there is a lack of the means of "decent living." It usually means shortage of food, fuel and shelter, or medical aid. This shortage may be due (1) to the poverty of particular families, (2) to disaster or economic misfortune in a particular region, as in the case of fires, tornadoes or floods, or of the distress in the wheat belt due to the falling wheat market, or (3) to the general poverty of a whole country, which is usually the result of overpopulation, as in China.

The first and second types of situations can be remedied by *relief work,* in which the government or philanthropic agencies bring the needed food and supplies free of charge to the unfortunate groups. But this is only a temporary palliative for acute conditions. Permanent remedy must consist in a better adjustment of the distribution of wealth, to be discussed in Chapter XVII, and in preventing the sickness, accidents, unemployment, or other fundamental cause of the trouble. In the case of nation-wide want, however, there is no prosperous portion of the country which can turn to the aid of those in want. In such a case, as in China, the trouble is overpopulation, and can be remedied only by emigration, limitation of offspring, or the slow economic improvement of the country.

Summary.—The first great objective of social reform, or cultural reshaping, is to eliminate suffering, which may be

conveniently divided into physical and mental. The major causes of physical suffering are war, sickness, accident, cruelty, and physical want. To eliminate these evils is partly a technical problem, requiring material invention and discovery, but also a social problem, requiring changes in the social structure. It is these social changes with which social work is concerned.

War continues, on an even greater scale than before, in spite of our cultural progress in many other respects. This growing magnitude of war may be explained by the culture pattern of nationalism and its peculiar relations to industrialism. The prevention of war may be helped by various reforms in education and government, but the fundamental need is a reshaping of the culture pattern through international organization. International organization includes general federations or groupings of nations, and also the world-wide organization of particular functional interests such as labor, capital, medicine.

To combat sickness we are developing a new culture pattern, the socialization of medicine. There are signs of a new set of *mores* in relation to the prevention of accidents. One of the most significant changes in modern Euro-American culture is the practical disappearance of cruelty. Physical want in forward countries is usually negligible, but in the backward it is apt to be a major ill, due mostly to overpopulation.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PREVENTION OF MENTAL SUFFERING

And the rest, a few,
Escape their prison and depart
On the wide ocean of life anew.
There the freed prisoner, where'er his heart
Listeth, will sail;
Nor doth he know how there prevail,
Despotic on that sea,
Trade-winds which cross it from eternity.
Awhile he holds some false way, undebarred
By thwarting signs, and braves
The freshening wind and blackening waves.
And then the tempest strikes him—and between
The lightning bursts is seen
Only a driving wreck,
And the pale master on his spar-strewn deck
With anguished face and flying hair
Grasping the rudder hard,
Still bent to make some port he knows not where,
Still standing for some false, impossible shore.

—MATTHEW ARNOLD, "A Summer Night"

Two methods of attack upon mental suffering.—A child is crying. Investigation may reveal that the crying is stimulated by the prick of a pin, or by the taking away of a cherished toy. In either case the physiological process is very much the same. It is the emotion we call anguish. The internal responses are mainly those of the sympathetic nervous system. Externally there is a turning down of the

mouth corners, half closing of the eyes, raising of the inner corners of the brows, a characteristic frown, tears, and vigorous use of vocal cords. If the stimulus happens to be the pin, there will be movements toward the affected locality, but these movements form only a special addition to the general pattern of the child's behavior.

The real difference between the two cases lies in the nature of the stimulus, not in the nature of the reaction. In the case of the pin the stimulus is received by one of the pain organs of the skin; it is biologically adequate and physical. In the case of the removed toy, the stimulus is a complex situation, registering mainly through the eyes, and it cannot by its very nature be biologically adequate. It is a conditioned stimulus. We call the first case physical, and the second mental suffering. Now in the case of the pin, there is only one remedy. That is, to remove the pin. But in the other case there might be used two kinds of remedies. One would be similar to that used with the pin: remove the irritating stimulus by restoring the toy. But another remedy would be to change the mental attitude of the child so that he would not want the toy. In the immediate explosion it might be too late to apply successfully the latter remedy, but reviewing psychologically the whole history of the situation, we know we might have educated the child not to care for toys, or not to be vexed when they are taken away. Instead of removing the disagreeable stimulus, we might connect to that stimulus a different response, a response of emotional indifference. In other words the stimulus would no longer be disagreeable. The first remedy, changing the external stimulus itself, as by giving back the toy, we may call an *objective* remedy. The second, reconditioning the stimulus, so that the same external stimulus, removing the toy, may occur without provoking the painful response, we may call a *subjective* or *psychological* remedy.

The possibility of using a subjective as well as an objective

remedy to alleviate suffering puts mental suffering in a class quite different from physical. The whole social problem involved is different.

Mental suffering is chronic rather than acute.—In general mental suffering is less acute than physical and does not require such immediate treatment. Its seriousness lies rather in the fact that it is prolonged. On the whole, it is probable that more damage is done to human life and health by the more chronic emotions of irritation, anxiety, and grief than by the more acute emotions of rage, fright, and pain. The mild chronic emotions in mankind are commonly caused by intangible situations that cannot be quickly removed. A dog's rage may be soon alleviated by the removal of his enemy from the range of sight and sound. But a man may not be able for hours or days to put out of his mind the memory of the insult or other situation which has enraged him. The mere memory of the experience serves as a continuing stimulus, which keeps up the high blood pressure, retarded digestion, and other anger responses, in mild degrees but for prolonged periods of time.

As life grows more complex, the possibilities of mental suffering as well as of mental enjoyment are increased. Many a man, living in the upper tenth of the social scale, and possessed of all the goods and opportunities which would seem to make life enjoyable, is nevertheless unhappy most of the time. He is unhappy because he has failed to get something, quite unimportant from a social point of view, which he set out to get. So the problem of mental suffering in human life is more complicated than that of physical suffering. There may be more possibilities of cure, but there are also more possibilities of relapse.

Subjective treatment of mental suffering a prominent feature of culture.—Although the psychological principles involved have not been understood until recent years, yet in practice man always has used the subjective treatment in vari-

ous forms. Religion has been the great palliative for the sorrows and anxieties man could not cure by removing the external cause. Oriental religions rely more completely than Western religions on this principle of *solace*. While Christianity is to a certain extent a religion of activity, lending its inspirations to many programs for improving the external conditions of life, and reserving its inner consolations for cases where such effort fails, Buddhism on the other hand teaches that effort is futile, that the only thing to do is to quench all desire, and seek peace through the cultivation of an inner attitude.

Modern social reformers often ridicule the attempts of religion to remedy evils by this subjective method. They point out, for example, that employers occasionally compelled their workmen to attend Billy Sunday's meetings, inferring that the employers hoped thereby to cure discontent without making any improvements in wages or working conditions. The Russian Bolsheviki, believing fanatically that economic reorganization is the only fundamental cure for the ills of the world, have bitterly attacked all religion, because they believe its subjective consolation weakens zest for this economic change. While they have not dared actually to destroy the church, they have compelled the posting at the entrance to each church the sign: "Religion is the opiate of the people."

The conservative moralist or preacher thinks that the only genuine remedy is to improve human character; the radical reformer thinks the only remedy is to improve conditions, and then character will take care of itself. The extreme position of the latter is simply a reaction against the extreme position of the former. Probably there always will be a role for the subjective treatment to play. Many sociologists have overlooked this point. The problem is to choose this role intelligently.

The very modern procedure of psychoanalysis is in fact the old method of religious consolation in a new form. The

patient whose emotions are out of harmony with reality, so that he suffers various nervous disorders, is cured, not by changing his environment, but by his re-education to a new attitude toward that environment. Other forms of psychiatric treatment do the same thing, although in different ways. While psychoanalysis works by giving the patient himself a thorough understanding of the case, hypnotism seeks to accomplish the result by suggestion. Faith healing, certain modern religious cults, and the widely popular formula of M. Coué, are all methods of subjective treatment.

Where subjective treatment will not work.—The harmfulness of subjective treatment consists in using it in the wrong situations. First, it cannot be expected to cure *organic* diseases or overcome biologically adequate stimuli. If nerve tissue is destroyed, as in general paresis, there is no hope of curing the patient by making him believe he is well. Nor can we heal a broken limb or stop its pain by any amount of faith or suggestion. Possibly we can distract somewhat the patient's attention, and make his suffering more bearable, but there is no real cure, except by setting the limb and waiting for it to heal by its natural, physiological processes. Such cases are not mental, but physical suffering.

Second, there is little hope of permanent subjective remedy where the stimulus to suffering is of the *universally* acquired type. If we are dealing with a type of situation which is unpleasant to the great majority of individuals the world over, regardless of their peculiar culture or their peculiar individual experience, then the only remedy is to remove the external cause, in other words, to use the objective remedy. What are these universally acquired annoyers? In the present state of our knowledge it is difficult to define them exactly. But probably belonging to this class are such situations as insecurity of livelihood, recognized injustice, needless restraint by other persons, loss of property accumulated with effort, injury to one's friends and loved ones. We

shall consider these situations in the latter part of the present chapter. They occupy such places in the pattern of life that they are sure to become unpleasant through conditioning of reflexes, though they are not so by inborn original nature. For such situations the only reasonable remedy is tireless effort to prevent their existing at all. We cannot educate the individual to "get used to them," any more than could the subject of a well known "bull" educate himself to get used to being hanged. With a certain number of highly suggestible persons, there may be temporary success in using the subjective remedy even with such situations. But this is no test of its validity for the mass of mankind. Those who teach the patient endurance of the sufferings due to these causes and yet make no attempt to remove them, are, whether consciously or unconsciously, enemies of human progress.

A third principle is that the subjective treatment should always be confined to cases where the objective method is impossible or costly out of all proportion. The objective treatment, on the other hand, should take priority in all situations where it is reasonably possible. Our first effort should be to give men what they want, and only when that fails to make them want what they get. And this for the reason that the subjective method is uncertain and not always permanent. We cannot be sure of the permanence of a conditioned response formed by artificial training. It would be safer to satisfy the conditioned responses which already are established in the personality through its own natural experience.

Where the subjective method is valuable.—But there are cases where in the nature of things a subjective remedy is the best or the only remedy. (1) First, there are cases which so closely mimic physical ailments that only the trained psychiatrist recognizes their really mental character. These are the *functional,* as distinguished from the *organic,* nervous and mental disorders. They include many cases variously known as hysteria, psychasthenia, neurasthenia, and anxiety neuro-

sis. This is not to say that there is nothing organically wrong with the patient who develops these disorders, but that the particular symptoms he develops are due to mental experiences, in other words, conditioning of reflexes, rather than to organic lesions or defects in body or brain. They often are produced by shock or some powerful emotion. They often can be cured by the same sort of thing which caused them. The remarkable healings reported today are frequently cases of this kind. It is significant that lameness, blindness, and speech defects make up a large per cent of these cures. A number of churches have large collections of crutches discarded by patients who have been cured at their shrines. A woman evangelist is reported as effecting recently many such cures.

Psychiatrists are familiar with the disorder known as hysterical paralysis. A railway brakeman, for instance, riding on the steps of a train, thought he was about to be struck on the leg by the walls of a tunnel into which the train was about to enter. He was not touched, but his leg nevertheless became paralyzed from the emotional shock. The disease itself was purely psychic, and hence the cure could be psychic. Such cases frequently are cured by psychiatrists without religious procedure. But the psychological principle is the same: the patient must be given a powerful emotional stimulation carrying the *belief that he can walk.* Whether this stimulus is gotten through faith in the doctor, faith in a supernatural power, or through faith in the psychoanalyst, who discovers and reveals the patient's repressed ideas and emotions, the result may be the same. Some sort of faith seems necessary: the patient must be moved by some force which he *feels* to be outside himself. One cannot directly give oneself the necessary stimulus.

The remaining kinds of cases in which the subjective treatment is the logical method are more obviously cases of *mental* suffering, although they too, in persons predisposed to ner-

vous disorders, may often give rise to seemingly physical ailments.

(2) The second kind of case involves unsatisfied desires which would in general require more than the world's available wealth for their satisfaction. When the child cries for the moon, the treatment of his suffering must be subjective if any at all. So treated must be the desires of the masses of the people for the luxurious life portrayed in our moving pictures, which unsatisfied cravings are said to lead young men to crime and young women to prostitution. There simply is not wealth enough in the country for any considerable per cent of the population to enjoy such material luxury. There is not even wealth enough to provide every worker with the wages which W. Jett Lauck and the railway unions declared to be a "living wage." The only remedy is an education which will teach the needlessness of such standards of living, and the possibility of getting happiness without them. It may well be that we cannot apply this subjective treatment to the poor unless we also regulate and restrict somewhat the luxury of the rich. That is, the mental sore spot with which we are dealing may be not so much physical poverty as an outraged sense of justice. In so far as this is true, an objective remedy is needed. It may be that we cannot secure the greatest happiness of society without some forcible leveling down of the extremes of wealth and poverty. On the other hand it would seem that this happiness could not be obtained by an absolute leveling, because of the great differences between individuals in the capacity to use and enjoy wealth.

(3) A third type of case requiring subjective treatment is desire for prestige or power beyond available opportunities. There simply is not opportunity in any society for *everyone* to be a leader, and the demand for star roles in the drama of life may well exceed the supply. We can increase somewhat the number of such roles by multiplying leisure activi-

ties, we can pay more attention to the abilities and desires of individuals when we select them for such positions, but beyond these points we cannot go. There still will be unsatisfied longings for prestige which will need to be treated by subjective methods. That is, we shall need to educate the person of mediocre ability to find joy in humble service, or in personal diversions which are independent of the prestige-scale. We shall do just what the preachers and moralists earnestly have tried with varying success to do for ages past; but with the help of modern psychology we may be able to do it more scientifically and effectively.

(4) Another class of mental suffering which must be treated subjectively consists of the sorrows caused to one person by the behavior of another, where that behavior falls within the class of socially justifiable liberties. A son, for example, chooses a wife, an occupation, or a mode of living which is quite within his legal rights but violates long cherished sentiments and ideals of his parents. The objective remedy would be to compel him to choose so as not to grieve his parents, as Japanese culture still does. But here the cure would in the aggregate, be worse than the ailment. As we shall see later, the greatest good is to be obtained by allowing everyone complete liberty to act according to his individual tastes, except where his action inevitably causes harm or danger to others. Modern culture is moving gradually toward this principle. An act such as that in the above illustration does not cause inevitable harm or danger to others. The son's action injures his parents only sentimentally, because they have established certain sentiments and ideals which they did not need to establish. The remedy which the culture of the future will probably provide is subjective: to educate parents to expect their children to exercise full liberty of choice in such matters; to satisfy their parental love by contemplating the freedom and happiness of their children rather than their loyalty to special family ideals.

But *legal* rights at the moment may not be a safe test of what a person should be allowed or not allowed to do to the discomfiture of others. In some respects the law itself is reactionary and anti-social. In some states we still arrest people for playing golf or working in their gardens on Sunday, or using profane language, on the ground that these acts violate the religious sentiments of the community and hence are a public nuisance. If the profanity were used in such place and manner that aggrieved persons were obliged to hear it, and that rather continuously, then a genuine nuisance would exist. The law would be quite justified in restraining the profane speaker on the same grounds as when it restrains undue noise about hospitals, churches, and schools. Again, it would be entirely social and progressive to establish certain zones where persons annoyed by certain activities might be kept free from such annoyances, as is the case in Ocean Grove, N. J., where automobiles are not allowed to enter on Sunday. But to have a State-wide prohibition of acts of this kind, simply because it violates our sentiments *to know* that such acts are taking place, is simply to make law for the preservation of culture itself, in violation of the needs and liberties of individual men, and is hence in opposition to cultural progress.

The annoyed persons usually are not obliged to hear, much less to see, the annoying acts; and if they are annoyed by the mere knowledge that the acts are taking place, then that annoyance itself and not the acts is the disease to be cured. The remedy is a rational education. And this principle holds even if the person who wants to perform the sentimentally shocking, but otherwise harmless, act is a minority of one in a population of a million who are opposed. Where personal liberty conflicts with sentiment and sentiment alone, the culture of the future will maintain personal liberty, no matter how overwhelming the majority that may be in any particular case against it. And this course is advocated, not from any

sentimental worship of liberty as an absolute value in itself but because of the belief that in the long run the liberty-policy will yield the greatest aggregate happiness.

(5) A fifth type of case is personal sorrow due to unpredictable and uncontrollable circumstances. Where the death of a loved one, loss of property, or disappointment in personal plans, occurs after every known objective method has been used to prevent such misfortune, then subjective consolation has an important place in easing the sufferings of life. In such cases the belief in personal immortality, the belief in future compensation for the evils of this world, Christian Science, Buddhism, and many other religions and philosophies have played a valuable part in human life.

The conflict between subjective and objective treatment. —But here lies the very heart of the problem. Can we have religious consolation for unavoidable misfortunes, without weakening the zest to avoid those that are avoidable? Will anybody, for instance, practice mental healing successfully upon mental ills, and at the same time be ready to call the doctor immediately when his child shows symptoms of diphtheria? Will a man who can console himself philosophically when his home burns down be as likely to take out fire insurance, or buy extinguishers, as the man to whom loss brings unalleviated pain? There are some who take the view that all these consolations are like so many mental drugs or anaesthetics, which weaken our campaign for the prevention of evils. The Marxian socialist, for example, wants no alleviation of poverty. He wants conditions to become as bad as possible in order that people may be aroused to make them better. A victory of the extreme conservatives, in his view, is more to be desired than a victory by the moderate progressives, for it means a step toward the inevitable revolution which will make things better.

If this view is correct, if all subjective treatment for mental suffering tends to weaken the objective treatment,

then the course of progress is to give up the subjective treatment. 'Twere better that all consolatory religion and philosophy were abolished than that they were allowed to handicap the progress of medicine, engineering, and social work. But here is where our anthropological view of culture helps us. Is there any essential reason, in the very nature of things, why subjective treatment should hinder objective progress? Or is this antagonism merely a matter of the culture pattern to which we are accustomed? Cannot we use subjective treatment for some ills and not for others?

The adherent of a mystical cult will reply that it is *illogical* to believe that some ills can be cured by psychic methods and others cannot. One must either believe the whole faith, or none. Here is the all-or-none fallacy again. The "logic" which all dogmatic believers demand is simply *cultural purity*. Yet modern psychology shows that there are some ills which can be mentally treated and it has given us definite methods, such as psychoanalysis, by which many mental sufferers do get this subjective relief without subscribing to any universal dogma of religion or metaphysics.

But with other patients, the success of psychic cures today may require faith in the supernatural, the mystical. If the patient understands the process of his treatment as a perfectly natural process, explainable by the laws of psychology, involving no miraculous interference by a "spiritual" power, he may not be sufficiently impressed to effect a cure. He requires this belief simply because his reflexes have been conditioned to a certain culture pattern. That pattern makes everything natural and scientifically explainable to seem commonplace and unimpressive, while something mystical and unexplainable is required to arouse the emotions of awe, ecstasy, wonder, self-abasement. But we may in the future be able to construct a new culture-pattern in which the discoveries of science may play the same awe-inspiring role as did mysticism in the past, and in which the great scientist

will play the emotional role of the medicine man or the faith healer.

The general causes of mental suffering.—Many of the causes of mental suffering are unique in the individual case, and can be remedied only by individual treatment. The psychiatrist and the religious confessor or healer give subjective treatment to individuals. The social case worker gives objective treatment to the individual case. She is on the lookout, not for general conditions which need reform, but for the specific factors in the individual situation which have led to poverty, desertion, and suffering. She then attempts to make whatever adjustment seems helpful in that situation, such as finding employment for the breadwinner, getting the sick person to the hospital, compelling the negligent husband to support his wife, placing in another family or institution the neglected child.

But there are certain *general* conditions which account for much of the world's mental suffering, and which require general and not merely individual treatment. Because they are general, and because they are fairly universal causes of suffering, the remedies must be objective and not subjective. The conditions to be dealt with are universal rather than individual conditioned stimuli.

These more general causes of mental suffering can be put under the following heads:

1. Repulsive physical surroundings
2. Insecurity
3. Group injustice
4. Personal conflict in primary groups
5. Crime

1. Repulsive Physical Surroundings

While all sights and sounds, and probably most smells, are indifferent stimuli at birth, it seems that certain groups of

stimuli almost universally and inevitably become attached to the unpleasant emotions, and there is nothing to do but to prevent such stimuli. It is thinkable that we could be educated to enjoy even dirt and filth, and if that were a cheaper remedy to relieve the unpleasantness than cleaning up the environment, and an equally sure remedy, the logic of progress would oblige us to follow it. Mere dirt in itself is not unhealthful nor is it biologically unpleasant to the senses. We find, in fact, many peoples of more simple culture who view with complete indifference dirty bodies, decaying food, and other things to which our disgust reflexes have become violently conditioned by our culture. Young children do not abhor filth until trained. On the other hand, we find peoples like the Japanese and the Indians of Yucatan among whom cleanliness is an important part of culture. So far as mere dirt goes, we might choose either alternative and secure happiness.

But the matter does not end there. Filth, though innocent in itself, has evil companions from which it cannot easily be separated. Foremost among these are disease germs. Second, dirt means inefficiency of labor. If the workmen in a garage were to exchange places freely and frequently with the stenographers in the office, without any change of clothing or washing of hands, the business papers in the office would soon become illegible from grease, resulting in a genuine breakdown of productive efficiency, which depends upon brain and paper work as well as on manual work. Our standard of office cleanliness, which seems to be a purely esthetic standard of respectability, may be simply an outer bulwark against mechanical inefficiency. In practical life we do not stop to think what eventually would happen in our dwelling houses if dirt were allowed to diffuse itself unchecked; we simply have our responses conditioned against the mere sight of the dirt itself and are annoyed at its first appearance. It would seem that a civilization progressive in

other respects must of practical necessity be a more or less cleanly civilization.

That being the case, those persons who share our culture in most respects, but are compelled to live or work in its unwashed nooks and corners, will necessarily suffer a certain amount of mental annoyance. It is to prevent this immediate annoyance, as well as to prevent the more remote harmful consequences, that social reform introduces such things as housing laws, tenement inspection, food and drug regulation, pure food laws, clean-up campaigns, civic beautification, consolidation of prisons and poorhouses partly because the larger institution is usually run with more cleanliness than the many small ones it replaces, inspection of prisons, factories, and workshops, minimum wage laws to insure minimum standards of living, and many other measures. Some of these measures are effective, others less so, but they all have as part of their purposes the elimination of things that are normally unpleasant to the senses, whether or not harmful in other respects.

2 Economic Insecurity

Insecurity a cause of anxiety.—Professor Thomas has said that the desire for security is one of the four fundamental wishes of human nature. This does not mean that it is an instinct or a reflex. It is a wish which grows out of more or less universal experience, based mainly upon the fear reflexes. Animals suffer fear only from external stimuli. Men, with their ability to imagine situations not immediately present to the senses, have enormously increased opportunities for fear. Especially plaguing to man is that mild but chronic fear we call anxiety. In individual cases, anxiety becomes a neurosis, that is, shows abnormal physical symptoms, and can be treated subjectively. But the bulk of the world's anxiety is the result of more or less general conditions of culture, which could be objectively treated.

Among primitive peoples we find much fear of calamities whose causes are not understood. Costly sacrifices are made to the gods, children are killed, witches burned, untold cruelty practiced, in the belief that some great catastrophe to the group will be thereby averted. These magical rites are practiced in order to get the feeling of security against disaster, that is, to alleviate fear. There is, however, little anxiety about the life and welfare of a particular individual so long as he cooperates with the group and obeys the group customs. There is sufficient communism of food and shelter to insure every member against physical want so long as the group itself prospers. This was more or less true even through the stage of pre-industrial civilization. In China today it is said that the unemployed worker in the town has little to worry about, for there is always rice in the pot for him out home on the farm. In European civilization the culture pattern took care of the unfortunate by making it a Christian virtue to give to the beggar.

But in modern industrial culture we have a new pattern of life. The household is smaller, the individual cannot so much depend upon his family in the larger sense, he is in large numbers divorced from any connections with the land, has no property, lives in congested city districts on food brought in from a distance, and is likely to be ejected from his house for non-payment of rent. And furthermore poverty is regarded more and more as a disgrace. One must live well for the looks of the thing and not merely to prevent physical suffering, and beggary is less tolerated as an outlet for generous impulses. It is said by the leaders of industrial society that the world owes no man a living, that each must shift for himself in the free play of the market. The actual danger of physical want, of death from lack of food or shelter, is certainly much less in our civilization than it is in China or was in mediæval Europe. But the danger of mental suffering from loss of position or property, failure of

cherished ambition, uncompensated injury, and from the disgrace which often follows failure, is probably much greater than ever before. Economic insecurity is the great new bugbear which accounts for much of the world's anxiety today.

Culture patterns that promote security.—Many features of our culture have the function of mitigating anxiety. Thus the institution of private property, the laws of contract, the standards of honesty, give us security. They do not always give us justice. But our strong allegiance to them suggests that security is more immediately important than justice.

An employer, for example, hires a clerk from among many applicants, and signs a contract with him for a stated period of time. After a few days he discovers that another applicant was really the better man, and moreover, from the standpoint of the applicant's personal needs, deserved the job more, the present incumbent not being so capable as he represented himself to be. Pure justice requires that this clerk be replaced by the other applicant. But such a replacement violates the principle of security. If it were permitted, contracts would lose their value. The success of our modern complex enterprises depends upon the planning of work long in advance. The entrepreneur cannot do this planning unless he can get others to bind themselves in advance to carry out their parts of the plan. Better perhaps, to have a somewhat unjust distribution of wealth and privileges, where each individual knows in advance just what from his effort he can expect to gain and keep secure, than a chaotic social order in which property is likely to be confiscated, or contracts declared null and void, at any moment in the name of justice. At least this uncertainty would prove a greater discouragement to effort, and would mean a lowered standard of living all round.

This is not an argument against the so-called socialistic legislation of modern days. It simply means that such legislation to be successful must promote security as well as justice.

And much of it in fact does. Workmen's compensation laws, laws exempting homesteads and wages from seizure to pay debts, minimum wage laws, the British health and unemployment insurance, the Mexican dismissal wage law, which compels the employer to give several weeks' advance notice, or else advance pay, before discharging a workman, and other such measures are not so much devices for equalizing the positions of social classes as for giving economic security to the class that most has lacked it. When a business fails, the employer still has his property and savings to fall back upon, or, with his experience in management, is fairly sure of getting a salaried job that will support him on at least a white collar standard of living. The workman, divorced from the soil, has nothing left except the chance, that after much searching, with an empty pocket and suffering family, he may find another low-paid job. Modern social insurance in its various forms aims not to increase the worker's share of the product in the long run, but to guarantee him a small but sure income at all times throughout his life regardless of misfortunes.

It is this same desire for security which accounts for much of the acquisitive behavior found among the more well-to-do classes of society. We are frequently told that there is no hope of permanent betterment through raising incomes, because the more people have the more they want. Human wants, we are told, are unlimited in their power to expand. If we analyze the motives, however, of "middle-class" people who are trying to "get ahead" financially, we find that there is not simply the desire for more luxury, more prestige, more accumulation for its own sake, but also the desire to become "independent," to feel that one is sure of a living whatever happens. There are in fact many persons who retire and enjoy life after they have obtained this independence and do not keep on accumulating. One finds this reaction frequent among successful farmers, who have not been exposed, as

have our city people, to the influence of competitive consumption. It is a very unsafe generalization that wants have no limit.

Under our existing culture, about the only way to obtain this much desired security and independence, unless one inherits property, is by saving. The error of middle class conservatives is their assumption that it is just as easy for the workman to save as for them. They are brought up to believe that the working class is habitually thriftless and has only itself to blame for its insecurity of livelihood.

The social function of insurance.—A new form of social structure is being built into modern culture to serve the purpose which group communism served in primitive society, and which individual thrift and voluntary charity have attempted to serve in more recent days. This new form is *insurance.* The principle is not essentially new. It was followed by the mediæval merchants who joined their capital and their efforts in dangerous trading expeditions. But the principle today is being applied to cover not only death and property hazards, but many other forms of personal and business risks. Experience has shown that when insurance is left to voluntary choice, the people who make use of it are in the main those who need it least. Heavy life insurance protection is enjoyed by families which could get along without it, while hosts of poor families have none.

So legislators in advanced countries have attached to the principle of insurance two other principles. The first is *compulsion,* which makes it obligatory for all persons in certain defined classes, presumably those who most need it, to have insurance protection; and the second is *socialized payment* of premiums, by which the payment is not proportional to the benefits received, but depends upon ability to pay and other considerations.

With these elements added, insurance becomes *social insurance.* Thus in European health insurance systems, every

worker earning below a certain wage must be insured, and the premiums are paid partly by the worker, and partly by the employer. In systems of old age pensions, as in Australia, any worker having certain qualifications as to age, residence, etc., is entitled to the benefits, which are paid directly out of state funds and do not depend upon contributions by the workers. Social insurance includes accident compensation, health insurance, maternity insurance, old age pensions and insurance, invalidity insurance, life insurance for the benefit of widows or orphans, mothers' pensions and unemployment insurance.

The primary purpose of insurance is to *spread the burden* of loss over a wide range of persons, so that the whole cost of a misfortune does not fall upon the individual who suffers it, at least not at any one time. The basal theory is that misfortunes are not chiefly the fault of those who suffer them, but of the social order, or of the inevitable conditions of life, and therefore a loss to one should be borne by all. Insurance is modern culture's substitute for the communistic family, or the neighborhood group, of primitive times, which took care of its unfortunate members.

But insurance has also a secondary purpose, which though it cannot always be accomplished, always must be considered. That purpose is the *prevention* of loss. Life insurance companies are helping to promote health and to reduce the death rate, fire insurance companies undertake fire prevention campaigns, and our workmen's compensation laws have led employers to use more safety devices in their factories, if only for the economic reason that establishments with higher accident rates are obliged to pay higher premiums. Insurance thus puts the burden of loss upon an organization rather than an individual, and that organization usually has the means and the power to undertake campaigns of prevention. It is a mistake, however, to regard this prevention as the chief purpose of insurance. It is, as shown, only secondary. In

spite of all that is done to reduce them, accidents, deaths, sickness, old age, and other misfortunes will occur, and the primary aim is to spread their burden.

Limitations of insurance.—Insurance can reduce, it can also increase the misfortunes which it covers. Here lies the limiting factor in the extension of the principle of insurance. It is the so-called *moral risk.* Cases of burning a building or killing an insured person for the sake of the insurance are too well known to require discussion. Sickness may be feigned for the sake of the benefits. The full development of the principle of social insurance would require that the insuring organization be permitted to pry into personal affairs in a way that would be intolerable to our present cultural sentiments. In an unemployment insurance case in England, the question of whether an unemployed girl was to receive compensation hung upon the question of why she had left her previous position. The firm claimed that she had been dismissed for tardiness, and the girl claimed that transportation difficulties had been to blame. A government official had to decide. So many such cases had been decided against insured persons that popular resentment turned against the government instead of against the employers.

Because of the moral risk it is never safe to let the insurance fully cover the loss. Evidently the full success of insurance requires a new set of *mores* regarding honesty and secrecy. We are brought up to be honest with property and contracts, but we have little conscience against making extravagant claims or concealing personal facts, when something is to be gained thereby. If some way could be found to eliminate these moral risks, the principle of insurance could be applied to many other sorts of misfortunes now uninsurable except at prohibitive rates. We might have insurance at reasonable rates against business failure, insurance against loss of reputation, against loss of articles having high sentimental but no economic value, against poverty; loss of a

particular position, divorce, change of style, and what not. Some kinds of insurance, however, are impracticable because of the irregularity and unpredictability of the events in question.

The typical life insurance policy of today does not fit the actual needs of the case. The benefit, for example, is quite needless if the widow is childless and able to support herself, while the same benefit would be much too small if the widow were left with several dependent children and no earning capacity. The true purpose of insurance would be more exactly carried out by a policy which would pay benefits according to the actual *needs* of the widow, fully protecting her against poverty and sickness, but not against the necessity to work when she is able. But the determination of such needs would require investigation and supervision for which our present culture pattern is hardly ready.

The principle of insurance embodied in many varied measures.—There are some other forms of social structure which are not usually thought of as insurance, but are essentially the same in principle. The proposed McNary-Haugen farm bill was a device to compensate farmers' losses on unprofitable crops by funds raised through taxes levied on many crops, some of which are sure to be profitable. These losses are mainly due to weather and to market conditions which the farmers cannot predict or control. Agriculture is one of the most hazardous of industries, and every few years there are areas of farm poverty and distress caused by failure of the particular crops on which the areas specialize. The opponents of the measure argued that the result could better be obtained by crop diversification, making each farmer, as it were, his own insurer.

Collective bargaining is virtually an insurance device for getting greater security and standardization of wage rates, so that the individual workman is not so much at the mercy of his employer. Bonding of treasurers and cashiers is a

method of insuring against losses due to personal dishonesty.

3. Group Injustice

What is justice?—The sense of justice arises out of comparison. If I feed one of my dogs better than another, the underfed dog will experience only such physical suffering as may come from his shortage of food. But if I feed one child better than another, the underfed child will feel in addition a keen mental suffering. He compares his own situation with that of the other and is angered or grieved by the pure *injustice* of the thing. The older and the more mentally developed he is, the more dominant will be this outraged sense of justice, and the more the purely physical suffering, if not too acute, will retreat into the background.

Justice matters in human life because it is impossible to prevent intelligent beings from making comparisons. The sense of justice is not inborn, but it is practically certain to be acquired. The conditions of human life inevitably give rise to it. It is, according to Professor Ross, one of the four great "pillars" of the natural (i.e., sub-cultural) social order.

The fundamental idea of justice is *equality* of some sort. It may be absolute equality, or equality according to merits, equality of opportunity, equality between individuals or classes of individuals. It may mean that the injury done by an individual should be balanced by an equal injury done to him, or an equal good rendered by him.

Injustice between individuals within primary groups will be treated under the head of personal conflict. In the present section we shall consider injustice between classes or groups of individuals. Society can be subdivided along many different lines. According to Professor Herbert A. Miller's scheme there are "horizontal" divisions along the lines of occupation and wealth, and "vertical" divisions along the lines of race, nationality, and religion. The term "social classes" seems

to apply best to the horizontal divisions. But there are really more than two, even more than three dimensions. Society can be divided also according to age, sex, physique, status of nobility if any, education, various interests, and of course geographically.

The oppression psychosis.—Any one of these social groups may feel itself unjustly treated by another group or by society as a whole. If this sense of injustice is prolonged, it forms a part of the cultural heritage of that particular group. We have then what Professor Miller calls the "oppression psychosis." As a group it tends always to be on the defensive, always eager to preserve group solidarity even after the need for it is gone. Adherence to a particular language or religion is often the symbol by which this solidarity expresses itself. According to Miller, for example, the Catholic Church stands as a symbol to the Irish of their distinctness from England. Nationality groups having an oppression psychosis, like the Czechs and Poles, tend to preserve their language and newspapers when they migrate to a foreign country, more than do groups like the Swedes and Italians who do not feel oppressed. This oppression psychosis often lasts long after the obvious oppression has ceased. One cannot dismiss the matter however, by simply telling the group that it is not oppressed. One cannot dispose of the nationality problems of Central Europe by lightly remarking, as did one popular writer, that oppression over there seems to consist simply in the inability to get a high school education in some particular language. Psychologically, any group which feels oppressed *is* oppressed, and something needs to be done about it.

Oppression consists in some kind of discrimination against the oppressed group, by which it is denied opportunities or liberties allowed to other groups. It is usually practiced because it is of real or seeming advantage to the oppressors, who thereby secure more of the wealth, more of the attractive

jobs and opportunities, more privileges, than they would get under free competition. That is, economic exploitation exists. But often the exploitation is not the most obvious feature, nor the one arousing the greatest resentment. The most resentment commonly is caused by some obvious restraint of liberty which is imposed to keep the oppressed in "their place." It may be a prohibition of the use of their language, in order to hinder their secret communication with each other. Or it may be the taking away of their weapons in order to prevent uprising. Political oppression often is felt more keenly than the economic exploitation which is its object, and cultural oppression or, "cultocratic domination," to use Professor Miller's term (that is restriction of language, religion, etc.), often is felt more keenly than either. Often the oppressors become almost unconscious of practicing economic exploitation, and they come to look upon the inferior position of the oppressed as a culture form to be preserved for its own sake, or for reasons quite other than the economic advantage. In the case of the American negro, for example, the basic motive, that of getting the menial work done by somebody else and as cheaply as possible, is concealed by the loud protestations that negroes must be kept in their place in order to keep the blood of the white race pure. Whatever the merits of this biological argument for negro subjugation, it serves to hide the desire to exploit.

When group or class-consciousness arises. Whether or not injustice shall lead to the development of a strong *group consciousness* among the oppressed, leading to group conflict or perhaps violent rebellion, depends upon several conditions. It depends (1) upon whether the passage into other groups is open or closed, (2) upon the dependence of the group, (3) upon the possibility of localizing it geographically, and (4) upon the ease of intra-group communication.

Professor Franklin H. Giddings has shown that there are closed and open groups. An open group is one which con-

tinually receives new members as they pass certain qualifications. A closed group is one whose membership is fixed by birth, or other circumstances over which the individual has no power. College graduates, the American Medical Association, the United Mine Workers, the Chinese literati, are open groups, while Hindu castes, most European aristocrats, ancestral organizations like the Sons of the American Revolution, the negro group in America, are closed groups. The class consciousness of manual workers is stronger in Europe than in America because, over there, there is little chance for the individual to rise, as here, to a higher social class.

The modern woman movement illustrates group consciousness in a sex group. Conflict however is limited by the fact that there is much interdependence between women and men, sexually if not economically, and anything like a real group struggle here is hardly thinkable. School strikes and student movements illustrate a growing consciousness in age groups, but here the conflict is limited by the fact that the children are economically dependent on older persons, and also by the fact that the group is very open and transitory. The children will have passed into the next age group before any organized effort they put forth is likely to benefit them. Negro group consciousness, although favored by the closed nature of their group and the impossibility of escape from it, has been checked somewhat by the rural and scattered location of the negroes, their daily communication being to a large extent with white employers who treat them with a certain personal intimacy and kindness. It has been said that negro rebellion is unlikely as long as every negro knows at least one white man whom he can trust. But when they concentrate geographically, as in the Harlem section of Manhattan, and their communication comes to be chiefly with other negroes, a greater group consciousness arises.

Revolutions arise more readily from an urban proletariat, concentrated in large factories, communicating daily with each

other, than from scattered agricultural workers. It is reported that the Pittsburgh steel mills mixed immigrant workmen of different nationalities so that communication among them might be difficult. When an oppressed group is concentrated in space, when its members have more communication with each other than with outsiders, when little opportunity of escape to other groups is open, and when they can become economically independent of outsiders, then let the oppressors beware.

Where the oppressed consist of all the people of a separate geographic territory, oppression is likely to lead to armed conflict. True war, which is always along territorial lines, is more easily provoked and harder to check than is revolution, which takes place between two groups occupying the same territory. Our Civil War was a true war rather than a revolution because the conflicting groups were geographically separate. In such cases there is little inter-group communication by which one party learns the viewpoint of the other, but a great deal of intra-group communication in which the most extravagant lies about the enemy are circulated with nothing to correct them. Furthermore it is usually possible for the one party to become economically independent of the other, for it has a large territory, and all classes of vocational ability at its disposal.

We are here particularly concerned with those cases of group injustice which do not readily lead to war and its consequent physical suffering, but which smolder along, causing resentment and other forms of mental suffering. For example the resentment which numbers of educated and able negroes feel when they are denied the opportunities of the white man, or that large numbers of women feel when the law permits their wages, homes or children to be disposed of against their desires by domineering and unreasonable husbands, the resentment which West Virginia mine workers feel when their employers drive from the premises organizers who would help

them to get higher wages, or compel them to sign contracts not to join a union, the resentment which North Dakota farmers felt when, on attempting to organize, they were told by Minneapolis business men to go home and "slop their hogs."

