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THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

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

JULIUS LIPPERT (1887)

THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

by

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LONDON

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.

MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN 1931

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

INTRODUCTION

"Comte, Spencer, Bastian and Lippert are the leaders in sociology. What others have done is of secondary importance ' This judgment of Gumplowicz,[1] himself one of the greatest of all sociologists, might be qualified today by the inclusion of a few later writers and by the omission of Bastian, whom his contemporaries were inclined to overrate. Few, however, would question the historical importance of Comte and Spencer. And that Julius Lippert should be ranked as one of the foremost sociologists of all time will surprise only those who are unacquainted with his work. Though his writings fall mainly within the decade 1880-89, and are thus more than forty years old, they may still be read by social scientists, not only with historical interest, but with much positive profit. Their enduring value and influence have abundantly justified Gumplowicz's high opinion.

Before seeking the basis for this judgment in the character of Lippert's sociological writings, we shall do well to acquaint ourselves with the main facts of his life.[2] He was born on the twelfth of April, 1839, in Braunau, Bohemia. His parents, both of German stock, belonged to the working class. His father, Vinzenz Lippert, was a weaver by trade, and his mother, *nee* Josefa Schon, was an orphan. Largely through the interest of the daughter of his father's employer, a lady of the well-to-do middle class, he received certain cultural advantages which his own home was unable to provide, and was educated instead of being apprenticed at his father's trade.

At the age of twelve young Julius was sent to the local Benedictine Gymnasium to prepare himself, his parents hoped, for a clerical career. The illness and death of his father, and shortly thereafter of his mother, threatened to cut short his education, but a small scholarship, eked out with tutoring and simi-

[1] *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 59.

[2] The outstanding biographical source is Lippert, *"Julius Lippert,"* in *Deutsche Arbeit*, Jahrgang V (1905-6). A translation of this article appears in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX (September, *"'* *tder the title, "Julius Lippert, an Autobiographical Sketch."

lar work, enabled him to enter the Obergymnasium at Pr gue. Here, under the severest financial handicaps, he studied law, philosophy, and history, and formed a number of valuable friendships both among older scholars and, through membership in the Teutonia fraternity, with a group of influential younger men. Economic considerations, however, made it impossible for him to pursue his studies farther and take a university degree.

From this time until his retirement from active labors in [1]898, Lippert's life falls into three well-defined periods, each marked by a dual interest. From his graduation until 1874, the first of these periods, he devoted himself to historical research and secondary education. Between 1874 and 1887 his activities and interests were centered on adult education and sociology. From **1887** until his retirement he was preoccupied with politics and social history.

After his graduation, a historical society,[3] of which he was one of the founders, supplied him with a small stipend, on which he undertook a survey of the city archives of Trautenau. The results of this historical study were published in 1863 in his first book, *Oeschichte von Trautenau.* During the next few years, while residing at Leitmeritz, he contributed minor articles to the publications of the local historical society and carried on research in the city archives, leading to the publication in **1871** of his *Geschichte der Stadt Leitmeritz.* These early historical studies gave Lippert a grounding in the inductive method. "For me," he says,[4] "they had the one great value that they taught me to penetrate through the historical phrase to the solid ground of facts. I ceased to 'learn' history from the top, and began, within narrow limits to be sure, to build it up from the bottom."

In the meantime, Lippert had been preparing to take the state examination for qualification as a Gymnasium teacher. In 1863 he passed, and was appointed to a position in the Oberrealschule at Leitmeritz. Here, in 1865, at the age of twenty-six, he married Malwine Fridrich, the daughter of a bankrupt Vienna linen merchant. From Leitmeritz he was called to Budweis to reorganize its demoralized school system along progressive lines in accordance with a new public school law. By dint of hard, conscientious work he carried through the reform to the thorough

[8] ***Verein fur Geschichte der Deutschen in Bohrnen.***
*"*Julius Lippert,"* **p. 26.**

safe sfaction of the authorities, so much so that in 1872 the city of Budweis appointed him director of its Oberrealschule. He had, however, aroused strong opposition among disgruntled place-holders and place-seekers, opponents of educational reform, partisan Bohemian nationalists, and the reactionary clerical element. His enemies resorted to petty annoyances and persecution and finally, through secret intrigue, succeeded in having his portion taken from him. Though he was thus left, in 1874, without means or position and with a wife and three children to support, he was glad of the opportunity to start afresh in a broader and less stifling environment.

The second period of Lippert's active life finds him engaged in adult education and sociological studies. For some years he had given freely of his spare time as a writer and lecturer for a society [5] devoted to the popularization of knowledge. On being deprived of his position in Budweis, he went to Germany and through friends became associated with a similar but more ambitious organization,[6] founded by a group of eminent men who felt the need of educating the people so that they might more effectively utilize their newly granted political freedom and power. Lippert, sensing a strong popular thirst for knowledge, entered into the new enterprise with enthusiasm. In the fall of 1875, after a year as traveling lecturer, he succeeded Dr. Leibing, the founder and head of the society, upon the latter's death, as general secretary of the organization. He moved with his family to Berlin, where he lived for the next ten years—the most strenuous and productive of his life. So busy was he with the duties of his office and with his own studies that during his ten years in Berlin he found time to visit a theater but twice, his only recreation consisting in an annual vacation at his old home.

Circumstances inevitably turned Lippert's interests more and more toward sociological subjects. His labors in behalf of the society carried him all over the German Empire, brought him into contact with all classes and conditions of people, and focused his attention on practical social problems. On the theoretical side, his work stimulated his own desire for knowledge, while the rich library and museum facilities of Berlin furnished every means of satisfying it. Morever, the activities of the society itself

[5] *Deutscher Verein zur Verbreitung gemeinnutziger Kenntnisse.*
[6] *Gesellchaft zur Verbreitung von Volksbildung.*

led him in the same direction. Under its auspices, he began to carry out a plan, which had long been germinating in his mind, for the publication of a series of popular textbooks on science, somewhat along the lines of the modern "outlines." The purpose was to issue them in a graded series which would lead the studious layman by easy stages from more familiar to less familiar subjects and in this way gradually build up a broad general knowledge. Lippert started with two little books on botany [7] and gradually added popular texts on geography, geology, and astronomy. His plan called next for similar works on history and culture-history, and to prepare himself he plunged into the study of ethnology and folklore. His experience and research steadily broadened his knowledge, interests, and aims, and carried him definitely over into the field of general sociology.

The unsettled conflict of his youth between faith and scepticism led him to immerse himself first of all in the study of comparative religion, the fruits of which appeared in a succession of books on religion.[8] A parallel line of research culminated in a general work on the family,[9] which Gumplowicz[10] describes as "a model of sociological composition." The next step was to synthesize the results of these studies, and of lesser ones on material culture and allied subjects, into a general work of broader scope. This was first done in his smaller and more popular *Evolution of Culture.*[11] Sociological research was now the interest nearest his heart, but the work of the society, in the face of a visibly slackening popular enthusiasm for education, was tending more and more in the direction of agitation and away from calm and persistent instruction. Questioning his talent and sympathy for the new type of activity, and grudging the sacrifice it would involve in his research, in 1885, Lippert with regret resigned his position with the society.

From his savings he purchased a piece of forest land in the beautiful mountain region of central Bohemia near Leitmeritz, built a house there, and moved in with his family. A publishing contract guaranteed him a livelihood for a few years. Though

[7] *Des Landmanns Gaste; Die mlden Pflanzen der Heimat.*
[8] *Der Seelenadt* (1880); *Die Religionen der europaischen Culturvolker* (1881); *Christenthum, Volksglaube und Volksbrauch* (1882); *Allgemeine Geschichte des Priesterthums* (1883-84).
[9] *Geschichte der Familie* (1884).
[10] *Outlines of Sociology,* p. 53.
[11] *Die Kulturgeschichte in einzelnen Hauptstucken* (1885-86).

his friends thought his venture a rash one, he had the thorough and sympathetic cooperation of his wife. In his forest retreat he spent two years, during which he was mainly engaged in writing, from notes chiefly gathered in Berlin, his larger *Evolution of Culture.*[12] This work represents the fruition and synthesis of all his sociological studies, and on it his reputation as a sociologist mainly rests.

On the completion of this work in 1887, while he was still less than fifty years of age, Lippert was induced by friends to return to active life. He removed to Prague and began his third period of creative work, that characterized by absorption in politics and social history. Even as a teacher he had been interested and active in politics, and in 1871 had served one term in the Bohemian Landtag. During his sojourn in Berlin, though excluded as an alien from direct participation in politics, he had come into close association with the parliamentary leaders of the National Liberal and Progressive parties. Now, in Prague, he was induced to run for the Austrian Parliament. He was elected in 1889 from the district of Tetschen-Rumberg and served in the Reichsrath at Vienna until his resignation in 1890. He took an active part in parliamentary proceedings. His main interest was centered, as one might expect, on social problems, chief among which were the question of racial minorities, religious freedom, education, public works and transportation, and conservation. After his resignation, he continued his interest in Bohemian politics, serving for years as a member of the Landtag in Prague. He naturally sympathized with the struggle of the German minority in Bohemia, but he could not lend his support to the German oppression of the Czech minority in the Empire as a whole. Discouraged by the narrowness and petty dissensions of the German party, he withdrew from the Landtag and all further political activity in 1898.

Public life did not, however, divert Lippert's attention from his primary interest, the social sciences. He returned in Prague to his first mistress, history, but now, after his sociological studies, it was not political but social history that appealed to him. In 1889 he published his *Deutsche Sittengeschichte*, a work which, though popular in form, strikes a distinctly modern note

[12] *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit in ihrem organischen Aufbau* (1886-87).

in its emphasis on development in material culture, economic life, property, law, religion, literature, and the like. While still a teacher, Lippert had conceived the plan of writing a social history of Bohemia. After many years of labor, frequently interrupted by his political activities, he finally realized this ambition with the publication of what is perhaps his most scholarly work.[13] In scope, substance, and method it might well serve as a model for the social historian of the present day. Indeed, from his writings of this period, Lippert might with justice be called one of the fathers of "the new history,"[14] a school which is today officiating at the marriage of history and sociology.

Warned by a serious illness, from which he never fully recovered, Lippert retired from active life in 1898. He invested his savings in a foundry owned by his son-in-law and began to enjoy the leisure which he had always craved but never known. Occasional articles from his pen, however, continued to appear in historical and sociological journals. His scientific labors now brought him the recognition of an invitation to a professorship in the Technische Hochschule at Vienna. But it was too late; age and his wife's poor health compelled him to refuse. After the death of Frau Lippert, in 1904, he went to live with his daughter. He died after an operation on the twelfth of November, 1909, at the age of seventy.

Of the many aspects of Lippert's activities, we are here concerned only with his work as a sociologist. To forestall possible objection, by sticklers for terminology, that he was not a sociologist but an ethnologist,[15] we may defend our use of the term. To be sure, he gives far more space to material culture than sociologists usually do, but he is interested not so much in tools, dwellings, fire, etc., for themselves as in their influence on social life and development.[16] This will be revealed very clearly in Chapters III and IV of the text. Moreover, as Gumplowicz[17] points out, "Lippert in his *Evolution of Culture*, along with subjects which decidedly do not belong to sociology, such as the de-

[13] *Social-Geschichte Bohmens in vorhussitischer Zeit* (1896-98).

[14] The exponents of this school today are too numerous to mention, though *The Rise of American Civilization*, by Charles and Mary Beard, may be selected as an outstanding recent example.

[15] "Culture history ... is another name for ethnology" (Case, *Sociology*, p. xxi).

[16] Cf., Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte*, I, iv.

[17] *Sociologie und Politik*, p. 152.

velopment of implements, the spread of domesticated animals, the influence of the use of metals, and the like, also treats a number of subjects of a purely sociological nature, as, for example, the evolution of the family, the origin of the state, religious institutions, etc." Indeed, his fundamental interest was in institutions, their development and interrelations. "He began with a special department of sociology, comparative religion, and . . . 'advanced in fact, if not in name, to sociology in the best sense of the word."[18] If Spencer, Sumner, Webster, and Westermarck are sociologists, then assuredly Lippert is.

Of the broader characteristics of Lippert's sociology in general and of his *Evolution of Culture* in particular, perhaps the outstanding one is his inductive approach. To be sure, his basis of fact is rarely adequate or conclusive, but we must remember that his was an age when reliable data were scanty and scattered by comparison with the present day. Occasionally, moreover, his imagination led him to venture too far from his facts, or to read too much into them, or, as Thomas[19] has shown, to propound "particularistic explanations of social change." But perhaps these also were faults inevitable in a pioneer. In spite of them, however, he consciously strove to be inductive, and usually succeeded. "That such a work," he says of his *Evolution of Culture*,[20] "can be based today only upon an inductive investigation, is self-evident." To a sociologist who is painfully conscious of the infancy, and often puerility, of his science, it is refreshing indeed to encounter such an inductive oasis in the desert of deductive sociological literature.

Part and parcel of Lippert's inductive approach is his use of the comparative ethnographical method, which aligns him with Spencer, Tylor, Frazer, Westermarck, Briffault, and Sumner, and to a greater or lesser extent with the various contemporary American exponents of a cultural approach to sociology, like Chapin, Keller, Wallis, Webster, and Willey. This method has the advantage of covering "by far the longest stretch of societal evolution." It gives a view of society which is vertical rather than horizontal, evolutionary rather than descriptive, dynamic rather than static. It promotes objectivity, scientific detachment,

[18] Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 52.
[19] *Social Origins*, p. 23. Cf. also Gumplowicz, *Sociologie und Politik*, p. 153.
[20] *Kulturgeschichte*, I, iii.

and comparative insulation from "the inevitable and ineradicable bias with which we all view that which, since we live in the midst of it, touches us immediately."[21] The neglect of such objective methods is in large measure responsible for the rationalization, "wishful thinking," and utopianism which characterize so much of sociological literature.

Another characteristic of Lippert's sociological writings is his breadth and scope. As Gumplowicz[22] says, he "manages his material masterfully and works the great array of scattered ethnological data into great mosaics. Julius Lippert always presents the whole object in broad lines." Like Spencer and but a handful of others, he views society as a whole. He covers the whole range of social phenomena, neither omitting anything essential nor stressing any one aspect of society, like the economic, political, or religious, to the subordination of the rest. Moreover, he has perspective.[23] He sees the parts in their relation to the whole. In his presentation, his facts are cemented together with a richer "connective tissue" than we find in any other sociologist employing the same method. He never allows his work to degenerate into a case-book, nor loses sight of his primary aim of exposition.

"The different aspects of civilization interlock and intertwine, presenting—in a word—a continuum, which must be studied as an organic unit. This applies to modern society and even more emphatically to primitive society." This statement by a modern anthropologist[24] might well have been made by Lippert thirty-five years before, so well does it express his view. Again and again he stresses the interrelation of social phenomena, using such metaphors as the strands or threads of the social web or fabric.[25] He views society, not as an aggregate but as a compound. We are never permitted to forget that social phenomena compose a unified and closely knit whole. Although the exigencies of presentation force him to treat each subject separately, he stops again and again to gather up his threads and to indicate the wide ramifications of the particular subject into other fields. In his ability to coordinate and to point out the interrelations

21 Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 2183, 2186.
22 *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 52.
28 Achelis, *Moderne Volkerkunde*, p. 286.
24 Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 31.
25 For a particularly striking instance, see below, pp. 157-8.

of Social phenomena, Lippert stands preeminent among sociologists.

A particularly characteristic feature of Lippert's work is his suggestiveness. Frequently from the midst of a piece of exposition there flashes forth a brilliant sentence or paragraph, which opens up a broad vista of some future or parallel development, or which sheds a ray of insight on some subject which he has not occasion to develop. Many are capable of being expanded into whole chapters or volumes, and a number have actually been taken over and enlarged upon by other writers. Thus the idea that human adaptation is mental rather than physical, of which Keller[26] makes so much, is embodied in a single paragraph of Lippert's.[27] The "aleatory element," which Sumner[28] makes the starting point in his interpretation of religion, and which Goldenweiser[20] likewise recognizes, is clearly suggested by Lippert.[30] The concept of automatic societal selection through group-conflict, the keystone of Keller's[31] theory of societal evolution, is similarly formulated, briefly, to be sure, but unmistakably, by our author.[32] Lippert's brilliant critical imagination, which is capable of interpolating such illuminating suggestions, makes his digressions not the least valuable part of his work.

Lippert is credited by Gumplowicz[33] with "a high degree of talent for tracing the development of social or psychological institutions through the history of all races and ages," and his work is clearly pervaded by the evolutionary point of view. His conception of evolution, however, is not metaphysical like Spencer's nor marred by antiquated dogmas such as the polygenism of Gumplowicz. Neither does he make the common error of confusing evolution with progress.[34]

To one versed in present-day anthropological and sociological literature, probably the most striking characteristic of Lippert's work is its modernity. To be sure, his evolutionary point of view, his general treatment of the development of social institu-

[26] *Societal Evolution,* pp. 17-24; *Starting-Points,* pp. 34-5.
[27] Below, pp. 9-10.
[28] *Folkways,* pp. 6-7; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 737-70.
[29] *Early Civilization,* p. 196.
so Below, pp. 5, 93-5, 109.
[31] *Societal Evolution,* pp. 53-89.
[32] Below, pp. 43-4, 245.
[33] *Outlines of Sociology,* p. 53.
[34] See below, p. 44. Cf. also Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 95; Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem,* p. 76.

tions, and his acceptance of the so-called "evolutionary" sequence" of the biological sciences as an adequate substitute **for** the chronological sequence of history[85] align him with the classical "evolutionist" school of sociologists and anthropologists, **a** school whose basic assumptions have been seriously questioned **of** late by a number of writers.[36] Lippert, however, has weathered this storm of criticism far better than Bachofen, Bastian, Letour**neau,** Lubbock, McLennan, Maine, and Morgan—better even than Spencer and Tylor. He avoids successfully most of the grosser errors of the earlier writers and shows himself, on the whole, surprisingly in harmony with the best of modern thought.

Though an evolutionist, Lippert is not a "unilateral" or "monotypical" evolutionist. That he does not confine cultural evolution to a single universal line is shown by two quotations from the text. "From these examples we see that the early arts of man must not be regarded as conforming to a single tradition and developed in such a fashion. On the contrary, human ingenuity has striven in different places to achieve the goal set by the care for life with the elements there at hand."[87] "All these and many more combinations are conceivable and have actually occurred in fact, depending on local influences, without, however, constituting a continuous evolutionary series."[88] Morgan[39] and others of the earlier writers fell into the "category fallacy,"[40] i.e., they tried to fit cultural evolution into a series of definite and clear-cut stages. Lippert, however, takes pains to point out "how precarious it is to take such a classification into epochs as a basis for the delineation of culture history,"[41] and he recognizes likewise that "all these systems are essentially similar to the arbitrary classifications of the descriptive natural sciences."[42]

Another serious fault of the early evolutionist school is its "failure to appraise at their true worth the processes of cultural

[35] See below, pp. 2, **20-1.**

30 E.g., Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man,* pp. 174-96; Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* pp. 20-7; Tozzer, *Social Origins,* pp. **14-17.** The same attitude is also implicit in the works of Dixon, Kroeber, Lowie, Wissler, **and** others.

37 Below, p. 169.

38 Below, p. 234.

39 Cf., *Ancient Society,* pp. 9-12.

40 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* **III, 2201-3.**

41Below, p. 183.

42 Below, p. 2.

diffusion in the course of historic contact between tribes."[43] But this is decidedly not the case with Lippert. He faces squarely the problem of diffusion versus parallelism, e.g., in the case of the bow,[44] and he does not slight the importance of the former. He explains the distribution of the fire cult by development in a single center and diffusion therefrom,[45] and he reaches a similar conclusion with respect to the origin of the vine.[46] Moreover, he clearly recognizes the two factors of invention and diffusion when he speaks of "the progress of social organization by internal development and external accumulation."[47] These facts reveal that Lippert, far from being a strict old-school evolutionist, avoids most of the errors of his contemporaries and is actually strikingly modern in his views.

This modernity is again apparent in his clear conception of the distinction between the "organic" and the "superorganic."[48] He speaks of "the uniqueness of man's cultural evolution,"[49] and insists that "man's physical evolution has been independent of that of his social organization."[50] Recognition of the superorganic could scarcely be more clearly expressed than in the statement that "the institution of human marriage is not a subject of natural history but of culture history."[51] The concepts of the "folkways" and "mores," which it required a monumental work by Sumner[52] to establish among English-speaking sociologists, were acquired in essence by Lippert as a part of the German linguistic heritage in the words *Volksbrauche* and *Sitten.*

But perhaps the most striking proof of Lippert's modernity is seen in the common fallacies which he avoids. Among them, unilateral evolution, the category fallacy, the identification of evolution with progress, and the confusion of social and organic evolution have already been mentioned. The old degeneration theory is rejected.[53] The concept of society as an organism, which insnared Lilienfeld[54] and Schaffle[65] and was even employed as

48 Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* p. 26.
44 Below, pp. 180-3.
45 Below, pp. 584-6.
46 Below, pp. 198-200.
47 Below, p. 124.
48 Cf., Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 3-7; Kroeber, "The Superorganic."
49 Below, p. 33.
5o Below, p. 222.
51 Below, p. 69.
52 *Folkways.*
53 Below, pp. 3-4
54 *Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft.*
55 *Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers.*

an analogy by Spencer,[56] does not trap Lippert. He likewise escapes the "animal-series fallacy."[57] He recognizes that human social phenomena "should not be regarded as an inheritance from the lower animals"[58] and that "animal instincts can not be regarded as forming in their evolution a progressive series culminating in those of man."[59]

The extreme doctrine of "geographic determinism"[60] does not receive Lippert's support. He admits, of course, the influence of the natural environment, but he nevertheless perceives that independent cultural factors exist and play an important role in shaping social evolution.[61] Nor is he led astray by the "racial fallacy," which has fascinated so many writers from Gobineau[62] to the present day.[63] He realizes that the interpretation of cultural differences on grounds of race or nationality is "only an apparent explanation" and really begs the question.[64] Similarly, he rejects the "great man theory,"[65] though conceding a place to "the personal element" in social evolution.[66]

It might seem at first blush that Lippert does not so successfully avoid the so-called "instinct fallacy," since he speaks of certain social phenomena like sexual modesty as "instincts." It was long the vogue among social psychologists to explain human behavior as the expression of an innate equipment of instincts—a herd instinct, an instinct of curiosity, a sex instinct, an instinct of pugnacity, etc. Various lists of such "instincts" have been proposed, all of them arbitrary and each differing radically from the others. That of McDougall[67] may be taken as typical. But the whole method of approach to sociology through instincts is now generally discredited. "It seems scarcely scientific to build up an edifice of more or less differentiated 'instincts' in order

[56] Who even entitles one of his chapters "A Society is an Organism" (*Principles of Sociology*, I, 449).
[57] See Sumner and Keller, Science of Society, **III, 2200-1.**
[58] Below, p. 23.
[59] Below, pp. 68-9.
[60] The history of this school of thought is admirably reviewed in Thomas, *Environmental Basis of Society.*
[61] See below, pp. 32-3.
[62] *Essai sur Vinegalite des races humaines.*
[63] See Hankins, *Racial Basis of Civilization.*
[64] Below, p. 20.
[65] Cf., Spencer, *Study of Sociology,* pp. 26-33; Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, pp. **283-91.**
[66] Below, pp. **19-20.**
[67] *Social Psychology,* pp. **47-92.**

to prove the influence of heredity and custom on social life."[68] "Such explanations do not explain. They amount to a restatement of that which is to be elucidated."[69] The instinct fallacy has been given its final *coup de grace* by the excellent work of Bernard.[70] Even the psychologists are abandoning this approach to human behavior.[71] "If," says Watson,[72] "we neglect the vegetative (including the sex act proper here) and the direct life conserving functions, such as attack and defense, there are few complete and perfect instincts in man yet observed. Instinct and capacity to form habits, while related functions, are present in any animal in inverse ratio. Man excels in habit-forming capacities." Human social phenomena are habitual in nature, not instinctive; they are learned behavior, not innate.[73] As Tozzer[74] points out, "from the point of view of human culture we can eliminate almost everything but those characteristics of man which he learns from his fellow man." Folkways, mores, customs, and conventions are not the expressions of instincts; they are habits. They differ from individual habits only in the fact that they are possessed in common by the members of a social group [75] and are thereby raised to the plane of the "superorganic."

Now Lippert, though he uses the term "instinct" with reference to certain social phenomena, does not really confuse the social with the biological. He makes it clear that he employs the term only for lack of a better. Thus he speaks of "those traits in human nature, which suggest the instinctive in animals and which we have simply called 'instincts' in default of a better word," [76] and of "a way of feeling or reacting, in other words an instinct, to use again this unavoidable word." [77] Moreover, he calls such phenomena "secondary" or "social" instincts to distinguish them from primary or true instincts. Several passages show his realization of the essentially acquired and social nature of these "secondary instincts." "Such of these precautions as are

[68] Vinogradov, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 42.
[69] Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 11.
[70] *Instinct.*
[71] Cf., for example, Josey, *Social Philosophy of Instinct;* Yerkes, *The Great Apes,* p. 209.
[72] *Psychology,* p. 254.
[73] Cf., Keller, *Societal Evolution,* pp. 27-8.
[74] *Social Origins,* p. 56.
[75] Cf., Chapin, *Social Evolution,* p. 178.
[76] Below, p. 19.
[77] Below, p. 19.

sanctioned by the group become, to the individual, instincts of a new and social type."[78] And nothing could be clearer than the statement that "the primary instincts are . . . hereditary in the individual himself, whereas the secondary have been developed by the experience of society and are transmitted to the individual through his social environment."[79] Actually, therefore, in spite of his somewhat ambiguous terminology, Lippert does not fall into the instinct fallacy.

It is appropriate at this point to inquire whether Lippert formulates a system of sociology. If by this we mean an elaborate classification and terminology such as we find in Ward,[80] or a metaphysical concept of society and social processes like that of Simmel,[81] then Lippert constructs no "system." He deals with objective facts, instead of juggling with subjective concepts, and hence pays little attention to "methodology."[82] He simply sets himself a scientific task and then proceeds to carry it out in a common-sense manner.[83]

The nearest approach to a sociological system in Lippert is his general underlying principle of *Lebensfiirsorge.* This term presents difficulties to the translator. It is a compound of *Leben* (life) and *Fursorge* (care, solicitude, provision), and has thus been rendered as "the care for life." This translation, however, slights the instinctive connotation of the word, for *Lebensfiirsorge* implies something not very different from the "instinct of self-preservation" as popularly understood. What Lippert really means is the internal impulse in man—or the lower animals—to live and to act in such a manner as to assure life, the "drive toward adaptation" as it were. Sometimes, however, he seems to employ the term not so much for the instinctive drive to adjust as for the actual mode of adaptation, e.g., when he speaks of "stages" of *Lebensfursorge.* In this sense it might be rendered as "provision for life" or as "self-maintenance."[84] Another possible translation would be "foresight for life," if this did not suggest

[78] Below, p. 12.
[79] Below, p. 25.
[80] See especially *Dynamic Sociology; Pure Sociology.*
[81] See Spykman, *Social Theory of Georg Simmel.*
[82] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 2172.
[83] The only "method" followed, for instance, by Sumner, whose example C H . Cooley, m an address before the annual convention of the American Sociological Society in 1927, advised younger sociologists to follow.
[84] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 89-92.

a conscious mental process and too strong a sense of futurity. The expression "care for life" in the text, therefore, really represents a sort of hypothetical average struck between these various meanings.

Lippert frequently uses the uncompounded *Fursorge* in a sense practically synonymous with *Lebensfursorge.* It is impossible to make a parallel distinction in English, for "care" is too broad, vague, and colorless a word to stand alone. "Provision" has similar disadvantages. *Fursorge* is therefore translated as "foresight," a somewhat inaccurate rendering since it slights the instinctive aspect and implies too great a sense of futurity. "Foresight" serves fairly well for the extension of the care for life in time, but very inadequately for its extension in space. In the latter sense, where *Fursorge* is usually rendered as "social foresight," it means the care for life which embraces the fellow members of a social group. The reader should bear in mind that "foresight" is used throughout the text in a very special sense, one nearly equivalent to "care for life" itself.

That the concept of the care for life is a valid one can scarcely be questioned by any one, whatever his shade of sociological thought. The impulse to live and to adjust to life conditions is an obvious and incontrovertible fact, a characteristic of all living organisms. In spite of its validity, however, the concept does not strike one as of very great practical value. The principle is too broad and general, as Gumplowicz[85] points out, to furnish an adequate explanation of cultural evolution. In its very breadth and obviousness, however, there resides a certain advantage. By taking the care for life as his starting point, Lippert avoids the narrow and questionable major premises upon which so many sociological systems are based.

Social evolution, according to Lippert, finds expression in the extension of the care for life in time and in space, i.e., in increasing foresight and socialization. As to its mode, he recognizes, as we have seen, the factors of invention and diffusion. Moreover, he takes into account the factor of selection through group-conflict,[86] first clearly formulated by Gumplowicz[87] and developed by Keller.[88] To Lippert, of course, all social change proceeds from the basis of existing culture, the so-called "cultural

[85] *Sociologie und Politik,* p. 154.
[86] See below, pp. 40-4.
[87] *Rassenkampf.*
[88] *Societal Evolution,* pp. 53-89.

base."[89] But it is not an easy process. A factor of inertia resists change, and progress is made as a rule only when inexorably forced by changing life conditions.[90] In common with most ethnologists,[91] Lippert attributes differences in cultural achievements to the influences of the natural and social environments, not to differences in mentality; he assumes "the identity of the primary impulses and mental laws of all peoples."[92]

The leading role in social evolution, according to Lippert, is played by economic factors. He uses "the stages of economic foresight as a basis of classification."[93] Material culture and economic organization respond most readily to geographic influences and to cultural contacts, and then in turn mold and shape the development of matrimonial, gentile, political, ceremonial, and religious institutions. This view that self-maintenance is basic is shared by Lippert with such diverse schools of social theory as those represented by Keller,[94] Wissler,[95] Marx,[96] and Beard.[97]

But Lippert is no more a narrow "economic determinist" than he is a rigid geographical determinist. This is evidenced by the influential role which he assigns to ideas in social evolution. "It is," he says,[98] "characteristic of the evolution of mankind that on each stage it has been stimulated and directed by a subjective element, its store of ideas." Since man makes mental rather than physical adaptations to his environment, he adjusts, unlike the lower animals, not to nature directly, but to his ideas about rija±ure. This fact opens the door to the element of illusioriVwhich has played such a prominent part in human history.[99] Religious ideas, in particular, have shaped the course of society to a degree scarcely realized by the majority of culture historians, and sociology is deeply indebted to Lippert for his clear and conclusive demonstration of their influence.

Lippert's views as to specific spheres of social phenomena are

[89] See Ogburn, *Social Change,* p. 82.
[90] Below, p. 41.
[91] See, for example, Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man,* pp. 1-29.
[92] Below, p. 2.
[93] Below, p. 123.
[94] See *Societal Evolution,* pp. 141-61.
[95] See "Aboriginal Maize Culture," p. 661.
[96] See Marx and Engels, *Manifesto.*
[97] *Economic Basis of Politics.*
[98] Below, p. 345.
[99] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 765-70.

as characteristic as the more general features of his work. In dealing with the objects of material culture, he is primarily interested, as noted above, in pointing out their social implications. For example, Chapter IV below, on the evolution of tools and weapons, treats among other things of their bearing on concepts of property, their effect in creating a division of labor and stimulating trade, their use as fetishes and ornaments, their disciplinary influence on human nature, and the problem of diffusion versus parallelism which they suggest. Economic organization and property are developed only in connection with material culture and other subjects, in short, incidentally rather than separately.

Marriage and social organization are covered by Lippert in his exposition of the family. His inspiration here is largely drawn from Morgan, Lubbock, and Bachofen, but he subjects their theories to rigid criticism, accepting only what seems to him sound in their work and rejecting much of what appears untenable today. As a result, his conclusions are often much more nearly in accord with those of modern authorities.[100] The indebtedness of sociology to Lippert for his work on the family has been pointed out by Gumplowicz.[101] In the sphere of marriage he has made at least two significant contributions.

Lippert[102] was the first, for instance, to show clearly the fundamental distinction between mating or sexual association, as the manifestation of an elemental instinct, and marriage as a social phenomenon. Nature insists on the former but is indifferent to the latter. Marriage is not a necessary consequence of the sex impulse, as is proved in countless instances among the lower animals. Human marriage is a superorganic phenomenon;[108] it is developed in the mores as an adjustment to human needs in a social environment. Achelis[104] commends Lippert on this point. Sumner and Keller[105] likewise follow him. [a]There is nothing in the sex relation, or in procreation, to bring about any continuing relation between a man and a woman. It is the care and education of children which first calls for such a continuing relation. The continuing relation is not therefore 'in nature.' It

[100] E.g., Briffault, *Mothers;* Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society;* Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence.*

[101] *Outlines of Sociology,* p. 54.

[102] Below, p. 66.

[108] Cf,, below, pp. 68-9.

[104] *Moderne Volkerkunde,* p. 288.

[105] *Science of Society,* III, 1495-8.

is institutional and conventional"[106] Vinogradoff[107] makes the same distinction. "It is a fundamental fact that there is inherent in our connotation of the term 'marriage' an idea of reciprocal obligation which is not implied in 'mating' or 'marital union.'" These writers excepted, practically all sociologists, both early and modern, have failed to note the superorganic character of human marriage. This has led them to untenable conclusions and has vitiated much of their work on the subject. It has prompted them, for example, to derive human marriage from superficially similar unions among the lower animals. Thus Letourneau[108] begins his work with a discussion of "marriage among the animals," and Westermarck[109] states categorically: "The marriage of mankind is not an isolated phenomenon, but has its counterpart in many animal species and is probably an inheritance from some pre-human ancestor."

Lippert was the first to show fully and clearly that marriage is primarily an economic institution on which the element of sex has been grafted as a secondary factor. Most writers on the subject, swayed by current ideas, have treated it as a purely sexual phenomenon and have thus been led into serious errors of interpretation. Lippert demonstrates that marriage originated as a form of economic cooperation between the sexes based on a division of labor arising with progress and differentiation in the food-quest. Comparatively few other authorities have perceived the fundamentally economic nature of marriage. Among them is Starcke,[110] who consistently treats marriage as an economic adjustment. Sumner and Keller[111] follow Lippert on this point. "The union of the sexes is primarily industrial. It has largely so remained through history and is of that character now." The same authors[112] further state that "the main strand of the marriage-institution . . . is economic," while the sex interest "forms a second main thread running through the organization for self-perpetuation and differentiating, it from any purely economic structure." Briffault[118] takes the same point of view and expresses it very clearly. "Marriage is both a sexual and an economic association. But while the economic relation implies the continuous association which constitutes individual marriage as

[106] Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 345.
[107] *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 203.
[108] *Evolution of Marriage.*
[109] *Human Marriage,* I, 72.
[110] *Primitive Family, passim.*
[111] *Science of Society,* III, 1508.
[112] *Ibid.,* III, 1517.
[118] *Mothers,* I, 608.

ordinarily understood, the sexual relation alone does not. . . . It is upon the economic and not upon the sexual aspect of the relation that individual marriage rests."

Lippert's work on marriage and the family, despite the fact that it is much earlier and is far less adequately supported with ethnographical data, is, in the opinion of the editor, considerably sounder than the monumental study of Westermarck.[114] In as much as the latter confuses marriage with mating and treats it solely as a sexual phenomenon, and from these faulty premises deduces many of his conclusions, the criticism he has received at the hands of Briffault[116] would seem in large measure deserved.

On the subject of political institutions Lippert has comparatively little to contribute. The widely accepted view that the state is the product of conquest and exploitation, brilliantly expounded by Gumplowicz[116] and developed by Oppenheimer[117] and others,[118] while not entirely overlooked, is in general subordinated to the conception of political evolution by the relatively peaceful process of confederation.

In the sphere of religion, however, Lippert is again seen at his best. Here his *Evolution of Culture* represents, as we have seen, the culmination and synthesis of a number of preliminary works. He rejects the now generally discredited theories of the school of comparative mythology.[119] On the whole, he adheres to the animistic or so-called "ghost theory" of religion originally formulated by Spencer and Tylor. Though criticized in many quarters and possibly inadequate on certain points such as magic, this theory, as refined and corrected by Frazer, Lippert himself, and many others, still furnishes the only satisfactory general interpretation of religion and survives in its main outlines in the latest major inductive work on the subject.[120] Of the countless other theories, many are purely deductive and philosophical. Others bear the earmarks of rationalization and special

[114] *History of Human Marriage.*
[115] *Mothers,* II, 14-65, *et passim.*
[116] Cf. especially his *Rassenkampf* and *Sociologische Staatsidee.*
[117] *The State.*
[118] See Davie, *Evolution of War,* pp. 165-75, for an admirable statement of this thesis, with a survey of the facts upon which it is based and the authorities who uphold it.
[119] Below, pp. 96-9. Cf., Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 830-49.
[120] Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* Vol. II.

pleading. Some, like those of Durkheim[121] and Freud,[122] are implicated with one-sided views of society and social phenomena. The only serious rival of the "ghost theory" today is that which seeks the origin of religion in the idea of *mana* or impersonal supernatural power. This theory is derived from religious ideas found by Codrington[123] in Melanesia and is supported by similar conceptions from West Africa and a few North American Indian tribes. Aside from its comparatively slender inductive basis, it scarcely accords with the prevailing view that "the primitive mind regularly works up to the abstract from the concrete" and is not originally preoccupied with mystic or metaphysical concepts.[124] At the most, therefore, the theory of *mana* is valuable only in a subordinate role, and even its strongest adherents do not reject animism but merely make it a later phase.

Lippert's contributions to the ghost theory include his foreshadowing of Sumner's "aleatory element,"[125] his treatment of the negative or defensive aspect of the cult,[126] and his development of fetishism.[127] In the last, his illuminating suggestiveness is seen at its best. In this connection, moreover, we should recall his emphasis on the significant role of religious ideas in cultural evolution.

To estimate the value of an author's work and the influence it has exerted is peculiarly difficult in the field of sociology. The science is a new one, and as such is sharply divided into "schools." Each school has its favorites and frequently regards the favorites of the others as of negligible importance. General agreement is rarely if ever found. It does not exist in the cases of Gumplowicz, Pareto, and Simmel, nor even of Comte and Spencer, and it is similarly absent in the case of Lippert. Practically the only objective method of judging the value and influence of a sociologist is to determine whether he is regarded as significant by a variety of different schools. By this criterion Lippert ranks high, for, while comparatively unknown in some quarters, he is held in unusual esteem by a number of widely divergent schools of social thought.

[121] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.*
[122] *Totem und Tabu.*
[123] *Melanesians.*
[124] Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1046-7.
[125] See below, pp. 5, 93-5, 109.
[126] Below, pp. 112-23.
[127] "VTTT <**A VTT7' k«l^„r

The influence of Lippert has been little felt in France. In England, we look in vain for references to him in the works of the leading sociological writers.[128] Westermarck,[129] to be sure, cites him occasionally, though without sympathy or real understanding. In Holland he has fared better, as witness the respect accorded him by the eminent ethnologist Wilken.[180] In German-speaking countries, Lippert's influence has been strong and steady for nearly half a century. His works are freely and respectfully cited and utilized by a long series of writers in various of the social sciences.[181] The opinion of Gumplowicz, already quoted, by no means stands alone.

In Russia, where Lippert is known chiefly through a translation of his smaller and more popular *Evolution of Culture,* he has enjoyed a curious sort of vogue. While elsewhere he has been followed by academic sociologists, often of a definitely conservative tinge, in Russia his influence seems to have been mainly felt in radical circles. This is probably only an indication of the universality of his appeal, for he was not, of course, a socialist. An example of the Russian radical interest in Lippert has been brought to the editor's attention by a friend,[132] who was a member of a small group of liberal students in Russia during the turbulent years 1905-06. To this group the radical Social Revolutionary Party furnished a list of readings in sociology, history, and economics, an acquaintance with which was held requisite for obtaining a position of any responsibility in the party. The list numbered about seventy-five titles, including not only the usual Marxian literature but also a large number of standard works in the various social sciences, and at its very head, intentionally so placed, was Lippert's smaller *Evolution of Culture.* It is significant, too, that this same book is today being printed in Russian in New York City.[188] In view of facts like these, it is interesting to speculate as to whether the tempering of doctrinaire Marxism, without which the Soviet "experiment" could

[128] E.g., Briffault, *Mothers;* Crawley, *Mystic Rose;* Frazer, *Golden Bough;* id., *Totemism and Exogamy;* Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*

[129] *Human Marriage,* I, 103, 225, 286.

[180] *Verspreide Oesohriften, passim.*

[181] See, for example, Achelis, *Moderne Volkerkunde;* Oppenheimer, *The State;* Ploss, *Das Weib;* Steinmetz, *Entwicklung der Strafe;* Wundt, *Ethics;* id., *Folk Psychology.*

[182] Mr. Samuel Bloomfield, of New Haven, Conn.

[133] Where it may be purchased from Max N. Maisel, 424 Grand Street.

scarcely have endured so long, may not be due in a measure to the impregnation of the Russian revolutionists with the sociological ideas of Lippert.

In the United States, Lippert's influence has been extraordinarily imevenly distributed. The early pillars of American sociology were, in most cases, well acquainted with his writings. **Ward**[134] speaks of him in the highest terms. Small translated his short autobiography [135] and welcomed the appearance of the present volume.[136] Howard[137] shows himself thoroughly conversant with his theories, though he does not in general accept them. Sumner, on the other hand, according to his biographer,[188] was more indebted to Lippert than to any other single author, and the tremendous influence on American social thought of his *Folkways*, regarded by many as the outstanding sociological work yet produced in America, is in no slight measure the reflected influence of Lippert.

Some of the more eminent contemporary American sociologists have likewise been strongly impressed by Lippert. Thomas,[189] for example, calls him "the great culture-historian," cites him frequently, and stars several of his works in his selected bibliographies. Keller[140] acknowledges an indebtedness to Lippert second only to that to Sumner. The extent of the debt of Sumner and Keller to Lippert is revealed by the fact that in their monumental work, *The Science of Society*, they refer to him no less than four hundred separate times, far more than to any other one authority. Finally, a number of younger sociologists, through the influence of Sumner or Keller, have fallen under Lippert's spell, as their writings indicate,[141] and in at least one instance he is cited with favor by a popular author.[142]

134 See, for example, his *Pure Sociology*, p. 352.
135 "Julius Lippert, an Autobiographical Sketch," in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, September, 1913.
136 In a letter to the editor, dated January 31, 1925.
137 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 19, 33, 39, 50, 54-5, 58-60, 61, 97, 101.
138 Starr, *William Graham Sumner*, p. 393. Cf. also Sumner, *War*, p. xviii.
139 *Social Origins*, pp. 23, 137, 441, 744; *Sex and Society*, pp. 62, 74-5, 90-1.
140 *Homeric Society*, p. 315.
141 See, for example, Davie, *Evolution of War;* Diamond, *Religion and the Commonweal;* Havemeyer, *Drama of Savage Peoples;* Maddox, *Afectecine Man;* Miller, *Child in Primitive Society;* Puckett, *Folk-Beliefs of the Southern Negro;* Todd, *Theories of Social Progress.*
142 Henshaw Ward, *Thobbing*, pp. 338-9.

For every American sociologist, however, who is familiar with Lippert or impressed by him, there are several who are totally unacquainted with his work. This is only partly due to the sectarianism which is the,.curse of sociology as it is, of psychology and other infant sciences. Lippert's indubitable influence on the representatives of so many divergent schools of social thought is sufficient—quite apart from the value of his work itself—to assure him a prominent position in an objective history of the development of the science, for here sectarianism is not a factor. Yet he is not once mentioned in a single one of the standard American works on the history of sociology or social theory.[143] This neglect, not to say ignorance, is due in the main to the fact that Lippert's works have not been translated into English, and that they are written in so difficult a style that to read them with appreciation requires a better than average acquaintance with the German language.

It is unfortunate that a work of such enduring value should be inaccessible to English-speaking social scientists, and it is certainly anomalous that an author of such far-reaching influence should be entirely ignored by the historians of sociology. It is with the hope of remedying this situation that the present translation has been undertaken. The work selected for translation, *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit in ihrem organischen Aufbau* (2 vols., Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1886-87), has been chosen as the most representative and mature of Lippert's general sociological works.

Not all of this work, however, is of equal interest and merit. Moreover, certain portions are now naturally out of date, and other subjects are already adequately treated in English. For these reasons a complete translation of the entire two volumes has seemed to the editor unnecessary. He has therefore undertaken a selective or critical translation with the object of making available to English-speaking readers in a single volume the best elements of Lippert's major sociological work. This policy renders necessary the omission of considerably more than half of the matter in the original, much of it of excellent quality. In the

[148] Barnes, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences;* Bogardus, *History of Social Thought;* Bristol, *Social Adaptation;* Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress;* House, *Range of Social Theory;* Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory;* Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *Social Sciences;* Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories.*

selection, the preference has been given in the main to the sociological rather than to the purely ethnological material.

Of the introductory or general chapters, that on the care for life as a cultural principle[144] has been translated in its entirety, that on primitive times[145] is complete except for the part dealing with language, a subject already adequately treated in English, those on the spread and distribution of the human races and the migrations of the European peoples[146] are omitted for similar reasons, and the excellent chapter on primitive forms of foresight (infanticide, care for the aged, etc.)[147] is omitted solely from considerations of space.

Comparatively few of the chapters on material culture have been translated, since they are not primarily sociological in character and since much of their content is available in standard English works on anthropology and ethnology. The omitted chapters in this group, many of them excellent, are those on the domestic arts, preparation of food, clothing and ornament, domesticated animals, domesticated plants, dwellings, and the use of metals.[148] Three chapters in this group, namely, those on the taming of fire, the evolution of tools and weapons, and means of indulgence,[149] have been included both as representative of the rest and as unusually interesting in themselves.

In the field of domestic and political institutions, the chapters on the primitive family, mother-right, and father-right[150] have been translated in full. That on wedding ceremonies and allied customs[151] has been omitted, since most of the material may be found in the works of Westermarck and other writers. That on the patriarchal family[152] has been included in part, the balance being concerned with primarily political phenomena. The chapter on the development of the state and legal institutions[153] has been entirely omitted.

[144] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chap. I; Chap. I below.
[145] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chap. II; Chap. II below.
[146] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chaps. III and X.
[147] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chap. IV.
[148] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chaps. VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, and Vol. II, Chaps. V and VI respectively.
[149] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. I, Chaps. V, VI, and XIII; Chaps. III, IV, and V below.
[150] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chaps. I, II, and III; Chaps. VI, VII, and VIII below.
[151] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chap. IV.
[152] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chap. XII; Chap. IX below.
[153] *Kulturgeschichte.* Vol. II, Chap. XIII.

The significant chapters on the subject of religion[154] **have all** been translated. Only the concluding chapter on the redemptive religions[155] has been omitted, since it consists largely of conclusions already broadly suggested earlier in the work.

Selection has not, however, been confined to chapters alone. Phrases, clauses, sentences, and even paragraphs have been deleted in translation wherever they have seemed superfluous, irrelevant, or of negligible importance. This expedient has been employed, of course, not to alter or suppress the author's views, but to clarify them. Thus space has been conserved and the text, it is believed, improved rather than weakened.

The original order of chapters has been preserved in the translation, with one exception. The chapter on the patriarchal family[158] is placed immediately after the others on marriage and the family instead of being separated from them by the chapters on religion, as in the original.

An effort has been made in the translation to correct a number of faults, mostly of a minor nature, in the original. Lippert writes in an exceedingly ponderous and involved style, characterized especially by long and complex sentences. To achieve greater clarity, the editor has used considerable freedom in translation. One sentence is frequently broken up into two or three. The order of sentences is occasionally transposed to effect a more logical development. In rare instances an entirely new clause or sentence is inserted to obviate confusion—usually by way of introduction where a change of subject is made without proper warning. The frequently illogical paragraphing of the original has been freely revised. The object throughout has been to do full justice to the meaning, rather than to the wording, of the original. Literalness has been sacrificed, however, only when demanded by considerations of sense and style. It is hoped that the stylistic handicap, which more than anything else has hindered a better knowledge of Lippert's work, has thus been removed in the translation.

In his evidence, Lippert is far from satisfactory. He is strongest on the history and literature of classical antiquity and on the folklore and history of the Germanic and Slavic peoples. He is

[154] *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chape. VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI; Chaps. X, XI, XII, XIII, and XIV below.
156 *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chap. XIV.
156 *Kulturgeschichte,* Vol. II, Chap. XII.

sufficiently conversant with the literature of his time on the civilizations of ancient Egypt and the Asiatic peoples. His ethnographic evidence, however, while fair in quality considering the paucity of reliable sources at the time he wrote, is rarely sufficient in quantity. Nowhere does he marshal, like Briffault, Frazer, Sumner and Keller, Tylor, and Westermarck, such an overwhelming array of facts as to make his conclusions irresistible. Not only are his data frequently inadequate but his sources are insufficient in number and often secondary. One example will illustrate the meagerness of his ethnographic evidence. A practically complete list of his primary sources of information on the American Indians includes only the works of the following writers: Appun, Bancroft, Carver, Clavigero, Cranz, De Laet, Egede, Eschwege, Garcilasso de la Vega, Humboldt, Jacobsen, Loskiel, Morgan, Musters, Quandt, Schoolcraft, and Wied. This list is supplemented from secondary sources, notably the collections of Andree, Lubbock, Muller, Peschel, Spencer, and Waitz.

In one respect,, however, this insufficiency is more apparent than real. Lippert has more evidence than he actually cites. Before writing his *Evolution of Culture* he had read widely in history, natural science, ethnology, and comparative religion. All this reading he had absorbed, digested, and stored in his naturally retentive memory. It formed a vast reservoir of information upon which he was able to draw in his sociological writing, even though he could not always cite a specific source.

The editor has endeavored to supplement Lippert's evidence in two principal ways. In the first place he has in scores of instances succeeded in discovering in the author's earlier works the exact reference for facts cited without authority in the *Evolution of Culture,* and he has indicated these references in the footnotes. In the second place he has referred in the footnotes to collections of cases by other authors on points insufficiently substantiated by Lippert.

The German edition is marred by a number of minor faults. The references are not infrequently inaccurate, occasionally grossly so, and they are in most cases very incomplete. These defects have been remedied, so far as possible, in the translation. In verifying hundreds of references, the editor has ascertained that Lippert uses his authorities legitimately. He does not give his cases a twist to make them fit his point, as Letourneau, for example, so persistently does. Another fault is Lippert's use of the annoying and time-wasting *"op. cit"* system of reference, which has been discarded in the translation.

A more serious defect in the original is its lack of a bibliography. This too has been remedied in the translation. Three elements are grouped in the present bibliography. Besides the works referred to by Lippert, it lists those cited by the editor in his critical apparatus, distinguished from the former for the most part by dates subsequent to 1887. Furthermore, it includes a bibliography of Lippert's own writings, as complete as the editor has been able to make it. The inclusion of a bibliography iii the present work makes it possible to give somewhat abbreviated titles in the footnotes.

In addition to this introduction and the bibliography, the critical apparatus by the editor consists of footnotes and appendices. The editor's footnotes, which are distinguished from the author's by an " (Ed.)," include references to further evidence, explanations or criticisms of the text, comparisons with other authorities, etc. In the frequent instances where brief quotations from other writers are cited in substantiation of Lippert's views, the reader should bear in mind that nearly always the priority belongs to Lippert, as a glance at the dates of the respective works in the bibliography will show. Such instances furnish repeated evidence of his striking modernity. The appendices are devoted primarily to the comparison of Lippert's views on controversial subjects with those of other writers. They serve to relieve the footnotes of overlong discussions and thus to preserve the continuity of the text. For greater facility in reference, the paging of the German edition has been preserved in the margins and indicated in the table of contents. There appears herewith as a frontispiece a photograph of Lippert taken in 1887, while he was engaged in writing his *Evolution of Culture.*

The editor makes grateful acknowledgment to Ferdinand Enke of Stuttgart, Germany, the publishers of the German original, for their kind permission to publish this translation in the United States; to Professor John L. Campion of the University of Pennsylvania and to Professor Adolph E. Zucker of the University of Maryland for their help on knotty problems of translation; to Mr. Samuel Bloomfield of New Haven, Conn., for revealing

unsuspected sources of information; to his colleagues, Professor Maurice R. Davie and Professor Carl F. Schreiber of Yale University, to his graduate students, and to his wife, Carmen Rothwell, for reading the manuscript and contributing valuable criticisms; and especially to Professor Albert G. Keller of Yale University for first introducing him to Lippert, for encouraging him to undertake the forerunner of this translation as a dissertation for the degree of doctor of philosophy in the Yale University Graduate School, and for kindly help and invaluable counsel throughout the years of bringing the present work to completion.

GEORGE PETER MURDOCK.

New Haven, Conn.,
December, 1930.

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[1] For facility in reference, the volume and paging of the German edition are shown in parenthetea.

THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

CHAPTER I

THE CARE FOR LIFE AS A CULTURAL PRINCIPLE

1 Man is the focus for all our strivings in the accumulation of knowledge. The manifold branches of scientific investigation labor on, separate and distinct as to subject and treatment, but identical in that they all have some reference to man. Even the exploration of the distant heavens has its connection here, **for** it shows man his true position in the universe and checks the errors of his soaring speculation. All the dependable knowledge that we possess today we owe to the modern division of labor in the field of research. We rightfully desire a synthesis of all this knowledge, which, divided only for purposes of investigation, forms in the aggregate a unified whole, the one great riddle for mankind to solve.

There are various points of view from which such a synthesis may be attempted, one of which, in our opinion, is offered by culture history. Whichever standpoint we choose, none affords a view of an entirely cloudless horizon. That offered by the history of civilization, we must confess, is deficient in its insight into the cosmic and geologic ages of the remote past, but otherwise it affords us a magnificent view of the totality of human life up to the present. The aim of such a history of culture should be to clarify all the phenomena of human life, not only the final achievements of long processes of evolution but also the many survivals of interrupted lines of development, to portray the evolution of man as an organic product including the inevitableness of his errors, and thus to bring about an understanding of the present in all its forms.

The term culture history or history of civilization has hitherto embraced a variety of things. First to be detached from political
2 history were those folkways and mores of peoples and periods which did not directly concern the history of the development of the state. This view of culture history yielded interesting and colorful pictures and also, in so far as they were drawn **from**

the truth, an insight into the motivating forces in the lives of nations and men, which are not always identical with the mainsprings of political actions. Another approach, inaugurated by Buckle,[1] conceived these forces to be natural laws and thus sought to establish a new kind of history in place of the old.

We shall follow neither of these courses, nor both together. At most our method of approach will attempt to distinguish how far natural law operates as a factor in human activity and in the development of culture, and how far man's own impulses, powers, and instrumentalities have enabled him to create a special human sphere within the bounds of nature. In this province the human personal element plays no insignificant role, although it can never free itself from the laws of cultural evolution nor use any means except those of cultural origin. Thus limits are set for the selection of our material, and it will be seen that the portrayal of cultural development in conformity to law offers a sufficiently large and important subject for a special scientific study.

This unusual task, the nature of which can be revealed to the reader only by its presentation, prescribes also an unusual procedure. We do not underestimate the value of attempts to divide the history of civilization like political history into a system of successive chronological periods. Especially do we recognize the many advantages of that set forth by Morgan.[2] But we can not overlook the fact that all these systems are essentially similar to the arbitrary classifications of the descriptive natural sciences. Moreover, if the system of general history were followed, culture history would have to move over the earth from one region to another within the more or less arbitrary great periods. This would greatly fatigue the reader and would make it difficult to grasp its essential unity.

3 A classification according to the fundamental factors in cultural evolution would seem more appropriate for a pragmatic culture history in view of the essential similarity of the course pursued by cultural development everywhere, a similarity due to the identity of the primary impulses and mental laws of all peoples. We shall therefore give this method the preference and make to the others such concessions as seem advisable.

[1] ***History of Civilization in England.***
[2] ***Ancient Society.* See also Engels, *Ursprung der Familie.***

We wish first to give the reader an orienting glance at the nature of the subjects which will engage our fuller attention later on. Then when we return to the primitive age of mankind with its indeterminate beginning and end, he will not falsely imagine that it was an age when all the impulses and capacities of man lay dormant. Indeed it is largely because this could never have been the case, that the limits of primitive times can not be definitely fixed. The concept of a primitive age is a useful one because, as we go back beyond a certain point, we enter a region of uncertain conjecture, and because, on the other hand, we find there a meager store of the products of culture which we contrast with civilization as a relatively uncivilized state and as the starting point of civilization. To the culture historian there exists no absolute boundary between the two. Everything that man does to raise himself even in the slightest degree above his natural limitations, is a bit of culture, and we, who are the heirs of the peoples of the past, are hardly justified in refusing the honor of the name of civilization to its earliest and most difficult achievements.

This unity and continuity of cultural development is in accord with the single basic impulse of all culture. This single, dominant, fundamental impulse in culture history is the *care for life*[3] It unites and distinguishes man and brute. It is manifested in different degrees in animal instinct and human reason.

The notion once prevailed that the low cultural state of savage peoples today is the consequence of a degradation from a former higher moral and intellectual state, not merely in individual cases, which must be admitted, but also in general. This view was zealously advocated by Gerland, who continued the great work of Waitz.[4] Lubbock[5] tested it thoroughly in the social
4 relations of savage peoples and rejected it. The notion has lost ground as an unbiased investigation of these peoples has brought about a wider knowledge of their actual conditions. Even when it was no longer possible to deny the intellectual progress of the human race in the course of cultural evolution, the notion retained a support in the conception that the moral state of primi-

[3] "The first task of life is to live." (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 2). For a discussion of the care for life *(Lebensfursorge)* see Introduction, pp. xviii-xix. (Ed.)

[4] *Anthropologic der Naturvolker.*

[5] *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 3-4.

tive man was higher than that of later generations. We shall now endeavor to clear up this matter.

It is necessary to distinguish two fundamentally different conceptions of morality: objective morality or the actual substance of a moral code, and subjective morality or the extent to which men live up to the moral canons of their time. The determination of the latter is certainly not the province of culture history. Indeed even historical research can scarcely establish the subjective morality of individual historical periods. General conclusions alone warrant the assumption that subjective morality is naturally greater when life relations are simpler and more primitive. The more undeveloped these are, the more rarely will anything happen which is not moral, i.e., customary.[6] But this itself indicates that the objective canon of morality can expand only as social relations develop. What was once admired as the ideal morality of the savage might also be called merely his more regular obedience to custom. But this again is evidence of the greater poverty of his canon of morality. We shall see this poverty give way, after a severe struggle, to a greater wealth of moral ideas and shall recognize the fallacy when an unwary observer interprets the subjective morality of the savage as an objective canon or a high ethical ideal. Without the knowledge of social forms which were still in the remote future, it would have been impossible in primitive times even for a philosopher to have conceived an ideal of morality comparable to ours, which is the product of a long historical development.

The observation of uncivilized peoples establishes nothing with greater certainty than that such philosophers are not to be found amongst them, even as exceptions. Their minds, however superior to those of the animals, as is evidenced by their tools and language, are unable to entertain elements unrelated to the sense impressions of the moment. Science was long arrested by a delusion regarding the substance of savage thought, which was
5 due primarily to a delusion about our own thinking. It was believed that the course of the sun and the phenomena of the heavens stimulate primitive man more forcefully than they do us and engross his thoughts more intensely—just as though we were

[6] See Tozzer, *Social Origins*, p. 30. "Morality is nothing else (and, above all, nothing more) than obedience to customs" (Nietzsche, *Morgenrote,* p. 16). "The word *morals* essentially means *custom*" (Ellis, *Dance of Life,* p. 245). (Ed.)

either more accustomed to the phenomena than he or more exempt from wonder because of our knowledge of their causes. Actually, however, neither primitive nor modern man thinks about these things until the ordinary experiences of life have become intelligible and commonplace. Even today the average man is not thoroughly familiar with the causes of the heavenly phenomena, yet only the more enlightened minds wonder about them. The unsophisticated child unthinkingly accepts them as a matter of course. Astonishment appears only when the idea of causality has become familiar and when causes revealed by everyday experience are applied to phenomena of far greater magnitude. That primitive man is still far from such a step is established by an abundance of trustworthy ethnographical evidence.

Irregular and unpredictable minor phenomena attract man's attention sooner than do regular major ones.[7] It is an attested fact that the lowest existing peoples, such as certain tribes of Brazilian Indians, seek an explanation of the capricious thunder and hail before they begin to inquire about the sun and sunshine. They already imagine an active spirit behind the thunder and hail but have not yet reached the point of seeking a similar explanation for the course of the sun. The normal has not yet stimulated their thought. But even in degree their astonishment at thunder falls short of fear. They perceive no disparity between cause and effect when they ascribe the cause of the awe-inspiring pageant to the departed spirit of one of their fellows.

The grandeur of nature and its phenomena can not stir a mind which has not been trained in the school of social life, and the rudiments of this school consist in the care for the self. Speculation always originates with the self. The sun impresses itself upon the thoughts of man only because and in so far as it warms or scorches his person, the thunder only since it frightens him, the hail only because it scourges him. With this relation to the self is associated a series of primitive ideas with which the discipline of man's mental powers begins.

6 It is significant that Klemm[8] begins his culture history with

[7] Because they belong to the "aleatory element." See Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 6; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 737-70; Keller, "Luck Element." (Ed.)

[8] *Allgemeine Cvlturgeschichte.*

the Tapuyas of Brazil as the lowest of living men, while Müller[9] asserts of the very same tribes that nature operates about them with a "stupendous primeval power" which arouses an abundance of thought and emotion in European observers. The sublimity of nature has made no impression and has had no stimulating influence upon the notorious stupidity and mental sluggishness of the Tapuyas. This sluggishness is correlated, not with their imposing environment, but rather with their low degree of foresight, for, devoid of dwellings or clothing, they pursue their daily food-quest with barely enough success to support life.

Baegert,[10] questioning the Indians of California as to whether they had ever thought about who created and preserved the sun and moon, received the simple reply, "No." Park[x1] had the same experience among the Negroes. "I frequently enquired of the negroes," he writes, "what became of the sun during the night, and whether we should see the same sun or a different one, in the morning; but I found that they considered the question as very childish. The subject appeared to them as placed beyond the reach of human investigation; they had never indulged a conjecture, nor formed a hypothesis, about the matter." The intelligent Eskimos of Greenland are also surrounded by a mysterious and sublime nature without being thereby stimulated in anything not directly related to the care for life. "Whenever they were asked," relates Cranz,[12] "who created heaven and earth and everything they see, their reply was, 'We do not know.' Others answered the questioner, 'It has always been so and will remain so.'"

Spencer[18] has assembled a collection of cases which demonstrate that surprise and curiosity at what does not directly bear on the care for life are entirely foreign to uncivilized peoples. This habit of indifference at times takes the form of absolute stupidity, inhibiting a high degree of curiosity even in the face of extraordinary phenomena. The Australians of Dampier's ac-
7 quaintance showed no awe at the marvel of a European vessel. Those who came on board "did not notice anything else in the

[9] *Geschichte der amerikamschen Urreligionen.*
[10] *Califorman Perwumla,* p. 390. (Ed.)
[11] *Travels in Africa,* I, 265. (Ed.)
[12] *Gronland,* p. 233.
[18] *Principles of Sociology,* I, 87-9.

ship" than what they had to eat.[14] Wallis found this same "unaccountable indifference" among the Patagonians, from whom even the mystery of the looking-glass could evoke no astonishment.[15] Spencer[16] explains this striking indifference of the savage, from which we may draw a conclusion as to primitive man, by his ignorance of natural causation. From childhood on he is accustomed to accept the phenomena about him as something inevitable, and, since he has no idea of the operation of natural laws, nothing seems to him unnatural, nothing astonishing.

Thought is confined to what directly touches the thinker in space or time; the savage reflects only about what is "present" in both senses of the word. Burton says of the East Africans that their thoughts are confined exclusively to what can be heard, seen, and felt, and that they will and can concern themselves only with the present moment.[17] Baker draws an identical picture of the black inhabitants of the Albert Nyanza region. Like the animals their thoughts are entirely occupied with their daily needs, and they possess no history and no clue to their past. The Eskimos, although they refuse to speculate about nature and remote objects, are not mentally inactive. The inhospitable nature of their country calls forth a degree of reflection unknown to the African. But, as Cranz[18] observes, "Their thought is manifested only in those matters necessary to their existence, and they do not think about what is not inseparably connected therewith."

It is scarcely necessary to establish the fact that in primitive times there could have been no speculation or philosophy as a
8 canon for regulating conduct. Primitive man stood face to face with the bare fact of existence, and the only conclusion to be drawn from this fact was to endeavor to maintain life. The care for life intervenes without speculation. It exists in the animals as an instinct, and even man does not lack it as such. For an animate being to possess this instinct and to be impelled by it to appropriate activity is the fundamental condition for the preservation of its species. Wherever this instinctive care is destroyed or loses contact with effective means of expression, a

[14] Howitt, *History of Discovery*, I, 68. (Ed.)
[15] Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, I, 376. (Ed.)
[16] *Principles of Sociology*, I, 86-7. (Ed.)
[17] Andree, *Burtons und Spehes Reisen*, p. 351.
[18] *Gronland*, p. 163.

withered branch breaks off from the tree of life. Wherever we find life, the concern to preserve it is the primary impulse in its expression and behavior.

In the process of organic evolution it should be noted that past variations, when fixed by heredity, necessarily exert a tremendous influence upon the possibility of future modifications. An exceptional adjustment to certain conditions may produce a perfectly adapted organism, yet this very perfection may make further modification impossible. On the other hand, a less perfect adaptation leaves room for further differentiation in the future and for a longer line of development. A hoof, for example, can never be changed into a hand by any adaptation, nor can a hand become a hoof, even though new life conditions may demand of the organ protection rather than flexibility. Should the existence of the animal in its new environment depend upon such an adjustment, it would simply be impossible; the species would become extinct. But an organ which has developed neither the perfected form of the hoof nor that of the hand, but has remained on a lower evolutionary stage with respect to both,
9 is able to adjust to the altered life conditions in the one direction as well as in the other. Thus wherever nature has equipped her creatures for the struggle for existence with a perfected physical specialization, she seems to have granted this perfection as a compensation for inability to advance farther.

According to this point of view, man's unique position in nature does not seem in the least contradictory. No such compensation fell to his share, so the path to unlimited improvement remained open to him. He has acquired no specialized weapons in the evolutionary struggle for physical equipment, neither the telescopic eye of the eagle, nor the incisors of the rodent, nor the canine teeth of the carnivore, nor the molars of the pachyderm.[19] His digestive organs have neither the power of the carnivore's nor the remarkable efficiency of the ruminant's. Even his limbs are relatively undifferentiated. He is not destined for victory by the development of tremendous power or bulk; neither is he protected by a pygmy size or insignificance. No extremely specialized weapon, such as we see elsewhere in the struggle for existence, has fallen to his lot. He has not staked his fortune in the struggle on a single cast. His physical per-

[19] **See Wilder, *Pedigree of the Humam Race*, p. 4. (Ed.)**

fection consists rather in a relatively enormous capacity for adaptation to the manifold conditions of life. Indeed even today public opinion can engage in a controversy as to whether man is to be classed as herbivorous or carnivorous by his masticating and digestive organs. As a matter of fact he is both, and has always been both whenever circumstances permitted.

The very fact that man's organs have remained relatively unspecialized has been of tremendous significance in making possible his dispersion over the earth. Paleontological research with respect to recent geological changes presents a colorful picture of varying animal forms, proving that these changes were sufficient either to destroy the existing forms or to force the animal world to adapt itself by migration or the development of essentially new forms. But man, whose first traces are
10 found in Europe among the fossils of the Pleistocene Period along with extinct species of the mammoth and rhinoceros at a time when the arctic glaciers joined those of the Alps, was then already much the same as he is today.

When we apply the methods of natural science to our rather inadequate prehistoric materials, we are fairly astounded at the relatively insignificant physical effect produced on man by such selective factors as the great geological changes since the Ice Age and the diverse climates and species of animal competitors which he has met in his dispersion. Even if the distinguishing characteristics of the various races are correctly to be regarded as products of these selective factors, they are nevertheless not significant enough to justify the naturalist in classing the races as distinct species.[20] These racial differences are confined chiefly to the form of the skull, the position of the teeth, the type and distribution of the hair, the proportions of the extremities, and the color of the skin.[21] Man's physically undifferentiated state is not in itself sufficient to explain his physical stability during a period which produced a world of new forms within the animal kingdom.

