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PREFACE.

THERE are two considerations which seem necessary to be attended to in abridging any author; the size of the work, rendering it inaccessible to the generality of readers, and the merit of the work, rendering it desirable that it should be within every one's reach. It is easy to perceive, that these two conditions are not always united: there are some works whose only merit seems to be, that they are so large that nobody can read them; whose ponderous bulk, and formidable appearance, happily serve as a barrier to keep out the infection of their dulness.

The work, of which the following is an abridgment, notwithstanding its excellence, has been little read. A philosophical work in seven large volumes presents no very great attractions to the indolent curiosity of most readers. Even the seven volumes of Clarissa, and Sir Charles Grandison, are at present viewed with doubtful looks by the eye of taste, and reluctantly engaged in: and our modern novelists, that happily privileged race of authors, whose works

"not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," are exempt from the charge of dulness or *ennui*, have been obliged to contract the boundless scenes of their imagination within four slender volumes, where the diminutive page vies in vain with the luxuriant margin. As to the studious and recluse reader, there is generally another obstacle which prevents him from gratifying his curiosity with respect to works of this extent, however valuable or important.

Again, there are works of great length, which cannot, however, be reduced into a less compass, "without suffering loss and diminution." Though vast, there is nothing useless, nothing superfluous in them; and nothing can be taken away or displaced, without destroying the symmetry and connection of the whole. This is certainly not the case with the writings of Abraham Tucker: they are encumbered and weighed down with a load of unnecessary matter. Not that there are any great inequalities in them, nor any parts which, taken separately, are not entertaining and valuable; but the work is swelled out with endless repetitions of itself. The same thing is said over and over again; the same subjects discussed in a different shape, till the reader is tired, and his attention quite distracted. This radical defect, which is certainly a drawback on the usefulness of the work, appears evidently to have arisen from the

the manner of composing it. The author was a private gentleman, who wrote at his ease, and for his own amusement: he had nothing to do but to take his time, and follow the whim of the moment. He wrote without any regular plan; and without foreseeing or being concerned about the deviations, the shiftings and windings, and the intricate cross-movements in which he should be entangled. He had leisure on his hands; and provided he got out of the labyrinth at last, he was satisfied—no matter how often he had lost his way in it. When a subject presented itself to him, he exhausted all he had to say upon it, and then dismissed it for another. The chapter was thrown aside, and forgotten. If the same subject recurred again in a different connection, he turned it over in his thoughts afresh; as his ideas arose in his mind, he committed them to paper; he repeated the same things over again, or inserted any new observation or example that suggested itself to him in confirmation of his argument; and thus by the help of a new title, and by giving a different application to the whole, a new chapter was completed. By this means, as he himself remarks, his writings are rather a tissue of loose essays than a regular work; and indeed the leaves of the Sybils could not be more loose and unconnected. It is so far then from being an injury, that it must be rather an advantage to the original work to expunge its

repetitions, and confine its digressions, if this could be done properly.

This is, in fact, what I have attempted to do: whenever I came to a passage that was merely a repetition of a former one, I struck it out: and, at the same time, I endeavoured to abridge those detailed parts of the work which were the longest, and the least interesting, and to correct the general redundance of the style. I have not, however (that I know of), omitted any thing essential to the merit of the work. All the singular observations, all the fine illustrations, I have given nearly in an entire state to the reader: I was afraid to touch them, lest I should spoil them. The rule that I went by was, to give every thing that I thought would strike the attention in reading the work itself, and to leave out every thing (except what was absolutely necessary to the understanding of the subject), that would be likely to make no lasting impression on the mind. A good abridgment ought to contain just as much as we should wish to recollect of a book; it should give back (only in a more perfect manner) to a reader well acquainted with the original, "the image of his mind," so that he would miss no favourite passage, none of the prominent parts, or distinguishing features of the work. How far I have succeeded, must be left to the decision of others: and perhaps in some respects one is less a judge of the execution

tion of a work like this, than of an original performance. The same deception takes place here, as, I have been told by painters, sometimes happens in copying a fine picture. Your mind is full of the original, and you see the imitation through this borrowed medium; you transfuse its grace and spirit into the copy; you connect its glowing tints and delicate touches with a meagre outline, and a warm fancy sheds its lustre over that which is little better than a blank: but when the original impression is faded, and you have nothing left but the copy for the imagination to feed on, you find the spirit evaporated, the expression gone, and you wonder at your own mistake. I can only say, that I have done my best to prevent my copy of the Light of Nature from degenerating into a mere *caput mortuum*. As to the pains and labour it has cost me, or the time I have devoted to it, I shall say nothing. However, if any one should be scrupulous on that head, I might answer, as Sir Joshua Reynolds is said to have done to some person who cavilled at the price of a picture, and desired to know how long he had been doing it, "All my life."

Of the work itself, I can speak with more confidence. I do not know of any work in the shape of a philosophical treatise that contains so much good sense so agreeably expressed. The character of the work is, in this respect, altogether singular.

gular. Amidst all the abstruseness of the most subtle disquisitions, it is as familiar as Montaigne, and as wild and entertaining as John Buncle. To the ingenuity and closeness of the metaphysician, he unites the practical knowledge of the man of the world, and the utmost sprightliness, and even levity of imagination. He is the only philosopher who appears to have had his senses always *about him*, or to have possessed the enviable faculty of attending at the same time to what was passing in his own mind, and what was going on without him. He applied every thing to the purposes of philosophy; he could not see any thing, the most familiar objects or the commonest events, without connecting them with the illustration of some difficult problem. The tricks of a young kitten, or a little child at play, were sure to suggest to him some useful observation, or nice distinction. To this habit, he was, no doubt, indebted for what Paley justly calls "his unrivalled power of illustration." To be convinced that he possessed this power in the highest degree, it is only necessary to look into almost any page of his writings: at least, I think it impossible for any one not to perceive the beauty, the *naiveté*, the force, the clearness, and propriety of his illustrations, who has not previously had his understanding strangely overlaid with logic and criticism.

ticism. *—If he was surpassed by one or two writers in logical precision and systematic profundity, there is no metaphysical writer who is equal to him in clearness of apprehension, and a various insight into human nature. Though he excelled greatly in both, yet, he excelled more in what is called the method of induction, than that of analysis: he convinces the reader oftener by shewing him the thing in dispute, than by defining its abstract qualities; as the philosopher is said to have proved the existence of motion by getting up and walking. I do not, for my own part, look up with all that awe and admiration to the grave professors of abstract reasoning that it is usual to do. They are so far from being men of great comprehension of mind, (if by this we are to understand comprehending the whole of every subject) that the contrary is generally the case. They are persons of few ideas, of slow perceptions, of narrow capacities, of dull but retentive feelings, who cannot seize or enter into the infinite

* Those persons who have been so long on the rack of incomprehensible theories and captious disputes, whose minds have been stretched on the Procrustes' bed of metaphysical systems, till they have acquired a horror of any thing like common sense or familiar expression, put me in mind of what is said of those who have been really put to the rack: they can bear their unnatural distorted state tolerably well; it is the return of sense and motion which is death to them.

variety

variety and rapid succession of natural objects, and are only susceptible of those impressions of things, which being common to all objects, and constantly repeated, come at length to fix those lasting traces in the mind, which nothing can ever alter or wear out. By attending only to one aspect of things, and that the same, and by leaving out always those minute differences and perplexing irregularities which disturb the sluggish uniformity of our ideas, and give life and motion to our being, men of formal understandings are sometimes able to pursue their inquiries with a steadiness and certainty that are incompatible with a more extensive range of thought. Abstraction is a trick to supply the defect of comprehension. The moulds of the understanding may be said not to be large enough to contain the gross concrete objects of nature, but will still admit of their names, and descriptions, and general forms, which lie flatter and closer in the brain, and are more easily managed. The most perfect abstraction is nothing more than the art of making use of only one half of the understanding, and never seeing more than one half of a subject, in the same manner as we find that those persons have the acutest perceptions, who have lost some one of their senses. A man, therefore, who disdains the use of common sense, and thinks to arrive at the highest point of philosophy, by thus denaturalizing his understanding,

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is like a person who should deprive himself of the use of his eye-sight, in order that he might be able to grope his way better in the dark!

A man may set up for a system-maker, upon a single idea: he cannot write a sensible book without a great many. I do not deny that one idea may often involve, and be the parent of many others; but I do not see how knowledge is at all the worse, because it brings us immediately acquainted with the very form of truth, instead of serving merely as an index, or clue to direct us in the search of it. If the one method tends more effectually to sharpen the understanding, the other enriches it more. The one method puts you upon exerting your own faculties; the other, meeting you half way, wisely saves you from the necessity of taking all that pains and trouble in the search after truth, which few persons are disposed to take, and is therefore more generally useful. The great merit of our author's writings is undoubtedly that sound, practical, comprehensive good sense, which is to be found in every part of them. What is I believe the truest test of fine sense, is that affecting simplicity in his observations, which proceeds from their extreme truth and liveliness. Whatever recalls strongly to our remembrance the common feelings of human nature, and marks distinctly the changes that take place in the human breast, must always be accompanied

companied with some sense of emotion; for our own nature can never be indifferent to us.

If there is any fault in his practical reasonings, it is that they are too discursive, and without a determinate object. No difficulty ever escapes his penetration; every view of his subject, every consequence of his principles is stated and examined with scrupulous exactness, and the weak sides and inconveniencies of every rule are pointed out, till a sort of sceptical uncertainty is introduced, and the mind sinks into a passive indifference. This kind of reasoning is certainly not calculated to rouse the energy of our active powers; but I believe it is that which generally accompanies much dispassionate inquiry. I am afraid the most patient thinkers are those who have the most doubts and the fewest violent prejudices; and perhaps, after all, we shall be forced to acknowledge with Sterne, as the truest philosophy, "that there is not so much difference between good and evil as the world are apt to imagine." A writer, indeed, who has a system to support, is not likely to fall into this error; but then, if it is only because he has a sytem to support, what is the value of that confidence in his opinions, which is the result of wilful blindness? A man's living much in retirement (as was the case with our author) where his thoughts have a calm and even course to flow in, may also contribute much to this indecision of mind.

There

There is many a champion who would soon sink into silent scepticism, if he was not urged on by the necessity of maintaining opinions which he has once avowed, and had nobody to dispute against but himself. The spirit of contradiction is the great source of dogmatism and pertinacity of opinion. I am aware, that a habit of much disputing also produces the contrary effect. But even where it renders men sceptical, it does not render them candid. It is therefore in great cities, in literary clubs, that you meet with the fewest sincere opinions, and the most extravagant assertions.

As to his system of belief on the subject of religion, I am unable to say what it was: and perhaps he did not know himself. I have however no doubt, that he was sincere in his professions of attachment to the established doctrines, or that he was habitually accustomed to look upon them as true. Still there is a distinction, which is not always attended to, between that kind of assent which is merely habitual, or the effect of choice, which depends upon a disposition to regard any object in a certain point of view, and that internal conviction, in which the will has no concern, which is the result of a free and unbiassed judgment, and which a man retains in spite of himself. Subtle distinctions are not always the most palpable; and therefore sometimes require the aid of violent suppositions to render them intelligible. I can conceive, that a person

person may all his life live in the belief of a certain notion, without once suspecting the contrary; yet, that if the case could be put to him, to declare his opinion freely to the best of his judgment, for that, if he were mistaken, his life must answer for it, he would instantly find by what slender threads his former opinion hung. The sense of convenience, humour, or vanity, are sufficient to blind the understanding, and determine our opinions in speculative points and matters of indifference. Common complaisance, or good-nature, or personal regard, may lead me to give credit to, and defend the truth of a story told by a friend, which yet, if I were put to my oath, I could not do. So that we, in fact, very often believe that to be true, which we *know* to be false.* The atheist is no longer an atheist on a sick-bed; and a violent thunder-storm has been known not only to clear the air, but to cure the free-thinker of his affected scruples with respect to the proofs of a superintending Providence. But the difference of our conclusions in such cases does not arise from any new evidence, or farther investigation of the subject, but from the greater interest we have to examine carefully into the real state of our opinions, and to throw off all disguises that conceal them from ourselves. Now this ultimate

* How difficult do we find it, to believe that a person is telling us a falsehood, while we are with him, though we may at the same time be thoroughly convinced that this is the case.

test

test cannot very well be applied to a man's religious professions, because the power of denouncing 'pains and penalties' is already lodged in other hands; but I cannot help suspecting, that if this test could have been applied to some of our author's notions, his external and internal, or, to use his own expressions, his exoteric and esoteric creed, would not have been found to coalesce perfectly together. It is amusing to observe with what gravity he sets himself to inveigh against freethinkers and freethinking; when he himself, as to his mode of reasoning, is one of the greatest of freethinkers. He seems to have been willing to *keep the game* entirely in his own hands; or else to have supposed that the liberal exercise of reason was only proper for gentlemen of independent fortune; and that none but those who were in the commission of the peace, should be allowed to censure vulgar errors. This was certainly a weakness.

With respect to his metaphysical system, he must be considered as the founder of his own school; or at least, the opinions of different sects are so mingled up in him, that he cannot be considered as belonging to any party. He professes himself indeed, and seems anxious to be thought, a disciple of Locke, but this is evidently very much *against the grain*; and he is perpetually put to it to reconcile the differences between them on the most essential points.—I know but of two sorts of philosophy; that of those

those who believe what they feel, and endeavour to account for it, and that of those who only believe what they understand, and have already accounted for. The one is the philosophy of consciousness, the other that of experiment; the one may be called the intellectual, the other the material philosophy. The one rests chiefly on the general notions and conscious perceptions of mankind, and endeavours to discover what the mind is, by looking into the mind itself; the other denies the existence of every thing in the mind, of which it cannot find some rubbishly archetype, and visible image in its crucibles and furnaces, or in the distinct forms of verbal analysis. The first of these is the only philosophy that is fit for men of sense, the other should be left to chymists and logicians. Of this last kind is the philosophy of Locke; though I would be understood to speak of him rather as having laid the foundation, on which others have built absurd conclusions, than of what he was in himself. He was a man of much studious thought and reflection; and if every thing by being carried to extremes, were not converted into abuse, his writings might have been of lasting service to his country and mankind. He staggered under the "petrific mace" of Hobbes's philosophy, which he had not strength to resist, but yet he attempted to make some stand; and was not quite

quite overpowered by the gripe of that demon of the understanding. He took for his basis a bad simile, that the mind is like a blank sheet of paper, equally adapted to receive every kind of external impression. Or at least, if this illustration was proper for the purpose to which he applied it (which was to overturn the doctrine of innate ideas), a very bad use has been made of it since; as if it was meant to prove, that the mind is nothing in itself, nor the cause of any thing, never acting, but always acted upon, the mere receiver and passive instrument of whatever impressions are made upon it; so that being fairly *gutted* of itself, and of all positive qualities, it in fact resembles the bare walls and empty rooms of an unfurnished lodging, into which you bring whatever furniture you please; and which never contains any thing more than what is brought into it through the doors of the senses. Hence all those superadded feelings and ideas, all those operations and modifications which our impressions undergo from the active powers and independent nature of the mind itself, are treated as chimerical and visionary notions by the profound adepts in this clear-sighted philosophy *. The object of the German philosophy,

* In this age of solid reason, it is always necessary to refer to particular examples, as it was formerly necessary to explain all hard words to the ladies. Condillac, in his Logic, that favourite

sophy, or the system of professor Kant, as far as I can understand it, is to explode this mechanical ignorance, to take the subject out of the hands

manual of the modern sciolist, with admirable clearness proves, that our idea of virtue is a sensible image; because virtue implies a law, and that law must be written in a book, which must consist of letters, or figures of a certain shape, colour, and dimensions, which are real things, the objects of sense: that we are therefore right in asserting virtue to have a real existence, namely on paper, and in supposing that we have some idea of it, that is, as consisting of the letters of the alphabet. Mr. Horne Tooke, a man of wonderful wit, knowledge, and acuteness, but who, with my consent, shall not be empanelled as a juror to decide upon any question of abstruse reasoning, has endeavoured to explain away the whole meaning of language, by doing away its habitual or customary meaning, by denying that words have any meaning but what is derived to them from the umbilical root which first unites them to matter; and by making it out, that our thoughts having no life or motion in them, but as they are dragged about mechanically by words, are "just such shard-born beetle things,

> "As only buz to heav'n on ev'ning wings;
> Strike in the dark, offending but by chance:
> ——— ——— ——— ——— ———
> They know not beings, and but *bear* a name."

Mr. Tooke's description of the formation of language* is a sort of pantomime or masquerade, where you see the trunks of our abstract ideas going about in search of their *heads*, or clumsily setting on their own *noses*, and afterwards pointing to them in answer to all questions: it reminds you of the island of Pantagruel (or some such place), where the men carry their heads before them in their hands, or you would fancy that our author had lately

* See his account of the terminations *head* and *ness*, or *nex*.

been

hands of its present possessors, and to admit our own immediate perceptions to be some evidence of what passes in the human mind. It takes for granted

been at the Promontory of noses. Andrew Paræus, on the solution of noses, was a novice to him. I am a little uneasy at this scheme of reducing all our ideas to points and solid substances. It is like the project of the philosopher, who contended that all the solid matter in the universe might be contained in a nutshell. This is ticklish ground to tread upon. At this rate, and if the proportion holds, each man will hardly have a single particle of understanding left to his share; and in two large quarto volumes, there may not perhaps be three grains of solid sense. Mr. Tooke, as a man of wit, may naturally wish to turn every thing to *point*. But this method will not hold in metaphysics: it is necessary to spin the thread of our ideas a little finer, and to take up with the flimsy texture of mental appearances. It is not easy to philosophize in solid epigrams, or explain abstruse questions by the tagging of points. I do not, however, mean to object to Mr. Tooke's etymological system as an actual history of language, but to that superficial gloss of philosophy which is spread over it, and to the whole of his logic: I might instance in the axiom, on which the whole turns, that "it is as absurd to talk of a complex idea as of a complex star." Now this and such like phrases had better have been left out: it is a good antithesis, but it is nothing more. Or if it had been put into the mouth of Sir Francis, who is a young man of lively parts, and then gravely answered by Mr. Tooke, it would have been all very well. But as it stands, it is injurious to the interests of philosophy, and an affront to common sense. Hartley proceeded a good way in making a dissected map of the brain; and did all he could to prove the human soul to consist of a white curd. After all, he was forced to confess, that it was impossible to get at the mind itself; and he was obliged to rest satisfied with having spent many years, and wasted immense ingenuity, in "vicariously

granted the common notions prevalent among mankind, and then endeavours to explain them; or to shew their foundation in nature, and the universal relations of things. This, at least, is a modest proposal, and worthy of a philosopher. The understanding here pays a proper deference to the other parts of our being, and knows its own place: whereas our modern sophists, meddling, noisy, and self-sufficient, think that truth is only made to be disputed about; that it exists no where but in their experiments, demonstrations, and syllogisms; and leaving nothing to the silent operations of nature and common sense, believe that all our opinions, thoughts, and feelings, are of no value, till the understanding, like a pert commentator, comes forward to enforce and explain them; as if a book could be nothing without notes, or as if a picture had no meaning in it till it was pointed out by the connoisseur! Tucker was certainly an arrant truant from the system he pretends to adopt, and one of the common sense school. Thus he believed with professor Kant in the unity of conscious-

torturing and defacing" its nearest representative in matter. He was too great a man not to perceive the impossibility of ever reconciling matter and motion with the nature of thought; and he therefore left his system imperfect. But it fell into good hands, and soon had all its deficiencies supplied, and its doubts cleared up, to the entire satisfaction and admiration of all the dull, the superficial, and the ignorant.

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ness, or " that the mind alone is formative," that fundamental article of the *transcendental* creed; in the immateriality of the soul, &c. His chapter on consciousness is one of the best in the whole work; and is perhaps as close an example of reasoning as is any where to be met with. I would recommend it to the serious perusal of all our professed *reasoners*, but that they are so thoroughly satisfied with the profession of the thing, so fortified and wrapped up in the mere name, that it is impossible to make any impression upon them with the thing itself. On some other questions, which form the great leading outlines of the two creeds, as that of self-love, for instance, his opinions seem to have been more unsettled and wavering. I have already offered what I have to say on this subject in a little work published by Mr. Johnson; and I shall therefore say the less about it here.* However, as I may not soon have an opportunity of recurring to the same subject, and as there is a part of that work with which I am not very well satisfied, the subject of which is also treated of in the following pages, it may not perhaps be altogether impertinent to add a few observations for the further clearing of it up.

We are told, that sympathy is only self-love disguised in another form, that it is a mere mechanical impulse or tendency to our own grati-

* Essay on Human Action.

fication. It is asked, Do we not attach ourselves to the idea of another's welfare, because it is pleasing to us, and do we not feel an aversion or dislike to certain objects, whether relating to ourselves or others, merely because they are disagreeable to us; and is not this self-love? I answer no. Because, in this logical way of speaking, it is a misnomer to call my attachment to any particular object or idea by a name that implies my attachment to a general principle, or to any thing beyond itself. Numerically and absolutely speaking, the particular idea or modification which produces any given action, is as much a distinct, individual, independent thing in nature, and has no more to do with myself, that is, with other objects, and ideas which have no immediate concern in producing it, than one individual has to do with another. The notion that our motives are blind mechanical impulses, if it proves any thing, proves, that instead of being always governed by self-love, there is in reality no such thing. So that, as far as this argument goes, it is no less absurd to trace our love of others to self-love, than it would be to account for a man's love of reading from his fondness for bread and butter, or to say that his having an ear for music arose from his relish for port wine. It is therefore necessary to suppose, that when we attempt to resolve all our motives into self-love, we only mean to refer them to a certain class, and to say, that they all

all agree in having some circumstance in common, which brings them under the same general denomination. Now, there is one way in which this has been attempted, by proving that they are all *ours*, that they all belong to the same being, and are therefore all equally selfish. This is as bad as Soame Jenyns's argument, that all men may be said to be born equal, because they are equally born. So, if it is contended, that sympathy is a part of our nature, and therefore selfish; that the imagination and understanding are real efficient causes of action, and therefore operate mechanically; that our ideas of all external existences, of other persons, their names, qualities and feelings, are only impressions existing in our own minds, and are therefore properly selfish, and ought to be called so; I shall have nothing to object to this kind of reasoning, but that it is taking a great deal of perverse pains to no purpose. The question stands just where it did, it is not moved a jot further. For what difference can be made in the question, by our calling benevolence selfishness, or sympathy self-love, I cannot discover, except that we should lose the advantage of having a distinct word to express those affections and feelings which confessedly have nothing to do with sympathy. The question therefore is, whether all our affections are of this latter class, or whether the two words do not express a distinction which

has no real foundation in nature. This is in fact what must be meant by saying that sympathy is self-love in disguise; for this must imply that sympathy does not operate as such, that it is only the ostensible motive, the accidental circumstance, the form or vehicle that serves to transmit the efficacy of another principle lying hid beneath it, and that has no power but what it derives from its connection with something else. But, in order to establish this mechanical theory of self-love, it appears to me necessary to exhibit sympathy as it were abstracted from itself, to resolve it into another principle, and to shew that it would still produce exactly the same effects as it does at present. Now there are two ways in which I can conceive that this might be satisfactorily made out, viz. if it could be shewn, first, that our concern for others only affects the mind as connected with physical or bodily uneasiness; or, 2dly, as abstract uneasiness. Suppose, for instance, that the imaginary feeling of what other persons suffer, as far as it is confined to the mind only, does not affect me at all, or produce the least disposition in my mind or wish to relieve them, but that the idea of what they suffer gives me a pain in the head, or produces an uneasiness at my stomach, and that then, for the first time, I begin to feel some concern for them, and try to relieve them, in order to get rid of my own uneasiness,

uneasiness, because I do not like the head-ach or the stomach-ach; this, I grant, would not entitle me to the character of much disinterestedness. but however I might attempt to gloss the matter over by an affectation of sensibility, and make a virtue of necessity, would be downright, unequivocal selfishness. This first supposition, however, is not true. To prove this, I need only appeal to every one's own breast, or at least to our observation of human nature; for it must be clear to every person, in one or other of these ways, that our interest in the pleasures and pains of others is not excited in the manner here described. Besides, how should the mind communicate an uneasiness to the body, which it does not feel itself? We must therefore have recourse to the second supposition for resolving benevolence into a mere mechanical principle, or shewing that it is at bottom the same with, and governed by the same laws as our most selfish impulses. There is no contradiction in supposing, that however great a disposition there might be in the mind to be immediately affected by the pleasures and pains of others, yet the impression made upon us by them might be nothing more than a mere abstract sensation of pleasure or pain, a simple detached or insulated feeling, existing by itself, and operating as a motive to action no further than the individual was concerned, or than he

was

was affected by it as a positive, momentary thing. This would still be a mechanical and selfish feeling. Compassion would in this case be an immediate repugnance or aversion of the mind to an actual impression, and a disposition to take the shortest way to escape from it, every thing else being a matter of perfect indifference. This account supposes the particles of individual feeling to be as it were drawn off by some metaphysical process, and thus disengaged from the lifeless unsubstantial forms, to which they were attached, to bend their whole force to remove every thing that may cause the least disturbance or detriment to the mind to which they belong. You must believe, on this hypothesis, that our gross material desires setting themselves free from the airy yoke of fancy, tend directly to the centre of self-interest, as the lead and iron work, when once disengaged from the body of the ship, no longer float on the surface of the water, borne about by the winds, but sink at once to the bottom. But I have already shewn at large, and the reader may easily perceive, that this description of the manner in which our motives operate, has not the least foundation in nature. Our ideas and feelings act in concert. The will cannot act without ideas, nor otherwise than as it is directed by them. The mind is not so loosely constructed, as that the different parts can disengage themselves at will from

from the rest of the system, and follow their own separate impulses. It is governed by many different springs united together, and acting in subordination to the same conscious power. It is so formed, that if it could only wish to get rid of its own immediate uneasiness, it could never get rid of it at all, because it could not *will* the necessary means for that purpose, and would be perpetually tormented by ideal causes of pain, without being able to exert itself to remove them. The sore part might shrink, but the hand would not be stretched out to remove the object that irritated it. Without allowing an elastic power to the understanding; a power of collecting and concentrating its forces in any direction that seems necessary; and without supposing that our ideas have a power to act as relative representative things, connected together in a certain regular order, and not as mere simple pleasure and pain; the will would be entirely useless: indeed, there could be no such thing as volition, either with respect to our own affairs or those of others. But the fact is, that our ideas of certain things are interwoven into the finer texture of the mind, in a certain order and connection, as closely as the things themselves are joined in nature; and if, as they exist and are perceived there, they are true and efficient causes of action, I see no reason for asserting that they act mechanically, when, by this expression,

pression, if we affix any distinct idea to it, we must mean something entirely different; nor for ascribing those actions and motives to self-love, which neither take their rise from, nor are directed by, nor end in securing the exclusive interest of the individual as a numerical unit, a mere solitary existence. As the idea which influences the mind is not a detached idea starting up of its own accord, but an idea connected with other ideas and circumstances, presented involuntarily to the mind, and which cannot be separated from one another, or the whole of them banished from our thoughts, without overturning the foundation of all our habits of judging and reasoning, and deranging the understanding itself; it follows that the object of the mind, as an intelligent and rational agent, must be, not to remove the idea itself immediately as it is impressed on itself, but to remove those associated feelings and ideas which connect it with the world of external nature; that is, to make such an alteration in the relation of external objects, as, according to the necessary connection between certain objects and certain ideas, can alone produce the desired effect upon the mind. Our mechanical, and voluntary motives are not therefore the same, and it is absurd to attempt to reduce them under the same law. They do not move in concentric spheres, but are like the opposite currents

rents of a river running many different ways at the same time. The springs that give birth to our social affections are, by means of the understanding, as much regulated by the feelings of others, as if they had a real communication and sympathy with them, and are swayed by an impulse that is altogether foreign to self-love.

But to return to my author: it may be expected that I should point out some of those parts of the work which I think the most excellent. I have already mentioned the chapter on the nature of consciousness. That on the necessary connection of our motives is equally admirable for the clearness and closeness of the reasoning, though he afterwards, somehow or other, unaccountably deserts his own doctrine. Among the chapters on subjects of morality, some of those, which I have entitled miscellaneous, are perhaps the best, as those on vanity, education, death, &c. The last of these, I have sometimes conceived, has a resemblance, in a certain peculiar style of reasoning, in which truth and sophistry are artfully blended together, to Cicero's beautiful little treatise on Old Age; and, setting aside the exquisite polish of style and gracefulness of the manner, in which it would be ridiculous to make any comparison with that elegant writer, I think the advantage is clearly on the side of our author, in ingenuity and

and richness of illustration.* But he has taken his boldest and most successful flight, in what he calls the Vision; this is the most singular part of the work, and that by which our author's reputation as a man of genius must stand or fall. I have given it with care, and more at large than any other part. The best things in it are his meeting with his wife, and the lecture delivered by Pythagoras.

Had our author been a vain man, his situation would not have been an enviable one. Even the sternest stoic of us all wishes at least for some person to enter into his views and feelings, and confirm him in the opinion he entertains of himself. But he does not seem to have had his spirits once cheered by the animating cordial of friendly sympathy. Discouraged by his friends, neglected by the public, and ridiculed by the reviewers, he still drew sufficient encouragement from the testimony of

* There is one argument in defence of Old Age, in Cicero, which is so exquisitely put, that nothing can surpass it: it is a perfect *bon bouche* for a metaphysician. It is where some one objects to old age, that the old man, whatever comforts he may enjoy, cannot hope to live long, which the young man at least expects to do. To which it is answered; So much the better; the one has already done what the other only hopes to do: the old man has already lived long: the young man only hopes that he may. A man would be happy a whole day after having such a thought as this.

his

his own mind, and the inward consciousness of truth. He still pursued his inquiries with the same calmness and industry, and entered into the little round of his amusements with the same cheerfulness as ever. He rested satisfied with the enjoyment of himself, and of his own faculties; and was not disgusted with his simple employments, because they made no noise in the world. He did not seek for truth as the echo of loud folly; and he did not desist from the exercise of his own reason, because he could make no impression on ignorance and vulgarity. He could contemplate the truth by its own clear light, without the aid of the false lustre and glittering appearance which it assumes in the admiring eyes of the beholders. He sought for his reward, where only the philosopher will find it, in the secret approbation of his own heart, and the clear convictions of an enlightened understanding. The man of deep reflection is not likely to gain much popular applause; and he does not stand in need of it. He has learned to live upon his own stock, and can build his self-esteem on a better foundation than that of vanity. I cannot help mentioning, that though Mr. Tucker was blind when he wrote the last volumes of his work, which he did with a machine contrived by

by himself, he has not said a word of this circumstance: this would be with me a sufficient trait of his character.

THE AUTHOR OF AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN ACTION.

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CHARACTER of Mr. TUCKER's WORK, extracted from the Preface to Archdeacon Paley's PRINCIPLES of MORAL and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

"There is one work to which I owe so much, that it would "be ungrateful not to confess the obligation: I mean the writ- "ings of the late Abraham Tucker, Eſquire; part of which were "publiſhed by himſelf, and the remainder ſince his death, under "the title of, 'THE LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED, BY EDWARD "SEARCH, Eſq.' I have found in this writer more original "thinking and obſervation, upon the ſeveral ſubjects that he has "taken in hand, than in any other, not to ſay, than in all others "put together. His talent, alſo, for illuſtration is unrivalled. But "his thoughts are diffuſed through a long, various, and irregular "work."

SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE

OF

THE AUTHOR.

Mr. Tucker was born in London in the year 1705. His father, who was a merchant of considerable eminence, married Judith, daughter of Abraham Tillard, Esquire, and died, leaving his son, who was then an infant, to the care of his uncle, Sir Isaac Tillard, a man of excellent moral character, and of whom Mr. Tucker always spoke with the greatest respect and gratitude.

Mr. Tucker was brought up at a school at Bishop's Stortford; and in 1721 was entered a gentleman commoner at Merton College, where he chiefly devoted himself to metaphysical and mathematical pursuits. He also made himself master of French and Italian; and made a considerable progress in music, of which he was particularly fond. About the year 1724, he went into chambers in the Inner Temple, where, for some time, he applied very closely to the law; but he was never called to the bar, for which he had neither constitution nor inclination;

tion; and his fortune of itself was sufficiently ample, without the aid of a profession. He soon after purchased Betchworth Castle, near Dorking, together with a large estate belonging to it; and, in 1736, married Dorothy, daughter of Edward Barker, of East Betchworth, cursitor baron of the Exchequer, and receiver of the tenths. By this lady, who died in 1754, he had two daughters: Judith, who survived him, and died, unmarried, in 1795; and Dorothea, who, in 1763, married Sir Henry Paulet St. John, and died in 1768, leaving only one son, the present Sir H. St. John Mildmay.

It seems that Mr. Tucker was severely afflicted by the death of his wife. As soon as the first excess of his grief was over, he employed himself in collecting together all the letters that had passed between them at different periods, when they had been accidentally separated from each other; which he transcribed twice over, under the title of, "The Picture of Artless Love." He gave one copy to his wife's father, the other he kept himself, and frequently read to his daughters.

He was frequently solicited to offer himself as a candidate to represent the county in which he resided; to which situation his fortune, as well as his private character, gave him the best pretensions. But this he constantly refused; as he had no turn for politics, and as he hated every thing

thing that had the appearance of party contention.

From the papers which Mr. Tucker left behind him, it does not appear that before the year 1755, he had any thoughts of the work which he afterwards completed. It was about the year 1756, that he began "The Light of Nature Pursued." He made several sketches of the plan of his work (one of which he afterwards printed in the shape of a dialogue), before he finally decided on the method he should pursue; and after he had collected all his materials, he twice transcribed the whole copy with his own hand. He intended to have given it a further revision, and to have corrected some of the defects in the style; but this he never did.

He published the first specimen of his work in 1763, under the title of "Free-will." This was a selection from the four octavo volumes which appeared in 1765, under the fictitious name of Edward Search. The remainder of the work was edited by his daughter, and published, under the real name of the author, after his death. Mr. Tucker also published a pamphlet, entitled, "Man in quest of himself, by Cuthbert Comment," in reply to some strictures that appeared in the Monthly Review for July 1763, on Search's "Free-will."

Mr. Tucker, though neither of an athletic form, nor robust constitution, possessed great

bodily activity. He always rose early to pursue his literary labours. During the winter, he commonly burnt a lamp in his chamber, that he might be able to light his own fire. After breakfast he returned to his studies for two or three hours, and passed the rest of the morning in walking, or some other exercise. As he was remarkably abstemious, he lost very little time at the table, and generally spent the early part of the evening in summer in walking over his estate, and collecting information on agricultural subjects from his tenants. In winter, he walked up and down his own chamber till he completed the distance he usually walked, and employed the remainder of the evening in reading to his daughters. In London, where he resided some months every year, his time was portioned out much in the same manner between study and relaxation; and he commonly devoted the evening to the society of his friends and acquaintance, among whom he was distinguished for his dexterity in the Socratic method of disputation. In his walks he generally had some object in view, as the transaction of any incidental business that occurred, which he always chose to execute himself rather than leave it to a third person; and, when no particular object presented itself, he would sometimes walk from Great James Street, where he lived,

lived, to St. Paul's, or the Bank, as he used to say, to see what o'clock it was.

His incessant application gradually weakened his eyes, and at length brought on cataracts, which increased so much, in consequence of a fever in 1771, that he could no longer amuse himself by reading, and he soon after became totally blind.

This misfortune, the heaviest that could befal a man of his pursuits, he not only bore with resignation, but with the utmost cheerfulness, often diverting himself with the mistakes into which his blindness led him. His favourite object, however, was not abandoned in consequence of it. By his mechanical ingenuity he invented a machine, which guided his hand, and enabled him to write legibly enough to have his papers transcribed by others.

It was during this period of his blindness that Mr. Tucker completed the latter volumes of the Light of Nature, but before they could be published, he was seized, in 1774, with an illness that proved fatal, and he died as he lived with perfect calmness and resignation.

INTRODUCTION.

RELIGION and morality being things of universal concern have always engaged the thoughts of such as were disposed to think seriously upon any thing; and that natural fondness which attaches every one to the decisions of his own understanding, has given birth to innumerable disputes in all ages. But though contention has never ceased, the particular subjects of it have been continually varying.

The principal question at present agitated seems to be; Whether reason alone is sufficient to direct us in every part of our conduct without the aid of revelation. On this point the merits of our present religious disputes chiefly turn, rather than upon any external evidence; for unless a revelation offered something which we could not discover by our own sagacity, no one would think it worth while to inquire into the truth of it.

While the contest is confined within the limits of argument, no very mischievous consequences can ensue. Truth will not long lie overwhelmed by sophistry, but will be freed from the rust and dross that gather upon the soundest doctrine by too long quiet. Too great a una-

nimity renders men careless and forgetful of their own principles, but the vigilance of an adversary suffers no foreign mixture that will not bear the strictest scrutiny. The evils of controversy are, that it draws off men's attention from the great end of religion, which is to make them better, substituting speculation in the place of the real duties of life; it destroys mutual esteem and good-will, and takes away half our means of improvement by shutting our eyes against the clearest truths and brightest examples presented by those of a different persuasion.

The worst kind of disputing is, that which tends merely to overturn, without establishing any thing. For I can have no right to pull down my neighbour's house till I have furnished him with materials for building a more convenient one. I shall therefore take the contrary method by beginning with principles universally agreed to. There are many inducements to prudence, honesty, benevolence, &c. acknowledged by persons of all persuasions, and these should be improved to the utmost, before we need touch upon any doubtful points.

Now there is one tract of ground claimed by none as his peculiar property, viz. so much as lies within the province of reason. Both believer and unbeliever will admit, that there are certain truths discoverable by our own sagacity,

that

that reason is of some advantage to us, and that we should make the best use of it in our power. I propose therefore to try what may be done by the exercise of our reason, either for the advancement of knowledge or guidance of our conduct, without pretending to determine beforehand, whether we can furnish ourselves in this way with every thing for which we have occasion. And it is to be presumed, that such an attempt cannot justly offend either party: if reason be sufficient, how can we do better than listen to her voice; and if not, how can this be better evinced than by putting her to the trial?

It is the duty of every one to serve the public in the way for which he is best fitted, and this is the only way in which I have any chance of making myself useful. I have neither constitution nor talents for active life, neither strength nor a sufficient fund of spirits for hard study: but my thoughts have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of right and wrong; my love of retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment. The service therefore I am to do must flow from this exercise or none at all. I pretend, however, to no sagacity capable of striking out uncommon discoveries, my dependence must be solely on my care and vigilance in collecting such sparks of light as occur from time to time spontaneously. For I am a kind

a kind of miser in knowledge, attentive to every little opportunity of gain, as well knowing that this is the only way for one of moderate talents to raise a fortune. I do not therefore presume to impose my notions on others, only desiring as much regard and attention as they would give to any common person in matters wherein he had been conversant from his childhood.

Many efforts have been made, as well by the ancients as moderns, for investigating the principles of reason, and establishing a solid structure of morality; and though they have all fallen short of the end proposed, they have not entirely failed of success. Mr. Locke, in particular, has contributed not a little to facilitate the increase of knowledge, by pointing out the sources from which it must be derived, and clearing away the rubbish of innate ideas, abstract essences, &c. which formerly obstructed the inquiries of thinking men. I cannot expect to go such lengths as he has done; but if I may advance one little step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved for the benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have lived or laboured in vain. But however high may be my veneration for Mr. Locke, it does not rise to an implicit faith; and as I do not often dissent from him, I am not sorry that it happens in some few instances, because it assures me that at other times I am not influenced by the

the authority of a great name, but by the force of conviction.

Reason cannot work without materials, which must be drawn from nature; and not all nature neither, for the greatest part of her stores lies beyond our reach. Of things within our reach, some we discern by immediate intuition, others we gather by inference and long deductions of reasoning. It seems expedient, then, to begin with things lying nearest to us. Now, what is nearer to a man than himself, his sensations, thoughts, and actions? These therefore I propose to examine in the first place, instead of hunting after abstract notions, or essences of good or evil; which can only be discovered, if ever, from a careful observation of the former. The experimental method may be followed with the same advantage in moral as in natural philosophy; but with this difference, that here there is no occasion to make experiments on purpose: for all that we see, or hear, or feel, or do, in the ordinary course of our lives, are so many experiments on which to build our conclusions. We can only arrive at the knowledge of abstract qualities by an acquaintance with the substances in which they inhere. We should never have known what whiteness was, had we not seen something white; nor hardness, had we not felt something hard. So neither could we have known what justice and goodness were, had we not

not been witness to the actions of men, and known how their sentiments influence their behaviour. By observing how we come to act in such or such a manner, together with the consequences and effects of our actions, we shall be likely to obtain the best rules for our conduct, and the clearest knowledge of what we ought to do. However, I am so far from being an enemy to abstract reasonings, when put upon their proper basis, that I shall perhaps be blamed for pursuing them too far. But the knowledge of religion and morality arises from the knowledge of ourselves. This then we may look upon as the groundwork or foundation: and he that would raise a solid superstructure, must allow time for laying the foundation well. Besides, I shall enter deeper into metaphysical niceties than I should have deemed requisite or allowable, had not others done the like before me. If all the world would agree to live without soldiers, we should have no occasion for them: but while other nations keep their standing armies, we must do so too, or shall be liable to perpetual insults and invasions. In like manner, the common notices of the understanding might be sufficient to answer all the real purposes of life, would all men agree to follow them attentively: but since we shall meet with persons every now and then, who will be drawing us aside from the plain road of common sense into the wilds of abstraction,

abstraction, it is necessary for us to get acquainted with the country beforehand, to examine all the turnings and windings of the labyrinth, or they will mislead and perplex us strangely. The science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, may be compared to Achilles's spear, which healed the wounds it had made before. It casts no additional light on the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had before overspread them. It does not advance the traveller one step on his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from which he had wandered.

I know of no method more likely to smooth the difficulties of the way before us than that of Plato, if one could be so happy as to copy him; I mean in his art of illustrating abstruse notions by the most familiar examples taken from common life, though sometimes of the lowest kind. We find him rebuked, indeed, for introducing crocks and pitchers into discourses of philosophy: and for my part, I shall pay so much respect to my contemporaries, as never to offend their delicacy willingly; but at the same time shall hope for forgiveness, if I prefer clearness and propriety to elegance; and fetch my comparisons from the stable or the scullery, when none can be met with to answer my purpose in the parlour or the drawing-room.

With respect to ornament of style, I would neither

neither neglect, nor principally pursue it; esteeming solidity of much higher importance than elegance, and the latter valuable, only as it renders the other more apparent; in the same manner as a surgeon desires to have the finest polish upon his lancets, not for the beauty of the instruments, but that they may enter the easier, and pierce the deeper.

As to the general arrangement of my plan, and choice of subjects, these will of course be left to my own judgment; and I hope the reader will not hastily pronounce every thing superfluous or tedious, or too refined, which he finds needless to himself; for I am, to the best of my skill, to accommodate every taste; and provide not only for the quick, the candid, and the reasonable, but for the dull, the captious, and the profound. Mr. Locke has observed, that one main obstacle to our arriving at mathematical certainty in questions of morality is, that the ideas and terms belonging to it are more indistinct, unsettled, and variable, than those of number and quantity. The difference between ninety-nine and a hundred is discernible to every body, and as well known as that between a hundred and a thousand; no man mistakes an inch for an ell; nor does the same man sometimes conceive a yard to contain three feet, and sometimes four. But the case is far otherwise in ethics: if one receives contrary commands from two

two persons, to each of whom we owe an obligation, who can determine the preference, where the obligations bear so near a proportion as ninety-nine to a hundred? What this man esteems an honour, the next accounts a disgrace: and if the same person were asked his idea of virtue, obligation, justice, &c. it is odds but he will vary in his notions at different times, nor ever be able to fix upon a definition he can always abide by. We must therefore endeavour to lessen this uncertainty, by affixing a steady and determinate sense to the terms we use; for so far as we can do this, so near shall we approach to the certainty of demonstration. This persuasion must be my excuse for often bestowing more time than I could wish upon the signification of words.

I shall now begin to work upon my foundation, which was proposed to be laid in human nature; and having taken the line and plummet in hand, shall look for directions in the contemplation of the mind, the manner and causes of action, the objects affecting us, and their several ways of operation.

BOOK I.

ON THE HUMAN MIND.

CHAP. I.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

MAN consists of two parts, body and mind. Whatever definition we may give of either, we are neither all mind nor all body. When an arm is cut off, or an eye lost, though the man becomes less perfect, the mind remains entire as before.

2. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the faculties of the mind and the faculties of the man, of whom the mind is only a part. In all compounds there are some properties belonging to the parts separately, and others resulting from the joint action of the whole. Thus in a piece of clock-work, it is the machine which has the property of shewing the time of the day, rising and setting of the stars, course of the planets, &c. The spring or weight which sets it in motion, has no other property than that of gravitation or elasticity.

In like manner there are many faculties belonging to man, which manifestly do not belong to the mind, for it can exercise none of them without the body: we can neither walk without legs, hear without ears, nor speak without a tongue. Yet the faculties which the mind exerts are not so various as the effects it produces. For there is only this difference observable with respect to the mind itself, that

upon some occasions, as in walking, speaking, &c. it acts upon the body; on others, as in hearing, seeing, feeling, it is acted upon by it. Hence the mind has two faculties, one by which we perceive, and another by which we act. The latter has been called the will, and the former the understanding.

3. We get our idea of power from observing the changes made in things by one another. Upon seeing gold melted by the fire, we conceive the fire must have a quality to melt the gold. And again, there must be a quality in the gold of being melted by the fire. So that there must be a concurrence of two powers in producing every alteration that takes place, an active power in the agent that works the change, and a passive in the recipient to undergo it. According to this distinction, the mind, when it wills, is active, for it then produces a change in other things, and in understanding is passive, for the change that takes place is produced upon itself, as in passing from one idea to another.

4. In all sensations, at least, it is obvious, that the objects are the agents, and we ourselves the patients: what is sight but the impression of visible objects on our eyes, and from thence conveyed to the mind? Or sound but the percussion of air upon our ears, which is thence transmitted to the mind? The mind can neither see blue in a rose, nor hear the sound of a trumpet from a drum, but is purely passive in receiving whatever impression is made upon it by external objects.

5. The matter is not quite so plain in the business of reflection, which the mind seems to carry on of itself without the intervention of the senses, or any thing external. Now though we should admit that the mind furnishes itself with its own thoughts, or acts in producing the thoughts, still it must be passive in discerning them when produced. As a man who strikes his right hand against his left, though

though active in the motion of one hand, is passive in feeling it with the other.

6. But it seems to me that we cannot consider the same thing as acting upon itself, or being at the same time both agent and patient. We say indeed that Cato slew himself at Utica: but he did it with a sword, therefore his action was exerted upon that, and he was passive in receiving the wound. Let us consider whether the same distinction is not applicable to the mind. Now how often do reflections intrude upon the mind whether we will or no: a recent loss, a cruel disappointment, an approaching enjoyment, an unexpected success, will force themselves upon our thoughts in spite of all our endeavours to keep them out. Here the mind can hardly be supposed to act upon itself, for our perceptions following one another against our will, or active faculty, cannot be produced by it.

7. To a man just come from off a journey, and desirous of nothing but rest, how many thoughts will present themselves without his intending it! The prospects on the road, occurrences happening to him, his acquaintance at home, their faces, their characters, histories, &c. Can the mind in this indolent posture be said to act upon itself when it does not act at all; not attending particularly to any thing, but suffering all ideas to come and go as it happens?

8. Even in cases of voluntary reflection, such as reasoning, deliberating, and the like, we shall find that the mind does not call up its thoughts directly by an immediate command, but seizes on some clue, from which all the rest follow. In thinking, though we chuse our subject, we do not chuse the reflections arising from it. Deliberation and investigation are like the hunting of a hound, he moves and snuffs about by his own activity, but the scent he finds is not laid nor the trail he follows drawn by himself. The mind only begins a train of thinking, or keeps in one par-

ticular track, but the thoughts successively introduce one another, as the first line of a poem suggests the second, and so on. We have the same power to direct our thoughts as a man has to direct the course of a river running through his grounds: he may divide it into a multitude of channels, alter and direct its motion, but can neither give nor take it away. The water runs by its own strength without any impulse from the man; so it is with our thoughts, which have a motion of their own, independent of the mind itself.

9. How often do we endeavour in vain to recollect a name, a transaction, a circumstance we know extremely well. How often do we try to study without effect, and perplex ourselves with difficulties we have made nothing of formerly? Which seems to shew, that the mind always employs some instrument which, when not at hand, it cannot work at all, or pursue the train of thought it attempts. As in reading we only open the book: but the page presents the words contained in it to our sight; so in thinking we set our imagination to work, which exhibits appearances to our understanding.

10. The instruments of thought are the *ideas* floating in our imaginations, by which I do not mean the perceptions produced in the understanding, but the causes immediately producing them.

When a peacock spreads his tail in the sun, we have a full view of the creature with all his gaudy plumage: the bird remains at some distance, but the light reflected from him paints an image on our eyes, and the optic nerves transmit it to the sensory. When arrived there, it becomes an idea, and after the bird is gone out of sight, we can recal the idea as before, though in a duller and fainter manner.

11. But an idea which is only an accident or modification of something must have some substance to inhere in, which substance is indeed the agent on all occasions. Yet

we

we commonly ascribe the action to the modification, because it depends upon it. The same nerves differently modified by external objects would have conveyed the image of an owl or a bear instead of a peacock. Therefore the last substance, whatever it be, which immediately gives us the perception, is the agent in all cases of sensation; and in like manner that something so modified which excites recollection is the agent in all cases of mental reflection, which modification is our idea.

What those substances are, of which our ideas are modifications, whether parts of the mind, or contained in it like wafers in a box, or enveloped by it like fish in water, whether of a spiritual or corporeal nature, I shall not pretend to determine. All I mean to shew is, that in every exercise of the understanding, that which discerns is numerically distinct from that which is discerned; and that an act of the understanding is not so much our own act as that of something else operating upon us.

12. I do not however deny that the mind acts upon itself remotely, both in producing sensation and action. When we read, opening the book, turning to the proper page, running our eyes along the lines are our own acts; and the sight of the words and sense of the author conveyed thereby are of our own discerning. This we naturally enough, though improperly, consider as the same thing acting on itself, because the action begins and ends in the same thing, and we do not take notice of the medium employed to carry it on.

Thus we see the mind possessed of two powers, or more properly speaking one power, the will, and one capacity, the understanding.

13. If we attend to the discourses of men, we shall find a great deal of confusion in the use of these terms. Understanding is generally applied to the knowledge, skill, or

judgment, resulting from experience in particular things, as when we speak of understanding a language, of a divine understanding the scriptures, or a lawyer the statutes. But the faculty itself is the same in all these cases. When we improve or enlarge our understanding by learning, we produce no alteration in our capacity, for that we must take as nature gave it us. We can only lay in a larger stock of materials for it to work upon, or open a larger field for it to expatiate in. A girl lolling out of a window for hours together, and who minds nothing but the coaches going by, or watches the market-women with their barrows, or a butcher's apprentice with a dog carrying his empty tray before him, exercises the same faculty as the laborious patriot, who spends his life in contriving schemes for the public good.

14. Again, we often speak of doing things against our wills. But the mind has only one active power, or will, by which it executes its purposes, and in this sense it would be absurd to talk of acting against our will. We therefore mean againſt our liking or inclination, which being generally the cause that sets the will at work, we confound the motive with the will itself.

Suppose a girl living with some relation from whom she has great expectations, invited to a ball which she would go to with all her heart, but the old lady thinks it improper; therefore she stays at home very much against her will. If you ask her the reason; the answer will probably be, I *would not* go, because I knew it would disoblige my aunt. In this last instance it stands for a dictate of prudence, or decision of the understanding, whose office alone it is to discern the propriety of our actions. But because the will is often determined by the judgment, we confound them together, just as we before did will and pleasure. Hence man has been often represented as containing two persons within

within him, the rational and sensitive soul; each having a will of its own, perpetually thwarting the other; sometimes one getting the direction of our actions and sometimes the other. Yet when we reflect that these actions are all of our own performing, we are at a loss to determine which of these wills is our own, or which of these persons ourselves.

15. Besides our active power, there are those who also give us an elective power. According to their account, the matter stands thus. Understanding and passion, like two counsel, plead their different causes, while the will sits umpire between them, and, by virtue of its prerogative or elective power, gives the preference to either as it pleases; the bill then goes to the understanding, which adds its sanction to the preference so given; then it returns back to the will, where it receives the royal assent, and is thence transmitted to the active powers as officers of government to be carried into execution.

To avoid all these perplexities, I shall call the faculties by other names, to wit, the active power, or energy of the mind, and the passive power, perceptivity, or discernment; though I shall not altogether discard the old terms, understanding, will, and volition, where I think the use of them can be attended with no inconvenience.

CHAP. II.

ACTION.

A FORMAL old gentleman finding his horse uneasy under the saddle, alighted, and called to his servant in the following manner: 'Tom, take off the saddle on my bay horse, and lay it upon the ground, then take the saddle from thy grey horse, and put it upon my bay horse; lastly, put the other saddle upon thy grey horse.' The fellow gaped all the while at this long preachment, and at last cried out, 'Lack-a-day, Sir, could you not have said at once, Change the saddles?' We see here how many actions are comprised under those three little words, Change the saddles; and yet the master, for all his exactness, did not enumerate the tenth part of them. For, had he staid to particularize all the steps his man must take in executing his orders, they would not have got home by dinner-time. To describe all the motions we make in the transaction of any business, would take up more time in the relation than in the performance.

2. The action of a poem, the critics say, must be one and entire: yet that of the Iliad takes up twenty-nine days, and that of the Æneid six years. For the purposes of our inquiry, it will be necessary to consider things upon a smaller scale, and give a different account of what constitutes a single action.

A single action I take to be so much as we can perform at once; for the present moment only lies within our power. What our future actions shall be, depends on our future

volitions; for, whatever we may determine about them beforehand, when the time comes, we shall do what is then in our minds, not what we had there before, if the two happen to differ. I shall not pretend to calculate how many actions we may perform in any given space of time, but certainly the motions of the mind are very quick. When upon finding yourself very hot and thirsty you snatch up a glass of water to drink, if, after you have got it half way up, you espy a wasp floating on the surface, you thrust it instantly back; which shews that one volition is not sufficient to lift your hand to your mouth, for you see the mind may take a contrary turn in that little interval. How readily do our words find utterance in common conversation, the moment they present themselves! yet the tongue does not move mechanically like a clock, which once wound up will go for a month, but receives every motion, and forms every sound, by particular direction from the mind.

3. But single acts, though confined to a moment of time, may contain several co-existent parts. For we make many motions at the same time, just as we perceive many different objects all together. I shall therefore, to avoid too great a nicety, call whatever passes between one perception and the next one action, though this action consist of several co-temporary motions, and may therefore take in a great variety of objects in a single moment, just like your mathematical surfaces, which though void of thickness may extend over a very large circumference. Our not attending sufficiently to the momentariness of action, is one thing that has given rise to the notion mentioned at the end of the last chapter, of distinct agents and various powers in the mind. But the moment we distinguish action into its component parts, we immediately perceive that what was esteemed the act of several agents was indeed successive acts of the mind exerting her faculties at different times.

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4. In common speech we confine action to external motion; as when we distinguish between an active and sedentary life. We are apt to consider ourselves as totally inactive unless where we can show some effects of our activity. But every volition produces some effect, though not always discernible; when the mind withdraws from the world, she may roam about her own habitation; when she ceases to act upon the limbs, she may still act upon herself, that is, raise ideas, and pursue a variety of objects

5. Mr. Locke divides action into positive exertion, and forbearance, which last he seems to think requires the interposition of the will as much as the former. But I cannot readily understand how a mere forbearance to act is any exercise of our active power at all. What we call forbearance, I apprehend to be generally a choice of some other action. We will not walk because we intend to ride, or talk, or think, or do something else. However it must be owned, that forbearance is sometimes the sole point we set our minds upon. When Rich sits as an equestrian statue in one of his pantomimes, we take him for the very marble he represents; he moves neither head nor body nor limbs, neither eye nor finger, but continues wholly inactive. Whether he is thinking of the audience or of the profits of the house, all this must be accidental, for his mind is intent on nothing but forbearance from all manner of action, and watching his ideas as they rise, so as to exclude all such as would prompt him to action. Perhaps his face itches or the stirrup presses against his ancle, and he wants to relieve himself, but he checks those desires as they arise, and by this means his purpose is answered without any thing actually to be done. For our limbs do not move of themselves, therefore their remaining motionless is not owing to volition, but to the absence of it.

6. There are some postures we must keep ourselves in by a continued

a continued effort of the mind. If our statue holds up a truncheon in his right hand, he must keep his arm in that position by his own strength: but this cannot be deemed a forbearance, for if he forbears to exert himself but for a moment, the arm will fall down by its own weight.

As however forbearance often requires a stronger effort of the mind than action itself, for it will cost us more pains to leave off drinking, swearing, or any other fooliſh habit we have got into, than to practise it, I shall not scruple to ascribe forbearance to volition, for it may be so remotely though not directly, and to include that together with any actual exercise of our powers under the general name of action.

7. In speaking of any action, we generally include the operations of other agents tending to complete the purpose we had in view, provided we conceive them necessarily consequent upon our volition. Thus when Roger shot the hawk hovering over his master's dove-house, he only pulled the trigger, this drove down the flint, which struck fire into the pan, and so on, till at last the bird was shot. But all this we ascribe to Roger; for we say that it was he who brought down the bird. So likewise we claim the actions of others as our own, when we know that they will certainly act as we direct them. "He who does a thing by another, does it himself." But this, though true in a moral sense (for we can only judge of the merits of men's actions by taking their consequences into consideration), is not true in a metaphysical sense, for nothing is strictly an act of the mind which is not the immediate product of her volition.

CHAP. III.

CAUSES OF ACTION.

THESE I shall distinguish into the material, the formal, the ideal, the final, the instrumental, and the efficient. When you sit down to dinner, the victuals are the material cause of your eating, their being properly dressed the formal, your sight of them and knowledge of their qualities the ideal, the gratification of your appetite the final. Your knife and fork the instrumental, and the mind or body the efficient, according as you refer the action either to the will separately or to the whole man, for in the former case the body will itself be an instrument in the hands of the mind.

But here I must observe, that there are persons who deny the mind to be any efficient cause at all, and as they are men of sense and learning, it would not be civil to pass them by without exchanging a word or two.

2. According to Dr. Hartley, the whole process of thought and action is carried on by vibrations in the smaller particles of the nerves and muscles; those which are excited by outward objects, and which he calls sensory vibrations, being the causes of all our sensations, and others which are mechanically excited in the brain, and propagated downwards along the muscles being the immediate springs of all our actions. Thus the sensory vibrations, like waves raised in a pond by throwing in a stone, extend to the remotest parts of the mind, and being able to get no farther recoil back again in different sorts of actions.

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The mind must in this case remain totally inactive, for the will is nothing but a certain state of the vibratiuncles, or disposition in the particles of the brain to vibrate in a given manner. She sits a spectator only, not an agent, in all we perform; she may indeed discern what is doing, but has no share in what is done; the whole being brought to pass by the action of these vibrations upon one another.

3. Bishop Berkley goes into a contrary extreme; he allows us neither ether, nor nerves, nor limbs, nor external substances, nor space, nor distance. For though we have ideas of all these things, he denies that there is any connection between the ideas and the things themselves, of which we know nothing, our perceptions existing only in the mind; and because some of our perceptions must be totally dissimilar from the objects exciting them, he concludes by an inference common to persons of a lively imagination, that this is the case with them all. Thus the life of man is made a mere delusion. We dream of taking long journies, and traversing the globe, but really never stir a foot from home: we please ourselves with the thought of being surrounded with an infinite variety of objects, while we sit in perpetual solitude, having nothing but ourselves to converse with.

If you object to this the regularity of appearances in nature, always following one another in a certain order, the answer is that our perceptions are excited in us by an invisible agent who has chosen to establish that order between them. So if you ask how it comes to pass that you always feel the same warmth whenever you hold your hands to the fire, though both your hands and the fire are imaginary things, or that by fancying you put it to your mouth, you immediately taste the flavour of visionary roast beef, they tell you, that this is owing to the will of the deity, who, whenever he excites one of those perceptions in the mind, causes it to be immediately

immediately followed by the other, to keep up a certain connection of causes and effects.

4. But for the preſent I shall venture to proceed upon the following postulata: that the bodies we daily see and handle actually exist in as great variety of forms as we commonly suppose, and that our operations upon them are of our own performance; that Westminster-hall is bigger than a nut-shell, and the moon somewhat higher than the weathercock; that I hold a real pen, and have a real paper before me; that my hand would not write unless I moved it, that the thoughts I write down are the result of my own labour and study, and that the ideas floating in my brain would produce neither regular thought nor outward action if I forbore to exert myself.

5. But though I would assume the mind as an efficient cause, it must be acknowledged she has not strength enough to accomplish her designs without foreign help. For the mind does not act immediately upon outward objects, nor even upon the limbs, but moves them backwards and forwards by tendons, muscles, nerves, and fibres, some of them invisibly small. Consequently the mind, though she were as mighty as a giant, can impart no more of her strength to the limbs than the fibres are capable of conveying. What could Goliah or Sampson do if you allowed them only a single cobweb to work with? They would not have power to stir a silver thimble. Yet when one tossed his weaver's beam, and the other carried the gates of Gaza, they performed their prodigious feats by tender filaments slighter than a cobweb, undiscernible with a microscope.

6. Considering then the force with which we often act, and how unable those tender threads we have to work with must be to bear the sudden jerks and violent struggles which they must encounter in great exertions, it seems most likely to suppose that the mind has some good friend at hand ready to assist her weakness, and that her force is not

really

really her own. Perhaps there lies a mighty weight of some subtle fluid bearing constantly against the orifices of the nerves, but prevented from entering by certain little sliding valves kindly provided by nature for our use; the mind then has nothing to do but to draw aside the valves, and in rushes the torrent. The mind in this case works like the miller of an overshot mill, who by drawing a little board against which the water presses, and which any child might pull up with a finger, turns the stream upon the wheel, and whirls round a massive stone which he could not stir by any other means.

CHAP. IV.

IDEAL CAUSES.

By ideal causes I understand all those notices of our senses and judgments of the understanding, which from time to time direct us in every step of our proceedings; though this is using the word in a larger sense than Plato, who understood by it only that plan of any work conceived in the mind before we go about it. But we cannot proceed in the commonest action without repeated directions from our senses or reflection. We can neither walk, nor write, nor eat our victuals without using our eyes or feeling, and applying some little degree of attention. Whatever we go about, we must have some notion not only of the thing we are to do, but of the means and ways proper to effect it.

2. Yet if we consider carefully how small a part of our actions is properly our own, we shall find, that, strictly speaking, we have no idea of any one thing we do, nor how we do it. The action of the mind extends no further than to opening the valves mentioned in the last chapter, nor perhaps so far neither: for she may have little imperceptible fibres to pull them by. Yet she feels neither valve, nor fibre; she neither knows how many there are, where they lie, nor to what they are fastened.

If the master of a large family had his study hung round with bells reaching to the different parts of his house, and offices; when he went to use them, besides knowing the person he would call, he must know the proper bell and in what

what quarter of the room it hung. Otherwise he would chance to call up the cook or chambermaid when he wanted to speak with the groom or coachman. So the closet of the mind is hung round with multitudes of strings reaching to the eyes, the mouth, the hands, and every part of the body: we know not their number, their situtation, nor the manner in which we must make use of them. Yet have we all our limbs perfectly at command; we put them upon services which they do not fail to execute according to our expectations, and all this without our knowing any thing of the matter. We feel a desire to help ourselves to victuals, and we stretch out our hand towards the dish: we want to be on the other side of the room, and instantly our feet move forward to convey us there. Whence then have we this surprising dexterity in a state of utter darkness?

3. But here perhaps Dr. Hartley would interpose with an objection. You require an ideal cause for every action of the mind, and yet you admit that the mind draws her valves without knowing what she does: may we not therefore conclude that this motion of the valves is not an act of the mind, but of some corporeal agent, which acts by impulse without any idea at all? You have an idea of speaking, but none of the means you must take to perform it: therefore you have not an adequate ideal cause, and perception cannot be the cause but concommitant of action, or co-effect of the same cause, given us for our entertainment, not the direction of our conduct; and we are only led to esteem it the cause of our actions by always seeing it precede them. Again, in reading the long periods of Cicero or Demosthenes you must exert your voice in a particular manner, to make your stops rightly, and lay your accents or emphasis properly. The boy at school does this with the greatest difficulty. But you, who have been long accustomed to it, do it so easily that you cannot tell whe-

ther the action is purely mechanical in you, or whether there is any thing voluntary concerned in it. May we not fairly conclude then, since voluntary and automatic actions are so much alike, as that we cannot well distinguish them, that they are both effected by means of vibrations, and that our discernment is not a direction to us what to do, but a foresight only of what will be done?

4. Now in answer to this, I will suppose the mind of a man separated from his body, without any of those disorders, which usually bring on our dissolution: let the muscles, the juices, the ether, remain in the same state as before: how would this body behave after the separation? According to my notion, though the pulse might continue to beat, the animal secretions to be carried on, and the lungs to play, it would do nothing further: its palate might come into that state which affects us with hunger, but having no sensation, it would not call for dinner, walk down stairs, sit at table, help itself to victuals, nor converse with the company. The doctor must contend on the other hand, that it would perform all this and every thing else one might expect from a reasonable being. When the child stretches out its hand to play with the candle, and upon touching the flame instantly snatches it away, crying as if its little heart would break; is this owing solely to the action of the flame in turning the tide of vibratiuncles into a new course, or is it not the smart felt by the child, which makes it exert its activity in a different manner? The perception of pain belongs confessedly to the mind alone, and I conceive that were it not for the sense of pain the child would still go on playing with the candle after its fingers were burnt, just as it did before. This is the state of the question between us, which I leave to the decision of my neighbours after a mature consideration of the case.

5. Upon the whole we may justly conclude, that in all voluntary

voluntary actions the mind must have a discernment, if not of the act she performs, yet of some bodily motion, or other distant consequence effected by it; and in general we take continual directions from our senses, and judgment shaping our conduct according to the intelligence they afford us, which justifies me in having ranked ideas among the causes of action.

CHAP. V.

MOTIVES.

HAVING in my list of causes assigned a particular class for the final, I shall treat of them distinctly, though in reality they are a species of the ideal, as the latter are of our ideas in general. Many ideas pass in review before us which have no share in our actions, and many serve us as guides in our conduct which yet did not prompt us to pursue it. When a man walks, he may see bushes growing by the wayside, cattle grazing, birds flying in the air, without regarding or deriving any use from what he sees; these are part of his ideas, but not ideal causes, which are the windings of his path, and the several marks by which he knows his way; yet neither are these the final cause, but health, diversion, business, or some other end he proposes to himself in walking.

This final cause is called the motive with reference to the first spring or mover, which sets mechanical engines at work, and at other times is compared to weights in a scale. Some there are who do not allow the mind to act from motives at all, or at least assign her a limited power of acting against or without them, or of giving them a weight which does not belong to them. They say, she plays tricks with her balance, like a juggling shopkeeper, who slides his finger slily along one side of the beam, and presses the balance down on which side he pleases. But when we do any thing like this, it is not by a free will of indifference overpowering

overpowering the force of motives, but by privately slipping in or stealing out the weights in either scale, which we often get a habit of doing so covertly that we are not aware of the fraud ourselves.

2. To prevent mistakes, however, when I speak of the efficacy of motives, I do not mean that they impel the mind as one billiard ball impels another, but that they give occasion to the mind to exert her own inherent activity in obtaining the objects they point out to her.

Nobody will deny, that we sometimes act upon motives; that we follow where they lead, and that we should have acted otherwise, had other motives presented themselves. How many people flock to hear Handel! They follow him to the Haymarket, to Covent Garden, or the Foundling Hospital: had he not been to perform there they would not have gone to any of those places, or if their doctor had told them that going might be fatal to their health, they would not have stirred from home. Motives therefore have a natural efficacy to put us upon action.

3. But we sometimes run into mistakes on this subject by using the word motives for any reasons we can allege in justification of our conduct. If any one should ask you why you eat your meals regularly every day, you would no doubt answer, why, I cannot live without eating. But do you really think of starving every time you go down stairs to dinner? Do you not go because you are hungry, because you will not make the family wait, &c? How then can the preservation of life, which is the farthest thing from your thoughts, be the motive of your eating; for this must be some feeling or idea existing in the mind at the time, and urging you to action?

4. But as Hermogenes was a singer, even when he did not sing, and the cobler retains his appellation after he has shut up his stall and retires to the alehouse, so motives

preserve their importance with us when they lie quite dormant and do not operate in any way. If a man has the character of being covetous or ambitious, we are ready to impute all his actions to that motive. A politician cannot take an airing in the park but we suppose him to be going on some deep design, forgetting the thousand other desires and objects which must bear a share in determining his actions besides the principal one.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish the real motive of our actions, when there are two that concur in inciting us to the same action. Inclination is very apt to draw reason after it, not as a friend to consult with, but as an advocate to support her cause. When the minister labours to extend the prerogative to increase his own power, he thinks himself defending the rights of the crown: when the young lady chuses her lover for black eyes, white teeth, and a sprightly air, she thinks she is despising all mercenary views, and regards only solid merit and happiness.

We seldom attend to our motives at the instant of their operation, and afterwards we find it too late to recall them, as they really were. In judging of motives it is necessary to take all circumstances into the account, for the same motives operate very differently upon different people, or upon ourselves at different times. We often say, I should have acted very differently from such a person, had I been in his place. But this is not strictly true, for had we had the same notions, ways of thinking, &c. that is, were all the circumstances the same, we should have acted just as he did. It seems an absurdity to put any thing in torture, when it procures no advantage to ourselves. But there are some tempers which are habitually fond of injustice and cruelty. And this disposition to torture others is with them a very strong principle of action, though it may seem to us purely wanton, and without any motive at all.

5. Motives

5. Motives introduce and give effect to one another. There are in general certain leading motives, which all the rest follow. We portion our time into large actions tending to some distant end, not presently accomplished, which consists of under parts, and admits of many bye-actions not implied in the principal. A man who travels to York upon business, divides his journey into several stages, and while upon each, thinks of nothing but getting well to his inn: this then is his motive for the time. On the road he finds himself weary and alights, or thirsty and stops at the door of some public-house, or perhaps he enters into conversation with the passengers in going along, or stands still to look at some fine building. All these actions have separate motives of their own, refreshment, amusement, or curiosity, which bear no relation to his main design.

One motive may impel us to action, and another determine the manner of it. When a grave divine and powdered fop enter the room together, civility prompts them alike to pay their respects to the company, but decency leads the one to a sober manly deportment, and vanity betrays the other into ridiculous motions, a fantastic air, and affected expressions.

The motives that give birth to our larger actions take time in the forming, and we have leisure to contemplate them: but the ideas causing our momentary actions, like lightning, appear and vanish: they pass so swiftly we cannot get a glimpse of them, or hardly perceive their existence. Besides, our general motives having the largest influence on our lives, deserve our greatest regard, and we commonly apply our whole attention to them, so far as to overlook all the rest, scarcely knowing we have any such belonging to us, or mistaking them for something else.

6. Our motives fluctuate and change their colour perpetually. A thing we were extremely fond of at one time we

care not a pin for at another: what we admire this hour, we despise the next. So that finding the mind does not always proceed by the same rule, we conclude that she has an authority of her own, independent of motives, and can give any of them a preference without regard to their real weight; by taking part with inclination can make it overpower the judgment, or by siding with the latter give it the mastery over the former. But all this may as well be accounted for from the variable nature of our motives, and change of our ideas. When you have formed a resolution, so long as the considerations inducing you to make it retain their original vigour, and those you rejected, their original weakness, you will surely keep it: but if the tables turn, and that which was strongest becomes weakest, you will as surely break it.

We have indeed a power over our ideas, so that we may close our eyes against the admonitions of wisdom, or may fill our imaginations with something else that shall hinder them from entering: but it does not lessen the real weight of a motive, that it does not operate when you will not let it come into the scale. And whoever watches himself narrowly, when he acts thus, may always find some motive of prejudice, wilfulness, or shame of being overcome, which puts him upon the artifice.

7. We will now endeavour to find out that ingredient in all motives which gives them their efficacy, and denominates them what they are.

CHAP. VI.

SATISFACTION.

PLEASURE seems at first sight to bid the fairest for being that ingredient, and it is so with respect to many of our actions. But pleasure, in vulgar acceptation, stands opposed to business, duty, or acts of necessity: yet in all these we feel some inducement, or complacency of mind, that carries us through with them. Therefore Mr. Locke has fixed upon the term satisfaction as being more general, comprehending all that complacence we feel as well in business as pleasure.

2. We are not however always in so happy a situation as to have a choice of enjoyments in our power: we are sometimes reduced to the hard necessity of choosing the least evil. A man in the pleurisy lying on his left side, does not expect pleasure by turning to the other: he expects only a diminution of pain. Uneasiness therefore sometimes prompts us to action as well as satisfaction. But as a penny saved is a penny got, so I may be allowed to consider every diminution of uneasiness as an approach to satisfaction, and treat of them both together.

3. By satisfaction I mean the feeling which a man has when any thing happens that pleases him; when he hears news of some desirable event, when he reads a diverting book, when he looks back upon his own actions with self-approbation, or in any of the most ordinary occurrences and transactions of life, which he pursues with alacrity. We all value our lives at a high rate, which we should not do considering

sidering how thinly pleasures are scattered in the world, unless we found something satisfactory in almost every thing we do. The lowest degree of satisfaction suffices to put us in motion when no higher intervenes. For the mind uses a nicer balance than the master of the mint: a cobweb will draw down the scale when nothing opposes it.

4. Some philosophers have placed happiness in the absence of pain, or in mere ease. But I might refer it to the first man you meet with, whether there is not a real and absolute difference between actual pleasure and the bare absence of pain: if this were sufficient to constitute happiness, we must be happy during every sound nap, or in a fainting fit.

Epictetus maintained that all pleasures were equal in degree, and differed only in kind, for the lowest of them satisfies the mind, and the highest can do no more; so that a man feels as much satisfaction in pulling up the heel of his slipper in a morning as in recovering his only child that had been stolen away by gipsies the week before. But this contradicts daily experience, which testifies that we find a much greater relish in some pleasures than in others. We always quit any common amusement for one that we are exceedingly fond of; and where different pleasures offer together, that apprehended the greatest always prevails, and carries away the prize from the rest, if there is no other reason to prevent it.

5. Happy is it for us that the slightest prospect of advantage is sufficient to put us in action! How miserably would the shopkeeper and mechanic spend their days, if they could work no longer than while the dread of starving hung over them! But their business furnishes them with an amusement that wholly engages their thoughts, and while they content themselves with finishing their tasks, they remove the evil without having it perpetually staring them in the face.

face. Hence it appears that our gentle satisfactions in their whole amount are much more valuable than our higher enjoyments, as exceeding them greatly in number, and furnishing us principally with employment for our time.

6. In a strict sense, the real motive of our actions is not satifaction itself, but the prospect or idea of it: one may have the idea of a tooth-ach one does not feel, or of a diversion one does not partake of. The end of action is some satisfactory perception attainable thereby. But this perception follows upon the action, and had no existence at the instant when the motive operated. Our expectations therefore often deceive us: the child, that went to play with the candle, expected pleasure but found only smart; and the coward, who runs away from his own shadow, dreads an enemy that would not have attacked him.

We may therefore pursue satisfaction without being in a state of enjoyment, and fly from uneasiness without being in a state of suffering. He that walks along Cheapside must turn and wind perpetually to avoid jostling the other passengers: the prospect of uneasiness he would feel in running against people induces him to all those motions, which yet makes no abatement of the satisfaction he has in the business he goes about, nor throws him into a state of suffering.

7. The end we pursue therefore is not present satisfaction, but that of the next moment; and as we must every moment have some conception or another, we must be always providing for the next ensuing perception, which confines our attention to what, in common language, though not strictly, we call the present time, leaving the provision for future objects to our subsequent endeavours.

Remote, imaginary good never influences the will but by means of the satisfaction we feel in making advances towards it. We flatter ourselves with distant hopes, and shudder

shudder at future dangers; we contemplate with pleasure the prospect of pleasures afar off, and look with horror on misfortunes before they happen. If remote objects did not affect us in this way by sympathy, they could not influence the mind at all. But they always affect the mind more strongly, the nearer we approach to them.

8. This presentiment of the future makes the great difference between man and the brutes, by enabling us to avoid mischiefs a long way off, and pursue advantages that require much time and labour to attain them. And it extends the influence both of our pleasures and pains beyond their natural limits; hope often supplying us with a continual fund of delight, while fear makes us tremble at imaginary evils that may never happen.

9. Mr. Locke ascribes the change of action solely to uneasiness, and the continuance of it to satisfaction: but it seems to me that both satisfaction and uneasiness have a like efficacy to make us either change or adhere to our measures as occasion requires. For, first, properly speaking, there is no such thing as a continuance of action, all our perceptions and all our volitions being transient and momentary. What seems a continuance is only a repetition of successive perceptions and volitions, of the same kind: just as a spout *continues* to run while it pours forth innumerable drops without any interval between. So if you continue to hold your hand under it for a quarter of an hour, this is done by successive volitions, for should you neglect to repeat them, your arm would fall instantly to your side.

But waving this nicety, if a man intent on reading a pleasant book is unexpectedly sent for by a friend whom he has long and ardently wished to see, is it joy or uneasiness that makes him throw aside his book, and run to meet his friend? Suppose a company of young people amusing themselves with dancing: somebody tells them of a firework going to be

be played off in a neighbouring garden: it is most likely they will all run to the window to see it. By and by some one puts them in mind of their dancing, and they return back to their sport as eagerly as they quitted it. Surely this change of action is not owing to the least spice of uneasiness which they feel either in leaving off their diversion or returning to it again. Again, a man might very naturally remain a long time in a very uneasy posture, for fear of being discovered by a gang of thieves, or some such cause.

10. But perhaps Mr. Locke meant by action what I should call a course of action, or a certain habitual conduct in given circumstances. Now in this sense I shall not deny that we seldom fail to continue our courses of action so long as they prove satisfactory, and seldom change them till they grow tiresome, and lead to inconveniences we do not like. If a habit of drinking be taken as one act, a man will continue this practice so long as he finds pleasure in it, and break it off only in consequence of the disorders or some other mischief brought upon him by it. Yet the single acts of which that larger action consists, (as his going to the alehouse, pouring out his glass, changing his liquor), may spring from satisfaction or uneasiness, indifferently, according to circumstances. For the shape and nature of the parts of any thing may vary greatly from that of the whole. Look at your table, and you see it is round or square, or of some other regular form; but hold your eye near the wood, and you will perceive it waving in veins, or running in longitudinal fibres, and a variety of other shapes. So that I believe the only difference between me and Mr. Locke is, that I speak of the component parts of actions, and he of their larger masses.

11. But there is one particular in which I cannot bring myself to agree with him, when he supposes desire to be always

always accompanied with uneasiness. I know that it is so in some situations, but that it is so always is what I can by no means grant.

I may say with Mr. Dryden, "Old as I am, for lady's "love unfit, The power of beauty I remember yet." I still bear in mind the days of my courtship, which in the language of all men, is called a season of desire; yet, unless I strangely forget myself, it proved to me a season of satisfaction also. Mr. Locke tells us, it is the uneasiness of a turbulent desire that drives men into the conjugal state. This, for aught I know, might be the motive with some men, who being of an unsocial and undomeſtic turn, can see nothing good in matrimony, but submit to it as a necessary evil. But this, thanks to my stars, was not my case: I might feel some scorchings of desire, while the object of it lay at an undiscernible distance; but as the prospect drew near, and the obstacles that stood in the way of its gratification were gradually removed, it had no more the fierceness of a furnace, but became a gentle flame, casting forth a pleasing exhilarating warmth. Perhaps I might meet with some little rubs in the way that gave me disturbance; if my fair one spake a civil word to any tall, well-bred young fellow, I might entertain some idle apprehensions lest he should supplant me. When I took a hackney coach to visit her, if we were jammed in between others, perhaps I might fret and fume, and utter many an uneasy pish: but as soon as I got through, though desire abated not, every shadow of uneasiness fled away. As near as I can remember, during the whole time, desire, close attended by satisfaction, directed all my steps, and occupied all my moments: it awoke with me in the morning, and was the last idea swept away by sleep: it invigorated me in business, gave me life when in company, and entertained me with delightful reflections when alone. Nor did it fail to accompany me to the altar,

exhibiting the prospect of an agreeable companion who should double the enjoyments, and alleviate the troubles of life; who should relieve me from the burthen of household cares, and assist me in bringing up a rising family. Possession did not put an end to desire, which found fresh fuel in mutual intercourses of kindness, and hearty friendship, and could often feed upon the merest trifles. How often, having picked up some little piece of news abroad, has desire quickened my pace to prattle it over at home! How often, upon hearing of something curious in the shops, have I gone to buy it with more pleasure than the keenest sportsman goes after his game! Thus desire, leading delight hand in hand, attended us for many years, though a little altered in shape and complexion, until my other half was torn from me. Then indeed desire left me, and with it fled joy, delight, content, and all those under desires, that used to put me upon the common actions of the day. I could like nothing, find amusement in nothing, and cared for nothing. And though I called in all my philosophy to rescue me from this disconsolate situation, it could not relieve me presently, but had a long struggle before it got the better of nature.

12. Some persons will perhaps read the account here given of myself as feelingly as I wrote it; others who may think me romantic, will yet have had desires of their own of some sort or other, and I believe we shall all give in our verdict, that our desires have furnished us with the greatest part of our enjoyments in life. It is only when desire meets with crosses or delays, when it rises to impatience, or requires an immediate gratification that cannot be had, that it brings vexation and uneasiness along with it. If on coming home from a journey in hot weather, you find yourself faint and thirsty and call for a glass of wine and water, have you not a pleasure in seeing the wine pour from the bottle or sparkle in the glass, even before you taste it? Which pleasure

pleasure must arise from the desire, for you would not feel it after quenching your thirst. Pretty bottle, says Sganarelle, how sweet are thy little glug glugs! how envied would be my lot, wert thou to keep always full for all my pourings! But it was desire which gave the glugs their sweetness, for Sganarelle was in a state of desire, not of fruition, when he solaced himself with their music.

Could uneasiness alone determine the will, how wretched must the condition of mankind appear! The will never ceases working from morning to night; yet human life from beginning to end would be nothing but a restless endeavour to throw off an evil we could never totally remove, and to deliver ourselves from one uneasiness after another.

I do not mean to deny that the lash of uneasiness is sometimes necessary to give effect to the active pursuit of any object. If a lazy fellow has some acquisition to make greatly to his liking, his indolence will probably at first hinder him from making any effectual exertions towards it: till beginning to reflect within himself, and finding the object no nearer than at first setting out, this raises an uneasy want of it, which grows greater and greater, till at last it completely overpowers his indolence.

13. I shall even go farther, and grant that in many instances uneasiness is the motive of our actions, when pleasure in the eye of the world runs away with the credit of them. Your debauchees, triflers, and very fashionable people, who make pleasure their sole business, no doubt find delight in it at first: but pleasure too often repeated, at length becomes tiresome: yet still they run on the same round of diversions, thinking they follow pleasure all the while, and so indeed they do, but not with satisfaction, but for want of something else to amuse them, or through the cravings of an unnatural appetite brought upon them by custom. The tyrant, pleasure, inveigles the unwary with exorbitant

exorbitant wages at first, but having bound them to his service by rendering them unfit for any other, he shortens their allowance, leaving them nothing but a delusive expectation of good, and for the most part lashes them through his drudgery with unrelenting cruelty.

On the other hand, the attachment to virtue is often owing to the abhorrence of vice, and fear of shame, or compunction upon acting wrong, rather than to any immediate satisfaction in the practice of the thing itself. I know a strong desire or love of any thing has power sometimes to pluck out the sting of pain: I have experienced it myself in little complaints, such as an aching joint or a grumbling tooth, which I have been able to overlook and despise when eager in pursuit of the light of nature. But I much question whether so strong a love of virtue as shall keep a man easy in Phalaris's bull, is to be acquired by the sons of men. Indeed it seldom happens that we can feel this passion in so strong a degree, as to carry us through common difficulties and troubles without being hurt by them.

14. But, in general, I can by no means consent to the maxim, that uneasiness is at the bottom of all our actions. We all desire life and health, and do many things in order to preserve them: but while in health and plenty, feel no want of either. Can we never choose a food because it is wholesome, or take an agreeable exercise to mend our constitution, unless when terrified by approaching sickness? We all desire the fresh air we breathe, but must we never walk into the fields to enjoy a purer draught till nearly suffocated by the smoke of the town?

15. In short, though every considerable desire may have its opposite want, and either of them be capable of inciting us to action, when we seek for the motive, we must consider what actually operated. For though uneasiness may be one of the motives which the mind always has in store, yet

if it does not enter the scale, it can have no share in weighing down the balance, or determining our actions.

16. Satisfaction and uneasiness often beget and introduce each other: the bare escape from pain gives us a sensible pleasure, and the loss of any great pleasure leaves us in a state of uneasiness. A man just recovered from a fever finds enjoyment in the very deliverance from his disorder, and can pass the day agreeably, though with his servants only about him, in a manner he would have thought insipid, lonely, and irksome at another time. So that a great part of our good springs out of evil; we should often rust in idleness, and feel the time hang heavy on our hands, were it not for pain, difficulty, and danger.

17. Neither satisfaction nor uneasiness ever enter the mind without some other sensation or idea to introduce them. For as you cannot have the taste of sweetness without putting something sweet into your mouth, nor the pleasure of a fine prospect without having a prospect to look at, neither can you procure satisfaction of any kind without either hearing, or seeing, or reflecting on something satisfactory. Nature makes up our satisfactions herself, nor have we any hand in the composition: sugar has its sweetness, gall its bitterness, success its joy, and disappointment its vexation, by her provision: we can neither alter nor diminish the relish of things by our own power. The same objects indeed often affect us variously, being sometimes delightful, and at other times insipid: but even these changes of taste are not of our own making, being occasioned by the variable nature of our palates, disposed to different viands at different times; and all that we can do is to take objects as we find them, according to the present disposition either of our body or mind.

18. However, there are persons, namely your sticklers for the indifference of the will, who pretend that nature has left

this matter undecided, objects being in themselves in a certain degree indifferent, so that we have a power of changing the quality of a motive, and can render that satisfactory which was naturally disgusting. We have, they say, a certain power to give colours to our ideas, and controul the understanding, so as to make it pass sentence against the clearest decision of reason, or strongest solicitation of passion.

According to Dr. King, on the Origin of Evil, and his profound commentator (a book not extant in the time of Mr. Locke, who was so little inclined to this doctrine of indifference as well as myself, that he could not even understand it), the mind sits in judgment between different objects offered to her choice: arguments are brought forward on either side, and unexceptionable evidence produced: she sees plainly which is the strongest side, yet gives judgment in favour of the weakest, by virtue of her arbitrary power. Now the question is, whether there is no motive, inducing the mind to annex the idea of best to that, which had not the preference before, no sudden suggestion of fancy, or impulse of passion, which may start up unawares, and whisper the judge in the ear just before the sentence is past, though they were silent during the whole of the trial?

The abettors of this doctrine being solemn folks, deal altogether in general terms and abstract reasonings; but to my thinking, the abstract is seen best by the concrete. If you would judge between two oranges, you have seen a little before, which is the deepest coloured, you will probably be at a loss to determine: but put them close together on the table, and fix your eye upon them, and you will immediately perceive the difference. I therefore wish that they had given us some instances in which they apprehend this privilege of indifference to be exerted; but as they have not done this, I shall do it for them, and examine whether in

actions esteemed the most indifferent, there is not always some motive actually prevailing upon us to perform them.

19. And, first, since they place the merit of our behaviour in the right use of this power of indifference, one may expect to find the effects of it most apparent in the most arduous exercises of virtue. Suppose a good man solicited by temptations, and urged by tortures to betray his country, yet he bravely resists: but is not this owing to a strong desire of fulfilling his duty, and a vehement abhorrence of treachery? These feelings must support him through his resolution; for another who had not these motives, or not in the same degree, would undoubtedly decline the task, or fail in the trial.

A perfectly wise man must in all his actions adhere to the dictates of his judgment, without deviating in a single instance; that is, he could never be indifferent to act right or wrong. Do the judicious and worthy then enjoy less of this great privilege of human nature than the thoughtless and giddy, whose conduct is much more unaccountable, and who often act from no visible motive at all?

Does not the very exhortation to act in this or that manner imply, that we may thus be prevailed upon to make a right use of our indifference? For what is exhortation, but the suggestion of some motive to do a thing? But if indifference may be thus wrought upon by motives, it is no longer itself.

20. There is generally some passion or habitual desire accompanying almost all our actions, which is frequently confounded with the will itself. And therefore, finding nothing previous to this desire that should immediately give birth to it, they suppose it self-begotten, and conclude that the will has a power of determining itself, and of receiving satisfaction from an object in its own nature indifferent or disagreeable. For instance, there is a desire having no other object

object than to restrain desire. But the reason of this is, that men find their passions and appetites perpetually leading them astray, which gives them a jealousy of their encroachments, so that they often will not comply with them, merely because they will not let them get the mastery over them, and acquire too great a strength to be resisted at other times.

21. On the contrary, you may sometimes meet with persons, who being recommended to do the most reasonable thing, reject it as it were out of mere crossness; the more reasonable you make it appear, the more they are set against it. But this is not properly owing to an inherent perversity of will, always resisting the impulse of motives; but such self-willed people are generally those who have been used all their lives to have their own way in every thing, or else persons of shallow understandings, who having been often deceived, contract a jealousy of all mankind, and see no way to escape being imposed upon but by rejecting every thing proposed to them by others.

In all cases whatever, if you have a knowledge of human nature, and an intimacy with the person, it is ten to one but you may discern the principle of his actions, which is always some motive that acts very powerfully upon him, though it might weigh nothing with yourself. There is always some secret passion, some humour, some averseness to trouble, that hinders us from acting as we ought, or in conformity to those motives which in themselves seem to be the strongest.

22. I once knew an old gentleman, who being pressed by his physicians to go out every day in his chariot, as the only thing likely to relieve his infirmities, acknowledged the expedience of their advice, and wished to follow it, yet could never muster up sufficient resolution. Yet he was a man who in other things did not shew any want of a power to

exert himself. May we not then look for some secret motive to account for this weakness? He had been a man of business, unused to stir out unless on some affair of importance, and had contracted a dislike to your idle jaunts, as fit for none but women and triflers, and therefore could not make up his mind to them, although they were become a serious affair, by being necessary to his health.

Even in the most sudden and trifling actions, which scarce seem to proceed from any motive at all, we shall find a certain regularity which shews that they depend on some habit or previous disposition of body or mind. One man whistles, another sings, another plays with his fingers, or with the buttons of his coat, when he has nothing else to do. Every one has some little trick by way of filling up the time when we do not know what else to do, which we have either fallen into by accident, or caught by imitation from others.