Remedies for group injustice.—To find a remedy for injustice, there are two main approaches. One is the sympathy of other classes, and the other is the organization of the oppressed class itself. Sometimes the one interferes with the other. If underpaid college professors, for example, were to organize a labor union, this act of arming themselves for the conflict would antagonize classes from whose sympathy much is to be gained. It is possible that small and weak groups will best rely upon sympathy, and the polite advertising of their grievances. But for large groups the best hope seems to be in organization. This is especially true of the large horizontal, occupational groups which we call social classes. American labor has gained more from its own organized efforts than from the sympathy and charity of the employing classes. Through organization it secured free public schools, homestead exemption, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt. As Professor Ross says, in his "Outlines of Sociology," the will to exploit lasts as long as the power to exploit, and the only sure preventive of exploitation is for the exploited class to stop it by its own political or economic power. If labor unions sometimes give organized labor an advantage over other classes, the answer is not to abolish labor unions, but to encourage those other classes to organize likewise.

Woman suffrage has had little effect upon politics. It might seem to be an unimportant measure. But from the standpoint of pure justice it is tremendously important. Even if voting is no more intelligent, no more progressive and altruistic than before, a great cause of resentment has been removed.

It is urged by many economists that there is no injustice between economic classes because each person gets what he earns.

If laborers are low paid, it is because there are too many of them and the marginal value of their services is small. To explain a situation by the workings of the economic laws of supply and demand does not however justify that situation. It is in fact impossible to tell what any individual is worth to society. One man plans a house and another builds it. If either service had been lacking, the result would have been zero; with both cooperating, the result is, say, $10,000. How can we tell what share of the proceeds belongs to each? There is nothing divinely ordained about that pattern of culture which we call our present economic system, with its free competition and its laws of supply and demand. There have been quite other systems of distributing wealth in the past, and there may be quite a different system in the future. If the workers rebel against the present system, as they did in Russia, that revolution will be quite as *natural* as the laws of supply and demand against which they rebelled.

However we may approach the problem of injustice, the final remedy must take the form of some readjustment in culture. Usually it consists in a new relationship between classes in the social structure. This readjustment is usually made definite and compulsory by legislation. Among the achieved and proposed adjustments might be mentioned:

The income tax and other progressive taxes, that is, taxes in which not only the actual amount, but the proportion, is greater on the higher levels of wealth
Taxes on the unearned increment of land; single tax
Social insurance
Woman suffrage
Proposed amendment making women's rights equal to men's
Free and universal education
Collective bargaining
Repeal of laws forbidding labor unions
Prohibition of the blacklist
Homestead exemption

Proposed laws making it illegal to require workmen to sign contracts not to join a union (declared unconstitutional)
Workers' representation in industry
Grievance committees to hear cases of disputes between management and workers, and to investigate dismissals
Proportional representation
The Dyer anti-lynching bill
Public defenders
Individualization of punishment
Philanthropic legal aid to the ignorant or needy classes
Simplified legal procedure
Limitation of use of the injunction in labor cases
Legitimation of illegitimate children
The family extra wage, as in France and Australia
Prison reform

4. Personal Conflict in Primary Groups

The importance of primary-group life to welfare.—Sociology has perhaps under-emphasized the importance of the face-to-face relationships of everyday life. The relatively small groups in which men meet face to face, such as the family, classroom, club meeting, are known as *primary groups.* The "old-fashioned" preacher often had a better sense of values in this respect than the social reformer. He at least suspected that a greater share of the world's unhappiness was caused by petty personal maladjustments than by conflicts between classes, races, industries, or nations. The stay-at-home housewife has good reason to be more interested in neighborhood gossip than in the tariff, for the gossip probably has a much greater effect upon her welfare. She makes her mistake in treating small-group problems from an entirely different viewpoint from large-group problems. The first are considered as matters of personal ethics, the second as civic questions. But there is really no difference in kind between morals and civics. As Professor David Snedden points out,

in "Educational Applications of Sociology," moral education is training for small-group life, civic education is training for life in large secondary groups. Both must be based upon a cold-blooded scientific analysis of our culture.

The Chinese have refined more than have we the structure of every day personal relationships. The poorest laborer, meeting a fellow workman on the street, will ask courteously, "Has my elder brother breakfasted yet?" A psychologist has analyzed French courtesy. The Frenchman, he says, converses in order to make his conversation interesting to the hearer, not simply to express his own emotions as does the American. More than we, he ignores physical discomforts, such as a bad seat at the theater, in order not to spoil the pleasure of his companions.

These examples, however, do not prove that our culture is inferior in promoting small-group happiness. All such behavior is a matter of conditioned responses. If Americans, when they speak, are more given to complaining and to rudeness, it may be that Americans, when they listen, have their emotions so tuned that they do not mind complaints and rudeness. They even enjoy certain forms of rude behavior on the part of their fellows. Among American college boys, at least in the North, the instructor who twits and banters his students, who "comes out straight from the shoulder," is often better liked than the one who always speaks with European standards of courtesy. As with everything such behavior must be judged by its results upon individual emotions, and not by the form of the behavior itself as contemplated by an outsider. The results might be tested in part by comparisons of assault rates, and homicide rates.

Allowing, however, for these cultural differences of training, there are nevertheless groups where personal intercourse is carried on at much less cost of irritation than in others. As Ross says, in his "Outlines of Sociology," there are egotistic forms of association where the chief personal satis-

faction is to gratify one's own ego by beating down another, and there are good-will forms of association where the satisfaction is obtained by each from kindly treatment by all.

Remedies for personal friction.—Personal friction could be reduced by a better education in manners and personal relationships. The trouble with this education in the past has been that it treats the forms of courtesy as ends in themselves. The well educated person will not be satisfied to ask: "Does my conduct conform to the conventional standards of kindness and courtesy?", but will inquire, "What sort of emotions is my conduct producing in the nervous system of this my neighbor?" He will not consider himself insulted by a mere lapse from the customary form of courtesy without ascertaining the real attitude of the supposed insulter. This does not mean that we can abolish all standards and cater to the idiosyncrasies of each individual. But we can simplify standards and treat them as means to ends. Progressive moral education will make clear the true values of kindly behavior, and portray the mental sufferings caused by unkindness. It will become a course in elementary social psychology.

Etiquette has been largely a matter of prestige and not of kindness. An act of genuine unkindness would have been overlooked, whereas an insult to one's dignity was cause for a duel to the death. Ludicrous in the modern world was the recent spectacle of Lord Stonehaven being "insulted" by Count Paderewski's refusal to appear standing on the platform when the Governor-General entered the hall. Ludicrous is the contention of certain members of a college faculty that the appearance of a feminine colleague at dinner in riding habit or knickers, because of haste or convenience, was an act of discourtesy. It is perhaps a universal feature of culture that the kindly attitude must be expressed by some definite symbol, and not merely implied by one's general behavior. Progress demands that that symbol be made as simple, natural, cheap, and convenient as possible. Except on special occa-

sions, it might better be a word, a gesture, or a salutation, than a particular costume or a complex and carefully timed ceremony. These latter obscure the real purposes of life and lead to the worship of culture for its own sake. Perhaps however, we always shall preserve certain museum zones of society, where elaborate and costly ceremonies are preserved for the benefit of those who enjoy them, as they have a right to do.

In spite of all we can do to oil the wheels of daily personal contact, a certain minimum of grievances and insults will occur, and antagonism will develop. Some of these amount to real "mental cruelty," causing acute mental suffering. The remedy here must be to make the small group itself more flexible. As easy means of escape must be provided from the group in which one cannot be happy. Here is where city life has a great advantage over rural life. The community center provides a means for the reshuffling of primary neighborhood groups. An ideal community center would include a clearing house for personal interests and hobbies. It would make it easy for John Jones, a photography enthusiast, to find others of the same ilk. Fred Smith, who likes to browse about country byways, is forced by his family and friends to motor up and down the paved highway until this difference in taste develops into a deep personal antagonism. But other ties continue to bind him to his group and he endures the constant irritation rather than break loose. Through the community recreational clearing house he might find congenial companions with whom occasional excursions might relieve this irritation. We might, in fact, have a clearing house for personal friendships. Employment exchanges would help the individual who suffers from personal friction on his job.

In Germany the law goes further than with us to stop personal friction. Not only libel and slander, but also insult is a punishable offense. Prosecution for insult then acts as a substitute for the duel. The modern prac-

tice of voluntary arbitration in business, as a substitute for court litigation, suggests a possible application of the same principle to non-business life. There could be in every community a "court of moral justice," with purely voluntary functions, which would attempt to settle personal misunderstandings submitted to it. Clergymen, social workers, and public-spirited citizens of known impartiality might serve upon this court. Its judgments might become so respected by public opinion that malicious gossip, in regard to an episode upon which the court had published its findings would be tabu. Any person who felt himself unfairly treated by another individual, or by the gossip of the community, might apply to this court for an investigation and publication of the facts. On the agreement of both parties to a dispute the court might suggest the proper form of compensation for an injury.

A unique attempt to solve the problem of personal friction is that of the members of the large church in Houston, Texas, who resolved that all members pledge themselves to avoid tattling, backbiting, unrighteous anger and intoxicating drinks, or consider themselves out of the church.

Personal friction in the home.—We have been considering the primary group in general. However the most important primary group is the home, and it is here that probably the greatest amount of personal friction occurs. It is customary in sociology to treat the disorganization of the modern family as a problem by itself. It is one of our major social problems. But the evil lies not in the breakdown of the institution itself, but in the personal suffering that this breakdown may cause to individual lives. It is not because homes are disorganized but because they are unhappy that something needs to be done.

There is now in the United States one divorce to every 7.5 marriages. This is four times the rate that existed in 1870. But yet our divorce rate is only half as great as that of Japan, where the family is more sacred than with us, but the whole

culture pattern is different. The legal grounds on which divorce is granted are, in order of frequency, first, desertion, second, cruelty, third, adultery, E. R. Mowrer has gone back of these legal grounds, and has determined from 187 court records the frequencies of the *real causes* which lay back of the divorce actions. He found that the main cause in 40 per cent of the cases was some sort of financial tension. In another 40 per cent the chief cause was sexual, consisting of infidelity, jealousy, illicit intercourse, venereal infection, desertion for another, or living with another. Drink and cruelty account for 15 per cent, and the remaining 5 per cent were due to irregular habits, such as quarrels, gambling, carousing, staying out late at night.

The significance of our increasing divorce.—The increasing rate of divorce does not prove that an increasing per cent of marriages are unhappy. It is, in one sense, a sign of progress. It indicates that individual happiness is being less often sacrificed to the sacredness of institutions. Because of the weakening of ecclesiastical control, the popularization of law, the greater economic independence of women, a door of escape once locked is now slightly ajar. But on the other hand, easy divorce, in so far as it encourages thoughtless marriages, and encourages hasty separations for causes which could be remedied otherwise, is a danger. The end to be gained is the long run happiness of individuals, not the gratification of their temporary whims. Whether or not easier divorce leads to this ultimate happiness remains to be seen.

It is significant that several countries which are advanced in the scientific promotion of human welfare permit easier divorce than do we. In France we observe the remarkable fact that although divorce can be obtained with more ease and less publicity than with us, yet the divorce rate is actually less. There are roughly four degrees in the liberality of divorce laws. The first is to permit divorce not at all, or only for adultery or prolonged desertion, and is illustrated by the

laws of South Carolina and New York. The second is to permit divorce for desertion, drunkenness, and physical cruelty. The majority of our states fall into this class. The third stage is to include "mental cruelty" or "incompatibility of temper," or "personal indignities rendering life burdensome," represented by the laws of Montana, Wyoming, Washington, and Oregon. This degree is the first in which the law recognizes unhappiness in itself as good cause for divorce. But all the laws covered so far are built on the basic pattern that a divorce is a relief to be obtained by an innocent party as against a party who is guilty of something. The agreement of *both parties* to seek divorce, instead of furnishing additional argument for the separation, acts as a barrier against it. The laws of the fourth degree move on to an entirely different pattern. They permit divorce, usually after certain safeguards and lapses of time, *on the sole ground that both parties want it.* This pattern is unknown in the United States, but characterizes divorce laws in Sweden, France, Russia, Yucatan, and other countries.

Remedies for domestic friction.—As we have seen the two great causes of domestic unhappiness, so far as revealed by divorce cases, are (1) financial tension and (2) sexual maladjustments in the broader sense, mental as well as physical. Among the promising remedies for the financial difficulties are scientific education for home-making, family budgeting, the establishment of definite written agreements between husband and wife as to the apportionment of their expenditures, part time jobs for women who need only half their time in the home, and more vocational opportunities and trained housekeepers for women who wish to spend all their time outside the home. We are here and there experimenting with community kitchens, with hotel life in place of the separate home, and with various methods of communal housekeeping. These schemes will be more fully discussed in Chapter XIV. Then of course the solution will be aided by various measures

for increasing the general economic efficiency, and by measures for adjusting the distribution of wealth, to be discussed respectively in Chapters XIV and XVII.

A great aid to harmony in the modern home would be something like a constitution or a code of law. In one case there was serious delay in calling a physician to attend a patient because the various members of the family could not agree on what physician to call. None would act for fear of bringing in embarrassments and complications. No business organization would have tolerated any such situation. Not the family in general but each particular family needs definite organization; the rights and duties of the various members need to be agreed upon, and the responsibility for action in an emergency should be definite. Much of the wrangling in the modern family is due to this lack of definite responsibilities. As in all communistic organizations, the temptation to shirk is great, and, whether shirking takes place or not, it is frequently suspected, with much bickering and ill-feeling as a result.

For the sexual difficulties in married life, meaning by that the delicate psychological adjustments of everyday companionship as well as the purely physical adjustments, it is not so easy to prescribe a remedy. There are two methods, whatever we may think of them, by which men and women have sought to escape the bonds of monogamy when they became burdensome. One is the method of divorce and remarriage, which is the less disapproved method in the United States and northern Europe. The other is to maintain the marriage for the sake of the property, the children, and the social position, and at the same time to maintain illicit liaisons, with more or less tolerance by the other partner to the marriage. This method, if not more frequent, seems at least to enjoy a greater degree of toleration in the Latin countries. Which method is chosen depends upon the culture.

To mention these traits of our culture is not to approve

them. But it is utter folly to attempt any solution of the marriage problem without recognizing their existence, and also recognizing that in many localities and social groups they are so prevalent that lifelong pair-marriage is little more than a nominal standard, very irregularly observed in practice. When one contemplates the rate, of one divorce for every two or three marriages, that exists in several of our western states, one cannot help wondering what the future of the family will be.

Judge Lindsey has suggested a legalized companionate marriage, which means simply that divorce would be granted on request of both parties as long as they had no children, but granted only as at present if there were children.

But before we give up hope of making monogamy successful, we might well try certain less radical remedies that offer promise. First, scientific education in psychology may enable many persons to overcome most of the misunderstandings of married life. This education should treat frankly the problems of sex in both its physical and mental aspects. Our young people get from fiction and drama many unscientific ideas of love. They are trained to believe that a love which is blind, uncritical, and exclusive is something infinitely superior to any other emotion. They are brought up to believe that jealousy is an instinct, and that it is the only proper reaction to certain situations. A general overhauling of the popular philosophy of love, in the light of modern psychology, would probably make it possible for more people to enjoy a permanent love and would minimize the danger of marital shipwreck.

Widening the variety of marital choice.—Second, there is a great need for machinery which will permit a wider choice of partner. Even today there are many neighborhoods where the young girl hoping for marriage is so limited in her contacts with the opposite sex that she never finds "her ideal," but is finally led to accept a mate simply because he seems

the lesser of several evils, and better than remaining unmarried. Coeducation, church young people's societies, community centers, the various recreational activities, the cut-in dance, the increasing association of the sexes in office, store, and factory, the weakening of the tradition that the girl must take no initiative; all help to widen the range of acquaintance. We are in a much better position in this way than the upper classes of Latin countries, where marriageable girls are carefully restricted as to their acquaintances, and where the matches are made largely by parents. On the other hand, it may be pointed out that these countries where choice is carefully restricted have lower divorce rates, and no evidence of greater marital unhappiness than do we who have freer choice. In those countries marriage is looked upon more as a matter of duty and less as a matter of purely personal satisfaction. Perhaps the peculiar personal satisfactions are obtained partly in other ways. But with marriage as it is in our American culture, a much greater range of choice may be necessary in order to get equally good results. It is a question of adjustment between two or more different parts of culture, not a question of absolute "best."

It may be that in the future we shall tear away some of the camouflage and frankly recognize certain social gatherings as machinery for getting young men acquainted with a wider variety of young women, and vice versa. That does not mean necessarily that we shall cease to call them dances, card parties, or church socials, but that we shall plan them more intelligently for the accomplishment of their primary purpose. The rules of chaperonage and of "proper introduction" may be simplified, as they already are to a large extent, especially in our western states. Opportunity will need to be given for prolonged and intimate conversations, not merely for the casual and superficial acquaintance of the dance floor. Before it is safe to choose a life partner, under our American culture,

there must be not only *wider* acquaintance but also more intimate knowledge of the personal traits and interests of one's closer acquaintances. The sexes need to be associated in many kinds of work and of recreational activity, not merely at dances, evening parties, or in the school room. The tabu which exists, more or less, against talking of serious subjects, against revealing on social occasions, one's inner feelings, might be relaxed to good advantage.

The future of marriage and the family.—It is frequently suggested that men, and perhaps women, are instinctively polygamous, and that monogamy therefore always must be an emotional strain. But the very form in which the theory is presented shows that we need a complete reeducation in psychology. Instinctively polygamous? Probably we are not even *instinctively* fond of the opposite sex! The sex instinct as given us by nature, according to behavioristic psychology, is nothing more than certain reactions to touch or to internal pressure. It is completely indifferent to sights and sounds. Only by experience and training do we come to "fixate" these powerful reactions upon a person at all, let alone a person of the opposite sex. The experiences and training that make us do this are more or less universal. The love of the opposite sex is therefore a subcultural trait and not the product of any particular culture. But the circumstances of this sex preference, whether it be for one or for several persons, whether it be accompanied by jealousy of rival lovers or no, seem to be matters of culture. For we discover hundreds of combinations of these attitudes when we explore the various cultures of the world. The question: "Are men instinctively polygamous?" becomes: "Are there any accompanying factors in our present culture, or in the physical or subcultural social environment, which render the strict observance of monogamy practically impossible? If so what are these factors? Is it possible to modify them, so as to bring them into harmony

with monogamy? Or is the only hope to modify monogamy itself?" By putting the question in this form we have at least a scientific basis for discussion.

It is worse than useless to make up our minds as to what should be done about the modern family until we know the facts. The first thing that needs to be done is to clear up the fog of secrecy which surrounds the whole business. A certain number of maladjustments are due to purely physical circumstances which could not possibly be known, under our present conventions, until after the parties are married. Whether these cases are few or numerous we do not know. And yet our whole marriage policy might depend upon the answer to this question. Until people are willing to discuss freely all phases of the sex question, and to answer questions about their own experience through properly safeguarded and scientific channels, there is no hope for any rational solution of the problem.

In Colonial America the family was more or less standardized. When a young man proposed marriage, the girl knew just what was included, economically, reproductively and every other way. But today the couple must come to an agreement on just what marriage is to mean for them. To mention only the economic features, shall the wife remain in her previous vocation, shall she become purely a homemaker, shall she be an auxiliary to her husband's vocation, or shall she follow some combination of two or more of these duties? Then there are many policies to choose from as regards reproduction, the education of children, residence, and recreational life, and even as regards personal friendship relations to outside persons. If there is coming out a "new model" family, it will not be a fixed pattern to which all must conform, but freedom to choose a life plan according to the needs of the persons concerned.

5. Crime

What is crime?—Maurice Parmelee gives the following definition of crime:

> A crime is an act forbidden and punished by law, which is almost always immoral according to the prevailing ethical standard, which is usually harmful to society, which it is ordinarily feasible to repress by penal measures, and whose repression is necessary or is supposed to be necessary to the preservation of the existing social order.[1]

Legally speaking, all that is necessary to make an act a crime is the first phrase of this definition. That is, a crime is any act forbidden and punished by law. The rest of the definition is sociological. It tells us what sort of acts are as a rule forbidden and punished by law. We see that there are four essential features; it must be immoral, harmful to society, possible to repress by punishment, and necessary to repress. Theoretically the first two of these features, immorality and harmfulness, are the important ones. But the last two features of the definition are practical limitations which keep many harmful and immoral acts out of the class of crimes.

Now to return to the two theoretically important features, "harmful to society" and "immoral," we have seen that these two things did not coincide throughout most of the history of culture; that there always have been many acts which were considered immoral but which were really not harmful. Let us call these acts *cultural offenses.* They are closely related to *evolutive* or *political* crimes which will be defined later. There always have been also many harmful acts not considered immoral. We have seen that as culture advances there is a tendency to bring immorality and harmfulness nearer and nearer together until, in a completely rational culture, they would both mean the same thing. The distinction between

[1] Parmelee, "Criminology," p. 32.

immorality and harmfulness represents human ignorance and culture's conquest of man.

Crime is a sort of behavior that puts the criminal in conflict with his neighbors. It is always a clash of interests. It is not an unmixed evil. It is a small temporary good, to the criminal, purchased at the price of a much greater evil. The criminal's behavior, like that of any one else, is directed toward the satisfaction of his desires. It satisfies him, however, at the cost of suffering to others. The person who suffers the primary injury is known as the victim. In the great majority of cases the suffering is mental. But other persons besides the victim suffer actually or potentially. The friends and relatives of the victim suffer grief, economic loss, and resentment; the neighbors over a wider radius suffer shock, or anxiety lest the offense be repeated.

In the days of early Anglo-Saxon law most crime was considered a purely individual injury, to be avenged by the victim and his family. It was essentially a conflict between families or clans. The larger community had no interest in the matter. But with the development of *government* this right to avenge crimes was taken away from the victim's friends and put into the hands of the government. The *community* now considers crime as an injury to the general well-being, and itself undertakes the responsibility of preventing it.

Crime, tort, and vice.—A certain class of harmful acts however, has been left outside the domain of crime, and is still treated as private wrongs. These acts are known as *torts* or *civil wrongs.* Examples are libel, slander, trespassing, unduly disturbing noises, physical injury to another through minor carelessness. Other acts, such as assault and battery, and injury through gross carelessness, are both crimes and torts. When an act is treated purely as a tort, the victim may sue in a civil court for damages, or for an injunction or court order to cease the nuisance; but no *criminal* action or

punishment (fine, imprisonment, etc.) may be taken against the offender. Whether an act is a crime or merely a tort depends on many fine legal distinctions, but in general pure torts are distinguished by the fact that they hurt only the victim, not endangering or alarming the rest of the community.

Crime must be distinguished also from *vice,* which consists of acts harmful to only the offender himself.

How justice and liberty hinder the prevention of crime. —True crime, as distinguished from torts, vice, and cultural offenses, can be described as a conflict between the criminal class and the community. The criminal to be sure is greatly in the minority. But he is never quite vanquished by the overwhelming power of his opponents because he fights with a peculiar weapon. This weapon is one which only a small minority can use, and without which such a minority could not possibly defend itself. It is *concealment.* The community is rebuffed by its inability to *identify* the enemy. The struggle against crime is very largely a problem of detecting the criminal. And the great principles of justice and liberty, essential to the happiness of every community, are here staked *against the community.* For " 'tis better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man be punished." And it is better to endure a certain amount of crime, than to subject every individual act to that minute surveillance that would be necessary for perfect detective work. Our Anglo-Saxon law gives the accused the benefit of every doubt. The business executive is justified in dismissing an employee if he can prove that that employee is *the most probable* cause of trouble in his organization. The engineer is justified in rejecting a certain material if his experiments prove that it is the *most probable cause* of the breakdown in his machinery. But the community is obliged to prove the defendant in court to be not merely the most probable criminal, but to be the criminal *beyond any reasonable doubt.* This is how a *judicial* decision differs from an *executive* decision.

This rule is not due merely to the abstract theory of liberty and justice. It is the result of ages of experience in criminal policy. Man has found that the right to punish offenders for merely probable cause has brought more harm in the form of unjust punishment, and class oppression, than it has done good by weeding out crime. When in the Middle Ages feudalism gave way to monarchy and then to constitutionalism, this limitation upon the punishing authorities was one of the chief demands of the people. For this the people tacitly agreed to take the risk of a greater amount of crime.

Causes of crime.—Lombroso thought that all criminals were born criminals, and that they were marked by the presence in abnormal frequency of physical stigmata, consisting of malformations of the head, face, limbs, etc. C. Goring, in a very careful statistical study of English convicts, disproved this absolutely. He did find, however, that the criminal class was inferior, physically and mentally, to the general population.[1] But Goring's findings as to *mental* inferiority, which were based on mere estimates of intelligence, were disproved by American investigators using psychological tests. To mention only one piece of evidence, the military prisoners at Fort Leavenworth were found to be on the average equal in intelligence to the non-criminal population of the country.

If it is the less intelligent criminal who gets caught, there is ground for suspicion that all criminals, jailed and unjailed together, average *higher* in intelligence than their better behaved fellow citizens. But on the other hand, these investigations lump all criminals together; the intelligent forger and the conscientious objector with the stupid rapist and the petty thief. The mental tests made upon prisoners in local jails and workhouses, and upon juvenile delinquents, show these classes to be decidedly inferior in intelligence to the

[1] Sutherland, "Criminology," pp. 74–81. See also Goring, C., "The English Convict, a Statistical Study," London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1913.

average population. There is little doubt that in *many kinds* of crime feeble-mindedness is a major cause.

Mental defect is not so important a factor in causing crime as *mental disease.* A large per cent of criminals are found to be affected with some psychosis (legally speaking, "insanity"), with epilepsy, or with borderline mental disorders such as the various psychoneuroses or constitutional psychopathic inferiority.

Some criminologists believe that practically every criminal is mentally "abnormal." This is probably not true unless we are willing to admit that all human beings are somewhat abnormal.

Parmelee divides all criminals into (1) the feeble-minded criminal, (2) the psychopathic (or mentally diseased) criminal, (3) the occasional criminal (by accident and by passion), (4) the professional criminal, (5) the evolutive criminal. "Evolutive" crime is that which is not committed in the interest of the criminal, against society, but committed, more or less unselfishly, in the interests of a new culture or government against the existing culture or government. John Brown's rebellion was an evolutive crime. Where the evolutive crime is directed especially against the government, it is often known as *political* crime.

The first and second classes of criminals are explainable through biology; the last three classes of crime must be explained in terms of culture.

Crime a part of culture.—A great deal of crime is descended from formerly normal and legitimate activities. Immigrants from South Italy show a murder rate much higher than that of native Americans or any other immigrant group. Hence many believe that there is something biological, temperamental, in the blood, which accounts for it. But when the American-born children of these same south Italian immigrants are studied, *their* murder rate is found to be reduced to the level of the native American. They show, moreover,

an increase in certain other forms of crime which are characteristically American. This tends to show that South Italian murder is a cultural trait, a social custom, rather than due to any inborn peculiarity.[1]

When village economy was developing in Asia and Africa the nomads from the surrounding deserts robbed the settled villagers as a regular means of livelihood. It did not pay the villagers to make a thorough clean-up of the plunderers, even when they were able to do so. They would have had to expend untold energy, neglecting their agriculture, and would have gotten nothing material in return, for the robbers had nothing. On the other hand, if they submitted to the raids with moderate resistance, they lost only the more centralized stores of food that the robbers could get away, and still managed to save enough for themselves. And so robbery became an integral part of culture. In China today thieving and brigandage are accepted in a measure as part of the regular order of things. Governments, too weak to punish brigands, reward them for keeping away. In the Chinese cities thieves are in much the same status as beggars.

As government develops, it tries to harmonize the activities of its citizens. It outlaws predatory means of livelihood and insists that each citizen shall really create wealth, not live off the wealth of others. Robbery ceases to be an honorable form of war or class struggle, and is branded as a *crime,* which the entire community is expected to help suppress. The "honor" of thieves is no longer recognized, except in their own group, and even the agent provocateur, or the criminal who turns state's evidence against his pals is regarded as doing his proper duty. But government has not yet entirely succeeded in suppressing predatory activities. And even though the grosser forms are abolished, there remain many refined and legal forms of activity that many sociologists claim

[1] Sutherland, "Criminology," pp. 101–102.

are really predatory. For example a certain proportion of our business occupations are said to be quite unnecessary. It is claimed that they add nothing to the total production of wealth, but only take it away from someone else. Such are the occupations of many advertisers, salesmen, lawyers, and financiers. It has been said that "no man ever *makes* a million, he *takes* it." But we have not yet devised any sure test for telling which of these people are productive and which are predatory. So we are not justified in punishing their activities as crimes, but must seek to control them by some more indirect method. It becomes a question of social *efficiency* and will be treated under Chapter XVII.

Many of our murders are the cultural remnants of activities that were formerly legitimate. They are the relics of pre-government methods of social control, where each family or group was entitled to avenge its own wrongs. Among South Italian immigrants, in the Chinese tongs, and among our Southern mountaineers, murder is often of this character. It is probably true that many murder victims deserved to be murdered, and that society is well rid of them. But society is interested not only in preventing the original crimes, but also in weeding out these ancient methods of punishing crime.

The cultural nature of crime is well illustrated by an episode that occurred in an American city some years ago. A householder found his furniture, rugs, and other possessions smashed and ripped to pieces, together with a note signed by "Jack the Ripper." As an unusual crime this was given considerable publicity in the newspapers. Within a short time there was an epidemic of similar crimes in the city, many of which also were accompanied by a signature "Jack the Ripper." For some time it was believed that a dangerous criminal was at large and had perpetrated all these outrages. But an examination of signatures, and of certain suspects, finally convinced the police that the crimes were committed by separate persons, presumably servants or others who held grudges

against their victims, and who, reading the account of the model set by the original Jack, had imitated his crime and blamed it upon him.

Culture would explain why the homicide rates in Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, California, and Colorado are four or five times as great as the homicide rate in New England, always including white victims only (and statistics show that in the great majority of cases the color of the killer is the same as that of the victim). It is quite needless to look for physical and mental differences in the populations. In a rough way high homicide rates go with warmer climates, but there are too many exceptions to allow this to be the main explanation. But if one studies the cultures of the two regions, one finds notable differences in cultural sentiments. In Tennessee, for example, if a man runs off with another's wife, or commits some other grievous insult, the community will tolerate personal revenge by the aggrieved party in a way quite foreign to the attitude of cool and calculating, Puritan New England. Rural conditions have little to do with it; the rural states of Vermont and Maine show even lower homicide rates than urban Massachusetts. New Jersey will allow justice to take its course with an atrocious crime by a negro who would be promptly lynched in Georgia. Cultural differences also offer the most promising explanation of why the homicide rate of cosmopolitan Chicago is much greater than that of equally cosmopolitan New York. There may be in Chicago certain traditions of crime, and criminal groups which are continually passing along their social heritage to new members.

The treatment of crime.—There are three great policies of treatment of crime: (1) the policy of *retribution* has nothing to do with prevention; it is concerned with revenge for *past* offenses. It was the pre-governmental policy. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," or as a famous Italian would have it, "two eyes for an eye, and a whole set of teeth

for one tooth." Such a theory seems to have no proper place in modern culture. Perhaps, however, the modern idea of *restitution,* by which judges compel criminals to compensate their victims financially as a condition for probation, is a form of this old theory. And the theory of retribution still influences judges and juries. They still feel that the punishment should in some measure fit the crime.

(2) The policy of *deterrence* aims at preventing *other* persons from committing crime. The deterrent punishment is not exactly the same as a retributive punishment. The retributive punishment is proportioned to the injury actually caused by the crime that is being punished. Deterrence considers not only the harmfulness of the particular crime, but the probable harmfulness and danger of similar crimes in the future. As Professor Ross says, the punishment must be proportioned to the attractiveness of the crime to the criminal as well as to its harmfulness. Real deterrence, for example, would require much heavier penalties than we now have for bootlegging, not because any individual case of bootlegging is so harmful, but because the temptation to others is so great. Murder might not require so severe a penalty as it now has because the crime itself is sufficiently abhorrent to deter most people.

Criminologists have pointed out, however, that in deterrence, *certainty* of punishment is more effective than *severity.* If *all* crimes could be detected and punished, the scale of penalties of a deterrent policy might approach more nearly the scale of a retributive policy.

(3) The policy of *reform* aims at preventing the criminal himself from committing future crimes. It requires *individualization of punishment.* That is to say, penalties are not to depend on the nature of the crime at all but on the nature of the criminal. Life imprisonment or even death would be the proper treatment of a criminal found to be incurable. On the other hand, a murderer whose life history and whose

prison conduct indicated that he would be a safe and valuable citizen in the future might be set free after a short term.

In actual practice all three policies are mixed, with growing emphasis on *reform.*

Among the measures for the reduction of the crime rate are the finger print system of identification, habitual offenders acts, such as the Baumes laws in New York, which make life imprisonment obligatory after four felonies, probation, parole, the indeterminate sentence, the juvenile court, restitution of stolen property as a basis for probation, simplification of the process of criminal justice, training schools for delinquents, licensing and control of revolvers, and psychiatric examinations in schools and elsewhere.

The evolution of crime depends a great deal upon material culture. The revolver and the automobile, for example, seem to give the criminal a relative advantage over the forces of law and order which formerly he did not possess. If this advantage proves too great, it will have to be overcome by adjustments in the social structure. It may be necessary, for example, to limit the sale of revolvers and even to change our constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms. It may be necessary to interfere with personal liberty in the use of automobiles, to the extent of inspecting every vehicle that passes a certain point after a bandit alarm has been given. But there is always the possibility of a new material invention or discovery which will give the police the advantage over the criminal, and make such restraints of liberty unnecessary.

Summary.—Mental suffering differs from physical not in its location in the human body, nor in the nature of the reactions involved, but in the fact that the provoking stimulus is conditioned rather than biologically adequate. For this reason it is possible to relieve mental suffering by a method impossible in the case of physical suffering, namely, by retraining, or changing the attitude of the suffering individual.

We may call this the subjective or psychological method, to distinguish it from the objective method, which consists in changing the external situation.

The subjective method of treatment has been used throughout much of human history, and is still used today, to relieve various forms of functional (not organic) bodily ailments, and of unhappiness. Faith healing, religious and philosophical consolation, psychoanalysis, hypnotism, and various other types of emotional reeducation are forms of subjective treatment. Subjective treatment must not interfere with objective treatment where the latter is more fundamental and permanent. But such interference is not inevitable, and there are many ills and sorrows for which the subjective treatment is the only practicable method and for which it will probably continue to be used in the future. The role of subjective treatment is to be found especially in those cases of mental suffering where the stimuli are more or less peculiar to individuals.

In the case of stimuli whose unpleasantness is more or less universal, although indeed acquired, objective treatment is the logical and usually necessary method. The more or less universal or general stimuli to mental suffering may be classified as repulsive physical surroundings, insecurity, group injustice, personal conflict in primary groups, and crime. We cannot hope to educate men to be happy under these conditions. Consequently our task is to remove the conditions themselves.

To mention only a few outstanding remedies, repulsive surroundings can be remedied by various forms of legislation, insecurity by social insurance in its various forms and by a reorganization of the labor market, injustice by the organization of the oppressed classes, personal friction by the provision of more varied opportunities and greater freedom in personal and domestic life, and by the development of more rational standards of courtesy, crime by the reform of crimi-

nal procedure and by a better social control over weapons and other material conditions of crime. Our campaign against all of these evils will become more successful as the science of sociology develops and gives us a better insight into the causes. In the case of personal friction within the family, the remedy depends not only upon a more scientific study of the facts, but also upon breaking down the attitude of silence which conceals the facts themselves.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ELIMINATION OF WASTE

Work is a curse. The chief aim of society should be to abolish work.

—CHARLES P. STEINMETZ.[1]

Why waste is an evil.—When a boy the author once watched a carpenter at work. He seemed to drop many nails and he never stopped to pick any up. The boy asked his father why the carpenter did not try to pick up and save these wasted nails, and he received then his first lesson in economics. It was explained that the waste of time involved would be greater than the value of the material saved. Somewhat contrary to the carpenter was the efficiency expert who refused to chastise his child because all the up motions were wasted. In nature we see what seems to be enormous waste. Millions of seeds are wasted that only a few may take root and mature.

Waste is an evil only when it is translated into human labor and from that into human emotions. Waste is in the last analysis needless boredom. Waste of material, waste of energy, which we see all about us, have no ethical significance at all except when they result in causing human beings to spend more time in unpleasant activity, and less time in enjoyable activities. Waste is evil only with relation to purpose, and all purposes are human purposes. Efficiency, the name we give to the opposite of waste, is the achievement of

[1] See Walter N. Polakov, in the *Nation*, 117:506, Nov. 7, 1923.

the maximum of pleasant experience with a minimum of disagreeable labor.

Civilization replaces pain by work.—Civilization has removed much of the primitive physical suffering from life. For this suffering it has substituted to a large extent labor. For the discomfort of mosquito bites we have substituted the labor of draining swamps and building screens. In general we gain by the substitution. Labor, by and large, is disagreeable, but its unpleasantness is mostly of that mild sort we call boredom, and much easier to endure than pain, irritation, anxiety, or grief. By some anthropologists it is held that steady labor is so unnatural to man's original human nature that he has had to acquire the habit of labor very gradually, first enforcing it upon slaves and women, and later subjecting the free and lordly male to the yoke. However that may be, drudgery has become a much bigger problem as suffering has grown less.

Primitive man is frequently pictured as "fighting for existence, with no time for seeing the beautiful." This picture does not correspond to what has been actually observed in primitive life. There seems to be more enjoying leisure than in many advanced societies. It might be asked how, if it takes us eight hours' work per day to earn a decent living with all our modern machinery, could the savage, without labor saving devices, get along with less work? Because there are two other factors we have not considered. For one thing the savage gets along on a much simpler standard of living. It is not a "decent" living according to our notion, but we probably could live on the same standard, too, if we wished. The other factor is density of population. The primitive man had a wide area from which to draw food and materials. Less work was required than to extract the same materials from a few acres. On the other hand, the Chinese have to work incessantly to secure their very low standard of living because of the density of their population.

Efficiency and liberty.—It is sometimes thought that these two principles are in eternal conflict, but that is true only within a certain sphere. Efficiency must forbid liberty in choosing the methods of work, but need not necessarily forbid liberty in choosing how much work shall be done, and toward what end. The matter is confused by the fact that efficiency is a *ratio* between two variables: it is results divided by efforts. One can have efficiency at many different levels of industriousness. A very industrious people like the Chinese can be inefficient by failing to produce but a small quantity of goods per man-hour of effort. On the other hand, a very lazy people could be high in efficiency if they accomplished a great deal in their few hours of work. Efficiency is *always* desirable, but whether it is to mean little work or much work should be decided by the principle of liberty. That is, each individual, in a truly progressive culture, will decide for himself whether he wants much work and much goods, or little work with little goods. Happiness is obtainable in both ways, according to individual tastes, but to force any individual to a policy contrary to his tastes means unhappiness.

In practical problems we have to assume one of the variables as fixed, usually the results. Then the problem of efficiency becomes a problem of how to get these results with the least work.

Six great classes of waste.—Let us trace the various elements of waste that are involved in the production and use of some everyday commodity, a pair of shoes, for example.