This riddle is solved by the discoveries which reveal the presence of man in Pleistocene times. The tools which the men of that age carried about with them are miserable bits of stone

[20] **See Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 34; Wilder, *Pedigree of the Human Race*, p. 278. (Ed.)**

[21] **See Haddon, *Races of Man*, pp. 5-14. (Ed.)**

and bone, but they are nevertheless tools, the evidence of a conscious and no longer unexercised mental power. By the use of tools, which supplement his organs where they are inadequate, man escapes to some extent the law of natural selection, or rather he confines it to another sphere, the seat of the inventive faculty, which exercises a certain control over nature.[22] The more perfect the tool becomes, and with it the whole adjustment
11 to life, the more trifling are the physical changes which natural selection can produce. A longer prehensile hand is no longer an absolute advantage, and its transmission by heredity is no longer necessary to assure the survival of the species, when man has learned how to lengthen his arm at will by means of a staff. Thenceforth the visible influence of natural selection is restricted more and more to the sphere of the intellectual powers and operates only indirectly through them to produce physical changes.[28] The "lower" races disappear before the "higher" with the result that the total picture of mankind is permanently altered. But the "higher" races are no longer those distinguished solely by their physical adaptation but those who by their inventive alertness have raised the care for life to a higher plane, extended it farther in time and space, and accumulated its fortunate consequences as a heritage for later generations.

The mental activity of primitive man in no way transcended the domain of the self. Just as the lower animal heeds no other stimuli than those directly affecting his sensory nerves, so also primitive man reacted only to things immediately touching his care for life. At least this is true of savages today, and primitive man could not have been farther advanced. In the lower animals every stimulation of the sensory nerves is immediately followed by a reflex response on the part of the corresponding motor nerves without the intervention of a special organ. Although no discriminating consciousness is involved, this response is in most cases "adequate," i.e., useful for the preservation of the animal, since it is a product of a long process of selection. In the higher animals the reaction is complicated by

[22] "Human adjustment is *mental* rather than physical" (Keller, *Starting-Points,* p. 34). See also Lull, *Organic Evolution,* p. 685. (Ed.)

[23] "The fact is that whatever structural modification there is has been made in the brain, and that the rapidity and success of brain-adaptation has rendered bodily change unnecessary, thus freeing man from the inevitable process as seen among plants and animals." (Keller, *Societal Evolution,* p. 18). (Ed.)

12 the interposition of complex intermediary organs, especially by the differentiation of the brain from the spinal cord. But never does the higher stage entirely supersede the lower. On the contrary, each higher form embodies the entire store of vital activity of all the lower stages. Even man still exhibits a number of reflex responses. Some, such as the involuntary protective movement of the eyelid, we clearly recognize as such. Others are carried out more or less under the mysterious influence of a conscious mental activity which has intervened between the sensory impression and the motor response. This board of review probably conquered its field little by little, gradually reserving for its examination and decision activities which had previously been carried out unconsciously.[24]

In the classical experiment with reflex action the cerebrum of a frog is removed. When an extremity is then cauterized with acid, an immediate response is produced. Higher animals seem to have retained the same reflex action as a necessary protection against injury. To a definite external stimulus some animals react by biting and others by striking at random. Man can often surprise himself in similar unconscious actions, but, half repressed as they are by the intervening consciousness, they survive only as gestures, as "expressions of the emotions."[25] Not one man in ten, when frightened by a touch in the dark, will fail to raise his hand for a blow and to take a step backwards at the same time, even before he has become conscious of fear. The blow does not ensue, but the arrested movement survives as the gesture or expression for sudden fear. Why does the hand not complete the blow? In earlier times such an involuntary blow was an advantageous adaptation and became hereditary. But accumulated experience has since learne4 that this response is a maladjustment, and the instinctive reaction is consequently interrupted.

Although this later inhibiting behavior often seems as involuntary as an instinct, we ascribe it to our higher mental processes, whose organ is the cerebrum. Reason only appears when fully conscious thought subjects an instinctive response, which is no longer thoroughly satisfactory, to confirmation or modification
13 by the elements of experience, or similarly determines **behavior**

24 Cf., Tilney, *Brain from Ape to Man,* I I , 1037ff. (Ed.)
25 Darwin, *Expression of the Emotions.*

in new situations by the comparison of new elements of experience. This conscious activity conflicts with the instinctive dictates of our nature to a considerable degree even today, and the more primitive a people is, the more rarely does it attain successful expression. Thus uncivilized man, as soon as his reasoning capacity begins to develop, is really a composite of two men, or "two souls" as Plato[26] called them, who struggle for mastery within him, each of them the product of a different age.

These two groups of basic impulses still betray by their divergent tendencies their separate origin in different stages of the care for life. On a very low stage it is distinctly useful for
14 the preservation of a creature that the stimuli to take nourishment and to reproduce its kind be followed directly by the appropriate motor activity. Man has not lost this ancient heritage. In the child the sensation of the nearness of food calls forth immediately, without the intervention of thought, the most adequate behavior.[27] The vehicle of the sexual sense was called by Plato an animal within man. The behavior of this instinct seemed to him independent of the influence of the "higher souls," and it appears no less overwhelmingly effective today.

With the lapse of time the inexpediency of the unrestricted power of the primary instincts is frequently revealed. The exercise of reason introduces certain precautions, such as the inhibition of the blow following fright. Such of these precautions as are sanctioned by the group .become, to the individual,, instincts of a new and social type 28 Thus the secondary instincts of prudence, self-restraint, and modesty are added to the primary ones. Whether a people will be dominated by their primary or secondary instincts will depend upon the existing status of the care for life and will thus be a measure of their cultural development.

The primary may be called the natural instincts. The secondary could not have arisen without the influence of social relationships, for only within a society are they a valuable adaptation. Peoples have developed them only to the degree in which

[26] *Timceus* xv *et seq.*
[27] Cf., Watson, *Psychology*, pp. 238-41. (Ed.)
[28] That Lippert, though he uses the term "instinct" for certain purely social phenomena, does not fall into the "instinct fallacy" will shortly become aparrent. See also Introduction, pp. xvi-xviii. (Ed.)

their foresight[29] has entered the social sphere. Since the later instincts aim at a temporary limitation and suppression of the earlier, the two can hardly meet in man without a struggle. With the lowest savages this struggle seems scarcely to exist; their life is a paradise of innocene. The primary instincts reign Supreme until with higher civilization the secondary emerge victorious in an increasing number of cases.

In the savage his natural instincts are not yet tamed by the later social ones. He has developed no ability to call a halt to an awakened desire. The Polynesians at the time of their first contact with Europeans were unable to subdue a desire for an object which "made their mouths water," an expression which suggests a true reflex phenomenon. For the sake of a fish or a turtle which they saw in the possession of the whites they would forget all their fear, disregard friendly relations, and involve themselves in unknown dangers. Appun,[80] who lived a long time among the wild Indian tribes of Guiana and presents them in a relatively favorable light, nevertheless states that they were unable, even among themselves, to respect a field cultivated with food crops.

The annoying cupidity of the savage, pictured by all travelers, is perhaps not fundamentally much greater than ours, but it strikes us as unpleasant because no inhibiting instinct prevents him, whenever his greed is aroused, from expressing it in the most barefaced form. Whatever seems to him desirable he immediately demands, either with fawning importunity or with brazen threats, and what he does not get he takes. These people have consequently been branded as "shameless beggars" by more than one traveler. Among the amiable Polynesians even princes and kings are not ashamed to rob their white guests if a tempting object strikes their eye. This phenomenon is, of course, closely related to the low development of the idea of property, but the brazenness of the proceeding bears likewise upon the present subject.

The savages themselves do not regard such behavior as annoying or unpleasant. Travelers report that they are as generous

[20] "Foresight" *(Fürsorge)*, as used here and throughout the book, is practically synonymous with "care for life" *(Lebensfürsorge)*. See Introduction, p. xix. (Ed.)

[30] *Unter den Tropen.*

in giving as they are shameless in begging. As long as such a give and take is not unfavorably regarded, no inhibiting instinct can develop. Refusal to take, on the grounds of incapacity or unreadiness to give, even should it appear in exceptional cases, would not be regarded as desirable and would consequently not be encouraged and conserved. On the contrary, it would be branded as a rebellion against the society. The practice must come to be regarded as onerous before a new social instinct can arise. But it could not be felt as a burden, as a social abuse, except from the point of view of the possessor, when a higher value is set on property. This, however, comes only with the development of foresight. Thus the care for life, which on a low stage created the simple instincts for the preservation of the individual, now finds it advantageous to curb them for the preservation of a developing society. No one consciously and
16 rationally devised a law to this effect. On the contrary, repeated cases enriched the experience of the group, and, where the results were beneficial, the exercise of restraint became habitual. A moment of reflection before seizing an object could only appear when the latter became increasingly likely to be a treasured piece of property. Self-restraint could not become ingrained until seizures resulted more and more often in unpleasant consequences. Our diffidence at begging, which now seems natural, can only have arisen at a certain stage of foresight when the willingness to give underwent a decline, for originally socially unpleasant consequences would have attended, not a request, but its refusal.

Another of the secondary or social instincts is that of sexual modesty. At first an extreme accentuation of the sexual sense is the best adjustment for the preservation of the species. The keener the sensation and the more intense and immediate the response, the less concerned need nature be about the survival of the species. This instinct is in all creatures extraordinarily intense. It impels them to activity in utter disregard of the greatest dangers to the individual. On higher stages of development, however, its intensity does not diminish as the number of its stimuli increases. Memory and the increasing power of ideas are now added to the bare sense impressions which, in primitive man as well as the animals, call forth the appropriate reflex responses. An inhibiting instinct, therefore, becomes necessary as soon as men advance to a more comprehensive foresight on a social basis.[31]

Modesty can not have been an original possession of man. The Bible, an excellent early ethnographical source, depicts a primitive state in which man did not possess the feeling of sexual shame, and it regards this as characteristic of ancient times. It represents modesty as first appearing when a distinction was made between good and evil in behavior—with reference, we must add, to the interests of society. The period to which the Biblical tradition belongs was still primitive enough to be able to draw the correct inference from the existing survivals of a prehistoric state of culture. We can do likewise today, since we have again established close contact with primitive conditions. Many savage peoples are still innocent of a sense of modesty operating to prevent or prohibit sexual provocation. To be sure they have fewer
17 causes of provocation than we, owing to their more undeveloped capacity for the association of ideas.

In the Bible the taboo of shame is placed upon certain acts but not as yet upon the naked words describing them. Since that time the feeling of modesty has developed until now it also forbids the words which call forth concrete ideas and thus arouse the sex instinct. This development is largely a recent one and is reaching its culmination in our time. Language originally consisted mainly in vocal signals to call attention to objects or gestures. Ideas could be successfully conveyed by speech only with the aid of such auxiliary appeals to the senses. This explains why the savage tires so quickly of discussing abstract subjects and why he soon begins to "give random answers, to spare himself the trouble of thought."[32] Upon a higher stage such exertion is no longer necessary and ideas can be conveyed by words alone, but the concepts evoked are still very vague and incomplete. For a long time, therefore, the object and the corresponding word are two very different stimuli. The former may give offense while the latter as yet does not. At the end of this process of development, however, we find a marvelous perfection of language and mental capacity. A word brings the idea to the mind nearly as sharply and clearly as does the object itself,

[31] "The passionate nature of the sex appetite, by virtue of which it tends to excess and vice, forces men to connect it with taboos and regulations" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 419). (Ed.)

[32] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 9.

and it evokes a response like that produced in the savage by any sense impression. Hence the secondary precautionary instinct now extends its ban to the spoken word. Where it is
18 lacking we are unpleasantly affected and take offense. What constitutes offensiveness, however, varies with different periods. Even our grandparents in their conversation were quite unaffected by much that seems highly objectionable to us. We may likewise observe the different stages of development among the various social classes today in exact proportion to their mental and linguistic training. Some classes still use forbidden words in complete innocence, not because their sense of shame is undeveloped, but because the words do not evoke sufficiently vivid mental images or sufficiently definite ideas to bring them under the ban.

There still exist savages who are devoid of any sense of shame at exposing the naked body.[33] The inhabitants of Tahiti a century ago did not seek privacy even for the most intimate relations between the sexes. In Africa, however, morality prescribes that the roof of the house shall be the only witness, intercourse outside the house being considered ill-omened. Concealment of the body from a sense of modesty increases on different stages, but it can be demonstrated, in contradiction to the Biblical account, that the feeling of shame was not the first impulse to clothing. This is proved by many authentic cases from savage peoples on a much lower stage of culture than any known to the ancient Hebrews. This subject is treated elsewhere,[84] but we may here anticipate so much of it as refers to the development of our social or secondary instinct. We have still to show how the custom of ornamenting the body preceded that of clothing it,[35] at least in the regions first inhabited by man.

Vanity is a part, even though but an isolated part, of the care for life. The individual wishes to exist, not merely as a personality, but as one of importance. He wishes to stand out, to represent something, and he often expends on this form of foresight the first fruits of his higher cultural endeavors. Avail-

83 See collection of cases in Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, I. 539-45. (Ed.)

34 *Kulturgeschickte*, I, 431-44. (Ed.)

35 "Ethnographical studies have established the fact that things were first hung on the body as amulets or trophies, that is, for superstition or vanity" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 429). (Ed.)

ability determines the selection of the earliest ornaments—feathers, bones, shells, etc. As soon as man learns to make a string out of fibers, he wears one around his loins as the chief support for his trinkets. A person with no other claim to distinction would pass as indecently poor, unless he wore at least one ornament hanging from his loin strap. As he walks, his swing-
19 ing feet keep this in the center. Thus a sort of natural selection hit upon, as the most adaptable to ornamentation, that very region of the body which a later age selected for concealment for an entirely different reason. The custom of decorating this part of the body may, nevertheless, be ascribed to a motive of propriety, for a man was ashamed, although not yet in a sexual sense, to appear among his fellows entirely naked, that is, without some distinguishing indication of his personal importance.

This development coincided with and stimulated that of sexual modesty, though in origin they were entirely different. Modesty, however, did not make much progress until the appearance of a relatively recent form of social organization. With the development of the patriarchal family the wives and marriageable girls became the property of the housefather, and the economic conditions of the period made them extremely valuable. It was to the interest of the entire society that this property be generally recognized as sacred and that the dangers of provocation be diminished by precautionary measures. Since then the custom of concealing the body as an expression of modesty has been steadily gaining ground. Its dual origin is betrayed by the fact that it did not at first apply before the age of puberty.[36] Egyptian sculptures, portraying the domestic life of the Pharaohs, show even the princesses of the royal house completely unclothed up to that age. This custom, applying to" both boys and girls, persists quite generally down to comparatively recent times.

How the mores of clothing have reenforced the feeling of modesty in a more or less mechanical fashion is seen in the extension of the latter to the various parts of the body when it becomes customary to clothe them.[37] In our climate the entire

se "Very generally in the savage world, where climate does not put obstacles in the way, boys or girls or both sexes go naked till they reach the age of puberty" (Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 557). (Ed.)

37 See Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. 425-6. (Ed.)

body, with the exception of the face, has come to be covered. In places, such as the Mohammedan countries, where the original view of modest concealment still persists, even the face must be covered, at least by the women. In other regions, as in parts of eastern Asia, where the sense of modesty is not yet entirely trusted, mutilation of the face is practiced by way of precaution.

However, even a secondary instinct developed on a high stage of culture may meet with limitations upon one still higher, if it seems no longer to be an absolute advantage. In a highly
20 integrated society, where the acquired impulse has severely curtailed provocation, it may be dispensed with to some extent. After the ideas of sexual love and marriage have changed, the custom of restraint may run counter to the actual needs of the society and accomplish more than is good or necessary at the time, a situation precisely like the crisis we have already pointed out in the history of the primary instincts. Different peoples have pursued different courses in this respect. The conservative Chinese still refuse to give way to the reaction. With them the betrothed girl does not emerge from the deepest concealment until she appears before her wedded husband. An echo of this custom has also been preserved, at least symbolically, in the Jewish wedding ceremony. This is in keeping with the traditional conception of marriage as a business transaction. Even today the Chinese bride is acquired by the parents of the groom without his participation. Love and marriage are entirely distinct. The groom plays no part in the formal courtship. Other peoples, upon achieving an early emancipation from the extreme power of the father, attempted to solve a difficult social problem by effecting a closer union between love and marriage. They necessarily came to regard the arbitrary secondary instinct as an unsuitable restriction upon socially admissible means of courtship. A reaction set in, limiting it. In one direction clothing again assumed more the character of ornament and emphasized what custom had formerly concealed. In another it permitted the exposure once more of certain parts of the body, at least at times, and this retreat received the sanction of modesty. This reaction, in part very recent, chiefly affected that sex upon which the older custom had exerted the stronger compulsion. Even today the clothing of the two sexes differs in character. In

the male, utility is the more emphasized; in the female, ornament.

The subjects just presented to the reader are far removed from the starting point of our discussion. This digression has seemed necessary because our conclusions as to the original property or working capital of primitive man can only be drawn from our knowledge of what has happened to human nature in the past and is happening today. According to the ordinary point of view, all that is natural is immutable, and those traits in human nature which suggest the instinctive in animals, and which we have simply called "instincts" in default of a better word, are natural because they are deep-seated. This current concep-
21 tion must now be qualified throughout the range of culture history—such is the first lesson taught by our anticipatory discussion. A way of feeling or reacting, in other words an instinct, to use again this unavoidable word, can undoubtedly be deep-seated and transmissible without thereby necessarily constituting a species characteristic or a natural attribute of the species. When a few more unimportant tribes, apparently already on the wane, shall have become extinct, it will be possible to assert without qualification that sexual modesty is a characteristic peculiar to the entire human race, distinguishing man from all animal species, not one of which possesses a trace of it. Nevertheless it is not necessary to regard such an instinct as either innate in or as old as the human species. On the contrary, it is a product of definite factors operating in human history, and furthermore, as soon as it arises, it becomes itself one of these factors, thereby complicating the process of further development.

If it were possible to analyze the process of cultural evolution so far as to show that its ultimate elements are physical forces only, it would nevertheless be impossible to overlook the fact that these elements have given rise in man to combinations of another and higher order, which in their turn have become active factors in evolution like the original natural forces themselves. They constitute the specifically human, or, if we prefer, the spiritual factor in culture history, and their significance can not be overemphasized. By its side appears the personal element, which deserves a place here as in political history, even though its prehistory must in a measure be lived through **over and over** again. We do not ignore the physical factors when we give our chief attention here to the human element.[38]

It is now apparent how little can be contributed to an understanding of the essentials of culture history either by an overemphasized classification according to races and peoples or by a vain attempt to adhere to a chronological system. From the appearance of the instinct of modesty, which has exercised such a disciplinary and creative force in society, we are able to establish only one fact, namely, that it was dependent upon the forms of social organization. An older form, as we shall see,[89] exercised a less favorable influence upon its development; a later form, one more favorable. But it is practically impossible to correlate these decisive factors with an Old and a New Stone Age, a Bronze Age, an Iron Age, and the like, however valuable such a classification may be in other respects. No matter how important for the understanding of culture either the tool itself
22 or its material may be, nevertheless these distinctions do not indicate the really significant causal factors in the evolution of society.

Likewise the method of presentation by separate races and tribes contributes neither to the clarification of the subject as a whole nor even to the interpretation of individual phenomena.[40] The facile explanation of important features in a particular society as the manifestations of a "national spirit" is in many cases only an apparent explanation, for these peculiarities of the "national spirit" are the very things to be explained. Their evolution could be traced, even within a restricted area, if historical records reached back a sufficient length of time. But since world history does not furnish us this information, we must rely upon the comparative method, encompassing the broadest possible field and supplementing gaps in some areas by data from others. When we see developing in one group as a product of known factors a custom which has existed in another group since prehistoric times, we may fill out the prehistory of the latter on

[38] Gumplowicz, who adopts the monistic view, criticizes Lippert for admitting the human and personal elements as factors in cultural evolution *(Sociologie und Politik,* pp. 152-3). But in this paragraph Lippert specifically admits that these elements may be only derived manifestations of natural law. (Ed.)

39 Below, pp. 323-34. (Ed.)

[40] Yet this method has been fruitful in the hands of recent American anthropologists. See, for example, Wissler, *American Indian.* (Ed.)

the basis of our knowledge of the former.[41] The universality of this method affords us the assurance that we are not going astray in applying it.

However diverse the manifestations of a human instinct or a significant custom may be, they are all to be traced back, as our example has demonstrated, to one fundamental principle, namely, the care for life. This principle appears in the most varied forms as it progressively associates itself with new elements and enters into new relationships with its own creations.

On the lowest stage of culture the care for life is characterized by an extreme degree of limitation in time and in space. In time it does not reach beyond the moment when a want is felt; in space, with the single exception of the maternal instinct, it embraces only the self. It ceases to act when a natural impulse is satisfied. The extraordinary exertion displayed by man on this stage under the pressure of want proves the absence of any provident thought. Provision for the future is unbearable; satisfaction is succeeded by a state of apathy. The senses and faculties of primitive man are subject to the discipline of this impulse, whose manifestations are as violent at times as they are intermittent. An examination of the reports about the nature of savage peoples reveals a perfect unanimity. A repellent ego-
23 ism would be their outstanding characteristic, if it were not tempered by indifference. Their nature seems to be a mixture of cold selfishness and good-humored tolerance.

It must have required unusual difficulties in the maintenance of life to initiate the first extension of foresight in time. We can scarcely undertake an analysis of this development, but a few of its important steps can not be entirely overlooked. The manufacture of tools and weapons, over and above the use of stones and sticks in their natural state, was one of these steps. The use of tools gave a new direction to the entire mental activity of man, and their antecedent manufacture in particular furnished a motive for foresight beyond the immediate moment. The necessity of protecting the body, when seasonal changes of climate became more severe, was another tutor in foresight.

The savage revels heedlessly during the short season when

[41] **This method, however, should be used with caution. The factors of cultural diffusion (see Wissler, *Man and Culture,* pp. 99-180) and adaptstion to a particular environment (see Keller, *Societal Evolution,* pp. 247-327) must also be taken into account. (Ed.)**

fruits are ripe and abundant. On a higher stage he begins to gather stores and to protect food plants. Foresight continues to grow, beginning with short periods of time, then extending over longer and longer periods. The first experiments with agriculture were tried on annual plants with a short growing season. At the other end of agricultural development are the vine and fruit tree, which demand a foresight extending over many years. The Greeks regarded the cultivation of the olive as a great achievement of their civilization, and their pride was certainly justified. Foresight in the acquisition of animal food undergoes a parallel extension. Naturally progress here does not consist so uniformly in the accumulation of stores. The Eskimos, however, have learned from their snow fields the principle of refrigeration, and the hot stony ground of certain regions of Africa has taught the natives how to preserve meat by drying. The Indian expended all his foresight on the acquisition of meat, but the peoples of the Old World extended their foresight beyond mere collection and hunting and learned to domesticate the living animal and to use it for various purposes.

Each of these steps extended the powers of man farther into the future and added another load to the vehicle of foresight. Human thought gradually became divorced from the things of the moment and concerned itself more and more with remote objects. Man became a different being from one stage to another in his acquired accomplishments and his intellectual qualities.

24 Having roughly sketched the development of foresight in time, we may now complete the picture by a glance at its parallel development in space,[42] which takes the form of an indirect or social care for life. Intermediate between these two paths is the use of fire. The consequences of this discovery are easier to grasp than to exaggerate. It opened up to the habitation of man vast regions where existence was possible only with a highly developed foresight, and thus prepared the way for the most severe and effective discipline the human mind has ever undergone. The invention of tools, the taming of fire, and the development of language are the three great steps by which man

[42] According to Spencer, mental development is "an adjustment of inner to outer relations that gradually extends in Space and Time" *(Principles of Sociology,* I, 54). (Ed)

outstripped his primitive ancestors. The use of fire did much to promote the extension of foresight beyond the self, while language became the indispensable tool and weapon of social life.

The social instincts in man should not be regarded as an inheritance from the lower animals.[43] They are obviously not derived from animal instincts where these have reached their greatest perfection. Such highly developed social instincts as are found in certain species of insects preclude the evolution of higher types. Man has no share in such a heritage. Even the monogamous instinct, the basis of the simple social groups in certain of the higher animals, finds no expression in the social organization of primitive man. Mother love was his only original social instinct. Everything else is derived from the care for life. This is evidenced by the fact that foresight has ventured upon widely different paths and has not infrequently retraced its steps. But in innumerable trials it has shown the individual that a care which extends to his fellows redounds also to his own benefit. This impulse gave rise to the first lasting associations. And today the development of foresight in space has brought us to the point where the barriers between peoples are falling and a brotherhood of man is recognized, at least as an ideal.

The great ideal possessions of humanity, which are often cultivated with such unselfish devotion, seem to bear no relation to the care for life. But however strange their exotic branches may seem upon the materialistic tree of human life, their roots, nevertheless, have drawn their first nourishment from the same
25 subsoil. Law and morality are the last two stages of a foresight which has extended in space and has reached out into the distant future. The former belongs to organized human groups; the latter may some day become the property of humanity in its ideal sense.

The origin of laws reflects the gradual development of man's mental powers. Although the laws of former times were usually ascribed to the will of an individual, they were actually, like our common law, codifications of long recognized principles,

[43] Attempts to derive the social behavior of man from the instinctive behavior of the lower animals have vitiated a vast deal of social theory. Lippert consistently recognizes the unique or "superorganic" nature of human social phenomena. (Ed.)

in short, law based on experience.[44] Actual experiment led foresight along this path, intelligence sifted the resulting experiences, and repeated practice stamped the more advantageous upon the memory of following generations as law. All good laws, as the Bible[45] well expresses it, are laws through which we live. History relates thousands of experiments which have violated this rule. Peoples who have disappeared from the earth bear witness to laws which did not lead to life. Not until a much higher stage does lawmaking involve the exercise of reason—reckoning with abstract conceptions, weighing the consequences of anticipated actions, and thereby reaching out into the future. Mere codifying ceases and creating begins. The value and permanence of these creations depend upon the adequacy of the material which reason has at its disposal.

Laws and moral codes, the materialized social foresight of smaller and larger communities, would have been unable alone to implant in mankind a legal and moral sense. Every true moral law is necessary, and this necessity is its natural sanction. It would never have arisen if its violation had been an advantage or a matter of indifference to the society. Injury to the society is the penalty for violation. Moral law is a product of social foresight, and morality in our sense can not exist without a society. The penalty falls upon the society in the first instance and reaches the individual only indirectly through the injury to the whole group. The individual very possibly is not subjectively guilty, or he is not able to grasp the connection between his act and his share of the consequences, obscured
26 as it is by the intervention of the society.[46] Experience with the natural sanction of the moral law on any stage is part of the accumulated experience of the whole group. The individual is only to a limited extent its bearer.

The positive law of the smaller community presents a different aspect. Its sanction lies in the punitive power of a patriarchal head or of a corresponding political organization of the whole group. But this punitive power does not reach all cases of trans-

[44] For the growth of law out of custom, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 657-67. (Ed.)

[45] Ezekiel xx. 11, 13, 21, 25. (Ed.)

[46] Some aspects of this lack of correlation between subjective morality and social consequences are brought out with great clarity in Sumner's illuminating essay, "Purposes and Consequences," in *Earth-Hunger*, pp. 67-75. (Ed.)

gression like an inexorable natural law, nor does it support moral precepts when they extend beyond the limits of the smaller community. In view, therefore, of the inadequate punitive power of the positive law and of the slight impression made on the individual by the natural sanctions of the moral law, neither can account for the rise of that moral instinct which we call "conscience." Moreover, conscience historically is not, as we might define it today, the reaction of the moral consciousness within us when injured by our own act, but rather, as we shall see, an instinct of fear.

Instincts of different stages frequently come into conflict. Man is inclined in many cases to follow the more urgent primary instincts and to disregard the secondary inhibiting ones. The controversial question of "free will" seems to hinge on this point. As a matter of fact, most men are still dominated in their behavior by their instincts, the "good" mainly by the social or secondary instincts, the "wicked" by the little repressed primary ones. By nature the impulses of the primary instincts are the more powerful, for not only are they older, but they are also hereditary in the individual himself, whereas the secondary have been developed by the experience of society and are transmitted to the individual through his social environment. When a hungry person stands under a fruit tree in the open, the primary instinct of self-maintenance so greatly outweighs that of the social order, that ancient law codes, such as the *Sachsempiegel,* take it into account. In our moral judgment "evil" means the disregard of the social insincts and the infraction of the social order from selfish motives, i.e., from domination by the primary instincts. It is thus in a certain sense correct to say that man is by nature more inclined to evil than to good. Since the relative strength of the respective instincts is either innate in man or imparted by his environment without his subjective cooperation, his will seems to be bound.

But we have seen that there is a third force, that of rational thought, which throws on the scales the weight of recognized
27 causes and effects. Thus through our reason we seem to exercise a measure of free will.[47] A subjective responsibility appears

[47] "The appeal to reason in the choice of possibilities is perfectly justified, and the formula of *free will* comes to mean in substance that men do not follow impulses blindly, but are normally able to act in accord-

when social foresight imposes upon every individual within the society the duty of sharing to the limit of his ability in the progress from instinct to reason. In this sense we find ourselves in perfect harmony with the oft misunderstood Socratic philosophy of antiquity, which made "virtue," a concept roughly equivalent to our idea of morality, identical with "knowledge." We disagree thoroughly with the opinion that knowledge and the mental discipline necessary to attain it are entirely non-moral and that ignorance is the best soil in which to sow the seeds of morality. To us ignorance with its allied mental incompetence is a sin against society and an obstacle to moral progress. Society has given expression to the Socratic view wherever it has established compulsory education, although, of course, the learning acquired in school is not the only sort of socially useful knowledge.

But no matter how much influence conscious rational thought may have exercised in giving expression to morality, it could not have created the instinct of conscience, which we recognize as the most powerful support of practical morality. Their chronological sequence alone refutes this hypothesis. Rational ethical sentiments can not have given rise to conscience, because they appear only in civilized man after a well-substantiated succession of experiences. Moreover, conscience in the savage manifests itself, not as self-reproach, but as fear. As soon as the impulse of a primary instinct is exhausted by satisfaction, an opposite secondary instinct makes itself felt. When the savage becomes conscious of this aftereffect, it is associated with the emotion of fear. And it is in this that the sanction of his moral law resides.

But the object to which this fear attaches extends our horizon to include a new group of phenomena, which seem entirely distinct from the things of the earth, but which nevertheless also originated in the care for life at the beginning of human culture.
28 This is the realm of religious ideas, which have been of extraordinary utility in the moral discipline of man. The nature and essence of this utility, however, have often been misunderstood. Religion did not create moral ideas, but it did create man's moral instinct, his conscience, without which moral law would have

ance with their reason and morality" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 43). (Ed.)

been no more deeply ingrained in his heart than the irksome commands of his superiors. The confusion of these two things results in either an overestimation or a depreciation of the cultural significance of religion, even of its most primitive forms. Religion, historically, is not the pure and ideal but the practical moral principle in man. It did not create the canon of moral law, for the injunctions and prohibitions of the latter have been supplied by advancing social foresight. But it did lend the moral code its extremely important punitive sanction,[48] without which man would have had no moral discipline on the lower and intermediate stages and therefore no moral instinct on a higher stage.[49]

The reputation of religion must suffer a considerable diminution when we recognize the historical fact that it has lent its sanction indiscriminately to all the customs and institutions of society, good or bad.[50] In the development of social foresight newer forms must ever and anon come into conflict with older ones, as we have seen reflected in the warfare of the instincts. Since religion on every stage lends its powerful sanction to the law, it must often sanction for a time things which are no longer regarded as moral or which are considered quite immoral. A consideration of the historical religions affords ample evidence of this. As the care for life advances, creating new moral standards, it encounters a conservative principle inherent in the very nature of the religious sanction,[51] and the blessing of the moral instinct may even become a curse. Religious institutions have always acted as a brake on the wheel of social progress, the more so the more rigid their external forms of organization. From time to time a revolutionary struggle bursts forth in the effort to sanction new forms, and new religious institutions achieve victory, bringing with them relative progress. But however greatly the substance of the great religions has been altered in the history of such struggles, one principle of religiosity has

[48] "Looking at religion . . . as a practical influence on human society, it is clear that among its greatest powers has been its divine sanction of ethical laws, its theological enforcement of morality" (Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II, 361). (Ed.)

[49] "Religion lent the sanction of ghost-fear, without which men on the lower stages could not have been disciplined into morality" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1459). (Ed.)

[50] "The religion has to follow the mores" (Sumner, *War*, p. 130). (Ed.)

[51] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1430-41. (Ed.)

remained ever the same, the very touchstone of its genuineness, namely, the unconquerable fear of violating the moral law.

To us, who have grown up with the idea of the unity of the universe, religion has acquired a meaning which it could not have
29 had to primitive man, although the latter did indeed try, within the narrow limits of his experience, to synthesize the disparate elements of knowledge. Our religious speculations thus seem far removed from the sphere of the ordinary human cares, yet historically these have been their basis. Our speculation returns to its starting point when it makes the moral law and the laws of the universe the keystone of a system of religious philosophy.

There are still many religious systems, however, which fix the attention of the individual, not upon life, but upon a projection of the care for life beyond death.[52] Certain phenomena of experience, as we shall see, led to the conviction of a second existence beyond the grave. From very early times the care for life has sought to project itself into this afterlife with a degree of effort commensurate with the intensity of the conviction and the economic organization of the society. For countless generations religion was nothing else than this foresight coupled with an introduction of the other world into the care for life of this. Such is the condition of religion in the most primitive forms we know of. Among simple peoples it appears, not as a religion of speculation, but as the cult, and the cult is nothing other than this extension of the care for life into a realm created by the childlike imagination of man everywhere with an astonishing unanimity.

When mankind later becomes conscious of its unity, it regards this unanimity as proof of the validity of its beliefs. Today we have progressed just far enough to recognize that this conclusion has of itself no evidential value. The unanimity seems to us sufficiently explained, first by the laws of logical thinking, which have everywhere and always been the same, and second by the identical manner in which phenomena have presented themselves to the minds of men everywhere. We are not yet able to substitute much in a positive way for these old ideas. We merely know, on the basis of our richer experience and

[52] This has been called "projectivism" or "otherworldliness" (see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 784), and has been defined as "care about the life after death and anxiety to secure bliss there by proper action here" (Sumner, *War*, p. 143). (Ed.)

superior mental training, that the simple perceptions of primitive man need not of necessity be combined in the way he combined them. But we also recognize that he, with his meager experience, could not have combined them otherwise. If the phenomena were deceptive in the sense that they were susceptible to erroneous interpretations, then the fact that the delusion is worldwide would be explained without implying the validity of the conception.

History shows that the creative power of ideas in the development of civilization is not dependent upon their relation to reality. The power of an idea depends, not upon its validity, but
30 upon its vividness and the extent of its dissemination. Belief in the power of truth is based on the principle that in the conflict of ideas the more valid will eventually become the more widespread. But greater vividness frequently stands victorious in the way of truth. Moreover, the more vivid conceptions are commonly those which can be arrived at by each individual himself, not by a complicated mental process, but by the most elementary thinking. Of this sort were the fundamental ideas of the cult.

Since it is characteristic of man that he can introduce his own ideas like natural forces into the mechanism of his social evolution, and since historically no other ideas have compared even approximately in power with religious conceptions, there is a sound basis for distinguishing man from all other earthly creatures by the characteristic of religiousness. The true nature of the overwhelming influence of religion, not only on culture history but also on political history, has scarcely as yet been rightly appreciated. Thus Hellwald[53] seems to us to overemphasize the historical religions, or at least to be inaccurate, when he regards the human impulse to idealize as the creator of religion. On the other hand he certainly underemphasizes its inevitable universality when he derives the most important idea of primitive religion, the concept of the soul, from a single and almost accidental phenomenon, the discovery of fire.[54]

The primitive religion of the cult is linked to the care for life in two ways. The concept of the soul, inferred from the phenomenon of death, involves the idea of the survival of the

53 *Kultugeschichte,* I, 46ff.
54 *Ibid.,* I, 78.

soul apart from the body.[55] This conception of a continued existence brings with it the desire to provide for life in the next world, as far as the state of primary foresight permits. How tremendously this projected care for life may influence the whole economic life, and how exhausting it may be on a lower stage of religious ideas, is illustrated by Egyptian history and also by that of the Middle Ages. Only the forms are different. The lofty cathedrals with their chapels, the thousands of altars with their rich mass-endowments, the wealthy monasteries with their treasures, landed estates, and subjects, and the enormous wealth of the "dead hand" all contrast as strongly with the poverty-stricken huts of the peasants as do the giant pyramids and columned temples of Egypt with the miserable mud dwellings
31 of the people. Both equally bear witness to how foresight was deflected from this world to the next, and how life was impoverished in order that death might be enriched.

The desire to preserve one's own soul becomes for one's descendants a command and an obligation, which binds man under all circumstances and never lifts its onerous burden once he has attained a certain stability of organization. This accords with the hypothesis which Caspari[56] has advanced as the most fundamental principle of religious development. This eternally binding obligation paved the way for that instinctive feeling of dependence which expresses itself in the savage as dismal fear, that sense of duty which, when violated, appears as conscience. But what actually created conscience and sharpened it to greater sensitiveness was fear. It was a self-created idea, far more powerful than any external authority which the individual might avoid, that terrified man and subjected him to a discipline which has proved beneficial in its results.

Completely unaware of the physical causes of phenomena, the savage knows from his experience only a single category of unseen agencies. These are the souls which he has perceived leave the body at death and which thereafter hover about him as invisible ghosts or spirits. He owes them support in their continued existence, and they hold him fast to his obligation by constant reminders. They express their wrath at every neglect.

[55] See Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 1-30; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 827-33; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,*1, 153-200. (Ed.)

[56] *Urgeschichte der Menschheit.*

They torment him with pain, they plague him with sickness, they hurl lightning and hail upon him. He explains all the ills of life on the basis of these notions, for his meager store of ideas leaves him no other choice.[57] There arises within him an undefined fear, as intermittent as the phenomena that arouse it. This fear, because in its origin it is associated with the idea of neglected duty, must be regarded as the germ of conscience. Their genetic relationship is borne out even today by the way in which the popular mind reacts to a thunder storm with twinges of conscience.

It will be our task in the proper place to follow these conceptions in their extraordinary development. Their path is an exceedingly long one. It leads from the crude idea of the vengeful anger of the neglected ghosts to that of a divine judgment, from this world to the next with a corresponding extension in the duration of punishment, from a concept of righteousness which consists in the performance of cult obligations appropri-
32 ate to the state of self-maintenance to one which includes highly developed moral duties. Thus arises that sanction of the moral law which, though a creation of man, has nevertheless made a supernatural principle one of the active forces in culture history.

However original this union of divine sanction with moral law may seem to us, its extension to the entire moral law actually belongs to a rather late stage of development. This is brought forcefully home to us by ancient writings which represent men of deficient morals as examples of "righteous conduct before God" and therefore as overwhelmed with his blessings. In those days blessing and curse attached only to the cult activities of man; these alone made him righteous or unrighteous before his gods. Hebrew tradition, and the Persian and Hindu as well, ascribes the entire moral law of the time to an alleged historical lawgiving. But although it dates this back into primitive times, it nevertheless manifestly attributes to the sons of a later age the standards of an earlier. We need only recall here the example of King David, whose conduct is so revolting to our moral feelings. This difference in moral views is blamed by some solely on the priestly reporters and their bias. But we must remember that the institution of the priesthood is an integral part of this entire development and that its advocacy of a partisan stand-

[57] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 787-90. (Ed.)

point is by no means accidental. The priest has been first and foremost the preserver of the old rather than the teacher of the new.

Our purpose here is merely to show the reader that he must look to the care for life, and especially to its higher social form, for the starting point of a development which seems finally to have detached itself completely from its original basis and to be rooted in a realm transcending man. As a priestly class gradually arose by a division of labor and was intrusted with the care of the cult, those who made use of its intercession deposited with it the objects given to support the cult. In this way the priesthood was directly instrumental in the earliest creation and accumulation of capital and indirectly so in all further consequences of this innovation.[58] The priestly class has frequently first drawn the logical deductions from popular notions and then, incorporating in itself in the most literal sense the authority of divine beings, used them to establish its absolute dominion on earth. Thus it has exercised a discipline peculiar to human society. But its significance in culture history is not
33 confined to this. Without the priesthood the treasures of the "dead hand," the first collection of capital in primitive times and the first provident equipment for life—though strangely enough an equipment for another life—would have been burned or buried and thus forever withdrawn from life. But under the administration of the priests they were rescued, and restored, at least in part, to life.[59] The priest earned his livelihood in the service of the dead and shared with them the treasures and luxuries of the cult; he lived from the altar in serving the altar. Thus living men began to share in the treasures of the cult and thereby came to possess capital which, although created in a strange roundabout way, could be transmitted to later generations as a part of their equipment for life. The priesthood was long vitally concerned in this process, whatever our moral or economic judgment of its activities may be.

By understanding clearly the tremendous influence of religion alone, one may recognize how hopeless it is to attempt to single out the physical forces of nature as the sole causal factors in culture history, as has been done by those who have followed

[58] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, **II, 1477. (Ed.)**
[59] See Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums.*

and exaggerated the tendency inaugurated by Buckle's[60] meritorious work. The effect of natural forces can certainly never be eliminated, and it is of the greatest value to have indicated their importance. Nevertheless we must not overlook how frequently human ideas enter in as other "components of the paral-
34 lelogram of forces." Nothing binds ideas to the objective in nature except natural law, and while this may guide the formal mental process, it in no way guards against errors in the interpretation of the objective. The effects of this type of component are often extremely great, and they characterize better than anything else the uniqueness of man's cultural evolution. The thread of the causal sequence leading back to these primary causes is often extremely tangled and more difficult to unravel than the effects of natural laws. It is like the mycelium among the lower plants, which begins its growth as a lifeless and inconspicuous mold that one would scorn to notice, but which, at the other end of its development, sends forth over the earth wonderful and extremely curious forms of vegetation, which in turn give rise to new forms. Similarly we ridicule as a meaningless savage superstition the idea that the soul needs food for its continued existence, yet the noblest creations of the civilized life of our age stand in a genetic relationship to the later offshoots of that very idea, which has itself now crumbled to dust.

We are far from,asserting that the fine arts are the invention of the priesthood, but it is nevertheless clear that the development of art is associated most closely with those higher stages of civilization which are characterized by a priesthood. From time immemorial man has been prompted by different motives to tell tales and to put them into verse, but one of the strongest of these incentives has been the higher forms of the cult. Even Greek tragedy, that eternal monument of an ancient civilization, sprang from the soil of the cult.

„ The love of decoration is indeed a much older impulse to the plastic and graphic arts than the cult under priestly supervision, but the latter supplied them with new tasks and higher aims. Only the cult could furnish them material resources out of the wealth which contrasted so glaringly with the poverty of private households. Hence in historical times we meet the

[60] *History of Civilization in England.*

beginnings of a magnificent development of artistic activity in the domain of the cult. Here first arose the artistic treatment of the image, the fetishistic abode of a spirit or god. As conceptions of the divine became more elevated, the realm of the ideal became the element of the fine arts, and this too enabled the human mind to rise from the dust.

The first scientific activity, rational thought about the phenomena of the world, was likewise intimately associated with those ideas which the cult had implanted in the human mind. Certain civilized peoples, whose high intellectual talents we
35 admire, knew no other basis for their thought, no other subject for their speculation. The peculiar philosophy of India, which makes such a strange and incomprehensible appeal to us, has its basis in the cult. The Hindu has never rid himself of the ideas arising from the domain of the cult in order to investigate objective reality, for to him they have complete reality and explain thoroughly the nature of things. Even a religious revolution like that of Buddhism has altered them not at all. Although Buddhism opposes the pluralistic conception of things, which was characteristic of the early cult, by its recognition of a "chain of causalities," it nevertheless recognizes as causalities only ideas derived from the cult. To it, nature with its physical forces does not exist and hence offers no explanation of phenomena. Its entire "knowledge" is an accumulation of popular cult ideas, which can impress us only by their scope and grandeur. We therefore do not share the fashionable belief in the high value and great future of Buddhism.

Greek philosophy pursued another course, without, however, being able to contravene its genetic relation to popular cult ideas.[61] If to the savage in his intellectual isolation a soul seems to be the cause behind every phenomenon, then, in the natural development of thought, to a philosopher, whose intellectual horizon has expanded to comprehend the idea of a universe, the cause of all causes behind this universe must seem to be a universal soul. From this idea, so evidently derived from the domain of the cult, philosophizing humanity has never since been able to extricate itself. It first engrossed the attention of the oldest Greek philosophers, of whom we scarcely know more than their names and this fact. Their early efforts consisted in

[61] **Lippert, *Religjonen*, pp. 403-9.**

applying the popular conceptions of the soul to a "first cause soul," the creature of their own thought. We know from accounts of savages that their first speculation is concerned with the self, with the soul. Starting from the observable differences between life and death, they ask and answer in many different ways the questions whether the soul departs from the body with and in the air or the moisture or the warmth of the breath, and whether one of these things, and if so which of them, is the material substance of the soul. Even Socrates is said to have occupied himself with these problems in his youth, before he turned his thoughts to moral and social questions. They were precisely the subjects of pre-Socratic philosophy. If the first
36 cause of all things is a soul, then the question whether things have originated from air, water, or fire, a question on which the early Greek philosophers disagreed, is clearly based, in spite of the elevated nature of the speculation, merely on the play of current primitive cult ideas.

Thus one thread is spun from another. But one end ever rests in the primitive impulse of the care for life, which man shares with the lowest animate beings, but which has led him far beyond them all in the accumulation and differentiation of means of satisfaction. In his joy in the exercise of his mental power, in his passion to investigate and discern, in his pleasure in the ideal, in his love for art, and in his good will toward all creatures, civilized man has won possessions which are apparently not of this world, not subject to that primary law of life. Yet everywhere the genetic connection is revealed, and when once they are achieved they constitute a priceless heritage of the life which we toil instinctively to preserve.

CHAPTER II

PRIMITIVE TIMES

37 Since we lack direct evidence of a primitive age, we can only arrive at a clear and correct idea of its nature by a process of elimination. This explains our preliminary digression. It was necessary to show the great importance of the principle of the care for life, and to anticipate later stages to some extent, in order correctly to estimate the consequences of its limited development, indeed its practical absence. The primary characteristic of primitive times, then, is care for life of the lowest type, limited in space to the individual himself and in time to the very moment of experiencing a want. It manifests itself like a simple reflex phenomenon, without being influenced by accumulated experience adapted by mental activity to the circumstances, and hence with but slight assistance from the memory or the power of reason. All accounts of the character of savage peoples agree on this point.

In harmony with this relative lack of foresight are the great dependence of primitive man on the changing influences of nature and his lack of adjustments to them. His tools and means of protection were of primitive simplicity. He was unable to make a selection of food products with reference to their nutritive value. All his productive powers were devoted and subjected to the acquisition of food, of which he required a large quantity because of the inclusion of much that was valueless. He frequently experienced the agonies of want, alternating with waste and improvidence in times of superfluity. Social foresight did not yet exist except for its germ in the relation of mother and child, which is obvious in nature and does not require reflection. Only within such limits did there exist a very embryonic conception of law and morality. However, fear of the ghosts of the dead seems to have appeared relatively early, probably as the first fruit of the dawning power of abstract thought.

We recognize the counterpart of primitive man in Spencer's[1]
38 picture of the savage. His fundamental trait is impulsiveness. His behavior consists simply in reactions to the impressions of the moment; it is not the fruit of premeditation and deliberation. The Australians are said to be "incapable of anything like persevering labour, the reward of which is in futurity."[2] It is no wonder that this incapacity, only the outward effects of which are seen, is regarded by most observers as laziness, so that they believe this to be a characteristic attribute of the savage. This is true, however, only with a qualification, **for,** when spurred on by hunger, he is able to develop a high degree of activity. It has been observed of the tiny Bushmen of South Africa that they abhor and avoid all exertion, but that, when the rare luxury of meat is offered them, they carry away loads of astonishing size. The same qualification applies to the statement that the Hottentots are "the laziest people under the sun."[3]

With the Bushmen it is "always either a feast or a famine."[4] Among the indigenes of India, the Todas are described as "indolent and slothful,"[5] the Bhils as having "a contempt **and** dislike for labour," preferring half to starve rather than work,[6] and the Santals as lacking "the unconquerable laziness of the very old Hill-tribes."[7] "So, from Northern Asia, the Kirghiz may be taken as exemplifying idleness. In America, we have the fact that none of the aboriginal peoples, if uncoerced, show capacity **for** industry." Spencer[8] finds a reason for these facts in an "inadequate consciousness of the future" and likewise to some extent in a limited capacity for comprehending remote benefits.

Fritsch[9] characterizes the Hottentots as carefree and **im-**

1 *Principles of Sociology,* I, 56-62, whence the cases immediately following are cited. Spencer's conception of the mental and emotional traits of primitive man is severely criticized by Boas *(Mind of Primitive Man,* pp. 100-23). Lippert, however, would agree with Boas that these traits are not innate psychological qualities but acquired cultural characteristics. (Ed.)

2 *Trans. Ethn. Soc.* (N. S.), III, 223. (Ed.)

3 Kolben, *Cape of Good Hope,* I, 46. (Ed.)

4 Barrow, *Southern Africa,* I, 244. (Ed.)

5 *Trans. Ethn. Soc.* (N. S.), VII, 241. (Ed.)

6 *Journ. As. Soc. Beng.,* XX, 506. (Ed.)

7 Hunter, *Rural Bengal,* I, 155. (Ed.)

8 Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 60-1. (Ed.)

9 *Die Eingeborenen Sudafrikas,* p. 56.

provident, and this absence of care is doubtless the mother of the gaiety so often observed among them. In comparison, the Bantus, who lead a life of greater foresight, seem correspond-
39 ingly less cheerful. This inverse relation of gaiety and foresight is stressed in another observation. "It is a noteworthy fact that the aborigines, when they have been for a long time in the service of Europeans, lose their cheerful nature and take on a gloomy and sullen character. This is to be explained only by the fact that such servants gradually acquire from their masters the habit of giving heed to the future, and that their dispositions can not stand preoccupation with such cares." Here we see contrasted the fundamental characteristics of civilization and savagery.

Of all savages the Bushman is considered by many as the nearest to primitive man. Fritsch[10] expressively calls him "the unfortunate child of the moment." He acts without forethought and treasures no property, since he dreads the care it involves. Nevertheless he has a great predilection for meat and hence is called a cattle thief by the neighboring herding tribes. From his standpoint this epithet is unjust. The truth is merely that he has not developed the concept of property in grazing animals and has not established a society on the recognition of property rights. The same classic authority completes his description of the tiny, frail, and prematurely worn out Bushman with the characteristics of brutality and excessive callousness. It is not chance which has associated all these characteristics with this particular tribe. We find them everywhere where a similar stage of culture exists. Hence they must be considered as necessary and fundamental concomitants of an uncivilized state of things.

The disinclination of the American Indians for provident activity and labor is well known and abundantly attested. Their customary lack of foresight was even raised in some points to a law, especially when religious ideas supervened to sanction and rationalize it. To preserve food for the needs of the following day was regarded by the wilder tribes as unseemly. Many Negro tribes likewise possess this custom with the rationalized explanation that scraps left over from a meal serve only to

[10] ***Die Eingeborenen Sudafrikas,* p. 418.**

attract hungry ghosts, whose proximity is then unpleasantly manifested by evil influences.[11] I

The Indian lacked foresight even in hunting, which was the only means of support for many tribes and for others the most important. He did not even spare pregnant animals, although he might already be living riotously on a superabundance of meat. He could not leave a bird's nest unmolested; he did not eat the eggs but dashed them to pieces. He hunted deer for their skins by surrounding them by fires, thus destroying whole herds, he left large amounts of meat unused in the forest, and at other times he was oppressed by dire want.[12]

With the northeastern Indians, who had developed a culture no longer strictly primitive and among whom maize cultivation was carried on by the women, the old propensity for improvidence still dominated many individuals, and their agriculture, the mark of their advance to a higher stage of culture, was thus constantly in danger of dying out again. "Many of them are so lazy that they plant nothing themselves but rely entirely upon the expectation that others will not refuse to share their produce with them. Since the industrious thus enjoy no more of the fruits of their labor than the idle, they plant less every year. Then if a hard winter sets in, when they can not hunt because of the deep snow, it may readily cause a general famine, in which often many people perish. Hunger then teaches them to eat the roots of plants and the inner bark of trees, especially of young oaks."[18] Thus the relapse to primitive improvidence leads naturally to an earlier maintenance adjustment.

On such a stage, of course, one generation does not provide the next with an equipment for life. As soon as man has a tool, he has the concept of property, but it is restricted to the tool alone. The Indian had advanced far beyond primitive man, and even the lowest tribes already had this concept. This primitive property shows, however, no trace of communalism; the evolution of property begins with the contrary.[14] The few possessions which aid in gaining a livelihood must be created anew by each generation, a circumstance which does not permit the accumu-

[11] Another reason for these customs is the fear of "exuvial magic." See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1293. (Ed.)

[12] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission.*

is /bid., p. 87.

[14] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 269, 302. (Ed.)

lation of capital. The rule of primitive times is that property goes into the grave with its owner.[15] Although inheritance was allowed among the Indians a century ago, the possessions of a dead man had to pass at least outside his immediate household, lest it be molested by his ghost. "The children inherit as little as the widow and relatives."[16] The Indian made no attempt to leave anything to his children, for he knew that nothing would go to them. The widow was left poor and helpless, and the children in providing for life had to begin at the beginning.

We meet all these limitations of foresight in an even higher degree among the uncivilized tribes of South America. "It is repugnant to their nature," says Appun,[17] "to retain possession of a supply of provisions for longer than one day at the most."

The aboriginal Sakalavas of Madagascar are described as "extremely carefree and unconcerned about the future."[18] In their contrast to the later tribes of the island we see at work an inexorable law of nature which impels toward progress. This harsh law of group-conflict[19] is as evident as it is familiar. It is "inhuman" like every natural law, but it is inevitable. Steady peaceful progress from generation to generation in the same territory would perhaps be ideal, but this does not as a rule happen. The accumulation of advances in restricted areas is opposed by a law not unlike the physical law of inertia. As soon as a human group in a particular climatic region has made just sufficient progress in the care for life to maintain existence with the means provided by nature, any further advance is inhibited if the burden of the increased foresight is felt to be greater than the advantage to be derived from it.[20] But this is nearly always the case with the savage as long as he remains in the same natural environment. Any extension of his responsibilities

[15] See Letourneau, *Property*, pp. 28-9; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 481-96; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 187-9, 197-8; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 912-15. (Ed.)

[16] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission*, p. 82.

[17] *Unter den Tropen*, II, 321.

[18] Waitz, *Anthropologic*, II, 431.

[19] The best exposition of this law is to be found in Gumplowicz, *Rassenkampf*. (Ed.)

[20] "In general, the amount of labor performed varies about some group-average set in the mores. . . ." "Increments of labor become more and more irksome and increments of the same product give less and less present satisfaction. There is a diminishing return in satisfaction and an increasing return in the pain of effort" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 142, 105). (Ed.)

is extremely burdensome to him. Missionary reports show many cases where savages, who have been introduced "by painstaking education to the enjoyment of the fruits of civilization, have nevertheless found it greatly to their advantage to discard these at the first opportunity in exchange for the stark freedom of their own people.[21] This overpowering "love of freedom," ap-
42 parently well authenticated, is nothing but the desire to return to that customary balance between care and enjoyment which can alone give a feeling of ease. As long as the restraint and effort associated with each new advance in foresight have not become deeply ingrained by long practice, any advance will disturb this balance to the detriment of the sense of comfort. Hence progress will be made as a rule only when it is inexorably forced by the appearance of new life conditions. We may select an example which will at the same time characterize one aspect of primitive life.

A measure of cleanliness is an "innate" necessity to every civilized man. Among savages, however, it is completely lacking. Even their widespread fondness for bathing has nothing to do with motives of cleanliness.[22] Fritsch frequently found the South African natives so dirty that it was difficult to determine the color of their skin. The lack of a sense of cleanliness is so extreme in some cases that it may be regarded as another proof that man has not inherited the highly developed instincts of certain lower animals.[23] Such a wonderfully developed instinct as that shown by the birds of the flycatcher family in their care for the cleanliness of their young and their nests must have been entirely foreign to primitive man. Indeed, so far as we can judge, such precautions would have been extremely onerous to him. Krapf,[24] when he was visited by the Prince of Kitui—near Mt. Kenya—and his father the Sultan, was amazed at the filthy deportment of the former, but he later learned that it was the "custom of the country." "For the performance of certain bodily

[21] "Missionaries have often taken men of low civilization out of the society in which they were born, have educated them, and taught them white men's mores. If a single clear and indisputable case could be adduced in which such a person was restored to his own people and did not revert to their mode of life, it would be a very important contribution to ethnology" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 108). (Ed.)

[22] The motives are usually religious, especially exorcistic. (Ed.)

[23] See above, p. 23. (Ed.)

[24] *Missiomreisen,* p. 462.

functions they do not even take the trouble to go outside the hut."

The scrupulous cleanliness which we are accustomed to exercise in this respect, although only within relatively recent times, is based on a rational estimation of the consequences of the opposite course. This is out of the question with the savage, but the immediate consequences of such foulness must become apparent even to him and lead to the desire to avoid them. However, by the law of inertia he will do nothing if the discomfort connected with provident behavior seems to outweigh the advantages to be derived therefrom. Inactivity usually prevails, because the perception of discomfort is immediate and real, while that of advantage is evoked by a conception of some-
43 thing more remote and is consequently less vivid. Moreover, the perception of present unpleasantness is weakened by habit. Thus to men whose mode of life has once become fixed within the limits of the traditional foresight it is uncommonly difficult to make an advance of this sort without a change in life conditions. But where such a change does occur, and its incidental disadvantage is compensated for by some advance which overcomes the factor of inertia, the one advance may easily compel the other.

The Bible devotes much space to a detailed regulation of this culturally important subject and thus indicates an ordered camp life of a large population. In fact it requires social progress, an advance in socialization, to force an improvement in cleanliness. But it will also depend on other advances. In many regions of Africa the huts are burned at frequent intervals and are rebuilt from the ground up. In this way too great an accumulation of filth is prevented. Cheapness of building materials and simplicity of construction permit this type of foresight. But if fixed residence is combined with an equipment of even slightly greater value, this advance will compel a preventive type of cleanliness.

Before the first active step is taken, man has always the choice of exchanging his discomfort for a higher comfort by overcoming the factor of inertia or of sparing himself the exertion by renouncing the comfort. Whole groups may be characterized by the different ways in which they make the decision in accordance with habit, precedent, and the influences of their natural environment. The customary manner of making the decision becomes a mark of the "spirit of the people" and constitutes a national characteristic, one generation influencing the next. Repeated choice of the latter alternative leads to ingrained traits of character such as resignation, high regard for the petty joys of a mean existence, love of home, and the courage of suffering and renunciation; of the former, to traits such as discontent, ambition, and the courage of energy.

This fact is the fundamental basis of the generally accepted distinction between "active and passive races." The distinction accords with the facts, but it does not indicate inherent racial characteristics. In every race, in every nation, in every human group, types of both sorts are to be found. But where the active element has once seized control, it can by the law of natural selection easily impress its outstanding characteristic upon the entire group. At the same time the task of overcoming the factor
44 of inertia must grow continually easier for those who have become habituated to disciplining themselves in this direction.

Today we observe that the inhabitants of the interior and the mountains are in general more afflicted with a stagnating love of home, if one may call it that, than are those of the coast and the adjacent lowlands. The former reveal more passive, and the latter more active virtues. Resignation characterizes the one, venturesomeness the other. In general the well-traveled man is more inclined, or finds it easier, to renounce beloved customs for the sake of an enterprise promising advantage, than is he who clings to his native heath. The peasant is conservative, the merchant progressive. If we may also speak of "well-traveled" nations, it is they who constitute the active races. The necessary initial impulse to overcome the coefficient of friction of inertia could scarcely be provided in any simpler or more compelling way than by the entrance of roving primitive man into a region with new life conditions, hence in general by migration from one climatic region to another, by spreading from zone to zone, and above all by entering regions with well marked seasonal changes.

Then if groups on different levels come into contact, if they enter into competition for their means of subsistence, indeed if they conflict in any way, the group with the more advanced care for life will emerge victorious in most cases, and if its

advantage be social, always and almost by necessity. Only in this way as a rule does progress come about.[25] The lot of the defeated party varies widely on different stages of civilization. It may be displaced, it may be destroyed, or it may be absorbed in various ways depending on the existing forms of social organization. Of two adjacent tribes, that which gathers fewer supplies for the future must occupy a larger territory in order to live, or, what amounts to the same thing, its population will be smaller in an equal area.[26] The more provident group will thus
45 become the stronger. In the struggle between them the stronger group will prevail, and with it its superior foresight. In this complicated way arise the different stages of evolution. Depending upon the nature of the conflict, however, superiority may reside in a one-sided development, so that the victor is not always the "better" in our ethical sense. Hence progress does not necessarily lead to absolute improvement on every stage.[27]

We were led to this survey beyond the limits of primitive times by the characterization of the Sakalavas as "extremely carefree and unconcerned about the future,"[28] for Waitz[29] adds immediately thereafter that this tribe, at one time dominant and not without bravery, is now dispersed and powerless, subject to the Hovas.

We have already recognized a definite but inverse relation between foresight and the exuberant joy of living. This relation should likewise afford us a conclusion as to the emotional disposition of primitive man. Dark seriousness and melancholy are the result of an accumulation of foresight. But the different stages of the latter naturally produce different effects, and other circumstances also contribute. Thus the dignified serious-

[25] Lippert's conception of the process of social evolution, here expressed, is strikingly similar to the "automatic societal selection" of Keller (*Societal Evolution,* pp. 53-89). (Ed.)

[26] "Population can never actually increase beyond the lowest nourishment capable of supporting it" (Malthus, *Population,* I, 6). "The widest and most controlling condition of our status on earth is the ratio of our numbers to the land at our disposal" (Sumner, *Earth-Hunger,* p. 32). (Ed.)

[27] "Evolution is commonly conceived to imply in everything an *intrinsic* tendency to become something higher. This is an erroneous conception of it" (Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 95). "It is adaptation which determines fitness, but the concept of adaptation does not of necessity include any idea of progress" (Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem,* p. 76). (Ed.)

[28] Above, p. 40. (Ed.)

[29] *Anthropologie,* II, 431.

ness of the Oriental corresponds closely to his stage of the care for life, but the true nomads, who form the historical basis of his civilization, have also made a contribution to his disposition. It is the chief business of these people to exercise dominion over both animals and men, and to this fact is to be attributed the majestic mien peculiar to that civilization. Even the seriousness of the North American Indians,[80] who in other respects present a contrast to Oriental culture, has an admixture which indicates an origin in the conditions of their social organization. We need look for no such gloomy pride in the case of primitive man, for its social basis was still lacking.

When a more comprehensive and ambitious care for life has once become a part of transmitted custom and has found its necessary medium abundantly in a progressive spirit, the onerous pressure which it exerts on the novice vanishes, and man recovers his lost cheerfulness. But with every stage of development this is of a different nature. The tendency of its evolution is sufficiently marked by its extremes: on the one hand a mood changing with every impulse and an inclination to a noisy and lively expression of hilarity, on the other a uniform quiet cheerfulness with no animated indication of its individual causes. It is the latter which civilization at its height strives to secure in return for all its cares, but only to the initiate, i.e., to those
46 already accustomed to a higher culture, is it a valuable possession. Even among ourselves there live representatives of different stages, varying according to their individual culture. The liking for social enjoyments with boisterous effusions of pleasure is inversely proportional to the esteem for that uniform serenity of mind which is a consequence of a more provident distribution of pleasures and which represses the liveliness of these pleasures as it multiplies their number. Even today, faced with the alternative, the great majority still prefer the livelier intermittent pleasures and go to much trouble to secure them. On the other path, however, lies economic and cultural progress.

In this connection we should like to make an observation which may serve to orient us later on, namely, that it is extremely precarious to attempt to characterize the cultural state of an. age by its festivals. Extreme expenditure for festivity in

[30] This is a common misconception of Indian character. See Verrill, *American Indian*, p. 48; Vestal, "The Wooden Indian," pp. 81-2. (Ed.)

itself gives no indication as to economic conditions. It is necessary first to determine in each case how much of it is due to the barbaric disposition to compensate for privation by overindulgence.

On a low level of culture, as soon as man is freed from the cares of the moment, he is disposed to enjoy life with boisterous hilarity when any impulse overcomes his natural inertia. The evidence is summarized by Spencer.[81] "Of the New Caledonians, Fijians, Tahitians, New Zealanders, we read that they are always laughing and joking. Throughout Africa the Negro has the same trait; and of other races, in other lands, the descriptions of various travelers are—'full of fun and merriment," 'full of life and spirits,"'merry and talkative," 'sky-larking in all ways', 'boisterous gaiety,' 'laughing immoderately at trifles.'" Spencer also contrasts the lively but improvident Irishman with the grave but provident Scot to show "that there is a relation between these traits in the uncivilized man."

Following this line of reasoning back to the primitive man who, during an extremely unfavorable climatic period, inhabited
47 the ice-free stretches between the giant glaciers of Europe, we must not expect to find him a sullen and gloomy recluse such as would correspond to our conception of his miserable circumstances. On the contrary we should compare him in this respect to the Greenlander. The latter has to expend a great deal of his energy in the mere maintenance of life and to exercise a large measure of foresight at ever recurring periods. But this has become second nature to him, and he is contented in his peculiarly circumscribed life conditions. He makes no attempt to find a way out of them, but is so satisfied with his life adjustments that he looks down on the European and his ingenuity.[32] Cranz [33] calls these Greenlanders, not to be sure especially vivacious or gay, but "good-humored, friendly, and genial, unconcerned about the future, and hence not anxious to hoard up for it."

How much lower was primitive man than the cave men of

[81] *Principles of Sociology,* I, 61.

32 "The Greenland Eskimo thinks that Europeans have been sent to Greenland to learn virtue and good manners from the Greenlanders. Their highest form of praise for a European is that he is, or soon will be, as good as a Greenlander" (Fries, *Gronland,* p. 139). (Ed.)

33 *Gronland,* p. 163.

the Ice Age? At all events not very much, however indefinite our idea of him may be. Since we must regard him as the most improvident of all mankind, we can look for his first habitat only in regions where he could obtain food without systematic labor and would not freeze to death without fire and shelter. Hence we should expect in him all the more that trait of cheerfulness which characterizes the savage today. Only it is necessary to take into account that many more incentives to hilarity are available to the latter through a more developed language, a wider range of ideas, and the institutions of social life.

Civilized man at first associated with the savage the concept of malevolence. Later, however, a reversal of this idea occurred as a result of a number of concurrent factors, and primitive man was pictured as a model of good-natured amiability. This sudden change was inspired by a theologico-philosophical reaction in which the name of Rousseau stands out. Among the facts of ethnography there came to its aid the somewhat partisan observations which followed the discoveries in Polynesia, where savages had actually been observed whose nature seemed radically different from that of the Africans, Indians, and Australians.

The unfruitfulness of the strife between these two points of view is due, as so often in the field of culture history, to the false manner of putting the question. Primitive man can be characterized as innately neither benevolent nor malevolent, for, in as much as his impulsive behavior always follows the spur of the moment, he may now seem to be the one and now the other, depending upon the nature of the impulse. This ac-
48 counts for the contradictions in the authorities.[34] Ellis[35] tells of a Hawaiian who smothered his child with a rag and then buried it in the house, for no other reason than that it had cried intolerably. In another case a father literally tore his child to pieces because it had quite innocently been the object of a quarrel between him and his wife. And yet from these same islanders come many beautiful instances of love and friendship and of extreme tenderness to children. These apparent contradictions are to be explained as behavior prompted solely by the immediate impulse. The savage is unable to balance two ideas against each other. He is dominated by one of them and

[34] See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 66-70.
[35] *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 174.

follows it out, often with gruesome consequences. In the first of the above cases the desire to get rid of an unpleasant disturbance was the only impulse of the moment, and the man obeyed it. He would have followed just as readily an impulse to caress his child. But the ability to restrain a present impulse by the conception of another, not operative at the moment, is a useful accomplishment which man on the lower stages had not yet acquired.

49 The savage, and consequently primitive man in even greater measure, is likewise characterized by callousness. Many important cultural phenomena, forms of foresight so gruesome that it seems incredible that they have played a part in human history, remain complete enigmas without due emphasis upon this callousness or lack of feeling. It is logic alone which we have qualitatively in common with primitive man; in quality of feelings we are as remote from him as from another species. It is significant that even in the animal kingdom, where we find individual cases of highly developed instincts even of the social type, we are unable to discover any specific instinct of sympathy and compassion. Indeed in many animal species the weakly and feeble members of a society are exposed to danger, cast out of the nest, or killed and devoured by their fellows. Thus man can have inherited nothing from the lower animals in this direction. He could acquire a sympathy for the pain of others only through the exercise of his imaginative powers.

The secondary instinct of sympathy could not have developed at an early period, for it obviously runs athwart the older and
50 selfish instinct of the care for life. Even today the type of foresight which the state performs for us is obliged to ignore completely the motive of sympathy for the fate of its citizens, and we customarily praise as the most energetic those governments which show the highest degree of cold-bloodedness in this respect. While we ourselves feel sympathy, we do not want the state to recognize it, and we withdraw from the dilemma by imagining the state as an impersonal power. Such abstractions as well as such political forms are beyond the powers of the savage.