23. Many of our actions proceed mechanically, without giving us time to deliberate at all, or to exert our power of indifference even if we possessed it. A man hears a sudden cry of fire; he leaps out of bed instantly, and hastens down stairs as fast as he can. The alarm banishes all other ideas but how to escape, nor does he once consider whether he shall stay to be burnt or not. So the most giddy and imprudent actions proceed rather from thoughtlessness than wrong election. Ideas start up in the fancy one by one without any thing to check them, and the mind follows the first impulse for want of seeing the inconveniences attending it.

24. Were the will indifferent to motives, so as to turn which way it pleased, without any cause determining it, all our actions, at least all our voluntary actions, must be absolutely contingent. We could have no good reason to repose an entire confidence in one man nor to refuse it to another,

another, though we know the one has always dealt honourably by us, and the other has always deceived us. For there is nothing to prevent them from changing characters to-morrow. Oh! but they say, the one has acquired a rectitude and the other a perverseness of will. Then it seems this perverseness once acquired determines the will to act perversely as often as occasion offers: so the will remains no longer at liberty (at least if we are to build upon this inclination as a foundation of confidence), nor is it the less bound for having brought the thraldom upon itself. A man who sells himself to the plantations is as much a slave afterwards, as the felon transported thither by law.

25. It has been a common thing to ridicule the doctrine of motives by putting the case of an ass placed between two bundles of hay, both equally alluring to the sense, who, they say, must starve in the midst of plenty for want of being able to give the preference to either. I confess their supposition is true in theory; and so it would, had they put the case of a long pole, set upright on a marble pavement with the centre of gravity directly under it, which would remain for ever in that posture if nothing moved it. But the fact is, we can never place the ass, the pole, or our own minds, in such a situation. Should the beast shake his head ever so little, this will bring it nearer to one bundle, which will make the scent of that the strongest: the least breath of air or brush of a fly's wing will throw down the pole; and imagination is constantly supplying us with a succession of motives, sufficient to put the mental balance in motion.

I remember I once called on a friend in the Temple to take a walk; we came down stairs, and then began to consider the course we should steer. I found him irresolute, but would not interpose, being curious to see the event.

The question was, whether we should go to the Park, or to Islington; we had no particular business at either, and both seemed equally agreeable. I believe we stood a full quarter of an hour in the court, before he could determine; for he was a man of gravity, used to weigh his motives carefully, and had rejected the impulses of fancy, till they had entirely lost their force; so that he had nothing to sway him; for you may suppose there could be no weighty reasons for preferring one walk before the other. What was become of his power of indifference, which might have been of some service in helping him out of this dilemma?

26. We have now gone through every species of action in search of a power of indifference; but we have been able to find no such thing, except in a suspension of action, while the motives hang doubtful, and the mind waits till some one of them preponderates. We may therefore fairly conclude, that no such power exists in the mind. But is it never in a man's power voluntarily to alter the impression which objects make upon him, to strengthen some motives and repress others? Yes, as you may sweeten your tea by putting in a lump of sugar, or give a relish to your food by eating salt with it. So if you feel an aversion to labour, you may conquer it by contemplating the advantages of industry, or the shame of idleness: but not if your love of indolence is greater than your regard for the opinion of others, or your own advantage. And as we can turn our eyes on any object of the scene before us, or shut them against the light, so we can direct the organs of reflection to what objects we please, and in this manner can, and often do, alter the complexion of our motives, by throwing a stronger attention on some, and by removing or obscuring others. But it is no impeachment of the efficacy of motives that they do not strike when you shut your eyes upon them, or mark of absolute power in the will, that it is forced to thrust

thrust out of sight a motive which it could not resist. Again, when we pluck up a resolution, as we sometimes do, to surmount any pain, difficulty, or danger, without having any fresh reasons for doing so, this I conceive is effected by the mind's raising an extraordinary degree of circulation in the animal system, and driving it into that particular channel which is necessary for the purpose. And that the body has a large share in producing the effect, appears from the sudden starts, the ferment of spirits, and anxious turns of countenance usual in times of vigorous resolution.

27. This power over our ideas I take to be the great distinction of human nature; for I can perceive nothing of it in the brute creation. Remembrance, fancy, and some degree of reason cannot well be denied them: but their ideas come uncalled, being occasioned either by sensible objects, or the motions of their animal juices: nor can I discern any such thing as voluntary reflection, or controul of fancy belonging to them. If our opponents will accept of this power in lieu of their principle of indifference, as an equally useful and ornamental distinction of the human mind, they are heartily welcome to it, but I cannot agree that both are the same thing.

28 The will is limited only by the confined nature of our organs and active powers. A man may walk a mile with pleasure, but may be fatigued with walking five, and be altogether unable to walk twenty. So he may hold up a weight at arm's length for some time, but cannot keep it in that posture for ever, for the muscles of his arm will grow weary. The same may be said of satiety with respect to objects of sense; we should grow dreadfully tired of venison, if we were to eat nothing else for a whole season, however much we might like it for a week or two. But I know of no labour, no weariness, or satiety, in pure acts of the mind; we are never tired of willing, so long as our limbs

limbs are not tired of executing. On coming home from a long journey a man may give orders for refreshments to be brought him with more alacrity than he had in first mounting his horse. Our employments often fatigue and nauseate, but let some new object give play to a new set of organs, and the mind follows it with as much freshness and eagerness as if it had done nothing before. When we take up a strong resolution, we find pains and difficulty in keeping it, and often faint in the mid way for want of spirit to go on. Which shews that there are certain mental organs employed on such occasions which require labour to keep them on the stretch, and fail us after a certain time, but may acquire strength, like our limbs, by constant practice. Thus that one man can restrain his animal appetites, but cannot refuse the offers of ambition; that another is inaccessible to the allurements of avarice, but cannot resist the impulses of anger; is not owing to any difference of will or to a strong and weak side of the will, but solely to education, turn of mind, and the habit of resisting one kind of temptation more than another.

29. What then are we to conclude, that there is no liberty at all in human actions, no freedom of will? Are all our motions under the controul of foreign causes, without depending in the least upon ourselves? By no means. Neither Mr. Locke nor I ever dreamt of such a consequence. He makes freedom of action to consist in our being so circumstanced as that action will follow or not follow upon our willing to act or to forbear. When upon using our endeavours to accomplish something lying within the compass of our natural powers, some obstacle prevents their taking effect, then is our liberty gone: when no such hinderance intervenes but that we can effect our purpose if we try, then are we free; and not the less so for being influenced by motives of reason, or the impulses of fancy.

fancy. He that relieves a family in distress, gives his money freely, although he does it on motives of charity or compassion, or particular kindness, and though he would have kept his money in his pocket, had he not had those or any other inducements to part with it.

30. As to freedom of will, I conceive that we may be said to possess it whenever we act willingly, or when we have no objection ourselves to act in any given manner; that is, when our choice proceeds from inclination, not from a disagreeable necessity which we would get rid of, if we could. Thus the phrase, I am at liberty to chuse as I please, does not denote that there is no motive for my chusing one way or other, but that I shall chuse which way happens to hit my fancy best, or that it will make no great difference either way. For if a severe penalty is attached to my making a certain choice, there is an end of my free-will; and though I am still at liberty to act, I am no longer at liberty to will as I desire. We retain our freedom of action as long as there is no force put upon our limbs, and our freedom of choice or will, so long as there is no force put upon our inclinations. For instance, if you wish to give a ball or an entertainment, it is but sending an invitation to persons fond of dancing or eating, and you will have your company resort to you of their own accord; nor could you bring them more effectually, if you had a warrant to apprehend them So if money be a man's idol, and you have enough to bribe him, you may make him do whatever you please; or if good nature be his ruling principle, you may get him to do any good-natured action you wish. But though you govern him in this way as you please, so long as this is as he pleases too, there is no impeachment of his liberty. Therefore, in this sense, free-will is by no means repugnant to the operation of prior causes moving us to the exercise of that power, nor to the dominion

dominion of Providence having all those causes at its disposal; but the plan of Providence may go on with unerring certainty, without infringing a little upon human liberty. Some persons fancy themselves subject to I know not what fatality, or irresistible secret influence hanging over all their actions, and leaving them no choice or power whatever, like that force by which we are weighed down to the earth without our feeling it; for, say they, the plan of Providence must take place whether we will or no. But this is not strictly true. The plan of Providence must undoubtedly take place, but not whether we will or no; for in those things where our volition is concerned, it cannot take place but in consequence of our willing it; and many of those things which we do voluntarily, we must do willingly, that is, with perfect inclination and good-will, or we should never do them at all. We need not therefore trouble ourselves at being under any other influence than that of the motives which we ourselves feel acting upon us, and the habits and passions by which (no doubt under the eye of God) we are governed.

Again, there is another sense, in which we possess freedom of will, and that is in encountering present pains and difficulties, and overcoming present inclination for the sake of some end which we have in view. In this sense the will being free signifies that it is not necessarily governed by gross mechanical motives, or outward circumstances, or by whatever casual impulse happens to be uppermost; but that we can exert our voluntary power in raising up distant ideas, and fixing them so strongly in the mind as to determine us to those actions which we think will be best. Now this sort of mental activity we may, and do practice every day of our lives: we determine upon things beforehand, and execute them punctually; we engage in difficult undertakings, and collect reasons to support us in them;

we

we inculcate them deep in our minds, and afterwards find they produce the desired effect. But here we must distinguish between liberty and power; for liberty can only relate to the free exercise of so much power as we have, not to the quantity of that power. He that goes to push down a stone wall fails in the attempt, through want of strength, not of liberty, provided you do not restrain him from shoving against it as long as he pleases. So we may attempt in vain to overcome the dread of any great pain or evil without an impeachment of our free-will. None of us but may, if he will, thrust his hand into the flames like Scevola, for the hand will undoubtedly obey the orders of the mind, should she so direct; but we cannot bring our minds to such a pitch of resolution, because we have not command enough over our imagination, nor motives in store sufficient to counterbalance the smart of the fire. Yet nothing hinders us from trying; therefore we are at liberty to exert such power over our will as we have: for there is a manifest difference between the two cases, where some secret reluctance prevents us from using our best endeavours to obtain the command of ourselves, and where we set about it heartily and in good earnest, but want strength to accomplish our purpose.

Therefore I am not for expunging the term free-will out of our vocabulary, nor against exhorting men to exert themselves, when any difficult task is to be undertaken. But there is no occasion to trouble them with niceties on their manner of going to work; for though they have not the power of indifference to determine their will without the use of means, yet if you can once stir up in them an unreserved desire of exerting themselves properly, they will soon find out the means, though without understanding them: just as we move our limbs without knowing by what muscles we move them.

31. Thus

31. Thus if we would penetrate into the depths of philosophy, we cannot proceed to any purpose without a philosophical microscope, which I shall therefore very frequently use. Now how much soever people may make themselves merry with me for talking of my microscope, I shall not be laughed out of it while I find it so necessary for discovering the secrets of human nature. And I can comfort myself the better, because I find my reprovers fond of using something like it, that is a very bad magnifying glass; which just enables them to discern objects not obvious to the naked eye, but does not exhibit a clear view of their nature and differences. For your half reasoners, by getting a smattering of philosophy without a thorough knowledge of it, only lose sight of their common sense, and so are fit company neither for the vulgar nor the learned: for they puzzle the former with their shrewd observations, and stand in the way of the latter with their cavils and blunders. They add nothing to the stock of knowledge, but deal altogether in objections, without knowing how to solve them or being able to understand a solution when given: and if they take up an opinion at a venture, they fortify themselves in it by throwing a cloud of dust over whatever is offered to undeceive them; and thus, if they can escape conviction by confounding themselves, they look upon it as a complete victory.

32. But having dwelt already too long on this subject of indifference, I shall proceed to consider the manner in which pleasure and pain are connected with different ideas, or transferred from one idea to another; but first it will be necessary to take a view of the origin of our ideas, and the manner in which they are formed into compounds.

CHAP. VII.

SENSATION.

SENSATION is the first inlet and grand source of all our ideas, and is excited in us by external objects. By external I mean so with respect to the mind; for many of the causes of sensation are contained *within* the body. Hunger and thirst, weariness, the pain of diseases, repletion after a hearty meal, the pleasure of exercise and of a good flow of spirits, are all of this kind, that is, proceed from the internal state of the body.

2. External objects are not always the immediate causes affecting our senses. Both visible and sonorous bodies act equally by mediums, yet in the former case we reckon the body the object, and in the latter the sound of the air; I suppose because we can make out a more distinct notion of the place, figure, &c. of any body by sight than we can by hearing. Some persons having in a course of experiments been shewn a calf's eye with the miniature of a landscape reflected in it, very learnedly insisted that the image pencilled on the back of the eye, and not the body represented in it, is the object we behold. Though unless with Aristotle they hold the mind to be existing in every part of the body, they must allow that neither is this image the immediate object of our discernment, but some motion or configuration of the optic nerves, propagated from thence to the sensory. But with regard to hearing, there is no such difficulty started, because you cannot by dissecting a calf's

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ear exhibit any thing similar to the lowings of a cow, which the calf heard when alive. Wherefore we all agree to call sound the object of hearing: yet we know at the same time that it must proceed from the collision, or action of some body causing the sound.

3. Whether there is any likeness between our sensations and the objects exciting them is more than we can tell.

Colours, it seems agreed on all hands, do not exist in bodies in the same manner as they appear to us, being, as the learned tell you, nothing but a certain configuration of the surfaces of objects adapted to reflect some particular rays of light and absorb others. And if you question the most illiterate person breathing, you would find him ascribing the sensation to the mind, and the power of raising it only to the object, though he may call both by the name of colour: but he will never fancy the rose has a sensation of its own redness, nor that when you think of a rose, your mind turns to a rose colour. Again, when we say the fire is hot, or we are hot, we do not mean the same thing by the word hot; but in the one case a particular sensation, and in the other nothing more than the cause, or quality in the fire, which produces it. Therefore those who would find fault with us for attributing colour, heat, and cold, to inanimate bodies, take us up before we were down; for we never meant to attribute any thing more to them than the power of raising those sensations; and I shall therefore follow my plain neighbours in maintaining snow to be white, fire hot, ice cold, pork savoury, wormwood bitter, and the like; which may be done without offence either to sound philosophy or sound grammar.

4. We lay ourselves open to the same criticism as often as we talk of a pain in our toes, or an itching in the the palms of our hands, for it might be alleged that our limbs are incapable of feeling either, and can only raise

sensations

sensations of them in the mind. Or we might be charged with incorrectness in complaining of our bed's being uneasy; but our defence shall be the same as before, for every child knows that the lumps in the bed which make it uneasy do not give uneasiness to the bed itself, but to the person who lies on it.

5. Magnitude, figure, and motion, are reputed both by learned and vulgar to reside in the bodies, to which we ascribe them. Now magnitude as it relates to the mind is not assuredly the same as it is supposed to exist without us. When we look at the cupola of St. Paul's, we cannot imagine any thing within us of equal size with the object it represents. Nor is it probable when we see a chariot drive swiftly before us, that the ends of our fibres imitate the whirling motion we discern in the wheels.

6. Sensations for the most part come to us through certain mediums of light or air, feeling only excepted, which requires that the object should lie in contact with our bodies. Yet things intensely hot or cold we can feel at a distance. But after the objects of sensation have reached the surface of the body, we must not think they have completed their office, for perception resides not in the eyes, the ears, or nose, or tongue, or fingers' ends. They have still several stages to pass through before they reach the seat of perception. And I conceive there are, besides the common organs of sensations, certain mental organs employed in exhibiting ideas to our view, whether they occur spontaneously, or are voluntarily excited.

As I have here supposed a certain organization in the mind itself, I must explain what I mean by the mind. Now in one sense the mind is that principle within us which feels, perceives, and acts, or as Tully expresses it, is the source of life, and power, and to which I ascribe no organization. For I conceive perception to be simple and

absolute, not admitting of degrees or change, and volition to be instantaneous and immediate; not an impulse conveyed from one organ to another by springs and rebounds. Whether this philosophical mind be itself a compound, or a simple, immaterial substance, I shall not at present stay to examine, though I shall bestow some pains on this subject hereafter.

But we frequently use mind in a vulgar sense for the repository of our ideas, as when we talk of storing up knowledge in the mind, of enriching her with learning and accomplishments: for this knowledge is not certainly in the mind just now spoken of, because then we must be actually conscious of it all; but I defy any man to call to mind the thousandth part of the knowledge he possesses: where then is all that stock of knowledge which lies dormant and unperceived? It is not in your closet, it is not in your organs of sense, but it is somewhere within your custody; where then can we place it but in the mind, in which you have laid up your ideas? But this mind, which perceives not what it contains, must be different from that which is conscious of whatever is impressed upon it; and this mind I may without scruple suppose to be a compound, consisting of various subordinate parts and organs, by the complicated action of which ideas are excited and connected together in the mind in all their variety of shapes and colours.

7. I found it impossible always to keep these two senses of the word separate without coining new terms and phrases, which might have looked abstruse, uncouth, and obscure, and formed a language not current in any country upon earth. I hope however the reader will pardon me for the adoption of the word mental organs, by which I mean to express that finer organization, on which, as I conceive, the ideas, talents, qualifications, and accomplishments generally

nerally ascribed to the mind depend. And these mental organs are also the immediate instruments of perception, in sensation as well as reflection, nothing bodily, nothing material being ever admitted into the presence of the queen-like mind. The only difference between sensations and ideas is, that the one are stronger than the other. But they are both impressed immediately on the mind by the same organs; and in dreams and strong impressions of fancy, we sometimes mistake the one for the other.

CHAP. VIII.

REFLECTION.

We may remember, when children, having amused ourselves with setting a small stick on fire at one end, and whisking it round to make gold lace, as we called it. This childish amusement we may convert into an experiment of philosophy, and prove from it that our organs can continue sensation after the impulse exciting it is over. For the coal is in one point only at the same time, yet there appears an entire circle of fire, which could not happen, unless the light coming from it put the optic nerves into a motion that lasted till the object returned to the same point again. And therefore you must move it very fast, or you lose the effect.

Let any one look steadfastly against the window when there is a bright sky behind it, and then shutting his eyes clap his hand close to them, and he will still see an image of the window distinguished into frames and panes. This image will grow faint and vivid again by turns, the glass will change into various colours, red, yellow, and blue; the bars of the sash will encroach upon the panes, throwing them out of their regular form, sometimes the frame will appear luminous, and the glass dark, and after the whole image has vanished, it will return again several times before it quite goes.

2. But there is this difference between our sensitive and reflective organs, that in a few minutes the image just mentioned will totally fly off, never to appear more, unless you renew

renew it by taking another look at the window: but an object we have once seen, may recur again to our reflection after days, months, and years, without any fresh application to the senses; and by being often dwelt upon, grows stronger instead of weaker.

3. Reflection then, as hitherto considered, is only a continuation or repetition of sensible impressions; and thus it is that we are furnished with the first stock of materials we have to work upon in the absence of external objects. But this knowledge of objects, while it lies dormant, and unperceived, I take to be nothing more than a certain disposition of the internal organs to fall readily into such forms or modifications as have been already impressed upon them through the action of the senses. For I do not apprehend that from our seeing any strange creature, as an elephant or rhinoceros, to our thinking of it again a year after, the same actual modification remains within us during the whole interval: for then our internal organs must be as numerous as the ideas we possess, which seems inconceivable. But one substance may be susceptible of various modifications at different times; and this I take to be the case with our internal organs, which exhibit different ideas to our view, according to the state they are thrown into, just as the same nerves convey the sensations of red, yellow, or green, as the rays of light successively strike upon them.

4. The ideas of sensation having got admittance into the mind, either by their action upon one another, or by their operation on the mind itself, generate new ideas, which the senses were not capable of conveying; such as willing, remembering, comparison, relation, power, and innumerable others. This second class of ideas alone is what Mr. Locke understands by ideas of reflection. However, I shall apply the term indiscriminately to either class as often as I have occasion to speak of ideas generally.

CHAP. IX.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

THE association of our ideas into various assemblages and connections I shall call their combination, as being more general than composition, the term usually employed. For our ideas combine together in two different ways: one by composition, when they so mix and blend together as to form one single complex idea, generally denoted by the same name, as a man, a table, a house; the other by association, when they appear in couples, strongly linked togegether, but not blended in the same mass, as darkness and apparitions, the burst of a cannon and the noise or danger accompanying it.

2. To begin with some account of *composition*. This, I apprehend, is preceded by a selection of particular ideas from a large number, exhibited at the same time to our view. For as a person who would make a curious piece of shell-work must first pick out the proper shells before she can dispose them into figures, so there can be no distinct compound formed in the imagination till the particular ideas of which it is to consist be disengaged from all others adhering to them.

Nature at first presents her objects in a chaos, or confused multitude, in which there is nothing distinct, nothing connected. When the new-born babe comes into the world, the sight of things in the chamber, the gabblings, and handling of the gossips, and perhaps some smells and tastes, rush in at all the five avenues of sensation, and accost

the mind in one act of perception. The nurse's arms seem no more to belong to her body than the wainscot on each side of them: and her voice has no more relation to her person than to the bed-post. Now these impressions become connected together, partly by the greater strength of some, which are left standing together as it were after the others have disappeared, and partly by the constant appearance of some of them together, which necessarily produces a connection in the mind between them. When the nurse walks about the room she carries her arms along with her, but not the wainscot seen on each side of them: when she goes out, every part of her disappears, and when she returns, the whole of her figure is presented to the eye, and by frequent use is considered by the child as one idea. We scarce know our acquaintance in an unusual dress, or different coloured wig; so that the clothes we have been accustomed to see worn seem to enter into our complex idea of the wearer. So that any ideas that use or convenience has led us to consider frequently together become a compound; as a yoke of oxen, a flock of sheep, a city, a county.

5. Sensations, after disappearing, leave ideas of themselves behind, and if other sensations follow immediately and constantly while those ideas are fresh, they unite into one assemblage. Thus the taste of sugar in the mouth joins with the colour we saw before putting it in, and the hardness we felt while we held it in our hands, and the ideas of a certain colour, consistency and sweetness make up the complex one of sugar. By degrees, and from farther experience, we add other qualities to our definition, as that it is brittle, dissolvable, astringent, &c.

6. Custom makes us consider many things as one, though actually disunited. Thus, if a bed be taken to pieces to be removed somewhere, we still look upon it as one piece of

furniture. At other times, as occasion requires, we speak of the curtains, the tester, the bed-posts, &c. as distinct things, and at others consider them as part of the same thing; thus by a kind of contradiction, conceiving of them at the same time as one and many.

7. With respect to the species of things, our ideas are greatly determined by the names affixed to them: ice, though nothing but water congealed, is esteemed a different kind of thing from water; but lead, whether cold or melted, retains its name, and is reckoned the same metal. Lead we seldom see in a state of fusion, unless when we melt it ourselves, and see the whole process; but we have no hand in the conversion of water into ice, nor do we see any particular causes to bring about the change, or know how long it will be before it returns to its old state again, so that we look upon it as a distinct substance, having a nature and causes of its own.

8. Our sensible impressions have others constantly united with them. We talk of seeing cubes and globes, but in reality our senses exhibit no such objects to the mind: we can at most see only three sides of the former, and one half of the latter; but imagination supplies what is wanting to complete their figures. All things strike the eyes in a flat surface, it is our former acquaintance with them that makes them appear to stand out one before the other: as in a picture, where nobody will dispute that the figures lie flat, the roundness and protuberance we discern in them cannot be perceived by the eye, but must be supplied from the imagination.

9. Our complex ideas of things in common life, such as a table, a chair, fire, water, victuals, drink, honesty, gratitude, and other things we frequently have occasion to think of, are much the same in all men. But as we divide into professions, or fall into different ways of thinking, there is a great

a great diversity in the trains of thought which the same object will suggest to different people. Take a number of people to the top of a hill from which there is an extensive prospect, and the farmer will see turnip fields, and corn grounds, meadows, pastures, and coppice; the soldier, eminences, valleys, morasses, and defiles; the surveyor, parallelograms, and triangles in the fields, and hedges; the country attorney, parishes, hamlets, manors, and the boundaries of estates; the painter, variety of colours, contrasts of light and shade; the poet, shady groves, sportful flocks, verdant lawns, the scenes of pastoral and romance.

10. Those things we are best acquainted with afford the largest combination of ideas to the mind. It is this which gives us ability and skill in any science or profession. The idea of the Iliad, in an unlearned man, is that it is an old story of a siege written in Greek verse: but together with this, there arises in the mind of the scholar, or critic, an idea of the fable, the characters, the sentiments, the style, any of which being altered, they would not acknowledge it to be the work of Homer.

11. In things with which we are very familiar, we can seldom recollect half we know of them at once. And were we to have all the particulars belonging to any thing recalled to our minds at the same instant, we should not have room (with our limited capacities), for any other ideas to enter. It is necessary for use that we should have two or more of these compound ideas in view together; without which we could discern neither the resemblance, differences, relations, nor effects of things, on which the whole use of them must depend. Besides, what good would it do to the gold-beater to think of the fusibility of gold, or that it will not evaporate like mercury in the fire? The colour, malleability, weight, and thickness, are all he has any thing to do with. However, we often forget those properties of things which

which are very necessary to be attended to in reasoning upon them: hence we are led to reason erroneously, and draw consequences which do not hold good in fact.

12. The action, or particular situation of things enters into the complex idea we have of them at the time. A man running, exhibits one complex idea in which his motion is included; the same man sitting or standing, another. But as these actions are changeable, we do not include them in our descriptions of things, unless where they are essential to the thing described, and there they constantly adhere to it, as in the ideas of wind, rain, a river, race, &c.

13. It is not always easy to determine when ideas combined together belong to the class of compounds, or associated: perhaps some of the instances I have given of the former, others might call association; nor is it very material to ascertain the limits between the two classes exactly. But since there are combinations which cannot with any propriety be styled complex ideas, I thought it best to notice some of them apart.

The principal of these, because the most universal and extensive in its influence, is the association between words and their significations. Nobody will deny, that words are mere arbitrary signs, having no real relation to the things they express, yet they become so strongly connected by custom that they constantly start up in the mind together, and mutually introduce one another. And this without any effort of the will to make them: for were a man obliged to sit and hear himself abused, he would be glad, I suppose, to separate the offensive words from the scandal they convey, and reduce them to mere empty sounds, but would certainly find it impracticable.

14. Words almost always suggest the idea which the context requires. The word man may be used for one of the human species, for a male, for a grown person, a statue, a picture,

a picture. or a piece of wood on a chess-board, yet we never mistake the meaning, or think of any thing else but what was intended, our imagination confining itself to things connected with the subject already marked out.

15. I do not know how it is with other people, but I find that on coming home after an absence of some months, I have a fuller and clearer idea of the scenes, persons, and places in the neighbourhood, immediately on coming into the house, and before I have seen any of them again, than I could have raised in the morning while at a distance: which must be either that the place itself reminds you of other objects, or that knowing that by just walking out it is in your power to see all those objects, this makes you anticipate them as if they were actually present.

16. There are many other sorts of association, which whoever desires to know, may consult Mr. Locke's chapter on this subject, or may add others from his own observation, if he thinks it worth while to pursue the subject farther.

CHAP. X.

TRAINS OF IDEAS.

OUR combinations being most of them too large to be taken in at one glance, do not present themselves all at once, but exhibit as many ideas at a time as the mind is capable of attending to. Thus one part of a subject occurs first, then another, and so on successively, one thing perpetually suggesting something else connected with it.

2. Even in the most incoherent ramblings of the fancy, there is generally a connection between the several ideas immediately succeeding each other, though the beginning and ending may have no relation to each other. On hearing the report of a gun, one's thoughts may run upon soldiers, their exercises, battles, particularly that before Quebec: this may put one in mind of Canada, the fur trade, of surprising stories told of the beavers, their contrivance in building themselves houses, of the sagacity of animals, the difference between instinct and reason, and a variety of other speculations widely remote from the sound of a gun.

3. What first links our ideas into trains, I take to be the connection of causes tending to procure our satisfaction. Having discovered that what we desire is brought about by a succession of means, the mind finds it necessary to recollect all these in their order, to know what is proper to be done for the obtaining any particular purpose. The sight or smell of his victuals constantly preceding the taste of them, excites an idea of their taste in the child before they reach his palate; in a little while the sight of the nurse coming into

into the room with the pap becomes another link in the chain, to which is afterwards added the sound of her steps on the stairs, &c. In process of time, the child making various noises, perceives that some of them have an influence on the nurse's motions: hence it gets an imperfect notion of language, of cause and effect; and when hunger presses, his little imagination runs backwards to the attendance of the nurse, and the sounds procuring it, which the child accordingly makes to obtain a relief of its wants.

4. In forming our ideas into regular trains, there seems to be something in our internal mechanism that often strengthens and completes what we have ourselves begun. It is well known, that school-boys after labouring the whole evening before a repetition-day to get their lesson by heart to no purpose, will often, when they wake in the morning, find themselves perfect in it without any further trouble. After having wearied ourselves with thinking on any subject, we always find that we can form a clearer judgment on it after a night's rest, or some recreation, or turning our thoughts for a while into a different channel. As if our ideas arranged themselves of their own accord in the mind's absence, and went on better, after being once put into the way, without her direction than with it.

The first link in any train of ideas naturally suggests the rest. In any thing we do not very well know we are often obliged to repeat what goes before two or three times over, in order to remember the rest, or the having a single word prompted will set us on; but what we are extremely perfect in, we can leave off, or resume, or take up in any part at pleasure. I remember formerly to have seen a poor fellow in Moorfields, who used to stand there all day long, and get his living by repeating the Bible; whoever gave him a half-penny, might name a text any where in the Old or New Testament, which he would repeat directly, and proceed to the

the next verse, the next chapter, the next book, and so on without stopping, till some other customer made him begin again.

5. But trains of this excessive length are not wanted for common use: we want a great number of very short ones, for if they were longer, they would not be able to follow the quick changes of action. By continual use, our trains multiply and run into one another, which gives a facility to our motions, and makes the imagination like a wilderness, cut into a number of little alleys, communicating by gentle, and almost imperceptible windings. These small trains woven together in this manner give a greater play to the imagination, and produce a greater variety in the shapes of our ideas, than if they were all stretched out in one long, dull, straight line.

2. At the same time they must not be too short and sudden. What is the difference between a number of words as they lie in a dictionary, or a well-written page? In both we know their several meaning; but in the former they represent a succession of loose incoherent assemblages, and in the latter they appear linked in trains familiar to our imagination.

3. As much a paradox as it may seem, I shall not scruple to assert, that the entertainment we receive from novelty is owing to our habitual trains of thought: for things so far out of the way as to be totally different from any thing else, appear strange and uncouth. But we are pleased with the novelty of a thing when it makes a new opening into old trains, or else reminds us of old things that had been long forgotten. For we may observe, that a new play, a new pattern, a new fashion, or a new any thing, does not please, if it does not in any respect resemble what we have never seen before, or remind us of any thing we have been already accustomed to: and an old custom laid aside for some time,

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may give us the pleasure of novelty again, for in that case it will be *new* to us.

4. The disposal of our ideas into trains gives birth to order, which consists not in the number or kind of our ideas, but in their introducing one another in such connections as shall readily answer our purposes.

Things are in order when their situation corresponds with the train of our ideas: and as the moulds of our imaginations are all similar in some respects, we term things regular or irregular, as they do, or do not tally with the trains which the ideas of mankind most generally fall into. Straight lines, and even curves, the imagination can slide along easily, from the sameness of the action used by the mind in following them; and hence squares, circles, triangles, parallelograms, and other such figures, are counted regular, because they naturally run into lines, and the mind has but a few simple parts to put together in order to form an idea of the whole. For the same reason, symmetry and proportion contribute greatly to order, because the one gives a readiness to the eye, by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the transition over them, by the mutual dependence of parts. Half the regularity of a fine building is lost to common people, from their not having been accustomed to observe proportion.

5. When a young lady cuts a curious figure out of paper, she gives no new position to the several parts, for they had the same situation with respect to one another before. Indeed every sheet of paper contains all the figures that can ever be cut out of it, so that she spoils, instead of creating; and for one figure she seems to make, she really destroys a thousand. Nevertheless she produces order and regularity where there was none, only by snipping away the superfluities of the paper from that particular figure, and so leading the eye along the edges of it.

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6. New prospects generally appear irregular, till by frequent contemplation they lose their perplexity without any real alteration in the scene. What can be more a wilderness than the great town of London is to strangers? But the penny-post man finds his way in it without any difficulty, as well, or perhaps better than if it were disposed into streets crossing each other at right angles.

7. We studious folks have generally a certain way of placing our implements peculiar to ourselves; the inkstand must be in one place, the pens in another, and the books and papers have their several stations allotted them. When the servant-maid comes in to clean the room, she is careful enough to set all to rights again after she has done; but her idea of order being different from mine, she lays the folio underneath, the papers upon it, just as they come to hand, and the smaller things at the top of all; so that on my return I find every thing in the neatest order, and the utmost confusion, for I am forced to tumble over the whole parcel before I can come at any individual thing I want.

Thus order often respects convenience and use; or the advantage we derive from having things disposed in one way rather than another. The disorders of the body, of the air, or elements, are such dispositions of their parts as destroy health, disturb the animal functions, or stop the progress of vegetation; and without a reference to these consequences, we should not term them disorders. What we call the order of nature, arises either from such a position of the bodies composing it as to be productive of utility, or from their constantly undergoing the same revolutions. Formerly, only the fixed stars were esteemed regular, while the other seven, being thought reducible to no rule, were called planets, or wanderers; but later discoveries having brought their motions into a system too, we now admire the wonderful regularity of their courses.

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Nor let it be said that there was an order in the things themselves before men took notice of it. For every number of things, not excepting the wildest productions of chance, must lie in some order or other; and if our understandings were quick and comprehensive enough to take in their respective situations at a single glance, as clearly as we do in things the most familiar to our observation, there would appear to be no such thing as disorder in nature. By disorder, we can only mean something unusual, or that we cannot readily and clearly comprehend.

8. After we have brought our thoughts to run easily along a train of ideas, they cannot always return back again the contrary way. Take a sheet of paper written in a fair legible hand, turn it upside down, or hold it against the light with the back part towards you, and though you have a full view of the contents, you see nothing but confusion and perplexity; you must pick out letter by letter, and spell every word as you go along. Now, if the particular situation of things gave them their order, this could not happen, for the form of things does not depend on their posture: a man does not lose his human shape by being set upon his head, nor does a horse undergo a metamorphosis every time he rolls upon his back: the words do not lose their places, nor the letters their joinings, by holding the paper differently; but the mind has been always used to read them from right to left, and therefore cannot follow any other course.

9. Though order subsists only in the conformity of our trains of thought with the position of objects, yet it is not produced by a voluntary act of the mind: for we cannot see order whenever we please, nor can we help seeing it in certain things, whether we will or no: which is the reason that things have been supposed to be essentially and absolutely regular or irregular in themselves.

10. I have but one other observation to make on this subject, which is, that where the channels of our ideas are worn quite smooth by constant use, the current is often too rapid for the mind to follow it. For which reason I have met with some persons who could understand what they read in Latin or French better than in English, because it required some degree of thought and consideration merely to construe the language.

CHAP. XI.

JUDGMENT.

When the mind perceives two or more ideas together, and there arises immediately from them another idea of comparison, or of their resemblance, identity, difference, number, situation, &c. this is what we call an act of the judgment.

2. Single ideas are expressed by single words, but to express a judgment, you must employ a proposition, which always consists of three parts, the terms, and the judgment passed on them; as man is an animal, fire consumes wood, &c. We say indeed, Peter lives, Thomas sleeps; but this is a contraction of Peter is living, Thomas is asleep; by which addition of another term we add nothing to the meaning: yet that this is implied as a distinct term in the proposition, appears from hence, that the ideas of Peter and life are both equally in the mind, whether we say that he lives or does not live; so that there must be a third act of the mind, which determines the relation of these ideas to one another, as it must certainly make a difference whether we deny or affirm the same thing.

3. That judgment is a distinct thing from the ideas to which it refers, may be also proved from our often having the ideas without passing any judgment on them. A man may have beheld a field from his window a hundred times without ever attending to the shape of it, or knowing whether the sides are equal, or how many there are of them. If judgment were nothing more than simple apprehension, why do not all objects, when clearly discerned, suggest all the relations they stand in to one another, or all the comparisons that may be drawn from them? One may have a

very distinct view of an isosceles triangle, and see it as plainly as the greatest mathematician, but without knowing or even thinking that the sides are equal. Men judge variously of the same object, and one faculty contradicts the conclusions of another, which could not happen if we had only one mode of perceiving things. The visible magnitude of objects depends on the angle they subtend to the eye, which must be certain, and always what it is; but the judgment we form upon them is variable, confused, depending upon habit, and other causes. Why does the sun look smaller than the house, and yet a man at twenty yards distance does not look smaller than your hand, though you might completely cover over his figure with it? Because we continually see men close to us, whereas we never saw the sun so near as to appear larger than the house.

4. But judgment, though a distinct act of the mind, is not a voluntary act. We cannot perceive snow to be green, nor believe fifteen to be the same as twenty: though we may in matters less evident warp our judgment, and alter the true proportions of things by bending our whole attention on one view of a subject, and shutting our eyes against others.

5. As judgment appears to be a different exertion of the mind from mere perception, we often find it necessary to hold objects a considerable time in contemplation before we can decide concerning them: but in things familiar to us, the judgment rises instantaneously on the first view of the objects. A man knows his own horse, his own house, or his own servant, at first sight, without taking a moment's time to consider, insomuch that we confound this with the evidence of sense, which we abuse, without reason, for perpetually deceiving us; whereas the senses cannot well deceive, because strictly speaking they never inform us of any thing. We are only sensible of certain appearances, which,

as far as they are appearances, are always true; it is our former knowledge of things, that is, our memory and imagination, that lead us to make certain conclusions concerning what they are, and herein we are often mistaken.

I have read an account of a boy born blind, who was brought to his sight by couching at the age of fourteen: one evening he was lost, and upon making inquiry, they found him upon the leads of the house. It seems he had been in the street, and upon seeing the moon peep a little over the roof, he was going to climb up the tiles in order to catch her. This story, whether true or not, seems very probable, if we may believe what has been held by many learned men, that a person on first coming to the use of his sight would imagine every thing lying close to his eye, and that our knowledge of distance is acquired by degrees, as we grow more familiar with the objects surrounding us.

6. Nevertheless, we may trust to the evidence of our senses, or to the appearances of things, till they are contradicted by other appearances. Why do we believe a stick to be straight, though appearing crooked in the water, but because on drawing it out we see the crookedness vanish; or, running our finger along it, we feel no bend where there seemed to be one? Why do we believe the sun to be an immense body, notwithstanding its apparent smallness, but for reasons drawn from the appearances of that and other objects we have seen at various distances, and in various situations?

7. Our ideas, that is the objects we remember, as frequently exercise our judgment as objects of sense. These judgments are often more uncertain, from the fluctuating nature of our ideas, though they are very rarely so loose and undetermined, but that we may pronounce some sentence upon them, their fluctuations seldom exceeding certain limits. Thus the idea of an elephant never contracts so small as to be contained within the dimensions of a mouse,

therefore we always know that the one is bigger than the other: or perhaps we rather remember the comparisons we have formerly made between actual impressions, as that such an object appeared ten times bigger than another that stood by it, than judge of things afterwards from the floating images of them in our memory.

8. With respect however to ideas of reflection (properly so called), that is, general and abstract notions, we cannot possibly judge of these from their actual impressions, as they exist only in the mind. We do not on this account find ourselves at any loss in speaking of the ideas of justice, mercy, approbation, virtue, duty, &c. or in reasoning upon their qualities and differences. But the faculty of judging, both in the mental sense and the bodily, is acquired by time, and practice, and familiarity with the objects, not the result of a necessary disposition in those objects to excite a perception of agreement or disagreement as soon as apprehended.

9. Reasoning appears to be nothing more than a judgment formed upon others actually existing in our understanding: it is perceiving the agreement between two ideas by their agreement with some third. When this process is often repeated, it becomes impossible to retain the whole chain of reasoning in our thoughts: and our actual belief in things of this sort is almost entirely founded on our recollection of having had reason to be convinced of them formerly, though those reasons have completely escaped our memories.

10. There are various degrees of strength in our opinions, from the lowest possibility to the highest assurance, which we call certainty. If our premises are slender, they will only bear a proportionable weight of conviction to rest upon them: but many slight probabilities, conspiring to one point, may supply by number what they want in strength; as one may make a prodigious glare with rush candles, provided

vided one lights up enow of them. Repetition of the same evidence will sometimes answer the same purpose as a multitude of proofs. Indeed a bare assertion, repeated over and over again, may supply the place of evidence: the tenets of a sect or party, continually chimed in men's, ears without any argument to support them, will gain at length the most implicit faith. And a man may tell a lie so often that at last he believes it himself.

11. As opinions grow up, so they die away by degrees. Facts we have read in history, problems we have seen demonstrated in Euclid, having been long out of our thoughts, sink into slight opinions: we think they are so, but we are not sure. A man's judgment on the same point often varies according to his humour, or the state of his animal spirits. A man over his cups judges differently from what he does in his sober moments; passion notoriously perverts the judgment, warping it more or less as it is more or less violent: when we wish a thing to be true, we believe it to be so.

12. The consideration of this variety of opinions has put some persons quite out of conceit with their understandings, which they say are governed more by whim and circumstances than any thing else, and are not therefore entitled to credit; for who would believe a witness that was perpetually contradicting himself? And it must be confessed that we cannot pretend to absolute certainty about any thing. Our knowledge of external objects or past occurrences depends upon our senses and memory, which we have found fallacious in many instances, and we can therefore never be sure that they do not deceive us in others. The utmost we can know of them is, that they have sometimes agreed constantly in one story, but for this we must trust our memory: and even this perhaps amounts to no more than a negative proof, that we have never been able to detect their inconsistencies.

Therefore, for aught I can demonstrate to the contrary, Bishop Berkeley may be right when he says, there are no pictures in the room, though I see them before my eyes; that I never was in my garden, though I remember walking there this morning; and that all the infinite variety of objects nature seems to present to us are purely imaginary, and life a continued delusion. For who has seen through all the compass of nature, so as to know without a possibility of mistake, what powers there are undiscovered by man, which may alter the properties of things, and their operations on one another, make impressions on our senses in the manner of external objects, create traces in our memory, conjure up pictures in our imagination, and influence our judgment without our knowing any thing of the matter?

13. A man in his sleep entertains as full a persuasion of the reality of his dreams, as he does of any thing else at other times: when he wakes, he sees they are mere delusion, not by any defect in the persuasion itself, or mark of truth wanting, but by their inconsistency with other things which he now believes more strongly. We have some assurances that are fallacious, and others that are true. When the false have been driven out by opposite evidence, we then discover their delusiveness, like servants whose faults you seldom hear of till they are turned away; but while we are persuaded of them, they seem to carry the same face and marks of truth about them as the others.

14. Have we then no test to try any opinion by, whether it be genuine or counterfeit? Or have we no certainty of the judgments we pass upon ideas in our own minds, though we should have none of external objects? If I hold no real pen in my hand, nor see a real table before me, have I not an absolute knowledge of the appearance of both being in my imagination? And may I not pass an unerring judgment

ment on those appearances? Cannot I discern clearly that my idea of the pen differs from that of the table in colour, shape, position, &c.? Though there should be neither lines, nor angles in nature, have we no distinct notions of either, and may we not reason with certainty concerning their properties?

15. First, this knowledge could be of little use to us beyond bare amusement, nor would it answer any real purpose of life. Unless our ideas correspond with the things themselves, we must be falling into perpetual blunders, however accurate we may be in our reasonings. Secondly, let us examine whether this abstract certainty is as great as we suppose. Now we are to remember that the judgment, in this case as well as others, is something distinct from the terms, whereon it is passed: there is one step at least between the apprehension of the terms, and the judgment resulting from them, and who can tell what causes may possibly intervene to give the mind a wrong bias in making that step? Again, our assurance here is only built upon this foundation, that we cannot conceive any possibility how we should mistake concerning ideas actually before us: but our not being able to conceive a thing otherwise, is not absolutely a proof of its being true. Lastly, our conclusions often contradict and overthrow one another, nor can we always satisfy ourselves that we have a clear idea of those things in our minds about which we reason very fluently. We have no clear idea of lines, points, or angles, yet mathematical certainty, which relates entirely to these things, of which we have no conception, is confessedly the greatest of all others. Perhaps, therefore, we had better confess, that all we know certainly is that we know nothing, unless even this sceptical certainty should be wrested from us; for the same reasons that make us doubtful of our knowledge,

knowledge, may also make us doubtful whether we ought to doubt of it.

16. Let us return to the objection first proposed, which was, that our understandings are incapable of absolute certainty, and therefore not to be trusted. And I fear we must admit the assumption, but I think we may deny the consequence: though our knowledge does not rise to certainty, we may still rely with sufficient confidence on what we have. The active mind of man cannot stand idle, we must be doing something or other every moment of our lives, and all that we have to do is, to proceed upon the best information in our power. If a man on a journey inquires the road of a stranger, is he not to believe what is told him because he is not certainly acquainted with the character of the informant? Therefore I can by no means agree with those of the ancients, who held that the perfect wise man would never assent without absolute certainty, unless they would make him a lumpish indolent being, less active and useful than other people; for without assent there can be no action, and certain knowledge is not in our power.

17. If we examine the nature of the mind, we shall find that all evidence begets a proportionable assent where there is none to oppose it. Children grow cautious, only because experience proves to them that neither their senses, nor other people are always to be relied upon. Even doubting implies an assent to something, for if you see no reasons to hold your mind in suspense, what can you doubt about? If you see a person at some distance, in the dusk of the evening, you think from his appearance that it is your friend, but you doubt about it because it may be somebody else. But if you were on a desert island inhabited only by yourselves, and saw something walking upright at a distance,

a distance, you would make no doubt who it was: therefore this imperfect appearance is sufficient alone to create assurance when it has nothing to stand in competition with it. Nor is the case different in our most careful deliberations from what it is in sudden and temporary assents; for what is the use of consideration but to discover the evidences on each side the question, and weigh their merits accordingly? And when we have once satisfied ourselves that we have examined the matter thoroughly, we wisely dismiss any doubts hanging on the weaker side out of our thoughts, as only tending to disturb us in the vigorous pursuit of our measures: till some new light occurring, or some change of circumstances happening, we judge it expedient to resume the consideration afresh.

18. What then are we to understand when we hear it asserted that the wise man never assents to things uncertain? As a man, he must sometimes assent to uncertainties, unless you suppose him to have a full view of all the lights that can fall upon every subject, the moment it presents itself to his thoughts. The expression then can only mean, that he will not assent rashly, like the common herd of mankind, before he has examined the matter as fully as opportunity will permit, or the lights of his understanding enable him. By following this practice constantly, he will become acquainted with the degrees of evidence, so as to measure them almost upon inspection, and will lay up a stock of principles in his understanding, which he may trust to, and from which he will be able to make his decisions quicker and surer, though less *hastily*, than other people.

19. As to those who may still insist that we can place no confidence either in our senses or understanding, because they have sometimes deceived us, we might ask them, how we are to know that such instances have ever happened, unless we give credit to our experience informing us of them?

them? Or what conclusions can we draw from the facts, if we cannot depend on any judgment of our understanding? If these obstinate sceptics do not assent to the truth of their own examples, or the force of their own arguments, they trifle with us and deserve no regard: if they do assent to them, they practise the very thing they wish to prove unreasonable.

20. My object in this disquisition has been to establish these two maxims; first, that absolute certainty was not made for man; secondly, that man is so constituted as to do very well without it. Hence arises the common distinction between absolute and moral certainty. For it is not the nature of the latter to exclude all possibility of mistake, neither is it destroyed by the suggestion of such a possibility. I shall not attempt to give an exact definition of moral certainty, that may comprise every thing belonging to the term, but I think a man may be said to possess it when he is conscious of having had all opportunities of examining a subject, has considered it thoroughly and impartially, and finds a clear judgment remaining in his understanding of the truth of his conclusions without the least probability of the contrary. This I believe all men confide in, and I do not see what the wisest of us can have better to rest his assurance upon.

21. Constant experience produces the like certainty, and it gives us a confidence in the testimony of our senses, and our conclusions with respect to external objects upon finding them always answer our expectations. So that we may without the imputation of folly, rest assured, that the tables, chairs, and other objects we see, are things really existing without us, that stone is hard and wood combustible, that occurrences have really happened to us as we remember them, that two and two make four, that a part is not greater than the whole, and that our established rules of acting

acting and reasoning are right, at least till we find sufficient evidence to doubt of them.

22. This moral certainty then, which is the portion of man, we must be understood to mean, when we speak of knowledge. And he who should say, he does not know where he breakfasted this morning, what it is he holds in his hand, whether there is such a place as London, or whether the sun shines, would be guilty of a gross abuse of language, and convey other ideas to the hearer than he has in his own mind.

23. The vulgar are apt to be positive, because they judge from partial views of things: a single weight thrown into the scale will always drive it down forcibly if there is nothing in the opposite one. But the contemplative use themselves to compare different arguments, which they frequently find contradictory: therefore they abound in doubts which never enter the head of a common man, whence doubt has been reckoned the avenue to philosophy. It is however only the avenue: the use of doubting is to prevent hasty decisions, and so to lead to greater certainty; and if we do not arrive at the end, we had better never have set out on our journey.

24. Let us not run away with a notion that a propensity to doubting shews sagacity and shrewdness of parts, for it may as well proceed from the contrary quality. Perhaps a man of more sagacity may have discerned the objection as soon as the doubter, but discerned at the same time that there was nothing in it. He whose views are confined to one narrow point of evidence will think himself certain because he sees only that: enlarge them a little, and he may discover something to stagger his confidence; but if he can open them still farther, he may discern what will bring him again to a fixed determination: and in the clearness and extensiveness of our views, sagacity chiefly consists, which

which gives stronger marks of itself in a quickness of resolving doubts, than a readiness in starting them.

25. We can measure evidences no otherwise than by the weight we feel they have: while the weights bear a near proportion to each other, the doubtful beam still nods from side to side: but the excellence of a balance lies not in having large scales, that will hold a number of weights, but in turning upon the smallest difference. Therefore there is a common sense or discretion infinitely preferable to brightness of parts, which indeed has no other value than to furnish ideas for it to examine. For your men of large capacities, if wanting in this quality, get rid of vulgar errors only to exchange them for others peculiar to themselves: they are quick at seeing things, but not at comparing them, they argue strongly but cannot determine justly, and you will generally find them obstinate in some absurdity which every body else discerns to be such with half an eye.

26. Our being always liable to mistakes ought to prevent every man from being so wedded to his opinions as to turn a deaf ear to all evidence that can be offered against them. A prudent man will indeed decline inquiry when he thinks there is a design and ability to impose on him by sophistry, or when the motives for entering upon it seem trifling and ridiculous: but he will never think himself so sure of any point as to render all farther examination needless, on whatever grounds, or by whatever persons recommended. For my own part, as well persuaded as I am that two and two make four, if I were to meet with a person of credit, candour, and understanding, who should seriously call it in question, I would give him the hearing: for I am not more certain of that than of the whole being greater than a part, and yet I could myself suggest some considerations connected with our ideas of infinity, that might seem to controvert this point. Yet for all this, I cannot find the least shadow

shadow of doubt in my mind whether two and two make four, or whether the whole is greater than a part, but build upon them as certain principles.

27. I shall here add a few words on an opinion that has been generally held, of the mind having a particular faculty to judge between her ideas, distinct from that whereby she perceives them; therefore we find three kinds of operation ascribed to her, simple apprehension, judgment, and ratiocination. But for my part, I can see no foundation for such a triple capacity, the single faculty of perception seeming to me sufficient for all those operations. And indeed, I can see no more reason to suppose one faculty for apprehending, another for judging, and so on, than to suppose one faculty for seeing blue, another for yellow, and another for scarlet. When I make judgment a distinct act from the apprehension of the terms, I do not mean that the faculty is different, but that it is a new idea or view of the subject. So we may reflect on a cow and a sheep, without thinking whether one be larger than the other, and when we make this second reflection, though it cannot subsist without the former, it has a new relation for its object; nor does there need any other faculty to apprehend this additional idea, than that whereby we perceive the things themselves.

28. As to first principles of reason, or certain abstract moulds, or forms of truth, inherent in the understanding, and giving shape and consistency to all our ideas as they pass through them, I can admit nothing of the kind. The knowledge of general and abstract truths is founded on that of particulars, which must be derived from experience. There are some truths esteemed self-evident, because supposed to be assented to as soon as proposed; but I question the fact, for I fancy one might meet with children, who do not know that two and two make four, or that the whole cannot

cannot be contained in a part, after they clearly understand the meaning of the terms. We call them self-evident, because we discern them at first sight, but so we do the figures and distances of bodies, which we have shewn to be entirely an effect of custom. There is as necessary a connection between nine times four and thirty-six as between twice two and four: and we find that the market-women, who have constantly used themselves to reckon by groats, judge of their amount without staying a moment to consider it: therefore those ideas have the same effect upon them as self-evident truths. But all men have had some experience, and acquired some habitual methods of judging of things daily occurring to their senses and reflection, from whence is derived the knowledge we call self-evident, because we know not its origin, nor remember the time when we were without it.

BOOK II.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN CONDUCT.

CHAP. I.

IMAGINATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

If a man were sent to take an account of any of those vast woods in America, scarce ever trod by human feet, he could not be expected to proceed with much regularity at first: he must follow wherever he could find an opening, and when he had examined one quarter, he must return to the place he set out from in order to examine another, and would often find occasion to take fresh notice of things he thought he had sufficiently examined before.

So in this my investigation of that wilderness, the human mind, I am forced to work my way where I find it practicable: I have already touched upon the subjects of this chapter in various places, but before I proceed I find it necessary to state my ideas again, a little more explicitly.

2. Imagination in common discourse, is applied to ideas purely fanciful, having no existence in truth and nature, such as a Cyclops, a chimera, the enchanted island of Circe, or whimsical adventures of Pantagruel. But the word is not confined to this signification, and I would understand by it that faculty by which different ideas and objects, no matter whether real or fantastical, are presented to the mind spontaneously, and without any effort on her part;

and by understanding, I would chuse to denote the power we have of voluntarily leading the thoughts into certain trains rather than others, and of calling up ideas that would not have presented themselves of their own accord. In what relates to imagination, ideas follow one another mechanically; in the exercise of the understanding the mind selects and pursues some, and rejects others, with a view to some particular end.

To make my notion of this distinction clearer, I shall illustrate what I mean by an example. Suppose a servant wench in London, after being fatigued with several hours' hard labour, can get up stairs to indulge herself awhile in indolence. She throws herself down upon a chair, shuts her eyes, and falls into a state between sleeping and waking: but her fancy roves upon the work she has been doing, the utensils employed in it, and the chit-chat of her fellow-servants. If the cat mews at the door, this changes the scene to puss's exploits in catching mice, or her fondling tricks while she lay playing in her lap; until some other sensation or turn of fancy leads to a new train of ideas. Hitherto all proceeds mechanically; volition remains wholly inactive, there being nothing alluring enough to raise a desire of retaining it in view: the images pass lightly and nimbly along, according to the impulse received from outward objects, without leaving any trace of themselves behind. Presently there arises a great noise and hubbub in the street. This rouses up the girl, and carries her in all haste to the window. She sees a crowd of people, and in the midst of them my Lord Mayor going by in procession. She minds nothing of the houses before her, nor the mob jostling one another below, for the prancing horses with their gorgeous trappings engage her whole attention, till it is drawn from them by the great coach all glorious with sculpture, gold, and paintings, which she follows with her

eye

eye as far as she can see it. The sheriffs in their liveries, and whatever else appears remarkable in the scene, has its share of her attention; which is so strongly impressed with all these objects, that the traces of them do not quickly disappear from her mind, but raise a curiosity to know what could be the occasion of this parade. Thus far imagination only is employed: but curiosity puts her upon searching for the means of gratifying it, which not occurring readily, she must use her understanding to discover them. So she examines the sheet almanack pasted up behind the door to see what holiday it might be, or runs down stairs to ask some one else, who tells her it is my Lord Mayor's shew.

3. In some cases we act inadvertently, heedlessly, and without thinking, being led mechanically to pursue some object that happens to strike our fancy; at other times we act knowingly, and designedly, with a view to introduce some other object not present to the mind, and with a consciousness and reflection on what we are doing. The beginning of our lives, I apprehend, passes wholly without this reflection, which we acquire by slow degrees, but till we have obtained it we cannot be said to have arrived at the use of our understanding.

4. Did we possess an imagination perfectly well stored and well regulated in all respects, it would answer all our purposes of itself, without any other assistance. But as nature has not given us this faculty in perfection, she has endued us with understanding to direct and improve it. Therefore it is the business of this last faculty to range our ideas in such assortments and trains as are best adapted to our purposes; to bring them under command, so that they may be ready for any services required of them; and continually to keep a watchful eye over them, to prevent their deviating into wrong channels.

5. Whatever knowledge we receive from sensation, or fall upon by experience, or acquire by habit and custom, may be referred to the imagination: and to this we may also refer the evidence of the senses, the notices of appetite, our common notions and conceptions of things, and all that rises up spontaneously in the mind. Whatever has been infused into us by careful instruction, or worked out by thought and industry, or gained by attentive observation, may be regarded as the produce of understanding; such as the skill we have in any art or science, or in languages, or in conducting the common affairs of life, or what we bring to our recollection with pains and difficulty. Our tastes, sentiments, opinions, and moral senses belong partly to one class, and partly to the other; their seat lies in the imagination, but they are brought there sometimes by an industrious use of the understanding, and sometimes by the mechanical influence of habit and example.

6. Plato used to compare understanding and passion to a charioteer driving a pair of horses; we have now-a-days left off driving our own chariots, so that I may be permitted to change the metaphor, and compare the mind to a traveller riding a single horse, reason being represented by the rider, and imagination with all its train of opinions, appetites and habits, by the beast. The strength and speed requisite for performing the journey belong to the horse; he carries his master every step of the way, directs the motions of his legs in trotting, walking, or galloping, and whisks his tail about or plays with the bit as he pleases; and if the road is plain before him, he will move on right enough of his own accord. Sometimes indeed he may prove startlish, or restive, turning out of the way, or running into a pond to drink, in spite of all endeavours to prevent him; but this depends greatly on the discipline he has

has been [illegible]. The office of the rider lies in putting his horse in the proper road, and the most convenient pace, checking him when too forward, and spurring him when too tardy, being attentive to his motions, never dropping the whip or losing the reins, but ready to interpose instantly when needful. There are also many things to be done previous to the journey; he must have his saddle, bridle, spurs, and other accoutrements, in proper order; he must learn to sit well in the sadule, understand the temper of the beast, get acquainted with the roads, and inure himself to bear fatigue; he must have his horse well broke, taught all his paces, cured of starting, stumbling, and all skittish or sluggish tricks. If he can teach him to canter whenever there is a smooth level turf, and stop of his own accord when the ground becomes rugged, it will contribute to make riding easy and pleasant: he may then enjoy the prospects around him, or think of any business without danger or interruption. As to the choice of a horse, our rider has no concern with that, but must content himself with such a one as nature has provided him; but since the spirit of the beast depends much on the usage he receives, every prudent man will endeavour to make it answer to his own strength and skill in horsemanship, and according as he finds himself a good or a bad rider, will wish to have his horse sober or mettlesome. For strong passions work wonders when there is a greater strength of reason to curb them: but when this is weak, the appetites must be feeble too, or they will be under no controul.

7. Understanding commonly draws imagination after it, but only by frequent use. Men seen from a great height seem no bigger than pigmies, though we know them to be of the common size: but seen at the same distance upon a level, they appear just the same as they are, because we see them continually in the latter situation, and but rarely in the former. Objects seen over water or any uniform

surface, seem smaller than their real dimensions, because the scenes we are generally conversant with contain a variety of distinguishable parts, and we erroneously judge of the distance and magnitude of an object by the number of other objects intervening.

8. It is only from the strong glare of their evidence, or from long habit that the conclusions of the understanding pass into ideas of imagination As the understanding therefore becomes master of her ideas, she gradually consigns them over to the imagination, and then proceeds in quest of new objects. However perfect any person may be in architecture, sculpture, or painting, though upon the first inspection of things belonging to those arts, he will discern more than the ignorant, yet by considering them attentively, he will strike out farther observations that had escaped him at the first view, which when he is become sufficiently familiar with them, he will be able to recall at any time, without any farther effort of the understanding. For what occurs spontaneously, and readily, whether this be owing to the vividness of the impression, habit, or any other cause, I call a movement of the imagination; and what requires pains, art, or contrivance, to bring to light, is, in my sense of the word, an act of understanding.

9. I have already denied this faculty, according to the explanation here given of it, to the brute creation. They sometimes fix a strong attention upon things, but it is of the mechanical kind described before, where the attention is drawn by the glare of present objects, and not directed to the discovery of something unknown. For the hound when at fault, may take as much pains to recover the scent as the huntsman to put him upon it, yet when returned home after the chace is over, and his organs are no longer excited, he does not, like his master, ruminate on the transactions of the day, endeavouring to find out his miscar-

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riages, and draw rules from them to conduct him better for the future.

10. My present design was to add a few words concerning the instinct of animals, which in many instances surpasses the sagacity of human beings, and has been sometimes esteemed a particular species of understanding different from our own. But I do not see why it may not be ascribed to the operation of the senses, or to that internal feeling, called appetite, which we find variously affected by objects in different creatures, and which may prompt them to take prudent measures unknowingly, without foresight of the good effects to result from them. And we often find something very like this in ourselves. If cattle, ants, and other animals, prognosticate the dangers of the weather, a shooting corn, or a rheumatism in the joints, will enable us to do the same: the same cause operates upon both, namely, a certain degree of moisture in the air, exciting a particular feel in the flesh. I once knew a person troubled with indigestion, for which he had three several remedies, each of which would give him relief at times, when the others would not: and he always knew which of them to apply, by the strong appetite he found in himself to that particular thing. Now why may not this be called instinct as well as that which inclines a dog to gnaw the grass by way of medicine, when he finds himself out of order? As to the greater degree in which animals possess this faculty, this may be accounted for from their having acuter senses, and nicer appetites to direct them in their choice between things noxious and wholsome. Then, as they have no other faculties to rely upon, they of course make the more use of this, and attain a greater proficiency in it. Just as persons deprived of any one sense make a greater improvement in the rest, and as he that should be obliged to walk in the dark would do wisely to take a blind man for his guide.

CHAP. II.

CONVICTION AND PERSUASION.

By conviction I understand a full, unreserved assent of the understanding to any proposition, and by persuasion a readiness in such conviction to present itself in lively colours to the imagination, and to influence our actions. Every judgment does not amount to a conviction, nor is every present appearance a persuasion; for when we see a stick thrust into water, we do not imagine it really bent because it seems so; nor does a man persuade himself he has two and twenty hands, when by holding up one of his own behind a multiplying glass he sees that number presented to his view.

2. There is sometimes a temporary persuasion we can lay aside at any time, as in reading a poem or a novel, where imagination enters fully into all the scenes described, and receives them as real facts recorded in some authentic history. Therefore fictions must be probable to give entertainment, for whatever contains a glaring absurdity, or is repugnant to our common notions of things, we cannot even fancy to be true. What are the changes of scene on the stage but contrivances to transport the audience in imagination to distant countries or companies? What are lively descriptions but representations to the mind, which make us ready to cry out that we actually see and hear the things described?

3. Where we have ocular or other sensible demonstration of any mistake, we are generally cured of it at once; but where such positive evidence is not to be had, a wrong opinion after being driven out will often steal upon us again at unawares. In this case, it is best to accustom ourselves to dwell upon the proofs already suggested rather than to aim

at

at finding out new ones: for importunity and habit prevail more upon imagination than strength of argument, which like a distorted limb, must be set right by continued applications, not by violence.

4. Probably conviction would operate more forcibly if we were capable of arriving at absolute certainty, but there being always a possibility that our clearest reasonings may deceive us, this lessens the authority of reason, and leaves room for a lurking suspicion of its fallibility in all cases.

5 If you desire a person to take something out of your eye with a feather, how much soever you may be convinced of his dexterity, yet when the feather approaches your eye you cannot help winking, because you cannot exclude the sudden apprehension that he will hurt you. All the arguments in the world avail nothing in the case; yet I doubt not, by repeated trials, a man might bring himself to undergo such an operation without flinching. Why can bricklayers walk safely along the ridges of a high building, but because they have gained an habitual confidence in their safety? Nothing will ever persuade you that you are safe in an old tumble-down house, till by living in it the fear dies away of itself. Some apprehensions, as the dread of seeing spirits and apparitions, being implanted early in our childhood, can never be totally eradicated afterwards, neither by reason, nor example, nor ridicule, nor time, that cures all things. The tenets of a sect or party, deeply inculcated betimes, keep their hold in spite of the strongest conviction. Hope will outlive all probability of success; and love often flatters with an opinion of reciprocal kindness, notwithstanding the grossest repeated ill-usage.

6. Hence proceeds the inconsistency in men's behaviour according as understanding or imagination gets the ascendency. Indeed we often do not know our own sentiments or intentions. The seeds of this self-deception are very frequently

quently sown in our childhood: boys are made to say, they love their book or love to go to church, when in reality they cannot endure either; and after we grow up to be men, it is no unprecedented thing for us to think we believe certain points in religion, philosophy, or morals, when in good truth we do not, being firmly persuaded of the contrary.

CHAP. III.

KNOWLEDGE AND CONCEPTION.

We know some things assuredly for true, of which we have no adequate conception. The velocity of light, travelling fifteen thousand miles in a second, the greater velocity in the vibrations of ether, which, we learn from Sir Isaac Newton, overtake the rays of light; the minuteness of the vessels carrying on circulation in the bodies of scarce visible insects; the eternity of time, immensity of space, &c. may be reckoned among things that are generally allowed, but which exceed the comprehension of all men.

2. Number itself, on which we can reason with the greatest accuracy, very soon gets beyond the reach of our comprehension. It is a question with me, whether we have a direct idea of more than four, for beyond that little number we cannot tell how many objects lie before us without counting. Higher numbers we cannot ascertain, unless when by ranging them in order, which combines the individuals into parcels, and thereby reduces them to fewer ideas, we can bring them within the compass of our apprehension: so we can easily reckon nine disposed in three equal rows, because then we need only consider them as three threes. We talk currently of millions, and compute them with the utmost exactness, but our knowledge of two millions being double one million is no more than the knowledge of two being the double of one: and we know the value of figures in general, only by the number of places they stand removed to the left.

3. Knowledge, though it lessens the difficulty of conceiving of many things, often creates difficulties which people in general do not discern. The plain man makes no boggle

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at the ideas of creation, annihilation, or vacuity: for he thinks he sees instances of them every day in the production of plants from the ground, the consumption of fuel in the fire, and the emptiness of his glass every time he drinks up the liquor. But the naturalist considers, that the materials composing the tree existed either in the earth, the air, or the vapours, before it grew up; that the fire consumes the wood, only by dividing it into imperceptible particles; and that after the liquor is poured out of the glass, it may yet remain full of light, or air, or ether: therefore he conceives no powers in nature that can either give or destroy existence, and disputes incessantly concerning the reality of a vacuum.

4. It is in a great measure the repugnancy of things to what we have ordinarily seen or known that renders them inconceivable. The savage cannot comprehend how men convey their thoughts to one another by writing, and the communication of these by sounds would appear as wonderful, but that all men learn to speak, before they know what wonder is.

5. We often call things inconceivable, not because we cannot imagine them, but because they are contrary to experience. I can easily conceive Dedalus flying in the air, for I have seen a print of him in Garth's Metamorphoses: though when I consider the weight of a man's body, the unwieldiness of a pair of wings sufficiently large to buoy him up, and his inability to flutter them fast enough, I cannot conceive the possibility of his ever practising that method of travelling.

6. However, the inconceivableness of things is not a sufficient argument against them, when daily experience convinces us of the fact. Few things are harder to conceive, than how the rays of light should make their way through glass. And it sometimes happens, that we are unable to account

account for things merely from the closeness of the connection between them. He that would explain how a clock is made to strike the hour, begins with shewing how the weights pull round the main wheel, how that with its teeth catches hold of the next, and so on through all the movements successively, till he comes to the hammer and bell. Here we see that explaining is no more than enumerating the several parts of an operation, and tracing its progress through intermediate causes and effects: therefore to call for an explanation of any cause operating immediately is absurd; because it is calling for an account of intermediate steps where there are none. All that we can do in this case is, to satisfy ourselves from experience, that such and such effects do constantly follow upon the application of particular causes.

7. It is one of the most useful points of knowledge, to distinguish when the repugnancy of things to our common notions ought to make us reject them and when not: for men have fallen into cross mistakes both ways. Some have been made to swallow the most palpable absurdities, under pretence that sense and reason are not to be trusted; and others have disputed the reality of motion, of distance, of space, of bodies, of human action, on account of some difficulties in all these things they could not reconcile to their ideas. I know of no other rule in this point, than that the strongest evidence ought to prevail; wherefore nothing inconceivable in philosophy deserves credit, unless it necessarily follows from some premises assuredly known, and clearly conceived.

CHAP. IV.

HABITUAL ATTACHMENTS.

I HAVE already taken notice in the Chapter on Judgment, of the transferable nature of assent, and how it passes from the premises to the conclusion, and often rests on the latter even after the proofs are completely gone out of our memories. Something of the same kind happens with respect to our motives, and feelings of pleasure and pain, which are perpetually transferred from the end to the means, and from one object to another by association.

2. This transition is sometimes effected by a single strong impression: a burnt child dreads the fire, and some persons having received hurt by a sword, can never bear the sight of one afterwards. But it is oftener the effect of habit, and repeated impressions: boys are driven to their lessons by fear a long time before they take a liking to them; and by use people become attached to professions they first entered into much against their inclination. Again, if a man wishes to see a fine house or gardens, but the way lies along very dirty roads, the prospect of wading through the mire does not immediately become pleasant to him; but if he had frequent occasion to ride along bad roads on very agreeable errands, though he might never come to like the exercise, it would grow much more tolerable to him than he found it at first. The perpetual tendency of any thing to what will greatly please us, renders it pleasant of itself, and in this case it becomes an immediate motive to action.

3. The most remarkable instance of this is in the case of money. Every body will acknowledge, that the value of money arises solely from the use of it: if we had not found it commanding the pleasures and conveniences of life, we should

should not have thought it worth our regard. Nature gave us no such desire; but we are obliged to teach children to be careful, and those, with whom such pains have proved ineffectual, cannot rest till they get rid of it, or, as we say, it burns in their pockets. Nevertheless, the continual experience we have of money supplying our wants and fancies, gives it a general estimation among mankind, so that the desire of gain is one of the most powerful motives of action. Few of us on being shewn some creditable and easy method of acquiring a fortune, but would feel an immediate pleasure in the pursuit, without looking forward to the many pretty things we could purchase: nor would it be thought prudent in any man to refuse a handsome sum of money till he could fix upon the particular uses to which he should apply it. A covetous man will often deny himself the pleasures, conveniences, and even necessaries of life, for the sake of hoarding up his pelf, and seems to be actuated by no motive whatever but that of dying worth a plumb.

4. Of this kind also, are, for the most part, our attachments to particular places and persons; not for the sake of any thing better in them than others, but because we have been used to them, and received most of our pleasures through their means, or in their company. And in general, most of our tastes, inclinations, sentiments, moral senses, duties, impulses of fancy, fondness for diversions, regard to reputation, virtues and vices, are to be traced to this source.

CHAP. V.

SYMPATHY.

THIS title may perhaps lead some persons to expect a dissertation upon those sympathetic cures spoken of by Sir Kenelm Digby, who tells you, that wounds have been healed by applying plasters to the instrument that made them. Or on that similitude supposed to be in the constitution of two persons, so that any good or ill, befalling one of them, shall instantly affect the other at the greatest distance, by means of certain cognate effluvia passing to and fro between them. But I deal in no such wonders; common experience is my guide, and that must have informed every one how much we continually sympathize with the sentiments and affections of those about us.

2. We are not long in the world before we perceive that our pleasures and pains depend much upon the actions of others: this makes children perpetually attentive to the motions and countenances of people into whose hands they fall. And another reason for their being so, is, that having but few ideas of their own, they catch those of other people to supply themselves with employment. When we arrive at the use of understanding, the judgment of others weighs with us as a just and natural evidence; we look to their opinions as a means of correcting our own, and purposely imitate the ways and manners of our teachers, or other persons whom we fancy more expert and knowing than ourselves.

3. Our affections are also influenced by the prospect of those exhibited by others. A sprightly countenance makes us cheerful, and a face of melancholy damps our spirits: we enter into other people's hopes, and are alarmed at their terrors: we grow to love things we perceive them fond of,

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and contract aversions from their dislikes. This goes so far as to affect our sensations: we may get a relish to a dish from observing the company eat eagerly of it, or nauseate a joint of meat because somebody at table fancies it not to be sweet; and it has been observed a thousand times, that laughing and yawning generally go round the company.

4. We are affected in like manner by stories of things happening at a distance; we receive strong impressions from facts recorded in history, and feel ourselves affected with the affections of those who have been dead a thousand years: and we take an interest in imaginary scenes, partaking the pleasures and pains of fictitious characters in a play or a novel.

5. If, however, we were governed entirely by sympathy, we should be strange whiffling beings, and should never persevere in one steady course of action, because we should be perpetually meeting with somebody or other, by their example to lead us out of it. It is therefore necessary to preserve a certain steadiness, reserve, and self-consistency, and to confine our propensity to imitation within due bounds. There are some indeed who carry this reserve to the opposite extreme; being entirely governed by a spirit of contradiction, or *antipathy*. These persons repine at others' successes, and rejoice at their disappointments: if you talk seriously to them, they fall to joking, and if you would make them merry, they put on a face of more than ordinary solemnity. Yet some situations render us all unapt for sympathy. In our seasons of jollity we cannot endure a melancholy aspect; and when under affliction, any levity disturbs us. But this proceeds rather from the force of sympathy than the want of it: for it is this which renders us uneasy, by urging the mind to assimilate her feelings to others she cannot enter into under her present circumstances.

CHAP. VI.

PASSIONS.

APPETITE, as given us by nature, is no more than a pleasant or irksome feeling, according as it is more or less intense: it does not properly become desire till we have learned what will satisfy it. Little children when uneasy, through hunger or sleepiness, do not know what is the matter with them; and are so far from being led by appetite to the gratification of it, that they fight against their victuals, and other methods of relief when offered them.

2. Every desire is not a passion: otherwise we should never be tranquil for a moment, for we are always desiring something or other. But when the end we aim at does not follow upon our first endeavours, the mind redoubles her efforts to attain it, in hopes that a stronger exertion may succeed where a weaker did not. After having practised frequent exertions of this sort, the spirits get a habit of rising in a ferment at the least difficulty, which will let no other idea intrude but that of the desired object; and then desire takes the form of a passion.

3. The mind often hankers after things that she has found to be unattainable: but this is either because we have formerly supposed them to be within our power, and so have got an habitual longing for them which we cannot break off, or else the mind deceives herself, and forces a temporary persuasion of the attainableness of things which are not really so. If the idea of something practicable were not a part of the essence of desire, there would be no difference between desire and the contemplation of any thing agreeable. I suppose most of us would like well enough to fly about in the air like a stork or an eagle: methinks it would

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be very pretty to glide along with such an easy motion, to transport ourselves suddenly from place to place, and soar aloft in the upper regions: yet we never fix our desires upon such an amusement, because we cannot raise even a momentary imagination that it would ever be practicable. But should some Dædalus invent wings for the purpose, we should probably find ourselves very desirous of having a pair, and many people would part with their coaches to make the purchase.

4. I have already made a distinction between desire and want, meaning by this last ineffectual or fruitless desire, which may be compared to the gnawings of an empty stomach, whose sides grind against each other, from having nothing else to work upon. Desire, therefore, which is attended with hope, proves the source of most of our enjoyments, as want is the great source of uneasiness to us. Content is the absence of want; and a contented state is therefore a happy state, because we never fail to find matter of amusement, when we can keep clear of all disagreeable perceptions.

5. Possesion does not always put an end to desire, but often excites it; urging the mind to strain her mental sight to obtain a stronger view of the object that pleases her, and to open the passages of the animal spirits to admit a larger current that may heighten and prolong the delightful sensation: this state of mind we call joy. This has been sometimes known to rise so high, as to produce great disorders in the frame, and to extinguish life itself; too great a redundancy of animal spirits causing suffocation, which is the more likely to happen, when their channels have been emptied before by some opposite stagnating passion, as grief, or fear, or want. The sight of an only child given over for lost, or a pardon brought to a malefactor at the gallows, have proved fatal: but then the pleasure was accompanied with

an idea of deliverance from something very dreadful before, which gives it a double force.

6. Hope is the expectation or desire of some good which is to be brought about by external causes, and not by our own endeavours. Hope is generally thought to imply a mixture of fear; and indeed most events not immediately within our own power are attended with some uncertainty: but this is not always the case, as we may have the prospect of a distant good to befal us without any doubt about our obtaining it.

7. The old philosophers, as we learn from Cicero, could not determine whether to define anger a fervour of mind, or a desire of revenge: which seems to me just as wise a dispute, as if they had contended whether Chrysippus were an animal or a man, the one being implied within the other: for anger is that particular fervour which arises in the mind at the thought of some injury. I conceive it is the sense of weakness that gives rise to the violence of anger: for as the party on whom we would take vengeance will naturally oppose us with all his might, a more than ordinary exertion becomes necessary to overcome this opposition; and hence the mind gets a habit of impatience and violence in every thing she does connected with the idea of revenge. So that it is common when we see people go about any thing in a great hurry and disorder, to admonish them not to put themselves in a passion. The desire of revenge is not a natural, but an artificial desire; we first look upon it as a means of obtaining security from injury, but afterwards we often entirely forget this end, and vent our wrath on inanimate beings; and in violent transports of rage beat our heads against the wall, or otherwise punish ourselves, thereby bringing on that mischief which it was the original design of anger to avoid. Though anger raises a mighty flood of spirits, it does not like joy diffuse them over the whole frame,

frame, but forces them upon the vessels concerned in action, producing sudden and violent starts, heating the outward parts, and showing more apparent signs of disorder than any other passion. Whence it has engrossed the name from all the rest; for by a passionate we mean an angry man. This is one of the most uneasy of all the passions, being accompanied with a restless impatience, which, like immoderate hunger, never ceases to torment till it be satisfied.

8. Impending dangers, that appear unavoidable, produce fear. The effect of fear seems to be to collect a fund of spirits to be ready for use, should any means of escaping offer; and on the other hand, to deaden the feelings, so that when the mischief comes it may affect us less sensibly. Though people stare wistfully at a dreadful object, they discern little of it, their ideas being duller than usual; and if the terror rises to a very high degree, it totally stupifies the senses, and causes a fainting. Fear chills the limbs, crowding the whole mass of blood upon the heart; and that a mighty fund of spirits is collected somewhere, appears from the uncommon force with which they break out into action. Fear adds wings to our speed; none fight so furiously as cowards driven to despair, and people in a fright have been known to exert double the strength they could ever do at any other time.

9. Shame is a species of fear, consisting in the apprehension of disgrace. Like other fear, it fills with confusion, and operates rather by deadening the ideas than collecting spirits for future exertion, therefore it seems to be occupied chiefly in driving them from the organs of reflection, whose seat is probably in the head, and discharging them upon the neighbouring parts, which may account for the blushings with which it often overspreads the face and neck. This feeling arises wholly from the estimation made by others of

our actions: for though we may habitually take shame to ourselves for actions that can be known to nobody else, yet we should never have acquired this habit but for the censures we have found others pass upon us, or that we have passed upon them. The contrary feeling to shame is that of honour, of which I shall treat more particularly hereafter.

10. Of all the passions the most unaccountable is grief, which fixes the whole attention upon some painful idea; and seems to contradict the common opinion, that satisfaction is the point which the mind every moment pursues, when we find her courting uneasiness, and dwelling on an object that affords her nothing but torment. But it may be remarked, that dwelling on an evil is one step towards removing it; because it may suggest expedients which did not occur at first, and because the strength of an idea, heightened by this voluntary attention to it, urges us to a stronger exertion of our powers. Complaint also procuring us the consolations and assistance of others, we get a habit of indulging a querulous disposition when anything is the matter with us, in order to obtain the surer relief. For which reason children grow more fretful for being humoured. Thus the mind having found the indulgence of grief, and the passionate expression of it generally useful, becomes fond of afflicting herself without thinking of the reason, giving way only to a mechanical feeling.

11. Love and hatred I do not take to be so much distinct passions in themselves, implying the active pursuit of some end, as a disposition in the mind to receive pleasure or pain from the idea of certain objects which we have found accompanied with either pleasant or painful sensations. As our pleasures are various, so are the affections produced by them. We talk of the love of eating, the love of money, of power, of fame, of virtue, of a friend, a wife, or a child.

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I shall confine myself to one or two of the instances here mentioned.

In the helpless condition in which we are born, we are indebted to the care of others for the continual supply of our wants, and the satisfaction we thus receive communicates a portion of itself to the idea of the person administering it: therefore a child's first love is its nurse. But this love is of the same kind as that which it feels for its rattle, which it regards only as an instrument of pleasure to itself. The child, however, finding that nurse is not always equally disposed to humour it, and that this is still less the case with other people, learns by degrees to do and wish them good, that they may be the more ready to serve it. In further process of time, if we find our enjoyments chiefly owing to a few persons, whose kindness we must engage by constantly striving to oblige them, this happens so often, that at last the end slips out of view, and satisfaction is associated immediately with the thought of doing them a kindness. Then it is that love becomes personal; and then arrives at its highest state of refinement, when it may be defined the pleasure of pleasing. This pleasure is of two sorts, which may be distinguished into love and fondness; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without injuring. So that the most resplendent love springs from self-interest, like a rose growing from a dung-hill. But as flowers retain no scent of the ground from which they sprung, so genuine love casteth out fear, seeking only the good of others. The strongest examples of love are those of friendship, of the sexes, and of parents towards their children. Friendship proceeds from long intimacy, mutual interests, and similarity of temper, which engage men in the same common pleasures and pursuits, till their society becomes almost necessary to each other. The love lighted by sexual desire too

commonly burns with the grossest flame, and is rather of the instrumental kind, than the personal: men looking on the beloved object only as a means of gratifying their own desires. Nor can this love be counted really such, till by communication of interests, and partnership in amusements of all kinds, "by those graceful acts, and thousand decencies that daily flow from all the words and actions of a wife or mistres," we have joined a thorough friendship to it, and till we have learned to forego our dearest pleasures, when they are perceived to be hurtful or displeasing to the object beloved; for if a man cannot do this, his passion is to please himself, and not another.

If parental affection were instinctive, nobody need remain in doubt concerning the genuineness of his offspring; and husbands would have a sure test to try the fidelity of their wives. But I never heard of a discovery made that way; and must seek for some other origin of this attachment. And, first, we see the care of parents so universal, that we derive the like feeling by sympathy from others. The notion of children being our own flesh and blood, transfers a part of our self-love to them. One of our inducements to enter into wedlock is, the prospect of amusements and comforts in them; and we receive congratulations from every quarter at their birth. Fathers who bring children into the world unlawfully and clandestinely, wanting these sources of attachment, often feel none at all for them. The regard we are thus led to feel for our children, and their being under our care, urge us continually to provide for their welfare and gratification, and this again increases our affection till it arrives at its full height. Every one is more afflicted at the loss of a child when grown up than of a new-born babe; which shews this affection is to be accounted for in the way here spoken of.

We also acquire a kind of personal fondness for the towns, the

the countries, and places, which have been the scene of our enjoyments, which we retain after having been long removed from them, and never likely to see them again.

12. Despair, envy, jealousy, contempt, astonishment, &c. are but branches or compounds of passions already described, and need not be particularly insisted on. But there is one emotion of mind which deserves particular notice, viz. that species of joy, called mirth, expressing itself by frequent laughter. This has been held by some persons to arise from contempt, or a comparison of ourselves with something thought greatly inferior. But if we consult experience, we shall find that contempt and laughter do not always go together. If a man is offered a bribe which he rejects with scorn, or if he sees a child endeavouring to stop his way, will he burst into laughter on the occasion? Contempt and scorn are gloomy situations of mind, and the proud, who feel most of them, are the most solemn and stately of mortals: but your merry giggling people love best to consort among their equals, to put themselves on a par with the company, and are less supercilious or disposed to draw comparisons between themselves and others than any body else. The sight of an exquisite dainty, an advantageous offer, a sudden honour, sets the voluptuous, the covetous, or the ambitious a chuckling, and would produce downright laughter, if they were not restrained by the rules of decorum, though the situation of mind they are then in seems the furthest imaginable from a state of moroseness and contempt. Who are so easily set a laughing as young children? But what idea of superiority can they be supposed to have?

13. Mirth I conceive to be occasioned by a sudden influx of spirits generally, if not always, let in from some other channel, which redundance of animal spirits overflowing the muscles, causes the convulsions of laughing. The most diverting

diverting humour is, that which raises your expectation of something very serious, and then cuts it short with something quite different. It is, perhaps for this reason, we call such things diverting, because the mind is suddenly diverted from what her attention was steadily fixed upon. Wit consists in pointing out some resemblance between things the most discordant, and which, considered separately, would lead into the most opposite trains of thinking: for the quick transition of thought, or fluctuation between such opposite ideas, is what causes your mirth. It is the same when we laugh at the follies and blunders we see committed. Every blunder implies a deliberate purpose to attain some end into which we enter by sympathy, and the sight of this end suddenly frustrated by the absurdity of the means employed produces that contrast, and disjointedness in our ideas which causes laughter. On the contrary, if the relater of a merry story lets you see beforehand how it will end, you lose half your pleasure; and a jest often repeated becomes insipid, for you cannot laugh when you know what is coming. The sudden news of any great event happening to us does not excite laughter, because the mind is drawn off from attending to the suddenness or strangeness of the thing by the importance of its consequences.

14. If laughter sometimes accompanies the idea of superiority, it is chiefly in very vain people; who having an immoderate fondness for pre-eminence, without abilities or application to raise themselves above the common level, feel a sudden joy in beholding any thing below it. This disposition, whatever they may think of it, redounds very little to the honour of the possessors, as it rather implies a want of real excellence in themselves; so that to sooth the cravings of vanity they are obliged to turn to the defects of others, and build soft flattery on them: besides, if they were constantly

constantly accustomed to feel their own superiority, they would not be so mightily tickled with every slight instance of it. Every one must see the difference between a hearty laugh of real joy, and a scornful sneer, or a grin, expressing a claim to superiority. The laugh of contempt is a forced laugh, shewing signs of gladness in the countenance, but not making the heart merry, and encouraged not so much to please ourselves as to vex others.

15. It is surprising that ridicule should ever have been recommended as the surest test to try the soundness of opinions. I can allow jest and irony to be useful engines of oratory, but can by no means think them proper instruments for reason to make use of; nor do we ever find them employed in the sciences, where understanding alone is concerned. Where is there purer, closer, or clearer reasoning than in the mathematics, but what room do they afford for merriment? Who ever demonstrated a problem in Euclid by ridicule? Or where will you find a joke in Sir Isaac Newton's Principia? The five mechanical powers, the properties of fluids, the courses of the planets, were not discovered or explained by sallies of wit and raillery: and though the cycles and epicycles of the ancients are now become ridiculous by being grown out of fashion, they were first overthrown by serious arguments from the phenomena of nature.

16. Violence constitutes the essence of passion: the same emotions of soul in a gentler degree are called affections. Passion may be styled the fever of the mind, which disturbs and weakens, and cannot continue long or return often, without pernicious consequences: but affection, like the steady beating of the pulse, actuates and invigorates, and keeps the mind continually alive. Our affections multiply our enjoyments beyond mere sense and appetite, and are the incentives to most of our actions, for were we totally unconcerned

unconcerned and unaffected by any thing, we should lie like logs of wood without sense or motion.

17. Passions are a stronger sort of habits acquired early in childhood: habits are feebler passions learned later, when the organs, being grown tough, are less susceptible of new forms, but having once taken them are less easily thrown out of them again. Passion works by vehemence and impetuosity, bearing down all opposition; and can only be mastered by strong resolution, and that not without difficulty. But habit prevails by perseverance and importunity; it steals upon you imperceptibly, or teazes you into compliance; it is easily restrained at any time with a little attention, but the moment you relax in your vigilance, it returns back again, and is extremely difficult to be wholly eradicated. Passion grows feeble with age, but habit gathers strength. Old people are the hardest of all others to be put out of their way; and in the few desires they have remaining, shew a great deal of stubbornness, but very little of the eagerness of passion. And when they are devoted to any object, it is not so much from the strength of their attachment to it, as from the feebleness of their other desires leaving it without any competitor.

CHAP. VII.

PLEASURE.

THOUGH nature at first supplies us with no other pleasures than those of sensation and appetite (among which, however, must be reckoned that soothing feeling which accompanies the free circulation of the blood when in health and vigour) yet in process of time the greatest part of our pleasures arise from other sources. For let any man reflect on a day agreeably spent, and he will find much less of it taken up in mere sensation than in some pursuit, or variety of amusement that occupied his imagination or reflection.

2. Our mental pleasures depend either on the turn our imagination has taken from education and habit, the humour we happen to be in, accident, or the satiety, or novelty we find in them.

This variety of disposition in mankind to receive pleasure from different objects, is called taste, because like the palate it enables us to distinguish the relish of things. Taste is usually confounded with judgment, though it is rather the basis of it than the thing itself, for taste properly denotes a sensibility to receive delight from certain objects, but having found by experience what pleases us, we learn to judge what will please ourselves or others another time. Hence we can pass a judgment on beauty, though not immediately affected by it, from having got a standard in our minds, with which we can compare it.

All men have their sources of amusement, and in this sense your mechanics or ploughmen may be said to have a taste for bull-baiting, foot-ball, the finery of a Lord Mayor's shew, or diversions of a country fair; but taste is

generally applied to those pleasures which depend on art, cultivation, or an uncommon sensibility of imagination. There is however an over squeamishness and nicety of taste which renders the imagination too delicate, and liable to disgust from every common object, like a very tender skin, that cannot bear the least drop of rain or breath of air without suffering, and is a weakness rather than a perfection. The best taste is that which is most suited to a man's condition, and likely to give him the truest relish of the pleasures of life, all things considered.

3. Genius I take to be a strong turn given to the imagination early in youth. A book falling into a boy's hands, an adventure related, or performance he sees that happens to strike his fancy, the conversation of a servant or a companion may lead his imagination into particular trains of thinking which thenceforward become easy to him, and he cannot strike into others. If genius were entirely the gift of nature, why should we see different ages and countries produce their several sorts of it, or why should men ingenious in any particular way generally arise together in clusters?

4. Beauty may be defined an aptness in things to please at first sight: for if they do not please so, they may be useful, or valuable, but not beautiful. Nothing is really beautiful in itself, but as it tends to give pleasure to the generality of mankind. Children seem to have no notion of beauty: they will turn away from a celebrated toast to hide their faces in the bosom of an old wrinkled nurse. And gewgaws, tinsel, glaring colours, ill-shaped playthings, and figures scarcely resembling any thing in nature, are the things in which they take the greatest delight.