(1) The tanning of the leather required a chemical substance extracted from the bark of trees. Unless the extract producer got his bark from a lumbering company which practices scientific forestry, the chances are that the forest which produced it is being cut much faster than it is being renewed. Forest fires add to the waste, and eventually there will come a time when there will be a great shortage of timber. Fields

and streams will suffer alternate floods and droughts, as in China, instead of the more regular flow of water that comes from a protecting forest cover. Our descendants will have to live a poorer and harder life. This is only one illustration of the *waste of natural resources.*

(2) The men and women who produced these shoes in the factory did not all work regularly. They passed through feverish months of overwork in which fatigue, long hours, and monotony not only prevented them from yielding their best output but also caused their work to be more boresome and unpleasant than it would have been under a better planned system. At other times they have been unemployed, unable to find work and worrying about where the next meal would come from, because of seasonal shutdowns in the factory, strikes, lockouts, injuries received from the machinery, or sickness incurred from overwork or poorly ventilated workrooms. The same amount of shoes would have been produced with much less labor and suffering if industry had been organized on a human basis instead of on a purely profit-making basis. These conditions illustrate what Stuart Chase calls "the waste of idleness." Since it is not idleness *per se* that is evil, but the fact that the idleness comes when and where it cannot be used for enjoyment or relaxation, we might better call it the waste of *irregular employment.*

(3) Assuming that employment was regular, technical methods used in the production of these shoes were not, on the average, up to the best standard that modern engineering makes possible. In the matter of machinery the shoe industry has gone about as far as it seems possible to go. At nearly every process the elaborate machinery multiplies by many fold the output the worker was able to produce under the old system of handicraft. But the Hoover engineers who investigated the industry found that much of this gain was neutralized by poor management and methods. About 30 per cent of the workers' time was lost through congestions of material in

certain parts of the shop, owing to poor routing and planning. Twenty-five per cent of all the shoes were damaged in the making. Additional waste was caused by lack of skill on the part of the workers. An inexpert leather cutter will waste per week one hundred dollars' worth of material more than a good cutter. Such waste could have been partly prevented by better selection and training of personnel. Again, the frequent and absurd changes of style, especially in women's shoes, made it impossible for the managers to plan well in advance, and caused over-production in many styles. These conditions illustrate the waste of inefficient methods of physical production, or *processing wastes.*

(4) These shoes perhaps were distributed to the consumer through a small retail shoe store, competing with many other small stores, all trying to do the same thing. Each store required a separate overhead, separate planning, ordering, and was obliged to carry a variety of stocks. Each retailer spent only a part of his productive energy in doing his essential task, which was to get shoes fitted and expeditiously delivered to those who bought them. A large part of his time was spent trying to induce consumers to buy from him rather than from some other dealer who might have served them just as well. This work, which took the form of advertising, expensive window displays, a needlessly expensive location on the main street, expensive furnishings, and a surplus of sales "service" idle part of the time, was largely neutralized by the similar efforts of his competitors. It did not yield more shoes, better shoes or cheaper shoes, and was so much lost motion. The purchaser paid for this lost motion. In addition to the waste of retailing, there was waste in the wholesaling and transporting process. Many a carload of shoes made in the Middle West and destined to be sold in New England passed en route another carload made in New England and destined for the Middle West. Salesmen from many different shoe firms, showing lines differing in no important respect, all covered

the same territory which might have been covered by one. All these items illustrate the wastes of *distribution.*

(5) But the waste is not at an end when the shoes are wrapped up and handed to the final consumer. From the viewpoint of orthodox economics, production is now ended and consumption begins. Any waste occurring from now on would be called the waste of consumption. But, if the logic of economics strictly be followed through, production is not yet finished. As long as *work* still remains to be done in connection with those shoes, whether that work be done in the business establishment or in the household, production continues. The work of shoe shining parlors is a part of production. It yields a satisfaction for which the consumer is willing to pay, and a business is established to earn profits by rendering that service. But if the consumer decides to shine his own shoes in his own home, the essential nature of the process is not changed. He simply assumes temporarily the role of a producer, and as such renders the service to himself as consumer. In fact there was a time when the great bulk of the economic work of the world took place in the household of the consumer. And roughly a third of it continues there. This estimate is made by considering that there are about twenty million housekeepers as compared with forty million workers in outside "gainful" occupations, making twenty out of a total of sixty million workers.

Now it is quite possible this much discussed pair of shoes sees more waste in this last, or household stage of the productive process than in all the preceding stages. If they are children's shoes, they will, except in the best regulated of families, be misused. This may cut down their serviceability by half. New shoes will be worn at play while old ones which might have been reserved for that purpose are mislaid, or lie useless from want of repair at the proper time. Perhaps they may get wet, and be ruined through poor methods or facilities for drying them. The household, it might be

said, has failed to establish businesslike methods of taking care of personal property, and, no matter how numerous and excellent may be the articles purchased, perhaps half of them are wasted because not kept so as to be instantly available when and where needed.

Another part of the household waste is the waste of the consumer's time caused by the poor organization of the retail system. The multiplicity of retail stores compels the consumer to waste time shopping about to find a particular make of shoe, which would be much easier to locate if all shoes for sale in a community were centralized and classified. Again, the manufacturer may, following the style, make all his more desirable shoes with eyelets clear to the top, which require much more time to lace and unlace than those equipped with hooks. These things illustrate the *waste of the household and self-service.*

(6) All of the above five classes of waste belong to the process of production. To reduce those wastes, we need make no change in the nature of the goods and services we use, or in the quantities of each. We need only change our methods of producing and using them, including the processes of extraction of raw materials, manufacturing, distribution and transportation, and of the household. But there is a sixth great category of waste which comes not from inefficient production, but from producing the *wrong kinds* of goods. It is the misdirection of our productive energy in a much larger sense. Of course every waste is a misdirection of effort. One fourth of the labor in a shoe factory is wasted by poor methods of producing shoes. But there is a still larger question. Is not another part of this labor wasted by the fact that it is producing the wrong kind of shoes or that it is producing any shoes at all? Should we not get more real enjoyment out of life if much of this labor could be diverted permanently to the production of more standardized, more durable, or more comfortable footgear; or even if it were diverted to the

production of books, canoes, or summer hotels? We might in fact go barefoot during part of the year, and in many places, not only without discomfort but with an actual increase of comfort and pleasure, as the behavior of children indicates. The only reason we do not is because we are conditioned to a culture pattern which associates bare feet with extreme poverty or with children. With some conventional exceptions, such as bathing, bare feet do not go with adult respectability. Yet the Greeks developed a high civilization with quite a different pattern. However, without any such fundamental violation of culture we could greatly restrict the vagaries of fashion and fad in footgear, and spend the labor thereby saved on genuine non-competitive enjoyments. This is what we mean by the *waste of consumption.*

At least our now probably worn out pair of hypothetical shoes have served a good purpose if they have helped toward a clear, though extreme, illustration of the wastefulness of our culture.

The campaign against waste.—Although man as an individual has never liked work and always has sought to unload it upon somebody else, yet he has never until recent years undertaken a social program to do away with work. Instead he has indulged himself in pious platitudes about the virtues of work, like "Satan finds mischief for idle hands to do." Only a little over a century ago many of the respected employers, and other good people of England, approved twelve hours' factory work per day for children, on the ground that it kept them out of mischief. The inconsistency of these two attitudes illustrates culture's conquest of man.

Stuart Chase has made a thorough analysis in his "Tragedy of Waste" and "Challenge of Waste." He contrasts the behavior of civilized society with that of the four castaways on Jules Verne's "Mysterious Island," who by efficient work transformed their island into a comfortable home. "Suppose," he writes, "that one of the castaways had spent his

days sleeping on the beach; one had given all his energy to making mudpies; one had built a house by the shore by bringing stones from the top of the hill—when there were plenty of stones nearer at hand; while the last, in his haste to clear a field, had carelessly burned off all the timber on the island." The sleeper on the beach in this parable represents the waste of idleness, the stone house builder represents the waste of productive methods, that is, in extraction, manufacturing, distribution and household processes, the field clearer represents the waste of natural resources, and the mud-pie maker represents waste in consumption, or "illth."

1. Waste in natural resources.—It is estimated that three barrels of oil are wasted for every barrel piped, that one ton of coal is wasted and unreclaimable in or about the mine for every ton shipped. Forests in the United States are now being cut about four times as fast as they grow. A single Sunday edition of a large New York paper consumes fourteen acres of forest and three-fourths of this paper is used to advertise commodities, many of which we do not need, or would buy without the advertising if we did need them. Natural resources may be classified as:

1. Renewable: forests, water and wild life
2. Non-renewable, but possibly in part reclaimable:
   a. Metals—exhaustion of supplies very remote, and may be reclaimed from the ruins and wastes of civilization
   b. Soil elements essential to food-growing. Three crucial elements: nitrogen, potassium, phosphorus, of which phosphorus is most limited in supply
3. Non-renewable and non-reclaimable: coal, oil, natural gas

From the law of conservation of matter we know of course that there is no absolute loss or destruction of elements. Things merely change form. The coal burned in our furnaces becomes dispersed in the air as carbon dioxide gas. But the

problem of natural resources lies in the fact that nature tends to concentrate them while man scatters them. He scatters them so wide into the atmosphere, or into the sea, that it seems impossible to reassemble the material without some giant chemical extractor through which the whole sea or the whole atmosphere could be passed. The most serious danger is the washing away of phosphorus from the soil. But even if it were not washed away, it would gradually be absorbed by century after century of food crops, and would pass through the human body and our drainage systems into the sea. Only limited deposits of phosphate rock are available to make good this loss. It would seem that eventually the whole world will need to do as the Chinese, return all human waste to the soil.

Another crucial problem is the exhaustion of petroleum. The most serious aspect of this is not, as some people think, the using up of gasoline. Substitutes for gasoline can be produced. The greatest danger is the exhaustion of the lubricating oil, which also comes from petroleum. Without oil not only gas engines, but all kinds of machinery would come to a standstill.

Here is where the future of culture depends upon material invention. We cannot predict what inventions will occur, and therefore what direction the solutions will take. One hundred years hence may see us with giant industries, producing fuel alcohol from plant stems, with which to run our motor vehicles; or it may see us using electric vehicles entirely instead of those driven by gas. A thousand years hence may see us using hydroelectric power everywhere in place of coal, or it may see us making coal by extracting carbon from the atmosphere as we now extract nitrogen. All that social effort can do is to give every possible encouragement to scientific invention, and by careful use of the exhaustible materials give science as long as possible to prepare for the day of exhaustion.

The purpose of this book is to suggest the *social* adjustments to be made and not the mechanical inventions. It is only these social adjustments that can be said to be part of the conscious reshaping of culture.

Conservation of natural resources requires social effort, and not only mechanical invention. If we could devise a social system which would make us use fully the science we already have, many of the problems would be solved without any further inventions or discoveries. Among the suggested remedies is government ownership of natural resources. A government always can afford to wait; it is not tempted, as the private individual, to sacrifice the ultimate good for the sake of profits within a brief lifetime. In Europe the governments regulate the cutting of forests even though they remain under private ownership. To be told what one may do or not do with one's own property is rather foreign to our American culture pattern, but we shall ultimately be forced to accept that principle. Another needed adjustment is in the taxation system. Progressive legislators in many states are trying to remove the taxes from standing timber and levy them only when it is cut. This would remove a common encouragement to cutting. In some way the use of natural resources will have to be brought under public control. It cannot be left to unrestricted private enterprise.

2. The waste of irregular employment.—Chase calls this the waste of idleness. He estimates that it amounts altogether to about six million out of the total forty million man-years of gainful labor performed in the United States, distributed as follows:[1]

[1] Adapted from Chase, "Tragedy of Waste," pp. 143, 144, Macmillan, by permission.

Intermittent unemployment	400,000	
Seasonal unemployment	2,000,000	
Cyclical unemployment	300,000	(to 5,000,000 in panic years)
Labor turnover, or moving from job to job	300,000	
Strikes and lockouts	200,000	
Absenteeism	200,000	
Preventable accidents	500,000	
Preventable sickness	500,000	
Idle rich	300,000	
Hoboes	300,000	
Total	6,000,000	man-years of labor

In the seasonal unemployment and absenteeism, and among the idle rich and the hoboes, there must be included a great deal of idleness which is deliberate. Now deliberate idleness is leisure, which is one of the primary values of life. This leisure may not be distributed as fairly as might be wished between persons, nor as wisely as to time and place, but it certainly cannot, like involuntary unemployment, be charged against society as suffering or even as waste. Some seasonal unemployment, moreover, is due to women working in canning factories at certain seasons and in their homes at others, men employed in industry at one season and working their own farms at others. Such work schedules are indeed often more interesting and beneficial than continuous industrial employment.

In fact the only true waste of "idleness" is when the "idle" time is spent in looking for a job, or in other fretful and disagreeable efforts, instead of being spent in enjoyment. Indirectly of course waste results from the irregularity of employment, constant changing of personnel, and idleness of costly machinery, which factors make less efficient the labor of other workers remaining on the job. But, as far as the

direct results go, the chief evils portrayed in the above table consist of physical and mental suffering rather than of true waste.

To remedy irregular employment we must correct the *business cycle*. Among the remedies is business forecasting, which has in the last ten years undoubtedly smoothed down the fluctuations of the cycle. When men anticipate that business will be bad at a certain time, they prepare for it, and hence it does not become as bad as otherwise it might have been. The Federal Reserve System has prevented panics. It is felt, however, that we cannot have complete stability until we can prevent the fluctuation of price levels. Rising and falling price levels always put economic relations out of adjustment because some prices change faster than others. Professor Irving Fisher's proposed "stabilized dollar" aims to prevent these price changes, but so far it has not been approved by practical business men. This, however, is no sign that something of the sort will not eventually be adopted. The Federal Reserve System was ridiculed by those very practical types of men who now enjoy its benefits.

To reduce seasonal unemployment we need collaboration between the various seasonal industries of each community by which they could agree on some plan of dovetailing their work, so that one plant might open at the same time when another laid off a part of its labor force. Progressive firms, such as the Dennison Manufacturing Company, are spreading their own seasonal work through the year, so as to keep an equal force employed at all seasons.

Employment exchanges tend to reduce the time spent in moving from job to job. The old doctrine that it is a good and noble thing for a person to go from place to place hunting for a job is a piece of dangerous "bunk" that has delayed the establishment of a scientific system of placement. To fulfill its purposes completely, an employment exchange must have a monopoly within its district and must be non-profit

making. This is best accomplished by having it managed by the government. It is said that private competitive exchanges often have three workers for each job; one going to the job, one on it, one coming from it. It is thinkable that in the future employers may be compelled by law to report dismissals to the exchange. Any teacher knows how much more valuable teachers' agencies would be if, first, *all* vacancies had to be reported to them, and second, if all the agencies were consolidated into one, so that by communicating with one office the teacher might learn of *all* vacancies in a given region which might interest him, and the school might know of *all* the candidates.

Strikes and lockouts can be reduced by conciliation, mediation, voluntary and compulsory arbitration, and compulsory investigation. Personnel management in industry helps to make workers more contented, to discover the full possibilities of each worker, to adjust his grievances, and to reduce labor turnover.

3. Waste in processing.—A committee of the Federated Engineering Societies, working with the cooperation of Secretary Hoover, made a careful study of several industries; building, boots and shoes, metals, printing, and men's clothing. They found the causes of waste to be poor plant control, poor cost control, failure to use research, failure to standardize and simplify, excess plant capacity, restriction of output, dumping and destroying the product, poor location, failure to use by-products, bankruptcies, tariff and trade barriers, trade secrecy, and the suppression of inventions. They estimated the total waste as blamable 16% to outside causes, 16% to labor, and 68% to management. Mr. Chase estimates the total waste in methods of production to equal four million man years.

To analyze the waste of physical production and its remedies is a task for a large book on engineering and economics, not for the present volume. All we need do here is to point

out the high spots which are significant from our bird's-eye cultural viewpoint.

Of course the big factor in industrial efficiency is machinery. It has been estimated by Richard T. Ely that in 1895 "it actually required only about 120,000,000 days' work to produce the nine principal farm crops of that year; whereas, had they been produced by the methods and machinery of 1850, at least 570,000,000 days' work would have been required." In manufacturing industries the product per worker per hour is from two to ten or even a hundred times as much as under the old handicraft system, depending upon the particular industry concerned. Under our present culture this increasing use of machinery is *the* accepted method of improving efficiency. We do not need to push it, industry itself can usually be trusted to take advantage of the method wherever possible. However, here and there we find obstacles to the full use of machinery which might be removed. For instance, in agriculture we have a culture pattern of independent farms, small in personnel and capital though large in area, and with farmers who have been brought up on traditions of self reliance. Under these conditions machine methods are not introduced so readily as in manufacturing industry, and social effort will help to stimulate such introduction.

But there are other adjustments, beside the introduction of more machinery, which are needed to give us the greatest possible economic efficiency. These adjustments apply both to the work of processing, and the work of distribution, which will be considered under the next heading.

1. Our culture pattern of business *competition* needs to be modified, but not entirely done away with. What we need to abolish is not competition *per se*, but (1) antagonistic effort, and (2) needless duplication of effort. It is where competition involves these that competition is bad. Otherwise it is a useful spur to better effort. Competition in a footrace increases the speed with which the runners move

toward the objective. But in a football game the competition between the two teams of course delays the ball in its movement toward the goal.

Antagonistic effort is seen in business where two tobacco concerns try by costly advertising to capture a market which either one of them alone easily could supply. Needless duplication of effort is seen in the excess plant capacity which is perhaps the most wasteful feature, the most serious indictment, of our whole industrial order. That is, if all the manufacturing plants in the country were run at full capacity, they would produce far more goods than could possibly find a market. We operate many factories partially and intermittently, instead of operating a few to their full capacity. The result is that we have invested more money in buildings and machinery than actually is necessary to produce the goods we consume. How did it happen? Because each factory was planned separately without consultation with other business men who were trying to do the same thing, and each factory was made larger than necessary in the idle hope that *it* might be the one to capture the market, and the competing firms might be the ones to shut down and waste their capital. Such a situation is unavoidable so long as we have unrestricted private enterprise. The only thinkable remedy seems to be putting all industry under a central authority, instead of leaving it to the will of many independent business men. In short, collectivism.

But some of the most ardent opponents of this socialistic culture pattern have failed to realize that business is tending in that direction by its own efforts under the present regime. Little by little small firms are combining into large ones, and gentlemen's agreements and understandings between the various captains of industry enable each to plan his policies with some regard to what the others are doing. This of course tends to reduce wasted effort. If the process keeps on, the people who control industry will be in time so few that they

can get together and make an integral plan for the country's production, as well, it would seem, as could any soviet planning board. We have attempted to check this process, it is true, by anti-trust legislation. This was a step backward in economic evolution. Big business, even monopoly, has enormous possibilities for greater efficiency and welfare if it be carefully regulated by the public. But the culture pattern we inherited from the past, the pattern of small scale private enterprise, would not let us take advantage of these possibilities—not yet. Fearing to undertake the responsibility of regulation we tried to check the whole process of combination and greater efficiency by passing the anti-trust laws.

This is not to be understood as an unqualified disapproval of the anti-trust laws. It would be dangerous to repeal these laws without at the same time giving the government greater power to regulate the monopolies that might result. It seems that we must have either regulated monopoly, or competition. Unrestrained private monopoly is intolerable.

But even were business to be integrated into giant monopolies there still would be a place for competition in the field of service, between the various subdivisions and between the individual workers.

2. Another general tendency of business is toward greater *specialization.* Specialization has gotten so thoroughly into our culture pattern that it is often accepted thoughtlessly where it is not for the best. An economist, for example, spent a summer trying to determine whether it would be more profitable for a mail order house to manufacture certain of the goods it sold, than to continue buying them from the usual manufacturers. He found that it would not pay to change the system. His finding was undoubtedly valid for the particular case. But in discussing the matter he wound up with a glorious generalization, that merchants are merchants, and manufacturers are manufacturers, that the merchant doesn't understand manufacturing, and it never pays

him to undertake it. Let each forsooth specialize on what he knows. This method of reasoning showed that his mind was under the influence of one of those culture patterns to which business men are very much enslaved. Anyone might know that if the merchant should decide to manufacture, he would have his manufacturing plant set up and run by people who had had experience in manufacturing. There is no inherent reason why manufacturing and merchandising operations could not be carried on by the same firm, any more than there is reason to disqualify a banker from heading the board of directors of a college.

Another culture adhesion is that American drug stores commonly have soda fountains and grocery stores do not. But there is no reason on earth why they could not, and when the market becomes sufficiently obvious, as in some villages, the grocery store breaks the traditional pattern and puts in its soda fountain.

Progress demands that this deciding of what functions shall be undertaken by what organization, this deciding between more or less specialization, be determined by a study of the circumstances of each case, and without any sense of obligation to follow custom for its own sake. In some spheres we can expect more specialization, and in some less. The department store is a very modern institution but certainly a step away from the much vaunted tendency toward specialization. Better results might be obtained from elevator operators if they were given something different to do during part of the day, and ran the elevator in short shifts.

3. Social remedies for waste in manufacturing and extractive processes include vocational education and guidance, profit sharing, piece work and bonus systems, scientific management and its plan of functional foremanship, time study, card indexing of information, cost accounting, better systems of inspection and grading, farmers' institutes and farm demonstration agents, cooperative use of farm machinery, boys' corn

and pig clubs, cattle quarantine laws, farm loan systems, agricultural forecasting, suggestion systems, paid inventors and research men. Of special significance is the new simplified practice movement which is being pushed by the department of commerce. By it manufacturers in any given line are encouraged and helped to agree with each other to standardize the types and sizes of their products. A shoe concern reduced the number of its styles from 2500 to 100, with consequent saving of money and increase of sales. "Axes," says Mr. Chase, "are made in 34 models in four qualities, eleven finishes, and from five to nineteen sizes. There are about thirty-five different brands of axes, and thus the buyer is actually offered a range of choice between 994,840 varieties."[1] The department of commerce is trying to get bed manufacturers to produce four standard sizes instead of seventy-eight as formerly.

4. The waste of distribution.—Mr. Chase estimates a total waste of 2,500,000 man-years per year in distribution. This results from too many retail stores, with duplication of overhead, expensive advertising, sky signs, expensive containers, often costing more than the contents itself, expensive salesmanship, traveling expenses, service follow-ups, selling talks, cigars, show cases, cross hauling of goods, duplication of territory as by milk distributors in a city, needless middlemen, inefficient railway terminals and use of cars. The total outlay for advertising in the United States was estimated by Edward Bok in 1923 as $1,284,000,000 yearly. This from a social viewpoint, is largely waste motion.

The chain store, the department store, the cooperative store, help somewhat to remedy the situation in various ways. One hundred chain stores can be run with less labor than one hundred independently planned and operated stores of the same size. When the plan is made for one it can be largely

[1] Chase, "The Tragedy of Waste," p. 169, Macmillan.

imitated by the others. In some cities the distribution of milk is being handled by a single concern, which can make a far more efficient routing plan for covering the territory.

Physicians and lawyers save a great deal through their professional codes of ethics which prevent their advertising. Business men might achieve the same results by agreements to limit their advertising. Business men in each line are now as a rule organized into a trade association. Some of these trade associations carry on cooperative advertising for their members, and it is conceivable that they might come to restrict and to cheapen advertising. The government might assist by prohibiting certain kinds of advertising, such as roadside billboards, which already are restricted in some states. Elsewhere there are plans on foot for the voluntary elimination of billboards by the advertising firms. These efforts so far are based mainly on esthetic or safety motives rather than economy. Advertising is today one of the most rapidly expanding lines of business. Its followers will do well to get their profits while the getting is good. For a day of reckoning probably is coming.

The practice of service charges in restaurants and stores would teach the consumer what it is that really costs money and would discourage some of our needless shopping, taking goods home on approval, waste of salespeople's time to gratify whims.

The good roads movement is greatly reducing the cost of transportation, and therefore of distribution, throughout the country. A state like North Carolina which has gone deeply into debt in order to give its citizens a splendid system of highways within a very few years, may be criticized as to its fiscal policy but it will reap great economic benefit. The various movements to improve railway terminals, the tunneling under the Hudson River in New York, the constructing of belt lines to shift freight between the various railways without bringing it into congested terminals, all help to re-

duce the labor of distribution. To solve the street traffic problem it has been suggested that our cities be reconstructed so as to provide a parking shed or arcade under every building.

While these measures are matters of mechanical arrangement, yet they also require new social arrangements. To accomplish them it is usually necessary to get agreements between business firms which according to the basic pattern of our culture should be independent and competing; or it is necessary for the government to regulate matters that formerly went unregulated. Sometimes constitutional amendments may be necessary. To permit the trade associations of the country to do all that they might do to cheapen distribution, the anti-trust laws would need to be modified, as they were in the case of the Webb Act, to permit our manufacturers to combine in foreign trade. It is unlawful, for example, for competing firms to agree on a division of territory, each to have exclusive right to sell in its own territory.

4A. Waste in non-material service.—Wasted effort occurs not only in the process of physical production and distribution, where materials are handled, but also in rendering the services of education, medicine, religion, government, and social work. Social surveys of many communities have revealed the appalling waste of our tax money, and our charitable gifts, through inefficient administration. It was common for a single case of family destitution to be studied and handled by several different charitable agencies, each one ignorant of what the others were doing. To remedy these overlapping efforts case work clearing houses were established, which all the agencies might consult before working on a case. A large part of the money raised for philanthropic purposes was used up in the work of raising it. To remedy this community chests and financial federations have been established, by which a general fund is raised at one time by the several agencies in a community. Here and there decrepit and dying

churches have been consolidated into one organization which could afford to employ a full time pastor, and to install if desired recreational equipment. Better results have been obtained in education with the same or less effort by consolidating one room rural schools into larger school houses to which the pupils are conveyed by free bus service; by devising standard educational tests through which the attainments of one class may be compared with those of any other class in the United States; by introducing project and case methods of teaching, by the Gary system and wider use of the school plant. In government the commission and city-manager plans, the budget system, the proposed simplifications of court procedure, the use of voluntary arbitration in place of the courts for business cases may help to reduce waste.

5. Waste on household processes.—Stuart Chase reports that Miss Hildegarde Kneeland, of the Bureau of Home Economics in the Department of Agriculture, outlines the main wastes in domestic economy as follows:

"1. Excess capacity and duplication of equipment. Laundry equipment only used once a week for instance.
2. Inefficient equipment—due to small production units.
3. Mishandling of equipment—due to untrained workers—particularly household servants.
4. Waste of fuel and supplies—due to small units and untrained management.
5. Inefficient delivery of household supplies—in milk, groceries, ice, etc.
6. Inefficient purchasing of supplies—due to lack of standards and training for consumers, adulteration, proliferation of retail stores, etc.
7. Elaboration of standards, service plates, table layout, ball tassels, starch, linen, silver, china—all the useless paraphernalia, involving untold extra cleaning and care which 'nice' people demand. (Cf. Veblen's theory of conspicuous assumption.)

8. Inefficient cleaning methods. Little is known concerning the relation between cleaning processes and health. It is now largely a matter or ritual, especially in dusting and polishing. Typical house construction greatly increases the labor of cleaning.
9. Maladjustment between work and individual aptitudes of household workers. Square pegs in round holes. Assumed that all women are born housekeepers; an assumption so unwarranted as to lead to untold friction and waste." [1]

There is reason to believe that the waste of labor in the household is greater than the waste in our entire industrial system outside the home. This is partly because the home is not subject to economic competition, and hence is not forced, like business, to be continually on the alert for improved methods. It is partly because the home is governed by rigid culture patterns while business is consciously trying to get out of the ruts of tradition, and to experiment with new things.

Chase estimates that there are in the United States about 18,000,000 housewives and 2,000,000 household servants. Our own independent estimate made from the census figures of married women, and allowing for the married women working outside the home, was about 20,000,000 full-time home makers working in their own households, in addition to the employed servants who of course are included in the census as "gainfully occupied." It is impossible to determine the total economic value of this household service with the same accuracy as we determine the total value of the products of agriculture and of manufacturing because it is nowhere reported in dollars and cents. But it seems reasonable to judge the importance of an industry by the number of persons working in it, assuming they all work full time.

It may be claimed that many of them do not work full

[1] Chase, "Tragedy of Waste," p. 232. Macmillan, by permission.

time. To the woman in a modern city apartment, without children, housekeeping is a mere dilettante occupation whose essential duties, if she went at them in a business way, could be finished in about three or four hours per day. The balance of the time is commonly spent in reading, conversing, telephoning, needless shopping trips, and in making extra work for herself to do, as by working on embroideries and lace curtains and other pleasant but needless elaborations quite beyond the capacity of a mere man to describe. But on the other hand it may be said that a man has no conception of the amount of labor involved when there are children, especially if they be fed and cared for by modern approved methods, and when there is sickness in the home. Then it is not a question of whether the homemaker works full time, but of whether the amount of overtime she puts in ought to be tolerated in any civilized community. There may be many periods of semi-leisure, but the housewife has got to *be on duty* fourteen and sometimes twenty-four hours per day, and frequently this being on duty fourteen hours reacts upon the nervous system in much worse fashion than eight hours spent in hard mental or physical effort. Her time is never her own; her attention is never free to become absorbed in personal interests. So it seems fair to assume that the *average* homemaker is a full time worker, putting forth effort and suffering (boredom) equivalent to that of the average worker outside the home. Since there are in the United States (1920 census) forty million people engaged in gainful occupations and about twenty million homemakers, it is reasonable to say that the total work of the household is about one half the total work of the economic system outside the home, or about one third of our total national work. Homemaking bulks almost twice as large as agriculture, the largest single division of "gainful occupations."

5A. Waste in self-service.—But the volume of this household service is even greater than thus far appears. We have

included only the labor of persons who are giving presumably full time to domestic duties. But every man, woman and child spends a certain portion of his time in performing little odds and ends of labor for himself or his family. These tasks are so mixed up with leisure activities that they are not usually considered as labor at all. But that only illustrates how our cultural eye-glasses prevent us from seeing obvious and crying realities. For instance the average person spends about an hour per day in dressing and undressing and attending to his own clothes and personal appearance. By a more rational mode of dress and certain labor-saving devices this time might be reduced by half. Yet that seldom occurs to us. On the other hand if we were compelled to stay a half hour longer every day at the office or the shop, or in school, without any increase in compensation, because these institutions persisted in using antiquated methods, we should greatly resent it.

To secure some idea of the volume of this personal self service, the author kept close record of the use of his own time for one week. Averaging all seven days and assuming them to be alike, the day's time was distributed as shown in the table on the following page.

The first two items, chargeable to the "gainful occupation," amount to eight hours fifty-six minutes. The third item, of self service, three hours eleven minutes, is more than a third as great. The author has the fortune to live very near his work. With masses of people this item would be swelled by an hour or more per day spent in commuting. If this case is typical, if the average individual among our 40,000,000 gainfully occupied persons puts into self-service one third as much time as he does into his occupation, this would mean about 40,000,000 ÷ 3 or 13,000,000 man-years to be added to our American household and self-service labor, making it 33,000,000 instead of 20,000,000. In short the labor of the country is only a little over half specialized; nearly as

much time is spent in rendering service to oneself and one's family, as in rendering services to the outside world for pay.

1. Work necessary to the immediate duties of occupation	7 h.	10 m.
2. Work necessary to personal advancement in occupation, such as keeping up with the news, extra study, correspondence on professional matters, attending lectures and meetings, etc.	1 h.	46 m.
3. Personal service to self or family, such as dressing, attention to clothes, household chores, shopping, going to town, transporting and putting away personal property, transporting self between home and place of work, personal correspondence, etc. (This was divided into dressing 67 m, transportation and storage 34 m, other items 90 m.)	3 h.	11 m.
4. True leisure, including meals, conversation for pleasure, pleasure driving, and physical recreation	3 h.	39 m.
5. Time in bed	8 h.	6 m.
6. Unaccounted for		8 m.
Total	24 h.	0 m.

It will be objected that some of the items included in this self-service, such as dressing, commuting, letter writing, shopping, are not to be considered as labor but as more or less pleasure. The tired business man even may consider his household chores in the evening as a recreation and relief from the strain of the day's work. His commuting time may be spent partly in reading the paper or playing cards. Very true, but for that matter a part of his vocational work time may be equally pleasurable. Some vocations are so interesting as to be more like play than drudgery. Others permit

considerable intervals for chatting and idling. The author enjoyed several of his occupational hours far more than he enjoyed the hours spent in dressing and shopping. There is a lot of welfare to be gained by making work more interesting, but that does not deny that it is work. Pure leisure exists only when one freely chooses his activities for their own sake, and not under the dictation of some ulterior end. When a man plays cards in the commuters' train he may be improving a boresome situation, but unless he is doing the same thing he would choose to do with this time if he were perfectly free, he is enjoying at best only a semi-leisure, and the time should be classified as work rather than play. His time is tied up by ulterior purposes, and not at his free disposal. We shall consider the problem of making work more interesting as a separate problem; we are here concerned with the problem of reducing the amount of work.

Will the one-family household be abolished?—The most effective remedy requires a revolution in our culture which can be expected to occur but gradually, and perhaps never at all. That is the abolition of the single-family household and the putting of all domestic work on that basis of large scale production which already has revolutionized our manufacturing industries. When men live in an army, students in a college, or travelers in a hotel, they do not band together in groups of twos or threes or fours with one person in each group devoting himself entirely to rendering domestic service to the rest. The persons needed to prepare and serve their food, clean their rooms, and render their other domestic services amount to a tenth or less of the number of persons served.

Yet there may be other values in our single family home whose loss would be greater than the gain in mechanical efficiency. Anthropology leads one to doubt this, however, and to suspect that the connection of family love and companionship with the separate building and kitchen is merely

a cultural adhesion which could be broken. There seems no essential reason why these spiritual values could not be retained by families living in hotels. It is a question which can be answered only by experiment and by perfect freedom of individual choice. Probably the outcome will be hotel or other communal life for a larger proportion of our population, but with the retention of the separate home for families who have children or who for other reasons prefer it. There is nothing new about this; the Jugoslav *Zadruga* or communal household of some hundred persons, and the Iroquois' long house, presided over by the elder matron of the group, represent methods of family life which can be conducted with less financial burden than our own separate household system. We might note also the simplified three-room household of Central European peasants, together with their custom of having women work on the farms in groups, one of the group taking care of the children of all.

The communalization of domestic services.—There are many remedies, however, which do not require such a fundamental change in our culture pattern. We could communalize certain household functions while retaining separateness of dwelling houses themselves. The apartment house, patronized by an increasing number of people, is a cross between complete communalization and the separate home. Then it is possible to group single homes so that they may enjoy central heating, community playgrounds, and other communal services. In such communities there could be a choice between separate cooking, central cooked-food service to separate dining rooms, and centralized dining. In Montclair, New Jersey, St. Louis, and elsewhere, community kitchens have been tried. It is remarkable that we do not try more of these experiments. Community day-nurseries would set free much of the time of mothers, for one woman can take care of ten children *almost* as easily as one.

When we shrink from some of these innovations we forget

that something like them existed in the good "old fashioned" home of colonial days. The family groups were larger, often including grandparents and other relatives, so that actually a lesser per cent of the population was obliged to remain in the home at any one time. Mutual agreements among neighbors to take care of one another's children when one family wanted to be away would play a valuable role in our culture, if we could sufficiently unbend the pattern to admit such a scheme. We are bound by a pattern which prevents our making definite and written agreements about non-business matters, and which makes us unduly critical of our neighbors. Likewise, if we could get more families to coöperate, we could establish a system of local community laundries, free from many disadvantages of the present commercial laundry.

There is a need for local service institutions such as shining parlors, tailor shops, and for specialized servants such as cleaners, going about from house to house with their equipment. One of the great needs which has appeared to the author has been for a local bundle wrapping establishment which would take over the job of finding string, paper and stamps, and of waiting at the parcel post window. He would like to see community storehouses for empty boxes, for second-hand articles, and junk of all sorts which the individual householder is always needing on occasion, but cannot store conveniently in his own attic. We are informed of the Peoples' League for Mutual Service in New York City, which will undertake to tell people the time of day, to give information about the quickest way to reach a given point, and about where to purchase various articles. In one small town there is a "Du-for-yu" shop, which undertakes to do many kinds of sewing and repair work immediately on demand. Possibly a great opportunity awaits those who will establish shops for *miscellaneous* service in communities too small to support a shop for any one specialized service, such as shoe shining or tailoring.

The establishment of these substitute institutions for domestic service is delayed by the rigidity of hours and incomes in the major industries of the community. It hardly will pay a low-salaried suburban-dwelling clerk to leave off pressing his own suits and take them to a tailor, unless the time he saves thereby can be used to earn extra income to pay the tailor. Theoretically, if he is a clerk, he ought to be able to earn more money in one hour of clerking than he could save by doing one hour of tailor work. The tailor, on the other hand, should be able to press the suit in less time, and therefore at less cost to the clerk's income, than the clerk could do it himself. According to economic law it pays each person to put his whole working time into the work he is best fitted and equipped to do, and to hire all other work done for him. But much of our working life is fixed in rigid patterns, and our clerk cannot augment his income by working a little overtime, unless perhaps he is willing to take a night job, which would mean too much overtime. There is no intermediate state of affairs that just suits his needs. So he is forced to eke out his living by doing various odd jobs for himself, which he might rather hire done for him with extra money earned in his own vocation. A prominent physician in a small town keeps a cow, milks it and cares for it himself. This might seem a great waste of a physician's time, but there may not be enough practice in the town to occupy his full time anyway, and his dairy farm labors may afford him a certain relaxation.

Each such case must be judged on its own peculiar merits, but in general it would seem that there is need for greater flexibility of vocational hours and opportunities; and that too many persons are forced by necessity to spend time in self-service which would mean more net satisfaction to them if spent in their own specialized vocations. On the other hand there are many persons who have the opposite need. Forced to spend long hours in fatiguing or monotonous labor, these

persons would do better if they could knock off two or three hours of their vocational day and income, and spend the time in gardening or miscellaneous self-service jobs. Here again we see the great objective of cultural reshaping not as some different yet equally rigid pattern, but as greater flexibility, greater variety of opportunity, greater freedom of choice for the individual.

The use of outside service institutions is limited by the time required to go to them and the time spent in waiting to be waited on. When our clerk decides whether to press his own suit or send it to the tailor, he must consider the extra time needed to stop at the tailor's shop, and the average delay on account of other customers who may be there at the same time. This often results in his choosing the self-service method.

How the present home can be made more efficient.—Without any change in the social structure much could be accomplished by the more scientific construction of dwelling houses. This is not entirely a matter of mechanical invention, but requires a change in our sentiments. Imbued with the sentiment that a home should be as different as possible from a factory, we seem to shrink from seeing in our homes anything which suggests the efficiency of the factory. A manufacturer will rearrange his building and machinery in order to save a few minutes daily from the time of each workman, but for him to suggest a similar adjustment in his home to save the labor of his wife or servants almost would brand him as a "crank." No farmer would try to raise chickens in a cow barn, but yet we try to raise children in buildings constructed for adults. The time may come when special suburbs are constructed for the raising of young children. A house for this purpose would do well to be a one-story building, with a special nursery room with built-in shelves for holding toys, linen, and so on. There could be a system of gates, fenced yards and fenced porches, for con-

trolling the movements of young children without that constant personal watching and giving of commands which wears out the nerves of so many families today. Toilet and kitchen facilities should be placed with an eye to the maximum convenience in attending to the children.

In a factory there are at least four physical functions which have to be provided for: the actual *processing* of the materials, the *repair* of equipment, *storage*, and *transportation* within the factory. In our homes, even where the first function is handled in up-to-date fashion by means of modern stoves, sewing machines, kitchens and bathrooms, yet the last three functions are often neglected. The neglect of repair work is due largely to personal inefficiency and lack of training of housekeepers; storage and transportation are largely problems of construction. Personal property in many of our homes is stored as the country lawyer was said to keep his papers—in the bottom of a barrel which had to be dumped out on the floor whenever he wanted to look up a case. We have expensive furniture, which looks like a million dollars on the outside, but in one drawer you may find an assortment of goods consisting of scattered playing cards, pipes, violin strings, broken parts of children's toys, a hammer and some paper clips, the family insurance policy, a pair and a half of sox, and perhaps a small apple. It ought to be possible to determine what kinds and quantities of articles are kept by certain types of families, and to build into a house a storeroom with adequate shelves and compartments to store this material in such a way that any article could be reached without disturbing everything else. There are not sufficiently numerous and varied compartments. Likewise it would be possible to plan a house for maximum economy of steps in doing the day's work. Another need is a shelf or box at the head and the foot of every stairway to accumulate articles which are destined to go up or down stairs, which would

require extra steps if transported immediately, and would be forgotten if left anywhere else.