Sympathy can extend no farther than the existing range of social foresight. Never on the lower and intermediate stages of human history has the "barbarian" been an admissible object of sympathy. The barbarian, however, is always the man outside the existing circle of social foresight.[36] The sphere of barbarism therefore shrinks in proportion as social foresight is extended in space, and only within these limits can sympathy follow. No man known to ethnography is more lacking in sympathy than the North American Indian. But, next to the Australians, the Indians are the race which has remained organized in the smallest social groups. Thus the essential condition for the extension of sympathy to a wider circle is lacking.

51 It is not a flattering fact, but it accords with historical truth, that man was enslaved by fear earlier than by sympathy. This refers not only to the dread of pain and wounds and of the visible enemies threatening him, but also to the bewildering terror of the invisible lurking agents of human suffering, whose number increased to ever more stifling proportions with the growing experience and accumulating traditions of man. From man's conquest by fear arose the cult with its old forms of foresight, with child and human sacrifice, barbaric forms which were destroyed after his conquest by sympathy.

Gentleness and kindness to strangers are certainly not among the attributes of the typical primitive man. These traits indeed are lacking in the ideal which the savage sets up for himself. In dealing with savages, mercy and consideration are often out of place unless used with great care. According to the opinion of an experienced explorer, nothing impresses the Negro except force. He has no interest in the weak, no sympathy for the suffering, and even as a rule no appreciation of kindness. He ordinarily lacks the feeling of gratitude, because he can not really appreciate kindness and consideration. He is always prone to attribute them to weakness, for which he has no respect, since his idol is force, the necessary product of his type of foresight. Hence a tribe often endures the cruelty of a leader with inconceivable patience, for to them it is the evidence of power. Force impresses and wins respect; weakness loses it. This also applies to woman if she once becomes an example of weakness.

This trait gives rise to the pompous and pretentious bearing of the savage, which contrasts so strangely with his abject poverty and the worthlessness of his trinkets. A tendency toward

[36] For an excellent statement of the sentiments toward the in-group and the out-group, involving the phenomenon of "ethnocentrism," see Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. 12-15. See also Keller, *Societal Evolution,* pp. 57-60. (Ed.)

boastful ostentation appears on an early stage. Thus the Ama-**xosa** are characterized by Fritsch on the one hand by their "thoughtless gaiety" and on the other by the swaggering tone and "false dignity" of their bearing. We shall find a reflection of these ideals in the evolution of religion. Frightfulness and force are the oldest attributes of the divine.

Now that we have analyzed the cares of primitive man and their influence on his nature, we shall turn to their concrete manifestations, first of all in connection with the objects furnished him by nature. These too are disciplinary factors. Lubbock[37] cites a list of islands in the South Seas where men are alleged to have lived without the use of fire until the time of their discovery. Peschel[38] has corrected this in individual cases, and it now seems a positive fact that without exception even the most savage peoples of today are so far removed from the circumstances of primitive man that they know how to avail themselves of fire. Indeed even in the cave deposits of the Ice Age pieces of charcoal and charred bones have been found. So man even then was assisted by fire in his struggle against the rigors of a climate approximating that which the Chukchis, Lapps, and Eskimos combat today. It has again been asserted, however, that the inhabitants of Bowditch Island were actually found to be without knowledge of fire, that they ate everything raw and yet were handsome and well proportioned people of a kindly and cheerful nature.[39] But we need not conclude from this that these islanders are the direct descendants of fireless primitive man. On the contrary, they probably represent a small group of people who had been shipwrecked on this coral island, who lost the treasure of their forefathers and were unable to replace it, and who from ignorance of its use had no desire for it. Nevertheless the example shows that man is able to live without the help of fire even under the uniform and circumscribed life conditions of a coral isle. This will be substantiated, however, by numerous other facts.

The use of fire greatly increased the number of available food products and made it possible to derive a greater amount of nutriment from a smaller quantity of raw material. In this

[87] *Pre-historio Times*, pp. 557-8.
[38] *Volkerkunde*, p. 139; *Ausland*, 1870, p. 225.
[39] Peale, "Men Ignorant of Fire," pp. 229-32. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough*, II, 254n. (Ed.)

way energy hitherto expended solely in securing nourishment was freed in part for other activities.[40] But fire has never been an absolutely essential condition of existence **in this respect for** man any more than for the lower animals. We ourselves relish not only raw fruits and vegetables of all kinds but also raw oysters and fish roe (caviar). The Fuegians devour raw mussels in large quantities. The exceptionally vigorous Chukchis regard frozen fish and frozen reindeer marrow as delicacies and as the first thing to be offered to guests, even to Europeans.[41] Even today they generally prepare fish for eating without the aid of fire. The flesh of the reindeer itself is still devoured raw by the Chukchis, at least in a sort of sacrificial act.[42] The cult will afford us many another such glimpse into the dark past.

The use of the raw fresh blood of warm-blooded animals as food is widespread even today, although only under circumstances which we in the temperate zone regard as abnormal. A hospitable Chukchi woman offered the sailors of the unfortunate *Jeannette* a bowl of walrus blood as a strengthening food after their severe hardships, and the crew of the *Polaris* while stranded on the ice floe learned to enjoy a drink of warm blood after a successful seal hunt.[43] The same drink is praised in ancient legends for its powerful restorative qualities. The Eskimos a century ago ate only cooked food as a rule but preserved the ancient usage in a sort of hunter's privilege. As soon as any one had slain an animal, he ate a piece of raw meat or fat and took a drink of warm blood. And the woman who attended to the flaying of the seal likewise handed the women standing around a piece of fat, which they ate raw.[44] Cranz tells of a European who, having been forced to this manner of living, maintained that he found a piece of raw reindeer meat no less digestible
54 than when cooked. The diet of the Eskimos, recorded by Cranz, gives an indication of the number of foods, even from the animal kingdom alone, which were available to primitive man before the employment of fire. In the winter they preserved seals under the snow and ate the meat "half frozen and half decayed." In the summer they similarly let the flesh become tender "under the grass." The meat of the larger fishes was cut into strips,

[40] **See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 190-1. (Ed.)**
[41] ***Globus*, XXVI, 330.**
[42] ***Ibid.*, XXVI, 363.**
[43] **Knortz, *Nordpolfahrten*.**
[44] **Cranz, *Gronland*, p. 173.**

dried in the wind, and eaten. Herrings were dried whole. "They eat the entrails of small animals, after simply squeezing them out with their fingers. From the contents of the stomachs of reindeer, which they call *nerukak* (i.e., that which is edible) and which they prize so highly that they send pieces as presents to their best friends only, and from the entrails of the ptarmigan, mixed with fresh blubber and berries, they make a delicacy as tasty as our snipe. Fresh, rotten, and half-hatched eggs, crowberries, and angelica are dumped together in a sealskin sack filled with blubber to furnish refreshment for the winter."

We are not interested here in the diets of particular tribes as such, but only as available facts indicating how varied the menu of primitive man could have been even without the aid of fire. The Negroes and the Bedouins in Nubia and Syria still occasionally eat raw meat, especially the heart, liver, and kidneys.[45] The important role which kidney fat long played in the cult betrays the great importance which it, like blood, once had in man's nourishment. Even in the Bible there are glimpses here and there of a not yet completely successful struggle against the food regime of an earlier barbarous age in which raw food was a prominent part of the diet. It is reported of the ancient Peruvians that they often ate meat raw.[46] Our discussion of cannibalism[47] will reveal a multitude of survivals of such food customs. In particular it will show that blood was the most sought-after delicacy of early times, a combination of food, refreshment, and medicine. It was taken fresh as a drink and clotted as a food. It is drunk by the Botocudos today either with or without dilution or seasoning.[48] The same custom is found in old Germanic
55 legends. The Old Testament speaks of "eating" blood and indeed uses only this term. That this was perfectly possible even without the use of fire is shown by the Eskimos, who preserve reindeer blood rolled into balls.

If all this is true of animal foods, it is scarcely necessary to cite additional facts to prove that it was possible to eat vegetable foods—fruits, seeds, and bulbs—without any preparation by fire. The raw foods used by the most savage tribes of today enable us, with some aid from prehistoric research, to reconstruct the probable diet of primitive man. The doctrine of vegetarianism is

[45] Waits, *Anthropologic*, II, 85. [47] Below, pp. 428-30. (Ed.)
[46] *Ibid.*, VI, 421. [48] Eschwege, *Brasilien*, p. 90.

largely based on the assumption that the human organs are specifically adapted for the assimilation of vegetable foodstuffs. However, it is the very non-existence of any such adaptation that has enabled man, unlike the carnivorous and herbivorous animals, to extend his habitat all over the world, encountering new life conditions, the disciplinary effect of which has made possible the development of civilization. It is, to be sure, perfectly possible for man to live an exclusively vegetarian existence either with or without the addition of eggs, milk, cheese, etc. Numerous populations of southern and eastern Asia give us proof of this, so that it need not be established experimentally. But experience, although it covers an extensive area, does not give a conclusive verdict as to the success or adequacy of a vegetarian diet, for other factors are always involved. But research in the chemistry
56 of nutrition comes to our aid as a supplement to experience. In the temperate zones it is practically impossible to obtain the quantity of proteins and carbohydrates necessary to support human life from plant foods alone, except where there is an organized cereal agriculture. It would have been beyond the capacity of primitive man to have gathered in the wilderness of nature the quantity of such foodstuffs necessary for his daily needs.

Subsistence could, however, assume a very different form in the southern Asiatic regions where the sago palm is indigenous. That plant even today is the best means of sustenance wherever rice does not grow, and elsewhere it takes the place of rice in a crop failure. According to an old calculation,[49] a man can maintain life for a year with 600 pounds of sago bread, which can be produced from 900 pounds of raw material. Sometimes a single tree furnishes as much as 700 pounds of raw material. A man and a woman working together can in five days produce a year's supply. So there are actually regions where man can maintain life with an extremely slight expenditure of labor. However, we must not look for the origin of any progress whatsoever in these regions as long as they remain isolated. The inhabitants are in fact described as the antithesis of industrious and ambitious men. There are various reasons for this. The principal one is that the external stimulus to a more developed foresight is lacking, while there is no internal impulse to activity proportionate to

[49] **Waitz, *Anthropologic*, V, 128.**

the large amount of leisure time. The food, being extremely poor in proteins, does not produce the muscular power possessed by European laborers, nor does it leave the body, which must expend all its energy in the assimilation of a quantity of worthless ballast, any surplus urging it to activity.

Large populations in the regions where Buddhism prevails furnish proof that an exclusive vegetarianism is also possible on the basis of a rice diet. But it is significant that this very religion, which makes a law of vegetarianism, emphasizes the sentiment that all existence is necessarily a source of suffering.[50] By
57 comparison with the poor but happy Greenlanders, these people inhabit an earthly paradise and pluck its fruits with little exertion, yet they are burdened by a heavy load of sorrow. They attain the height of serenity only in non-existence and at a lower level see their salvation in a return to a cultureless existence without pleasures but also without cares. We have already recognized this latter phenomenon in savage peoples as a necessary result of cultural progress, as an expression of the feeling that the care for life has become too burdensome. Buddhism in one direction marks a high stage of civilization; like true Christianity it is an expression of the advance toward kindness and sympathy. But at this point the joy in life and creation flags in its adherents, as when a savage people presses forward on new paths of foresight with inadequate means and untrained powers. One is involuntarily reminded of the assertion of physiologists and chemists that, while vegetable foods alone may indeed be capable of maintaining human life, nevertheless when taken in large quantities they make man sluggish because of the great expenditure of energy required to digest them, and that when taken in insufficient quantities they make him weak and dispirited. The Hindu penitent and Buddhist monastic orders seem therefore to be an expression of the renunciation of efforts toward higher foresight and of the retreat to a more primitive but also more carefree stage of culture. The prevailing popular attitude could find no such expression, however, until sympathy had developed to the point where it was ready to give asylum to these parasites of society. Among the callous American Indians such a

[50] **The first of the Four Truths of Buddhism is that all existence is sorrow. "Birth is sorrow, age is sorrow, sickness is sorrow, death is sorrow, clinging to earthly things is sorrow" (Hopkins, *Religions of India, pp*. 305-6). (Ed.)**

retreat from reality would have been impossible. On the other side of the question, the alertness and activity of the Japanese is a recommendation for their predominantly, even if not exclusively, vegetarian diet.

In contrast to the above, the vegetable element in the diet of the Eskimo is extremely limited. Yet he certainly gets along quite well with his food supply and shows himself equal to the tasks of his care for life, without however being able to develop it beyond the point he has already attained. With us the forms of subsistence change appreciably from generation to generation, but the above peoples with their extreme food habits live today as they did centuries ago. Their bodies have probably undergone structural modifications enabling them to do without the usual amount of proteins in the one case and of carbohydrates in the
58 other. However, as the advantage of this local adaptation increases, that of the capacity to modify and develop will diminish. Peoples with extremely one-sided food habits will thus tend to assume the characteristics of passive races.

The whole course of later development would be inconceivable if primitive man had been predisposed exclusively in one or the other of these two directions. His masticatory and digestive organs are not those of the exclusively herbivorous animals. Even the anthropoid apes, whom he most closely resembles in this respect, do not entirely exclude animal food from their predominantly vegetable diet. Nor do the organs of primitive man resemble those of the carnivores, even though many of the latter do not reject vegetable food altogether. The bear, marten, and badger love fruits of all sorts, and the dog can be trained to accustom himself to a solely vegetarian diet.[51] On the other hand, the rodents, which we commonly classify by their teeth as herbivorous, show a marked taste for meat food. Squirrels are notorious nest robbers, and mice under certain circumstances wall turn cannibals.

Following these analogies somewhat further, we are led to presume that vegetable food at first predominated in the mixed diet of primitive man. This is the case among the higher apesf. Even among predominantly meat-eating tribes, the human child at the age of weaning needs a substitute or transition food in the form of a cereal diet together with animal milk. But man did

[51] **See Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man,* p. 67. (Ed/**

not acquire these until a comparatively high stage of culture, attained by but few peoples. Where such a transition food is lacking, as among the Eskimos,[52] great infant mortality prevails and is a source of weakness to the tribe. Our own children up to a certain age prefer vegetable foods with sweet seasoning to
59 meats. Moreover, in all scientifically balanced diets vegetable elements constitute the major portion. All this forces us to the conclusion that primitive man depended mainly upon plant foods. The advance from this point to an increasingly efficient mixed diet is a section of culture history of vastly greater importance than is commonly recognized.

In primitive times, unlike the present, the initiative did not lie with man. Modern social foresight assigns to each individual in some way the amount of labor which is the condition of his existence, and accordingly our problem is to choose the diet which will most efficiently provide the energy for the work assigned us. But with improvident primitive man the opposite situation naturally existed. Nature chose for him without initiative on his part. Man took what nature offered for the least pains, and all his surplus energy was expended, as among the animals, in the quest for food.[53]

The animal, left to himself, never rises above this level. What then can have lifted man above it? Among the conceivable factors the most prominent are his peculiar talent of omnivororsness in connection with the possible change or extension of his habitat, and his use of the first primitive tool, the grinding stone. The former led, as it were by chance, to a more and more advantageous selection of foods. The latter increased the number of available foods, lightened the labor of mastication and digestion, and thus released a certain amount of energy, which, following the primary impulse of the care for life, could be applied to a more selective food-quest. Thus the ball of cultural progress was set rolling once for all. The liberated energy could at first find no„ other channels than those which it had formerly pursued. The advance, once initiated, was marked by an increasingly vigorous and venturesome food-quest, by the invention of more and more adquate tools and weapons, and by the acquisition and conquest of things unattainable to helpless primitive

[52] Cranz, *Gronland.* p. 196.
53 Cf., Harrow and Funk, "Instinct as a Guide to Food," p. 492. (Ed.)

man. Every triumph of this sort, however, gave man a new working capital of surplus energy.

60 When a diet is inadequate in any respect, nature produces a feeling of dissatisfaction, a physical and mental discomfort, an instinctive craving to supply the lack. Where foresight is limited, this impulse is intermittent and of varying intensity; when the intervals between the moments of satisfaction are great, it grows more intense; and when satisfaction is very irregular, it rises to a burning desire. Ethnography furnishes many instances of such a literal lust for flesh and blood. The orgies of meat eating at the feasts of an otherwise vegetarian people or after periods of insufficient nourishment are a last survival of this unregulated foresight with respect to food. Upon an intermediate stage of culture far removed from primitive man we recognize an aggravated craving of this sort as one of the roots of cannibalism, which is characteristic, not of backward and degenerate tribes of savages, but of those well advanced in intelligence and energy.[54] Under such a tension the taste for blood in particular gives rise to an orgiastic indulgence of passion. A parallel to it is the taste for fat. Schweinfurth[55] found prevalent among the Niam-Niam of Central Africa the strange notion "that the drinking of large quantities of human fat produces complete intoxication."

The shortcomings of food also produce a craving for all sorts of condiments,[56] such as salt, acids, and spices, which are necessary partly to upbuild the body and partly to put the digestive organs into a receptive condition for insipid food. In this connection we must stress the fact that the most natural and indispensable seasoning, salt, could not have been available to primitive man in mineral form. Higher stages of culture have been without it, and even today it is absolutely unknown to many peoples. Primitive man, not possessing the concentrated substance discovered by later culture, was dependent upon gleaning the necessary quantities in small amounts from a mass of vegetable materials.

Similarly animal milk, the most natural substitute for mother's milk, can not be included among the foods of primitive man. **The**

[54] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1227-9. (Ed.)
[55] "Reise nach den oberen Nil-landern," pp. iv-v.
[56] **See below, Chap. V.**

acquisition of milk is dependent upon such a long series of advances that it did not appear until a relatively high stage of culture. On the other hand, in a comprehensive view of man's
61 whole development, mother's milk deserves a much higher rank among foods than it enjoys among civilized men. There are still peoples who suckle their children until the end of their fourth year, even where nature is as bountiful as she is in Siam. Where she is parsimonious, as in the polar regions, this custom becomes inevitable from the lack of a transition food.[57] On the other hand, children in the tropical regions mature very early. In the vicinity of the Gazelle River in Africa boys leave the parental hut at the age of eight, since they are thereafter able to take care of themselves.[58] The ages of weaning and independence draw farther and farther apart under the influence of advancing culture and a northern climate. With primitive man, however, the interval must have approached a minimum. No considerable intermediate stage existed between nourishment by the mother and self-support.

Some primitive food plants are still utilized. On others the cult has stamped the evidence of ancient use. Many, however, have been eliminated in the course of time on account of their poor nutritive value. Primitive man made no such selection but was dependent upon large quantities for sufficient nourishment. An example of a primitive diet is presented by the vegetable fare of the Bushmen, which includes the earthnut, the Hottentot's-fig, and the bulb of Cyprus grass. These plants are not cultivated but collected. Both on the Nile and on the Ganges, according to evidence from the cult, the seeds and other parts of the lotus blossom were used as food by a savage aboriginal population. The rootstock of the papyrus plant was also eaten. Beans were eagerly sought for everywhere. In tropical regions, including Polynesia, plant foods are abundant, among the most important being the arum, yam, sweet potato, pandanus, coconut, sago, breadfruit, banana, and Santo Domingo apricot.

Man also collected the mealy grains of grasses long before he created a prime mainstay of life by cultivating them. However laborious the acquisition and scanty the supply of such foods, their greater nutritive value and smaller bulk in com-

[57] For cases of prolonged nursing see Ploss, *Das Weib*, II, 466-60; Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem*, pp. 137-8, 165-6, 174, 185, 196; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, III, 67-8. (Ed.)

[58] Paggia, in *Globus*, IX (1872).

62 parison with other vegetable products compensated for the expenditure of time. The kernels were at first no doubt chewed and eaten raw. The Bible occasionally mentions such fare.[59] Nachtigal saw the Tubu women laboriously gathering the kernels of the wild joint grass, and the Indians of the upper Mississippi at the time of their discovery did likewise with the wild rice.[60] Doubtless in still earlier times people used the kernels of millet and rice and other grains where they were found. The tropics of each hemisphere provided a grain which on account of its size was still more striking and productive, namely, maize and durra.

As yet, however, no selection was made on the basis of experience, and taste was not developed exclusively in any one direction. Man, in need of large quantities, tried everything that offered. The people of antiquity as well as our own forefathers still ate many grains which we reject. Thus flaxseed was once regarded as a valuable food product, and the peasants of southern Germany ate hempseed as late as the thirteenth century.[61] In the medieval peasant fare hemp formed a supplement to beans, just as oil accompanied fish in the diet of the upper classes. Hemp is one of the plants containing vegetable fats, for which the man of that period, living chiefly on mealy grains, **felt** a great need. Many different products of nature were sought to fill this need. The sesame seed in the tropical and subtropical regions of the Old World may be taken as typical of all these foods, and its importance in the early cults of Egypt and India indicates that we must ascribe an extreme antiquity to its use.

It may have been the lack of a satisfactory mixed diet which made man hanker after stimulating seasoning. He satisfied this craving by eating many plants which made practically no contribution to the upbuilding of his body. An enumeration of these could never be made exhaustive enough for any period. We still find survivals everywhere. In Persia and in Central Africa a wide variety of raw herbs forms a constituent of every meal, and before our present standard spices became established our forefathers cultivated hundreds of varieties, now despised as weeds, for the seasoning of their insipid foods. The Bible recognizes

[59] "And he reached her parched corn, and she did eat" (Ruth ii. 14).
[60] See Jenks, *Wild Rice Gatherers.* (Ed.)
[61] Seifried Helbling, viii. 880ff.

"bitter herbs" as a condiment of primitive times, and the tropics
63 provide tender palm shoots and the delicious sugar cane. The most exquisite of sweet substances, however, must have been honey, if we may judge primitive man by the savage. It is the ideal delicacy among all childlike peoples, and it was certainly the same in the childhood of mankind.

This brings us to the animal foods available to poorly equipped primitive man. He could hardly have refrained from eating the bee itself for the sake of its honey sac. It is still the custom of most savage peoples to eat other live insects of similar size and tenderness. Ants and the larvae of beetles are highly esteemed, likewise grasshoppers both fresh and dried. Even the African Boers and the Arabs do not despise them. The Bushmen include lizards, frogs, and snakes, and primitive man could also have caught them. Far easier to catch, however, were the mollusks, crawfish, crabs, and fish in the shallow places of lakes and rivers and in the still inlets of tidal waters. They may be caught without implements and eaten raw. The great value to primitive man of these abundant and easily obtainable sea foods is proved by the immense mounds of shells, called "kitchen middens," which are heaped up here and there along the coasts of both Europe and America.[62]

We must agree with Morgan[63] that it was chiefly this abundance of savory food, so attractive to the involuntary vegetarian, which attracted him to the rivers and sea coasts away from regions in other respects more congenial. Tribes at the edges of inhabited areas could thus be forced step by step almost imperceptibly to enter regions with the more congenial food, abandoning regions, or in time even zones, with many other advantages, and to hit upon new methods of foresight in the process of adaptation. We have seen, however, that decisions of this sort, when frequently repeated, lead to the differentiation of active and passive races. We have likewise seen how each more available and nutritious food releases a surplus of energy which, when an external stimulus appears, can be directed toward new methods of foresight. But every change of habitat provides such a
64 stimulus. Thus the physical nature of our planet has made the

[62] ***Globus*, 1872, p. 124. See Lubbock, *Pre-historic Times*, pp. 227-52; MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, I I , 23-7. (Ed.)**

[68] ***Ancient Society*, p. 21. (Ed.)**

natural expansion of our species an original causal factor in culture history.[64]

With the surplus energy released by animal food primitive man was able to develop more effective weapons and better methods of hunting, which continually enlarged the range of his prey in the animal kingdom. He ventured with increasing success against the rodents, certain varieties of the dog and wild swine, the deer, and the bear.

The farther he went along this path—and we have proof that the men of the Stone Age already competed with the larger animals—the more the natural differences between the two sexes must have increased. The young girls and the mothers made poor hunting companions. The Polynesian women went so far as to catch small fish, and the Fuegian women, with their children strapped to their backs, waded in the water to gather shellfish, but their burdens made them unfitted to catch sea otters. On the higher hunting stage the woman's productive activities diverge from those of the man. Even the crudest weapons become the distinguishing implements of the male. The woman, fettered early and for many years by the duties of motherhood, no longer follows the man in his economic life, or follows him but halfway. The man braves the dangers of the chase in his search for dainty morsels, wresting them from fortune often only after long periods of hunger. The woman, with two lives at stake, can not take such chances. Her foresight must pursue another course, giving preference to poorer foods for the sake of a steadier supply. This inevitable divergence gives rise in time to a division of labor by sex.[65]

Doubtless the difference between the sexes in the matter of diet exerted an influence on the development of the secondary sexual characteristics. These are very striking in many species of animals, but almost never is the female sex distinguished by greater frailty and weakness. Indeed frequently, as in the ants, bees, butterflies, and birds of prey, precisely the opposite is true.
65 In all the races of man, however, the sexes are markedly dis-

[64] This explains why Lippert, in sections not herewith translated, treats at such length of the migrations of peoples. See *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 164-200; I, 455-77. (Ed.)

65 Ward comments that "this passage is as clear a picture of the actual transition as I find in the writings of anthropologists. . . ." *(Pure Sociology,* p. 352). (Ed.)

tinguished in average stature, musculature, and strength, and the difference is so great in some tribes that the two sexes seem to belong to two different races. Along with her smaller bodily proportions, however, woman frequently possesses the greater stamina and resistance. We may conclude that these secondary sexual characteristics are due in part to the divergence in the food habits of the two sexes and that the primitive human race did not yet possess them to any marked degree.

That primitive man was without foresight with respect to clothing needs no proof. What is commonly regarded as the first traces of clothing in tropical regions is shown elsewhere [66] to be merely ornament. True clothing, arising from the need of protection, did not originate until man's migration into higher latitudes.

That clothing was not first created by a sense of modesty has already been shown.[67] Material proofs of the existence of peoples without clothing, a sense of shame, or any ethical or esthetic embarrassment at the nakedness of all parts of the body exist in great number.[68] Meyer,[69] in his travels in New Guinea, found tribes on the east coast of Geelvink Bay who "go about entirely naked, without any clothing, even the slightest." The question occurred to this explorer, in view of the many stages of culture represented by different groups on the same island, "whether they have risen from a pure state of nature through their own initiative or external influences to a somewhat higher stage, for example, with a more developed sense of shame and many other emotional and intellectual qualities which more nearly approach us, or whether they have retrograded into this state of nature." We have already granted that the latter is possible in individual
66 cases, but we have also shown that it is in general far easier to explain the development of a sense of modesty from natural causes than the loss of an instinct of shame inherent in nature. Meyer himself concluded that nakedness is the true state of nature. Everywhere it is associated with a mode of living which indicates a relative nearness to such a state. In Cook's time many Australian tribes still went unclothed. "Both sexes go entirely

[66] Lippert, *Kultwrgeschichte,* I, 365-411. (Ed.)
[67] Above, pp. 16-18. (Ed.)
[68] For additional cases and discussion see Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 534-71; Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. 424-41. (Ed.)
«* *Globus,* XXV, 165.

naked, and it seems no more indecent to them to go bare from head to foot than it does to us to expose our hands and face."[70] Africa and America also furnish illustrations. Livingstone[71] found the Bava on the Zambesi, Baker the Latuka, and Schweinfurth[72] the Djur, Shilluk, and Dinka either entirely or for the most part without clothing, especially without any which might reflect a sense of shame.[73]

The use of tools severed the foresight of man forever from that of the lower animals and turned it into new channels, but how far back into primitive times it extends can by the very nature of the case never be known. Nevertheless man could scarcely have left his original habitat without these aids. The men of the Ice Age and those of the "kitchen middens" both possessed them.

It is not difficult to reconstruct their nature if we simply descend the evolutionary ladder furnished by savage peoples. When we exclude everything that must be regarded as an improvement and refinement in even the ruder tools of the savage, the stone and the staff in their natural form remain as the earliest implements. In contrast to the more modern bow, they represent the principle of *primary* tools in their simplest form. The basis of this principle is a correction, a reenforcement, or an imitation of the human organs themselves.[74] A stone held in the hand to crack a nut is only a more solid fist. Primitive **man** did not as yet shape it for that purpose nor even keep it as a permanent possession but made the discovery anew in each case
67 by selecting a suitable stone to protect his sensitive hand. Kapp would call such a stone an "external projection of the organs" of mastication. It was not as yet a grinding stone, but even in its most primitive use it was a valuable acquisition, for it freed a certain amount of organic energy which had formerly been consumed in the laborious chewing of hard-shelled foods.

Similarly the staff was an artificial extension of the arm, and the effective force of the latter increased with its length. Each staff seemed to fit the hand of an individual, and this quality

[70] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* III, 233.
[71] *Neue Missionsreisen,* p. 250.
[72] *erzen von Afrika,* I, 322, 163. (Ed.)
[73] Further examples in Waitz, *Anthropologic,* I, 317.
[74] Accurate but somewhat stilted is the term "external projection of an organ" (Kapp, *Grundlinien der Technik).* See Noire, Dos *Werkzeug.*

became the point of departure of private property. This is partly the reason for the great respect which this primitive implement enjoyed as a tool and weapon on higher stages of culture. In the form of the club, the staff obviously represents a union of arm and fist. But the artificial union of a stone and a staff to form a similar tool can not be ascribed to primitive times. Indeed, if it were possible to determine the time of this discovery, we should date a new epoch from it.

Primitive man could have had no dwellings but only camping places and, at best, the simplest provisions to protect them. For shelter against sun, wind, and the direct beating of the rain we find widespread among the lowest peoples a device aptly called the windbreak. Among the old Californian Indians this consisted of crudely interwoven twigs.[75] A similar device has been found among the Australians,[76] and also in transition to a half-inclosed hut among the Fuegians.[77] According to Tacitus,[78] the dwelling of the Finns of his time was no more than a hurdle of twigs. The Bushmen, who also use the simple windbreak, take us back, however, several steps nearer to primitive times. According to Fritsch, they sometimes make this wattled shelter out of the branches of growing shrubs and in this manner build
68 a sort of nest in the bush.

But none of these savage peoples under other circumstances despised the shelter of natural caves and subterranean recesses. They all were troglodytes on occasion. Both the Californians and the Bushmen used such caves or holes, and the more civilized Rock Tubus combine an open-air dwelling with adjoining sleeping quarters in a rock crevice. The men of the Ice Age used such caves where they were to be found, and survivals of the old custom are found on much later stages.[79] That caves and rock shelters, at least under certain climatic conditions, were of great importance to primitive man may be inferred with a high degree of certainty from the earliest forms of the ever conservative cult. It is an ancient custom to make the dwelling place the abode also of the dead. When, therefore, the oldest cult myths of so many peoples relate that all mankind originally issued from a

[75] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 249.
[76] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* III, 47.
[77] *Ibid.,* II, 55.
[78] *Germania* xlvi.
[79] See Hehn, *Kulturpflazen,* pp. 16, 436.

cave,[80] this indicates that former generations must at one time have dwelt in caves.

Equally current among the oldest groups of whom we have knowledge is the idea that the ancestral ghosts dwell in trees.[81] The scientific question thus arises whether primitive man did not in general live exclusively in trees, quitting them only gradually for other abodes. This hypothesis has been based mainly upon the relative similarity in bodily structure between man and the anthropoid apes. However, as we understand the doctrine of evolution, this similarity does not necessarily imply a close genealogical relationship. The common ancestor of the two lines may possibly be quite remote.[82] The unknown members of the
69 series, with organs still capable of development in different directions, would then certainly have to be excluded from a culture history of man.

To primitive man, living in a favorable climate, the chief desideratum in his abode must have been protection from dangerous animals. This was easily provided by blocking the entrance to a cave. Yet it can not be denied that the tree tops offered equal security. Even modern man, if trained to it, would not lack the agility needed to move about in the branches of trees. The Papuans on Dourga Strait in New Guinea have been seen to clamber with the nimbleness of apes from tree to tree over an impassible swamp along the coast, trying to follow a moving sloop. Their dwellings, however, were situated on dry ground beyond the morass.[83]

The name of "tree men" could also have been applied to the Gaberi Negroes of Central Africa, whose large dwellings in ceiba trees are described by Nachtigal.[84] Upon adjoining horizontal branches they erected a sort of wicker platform, which supported the little hut and its entire household, including even goats, dogs, and fowls. But even these perfect tree people also possess huts on the ground and regard their tree dwellings as refuges in time of danger. Of course, danger must have been of daily occurrence before the use of fire served to keep away the beasts of prey, and it is therefore still a question whether such a custom of spend-

[80] See below, pp. 510-11. (Ed.)
[81] See below, p. 521. (Ed)
[82] See Lull, *Organic Evolution,* p. 647. (Ed.)
[83] *Globus,* 1872, p. 215.
[84] *Sahara und Sudan,* II, 628-9.

ing the night in the trees is not derived from a more ancient and helpless age of man. Geiger has conjectured, with some plausibility, that men formerly lived in trees in the regions where the hammock is found.

It accords best with man's characteristic lack of specific physical adaptations and with the decisive influence which this has had on his history to assume that primitive man was able to adjust himself to different circumstances better than his more specialized descendants, and to be a cave dweller and a tree dweller at the same time. Certainly both habits must have exerted a selective influence upon his carriage and physique. But all these influences must have been definitely paralyzed when the use of tools and weapons became customary. This must have been the decisive factor in the complete differentiation of the hands and feet and in the development of upright carriage.

70 In order to comprehend correctly the origin and basis of human social organization, we must first of all attempt to eliminate certain current fallacies. We must guard against attributing to the beginning of things the conceptions of our own time, which are the product of a long struggle toward civilization—an error into which we are all too prone to fall. Ideas developed only on a high stage of civilization have intimately associated the sexual union, or mating, with marriage as the foundation of the family. From the standpoint of an unbiased culture history this association must be dissolved.[85] Mating or sexual intercourse and marriage as a social form in the strictest sense are two entirely distinct things. Only when we properly stress this distinction—and here we differ from Morgan, Bachofen, Lubbock, and others—can we arrive at a clear conception of the evolution of these important relationships. Sexual intercourse rests upon an impulse of the most elemental of instincts and stands very close to the group of reflex phenomena. Marriage, as the basis of the family organization in any of its forms, is the creation of social foresight. The two stand far apart in origin and purpose.[86]

The Tahitians a century ago preserved this distinction very

[85] Cf., Briffault, *Mothers*, II, 1-2. (Ed.)

[86] Failure to draw this fundamental distinction is responsible for much fallacious reasoning about the evolution of marriage institutions. See Introduction, pp. xxi-xxii. (Ed.)

clearly. Extreme freedom prevailed with respect to love alliances, and, although these unions based on affection were not always dissolved again immediately, they nevertheless obligated the parties to nothing except the accomplishment of their first and only object. Although they often endured a long time from choice, they did not constitute a marriage union. Indeed the Tahitians did not form such unions to indulge the primary instinct. Only the birth of a child caused the parents to decide whether they should contract marriage. No social institution was necessary to produce a child, but only to maintain it. If the parents had no other intention than to continue sexual intercourse, the cold logic of savagery suggested as the most obvious course the destruction of the young life. We show elsewhere[87] how often uncivilized man has taken this course. But if the child were reared from whatsoever motive—and there were others besides the instinct of mother love—then and then only did the two parties unite as man and wife, the mother reserving the support of the husband in return for the unequal burden which she assumed. Only this agreement, this mutual obligation for the
71 common maintenance and rearing of the child, did the Tahitians regard as a marriage union,[88] and therein they unquestionably followed age-old tradition.

Marriage had at first so little in common with the approach of the sexes in pursuance of the primary instinct that it even excluded such approach for the long duration of the suckling period. On the other hand, the union naturally stipulated mutual assistance in the cares of maintenance, especially in those relating to food, and thus led to the germ of what we call the "common household." The goal toward which the course of civilization has striven is here indicated. It is the combination of the two motives, originally entirely distinct. Its attainment, however, was still in the distant future, not only to primitive man, but to many later generations as well. Moral considerations should not prevent the student of culture from recognizing the replica of olden times in the folk life among the peasant classes in certain parts of Europe today. With them a very loose love union frequently precedes marriage, and the conclusion of the latter, as in Tahiti, does not take place until the occasion of a new responsi-

[87] *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 203-25. (Ed.)
[88] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* VI, 428.

bility compels a decision.[89] The cooperation of the man in the common household then becomes the tacitly demanded return for former concession. In primitive times the two disparate elements, which have become more and more closely associated in the course of the development of civilization, still stood completely isolated. This also accords with an age without foresight, when every impulse was its own object. We must therefore regard the intercourse of the sexes as an independent matter, while the care for progeny may assume various forms before it finds support in a marriage alliance.[90]

This state of things is indicated by all historical traditions and by countless surviving customs. Even the students of culture history find themselves in agreement on this matter.[91] The names they have chosen, however, seem to us to contribute more to the confusion than to the clarification of the subject, because they have been borrowed from later institutions. Ever since Bachofen[92] it has been customary to designate this state of sexual relations as "hetairism." Engels rightly objects to this word as denoting the extra-matrimonial intercourse of the sexes. Such was impossible in an age when matrimony did not as yet exist. If, however, we apply the term to every sort of sexual intercourse, we bring the whole matter again into confusion, from which even the "communal marriage" of Lubbock[93] does
72 not free it. We must insist that the term "marriage" be reserved for a later social creation.

The opposite view, which would ascribe some sort of marriage union to primitive man as the expression of an inherited instinct,[94] seems to find support in a comparison with certain forms of association in the animal world. A form of monogamous marriage does actually exist among the animals, and, while it is usually concluded only for the duration of the rearing of a brood, it lasts longer in certain species. But we have already emphasized the fact that animal instincts can not be regarded as forming in

[89] See Vinogradov, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 247. (Ed.)
[90] Cf., Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 395. (Ed.)
[91] For a discussion of the controversy which has raged more recently over the theory of "primitive promiscuity," see Appendix A. (Ed.)
[92] *Mutterrecht,* p. 10 *et passim.* (Ed.)
[93] *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 86. (Ed.)
[94] Cf., for example, Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 72; Tozzer, *Social Origins,* p. 145. This view involves both the animal-series and the instinct fallacies. See Introduction, pp. xvi-xviii. (Ed.)

their evolution a progressive series culminating in those of man.[95] Even the animal world itself does not reveal an evolutionary sequence of instincts paralleling the development of other species characteristics. Thus highly evolved social instincts are found in the low class of insects, while many higher animal classes lack them. The dog stands higher than many species of birds, but his instincts regarding sexual life present a sharp contrast to theirs. Some species of birds possess a true marriage, a living together of the parents for the purpose of the joint maintenance of the young.[96] That such an instinct does not belong to the entire class of birds, that its existence, moreover, is dependent upon apparently insignificant factors in their food habits, is shown by the comparison of a flock of chickens with a pair of doves. The necessity of placing food in the bill of the young pigeon forces the dove cock to cooperate in the affairs of the household, from which the rooster is released. The restriction in the former case has resulted in monogamy, whereas the guidance of the mother hen suffices for the more independent habits of the autophagous chick.

If we can draw from this comparison any conclusion as to primitive man, it can only be that the extraordinary diversity of life conditions, to which man was able to adjust as none of his fellow creatures could, precludes a line of development restricted by a full-fledged instinct of this sort. In other words, the institution of human marriage is not a subject of natural history but of culture history.[97] This thoroughly harmonizes with the multiplicity of its historical forms, which conform to the various changing conditions and habits of life.

If we look back, it becomes perfectly evident that we should least of all expect to find an institution of the nature of monogamous marriage at the very beginning of cultural development in
73 the primitive age of mankind. True marriage in the strict sense of the word, i.e., for the purpose of rearing children,[98] was not inevitable under primitive conditions. As long as the man had made no great progress in the use of tools and weapons, he had no

95 See above, p. 23. (Ed.)

96 See Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 29-30. (Ed.)

97 The distinction between the "organic" and the "superorganic" could scarcely be more clearly expressed. (Ed.)

98 "The primary end of marriage is to beget and bear offspring, and to rear them until they are able to take care of themselves" (Ellis, *Love and Virtue,* p. 63). (Ed.)

advantage over the woman in the food-quest. He could offer nothing to a possible household which the woman herself, except for a short interruption, could not provide. The life of low tribes today shows us that the mother is not hampered in any work by the burden of her child. The nourishment of the child took place only in the natural way; hence its mother alone sufficed to care for it.

As for the union of lovers, which is only falsely called marriage, nature herself long stood in the way of its becoming a durable monogamous association. Among the animals the excitation of the sexual instinct emanates from the disposition of the female, and this recurs only after considerable intervals and for limited periods. When it is detected by the keen senses of the male', the primary instinct is aroused and finds immediate expression like a reflex response. The male, unlike the female, is always susceptible, so that the periodicity of the female's disposition exercises a sort of hygienic regulation of the instinct, which is itself not without danger to the individual.

The situation could hardly have been otherwise with primitive man. Certain low tribes apparently still preserve remnants of a primitive pairing season.[99] It seems to be lost in civilized man. In its place there appears in both sexes a more constant disposition, which might now be cited as a distinguishing characteristic of the species. This may have several causes, but the most important is the power of ideation, developed in man and in him alone. It takes the place of the material stimulus and can by its very nature be active at any time. But, as we have seen, we can not assume a high development of this mental faculty in primitive man. He lived under conditions which themselves exercised that hygienic limitation which civilization, among other advantages, expects from its secondary instinct of modesty and its social institutions. Hence we must not regard the condition of primitive humanity, even without the institution of marriage, as in any way comparable to the so-called renaissance of paradise brought about on certain South Sea Islands shortly after their
74 discovery by the combination of a virtual state of nature with the fragments of civilization of English sailors. So even in this

[99] The evidence is assembled in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 81-92. On the probabilities of a pairing season among the anthropoid apes, see Yerkes, *Great Apes,* p. 542. (Ed.)

direction regulation by a social institution of marriage was not yet necessary.

As for a monogamous marriage, nature herself stood squarely in its way. Under the conditions of nature every impulse of the primary instinct is in abeyance throughout the period of suckling. In the animal world this lasts but a fraction of a year. But with long-lived primitive man it extended four or five years. During it the mother had to renounce sexual intercourse,[100] but there was no natural inducement for the man to do likewise. So nature could not possibly lead to monogamy on this or any stage.

How then could nature be overcome? Only by progress in the nourishment of infants—by the grinding and cooking of foods and especially by the introduction of animal milk as a substitute food. Before these advances, any attempt to struggle against nature would undoubtedly have been detrimental to the species. Even today the mortality of children at the time of weaning is very high among peoples of lower culture and those who, like the Eskimos, do not possess a substitute food. Every attempt to cut short the nursing period in the interests of the marital relation would necessarily have increased the infant mortality rate, and a group which followed this course would have become extinct. This situation was reversed only by progress in the food-quest, especially by the introduction of animal milk. Groups with a shorter suckling period then became the more populous and survived in their competition with others. This is one of the reasons why domination over the earth has fallen to the peoples who have passed through the pastoral stage. But since the domestication of cattle with the production of milk is found only on a comparatively high cultural stage and originally with but a very small fraction of mankind, it follows that there must have been a very long period during which man could not have made any substantial progress toward the establishment of matrimonial institutions in the stricter sense.[101]

But although primitive man must be denied any form of a true marriage union, a conclusion which is borne out by abundant

[100] Although such restraint might seem strange in the "child of the moment," it is well authenticated by ethnographical evidence. See Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem,* pp. 141, 165-7, 174-7, 186. (Ed.)

[101] Thomas, with much justice, criticizes Lippert's emphasis on the importance of animal milk as a "particularistic explanation of social change" *(Social Origins,* p. 22). (Ed.)

75 survivals on later stages, it is by no means to be maintained that he lacked every sort of association. On the contrary, the sex need has always been but one of many motives leading to association. The animal world again offers a number of analogies. The wolf and the hyena dog associate for hunting, grazing animals for finding good pasturage and protection at night, and birds for orientation on migration routes. In all these cases a social group has recourse with profit to the memory of all its individuals.

These associations^ of utility are variously related to those of necessity, which we may term the natural or primary ones.[102] In the social birds, for example, the former association destroys the latter forever. As soon as the young starling can feed itself, it is introduced by its parents into a larger society, which is composed of the old and young of the neighborhood. This flock, led by the more experienced, now seeks the best food in orchards, meadows, and vineyards and the safest night perches in reed marshes. Its numbers are augmented from time to time by the accession of neighboring flocks. In this community they then seek and find suitable routes to the open tracts of the south, in it they pass by far the larger portion of the year, and in it they return to us. Then, however, the association of the sexes completely dissolves the larger one for a short period. In certain species of deer this dissolution of the herd is not complete, since only the mother animal leaves the herd and she only partially withdraws for the period of lactation or rather forms with her young a smaller group within the larger. The model society of the bees is founded upon the type of association which we may call secondary in contradistinction to the primary one of the sexes. The males, however, make practically no contribution to the maintenance of the society. They are well cared for by the females solely in order that they may enter into the sexual union at the proper time. This, however, in no way dissolves the secondary association but rather continually establishes it anew. The hive society, although it may occasionally be enlarged or strengthened by the addition of strange broods, is nevertheless usually a family union in the strictest sense of the word as a result of its possessing only one mother bee. However, on ac-

[102] This remotely suggests Cooley's "primary groups," one of which is also the family {*Social Organization*, pp. 23-31). (Ed.)

count of the absolute improvidence of the males there does **not** exist even the semblance of a marriage relationship.

76 The purpose of all this is merely to show that the advancing care for life can create many different forms of association **not** necessarily based on marriage in either the strict or the erroneous sense of the word, and to show that the union of the sexes, which is everywhere called forth by the primary instinct, can enter into various relations with them. A connecting link is the *family* in its broadest and most indefinite sense. In this sense the family is older than marriage.[103] It plays its important role in culture history long before the marriage union. Indeed it is preeminently the family which gives rise to the secondary associations, although they rest on an entirely different principle. The bee society is as a rule only a single large family, since all its members, who are united by the same social foresight, are also usually children of one and the same mother. A flock of migrating birds unites for a practical purpose, but as a matter of fact it is in many cases also a kinship organization. Those who live in the same locality have the greatest incentive to unite, and the fact of living in the same neighborhood is usually the result of common descent, because migratory birds habitually return to the starting point of their first journey and consequently to their cradle.

In this sense we can also regard the human family as the basis of all social organization, as the point of departure of all social foresight. Its forms, beyond the sole possible primitive one, have been extremely varied. The primitive form, however, is reflected in all its successors until a comparatively high stage of culture, when it is completely subordinated to a later form, only to regain once more, however, a portion of its old importance. It owes its great strength and tenacity to nature herself, whose creation it is. Its simplest form is a mother and child.[104] It required no reflection to establish this union, no agreement or contract to bind the mother to her child. Both, however, were

103 "The family is the institution, and it was antecedent to marriage" (Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. 348-9). "Marriage is rooted in the family rather than the family in marriage" (Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 72). Cf., also Ward, *Pure Sociology,* p. 353. (Ed.)

104 Sumner also believes that "a woman with an infant in her arms is what we see as far back as our investigations lead us" *(War,* p. 43). *(Ed)*

necessary for the inclusion of the father in the family, which therefore did not take place until much later.[105]

Nature itself teaches the mother to regard her child as a part of herself, even after it has left her womb. During its early years, under primitive conditions, it belongs to its mother like a member of her body, by which alone it lives. Mother love is the first social instinct,[106] and a mother-right the first social order.[107] Since the child is a part of the mother herself, she has a right to it more indubitable than any other legal relationship of primitive times. The stern side of this right is revealed in a later
77 age.[108] In times of distress, when self-interest and the interest of society tremble in the balance, when the primary instinct conflicts with the social, and self-preservation with mother love, mother-right, with the cold logic characteristic of primitive times, decides in favor of the more immediate advantage, of the one directly perceptible to the senses. The child is the victim of the conflict and has never an advocate. When developing cult ideas have sanctioned this sacrifice of mother love, there appears for the first time a perversion of human foresight, which is frequently found where the more primitive foresight comes into conflict with the more advanced. Among savage peoples of some culture, according to evidence of the most incontrovertible sort, infanticide is an exceedingly popular method of primitive foresight.[109] Mankind would have been nipped in the bud, as it were, if this expedient had been common with primitive man. We must therefore assume that his food cares did not drive him to it in his original home, but rather that he was forced to it only after he had begun to wage a harder struggle for existence in more remote regions. But the formal right of the mother dates from the time of the simplest social forms.

Thus by nature mother and nursling form a tiny social group, the germ of all forms of the family. The deeper we delve into primitive times, the more impossible becomes the existence of

105 Westermarck, however, regards the father as an original element in the human family (*Human Marriage*, I, 37-53). (Ed.)

106 See above, p. 23. (Ed.)

107 See Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 56. (Ed.)

108 See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte*, I, 203-25. (Ed.)

109 For cases of infanticide and discussion of "population policy" see Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem*, pp. 135-307; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1885-98; IV, 1043-54; Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 308-21. (Ed.)

the baby without this original association, which is created by nature and based on the sacrifice of mother love. But the primitive age also provided that this union should not be dissolved when the immediate compulsion of nature ceased. We recall that weaning and puberty must then, presuming a southern climate, have come very close together. As a result of this circumstance the adolescent child necessarily became personally aware of his absolute dependence upon his mother, and the consciousness of this fact carried over into the rapidly approaching time of his personal independence. This consciousness, which is an enduring one in man alone of all living beings, developed into a sort of instinctive esteem for the mother and became the cement of an association which in even the most highly endowed animals is dissolved again by nature.

None of the nobler social sentiments seems so deeply and universally ingrained in man as the high esteem for the mother, the love of her child for her. Explorers like Livingstone have heard the name of the mother escape like a prayer from the lips of callous savages in moments of sudden fright, and in those extensive regions where a special cultural development has
78 reduced woman as such to a miserable slave, the woman as mother, in sharp contrast thereto, enjoys unbounded respect.[110] Deep in the interior of Africa, in the regions of crude Mohammedanism as well as in the "heathen states," the person of the king's mother stands even today, in contrast to all the other folkways, like a sacred image taken from the sepulcher of a long vanished age. And it is this same maternal figure which the oldest cults of all peoples have set upon the altar. These are survivals which extend beyond primitive times. Their value is betrayed by the mute strangeness with which they stand out in stark contradiction to their surroundings. Ethnology would seek in vain among savage peoples for a feeling toward the father of equal depth and tenderness; even among civilized peoples a fine distinction between the two sentiments should be easy to recognize.

We have good reason to assume that the concept of the father in our sense was unknown to primitive times.[111] This idea even in much later times was subject to many vicissitudes and changes

110 See below, pp. 249-51. (Ed.)

111 On the primitive ignorance of paternity, see Appendix B. (Ed.)

in meaning. A connection between father and child could not have been perceived by the latter before the creation of marriage in the stricter sense. There was no perceptible bond between them until the father participated in the support of the child, for the physiological connection could not be discovered by the child. But even had it been perceived, it would have been without significance for primitive social organization, as is proved by many much later societies.

On the other hand, about the mother as a center there naturally formed a small human group united by living together from earliest childhood on. Not a decade elapsed between the weaning of a female child and the appearance of another generation. This short period could not in most cases have been enough to make the young mother forget her relation to her own mother. Her children were also associated through her with the same group. No division of labor as yet tore them away. Girls and boys, the latter not yet possessing artificial weapons, roamed together in search of fruits, seeds, grubs, and shellfish. The young, without special incentive, would no more have rejected the experience of their elders in seeking out the places richest in booty than young birds would seek migratory routes far from their parents. Thus with man, as with the birds of passage, there developed of necessity a group in which the younger were chained to the older by habit, the youngest by natural dependence, from which they could only gradually escape. The girls of the group aided in
79 binding the young men to it. They belonged to the whole group as objects of sexual indulgence until maternity put an end to this life for years. Consanguinity as yet formed no obstacle to sexual intercourse. The nature of the case still forbade any such limitation of choice. A group of this sort may be called a "tribe." The terms "clan" and "gens" should be reserved for a later historical phenomenon.

At an early period the bond which held such a tribe together must have been reenforced by the first naive speculation, formulating the concept of consanguinity. This may be assigned to a very early age, for it is hardly beyond the range of thought of primitive man, which was limited to what concerned his own person. Moreover, this concept, as we shall repeatedly see, is one of the stock of ideas common to all mankind without exception, and it must therefore have been acquired very early.

Finally, its very substance gives evidence of a naive and superficial mode of combining perceptions of the external world.

Such inferences of primitive times passed over as facts into the mental inheritance of mankind. The peculiar manner in which the ideas thus arrived at and transmitted have continued to operate as factors in culture history long after their basis has been destroyed by later knowledge constitutes one of the most interesting mysteries of cultural evolution, which seems at times to follow strict logic and yet so often to pursue steps so utterly illogical as to provoke our amazement. We have elsewhere[112] called this remarkable and significant phenomenon the *law of compatibility,*[113] This law seems capable of explaining a large number of logical capers in the development of popular ideas which are surprising often to the point of drollness, and of showing that it is always fundamentally the same logic which, by treating elements of entirely dissimilar origin as of equal value, produces forms which can no longer find the slightest basis in the critically examined realities of nature.

The nature of this law may be well observed in the subject at hand, and for that reason we mention it here. To primitive man, with powers of observation such as he had, it appeared, and thereafter stood unshaken, that it was equality or rather unity of blood in a very literal sense which established what we call kinship, or more precisely consanguinity or blood relationship—a term still expressive of the early conception—and that this
80 unity of the vital fluid had its source in the mother and in her alone. From this fundamental conception there were then deduced with all logical consistency a multitude of later ideas, practical courses of action, legal principles, and customs of every sort. But human discernment advanced, criticizing and correcting itself, and arrived much later at the fact that the father too has a material part in the creation of a new life. Indeed in a certain period of sharp reaction this view gained the upper hand so completely that the child was believed to be derived from the paternal substance alone.[114]

Now one might expect that this new idea would necessarily

[112] *Religionen,* p. 4.

[118] Spencer also calls attention to "how readily primitive men, low in intelligence and without knowledge, may entertain conceptions which **are** mutually destructive" *(Principles of Sociology,* **I, 171-2).** (Ed.)

[114] See Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. **497-8.** (Ed.)

not only have corrected and supplanted the old conception, **but** also at the same time have done away with the ideas, courses of action, legal principles, and customs logically deduced from it, to set up new ones in their place. This, however, did not occur. Rational thought had not yet achieved dominance. Strict logic had produced the deductions, but it was not logic which preserved them in the life of mankind. The individual accepted them without verification as a treasure of group experience. Their logical foundation had given way, but the deductions themselves continued in full force. Their existence was sufficiently justified by the fact that they were part of the treasure of experience handed down from the past. Men, in whose minds rational thought had not yet attained undisputed dominion, no more doubted the reality of these traditional ideas than they did the existence of the sun and moon. Thenceforth a new fundamental conception and a complex of old deductions existed side by side in spite of their inherent contradiction. This relation is what we call compatibility in culture history. It sometimes even happens that man is satisfied to draw a practical deduction from new knowledge in one direction only, and in all else to preserve the old conception itself along with the new one, ignoring their contradiction. In every such case there appear phenomena which, by an extension of an expression used by Max Miiller in mythology, might be called the irrational in culture history.

Among the Choctaws on the Indian reservations the father is now, as with us, the dominant element in the family. Why then must it always be the mother's uterine brother, the maternal uncle, who places the child in school?[115] It is a manifestation of the principle that the uncle, not the father, is of the same blood
81 as the child and is its nearest male relative. Such a phenomenon in its isolation we call a cultural *survival*[119]

We can easily understand how primitive man arrived at this conception of blood relationship if we lay aside all modern physiological knowledge and look at the facts as primitive man saw them. To him the participation of the man in the sex act seemeci to serve only to stanch the woman's flow of blood. To this stanching a new life owed its existence. It was a new

[115] Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity*, p. 168. (Ed.)
[116] See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 16, 70-159; *Anthropology*, pp. 16-18.

manifestation of that blood. The child was formed from the blood of its mother.[117]

Accordingly all those in whatsoever generation who were descended—in the maternal line, of course—from the same original mother possessed the same blood. They were all blood brethren, in a literal sense blood related. This relationship embraced the whole group or tribe. According to its basic principle no degrees of kinship were conceivable. Every individual member possessed the same blood, the same bond of kinship encompassed the whole tribe, and the only distinction that could assert itself was that between the different generations. Through such distinctions alone was the way paved to degrees of relationship in our modern sense.

This fact is perfectly confirmed by the rudimentary systems of consanguinity of savage peoples, upon the investigation of which Morgan[118] and Lubbock[119] in particular, each in his own way, have expended the greatest pains. Morgan deserves the credit for having assembled with extraordinary labor an imposing mass of material, but Lubbock seems to us often more correct in his interpretation of the facts. We agree with him that even the most surprising agreement between the oldest systems of consanguinity of peoples on opposite sides of the earth does not prove their close ethnological affinity, but is rather only evidence that the same conclusions have been drawn everywhere from the same natural elements.[120]

But we must also dissent somewhat from Lubbock in that we can not accept his distinction between the first stage of social organization and the second. He maintains that, in the former, relationship was based purely and simply on tribal organization, whereas in the latter it was traced through the mother.[121]
82 In our opinion his second stage is merely a continuation of the first, and the distinction does not involve a new basic principle. Even on the first stage, which is most eloquently represented by the kinship systems of the Hawaiians and the Kingsmill Islanders,[122] the very idea of the tribe was dependent upon

117 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1938. (Ed.)
116 *Systems of Consanguinity.*
119 *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 149-204.
120*Ibid.,* p. 171. (Ed.)
121I *Ibid.,* p. 200. (Ed.)
122*Ibid.,* Table I (p. 166).

possession of a common ancestral mother and the consequent community of blood.

According to the evidence of these ancient systems, primitive man was satisfied to distinguish between membership and non-membership in the tribe. Every one who did not actually belong to the tribe must have been regarded as alien, for we must assume that primitive man, with his entirely undeveloped historical sense and his mere germ of a social organization, preserved no tradition of the possible remote kinship between one tribe and another. If a part of a tribe became separated, it became actually estranged from the parent group in a very few generations, and historical recollection did not as yet extend far enough to preserve the nature of its genealogical connection.

The provisions of these primitive systems bear the stamp of that uncompromising logical consistency which so frequently characterizes primitive times. Whoever was not alien belonged to the tribe, and because there was only one blood in the tribe, each member was related to every other in the very same way. How indeed could the blood, derived in each case from the same source, have been altered by the nearness or remoteness of the connection? The word "consanguine" (of the same blood) is much more in keeping with the sense of primitive times than is the more usual term "related." In view of the above, a child could not be in any higher degree consanguine with its own mother than with its most remote collateral relative, provided he belonged to the same tribe. Hence the language of tribes which have preserved these primitive conceptions had no occasion to develop words to designate degrees of consanguinity or relationship in our sense. All that was distinguishable within the same general consanguinity were the different generations or age-
83 grades[12S] within the tribe. Only for these could primitive man have originated distinguishing names. But the tribe did not discard this vocabulary when from any cause it advanced to a classification of degrees of relationship in a later sense. It merely transferred the old names to the new concepts.

The system of the Kingsmill Islanders will serve as an example, although the terminology can naturally be given only in translation. According to this ancient system my mother's brother is

[123] See Rivers, *Social Organization*, pp. 136-9. (Ed.)

called my "father," his son my "brother," his son or my uncle's grandson my "child male," and his son or my uncle's great-grandson my "grandchild male." Likewise my father's sister, my mother's sister, and my own mother are all my "mothers," and my father's brother my "father." The sons of all these mothers and fathers are my "brothers," their grandsons my "children," and their great-grandsons my "grandchildren." Also my grandfather's brother is my "grandfather," my brother's son my "child," and this "child's" child my "grandchild." Likewise my sister's sons are my "children," etc.[124]

This system, which, by the way, is primitive only in this one respect[125] since it has already adopted kinship through the father, seems, with the many mothers and fathers which it assigns to every person and the children and grandchildren which it attributes to the childless, completely puzzling and devoid of all logic if we insist on regarding it as a system of relationship in our sense. However, it is only a proof that this island group has preserved in its language a survival from the primitive age when consanguinity in the tribe was regarded as self-evident, but not degrees of consanguinity, because according to strict logic the latter could not be reconciled with a general identity of blood.

Therefore the names which we now translate, and perhaps justly, as father, mother, child, etc., certainly had no such meaning originally, but designated purely and simply the different age-groups within a general and identical relationship. If we place ourselves in the system as "we," these names doubtless once meant respectively only the oldest, the old, we, the young, the younger or small, the smallest. All those in our own age-grade, those covered by "we," are our "brothers." This holds true of
84 the members of every age-grade; all fathers, for example, are "brothers" to each other. The other designations naturally shift according to the generation to which the speaker belongs. In this way at the same time the only natural degrees of subordination among tribal members coordinate in blood were sufficiently characterized. It is still customary among the North American

[124] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 166. This is an example of a "classificatory" system of relationship, as opposed to a "descriptive" system like our own. For a detailed differentiation of the two systems, see Wissler, *Social Anthropology,* pp. 167-72. (Ed.)

[125] See Rivers, *Social Organization,* pp. 177-82. (Ed.)

Indians for people to address one another by titles corresponding to their age relation.[126]

Not until a tribe had advanced from this primitive condition to the point of distinguishing the degrees of actual genealogical connection and giving them special names, did the older terms undergo that restriction of meaning which renders their translation so open to misinterpretation. We can readily perceive that the old indiscriminate use of age or generation names for degrees of relationship was in keeping with the actual life conditions in a tribal community and that there was no need to define kinship more accurately so long as circumstances remained unchanged. The child, when he outgrew his mother's care, became independent, and nobody possessed a special duty of guardianship over him. Leading the life of the tribe, he properly belonged to it alone. No individual, but only the experience of the older generations, could compel his submission.

But we can hardly conceive of the relation of the "mothers" of a tribe to the nursing children as communal in this sense.[127] Just as the germ of social organization is found in the peculiar relation of mother and child, so too the first impulse toward progress in the conception of kinship is probably to be sought in the same relationship. It is hardly conceivable that even the language of primitive times did not possess, besides the age-grade terms, a special word for this relation, a word which for some reason or other we do not encounter in the systems. In this connection the well-known fact suggests itself that many languages have two words for a parent: one the pet name heard in the nursery, the other announcing the degree of relationship. By the former word without further qualification the child designates its own mother. There was probably a term of this sort even in primitive times to denote this unique relationship as such, while the names for mother in the systems applied merely to the women of the higher age-grade. Perhaps we ourselves still harbor an instinctive feeling of this sort. We are ready to call any old woman "mother," but we address only our actual mothers with the pet name of baby talk.

85 As has already been brought out, it is impossible to speak of matrimonial relations within a primitive group without mixing

[126] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 168. (Ed.)
[127] See Darwin, *Descent of Man,* II, 359. (Ed.)

concepts. Any source which might shed light upon the nature of the intercourse of the sexes would certainly, however, be significant. Morgan's later work, to be sure, would seem to afford us a fairly clear insight into these primitive conditions. He calls the organization described above not inaptly the "consanguine family" and distinguishes from it as the next stage of development a type of group marriage, for which he borrows the term "punaluan family" from the Hawaiian system of relationship.[128] In the former, the consanguine family, the boundaries between the different generations are said to have acted as legal obstacles to sexual intercourse, while each individual age-grade formed a marriage group. Thus all "fathers" and "mothers" had intercourse with each other polyandrously and polygynously, and likewise all "brothers" and "sisters," while intercourse between members of the two generations was prohibited.[129] The advance to the "punaluan family" then took place allegedly through a tendency to extend the obstacles to sexual intercourse into the individual age-grades themselves, separating brothers and sisters in the modern sense or rather the children of the same mother. In this way there resulted a group or community of brothers- and sisters-in-law living in communal intercourse, from which were excluded, however, the true sisters of the brothers-in-law *(punalua)* and the true brothers of the sisters-in-law. Natural selection then took care of further progress in the direction of similar restrictions against close inbreeding.[130]

The foundation of this system, however, is entirely inadequate, for it is really based on a misunderstanding of the systems of consanguinity in question. We must not fall into the error of regarding the terms of the Kingsmill and Hawaiian systems in our modern sense and of interpreting them according to genealogical systems of a very recent type. Only if we do so, only if we conceive that all the brothers in one age-grade regarded all the men in the next higher group as their fathers in a modern sense and all in the next lower as their true sons, does it seem to follow that each age-grade necessarily constituted an exclusive marriage group from which members of the next higher and next lower generations were debarred. The reader may decide from

128 Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 384. (Ed.)
129*bid.*, pp. 401-18. (Ed.)
130 *Ibid,*, pp. 424-46. (Ed.)

86 the above whether Morgan has not given the names too definite a meaning. If he has, his interpretation rests on a weak foundation.

The situation is similar with respect to the alleged advance to the "punaluan family." Morgan[131] bases it on the fact that the more advanced kinship systems of the Indians seek to distinguish in name between the true father and the mother's brother and father's brother. We must admit this advance, although it exceeds somewhat the limits of this chapter. Of the eighteen systems compared by Lubbock,[132] fourteen attempt to distinguish the mother's brother from the true father by restricting the old name to the latter and choosing a new one for the former. The Japanese call him the "second little father;" all the other thirteen systems use a word translated as "uncle." It must have seemed less important to differentiate the father's brother from him, and only eight of the systems attempted to do so. The Micmacs and Japanese choose the term "little father;" three systems add a word translated by the prefix "step-" and probably meaning little more than "strange;" the others use "uncle" for the father's brother also.

In a beautiful example of compatibility Lubbock has furnished at the same time an excellent demonstration that the systems which have thus advanced must also be the most recent. Although a correction was undertaken in the names of the older generation, those of the younger, being of less importance, were often left unchanged. Thus in many of these systems my mother's brother is, to be sure, my "uncle," but his son is still called my "brother" and his grandson my "son." Such a combination seems highly illogical and inconsistent. It is only explicable by the hypothesis that in these systems "father" was formerly used in place of "uncle," in other words that these systems are the more recent and have resulted from the improvement of older ones.

Now Morgan again invests the old names with a modern meaning when he makes the uncle's loss of the name of father equivalent to an exclusion from the community of sexual indulgence, or rather derives it therefrom. Since this connection does not seem self-evident to us, we shall have to seek, in its proper place, other causes for this development, especially as we

[131] *Ancient Society,* pp. 437-8. (Ed.)
[132] *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 166. (Ed.)

are unable to recognize in the circumstances of the maternally organized family of primitive times a material basis for the tendency to establish marriage restrictions. Moreover, Morgan appealed for this only to the effects of natural selection and
87 accordingly left it open to doubt by what chance man might have been brought to this course.

In this connection, to anticipate further, we may name two out of the many possible factors which could have led to this advance in nomenclature. They both belong to a much later age, so that we shall have to discuss them again in connection with other phenomena, where they will appear in their true light. The first factor is the importance of the father appearing with the development of a marriage institution in the strict sense. Although the mother's uterine brother had formerly been the child's nearest male relative in the tribe, he had to yield as soon as the procreator was recognized as the true father. He would then have to receive a distinguishing name, the new one in the fourteen systems mentioned above.

The second factor is that of exogamy, which appears at a much later time and among a more limited number of tribes. Morgan without adequate grounds rejects this phenomenon together with the name given it by McLennan.[133] But there exists an overwhelming array of facts and survivals which prove that a later form of marriage in connection with the reconciliation of previously isolated tribes brought it about that a man could win a wife only from a different tribe. But since kinship was still reckoned through the mother, exogamy necessarily produced a situation where the father was always a stranger to the tribe of his child. Even though he himself, as the procreator of the child, might be included among its "fathers," this could no longer be the case with his brothers. As strangers to the tribe, they could not be counted among the fathers of the tribe without a distinguishing auxiliary name. Thus can be explained the other improvement over the kinship nomenclature of primitive times.

Thus we are left with no support for conceiving of any restriction on the intercourse of the sexes in primitive times other than that offered by nature herself. Only in so far as nature ex-

[188] **Morgan, *Ancient Society*, pp. 511-15; McLennan, *Ancient History*,** p. 41. (Ed.)

eluded the youngest and oldest generations, can intercourse have been confined to a few proximate age-grades. Within these groups a man associated with several women and a woman with several men.[134] Indeed there have been preserved until late historical times some very eloquent survivals, from which it is apparent that this practice was once regarded as a lawful state. Some of them have been more than survivals, and others have shriveled
88 into a form so harmless that they have been able thus to survive until today. Among the former is the exposure of maturing girls to the will of all the tribal members, an ancient practice which exists today in West Africa exactly as the writers of antiquity reported it with astonishment of the peoples of Syria and Babylonia. It includes a particular form of religious prostitution and a number of historical wedding customs. The second group is represented by similar customs in our time. A more detailed discussion of these practices will be reserved until later.[185] We merely mention them here as authority for our view that in primitive times the supply of women must have been esteemed by the tribe as a common source of pleasure, the enjoyment of which should be denied to no one who belonged to the tribe when the time was ripe for it.

Nevertheless it would be a mistake to depict the animal nature of these relations too vividly.[186] Bachofen, who first conceived and demonstrated the revolutionary but now accepted idea of an earlier condition of the family, based his conclusions, not on the ethnographical facts of today, but almost exclusively on an enormous acquaintance with the literature of antiquity, and thus, following the taste of his time, introduced and interwove myth and symbolism into his presentation in a way which does not always further his cause. By thus introducing the term "swamp reproduction" for the age of promiscuous unions,[137] he suggests in mankind a condition of exuberant fecundity comparable with the teeming fertility of nature in the humid soil of the equatorial jungles. This idea is very much in need of correction.