5. One chief source of beauty is order. The materials of a fine building do not please the eye till disposed in their proper places; and a parcel of colours not striking in themselves

selves may become beautiful by being curiously contrasted together. It is use that makes order appear beautiful. A rustic bred up among wilds and forests, and brought into a fine garden, would see more confusion than ornament in it; and though you were to point out to him the regularity and nice connection of the parts would be little pleased with it. Deformity is the appearance of disorder in things, when we have been accustomed to expect the contrary.

6. Variety is another source of beauty. But the change must be gradual, and such as we naturally fall into from our previous trains of observation. Mere novelty does not please of itself, any more than a man would take delight in walking backward. Contrast is the art of making things more agreeable by mixing others with them that are not so.

7. Association contributes very much to determine our ideas of beauty. A person who has delivered us out of some great distress, or gratified our desires in many instances, appears the handsomer for it ever after, insomuch that we shall even like another person the better for resembling him. So lovers think their mistresses, and parents their children, handsomer than others do, because they have been accustomed to behold them with delight. And we see charms that other folks cannot discern in places where we have spent our time agreeably, whence the saying, that home is home, be it never so homely.

8 But the most plentiful source of beauty is expression. It is this which gives a commanding majesty, a winning softness, and other graces, to the countenance: for the face being a picture of the mind, whatever amiable qualities are discerned there, give a lustre to the features expressing them. Therefore, in our descriptions of beauty, we commonly employ epithets borrowed from the sentiments, such as a cheerful, an innocent, an honest, or a sensible countenance. Beauty in the other sex delights us more because

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we are more interested in it. Women, on the contrary, are very bad judges of one another's persons, because they are not affected by them: they judge by rules, not by what they feel.

9. Many works of art are beautiful merely from their likeness to the works of nature: wherefore there may be a beautiful copy of an ugly original. The famous statue of Laocoon is admired, though Laocoon himself would be shocking to the beholders; and we admit pictures of satyrs, witches, old men with rugged features and grisly beards, to hang as ornaments in our chambers, though we should deem the originals frightful.

10. Our tastes varying as much as our faces, make us bad judges of one another's enjoyments, for we take for granted that every body must be pleased with what we like ourselves. Nor are we often much better judges of our own pleasures than of theirs, for we cannot be sure that because a thing has pleased us once, it will do so again. The boy who wished to be a king that he might have an officer appointed to swing him all day long upon a gate, we may suppose, had found supreme delight in that simple amusement, and concluded that it must always be equally delightful. He that keeps a regular account of his cash, may know to a shilling what were his receipts and what his disbursements in any month of the last year, and how much they exceeded or fell short of any other month: but a man cannot make the like entry of his enjoyments and disquietudes. He may perhaps be able to tell that one day was more agreeably spent than another, but this is the most he can do. Therefore we are forced to estimate our pleasures by the gross, as a man guesses at a flock of sheep by the ground they cover, without being able to count them distinctly.

11. As objects influence the mind only by the representative

sentative idea we have of them, intense pleasures have a greater attraction for the majority of mankind than a continuance of gentler satisfactions, which from their number cannot so well be brought within the compass of a single idea; whereas high delights, carrying their whole force in a single point, are much more easily comprehended at a glance. This is shewn in other things, for a man who would recommend a poem, or a play, for instance, always pitches upon a few striking parts, which serve as a rallying point to the imagination. Men run eagerly after intense pleasures, thinking the more of them they can obtain the better, reasoning herein like the boy on the gate, that if a quarter of an hour's swinging gave him such delight, five hour's swinging must give him twenty times as much. The calculation however to be employed here differs very much from common arithmetic, two and two do not always make four, but the second number often operates as a negative quantity on the first. The most eager pursuit is often followed by the bitterest disappointment, and beside other mischiefs unfits the mind for receiving satisfaction from every thing else.

12. Yet pleasures of the high kind, if properly chosen, have their value, not so much for their intrinsic worth, as for the fruits they produce. The pleasures of wealth, or those expected from eminence or fame, spur men on to industry in their callings and professions. The joy of seeing a piece of work completed carries the artizan through the difficulties of his task. Or a few days diversion in summer may supply a fund of entertainment, and be something to talk of the whole succeeding winter.

13. In the common diversions and actions of our lives the pleasure lies almost entirely in the pursuit, and very little in the attainment. He that at whist should have four honours, six trumps, always dealt him, would lose his

whole diversion, because he would have nothing to do but to throw down his cards, and win the game. In bowling the player takes care to deliver his bowl aright; he runs after it, chides it, encourages it, writhes his body in all manner of contortions as if to influence its bias, and in this consists his entertainment; for the joy of winning the game is over in a moment, he takes his stake, pockets it, and only thinks where to throw the jack for beginning another cast. Many a man has found greater pleasure in planting a tree, tending and pruning it, and observing its growth, than he ever did in tasting the fruit: yet the former depends upon the latter, for else why might he not plant a bramble as well as a nectarine?

CHAP. VIII.

USE.

THOUGH nature has poured enjoyments around us with an unsparing hand, she has not hung them so near us as that we can pluck them whenever we please. We must provide instruments, and lay in materials to serve us on occasion, furnish ourselves with the necessary means of administering to our wants, and take pains in planting and cultivating the tree long before we can gather the fruit. And as the means of enjoyment are no more to be had with a wish than the enjoyment itself, hence use grows out of use; and whatever conduces to the acquisition of things useful becomes useful on that account. Thus the accommodations of life are useful for the gratification they afford, and money is useful because it will purchase them: a profession is useful because it brings in an annual income; application and industry, because they help to make men thrive in their professions; skill and sagacity, because they render industry successful. All that men esteem valuable or think worth their while to preserve, derives its value either directly from enjoyment, or from something else connected with it. Riches, power, fame, strength, existence, talents, knowledge, liberty, justice, fortitude become in this way objects of our desire. I have already shewn that the love of money is not a natural but acquired propensity, and I shall shew the same thing more particularly hereafter with respect to some of the other instances here mentioned.

2. That species of use called convenience has an evident reference to pleasure. A man may make shift to do his work, though he has not convenient tools, but with con-

venient ones he can do it with ease and pleasure to himself. He that has all the necessaries of life, has every thing requisite for his being, but its conveniences superadded enable him not only to support, but to enjoy his being.

CHAP. IX.

HONOUR.

As use springs from pleasure, so honour branches out from use, and is one remove farther from the parent root, for which reason it is more often supposed innate, its derivation being less easily traced: for it never grows to maturity, while adherring to the mother plant, nor till it is separated from it as an off-set, and stands upon its own stem.

Little children as they shew no signs of shame, so neither do they discover any desire of applause, till being perpetually told that mamma will not love them, nor papa give them pretty things, nor nurse take care of them unless they are good, they learn to look on the approbation of those about them as desirable. And when we grow up, we find it so extremely useful to have the good opinion and esteem of others, that this is enough to make us attached to those actions or qualities which tend to produce it, even where no immediate benefit is likely to result from them.

2. Whatever enables a man to do much good or hurt, by exciting fear as well as hope, sets him higher in the estimation of the vulgar than a disposition to use his powers well.

3. Our admiration of superiority renders the marks of it subjects of our admiration too. Hence proceeds our fondness for titles and equipage; hence likewise majesty of countenance and dignity of deportment command our respect, as expressing something extraordinary within: for where we know the person exhibiting them possesses nothing more than common, they excite our laughter instead of admiration. We admire the noble mien of a lion, the magni-

ficence of a building, the vast expanse of heaven, the regular courses of the stars, the sublimity of poetry, because they either fill the imagination with grand ideas, or imply something extraordinary in the authors of them. But as excellence is only admired as it appears, and we judge of it chiefly by comparison, this gives rise to envy, jealousy, affectation, vanity, and other evil passions.

4. Our propensity to dwell on any supposed excellences we possess, if not kept within due bounds, is generally attended with very pernicious consequences, misleading the judgment, damping industry, and producing a surfeit of the very food we are so fond of. Accordingly, the proud reap no delight from their pride, but are more gloomy and discontented than other people. I see no objection to the boys' indulging his fancy for swinging, provided he took care to get his lesson first, not to break down the farmer's gate, and to give over his diversion before it grew tiresome. So neither need we scruple to ride upon any little excellency we possess; if we only dwell upon it while it gives us a real pleasure, when we have nothing else to do, and in such a manner as neither to injure nor offend any other person.

5. The professions and situations of men in life rendering different things serviceable to them create the same variety in their sentiments of honour: the merchant places it in punctuality of payment, the soldier in bravery, the artisan in the completeness of his works, the scholar in his learning, the fine gentleman in elegance of taste and behaviour. One man values himself upon his sincerity and plain dealing, another upon his art and dissimmulation; one upon his patience in enduring wrongs, another upon his quickness in resenting them; every one esteems that highest which he has found best promoting his designs, or adding most to his character among those with whom he has chiefly associated. Which shews that our sense of honour is not

natural

natural like that of sight, for this presents the same distinctions of colour to all alike, nor ever makes a lilly appear blue to one man, green to another, and crimson to a third, according to the several ways they have been brought up in, or employments they have followed.

6. You may move any man almost any way by touching his point of honour, if you can but find out where it lies: but in this, and in knowing how to work upon it lies the difficulty, for perhaps it is not affected by the same objects as it is in yourself We are apt to pronounce the vulgar void of this principle, because they have not those notions of it which we have instilled into us by education and good company, whereas the meanest of mankind are as ready as the most refined to take fire at any opprobrious language or insult offered them, if they understand it as such.

7. Studious men, finding that the opinions of mankind were infinitely various and contradictory on this subject, and that their own sentiments could not always be trusted, have endeavoured to fix upon some criterion whereby to distinguish true honour from the false. This essential quality residing in objects and rendering them laudable in themselves was called by the Greeks Kalon, and by the Latins Honestum. If you wished to know what this Kalon was, you were referred to the effect it would have upon any impartial beholder. But people do not always see the same things alike: this, it was replied, arose from a defect of vision, or the mists of prejudice overclouding the natural beauty of the object. Well, but how shall we know whether our optics are clear or not? Why, observe the conduct of the best and wisest of men. Thus the whole matter is at last resolved into an appeal to authority; for it remains to be shewn who these good and wise men were, and what were the reasons of their conduct. Besides, the actions of these wise men have themselves been made the subjects of

controversy, many persons having doubted whether Cato the censor had a just idea of the Kalon when he pursued the Carthagenians to destruction; or Brutus, when he assassinated Cæsar; or the younger Cato, whom Seneca pronounces a perfect wise man, when he deserted his post of life at Utica: so that we want some other test to try the dictates of wisdom when mingled with the frailties of human nature in the very best of men.

8. The only way to determine the matter is by a reference to use. But if things be laudable because useful, must not use and honour go together? Is there no difference between the one and the other? If a man intrusted with a valuable deposit by a person deceased, debates with himself whether he shall apply it to the purpose intended, or to his own benefit, does not use prompt him one way, and honour the other? But this distinction arises from the narrowness of our views, use here standing for the immediate, occasional interest of the individual, and not regarding the good of the whole. Were there a race of men of so penetrating and enlarged an understanding as to comprehend at one view all the consequences of every action, and of so well-regulated a taste as constantly to prefer the greater remote good before the less, though nearer at hand, they would have no sense of honour, because they would want none: their own discernment would lead them into those very courses which true honour recommends. They that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick; and honour is that remedy which can alone counteract the disorders and confusion brought upon the world by a too close and injudicious attachment to our own interest in disregard to the general good, wherein our own is ultimately contained. The voluptuous who are governed entirely by appetite and inclination have the narrowest minds; a prudent regard to interest widens them a little, but

but a due sense of honour expands the mind as far as it can go. For as use contains the seeds of many future enjoyments, and is therefore preferable to pleasure, so honour leads to further uses than wisdom, imperfect at the best, can always descry.

The uses we daily see resulting from a principle of honour are sufficient to give it a value in the eyes of every prudent person: it deters us from folly, rouses us to industry, dispels the mists of prejudice, and counteracts the influence of passion: nor can any one avoid observing how much men's regard for the esteem of others, or their own approbation, contributes to preserve good order and decency in the world.

9. Where there are other motives sufficient to actuate our conduct, commendation must be set aside as superfluous. Therefore though honour is founded in use, every thing useful is not laudable: because where we discern the use and are moved by it to exert ourselves, there is no room for honour. Consequently we do not lavish our applause on things we find men ready to do of themselves, however beneficial they may appear. What is more useful than eating and sleeping? Yet nobody gains credit by them, because without the assistance of vanity we are sufficiently disposed to both. Bakers, shoemakers, and tailors, are very serviceable members of society, but who ever rose to honours by exercising those trades? The mere hopes of getting a livelihood is sufficient to call forth all the exertion required in them. Yet when boys are first put out apprentices, the master finds it necessary to encourage them by commendation, because they have then no other inducement to industry, but either this or the fear of punishment. We chide and applaud children to make them careful of their money; but when they have once learned the use of it, then honour changes sides, standing as a fence to deter them against covetousness.

Hence

Hence we may see why honour generally runs counter to profit and pleasure, because the use of it lies in restraining our appetites; and the more forcibly they tempt us, the greater is the merit of resisting them, because in this case we need a stronger motive on the other side to counteract them.

10. It is well known what irregularities the Cynics were led into by judging of things as laudable or blameable in themselves: for intrinsic qualities cannot be separated by circumstances of time or place, from the subjects in which they inhere. A stone must be hard, and air yielding to the touch, always and every where: therefore they made no scruple to commit the grossest indecencies in public, because their adversaries could not but admit that the acts they performed are at some times allowable. But if they had judged by a proper reference to use, they must have seen that what becomes one man may not become another, and that the same actions, as they do or do not tend to give offence, or to the breach of good manners, are either blameable or allowable.

11. What I have said to shew that the sense of honour is an acquired sense, does not at all tend to diminish its value, unless we would despise all arts and sciences, learning, and whatever else we had not from the immediate hand of nature; which would reduce us back again to a state worse than that of the savages.

CHAP. X.

RECTITUDE.

THE word right is taken originally from lines; being the same as straight, in opposition to curved or crooked. Now the nearest way from any one point to any other is along such a right line. Hence it has been applied by way of metaphor to rules and actions, which, if they conduct effectually and directly by the nearest way to any end we have in view, are pronounced to be right. Therefore it seems that the very expression of right in itself is absurd; because things are rendered right by their reference to something else which must be taken into the account to determine their rectitude. When a man digs for hid treasure, we say he has hit upon the right spot if he pitches his spade just over the place where it lies, though perhaps he did it by guess. But action has another source of rectitude, *viz.* its conformity with some rule, which has been found generally to conduct us right, though it may not do so in each particular instance. If you look over the hands at whist, and see the party on whose side you bet lead his ace of trumps when the adversary has only the king, you will be apt to cry out, That's right; because it suits your purpose better than any thing else, yet he might play wrong according to the rules of the game. What then becomes of the essential rectitude of actions, when the same thing is both right and wrong at the same time? Again, considered in itself, nothing can be more harmless than wagging your finger; yet if it rest against the trigger of a gun, and a man stands just before you, you cannot do a wronger thing, and why? not because of any thing in the essence of the action, but from its fatal consequences. Rules are equally liable to variation, according

ing to circumstances. Suppose you make it a rule, when you want provisions, go to the east: this may do very well while you live to the westward of a market-town, but if you go and live on the opposite side, it will no longer be right.

2. In all cases whatever, rules do not so much constitute the rectitude of actions, as show what actions are right. Could we always see the certain consequences of our actions, we should need no rules, our own sagacity would be a sufficient guide. The rules of life are certain marks hung up by observing men, for the benefit of themselves and others travelling the same road, and derive their use from the narrowness and shortness of our views, and the need we stand in of a conductor. As people make a proficiency in any art or business they employ the fewer rules, and in things quite familiar to them use none: like carriers jogging on continually in the same road, who never mind the posts of direction.

3. But it may be objected, that actions are often thought right, though they do not answer the purpose intended by them. A good man failing in the success of his endeavours, will find consolation in reflecting that he acted properly, that is, according to some general rule. But let us remember, that the good man aims at the greatest sum of good; and though he misses his end in one instance, by adhering to his rule, yet he will attain it more completely in general by this means. Prudence and steadiness will always succeed in the long run, better than folly and inconsiderateness. As perseverance in a right habit strengthens our attachment to it, we may always be satisfied with ourselves for conforming to it; as the possession of such a habit will conduce more to our happiness than any little success we might have gained by a lucky misconduct.

4. Some rules are evidently occasional and partial, others are founded in the nature and constitution of man, and while

while this remains the same, can never change; therefore they are called essential. Thus to lay in a stock of coals in summer, is a very proper rule of family œconomy in this northern climate, where the coldness of our winters renders such provision necessary: but were we to inhabit the Torrid Zone, this rule would lose its propriety. On the contrary, look before you leap, is a rule founded on a general observation of human nature, wherein appetite would continually hurry us on to mischief if not restrained by consideration: therefore this rule will remain right so long as we continue to be human creatures.

5. The idea of rules being right in themselves, I conceive arose from our observing that they often grow out of one another, so that we are contented to trace them back a certain way, but do not think it necessary to inquire into the foundation of the more remote and general ones, which we therefore look upon as right in themselves, because we feel their good effects without being at the trouble to inquire into their origin. But no rule is right without a reason that renders it so, nor are the clearest of them above examination; nay, an examination is now and then adviseable, as they are apt to warp with common use, or contract rust and dross with lying by; and if their purity be doubted of, there is no other way so certain to try them by as the touchstone of expedience.

CHAP. XI.

VIRTUE.

THE most obvious definition of virtue seems to be, a habit of acting rightly. Yet this upon examination will be found too general: since, though every act of genuine virtue must be right, every right action is not an act of virtue. It is very right to eat when we are hungry, sleep when we are weary, put on boots when we ride a journey, and a great coat when we must walk out in the rain; but these are never looked upon as instances of virtue, except that she does not disallow them. The next definition occurring, is a habit of resisting any inordinate desire, or impulse of passion. Now against this there are two objections; one, that there are people whose natural temperament, or manner of education, inclines them to be sober, industrious, generous, and obliging, without any effort of their own; the other, that this definition does not suit with virtue at all except in her imperfect state, and before the opposite passions are completely subdued. To avoid exposing myself to either of these objections, I shall therefore call virtue a habit of pursuing courses contrary to those pernicious ones that passion and appetite generally lead men into.

2. But here it may be asked, what merit there is in following the bent of inclination, or torrent of example, when they chance to carry us in a right course, without difficulty or trouble? Remember the story of Zopyrus, the physiognomist, whom some of Socrates's scholars brought to their master, and asked him what he thought of that man. Zopyrus after examining his features, pronounced him the most debauched, lewd, cross-grained, selfish old fellow he had ever seen; upon which the company burst out a laughing!

ing! Hold, says Socrates, do not run down the man, he is in the right, I assure you; for I was all he says of me by nature, and if you think me otherwise now, it must be because I have in some measure corrected my nature by the study and practice of philosophy. Now, does not this story manifest a higher pitch of virtue in Socrates, than if he had been born with the happiest disposition in the world?

To this I shall answer, that the most difficult and useful part of virtue is to follow the dictates of reason in opposition to fancy or appetite; and the more of this higher kind of virtue any one possesses, and the more he shews it by conquering the greatest obstacles, the more does it redound to his honour. But I see no reason why the superior excellence of this virtue should destroy the merit of all the rest. Silver may be worth having, though not so valuable as gold; and whatever tends to mend our manners, to the benefit of society, or our own convenience, is not to be despised. So if a man is honest from a principle of self-interest, it is better than that he should not be honest at all; if he keep himself sober for his health's sake, still it is a point gained; if he learn activity and perseverance in difficult undertakings from a love of fame, it is likely he will do more good in this way than if he sat down in total indolence. Nevertheless, we ought to make the love of rectitude our principal care, and keep it in continual exercise, by rectifying the frailties of our nature, and opposing those inclinations that still point to improper objects.

3. Whether virtue be good in itself may be determined by considering that satisfaction, the only intrinsic good, lies in our perceptions: action is only good as it applies the proper objects for raising those perceptions; and virtue, which is a habit or disposition of mind, is good only as it leads to such actions; so that it stands two removes from absolute good. But it will be said, there is a satisfaction in the very exercise

exercise of virtue. This I grant; but then it must be to those who have a taste for virtue, and there is the like satisfaction in every other taste. The virtuoso feels it in catching a butterfly, the proud man when flattery soothes his ear, the covetous when making an advantageous bargain, the vindictive when taking measures to satisfy his revenge. Perhaps you will say, there is a secret misgiving and compunction attending the performance of unwarrantable actions. I believe there would be in me or you, because I hope we have some seeds of virtue in us; but the consummate villain, who has none of these, feels no remorse to embitter, no reluctance to lessen, the pleasure of any wickedness his vicious inclinations prompt him to: so in this respect he has the advantage. The difference is, that when I act right, I am providing for my future enjoyments; when I act wrong, I am doing something that will cross my other desires, or bring mischief upon me hereafter. The advantage of virtue over vice, lies not in the act, but in the consequences. The pursuit of either will please each man as he has a relish thereto: but one relish prompts to take in wholesome food, the other to that which will bring on sickness of stomach, painful distempers, and perhaps utter destruction.

4. Were virtue the sole and ultimate good, she would have nothing else to do besides contemplating her own beauties: she could never urge to action, because action must proceed upon a view to some farther end. Should a man do nothing all day long but reflect within himself, How I love rectitude! How happy am I in the possession of virtue! you would hardly think the better of his character on this account. Such contemplations as these, I fast thrice a week; I pay tithe of mint, annise, and cummin; I give alms of all I possess; are more likely to engender spiritual pride, than to prove a man's virtue, or ensure his happiness. The confining virtue to the satisfaction of possessing her,

destroys her very essence; which consists in the efficacy she has to put us upon exerting our active powers, which cannot move without a prospect of something better to be had than gone without. Did it make no difference what befals us, it were wholly immaterial what we did; for every manner of acting, and even total inactivity, would become equally right.

5. For my part, I can see none other original evil besides physical. Were there none of that in nature, there would be no moral evil; for we could never do amiss, if no hurt could ever redound from our actions either to ourselves or others. Could you steal a man's goods without endamaging his property, or depriving him of something useful, why need you scruple to do it? Or were it possible to murder a man without pain, without abridging him of the enjoyments of life, and without setting an example that might occasion the murdering of others not so circumstanced, where would be the immorality of the deed? But these are wild and impossible suppositions; moral evil constantly leading some way or other to physical, and therefore it is most strenuously to be avoided.

6. The question we are now upon commonly produces another; whether pain be an evil in itself, or only rendered so by opinion? First, pain is avoided as an evil by young children, before they can be supposed to have contracted any false opinions, so there remains no doubt of its being sometimes an evil not of our own making; and if we can afterwards render it harmless merely by thinking it so, then it will follow that we can change the nature of things by our opinion of them; which surely no philosopher will assert. Certain it is, we can all upon occasion support a small degree of pain: sometimes diversion will beguile it, business lull it asleep, fear banish it, revenge despise it, wilfulness, eagerness after pleasure, or the love of rectitude, overpower

it. But in all these cases there is a withdrawing of our attention from the pain, and turning it upon other objects, which prevent us from feeling it. And it does not surely prove that a burden is not galling in its own nature, because you can shrink away your shoulder from it, or thrust in something soft between: for while you can keep off the pressure of the burden, it is no wonder you think it easy. Therefore we may admit, that pain is no evil to those who do not think it so; for those who do not think it so do not feel it: but opinion must follow fact, and does not make it.

7. Virtue, even in its highest state, must make a man more or less happy, according as things fall out well or ill. How much soever the virtuous man may console himself with the reflection that he has done his best where he has failed, yet I suppose he would have been still better pleased had the success answered his intention. If he sees a distress he knows not how to relieve, will he not feel an additional joy upon the proper means being put into his hands? Could he say to any one imploring his assistance, Look ye, friend, I'll do my best to serve you, because it is right; but I do not care two-pence whether you reap any benefit from my services or no: were he capable of saying this, it is hard to conceive how he could have any spice of benevolence, and as hard to conceive how, without benevolence, his virtue could be complete. So that were there two persons alike consummately virtuous, the one destitute of all materials or ability for doing good to mankind, the other amply provided with both, this latter must pass his life more happily than the former.

8. But the highest pitch of virtue we can attain to, will be far from setting us above all approach of evil: pain will gall, labour will fatigue, disappointment will vex, affliction will torment, when they cannot overcome us; so that we shall owe more of our enjoyment to nature and fortune than

to

to virtue. There are people with a very moderate share of virtue, no more than just enough to keep clear of turbulent passions, and destructive vices, who, being placed in an easy situation of life, pass it more agreeably than others of far superior merit, forced to struggle perpetually with disease, poverty, contradiction, and distress. Much less will it appear on an impartial survey, that every man's share of enjoyment in the world bears an exact proportion to the measure of his virtue. Nor yet do the strongest instances of virtue prove always the scenes of the greatest enjoyment; for we may remember, that uneasiness sets our activity at work as well as satisfaction. We may sometimes fortify ourselves against pain, by the dread of infamy or compunction; and it is for the interest of virtue that we should on such occasions put ourselves under the iron hand of necessity, which will pinch us sorely while it has us within its clutches, and all that time we shall be very virtuous, and yet very uneasy.

9. Thus we see that virtue cannot secure us uninterrupted enjoyment, for there are other causes contributing to produce it: but though the condition of men does not always answer to their virtue, yet I conceive every particular man will be more or less happy in proportion as he acts right. Life has been compared to a game at cards; we know the cards will beat any body: but he who plays them carefully, will do more with the same cards than he who throws them out at random. The gifts of nature, education, and fortune, are the cards put into our hands: all we have to do is to manage them well, by a steady adherence to the dictates of sound reason.

CHAP. XII.

PRUDENCE.

VIRTUE has been divided by ethical writers into four principal branches; Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, which are called cardinal virtues, because on these all inferior virtues, and particular rules of conduct depend. The first of these in order they reckon prudence, as being the chief, and in effect comprehending the other three.

2. It is necessary to observe, that there are two kinds of prudence, which may be considered as physical or moral. The former consists in knowing the best measures to be taken on any occasion; and depends upon sagacity, quickness, and strength of parts, or upon experience, instruction, and knowledge; and may be found in persons who have no pretensions to virtue of any kind. But moral prudence, with which alone we are at present concerned, consists in making the best use of such lights as we have, not in the number or clearness of them; for virtue lies solely in the right application of our powers, and may reside in the narrowest as well as the largest capacity.

3. There may be the greatest folly where there is most knowledge; and upon that very account. If a man unacquainted with a wood takes a country fellow for his guide, who knows all the paths and turnings perfectly well, but will needs push on through the thickest part until both are entangled in the briers, it is very easy to see that the charge of folly lies wholly at the door of the guide, and for this very reason, that he knew better than the other.

4. We sometimes see persons of very moderate capacities, who by a discreet management of them pass their lives with more comfort to themselves and credit among their neighbours,

neighbours, than others of far superior endowments. They know the extent of their talents, and do not aim at things beyond their reach; not less carefully considering what they shall do, than how they shall compass it. They attend to all the notices of their judgment, never fondly fixing on any one point to the overlooking of others. They are ductile and flexible, never striving obstinately against the stream, but ready to seize every light that shall break in upon them, and to lay by their design, or change their measures, as occasion varies; yet steady to their purpose, so as not to waver with every sudden start of fancy. Willing to play a small game rather than stand out; and always making some progress when they cannot run extraordinary lengths. If they cannot perform great things, what they do is complete and free from fatal mistakes; one of which may do more mischief than a great deal of sagacity and diligence can afterwards repair.

5. Now this character of prudence in the common affairs of life is applicable to moral prudence, which should regard all the rules of rectitude, and proceed on a judicious love, not a fanciful fondness for virtue, regarding all her interests, and the ways of promoting them, so as to hurt none by too eagerly pursuing others. Persons, having this, will be more solicitous to avoid acting wrong than to act remarkably right; nor will they think that the omission of common duties can be compensated by works of supererogation.

6. It is not an easy matter to settle the exact idea of prudence, so as to know when it is a part of virtue, and when not. It is not knowledge, nor acuteness of parts, nor clearness of understanding, nor largeness of information, nor goodness of principles instilled: it must be something entirely our own, but all these depend upon other causes. Since then it is so difficult to define, let us try to place it in several lights, that one may supply what is wanting in another.

other. I conceive then that prudence will enable him that has it completely, to keep his faculties watchful and open, hearing the whispers of the moral sense amid the clamours of passion, and discerning the feeblest glimmerings of reason through the glare of fancy; so that every object in the scene before him will be seen in its true shape, and his attention will instantly turn on that which is most proper. It will direct him which of his several faculties to exercise; when to deliberate, and when to execute; when to suspend his judgment, and when suspension is needless; when to exert resolution, and when to comply with the occasion; when to bestir himself, and when to receive whatever ideas occur. In short, though he may sometimes take wrong measures through ignorance, his every motion will be right with respect to his degree of knowledge, and present information.

7. In another light we may consider prudence as a disposition of mind to regard distant good equally with present pleasure, estimating both according to their real, not apparent magnitude: like the skill we have in discerning a grown person twenty yards off to be larger than a child standing close by us, though the latter takes up much more room in our eye. For as worldly prudence engages a man upon every occasion to improve his fortune rather than to get a little ready money in hand, so moral prudence will incline him always to prefer that which is best, before that which will immediately please his senses, or gratify his desires or his indolence.

8. Another light in which I shall place this virtue is, that of a readiness in following the dictates of reason; I mean those habitual determinations of the understanding, which are the produce of careful consideration, and have been from time to time treasured up in the storehouse of our ideas. Our active power must take some turn every moment; and

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if our judgment does not operate, the action will be imprudent, though no damage may ensue. This readiness depends on a happy cast of imagination, easily converting conviction into persuasion, and representing whatever we know to be useful as desirable: so that prudence is a steady habitual desire of acting reasonably, generated by a thorough persuasion, that in so doing we shall act most for our advantage.

9. This virtue of prudence constitutes the essence of moral wisdom: it is the most durable possession we can have, as being untouched by many outward accidents that may deprive us of all others, and warning us against the approach of whatever might endanger it; and the most valuable, for though it cannot ensure us perpetual success, it will help us to the greatest measure of all valuable things within our power; and if we believe the poet, we shall find no deity averse, if prudence be not wanting.

CHAP. XIII.

FORTITUDE.

It is not easy to fix on a definition of this virtue. We might call it a habit of fearlessness; but every absence of fear is not courage. It may proceed from ignorance of the danger, as when a child goes to play with the muzzle of a loaded musket; or it may arise from an insensibility of temper; for there are people, who, though they see their danger, have not feeling enough to be moved by it.

2. This fearlessness of temper depends upon natural constitution as much as any quality we can possess: old age abates it; men have their ebbs and flows of bravery, and some distempers affect the imagination with terror mechanically. Courage is differently affected by different objects: Mr. Addison tells us of an officer who could march up to the mouth of a cannon, but was ready to take fright at his own shadow; and could not bear being left alone in the dark. Some people are mighty valiant in their cups; others in the heat of resentment care not what becomes of themselves, so they can but have their revenge; others eagerly bent on some foolish desire, will run any hazards to obtain it. Courage in all these cases is not so much a mark of strength, as of stupidity, and weakness of mind.

3. But the fortitude of which I intended to treat, is a branch of prudence, and consists in having such a command of our faculties as to fix our attention on whatever point seems most proper, and to exclude or deaden all such ideas as may divert us from our duty, and ruffle or discompose the mind. The being master of our thoughts, having the perfect use of our discernment, and all that authority over our faculties we are capable of, constitutes prudence; and the

the having this power in terrible situations, so as not to be overcome by them, or prevented from acting properly, is what is to be understood by fortitude.

4. Patience consists in having this power not under the apprehension, but actual pressure of unavoidable evils, such as pain, labour, indignity, affliction, disappointment, and whatever else is irksome to human nature.

5. There are some ludicrous instances of a want of power over our ideas, making people distrust their own senses, and afraid that some sudden impulse should drive them into extravagant actions, though they have never yet done any such, and have the strongest intention to avoid them. I know a very sensible man, who once scrupled to take a bank-note into his hand, for fear he should throw it in the fire, another unwilling to go near a precipice, lest he should have an inclination to throw himself down. I am apt to suspect there are more of these whimsies in the world than one hears of, for people are shy of betraying their foibles, and it is but by chance, after being very intimate, that one gets any such confession out of them. These little distempers of mind may proceed from too great intenseness of thought, so that the organs being overstrained, become unable to resist whatever fancies start up in their way, or often from a habit of building castles in the air, by which means we teach imagination to paint her figures as strong as the real objects exhibited to us by nature. The best way to remedy such disorders is not by reason, but care and resolution in resisting their impulses whenever they occur, and avoiding those habits which encourage their growth.

6. Neither is patience confined solely to the endurance of pains and labours; those, whose situation exempts them from such trials, may yet find subjects whereon to exercise this branch of fortitude. There is nobody but meets with

with disappointments and cross accidents, as well in business as diversion, and if we could bear these without ruffling, it would be gaining a valuable point. For my part I often envy the patience of hackney-coachmen sitting whole hours in all weathers on their boxes, tradesmen waiting behind their counters, and servants attending in antichambers, liable to be called on any trifling errand at every touch of the bell. Were I in their situation, restrained from employing myself as I liked, and unable to enter on any train of thought, because expecting every instant to have it broken, I should be miserable; but though I would not chuse to pass my time in idleness, I should be glad to bear it when forced upon me unavoidably. While I am poring with the microscope on the light of nature, if a billet rolls off the hearth, or my servant comes in abruptly with a message, I cannot help fretting and fuming a little inwardly: this I acknowledge to be a failing, and would wish to receive all events with tranquillity and evenness of temper, pursuing my engagements without anxiety and breaking them off without discomposure.

CHAP. XIV.

TEMPERANCE.

THERE have been heroes intrepid in danger, and indefatigable in labours, despising death, wounds, and hardships, who yet have been shamefully overcome by luxury, and all kinds of wanton desires. Therefore the habit of resisting pleasure and controuling desire has been justly reckoned another cardinal virtue. Many persons are not in a situation exposing them to much danger or labour, nor of a constitution subjecting them to acute or frequent pains, and so may pass through life well enough without any great degree of patience or fortitude: but there is no man without desires, and no man whom they will not lead astray, if he has not power to restrain them. Pain and danger assault us rarely; their attacks are furious, but generally short; if you can sustain the first onset the business is as good as done; but desire brings a numerous host into the field; put one enemy to flight and another presently succeeds in his place, and if they cannot master you by force, they will weary you out by importunity. The most judicious persons have therefore always esteemed the conquest of oneself as the most important and glorious of all victories.

2. Of all the propensities that take us at unawares, there is none more dangerous than indolence and pride or vanity, because none are more universal, and none more artful in making their approaches: a man can hardly fall into excesses of debauchery without being sensible of them, but he may be vain or idle without ever knowing that he is so. Perhaps laziness may lie at the bottom of all pride and vanity, for there is much less trouble in persuading ourselves we possess accomplishments we have not, or in displaying

playing those we have to public view, than in improving them or acquiring new ones. He that is always diligent in advancing forward will scarce have time for more than a transient look now and then at the progress he has made, much less will he stand pointing out the length of it to every one that passes by. But vanity is so deeply rooted in us by education, example, and in every other way, that it is no wonder we are not able to guard against it effectually: we are taught to judge of ourselves and whatever we possess by comparison with others, to despise or overlook what we have not, and value ourselves upon any trifle peculiarly our own. The Spectator tells us of a young lady whom he found one day holding up her head higher than ordinary, and wondering what would be the occasion, her sister whispered him that she had got on a new pair of flowered garters.

3. Were there a perfectly wise man, I conceive he would never practise self-denial, his desires lying under such controul as never to raise an opposition for him to struggle against: not that he would be without desires; on the contrary, I imagine he would abound in them more than we do, receiving delight from many things we should count insipid; but they would hang so loose about him, as to let go their hold the instant an object appeared improper or unattainable, to leave no secret hankering behind, nor ever degenerate into want like the sheep, who they say is never thirsty, unless when he sees water; so all his appetites would prove sources of pleasure to him, but none of pain. And why should we think such a disposition of mind impossible when there is scarce any of us, who does not possess it in some little degree? We can sit down with pleasure to a party at cards, when proposed, or content ourselves without it, if not agreed to: we may eat fruit with a good appetite in summer, and yet not want it in winter; we engage eagerly in hunting, fowling, or dancing, or any other diversion

diversion when they fall in our way, and are very well satisfied without them when they do not. The secret of happiness lies in having a multitude of engagements fitted for every occasion that can happen, so that some or other of them may constantly find us amusement, but none of them disturb us when we judge it necessary to break them off.

4. Intense pleasures do not certainly deserve the value so commonly set upon them; it may be a man's misfortune to have been too highly delighted, for it will often destroy his relish for common enjoyments, or fix so strong an impression on the fancy, as to make him always restless for a repetition; so that, whoever seeks to be highly pleased, runs a hazard of being seldom pleased, and passing the greatest part of his time in disquietude and impatience. He that makes intense pleasure his whole business is like an extravagant heir, who squanders away his whole patrimony in a year or two, and leaves himself nothing to live upon afterwards beside want, poverty, and distress. The advantage of temperance therefore is that while it debars us of no pleasure we can have at free cost, it will rescue us from those that will make us pay more for them than they are worth, will open to us many sources of delight the voluptuous never taste of, and secure us an estate for life in such enjoyments as our nature is capable of.

CHAP. XV.

JUSTICE.

THERE is one particular desire, that of appropriating whatever we can get to ourselves, and following our own pleasure without regard to the hurt it may do other persons; which prevails so universally and is of such mischievous consequences, that the restraint of it has been regarded as one of the cardinal virtues. It is easy to see that justice owes its being to society, for it could have no place, were each man to live separately by himself, or had he not the power of injuring others. Were men just now, for the first time, placed together upon this habitable earth, every one would naturally take of the good things scattered around him, whatever he wanted for present use; when he went to do the same a second time, he might find that some one else had taken away what he wanted before him; this would put him upon securing as much as he could get together, to provide against the like accidents for the future. But as others would do the same, the public stock would be soon exhausted, the fruits all gathered from the trees, and this would lead men to invade one another's hoards; whence must ensue trouble and contention, and much waste must be made in the struggle, to the great detriment of all. These inconveniences being severely felt would teach them to see that their true interests lay in restraining their desires within such compass as might make them compatible with those of others, and they would form rules for securing to each man his share of the blessings that nature had poured out among them. But it being obvious that the gifts of nature may be improved by labour, and indeed cannot fully supply our wants without it, and there being no encouragement

ment for any man to labour, if all the rest were to share the fruits of it as well as himself, they would find it necessary that all should enjoy the produce of their skill and industry in severalty, without interruption from others: and this would lay the foundation of property. But as it is often in a man's power to work out some advantage for others, or for the public, and the mere security of property would in this case be no encouragement for him to do so, they would see the expedience of a compensation or reward to serve as an encouragement for performing such actions. On the other hand, some would still employ their strength or cunning to encroach upon their neighbours' properties, or through mere wantonness or resentment, or other unruly passions would endamage them in their persons or possessions: and hence would arise the necessity of punishment to restrain such outrages. And as vicious inclinations according to their strength would require a greater or less restraint to curb them, therefore punishment would be proportioned to the heinousness of the offence and the inward depravity discovered. Since then we find so manifest a necessity of justice to secure the happiness and tranquillity of life, we need seek for no other foundation than utility, whereon to build our obligations to practise it.

2. Nobody will deny that there is a natural justice distinct from the legal, and antecedent to it; if there were no right or wrong, laws must be without any sanction to enforce them. He only deserves the title of just who would deal honestly, and abstain from injury, from a motive of duty, and though there were no legal penalties to deter him. Where this principle is wanting, the best contrived laws can supply the deficiency but very lamely; for they being calculated for general use, it is impossible to shape them so exactly as to suit all the variety of cases that may happen, and there are many ways in which men have it in their power

power to hurt one another, in which the law is utterly unable to interfere.

3. If we consider the design of law, we cannot well conceive it to be any other than the preservation of property, the security of life, limb, peace, liberty, and all other requisites for enjoyment, that may be destroyed or lessened by men's behaviour to one another. The law therefore always looks forward, or only casts a retrospect behind, in order to provide more securely for the time to come. So that in reality punishment is not inflicted for crimes committed, but as a remedy against those which may be committed hereafter; and guilt is rather a direction than a motive for taking vengeance.

4. But we are fond of personifying every thing, and of transferring our own passions to every thing, so we suppose the law to be influenced by the same narrow views and passions as ourselves, and to punish delinquents for her own satisfaction rather than for the sake of the community under her charge. This custom, together with the detestation which instantly arises in the minds of the best and wisest men at the thought of heinous wickedness, has given rise to the notion of an immediate and essential connection between offence and punishment, which is supposed due to the former without taking any other idea into consideration. But it will be hard to establish the connection between justice and punishment, except by the intervention of two intermediate links, namely the power of men still to hurt one another, and the tendency of punishment to deter them from exercising this power. Were mankind to be suddenly placed in a situation which should render them incapable of ever receiving hurt from others, or their dispositions so changed as that they should never more think of doing acts of injustice, I believe every good man would vote for a general amnesty of all past offences.

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If the connection between offence and punishment were natural and necessary, submission and repentance could never separate them; but repentance, answering the purpose of chastisement, takes away the use of it, and renders it improper at the same time.

On the other hand, we sometimes punish the innocent for the guilty, as in war, where the goods and possessions of private persons are invaded for injuries received from the state. If the French king has fortified Dunkirk, or encroached upon our colonies in America, in violation of treaties, you cannot charge the merchant trading from Martinique with any faithlessness or badness of heart on that account; yet you esteem it lawful to seize his effects by way of reprisal. And why so? Because you cannot right yourself otherwise: so necessity creates the justice; for were it possible to come at the governors directly without touching the subject, no man would think the latter method justifiable.

Were the justness of action essential and inherent, whenever the rules of justice clash, that which is superseded must abate something from the justice of the other. Suppose, then, two men in different parts of a field near a river, alarmed by the cries of some person drowning, one of them has a path to run along, but the other cannot give his assistance without trampling down his neighbour's corn, which you must allow to be an unjust action in itself; yet this takes nothing from the merit of his exertions, for the impropriety of doing mischief to another's property is done away by the necessity of saving a man's life.

4. Nor do the obligations of truth and fidelity rest on any other basis than expedience. Were all falsehood wrong as such, why are poems and novels suffered? Why do moralists invent fables in which they introduce beasts talking, gods appearing in the air, and the moon desiring to

be decked out in a new suit of clothes? When fiction may serve some good purpose, and does no hurt, the wisest do not scruple to employ it. Did the bare form of an agreement create the obligation to perform it, no circumstances whatever could render it invalid. Are then all those persons dishonest who apply to our courts to be relieved from rash contracts? Or are the courts unjust in decreeing them relief? But were there no faith among men, no regard to their engagements, any one may see at once what stagnation of business, what distrust and confusion, must ensue: and it is the avoiding of those evils that gives them their sanction. Therefore where no such evils are to be apprehended from a departure from any positive contract, but rather the contrary, as in the case of a manifest imposition, for instance, there can be no impropriety in setting them aside.

5. I shall conclude this chapter with observing that justice, though distinct from temperance and fortitude, cannot well subsist without them. Ambition, avarice, extravagant fondness for pleasure, anger, and other violent passions, hurry men, however well disposed, into unwarrantable actions. Fretfulness, sloth, and effeminacy will not suffer them to do justly, when any pains or difficulty are to be undergone. These vices lay them under a necessity of being unjust. Therefore the ancients were right when they said that whoever possessed one virtue completely must possess them all, because they are mutually necessary to one another's support.

CHAP. XVI.

BENEVOLENCE.

THE great impediment against making philosophy universally understood, arises from the forced style and technical terms unavoidably employed to express unusual distinctions, and methodical reasonings. Thus prudence has a very different meaning as it is used in common or philosophical language. In the one it ranks at the head of all the virtues, but in vulgar acceptation it stands for sagacity, penetration, clearness of judgment, &c. which are not virtues, but good fortune; or is often understood of a cowardly regard to self-interest, directly opposite to virtue. So likewise, for method's sake, fortitude is made to include patience, because it is supposed that the same firmness of mind, which enables the possessor to look danger in the face, ought to render him invulnerable to pain. But to common apprehension a man may be very patient and yet very timorous: nor on the other hand, if we see him preserve an uninterrupted presence of mind in dangers of all kinds, shall we think him deficient in courage, because he frets under confinement, or cannot bear disappointment and contradiction. Again, temperance implies the moderation of every desire and appetite that would carry us on to improper gratifications; but, in ordinary discourse, we confine it to sobriety in eating and drinking, for if we find a man abstemious in these points, we count him a model of temperance, though he may be ambitious, slothful, and revengeful. Lastly, under justice the philosopher must include benevolence, and charity; but nobody else would esteem that person a friend or good neighbour who should

do no more to serve another than he was in *strict justice* bound to do.

2. For this reason I have made a distinct article of benevolence, and indeed I do not see why it may not as well be reckoned the root of justice as a branch of it, for we seldom think of behaving dishonestly to our friends; and if we had a proper regard for all mankind, this would be sufficient of itself to prevent us from ever dealing unjustly with any body. Justice (at least in the common conceptions of mankind) only restrains from doing wrong: good nature prompts us to do all the service in our power. A debt and a favour seem essentially distinct, so that the one cannot be the other: a man is bound to render to every one his due, but in doing a kindness he must be free from all obligation, or it ceases to be a kindness. When a man pays you what he owes, you do not thank him for it, he only escapes the censure to which he would otherwise have been liable; but if he does you a service you had no right to expect, he then deserves your acknowledgements. I think benevolence may be defined a diffused love to the whole species; and whoever has this desire habitually, will feel a satisfaction in acts of kindness proportionable to the good to result from them, which will urge him to perform them for his own sake whenever they fall in his way.

3. Persons deficient in this quality endeavour to run it down, and justify their own narrow views, by alleging that it is only selfishness in a particular form: for if the benevolent man does a goodnatured thing, it is because he likes it, so that he acts to please himself, and self is still at the bottom. Where then, say they, is his merit? What is he better than we? He follows his own inclination, and so do we: the only difference between us is a difference of tastes. To this we might answer, grant it, but this difference

ference of taste makes all the difference; one man's taste leads him to do me all the good he can, and your's to do me all the mischief in your power. Now this is all that I am concerned with. You would not surely have me feel and act in the same manner towards you that I do towards him? For though you may both equally please yourselves, you cannot expect equally to please me. In the next place, I shall deny that acts of real kindness, how much soever they may proceed from inclination, have any thing selfish in them. Men are led into this mistake by laying too much stress on etymology, for selfishness being derived from self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to please oneself must fall under that appellation. Wearing woollen clothes, or eating mutton, does not make a man sheepish, nor does his looking into a book now and then render him bookish; so neither is every thing selfish, that relates to oneself. If somebody should tell you, that such a one was a very selfish person, and for proof of it give a long account of his being once caught on horseback in a shower of rain, that he took shelter under a tree, alighted, put on his great coat, and was wholly busied in muffling himself up, without having a single thought all the while about his wife or children, his friends, or his country; would you not take it for banter, or should you think the person or his behaviour could be called selfish in any propriety of speech? Or what if a man agreeable and obliging in company should desire another lump of sugar in his tea to please his own palate, would you pronounce him a whit the more selfish on that account? So that selfishness is not having a regard for oneself, but having no regard for any thing else.

4. We have shewn above, that the desire of satisfaction is the spring of all our actions, so that if that rendered

them selfish, there would be no use for the term, nor any distinction between selfish and disinterested: for the wise and foolish, the good and the wicked, the thoughtful and the giddy, all follow the impulse of present satisfaction. The following of inclination, therefore, does not constitute selfishness, for in this respect all men are alike; the difference results from what they severally fix their inclinations upon; for it is the object of desire, the ultimate point in prospect, that denominates an action one thing or another. Neither need we seek for any greater refinement or purity of motives than this pleasure of pleasing others; we may lawfully follow our pleasure, provided it be directed to so laudable an object. The good old rule holds in this as in other cases, of doing and standing affected to others as we would have them disposed towards us: now what more can we desire of others than that they should take delight in pleasing us? Could your family, your neighbours, your acquaintance, come and say with perfect sincerity, Sir, please to let us know in what we can serve you, for we shall take the greatest pleasure in doing it, what would you require of them more? Would you answer them, look ye, good folks, while you take delight in serving me, you do it to please yourselves, so I do not thank you for it: but if you would lay a real obligation upon me, you must first hate me with all your might, and then the services you may do me will be purely disinterested. Surely he that could make this reply must have a very whimsical turn of thought and a strong tincture of envy, since he cannot be content to receive a kindness, unless the person conferring it puts himself to uneasiness in doing it.

5. As an action takes its quality not from the thing done, but from the thing intended, benevolence to be genuine must be free and voluntary; for what we are drawn

drawn or over-persuaded to do, does not proceed from inclination, and is rather an act of compulsion than choice. There is a softness and milkiness of temper that cannot say nay to any thing; but he that can never refuse a favour, can hardly be said to grant one, for it is wrested from him, not given; he does it to rid himself of an importunity and save the trouble of a denial, in which case it is a weakness rather than a virtue. Hence goodnature is often called, and sometimes really proceeds from, folly, which gets no thanks even where it proves most serviceable to us.

6. There is likewise a spurious benevolence which flows from vanity, that makes men active and obliging to shew their power and importance, or gain the incense of applause, or bring others into dependence upon them. Persons actuated by this motive may behave kindly enough to such as are submissive to them, but are generally envious of their superiors, and carry themselves haughtily to those who do not want their assistance, and cannot endure to see any good that is not done by themselves. Their good deeds have therefore very little merit, for their desires never terminate in the good of another, but only consider it as a necessary means for serving their own ends.

7. The man of true benevolence will preserve the same impartiality and firmness in every part of his conduct, and though he will prove an affectionate kinsman, a zealous friend, yet his attachment to particular persons will not overwhelm his regard for mankind in general, but rather cherish and purify it; for by reflecting on the sincerity and heartiness with which he can run to oblige those who are dearest to him, he will learn what kind of disposition to put on with respect to others. Nor will he carry himself stiffly and austerely, despising little good offices, when they

do not stand in the way of more important ones. He will study not only to do solid good, but will be ready to comply with every innocent desire and fancy of others, like the ivy which twines and conforms itself freely to all the inequalities of the substance to which it adheres. Courteousness is the skin and outside of virtue, and though a man would wish in the first place to enjoy vigour of limbs and soundness of constitution, a smooth and beautiful skin will be no detriment to his person. So we should endeavour to finish our virtue in every part, small as well as great, ornamental as well as useful, nor think the body of it complete till the bones and muscles are invested with their proper covering.

8. The benevolent man will feel no resentment against vice, but will consider it as a distemper of the mind, dangerous to the patient and the public, and proceed against it with the same disposition as a surgeon who performs a painful operation for the sake of a cure, or cuts off a limb that would endanger the whole body. He will be ready to forgive whenever repentance renders punishment unnecessary, and rejoice to find it so. He will feel goodwill even towards his enemies, and in all things, when it may be done safely, will be ready to do them any kindness. He will have that laudable love of pleasure as to take it in all the good he sees, and feel the prosperities even of strangers; and will be so covetous of enjoyment as to make that of other persons his own, by partaking in all the satisfaction they feel.

9. But however desirous we may be to cultivate a disposition to do good, this must not make us forgetful that it is also necessary to acquire abilities and employ certain means for this purpose. Other things therefore deserve encouragement besides virtue. A man that wants a pair of shoes is not to leave a clever workman to give his custom

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to one who is more honest, but a bungler in his trade; and when attacked by a distemper, it is better to call in a debauchee physician, skilful in his profession, than one of strict morals, but of dull capacity and little experience. Were all our artisans and professors to barter their knowledge and dexterity for a proportionable degree of virtue, the world would suffer greatly by the exchange: we should all be ready indeed to help one another, but could do no good for want of knowing how to go about it. Wherefore he that never loses sight of the general good, will endeavour to procure for himself and others all useful endowments both of body and mind, as well as the disposition to use them rightly. To do otherwise, would be like a man who should spend his whole time in a riding-school, in order to make himself a complete horseman, but should never get a horse to ride upon either on the road or in the field.

10. Neither are we in many cases to consider so much whether things are laudable in themselves, as whether they may not lead to things laudable, and be turned to excellent uses. It is better to arrive at our journey's end by going a little round about, than not to arrive at it at all. Ambition, covetousness, vanity, spur men on to industry; an affectation of being thought polite makes them obliging; fear begets caution, and obstinacy courage. Perhaps the admiration raised at the finery of a chancellor or lord mayor's coach, may have stimulated many a school-boy or apprentice to that application and diligence which have made them eminent at the bar or in commerce. Therefore the judicious lover of virtue will study to cultivate and prepare the ground for its reception; and nourish up such wild plants as may serve for stocks whereon it may be grafted most easily, and flourish most abundantly. We are not to keep our eyes always fixed on the sublimest heights of virtue or excellence,

without considering whether they be attainable, and so by aiming at too much, miss of the good we might have done; but should choose rather to sow such seeds as the soil will bear, and the season cherish, than such as would in other circumstances yield the most delicious fruit.

CHAP. XVII.

LIMITATION OF VIRTUE.

I HOPE what has been hitherto offered may be found tending to recommend virtue as the most desirable object a man can pursue. Here however an objection presents itself, which I shall not attempt to palliate or conceal. It may be said, that if satisfaction, a man's own satisfaction, is the groundwork of all our motives; that if virtue and benevolence are recommended by reason only, as containing the most copious sources of gratification, then are they no more than means, and deserve our regard no longer than while they conduce to that end. So that if a man should have an opportunity of gaining some great advantage secretly, and without danger to himself, though with infinite detriment to all the world besides, and in breach of every moral obligation, he would do wisely to embrace it.

2. Now it is easy to answer this objection as a thing of general application. For, according to the principles already laid down, we must take into the account not only the advantage accruing from an action, but likewise the benefits or mischiefs of the disposition of mind giving birth to it. If therefore we cannot secure some immediate advantage without hurting our best feelings, or weakening some useful habit, we had better let it alone. Vice stands upon the edge of a precipice, and if we once step over the brink, no body can tell where we shall stop: we shall either continue our downward motion till we fall into destruction, or shall be put to infinite trouble in regaining our first position. He that cheats when he can do it safely, will want to cheat at other times; and will either go on till he is detected, or, to prevent

prevent it, will be obliged to put a restraint on himself which he had better never have taken off.

3 Nevertheless, when life draws near to a close, if it should be urged that then the obligations to virtue must give way, since they can no longer be built upon a calculation of the future, I should not know what to answer. We have already laid down, that a man need never deny himself in any thing, unless to please himself better at the same time: if then he shall never see that other time, there can be no reason why he should deny himself at all. Why should he restrain his extravagance, when he has enough to last him the little time he expects to live? Why should he forbear intemperance, when it will not have time to fill him with diseases? Why should he trouble himself with what becomes of the world, when he is on the point of leaving it; or any thing for the benefit of others, when he can receive no returns from them?

4. Still it does not follow that a man must quit the practice of virtue when he sees his end approaching; for this will depend on the turn his mind has already taken. I knew a tradesman, who, having gotten a competency of fortune, thought to retire and enjoy himself in quiet; but finding he could not be easy without business, was forced to return to the shop, and assist his former partners gratis. Why then should it be thought strange that a man, long inured to the practice of moral duties, should persevere in them out of liking, when they can yield him no further advantage? To tell him he may squander without fear of poverty, gluttonize without danger of distempers, or bring a secret mischief on others without hazard of its ever coming round to himself, were no temptation to him: he has no relish to such amusements, his affections having been long since set on what is just, and becoming, and beneficent. So that his wisest

wisest course must be to proceed [illegible]s old habitual track, as the most [illegible] way in which he can lay out his few remaining moments.

5 And here I cannot avoid entering the lists in behalf of Epicurus, to defend him from a charge brought against him by Cicero. Epicurus, it seems, had written a letter on the last day of his life to one Hermachus, earnestly recommending his pupils, the children of his deceased friend, Metrodorus, to his tuition. And had directed that his executors should provide an entertainment yearly on his birthday, and on the like day of every month for such as used to study philosophy with him, in order to preserve in their minds the remembrance of himself and of the said Metrodorus. Now this friendly concern for the name and family of Metrodorus, and this careful provision for keeping up the spirit of the sect, by bringing them together once a month, Tully thinks out of character in one who referred all things to pleasure, and held that whatever happens to us after our decease is nothing to us. But whoever observes the motions of the human mind, must see that many things which are nothing to us when they happen, are yet a great delight to us in the prospect and contemplation. How often do people please themselves with laying schemes for raising a family, or spreading their fame to future ages, without any probability that they shall enjoy the successes of their family, or have any knowledge of what the world shall say of them a hundred years hence? But the thought of what shall then happen affords them a present satisfaction, and therefore they follow pleasure as much in promoting those schemes as they could do in any other. I would fain know how Tully would have had Epicurus dispose of his last day to have acted in character. La Fontaine's glutton, having eaten up a whole salmon, all but the jowl, was taken so ill, that his physicians

physicians declared him past all hopes of recovery: well then, says he, since that is the case, bring me the rest of my fish. Now this man, we must own, behaved consistently enough: but why must other people follow his example who have not the same fondness for salmon? It appears from accounts handed down to us, and which Tully was not ignorant of, that nobody was less of an epicure than Epicurus himself. He had carefully studied the sources of pleasure, and found nothing more conducive thereto than temperance, patience, probity, friendship, and public spirit: why then should he all at once give up his former habits, or how could he do better than spend the last day of his existence in indulging those sentiments which he had constantly found most pleasurable, and best suited to his taste?

6. I cannot however say so much to justify Regulus from all imputation of folly upon the same principle. For it is one thing to contrive how we shall lay out the day in a manner most agreeable to our liking, when nothing we can do therein can affect us to-morrow, and quite another to take our measures wisely, when it depends upon our present behaviour whether we shall have a to-morrow or no. There is nothing more glaringly evident, than that the end of being must put an end to enjoyment. Nor am I moved with those ranting exclamations of the Stoics, that there is more joy in a day well spent than in years of sensual delights. I am sensible our pleasures are not always equal in degree; but I cannot conceive how so much enjoyment can be crowded in so small a space of time, as to make it worth while to neglect whole years to come for the sake of it. Such outcries are in the style of the dissolute and inconsiderate, encouraging the same disregard to the future as their maxim of, a short life and a merry one. Nor shall we be disposed to think so highly of these raptures of virtue, when we

we reflect how many meaner objects can give them as well for a time; a sudden turn of good fortune, a title of honour, a ribbon, whether blue, green, or red, the smiles of a mistress, a kind word, a delusive promise, the veriest trifle, will do it in proportion as we set our hearts upon them. Wherefore the preferableness of virtue does not arise so much from the transports she occasions, as from the calm serenity, and steady complacence of mind she ensures, the satisfactory reflections she gives scope to, the attainableness of the desires she raises, their compatibleness with one another, and their clearness from mischievous consequences; all which regard the time to come, and therefore are inconsistent with whatever renders us incapable of good or evil for the future. If it should be said that Regulus had contracted so strong a detestation of treachery and abhorrence of infamy, that he could not have supported his life under the reflection of them, and therefore did well to quit it, I answer, that this was his own fault. For what but his own weakness had brought him into this situation, or made him so a slave to his feelings of honour, as to be carried away by them from the end of every rule, and all true wisdom, happiness. A man having a perfect command over his passions, finding himself driven to such an extremity, as that honour and happiness were no longer compatible, would throw aside his scruples at once, and turn his thoughts to such enjoyments as were to be had without them.

7. Upon the whole, we are forced to acknowledge, that hitherto we have found no reason to imagine that a wise man would ever die for his country, or suffer martyrdom in the cause of virtue. The only way in which we can extend the obligations of virtue to every circumstance that can happen, is by supposing that the end of life is not the end of being; that death is but a removal to some other stage, where our good works shall follow us, and yield a plentiful harvest

harvest of happiness which had not time to ripen here. This must undoubtedly make a great alteration in the question: now whether there is any ground for this suggestion, and for such a supposed connection between our interests here and in some other state which is to come, is what I propose to examine in the succeeding book.

BOOK III.

NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAP. I.

INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE OF MIND.

THE first thing I shall attempt in pursuit of the inquiry proposed at the end of the last book, will be to determine, by arguments drawn from the nature of the mind itself, how far we are likely to have any concern in futurity, or the operations of an invisible world. For certainly what shall happen in another state of things would not be worth inquiring into, if it could be shewn that we shall be in no capacity to be affected by it. The bodily frame which we carry about with us will be dissolved in a few years: we see daily instances of its mouldering into dust, or falling to decay: but it has been made to appear, that the body serves only as a channel of conveyance to the mind, which is properly ourselves, as being that sentient principle which perceives whatever is perceived by us, and performs all that we do. Our business therefore is, to ascertain, by reasoning on such facts as we are acquainted with, what is the constitution of the human mind, and whether it be of a lasting or perishable nature. Now this question again may be resolved into another; namely, whether the mind be a compound made up of several materials, or a pure simple substance, without parts or distinction.

2. Whatever has been produced may as easily be destroyed again. Those therefore who would contend that the end of life is the end of man, have proceeded on the supposition, that the finer parts of the elements being united properly in a certain organized structure, might produce an animal endowed with life, sense, and motion; and that the mind itself was nothing else besides a curious assortment of elementary particles ranged together after a certain manner. And this being laid down, it would incontestably follow, that the laws of nature, which have brought those elements together in such order, may as easily separate them again, and so divest them of that sense and reason they had acquired by their conjunction; in which case the mind could last no longer than the organization producing it.

3. On the other hand, those who would extend our existence beyond the present state, set out with showing the absurdity of imagining that any combination of senseless matter could produce sense and reason, which must be primary qualities belonging essentially to the subject in which they are found. They insist that mind is a kind of fifth element, distinct from every modification of matter; that being no production of nature, it is not destructible by any law or power of hers; that it may be united to the body or separated again from it, without losing any thing of its existence, and consequently that we may retain the same consciousness, and exercise the same or higher powers after our mortal exit as before.

4. But our ideas being taken originally from sensation, and having been accustomed to regard whatever appears constantly together as the same thing, we contract a grossness of conception, which makes us extend our individuality to the whole human composition. For our flesh and limbs accompanying us wherever we go, and the operation of external objects ending at the surface of our bodies, we conceive of

our

our sensations as beginning there, and that we ourselves are present at the extremities of our organs where we receive the impulse. But not to insist on the discoveries of anatomy, by which it appears that impressions must be conveyed along the nerves to the brain before they can affect us with the least sensation; every body knows, that men may be deprived of their limbs or organs by diseases or accidents, and yet retain their existence. Let a man lose a leg or an arm, an eye, or an ear, he still continues the same man, and holds his rank in the list of beings as much as he did before. Whatever can be separated from him he should look upon as a possession, an instrument, or useful organ, and that alone which remains after all imaginable separation, as properly himself. Besides, our organs have their separate offices, not transferrable to one another: the eye which sees cannot hear, and the ear which hears cannot see. They cannot therefore be the thinking substance itself, but organs conveying impressions to it; for no man can doubt but that it is the same himself which sees, and hears, and receives all other impressions. If the mind were a compound, every self must contain a number of little selves, every mind many little minds, and every sentient principle a multitude of sentient principles. But who would not be shocked to hear talk of a half or quarter of a man's self? Besides, if things sentient were divisible, the parts might be dispersed through the four quarters of the globe, and a man might have perceptions at the same time in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

5. But to this it is retorted, no; for that this self, mind, or perceptive being, may be produced by a combination of unperceptive principles. Now, on this I shall remark, that in such a combination the parts considered singly cannot have, nor are they pretended to have, any other properties than they possessed before, neither can they club to

take their several share of a perception: for it is contrary to the nature of perception to suppose it to exist piecemeal, or to hang suspended between a parcel of unthinking atoms. I can conceive a whole camp to hear the evening gun, because every man in the camp hears it; but I cannot comprehend how they could all hear the sound, if it were to escape every single person. And the case would be the same if they were tied or glued together, or if their brains were all crowded into one head: for I cannot, with the utmost stretch of my understanding, conceive of a perception in any compound or collection of substances, however united together, which must not be complete in every one of them. Some persons have ascribed an imperfect perception to these atoms, which did not become complete perception till they were properly joined together. But I can no more comprehend how an imperfect whisper, when heard by twenty persons, shall become an audible voice, than how they can all hear a voice heard by none of them singly: I would just as soon undertake to explain how a letter might be sent a hundred miles in an hour, by employing twenty men who could walk five miles a piece in the time.

6. We commonly apprehend things to remain the same while they continue to serve the same purposes, and exhibit the same appearances: thus you call a river the same, notwithstanding the perpetual fluctuation of the waters; but though it is the same river, no man can esteem it the same substance: as it is necessary to substantial identity, that the component parts should remain unchanged. So if the mind were a compound, should some of the parts be taken away, and others substituted in their room, though it might still remain a mind, it would be a different one from what it was before; and as, according to Lucretius, the mind grows and decays with the body, every man would have a different self in his childhood, his maturity, and his old age.

7. But

7. But it may be said, that the mind is not so much a collection of particular atoms as a figure or harmony resulting from the order in which they lie, and therefore may continue the same, although some or all of the atoms be different: just as if you place twelve shillings in a circle, though you may change your shillings as often as you please for others, you do not alter the figure, which still remains a circle. But what then becomes of *our own* existence? Or where shall we place personality? For there is no difference between similitude and identity in forms. Therefore two minds composed of atoms, having an exactly similar arrangement, must be the same person; and thus there may be a thousand same persons in different parts of the world, as there may be a thousand same forms, or harmonies. The same circle may be drawn at once in Tartary and in Chili; or the same tune played at Canton in China while it is playing in London. Therefore, if one particular form or harmony be you, and another particular form or harmony be me, there might be as many you's and me's in the world as there are clusters of atoms capable of running tother in the same manner as ours have done. For, be it remembered, we are not now supposing mind to consist of a number of particles combined together in such or such an order, but to be the order itself, considered as distinct from the particles, and equally capable of residing in any others brought together in the same manner. Or, if you make a numerical distinction between one form and another, this will apply equally to the successive forms constituting the same being. For instance, if roundness in one piece of wax be a different thing from roundness in another, by the same rule, if you flatten a globe of wax, and entirely destroy its roundness, the roundness you may give it by a second moulding, must also be a different thing from that which it had before being flattened.

8. Nor will it be easier to preserve the identity of mind in one collection of particles, than to distinguish the diversity of minds in several: if each particular mind were nothing but a certain order of the particles composing it, we must lose our identity on every turn of thought, for we may perceive a change in our minds upon passing out of pleasure into pain; but there can be no change among forms without changing the component parts, so as to destroy the order they stood in before. If self therefore depended on a certain order, or combination of particles, those constant changes which take place in the same individual, could not happen without a change of structure in its component parts, and consequently a change of person; contrary to the apprehensions of all mankind, who esteem themselves the same person from the cradle to the grave, notwithstanding any variation of character or circumstances they may have gone through in the interval.

9. Mr. Locke's doctrine of consciousness seems equally liable to objection. For I do not apprehend a man loses his existence or personality every time he loses his consciousness by falling fast asleep. The most I can allow to consciousness is, that it may in general be taken as the sign or evidence of our personality, but not always. For in some cases it deceives us, and in others is insufficient. Who does not know, that he was once a puling infant wrapped up in swaddling clothes? Yet I never heard of any body pretending to have a remembrance, or consciousness of his being in that condition. Again, consciousness is a thing that seems to belong equally to every individual, so that it can hardly serve as a criterion to distinguish one individual from another; for in this respect we are all alike. Oh, but we are not all conscious of the same thing, so the identity of the consciousness depends on the identity of the fact; but this will not do neither; for I am conscious of several actions I have

have performed, and therefore should be so many different persons. The only way remaining in which I can understand an identity of consciousness is, by placing it in the consciousness of the same person; in which light the idea of person must precede that of consciousness: so it is nothing to tell me I may find my personality by my consciousness, because I must fix my idea of personality before I can make use of the explanation.

10. Lastly, that there is some one principle or substance, absolutely simple in its nature, and distinct from every composition of matter, which is the seat of thought, the soul of man, and the bond of our existence, will appear evident to any one who considers the nature of judgment and comparison; where both terms of the one, and both branches of the other must be apprehended together, in order to determine between them. Let one man be ever so well acquainted with St. Peter's at Rome, and the other with St. Paul's in London, they can never tell which is the larger, the handsomer, or make any other comparison between the two buildings by virtue of this knowledge. But you say one may communicate his knowledge to the other: but then that other has the idea of both before him in his imagination, and it is from this that he forms his judgment. Nor is the case different with respect to the parts of a precipient system: let the idea of an elephant be impressed upon particle *a*, and that of a mouse on particle *b*, they can never know either jointly or separately which is the larger creature; nor can a judgment be passed, till the ideas of both coincide in one and the same individual.

11. This is the common sense of mankind. For when we make use of the pronouns I, He, You, &c.; and say I heard such a sound; I saw such a sight; or felt such a sensation; are not these different impressions all referred by implication to the same simple individual? Or were I to

say, that, in looking at a chess-board for instance, one part of me saw the yellow king, another the black, another the queen, another the bishop, and so on, should I not be laughed at by every body, as not knowing what I was talking about?

12. What has been said of perception, may be applied equally to volition, or action: for as a body could neither impel nor resist another, unless all the particles of the whole mass had a quality of impelling or resisting, so neither can any system have a power of beginning motion where there was none in the parts. A hundred men may certainly lift a weight that would crush any one of them; but a thousand would never be able to stir it, unless each man had some strength of his own independent of the rest. Whence we may conclude perceptivity and activity to be primary qualities, essential to the substance possessing them, and not producible by any combination whatever of imperceptive and inactive ingredients.

13. We have heard of metamorphoses, and transmigrations from one form of being into another. I do not desire any one to believe the truth of those relations, but the pleasure we receive in hearing them, shows they are not unfamiliar to our imaginations; nor do we apprehend a contradiction, in supposing the same person to take various forms. But in all those changes the same self continues throughout: Calisto when a bear, and Io when a cow, are the same persons that they were, though different sorts of creatures: and though they should lose their remembrance or consciousness, still we rejoice or grieve with them as we think they have deserved well or ill in their former state. We may imagine ourselves to have new members added to our bodies, four legs, or twenty arms, or a pair of wings sprouting from our shoulders, yet still we should remain the same individuals; or, though we should lose our limbs, be deprived of

of all our faculties, and become senseless as idiots, we should nevertheless retain our identity.

By such considerations as these I apprehend a man may convince himself of his being neither a form, nor a harmony, nor a system, nor yet a quality or consciousness annexed thereto; but a real existent substance numerically distinct from all others, uncompounded and indivisible.

CHAP. II.

SPIRIT.

HAVING settled with ourselves that mind has a being of its own distinct from all other things, and is a pure, unmingled, individual substance, it still remains to be examined what that substance is, since for any thing that has appeared to the contrary, it might be a single particle of matter. Let us therefore consider what is meant by matter.

2. The essence of things arises from the qualities we find them have: to ask what a thing is, implies a supposition of some substance, and a want of information concerning what qualities it possesses, or what appearances it exhibits. I have met with people who pretend they have no idea of substance, because they cannot comprehend a naked substance divested of all its accidents: they want to see one taken out from its qualities, and laid upon a table for them to push about and examine like the spring of a watch taken out from the rest of the work. But this is a most unreasonable expectation, for were there such a substance, we could never know it, since substances discover themselves to us only by their qualities, and these are as irrefragable an evidence of their existence as we could have, were we able to discern them without. Naked quality is no more comprehensible than naked substance, and you might as well undertake to lay a substance without quality on the table as to lay whiteness, squareness, softness, coolness there, without laying something white or square, or soft, or cool.

3. Whatever has a power of acting upon us or upon other things is a substance; and therefore space is not a substance, because, whatever reality it may possess, it does nothing,

nothing, it produces no effect, but is the most passive of all things, permitting all else to remain in it, remove from it, or pass through it. We neither see it nor feel it, nor does it affect us in any way.

4. We get our first idea of substance from ourselves, our perceptions convincing us of our existence. For in the proposition, or consciousness, *I feel*, there is implied the idea of some being that truly and substantially feels, or we might as well say, that nothing feels, which would be nonsense; and again there must be an idea of something felt, which gives us our knowledge of things without us. When we grasp a stone in our hands, we find it press hard against our fingers, so that we cannot close them as we did before, whence we apprehend it to be a solid substance; and if we cast it behind us, where we can neither see nor feel it, we still conceive it retaining its solidity. And indeed our touch gives us the first evidence of external substances, which do not discover themselves to our other senses, till we have been convinced of their reality by that. Wherefore ignorant people do not count those things substantial, which they cannot feel compact in their hands, such as froth, vapour, light, odours, or the like; though a very little philosophy soon teaches us that we cannot see without something striking against our eyes, nor smell an odour without something entering our nostrils; we cannot perceive a smoke or vapour unless there be something floating about in the air denser than itself, nor discern the colours in a bubble unless there be something capable of refracting the rays of light.

5. Thus solidity, resistance, or tangibility, seems the only positive ingredient in the essence of body or matter, for I conceive mobility to be rather an accidental property than any thing essential. But besides these, we apprehend body to be senseless and inert, which are only negative terms, implying nothing more than a denial of perceptivity and

activity: but at the same time these negative terms seem the distinguishing characteristic of body. The ancient sect of the Hylozoists indeed held a mean between perceptivity and senselessness, between motion and rest, something that was neither perception nor stupidity, neither action nor inertness, but resembled the thoughts of a man half asleep, or muddled with porter; and that a multitude of these drowsy atoms clubbing forces together might produce a genius penetrating, alert, and sprightly: all which whoever can understand must be a much shrewder man than I am. But as, with the exception of this whimsical sect, it has been universally agreed that matter is in itself void of activity and perception, and as we have shewn that no combination of different atoms however artfully disposed into an organized system could account for the individuality and independent nature of thought and consciousness, we may safely conclude that mind is another species of substance, essentially distinct from body, which is what we understand by spirit.

6. Even could we suppose any one fantastical enough to improve upon the above theory and ascribe a complete perception and volition to bodies, all the operations of nature being supposed to proceed from an exertion of voluntary power occasioned by the satisfaction or uneasiness they feel in certain situations, thus resolving attraction and repulsion into real love and hatred, still this would not alter the case. It would follow indeed, that there was but one kind of substance in nature, but not that this substance was body. For the idea of body including inertness and senselessness, if the atoms were sentient, the consequence would be that they were spirits, and mankind would have been all this while under a delusion in taking the trees, the stones, the earth they see for bodies, when they are not in reality such, but clusters of spirits held together by the delight they take in each other's company. But as this is a mere imagination like

like Berkeley's ideal world, Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, and Hartley's mechanical volition, without any positive proof to support it, I shall continue to believe with the rest of the world that the bodies we see and handle are substances of a different kind from ourselves who see and handle them.

7. Besides the qualities abovementioned, spirit is generally held to be penetrable, unextended, not confined to place, and endued with the power of self-motion. As to the first of these, I shall neither affirm nor deny it, as I think we know very little about the matter. If however I were permitted a conjecture where nothing better than conjecture can be had, I should be inclined to suppose spirit naturally penetrable, but capable of rendering itself solid when it chose with respect to particular bodies, and that on this our activity depends.

8. As to extension, if by this is meant the consisting of parts, I cannot be suspected of ascribing that to spirit after the pains I have taken to prove that perceptivity can belong only to individuals. But I have an idea of a thing being extended without parts, and so have other persons, if we may judge from their expressions: for I have heard of the stench of a brick-kiln reaching into the houses in London, and of a noise extending many miles round, yet I never heard any body talk of the half or quarter or any other part of a smell or sound. Now I do not see why having once gotten the idea of extension without parts we may not apply it to substance, which we may consider as existing and present throughout a certain portion of space without losing its unity. At least the possibility of this must be admitted by all those who hold a simple indivisible Being present in all the regions of immensity. And that we ourselves possess this sort of extension, though within very narrow limits, may I think be shewn from principles universally agreed to. It is an uncontroverted maxim, and

may pass for a self-evident truth, that nothing can act or be acted upon where it is not, and though bodies seem to act at a distance, there is always some medium employed between the agent and the patient. Thus an engineer may batter down a wall a mile off, but the ball does no execution till it touches the wall. In like manner we see and hear and receive different impressions from bodies lying far from us, but then something must be thrown from them to strike upon our organs, and excite motions there which are propagated onwards to the seat of perception: nor can we receive sensations of any kind, unless the nerve or animal spirit, or ether, or whatever else it be immediately exciting them, either penetrates the mind itself, or at least comes into contact with it.

Now let us suppose a chess-board with double sets of men, a red and a green besides the yellow and black, so that every square of the board may be covered with a piece: set this board on a table before you, and I believe it will be granted that you may have a distinct view of all the pieces at once. Now there must be at least sixty-four particles of matter with different modifications employed to convey the different objects to the mind, and operating upon it together in the above experiment, (allowing only one particle to each object, though in fact every object on the board must employ many particles to convey its whole image): which sixty-four particles cannot possibly enter or become contiguous to a mathematical point, and consequently the mind to be affected by them must at the same instant be actually present throughout such a portion of space as may touch or contain them all. This space I shall call the sphere of our presence; not that I pretend to know it must be round, but because it is the fashion to apply that term to every figure we know nothing of.

9. Nor is this a novel thought of mine, but at least as old

old as Aristotle, who held the mind, or entelechia, to be co-existent with the whole body, being all in all, and all in every part, not as a compound, but as a true individual. But this was carrying the notion too far, for it is plain the mind itself is not in the eye, or it might see without the assistance of the nerves; and besides if it were commensurate with the whole body, it must grow as it grows, and contract as it diminishes, so that if a man were to lose an arm, it must withdraw into a much narrower space than it held before. This is quite contrary to my notion of the mind's sphere of presence, which I suppose incapable of becoming larger or smaller than it ever was; for as a solid particle of matter must always occupy, so a spirit must always be present in, the same extent of space; magnitude in the one, and presence in the other, being an essential primary property annexed indissolubly by nature to the substance possessing it. However, I do not pretend to impose this opinion on any one, I only wish every one to give it the weight he thinks it deserves.

10. There is one quality more belonging both to body and spirit, to which we can give no name, but on which their vital union depends. We know that wherever the body goes, the mind constantly accompanies it, and keeps her station in the same part of the human frame, but by what power of either this happens we cannot discover. Perhaps the mind might be able to detach herself at any time from the body, if she knew exactly in what manner to set about it. But in our present condition it may be lucky that we do not, for were the mind once to quit the seat where her perceptions are conveyed to her by means of the mental organs, she might lose all her ideas, and so never know how to get back again. Some have disputed whether spirit properly occupies any part of space, or only exists in it; but be this as it may, it has certainly a relative

relative place, and is therefore moveable as well as the body. While in my chamber this morning I was in one place, now I am come down into my study, I am in another: now this would be impossible, unless a power of locomotion belonged to the mind.

11. Whether the mind has a power to move herself by her own energy, is more than we can tell, because if she had such a power, she could not exert it in her present state. We live imprisoned in walls of flesh and bone, and like the snail can stir no where without our houses to accompany us. When we walk, we act upon our legs, which carry the body forward, and that moves the mind along: so that in walking we are as much carried as when riding in a coach driven by our own orders. Nor let it be thought that the mind herself chuses to accompany the body: for this is not always the case. A man may be dragged forcibly from his seat, when he has no inclination to stir, or carried in his sleep, when there is no exercise of volition.

12. The durability of the mind may be inferred from her individuality and distinct existence. The powers of nature can neither increase nor diminish the stock of beings: they may throw them out of their order, and dissolve the compounds formed thereby, or destroy the secondary qualities resulting from their composition; but what has existence cannot be annihilated, and what is one cannot be divided, nor can primary properties essential to the subject be ever taken from it. In all the various modifications of matter, the only change that takes place is in the order and position of the parts, not in the things themselves, or individual substances, none of which is ever lost, or changed into a different one. A pint of water is the same quantity whether lying in a bason or evaporated in steam, and if there were five millions of particles in the vessel, there are still

still the same identical five millions floating about in the air: it is not now water, but is still substance, having lost its quality, but not its existence. Neither need we fear that the particle of the divine nature, which constitutes the soul or spirit within us, will lose its existence, but will have a duration beyond all the powers of nature to cut short.

It is not however enough to know that we shall exist, unless we know what we shall carry with us after quitting our present habitation; and we can assure ourselves of no more than our two primary faculties of perceptivity and activity, which being inherent in our nature nothing can divest us of. But these will avail us little of themselves, for we shall neither be able to perceive nor act without objects to perceive and materials for us to act upon. We know that we shall continue in existence, and capable of receiving perceptions, but what perceptions shall accost us, whether those of pleasure or pain, of sagacity or dulness, or none at all, we are utterly ignorant. We have seen in the progress of these inquiries, how the mind in her acts of recollection, of reasoning, of habit and passion, communicates with the animal system: how do we know then that she can perform her operations at all when separated from it? We find ourselves more or less ready in our mental operations according to the disposition of the body, and when the communication is cut off by fits or sleep we cannot perform them at all. Therefore it is not impossible that the causes on which our ideas depend may reside in that outward soul, or finer bodily organization already described as the probable instrument of thought and action; which being a compound, is therefore destructible, and no necessary part of ourselves; so that on parting from this we may lose our remembrance, our knowledge, and all our acquirements, and pass into another state as much a blank paper as we

industrialization the differentiation attains an extent that is often hardly conceivable. To mention one example. For the German *small* iron industry alone a range has been ascertained of about 3500 different products.[1]

The present selection of sixty-two manufactured goods of group C, divided into eight classes, could not therefore represent anything more than a list of particularly characteristic export goods of the leading European industrial countries; these were goods the export of which, by its relative proportion to the total export of manufactured goods, was calculated to supply information about the chief industries of finished goods of these countries.

Class CI includes nineteen finished textile goods (besides leather, ready-made and hosiery goods of the cotton, wool, silk, and artificial-silk industries) the export of which was of great importance for the leading European textile-exporting countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria, of secondary importance only to Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia.[2]

The three outstanding finished goods of the paper industry are set out in class CII (pasteboard, printing paper, and packing paper). Since the War they were very important export articles of Germany, Great Britain, North Europe, and Austria.[3]

For countries with export industries in the field of cement, glass, and china production (particularly Germany, Belgium, France, and Czechoslovakia) six articles have been selected in CIII.

The production of the iron and steel industry, as well as of industries devoted to the manufacture of copper, aluminium, and precious metals, splits up into so many separate articles that any list of goods claiming to be representative ought to

[1] See *Enquête*, II, p. 242.

[2] On the differentiation in European textile industries see *Enquête*, II, pp. 219 et seq.

[3] See *Enquête*, II, pp. 52–54 and 144–145, as to growth of paper consumption and exports of the world.

came into this, capable of taking any impression, but having all those that were made before entirely erased.

13. We are here luckily placed in an organization enabling us to furnish ourselves with the conveniences and enjoyments of life, but when turned out of this, we know not where to find such another. Though surrounded with dangers on all sides, we have sense and experience to avoid them, but in any other state, we must be like a blind man turned out into a crowded street, having nothing but chance to direct our steps, insensible to approaching mischiefs, or not knowing which way to escape them. We may be tossed about among the elements, driven along by streams of air, or whirled round in circles of fire; the little corpuscles of light may hurt us, and the ether tease us with its continual repulsion; in short, we have every thing to fear, and little to hope for. Thus, the mere discovery of our durable and perceptive nature affords no comfort, for while we confine ourselves to that, the prospect lies dismal, dark, and uncertain before us. Let us then turn our attention upon external nature, in order to see what rules and powers may be employed in governing that, in hopes of learning how they may affect us, and in what manner we are likely to be disposed of in that other state of being.

CHAP. III.

CAUSES AND EFFECTS.

We may distribute the different causes in nature into three classes; primary qualities, motion, and situation, which concur in every operation we see or can think of. It is needless to insist upon the first of these; I shall therefore proceed to the consideration of motion; and this we may satisfy ourselves is not a necessary quality of body, which is a moveable, but no more a moving than a quiescent substance, being alike indifferent to either state, and continuing in either till put out of it by some extraneous force. We see bodies moved by others striking against them, but they give no more motion than they had themselves before, and always lose just as much as they have imparted to others. It is true we see motion frequently produced without discerning the cause, but then experiment and reason assure us that every motion of matter is the produce of some preceding motion, transferred from body to body, and incapable of increase by the communication. Now the force with which all bodies act is in a compound ratio of their quantity of matter and velocity, so that any deficiency in the former may be made up by a proportionable increase in the latter: we know that very small agents may produce great effects, since the burst of a cannon will shake a whole street, but the particles of air immediately producing this shock cannot be supposed to weigh many grains. The same thing appears in explosions of gunpowder where the quantity of matter operating is a very trifle in comparison with the heavy masses it raises, and the solid bodies it rends asunder merely by the violence of its action. Some have therefore supposed a very

fine ether or more subtle kind of matter diffused every where, and acting with inconceivable velocity, which they have made the primum mobile, or first material agent in all the operations of nature, as driving her two main wheels of attraction and repulsion, by which distant worlds are held together, and whence her more minute operations, the power of salts, acids, of fire, fluids, electricity and magnetism, the circulation in plants and animals, spring; and all things derive their activity according to their structure, and the position of their several parts turning the motion of those great streams of action upon them.

2. But though the quantity of motion in nature cannot be increased by communication, it may be diminished by the collision of different bodies meeting one another, and destroying the momentum of both. Every time a man claps his two hands together, he takes something from the stock of motion which is to carry on the operations of nature. And when once any motion is put a stop to, it can only be renewed again by diverting the same quantity of action from some other channel into that, which must equally impoverish the general stock. So that from the perpetual jostling and interference of one body with another, one would suppose that the largest stores of action nature might once have possessed would have been exhausted long ago, and all matter by this time reduced to a stand-still, but for some unknown power throwing in fresh supplies of motion from time to time as they were wanted. Should it be thought that the activity which we have ascribed to man may serve as a beginning of motion, (though what could be done in this way would at best be so trifling as not to deserve notice) it is to be remembered that we ourselves do not act without causes to set us at work or without being acted upon. If nothing moved without us, we should receive no impressions from outward objects, and without

perception have no inducement to exert our volition, nor should we know how to exert it. Therefore motion must already have a beginning in matter, before it can be produced by the mind of man.

3. In like manner the situation of things follows constantly from some preceding situation either of the same or other things. Matter is generally held homogeneous, and that infinite variety of forms, constituting the essence of bodies, falling under our cognizance, depends entirely on the order, in which their minute parts are placed. So that the same first matter makes a stone or a metal, a plant or an animal, according to this internal structure of the component parts. Now in particular things the order which they have does not depend solely on the order they had before, but also upon other things, which are or may be brought contiguous to them, or mingle with them. But the universe, having nothing external, must receive its order co.. inually from itself; so that if the position of all substances could be known precisely at any given moment of time, it might thence be determined what position they would have at any future time.

4. It is not easy to satisfy the inquisitive mind of man. Spirit is active and intelligent, matter inert, and incapable of understanding; why should there be such a difference in substances? Why are they not all homogeneous and primarily alike? Or why is the quantity of matter existing in the world exactly what it is? For there is no impossibility in supposing it to be double or treble, or an hundred times as much as it is, as there must be abundant room in the empty spaces for much greater multitudes of atoms than those already in being. Neither will it satisfy us to be told that every motion and situation follows from a preceding one, that again from some other, and so on through all eternity; because if we contemplate a series of changes following one another, there will arise an order of succession as well as

of position. In the effects we see around us, things pass out of one form into another through different intermediate states; a seed does not produce the full grown tree at once, but first shoots up a tender twig, which then becomes a sapling, and at last a perfect oak laden with acorns: the human body advances through the several stages of infancy, of childhood, of youth, to the maturity of manhood; and these gradations in the several productions of nature may be called their order of succession. Now if the situations of all the substances in the universe have followed one another for ever, there must have been an eternal order of succession prevailing throughout: but if it should be asked, why some other succession might not as well have prevailed eternally, what shall we answer? For I know of no natural repugnance in things against taking any position, or series of motions, so that their changes might not have succeeded one another in a quite different manner from what they have actually done Therefore it remains to seek a reason for their having an eternal motion rather than an eternal rest, or for their having taken those different positions and directions, from which flow that order of events and those various combinations we call the course of nature.

5. Another question may arise concerning Time, why such a particular point of it must be the present. How shall we fix the beginning of eternity, or compute how many ages have elapsed since then, so that the present year must necessarily be 1761? That year follows year, and the second precedes the third there is no dispute, but why might not the whole course of time have been anticipated or retarded, so that it might now be the reign of Henry I. or George X. instead of George III? But this will be thought a question rather of curious speculation than of any real utility.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

CHANCE, NECESSITY, AND DESIGN.

THESE three have been severally assigned as the causes producing that order which we observe in nature. Some have laid great stress on chance as originally giving rise to the other two by strewing the particles of matter about through infinite space, and throwing them into random combinations, from whence the various qualities and forms of things have necessarily resulted. Chance or fortune is also supposed to have a mighty influence in the affairs of men: it is this which is thought frequently to baffle the skill of the wise, the valour of the brave, and the strength of the mighty, to turn the scale of victory and determine the success of all enterprises. But if we examine the proper idea of chance we shall find that it is neither agent nor power, nor has any existence whatever except in our own ignorance, but that whatever is ascribed to that, we should see performed by other causes if we had sagacity to discern them. And that this is the case is evident, because wherever our uncertainty and ignorance vanish, there is an end of chance. To him that sees two hands at whist, it is less a chance on which side the odd trick will fall than to the players; if he sees all the cards, he will be able to give a still better guess, and if he knows exactly each person's manner of playing, he may compute to a certainty how much will be scored that deal.

Another thing which shews that the power of fortune is merely ideal is, that we often suppose it remaining after the event is determined. Thus when a merchant risks his all upon a venture to some distant part of the globe, if fortune had any power at all, she must have exerted it during the voyage;

after that she has nothing more to do, nor is there any possibility of the event falling out otherwise than it has fallen out long before we can hear any thing of the matter. Nevertheless because we know not the event, we still apprehend ourselves under the power of fortune, and if another merchant should purchase the vessel, he is supposed to do it at a venture: for it is not till advice comes of the ship being arrived safe, the cargo advantageously disposed of, and the money deposited in good hands, that we conceive the power of fortune at an end, and ourselves secure against her caprice.

2. Thus chance is no cause of any thing, but serves only to express our ignorance of the manner in which other causes operate, and may therefore be applied equally to the strongest necessity or most deliberate design. What is esteemed more casual than the weather? Yet nobody doubts of the air moving, the vapours rarifying, or the clouds condensing according to a certain mechanical impulse. When we see water poured upon a rising ground, we know that it will run downwards, and thus far there is no chance: but into what streams it may divide, or when it will stop, is casual, because depending upon the inequalities of the ground, the obstacles lying in the way, and other circumstances, which we cannot properly estimate. It may therefore be proper to say there is a chance of a thing falling out so or so, but never to say it was the effect of chance, which has no hand in the production of any thing. Therefore to ascribe the world to chance, or assign that as the beginning of all things is to talk absurdly; for there must always be something in motion previous to chance, which cannot exist till there are certain causes operating, of which it may be doubtful (to us) in what manner they will operate.