The future evolution of the household depends somewhat upon the invention of labor-saving devices. These inventions already have served to lighten housework to such an extent that the relative advantages of communal housekeeping have been lessened. The French government and Chamber of Commerce recently have offered prizes for inventions to lighten housework. The growing unpopularity of domestic service, and the high wages of housemaids, help to stimulate such invention. Senator Breton, of France, is quoted as saying that in the near future practically every household service will be performed mechanically, by means of electricity. If so, it will require that mechanical and electrical education be given to girls as much, if not more, than to boys, which means somewhat of a change in our educational culture pattern. Moreover, some change in our sentiments is required to enable us to see the full possibilities of this mechanization. The man who rigs up his house with strings and electric wires is still a subject for comedy in the moving pictures. This attitude is not altogether favorable to progress. In automobiles one of the strong selling points is the multiplicity of indicators and controls, by which the driver can learn of conditions and make necessary adjustments without leaving his seat. If we carried over the same attitude into household life, we should be eager to install devices by which we could open doors and windows, control the heater and the kitchen stove, see and speak to the caller at the door, and all from one central control station. Automatic heat control by thermostats and alarm clocks already has proved its value to human comfort and convenience.

Education for personal efficiency.—Still another type of remedy, requiring no change in home construction or in social organization, consists in home economics education. Personal

habits and attitudes count enormously in efficiency. But it is not enough to educate prospective homemakers. Every boy and girl should be given a course in personal efficiency. This should be something apart from vocational training or household economics training. It should be something applicable to everyone regardless of sex or occupation. Here are some of the points that might profitably be included:

1. The use of suggestive lists of articles, or other details, to aid the brain in answering questions like "What articles do I need at the store?" or "What articles shall I take on this trip?" etc.
2. The use of memorandum books and shopping lists.
3. The importance of routinizing the regular daily duties of life, memorizing the routine, and practicing for speed.
4. The economy of a few carefully planned shopping trips rather than many hasty and trivial ones.
5. The importance of having a place for everything, everything in its place, and everybody informed of that place by means of labels, signs, or some logical system.
6. Dust and dirt increase arithmetically, disorder increases geometrically. So if something must be neglected, neglect dirt.
7. Have in the household a generally understood method of conveying information, such as a bulletin board.
8. The desk, the kitchen sink, the stove, the carpenter's bench, the chiffonier, the dressing table, the garage, are workbenches. Arrange your tools in permanent positions about the bench and carry your work to the bench. Do not attempt to carry the tools to the work. For making repairs where the work cannot be carried to the bench, a standardized tray or kit of tools is useful.
9. The keeping of personal accounts and the making of budgets.
10. Essential properties of textiles, foodstuffs, and other household materials.
11. Every girl as well as boy should know how to repair simple electric fixtures.

There is reason to believe that personal and household inefficiency is one of the contributing causes of domestic unhappiness and personal friction. Delay in finding equipment, needless argument and questions about material details, are irritating, and the irritation responses become conditioned to the familiar sights and sounds of the home, which thereby may become unpleasant.

6. Waste in consumption.—It is difficult to draw the line between the waste of consumption and waste of production. Visiting a paper mill the author was shown how "linen" writing paper is made. There is nothing unique about its composition. It is merely pressed, when still soft and wet from the rolls, against a sheet of linen cloth which gives to the paper the imprint of its peculiar weave. His guide showed him this as an illustration of how the whims of the consumer increase the cost of production. The consumer was not getting any better paper. He was getting merely a paper with a rough surface which is of no particular utility, but satisfies a personal or conventional taste. Going through a hosiery mill, he saw how needless seams are sewed on to tube-made stockings, merely in order to make them look like the traditional stocking, which must have a seam, and is called "full fashion" hose. This too means extra cost. These cases might be considered as wastes in the process of production, but they are rather wastes in consumption, because they are incurred simply to gratify the whims caused by the irrationality of the consumer in choosing a more costly article when a cheaper one would fulfill the same purposes.

Stuart Chase, in his "Tragedy of Waste," as we saw in Chapter X charges about 20 per cent of our national income, or 8,000,000 gainful workers, to waste in consumption. Of these 2,000,000 are charged to activities which most of us would agree are desirable to eliminate, such as military activity, crime and the watching of criminals, the drug traffic, prostitution, etc. The other 6,000,000 are charged to

"superluxuries," but in this case there will be little agreement as to just what commodities should be included and what should not. Mr. Chase evidently thinks that if each one of us should give up the things that to him personally are "superluxuries," we should save altogether the labor of 6,000,000 gainful workers, which labor we either could use for the production of other more important things, or could eliminate altogether, redistributing our remaining 34,000,000 man-years of labor in such a way that we should all have 15 per cent less work to do. In Chapter X we took a somewhat different viewpoint from Mr. Chase on this matter of superluxuries, holding that it is not the luxury element of the commodity, but the element of artificial necessity created by our culture, that should put a commodity on the blacklist.

According to orthodox economic theory there can be no waste in consumption. The consumer is assumed to be rational and always to choose the article which best satisfies his wants at the least cost. The economist admits that the consumer's wants are not always such as to yield him the greatest ultimate welfare. The wants may even be harmful, but nevertheless they are wants, and economics takes wants as it finds them. But cultural sociology goes behind these wants. It does not consider them as free choices of free individuals, but as the results of culture patterns of consumption which individuals are practically compelled to observe. Progress demands changes in the pattern of wants as well as changes in the pattern of production. It demands that the direction of these changes be determined by free individual choice, which can be secured only by enlightening the individual and freeing him from cultural prejudices and social pressure.

What progress would mean in terms of economic consumption.—Just how may our present habits of consumption be expected to change if we really do, some day, develop

rational, enlightened habits of consumption? Answering tentatively, we suggest that the changes might be as follows:

(1) *Material goods will occupy a lesser proportion and services a greater proportion of our budget.* Today medical service, educational service, repair work, information service, day nursery service, transportation, and travel, and miscellaneous domestic and personal services are either unavailable or are purchased with undue economy; but we are spendthrift in our outlay for the things that can be wrapped up in packages. And this is partly because business pushes us to buy the latter and not the former. When the author moved into a new house a concern using all the plausibilities of salesmanship, tried to sell him some of its 100 varieties of brushes and brooms which he did not need, but no salesman ever approached him offering the services of his firm to construct a play yard or a sand pile for children, or to take over the work of making household repairs and adjustments which were very much needed. A modern slogan of business is "service." The theory is that business tries to discover the needs of the consumer and then endeavors to cater to those needs with the painstaking detail of the old fashioned servant or valet. But this is true only in a very limited sphere. Business caters only to those consumers' needs which can be supplied by the method of large scale production, and there it tries to create artificial needs. The business which undertakes to sell *material service,* as distinguished from material *commodities,* will probably play a greater role in the future.

(2) If there is to be progress, we can expect that an *increasing per cent of our consumption will consist of commodities and services which enrich the variety and complexity of experience, by overcoming the limitations of time and space.* Such things are the automobile, the pleasure boat, the radio, the telephone, traveling, camps and hotels, books, "movies," phonographs, and outdoor equipment. And we may expect

this gain to be *at the expense* of clothes, jewelry, tobacco, perfumes, food delicacies, and other goods which *cater to the simpler orders of sense experience.* A $500 automobile can provide six new experiences per week, but a $500 gown will provide only one pleasant experience to a wealthy woman; after that she might be ashamed to be seen wearing the same gown again.

(3) In particular we may expect a *decreasing role to be played by commodities whose appeal to the senses is based on competitive display and prestige.* We may be less hasty to scrap old buildings which are perfectly adequate for their purposes, and whose only fault is that people make fun of their appearance. Our expenditures for education and other great institutions may be put more into brains and less into bricks.

It is said by some business men that the automobile is killing the jewelry business. If so it is a sign of progress, unless the automobile business also prostitutes itself to ostentatious display.

There is great room for economy in clothing. We have estimated in three different ways the total amount of our expenditure for articles of personal wear. (1) It makes up 12½ per cent of the family budget figured by Kennedy for a family of five living on a standard of mere subsistence. (2) It employs about 11½ per cent of the gainfully occupied workers in the country. (3) By studying the total value of the products of the clothing industries, knit goods, boot and shoe industries, and adding proportionate estimates for the products of dressmakers, tailors, and of clothing made up in the home, and adding 33 per cent of the manufacturing cost to account for the cost of distribution, we estimated that consumers in 1919 paid about $8,000,000,000 to cover their bodies, which was 13½ per cent of the national income of that year.

These three rough estimates are so nearly alike that it seems fair to say that we devote one-eighth of our gainfully

occupied labor power to covering and adorning the human body. Without any physical discomfort whatever, without even disregarding esthetic values, it is reasonable to suppose that we could reduce this outlay to $4,000,000,000. This is the amount we should be spending if everyone were content with the minimum equipment of clothing allowed by Kennedy's budget for health and subsistence.

The spectacle of everyone dressing as our lowest paid workers dress is to many persons not an inviting one. But it must be remembered that the basic pattern of our dress is needlessly elaborate and complex. Four billion dollars' worth of clothing manufactured by modern industrial processes, but on the simpler patterns of the Chinese or of the ancient Greeks or any other simpler patterns you please, could be made much more pleasing to the eye, and probably more satisfactory in all respects, than the same four billion dollars spent in producing cheap imitations and shoddy garments of standard Euro-American dress. Great saving would be effected by establishing uniformity in dress in those features where variety is expensive, and securing the variety in those features where variety is cheap. Thus variety of color always could be obtained with little additional cost, but variety in shapes and forms might need to be limited to a few hundred standard types instead of many thousand. The four billion dollars thereby saved would buy three weeks' annual extra leisure for every gainfully occupied person in the country.

(4) *There will be less consumption of labor-producing commodities,* such as table linen, and more *consumption of labor-saving commodities, such as glass covers for tables.*

Making work more attractive.—All the previous remedies have aimed to reduce the amount of labor. But there is also much to be gained by making work more interesting. In a European city the author saw a woman trudging along beside a large dog, both pulling a small wagon. From the standpoint of labor time, the woman had to be on the job any-

way to drive the dog, and the fact that she helped pull did not increase her hours of labor. But it did probably make the labor less desirable and interesting, and gave it more the character of drudgery. Modern machinery has done a great deal to lighten the physical burden of labor. Whether it has made it mentally more or less interesting depends on the character of the processes involved in the particular case. To spend the whole day tightening a certain nut on hundreds of Ford cars is certainly less interesting than the work of completely assembling one or two cars, even if this all round job requires more heavy lifting and physical strain. But on the other hand it is probably much more interesting to spend the day operating an electric crane moving materials about the shop, than to spend it loading and wheeling the same materials on carts.

It has been said that modern machinery and specialization are leading our workers into a more and more monotonous life. But here is the hopeful feature of the situation. The more that work becomes mechanical and monotonous, the fewer men are required to handle it, and the more are set free to work in other processes which are still unmechanized. While the textile and the shoe industries have become highly mechanical, they have called for an increasing production of textile and shoe machinery; and the making of machinery is an industry which still requires much skill, judgment, and hand work. Labor is highly specialized and monotonous in the automobile industry, but the very development of this industry enlarges the opportunity for all-round mechanical ability in the repair shops.

In Europe there has been protest against the so-called "Fordizing" of industry, and a demand that the processes be planned with some regard for the personal interests of the worker. Workers' representation in industry by shop committees and otherwise, in this country, helps to provide a partial substitute for the interest the worker formerly had in

his job. A semi-political or semi-managerial interest is substituted for the old handicraft interest. Walter N. Polakov thinks there is a great future in making industry interesting to the workman. Employers are attempting to interest their workers through rest rooms, gymnasia, playgrounds, plant baseball teams, by systems of representation, bonuses, profit-sharing, insurance and pensions, more regard for seniority of service, and other measures.

When it comes to brain work, no one would claim that the specialized work of the eye and ear specialist, for example, is less interesting than the work of the general practitioner. That specialization kills interest is a very partial truth, and the spheres in which it holds good remain to be determined.

It would seem, however, that the principle of making work interesting is of more limited application than the principle of shortening hours through greater efficiency. Concessions may be made in efficiency to secure interest, but in the long run the processes of an industry will be determined according to the speed with which they turn out the work rather than according to the mental interest they arouse in the workman. In many industries at least, the workers will be obliged to get his personal satisfactions through the earlier hour of quitting rather than through the work he is doing. The Mexican peon works from sunrise to sunset with numerous siestas and an easy-going attitude. The American farm hand, although he has been reported as cheering himself during his work by a radio placed on a nearby wheelbarrow, works to get his work done, and spends the rest of the time in leisure. The general trend of industrial culture seems to be toward the more complete separation of work and play. This may have its ultimate limit, but as yet bids fair to go much farther. In the future we shall work less, but we shall work when we work, and play when we play.

There is a somewhat analogous movement in education. That is the movement to make school more interesting. The

speed and amount of learning depend more on the interest than we had previously thought. But apart from that, it is inhuman to demand drudgery where the same results could be accomplished with pleasure. The child in school has an ethical claim to happiness as much as the worker in the factory or the housewife in the home. Those who oppose this movement are slaves of culture. There always will be sufficient opportunities for effort and self-control, to give plenty of exercise to those supposed "faculties of mind." As long as we keep the results up to standard, we need never worry about making the methods too easy.

Summary.—The second great objective of cultural reshaping is the elimination of waste, or in other words, the reduction of human labor to the minimum necessary to supply our wants. Although labor cannot be said to be a source of acute mental suffering, like the evils mentioned in the last chapter, it is nevertheless, by and large, disagreeable, and therefore an evil. The mild form of suffering it causes may be called boredom.

The tendency of advancing civilization is to substitute labor for the more acute forms of physical and mental suffering. It tends to burden mankind with more labor than is absolutely necessary to prevent these other sufferings. In his zeal to remove his more obvious forms of suffering and to increase his positive satisfactions, man fails to count the cost of his achievements and to balance this cost nicely against the value of the achievements themselves. He tends to overlook the fact that leisure itself is a necessary part of the good life.

Waste, or needless labor, may be classed as waste of natural resources, irregular employment, waste in the material processes of production, waste in distribution, waste in household and self-service, and waste in consumption. To reduce the first four classes of waste, we need to promote the conservation of natural resources, the scientific organization of

the labor market, scientific management and technical research in industry, the simplification of the channels of distribution, vocational education and guidance, and those forms of industrial reorganization which tend to reduce the wastes of competition.

The wastes of household and self-service have been especially overlooked. For every two persons engaged in gainful occupations there is one engaged in the work of the household. In addition, every gainfully occupied person spends on the average about one hour in personal and household tasks for every three hours spent in the work of his gainful occupation. The aggregate of all household and personal labor is nearly as great as the sum total of gainful labor, and is probably much less efficiently carried on than the latter. One of the great social problems of the future is the material reorganization of the household and the invention of a more efficient system for the physical care of children.

Waste in consumption is distinct from these wastes of household and personal labor. It is the waste which comes from using expensive goods to satisfy wants that could be satisfied just as well in a manner requiring a lesser burden of labor. To substitute these cheaper methods of satisfaction would often require fundamental changes in our cultural values or sentiments. But such changes are eventually to be hoped for in the interest of human welfare.

CHAPTER XV

THE ENRICHMENT OF LEISURE

Not that I always struck the proper mean
Of what mankind must give for what they gain,
But, when I think of those whom dull routine
And the pursuit of cheerless toil enchain,
Who from their desk-chairs seeing a summer cloud
Race through the blue heaven on its joyful course
Sigh sometimes for a life less cramped and bowed,
I think I might have done a great deal worse;
For I have ever gone untied and free,
The stars and my high thoughts for company;
Wet with the salt-spray and the mountain showers,
I have had the sense of space and amplitude,
And love in many places, silver-shoed,
Has come and scattered all my path with flowers.

—ALAN SEEGER, Sonnet II.[1]

The personal interest pattern.—Assuming that we have reduced suffering and labor to a minimum, what remains to be done? We still have the task of promoting positive enjoyment. Not merely a life free from pain and boredom, but a life filled with intense happiness, and that for the greatest possible number, is our goal. As Professor Giddings says at the close of his "Principles of Sociology," the aim is the highest development of the individual personality. But this is apt to be misleading. What we want is not a personality to be contemplated and admired from the outside, not a showcase personality, but personality as something to be enjoyed

[1] Charles Scribner's Sons, by permission.

by the person himself. In other words, what we want is the enrichment of personal experience.

Happiness is not obtained through any mechanical addition of pleasant experiences. Nor is it simply a matter of balance, some ideal proportion between athletics, travel, theaters, music, friendship, and other pleasures. Happiness depends upon the fitting of new pleasures into the already existing pattern of interests peculiar to each individual. Every human being as he goes through life builds out of his experiences a *pattern of personal interests.* This pattern grows as long as he lives. Most of his personal enjoyment comes from experiences which would have no value to him as isolated elements, but are valuable only when fitted into their proper places in the pattern. Thus a trip to Alaska may mean little or nothing to a 15-year-old boy, but twenty years later he may have ripened certain interests which would make this same trip an intense pleasure. Two years' ownership of a cheap automobile followed by two years' ownership of a high-grade model would yield more pleasure to most people than the same experiences in reversed order. Pattern is not altogether a matter of time or sequence, but also a matter of place and combination. An evening bonfire in the backyard may not mean so much as a similar fire in front of a tent in the woods. Attendance at the opera alone may be boresome, with certain companions it may be painful, with one's best girl it may be an emotional treat.

The personal interest pattern is built out of conditioned reflexes, most of which are established by situations into which one more or less accidentally falls. It is only in part subject to conscious control by the subject or by other persons. The best opportunity for consciously shaping it lies with the parents in the early childhood of the subject. The pattern determines its own fresh needs as it develops. Thus the outdoor enthusiast in the early stages of his career may feel no particular desire to visit some obscure lake in the Maine woods,

but there may come a time in his development when he wants above anything else to go to that particular lake.

These personal interest patterns are entirely distinct from culture patterns. They depend partly upon culture, for culture supplies many of the situations upon which they feed. They also are limited by culture, for cultural tabus prevent certain situations from occurring. But only at certain points do they really fit the culture pattern, and at other points they are so at variance with it that every individual is compelled to seek certain portions of his personal enjoyment more or less surreptitiously. As a college student, the author liked to arise very early and to wander with seeming aimlessness into the woods and fields, looking for birds and other objects of nature. Even though there was no special tabu against this, it was at variance with the standard pattern of recreation followed by college boys so that he felt a distinct tendency to choose back streets and to make himself on such trips as inconspicuous as possible. A professor who was fond of visiting the saloon was seen to scan the horizon carefully as he emerged from its door. Personal interest patterns are greatly elaborated by imagination, daydreams, and fiction.

Obviously these personal interest patterns are not mainly under the control of society. Society cannot shape them, neither can it determine the new experiences which will fit them after they are shaped. The individual himself can do this better than anyone else can possibly do it for him. But society can provide conditions which help or hinder the individual in this fitting process. As Von Humboldt says, individuality of power and development requires two things, first *freedom,* and second, *variety of situations.* These are the conditions which society can provide or withhold. To these should perhaps be added a third condition, wise *guidance* during immaturity.

The question of freedom will be left to the following chapter. The present chapter will concern itself with *variety*

of situations, and incidentally, *guidance.* In the last chapter we showed that the largest hope of increasing positive enjoyment is through the leisure life, and not through the making of work more interesting. The possibility of making work more enjoyable already has been discussed. So this chapter will deal with the enrichment of leisure.

Obstacles to breadth of leisure life.—Five great obstacles hinder our program:

1. Lack of wealth or material equipment.
2. Lack of leisure time.
3. Inadequate social organization.
4. Lack of knowledge of the possibilities of enjoyment.
5. Limited range of interests.

Lack of wealth is a difficulty which applies to certain classes rather than to society as a whole. It is part of the general problem of efficiency, which was treated in the previous chapter, and of the distribution of wealth which will be discussed later.

Increasing leisure time.—The way to increase leisure time is to secure greater economic efficiency. In the last chapter we showed how, by reducing the wastes of production and consumption, we might secure our present volume of goods and services with fewer hours of labor. But the principle of liberty is to be considered, and it might turn out that most individuals would choose to make use of this greater efficiency in the form of more goods and services rather than of more leisure. Just how much leisure is desirable is theoretically a question for individual choice and not for social prescription. But in an industrial civilization it is impossible to let each individual choose freely how long his working day shall be. Most of the work of the world, if it is to maintain the efficiency we so vigorously advocated in the last chapter, must be done on more or less fixed schedules. So it becomes

necessary to arrive at some social standard of working hours which will suit the largest number of workers.

Where the workers have been heard on this matter (and they commonly are listened to only under threat of strike), they have spoken usually for a shorter day. This standard has tended steadily downward. Before the industrial revolution the average workday was from ten to fourteen hours. After that revolution it became eight to twelve hours, and now the eight-hour day is being more and more generally observed. In Europe it is commonly enforced by law. In the United States the law, with a few exceptions, limits the working hours only of women and children. But we are achieving the same standard for men through the voluntary agreements of labor unions with the employers. We now hear demands for seven- and even six-hour days in certain industries, and progressive engineers are predicting that labor will be reduced to four hours, while conservative employers become frightened at the prospect. The great steel strike of 1919 had as one of its objects the establishment of the eight-hour, three-shift system, in place of the twelve-hour system which was still followed in many parts of the industry. Although the workers technically lost the strike, President Harding soon thereafter called together representative steel men and got them to undertake voluntarily a program for changing to the eight-hour day, which now is in large measure accomplished.

Among all the various happenings of our contemporary civilization, this reduction of the working day is one of the most fundamental, unqualified signs of progress. Because of the rigidity of schedules necessary in large industries, there is danger that increased efficiency will make itself felt in higher wages rather than shorter hours. Wages readily can be adjusted without any change in culture, while the shortening of the working day is rather a change in the culture pattern. In general then, the shortening of hours tends to lag somewhat behind, and definite efforts on the part of labor

unions or government are often necessary to hasten the adjustment.

From the standpoint of the individual, it is better that the standard working day be a little shorter, rather than a little longer, than the needs of the greatest number of workers dictate. For it is possible to secure overtime and odd jobs to increase the earnings of those who prefer to work a little longer. But there are not so many ways of taking care of those who prefer hours shorter than the standard. They must either work the standard day or give up the job altogether.

Adjusting the work schedule to the worker.—Dr. Lorine Pruette has ably pointed out in "Women and Leisure," the need and opportunity for part time jobs in modern industry. They would make it possible to utilize a tremendous reservoir of labor now frittered away in inconsequential household and self-service tasks. Not only married women, but school adolescents, and elderly men could be used in this way to great advantage. The viewpoint of industry is that work schedules are made for the getting out of the work, and not for the convenience of the worker. The average employer can get all the labor he needs, to work on the standard schedule, and he will not bother to reconstruct his organization to allow for a special class of part time workers. But in the future industry will be compelled to cater more to the needs of individuals. That is the direction of progress. The freedom of the employer will be regulated in order that more freedom and opportunity may be given to the worker to find the ideal situation which fits the needs of his individual life. The objections which employers make to this scheme are largely beside the point. The real obstacle we are up against is the rigidity of the culture pattern, the fear of doing something that "isn't done."

The problem of leisure will not wholly be solved by adjustments in the working *day*. We need also adjustments in the

working *week* and the working *year*. There has been a movement of late in some industries for a five-day week. In progressive establishments workers are given short vacations with pay. We need a great extension of the vacation principle. Many of the most valuable leisure time activities for the enrichment of human life, such as travel and camping, simply cannot be carried on in the day-and-a-half week-end now provided by most of the world's work. They require several successive days of leisure. There are also many persons who would gladly, and without injury to themselves, work ten hours a day and even seven days a week for considerable periods if they could have their leisure time "bunched" so that they could use it for the activities they most desire. The industry of the future will provide opportunities for such persons.

Our present habits of competitive and ostentatious consumption are encouraged by the schedules of our work. A very common type of business man, for example, has his vacation time limited to Saturday afternoons and Sundays and two weeks' vacation per year. There is no time for the extended trips and out-of-door activities that can be enjoyed by the teacher during his summer, or by the farmer or craftsman during his off season. When he takes his two weeks' vacation he makes up in luxury of service what he lacks in time. He goes to the best hotels and travels de luxe. He buys himself an uproarious good time for those paltry two weeks.

It is no wonder that the Babbitts spend their surplus income on clothing, ostentatious cars and residences, and expensive amusements. Having no time for really living, they spend their money on appearances. Their wives, their children, their suburban residences, their clothes, do their playing for them.

In contrast with this standard of living is that of the semi-retired farmer or craftsman who dresses plainly, who

seldom goes out at night, travels economically; but who owns two modest homes, one in Florida and one in the North, and who feels free to go and come at leisure, almost anywhere and any time. The economic system of the future may provide opportunities for more people to enjoy a mode of life of this latter kind.

To deal now with the last three obstacles. How can we modify our culture so as to provide the organization, the knowledge, and the interests, for a wider enjoyment of leisure, assuming leisure time and wealth to remain the same?

Organization for leisure—the play movement.—Every culture contains organization for play. Every game is in itself a temporary social structure handed down by tradition. The social structure of a baseball game, for example, can be charted and described as we describe the structure of a business organization or of a government. The relations of the players to each other in space and time, their various duties and rights, their thou-shalt-nots, are determined by a definite code of rules just as the relationships between officers of government are determined by the constitution.

According to Dr. Clarence Rainwater the play tradition was rich in colonial America. It then seemed to suffer a decline, owing to commercialism and congestion in urban districts, and to the extreme isolation of rural districts. Our Southern farm population, for instance, lives in a much more scattered distribution on the land than did its ancestors in the British Isles who lived in villages. In 1885 was planted in this country the seed of a new movement to revitalize the play life of America. This is generally known as the Play Movement, and it has its central guiding organization in the Playground and Recreation Association of America. This first seed was the establishment of sand gardens for little children in Boston. This was not a new social invention, but was brought over by a social worker who had observed it in operation in Germany. From that time to the present, the

development of the play movement is divided into seven stages by Rainwater in "The Play Movement in the United States:"

1. The sand garden stage, 1885–1895.
2. The model playground stage, 1895–1900, in which there was more emphasis on apparatus, more provision for older children, in definitely planned small playgrounds located especially about schoolhouses and other institutions.
3. The small park stage, 1900–1905, in which for the first time the playground idea was combined with the idea of esthetic surroundings, by locating playgrounds in public parks.
4. The recreation center stage, 1905–1912, in which indoor recreation was added, and provision made for adults as well as children. Schoolhouses and special recreation buildings were used.
5. The civic art and welfare stage, 1912–1914, in which there was emphasis on community music and art, both in and apart from the recreation center. Attractive community recreation buildings were built.
6. The neighborhood organization stage, 1916–1918, in which the emphasis was on the organization of neighborhood groups, clubs, community councils and community associations, which often took part in other than recreational programs.
7. The community service stage, 1918– , in which local recreational programs are developed by the cooperative action of the old and established organizations of the community, often with the help of outside experts.

Some idea of the growth of the play movement is given by the figures published annually by the Playground and Recreation Association in its Year Book. From 1921 to 1926, for example, the number of cities which had organized programs increased from 502 to 790, the number of paid recreation leaders in the country from 11,079 to 17,090, the number of year-round workers from 191 to 343. North Carolina in 1924 spent four times as much money for public recreation as in

1919, although there was no increase during that period in the general level of prices. By public recreation is meant that which is operated by the city government itself, or by a private agency in behalf of all the people. It does not include, of course, the recreation operated for exclusive and private groups, nor commercial recreation.

Tendencies in the play movement.—In general, the changes of culture pattern represented by this movement are in these directions:

1. To substitute active participation for "spectatorism" or "onlookerism."
2. To substitute amateur recreation and amusement, produced by the consumers of amusement themselves, for commercialized amusement which is sold to the consumers. In other words this is a step away from personal specialization and toward self-service.
3. To substitute neighborhood recreation for centralized recreation.
4. To substitute organized for unorganized leisure time.
5. To harmonize recreational objectives with health, safety and economy objectives, by reducing dangers and material costs.
6. To enlarge the variety of recreational opportunities, and the variety of each individual's recreational experience. Without social guidance both individuals and communities tend to fall into ruts in their recreational habits. Baseball, marbles, and rope skipping, "movies" and reading may occupy nearly the whole leisure time of the children, and cards and golf that of adults. The individual who wants to try something different is discouraged or even ridiculed.

But it is not expected that any of these substitutes can be carried out indefinitely. Each has its desirable limits. Some expert or professional games with their thousands of spectators may be needed as a stimulus to interest and participation in the little amateur games. Many kinds of commercial

amusement fill a worth while place in our life, and could not be duplicated by amateur efforts; Coney Island and moving pictures, for example. Not all recreation can be decentralized. Adults with highly specialized interests cannot always expect to find congenial companions and satisfying activities in their own neighborhoods, but must rely upon downtown clubs, and meeting places which draw persons of similar specialized interests from a wide area. And finally, there is a limit to the organization of leisure. A place in life always must be left for free individual self-amusement, and even for loafing.

Let us not be misled into thinking that the purpose of the play movement is to substitute some new but equally rigid pattern of culture for the existing pattern, in the hope that the new pattern will be "better." As we have seen in many other respects, "betterness" in culture usually consists in greater freedom and flexibility. There are recreational enthusiasts who talk as if they would like to see the play activities of all the people directed and regimented as if by a master mind. They would carry the ideal of the army, or of the well organized factory, over into the realm of leisure. But the true recreational engineer will not misconceive his function in any such way. He will realize that what he is trying to do is simply to give the people a wider choice, a broader opportunity to enrich their own individual lives, and not to dictate to them how they shall use this opportunity.

The relation of play to other divisions of culture.—The play movement is in part a response to the changing functions of the home. Urban life has removed much of the old time recreation from the home, and put it into the school, the church, the club, the playground, and the neighborhood gang. Children today associate. They have more leisure time contacts with other children and less with their families. With adolescents and adults the customs of home entertainment seem to be waning. Hotels are increasingly used to entertain guests. Old parlor games are replaced by outside activities.

But on the other hand the radio may check somewhat this de-domestication of play, although Marshall Beuick thinks it will prove of little influence except on isolated communities and shut-in persons.

It was found that when neighborhood and community organizations were formed to promote recreation, they provided also a means for accomplishing other purposes. It is in his leisure time that the average citizen has the best opportunity to become interested in the general problems of his community, and to form opinions on public questions. So the school recreation center often became a forum for the discussion of public affairs, and a medium through which the officers of local government might enlist the coöperation of the citizens in promoting health, education and public safety. As Rainwater says, " 'Community organization' may be regarded as *a* scheme of 'community service' and *the* scheme of community recreation today."

Invention and diffusion of recreational culture.—Among the particular traits of social structure which are being promoted more or less in connection with the play movement are mass athletic contests, athletic badges, community "sings," community drama, pageants, the "little theater," community orchestras, holiday celebrations, community Christmas trees, fairs, field days, festivals, summer camps run by city governments, Boy Scouts, hiking, woodcraft, municipal golf courses, memorial buildings, city-operated bathing beaches, skating, dancing, picnics, wading pools, tennis courts, kite tournaments, gardening, photography, street dances and block parties; demonstrations of immigrant costumes, dances, songs, and other culture traits for the sake of mutual understanding; vacant lot playgrounds, streets reserved for play, and outdoor swimming pools. Among novel developments is a school of forest recreation at Syracuse which aims to teach leaders the methods of utilizing our areas of wild nature for recreation, and a vacation service bureau for the Greater New York

district, which aims to inform people about places and opportunities for vacations. Some day, it is to be hoped, we shall have recreational clearing houses analogous to our vocational placement bureaus, through which persons having special hobbies may be brought in touch with opportunities to develop those interests, and with other persons of similar leanings.

These culture traits are diffusing throughout the United States. They do not diffuse, however, according to geographic proximity. Our culture is so much a national unit, and communication between different regions is so rapid, that traits seem to jump from place to place before they spread to the immediate environs. Some new game, for example, may be carried from New York to Chicago before it has had a chance to spread by local imitation up the Connecticut shore. Mr. John Martin of the Playground and Recreation Association makes it his business to travel here and there throughout the United States demonstrating group games. Thus communities all over the country are finding their play culture enriched.

In the field of recreation there is great opportunity for real social invention. Although most of our games perhaps can be traced back to the culture of the pre-industrial era, where their origins are lost in obscurity, yet we have records of some, like basketball, which were invented outright in recent years. The work of recreation experts consists partly in inventing new activities and partly in diffusing old ones, by means of literature and personal demonstrations.

The widening of recreational knowledge and interests.— The narrowness of leisure life in many groups is due not only to the lack of organization, but also to the fact that the individual does not know the possibilities of recreation which exist, or, if he does know something about them, is not sufficiently interested to experiment. Everywhere we find groups of boys and girls with "nothing to do"; and yet there may be any number of games they could play on the spot, and any number of things of interest in the next street or the nearby

woods. Interests often have to be started artificially, even though they may perpetuate themselves automatically after being once started.

This purpose is accomplished in part by the organizational efforts of the play movement. But it requires also the special training of the individual. It is a task for the school and the home. The objective should be to familiarize the child with as many ways of enjoying leisure as possible, and to awaken as many interests as possible. Then he will be able to use the opportunities which nature or community organization provides. There is need for the careful study of the development of play attitudes, likes and dislikes, in children. The central principle is the conditioned response. A girl, for example, never enjoyed walking. Many outdoor recreational opportunities were mentally closed to her because of this attitude. She was not physically lazy in general, for she was keen for basketball, tennis, swimming, and other vigorous sports. Inquiry revealed that her early experiences of walking were with a father who always hurried ahead of her, reproached her natural childish lack of speed and endurance, and took no pains to point out things of interest along the way. Thus walking had become a conditioned stimulus to unpleasant emotions. A man, as another example, did not much enjoy watching big games from a grandstand. As a boy he had had a delicate digestion which had been repeatedly upset by eating peanuts while attending professional baseball games. Indigestion mentally poisons every situation with which it is repeatedly associated.

On the other hand, lifelong recreational interests are often started through their being associated with pleasant experiences of friendship, or with various physical gratifications. The tasty lunch at the end of a long hike may do a great deal to establish interest in hiking. The way to create an interest in a child is to find out what interests the child already has and then to condition these existing pleasure re-

sponses by presenting simultaneously the new situation it is desired to make interesting. Interest in nature study at summer camps is often stimulated by connecting it with the already existing interest of rivalry in making "points" for one's team. Or, it is connected with "good eats" or with stories told around the campfire.

Fashion has a great influence upon recreational culture. We say that games should be for relaxation, we make fun of the "high-brow." Yet the crossword puzzle craze, the "ask-me-another" books, have beguiled us into sweating our gray matter harder than does the person whose amusement is to read a foreign language or engage in metaphysical discussion. We say strenuous physical effort is not pleasurable, yet the trout fisherman, the hunter, or the mountain climber would consider himself a slave if forced to undergo as much physical exertion in his work as he does in his play. Many of us consider it boresome to follow the details of European politics, but we are thrilled to follow the much lesser details of a baseball series. We may be amused at even the effort to pronounce the name of a Slavic prime minister, but remember in deadly earnest long lists of names of race horses or movie stars. It would seem that fashion could make anything interesting. The psychology of it lies in our gregarious habits. We consider it important and interesting to know about anything which other people know and talk about.

Education for leisure.—Our recreational life could be made more varied and interesting if its psychology and sociology were more generally understood; if, for example, we were taught in the school that:

1. Recreation need not be competitive. There is pleasure to be obtained from beating one's own record, or from following hobbies that one follows alone.
2. Recreation need not be gregarious. There are some keen satisfactions to be obtained in small parties or alone.
3. Recreation need not be specialized for age and sex. There

are games in which boys and old women can participate together with mutual pleasure.

4. Recreation need not be determined by fashion. It is more promising to ask: "What are the possibilities of this environment in which we are?" than to ask: "What is in season?" or "What is in vogue"?

In other words, one of the main objectives of education for leisure should be the freeing of our minds from domination by traditional culture patterns of recreation.

The general movement to enlarge knowledge and interests concerning leisure activities may be called *education for leisure*. Essentially it is the same thing as "cultural education" as defined by the educational sociologists. A certain amount of concealed compulsion often is necessary in the home and in the school to get many of the interests started. You compel the child to *try* various amusements, as you compel him to try new varieties of food, in order that he may later have a greater range of choice. One of the traits of certain low-paid economic classes of society is the narrow range of foods they will eat. They will not eat many dishes relished by persons brought up on a higher standard of living. They simply have not had sufficient opportunity to try them. Likewise a narrow range of leisure interests usually results from poor education.

There is creeping into education a new note. It is this stress on *appreciation*. Education originally was a training for leisure; but the kind of leisure which could be enjoyed only by the few. The classics were emphasized. Then came a revolt against this, and a strong drive for vocational, bread-and-butter education. Now leisure, rather than vocation, is again being emphasized. But it is the leisure which can be enjoyed by the many. The keynote is appreciation: appreciation not merely of that traditional "culture" which is the badge of social superiority, but appreciation of the common things of life; as knowledge of games, of music, of local

geography, of nature, of the way the world's work is carried on. Children, and perhaps also adults, can be trained to take an interest in features of their everyday environments which formerly they passed by without notice. Birds, animals, plants, stars, clouds, rocks, local topography, types of buildings, local manufacturing processes, the arrangement of city buildings, and streets, the functions of the police and fire departments, work on the railroads, agriculture, architecture, the personal characteristics of fellow men, are only a few of the classes of objects about which hobbies may be built up.

The role of personal hobbies in cultural progress.—A schoolboy companion of the author had the fire department as a hobby. Every noon he used to walk over to the nearby firehouse to learn what alarms had been turned in during the previous day, what engines had answered the alarms, and other details. He seemed to have a more scientific knowledge of the organization of the city fire department, and of the causes of fires than most of the firemen themselves. The "cultural" value of this hobby was of the same sort as the "cultural" value of reading Homer in the original Greek. Either of these interests represents the enrichment of leisure by having pleasant emotions conditioned onto situations which are of no immediate practical value to the person concerned.

In our sophisticated adult life the two leading pleasure-motifs seem to be victory and sex. Practically all fiction and drama are based upon the vicarious satisfaction of these desires. There must be a hero, and he must win the girl. If either be left out, however, it is the girl. There are fiction plots without a love story but not without heroism in some form; that is victory, success, personal prestige. It would seem as if all life were a struggle, with joy to be found only in victory. The *summum bonum* of life seems to be personal triumph. This flavoring of all life with the idea of success versus failure, triumph versus humiliation, is probably due to the fact that our defensive emotions of anger, fear and

anguish, are being continually stimulated. As we have seen, these emotions are imperative, they demand the right of way over all other emotions. The animal must escape danger *before* he satisfies hunger, sex, or curiosity. Otherwise he would not survive. In modern civilization physical danger is rare. But we have conditioned our defensive emotions onto any number of mental situations. We are enraged by the attitudes of others, afraid of losing our jobs or money, aggrieved by the behavior of our children. So quite naturally the primary motive of life comes to be escape from unpleasant situations, and this colors all our fiction, our daydreams, and our leisure life.

But we who would guide culture must study ways and means of soft-pedaling this motive of victory or success. It is not the *summum bonum* of life, but simply a necessary evil. There are deeper values of life, and they often may be observed better in the activities of the young child than in the behavior of adults. The child, for example, is above all things interested in his environment. His primary motive is curiosity, exploration, long before he has had any experience of personal conflict or of sex. He does not yearn for victory, to be a hero, because his environment has never yet threatened him with defeat or failure, except in very simple physical ways. When, becoming men, we put away childish things, we put away some of the best values of life. The best, because the more frequent pursuit of those values would lead mankind away from efforts in which necessarily they conflict with and neutralize each other, and into efforts which can be pursued by all *without conflict*, and which, therefore, make for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

One who in youth has learned to enjoy contemplation of the life about him, whose pleasure reflexes are conditioned by many hobbies and interests, can find happiness in almost any environment. *His* happiness will not depend upon victory, nor will it need to be purchased at the price of the unhappi-

ness of somebody else. "Cultural education" is among the subjective or psychological modes of treatment for our human problems. For after engineering and medicine and industry have done their utmost to fit the environment to man's desire and interests, such education still will be necessary to fit man's desires and interests to the inevitable environment.