We must take into account the natural intervals in the sexual

134 See Appendix A. (Ed.)

135 See below, pp. 207-22. (Ed.)

136 Ethnography indicates, contrary to the popular notion, that savages are sexually cold rather than the reverse. See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1496-7. (Ed.)

137 Bachofen, *Mutterrecht,* pp. 10, 20, 50, *et passim.*

impulse, the lack of the stimulus of the imagination, the absence of the love motive, the all-exhausting food cares, the mother's long period of renunciation, her early fading due to incessant labor and the burden of care for her children, and many other considerations. We can not possibly regard the tribes of primitive times as especially populous. The difficulty of rearing children set a limit to rapid increase. Along with a low birth rate, the mortality among the aged must have been considerable owing to the lack of any provision for the infirm. Thus the group probably always had but a limited number of members. Moreover, since it had no relations of any kind with any other tribe, since it was surrounded by a ring of enemies, of "barbarians,"
89 each group was dependent upon itself in regard to its sexual needs. Endogamy prevailed as the natural, because the only possible, state of things.[138]

It is easy to calculate how limited the opportunity for satisfaction must have been, as far as the men were concerned. If we assume the numerical proportion of the sexes to have been approximately equal, all the men except the boys and the very aged would have constituted an active element. The number of available women, however, would have been greatly reduced by immaturity, the duty of nursing, and natural periods. Thus even with an equal distribution of the sexes the tribe might frequently have experienced a lack of available women, all the more so if we assume that the law of the preponderance of male births operated also in primitive times. Consequently even under such simple conditions and in spite of the liberty of indulgence a considerable measure of abstinence was imposed by nature herself.

From the point of view of the other sex the situation was reversed. The woman did not lack attention from the moment of maturity on; indeed she was threatened by an excess of indulgence. But she paid for it sooner or later with a heavy burden and years of forced denial. If this maternal duty of renunciation, still held sacred by many savage African tribes, were broken, the result was a loss in the numbers of the tribe. A group in

[188] Cf., Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 401; Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 482; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1597-8. Contrary views on original endogamy are expressed in McLennan, *Ancient History*, pp. 109-20; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 641; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, II, 207; Wilken, *Verspreide Oeschriften*, I, 371-2. (Ed.)

which the nursing mothers were not inviolable would have degenerated and become extinct. As soon, however, as a certain measure of foresight arose, it harbored another danger of a similar nature. The prospect of a subsequent period of renunciation led to attempts to compensate for it in advance. This custom, still widespread today, can not have been conducive to the fruitfulness of the unions.

Practically nothing remains, therefore, which would lead us to compare the birth rate and population growth of primitive times to the luxuriant vegetation of swamps incubated by the tropical sun. On the contrary, we can assume only an extremely slow rate of increase. So long as each person in general sought his own food, and no cooperation or division of labor, in short no socially organized foresight, existed, a minimum rate of increase in the tribe would not be felt as a drawback. But with
90 every advance in organization the weaknesses of this condition must have become more perceptible. It will be our next task to acquaint ourselves with the various ways and means which led in one way or another to new social forms.

This first social state of mankind may be called the *primitive family.*[139] In it the fundamental constructive principle is matrilineal descent, the determination of membership by derivation from the same mother. Were it desirable to designate this position of the mother, which is at first only of genealogical significance, in a different sense, in terms of a principle of social organization, it might be called "primitive mother-right." The qualifying adjective is necessary, for two new factors of progress shortly appear, a division of labor and a marriage union, which distinguish it from the mother-right of a later stage, mother-right in the strict sense of the word. When the woman as mother, through her position gained on the first stage, acquires control of the organized labor in woman's economic sphere, and when, no longer unconditionally prostituted to the men of the tribe, she demands through the marriage union the cooperation of the man in the support of the household, she elevates herself to an actually dominant position in the home.[140]

We have thus far barely touched the question of the relations of these matrilineal primitive families to each other. There is,

139 See below, Chap. VI. (Ed.)
140 See below, Chap. VII. (Ed.)

however, very little to add. We need only mention that the discoverers of New Zealand and Australia all emphasize the complete dispersion of the population into tiny groups, very similar to our primitive family, which lived utterly without connection with each other, indeed in a perpetual state of war. Wherever, as in New Zealand, cannibalism was superimposed on this disorganized condition, the discoverers could not avoid predicting the future downfall of the people. It seemed that they must inevitably exhaust and consume one another. Each tribe regarded its neighbor as a herd of wild animals from which a piece of meat might be obtained if opportunity presented. Reprisals would then follow. The tribes organized against one another not so much for war as for hunting.

And yet there can be no doubt that all these tribes, in so far as they are of the same racial type, can only have originated by fission from older ones. As to the reasons for their estrangement, it seems necessary merely to repeat in brief what has already been stated above. In as much as the principle of blood unity, logically adhered to, does not recognize distinctions and
91 degrees of kinship, it could not become the basis for a system of varying degrees of relationship between separate tribes. As long as a group remembered that a neighboring tribe, which had perhaps broken away to secure a better food supply, was related to itself by blood through its mothers, the latter was not an alien tribe. Its people were full and complete members of the former, even if they gathered their mussels in a different pond, for these things did not disturb the old family principle. But when this memory faded, there was no longer any conceivable connection or tie between them; the other tribe were strangers, and only as such was their independence recognized. On a later stage we shall encounter a number of artificial means by which tribal membership was preserved, so that tribes dwelling interspersed among others or scattered over many miles of territory could always recognize their own members, but the nature of these means indicates that they could not have been invented in primitive times. In view of the absence of artificial aids as well as of a historical sense, the memory of common blood must naturally have faded easily and often. This explains why, in contrast to historical times in which the amalgamation of old groups is much more frequent than the formation of new

ones, the prehistoric period was characterized by great productivity in the creation of new tribes.

We must assume that within these primitive groups social foresight was of the lowest type. Since the entire energy of the individual was expended in his own maintenance without preparation for the future, none was left over for the care of the sick and disabled. The numerous survivals of the abandonment of the sick and the old are derived from primitive times, even though the custom of putting an end to their misery by killing them may belong to a later age. Nevertheless the more or less unconscious guidance and example in the food-quest, furnished by the older and more experienced generations to the younger ones upon their reaching maturity, provided a social impulse.[141] Thus the mere fact that the young necessarily adhered to the old from natural habit as well as from the idea of the blood bond contained a germ and beginning of social foresight.

Outside of the group, however, reigned utter indifference and hostility.[142] All that man has in common with his fellows existed at first only within the family group, and it is more than probable that the primitive equivalents of our word "man" applied
92 only to the members of one's own tribe. This alone can explain why even today such an exceedingly large number of original native tribal names coincide in meaning "men" or "people."[143] Such a name is spoken with a suggestion of pride. Every tiny tribe regards itself as the association of the first men, as the center of the visible world.[144] Round about it lies the wilderness of "barbarism," which is always the popular name for the opposite of "humanity." The situation is ever the same, and it went to extremes in the highest civilizations of the past. To the Greeks, as is well known, there existed outside of themselves only a

[141] "The people in lower civilization profit more by the wisdom and counsel of the aged than those in higher civilization, and are educated by this experience to respect and value the aged" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 322). (Ed.)

[142] "Uncivilized man regards strangers with feelings of hostility and suspicion" (Crawley, *Mystic Rose,* p. 156). (Ed.)

[143] "As a rule it is found that nature peoples call themselves men. Others are something else—perhaps not defined—but not real men" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 14). See also below, pp. 398-9; Keller, *Societal Evolution,* p. 58. (Ed.)

[144] "Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 13). See also Keller, *Societal Evolution,* pp. 57-60. (Ed.)

world of barbarians, and to the Chinese today outside of their own Middle Kingdom there exists officially only a "horde of barbarians."[145] The higher the social foresight within a group, the greater must seem the gulf which separates it **from the** world of barbarians and strangers. Toward them there **can** be neither consideration nor obligation, for these arise only within the group and are observed only there.[146]

Since we see the path of civilization advancing toward the ideal goal of including all mankind in the benefits of social foresight we must look for the opposite extreme in primitive times, at the beginning of all cultural development.[147] Then we can be surprised only at how infinitely small the world seemed to primitive man. But we must accustom ourselves to this conception. He could obtain his ideas only from the sphere of his experience, and this must have been extremely limited for all his mobility. Much later, when isolated tribes attempted to establish a social bond between one another, a primary alliance of three, or at the most four, tribes was usually quite sufficient, because only that many were in actual contact with each other. Primitive man could not often have exceeded this limit in his knowledge of peoples.

His cosmic conceptions must perforce have been as limited in scope as his ethnology. To him the world was necessarily first and last the sum of what he actually saw. This included the moving lights of the heavens. Even if he had actually been inclined to marvel at commonplace phenomena which did not require his assistance, his astonishment at what they seemed to be would have been very much less than ours at what they are. Of cosmic space and cosmic bodies with their incomprehensible
93 dimensions primitive man saw nothing. Evidence of this is furnished by those Polynesians who, when first visited by white men from across the sea, confidently assumed that such widely

145 "To the Chinese as to the Romans all foreigners are barbarians" (Vassal, *Yunnan Fou,* p. 51). (Ed.)

146 "The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 12). Giddings has taken this principle, under the name of "consciousness of kind," as the basis of his system of sociology *(Principles of Sociology,* 17-18 *et passim).* (Ed.)

147 For a discussion of "primitive atomism" see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 16-19. (Ed.)

traveled men must also have been to the sun and moon.[148] The fact that this experience had never happened to these people themselves did not disturb their conclusion in the least. It could not be shaken until experience to the contrary was established for all parts of the earth. But primitive man was so infinitely far removed from such a comprehensive point of view that his narrowness of outlook was the most distinguishing characteristic of his entire mode of thought.

Did primitive man possess religion?[149] This is one of the most mooted questions of culture history. For a long time the true answer was sought exclusively in the two opposite extremes. The affirmative reply included an assertion that he possessed the most perfect, because absolute, religion. The negation, so far as it dealt with savage peoples as subjects for comparative study, was equally positive.

Religion in its embryonic form, as we have seen,[150] is to be distinguished from the moral code and the actual state of morality. In the history of the cult this distinction has been clearly preserved as a fact down to very recent times, but in the sacred traditions of man and his early history the two are blended, or else a later interpretation has produced such a blending. When ancient traditions, of which our best known representatives are the Bible and the closely related Avesta of the ancient Persians, portray primitive man's state of subjective morality as one of relatively perfect innocence, this thoroughly harmonizes with the social conditions they picture. In that state of society only a very small number of duties had yet developed, and the fulfillment of these was easily enforced by habit, which was not yet confused by complicated life relationships. The moral innocence accorded with the lack of foresight of the time. Ancient tradition never entirely escapes this point of view. Everything was permitted to primitive man; his whole moral code consisted of a single prohibition.[151] But this one obligation, as we shall shortly see,[152] is characteristic of the

148 Forster, *Seereisen*, II, 97. (Ed.)

149 Tylor asks the same question and answers it in essentially the same way (*Primitive Cidture*, I, 417-24). (Ed.)

150 Above, pp. 26-7, 31. (Ed.)

151 "But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Genesis ii. 17). (Ed.)

152 Below, pp. 119-22. (Ed.)

earliest form of the cult. The content of the moral law is the product of social foresight on the existing stage of its development and must be distinguished from religion, whence it derives its sanction.

The essence of religion, if we regard as fundamental those characteristics which are always present in all its forms as opposed to those which are variable and fluctuating, is to be found in
94 the conception of a supernatural principle on which man feels himself in some way dependent.[153] From this feeling of dependence there arises a sense of obligation. Now it is clear from the outset that the nature of this sense of dependence will vary widely according to the prevailing stage of self-maintenance. But naturally it can not be felt by man on any stage except as it attaches to himself. Only his own dependence could possibly attract the attention and arouse the reflection of primitive man, not the dependence of phenomena upon each other. This restriction of speculation is absolutely imposed by the nature of things. The savage, for example, can not possibly begin to reflect on the phenomenon of hail with its dependence upon the differences in temperature of various strata of air. To him hail would not deserve the slightest consideration if it did not lash his skin and torment him with a sensation of pain. This arousing of pain and discomfort is to him the material fact in the case. In his mind, with its paucity of ideas, hail is defined purely and simply as a cause of pain, and, since in his further thinking he adheres consistently to the bearing upon his own person as the essential thing, it must seem to be directly occasioned by some ill will toward himself. If he knew of any power which according to his experience were capable of malevolence toward him and at the same time of operating invisibly, he would necessarily regard it as the impelling cause of the phenomenon. Especially would

158 "Wherever and whenever man has a sense of dependence on external powers which are conceived as mysterious and higher than man's own, there is religion" (Dawson, *Age of the Gods*, p. 22). Tylor gives "as a minimum definition of Religion, the belief in Spiritual Beings" *(Primitive Culture*, I, 424). Frazer defines religion as "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life" *(Golden Bough*, I, 222). "The adjustment of mankind to the spirit-environment" is the definition of Sumner and Keller *(Science of Society, II*, 789). According to Hopkins, "what is common to all religions is belief in a superhuman power and an adjustment of human activities to the requirements of that power" *(History of Religions*, p. 1). (Ed.)

this train of thought obtrude itself upon primitive man in the case of any pain sensation in which the immediate external cause did not seem sufficient, e.g., sickness and suffering not caused by any external wound.

How man arrived at the conception of such a power will be revealed below. First the reader should be shown how manifold the expressions of the feeling of dependence must inevitably have been. As life gains in foresight, this feeling is aroused by an increasing number of phenomena. The horticulturalist has more influences to take into account than the farmer; the herds-
95 man fewer.[154] Likewise man's obligation, which may be regarded as a continuation of social dependence, necessarily expands with the evolution of society. We have merely suggested here the many gradations of the conceptions which we must regard as the germ of religious ideas. Their number must actually have been legion.

This explains the contradictions in the reports of ethnographers, some of whom maintain that they have never met a people entirely without religion, while others bluntly assert that they have never discovered anything which could pass as religion in tribes with which they were very familiar. Thus, among others, even so extremely discerning a man as Fritsch denies the existence of any sort of religion among a number of South African tribes whom he knew from years of association and observation, while at the same time he admits in its place a blind superstition and a certain fear of ghosts. As a matter of fact these tribes belong to so low a stage that we may infer from them with some degree of certainty as to the condition of primitive man. Nevertheless what is found among them is not so much a corrupt equivalent as an undeveloped and unfavorably influenced embryonic form of religion. We shall not use the term "superstition" for the ideas of this age. From the standpoint of culture history, superstition properly signifies only a survival carried over from a lower stage of development into a higher one, where it lives on in fundamental contradiction to its surroundings.[155]

[164] Lippert here foreshadows the "aleatory element," which in the hands of Sumner and Keller has shed such an illuminating light on the nature of religion (*Science of Society,* II, 737-70). (Ed.)

[155] According to Lehmann, superstition is a view which has no basis in a prevailing religion and which is in conflict with the current scientific conception of nature (*Aberglaube und Zauberei).* "A superstition is essentially a survival"^ (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 764). Tylor

Closely related to the manner in which the thinking of the savage is first of all concerned with influences affecting his person is the phenomenon that only the painful at first arouses thought.[166] Man, regarding himself as the center of things, is inclined at all times to regard the advantageous and the pleasurable as the normal and expected course of things, and the unpleasant as a disturbance and interruption of it.[167] Primitive man does not reflect about the reasons for the ordinary course of events; only its derangement can bring him to the point of investigating the reasons and thereby discovering remedies. To consider methods of maintaining the normal course seems unnecessary to his foresight.

This phenomenon is the basis of the further fact that the crude germ of religious sentiment among the lowest peoples consists, so far as investigation has been able to determine, only in an incoherent fear of individual acts of malevolent intervention. This is in keeping, moreover, with the solely defensive nature of the first cult efforts.[158] We are accordingly justified
96 in regarding an indefinite ghost-fear as the only expression of religious feeling on this stage, and in this we find ourselves in agreement with practically all the observers of uncivilized peoples. All reports which mention this often stifling fear in the mind of the savage agree in calling it ghost-fear, or, what amounts to the same thing, they call those invisible but chiefly malevolent powers ghosts or spirits.

It still remains for us to discover how primitive man could have arrived at a conception of such a peculiar nature, a conception which, as we must assume, was the very first to obtrude itself upon him otherwise than through direct perception. Nevertheless it could only have been inferred by means of very simple and obvious deductions. Of all the possible deductions we must necessarily consider the most obvious and the most obtrusive as the correct ones, in view of the unparalleled similarity in the conclusions reached by all the peoples of the earth.

also substitutes "survival" for "superstition" *(Primitive Culture.* I, 72). (Ed.)

156 "The ills of life caused reflection" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 751). (Ed.)

157 "The minds of men always dwell more on bad luck. They accept ordinary prosperity as a matter of course" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 6). (Ed.)

158 See below, pp. 112-16. (Ed.)

It might seem a difficult and dubious matter to establish these ideas empirically for all peoples, especially since they lack fixation for the most part and are often secure in their own haziness. Nevertheless countless objective acts, based on logical deductions from these ideas, remain as incorruptible witnesses for them.[159] These are the actions of the *cult*, which persevere with infinite tenacity. They guide us back with inflexible logic to those simple elemental ideas with which man, trying for the first time the wings of his developing intellectual powers, soared aloft from the firm ground of sense impressions into a self-created realm of illusion. But however high he mounted, building one idea upon another, the onerous weight of the realities of the cult always brought him back to earth again and never permitted him to forget its origin. When man began to free himself from this burden, when these monitory realities shriveled into mere symbols into which later speculation tried to breathe new life, then and then only could culture history analyze them, and then only could the question arise whether man had carried aloft to greater and greater heights an image of himself as the cause behind phenomena, or whether he had sunk from the height of an independent comprehension of nature itself through the medium of fancy and poetry to a combination of the ideas he had received out of the ether with his own earthly shadow.

It is in fact this very contradiction which separates the most important schools of thought in the natural history of religion. Lubbock, Tylor, and Spencer regard "animism" as the lowest
97 stage of religious ideas and "ancestor worship"—somewhat too limited a term—as the lowest form of the cult.[160] On the other hand, the school of comparative mythology—J. Grimm, Kuhn, Miillenhof, Mannhardt, Max Müller, and others—considers an imaginative attitude in observing natural phenomena, including the regular and commonplace, and the myth-making associated with it, as the origin of a so-called "religion of nature." A few, J. G. Müller among them,[161] have effected a compromise in the

[159] To Lippert, as to most anthropologists and some sociologists, the data of the science of society are concrete, objective, behavioristic facts like "folkways" and "culture traits," not abstract and largely subjective facts like "attitudes." (Ed.)

[160] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 205-393; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 417-602; II, 1-361; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 134-434. (Ed.)

[161] *Geschichte der amerikardschen Urreligionen.*

sense that they recognize animism as the active element in the religions of uncultured tribes but retain the religion of nature as the form of the natural religious ideas of civilized peoples.

This interpretation, however, can be justified at **most only** in describing the state of religious conceptions at a particular time; it is by no means admissible in explaining their evolution.[162] The establishment of an even approximately definite line of demarcation between civilized and uncivilized peoples is impossible to one who is at all familiar with the laws of cultural development. We ourselves, to be sure, indulge in the ordinary use of language and speak of "uncivilized" peoples, but we do so only because we are unable to indicate more adequately in any other way a relatively low state of culture. The differences in cultural stages are only quantitative, so much so, in fact, that we are able to find latent even in primitive man the germs of the highest forms of development.

Where, then, is an absolute parting of the ways between civilization and non-civilization to be found, a parting, indeed, which is supposed to have resulted at the same time in a complete reconstruction of religious ideas? It might be thought to **exist** in connection with the above-mentioned distinction between active and passive races, as though the passive races were destined by nature for ancestor worship and the active for nature worship. But in primitive man there was as yet no predisposition in either direction; the two groups have developed from the same raw material by the differentiation of their secondary instincts alone. Nowhere can we perceive any insurmountable barrier which could have separated and isolated such different spheres from the very beginning. On the contrary, we discover everywhere only transitions and evolutionary stages.[163] The religious ideas of different stages might even be as dissimilar in their nature as the implements of the Bronze Age and those of the Stone Age, and still we could not be brought by such a comparison to suppose that the two stages could ever have existed side
98 by side without connection or have followed one another without an intermediary. Even the bronze weapon is at first only a recasting of the old model in a new material, until the plasticity

162 For a thorough criticism of the theory of the school of comparative mythology see Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 830-41. (Ed.)

163 This is an example of Lippert's avoidance of the "category fallacy," (Ed.)

of the metal leads to more and more divergent forms, which then look to us like pure originals unrelated to the intermediate links.[164]

Even in the school of comparative mythology this continuity is not entirely disregarded. Max Müller[165] in particular attempts to examine the religious ideas of uncivilized tribes by his method of interpretation and even to relate the conceptions of the Hottentots to the impression of the dawn, but he exempts from a similar scrutiny the extremely important epoch in the development of religious ideas which emanated from a branch of the Semites by accepting a direct revelation from absolute divinity to the tribal ancestor Abraham.

We have tried elsewhere[166] to show that the opposite course leads more naturally to the goal. From the universal conceptions of animism, in connection with those of an obligation toward the invisible powers, there arose the "ghost-cult,"[167] a term preferable to the narrower "ancestor worship." The nature and elements of this cult are derived with logical consistency from the above conceptions on the one hand and from the existing range of savage thought and foresight on the other. The forms of the cult necessarily reflect contemporary or antecedent religious conceptions and thus furnish a reliable source and touchstone for the ideas of prehistoric times. The underestimation of this touchstone by comparative mythology has been avenged by the unreliability of the conclusions of that school. The cult is the material expression of the feeling of obligation, and its presence in any form is alone an indisputable proof of the existence of that feeling, which is the essential factor in religion.

Any myth about the heavens or other natural phenomena can, of course, be conclusively proved as a fact, but if it can not be demonstrated that it serves as the basis for some form of the cult, we have no right to characterize it as an expression of
99 religious ideas, unless we wish to dilute and obscure the concept of religion. The "nature myth" may therefore exist for itself, perhaps even as a later reflection of the religious mode of thought, but we can not recognize it as the basis of religion.

[164] See *Cambridge Ancient History,* I, 103-5. (Ed.)
[185] *Science of Religion; German Workshop.* (Ed.)
[166] *Seelenkidt; Religionen.*
[167] On Lippert and the "ghost theory" of religion, see Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxiv. (Ed.)

Even when myth and cult bear an unmistakable relation to each other, it is necessary to inquire whether the latter did not give rise to the former, as is the case with a multitude of "cult myths." Since the form of the cult frequently carries the life adjustments of one age over into another, later generations, in consequence of their ignorance of antecedent modes of life, often lose their understanding of the cult usages handed down to them and treasured with a holy fear. Since these cult forms are transmitted from generation to generation along with more or less adequate attempts to explain them, and since primitive times can record such explanations only in narrative form, there arises the class of cult myths,[168] which no more contain the original germ of religious ideas than do nature myths.

It is necessary to make clear in advance the attitude of culture history toward a special type of religion, which apparently does not fit into any of the categories thus far reviewed. We refer to the "revealed religions." First of all, it must be admitted that this term is used in two different senses, first in a neutral or scientific sense, and second in a partisan sense, which concedes the claim of revelation to but one such religion. Distinctions of the second type can not concern us here, although the circumstances and social conditions which give rise to such subjective convictions by no means lie outside the domain of culture history. But of revealed religions in the former sense, i.e., of those which themselves claim to derive the substance of their religious ideas and especially the canon of their obligations directly from the divinity in question, there are a considerable number. We must include among them not only Judaism and Christianity but also Zoroastrianism, Mohammedanism, and Buddhism. Even Manu, whose laws the ancient Hindus were obligated to observe, enjoys the respect of a divine being.

We may take this opportunity to call attention to certain distinctions. The concept of divinity which corresponds to a primitive and atomistic conception of the world, and which sees a divine being as the effective cause behind individual phenomena, we call the concept of "relative divinity" and distinguish from that of "absolute divinity" or the conception of a unified uni-

[168] **Lippert bases the formation of such myths on the principle of "mythological substruction," which he defines as "the epic representation of that which is inferred as the logically necessary presupposition of a traditional fact" *(Kulturgeschichte,* I, 128). See also below, p. 407. (Ed.)**

verse and a single first cause corresponding thereto.[169] Accordingly there are, objectively speaking, revealed religions based on both the relative and the absolute concepts of divinity. To the latter, if we do not examine the concept too closely, belong Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. Zoroastrianism approaches them closely, but Buddhism adheres positively and consistently to the point of view of the relative concept of divinity.

The question of the agent of revelation gives rise to another classification. In Christianity and Buddhism the divine being himself, absolute in the one case and relative in the other, appears among men as the bearer of the revelation. In Judaism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism the revelation comes through the medium of prophets. In spite of the great difference in their concepts of divinity, Christianity and Buddhism have in common the fact that historically they both arose as reactions against the domination of a priesthood grown into a caste.[170]

What is common to all these revealed religions, with all their manifold differences, is the greater or less systematization of their revelation, the increasing unification of their "law" into fundamental and universal principles. The laws of Manu, Zoroaster, and Moses, to be sure, still prescribe for a multitude of individual cases, especially in the domain of the cult, but with Moses a synthesis into a few fundamental principles was also consummated. Buddha taught still fewer, and in the teachings of Jesus they are all condensed into the one word Love. It is impossible to mistake the correspondence between these stages and the law of the extension of the care for life in time and space.

This synthesis, which is the common element in the so-called revealed religions and which indicates a higher development of social foresight, distinguishes them from all other religions far more than does the idea of revelation itself. Indeed the principle of revelation is to be found in some form or other in all religions, even the lowest. David extorts from his God a revelation as to the success of his campaign.[171] Egyptian temple walls tell the history of the revelations of the gods to their kings. And

[169] See below, pp. 389-92. (Ed.)
[170] See Lippert, *Kultwgeschichte,* II, 605-14. (Ed.)
[171] 1 Samuel *xxx.* 7-8

wherever a primitive priesthood exists, the receiving of revelations is its chief occupation. The form is varied but the substance is the same. The royal astronomer in the observatories of Babylon served the same purpose in his way as the medicine man of West Africa who summons the spirit with a rattle to inspire him with his thoughts. Even the Bible compares the mediating priest to the mouth of Yahweh.[172]

In still another way every traditional cult practice is based on a revelation. The rules of divination make it possible to recognize the manner in which the divinity receives the sacrifice and to infer therefrom whether requests will be granted. On the other hand, repeated favorable responses necessarily constitute a revelation with respect to the particular cult form. A group which attributes its preservation to the favor of its divinity must conclude from the very fact of its fortune that its manner of rendering homage is the one most pleasing to him. An objection to the form of their cult will be met, and not without logic, by the rejoinder that it has been ordered by the direct will and wish of their divinity. There has probably never been a form of the cult which did not trace its origin in this sense to a revealed command. The forms, being diverse, may be variously esteemed, but the existence of a belief in revelation of some kind or other is a characteristic of every historical cult religion.

On this fact rests, in part, the great credulity with which the savage on his stage of religious ideas accepts reports of revelations of any sort. It is by no means scepticism which impedes the labor of the missionary among savages. They eagerly believe everything he tells them of his revelation, but it does not grip them nor influence their life in the desired way. They always distinguish it as the revelation of a strange god to strange men. It is not their own revelation. It may be excellent, they so often say in support of their rejection of it, but for the stranger, not for them.

We are here interested, not in the account or history of any particular revelation, but only in the above classification of revelations according to their subject matter. This shows us that tribes with an undeveloped care for life seek and possess such a treasure only in atomistic forms. For them the only thing

[172] Exodus iv. 16. See below, p. 599.

worth asking for is the success of the moment, and only for this will they employ their divinity or set their cult machinery in motion. The cult provides their sole means of exercising greater foresight. Hence the increased wealth of revelation on a somewhat higher stage relates chiefly to the regulation of cult activities. Not until a fairly advanced level of social foresight has been attained does a divine revelation become necessary to sanction more exhaustive rules or more comprehensive principles. In view of these facts, it is inconceivable that primitive man should have possessed a revealed religion of the historical type. This was impossible until a later protohistoric age.

We can not, however, entirely disregard the so-called "original revelation" accepted by a comparatively late view of religion on the authority of the Hebrew doctrine. The methods of our science offer us no means of judging as to the asserted actuality of such a revelation, especially since it is said to have been lost again in consequence of the fall of man. But we could only imagine its moral content to have been definitely limited, in contradiction to the broad conceptions which theology has read into it. Under the circumstances of a generation of primitive men carried back to a single ancestral pair,* and with the state of social foresight corresponding to those circumstances, the subject matter of such a revelation could only have been very poor indeed. A revelation anticipating the distant future of mankind would have seemed vain in view of its imminent loss by the first generation.

As a matter of fact, the elements of the Hebrew tradition of an original revelation completely bear out these assumptions. They consist in a conception of God, of man, and of an intercourse between them. God offers man the fruits of the earth, his garden, but his commands are limited to a single prohibition, which, as we shall see, represents the most ancient type of cult commandment.[173] It is the germ of the "law" of a later period, which develops gradually along with social forms. Thus, even according to the Bible itself, the original revelation, so far as it relates to religion, contained nothing except the simplest elements of primitive religion: God, man, their intercourse, and the cult obligation of the latter. Its infringement was followed by bodily pain, misery, and death. These, however, are the very

178 i.e., a "foodtaboo." See below, pp. 119-23. (Ed.)

same elements that we find in the simplest religious ideas of savage peoples. Only we encounter in the Biblical tradition a complete, though still very anthropomorphic, concept of God, while we see nature man striving upwards from the depths toward such a concept.

In nearly every case where we encounter the opinion of an ethnographer that a savage people has no religion, it is directly followed by one and the same qualification.[174] Burton's opinion of the East Africans whom he visited is the most unfavorable imaginable. He states that they possess not a trace of reverence for any being, not even respect for men, but he adds that **fear** of the dead dominates their every thought, that they believe in ghosts and in a sort of black art and try to come to terms with these ghosts in any way they can, in order to protect their fields from harm.[175] Waitz[176] similarly reports of the Kaffirs that they knew nothing of God and had no cult, sacrifice, or prayer, but that they attributed every misfortune to "dead brothers" and entertained a superstitious reverence for *mahlozi,* the ghosts of dead chieftains. Fritsch[177] found no trace of religion among the Bechuanas, but he reports a belief in goblins and a cult of the ghosts of the dead, and he found the same among the Zulus, Damaras, Hottentots, and Namaquas. Thus all the savage peoples of South Africa, according to the best of evidence, are animated by the same ideas. Livingstone[178] mentions the *wazimo* or souls of the dead of the Zambesi peoples. Baker's[179] assertion that the Central African tribes "are without a belief in a Supreme Being" is subject to the same qualification. Only in this sense do the Micronesians lack a belief in God.[180]

So-called ancestor worship is also widespread in Polynesia, the East Indies, the Philippines, Japan, China, and among the hill peoples of India. The shamanism of the peoples of Siberia and Russia as far west as Lapland, as well as the former reli-

[174] "It is not unusual for the very writer who declares in general terms the absence of religious phenomena among some savage people, himself to give evidence that shows his expressions to be misleading" (Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I, 418). Tylor appends to this statement an exhaustive list of cases *(Ibid.,* I, 418-24). (Ed.)

[175] Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen,* p. 363.

[176] *Anthropologic,* I, 410.

[177] *Die Einaeborenen Sudafrikas.*

[178] *Neue Missionsreisen,* p. 241.

[179] "Nile Basin," p. 231; *Albert N'yanza,* I, 246. (Ed.)

[180] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, pt. II, 135.

gion of the Finns and Lithuanians,[181] rests on the same foundation. In America the same belief is said to form the basis of the religions of all the tribes from Canada to Tierra del Fuego, except that a few of the more civilized tribes, like the inhabitants of ancient Mexico and Peru, have allegedly exchanged it for a so-called nature worship.[182] Spencer[183] has assembled copious evidence of the world-wide dissemination of this cult form.

From the universality of this cult among savage peoples, and from the fact that its forms appear less disguised, simpler, and more naive the closer a tribe has remained to the life of primitive times, the conclusion is irresistible that the very simplest of these cult forms must have existed in the primitive age itself. This conclusion becomes a certainty when we realize the limita-
104 tions of primitive man. Having to form his judgments by feeling his way forward in the space about him with all that it contained and pressing onward into wider and wider spheres—always with himself as the subjective point of departure and the objective center of thought and endeavor—he could not possibly have pursued any other course.

Whereas all regular natural phenomena bore the stamp of the commonplace before the mental power of the individual was ripe enough to concern itself with them, death was to each witness an event of an uncommon sort. When human groups were small and isolated and the whole store of experience of each was limited in time and space to the elements it had itself acquired, the series of inductions from which the inevitability of death is today inferred existed only in rare instances. One might venture the assertion that there must have been a time when primitive man did not know that he must die. Does the animal know anything of the kind? Who indeed, unless he draws the generalization from the ever only fragmentary experience outside of himself, is conscious in the full vigor of his life of the necessity of his death?

Out of that age of limited experience have come survivals which have been creative factors in the life of later generations by the mere fact of their existence and largely without regard

[181] Lippert, *Religionen*, p. 69. (Ed.)
[182] Muller, *Urreligionen.*
[188] *Principles of Sociology*, I, 285-305.

to their objective truth. One of these is the idea prevalent among all savage peoples that death is not natural and can not occur in the undisturbed course of things.[184] It is always regarded only as an abnormal phenomenon caused by some malevolent power. This idea was strengthened by the many cases of violent death which primitive man, unprotected and surrounded by wild animals, must have been exposed to. Even in cases of natural death some act of violence was necessarily assumed by analogy in order to explain the abnormal event. The invisible nature of the effect suggested an invisible cause, and among such causes primitive man had no choice. His extremely narrow range of experience had revealed to him but one, namely—to use the Zulu term—his "dead brother."

Another survival is a cult myth of the simplest sort, which is, properly speaking, only the narrative or mythological version of the above. This myth, which is widely disseminated over the earth in different forms, relates that originally there was no death and no sickness among men, that both first came into the world through sin. The last clause is incomprehensible unless we anticipate somewhat to explain it. Its sense is derived from the very same range of ideas, only it is obscured a little by the word "sin," the definition of which, as so often happens, has altered considerably with the passage of time. To adhere to our expression, it is the "dead brother" who invisibly torments the living. Man seeks to avoid misery by propitiating the malevolent one. He owes him this propitiation according to the most primitive cult commandment, and failure to propitiate burdens him with a debt which must be expiated. Expiable debt is the oldest meaning of "sin."[185] The myth that "the wages of sin is death"[186] thus appears as an abstract refined expression for the crude primitive idea that the unpropitiated dead kill the living. The Bible contains the most familiar epic version of this idea, and in it the original sin appears explicitly as an expiable

[184] "It is the exception to regard death as natural" (Wallis, *Anthropology*, p. 251). See also Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 775-80; IV, 302-5; Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, III, 314; Carr-Saunders, *Population Problem*, pp. 152-3. (Ed.)

[185] Note the expression of this idea in the Lord's Prayer. "And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors" (Matthew vi. 12). "And forgive us our sins; for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us" (Luke xi. 4). (Ed.)

iso Romans vi. 23. (Ed.)

debt, as a violation of an abnegation sacrifice[187] of the oldest kind.

The most important survival, however, is that implicit in the facts which gave rise to this surprisingly universal idea. It is the obligation of propitiation itself. From this was derived the original idea of the cult, which led and dominated mankind to a degree impossible to exaggerate until slowly and painfully the knowledge of another kind of causality penetrated the mind of man, a process which even today is very far from its conclusion. Along with and superior to knowledge, there reign and will reign the laws of compatibility and survival.

The phenomenon of death alone included all the factors necessary to stimulate primitive man to the first hesitating advance in his thinking.[188] It was not commonplace like the drama of the sunrise, nor a matter of indifference in the immediate problem of living like the dawn. It entered into his narrow world with shocking seriousness and a sudden menace. And it was utterly inexplicable to him. Here were the same mouth, the same eyes, the same arm, the same man; what was it then that was no longer here? Kuhn and his followers think the miracle of reproduction and birth better calculated to arouse the speculation of primitive man and to lead him to formulate the concept of the soul.[189] But, even aside from the inadequacy of imagining that the thoughts of untrained primitive man could have been
106 stimulated and guided by symbols and allegories alone, the phenomenon of birth, wonderful of course in itself, nevertheless only bestowed life upon a miserable little worm who for a long time remained very inconspicuous and did not enter into the life cares of the men. Its entrance into the world, therefore, could not possibly have aroused such wonder as the death of a man whose energy had deeply impressed the entire tribe.

If objection be made that so refined a concept as that of a soul or a ghost could not have been conceived by man on the lowest stage of culture, the reply is that the first idea of a something which left the body in death could not yet have embraced all the characteristics of our concept of the soul. Historical facts teach rather the contrary. When we speak of primitive

[187] See Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 376. (Ed.)
[188] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 77£4. (Ed.)
[189] See Kuhn, *Herabkunjt des Feuers;* Hellwald, *Kulturgeschichte.*

man's formative idea of the soul, we naturally mean an idea of the most indefinite nature, to which we give the name of our modern conception for want of a better.

The phenomenon of death, when once it impressed itself on the consideration of man, must necessarily have led him to the conclusion that the speechless and inert body was no longer the same as the being who had formerly talked and moved. The one had parted from the other in some unknown manner. Who was the one and who the other? They had both been the same, and man was probably satisfied to designate them both by the same expression, one approximately equivalent to our word "person" or the indefinite "he." Our language still preserves this usage as a survival. We say, "He is beside himself," and, if he is actually dead, "He has not come to" (i.e., to himself), meaning by "he" in the one case the spiritual and in the other the physical man. Primitive man certainly did not think more clearly; the definition of the concept is the affair of a later age. It was enough for him to see that "he" had parted company from "him" and to know that, since "he" could not entirely have disappeared, "he" must be living on in some other manner.

Egyptologists have observed that the civilized people of ancient Egypt in their earliest grave inscriptions do not distinguish in language between the dead and the living. *Ywang,* the name used in Java to designate the object of the cult, originally meant approximately "he who." [190] The Abipones are said to have had no conception of what became of the dead man, i.e., of his ghost, "but they fear it, and believe that the echo was its voice,"[191] that is, they set it up as the invisible cause of something otherwise inexplicable. This is the only connection into which natural phenomena and human ghosts are brought on this stage. Thus the Tupis of Brazil believe that their dead are the beings who cause the terrifying phenomenon of thunder.

The conception of some sort of continued existence of the vital principle which apparently deserts the body at death gains particular support from the phenomenon of the *dream,* in the interpretation of which a striking agreement exists among peoples of all ages.[192] While death, as it were, only prepares man to

[190] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* II, 1067.
[191] Southey, *History of Brazil,* III, 404.
[192] See Dorman, *Primitive Superstitions;* Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 134-44.

entertain ideas which, since they lie outside the **range of direct** perception, can only be comprehended by inference, the dream leads him along a positive path to the desired knowledge.[198] The more vividly death preoccupies the senses, the more surely will the survivors be inspired to dream of the dead man, and the circumstances of the dream will the more nearly approach those of life and hence be the more credible, the fewer the concepts which unbridled fancy has at its disposal to combine.

A characteristic dream of this kind is told by Callaway[194] of a Zulu. The dead brother came to the latter in a dream with the reproachful question why he did not call upon him when he slaughtered a bullock. The dreamer answered by way of excusing himself: "I do call on you, and laud you by your laud-giving names. Just tell me the bullock which I have killed, without calling on you. For I killed an ox, I called on you; I killed a barren cow, I called on you." Whereupon the dead brother answered, "I wish for meat." In order to grasp fully the connection of such a dream we must realize the fact that among the Zulus it was held a serious offense to slaughter an animal and not invite all the relatives to the feast. In this case, then, even the recently deceased will not allow himself to be overlooked. If we shift the wording of the translation ever so slightly, saying "sacrifice" instead of "slaughter," "invoke" instead of "call," and "glorify" instead of "laud," the demand of the dead man is changed into a cult exaction of a later type.

According to the American Indian conception of dreams, which is representative of all savage peoples, either the dream apparition actually appears before the sleeper, or the thinking, feeling, and acting part of the latter, which also abandons the body in death, leaves it temporarily and visits the objects with which the dream deals.[195] The dream of the dead brother thus proves to the savage that he still lives on in this form and has actually come to him. In exactly the same way the soul of Patroclus appeared to Achilles,[196] and in the Bible Yahweh himself several times comes to some one in a dream. Similarly the monks of the

198 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 782-4. (Ed.)
194 *Amazulu,* pp. 146-7.
195 Lafitau, *Moeurs des sauvages,* I, 363; Tylor, *Primitive Culture.* I. 442-3. (Ed.)
196 Homer *Iliad* xxiii. 59-67. See also Keller, *Homeric Society,* p. 119; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I, 444. (Ed.)

Middle Ages attributed holy dreams, amongst other causes, to the actual appearance of the Divinity or a saint, or else to the temporary departure of the spirit from the body on a journey to them.[197] We must conclude, therefore, that to primitive man a dream was conclusive proof of the existence of what he saw in it.[198]

The first and, for an immensely long time, the most powerful impression which the idea thus acquired and established made upon primitive man was that of *fear.* As long as the ghost was vividly remembered, the idea continued to arouse fear, for it was associated with the conception of a powerful and sinister something manifesting itself in an invisible manner. But this sinister power furnished the explanation for everything that took place without visible and apparent cause. Consequently thenceforth all the ills of life and all the terrifying manifestations of nature necessarily nourished this fear of ghosts.[199]

Fear is revealed in everything connected with the cult ideas of the Indians.[200] The Micronesians are afraid of wandering souls at dusk and at night.[201] The Tahitians regard their ancestral ghosts *{eatwa)* as the direct causes of sudden death and similar misfortunes. "If a man stubs his foot on a stone and hurts his toe, the *eatua* has done it; in a word, they walk here as if on enchanted ground. If they come too near a burial platform or *tupapau* at night, they are frightened, as ignorant people among us tremble with superstitious fear of ghosts at the sight of a cemetery."[202]

This fear, existing everywhere and even amongst ourselves as a survival, has its basis in the causal relation which primitive man believes to exist between the dead and all misfortunes, especially sickness, and in the propensity for causing injury which he ascribes to them. This latter conception, which is universal, might lead one to attribute a certain habitual malev-

197 Caesarius of Heisterbach *Diologus miraculorum* ii. 2 *et passim.*

198 See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 135-42; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I, 445-7; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 782. (Ed.)

199 Lippert here shows his grasp of the fundamental fact that religion originates in the association of the conception of ghosts with the aleatory element, the former explaining the latter. This connection has since been brilliantly elucidated by Sumner and Keller (see *Science of Society,* II, 771-2, 786-90). (Ed.)

200 Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen,* I, 304.

201 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, pt. II, 135.

202 Forster, *Seereisen,* V, 436.

olence to primitive man, since he has created his spirits in his own image. But another trait of his comes nearer to the explanation, namely, that of accepting the pleasant as the normal and of seeking a causal agent only for the painful.[203] Since pain continually refreshes the memory of the deceased, otherwise soon forgotten, the idea of pain-bringing is associated with him. Here again the thinking of primitive man is characterized by unswerving logical consistency. Livingstone[204] tells of a Negro on Lake Nyassa who attributed his headache to the bad humor of his dead father, whose power he felt in his head. Even stranger, but likewise not inconsistent, is the explanation of the Australians that the ghosts usually perch in trees and slip from there into the mouths of passers-by. They then cause the body, unless they speedily leave it again, those torments which we ascribe to indigestion.[205] In this exceedingly naive conception we recognize the archetype of the theory of possession, which has reigned for untold thousands of years as the sole explanation of disease and the logical basis of all methods of treatment.[206]

Another very logical idea, which still exists as a survival, has been placed in the right light by Lubbock.[207] Sneezing is very generally regarded in analogous fashion as the manifestation of a spirit which has forced its way into a person. The involuntary nature of both indigestion and sneezing proves to the logic of the savage that they must arise, not from the man himself, but from an alien and independent power within him. In his experience, however, there exists only a single category of such powers. Thus sneezing proves possession by a spirit, but it also indicates the probability that it has been expelled from the body. Hence there arose at a later time the custom of congratulation upon this occasion.[208]

Since, on the lowest stage of the care for life, a spiritual agency was imagined only in the case of misfortunes, and since sickness, in an age when crops and herds did not yet exist as objects

[203] See above, p. 95. (Ed.)
[204] *Neue Mimonsreisen*, p. 241.
[205] Waitz, *Anthropologie*, V, pt. I, 809.
[206] See Maddox, *Medicine Man*, pp. 7-12, 167-226. (Ed.)
[207] *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 499-502. (Ed.)
[208] for an excellent discussion of the customs regarding sneezing, with examples, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 97-104. (Ed.)

of care, was the most striking misfortune, cult activities were largely and necessarily focused on sickness and its treatment. It must be confessed, however, that this did not at first bring about any advance in the care for life. With the first digression of logic into a sphere governed not by direct perception but by inferences based on imperfect knowledge, progress in the care for life deviated from the straight path. Mankind abandoned its social foresight for the fleshpots of Egypt and turned aside to wander through the wilderness toward the promised land, only to return at last, sick of manna, to the hearth of its communal cares. In its wanderings, however, it found treasures of another sort.

As a result of this deviation of logic the sick person, to whom an increased foresight ought to have extended, became instead an object of suspicion and fear. From survivals among many savage peoples we may conclude that primitive man, under the spell of this idea, under the compulsion of the poverty of his remedies, and with the cruel consistency peculiar to him, cast out his seriously sick and left them to shift for themselves.[209] Even the relatively advanced Kaffirs of South Africa cherish a fear of this sort, so that they allow no one to die in his hut. An old man who is near death is dragged out and cast aside. The same treatment is accorded the seriously ill, contact with whom is generally feared.[210] The very same custom with the same motive was found in America among the Caribs. They abandoned the sick from fear of the spirits by whom they were possessed.[211] The widespread custom of killing the aged is discussed elsewhere,[212] but how far fear rather than necessity operates as a motive can not be determined. This is probably the case in so far as old age involved infirmity. Thus the merciless treatment of the seriously ill belongs in general to that primitive age when the conception of ghosts had developed sufficiently far.

What an emancipating advance it must have been when cult methods were invented by which the sick, although to be sure not cured, were nevertheless given humane attention! Yet we now condemn these methods as despicable black magic, com-

[209] See Sumner, *Folkways,* pp. 324-7. (Ed.)

[210] Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Sudafrikas,* p. 116. See also Waitz, *Anthropologic,* II, 401.

[211] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* III, 388.

[212] *Kultwrgeschichte,* I, 230-8. (Ed.)

miserate the poor savage for practicing them, and not long ago burned people at the stake for suspicion of them. But primitive times had not yet begun thus to wander aside from the path of reality. Man did not set foot on this bypath until he had conceived of himself apart from his body.

The kind of attention first paid to the ghost can not as yet be called a cult. It was, if we have interpreted the primitive condition correctly from the multitude of survivals, merely of a *defensive* nature, in keeping with the solely disturbing and malevolent influences of the ghosts on that stage.[218] A selection of survivalistic usages of this sort will give us an excellent insight into primitive times. We can distinguish two types of this defensive attention to the dead: first, the concern to get rid of the corpse and with it the ghost—the two are often confused—and second, the concern not to attract it again in any way.

The former was accomplished by throwing the corpse away or, what was often as easy or easier when man had no permanent abode, by abandoning it along with the place where it lay.[214] The aboriginal Veddas of Ceylon, who still live in caves, until recently left the dead man where he died. If the death occurred in an inhabited cave, the survivors abandoned it to the corpse and sought a new one for themselves.[215] The Kaffirs, when some one dies in a hut, protect themselves from the deceased even more thoroughly by not only abandoning the hut but also burning it.[216] While survivalistic suggestions of this practice are found even in Europe, it is still a vigorous and widespread custom in America. The California Indians preserved it in the same form as the Kaffirs.[217] It sometimes occurs in connection with earth burial, a practice of a higher stage. Thus the insular Caribs constructed a true grave, in which they buried their dead in the well-known squatting position, but they still did this in the hut of the deceased, which they then abandoned.[218]
112 The wild tribes of Brazil, especially the Coroados, do likewise.

218 Sumner and Keller treat this defensive attention under the negative aspects of the ghost-cult, which "include avoidance in various forms and also methods of offense and defense" *(Science of Society,* I I , 853). (Ed.)

214 See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 202, 254; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I I , 25-6; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I I , 856-61; IV, 354-60. (Ed.)

215 Bailey, "Veddahs of Ceylon," p. 296. (Ed.)

216 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* I I , 401.

***217bid.,* IV, 243.**

***218 Ibid., Ill,* 387.**

If the dead man is the head of a family, they abandon the entire hamlet.[219] The Bechuanas, the Hottentots, and the Boobies of Fernando Po all abandon the whole settlement when a death occurs.[220] The Creek Indians quit the house for the alleged reason "that where the bones of their dead are deposited, the place is always attended by goblins."[221] The Kamchadales "frequently remove to some other place when any one has died in the hut, without dragging the corpse along with them."[222] Among the Lepchas, the house where there had been a death "is almost always forsaken by the surviving inmates."[223] In Europe the Lapps still preserved this custom a century ago.[224] When dwellings become more valuable, the care for life necessarily comes into conflict with this eidolistic practice and seeks a change. An example is furnished by Bastian,[225] who states of the Negroes of Duketown that after the death of a housefather they leave his dwelling undisturbed for one year only, after which they reoccupy it and construct a cheaper hut for the dislodged ghost.

These few examples show us two things. In the first place, they indicate that a distinction is made between ghosts and that some are feared more than others, so that precautions which are otherwise general are in some cases limited to heads of families. It follows from this that the reason for the fear of the dead man bears a relation to his importance while living. For the time being we need merely mention this first differentiation in the spirit world and its cause.[226] In the second place, it is clear that the custom adjusts itself only later and by gradual changes to the advance of civilization. We must conclude, therefore, that primitive man, as soon as his deductive reasoning began to fill him with a fear of the dead, met this fear by abandoning the field to them.

Another group of expedients is closely allied to the above, but they seem, in spite of the childlike simplicity of their root idea, to be refined to such a degree that we can assign them only to a

[219] Eschwege, *Brasilien*, I, 122, 129.
[220] Thompson, *South Africa*, I, 214; *Journ. Ethn. Soc.* (N.S.), I, 149; Bastian, *Afrikanische Reisen*, p. 320.
[221] Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, V, 270. (Ed.)
[222] Krasheninnikov, *Kamschatka*, p. 221. (Ed.)
[223] *Journ. Ethn. Soc.* (N.S.), I, 149. (Ed.)
[224] Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken*, p. 245.
[225] *Bilder*, p. 137. (Ed.)
[226] This subject is discussed at length below, pp. 389-414. (Ed.)

somewhat later period. By their intimate connection they illustrate once more how impossible it is to delimit sharply the stages of culture history. One of these expedients, the burning of the hut, we have already observed in passing. This naturally can not belong to primitive times. The Lapps, by a similar but confused association of ideas, were accustomed to cover the spot in a hut where a corpse had lain with stones.[227] Later superstitions select ashes, peas, water, and the like to make a place inaccessible to the departed.[228]

More ancient and possibly belonging to primitive times is another usage. The Damaras thought that the burial of the dead in graves afforded no security, saying, "You must throw them away, and let the wolves eat them; then they won't come and bother us."[229] The Kamchadales still preserve the custom of throwing their corpses to the dogs to devour.[230] This radical precaution has served as the basis for later cult usages over wide areas. Although civilized nations with their later form of the cult have rejected this custom as a terrible disgrace—one recalls here the worst threats of the Homeric heroes[231]—it was still preserved in historical times by the Aryan Persians.[282] Formerly, however, it must have existed over nearly the entire earth.[283] From indubitable conclusions, the premises of which will be set forth later,[234] we know that in different regions the shark, crocodile, dog, wolf, jackal, eagle, vulture, and raven have all been regarded as destroyers of dead bodies. Perhaps the snake, like the worm, should also be numbered among these animals. Bodies of water performed the same service. It is not an uncommon custom to put the dying into leaking boats and push them out to sea, or to pilot them across rivers and set them adrift, or to treat corpses in similar fashion, or to expose them on uninhabited mountains or in the desert. In the one case they are swallowed up by the water; in the other, as it were, by the wilderness. Their going removes dread fear from human habitations.

227 Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken,* p. 245.
228 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, *889-92.* (Ed.)
229 Chapman, *South Africa,* II, 282. (Ed.)
280 Krasheninnikov, *Kamschatka,* p. 220. (Ed.)
281 See Keller, *Homeric Society,* pp. 117-21. (Ed.)
282 See Maine, *Early Law and Custom,* p. 65. *(Ed.)*
283 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 882-4; IV, 379-81. (Ed.)
284 Pp. 529-48. (Ed.)

The savage also takes precautions against a possible return of the ghost, and again we meet identical methods in the most remote regions.[235] Even today the corpse of the Siamese is "carried out of the house feet foremost, not through the door but through a hole broken in the wall, and is then borne three times rapidly around the house, so that it will forget the entrance and not haunt the place."[236] Similar customs are known in South Africa and even in Europe.[287]

Another equally widespread precautionary custom seems to fall into the present category. A motive for it has been found among the Tupis. "The corpse had all its limbs tied fast, that the dead man might not be able to get up, and infest his friends with his visits."[238] It is possible that the same design was the original basis of the practice among other South American peoples of compressing, wrapping up, and preserving the bodies of their dead, and of forcing them into comparatively small earthen vessels. Certainly the custom in ancient India of binding the feet of the dead belongs here and had exactly the same motive. We may also conclude from cult usages of the classical peoples that this method of preventing the evil influences of the dead was well known to antiquity.[239] We do not, to be sure, assign this expedient to the lowest stage of this whole development; nevertheless it probably belongs to an epoch not too far removed from primitive times. At any event it can not be as late as the age when it was discovered how, by amicable methods, to render the dead harmless and even to win them over to benevolence.

The second type of primitive precaution is concerned with the avoidance of provocation. The Zulu dead brother desired to be "called" by his kin to every slaughter, and one of them promised to call him by his "laud-giving names." The conception rests squarely on the social and economic conditions of the time. Among some tribes there arises, as an advance in social foresight, the custom whereby the lucky discoverer of a natural

285 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 861-8; IV, 360-70. (Ed.)
236 *Bericht der preuasischen Expedition.* See also Bastian, *Volker des ostlichen Asien,* III, 258.
287 For further examples and discussion of the "doors of the dead," as these customs are called, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 26-7; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 861-2. (Ed.)
238 Southey, *History of Brazil,* I, 248.
289 The Egyptian practice of mummification is, of course, the most familiar of these customs. (Ed.)

source of food may not remove any of it until he has announced his find by loud cries, so that it is made available to the whole kindred. A logical extension of the same fundamental idea is to be seen on a somewhat higher stage in the custom of consuming supplies of meat obtained by hunting or slaughter only in the company of the entire kindred, and here by an easy transition an invitation takes the place of a call. The conservative cult, however, still prefers to speak of "calling" rather than "inviting" the ghosts.

Now the dead brother, like a living member of the kindred, is waiting longingly for such a call. Men need only to mention his name aloud to have him on their hands for sure. But primitive men, knowing him only as a bad influence, did not want this. Indeed, living from hand to mouth, they had nothing to give him to satisfy his greed permanently and thus to win him over to them. We know, however, that immoderate greed is one of the characteristics of improvident man. Hence methods of prevention and precaution come to the fore, one of them being the injunction not to mention the dead by name.[240] This custom still prevails among certain Indian tribes,[241] and in South Africa it has some cultural influence. Not merely the actual name but also all similar sounds must be avoided, because even a misunderstanding may attract the ghost. In primitive times this practice could easily have been of great importance in the modification and differentiation of language.[242] We find it in a highly developed form among the Zulus in the custom known as *hlonipa.*

The practices thus far examined can not as yet be called the beginnings of a provision for the ghost, of a cult; man's first efforts were aimed at the exact opposite. Now for the first time we shall encounter a group of precautions which lead to its development. That the dead, in the opiniorjt of the savage, strive for the enjoyments of the living is made clear by so many reports that we could not exhaust them even with the most tedious thoroughness. Beside this mass of inductive material, the very

240 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 863-6; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 246, 278. (Ed.)

241 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 240.

242 See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 158-9. It is significant that this practice is very prevalent among the California Indians (see *Handbook of American Indians,* I, 808, 941), while native California is noted as one of the regions of greatest linguistic diversity in the world (see Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 98). (Ed.)

circumstances of the case lead us to the same conclusion. The nature of the dead in their continued existence, i.e., of the ghosts, doubtless remained undefined for a long time in human thought. Nevertheless certain of their attributes impressed themselves on man's experience from the point of view which he had taken. They poured in on him from two sides. He took them as facts into his store of experience, accumulated them, and drew from them logical conclusions for his conduct, all quite in accordance with his fundamentally egoistic nature, without worrying in the least whether at some future time a synthesis of all these possibly antagonistic attributes would produce a possible or an impossible concept.

The history of human ideas necessarily involves the formation of concepts with inherent contradictions and their toleration. They are the inevitable consequences of the first step. Later generations are satisfied with the truth of the traditional attributes. If, when man combines them, their contradictions come to light, he does not resolve them into their elements and subject them to proof. On the contrary, he only regards such contradictions as additional authority that it is a characteristic of a certain class of concepts to be able to combine attributes which the human mind can not reconcile. This is the principle of mysticism. We here encounter its earliest suggestion but shall find it to be an extremely important factor in the development of the most advanced religions. The "mystery" arises, as a concept explicable only on historical grounds, in a *cul-de-sac* of logic, from which subsequent theology extricates itself by explaining that it is not contrary to reason but superior to it.

The first step toward the development of this principle of human history is to be seen, therefore, in the acquisition of the first apparently empirical attributes of the spiritual, the root idea of the supernatural, inasmuch as these attributes were derived from two irreconcilable categories. On the one hand, all the properties referable to the vital principle in man were attributed to the ghost. The human body, filled with the breath of life, hungered and thirsted, craved and enjoyed pleasures of all sorts, but not so the inert and soulless corpse. Thus, before the intervention of new factors of experience, it was a logical conclusion that all these needs continued with the departed ghost. Since satisfaction gladdened the soul in the body and predisposed it to benevolence, while want made it peevish and ill-humored, the same should be true of the ghost. Thus there appeared a deeper cause for the sufferings of the living and an intimation of their remedy. On the other hand, these same spiritual beings were regarded as the causes of human sufferings and of all the phenomena which intervene directly or indirectly in human life to produce sensations of pain. The very nature of these phenomena, therefore, could give rise in men's minds to a second series of attributes, which were necessarily ascribed to the ghost with a degree of assurance corresponding to the strength of the conviction as to the spiritual causes of things.

In this way the first combination of the contradictory was established, another type of compatibility created, and an avenue of ideas opened up which logic can follow only by means of the thread of history. The same spiritual being, who, according to the one deduction, is bound forever to the vicinity of the body, to its last bone, to its very dust, possesses equally certainly, according to the other, the property of lingering at will in his favorite haunts and of penetrating into the bodies of his victims. The same being loses his way to his hut through a simple deception yet finds his way on all the paths of the air, can not cross a bit of water yet scourges the body with rude raindrops, flees from the fire which consumes his dwelling yet hurls thunderbolts from the air. The same being who, on a higher stage, demands the miserable gifts of men and without them would have to die another death, grants the fields their fruitfulness or withholds it from them. Thus even on the lowest stage of cult ideas a large number of contradictions are brought together.[248] They are inseparable from the paths by which man arrived at them.

The cult finds its incentive in the phenomena of the second group, in the encroachment of the spirit world on human life. Its forms, however, arise exclusively in connection with the ideas of the former type; consequently there is no human desire which does not find expression in them. But the forms of the cult, when they first appear, are the forms of life developed on that particular stage of foresight and self-maintenance. These forms, dislodged by newer ones, then vanish from life, but by no means from the cult. They survive there along with the later ones in

[248] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 824-6. (Ed.)

accordance with the law of compatibility. Thus in the course of time a later age finds that it possesses cult forms which are unrelated to any other habit of life and which seem to have been devised purely and simply for the cult. On the other hand, precisely because of this circumstance the various forms of the cult show us, as though in a kaleidoscope, the forms of life of ages long past.

The first act of the nature of a ghost-cult was connected with the abandonment of the habitation after the occurrence of a death. Man abandoned not merely his last camping place but the entire region roundabout where he had sought his food. Thenceforth this all belonged to the ghost alone. Here he acquired his food as he had done in his lifetime, and whatever ill-will he had—good-will was as yet out of the question—depended on its quantity and quality. This relinquishment was, properly speaking, the first type of propitiation and sacrifice, the earliest cult act.[244] It developed into a cult as soon as the need appeared. The form was borrowed from the social and economic conditions of the time. A small roving society, which accumulated no stores, which did not cooperate in any sort of division of labor, and which daily left each individual to his own fortune, could provide no one with sustenance from its larder and was not schooled to maintain anyone's life by voluntary offerings. All it could grant was the relinquishment of a chance find or, for a longer period, the abandonment of its source. This system of relinquishing the source of sustenance bears approximately the same relation to the later system of sacrifice as the medieval allotment of land to serfs bears to the modern wage system, and both distinctions spring equally from different economic conditions.

The old system was preserved in its purest form on the isolated islands of the Pacific until the last century. On certain islands, beside the place set aside for the deceased, a large field with all its fruits was occasionally abandoned to him. The Polynesian word for private property, in its more restricted meaning of

244 This conception of sacrifices of renunciation is, so far as the editor is aware, original with Lippert. It is not found in Spencer, Tylor, or Lubbock. Tylor regards the "abnegaton theory" of sacrifice as a late development *(Primitive Culture,* II, 396). Lippert, however, makes abandonment and abstention earlier than gift sacrifices. See also Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 873-7. (Ed.)

that which is given to a ghost as his own, has found wide acceptance. To use this expression, a *taboo* is put upon the field; it becomes the property of the ghost or sacred to him. Similarly in Hawaii, not only did an entire mountain belong to the spirit of Pele, but also the cherished berries which grew there were sacred to her.[2*5]

The same system may likewise appear in a somewhat modified form. Various circumstances might make the relinquishment of a whole productive area seem more burdensome than abstention from a particular food product. Thus even today on Easter Island the relatives of a dead man commonly abstain for one to two years in his favor from the principal food product there, **the** yam. The entire yam crop during this period thus falls to the ghost.[246] In Hawaii the fish in a certain body of water or the fruit on a certain tree were often specially tabooed, the former place being marked by a pole with a bunch of bamboos and the tree by a palm leaf wound around the trunk.[247] The old Caribs, whose prodigious fear of ghosts by day and night presented such a strange contrast to their daring piracy, abstained from all food for a period after the death of a comrade. Those in Haiti, who used to drag their dying to the nearest mountain and expose them there, relinquished to them permanently a certain fruit, the mamey or tropical apricot. They believed that the ghosts came down from the mountains at night and visited these trees to secure food; consequently no man might touch them.[248]

In West Africa the very same cult form has survived in a guise no less simple at bottom. However, this region is inhabited by countless little tribes living interspersed among one another, and each tribe acts independently in the selection of what it shall relinquish to its divinity. The result is a motley jumble of taboos. Nevertheless, Bastian[249] was able to disentangle them sufficiently to show that every fetish to which any one adheres **imposes some** special duty of renunciation. Ancient civilized peoples still preserved the idea of the "sanctity" of certain prehistoric vegetable foods, as for example the lotus plant. This,

245 Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* pp. 116, 129.
246 Geiseler, *Oster-Insel,* p. 30.
247 Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 218.
248 Muller, *Urreligionen,* pp. 214, 223; Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 327.
249 *Deutsche Expedition.*

we must conclude, was once the food plant tabooed to the dead in the Nile Valley. From West Africa Bastian has brought us the word *quixilles*, the native name for this extremely widespread cult form.

It has been asserted of the Australians that, with the exception of the southern tribes, they have no form of cult at all. They are said to ascribe to the ghosts no great influence over the living except that on their health and to offer them no sacrifice or cult gifts, since they believe that they can exist in their disembodied form without nourishment.[250] Nevertheless these low tribes possess the most complicated food taboos under other names, and their rationalized interpretations have made it easy to overlook the fact that this is the very cult form adapted to their stage of culture. Their ghosts do not need sacrifices of food simply because they can live on the particular food products left untouched for them by the living.[251]

In Hawaii at times when mollification or propitiation of the ghosts seemed especially urgent, as for example when the king or chief had fallen ill, it was customary to hold a "general taboo" frequently lasting many days. Such a taboo on a period of time does not differ in sense from the more common taboos on specific fish, fruits, or edible animals, except that the restriction lies, not in the selection of food products, but in the duration of the renunciation. The "strict taboo" forbade any sort of activity while it lasted. In order to grasp its true meaning we must keep clearly in mind the conditions of the primitive age. This was characterized, as we have seen, by the fact that man knew no other incentive to action than the satisfaction of his immediate needs. All activity was absorbed in the food-quest. Hence if a man rested from his activity he thereby renounced the competition for subsistence in favor of some one else. He thus did in a more thoroughgoing way what was the very object of the system of *quixilles;* he abandoned to the ghosts all the fruits of the land, beasts of the field, and fish of the waters for the duration of his inactivity.

Hawaiian legend ascribes prodigiously long periods to the taboos of the pious men of long ago. One taboo period, it is

250 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 804, 809, 811.

251 For further cases and discussion of food taboos see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1114-21; IV, 583-94. (Ed.)

said, lasted five years, another thirty years.[252] Aside from such exaggerations, of which myth is very fond, taboos of forty days have actually been observed in historical times, though even this was only possible by the arrangement of a compromise between ghosts and men, such as we frequently meet in culture history. The ghosts retained their old right, and the living avoided starvation by an expedient whereby the men fulfilled their cult obligation strictly while the women supported them by their labor. This was the mild or "ordinary taboo."

This ancient form of the cult with its taboos on foods and periods of time finds its modern equivalent and descendant in fasting and rest days.[263] Although to the subjective point of view, which we are still scarcely able to escape in things religious, fasts and holy days may seem more refined and hence presumably later forms than offerings and sacrifices, they have nevertheless actually grown out of a primeval form of the care for life and are hoary heirlooms in the jewel casket of our civilization. Later ages have modernized the setting of the stone and arranged it for uses appropriate to later needs, but the antiquity of the institution is vouched for by its wide distribution among tribes of lowest culture.[254]

Fasting at times of severe visitations or on occasions of impending decisions of a grave nature—always, however, when man comes into contact with spirits[255]—has been a widespread cult practice among diverse Indian tribes. The ancient Hebrews in the same situations resorted to the same methods. The European peoples, however, did not first acquire it from the latter by way of Christianity; it was known even to the heathen Germans. When an epidemic fell on the Norman host, they abstained from meat and mead for two weeks.[256]

Now if we compare these primitive food taboos, such as those on the lotus plant of the ancient Egyptians and the mamey tree of the Caribs, with the tree in the Garden of Eden, we can scarcely impugn the historical truth of this venerable cult myth,

[252] Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 217.

[258] The standard authority on this subject is Webster, *Rest Days.* (Ed.)

[254] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 873-8, 1180-2: IV, 636-7. (Ed.)

[255] Spencer and Tylor regard fasting as a means of inducing dreams and ecstasy, i.e., intercourse with spirits (Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 265; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 410-16). (Ed.)

[286] Xanten *Annates ad* a. 845.

which says, "Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die."[257] In perfect agreement with this is the story which Cook tells of a New Zealand youth who would not break his fast for the same reason, namely, that his *eatua* would kill him.[258]

Abandonment, relinquishment, and abstention are the only cult forms which we can assign to primitive times, if we are correct in using the stages of economic foresight as a basis of classification. Everything in the cult over and above this presupposes a more highly developed economy. The necessary underlying assumption of this simple primitive cult was, as we have seen, a conception of the soul, if we may call that indefinite something, the behavior of which determines whether the body is alive or dead, the soul. To the attributes of the soul which primitive man was able to abstract from its behavior in the body were added, however, those which he deduced from its activities outside the body as the cause of multitudinous external phenomena. In accordance with the cult point of view and common usage we call the soul in this latter role a ghost or spirit.[259] We must therefore regard a belief in ghosts and spirits based on a belief in souls as the first and oldest form of cult and religious ideas.[260] We shall see later whether it is also to be regarded as the original form of all religions.

The assertion has been made, as the result of a false identification, that a belief in immortality exists among the lowest peoples and thus by inference also prevailed with primitive man. This, however, is incorrect. Primitive man had not the slightest cause
122 to formulate the concept of eternity, and it is probable that such an idea was beyond his mental capacity.[261] How long then,

257 Genesis iii. 3. (Ed.)

258 Forster, *Seereisen,* VI, 91.

269 Lippert makes no distinction between ghost and spirit, the German word *Geist* representing both concepts. It is, however, convenient and scientifically correct to distinguish them. The ghost is the disembodied soul of an actual human being, whereas the spirit is a higher supernatural being no longer referable to any individual but of an order lower than a god. Thus we have an evolutionary sequence of soul—ghost—spirit—god, each of which shades gradually and imperceptibly into the next. See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 931. (Ed.)