3. I proceed next to the consideration of necessity and design,

design, neither of which can be rationally assigned for the origin of things. Necessity itself must have a beginning in the previous condition of things, from whence their operations may be necessarily inferrred; for no effect is necessary till there are causes in being tending to produce it. Therefore necessity is at most but a channel of conveyance, transmitting efficacy from cause to effect; and we may admit it as one of the laws by which nature preserves the tenor of her course, but can by no means employ it to account for the origin of the universe. Nor will design, such at least as we have any experience of, answer the purpose any better, since reason requires materials to work upon, and intelligence cannot exist without objects previously existing to be understood. Something must suggest the design, and furnish ideas of the means to be employed before we can enter upon any undertaking. The action of a finite understanding then, though it may assist in carrying on the order of the universe, cannot account for the existence of such an order, because there must have been some previous situation of matter before that action began, exciting perceptions which gave occasion to the exertion of its powers.

CHAP. V.

FIRST CAUSE.

THERE is not a more evident truth, or one more universally acknowledged among mankind, than this, That nothing can produce nothing: therefore, if there had ever been a time when there was no being in nature, there could have been none now, and the bodies we daily see and handle are an irrefragable proof that something has existed from all eternity; because, either they themselves did so, or they were called into being by something existing before them, and which had nothing prior to itself. Thus we must needs acknowledge there is a being existent somewhere without a cause: for till we find such a one, we shall have no cause from which to derive the existence of other things; and this we may safely assign for the First Cause of all existences, modes of existence, properties, and order of succession in the universe. To this Being we commonly apply the terms self existence and necessary existence; by which is meant underived and unproduced, either by itself or any other being, or in other words, existing always without a cause. Necessary existence cannot here mean a being that has no power to lay down its existence; for in this sense you and I, the dog, and the chimney-piece, are necessary beings, because we can none of us annihilate ourselves, or cease to be.

2. Now of this being we may affirm without hesitation, that it cannot be local or temporary; for we cannot conceive any such difference in times or places, as that a being should be necessarily existent in one spot or time which is not so in another. Bodies are not necessarily existent, because we see that any place may be without them; but if there were an absolute necessity, independent of every thing

else,

else, that a body should exist in any particular place, there would be the same necessity for its existing in the next adjoining place, and so on in every other, till the whole universe became one enormous mass of solid matter. For whatever has a necessary existence in itself, must have it always and everywhere.

3. But though the existence of the First Cause is necessary, its operations are not so. The varieties of nature must convince us, that there is a choice belonging to the first cause of all things, determining the precise number of substances, allotting them their primary properties, stations, and motions, assigning their positions with respect to one another and so ascertaining the particular order of succession which constitutes the course of nature. This choice we must call intelligence; not that it is like our own, which can never act of itself, but for want of a better term; and from this choice or intelligence the first cause is denominated God. For I take the point of intelligence to make the fundamental distinction between the theist and atheist: all who hold the world and the affairs of men governed by a superior wisdom and foresight, of whatever kind it may be, must be allowed to believe a God. On the contrary, however highly any persons may think of the eternity, self-existence, and power of the first cause, yet while they ascribe its operations to unthinking chance or blind necessity, they cannot escape the charge of atheism.

CHAP. VI.

ATTRIBUTES.

THERE is no circumstance we find oftener quoted in treatises on this subject, than the conversation of Simonides with king Hiero; who desiring him to explain what God was, Simonides asked a day to consider of it: at the end of this, instead of giving his answer, he asked for two more; and when these were expired, he requested four: for, said he, the more I consider the subject, I find the difficulties double upon me. Nor is this to be wondered at, for knowing nothing of causes unless by their effects, seeing none of the immediate operations of the first cause, and being confined to a very small part of nature, we can only form a very imperfect idea of God; and the terms we employ in speaking of him are for the most part figurative, containing some remote similitude, but not fully expressive of the things we would signify.

2. So when we declare God intelligent, it is chiefly to avoid the impropriety of declaring him unintelligent, which would convey the idea we have of senseless matter. But we cannot suppose intelligence in God to be the same that it is in us, who understand by organs of sensation and reflection; by traces lying in our memory, and slow deductions of reason; and could have known nothing but for objects existing without us, and acting upon us of themselves. So that we may be said to resemble God, only because we are less unlike him than the stocks and stones we toss about; just as the top of a molehill is nearer the sun than the bottom, and so far resembles that glorious luminary, in being raised above the surface of the earth.

3. I have already shewn, that God must be infinite and eternal;

eternal; and his unity may be inferred something in the same way. For there cannot be two infinite and self-existent beings, since they would necessarily encroach on one another, and it would require some third power to settle the boundaries between them; to which power they must be subordinate, and consequently no longer supreme causes of every thing. The ancient Magi, to account for the origin of evil, supposed all things to proceed from two principles, one good and the other evil; attributing the creation of sentient beings to the first, whom they called Oromasdes, and who made them capable of happiness, wherein they would have continued for ever, but that Arimanius, the opposite principle, introduced disorders and mischiefs among them. This, however, is but a lame account of the matter; for his malicious purposes could have had no effect upon beings that were not originally made capable of misery. The difficulty therefore remains as before; because the good principle must have furnished his antagonist with fit subjects to wreak his malice upon, and concurred in the production of evil, by giving his creatures a capacity of suffering by it.

4. With respect to the manner of the divine duration, a difficulty has been started which I shall not pretend to solve. Some of the schoolmen rejected the common idea of eternity, viz. that of a succession of time without beginning or end; because they looked upon succession as implying a continual perishing and renewing of things one after another, which they thought inconsistent with the immutability and independent nature of the First cause. Therefore they supposed eternity a standing point with God, or a perpetual *now*; so that all ages, past and future, are as actually present before him as this instant is with us. The only opinion I shall hazard on this subject is, that time does not depend, as has been supposed, on the succession of our ideas,

ideas, but that the idea of succession itself implies the existence of time, that is, a previous idea of first and last before it can be attained; for a variety of objects affords us no notion of time, unless they come one before the other. Nor does this idea proceed from their different degrees of vividness or faintness; for let a man stand with a candle in his hand between two looking-glasses, and he will see a number of flames in the glass before him, each fainter than the other, yet the whole scene will appear quiescent, nor exhibit any idea of succession. And the ideas of things in our memory, though fainter as they are more remote, would do the same, unless we had a distinct idea of precedence annexed to them. So then our idea of succession seems to be original, not derived from any other, but existing in the nature of things. This account will perhaps make the idea of time a little more untractable, and not so easily moulded into any shape we please; but at the same time I shall not undertake to say that this efflux and succession of time, as well as the extension of space, and the rest of what is called the nature of things, is not owing to the power and will of God, and therefore may take place only among his creatures.

5. The very train of reasoning leading us to acknowledge a God, evinces his omnipotence; or rather, if I may so speak, finds omnipotence in the way towards his existence: for we infer a God, because we want a cause from whence all other causes and effects must originally proceed.

6. Thus the contemplation of the works of nature, and the powers we see employed in their production, gives us our first idea of omnipotence: but the mind of man requires something further than actual operation to complete the idea of power. We find instances in ourselves, in which we might have acted otherwise than we have done, nor can we avoid thinking the same of God; for were we to confine his

power

power to the works he has actually performed, we should destroy that choice which distinguishes him from blind necessity or chance; and a power tied down to one particular way of acting, would in fact be no power at all. We must therefore include possibilities as well as real events, in our idea of omnipotence; and consider every thing that could have happened as equally its object with what has already happened, or will hereafter come to pass.

7. But what shall we say to absolute impossibilities? Are there not some things which must be such to Omnipotence itself, and which therefore seem to circumscribe it within certain limits; as, for instance, making a body exist in several places at once; causing two and two to make five; annihilating space and time; undoing past events, or producing contrary ones. Now, as to those things which imply flat contradictions, they are generally held to be no objects of power; because to make a thing to be what it is not, is not to make it to be any thing, it is to do something which is not done, and is therefore doing nothing. And here I might call in the aid of my Lord Bolingbroke, who declares, that all such absolute truths are identical propositions, carrying a shew of something profound, but really expressive of nothing. Thus the necessity of two and two making four, carries the appearance of an operation performed by two and two to produce the new being four, together with some absolute power restraining them from producing any thing else; whereas two and two were already the same thing with four before our multiplying them together, and differ only in idea, as we consider them separated or united. In like manner, to urge that it is impossible for any power to make the angles of a triangle unequal to two right ones, is only to say, that no power can form a triangle which shall be no triangle. But who would think it a limitation of his powers, to have it proved impossible for him to do a thing that shall be quite different from what

what he does? Or lament that he is under a disagreeable controul, because he cannot write a letter without writing it, or walk across the room without walking? But after all, I do not know that there is any thing absolutely impossible in its own nature, but as it has been rendered so by those laws which God has established immutably. He has made body local; and to exist in several places it must be a different thing from what he has made it: he has fixed certain relations between numbers, and to alter those relations would be introducing a confusion which he has not permitted: he has made the past unalterable, and determined that no operation shall have any more than one issue; and to suppose otherwise, would be supposing him to have done what he has not done. Therefore we may, without impropriety, ascribe the impossibilities which there are in nature to the will of God, who has established the properties of substances, and issues of events so firmly, that they cannot be altered.

8. But however this may be, there are many things which our modern freethinkers include in their nature of things, and consider as beyond the reach of Omnipotence, which I cannot admit among the number: for they will tell you, that God cannot work a miracle, cannot give a revelation, or annex reward to an assent of the mind; that he could not prevent moral and physical evil, nor make his creatures all of equal degree, without a continued gradation from his own perfections down to nothing; for these are contrary to the nature of things. If you ask what things they mean, or what by the nature of them, they will not vouchsafe, or rather cannot give an explanation; but are angry with you as a captious person for putting the question. It seems extraordinary, that persons who are so severe on others for using expressions they do not understand, should fall into the same absurdity themselves, and pretend to build demonstrations

monstrations upon principles of which they have not a clearer idea than the vulgar, whom they affect to ridicule, have of their mysteries: both place an implicit dependence on words, without any distinct meaning, and both expect that a constant repetition of positive assertions chimed in your ears should pass for proof and explanation.

For my own part, I can understand nothing effectively by the nature of things, but the properties of substances, the situations given them, and motions impressed upon them, together with the mutual operations resulting thence: and these being given to them at or after their creation, could not controul the acts of the Almighty, to which they were posterior. It is the nature of plants to vegetate, but before there were plants or growing bodies there could be no such thing as vegetation: it is the nature of fire to burn, but before there was any fire there could be no such thing as burning. In like manner, physical evil began with the capacity of sentient beings to suffer pain; and moral evil depends on this, together with the constitution of man, occasioning perpetual struggles between reason and appetite: if he were not liable to suffering, he could not take his measures amiss; and if he were void of reason, he would not do wrong in following appetite, having nothing else to follow. That there is a scale of beings I know, but that it reaches within one step of divinity I neither know nor believe; nor if it did, could I ascribe it to any thing else but the good pleasure of the Creator: for I see no necessity but that all beings might have been made of the same species. Therefore the capacity of man, his faculties of reason and appetite, the various orders of beings, the properties of substances, &c. could not prescribe rules to the Almighty, from whose power and appointment they proceeded.

If it be alledged, that we may conceive a nature of things abstracted from the things themselves, let it be remembered

that our abstractions are all taken from our observation of substances, and the manner in which they mutually affect one another; and that the abstract is made by an arbitrary separation in our thoughts of things that nature has exhibited in the concrete. It is said, the rules of justice are unalterable; and so they may, because resulting from the nature of man, which does not change with time and place, for he is made a sociable creature, capable of assisting and hurting his fellows; but were he shut up alone, like a maggot in a nutshell, there would be no place for justice. Therefore when God gave man his faculties, and placed him in a situation to have intercourse with his fellows, then he established justice, and then the nature of it began.

9. This doctrine of an independent uncreated nature of things seems to have gathered strength from a notion of its being necessary to direct the choice of the Almighty in the creation: for choice must be founded on a discernment of the preferableness of one thing to another, which discernment does not make the preference, but is founded on a preference already subsisting in the object contemplated. If this account would solve every difficulty, it would be very well; but many things must have passed in the creation for which no direction could be found in the positive nature of things. Supposing the number, ranks, and characters, of all percipient beings determined beforehand by certain necessary laws, yet how can there be any reason for allotting particular persons to the several parts and situations thus necessarily connected with the order of the universe? What if there must be an archangel to lead forth the host of heaven to battle, and such a reptile as Ned Search to puzzle his brains with dry speculations that nobody heeds, why was it necessary that Michael should be the archangel, and I the insignificant being that I am? It is true, that in my present condition I should be utterly unable to cope with

the arch-rebel, and this is owing to the infirmity of that nature which God has given me: but what was Michael better than me before either of us was created? Both were then nonentities, undistinguishable nothings; having neither fitness nor unfitness for any office whatever. What antecedent necessity then could so constrain omnipotence, as that God might not have created me with the powers and intelligence of the archangel, and made Michael the weak and sinful son of Adam? The plan of universal providence would still have gone on the same: Satan would still have been overthrown, and the same chapters have been scribbled. Yet why was it necessary there should be an endless variety of creatures, with continual gradations of power and intelligence among them? Was it not possible for them all to have been made equal and alike? What can we see in the antecedent nature of things to make such distinctions indispensably requisite, or can we assign any higher cause for them than the will and good pleasure of the Creator?

10. The sophism I have here been endeavouring to answer, took its rise from the habit we are constantly falling into of embodying our abstractions, and considering them as real essences, having a distinct existence of their own. I shall not, with Berkley and some others, go so far as to deny that we have any abstract ideas, which seems to me the same thing as denying that we have any partial, indistinct, or imperfect ideas of things. Now this is so far from being true, that we have, in fact, hardly any others. Thus, if my senses exhibit to me the front view of a man sitting behind a table without legs or feet, and my memory can make a farther separation, by assuring me a week afterwards, that I had seen a man sitting there, yet with so little remembrance of his features, that I should not know him again if shewn me, surely I can go a step farther, and conceive of a human figure having eyes, nose, mouth, and so forth, with-

out thinking whether the nose be long or short, what colour the eyes are of, or of the width of the mouth. This doctrine goes in fact to say, that we can have no idea of any thing, unless we remember the whole and every part of it; in which case, we should have a perfect knowledge of all subjects that had ever fallen under our notice, which is contrary to fact. But at the same time I must contend, that these abstract or imperfect appearances are all originally derived from particular objects, without which they would have had no existence; and that the more general they are, the farther they are removed from reality. It is however this very remoteness, which, by making it difficult to trace them to any positive source, leads the mind to regard them as totally unconnected with any thing in nature, and as subsisting by an absolute independent necessity of their own. Thus the rules of justice are apprehended immutable and unproduced, because you cannot draw them directly from any object before you. If you see a man sit musing in a chair, you may discern his complexion, size, and all the parts of a human figure, but he exhibits no idea of justice in the whole appearance you have presented to you. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the rules of justice are derived from the contemplation of man; for they relate solely to his dealings with others: if there were no transactions among men, there could be no rules of justice; and if there were no men, or if they were beings differently constituted, there could be no transactions among them, or they must be guided by very different principles.

11. Some writers, particularly Bishop Beveridge and Dean Sherlock, endeavour to heighten our idea of Omnipotence, by asserting, that God is not only the creator, but the continual support of all substances whatever. The Bishop, after his usual manner, speaks positively, as if he knew the thing by ocular demonstration; and uses the comparison of a book held

held in one's hand to explain his meaning. For, says he, if I take away my hand, the book will fall to the ground without any act of mine to throw it down: so I myself should instantly drop into nothing, were God to withdraw his sustaining power from under me, without his doing any thing to thrust me out of being. Now, in the first place, the argument is a bad one, because the book does not fall to the ground of itself, but would remain where it is but for the attraction of the earth drawing it downwards; and as to the doctrine itself, it does not seem greatly to enhance our idea of the creator; for it supposes that substances may as it were annihilate themselves, and thus undo the act of the Almighty. It seems therefore most agreeable to our ideas, to conceive of substances as having a permanent existence given them, and that it requires an exertion of the same power to annihilate as to create.

CHAP. VII.

OMNISCIENCE.

We have remarked before, that intelligence is not the same thing in God as in ourselves; for our intelligence would not suit a first Cause, being always derived from something previously existing. At the same time, therefore, that we ascribe intelligence to God, we must acknowledge this attribute to be ineffable, being something of a higher nature, but comprehending under it all that belongs to understanding as this exists in the mind, abstracted from the idea of any conveyance bringing it thither. And though it would be in vain to go about to describe the manner of his knowing, which in the nature of it must be different from ours, yet as we can form no idea of any other knowledge than that we experience in ourselves, we are excusable, because necessitated to think and speak of him in a language suited to our ideas. Thus, we say he sees all things; looks backward on the past, and forward into the future; discerns all possibilities, together with the consequences of his own immediate acts, or those of second causes to the remotest chain of events, and knows whatever is the object of knowledge. The highest term we have to employ is intuition, a term taken from our sense of vision; and serving only to exclude the slow process of reason, by which we advance gradually to the knowledge of what we cannot discern directly by our senses or judgment.

2. The difficulty of apprehending any voluntary act, even that of creation, to proceed without a prior intelligence, or of intelligence subsisting without objects to be understood, has set men upon contriving objects for the divine intelligence coeval with itself: for the ancients held forms, ideas,

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and truths to be eternal, existing always in the divine mind; and I suppose these are what our moderns would understand by their unalterable nature of things. Now, admitting the truths here spoken of to be real things, it will be hard to conceive of them as possessing an inherent eternity; for truths are propositions concerning substances, or something relative thereto, and therefore cannot be older than the substances of which they are predicated. The epithet eternal given to some truths, implies there are others not so; and the very distinction made between eternal and temporary truths, shews their duration to depend on that of the subjects to which they are applied. But it may be urged, that although all external objects were annihilated, yet we might retain an idea of the forms they had exhibited; therefore there is no inconsistency in supposing the same idea to exist in some mind before they were created. Now, in this case, the idea will not be derived from any thing external to the mind, but will be a pure act or emanation of the divine intelligence, instead of the object or primary agent giving scope to its exertion. Since then we find an understanding, such as ours, inadequate to account for things as they exist, but are satisfied nevertheless that they require an understanding to account for them, let us conclude the divine intelligence a subject above our reason, and forbear to pronounce any thing more concerning it, than that it is sufficient to produce all that admirable contrivance we observe in the works of nature.

3. It has been sometimes urged, that the world could not have been made in perfect wisdom, being so full of defects. Ravenous beasts, poisonous herbs, and pestilential vapours, are almost every where to be met with: the rain falls into the sea, where it can do no good; the sun shines upon barren rocks, where it can produce nothing; and man is liable to continual disappointments and disasters. But

those things, of which we cannot discover the uses, by extending our views far enough, are exceedingly few indeed; and even where we cannot do this, we have no right to conclude that they are therefore without any use, or may not be highly necessary to the good order of the universe. If a man, of whose skill in language and reasoning we had experience, were to deliver himself darkly and mysteriously on some occasion, we should not presently conclude he had no meaning in what he said. If we went into the workshop of an artificer, where we found many things admirably contrived and put together, with others of which we could not possibly guess the use, we should not infer from the latter that he proceeded foolishly and unthinkingly in all we saw before us. We should attribute the seeming uselessness of any thing we saw to our own want of discernment; and much more ought we to do so with respect to the operations of nature, whose tendencies and mutual connections we have still less ability to comprehend.

4. When we reflect what an immense extent of thought must be requisite to govern innumerable worlds, and order all the particulars belonging to them, it seems almost inconceivable that so much can be contained in one understanding. But if we consider why a multitude of thoughts are perplexing to ourselves, we shall find that it is because the sphere of the mind's presence being too narrow to admit many of them, we are forced to labour hard to bring such of them into play as we want; and generally others intrude with them, which disturb their operation, and confound the understanding. When once a train of reasoning is become familiar to us, so that the ideas start up readily in the imagination, we then find no difficulty in comprehending easily and distinctly so much of it as our faculties will bear. If then we will needs imagine God to understand as we understand, by distinct ideas, let us remember that the sphere of

of his presence extends through all immensity, that he can be in no want of ideas, nothing being ever absent from his thoughts, and that it is not the number of our ideas, but the want of them, that causes all our confusion and perplexity.

CHAP. VIII.

GOODNESS.

Of all the divine attributes there is none that concerns us so nearly as that of goodness. Infinite power and wisdom avail us nothing of themselves, but are rather objects of terror than of comfort and confidence. Indeed, nothing has contributed so much to drive men into atheism as the contemplation of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, without goodness, for they looked on such a being as an universal spectre hovering continually over them, from whom they might have to fear the worst consequences.

2. There is one difficulty occurring on this subject of which it is perhaps impossible to give a satisfactory solution; for as all the attributes of an infinite being must be infinite, his goodness must be so too; whence then comes there to be any evil in the world? Nor will it be a sufficient answer to say, that many of the evils we complain of are necessary to produce greater good, and that this is probably the case with all of them; for this only shews that evil is necessary according to the present constitution of nature, but the question is, why was it necessary that it should be constituted in that manner?.

3. Some ascribe the origin of evil to our immersion into matter. But this is also the immediate source of all the good we enjoy, and besides, I do not see any necessity why such an immersion should take place at all. Might we not have had bodies given us fitted only for the conveyance of pleasant sensations, but not of painful? Or might we not have received such a succession of ideas as was thought proper for us from the immediate hand of God, according to Berkeley's system? Others attribute all the mischief in the

the world to the abuse of freewill. But in the first place, we have seen reason to doubt whether any such faculty either exists or is possible. Secondly, if it were possible, there is no reason why such a mischievous and ungovernable principle should have been introduced into the constitution of the world. Would it not have been better if irresistible grace had been substituted for freewill, and all men had been created necessarily wise and virtuous by a law of their nature? Again, this account only extends to a small part of the evils which we daily witness. Many of our disasters proceed from accident, and physical causes: and this is altogether the case with the sufferings of animals, who have no power of freewill which they can abuse.

4. Some persons have endeavoured to get over the difficulty by alleging the absurdity of supposing creatures equally perfect with their Creator, and that imperfection necessarily implies a liableness to evil: but this consequence I cannot perceive; for there is a manifest difference between actual pain and the absence or diminution of pleasure. A creature with dull capacities and few materials of enjoyment might nevertheless be placed in a situation to exempt it from all pain and uneasiness. But even admitting that imperfection is necessary to all beings, and that evil is a natural consequence of imperfection, I do not see why there should be a scale of different orders of beings descending so low, or what inconvenience would ensue upon the lowest being raised to the same rank as the highest. Shall we make an attribute of curiosity and imagine the Supreme Being like some great nobleman, who will have animals of all kinds in his menagerie to divert himself with looking at them? Or did it cost Omnipotence more trouble to make an angel than an oyster, so that being fatigued with working up the former, the latter was undertaken by way of play and recreation? Or does one take up more

more room than the other, so that after the universe was filled with beings of the superior order, there only remained space for the inferior classes in the interstices between them? Since therefore all the explanations which have been given of this subject, are insufficient, we can only do as we have done before: that is, suppose that our inability to reconcile the different attributes of infinite power and infinite goodness arises from our not fully comprehending their nature, and from something fundamentally wrong in our method of reasoning upon them.

5. As to the practical proofs of the goodness of the Creator we need not go far in search of these: the very air we breathe, the food we eat, the relish we find in our employments, the benefits and mutual pleasures of society, the value which every one sets on life itself, are so many striking proofs of the beneficent disposition of the author of all these things. We are too apt to form our estimate of the pleasures of others by considering what would give us pleasure, and if we happen to be out of humour with our favourite objects, fancy that there is no good left in the universe, because there is nothing which affords us any delight. Nothing contributes so much to enliven the imagination and give a cheerful cast to the scenes around us, as a kind and social temper. What we wish well to, we think well of, and if we wish well to every thing we shall be attentive to the successes and pleasures that happen to every thing. By constantly turning our observation that way, we shall cease to measure the satisfactions of others by our own standard, and shall discern a variety of tastes adapted to the several conditions wherein men are placed, and that there are many things desirable, besides what we would chuse to have for ourselves. We may see that children have their plays, the vulgar their amusements, coarse jokes, and Maygames: even folly does not exclude pleasure

sure, nor poverty banish content. There is as much mirth in the kitchen as in the parlour, and as much diversion at a country fair or a cricket match as a card assembly, or a ridotto. The cobbler whistles at his stall, the dairy-maid sings while she is milking, the ploughman munches his mouldy crusts with as good a relish as the rich man eats his dainties, for he has that best of sauces, hunger, to season his victuals. Labour purifies the blood, invigorates the limbs, strengthens the digestion, ensures sound sleep, and renders the body proof against the inclemencies of the seasons, all which are considerable articles in the enjoyment of life; nor need we stop at the human species, for a good-natured man may rejoice to see the cattle sporting in the fields, or hear the birds singing for joy; to behold the swallow building nests to hatch her young, the ant laying in her stock of provisions for the winter, the flies in a summer evening dancing together in wanton mazes, or the finny tribes frisking nimbly about in the water, as if delighted with their existence.

6. That there must be a much greater quantity of enjoyment than suffering in the world may appear from hence, that pleasures spring from permanent steady causes, as the vigour of health, the due returns of appetite, and alternate exercise and rest; but pains proceed from accidents which rarely happen, or diseases which are either slight, or soon over. Now this preponderance of good over evil in that part of the creation lying within our notice, manifests a beneficence in the character of its author, which must operate equally in all other parts of his works; for so we reason in other matters, were we entertained in the family of some nobleman, if we found him kind and condescending to his dependants, humane to his servants, careful to establish salutary orders for the regulation of his household, watchful to see that even his cattle had their proper food and conveniences,

conveniences, we should naturally conclude the same good management prevailed in all his other houses: we have lived some years in this family of terrestrial beings, and we may as naturally conclude that the same beneficence which we find so amply exerted in providing for their welfare, extends to every other family of sentient beings throughout the universe.

7. Though we are not in a capacity to pronounce any thing concerning the introduction of evil into the original constitution of things, yet we may see that as the world is constituted, it is continually productive of the greatest benefit. Nay it is so inwoven with our very frame, that the business of life could not go on without it, for if there were no danger, or want, or pain to be avoided, we should have nothing to do, and our time would pass insipidly for want of employment. It is a matter of common observation that we know not the value of blessings till we lose them, and those who never meet with any thing to thwart their desires are scarce sensible of their happiness. We learn wisdom from the disappointments we have suffered, and we learn to feel for others from seeing the distresses to which they are exposed. Thus evil is perpetually the source of good, and we may conclude is only suffered as far as it answers this purpose. We may therefore look upon evil as the purchase-money of happiness, and as so much necessary deduction from the latter. But an estate of five hundred pounds a year, chargeable with a constant land-tax of four shillings in the pound, is equal to four hundred without that deduction; or if a friend put you in the way of making a thousand pounds by laying out four hundred, you would think yourself as much obliged to him as if he had helped you to a clear six hundred. Why then should we not reason in the same manner with respect to the gifts of Providence, instead of making the little evil that is mingled in

in our cup for useful purposes an impeachment of its goodness?

8. Having thus established the principle of a beneficent over-ruling Providenee governing the universe, we may, from the character of equity in the Deity, infer our title to a due share of his bounty. This attribute seems to be a necessary consequence of his goodness, which flows entirely from himself, and which we should expect to see diffused in equal portions among all his creatures, as there could originally be no difference between them to make him more favourable to one than another. If therefore we have not received our full share of advantages here, we may presume that ample amends will be made us in another state of being, for we have already shewn that our existence will extend beyond the present scene, and that we can no more pronounce upon a man's lot by the small period of his existence within our observation than we can upon his enjoyment of life by a single day.

CHAP. IX.

PROVIDENCE.

We may consider God in two characters, either as the creator, or governor of the universe. In the former of these, he is often unfathomable to our shortsighted reason: for there are many circumstances relating to the origin of things, and the principles which guided him in the creation of the world, which are far beyond our comprehension. In the latter he comes nearer the level of our understandings, for then we have only to consider him as regulating the affairs of the universe according to certain stated laws or general principles which he has himself established, and as overlooking every event for that purpose, which is what we understand by Providence.

2. But though every one who believes God to have been the sole first cause of all things will acknowledge that every thing contained in the divine plan falls out accordingly, yet some have doubted whether all events that have happened were comprised within that plan. Thus the stoics held that God took care of great matters but neglected small ones: my lord Bolingbroke seems to have been of the same opinion; and if we attend to the common discourses of men concerning chance and fortune, we shall be ready to think this the idea generally prevailing among them.

Now this is owing to two reasons, one that they look upon little matters as unworthy the notice of God, and think it derogatory to the divine majesty to suppose him attentive to the crawlings of an emmet or tossings of a feather in the wind; the other that to draw out a plan containing every the minutest event without exception seems impossible even to omniscience itself. But for my part, I

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can see nothing unworthy of notice in itself. The wisest man may attend to the motions of insects, or floating of little bodies in the air, when he has nothing else to do; and when he does not do it, it is because it draws off his attention from matters of greater importance For our views being confined to a narrow compass, we cannot take notice of one thing without overlooking others. But this cannot apply to the Deity, who is not liable to any such perplexity or distraction of ideas from the multiplicity of objects engaging his attention. This objection therefore resolves itself into the other of the inconceivableness of such an all-comprehensive intellect as shall foresee every minute particular, and every little motion that is to take place in the universe. This difficulty I have already answered, by shewing that it is the limited nature of our faculties and slowness of our organs which produces the confusion of ideas in ourselves, and that this cannot happen with respect to a being who is infinite himself, and has an intuitive perception of every object existing in nature.

3. Besides, one thing is so interwoven with another in the order of nature, that those of the greatest moment often depend upon others the most trifling and seemingly unworthy of regard. For though when the farmer sows his corn, he does not mind the exact number of grains he takes up at each time in his hand, nor whether any two of them fall the tenth of an inch farther apart or nearer to one another, this kind of gross calculation would not at all do in the general affairs of mankind. Persons have been killed by boughs falling from trees, or bricks from houses, as they were passing under; but had the fibres of the bough, or the mortar holding the bricks together, been ever so little stronger or weaker, they would have fallen a moment sooner or later, and the lives of the passengers been saved. Some persons have lost their lives by a gun going suddenly

off, others have been saved by a pistol flashing in the pan: here the little particles of rust or wet among the powder must be exactly ascertained to make it take effect at the destined instant and not before. What is it marks out the paths of bullets flying about in an engagement? The strength of the powder, its being rammed in more or less close, and a hair's breadth difference in the position of the muzzle of the gun, will cause them to miss or kill. Therefore, all these minute circumstances must be foreseen, even if we suppose God only to determine how many shall fall in battle that day, but not to care whether John or Thomas make one of the number. Nor is the condition of men's lives less dependent on slight causes than the issues of them. The behaviour of a fantastic woman cannot but influence the constitution and temper of the child: the giddy carelessness of the nurse may occasion maims, fractures and bruises, which can never be cured afterwards. It can scarce be doubted that the tenor of every man's conduct and fortune depends very much on the situation in which he was placed at his birth, and the natural endowments with which he was born, and that these again depend on the persons who gave him birth as theirs did on those from whom they sprung: so that he might either not have been born at all, or have lived a very different life, had either his own parents, or their's been otherwise matched. But who can help observing what trivial causes, what idle turns of humour, whim and fancy, sometimes bring people together? An accidental meeting, a ball, or an entertainment, may begin the acquaintance; a lucky dress, a handsome compliment, or a lively expression, first engage the notice; or an officious old woman drop a word that may decide the preference. But on these slender threads the fate of a whole nation may depend. Perhaps the Roman commonwealth might have subsisted longer, or the

the empire have been established in another family, had Cæsar's grandmother worn a different coloured ribbon at some particular festival.

4. Thus we see the scheme of great events could never be so surely laid but that they would be defeated by little accidents, unless these likewise were taken into the account. And whoever considers the whole chain of causes contributing to govern the weightiest affairs of mankind will find many inconsiderable ones among them, these again depending on others as minute, and so growing still more numerous and complicated the farther he goes backward, till at last he will be ready to believe with Plato, that the whole world is one tissue of causes and effects, wherein, nearly or remotely, every thing has an influence upon every thing.

5. Again, we find not only that there is a concurrence of causes necessary to produce one effect, but that various effects follow from one and the same cause. The air that supplies us with breath assists the growth of vegetables, sustains the clouds and vapours, and purifies the earth with its continual agitations: the sea that contains the stores of rain and dew, that wafts our ships from coast to coast, serves likewise as an element for the fish; and there are seldom any events happening among mankind which affect only a single person. The silk-worm weaves her web for a safe-guard to herself, and at the same time furnishes us with materials for our cloathing and ornament; the fly injects her juices into the oak-leaf to raise an apple for hatching her young, and thereby supplies us with ink for our correspondence and improvement. Hence we may infer the probability of there being other uses in the works of nature, besides those we discern, much more that there are uses where we cannot discern any.

6. We commonly say, that all things were made for man,

and so we may, provided we do not add, for man alone, but allow him likewise to be made for other creatures. For the sheep and oxen feed upon his pastures; the horse receives provender from his hands; the birds eat the grain he sows; the little mouse shares in the provisions of his table; the swallow nestles under his roof; the mastiff and spaniel earn their wages in his service; the flea and the gnat regale on his blood; the harvest bug burrows in his flesh; and his carcase breeds and nourishes the worm and maggot. There is also a constant intersourse between the animal and vegetable kingdoms: man sows the corn that is necessary to his subsistence, plants and prunes the trees that yield him fruit, cultivates the flax that serves him for clothing: the cattle manure the pastures that feed them, the birds scatter about the seeds that grow up to supply their future wants. It is thought the misletoe would be lost out of nature if it were not continually propagated from tree to tree by the thrush. And every species of living creatures has an interest in the curious structure and alimentary qualities of those plants which furnish them respectively with proper sustenance.

7. It is this manner of proceeding by second causes that discovers the divine wisdom, which could not so well be manifested by a direct exertion of omnipotence: the raining manna from heaven might display power and a kind concern for the wants of mankind, but it would not give evidence of wisdom like the admirable contrivance in a grain of corn, made to protect and nourish the tender germ, and fitted with little tubes for straining such earthy particles as are proper for our use. If Almighty power were employed at every turn, there would be no room for wisdom, because nothing more would be required than to chuse what should be done, and do it accordingly: as a man who carries a bowl in his hand wants no skill to place

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it where he has a mind; but if he rolls it along the turf, he ought to know exactly the inequalities of the ground, and what force and direction must be given to make it rest just in the spot where he would have it lie; much more when a multitude of causes are set in motion to produce a variety of effects, does it require a consummate wisdom to adjust them so nicely as that nothing may fall out contrary to intention. And the subordination of causes gives rise to subordinate ends, where we may sometimes discover a wisdom of contrivance in the means employed, though we cannot trace them to any ultimate end: for we may discern a curious contexture in the parts of weeds and noxious plants, of toadstools and moss, pyrites and other useless productions of the earth, though we cannot see how they promote the benefit of any sentient creature.

8. But wisdom cannot be disjoined from goodness, for it must have some purpose to proceed upon, and none other can be conceived worthy of it. Wherefore the most considerate persons have laid it down as a maxim, that nature does nothing in vain; but this maxim can hardly be maintained, unless we suppose a connection of interests between the known and unknown world. For as far as we can observe, we find nature often defeated of the purposes she seems principally to have intended; she forms the grains of corn in a manner fitted to produce plants of various kinds, but how few of them ever attain that end? She forms the eggs of birds with curious integuments, one within another, to protect and nourish the growing fœtus: as to those which man converts to his use, we think her pains not ill bestowed; but how many of these are addled, chilled, or broken, without ever coming to any use at all! If we turn our thoughts to man himself, we shall find that after all the wonderful care of nature to form children in the womb, many of them never are born; and of those that are, one

half are cut off by diseases, accident, or ill management, before they arrive at the use of reason. In short there seems to be a general waste around us, a great deal of pains and contrivance thrown away, and that half the provisions that are made do not answer their intended purpose. The fair conclusion from all this seems to be, not that the world was made without wisdom, (for of this we have too good proof to doubt,) but that Providence has other ends in view that we know nothing of.

9. It is true, that by applying ourselves to the study of nature, we daily find more and more uses in things that at first appeared useless. But some things are of such a kind as not to admit of being applied to the benefit of man, and others too noble for us to claim the sole use of them. Man has no farther concern with this earth than a few fathoms under his feet; was then the whole solid globe made only for a foundation to support the slender shell he treads upon? Do the magnetic effluvia course incessantly over land and sea, only to turn here and there a mariner's compass? Are those immense bodies, the fixed stars, hung up for nothing but to twinkle in our eyes by night, or to find employment for a few astronomers? Surely he must have an overweening conceit of man's importance, who can imagine this stupenduous frame of the universe made for him alone. Nevertheless we may so far acknowledge all things made for man as that his uses are regarded conjointly with those of other creatures, and that he has an interest in every thing reaching his notice, and contributing either to the support of his body, the improvement or entertainment of his mind. The satellites that turn the night of Jupiter into day, assist him in ascertaining the longitude and measuring the velocity of light: the mighty sun, that like a giant holds the planets and comets in their orbits, enlightens him with its splendour, and cherishes

rishes him with its warmth; the distant stars, whose attraction probably confines other planets within their vortices, direct his course over the boundless sea, and the inhospitable desert.

10. It is the narrowness of our views that makes it difficult for us to conceive there should be creatures totally different from any we see. For many ages this little spot of earth was thought the only habitable part of the universe. Xenophanes was laughed to scorn for asserting that the moon was bigger than all Peloponesus: and though later discoveries have persuaded many persons of the planets being habitable earths like ours, yet they think no further than of peopling the surfaces of them in the same manner as our own. I suppose if we had never seen fish we should have been positive that life could not subsist without air to breathe, and that there could not be generation without sexes if we had never heard accounts of the polypus. But who can reckon up all the varieties that infinite wisdom can contrive, or shew the impossibility of organizations dissimilar to any within our experience? Who knows what cavities lie within the earth, or what living creatures they may contain, endued with senses unknown to us, to whom the streams of magnetism may serve instead of light, and those of electricity affect them as sensibly as sounds and odours do us? Why should we pronounce it impossible that there should be bodies formed to endure the burning sun, to whom fire may be the natural element, whose bones and muscles are composed of fixed earth, their blood and juices of molten metals? Or others made to live in the frozen regions of Saturn, having their circulation carried on by fluids more subtle than the highest rectified spirits raised by chymistry?

How does it appear necessary that sensation must come by that long train of channels leading into one another,

through which we receive it? Hartley and others pretend to demonstrate that sensations and all our ideas are produced by an ether lodged in the interstices of the brain; if this be the case, we shall have, when disengaged from the grosser body, a denser ether surrounding us, which may excite stronger sensations, and of a very different kind from any we now experience. May there not be bodies fitted for the purposes of sensation and reflection, consisting of simpler organs, and lying within a narrower compass than any thing we can imagine; all eye, and ear without, all memory and understanding within; small enough to penetrate the densest metals with the same ease as we walk about in a grove of trees; too minute for wind to take hold of, or fire to penetrate and rend asunder; which may expatiate in the boundless fields of ether, and find a pabulum there to support them; or have such a contexture as not to be liable to continual waste, and consequently need no recruiting?

11. Whoever admits the doctrine of final causes, and nothing made in vain, will scarce imagine that our faculties of reason and action were given us only for a few years' employment on this short stage, to lie buried ever afterwards in eternal sleep, but that the soul on quitting this country passes into some other, whose districts are continually peopled by colonies sent from hence. When the plant has stricken root, the seed that before involved it rots and perishes; when the chicken is hatched, the shell and other remains of the egg crumble and moulder away; so we may presume that this gross body of ours, which will decay and return to dust, is an integument to preserve and form the embryo of some future animal.

19. Nor is it a contemptible argument to prove that our present habitation is only introductory to something farther, that so little value appears to be set upon life by him who is the best judge of what is valuable: every one must see, upon

upon how slender a thread it hangs, liable to be cut short by a thousand accidents. We may observe nature almost as careful to provide means of destruction as preservation: ravenous beasts, venomous animals, and poisonous herbs, are fitted for instruments of death; diseases, famines, wars, damps, suffocating vapours, and pestilential airs, sweep men away by numbers; appetite urges them to pernicious excesses; many useful occupations lead them into dangers; even virtue itself sometimes forces them upon hazardous enterprises. So that life seems to be given, not for the benefit of the individual, but for some good to result to the whole; and one might be almost tempted to believe with some of the ancients, that the luckiest thing that could have befallen us was never to have been born, and the next luckiest, to have been taken away again immediately.

13. For my part, these seeming faults, and the vast profusion of second causes, many of which serve no immediate purpose, are so far from being stumbling blocks to me, that I look upon them as an earnest of our future expectations. We have sufficient marks of a wisdom displayed in this visible world, to satisfy us that the affairs of men and all nature, lie under a wise controul: therefore I care not how many instances may be produced, wherein the purposes of that wisdom are frustrated or incompletely answered here, because I may reasonably infer from thence, that they are more fully answered elsewhere.

14. Now, to sum up the whole of what has been offered on this subject, we may gather from the perishable nature of our bodies, and durable nature of our minds, that there are other forms of being besides this, wherewith we shall be invested: from the method constantly taken by nature, in bringing her works to perfection slowly, of generating one thing by the corruption of another, and the mutual depen-

dence of the several parts of this visible world, that there is a like connection of interests running through the whole; and from the grossness of our outward frame, receiving sensations only through a few very complicated channels, that we may be capable of stronger, clearer, and a much greater variety of perceptions than we now have. Thus far we do not discover any thing to satisfy us as to the chief point we have in view; for the greater sensibility of our unembodied state may render us liable to acuter pain as well as more exalted pleasures; and the greater variety of our perceptions may give rise to more of the irksome as well as the agreeable kind. But when we raise our thoughts to the First Cause, and contemplate the character of wisdom and goodness manifested in those things of which we have an adequate knowledge, our uncertainty vanishes; for we cannot suppose that evil will be inflicted needlessly, or dispersed in greater quantities than the welfare of the whole creation requires. Therefore we may look upon the good we at present receive, as given for its own sake; but on the troubles and uneasinesses we are exposed to as a necessary introduction to our reaping some greater advantages hereafter.

15. Nevertheless, the heart of man finds little scope for contemplation without a prospect of something it can conceive; for imagination wants a more solid ground than mere abstraction to rest upon. Therefore as men turn their thoughts to another state, they find ideas rise bearing a resemblance to what they have known in the present state; and moralists comply with the bent of human nature in this respect, leading imagination in such tracks as she is capable of pursuing. Since, then, the method of hypothesis has been fallen into by all those who have treated of an unknown world, and there is considerable advantage to be derived from it, why should not I have the liberty of trying my hand as well as others? Imagination may be lawfully employed

employed in support of reason; and in this capacity may perform excellent service, by turning the conviction of important truth into an habitual persuasion. I have endeavoured all along to draw my reasonings from observation and experience as closely as I was able, and I intend adhering to the like method for the future: therefore, if I should be found attempting to prove any thing by hypothesis, it must be looked upon as an inadvertency; for my design is only to render those truths more intelligible that have their foundation elsewhere. We have already seen reason to conclude from the contemplation of that power which governs both worlds, that they are connected in interest with one another; and that what befals us in this will affect our condition in the next; but a general idea of mutual dependence weighs but little on the mind, unless we imagine certain links, of which it is to consist; and as physicians mingle their subtler medicines with more solid ingredients, that they may not be lost in the mouth, so our abstracted ideas must be clothed with others more sensible, to make them sink into the imagination.

CHAP. X.

VEHICULAR STATE.

When death puts an end to the animal circulation, the body remains a mere lump of sluggish matter, showing no signs of perception or activity, from whence we naturally conclude that the spirit is flown; but whether it carries any thing away with it, we are altogether uncertain: we see nothing fly off with the last breath, but our senses are not acute enough to assure us that nothing does fly off. Therefore by virtue of the privilege constantly claimed in making an hypothesis, I may fairly assume what nobody can disprove, that the spirit on quitting her present mansion does not go out naked, nor entirely disengaged from matter, but carries away with her an integument from among those with which she was before invested. And I am far from being singular in this notion, for many wiser men have assigned a fine vehicle for the habitation of the spirit after its being divested of flesh and blood; and the ancients generally painted the soul or Psyche, with butterfly's wings, to shew that she came out with a new body as a butterfly does from the chrysalis.

2. But we must suppose this vehicle extremely small, so that the nicest eye may not discover it when going, nor the finest scales discover an abatement of weight in what remains after it is gone. No doubt it will appear strange to many, that so many organs of sensation and reflection, and instruments of action as a man possesses, can ever be contained in a body so small as to be undiscoverable by any of our senses. But so must every thing that differs widely from what we have been accustomed to. The young fellow who has never been in a nursery since he left his own, the first time

time he sees a new-born babe, is apt to wonder at its littleness: and if he dips into a treatise on the formation of the fœtus, can scarce believe the lineaments of a human body could ever be comprised within so narrow a compass. Now, what hinders our conception in these minute divisions is, that we commonly think of making them by dividing the whole without dividing the parts, which must certainly spoil the composition. If St. Paul's church were cut in halves, each half would not make a church: if into quarters, and so on, they would be still more remote from the plan of the architect; but were all the stones, the timbers, and ornaments, proportionably lessened, the whole form of the building might still remain the same, though reduced to the bigness of a nutshell. So if we could pare away one half of a man from his head downwards, without destroying his vital functions, yet he would have but one arm and one leg left, and would lose many of his powers: but if all his component parts, his bones, his muscles, his fibres, the globules of his blood, and other juices, were made proportionally smaller, he might still continue a little man, with the same variety of powers and faculties as before. He could not indeed exercise them upon the same objects, but we may suppose nature to have others in store answerable to his new condition.

3. Small as these spiritual vehicles must be, we need not be alarmed lest their slender forms should be driven to and fro by storms, or tossed about in whirlwinds; for whoever pleases may imagine them conveyed by some law of nature to the fields of ether, where all is calm and serene: or taking shelter in the pores of solid bodies, as we do in our houses, till the tempest is blown over. But, in fact, these expedients are not requisite: for their own minuteness will preserve them against all such injuries. We are told by naturalists, that the particles of air lie at a great distance in proportion

to

to their bulk, so that there is room enough for them to pass on each side of those little bodies without touching, as we know the rays of light from innumerable stars cross one another in all directions without interfering: or if any one of them should happen to strike, it would do them no more hurt, considering their lightness, than a stone thrown against a feather hanging loose in the air.

4. Perhaps it may give disturbance to some persons to think of being reduced to such contemptible animals, tenderer than a worm, and weaker than a fly: but the strongest creatures are not the most favoured by nature: the mighty elephant, the vigorous horse, and the unwearied ox, are governed by man; and among our own species, the most robust and athletic are generally of the lowest rank. Besides, the strength of creatures need only be proportioned to their wants. We in our present state have large works to execute in providing for our sustenance, our clothing, and other accommodations of life; powerful enemies to contend with, and strong animals to employ in our services; all which we could not do without solid bones and muscles: but the vehicular people have no such bulky materials to move about, such massive stones to heave, such beasts of prey to contend with, nor such beasts of burden to manage: therefore, though their strength be trifling in comparison with ours, it may be greater in proportion to the objects on which it is exerted, and sufficient to answer every useful purpose.

5. Besides, the parts of such a body being finer, and having fewer pores, its limbs and muscles will be so much the stronger and more active: this we find to be the case with all animals whose motions are unwieldy in proportion to their size. A little horse shifts its legs quicker than a tall one; the vulture and the eagle cannot flutter their wings so fast as the sparrow, and little men are generally the quickest in their motions. Imagine a race of giants, as big as Hampstead-

stead-Hill, placed on an earth where every thing else should be proportionably vast: they might have all the same provisions for their accommodation as we have, but could not make the same use of them from the slowness of their motions. If they sat down to dinner at eight in the morning, they would scarce have done by night, having a mile to carry every mouthful from the plate to their mouths; when they went to bed, it must take an hour to get up stairs, and after unbuttoning their coat, they must give their arm a swing of two or three miles round to pull down the sleeve behind; when they talked, it would require four or five seconds for their voices to reach one another's ears; and as their mental organs would perhaps be conformably dull, if you asked what o'clock it was, it might be necessary to consider half an hour before they could think of the proper answer. In short, they must needs be a slow, solemn, heavy generation, without any spark of wit or liveliness belonging to them. If one of us were enclosed in their enormous hulks, should we not, think ye, be glad to get back again into our less than six-foot bodies? And, by parity of reason, it may be presumed we shall be as much rejoiced to find ourselves got out of our present cumbersome bodies into our vehicular state, wherein we may dispatch as much business in a minute as we can now in an hour, and perhaps be able to read through Guicciardine in the time it now takes us to pore over all the nothings in a newspaper.

6. I have hitherto spoken of the vehicles as little diminutive men, with arms, legs, and so forth; but I do not think so narrowly of nature, as to pronounce with Epicurus, that she cannot form a reasonable creature unless in a human shape. It seems to me more agreeable to reason, at least more soothing to our hopes of bettering our condition, to suppose them not made in any particular shape, but consisting

sisting entirely of muscle, tough and strong, but extremely flexible, and capable of being cast into the shape of any animal; of being made soft as a feather, or hard as a bone. We find something like this in our own bodies. Our tongue lies round and yielding in our mouths, yet we can thrust it out to a considerable length, make it push with some force, or support a pretty large weight. If a man sits resting his leg carelessly on a stool, his calf will hang loose and flabby, like the handkerchief in your pocket; let him stand upright with a burden on his shoulders, as much as he can well bear, and you will find his calves hardened into very bones. We can open our hands into five moveable fingers, or we can close them into a kind of hammer for striking; or bend them into rigid hooks for pulling. We have but one wind-pipe to sing, to talk, to cry with, and to cast into as many various forms as the tones of voice we utter; whereas, were it necessary to have a different pipe for every articulate sound, our throats must have been made bigger than a chamber-organ. Again, the simplicity of our organs, not consisting of a multitude of parts, propagating their impulse from one to another, must greatly assist us in our operations. You may have a bell-handle hanging by your chimney-side, with which by means of strings and pulleys you may ring a bell at the other end of the house: but you cannot give it so many jirks up and down, to and fro, quick and gentle, as if you held the bell itself in your hand. In like manner, could we exert our activity immediately upon outward objects, without that long contrivance of strings and pulleys, bones, muscles, and tendons, we might manage them a hundred times more cleverly and expeditiously.

7. We may suppose the same flexibility to extend to the organs of sensation, which are only so many textures of net-work variously woven together. The retina of the eye, on which all visible objects are painted, takes its name from a net;

a net; the auditory nerves are represented to us, by anatomists, as expanded in a similar form at the bottom of the ear; and the same account is given of the olfactory and all the other nerves. Now, if we had power to change the position of our threads, what should hinder us from throwing them into any texture fitted to receive the vibrations exciting any sensation we pleased; so as to see, or hear, or taste, or smell, or feel, with the same organ, according to the qualities of external objects striking upon it? Here I must beg indulgence from modern delicacy, to allow me a childish experiment for explaining my idea. Boys at a certain age have an ingenious play they call cat's cradle; one ties the two ends of a pack-thread together, and then winds it about his fingers; another with both hands takes it off, perhaps in the shape of a gridiron; the first takes it from him again in another form, and so on, alternately changing the packthread into a multitude of figures whose names I forget, it being so many years since I played at it myself. So if we were able to construct the interior fibres of our little body like so many fingers, we might take off the exterior therewith, still shifting them from one set of fingers to another; sometimes in retinas, sometimes in auditory, or olfactory expansions, or perhaps others capable of conveying new sensations, of which we have no conception.

8. As to what may be the particular employments of the inhabitants of the vehicular state, it would be almost vain to conjecture. Nevertheless, we may try to form an idea of some of them. As their organs will be fitted for discerning minuter objects than we can now distinguish, they will have an opportunity of observing the motions of those subtle fluids, whereon gravitation, cohesion, magnetism, electricity, heat, vegetation, muscular motion, and sensation depend, which will furnish them with a new set of sciences. We find that light discovers to us the form and situation of bo-

dies at an immense distance; and when we reflect how extremely moveable and elastic the ether is known to be, we may conclude that no single particle of gross matter can stir without affecting its vibrations to a prodigious distance. This then may answer their purposes better than light does ours, and inform them accurately of the positions, distances, magnitudes, and motions of all the visible universe. From whence they will be able to attain a fuller knowledge of the author of nature, his greatness, goodness, and wisdom.

9. Nor can we deny them the means of mutual intercourse with one another. We cannot but suppose that such agile creatures, all nerve and sensory, may form characters upon their vehicles, or throw off little particles of fluids surrounding them, or find twenty other ways of communicating their thoughts. We may also suppose that they will have methods of transporting themselves from place to place, not in the manner we walk, by pushing our feet against the solid ground, but rather like the steerage of a ship, whose sails are set before or sidelong to the wind, receiving the direct or oblique impulse of the little streams of ether passing continually on all sides of them with such dextrous management, as never to be thrown out of their intended course. Among the variety of objects and ideas continually presenting themselves, it cannot be doubted but there will be some both of the agreeable and disagreeable kind, which will demand their care to procure the one and avoid the other. And if the immediate perception of evil be a necessary spur to action, they will not want examples of actual sufferings in some of their compatriots, who will come infirm and maimed into their world, by reason of the hurts received in this.

10. For when the vehicle gets loose from the body by death, it is not impossible but it may carry away with it some particles from the grosser nerves, to which it adhered.

Thus

Thus vicious courses may injure the little ethereal body, by crusting over its fibres with terrene concretions, rendering them stiff and useless, or by fixing too many gross elementary particles upon them, which must prove grievous hindrances and disturbances there; or stretching them beyond their strength with the eagerness of sensual appetites, so as to render them feeble like a strained sinew, or flaccid like a paralytic muscle. And we may easily comprehend how great a degree of pain may be inflicted in this way, when we reflect on the miserable condition of those wretches who are born into this world diseased, maimed, or imperfect, and how small a quantity of foreign matter is able to cause the greatest disturbances in our bodily frame. A grain or two of sand gives racking pain in the kidneys, a drop of rheum in our joints disables us from using them, and a little thickness in the blood fixes an incurable madness in the brain. So a similar foulness in the naked sensory, might overwhelm the soul with perpetual delusion and perplexity, tormenting fears and jealousies, intolerable horror and despair.

It must be evident to every one how much the tenor and condition of our lives, the strength and health of our bodies, and the faculties of our minds, depend upon what happens to us in the womb. The vehicle, lying so long enclosed in the body, to whose action it is constantly subject, must receive some alteration in its make and texture by this means: for every sensation and every idea passes through that in its way to the mind; and though each singly may affect it only for the present moment, yet by being often repeated they will work a durable effect. Just as if you press your nail against the back of your hand, the flesh will return to its natural smoothness as soon as you take it away, but if you do this for hours together every day, the skin will part asunder, and leave a dent between. So that every man goes out of the world with a differently modelled vehicle,

according as he has been a soldier or a scholar, a merchant or a mechanic, a gentleman or a labourer; according to the pursuits and expectations that have taken up his thoughts, to his successes and disappointments, his joys and afflictions, his occupations and amusements.

11. Thus we work out our future fortunes by our present behaviour, and fit ourselves unknowingly for the several parts we are to act upon the next stage, by practising those assigned us in this; so that we may look upon life as a necessary preparation to qualify us for the employments of another state. And I should regard this conclusion as more than hypothetical, if it were not for one objection occurring, which is the multitude of human souls passing directly into another state without touching upon this, and therefore incapable of receiving any such preparation. We may therefore suppose that the rational soul is completely formed before its entrance into the human body; and that the fashion and lineaments it takes by long habitation there are not necessary for its subsistence in the vehicular state, but preparations fitting it for some particular functions to be exercised there. Those who go without this preparation, will, however, be free from that terrene concretion, with all its consequent pains, disabilities, and mental disorders just now spoken of; and as they can do nothing to improve their future condition, so neither can they do any thing to injure it.

12. But whether we go prepared or unprepared, we shall all of us be children at our first entrance into the other world, and require the care of the old inhabitants to overlook and cherish us; so that we may suppose, the business of nurture, education, and parental fondness, will go on there as it does with us. Nor will they want a clue, if it were necessary, to guide them in their adoption of the new comers continually flocking in upon them, according to former

mer connections and relationships here on earth. Though neither my senses nor memory inform me of any such thing, by looking over a few scratches upon paper, I can tell what my friend was doing yesterday a hundred miles off, or what he thought of in his most retired meditations; and in this way we know what was done two thousand years ago, in the days of Scipio and Hannibal. This is indeed accomplished by the consent of mankind, affixing certain ideas to certain characters; but why may not the same intelligible language be exhibited by nature in the regular dependence of causes and effects; so that disembodied spirits having acuter faculties than ours, and having improved them by constant exercise, may know precisely what has happened from what they see happening; discover their own preexistence, trace out all that has befallen them in their former state, become acquainted with the history of mankind, learn from the manner and condition in which the new comers arrive from whence they come, and discern from a resemblance of features their connection with themselves. By these marks they may find out a wife, a child, a brother, a friend, a neighbour, or fellow-countryman; and, what is more than we could do, may distinguish their descendants, though they were never born, or were snatched away in the cradle. These discoveries must double their diligence in taking care of those who come helpless, or relieving those who come contaminated with such impure mixtures of their former composition as it is in their power to remove.

13. Thus I have attempted to give some faint idea of the state into which the soul will be thrown immediately after its separation from the body; but though the vehicle or finer organization survives the body, we cannot conclude from thence, that it will last for ever. On the contrary, I conceive that the action of the mind within, gradually distending and separating the fibres of the vehicle, they will at

length open, and let loose the enclosed spirit, which will then fly off naked and alone. But what means of perceiving and acting we may imagine pure spirit to possess, when totally disengaged from matter, and divested of all organization whatever, we shall reserve for the subject of the next chapter.

CHAP. XI.

MUNDANE SOUL.

When I consider Bishop Berkley's notion of the non-existence of all bodies, and that the appearances they seem to exhibit are only perceptions raised in our imagination by the Divine Power, I cannot help wondering that he did not go farther, and deny the existence of all spirits too; for we have no better evidence of the one than of the other. If when I see the sun rise in the morning, ascend to the meridian, and set again in the evening, trees buffeted about by the wind, or rivers rolling along their foamy waves, the whole be nothing more than a succession of ideas in my own mind; by the same rule, when I behold my friend enter the room, and hear him talk on various subjects, I may be alone all the while, and what I take for the sound of his voice, is nothing but a like succession of ideas excited in me by the same power that excited those of the sun, the trees, and the rivers, in the former case. So that it would follow, that possibly there may be no more than two beings in nature, God and myself. Thus, if we give way to the suggestions of a lively fancy, and think ourselves warranted to take every thing for granted, the contrary of which cannot be mathematically demonstrated, we shall never know where to stop. But as these notions are apt to hang on the minds of the speculative, there is no better way to cure ourselves of them entirely, than by setting up opposite notions equally possible, and equally incapable of being demonstratively disproved. If it cannot be made appear with absolute certainty that there is that multitude of objects existing without us, which we daily see and handle, neither on the other hand can it be proved that there are not multitudes of sentient

beings in the composition of every man. We are so little acquainted with the nature of spirits, that we cannot tell how a number of them, lying contiguous, without any bars of flesh intervening, would affect one another: perhaps a perception raised in any one of them, would spread instantly through them all quicker than fire does among the grains of gunpowder. In this case there may be many spirits contained in one sensory: nor is there any need the corporeal organs should act upon them all, for whatever sensations are impressed upon each of them, will immediately be perceived by the whole number. Instead therefore of being the sole inhabitant of the universe, as I might persuade myself on Berkley's principles, I may not even be the sole inhabitant of my own brain, but one member of a most numerous family lodged there. Nor let it be objected, that it is much I should know nothing of my fellow lodgers, if there were such multitudes of us together in one chamber; for only receiving the same perceptions from my companions which they first received from matter, I should have no means of distinguishing the one from the other. Neither can the probable want of unanimity among so many be made an objection; for having constantly the same ideas, the same appearances, the same motives presented to us, there would be no room for opposition. When our stomach grew empty, we should all at the same instant feel its cravings; if a well-spread table were set before us, having the same palate, we should all be inclined to stretch out our hands towards the same dish; and thus we should proceed in all our measures with such excellent harmony, that neither ourselves nor any body else would be aware of the difference. As such a notion is not likely now a-days to raise one to preferment (though it might have done this at the time that disputes ran high upon original sin, when a man might have risen to be a a cardinal, by demonstrating that the spirits of all men were contained

contained in the brain of Adam, and of all women in that of Eve, and so were actual partakers of their guilt) I may even reject it as an idle fancy fit only to be opposed to the no less idle fancy of Berkeley, that all about us is mere idea and delusion. However, it has furnished me with a hint for understanding that old notion of a soul of the world in such a manner as to make it a fit receptacle for our spirits to be absorbed in, after they leave the vehicular state.

2. The doctrine of a soul of the world, otherwise called the mundane or universal soul, must be acknowledged of very ancient date, as old as the Ionic philosophy; and seems to have been embraced by the most eminent sages of antiquity. They held it eternal, immutable, completely wise and happy, extending throughout the universe, penetrating and invigorating all things, the maker of the world and all creatures, the fountain of sense, life, and motion, from whence the souls of men and animals were discerped, and after dissolution of their bodies, absorbed in it again: and they gave it the appellation of God. Their calling it by this name has made it generally believed that they intended the Supreme Being; so Pope understood them when he talked of "one stupendous whole, whose body nature is, and God the soul." But I apprehend the mundane soul originally was not understood of the Supreme Being, but a created God, dependent on him for its existence and faculties; and though it was supposed the maker, it was not supposed the Creator of all things, but to have formed the world out of pre-existent materials according to a plan assigned it. The ancients, even those who held the unity of the first cause, did not, like us, appropriate the term God to him alone, but applied it to other beings of an order and intelligence superior to man. That it is not so restrained when applied to the mundane soul, appears from the Timæus of Plato.

3. However,

3. However, there is one objection to their theory, for we find them speaking of the mundane soul as one entire thing, or mind But this will confound the distinction of particular souls, for they were not created upon their discerption, their substance already existing in the universal soul; therefore, before their discerption, they must have existed there as so many distinct individuals, or they could not have become so by being separated from it; as we have already seen that one individual cannot be made into any other individual, much less into many others. Now, without troubling ourselves to conjecture how the ancients would have removed this objection, I shall lay down that the mundane soul is one no otherwise than as the sea is one, by a similitude and contiguity of parts, being composed of an innumerable host of distinct spirits as that is of aqueous particles: and as the rivers continually discharge themselves into the sea, so the vehicular people, on the disruption of their vehicles, discharge and incorporate themselves into the ocean of spirits making the mundane soul.

4. We have found reason to conclude, in the course of this work, that all created spirit, as well as all matter, is homogenous; and as bodies receive their differences and secondary qualities from the various forms and combinations into which the atoms composing them are thrown, so spirits derive their characters and various faculties from the organizations to which they are united; so that the spirit of an angel, of a statesman, a shoe-black, an idiot, a man and a child, are intrinsically the same, differing only in their being variously lodged and circumstanced. Hence it follows, that the spirits composing the universal soul are all of similar nature, having the same powers, and altogether such as ourselves, except these bonds of flesh in which we are imprisoned. But since we receive all our perceptions from our corporeal organization, and

have

have no sensations but what come to us through the windows of our prison, it remains to inquire what perceptions we can have after being totally disunited from matter. As we live here each immured in his separate cell, we have nothing to discern besides the modifications of our organs in the sensory, nor can we converse together but by the intervention of some bodily medium, as of sound or letters; but if we could throw open the doors of our cell, and hold immediate intercourse with one another, who can say how much more expeditiously and clearly we might carry on our conversations? Perhaps whatever either of us saw, or heard, or conceived of might instantly be discerned by the other. Or perhaps we might select what perceptions we thought proper to impart, and keep the others to ourselves; as in conversation a man is not obliged to utter all he knows, but communicates such of his thoughts as he judges worth hearing by the company. Suppose then that being myself in London I have a friend at Plymouth, another at Paris, another at Amsterdam, and that there is a string of spirits reaching from every one of us to all the rest. Having these channels of conveyance ready, we should despise the tedious method of correspondence by the post, for our intermediate friends in the different lines of communication might transmit all that any of us saw or heard in any of the four places together with our observations thereon with a precision, clearness, and vigour equal to that with which we discerned them ourselves. Now it is no very violent assumption to suppose that all space not occupied by matter is replete with spiritual substance, each part whereof, that is, each component spirit, lies contiguous to others: so that there is a continuity in the whole mass, the same as in the waters of the ocean; for lines might be drawn from any drop in the Atlantic sea to every point of the European, African, and American shores surrounding it,

it, which should pass along rows of drops contiguous to one another. Thus by the mutual communication of perceptions every individual of the mundane soul may feel those impressed on every other.

5. We have already seen that a multitude of objects does not necessarily produce distraction of ideas. Cæsar could dictate to three amanuenses at once, and call all the Roman citizens by their names. When we have as many visible objects before us as we can attend to without confusion, we may still perceive a sound or idea conveyed by any other sense very distinctly. So that it is the scantiness of our organs that sets limits to our understanding; nor can we tell what our mental faculties may be capable of, when exerted alone. But though we may suppose it much larger than any thing we have experienced or can imagine, there is no need to suppose it infinite. Each spirit may impart such perceptions to his neighbour as he knows will be useful or convenient to him; and every one having all the knowledge he wants may be styled completely knowing, though he does not absolutely know every thing. Thus the parts of the universal soul will serve for organs to each other, conveying perceptions instantaneously from the most distant parts of nature, and distributing to every one whatever information it concerns him to receive. And though I do not imagine they will all have the same parts to act, for these must vary according to their several situations, they will contribute their respective shares towards carrying on the general system of the world with perfect unanimity, the bodies dispersed up and down through nature probably serving them for the instruments of action instead of limbs.

6. The learned tell us, that all attraction is owing to the repulsion of the ether, or some subtle fluid pressing on the outsides of bodies and forcing them together: but having thus resolved attraction into impulse, what if we are asked the

the cause of the latter? For a cause it certainly requires, since matter cannot act by its own energy. We have observed before that there is a prodigious consumption of force every moment, occasioned by the collision and pressure of bodies throughout the universe; and where shall we seek for a fund for repairing these continual decays of motion? Since then we find in ourselves a power of giving impulse to matter, and since all matter must lie within the reach of some spirit contiguous to it, why need we scruple to suppose it acted upon in the same manner by it as we act upon our motory fibres? Thus we may assign spiritual substance for the first of second causes from whose action the repulsion of ether, whence all other material agents derive their vigour, begins; by whose ministry the laws of nature are exerted, the continual decays of motion repaired, the world and all things kept in order. Nor will the admission of such a power derogate from our idea of the Supreme Being. For since all material and spiritual substances received their existence, their powers and properties from him, and not a particle of either stirs but by his appointment, they are to be regarded only as instruments in his hands, and whatever mighty works they perform ascribed ultimately to him.

7. As to the force a single spirit may exert, we have no method of ascertaining what this may be. We can indeed lift heavy weights, but this, it has been shewn, we do not do by our own strength merely, for we receive considerable assistance from our animal circulation: yet we must begin the motion upon some little nerve or fibre to pull up the valve for letting in the vital stream upon our muscles; and therefore the force we impart must be something. But however small this force may be, or limited the sphere of our activity, this will be no reason why a multitude of us acting together may not perform mighty feats upon huge masses

masses of matter. For we know the efficacy of union to produce strength out of weakness, as well in the works of human industry as of nature. When a number of men are disciplined to act at one signal, what masses can they not move, what achievements can they not perform? We know of few things weaker than water or more yielding than air; yet what havoc do storms and inundations make merely by the combined force of little particles, thousands of which one might blow away with a breath! How feebly does one grain of sand attract another, so that it is not discoverable by the nicest experiments; yet it is the aggregate of such attractions from all the grains in all the earth that holds down the moon in her orbit. The action of innumerable spirits may therefore suffice to hold the particles of bodies together in the strongest cohesion, or may dart them along when detached from one another with a proportionable rapidity: so that we shall not want a cause for the velocity of light, the vibrations of ether, or any of the swiftest motions that human sagacity has yet discovered.

8. An objection may be started against the possibility of what I have here supposed from the doctrine that action and reaction are always reciprocal, and opposite. But though this rule holds good with respect to bodies, it does not necessarily follow that it prevails between body and spirit, the one acting by impulse, and the other by volition: nor have we reason to think it does from any thing happening to us in our common actions. We feel our limbs move and the outer parts of our body, but we feel no resistance from the inner fibres we employ in moving them. And this consideration may obviate a difficulty concerning the laboriousness of those tasks we have assigned the universal soul, which may be thought incompatible with the enjoyment of perfect happiness. For there is nothing operose

or

or toilsome in volition: the mind is never tired of willing so long as the limbs are not tired of executing, and therefore there can be neither weariness nor satiety in the actions of pure spirits.

9. Thus we may look upon the mundane soul as having one understanding, one design, and one volition, and as having one body, the material world, which is the organ through which it receives sensations, and the instrument by which it acts, altogether making one compound, as the human soul and body make one man. This soul of the world will have a full discernment of all its parts with their combinations, proportions, situations, and uses; nor will any thing however minute escape his notice, for not being confined like us to one little cell in the brain, where we know nothing of the many secretions, circulations, and other actions passing in our frame, but his spirit insinuating and penetrating every where, not an atom can stir without his knowledge and observation. In him as parts are contained all the powers that men can imagine concerned in the phenomena of nature or affairs of mankind: and we might call so much of his substance as actuates the motions and operations of different worlds the god or angel of the sun, the god of the moon, of Saturn, of Jupiter, or the other planets; and so much of it as surrounds every particular man may be called his guardian angel. Yet I would not suppose the same particles of spiritual substance to attend the moving bodies throughout their progress, but to transmit them to others having the same dispositions, purposes, and active powers, so that there will not be the least irregularity in their courses. For we divide the ocean into seas, gulphs, and bays, the waters of which are continually changing, and those which compose the German sea to-day may be the British Channel to-morrow, the Bay of Biscay the next day, and afterwards

wards the Mediterranean: and as the wake of a ship, by which I think the sailors understand the stream drawn after the stern by its motion, follows it through the whole voyage, yet consists every moment of different waters, so wherever a man goes he may always have his guardian angel about him, the same in kind, character, and ability, but not a moment together the same in personal identity. Nor need it be wondered that the courses of nature should go on so steadily as they do, if guided by a number of voluntary agents, some of whom we might imagine would proceed in a manner different from others, because we find them do so among ourselves: for having all the same clear and comprehensive views of things, they cannot be subject to those sudden starts and wanton sallies which too often take our own fancy, (for this would occasion strange irregularities in the visible world,) but must be best pleased with that regular scene of contemplation exhibited by the stated laws of nature, and with contributing all in their power towards preserving them entire. Therefore though these superior beings have the power, if they chose, to raise dreadful phantoms, or rattle chains in our ears, or terrify us with horrid dreams, and work all the feats that have been ascribed to witchcraft and witches, we need be in no fear of their performing any such childish pranks. To entertain these apprehensions of them would be as idle a fear as if upon our most intimate friend entering the house, we should distress ourselves lest he might steal a silver spoon, or take some sly opportunity to spoil our furniture: and we ought to be as backward in giving credit to reports of these supernatural appearances as we should be in believing any one who told us he saw a group of persons of the highest dignity and most venerable character playing at taw together in the street, or robbing an orchard, or practising the mischievous tricks of an unlucky school-boy.

10. Though

10. Though I do not suppose the mundane soul contiguous with our own, (for there must be certain bars and obstacles to separate us, or we should be identified with him, and partake of his knowledge) yet he may be so with the outside of our sensory, and by observing the motions there, and knowing from what operations they proceed, he may read our thoughts as familiarly as we read one another's thoughts in a letter. And if evil be necessary in nature, as we may conclude from its admission into it, it may be confined to the animal and vehicular states; and the inhabitants of the world of pure spirits, merely by perusing our sensories, may attain the knowledge of evil without actual suffering. Perhaps our interests may furnish the universal soul with a principal part of his employment, for being completely happy and placed out of the reach of evil, he may have nothing to desire for himself, and nothing to do but exert his power and contrivance in lessening the burdens and enhancing the enjoyment of others; so that the highest spirits may be constantly attendant on the services of man, not on account of his great importance, but because he is the only poor creature that wants their assistance.

11. Having given the fullest account I was able of this exalted being, the head and principal of all created natures, let us now consider how well he deserves the glorious things said of him in former times. And first we need not scruple to admit him for the maker of the world, or agent employed in executing that stupendous work; for penetrating into every pore of material substance, being all intelligence and activity throughout, he might discern all the particles in chaos, if ever there was one, know what they were severally fit for, assort them into elements, and of them compose habitable earths. On the word given, Let there be light; he might twist the sevenfold rays, and dart them about in

all directions, or upon a second word collect the main body of them into a sun. He might give the heavy planets their circular motion by one strong and exactly poised stroke He might gather the waters from the dry land, having first scooped out the capacious bed of ocean, and raised the other parts, lest the diurnal rotation should cast up the sea above them. He might give the earth a twirl as easily as a child twirls round his top, and produce the vicissitudes of day and night. He might thrust the poles askance "twice ten degrees and more," that summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, should never fail. He might draw out strings of viscous juices from the ground, and perforating them into tubes, and interlacing them artfully together, compose therewith the tree yielding fruit after his kind, and the herb after his kind, whose seed is in itself. He might form the dust of the earth into animal organizations, with proper members for walking, or flying, or creeping, or swimming, as soon as the breath of life should be breathed into them; and extracting the finer particles from the grosser might work them into mental organs and sensensories, fit for the reception of spirits to be created for them, who should begin the race of men upon earth. He would still continue to turn the grand wheel of repulsion, that first mover in the wondrous machine of visible nature, till the fulness of time being come, or the signal given from the throne of glory, the same agent will rend the mighty fabric asunder; throw the parts of compounds out of their order, dissipate them with a sudden explosion, and reduce all back into chaos again. From whence, upon a new plan assigned, new systems may be formed, new earths stretched out, new vegetables and animals produced to cover and inhabit them.

12. Again, we need not doubt but that this exalted being will be unspeakably happy; or if any particles of evil should

be sprinkled upon him by the contemplation of the miserable creatures in the two embodied states, they would be so overwhelmed by the joys flowing in upon him from other sources, that he would feel no more disturbance at them than a man, who had just received news of some great good fortune, would feel upon happening to break a China saucer.—This host of happy spirits, called by one name, the universal soul, from their uniformity of action and sentiment, we suppose the receptacle for particular spirits, as they disengage themselves from their union with matter: so that upon the disruption of a vehicle, the communication with spiritual substance being thus opened, it will immediately partake in all the knowledge and designs of its neighbours, and take its share in their operations according to the station in which it happens to be placed. Leaving the traces of its former memory behind, it will have the records of the universal sensory to inspect, wherein the remembrance of events happening in nature is preserved more fully and exactly than it can be in any animal organization. Thus there will be no infancy or growth of faculties or advancement in learning in this state, but the new comers on their first arrival will stand upon the same footing with the old members, as if they had always resided among them. As they act in concert in carrying on one plan of operation, the act of all will seem the act of every one, and each feel a personal interest in what is performed by the whole society. For, as among men, concurring heartily in one undertaking, all claim the merit to themselves; as the majority at an election exult as much as if the choice had depended on their single votes, and a tradesman at a coffee-house triumphs in a victory, and thinks himself entitled to say, We have beat the enemy, because he pays some trifle towards the expense, and is a member of the nation whose cause he espouses; so the

members of this mighty agent, the universal soul, will partake in the joy of those stupendous works carried on by their united strength. For all contributing their activity to roll the celestial orbs in their appointed courses, to diffuse light through the universe, to keep the elements in order, to produce and preserve the several species of plants and animals, to direct the affairs of men and turn the wheels of fortune, to fulfil invariably the will of Providence, and execute the mighty plan assigned them, the pleasures of the whole will be felt by every one, as if he had been the sole agent employed.

13. With all these sources of enjoyment, the contemplation of universal nature, the science of all operations as well in the largest as in the minutest bodies, the possession of an enlarged understanding and perfect reason, the assurance of immortality, the constant occupation without labour or difficulty in the most magnificent, delightful, and important works, the consciousness of acting invariably right, and a clear conception of the divine attributes, we need seek no higher, but may take this for our idea of heaven. This spiritual community being heaven, and all space not occupied by matter being replete with spiritual substance, it follows that heaven is not local, but every where, around, above, below, and within us; filling not only the starry regions, but the air, the earth, and the seas, and penetrating the pores of all compound bodies. Therefore our being out of heaven is not owing to our distance from it, but to our being pent up in walls of flesh which cut off all communication with it. We are like persons enclosed each in a sentry-box, having all the chinks and crannies stopped that might let in the least light or sound, and in this condition set down among the splendid throng in a full ridotto: they would be alone in the midst of company, and could know nothing of the gaiety and diversions around them.

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If they had strings reaching to one another's boxes, they might make signs by them, learn in time to understand one another's motions, and carry on a sort of conversation together; but very imperfectly in comparison of what they could do if let out and permitted to converse like other people. So we, while imprisoned in this gross body, see little and know little of all that passes around us, and converse together imperfectly by the help of sights and sounds. Upon the dissolution of this body, we may find an inner integument still clinging to us; but when we shall be released from that too, we shall not have far to travel before we join our company: for, wherever our vehicle leaves us, there we shall find heaven, and take our place and occupation therein immediately, without any of that surprise or awkwardness, or agitation, usually thrown upon us by scenes wholly new, but with the same readiness and familiarity as a man coming off a journey feels, having his own house, his own family, his own furniture, and conveniencies about him; for we shall then understand and apprehend not by our old ideas, but by those of the universal mind, and partake in the expertness and full remembrance belonging to that.

14. As to the common notion of a resurrection in the same form and substance we carry about with us at present, the various ways in which it has been explained, and the many difficulties raised against them all, sufficiently declare it untenable: and the reason ordinarily given, because the body being partaker in the deed ought to share in the reward or punishment, as well requires a resurrection of the sword a man murders with, or the bank-note he gives to charitable uses: for our mind is the sole agent, and our hands are as much instruments as any thing we hold in them.

15. I know of but one exception that can be taken against the idea here stated, which is, that it leaves no room for

the several spirits to differ in their degrees of happiness as one star differs from another star in glory. But since the communication of perceptions which constitutes their happiness is voluntary, whoso pleases may suppose them communicated in different measures to every one according to his deserts, as we give more or less countenance to different persons in the same company in proportion to our esteem for them. Yet I should rather chuse to interpret what is said of the different degrees of happiness as relating to an intermediate state, than admit any particular distinctions among the most perfect of created beings.

16. I have now offered what I had to say on the condition of our intermediate and final states after we leave this life. My intention was to give a livelier idea of some important truths, which I think discoverable from our observation of nature and knowledge of the divine attributes, than we could have of them while they remained in general and abstract terms; namely, that there may be life, enjoyment, and action out of this body; that there are other beings to whom what appears useless to us may be serviceable; and that whatever befalls us here, though seemingly nugatory or hurtful, will turn to our account some time or other. So far as any one shall find what I have here suggested answer this purpose, and impress more strongly upon his imagination, or display in more sensible colours what he knew before to be true, I shall be glad he will attend to me: for I do not propose my scheme as an article of faith, and desire to prove nothing by hypothesis; nor am I so wedded to it, but that if any thing contained in it can be shewn contradictory to the judgments of sound reason, or hurtful to the mind or good manners, I shall be the foremost to reject it.

CHAP. XII.

THE VISION.

Speciosa dehine miracula promat,
Antiphaten, Scyllamque, et cum Cyclope Charybdin.

ONE day, after having my thoughts intent all the morning on the subject of the two foregoing chapters, I went out in the evening to a neighbour's house, to recreate myself with a game at cards. After some time spent in this amusement, we sat down to supper, during which, according to the English custom, we began to settle the affairs of the nation, particularly that important point now in agitation, a Spanish war, on which we could not come to a satisfactory decision. Under this difficulty, and finding that our own politicians could not agree, we wished for some of those to extricate us, of whom we had read such wonders in former times, the Godolphins, the Burleighs, and the Walsinghams. This turned the discourse upon necromancy, and leaving the national concerns, which we believed would go on full as well without us, every one fell to considering how he should gratify his curiosity, if he were possessed of that art, what persons he would evoke from the shades, and what questions he should put to them. One was for seeing his relations and friends again; another for a tete-a-tete with Elizabeth, or Mary queen of Scots; others were for calling up Belisarius, Cicero, Archimedes, Alexander, and the heroes and sages of antiquity. Being thus led to think of the old philosophers, we proceeded to discuss some of their peculiar doctrines, though we should have been better pleased to have heard them explained by themselves, or to have known some particulars concerning

their employments, and manner of living in the regions they now inhabit. With conversation of this kind, partly serious, and partly jocose, we passed the time till the company parted. When I came home, finding it not my hour of bedtime, and being unwilling to fatigue my spirits with any thing like study, I walked to and fro in my chamber, giving my thoughts a liberty to run as they listed. I found ideas start up promiscuously in my mind, chiefly made up of what I had thought of in the morning or heard in the evening, introducing each other by any slight connection in those wanton assemblages customary with imagination when judgment throws the reins upon her neck. In this manner I continued to be amused while undressing, and till I laid myself down upon my pillow; when, having neither crudities, nor crying sins, nor debts, nor hopes of preferment, nor schemes of cajoling a county, or buying a borough, to break my rest, I presently fell fast asleep.

2. I cannot tell how soon afterwards it happened, but methought something broke on a sudden in my head, in the manner I have heard described in an apoplectic fit. Instantly I found my limbs and all my outer parts benumbed, so that I had no feeling left in them; yet still I had a feeling of my muscles, whose motions I could distinguish plainer than before. But this lasted only for a moment, for the muscles quickly lost their feeling too: thus my sense seemed gradually to retire inwards, and as it withdrew, sensation seemed always to reside in the extremities of those parts with which I still retained a connection, and to convey perceptions from them which it had not done while it had any to convey from others beyond them. Just as a man gazing at a distant prospect overlooks things close before him, but if clouds intercept his view, his eye contracts, and presents him with a distinct view of those lying nearer. The last thing I perceived was, that I seemed clinging to something

something hard like a stick, much in the condition of a man who hangs by both his hands clasped round the bough of a tree; only with this difference, that what I clung to moved with a prodigious swiftness, and dragged me along after it. Not liking to be hurried on, I knew not whither, with such impetuosity, I let go my hold, when instantly the stick slipping away, left me behind utterly destitute of all sense and perception.

3. How long I remained in this state of total insensibility I know not; but was first roused out of it by something brushing along nimbly by me. This set my ideas afloat again; and though they appeared very obscure and confused, like those of a man not half awake, I had discernment enough to persuade me that I was now a defunct; that the stick I had clung to was that part of my human composition to which I had been vitally united; which, as I afterwards learned, being carried rapidly on with the annual motion of the earth, had left me on quitting my hold, or in other words, that I was actually departed into the other world. Believing then that the brushes I received were to be the first rudiments in laying the foundation of my future understanding, I made one strong effort at random, to catch hold of whatever occasioned them, that I might feel what it was made of. Immediately I seemed to stretch out a hundred arms all around me, but with no better success than a man who should thrust his arms out at a window, while the bricklayers were sweeping down tiles, brickbats, and mortar from the gutters above him; for I felt my limbs knocked about incessantly with a shower of hard balls, which, besides hurting me grievously, turned me round and round by the violence of their strokes, as chaff is whisked about in a whirlwind. I do not know what might have been the consequence, if I had not presently perceived something

something take hold of me and draw me aside from this troublesome stream of bullets: but as some of them still struck against my fingers, I judged it prudent to draw in my arms, and give myself up to the management of my new protector.

4. I was glad to find I had no bruises remaining from the blows I had received: but soon a new desire started up in my mind, of seeing what it was that took so friendly a care of me. On the first effort, I saw little flashes of light sparkling and vanishing again on all sides of me, together with various objects, but all indistinct. After repeated trials, I found I could form a set of optics, but they would return back again almost as soon as I had thrust them out; till by a little farther practice, I learned to keep them steady, so as to observe any thing before me. I then beheld a kind of sack or bag, filled out like a bladder with air, from one part of which there came out the arm which held me, and from another a longish neck, with a head upon it, having a meagre lank-jawed face, very like the prints I have seen before some editions of Locke's works. It looked upon me stedfastly, with a mild and benign aspect; and the lips moved as in speaking. My whole attention and desire being now bent upon hearing, my eyes sunk in directly, and left me in the dark; but I heard a confused jumble of whispers, short, broken, and inarticulate at first; yet that did not discourage me, believing I should manage better by degrees, as I had done in the use of my sight. Accordingly, I could soon distinguish my own name repeated; which surprised me agreeably to find I was among friends. How's this! thinks I to myself, that the retired Ned Search, scarce known to twenty people in the other world, should be so well known here, that the first person he meets accosts him by name! It must certainly be some old acquaintance whose

whose face I have forgotten, come here before me. Sure it can never be really John Locke himself, sown up here in a sack for his sins; for he died before I was born.

5. At length after some more struggles, my good friend perceiving me prepared for an audience, addressed me as follows: Welcome, Ned Search, into the vehicular state; you are in the hands of one who is not an utter stranger to you, though not your cotemporary: for know, that I am John Locke, with whose writings you are not unacquainted. I have observed a faint resemblance in your way of thinking with mine, which, though mingled with a great diversity of character, has given me a family kindness for you. I was apprised of your being to make a visit here, and came this way on purpose to assist you. It is natural to suppose I wanted very much to thank him for his kind offers and assistance. But I knew not how to express myself. My business now was to attain the use of speech; which I no sooner attempted, than I found myself in possession of mouths and tongues innumerable. I was yet so inexpert in my faculties, that I could exercise no more than one at a time. So not being able to talk and hear what I said at the same time, I strained all my mouths to make as much noise as possible, that I might be sure of being heard; like those disputants, who make up for their want of sense by their vehemence and vociferation. At last, returning to my listening again, (for I suspected my pronunciation might be somewhat defective), I heard my good friend laughing most immoderately; and when his mirth was over, Prithee, Ned, says he, what didst thou make those hideous mouths at me for? If you could have seen yourself, you would have been frightened. I guessed indeed by your gaping, that you wanted to speak to me; but not a single word did you utter. You do not consider that we do not talk by the mouth in this country; and if I showed you one in my face, it was only

only to excite a desire of conversing with me, because I knew you had no notion of any other way of speaking. Look at me once more, and observe how I manage: but contrive if you can to hold out an ear at the same time. Nay, says he, do not stand staring me in the face, you will learn nothing there: look down upon my vehicle. I did so: and observed little fibres bouncing up and down with wonderful agility in a kind of network, consisting of variously shaped meshes. I can liken them to nothing so well as the little wrinkles in the skin on the top of warm milk set in the window to cool, only they moved much quicker, and with a more tremulous motion. There, says he, that is our way of talking: try if you can copy the style.

6. I tried and tried again with might and main, but all to no purpose: for though I found myself all over in agitation like a Quaker when the spirit pours plentifully upon him, yet not a single sound or whisper could I get out. My good patron saw my distress, and laid a little innocent plot to relieve me. On a sudden his head changed to the form of a lion's, with great gaping jaws full of monstrous fangs; and he shot out twenty paws, armed with claws as sharp as a needle. I was horribly frighted at this unexpected freak in a friend and a philosopher, which I took for a fit of phrensy that had seized him. I exerted all my strength, and cried out O! with a more violent scream than that with which Belinda rent the affrighted skies when the rape was made upon her lock. Very well, says he, with a smile, and resuming his benign human countenance, now we have broken the ice, we shall go on swimmingly: you will not be angry with me for frightening you into a scholar, when I could not teach you to be one. But do me the favour to try whether you cannot repeat your O without being in a passion: you need not bawl it out quite so vehemently as you did just now. My terror had left so strong an impression

sion on my fancy, that I had a clear idea of every little motion it had occasioned within me; I found I could say O in cool blood as often as I pleased, and with as careless a tone as a very polite congregation, while adjusting their dress or thinking of their routs, where that little particle occurs in the responses of the Litany. Courage! my boy, says the preceptor, now you are perfect in O, we shall soon teach you A, E, I, and U; but you must ply close to your lesson, and follow my directions exactly. You know that our faculties assist one another: therefore try now to thrust out a neck and a head, with a pair of eyes and ears to it, that you may see yourself speak. I obeyed orders; and turning my face downwards, saw that I was made just like my neighbour: both like two tortoises, only enclosed in bags instead of shells. Bravely done, says Locke. Why you perform as dextrously as if you had served an apprenticeship. This is an advantage attending us who have used ourselves to reflection; for most of those who come from the other world have a great stiffness in their necks; they can see any thing sooner than themselves. I afterwards discovered the internal fibres or first instruments I had to act upon: but this did not hinder me from making frequent mistakes in touching the wrong ones. If I went to stretch out an arm, I should sometimes loll out a tongue: if I wanted to form an ear, I should kick with a foot; if I endeavoured to look earnestly at an object, I should find a mathematical problem start up in my imagination. So I resolved to have recourse to my instructor to teach me the proper command of my faculties, beginning with that of speech.

7. It would be tedious to relate all the particular lessons he gave me: suffice it to say, he proceeded much in the same manner we teach children to read, insructing me first how to form the sound of letters, then syllables, and afterwards

wards words. We have, says he, another language among us, we call the sentient in distinction from the vocal, in which I have been speaking to you. This is carried on by applying our vehicles close to one another, and raising certain figures or motions on our outsides, which excite the same ideas in our neighbour that gave rise to them in ourselves, making him, as it were, feel our thoughts. This is a much completer way of conversing, but difficult of acquisition; and as you have now gotten possession of one language, that will be sufficient to answer every purpose while you stay here.

8. It is easy to guess what was the first use I made of my voice, as soon as I acquired the full management of it: the polite reader's imagination will suggest, better than I can relate, what fine speeches I made to thank my benefactor for the pains he had graciously bestowed upon me, to express the joy I felt on hearing I had a particular share in his favour, &c. Truce with your compliments, says he; we deal but little in that coin in this land of sincerity: we find an immediate pleasure in doing good, so want not the spur of applause to instigate us. But lest you should think the liking I have taken to you only a sudden fancy that may wear off again, be assured I look upon you as a relation. You know I had no children upon earth. I beg pardon, says I, for interrupting you: but though you left no issue of your body, you had a more prolific head than Jupiter; the whole body of sound reasoners in the nation I came from derives from you. No, no, says he, that is not the way I make out the relationship. I trace it from a higher stock.

Pythagoras, you know, was the first among those who applied themselves to the study of nature, who prevailed to have the name of wise man, given them by the vulgar, changed into that of lover of wisdom, by which he took upon

upon himself the character of a person assiduously employed in the search after knowledge, without ever pretending to have attained it completely. Thus he became the father and founder of philosophy; and his descendants for a while preserved the same character. But soon after, some among them not satisfied with these modest pretensions to wisdom, thought proper to give themselves an air of positiveness and self-sufficiency, set up for oracles, issued their *ipse dixits* like the edicts of an emperor, and reassumed that claim to wisdom which he had taken so much pains to reject.