The role of fiction.—What will be the future role of fiction in the enrichment of individual life? Fiction is a universal feature of culture. In primitive societies it consisted of legends and stories related about the campfire. The great folk stories and songs of the past were collective products. No one author composed them; they just grew. In the literate stage of culture folk-lore and fiction were committed to writing, and since the days of printing have been circulated in millions of versions. Then the practice of individual authorship developed. Yet all that most authors have accomplished has been to play a new tune upon the same fundamental plots. Another means of presenting fiction is through the drama. Finally we have the moving picture.

Despite the complaints of authors and literary people, the moving picture is a tremendous improvement over the book in serving the primary purpose for which fiction is written. More real plot can be presented in ten minutes of pictures than in a ten-minute chapter of words. That primary purpose is to stimulate pleasant emotions by presenting a series of imaginary situations, which seldom occur in real life, but which the reader would like to experience if he could. In short, it is "vicarious wish fulfillment." The psychological basis of all fiction is that the reader identifies himself with the hero. Literary connoisseurs, who are interested in fiction as literature, are looking at it from an entirely different point of view. Their satisfaction is of a different kind, and valuable to be sure. But it quite overlooks the attitude of the average man, and the basic mental process which gives works of fiction their market. This process is the satisfaction

through imagination of desires which ordinarily can not be satisfied in real life.

In so far as fiction is a mental substitute for real life its importance probably will grow somewhat less as the opportunities for the enjoyment of reality grow more numerous. But in so far as its function is to enrich the imaginary halo which surrounds our real activities, it will continue to play a valuable part.

The individual's life-schedule of leisure activities.—As noted early in this chapter, the maximum enrichment of leisure may be promoted by freedom, variety of situations, and guidance. Thus far we have discussed variety. Freedom will be considered in the following chapter. Let us now consider the third condition, namely intelligent *guidance* in early childhood. The interest pattern depends upon the experience pattern, and we can guide the experience pattern. Within limits, we can see to it that the child does or does not get certain experiences at certain times and places. But are there any established psychological laws to guide us here? Can we by artificial planning do better than to give the pattern a wide variety of situations to feed upon and then allow it to grow as it may? Any answer that we can make to this question must be very tentative. We do not know enough to prescribe definitely.

Although as parents and teachers we have erred sometimes in letting things drift, we also have erred in trying to restrict experience to certain patterns which we assumed to be the "normal" and "proper" course of development. One moral educator even troubles to exhort the children to play games suitable to their ages! Psychologists have written books attempting to show what are the normal and proper activities for each age and sex. The cultural anthropologist, however, looks upon these theories with a certain suspicion. About the only sure ground here is the fact that certain activities require certain degrees of intelligence, and others, certain phys-

ical abilities, which may not be attained until certain ages. One would not, for example, attempt to teach children of eight to play bridge, nor would he advocate long distance running for pre-adolescent girls. But beyond this point we cannot be certain as to how far the preferences of certain ages and sexes for certain activities is psycho-physical, and how far it is purely cultural. Robust boys, for example, squat all afternoon over their marbles while delicate girls skip rope. The age from 9 to 12 is regarded as a period of special predilection toward gangs and rivalry. How far this is a universal tendency, and how far it is purely a cultural result, cannot be known without studying the habits of the 9 to 12 year olds in other cultures.

The thermometer stands 99 degrees in the shade. Children in bathing suits are playing about on a shady lawn, chasing and drenching each other with the hose. On a nearby golf course adults in spotless white flannels are knocking balls about. What does it mean? The average intelligent observer might say that here is some psychological law which causes the children to choose their particular activity and the adults to choose the other. He might perhaps quote the scriptural passage about becoming a man and putting away childish things. Hearing this naive theory expressed, the anthropologist laughs in his sleeve. He knows that the adults would enjoy that drenching with the hose fully as much as the children, if their culture would let them. He has seen adults do similar things under other cultures, or in our own culture, where they have been away from public observation. And he knows that the children are psychologically just as well fitted to enjoy golf as are the adults, even if their elders give them no encouragement or necessary cash.

But general psychological laws of another kind may be found. The so-called "blasé" adolescent, who seems to be "fed up" on the pleasures of life and bored with everything, comes to mind. Are such children simply abnormal cases, or

do they indicate that there is a certain general danger of overfeeding children on pleasant experiences? Must new pleasures and interests be introduced gradually, and in a certain order, so as to get the best results? We know of young children who abhor riding in automobiles and prefer the street car, because they have been dragged around so much by their parents in the family car. Such an attitude was unthinkable when the automobile was a novelty. There may be such a thing as allowing too much spending money at too early an age. And also premature sex experience may possibly have a blighting effect upon the general enjoyment of life, quite apart from its other dangers. There is grave danger in our American civilization with its long education and abolition of child labor, that it will make youth too much an age of pleasure and irresponsibility, and postpone all the burdens of life until the dull years of maturity. More happiness may be obtainable from a life in which the work and the play are evenly distributed throughout.

In our efforts to enrich the leisure life we may well need to beware of the principle of anti-climax. There is more reason to believe in a universal psychological principle of that kind than to believe in a universal psychological law of innate preference of girls for dolls and doll carriages, and boys for toy engines.

A possible future science of happiness.—We may perhaps discover universal laws of enjoyment whose application will lead us to happiness hitherto undreamed of. But probably we shall find that these laws deal with the combination, arrangement, or sequences of experiences, rather than with the particular experiences involved. They will be laws of pattern rather than of content.

One such possible law is that the best enjoyment of life depends upon continual change, new experience, adventure. No matter how thrilling a given situation may be when first experienced, it seems, when continually repeated without

change, to lose much of its gratifying power. Happiness is perhaps not a state, but a continual becoming. A static heaven, where life is perfect and cannot be improved upon, does not appeal to us. How to organize the leisure life of society so that each individual may experience this continual change and adventure, is a problem mankind may well take up after he has solved some of the more immediate problems of preventing suffering. The solution of this problem may involve a more careful regulation and guidance of the experience of the individual, especially in his early years, than here has been indicated as desirable. It may be that not complete personal liberty of enjoyment, but rather a scientific combination of regulated experiences and free experiences, will ultimately yield the greatest happiness.

There is food for thought in the plots of much of our popular fiction and drama. It would seem that the love story combined with the hero motive, or personal aggrandizement, represents the utmost in personal happiness. It is significant that in order to get the utmost "kick" out of our plot, or imaginary experience pattern, we so often have to introduce situations which belong to the culture of yesterday rather than of today. For example, the heroine is prevented by her parents from marrying the hero, and thereby an obstacle is introduced which gives added suspense. In actual life today such an obstacle is rare. Parents no longer exercise the authority over their children represented so commonly in our moving picture dramas.

In short, it seems that if we wish to imagine the highest possible joy, we must imagine not only greater personal power, or luck, than exists in real life, but also greater obstacles than exist in reality.

This raises the question whether or not the modern liberalization of culture, the growing personal freedom of the individual, is taking the "kick" out of life. Does happiness consist in jousting with artificial and needless obstacles for

the sake of the greater thrill which results from overcoming them? Is life essentially a struggle, and joy only in the victory? Is there a value which we have overlooked in our needless cultural tabus, namely, the excitement of circumventing them? Is one of the functions of a tabu to give "spice" to life by furnishing an opportunity for occasional violation? A group of young people on a summer outing derived a large part of their satisfaction on certain midnight "feeds" from the fact that the watermelons came surreptitiously. We wonder whether the present generation gets as much joy out of its comparatively open and tolerated "petting parties" as did their parents from similar activities carried on with more secrecy, and greater fear of Mrs. Grundy?

Perhaps after all we shall get the most satisfaction out of life by treating it as a game with artificial rules and penalties, rather than a perfectly free opportunity. But certainly our present culture never was consciously planned for the purpose of providing such an interesting game. It just "grew." If artificial obstacles and restraints do add to the total joy of life, they will need to be planned intelligently for that purpose. The penalties for violation will need to be reasonable as befits a true game. Until we know enough of human psychology to plan such obstacles intelligently, we shall do better to follow the policy of removing all needless obstacles, the policy of maximum personal liberty, as outlined in the next chapter.

Summary.—The third great objective of cultural reshaping is to provide greater variety of opportunity for the enjoyment of the leisure life. Although much can be done to render labor more interesting than it is, yet the main hope of increasing human enjoyment seems to be through leisure.

With a given amount of wealth and a given amount of leisure time, the amount of enjoyment which results will vary greatly according to the social organization, the range of knowledge of the people concerning possible modes of recreation, and their

range of interests. The play movement aims to develop forms of social organization which will provide more varied opportunities for the use of leisure. Education for leisure, or "cultural" education, in its broader sense, aims to enlarge the knowledge of recreational possibilities and to multiply leisure interests.

It is also important to provide a greater flexibility of work schedules, so that interests requiring extended periods of unbroken leisure may be gratified.

The enrichment of leisure is handicapped by preconceptions and prejudices regarding the "fitness" of certain amusements for certain seasons, places and classes of persons. The study of human culture will help to break down these prejudices.

There is a great need of and opportunity for research, to discover what patterns, what life-schedules, of recreation, offer the greatest amount of enjoyment. In the present state of our knowledge the best policy is not to prescribe for the individual any rigid plan, except perhaps in early childhood, but rather to provide the widest possible opportunity for him to choose his own plan according to his personal tastes.

CHAPTER XVI

PERSONAL LIBERTY, THE KEYNOTE OF MAN'S CONQUEST OF CULTURE

Why freedom matters.—As noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, the personal experience pattern of each individual is unique, and no one can do his choosing and fitting for him so well as he can do it for himself. Therefore, all schemes of social reform which aim to change our present social structure into some "better" structure which is equally rigid and binding are on the wrong track. Assuming that all possible is done to prevent suffering and waste, then, outside of those achievements, cultural progress consists simply in greater variety and liberty of individual experience. It is no wonder that anthropologists like Sumner and Lowie have been unable to find any test of progress in the recreational and esthetic side of culture. They were looking in the wrong direction. Progress in those fields does not consist in having some "better" thing, but in having more things to choose from and less strings upon the choice.

The chapters on waste, and the enrichment of leisure dealt with opportunity, or what we "can" do. This chapter will deal with liberty, or what we "may" do. The question of personal liberty has aroused much bitter discussion and is greatly misunderstood. At one moment we hear that we are losing respect for law and authority, that we are headed straight for ruin. The next moment we learn that our sacred liberties are being taken away by too much law and authority. Liberty matters for three great reasons. First, as we have pointed out in the previous chapter, it is necessary for the

greatest satisfaction of these personal interest patterns of individuals. The value of freedom here is a direct and positive value; it contributes immediately to individual happiness.

Secondly, liberty is also necessary to the prevention of certain kinds of mental suffering. We might have treated this aspect of liberty under Chapter XIII, making its opposite, coercion, a separate cause of mental suffering, but it seemed more appropriate to consider it here. In injustice and personal conflict the most annoying element is often the needless restraint or coercion placed upon the victim of the situation. It is this power which coercion has, to provoke acute mental suffering, that led Patrick Henry to say "Give me liberty or give me death." Not all restraints and coercions, however, provoke anger, for some, like the coercion of fashion, are not recognized as what they are. The usual process of conditioned reflex formation trains the individual to be irritated mainly by personal situations. If the restraining force is abstract or impersonal the average mind does not readily identify the situation as coercion.

But liberty matters for a third reason. It is necessary not only for present happiness, but for progress toward still better adjustments which make for greater happiness in the remote future. Here we must think of posterity, as we did in considering the question of natural resources. Culture itself, like a tree, requires liberty to send out shoots in *any* direction. Just which shoots are to be allowed to grow, and which are to be pruned away, cannot be decided until later. But we shall get a very inferior tree if we allow it to be cramped on one side by a stone wall. This liberty of culture to experiment, translated into individual liberty, is *freedom of expression and communication.* This phase of liberty will be treated in the following chapter.

For these reasons liberty is ever and always a "consummation devoutly to be wished." It is not always possible to have liberty without its leading to waste or suffering, and in

such cases liberty must be restrained. We must check the pain before we can promote the pleasure. But this restraint of liberty always should be looked upon as a necessary evil, and not as an ideal situation. How often we hear those in authority reply to a request for some privilege after this fashion, "Why *should* you be allowed to do so-and-so?" But rather, why should they *not* be allowed? In cases of coercion or restraint the burden of proof lies always upon the coercing authority, to show why this coercion is necessary to prevent trouble or secure efficiency. The necessity is not upon the coerced to show why he should be free. Freedom is *ipso facto* desirable where it is possible. As John Stuart Mill said in his "Essay on Liberty": "In maintaining this principle (of liberty), the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means toward an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself . . . individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account."

Is liberty declining?—Yes.—There are hosts of learned opinions and pieces of evidence to indicate that liberty is on the wane. Professor Ross in "Social Trend" says that with the passing of the frontier fewer of us can expect to drink deep of personal liberty. City life, which is including a greater and greater proportion of mankind, seems to require restraint. In the almost completely urban state of Massachusetts, there is one policeman to about every 642 inhabitants, but in the rural state of Vermont there is only one to 4250. Crimes and arrests are more numerous, in proportion to population, in the city than in the country. While the employer used to be free to run his business as he saw fit, now he is hedged in by innumerable factory laws and sanitary restrictions. Child labor laws and compulsory education laws leave the parent no longer free to dispose of the time of his own child. Prohibition and anti-narcotic laws take away

what many people believe to be one of the most fundamental liberties of mankind. Immigration restriction laws make America no longer a free haven for the oppressed, and a land of welcome for lovers of liberty.

Not only laws, but private institutions seem to be lording it more and more over the individual. Where scientific management is practiced the employer often does not allow the workman to decide what shovel he will use for a piece of rough work, but the shovel is prescribed for him by the expert. Workers must punch the time clock, must not eat lunches in workrooms, must not smoke. We hear of workers being threatened with dismissal if they will not save, or if they join a union, or if they are heard agitating for changed conditions. Workers in many industries are obliged to live in company houses under contracts which make it possible to turn them and their families out of house and home on short notice if the workers engage in any radical activities. But if the industry becomes unionized then the individual is subject to the union. He may not, in many unions, work overtime without permission of the union, or may not do plumbing work if he is a carpenter. Union rules carefully limit the conditions of work, which limitations may be of benefit to the majority, but are oppressive in many individual cases where a better arrangement could be made without them. Corporations and individuals are obliged to report what were once financial secrets, physicians are obliged to report facts which were once personal secrets.

Many philosophers think we are headed toward a regime of regulation. Comte, often known as the father of sociology, accepted the notion that society normally and properly wields a despotism over the individual. At a social work conference a few years ago it was reported by a trained observer of social movements that the outstanding note seemed to be increased emphasis on compulsion. Radical theorists play up the ideas of class consciousness, solidarity of the workers, dictatorship

of the proletariat, compulsory labor, state management of industries. They say little about personal liberty, and many of them frankly ridicule "liberalism" as an effete "bourgeois" philosophy. The two greatest political experiments since the war, Italian Fascism and Russian Sovietism, have both rested upon dictatorship and compulsion. They have muzzled the press and inflicted wholesale punishment on persons who opposed the new system, although these victims were innocent of anything that would be a crime in a liberal democratic society. In Russia a man has been put to death merely for entering the country without permission, and digging up money buried in pre-revolutionary days. Every few weeks we hear of executions for counter-revolutionary activities. Italy, says Signor Mussolini, will march forward to better things over the prostrate body of the goddess of liberty. Liberty, he says, is out of date, and discipline is the keynote of today. A Russian novelist, Zamiatin, has written a fantastic story of future civilization, entitled "We," in which he imagines that human beings will be designated by numbers instead of names, and will be carefully regimented in every detail of life by an all-wise scientific government. Individual "fancy" is to be removed from mankind by a "great operation" on the brain, and even the lovemaking of the citizens of the future "United State" is to be carefully limited to one "personal hour" per day!

Is the ultimate goal a society like that of the bee or of the ant, where the individual exists for the group rather than for himself?

Is liberty declining?—No.—On the other hand there are plenty of evidences and opinions pointing towards an increase of liberty in the future. If we compare our modern culture first, with the culture of our own past, and second, with the culture of less advanced peoples today, we find that it allows the individual many liberties which these other cultures did or do not. And in the matters in which we still are subjected

to restraint, the penalties are often milder, which is equivalent to greater liberty. The heretic is no longer burned at the stake, but simply loses his job, if he be a clergyman or professor, or gets gossiped about if he is in some less influential walk of life. *Lese majeste* is no longer a crime in democratic countries. One can take the name of God or of the King in vain without fear of the gallows. Holy days are becoming simply holidays. Foods are losing their "uncleanness." Women smoke and play baseball and men are no longer so afraid to be discovered engaging in feminine tasks. Children choose their own vocations and mates. They are increasingly regarded as having certain rights, which the law will protect against cruel treatment by parents. Women are less subject to male domination. The *patria potestas* is a thing of the past. Slavery, serfdom, peonage, imprisonment for debt, have disappeared from advanced countries, and in our country the law will no longer compel the worker to live up to a contract to work for a specified period of time. Theater, cards, and dancing are no longer tabu among "good" people. The sumptuary laws which forbade the lower classes to consume certain articles, or to dress beyond a certain style, are long past and forgotten.

Modern constitutions are written to include a "bill of rights" which puts certain spheres of life beyond the power of the government to regulate. On the other hand the government tends more and more to protect the individual against coercion by other institutions. Formal punishment can no longer be inflicted upon an adult against his will by anything save the law, for he may simply withdraw from the organization that would punish him, and then its power over him ceases. The principle of elective rather than compulsory courses is gaining in our colleges. Once forbidden subjects are being freely discussed. There is increasing freedom of dress and undress. In Germany recently the censors permitted moving pictures of athletics in the nude. Divorce is

getting freer. Russia, in spite of her iron clamps upon political liberty and liberty of speech, has granted to her citizens in several personal matters greater liberty than ever existed before. Marriage, for example, is more easily arranged, and divorce may be had when asked by both parties.

According to many thinkers, the world is intoxicated with and the sphere of increasing liberty.

Is liberty then on the increase or on the wane? Are we moving toward a civilization in which the individual shall be merely a cell in a great social organism, or toward one in which society will be merely a convenient framework for the development of all sorts of free and varied personalities?

What the evidence tells us so far is that liberty is gaining in some matters and losing in others. Let us look more carefully into these gaining and losing situations. Then we shall be able perhaps to chart roughly the sphere of decreasing and the sphere of increasing liberty.

The substitution of public for private power gives the appearance of declining liberty.—The liberty which we see declining is largely *power,* that is, the right of one person or group to control another. The liberties that have been taken away are such privileges as the ancient right of the family to kill, beat or starve a child, or to coerce that child in his choice of mate or of vocation; the mediæval right of church, allied with state, to imprison, kill, or cause social boycott to the unbeliever; the somewhat recent right of the school to beat a pupil disobeying its rules; the right of a guild to imprison a recalcitrant member, as is still done in China with the tolerance of the police. In pre-war Russia it was common for an employer to strike or kick a workman, or an officer a common soldier. But today, in most advanced countries, employers may not beat servants and workmen and control their leisure time as they did formerly. It is less often tolerated for the neighborhood group to lynch, or to tar-and-feather the citizen whose conduct it does not approve. Fami-

lies are no longer permitted to settle their difficulties by feuds, nor individuals by duels, but all must apply to the courts for justice.

Little by little these powers over the individual that once were held by the family, the church, the school, the employer, the landlord, the guild, the secret society, the informal neighborhood group, are being taken over by the government. The transition can be observed in modern Japan, where feudalism only recently has given way to modern civil law. Under feudalism each individual was under the absolute control of *his* feudal superior. Children and women were under the power of the heads of families. Offenders against the customs of the village could be punished informally by the village acting as a mob. A comparatively recent episode is reported in which a citizen had violated one of the customs of his village. On the next religious holiday, as usual, the huge image of the village deity, borne on the backs of scores of men, was carried in procession down the narrow street. Now and then this heavy statue would lunge to one side or the other. On passing the offender's house, the enraged god lunged violently toward it and smashed in the frail walls of the dwelling. According to the modern European code, now in force in Japan, the victim of this Olympian wrath could go before a court and demand damages from his fellow villagers who were carrying the statue. No one would have any right to injure him in person or property as punishment for his violation of custom, unless the custom were also a law, and in that case the government would do the punishing. It is said, however, that in the more backward villages, the citizen would not yet dare even today to avail himself of this protection by the central government, but would accept the punishment thus given him by his neighbors.[1] There is a somewhat similar transitional situation in American rural

[1] See Hearn, "Japan, an Interpretation," pp. 113–117.

communities. There are regions where lynching, feuds, and mob beatings still are tolerated as means of punishing certain offenses, and where public sentiment will not permit the law to interfere.

But in general such situations are things of the past. More and more the individual comes under the direct control of the government and less under the control of other institutions. Even the merest child now may be taken from an incompetent parent by the juvenile court. The education of the child is being determined more by government and less by the parent. The movement against the religious schools, which is illustrated in the new Oregon law, and which culminated in France several years ago in the complete secularization of the school system, is a movement that curtails the liberty of the parent. But the liberty it curtails is simply his power to control his children.

Government may be more or less oppressive than the groups whose powers it takes over. It is possible that the new regime might therefore result in less personal liberty than the old. It was this fear of government power which led our American forefathers to insert the bill of rights in the constitution. But this fear of governmental tyranny was bred in an age when governments were the tools of special classes. The first true governments, thinks Franz Oppenheimer, were essentially instruments of conquering peoples for the subjection of the conquered. The anarchist, therefore, wants to abolish government or reduce it to a minimum. But cultural evolution shows us many cases where an institution has greatly changed its structure and functions, although it has maintained unbroken continuity with the past. It is not necessary to destroy an institution and create a new one in order to get progress. The old institution can be adjusted to give better service to human welfare. Modern democratic governments are responsive to the desires of many elements of the population which previously had no voice. It is dif-

ficult, though not of course impossible, to get modern governments to maintain restraints and coercions which are not favored by the masses of the people. They are more independent of particular institutions and interests, and will regulate individual life only in those matters where cooperation or conformity is felt by the majority to be necessary. When governments are based on written constitutions and written laws, when they provide representation for all classes, subservience to special interests is more quickly detected and exposed.

In general what seems to be losing ground is not true liberty but certain kinds of *power*. The power of one man to coerce another is liberty only from the point of view of the coercer. True liberty is that which can be exercised without coercing another. The freedom to restrain another's freedom is not any freedom at all. It is merely a plus quantity neutralized by an equal or often much greater minus quantity. Power is not an end in itself. It becomes such only when human beings lose sight of the true ends of life and come to exercise for their own sakes rights which are entrusted to them for social welfare. President Coolidge, regardless of what we may think of his Philippine policy, saw this point and expressed it very cogently in his message in reply to the demand for Philippine independence. As he put it, political activity is not an end in itself, but merely a means to economic welfare.

The sphere of cooperation.—There is a large sphere of human activity in which one man necessarily controls another, for such control is essential for cooperation. This is the sphere of organized, cooperative activities. It is, and must be, a sphere of regulation. In this sphere of regulation what we see is merely shiftings of power. The direction of control changes, but control continues as before. There can be no true loss of liberty because there was no true liberty to begin with. The employer complains that his "liberty" to

run his business as he sees fit is being taken away by labor unions and by labor legislation. Unless he is an individual working practically alone, this so-called liberty he demands is merely power. His liberty is the right to control his own personal life, and that is not affected. But he is losing power because he is forced to surrender certain powers to the unions and others to the government. This readjustment of power is made because it is believed to promote the public welfare. It is not a question of liberty at all.

Likewise when compulsory arbitration is introduced, as in Australia, the labor unions, which formerly had the power to settle difficulties with the employers by calling strikes, are now obliged to surrender that power to government boards, which settle the difficulty in a different way. The individual workman is not prohibited from quitting, but the union is prohibited from calling and supporting an organized strike. The unions protest in the name of liberty, as the employers did in the former case. But it is not a question of liberty at all, it is a question of the best distribution of power. Injustice often may be done by these changes, but the injustice is to be corrected by a still better distribution of powers. Questions of justice do not necessarily involve liberty.

Democracy is not liberty.—Questions of democracy and self-determination are not directly questions of liberty. They indirectly may promote or injure liberty, but the word "liberty" is commonly used by the contending parties in such a way as to confuse the issue. They demand liberty when what they really want is power. Thus self-determination is demanded for India in the name of liberty. Self-determination is simply the right of a people to practice its own culture without interference by another people. If that culture is a more coercive culture it may mean less liberty than would government by a more advanced people with a more liberal culture. Thus the Hindus burned widows while the English "oppressors" set the widows free from this tyranny of a

cruel and inhumane culture. Hindu culture rigidly confines the individual to marriage within his caste and to a limited choice of occupations. British culture would set the individual free from such restraints. Mumtaz, a dancing girl, was "kept" by the Maharajah of Indore. Cruelly treated she desired to leave his establishment, and, when she was rescued by a wealthy Mohammedan merchant of Bombay, the Maharajah had her rescuer murdered and sent out a party to re-kidnap the girl. It took British interference to foil this plot and to punish the murder. For under British culture the personal liberty of the poorest citizen stands untouched against the will and the wealth of even a king.

In our colleges there is a growing movement towards greater control over certain affairs by the students themselves. One phase of this movement is student self-government in disciplinary matters. While this step certainly means greater democracy, it is not directly a question of liberty. In some cases the student disciplinary court is more severe in punishment, less inclined to safeguard the rights of the accused and to give him the benefit of a doubt, than is a faculty body. Aside from such judicial matters, there is a tendency among students to discriminate against their unpopular or eccentric fellows, often known as "wet," and to demand conformity in many unessentials that the faculty would leave to individual liberty of choice. Liberty may be as effectively suppressed by a democratic mob as by an aristocratic tyrant.

We are not attempting here to judge any of these questions of self-determination or democracy. We are merely pointing out that democracy does not necessarily mean liberty. It probably does afford greater opportunity for a liberal culture to arise. But primarily, self-determination refers to the group and not to the individual. And all true liberty is personal liberty.

The sphere of liberty.—We have just seen that in the sphere of organized, cooperative activity there never can be

true liberty but only shiftings of power. But there is a sphere in which liberty can be the rule of life. In the words of John Stuart Mill in his "Essay on Liberty":

> "There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of an individual's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance; for whatever affects himself, may also affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This then is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; . . . conscience . . . thought . . . feeling . . . opinion . . . sentiment . . . Liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly . . . tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them. . . . Thirdly, the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others; the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived."

In this sphere power has no place or meaning, because enforced cooperation is unnecessary. The activities in this field can be carried on more or less independently by each individual for himself, with only temporary and voluntary cooperation here and there. When we attempt to regiment activities in this field what we get is merely conformity.

There is a big difference between conformity and cooperation. One may or may not mean the other. A certain basic conformity in the use of language is also cooperation, because misunderstandings are thereby spared and the problems of life simplified. Conformity to the rule of passing to the right also means cooperation, because accidents and delays are thereby spared. But conformity to the custom of going to the theater on Saturday night is anti-cooperative, because the theaters are thereby overcrowded on Saturdays and half empty on other days. Greater good would be obtained by not attempting to go when we think the crowd is going. In dress conformity has nothing to do with cooperation, except in so far as it makes possible cheaper clothes through mass production. Conformity in recreation, except as to the rules of a particular game, limits the variety and enrichment of life, and serves no rational purpose. Conformity to a "college type," or a "fraternity type," of dress, manners, and interests toward which many colleges and fraternities seem to think they are molding their members, is of no human importance. It simply serves to distinguish one group from another, which is all right in so far as it is done in merely playful vein, but often it becomes a serious worship of the "traditions," in other words, a worship of culture for its own sake; and it frequently degenerates into snobbishness. It is the *individual* who should have freedom to develop a distinctive and unique personality, not the college or the fraternity or the social "set."

If we want to cultivate a distinctive *group* character we can do it in two ways: by careful selecting of the individuals who are to belong to the group, or by molding them toward the desired type after they have joined the group. Colleges, fraternities and clubs are seldom very skillful in using the selecting method; they are in too much of a hurry. So they resort to the molding method, which is in theory an outrageous violation of the principle of liberty. In practice, how-

ever, the pretended molding is so desultory and ineffective that it probably does no great harm.

We have now seen that there is a sphere of organized cooperative activity where the rule should be regulation, and also a sphere of true liberty. In the sphere of regulation progress consists in getting a more just, or a more efficient, balance of power, and has nothing directly to do with liberty. In the sphere of liberty progress consists in freeing the individual from all pressure and restraint by his fellow men, or by his culture and institutions, and in leaving him free to develop his plan of life according to his personal tastes. We might visualize these two spheres by two concentric circles. The area within the inner circle would represent the sphere of cooperation and regulation. The outer zone would represent the sphere of liberty. In the inner circle is a region where individuals are crowded in either a physical or a social sense, where their activities must be regulated lest they work at cross purposes, where authority and control are necessary. But in the outer zone, individuals have more room, physically and socially; their activities do not necessarily conflict with each other, there is opportunity, within certain limits, for each to have just what he wants without taking from another. In this outer zone individuals must be treated not as members of groups, not as majorities or minorities, not as rulers or as subjects, but as individuals.

The boundary between the two spheres of cooperation and liberty.—There are a few rough generalizations that can be made about the two spheres of cooperation and of liberty. (1) *The sphere of cooperation is a sphere of organized activity.* It contains most of the activities of business firms, of corporations, of labor unions, of governmental bodies, of schools, of professional associations. *The sphere of liberty is a sphere of more or less unorganized, individual activity.*

(2) *The sphere of cooperation includes most of the work of life, the sphere of liberty most of the leisure.* That is, the

things we do in organized groups and under authority are largely work-activities. We work in the shop or office, we organize unions or associations, we study, we go into politics, we make and obey sanitary laws, not for the joy of doing those things, but in order to get a living, and to protect ourselves from suffering, so that we may have more opportunity to enjoy life. While we do get a great deal of secondary enjoyment from some of these work activities, yet we probably should not carry them on to any great extent if we could live just as well without them. On the other hand the sphere of liberty comprises many activities which are followed for no purpose beyond themselves. The rule is regulation in work, liberty in "play, love, and worship."



FIGURE 5.

(3) *The sphere of cooperation is a sphere of means, the sphere of liberty is a sphere of ends.* This distinction is almost the same as the work-leisure distinction above, but is slightly more refined. For example, even the activities we call leisure may be subdivided into some elements which are directly enjoyed as ends, and into others which are more or less preparatory as means. One may count an afternoon's ride as leisure, but there are portions of the ride, such as perhaps the congested streets, which one does not enjoy, but endures only because they are necessary to transport him to some region he does enjoy. It is in the means portion of the ride that traffic regulations are most likely to step in and interfere with liberty. The traffic laws will also restrain his speed, his lights, and many other more or less preparatory

details, but the law does not prohibit his having the main thing he wants, and that is a ride with whomsoever he wishes, and wheresoever he wishes. He is compelled to subject himself to regulation in several details of means in order that he and all others may have more freedom to enjoy in safety the essential ends for which the automobile exists.

In playing a game of ball the game itself is the end, but the choice of time and place is an element of means. Authority does not and should not tell the boy what game he shall play. But authority may well restrict his liberty in the choice of time and place. He may not play on crowded streets, or on Sunday morning just outside a church, or on the school playground while classes are in session.

In our work life, which is mostly a matter of means, there are nevertheless a few elements which belong more to the realm of ends. Such, for example, is the *choice* of a *vocation.* A man may get a great deal of direct enjoyment out of following the occupation he wants, and much suffering out of being forced to follow another. But the details of place, hours, tools used, relations to fellow workers and employer, and so on, are of less importance. These means-details are being more regulated; while the end, or free choice of the occupation itself, is if anything becoming more free.

(4) *The sphere of cooperation includes the work of constructing and reconstructing social organization. The sphere of liberty includes the choice by the individual of his place in that organization.* In the future we may expect less opportunity for strong men to organize business enterprises and governments, to plan cities, according to their own individual discretion; but we may expect more opportunity for the individual to choose his residence, his kind and place of work, and perhaps even the hours of his job. The framework of life will be organized by social experts responsible to society in such a way as to provide the greatest opportunity and freedom for all; and those who will not cooperate with the

social plan, but who want the so-called freedom to provide opportunities for other people according to their own private tastes and prejudices, will find themselves powerless.

(5) *The sphere of cooperation includes activities which affect the public health and safety,* and the sphere of liberty must be limited by those considerations. Even where the individual is performing an act which seems by all other tests to belong to the sphere of liberty, nevertheless that act will be brought under social regulation if it be found to threaten seriously the health or safety of other persons, or if it has a universal, sub-cultural effect on the mental health of others. If, however, it is an act which can harm other persons only in a sentimental manner, which harm could be prevented by the more rational education of the persons thus harmed, then the act will tend to be brought under the sphere of liberty.

(6) *The sphere of cooperation will include more and more the control of the quantity and quality of population.* Reproduction and mass migration are being taken out of the sphere of liberty in which heretofore they were included.

The tendency of cultural change during the last century has been to increase personal liberty in the sphere which we have roughly outlined above as being the sphere of liberty. The situations in which liberty seems to have been curtailed belong mostly to the sphere of cooperation, in which there never can be true liberty, but only a shifting of power away from certain social groups and classes toward others. The general tendency in this sphere of cooperation seems to be to make power more democratic, to place it more and more in the hands of those whose interests are vitally affected by it. In the sphere of cooperation, disputes as to the distribution of power will be settled eventually by the majority of those concerned. But in the sphere of liberty majority rule has no place. There majority rule is simply one form of tyranny. In the spending of public funds, or the drawing up of laws

governing business, the individual must bow to the will of the majority. But in matters of personal taste no majority, however overwhelming, will have any right, under a progressive culture, to dictate to the individual how he shall live.

How disputes over the boundary can be settled.—So much for the general rules. But when it comes to some specific problem, it is not always easy to decide whether it belongs in the sphere of cooperation or the sphere of liberty. It may have aspects that will put it into either or both spheres. What about prohibition, for example? There will be honest differences of opinion, and nobody may have sufficient knowledge to decide between them. To hear it discussed, one might think that its advocates cared nothing about personal liberty but everything about public health, while its opponents cared nothing about public health and everything about personal liberty. But such is not the case. Both parties would probably agree that public health must come first. But they differ (1) in their opinion of how far alcohol really injures public health; and (2) in their opinion of how far the principle of liberty, which is certainly injured by prohibition, should be sacrificed to another principle, health, which would be injured to a very uncertain extent by a licensed sale of alcohol; and (3) in their opinion as to how far the measure is really effective in promoting the health values it is supposed to promote. Most of the violent disputes *pro* and *con* personal liberty are beside the point. The real question is the extent of the harm or the good done, and that is a matter which can be decided only by scientific study.

In the long run it is the *majority,* acting through its chosen representatives, which will decide what questions belong to the sphere of liberty, and what questions to the sphere of cooperation and regulation. But that majority decision will be increasingly affected by scientific knowledge and expert opinion. The hope of progress lies in educating the public to accept the results of scientific investigation rather than

unintelligent opinions and sentiments. When the individual, about to perform some act, hears thundered at him society's "Thou shalt not," his reply is apt to be "Who says so? Who and how many disapprove?" In a progressive culture this is not the right answer, but rather, "What harm is there in it? Whose business is it, society's or mine?" The test should not be the immediate public approval, but rather the impartial judgment of experts, as to how far the act is likely to do injury. This judgment should be from time to time incorporated in the law in form of general precedents. In a progressive culture there will be a big difference between disapproving an act and prohibiting an act.

Activities that shift from the one sphere to the other.— With the gradual evolution of our culture many questions have been and will be shifted from the sphere of liberty to the sphere of regulation and vice versa. These shifts are commonly the result of material inventions and of the spreading of scientific knowledge. Among the individual liberties of the past which no more are liberties is the right to employ a mother before and after the birth of a child, the right to be at large with smallpox, the right to drive at any speed in cities, the right of anyone to send out radio messages without license, the right of feebleminded persons to reproduce, the right of tourists to pick wild flowers *ad libitum*, the right to maintain a house of prostitution, the right to plaster the roadside with advertising signs, the right to keep a dog unlicensed. In the future we may lose the right to be at large while suffering from a common cold, the right to transfer large amounts of money secretly by cash, which transaction played such a notorious part in recent oil scandals, the right to dismiss employees without a hearing before some impartial board, the right to reproduce without physical and mental examination, the right to consume tons of spruce pulp in advertising, the right to subject our children to unscientific, sectarian education, the right to keep our business profits

secret, the right to make a secret of diseases which may affect the public health. These shifts from the field of liberty to the field of regulation are or will be due largely to changes in our *material culture,* or our *scientific knowledge.* Thus with the increasing use of automobiles freedom of traffic, which once had been harmless, became dangerous and caused many accidents. With the discovery of germs we have learned that common colds are due to contagion, and not to the night air.

But science and invention may cause shifts toward liberty as well as away from it. These shifts are not always recognized because they take place gradually. In primitive life there were and are hundreds of tabus, foods that cannot be eaten, persons whom one may not marry, sacred objects which must not be touched, names and subjects which may not be mentioned, articles that must or must not be worn. These matters were kept under the sphere of cooperation because they were believed to affect the public health and safety (*see* rule 5, p. 446). It was believed that violation of such tabus was likely to bring some calamity to the group. But with the spread of critical philosophy and scientific knowledge, people began to doubt the necessity for these tabus and came more and more to tolerate violations of them. Thus their liberties were widened. For example, when people began to understand the difference between magic and science, the tabu against sitting thirteen at a table broke down. We are sometimes inclined to think that we now have gotten rid of all irrational tabus and that there is no further opportunity to increase our liberty in this way. This however is probably not true. We still observe many needless tabus in regard to food, dress, sex, recreation, conversation, the expression of our feelings, and the social amenities, and we justify them by saying that human experience has proved that these rules are for our good. Yet if anthropology and psychology reveal that it is possible for a people to dispense with some of these

regulations without harm, we probably shall do so, thereby permitting greater liberty for individual taste and variation.

When the public gets to appreciate the effectiveness of filtering drinking water, bathing may be permitted in reservoirs where it was not allowed before. With fireproof construction, it may be possible to permit smoking where it was forbidden. As anti-toxins, and other preventive health measures are perfected, quarantine may be relaxed. With sterilization, some classes of defective persons now kept in institutions may be permitted to be at large and to marry.

Means of promoting liberty.—Two kinds of practical social devices are especially helpful in protecting personal liberty. One is the device of constitutional bills of rights. The things which are agreed upon as belonging to the sphere of liberty are embodied in written constitutions, as distinguished from ordinary laws, rules, orders, and regulations. A constitution always is more difficult to change than a law or regulation; it represents the long-run will of the people rather than their immediate will. The constitutional guarantee of the right to bear arms, for example, means that the people cannot take this liberty away from themselves, in a year of transitory excitement and disorder. Such a change requires something more than mere legislation; it requires the slow process of constitutional amendment. The first ten amendments to our Federal Constitution are designed to protect certain personal liberties in this way.

But the principle could be applied in other than the political sphere. Churches, schools, business organizations, clubs, have charters or constitutions which are established on a plane of relative permanence, as compared with their by-laws and regulations which are subject to quick change. Groups founded upon unwritten laws and agreements, such as the family, would do well to commit to writing the fundamental rights and liberties of their members. Whenever any

new liberty, after thorough discussion, is agreed upon as desirable, it should be *written* into a constitution or equivalent document, lest in the next wave of repression and reaction it be thoughtlessly surrendered. It would be a great step forward, for example, if business organizations and educational institutions could write into their charters, and into their contracts with their employees, a clause providing that officers and employees shall never be dismissed for the sole reason of their opinions, or for personal conduct during leisure time having no bearing on the work of the organization. Such a clause would need to be enforced by constituting a judicial body to review cases of dismissal where the clause was alleged to have been violated.