260 Tylor also believes "that the doctrine of souls, founded on the natural perceptions of primitive man, gave rise to the doctrine of spirits. . . ." *(Primitive Culture,* II, 110). (Ed.)

261 See Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 22; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 847-9. (Ed.)

according to the original conception, did the ghost live? To this question a later cult form might seem to give us a fairly definite answer. If the ghosts need human support, we should be able to measure their lifetime by the duration of their cult. But we are upset in this calculation by the manner of providing for them just described. By the relinquishment and consecration to them of places, foods, and tabooed objects of all sorts, they are guaranteed a measure of independence, which would make the later cult acts of sacrifice superfluous if it were not for the law of compatibility. The Australian who asserts that the ghosts should be able to support themselves and to live without food offerings would have been understood even by the Romans, the most zealous and conscientious of cult observers.

Even primitive man must already have formulated the concept of a ghost or spirit world as a consequence of his defensive mode of dealing with the dead. Every place to which he gave a wide berth from fear of the dead was already the germ of a realm of departed souls. An actual society of the dead, such as we encounter at a somewhat later period, was not needed to bring forth this idea. Every general consensus in the choice of a locality for the disposal of the dying and dead led inevitably to such a conception. In Haiti the dead were carried to the barren mountains; hence these constituted their abode thereafter and naturally therefore a realm of the dead. The Kaffir, who casts his dead into the bush, regards the bush as the spirit world. To those who exposed their dead on the other side of a river, the ghosts dwelt across the river; to those who set them adrift on the ocean, the realm of the dead was in the depths of the sea. Where the living abandoned their cave dwellings to the dead, the spirit world was to be found in the mountain caves, and where graves for the dead were dug in the earth on the model of the caves occupied by the living, there arose the most widespread conception of all, that of a realm of the dead in the dark bosom of the earth.[262]

When a later age had made gifts and offerings to the ghosts and spirits a part of its cult obligation and had learned thereby not only to avoid their malevolence but also to transform their proximity, formerly merely dreaded, into a helpful influence in human activity, mankind possessed side by side the following

[262] For further cases and discussion see Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 203-4; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 59-69. (Ed.)

four elements of the cult: the final riddance of the deceased, his peaceful continued existence in the realm of the dead, his permanent support by the living, and his benevolent presence among them. How have these contradictory elements been reconciled in actual fact? According to the testimony of history it happened practically everywhere as follows. The contradiction between the presence of the ghost among the living and his existence in the spirit world was removed by a compromise with respect to the duration of the former. The deceased tarried for a period among the living but thereafter took up his residence in one of the realms of the dead. The offering of gifts during this period of sojourn, however, logically took the place of the former abandonment of territory and final riddance and became the necessary condition for entrance into rest in the realm of the dead. Any departed soul who did not receive such a cult, or was inadequately provided for, increased the chorus of haunting ghosts who were the cause of all harm and evil in the world. Thus even on this stage it was in fact an unpaid debt, a "sin" in an old and no longer current cult sense of the word, which brought evil into the world. On the other hand, according to a Brahmanic expression, sacrifice alone kept the world going. It is sacrifice, then, which on this higher stage expedites the ghosts into the realm of the dead and removes from man the incubus of fear, but it is also sacrifice, in connection with invocations, which brings the spirits back to man.

We may now return to the question: how long does the ghost live? Different savage tribes would answer it very differently. But the decisive factor in the formation of ideas of this kind is at first the strength and vividness of memory. As the recollection of individual ghosts pales, fear of them vanishes and with it the impulse to make them offerings. Gifts grow more infrequent and are called forth only when special occasions jog the memory. A forgotten ghost ceases to exist as an individual, and one which has never received cult attention is not easily remembered. Hence subjective consciousness must actually determine the seemingly objective fact of the life of the ghost.

The conception of the fate of a neglected ghost, however, varies widely with different peoples in accordance with the further development of their forms of life. The West Africans regard such ghosts as the vagabonds of the spirit world, earning a meager living by their own efforts. They are everywhere ready to scavenge from the leavings of meals and sacrifices. It is they who are attracted by food supplies and leavings, but not to the peace and weal of such a careless house. But it is also they upon whose existence a very important cult institution is founded. Their hungry existence makes them destitute of all pride and inclined to jump at any bait which man sets for them. Thus they fall into his power. A later cult form,[2*3] practiced uninterruptedly and with this in view, is able to reduce them, as it were, to a state of domestication, as we shall find them among the Indians, Negroes, and Mongols. The Great Spirit of the Indians is little interested in sacrifices and offerings, and is not disposed to concern himself with the petty economic cares of man for such a bribe. But the proletarian spirits become the willing retainers of the medicine man.

The most perfect antithesis of all this is revealed by the ancient Egyptians, the earliest people with an advanced foresight. In a society as highly organized as the kingdom of the Pharaohs, with its intensive use of the land, there was no room for such a vagabond life. A departed soul which was not properly and sufficiently provided for necessarily died a second death, and only those well cared for entered the no less organized spirit world. On the other hand, the cult lengthened the life of the ghost, or it kept his memory continually fresh in the minds of his survivors. The logical consequence of this conception is that the prosperity and power of a spirit grows with the size of its cult, a view actually current among savage peoples but also very clearly expressed in many inscriptions of the ancient Egyptians. The purpose of this anticipatory glance into a later age is to call attention in advance to the place where a further differentiation in the spirit world is to be expected.[264]

However simple the religious ideas of primitive times may seem on the whole to be—so simple indeed that by many they are not even regarded as religious but are distinguished as "fear of ghosts and specters" or as beliefs in goblins and superstitions of the most depraved sort—they nevertheless already contain the germs capable of development in different directions into ex-

[268] Le., shamanism. (Ed.)

[264] See below, pp. 389-414. The first differentiation, according to Lippert, is that dependent on the status of the ghosts in their lifetime (see above, p. 113). (Ed.)

tremely important systems and institutions. What one chiefly misses in them is system, but this very lack accords perfectly with a stage of social unorganization, and one will seek in vain for another key to the understanding of the religious and mythological systems of a later age if one scorns to accept as the basis of explanation the progress of social organization by internal development and external accumulation. If we were to judge these primitive notions by what we expect from the inward power of religious ideas today, we should greatly underestimate their intrinsic quality.

It is not to be overlooked that historically the first and oldest principle of religion, although of course by no means the highest according to our standard, was that of *fear*.[265] The Bible is again incontestably correct in saying that, not love and confidence, but the fear of God is the beginning of all religious advancement.[266] Even our language has preserved a survival of earlier times; "the love of God" is a relatively unfamiliar expression compared with "the fear of God," by which we still designate the core of religious feeling. Probably nowhere is the fear of God more effectively motivated by the fearsome attributes of the divinity than in the Old Testament. Even the ancient Egyptian monuments bear witness to a much more friendly relation between man and his divine father. This advance is the achievement of a later form of the cult.

Another closely related characteristic of primitive religion is what we might call its objectivism. This well authenticated phenomenon would scarcely be comprehensible if religious ideas had first been stimulated in any other way than that with which we have become acquainted. The primitive cult is far indeed from regarding the good intentions of man as of more importance than his acts and offerings. The spirits of primitive religion know nothing of the attitude of the human heart. What they want and require is the reality of the offered objects themselves, free from all symbolism. This objectivism characterizes all early religions, including Yahwism as the priestly caste represented it.

265 "Any sociologist knows . . . that there is no real religion that **does** not rest upon unreasoning fear of the unknown" (Keller, *Societal Evolution*, p. 200). (Ed.)

266 "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Psalms cxi. 10; Proverbs ix. 10). "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge" (Proverbs i. 7). (Ed.)

Therefore in all old religions it becomes not only possible, but logically inevitable, that those under cult obligations be represented by experts in cult observances. Here we have the basis of the priesthood.[267] Nothing depends on the subjective attitude, everything on the right thing being offered in the right way. Thus in the principles of primitive religion there inheres a characteristic, so repugnant to humanism, which finds such bald expression in Brahmanism; the spirits hate poverty because it can offer them nothing. For the same reason symbolism, which was once regarded as the foundation of religion, is absolutely foreign to primitive religion. The cult symbol develops only out of actual forms, which have been superseded in life but are preserved as survivals in the cult.[268] But because this sort of progress never ceases and because the cult, in contrast to economic life, tenaciously preserves old forms, every religious system must in the course of time become filled with symbols. The transition of religion from objectivism to subjectivism, to the redemption of poverty, is gradually consummated in connection with the progress of humanitarian ideas. The stages of this transition are illustrated by the non-priestly prophets of Israel, and we may accept as the slogan of the victorious revolution the statement of Jesus that the mite of the poor widow in consideration of the attitude of the giver should balance the treasures of the rich.[269]

The grandest cultural element already contained in the primitive form of religion was that of discipline through the fear of a power transcending that of man.[270] While the human wielder of power of any sort could at most realize his will and authority only within limits, there emerged with these ideas a more far-reaching power to discipline the will, although, of course, it was restricted at first to a very narrow range of obligations. As poor as the primitive age was in its phenomena, it was rich in the germs of future development. Thus that superhuman power lay, as it were, still unimpregnated in the womb of primitive times,

[267] Lippert deals fully with the evolution of this institution in his *Geschichte des Priesterthums.* (Ed.)

[268] "There is a strong presumption that most if not all symbols, as they occur among primitive peoples, at least, are survivals" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 2204). (Ed.)

[269] Mark xxi. 42-4; Luke xxi. 1-4. (Ed.)

[270] According to Sumner and Keller, "the first and last service of religion to society [is] the discipline it exercises" *(Science of Society,* II 1479). (Ed.)

for at the outset no especial advantage existed in the fact that man was again and again driven by the dead from the places which he had begun to equip for life. Even this, however, furnished an impulse to repeated new tests of strength and to a progressive conquest of the factor of inertia, the dominance of which distinguished the passive from the active races and led to their gradual but certain retreat and ultimate downfall before the latter.

In the embryonic social organization of primitive times there was as yet no true human sovereignty, but a broad perspective is opened up in the realization that such might develop in some way and unite with the disciplinary power created by cult ideas. From this union there might arise an authority which, equipped with supernatural power, could lead human societies to goals far beyond the utmost that animal instincts are able to attain. And such a union has actually taken place.[271] The scanty attention which history has thus far paid to it does not detract in the slightest from the fact that the union of divine power with human sovereignty has played an extraordinarily important role from the dominion of the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt down to the empires of the present day.

[271] Lippert later develops this idea in a most illuminating way in his treatment of the man-fetish. See below, pp. 603-43. (Ed.)

CHAPTER III

THE TAMING OF FIRE

250 Among the expedients by which man irrevocably widened the gap between himself and all his fellow creatures, the most appropriate for bringing to a natural conclusion the first epoch of human history is fire. In spite of the voluminous literature on this extremely important subject,[1] we must confess that we have no reliable information about the original discovery and diffusion of fire. The consequences of this advance, however, are perfectly obvious, yet we—far removed as we are from the event—naturally tend to be more impressed by the remoter consequences than by the more immediate ones. It is the extraordinary importance of the latter to which the reader's attention must here be called.

The use of fire in the mechanic arts is very late, and even its employment in the preparation of food is not original. What fire provided first of all was protection from cold and from the nocturnal attacks of carnivorous animals. Man could abandon his tree dwellings, where he inhabited such, and station a dependable watchman before his camp site, whether in a cave or in the open field. Thus for the first time it became possible for mankind to extend its habitat into wildernesses dominated by animals and into bleak highlands and the frigid north. Ashes and charred bones in the deposits of the prehistoric cave men of Europe prove that fire was then already man's companion.[2]

251 Fire, once obtained, could never again be parted with, for its benefits were too great. Only a munificent reward could have impelled primitive man to sacrifice a portion of his comfortable improvidence. Fire became an exacting disciplinarian. The possibility of losing it again forever was perhaps long the only thought of the future to dominate the present. A primitive family which had once become acquainted with fire could no longer permit all hands to be idle. Every flicker of the flame became a stimulus

*An extensive bibliography in Planck, *Feuerzeuge.*
2 See Osbora, *Old Stone Age,* p. 165. (Ed.)

to renewed provident labor. There was something subduing in a possession so ever-threatening and yet so highly esteemed.

The influence of fire was even greater than is commonly supposed, for it must be regarded as antedating the invention of the various methods of artificial generation.[8] The latter are found nearly everywhere in the hands of the male sex. They restored to men their partially lost liberty and helped to pave the way to male supremacy. Tending the fire, however, is woman's affair. It formed the center of the sphere of life which woman dominated. It made the woman's domestic establishment more stable and to some extent more onerous than it had formerly been, but it likewise made it much more permanently attractive to the men than when her intermittent sexual charm had been the sole allurement. Those who had previously sought the company of woman only for limited periods were now bound permanently to her hearth, and soon no longer as mere guests but by ties of reciprocal duties and obligations. About the hearth there arose the home in every sense of the word. The old society based on community of blood, the primitive or consanguine family, began to recede into the background before a new type of domestic association.

Woman received a rich reward for the extra burden she assumed as the guardian of the fire, until later man as the firemaker seized a portion for himself. Roasting made a variety of kernels available as food for infants, even before they had developed a complete set of milk teeth. This shortened the nursing period and restored the mother to the man at less infrequent intervals. The food obtained by the man was likewise agreeably improved by the influence of fire. This must have impelled him to return again and again with his booty. Thus woman acquired a position where she could demand from man a contribution to the maintenance of her home. The basis was given for an alliance, an agreement with mutual obligations. But the woman did not attach herself to the man's vague household. The possession of fire had made her own home the more important, and the man, attracted by its comforts, now attached himself to it in a more permanent fashion.

Where and under what circumstances such an epoch-making

[8] According to Fraaer, "mankind possessed and used fire long before they learned how to kindle it" *(Golden Bough*, I I , 255-6). (Ed.)

event occurred we do not know, and the evidence that the men of the Ice Age were already acquainted with fire makes us even wonder whether all research in literature and folklore will bring us any closer to knowledge. Even the oldest legends and myths can not possibly extend back to the generations that remembered the great event. Of all such legends,[4] however valuable they may be of their sort, we can at best expect only that they be true culture myths, that is, that they depict in epic fashion the cultural state of an earlier age. Such a culture myth—it might more properly be called a cult myth—is found in the Rig-Veda.[5] The Hindu fire-priest worshiped his god in the fire itself, and in his invocation reminded him of his childhood history. Agni (fire) was born of parents who could give him no breast nourishment, and "the child at his birth devoured both parents." Unsuckled "he yet grew up, forthwith bearing tidings afar." This teaches us nothing except that the priest of Agni used to generate fire by friction with two pieces of wood, and that he described this process in epic form to the fire he worshiped. A comparison with other legends and—what is more significant—with the customs of primitive peoples and those of classical antiquity shows us that such a description can not refer to the earliest use of fire. Even the priest or fire-maker to whom we owe this little fabricated myth is a phenomenon of a later age.

From a comparison of these substitutes for records it becomes reasonably clear and certain that the problem of the first *use* of fire must be treated specially and distinguished from the question of the invention of tools for the artificial *generation* of fire. Everything indicates that mankind had already enjoyed the benefits of fire for a long time before men here and there discovered means, sometimes similar and sometimes very different, of renewing fire at will.[6] Strong evidence for this is afforded by
253 the fact that the practice of preserving and transporting fire was long retained and sanctioned by religious conservatism, even when adequate fire-making implements were generally available. This conservative sanctity could have been imparted to the practice only at a time when it represented the general custom. In

[4] The most important are collected in Kuhn, *Herabkunft des Feuers.*
[5] Hymns x. 79, x. 115.
[6] Even today the Andamanese and a few other tribes do not know how to generate fire. Cases in Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 253-5, and Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 193. (Ed.)

view of the natural disposition of primitive man, such a clumsy, slow, and tedious method would never have attained such wide acceptance, had the knowledge of generating fire at will preceded that of its use. As a matter of fact, most traditions reflect the same attitude, for they arose at a time when the problem was not the generation of fire but the manner of acquiring and transmitting it.

By what chance, what natural event, man originally obtained fire is a question that will probably never be definitely answered. When Kuhn[7] arrived at the hypothesis that primitive man might once by chance have witnessed a broken bough being rubbed by the wind against the tree trunk until its splinters caught fire, he was obviously influenced by the desire to explain at the same time the origin of the use of fire and the invention of one of the most practicable fire-making implements. Historically, however, the two seem by no means as inseparable as he assumed. The rubbing of wood on wood is but one of several early methods of kindling fire, and among the ancient Romans, indeed, it seems quite clearly to be later and more aristocratic than the rustic method of using stones. Even in itself, however, an event such as that imagined by Kuhn is highly improbable.

The earth possesses two natural sources of fire, atmospheric electricity and volcanoes. If fire was used and preserved before fire-making tools were invented, it must have originally been obtained in primitive times from one of these two natural sources.[8] In all probability, however, it was not tamed in one spot only, and in that case one source may have been used here and another there. But the person who first replenished a fire-brand with fresh fuel and pitched his camp near its beneficent warmth, and who then tried to carry the brand with him to a distant camp site in order not to be without it the next night, was the abject slave of fear in the face of incomprehensible influences and could not have become acquainted with fire in its terrifying aspects of incendiary lightning or a belching crater. Neither phenomenon would have attracted him to a closer investigation; much sooner would they have put him to flight.

There are, however, other less fearsome manifestations of fire, less obviously though still causally related to the above phe-

[7] *Herabkunft des Feuers,* pp. 92, 102. (Ed.)
8 See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 256. (Ed.)

nomena, and we are accordingly dependent upon them for an explanation. Darwin[9] and Peschel[10] have called our attention to the lava streams near volcanoes, where man can become acquainted with the nature of fire without fear or danger. Humboldt[11] relates how for twenty years after the eruption of Mt. Jorullo splinters could be ignited in the fissures of its little secondary craters. In other volcanoes, as in Hawaii, the molten mass of lava has bubbled up periodically from time immemorial, and for a long time after each overflow there is preserved underneath the cracked crust a natural and not unavailable source of fire. Not long ago in Iceland one lava stream filled the entire valley of the Skapta River, while others measured as much as five miles in width. Before such masses could cool off completely, they would afford an entire generation of men an opportunity for the safe observation of the element of fire. Such phenomena, moreover, are widely distributed over the earth and are found on every continent, if past centuries are taken into account.

Similarly a fire kindled by lightning may in certain cases survive under conditions where it becomes more approachable. It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility for a forest or prairie fire, caused by lightning, to smolder on in a log or stump, protected by its own ashes, after the land has again become accessible. Then the reaction of branches thrown on, or of sticks poked in out of curiosity, would teach man how to manage the element. It would then be a relatively easy step for wandering man to invent methods for the transportation and preservation of this treasure.

The surviving myths on this subject, excepting those in the class of the Hindu one already mentioned, everywhere speak of the transportation of the first fire and sometimes also indicate a point of origin or its direction. That a mythical element is often associated with them is natural and inevitable. Primitive speculation is unable to attribute unusual phenomena to any cause other than a spiritual power. Consequently lightning can be hurled only by spirits, and the volcano must necessarily conceal a similar agency. The Hawaiian volcano Kilauea is the seat or home of the dangerous goddess Pele, and this property

9 *Descent of Man*, I, 44.
10 *Volkerkunde*, p. 141.
11 *Kosmos*, IV, 334, 341.

relation, as we shall see later, is the essence of a taboo. The Hawaiian dared not spend the night on the goddess's mountain, and considered it very dangerous to rob the divine owner of even so much as a berry growing there. The fear of committing such a desecration was proportionately greater, the more immediate and terrible the vengeance promised to be. Elsewhere it has been regarded as an enormous risk—often ventured nevertheless—to descend into the grave of a dead man and rob the jealously watchful ghost of his weapons and treasures. In exactly the same way the fetching of fire from its natural hearth must have seemed an act of superhuman daring, not on account of the material dangers involved, for they might conceivably be reduced to a minimum, but on account of the current cult ideas, which must have represented the acquisition of fire from such a source as robbery in the home of the divinity. Gratitude, which might be inferred from the fact that legend extols the performer of such a feat, is a trait which little accords with the nature of primitive man. The champion in all such legends is exalted, not as the benefactor of mankind, but for his immense daring, his heroism, which appeals to primitive man and makes him like to recount these heaven-storming deeds of the giants of yore.

The same thing holds true in the case of lightning. Here the Romans were on the same level as earlier peoples, in that they regarded objects struck by lightning as sanctified to the divinity of lightning and consequently not to be used. But since the foundations of this idea are common to all mankind and are not the product of the speculation of any one race or linguistic family, it would seem unwarranted to draw conclusions from the presence of the same legendary material in several tribes.[12]

The Australians also have a fire legend.[13] They tell of an earlier age without fire, and complain of the winter's cold at that time but not of the fact that food had to be eaten raw. Then, however, fire was brought to them from the east in the stalk of a grass tree. Likewise one of the many legendary and mythical tales of the Maoris of New Zealand recalls the manner in which primitive peoples dealt with fire. The Maoris preserved the tradition that their ancestors had come to New Zealand by boat from

[12] As does Peschel (*Volkerkunde,* p. 142).
13 Jung, in *Natur,* 1887, No. XIII.

a distant land called Hawaiki, which some conjecture to be Hawaii with its active volcanoes. From Hawaiki they brought to their new home a sacred and perpetual fire, the same which is still preserved on the island today. In New Zealand the volcano Tongariro is still active, and the myth would probably have associated itself with this mountain in the usual way, had not the Maoris with their fondness for story-telling kept alive the old historical legend. Consequently the connection with the volcano was made, strangely enough, in the opposite way; the mountain, too, derived its fire from the sacred source in the old fatherland. On its summit, runs the legend, there was once only snow and ice. The chieftain Ngatiroirangi, one of the immigrants from Hawaiki, climbed it at that time. Threatened with the danger of freezing to death there, he called across to distant Whakari—White Island—where his sisters were tending the sacred fire from Hawaiki, to send him some of the fire. At their command it was borne by two spirits under the earth to the mountain peak, where it has burned unceasingly ever since. The only fact we can glean from these traditions is that in primitive times the transportation of fire even over great distances was the usual method of obtaining it, and that thereafter it had to be preserved.

The fire legend of the Ossets in the Caucasus resembles in type the Prometheus myth, which has become celebrated in many poetic forms, although this coincidence does not justify us in establishing the birthplace of the myth or a special claim of the Aryan peoples to it. The Prometheus myth bears the stamp of a certain fidelity to fact, both in its content and perhaps even more in its history,[14] To be sure, the memory of no people from whom we have been able to obtain living legends can hark back to the actual introduction of fire, but many tribes seem to have been witnesses of the fact that the primitive method of preserving fire was not followed by the discovery of how to generate it until a relatively late date. Prometheus is the Titan who dared to steal fire from the divinity and bestow it upon mankind. The name of the divinity is unimportant, but the early vacillation of the myth between a heavenly and an earthly deity clearly reflects the two possibilities for the derivation of fire. According to Hesiod and those who follow him, the Titan pilfered the

[14] See Planck, *Feuerzeuge,* pp. 5ff.

fire of heaven from Zeus, the god of lightning, but according to AEschylus Prometheus ignited a narthex stalk at the volcano Mosychlos on the island of Lemnos and thus stole fire from Hephaestus. The narthex, according to both Proclus and Pliny, served the same purpose as the Australian grass tree stalk, namely, the preservation and transportation of fire, the spark of which was kept smoldering in the pith.[115]

Again at a later period, according to Fulgentius, Prometheus is said to have despoiled a third deity, Apollo, by lighting his narthex on the sun god's chariot wheels. Here we see a third source of fire, the sun, added to the other two, lightning and volcanoes, a fact undoubtedly influenced by the prevalence in Rome of the burning mirror as a fire-making instrument. In other words, the myth narrators admit that by their time the views as to the source whence their ancestors had first gotten fire had branched off in two, and later three, possible directions. Nevertheless they all agree in characterizing the preservation of the spark and its conveyance in the narthex stalk as the earliest mode of obtaining fire.

Now if this was still within the recollection of the Greeks, what earlier method could there have been? Everything that might hypothetically be so regarded, however, does not appear until later in the history of the myth. Pliny's interpretation of the myth is that Prometheus is to be regarded as the historical inventor of the art of preserving fire by means of the narthex, and Hyginus later adds that in this way man learned how to preserve the embers by covering them with ashes. Now for the first time we encounter interpretations based on the later methods of making fire. Diodorus explains the myth to mean that Prometheus was the discoverer of fire sticks, but Heraclides makes the same hero the inventor of the metal burning mirror. Thus we see that in earliest times the derivation of fire was not identified with the discovery of its artificial generation, while a later age confused the two. The necessary conclusion from this is that, as a matter of fact, the constant tending and careful transportation of fire obtained from a natural source long preceded the discovery and use of any kind of fire-making tools.

This conclusion is also in accord with the fact that we find the cave men of Europe already in possession of fire at a time when

15 See Frazer, *Golden Bough*, II, 260. (Ed.)

their tools were still of a primary type. On the other hand, it is consistent with the not unfounded conjecture that the artificial generation of fire may occasionally have been discovered in the process of manufacturing tools. Finally it is evidenced by the extant customs of savage peoples, while a large number of survivals can be satisfactorily explained by no other hypothesis.

The Australians at the time of their discovery always preserved a piece of smoldering wood and carried it constantly with them on their journeys.[16] King observed "that one never met any of them who did not carry a piece of burning wood in his hand."[17] How the New Zealanders preserved fire, even on voyages over the sea, may be inferred from the story related above. To give fire from their own constantly tended source was regarded by them, as Cook learned, as a compliment and a sign of friendship. When his associates, Banks and Dr. Solander, visited a small family and they were sitting around the fire under the open sky, each guest received as a present a fish and a special firebrand to prepare it with.[18] Similar facts are reported from Polynesia, where a small fire is kept burning in the hut throughout the night, exerting its beneficent influence in keeping the mosquitoes away.

Such customs, to be sure, rapidly die out when their owners come into contact with our civilization. But a century or so ago it was still possible to learn that the North American Indians had formerly dealt with fire in the same way. In the home it was naturally in the custody of the women, but the men on their long hunting trips did exactly as the Australians. "Formerly they always carried fire with them, using for the purpose tree fungi, which they kept smoldering from morn till eve."[19] It is apparent from this that the Indian hunter passed the night in the wilderness before a blazing fire, in the morning lighting from its coals a piece of fungus, the equivalent on this continent of the grass tree and the narthex.

Should these data, because of their paucity,[20] not be regarded as conclusively establishing the universal prevalence in primitive times of a custom which amazes us by its inconvenience and the

16 *Natur,* 1878, No. XIII.

17 Forster, *Neueste Reisen,* III, 317.

18 Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* II, 400.

19 Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 130.

20 Additional evidence in Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 257-9. (Ed.)

tyranny with which it fetters man, especially the unbridled savage, all doubt is made impossible by the evidence of classical antiquity. So we must make a long jump in time and take up this evidence in detail.[21]

First, however, the reader should be impressed with the fact that fire, though an excellent adjustment to life conditions, was nevertheless a tremendous curb on man. Perhaps for a long time the burden it involved more than outweighed the apparent advantages, especially under fortunate circumstances where primitive men could manage very well without it. It was a benefit purchased at the price of daily care. It demanded elaborate preparations whenever the camp site was changed or a hunting excursion of several days undertaken. The necessity of watching it made it even more difficult for the women and children to accompany the men. There is no doubt that it imposed an increased burden on human foresight, but this very fact made it an important disciplinary factor.[22] Its disciplinary influence was enhanced by that very helplessness which at first made its enjoyment dependent upon its careful preservation, and would not have materialized to such a degree if instead the far more convenient methods of generating fire had appeared at the very beginning. This influence of the use of fire, together with the fact that its advantages are unequally distributed over the earth in inverse proportion to the natural benignity of the climate, should undoubtedly be given serious consideration in explaining why mankind has not been checked in its dispersion by climatic barriers, and why, in particular, it is the less favored climates that have revealed that peculiar stress toward improvement which has repeatedly produced new and more vigorous races to dominate the old.

Just as the vanishing Maoris of today believe that they still possess the cherished and sacred fire of their unknown ancestral home, so the historical peoples of Europe, the Greeks at their head, preserved a similar bond between original home and colony. Whenever the Greeks left home to found a new colony, they took with them fire from the common hearth of the mother community.

If for any reason they were compelled to make **a** new **fire,**

[21] An invaluable aid here is Planck, *Feuerzeuge.*
[22] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 194-5. (Ed.)

they did not turn, in the cases where ancient usages were preserved, to the fire-making implements which had then been in use for a long time, but they got fire from some other place, oftentimes at a great distance, thereby proving this to be the ancient method of obtaining fire. To illustrate with a well-known case, Lemnos each year sent a ship to the island of Delos in order to fetch from there new fire to supply the needs of the island and be preserved continuously for the ensuing year. We must digress here briefly to explain the extraordinary attachment of early man to his fire, although the subject will be taken up later in its proper connection. Ever since there has been private property, the ghost has clung to his tools and weapons as tenaciously as the living man himself. This should not surprise us, but it is astonishing to find that one of the objects from which the ghost can not part is the fire of his hearth. It remains his property, or, according to the original idea, he stays with it. If, then, a recently departed ghost or one that has returned to participate in some human festivity is to be expedited to that state of peace and rest so much desired by the survivors, the old fire to which he clings must not continue to burn. It is, therefore, extinguished at all "festivals of the dead," and, after the ghosts that have been summoned and propitiated have again departed, a new one is kindled or rather, according to earliest custom, fetched or borrowed. For this reason the ship returning from Delos with the borrowed firebrand had to wait on the open sea until the festival of the dead, celebrated with extinguished hearths, had come to an end.[23]

The foregoing digression is necessary in order to understand the behavior of the Greeks on a special occasion, which furnishes a further illustration of our point. The facts themselves are related by Plutarch,[24] but the motive behind them had come to be misunderstood with the passage of time, and he gave it a different interpretation which later became regarded as authoritative. The Greeks had won the battle of Platsea, but not without heavy losses. The ghosts of the slain hovered over the land, causing uneasiness and alarm. For each family that mourned one of its members, a hearth awaited with anxiety the return of
261 an unappeased ghost. A primitive fear oppressed the hearts of

[23] See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* X, 138. (Ed.)
[24] *Aristides* 20. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* I, 33. (Ed.)

the Greeks. It is well known with what pains and solicitude they set about making to all the fallen an atonement equivalent to the last honors accorded those who died at home. As one of these precautions it was decided, on the advice of the Delphic oracle, to extinguish all the fires in the whole land and to replace them by new fire. In this extraordinary situation the ancient custom came to life once more—the new fire was not to be generated but fetched. While the Greek leaders scoured the land compelling all the inhabitants to put out their hearth fires, the Platsean, Euchidas, hastened with all speed to Delphi and back to Plataea with a firebrand, which he was just able to deliver before he fell to the ground dead with exhaustion from his superhuman effort. It was natural for a later rationalistic age to ascribe this ancient cult action to the defilement of fire in the war area by the barbarians, necessitating a purification of the land by cult means. This expanded concept will engage our attention later. Here our purpose is merely to demonstrate at how late a time on exceptional occasions the transportation of fire was still practiced.

A Spartan military expedition reminds us somewhat in this respect of the hunting excursions of the Indians in former times and the wanderings of the Australians, when a firebrand was carried along. When the Spartan king took the field with his army, he was accompanied by a single "fire-bearer" with a smoldering flame, which was the sole source of fire used during the entire campaign.[25] Since this individual was chosen from the priesthood, he must have enjoyed immunity in the struggles of the Greeks with each other. To describe the Persian anticipation of the utter annihilation of the Greeks, Herodotus [26] uses the expression that not even a fire-bearer should escape, from which one must conclude that it had formerly been the general custom among the Greeks for armies on the march to take fire along with them.

The same usage prevailed among the Persians, but in addition to the usual motive they had a special one in that they reverenced the flame itself as the fetish of their deity. The Persian kings employed silver braziers for this purpose,[27] and their Magi

[25] Xenophon *Respublica Lacedoemoniorum* xii.
[26] *History* viii. 6.
[27] Quintus Curtius *De gestis* iii. 3. 7.

preserved the tradition that the fire which they perpetually guarded had originally descended from heaven.[28]

The Germanic peoples on their extensive migrations followed the same procedure, even though spirit and flame were not so closely associated. The Scandinavians, at least, never set out to acquire land without a firebrand, and from this practice was later derived a formal legal symbol for taking possession. When Iceland in the Ninth Century was "taken possession of with fire" or "sanctified with fire" by the Norsemen in this way,[29] it was doubtless done with fire brought from home in their ships. Even much later, when appropriation had to be limited to definite bounds, the amount was fixed at as much land as a man could "encircle with fire" in a day.[30] Whenever the fire of the Vikings went out, as must often have happened on their perilous voyages, they bethought themselves first, not of generating it artificially, but always of obtaining it elsewhere, even if this could not be done without difficulty and danger. An incident of this kind is the subject of the Saga of Grettir the Strong. Grettir, who had sailed with merchants from Iceland to Norway, where their fire failed them in a storm, swam across a fiord, seized a firebrand from the hearth of the nearest hut, and brought it back to his companions in the same way.

What was the custom on a large scale was also the practice on a small scale. The borrowing of fire, even in classical antiquity, was the usual mode of obtaining it. Planck, after discussing the character of the fire-making implements among the ancients and searching their literature with this in mind, comes with surprise to the unexpected conclusion that their use was decidedly not of the practical importance usually attributed to it. "The borrowing of fire from neighbors is very customary and widely practiced; indeed, in individual reported cases it seems to be so much the accepted means of obtaining fire that we are probably justified in regarding this fact as an indication that the use of fire-making implements has not been a general one." In fact he shows by many illustrations both that it was quite customary to enter a house in order to obtain fire and that people often preferred to run from neighbor to neighbor without

28 Ammianus Marcellinus *Rerum gestarum* xxiii. 6. 34.
29 See Strinnholm, *Wikingszuge,* II, 18.
80 *Landnamabok.*

success before making use of a fire-making implement. The transfer was effected either by means of a lighted lamp or by carrying glowing coals in an earthen vessel *(textum)* or shard.

The custom of borrowing fire was still common in the cities of Scandinavia a century or so ago. In the early morning, here as in ancient Rome, one could see the housewives running from house to house till they found in one of them a live coal, which they then carried home in a vessel. The laws had already directed that these vessels be covered with a lid.[31]

These facts are important because they indicate, contrary to the usual supposition, that the taming of fire must have been independent of the discovery of fire-making tools and therefore earlier than it could have been if it had had to await the development of those aptitudes and arts which alone could have made such a discovery possible. Even more important, however, is the fact that from the necessity of preserving this valued possession there flowed a number of influences which have had a tremendous effect on social development. Above all, a widespread and developed skill in generating fire would never have exerted such a compulsion to foresight.

The practice of borrowing fire indicates, of course, that the normal custom was to preserve it uninterruptedly. Among civilized as well as savage peoples this custom has persisted until relatively recent times, at least as a survival.[32] Where people did not dwell in close proximity and could not depend upon borrowing, they had to be especially careful about the preservation of fire, as an observation of Homer[33] indicates. "As when one hides a brand in the black ashes, one who dwells on a faraway field with no neighbors, preserving the seed of the fire, that he may not be forced to seek it elsewhere." Thus, in Homer's time, even the isolated countryman did not think of having with him a fire-making implement for every contingency. His first thought was of borrowing fire in case of need, and only the remoteness of his neighbors compelled him to be more careful himself. His method of keeping it over night was not a primitive one, but was itself, in the opinion of Hyginus,[34] an invention worthy of being ascribed to Prometheus.

[31] Lund, *Leben in Skandinavien*, p. 135.
[32] Cases of "perpetual fires" in Frazer, *Golden Bough*, II, 260-5. (Ed.)
33 *Odyssey* v. 488-90. See Keller, *Homeric Society*, p. 49. (Ed.)
34 *Fabulce* cxliv.

In earliest times men had the strongest motives for keeping the fire blazing at night, for it thus protected those camping in the open field. In a closed house, however, its maintenance at night became a burden, and the device was arrived at of protecting the glowing coals under a heap of ashes and in the morning blowing them again into a flame and replenishing them. This method of preserving fire was very general in antiquity and was taken for granted in every regulated household. The first work of the day was to fan the coals taken from the ashes and to add kindling materials. Thus the mariner Amyclas stuck a piece of ship's rope into the ashes on his hearth, withdrew it smoldering, and brought it to a flame by swinging it in the air.[35] Perhaps this was an actual practice among sailors, or perhaps the poet merely assigned another more general method to this particular vocation.

The same custom existed among the old Germanic peoples. From an ordinance of Charlemagne[36] it seems that a continuous fire had to be preserved on the hearths of the houses on his different estates, even when they were not occupied by their lord. In the peasant homes of Scandinavia down to the late Middle Ages fire was kept burning on the hearth day and night.[37] The quantity of fuel required—at the end of the Sixteenth Century Queen Sophie of Denmark granted an old widow from two to three cartloads of firewood each week—led to a change, first of all in the growing cities. Those who could afford to do so still kept up the ancestral custom, but with all possible attention to economy. Thus a court regulation of King Christian II enjoined the chef to burn no more wood in the kitchen during the afternoon and at night than was absolutely necessary to preserve the fire.

Among the Celts, Teutons, and Slavs a heavy log of hard wood was kept on the hearth throughout the year in such a fashion that one end smoldered steadily without blazing. By covering it with ashes over night a supply of fire was safely preserved.[38] In the remoter parts of western Germany the custom did not die out completely until very recently, and it is still

[35] Lucan *Pharsalia* v. 523.
[36] *Capitulare de villis* xxvii.
[37] Lund, *Leben in Skandinavien,* p. 134.
[38] See Lippert, *Christenthum,* pp. 486-7.

preserved in folklore.[39] In this region the hearth-log was called *Scharholz* or *Christbrand,* in Scandinavia and Mecklenburg *Julblock,* in England "yule log," and in southern France *calendeau.* Among the South Slavs it still survives as the *badnjak.*[40] The Lithuanians, too, are acquainted with it.

These conditions, extremely important in themselves, inevitably resulted in even more significant changes in social relations. Although a discussion of these changes does not really belong here, they must nevertheless be indicated in order to show the importance of the subject. If one seeks the physical center of the primitive family on this stage, it is to be found manifestly in the communal fire, the common property of the family. This forms henceforth a symbol of its unity even more concrete than community of blood. The latter, to be sure, is and remains the true bond. But branches, cut off by any of the many chances offered by a migratory life, easily forget their community of blood. Once separated, they remain strangers and can never again come together, for they can not again recognize the mark of their unity. A common fire, on the other hand, is a concrete indication of the actual membership of new families. It now becomes possible to say that a family is made up of those who possess a common fire and who avail themselves of fire from the same source.[41]

In this way a new mark of distinction between member and stranger emerges, and, as the new visible symbol grows more prominent and the older one recedes somewhat into the background in actual importance, a new concept of the family also arises. Henceforth blood appears more as the symbol of an ideal union, whereas common fire characterizes the human group actually combined into a social unit by definite social objectives. This new symbol, moreover, under certain circumstances even accepts the blood stranger and grants him a place in the group. In short, it paves the way for a new principle of socialization and for the extension of a form of foresight beyond the limits of the old consanguine family. Two alien families can not mingle their blood and enter into a union with the old natural principle of association as a basis. If anything was able to bring about a

[39] Kuhn, *Sagen aus Westfalen,* pp. 103ff.; Montanus, *Deutsche Volksfeste,* p. 127.
[40] Rajacsich, *Südslaven.*
[41] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 195-45. (Ed.)

rapprochement between atomistic hostile primitive families, it was the need of exchanging fire at a time when there was no other means of procuring it.

The conditions prevailing among neighboring Australian tribes furnish us an approximate picture of the isolation of primitive families. None has need of the others in hunting or in collecting nardoo spores and similar plant foods. On the contrary, any cooperation of this sort is prejudicial with the crude methods of primitive times and is prohibited by the primordial type of care for life. Logically each encounter should be a warlike one, and this is borne out by the facts. Before the discovery of fire-making implements, if the fire of one of these little tribes went out, the tribe had but two alternatives. Either it must sink back rapidly to the lowest stage of savagery and succumb in the competition with others, or it must make the first peaceful advance and bridge over for the first time the deep chasm which had theretofore only been dug deeper by the impulse of self-maintenance. The extremely strong motive for making such an advance was matched, on the other side, by a unique ease of compliance. Fire is something that can be given away without loss. It is a gift which involves no sacrifice. Moreover, it assures a reciprocal gift in case of need, an eventuality which must have loomed as a dire calamity to the mind of wandering primitive man whom the taming of fire had educated to greater foresight.

Thus was tied the first bond of an association extending beyond the family. There arose groups of families who by a mutual exchange of fire established friendly relations with one another in at least this one direction. Only those who were excluded from the benefits of such an alliance were now completely hostile. Even though this association, being limited to a single point of contact, was an extremely loose one, it nevertheless opened up one path to peace between different primitive families. Just as in Rome, according to the evidence of the poets, there was no safer or readier pretext for entering a strange house unopposed than to assert that one wanted to get fire,[42] so also, we must suppose, there was created henceforth a safe-conduct which led securely from tribe to tribe and could open the way to any other type of intercourse.[48]

[42] Longus *Pastoralia* iii. 6.
[48] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 198-9. (Ed.)

Although we can no longer witness this process among savage peoples, its actuality is nevertheless evidenced by a multitude of survivals, the significance of which in later social life sheds a ray of light on the importance of the process at the threshold of primitive times. At Athens it was a duty recognized by the state to give fire to a person seeking it.[44] So important was this matter held in that civilized state that one who could not himself comply with the request felt obliged to accompany the seeker to a place where his wish could be gratified. But the sources also make it clear that the sanction of this duty consisted only of public imprecations, i.e., that the punishment was not performed by the state but was left to the vengeance of the gods. This argues very distinctly for the antiquity of the obligation. It must have existed before there was an Athenian state with a special law code. When the state was formed, it was no longer necessary to enact what had long lain under the punitive sanction of the cult divinities of each of its families. Hence the authority to punish remained with the gods. The duty thus fell into the class of religio-ethical mandates.

These obligations, in contrast to those specifically sanctioned by individual societies, are by nature the most likely to attain general acceptance beyond the limits of the group. We find an advance of this sort in the later history of Roman civilization. Cicero in his moral philosophy urges that fire be shared with the stranger, and Plautus includes even the enemy in this obligation. It is certainly not accidental nor without significance that the very same obligation which was the first to extend beyond the iange of consanguinity was also the first to shake the conception of the spatial limitation of morality and was the first tenet of the budding idea of humanism.

The manner of dissolving the tribal relation shows clearly that rights and duties with respect to the exchange of fire had formerly been valid only within established social unions and that the sharing of fire and free access to water had been the first and most important material objects in the formation of associations on a broader basis than consanguinity. Persons expelled from the society forfeited thereby the communion of fire and water, as though the essence of membership still consisted therein. Even at a time when such a deprivation could no longer

[44] Planck, *Feuerzeuge*, pp. 29ff.

be of fatal or even serious consequence, the old expression remained in use as a survival to denote exclusion from the body politic.

There is no doubt that the Spartan "atimy" signified in its essence exclusion from the union of citizens forming the Spartan state. In the case of Aristodemus, Herodotus[45] explains that atimy meant that no Spartan would give him fire or speak to him. While in Sparta this punishment was still inflicted entirely by the state, such was no longer the case in Athens, but a general proscription of an individual by the society was still effected in the same way.

This punishment reappears in a very severe form in Rome. Water and fire were there regarded as benefits which only the state could assure to individuals, and a person who no longer belonged to the state lost, by strict logic, the right even to use these things within its borders. Any one to whom fire and water were denied by the Cornelian law, lost thereby his Roman citizenship.[46] It was also a practice among the early Germanic peoples to exclude individuals from the society by a prohibition against lending them fire.[47] In all these cases the right to procure fire, together with a few other similar rights, must originally have constituted the true substance and purpose of the union of families which was the precursor of the state.

The extraordinary importance of fire in human history has two
269 aspects, one social and the other technical. The latter seems the more striking, and the progress of the last few centuries has certainly been so great as to dazzle our eyes. Yet we must not for that reason overlook the other aspect. It seems almost paradoxical that it was the difficulty in acquiring and the inconvenience in preserving this exceptionally beneficial element, perhaps even more than the element itself, which paved the way to social progress. It was a great advance on the technical side when man discovered various artificial means of generating fire at will, but it is probable that the social consequences, which have been so extremely important and salutary, would not have appeared if these inventions had immediately followed the first taming of fire. That they did not do so is established by the

[45] *History* vii. 231.
[46] Gaius *Institutiones* i. 128.
[47] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer*, p. 530. See also Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 360. (Ed.)

manner in which the old forms of preserving fire were able to penetrate so thoroughly all the social relations, and embed themselves so deeply in the folkways, even of peoples well advanced in material culture, that throughout the whole of antiquity fire-making tools remained of strictly subordinate importance in practical everyday life. If we had to do merely with the customs of uncivilized peoples, the deep-rooted old practice of fire preservation might be sufficiently explained by the imperfection and inconvenience of the first fire-making tools. But the Romans were acquainted with flint and iron and various eminently suitable tinder materials, implements with which our own immediate forefathers knew quite well how to make shift. Yet their use never became equally popular among the Romans.

Exactly how and for what purposes the enlightened peoples of antiquity used their fire-making tools can best be demonstrated by a glance at the motives for the renewal of fire. Even though the different motives which lead civilized and semi-civilized peoples occasionally to renew fire by artificial means are not explicable in all cases, nevertheless among them cult ideas undoubtedly play the most important part. A period of time, however, must have elapsed before the old cult conceptions could assimilate the new element thoroughly enough to give rise to new ideas. That was the period of the utilization of natural fire.

The relation of fire to the cult is of two sorts, depending upon whether the new element has been connected with the earlier cult form of avoiding or the later one of propitiating the spirits.
270 That the two correspond to two different stages of the food-quest and the economic arts, we already know. We likewise know that by the law of compatibility the earlier connection will not be displaced by the later one but will continue to exist by its side. Indeed it will necessarily be the more widespread of the two, because the more recent form of economic organization, on which the other fundamentally depends, has not even yet supplanted the older one everywhere.

We have already examined in detail the earlier form of the cult and have indicated how it assimilated the new economic element of fire. For the convenience of the reader we shall review a little. To primitive man, who knows the ghosts only from their disquieting activities and judges them accordingly, the thing to do is to keep them, and with them the disturbances they are likely to cause, at a distance. This he does by removing the corpse, with which he has found them to be associated.[48] With the advance of culture the objects of developing property—weapons, tools, ornaments, clothes—are deposited with the corpse. The ghost clings to all these as to the body itself; hence they must be removed with the corpse for the security of the living. Now we have already seen that fire also belongs to this group of intimate possessions and have indicated the implications of this fact. But fire by its very nature was not subject to exactly the same treatment as the other objects. It could not be buried in the grave, a method which has preserved for us almost all the other treasures of primitive times. So man did the next best thing and allowed it to go out when a death occurred. He was thus compelled to replace it with a new fire, just as it seemed necessary to seek a new hut.

The next stage of economic activity brings with it the art of disarming the ghost who is active in the vicinity, or even of winning him over positively to the house for its protection and benefit, by allowing him to participate in the livelihood of the family. When fire becomes associated with the cult ideas of this second stage, its intimate connection with a guardian household spirit, once a source of fear, makes it now an object of special and extraordinary esteem.

Since we know the foundation upon which the whole advance rests, it is explicable why this association does not appear before the pastoral stage is reached. This stage began with the migration of nomadic tribes from the plateau of Central Asia. It is unknown to the black and red races and even to some branches of the yellow and white races. It has found its second home in northern Asia, where nomadism still retains its old form today. Here there still exists a cult of fire, one not of avoidance but of propitiation. This would completely have transformed the old attitude toward fire but for the intervention of compatibility. As a matter of fact, however, the one type of reaction is always found in conjunction with the other. Thus among the Buriats it is unlawful to put out fire with water, and, although it is generally the custom to share fire, the tribes on the Amur are afraid to give away any of the fire in their huts.[49] In southern Asia this idea

[48] See above, pp. 112-13.
[49] See Bastian, *Bilder*, pp. 399-400. (Ed.)

first appears among the Aryan invaders of India, who recognized fire as at least one of their cult objects, and among the Avestan Iranians, who placed this cult in the foreground ahead of all others. Parsiism, as is well known, is the last offshoot of this movement.

On the later stage the same fire must be perpetually preserved; on the earlier one it is from time to time extinguished and renewed. The original sense seems to be preserved in all purity in a custom of the Argives reported by Plutarch.[50] In connection with the forms of the ghost-cult they kept up the practice of extinguishing the hearth-fire and replacing it with a new one after each death in the house or family. Another fact favorable to our interpretation is that the core of this custom existed independently among the Germanic peoples. The fire which was nourished continuously on the hearth was formerly extinguished when the head of the house died.[51] The same thing was done at the recurrent festivals of the dead, and likewise in Rome at the death festival of February 21,[52] showing that the basic idea in these festivals and the general opinion about them was that the ghosts of the dead returned for them.

According to the theory of the later stages of the cult, however, the ghosts not only attend the festivals given in their honor but also come as invited guests to those which men celebrate for their own sakes, that is, those which naturally occur in times of plenty. We shall later become acquainted with a number of precautionary measures in the folkways, all of which have the common object of making certain that the ghosts depart once more when the feast is over. In this way later generations reconcile the old and the new ideas. The ghosts, who, when invited on festive occasions, bring men happiness and good fortune, become evil haunting specters at other times. A trace of logic underlies this interpretation of coexistent though contradictory facts, for it was only in times of plenty, such as at the bunya harvest in Australia, that the poor men of primitive times were in a position to purchase the good will of visiting ghosts with material offerings and thus rest easy in their presence.

In reality, therefore, every human festivity would have made

[50] *Qucestiones Grcecce* 24.
[51] Pfannenschmied, *Germanische Erntefeste.*
[62] Ovid *Fasti* ii. 664.

a renewal of fire advisable. But often in such cases the individual parts of a ceremony become separated, come to lead an independent existence, and are then distributed among several festivals, and this may take place in different ways with different tribes. That something of the kind very probably happened in the present instance is indicated by the fact that we find fire-renewal among many tribes, but in different ones attached to different festivals.

A subsequent rationalized interpretation of the usage could, of course, completely change its purpose and character. The physical nature of fire and flame was entirely unknown to all antiquity. When speculation turned to it, it got no further than superficial analogies. The favorite comparison was with an animal or spiritual being.[53] Plutarch[54] finds a striking resemblance in the fact that fire needs food, can move, and gives forth a sound when dying as though in pain. Cicero[55] calls the spiritual part of his being his *ignis animal.* Such ideas were not too learned to be popular. It was even possible to perceive that a fire which had been maintained too long was growing old, as it were, and to suppose that an occasional rejuvenation would augment its strength.

As is well known, a general renewal of fire took place in Rome at the festival of the ancient new year on March 1. All hearth-fires were extinguished. Then a new flame was kindled on the hearth at the temple of Vesta, and from this the household hearths received the new fire.[56] This renewal was undoubtedly accomplished in the same way as when the Vestal fire had gone out from neglect, i.e., by artificial means. According to Festus, this artificial method consisted in the use of the fire-drill, a wooden tablet *(tabula)* in which the priest drilled a hole until tinder could be ignited from the heated wood. The newly generated fire was received in a bronze sieve.[57]

Although these and similar fire-making tools were by that time in many hands, Pliny nevertheless ascribes their use mainly to shepherds and scouts in the field, hence to a class of people who, unlike even Homer's isolated peasant, were unable to keep

[58] See Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie,* I, 506.
[54] *Qucestiones Romance* 75.
[65] *De natura Deorum* iii. 14.
[56] Macrobius *Saturnalia* i. 12. 6; Ovid *Fasti* iii. 143.
[57] See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 207. (Ed.)

fire. In a society accustomed to permanent hearths, however, the priests alone seem to have generated fire artificially, while the rest of the society with help from this source could still adhere to the old custom of borrowing fire.

The Celts also practiced fire-renewal for cult reasons, and many survivals have been found in England. At their fire-festivals[58] all hearth-fires had to be extinguished and could not be kindled again until new fire had been generated artificially by a priest. Even today the belief survives that new fire benefits man by driving away the spirits. This is at bottom only an easy reinterpretation of the idea that man, in order to get rid of the spirits, must extinguish all fires, an act necessarily followed by the generation of a new fire. Among the Celts, too, it was a special priestly functionary who made the fire, while the individual household hearths apparently obtained it by borrowing. A similar situation is suggested among the Creek Indians by the fact that the priest was called the "fire-maker." Thus among many peoples the artificial generation of fire seems to have remained a most unusual act, even though among others it has become a very common matter.

The Teutons and Slavs obtained the custom of fire-renewal from two sources—on the one hand from their own prehistoric ancestors in the form of a custom now exercised only in cases of special emergency and, on the other, from the Catholic Church in the form of a regular practice, though one that had shrunk to a survivalistic symbol.

The Catholic Church became the heir of all the priests and "fire-makers" in its territory. It merged the old Roman new year in its Easter cycle and adapted the ceremony accordingly. Easter Eve, the Saturday before Easter Sunday, is its specific festival of the dead. It is then that Christ, who died for all and whose death symbolizes the death of all, lies dead in his grave. Here the old usage crops out in the form of the "Easter fire."[59] On Easter Saturday the old fire on all private hearths and the perpetual fire in the church, now interpreted as "the everlasting light," are extinguished. Then the priest makes a new fire by artificial means—flint and steel—on the hearth of the church.

[58] An enormous amount of data on the fire-festivals of Europe is assembled in Frazer, *Golden Bough*, X, 106-346. (Ed.)

50 Cf., Boniface *Epistolce* lxxxvii. Full data in Frazer, *Golden Bough*, X, 120-46. (Ed.)

From this he lights the giant Paschal candle, with which all the lights of the church are rekindled. The housefathers of the community each bring a new hearth-log *(Scharholz)* to the church to be ignited from the newly generated fire and then hasten **home** with the brand to kindle a new fire on their hearths. Thus all the evil spirits who might for any reason cling to the old hearth-fire are banished from the house, and it is visited with a blessing.

This is of course a reconstruction, but, with the exception of the necessity of transporting and preserving fire, all the old elements are very well preserved. The ceremony itself is still widely celebrated. In the Alpine regions fire is everywhere allowed to go out on Easter Eve, and a new one is kindled.[60] In many places the peasants still bring great logs of wood and rush home in hot haste with them when they have been ignited.[61] They are no longer needed, of course, to preserve fire, but the new Easter fire and the hearth-log for fetching it still serve a practical purpose in keeping disturbing spirits and their noxious influences at a distance. In one region the hearth-log is abolished but is brought out on the hearth again in the old way during a thunderstorm.[62] It is a protection against harm at such a time, for, as we know, it was originally the spirits who hurled the thunderbolt. In another district the charred bits of the new hearth-log are set up in the corners of the fields to protect against evil spirits and to bring increase.

Along with these practices, however, there long existed another popular custom, ancient and primitive, which proves what we have already surmised, namely, that fire-renewal did not originally occur, as it later came to do, only once a year, to mark the beginning of a new period of time, but that, on the contrary, it took place on every high holiday to banish the spirits that had been invited.

Although the Church renewed fire at Easter time, in northwestern Germany the hearth-log was formerly changed at the time of the summer solstice.[63] Among the South Slavs, however, this ceremony still takes place at Christmas. It formerly occurred on the same date in southern France, England, Scandinavia,

[60] *Zeitschr.f. deutsche Mythologie,* III, 31.
[61] Wuttke, *Deutsche Volksaberglaube,* §81. See Lippert, *Christenthum,* p. 488.
[62] Leoprechting, *Am dem Lechrain,* p. 172.
[63] Montanus, *Deutsche Volksfeste,* p. 127.

Mecklenburg, and Lithuania, as is indicated by the respective indigenous terms for the hearth-log (e.g., English "yule log") or for Christmas (e.g., Lithuanian *blukko-vakars).*

A similar renewal, however, also took place at any other time of the year when a situation seemed to exist like that to which the custom owed its origin. That is to say, it took place when some calamity occurred that could be attributed to the evil influence of spirits not completely banished. That such an event can be due only to such a cause, is a very primitive idea which man has preserved throughout the ages, as it were, like a smoldering hearth-log under the ashes. A fire renewed out of season from such a motive is called a "needfire."[64] We see no necessity in following Grimm in his far-fetched etymology of the term, when the interpretation is so obvious—it was a fire so named from the need that occasioned it.

At any rate, it was generally the most ancient methods of artificial generation, those of friction rather than of percussion, that made their appearance in the kindling of the needfire. At the same time, however, a certain diversity in methods indicates that experience may have led to the discovery of fire-making implements in different ways. One of these instruments for generating fire by friction was based on the principle of the rope and drum,[65] another on that of the wheel and axle. It is remarkable that in Germany, where this folkway has survived in the provinces to the present day, there is no trace of the principle of the true fire-drill, so widespread elsewhere, unless the method of twisting a fence rail, which is very inadequately described by Lindenbrog,[66] be so interpreted. In the rope and drum method, the whole construction of the apparatus suggests the axle of a draw-well, like that indicated in the epic *Reynard the Fox,* except that the sockets are made tight in order to increase the friction on the drum, an effect opposite to that desired in a draw-well. Nevertheless the friction on a well axle when the bucket is moved with exceptional rapidity seems to have led to the discovery of this clumsy apparatus. The flame was caught by linen rags and similar tinder applied to the socket. The wheel and axle method was obviously discovered from a wagon axle

•* Collection of cases in Frazer, *Golden Bough,* X, 269-300. (Ed.)

[65] See Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie,* I, 502ff.; Wolf, *Beitrage zur deutschen Mythologie,* pp. 377-8.

[66] Grimm, *loc. cit*

catching fire, an even more frequent occurrence. It is still practiced today by the Mazurians, not only for the generation of the needfire, but also for the regular fire-renewal on Midsummer Day. "Toward evening every fire in the village is extinguished. Then an oak post is set in the ground and a wheel fastened to it. This is rotated rapidly by the peasants, who relieve one another at the task, until the post catches fire from the intense friction. Each then takes a brand home with him, and in this way fire is again kindled in the village." [67] The same practice was followed in making a true needfire on occasions of witchcraft, the drying up of milk, epidemics, cattle plagues, and the like, and each time the extinction of the village fires was part of the proceeding.

All these methods must have been relatively late inventions. To explain certain contradictions, we might, if need be, assume that an older and easier method, perhaps that of the more widespread fire-drill, had been dislodged among the Germans and Slavs by the introduction of flint and steel in such a way that nothing remained of it but the tradition that the forefathers had generated fire for cult purposes by means of wooden implements rather than by flint and steel. Their descendants would then have been forced to invent a corresponding method for the exceptional case in which it became necessary, and would have been influenced in this by familiar phenomena. If this solution seems inadequate, then nothing is left but to admit that the Teutons and Slavs did not discover how to make fire artificially until a relatively late date. It was, to be sure, before the introduction of Christianity, when they got flint and steel, but not until, as nomads, they became acquainted with artificial wells and wheeled wagons. Before that time, therefore, in decided contradiction to the usual view, their only possible way of obtaining fire would have been to fetch or borrow it. To be sure, it must be added that artificial wells early became necessities to the nomads—the prehistoric Hebrews already possessed them—and that certain Germanic tribes were already acquainted with loudly creaking wagons at an early period in the *Volkerwanderung.*

In any event, it is quite certain that throughout prehistoric times the preservation of fire was of transcendant importance and that, by comparison, artificial generation played a very subordinate role. Planck reaches the same conclusion with respect

[67] Toeppen, *Aberglauben aus Masura,* p. 71.

to the two principal civilized peoples of classical antiquity. It has not escaped him that theoretical representations of actual life may easily be deceptive. "Natural philosophers like Theophrastus and Pliny naturally look at this sort of thing from the theoretical, scientific point of view; the practical side is to them a secondary consideration and is therefore only occasionally touched upon. Now, in contrast to the very few places in which fire-making tools are mentioned and to the still fewer where we hear of their being used, there are a large number of others which indicate that people, to obtain fire, used none of these tools, but sought, on the contrary, either to preserve fire on the hearths of their homes or, if it went out, to get it at the house of a neighbor."

The full proof of this, however, he finds in the custom of fire-renewal, which we have discussed last because of its importance on this very score. "This whole custom of extinguishing fire and lighting it again at the pure fire, as it appears in Rome and Greece with different motives and in different forms, indicates that people tried to keep fire burning in their private houses. This is a natural and almost a necessary assumption. For if fire had been kindled anew each day by means of wooden or stone tools, this would each time have produced a pure flame, and, on the other hand, the reestablishment in the houses of a pure fire, as was done in Rome on the first of March for the whole year, would have lost its effect had these purified flames not been maintained continuously on the hearth. Only with an
278 arrangement of this sort, where the continuity of the hearth-fire is preserved, has the custom any sense or meaning." This line of reasoning is valid, even though we have found it necessary to endow the concept of the "purity" of the fire with a more materialistic meaning. The relation of flame and ghost, which was so disquieting to primitive man obsessed by ghost-fear, would have been destroyed over and over again without any special endeavor, if it had been the usual practice to kindle fire with implements. This relation the reader will have to accept on faith for the time being, for a detailed demonstration can not be introduced until later.

The impossibility of a systematic classification and the necessity of such anticipations show how intricately threads of all kinds are interlaced in the history of civilization. We can not follow any one of them without touching a number of others, and we can not sever a single piece of the fabric without impairing our insight into the course of the individual strands.[68] That nearly every strand which we can pick up leads us into a mesh of social relations is a fact that will astonish the reader less than that we can so seldom advance for any distance without falling into the sphere of cult and religious ideas.[69] We clearly perceive the reasons which might lead the reader to attribute this repeated encroachment to the subjective bias of the author. But whoever wishes to delve into history to advance his knowledge must leave behind the subjectivity of his age. A sort of indifference toward cult and religious ideas has a measure of justification in our time, especially in our practical social aspirations. In all our attempts to explain the past and present and in all our projects for the future we rely on the principle of physical causation, and the extent of the knowledge which we have won thereby justifies us in rejecting any other point of view, at least as a hypothesis in seeking and testing the truth. In view of the results which have actually been attained in this way we have become indifferent toward the pluralistic manner of explaining phenomena on the basis of spiritual hypotheses. This repudiation impresses upon our age the stamp of reaction against all the past. It seems to us a rule which we may safely follow everywhere. But when we study the history of mankind, we can not eliminate from our consideration other opposite conceptions. We shall never comprehend the past and its contrast to our own age, nor its struggles and imperfections, nor the glorious heritage of our generation, if we reject these motives for the reason that they are no longer our own. Even though we class them straightway as errors of human aspiration, the fact nevertheless remains that our whole civilized life is the product of the aspirations and errors of the past. We have no choice save to follow even the errors wherever they may lead us, for their paths are the paths of the immaterial factor in human history.

We shall return elsewhere to the material side of our subject and show the advancing capabilities of a somewhat later age as reflected in their tools, among them those for the artificial

[68] Cf., Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* p. 31. See also Introduction, pp. xii-xiii. (Ed.)

[69] See Introduction, p. xx. (Ed.)

generation of fire.[70] When we glance back over our subject in retrospect, the fact which stands out as the most significant is that, as a result of the relatively late advance in technic, the use of fire was able to exert an unexpectedly far-reaching influence on the social development of mankind. On the one hand, it made possible the first step in the establishment of peaceful intercourse and tied the first loose bond of association between primitive families. On the other, it imposed upon man a tremendous extra burden of labor and foresight by the very exigencies of its preservation, while its manifest value and advantages were sufficient to overcome the resisting force of human inertia and subject it to discipline.

[70] Lippert deals with the invention of fire-making implements in a section not herewith translated *(KiUturgeschichte,* I, 318-24). On this subject the English-speaking reader may be referred to the excellent articles by Hough ("Aboriginal Fire-Making;" "Fire-Making Apparatus;" "Methods of Fire-Making"). (Ed.)

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF TOOLS AND WEAPONS

In order to follow the development of man's care for life along straight lines, we should first have to accompany his food-quest in the expanding regions of his existence. We should then see how, in encountering new difficulties in one case after another, he overcame them by new adaptations, how he availed himself of what nature itself offered, and how the expedients that proved fittest were preserved through imitation as new pieces of his self-created equipment for life. Yet we can not even here lead the reader from one event to the next, from each cause to its series of effects, as political history is able to do. We must unfortunately break up this natural sequence and examine groups of related phenomena by themselves. We shall first consider, therefore, the implements which man has created for himself. Even here, however, it will be more important for us to discern the nature of the advance than to arrange the implements themselves in a series, as archeology commonly does.

We left man on the lowest stage with undifferentiated tools and weapons of the most primitive sort.[1] We must assume that the rough stone, as it was offered by nature, and the staff, as it was found or broken off, constituted the representative implements of this stage. Now for the first time there appeared a twofold advance, which, however insignificant it may seem in itself, was nevertheless pregnant with consequences. In the one direction it consisted in the selection of different tools for different purposes; in the other, in the modification and improvement of the tool by the human hand.

In the former direction the transition from the lowest stage was a very gradual one. Nature itself paved the way, since the human organs, to reenforce and extend which the most primitive tools were adopted, themselves showed a differentiation.

[1] See above, pp. 63-4. (Ed.)

Thus the stone reenforced the tooth and the fist, and the stick the arm.[2] Neither was suited, however, to replace the hollow palm. It was more natural for a person bending over to drink
281 to use a shell instead. Moreover, the stone was not as good a substitute for the sharp finger nail as a shell or a splinter of bone. Progress in this direction led to an increase in the number of tools, in the other to their improvement. Man was no longer satisfied with the stone as he found it, but sought to give it the form most suitable for his purposes. There may still be a question whether man is unique in possessing the knack of reenforcing his fist with a stone.[8] By shaping his tools, however, he detaches himself completely from his animal relatives, for such shaping, even if at first it consisted only in the chipping of an edge or point, presupposes a premeditated intention based on previous experience and observation.

At the same time, however, this class of tools initiated an exceedingly far-reaching social advance. The unshaped stone which primitive man threw at an animal in order to kill it, or with which he cracked the shell of a nut, could be replaced at any moment by another similar one. Such a stone did not seem from its use to bear a special relation to his hand, to be, as it were, a part of his hand. It had no individuality, no lasting connection with himself. But a stone or staff that had been shaped into a tool or weapon did enter into such a relation. Man no longer parted with it. He recognized it as a personal supplement to himself. To have snatched it away would have been to remove a part of himself with it. Everything on earth still belonged to all alike, or to any one who seized it, with the sole exception of these tools. Here we face the source of the concept of property. From divers circumstances we must conclude that the first men who found themselves in possession of such individualized tools, shaped for a special purpose, placed an extraordinary value upon them. This is easily accounted for by their importance, their original scarcity, and the effort expended in their manufacture. This first property relation was so intimate that it could not be severed except by the will of the

[2] For a very suggestive discussion of the nature, origin, and evolution of tools and weapons from the point of view of an eminent chemist, see Ostwald, *Energetische Grundlagen,* pp. 71-80. (Ed.)

[8] According to Kohler *(Mentality of Apes),* the higher anthropoid apes naturally make use of the simplest tools, like sticks and stones. (Ed.)

owner. It continued even after death.[4] Thus the property idea passed over into the cult and became an exceedingly important element in the evolution of the latter. The concepts "sacred"
282 and "own" were originally identical.

The chipping of stone and the dressing of wood were followed by the more ingenious combination of the two materials or their substitutes. The stone was provided with a wooden shaft, and wood was given a point or an edge by attaching sharp stones, teeth, or pieces of shell. For this, methods of fastening became necessary, and forethought was directed toward new objectives. Thus binding and twining were learned. Finally there appeared the art of attaching, not the stone to the wood, but the wood to the stone, by the tedious labor of boring a hole through the latter. Tools arose for the making of tools. The invention of implements for the artificial generation of fire seems to belong here.

With boring, the working of stone, which was still the chief material for weapons, began to advance to an art in which every one could no longer be equally versed. A division of labor necessarily arose, the first other than that between the sexes. Just as the acquired skill could not have developed equally everywhere, so also a stone material which repaid such labor was not found everywhere. The great value attached to this possession led to intercourse between tribes along the path already trodden to some extent in the borrowing of fire. Only here a new factor appeared. One who gave away fire actually lost nothing. The prospect of receiving the same object in return in the event of need was a sufficient recompense. But now the situation was changed. Intercourse necessarily led to exchange and trade. Evidence of an extensive prehistoric trade of this sort is furnished by finds of stone artifacts often at extraordinary distances from the natural sources of their material.