Thenceforward the family became divided into two branches, the Searches and the Knowalls. The former, retaining the spirit of their ancestor, were perpetually searching after knowledge, without ever thinking they had enough; docile, humble, and modest; willing to learn of any body, and ready to communicate whatever they knew; desirous of reputation, only as it might gain them the better hearing; and wishing to be believed no farther than they could offer reasons convincing to the hearer. On the contrary, the Knowalls, confident of their abilities, soon thought themselves masters of whatever they undertook; they scorned to examine their principles minutely, as betraying a want of genius and penetration; assuming, peremptory, and overbearing; proving every thing by demonstration, or expecting their word should be taken in lieu of demonstration; impatient of contradiction themselves, and delighted to overthrow all who but seemed to differ from them. This branch produced the Sophists of Greece, the Academics of after times, who would maintain the pro and con upon any subject proposed, the Schoolmen and Popish doctors, and many other sects.

The Search branch, not fond of putting themselves forward, have scarce ever composed any sect, but lie scattered up and down, minding their own business quietly in their

several

several stations. To this branch belong those who have made any real improvement in the arts or sciences; or those who, wanting abilities to strike out improvements of their own, endeavour fairly to understand and make a good use of those imparted to them by others. For many of the Searches have very moderate parts; on the other hand, we often find shining talents among the Knowalls, but then they only seek to shine with them, and it is well if they do not turn them to mischievous purposes.

9. I need not therefore use much flattery to persuade you of your being a relation: for it is not brightness of parts, nor extent of learning, but an honest industrious temper, a cautious freedom of inquiry, and sobriety of understanding, that characterize our line. However, to speak my mind freely, you have pursued your Light of nature in a manner not always very suitable to my taste: you have a great many more flights than ever I pretended to. I should never have thought of likening the human machine sometimes to a mill, sometimes to a study hung round with bells, sometimes to a chamber-organ; much less should I have ventured to introduce the carpenter, or the cook making a plumb pudding, into a metaphysical discourse, or brought a cat to assist in an optical experiment. But whatever faults you have, since I discern the attentive prying eye, the modest brow, the serene countenance, and flexible neck of the Searches, and find you here in the helpless condition of a new-born babe, it raises a kind of paternal instinct towards you. And for my part, said I, I feel myself possessed with a filial reverence and gratitude. I begin to wish I had not taken notice of your annexing the faculty of thinking to a system of matter; I am afraid you think me an ungracious boy, but indeed it was nothing but my zeal to defend the spirituality of the mind, that led me to contradict you. Oh! says he, you need make no apology. We Searches are the

last

last people to take offence at any body for differing from us. I assure you, I do not think a whit the worse of you on that account; neither do I absolutely blame you for your sallies of imagination; for I know every one must follow the bent of his genius. To do otherwise would be like dancing in fetters: but I doubt you have been dabbling with the French and Italian authors. As to the French and Italians, said I, I never had much notion of them. I rather endeavour to form my taste in matters of humour from our cousin Addison. But I cannot yet be quite out of conceit with my flightiness; because, but for that perhaps I had not enjoyed the pleasure of your conversation here, nor ever seen that lion's face of your's, which first made me a spokesman in the vehicular language. Besides, if I remember right, your great uncle Plato gives large scope to imagination, and introduces images as low as the carpenter, the cook, or the cat, in many of his dialogues. Nay, I have been told by Prince Maurice's parrot, that you yourself were not utterly averse to the familiar and the marvellous. You are a saucy Jack, says he, smiling, to come over me thus with my parrot. But I related no more than I believed myself; you tell stories that no mortal can believe.

10. After this I begged leave to indulge the natural curiosity of my temper, by asking some questions with respect to my passage out of the other world. Pray, is the stroke of death always so gentle, or was I favoured particularly? The poets describe the gates of death as surrounded with terrors, pains, regrets, and despair. You must distinguish, says my patron, between death itself, and the avenues leading to it. Men are generally brought to an end by some violent distemper or grievous wound; and these are certainly painful, but so they are to those that recover from them. Therefore, whoever has gone through a painful distemper, and given himself over as past recovery, knows the

worst; nor has death itself, abstracted from the harbingers of it, any thing terrible.

11. But how came I among that river of stones, or bullets, or what were they? On quitting your vital hold, your body, carried along by the earth's motion, left you behind: while the nocturnal shadow protected you, you remained insensible and quiet: but this being soon gone, left you exposed to the rays of light, which passed generally on each side of you, or only gave you some oblique strokes, which just pushed you out of their way, till upon thrusting out your arms directly into the stream, they buffetted you about in the manner I found you. Nay, now, Papa, says I, you treat me like a child indeed. Am I to swallow this, or is it an esoteric that we babes are to take for garnish of the dish? Sure the light of this country must be a vastly grosser element than ours: instead of being fit to enter the tender tunicles of the eye without hurting, it is enough to knock out one's brains. You forget, says he, your own doctrine, that all magnitude is relative. The light here is the very same with that below, but you are not the man you were. You are but an atom in respect of your former body, and that makes you think the corpuscles of light so much bigger by comparison with yourself. Truly, says I, I seem to myself a good proper sized person: what though I am but a bag and not a man, methinks I could hold two good Winchester bushels of corn without bursting. No, no, says he, little gentleman, thousands such as you might creep into a single grain. But your present composition being much finer than your former, that which before was the object of vision becomes now an object of touch. Touch indeed, quoth I, with a witness! if we have nothing softer to touch, I shall never desire to use my fingers again as long as I am a vehicle.

12. Since then, continued I, we can only feel the light, how

how come we to see one another so plainly? Is ether such a Jack of all trades, as to serve for light, and sound, and every thing? Our ether, says he, contains various mixtures; though you folks below call it all by one name, because you cannot distinguish them. It consists of many dissimilar fluids which respectively perform the office of light, sounds, flavours, odours, and objects of other senses you know nothing of. It likewise supplies us with a pabulum for our sustenance. Will you taste it? Now you put it in my head, says I, I do find myself very hungry, though I was so busy in attending to you I did not perceive it before. Come, says he, put out an arm for me to draw you along, for our pasture does not grow every where; it comes from the tails of comets, dispersed up and down in long gleams throughout the vortices. I know of a very good layer about a hundred miles off; we shall be there in an instant. No sooner said than done: he set me down in the stream, and upon opening my lips I found a delicous clamminess hang about my palate; and though I could not swallow, I felt it insinuate itself into my pores as the vivifying spirit of air does into a man's lungs, and refresh me prodigiously. Well, says Locke, how do you like our celestial ambrosia? Charmingly, quoth I. It is better than all the sauces of a French cook, than venison, turtle, or even than a slice of good mutton after a whole morning's air and exercise; and which is best of all, one may indulge freely without danger of excess.

13. I was now all life and spirits, and began to throw my legs and arms about, and exercise all my faculties with more dexterity and alertness than I had done yet. I was so pleased with myself, that I could not help crying out, Methinks I perform a multitude of feats for such a little fellow: I like this agile body hugely; it is a thousand times better than that great clumsy carcase I was stifled up in upon

earth. Not that you have acquired any new instruments of action upon coming hither, said my guide, you have only got rid of the gross machinery which before incumbered you. Upon being delivered from our corporeal manacles, we have the command of every part belonging to us; and an absolute controul over those internal springs, or fibres, you saw awhile ago, so that we can throw ourselves into any shape we please, however fantastical. Of this I have already given you a specimen. But we have another slight of hand we are more fond of practising; we have our imagination as perfectly under command as our limbs, so can raise passions and desires of any sort we find expedient. We never let them get the mastery over us; as we take them up, we can lay them down again the moment we please; so to adopt your distinction, we never have any wants though we abound in desires. O charming! cried I; cannot you instruct me a little in this art? You will not have time, replied he, to make much progress: it is a difficult lesson, not to be learned presently. Besides, what you have already learned will suffice for all you have to do during your short stay among us. Alas! alas! cried I, now you strike me quite down. What, then! Am I to be snatched away from this new life in my cradle? I was in hopes I was settled here for two or three thousand years at least. I tell you, answered he, you are not come now to reside among us, but only on a visit, in order to carry back an idea of this place to your countrymen. It will not be many years before we shall have you here again, to take up your abode among us. He then gave me many exhortations to conduct myself properly; assuring me, that the manner of my return thither would depend very much upon my behaviour below. I listened attentively to his advice, hoped to retain it strongly in memory; and that the idea he had already given me of things would instigate me to follow it. And

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am I then, says I, to travel back the irremeable way? I thought nature had opposed indissoluble bars against the return of a departed soul to its old habitation. Your present journey, says he, is supernatural; so I will not pretend to account for it. The like has never happened within my remembrance, or that of my acquaintance. That stroke you felt in your head was not a real apoplexy; for your body lies below as sound and entire as before you fell asleep, without rupture or disorder in any of its vessels, still performing its vital circulations and secretions, though destitute of all thought and sensation.

14. And you came here differently accoutred from other travellers; for you have brought away your memory and imagination along with you. Not that they have not the tablets of those faculties too, but without any figures or writing upon them. They come into this world as much a blank paper as ever they were born into the last; ignorant and helpless, and rise to knowledge gradually and slowly in the manner they did in their former state. With this difference, however, that though they leave all their old acquisitions behind, they bring with them a particular aptness to make new ones similar to those they possessed before. Whereas you brought not only your understaning, but whole stock of ideas with you. You wanted only to acquire the use of your new senses, and the management of your voice; for you had plenty of reflections to make on all you saw as soon as you could utter them. And let me tell you, your progress has been more rapid than you think of. How long do you imagine you have been among us? Why, I can hardly tell, says I: but by the many trials I made before I could get the tolerable use of my faculties, and the many lessons you have favoured me with, I should guess myself about a fortnight or three weeks old. Oh no! says he. Our ideas here flow in so much quicker succession

than those of heavy mortals upon earth, that that makes the time seem much longer than it is. The clocks you left at home have gone but one hour, forty-two minutes, and fourteen seconds, since I first found you assailed by the corpuscles of light. Surprising! says I. Now this ends another wonder of mine, that I never felt myself drowsy all this while. No more you would, says he, if you were to stay ever so long. We never sleep, nor ever feel the want of it. Then, says I, how do you find employment for your time, of which you have so much more than other people? Does it never hang heavy on your hands?

15. Never in the least, says he. We have an inexhaustible variety of employments, an endless field to expatiate in. There is the education of our adopted families; for as we have no offspring here, we adopt children from the inhabitants of the other world, as they arrive here. The dividing the ambrosial streams so as to disperse them about more equally, as you disperse your New River water for the uses of the several quarters of the town. Our journies down to earth to know what passes there. Studying or practising our art of reading by the observation of the state of the ether; and investigation of causes by their effects. Observing one another's talents and characters, which we may call the knowledge of the world. Purifying ourselves from any corruptions remaining within us, or removing any new concretions that might gather; for we have the seeds of diseases among us, though we can expel them almost as easily as you wash the soil off your body. Besides the benefit of conversation in our sentient language, by which we can impart and receive information of all kinds, and from all quarters, with the greatest readiness and precision. Then we can travel with incredible swiftness to distant regions of the world; follow the motions of the heavenly bodies; study the systems of nature, and economy of Providence. With all these advantages

tages you may well conceive we have objects enow before us to take up an eternity without weariness or satiety.

16. You give me, says I, a most inviting description of your way of life. But since you have mentioned conversation as one of your principal amusements, pray where do you find your company? I suppose they gather together in cities; and we are here in some remote desert, out of the way of any road, for I have not seen a soul besides yourself since I came here. That is, says he, because you have not made a good use of your eyes. Put me out twenty now all on one side, then look about ye, and observe what you can see. Oh! now I see a multitude of long lank bags flitting by me like shadows: but they all go the same way. Have they any wings? For they whisk so nimbly along, I protest I cannot see. And now I recollect, when you carried me to the ambrosial fount, you kept kicking all the way like a dabchick in diving with a pair of sprawling legs, one on each side of me. But I cannot guess what you did with them: for though I can sprawl out legs too, I feel neither ground to tread on, nor water to push against, and I am afraid to stretch them out too far, for fear of those plaguy rays of light knocking against my shins.

Those very rays, says he, so formidable to you, are the springs that convey us on all our journeys. By thrusting a leg against some corpuscle of light, we take any momentum we please from it, and any direction within the compass of a quadrant. Thus we pass along between two rays, one for the right foot, and the other for the left; much in the same manner as a Dutchman skating upon the ice. Our motion is indeed a little irregular; but the rays being no more than one thousandth part of an inch asunder, and we going about ten miles at a step when we are in haste, this small undulation may well pass for a right line. As the ether makes some resistance against our light bodies, we throw

out lengthways, in the form of worms, when we would go forwards; and spread ourselves out dish-fashion when we would stop. Oh pretty! says I. Be so kind as to teach me to skate a little. I am loth to give you the trouble of lugging me always about like a beggar's brat. Be content, says he, since I do not grudge the trouble. Think with yourself how much time and dexterity is requisite to practise this art; for we must give our touches with the greatest nicety imaginable, the least mistake would carry us quite out of our course. There are some among us who have been here these two hundred years, and can scarce waddle yet.

Those who were bigots below, being always used to leading-strings, come on very slowly. It is the hardest matter in the world to get them to help themselves, or try to find their feet. On the other hand, the Knowalls will not submit to be shewn any thing, so they kick and cuff about at random, and get themselves tossed from ray to ray without ever learning a step. He then drew me aside to a place where I could see travellers hasting several ways by help of different rays: and it delighted me to observe how, though they went at a prodigious rate, they managed with such amazing dexterity as never to touch the crossing streams of light, nor jostle one another.

16. While I was entertaining myself with this spectacle, I heard my friend cry out with a loud voice that almost stunned me, Holloa, here we are. Presently there came up a vehicle that stood and stared at me wistfully, as I did at him again: he then entered into a close conference with Locke in the sentient language; after which he surveyed me a second time from top to toe; and having perused me as much as he liked, I saw him strike his foot against a solar ray, which wafted him over to a stellar, from whence he took a direction almost at right angles with the former, and was instantly gone out of sight. Pray, says

I,

I, who may that very curious gentleman be? He examined me all over so strictly, that if I had not heard you call to him, I should have suspected he had some design upon us. So he has, says Locke, but no bad one. You cannot know his face, but you have read his compositions. He is Aulus Gellius, author or rather collector of the Attic Nights' Entertainment; for, having a very moderate capacity, he could produce little of his own, but made it his business to pick up the scraps of his oracle Favorinus: however, as he was a diligent honest creature, we must acknowledge him for one of our line. You find him often quoted by the learned; for though his writings contain nothing of much importance, yet such minute matters as he has recorded, may be turned to good account by others. I am glad of that, says I, for the sake of my microscope: if I am not useful myself, I may be the cause of other people's being so. As industry and exactness are his talents, continued he, we put him upon employments where those qualities only are requisite. He is now gone down to earth on an errand of that sort for you. I thank him kindly, says I; but what service can he do me there? I will tell you, says Locke. You have now no intercourse with your body, so no traces can be left there of all you do or see. Now he is gone to engrave traces of every particular in your sensory with a fine pencil or style he will pick out of the air as he goes along; for else when you awoke you would think you had slept sound all night without any thing extraordinary having happened to you. I gave him an exact account just now of all that has passed hitherto, and shall take care to send down intelligence from time to time of what further shall fall in our way. We shall have time enough to send after him, for he is a little tedious in his motions, and scrupulously exact: I warrant ye now, he will be puzzling about in the atmosphere a whole day of vehicular time before he will

will find a style to his mind —I hope, however, said I, you will suppress what we have just said of the gentleman: he might have reason to take it amiss, that we have spoken so freely of his character and performances, especially at the very time when he is doing us a friendly office. Never disturb yourself about that, says my patron; we have none of that vanity clinging, more or less, to all mortals. We value ourselves here not on our talents, but the application of them. Natural infirmity and slowness of capacity are no disgrace among us, therefore he is not ashamed of having them, nor will he be offended with us for taking notice of them.

17. But, says he, that we may have your history perfect, were there not some wishes you were shy of disclosing. Do not endeavour to conceal any thing from me, you know I am your friend; and besides it would be in vain, for I should ferret you out. Oh! you want to hear something of your relations; and your wife is uppermost in your thoughts. Well, well, you shall hear more of your deary presently. We seldom meet with husbands so anxious about their wives, except now and then a Search that has happened to match with one of the same blood. Yes, yes, I know she was a Search; we all look upon her as such, and bear her a brotherly affection. We had very little trouble with her, as she brought few terrene concretions, and was very patient and desirous to have them removed. Having a soft hand and great tenderness of temper, we employ her in picking out the spots from prudes, demireps, and ladies of fashion, who have lived in a continual round of genteel diversions, doing neither good nor harm. But what would you say now if I would carry you to visit her? She plies close to her picking trade with some of the finest aerial needles we can get for her, not above fifty thousand miles off: we may skate there easily upon a couple of rays of Spica

Spica Virginus in two hours vehicular time. Nay, none of your coaxing and cajoling, your pray Sirs, and do Sirs: when I offer a thing, I do it readily without needing to be pressed.—I durst not speak before, for fear of putting him out of humour, so believing a short speech was best, Thank ye, thank ye, says I, dear kind patron; she was the most agreeable, if not the most valuable gift heaven bestowed upon me below, and this offer is what I most desired. You have taken pains for my good and instruction before, but this shews your benevolence is tender and indulgent as well as judicious. I then presently stretched out an arm for him to take me by. Hold a moment, says he, till I give you some instructions for your behaviour on this visit.

18. We gave her an intimation some time ago of your coming to visit her in the shades, like another Orpheus. Ever since she has taken it into her head to call herself Eurydice, for we have our innocent fancies, allegories, and fables here, as well as you mortals. So you must mind to call her by that name. Oh! any thing, quoth I, that will please her best. Eurydice; methinks it is a pretty name, and I am sure the real Eurydice could not better deserve such a journey after her. In the next place, says my instructor, she is not a woman here, so you must consider her as an intimate friend, not as a wife. Let us have no kissings nor embracings, no raptures nor transports: remember your own distinction between love and fondness, and that we are here all Isangeloi, therefore your love must be pure, sedate, and angelical. I will try my utmost, says I, and hope to succeed the better, as I always endeavoured below to make my love as refined and sentimental as possible. He then took hold of my arm, and we went on swimmingly at the rate of forty thousand miles in a minute of Paul's clock. At length we stopped, and I beheld a vehicle

intent on picking out the dross from another with a needle. My friend whispered something to it in the sentient language, when instantly there shot out the dear well-known face, not that of the blooming bride which enchanted my youthful eyes, but of the serenely cheerful matron endeared by eighteen years cohabitation, when we used to take sweet counsel together on the measures of our conduct, the economy of our affairs, the education of our children, or remark to one another the growing seeds of sagacity appearing in their little contrivances and prattle as they played around us.

19. My dear, dear Eurydice, says I, do I see that face once more which used to be a continual feast to mine eyes, expressive of a most amiable character within, innocence, sweetness, sincerity, constancy, judgment, affability, ease, sprightliness: my pleasure at home and my credit abroad. I never knew what a happy life was till you taught it me, and have never felt it completely since your departure. Welcome, thrice welcome, says she, to these happy mansions, my sincerest, tenderest, truest, best beloved friend! How happy is it we can thus meet without reflection of having done any thing which might make us unfit for this place. Thanks to you, my Eurydice, says I, that I have no more to reflect upon with remorse. Your sprightly temper gave me spirits to improve my faculties, and you taught me to make some use of them by rendering me more sociable and active. I hope to come here one day with fewer terrene concretions, for having had the benefit of your company. You can scarce have brought any here; you were all innocence and unreserved goodness. And, indeed, I see by the serene satisfaction in your countenance, that you have nothing to trouble you. Oh! how charmingly different does it look from that I saw last in convulsions and agonies!

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Name them not, my Search, says she: the avenues of death were grievous, beset with pains, sorrow, and regret at leaving my husband and children: but they quickly end in a quiet sleep, out of which we awake to a new life and enjoyment. Every thing is new to us, yet nothing appears strange, because we remember nothing of former scenes. We soon discover that we are in a society, and it is not long before we learn to converse among them. We quickly receive information of what we have been, what we have done, and what we have gone through: and believe me the troubles we have undergone appear as nothing in comparison of the enjoyments they lead to The people of this country are universally obliging and benevolent: every body is helpful to me, and I have the pleasure of being helpful to others. Your conversation had prepared me to relish those subjects, which are here the topics of our discourse. I had only one thing to wish for, and am thankful it is now granted me, though but for a moment. Heaven send it may be granted me one time or other for a long, long continuance!

Amen, amen, says I; may we meet in such happiness, never to part again. Your remembrance is my continual solace below: the image of my Riddy goes with me into company, attends me in business, entertains me in my walks, and steals in upon my studies. Heaven made us the principal instruments of one another's happiness upon earth, and I think the prospect, or even possibility, of our being so again, adds to my diligence in the prosecution of those duties that lead to a better state. While the thought of me does you any real good, says she, indulge it; but let it not interfere to divert you from any thing you ought to do. My kind benefactress, you were born to do me solid good as well as to give me delight. Your advice was never wanting, if at any time I happened to forget myself. Your

example taught me to be more obliging and tender to others. You encouraged and assisted me in every thing laudable and becoming a reasonable creature. The happiness conveyed me by your means was one topic of my thanksgiving, and I used to join more heartily in the public prayers, knowing that you were one of the congregation. Shall then the remembrance of my Riddy do me harm when she herself was incapable of doing any? Your loss was a heavy, and grievous stroke to me, but I strove and struggled hard rather to thank heaven for the gracious loan I had had, than to repine at its being withdrawn. I beheld your likeness in your two girls, and began to reflect how I might best exert my love for you in my cares for your children. I still call them yours, for I love them better in that light than while I consider them only as my own. They answer my cares as I could wish, and the poor things do what they can to repay them by their duty and tenderness; but nothing upon earth can fully satisfy me for the want of you.

20. I hear very good accounts of your children, says she, for I call them yours, for the same reason you call them mine. Somebody or other in the neighhourhood is going down continually, and we are very sociable; so, scarce a day passes but I hear of you all. It is one of our amusements to communicate all the good news we can pick up of one another's relations and friends: but ill news quickly stagnates, for we have no taste for scandal, nor are we solicitous to inquire after things we cannot remedy. But since it has been known you were to come here, nobody would tell me a word of our family, for they would not anticipate the pleasure I should have in hearing it from yourself. When you mentioned me in your argument upon the uneasiness of desire in your chapter on Satisfaction, they foresaw you would never be quiet till you had contrived one way or other

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to see me. So I know nothing of your history for that two years and a half.

21. Why, says I, it has run much in the same tenor with that you have already been informed of. Your girls go on in such improvements as I can give or procure for them, and in forming their characters to make themselves useful and agreeable, though in different ways. Serena has the modest brow, the flexible neck, attentive eye, and true countenance of a Search. Sparkler, you know, we used to call little mamma, and she still preserves your likeness: the same sprightly look, the same lively action and inoffensive archness of tongue. I would instruct them in the foundations of religion and morality, but my notions are so abstracted, that though they may do tolerably for myself, they are unfit for common use. So I scarce ever give them any rules; but as I am much with them, attend to their prattle, and endeavour to lead their thoughts gently into such trains as may tend to their improvement If they let drop any inconsistencies, I take notice of them with a smiling air; if they consider a thing partially, I turn it about for them in various lights, and by short observations, similes, and examples, strive insensibly to make their reasonings just and connected, their views full and clear, their aims directed rather to the useful than the shewy; and not so much to teach as shew them how to strike out lights for themselves. As they delight in figure and allegory, I tell them the family arms of the Searches are a microscope and a balance, with a bit of gold in one scale outweighing a gaudy plume of feathers in the other, in a field of natural green, interspersed with common flowers, and a bee extracting honey from any that falls in his way; the motto for the men, Esse quam videri, To be, rather than to seem; and for the women, Be merry and wise. That the Knowall arms are a concave mirror, placed near the eye, to see itself

self in, and an inverted telescope to look at every thing else, upon a brazen shield, ornamented with butterflies and trophies of victory; the male motto, Veni, vidi, vici, I came, saw, and conquered; the female, None so pretty.

With these little helps, your girls have acquired for themselves as much soundness of judgment, and considerateness as may content a parent. They carry an unaffected openness and gaiety upon their countenances, a watchful observance and discretion in their hearts. They have just sentiments of their Maker, esteeming him as their sole benefactor; they are assiduous, not scrupulous in their devotions; strict, not superstitious in their religion. They can conform their minds readily to their situation, pass whole winter months alone with me in a retired country, without vapours, or discontent, or hankering after company, and then enter heartily into all the innocent diversions of the town; can find resources in themselves without cards, or balls, or plays; or can enjoy the busy world without being enslaved by it.

You delight my heart, says she, with this charming account of my babes: their welfare makes one of my joys in this place, and it is no small comfort to reflect that I have done my poor endeavours towards setting them into the way that leads hither. God grant they may persevere in it to the last. But I have still one more anxiety for my children: as they are now women grown, they may, probably, ere long, come into other hands; and what changes that may make in their way of life and conduct, cannot be foreseen. This, my Riddy, says I, is my greatest difficulty: I cannot be of that service to them I would, my knowledge lying more among books than men. Never did I want you more than at this juncture; you could have assisted me with your counsels; your conversation would have given a freer issue to my own thoughts. But I miss you every day at home and

and abroad, in business and in amusement, in my troubles, and my successes. O that I were permitted to take you down with me once more, to make a Paradise upon earth! Or that I might remain with you here and learn of you the sciences I used to teach! The laws of this place lay a severe restraint on the fondness of love. My rigid tutor here has forbid me one civil salute: am I not allowed to take your hand, whose soft touch used to steal a thrilling joy into my heart?

At this the dear eyes seemed ready to overflow with tears of love and joy. There came out a taper arm and pretty hand, having on one of the fingers the semblance of our wedding ring, that pledge of our plighted troth, and seal of our union. I shot out half a dozen eager arms to take hold of it; and now perhaps had grasped it so fast that nothing could have parted us, had not that severe, relentless pedagogue, that hard-hearted old bachelor Locke, who never knew the tenderness of love, been too nimble for me; for he darted out a great brawny arm and mutton fist, with which he caught up the skin of my vehicle, as one catches up a dog by the nape of his neck, and away we flew with incredible swiftness.

22. As soon as he let me go, I began to lament and expostulate at a woeful rate. Do not pretend to be angry with me, says he, when you were to blame yourself. Did not you promise to make your love pure and angelical? Instead of which you have burst out into all the flames and raptures of an earthly passion. What a wish was there, to carry her back with you! I stand corrected, good master, says I, for I would not do her a prejudice, no, not the least momentary hurt, for all the pleasures in the world. But what must the dear creature think of my leaving her so abruptly? Never trouble yourself about that, says he: she saw plainly you could not help it, and before this time is sensible I acted kindly: she would presently recover her-

self, and go again to her needlework. Do you apply yourself to improve the state of your own mind; the news of that will be the greatest pleasure you are now capable of giving her. I perceive you have store of concretions about you, and to them were owing your intemperances: we shall have some work with you, when you return, and you must undergo some discipline. Do, my boy, while upon earth, strive to lessen the need of it as much as possible. Take my word for it, the practice of virtue, the moderation of all your desires, and vigilance against evil habits, will save you a great deal of inconvenience, vexation, and self-reproach by and by. But I must leave you a moment to send the particulars of our last adventure to Gellius.

23. Being left alone, my thoughts ran again upon the dear object of my wishes. While I was thus employed, I felt myself on a sudden seized all over with something hard, rough, and scorching; a hundred cords seemed wrung round me, a thousand points struck into my flesh, and I felt rough teeth grinding upon my skin. Ideas of resentment, cruelty, avarice, injustice, lewdness, blasphemy, terror, shame, regret, and despair, poured in upon my imagination and pierced me to the very soul. I found myself tempted to all kinds of wickedness, to snatch the bread from the hungry, tear out the bowels of children, dash my own brains against the wall, wallow in all the impurities of a brothel, rebel against the throne of heaven, and worship the devil. I struggled with all my powers of body and mind to deliver myself from my distresses, and call up ideas opposite to those that oppressed me. On the first effort I found myself relieved, the cause of my grievances was removed, but though I was free from pain, it left a strange dismay and uneasiness upon my mind. My good friend came up instantly to me. What's the matter, says he? You seem all over agitation and disorder. God bless me, says I, I never was in such a taking in my life. All pain, smart,

smart, and burnings without; rage, horror, anxiety, and torment within. Sure these are not fits occasioned by the terrene concretions. Heaven save me from any more returns of them; I would not undergo such another moment for all the pleasures in the universe. No, no, says he, your concretions are not so bad as that Oh! now I see it; look yonder, there is the enemy that has done you all this mischief. I looked the way he pointed, and saw a black-bottled spider as big as myself, sprawling and cuffing with his nasty claws against three or four vehicles, who thrust out arms as long again as usual to push him away. However, they made shift to get rid of him pretty easily. Pray, says I, what hideous monster is that? The very sight of him makes me shudder, and almost renews the pains I suffered from him. That, says he, is one of those wretched vehicles whom you have not yet heard of; his name, while on earth, was Cæsar Borgia. I do not know how he came to stroll up here from the regions of darkness, for they very rarely come among us. Rarely, says I, is too often; I shall be afraid of them as long as I stay here.

24. But how could he contrive to overspread my imagination with such a dreadful cloud of infernal thoughts? There, says Locke, you had a specimen of the sentient language: I am sorry you took your first lesson from so bad a master. But it was well you exerted yourself in raising up contrary sentiments that made him glad to quit you immediately, for those evil spirits feel an envy against every thing better than themselves, which increases their torment. However, as you seem not yet to have perfectly recovered yourself, we will endeavour to cure you in the same way in which you were hurt. Let us see what a second lesson will do under a gentler master. He then applied himself close to my side, and though I could discern nothing distinctly for want of skill in the language, I felt such a general gleam of piety, sound reason, benevolence, courage,

temperance, and cheerfulness, spread over my imagination, as dissipated all my troubles, and restored me perfectly to myself.

25. I then begged to know where lay those regions where he said the unhappy vehicles resided. In the pores or caverns of the earth, says he, or the atmosphere surrounding them. For the foggy vapours abounding there, a little stupefy their faculties, and make them less sensible of their torments. When they rise above ground, they keep in the nocturnal hemisphere, and if by great chance they mount up into ether, it is always along the shadowy cone of night; and when this leaves them exposed to the thick solar effulgence, they are buffetted about, not knowing which way to turn, till some of us drive them down again. Pray, says I, are they made like other vehicles? Entirely, say he, but they have debilitated themselves by the vast quantity of terrene concretions worked into them. For these gross particles of heterogeneous matter prick their flesh incessantly like so many needles, feel like worms boring into their vitals, obstruct their circulation, thereby raising feverish heats, and distort their imagination, laying it open to all manner of unruly passions, and rendering it incapable of a pleasing or a comfortable thought. Add to this, that instead of alleviating one another's miseries, they do all they can to increase them: continually in broils and quarrels, actuated solely by envy, spite, and rancour; melancholy and distracted with their own thoughts when alone, teazed, abused, and plagued in one another's company. Do you never try, says I, to deliver them from their concretions? It has been tried, says he, but without effect. For these poor creatures are so perverse, that they fight and struggle against us whenever we go to assist them: so we are forced to abandon them to their fate.

26. What then, says I, is their misery eternal? That

is a point, says he, which I cannot resolve you with certainty. I can only say, their continuance in this state is very long, at least seventeen hundred years; for it was but the other day Nero was seen here kicking about among the solar rays, and trying to raise a combustion by throwing them one against the other, so to set the world on fire. However this may be, their present condition is the same to them as if it were eternal, for they have no prospect, or notion of any escape from it.

27. I thanked my instructor, and added, that as this was a melancholy subject, I should be glad to divert my thoughts during the remainder of my stay with some other objects. He then proposed to introduce me to Plato, who was at some distance from us, with whom he said I might have some conversation on the subject of love, if I chose, as he was an adept in the passion. He accordingly took me by the hand, and after we had gone a little way, I saw a vehicle lying just before us collected within his bag, and seemingly wrapped in profound meditation. My conductor gave him a gentle tap, when presently there came out the honest, open, lively, but sensible countenance, and broad shoulders of the first academic. Hah! says he, my good English cousin Locke, I am heartily glad to see you. I shall never forget the honour you have done my ideas by bringing them into greater repute in the tin islands than ever I could do in Athens. But who is this honest looking young spark you have brought with you? Have I ever seen his face before? A countryman of mine, says Locke, and a distant relation, of an underbranch of the Searches. You must know he is a disconsolate turtle that has lost his mate, and as he cannot get her out of his head, he wishes to have a lecture from you on the subject of love, that he may learn to love like a philosopher. The polite founder of the aca-

demy very readily engaged to recollect what he could upon that head, that he had learned from his master Socrates.

28. My master used to tell us there were two Venus's, distinguished by the names of Thalassia, and Urania. The former, sprung from the foam of the sea, is completely formed for enchanting the eyes of mortals. Her cheeks smooth and blooming, her lips moist and pouting, her round neck and swelling bosom generally bare, her shape elegant, her limbs delicate and pliant, she glides in easy swimming motions, or trips lightly along with wanton airs, and winning graces. Her eyes are bright and striking, but a little short-sighted, so she follows the pleasures nearest at hand, seeing nothing of those at a distance, nor of the pains sometimes close at her elbow. Urania, heaven-born fair, offspring of Almighty Jove, father of gods and men, is his best beloved daughter. She has a dignity in her aspect, blended with mildness and benignity that commands at once love and respect; her eyes are strong and piercing; though she follows pleasures too, she discerns the remotest as well as the nearest, and counts the pains mingled among them. She looks backward upon the past, and forward to the future, and extends her view to every thing around her. She was present with her father when he made the worlds, and the blessings he poured forth upon them passed through her hands: she still moves him to shower down his mercies from time to time upon mortals, and solicits leave of him to descend herself to rescue them from their miseries and errors. But they cannot approach her unless introduced by some inferior goddess, of whom the Thalassian Venus is best qualified to perform that office.

When Psyche first falls from the unknown regions, she lies helpless and grovelling upon the ground, till external objects

objects and her own appetites awaken her from her lethargy. She then starts up, and plays about within a small inclosure, called the garden of Self. Every thing is new to her, every thing delightful. She admires the wild plants growing there, which quickly shoot up large and vigorous stems, bearing flowers alluring to the sight, and fruit grateful to the taste. If any body controuls her, she resists, and frets and slips from them to run to the gardener Selfish, who indulges her desires, finds her abundance of diversions, and makes her store of pretty playthings. The last of these is a light easy car drawn by two horses, called Concupicible and Irascible, which the gardener takes care to feed and pamper continually with his own hand. With those she courses about the smooth walks of the garden without much damage, except now and then a slight bruise or gentle overturn.

But in a little while the garden gates fly open, and Psyche upon her car launches forth into the wide world. She finds an open champaign before her, and the passengers ready to give way to her. The horses gambol about without rule or guidance, for she knows not how to manage them, but looks back to the gardener behind, who know as little how to manage as she. He has got a basket of his wild fruits, with which he wantonly pelts the people on each side. This makes them clamorous, on which the horses are frighted, grow rampant, and quickly overturn the car, dragging poor Psyche along until she is torn to pieces, unless some one luckily steps in to rescue her. Happy if the Thalassian Venus chances to pass by that way; the brisk goddess mounts the concupiscible horse, and with the whip of desire in her hand makes them both pull together, and singles out some object to which she drives them. She sends the gardener back to graft learning, politeness, and accomplishments, upon his wild stocks, with

orders to bring back the fruits they shall produce, which she deals out among the persons near her, that they may make way and assist her progress. It is she first opens the heart of Psyche, teaches her obligingness, and to look a little beyond herself. Nevertheless the goddess is apt to change from object to object, or if she fixes steadily upon one, is apt to drive too eagerly, and sometimes even to hurt the object she pursues. By plying her whip too furiously, the horses grow restive, the clay of satiety clogs the wheels, and Psyche is again brought into imminent danger.

Her only refuge now must be in Uranian Venus. The celestial power ascends into the car, corrects the errors of the sea-born goddess, takes the whip from her hands, delivers it up to Psyche, and instructs her how to handle both that and the reins. She sends the gardener Selfish back again to graft the virtues, which being exotics in the sublunary climes will not grow out of the earth, upon the wild stocks that nature has thrown up spontaneously. When he has brought her the fruit of these celestial scions, she dismisses him quite, for she will not suffer him to mount the car, nor Psyche to look behind upon him any more. She purges her visual ray from the films that before overspread it; she instructs her to follow good principally, and pleasure only when not interfering with it. She rectifies her judgment, enlarges her heart, and teaches her to distribute the last brought fruits wherever they may be useful. She keeps the postilion goddess constant to the pursuit of an object, and if that be snatched away by fate, she sometimes, as I find was your case, discharges her quite. She presents a picture of the beloved object to Psyche, emblazoned with golden rays by her sister Elpis, but will not let her sigh or lament over it, or neglect the distribution of her fruits.

Elpis

Elpis was the second daughter of Jove: she goes clad in virgin white, and has the softest hand of all the goddesses; for the touch of it soothes the smart of every evil in Pandora's box. The car then rolls tranquil and steady along till they arrive at the gates of the country, which being beset with terrors and frightful apparitions, the goddess makes Psyche look back on the road they have travelled, and the people eating the fruits they have distributed. She then beckons to the satin-robed Elpis, who lets down a golden anchor: the goddesses place Psyche thereon, and the elder sister holding her firm while the other supports their weight, all three mount up into the blessed abodes.

29. When the divine Plato had ended, his voice still chanted in our ears, and left the same effects as the charms of poetry upon the imaginations of the whole circle: for several vehicles had by this time gathered round us. Among the rest I perceived one whom I took to be Socrates; and afterwards found that it was he, upon being introduced to him by Locke. He engaged me in a smart dialogue, to confirm what Plato had said, That true love leads us to deny the wishes of others, when they interfere with their real good, but that it leads us to consult both when they are both compatible with each other. He also explained his Demon, in a manner that would not have been so greatly objected to by some modern divines; for it seems he understood by it pretty much the same thing we mean by conscience.

30. I then requested a conference with the Samian sage, if it were not too great a favour; upon which Plato offered his service in the politest manner imaginable. Locke took me in tow, and we set out together for the school of the first founder of philosophy. As we went along, methought I made a very ridiculous figure dangling behind him. I fancied myself like a bone that some unlucky boy had tied to a dog's

dog's tail, and then turned him into the street. However, my mirth was all to myself; for the passengers, used I suppose to such sights, took no more notice of me than we should on meeting a good woman carrying along a child in her arms. My conductors informed me, that Pythagoras generally resided in the intermundane spaces, for the convenience of hearing the music of the spheres, but he was now come down upon some particular occasion below the orbit of Mars, so we should not have a great way to go. On our arrival at the place of destination, we beheld the venerable Father of Philosophy dictating his precepts to a crowded audience with an air of authority. He appeared in a human form, like that the painters have given to Olympian Jupiter: his locks rising in large curls, his eye-brows thick and dark, his aspect majestic, with the solemnity and mysteriousness of one who had been used to govern an ignorant and barbarous people. I looked earnestly for his golden thigh; but his robes covered him quite down to the feet. On Plato's appearing the crowd gave way; and he whispered Timæus that there was a stranger just come from the earth, whose stay was very short, and who had an earnest and humble desire to receive some sprinklings of his wisdom to carry down for the benefit of mortals below. Locke also stepped forward, and they had a private conference together: after which the master, first mumbling a few words to himself, such as light of nature, microscope, mundane soul, cried out with a loud voice, Hence ye profane, but ye that are pure in heart, and clean of hands, draw near; that have kept the five years' silence; that have lifted up your minds above the earth upon the wings of contemplation; attend and learn.

31. The Quaternion is the holy Tetragrammaton, the same awful name variously pronounced among the sons of men: whether Jeva, Isis, Jove, Zeus, or Deus; or in modern

dern times Alla, Dios, Dieu, or Lord; for all these are Tetragrammata. Uranian Jove alone is one, unproduced, without father, containing all powers within himself. All things besides are numbers: the mundane soul is a multitude: the bodies thou seest are divisible into numberless atoms: men and animals are the divine particles mingled with lumps of clay; our vehicles contain a number of threads and fibres.

Jove produced the two first members, the mundane soul, and matter: he made matter inert and senseless, but to the mundane soul he gave activity and understanding. The latter being informed of the will of Jove, disposed the portions of matter scattered up and down into regular systems; formed the organizations of men, animals, and plants, and lodged in each of them a particle of its own substance. Hence it is that men and animals perceive, and see, and feel, and act; for matter, however nicely arranged, can neither perceive nor act; but the particle of divine air enclosed within it perceives and acts according to the objects exhibited, and instruments it has to employ.

The mundane soul is the same throughout; therefore the divine particles drawn from thence have all intrinsically the same nature, and have different capacities, according to the finer or grosser contextures of matter investing them. If thou doubtest of this, consider what the brightest genius could do with the dull organs of an oyster; why then shouldest thou impute the stupidity of the oyster to its natural incapacity rather than to the darkness of the habitation where it dwells? In plants there are channels of perception, but no instruments of volition, so their activity lies dormant in them; neither do they feel pain upon amputation of their limbs: for pain would be useless to them, as warning them against mischiefs they could not prevent. But thou, O man, that pridest thyself upon thy reason, and expectest to be raised one day to the intelligence of an angel, wilt not conceive

ceive that a creature like thee can be debased to the condition of an insect or a vegetable. Reflect within thyself, what thou art when asleep; how little better than a stone, insensible and motionless like that. What wert thou in the cradle? Sleeping, feeding, and crying; with less signs of rationality than the brutes thou despisest. What wert thou in the womb; growing like a plant, and receiving a few perceptions, but performing nothing?

Individuals change, but the species remain constantly the same; and as the systems they inhabit are broken up, others are formed for their reception. Nor think thou, vain man, that thine is the most favoured state, or that thou alone hast an interest in futurity. Knowest thou not that thousands of animals drag on a life of labour, pain, and misery? Does not then the justice of Jove require, that for this amends should be made them elsewhere? The divine particles migrate from the mundane soul into those states, each taking his turn in rotation, that the fate of all may be equal. Thus the soul passes successively through the several species of insects, animals, and men, savage and civilized, but with immense intervals between each migration, during which it is absorbed again in the mundane soul, and all that interval it remains happy and immortal.

I was Panthoides Euphorbus, who fought in the Trojan war; not that sung by Homer, but another in another world, innumerable ages before. The spear of the Younger Atrides could not destroy nor remove me from my country, but advanced me one step towards it; for my country is the mundane soul. During my long abode there I contemplated the universe: I surveyed the systems, their order and courses: mine eye penetrated into the minute portions of matter, their properties and effects. I comprehended all things, all except one; but the One is inscrutable, dwelling in light, whither created intelligence cannot approach. Nevertheless

vertheless I beheld clearly the image of his splendour in the order of nature, and in the powers and excellences of the universal soul around me.

Reverence the oath of Jove, for the order he has sworn to establish he will keep, nor canst thou alter or obstruct his plans. Observe diligently what nature requires thee to do, especially thine own nature; and examine for what uses thy several faculties are designed. The faculty of reason is the most precious, as gold is above other metals. This is the golden thigh on which thou mayest stand firm: let this be the support of thy meditations, the basis of thy conduct; nevertheless, when thou goest forth into the world, use also the thigh of flesh.

Worship the immortal Gods according to the rites of thy country. The same Jove made the wise and the ignorant: he gave forms and ceremonies for the vulgar: do not despise what thou thinkest needless to thyself, yet neither are they wholly useless to thee, for thou also hast a thigh of flesh, a vulgar part in thy composition; nor is it given to mortal man to guide all his steps by reason alone. Remember thou livest not for thyself: if thou hast knowledge, keep to thyself that which would hurt another; impart to every one discreetly what will be useful to him, and in a manner he can understand and relish. Delight not to thwart the opinions of others, but turn them gently the way that will be most advantageous to them; neither regard the lawful only, but also the expedient.

32. The master then withdrew himself into his vehicle, gathering his vestments around him; so that he looked like a portmanteau lying under a heap of cloaths. Plato, after making a handsome compliment to Timæus for his good offices, told us we had nothing more to do but return back again. So we set off directly; and Locke and I having dropped Plato at the Grecian quarter, came back to the

place

place we set out from. As we passed along, after thanking my patron for the favours he had already procured for me from the ancient sages, I added, that if it was not trespassing too much upon his goodness, I would beg an introduction to one of the moderns. Whom would you see, says he? There are but few of them within reach; for being new comers here, they are gone to visit the regions round about; as your young gentlemen below are exhorted to travel for the finishing part of their education. Why, says I, the person I thought of was the famous German professor Stahl. That is lucky, says Locke; for he being of a heavy phlegmatic temperament, we shall be more likely to find him at home. But what can you want with him? Sure you do not design to study physic at these years. No, no, says I. But the fact is, as he has treated of natural philosophy as well as medicine, I was curious to know, whether some improvement might not be gotten from him, and have read so much of his True Medical Theory as relates to subjects in my way; as likewise his controversial tract called the Idle Business, or the Shadow-fight; but can make neither head nor tail of them. Boerhaave makes him hold, that the mother's imagination forms the fœtus. Hartley, that the fœtus forms itself, and that all our automatic motions were originally voluntary actions of the child. And, to my thinking, he allows nothing automatic even in the grown man, but that we place the particles of our daily nourishment every one in its proper place by our own will; particularly in his section on the sphacelus, where he seems to ascribe the spreading of a mortification to the laziness of the mind in suffering it to encroach on the sound parts adjacent. Now I love always to go to the fountain-head, and should be glad to know from his own mouth what his real opinions are.

Well, says he, I am willing to humour you, but question whether you will be much the wiser for the journey. Your desire

desire of recurring always to the spring-head is commendable, but I cannot promise you much benefit here: for our spring runs ice rather than water, that one had more need to bring a hatchet to cut out a slice than a pitcher to draw with. Besides, that he has no very happy facility of expressing himself, he is not disposed to be very conversable, but is sullen, peevish, and fractious. You must behave very respectfully; seem to comprehend him whether you do or not; and contrive if you can sometimes to imitate his language without mimicking it: it will please him, and perhaps make him more communicative. He has, however, a large fund of honest industry and zeal for the good of his fellow-creatures; and the faculty below hold themselves much indebted to him for many useful discoveries he has made in the science. So you must not think meanly of a man who has valuable talents, with a disposition to use them right, because he is a little uncouth in his manner, and cannot run ye off an elegant period. Oh no, says I; I always preferred the solid before the specious. But give me leave to ask, who is that antagonist whom he bumps and pummels so furiously in the Shadow-fight, for he never calls him any thing but Mr. Author. That, says Locke, you might have known could be no other than Leibnitz, by his claiming the first thought of a pre-established harmony. What! says I, that veteran polemic, who battled so long with Dr. Clarke? Indeed, he shews himself the better disciplined soldier of the two; and handles his arms much more cleverly, at least so far as relates to style.

33. I had but just vented my last observation, when I found we stood still close by a bag, which looked more lumpish, and made of coarser stuff than any I had seen. There, says my guide, there is your oracle. Perhaps I may not get you an audience now you are come. He gave it five or six gentle taps, and hallooed to it as many times; but nothing

thing ensued. Pray, says I, had you not better talk to it in the sentient language? He does not understand that, says he, though we can understand him plain enough: for he has a wonderful propensity in thrusting his own notions upon other people, but as great backwardness in receiving theirs, or even entering into their meaning. Suppose, says I, you should give him a good hunch with your foot. That will not do, says he: our vehicles are so light, and the resistance of ether so small, I should send him a bowshot from us; and it would be an odd way of asking a favour, to kick a man about like a football till he grants it. So he thrust out two brawny arms, and gave him a lusty punch on both sides, that the force of one might counteract the other. We then heard a grumbling voice mutter out, Who are ye? What do you want? Let me alone. Do you think to foist, or like the Plautine Sosia, fist your notions upon me? Your skirmishing parties, call them cohorts, or cowhearts, shall never drive my statarianly disciplined battalion from its ground. Why, your infinitely-infinite monads in infinitely never single bodies, producing on a thing non-existent a non-existent effect, cannot get the better even of my light armature, my skipping scampering hussars, yea, with Parthian dexterity, pugnacious even in flight. Locke whispered me, Now he is dreaming of Leibnitz all this while. And then addressed the Shadow-fighting champion in these words: Celeberrimous Doctor, sole master of medical science, we mean no attacks either upon your battalion, or light armature: they are too respectable a body. You know my voice, that I am not Mr. Author, nor one of his adherents. I have made bold to bring a new adopted son of mine to beg an introduction into the regions of physiology and pathology. A commendable attempt! says the bag; yea, a laudable, not to say noble ambition! But what need he plague me? Is not my True Theory to be had? He may learn

learn there every thing that is to be learned. He has had recourse to that, says my patron, but being diffident of his own capacity, he is not sure of comprehending every thing exactly, and wishes earnestly to be set right from your own mouth. Has your boy any brains, quoth the bag; yea, is he attentive, not to say docible, nor yet tractable? As for brains, replied my patron, it does not become the partiality of a parent to pronounce upon them; but I have always found him very desirous of learning while under my tuition. Well, well, quoth the voice, let him propose his difficulties. But, added my conductor, my son has been so constantly used to sensible objects, that he cannot hear what any body says unless he has a face to look at. Do so much as put out a head to humour him, and make his improvement the easier. Pish! Phoo! grumbles the bag. What a deal of pother is here to please a young fellow's whims, yea, vagaries, not to say fooleries, nor yet impertinences! We then beheld a head with a stern hard-featured countenance rise slowly up, like a ghost through the trap-door of a stage. Come, says my guide, be quick. Do not waste the Doctor's precious moments.

34. Venerable Sir, says I, son and heir of Esculapius, that I may not stick at the threshold, I would be glad to know whether I rightly comprehend the force of those introductory terms which open the door to all the rest: I mean a mixture, a compound, a machine, an engine, or instrument, or organ. Prithee, says the professor, none of your fashionable, finical, gossiping, not to say vulgar language. You must learn to use the scientific terms if you would be good for any thing; and say mixtion, composition, mechanism, organism, as well in entire systems as in their sundry parts, yea members, and moreover the speciallest species of them. I thank you, learned master, says I, for your correction, which shall not be thrown away upon me.

Now I apprehend those four things are under-species of one another: so that a particular kind of mixtion is a composition, a particular kind of composition is a mechanism, and some mechanisms are organisms. With respect to the two last, when a watch maker has completed a watch, so that it can point out the hour and minute, and make several movements of itself, this is a mechanism: when an artist has finished a fiddle to give all the notes in the gamut, but not without a hand to play upon it, this is an organism. Thus the poet said of a pair of scissars, He takes the gift with reverence, and extends the little organ on his fingers' ends. Good boy! Good boy! says the venerable, your child may come to something in time. But, continued I, I fear that I have not yet gotten the true characteristic, yea criterion, not to say diagnostic, nor yet line of separation disjunging the province of organism from the rest of the mechanism territory, so as to know precisely upon every particular occasion which is which. For though I can easily see that a man's hands, and feet, and tongue, are organisms, because they will not handle, nor walk, nor speak, unless he sets them at work; yet, to my apprehension, the heart, and arteries, and many other vessels, fall under the idea of proper mechanisms. Whereas you have taught us, that the whole human body, together with all its viscera, digestories, yea sanguiferous trunks, not to say minutely-minute glands, and moreover speciallest species of secretory ducts, and even cellules of the adipose membrane, are so many distinct organisms. I see, says the professor, your boy is a little dull of apprehension; but that, you know, he cannot help. Therefore, though we are confident that every thing set forth in our theory radiates with its own lustre, yet we shall cast a farther blaze upon it by one or two familiar examples in condescension to shallow capacities. Suppose you bespeak a clock of artificial and workman-like construction, with every

every way multiform exquisitely mechanical circumstances belonging to it. The artificer brings it home, puts it up properly on the dimidiate platform of your staircase, and sets it exactly by the equation table: now it is an organism. But if you let it go down, and after winding it up again should, either through oscitancy or want of skill, set it haphazard, so as to make it strike four when it ought to strike one; or lengthen the pendulum, so that it loses ten minutes an hour; then it is nothing but a mechanism. Again, suppose in some remote, yea hitherto, perhaps, by human industry undiscovered regions of the terraqueous globe, there should be large tracts of country, or islands, which by the spontaneous condition of their soils should be beautifully adorned with woods and fields, and animals of various kinds, nobody I think would contradict that all this proceeds from mere mechanism; and it must appear I think with equal evidence, that there is nothing in act organical among all these circumstances. Send a colony thither, who shall build houses, dig cellars, raise provisions for themselves and their domestic animals, plant trees and corn, which the ground may nourish and bring up quite to maturity; then it immediately becomes an organism. I am a little suspicious, says Locke, that my boy does not fully comprehend you yet. No? says the venerable in surprise; he must be a blockhead, yea a numskull, not to say a beetle, nor yet a blunderbuss, if he does not. Oh, yes! says I, the Doctor has made the thing as clear as the sun. I can easily understand how any tract of land or water may become an organism. I remember, when I was a stripling, the vast Pacific Ocean, commonly, yea vulgarly, not to say newspaperically, nor yet teatabellically, and moreover among the speciallest species of ale-drinking, burthen-carrying, fish-selling rhetoricians, called, appellated, and as the saying is, annominated the South-Sea, was made an engine, I mean

organism, to pick people's pockets, and ruin half the nation.

35. It quickly appeared I had committed murder: his features became now as hard as a rock, and he began to draw in his head with as much speed as his gravity would permit. But Locke being a good deal nimbler, clasped him under the chin with two stout ploughman's hands, crying at the same time, Pray Mynheer, dear Doctor, celeberrimus Doctor, Hallensian star culminating in the zenith of brightness! never mind what a child says. I am sure he meant no harm. It was only his vanity made him pretend to understand you when he really did not. I durst not utter a syllable all this while for fear of making matters worse, till at last he was obliged to let him go, when instantly the head shot in like a large case-knife into a new sheath, when by pressing very hard you have just overcome the stiffness at the entrance. We had now only a shapeless bag before us: but we saw the vocal fibres agitated all over, and heard a vehement eager grunting, such as the hogs make when a strange pig comes into the yard. So we left Mynheer Celeberrimus to compose himself, and make peace with his own shadow as well as he could: and being gotten to some distance, I owned Locke was in the right, that I should never profit much by him, for he is a bar's length more profound than Pythagoras, said I. Pythagoras, returned he, had his reasons for being profound; but this man is profound because he cannot help it. But how came you to be so careless as to disgust him after all the hints I had given you? Why, did I not follow your injunctions to a hair? Truly, says he, not to the thickness of a cable. Instead of appearing to comprehend him, you shewed yourself resolved to misapprehend him, nor did you observe what I said about distinguishing between imitation and mimickry.

Well, says I, this is the second time I have suffered by my

indiscretion: though I have some excuse here, for he so be-blockheaded and be-blunderbussed me about, as was enough to hurry any body, and throw them off their guard.

But since the mischief is past remedy, I must rest contented under it; unless you will be so kind as to remove it, by giving me an account of his sentiments. This led to a sort of dissertation on midwifery; of which, as it might not prove very entertaining to the reader, I shall only give the outline. My curiosity to consult Mynheer Celeberrimus, I told him, was first raised by Hartley, from whose hints concerning him I was simple enough to expect he would shew me, by undeniable arguments, that our health or sickliness of constitution, our strength or weakness of body, our quickness or dulness of parts, and even our natural propensity to particular virtues or vices, were owing to our prudent or careless management of ourselves before we were born. But, alas! how was I disappointed, when, instead of clear demonstrations, I was presented with a confused chaos, wherein I could discern nothing distinctly, and even suspected that the Celeberrimus did not always understand himself. I was in hopes too of finding something concerning the animalcules: for though their existence seems generally believed among my learned cotemporaries, it is not admitted by every body.

36. He had no thought, interrupted Locke, of the animalcules while he was below, but since Leuwenhoek and Boerhaave have come up, has been a thorough convert to them. He says, the animalcule gets into the ovum at the broken end of the calyx, where it finds a tube growing narrower by degrees, into which it pushes with vehemence, till being straitened on all sides, by the closeness of the passage, it can neither move backwards nor forwards, nor even bend its little body; nevertheless, being all nerve and fibre, it exerts itself strenuously in every point of its surface.

Those points in the internal surface of the ovum, which are soft and susceptible of its action, adhere to it, and receive its impulse; which, continually protruding them forward, causes them to grow first into an embryo, then into a fœtus, and lastly into the full-formed child. But as there are multitudes of fibres capable of extension in different degrees, and they often stick to one another, if the ends of those which have done growing should fasten to the sides of the others, it must necessarily stop their progress, and cause them to double into folds. Thus the heart, which was at first a straight canal, becomes doubled into ventricles and auricles. Thus the six bowels, affording a passage to the victuals from our stomachs, are one continued tube, esteemed six times the length of the man, but folded together so as to lie commodiously within the abdomen. Thus likewise the smaller fibres become convoluted into plexuses, ganglions, glands, and winding ducts.

He is grown so zealous an advocate for the animalcules, to insist that they are rational creatures, and that they exercise choice and discretion in refusing to enter places unfit for their accommodation, being never found but in certain vessels, though the humour they float in is known to diffuse itself over the whole human body. Besides, it stands to reason, that the ethereal body should have a fuller use of its powers, the thinner and finer the material covering is wherein it lies enveloped: as a man has a fuller use of his arms and fingers in kid gloves and a silk waistcoat, than if he put on a great horseman's coat and a pair of heavy gauntlets. The rationality of man proceeds from there being some hollow cellules in the ovum which do not adhere to the animalcule: whereas, in the brutes, the gross elementary body presses every where close upon the little inhabitant within, so that it is always subject to the action of external objects, and has no room nor power to act upon its

its own ideas. He has battled strenuously with some who denied there could be much room for action and enjoyment in so narrow a prison as the animalcules were cooped up in; for, says he, all magnitude is relative to the size of different creatures. Now, suppose the animalcules to measure their distances by the width of their tail, as we do by the length of a foot: let five of those feet go to a pace, that is, such length as they can throw themselves forward by one wriggle of their tail: then reckon by animalcular miles, or thousands of such paces, and you will find more of them in the many winding ducts open to their passage than you would have miles to pay for a post chaise to carry you about through all the roads in England. But you would hardly think a man imprisoned, who should have the whole kingdom of England to range in.

It has been objected against him, that the violent frisking motion with which they are always seen to dart to and fro, does not give the appearance of a prudent considerate animal. To this he answers, that this is not their natural motion; for they are never seen with a microscope out in a dying state on being driven out of their proper element. Yet are their agitations neither effects of wantonness, nor expressions of pain or uneasiness, for death is terrible to man alone: but they perceive their material integument beginning to break, and exert all their efforts to rend it asunder the sooner. Have you not observed the little insect producing a gnat, dart up and down with sudden jerks and great velocity in the water, till one end being got open is raised up to the surface, when immediately issues forth the winged captive from its imprisonment, in joy, no doubt, and transport, soaring aloft to take possession of its new aerial country. So Psyche enclosed in the animalcule, upon finding the walls of her prison give way, struggles hard to hasten the total rupture, that so she may obtain a complete

deliverance from her immersion in matter, regain her native heavens, and mingle with the host of congenial spirits.

37. My good patron had his reasons for concluding in this manner; but though he did not disclose them, they became apparent presently. For no sooner had he done, than we saw ourselves surrounded with a group of vehicles, who came up with great joy and alacrity to congratulate me, for that they perceived I was just going to be advanced to the world of spirits. I was a good deal startled at this, having brought up some of those apprehensions natural to mortals on an approaching change; but in a few minutes my vehicle burst, and I became instantly absorbed into the mundane soul.

As upon a man's awaking in the morning out of sleep, the dreams and visions of the night vanish away, his senses which had been stupefied, throw open their windows; his activity that had lain dormant, returns; he resumes the command of his limbs, recovers his ideas and understanding, and goes on with the schemes and occupations he had been employed in the day before; so upon my absorption I found myself not translated into another species of creatures, but restored to myself again. I had a perfect command of my limbs, and their motions were familiar to me; I had that knowledge and judgment which are the result of experience. My body was immense, yet I could manage it without trouble; my understanding extensive, yet without confusion or perplexity: for the material universe was my body, the several systems my limbs, the subtle fluids my circulating juices, and the face of nature my sensory. In that sensory I discerned all science and wisdom to direct me in the application of my powers, which were vast and mighty; extending to every member and fibre of my vast composition. I had no external object to look on, nor external subject to act

act upon; yet found an inexhaustible variety to employ my thoughts and unwearied activity within myself. I rolled the bulky planets in their courses, and held them down in their orbits by my strong attraction; I pressed heavy bodies to the earth, squeezed together the particles of metals in firm cohesion, and darted the beams of light through the expanse of heaven. I beheld the affairs of men, discerned all their springs of action, and knew how to set both them and the causes of events so as to guide the wheels of fortune with unerring certainty.

Yet with all these mighty powers and privileges I had no temptation to pride or vanity, for I knew that in myself I was weak and ignorant, unable to stir a mote in the sunbeams, or produce a single perception: but all my knowledge was brought me by communication, and my operations performed by the joint concurrence of innumerable hosts of substances of the same nature with myself. For there being a general participation of ideas through the whole community, we had all the same apprehension, the same discernment of things, the same aims and purposes: so there was no variation of sentiment nor discordance of desire among us. The thoughts of all were the thoughts of every one, and the actions of the whole, the acts of each in particular; for each was consenting to whatever was done by the others, and no sooner wished to have a thing done, than he saw it instantly performed. As we had but one mind and one will, every thing happened according to that will: for pervading and being mingled with the corpuscles of matter throughout the universe, we actuated the vast mass, each contributing his share, which though singly small, yet when united with the rest was sufficient for every work however stupendous.

38. But I remained in this state only for a moment; it was proper that I should return back again into my vehicle,

vehicle, and I obeyed. Accordingly I injected myself into the rent of the vehicle, and closed it up: so the bag became entire as before disruption. Immediately I thrust out my head, and opening my eyes, saw my patron Locke with the rest of the vehicles standing around him in great surprise: for none of them but he had expected my return. They were very curious and importunate to know the particulars of my journey, and I was in danger of having a rape committed on my imagination, if my good friend had not interposed. Gentlemen, says he, you will not get any thing of him by violence. Your sentient language will be of no avail to you: my cousin has such an abundance of odd thoughts, and jumbles them so together in motley mixtures of serious and trifling, abstruse and familiar, jest and earnest, that you will not discern any thing he knows or thinks of, if he has not a mind to let you. But, (then addressing himself to me) it is time you should think of returning to your body again: the day has appeared some time upon your hemisphere, and if you should stay beyond your usual hour of rising, it will put your family in an uproar; they will think you defunct in earnest, and will send for doctors and surgeons to wrap you in blisters and scarify you all over. But, says I, may not your clocks go too fast? Could we not take a little turn first some where or other to see more of the country? What, says he, then you do not care to leave it? But we do not go by clocks—I see the earth yonder posting away before us; the verge of night is already gotten beyond the British Isles. Well, says I, since it must be so, here is my arm: but I go half reluctantly, for I could be glad to live here always; and yet methinks I should want to see my girls again. So he took hold of my arm, and we pushed forward to overtake the terraqueous globe, which we did with as much ease as a waggoner, having stopped at an alehouse door,

door, to wet his whistle, runs after his creeping team. When we came into the zenith of the great metropolis of commerce, we shot directly down like a falling star, Locke being the nucleus, and myself the tail.

39. Being now arrived at the top of my own house, the rays we travelled on would not attend us any farther; but it pleased me to see how nimbly we gilded through the pores of the tiles and beams, like a snake along the twigs of a hedge. My conductor stopping, asked me what I saw before me. I see, says I, a prodigious torrent rushing directly upwards in circling eddies with a tremulous motion. That, says he, is the flame of a candle your maid has left upon the stairs while she is gone down to fetch some chips for lighting your study fire. Come, shall we go into it? You do not say so! cried I. We shall be burnt up in an instant like a spider thrown into the kitchen fire. He laughed at my simplicity. No, no, said he, we are not afraid of material fire, if we can keep from inward burnings. Then laying hold of me, he gave a strong jump, which threw us into the middle of the snuff, but we could not stand there a moment: there was such a commotion of the particles moving in all directions about us, that we were forced to shift our quarters every instant, but my conductor managed so dexterously, by pulling and pushing to the right and the left, that he kept me always in the interstices between them; and though I felt them continually brush my sides, I did not receive the least hurt from them. He then carried me down stairs, and set me upon the floor. Now, says he, you may use your legs; here is ground to tread upon. I was overjoyed to find my feet again. I scampered to and fro like a wild colt upon a common, shifting my little legs faster than a fly upon a table. At last we got into my chamber, not through the key-hole, but through the chink under the door. I followed my guide to the right

right hand and left, up hill or down, as he led me. We now climbed a high pinnacle like the Peak of Teneriff, tapering up to the top, where was a spacious flat, large enough to have contained five hundred of us. What are we got upon now, says I? The point of a pin sticking out of your pillow. But look up over your head and all about ye. That, says he, is your bed. But what is that huge mountain over against us, with a monstrous gaping chasm on one side, and a great ridge in the middle, from whence issue streams of dark vapour? That, says he, is your head, mouth and nose. Surprising? says I: have I lain so many years like another Enceladus, under this smoking Etna! How could I escape being suffocated!—Hark, says he, I hear the cocks crow in the stableyard, which, you know, is a signal for spirits to depart. So we descended the pinnacle, ran along the pillow, and he conducted me through one of the pores in my head, having first made me cast myself into the form of one of Leuwenhoek's animalcules. When we arrived at the anterior ventricles, he took a hearty leave, wished me a happy return to the vehicular country again, and bid me take my station. I hung back, and with a lamentable groan, must I, says I, must I again lie imprisoned in that loathsome dungeon? Prithee, says he, no words! Reverence the oath, for it is the oath of Jove. Be ready upon call, either to enter the body, or quit it. In matters put within thy own power, use thy judgment and discretion: but when thou seest where the laws of nature or dispensations of Providence point, revere, resign, and obey. He then beckoned to Gellius, who leaving off writing, I know nothing of what passed afterwards.

40. It was now broad day-light when Somnus, taking off his poppy garland from my temples, fled away, but with him fled not the visions of the night: for the faithful Gellius had engraven them in strong characters upon the tablet

tablet of my memory. I started up full of the wonders I had seen: I turned eagerly to look for the pin, which I found sticking with the point upwards about six inches from my ear. Is this the summit says I, where Locke and I found so much room to expatiate? I then threw myself on my back, and was astonished to see the bed-tester so near me, which I beheld just before like the canopy of heaven stretched over me at an immense distance. I tried to get a little nap for composing my spirits, but could not. So I got up and after breakfast finding my head too confused for application of any kind that morning, I sauntered it away at auctions, coffee houses, and so on. I could not help every now and then talking to myself, muttering out some mysterious words, such as Eurydice, vehicles, Cæsar Borgia, riding upon the rays, and complained of my chocolate not being so good as Ambrosia; till I perceived people began to look strange upon me, and suspected that, as the French ambassador said of Mons. D'Eon, I had a little alienation of the organs. This made me more circumspect and careful to bring myself down to sublunary affairs to save the credit of my intellects: for had I run opera-mad, or assembly-mad, or methodist-mad, or election-mad, I might have found companions enow to keep me in countenance, but such a peculiar species of insanity as vehicle madness, must have been pointed at by every body; so I strove hard against the infection, and with a little practice came to think and talk again like other folks.

I then proceeded with diligence to reduce into writing the records engraven by Gellius upon my memory, and think I have done it very exactly, hardly omitting the minutest circumstance that could be discerned clearly; so if there be any thing in them not consonant to the truth of facts, it is his fault for misleading me. I thought it very obliging in my kind patron to lead me through such a variety of entertaining,

tertaining, as well as instructive, scenes: no doubt he had the latter principally in view, but interspersed the former to make the others more palatable to my compatriots, who it must be owned, are too squeamish in their taste, and fonder of the toothsome than the wholesome. I hope they will not frustrate his good intentions by doing like the children when one sweetens a pill for them, who suck off the sugar, and spit out the medicine.

CHAP. XIII.

EQUALITY.

HAVING now dismounted my Pegasus, and got safe on firm ground again, without any bruises or broken bones, or cracks in the pericranium, that my friends can perceive, let us turn him loose on the common for the use of others who may be disposed to take the like adventurous flight, and let us proceed for the rest of our way in the safer tracks that reason may point out on the solid ground of experience and observation.

2. One principal object that I have had all along in view in the foregoing disquisitions, has been to establish the doctrine of equality, or that all will, sooner or later, have an equal share in the bounty of Providence; hence to deduce a connection of interests between all mankind; for if the lot of all is to be made equal, all must have an interest in the fate of all; and on this foundation to proceed to the re-enlargement of virtue, which the reader may remember we left at the end of our second book confined and cabinned in within certain limits, to which her true friends would by no means wish to see her reduced.

3. We have seen that whatever portion of happiness each man possesses, is such and no other than was allotted him by the divine bounty; for the virtues, good qualities, and enjoyments men have worked out to themselves were as much owing to opportunities given them as what came without their seeking; when, in our state of non-entity, we were all equally devoid of merit or demerit, and were called forth from thence to the several stations and characters allotted us: nor is there any thing in one man rather than

than another to engage the divine favour, which was not nearly or remotely the effect of his bounty. Since then none of us have any thing besides what we have received from his goodness, and God is no respecter of persons, (the attribute of equity being that of which we have the clearest conception of all others, as implying nothing more than an impartial distribution of happiness among all creatures capable of receiving it) it follows that there must be an exact equality of fortunes among us, and the value of each person's existence will in the end be precisely the same.

4. This conclusion doubtless will shock the vanity of mankind, to whom happiness itself is hardly welcome unless they engross the monopoly of it to themselves; and who esteem the advantages and accomplishments they respectively possess as the only blessings worth receiving. The statesman, the soldier, the scholar, the philosopher, the rich merchant, the poet, the player, and the fiddler, have a sovereign contempt for each other's endowments in comparison with their own; believing themselves the peculiar favourites of fortune, and claiming an intrinsic merit to be found in none besides. But they will all be scandalized to find themselves put upon a level with the greasy ploughman, the illiterate porter, the contemptible ideot, the unenlightened savage, and the scarce human hottentot.

5. As to the manner in which this equality will be brought about, it is impossible to ascertain this point. But if, according to the notions of Pythagoras, as delivered in the vision, we extend the doctrine of transmigration beyond this narrow earth to all the states of immersion into matter through the universe, we cannot desire a more perfect equality than is thus represented. For though existence be divided into many various forms of being, some containing a mixture of evil, and others nothing else, yet the spiritual substance, taking its turn in rotation among the

the several forms, the fates of all will remain alike upon having passed through the whole. There is at least one benefit accruing from indulging such imaginations as these, that we shall be more ready to imbibe an inward esteem for the person of every man equally with ourselves, notwithstanding some adventitious temporary difference there may be between us. Just as if we found a person of our own rank and fortune, but at a distance from his estate, struggling with hardship and distress for want of convenient remittances, or if we saw one of equal understanding and sagacity with ourselves, under some disorder that stupified him for a while, we should still esteem them on a par with ourselves: and as esteem naturally begets love, this will go a great way towards bringing us into obedience to that grand precept both of natural and revealed religion, to love our neighbour as ourselves. It will give us a fellow-feeling of all the pains, distresses, vexations, and even little disappointments and cross accidents we see; for upon the hypothesis of a rotation we shall ourselves stand some time or other in the very situation in which we behold another *.

Selfishness

* We are directed to take the pattern of our charity from self-love, and taught to love our neighbour, not as we do our child, our brother, or our friend, but as we do ourselves: now we do not love ourselves for being handsome, or wise, or witty, or good-tempered, or accomplished, or virtuous, or born in such a place or family, not for any adjunct or circumstance belonging to us, but for being ourselves. If we be distempered, deformed, wretched, and involved in crimes, this does not abate our fondness, which rests solely on the person, and follows it through all its changes: and we ought (as far as we can) to feel the same personal regard for others and desire for their happiness, however circumstanced. But I think nothing is more likely to contribute to this disposition than some such scheme as I have here marked out, for we shall thus be accustomed to disregard all petty distinctions, and outward circumstances, as subject to perpetual change, and to consider nothing as permanently belonging to the individual but that essential capacity for happiness

Selfishness and insensibility to all around us seem to be at present made the characteristics of high perfection in religion: our fellow-creatures of a different language, or make, or way of thinking, or sentiment, on some speculative point, are not worth our concern; but so we ourselves with a few of the same orthodox stamp be safe, the devil may take all the world besides, as deserving victims of a divine wrath never to be appeased. For my part, I cannot help being shocked to hear with what calmness the most pious people talk of the innumerable multitudes that are to perish in everlasting flames: and with what glee the Methodists regale upon the thought, that at the day of judgment the rich and mighty of this world shall be dragged by devils for Whitefield and his mob of carmen and basket women to trample under foot. But if we claim no more than an equality among our brethren, children of the same Father, and subjects of the same kingdom, we shall look upon the states of suffering as the sinks and cesspools of the universe to drain off the evil from all the rest; and the drudgery of wading through them as a necessary service to be performed in rotation by all alike. This of course will turn our prejudice the contrary way, and set us upon hunting for arguments to contract the number and lessen the misery of them as much as possible.

6. But there is one objection to this scheme of rotation, which will, I fear, prove fatal to it, and what no man will admit the supposition of, which is, that he himself and the most righteous person that ever lived, shall in some future

which he has in common with us. What though we see nothing in the greater part of our fellow-creatures to engage our affection at present, we may know that in the worst-formed bodies and most untoward organizations, there lies an immortal spirit, which we may hope will one day be partaker with ourselves in a state of glory, of consummate intelligence, of noble sentiments, of pure love, of mutual kindness, and exalted happiness.

migration

migration become a reprobate, a thief, a debauchee, a murderer, profane, sacrilegious, atheistical, obnoxious to the utmost severities of divine justice. My concern however is only with the system of equality, and this does not necessarily imply any such consequence; since the balance may be set right by an amends made in value to the sufferer without any other person suffering at all, for an increase of good in one scale will have the same effect as a weight of evil thrown into the other. Many learned and pious men have held two future states, an intermediate and a final, and though the former is a state of happiness to the virtuous, yet the bliss of the latter will be incomparably greater. Thus the balance may be brought even, by supposing the period of suffering so much shorter than that of the intermediate happiness, as that the quicker passage from thence into the final state may compensate for the greater evils undergone. But that it will be set right in some manner or other, so that all will at last be equally partakers of the divine bounty, appears to me to follow unavoidably, unless we will suppose either a defect of equity in the Almighty, which is unworthy of our best conceptions of his attributes, or an inherent merit and peculiar claim to his favour in man, which we have shewn to be inconsistent with the nature of created beings.

7. Now the inference which I would deduce from this principle, if granted me, is a general connection of interests running through the whole. For if the accounts of all are to be set even, we can get nothing by obtaining a little advantage at the expense of greater damage to another; and lose nothing by submitting to some pain in order to procure him a greater pleasure. In the former case we depress his balance more than we raise our own, and thereby cut ourselves off from the greater expectations we were entitled to by the rule of equality: in the latter we raise his

balance more than we depress our own, and thereby increase our future expectations proportionably. So if there be two merchants in partnership, each of them would think himself interested in the balance appearing from time to time in the other's books: and would judge it prudent to throw any branch of trade into the other's hands, if it would turn to greater profit there than in his own.

Therefore, the universe may be justly regarded as an immense company dealing together in the traffic of happiness: and it is our business to apply all our contrivances and industry towards improving the common stock, and adding to the quantity of enjoyments in nature wherever we can. But there are disbursements to be made in all traffic; labour, danger, disappointment, self-denial, pain and punishment, are the disbursements necessary in the commerce of nature; and the prudent merchant will grudge no expense likely to yield a larger return. Only he will manage carefully, driving his bargains hard, that the cost may not exceed the profit; though he will not scruple to advance any sums because the returns may fall into other hands, for the common stock will always be the object he has in view, knowing himself to be so much the richer man as that can be in any way increased.

8. Thus the general good becomes the root, from which all our schemes and contrivances, all our rules of conduct and sentiments of honour are to branch: and the centre to which all our particular lines of direction are to point. We may now, therefore, do ample justice to Regulus, whom we left under a sentence of folly for throwing away life with all its enjoyments, for a phantom of honour. For he may allege that he had not a fair trial before, his principal evidence being out of the way, which having since collected he moves for a re-hearing. He will now plead that it was not a fantastic joy in the transports of rectitude, nor the stoical

ical rodomontade of a day spent in virtue, containing more enjoyment than an age of bodily delights, nor his inability to bear a life of general odium and contempt, had his duty so required, which fixed him in his resolution; but the prudence of the thing upon a full and calm deliberation. Because he considered himself as a citizen of the universe, whose interests are promoted and maintained by the particular members contributing their endeavours towards increasing the quantity of happiness, wherever possible, among others with whom they have connection and intercourse.

He saw that his business lay with his fellow-creatures of his own species, among whom a strict attachment to faith and honour was the principal bulwark of order and happiness, that a shameful conduct in his present situation would tend to make a general weakening of this attachment, which might introduce disorders, rapines, violence, and injuries among multitudes; that if he behaved manfully, he should set a glorious example, which might ensure prosperity and glory to his country and all belonging to her, greatly overbalancing the weight of his sufferings, especially when alleviated by the balmy consciousness of acting right. He was persuaded likewise, that all the good a man does, stands placed to his account to be repaid him in full value at some future time; so that whoever benefits another benefits himself; and, by serving others, earns more than he could possibly do by working for himself alone. Therefore he acted like a thrifty merchant, who scruples not to advance considerable sums, and even to exhaust his coffers for gaining a large profit to the common stock in partnership. Upon these allegations, supported by the testimony of far-sighted philosophy, and confirmed by heaven-born religion, I doubt not the jury will acquit him with flying colours, and the judge grant him a copy of the re-

cord to make his proper use of, whenever he may be impeached or slandered hereafter.

It is not unlikely here but somebody may put me in mind of St. Evremond, who attempted to write a tragedy, in which Hippolitus was to be the principal character, but had not gone far before he found his hero dwindled insensibly into a very Mons. St. Evremond, having the Frenchman's sentiments, making his reflections, and talking exactly in the same strain: and then ask me by what authority I prove that Regulus had any notion of vehicles, the balancing periods, the mundane soul, the nature of justice, her generation from expedience, the purchase of a reversion of happiness by unavoidable or virtuous suffering, the general partnership, and universal bank of Ned Search. To this question I shall reply, that I have nothing to do with the person of Regulus, or his history, nor is it my business to penetrate the real motives of his conduct. He stands with me as an ideal character, the representative of all persons who might be placed in his situation; and I was to shew that prudential motives of true self-interest might be suggested to them, by taking the most comprehensive, and not an improbable view of things, for acting in the manner he did. Still it is not necessary that whoever practises the same firmness of behaviour should be led into it by just the same train of reasoning as I have drawn out; for I am not so narrow-minded as to pronounce every thing no more than a shining sin, which does not proceed precisely from the principles appearing truest to me. It is enough if we have shewn the action to be prudent, and whoever performs it as being right, deserves our approbation, though he may not discern wherein the prudence of it consists.

9. It is necessary however, before I quit this subject, that I should explain in what sense I recommend the pursuit of the general good as the proper end of morality. By this then

then I understand none other than the greatest good in our power to perform, or that conduct, which taken in all its consequences, is likely to be the most beneficial of any other. For we can only promote the general good by adding to that of individuals, and it is very rarely that we can be of any signal service to the public. If we stand still, waiting for opportunities of promoting the good of the whole by some grand stroke of benevolence, we shall pass away life in a dream. Moralists, indeed, continually exhort men to look to distant consequences; but there is a moderation in all things: one may stretch one's view too far as well as confine it too near. He that goes along with his eye fixed on the ground will be liable to miss his way or run into danger; so we exhort him to look up that he may see the windings of the path before him, and the objects about him; but if he keep gaping at the distant horizon, this will be as bad as to keep poring on the ground. The proper way of judging of our rules of conduct, is by their usefulness; we ought to study the duties of life lying every day in our way, and make ourselves perfect in the common virtues before we attempt the shining. This love of the heroical and grand in virtue, of making painful sacrifices, and engaging in lofty enterprizes, is, for the most part, just as absurd as if a taylor or shoemaker should live in a boat to enure himself to the hardships of a sea voyage, or lie out whole nights in a ditch, by way of preparing himself for a winter's campaign, to neither of which services he is ever likely to be called.

10. There are some persons, who may be inclined to treat the whole scheme of morality which I have here marked out, as an airy speculation that will hardly bear to be proposed in theory, much less to be insisted on in practice. For it may be alledged, that according to this account, the quantity of good and evil in nature is such, and none other

than God in his wisdom has thought proper to make it; and consequently the portion of each individual must be such precisely as falls to his share, according to the number of beings in the universe, beyond the power of any thing to alter it. So that it matters not what good or hurt they bring upon their neighbour, because they cannot diminish the quantity of either ultimately allotted him.

Now this objection would have some colour of reason, if we knew the precise portion assigned to each creature, or if it were to be ascertained by an unalterable fatality. Whenever we do good, we see the immediate benefit of it; but we cannot see or rationally conclude, that some remote loss or injury will ensue from it. And with respect to the quantity, that must depend on the several articles composing it, and the causes giving rise to them; that is, is not determined by a fatality, but by a provision of adequate causes. Let men but turn the tables, and they will see the hollowness of the excuse; for if another goes to hurt them, or debar them of any pleasure in their power, they will not allow you to tell them, it is only an anticipation or keeping back for a while of what they must receive some time or other. Therefore, let them only feel the same desire to advance the general good as they do to gratify their own inclinations, which are as much under the controul of destiny as any thing else, and the objection will vanish of itself.

11. Another handle for cavilling may be taken from our having laid down that every evil is to be considered as the payment for a purchase of something more valuable; from whence it may be inferred, that by plaguing and hurting another, we do him no injury, but in reality confer a benefit on him. Or if the value of the purchase, and the price be settled by divine appointment, we only call upon him for a part of his payment, which it is all one whether he

he make to-day or to-morrow, since he must make it first or last. But this may be answered in the same manner with the former; for we know not the certain value either of the gain or loss, and therefore by doing hurt, we wantonly increase the latter without knowing that we shall add any thing to the former. Besides, by this rule it would be incumbent on every man to make himself as miserable as possible, because by so doing, he would secure himself a larger fund of happiness: but no man in his sober senses would ever throw himself in the way of miseries on this account. We know not what proportion of evil is necessary for the service of the universe, therefore ought to use all the means in our power for lessening it; for there is no danger that we should cheat providence of any thing that is necessary for wise purposes. The public taxes are a pavment for the protection afforded by the state; yet he that should compel his neighbour to pay a shilling in the pound more than the law demands, or than the exigencies of the state require, would be doing an injury. So he who puts another to a pain or trouble from whence he sees not the benefit resulting, does him a wrong; by exacting what he cannot be sure would ever have been demanded.

12. But though I would not wish any one to do me a mischief, or discover misfortunes in store for me that I know nothing of, yet I should not be at all displeased with any one who should prove me the most miserable creature in the universe; that is, prove the condition I now stand in, such as it actually is, inferior to that of every other being; so that the common labourer, the negro, the galley-slave, the meanest reptile, are all of them better off than me. Such a discovery would afford me a most ravishing prospect of nanature, and without hurting me in the least, give me higher expectations for the future; for since I am not to continue always thus, I could only change for the better.

But

But I am too sensible of the blessings vouchsafed me, to be persuaded into such a belief: on the contrary, when I behold miseries far greater than any I ever underwent, it raises, besides a fellow-feeling for the sufferer, a melancholy reflection to think that the lot of existence is subjected to so severe a condition. However, my disposition to wish it easier, makes me ready to embrace every evidence to prove it so; and it is with pleasure I find alleviations from custom, difference of apprehension, or insensibility for almost every natural evil; and extenuations from ignorance, inadvertency, and surprize for moral evil. Or if this cannot be done, find benefits resulting from them, enjoyments and advantages compensating them.

Thus the doctrine of equality tends directly to nourish favourable sentiments and good wishes to our fellow-creatures; and though it may at first sight seem to encourage indolence, by making men trust to the favour of providence, yet when fairly examined, it proves as strong a recommendation and solid ground of care and industry in particular persons, as any principle whatever. Therefore, those who do not admit it, may yet allow it excuse for the sake of its moral tendency.

CHAP. XIV.

FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

If the doctrine of equality maintained in the foregoing chapter shall appear novel and paradoxical, I hope the candid reader will do me the justice to believe, it was not on that account I offered it to his consideration. For I have constantly professed, and I think all along preserved, a tenderness for prevailing sentiments; and though in the exercise of that sober freedom which is the natural right of every thinking man, I may have departed from them for a while, it has been only to return again into the beaten road, and to take what seemed to me the surest method of arriving at the practical conclusions connected with them. Nor am I so fond of novelty, or the credit of making discoveries that have escaped others, as to purchase it at the expense of religion or good manners. If I have any desire of reputation, it is that arising from the character of a discreet and well-applied industry in the service of mankind. Therefore, though this doctrine of equality appears to me to follow clearly from the universal dominion of Providence, and goodness of God extending over all his creatures, without partiality or arbitrary proceeding, which I hope will be counted orthodox tenets, I should nevertheless have kept it to myself for fear of disgusting the weakly righteous, whether great scholars or illiterate, if I had not thought it a necessary foundation, and indeed the only one I could discover by the light of reason, for establishing that general interest, from whence I apprehend may be deduced the great practical duties of life. But as this doctrine, being incompatible with an absolute eternity of punishment, may be thought of pernicious tendency, by lessening the discouragement against

against evil-doing, a consequence I should be very sorry to have drawn from it, I have appropriated this chapter to obviate the mischief, by showing that nothing which I have advanced can really tend to lessen the discouragement.

2. But before I enter upon this task, I shall take the liberty to notice an objection against the everlasting duration of punishment, which appears to me not to have been enough attended to. Justice, in the received idea of it, requires an exact distribution of reward and punishment according to the character of each individual. It is not enough that reward be given to the good, and punishment to the bad, but the proportion of each must be determined according to their respective degrees of goodness or badness. So we are taught to expect a difference, not only between the good and the bad, but between the good and the better, the bad and the worse. The righteous shall rise above one another, as one star differeth from another in glory; and of disobedient servants, he that offendeth much shall be beaten with many stripes, and he that offendeth little with few stripes. Since then there is an exact proportion observed, corresponding with every little variation among individuals, and the difference between everlasting bliss and everlasting misery is immense, it follows that there should be the same immense difference of character between the good and the wicked, which we do not find true in fact; for there are all gradations of character, from the most virtuous man that ever lived, down to the most abandoned villain. Can we suppose that one man is doomed to everlasting flames, while another, but little better, is rewarded with everlasting bliss?

Those who place salvation in faith do not mend the matter; for a saving faith must be right, and it must be strong; but there are degrees of strength and rectitude in faith as well as in every thing else. Will any man assert, that every little

little error in matters of belief, and every falling short of the invincible confidence of a martyr, shall exclude from heaven; or every faint and inconsiderate assent to the orthodox faith secure a place in it? Thus there are degrees of faith and unbelief, as well as of morality and immorality. Who then can assign the precise degree of assent that distinguishes between a dead and a lively faith? Or mark out the exact line of separation between the believer and the infidel? So that whoever passes it, enters the state of salvation; and whoever falls a hair's breadth short, remains a child of perdition. Which yet, if we regard the distribution required by justice, ought to be not a mathematical line, but a spacious gulph, like that which separated Dives and Lazarus.

3. There seems no occasion to suppose, that the word everlasting, as applied in scripture to future punishments, was used in a strict philosophical sense (for the generality of mankind to whom it was preached, knew nothing of any such refinements) but meant merely to convey an idea of a very long duration, without setting any limitation to it, or thinking of any thing beyond. So in common discourse, we speak of an immense desert, the boundless ocean, an endless prospect; and we talk of a man purchasing an estate for him and his heirs for ever; not that we believe the estate or his property in it will be eternal, but because no limitation is set to the possession. In these cases we are something like those Indians, who, it is said, can count no farther than twenty, and for all higher numbers can only point to the hairs of their head: so if you tell them of a flock of a hundred sheep, you can only point to your hair; if of a thousand, you must do the same; and if you talk of the immensity of space or infinitude of time, you can only use the same sign. In like manner we use the term For ever, to express any length of time to which we can set no bounds,

and

and which has no end in our imaginations. Nor is it denied, that the word is often used to express periods which cannot be supposed endless, except in the figurative sense here spoken of.

4. Let us now suppose, we could know for certain that the duration of future punishment was precisely one thousand years (and we are not without some remote probabilities to show that it must be full that, from the proportion between the time we take to fashion in the womb and the common life of man, from the embryo nature of our present existence, as preparatory to another state of being, to which it perhaps bears as inconsiderable a proportion; and even from the length of life before the flood, which makes it probable that we shall not entirely escape from our immersion into matter, till we have balanced accounts with Methuselah, from whom it is evident, that all the deaths appearing upon our present bills of mortality are hasty and premature exits, not a full and fair release from our bodily prison)—still what encouragement would this be to the sinner? Suppose a wicked man talked to by the parson of the parish, who terrifies him with the dread of everlasting flames into the resolution of amendment. You come in afterwards, and bid him not mind the parson, for you know better than all of them put together, and can assure him there is no such thing as everlasting flames. Aye, says the man, I am heartily glad of that; for then I may take my pleasure as I like. No, no, I cannot engage for that neither, you say: you must expect to smart, but it will be only for a while, for a thousand years, and all will be well again. What comfort could this give him? Must it not rather damp his spirits; and the naming so vast a sum, increase his terrors more than their being limited to that term would abate them?

For both choice and evidence have a certain weight which renders them complete: while below this, you may enforce them

them by additional motives or evidence; but when once arrived at it, all further addition is superfluous. Were a man offered a long life of pleasure for a month's sufferings, perhaps he might be stout enough to accept the condition: were they increased to a year, he might hesitate; but were they multiplied to a thousand years, he could not doubt a moment, if he had any consideration at all left. Where demonstration will not convince, nor things beyond all comparison determine the choice, it shews an insensibility in the mind which nothing can cure. If those who hear not Moses and the prophets would not believe though one rose from the dead; neither would he, that is not touched with a thousand years of severe punishment, be moved with an eternity. For it is plain, the present wholly engrosses his imagination: he has no regard for the future; and you may as well make a blind man see by lighting up more candles, or a mortified limb, that has utterly lost all sensation, feel by laying on harder blows, as affect him by any future sufferings whatever.

5. Indeed the only danger in this case must arise from the common practice of expatiating with all the powers of oratory upon the word eternal: as if the punishment would not be worth minding, if it were not eternal. This seems to be enuring men never to stir except on the strongest inducement, whereas it would be better to bring them into a habit of answering even the feeblest calls of judgment. It has been remarked, that a trader never grows rich who despises small gains; and a man will never be happy or wise, who despises small advantages. For the excellence of moral reason lies in discerning, and being immediately determined by the slightest preference on all occasions.

Yet every innovation, even of a word, in matters of religion, is looked upon as dangerous; and I cannot help owning with reason. Because the bulk of mankind, too lazy

to

to think for themselves, take their opinions upon the credit of their teachers; and if they find that credit shaken in any single instance, very hastily infer that every thing else they have been taught was mere invention and mistake. Therefore to avoid giving a handle to any such scandalous conclusions, I shall endeavour to make out that the punishment of a future life may still be properly called eternal.