The other device is the clearing house device. Information about vocational openings, recreational opportunities, houses to let, and the other things which make up the classified advertisement columns of our newspapers, could be centralized and classified in a way far more effective than at present. If this were done, as undoubtedly sooner or later it will be done, the individual would have a much wider range of choice than he now has over the things he wants. More perfect adjustments between personal interest patterns and the environment would be possible.

One of the dominant features of our culture pattern is salesmanship in that broader sense which includes propaganda and missionary work as well. We are all missionaries, trying to change each other's tastes and ideas. We are always forming associations to spread and promote interest in this and that. It is conceivable that in the future we shall organize not so much for the sake of promoting interest in some particular endeavor, as for the sake of finding those persons who already are interested, and giving them an opportunity to indulge their interest. The pattern of the vocational placement bureau, of the clearing house, will be applied to

a wider sphere of life. Instead of trying always to mold the personalities of our fellow men to fit situations we shall rather take personalities as they are and try to find situations to fit them. That is true liberalism. It recognizes individual personality rather than culture as the end.

The future of liberty.—Let us tell the story of liberty, our fourth great objective, in a parable. Mother Civilization once built a huge makeshift hotel to accommodate many millions of guests. Wanting to give them all a good time, but also realizing that in such a multitude many would become discontented and many would tread upon others' toes, she had to devise some scheme to insure order and discipline. So she ruled that nobody might criticize the hotel or its management, and that every guest must keep permanently the room which she more or less arbitrarily assigned him. If he did not like it he might alter it to suit his tastes, but the changing of rooms would not be tolerated. Let one change, she thought, and they would all want to do so, and there would be chaos.

So the guests set out altering their quarters. One repainted his room a different color, splashing paint far and wide. Another marred the walls with extra nails on which to hang pictures. One in trying to enlarge his room broke through a partition and ruined the room of his neighbor, still another built himself a balcony which fell down and killed another guest beneath. But those who suggested any general scheme of reconstruction to prevent these calamities were locked in the dark cellar.

Centuries later, ripened in experience, Mother Civilization built a new hotel. This time she had the structure carefully planned by experts. Thousands of different rooms of different colors, shapes, sizes, and equipment were provided to meet the demands which experience taught her to expect. Then she said to her guests: "You may suggest any alterations, however radical, without fear of punishment, but alterations

actually may be made only after approval by the majority of those concerned, and after hearing the advice of my architects. However you may freely choose your own rooms. And when you get tired of them, you may make a change. Somewhere there is a room to suit every individual's taste."

The first hotel represents the so-called liberty of the past. The second represents the true liberty of the future.

CHAPTER XVII

SOME UNDERLYING CONDITIONS OF HUMAN PROGRESS

There are some fundamental adjustments needed in human culture which cannot specifically be classified under the great objectives discussed in Chapters XII to XVI, but which underlie all of them.

1. The Quantity of Population

One such condition is a suitable population density. This means that the population of a given area of given economic culture must be neither too large nor too small. This is necessary for the prevention of suffering of many kinds, both physical and mental, and also for the best possible enrichment and freedom of living.

The problem of optimum density of population would seem to be a biological rather than a cultural problem. As we shall see, however, it requires cultural changes for its solution. Contraception illustrates how biological conditions can be influenced by cultural forces. The recent fall in the birth rate, probably due in large part to these contraceptive measures, is one of the most important things that ever has happened to mankind. It is perhaps of more fundamental importance than the industrial revolution.

We saw in Chapter III that the quantity of population exerts a limiting influence upon culture, but that it exerts a positive influence is doubtful. We can say, for example, that a dense population, like that of Shantung, cannot possibly practice hunting or herding for its living, but must

practice intensive agriculture or industry. But we cannot say that the growth of the population is what caused it to take up agriculture. Rather it seems more accurate to say that the adoption of agriculture is what permitted the population to grow to the present density. There have been many other populations which "wanted" just as badly to grow, but not knowing the art of agriculture they were obliged to cease growing. Culture and population have a mutual influence on each other, but the influence of culture upon population is the more positive.

Results of underpopulation and of overpopulation.— There seems to be for every physical environment, under a given stage of the development of science, an *optimum* population. If the population is much below this ideal figure progress is delayed by lack of specialization, lack of efficient transportation and communication, and lack of stimulus to scientific invention and mental effort. In a sparsely settled frontier country the tendency is for each to do everything for himself. There are not enough inhabitants to make it pay to build railroads and good highways. There is little city life, and little chance for intellectual specialization. Art and science are not likely to develop.

On the other hand, where the population gets too large, we have high specialization and communication, but the advantages thus gained are neutralized by the increasing difficulty of getting food and fuel. As in the frontier country, but for a very different reason, a large per cent of labor must be devoted to getting the physical necessities of life, and less remains for intellectual effort. In China women and children scavenge the country for stubble and refuse to be used as fuel. In Japan it apparently pays to hunt down grasshoppers by hand in order to reduce somewhat their damage to the crops. No effort is spared to add just a little bit more to the product of one's fields, to save just a little bit more of the waste. In such an overpopulated country, moreover,

human life is likely to be valued cheap. There are too many people anyway and a few thousands perishing by plague, starvation, or the headsman's ax, mean little.

Remedies for overpopulation.—When an agricultural country, like China or Italy, is overpopulated, there are four possible solutions. The first is to improve agriculture, by more intensive cultivation, by using more or better machinery, more fertilizers, better methods. A great deal could be gained in this way by Poland and Italy, but China and Japan already have gone about as far as they can go toward intensity. China and Japan perhaps might increase their production of food if they completely revolutionized their methods by adopting modern machinery, but it is doubtful whether they could make this change without some temporary losses in production which would cause starvation. Denmark is a good example of a country which has successfully taken this step.

The second possible solution is to industrialize the country. This means that the surplus population is put to work manufacturing, and buys its food partly from outside the country, paying for it in manufactured goods. This is the method followed by England, Germany, Sweden and Japan. It is obviously a method which can be practiced only by *some* countries, for there must be some surplus food-producing countries from which the food-deficient countries can buy. By means of this international trade in food the whole problem of overpopulation has taken on a different meaning. In earlier times a country was regarded as overpopulated when it could not produce enough food to feed its own population adequately. But such a notion is now obsolete. On such a basis England is far more overpopulated than China. Nowadays we regard as overpopulated a country where the population is too large for the total resources and opportunities, whether to produce food, or to produce other things that will buy food from abroad. On such a basis China is more overpopulated than England.

The third solution of the problem is emigration. The surplus population simply moves to other regions where it can secure a better living. This is the method practiced by Italy, and, before the World War, by Austria Hungary. It also was the chief method of Germany and Sweden before they took up industrialization. Obviously this method also cannot be a world method. Only certain countries may practice it, the others must act as receivers for the emigrants.

The fourth solution is to limit the population by artificial measures, the most humane of which is contraception. This is a permanent solution, which can be practiced on a world-wide basis.

The Malthusian doctrine.—For a hundred years or more most of our thinking about population problems has been tied up closely with the doctrines of Dr. T. R. Malthus, who in 1798 startled the world by some very plain statements of certain principles which were more or less self-evident, but whose full import had not before been realized. Malthus showed that, (a) population tends to increase geometrically, thus constantly tending to outrun the food supply which in the long run can increase only arithmetically, and which eventually must slow down and come to an absolute limit. When it has free rein, any normal population, as proved by the actual statistics in newly settled countries, can double itself every 25 years. If man had started with a single pair, ten thousand years ago, and had kept up this rate of increase continuously, the world would now contain 2^{400} persons (two to the four hundredth power), a number which written out would require about a hundred digits. The actual present world population is only 1,700,000,000, a paltry figure which can be expressed in ten digits.

(b) The actual increase in population therefore seldom is or can be the full potential increase. Therefore *checks* are usually operating.

(c) All these checks can be resolved into moral restraint,

vice, or misery. Checks are classed as *positive* checks, which increase the death rate, and *preventive* checks, which lower the birth rate.

(d) Every increase in food supply is soon followed by the full increase in population thereby permitted, so that population, except for short periods, is always kept close to its maximum. The Irish potato case illustrates this law. The population of Ireland had been stationary or growing very slowly for some time, until she introduced the potato, which made it possible to produce more food per acre, and then her population jumped ahead rapidly. Then came the potato famine, which again reduced the population to near its earlier figure.

(e) Therefore, according to the general Malthusian way of thinking, starvation always hovers near. The other checks: disease, war, infanticide, vice, crime and punishment, moral restraint, etc., are by themselves never really effective enough to offset the great reproductive power of mankind. These checks, nearly always are reinforced by starvation or undernourishment or the fear thereof. Food shortage is the ultimate and only *controlling* check.

Modern revisions of Malthus' Laws.—Modern sociology makes three important modifications in this Malthusian doctrine. First, it is now realized that Malthus did not foresee the tremendous improvements which have taken place in our agriculture, and in our development of the newer portions of the earth. He did not foresee modern agricultural machinery. Ever since his day it would seem that the food-producing capacity of Western countries has been moving ahead as fast as population has cared to move, and not holding population back as Malthus envisaged. But it must be said that this is only a temporary respite. It only postpones, and does not prevent, the day of diminishing returns, and the full operation of Malthus' law of starvation.

But there is a second modification which permanently

changes Malthus' laws. That is modern birth control. It would seem that in Malthus' day contraceptive measures were little used, or if so were so obscurely known as to be classified under "vice." Malthus did not foresee the heavy decline in birth rate which has taken place in most advanced countries since 1870. In this we are offered a fourth alternative added to the moral restraint, vice and misery, of Malthus, namely, *birth control,* and the evidence shows that we are choosing, in ever greater measure, this last alternative.

The evidence indicates that the modern decline of the birth rate is not due to any physiological sterility. It is not accounted for by any increasing per cent of childless marriages, but by an increasing per cent of families with only one or two children.

A third important modification of Malthus arises out of modern cultural anthropology, being treated particularly in Carr-Saunders' work on the "Population Problem." The upshot of this is to cast doubt on the whole Malthusian idea that starvation is the only controlling check to population. Carr-Saunders has shown that infanticide, abortion, abnormal sex practices, and warfare occur in large degree among pre-scientific peoples, and that even contraception was known in Africa long before the white race adopted it. He finds relatively few cases of peoples which can really be said to live right up to the margin of their potential food supply. He thinks that population is more or less unconsciously checked when it begins to feel the pinch of poorer circumstances, and long before it begins to experience actual lack of food. The brake is applied by more or less unconsciously increasing these other checks and not by waiting for starvation to set in. Normally, population is kept at its *optimum,* and not at its *maximum* as Malthus thought. Overpopulation is the exception rather than the rule. But after all, Carr-Saunders is merely saying that the majority of mankind always has been doing, by unconscious, bungling and sometimes cruel

methods, what Malthus says they ought to do by "moral restraint," and the Neo-Malthusians by birth control.

Whether we think in Malthusian terms or not, we must come to the same conclusion. Namely, we cannot obtain true welfare unless the quantity of the world's population is controlled, by some painless method, and not allowed to increase *ad libitum*. This is what Professor East means in his "Mankind at the Crossroads," when he revives once more the ghost of Malthus. Man's conquest of culture cannot take place without an adaptive fecundity, to use Professor Ross's term. Man must not allow his numbers to be determined by the blind working of natural or sub-social laws, but consciously and deliberately.

Race suicide not a present problem.—Some writers have feared race suicide. It is indeed quite possible that birth control might become so widespread that the danger would be one of annihilation rather than of overpopulation. Among certain classes within our population that annihilation already is taking place. The families of college women, for example, so far as their birth statistics have been studied, are not maintaining themselves. The Anglo-Saxon stock in the northeast seems to be declining, though not in the South and West. The problem here is one mainly of quality rather than quantity, the better stocks having higher mental ability are certainly not reproducing themselves so fast as those of lower ability.

A general decline of the whole population of a country is a much more remote and unlikely possibility. For no matter how much the more prudent and intellectual elements may limit their birth rate, there are likely always to be other large groups which will have large families either from inadvertence or from actual preference. Not all feel in the same degree the burden of raising children. In the rural districts particularly the burden is made lighter by the easy access to food and fuel and abundant space, and the oppor-

tunity to get some economic help out of the children at an early age. Still nationwide race suicide is a possibility that some day may have to be reckoned with.

World-wide decline of population is still more unlikely, because, with widely varying cultures, there would always be some people in the world who probably would make a religion of large families. The birth-limiting peoples would gradually disappear, and the fecund peoples would take their places by migration, as European Slavs and Hebrews have replaced Anglo-Saxons to a certain extent in the United States. If world race suicide ever does become a problem, we may hope that an enlightened mankind will find some means of dealing with it. There is as much hope of dealing successfully with that as with the opposite problem of overpopulation. But it is quite illogical to oppose birth control as a solution of pressing problems of today on the ground that it might go too far and lead to an opposite problem in the remote future. If we get to such a stage of enlightened control over culture that we can successfully limit the birth rate to the best possible point, we shall be able also to encourage births whenever that becomes necessary.

The need of population restriction.—The present problem is quite the other way. It is well stated by Professor East, in "Mankind at the Crossroads," who calculates that the world can reasonably support a maximum population of 5,200,000,000, and that that population will be reached, if the present rate of growth continues, in about a century and a half. His calculations are those of a shrewd biologist who has a good sense of values regarding the food-producing powers of the earth. He considers carefully the various suggestions so often advanced for enlarging our food supply, such as more intensive agriculture, the development of the newer countries like Siberia and Australia, the use of sea food, the use of the Arctics for raising reindeer on a commercial scale, the use of rugged hillsides and tropical regions for

fruit and nut trees, the development of new and better types of food plants, the practice of irrigation. But each of these possibilities has its limits. Irrigation, for example, can be practiced on only a small part of the earth's surface because water is not everywhere available. After making a reasonable estimate of these limits, East thinks that unless there be some unforeseen invention for making synthetic food out of earth, air, or sea water, likely only in the remote future, the world's comfortable maximum is about five billion. In fact this problem of general overpopulation and food shortage will be met sooner than will the shortage of any particular natural resource, except petroleum.

A controlled population seems necessary not only to avoid starvation, but also for the general welfare in other ways. Public health measures cannot do their work where there are so many children in a family that they cannot be cared for properly. The rich and emancipated leisure life, which we saw to be the climax of human happiness, cannot be obtained where there is a struggle for mere existence.

And yet there are laws in nearly all of our states making the giving of contraceptive information illegal, and the federal government declares such information obscene and unmailable. The more intelligent classes of the population already have this information. The main effect of such laws is to prevent the information's being given in a decent way and to the less intelligent classes who most need to limit their families.[1]

2. The Quality of Population

Social and racial improvement.—Human welfare depends partly on social improvement and partly on racial improvement. There is a great difference between these two. Racial improvement means betterment in the inborn quality of the

[1] See Reuter, "Population Problems," pp. 170–171.

people, social improvement is simply the betterment of culture. We often hear it said that racial improvement is the more important, and that our modern social reform too often interferes with it. We are warned against public health measures because they may permit the physical weaklings to survive who otherwise would be eliminated. We even are warned against some features of community organization and education, lest they remove the efforts and the temptations necessary for building strong character.

There is a great deal of confusion here. For one thing, many people have never yet gotten over the belief that acquired characters are inherited, a belief which science has shown to be substantially untrue. Then again, most of us do not realize that there has been no demonstrated general racial improvement since the times of Cro-Magnon man. Up to that time, there must have been improvement, if we admit that man is a somewhat better animal than the ancestral sub-human forms. But since the appearance of true man we have nothing to prove any general change in the inborn physical or mental qualities of the race. If anything we are smaller and have less brain capacity than did the Cro-Magnon. All we surely have gained since then has been the improvement of culture.

But this does not deny that there may be ups and downs of human quality, and that some races more than others may possess those qualities which make for the highest human welfare. It does not deny that race quality may be improved, and also may be made worse by various features of culture. A thorough and up-to-date discussion of the whole question can be found in Professor Hankins' "Racial Basis of Civilization."

Natural and cultural selection.—It should be clear, however, to anyone who knows any biology whatever, that the only way in which culture can affect racial quality is by *selection*. That is, culture cannot make a man better in some

respect and then enable him to pass down this betterness through heredity to his children. Even a slow and gradual improvement by this method seems very improbable if not impossible, in the light of modern biology. The only way in which culture can improve the race is to give those individuals, who already are superior by original nature, a better chance to survive or to reproduce than it gives to those who are inferior. This is the way nature improves the race; the method of natural selection.

Natural selection continually weeds out those of weak physical resistance to disease, and maintains a certain quality of physical vigor although not so high as we might wish. There can be social or cultural selection as well as natural. Whenever a people has a certain culture standard of personal beauty those that conform most to that type are most sought in marriage and tend to reproduce more abundantly, while those who depart most from the popular type are more likely to remain childless. Thus, thinks Ripley, was produced the triangular facial type of the Basques in Spain, and some of the facial characteristics of the Jews; and thus is maintained a certain standard of facial beauty in American women. These cases illustrate social or cultural selection.

Cultural selection may work in the same direction as natural selection, or it may work in the reverse direction. Our preference for marriage with healthy persons helps natural selection. The custom of many pre-industrial peoples to allow many wives and children to the strong men of the group also helped natural selection. Primitive warfare may have helped natural selection somewhat because with hand weapons the stronger men had a better chance to defend themselves and to survive the battle. In Chinese civilization the men of superior wealth and presumably superior ability, it is said, tend to have larger families. Migration, as shown by Ellsworth Huntington, in "The Character of Races," helps natural selection because the physically strong and mentally alert have a much

better chance to survive the hardships of the journey. For this reason, he thinks, some of the finer blossomings of civilization have followed the arrival of selected migrants from a distance, as in Cambodia, in Iceland, in New England.

How modern culture hinders natural selection.—But there also are many cultural factors, especially in modern culture, which work contrary to natural selection. Medicine does save some of the physically defective. Modern warfare calls forth the able-bodied young men to be killed and leaves the weaklings at home to raise families. Modern city life attracts the more alert of the rural population, and puts them in crowded quarters where large families are a burden, and leaves the duller individuals to remain in the country where they reproduce more abundantly. Modern migration is not so surely beneficial to the race as the migrations of ancient times. Final conclusions must rest on intelligence tests and other research, but there is reason to suspect that the masses of immigrants from southeastern Europe in the last thirty years have come from somewhat inferior peasant stocks, pushed out by the overcrowding of farmlands in their native countries, while the more able elements have remained at home owning property and directing business.

A most serious anti-natural-selective influence of modern culture is *competitive consumption.* This causes people on the road to economic success to limit their families in order to enjoy a more luxurious standard of living, while those who have no hope of such success reproduce more liberally. It is quite the opposite pattern from that of the Chinese, who like to display their surplus wealth in the form of larger families rather than of more material property. It is the old old story of the big families in the little houses and vice versa.

Eugenics.—Cultural selection can be worse than natural selection; it can also be better. When cultural selection is practiced deliberately and consciously, for the improvement

of the race, it becomes eugenics. The average man does not understand what eugenics is. He thinks of it as some kind of scheme for the scientific matching of people in order to produce better children. As a matter of fact the eugenist has little to say about who should marry whom. On the whole persons tend to marry within their own social classes rather than outside them.[1] To persuade a few persons to forego a personally desired marriage in order to arrange a somewhat more "eugenic" one is not the idea at all. It probably never would be accomplished on a sufficient scale to be of much effect. The great message of eugenics is simply that certain classes of persons should have no children at all, others should have fewer than they do, and others should have more. These three "classes" would be determined by mental and physical traits, not social status. The eugenist is the one who sees the importance of racial improvement, and who sees how it is being endangered by certain features of our modern culture.

There now seems to be in sociology a movement away from eugenics. Heredity, much advertised in recent years, is again soft-pedaled, and environment proclaimed more loudly as the key to human welfare. However, we must be careful to see just where the eugenic theory is weak and where it is strong. There can be no question about the importance of eugenics for maintaining those human qualities which are truly hereditary. When it comes to an inborn trait no amount of education will help. Selection is the only method of developing such a trait. In this latter sphere eugenics stands its ground. The weakness of eugenic theory has been that it has presumed to cover too wide a range of human traits. It has assumed as inborn many traits that are acquired. Under the captivating slogan of racial improvement it has falsely claimed the

[1] For statistical confirmation see Marvin, D. M., in Publications of American Statistical Association, 16:131.

power to control many things which are purely matters of cultural evolution.

What eugenics can and cannot do.—What are the qualities in which blood tells? As far as our knowledge goes, they include physiological structure, height, weight, vitality of constitution and longevity, eyesight, pigmentation, general intelligence, mental and nervous diseases, differences in the gland mechanisms, and in "temperament" which seems to rest upon glands. Eugenics would help nature to eliminate tuberculosis, epilepsy, mental diseases. Eugenics alone must be depended upon to eliminate feeble-mindedness, for apparently society today gives the mental defective as good a chance to live and to reproduce as it does the genius. This need for elimination of mental defect is one of the most pressing problems of the day, and one which can be solved only by eugenic means. The upholding by the Supreme Court of the United States of the new Virginia sterilization law, which gives the state power to sterilize feeble-minded persons, is an important step forward.

There are some bad qualities which nature herself can be trusted to eliminate slowly without the artificial aid of eugenics. Tubercular tendencies, for example, are more or less self-eliminating, for they develop in young life and reduce the patient's chance of reproduction. The white man having been long exposed to this disease, is relatively immune to it, while the black and yellow races succumb readily. The Eskimo, having had no racial experience with smallpox, dies from the effects of vaccination. The American Indian races were relatively immune to syphilis before the white man knew it. On first exposure the white men succumbed to this disease as to a pestilence, but now a relative immunity is developing.

But there are other qualities with which blood has nothing to do. "Tell the eugenist what type of nation we want, and he will evolve it," illustrates the extravagant claims that

have done eugenics more harm than good. To make a people honest, thrifty, religious, courageous, artistic, stay-at-home or adventurous, is quite as much beyond the powers of eugenics as it is to induce a people to give up pictographic writing in favor of the alphabet. At first sight many will challenge this statement. It has been defended several times before and we shall not take space to continue the discussion here. The extreme eugenist argues: If we can breed faster race horses, why cannot we breed more honest men? The answer is found by analyzing carefully the nature of this trait we call "honesty," an analysis which few have really undertaken. When we do analyze it we find that honesty is a *complex pattern of behavior* rather than a "trait" which can be ascribed to any particular quality of the individual nervous system. Speed, vitality, longevity, resistance to scarlet fever, are physiological traits, but honesty is a trait of culture rather than of the individual constitution.

The pressing need of eugenics.—The importance of eugenics within its proper sphere cannot be overestimated. Day nurseries, family extra wages, subsidies and bonuses for superior children, birth control clinics, sterilization laws, the widespread use of intelligence tests, and other measures, may help to encourage the reproduction of the superior and to discourage the reproduction of the inferior.

We must, however, keep our eyes on the true goal of eugenics, which is the improvement of *human* quality, regardless of race. If any given race is found to average somewhat inferior to other races in ability, as appears from mental tests to be true of the negro, the eugenic course would be simply to discourage the reproduction of a larger per cent of the members of that race than of the others. But this does not mean that there should be any discrimination against the superior members of such a race. They have as much to contribute to human quality as do their physical and mental equals in other races.

No matter how well we may succeed in cutting down the reproduction of the inferior, eventually we shall have to come to some method of raising the birth rate of the superior classes. Statistics of the families of graduates of several large eastern colleges indicate that these people are not reproducing themselves sufficiently even to maintain their numbers. Dr. John C. Phillips recently found that the average number of births in the families of Harvard graduates of the classes of 1891-1900 is only 2.33, whereas it should be 3.52 to allow for deaths and keep the Harvard stock just stationary. With the graduates of women's colleges the situation is much worse than this.

It is the fashion to scold these intellectuals, to tell them, especially the women, that they are selfishly sacrificing their family duties to personal ambitions and careers. Some go so far as to hold that these types of persons who prefer personal freedom and careers to normal family life are not fit types anyway from which to reproduce the race, and that society does well to be rid of their blood. There is no ground for such an assumption. What society needs more than anything else is native intelligence, and it is in these classes that intelligence is to be found. If we are interested in human progress we shall cease scolding, accept facts as they are, and *invent social machinery* to eliminate the conflict between family and career. This machinery may well include day-nurseries and cooperative housekeeping for superior families, and perhaps even financial subsidies to qualified persons to ease the burden of raising children. Improved rapid transit, making it possible for families with small children to live farther out of town, where there is more space, also may be helpful.

Let us remember, finally, that though eugenics works upon biology, and not upon culture, that nevertheless, as a social measure, it is a part of culture. The adoption of any widespread eugenic program would be a fundamental change in

our culture. In the last analysis it is culture that has to be changed.

3. The Distribution of Wealth

How the distribution of wealth affects welfare.—Many of the cultural adjustments we have suggested in previous chapters depend upon the distribution of wealth among the individuals, and families, of society. We already have considered this distribution under various headings; we now shall consider it briefly as a problem by itself.

The equality or inequality of wealth distribution is only indirectly an index of welfare. The important thing is that every individual should have security of livelihood, should have hope of bettering his condition, and that he should have guaranteed care of health. Beyond this, if one has more income than another, it is not *necessarily* a source of evil. We feel sorry for the person who must dress in patched and shabby clothing; but what invokes much more our pity is the fact that probably he does not get adequate dental treatment, consequently loses his teeth at an early age and is exposed to serious infections.

Nevertheless the distribution of wealth does, indirectly, have a great effect upon welfare, and it is probable that those communities where wealth approaches a level are happier, other things being equal, than the communities having great extremes of wealth and poverty. The reason for this is fourfold.

First, inequality of wealth is likely to mean, for those at the bottom of the scale, a poverty which is not merely relative but is absolute. There are sections of our population which have an actual shortage of the physical necessities of life.

Second, inequality arouses the sense of injustice, with resentment and rebellion. The rich, rightly or wrongly, are blamed for the ills of the poor, and social conflict results.

No matter how plausibly economic theory may prove that each gets what he is really worth, a social order cannot permanently stand up under the strain that comes from abject poverty contemplating luxurious wealth living by its very side.

Third, increasing amounts of wealth in the possession of the same family have less satisfying power. The man with an income of $20,000 per year gets less utility, less true satisfaction, out of his second ten thousand than he does out of his first. Wealth has a diminishing utility. Hence the wealth of the rich adds less welfare to society than if the same wealth were spread out somewhat more evenly.

Fourth, and not least, wealth gives power. It is true that by and large the wealthy classes have more intelligence than the poor, and hence are better fitted to direct the evolution of society. But there is no guarantee that they will not use this intelligence merely for their own selfish interests, and to perpetuate their own power. A somewhat bungling management of society in the interests of all is to be preferred to a shrewd management in the interests of a limited class. Extremes of wealth and poverty put an inordinate share of social control in the hands of the wealthy. Only the wealthy have the leisure to learn and use the technique of control. Only wealth can purchase the organs of publicity and propaganda upon which public opinion so much depends.

One of the most significant features of the Russian soviet system is the effort to divorce wealth from power. The Bolshevists soon found that they could not equalize wealth. Inequalities were bound to develop. So they set out to put the political power deliberately into the hands of those who did not have the wealth. This is the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A clever enterpriser in Russia can acquire considerable wealth by private trade, but if he chooses to enjoy life in this way, he must forego the right to vote. On the other hand, if one would have a voice in directing the

affairs of the state he must forego wealth. He must be a manual worker, or a brain worker in the employ of the state.[1]

Poverty and its causes.—Perhaps the social problem which most frequently is discussed in our textbooks is the problem of poverty. As we have seen, the real evils do not lie in poverty *per se,* but in the illness, injury, overwork, resentment, and other painful experiences of personal life which go with it. Poverty is our name for a complex of these evil conditions, caused by low income, and usually found associated together. The causes of poverty may be classified as follows:

1. *Bio-geographical causes*
   - Overpopulation
   - Shortage of natural resources
2. *Cultural causes*
   - Irregular employment
   - Unequal distribution of wealth
   - Misdirected production of wealth
   - Competitive consumption, giving rise to a purely relative poverty which may cause as much suffering as does absolute want
3. *Individual causes* (but traceable back also to cultural and biological factors)
   - Sickness
   - Injury
   - Defectiveness—physical and mental, hereditary and acquired
   - Lack of vocational training

The correction of economic inequality.—Man's efforts to correct the unequal distribution of wealth are partly unconscious and partly conscious. They follow two different lines. The first method is financial. It consists in various efforts to bring about greater equality in *money* incomes. We see it in minimum wage legislation, in progressive taxation such as

[1] Strong, "The First Time in History."

the income tax, which increases the per cent of tax as the income goes higher, in government price control over necessities of life, such as was exercised over bread and flour in warring countries, in labor unions and collective bargaining, in the communist efforts to fix more or less uniform wages.

But there is another method by which the same results can be accomplished in a more indirect manner. Instead of trying to equalize money incomes, we can bring about a redistribution of particular *goods and services* without touching money incomes. This redistribution usually is accomplished by putting large amounts of wealth into the form of collective utilities (*see* Chapter IX). This method always has functioned to some extent in human society. Philanthropy gives the poor more than they would be able to buy with their money incomes, and this surplus comes from the rich. Many public enterprises such as the public school system, public highways, public health service, give the poor more service than they really pay for, making up the deficit by taxation upon the rich. The communistic pattern, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," though it is condemned as un-American, Bolshevist, revolutionary, nevertheless is and long has been tacitly accepted and practiced at several points in our social system. It arouses antagonism only when it is proposed to extend the principle to some new sphere, as in the proposal for universal compulsory health insurance. Even in private business dealings there are many situations where charges are made according to ability to pay rather than according to service received. The custom of physicians of charging higher rates to wealthy patients illustrates this tendency. The man who is known to be rich has to pay more for personal services than another man. The wealthy family with two children, both in private school, pays more for the support of the public school system than the poor family with six children, all receiving the service of the public school.

In fact any effort to measure what each individual really earns, what he really deserves of society, and to compare this with what he actually receives, is hopeless from the start. The very question, "What is he worth?" misconceives the nature of our society. It assumes separateness of individual lives which nowhere exists in reality. Economic value and distribution of wealth cannot be explained by abstract laws of demand and supply. They are part of our culture, and must be explained in cultural terms. It is a feature of our culture pattern that we pay for some things less than they are worth, such as a public school education and the daily newspaper, while we make up the deficit through other channels. For most goods bought in department stores, for example, we pay more than they are worth. The surplus accumulates in the pocket of the store proprietor, who uses it partly to support the newspaper through his advertising, partly to support the public schools through his taxes, partly to give charity to the poor. The same results could be accomplished if we paid less for the merchandise, and used the money thereby saved to pay higher rates for our newspapers and for the education of our children.

The effect of vocational education and vocational guidance upon the culture pattern.—Vocational education, by training young persons for their prospective occupations, and vocational guidance, by helping them to select the occupations in which they can be more efficient, are both valuable measures in the campaign against waste. Vocational guidance, moreoever, by opening to the individual a wider range of choice among occupations, indirectly promotes personal liberty. But these measures may have still another result that is as yet but dimly visualized.

The low wages of unskilled labor are in part due to the great plethora of unskilled labor on the market. According to economic theory, the supply of this labor is so great in proportion to the demand that its marginal value, and hence

wages, are low. If now we should train half of these unskilled persons making them into skilled labor, we should, according to economic theory, cause the wages of the unskilled to rise and of the skilled, because of their increased abundance, to fall. The result would be greater *equality* of incomes, but no change in the *average* per capita income of all classes.

But all this theory works on the assumption that there is a rigid pattern of occupations in our economic system into which individuals must be fitted. It is assumed that industry provides always a fixed per cent of unskilled jobs, of skilled jobs, of clerical and managerial jobs and so on. Such an assumption is not justified. The pattern of occupations is affected by the kinds and amounts of available persons. If we by training make the unskilled worker a scarce and expensive article, we encourage industry to substitute machinery for unskilled labor, thereby creating a greater per cent of machine-tending jobs and also of machine-building jobs, and indirectly of clerical and managerial jobs. The whole hierarchy of jobs may be lifted to a higher level. It may be possible to replace the present ignorant and inefficient unskilled worker by a new type of "unskilled" worker, who, though performing much the same sort of work, will be able to perform it more rapidly and hence with higher pay.

Vocational guidance, a very new feature in our culture pattern, aims at something more than merely shifting individuals about until they fit better into the existing structure, as by moving A from job X to job Y, and B from job Y to X. It aims to change the structure itself. By warning its clients away from "blind alley" jobs, it does not necessarily cause these jobs to be filled by others. It may tend to eliminate the jobs themselves, compelling industry to reorganize and to make more efficient use of its personnel.

4. The Distribution of Power

Why democratic distribution of power is important.— Human welfare requires a redistribution of power between the various elements of society. We have seen that in certain large spheres of life what we need is to do away with power and to introduce complete liberty of the individual. But in other spheres there always must be regulation and control, and the problem here is how to reorganize that control in the best interest of all.

A democratic distribution of power is important to welfare for two reasons. First, because it is important to social justice. Justice refers to the distribution of personal joys and sufferings; while democracy refers to the distribution of power. An autocratic society might be benevolent and just, but not democratic. And a democratic society might be cruel, and somewhat unjust to small minorities. But in general, there is more hope of justice through democratic organization than otherwise. Second, democracy is necessary to insure progress in general. The prevention of suffering, the elimination of needless labor, the enrichment of leisure, personal liberty, are aims which might be accomplished in large measure under a benevolent despotism. But there is no guarantee that they would be. At any time the ruling group might choose to seek its own welfare at the expense of the masses. It is not possible in the long run to entrust the interests of any group to another. Each social group must have the power to look after its own interests. If any good thing is to be achieved, the *power* to achieve it must be in the hands of *those who care.*

Persons and groups who have been exploited and dominated by others must be given some voice in the management of society. There is no one so humble, unless perhaps a young child or an imbecile, that he does not merit some share in deciding questions which affect groups of people. The whole drift of the age is away from the conception that some are

born to command and others to obey. The obeyers must have an opportunity to check up on their commanders.

Political democracy is only a small part of the whole problem of the distribution of power. Political democracy already has been fairly well achieved in the United States. The problem of the future is how to establish democracy within various other branches of the social structure which are nearer, and often of far more immediate importance, to the lives of individuals. There is a growing movement for democracy within industry, for student government within schools, for community control of recreation and of philanthropy, for a better balance of rights and powers within the family.

"Industrial democracy" is perhaps the leading problem. It means giving the workers in each industry a voice in the management of things which vitally affect their daily working lives, as hours, ventilation, light, working rules and conditions, safety, the settlement of grievances, the power to veto unjust discriminations and dismissals. The labor union seeks to gain these powers for the workers. In many instances the employer himself has established a system of employee representation which gives the workers many of these powers, although it does not guarantee them beyond the desire of the employer.

The channels of power.—But the distribution of power is not entirely a question of *who* shall rule. It is also a question of *through what channels* control shall be exercised. If we should leave to each citizen of the United States the same amount of power he now has, no more and no less, but change the machinery through which he exercises his power, we might get a totally different result from what we now have. For example, in the political sphere, every citizen of certain age and qualifications has the right to vote. He is obliged to vote, however, as a citizen of a particular geographic district. If he is with the minority in his particular district his vote, to use common expression, is thrown away. A third party,

even if it commands the allegiance of one-fourth the voters of the country, has no representation at all in Congress or legislature, unless it is abnormally strong in one or more localities, so as to get a majority in those districts. The socialists, with some five per cent of the voting strength of the country in their strong years, could never get more than about one-third of one per cent of the total representation in Congress.

Proportional and functional representation.—But suppose now that we should introduce two important changes in legislative machinery. One of these, already widely practiced in Europe, is *proportional representation.* By this device the minority votes would not be lost, but would be totaled up in such a way that the socialists, for example, if they had five per cent of the country's voters, would get about five per cent of the representatives. The other new device is *functional representation.* According to this plan at least one house of a legislature would be made up of delegates who represent not localities, but occupations and industries. The farmers of a state, or of the nation as a whole, would have their due share of farmer delegates, representing them not as citizens of particular localities, but as *farmers.* The railroad workers, the retail store keepers, the physicians, likewise would be represented as such. In this way the true economic interests of men would be brought to the forefront, and could be discussed and balanced against each other without being confused and clouded by regional questions.

In a recent canvass of our Congress, it was found that the great majority of the members of that body are lawyers. How, says the advocate of functional representation, can an assemblage of lawyers truly represent the interests of the whole American people? In spite of their broad contacts with people in various walks of life, their points of view are inevitably limited by their own occupational prejudices and interests. The same objection would apply to a legislature

made up of physicians, or machinists, or members of any other single occupation. A Minnesota farmer, thinks the functionalist, could be better represented in Congress by an Indiana farmer than by a Minnesota lawyer. Functional representation is one of the planks of that radical program known as syndicalism. It distinguishes syndicalism from State socialism and some other forms of socialism. It is a feature of the Russian soviet system. But it has been adopted in principle by many peoples who are by no means syndicalists. In Germany and in Czechoslovakia there are economic councils or parliaments, having so far only advisory power in the actual government of the state, but which are made up of delegates from various industries and occupations.

Centralization versus decentralization.—Another problem is centralization versus decentralization. This has been one of the leading issues between our Republican and Democratic parties. Doubtless we need more centralization in certain matters and more decentralization in others. Constant readjustments are needed as conditions change. Our school systems would be greatly improved, over large sections of the country, if they were administered on nation-wide standards by federal authority, or even by state boards in place of local boards. Such a measure would tend to keep the weaker schools nearer to the standard of the better. But even the very moderate step of making the Federal Bureau of Education a full governmental Department, with a secretary in the President's cabinet, with only promotive and advisory powers and no authority to *manage* education within the states, is stoutly resisted as a blow at local authority. On the other hand, the extreme of centralized education is illustrated by the complacent remark attributed to a French Minister of Education, who looked at his watch one afternoon and proudly said to a visitor: "It is now 2 P.M. Every student in the —th grade in the secondary schools of France is now preparing a section of Latin prose."

The question of centralization versus decentralization is for the most part a question of technical efficiency as against local community satisfaction. Central authorities usually know how to do the thing in the best way, given standard conditions. But in trying to satisfy the ideal standard, they step on local prejudices, fail to get the best cooperation in the local community, and fail to satisfy the needs peculiar to localities. Central authority tends to become over-standardized, leading to what we call bureaucracy. An example of this was observed in the administration of Y. M. C. A. huts in the army camps. One camp headquarters had numbered its six service buildings 104 to 109 inclusive, the numbers 101, 102, and 103 being assigned to headquarters and two storehouses. One day they received orders from national headquarters to renumber all buildings, calling the service huts 102 to 107 inclusive, for the sake of uniformity in the records of national headquarters. But the original numbers already had become associated in the minds of thousands of local soldiers and civilians with the particular buildings to which they were first attached, and this renumbering meant far more confusion to the local persons served by the buildings than it possibly could have meant convenience to the central administration.

Producerism versus consumerism.—A fourth great issue in the distribution of power, as yet dimly recognized, is that of producer control versus consumer control. This applies of course to the economic branch of our culture. The direct control of industry is in the hands of the producers. The consumer exercises only a passive choice among the several commodities or services that are offered him. *Capitalism* puts control of an industry in the hands of the owners of the capital. *Syndicalism,* and some forms of socialism, would place the control in the hands of those who work in the industry. *Consumers' cooperation,* as illustrated by the co-

operative store, represents neither of these, but represents control by those who consume the services of the store.