Finally we find evidences of a stone technic which presupposes an exceptionally high degree of technical skill. The stone is brought into suitable and for the most part beautifully rounded
283 forms by grinding, boring, and artistic polishing. On this stage

[4] "Articles of immediate personal use which are associated in the native mind with an individual seem to acquire a savour of his personality; they become a part of it; they are identified with him. Such articles are frequently destroyed at his death, or buried with him" (Hartland, *Primitive Society*, pp. 52-3). Cf., also Lumley, *Social Control*, p. 372. (Ed.)

of the Stone Age we encounter a highly developed industry in centers determined by the materials, and an extensive inter-tribal trade emanating from these centers. Archeology distinguishes stone implements as "paleolithic" and "neolithic" according as they are chipped or polished. Since the art of polishing is undoubtedly the later method of manufacture in point of time, it is also proper to speak of a Paleolithic and a Neolithic Age with respect to the art of preparing stone tools. For historical purposes, however, this classification must not be used without caution.[5] Although the new technic follows the old, it does not immediately supplant it. The two actually run parallel for a time. Without other evidence, therefore, it would certainly be wrong to conclude that all prehistoric sites containing chipped implements are older than those with polished stone tools.

The situation is precisely the same with regard to the great advance to the use of weapons and implements of bronze, from the appearance of which archeology with full right dates a new period, the Bronze Age. If we know exactly when bronze first appeared in a particular region, the occurrence of bronze products in a site enables us to fix its lower age limit, but their absence does not permit a conclusion as to its upper limit. The invention and use of bronze can not have occasioned such a radical transformation of life as is commonly assumed. It could scarcely have had a much greater effect, at least shortly after its introduction, than the appearance of polished stone tools. Only indirectly was its influence considerably greater. It is questionable whether, in comparison with a polished stone ax, a bronze implement of the same kind enjoyed any practical advantage in view of the scarcity of its material. But the thing had a dazzling luster and consequently lent itself readily to an unusually extensive trade. The discovery of the use of iron, on the other hand, was decidedly of epoch-making importance.

If we disregard ornamental objects and consider merely tools in the narrower sense, which naturally includes weapons, we may say that the introduction of the new material—copper, bronze, or iron—did not at first mean an advance in invention. The old models were simply recast or copied in the new material and

[8] See Mason, *Origins of Invention*, pp. 127-9. (Ed.)

frequently in a reduced form. The invention of new tools went its way independently of such innovations.

The implements which we have thus far considered have all been tools of a *primary* type, i.e., tools arising from observation of the activities of man's bodily organs, from the desire to re-enforce and strengthen them, and from the attempt to imitate them artificially. Stone and bone chisels, scrapers, and awls took over the tearing, scratching, and boring functions of the teeth and nails. The grinding stone relieved the teeth in pulverizing. The hafted stone, imitating fist and arm, formed the hammer; combined with the cutting edge of the chisel, it made the ax; usually it was both at the same time by the alternative use of the blunt and sharp ends. The staff, as an extension of the arm, became a spear, sword, or knife, according to the location of the cutting part. The sling, spear thrower, and boomerang also lengthened the arm, and the blowgun the opening of the mouth. Man sought protection for his body in a very natural way by reenforcing his own skin with another. All kinds of armor, as well as portable shields, were with few exceptions made from animal skins or leather. Recasting these in metals gave rise to the mail, plates, helmet, and shield of a later age.

With regard to these primary tools and weapons man must everywhere have followed the same paths of invention, because in all these cases his own organism showed the way. The unity of the principle rests on this fact; the multiplicity of forms depends upon the external means provided by nature. These latter, however, are themselves capable of leading ambitious man still farther. He can learn to profit by observing them. Thus, while a shell or a gourd was merely a substitute for the hollow hand in raising a drink to the mouth, the basket which serves a similar purpose is no longer an imitation of the hollow hand but an artificial copy of the gourd. We may thus call implements and utensils of this sort tools of a *secondary* type.

Typical of this secondary group is the bow. In this weapon man imitated none of his own organs but discovered the principle from some external source and seized upon it for his own purposes. With the invention of contrivances of this sort man obviously entered an entirely new sphere, advanced to a new stage. It is easy to understand, therefore, why essential unanim-

ity throughout the earth no longer prevails with respect to secondary tools and implements. In the artificial reproduction of utensils one nation has left another far behind, and not every race has arrived at the invention or adoption of the bow. Among the peoples who have not advanced beyond the use of primary weapons we must include, in opposition to Peschel,[6] that part of the black race which penetrated farthest to the southeast and thus remained untouched by later advances. We might agree with him that the Polynesians have merely forgotten the use of the bow, since both the volcanic and coral islands of the Pacific lack suitable game animals, although dogs and swine were brought thither in a semi-domesticated state. But this explanation is thoroughly inadequate for Australia, for the aborigines there lived chiefly on the products of the chase. They would have had no occasion ever again to forget the art
286 of the bow, if at the time of their migration to their remote world it had already been a heritage of the race. One of the many things which distinguish the Papuans from the Australians is the bow and arrow. The former possess them, but they are unknown to the latter.

We may now acquaint ourselves somewhat more closely with the advances in the technic of tools and weapons on these successive stages in so far as they have exerted a social influence.

The staff must be regarded as the very foundation of man's external equipment. Stone, bones, shells, teeth, and the like are more dependent than wood upon local conditions. Only one of these objects, to serve as a cutting and scraping instrument, was needed in order to execute the numerous early advances in wooden implements. The ancient simple staff has been handed down even to recent generations as a symbol of authority. In its practical use, however, it has undergone various differentiations and has thus produced new tools and weapons. The Bushman, who seeks in the ground after edible roots, uses it as a digging stick. Progressive differentiation has added a suitable sharpened point, a tip of bone or the like, and an attachment to utilize the weight of the foot.[7] The early Anglo-Saxon spade

[6] *Volkerkunde*, pp. 189ff.

[7] "The digging stick is the beginning of agricultural implements, the progenitor of the hoe, the spade, the plough" (Mason, *Origins of Invention*, p. 190). (Ed.)

differed from a pointed stick of wood only in having, like a stilt, a notch on one side for the pressing foot.[8]

The staff deviates from such forms when it is intended to serve only for killing. It becomes the club, either in a crude form as it was apparently still used in antiquity, or artistically polished and decorated like the battle mace of the Polynesians, Australians, and other peoples who are fond of external ornament. In New Zealand and Tahiti a specialized instrument, used only for rending human flesh, was made from such a club by the insertion of sharks' teeth on one side. A club of similar shape was perhaps also the prototype of the later combination of stone and wood. A staff with a projecting thorn may possibly have preceded the hafted stone battle-ax and hammer. Moreover, the club and wooden hammer still possess a sanctity similar to that which the staff has preserved from primitive times. In England the club still "survives as a symbol of power, when the mace is carried as emblem of the royal authority, and is laid on the table during the sitting of Parliament or the Royal Society."[9] In other regions the wooden hammer plays a similar role, but even then it is usually still called a "club," for our word "hammer, " which in the Old Scandinavian *{hamarr)* still denotes "rock" as well as the instrument, belongs by rights only to the stone weapon.

Diverging in another direction, the staff became the spear. The point, which is what makes it into a spear, may be produced, without the attachment of any foreign material, by means of fire and scraping. This simple instrument has remained the principal weapon over extremely wide areas until very recent times. The Australians with their simple stone tools know how to make it into a very dangerous instrument by carving a series of barbs on the hard wood, or a serrate edge at the point. However, these forms appear to be only imitations of the otherwise usual insertion of fish teeth. The staff also preserves its old sanctity in the form of the lance, as is illustrated by the spears of Mars at Rome and the lances bearing military banners. The reader will already surmise that this quality is a survival of that sanctity of property which the very earliest objects of property have never lost.

[8] Reproduced in Anton, *Geschichte der Landwirthschaft.*
[9] Tylor, *Anthropology,* p. 184.

A rare and surprising example of the as yet incomplete differentiation of a tool is found in Australia. Although the aborigines know how to build bark boats, they nevertheless still use the spear exclusively for propulsion. Among them it has not yet differentiated into the paddle, as it has among the Papuans and Polynesians.

The sword, the noblest personal weapon of a later age, is in its origin a cross between the spear and the club, or rather a combination of the two. Here of course we refer only to the flat sharp-edged clubs so widespread in Oceania. The discoverers encountered such a sword in South Australia. A traveler reports of a group of Australians that two of them were armed with shields and swords, the rest merely with lances. "The swords were of wood, narrow in the hilt, and evidently less formidable than a good stick."[10]

It is not clear from the above statement whether the points and edges of the weapons were formed by insets. Such reinforcement, however, is quite familiar to the Australians, although we must include them in this respect among the most undeveloped tribes. The insertions consist not only of bones and fish teeth but also of stone. The attachment is accomplished by means of suitable gums and thongs.

Of the different types of stone the Australians prefer basalt, but they also use quartz and other kinds. Although these desirable types of stone occur only at isolated places, a true trade in them has not yet developed. On the contrary, this subject affords us a welcome insight into a still more primitive method of obtaining desirable but unevenly distributed objects.[11] A tribe in whose hunting grounds suitable stone deposits occur agrees with its neighbors to allow a few of their men to enter its territory at specified brief periods, use the quarries, and carry the necessary supply back to their people.[12] The Australians know how to chip stone skillfully and also how to grind and polish it, but not how to bore it. Hence their battle-axes still exhibit the more primitive types of hafting.

Certain particular kinds of stone, like flint and obsidian, with skillful workmanship yield sharp cutting and piercing instru-

[10] Cited in Forster, *Neueste Reisen,* I, 43.

[11] For other cases and discussion of "peaceful access," see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 156-8. (Ed.)

[12] Jung, *Australien,* I, 132.

ments of various types. Nevertheless the work calls for no inconsiderable skill and requires long practice. Experiments have shown that here too savage man could only have advanced gradually.[113] If a piece of flint is firmly held with its flat side down and is struck vertically on the upper surface with a stone or hammer, a flat discoidal piece is detached. Many flint implements of this type, which must be ascribed to an earlier and less practiced age, appear in prehistoric finds. They are recognizable from the concave fractures on their upper surface. If, however, the rough piece of flint is placed on its end and is then struck in the direction in which the desired chips are to go, long laminate flakes are obtained after sufficient practice. These blades, in contrast to the jagged edges of the first type, often show edges so smooth that in Mexico stone knives of this kind were commonly used for shaving and the ancient Hebrews were even able to perform surgical operations with them. However, an expert gun-flint maker told Lubbock[14] "that it took him two years to acquire the art." Skillfully worked spearheads of this sort are found in Australia. Consequently the few men who were granted access to the stone quarry would always be the same for a generation. This advance necessarily resulted, therefore, in specialization and a division of labor.

The keen-edged stone blades of this superior type, which are capable of different uses, commonly form a flat triangle or trapezoid in cross section. The Shasta Indian of California went to work in the following way. He placed a stone on his knee as an anvil. On this he held between his fingers and thumb a piece of obsidian, the core of which was to be shaped into an arrowhead. Then with an agate chisel he struck off at first coarse and then finer splinters, until after an hour a point of the desired form was ready.[15] This art, however, was by no means understood by all the Indians, but only by a few. Thus here too it had led to a division of labor. The Eskimos have been observed to perform the same task in still another fashion. The flint was supported in a hollow wooden block like a vise and was struck with a specially constructed instrument consisting of an ivory hilt in which the sharp prong of an antler was inserted and

13 *Ausland*, 1870, I, 195.
14 *Pre-historic Times*, p. 91.
15 *Ausland*, 1870, I, 3.

fastened.[16] From these examples we see that the early arts of man must not be regarded as conforming to a single tradition and developed in such a fashion. On the contrary, human ingenuity has striven in different places to achieve the goal set by the care for life with the elements there at hand.[17]

A later practice than chipping is that of grinding. At first merely the edge was sharpened on another stone, but gradually this finish was extended over the entire surface of the implement, giving it as a rule the form of a celt. With the perfection of methods this smooth surface was then given a polish, probably with the aid of a suitable fine sharp sand like emery. Even the Australians, in spite of their meager cultural heritage and long isolation, have developed their stone technic to this point.

Historically the successive types of stone technic have been practiced contemporaneously. A new and more perfect method has usually come to the fore in conjunction with some special implement, to which it is applied by preference, while the old technic has continued in use for other needs. Thus with grinding, the celt became more prominent than before, and with hafting, the ax and hammer, while the old method of chipping—and that not always well done—was still regarded as sufficient for arrowheads and the like.[13] This fact likewise makes it very difficult to use such survivals for determining chronology. In Tiryns, for example, Schliemann[19] found, even in the upper fortress whose design and construction give evidence of the most advanced technic of the Bronze Age, a quantity of stone implements of a type which might otherwise have been ascribed to the men of the Ice Age.

Obsidian, the material chiefly used for these implements, must already have been an object of trade. According to Schliemann, obsidian deposits do not occur in Greece except on the island of Melos in the Cyclades, while from the many fragments found in Tiryns one must conclude that the manufacture took place

16 See *Trans. Ethn. Soc.* (N. S.), I, 138. (Ed.)

17 In this passage Lippert aligns himself more closely with the modern ethnologists and anthropologists than with the earlier adherents of "monotypical evolution" like Morgan. (Ed.)

18 Thus in the early Neolithic Period, although stone axes were polished, chipping was still used in the manufacture of stone knives, daggers, arrowheads, and the like. See MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, II, 20-43. (Ed.)

19 *Tiryns*, p. 88.

there. Probably the rough stone was brought back as a return cargo on trading voyages, and thus was obtained a cheaper material than copper and bronze, metals which had then been long in use.

Unhafted stone hammers of crude workmanship, which had to be grasped in the hand, were likewise still used in Greece in this prehistoric age. Since a sharp edge was not a consideration, no imported stone was needed; flint, granite, or diorite were selected. Implements of this type have been found in great quantities in Troy,[20] in smaller numbers in the lower strata of the Acropolis at Athens and the oldest settlement at Tiryns, and also in Babylonia and Italy. Doubtless this simple handstone was also at one time the primitive personal weapon of man,[21]

The same tool could also serve woman in her preparation of food as an instrument for grinding or pulverizing farinaceous grains. But even in the period under discussion this special use had already led to the differentiation of the tool. The early finds reveal different types of this implement, and it is apparently not yet definitely settled whether their nature is correctly inter-
292 preted. In the Swiss lake dwellings, on the Acropolis at Athens, at Mycenae and Tiryns, in the lower strata at Troy, in the Thracian Chersonese, in the terramare of Emilia, in France, and elsewhere, there have been found stones shaped like an egg split lengthwise. These so-called "hand-mills" are variously made of sandstone, trachyte, and other stones, and it is believed that they were used by taking one in either hand and grinding the grain between them to coarse pieces or grits. Another form is the more rounded "grain-crusher," made of granite, quartz, porphyry, or diorite, and frequently found in Germany, France, Hungary, Greece, and Italy. This implement presupposes a second hollow stone as a mortar, in which the grain could be ground to a fine flour on the principle of the apothecary's pestle.

A development of the foregoing methods was the drilling of holes in stones, which greatly advanced the art of hafting. The process of boring was already known to the prehistoric cave men of Europe. It was a relatively simple matter to imitate with

20 Schliemann, *Ilioa,* pp. 268, 492.

21 The hand-ax or *coup de poing* was the principal tool and weapon of the early Paleolithic inhabitants of Europe (see MacCurdy, *Human Origins.* I, 110-11). (Ed.)

the aid of a sharp-pointed stone or bone the motion by means of which a hole was made through a skin with the finger. Every thorn with which two pieces of skin were fastened together, pointed the way to the awl and the needle. Indeed, the men of the Upper Paleolithic Period were able to perforate even horn and teeth. All this, however, was the work of a pointed borer or awl, the discovery of which was comparatively easy. But the boring of stone, which was not discovered till much later, was done with a hollow borer or drill. It was probably arrived at by using a hollow bone as a drill, rotating it with infinite patience on the place to be bored, and using sharp sand to increase the friction. The old inhabitants of the West Indies were able to saw stones apart with the aid of sand and certain sharp plant fibers.[22]

A hollow drill was also used by the builders of the prehistoric citadel at Tiryns to bore dowel-holes in the stone foundations for the support of wooden pillars. "The condition of the bored holes of Tiryns shows us that they were made with a simple hollow cylinder and that the drill thus had the form of a stout reed. Even by very rapid rotation no hole could have been bored in a hard stone with such a drill, unless, as in sawing, a sharp sand (emery) had been strewn in the hole. The sand, in being moved about by the drill, rubbed small particles from the stone, and thus there gradually appeared a cylindrical hole, in the middle of which a thin cylinder of stone remained standing. When the hole had reached the desired depth, the central nucleus was broken off with some instrument, and the dowel-hole was ready."[23] This description does not reveal the material of which the drill was made. If stone can be sawed with suitable plant fibers, it could also have been bored with an actual reed and the use of emery. But even if the drill was made of metal and only "had the form" of a reed, this relation might nevertheless indicate the actual genesis of the tool. On the other hand, the usual drill of the ancients was of a type like our own.[24]

The manipulation of such a drill would have been, however, not only tiring but also ineffective, unless the artisan had availed himself of assistance such as is graphically described by Homer.[25] Odysseus compares the way in which he put out the eye of the

[22] Waitz, *Anthropologie*, IV, 325.
[23] Schliemann, *Tiryns*, p. 303.
[24] See Blumner, *Technologie*, III, 233ff.
[25] *Odyssey* ix. 382-6.

Cyclops to that in which a shipwright bores a timber by directing the drill while his assistants twirl it by pulling a strap back and forth.

294 The boring of stone represents at the same time the most advanced attempt to combine stone and wood. Cements of gum or pitch and bindings of different sorts were often used for this purpose. The attachment demanded great care, and it may be assumed that the diverse and often highly ingenious methods of twining and interlacing the strings introduced man to an art which he could also practice independently in case of need. The union was given firmness by the use of wet strips of leather which shrank in drying and fitted snugly. Similarly in the hafting of stones with horn, the latter was previously heated, whereupon it closed tightly over a stone driven into a cavity made in it. To make an ax out of a stone chisel, either a right-angled piece of wood from a root or a bough was employed as a helve, or else the stone was clasped in the middle. Sometimes the stone was forced into a slit in the handle, and the binding was relied upon for firmness. In other cases the handle was split lengthwise like a hoop, twisted around the stone, and its ends fastened together with strings like a single piece of wood, so that the stone was firmly embedded in a wooden noose. This method is found both in Brazil and in Australia. Sometimes a triangular stone blade, with a long point opposite the cutting edge, was driven into a hole in a thick club-shaped stick. The North American Indians very ingeniously slit a living tree trunk, forced in a stone chisel with an uneven surface, let it become embedded by the growth of the wood, and then cut out to suit themselves the club-shaped ax thus formed.[26]

The purpose of all this is merely to show that manifold human adjustments have been stimulated by the diversity of the elements provided by nature, and that tools which on account of their imperfection we are wont to regard as the earmarks of a state of savagery have necessarily, through the difficulty of their manufacture, exerted a disciplinary influence on mankind.
295 Here too the great diversity of nature achieves importance, for it has continually set new tasks for human ingenuity.

The hafted stone hatchets of the Indians, according to Loskiel,[27]

[26] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* III, 74.
[27] *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 70.

"were not used to chop wood but only to girdle and strip trees." Trees were felled simply by the application of fire. The fallen trunk was divided, likewise by means of fire, into portable blocks with which the hearth-fire was fed. If the inconvenience of procuring firewood in this way became too great, it was overcome by moving the camp to a district with more abundant wood. Modern experiments with such stone axes have demonstrated, however, that it is perfectly possible to cut down small pine trees with them. Indeed the Polynesians with similar simple tools were even able to make planks and build boats from them. They exposed a log to the heat of the fire in such a way that it cracked. Then with stones they drove wedges into suitable cracks. In this way the tree was split into unequal pieces, which were then hewn with a stone ax until they could be used as planks. These were put together with coconut fibers and the seams and joints calked with gum.[28]

The American Indians made extensive use of wood for their tools and weapons. In the arctic regions, however, where wood is scarce, technic necessarily pursued a different course. The people turned chiefly to the working of bone and horn. The Eskimos in particular seem to have advanced to as near perfection as is attainable with the means available in their territory.

Among the prehistoric cave men of Europe technic tended in the same direction as among the arctic peoples of today, even if it did not attain equal perfection. In the Upper Paleolithic Period they used chipped unpolished stones and a comparatively large number of horn implements, like chisels, awls, and barbed spearheads, and they followed the same inclination to sculpture their bone implements as the arctic peoples, who devote themselves to artistic activities in their periods of enforced leisure.[29]

In the great shell heaps or "kitchen middens" of Denmark chipped flint implements of the latest type have been found, and the neighboring burial mounds contain beautifully polished stone weapons. The implements of the Swiss lake dwellings illustrate almost the entire history of technic thus far surveyed and even later stages. They include arrowheads of flint, polished stone knives hafted with wood and horn, and splendidly polished and

[28] Waitz, *Anthropologic*, V, 66.
[29] Lartet and Christy, *Reliquiae Aquitanicce*. See also MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, I, 154-293; Osborn, *Old Stone Age*, pp. 260-455. (Ed.)

bored jade axes. Imitative and original forms in bronze and iron are also found among them.

297 In Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, England, France, and Italy, Neolithic deposits everywhere yield, among other valuable implements, exceedingly fine axes of jade. Since this stone has not thus far been discovered in Europe,[30] its nearest source being in Asiatic Turkey, it has been correctly inferred that the desire to possess such a valuable weapon created intergroup commercial intercourse earlier than one might have believed. Trade is, however, immediately conditioned upon some form of agreement or "peace" between tribes. On the lowest stages, of course, this advance consisted solely in the agreement to permit peaceful access to some source of supply. This paved the way for exchange. In the burial mounds of the Indians of the Mississippi Valley copper from Lake Superior, mica from the Alleghenies, shells from the Gulf, and obsidian from Mexico are found side by side.[81] Peaceful access must have given way to actual exchange. The Indians therewith advanced a stage beyond the Australian blacks.

The borrowing of fire, as has already been pointed out, furnished the first basis for a peaceful approach of alien tribes. A second incentive was the desire for weapon materials, and soon also for manufactured arms. From the case last cited we may infer that the desire for ornament was a factor leading to the same result. The impulse of vanity was awakened much earlier and was long much stronger even than that to provide necessities. This was also a factor conducive to the utilization of bronze in the manufacture of weapons, for from earliest times personal weapons have been at the same time an object of pride and vanity. The savage attaches ornaments to his body to give it character and to express his passion to stand out as an individ-
298 ual of distinction. In the same way his personal weapon, which is like a part of himself, is also adapted by its nature to impress upon him the stamp of individuality. Consequently the weapon early acquired, in addition to its practical importance, the significance of an ornament, and it is this, more than any other

[30] However, jade has since been found in Silesia. "Jade in Europe can thus be accounted for without making a draft on Asia, but commerce is the logical explanation for its Neolithic dissemination" (MacCurdy, *Human Origins,* II, 159). (Ed.)

[31] Lubbock, *Pre-historic Times,* p. 84.

factor, which distinguishes it from all other implements as a badge of rank and nobility. This dual role of the weapon served to promote its dissemination as an article of trade and thus greatly to encourage intergroup exchange, for from earliest times man has been able to make greater sacrifices for the sake of his ornament than for any other object.[82] Soon we shall see enter into trade a still more precious ware—woman, when she is subjected to man.

Trade, as it arises and develops from stage to stage, inevitably reacts on languge. It leads to acculturation and thus to the formation of linguistic families covering wider areas. Trade remained rudimentary in Australia, in Africa outside of the Nile Valley, and in America. It was in the largest of continents, Asia with its European appendage, that the yellow and white races developed the first extensive intergroup division of labor. In another and later way the Phoenicians appeared as the first international middlemen by vocation.

Although the secondary weapons, of which the bow is a representative, are characterized by a new principle, there are nevertheless not lacking many transitions which still lie within the range of the primary principle, that of "organ projection." Among these transitions must be included all the devices which are designed to project a missile at a distance, but which are only imitative reinforcements of the human organs as originally used. The Australians, who possess several extremely peculiar weapons of this type, are at the same time distinguished by their lack of the bow. This connection might at first arouse surprise, especially since these singular implements presuppose no little ingenuity. It proves, however, to be a very natural one when we realize that the bow was not invented until after the most southeasterly contingent of the black race in its dispersion had already become separated from the parent stock, and that
299 the Australians were not led to make the invention independently but rather turned their natural ingenuity to the perfection of the transitional implements.[33] These probably belonged in some form or other to an earlier age and enjoyed then a much wider distribution than today, but they necessarily succumbed in com-

[82] "In inter-group exchange, it is the luxury rather than the necessity that is in demand. . . ." (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III. 2152). (Ed.)

[33] See Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 494. (Ed.)

petition with the bow wherever the latter appeared. Hence they naturally found an asylum in Australia precisely because the bow did not spread thither.

The throwing of stones with the hand was, at any rate, one of the primordial discoveries of man. The hafted stone or the hammer can also be thrown, and certainly with greater force and effect. The tradition of such a thrown hammer has been preserved, for instance, in Norse mythology. The throwing club, of which the boomerang is a special representative, must be placed midway between stone and hammer and regarded as a fairly early primary invention. It was probably an accident, perhaps a rather frequent one due to the peculiarity of certain kinds of wood, which led the Australian to give the throwing club the form upon which the singular trajectory of the boomerang depends. In any case he made excellent use of his accidental observation. This weapon, while not entirely reliable, is nevertheless dangerous and at any rate most extraordinary. It consists of a curved piece of wood so twisted that it does not lie exactly in a plane in any direction. In consequence of its shape the boomerang, when thrown, spins about itself and describes a great circle in the air, usually rising obliquely at first, then falling again and returning to the thrower. The true artist, however, can make this throwing club follow very curious paths.

Although the boomerang proper is found only among the Australians, it is nevertheless probable that a missile of the same general type formerly had a much wider distribution, perhaps coextensive with the original black race. An analogous throwing club or "knobkerrie" is found in South Africa, a similar implement is depicted on Egyptian and Assyrian monuments, and the "throwing iron," so widespread in Central Africa, may be only the recasting in metal of the same type of primitive weapon.

The sling, although not used in Australia so far as we know, has a wide distribution in other continents. Throwing stones at fruits and animals must already have been familiar to primitive man. Where his attention was turned to it, comparison and experience could easily show him that the **force and range of** the stone increased with the length of the throwing arm. Man employs this principle almost instinctively in throwing. Children learn, without any instruction, to follow the motion of the arm with the entire body, to step from one foot to the other during the throw, and to end the swing standing on the toes of one foot. This position enables the whole body to serve as an extension of the throwing arm. In the sling man finally discovered a corresponding extension of the arm external to his body.

The sling not only lengthens the arm artificially but also imitates the opening and closing hand. Its simplest form is a leather thong folded back in the middle. One half of its length constitutes the extension of the arm. The stone lies in the fold as though in the closed hand, while the other half of the thong reaches back to the hand and acts like the closed fingers. When this part is released during the swing, the leather hand opens and discharges the stone, thus hurling it with a greater swinging radius.

The sling is found sporadically in North and South America. It is rare in Central and South Africa but common in Oceania with the exception of Australia. In the ancient world it was apparently well known to the earlier stratum of population in the Mediterranean region. Strabo reports it among the Iberians. The inhabitants of the Balearic Islands were famous on account of it, and the Guanches of the Canary Islands also used it. The sling was a true personal weapon among the Semites, at least among those of the southwestern branch. The Bedouin Arabs still delight in practicing the art today, and the ancient Hebrews opposed the metal weapons of the Philistines with slings and stones. In the Bible the children of Benjamin are praised as excellent slingers who did not miss by a hair's breadth,[84] and David's prowess is well known.[35]

The spear thrower or throwing stick is a sling for hurling a stick or a spear, and is thus in the strictest sense the earlier equivalent of the bow. It is based on the same principle of the artificial extension of the throwing arm. One end is held in the hand. The other, which has a hook to grasp the end of the spear shaft, is thrust back with the upraised arm before the throw, so that the lance lies horizontally along the spear thrower. In making the throw, the spear is released from the grip of the fingers, the throwing stick is swung forward with the arm, and

[34] Judges xx. 16.

35 1 Samuel xvii. 40-50. (Ed.)

the hook imparts to the lance the added impetus of a lengthened swinging radius. The spear thrower is found, not only among the Australians, but also among some of the most northern peoples, the Eskimos and the Aleuts. As evidence that this now restricted implement once had a wider distribution, it was known to the ancient Mexicans, although even among them it was apparently already obsolescent at the time of their conquest.[36] Still closer to the sling was a whiplike instrument which Cook saw in similar use in New Zealand, and in the New Hebrides a short string with a loop, in which the end of the shaft was placed, served as a spear thrower.

An advance of a very special kind produced the bola, which is essentially a sling attached to the stone and thrown with it. Thus it represents, not an advance in technic, but an adaptation to a particular use. The bola is found in two widely separated regions, namely, in ancient Egypt, where its use is graphically depicted in paintings,[37] and in Patagonia, where it is still employed today.[38] The Patagonians, however, were in contact with the old civilized Quichuas of the Peruvian highlands, among whom the bola was no less widespread.[89] Now this civilized people of the Andes was the only one in America to bring into a state of domestication a large and useful animal, the llama, while in the Old World the Egyptians were doubtless the first people to make the transition from the protection to the taming and breeding of antelopes and cattle. All this suggests this weapon as a requisite of the incipient cattle raiser or nomad. With it the hunter elevates himself to a herder. To be sure, this is not entirely correct in the case of the Patagonians, who used the bola only to entangle the animal and cause it to fall in order to kill it. Yet they probably found it easier to borrow a useful weapon from their civilized neighbors than a different mode of life.

In the hands of the nomads the bola became the lasso. With expert management the stone can be dispensed with; the weight of the rope suffices, or a running noose is thrown over the head of the animal. The half wild horses of the Hungarian steppe are still caught in this way today, and the lasso is now uni-

[36] The spear thrower was widespread in aboriginal America. See Kroeber, *Anthropology,* Fig. 35. (Ed.)
[37] Wilkinson, *Ancient Egyptians,* III, 15.
[38] Musters, *Unter den Patagoniern.*
[39] Peschel, *Volkerkunde,* p. 199.

versal on the plains of South America, where cattle raising is carried on under similar conditions. The Teutons and Slavs formerly caught their half wild animals in the same way.[40] Even farther back, according to Pausanias, the Sarmatians, typical primitive nomads still living in the Stone Age, even employed their lassos in battle against their enemies. When, moreover, we consider that this implement was unknown to all native North America and Oceania, including Australia, its close connection with the pastoral stage can no longer be mistaken.

An implement on another principle but of restricted distribution is the blowgun. It may be used with advantage against small game, especially birds, if the hunter can lie in wait concealed by a sufficiently dense vegetation. Moreover, it is originally dependent upon the presence of tall and suitable varieties of grasses. Hence the tropical forests of both hemispheres are to be regarded as its home. As a matter of fact, its two areas of distribution lie in southeastern Asia, where it is one of the old weapons of the Malays, and in the tropical region of South America. The bow has not been able to supplant it; the two weapons are used for different kinds of hunting. Thus the tribes of Guiana carry both the bow and arrow and a blowgun of enormous length. From Appun's[41] description, it must exceed ten feet in length, and the arrows which are blown through it are six inches long. As regards its invention, it might well have been preceded by the use of tubular reeds for the production of sounds. The great war trumpet which a band of Araucanians brought with them to Europe was, with the exception of the everted mouthpiece, nothing but a long tube. Through the use of of such an instrument man could very easily become acquainted with the force of compressed air. The air gun, now practically vanished from use, is a lineal descendant of the blowgun.[42]

All these throwing weapons are surpassed in utility and distribution by the first implement of the secondary type, the bow. The bow is essentially an implement for throwing a spear, but its projectile, reduced in size for this purpose, is customarily called the arrow. The bow and arrow are to us the distinguishing mark

[40] See Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen,* p. 24.
[41] *Unter den Tropen,* II, 308.
[42] The gun itself is another descendant (Tylor, *Anthropology,* p. 197). (Ed.)

of a stage of culture higher than that of primitive times. From the invention of the bow and arrow—it would be more correct to speak merely of the invention of the bow—Morgan[43] dates his third or upper status of "savagery," which to him is then followed by "barbarism" and finally by "civilization."

The question as to the cause and the nature of the invention of this implement, which was not, like the primary weapons, suggested by man's own instinctive reactions, can naturally be answered only with conjectures. Tylor[44] mentions the surmise of Pitt-Rivers, who regards the spring-trap, an elastic branch with an attached dart so set that a passing animal springing it is transfixed, as the precursor of the bow. But we must not overlook the fact that the bow, however simple it seems, clearly combines two principles; there was not only the elasticity of the wood but also the importance of the string to be discovered. Some have thought that it might have been suggested by primitive stringed musical instruments.

305 The area of distribution of the bow today excludes, on the whole, only Australia and Polynesia. If, with Peschel, we assume a retrogression in the latter region, then only the extreme outpost of the black race has remained exempt from this advance. Both the Papuan and Melanesian branches already possess the bow. Thus the only permissible conclusion is that the primitive ancestral stock, from which both the black Australians and the Negroid peoples elsewhere are descended, did not as yet possess this weapon. The next question to be decided is whether, within the territory occupied by the other later races, the bow was invented in and diffused from only a single center or was discovered independently in several places at different times. However important the invention may be, it is nevertheless not of such complexity as necessarily to exclude the latter possibility.

A clue to the answer of this question is furnished by the fact that at the time of their discovery the inhabitants of the West Indies, the so-called Columbus Indians of Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and Porto Rico, were ignorant of the bow, although it was generally used by the tribes of the same race inhabiting the adjacent mainland. Peschel,[45] to be sure, also attempts to explain this

[48] *Ancient Society,* p. 10. (Ed.)
44 *Anthropology,* p. 195.
45 *Volkerkunde,* pp. 191-2.

fact as a retrogression caused by the lack of animals fit for hunting, but he has to admit that this argument does not apply in regard to the most important of the islands, Cuba. "Yet it must be added to intensify the foregoing that both on the Antilles, namely, on the eastern edge of Haiti and the eastern half of Porto Rico, and on the Leeward Islands there were settled peoples who wielded those weapons with skill. Only these were newcomers, namely Caribs, who, with a maritime prowess beyond that of any other American nation, harassed the inoffensive inhabitants of the West Indies, slew the men, and dragged the women into captivity, whence there developed among them separate languages for men and women." These Caribs, however, came from the mainland and brought the bow with them. Moreover, they never laid it aside again, even on the smaller islands, as one would have expected if Peschel's interpretation were correct.

It is certainly much simpler, therefore, to assume that we are facing here in the New World a process precisely like that which we have just found in the regions inhabited by the black race. When the red race spread over America, including the West Indies, it was not yet in possession of the secondary weapon, and when it afterwards acquired it, the isolated islands remained unacquainted with it until a new population from the mainland colonized their coasts. Accordingly it is probable that, at the time when the red race branched off and spread to America, the bow was not yet the common property of mankind.[46] Moreover, to explain the presence of the bow in America by diffusion via the arctic peoples does not seem to us well-advised.[47] These peoples themselves must have acquired it only relatively recently, to judge by their preservation of the spear thrower. On the other hand, it would have had to travel the long distance to the Fuegians with considerable rapidity. We are thus forced to concede to the Indains its independent invention.

Even in the Old World we must probably assume several different centers of invention and diffusion. Of the implements of

[46] The consensus of opinion among American anthropologists, however, is that the Indians brought the bow with them from Asia. See, for example, Wissler, *American Indian,* p. 399; Kroeber, *Anthropology,* pp. 348-9. (Ed.)

[47] But the sinew-backed bow, at least, seems to have been transmitted to northern and western North America from Asia by way of the Eskimos (Wissler, *Man and Culture,* pp. 131-2). (Ed.)

Paleolithic man in Europe many stone blades have certainly been falsely classed as arrowheads. In the Neolithic lake dwellings, on the other hand, the bow has definitely been found.[48]

In earliest times the bow seems to have been peculiar to the civilized peoples, and perhaps it was also invented by them. At least, this is indicated by the circumstance that several of the later peoples to migrate from Central Asia seem not to have been acquainted with it. It can not, therefore, have been invented there. On the other hand, the ancient Egyptians were familiar with it, and in Mesopotamia it must be derived at least from the Mongoloid Sumerians. In both these culture areas it was in later times highly esteemed as a weapon and an ornament. It found employment both in war and in the chase. From Egypt this civilized weapon could have spread via Ethiopia to the black peoples of Africa as far as the Bushmen and Hottentots, while from southern Asia it could have passed by way of the seminomadic border tribes to the steppe peoples who afterwards entered the horizon of the European civilized peoples as typical nomads.

In America also the bow was in high esteem among the civilized peoples, and probably the ancient Mexicans did not change to it from the spear thrower until within the historical period. Thus the bow was possibly here too the invention of an advanced culture. If this was the case, then, since ancient Mexico, Egypt, and Babylonia were all well advanced in industrial technic and division of labor, we might with good right locate its invention in the workshop of the technician. Perhaps, therefore, the bow drill was not, as is commonly believed, an imitation of the bow or its employment for another technical purpose. On the contrary, an improvement on the drill by attaching the ends of its strap to a bow-shaped piece of wood may first have called man's attention to the elasticity of such an implement.

From the circumstance that the bow became the special weapon of the chase and of hunting tribes it does not necessarily follow that it must also have been invented by a hunter. Indeed there might have appeared with this new type of weapon for the first time a situation which has become the rule with later more complicated arms. Hunters, who today use the gun most frequently,

[48] The bow did not appear in prehistoric Europe until the advent of the Neolithic Period. See MacCurdy, *Human Origins,* II, 139. (Ed.)

can claim for themselves only a few inventions and improvements; the credit for such belongs to the technicians. Moreover, civilized peoples like the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, and Aztecs had by no means given up the practice of hunting, as is proved by hundreds of documents. Thus these early centers of civilization actually possessed both an interest in such a weapon and the technical prerequisites.

The bow is a weapon better suited for hunting than for warfare. Very seldom has a people depended upon the bow alone as a military weapon. It lacked, in the case of hand-to-hand fighting, the support which the bayonet furnishes the rifle. Consequently, either it had to be supplemented by a weapon of the earlier type, or else the army had to be composed of differently armed units. Only a mounted people, who could withdraw when necessary from close combat, could have based its mode of fighting solely on the bow. The Parthians and Numidians in particular later excelled in this respect. The Thracians and the nomads of the Sarmatian and Turanian steppes, whom the
308 Greeks called Scythians, were likewise celebrated archers. The Greeks themselves held the bow in rather low esteem. It was not one of the personal weapons of their Heroic Age. Only a few Greeks, like Philoctetes and Odysseus, were able to achieve fame as archers. Odysseus carried his good bow, but in the field he preferred the spear and sword. The archers in the Greek armies were usually foreigners. In the territory they had acquired the Greeks were no longer in a position to live as hunters and accordingly to treasure the bow as their principal weapon, while it did
309 not seem to them sufficient for serious warfare. The Romans, although they employed auxiliary troops armed with bows, also placed their confidence in the iron sword and spear. These and many other facts seem to us to be most consistent with and best explained by the hypothesis advanced above.

We dislike to criticize the theory that mankind made an ideal advance with the invention of the bow. Consequently we should like, with Morgan, to recognize that event as a landmark in culture history. Nevertheless, our sketchy history only shows once more how precarious it is to take such a classification into epochs as a basis for the delineation of culture history. The threads of the fabric are much too intricately intertwined. But even aside from this, there is another very important factor to consider. In culture history the actual magnitude of an achievement, an invention, or a cultural fact of any kind, judged by its intrinsic value, does not by any means bear that relation to its consequences which a poetic justice would demand. Indeed one proof has already been afforded us by the domain of the cult. The utterly extraordinary influence on history of certain cult ideas actually stands in an inverse relation to the extremely simple process of their formation. Similarly, on the other hand, the invention of the bow, however important in theory, has not in practice had an effect as far-reaching as the use of the almost ignored bola and lasso. The bow placed in man's hands an easy means of killing animals, and where he had not already advanced to their domestication, this easier form of the food-quest sufficed him; his natural inertia held him back on the hunting stage. But where he labored with a less convenient weapon, there came to him a higher reward for his toil. He arrived at the domestication of animals and therewith gained access to the sphere of a new and more intensive type of culture.

An episode in the evolution of weapons, not of lasting influence but important because fairly widespread, is the use of poisonous substances on missiles, especially on the arrow and the dart of the blowgun.[49] They are mostly plant juices, whose fatal or paralyzing effect could easily have become apparent to primitive man, who ate or tried to eat everything. More rarely poisons from the fangs of snakes are employed. In the Old World the chief seat of this practice is among the Malay peoples, who, at the time of their discovery more than at present, used poisoned blowgun darts in particular as a means of killing.[50] In America the custom is widespread in Guiana, on the Amazon, and on the Paraguay. The poison here is derived principally from the bark of *Strychnos toxifera* and acts only when mixed with blood. Humboldt[51] learned that the Otomacos used to cause death by scratching with a poisoned thumb nail. This may have been the origin of the knowledge, the arrow being used later to transmit the poison at a distance.

The smearing of weapon blades, especially of missiles, with toxic preparations is still found sporadically throughout Central

[49] See Cheney, "Plant Arrow Poisons." (Ed.)
[50] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 162.
[51] *Ansichten der Natur,* I, 247.

and South Africa as far as and including the Bushmen and Hottentots. Sometimes vegetable and sometimes snake poisons are used. Formerly the custom was probably disseminated over the entire continent with the possible exception of civilized Egypt. But even in Asia and Europe it was formerly by no means unknown. Arrow poison is or has been in use among the Ainus of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the Kamchadales, the Aleuts, and according to early Chinese accounts, the Tunguses and Mongols. According to Pliny, it was used by the Arabian pirates on the Red Sea. The custom was at least known to the Homeric Greeks,[62] and likewise to the Romans.[53] According to Ovid, it was practiced by the peoples on the Black Sea, and the Celts and Arabs in Spain are said not always to have spurned it.[54]

In Greece, however, we become aware for the first time of a humanizing advance. The practice was proscribed by public opinion and a kind of international law in proportion as peaceful relations were established between independent tribes.[55] In the Greek nation, as a consequence of the extension of intergroup relations, even the stranger had his "avenging Zeus." In other words, mores recognized as valid beyond the limits of the group also received the sanction of the cult. Thenceforth, therefore, assassination with poisoned weapons was followed, not only by the contempt of men, but also by the revenge of the gods. Even Odysseus as a young man had sailed to Ephyre to get from Ilus a poisonous drug to taint his arrows. Ilus refused him "through fear of the eternal gods," but he obtained it from another man.[56] However, his son later had to bear the taunts of the suitors for his father's act.[57]

Up to this point we have been able to observe an uninterrupted improvement in weapons from the first groping attempts on, or at most the supplanting of a less effective implement by a more effective one of another type. Now, however, we encounter the first case of an actual retreat, the renunciation of a weapon without the invention of something more effective along the same lines. Advancing social foresight enters as a check on primary

52 Homer *Odyssey* i. 260-3.
53 Horace *Odes* i. 22.
54 The data on this subject were first assembled by Peschel *(Ausland,* **1870,** XIX, 432-3).
55 See Keller, *Homeric Society,* p. 60. (Ed.)
56 Homer *Odyssey* i. 260-3.
57 Ibid., ii. 329-30.

or individual foresight. To the extent that the former is developed, poison must be proscribed in spite of its unrivaled excellence from the point of view of the individual.[68] Here the struggle for existence finds a limitation often ignored by social theory.

It seems to us inadequate to try to explain the existing distribution of poisoned weapons on geographical grounds, as when Peschel[59] limits them to a definite zone "within the tropics or at least in the subtropical belts." In considering the refusal of Ilus, the excellent pioneer comes somewhat closer to the core of the matter. "The reason for this refusal allows us to divine whence it comes that we now find poisoned weapons only in or near the tropics, because just there are located the crudest human tribes, who do not yet concern themselves about the anger of the eternal gods." The reader already knows that the latter is not entirely correct. No one lives in a more harrowing dread of his gods than the crudest of the tropical inhabitants or the treacherous Bushman. But the gods do not punish the murder of a tribal stranger; they abandon him to any kind of death inflicted by their people, and protect and shield the latter from the consequences. They do not lend their punitive sanction to obligations extending from tribe to tribe, because the tribes themselves have not yet established a bond involving obligations.

In reality, therefore, the retention of poison as a weapon, where it has once been discovered, is correlated with the degree to which the atomistic form of society with its lack of relations between tribal groups has been preserved. Since this is for the most part still the case in greater measure in the tropics, as Central Africa and Brazil show, the essentially superficial geographical correlation results. On the other hand, the custom necessarily disappeared in civilized regions, as in China, southern and western Asia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, for all these civilizations are based on a broader social foresight.

[58] If Lippert had foreseen the use of poison gas in modem warfare, he might have modified the view here expressed. (Ed.)

59 *Volkerkunde*, p. 197.

CHAPTER V

CONDIMENTS, NARCOTICS, AND INTOXICANTS

619 Nature itself has led man from the beginning to seek means of indulgence, the spice of foods and of life, and it has not led him astray. But the primary instinct impelling to indulgence, as in all analogous cases, developed great strength in him before experience, memory, reasoning power, and the capacity to formulate ideas created the social check of provident self-restraint. Even today this still appears completely undeveloped in many cases. Only reflection and reason fix the limits of wise moderation demanded by a socially recognized standard of admissibility.

These means of indulgence fall into two very different groups, of which the first is composed of condiments. The sense of taste instinctively craves a tempering or seasoning, in either case an improvement, of food which is either too uniform or too insipid and hence fatiguing and enervating to the organs. Many oily seeds and berries, juicy and spicy bulbs and roots, and acidulous fruits have been gradually brought under cultivation precisely because of their high esteem as condiments. A large number of now despised wild plants were still used for seasoning at the time of Charlemagne, as we learn from an enumeration in one of his domestic regulations. The preservation in pharmacy of many plants which in truth possess few active properties is a survival of their ancient use. We still use the tart Oriental lemon as a seasoning with fish. A similar plant condiment of early times is the "bitter herbs" traditionally eaten with meat by the Jews on festive occasions. A concentrated equivalent of these vegetable condiments is mineral salt, the use of which in the past has in no wise been so widespread over the earth as is
620 generally believed. We must content ourselves here, however, with referring to its interesting history as it has been written by Hehn.[1]

[1] *Salz*. See also Moller, *Salz*. (Ed.)

From the point of view of culture history, these means of indulgence, as well as those to be mentioned later, resemble the means and objects of ornament. The savage attaches more importance to them than to even his most immediate necessities.[2] To maintain his existence with the latter, as well or as ill as the land allows, seems to him a prosaic and uninspiring economic requirement. But to stand out before others as a personality, and to make of his ordinary nourishment a pleasure which nature plainly does not offer to every one, spurs and electrifies his will power. Hence the craving for means of indulgence, like that for distinctive ornament, constitutes one of the most important incentives to intercourse between tribes, to trade, and thus to social progress.[8] Among nomads the first lands to be "taken possession of," or to become sacred places, were those with salt deposits, and there developed in connection with them a concept of property exactly like that among savages in the sources of materials valuable for weapons or ornament. While all other land was still open pasture and hunting grounds, fortunate tribes took possession of these places and by exacting tolls for the removal of the treasured substance promoted intercourse and trade. Yet history shows us also that the vicinity of these much sought-after places was a favorite scene of war. Nachtigal[4] has disclosed in the midst of the Sahara Desert in our own age a replica of early history—the caravans traveling from afar, the fortunate possessors and "protectors" of salt oases, the trade and wrangling, and the bloody struggles for the possession of such protectorates and a share in their profits. Salt in bars of a standard size constitutes the uniform medium of exchange, the money, of the peoples of these regions.

Even today many peoples are unacquainted with the use of salt as a condiment,[5] although with world trade this culturally important substance is rapidly spreading. In its place man formerly supplied his body with large quantities of piquant vegetable materials. The transition to the use of salt freed the body from

[2] "It is the nature of the savage everywhere to strive with greater energy for things which more experienced civilized man ranks as inessential or useless or even harmful" (Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte*, I, 364). (Ed.)

[8] For instance, spices, tea, sugar, tobacco, and the like played a tremendous r61e in the history of the Discoveries Period and the colonial expansion of Europe. See Keller, *Colonization, passim.* (Ed.)

[4] *Sahara und Sudan,* (Ed.)

[5] Cases in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 2076-7. (Ed.)

a not inconsiderable amount of mechanical labor and released energy for other activities, for the extension of foresight. Hence it is by no means accidental that the enjoyment of salt accompanies a higher stage of culture. History even reveals instances where ruling and subject tribes are distinguished by their use and non-use of salt. A venerable token of its importance and at the same time of an early cultural advance is the mixture of salt and spelt in Roman ritual. The Semitic tradition of "bitter herbs," however, reaches deeper into prehistoric times.

A condiment of another sort, yet belonging to the same group, is the sweet seasoning added to the otherwise insipid cereal food. It still exists in the coating of our pastry with fruits, jelly, raisins, honey, and sugar. In tropical lands the sweet juices of plants, especially of the sugar cane, are obtained by chewing the appropriate part of the plant, usually in the intervals during the taking of food. In higher latitudes their place is necessarily taken by more dilute juices, such as the sap of the maple and birch. The most concentrated of sweets, however, is the store of food in the beehive. Honey, to the savage on a certain stage, is the supreme delicacy. "Milk and honey," according to the Bible, was the slogan which attracted the Semitic nomads to a life of permanent residence and private property in land. The result was a certain disillusionment, for what had allured the fathers in primitive times frightened their pampered sons at the time of the great prophets of Judah; a land full of honey had become a land without civilization. To the enlightened Greeks a land full of honey likewise meant a desert region.[6] In the Middle Ages the eastern countries, especially Lithuania, were celebrated for their wealth of honey, while at home, in spite of the great veneration of honey, bee culture was regarded as the concern of inferior people. Tribute in honey and wax was imposed on the poor.

This apparently contradictory attitude is based on the fact that honey was still acquired in the manner characteristic of the former collecting stage. The wild honey which was gathered from rocks and trees was the more abundant, the less civilization had restricted the area of the wilderness. With civilization this abundance necessarily vanished, but the transition to the domestication of bees did not keep pace with this advance. It was not really such a difficult step to detach the piece of a hollow tree

[6] Plato *Critias* 15.

which bees had colonized and to set it up in the farmyard. Such semi-artificial beehives were already known, to be sure, to the Greeks and Romans, but how far the latter still were from a rational bee culture may be gathered from Vergil's famous treatise itself. Likewise at the time of the Germanic folk laws the concept of property in beehives took form only gradually and step by step. Thus, for example, the finder by marking the tree kept for himself a right of private property only for a stated time. At the same time, the very inadequate provisions of the laws show how slight the understanding of the matter still was. Thus even in the transition to higher civilization bee culture, because it required an insight into far more complicated life phenomena, lagged far behind agriculture. Consequently in more backward lands this youthful civilized pursuit could not compete with the acquisition of wild honey.

In this entire field, the law of selection, of "weeding out" as Darwin once called it, shows itself to be operative in striking fashion. At first, freed from the fettering instincts of the animals, man scoured all the thickets and meadows and, so to speak, tasted every leaf and bark, in order to supply the body with the satisfaction it craved. Then oil, butter, salt, and sugar, the products of his arts, partially took the place of a chaos of condiments. A remnant of the latter survives, however, in the comparatively small assortment of spices procured by trade from all corners of the earth. Even among these spices the weeding out still continues, and we ourselves are witnesses of this process. Pepper, which in the early Middle Ages was indispensable with everything, has been assigned by us to much narrower limits, and we have practically banished from our cookery saffron, then the most highly esteemed of all spices.

The second group of means of indulgence consists of narcotics and intoxicants. According to the notions of certain moralists, it is a peculiarity of civilized man alone to seek pleasure, with more or less moderation, in alcoholic beverages, while the savage is characterized by the drink of unadulterated water. This assertion, however, holds true in face of the facts only if the concept of the savage is strained to mean primitive man on the lowest stage. With the exception of this stage, we must take issue with the moralists and charge man with having distinguished himself from the animals to his own disadvantage by seeking intoxicants under all circumstances, while the animal is completely free from any such propensity.[7] When we recognize, however, that this distinction is founded on the first and most important differentiation between man and animal, it is difficult for us to class it without consideration as a "degeneration" of human nature.

We have not hesitated to admit that a deterioration of human circumstances in one direction may be the result of cultural progress in another. But that this particular deterioration has increased historically *pari passu* with the advance of civilization is one of those assertions which confuse truth and falsehood and are based on superficial observation. On the surface there
623 floats, to be sure, the sad fact that the migration of the European has everywhere with trifling ease corrupted the child of nature with "fire water." The European has become the Phoenician of the modern world, and, among the keys of trade with which he, like his predecessor, unlocks all doors, "fire water" has unfortunately been the one which under all circumstances has failed him most rarely. But the parallel extends even farther. If the Phoenician of antiquity tempted the barbarian peoples with glass, metal, oil, and dyes, nevertheless we can say of him only that he knew how to offer these articles in their most attractive form. The predilection for ornament, which was the nerve that stimulated his trade, is present even among tribes on the lowest stage and among those which have never been reached by a Phoenician of the ancient or modern kind.

The same thing is true of the predilection for intoxicants, which the European often exploits certainly in the most unscrupulous manner. But lower culture is distinguished from higher by the very fact that in the former the primary instinct of greed still prevails exclusively and with undiminished vigor, while in the latter experience and judgment apply the curb to it. And in yet a second way civilization is distinguished from savagery. We are here reminded strongly of the evolution of dress, which, in making the transition in civilized regions from ornament to clothing for protection and concealment, nevertheless does so in such a way as to attain both ends at the same time. Similarly in the case of intoxicants the idea of what constitutes

[7] **The use of intoxicants of some kind is nearly universal among savages. The few exceptional cases are cited in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 2086-6. (Ed.)**

enjoyment has shifted materially in the transition to civilization. The savage seeks that which intoxicates and paralyzes the con-eciousness without regard to any demands of taste or to any attendant pleasure, while on higher stages agreeable flavors and odors are added to the original, until gradually the selection of stimulants is made for an effect considerably different from that originally desired.

This predilection of savage man has no analogy in the animal world. It is closely connected, as we have seen, with one of the most important differentiations of man and has thus become characteristically human. We have already depicted the great struggle between the painful extension of foresight and unproductive resignation, and have shown how its final outcome has distinguished the "active" from the "passive races."[8] We have demonstrated by examples how every extension of foresight, from the moment when the first man rose superior to his inherited instinct by making a tool, placed a burden upon the human disposition. And this burden increased as man, struggling for existence amid new life conditions and mistrusting his instincts, was forced to make fresh decisions and reason out new actions to achieve his new goals. This increasing burden of foresight is the essence of all cultural progress. On it alone the security of human existence depends. Man pursues every course to escape this dilemma. The savage, presented with a strange civilization, simply discards it as soon as he can, in order to feel happy once more. But the measure of care for the future which is imposed upon man by the state of culture into which he is born can not be discarded permanently. His existence depends upon it. Yet on any stage of culture that part of the necessary care and foresight which has not yet become fixed and ingrained by tradition must be felt as an excess and a personal burden. In actual amount it will be less to the man of lower culture. But it is precisely he who subjectively feels most oppressively and acutely every slightest addition to the average traditional care.[9]

The lower animals have remained aloof from this whole development, and hence also from the care which characterizes man alone and from the desire to avoid this care. Man had to find means to banish care in empirical ways during his quest

[8] See above, pp. 38-44.
[9] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 2090. (Ed.)

for food throughout the range of the edible and semi-edible. The aim was ever only to call a halt to the thought of care, and scarcely a means which produced this sort of lethargy has remained entirely unused. These means, however, often differed widely in their effects, and it was in this direction that selection and exchange subsequently took place. We do not wish to introduce into our exposition a history of narcotics. The object of the following brief selection of facts is only to furnish proof by a few random illustrations that the use of such means has actually been widespread all over the earth and on all stages of culture which are still within our ken.[10]

One of the most primitive ways of satisfying this craving is the chewing of raw plants.[11] Thus coca is still chewed in Peru and the surrounding regions, and betel in the East Indies. In both cases lime or potash is added to increase the effect. Everywhere it is shown very clearly how much more strongly the savage is spurred to the cultivation and care of these indulgents than to the pursuit of his ordinary care for life. Worner,[12] who represents the present-day Peruvian Indian as an example of indescribable stupidity, shows how his animal spirits flare up in only a single case—where coca is involved. Indifferent in everything else, "he nevertheless employs the most extreme care in the cultivation and harvesting of this plant; he is on his guard lest the slightest harm befall it, he cleans and harvests it with care, in short he treats it like a dear and precious child, like a holy object; the leaves which the wind blows away he scrupulously collects; it would be a calamity if they should be uselessly wasted." Similar observations have been made almost everywhere, no matter whether the narcotics are native or imported. The lightning-like rapidity with which tobacco has spread even to the most inaccessible corners of the earth[13] is to be explained only by this trait of human nature. The Mishmis of Assam, according to Cooper,[14] are "lazy and negligent in agriculture beyond all conception. . . . Naturally they usually face starvation

[10] "In short, not a people is found which does not use some means of narcotic enjoyment" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 2082). (Ed.)

[11] See Wallis, *Anthropology,* pp. 215-17. (Ed.)

[12] In *Ausland,* 1870, pp. 1193ff.

[13] For a brief history of the diffusion of tobacco, see Kroeber, *Anthropology,* pp. 211-14. (Ed.)

[14] "Mischmis in Assam," p. 60.

toward the end of the summer. All the more carefully and plentifully, however, do they cultivate opium and tobacco, to which they render excessive homage." It might seem surprising to rank the laurel of southern Europe with the coca of South America **and** the betel of southern Asia, yet a kinship unquestionably exists between them. Here again the cult gives us many a valuable clue, especially since intoxication, or more precisely the suppression of the conscious mind for the purpose of making room for another spiritual being to manifest itself, is one of the most important expedients of the ancient cult. The priestess at Delphi used to chew the leaf of the laurel for this very purpose,[15] a proof that this plant had formerly been utilized before the introduction of more efficient intoxicants. The subsequent fame and glorification of this tree of the poets rests on this very materialistic basis.

The Australians, although unacquainted with true spirituous liquors, knew how to obtain a similar effect by chewing the twigs
626 of the pituri bush.[16] The Papuans of New Guinea in their intoxicating sagwire, prepared from the sap of the palm, illustrate the transition to a fluid medium for the same purpose. Besides this, these unspoiled children of nature also chew betel assiduously, and tobacco is cultivated in the remote interior of this inaccessible island.[17] Throughout Polynesia there prevails the unpalatable but very intoxicating kava, a drink prepared from the root of a species of pepper. The ill-smelling fermented mash which the Polynesians prepare from the breadfruit is also to be included here.

If certain peoples are hostile toward the stimulants of an alien culture, as were the semi-Hebraic Rechabites[18] and later the Arabs and all Islam toward wine, this does not necessarily imply that they do not themselves know or need any intoxicant. In southern Arabia Maltzan[19] became acquainted with the kat, "a plant whose leaves when chewed produce a pleasantly stimulating and exhilarating effect." Without kat there is no cheer in this region, and only its expense prevents its wider use. The Arabs of Africa use a popular drink, made from honey, water,

[15] Evidence in Hermann, *Alterthumer der Oriechen,* p. 257.
[16] See Howitt, "Dieri," p. 76. (Ed.)
[17] Cf., Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 213. (Ed.)
[18] Jeremiah xxxv. 2-18.
[19] "Sudarabien," p. 10.

and a spicy plant,[20] which should perhaps likewise be included here.

It is necessary only to mention the wide distribution enjoyed by opium and hashish, preparations from the poppy and hemp. In the extreme north of Siberia, where nature seems to have denied man every banisher of care, the poison of the fly agaric serves to interrupt violently the care-laden train of human thought. Hemp had its original home among the Aryans of Asia and Europe. The European Scythians used its seed as a narcotic. The name of the Aryan Hindus for hemp was used by the ancient Persians as the term for drunkenness. Although hemp as a textile plant was long unknown to the Semites, its introduction was accelerated by hashish, which entered into Arab culture and advanced with it into Africa.

Countless in number, widespread over the earth, and defying exhaustive description are the fermented drinks which man has attempted to manufacture from almost every fruit juice as soon as his technic of food preparation has developed sufficiently far.[21] Wherever he brought any fruit-bearing plant under special cultivation, he also approached it with an attempt to divert its product to this desirable purpose. It was as though he sought in every tree and plant a cure for the pain of care which was now the inevitable heritage of his kind. Every culture area especially characterized by any cultivated plant may also be characterized by the corresponding drink. The fermentation naturally associated with the preservation of liquids frequently met man's approval. The sagwire of the Papuans might well be called "palm wine." Throughout Africa wine *(lakbi)* is prepared from different varieties of palms, although the Moroccans refuse to use their date palm for this purpose because boring for the sap damages it. Sake or rice wine accompanies the cultivation of the rice plant throughout southern and eastern Asia, and a similar drink is found where sugar cane is cultivated; they are the primitive ancestors of arrack and rum.

Palm wine is accompanied in Africa by banana wine. In the range of durra from the south to the north of Africa there prevails, under the names of joalla, pombe, etc., a drink which we need not hesitate to call durra beer. Where the old millet culture

[20] **Rohlfs,** *Afrikanische Reisen.* **(Ed.)**
21 **See Wallis, *Anthropology*, pp. 208-15. (Ed.)**

existed we find traces of a formerly prized millet drink. As *busa* it is still popular today with the Kirghiz,[22] while in Wallachia it perhaps recalls an old Bulgarian custom. In Turkestan a strongly intoxicating drink is even made from poppy capsules.[28] This group of intoxicants is also represented in America. The inhabitants of the old Inca Empire were not satisfied with the coca leaf but brewed a fermented drink from maize.[24] The Indians of Guiana prepare their sour paiwari from chewed cassava bread,[25] just as the Russian kvass is sometimes made from twice baked bread fermented with honey.[26]

Fermented mare's milk or kumiss has long been characteristic of the Asiatic and European nomads. Toward the west it survived as the distinctive drink of the ruling classes. But the true popular beverage throughout the entire territory of nomadism was a honey drink of some sort. We have already found it among the Arabs. Under the form and name of mead an intoxicating honey drink has been indigenous everywhere in Europe and far beyond where a pastoral life once prevailed. Even Greece, which began to cultivate the vine in prehistoric times, is not an exception to this. Hehn has shown from an Orphic fragment how Cronus, the god of a pre-Hellenic people, once rested under the oaks "drunk with honey," just as the Hindu Indra was a heavy drinker of the Aryan soma. As the Pelasgic and Semitic cultures are characterized by wine, so mead is justly to be regarded as typical of northern Europe. Strabo found it still existing in Gaul along with its younger rivals. With the advance of agriculture, mead gradually retreated from Gaul and soon also from Germany toward the east. It survived longest among the Scandinavians, Lithuanians, and Slavs. It also accompanied the Huns to Pannonia.

As civilization spread outward from the Roman borders, forcing the pastoral peoples to adopt a settled life and replacing nomadic cattle-raising with agriculture, mead gave way to beer, the fermented drink made from cereals. The question as to the invention of beer is one of those which show how necessary is a degree of orientation before questions can be put scientifically

22 Wereschagin, "Turkestan," p. 23.
23 *Ibid., p.* 34.
24 *Ausland,* 1870, p. 1209.
25 Appun, *Unter den Tropen,* II, 269.
26 *Globus,* 1874, II, 237.

Since, as we have seen, man has everywhere used the available food plants for fermented drinks, this art was discovered, not in any one place, but everywhere where the transition was made to the cultivation of the northern cereals, provided only that it had not been forestalled by the foreign importation of wine. Thus beer has been brewed from every kind of grain, including millet and sorghum. Not until a later time was a selection made of the better and best. Oat, wheat, and barley beers were still drunk in Germany in the Twelfth Century. Barley beer was prepared by the aboriginal inhabitants of Italy; at least it is proved with respect to the Ligurians. Xenophon drank beer among the Armenians. It prevailed in Phrygia and Thrace and extended to the very gates of Greece. The ancient Celtiberians and Spaniards likewise drank barley beer even as late as the time of Strabo,[27] when the vine had already begun to be firmly established in Spain. The people of Hungary at the time of the *Volkerwanderung* were also beer drinkers, in so far as they did not still prefer mead. But the outstanding beer country was Celtic Gaul. The Celts were also the first of all northern peoples to be bent under the yoke of settled civilization. On the other hand, the old Prussians, who were the most eastern of these peoples and who were withdrawn even from Greek and Byzantine contact, refreshed themselves longest on kumiss and mead, and were still unacquainted with beer in the Ninth Century. The Late Latin terms for malt and brewing were of Celtic origin, while the form *cerevisia,* first mentioned by Pliny, is derived from the *cerea* (beer) in common use in Spain.

For the same reason that Gaul appears to be the oldest beer country of the north, Egypt bears that honor in the sphere of earlier civilization. The relatively northern grains, barley and wheat, were here first brought under general cultivation, and here too we find the oldest references to barley liquor. Herodotus[28] says that the agricultural inhabitants of the delta country drank "a wine which they obtain from barley." Diodorus,[29] who praises the strength and agreeable taste of this drink, indicates its antiquity when he calls it an invention of Osiris, the oldest and most popular divinity. Even in ancient Egypt there were complaints about the excessive indulgence in beer and the beery

[27] *Geography,* p. 155.
[28] *History* ii. 77.
[29] *Bibliotheca* i. 20.

odor of the scribes, a guild which flourished in that literate country.[30]

On the other hand, it is still an unsolved problem when and under what circumstances man discovered how to overcome the acid fermentation threatening his nectar by means of hop bitters. The general behavior of man, of course, indicates the way the discovery was made. Since he added to his favorite drink every possible seasoning, not excluding even honey, he necessarily at some time found success with one repulsive in itself. Thus attempts have been made to prove that even the ancient Egyptians already mixed skirret and lupine bitters with their beer.[81] The discovery was therefore only a question of happening upon the right plant. The first documents which mention hops come from certain French monastic estates in the Ninth Century, but the decrees of Charlemagne do not mention the plant.[32] Monastic documents also speak of hops and of hop gardens in southern Germany in the Ninth Century. The monasteries necessarily carried on the preparation of food and beverages for their "families" on a large scale and with a division of labor, and this fact may have led them to make the discovery. Charlemagne, the master of domestic economy, would certainly not have ignored the plant if it had been known to him. The very organization of the monasteries, on the other hand, provided a means excellently suited to disseminate the new custom. We can not possibly agree, therefore, with the hypothesis of Linnaeus that hops came into Europe with the *Volkerwanderung.* Which of these peoples, with kumiss, mead, or millet beer as their national drinks, could have brought them? At first, moreover, tribute in hops was imposed on poor people, whence we may infer that it was as yet only a question of gathering the native wild plants, and that only gradually was a finer product raised by cultivation in the gardens of the ruling classes.

The palm among these dispellers of care belongs to wine, which was made possible by the cultivation and improvement of the wild grape. The original home of vine culture is, broadly speaking, not difficult to determine. Africa, including Egypt, falls outside of consideration. In Europe only Greece could raise a

[80] Lauth, *Altdgyptische Hochschule,* p. 67.
[81] **Sprengel, *GescMchte der Arzneikunde,* I, 75.**
[82] **Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen,* p. 387.**

doubtful claim. India and all of eastern Asia are out of the running, as are the deserts of Arabia and the steppes of Turkestan. Within the limits thus circumscribed the Phoenicians can raise the best claim to the prize. As between them and their nomadic Semitic neighbors the issue can not remain for a moment in doubt, for the cultivation of the vine more than of any other plant presupposes a settled life. The Hebrews, according to their own historical narrative, found this gift of civilization, to which they were afterwards so devoted, already present when they conquered Palestine. They set out like true nomads after honey and discovered wine. The kindred tribe of Rechabites, which continued to lead a nomadic tent life, did not cultivate the vine and despised wine.[83]

In Egypt, vine culture had already been introduced and had gained a firm foothold, at least in certain districts in Middle Egypt, at the time of the Fifth Dynasty and thus about three thousand years before Christ. Nevertheless the vine was only an importation in Egypt, for, even if wine found acceptance in cult donations, the ancient cult place of Heliopolis kept aloof from it, a proof that it had not been an integral part of the original tradition of the people.[34] Syria and Palestine, on the other hand, appear as a wine region *par excellence,* since wine had completely suppressed every other intoxicating drink as inferior. Hence the credit can be ascribed to no other nation than the early Phoenicians. Moreover, we see the diffusion of the improved vine following closely the trade connections of this people. We meet it at an early date in Egypt. We can follow its irregular diffusion through Asia Minor, where it sometimes alternated with cereal beverages and sometimes existed on a **par** with them. Along with a series of other cultural elements it also reached Greece, indeed in prehistoric times. The Homeric heroes were already wine drinkers;[35] the Greek rejected a grain drink as a barbarism. Only a weak—and weakly attested—recollection of the age of mead still survived. Wherever Greek colonization extended, in Italy and southern France, wine conquered cereal liquors. Then Rome itself became the disseminator of this culture trait throughout its more extensive range. With **Rome**

[88] Jeremiah xxxv. 2-18.
[44] Wonig, *Pflanzen im alten Aegypten,* p. 274.
[35] See Keller, *Homeric Society,* pp. 48-9. (Ed.)

it conquered Spain and Gaul, and from **Gaul a** part **of Germany.**

In considering, finally, the contributions of the remoter cultures to modern civilization, we must mention that mildest of all dispellers of care, tea, a gift of eastern Asiatic culture, and the invincible tobacco, the birthday present made to us by the American Indians at their entrance into the sphere of our civilization. When the Indian has been pointed out as an unspoiled child of nature who knew no kind of intoxicant, it has not been taken into account that only the method of indulgence was different. Actually the primary object of smoking is similar—to produce a mild narcotic effect. The smoker becomes deaf to
632 the incessant knocking of the mounting thought of care, and the mind thus set free seems to soar into a realm where thought, freed from all torment, becomes the delightful plaything of the mind.