6. What else is eternity but an infinite length of time? Now the idea of infinity is, that of being able to add perpetually without ever coming or approaching to an end. So that the infinitude of a quantity is its exceeding all our methods of computation, a circumstance we can easily conceive belonging to it: but what does so exceed them cannot be the object of our comprehension for that very reason; therefore we have no right to say there can be nothing beyond what is infinite, or that all infinites must be equal. We have no other name indeed for all those quantities which surpass our powers of numeration; but because we call them all by one name, it does not follow that we are to suppose them all the same thing. There may be great varieties among them, and they may contain one another many times over, without our being able to find any difference between them; for they rank under the class of incomprehensibles, concerning which we can form no clear or adequate conception.

But I am got into the wilds of abstraction, and shall be better understood by recurring to instances where we may have sensible objects to assist us. Lay down a shilling upon the table, and there lies an infinite space directly over it: for all the solar and planetary systems, all the vast expanse containing the visible universe, if squeezed into the diameter of the shilling, would not fill up the cylinder: they would only raise it to a determinate height. Place another shilling close to the former, and there stands the like infinite

space over that too. Draw a line across the two shillings, and produce it in imagination as far as you can to the right hand: as it passes along, it will continually pass through superficies capable of containing other shillings, each having the like cylinder over it; but as you can never find an end of your line, you must conclude there runs an infinite row of columns on the right side of your shillings. So here we have the square of infinitude; that is, an infinite number of infinite spaces. You may may likewise imagine another row running by the side of the former, another beyond that, and so on without limitation, which gives you an infinite number of rows, or the cube of infinitude. Then we may consider, that there hangs the like cylinder under each shilling as well as above it; that the line might be produced on the left hand as well as on the right, &c. so that we have double infinities, quadruple squares, and octuple cubes of infinitude; and all these together compose the immensity of space, which we can express by no higher term than still to call it infinite.

With respect to infinite time or eternity, we cannot find squares and cubes there; yet every one may see that it consists of two eternities, that which is past, and that which is to come: the one continually receiving addition, yet without increase of quantity, the other continually perishing, yet without diminution, by the successive efflux of years and ages. Thus we see that infinities elude all our rules of arithmetic: if we add, multiply, square or cube them, we cannot increase; if we subtract or divide, we cannot diminish them. But the divine mathematician proceeds not by our arithmetic; he wants not comprehension to grasp the immensity of space, nor line of intelligence to measure the abyss of eternity. He sees distinctly what varieties of infinites lie contained within one another; and what proportion each bears to the other. Nor can we take upon us

to deny that he may know there have been many eternities already past, and many still reserved in the bosom of futurity; whereof he may assign one for the distribution of rewards and punishments, leaving ample room beyond for restoring equality, by provision made to bring the balance even among his creatures. If we cannot comprehend this, tell me what there is we can comprehend upon the article of infinities; and then I shall admit our not comprehending it to be an argument of the thing not being so.

7. Yet whatever limits be really set to the duration of future punishment, it will be the same to the sinner at his entrance upon it as if there were none: for if not endless, it will be hopeless. A man cast into a loathsome dungeon, or put on shipboard to be sent into banishment, while lamenting that he shall never see the light, or his friends and country again, can receive no comfort from the prince's having privately resolved to revoke his doom. In like manner, the sinner who lies engulphed in the dark abyss of wretchedness, can receive no consolation from a deliverance he will know nothing of.

If he flatter himself he shall become reconciled to his sufferings by custom, this is a vain expectation, which he has no ground to build upon. Pain and labour abate of their grievousness here, because our bodily organs lose their sensibility by frequent use, as our flesh becomes callous by continual pressure; but we do not find the same relief in disorders of the mind. Time may cure them by introducing other habits, but can never wear them out. Boys begin to want money as soon as they know the use of it, and this want increases with their years; so that covetousness is the predominant vice of old age. Those who have given way to anger and resentment in their youth, grow more touchy and revengeful the longer they live. And lust, when it has once taken strong hold of the mind, continues to plague the old

old lecher with the cravings of impure desire long after he is past all capacity of enjoyment.

8. How intense the sufferings of another life may be, nobody can pretend to tell: though there is every reason to believe, that the mind, when stripped of its gross outward covering, will be more susceptible both of pleasure and pain than it is now; as a man is more liable to be hurt with a stick who has no clothes on, and still more if you lay his skin bare; for the fewer obstacles the sensation has to make its way through before it touches the mind, the more keenly will it be felt. It may be said, that ideas of reflection which affect the mind immediately are in general much fainter than those of the senses; but then our ideas of reflection are only copies of impressions made by external objects, and it is no wonder the copy should fall short of the original. But this will not be the case when the mind itself is laid bare to the stroke of things external, and no longer wrapped up in the thick clothing of the body.

Now we know that there are evils enough in this life, shocking to human nature, terrible to think of, and much more terrible to feel! Racking pains of the rheumatism and stone, and all that long catalogue of diseases described in Milton's lazar house; terrors and lingering deaths under the ruins of earthquakes; painful perishings by fire; tearings by ravenous beasts; stings of venomous serpents; miserable exits from the bite of a mad dog; fractures, dislocations, and inward contusions by wars or accidents. What barbarities do not savage nations exercise upon one another! What tortures and refined cruelties have not been practised by tyrants and persecutors!

Nor are there less terrible scourges in the journey through life than in the passage out of it. The distresses of extreme poverty, hunger, nakedness, cold, and scorching heat; the mischiefs of vice and debauchery; the fatal effects of folly

and imprudence; the evils of bodily infirmity and constitutional disease; the vexations of injury, oppression, and ingratitude; the desolations of war and invasion; the miseries of shipwreck, and comfortless lengths of time passed on desolate shores, or in an open boat without covering or provisions, or hope of escaping; the wretchedness of slavery, when the unhappy negro, perhaps a king in his own country, is thrown into a stinking hold, kept upon rotten pease besmeared with tallow grease, and then delivered up to the inhuman Spaniard, who works him beyond what he can bear; and every now and then fells him to the ground with a hatchet, to shew his power, by way of entertainment to his visitors.

As to such as do not think the Negro worth their concern, because his skin is black, because he cannot talk English, and was never christened, it would be to little purpose to put them in mind of the miseries of the brute creation; whom nature has not only subjected to the severe service and wanton cruelties of man, but has likewise made them to worry, destroy, and torment one another. The cat plays with the mouse, cheats him continually with pretences of letting him escape; pats him when fainting to make him exert himself, a long while before she devours him. The water-snake pursues the shrieking frog through all his turns till she gets his head into her mouth, then swallows him by slow degrees into her stomach, where he lies digesting for some days before he dies. The spider has a long struggle to entangle the fly, till at last he wraps her up close in his web, and sits at leisure sucking out her vitals. The stupid unwieldy beetle beats himself down against a tree, or overturns himself as he crawls along, and lies sprawling on his back, till the little titmouse comes, pecks a hole in his side, scoops out his entrails, and leaves the hollow carcase to crawl about alive.

But

But to return to those of our own species whom we daily converse with: they have their private troubles and anxieties more than we can discover; for nobody knows where the shoe pinches so well as he that wears it. When men appear together in company, they put on a cheerfulness in their countenances, but who knows what disquietudes they have at home? Unnatural parents, faithless wives, disobedient children, ungrateful friends, deceitful patrons, approaching ruin of their fortunes, disappointment of schemes they had set their hearts on, resentment of cutting affronts, animosities against persons they cannot hurt, slights of the world upon their supposed merit. Add to this, the terrors of complexional fear and superstition; apprehension of fires or robberies, dread of infectious disorders, frights of apparitions, prognostics and dreams, doubts about predestination, dread of a future state, despondencies and aridities of Methodism, misgivings of freethinking. We may laugh at these grievances as fantastical, but however fantastical in their causes, they are real in their effects; and perhaps if we could look into the hearts of mankind, we should see them suffer more from imaginary evils than from real ones.

9. Thus we see how great a weight and variety of sufferings are consistent with infinite goodness, and necessary to work out the plan of providence. Yet as we do not know the grounds or limits of this necessity, we cannot tell how much farther it may extend in other stages of our existence; nor to what acuter sensations, more grievous distempers of mind, and more tormenting passions, our naked organizations may be liable. So that although we should not think an elementary fire or a corporeal worm reconcileable with our philosophical notions, there may well be punishments, if not similar in kind, yet equal in degree to the scorchings of unextinguishable flames, and gnawings of the never-dying worm. The punishments commonly described are

alarming enough to human nature: but these things have the strongest effect upon the weak and low-spirited, who want encouragements rather than terrors, and are more apt to dismay and stupify than rouse them to activity.

It is not always safe to follow authority too closely; a man may do very wrong by imitating another who did very right: for human nature, manners and sentiments, must be considered; and if these are different, a different conduct will be necessary. The Jews, and primitive Christians derived from them, seem to have been a serious, solemn generation; fond of extravagant metaphors, far-fetched allusions, hard-featured images, mysterious and enigmatical allegories, requiring painful attention to understand them. Their tempers were soured by oppression and public contempt; for it is not in human nature to preserve an easiness and benignity of mind under continual opposition and indignities: therefore they could think no reward alluring which had not a mixture of retaliation and triumph; nor was the bliss of heaven complete, without the satisfaction of beholding their persecutors swallowed up in the devouring flames of hell. And being accustomed to look for something of latent importance in words and syllables, they might be trusted with any figures without danger of turning them into ridicule.

But we moderns, living in ease and plenty, for the most part better fed than taught, affect the lively and amusing, rather than the pompous and perplexing: instead of labouring to find mysteries in every thing, we divert ourselves with turning every thing into jest: and have acquired the knack of making a trifle of whatever would naturally be most affecting to the imagination. Those to whom terrors would be most serviceable, being persons of strong spirits, sanguine complexions, and hardy constitutions, able to bear a bang or a burn without flinching, are little touched with bodily

bodily pains; and being generally of unlucky dispositions, they delight in broils and squabbles, finding themselves able to make their party good whatever adversary they have to cope with; and being used to abuse others and receive abuse themselves, care not what company they fall into. By foisting in the word Little, they can reduce any pain to a bearable size: for what signifies a little scorching or a little flogging? By familiarizing themselves to the term Damnation, they can wear away all meaning from it, so that it becomes a harmless sound. And the sooty countenance, horns, and cloven feet of Satan, make him the odder figure; so he passes for an arch comical droll, that hates to be confined by rules, and plays all sorts of mischievous tricks for fun and merriment. But if we could once catch those persons in a sober mood, and prevail on them to lay aside their all-healing epithet Little, they might see the difference between the sharpest pains they have experienced, and the violence of unquenchable flames; between temporary squabbles they can laugh at when over, and endless contests with a superior adversary who will leave them no respite nor inclination for laughing. And besides outward hurts and injuries, they may be tormented with inward pains, joint-racking rheums, or other excruciating distempers; with intolerable thirsts, insatiable cravings, the horrors of melancholy, and all dreadful disorders of mind. Nor are they sure of carrying with them that hardiness of constitution they so much depend on: but may be born into a new life with the fearful weakness of a woman, or helpless tenderness of a child, apt to be terrified at a word, to shudder at a shadow, and unable to bear the scratch of a needle.

And even supposing, what cannot well be supposed, that they are so stout as to value all this no more than a flea-bite, he will then take some other course with them, that will be sure to make them heartily sick of his company. Should

they have antipathies to particular animals, he will then tie them round with knots of vipers, wrap them up in webs for a prey to monstrous spiders, or shut them up with enormous toads or serpents. I do not mention these images as proper to be used generally, but to shew that there is something or other which every one must have a dread of, and which he ought therefore to do all in his power to avoid. There is no doubt that punishments will be found sharp enough to overcome his obduracy at last; so that he had better get rid of it, while he can, upon cheaper terms; for the more inveterate it grows, the severer remedies will be requisite. For let any one compute all the pleasures of vice and folly, that the longest life, with the most uninterrupted success, can afford him, and he will find them greatly outweighed by an extremity of torment, for however short a period it may be supposed to last.

10. We are as much at a loss to know what will be the nature of our enjoyments in another life: but those who go about to paint them by figurative representations, seem not always to have chosen the best. They tell us, that the righteous shall feel neither pain nor sorrow any more; and that all tears shall be wiped from their eyes. So far it is well; this however is only a negative happiness, such as may be found in annihilation: but what actual enjoyments are they to have? Why, they shall sing psalms all day long, and every day. This may be vast pleasure to a mind rightly tuned, but as our minds are strung at present, I believe there is hardly any body who would not be tired of singing psalms before half the day was out, or after having sung out the whole week, would have much stomach to begin again on Sunday.

But then they shall sit in white robes, with crowns on their heads, and all be kings. This may have great weight with such as are fond of fine clothes, and would be delighted

to

to hear themselves called, Your Majesty: but if we are all to be kings, where are our subjects? Oh! the toils of government would be troublesome: but we shall be called to judge the wicked, and triumph over all our enemies. This may be pleasant to persons of an ill-natured religion: but for my part, I should esteem the condemnation of malefactors a burden rather than an amusement; I never sign a mittimus, but I had much rather it were done by somebody else; and if I had any enemies, I should not wish to insult and triumph over them. Besides, all this will furnish employment only for the day of judgment; when that is ended, there will be nothing farther to do. Well, but their enjoyment of the beatific vision will not cease. Now though I can conceive, that to be able to see God as he is, may afford the highest delight to a rational soul, yet the expectation of this can touch us but faintly at present, so little do we know of the matter; and besides will furnish employment but for one of our faculties, and will end in speculation merely. In short, the common notion upon this subject seems to go no farther than an Epicurean heaven, a monastic happiness, an undisturbed pious idleness.

Some religions propose rewards alluring enough to human sense; a Mahometan paradise suits very well with Asiatic luxury: but such incitements are worse than nothing, being more calculated to deprave than purify the heart, and to lead into the road of destruction than that of happiness. Nor are our modern enthusiasts less blameable in flattering the mob with the privilege of insulting and ill-using their betters: for of the two, a man is not drawn so far aside from the spirit of piety by the thought of possessing a seraglio of beautiful wenches as of having a lord or a bishop bound hand and foot for him to kick and cuff about as he pleases.

Therefore,

Therefore, in figures employed to describe things unseen, care should be taken to admit nothing gross, sensual, or vindictive, but such only as may be at once innocent, and attractive. This is what I have attempted in the vision and in the account of the vehicular and mundane states: and I have so far succeeded, that upon reading them to a very sensible man, his remark at the end was, Well, I wish all this may be true. Now this is what I intended, and if my readers shall be ready to say so too, my purpose is answered. I do not desire them to believe it true, they may use their own discretion on this point; my object being only to present them with an encouraging prospect of a future state; and they may find reasons elsewhere to convince them, that if they take the right method for attaining it, they shall enter upon a scene of things which will be as well or better for them than if all this were true.

CHAP. XV.

PRACTICAL RULES.

RELIGION being intended for the good of mankind must be adapted to their nature and necessities, in order to be serviceable to them. But, as human nature is very various among different people and individuals, this diversity of character requires a different management, according to their several capacities, situations, and turns of imagination. And you may as well think of cutting out a measure for a suit of clothes that shall fit every body as of drawing up a system of religion adapted to the uses of all mankind.

There has been much talk in the world about uniformity; and indeed uniformity of profession were a desirable thing, as preventing discord, and a contempt of religion in general: for religious feuds being the most rancorous of any, no care too great can be taken to avoid them. And the bulk of mankind, who are unable to reason for themselves, would have no restraint upon their passions, no thought or dread of an invisible power governing the world, if they were not led into it by custom and authority, which will have the greater weight the more generally they are complied with. But no established form can contain the whole of every man's opinions, nor do the same expressions ever convey exactly the same ideas to a number of hearers; so that it is not to be concluded we have all the same sentiments, because we join in the same form of words.

How short is the first article of our creed! I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth. Yet how various are our conceptions of the Supreme Being? Some conceive him governed by human affections, others believe him exempt from passion of all kinds, &c. Then

for

for the epithet Almighty, if any one would see what a multitude of reflections that alone may give rise to, let him look into Barrow's long sermon upon the Greek word Pantocratoor. Again, what are we to understand by the word heaven? The common people mean by it the air, or atmosphere; some may begin it just above the atmosphere; others perhaps remove it beyond the starry sphere and visible universe. Then again, it may be argued from the motion of the earth, that what was heaven yesterday may be earth to-day, and the space contained in the room I now sit in, will be part of heaven to-morrow. Some may imagine that heaven is not local, but that it is our imprisonment in matter that excludes us from it, so that we should instantly find ourselves in heaven without moving from our places, could we but once get rid of the material body in which we are confined.

Thus a perfect uniformity of sentiment is neither practicable nor necessary. Our laws have therefore only provided for such an uniformity of profession as is requisite to maintain order, and keep alive a sense of religion in all parts of the community, at the same time allowing full liberty and indulgence to any diversity of opinions that does not tend to invalidate those ends, and unsettle the minds of the people.

2. Yet is this liberty to be used cautiously: speculative opinions may have an influence upon practical, and one man's speculations, though innocent and salutary to himself, may cause disquietude and do mischief in the mind of another, who will draw inferences from them quite the reverse of what the author intended. For in every science, those who make it their business to dive into the depths of it, find a very different scene of things from those who take only so much as is requisite for common use: and as such as have bestowed much thought on the foundations of right

right and wrong discover many contradictions and absurdities in the popular notions; so on the other hand their refinements appear unintelligible and absurd to the generality of men.

Hence the well-known distinction made by philosophers between their esoteric and exoteric doctrines, the one to be trusted only with adepts, the other communicated to the vulgar: or if they did sometimes venture the former in a mixed audience, they couched them in such enigmatical and mysterious terms, that nobody could tell what to make of them without the proper key. Now this reserve of theirs has been often placed in a wrong light, as if proceeding from a vain and niggardly temper, a contempt for all those who were not of the initiated, or an affectation of profoundness and mystery, the better to conceal the defects of their systems. No doubt such a narrow jealousy would be the very reverse of the character of true philosophy. The genuine philosopher pursues knowledge for the use, not the credit of it, and desires reputation only as it may assist his usefulness. He chooses his science not as the most noble and elevated above all others, but as most suited to his particular genius and circumstances. He sees that active professions are more necessary to the public well-being than speculative, and that many of them require as great acuteness of parts, soundness of judgment, and as piercing a sagacity, as the depths of philosophy. Like the sailor ordered up to the top-mast to descry ships or clouds, or promontories at a distance, who, though higher in situation, is not higher in rank than the crew below, who are governed by his signals; so he considers himself as placed upon some watch tower, there to sit a careful spectator of the earth with its inhabitants, their ways, natures, and all that passes therein, only to draw observations from thence for the service of his fellow-labourers, busied in employments

as

below, as useful and as laudable as his. Nor is he more prone to monopolize than to despise: for whatever wealth he possesses, is of a nature to be imparted without diminishing the stock of the owner. He never keeps back any discovery that would be of real service to another; but he knows that one man's meat may prove another man's poison, and it would be no benefit to give another what must disagree with him. As he pursues knowledge to its foundation, it appears there in a different form from what it does on the surface, and produces reflections foreign to common apprehensions, because not regarded in the common intercourse of life. For the particular rules of action often take a different direction from the principles giving them birth; and like a winding road seem to carry the traveller quite away from the point to which they will conduct him at last. Therefore he has one set of doctrines for his private use, and another for general use; not that they differ in substance, for they are intrinsically, and in their end, the same, but the one is a translation of the other into the vulgar language.

Were he to do otherwise, he would be so far from dealing honestly with his hearers, that he would deceive and mislead them, by conveying ideas the most foreign to his real thoughts. If he talked of self-interest, they would suppose he meant getting money or preferment; if of gratification, they would think this referred to sensual indulgence; if he represented the deity as incapable of receiving pleasure or pain from any thing we do, they would suppose it all one in what manner we behave, all actions being beheld with indifference by the all-seeing eye. Therefore to convey his real sentiments, he must disguise, and even contradict them, the idioms of the two languages being so widely different, that to keep the spirit of the original he must sometimes express himself directly opposite to the

the articles of his own creed. And he will be likely to practise the same honest artifice upon himself, conforming his speculations to practical purposes, and lending reason the powerful aid of imagination. Your beginners in science, fond of a new acquisition, cannot lay it aside on any occasion; so they mingle subtleties in their common affairs, and gross ideas with their meditations, making a jumble of both. But the perfection of understanding lies in keeping them both separate, or in having such a command over our thoughts, as to be able to direct them in the channel in which it is most proper for them to flow, according as we have to determine upon the remote principles of our actions, or to put them in immediate execution. For upon ordinary occasions we shall find it necessary to make use of our senses and habitual feelings in our intercourse with others; the force of sympathy will insensibly assimilate our conceptions to theirs; or if we could resist this force it would only destroy the ease, freedom, and mutual benefits of our intercourse with one another.

Thus it is often necessary for us to conceive of things otherwise than we know them to be: we know the sun stands still, and the earth rolls round it with inconceivable rapidity; yet to think of the stately fabrics, the spacious cities, the lofty mountains, the brimming ocean, and the universal repose of a still evening, as rushing forward with such unceasing impetuosity, is an idea too unwieldy for our imagination.

We hold matter inert and senseless, but yet ascribe force to storms and inundations; activity to poisons; inclemency to seasons; kindliness to dews; benignity to vernal gleams; and give bodies other powers and affections belonging only to ourselves. Nor can we avoid debasing even the divine nature by figurative expressions, making it tenable to our imaginations; as when we speak of the hand, the finger, the

the eye, the voice of God, apprehend him pleased or angry, compassionate or jealous, and actuated by our own conceptions and passions.

3. I have hitherto addressed myself chiefly to the more thinking and refined sort of readers, endeavouring to establish certain general principles, and leaving the application of them to be made, and their use to be pointed out by others, if any should think it worth their while to new-model the exoteric or practical doctrines by my esoteric theory. We may look upon the philosopher in the light of a wholesale trader, importing the principles of reason from all quarters of nature. If you go to him for the supply of your family, he cannot accommodate you; for he deals only in tons and hogsheads, or quantities larger than you will know what to do with. Besides, what you purchase would consist partly of cask and packing, which must encumber your house; and contains a mixture of stalk and husk and rubbish, which would require a great deal of skill and trouble to pick out. Or he may shew you piles of plank or bars of iron, good for nothing till they are properly manufactured. So it is his business to supply the retailer who may work up his materials into tools and utensils, necessary for the artificer and the housekeeper; or pick and sort and parcel out the different articles, and make them up in such compositions, as that you shall scarce know the ingredients, yet shall find them fit for your immediate consumption. But it being no uncommon thing for the wholesale dealer to have a separate shop wherein he carries on the retail business, why may not I be indulged in the same thing, and permitted to try how the esoterics will look in the exoterical form. This attempt is the more commendable, because great mistakes have often been committed in this kind of manufacture; I will therefore shew in one or two instances how far I would have the foregoing speculations

lations influence our common notions and ordinary trains of thinking.

4. Thus, for instance in speaking of the attributes, I have taken no notice of purity, because this, as implying an exemption from all foul and heterogeneous mixture, is so obvious a part of the divine essence, which is perfectly simple and individual, and cannot mingle with any thing foreign to itself, that one might wonder a particular attribute had ever been assigned to the Supreme Being to preserve him from a debasement it is not in his nature to undergo: we might as well make an attribute of abstemiousness because he lives without eating, or of hardiness because he wears no clothes to keep him warm.

Nevertheless, it is not so material to us, what is the divine essence as what is the nature and condition of our own imagination. For we cannot behold God as he is: with the utmost strength of our thoughts we cannot delineate him exactly, but still find him incomprehensible; and that miniature we carry about in our hearts for constant use falls short even of the imperfect drawings in our understanding. So that at best we are all but idolaters, and the materials employed in making up our golden image are taken from ourselves: for we pick out what golden particles we can find in ourselves, whatever we esteem an excellence or proof of power in man, and raising them to the highest degree we can conceive, thence form our idea of God. This is the idol we worship, to which we look up for protection, and the continual contemplation of which must assimilate our character gradually to itself. And as without due care some of the dross belonging to us will cling to the ingredients, and become a part of the composition, it is therefore of the utmost consequence to keep this idea clear of all manner of grossness, weakness, or impurity.

I can just remember when the women first taught me to

say my prayers; I used to have the idea of a venerable old man, of a composed benign countenance, with his own hair, clad in a morning gown of a grave coloured flowered damask, sitting in an elbow-chair. I am not disturbed at the grossness of my infant theology, it being the best I could then entertain: for I was then much about as wise as Epicurus, having no conception of sense or authority as possible out of a human form. And perhaps the time will come when, if I can look back upon my present thoughts, I may find the most elevated of them as unworthy of their object as I now think the old man in the elbow-chair.

We conceive of God as a spirit without mixture of any thing corporeal; but then we take our idea of spirit from those among whom we are conversant, that is from one another. The different features of his character are derived from human nature, and so they must always be; for we have no colours to employ, nor any image to represent him by, but what our experience has afforded us. And we are excusable in employing this mode of apprehension, provided we render it as refined and spiritual as our imagination will bear, striving to exclude all impurities, or grossnesses that can possibly be spared, without making the idea too thin to be sensible. So that there is a discretion to be used upon this article as well as all others relating to the purity of our ideas: something gross and human we must mingle in our conceptions of God, because it is unavoidable, and more we must not, than is unavoidable. Therefore it is a very nice point to distinguish exactly what is necessary to give a solid body to our religion that it may not evaporate, yet without retaining a single particle more of *caput mortuum* than is requisite to fix the spirit. And the exact proportion must depend on times and persons: for when bodily disorders obscure our faculties, when the hurry of business leaves no room for reflection, if our talents

be

be small, our education low, the objects and people about us vulgar, we shall not be able to raise our imaginations above gross and sensible ideas. Therefore that conception is pure and clean to every man which is the purest and cleanest he can entertain.

When Clarissa tells the wretched women who were trying to accomplish her destruction, that the eye of God was upon them, she says, they looked up to the cieling, expecting to see his eye: now this conception was exactly suited to the gross and abject state of their minds, nor would a more refined notion have been better, for this was the only one that was at all likely to affect them. We have all of us some grossness left; and stand in need of sensible images and impassioned representations to rouse us to action, which, however unworthy of the divine being, are yet the best adapted to the condition of human weakness. Still the imagination may be made gradually susceptible of purer ideas, not only among individuals, but nations, by the general diffusion of knowledge. Of this we have a striking example in the difference between the ancient world and the modern; for they could not do without images, sacrifices, numerous rites, and corporeal attributes, in their idea of the deity, which are now almost wholly banished from the lowest of the people.

5. But there is another branch of purity, which consists in separating our idea of God from external objects of nastiness and impurity: and here the exoteric doctrine runs directly counter to the esoteric. For the latter describes him omnipotent, and omniscient, filling the whole immensity of space, beholding all things without exception, alike present in the kitchen and in the chapel, in the stable-yard and at the sacred altar. I might here, according to my usual method, shew this in some striking instances: but I forbear, lest while I labour to convince the understanding I

should shock the imagination. But whoever will cast a momentary glance upon what his own reflection may suggest, will instantly feel how inexpedient it is to accustom ourselves to dwell upon every thing we know to be true, and how necessary to provide one system for the closet and another for our familiar use.

For we are not to conceit that we carry the real essences even of common things in our minds, much less of the most excellent and glorious of all beings; we apprehend them only in types and colours drawn out upon our sensory. It has been observed before, that the God we worship is no more than an idol framed out of human materials, picked up from our own composition. Therefore, though the divine essence be like Ithuriel's spear, incapable of defilement by any thing external to it; yet the idea in our imagination may be polluted by improper objects adhering to it; and we ought therefore to lay aside every idea of that sort when we think of him. Which shews the extravagance of those enthusiasts who literally exhort us to have God always in our thoughts, and do every action of our lives with intention to please him. For if every time we shifted, or washed our hands, or paired our nails, or did other things I do not care to name, we were to do them as in his presence, it would be more likely to debase and contaminate than ennoble and sanctify our minds, to degrade him below ourselves, than raise us to a nearer resemblance with him.

6. The same observations will apply to those other attributes of Majesty and Holiness, our notions of which we ought to regulate more by our own nature than the divine, and carefully avoid whatever might appear derogatory to them in our own apprehension, however agreeable to our esoteric reasonings. Thus we know that God is everywhere present. Yet it would degrade, and I may say, vulgarise the Almighty to imagine him resident among ourselves, and

and (what must of course follow in our thoughts) engaged in the trifling scenes that occupy our attention. For we ourselves cannot be present in one place without being absent from others, and are almost entirely taken up with the things passing before us. Therefore we say God is in heaven and we upon earth, that he dwells in the heaven of heavens, in the centre of light inaccessible. Still we must not forget that, at whatever height or distance we suppose heaven to be, the ever-watchful eye of Providence can thence behold distinctly all the concerns of the earth, the workings of nature, the courses of fortune, the secret chambers of darkness, and inmost recesses of the human heart.

This limited conception of the Deity renders him capable of locomotion (an article that can never find admittance in the esoteric creed), so that we may represent him as going forth to plan out the spaces for a new world, to lay the foundations of the solid mountains, to set bounds to the restless ocean, to turn the scale of victory, or rescue nations from destruction, as riding in the whirlwind, and making the clouds his chariot. Thus, whatever does not tend to lessen, but rather to exalt our idea of him, may be safely indulged, and whatever in the familiar train of our thoughts might have a tendency to degrade him ought to be excluded. We ought not therefore to consider God as the author of the vice or misery that there is in the world, unless at the same time we could so purify and strengthen our imaginations as to feel that nothing is evil as he has established it; that is, in reference to the whole; but is the dictate of the most perfect wisdom and goodness. It is proper that we should look upon evil with aversion and on vice with horror; because we only see their immediate effects, and, as far as relates to ourselves, we ought to avoid them with the greatest earnestness. But if we consider them

with respect to the plan of Providence, we must then either suppose them to be as hateful in the sight of God as in our own, or that their nature and effects are really such as to make them necessary and desirable. If therefore we have not such a command over our imaginations, as to see every thing with the eye of faith, we may at least put a rein upon our thoughts, and divert them from those objects which would prove stumbling blocks in our way.

This explanation of what I mean by the difference between esoteric and exoteric doctrines will I hope be sufficient to prevent any hasty conclusions being drawn from the speculative refinements in which I have sometimes indulged. It will be seen that I do not wish to confound the separate provinces of reason and imagination, or that every general theorem, of which we may be convinced, should immediately be applied to the commonest actions and occurrences. Our contemplation of external nature and our reasonings drawn from thence will best teach us what notions we ought to form of the Supreme Being; but we must appeal to our own bosoms and experience to know what ideas we *can* indulge of him with safety, and so as to produce in us those sentiments, and that veneration, which we are sure would be excited in us in a much greater degree, could we have a nearer view of his exalted nature and perfections.

BOOK IV.

ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTORY.

WERE it necessary for me to have drawn up a complete scheme of practical religion (according to the distinction laid down in the last chapter) I might perhaps, conscious as I am of my insufficiency for the task, have attempted to throw what light I could upon the several subjects that might offer themselves. But there is no occasion for me or any one else to enter upon any such bootless enterprize, at least till we have tried what can be done with the materials already supplied to our hands. When we find them fail, it will then be time enough to think of doing the best we can upon our own stock; if they do not fail, they will answer our purpose more effectually than any thing we could have produced ourselves: for were it possible to strike out a new system equally good, this might not prove so advantageous as building on an old one. Men are not easily put out of their accustomed trains of thinking, nor are they willing to take a new road where every thing must appear strange and uncouth; or if they were, still they could not make the same advances as upon grounds that were familiar to them before.

2. For this reason, if there were no other, I am warranted

in having recourse to the doctrines prevailing in these countries, borrowing from thence whatever I may want for the completion of my plan, and supporting what I take upon the foundations already laid down in the former part of the work. Not that I mean to call in authority to my aid, for that would be contrary to my plan, which was to build entirely upon human reason. But my not using authority ought no more to be taken as a proof of my rejecting than receiving it. I am not conscious of having yet advanced any thing inconsistent with the opinions generally received as fundamental, nor shall I advance any thing which has not its support independently of them. I may therefore consistently with my first assumed character, which was that of a neutral, and without contending with either party, proceed to examine what there is conformable between the discoveries of Reason and Revelation, and how far they support and illustrate each other, if perchance I may thus produce something that may be styled either a Christian philosophy, or a rational Christianity.

3. Not that I expect to please every body by making this attempt: for there are persons who seem to have placed the corner-stone of their faith in that saying, He that is not with us is against us. With such there is no medium to be preserved: a favourable word spoken of any they do not like, is taken for a declaration of hostility against themselves; as if it were high treason in religion and philosophy to drink a pretender's health. They are more eager to run down an adversary than to make any improvements themselves; and aiming at distinction rather by differing from others than by their intrinsic merit, they cannot bear with patience whatever tends to lessen that difference, which they wish to make as wide as possible; so that he who presumes to doubt of a single truth must be a heretic, an infidel, a man of no principles; or, on the other hand, he that

that believes a single point more than they approve, must be a bigot, an enthusiast, a crafty designer on the liberties of mankind.

But there are others of a different turn, who judging of opinions by their inherent lustre, do not want a foil to set them off, and are under no temptation to depreciate what they reject, in order to magnify what they adopt; who are candid and favourable to those who seem at the farthest distance from them, glad to find them less unreasonable than they expected, and ready to interpret every thing for the best. Persons of this character will be ready to lend me an attentive ear, whatever they may think of my success: but as they stand at present divided into two parties, it will be necessary to have some explanation with each of them separately, before I enter upon any attempt to accommodate matters between both.

4. I shall first address myself to those who hold the reality of revelations. These, they will acknowledge, proceeded from the God of love and truth, who had no end of his own to serve thereby, but gave them in pure kindness to mankind; or if they suppose the advancement of his own glory to have been implied, yet they will hardly suppose this inconsistent with the good of his creatures. So that the benefit of mankind, if not the sole, was yet one thing constantly designed in every dispensation of Providence; and we may say of all the divine institutions as we are told of one in particular, That man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man.

The next thing to be considered is, in what manner we shall conceive the benefit to be produced: whether by a new virtue infused into certain institutions by Omnipotence, or by the effect they must naturally have upon the minds and conduct of such as practise them. I hope I shall not give offence, if I am unwilling to admit any thing that looks like

like charm and magic in religion; since he who made us, and knows intimately all the springs of our composition, has no need to give a preternatural efficacy to things insignificant, but can find out methods suited to the nature and condition of his creatures. I shall therefore venture to suppose, that whatever commands come from God are such, that if we were able to discern their expedience, we should find it prudent to follow the courses they direct to, although they had not been enjoined; so that we might regard his precepts as issuing from wisdom rather than authority; as advices of one who knows what is best for us, rather than edicts we durst not disobey, were we of so happy a temper as always to take good advice without the dread of authority to enforce it. From hence it will follow, that reason and nature are the same thing as divinity; that whoever should perfectly understand one must understand both, and that every step of real proficiency in either is also an advance towards the other. Still this does not lessen the value or necessity of revelation, or shew that we should ever have been able to discover what it is necessary that we should know without a divine interposition. Neither does it follow, because the truths communicated to us were such as lay beyond the reach of human reason, that they are therefore contrary to it, or that the exercise of our reason is not necessary to understand them. We are exhorted to try all things; and told that we may know of the doctrines whether they be of God: but how can we make trial of any thing without the use of our judgment, or distinguish the internal marks of divinity in a doctrine, unless by comparing it with those ideas of God we have before collected from natural religion? And if the truth were known, I am apt to believe the internal evidence is what determines most men who do not take their opinions upon trust: for the external of all kinds has been so perplexed by subtle disputations, pro and

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con, that it requires a compass of reading few have opportunity to go through, to be masters of the argument; but according as they think well or ill of the doctrine, they admit the slightest or reject the strongest evidence in its favour. Nature is certainly the work of God as well as revelation; why then should we despise the study of it, and not rather consider it as another Bible dictated by the same author? So far as we perceive them to agree, we may rest assured of having the true sense of the author; but whenever they seem at variance, it is certain we have misunderstood one, and a shrewd suspicion we may have mistaken both. What then can we do better than carefully study both, and pursue the comparison between them, in order to discover our mistake, or remove the causes of it, by employing them to explain one another? Besides, that revelation was not intended wholly to supersede the use of our rational powers, must appear from hence, that it cannot contain positive rules for every situation in which it is necessary for us to act; that the rules cannot apply *themselves*; that some precepts are acknowledged not to be universally binding, but to have been intended only for the particular persons to whom they were delivered; yet there is no distinction marked in the text, between the injunctions intended for the disciples and those addressed to all mankind; lastly, we do not scruple to alter the primitive institutions and practices, according to the difference of times and circumstances rendering those changes necessary. Christ sent forth his preachers with nothing more than a staff in their hands; and after his departure, the Apostles maintained themselves by their own labour, or the voluntary contributions of the faithful; yet it is easy to see, that in the present circumstances of mankind this method would neither be practicable nor eligible. Thus we see, that it is necessary to make use of common sense and reason in religion as well as other things, and that therefore

therefore we ought not to look with a suspicious eye on any attempt to effect a reconciliation between them.

4. I shall next pass over to the other side, where I must take up principles directly opposite; for when one goes upon the errand of peace-making, one must not contradict nor thwart, but say the things that will please. Therefore I must now look upon revelation as incredible, and that what has been palmed upon the world for such, was either the invention of crafty politicians, or a delusion of enthusiasts. Now, however this may be, it is certain that the religion of mankind was brought into its present form by a long and complicated tissue of very remarkable causes. The nations of Europe are now mostly Christian, and if we consider that Mahometanism is an excrescence or corruption of Christianity, perhaps as well deserving the name as some systems that still retain it, we must allow, that either in its purity or its corruptions, it has spread nearly over the whole civilized world. Now, unless we allow chance a principal share in the management of human affairs, we must needs ascribe this extraordinary concatenation of causes producing so important an event to the will of God. For however we may think it beneath his dignity to concern himself with minute affairs, we can hardly refuse him cognizance of that which has operated upon all mankind.

But it may be alleged, that there is a distinction to be made between things appointed and permitted; and that delusion and superstition being evils (though perhaps necessary evils), are not to be considered as approved of by him. But why must we suppose religion to be an evil, or to have thrown mankind into a worse state than they would otherwise have been in. Are the Chickasaws, Twigtwees, or the Hottentots, who are reported to have none, more humane, more enlightened, better governed, or better provided with the conveniences of life, than those nations who have some

kind of worship among them? On the contrary, the wisest lawgivers have always found it necessary to inculcate the belief of an invisible power, taking cognizance of human actions; and as the worst government is better than none, or complete anarchy, so the worship of a stock or a stone is better than no worship at all. It may be said that natural religion might serve us better; but the truth is, that this has been tried, and we all know how very far the doctrines and institutions of the wisest heathens fell short of that wisdom which descended, or at least is supposed to have descended, from above.

Why then should we deprive ourselves of this 'vantage ground, raised upon authority and popular belief, which is the only one from which we can have a prospect of producing any effect upon mankind at large? Were we assuredly wiser than convocations and synods, we could not open the sources of our wisdom to the world; we could only deal out the streams in salutary precepts, exhorting them to a reverence of the divine Majesty, dependence on his providence, honesty in their dealings, and industry in their callings, which they must take on the credit of our authority: but what authority can we expect with those who are no judges of our extraordinary merit? Therefore how fortunate, or rather providential, is it that the same things are recommended by an authority so generally allowed, and how imprudent must it be to weaken that authority, which is the only effectual engine we have to accomplish our beneficial purposes with?

As much as we may laugh at our grandmother Eve and her apple, or the romantic perfection of Paradise, certain it is, that human nature and human understanding are now far from being perfect; and though it should not be owing to that cursed pippin having spoiled our constitution, we are evidently a weakly distempered race of mortals, who require a great

a great deal of care and management to make our natural aliment digest. We are a kind of children who require to be told this thing, and forbidden that: it is rarely that we can discover what reason directs, and still more rarely that we are inclined to follow her directions without some habit, or passion, or mechanical motive to influence our choice. The necessities of life require our time and attention to provide for them; reason directs us to devote a part of our thoughts to our spiritual concerns: some few may be led by inclination to employ a due proportion this way occasionally; but it is easy to guess this dictate of reason would be generally neglected, without certain stated times appropriated to the performance of it. Perhaps the philosopher might think one day in ten enough, or one in five but just enough, or he would certainly see that Wednesday would answer the purpose as well as Sunday; but if it would not do better, why should he wish to put men out of their way to no purpose? And, besides, who would mind the philosopher enough to throw aside his common business once a week to please him? If there are persons so gross and narrow-minded, as to imagine an intrinsic sacredness in the day, yet if this is the only consideration that would cause them to make a proper use of it, it would be doing them an injury to undeceive them.

The same may be said of other customs esteemed sacred: if not valuable in themselves, they may lead to practices and sentiments, the benefit of which it might be impossible to make manifest to every eye; and there is this advantage in all discipline, even though practised in trifles, that it enures men to order and rule, and to resist a present fancy, and renders them more susceptible of benefit from the knowledge of what is right, whenever they can attain it. If then we consider religion only as the scaffolding of reason, it is well worth our attention: for whether human nature in its

its present condition be an unfinished building, or the ruins of an ancient structure, it stands equally in need of props and outwards additions; when the edifice is once complete, it may stand alone; but any one that contemplates the present state of it, may see that it is much too early to strike the scaffolding yet.

But it is suggested that many doctrines are propagated among the vulgar, contrary to reason and subversive of morality; contrived by designing persons solely for their own profit and aggrandisement. What then? May we not pick out the corn from the chaff; and is it not worth while to sift them carefully, that we may know how to distinguish them, instead of casting away both out of wantonness or laziness? If we find any thing manifestly superstitious, we shall do well to oppose or qualify it by a rational construction, always taking with us the caution just now given, and remembering that superstition is relative; for otherwise we may do hurt instead of good. There is no doubt that schemes of avarice, ambition, and tyranny, over the very thoughts, as well as persons and properties of men, have been erected on the basis of religion. But then our antagonists may retort the argument upon us, for reason also has been found to make wild work in some hands; and if it has never done such extensive mischief, it was for want of strength to influence the passions: if therefore religion, which has by far the greater innate vigour, can be brought to assist in the purposes of reason, how much more good may be done in this way than without it! But it is unfair to take the character of either from their appearance under the disguises with which they have been loaded by the passions and follies of men. The Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Pyrrhonists, were much such philosophers as the Gnostics, Muggletonians, and Moravians were Christians: and he that should form his judgment of reason or religion from these examples, would

would do as wisely as if he expected to discover the alimentary qualities of fruits by analysing such as were rotten. To have a true idea of things, one ought to know the best they are capable of; which can never be learned from their depravities, nor without examining them in their fairest lights, and observing to what uses they are applicable. Why then should we so wrap ourselves up in the conceit of our own accomplishments, as to think there is nothing to be learned from another, or to despise in the lump a whole set of regulations, established by the wisdom of politicians, and approved by persons of the best dispositions, and most enlightened judgments? Suppose, for instance, that the Jewish lawgiver was an impostor, and ambitious, how would this shew that the institutions which he gave his countrymen were not wisely adapted to their circumstances, or that, in exerting his authority over them, he might not have a sincere desire to make them a great and happy people, as well as to aggrandize himself?

5. Having thus apologised with both parties for my attempt, I shall now proceed to shew the points of agreement between them; in doing which, if I am successful, I may at least hope to render them less odious and contemptible to one another. But I think that other advantages would follow from this incorporation or ingrafting of reason with religion, if it could be completely effected: for by thus blending them both together, the coolness of the one would temper the warmth of the other, and in return derive a fructifying vigour from it. For reason is a very indifferent bearer; its juices viscid, and its circulation slow; producing leaves, and blossoms, and knotty excrescences without number; but seldom bringing any serviceable fruit to maturity without great advantages of soil, cultivation, and continual tendance. Whereas religion is a prodigious bearer, often redundant than barren in the poorest grounds: but

but the strong tone of its vessels, and rapid circulation, drive on the juices before they are well digested, and are apt to occasion crudities in the fruit, which will, like some pears, frequently contain more wood than wholesome pulp.

6. In executing this task, I must be allowed a reasonable latitude and freedom of thought. But since freedom has been so grossly misunderstood, as to be taken by some for perverseness and obstinacy, and by others for a bold opposition to whatever they do not like, it will be proper to know something of its genuine nature before we venture upon the use of it; and as it contributes greatly towards keeping us in the right way, to observe the turnings on either side that lead out of it, I shall endeavour to point out the principal hindrances that in general obstruct the course of a true freedom of judgment and inquiry.

CHAP. II.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT.

NATURE has given to each species of animals some distinguishing faculty for their preservation and amusement. The lion lives by his courage; the elephant by his strength; the swine by his sturdiness. The squirrel delights in his agility, the swallow in the strength and swiftness of his wing. The spider maintains himself by his cunning, the bee by her industry. The nation of flies and little fishes, artless and defenceless, exposed for a prey to all other creatures, subsist by their prolificness, multiplying faster than they can be destroyed. To man she has given understanding to supply the want of strength, robustness, agility, and sagacity of instinct, in all which he falls short of his brother animals. Therefore our understanding is the faculty it behoves us most sedulously to cultivate, because it is on this we must principally depend for a supply of our wants, and for our several enjoyments.

Yet we need not despise our fellow-creatures for the want of it: for we cannot enter into their ideas, or know for certain whether their lives do not pass as pleasantly as our own. We know our pains are doubled by reflection; and perhaps it does not add much to our pleasures, which are thereby made to satiate the sooner: if we have funds of amusement unknown to them, we have also many sources of disquietude and unhappiness, from which they are exempt; and we find with respect to ourselves, that there are few among us who do not acknowledge they passed happier days while children or school-boys, than they have ever enjoyed among the fruits of reason when ripened to full maturity. Nevertheless, as water supplies breath to the fish,

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and hay nourishes the cattle, yet are unfit for the respiration or sustenance of man, wherefore we choose the fresh air and wholesome food, not because a nobler kind of support, but because better suited to our constitution; so we should avail ourselves of our rational faculty, not for the pride of its superior excellence, but for its being the most adapted to our uses. For sense and appetite, though proper guides to the brutes, would be perpetually leading us astray; and nastiness, however it may give a real enjoyment to the swine, perhaps greater than we find in our delicacies, our perfumes, or even in the contemplation of our sciences, would fill us with disorder and loathing. So that without thinking any thing contemptible in itself, wherever nature has placed it, we may despise brutal appetites as ignoble and unworthy of us, because we have another faculty *we* may employ to higher uses and nobler advantages than we can receive from them. Thus it becomes our glory to improve our understanding, to raise it above the mire of appetite and passion, and approach as near as our capacities will permit to that openness and largeness of mind we believe belonging to superior orders of beings.

2. Education, example, and custom, are the first channels of knowledge and sentiment. At our entrance into life, every thing is new, every thing unknown to us; so that there is no ground to build a rational conviction on, nor other reason to be had for assenting to any thing, than because we are taught it. Thus the improvement of the understanding goes on by slow degrees; and the first advances towards it are made by laying in a stock of materials, whose uses we are to find out afterwards. For single persons could make but small advances of themselves; and the difference between one people and another arises solely from the mutual communication of lights among them. The experience of those who have gone before us, conveyed by in-

struction, shortens our road to knowledge; and by lifting us over a considerable part of the way, leaves us in fresh vigour and spirits to pursue the rest, or run further lengths beyond.

3. Docility is therefore the first step to our improvement; and freedom of thought the second. For instruction will not do every thing. The opinions we receive from others are often false, imperfect, liable to misapprehension, nor can we always tell in what manner to act upon them. Therefore we must see as well as hear; and employ our judgment to understand, to apply, to enlarge or correct the notions we have imbibed from education, example, or custom. But this exercise of private judgment is a very difficult thing to manage; and its decisions liable to the same inconveniences as those made for us by other people: for we often do no more than substitute our own blunders and prejudices for those of others, opposing their authority with an overweening conceit of our own sagacity and infallibility. For the high veneration commonly inculcated for the ways and principles men have been brought up in, becomes transferred to their own sense as soon as it begins to distinguish the character of truth or falsehood independently of the teacher's authority; especially if it discovers errors and imperfections in the things they have been taught, for then it appears more venerable than what they have been habituated to venerate. This opinion of our own sagacity, and attachment to our own views of things, not unfrequently grows into a strong passion, which puts shackles upon the thought: for innocent mistake or ignorance may proceed from other causes, but it is always some secret passion that infringes upon our liberty, forcing us into a train of thought to answer its own purposes, and restraining us from looking upon any thing that seems to contradict them. It would be endless to hunt after all the extravagances this passion produces;

produces; but as connected with religion, it divides into two principal branches, bigotry and free-thinking.

3. Now, however distant these two branches may seem, there is a nearer resemblance between them than one would at first imagine. For the bigot is a freethinker with respect to the doctors of his church, delighting to censure their expositions and practices as deviations from the primitive purity; and the freethinker is a bigot to certain favourite principles of his own, the infallibility of reason, the absurdity of divine interposition, &c. Both are alike presumptuous, arrogant, self-sufficient, indissolubly wedded to their own peculiar opinions, and confident in their sagacity to discern certain truths intuitively; impatient of contradiction, scorning to learn, as implying imperfection, but aiming to draw all others after them; ambitious of shining every where, so as to appear persons of consequence.

The views of both lie confined within a scanty compass; for they care little to observe human nature, to study the passions, affections, or relations of men, but frame their system both of opinions and conduct according to their own situation and ideas, and then expect every body should conform to it. They make a mighty pretence of zeal for the public good, but then it extends only to such of the public as chime in with their schemes; for all the rest they detest and despise. Both entertain equally narrow conceptions of the supreme Being; taking their idea of him from human affections, and confidently persuading themselves that their picture is an exact copy of the original: thus depressing him to their own level, as a shorter way than striving to imitate his perfections, and depreciating their fellow-creatures till they conceit themselves raised far above the midway between them and their Creator. Both agree to place the whole sum and substance of religion in forms and creeds: which the one therefore regards as the sole thing essential, in contempt of

practical sentiments and the common duties of life; while the other, finding no essential value in them, concludes unfavourably of religion itself, as containing nothing else.

4. The bigot has been carefully trained up or terrified by the rantings of some gifted preacher, into a serious and thoughtful temper; he hears grievous lamentations at the universal depravity and blindness of mankind, is perpetually reminded of the doctrine of the strait gate, and how happy it is that he has the means and disposition afforded him for entering it. He shews a strong propensity to work miracles; but the inquisitiveness of the times not permitting it, he deals largely in secret whispers, private illuminations, and inward feelings, in which nobody can contradict him. Providence seems to have nothing else to do but to watch his most minute motions; and every little turn of chance respecting him is an interposition of Heaven. He affects humility, but sees none comparable to himself in that only valuable quality, a zeal for the divine glory; his great object is to gather a multitude of followers, whom he strives to chide and frighten into religion, instead of inviting and persuading them: he would have every body hunt after lectures from morning to night, or sing psalms every third hour, mingle prayers with their diversions, and starve themselves both in food and clothing, but give him all their money to dispose of in pious uses, and purchase himself more followers and more adoration. He is the prime favourite and chief messenger of Heaven, to whom he has become in a manner necessary; for without him the true worship would be lost out of the world. He would persuade all mankind to throw aside their respective callings, or follow them only by the bye, making divinity their principal study, because then they must all resort to his oracle, from whence alone they can have it genuine; not considering that it is just the same absurdity for a man to neglect his active

active duties to spend all his time in devotion, as it would be for a soldier to desert his post, and lie lurking about his general's tent, out of a pretended respect to him.

5. The Freethinker has probably been bred up in no principles at all, or if he has, it has generally been a little too strictly among persons better versed in the forms and tenets of religion than the ends they were calculated to answer; but being of a lively volatile temper, he digests nothing of what is taught him; his lessons become dry, all appears task and burthen, and he despairs of ever making any great proficiency. Under this uneasiness he meets with somebody who, with a confident air talks slightingly of the discipline that has disturbed him, reflects upon his teachers as proceeding more by rote than judgment; convinces him that forms and articles have nothing essential in them; that if men would do what they know to be right, performing their duties as members of society, nothing more would be wanted; and makes wondrous merry with the dogmaticalness of pedants, and the superstitions generally esteemed sacred by the vulgar.

These comfortable discourses, addressed both in the argumentative and ludicrous part to the good sense of our pupil, well suiting his convenience and lively temper, quickly wear off what little reverence he may have remaining for his instructors: he is conscious of having received no benefit from their teaching, and rejoices in the freedom of thought which he has at length obtained. He will now take nothing upon trust, nor otherwise than as hints, till he has made them his own by having the sanction of his judgment. But he hates trouble; thinks all painful investigation needless, as tending only to perplex; makes his decisions easily, without scruple or diffidence. This begets in him a superlative conceit of his own understanding, which can discern right and wrong at a glance; for whatever strongly strikes his

fancy carries an intrinsic beauty; and whatever does not coincide with his ideas, *he will venture to say*, must be absurd in itself: by these marks he distinguishes the essences of things, as the eye distinguishes colours upon inspection. In this faculty he participates of the divine nature, whose intelligence may indeed be somewhat larger, but in kind must be just the same with his own, for there are no degrees in certainty or intuition; the merest idiot who can just know that two and two make four, must know that as certainly as Newton. He talks much of a nature of things binding upon the Almighty, and marking out the field for Omnipotence to range in; but he never vouchsafes to explain what he means by this nature of things; and if you ask him, he laughs at your stupidity, or, when most gracious, tells you, that you will not know, for fear it might overturn some prejudices of education.

He never tries to improve the knowledge of mankind, or strike out any practical system preferable to those in vogue. His delight is wholly in opposition: if men believe nothing that is taught them, it is enough, no matter what else they believe. To build up would be laborious and pedantic; so he takes the easier, pleasanter task, of pulling down; and is never better pleased than in puzzling an illiterate person upon some common article of belief. He is not so prone to anger as the bigot, except now and then when gravelled in argument; but is an utter stranger to discretion. Ridicule is his trusty weapon, which he is ready to use upon all occasions; but any queer fellow that tries to joke upon him only makes himself ridiculous, for he knows what is a good joke as well as a good reason. He appears mighty full of doubts, but in reality never doubted of any thing; for what he pretends to doubt of, he is absolutely sure must be false, because he discerns it to be so by his moral sense.

He takes his idea of Christianity sometimes from the extravagances

travagances of methodism, and sometimes from the tyrannical policy of Popery, and perceives no inconsistency in making it either the delusion of silly enthusiasts, or the deep-laid contrivance of crafty deceivers to raise immense riches and power, according as serves his present purpose. He laughs at Satan and the burning fiery furnace; and remarks very profoundly, that anger is a passion, and God being dispassionate reason, cannot be angry or displeased with any body; but that if men abuse their free-will, they must inevitably incur the punishment of their folly; nor can the divine power help them, for it is not in the nature of things that they should be happy.

6. Thus I have attempted to sketch out the lengths both of bigotry and free-thinking, to serve as a warning to prevent our falling into either extreme. But there are causes that give a wrong bias to the judgment, besides vanity and a desire to appear wiser than others; such as a too great attachment to imbibed principles, which is another sort of bigotry, shame of appearing singular, compliance with custom or overbearing authority, indolence, hastiness of determination, which is a consequence of it, admiration or dislike of particular persons, interest, party-spirit, or private inclination. All which frequently prove grievous hindrances to the progress of our reasonings, and yet some of these restraints upon true freedom of thought are often necessary to balance one another, so that it is lawful, upon occasion, to call in their aid by way of self-defence: like the garrison of a fortress, who, while the enemy scour the country, are forced to shut themselves up within their walls to prevent their being taken prisoners. Well were it, if we could always distinguish the friend from the enemy, that we might take to our fastnesses, whenever passion is abroad, but open our barriers to calm and sober reason.

7. One great thing that fetters the mind when entering

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on subjects of religion is a sensible fear, that shuts out all means of information and amendment, and often dashes men on the very rocks of offence they were so anxious to shun. Some people are so afraid of departing from the faith, that they will not give up any error or absurdity when imposed upon them as an article of faith. This leads men to represent God as an arbitrary, inexorable task-master, under a notion of thus magnifying his authority; it pins them down to the letter, without regarding the intention; attaches them to forms and ceremonies without daring to penetrate into their uses; overwhelms them with scruples, misgivings, and terrors; debars them the use of their understanding as a profaneness, and presumptuous resistance against heaven, and leads to a gross adulation of the deity, whom they strive to flatter with contradictory perfections, some divines having carried this so far as to prove that God is good to those whom he damns eternally, because he preserves them in existence. So that fear, though "the beginning of wisdom," must not pass certain bounds, or it will end in folly. There is a wholesome degree of it, which like medicine is good in particular cases, and for certain constitutions. The bigot would fill every body with fears, though he has none himself. The free-thinker would banish all fear and caution and reverence along with it, and would emancipate the world in the same manner as an apprentice is emancipated by running away from his master: but the only desirable emancipation is that attained by having served his time and learned his trade.

8. Since the dangers on all sides surrounding us are so many and great, as well from too much as too little freedom of thought, it will be necessary to procure some good stout armour to defend ourselves with; and the best security that I know of will be a modesty and humility of temper, patience of inquiry, a decent deference to authority, though

though not amounting to implicit faith, a candid construction of the opinions of others, however singular, an unbiassed equity, having no partiality but to truth, a temperance of imagination not to be seduced by the charms of novelty, or shining discoveries, and lastly, the knowledge of our own ignorance, and a backwardness to undertake more than we are capable of performing. Having armed myself in this manner as well as I could, I shall now venture on the dangerous route I have marked out, and though not without apprehension of making many false steps on the road, yet in hopes of arriving safe and well at my journey's end.

CHAP. III.

MIRACLES.

In treating of this subject, nobody will expect me to enter upon the proof of any particular miracle: no more falls within my province than to examine the credibility of miracles in general, and whether all proofs offered in support of them ought to be rejected without hearing, as an absurdity so abhorrent to reason, that no weight of evidence whatever can counterbalance it.

2. Now here it seems proper in the first place to try to settle the real province of reason: for here the parties generally become litigants at setting out; and till they can be brought to some agreement on this point, there is little hope of travelling amicably together for the rest of the journey. The believer is perpetually warning men to beware of reason as a blind fallacious guide, to submit their reason to faith, to believe things they cannot understand. The rationalist will admit nothing of all this, for he maintains that reason is the only faculty we have to distinguish truth and falsehood, right and wrong; that therefore, if we discard this guide, we must grope in the dark without any guide at all: nay, insists that no man can help following it if he would, for he who takes things upon the credit of another, does it from a conviction of that other's knowledge and veracity, without which he would not believe him. There seems however, to be a little inconsistency in the conduct of both parties. For the man who would persuade another to give up reason plies him with arguments to enforce his miracles, prophecies, and other evidences, and thus appeals to that very reason he so totally decries. On the other hand, he who insists upon

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reason being the sole faculty, which every man follows, whether he perceives it or not, has no right to charge another with casting aside his reason, which it is not possible for him to do: the Spanish villager must in this sense be guided by his reason in believing what is told him as well as the boldest free-thinker.

3. Therefore reason, to be made the subject of a dispute, must imply something that is not the sole principle of assent, but capable of being over-ruled by other evidence. Thus we often distinguish between reason and information, reason and experience, reason and authority, which are considered as so many distinct sources of knowledge. And if we attend to the language of mankind, I think it will be found that reason denotes that set of principles or judgments which have been stored up in the mind from experience or other sources: as when we say a thing stands to reason, or is discordant from it, we mean that it coincides or disagrees with the notions we have hitherto formed of things. Now were we masters of mathematical certainty, our present judgments would be an infallible test to try all other evidences by; but this not being the case, it would be the most unreasonable thing in the world to resolve against ever departing from our present judgment upon any evidence whatever; as it must be equally wrong to do it, unless the new evidence outweigh the old.

But it is said, there are some principles so confirmed by constant experience, that though they have not mathematical certainty, they carry so full a degree of assurance as no weight of testimony or other subsequent evidence can overbalance, without the aid of violent prejudice, or some great perversity of understanding. Yet we know for once this rule failed, when the Indian king discredited all the Dutchman had told him before, upon hearing him assert that in Holland the cold was so intense as to make the water

water hard enough to walk upon: for we can scarce be better assured of any thing than he was, that if a greater degree of cold make water quite hard, a less degree must harden it proportionably, which was contrary to constant experience. Equivocal generation was formerly the orthodox opinion, founded as it was thought on constant experience, by which men found it was the nature of dust and putrefaction to breed vermin: but this is now universally exploded. It was held to be against all appearance of reason that there should be sexes among vegetables, until observations upon the farina of lilies, upon the dust flying among the blossoms of mulberries, and the female date-tree becoming barren after cutting down the male, brought the other doctrine into vogue. A few years ago the propagation of animals without sexes would have been thought contradictory to experience; notwithstanding which, many have since been persuaded of the fact, either by their own experiments, or other persons' accounts concerning the fresh-water polypus.

4. Such instances happening, however rarely, may convince us that experience is not so infallible a guide as to justify our refusing any information that makes against it: for, in truth, it never makes us thorough masters of the subject. We may know enough for our present uses, but can never know there is not more to be learnt besides what we have discovered. Our pretensions to decide absolutely on questions of this kind, must rest upon a wrong foundation, viz. the persuasion that our idea of things comprehends their whole essence, whereas we are quite ignorant of it: we can only observe what effects they produce upon our senses, or on one another, and thence deduce imperfectly the powers and properties belonging to them, but can make no just inference that there are not other powers and causes, whose effects may reverse all our past experience.

rience. Nevertheless, I know not what better guide we can in general go by, so that we take care to make the best and most rational use of it; and in some cases where a thing directly contradicts the clearest, best established principles of reason, the evidence may be so strong against it, that I doubt whether any thing but the testimony of our senses can overcome it. If a man were to tell me that he drank out a bottle of wine yesterday, I should easily believe him, because I see nothing to hinder him from doing it; but if he added, that after he drank out the wine, he crept into the bottle himself, this appears so discordant to my clearest conceptions, that I should deem it superfluous to let him call witnesses to the fact, or enter into any long argumentation to prove the possibility of it. I should cut the matter short by desiring him to send for the bottle, and if he would let me see him creep in again, I would engage to believe he had done it yesterday.

5. It will be said, all this has nothing to do with miracle, for should we discover by any extraordinary means some new kind of operation unknown to all mankind, we should not consider it as supernatural, but owing to some latent property belonging to the bodies exerting it, which was never observed before. Those who have altered their opinion upon equivocal generation, on the sexes of plants, or the hatching of polypuses, think they have found out a new secret in nature, not something which implies that all her former laws are superseded by an invisible agency. Very well; but let us first examine what we are to understand by nature, for perhaps in some senses we may find that to be a secret of nature, which we vulgarly call supernatural. I do not know any body of whose person and features we have a more unsettled idea than of that same dame Nature: we all think ourselves extremely well acquainted with her; do but mention her name, and every body knows whom you

you are speaking of without asking questions, and yet if you were to ask them, it would puzzle them exceedingly to give you a description of her: but it becomes profound speculatists who set up for reforming the reason of mankind to know what they talk about before they establish their important conclusions.

6. The word Nature, when standing alone, commonly denotes the properties of bodies, and their different operations falling under our notice, the several species of animals, plants, fossils, and so forth, all which are the objects of natural philosophy; and whoever should understand them all completely, would be thought to have a thorough knowledge of nature. Yet this idea will not be sufficient to carry us through our present question, which takes in a much larger compass, the knowledge, the sentiments, the powers, and actions of man, together with the arts and sciences, dependent thereon, all which the naturalist has nothing to do with, yet must they all be added to his stock to make up that nature with which we are acquainted, and beyond whose known limits we pronounce every thing supernatural and incredible.

But with this addition are we sure of having the whole of nature in our grasp? For there are those who think that from the view of this nature, they can discover another beyond, of which this is only a part, and the rules by which it is governed, only municipal laws of a single province within a boundless empire: and that there is a universal nature, having general laws superior to the municipal, connecting all particular systems in one well-regulated polity under one supreme governor. Now let our experience of this sublunary globe, and the transactions upon it be ever so complete, what can we know by it concerning the general polity, or how far that may or may not over-rule the particular one established here?

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But you suppose the municipal laws are so provided as to make a part of the general, and therefore are not likely to be irregularly broken in upon by them. Why so I suppose too, because I never yet saw an alteration made in them, and shall continue to suppose so till I see cogent reason to suppose otherwise. Nevertheless this supposition, though a rational one, is but supposition, and not strong enough to render all evidence produced to the contrary absolutely incredible.

For let us consider how far our experience deposes: that there are such powers of nature and such an order as we find prevailing here, but with regard to all beyond it is totally silent. It informs us nothing concerning creatures invisible, what power or views they may or cannot have, what inducements or restraints with respect to their interfering in sublunary affairs. All that experience informs us of relative to the case is the capacity of substances to receive positions and modifications from the operation of foreign powers upon them. Thus far, there is nothing in miracles absolutely incredible, for they imply no more than a natural effect produced by the operation of supernatural causes. We never knew an instance of water changed into wine, otherwise than by its passage through the circulating vessels of the vine and the grape, and perhaps in its way receiving an accession of other particles which never were in the composition of water. What then? We still know that the matter composing those particles was capable of being arranged in such a manner as to make it water; and experience deposes nothing concerning any other powers, whether they have or have not skill, discernment, and activity, sufficient to change the arrangement of matter in water, so that it shall instantaneously become wine.

7. It may be said, that allowing all this, it will prove no

more than that there may be a power of causing supernatural effects, but raises no probability that such a power ever is exerted. I do not desire it should; I would have them still remain improbable; all I contend for, is only a possibility that they may sometimes come to pass, and that therefore we ought not to stop our ears against all evidence, however strong, offered to prove their reality. Or perhaps it may be denied, that we have even yet made out their possibility: because the acts of voluntary agents, such as we must suppose the authors of supernatural effects to be, may be rendered impossible by being repugnant to the character of the agent, how much soever it may be in his power to perform them. A miser has it in his power to make ducks and drakes with his guineas on the water; a nobleman to turn hedger and ditcher; a fond mother to strangle the child she doats upon; yet such things are morally impossible, and therefore utterly incredible. Now the character of infinite wisdom and goodness belonging to God makes it inadmissible that the original plan of creation should have been left imperfect, so as to need occasional corrections afterwards, or that God would permit the order of nature to be disturbed by inferior beings for trifling or mischievous purposes.

This is no doubt true, as well the assumption as the inference made from it: but do we know the original plan so perfectly as to be assured the connection between the several systems comprised in it may never cause an alteration in the laws of visible nature; or that some interpositions were not contained in the first plan, and made essential parts of it. As to things pernicious, wanton, or trifling, I own it appears to me incredible, that any such should be the work of God or the superior orders of beings: but the same objection applies here as before, for we are not, by any means, such masters of wisdom, or the science of general

neral happiness, as always to be able confidently to pronounce what is or is not inconsistent therewith.

Some persons have amused themselves in a vacant hour with imagining what ideas the brute creation must entertain of our transactions, supposing them endued with understanding and reflection like ours. I have heard a story of a very valuable piece of plate having been lost in such a manner as to make it certain some one in the family had taken it, but no suspicion could be fastened upon any particular person, and they all stoutly denied having any knowledge of the matter. The vicar was called in to examine them, but being able to get nothing out by his interrogatories, he engaged to discover the thief by art magic; for he had a cock of wonderful sagacity, that being rightly prepared would know the touch of a light-fingered person in the dark. So he fetched the cock tied down in a nest of hay in a basket, which was placed at the further end of a darkened room: the servants were to go in one by one and stroke the back of the cock, who upon feeling the delinquent's hand would instantly crow. They went in each of them alone, but still the cock did not crow. Our conjuror seemed surprised, for he never knew the cock to fail before, and surely they had not all touched him. Yes, indeed they had. Pray, say he, let's see your hands. Upon shewing them, the palms of all except one were found as black as the chimney, for he had besmeared the cock's back with grease and lamp-black, which those who were conscious of their innocence had rubbed off by following the direction given, but the guilty person, though without much faith in the cock's virtue, yet not knowing what tricks your learned men may play, thought it safest not to venture, especially as his word must be taken, there being no witnesses by to discover how he behaved.

Now imagine the parson's poultry possessing as large a

share of the rational faculty as you please, they would never be able to account for these ceremonies undergone by the cock: but when he got home to relate his adventures, if there were any free-thinking cockerills in the roost, they would treat it as an idle improbable tale; for there could be no use nor purpose in daubing his back, tying him in a basket, shutting him up in a dark room, and sending so many different persons to rub him over. Certainly, say they, our daddy begins to doat, and vents his dreams for real facts, or else has been perching carelessly upon the edge of a tub until he fell backwards into some filthy stuff within it, and now would impose this incredible invention upon the credulous vulgar of the chicken kind, to set us a pecking away the grease from his feathers, in hopes we shall foul our bills, or spoil our stomachs, so that we cannot eat, and then he will have all the barley to himself.

8. With regard to the speculative probability of miraculous interposition in general, it may be observed that the constitution of all created intelligences, so far as we can comprehend them, seems to require it; for if God had rested from his works from everlasting, having once for all given such a vigour and regularity to nature as that it might have proceeded on its course for ever without needing the further touch of his hand, all dependence and thought of him would have been utterly lost from among them. For he would have been deemed to have delivered them over to the government of second causes, with which alone they had concern: so the question, whether all things had a beginning or from what power derived, would have remained a matter of mere curiosity.

Then if we proceed from abstract theory to reason upon facts, we shall find that neither the present form of this earth we inhabit, nor courses of the planets composing the solar system, could have been eternal: so that there must have

have been an interposition to produce the present order of nature out of chaos, or out of some other order existing before. Here then seems to be a positive proof, deduced from experience, that the divine power, either by itself or its ministers, does interfere with the laws of universal nature in the production of a new system, not provided for by those laws; why then may not the same power interfere upon great and important occasions during the continuance of that system? Oh! It will be said, the two cases are very different, for it is necessary that a supreme power should interfere to give birth to a new system, but neither necessary nor probable that a wise governor should innovate upon the laws he had himself once established, or break through them while remaining in full force and vigour. But I do not see the pertinence of this distinction: for first all interposition does not imply innovation upon the laws already established. What if water were once changed into wine, the laws of nature producing wine from the juice of the grape continue still the same. What if injunction was once given to cut off every soul of the Amalekites, the laws of humanity and mercy, of love even to enemies, still remain inviolate, and have been strongly inculcated by the same authority which issued the injunction. And besides, the interpositions now in question must appear less incredible, when we consider the purpose for which they are supposed to have been made; not to supply defects in the laws established, but to manifest the dominion of the governor; which it is notorious, was so far overlooked, that many laboured arguments have been brought forward to prove the laws self ordained without a legislature to enact, or governor able to controul them. Were there a kingdom so well policied as that all things might be kept in order everywhere by inferior magistrates, till the people in some distant corner, seeing nothing higher than constables and

justices among them, grew refractory, thinking those officers acted upon their own authority, would it not be more than credible, that the prince should manifest himself by some signal exertion of power to convince the mutineers of his dominion? Then if we take the whole series of interpositions jointly, they may not unfitly be likened to those used in the formation of a world: if we reflect how great an influence they have had upon the moral world, which is a part of the natural, introducing a new system of thinking and acting, scarce less important than that formed at what is vulgarly called the creation, out of a chaos of ignorance, darkness and vice.

From all these considerations, I think it may fairly be concluded, that miracles are not absolutely incredible; though not to be discovered by reason, yet neither are they contrary to it, nor like the idle tale of a man who should pretend to have found out a method of flying in the air; because we know the extent of human powers, and know that this exploit does not lie within them. But I suspect that in general our averseness to give credit to miracles does not proceed so much from any rational objection to them as from the reluctance of the imagination to admit any thing strange and unusual. This is no better than the prejudices of the lowest vulgar, who can hardly be brought to believe the accounts of foreign customs and manners that are very different from what they have been accustomed to see; or like those who will not believe an historian when he relates, that the beaux of king Edward the Fourth's reign wore their shoes of such an enormous length that they were forced to tie up the toes by a string fastened to the knee, to prevent their doubling under them. Or it is the same sort of reasoning with that used by my children's nurse, when, upon seeing a picture of my Eurydice brought home,

home, she cried, Lauk! that cannot be like mistress, for she has never a blue gown.

9. Nevertheless, credible as I have endeavoured to shew them, I still hold them highly improbable. So that supposing I had never heard of any such thing till to-day, and just now some learned man were to tell me he had met with a book in which were related the stories of the burning-bush, the rod turned into a serpent, the recalling of Lazarus to life, and so on, I should certainly feel little disposed to believe them; and though, upon mature reflection, I should think them not absolutely incredible, yet I should require very weighty and cogent evidence before I could believe them.

Therefore it seems rather too daring a challenge, when divines undertake to prove their system, if we only allow the sacred writings so much credit as we give to a common historian: for I cannot help joining with Middleton, that if some of the accounts recorded there were found only in Sanconiathon's Phenician history, no man of sense or information would pay the least regard to them. But this does not affect their credibility, for I suppose no one will deny the authority of Moses or the Evangelists to be something better than that of Sanconiathon or Livy. On the other hand, it is against nature that men should knowingly embrace, or needlessly propagate error; they may frequently be led into it by delusion, or mislead others for designs of their own, but without some reason to suspect that these causes might have interfered, our rule holds good: and any thing which seems to contradict it, has its improbability too, for which the believer may as reasonably require the freethinker to account, as the latter may demand of him good evidence to overcome the antecedent improbability of supernatural interposition.

10. It is not my business to apply any of these conside-

rations, or to poise their respective weights in particular cases, for this belongs rather to ecclesiastical history: it would be carrying the shoe-maker beyond his last, and encroaching upon the province of divines. It is service enough for one private man to have acted as pioneer, endeavouring to level that entrenchment of absolute incredibility by which the enemy used to keep them at a distance; for while they remained entrenched behind this it was not possible for any battery of historical or other evidence, however formidable or well-directed, to make the slightest impression upon them.

I would wish to have the faith of mankind compact and solid throughout; sound not only in the articles believed, but in the foundations for believing. It is not uncommon for men to build a real truth on hollow ground, in which case their faith is owing rather to good fortune than good conduct, and will be apt to shake and totter grievously in the storms of opposition or batteries of ridicule. If I have any title to meddle in the cause, it must be in that part respecting the internal evidence, which, as already observed, has a just and strong weight in the determination, and probably does actually cast the balance with most persons: but religion does not consist so much in a set of articles, as in the sense impressed by them upon the mind; so that the same outward form of profession may contain very different religions; some frivolous, absurd, and wicked; others noble, rational, and manly; as they are differently understood by the believer. Therefore, what I am next going to enter upon may be of some moment towards determining the judgment, namely, to attempt explaining some of the orthodox tenets by the theory of human reason, which I have endeavoured to sketch out in this work, aiming to discover such a sense of them, without violence or wresting, as may coincide or be reconcileable therewith. Whoever shall happen

happen to come into my explanations, will by this means see what degree of improbability still remains for the divine to overcome by skilful management of his weapons of external evidence.

CHAP. IV.

CHRISTIAN SCHEME.

I SHALL begin with the doctrine of the Trinity, that most mysterious article of the Christian faith; the hardest of digestion to the reasoner, esteemed most sacred by the orthodox, and acknowledged incomprehensible by both: which we are taught to regard as the grand fundamental of our religion, to be received upon the word of God with a reverential awe and submission.

I have already shewn some practice in abstruse and knotty disquisitions, and some exercise in the methods of explanation and illustration; both of which we seldom see the same person endeavour to unite, those who think the deepest taking little care to express themselves clearest. Upon this survey of my own abilities, small as they are, I seem to myself not totally disqualified for the task I am now entering upon; in which, if I can proceed according to the rules laid down in a former chapter, I need not be apprehensive of offending that Being whose displeasure is most to be dreaded, notwithstanding the sacredness of the subject. But I have less expectation of being fairly judged by my fellows: the man of zealous piety regards all examination of religious mysteries as a profanation, as touching the ark with unhallowed hands; the man of reason looks upon every mention of them otherwise than in the light of an exploded absurdity or unintelligible jargon, as a certain mark of a weakness in the intellects, unable to throw off the impressions of the nurse and the school-master. I have more respect for my fellow-creatures than to be indifferent to their censure, or not to wish for their favourable opinion; yet can bear to hazard this in prosecution of what to me carries the appearance

appearance of a duty. "There are evidently mysteries in visible nature: in the laws of gravitation and cohesion, in the vital circulations, in voluntary action; therefore there may well be mysteries in the divine nature." Some persons try to put a stop to inquiry with this triumphant inference. Still I am for leaving as little mysterious as possible, and though I must not expect to comprehend all it may be proper for me to believe, yet it seems at least a commendable attempt to understand as much as I can.

2. There is no occasion to take pains in setting out the doctrine, we may refer to the three creeds appointed to be read in our churches: now the grand objection generally made to them is, that they impose upon us the belief of three being one, which is contrary to the clearest principles of reason. For if we may not trust our understanding in discerning the difference between one and three, it must lose all credit whatever with us, since I am not more sure that I read the creeds in my common-prayer-book, or that I know what they enjoin me to believe, than that one number is not another.

Now I shall not undertake to defend the point objected to, but must give it up as directly contrary to reason: the only question is, whether it is to be found in our creeds. Our divines, I dare say, will none of them answer in the affirmative: Athanasius affirms no such thing; for he tells us expressly that one God is not three Gods, nor are three persons one person, but pronounces it a damnable heresy to believe so. Therefore the question seems to depend altogether on the construction of the words employed; and is to be resolved into this other, namely, whether saying that three persons are one God, is the same as saying, that three persons are one person, or three Gods one God.

Now I apprehend the unity of the Godhead is clearly enough admitted on both sides: so the only difficulty rests on the

the word person; which it is plain must have such a sense affixed to it as shall not include the idea of individuality or distinct substance (though this is the way in which we commonly use it), for else we shall never escape the contradiction of making number three to be number one. I can never be you nor you me: in this sense every intelligent or percipient being is a person, and every person an individual distinct from all others, and unchangeably itself. Let us therefore have recourse to the Latin etymology of the word, and see whether we can extract any thing from that, which may answer our purpose. Persona signified originally a vizard used by the Roman actors when they appeared upon the stage, and was shaped and coloured as nearly as could be guessed to represent the features and complexion of the person to be represented: so if you were well acquainted with Œdipus, or Atreus, or Priam, from pictures or statues of them extant, you might immediately know which of them you were to imagine standing before you, as soon as Roscius entered, before a word was spoken. Therefore persona is the same as character, a very different thing from person in the English sense of the word, for Garrick is still the same person, whether in the character of Lear or Richard: nor do the audience ever suppose him to lose his personality, for then they would not applaud him for imitating so truly the gestures, the countenance, the tone of voice suitable to the character he represents, all which would flow naturally from the real person without any skill or art to produce them.

I would gladly have forborne mingling theatrical ideas with the consideration of so sacred a subject, but it was not easy to avoid them in explaining a term derived originally from the stage. Yet there is no necessity for supposing the word to be used always in the same artificial sense. We find a similar distinction of characters takes place in real life. A man invested with authority, may behave with familiarity and

and freedom among his friends in private, but keep up a distance and dignity when acting in his character of a magistrate. And our laws consider a justice of peace, or a constable, as different persons in the execution of their authority and in their private transactions: the same treatment which would be no offence against the one, is an indictable misdemeanor against the other.

Therefore it would be blasphemy to imagine God counterfeiting any other character: if he acts in several, he acts always in characters peculiarly his own, incommunicable to any other being. Now we are told, that God not only created the matter, and gave the form of this visible nature we behold, but that he has interposed many times since by miracles, prophecies, and revelations; that he united himself to one particular man, so as to become the same person with him from his birth; that he frequently co-operates with our endeavours to discover truths and perform good works, which we could not have done without such aid; and that these operations are performed by three Persons in one God, not jointly, but severally; the union with manhood, and all done in virtue of that union, was the work of the Son, the assistance occasionally afforded to men in general is the province of the holy Spirit, and all the rest is to be referred to the Father.

By these distinct modes of operation God appears in three characters, easily separable from one another in our conception, but joining mutually in advancement of the general design, and executing the principal strokes in the plan of Providence respecting the moral world. The Father acted in the character of king or governor, controuling the courses of nature, and actions of second causes, by immediate exertions of his power; and by his signs and wonders prepared the minds of men for the reception of the benefits to be imparted from the other two. The Son acted in the character

of

of a co-agent or partner, not controuling the mental or bodily powers of Jesus, but adding a force and vigour to them, which could not have arisen from natural causes; supplied what had been left deficient in the plan of Providence, and rendered mankind capable of reaping advantage from the effusions of the Holy Spirit. This last acts in the character of a friend and monitor; not working with the power and majesty of a monarch, nor dwelling continually in the mind of man, but imperceptibly throwing in assistance from time to time, and thereby filling up the last lines in the divine plan.

3. For the effects of the union between God and man, I shall have occasion to consider these more particularly by and by: I shall here offer my idea of the union itself. Our common notions of unity seem very confused and fluctuating: whatever collection of things hangs long together without being visibly disunited or changed in its constituent parts, and all that time bears one name, we esteem one thing. The whole composition of a man, blood, bones, skin, hair, nails, we style an individual, and apprehend to be one substance, one existence: if he lose a leg or an arm, if he cut his hair and pare his nails, and they grow again, if every particle in his body be changed by perspiration and nourishment, still it is the same individual substance. But whoever will reflect steadily on the nature of substances must see, that they can never change into one another, however one may be substituted for another without our perceiving it; nor can any two, however closely placed or joined together, become one, but must remain numerically distinct, though we may not be able to distinguish them by our senses, nor separate them by any experiment. And the case is the same with substances of different natures, for a spirit can no more become a body, or body a spirit, nor both together make one individual substance, than two bodies can:

can: therefore to say that God was changed into man, or man into God, or that both united made one person in the modern philosophical sense of the word, is as flat a contradiction, as that number two is number one. So that we must not understand the hypostatic union of a consubstantiality, or numerical identity between God and man; nor does the church affirm any such thing, but teaches us to look into ourselves for an explanation of her meaning, "as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ."

Now let us consider in what manner our soul and body are one, and we shall find it to be not by conversion of spirit into body, but by taking body into joint partnership with spirit: not by confusion of substance, but by unity of action. Personality belongs properly to spirit alone; body has none of its own, but assumes a borrowed personality from the particular spirit to which it is vitally united. If the spirit of Euphorbus migrated into a cow, then into an eagle, and afterwards into Pythagoras, still it was the same person in all these changes; and if the cow suffered for the faults of Euphorbus, here was no injustice done, because the party offending bore the punishment. So if the substance of your arm should by successive change of particles have become the substance of mine, which is not impossible to have been the case, considering the daily fluctuation both of our humours and solids, then during its respective union with either of us it is part of ourselves, and all the good and evil deeds performed by it were your and my deeds.

Let us now apply this to the hypostatic union, where, though we must understand personality in another sense, as signifying character instead of numerical identity, yet the manner of union will remain the same: for the character of moral wisdom, innocence, and fortitude, to resist all pain, terror, and other temptations, belonged solely to the Deity: no

no human soul could act up to it, till God being pleased to supply what was wanting in human nature, Jesus was united to the Son, which together became one Christ; whose whole conduct was of a piece throughout, running in one constant tenor, and his actions were those of the united agency. For the acts of Jesus were acts of the Son, and the Son performed nothing but by the instrumentality of Jesus; just as the spirit of a man performs nothing but by the instrumentality of his bodily powers.

I shall just add here, that the name Christ signifies Anointed, which term is likewise applied to the reception of the Holy Ghost, sometimes called a chrism or unction. This name, doubtless, was chosen as being familiar to the Jews, in order to lead them through their expectations of a temporal king, styled by them the Lord's Anointed, to attend to the promulgation of a new law. For the like reason we may presume, the other appellation of Word, or Logos, was employed, because the Jews, by a metonyme common among them, called a thing promised the Promise or Word given. But its being frequently applied to Christ, as a proper name, has induced many persons to believe that it contained something mysterious, expressive of certain qualities or powers peculiar to him: and because Logos signifies either a word spoken, or the faculty of reason, they conceived of the word as something analogous to the Nous, or second Hypostasis of Plato's divinity, and made the persona to whom it belonged the Demiourgos, or maker of the world; being confirmed in this by an expression of St. John's, By him all things were made, and without him was not any thing made. But this might perhaps mean nothing more, than that the whole plan of Providence was formed with a reference to the part he should act in it; he being the wisdom of God in the most emphatic sense, as the central point and

main hinge on which the salvation and redemption of mankind depended in the everlasting determinations of the Almighty.

4. But having explained my idea of the doctrine of the Trinity as clearly as I am able, it is time that I should come to the uses of it, and its importance as the chief foundation of Christianity. First, then, the very terms salvation and redemption, constantly employed to express the end proposed in the Christian dispensation, direct us to regard it as a deliverance from some evil that mankind laboured under: which evil is represented to have been brought upon the human race by the lapse of Adam, and is called death. For man was created perfect, having access to the tree of life, which would have made him immortal; until upon the first act of disobedience his nature was debased, himself banished from the tree of life, and laid under the curse, Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return. Which curse was taken off by the sacrifice of Christ; and as in Adam all died, so in Christ shall all be made alive.

As all things proceed from the provisions of God, whose knowledge is infinite, we cannot suppose him ignorant of any consequence to result from the provisions he had made. Therefore the trial he put Adam to in the garden was not needful for his own satisfaction, the issue being certain before the trial was made: nor need we understand the trial to have been that of a malefactor, who is tried, convicted, and condemned for the crimes he has committed, but like that made by the master of the mint, when he tries and condemns a large mass of metal as below the standard, upon assaying a little piece of it. For the supposition of our being punished for the offence of our primogenitor, or becoming actual delinquents by his transgression, has constantly proved a stumbling block to human reason: but we can easily imagine that any one man may stand as a repre-

sentative of all the rest, and by his example it might be shewn what all other men would do in the same situation. We commonly impute our several vices to some defect of constitution, or bad education, or evil company, or external accident: but the assay made upon Adam manifested what human nature was, and proved a condemnation of the whole race, by shewing that a man placed in the most favourable circumstances possible, would yet be overcome by the first temptation assailing him. So that we bring into the world with us an original sin, by which I do not understand actual guilt, but a certain propensity to contract it upon the first occasion offered; and are born children of perdition, not as involved in it already, but because fallen into a road that leads inevitably to it.

5. Thus we see the evil from which we are to look for deliverance, is that sin which entered by Adam, or rather that sinfulness of our nature which was manifested by his disobedience. This arises from that violence of the passions, and weakness of understanding, perpetually confining our thoughts to objects of sense, to narrow views, and gratifications of physical appetite; and rendering the soul incapable of resisting the impulses excited in it by the gross corporeal frame to which it is united. The philosopher may build what hypothesis he pleases for getting rid of the foulness produced by our immersion into matter. He may say, that nature has provided future punishments for the purification of contaminated souls; that as none pass out of life without a degree of impurity, all without exception must undergo some course of discipline suited to their respective complaints; some to be hung in the wind for sweetening, some plunged in rapid waters to wash away their filth, others to pass through scorching flames. However, it is not my business to contest this point with the philosopher, but to state the doctrine taught by revelation on this subject, which is,

that

that there was no provision of second causes sufficient to work out the deliverance of human nature, but that it could be effected in no other way than by the interposition of Almighty power for that purpose in the incarnation of the Godhead, and consequent exaltation of man's nature to a higher state of purity and perfection than that from which it had apparently fallen. The office then performed by God in his second Person, or the character of the Son, was to invigorate the human soul of Jesus, that his understanding might never be overpowered by appetite, or passion, or any impulse of imagination whatever, but have the constant controul of his will in every single instance, and be proof against every temptation of pleasure, danger, or pain.

Some have been led by an inconsiderate and hasty zeal for the honour of their Saviour, to insist, that his soul was originally pure, and perfect beyond that of all other men: but zeal operates differently in different persons. For my part, I must acknowledge that my zeal for the glory of God inclines me to imagine him less perfect than the rest of Adam's race: for I have so high an idea of the Divine power, as to believe it capable of sanctifying the most abandoned profligate soul that ever inhabited a human body; therefore if I could admit the doctrine of an intrinsic difference in souls, I should be persuaded that God had chosen to unite himself to the very worst of the species, in order to manifest his power the more fully. But as I happen to have found no evidence of any such distinction, but that all souls are originally alike until corrupted in various degrees by vicious courses, it follows that the soul of Jesus was in itself neither better nor worse than our own. He was a descendant of Adam; and when it is declared that in Adam all sinned, no exception is made of him; that is, we are to suppose that the child Jesus partook of a nature in common with us, too weak and frail to stand against temptation.

Nor are there circumstances left unrecorded in the account of his last agony, and at other times, which indicate a natural imbecility and struggle of mind; which attacks of the enemy within, together with the distress and sufferings brought upon the champion of our cause, may be regarded as one completion of the prophecy, that the serpent should bruise the heel which trampled upon its head. For we cannot imagine the organs of Jesus rendered insensible, or that he did not feel the same weight of anguish, when he cried out, My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me? that any of us should have done: but that was overbalanced by the contemplation of the end proposed in his suffering, and the joy of opening a passage, by which all mankind might arrive at the same tranquillity of mind under the severest calamities.

6. This leads me to the question, in what manner the sufferings of our Saviour operated to our benefit: and I apprehend it to have been, not by lessening our obligation to the performance of our duty, nor by working a secret change in the constitution of human nature, for this would look like charm and magic; nor yet by turning the resentment of God into mercy, for this would be to represent him liable to passion and mutability; but by setting an example which might lead us into a method of performing the hardest services with the same tranquillity and satisfaction of mind that he did. We know the force of example, sympathy, and instruction given in consummate wisdom to work strange alterations in the characters of men. We know what incredible tortures the first disciples were enabled to endure by continual contemplation of their Master's example. Some philosophers have been positive, that could we behold virtue in her native beauty, unclouded by any mixture of folly or error, she would captivate all hearts: so that there needed only one perfect wise man, in whose actions she

she might stand confest to view, to bring all others into an admiration of virtue and wisdom, and raise human nature to the utmost perfection it is capable of. Consequently, we are not to imagine our ransom so fully paid that there is nothing left for us to do: we are captive still, but have the key put into our hands that will unlock the chains, which we must use ourselves, or remain bound.

7. Thus we see the imputation of righteousness, the mediation and intercession for sinners still continuing such, are only figurative expressions, to denote that we derive our righteousness from Christ, and are enabled by means of his example and instruction to fulfil the laws of nature, which we could not do before. But the righteousness must become our own before it can be imputed to us; and though he has rendered the way passable, by going before us, we must travel it after him with our own feet, or shall never arrive at our journey's end: we may expect to be *helped* forward, but not carried, for any the most pressing, repeated importunities whatever. Both the Jews and heathens had an opinion, that after having angered God by their transgressions, they might bring him into good humour again by the sweet savour exhaling from their sacrifices, or the magnificence and beauty of their oblations. But who, in these times of better knowledge, can imagine that God is to be bribed out of his favours, or that any thing can really divert him from his purpose? The phrase, of bringing him to our desires, seems to be just like that in common use among sailors, when they tell you that, in order to make into a particular port, you must bring such a hill to bear directly over such a point of the shore: they do not imagine that any effort of theirs can stir the hill an inch from its place, but that they can work the ship till it comes into a line with the two other objects. So the sacrifice of Christ could have no efficacy to change the immutable counsels of God,

or to turn him from severity and justice to graciousness and mercy; but was necessary to raise the human race to that righteousness, which in his original constitution of universal nature he had made the sole avenue to eternal life. Therefore our trust, our devotion, our religious exercises, will not compound for the want of that righteousness which is the sole operating cause of our salvation; nor are they of any other avail, than as they tend to generate in ourselves the same moral wisdom which was shewn by our great leader in the ready resistance of pleasure, desire, and temptation, and cheerful endurance of the severest trials.