If this principle were applied more generally in our culture, it would mean a revolution even more fundamental than most of the socialists conceive. Under producers' control it is possible for the producers of any essential commodity or service to coerce the community by withholding their product, as both mine owners and mine workers have done at various times. Another instance of this control was the securing of the Adamson law in 1916 by threat of strike by the railway brotherhoods. A great degree of producer control exists in the case of professional associations such as the American Medical Association, which standardizes medical requirements and education, and which has considerable power to dictate to the consumers of medical service what they shall and shall not have. Osteopathy, for example, often proves very helpful to patients, but is frowned upon by the Medical Association. Hence the patient often has difficulty in securing the combination of orthodox medicine and osteopathy, the cooperation between physician and osteopath, which might from his standpoint be ideal. In matters of retail trade the consumer does not get the most ideal type of service because of the competitive organization of trade, as now carried on under the direction of the tradesmen themselves. It is possible to imagine a trading town in which goods are arranged and classified for the maximum convenience of the consumer in finding exactly what he wants. One store, for example, might specialize in neckties, and it might have all the neckties in town, arranged and classified according to color and quality. But under the existing system the consumer must waste much time shopping about from place to place. The time wasted in matching ribbons is enough to bring tears to the eyes of an efficiency idealist.

It is possible to imagine a pattern of society in which

industry is organized from the standpoint of the consumer, under the direction of some body of experts who would represent their needs. Under our existing culture it is organized from the standpoint of the producer, or the would-be producer who thinks he sees an opportunity to sell something. So long as this selling is based upon scientific investigation of the true needs of the consumers it is really service. But a large part of it ignores real needs, in catering to which there seems only remote hope of profit, and busies itself with creating artificial needs which seem to offer more immediate gain. A college community waits for years, for example, for somebody to start a much needed community newspaper, laundry, day nursery, or kindergarten. When such things are started it usually is at the initiative of consumers. But soda fountains and hot dog stands spring up like mushrooms in every available spot where an enterprising producer sees hope of creating an artificial demand for these products.

In the immediate future the outstanding changes in industry may be in the direction of putting more control into the hands of the workers, limiting somewhat the power of the owners. But eventually we may expect movements in the direction of greater control by consumers, limiting both capital's and labor's power. This will not necessarily mean any change in the distribution of the ultimate power *as between individual persons.* It will mean a change in the channels through which power is exercised. The citizen as consumer will have more power, the same citizen as worker, or as owner, may have less. But such a tendency will of course have its limits. It will be necessary for the workers as such to maintain certain constitutional rights in their respective industries, especially in relation to determining the hours and conditions of work. The consuming public, organized in powerful consumers' organizations, might overwork and exploit the workers in certain industries, as readily as the workers in certain industries might "hold up" the public. In the coal

mining industry, for example, if there were not powerful labor organizations and the power to strike, an indifferent public could maintain a perpetual serfdom of labor in one of the most dangerous and disagreeable jobs, on the public's own terms. Any individual worker might escape this slavery by going into some other occupation, but there always would remain a certain shifting group willing to work and live under those conditions, because of their temporary failure to find anything better.

Guild socialism seems, better than any other proposed reorganization of industry, to provide a due balance of power between producer and consumer. It would have each industry run by a *guild* made up of the workers and managers of that industry. But the power of the guilds would be held in check by the state, representing the citizens as consumers and as members of geographic communities.

The organization of will.—Graham Wallas in "The Great Society" considers the social structure under three headings, the organization of effort, the organization of will, and the organization of thought. The organization of effort is the organization of individuals to *get things done* which already have been decided upon. It is typified by the army or by a railroad organization. Reports and sometimes requests travel from inferior to superior, but orders travel only downward. The movement of ideas is from above downward, and *diverges* from the few to the many. Each officer in the descending hierarchy subdivides further the task which is given him to do, and apportions out the various parts of the task to his subordinates, who may again subdivide it further.

The organization of will is the reverse process. It is the process of deciding what shall be done. In an army there is no place for organization of will; for what shall be done is determined by circumstances outside the army itself. But in those parts of human society whose purpose is to *live,* and not merely to accomplish some special task, there must be

some way of determining what things are to be done by collective effort. The many and varying desires of the citizens, so far as they must be satisfied by group effort, are organized, integrated, into a common purpose. A political party formulating its platform and choosing its candidates, a church formulating its creed, a town meeting deciding how to spend its funds, illustrate this organization of will. The movement of ideas here is from below upward, and converges from the many to the few. Every citizen should have a part in the organization of will as well as in the organization of effort. We are accustomed to thinking that the average citizen's part in the organization of will consists simply in voting at the polls once a year. It is much larger than that. Here are some of the points in life at which the citizen exercises power, or takes part in the organization of will.

Voting { at the polls / in associations
Joining and withdrawing from organizations
Expressing opinion on matters subject to collective control
Giving and withholding donations
Molding the opinions of children and others
Choosing to purchase one commodity rather than another

The role of the expert.—But as culture becomes more complex, the average citizen becomes less competent to make decisions affecting the whole. He cannot command a sufficient range of knowledge. He is less interested in public affairs than he was in the small town meeting stage of control. In the future the function of the voter will be less to decide on what measures are to be taken, more to choose expert leaders, and to see that these experts make their decisions in accordance with sound procedure and social conscience.

The only way these experts can be made safe is to put them in a position where they have no personal advantage

to gain except by deciding in the interests of the whole. This can be accomplished partly by bringing the experts to a greater extent into the public pay, and partly by developing and protecting the "expert conscience."[1] Such protection is greatly needed where experts are dismissed by private organizations for making decisions in the interests of public welfare, but contrary to the policy of the employing organization. In such cases the dismissed expert should be given easy recourse to court action and to the channels of publicity.

Ultimate power rests with the people.—Some questions are best left to the individual to decide for himself. These belong to the domain of *liberty*. Other questions are best answered by *truth* in the possession of experts. Still others are best answered by the people collectively, each contributing equally to the collective will. This we call *democracy*. But who shall decide which questions belong in which group? The answer is: *democracy* has the power to decide on this assignment of questions, and ultimately democracy does decide. It is the final arbiter. No pre-established principle of personal liberty, no opinion of experts, can withstand this power. Experts may find sterilization laws necessary to uphold the quality of the race, but unless this truth is appropriated by the people they will block the program and allow themselves to fall into decadence. A constitution makes private property a sacred liberty, inviolable even by a majority vote, but ultimately the "masses," if they will, can confiscate the private property of the "classes."

The only salvation is to put democracy in possession of truth. As truth becomes more and more specialized and requires an increasing army of experts to make use of it, there must be also a corresponding progress of social appropriation of the more general truths, the truths which throw light on ends rather than those which determine means. Society more and more will need to rely on experts to make

[1] Ross, "Social Trend," Chap. 10.

her decisions as to *methods* and details. But this cannot be successful unless at the same time the masses of the people become increasingly intelligent in deciding what they will leave to the experts, and also more effective in controlling those experts. There is no *a priori* guarantee that experts will be loyal to society. They often profit by sacrificing the interests of society to the interests of some class which can pay them better.

Granted that the majority are not always at first right on a given issue, granted that much education must be given before the people are fitted to decide, yet on the ultimate questions of social policy, and in the long run, "the voice of the people is the voice of God."

5. Social Education

The distribution of knowledge—education for citizenship. The aims of education.—The first and last step in man's conquest of culture is education. Only through knowledge does man become free. It was knowledge that enabled him to master his physical environment, and it will be only through knowledge that he can master his own culture. Snedden in his "Educational Applications of Sociology" has said that education has four great aims, physical, vocational, social, and cultural. He uses here the word "cultural" in the everyday sense. The physical aim is to make the student a good animal, the vocational aim is to make him an efficient worker in some occupation, the social aim is to make him a good citizen, that is, a good cooperator with his fellow men, and the cultural aim is to enrich his life as an individual. Three of these aims of education already have been treated. The physical aim was seen to be part of the campaign against suffering, the vocational aim was part of the campaign against waste and a means to the better distribution of wealth, the cultural aim was part of the program for the enrichment of

the leisure life. The social aim of education is not so easily classified under any one great campaign. It underlies the whole of man's conquest of culture.

There have been many conceptions regarding the purpose of education. It has been conceived as a training of the individual mind, as a preparation for individual life, as the development of one's individual powers, as "learning how to learn." A college president once said that college was a place where the student learned many things he would *not* use in later life, but by methods which he *would* use. Some years ago this "formal discipline" was the popular theory of education. The subject matter was considered secondary in importance, the methods of learning and the development of various powers of mind were the primary purpose. Mathematics and the deceased languages were the basis of the higher education, not because of the utility of their subject matter but because they were believed to be the best mental gymnastics. There are still today educators who believe that the frequently superior scholarship of groups of students in the classical courses is due to the superior nature of the subjects they have studied. They seem to forget that these classical courses have a tendency to attract students who already have scholarly ability or ideals above the average. It is not at all proved that the courses are responsible for developing those qualities.

The social aim of education.—The sociologist is not satisfied with any of these conceptions of the purpose of education. The keenest insight into the true purpose of education has been shown by a man who was not primarily an educator at all, but who had a broad knowledge of the evolution of human society as a whole. That man was Lester F. Ward. In his view the purpose of education is to distribute *knowledge*, that is, knowledge of those fundamental facts and principles which enable mankind to master nature and his own culture. The main thing in education is *science*, including the natural

sciences, history, and the social sciences.[1] To this end all other courses are merely preparatory. Languages and mathematics are merely tool-courses. Ward put the emphasis on the very thing which the educators of his time considered secondary, namely, the social utility of the subject matter itself.

Modern psychology, by modifying and belittling the old theory of formal discipline, has paved the way for a more favorable reception of this view. It has been shown that almost any branch of learning can be made to afford a "training for the mind," but that a training acquired in one line does not automatically function in other and unrelated lines. Outside of a few general habits of study which may be used in all kinds of mental work, most of our mental training is training in specific fields of knowledge, and cannot be transferred to other fields. The important thing, therefore, is to select those fields of study in which the subject matter itself is useful.

This does not mean, however, a "bread and butter" ideal of education. We can leave it more or less to the individual to acquire the knowledge he needs for his particular vocation, and there is no use in trying to give him that knowledge until he has chosen his vocation. The most important knowledge to be transmitted to the rising generation is the knowledge which is necessary to the efficient worker in *any* vocation, and to intelligent living as citizen and consumer. This is education for citizenship, or *social education.* It consists primarily of natural sciences, history, and the social sciences. The classics are chiefly valuable for the "cultural" rather than the social aim of education. In this "cultural" education they must take their places alongside a great many other subjects which have equal value in the enrichment of the leisure life. As H. G. Wells says, in "Salvaging of Civiliza-

[1] Ward, "Applied Sociology," pp. 90–93, 299–302, 307–313.

tion," "That there is a wisdom and beauty in the classics which is incommunicable in any modern language, which obviously neither ennobles nor empowers, but which is nevertheless supremely precious, is a kind of nonsense dear to the second rate classical don."

Science, information, and ideas.—Education is something much bigger than the school system. The school is only one of the agencies engaged in the work of education. The home, the church, the newspaper, conversation, the lecture platform, the open forum, the street meeting, the library all play an important part. Let us consider the whole process of social education, regardless of the agencies which perform it. This process consists of the diffusion of three different kinds of intellectual culture elements.

First is the teaching of general principles and facts, established truths, useful working theories. These elements are *science*. This part of the task falls primarily to the school and the book.

Second, there is the giving out of news and information about current events and facts of temporary or local importance, which task falls primarily to the newspaper. These elements are *information*.

Third, there is the airing of unproved opinions, theories, proposals, which is done more or less by all the agencies of education. These elements we might call *ideas*.

All these three tasks are essential to the work of social education. Every agency of education must be free to undertake any one of them where the circumstances justify. When we limit the school rigidly to the first task, we hinder the effectiveness of its work and miss valuable opportunities. For the central problem of all education is to *stimulate interest*. It seems not to be "natural," if we may use the term, for the average human mind to take an interest in a wide variety of affairs not closely connected with one's personal life. Always and everywhere the school, the newspaper, the

propagandist, the lecturer, strive to tear men's minds loose from their pre-occupation with their immediate problems and daydreams, and to arouse their interest in those "duller" and "dryer" things which affect them just as certainly, but more remotely and indirectly. To arouse interest, science, information, and ideas must be variously combined.

The central problem of education is to arouse interest.—Interest is a matter of conditioned reflexes. When the experience of hearing, reading, talking about a certain subject has become attached to pleasant emotions, especially the emotion of "thrill," we say that we have an interest in that subject.

School educators only recently have acknowledged that the stimulation of interest is the vital problem in education. If they are going to get this interest, they must be free to arrange various combinations of science, information, and ideas; of pure and applied science; of book work and manual work. By experiment the educator finds what combinations are effective in stimulating interest. We cannot afford to hinder him by any rigid standard of the "proper function of the school." When Scott Nearing made a radical speech at one of our universities, it was objected by many that it was not the place of the university to act as a channel of propaganda, that if it considers radical doctrines at all it should do so impartially, in the regular classroom work. But the point is that this particular speech did more to awaken interest and discussion of certain economic problems than could many hours of "temperate" classroom discussion. It stimulated the opposite views as well as those in agreement with the radical views presented.

Each of these three divisions of the social educational task, namely, the diffusion of science, of information, and of ideas, has its own special problems.

The tasks of social education: 1. The popularization of scientific knowledge.—First, let us consider science. Both the natural and the social sciences are essential. Ward has

said that the main task of education is to teach the essential principle of all the sciences to all mankind. But here a serious problem arises. Science becomes more specialized every day. No longer is it possible to have men like Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Leonardo da Vinci, who were masters of most all of the scientific knowledge of their times. The field of knowledge is now too vast for any one man to master it all. But this means only that we must devote our efforts more and more to the *summarizing* of scientific truth, and to the careful selection of the things most important for the masses of the people to know. This is not an impossible task.

There already is a movement toward providing courses in general natural science, instead of offering a choice between physics, chemistry, and biology. Attempts are being made to construct courses and textbooks in general social science. Columbia's "Contemporary Civilization," Dartmouth's "Evolution" and "Problems of Citizenship" are illustrative. As the trees become more numerous, it is simply a pr[illegible] of getting a better viewpoint in order to see the fore[illegible] whole. In the past the chief academic honors have g[illegible] men of research and original discovery. But there is a [illegible] of growing importance for the text writer, the good tea[illegible] the man who has the skill to select and organize exi[illegible] knowledge for retail distribution among the masses of [illegible] people. In the future we shall train some scholars specifica[illegible] for this work, instead of training every scholar for original research as our Ph.D. requirements now compel us to do.

This body of summarized knowledge, which we shall attempt to teach to the common citizen, should be agreed upon as far as possible by educators from various nations. Especially in history and the social sciences is it important to have some kind of international uniformity in the knowledge and ideas to be taught to the masses. H. G. Wells has pointed out the importance of this in his "Salvaging of Civilization." He sees the need for a great standard textbook of history

and sociology which would perform the international function that the Bible has performed within its sphere. He calls this proposed book the "Bible of Civilization." Such a book would afford a common meeting ground for the minds of men from all over the world, and would break down local and national prejudices. It would counteract the false beliefs which nations hold regarding each other, and pave the way for international brotherhood and peace.

The destructive influence of science.—Modern scientific education is criticized as being destructive. We may as well admit that it is destructive. It must tear down certain things before it can re-construct. Education is to a certain extent a process of unlearning—a "debunking" process, if you will. Let us make no apologies for this. The destruction of false notions saves mankind from untold suffering. It is the destruction of error and illusion that has set men free from the terrors of the mediæval torture rack, from the supposed necessity of exposing infants, hanging witches, and burning philosophers at the stake.

The natural sciences have nearly finished their destructive work and are now in a stage of construction. The destructive features are still prominent, however, in the social sciences, and it is these sciences that are today getting the heavy dogmatism. In the circumstances this is inevitable.

When the student enters his first class in physics or chemistry, he does so with an empty and open mind. The teacher can begin right away to build up knowledge. He can teach that water is H_2O because the student never has had any idea that it is anything else. But when a student enters a class in social science his mind is already full of prejudices and preconceptions on the subject. From the cradle up he has absorbed a lot of popular wisdom, much of which is long outworn, regarding human relations. He believes that national prosperity can be secured by printing money, that the protective tariff is the secret of American economic suprem-

acy, that crime can be checked merely by making the punishments more severe, that the color line is something born in us, that labor troubles are caused mainly by red agitators, that government ownership is always inefficient, that any evil can be stopped simply by passing a law against it. He has to unlearn or modify these ideas before he can begin to learn. For this reason the person who is well educated in social science often seems to have less positive knowledge, less sure convictions, than the ignoramus. His uncertainty, his doubt, his "ifs" and "ands," his lengthy explanations, are looked upon as a sign of weakness. In reality they are signs that he has begun his education.

Many people do not like this destructive side of the social studies. They say that they tear down beliefs and put nothing in their place. They leave us in doubt and uncertainty about many things of which we formerly felt sure. For this reason, it is said, they are not true sciences. A true science, it is said, should give us definite laws, which can be proved beyond doubt, it should give us formulas to solve the problems of life.

But every science has its destructive side as well as constructive, and the destruction alone is worth while. Chemistry destroyed alchemy, without putting anything in its place. It did not show us a better way to make gold out of iron, but showed us simply that we *cannot* make gold out of iron. The mere learning of this negative fact has been of immense service to mankind. The natives of the Japanese mountains had a magic formula for making rain. They climbed to the tops of the highest mountains and rolled down great masses of rock, while others built fires in crude imitation of the lightning. With another primitive people the method was to draw blood from some member of the tribe and sprinkle it about on the ground. Often rain would follow these ceremonies, for it was about due anyway. If it did not come, then some mistake must have been made in the cere-

mony. Well, modern science has "debunked" all of this magic and has put nothing in its place. It simply has taught us that there is nothing we can do about it. But, has science done harm in destroying these old beliefs? Rather it has done immense good. Knowing wherein we are powerless, wherein we are ignorant, we devote our energies to irrigation, crop insurance, or better agricultural methods and other things which we *can* accomplish.

Likewise, science gives us so far no formula for predicting the lucky number in a lottery, for predetermining the sex of a child, for restoring the hair to a bald head, for finding the one ideal soulmate or the one ideal occupation for which one is above all else fitted, or for solving the negro problem or the alcohol problem. But science performs valiant service by exposing the smug philosophers who claim to know how to do these things.

The first step toward knowledge is a recognition of one's ignorance. It is only by taking that step that we shall ever hinder the knowledge which will give us a better and richer social life.

The organization of news and information.—An education in science is useful only when we apply it to particular problems and situations of life. Some of these problems and situations are thrust directly before us in our everyday lives. Others become known to us only by hearsay, through conversation or reading. The second of the three tasks of social education is the circulating of knowledge concerning these particular facts and events. In other words, the distribution of news and *information,* mostly through journalism and literature. The great problems here are (1) truthful reporting, (2) impartial selection, and (3) efficient organization. The cases where the newspapers and other organs of information tell downright falsehoods are comparatively rare. Much more serious and numerous are the cases where situations are misrepresented by publishing certain facts and concealing others

which have an equal bearing on the case. During the early days of Soviet Russia, for example, our newspapers published a front page story of a proposed massacre by the Bolshevists alleged to be scheduled for St. Bartholomew's Day. When the proposed massacre failed to materialize the fact was very briefly mentioned in some obscure corner of the paper. The great need is for impartial, fact-reporting newspapers. It may be necessary to separate news from advertising, for the advertisers always enjoy a control which prevents the newspaper from giving merited space to facts or ideas that might be injurious to the advertisers.

When Dr. Frank Crane wrote in his column in the New York Globe: "Back of every display of diamonds and pearls is sheer vulgarity," the advertisement of a prominent jewelry company was withdrawn from the paper. The Globe courageously printed the letter of withdrawal, by which it was accused of "irresponsibility" in its columns. Such journalistic independence as this might become the general rule if newspapers would organize to resist the pressure of advertisers.[1]

The efficient organization of news and information presents a large problem for the future to handle. Consider, for example, the time now wasted by a stranger becoming adjusted to a new community. By much trial and error he picks up his information about the location of streets, the best places to buy this and that, the time required to travel from one place to another, the peculiar type and flavor of amusement offered by various establishments, the interests of his neighbors, the local opportunities for employment and for play. We may expect to see in the future a great development of community information bureaus. Some might offer vocational, some recreational, and some general service information. *Information* organized from the standpoint of con-

[1] See The *Nation*, Dec. 22, 1920, p. 721.

sumers' needs may take the place of *advertising,* which is organized from the standpoint of the producers' desire to sell. In the field of more general knowledge, the information now scattered at random through numerous books and pamphlets becomes gradually organized into convenient encyclopedias, yearbooks, manuals, directories, readers' guides. The mapping in detail of every square mile of country in the United States has been undertaken by the Geological Survey, and such maps for most parts of the country already are available.

3. Freedom of expression, a *sine qua non* of progress.— The third task of social education is to provide a free market for *ideas* of all sorts. Much could be done to organize better channels for the expression of opinions. The Open Forum movement is a step in this direction. But the great need is [illegible]edom. Any idea with sincerity back of it will find a means [illegible]he[illegible]ression if it is not artificially suppressed. Absolute [illegible]n of speech is the theory of our Constitution. In late [illegible]e have fallen considerably from this vital principle set [illegible]n the First Amendment. Russia and Italy are punish- [illegible]ople for expressing opinions. Under the new criminal [illegible]calism laws of some of our states we are doing the same. [illegible]hy is freedom of expression so important to human [illegible]ress? First, because it is part of our personal liberty. [illegible]s necessary to the immediate enjoyment of the individual [illegible]ife. Its desirability rests on the same grounds as freedom of dress, of recreation, and of the other activities which we showed in the last chapter belong to the sphere of liberty rather than to the sphere of cooperation and regulation.

Second, freedom of expression is necessary as a safety valve to discontent. Some of the world's most violent revolutions, such as the French and the Russian, have followed upon long periods of repression in which grievances had no chance for an airing, no opportunity to get to the attention of those in power.

Third, freedom of expression is necessary because it provides a nursery for hidden truths. As Mill says, in his "Essay on Liberty," it is possible that the opinion which we attempt to suppress may be true, or that it may contain a germ of truth. To suppress it kills temporarily the chance of this truth being discovered and used. Eventually, if it is really a truth, it will come up again, but there is much loss and wastage in the delay. Truth has no inherent power to prevail over error: it prevails eventually because the truthful idea will appear repeatedly while the erroneous idea will not. If several attempts are made by different persons to add up a difficult column of figures, resulting in several different answers, any answer that is repeated several times is likely to be the true one. There is only one true answer. But the erroneous answers, being drawn from an immense number of possibilities, are likely to be all different, and never to duplicate.

One never knows by what door truth will enter. The sound policy is to keep all doors open. As Justice H[illegible] said in his famous dissenting opinion in the Abrams Espionage Act case, "When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas, that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . . Only the emergency which makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.'"[1] In the words of John Stuart Mill, "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that

[1] Dissenting Opinion of Supreme Court Justice Holmes, in the Abrams Case. Quoted in Chafee, "Freedom of Speech," pp. 155, 156.

one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.''

Objections to free speech.—Several objections are raised against this policy of absolute, unqualified freedom of expression. First, it is said, what if the expressed opinion be dangerous or injurious? This objection is based upon the naive view, readily accepted by the simple minded, that evil should be rooted out at the very source. In this view, if a deed is wrong, then all words that seem to lead to that deed are wrong, and should be punished. But the whole point is that you cannot tell whether a given line of action is right or wrong until it has passed through the stage of discussion. You cannot root out evil at its very outset, because you cannot tell at the outset what is good and what is evil. Like many tiny sprouting plants in the garden, you must allow all to grow to a certain size before you can tell which are the weeds and which are the flowers. Where then is the point at which suppression of evil should begin? It is at that point where opinions and expressed wishes pass over into conspiracies and overt acts. Can we tell where that point is? Yes, in general there is a very clear and definite line of demarkation which has been lost sight of in the recent hysterical outbursts against radicalism.

Suppose we should get up on a soap box and exclaim: "The workers ought to declare a general strike, overthrow the tyranny of capitalism, and declare a workers' dictatorship." We should be expressing merely an opinion, a wish, an attitude, and any law that would punish us for these words is contrary to the spirit of our Constitution. If we feel that way about it, it is better to have our feelings aired than to have them bottled up and perhaps leading to underground conspiracies. If a group of persons has a grievance, the government needs to know it. To suppress the expression does not eliminate the grievance.

If, however, we say: "Come, boys, let us march on the

City Hall and bomb the First National Bank," and we follow these words by appropriate acts to carry out our intention, then we are punishable under the ordinary criminal law. We are guilty of riot, or of inciting to riot. What we are punished for is not the words *per se*, but the general course of *action* of which the words are merely a part. Freedom of speech means that words alone, when not part of any actual criminal act or conspiracy are not punishable. It matters not what the words *advocate*, so long as they do not *direct* or *deliberately incite* an illegal act. Practically all of the radical utterances for which persons were arrested or punished during the war and post-war period have been mere expressions of words disconnected from any illegal act. If a group of radicals were about to commit some actual deed of violence, they would prepare for it secretly and not shout it from housetops.

It will of course be argued that violent and abusive language tends indirectly to stimulate illegal deeds. But it is impossible to prove that any particular speech stimulates some particular deed. If we are going to forbid and punish all words that might possibly provoke somebody to criminal violence, then we have cut out for ourselves a big and impossible task. We shall have to punish everyone who provokes a fellow man to anger against a third party, for this may lead to murder. We shall have to forbid the portrayal of scenes of luxury on the moving picture screen, lest the cravings they arouse incite somebody to robbery. It is the settled policy of law to punish only acts which are in themselves harmful or dangerous to the public welfare. To punish all the acts which *might tend to cause* these harmful acts is not only impossible, but if it were possible would mean the end of all personal liberty.

A second objection is that dangerous ideas spread rapidly, and that it is necessary to check them as one would a disease. But if an idea does spread rapidly, that is usually a sign

that it contains truth and ought to be spread. Our attempt to suppress the hostile opinion shows that we do not trust the soundness of our own opinion.

Third, it is argued that freedom of speech is all right so long as the speech does not advocate force or violence. But there is no clear way of determining whether a given speech advocates force or violence. It leaves too much to the discretion of the judge or jury, which may be swayed by prejudice for or against the ideas represented by the speaker who is on trial. It would be possible to jail almost any unpopular propagandist if we could find that his language even metaphorically implied violence. We could jail people for almost any kind of loose talk in which they thoughtlessly expressed approval of some violent or criminal act. To exclaim: "he must be murdered!" might become a criminal offense. Our forefathers already had had experience with these exceptions and qualifications to the rule of free speech, and their reply was the unqualified statement: "The Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech." The only sound policy is that expressed by Thomas Jefferson when he said: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."

6. The Promotion of Discovery

Finally, and above all, cultural progress depends upon continual new discovery and invention in both the natural and the social sciences. There is little that society can do in this respect except to provide the conditions favorable to scientific research in general.

The possible future inventions of mankind are a favorite theme of a certain type of fiction. We imagine the artificial creation of life, instantaneous transportation over great distances, aerial navigation brought within the purse of every-

one, unlimited food made synthetically from earth, air, or water, the indefinite prolongation of the individual life, thought transference, the breeding of a race of supermen, and even trips to the moon. As to the real possibilities of such inventions' occurring we are as ignorant as babes in the woods.

But this much can be said. Every new invention or discovery is likely to solve old social problems and also to create new problems. Many a problem with which we have wrestled unsuccessfully for centuries, by means of legislation, education, or exhortation, may find its solution almost overnight, through some unexpected stroke of mechanical genius. But the same discovery will probably create some new and totally different social problem, so that the work of social invention and cultural adjustment must continue as long as ma

Society cannot determine in advance what discove take place. It cannot guide the course of invention. tion itself is the initial process. It is in cultural e what a mutation is in biological evolution. It is the n unforeseen departure to which all other things must themselves. But society can be organized so as to invention more or less rapid. If we give rewards and agement to the inventors who stand in the vanguard tural evolution, if we spend more of our social incom research laboratories, if we organize a scheme for finding stimulating the creative geniuses who are hidden among us we stand a better chance of arriving quickly at the new discoveries which will solve our problems in new and better ways.

Summary.—The measures suggested in Chapters XII to XVI toward the attainment of the four great objectives of social betterment cannot be successful unless certain underlying conditions are fulfilled. These conditions include a population density that is not too great or too small, the maintenance of an adequate level of hereditary quality in the population, a not too unequal distribution of wealth, a dis-

tribution of social power which gives to all classes and groups an adequate share in the control of social policy, the widespread diffusion among the people of scientific knowledge and correct information, absolute freedom of expression, and conditions which encourage invention and discovery.

With respect to the quantity of population, the pressing problem today seems to be the growth of world population at so rapid a rate that overpopulation may be expected in about a century and a half. The most humane remedy available is birth control, and it is being increasingly practiced. With respect to population quality, the pressing problem is that of preventing the increase of mentally defective or inferior stocks. Though sterilization and the teaching of birth control to the inferior classes may have some slight effect, the movement seems insoluble without some measure for encouraging the greater reproduction of the mentally superior [illegible] A more efficient system, perhaps socially subsidized, [illegible]ng for the children of superior parents, and social [illegible]nts to limit competitive consumption, and simplify [illegible]ds of living, seem outstanding needs.

[illegible] task of social education has both its positive and negative aspects. The negative aspect, that is, the tearing down [illegible]rstition, prejudice and pseudo-knowledge, is an important task of education, and is valuable even where there is [illegible]ing positive to put in the place of the destroyed beliefs. [illegible]he central problem of education in the schools is to stimulate the interest of the student.

Freedom of expression is not only a part of the general objective of personal liberty, but is essential to progress also for the reasons that it provides a safety valve for discontent, keeps the government informed concerning the will of the people, and provides a nursery for hidden truths.

Material invention and discovery are the unpredictable mutations in human culture. They can be encouraged, however, by social effort.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PURPOSE OF HUMAN LIFE

There are discernible in this world two kinds of organized structures. One is a structure in which the parts exist for the sake of the whole. It is typified by architecture, by machinery, by plants and animals. The other kind of structure is the one in which the whole exists for the sake of the parts. It is illustrated by such humble things as lumber piles, haystacks, cakes and pies, and the interior arrangements of museums and storage warehouses. Structures of this type indeed have more or less characteristic forms, as of the first type, but the form is chosen for the sake venient preservation of the material it contains and cause it has any particular value in itself.

Man's cardinal error through all the ages has b habit of regarding culture, or civilization, as a struc which the parts exist for the whole. To liken the Sta Church, or other institution unto a great edifice, a grea chine, or a great organism, presents indeed a captivatin ture. But it is a misleading picture. We shall better per our destiny if we imagine civilization as a convenient fra work for the development of the individual lives that live upon it, and not as an organism existing for its own sake. The test of a civilization is neither its "material greatness" nor yet its "spiritual achievement" in the sense usually implied. It is the long-run happiness of the people.

But do we not gain freedom in certain respects only to become enslaved to every new feature of culture? Is there any real hope that culture shall become the servant of man

rather than his master? There do indeed seem to be several grounds for such a hope.

First, man has learned to guide biological evolution, by artificial selection. His dogs and cattle, corn and beans, are better (from the standpoint of human utility) than what nature would have evolved if left to itself. We could breed a better race of men if the masses were sufficiently educated to cooperate. Having thus experienced a degree of mastery over biological evolution, it is conceivable that man will learn to guide the evolution of his culture by rational selection and rejection of traits.

Second, we are for the first time in history learning to *measure intangibles.* Our business barometers, our index numbers of prices, our social and vital statistics, all point the way toward a possible barometer of welfare-in-general.

Moreover, the modern humanitarian movement gives us ground for hope. It would seem that never before in the history has the prevention of pain and cruelty been raised to so high a plane of importance, never before has man been unwilling to sacrifice individual happiness for the sake of some cultural ideal or institution.

Finally, for the first time in history the intellectual leaders of mankind are *conscious of culture,* as a thing in itself, apart from human nature, and evolving according to certain laws. This understanding of culture may be a preliminary step toward directing and controlling it.

Modern anthropology itself gives us a new ground for hope. We used to believe that human society develops by passing through a series of more or less fixed and inevitable stages, much as the infant grows to manhood. To one holding this viewpoint it was a great surprise that the revolution long predicted by socialists came to backward, agricultural Russia, before it has reached advanced, industrial, ripe-for-revolution England. But under the newer theories of anthropology, which emphasize diffusion, a relatively simple

culture, located almost anywhere, by borrowing just the right combination of traits from more complex cultures, may suddenly blossom, whether for better or worse, into something unforeseen. These newer theories make progress seem less guaranteed, but they make it infinitely more available.

In this book we have based our philosophy of human welfare upon the best knowledge that humanity has. It may be, however, that we are wrong. It may be that the real and ultimate purpose of human life is not to be found in the enrichment of individual lives. Perhaps the evolution of culture is inevitably working toward some superorganic goal of its own, some complex, symmetrical structure in which the individual will be reduced to the place of a mere cog in a great machine. Perhaps we are only pawns in [illegible] greater game. If this be true, then the goals we [illegible] for ourselves in this book may be hopeless, and th[illegible] to attain them may be in vain.

But there is no valid evidence to prove that cult[illegible] any such superorganic goal of its own. Neither is the[illegible] thing in any of our great world religions that would [illegible] anyone to believe such a doctrine. The essential tea[illegible] of religion are quite in harmony with the ideal of "the gr[illegible] happiness of the greatest number."

We are under no obligation to guide our behavior b[illegible] unknown purpose. It is our obvious duty to guide ourse[illegible] by the highest purpose that we do know. And that is, in th[illegible] words of Jesus of Nazareth, announcing his mission, "that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." Each of us knows from his own personal experience that certain conditions of life are good, good both in their immediate effects and in their after-effects. Of this we require no proof; our own emotions are the test. To avoid the error of mistaking personal or cultural tastes for universal good, we check up by consulting men of other experience, of other civilizations. We find that the things which

men call good can be reduced to certain common denominators, which we have attempted to enumerate in this book: physical health and freedom from pain; long life; freedom from irritation, anxiety, grief, disgust, and other unpleasant emotions; a minimum of labor yielding a maximum of goods; abundance of leisure; variety of pleasant experiences, and personal liberty. To obtain these things for the greatest number of mankind can be the only rational goal of human endeavor. The great purpose which men always have sought is *in themselves,* in the condition of their own glands, muscles, stomachs, nervous systems.

But here enters into the heart of one type of philosopher a great fear. He fears our happiness philosophy as he would some stick of dynamite. The minds and conduct of men must be held under control by standards and institutions which they perceived only dimly as through a mist, with unknown forces surrounding them. Now that the mists are clearing and these standards and institutions are exposed to the searching sunlight of reality, he fears that they will lose their holiness and their power to control mankind. Can men hate one with the other only in the dark? When they see clearly will they tear each other's throats?

Because we frankly recognize all institutions and cultural standards for what they are, namely convenient instruments, more or less effective, toward human happiness, and because we describe that happiness in the realistic terms of glands, reflexes, and physiological processes in the human body, our philosopher seems to forebode a terrible catastrophe. He fears that we are tampering with the underpinnings of civilization and that pretty soon the whole structure will tumble down upon our heads.

In this age of disillusionment, of withering standards, what shall we teach the rising generation? What possible argument can we use that will win them away from a life of selfishness and irresponsibility to the rest of mankind?

To fear that this frank and realistic analysis of human life will produce chaos is utterly to misconceive human psychology. The individual may be born selfish, but as long as men shall live in social groups and not as hermits, the individual will inevitably acquire habits of cooperation and self-sacrifice. Just as the rough fragment of rock which falls into the stream is sure eventually to become smooth and round from the constant friction with other rocks, so the individual, though born selfish, is sure to become socialized. The problem is to see that he becomes intelligently socialized.

Under our present culture the actual processes of group life and education fail in some respects to develop sufficient unselfishness, sufficient cooperation. But in other respects they oversocialize the individual. They crush his individuality, they grind him into conformity where conformity is [illegible] To make good teamworkers is only one half of the pr[illegible] education. The other half, overlooked by too man[illegible] educators, is to develop, where freedom is possible, f[illegible] unhampered individual personalities. The danger t[illegible] individual will break loose from social control is n[illegible] serious than the danger that he will be over-repressed.

In the brilliant sunshine of Colorado the author ha[illegible] obliged to spend many hours looking at the world th[illegible] dark green spectacles. He became very fond of the my[illegible] unreal view they gave him of his surroundings. He often[illegible] loath to discard his colored glasses and to face reality. [illegible] when he finally brought himself to remove them he found that nothing genuine was lost. The mountains with their snow-capped peaks, although seen in a different light, were still there. Their power to charm and inspire was as great as ever. Nothing could destroy reality.

To analyze is not to destroy. In our engineering laboratories we often "tear down" a complicated and wonder-inspiring piece of machinery, in order that the student may understand it part by part. But this experience does not provoke

the student to go forth and destroy all machinery. It prepares his mind to build a better machine. In like manner the theoretical analysis of man's cherished ideals does not destroy all idealism. Man, by his very nature, and the nature of the environment in which he always must live, is an ideal-building animal. If one system of ideals be discarded as the result of scientific analysis, another and probably better system will inevitably arise to take its place.

There always will be need for devotion to great causes and ideals. In any age it is a small and unworthy man or woman who is unwilling to sacrifice immediate personal pleasure for the greater good. What higher ideal could there be than the pursuit, with a free mind and an unclouded vision, of the goal of *happiness for all?*

[illegible]s return, then, to the question of what we shall teach [illegible]ger generation. Why cannot we teach them the [illegible]nadorned principle of altruism, the keynote of all [illegible]t religions of mankind? Namely, that one's own life [illegible]one small part of the total of human life, and that the [illegible]ess which he pursues individually for himself is only [illegible] of the happiness he must help promote for all. The [illegible]dual does not, and cannot live unto himself alone. The [illegible] that can completely grasp that truth has the essentials [illegible] morality and religion.

[illegible]ut, can we live without faith in something beyond the [illegible]wn world? Some sincerely believe they can, others con[illegible]ess they cannot. At least one simple, axiomatic faith is necessary to all. That is the faith that human life on this earth is worth while, and that it is worth while to strive to make it better.

Say not the struggle nought availeth,
  The labor and the wounds are vain,
The enemy faints not, nor faileth,
  And as things have been they remain.

If hopes are dupes, fears may be liars;
It may be in yon smoke concealed,
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers,
And, but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking,
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,
When daylight comes, comes in the light,
In front, the sun climbs slow, how slowly,
But westward look, the land is bright.

—Arthur Hugh Cl

DISCUSSIONS AND REPORTS

CHAPTER I

1. What are the essential differences between man and the lower animals?

2. Outline the general stages of development of man's conquest of nature, and list the principal new achievements in each stage.

3. Reclassify the stages of man's conquest of nature according to Ellwood's scheme:

(1) Pre-literate, pre-agricultural ("savagery")
(2) Pre-literate, agricultural ("barbarism")
(3) Literate, pre-scientific ("semi-civilization")
(4) Literate, scientific

4. Divide cultural evolution into stages based upon organization rather than material technique.

5. What were the six great Bronze Age civilizations and [illegible] tinctive traits of four of them?

6. Is it correct to say that culture was lost in the Middl[illegible] and had to be regained?

7. Distinguish the evolution of man himself from the evo[illegible] of his culture or civilization.

CHAPTER II

1. What, if any, is the difference between "civilization" and "culture"?

2. Distinguish "culture" in the popular sense from "culture" in the sociological sense. Who, in each sense, can be said to be "cultured"?

3. What is the "superorganic"?

4. Define the different classes of human traits.

5. Make a list of (*a*) universally (*b*) personally (*c*) culturally acquired traits observed among our fellow-students.

6. What are the six kinds of elements of which culture is composed? Analyze football as a culture complex, and point out elements of each of the six types.