Since again only the method is different, we may also include music among these dispellers of care. That in one aspect at least it belongs here is evidenced by the earliest cult usages. Even the Hebrew prophet asserted that he could not prophesy without the playing of the harp. When it is important to silence the prophet's own thoughts, his own spirit, or, according to a more naive conception, to entice them from his body, when it is important to induce an "ecstasy," the cult seizes now upon one means and now upon another. Drink, smoke, and music serve equally well to produce stupefaction. The dance under primitive conditions is only an expression of the sympathy of music. Indeed the dance itself under certain circumstances by its rhythm constitutes the music. But this rhythm, the most original thing in music, by taking the mind captive exercises the same emancipating effect as any other intoxicant. Rhythm shackles the thought and tears it away from the subjects which it otherwise ruminates over to its own misery. It seems to set it free by binding it.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRIMITIVE FAMILY

1 We have already stated the case for a primitive age with a primeval form of the family and without a marriage union of any kind whatsoever.[1] The bond of union of this primitive family consisted in the possession of a common mother or maternal ancestress. According to the simplest sense perceptions and in consequence of the first and most natural deductions, community or identity of blood,[2] derived from one ancestral mother and transmitted through all succeeding births, seemed to primitive man to be the true and essential foundation of this family association. It could be disturbed by nothing and dissolved by nothing except lapse of memory, for the foundation seemed too natural and too obviously sound to admit any other criterion than human recollection. So here already we find combined with a natural and material factor a specifically human one, with an objective factor a subjective one, the origin of the historical life of mankind.

The subjective socializing factor, the memory of blood identity, found its first, and for a long time its only support in the fact of living together. In the course of time, however, it acquired two new aids: first, the developing cult, which maintained the tradition of a common maternal ancestress, and second, at a later period, some recognized external mark identifying all the individuals belonging to the group.[3] The most widespread of these tribal marks are skin markings, a common mode of ornamentation among savages.[4]

2 The possibility thus provided of preserving the memory of common blood over a wider range of space and time than actual

[1] Above, pp. 66-88.
[2] *"Haec est generando homini materia"* (Pliny *Naturalis historia* vi. 15. 13).
[3] "By the totem device the mother family is made capable of indefinite extension" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 354). (Ed.)
[4] See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 396.

living together, paved the way for the first advance, as well as for the first complication, in social relationships, for we must remember that the idea of blood unity established only one, although to be sure the most important, of the different types of human association.[6] Deductions made from the principle of organization in one of these types of association become in one way or another contributory factors in the formation of other types, and they then often remain in force as survivals after the stage of social development which gave them birth has been supplanted by another arising on an entirely different basis, a fact which renders their understanding even more difficult. In this way there arose at the time of the consanguine family the idea of the community of natural goods within the group, an idea which often continued as a survival in contradictory surroundings and which emerged again as the right of the community at a later period in the development of concepts of law and property.

The fundamental conception of the absolute identity of blood within the primitive family admitted, as we have seen,[6] of no degrees of kinship other than those of the different age-grades. In the most ancient systems of consanguinity which have been preserved, the terms for children, parents, and grandparents on the one hand, and for brothers and sisters on the other, denote only the relations of the different generations to one another. Not until a later time did the old names become associated with a new meaning, acquired in the further development of social relations about to be described.

Within the consanguine family there was no institution of marriage in the strict sense, no *xndividua vitoe consuetudo liberorum qucerendorum causa* such as exists both in the conceptions of naive savages like the Tahitians[7] and in the legal formulas of the most highly developed social system of classical antiquity. Within the consanguine family, as is incontrovertibly proved by the systems of consanguinity cited above, there was no special union for community in the maintenance of life and the rearing of children. This conception of the true state of affairs might seem to be open to the objection that so deficient a fore-

[5] See above, pp. 72-3.
[6] Above, pp. 79-82.
[7] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen*, VI, 428. See above, pp. 66-7.

sight would have threatened first the rising generation and then
3 through it the existence of the whole group. But its essential distinction from a later stage of development was merely the absence of a union and identification of the two associations of love and foresight, while a substitute for both existed in another form.

This form was the consanguine family itself. The child was fed and cared for by its mother until it was quite old. During the brief period that then remained until its maturity, which put it on an equal footing with every one else in the tribe, the whole community offered it the guidance and support which on a later stage are the substance of the stipulations of a marriage union. The child, from the moment when it was able to leave the special care of its mother, belonged in actuality to the entire family, i.e., to the tribe, and the latter became its tutor in everything. The lower the stage of economic activity and material culture, the more adequate this arrangement was for the preservation of the species. The lowest stage knew no other concern than the food-quest, in which all activity was absorbed. At the same time the food-quest was the same for everybody until the staff differentiated into the spade in the hands of the woman and into the weapon in the hands of the man. So long as there was no division of labor, the homogeneous community as a whole was the proper tutor of the young person. It alone could furnish him in case of need the measure of foresight which he required over and above his own ability. This community of interests and labor made unnecessary as yet any differentiated organization for the education of the individual in successful self-maintenance. On this stage a person was either an unindividualized appurtenance of his mother or a full and complete member of the tribe. But the tribe was nothing but the enlarged consanguine family. With the existing objects of life and the uniform nature of foresight, any other association was unnecessary and could not therefore have been developed.

Only one factor making for differentiation in this homogeneous society is suggested by the future. As soon as the food-quest advanced ever so little beyond chance collection and began to have recourse to experience and memory, the primitive family group was inevitably divided to some extent into instructors and instructed, leaders and followers, and this relation of guidance

could gradually develop into a relation of domination. By the very nature of the case, however, these groups practically coincided with the age-grades and hence with the oldest intimation of degrees of relationship. In this way these embryonic
4 degrees of kinship were given a new support and a new evidence of their practical importance and authority, as can actually be observed in the very loose social organization of the North American Indians. Little as their general equality is modified by fixed relations of master and slave, custom nevertheless watches jealously over the external recognition of a social stratification composed of younger and older generations. The names of the older groups are regarded and must be used by the younger as titles of respect.[8] On the lowest stage of culture this social stratification was reduced to two main groups. The youngest were excluded on account of their dependence; the helpless aged, since society had not as yet found a way of providing for them, vanished from the scene. Thus there remained essentially only an older and a younger age-group as the germ of the developing social organization.

The languages of later civilized peoples have preserved many survivals of ancient conceptions which have caused confusion in their adoption by one stage of organization from another. Among them is the German word *Eltern,* which from its etymology can not originally have meant "parents" in the modern sense but only the members of the older generation, the "elders."[9] Similarly the classical, Slavic, and Germanic languages have borrowed many names for socially prominent positions of every sort, for titles, family leadership, and offices of direction and authority, from the idea of age. They are derived from the same original source and are often very confusing to us since they are mixed with terms for fatherhood, which we construe only in its genealogical sense. The gerontes and senators of classical antiquity, the starosts and kmets of the Slavs, and the aldermen and elders of the Germanic peoples belong in this category. In the medieval guilds, orders, and fraternities, which were created in imitation of and as a substitute for an old family organization, such titles were long preserved, although they applied to an office which had nothing to do with a succession by

[8] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 168-9. (Ed.)

9 See Weigand, *Deutsches Worterbuch,* under *Elter.*

5 seniority.[10] Even the common word "master" has a similar etymology.[11] In the Semitic languages the use of the word "son" clearly recalls the old conception.[12]

Thus in primitive times the object of the later institution of marriage, in so far as it concerned the support of children, was attained by the peculiar organization of the primitive family, since a common foresight still embraced the entire group. Moreover, there was obviously no need of any alliance for the purpose of reproduction. Even if such an alliance had tended to result from habit,[13] it would necessarily have been disrupted again and again in the natural and ordinary course of things, as long as the mother's nursing obligation lasted for years for want of a substitute food. As has already been pointed out,[14] for the young science of sociology to call these unions of the sexes, which by their very nature are temporary and changing, poly-andro-polygynous marriages or hetairism, is both incorrect in itself and misleading with respect to the further evolution of the institutions of sex and family life. Both names assume a marriage union, the one directly and the other by implication, yet the very essence of such was utterly lacking. Anachronism can be avoided only by admitting that the institution of marriage in the later sense was completely absent in primitive society. The same evolutionary process of differentiation has taken place in the institutions of this sphere of human culture as in the instruments of material culture. Just as the undifferentiated staff and stone once included within themselves in embryonic form the whole succession of later tools and weapons, so also at first one form of social organization, the consanguine family, embraced and represented every form which a later age created by differentiation for a specific purpose, be it the food-quest or the rearing of children or any other similar need which made itself felt separately.

The organization of the grazing animals living together in herds may be regarded as an inexact parallel to this stage of society. Not that the social organization of primitive man was

[10] Cf., Jenks, *The State and the Nation,* p. **111.** (Ed.)
[11] See Weigand, *Deutsches Worterbuch,* under *Magister* and *Meister.*
[12] Cf., Renan, *Life of Jesus,* p. 143. (Ed.)
[13] Sumner and Keller use the term "monandry" **for** such primitive **non-**institutional alliances *(Science of Society,* **III,** 1559-63). (Ed.)
[14] Above, p. 68. (Ed.)

genetically descended from it, but in both cases similar needs led to similar habits. These became established in the animals by the power of developing instincts, in man by that of clarifying ideas. A typical example of this characteristically human factor is the early conception of the identity of blood as the
6 basic principle and fundamental condition of association. Such a conception, because it could be evolved only from the given premises, i.e., those offered by experience, may, because of their incompleteness, be materially inadequate or even entirely erroneous. Nevertheless the mere existence of such ideas remains the important distinguishing characteristic of human institutions and is responsible for the increasing disparity between animal and human organizations as they develop farther.

It can not, of course, be denied that in certain cases the animal, undisturbed by ideas of uncertain validity in its acquisition of adequate instincts, may attain the goal of a one-sided but in its way extremely marvelous perfection of organization sooner than mankind. A glance at the animal world shows how closely the different transitions from a life in herds to one in pairs are tied up with the food-quest, with the kind of food and the manner of its acquisition.[15] Where the individual animals need a large and unspoiled ranging area, the herd dissolves in each generation into pairs, and a parallel of monogamy thus results. But man could not advance so rapidly or directly to this form of association. On the one hand, he presents a contrast to the animals in that his food-quest is many-sided. Thus he escapes the influence of specialization, which in the animal world has been conducive to the development of fixed and unalterable instincts. On the other hand, he carries along with him into later stages an impelling factor in the form of survivalistic ideas and usages from every earlier stage. Thus we shall later become acquainted in detail with the extraordinary importance which inheres in the primitive conception of the nature and significance of blood. This lives on, not perhaps in theory, but embodied in highly important folkways and institutions. It must be emphasized again and again that evolution within the animal world completely lacks this factor, and that precisely because of it a distinctive diversity and complexity have become part and parcel of human history.

[15] **See above, pp. 69-73.**

Later survivals, subsequently to be mentioned, afford us a fairly clear and reliable picture of the manner in which the concern of propagation found expression within the consanguine family before the development of marriage institutions.[16] Man acted, since every sort of provident foresight was as yet foreign to him, purely and simply in response to the impulses of the primary instinct, yet not entirely uninfluenced by the first form
7 of social organization. With the primary instinct dominant, the women of a primitive family must have been regarded as a gift of fortune in which each member had an equal share as in other goods provided by nature. Survivalistic usages compel us to assume that this parallel extended so far that we may compare the community of women within the tribe to the community of water and, after man had acquired it, of fire. Just as in later times the community of fire and water was a sign of membership in a human group,[17] so also in earliest times the community of women must have been a token of the consanguine family. Blood relationship was as yet no bar, but on the contrary a legal title to sexual indulgence. Like every other form of peaceful intercourse, sexual intercourse took place exclusively within the limits of the primitive family. Strict endogamy prevailed.[18]

A reminiscence of these conditions survives at a later period in notions, often contradictory to the institutions of the age, of the natural claims of the members of the tribe.[19] These ideas clearly reveal an important distinction between earlier and later times. In the former, which we are here discussing, the men of the tribe by no means possessed a right of property or dominion over the person of the woman, but only a common and equal legal title to the enjoyment of her sexual favors. In an entirely analogous fashion the tribe in primitive times did not know the concept of property in the land which it scoured for food but only a common right to its fruits, which it protected from the competition of others.[20] Indeed this analogy extends considerably farther. An abundance of wild fruits inviting special indulgence likewise comes at definite times, and we recall the

[ie] For a discussion of primitive promiscuity, see Appendix A. (Ed.)
17 See above, pp. 147-8. (Ed.)
[18] See above, p. 87. (Ed.)
[10] See Lippert, *Oeschichte der Familie.* pp. 165-80.
[20] "Thus the 'common property' which the primitive horde is said to enjoy in the land on which it has settled is simply common use and not real ownership" (Gumplowioz, *Outlines of Sociology,* p. 115). (Ed.)

custom, originating in the communal principle of the primitive family, of not utilizing a discovery of food until the whole tribe has been summoned by loud cries to share in it. Primitive times, according to the evidence of numerous survivals, actually carried this custom over with logical consistency into the sphere of sexual relations.

But the primitive sexual right could be exercised only at a
few periods of life, indeed in the final analysis only at a single
period. The entire life of the woman could not be sacrificed to
the pleasure of all. Upon becoming a mother she withdrew for
several years, and upon her early decline she gradually with-
drew entirely. But a premature withering must have been the
8 rule with early childbirth, the heavy burdens of motherhood,
and a life of privation and hardship. If the ancient Romans still
adhered to the custom of giving their children in marriage
immediately after they reached the age of puberty,[21] and if they
later fixed this at the twelfth year for girls and the fourteenth
for boys, we certainly can not assume a later age among savage
peoples. Probably indeed the time of maturity occurred still
earlier in the original tropical habitat of mankind. The Romans
of earliest times, however, did not observe the years but the
fact itself. In the female sex the transition seemed definitely
marked by nature itself. In the case of the males a formal test
took place,[22] and its outcome decided at the same time whether
the youth might leave the home and enter the association of the
community. That the state as such should have concerned itself
in this way with so private a matter, especially in earliest times,
is so out of keeping with the whole course of development of
Roman law that we can only understand this close connection
between puberty and the entrance into the community of rights
within the tribe as a survival of the customs of an age long past,
an age when the sexual right was the most important of the
rights of the tribal community.

This is natural and comprehensible. Rights develop not from theories but from facts. Whoever was incapable of making use of this most valuable right of the primitive community did not yet possess it. Of necessity he could not yet be considered an

[21] Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* pp. 404ff.
[22] For cases and discussion of such marriage tests, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1665-9; IV, 925-9. (Ed.)

equal or fully qualified member of the family group. Only from this fact, moreover, can the idea have arisen that the right could not be acquired without some act of adoption into the family or tribal community. We shall later examine the forms of these acts of adoption in greater detail.[28] Without the historical hypothesis here advanced, however, we should not be able to explain why even at a much later time their occurrence coincided exactly with the appearance of puberty, since neither proficiency in war nor experience in office, the only other conceivable motives of adoption, are necessarily acquired at that time. It is likewise easy to understand that those who already possessed this right watched over it with some jealousy and did not permit the privileged circle to be enlarged without trial and formality.[24]

Finally, this right came to apply more and more exclusively
9 to the girls at the threshold of sexual life, as restrictions gradually asserted themselves in this respect as well as in others. The mother, looked up to by a generation of adults, could not possibly be the unresisting object of courtship in the same way as the blossoming girl, even though there was as yet no legal principle excluding her. The degree of authority naturally associated with the position of mother necessarily paved the way for an exception to the general tribal right. Its exercise became concentrated on the maturing girl, whom nature ripened and offered to the tribe like a desirable fruit. Budding womanhood, as many customs and accounts prove, knew no renunciation but only a life of carefree love, until this was cut short by a new care, never to bloom again in the old way. Even the prophet speaks of this one period of budding charm in the words: "thy time was the time of love/'[25] This likewise explains those survivals where the legal theory that all blood relatives have an equal right to enjoyment is observed in actual fact only for the brief period in which the woman arrives at sexual maturity.

The path marked by these survivals must have been that actually followed by social evolution, and the same path, unless other factors unknown to us were at work still earlier, must have led to the first limitations of the general right of the tribal members, to those restrictions on sexual intercourse which

23 Below, pp. 483-503. (Ed.

24 For an excellent study of puberty and initiation ceremonies, see Webster. *Primitive Secret Societies*, pp. 20-73. (Ed.)

25 Ezekiel xvi. 8.

have their roots in endogamous circumstances. As the old connubial right was gradually confined in fact to the ripening girls alone, the younger generation of males naturally seemed debarred in fact from connubium with all females of the older generations. And fact, here as always, necessarily gave rise to a legal principle. This principle is evidently purely human and exclusively social in origin, since it has no analogy in the entire animal world. Nor can it have been in operation from the beginning. History and ethnology show us, on the contrary, that the principle of connubial restrictions came into being only very gradually. From the point of view of culture history it is absolutely incorrect to say that restrictions on consanguineous unions were originally created, even under conditions of endogamy, by the principle of blood relationship. On the contrary, the idea of
10 community of blood involved an absolutely unrestricted right of connubium. The only segregation, in connubial relations as in many other respects, was that which gradually came into effect between the different generations. Within the same age-grade, between "brothers" and "sisters," not only did sex connections suffer no restriction, but they prevailed as the absolutely normal state of things. Therein lies the distinguishing characteristic of the tendency, already appearing under endogamous conditions, to impose limitations on sexual intercourse.

Most of the cases where polyandry is still preserved as a group institution hark back to this foundation.[26] It has been widely believed that all these practices, so remote from our social ideal, can be explained as lapses from a former higher state of mankind. Yet there have been observers, like Marshall[27] with respect to the Todas, who have found even institutions like polyandry so closely bound up with the whole social condition of a people that they can not deny them a measure of naturalness under the circumstances.

Herodotus[28] reports of the Agathyrsi, neighbors of the European Scythians, a condition exactly like that of our consanguine family. "They have wives in common," and are "all brothers" and "members of one family." It did not escape the notice of the peoples of antiquity that the whole life of the Scythian

[26] For a discussion of polyandry, see Appendix A. (Ed.)
[27] *Phrenologist amongst the Todas.*
[28] *History* iv. 104.

peoples was based on such a primitive social organization.[29] They were struck by the fact that the Scythians shut themselves off from the outside world by "their cruelty to strangers, whom they sacrificed, whose flesh they devoured, and whose skulls they afterwards used as drinking-cups,"[30] while at the same time amongst themselves they were law-abiding and extremely well-disposed.[31] These facts were also correctly explained as the remnants of that primitive state, according to which they "possessed all things in common, and especially their wives and children, who were cared for by the whole community."[32] This
11 communism of women and children reminds Strabo of the social fancies of Plato,[33] and indeed such architects often believe they are constructing the future when they are really only reconstructing the past with the elimination of complicating factors. We must add that the primitive family organization of the Scythians was also correctly characterized by the fact that the community of women was only the logical consequence of the community of all goods within the tribe.[34] Personal property did not yet exist, or rather, according to Strabo,[35] it had just begun to exist in two embryonic forms; the "sword and drinking-cup" alone, except for ornaments worn on the body, constituted the first objects of personal property, the first characterization of personality and individuality within the consanguine group.

On the northeastern border of classical civilization lived the Massagetse, a nation of wagon dwellers, and they too are described in the same way. To be sure each Massagetan acquired but one wife—which indicates a later stage—but all were allowed to cohabit with her.[36] To manifest his temporary possession of a woman, a man hung up his quiver in front of her chariot or stuck his staff, his personal symbol, in the proper place in the earth.[37] The import of this precaution can only

29 Strabo *Geography*, p. 302 (vii. 3. 9).
30 *Ibid.*, p. 300 (vii. 3. 7).
31 These are characteristic "sentiments in the in-group and towards the out-group." See Sumner. *Folkways*, pp. 12-13. (Ed.)
32 Strabo, *loc. cit.* (Ed.)
33 *Republic* v. (Ed.)
34 Rivers calls attention to the close association of communal property and sexual communism (*Social Organization*, p. 115). (Ed.)
35 *Geography*, p. 300 (vii. 3. 7).
36 Herodotus *History* i. 216; iv. 172.
37 Strabo *Geography* xi. 8. 6. (Ed.)

have been to secure peace for the period of his temporary possession. His personal symbol indicated to the tribe that he was one of their fellows, for what was permitted a member of the tribe would have been a crime for a stranger.[88]

Community of women also prevailed on the southeastern, southern, and southwestern borders of classical civilization, es-
12 pecially in Ethiopia. Among the Nasamonians, a Libyan people, the condition of the family resembled that of the Massagetae, including the custom of indicating possession by setting up a staff.[39] But here Herodotus leads us a step farther. The Nasamonians already possessed the institution of marriage, indeed marriage of a later form, for a man could acquire a wife for himself alone. Then, however, the old right asserted itself. Whatever the man may have been able to expect and obtain for himself from the later marital right, he did not secure an exclusive right of cohabitation. The older right of the consanguine family stood in its way. Our present example, along with many others entirely in accord with it, shows how the later right at first compromised with the earlier one, then gradually reduced it to the status of a survival or symbol, and finally acquired sole sway. The wife was reserved to the husband alone, but the unmarried woman, i.e., under primitive conditions the girl just reaching maturity, remained subject to the whole tribe in the distribution of her favors.[40]

One step farther in the tendency toward increasing restriction and the old decadent right is confined to a single act. Among the Nasamonians the wedding guests took the place of the whole tribe in cohabiting with the bride, and the communal right lasted only till the morning after the wedding, when the husband acquired sole possession of his wife.[41] During this short period, however, the suit of no guest might be refused; as the tribal member of olden times he had a right to her favors.[42]

In this report of Herodotus we meet for the first time a new factor. The bride received a present from each of the guests in

[38] Lippert elsewhere dwells on the fact that the concept of adultery under mother-right applies only to the encroachment of a member of an out-group (below, p. 326). (Ed.)

[39] Herodotus *History* iv. 172.

[40] For a discussion of premarital license, see Appendix A. (Ed.)

[41] Herodotus *History* iv. 172.

[42] Lubbock regards such customs as examples of "expiation for marriage" {*Origin of Civilisation,* p. 131). Discussion in Appendix A. (Ed.)

return for her favors. If this seems inconsistent with the old right, it is nevertheless easily explained by the primitive position of woman. Not yet subordinated to man by a later form of society, she preserved by nature despite all rights a certain measure of independence and self-will, to allow for which a special recompense was required. Thus a wooing with gifts for woman's favor arose even in connection with the earliest form of society.

While among the more advanced Libyan tribes the earliest condition of society, although still recognizable, was nevertheless already mixed with later features, classical reports of the true Ethiopians, tribes of the Negro race, reveal facts suggestive of
13 the conditions of the primitive family. Of the Libyan Auseans on Lake Tritonis Herodotus[43] is able to give no particulars except that they "do not marry or live in families, but dwell together like the gregarious beasts." The Ethiopian Garamantians, according to Solinus, Mela, Pliny, and Marcianus Capella, were unacquainted with either the marriage institution or the concept of the father in the later sense, the children following the mother alone.[44]

Although community of women and children prevailed among the Troglodytes, they nevertheless showed an advance in another direction. They were nomads and consequently subordinated themselves to a chief whose position and importance were in no way based on the old constitution of the family but on the need of systematic leadership and an organization of labor in the pursuit of their livelihood. This new type of organization now began to exert a disruptive and disintegrating influence on the constitution of the primitive family. Thus the Troglodyte chief, or "tyrant" as the Greeks called him, used his power to single out certain women of the tribe for his own exclusive property. These women and these alone were withdrawn from the tribe; the old condition still prevailed for all the rest.[45]

Ethnography shows that what the classical peoples saw to the south of their civilization still exists today among the Negroes of West Africa, especially on the Loango Coast. Here too marriage has fallen under the domination of the man, but here also the

[43] *History* iv. 180.
[44] Evidence assembled in Bachofen, *Mutterrecht*, pp. 11-12.
[45] Strabo *Geography*, p. 775 (xvi. 4. 17).

same compromise with the old right of the consanguine family has been preserved. And, exactly as among the Troglodytes, the "tyrant" alone is able completely to disregard the old right. Only the princes can select a girl child to belong henceforth to themselves alone without any compromise with the old right. The commoner can acquire a wife for himself only after she has satisfied her obligation toward the tribe. No one may give his child in marriage to one man until he has offered her in a bride-hut to all who wish to sue for her favor with presents. As soon as the girl is marriageable, she must be exhibited in her bridal
14 ornaments in an open hall, the so-called casa *das tintas*, to the men of the entire tribe. She may deny herself to none. The gifts she receives in return, however, frequently form a rich dowry for the marriage which she ultimately concludes with one man.[46]

As regards their evolutionary significance, there is no essential difference between this institution of the bride-hut and that of the general bride-show which took place among the Nasamonians. Both are at the same time survivals of and compromises with the old right of the primitive family. The latter, however, has taken a step farther on the road to becoming a rudiment, in that the communal right of the members of the tribe is restricted to a single short period of time.

Mela [47] found the women of the African Augilae to be exceptionally modest, and yet a similar custom still continued. The bride on her wedding day might not deny herself to any man who sued for her favor with a present. Indeed it was regarded as an honor and a distinction to be desired by many in this way. Where this sort of esteem still exists in contradiction to a later view of life, it is certainly not far-fetched to conclude that the custom is original and thus to explain the contradiction. Herodotus[48] similarly relates of a tribe of nomadic Libyans, the Gindanes, that the women wore leather anklets, by the number of which could be determined the number of their successful affairs. A woman with a large number of these rings was highly esteemed, because she had been much sought after.

But these eloquent survivals of the primitive form of the family are by no means peculiar to Ethiopia and Libya. The

[46] Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* I, 152, 175ff.
[47] *Chorographia* i. 8.
[48] *History iv.* 176.

same strange custom of the wedding guests is related by Diodorus[49] of the old inhabitants of the Balearic Isles, but he adds the new fact that among them the order of cohabitation was determined by age and that the groom himself followed last of all. The old right had to be satisfied before a later one came into force. From reports about even the Egyptians and Etruscans[50] we must conclude that it did not offend against ancient custom to seek to earn such presents from members of the tribe before the wedding and to save them as an honorable marriage portion. Certain Egyptian women are even said to have worn rings as marks of distinction like the Gindanes. Moreover, on his personal visit to Egyptian Thebes Strabo[51] found the ancient custom as a cult survival; though it had disappeared from the everyday life of a civilized people, it was preserved by the cult. A. beautiful and highborn virgin was dedicated to prostitution by a "marriage" with Amon.

When Babylonian colonists flocked to depopulated Israel, they brought with them their custom of "daughter huts" or *Succoth-benoth,*[52] the bride-huts or *casas das tintas* of the Africans. From the abhorrence which the Hebrews displayed toward this custom it might be inferred that these survivals of the primitive form of the family were not indigenous in that part of the world. But a report concerning the Arabs makes this supposition at least doubtful. This report gives a fairly accurate picture of the old form of the family with strictly endogamous unions, persisting even under a household patriarch. All blood relatives held property in common, all were brothers to one another, and each was nearer to his brother than to his child. All the men of such a consanguine group had the same right to each of its women. Not only the "sisters," however, but also the "mothers"—at least in the old sense of the word—were allegedly common to all. Nevertheless the concept of adultery was known, and it was punished with death, but an adulterer was only a man from a tribe of alien blood who dared to seek his pleasure thus. The personal symbol of the staff here too denoted temporary possession.[53]

49 *Bibliotheca historica* v. 18.
50 See Sextus Empiricus *Hypotyposes;* Athenaeus *Deipnosophists.*
51 *Geography,* p. 816 (xvii. 1. 46).
52 2 Kings xvii. 30.
53 Strabo, *Geography,* p. 783 (xvi. 4. 25). For an excellent study of marriage and the family among the early Arabs, see Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* II, 1-55. (Ed.)

In Babylon itself the old custom was preserved in connection with the temple of an ancient maternal divinity. All the circumstances, as they are related by Herodotus,[54] show how oppressive the old barbaric practice had become to the cultured people of the time, but it found sanctuary under the shelter of the cult. The rights of a group of men are often transferred to the divinity who represents them. All that belongs to a people is also fundamentally the property or right of its ruling divinity. In this case the Babylonian goddess Mylitta had fallen heir to such a right. To her, as a reigning mother, the proceeds of all the maidens of her people belonged; to her, as the guardian of the ancient right, they were under obligation to prostitute themselves. The sacrifice of the budding maiden took place in the shrine of Mylitta, whom the Greeks therefore identified with the goddess of love in their pantheon. No one who paid court with a piece of silver might be refused. The coin, however, went into the temple treasury. How very repugnant this custom was to the feelings and morals of Babylon at the time is shown by the statement of our authority that when a woman had once paid her score with the goddess in this way, she would not submit again for any price.

Herodotus himself mentions the similarity between the Babylonian dedication of girls and usages prevailing at his time in certain parts of Cyprus, and probably the Cyprian goddess became the "goddess of love" in this way. Strabo[55] testifies that the Armenians at his time practiced the same custom. Even the most aristocratic maidens devoted themselves in the same way before marriage to the service of the goddess, and no bridegroom took umbrage thereat. In Lydia, on the other hand, although general intercourse before marriage and the collection of a dowry in this way did exist, it was not connected with the tribal divinity.[56] That such a connection did prevail, however, among the Phoenicians and Carthaginians is indicated by a mass of evidence.[57] The public auction of maidens to prospective husbands within the tribe, which in West Africa is associated with the institution of the bride-hut, is said by Herodotus[58] to have been customary also among the Illyrian Eneti. Among the Thracians

54 *istory* i. 199.
55 *Geography,* p. 532 (xi. 14. 16).
56 Herodotus *History* i. 93.
57 See Bachofen, *Mutterrecht,* p. 321.
58 *History* i. 196.

complete freedom of intercourse for the maidens prevailed before marriage and strict supervision of the wife thereafter,[59] a condition which is still common among many savage peoples today as a transition stage from an earlier to a later form of the family. While the requirement of fidelity in the wife has arisen out of the later marriage institution, the free life of youth clings to the right of olden times.

Usages restricting the former communal right in the woman to the time of the wedding festivities were observed by Garcilasso de la Vega[60] among the old Peruvian Mantas and by" Langsdorf[61] in Nukahiva. Among the aboriginal Santals of India all weddings are concluded at a definite time of the year, a custom which has also been preserved by some of the South Slavs. Among the former tribe the old custom of communism in women reasserts itself at this festival, and only after it is over do the couples separate.[62] Carver[63] learned among the Dakotas that women still occasionally ventured to submit to the ancient right and thereby attained high distinction throughout the tribe, just like the women of the Gindanes mentioned by Herodotus. The custom was described to him as very ancient but falling into disuse.

The above-mentioned Babylonian custom of religious prostitution, in other words the transfer of the bride-hut to the temple, was also found in the Ganges Valley, and it is said to have prevailed also at Pondicherry and Goa.[64]

The custom of extending hospitality by offering wives to guests is doubtless to be regarded as another survival of the old form of the family. It occurs among many savage tribes including the Eskimos, Indians, Polynesians, Australians, East and West Africans, Kaffirs, and even the Mongols, Abyssinians, and Arabs.[65] The guest enters into all the rights of the tribal member, and the special sanctity of the relationship revives the ancient rights of the latter.

18 There can no longer be any doubt that the social organization

[59] Herodotus *History* v. 6. For a discussion of premarital license, see Appendix A. (Ed.)
[60] *Commentaries,* II, 442. (Ed.)
[61] *Voyages and Travels,* I, 153. (Ed.)
[62] Watson and Kaye, *People of India,* I, 2. (Ed.)
[63] *North America*, p. 245. (Ed.)
[64] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 537. (Ed.)
[65] *Ibid., p.* 132. (Ed.)

of the Scythian peoples whom Nicolaus Damascenus[66] calls the Galactophagi (milk eaters) was based on the primitive family. The report of our authority confirms us, not only here, but also in our conception, as opposed to that of Morgan, of the nature and significance of the stages and nomenclature of relationships in the primitive family. After speaking of their community of property and women, he explains expressly that their terms "father," "son," and "brother" were designations for the older men, the younger men, and those of equal age respectively, and he regards this classification as based on their communalism.

That the ancestors of the Greeks and Romans must have passed through this stage of culture follows from their relationship to other peoples who have. That they should have preserved fewer survivals from olden times is likewise natural in view of the higher state of civilization to which they had gradually advanced. Among the Lacedemonians the principle, ascribed by Plutarch[67] to Lycurgus, that the children belonged, not to their fathers, but to the state, is obviously a survival from the ideas of the consanguine family adapted to a later form of society. And here too probably belongs the rumor current among the ancients that the Lacedemonians under certain circumstances offered their wives ungrudgingly to the more prominent men.[68] Strabo[69] says that the celebrated action of Cato in yielding his wife Martia to his friend Hortensius was in accord with an ancient Roman custom. But no similar survival had been preserved in the wedding customs of the Romans. On the contrary, the very correctness and logical consistency with which they carried out the principle of a later legal development, even in their forms, characterizes and distinguishes them no less than their career of dominion. The Greeks, however, preserved to the end a survival of olden times in the peculiar esteem accorded to the hetaira, contrasting with the strict duties of the married woman, and in the r61e which the former could play even in public life.[70]

In India also, until recently, women educated beyond the sphere of their domestic activities were to be found only among

66 *Fragmenta,* p. 460. See also Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, **107.** (Ed.)

67 *Lycurgus* **14-16.**

68 **Nicolaus Damascenus** ***Fragmenta,*** **p. 468.**

60 ***Geography,*** **p. 514.**

70 **Karnes,** ***History of Man,*** **I I , 50. (Ed.)**

the courtesans. How very little such a position disgraced them, even when they were not connected with cult institutions, is shown among other things by the high rank accorded the woman who held the office of chief of the courtesans at Vesali in the Buddhist legend.[71] In Java and certain parts of West Africa they
19 also enjoy the same esteem, while the comparatively harmless vocation of a musician is despised as dishonorable.[72]

The custom of acquiring wealth outside of marriage by prostitution is permissible among certain Indian tribes,[78] is indicated by the Hebrew prohibition against the acceptance of such earnings by the temple treasury,[74] and is said by Plautus[75] to have been characteristic of the Etruscan women. It can not always have been scandalous even in Rome, else all the tales of Acca Larentia could not have found acceptance in the cycle of ancient folk traditions. The contradiction in moral sentiments is the result of compatibility, which associates ideas of favor and disfavor originating in different stages of social development.

Survivals from the rights of the consanguine family have been preserved in another way in the folkways of the Slavs. Here we shall disregard the descriptions of early Slavic folk life which date from the period of missionary activity and the conversion to Christianity.[76] Although they often seem to picture a still undisturbed state of promiscuity, it might be too difficult to distinguish in them the exaggerations of the zealot from the modicum of truth. But assuredly this modicum, however large or small it may be, is to be regarded far less as an indication of moral degeneration than as an evidence of relative nearness to the old condition of society. Naturally the path by which a vigorous custom becomes a survival is not everywhere the same. On the contrary, local influences and even the element of chance have their fullest scope here. Thus in Slavic folk life, for all its conservative character, the ancient rights are to be found only sporadically.

Among the present-day Serbs in the Banat the wedding ceremonies occupy several days, during which time the *dever* or

[71] Speir, *Ancient India,* p. 281. (Ed.)
[72] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 538. (Ed.)
[73] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 277.
[74] Deuteronomy xxiii. 18.
[75] *Cistellaria* ii. 3. 20ff. (Ed.)
[76] A number of these reports are cited **in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 110-12. (Ed.)**

groomsman, who represents, as it were, the old tribal members and wedding guests, shares the bride's bed. His place is not taken by the bridegroom until the last day.[77] There can be no doubt that this custom expresses, in an attenuated form, the same compromise between the old and new rights that we found among the Augilae. Of course in time even this substitution must give offense, and in order to avoid this the custom has been modified in various ways. Thus usages have arisen which of themselves would be difficult to explain. In the regions under discussion this eloquent practice has not itself been sacrificed, but its objectionable character has been removed by selecting the *dever* from among the immature boys of the family. He is treated in his role, however, quite as though he were a man.

Along with this survival, as very often happens, there appears another one, the so-called bolster dance. On the evening of the wedding each male guest, following the example of the bride's godfather, kneels on a bolster before the bride, kisses her, and leads her out to dance. But the *kum* (godfather) allows no one to dance with the bride unless he has first paid some money, which is set aside for her.[78] Even the first-named survival, however, is associated with gifts to the bride. When she emerges from the bridal chamber with the *dever,* she is greeted by the guests with obscene jokes and at the same time with presents of money, which, as is now alleged, must be paid in punishment for the jokes. Among the Serbs of the former Karlstadt military frontier the survival takes a slightly different form. The *kvm* shares the bed with the bridal couple and lies between them, leaving them after a short time.[79]

In other districts we are reminded in another and still more rudimentary manner of the African bride-hut and of the earning of a dowry under the forms of the consanguine family. Thus in the Bacska a formal bride-show precedes the betrothal. Surrounded by her girl friends and attended by two older women, the marriageable girl awaits the visits of the suitors in a brightly lighted room. While the two women light the way with candles, she follows each suitor to a dance. This must happen, the people rationalize today, so that the suitor may not be deceived by a cripple. "Each such inspection is paid for with money, in which

[77] Rajacsich, *Sudslaven,* pp. 180ff. 73 *Ibid.,* p. 184.
"*Ibid., p.* 147.

the copper kreuzer is called a ducat and is paid as though it were such. A girl oftentimes collects a considerable sum of money in this way, as she is sometimes inspected by several fellows on the same day."[80] The gift belongs to the girl even though the inspection does not lead to a proposal.

It is significant that in these regions it is not usual for the bride to bring a dowry from her home. The wedding guests assemble one for her. In many cases this takes place in a peculiar form reminiscent of ancient customs. Herodotus,[81] in describing the
21 sexual life of the Babylonians, relates that intercourse was customarily followed on the following morning by a bath. This custom also extended to the Arabs and Jews. Now among the South Slavs, according to a very common practice, on the morning after the bridal night the bride prepares a hand bath, first for all the men of the house and next for all the guests, and then receives gifts for her dowry from the latter.

While Turner[82] regards the German "morning gift" as the groom's share in this donation, he aptly points out that the South Slav bride receives the morning gift, not from her husband, but from all the guests at the wedding feast. This form is the more general and certainly the more ancient one.[83] The German morning gift still survived in rural life at the time of the *Sachsenspiegel* and only became obsolete in the cities because it embraced objects of the peasant household. This gift of the groom really represents, like his marital right of its kind, the lone survivor of the gifts which had formerly been as numerous as the members of the tribe.[84] But the other presents have not vanished without a trace, nor is there lacking a faint suggestion of the suppressed right of the tribal members now represented by the wedding guests.[85] In parts of Germany there still exists a bride-show on the eve of the wedding day, at which each respectable guest has the right to demand that the bride be given to him for a dance. In return he is under obligation to make her a present, which is now, to be sure, expended in paying the

[80] Rajacsich, *Sudslaven,* p. 167.
[81] *History* i. 198. (Ed.)
[82] *Slavisches Familienrecht,* p. 29.
[83] See Talvy, *Serbische Volkslieder,* II, xvi.
[84] Various interpretations of the morning gift are discussed in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* II, 422-3. (Ed.)
[85] We are instantly reminded here of our own customs of wedding presents and "kissing the bride." (Ed.)

musicians. This tenacious custom is likewise found among the Lapps of Russia, and its divergent form there indicates that the dance itself was by no means always the essential factor in the case. The Lapp bride remains veiled in the home of the bridegroom for eight days before the church wedding, and "every one who wishes to see her must pay her a few kopeks."[86]

The discovery of all these survivals of the consanguine family among so many different races and nations teaches us the very
22 important fact that the differentiation of forms of the family does not coincide with that of races. On the contrary, man's physical evolution has been independent of that of his social organization. All racial types must have developed within the same original form of society through the influence of external conditions, and only after racial differences had for the most part already become fixed did differentiation in the sphere of social organization take place within each individual race. Only thus could it come about, for example, that the white race could bring forth, within the closest kinship of blood and even of language, nations so different in their social forms as the Romans, Celts, and Sarmatians. These social differentiations in turn furnished the impulse whereby some groups became subjected to neighboring groups of kindred stock who were more advanced in organization. Only in this way was that historical movement initiated, which at length built up world empires out of isolated atomistic societies and has filled human history with a significance compared to which the infinitely longer period of prehistoric times, in spite of the tremendous importance of the spread of mankind and the development of races, seems poor indeed.

[86] Frijs, "Wanderungen," p. 54.

CHAPTER VII

MOTHER-RIGHT

23 It was dependent upon the appearance and character of social advances whether or not the mother-right latent in the constitution of the consanguine family [1] became of practical importance in social organization, in other words whether the principle of matrilineal descent, involved in the bond which held the primitive family together, was raised to the practical importance of a mother-right.

Classical writers left behind many accounts of matriarchal conditions, to which may be added those of modern ethnography. But so overwhelming was the influence on Christian civilization of the Old Testament, which was regarded as the oldest source of early history, that the whole phase of human history characterized by mother-right had become almost completely lost to scientific knowledge until it was rediscovered by Bachofen.[2] Thereafter the estimation of the importance of mother-right fluctuated between undervaluation and exaggeration, due probably directly or indirectly to the borrowed term "gynecocracy."

Our current idea of government has been derived from the most important and extensive political organizations of history. Such a government among savage peoples exercised exclusively by women is certainly a conception inadmissible from the outset.[3] We must clearly realize that the forms of organization on which we involuntarily pattern our concept of government are not those of the phase of mother-right but owe their origin to a much later time. Mother-right reigned both with the means and within the organizations of its own peculiar kind.[4]

[1] See above, pp. 73-5, 88.
[2] *Mutterrecht.* (Ed.)
[8] "Nowhere, as far as is known, do we find a true matriarchate, where the woman occupies the office of ruler" (Tozzer, *Social Origins,* p. 168). (Ed.)
4For a discussion of the matriarchate, see Appendix B. (Ed.)

24 One of the characteristics of maternal authority is the limited size of the organization in which it prevails. By no display of power can mother-right extend beyond the sphere of the consanguine family, and natural limits are set to the increase of the latter. To be sure, by the use of artificial expedients such as tribal marks,[6] which enable distant groups following different maintenance ways or scattered individuals in alien territory to preserve the consciousness of their unity, a consanguine family may expand into a sizable tribe. In such a case, however, the need of organization naturally brings to the fore other powers and other institutions, and mother-right is shorn of its substance and reduced to the mere principle of matrilineal descent and similar relics of its former sway. Mother-right itself, based exclusively on community of blood, originally possessed, except for natural increase, no means whatsoever of creating larger organizations. Artificial community of blood was first discovered under male supremacy. It still preserved, to be sure, the old concept of blood as the sole bond of union, but it was nevertheless able to bring aliens into the union. These two bonds, birth from the same blood and adoption into community of blood, present a contrast like that between nature and art. The former, however, can operate only in relatively small organizations and can not become a state-creating factor in our sense.

The classical writers, to be sure, speak of large nations which at their time still lived under maternal authority or the matriarchate. But these are to be understood only as large homogeneous nationalities, each composed of a large number of small organized groups, never as unified states of like magnitude. The Thracian peoples at the time of Herodotus no longer lived under mother-right like the neighboring Agarthyrsi, but the unrestricted license which they allowed their daughters before marriage shows that they could not have disengaged themselves from that condition for very long. Hence they still bore the traces of disorganization and national disunion. Herodotus[6] says: "If they had one head, or were agreed among themselves, it is my belief that their match could not be found anywhere, and that they would very far surpass all other nations. But such union is impossible for them, and there are no means of ever bringing it about. Herein therefore consists their weakness." This condition is characteristic of

[8] See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 389. [6] *History* v. 3.

25 all peoples, otherwise homogeneous as to residence, racial type, and language, whom we see emerging from the organization of mother-right and hesitating at the threshold of political organization. In this condition the Celts, Scythians, and Sarmatians make their appearance on the stage of history, and thus countless semi-civilized tribes survive today.

Herodotus brings out certain other noteworthy characteristics of this transition stage in the example of the Thracians. They indicated their birth and extraction by skin markings, as most Africans still do today,[7] and had thus discovered a method of preserving the unity of the tribe while allowing freedom of movement to the individual. An increase of the consanguine family to a fairly numerous tribe thus became possible, but beyond this limit no means of organization as yet extended. A peace union between one tribe and another was still lacking. Such a union lay outside the principles of mother-right and was beyond its capacity to create. Hence the constant marauding warfare between tribes. The increased desire for war and plunder, noted by Herodotus,[8] indicates the victory of man-rule over the old organization, just as the contempt for agriculture illustrates from another angle the overthrow of mother-right. When we find a people on this stage still organized in small groups, we are shown the limit beyond which we must not allow ourselves to be misled by the high-sounding name "gynecocracy." Rule by women is out of the question in advanced political organizations; it can only appear within the old consanguine family.

The next advance in organization, apparently, was a further differentiation in the homogeneous primitive family, subdivided thus far only into age-grades. Its impulse is undoubtedly to be sought in advances with incipient differentiation in the care for life. Individually, however, these causes were necessarily so numerous that history can no longer follow them. Various factors could have contributed to bring about the formation of smaller groups within one and the same generation, especially when the memory of common blood was preserved by means of artificial expedients over and above the fact of living together. Any sort of progress in the mode of life or the food-quest could have led to this. Likewise in the relation of the generations to each other

7 See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 389.
8 *History* v. 6. (Ed.)

the claims of the one to protection and leadership, and of the other to subordination, necessarily became differentiated into more immediate and more remote claims, just as the systems of consanguinity of primitive peoples gradually acquired terms for
26 such distinctions. The fact of closer and looser companionship, caused by the increasing diversity of the food-quest, broke through the logical consistency of the old system, in which identical blood involved ungraduated membership. In place of this there now appeared nearer and more remote degrees of kinship.

All these later systems, however, were built around the individual mother; she was henceforth the focus of all group formations. The concept "mother" was the first to lose its general meaning of any woman of the older generations, while the concept "father" did not as yet emerge in our sense but still denoted only a man of the next higher generation within the same kin-group. The natural intimate connection between mother and child, which found as yet no counterpart in the case of the father, was supplemented by the ideal role of the mother in determining degrees of relationship. Blood alone was still the only basis of kinship and association, and its common source could be sought at that time only in the common mother. A maternal figure was therefore necessarily raised to a position of eminence in each kin-group, as is proved in fact by a series of survivals to be reviewed later.

But rank and authority tend to pass from the hands of the living into those of the dead, of divine beings. We shall encounter a situation of this kind under father-right. On that stage man with his advancing mental facility devises methods of bringing the elusive authority back again into connection with a living individual. Even then, however, it resides, not in the living ruler, but only in the lifeless insignia of office which he temporarily possesses.[9] With respect to the maternal' position of eminence, however, our historical knowledge is not so complete. We only know that it was also prone to escape from the hands of the living.

As soon as historical tradition, reenforced by external means of identification, had advanced a little, individuals were able to preserve the knowledge of their unity of blood, even though it was no longer derived from a living mother or ancestress. Even

[9] **See below, pp. 526-8, 605-8. (Ed.)**

if their actual ancestress had long since been dead and was not remembered as an individuality by any historical tradition, the very fact of their common tribal membership would inevitably
27 have led them, since tribal membership and unity of blood were still identical, to invent a hypothetical common ancestress as an explanation of their unity. As soon as the cult made the transition from negative to positive foresight, this hypothetical ancestress was identified with one of the tribal divinities. Thus what was originally only an idea, a not only logically admissible but also under the circumstances logically necessary inference, finds in the facts of the cult a confirmation of its actual existence. Thus there entered into life as a historical fact something which was in reality only an idea and hypothesis. This idea, moreover, could not have coincided with a historical person, for at the time when a larger human group drew the inference there could no longer have been any historical recollection of such a person. Thus hand in hand with this association of ideas *privata sacra* were elevated for the first time to the dignity of *sacra publica.* And it was this ideal tribal ancestress, made real and preserved as a spiritual being by the cult, who achieved the maternal position of eminence in fullest measure.[10]

But there was another and much more concrete way in which woman rose to a measure of authority. Reports and survivals have acquainted us with the presents which the man of the tribe gave the woman in order to realize his right to her favors, for by the nature of the case the tribal right alone could not secure him the full measure of enjoyment. A social advance was now initiated by the endeavor of the woman to extend these contributions of the man to a degree at least remotely commensurate with the burdens which her concession inevitably brought upon her. A stipulation of this kind marked the first attempt to establish a true marriage union.

The man, however, would have had no reason to conclude such a union for a long period unless it could offer him some benefit beyond ephemeral enjoyment. A condition where such an advantage existed appeared with the increasing differentiation of the food-quest. The freedom and lack of responsibility on the part of the man, and the shackles of mother love on the part of

[10] In other words, the perfect matriarch was not a living woman but a goddess. (Ed.)

the woman, developed the economic aptitudes of the two sexes in different directions. The products of the food-quest of one sex
28 must, however, have seemed desirable to the other as a supplement to its own, even if, and indeed just because, the activity involved in their acquisition was unfamiliar and uncongenial to it. As long as hunting was confined to the collection of larvse, lizards, and shellfish, in which both sexes took equal part, there could have been no impulse to social development. But when man's skill with weapons improved so that he could engage in higher hunting, where woman could follow and assist him only in a very subordinate way, such an incentive appeared. The woman must have been desirous of the temporary excess of game, while the man in times of want coveted the less dainty but life-sustaining supplies of dried fruits and vegetables which woman in her more restricted economic sphere had learned to accumulate. These circumstances gave rise to an actual division of labor by sex.[11]

The substance of further social development consisted in the establishment of definite unions between the sexes for cooperation on the basis of their different modes of livelihood. Among the advantages which the woman could offer the man in such an association was shelter. Everything that goes to make up the actual dwelling appears historically, at least at first, entirely within the woman's economic sphere. In general the erection of the tent and the hut is the exclusive affair of the woman from the most primitive tribes up the cultural ladder as far as the Eskimos, and even on much higher stages as a survival. The natural reason for this lies in the fact that a measure of immobility is necessarily associated with woman's mode of subsistence, and a certain need of protection with her maternal obligations. Both factors led her to establish a permanent dwelling when a changing and unequipped camping place still sufficed for the man.

An additional attraction was the fire. As we have already seen,[12] the possession of fire throughout early times depended upon its continuous preservation, and this naturally found a place only under the more stable administration of the woman. By her possession of fire and custody of the hearth woman ac-

[11] For a full treatment of this subject, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 122-40. (Ed.)

[12] Chapter III.

quired the power to make herself the center of a permanent social union. Even the Roman concept of marriage, although its most essential characteristics were derived from a later stage, still
29 preserved the old idea that it was above all a union for "community of fire and water."

In proportion as woman became increasingly able to offer man more than her body, the old right of the tribal comrades shriveled more and more into survivals such as we have observed above,[18] and at the same time she came more and more into a position where in each union she could stipulate the permanent cooperation of the man instead of mere wooing gifts. He now returned again and again to her hearth and shared in the enjoyment of the warm and protecting fire and the stores of food,[14] both of which were permanently under the custody of a maternal mistress. In return he obligated himself to contribute from his sphere of activity to the maintenance of the fire and the replenishment of the food supplies. Since the man appeared only as a guest or even, in view of his services, as a menial member of the household, in which the woman was the only stable element, we may speak within these limits of a supremacy of the woman in the home and in the group to which it was able to expand.[15]

The form of society of this first primitive advance has been preserved no longer merely in survivals but in actual cases. Livingstone met a typical example among the Balonda north of the Zambesi.[16] Unlike their neighbors, these people were unable to make the advance to cattle raising on account of local conditions. Since this advance in turn is normally associated with the rise of a later form of the family, we owe the conservation of the old condition to its failure to appear here. The Balonda attached himself, not to one woman, but to several at the same time, all

[13] Chapter VI.

[14] According to Starcke, woman "became indispensable to the man, not on account of an impulse which is suddenly aroused and as quickly disappears, but on account of a necessity which endures as long as life itself, namely, the need of food" (*Primitive Family,* p. 257). (Ed.)

[15] This is the extent of Lippert's modest conception of the matriarchate. Sumner and Keller, however, question whether woman attained even this degree of authority (*Science of Society,* **III, 1990).** (Ed.)

[16] The editor is uncertain as to the authenticity of this case. Lippert takes it, not directly from Livingstone, but from Bachofen (*Mutterrecht,* pp. 105-6), who apparently got it from Krapf. The editor has been unable to verify it in Livingstone, although that author reports a similar, **but** less striking, situation among the Banyai (*Missionary Travels,* pp. **622-3).** (Ed.)

of whom, however, belonged to one household under a maternal head and inhabited the same kraal. He went to the kraal—not the women to him. With their mother, as head of the house, he concluded an agreement, the chief consideration of which was the promise to provide her with firewood. In return the women promised to give him food from their stores as well as sexual gratification and a place at the hearth fire. There was nothing to prevent these unions from being polyandrous as well as polygynous. From the standpoint of the man they were necessarily the latter, for a single woman, because of her long nursing periods, was not in a position to keep the man at home.

The authority of the mother of such a house was obviously
30 great enough to be called domination. Whenever the relation was dissolved, the mother remained mistress of all the children, for through her alone was their kinship and tribal membership determined. The mother even possessed an important means of discipline in that the women, as Livingstone himself observed, deprived insubordinate men of food.

We notice, however, even at this first glance into the subject, the slender thread by which such a matriarchate hangs. In the present case it is the absence of cattle raising. Woman's control of the food supply and her disciplinary weapon must lose their importance as soon as man has found, in exceptionally productive hunting or in the art of raising domesticated animals, a basis of subsistence as secure as that obtained by woman in the advance from the collection to the cultivation of plant foods. A "rebellion of the men," such as Livingstone was never able to witness among the Balonda, must have been an event impending well-nigh everywhere whenever the sphere of masculine activity had advanced thus far along its specialized path.

Many tribes still preserve the custom whereby the man marries into the house of the woman or of her mother.[17] Another survival of the same domestic arrangement is suggested by reports of several Indian tribes that among them a man by marrying an eldest daughter thereby marries all her younger sisters at the

IT "Two kinds of marriage have been distinguished, according as the wife goes to live with her husband, or the husband goes to live with his wife. These two kinds are known as *patrilocal* and *matrilocal* respectively. As a general rule patrilocal marriage is associated with father-right, and matrilocal marriage with mother-right, but the association is far from invariable" (Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 90). Cases of matrilocal marriage are collected in Briffault, *Mother**, I, 268-310. (Ed.)

same time.[18] The same construction is to be placed on the custom, which prevails generally among the Todas of India, according to which every man regards all the sisters of his wife as likewise his wives, while on the other hand there are always several men who enter into such a marriage relation.[19] In the old consanguine family such intercourse took place generally and without restriction throughout the tribe. Now, however, it was confined to a smaller association of brothers- and sisters-in-law occupying a single house presided over by a maternal head, an association in which rights and duties were no longer based exclusively on community of blood but on a definite agreement. Accordingly, this joint family[20] no longer consisted necessarily of near blood relatives alone. Morgan's[21] so-called "punaluan family," constructed by him from the Hawaiian system of consanguinity and the institutions of certain Indian tribes, seems to rest on this foundation. In Hawaii the members of such a household group were no longer designated according to their
31 degree of kinship or age-grade but according to this later artificial and voluntary relation. They called each other *punalua,* i.e., brothers- and sisters-in-law. Associations of this sort might be inferred among the ancient Britons from the statement of Caesar[22] that they had their wives in common by groups of ten or twelve.

The great importance of this advance compels us to set forth its nature in this connection. The motive of a common household freely chosen is now added to that of sexual intercourse. The sexual right of all the tribal members, conferred by blood relationship alone, continues, but with the emergence of the newer form of association—the common household combined with sexual intercourse and based on contributions stipulated in advance—the exercise of the old right is confined to the first intercourse of the woman. Once she has satisfied it, she is permitted to conclude a separate alliance with individual men of the consanguine family for the purpose of self-maintenance. Thus there arises within the primitive family an organization of a new sort, based upon choice and agreement. The advance rests upon these two

[18] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 169.
[19] Shortt, "Hill Tribes," p. 240.
[20] A form of the family roughly corresponding to group marriage. (Ed.)
[21] *Ancient Society,* pp. 424-52. (Ed.)
[22] De *hello Gallico* v. 14. (Ed.)

factors and their economic basis. In the former an instinctive motive predominates, in the latter a conscious social one.

Among the factors attracting the man into such a union were the more advanced condition of the feminine household, the comforts which it offered, and the share that fell to him of the products of woman's ingrained industry. The lower the culture of a people, the more exclusively are the women alone capable of and devoted to continuous labor.[23] Whenever, as a result of local conditions, woman's economic sphere lies utterly prostrate, especially when she has not arrived at any form of agriculture, her status is low, for the instinct of the savage is too impulsive and his foresight too undeveloped to accord her a lasting esteem on account of sexual intercourse alone.[24] Thus the Todas, who may serve as an example, far from cherishing woman, practice female infanticide and remedy the resulting scarcity of women by extensive polyandry. But wherever the subsistence of a people depends, even to a slight degree, upon the product of woman's labor, the whole burden tends to fall on her shoulders, especially in a low stage of culture, and she becomes correspondingly more desirable as head of the household. This explains the apparent contradiction that the position of woman within her limits may be a dominant one among very low peoples.

Spencer[25] has assembled some significant data with respect to the difference between the sexes in this direction. "Among the
32 Bhils, while the men hate labour, many of the women are said to be industrious. Among the Kookies the women are 'quite as industrious and indefatigable as the Naga women:' the men of both tribes being inclined to be lazy. Similarly in Africa. In Loango, though the men are inert, the women 'give themselves up to' husbandry 'with indefatigable ardour;' and our recent experiences on the Gold-Coast show that a like contrast holds there." The Iroquois women at the time of the first missions made everything that could be called work their concern, while

[28] On this and kindred subjects, see Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*. (Ed.)

[24] "In general, the status of women has been controlled, in all civilization up to the highest, by their power to help in the work of life. Where women have had important functions they have been valued; where they have needed protection and support, and have not been able to contribute much, they have been treated with contempt. . . . Under agriculture women win a position of independent cooperation" (Sumner, *War*, p. 65). (Ed.)

[25] *Principles of Sociology*, I, 61.

the men, except for war and hunting, led the life of drones. It was the woman who carried on the primitive agriculture, fenced the fields, repaired the hut, tended the fire, carried the belongings on the march, and even took charge of the surplus game.

Among the Delawares, however, a share of the work had already been taken over by the men, and we see very clearly how the marriage union, by uniting the two spheres of labor, could work out to the great advantage of both parties. The woman tilled the field and garden, watched the fire, and prepared the food. Without exceptional cause the man never laid a piece of wood on the fire, but he procured meat and skins for roofing and clothing. In return he could demand cooked food twice a day from the woman's kitchen; this was an essential point in the tacit compact. "Most married people," says our authority,[26] "have an understanding with one another that everything which the man acquires by hunting belongs to the woman. Thus as soon as he has brought the skins and meat home he regards them as the property of his wife." Moreover, the man claimed his share of the food "which the woman cultivates and harvests in the garden and field," and he enjoyed, we may add, the shade of her roof and the warmth of her hearth. It needed only a gentle hint from the woman and the man "goes out early in the morning without victuals and seldom returns without some game, should he even be obliged to stay out till late in the evening." On the other hand, the woman had to prepare the man's provisions for every hunting trip. But she disposed of the booty as she pleased. The man had to acquiesce even if she presented the largest portion to her relatives, for it was her property now—such was the substance of the contract.

Not only did the Indian clearly recognize this as the essential feature of his marriage, but he also expressed it symbolically yet intelligibly enough in the betrothal ceremony. The mother of the bride delivered bread and firewood at the home of the bridegroom, receiving meat and clothing in return.[27]

33 It is evident, therefore, that with this group of Indians the husband both in theory and in fact still entered the household of the wife and not *vice versa.* Hence the same situation existed here as among the Balonda. The subject matter of the stipulations

[26] Loskiel, *Oeschichte der Mission,* p. 77.
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 73.

varies only immaterially in accordance with local conditions. It is, moreover, only consistent and natural that in such a household, as in the bee society, property and authority should fall to the share of the females. This is true in either case, however, only in so far as it is rendered necessary by the vocations of the contracting parties. Excepted from the property of the woman are the personal possessions of the man—his weapons, tools, and ornaments. Excepted from her authority are his activities in his own field of labor—hunting and warfare. This qualification gives at the same time a hint of future developments. Woman's authority will decline and suffer restriction if man's activity in the economic sphere becomes preponderant or if he should feel himself impelled to give up his contempt for the female type of foresight and take the conduct of female work into his own hands, and woman's ascendancy will finally disappear if the two spheres of labor should strike a balance in a mutual exchange. All these and many more combinations are conceivable and have also occurred in fact, depending on local influences, without, however, constituting a continuous evolutionary series.[28]

We must, however, linger for the present with the state of things represented by the northeastern Indians down into the Eighteenth Century. However contradictory it may seem in view of their intractability, their family organization was nevertheless still dominated by the women. This was true in principle everywhere and in fact depending upon individual circumstances. Indeed the untamable character of the Indian race and its utter inability to supply the European with useful slave material was the very result of its retention of a primitive type of authority, which was neither comprehensive nor strict. The education of the Indian lacked discipline by a paternal authority. Even if the wife neglected her primary marital duty by omitting to prepare the man a meal due him, he ordinarily did not complain but
34 silently sought to make up for it by a visit to friends.[29] Among the Seneca tribe of the Iroquois the women were likewise usually dominant in the home. "The stores were in common; but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too shiftless to do his share of the providing." He was expelled from the household.

[28] This sentence shows how far Lippert departs from the rigid evolutionary doctrine of Morgan and other earlier writers in the direction of the modern anthropological point of view. (Ed.)

[29] Loskiel, *Oeschichte der Mission*, p. 76.

But female authority went even farther. "The women were the great power among the clans, as everywhere else. They did not hesitate, when occasion required, 'to knock off the horns,' as it was technically called, from the head of a chief, and send him back to the ranks of the warriors."[30]

That the unruly Indian did not feel the pressure of this authority was due, on the one hand, to the easy dissolubility of these marriage unions and, on the other, to the man's whole mode of life. The dissolubility and instability of marriage on this stage was inherent in its purpose. The woman, who logically kept the children after the dissolution of the relation, was only the man's housekeeper, secured by an agreement. The Indian indicated clearly by the expression, "My wife is not my friend," i. e., blood relative, that the tie was different from that of the old endogamous unions. He made use of its dissolubility as often as he pleased. One of the most common causes, however, was the long nursing period of the mother.[31]

Moreover, the woman's household was to the Indian little more than a resting place, in which he sought comfort and hospitable attention only during the pauses in his own economic life, and for which he paid by his contributions. He accommodated himself to the authority of the woman as one adapts oneself to the house rules of a pension, but this docile luxury did not occupy his entire life. On the contrary, he spent the greater part of it in hunting, fishing, and warfare. Single hunting expeditions in Loskiel's time lasted three or four weeks and frequently even several months.[32]

During this time the Indian lived in an organization which coincided neither with the consanguine family nor with the joint family, but which was created purely and simply by the nature of his economic activity. The family organization existed undisturbed alongside of it, at least in survivals. Not only is a unified leadership advantageous in the chase, but in the course of time old hunting usages become transformed into legal principles which must be supervised. For both reasons each Indian hunting band united under a chosen leader, whose authority had acquired definite limits in the same way.

[30] Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 455.
[31] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission*, p. 74.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

The distinct nature of these two systems of government[88] was preserved by the Indians even in the tradition of the formation of an extensive political organization by means of intertribal alliances, and they gave striking expression to it in their legends. When they wished to relate that they had intrusted the functions of peace in their confederation to the Delawares, they said that they had appointed that tribe as their wife. "We will take her into our midst; the other warring nations, however, shall be the husbands and dwell around the wife. . . . And the men shall then listen to the woman and obey her." And they said to the Delawares, symbolizing the economic sphere of the woman: "We herewith present you with a maize stalk and a hoe."[34]

A cause of the decline of woman's authority is suggested by the development just indicated. That the joint family originally existed in America is shown clearly enough by the fact of sister marriages. Morgan[35] states that in about forty North American Indian tribes marriage to an eldest daughter entitled a man to marry all her younger sisters, and the early missionaries were still acquainted with the old "long houses," in which men of different extraction lived together with the women of one clan. In a comparatively large group of this kind the authority of the one leading woman, the mother of the married sisters and the mother-in-law of a number of men, must naturally have been more conspicuous than in the houses arising from the disintegration of such groups, a process which had already begun among the Indians. Loskiel[36] attributed this tendency to disintegrate—or, what is the same thing, the tendency gradually to restrict polygyny and polyandry—to the Indian's extraordinary love of ease, i.e., to the factor of inertia in man which acts like a brake on all cultural evolution. This love of ease allegedly caused him to set an extreme value on domestic peace, which he was naturally more certain to enjoy in a smaller group. We shall not err, however, if we regard this liking for ease as a desire for independence. An ordinary man could more easily attain this goal in a smaller marital union than in a large joint family where he was subject to the many commands of a maternal household

[33] I.e., the domestic or family organization of the women and the hunting or military organization of the men. (Ed.)

[34] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission*, pp. 161-2.

[35] *Ancient Society*, p. 432.

[36] *Geschichte der Mission*, p. 75.

head, although, to be sure, he could do so only at the cost of the stability of the home.

But this process of disintegration was only possible under definite economic conditions. The state of the food-quest had to be such that one wife or a small number of them could offer the man a sufficiency in the household. Here there opens up a vista beyond the limits of our present subject. In the natural course of things there develops a social organization in which the authority of the woman is absorbed by the man and in which the man becomes the unconditional master even within the family organization. As the reader will judge from the foregoing, an advance by the man to cattle raising will inevitably bring about his supremacy.

We must bear in mind, however, that it was not the absolute height of the man's economy but its relative superiority to that of the woman which brought about her subordination. But a relative superiority could have been attained even among a generally very backward people.[37] The Australian in his completely isolated culture area had advanced no farther than the development of such skill with weapons that he could catch all the animals of his territory. Yet the economic sphere of the woman was even more backward. She had made no considerable progress in the acquisition of plant foods, much less made the discovery of agriculture. The result of this unequal advance was, therefore, the relative superiority of the man, even though on a low stage. The products of the chase were vastly superior in quantity and nutritive value to the miserable fruits of the land gathered by the women. Fetching water, keeping the fire, preparing the food, and transporting the household effects were the most important economic activities of the woman.[38] All of these, however, can be reduced to a menial status if the man becomes the sole provider of life-sustaining food. The nature of the economic activities of the sexes does not affect the result; the only essential is their disparity. Consequently we can not agree with Lubbock[39] when he appeals to the primitive cultural stage of the Australians as evidence that the oppression of woman necessarily charac-

[37] Thus Lippert explains why certain low tribes possess father-right, a fact which has led certain writers, among them Westermarck (*Human Marriage,* I, 280-3), to deny the priority of mother-right. (Ed.)

[38] See Eyre, *Central Australia,* II, 321.

[39] *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 69, 72.

terizes the lowest stage of development as opposed to all others. Likewise in America the later form of man-rule is to be found among many backward tribes, while vigorous remnants of the stage of mother-right have been preserved by the very tribes that had advanced to the beginnings of agriculture. But the natural explanation lies precisely in this advance. Among these civilized Indian tribes the woman's agriculture shifted the balance, which otherwise would have tilted earlier in favor of the man.

It is plain why conditions can but rarely continue permanently as they are among the Balonda, in whose territory a dangerous insect has prevented the spread of cattle raising. Nevertheless remnants of the old organization have survived elsewhere. Such is the case extensively among the Malays, in spite of the intrusion of later forms of organization. The old consanguine family still exists as the *suku* (tribe), within which unqualified matrilineal descent prevails.[40] All property, with the natural exception of intimate possessions, belongs to this community. The individual derives the right of membership only from his mother; she alone determines blood relationship. But within the tribe, which here means the primitive family, individual marriage has already come about, presumably by way of the joint family. In its oldest form, called *ambil-anak*[41] the man enters the house of the woman and occupies there a position midway between child and debtor.[42] The entire household belongs to the family, but a share in what is produced belongs to the man, although he can not acquire any private property. If he is cast out of the house, which may be done without ceremony, the children remain.

Among the Khasis in the hills of Assam many marked survivals of mother-right have been found.[43] "The domestic relations lack any hard and fast bond, and frequently the man changes not only his wife but also at the same time his house and
38 home, since, strange to say, the man does not take the woman with him but enters into the family and property of his wife as a new member. Even the children recognize themselves as belonging only to their mother. It not infrequently happens that

[40] Waitz, *Anthropologic*, V, pt. I, 141.