The sum of our imitation then, and substance of our duty, is the same with what was comprised by the old philosophers in two words, Bear and Forbear: but they could only tell us what would make for our good, whereas he has set us an example, and prescribed methods and institutions by which we may learn to bear and forbear with content and satisfaction to ourselves. Thus Christianity makes no alteration in the ultimate end of action, but only furnishes us with motives more effectually to attain it.

8. We now see the points in dispute between the philosopher and the Christian, when they understand one another, reduced to a very narrow compass. The one will not admit the fall of Adam by the artifices of the serpent; but he acknowledges that human nature lies very low, immersed in a material body, whose corruptions taint the very soul: unable to clear itself from folly and error, or rise in any single instance to the character of perfect wisdom. He banishes the Devil from his system, yet retains the influence of appetite, example, and custom, the world and the flesh; and allows they will generate anger, revenge, spite, rancour, and other devilish dispositions. He will not hear of an Incarnation, of an omnipresent God included in a human body, yet he may comprehend a continued co-operation of

the Deity with a human mind; and how powerful an effect the belief of such an event has had to make a system of religion prevail in the world. He may perceive too, that the system of righteousness, sanctity, deadness to the world, and heavenly-mindedness, is the same with his own system of rectitude in sentiment and conduct, only expressed in a different language, and more powerfully enforced.

There are many excellent sentiments of piety and morality to be found in the writings of the ancients; but those writings are studied by few, and read chiefly for curiosity and amusement. They make some impression in the reading, which however quickly dies away again upon laying the book aside; as Tully tells us was the case with himself in reading Plato upon the immortality of the soul. Whereas the Bible is the first book we are taught to read, and to receive as the oracle of God, containing the way to salvation, which at our utmost peril we must not disregard, and the truth of which it is a sin to doubt: so that whatever is drawn from thence, comes accompanied with a reverence and idea of high importance, which give force to the impression. Let a man, for instance, take as a thesis the Stoical maxim, Things out of our power are nothing to us, and descant upon the folly of anxiety about future events we can no ways prevent; it will not have the same effect on the hearers, which the very same discourse might have, pronounced from the pulpit, and from the text, Sufficient to the day is the evil thereof.

Thus the Gospel operates to our benefit chiefly by its sacredness; and this must depend upon our reverence for the Law-giver. Wherefore it is that we are so continually exhorted to believe in the name of Jesus; that God hath given him a name above all other names, that there resided a Divinity within him, that his words were the words of God, and his acts the acts of God, in performing which his

human powers were only instrumental. This I take to be the fundamental article of the Christian faith: if there are other articles of which it is pronounced, This is the Catholic faith, which except a man believe, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly, it must be because they were necessary to protect and establish the principal: for if it were possible for any man fully and heartily to acknowledge the authority of the Gospel, although through some misapprehension he should be found deficient with regard to the other particulars enumerated, I humbly apprehend that Athanasius himself would not anathematize him.

9. As in heathen ethics, wisdom stands for that consummate character which includes all the virtues, so in Christian language, faith is often employed to express the highest perfection attainable in this world. Nevertheless, when we consider faith distinctly in its primary signification, we shall not find it to be the saving principle: it gives us an entrance upon our journey, but it is by hope and charity that we come to the Father; wherefore love to God and to our neighbour are declared to be the fulfilling of the law. By the love of God, however, we are not to understand a desire of procuring profit or pleasure to its object, for of that we are incapable, but a filial love of dependence, and resting our expectations upon his providence, his wisdom, his mercy and goodness; and this may well be styled hope. Without a competent mixture of these virtues, faith is an unavailing form, a mere dead carcase, like the dust of the ground, when God first formed it into a human body; but they are the breath of life, which being breathed into it make it become a living soul, and manifest its vigour by continual efforts to put forth more fruit of good works than these sublunary climes can bring to maturity.

Faith, however, being the foundation on which to build all the rest, demands the first cares of the builder to work

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it strong. If there were a solid bottom of rational conviction, this would be the best ground to lay the foundation on: but this not being to be had for the generality, it must rest on the authority of churches, and creeds, and canons, and customs; like the houses of Amsterdam, which are reported to stand upon piles driven deep into a quagmire. It is for fixing this foundation firm in all its parts, that our divine services, assemblies, forms, and places of worship, ceremonies, and other religious institutions have been provided. For faith is one species of persuasion, and we know persuasions are strengthened by forms and customs, concurrence of numbers, external appearances, and frequently repeating the same thing to the ear. Wherefore it is an idle question of those who ask, What shall I learn by going to church? For the principal use of going, is not so much to learn, as to impress a thorough persuasion of what they had learned before, to discipline their affections, to subdue the violence of their appetites and passions, and to bring their habitual desires and feelings to run readily in the track that reason points out, so that there may be no wavering in their sentiments or conduct, no alternate seasons of discretion and thoughtlessness. Philosophy addresses the studious, the man grown, and the few; religion the thoughtless, the child, and the many. One holds out light to direct the course of thought; the other inspires warmth and vigour to make men act. One applies to the head, which is the ruling power; the other to the heart, which is the executive. The prerogative of reason lies very low, perpetually overpowered by a rabble of appetites, passions, and opinions; it is in this part our constitution is disordered, and here it wants amendment, which is to be effected not by reason itself (for its weakness is the very thing complained of) but by reverence and authority, that is, Religion.

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It is a common shrewd observation, that if men would follow their own reason, they need not mind what the parson preaches: true; and so if they could always keep in health, they need not call in the physician. It is the disorders of body and mind which make both the one and the other necessary. But the rationalist can keep his ideas pure and his conduct exact without any foreign aids. Be it so: yet his vanity will allow me to say, there are very few of such a happy temperature. Will he then forget that the object had in view was the improvement of mankind in general, that the Gospel was preached to the poor? Let him suppose Christianity banished from the world: I do not ask what he would lose himself, but what would the world in general be the better? But the wisest of us have a personal interest in the general turn of thought prevailing around us: therefore as soon as he shall please to compose a form of rudiments better suited to the capacities of the young and the vulgar than those in use at present, and satisfy me of its excellence, I will consent to its adoption; provided that till then, he will give me leave to use the catechisms already put into my hands, and willingly received by other people.

CHAP. V.

RELIGIOUS SERVICES,

I SHALL have two things principally in view in what I have to say on this subject, to shew that our obligation to the performance of duties of this kind arises from their tendency to produce a good effect on our habitual sentiments and practice, and that what may therefore be a duty and of service to one man, will be often none at all, but rather a hindrance to another, according to the different constitution of our minds and our different degrees of strength or weakness.

2. It may be remembered, that the mechanical trains of our ideas bear a large proportion to those excited by express design, imagination is the seat of our persuasions, conductor for the most part of our actions, and often the employer of our understanding. It is like a house-clock, which may be set right now and then, by careful observation of other regulators, but ordinarily is itself the regulator of all business in the family. And this faculty depends altogether on the state of our internal organs, which are affected by habit, custom, external appearance, and sensible objects. These things then, properly applied, may bring it to run spontaneously and habitually in trains which the most refined exercises of our understanding can only throw it into for a while.

I do not doubt there are many persons who have experienced that on coming out from their devotions, they feel themselves in a manner new creatures: they seem above the world and all its allurements; they have no sensual desires, nor vanity, nor selfishness, nor resentment nor ill-will to any body; they have no indolence, no repining at

at their condition, no fretfulness at accidents that have befallen them, nor uneasy dread of dangers to come: but are inspired with an exalted love of virtue for its own sake, and could almost do and suffer any thing for the glory they have had in contemplation before them. And though they find these impressions quickly obscured by the common business of life, as soon as they engage in it again, yet will they gather some additional strength every time, till at length they come to have an influence upon the general tenor of the mind and conduct. The knowledge of these desirable effects will make them feel a sensible joy in having succeeded in the performance of their religious duties, and would urge them to the continuance of them, although there were no threatenings annexed to the neglect of them, nor obligation to render them indispensable.

Not that I pretend to deny that there is an obligation to those exercises, or that grievous mischief will ensue from the omission of them: but it is no unusual thing to do what we are obliged to, without thinking of the obligation, when we have other motives inciting us to act. He that passes through a turnpike must pay the toll, or his horses will be seized; but if the road has been made safe and smooth from having been very dangerous and miry before, the toll comes from him as a voluntary thing, nor does he once think of the seizure.—That religion has been made so much a task and terror, I apprehend has been owing to the craft of former times, for there is nothing like frightening men to make them tractable, and the dupes of a fraudulent superstition. Our modern enthusiats, though perhaps they have not the deep designs of their predecessors, employ the same engine to draw an ignorant mob after them. They persuade men that nobody can be saved who does not first believe himself actually in a state of damnation: they have the words perdition, reprobation, hell-flames, and eternal

nal torments perpetually in their mouths: they delight to describe the terrors of the last judgment, when the rich and mighty of this world shall be haled about by devils, and the mass of mankind overwhelmed in the unfathomable gulph, except a few of their own followers; and even these are continually liable to be drawn aside with the multitude, unless they neglect their proper business to follow lectures and practise idle austerities; so they are always kept in terror, like a person walking along the brink of a precipice, who is in danger of falling irrecoverably, if he takes his eye off but for a moment.

These topics of eloquence might be of service if they were judiciously applied to the voluptuous, the giddy, the worldly-minded, and the obdurate, upon whom they might work a more powerful effect than any rational discourses: but to the phlegmatic, the weak-nerved, and the timorous, this regimen is arrant poison, fit only to drive the patient into desperation or madness. In short they too much resemble Doctor Sangrado, who prescribed bleeding and copious draughts of warm water for all distempers, the dropsy and the atrophy, as well as the fever, the surfeit, and the plethora. Hence come the common anxieties and suspicions of having failed in the due degree of devotion; the sighs and groans, the turned-up eyes, and mortified countenances of the godly: which besides the mischief it does to them, is an injury to religion itself, by making it the aversion and laughing-stock of the world; and I suppose gave occasion to Lord Shaftesbury's objection, that so much care is taken of our future happiness as to make us throw away all our present. There are some persons so fond of fear, that they would make it do every thing, and would terrify us into all the flames of heavenly love, and rapture of devotion, on pain of damnation: but it seems an unnatural way of proceeding, to extract the flame of love out of this chilling

chilling principle; not unlike the virtuoso's, who would needs try to make burning-glass of ice.

Being myself of a phlegmatic and bilious habit, I think I am the more likely to understand the disorders and difficulties of those of the same class. Now I find in myself that indigestion, east winds, or an air disposed to thunder, make a considerable alteration of colour in the articles of my creed: nor can I then behold some of the most important truths of religion, nor grounds of trusting in the divine Providence, nor duties of humanity and benevolence, with the same vigour of assent as at other times. For crudities in the juices will often quench the spirit by chilling the blood; and I have experienced more than once that a sip of Daffy's elixir in the morning rising, has proved a powerful means of grace, dispelling doubts and despondencies, and restoring faith to its former strength and brightness. I would therefore advise those weakly-pious people who disturb themselves because they cannot raise a fervent glow of piety whenever they please, to recollect that this often depends on causes not in their power; or if they will do what they can to help themselves, they had better have recourse to their horse or apothecary, than to their gospel minister: for air, exercise, a proper diet or regimen, may relieve them; but during these gloomy fits, pathetic lectures, long prayers, and incessant hymn-singing, will be more likely to prove quenchers than quickeners of the spirit, to stupify than enliven their faith.

3. There is one set of religious exercises so little understood, those I mean relating to humiliation, that they deserve a particular consideration. I believe, indeed, they are now pretty much out of fashion, because the generality of mankind are too fond of indulgence, and think too highly of themselves ever to cast their eyes willingly on any thing that may tend to mortify them: but for that very

reason

reason they might prove the more serviceable, if they could be prevailed on once in a while to try them.

A man living in some of the back settlements in America, on hearing there is a party of wild Indians coming that way, will I suppose examine carefully into the state and condition of his house, particularly the weak parts of it, inspecting the doors and windows, and searching for any loosened pannel in the walls where they might possibly break in: he will look over his arms and ammunition to see what he has in store, and whether there be any rust or damp, or defect discoverable in them; and all this he will do without taking any pains to afflict himself at what he finds amiss, but in order to provide for his necessary defence by knowing what he wants, and where he is liable to be attacked. Again, he that has an infirm constitution, will do well to make himself acquainted with his particular disorders, to observe what kind and quantity of food, what exercises, or employments have disagreed with him; that he may not think too highly of his strength, so as to brave weathers, undertake fatigues, or indulge in excesses that would hurt him. In like manner it is highly expedient for us, who are all of very crazy constitutions in the internal part, and have dangers and enemies perpetually surrounding us without doors, to take ourselves into close examination, particularly on the worst side of our characters. But there is no religion in trying to afflict ourselves at the discovery. Some displeasure will naturally arise at the first view of our disorders; but he that has been used to the exercise knows what he has to expect, and will not consider it as a matter of mortification, but rather as a means of finding out a remedy for an evil that would otherwise be incurable. It is in fact, like the search made by a mariner who knows his ship is leaky, and thinks it the luckiest thing in the world, if he can find out all the leaks, because

because till then he has no chance of stopping them. Still as our blemishes and foibles are a very unwelcome object, which the eye does not willingly fix upon, but is apt to skim lightly over if left to itself; therefore it has been generally recommended to make this examination a matter of devotion, performed as in the Divine presence. For we dare not prevaricate with the searcher of hearts, and the awe of Divine majesty before whom we stand, will make us more earnest, more honest and impartial in the scrutiny; so that we may discover lurking faults, secret propensities, and many unjustifiable motives, which would have escaped us in the ordinary way of meditation without the check of that bridle upon our thoughts.

4. Great stress has been laid on the duty of fasting, which being a medicine in the spiritual dispensary, the qualities and uses of it deserve to be well considered before it be prescribed. Now, I conceive it operates as a damper of the spirits and weakener of that attachment we have to the common enjoyments and occupations of life; therefore ought to be administered to such patients as stand in need of this lowering of the blood, and require to be weaned from their fondness for gross gratifications.

But there are various degrees of fasting: the abstinence from all food or from flesh, for whole days together, was strongly enjoined in former times, perhaps not so much for the sake of religion as to force men, by the inconveniencies of it, to purchase a dispensation; so that he was the best son of the church, not who starved himself most, but who gave most largely to be excused from the obligation to starve. Such abstinence may be very advisable for your turtle-eaters, your city-feast hunters, and persons who live in a continual round of pleasures: but for old women and others, who have frequent occasion to consult with their apothecaries, I hold it stark naught. They have more need

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of something to raise their spirits than to depress them, their scruples, despondencies and murmurings, proceed in great measure from poorness of blood, or stagnation of the circulating juices, occasioned by the feeble tone of their vessels, want of exercise, or of seasonable recreation; and if they would apply with more liveliness to their common employments, they might return from them with greater alacrity to their devotions.

For my own part, who am of a rather melancholy temperament, and cold digestion, I could never reap any benefit from fasting, though I have tried it formerly, but found it enfeeble my understanding, and make me less fit for religious exercises: and, had I continued it till this time, I believe my chapters would have dissolved into a water-gruel style, and been still more deficient than they are in a rational cheerful strain of piety. Nevertheless, moderation and temperance can do hurt to no man: he may keep a continual fast in this sense with advantage, and if he rise up now and then with half a meal, he may find himself lighter and more alert for any serious application. At least it will inure his appetites to discipline, and help to give him the command over them; which is the more needful, because civility and custom often laying temptations in his way, it would be doubly dangerous to have an enemy within to contend with. As to higher degrees of abstinence, I shall not pretend to decide upon them: as they are strongly recommended, it becomes every man to make the trial. Once or twice cannot spoil his constitution, and then he may consult experience; than whom he cannot have a physician of better authority, either for the continuing or leaving them off.

But in whatever manner he practises them, he ought to think them not so much actual duties in themselves, as means assisting him to perform his other duties better: for

if he regards them as actual services, he may be apt to imagine that after having gone through so laborious a task, he may be allowed a little relaxation in other respects. This must needs throw him off his guard when entering into the common transactions of life, and then his passions and desires having been kept suspended for a while would return upon him with fresh vigour: which might make his case too much resemble that of the man out of whom a devil had been cast, and he returned to his house and found it swept and garnished, and then took unto him seven devils, more wicked than the former, so that his last state was worse than the first.

5. The same observation will apply to prayer, which is no doubt to be considered as one principal means of grace, and therein lies its whole efficacy. It is good because it tends to confirm in us those desires and affections which we thus solemnly express in the sight of heaven. Habits are acquired by a repetition of single acts, and frequent prayer has a natural tendency to beget virtues in us which could not have been acquired by reason and instruction: in which way alone I apprehend it is that we receive an answer to our prayers.

Hence it appears that the benefit of prayer depends entirely on the manner of performing it: a single ejaculation pronounced with fervour is worth a million of mere words and genuflections. From the practice of the Papists on the contrary one might be apt to conclude that they think twenty Ave Mary's run off without any devotion, like twenty shillings dropped into a man's hat, worth just as much again as ten. But prayer has no efficacy to procure us any advantage but by raising a desire for the things we pray for, and a relish to the objects then held in contemplation, so that it is only when the desire is sincere and the attention undistracted, that it can give us an habitual happy

happy temper of mind, rendering us obedient to the will of God, easy and satisfied within ourselves, prudent in our conduct, and cordially disposed towards one another. Therefore, considering prayer as a remedy for personal deficiencies, it will be proper to prescribe the four several species of it (as they are generally classed,) more particularly for different patients; confession for the proud, the sanguine, and the pleasure-hunter; petition for the thoughtless and worldly-minded; intercession for the selfish, the ill-natured, and the passionate; and thanksgiving for the fearful, the melancholy, and the discontented. This last may be thought an improper distinction; for where shall the discontented find any matter of praise? I expect they will be at a loss at first, but after some practice, by reflecting on much greater evils that might have befallen them than those they complain of, and noting well whatever touches them at any time, they will perceive the list increase surprisingly.

6. There is another religious performance, which if it cannot rank as a species of prayer, yet bears a near affinity therewith, because operating in the same manner, viz. by impressing ideas more strongly upon the imagination; and this is, singing. It answers more particularly to that species, called thanksgiving: therefore St. Paul directs, if any be sad, let him pray; if joyful, let him sing psalms. We have observed somewhere before, that importunity and repetition work more upon the imagination than argument: now singing has the same effect, the words are drawn out, and the same thoughts made to dwell upon the mind longer than in any other way. Therefore you find that in clubs and parties they have their songs, which are known to encourage them greatly in their sentiments and proceedings.

It was much used by the primitive Christians, by the first reformers, and in the beginnings of most sects: but

what vitiates it in the established church is, the fondness for an exquisite taste in music, which wholly draws off all attention from the thought to the sound, and renders it impracticable to join in the tune. Go to an Italian opera, and you will hear the singers so clip and mangle their words, that without a book in your hand, you will lose even the little sense they contain. Not but that good music may be employed to give strength to the expressions, witness the Coronation Anthem, the Messiah, and other of Handel's performances: but there are few composers who know how to do this, or even attempt it. Besides, those pieces ought to be executed by good and skilful voices, who cannot be followed by a common congregation.

The songs inspiring party-zeal and the spirit of drinking are generally very bad music, badly executed, being rather roars and squalls, than songs: yet they have their full effect upon the company. I doubt not that many a jolly toper has bawled out, The soph he is immortal, and never can decay; for how should he return to dust, who daily wets his clay? till he has sung himself into a full persuasion of that witticism being a solid argument. Though the Quaker never sings professedly, yet the whine and awkward cadence, and see saw action, with which the spirit vents itself in his sermons, may be called a bastard-singing: perhaps that is all there is affecting in them. Thus it appears from constant experience, that singing, even of the most hideous kind, is a powerful engine for working on the sentiments. We should not therefore pretend to faint away at the screamings of a country church, because we have a fine ear, and delicate taste for music. In our own private amusements we may consult our own feelings, but in what regards the public, we are to consider not the effect that things have upon ourselves, but what they will have upon others. The custom of bringing up a set of singers to perform

form according to the rules of art has, I apprehend, proved a hindrance instead of a help to devotion: as the rest of the congregation let them sing by themselves, and are wholly taken up in attending to their quavers.

7. Having thus examined the nature of divine services, and shewn that their efficacy consists in impressing salutary dispositions on the mind, it is obvious that their end may be assisted by forms, ceremonies, external appearance, example and sympathy; whence arise the expedience of public worship, and the necessity of having certain stated times appointed for the purpose. I make no doubt that worship performed with the same sincerity, heartiness, and devotion, on a Thursday, would be as effectual to all intents and purposes as on a Sunday: but it is hardly to be supposed that a man who neglects it at the appointed time will perform it at any other. For it is well known, how backward people are to find a time of their own accord for matters that require serious attention, which they apprehend may be done at any time. Besides that very few have such a pliancy of imagination as will bear turning suddenly into the most opposite trains of thinking without having a hankering after those we have just been engaged in, so that it is absolutely necessary to appropriate some particular day to an affair of such importance.

'Nevertheless, if any one imagines Sundays of no use to himself, for that he can think of religion as much as becomes a gentleman without them, yet it is an unpardonable negligence to take no concern for others. People are apt to cry, What shall we be the better for going to church, or nodding over a musty old book in the evening instead of taking an innocent game at cards; but they should go on to ask one little question further, what hurt may we do our neighbours or the family? If I stay away from church, I may probably apply to my chapters, which often turn

upon matters not wholly unsuitable for a Sunday's employment: if my neighbour the cobler stays away, he goes to the alehouse, an employment less useful than that he follows on other days; and he thinks he copies my example herein, because we both agree in that circumstance of absenting ourselves from the public service. For the generality can look no farther than to the outward behaviour, and think a conformity in that, necessarily infers a thorough conformity of character. I have formerly played at backgammon on Sundays, one hand against the other: I never do it now because I do not like it, but should make no scruple of doing it: yet should scruple playing with any one else, for fear he should tattle, or we be over-heard: and this, not from any wish to gain the character of a righteous man, but for the same reason St. Paul gives for advising his pupils to abstain from *things offered to idols*. Hence it appears, that to use the softest name, it is a high degree of inconsiderateness to do or omit any thing, that may bring Sunday into contempt. However we may persuade ourselves it is a form needless for us, it is certainly needful for the greater part of mankind, who cannot enter into the substantial reasons of things, and will catch at any authority or example of their betters to excuse them from the form, which is irksome to them because they cannot discern its utility.

8. The same reasoning that leads to the appointment of particular days, may be applied to the appropriation of particular places for divine worship, because it assists the imagination, and produces a certain awe and solemnity in the mind. I therefore see no impropriety in the consecration of churches; not that it conjures down a supernatural influence into the stones and mortar, the pulpit or the pews, but because it begins the association between the place and devout ideas, and serves as a warning to admit no other

other ideas to intrude into it. Therefore, there is an expedience in keeping places once appropriated to sacred uses from being employed in any others, which might dissolve the association that gives them their salutary influence. Some regard should also be paid to the dress, utensils, or other objects employed in sacred services. There is a greater exactness required in those articles for a gross and ignorant people; wherefore we find very particular directions given on this subject in the Jewish ceremonial; for which we must presume there was good reason. As mankind grow more rational, there is less occasion for applications to the senses: perhaps little more is necessary than such a neatness and decency in external appearances, as may not draw off the attention, either by finery or slovenliness.

But, that surrounding objects have no influence upon the minds of people, is contrary to the experience of common life: why else have we our drawing-rooms, where things are kept a little more nice and elegant than in the common rooms for family use? A parcel of young folks might once, for a frolic, be very merry together in a barn hung all round with enormous cobwebs; and in that case the novelty of the thing and oddity of the furniture might even have an effect to increase their mirth: but whoever should make a practice of receiving his company in this manner, I fear would find the ease of conversation greatly clogged thereby, unless it happened to turn on rallying him for the peculiarity of his taste. Therefore, those who aim solely at the pleasures of conversation, and do not think of drawing an admiration of their wealth or elegance of taste, should be careful to exhibit a scene that may neither offend nor attract the eye.

9. Forms and ceremonies are so necessary, that Christians of all denominations, even those who affect to declare

most loudly against them, find it impracticable to do without them. They all have their particular places of worship, which they are careful to keep in what they call decency, and their badges of clerical distinction, be it a black cap, a cloak, or coat of a peculiar cut. Even the gifted priestess among the Quakers is known by her green apron; and the brotherhood, though affecting to regard nothing but the inner man, are yet so conscientiously attached to externals, that I suppose they would sooner burn at the stake than abate an inch of their broad-brimmed hat. In the last century, while a real sanctity was attached to externals, it was a noble struggle for religious liberty to oppose other externals against them: but now that nobody retains the notion of their containing an intrinsic virtue, the charge of superstition lies at the door of those who imagine them to contain an intrinsic malignity. For reason pronounces them alike indifferent either way: consequently there is as much superstition in believing that the service cannot be read devoutly in a surplice, as that it cannot be read properly without one.

I have thus attempted an explanation of the manner in which externals are of service to religion, by assisting to bring the mind into a disposition proper for the discharge of more important duties, and so becoming a natural means of grace; and the result seems to be, that a due regard for them deserves to be carefully inculcated, especially upon the young, the giddy, and the ignorant, who will be least capable of understanding wherein their efficacy lies. However they must be made to have an influence in such way as can be effected; the more rational, undoubtedly the better: but theory must sometimes give way to practicability, and he that cannot do as he would, must do as he can, rather than do nothing, to attain a good end. A popular system designed for every body's use, cannot be expected in all its parts,

parts, equally to suit every one's taste and wants. But it becomes those who set up for profound reasoners, to search fairly what rational construction things are capable of, and to what rational uses they may be applied, before they pretend to decide upon the merits of them.

CHAP. VI.

SACRAMENTS, DISCIPLINE, ARTICLES.

I HAVE little to add on any of these subjects but what will be easily anticipated by those of my readers who have paid any attention to what I have already advanced in the preceding chapters.

To begin with the sacraments. Now, in order to know how our church expresses herself on them, we need only have recourse to the Catechism which we have all learned, and perhaps most of us forgotten again; but we may easily borrow a book to refresh our memory, and there we shall find a sacrament defined to be an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, given to us by Christ himself. A sign we know is ordinarily an indication of something happening: when the weather-glass falls, we think it a sign it will rain; when on looking through the window we see the women pulling their handkerchiefs over their heads, we take this for a sign that it is beginning to rain; but neither the mercury nor the handkerchiefs can have any influence upon the clouds to bring down their contents, being declarative only, not productive of an event befallen or likely to befal. But there are other signs, which are not discoveries of something unknown, but remembrances of something slipt out of mind: as when you make signs with your finger to a person who through mere inconsiderateness is going to blunder out a secret he knows well enough is one.

The sacramental signs I apprehend are of the latter sort: they are neither efficient causes of any external event that may concern us, nor are they declarative signs of any operation performed upon us; but being ordained by Christ himself, the sight of them solemnly administered serves naturally

naturally to impress a strong remembrance of him, and remind us of the inestimable benefits procured for us by him. Therefore there is nothing conjured down into the elements by consecration, nor have they any power or quality different from other elements employed in common uses; nor can we expect to receive any other benefit from them, than the effect the sight and ceremony may work upon the heart and imagination. In like manner they are called pledges; as being means of producing in us the strongest assurance of his favour Now assurance is a state of mind which it may be cast into by sensible objects, working a lively and vigorous persuasion of what we knew well enough before, but had a very faint sense of in the imagination: therefore the sacraments are not evidences to convince, nor conveyances to put us in possession of any thing promised, but methods of turning conviction into persuasion. They are visible transactions between the first institutor and ourselves, the most direct and pointed that can be since his departure from earth; and therefore the best pledges of his continued kindness, and the inestimable advantages we hope to receive at his hands.

Thus the sacraments are rather Christian than divine services, efficacious to invigorate our faith in Christ, which is called the saving faith, because leading to that which is immediately so. Not that we are to look upon ourselves as advanced a single step in the road of salvation, but that we are better provided with the means of attaining it. Or, to use the Stoical allegory, we are still as much in a state of drowning as before, but have laid hold of the cords, by which, with hearty efforts, we may raise ourselves into the pure air of rectitude and holiness.

If there be any who think they can do as well without them, it does not become us to judge of another: we must leave every man to his own conscience and experience upon that

that article. Yet, even admitting him right, still, according to the expression in the liturgy, they may be generally, if not universally necessary. I cannot indeed suppose the compilers had any such construction in their thoughts, but the words may be true in that construction: the practice of them may be necessary in general, to keep up a spirit of Christianity among us, which spirit will diffuse it imperceptibly by sympathy to those who do not make use of them. To which it may be owing that our modern philosophy has a greater mixture of Christianity in it than the ancient; and I have met with profound reasoners, seeming to retain very little respect for the name of Christ, who yet have more of the Christian in their character than they know of, so have actually received a benefit from the sacraments they will not acknowledge.

2. Perhaps it may be alleged, that if the sacraments have no effect but upon the mind and imagination, baptism must be a mere empty form, being administered to infants who can have no imagination of what is doing to them. But if they have not then, they will when they grow up, and come to reflect on the solemnity with which they have been admitted into the religion of Christ; and in their own persons receive the sign and pledge of his love ordained by himself. It would likewise operate on the by-standers as a means of grace, were they carefully to assist at it with a little more seriousness, and not as a mere customary form: it would remind them of their own admission by the same ceremony, and engage their charity to a new fellow-traveller, to whom an entrance has just been opened into the same road of salvation with themselves.

It was therefore a very wise provision of our church, that all baptisms should be celebrated publicly, except upon extraordinary occasions; and it is no less prudent in our present clergy to administer privately, without waiting for your extraordinary

extraordinary occasions; because else, as the world goes, there would be no baptising at all; and I have said more than once before, that a wise man will do as he can, when he cannot do as he would. Indeed, as our places of worship in this humid climate are stone vaults, many times half under ground, and our children born with more delicate constitutions than those of our forefathers, who were a nation of soldiers and huntsmen, there may be good reason against exposing them to the damps of a quarry in winter season: but since the rubric has not limited the time, why might not the ceremony be deferred till vernal suns have exhaled the dangerous vapours, and blunted the cutting edge of Eurus?

There is one obstacle against this method, that the nurses would lose their fees; and it is well known the laws of fashion are held more inviolable among us than those of the church. This, however, might be removed, by the sponsors coming early to make their offerings to the air-born goddess, and at the same time appointing their substitutes to attend for them at the sacred font, in case they should be engaged in the more important transactions of Tunbridge or Newmarket; by which means both our credit and our consciences might be saved unhurt at once.

As to the objections of those who contend for adult baptism, I think there might be many inconveniencies in delaying the ceremony till children were grown up. I have observed before, how apt people are to put off a thing for which there is no fixed time. Some would never think themselves sufficiently qualified for the undertaking. Some would delay it, on purpose that they might not double the guilt of complying with the world, the flesh, and the devil, by a solemn renunciation of them. Some would be cruelly tormented by the dilemma of precipitating the sacred rite before they were well prepared, or else running the hazard

of

of being cut off by a sudden death from the benefits of their initiation. Multitudes would omit it through carelessness; so that we should never know who were even nominal Christians among us. Besides, as a great deal of wickedness may be committed before seventeen, which I think is reckoned the the adult age, many sprightly young people would imagine they had a licence to do as they pleased, presuming upon the laver of regeneration for washing away all their sins.

3. Having thus shewn the reasonableness of rites and ceremonies, of places of public worship, and particular holidays, and how they are instrumental in promoting the essential objects of religion, it remains to inquire whether these advantages could be so well obtained without the establishment of general regulations for that purpose throughout the community.

It may be fancied, that people might fall into such regulations of themselves upon a view of their expedience, without the interference of civil authority; which, as it is human, will always be liable to error; and, in fact, has proved more mischievous than serviceable to religion in former times. I shall not deny, that grievous abuses have been committed, and so there have in secular government under all its forms, whether democratical, oligarchical, or monarchical: but would any man therefore wish to live in anarchy among a people who had no other guide than their own opinion of what measures were requisite for the general security and well-being?

A few friends of reasonable tempers and similar characters, might live together well enough in this manner: for they would form the same judgment upon most occasions, and where they did not do this at first, they would quickly be brought over to each other's sentiments, or at least see the necessity of acquiescing. So a young sect in its beginning may subsist and grow without the aid of authority: for

for being few in number, they will be friends to one another, will all have the same scheme at heart, and will sacrifice every other consideration to promote the common cause. And yet though I have admitted this possible in theory, I should be puzzled to produce an instance of it in fact: for there has always been some particular person of high repute among his brethren for extraordinary sanctity, and knowledge in spiritual matters, whose decision is sacred, and whose word is a law to all the rest. Our modern innovators exhibit strong specimens of the force of such a prepossession, upon which they depend wholly for cementing their flock together. They pronounce upon every thing with the peremptoriness of an absolute monarch; and I have been informed, that one of them in particular, if any body scruples doing as he desires, never stands to reason the case, but tells him with a confidential air, You'll be damned if you don't. This was all the Pope ever had to say: yet we know too well what a mighty influence this little terrifying word gave him over kings, and states, and all temporal affairs.

But whatever may be done among a society of friends, or in the infancy of a system, when it is once spread among multitudes, or become national, there must be some public regulations for keeping things from running into disorder; for the members being numerous, strangers to one another, dispersed in different places, of different humours, and turns of thought, there would be a thousand various modes of discipline among them: which being seldom distinguishable from essentials by the generality, they would become a disjointed body, perpetually at variance, or at least incapable of that benefit they might receive from their mutual connection. Besides, that provision is to be made not only for such as are well disposed, but likewise for instructing the ignorant, for engaging the thoughtless, for preventing those who

who will do no good from doing harm, and restraining the licentious within some bounds of decency.

For when we reflect on the force of appearance and sympathy, we must acknowledge that every man's outward behaviour may be of consequence to others, where it is of none to himself: and though hypocrisy may prove as pernicious to the owner as blasphemy, it is much more innocent with respect to the public. Therefore we see that in all countries upon earth, that have any religion among them, there is some established discipline; and though the wisest and most rational tolerate other forms beside their own, there are particular institutions and usages appointed for the generality, and for such as have no opinions, and but little thought of their own. And even the tolerated systems of any consequence, though not supported by law, have their forms, their customs, and their discipline enforced by some kind of authority among them.

I know there are some people disturbed at the dignities and revenues established in the church: if they have so contemptible an opinion of religion, as to wish it were utterly lost out of the world, I cannot blame them. But I will not suppose this of them; and as those who complain loudest, are such as would be thought very rational men, they will hardly expect the world should be well instructed by means of extraordinary illuminations or supernatural impulses imparted to private persons, qualifying them instantaneously for the office: or if the thing were doubtful in speculation, experience testifies what wild work has been made by persons undertaking it on those pretences. For it is well known, the doctrines of religion may be grossly misunderstood, and perverted to very mischievous purposes, as well through ignorance, indiscretion, or misapplied zeal, as by design. If we do not think a common artificer well qualified for his business without having served a regular apprenticeship,

ticeship, surely this, which is a more dangerous edge-tool than the saw or the chisel, requires an early preparation to handle it skilfully. Then if we consider the trouble and expense attending it, and how soon the election must be made between the shop and the pulpit, we shall find it quite necessary that some temporal encouragement should be cast into the scale to determine it. Friends and parents (on whom the choice generally depends, except when a lad now and then takes a strong turn that way himself), have the temporal advancement of their children in view, grandeur and riches are their incitements: they consider life as a lottery, and would not venture their child in a class where there were no great prizes to excite their hopes. If they propose an apprenticeship, it is a step into my Lord Mayor's coach; if the law, they have in view the great purse and the seals; if divinity, they think of the lawn sleeves and his Lordship.

It becomes not me to pronounce upon the honours and possessions of the church, whether they be more ample than necessary, whether properly distributed in proportion to the duties annexed, or conferred according to the true intent of their institution. Those are matters belonging to wiser heads and higher powers. All I contend for is, that without temporal emoluments sufficiently inviting to those who have the disposal of young people, labourers would be wanting in the vineyard. I knew a very good man, a dissenter, whose son desired to be bred up to the ministry; but he would not let him, because he said there was nothing to be got in that way above a hundred a year. Now the talents of the lad were such as, I believe, would hardly have raised him to a hundred pounds a year if he had gone into the establishment: but the father thought higher of him; and so I suppose do most fathers.

Therefore, if there were not a possibility of something

great, few would be put upon the lists who were not of such unpromising geniuses, as that even the partiality of their friends could not judge them fit for any thing else; or in such low circumstances, as that the bare exemption from bodily labour would be deemed a prize. But if it be thought that any thing can be taught to read over a service intelligibly, yet I hope it will be allowed that some better qualified heads are necessary in the church militant; for there are so many attacks made upon religion, so many misapprehensions and perversions of its doctrine, so many new vices and follies continually starting up, that plodding industry, and downright probity alone, cannot manage them, without acuteness and strength of parts, improved by extensive learning. And there is the more need to provide for store of hopeful plants, because, out of every score of ingenious boys in the mother's estimation, it is good luck if one turns out an ingenious man when come abroad into the world.

Neither will acuteness of parts and depth of learning answer the purpose completely, without aid of other qualifications: men of a scholastic turn are commonly too abstruse and rigid; they cast religion into a form which is fit for nobody's wear but their own: therefore it is requisite there should be some mingled among them, who by a competent knowledge of human nature, of the manners and characters of mankind, may be able to turn the labours of others to general use, to render speculation practical, and discern what is feasible as well as what is desirable. But discretion and knowledge of the world are not to be learned at the grammar-school, nor at college: they must be gotten at home, if gotten at all, from the parents or persons with whom we are used to converse familiarly, and therefore there should be such prizes in the lottery as may be a temptation in the eye of families, where alone there are opportunities of studying this science.

4. Great

4. Great outcry has also been made against imposing articles of belief on men's consciences, and invading their most inviolable and inalienable rights, by denying them even the liberty of thought. One would think the persons who join in this clamour were foreigners, who had just gotten some history three hundred years old, and taken their idea of our constitution and polity from what they read there of the Popish tyranny and persecutions. But I know of no imposition now put upon the conscience, nor fetters attempted to be cast upon the liberty of thought. An English gentleman may believe the world was made by chance, or the moon of cream cheese, if he pleases: no scrutiny will be taken into his thoughts by the courts of justice, nor, if discovered, will he incur any corporal, or pecuniary penalty thereby, since the writ *de heretico comburendo* has been taken away. Very true, you say; a man may think what he pleases, because you cannot hinder him by all the laws you can contrive, but then he must keep his thoughts to himself, and this it seems is a grievous bondage; for liberty of thought is nothing, without liberty of expressing one's thoughts upon all occasions, and in all companies.

It may seem surprising, that in a country where liberty is our idol, it should be so little understood: but each man's notion of liberty seems to be, an unbounded licence for him to do whatever he thinks proper, without regard to any one else. Whereas liberty subsists by restraint, therefore if unbounded, must necessarily destroy itself; for the law, its only safeguard, operates only by penalties, restraining from the practices which it forbids.

A man cannot be said to enjoy his property, or the liberty of making what use he pleases of it, unless other persons are restrained from reaping the corn he sows. And the case is the same with respect to communities, who can no more

carry any salutary plan into execution while liable to continual interruption from every quarter, than a private man can avail himself of his property. Therefore the law and the magistrate are armed with authority to restrain the wanton and the selfish from giving such interruption, that so there may be free course for every good provision to take full effect. For as one of the most valuable liberties of mankind is, that of forming into societies, and enjoying the benefit of regulations made for public order and convenience, whoever endeavours to propagate opinions tending to disunite or disturb the society, to weaken the authority of those regulations, or hinder the good effects of them, is an infringer of that liberty, and consequently a proper object for the restraint of the law. But if it be fairly considered, what great indulgence is given in this country to every man's conscientious declaration of his sentiments, how large a freedom to all kinds of sober argumentation; and that no other restraints are enforced except those against wantonness, self-conceit, rancour, and indecency, which may do hurt to the vulgar and unwary; there will be found much less inconvenience in obliging private persons to suppress some of their sparkling notions than in a general licence to throw out indiscriminately whatever strikes the fancy.

We are a religious as well as a civil community, and rules have been established for our guidance in both: nor could it be otherwise, for the people will have some imaginations or other concerning the invisible world; if you do not provide them with a rational system, they will run after conjurors, diviners, tales of fairies and apparitions; and lie open to the first crafty or enthusiastic deceiver who wishes to make dupes of them. Therefore the polity of a nation would be grossly defective, where no provision was made for instructing the ignorant, warning the thoughtless, and educating children: but how can such provision be made without

out a summary of doctrines, and set of articles composing the system to be taught? Or would you have a law enacted, that the people shall be duly instructed, and that parents shall educate their children, without giving the least direction in what manner the instruction and education shall be carried on? But if the system of doctrines established is believed beneficial by those who have it in charge to make provision for the public welfare in all its parts, it is natural as well as incumbent upon them to have the benefit secured by the protection of the laws: and this is all that is ever aimed at. If the vulgar, who want the aid of such public institutions most, are not disturbed in their attachment to them by jokes and sophisms, and other attacks upon things recommended to them as sacred, the law is satisfied. It makes no inquisition into men's private sentiments, nor discourses among their friends, or in their families, nor whether they breed up their children in orthodox principles: neither does it prohibit the publication of works not perfectly reconcileable with orthodoxy, provided they do not directly tend to shake the popular belief. For Berkley's denial of body, space, and motion, Hartley's notion of our performing all our actions by the mechanical impulse of vibratiuncles, and Burnet's theory of the earth, must, I doubt, be counted heterodox by a rigid believer in the thirty-nine articles: yet they never fell under the lash of the law, nor even suffered in their reputation of being good men and pious Christians.

And for the manner of understanding established doctrines, this may be, and has been accommodated to the prevailing modes of thinking, by the tacit consent of the people themselves: for whoever will examine the writings of the last century, compared with those of our cotemporaries, may perceive, that although we still retain the same set of articles, we find in them much less of the mysterious, the marvellous, and the magical, than our forefathers did a hundred

years ago. And it is chiefly on this foundation that I build my title to praise for the intention, however feebly executed, with which I have gone through my present task; for implicit faith will not go down now a-days: men are not easily silenced unless they are convinced, nor will they be made to swallow mysteries, to them unintelligible, by the drenching horn of ecclesiastical authority. It is therefore labouring in the service of the church, to attempt shewing (as I have now done), that without changing a single iota of her doctrines or ordinances, they may be so expounded as to be consistent with the discoveries of reason and philosophy, and to stand the closest inspection by the light of nature.

CHAP. VII.

HISTORY OF MAN.

We were born into the world selfish and sensitive, having no regard for any other creature, nor for any thing beyond the present calls of appetite; and if we had been planted like trees, always to grow, each in his several spot, receiving our nourishment from the ground beneath us, our pleasures and pains continually from the sun, the air, the rains, and the dews, we should never have had a thought reaching further than ourselves, or the present moment. But God has been pleased to endue us with remembrance and observation to discern the influence of the past upon the present, and the present upon the future; which leads us gradually into a degree of foresight, prudence, and reason. He has also given us the powers of motion, and organs of speech, by which we may have intercourse with one another; and has sown the seeds of wants and desires, which draw us together for our mutual assistance and gratification. This first opens the heart a little beyond itself, and begins our concern for others, generating love, instinct, and friendship; for I have shewn in the chapter on the Passions, that those affections are the products of wisdom, not the gifts of power, being no more born with us than speech; but our organs are so constituted and suited to receive the action of external objects, as to lead us naturally into them, pains and cultivation being only necessary to hasten their growth.

He has moreover given us the faculty of imagination, which when stored with variety of associations and ideas, can furnish an entertainment of its own from objects that do not touch the senses; and as we grow up, finds employment for most of our time: for hunger and thirst, and the pleasures of sensation, affect us only now and then, but ha-

bit, fancy, amusement, curiosity, novelty, and other movements of imagination, occupy us continually. This of itself renders us sociable, and makes us take an immediate pleasure in one another's company; for the trains of thought in other persons bearing a similitude with our own, their conversation and motions attract us by sympathy, and lead the imagination into a greater variety of reflections and modifications than the scenes of inanimate nature around us can do. Were a child to be kept always alone from its birth, it would never want company, because having never experienced the pleasures of it: but if one of us was shut up by himself for a while, he would grow melancholy and dull, his spirits languid, and his thoughts stagnant: and if he could only see a number of people from his window, among whom there appeared something of business and bustle going forward, it would give a lift to his spirits, and briskness to his ideas. So that we are not born sociable creatures, but are placed in such circumstances by nature, and endued with such capacities, that we insensibly acquire a habit of sociability.

2. But imagination is more strongly affected with scenes expressive of passion and emotion than those that are calm and placid. This I believe is what makes boys generally unlucky, and those of the sprightliest temper are commonly fullest of mischief: because they cannot bear to see things languid around them, and they can raise more stir by doing mischief than any thing else. Therefore their mischief is not malice, but fondness for something that may keep their attention alive; for when they first meet together, they are pleased with one another's company, but not knowing how to keep up a conversation, they begin to play unlucky tricks with one another, merely for want of better employment. For the same reason they throw stones at people, because they can thereby put them into a greater flutter than by any thing else they could do. Or if they have not an opportunity

nity of seeing the vexation occasioned by the pranks they play, still they can enjoy the thought of it: and will break a window slily, hide a workman's tool, or fasten up his door, for the sake of fancying how he will fret and fume when he comes to discover the roguery. Nor are our vulgar much better than overgrown boys in this respect: for if they can get into a fine garden, it is fun to them to break off an ornament, or disfigure a statue, or do any mischief they think will give much disturbance: and they find a supreme delight in teazing an idiot, a deformed person, or a foreigner, that has the ill luck to fall in their way.

But it is not a delight in mischief alone, that makes us hurtful to one another; our very wants and desires, which first bring us together, have a tendency likewise to dissociate us. For the same materials of gratification being wanted by several, and that selfishness which is our first principle of action prompting each to appropriate them to himself, this gives rise to competitions, contentions, jealousies and aversions.—The most obvious advantage we can take of a man is, by getting something away from him, and the easiest way to make the sight of him entertaining is by doing him a displeasure: but it requires some acquaintance with the taste, and character, and disposition, to know how we can oblige a man, or receive benefit from his assistance or pleasure from his conversation.

It is this greater facility with which we can do one another an injury than a benefit, that excites our suspicion, and gives us an unfavourable opinion of new faces: besides, while it is uncertain whether they stand well or ill disposed towards us, prudence will direct us to guard against the latter in the first place, and keep us on our self-defence till we know something more particularly of them. Therefore children are shy and fearful among strangers, and the vulgar come among them either with dread or defiance, according as they think themselves their equals or not: nor do

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men wear off these sentiments till, by commerce with the world, they learn to know dispositions by looks and appearances, and become well versed in the methods of civility proper for removing suspicion, and ingratiating themselves with whatever company they fall into. But as long as fears and jealousies subsist, it is natural to feel a hostile disposition towards whatever causes them: therefore, I imagine, that if two companies of savages utterly unknown to each other were to meet, they would fall a fighting: and we civilized people have still so much of the savage left in us, that we fall to censuring, ridiculing, and criticising one another's characters, manners, and sentiments. Nor perhaps are there many, who if they examine themselves narrowly, might not find that they rarely come into company without a little spice of hostility in their disposition and a spirit of defiance, however their good sense and good breeding may overpower and stifle it.

3. These observations upon the turns that human nature takes spontaneously were, I suppose, what induced Hobbes to lay down that men were born enemies to one another, and that it was necessity and weakness that drove them into society to provide for their mutual defence: but it would have become a philosopher to have gone to the bottom of things, and not have charged upon nature what does not appear in us till some time after we are out of her hands. Whoever observes little children, may perceive them wholly wrapped up within themselves, attentive only to present sensations of pleasure and pain: so they are born with neither friendship nor enmity, but have the seeds sown in them that will produce both; and if we must ascribe the plants to nature, because she furnishes the soil and the seeds, we may with as much justice say they are born friends to the species as enemies. For the pleasures they receive from others naturally incline them to feel an affection for those from whom they receive them, and they will

will cry upon seeing mama, or nurse, or brother, or sister, or John or Molly in pain, though they have no apprehension of any hurt to follow to themselves.

The continual supply of necessaries and conveniencies from parents, the gratification they find in the care of their children, and pleasures mutually received among playfellows, first cement us together, raise us a little out of ourselves, and begin a family attachment; and though greediness and wantonness sometimes a little disturb the union, yet the visible expedience of the thing keeps them within some bounds. But with respect to persons between whom no such union has been cemented, there is no obvious necessity to lay a restraint upon those turbulent humours; they are therefore left to take their scope, from whence injury, abuse, and continual suspicion must ensue. And this fear of strangers strengthens the attachment of intimates, for a man never enjoys his friends so heartily as after having been teazed or terrified among persons he dislikes, nor is ever so fond of home as when apprehensive of danger abroad; nor perhaps could we keep our boys from running away, if they could expect the same kindness and tender usage every where as they meet with from ourselves. Thus to take a metaphor from matter, the repellent quality of external bodies holds their internal parts together in a stronger cohesion.

But single families cannot furnish all the accommodations convenient for them within themselves; they must soon perceive that one can supply what another wants, and that one has hit upon inventions which are new and unthought of by the other. Hence alliances, commerce, and mutual intercourse will extend the bands of union to a wider compass, and join them into cities or districts. Yet rapaciousness and wantonness will still incite the inhabitants of one district or city to invade the properties of others, who will naturally exert themselves to repel

repel their aggressors; but finding themselves too weak to maintain themselves in perfect security, or being tired of perpetual squabbles with their neighbours, they will try to strike up an agreement with them, or to associate themselves with other cities, so as to form a nation of sufficient extent and power to repel invaders, and preserve domestic quiet.

Thus, perhaps, it may be true that men were first driven into large communities by fear and self-defence, because in a state of nature they might not be sensible of any other benefits redounding from them. However, it is nothing more than a perhaps, that nations were actually first formed by fear; they may have been families, descendants of one ancestor, grown into a numerous people, or colonies transplanted into an uninhabited country: and this opinion is countenanced by ancient history. Or if they were made up of different clans and families, there were other means of uniting them together besides the fear of danger: for we may gather from the fables of Orpheus and Amphion drawing stones, and tigers, and trees after them by the sweetness of their music, that it was not by terror they drove the wild men dispersed about the forests and mountains into society, but lured them by the prospect of advantages and pleasures greater than they had experienced in their savage state.

4. But the old leaven of wantonness and greediness, too deeply worked into human nature, ever to be totally eradicated, spreads itself in families, cities, nations, or whatever other combinations men can be thrown into, and gains a new form in large communities, which it could not assume before, being converted into the lust of fame and power. Hence proceed wars, encroachments, plunderings, conquest and tyranny: yet these evils were not utterly unproductive of salutary ends, conquest often ending in uniting several nations under one empire. The four great monarchies, though not universal, as they were called, overspread

spread a considerable part of the earth: they must have produced great oppression, distress, and confusion at first, till in a little time things fell into a settled course, and the inhabitants lived more quietly and happily than they had done in their former condition. For the conquerors and conquered became incorporated by degrees into one people, having a communion of interests and a continual intercourse together: whence arts, civilization, commerce, and social order spread further than they had ever done before. Even while wars and animosities subsist, they tend to cement the union of individuals with the community: so that it is a common artifice of policy to give ill impressions of a foreign nation to make the subjects join more heartily against a detested enemy.

5. Thus the wisdom of Providence has mingled all varieties, both of the jarring and harmonizing passions, adjusted to one another in such admirable proportions as to form together a salutary composition, by which mankind have been gradually raised from their original ignorance, and wildness to the degree of knowledge, reason, mutual good-will and general intercourse, we see them arrived at in the present age. Yet this wonderful complication of counteracting springs could not render the harmony complete without a knowledge of God: since it is our origin from one common Father, our subjection to one Ruler, that unites the whole universe into one empire, and constitutes us citizens of the world: and that knowledge has proceeded slowly through many stages of error and imperfection.

The fear of spirits and hobgoblins was perhaps the first thing that would loosen the attachment to objects of sense, and put the savage upon some kind of reflection concerning things unseen. It seems reasonable to imagine that persons who had obtained an authority over others, would endeavour to keep up its influence, when their backs were turned,

turned, and for that purpose might notch a stick into something like a human face, and set it up in a corner, pretending that it would inform them of whatever should be done contrary to their orders in their absence. Such stratagems as these require no great invention; our nurses, the silliest people in the world, often hit upon them: for they tell their children of an old man in the cupboard that will take them away if they are naughty; and if they play unlucky tricks slily, the little bird that peeps in at the window will tell of it.

Then if some person who had been greatly reverenced among them happened to die, the thought of him would remain for a while strongly impressed on those who were left behind: they would frequently dream of him, and those dreams, among a gross and simple people, would sometimes be taken for real conversations. This would give an easy handle to such as were more cunning than the rest, to pretend an intercourse with the dead, and by means of orders or advices feigned to have been received from them, work their ends upon the others. In a little time they might improve upon their first invention, and find an account in enlarging the powers of the deceased, ascribing to them the management of the winds and weather, the increase or sterility of their cattle, of the fruits of the earth and herbs of the field; giving them the determination of the courses of fortunes, and the success of transactions among the living. And as some of these venerated names would be handed down to succeeding generations, after every thing relating to their history had been forgotten, this would give rise to the distinction between the immortal gods, of whose origin nobody could give an account, and heroes or demigods who had been remembered here upon earth.

By these means the belief of beings in the air having an influence on things below might be established among an ignorant

ignorant people, which though extremely gross and imperfect must be of some benefit to them; and it was also one step, though a small one, in the progress of true religion in the world. For the persuasion of an invisible power, observant of what passes among us, and having an influence upon the affairs of men, is the first article of a sound and saving faith; and how much soever their notions of this power were confused and contradictory, still the general opinion of its existence was a point gained, which would make the other steps in useful knowledge more easy to be taken.

6. As men advanced in society, and fell into a more settled way of living, they would extend their thoughts beyond their own immediate wants, and begin to take an interest in the welfare of their children and descendants, after they themselves should be no more. They would therefore wish to survive their mortal part, that they might be able to watch over their conduct, and rejoice in their prosperity. And this would lead them to imitate and strive to gain the favour of those whom they considered as having been advanced for their virtues to the upper regions, and still presiding over the affairs of men. Here then, is a second step gained in the progress towards true religion. Nevertheless it must be supposed that these two fundamental articles of a superintending power, and a future state, in which our condition will depend on our behaviour here, must at first lie overwhelmed with a multitude of gross errors and absurdities; for the passions of men, the examples of vice, folly, and contention in the most admired of them, the interests of states, the craft of private persons, accidental impressions of fear, and fantastic rovings of imagination, each making some perverse addition, must altogether produce a strange mixture.

And accordingly we find in all ancient history what a number

number of incoherencies and absurdities abounded in the first received creeds concerning the immortal gods and demigods, the wars, rebellions, quarrels, thefts, amours, infidelities, and partialities among them, their residing in statues made by men, their declarations by oracles, omens, and prodigies; as also concerning the apparitions of shades and spectres, the enjoyments of Elysium, and punishments of Tartarus. And it being obvious that no community can subsist upon earth without something of order and government, they transferred the same idea of subordination and distinct dominion to the inhabitants of heaven. Jove ruled over the heavens; Neptune over the sea; Pluto in the infernal regions; Minerva had the patronage of wisdom; Apollo of wit; Mercury of cunning; Ceres presided over corn, and Bacchus over wine: but that they might not encroach upon one another's provinces, as such gods might be apt to do if left to themselves, Jove had the supreme authority over all.

Which last notion opened a narrow passage towards the unity of the Godhead, yet was even this little avenue choaked up with doubts and confusion: for the Parcæ or Fates were held sometimes to controul the will of Jove, sometimes only to enforce his decrees, and if he had once bound himself by Styx, he durst not recede, even though he should afterwards change his mind: so that one cannot tell whether Jove, though supreme over the gods, had not another supreme power over him.

7. Such fluctuations and incoherencies in the popular doctrines set reflection at work, and gave birth to philosophy: for reason must have materials to begin upon, and philosophers as well as other men, were once children, susceptible of any impressions stamped upon them by others: nor could their sagacity, when mature enough to act for itself, do any thing more than examine the opinions they had

had imbibed, endeavour to separate the solid from the empty, and pursue such further lights as could be struck out from time to time. But the reason of one man could go but a little way, for his life must be almost spent in getting rid of erroneous prejudice, before he could begin to make an advance towards truth; and any discovery that he might make would require time to settle into something like an established opinion before it could serve as a foundation for another to proceed upon.

The earliest persons of thought and careful reflection seem to have been legislators and founders of states; and the object they had in view to have been that of perpetuating their names among posterity with love and honour for the services they had done. It were mere conjecture to say what were their notions of the gods and a future state, for they were probably too much taken up with their grand object to think closely of any thing else, and studied only how to turn popular opinions to the best advantage of the communities under their care.

Next arose persons who were desirous of going to the bottom of things, and investigating the causes of all the phenomena around them. The first philosophers seem to have been mere naturalists, who set themselves to study the primary properties and elementary principles of bodies, in order to frame hypotheses of the manner in which all visible productions might originate, and employed the names of the gods only to allegorize the powers of nature: for with them Jove was the ether, Juno the air, Neptune the sea, Vulcan fire, and so on. Or if they had any thing of the theologian, and held the existence of intelligent beings superior to man, they supposed them productions of the finer elements, as they did the first men of the grosser: for they made Jove, the father of the gods, the son of Chronos or Time, and Rhea, the Flood; that is, produced by the

operation of mechanical causes in the efflux of rolling years.

It is not easy to ascertain the time when philosophy rose above the contemplation of material objects: we have heard great things of Hermes, Trismegistus, Orpheus, and other sages of earliest antiquity, but the accounts of them are much too imperfect and uncertain to be depended upon. Cudworth will have it probable that Orpheus taught the doctrine of the Trinity, or three co-eternal hypostases in one substance; but, if we may take Cicero's word, Thales was the first who discovered an intelligent principle operating in the birth of nature: for he held that all things were formed out of water, but that mind or intelligence was what threw the water into those various cohesions, forms, and motions, which we call the order of nature. One cannot tell certainly whether he made mind a distinct substance from the water, or only a quality residing in it, for the ancients entertained a notion that quality had an existence of its own, distinct from that of the subject to which it belonged: which existence was in the whole compound, not in the several component parts, for there is no beauty in the single bricks, the mortar, the wood-work, the glass panes of a house; the beauty resides in the whole composition aptly put together.

It seems most likely he had this latter idea, and so was not a complete theist, because we find the introduction of theism, that is, the doctrine of an intelligent agent, the author of nature, and substantially distinct from the materials on which he worked, claimed for Pythagoras in what are called the golden verses: in which he is alluded to as having been the first who discovered the Psyche, or spirit imprisoned in the human body, and taught the knowledge of the unfathomable Tetrachtys, or name of Jove, the fountain of ever-flowing nature. However this be, and whether Pythagoras

goras were the discoverer or not, it can scarcely be denied, that in his time there was the belief of a God in the proper sense of the word as we now use it, an omnipotent, intelligent, unproduced being, author of nature and all her works: for the gods we have spoken of before were nothing more than huge flying men, of enormous strength, and bodies so finely contexted as to render them invisible, unless when they had a mind to shew themselves, by assuming a clothing from the grosser elements.

Here were great and important advances made, which were maintained ever after in the true church of philosophy, if I may call it so, for there have been grievous schisms and heresies there as well as in religion. But I am scarcely entitled to call it a church, as consisting of a clergy alone without a people: for there never yet was a nation of philosophers, nor ever could be; their credenda being too refined and speculative for vulgar comprehension; nor had they authority enough to establish an implicit faith in their doctrines among all ranks of people.

8. The chief source of the general diffusion of the great truths of religion among mankind was undoubtedly the Jewish dispensation. For accounts of things we must necessarily recur to the Old Testament, having nothing else that will carry us back far enough: for Homer, the oldest profane writer extant, is, I think, supposed cotemporary with Solomon, and the transactions he treats of, to have passed in the time of Jephtha. If there were other authors at hand, it would certainly be right to consult them, but, since we have only Moses, we must be content with the materials he has furnished us. Nor must I, upon this occasion, regard him as an inspired writer, for reasons already explained; therefore, I shall meddle with nothing supernatural, which might be objected against as incredible, but employ such parts only of his narration as might have been received

upon the credit of Livy, or any common historian. For the same reason I propose to go no higher than Abraham, because it is the humour of some among us to regard all that has been recorded of the earlier and antediluvian times, as fabulous.

And I think it could not be doubted, had we no better authority than that of Livy for the fact, that there was such a person, eminent in his time and the founder of a a family, whom he bred up in the belief of one God, supreme governour of heaven and earth, and arbiter of the affairs of men; and preserved them from the contagion of superstition and idolatry which prevailed all around them. I shall not pretend to decide what we are to think of the angels with whom he is said to have been conversant, nor am I concerned with the reality of their appearance, let him only have dreamt of them, and taken his dreams for realities. But how came it he did not dream they were independent powers, self-existent, or produced by some fatality or plastic energy of nature? Or how did it happen that nobody in other countries should ever dream of one Supreme Power, governor and maker of all other beings, before the time of Pythagoras, or suppose Thales, who was but a little earlier, and both of them many centuries posterior to Abraham? For he was no philosopher, he never pried into the secrets of nature, nor pursued the demonstrations of mathematics, nor studied the courses of the heavenly bodies, nor dived into the depths of metaphysics; but was a plain man, occupied in the managemnt of his cattle, and providing accommodations for his household; and his theology was such as was intelligible not only to adepts, but to his servants, his shepherds, and all under his influence.

Whence got he then this purity of sentiment concerning things unseen, unmingled with any thing of the notched sticks, the portable household divinities, or the quarrelling, intriguing

intriguing, over-reaching, immortal gods, the deified heroes, or subterraneous intelligences? We dare not say he received it by tradition from Noah and Adam, nor by supernatural illumination, for fear of bringing discredit upon our intellects, as too weak to throw off the prejudices of the nurse and the schoolmaster. What then shall we say? Was it the remains of a rational system struck out by some philosophers who lived a thousand years before him, but whose works and remembrance have been completely swept away by an inundation of barbarous nations? We have not however the least hint of any such primœval sages, or antepatriarchal Saracens, Goths, and Vandals, even in fabulous history: so that their very existence is mere hypothesis brought in to serve a particular purpose. But admitting the supposition, unsupported as it is by any shadow of evidence, how chanced it that those genuine remains were preserved only in his family? Or, if craft and credulity could bear such excellent fruits, why did they never produce them again in any other soil? If it were the growth of mere natural causes, still nature and all her movements, both accidental and regular, were laid out at her birth in the plan of the Almighty: we must therefore acknowledge a particular Providence that, in the formation of this sublunary system, had prepared the seeds from which in long process of time should spring a tree of sound knowledge overspreading the earth. It seems probable, and appears to have been fact, if we may take Moses's word, that the true God was known to Enoch, Melchisedech, Noah, and others, before Abraham, but they could not transmit it inviolate to their descendants: he first succeeded in making it the received doctrine among all his household, and entailed it as an inalienable privilege upon his posterity; from whence he became entitled to be called the father of the faithful.

9. I shall not touch upon the blessing given to Isaac and Jacob, because this would be building on controverted ground, but I suppose it will be admitted that this family grew into a numerous nation, still possessed with the persuasion of one God omnipotent, Lord of heaven and earth, besides whom there was no other God; which persuasion was peculiar to themselves. For though most other nations had their patron God, upon whose protection they depended, yet they believed their neighbours to have tutelary deities too, contending often, and struggling with their own: if they succeeded in an expedition, they extolled their own God as the mightiest, if beaten they would pass over to the victorious God as the most potent: or at other times endeavour to keep on good terms with both, by taking the neighbouring deity into a share of their worship. This last practice sometimes crept in for a time among the Israelites, from the days of the golden calves down to the end of their monarchial government; nevertheless the worship of Jehovah still continued the national religion, and after the captivity, when one might have expected quite the contrary, it was more firmly established among them than ever.

10. Let us proceed to another persuasion of this people grafted upon that of their being the peculiar care of God; I mean their expectation of an extraordinary person to arise among them. They had before believed that God had established the house of David for ever, and that he would preserve the throne in that family against all opposition whatever; but this hope proving abortive, they were then persuaded there should arise one from his loins who should restore the kingdom to Israel; and this opinion they built upon certain types and prophecies recorded in their ancient writings. I have nothing to do with the significancy of the types, or interpretation of the prophecies, with

with the exact time when the sceptre departed from Judah, or the propriety of understanding a promise made for the comfort of a besieged city, almost perishing with famine, to relate to a child who should be born of a virgin above five hundred years after. Let the application be as forced and fantastical as you please, still it had its effect upon the imagination of the people; and this is enough for my purpose; for the Jews did actually persuade themselves, either upon solid or forced grounds, that the sceptre was departed and their Shiloh at hand about the time when Jesus entered upon his ministry.

But the general expectation of a restorer would not have been sufficient of itself; for it seems there were several pretenders to this character. These required a designation of some particular person, in whom those expectations might centre, and this was effected by a comparison of the prophecies with events, and by signs and wonders believed to have been wrought by Jesus and those delegated by him. I shall as before forbear to insist on the accomplishment of the prophecies or evidence of the miracles: for I desire no more to be granted me than what will scarcely be disputed, that multitudes were drawn into a belief of the prophecies being accomplished, and the miracles really performed. Now whether this belief was the effect of craft, prejudice, delusion, and enthusiasm, or of rational conviction upon a full, fair, and careful examination, all those sources of conviction must be acknowledged to lie under the controul of Providence: therefore the event produced by them having since extended so wide over the earth, must be regarded as one of the main engines employed in the administration of the moral world. For, by the coming of Jesus, the vail of the temple was rent in twain, the partition wall broken down, a passage opened for the Gentiles to become the people of God, the ceremonial law abolished,

righteousness preached to the poor, and the resurrection to eternal life expressly taught as a popular doctrine. This last doctrine does not appear to have made part of the popular religion of the Jews, the great object by which they were actuated being their prosperity, and perpetuity as a nation, and therefore it may be truly said, that life and immortality were brought to light by the Gospel, notwithstanding they might be known to a few persons of thought and reflection for some ages before. As when a man has written a book, and communicated it to two or three friends, we do not say it has seen the light, we never use that expression till he has published it to the world; in like manner the immortality of the soul, together with personal reward and punishment after death, may be said to have been first brought to light by that religion which drew it from the closets of the studious, and spread it through whole nations.

For take the most illiterate person among us, and he will tell you there is one God, eternal, almighty, spiritual, holy, infinitely wise and good, Creator as well as Maker and Governor of all things in heaven and earth; that tempests lay waste, earthquakes overturn, lightnings fall, diseases destroy, and fires consume, where he commands, and have no power when he forbids; that his Providence is ever wakeful, extending not only over nations and kingdoms, but over every particular person; so that no good or evil comes upon us without his knowledge and permission or appointment; that he continually observes our actions, remarks our words, and sees into our most secret thoughts; that he will raise us to immortality, and that we shall be rewarded or punished according to our deeds upon earth; that there is a communion of saints, and fellowship between them and the angels; that we are all under one head, and that advancing the glory of God by doing good to his church or

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any member thereof, according to our powers and opportunities, is our first duty, and the foundation of all the rest; that whatever is done to the least of our brethren, be it no more than giving a cup of cold water to drink, will not pass without its reward; that we owe a love to our enemies and persecutors, to strangers, aliens, and infidels, and ought to abstain from all wanton cruelties and needless hurts, even to brutes and insects.

Perhaps I shall be stopped short here with a round assertion, that the influence of Christianity has neither been so salutary nor so extensive as I seem to insinuate; for that Christians are not so good men as the Turks, Chinese, Tartars, or Iroquois, nor are more than an inconsiderable number in comparison with those we term infidels: Gordon in his Geography computes, that more than half the countries upon earth are Mahometan, and of the remainder the greater part are heathens. But we might, if it would do us any honour, claim Mahometanism as a botchy excrescence, or spurious offspring of Christianity: the professors of it preserve a great veneration for Isa, or Jesus; look upon him much in the same light as we do upon Elias, and pretend that their prophet was the comforter, whom we have promised to us in the Gospel: their Koran inculcates some of the most important truths contained therein, and what there is good in it is borrowed from thence.

Since then we see that God has been pleased, by an extraordinary series of events, beginning from the infancy of mankind, to nourish up a religion, whereby purer sentiments of himself, and a more extensive charity are introduced among the multitude than was ever done before, why should we scruple to avail ourselves of the benefits to be derived from it, as well as those we can gather from the contemplation of nature? For both are his work, and both deserve our serious attention on that account. The course of affairs

affairs respecting the moral world proceeds equally with the courses of nature, from the will or eternal purpose, the word or covenant of God, styled in the Pythagorean language, the Oath of Jove: therefore we do not reverence the oath when we treat either branch of it lightly; and the experience of former times may convince us, how expedient it is to employ both for supporting and strengthening one another.

BOOK V.

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

CHAP. I.

EMPLOYMENT OF TIME.

To know the sources of our enjoyments, what things are good and useful for us, and to what objects we should principally direct our exertions, are certainly very valuable attainments; but something further is wanting to fill up the spaces between, and make the whole conduct of a piece. For our desires do not always find fuel to feed upon; and when they are attained, the joy of having gained our point can last but a little while, ere we want fresh matter to engage us. The busy mind of man cannot rest in a state of indifference: if it does not feel satisfaction, it will fall into uneasiness, and every fleeting moment must have its distinct portion of one or the other. It avails nothing to me now how much I was delighted an hour ago, or shall be delighted an hour hence, without some present reflection on the past, or some immediate object of pursuit to fill up the interval.

Therefore I have laid down, that intense pleasures are not so valuable as generally apprehended, though they are what strike most on the imagination. The boy thinks he shall be

be supremely happy when he can be delivered from the discipline of a school; the labourer if he could be maintained in idleness; the lover if he can obtain his beauty; in short, every projector and schemist, if he can obtain the thing he has set his heart upon; that is, he shall be exquisitely pleased; and perhaps he may be, or perhaps not: but how long will the pleasure last? For our organs cannot hold out beyond a certain period, and what affected them vehemently at first will soon become insipid or cloying, unless there be a succession of objects to engage the attention. But intense pleasures too much fill the thought, to leave it at leisure to provide for any thing besides themselves; and as high delights rarely fall in our way, when an over-fondness for them has taken away our relish for all others, the greater part of our time must pass irksome and uneasy.

2. Hence it appears, that the true secret of happiness lies in contriving to be continually pleased rather than highly pleased; and this is best effected by providing constant employment for our time. So long as the thoughts are employed in any thing just sufficient to keep them in motion, the mind is satisfied: it is only when there is a stoppage of motion, when there is nothing more desirable to be done than omitted, when under some pain or want, without means discerned on any side for removing them, that the time passes irksome and heavy: for things insipid are always displeasing, as well to the mental taste as to the palate.

The world commonly seek for employment of their thoughts in external objects, circles of pleasure, and amusing ideas suggested to their imagination. All these may do very well, while there is an uninterrupted succession of them, and as long as they continue really engaging; but the misfortune is, they are not always to be had, or they quickly cloy, and then recourse must be had to some few fancy;

fancy; till, having exhausted all their tastes, novelty itself becomes nothing new, and variety a stale expedient, no longer able to give a spur to desire.

One may see how lamely this method answers its purpose, by the great dilatoriness there is in going to engagements, by which means they have been put off later and later, till our hours of amusement have almost run into midnight. Where there is an expectation of real delight, people are eager to run to the place beforehand, instead of which your fashionable folks do not care to think of one indulgence, till another is grown wearisome: they rise, because tired of lying a-bed; they come home to dinner, because tired of sauntering about; for while any little trifle amuses them, they care not how long dinner waits, and do not go abroad again until driven by the irksomeness of not knowing what to do with themselves at home. It is ridiculous to see how many shifts are made to kill time, as it is called, and how lucky it is thought when such can be found.

Therefore business, and those pursuits which partake of the nature of business, as requiring long contrivance and application, are more productive of satisfaction than pleasure itself; for there the active powers are employed as well as the passive; but what depends upon our own activity is much less precarious than what we receive from other causes. And we may presume that God has placed the far greater part of mankind under a necessity of working in some way or other, and subjected the rest to their portion of care, contrivance, and application; because he sees with other eyes than we do, and may know that those are the happiest states of life, which are generally thought most burthensome and least desirable.

He who plies close to his business finds it, when grown familiar to him, a state of satisfaction; his mind is wholly intent upon it, it is only in the vacancies of employment that

that he ever thinks, or feels a want of the advantages possessed by those above him; he returns regularly to his work, without staying till he is tired of doing nothing; and leaves off, not from satiety, but because his time or his job is ended; he receives a solace from seeing the progress made in his work, and when he has done, finds a new relish for any amusements that may fall in his way.

Persons who are exempted by their situation in life from the necessity of application to any thing, yet find it necessary to employ their time in some way or other, without which they would be left in a worse condition than those whom they despise. Building a fine house, laying out an elegant garden, making a collection of butterflies, working a carpet, picking up curious pieces of China at auctions, serve to make a gentleman or lady, while earnest in the pursuit, just as happy as a carpenter is when sawing his boards, or a sempstress while stitching her linen: they are alike intent upon their work, they think of nothing else; want nothing, and regret nothing, and so long are in a state of enjoyment. This use I have already found in my chapters: for if they do no benefit to any body else, they have been of benefit to me, by keeping me engaged for many hours which otherwise might have lain heavy on my hands: nor am I solicitous to prove my employment more delectable than that of the carpenter sawing his boards, or the commoner pushing his interest for a title, or the fine lady assiduous at her routs: for I wish to pass as much of my time as I can with satisfaction to myself, but care not how many others pass theirs as well satisfied; the greater numbers of them can be found, the more shall I esteem it for my interest, for reasons formerly mentioned, and needless here to repeat.

3. However, there is one caution necessary to be taken, that no particular attachment be suffered to swallow up all

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our other desires, or take away the relish we used to find in other things; for then there is a hazard it may lose its own, and we shall not so much follow, as be tied to it, by not knowing what else to do with ourselves. It conduces greatly to a happy life, to have as many desires or objects of pursuit as possible, so that we may never be at a loss for something to occupy the time agreeably. Indeed, the regular employment of our time, and the greater variety in our sources of entertainment, are what principally mark the difference between a civilized and barbarous people; between the man and the child. When a child, I have been more highly delighted with a coloured print bought for a halfpenny, with a common ballad sung by the coarse pipe of the chambermaid, in reading the dragon of Wantley, in discovering a better way of building houses with cards, than I ever was since with the finest paintings, the sweetest music, the sublimest poetry, or the luckiest thought occurring in the progress of my chapters. Nor do I doubt, that the American savages find as strong a relish, for the time, in their lumps of flesh with the skin on, taken from the burning coals, in their contrivances to catch the beaver, in successes against their enemies, and getting a rich booty, as we do in our dainties, our elegances, our arts, and accomplishments.

But arts and sciences, and civilized manners, add to the enjoyments of life, not by heightening the gust of it, but by supplying a greater variety with fewer vacancies or blank spaces between. For the gross pleasures of animal nature, the gratifications of undisciplined appetite, are as intense, or perhaps more so, than those arising from the most refined pursuits. The benefit results from the pursuit itself, which supplies us with a continued employment for our time, and yields a fund of agreeable reflection on the advances we have already made, or the farther ones we have in view, at the same

same time that it does not exclude the gratification of our natural appetites, as far as they are consistent with our welfare in other respects, and not injurious to that of other persons.

4. Too many aims create confusion, unless we introduce some method, and a due subordination among them. Persons who lead a life of dissipation, seldom knowing one hour what they shall do the next, meet with many tedious vacuities, in which they have absolutely nothing to do. To avoid this, it would perhaps be expedient to have some scheme of employment for every hour of the day, and every season of the year, so as never to be thrown into one of those dreary uncertainties, in which we know not which way to turn ourselves. The calls of appetite generally determine some of the principal divisions in our stated meals, and hours of rest, in which the more regular we can be, the better: trades and professions of all kinds, require certain portions of our time to be employed in attending to them; and where these sources of regular employment are wanting, it is observable how apt men are to run into clubs, parties of pleasure, rounds of visits, and particular ways of disposing of themselves: for there is no finding a constant course for our activity, without providing channels for it to run in. The use of these rules, however, is only to lie ready in reserve; to supply us with business when none offers, not to stand in the way of it: they defeat their own intention, unless they can be made easily to give way to whatever other avocations may arise, either from a principle of duty, or prudence, or civility, or innocent inclination.

5. Men sometimes engage in undertakings above their forces to achieve, or so laborious as to exhaust the strength and spirits before they can be completed: in this case, disappointment, and a consequent want of alacrity and cheerful exertion must ensue. Though when we see men bestir themselves,

selves violently and eagerly, it proceeds as often from indolence as from industry: they while away their time in trifles, from an unwillingness to set to work, and then are driven hard to dispatch in a few minutes what might have been done easily in an hour. Or they do not like the trouble of digesting their plans, and go about their business in a slovenly manner, which proves ineffectual, and so are forced to do it over again; whence the common observation, that lazy folks take the most pains: or they want to have the task over, and so make extraordinary efforts that they may come to the end of it the sooner. This is the reverse of genuine industry, which never wishes to be idle, but finds satisfaction in the employment, as well as in the completion; and by proceeding steadily and cheerfully, makes effectual dispatch in every undertaking. In almost all cases, assiduity will do more towards the accomplishment of our purposes, than labour and eagerness: the latter may be necessary in cases of difficulty to make a beginning, but the former must perfect it, as the spade and pick-axe may be serviceable to level hillocks in the road, but it is the continual beating that lays it smooth and even.

6. There is one employment of our time which few of us ever think of, but which would always find us enough to do; I mean the practice of examining our own motives, and trying to suppress any bad habits that have got hold of us. The world on all sides assists the covert workings of vanity, entices into selfishness, indolence, and dissipation. There are habits of misapprehension and prejudice common to every class of men; fretfulness, industrious to seek, or even feign, and brood upon matter that may nourish it; captiousness, ingenious in perverting the meaning of words; partiality, warping every thing to its own purpose; censoriousness, unable to discern a bright part in

any character; self-conceit, averse to discern the real motives of acting; melancholy, augurating always for the worst; besides many more, some of which every man may find lurking in his own breast, if he will but look narrowly into it.

CHAP. II.

CONTENTMENT.

PRUDENCE and virtue, for the most part, consist in preferring greater enjoyment to come, before present gratification; the contest between them and appetite being, whether we shall be most pleased, or soonest pleased: for pleasure is the object of both; only appetite urges to that which may be had now, and prudence chooses that which is the greatest, whether to be had now or not till to-morrow.

But with regard to contentment, the struggle seems to be of a quite different kind; both parties pulling the very contrary way to what they do in all other cases. Reason exhorts us to make ourselves easy under our present circumstances, and suspend our desires till we can find materials for their gratification: on the other hand, passion and evil habit solicit us to fret, and vex, and torment ourselves at present, with the tantalizing imagination of ease or pleasures at a distance, and out of our reach; or to make the most of an evil, by studiously aggravating all the uneasy circumstances attending it.

2. One would think there could be no need of persuasion to induce people to make their present condition as comfortable as possible, or to dismiss from their thoughts whatever tends only to fill them with uneasiness; but the fact is, that this habit of discontent and repining at every thing, is a trick we have mechanically fallen into, in hopes of exciting other people's sympathy, and by being humoured when children; and such is our indolence, that we cannot resolve to take a little trouble to get rid of this troublesome companion, the force of the habit being too great to be overcome by the immediate pain and vexation it occasions. What

makes the folly greater is, that by avoiding the thorns which this disposition strews in our way, we should fall into a flowery path, and so obtain actual pleasure merely by our escape from pain. For though content be nothing in itself more than a negation of uneasiness, yet satisfaction and uneasiness follow one another so closely, that the moment one disappears, its place is occupied by the other. Content, when obtained by our own efforts, is a deliverance from vexation: but there is a joy in the bare deliverance from evil; a joy in finding ourselves able to throw it off; a complacency of self-approbation in having used our power for our own improvement and happiness.

3. There is one cause which has a great tendency to encourage this peevish habit; and that is, that we see so many examples of it about us. The godly fret at the profaneness and licentiousness of mankind; at the prosperities of the wicked; at their own want of more than human strength to perform punctually all the rigorous tasks they have enjoined themselves: the poor fret at being obliged to labour; the rich at losing opportunities of growing richer; the proud at having their tribute of homage withheld; the accomplished, at the want of due encouragement to merit: the connoisseur in music, delights to make himself miserable on hearing any thing that is not Italian; the elegant, on seeing things a little out of order, or not sufficiently fashionable about them. In short, how amply soever we are supplied with materials of enjoyment, there is something still, as Prior says, "for books, for horses, houses, painting, to thee, to me, to him is wanting: That cruel something unpossessed, corrodes and poisons all the rest."

Especially in this country, whether from the gloominess of our climate, the great consumption of flesh meats, or the wantonness of liberty, there is more discontent, and less ground for it, than in most nations upon earth. If we find any

any symptoms of this splenetic disease in our temper (as who is there that may not find them, if he watches carefully for them?) we should use our utmost diligence in getting rid of them as fast as we can, only taking care that we are not discontented at being unable to quiet our discontent at first, for this would prevent us from returning to the charge again. Our best way will be, to begin with trifling sources of uneasiness, such as occur every day: as when we are called away from a pursuit we are earnest upon, whether writing chapters, or sonnets; whether singing a third-hour hymn, or reading a novel, or finishing a head-dress: when obliged to sit in disagreeable company, or wait for the fifth head of a tedious heavy sermon; when reduced to coarse fare and bad accommodations at an inn, or when we have wandered out of our way on a journey; when forced to go through a business we do not like, or disappointed of a pleasure we had promised ourselves a long while. By dwelling upon the bright side of every prospect, by calling off the thoughts from disagreeable objects, and submitting to little inconveniences, we shall break the force of a bad habit, and learn to undergo labours, pains, and distresses, without murmuring.

4. But there is a spurious content, the child of indolence; as when men acquiesce in the present state of things, because they do not like the trouble of mending them: so they stifle any rising desire that might stimulate to the pursuit of some great advantage, lest it should cost them pains in the acquisition. This, however, is making havoc of appetite, instead of correcting it; it is plucking up the corn together with the weeds: for, when our desires are gone, our ease will become insensibility; if we have no pains, neither shall we have any pleasures, nor activity to pursue what is necessary and useful for us. Genuine content lies in the absence of wants, not of desires: and it is one principal

branch of it to be content to labour when there is a good reason for it. Tranquillity of mind is not at all incompatible with industry; and the happiest temper is, that of being never satisfied with our condition when we have the means of improving it in our power, and never repining at a thing we cannot help, and that cannot be removed without imprudence.

CHAP. III.

ON VANITY.

But how shall we manage to pursue our inquiry effectually? Where find the scales nice enough to weigh a bubble, or get a needle fine enough to pick up a vapour, that we may turn it about for our inspection on all sides, so as to discern exactly its shape and colours? We can all see vanity at a distance with striking plainness; it is like the clouds gathered in a body, whose tinselled edges glitter to the western sun: but who can see the vapours drawn up by his meridian beams to form those clouds, when standing in the midst of them? So that other vapour, which surrounds us always like an atmosphere, eludes our sight by its nearness. It lies too close to the eye to be discerned; too flat upon the skin to be taken hold of: it insinuates itself into our pores, mingles with our vital juices, trips along the tongue, dances in the eyes, trembles through the nerves, wantons in the gestures, lurks in the sentiments, taints the imagination, and runs through the whole constitution; insomuch that it has been generally thought innate, and an essential part of the human composition.

But though nature will not own the monstrous birth, it must be acknowledged one of our earliest acquisitions, which being bred in the bone, will never go out of the flesh: for we suck it in with our milk, imbibe it from our parents, catch it from our play-fellows, are enticed into it by our self-love, encouraged to it by the world, and confirmed in it by general practice: so that education, sympathy, and example, all combining to strengthen it, it is no wonder it grows into an inveterate habit, giving birth to most of our latent motives, and perpetually operating upon us without

our perceiving it. For by its quality of infusing itself into, and pervading all our sentiments, it can skulk under a thousand disguises, and, Proteus like, assume a thousand various forms; taking always the similitude of the passion that conceals it. You can never tell when you have got a sure hold of it; if you mortify it in one shape, it gathers new life in another; if you weed it out effectually from one spot, it instantly sprouts up in another: so that with all your efforts you can never completely subdue it, nor ever know what progress you have made.

Vanity is given to children with their play-things, and taught them with their lessons: they are made to shew about their little toys, to angle for every body's admiration at their prettiness; and bid to be mannerly, that they may not be like the dirty beggar-boys in the street. In youth, the fancy dwells upon the advantages we possess over others, whether bodily strength, sagacity, handsomeness of person, or finery of dress; and represents the school we were bred up in, the way of life we have been accustomed to, or any little accomplishment we chance to have succeeded in, as infinitely preferable to every thing else in the world. In manhood, there are riches, or family, or connections with the great, or magnificence in buildings, or equipage, with all the pride of life, to administer fuel to vanity: the desire of excelling actuates all; and in the consciousness of it they place their chief delight: every one has something belonging to him better than his neighbours, and does something in a cleverer manner than any body else; and to make his superiority the surer, he despises every other accomplishment in which he cannot shine eminently himself. If the gifts of fortune are shewn to be an insufficient ground for a man to value himself upon, he will assume a title from those of nature, from endowments of the mind, from learning, good breeding, or some other acquirement; if driven out of this

this claim too, he will be vain of his virtues, his goodnature, his humanity, or his piety.

This passion operates where one would least expect it; sets up the mechanic for a judge of literature, qualifies the common-councilman to dictate measures of state, serves for inspiration to the enthusiast, supports the methodist under his incessant exertions, and reigns in triumph over the free-thinker. The wily sorceress contrives to nestle in the bosom of religion, works hollow passages under the solid foundations of philosophy, and finds a crevice to slip through into treatises on humility. Perhaps a tincture may have infused itself unperceived into this very page, under the specious pretence of relieving the reader, that he may return with fresh spirits to drier disquisitions, and the glittering sand of ornament been strewed, not so much to set off the subject, as to reflect its lustre on the hand that strewed it.

2. But though I will not undertake to pronounce assuredly in all cases, what is vanity and what is not, yet where one can perceive the water muddied by something wriggling underneath, I shall try my best to catch hold of the slippery eel; that with the help of the microscope, I may examine her carefully and discover the slender threads which are the spawn by which she multiplies. I am aware that ambition of all kinds, (from that of the statesman down to the fiddler), and pride are distinguishable from vanity: the first being a greediness of acquiring superiority, the second a fond contemplation of that we possess, and the last a restless desire of shewing it. But since too many distinctions only tend to distract the mind, and I see no occasion for them here, I shall comprehend all three under the general name of vanity, as they all spring from one common principle, the love of excelling others.

3. Vanity in all the several species of it consists in a comparison

comparison of ourselves either with particular persons, or the common run of mankind, or sometimes with other creatures, and even inanimate beings; (for we can sometimes value ourselves upon the privileges of human nature, assuming the title of imperial man, lord of the creation). This passion is excited by the sight of any thing superior or inferior to what we ourselves possess, prompting us to emulate the one, and to despise the other. But true honour respects only the laudableness of the deed without reference to what is done better or worse by another; for his acting rightly takes nothing from the rectitude of our actions, nor are his failings any excuse for our own. Therefore the virtuous man is never better pleased than when he sees examples of virtue around him, because his love is of the thing, not of himself; the vain man on the contrary rests supremely satisfied while shining among his inferiors, but if a competitor arises to eclipse him, he is instantly mortified. The terms excellent, exalted, transcendent, incomparable and the like, usually employed in speaking of things laudable, may indeed make it imagined that all honour subsists by comparison, if we do not reflect that complacence of every kind may spring from contemplation of a single object without any other to compare with it.

A man with a good appetite may rejoice at the sight of his victuals without thinking how much better they are than bread and cheese, or take pleasure in receiving a present of a bank-note without staying to compute how many times more valuable it is than a shilling, or be delighted with the conveniences of a house that he has taken, though he does not reflect how much better off he is than if he were obliged to remove into the next cobler's stall: so the consciousness of having acted right may yield its full satisfaction to him, that has a love of rectitude, though he never thinks of what would have followed if he or any one else

else had acted wrong. I know that comparison often enhances our pleasures, but wherever the complacence of an action arises wholly from contrast, and would be lost if a different object were set by the side of it, there is certainly a spice of vanity at bottom; and the feeling is not so properly self-approbation as contempt for others. Yet it may be said that rectitude points to the more excellent performance in preference to the less, which however might have been eligible if the other had not been in our power. A man may rest satisfied with the prudent management of his own affairs while he has nothing better to do, but if some public service interferes which cannot go on well without him, it would become wrong and blameable to let his private affairs engross all his attention; so that comparison seems here to determine the real laudableness of an action.

But if we consider the matter attentively, we shall find that the one action loses nothing of its value because another more beneficial presents itself, but because we cannot do both, we must make choice of that, the omission of which would be attended with the greatest disadvantages. The case is the same in things of profit: where a man may pick up a guinea or a shilling, but cannot get both, I suppose he will take the gold; not that the shilling is worth a farthing the less, or the guinea the more, for lying by the side of one another, but because the one is really worth so much more than the other. Whereas the most laudable action weighs nothing in the scale of vanity, but as it is supposed to imply a superiority over others. Besides, that rectitude has nothing to do with comparisons, unless where there is a choice of different actions, and then it compares between things and not persons: forming its decision upon what the individual himself might have done, not upon what any other person might have done, either better or worse. But is not the sense of honour, when

when most real, roused by the sight of excellence in others? Does it not powerfully stimulate to the imitation of noble examples? All this I can very readily grant, but it does not follow that the emulation is personal, as we may perceive by attending to our feelings in other cases. An empty stomach may be quiet while there is nothing to excite a craving; but the sight of company sitting down to a plentiful meal will immediately set it a longing. Yet the desire here fixes solely upon the victuals, and has nothing personal in it: for if the hungry spectator is admitted to sit down among them, and finds enough for all, he will not care how many others there are to partake with him, nor how much they relish their food. If a traveller on foot, who is almost tired out, is overtaken by a stage coach, he will be glad to get a lift in it: the convenience of getting a seat is not lessened by the number of persons there may be in the coach, provided there is room enough for him, nor is it the greater for the number of travellers he passes by on foot; and if he feel any superiority over them, the gratification does arise from the love of ease, which makes the ride pleasant to him, but is an impulse of vanity. So when a laudable example stirs up an ambition to do the like, or makes a man ashamed of himself for falling short of it, it is or ought to be the thing done, not the person doing it, that excites his emulation; for if he can but succeed in doing equally well, it ought to give him no concern how many others follow in the same steps, or how well they acquit themselves.