7. What are symbols? What kinds of symbols are there? What is their function in human life?

8. Does culture consist of human activity, or the results of human activity?

9. Distinguish biological from cultural evolution.

10. Trace the evolution of hazing, of fraternities, of some athletic sport, or some custom in your college. Does this evolution correspond to any changes in the nature of the students themselves?

11. "World peace will come about through the gradual self-elimination of the bloodthirsty and pugnacious types of men, and their replacement by men of more peaceful blood." Do you agree? Discuss in the light of this chapter.

What is the value of the study of culture in general?

fine and illustrate culture, trait complex, culture type, ıter, culture area.

ıat are the principal culture areas of the world?

ıuld you divide up the United States into cultural sub- What might such areas be, and the distinctive traits of each? ellow-students who were brought up in different regions.

how that there is a definite culture pattern in the college ım, including such features as regular recitations, quizzes, ıtions, etc. Show how the new ideas and schemes of educaıat are occasionally introduced into the college, are forced to nselves into this pre-existing pattern.

Is there a pattern to which college athletic activities must conform? Describe it.

CHAPTER III

1. What is the environmental explanation of culture? Why is it not satisfactory? Illustrate.

2. What is the racial explanation of culture? Why is it unsatisfactory? Illustrate.

3. What is the relation between culture and population density? Illustrate.

4. What is the "great man" interpretation of cultural history?

5. Show how physical environment and the biological charac-

teristics of a group of young children may *limit* their play life, but not *determine* or *direct* it.

6. Why has civilization moved from warmer to cooler climates?

7. What is meant by explaining culture in terms of culture? Illustrate.

8. Mention some differences between the life and customs of two or more colleges which seem to be due (1) to differences in physical environment, (2) to differences in the innate ability of the average student, (3) to differences in the size of the student-body, (4) to differences in history.

9. What is the economic interpretation of history? Illustrate.

10. Illustrate from your own experience the processes or principles of invention, accumulation, diffusion, adhesion and functional relation, cultural inertia, cultural lag, cultural adjustment.

11. Is necessity the mother of invention? What are the conditions which produce invention?

12. Are the student annuals published in most of o
a case of parallelism or of diffusion? Why?

13. "Restriction of immigration is bad because it cuts
the valuable contributions which foreign peoples make t
ture." Do you agree? Why or why not.

14. What is organized diffusion?

15. What are the possible kinds of adjustment between
ples having different cultures?

16. Most peoples who profess Christianity also have r
Is this a case of adhesion or of functional relation? Same c
for: English language and football; factories and labor
absence of caste and reign of fashion in clothing.

17. Have you ever observed any problem of human relat
solved by *social invention,* rather than by imitating a solution
elsewhere? Describe.

18. Why does social invention lag behind mechanical invention?

19. Does the modern view of cultural evolution tend to encourage or to discourage our acceptance of the predictions of the future frequently made by various speakers and writers?

CHAPTER IV

1. Make a list of all the technical terms, and other terms new to you, used in this chapter, and see that you understand the meaning of each.

2. What is the essential difference between animals and plants?

3. A child, frightened by a dog in the street, runs into the house, closing the door behind him. Point out the nine steps in this behavior mechanism.

4. Classify the receptors and the effectors.

5. Distinguish between isolated random reactions, and reaction patterns. To what extent is each inborn?

6. A six-months-old baby sees a pencil and grasps it. Is this instinctive? In what respects is it inborn, in what acquired?

7. What is the difference between the old and new conceptions of "instinct"?

8. What is a biologically adequate stimulus? In general, what kinds of stimuli are never biologically adequate?

9. "There can be no instinctive fear of snakes because there is no inborn mechanism to recognize snakes as distinguished from any [illegible]ject." Give the reasoning in support of this.

[illegible]t[illegible]e the six classes of "prepotent reflexes" and the biologi[illegible]ate stimuli to each. Show also what emotions, or visceral [illegible]tend to function with each of these groups of somatic

[illegible]hat are approaching and avoiding reactions?

[illegible]hat are the principal emotions? Describe carefully the [illegible]m of each, including the biologically adequate stimulus and [illegible]inal reaction pattern. What is the biological utility of

What is the difference between the pleasant and unpleasant [illegible]s?

Describe the conditioned reflex, using diagram. Show how [illegible]lies in the case of training a dog, by whipping, not to jump [illegible] a table.

15. Could you train a child to become angry whenever he saw a red light, and to become happy at the sight of a green light? Describe how.

16. Do you find, in studying, that whispering distracts you more than talking? If so, explain.

17. Describe and illustrate trial-and-error learning. Why does the successful response become established as a habit?

18. Show how symbolizing reactions short-cut the learning process in mankind.

CHAPTER V

1. Distinguish the physical, sub-cultural social, and cultural environments. Illustrate, using features of your own environment.

2. In what class (inborn, universally acquired, personally acquired, or culturally acquired) would you put each of the following traits? Each trait is designated thus: stimulus—response. The phrase in parentheses, when it occurs, indicates the type of individual in which the trait is found. Thus "(Mother) sight of her child—caressing tendencies" indicates the trait found in mothers, of tending to caress the child.

Your answer may, in many cases, be qualified. You may find, for example, that a certain trait is cultural within a certain social group, but personal outside of that group.

Loss of pocketbook—anger.
Odor of cooking onions, in parlor—disgust.
Herd of cows slowly approaching on road—fear.
Plate whose whole area is smeared with food before bei
ceived by the eater—disgust.
Sight of snake—fear.
(Man) odor of perfume—mild sex interest.
Cold soft boiled eggs—disgust.
(Cat) sight of stove—fear and withdrawal.
Sight of skeleton—mild fear.
Sound of "Star Spangled Banner"—thrill.
Sight of trigger being pulled on gun—shudder.
Sound of dinner bell—flow of saliva.
Sound of a hurdy-gurdy—irritation.
Praise by fellow-men—pleasurable thrill.
Disorderly room—irritation.
Death of loved one—grief.
Being lost in woods—fear.
Praise by fellow-men—pleasurable thrill.

3. How would you explain the proverbial feminine fear of mice?

4. Music in a minor key is said to be sad, melancholy, while the major key more often suggests cheer and hope. Do you think these connections are inborn or acquired? Could you train a child so as to develop the reverse associations? How? Why, in our culture, does minor music more commonly suggest sadness?

5. Is a nation whose boys are allowed and encouraged to engage

freely in fist fights likely to be more warlike than another nation where juvenile combats are repressed?

6. What is the subcultural pattern? Memorize its main divisions.

7. What is the difference between the older and the newer way of explaining how man's original nature produces the subcultural pattern?

8. "Gregariousness must be an instinct because it is universal in mankind." Explain why this view is not held by modern psychologists.

9. Show how the institution of property could arise universally out of man's original nature, and yet not be "instinctive."

10. What is the difference between social psychology and sociology?

11. What is tradition? The social heritage? What is meant by [illegible] acquires a momentum of its own"?

[illegible] uld you say that New Englanders are by nature more [illegible] re economical, than persons of similar social status in the [illegible] Vest? What is the true nature of the difference?

[illegible] would appear that political conflicts less frequently lead [illegible] e and bloodshed in Great Britain than on the Continent. [illegible] true, would you ascribe the difference to greater innate [illegible] ol, "calmer temperament," on the part of Englishmen? To

[illegible] Serfdom in mediæval Europe was a device through which [illegible] ers overcame the nomadic instincts of their tenantry . . . [illegible] n as these nomadic instincts ceased to exist serfdom van- [illegible] (Madison Grant, quoted in Ross, "Outlines," page 58.) [illegible] e this.

[illegible]. How do cultural standards conflict with other forces in [illegible]man behavior? Illustrate.

16. If culture is the product of the behavior of individual human beings, how does it become "master over the individual"?

17. By what instruments does culture control the individual?

18. Do you think there is more or less "crime," or its equivalent, in animal society than in human? What checks "crime" in animal societies?

19. Compare artificial or cultural social control with sub-cultural social control. Illustrate.

20. Show how cultural social control makes possible more efficient coöperation, and also more suffering.

21. Distinguish physical from mental suffering. Physical from mental enjoyment.

22. Why are mental enjoyments the chief source of human happiness?

23. What are sentiments, tastes, interests? Illustrate universal, personal, cultural sentiments.

CHAPTER VI

1. "Civilization makes human life more worth living." Give the arguments for and against this generalization.

2. What is the "cost of culture"? Illustrate. Is the cost altogether necessary to the results achieved? Mention some costs that might be spared.

3. Mention some beliefs which play the role of "tyrant" over people of your acquaintance. Distinguish these from [illegible] liefs.

4. At what stage of cultural evolution has the tyrann[illegible] been apparently greatest? Why this stage rather than [illegible] or later one?

5. Have you ever been helped by getting rid of a f[illegible] even though it was replaced by doubt rather than by a ne[illegible] conviction? Illustrate.

6. Wherein does our admiration for martyrs someti[illegible] lead us?

7. Is there any practical difference between self-sacrifice [illegible] institution, such as the state or the family, and self-sacrifice [illegible] *members* of that institution?

8. What evidence is there that the tyranny of institutio[illegible] groups over the individual is waning?

9. What is nationalism? Patriotism?

10. What practical difference will it make in the behavior of a citizen, whether he regards his community as an end in itself, or as a means to the welfare of its members?

11. Mention some practical decisions that might be affected by regarding wealth as a means rather than as an end.

12. Distinguish the "tyranny of fashion" from the tyranny of the conventional standard of living. Illustrate.

13. Why are our standards of living wasteful?

14. What is competitive consumption?

15. "After satisfying our physical needs, we spend the rest of

our income according to our *personal* preferences." Wherein is this false?

16. How does the custom of duelling illustrate "culture's conquest of man"? Does the abolition of duelling, in countries where it still is practiced, require a change in human nature? How might it be abolished?

17. Notice the advertising for "The New Book of Etiquette." "How I made a monkey of myself," "the old maid has vanished," "the comfort of knowing what to do and say," "are you always poised and at ease?" are typical headlines. Suppose everyone were to study this "Book of Etiquette." Would the net result be to cure "inferiority complexes" or to create new ones? Does etiquette illustrate culture's conquest of man?

18. A Moro, in the Philippine Islands, is reported as slaying a family of four to avenge an insult to his sister, which consisted of the [illegible]zing of her arm by her fiancé, one of the victims. How [illegible] illustrate "Culture's conquest of man"? Have you heard [illegible]iagous cases in our own culture?

[illegible] children invented an imaginary play-world in which [illegible] paper dolls, tin soldiers, etc., dramatized human social [illegible] of the leading sentiments in this imaginary society was [illegible] sacredness or prestige attaching to the color green. Sev[illegible]e paper dolls were imagined as raising a pink banner and [illegible]ing pink and not green as their favorite color. For this [illegible]itors" were, after a solemn "trial" and "sentence," cut to [illegible]nd burned. With what features of human culture and his[illegible]st the children have been familiar? Discuss the episode as [illegible]tization of "culture's conquest of man."

CHAPTER VII

1. Does democracy free us from the tryanny of culture? Explain your answer.

2. How does modern psychology change our traditional ideas about the nature of beauty? Illustrate.

3. Among the things which you consider beautiful, name (*a*) some that derive their beauty from probably universal tastes, (*b*) cultural tastes, (*c*) personal tastes.

4. Should the public have its fiction, art, and music selected for it by literary and art critics? Why or why not?

5. Cite some specific cases in which esthetic standards interfere with progress.

6. What is meant by saying "Moral virtues are devices of social control"?

7. Show the difference between the personal ethics viewpoint and the social ethics viewpoint in the case of (*a*) gambling, (*b*) drunkenness, (*c*) lying.

8. What is "honor"? Show how the ideal of honor functions in social control. Does it ever mislead us? Illustrate.

9. Why is democrary desirable?

10. It is considered good taste to conceal, more or less, our emotions, and not to advertise personal pleasure or happiness as a motive for our actions. We feel that it is better taste to give impersonal, objective reasons for what we do, even though such reasons may not be the ones which weigh most heavily in making our personal decisions. Is this cultural sentiment conducive to human progress? Why or why not? Do you know of a [illegible] who conceal their emotions more than we do? Any [illegible] them more?

11. An American teacher objected to certain methods [illegible] tion on the ground that they were German methods. [illegible] this illustrate? Do you think it was a valid objection?

12. Why do many parents send their sons to militar[illegible] and colleges? Do you think military life affords a superi[illegible] ing for civilian life? Discuss.

CHAPTER VIII

1. How does "man's revolt against culture" differ from re[illegible] tion in general?

2. What was the main idea contributed by Epicurus? Buddha? Rousseau? The utilitarians? Lester Ward?

3. Distinguish "aim" and "purpose."

4. What is symbolization?

5. How does man's purpose differ from the aim of nature?

6. What is value? What is the relation of economic to ethical value?

7. "The buying up and suppressing of a useful invention by a concern which would be injured by it is legally and economically right, but morally wrong." Criticize and discuss.

8. What is the difference between cultural evolution and cultural progress? Why is there doubt as to whether we have actually had progress?

9. How does the substitution of the novel for the epic in modern literature illustrate man's revolt against culture?

CHAPTER IX

1. "The per capita income of the United States in 1920 was about $600. The per capita income of Germany in 1914 was about $150, translating marks into dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange of 1914. Therefore, the average welfare of Americans in 1920 was four times as great as that of Germans in 1914." What seven reasons make this comparison invalid? Explain and illustrate each carefully.

[illegible] the prices of similar goods tend to be equal throughout [illegible] cial world? What goods? What kind of goods show [illegible] equal prices? Why?

[illegible] vages tend to be equal throughout the commercial world? [illegible] why not?

[illegible] at is real income? If we could measure the real income, [illegible] an the money income of countries, which of the above [illegible] irces of error would be eliminated? Which would remain, [illegible] ?

[illegible] all the homemakers of America should engage in gainful [illegible] ions outside the home, hiring servants and professional [illegible] epers to take their places, how would the per capita national [illegible] income of America be affected? Why? Would the real [illegible] be affected? If so, how?

[illegible]. Distinguish physical necessities, psychological necessities, true [illegible] xuries.

7. Distinguish positive or pleasure utility from relief utility.

8. Why are psychological necessities to be blamed upon culture rather than upon personal tastes?

CHAPTER X

1. How does the barometer of welfare suggested in this chapter differ from the method of measuring welfare described in Chapter IX?

2. What are the seven elements of the proposed barometer of welfare? Show why each is included.

3. What is the mathematical relation between average life-span and the birth and death rates?

4. State in figures the extent of sickness in the United States. Of physical defect.

5. What are the possible measuring rods of mental unhappiness or mental maladjustment? Show the limitations of each. By combining them all could we get a possibly reliable index?

6. Estimate carefully the number of hours per week of true leisure in your own life. Compare this with a similar estimate made for your father, or mother, or some other person.

7. What do you consider the over-worked and the under-worked classes of our population?

8. Why is quantity of goods consumed a better index of welfare in the case of true luxuries than in the case of necessity goods?

9. How does the view of luxuries given in this char
from Chase's view?

10. What is meant by "expenditures for advanceme
Department of Agriculture standard of living studies? I
used as an index of welfare?

11. Is *quantity* or *value* of luxury goods the more reli
of welfare? Why?

12. Construct a rough plan for measuring recreationa
in your college community, as compared with a village co
of about the same population.

13. Construct a rough plan for measuring the degree
sonal liberty in a women's college as compared with that in
college.

14. Why is liberty a part of welfare?

15. What types of commonly used statistics are purp
omitted from the barometer of welfare? Why?

16. (1) "All moral values are absolute, being derived from
universal Moral Law." (2) "There is no absolute right or wrong.
All moral values are relative, and change with the time." Does this
chapter support either of these propositions? State the philosophy
which it does support.

CHAPTER XI

1. What is meant by "man's reconquest of culture"? What other terms are used for it in sociological writings?

2. What parts of the general task of social betterment must be accomplished by social or coöperative effort? What can be left to individual effort? Why?

3. Why cannot society establish a perfect mode of life, and then train the individuals to fit into this pattern, instead of giving individuals freedom to construct their own patterns?

4. What is the functional view of social problems, as distinguished from the structural? Why does true progress require our taking the functional view?

5. What are the several types of prejudices or fallacies which have interfered with social progress? Illustrate each.

6. What is meant by an "eclectic" culture? Is progress helped by insistence upon cultural purity?

7. Add some suggestions of your own to the list of new trait combinations given under "Reshuffling of traits."

8. Give your own illustration of a "moral" problem solved by [illegible]aterialistic" adjustments.

[illegible]ove t[illegible]cial reformers make their mistake in assuming that [illegible]edom [illegible]an be made better by changing the social system. You [illegible]h[illegible] the character of individual men and women, and then [illegible] will take care of itself." From whom have you heard [illegible]ophy? What is the matter with it?

[illegible]hat is the difference between "preaching" (in the moral [illegible]ian religious sense) and "social agitation"? Why do we [illegible]put less faith than formerly in preaching as a means of [illegible]ishing social reform?

[illegible]"War cannot be abolished without substituting some other [illegible]or the emotions." Criticize.

[illegible]Our attitude toward criminals is slowly changing from a [illegible]ment-attitude to a treatment-attitude. We are beginning to [illegible]d the criminal as a "case" to be "treated" rather than as an [illegible]ject of social vengeance. Criminologists have shown that this [illegible]nange began in practice, through the introduction of reformatories, prison education, probation, juvenile courts, etc., before it began in theory. What principle in this chapter is illustrated by this fact?

CHAPTER XII

1. What are the specific evils of war? Are there any benefits? If so, what?

2. What are the various causes of war? Illustrate each.

3. How does warfare differ from the animal struggle for existence?

4. Explain the relations between industrialism and nationalism.

5. Does international trade stimulate or check war? How? If both, show how in each case.

6. Make a list of social movements, measures, and organizations aiming at the prevention of war.

7. Does the greatest hope of eliminating war lie in material or social invention? Why?

8. Can war be abolished without changing human nature?

9. Does the class struggle tend to stimulate or check war? How?

10. Do you think the breaking up of Austria-Hungary into several smaller states was a step toward greater peace?

11. How does the average length of life in the U. S. now differ from 1885? What has been the chief reason for increa gevity? (See Groves, Case.)

12. With respect to what forms of sickness has there l recent progress in medicine and public health? In what ress been small?

13. What is the "socialization of medicine"? Give sev cific illustrations.

14. Is sickness a social problem or merely a technical problem? Why not leave it to the doctors?

15. Should the government compel people to be healthy?

16. Is there a cultural lag in our treatment of health pro Explain.

17. Make a list of social movements, organizations and m aiming at the prevention or alleviation of sickness.

18. Why is there thought to be a conflict between eugenics public health?

19. What, in order, are the 10 leading causes of death in the U. S.? (See Reuter, Case, or World Almanac.)

20. Is a broken arm inflicted in a deliberate assault a worse evil than the same injury caused by a careless driver? Why?

21. To what extent are accidents the fault of the injured individual, and to what extent the fault of society? Discuss the meaning of the word "fault" in such cases.

22. What five industries, in order, are the most dangerous to life? (See Douglas-Hitchcock-Atkins or Atkins-Lasswell in Bibliography.)

23. Make a list of social movements and measures aiming to prevent accidents or alleviate the suffering caused by them.

24. List the evidences that physical cruelty is disappearing. Is there any contrary evidence?

25. Debate: Resolved that the docking of the tails of horses and dogs, and other mutilations of animals for the sake of appearance only, should be made a misdemeanor and punished by fine. Consider physical suffering, the superior importance of human pleasure over that of animals, personal liberty, the relativity of esthetic tastes.

26. What are causes of physical want? How can each cause be remedied?

27. Is poverty an absolute, or merely relative condition? If in any sense absolute, define it.

CHAPTER XIII

ow does mental suffering present a different kind of prob- physical suffering?

hat is meant by subjective and objective treatment? In ds of situations must the subjective method take prece- The objective method?

Relate some everyday incidents which illustrate the subjective of relieving mental suffering.

Why is there sometimes a conflict between the subjective and ve methods?

Much mental suffering is said to be due to "conflict of s." We are said to be "torn" by indecision and doubt. Are rn by *all* indecision or doubt? By what kinds, then? What which causes the suffering, the mere fact of indecision, or the fact that one of two strong desires must be left unsatisfied? Discuss.

6. Even some kinds of physical suffering can be mitigated by mental attitude. List illustrations of this from primitive and modern life.

7. Is there any evil in unsightly tenement houses so long as they are sanitary, properly heated, and ventilated? What?

8. Make a list of social movements, measures, and organizations aiming at the abolition of repulsive physical surroundings.

9. Why does there seem to be more insecurity in modern society, in spite of the fact that there is more wealth?

10. List the various social movements, measures, and organizations aiming to relieve the suffering of economic insecurity. Which ones embody the principle of insurance?

11. Does private property promote mainly security, or justice? Why?

12. Show how the controversy between Russia and the United States, over the recognition of alien property rights obtained in Russia before the revolution, illustrates the conflict between security and justice.

13. Compare the social pattern of insurance with that of a lottery. Is not each the making of small contributions in order to reap a great gain? What is the difference?

14. Would insurance against bad weather be practicable? Against damage of *all kinds* to *all personal property?* What are the difficulties involved?

15. What is justice? The "oppression psychosis"? Cl[illegible] open groups? Exploitation? Social classes?

16. List and classify the various social groups to [illegible] belong.

17. What is class consciousness? What conditions enco[illegible]

18. Why is the class struggle less pronounced in Ame[illegible] in Europe?

19. Make lists of illustrations of

(1) the conflict between men and women

(2) the conflict between old and young.

What prevents these conflicts from becoming as serious race or class conflict?

20. "The rich receive only 13% of the country's income." this prove there is no injustice in the distribution of wealth?

21. Discuss: "The labor movement is not justified because the better paid groups of workers who are most active in it; lowest paid workers remain silent and unorganized."

22. Discuss the inferior social position of the negro. Is it due to his different color, different degree of general intelligence, former slave status?

23. What is a "primary group"?

24. Distinguish "moral education," in the popular sense, from "civic" or "social" education.

25. Is personal friction a social problem, or only a problem of *personal* character? Show how culture itself may make it easier or more difficult for persons to treat each other kindly.

26. What is the extent of divorce in the United States? Distinguish between legal and real, or natural causes of divorce.

27. What are the arguments for and against liberal divorce laws?

28. Make a list of social measures, movements, and organizations aiming to prevent domestic unhappiness.

29. Draw up a list of rules, based upon the principle of the conditioned reflex, which would help to prevent the development of irritations within the family.

30. What is the main difficulty in solving the problem of marital unhappiness?

31. Is there a cultural lag between the industrial system and our attitudes toward the work of women? Explain.

32. If material culture changes first, why not solve the problems of the family by reorganizing the material household?

[illegible]. Define crime. Distinguish crime from tort, vice, sin, cul-[illegible]nse, anti-social behavior. Does "immorality" mean harm-

[illegible]w did the early Anglo-Saxon treatment of crime differ [illegible]?

[illegible]ow do justice and liberty make the prevention of crime [illegible]

[illegible]hat is the relation of crime to mental defect? Mental [illegible]

[illegible]lassify criminals. Distinguish biological from cultural of crime.

"Some crimes are simply the relics of formerly approved [illegible]ments for crime." Explain.

[illegible] Why are Southern homicide rates much higher than New [illegible]nd rates?

[illegible]. What are the three major policies in the treatment of crime? [illegible]ustrate each.

41. Discuss: "The molly-coddling of criminals by reformers and social workers is responsible for our large rate of crime."

42. Do you think the moving pictures tend to increase crime? If crime always is punished in the end of the story, is the influence therefore beneficial?

CHAPTER XIV

1. What is work?
2. Why is waste an evil?
3. "The savage needed all his time for making a living. Modern

man, because of labor-saving machines, has time to play." Criticize this.

4. What are the several great classes of waste? Illustrate each.

5. Distinguish waste of household- or self-service from waste in consumption.

6. Show the sources of waste in some job with which you have been closely connected. Classify them as above.

7. Point out some sources of economic waste in the work of your home or school.

8. What are the crucial problems in the conservation of natural resources? Why are these social and not merely engineering problems?

9. What are the remedies for irregular employment?

10. How and in what respects is competition wasteful in industry?

11. Does the division of labor change freely according to economic advantage, or is it somewhat crystallized into customary patterns? Illustrate.

12. What are the remedies for waste in processing?

13. Show the different ways in which competitive selling is wasteful.

14. Could you draw a rough distinction between socially useful advertising and wasteful advertising? What would be the principle or bases of your distinction?

15. A man let his clothes go unbrushed for a month because the clothes brush was in the attic and he "never could remember" to bring it down when he was up there. Suggest a *general* remedy for eliminating the many personal and household inefficiencies of which this is only one.

16. Suppose all transportation could be made suddenly twice as rapid. What social effects do you think this would have? Would it mean more leisure time, or would the time saved be used in work, or in traveling to still greater distances? Does the culture-pattern concept help to answer this question?

17. "Never do for yourself what you can hire done for you." "Never pay someone else to do what you can do yourself." Discuss the merits of these two philosophies. Can you state an intermediate rule which would be more reasonable than either?

18. Self-service, self-sufficiency, was the keynote of economic organization in Colonial times. Do the cafeteria, the operator-less

elevator, the cash-and-carry store represent a step backward? Discuss.

19. What are the advantages in communalizing household work? The limitations? Illustrate.

20. "Never put off till tomorrow what you can do today." Do you agree entirely with this philosophy? Discuss.

21. "What's worth doing is worth doing well." Do you agree entirely with this philosophy? If not, point out its limitations, and illustrate.

22. How could the average college student make his daily life more efficient without sacrifice of other values?

23. "There is more room for improvement in the household than in any other industry." Do you agree? Why has less study been devoted to household efficiency than to manufacturing, selling, and agriculture?

[illegible] What goods and services would occupy a greater, what a [illegible] ce, in a truly rational and progressive budget of consump-

[illegible] The final goal of the medical profession should be to elimi- need for its own existence." To what extent and why is [illegible]? Make a list of other occupations concerning which this [illegible]t could be made. Does society need to control such occu- in a different way from others? Why?

"With the advance of civilization, human labor is becoming, average, more and more monotonous." What evidence is for and against this generalization?

"Idleness means mischief and boredom. The hope of the lies not in reducing the amount of work, but in making work interesting, and teaching men the joy of productive labor." [illegible]ou agree? Discuss.

28. Make a list of the tasks in your life which you have found most interesting, and of those you have found most boresome. Compare notes with others. Can you make any generalizations as to what is interesting and what not? In what do you find great personal differences in this respect?

CHAPTER XV

1. What is meant by "personal interest pattern"? Give examples from your own experience.

2. Could you describe accurately the interests of a given person

by making a long list of all the chief human interests, and then grading him, on a scale of 0 to 10, in each of these interests? Why is the pattern description a more accurate method?

3. Many persons do not enjoy going to the theater unless faultlessly dressed. How does this illustrate the principle of personal-interest patterns? Think out other illustrations of the same principle.

4. How do you account for the fact that a given piece of music will cause thrills of pleasure in one hearer and leave another, of similar education and environment, unmoved?

5. "A long working day is good because it keeps the working classes from loafing and mischief." Discuss.

6. Should there be an eight-hour law for all industries and occupations? For some? Which ones?

7. What adjustments in working hours, besides mere reduction, are needed in order to give opportunity for the enrich[illegible] leisure?

8. "As culture advances, work and play tend to bec[illegible] definitely separated as to time and place." Is this true? does it lead to greater average happiness? Discuss.

9. We leave it to the individual to get his food and [illegible] Why not his recreation also? Why a social movement to [illegible] recreation?

10. What is the "play movement"? Outline the stages [illegible] development.

11. What are the cultural trends, or tendencies, of the [illegible] movement?

12. What changes in our recreational culture have you ob[illegible] in your own lifetime?

13. Compare the leisure time problem in the city with th[illegible] the country.

14. Have you ever observed the *invention* of a new game or method of amusement? Describe.

15. How do you account for the intense concentration upon bridge games or crossword puzzles, by many persons who seem otherwise mentally lazy?

16. Most colleges have courses in the appreciation of art, music, literature. Can you think of any other "appreciation" courses that might be introduced? What courses in your college are really appreciation courses, although not always so-named?

17. Could there be a worthwhile course in the "appreciation of

agriculture"? How would it differ from a pre-vocational course in the principles of agriculture?

18. Consider the "four wishes" said by Thomas to be the basis of human activity: security, new experience (or adventure), recognition (or power), and response (or love). Which one seems to play the major role in recreational life? Why?

19. Compare the life of the five-year-old child with that of the twenty-year-old adult as regards the relative importance of the desires for security, new experience, recognition, and response.

20. In what sense is good fiction true to life? In what sense is it not?

21. "American audiences require a happy ending," comments a European observer of our motion pictures. "The boy has gotta get the girl and the dough," says a scenario editor. Europeans enjoy, to a much greater extent, films with tragic endings. How [illegible] for this difference?

[illegible] Make a list of harmless recreations which you would like to [illegible] which you are prevented by culture from following.

[illegible] What, specifically, do we mean by "high" and "low" forms [illegible]ment?

[illegible] Which of these policies do you tend to follow in the use [illegible] leisure time: (1) A policy of *drifting,* (2) a policy of [illegible] *activity,* consciously trying to give a due proportion of [illegible]me to each of several types of activity, (3) a policy of "[illegible]*rating* on a few things which interest you most, deliberately [illegible]ng those less interesting.

[illegible] What are the advantages of each policy?

"Life is a great game. That is what gives it its meaning [illegible]alue. A game requires difficulties. The joy of life comes [illegible] *overcoming* difficulties, not in being freed from them. There [illegible]nger that social progress, by removing difficulties, will also [illegible]ove the joy of victory and achievement. Life, by becoming too easy, will become dreary and tiresome."

Do you agree with this philosophy? Discuss.

CHAPTER XVI

1. Why is liberty an important part of welfare? Why has its importance been so poorly recognized?

2. In what matters is liberty declining?

3. In what matters is liberty gaining?

4. "Modern labor legislation is destructive of liberty, for it takes away a man's freedom to run his own business as he sees fit." Criticize.

5. Milton said: "License they mean when they cry liberty," implying that the difference between good liberty and bad liberty is a matter of degree, of "enough" and "too-much." Show how the distinction made in this chapter between good liberty and bad liberty differs from that old distinction.

6. Make a list of what seem to you unjustifiable restraints of personal liberty. Classify your cases according to the controlling authority which did the restraining: home, school, church, business establishment, club recreational group, association, gang, neighborhood or community, government.

7. "The growing domination of government over other social institutions is a serious threat to our liberties." Criticize.

8. Distinguish between liberty and power.

9. Distinguish between justice and liberty.

10. Distinguish between democracy and liberty. Lf determination of peoples mean liberty? Explain.

11. Explain the difference between conformity and coö

12. "Social welfare requires that the individual subordin self to the group." Point out the truth and error of thi ophy.

13. What are the boundary lines which roughly mark sphere of coöperation from the sphere of liberty?

14. Give your own examples of activities which have been from the sphere of liberty to the sphere of coöperation, an versa.

15. What are two kinds of devices for promoting liberty

16. If it is desirable to enforce the laws, then why are esp and tale-bearing, which help the authorities to catch violato widely condemned?

17. What relation has secrecy to liberty? Make a list of situations in which the right of secrecy is passing away in modern culture; and situations in which it is gaining.

18. In the 13th Century the common people of France were restricted in their consumption by many "sumptuary laws." Thus "people worth less than 6000 Turkish livres shall not use any gold or silver plate." Would sumptuary laws be desirable today? Why or why not?

19. Discuss the assertion that crime is caused by too much liberty.

20. Some progressive criminologists suggest that criminal procedure, with its more or less predetermined punishments for each kind of offense, be replaced by equity procedure such as used in the juvenile court. This would enable the judge to declare the offender a ward of the state, like a child or insane person, and to treat him according to his individual peculiarities. It might result in very light penalties for serious crimes where the criminal was judged safe to release, and indefinitely long confinement for repeated petty offenses. Can you see any threat to liberty in this arrangement?

CHAPTER XVII

1. What are the results of underpopulation? Overpopulation?
2. What are the remedies for overpopulation in the case of
[illegible]n country? Which of these remedies would be effective
[illegible]ld-wide basis?
[illegible]tplain Malthus' theory.
[illegible]hat three revisions does modern social science make in
[illegible]laws?
[illegible] there a present danger of race suicide? Explain.
[illegible]hat is the world's probable maximum population? Present
[illegible]on? At the present rate of increase, when will the maximum
[illegible]hed?
[illegible]Is racial improvement necessary to social progress? Would
[illegible]ably make social progress easier? Why?
[illegible] What is cultural selection? Mention and illustrate several
[illegible]
[illegible]How does modern culture affect natural selection?
[illegible] In what respect: physique, susceptibility to disease, mental
[illegible]t, etc., is there greatest danger of race deterioration through
[illegible]oad selective influence of modern culture? Why?
11. What is eugenics? What can it do for mankind, and what are its limitations?
12. Outline a program of social adjustments aiming to raise the birth rate among the superior stock but not among the general population.
13. Why does great inequality in the distribution of wealth tend to detract from the average welfare?
14. What are the causes of poverty?
15. What are the two general methods of correcting extreme inequality of wealth?

16. Discuss: "A man earns what he is worth." A lawyer gets $100,000 for a few weeks' work resulting in securing valuable property rights for his client. Has this lawyer 100 times as much ability as the engineer who earns $1000 during this same time? Is he worth 100 times as much to society?

17. "The rich do not consume their share of the country's wealth, but reinvest large portions of their earnings in productive enterprise, pay the bulk of the taxes, and support charity, while the poor consume *all* they earn." Do these facts justify the existing distribution of wealth?

18. Why is democracy desirable?

19. Illustrate increasing democracy in government, in the school, in industry, in the home, in the church.

20. Why are the channels as well as the source of power important?

21. What is functional representation? Proportional r[illegible]tation?

22. What are the advantages of centralization and of [illegible]ization?

23. What is meant by "consumerism"?

24. What is guild socialism?

25. What is the organization of will?

26. Make a list of the ways in which you participat[illegible] will-organization of society.

27. Why is there conflict between democracy and efficien[illegible]

28. A Y. M. C. A. secretary makes a public speech in w[illegible] criticizes the low pay of girls in ten-cent stores, and poi[illegible] the difficulty of their living respectable lives on such pay[illegible] owner of a ten-cent store has been contributing liberally [illegible] Y. M. C. A. and threatens to withdraw his support. What p[illegible] solutions are there to problems of this sort?

29. Classify the subjects, or parts of subjects, that you have studied according to their chief educational aim: tool courses, physical, vocational, social, and "cultural" education.

30. How does the sociological concept of the purpose of education differ from the ideas of many educators? How does it differ from the "bread and butter" idea of education?

31. What "science," what "information," what "ideas" in the sense used in this chapter, have entered your experience for the first time during the past week?

32. "The school and college should confine themselves to teaching established truth." Do you agree? Explain.

33. Why is the condensation and popularization of knowledge very important today?

34. What is necessary in order to make the study of history an instrument toward world peace?

35. Make a list of popular prejudices and fallacies which college education tends to destroy.

36. What are the main problems in the organization of news and information?

37. Why is control of the press a vital factor in the class struggle?

38. What are the arguments for freedom of expression?

39. "Everyone should be free to express any opinion, so long as the opinion is not harmful or dangerous." Criticize.

40. "There should be freedom of speech so long as it does not advocate the overthrow of government by force and violence." C[illegible]

[illegible]w is social progress affected by a custom like that of the [illegible]t [illegible]clerians, among whom the propounder of a new belief was [illegible]dur [illegible]r stand, while expounding it, with a halter about his neck? [illegible]hy is it important for society to promote invention and [illegible]? What methods can be used to promote them?

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

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CHAPTER III

R Chap. 7. A brief, stimulating account of the influe... graphic environment upon culture.

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W Chap. 6. Invention, diffusion, and convergence of ... traits.

W Chap. 3. Shows the steady accumulation and the con... of culture, and the relatively small importance of the "... arts" and the rise and fall of nations.

W Chap. 7. Illustrates the diffusion of culture by tracing spread of the horse complex and the maize complex.

C Pages 468–474. Kroeber's interesting account of the magic flight, the double-headed eagle, and the figure zero, showing why diffusion is probable in the first two cases and parallelism in the third.

C Pages 153–156. Keller shows why the material and economic parts of culture are the vanguard of cultural progress.

CHAPTER IV

C Pages 72–76. According to Thomas, the various reflexes, etc., that makes up original human nature become organized into "four fundamental wishes," which may be considered as the mainsprings of social behavior. Berman shows the nature of a "wish" from a physiological point of view.

CHAPTER VI

S Pars. 213–216 on mediaeval gregariousness, 231–245, 269 on mediaeval persecution and torture, 605–611 on child sacrifice, 672–677, 690–692, 697–698 on asceticism, vividly illustrate culture's conquest of man during the pre-scientific era of civilization.

CHAPTER VII

[illegible] 70–210. The *mores,* suggestion, fashion, convention, [illegible]ses, fads, cant, caricature, ideals, illustrated by striking [illegible]amples from the past.

[illegible]72–578 illustrate the power of the *mores* to make any[illegible]ing seem right.

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CHAPTER VIII

W Pages 326–335. Discusses the gradual growth of man's consciousness of his own culture, the control of culture by reason, and the growing conception of individual rights.

CHAPTER IX

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CHAPTER X

H Pages 22–26. James Bryce shows wherein mankind has progressed, but despairingly admits his uncertainty as to whether happiness, the ultimate test of progress, has advanced.

Ru Chap. 8, 9. A more hopeful attitude toward the problem of measuring human welfare. Russell gives a definite answer to the question "What makes a social system good or bad?", and also tells how *not* to judge the excellence of a social system.

CHAPTER XI

R Pages 364–374 and first par. on page 354. Shows difference between transformation (evolution) and reshapir[illegible] rogress). Holds out hope of man consciously [illegible]ng society for the better and gives six general r[illegible] observed in this reconstruction.

CHAPTER XII

RST Chap. 14. A stimulating interpretation of the ro[illegible] in human culture. Attributes it not to the love o[illegible] but to the absence of law, and finds the essentia[illegible] in international organization.

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CHAPTER XIII

H Pages 836–838. Realistic descriptions of repulsive physical surroundings.

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H Pages 652–654, 657–659. Brief statements illustrating the points of view involved in industrial conflicts.

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G Chap. 12. Surveys the whole problem of race friction in the U. S.

R Pages 87–94. The social psychology of the struggle between personalities in face-to-face association.

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CHAPTER XIV

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. 638–642. Van Hise summarizes the principles of conervation of natural resources.

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CHAPTER XV

C Pages 852–857. Edwards tells what is the matter with our system of recreation.

CHAPTER XVI

R Chap. 31. Discusses liberation as a social process, and shows what social changes are making for greater personal freedom.

CHAPTER XVII

R Chap. 3. Briefly summarizes the facts concerning growth of population, Malthus' theory, the modern decline in the birth rate and death rate, and shows the need for social control of reproduction and of immigration.

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RST Chap. 1. Shows the danger of migration to the quality of population.

C Pages 688–695. A more cautious statement, by Reuter, regarding the effects of immigration on the quality of population. Discusses also its effects upon American culture.

C Pages 767–779. Gillin and Devine present scientific views of the origin and nature of poverty. Main facts from the Bureau of Economic Research regarding the amo and distribution of American wealth. The Webbs, g inequalities in the consumption of wealth, inefficiency of our economic system.

R Chap. 21. The general theory of the organization of

RST Chaps. 7, 10. The roles played by "philanthr strings" and the "conscience of the expert" in the tion of power.

Ru Chap. 11. Justice and liberty can be secured only the organization of the weaker social interests a transferring of much power from the geographic s various functional groups.

B Chap. 23. Describes the several proposed radical sche the control of industry and government, such munism, syndicalism, etc.

RST Chap. 11. Tells what is needed in education to promote the service rather than the combat idea in business and professions.

B Chaps. 2, 3. The problem of the newspaper. Intelligent newspaper reading.

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