4. Therefore the desire of excelling is not the same with the desire of excellence: the distinction between them is pretty nice, and commonly overlooked, but there is a just and real one. Men are forward enough to aspire at great things, but then it is only to give them a pre-eminence and superiority over others; and they have so little fondness for the

the heights they aspire to, that they would be very well contented to stand where they are, provided they could be sure that nobody else would ever come up to them. But he that desires excellence can take nothing else in compensation for it: to see others without it, affords him no gratification, nor is his joy in the attainment abated by the success of others, for he regards only the intrinsic value of the possession, without envying or despising the acquisitions of his neighbours. When once he begins to say within himself, nobody is so vigilant in his conduct as I am, and to make an amusement of pitying the thoughtless multitude around him, he is drawing within the magic circle of vanity: for real pity always carries a degree of uneasiness with it, and whenever we feel a pleasure in the exercise of it, we may be sure it is spurious and hypocritical. If we could thus bring our desires to fix upon the attainment of real excellence without regard to what is done by others, we should lose nothing by it even in respect to that superiority the world are so fond of, for whatever distinction is within our power, we shall attain by constantly doing our best. I would have a man endeavour to shine in common conversation, but why need he strive to outshine? Let him shine as much as he can, and if outshining be in his power it will follow of course; if not he will but fret and vex himself by aiming at it. Not that I would wish to recommend a blindness to the acquisitions or defects of others, but then they ought to operate as examples rather than as motives, because the same things would be desirable or the contrary, whether they belonged to any one else or not.

5. People commonly value themselves upon what they have acquired, until they sink into indolence and lose all desire of making further progress. When this passion rises to an immoderate degree, so as to hang perpetually upon the thoughts,

thoughts, it becomes pride, and proves an effectual bar against all subsequent improvement: for the proud man so wraps himself up in his excellencies, as to think he is all perfection already, or at best so far superior to the rest of mankind that it is needless for him to do any thing more, even for the sake of surpassing others. But the great mischief of this disposition is, that it proves a continual source of enmity and contention among mankind, producing it out of the smallest trifles. For, as it is impossible that more than one should gain the superiority, wherever this is the immediate aim, there must be an opposition of interests. The proud man therefore looks upon every body as an adversary; if a disposition is shewn to excel in any thing, it is an attempt to eclipse his lustre. And the mischief sometimes extends to multitudes who have no concern in the quarrel; for the world must be thrown into confusion because Pompey could not bear an equal, nor Cæsar a superior.

A vain man, as such, must necessarily be selfish and ill-natured: he cannot afford others the least spark of hearty esteem, because that would raise them a little nearer to his own level: he dares not do them a real service nor sincerely wish them well, because he would conceit himself the only happy and deserving person alive; or, if at any time he does a kindness, it is for the vanity of shewing his power and creating a dependence.

This temper of mind is just as injurious and troublesome to the possessor as it is to others. If you can find means to flatter his vanity, you may do any thing with him, serve any end upon him; though his attachment to you is just the same as that he has for his horse, which is merely for being instrumental to his gratification. He is discontented and fretful at not receiving his due from the world, and must meet with continual mortification from the competition

tition of others, but that he has a trick to persuade himself that whatever he happens to excel in is the only valuable qualification. The vain man can never think justly of things or persons, where his vanity has the least concern, which it seldom fails to have in most cases occurring for his decision. It closes his ears against information, and his heart against conviction, lest he should appear to have been deficient in knowledge or liable to mistake. It prevents self-examination, for fear he should find something that might wound his vanity. It damps his industry, through his disdain of little acquisitions as unworthy of his notice. For the conceited will stoop to nothing that is not grand, noble, and extraordinary; and if by scorning to do any thing common he remains quite useless, he consoles himself with reflecting what mighty wonders he should have performed, if such and such perverse accidents had not fallen in his way.

If examples are not to be found of all these mischiefs produced in the same person by vanity, it may be ascribed to that little mixture of good which has place in the most faulty characters, or to other passions counteracting it, or to the awe of the world keeping it a little within bounds; for vanity, how much soever cherished by the owner, always appears odious to others. who look upon it as an attempt to encroach upon their right to reputation. Besides, as you cannot praise a proud man without giving him an occasion of triumphing in his own superiority over you, and thereby becoming accessary to your own disgrace, it defeats its own purposes, and by exacting too much, prevents that tribute of applause even which is due to him. Therefore he strives to conceal his pride, nor dares even think within himself that he has it; by which concealment he checks the growth of it a little, as the growth of weeds is checked by being covered from the sun and air: so that perhaps there

there is not a thorough proud man upon earth, and if there be such a being existing, it can be no other than the devil.

6. But it will probably be asked, would I then extinguish every spark of vanity in the world, all thirst of fame, of splendour, of magnificence, of show, all desire of excelling or distinguishing one's self from the common herd? What must become of the public service, of sciences, arts, commerce, manufactures? The business of life must stagnate. Nobody would spend his youth in fatigues and dangers to qualify himself for becoming a general or admiral. Nobody would study, and toil, and struggle, and roar for liberty to be a minister. The merchant would not drudge on through the infirmities of age to fill his own coffers, and supply his country with foreign commodities. The artificer, having acquired an independence, would leave his business to be practised by novices and bunglers. The man of learning would not waste his time and spirits to enrich the public with knowledge, to combat error, or defend his favourite truths against all opposers. Poetry, painting, music, elegance, wit and humour, would be lost from among us, affability, politeness, gallantry, and the pleasures of refined conversation be things unknown. How would you keep your children from rolling in the dirt without some motive of shame to influence them, or bring the school-boy to ply close to his task? How prevent your sons from consorting with blackguards, or your daughters from romping with the grooms.

Now to confess the honest truth, I am afraid if this evil weed were totally eradicated, so as to leave no fibre of it remaining any where, we should find business of all kinds go on very slowly without it. Nor would I wish to see it banished from the world till some better principle can be had in lieu of it. While we remain indolent and selfish, it may be necessary for us to have vanity to counteract those mis-

chievous qualities, as one poison serves as an antidote to another. But I could wish that there were no necessity for the poison, which must always have a tendency to impair the constitution. Moralists are constantly misrepresented in this, as if when they attacked any particular vice, they were at the same time for keeping all the others. They do not say to people, we think selfishness a good thing for the world, but vanity a bad thing, but they are for getting rid of both one and the other; they wish them to be neither vain, nor selfish, nor indolent, but actuated by other and nobler motives, the public good, and their own good; and as far as they can succeed in persuading people to act upon these motives, all the good effects will follow, and in a greater degree, without the same mixture of evil. The only question is, how far this change for the better is practicable: and for my own part, I cannot help thinking that education might be carried on very effectually without any tincture of vanity. Though in this I cannot speak from my own experience, for I had vanity enough myself while a schoolboy. As soon as I could well read, having gotten some books of chivalry, I determined upon making the conquest of the world; but being of a weakly constitution, and continually bumped about by other boys, I found this scheme impracticable, so at thirteen resolved to write a finer poem than Homer or Virgil. Before I went to the university, having been told that the solid sciences were more noble than poetry, I purposed as soon as I should have made myself perfect master of logic, to elucidate all useful truths, and banish error from among mankind. What benefit these ambitious projects may have done me, I know not: perhaps my present labours might be owing to some remains of them, for I well remember that while the design of these dissertations lay in embryo in

my head, they promised a much more shining appearance than I find them now make upon paper.

If masters can find no other way of making their lads apply to their learning willingly, but by exciting an emulation among them, I would not deprive them of the use of this instrument. But there may be a commendation which has no personal comparison in it, and the pleasures, the advantages, the credit of a proficiency in learning may be displayed in sufficiently alluring colours, without suggesting a thought of superiority over others, or of being the foremost. I acknowledge that it is a very nice point to distinguish between the desire of excellence and the desire of excelling, and the one is very apt to degenerate insensibly into the other: yet I think it may be effected by an attentive and skilful tutor, and the first will answer all the good purposes of the latter without running the hazard of its inconveniences. It is evident that in one point of view there is nothing more pernicious than the general disposition of parents to bring up children with a notion of their extraordinary parts and consequence: for being taught to look upon themselves as superior to every one else, they will naturally despise what is fit for their talents and situation, aim at things out of their reach, gain a general ill-will, and involve themselves in quarrels and difficulties by claiming a respect and deference to which they are not entitled.

And we find in fact that the best and greatest men, those who have done the most essential services to mankind, have been the most free from the impulses of vanity. Lycurgus and Solon, those two excellent lawgivers, appear to have had none: Socrates, the prime apostle of reason, Euclid and Hippocrates, had none: whereas Protagoras with his brother sophists, Diogenes, Epicurus, Lucretius, the Stoics who

who were the bigots, and the latter academics who were the freethinkers of antiquity, were overrun with it. And among the moderns, Boyle, Newton, Locke, have made large improvements in the sciences without the aid of vanity, while some others I could name, having drawn in copiously of that intoxicating vapour, have laboured only to perplex and obscure them. This passion always chooses to move alone in a narrow sphere, where nothing noble or important can be achieved, rather than join with others in moving mighty engines, by which much good might be effected. Where did ambition ever glow more intensely than in Cæsar, whose favourite saying, we are told, was, that he would rather be the first man in a petty village than the second in Rome. Did not Alexander, another madman of the same kind, reprove his tutor, Aristotle, for publishing to the world those discoveries in philosophy he would have had reserved for himself alone? We may therefore fairly conclude that the world would go on infinitely better if men would learn to do without it; and we may rank it among those evils permitted by Providence to bring forth some unknown good, but which we should neither encourage in ourselves or others.

7. This being the case, it seems the greatest of all absurdities, that men should be proud of their pride, and vain of their vanity: yet we often see it made a topic of panegyric that such a hero disdained to do any thing like other folks, that he could not bear to rank among the rest of his species, could not be satisfied without surpassing all who went before him, and eclipsing all his cotemporaries. For nothing is more common or vulgar than vanity. The Roman mob had it as well as Cæsar; and that was the reason they admired his grandeur, because they thought it a charming thing to possess it. It betokens a shallow judgment taken with a shadow, and never reaching to the

substance. For though praise may be a useful bauble to bribe children to their good, and little master will not learn his letters unless you tell him how much he will be despised for not knowing them, yet this is no longer necessary when he once begins to be able to read, and perceives the advantages and pleasure attending it. So that applause is only an expedient to supply the want of discernment, and raise an artificial desire of attainments, the advantages of which are not perceived: and he who can never act but from this motive, nor discern the intrinsic value and excellence of things, continues all his life a child, without ever arriving at the full maturity of manhood.

8. But, after all, we have little reason to be proud of the greatest advantages we possess, which are really not our own, but the goods of nature or fortune deposited for a while in our keeping. So that the best of us are only in the same situation with the ass in the fable carrying the image of Cybele: the opening crowd fall prostrate on either side as he passes, but their adoration is paid to the goddess, not to the beast, who would sell for no more at a fair than his brother long-ear, carrying two bundles of rags with a gypsy brat in each of them. But alas! we poor strutting mortals have not the same good fortune; we none of us carry the whole goddess full dressed in all her gorgeous robes and precious symbols: we creep in long procession one behind another, each bearing something from the sacristy.

The great and potent carry her crown, embattled with turrets; the rich and opulent carry the gold and silver vessels for her sacrifices; the magnificent and elegant her nice-wrought robes and spangled vestments; the beautiful and witty her flowers, embellishments, and perfumes; even the opera-dancer, the milliner, the French frisseur, and Italian singer, have got a rag of Cybele with which they draw

draw transports of admiration from connoisseurs. Those laden with useful knowledge carry some of her most valuable jewels; yet still they are hers, not their own; nor do they draw much admiration by their own lustre, unless set off with a multitude of false sparks, and a deal of silver flourishing after the modern taste: Virtue itself is but an inner garment, the fine linen kerchief worn nearest the bosom of the goddess; for though we must acquire it for ourselves, yet the abilities, the opportunities, the inducements previous to the acquisition were not of our making but sent down to us from the celestial regions.

9. I have now done my best to detect this siren Vanity, as the most likely way to avoid it. I have endeavoured to turn it inside out, to discover its emptiness, lay open its ugliness, and raise a disgust at the foulness it is found to contain, when divested of its coverings: for it is the reproach of human nature, and breeds like vermin in the corruptions and infirmities of our constitutions. But it is such a dissembler there is no getting rid of it entirely; when you go to hunt it down, it will follow close at your elbow like the accomplice of a pickpocket who joins in with the crowd as one of the pursuers. For a man may be vain of his exemption from the vanity he sees in others, or more vain of having none at all himself. One would think the contemplation of our own follies and infirmities would be the surest way to mortify it; but this is not always the case. We may take pleasure in exaggerating our natural vices to enhance our merit, in imitation of the greatest sages of antiquity, who have done wonders that way; puffed up with conceit to think how we should cheat Zopyrus the physiognomist, and how our friends who know us would laugh as heartily at him as Alcibiades did, if he were to try his skill upon us.

Therefore it is the emptiest of all vanities to fancy our-

selves utterly void of it. All one can do with respect to the poison is to disperse it upon the skin, away from the nobler parts, as physicians do a disorder they cannot cure. Therefore, taking it for granted, I must have some vanity in my composition as well as other folks; it is perhaps best to let it evaporate in odd thoughts, quaint expressions, far-fetched similies, and long-spun allegories, rather than let it work into the sinews and marrow of the argument. Perhaps there may be no hurt in sprinkling something that will startle and rouse the reader when beginning to nod over a dry subject; and if he have a spice of the common malady himself, he will feel a soothing pleasure in reflecting how much more gravely and decently he could have managed the same topics.

CHAP. IV.

FASHION.

As much as we may affect to define man a reasonable creature, it is plain that reason has a very small share in our actions: it is well if the principal of them be dir cted by it, for most of our motives take their rise from mechanical influences or impulses of imagination. Rules, custom, and fashion, are the great engines by which men's conduct is governed. Rule is the substitute of reason to direct us in doubtful cases, where there are not lights sufficient for informing the understanding, and to restrain the roving of appetite by its authority: custom operates as a motive of use, or from an obscure apprehension of some advantage to result from it, and fashion as a motive of honour, being followed for the sake of the credit attached to it. There is a similitude between the three; they often rise out of one another and grow into one another, and common language often confounds them together: but if we make the distinction, it seems to be as I have just stated; for a man in a desolate island might form rules for his conduct or fall into certain customary methods of employing his time, but could have no such thing as fashion.

2. The proper province of fashion lies in little matters, such as dress, furniture, diversions, equipage, compliments, variation of language, idioms, and other things, which rule and custom have not decided upon: therefore it has the greatest influence upon persons of much liberty and much leisure, and in hours of leisure, on high-days and holidays; at least in this country, where our artificers think nothing of it while busy at work, but the French carpenter cannot saw his boards without a long pig-tail and ruffled shirt,

and calling to his fellow, Monsieur, have the goodness to reach me that file. It stands in lieu of all obligations with the ladies, who tend a sick relation, take care of their children, go to church, and perform the most important duties, because, what would people say; how odd and strange it would look if they were to omit them!

As fashion depends on the desire of admiration and fear of shame, it necessarily occasions perpetual fluctuations in matters of indifference, one party taking up new modes to distinguish them from the vulgar, and the other creeping after them as fast as they can, to put an end to the distinction by which they are so much mortified. So the contest rests on much the same foundation with that between Pompey and Cæsar, the courtier cannot bear an equal, nor the citizen a superior; the country dame would have you believe she had lived in London all her life, and the town lady strives to make the difference so great you may see it a mile off.

Therefore the recommendation of a fashion, is not that it is the prettiest, the neatest, the most commodious, or most useful, but the newest, and adopted by persons of the highest rank; nor is any other recommendation necessary, all others being virtually contained in that, for novelty and example will make things beautiful and useful, that were never so before, nor ever will be again when those causes cease. How cumbersome, how ugly and ridiculous, do we think the ruffs and farthingales of former times! Yet no doubt they were vastly pretty when in vogue, and our great grandmothers could trip about in them as nimbly as our daughters can do in their great hoops. A few years ago the hoop could not be pretty unless it rose on each side in a camel's hump, so that the sleeves were forced to be stiffened and made to stand up like a bantam cock's tail, that they might not hitch in the petticoat. One principal source of beauty

beauty is expression: but it is not long since the beau, almost throttled in a large solitaire, and his hair strained tight to the bag, till almost ready to start from the temples, was thought to appear most charming under an expression of the utmost distress.

I was grievously mortified the other day, on happening unthinkingly to produce ten-pennyworth of halfpence out of my pockets in the presence of a fine gentleman. He raised a violent outcry against me for the absurdity of loading myself with such an enormous weight of dirty metal, that one could not touch without daubing one's fingers. Now, he always lugs about with him a swinging sword, that weighs ten times as much as my halfpence, and has left an indelible mark of its neatness, in a long sooty stain upon the lining of my coach: but I durst not retort upon him, because I knew very well that fashion has a magical power to make any thing light or heavy, clean or dirty, by a laugh and an exclamation.

Fashion has indeed a most wonderful power to change the qualities and appearances of things. We prefer dry veal because it is white, and unwholesome bread for the same reason: we admire white hashes and stewed cucumbers, that look as if they had been eaten once before, and garnish the rims of our dishes with dabs of chewed greens: boiled rabbits are trussed up to look as frightful as possible, and made to resemble that terror of our childhood, Raw head and bloody bones. Our town houses are thought most commodious, when the family are squeezed up in scanty closets for the sake of having a spacious hall for an entrance; and in the country, we are forced to cut down our shady groves and arbours, that a visitor may have a full view of the house half a mile off. Persons without any ear, learn to die away in ecstasy at the charms of music they are told is Italian;

contradictions become elegance and propriety of language; for a thing may be excessively moderate, vastly little, monstrous pretty, wondrous common, prodigious natural, or devilish godly; and a lady last winter, walking from the next street to see my Serena, told her she found the way she came along so dirty, that in one part it was absolutely impassable.

3. Yet fashion is not without its uses, and those no contemptible ones. It furnishes some persons with the whole employment of their time; rescuing them from that most forlorn condition, the having absolutely nothing to do. How would the fine lady, or the pretty gentleman, dispose of themselves, if it were not for the labours of the toilet, for auctions and exhibitions, till three o'clock; and for visits, plays, routs, drums, or Ranelaghs, from seven in the afternoon till one in the morning? It is chiefly this that supplies us with desires, nourishes habits, constitutes elegance, and gives a relish to the common enjoyments of life. The men are taught what books to read, the ladies in what works to employ their needle; and both to touch neither, when the prevailing mode prevents it. The same test determines what shall be deemed an accomplishment; what game at cards or dice, or what exercise shall be most agreeable. And many order their household, breed up their children, regulate their expenses, and are determined in their most important concerns by what they see others do.

Besides, as we live in society, common usage constitutes a reason in many things; because, without a regard to that, our several manners of proceeding would appear so uncouth to others, that it would destroy the benefit of mutual intercourse; and you find when people are obstinately attached to their own particular ways, that it is very difficult to transact any business, or partake in any diversion with them.

Were

Were people never to meet, unless when some business of importance brought them together, occasions of this sort happen so rarely, they would continue in a manner strangers to one another; but the rules of civility are the threads completing the social union begun by our mutual wants. The forms of good breeding, and general topics of discourse lying on the level of every capacity, lead us into conversation, or serve to fill up the vacancies of it. They facilitate mutual good-will, by pointing out a way in which it may exercise itself in trifles; for, however well disposed, we should hardly know at first how to proceed in pleasing one another, if there were not certain modes of behaviour which custom has made agreeable to every body.

4. The sages of old have ranked courtesy among the virtues, though the lowest of the number; nor is it only a virtue itself; but is a means of introducing many others. It first weans from boyish humours, and sudden impulses of wantonness; reconciles us to something of discipline and orderly deportment; curbs the eagerness of appetite, and inures us to bear little constraints and self-denials. It creates a sensibility of approbation and censure, more attentive to the rectitude of actions than to present ease or pleasure; and is of use in creating a certain deference for others, and the common rules of behaviour; for it has been constantly remarked, that those who affect an utter contempt of the world always fall into some fatal error or gross absurdity, since no man's judgment is so complete as to set him above learning something from his neighbours. It thus operates as a check upon that vice of self-sufficiency, and tends to encourage a greater equality, by the affability it recommends towards inferiors, and the voluntary respect it excites towards our superiors, instead of servile dread and forced obedience.

If

If courtesy be the lowest of the virtues, politeness is the lowest of the sciences: for however useful it may be in the commerce of life, it requires no great ingenuity or laborious application to attain it: a desire to learn, and a constant attention to the best masters, that is, the politest company, will suffice; for it is more to be caught by sympathy, than acquired by instruction. It requires little previous preparation to qualify the learner for making a proficiency; for a man may be very well bred without any other learning than that derived from the dancing-master, to give an ease and grace to his motions: yet it admits of many additions from other sources, which render a man more accomplished, and afford a larger field for his politeness to shew itself in. So much knowledge is useful, as may serve to give a solidity, without restraining the ease, or damping the liveliness of conversation; and good breeding is most fully exemplified where one appears to understand something of every thing, without pursuing any thing to the bottom.

It would be a vain attempt in me to set about drawing a perfect character of politeness; a quality for which I never was famous myself, being too much taken up with my speculations to pay that attention to the best masters, which I have just now pronounced necessary for acquiring it completely; but I will state as well as I can what observations have occurred to me on the subject.

I have before said, that private affection is the proper avenue to charity; and politeness naturally tends the same way. Affection first draws us out of ourselves, but then it fixes our regards on a few particular objects; whereas politeness, like charity, spreads them more diffusively, so that all persons are equally objects of it. Charity covers a multitude of sins, and politeness hides all defects: if there be any imperfection or deformity, any coarseness or inelegance of dress,

dress, gesture, or language, any mark of ignorance or peculiarity, any difference of sentiment, it overlooks them all, and strives to suit itself to the taste of every person present. Superior strength and knowledge are given for the advantage of others; so that imbecility of all kinds, produces a title to deference and complaisance. The weaker sex, who in unpolished countries are considered as the property of the stronger, have by far the greatest share, both of the legislative and executive authority in the kingdom of fashion; they are likewise the depositaries and judges in matters of form and ceremony; so that the soldier, the scholar, the divine, and the metaphysician, unskilled in the niceties of ceremonial law, stand in awe of their decisions; as Hector dreaded the *Trodas elkesipeplous*, the Trojan ladies with their sweeping trains.

As politeness stands in the mid-way between affection and charity, it assumes the countenance of the former as well as of the latter; whoever makes one in the circle around you, is to be treated as your particular friend; you are to rejoice at whatever has fallen out to his wishes, and sympathize with his disappointments; to take part with him against those who are absent; to express an esteem of his qualifications, and deference to his judgment; or if, for keeping up the conversation, you offer a different opinion, it should be done by way of suggestion rather than opposition. The polite man has no will of his own, but is governed entirely by that of the company. He is superior to pain; for if his tooth aches, he must not make wry faces, or complain, lest it should give other people uneasiness: he possesses the stoical apathy, by which he can make all things indifferent, and give up his own inclinations to those of others. If any thing of contention is unavoidable, he shews an unwillingness to enter upon it; manages it with tender-

ness

ness and good manners; and never suffers you to think his esteem or good-will suspended for a moment. On proper occasions, he can give advice without insolence, point out a mistake without displeasing, and rally without giving offence.

Assurance or courage is a necessary ingredient of politeness; for if people are satisfied you could do a rude thing if you had a mind, yet never do it, your merit is greater with them, than if complaisance were forced from you by dread of their censures: for there is a difference between respect and servile fear; the one is amiable, the other contemptible. Some, who would be thought extremely well bred, though they behave very obsequiously to every body in their presence, make a practice of censuring, criticising, and calumniating them as soon as their backs are turned. Now, it may be one way to gratify the humours of the company by depreciating others; but then, if they have any reflection, they must see that the same talent will be turned against themselves another time: so they love you for a moment, but will be afraid of you ever after.

Therefore I conceive the polite man will not be forward to speak ill of any body, but select the bright spots of a character, and seek to extenuate those things which cannot be entirely defended; for by constantly giving others their due, his civilities to those present will appear to be sincerity, and not mere compliment.

In former times there was a good deal of constraint in the modish ways of treating one another; people were forced to eat and drink more than they liked, and pressed to stay longer upon a visit than was agreeable: but now those nuisances are happily removed, and liberty is become the basis of the laws of fashion, as well as the laws of the land.

5. I have said just now, that politeness assumes the countenance

tenance of affection and kindness; but it too often assumes the countenance only, without having an atom of the substance. It is an old proverb, That the Spaniard often kisses the hands he wishes were cut off: your very courtly people appear extremely obliging to persons they do not care a farthing for; nor does the affability of the well-bred always make them a whit the more candid to think well, or more inclined to wish well to others. This proceeds from their aiming only at the credit of politeness; pursuing it as a brilliant accomplishment, rather than as a valuable quality. When thus made an object of ambition, it produces the direct contrary effects to those it ought: it generates contempt and loathing, and widens the difference between man and man, making us regard the rude and vulgar as an inferior species of creatures. In some persons it excites an utter aversion to trouble, to consideration, regularity, and decency, as mean things, fit only to keep the populace in order, and hurries them into all fashionable follies, dissipation, and ruinous expenses.

The very fine gentleman must not put on his own clothes, look into his own estate, nor eat, nor talk, nor do any thing like the bulk of mankind; he has no judgment of his own, but takes his opinions of all kinds from the modish standard; and even chooses his diversions, not because he likes them, but because they are followed by the polite world; he despises application and seriousness, economy or justice to his tradesmen, because he sees them disregarded by persons of fashion; and would be ashamed to pursue a close train of thought or argumentation, as being pedantic, but decides every thing at once by positiveness and exclamation: he cannot endure to be alone, because he has then no opportunity of shining, but aims to sparkle in all companies, even before his own servants; and is as vain of understanding all the

the punctualities and niceties of fashion, as Alexander was of conquering the world.

Politeness requires, that you should submit your own humours to those of the company; but then it puts no check upon their humours, so that when made the sole principle of action, it encourages the indulgence of every humour and folly in which others will join. Thus the restraint of private inclination, serves only to instigate and give larger scope to the general. Its object being to please and entertain rather than produce real benefit, it naturally fixes the attention upon little forms and modes of behaviour, which best answer its purpose. By this means things of moment and trifles are made to change their nature; great stress is laid upon the latter so as to engross the thoughts, in contempt of the former, as if the whole business of mankind were amusement; and a man is estimated, not by his virtues, by his skill in any science, or merit in his profession, but by his manner of entering a room, the fluency and liveliness of his discourse, and readiness in making a handsome compliment.

6. It is difficult to find out where the legislative power in matters of fashion resides: the women have certainly a considerable share, but they do not proceed by session, deliberation, or council, so their statutes are often fantastic and arbitrary; and if chance and whim have an influence any where, it must certainly be here. The administration is carried on with the utmost rigour; no allowance being made for mistake, or ignorance, or want of information, but whoever does not conform exactly to the letter of the law, is cried down as a brute. For though the thoroughly polite overlook all failings, there is a set of people, one may style the executioners of the law, who, pretending to every thing of politeness except an equitable temper, always pass severe judgment

judgment; and though the regulations change every half year, it is the highest crime with them not to be acquainted with the several alterations the moment they are made.

The wants of nature are soon satisfied, but men multiply their wants by extravagant desires; and if they can keep their desires within the bounds of reason, still the world will be perpetually urging them to new cravings, and imposing many things as necessary, in order to keep up their appearance and respectability: if it could be computed how much we are forced to do, to satisfy others, which we should not do of our own accord, perhaps it would be found that many of us pay a heavier tax to the fashion than to the national supplies. But this, like every thing else, has its uses: some of these I have pointed out already; and as there are various talents of all sorts and degrees among mankind, those whom nature or education have rendered unfit for any thing else, do right in making it their business to study the modes; for, any business is preferable to none at all: but before they value themselves upon their extraordinary proficiency, I would have them satisfied that they were utterly incapable of any better employment. In this case they cannot incur our contempt, for nothing is insignificant in the eyes of Providence: the butterfly, the gold-finch, the fiddler, and the beau, have their several uses in the sublunary system; and he that does his best, however little that may be, does all that was required of him.

We do not reckon our houses finished when the mason and carpenter have done their part, but there still remains employment for the painter, the carver, the gilder, and the paper hanger: nor is the system of life complete when the uses of it are provided for, but something is still wanting for embellishment and amusement; and in those intervals when there is nothing of serious importance to demand our

attention, entertainment and pleasure are our business. Therefore those innocents, who are in no situation to do any real service in life, deserve our thanks if they contribute what they can to the cheerfulness and enjoyments of it: for this world is a stage, and it is not the importance of the part, but the performing it well, that merits applause.

CHAP. V.

EDUCATION.

THERE have been too many masterly systems of education already compiled, for me to think of making any improvement upon them; yet since old things, repeated in a different manner, may sometimes be of use, I may attempt to remind people of what they had overlooked or forgotten, without pretending to instruct them in what they do not know. Nor do I purpose to deal so much in rules and maxims, as in suggesting the particular objects to which our attention should be directed: for having used myself, as far as possible, to proceed by reason rather than by rule, and having found the benefit of this practice, it is natural that I should recommend to others what has proved beneficial to myself. But there is one circumstance of such importance to the success of education, though not immediately connected with it, that I cannot help recommending the most serious attention to it, and that is, the share that we ourselves have in determining the condition in which our children are born into the world, either by our own previous habits, or the choice we make of their other parent, on whom their future health of body and mind must depend, as well as on ourselves. Therefore it is the greatest cruelty, or, at best, unpardonable negligence, when people entail diseases, distemperature of mind, weakness, or poverty, on their offspring, by unsuitable matches, or provide them with a parent attached only to dissipation and amusement, and incapable of assisting them either by instruction or example. But in general we think only of our own fond fancies, interest, or gratification, in making this choice, without ever regarding the consequence to those who are

yet unborn; as if that were an event not likely to happen, or too remote and insignificant to deserve our attention.

2. The end of education is to produce a healthy and well-formed mind in a healthy body: for a constitution enfeebled by intense application and study, or an exuberance of bodily health without any judgment to guide it, will never make either a happy or a useful man.

As to the growth and health of the body, I shall not attempt to give any directions on a subject which I know little of, nor do I apprehend that any will be wanted. If the child has any natural defects, or weakness, or disease, recourse must be had to the faculty; and if not, the parents themselves will be sufficiently directed by their own sagacity, or the information of their friends and acquaintance, what methods to pursue. They should however remember, that the vigour and activity of the full-grown man are the great object to be had in view; that it is not enough to consult the present ease and accommodation of the child, to keep it plump, lively, and in good liking, but that attention is likewise due to every thing that may strengthen the constitution, purify the blood, render the joints supple, and give it a dexterity in the use of all its limbs and organs of speech; that no ligatures be suffered to retard the circulation, nor any methods taken by which it may become heavy, distorted, or feeble.

Health and vigour cannot be completely attained in a tender delicate body: therefore it is a great advantage to any one to have been brought up in hardiness from his childhood; for this quality depends almost entirely on custom, which the earlier it is begun, the more easily will it be acquired. If we reflect how much we suffer from winds and weathers, how much more liberty a man has, and greater choice of employments and pleasures, who can take up cheerfully with bad accommodations, and live well upon any diet,

diet, we must acknowledge it a very desirable thing to possess such a habit; and no pains should be spared to acquire it, which are consistent with the circumstances and future destination of the child.

But the greatest of all absurdities is, that of teaching a child to value himself upon his tenderness and delicacy; this is making a boast of imperfections, which he will naturally be prompted to increase by such instigation: for though in many cases they are excusable, either from weakness of constitution, or the manner of living one has been necessarily accustomed to, still they are imperfections. Therefore if a man cannot bear the least hardship or fatigue, nor rest a moment satisfied without all his conveniencies and elegancies about him, though I should not presently think the worse of him on that account, any more than I should for a broken leg or want of an eye, yet I should think it better and happier for him if he could be delivered from those weaknesses, which good nature and politeness may overlook, but folly alone can make topics of admiration.

We cannot indeed have too much tenderness for children, provided it is under the controul of reason; and this will incline us to procure them all the ease and pleasure consistent with their good, but never to give way to any indulgence that may be attended with mischievous or dangerous consequences. If we neglect our own interests to gratify some present fond desire, it is folly: if we do so with our children, it is injustice and cruelty; for nature has given them no knowledge of the future, but intrusted them to our care; and we betray our trust in the most shameful manner, if we suffer our fondness for them, which in fact is nothing more than a fondness for ourselves, to make us neglect their real welfare. I have heard people value themselves upon their inability to resist any importunity, though they know it to be

hurtful; but they did not know how severely their darlings might rue this indulgence.

But there is a moderation in all things; and we should be very cautious of forcing lads upon things beyond their strength, or dangerous to their health. This caution is not so necessary for parents, who generally err the other way; but young people have sometimes destroyed themselves by violent exercises, and the notion that nothing will hurt them. The danger mostly arises from their attempting something much beyond what they have ever done before; not considering that hardiness is to be acquired by habit, and not all at once by a sudden effort. People sometimes, when taken with some disorder or feverishness, will just then resolve upon being stout, and doing as they did at other times; but this is foolhardiness, not courage, which is ever consistent with discretion, and exerts itself only on proper occasions.

3. Nature has given us appetite both for our sustenance and gratification; by preserving it genuine, it will answer both purposes most effectually: but there are a thousand causes continually surrounding us from our infancy, which tend to pervert and vitiate appetite, by grafting unnatural cravings on it. When children cut their teeth, the uneasiness of their gums urges them to put every thing into their mouths; whatever they can lick off they swallow, especially if it has any sweet, or salt, or piquant taste that pleases them. As soon as they can run about, people are continually cramming them with cakes and sugar-plums; when at school, the example of their companions prompts them to get all the pies, and fruit, and trash they can lay hands on; and, when they grow up, the world is continually labouring by its example, its fashions, and its encouragements, to extend appetite beyond its natural bounds; it is made a genteel

teel accomplishment to have a taste for elegances, curiosities, and dainties; variety of all kinds, the tricks of cookery, dishes of tempting fruits, and the finest wines, are made use of to gratify and stimulate appetite as much as possible.

I know it is impossible to keep appetite always within bounds, and therefore there is the more need of care and contrivance to restrain it within bounds as far as is practicable. I would not wish any man to resolve upon never eating but when he is hungry, nor taking a bit more than nature requires, for as the world goes, and as he himself has been accustomed, he would by so doing lose more than half the comforts of society, and half the pleasures of life. My purpose is only to remind parents of the dangers hanging over their children from the cradle, that they may use their vigilance to guard against the mischiefs of them from the first, and beware of laying unnecessary temptations in their way, since but too many will offer of themselves. It would perhaps be a good rule, to find plenty of play-things and other amusements for children, but never to give them any thing to eat in the way of indulgence: one cannot expect to have this rule always followed, but it would be right to approach as near to it as we can. When we reflect how much of our time is spent at our meals, and in other gratifications of this sort, it will be found that no inconsiderable part of the enjoyment of life consists in eating; but, to have it a real gratification, we must not take pains to make it such, for there is no sauce like hunger; and whatever contrivances we practise to supply its place, will only lessen instead of increasing our enjoyment. Pleasure shews her coquetish disposition more in this than any thing else; while we remain indifferent to her, she will court us daily of her own accord; but if we betray an eagerness for her favours, she will turn her back upon us, and allow us no more of them than we can extort from her by arts and contrivances, which

must be perpetually varied to obtain even a momentary delight. Nor will she suffer us without much difficulty to return to our former moderation; for people, by frequent excess, stretch their stomach beyond its natural tone, which then will crave more than it can digest; so that if afterwards they would practise moderation, they cannot, but still eat too much without knowing it.

4. There is also an intemperance of sleep very necessary to be guarded against, because extremely apt to creep upon young people; especially in this cold climate, where it gives a smart pain to jump out of a warm bed into the winter air. While under the eye of parents and masters, they may be kept constantly to a certain hour, which will make it the easier for them to persevere in this habit afterwards: in general, they will need no more than one nap, which, from custom, will terminate of itself at the usual hour; and then if they turn upon the other ear to take a second, they should be taught to look upon it as an indulgence, not at all redounding to their credit. But this second nap is not so bad as lying awake; than which nothing tends more to corrupt the blood, to sharpen the juices, to exhaust the spirits, to unbrace the solids, to stupify the understanding, and to produce other very mischievous consequences. Regularity is indeed of the greatest consequence in almost every thing; because nature may be gently bent into any course by custom, her second self, but cannot be suddenly put out of her way without great violence done to her, and danger of injuring her powers; nor can she move so vigorously and readily as when she has some settled course to proceed in: for the human machine is like a watch, that will be spoiled by perpetually putting forwards and backwards; by hurrying on, or stopping, or disturbing its movements. There are, however, some professions which require a perpetual breaking in upon common rules; when therefore there is any thing

thing of this sort in view, it will be prudent to prepare for such deviations beforehand, that we may receive the less shock from them when they become necessary.

But it will be very difficult to get a man from his pillow till he is quite tired of it, if he has nothing to do when he is up: for he will be apt to think, that if he must be idle, he may as well be idle in bed as elsewhere; thus Sloth is the child of Idleness, continually nourished by it, and would die away of itself, if the latter could be removed. Therefore it would be of great benefit to young people to contrive if possible, that they should always have some employment to turn to immediately upon rising; some task enjoined, which if they dispatch early, they will have the more time afterwards for their own amusements; or, which is better, something that they may apply to with pleasure, and that may be foremost in their thoughts as soon as they awake. For it is not enough to overcome our fondness for sleep, if our waking hours be suffered to dream away in a torpid indolence not much different from sleep: it is of great service even to the health to cultivate a spirit of activity, both of body and mind. The former is more necessary for the animal machine, and for that reason deserves to be particularly regarded by such as are destined to follow some sedentary profession, who ought never to sit still with their hands before them in the intervals of employment, but engage in such exercises as may keep up a proper degree of circulation, and prevent ill humours from gathering in the blood.

Yet activity of mind is not by any means useless to the body. There are some who love to sit in a corner, building castles in the air, musing upon improbabilities soothing to their fancy, and wishes of what can never happen, or perhaps upon something that has vexed them, or the imaginary dread of mischiefs never likely to happen. Though

Though this may seem an intenseness of thought in which the mind is rather too busy than too remiss, it is not in reality an activity, but passiveness of soul, bound down to an object rising mechanically in the imagination. Tempers of this cast have a perpetual listlessness and dilatoriness; they apply to nothing readily, but want to put off every thing another minute, even their meals, their diversions, and their beloved nightly repose. Such stagnation of mind, become habitual, must inevitably produce a stagnation of the animal juices, fret and waste the spirits, generate fearfulness and melancholy, and impair the health more than will easily be imagined.

There is also a contrary extreme, urging people to make more haste than good speed; a continual hurry and agitation, never satisfied but when in motion; an impatience to do things before the proper time, and an eagerness to dispatch them at once by a violent effort; an over solicitude for their success, and vexation at the least cross accident or failure. This temper is equally hurtful to the health, and no pains should be spared to cure either of these dispositions in children as soon as it begins to discover itself, and before it be grown inveterate; though I think the former should be guarded against with the most care, because it is not only the most common but the most difficult to be discovered.

5. In early infancy the body requires more attention than the mind; but the latter will soon demand the preference, and something may be done even in the first years, by assisting the opening of the faculties, and laying the foundation of that most valuable quality, a command over our desires. For children naturally cry for what they want, but it is of greater importance than nurses and mothers are willing to own, never to let them extort any thing by this means, yet not to refuse them roughly or with

with an angry countenance, but smiling, and amusing them with something else, sometimes even taking away their playthings in like manner: for this practice will save a great deal of trouble at other times, when they happen to catch up things that would hurt them, which then you must take away from them at any rate.

For the same reason it will be proper to prevent the presence of their nurses from becoming necessary to them, so that they may bear at any time to see them go out of the room, and be left contentedly in other people's hands, especially your own; for you cannot be too early in gaining their acquaintance and liking, of which excellent use may be made. If little hurts or dangers happen, never set up an outcry, for that will frighten them, but try to jest it off, and though they cannot enter into the jest, they will be kept in good humour by the pleasantness of your looks and gestures. When in pain with their teeth or otherwise, give them all the relief and ease you can, but do not bemoan them or put on a dismal countenance, for that will only teach them to redouble their grief; sympathy is caught much sooner than is generally supposed, and indeed is the only language intelligible to children.

Playthings are no doubt useful, because every body sees they divert the child; but present amusement is not the only thing I would have in view: wherefore I would choose such as have some kind of movement belonging to them, will take to pieces, and bear being banged about without breaking: for they will serve best to exercise their little limbs and sagacity. Nor need you always resort to the shops for materials; a little hammer, a coffee-mill, or the bell handle, will sometimes answer the purpose, or your penknife-sheath will do for them to pull open and shut again. I have sometimes tried to throw a napkin over their heads, thrust a plaything up their sleeve, or put them in some little difficulty from

from which they can extricate themselves; but the women always interpose immediately on these occasions, which I conceive tends to make the child helpless, and dependent on others for assistance in every trifling instance. Care must however be taken not to teaze him in these experiments, which therefore I would never suffer to be practised upon him by other children, if there are any bigger in the house.

You may lay him upon the ground to sprawl about as well as he can: when he is tired do not take him up instantly, but let him wait for a minute or two. Many little devices may be thought of to put him upon striving for himself, and acquiring a dexterity in the use of his hands and feet; nor perhaps would it be without its use if he were taught to make a variety of noises instead of squalling perpetually in the same note, as this would give him a better command over the muscles of his mouth when he comes to learn articulate sounds, and help to prevent lisping, stammering, or other imperfections.

6. When the child can run alone, and prattle, the faculties begin to spread and admit of more rapid improvement. Care will then be wanted to make him speak plain, to pronounce words of similar sound distinctly, and to understand the difference between those of the same sound. When he comes to read there will be a difficulty to prevent his getting a tone. The most likely way to avoid this seems to be by writing down some sentences that you may have used yourself, or should be likely to use upon particular occasions in common discourse, in joking and merriment, in anger, in expostulation, in importuning, in compassionating, in telling a story, in relating an historical fact, in describing something grand, magnificent, or surprising, and teaching him to read them exactly in the same manner as you spoke them: by this means he will learn the natural emphasis and inflections of voice belonging to the several

several styles, the familiar, the humourous, the pathetic, the narrative, and the sublime.

The object now to be had in view will be to encourage the growth of his faculties, to whet his sagacity, and begin to store his mind with such knowledge as he is capable of receiving: for which purpose it will be expedient to gain his confidence and friendship, that he may apply to you of his own accord, not be uneasy in your company, nor want to get away among the servants; that he may have no reluctance in telling you what he has been doing when out of sight, nor stand in perpetual dread of your displeasure. Yet it will be necessary to keep up a proper reverence and dependence, which you may better do by steadiness than sternness; not perpetually constraining him in his motions nor interrupting his plays, but rather assisting him in the prosecution of them; laying as few commands as possible, but always enforcing those you do lay with firmness, and, as far as it can be done, pointing out the reasons of them. If correction be needful, it must not be inflicted in anger, nor without an expression of unwillingness and shewing the necessity of it, for preventing worse consequences.

If he plies you with questions do not discourage him, for curiosity is the great spring of knowledge. While you are giving him lessons, perhaps his head is running after something else, so that not a word that you say has any impression; but when asking questions his attention is open, and nothing will be thrown away. He will probably ask more than you are able to answer; if this be the case, acknowledge it honestly, and do not save your own credit by chiding or laughing at him for his impertinence: if the thing be above his comprehension, or not proper to be known, or too trifling to be worth the inquiry, tell him so plainly. There is the same advantage in employing little games, tricks upon cards, bits of paper, to be disposed of in different

different figures, prints, stories, or riddles, for exciting his curiosity: nor will it be useless sometimes to criticise his expressions and try to puzzle him, provided the attack be no greater than he can defend himself against, or that you help him if he be gravelled; for then he will not be disheartened by it, but learn to speak correctly and pertinently.

Still every thing is not to be made a play of, either in childhood or in more advanced life; those who resolve to live a whole life of amusement being the most useless, and generally the most unhappy of mortals. Therefore, one principal object must be to inure him early to some kind of discipline, to train him gradually to bear close application, and so far to consult his ease as this can be done by giving him a taste for employment, by teaching him dispatch in it, and by inspiring him with an ardour for proficiency in his studies. The way to procure ease and satisfaction is not by avoiding labour but by learning to take delight in it.

7. For lads intended for the learned professions, it has been disputed whether a school or a private tutor be more eligible. The discussion of this point seems needless for general use, because few can afford the latter, and perhaps there are some out of those few from whose example and manner of living, so little good is to be learned, that they had better put their children into other hands. Where there is a robust constitution, good principles early instilled, and a steadiness of temper not easily led away by example, I conceive a large school may be best; but if the child's frame be delicate, his inclinations suspicious, or his mind too flexible and open to any impressions, I should prefer a small one, because there he may be more narrowly watched. When once they are delivered up to the master, every thing must be left to his management; for it would be presumptuous

tuous to teach a professor any thing in his own science; yet I may suggest, by way of query, whether it would not be better to exercise children's memory upon things than words, and instead of those tiresome tasks usually set them upon repetition days, which seem adapted only to fit them for stage players, to put them upon repeating the substance of the lessons they have learned the week before, preserving any remarkable words or turns of expression, or passages which have a peculiar beauty and energy? Again, whether among the theses given them to declaim upon, it might not be of service sometimes to choose those in which the boys may be heartily interested, and which have a nearer relation to the common business of life; such as whether law, divinity, physic, the army, the sea, or trade, be the more eligible profession; and for what characters, and to persons in what situation in life; what are the advantages of the county each boy belongs to, whether cricket or prisonbase, shuttle-cock or trap-ball, be the better amusement; why holidays are expedient, and what number of them is proper? If they have had disputes among one another, or entertained any favourite notion either on morality, behaviour, politics, elegance, pleasure, or any other subject, each may be set to maintain his own opinion in an exercise: and sometimes several exercises may be branched out from one beginning, for it is common for one question to lead to another. But, whatever topic they maintain, they should be accustomed to employ such arguments only as really weigh with themselves; for the common way of filling up a page with a set of plausible words, taken from books, perhaps without having ever comprehended their force or meaning, can teach them at best only to amuse or silence an opponent, but will never help to affect or convince any body. I know it is necessary upon many occasions in life to use arguments to the man which you do not

feel

feel the force of yourself; but then they ought always to be such as you would be willing to act upon, if you were of his sentiments in other respects. This practice of addressing the ear rather than the understanding or the heart, is I conceive the occasion of that emptiness and superfluity which abound so much among mankind, and that they have so little power of influencing one another; and, what is worse, leads them to deceive themselves by concealing the true motives of their actions and imposing upon them for such any false colouring that might pass for a justification. For professions requiring much application of thought, I conceive some knowledge of mathematics will be eminently serviceable, because nothing helps so much to produce closeness of attention, exactness of observation, clearness of reasoning, and acuteness in finding out the minute steps by which one truth leads to another.

After all, a school is not to be depended upon for every thing; sound principles of morality, discretion, and common prudence, good manners, politeness and knowledge of the world, are not likely to be acquired there. Even though the master should be well skilled in all these matters, of which there is a great chance, he will not have leisure or opportunity to teach them: therefore it is incumbent on the parent to lay the foundation well beforehand, to improve the growth of them, and correct errors that have insinuated themselves from time to time, when the boy returns under his eye at the school-vacations or afterwards.

8. The foundation of a child's morals cannot be laid too soon: prudence and moderation of their desires are the corner-stones which must support the building. In order to prevent the growth of the turbulent and selfish passions, it will be expedient, in the first place, when there are several children, to preserve an exact impartiality towards them, making them sensible of one another's rights, and ready to allow

allow them: then let them see that you have other objects to attend to, in which they have no concern, that other people have their several interests with an equal right to pursue them; and inure them gradually to entertain a sentiment of justice even towards strangers, and persons they do not like. But especially beware of servants instilling the prodigious importance of master or miss above all others of their inches, which they will be apt to do through mere indiscretion and ignorance; you may soon discover this by the prattle of the children, who love to repeat what they hear, and then you must lose no time to apply a proper remedy. Nevertheless, together with a regard for the rights of others, you should teach them circumspection and steadiness in the maintenance of their own: and that they may be the more willing to attend to you, you may lead them to expect frequent opposition in the world, as well from the unreasonableness of some as the misapprehensions of others, that they may strive to avoid the mischiefs of both by their sagacity and resolution, rather than by anger and peevishness which can be of no use to them. Teach them to observe the difference of characters both on the good and bad side; to be hasty neither in their friendships or aversions, yet not prone to suspicion, but open, liberal, discreet, and manly.

9. You cannot be too careful to study the tempers of children, in order to take advantage of their good, or correct any bad dispositions. It will be necessary, if they are sly, cunning, and crafty, to inculcate openness and sincerity; if careless, to teach them caution; if sluggish, to stir up their activity; if impetuous, to moderate their ardour; if obstinate, to render them flexible; if volatile, to give them steadiness. But whatever you do with them, must be done in time, for the old proverb is too true, that what is bred in the bone will never be out of the flesh.

There is one thing particularly necessary to be attended

to, and that is, the purity of their sentiments and manners: this is the more difficult to secure, because you cannot caution them directly what to avoid without suggesting and perhaps raising incitements to the very things you forbid. The only method is by guarding all the avenues leading remotely to any thing improper, (though you must take care not to let them see the reasons of your caution,) by making them leave their pillow as soon as awake, finding them constant employment, and keeping them out of company that might be dangerous to them.

But all your cares will be in vain, unless you assist them by your own example. Children are extremely imitative, attentive to every little word and motion, and turn of countenance, and way of acting, open to their observation; and I am apt to think their future character depends more upon the sentiments and habits they imbibe inadvertently, than on what is usually comprehended under the term Education; nor would I pronounce it impossible that children might be led into all kinds of useful knowledge by a regular, judicious conduct in all those about them, without other aid than such instructions as they would apply for of their own accord. However romantic this notion may seem, yet it cannot be denied that a great deal may be done in this way. Example has always been counted more powerful than precept, and by its bad influence may easily overthrow all the good that has been done by the other. You may in some measure lessen this influence from the examples of other persons by shewing their evil tendency or turning them into ridicule, but you cannot condemn nor ridicule your own actions; you will have neither inclination nor eyes to see your own faults, nor will it be prudent to lessen yourself in the child's esteem. Juvenal says, the greatest reverence is due to children; by which must be understood, that we cannot be too much on our guard how

how we behave before them; never to betray any marks of passion, intemperance, greediness, folly, or selfishness in their presence: if we have a foible we are resolved not to part with, let us at least reserve the indulgence of it for times when they are not by.

But you will say it is unavoidable to do many things before children, which one must not permit them to do; and they should be taught to know the difference between themselves and grown persons. True, for you may say to a child, You must not get on horseback, though I may, because I am stronger and know how to manage him: but you cannot tell him you must not swear nor get drunk, but I may; for there your prohibition must be general, or it will signify nothing. Therefore, if you invite him by your practice to what you forbid him in words, though you should be able to keep him in order at present by the fear of your authority, it will be a state of irksomeness and bondage to him; he will long for the time when he may take the same liberties you do, or more probably he will take them sooner, as often as he thinks it can be done without danger of discovery; therefore prudence should withhold you even from some things allowable for yourself, when you cannot make him understand the danger and mischief of them to him.

Some persons are very apt to vent themselves in wishes for things which would no doubt be very convenient for them; as that they could find a mine, get a prize in the lottery, obtain a place at court, or that some overgrown rich man would leave them a swinging legacy. If these imaginations are an amusement to you, however keep them to yourself, and let your child hear nothing of this sort, for it may teach him to be discontented, visionary, and perhaps make him a projector or a gamester. Beware likewise of boasting of your family, fortunes, abilities, or any other

superiority, or of criticising, censuring, or ridiculing other persons; for he will be too ready to fall into the same errors

It will be a great advantage if you can recall to mind the ideas, desires, and fancies you had yourself at his age, for this will be a sort of setting the old head on young shoulders. You will feel what the shoulders will bear, be less severe upon his failings and sallies which were once your own, see clearer the dangers they lead into, and know better how to manage them. There is an indiscretion people are sometimes guilty of in consulting, when their children are in the room, what measures they shall take with him, or how to break them of some unlucky trick; they think the children take no notice, because seemingly busied in their play, but for all that they are very attentive on such occasions, and will be sure to counterplot you, or perhaps arm themselves with an obstinacy you will find very difficult to overcome.

11. There is no need to say much of Religion, because the rudiments of it are in every body's hands: it is enough therefore to recommend that the child should be made to understand what is taught him; but this must be done slowly and gradually in proportion as he is capable of it. Their system must be wholly of the exoteric kind, admitting nature and chance to a large share in the production of events, and representing the divine power as exerted only on particular occasions; afterwards the esoterics may be introduced by little and little, as the understanding opens to comprehend them, taking care they are not misapprehended so as to seem a contradiction, and to overthrow what had been inculcated before. What rules and forms you judge needful, keep them steady to the observance of, and a little more strictly than you wish they should adhere to them afterwards; for it is much easier to relax than to straighten.

straighten. Therefore I love to see young people rather too rigid and scrupulous, because their own experience and the world they converse with will correct this excess; but libertinism is the hardest thing in the world to be cured, because it disdains to submit to any regimen. If a lad were not accustomed early to the use of prayers and ceremonies, the strangeness and awkwardness with which he would go about them afterwards, would fix his whole attention on the external form, and render them useless and ridiculous.

1 . I do not pretend in the foregoing pages to have laid down a complete system of education, or pointed out all the particular objects to be attended to; yet I conceive here are enow to make a happy and a useful man, if steadily pursued, and perhaps more than can be pursued so effectually as might be wished; for none can make it their whole business to take care of their children; it is well if they can be persuaded to make it a business at all, and not a mere amusement, or formal obligation, which one must comply with, because else, what will the world say?—a thing to be thought of by the bye, when one is in the humour, in the intervals between polite engagements, consisting in directions now and then to the servants, or in the choice of a school or a tutor.

My intention was to offer such suggestions as occurred, leaving others to make what use of them they please. If any body shall find one or two among them which he did not think of before, and which he deems practicable and useful, he will do well to adopt them into his plan, taking care beforehand, that he has firmness enough to persevere in them afterwards, otherwise he will do more harm than good. But, whatever plan he resolves on, or additional strokes he admits into it, he must be careful to examine whether they be suitable to the subject he has to work on;

for you cannot make a Mercury of every stick, but must endeavour to do the best you can with it, and adapt your scheme to your materials. It is not your business to aim at doing great matters, but to take care that nothing be lost through your own negligence and mismanagement.

CHAP. VI.

ON DEATH.

UNSPARING gloomy king of terrors, sole universal monarch, whose power no courage can withstand, whose fatal stroke no artifice can evade; the eye cannot support thy looks, and the blood curdles at thy name; we stifle all remembrance of thee, that we may enjoy our pleasures in security, that our lives may not be embittered by the dread of thy approach. For thou tearest us away from our friends, turnest us out of our possessions, breakest short all our beloved schemes, and deprivest us of all our enjoyments. Whatever reason may suggest, still thy stroke seems an annihilation to the fancy, or presents an uncertainty more dismal, where imagination can find no certain object on which to fix even a distant hope. Thou comest beset with pains, uneasiness, regrets, imbecility, and distate for all common enjoyments; and, as if thy native frightfulness was not enough to dismay us, we are compelled to dread thee more by the behaviour, the language, and customs of the world around us. For Death is spoken of as the worst of evils, the danger principally to be guarded against before all others; men will part with any thing to save their lives, and submit to any pains to retard an evil which they know must reach them some time or other; lamentations are made for the loss of friends, as if this were the greatest calamity that could befall them, and the law denounces death as her severest punishment for the most atrocious crimes; add to which, the forlorn appearance of a dead body, the close-imprisoning coffin, the yawning grave, and melancholy pomp of funerals, striking a mechanical dejection upon the spirits; and it will appear

no wonder that all these causes combining, raise alarm in our minds, and give us a strong desire of self-preservation with an abhorrence of whatever threatens destruction.

Yet we do not find this abhorrence universal or insurmountable. Philosophy can overcome it, enabling its possessor, like Socrates, to swallow the deadly potion as if it were a cheerful glass among his friends; Religion can set it at nought, and urge the zealous believer to court a crown of martyrdom; ambition, fame, revenge will stifle it; vexation, disappointment, or any intolerable pressure will outweigh it; the ruined gamester, the broken trader, and the disgraced courtier have sometimes flown to death as to a sure asylum; and even the whining lover has taken refuge there against an evil of his own creating; the common soldier and the sailor lose all dread of it, not by profound reasonings, but by familiarity with the object, by the taunts and jests, the intrepid countenances and behaviour of their comrades; the unenlightened Canadian takes pride in singing while tortured by his enemies; and there are some, who, like Shakespeare's Bernardine, seem never to have been sensible to any thing beyond the present indulgence of their gross appetites.

Thus it appears that the fear of death, unknown to other animals, is not so deeply implanted in human nature, but that there are methods by which it may be eradicated; and one may observe generally, that persons who can readily endure pain and distress are less liable to it than the delicate and voluptuous, who can only quiet their apprehensions by banishing it wholly from their thoughts. But, since this practice is far from advisable, as serving, at best, only for a present expedient; and that of insensibility, though necessary to qualify some persons for the public service, is but reducing them in that respect to the condition of brutes, (for we find that the horse is capable

of

of being made as fearless in the battle as his rider,) let us try whether we cannot succeed better by the help of reason, so as to bear looking death calmly and steadily in the face; to contemplate all his features, and examine what there is terrible or harmless in them.

2. In order to do this more effectually, it will be necessary to analyse the object of our dread into its component parts; for death, though considered as one thing, and called by one name, is in reality a complication of terrors springing from different quarters, and it is their combination that makes him so formidable. For all the sources of affright above enumerated, pouring in on every side of us, raise such a commotion within, as throws the mind quite off her centre; it is in vain to think of subduing them all together, for while you turn to wrestle against one adversary, another by a sudden shock will trip you up behind. If you go to talk to people upon the folly of fearing hurt to the dead insensible body, they will cry, But then to toss about in a sick bed without hopes of recovery: try to comfort them upon this head, and they interrupt you with, But then to leave all one's friends, one's home, one's conveniences, and enjoyments: thus they will dodge you round and round with their complaints and apprehensions, so that it is impossible to get at them to remove them. We had better therefore try to separate the causes of our disquiet, and consider each circumstance by itself.

3. To begin with the pains and distresses accompanying it, as the first thing that is likely to excite our dread. Pain is undoubtedly grievous to human nature; but so it is when not endangering the life; wherefore we have no more reason to be afraid of it then than at other times. But people fancy it must be acuter then than at other times: why so? what foundation is there for this fancy? Some obtain their quietus without any signs of pain at all, as if they dropped asleep; and

and, at other times, there is no appearance of its being more tormenting for being fatal. Physicians tell you, he that recovers from a violent distemper suffers more than he that falls by it: for the uneasiness arises from the struggles of nature, which are greatest before the crisis; but when the scene of death begins, nature has yielded to her foe, and, having lost her vigour, the senses become benumbed, and are no longer able to feel the same acute pain as before.

Therefore, in some diseases, as the palsy, ease and insensibility are reckoned the most fatal symptoms; and it is the same in violent inflammations, which are extremely painful till the mortification having begun, sets the patient at perfect ease: thus the approach of death is known by the departure of pain: and probably the last stage of all distempers is a palsy, when some mechanical motions remain, but those which reach the sensory cease, or act but feebly. For that the convulsions and agonies that are produced are mere motions of the machine, not struggles of the voluntary powers, nor affections of the organs of sense, may be inferred from their resemblance to common convulsive fits to which some persons, otherwise in good health, are subject. When come out of them, they know nothing of what has happened, but the whole time seems as if it had been passed in a sound sleep. So after the convulsions of a fever, you do not find the patient complain of having suffered under them, nor does he remember any thing of what has happened: or, as I have heard instances of some persons, when too weak to stir themselves, a convulsion has suddenly raised them upright in their bed without stupifying their senses; they take it for a voluntary motion, a return of their strength, call for their hat and gloves, want to go out upon their usual business, and feel no other uneasiness than what arises from the opposition of the people about them.

But we hope to escape other evils by caution and good management,

management, whereas death is inevitable: it is true death is certain, but a painful death is not so. And when the last trial does come, we may take encouragement from its being the last; for it is easier to struggle with a difficulty that cannot hold out long, than to maintain our resolution through an indefinite series of them; but we may be sure, when this is ended, of having no more bodily pains to go through; nor diseases, wounds, fractures, robbers, invasions, fires, losses, or vexations to encounter, that used to alarm us so frequently in this world.

4. Let us proceed next to the regret we must feel at leaving our friends, being shut out from our possessions, conveniences, and places of resort we used to delight in, and having all our favourite schemes broken off; but there is no infidelity in departing from friends we cannot stay with, no waste or imprudence in quitting possessions we cannot keep, nor inconstancy in laying aside schemes we can no longer pursue: so we have nothing to blame ourselves for, if we should cast off that attachment which was commendable only because it furnished us with motives to pursue our own good, and made us serviceable to one another. But we can expect to find no more pleasure in the enjoyment of them:—very true, neither shall we feel the want of them, for they are not so necessary to us as that we cannot subsist without them.

Some of our friends have been taken from us long ago, others were not born till we had enjoyed many years of life, and our connections have frequently varied, yet always seemed engaging to us at the time: while children, we had no possessions; we toiled not, neither did we spin; yet our heavenly Father provided for us by the instinct which he gave to our earthly parents: we then had no thought of those schemes and conveniences that appear so indispensable to us now. Our fondness for all these things proceeds from habit,

habit, because we have been used to them; and from the condition of our bodies requiring provision for our accommodation, the concurrence of other persons in our views and pleasures, and a train of pursuits to keep us continually engaged. But while on the bed of sickness we are in no condition to derive advantage from those sources of enjoyment which have hitherto supplied us, and if that terminates in our dissolution, we shall stand in as little need of them then: therefore the parting with them is no cause of regret, as it would be to a living man, who still retains many wants and desires that cannot be satisfied without them. But, on quitting our animal machine, we quit therewith our habits, our propensities, ideas, and remembrance; so that if our old acquaintance, or the most familiar objects, were presented to us again, we should not know them, nor be able to conceive what benefit they could be of to us; but should be as indifferent to receive new impressions or desires, and to form new connections, as ever we were in our original state of infancy.

Yet why should we say the approach of death breaks off all our schemes, and threatens an utter deprivation of all friendships? There is one scheme, which if we take care to make our principal, and bring all our other views to bear a reference to, or coincide with, that will not be frustrated by our removal from this imperfect state: even when the peremptory summons comes, we have still one step to make in the prosecution of it, by patience and resignation to the call, and by withdrawing our desires from the good things that used to delight us here. And if we have cultivated a habit of charity, regarding ourselves as citizens of the world, and all perceptive beings as intrinsically equal, we shall be capable of feeling a hearty goodwill to any of our fellow-citizens, whatever class of them we may happen to be cast among.

There

There is no doubt but the mind, when restrained by indisposition or confinement from exercising its active powers, loves still to feed in imagination on her usual objects; she roams to scenes of business or entertainment expected at a future time. This indulgence in distant prospects, proves a relief under little uneasinesses; but it is thought, that when the reflection darts in, that all is only a vain imagination of scenes that can be enjoyed no more, this must change them into scenes of horror, and overwhelm the mind with the greater disappointment the more eagerly they were beheld. But I believe we shall not be very liable to this source of uneasiness on a bed of sickness, when there is little relish left for common amusements, and little leisure from present pain to think of other things; it can only be in the intervals of ease, when the distemper suspends its violence without having impaired the senses, or in those gradual decays, which waste, but give no pain, that such things can trouble us. Yet, if the thought of our pleasures should molest us, we may place in contrast with them the troubles, contradictions, inconveniences and infirmities, from which none of us are wholly exempted; and, if we recollect how grievous they have sometimes been to us, it will afford some comfort that we are now going to be delivered entirely from them. For what must be parted with, it will be prudent to contemplate on the unfavourable side, which may have a greater effect than we imagine.

5. Another difficulty arises from the strangeness of the thing, as being a scene entirely new, of which we have had no experience. In general, when we have any danger to go through, we strive to strengthen our courage with the remembrance of something similar we passed through before, and of which we know the issue. But here we have nothing to draw a comparison with: and though we daily see others go before us, we can get no account from them how

how it fared with them, either during the passage, or at the end of it. Yet this very circumstance of the passage being made every day, may afford a substantial ground of comfort, since whatever is universal cannot be an evil. Nor may we scruple to call the departure of our dearest friends in some sort an experience of our own: if we have esteemed them for their honesty, integrity, and good qualities, we shall not be willing to think them subjected to so hard a lot as imagination first represents; if we have taken part in their joys and sorrows, they will have been to us as another self; occurrences happening to them, will affect us almost in the same manner as if happening to our own persons; and love and shame will help us to bear patiently whatever we have seen them go through.

But the imagination is perplexed and startled, because it is appointed to men once to die: is the particle Once, which makes the strangeness, a cause of complaint? What if we were appointed to die two or three times, and come to life again, that we might know what we have to go through when the last summons arrives? Should we think the condition of life mended by this alteration? I fancy we should not accept of it if left to our own choice; for we are not very fond of sickness, even when it does not prove mortal, though this furnishes us with some of the experience we want. For the worst of the passage, as already observed, is during the progress of the disease, which those who have recovered from a very dangerous one have passed through, so they do know what it is; therefore many of us have already so far died and come to life again, as was necessary for the present purpose of taking off the strangeness of the thing.

6. With respect to the loss of our powers and ideas, it should be considered that those are valuable only as they serve for our help and direction in the supply of our wants; but when our necessary wants are gone, we may spare them without

without damage. What would our powers of walking avail us when we have no ground to tread upon, nor an unwieldy body to carry about from place to place? What good would our language do us, unless we were to meet with persons who could talk it? How are we the worse for being unable to provide ourselves with sustenance, when we shall get rid at once both of hunger and thirst? As to the loss of our ideas, this must be rendered light by its being total; for when all are gone, we can have no uneasy ones. Were some of our ideas to remain, they might torment us with the reflection on those that are wanting: if we retained an idea of our home with all its conveniences, but none of the way to get there, we should be made miserable by our knowledge. Therefore our security lies in having the whole expunged; because then we cannot be sensible of any deficiences in it, nor have any uneasy cravings left after losing all conception of the objects that used to excite desire.

7. But it is a melancholy thing to find our glass almost run out, with only a few sands left at the bottom; for we have been used to consider time as our most precious treasure; we have pleased ourselves with the thought of having a plentiful stock before us, and we must needs be dejected when that pleasure is wrested from us, and we see it shrunk almost to nothing, however careless we have been of it while not sensibly perceiving its decay.

We have indeed a small allowance of it dealt us here, and much we have to do with it; and we should therefore husband it well, that we may lose none of those advantages and innocent amusements for which it was given us. But though our time here is soon over, yet time itself is not exhausted, having the boundless ocean of eternity from whence to replenish his glass, larger than all the sands of the Atlantic, the Pacific, and all other seas together. Having then such an immense estate of time, we need not grudge the expense of

of fifty or a hundred years irrecoverably gone from us: for this trifling diminution no more leaves us the poorer, than a man worth ten thousand a year would be the poorer for having lost a sixpence. Whoever bears this reflection in mind, will not wish to recall the years that are passed over him, nor be so apt, as many people are, to complain that they see the rising generation growing up to shove them out of the world: the great boys at school do not make this complaint, because younger ones are perpetually coming in to supply their places; nor do travellers complain, on setting out again after having baited at an inn, when they see other company coming in to take the commodious room and refreshments which they are going to resign.

But this life is a school to prepare our faculties for higher exercises than those we are here employed in; it is a journey, or rather one stage of our journey, through matter. For that there are further uses to be derived from our transactions here, I have before given reasons to evince: those uses being provided for, we want no more sand to keep our glass running, but may leave it to time to find another glass to conduct us onward through our next stage. This consideration may secure us against all apprehension of the glass breaking before it be quite run out; for God knows what uses we are destined to fulfil, and what length of time is necessary to complete them; so that whenever we find the glass run out or broken, so that it be not by our own fault, we may rest assured that the ends for which it was given are accomplished.

8. The melancholy appearance of a lifeless body, the mansion provided for it to inhabit, dark, cold, close, and solitary, are shocking to the imagination, but it is to the imagination only, not to the understanding; for whoever consults this last faculty, will see at once that there is nothing dismal in all these circumstances. If the corpse were kept

wrapt up in a warm bed with a large fire in the room, it would feel no comfortable warmth from thence: were store of tapers lighted up as soon as day shuts in, it would not be gratified at the sight; were it left at large, it would have no liberty; nor, though surrounded by company, would it be cheered thereby. Neither are the distorted ghastly features expressions of pain, uneasiness, or distress. This every one knows and will readily acknowledge, yet still cannot behold, nor even cast a thought upon those objects without shuddering; for, knowing that a living person must suffer grievously under those circumstances, they become habitually formidable to the mind, and strike a mechanical horror, which is increased by the customs of the world around us.

It is common to frighten children into taking their physic, by telling them that else they must be put in the pit-hole; when grown up, the tolling knell, the solemn pomp of funerals, help to depress their spirits; the doleful countenances and discourses of other persons affect them by sympathy; and all the scenes of death are heightened by poets and rhapsodists. As for the pit-hole, I see no need for that in medicine; for, if terrors are wanting, those of the rod would answer the purpose full as well; decency in burials indeed is practised in all civilized countries; nor is it an idle ceremony, because the omission of it might introduce a savageness and obduracy that might be dangerous to the living. However, it is serviceable only as it raises a feeling in the thoughtless, which may make them more helpful to persons in sickness or danger: but, for such as possess sensibility and a sympathizing temper, it behoves them to take care that this provision, salutary in general, does not become injurious to them, by stirring up a sympathy with the shrouded carcase, and tainting their imagination with a dread of being themselves one day the subjects of a like doleful ceremony. It would be in vain to use arguments

here, for none are wanted; the understanding being already convinced, that there is no pain or suffering within the coffin to sympathize with: the disease lies in the imagination, which can only be cured by accustoming the mind to dwell on the opposite ideas.

We ought therefore to distinguish carefully between the different parts of our composition; to familiarize our thoughts to the idea of a substance which is not body, nor an object of sight, or touch, or any sense, yet perceives whatever is impressed on the senses, which is properly ourselves; makes whatever else comes into vital union with it to be part of ourselves for the time, and has no further concern with the different portions of matter, when once disunited from it, after which they are no more parts of ourselves than of any other person.

If we find these ideas too abstracted to make themselves felt, we may assist them by the observations of our senses; we know that limbs have been cut off, and then, whatever treatment they receive, no more affects the former owner than it does a stranger; we daily see the slaughtered animals serve for our food, yet without the least apprehension of any hurt being done to them by the cuttings, the roastings, and hashings they undergo; why then should we fancy a dead man pent up in a coffin, and laid in a grave, more miserable than a dead chicken, closed up in a pie, and baked in an oven? Yet we shudder at the dead man's situation, thinking how dreadful it would be to us: so it certainly would, if placed there alive; and so would the chicken's, if put in with all its feathers on, and without being killed; and both have been in a situation as little suited to our liking, one enclosed in an egg-shell, the other not much more agreeably lodged in the womb. Yet the thought of that yields no apprehension of misery, though then there were senses to suffer by it; why then should we tremble at a con-

dition where there are no senses to be affected by any thing passing there? But, whatever considerations we employ will be of no use for being once or twice suggested; for knowledge is not the thing we want here, but persuasion; and this, being a habit, is neither to be weakened nor acquired but by repeated efforts made at proper seasons for bringing the imagination into a due subordination to reason without being carried away by external appearances.

9. Nevertheless, after imagination is cured of anxiety for the body, as being devoid of all sense, and having ceased to be a part of ourselves, it will retain a solicitude for that part which still continues to be ourselves, lest it should utterly lose all powers of perception on losing the body which contained all the organs of sensation, and the repository of our ideas within it; and this inability to comprehend what means of occupation or enjoyment we shall then have, strikes a horror upon the mind.

This difficulty must always perplex us, unless we have used ourselves to carry reflection beyond the immediate operation of the senses, and to distinguish the impression they produce upon the mind from the organs employed in producing it. We have pleasures of very various sorts with respect to their objects, and sometimes pass through very quick successions of them, yet with equal pleasure all the while. A man sits down to a dinner he likes extremely well; when that is ended he converses awhile with agreeable company, he then takes up a diverting book, from that he goes to a concert, and after this there is a ball: his pleasure all along may be the same, though the sources of it have varied; which shews that pleasure is something very different from the causes exciting it. Why then should we think it strange, that we should continue to receive pleasures from objects of which we have at present no conception, by different organs, and in a different way, from any thing we have hitherto ex-

perienced? A man born blind, can form no conception of the pleasures we know are received by sight; neither can an infant in the womb, of the various enjoyments of life, nor a child of most of the pursuits and gratifications of manhood. Thus we have experience of creatures capacitated to receive pleasure from a change of organs, of which they can previously form no distinct idea; which may enable us to comprehend the more easily how we may still find objects for the exercise of new senses, unknown to mortal man.

However, it has been common, as a further help to the imagination, to employ sensible images in representing our future condition. But since some people have taken offence at the descriptions of angels with wings, or creatures shaped and sized like ourselves, whether with gross or thin aerial bodies, if they find the vehicular hypothesis more to their taste, they are welcome to the suggestions I have offered concerning it; only let them not be mortified at their minuteness, for we judge of magnitude by ourselves. Children think grown persons huge creatures; and whatever diminutive size we may be reduced to, no doubt we shall esteem ourselves proper persons: if a thousand of us can creep into a grain of corn, we shall not fancy ourselves mites for all that, but the corn swoln into an enormous mountain, abounding with spacious caverns in which we may ramble about at pleasure.

However difficult we find it to form an idea of pleasure in the abstract, nothing is more easy than to apprehend pain and uneasiness, without any particular object wherewith to connect them; which makes the imagination so prone to forebode mischief in uncertainty. Now, if we examine how we acquire the habit of abstracting pain rather than pleasure, we shall find that it is occasioned by the narrowness of our desires confining us to particular objects: therefore, when a pleasure is proposed, we are willing to learn something

thing more about it, that we may know whether it is to our taste, for otherwise we would not give a farthing for it. But all uneasiness is disgustful to us; therefore, when threatened with it, we do not stop to inquire what species it is of, but feel an immediate aversion to it. Then our enjoyments for the most part require a long train of measures to be taken beforehand for their attainment, and it is a chance if after all we gain our end: but mischiefs surround us on all sides, so that it is necessary to be continually on our guard, and ready to take alarm at every appearance of danger. We are therefore apt to be tormented by any thing like uncertainty; and when we do not see some object of desire distinctly before us, there starts up a frightful phantom in its stead, made formidable by its confusedness, as having neither shape, nor colour, nor distinguishable feature. Thus we see that our disposition to forebode evil in uncertainty, proceeds solely from habit, and not from the reason of the thing; for though we should be beset with as many evils in another life, there is no doubt but we shall also possess the same means of providing for our safety.

10. The last source of terror on quitting this mortal stage is, that of an after-reckoning: and this I can offer no solid arguments to remove, where there is just cause of apprehending that it will terminate unfavourably to us. The only way that I know of to remove our apprehensions upon this head, is, by a rational piety, and sound sentiments, concerning our relation to God and our fellow-creatures, exemplified in the practice of good works, to remove the causes of our dread.

I have now done my best towards unravelling that complication of terrors, which renders the thought of death so dreadful. But let no one expect to be cured of his fears from once giving me a hearing. He had better make use of the topics he will find here, as hints to set his own thoughts

at work: for our imaginations and our understandings are as variously formed as our faces; and the same object that strikes upon one person in the most forcible manner, scarcely touches another. Whatever he can deduce from his own sagacity and observation, will do him more service than a thousand arguments suggested by any body else. Only I beg leave to warn him once more of his 'But thens,' and to pursue his reflections on one source of alarm to the end, before he gives admission to a second: for, while he suffers them to break in upon one another, he will never come to an end with any of them.

The fear of death was no doubt given to man for useful purposes. It is commonly said, a man who values not his own life has every other man's in his power; so that if there were not a sense of self-preservation making the laws formidable, there could be no order nor government, the number of robbers and banditti would increase, and a great part of mankind would become savage beasts, so much the more dangerous as they would have more cunning. The dread of death is also some check to intemperance, when the excesses of it have brought men into imminent danger. It makes them more compassionate to sickness and pain; for we seldom pity another for the tooth-ach, or other complaints, that put the life in no danger; and it leads the giddy to think of religion and another world, which would never enter their heads amidst the bustle and amusements with which they are surrounded. And it is of use to every one, as a trial of fortitude, if he uses his endeavours to overcome it; not by shutting his eyes against it, for that is more a cowardly shift than a brave conquest, but by taking the proper means for turning the dreadful object into a harmless one. For our aversions, as well as our likings, were designed for our benefit, that in struggling with them we might not only deliver ourselves from their tyranny, but gain the spolia opima,

opima, the richest spoils, in an accession of strength to our spiritual body. The cry of Memento mori, is generally thought a dismal sound; and so indeed it is become, through the indiscretion or artifices of those who make it loudest, so as to increase the natural terrors of mankind, that they may govern them the more easily. Hermits and holy men are described sighing over deaths heads, sobbing and groaning at the thought of their mortality, and practising austerities and self-denials without ceasing, to prepare themselves for it.

But why do we need a death's head for a memento, when every church-yard, every probate of a will, every newspaper, or old wall of a hundred years standing, might do as well, if we turned our thoughts that way. If we perceive a use in any particular exercise of austerity or self-denial, either for our future ease in this world, or preparation for the next, let us go through it manfully in God's name, as we go through any other laborious or disagreeable task, with a view to the advantage to be gained thereby: but why need we afflict our bodies, only to deject our spirits, and double the horrors of that which is formidable enough already?

CONCLUSION.

My labours are now drawn to an end, not by having exhausted my subjects, which, perhaps, were inexhaustible, but my stock of materials: and labours they have been to me, who, wanting that readiness of thought and expression which many people have at command, have found great difficulty in collecting and digesting my ideas, drawing out the threads of argumentation, preventing them from entangling, guarding against misapprehension, and against giving occasion for inferences to be drawn from my words which I never intended. The women generally end their letters with, Excuse mistakes through haste, and many male authors affect to give you a hint, that they could have done better if they had a mind, or would have allowed themselves more leisure: but I happen not to be of a humour to desire excuse for mistakes through haste; I had rather the reader should be satisfied of my care and honest zeal in his service, though at the expense of my abilities; and believe where he sees a blemish, that I should have done better if I had known how. For, of how little importance soever this attempt may prove, it seemed the most important I was qualified to undertake; and I have laid down all along, that it is not so much the importance of the part assigned, as the just and diligent performance of it, about which we should be anxious.

Having this testimony of my own conscience, I may now make holiday with a quiet mind, and with the same joy as a workman, upon having finished his task before the evening of his day is quite spent; but my pleasure is considerably abated, by finding the performance fall short of the idea pre-

preconceived at entering upon it. Nevertheless, I may comfort myself with the reflection, that this is a common accident happening to thousands besides myself: the projects of ambition, the schemes of avarice, almost all the pursuits of life, whether in great or small undertakings, promise more at the outset than we reap from them afterwards. And it is necessary that they should do so, that the business of the world may go forward; for, our indolence is so great, that it cannot be roused but by very flattering hopes; we will not work for small wages and do not deserve great; therefore, when Providence has any little service to put us upon, we are permitted to magnify it in our imagination, or else we should want spirit to exert ourselves. I now find by experience that my design required a more expert and masterly hand to execute it, appearing as here managed rather a tissue of separate essays than a neat, compact, and workmanlike composition, strengthened in all its parts by a mutual dependence and clear connection of one thing with another. Yet has it something of a shape, and one general design running through the whole. To any one who will cast his eye over the outline of my performance, and recollect the general course of the argument, without following it through all its windings and digressions, it will appear pretty plainly (as the chart of a wilderness produces a discernible form by drawing all the mazes within the compass of a single view) that there is a uniform design pursued steadily throughout, a contexture of muscles and sinews deriving strength from their mutual connection, and forming something of a regular body, yet disguised by the unskilful manner of putting the limbs together, and defective in point of symmetry and elegance of shape.

It is customary to give the reader his bill of fare beforehand, but it was not in my power to gratify him in this respect,

respect, not having been able, after repeated trials, to sketch out the principal lines of my plan, so as to leave nothing more to do afterwards than fill up the colouring. Pursuits and inquiries are generally descriptions of a route already preconcerted and travelled over by the author in his own mind, and this may be the most masterly way of proceeding for such as can take it. But my inquiry has been a real one to myself, producing discoveries of tracks I was wholly unacquainted with at setting out, often not knowing what would be the subject of the next chapter, until the preceding was ended, sometimes forced to rehandle my premises to fit them for further use, and continually finding my materials grow out of one another. Perhaps it has not been the worse, for either my readers or myself, that I could not do otherwise; for when there is a scheme already formed, one lies under a temptation of misapprehending or undesignedly wresting facts, in order to accommodate them to it; and as few people are without their schemes, they will not look with an impartial eye on any thing offered to them, which they foresee or suspect will contradict what they have already made a part of their creed. Besides, when it is known beforehand what is to come, there arises an impatience of arriving at it too hastily without fully digesting the premises: therefore it is safest to examine the foundations first by themselves, without casting an eye upon any thing else. And when they are well established, then is the time to consider what superstructures may be raised on them. It is not, however, always necessary that the superstructure should be novel, for we may find old ones that will stand firmly on our new foundations. This is what I have been all along more desirous of doing, than of drawing conclusions entirely my own, having so much deference for the opinions of mankind, as to presume them just, if they could be cleared from

from all misconstructions, false colouring, and artificial excrescences.

With respect to the manner of handling my subjects I shall need great allowances, and I shall think myself lucky, if those who are disposed to make none should happen to disagree among themselves what particular spots to condemn. Some may think me too light and others too profound, or perhaps find me guilty of both extremes at different times. But they will please to distinguish when the obscurity is unavoidable, as arising from the nature of the subject, and when owing to unskilful management, charging the latter only to my account; and they may ascribe the levities and singularities of thought to a desire of enlivening abstruse matters, and rendering them visible by familiar images, not always chosen by the courtly standard, for want of perfect acquaintance with modern delicacy.

If propriety of diction, and harmony of composition have suffered in many places, or the period has "like a wounded snake, dragged its slow length along," it has not been through inattention, but an unwillingness to curtail the sense for the sake of the measure: and though Horace directs that we should send back the ill-turned line to the anvil, I have found the first working too laborious to leave me strength for a second revisal. I have endeavoured to be industrious, but not grave or formal, thinking it a less fault for the horse to be a little too mettlesome than heavy: therefore, after carefully considering my subjects, have chosen to follow impulse rather than rule in the disposition and clothing, still keeping the reins in my hands to check it upon occasion; for which my own word must be taken, because, nobody else can know in what instances I have restrained its scamperings. And I have generally observed, that productions which were more the growth of nature than

than of art, have been better received than those which proceeded with a scrupulous unvaried exactness; for men have such an indolence of temper, they want something continually to awaken it, and will easily pardon irregularities which have that end in view.

Though I have addressed myself chiefly to the speculative, my view has not been confined entirely to them; but besides my efforts towards forming a regular system for their use, I have endeavoured to lay open the general constitution of human nature, by the study of which they may learn to apply their knowledge to the service of such as want either capacity or leisure to make the full use of their own reason. For it seems too narrow a vulgarity in those who value themselves upon being raised above the vulgar, to despise every old woman that thums over good books all day, and groans for her sins, merely because she does not understand Latin and has no interest in the county: my notion is apparent enough by this time, concerning the equality of spiritual beings, (their differences proceeding from the structure and fitting up of the habitations wherein they are lodged) so that I can regard none of my fellow-creatures as beneath my notice. Perhaps the learned reader will take this oddity, if he thinks it one, as an excuse for some sections scattered up and down, which were designed for the old lady; as I hope the latter will admit the like excuse for what she may find strange and latitudinarian elsewhere, believing me a well-intentioned body, but a little bewildered by dealing too much among heathen authors.

But though desirous of keeping on good terms with every one, I am less solicitous to save my own credit than to avoid doing real hurt to any: I have used all the caution I was master of in handling delicate subjects, and if I have notwithstanding transgressed the bounds of discretion in any

any material points, the candid reader may please to know that my conversation for some years past has fallen among persons who had other ways of employing their thoughts than those in which I was engaged; so I have been forced to break through the briers of abstraction by myself, without companions or assistance on my journey: he will therefore consider me as *inopem concilii*, destitute of advice, and grant me the same indulgence which the law courts allow to a will made in such circumstances, wherein they endeavour to discover the testator's intention, without insisting upon a legal nicety of form or expression.

I confess, I am a little in pain about my doctrine of the vehicles and mundane soul, for there is a hazard that some persons who are capable of apprehending nothing but by sensible images, if once persuaded that the room is full of spirits, may take it into their heads, to fancy they see them whisk to and fro, or feel them in their insides, or hear them buzzing about their ears, or perceive some operation performed by them. But I must desire such people not to charge their superstitious notions at my door; for, in my idea of spiritual substances, they are not the objects of any of the senses; and though I have supposed them concerned as first movers in the operations of matter, yet in this they act in strict conformity to the will of Providence; nor are they liable to any of those wanton freaks or irregularities too often practised by ourselves. And as for the vehicular gentry, if we have any of them in our company, their minuteness is such that we can have no intercourse whatever with them, nor see them with all our straining, any more than we can the particles of air, of which we know the room is full.

Amusement is thought so much the sole business of every one who is not debarred from it by necessity or the duties of a profession, that all voluntary labour, or abridg-

ing one's self of diversions in one's power, appears an oddity and strangeness, and must needs therefore be wrong. The pains I have taken in this work have, according to my own confession, cost me so many weary hours, that I shall need an apology with the world for undergoing such drudgery.

Yet I think there is one exception against this rule in the case of self-interest: a man may constrain himself in his pleasures for the sake of raising an immense fortune, or getting a place in the ministry, or a title, or establishing an interest in the country, without imputation of folly, or being thought a strange creature. This exception then I may claim the benefit of, being in principle one of the most selfish mortals upon earth: not but that, to my shame it must be owned, I daily swerve in my conduct from this unerring guide, but then it is from being taken by surprise, perplexed by the obscurity of my ideas, hurried away by some impetuous, or beguiled by some secret passion, or driven along by the torrent of the world: but in my contemplative moods, and when I have the full use of my understanding, self lies at the bottom of all my schemes; and this work being the produce of my calm considerate hours, it may be supposed, that I was actuated all along by this same laudable motive. But, it will be asked, what private advantage I can propose by taking a course which lies neither in the road to profit nor honours, nor popularity, nor can be expected to attract notice enough to gain even an empty reputation? These objects indeed I had not in view, not even the last of them, for the world admire what they love, and love what gratifies their passions, not what aims at correcting them; and though I have ranked compliance among the virtues, I am unluckily ill qualified for a servile compliance either with court or common-council. Besides, supposing the most that can be admitted,

performances

performances of the present kind, if they make their way in the world at all, do it by very slow degrees, being at first regarded only by a few, till recommended by them to public notice: so that I can hope to reap no benefit from this distant reputation, for a few years will enrol me among the vehicles; when, if I should know any thing of what passes here below, I shall probably retain as little relish for the sounds of earthly fame as I do now for the applauses, bestowed on my childhood for having made a pretty bow, or fluently repeated the fable of the frog and the mouse.

Nevertheless, I have already reaped some benefit from my labours, having been enabled to cast my thoughts into a more regular train, and obtained a greater degree of light in some points, as well of speculation as of daily use, so as to render my conduct a little more consistent and satisfactory. Could I conform my practice completely to my own doctrines, and turn all my convictions into habitual lively persuasions, I should be a clever fellow and a happy man: but of this I fall greatly short, and yet this very failure is not without its benefit, as helping to check that noxious weed, a presumptuous vanity. For self-conceit grows most copiously out of ignorance, as heath and breaks do from barren sands: the better acquainted a man becomes with what is real excellence, the more he will be mortified on finding how far he falls short of it; and he will sometimes discover those very sentiments and actions to be weakness, which otherwise he would have been extremely proud of.

Yet if any body else can make a better use of the lights here struck out, he is heartily welcome: I do not mean this as a compliment, nor to give an idea of uncommon disinterestedness in myself, for to confess the honest truth I am so thoroughly selfish, that I should hardly concern myself with what happens to other people, if I did not think

think my own interests involved with theirs. But I have taken so strong a tincture from my speculations as to be persuaded of a general connection and partnership of interests throughout the universe: so that, by promoting the welfare of another, I serve myself, and whatever good is conferred on a fellow-creature, redounds to the benefit of the author. But, should it still be asked, whether I expect to make much progress in the reformation of mankind with all my toiling, (for people will not easily pardon you for taking great pains without great prospects,) I shall answer, that I have already sufficiently stated my ideas on this head. True industry consists in an attention to small profits, when there is no opportunity nor powers for greater. Therefore, I am not solicitous to ascertain the size of my talents, nor discover important services to employ them in, but to do the best I can with them. I am not qualified to serve my country in the cabinet or senate, nor to declaim in prose or verse in the cause of liberty without well understanding what liberty is; therefore, for however little purpose I may have exerted myself, I know of no way in which I could have done it more effectually. I seem also to have some advantages for entering upon this undertaking from my particular situation in life: for the clergy, within whose province it might perhaps be thought to lie, besides that they are suspected by many persons as parties interested in all they say, and considered as advocates retained to support a cause rather than friendly monitors or impartial inquirers, are likewise under some little restraint from a necessary regard to their profession and character; for the same truths ought no more to be spoken by all men than to all men. This circumstance I conceive restrains them a little in their freedom, though of late they make frequent excursions, as far as a regard to decency and discretion will permit, in the way of rational explanation, which

which is the same road I have attempted to travel: to instance particularly in one article, the operation and efficacy of prayer, there seem to be some strokes of similitude between my chapter, and arch-deacon Stebbing's treatise on that subject; and I flatter myself the resemblance would have been greater, if either he had addressed himself to the studious, or I been to write for the better sort in a country parish.

With respect however to my own expectations of success from my labours, I do not look for much notice to be taken of them, nor much good to be done by them directly. Still it is not impossible but this imperfect attempt of mine may put somebody else upon erecting a more perfect edifice of Religion and morality: and as Falstaff valued himself on being the cause of wit in other men, so if my rude sketches should occasion some completer production, which may gain general currency and do signal service among mankind, when Search and his embryo work are clean forgotten, I may still take credit for it on my own account. For had I been able to have effected this myself, those to whom I was indebted for my information, or by whose works I had profited, would have been entitled to their share of the consequences; and whoever is remotely instrumental to a good purpose, though achieved by other hands, promotes his own interest in the end. Therefore, I shall conclude with a wish well becoming a selfish person, that this may in any manner prove wholesome bread which I cast upon the waters, for I do not fear to find it again after many days.

THE END.