[41] Collections of cases and discussion in Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften*, II, 223-61; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1664-8. (Ed.)

[42] Marsden, *Sumatra*, pp. 235-6, 262-3.

[43] Rivers calls the Khasis a "good example of complete mother-right" (*Social Organization*, p. 92). See Gurdon, *Khasis*. (Ed.)

adults no longer recognize their father as such after he has left, even if they associate together in the same village."[44] Likewise in Ceylon there still exists, along with a later form, the old beena marriage, in which the man removes to the hut of the woman.[45] It is said that the old form still crops out in Japan in certain cases. Among the upper classes it is said to be the custom that, just as the eldest son brings his bride to his home, so the husband of the eldest daughter enters her house and assumes her name.[46]

Survivals of this form of the family are also found even in historical times among the peoples who once occupied the territory of the later Greek and Roman civilizations.[47] Heraclides Ponticus[48] says of the Lycians in Asia Minor, that they were from of old ruled by women. Herodotus[49] reports that they took their names not from the father but from the mother. The same phenomenon reappears in Cantabria at the other end of the classical culture area. Strabo[50] asserts that the valor of the women was a characteristic common to the Celtic, Thracian, and Scythian peoples, and that the Cantabrian women, who looked after the agriculture of this extremely warlike people, resembled them. A sort of matriarchate prevailed among them. The daughters alone inherited property. Sisters gave their brothers in marriage. Thus it happened that the men entered the home and estate of their wives and brought a dowry with them. Tacitus[51] concludes his tabulation of Germanic peoples with the Sithones, among whom "the woman rules." Among the Lapps of Scandinavia a century ago the bridegroom had to remove for at least a year to the home of his parents-in-law,[52] a compromise which is quite widespread.

39 Even if, as we have already seen, the mother-right organization is naturally so unstable that its dissolution has necessarily been more frequent than the expansion of families into respectable tribes under maternal authority, nevertheless the possibility of the latter can not be excluded in all cases. The supposi-

[44] Schlagintweit-Sakunlunski, "Khassias," p. 533.
[45] Davy, *Ceylon*, p. 286.
[46] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 78.
[47] A full collection of cases in Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 388-430. (Ed.)
[48] *Fragmenta* ii. 217. (Ed.)
[49] *History* i. 173.
[50] *Geography*, p. 165 (iii. 4. 17).
[51] *Germania* xlv.
[52] Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken*, p. 198.

tion that the expansion of the family into a sort of body politic under woman-rule was prevented by defenselessness rests on an erroneous conception of the conditions. The ancients, who still saw around them examples of this primitive organization, from the downfall of which they dated the beginning of their own history and civilization, were of an entirely contrary opinion on this point. Aristotle[53] asserts that the most warlike and valiant tribes were those ruled by women. All the Scythian-like peoples in the vicinity of classical civilization afforded evidence of this. But even in the heart of Greece itself many a survival of this ancient condition was preserved.[54] Thus in Laconia a conspicuously martial disposition was coupled with a pronounced conservatism.

But the classical peoples, at least in their folklore and legend, misinterpreted the actual historical conditions and assigned the authority and warlike deeds of these mothers to a form of society, the principle of which they derived from their own later type of organization. To be sure, history records striking examples of the capacity of the female sex as actual warriors. The King of Dahomey's bodyguard of women[55] may have had parallels elsewhere. Nevertheless it was unhistorical to explain the warlike nature of peoples under woman-rule in this way alone. This unhistorical idea, however, became a fruitful theme of legend and poetry. The great complex of Amazon legends rests in large measure on this misconstruction.

Actually and in by far the greatest number of cases the military fame which distinguishes so many peoples with mother-right is to be attributed only indirectly to the women. The cause of the phenomenon lies in the perfected division of labor and dual economy of the sexes, in the complete liberation of the man from the cares of household organization and management, and
40 in the support which he could nevertheless always find in this reserve of his fortune. This arrangement left the man absolutely free to practice his calling. He naturally advanced from hunting to war for plunder, just because strict mother-right recognized no bond save that of blood and knew no means of peacefully uniting neighboring tribes of alien blood or forgotten kinship.

[53] *Politics* ii. 6.
[54] See Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 398-404. (Ed.)
[55] See Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples,* **pp. 183-4. (Ed.)**

No conceivable legal relation could exist between the tribal member and the stranger. Hence war for plunder in the latter's territory did not differ in principle from hunting and the economic activities of the man. As the woman on this stage of society had in most cases advanced to agriculture, so the profession of arms—as hunting or warfare—flourished in the hands of the man, and he was diverted from this only in so far as he began to make himself master of the household. As soon as he assumed control of agriculture as the chief source of food, his readiness for war necessarily took on another character. He gradually entered the stage of peace unions between tribes, which the ancients regarded as the foundation of their civilization. This revolution was necessarily associated with a struggle against the old form of society and the peace-disturbing peoples who did not give it up—the struggle with the Amazons as it was expressed in Greek legend.

Abundant reports leave no doubt that political organizations of considerable magnitude have arisen on the basis of mother-right, at least in Africa. In civilized Egypt only survivals of the older condition still existed in classical times.[56] The legends of Libyan Amazons, however, certainly indicate phenomena similar to those preserved by history with respect to the adjacent Ethiopians. According to Strabo,[57] a woman reigned in the kingdom of the Sembritse beyond Meroe. From the campaign of Petronius he learned that a woman, Queen Candace, ruled over other Ethiopians from Napata.[58] But however valorous this queen is represented to have been, the Roman army was nevertheless naturally opposed by the men of her people under field commanders of their own sex, while the queen took shelter in her royal residence. The same need which impelled the Indian men to appoint a leader from their midst, even for their hunting expeditions, must naturally have led to an organization of the men in war.
41 But in either case a domestic government by a queen-mother could continue to exist beside it just as long as the whole economic life of the people was made up of two entirely distinct factors. Pliny[59] regards Candace as the title of the female ruler,

56 Much evidence of mother-right in early Egypt is assembled in Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 377-88. (Ed.)

57 *Geography*, p. 786 (xvii. 1.2).

58 *Ibid.*, p. 820 (xvii. 1. 54).

59 *Naturalis historia* vi. 29.

while others interpret it as meaning "queen-mother." Were the latter the case, then king and queen-mother would accurately represent this dual government, corresponding to the dual economy of that stage. The course of further development then put the queen-mother more and more in the shade. Thus, among other cases, the queen-mother appears in an honorable, though subsidiary, position in the books of Hebrew history. Mother-right prevailed even later among the Boega, the descendants of the Ethiopians of Meroe. Similar survivals led Lepsius[60] to the conclusion that "from ancient times the female sex seems to have enjoyed great and general favor in these southern lands. . . . In the sculptures of Meroe we occasionally see pictured very martial and without doubt reigning queens."

Since that time there have been successive reports of northern African tribes under the authority of a woman. A woman ruled in Darfur until the conquest of the land by the Egyptians. Nachtigal[61] was able to substantiate a report, which at first seemed incredible to him, of such a kingdom in the vicinity of the so-called "heathen states" south of Bagirmi. Its inhabitants are always ruled by a queen-mother, *Mbang-Ne,* and for this reason the country is called Be Mbang-Ne ("land of the queen" or "queensland") by the Bagirmi, and Beled el-Mra ("land of the woman") by the Arabs. Not even Islam has been able to destroy the remnants of this ancient form of society. Among tribes like the Aulad Soliman, who lead a hazardous life of brigandage, the authority of the woman can not, to be sure, become manifest externally; to the afflicted tribes the military leader represents the horde. But internally, according to Nachtigal, the ascendancy of the woman is still preserved, presenting a strange contrast. Similar conditions also exist among the dreaded Tuareg of the western Sahara.[62] Among the Ashanti the queen-mother is the only woman who may mingle in the affairs of state and go about freely and unveiled. In Bornu too the queen-mother occupies a strikingly high position.

Wherever else this situation continues amid contradictory sur-
42 roundings, the probability is that it constitutes a survival of
earlier conditions. When, for example, the Hebrew Book of

[60] ***Briefe aus Aegypten,* p. 181.**
[61] ***Sahara und Sudan,* II, 675.**
[62] **Cf. also Rodd, *People of the Veil.* (Ed.)**

Chronicles[63] always mentions the queen-mother in connection with a new king of Judah and Israel, the transition that has taken place is not difficult to imagine. Formerly the domestic authority of the mother had been absolutely supreme in the joint, family even when it had expanded into a petty state, because the whole organization was still determined exclusively by the blood bond. As long as the conception of community of blood was the sole basis of all association, the mother was necessarily its center. Her position was inherited in the manner determined by blood relationship quite independently of the fact that one of her sons in the older sense was the leader of the men in their economic life. But with the revolution which terminated the period of mother-right, and with the importance which accrued to the male sphere of activity in its transition to a later type of political organization, the leader of the men stepped forward into first place. The maternal office might still continue to exist for a time with its special right of succession. Eventually, however, it combines with the new authority in such a way that only the succession of the male ruler seems important. Hence in every case the ruler's own mother occupies the old office, which is now important only by tradition.

Precisely where the mother-right organization seemed to have reached its culmination it became an object of disintegration, just as it in its beginning had operated to break up the simple forms of the consanguine family. By combining as cause and effect the facts furnished by history, it is not difficult to gain in broad outline a picture of the process. Through the formation of joint families, such as those which inhabited the "long houses" of the Indians, the old consanguine family necessarily split up into smaller groups. But, unlike the situation in earliest times, these groups did not lose all connection with each other in spite of their separate existence, because the fact of their mutual intermarriage preserved the consciousness of their contrast to other tribes who as aliens were excluded from such connubium.

The formation of these smaller associations, however, necessarily paved the way for a differentiation in the fortunes of the individual. What family or household he entered now depended very largely on how well it was stocked with supplies and pro-

[63] See, for example, 2 Chronicles xxii. 3; xxiv. 1; xxv. 1; xxvi. 3; xxvii. 1; xxix. 1. (Ed.)

vided with a laboring force. The whole fate of a man hinged, as it were, on this choice. Naturally no one wished to be left behind
43 in the pursuit of fortune or to miss the opportunity of enjoying the enviable treasures of another household. In short, there was no longer any advantage in remaining at home and mating within the immediate kin-group. Instead, the young man took from his home what he could demand as his share and, keeping it, sought more in another joint family. This greed of gain could naturally have had no stimulus until the maternal household enjoyed some degree of wealth in the possession of fire, shelter, and provisions.

But it was also to the advantage of the maternal household to attract men from other families. The capacity of the native born was determined by chance; that of the stranger became an object of selection. Thus, following the example of Morgan, we might explain by a sort of natural selection the phenomenon that exogamy, or the choice of the husband from another joint family, gradually became custom and then law among many peoples, while among others remnants of the old communalism survived as endogamy. The law of exogamy manifests itself at the same time as a prohibition of marriages within the same joint family, which we may now call the "clan." To all intents and purposes the clan is a kin-group united through a common ancestress, for without exception kinship on this stage is still reckoned through the mother, and the children are not related to their actual father or to his brothers and sisters in the other group. In this way there arose a new restriction on marital unions; along with the natural segregation of the older and younger generations there now appeared a restriction within one and the same age-grade.

Since all the women of the female house were necessarily blood related in the old literal sense, whereas the men married into it from other clans, the old consanguinity might in fact be regarded as the basis of restriction. Nevertheless it would be incorrect to regard this pregnant social advance as having emanated from any idea of the unwholesomeness of close inbreeding.[64] Morgan[65] says that exogamy "tended to create a more vigorous stock physically and mentally," that when two advancing tribes

[64] **It is exceedingly doubtful whether there are any harmful effects from consanguineous unions in man. See Holmes, *Trend of the Race,* pp. 238-47; Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 204-40. (Ed.)**

[65] ***Ancient Society,* p. 459. (Ed.)**

mingled their blood, "the new skull and brain would widen and lengthen to the sum of the capabilities of both." As a matter of fact, however, the experiment of excluding blood kin from marriage was not made at that time at all. The paternal uncle could marry his niece, since according to the ideas of mother-right he was not related to her. Likewise first cousins could marry,[66] indeed even brother and sister provided they did not have the same
44 mother. So even if Morgan's proposition were true, the fact could become manifest only in so uncertain a fashion and over so long a period of time that it is difficult to believe that such experiences would finally have been incorporated in a folk law.

It must rather have been the economic consequences of the two systems that paved the way more and more for one of them. If a tribe, consistently following the passive trait of mankind, clung to endogamous marriage, its fate must have been entirely at the mercy of chance and beyond all human remedy. Any unfavorable ratio between the sexes could give rise to physical and social ailments which would react unfavorably on the preservation of the community, and on the economic side the possibility was lacking of calling forth greater exertions by means of stipulations. Exogamous tribes, on the other hand, entered into a stimulating competition. The greater the wealth of a maternal house, the greater its choice among suitors, and this permitted the stipulation of increased amounts of work. In short, motion took the place of rest, and the race passed over from a condition of passivity to one of activity. As a natural consequence of this, exogamous tribes necessarily became superior to endogamous ones in the competition of life; among them the greater accumulation of capital and laboring strength took place.[67] The connection of these economic advances with exogamous institutions, however, would certainly be more evident to the savage than the conjectural influences of blood mixture on skull and brain. At any rate the retrogression of a tribe as a penalty for the relapse into endogamy followed more rapidly by way of social than of physical selection.

From well tried usage exogamy became the law, finding expression according to the conditions of kinship then existing

[66] Indeed cross-cousin marriages are often the usual and accepted form. See Rivers, *Social Organization*, pp. 69-76. (Ed.)

[67] Exogamy, in other words, has survival value. See Appendix C. (Ed.)

under mother-right. It was taken over thence into the later conditions of father-right and was thus extended to a new sphere. The Bible,[68] for example, still regards it as possible to excuse Abraham's marriage with his sister on the ground that the patriarch's wife was the daughter only of his father, not of his mother. The idea of shame may have attached first of all very appropriately to sluggish inactivity. In connection with the establishment of exogamous restrictions, however, it became blood shame or incest. In the concept thus formulated man acquired a new and unique disciplinary factor. But the exogamy which thus arose under mother-right—and here we must again differ with Morgan
45 —is not the only phenomenon of its kind. We can not derive every historical kin-group from the joint or "punaluan" family, nor can we overlook the abundantly authenticated fact that another type of exogamy arose under father-right in an entirely different way and upon other foundations.[69]

The historical fact of the matriarchate was easy to overlook, for it belongs with few exceptions to a prehistoric age with insignificant organizations. The "history" of mankind in the literal sense begins precisely with the formation of larger organizations, the conflict between them, and its manifold consequences. Hence it is by no means accidental that the matriarchate falls into the age of prehistory. But the various ideas and institutions which mankind took over into its historical life as a heritage from that earlier state were still of the greatest importance even in historical times. We call them survivals in this later period only in the sense that they have lost all vital connection with fundamental ideas and institutions; they are not survivals, however, in the sense of having become obsolete or obsolescent. On the contrary, they dominate the next stage as very vigorous factors of culture history, and it is the nature of this domination in general that it is in no way dependent upon human knowledge of their origin. They impose themselves upon mankind by the fact of their existence alone, and indeed apparently the more so, the less their existence can be explained from the prevailing knowledge. The rationalized foundations commonly invented by a later age are, by comparison, very worthless supports and have often only a literary interest.

[68] Genesis xx. 12.
69 See below, pp. 286-93. (Ed.)

That mere ideas should exercise such a domination over savage peoples might perhaps seem questionable. But, as has already been pointed out,[70] it is neither the abstract nature of ideas themselves nor the inherent validity of a particular conception that exercises such a magic power and domination over mankind. On the contrary, it is exclusively the general dissemination of an idea among all individuals that invests it with the force of a factor operating by physical necessity in the life of mankind. But its general dissemination again is a necessary concomitant of its history. In so far as experience warrants a comparison, an idea which is the product of the reflection of an individual, and thus reaches fruition only within a single culture area, will never attain the degree of domination and, in spite of the clearest evidence, never the degree of vividness that has been won, for example, by the belief in ghosts in all its ramifications despite its problematical evidence. Never will the well-founded ideas
46 introduced by Copernicus and Newton call forth such profuse emotion as those naive notions have evoked.[71] The reason lies, however, not in the quality of the conceptions themselves, but in their mode of origin. The deeper an idea reaches back into the prehistoric age of mankind, the more widespread must it be, and this general dissemination is the basis of its creative power in history. Herein lies the explanation of the fact that the most varied traces of mother-right are found even in the most advanced forms of societv and combined with them by the law of compatibility.

One of these survivalistic cultural factors in historical times is a remnant of the high esteem for the woman as mother, which contrasts strongly with the general status of woman in a later form of society. Another is the persistent idea that kinship is determined by the mother alone, for the later organization is able to usurp the authority long before it can establish patrilineal descent. This gives rise to composite and rather com-

70 Above, p. 29. (Ed.)

71 "When, therefore, we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that that opinion is a nonrational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence" (Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, p. 44). "Opinions, on the other hand, which are the result of experience or of honest reasoning do not have this quality of 'primary certitude'" (Robinson, *Mind in the Making*, p. 43). (Ed.)

plicated organizations; membership in the tribe, itself only the continuation of an earlier form of the family, is still reckoned according to mother-right, while within the tribe new family groups are formed according to father-right. But even the new authority arising in this way is dependent, at least for its transmission, upon the old mother-right. From a combination of male protective power and matrilineal descent there arises the so-called "avunculate," which in a peculiar way fills the hiatus between the organizations of mother-right and father-right. Furthermore in another way father-right has not always been able to restore full unity to the family organization, and never has it been able to do so immediately. Consequently there have been preserved into historical times many survivals of the dual economy characteristic of organizations under mother-right.

Finally, the transitory age of mother-right left a permanent impression on cult forms and religious ideas. These forms and
47 ideas continued to operate as creative factors, and in a strange roundabout way contributed, like a savior from an ideal world, to raise once more the status of woman, who had sunk into servitude under the logical compulsion of a later organization. Both as stewardess and as object of the cult the woman of the period of mother-right had laid the foundations for this position. Even after she had been entirely dethroned as stewardess of the domestic *sacra,* she was believed to harbor a specifically religious trait in her nature, as Tacitus noted among the savage Germans. This idea finally yielded in the organized struggle against the old order and died away in the barbaric belief in the sinister magic powers and unholy magical faculty of the female sex. As an object of the cult, however, woman remained for all time in blessed memory. Since the time when a man's scepter began to sway over the different Olympuses, the image of a woman has emerged again and again as the center of a cult, often secret, apparently foreign in origin, always redemptive and propitious in love. When traditions derived from mother-right were grafted upon the organization forms of classical civilization, this cult memory hovered above life like a Fata Morgana. The contradictory romanticism of medieval chivalry was a compromise between this mirage and the barbaric dominion of the warrior on earth. In this connection, however, we desire only to

indicate the extent to which mother-right has lived on in social relations.

Where a high esteem for the mother occurs along with the subordination of woman in other respects, we will not attempt to decide how much of it is to be regarded as a survival of the old organization and how much is to be attributed to the natural relationship. But when we encounter among the civilized peoples of eastern Asia a contrast between the low social status of the wife and the exalted position of the mother which scarcely permits of exaggeration in any direction, the full explanation is only to be found in a combination of both factors. Of a shipload of Chinese coolies returning home, practically none had thought of their wives while abroad. All their wages were devoted to the support of their mothers. As long as his mother lives, the Chinese coolie leaves his wife to her fate. He can find a substitute for her. His mother, however, means far more to
48 him.[72] Similarly the empress-mother occupies a distinguished position in China. While every Chinese woman is equivalent to a purchased ware, she can actually conduct the government.[73]

Strikingly similar in this respect was the queen-mother in Israel and Judah, who "was honored at those courts far more than the younger queen and was even invited under the name of regent to participate in all the highest governmental affairs."[74] Even when the Book of Chronicles can tell us nothing about a king except his name, it does not forget to add the name of his mother,[75] just as though the total sovereignty were covered only by mentioning both names. This might, to be sure, have been merely the reflection of a system of family authority, but nevertheless it would have been one in which the power was shared, not by the husband with his wife, but by the mother with her son.

Likewise in Japan women, entirely in contradiction to their subordination in other respects, could themselves occupy the office of mikado. In Burma above a supreme emperor stood an empress-mother with great influence. That the rudimentary character of the queen-mother's eminent position must have been a late development, and that she must originally have possessed

72 *Globus,* 1872, I, 218.
73 See Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 367. (Ed.)
74 Ewald, *Propheten,* II, 65.
75 See above, pp. 242-3. (Ed.)

actual governmental authority, is indicated by a phenomenon found in the old Inca Empire of Peru. In contrast to the people, the ruler alone lived in endogamous marriage, by which **means** the two powers were kept in one and the same family and blood. When one family had usurped both powers by this institution, one of them, the maternal power, could all the more easily recede into the background.

The effort of the male power to achieve a unified authority is everywhere responsible for the fact that we meet in general only weak remnants of the maternal position of authority. Besides the above expedient, however, still others have been tried, and all demonstrate equally that we are dealing, not with a phantom, but with actual authority. In the states of Central Africa the *magira* rules as maternal regent beside the prince. In Mohammedan Bornu she seems relegated to second place in that she has become the feoffee of the male prince in possession of definite assigned districts and villages.[76] In Bagirmi and Wadai this second sovereign office continues even after the death of the king's actual mother, but it is then occupied symbolically
49 by a eunuch—an evidence both of the former importance of the position and of the possibility of wresting away its actual power in various ways.[77]

A similar esteem for the mother in her social position is attested by the venerable cult documents of ancient Egypt. In the *Book of the Dead* the deceased is identified by the addition of the name of his mother, while that of the father is more rarely found.[78] Legal documents show that this custom prevailed in ordinary life until the time of Greek rule and that the mother's name yielded to the father's only under Greek influence.[79] Even the motive which individual stone inscriptions seem to suggest for this usage—"my heart is from my mother"[80]—is still entirely in keeping with the old conception.

Even though nothing of all this has survived among the tribes of northern Africa, there is at least a contradictory esteem for the otherwise degraded wife. The status of the "first wife" in a region of polygynous marriages of a later order can only be ex-

[76] Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, I, 723.
[77] *Ibid.*, 11,610.
[78] Lepsius, *Todtenbuch*, p. 3.
[79] Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens*, p. 19.
[80] Lieblein, *Aegyptische Denkmaler*, pp. 28ff.

plained on this basis. To the African and especially to the Mohammedan today all women are in theory objects of property, purchasable chattels. The distinguished position of the first wife can not have arisen from this system. Its origin is betrayed by the distinction drawn by the West Africans that only the first wife may cook the food for the husband, while all the other wives must eat alone like servants and may not even touch the man's food.[81] This right is obviously derived from the older form of marriage, where the man entered the household community of the woman. The one wife in charge of the household, at least, retained the old position of honor. The contradiction crops out most strikingly in the marriages of the Mohammedans. The first wife is always the ruling one, even if the husband has long since lost his affection for her.[82] And her rule is not merely nominal. "It was not uninteresting," says Nachtigal[83] with reference to the unruly Aulad Soliman tribe, "to see these rough men whose whole life was a hard battle with toil and danger, these robbers and cutthroats feared far and wide, powerless in their own homes." Here the position of the queen-mother has also been preserved in the narrower circle of the family.

In the isolated culture area of Polynesia we encounter traces of a very similar development. On the Tonga Islands the discoverers found conditions quite like those in Central Africa. Above the supreme king in rank stood a woman who claimed from him the same evidences of honor as he himself received from the rest of the people, without however exercising governmental power.[84]

One of the most striking features of the culture of the northwestern Indians is the contradiction between the degraded status of woman today and the abundant traces in their life of her former predominant importance.[85] The "queens" which the Europeans to their astonishment thought they had found among the tribes in Rhode Island, Carolina, Florida, and elsewhere may almost certainly be properly classified as maternal heads of families.

Wider still is the range within which matrilineal descent has

[81] Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* I, 151.
[82] Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan,* II, 177.
[83] Ibid, II, 83.
[84] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* V, 217.
[85] *Amerikas Nordwestküste.*

survived.[86] Advances in social organization necessarily brought about an alteration in the position of the mother and favored the gradual rise of the man. As long as the primitive family, based on blood relationship alone, was the only form of organization, the mother was the actual center of all association. But as groups with a later type of organization detached themselves, the consanguine family became less and less a reality and more and more an ideal, and the position of woman naturally followed the same course. As the consanguine family became rarer and rarer as a real organization, the true matriarchate likewise became more and more infrequent, and all that we have been able to grasp of it is scarcely more than its shadow. On the other hand, the intangible bond of kinship continues to exist under
51 later forms of organization. And in this sphere, remote from real life, the mother still rules. But it is not the scepter which characterizes her sway. She merely determines to whom in the same line it shall pass. Where authority and rank of whatsoever sort are inherited, it is through the mother alone. Husbands and fathers may belong to different clans or tribes, but they can not win their offspring for their own group. The child still belongs to that of its mother. Hence descent and kinship are determined by her alone.

This system still prevailed widely in North America at the time of its discovery. On the southern Mississippi, for example, the rank and station of a man were determined by the family to which his mother belonged.[87] The children of the Hudson Bay Indians "are always distinguished by the name of the mother; and if a woman marries several husbands, and has issue by each of them, they are all called after her."[88] Tribe and nationality likewise follow the mother exclusively. "If a Cayuga marries a Delaware woman, for example, his children are Delawares . . . but if a Delaware marries a Cayuga woman, her children are Cayugas, and of her tribe of the Cayugas. It is the same if she marries a Seneca."[89]

In Africa, according to Nachtigal, the same views of tribal

[86] Cases of matrilineal descent are collected in Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 151-7; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1966-63; IV, 1090-1105. (Ed.)
[87] Waitz, *Anthropologie*, III, 106.
[88] Carver, *North America*, p. 378.
[89] Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity*, p. 166.

membership have survived even under Mohammedan influence, and the Malays likewise calculate relationship in this way.[90] On the Tonga Islands the conquering tribe has formed itself into a noble class, and this nobility is inherited only in the female line.[91] Traces of this condition exist throughout Polynesia. Among the Maoris of New Zealand rank is determined exclusively by the mother. The same holds true of Western Australia, where the name, in addition to rank and tribe, follows that of the mother.[02]

There is plain evidence that even more highly civilized stocks only gradually outgrew this conception of primitive man. Ancient authors testify that the Lycians,[93] Xanthians,[94] and Lo-
52 crians [95] all possessed the custom of taking the family name of the mother. Grave inscriptions indicate the same practice among the Etruscans.[96] Among the earlier peoples of the north, the Picts furnish an example of matrilineal descent.[97] This must also logically be assumed wherever, with exogamy prevailing, only the marriage of children by the same mother is prohibited. This was the case in earliest times among the Hebrews and Athenians. In the story of Abraham and Sarah this construction is clearly expressed.[98] Nahor apparently did not regard his brother's daughter[99] nor Amram his father's sister[100] as blood relatives. Tamar could wish to marry Amnon although they were both children of David, not, however, by the same mother.[101] Solon's laws likewise permitted marriage with a sister on the father's side.[102] Thus among the Semites and Greeks of earliest times there certainly existed the same conception of kinship as has remained the prevalent one among the Indians down to the present, and it can only have been supplanted by a newer conception at a later period.

We must take £his opportunity to call attention to how un-

[90] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 141.
»i Mariner, *Tonga Islands,* I I , 89, 91.
[92] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 793; Eyre, *Central Australia,* p. 330.
[98] Zlerodotus *History* i. 173.
[94] ?lutarch *De mvlierum virtutibus* ix.
[95] Polybius *Historia* xii. 5.
[96] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 153. (Ed.)
[97] Bede *Historia ecclesiastica* i. 1.
[98] Genesis xx. 12. (Ed.)
[99] *Ibid.,* xi. 29. (Ed.)
100 Exodus vi. 20. (Ed.)
101 2 Samuel xiii. 13. (Ed.)
[102] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 157. (Ed.)

reliable the legends of a people are often shown to be, when tested by facts such as these. We know that knowledge of the revolution in the condition of the family existed in learned circles until the time of Sophocles, indeed of Aristotle, yet the people, easily satisfied by legendary accounts, preserved so little historical sense that they regarded the existing condition as the oldest and natural one, and any other as an exceptional aberration. And because this happens not only in the present instance but very generally, our example seems worthy of mention as a paradigm of the popular mode of explanation. The metronymy of the Xanthians and Lycians was familiar to the Greeks as a fact, but it seemed explicable to them only as a special honor accorded the sex, and nothing could be more natural than to look for its source in some special merit of the women of those regions. It was then only necessary to suppose that in some episode in the history of the land, it did not matter what, disaster had been averted by the meritorious actions of the women. The narrator was most certain to be believed if he started with what was already accepted and made a connection with the sphere of legend familiar to his listeners, so that at least he would not have to introduce new characters. Perhaps it was the merchant folk of Corinth who ascertained the existence of these strange customs, so that the Corinthian hero Bellerophon, the son of Poseidon, became the point of departure for the story.[103] Provoked by the ingratitude of the Xanthians, he made them feel the avenging might of his father, who sent a salt dew to ruin the land. Then the women alone were able to mollify Bellerophon with
53 their pleadings. "Hence there was a law among the Xanthians that they should derive their names in future, not from the fathers, but from the mothers." [104] But now the same phenomenon in far-away Lycia entered the Greek horizon, and again the same mode of explanation was applied to it. Legend already knew of Bellerophon in connection with the honor accorded the Xanthian women, and it was only necessary to find a motive for his going to Lycia also—a piratical expedition, an Amazon campaign. Thus the whole legend was obviously constructed to explain a fact which was already utterly misunderstood. Now

[108] These legends are given in detail in Bachofen, *Mutterrecht,* pp. 2ff. (Ed.)

[104] Plutarch *De mulierum virtutibus* ix.

when Plutarch calls even this legend a "very old myth," we are warned thereby against overestimating the age of such myths. Their profit to us is limited, as a rule, to proving the existence of what they are trying to explain. In the present case it is the fact that the idea of matrilineal descent still existed among the Xanthians and Lycians at a time when it was no longer understood at all by most of the Greeks.

The area of distribution of mother-right is still further increased by the inclusion of the avunculate and nephew-right. These are implicit in the idea of matrilineal descent, so that where we encounter traces of them without any other evidences of the latter, the existence of the latter must nevertheless be unreservedly assumed. Although resting absolutely on mother-right, the avunculate nevertheless also leads over to, and forms a connection with, the organization of the men.

The development of different types of association was, as we have already seen, a natural necessity. It was caused primarily by economic needs and the differentiation of the food-quest according to the different aptitudes of the sexes. With advances in the two economic spheres, each necessarily came to feel the need of a more systematic supervision. The associations of both sexes developed into organized groups under unified leadership. The female and male organizations became further differentiated by the manner in which they created this leadership. The former simply clung to the principle of the primitive family, and the nature of its economic pursuits permitted that type of leadership. This, however, became less and less true in the case of the male organization, the more its economic technic improved. It was not possible to leave the conduct of the chase to the maternal head of the family in the same way that supervision over the gathering of vegetable foods and the keeping of
54 fire devolved upon her. Thus there made its appearance here another principle of leadership, which the Greeks called "tyranny" in sharp distinction to patriarchal authority.[105] Only in this sense could they have spoken of a tyranny among the Troglodytes. It is to be regretted that the term has been rendered unavailable for us by a misleading subordinate concept, for we possess no distinctive word for a type of authority which is rooted, not in the ideas of blood relationship, but in the concep-

ts See above, pp. 213-14.

tion of the purpose of an organization. Originally this authority was confined in time and scope to its primary purpose of leadership in the men's organization for hunting and warfare. Gradually, however, the two principles entered into combination in various ways.

A sort of male protective office, which already combined in itself both principles, served as a transition. While the idea of the duty of this office was created by the blood bond, not uninfluenced by cult ideas, it was fundamentally the economic differentiation of the sexes that made the man more capable of filling it. All progress in proficiency with weapons lay in the man's economic sphere, but in a conflict with people equally armed the man alone could furnish adequate protection for the women and children.

Although this protective function was necessarily called forth by the fact that blood relatives lived together, and by repeated exercise became established as a legal relation, it found its highest sanction in a series of ideas associated with the earliest conception of the soul in connection with cannibalistic practices. We shall examine this series of ideas more closely in the history of blood revenge. Here the duty of blood revenge will serve only to indicate the path followed in general by the duty of protection. In exogamous marriage the husband is not the born avenger of the blood of his wife, for he is not of her blood.[106] The obligation rests on her blood relatives. Likewise the duty of protection in general arises without reference to the marital union with a man of different stock. In this union, community of household, fire, and water are stressed practically to the exclusion of the husband's duty of protection, even though the man residing in the family of the woman must naturally be counted among the defenders of her house. The woman's uterine brother, on the other hand, is her nearest blood relative and therefore her natural protector.

An older brother may also be the natural protector of a
55 younger brother if the difference in age is great enough. Consequently a number of systems of consanguinity among

[106] "A wife was not included in blood revenge. Her relation to her husband was not one of 'blood.' It was institutional. Therefore it was not so strong as the tie of sister to brother by the same mother" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 498). (Ed.)

savage tribes possess terms to distinguish the order of birth.[107] As a rule, however, a man can not for a very natural reason stand in the relation of protector or instructor to another in the same age-grade. The natural guardian of a youth is rather to be sought in the next higher generation, and there his nearest **male** relative is his mother's uterine brother. This special position of the nearest male relative led, as soon as the primitive family began to disintegrate, to the introduction of a distinguishing term for it in savage systems of consanguinity. The mother's brother, because of his special relation to his sister's child, was distinguished from the general group of "fathers" and given a special name which we render as "uncle." Out of eighteen systems compiled by Lubbock[108] after Morgan, only two, those of the Hawaiian and Kingsmill Islanders, have retained the general term "father" for the mother's brother. They still recall vividly the undiscriminating equality within the old consanguine family and have as yet yielded no ground to differentiated foresight. On the other hand, only four of these systems have introduced a similar distinctive name, "aunt," for the mother's sister. There' was no similar motive for distinguishing her from the rest of the "mothers."

Countless proofs of the intimate relation between uncle and nephew, however, are found among all races. This striking unanimity among the most unrelated tribes has, nevertheless, no other basis than the logic of the matter. As long as no kinship is recognized between a child and its procreator, its maternal uncle is in fact its nearest male relative in the generation of "fathers."

When, therefore, the protective function is to be transmitted from an older generation to a younger, the nephew will succeed the uncle as his next of kin. From this point of view the avunculate may be termed "nephew-right." We here approach a sort of right of inheritance—within the limits of the prevailing ideas of property. Consequently we meet it as a permanent relation
66 even in civilizations which have already sloughed off other vestiges of mother-right. Survivals of nephew-right indicate unmistakably that even the Germans and Slavs must have **been** organized on the basis of mother-right not very long before

[107] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 166, 176.
[108] *Ibid.,* p. 166. (Ed.)

their contact with classical civilization, and this entirely agrees with ancient reports about the Scythians and Sarmatians.

Concerning the position of the brother toward the sister we shall confine ourselves to a few cases. Strabo[109] reports as a curiosity that among the southern Arabians with their primitive form of the family the brother occupied a position of honor with reference to his sister's children. Earlier authors show us that this conception was likewise once current among both the Persians and the Greeks. The sister esteemed her brother higher than her husband because of the bond of blood and because of his relation of protection over her children. Herodotus[110] has illustrated this in the anecdote of the wife of Intaphernes. Of her kinsmen who were condemned to death, Darius promised to liberate the one of her choice. She chose neither her husband nor her child but her brother, because he alone could not be replaced. The tragic factor in the *Antigone* of Sophocles[m] is based on this same idea of the intimacy of the fraternal bond, which alone warrants the supreme sacrifice.

Among the Slavs a suggestion of the old authority of the brother over his sister has survived, especially in the circumstances attending a wedding. Thus among the South Slavs it is significantly the brother who guards the bride in her chamber and permits the *dever* to enter only after the latter has paid him a sum of money.[112] The brother's protective duty likewise lives on in the legends and folk songs of the South Slavs. The maiden warns her captor only of her brothers and cousins—there is no mention of her father. Only upon her brothers and cousins falls the duty of revenge for her abduction. Similar survivals are found among the Germanic peoples. Thus the old Gottland law[113] obliges the brother to provide for the marriage of his sister.

57 A survey of the distribution of nephew-right shows that only a few civilized peoples have risen above this last remnant of mother-right, and many of them only within historical times.[114]

109 *Geography,* p. 783 (xvi. 4. 25).
110 *History* iii. 119.
111 *Antigone* 901-10.
112 Rajacsich, *Sudslaven,* p. 155.
113 *Guta-Lagh* xxix.
114 Cases of the avunculate and nephew-right are collected in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 40-5; Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 498-505; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1964-7; IV, 1105-12. (Ed.)

It can be said in general that it still prevails practically without exception among the darker races. In Africa it is still in full bloom. On the Loango coast princesses give birth to princes even though they are married to proletarians, while princes beget only commoners since they can not marry princesses of their own stock on account of exogamous restrictions.[115] Consequently nephew-right prevails in full force. In Angola it extends with all logical consistency to every sort of inheritance.[116] From the husband of a woman her children receive nothing except what he sees fit to give them during his lifetime, and accordingly he can be counted as their "father" only in the sense of the primitive family. He has no power over his son, who in the event of the dissolution of the marriage union always follows his mother. But the boy can not escape the paternal authority of his mother's brother, whom he addresses as *tate* (father).

Battel found the town of Longo "governed by four chiefs, who are sons of the king's sisters; for the king's sons never come to be kings."[117] Caillie[118] found the same condition among certain tribes of Central Africa, where, although the authority always remained in the same family, it was transmitted, never from father to son, but from the ruling prince to his nephew. The Banyai elect their chief but choose by preference the son of the deceased chief's sister.[119] On the Congo hereditary succession in the female line prevails.[120] Among the Bangalas in South Africa Livingstone[121] found the protective power of the uncle in the process of transition to a property right; the uncle "often sells his nephews to pay his debts." Among the Wamoima the sister's son is given preference over the own son in the matter of inheritance, as the observer inexactly reports,[122] for what we regard as the "own" son is to their way of thinking only the son of the wife. The husband's blood ties extend through his mother to his sister and her children only. His brother's children are unrelated to him for the same reason. This condition also extends

115 Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* I, 198
116 *Ibid.,* I, 153, 166.
117 Pinkerton, *Voyages and Travels,* XVI, **331.** (Ed.)
118 *Central Africa,* I, 153. (Ed.)
119 Livingstone, *Missionary Travels,* p. **617.** (Ed.)
120 Tuckey, *River Zaire,* p. 365. (Ed.)
121 *Missionary Travels,* p. **434.** (Ed.)
122 Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen,* p. 54.

to the Nubian tribes.[128] Similarly the Ethiopians were known by the ancients to hold their sisters in high honor. "The kings
58 transmit their sovereignty, not to their own, but to their sister's children."[124]

This ancient condition extends from Madagascar on the one hand to the Berbers on the other.[125] Indeed, if we may rely here on Brugsch,[126] it formed the very pillars of the Egyptian state, which was the first to rise from prehistory into historical life and which far surpassed its astonished contemporaries in the magnitude of its new forms of organization. The Egyptian state was composed of a considerable number of district unions or nomes. Under the later empire these formerly independent provinces formed the administrative districts of the country, and their former heads became hereditary officials. In these petty states, which were older than the large state, the older condition, under which they had doubtless been formed, was still preserved, and the office of nomarch, so far as it was hereditary, was transmitted, not from father to son, but "according to old Egyptian law from the father to the oldest nephew on the mother's side."

Nephew-right is also widespread among the darker races of Asia. Among the Khasis of Assam Bastian found, as it were, a monumental representation of the avunculate; families were arranged according to this principle even in the cemeteries. The gravestone of the maternal uncle formed the center around which those of the other members were grouped. The same situation prevails among the neighboring peoples. Among the Bantar, for example, the property of a man does not descend to his own children—indeed according to the matrilineal idea he has none—but to those of his sister.[127] Latham12[8] reports the same thing of the Nairs with the added observation that no father knows his own son and no son his father, a statement which, when correctly interpreted, means that the concepts of paternity and paternal filiation in our sense are utterly unknown. In Malabar property is transmitted exclusively through females only, and

[123] Bachofen, *Mutterrecht*, p. 108.
[124] Nicolaus Damascenus *Fragmenta*,t p. 463.
[125] Cases in Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 151-3.
[126] *Geschichte Aegyptens*, p. 19.
[127] Buchanan, *Journey from Madras*, III, 16. (Ed.)
[128] *Descriptive Ethnology*, II, 463. (Ed.)

the same form of inheritance obtains in Travancore among all except two castes.[129]

The chiefship among the Battak of Sumatra is transmitted according to nephew-right, and with respect to inheritance the same holds true among the Malays of the island.[180] Similar
59 reports come from certain South Sea Islands.[131] Hence we can say of the darker races in general that, in so far as they have advanced from the conditions of the primitive family to a protective relationship, they have all lived under the avunculate in historical times.

There is abundant evidence that the same has also been the case with respect to the red race of America. In North America "the relationship of uncle in Indian society is in several particulars more important than any other, from the authority with which he is invested over his nephews and nieces. He is practically rather more the head of his sister's family than his sister's husband. Among the Chactas, for example, if a boy is to be placed at school his uncle instead of his father takes him to the mission and makes the arrangements." [182] Among the Indians of Haiti the authority passed to the sister's children.[188]

Even in the civilized state of Mexico the emperor's successor was chosen, first from among his brothers and then from among his nephews but not from his children,[134] a sufficiently clear indication that here as in Egypt the early political organization was established independently of father-right. Hence it is an absolutely false generalization to derive all political organizations from patriarchal authority as either genetic developments or imitations. On the contrary, most forms of organization among the darker races reach back to the principles of mother-right, and only exceptionally do later forms rise above them. The yellow race seems to occupy an intermediate position in this respect, while with the white race the opposite is obviously the case. Organizations based on father-right appear in the majority. But the numerous exceptions show that they are the product of social advances in historical times.

120 *Trans. Ethn. Soc,* 1869, p. 119. (Ed.)
130Marsden, *Sumatra,* p. 376. (Ed.)
131 Cases in Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 166. (Ed.)
132 Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity,* p. 168.
132 Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 167.
134Ibid., p. 639.

If now we put the question why, on the level of organization attained by the American Indians, the true father in our sense did not gradually encroach on the protective relation of the uncle and supplant him, the answer does not seem difficult under the circumstances. That popular physiology had not yet recognized the genetic bond between father and child is, to be
60 sure, always important,- but it can not have been decisive by and of itself, for even without knowledge of such a bond it might be expected that the woman would have included the protection of her children among the marriage stipulations. Indeed we must be astonished that this very point of male protection for woman and child was not the first stipulation of all. Instead of this, however, everything always centered on the share in the household and the contribution to it. But this is quite comprehensible in view of the condition prevailing among the Indians. As long as the man attached himself to the house of the woman under undisturbed mother-right, instead of establishing a new one through her, the woman had absolutely no occasion to leave the protection of her uncle even as a mere matter of space.

But even when these large households dissolved and "pair marriage"[135] got the upper hand, the outstanding characteristic of these alliances was their instability. They were not established for permanency; one man did not suffice the woman for life, nor one woman the man. This insecurity and impermanence is undoubtedly the natural reason why the protective power of the blood relatives, and especially that of the uncle, could not be dispensed with or supplanted by that of the husband. Compared with the indestructible bond of common blood, the marital tie was at first only a gossamer thread, and upon such the mother did not wish the fate of her children to depend.

If we follow this idea a bit farther, a few of the more essential conditions for the revolution are revealed. Among the various circumstances which could have contributed to make the marriage alliance more permanent, three seem of especial moment. In the first place, the motive for changing wives would be diminished if the nursing period were shortened by an advance in the technic of infant nourishment. The most important advance of this sort,

[185] I.e., the "syndyasmian" or "pairing family" of Morgan (*Ancient* 5o-*ciety*, pp. 463-07).

the use of animal milk, was, however, unknown to the American race.

A second way of chaining the man permanently to the home lay in a strengthening of the female economic sphere by the acquisition of a more constant food supply. A household in which the stores accumulated by the women frequently dwindled away, as was inevitable when the gathering of plant foods depended on chance, offered the men no permanent point of attraction, for participation in the reserves of the female household constituted, as we have seen, an essential part of the marriage stipulations. Woman was unable thus to strengthen her economy until she acquired agriculture. This prerequisite, however, existed by no means universally in America.

61 The home could be invested with stability in a third way, if the economic sphere of the man advanced beyond casual chance to permanent security. In this case the woman will necessarily become a subordinate member of the household, but even this relation of subservience will by the nature of the case lead to greater stability. But the Indian race did not advance to the domestication of cattle. However, the steady productiveness of the chase approached such a condition over wide areas, and to this extent the man attained the goal of becoming master of the woman.

In contrast to this, the Semitic representatives of the white race were already cattle raisers at their first appearance in history, and their domestic organization had been transformed accordingly. But just as the office of the Hebrew queen-mother survived from the earlier form of organization, so also a suggestion of the importance of the maternal uncle has persisted among the Arabs and Jews at least in popular opinion. According to Consul Wetzstein,[136] the Arabs still believe that at least all the mental qualities of man, indeed his mind and character in general, are inherited, not from father to son, but from maternal uncle to nephew.[137] A large number of Arabic proverbs and folkways give expression to this ancient conception. It still survives today among the Jews in popular notions, according to well-informed witnesses. An old rabbinical Biblical commenta-

[186] In an address before the *Anthropologische Gesellschaft* in Berlin, October 16, 1880.

[187] See also Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften*, II, 35. (Ed.)

tor found an intimation of it even in the Bible in the fact that the brother of Aaron's wife is mentioned as well as her father.[138] Therefore every one should be warned in choosing a wife to inquire about her brother, since his mental qualities will reappear in the children.

Among the more northern peoples of the white race the old condition is represented among the Celtic tribes. Among the Picts the throne until the end of the Eighth Century was always filled by nephew-right.[139] According to Tacitus, the Germans at the beginning of our era were in the process of transition from the old to the new condition. The latter doubtless prevailed more rapidly than would otherwise have happened due to the accelerating influence of the Romans. Not only imitation but also the
62 organized military life must have contributed to produce this revolution. It probably spread from west to east and from south to north according to the degree of contact with the Romans. In the extreme east Tacitus still knew of peoples organized according to mother-right. On the coast of the Baltic a cult of a divine tribal ancestress still prevailed and constituted the state cult. Within the Roman horizon, however, the Germans were swayed by paternal authority, and the son succeeded his father in office and property. Only we must add to this statement of Tacitus the fact that, even according to much later sources, by no means the entire property of the house belonged to the father, to be transmitted through him to his children. In contrast to this condition was the phenomenon, so surprising to Tacitus,[140] that the authority of the uncle over the children of a woman was just as great as that of the father, and that certain of the Germans even considered the bond of blood between uncle and nephew as the closer and more sacred, and that they acted on this principle in levying hostages. Thus nephew-right still actually existed among at least a few tribes.

The transition from nephew-right to patrilineal succession and inheritance could scarcely have taken place without confusion and conflict. In such a transitional period it might have been of great interest to certain circles to prevent the outbreak of struggles over the succession. Herein doubtless lies the key

138 Exodus vi. 23.

139 See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 153; Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 418-19. (Ed.)

140 *Germama* xx.

63 to the understanding of the peculiar tradition of brother and sister marriages in many princely houses.[141] Familiar instances are furnished by the Incas of ancient Peru[142] and the royal house of Madagascar.[148] The Inca, by making his sister his chief wife, united in one person the claims to the throne of his son and his nephew.

The development of the family organization under mother-right, as we have thus far pursued it, consists in the gradual approach and mutually advantageous union of two forms of economy, originally distinguished by the divergent modes of livelihood of the two sexes. How far they approached, or joined forces, or even merged in one another, necessarily depended primarily on local conditions of existence and the stage of technic attained in the food-quest. The various stages of organization reached in different regions will thus shed light on the period of mother-right and must therefore engage our attention here in brief.

The domestic adjustment which we found among the North American Indians may be regarded as the normal one for incipient agriculture on the one side and developed hunting on the other. But loose as the union between the two economic spheres was among the Indians, it was far looser in Polynesia. There the supply of animals and the yield from hunting were exceptionally meager. Doubtless this is the reason why the rare morsels of warm-blooded meat did not become an object of the marriage stipulations. The men did not condescend to share this superior food with the women, especially since the common hearth and shelter were valued less highly in that climate than in others. On account of their rarity, certain products of the economic activity of the men were not furnished by them in the household of the women. In the Hawaiian and Tonga Islands these were birds, tortoises, and certain rare fishes, which the men alone caught, the flesh of the pig, which they raised for themselves, and, in the plant world, the coconut. These food products were reserved for the men alone and tabooed to the women. The contribution of the men to the common household

141 The numerous cases of royal or dynastic incest are collected in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* II, 91-7; Briffault, *Mothers,* III, 26-42; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1573-7; IV, 859-62. (Ed.)

142 See Vega, *Commentaries,* I, 308. (Ed.)

143 See Sibree, *Great African Island,* p. 252. (Ed.)

was limited to those vegetables and small animals which were not excluded from the economic activity of the women. The fattening of the dog also belonged to this common sphere. Interchange was confined to this "common food," and in keeping with its insignificance marriage unions were extremely loose.

It was certainly primarily the fact that the men clung jealously to their food, while the taboo made it unavailable to the women under all circumstances, that prevented the merging of the
61 kitchen economy of the two sexes. The men and women always cooked and ate separately, and the custom of social meals remained entirely unknown. Only the rest of the household—the common hut, the clothing prepared by the woman, and the provision of the "common food"—could constitute objects of the marriage agreement.[144] In Tahiti there are even said to have been special huts for the women near the houses of the men, so that the burden of service fell very unequally on the women without any adequate recompense. It is certainly significant in this connection that the entire female sex was regarded as belonging to the subject race.

Separate households for the two sexes also existed in the Fiji Islands until missionary times, and the married men and the youths slept in different huts.[145] In certain parts of New Guinea there still exist huge long houses which shelter all the separate families of a tribe in compartments partitioned off on both sides of a corridor which is the common ground of all.[146] The marriageable but still unmarried youths, however, have separate sleeping quarters together. In many regions the public buildings are used for this purpose, especially those erected for cult purposes. Modesty can not have been the motive which first called forth this custom of separate bachelor houses among these savages. They are more likely the remnants of the former separate household of the men, which shriveled to this condition from the fact that the married men entered the tribal huts, which must originally have been under maternal authority, and afterwards seized control in them.

Africa has also preserved remnants of a similar organization.

[144] Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 216.

[148] Cases of "men's houses" are collected in Webster, *Secret Societies,* pp. 1-19; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1557-8. (Ed.)

[146] Wilken speaks of similar houses in Borneo *(Verspreide Geschriften.* I, 372-3). (Ed.)

In many parts of that continent the life of the men is centered and largely spent in a sort of clubhouse, which the women enter only in order to bring *them food. Close at hand are special quarters for the women. Men's houses of this kind have frequently been found by travelers in East Africa. They reappear in West Africa as "palaver houses." Their use indicates that they represent the germ both of public houses and inns and of assembly halls and town halls. Indeed the two were still combined in the medieval cities of Germany. In East Africa these houses are hourly full of pombe drinkers, who perform here the men's share of the organized labor and foresight in the form of "public affairs" and receive in return the popular cereal drink produced by the women in their economic sphere.

Ancient India also possessed such palaver houses. In the
65 Rig-Veda they bear the name *sabha.*[147] They were not only places of assembly but also drinking and gaming houses. Nachtigal[148] met traces of separate men's associations and distinct women's establishments south of Bornu. The same principle is illustrated by the club organization in the Pelew Islands.[149] In the Kamerun region, although the different huts of a household form a unit, the hut of the husband is still distinct from that of the wives and children.[160]

Separate households for men and women must also have existed among the ancient Macedonians, according to what Herodotus[151] relates of them, and indeed the domestic life of the Greeks themselves shows a number of survivals of a similar nature. Although the organic principle of mother-right was still preserved among the Lycians at the time of Herodotus, it had been overthrown among the neighboring Carians of Miletus by the conquering Ionian colonists. However, one remnant had survived, the separate meals of the men and women. The Carian women followed the principle that "none should ever sit at meat with her husband,"[152] and legend, in the manner described above, attempted to find a motive for this in historical events. The circle

147 Ludwig, *Rigveda,* III, 253.
148 According to an unpublished address before the *Lette-Verein* in Berlin.
149 Semper, *Palau-Inseln.*
150 Cases of the segregation of the sexes are collected in Briffault. *Mothers,* I, 508-13. (Ed.)
151 *History* v. 18.
152 *Ibid.,* I. 146.

in which the woman took her meals was naturally that of the old family household composed of the female relatives and children. For the women of different houses to eat together was still unheard of.[158]

On the other hand, the African men met in their special organization for social meals. From this developed the principle of the "syssitia" or men's mess, which is also found among the Greeks, the Dorian stock in particular remaining closer to the old tradition than the Ionian. This custom, according to which the men dined in common with women excluded, existed in Crete and lasted until very late in Sparta.[154] In Crete its institution was attributed to the laws of Minos, and in Sparta to those of
66 Lycurgus, although as a survival of the old household constitution it manifestly could not have been introduced by any law, but at the most kept in existence by such. In Megara the men's mess still continued at the time of Theognis, while it was abolished in Corinth by Periander.[155] It must formerly, however, have enjoyed a wider dissemination among the Greeks, for, according to Aristotle,[156] it had even spread with the Greek colonists to lower Italy.

But even more widely preserved than these external life usages is the germ of the matter, the source of the entire combined organization, namely, the dual sphere of human economic activity with its exactly defined distribution between the sexes.[157] This division of labor continues fundamentally today, although it is beginning to make itself felt as an inconvenient restriction. The bars have been raised here and there, but they fall down again in the old way as soon as woman enters the more desirable vocations. Since the first differentiation of human labor according to sex, not free will but natural necessity has been at work in this sphere. We are living in a civilized age in which liberated reason is beginning to become the dominant factor, and we accordingly break down the barriers in all places where reason shows it to be possible. The case is otherwise among peoples on a lower stage. There tradition is the law of action, and there

[158] Aristotle *Politics* ii. 4. 1.
[154] Evidence assembled in Bachofen, *Mutterrecht,* pp. 81-2.
[185] Plutarch *Symposiaca* vii. 9.
156 *Politic** vii. 9. 2.
[157] Cases of division of labor by sex assembled in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 131-8; IV, 29-37. (Ed.)

also we find the spheres of activity of the two sexes most rigidly differentiated.

Examples and proofs are to be found everywhere. Among the Kaffirs the division is strict. The man is the hunter, cattle thief, and cattle breeder, and his pride therein is such that the woman may not even approach his economic sphere. The woman, on the other hand, is the exclusive agriculturalist, and the same pride keeps the man from mingling in this despised occupation. Among the neighboring Bushmen this distinction is less marked to the extent that, with his lack of agriculture and cattle raising, differentiation in the care for life has been retarded.

Among the Greenlanders, aside perhaps from the collecting of shellfish, the food-quest devolves almost entirely on the man. Because of this and because vegetable food is not obtainable,
67 one might expect to find a lack of demarcation. This is not the case, however, for the reason that greater foresight must be employed upon clothing, shelter, and food preparation on account of the climate. The cleavage is traditional and extremely sharp. Only the actual catching of animals, involving some danger and some technical skill, falls to the share of the man. All preparation of food, shelter, and clothing falls into the economic sphere of the woman, who still exercises a sort of authority over her married son and his wife and children.

The details of this division of labor show us in what provisions the marriage compact of these people consists. The food, as soon as it is caught on the harpoon, becomes the absolute property of the wife. Only the highly esteemed blubber of the seal is retained by the man, and the woman no more participates in it than does the Tahitian woman in the tabooed animals of the men. The description of these conditions by Cranz[158] is strikingly like that of Loskiel with reference to the Indians.[169] The food supplies belong in principle to the woman. She can administer them as she pleases without protest from the man, and even feast on them in his absence if she wishes.

Therefore the man's work is done when he has caught the animal. As soon as this is accomplished, he will not stir a hand further; "it would be a disgrace for him even to drag the seal out of the water onto the land." The women do this, and "they slaughter, cook, dress the skins, and make them into clothes,

158 *Gronland,* p. 199. 159• See above, pp. 232-3. (Ed.)

shoes, and boots." Furthermore, the construction and maintenance of the dwelling fall into their sphere of labor. "They build and repair the houses and tents entirely by themselves except that they leave the woodwork to the men to construct; and even when they have to carry stones almost heavy enough to break their backs the men look cold-bloodedly on." Thus the economic spheres of the sexes are strictly separated. But they are complementary, and the marriage union rests on cooperation between them, especially with respect to the support of the children, which is lightened thereby.

Striking but natural is the similarity of conditions among the early Scandinavians, if one disregards the differences due to the divergent mode of subsistence. As among the agricultural Indians, the chief wife, for she alone was an heiress of the ruling
68 mother, had preserved a portion of her former eminence. To be sure, the law was based on a later principle of organization, but it was administered only by the men as a political organization. Woman had no share in this organization, and at home, in her old sphere, she refused to let the law curtail her authority.

Norse legends often tell how men prominent in public life were ruled by their wives at home, and the Icelander, Thorhaller, asserted that this was customary in his house.[160] Public opinion desired in the maternal head of the house the stern and steadfast character to support her authority in a sphere that remained indisputably woman's despite all the laws created at the courts of the men.

Strinnholm,[1*1] strikingly enough, characterizes this old Norse division of labor in almost the same words as those used by the missionaries with respect to the Eskimos and Indians. "To provide what was requisite for the needs of the house fell to the share of the husband, but to concern himself with the domestic management or even to interfere with it were not considered worthy of the man." The wife attended to "the preparation of the food and everything connected with it, the brewing and baking, the curing and slaughtering." This bipartition extended even to the house and property. The house still had its special "men's door," which suggests an old segregation of the sexes. The wife possessed her own woman's property, over which the husband had no voice. She assembled it from the dowry which

[160] ***Thord Hredes Saga.*** **161** ***Wikiningszuge,*** **II, 286.**

she brought from her home and the gifts she received before and after her betrothal. It also included the morning gift, which the groom gave her allegedly in return for her virginity.

The seemingly complicated property relations within the early German family, as they are set forth in the *Sachsenspiegel,*[162]
69 rest on the same ancient foundation. The conditions of subsistence, to be sure, had greatly changed. The spread of civilization had put an end to nomadic cattle raising. In the lower classes the men were now forced to take a hand in the formerly despised agriculture. In the families of knightly rank, however, the remnants of cattle raising were amalgamated with agriculture, which was still under the control of the women, while the men in their civil and military service still clung to a remnant of what had formerly been the chief activity of their organization. The division of property in families of this rank was still based on the old principle.

Property in land and persons, covered by the term "estate," must naturally be disregarded here, because it was property of a later origin and was consequently held and inherited according to a later principle. But with respect to the older forms of property, the early German household was divided precisely like that of the Indians.[163] One portion of this property, the *Gewaet,* served the male economic sphere and belonged exclusively to the husband. A second, the *Gerade,* served the woman's sphere and belonged just as exclusively to the wife. A third, the *Musteil,* comprised the products of both spheres and served both in common. The first two groups retained their special modes of inheritance, while the third followed the principle of common property in this respect also.

In the *Gewaet* or special property of the husband the "staff and shell" of primitive times, the characteristic personal possessions of the man which followed him even into the grave, had evolved in the course of time into a varied equipment, such as the life and activities of a knight required. Besides the everyday clothing of the man, mentioned however only in a later manuscript, it consisted of his sword, armor, and personal steed, and a small traveling outfit including two dishes, a towel, a tablecloth, and a bedding roll. These constituted the household of the

[162] Especially *Sachsenspiegel* i. 20, 22, 24.
[163] See Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 256. (Ed.)

husband, over which he disposed during his lifetime without protest from any one,[164] and which after his death passed only to a man, even though all later property was inherited by another person.

Independent of this was the household equipment or woman's *Gerade.* It was the property of the wife and was inherited exclusively within the female kin. This property was assembled from the dowry brought by the wife from her maternal house and the personal gifts she had received. Besides this *Gerade* proper, it also included the morning gift from her husband, representing all that the budding girl had once earned for herself before marriage. This separate property originally comprised only the objects appertaining to the separate economy of the woman. The most important of these, as ethnography shows, were the hut itself, the hearth utensils, and all the instruments of the female economic sphere, as well as the objects of ornament and clothing which the woman wore on her person. This same core, enlarged with the passage of time, may still actually be seen in the Middle Ages.

The house, or more accurately the separate dwelling on the family estate occupied by the single married couple, still belonged to the wife according to early Saxon law. If her husband died, she might tear it down and, if she wished, set it up again on the estate of her blood relatives. Nevertheless the house was at that time no longer a tent but a building of hewn timbers. As we saw among the Greenlanders, however, the working of wood was no longer woman's affair. The ax was the weapon and tool of the man. Moreover, the German bride now came to live on the estate of her husband. Therefore he built the house. But, since old tradition could regard it only as the property of the housewife, she now received it as the morning gift.

Herds, which had been the pride of the nomad, existed no longer. The remnants of cattle raising had been incorporated with agriculture in the woman's economic sphere. Only the horse still lived in a semi-wild state. Hence wild horses and studs were no more the concern of the woman than game. But farm horses, milch cows, goats, and swine were included with the house in the morning gift. From her own home the wife brought sheep, geese, and ducks. Furniture, cooking and brewing utensils,

[164] ***Sachsenspiegel* i. 10.**

flax and yarn, table linen, bedclothes, female apparel, and jewelry completed the woman's household.

The *Gewaet* and *Gerade* constituted the major part of the separate economic instruments of the husband and wife. The means of subsistence acquired with them, however," belonged to neither party alone but were enjoyed by both in common, pre-
71 cisely as in the domestic economy of the Indians and Greenlanders. Nevertheless, as is apparent from the objects themselves, the labor of preparation fell to the share of the wife as mistress of the hearth. This common property was the *Musteil* of German law, the store of food which was ordinarily renewed each year. Cereals and bread, malt and beer, other beverages, fruits, and vegetables, slaughtered cattle, and salted and smoked meat composed in the Middle Ages the principal part of the *Musteil*. The widow alone administered it until the thirtieth day after her husband's death, since his soul did not quit the household until then. She then shared it equally with the heirs.

Thus even here the same elements appear, and enter into the same combination, that created the first marriage organization on the stage of savagery. When under these advanced conditions the woman still stands out so clearly not merely as the manager but also as the mistress of the fixed household, the genetic connection with the form of organization under mother-right is not to be mistaken. Only the land itself, the most important instrument of her vocation, was not her property, because the concept of property in land did not arise until the later period of prevailing father-right.

CHAPTER VIII

MAN-RULE AND FATHER-RIGHT

73 Whether man-rule and father-right are to be identified or distinguished depends on our interpretation of the term "father." This word has retained down to the present day, at least outside the narrow limits of our own culture area, a double sense founded on its history, and this alone explains a number of enigmatical phenomena and circumstances. The Russian manorial lord in recent times, and formerly also the Bohemian, was the "father" of the whole village community and ruled it with paternal authority in the older sense of the word. But this idea even then had had its history. Since "father" originally meant a man of the higher generation in a human group united by the bond of blood, the fact of leadership and authority came to be associated with fatherhood, and the two concepts became so closely identified that finally the mere fact of authority implied fatherhood. This conception of paternity had absolutely nothing to do with the idea of kinship through procreation, and after the development of exogamy it even ceased to depend on relationship through the mother.

But the manorial lord was also "father" in another sense. From his marriage with an individual woman he stood especially close to her children. Besides the authority which he exercised over them, he was connected with them by a double bond. On the
74 one hand, the provisions of the marriage union guaranteed these "legitimate" children special advantages, and, on the other, popular physiology had come to recognize a natural relation between procreator and child.

We must not, however, let ourselves be misled into assuming that this recognition brought about a rectification and complete revolution of conditions. The idea did not acquire such an influence until a high level of civilization had been reached. The right of succession to the paternal authority was dependent, not on the genetic relation to the father, but on the **nature of** the marriage union. Even under legally established polygyny it is exclusively the agreement with the chief wife which guarantees this important right to her offspring. In Greece the recognition of paternity went to the extreme of ascribing the child to the father as exclusively as it had belonged to the mother according to the older conception.[1] But this revolution in thought produced no corresponding reformation in social organization. The latter could be transformed only by accepting the new while preserving the old.

There must therefore have been a series of events which transformed the family from within, and these must not be imagined in the form of an annihilating revolution. We should not confuse the phenomena within the house with those outside, which followed as the effects of the former. The latter are known to political history as a special category of struggles such as those traditionally preserved in the numerous Greek Amazon legends and in many stories of heroes.[2] We can not, however, assume that the collapse of mother-right was brought about by such struggles. They were fought for new prizes and new objects and were only a proximate consequence of the quiet and gradual development of an organization of a later type.

Mother-right was unable to expand its organization otherwise than by natural increase. Matriarchal power must therefore have seemed weak in comparison to a larger organization, unless it relied on a male arm for support. Then, however, it was on
75 the point of abdicating. The men, on the other hand, possessed an organization for a special external purpose and invented methods of binding even the alien to it by way either of a peace treaty or of subjection. The possession of such means necessarily invited their use, and the tribes remaining under mother-right must have been especially tempting objects. Wherever an organization began to wax strong under father-right, it was inevitably impelled by its youthful consciousness of power to test itself in actual conflict, and thus a greater struggle with the old order of things could appear to blaze forth. Heracles in one of his forms has been preserved by Greek legend as a representative of this conflict. He was the misogynist, the

[1] **See Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 497-8; Lubbock, *Origin of Ciwlisation*, p. 160; Lecky, *European Morals*, I I , 280. (Ed.)**

[2] **See Lippert, *Geschichte der Familie*, pp. 71-94.**

woman-hater, who undertook, as a benefaction to the male sex, to annihilate the last remnants of despicable woman-rule, to liberate all peoples from it.[8]

In- America, where among the great majority of tribes the emerging father-right rose on a par with the prevailing mother-right only in an emergency, it was precisely those few peoples who had advanced farther, and they alone, who ever waged war with the intention and result of creating larger organizations. These were the Aztecs of ancient Mexico and the Quichuas under the leadership of the Incas. Of the North American tribes, however, only a few, under pressure from the whites, arrived at confederations, and these, as we have seen, were organized on a matriarchal model. The wars of these tribes did not create political organizations. They were waged over hunting disputes or, most commonly of all, to obtain revenge for injuries or affronts, and their only result was to cool the thirst for vengeance. Hence the exquisite cruelty of Indian warfare and the merciless treatment of captives. Such cruelty is the necessary characteristic of warfare which in most cases has no other object than revenge.

Although the Trojan War, at least from its description, strongly reminds one of an Indian war except that with a more advanced economy the motive of plunder is more prominent, the facts of history soon appear in a materially different light. The struggles of the Dorians in the Peloponnesus and the enterprises of the Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor had as their object and result the establishment of organizations of a new type by cementing and amalgamating the tribal stranger, which
76 mother-right could not accomplish. The new organization penetrated victoriously among the very peoples who had remained under mother-right, namely, the Lycians and Carians, and here as in Greece we find this important external conflict reflected in mythology. A new dynasty of gods seized the supreme power in the Hellenic world in a struggle with the Titans, the sons of a maternal divinity. The sons plunged into the abyss, but the mother was assigned an honorable place even in the new hierarchy of younger gods. The father of gods and men, however, remained the ruler.

Where Indian mythology has a similar fact to report, it **does**

[8] Diodorus *Bibliotheca historica* iii. 54.

not show itself so lenient. According to the Chibchas, for example, Botchica the man and Huythaca the woman once reigned side by side. That was at the time when men were still utterly savage. The woman was beautiful but infinitely wicked, and she thwarted all the good that the man intended to do. She was guilty of causing the river of the land, the present Rio Bogota, to flood the entire plateau, so that men in distress sought refuge on the mountains. Then Botchica banished the wicked woman forever from the earth, opened a bed for the river, drained the land, and assembled the refugees to a life of civilization.[4] As a matter of fact, only the later organization could create such a civilization as those of Peru, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, requiring the assembly of a large population for joint and systematic labor.

In a later historical epoch, settled civilization struggled for existence with nomadism and was able to find effectual protection only by extending its boundaries farther and farther into the enemy's territory. Similarly in the age of which we speak the surviving mother-right organization must everywhere have challenged to conflict the later organization which was striving upwards in its midst, so that the period was remembered in tradition as a heroic age of stirring strife. But the actual process can not have been as stormy as these consequences of it.

The evolution was completed earlier in some places than in others, even within the same race, so that sometimes centuries and even thousands of years intervened, and this circumstance constituted an important cause of differentiation and exerted a creative influence on human history. Just as the revolution took place at different times under different cultural conditions, so also its causes were not everywhere the same. We have already encountered a number of factors which could gradually have brought about a change, and we may review the most important of them again in this connection.

The danger to the independence of female authority which we last encountered lay in the development of a protective
77 relation based on the differentiation of the sexes in their economic activities. Every relation of protection, however, tends to become a relation of mastery as soon as the differentiation has become sufficiently great that the protection becomes indis-

[4] **Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 423.**

pensable. Thus the warlike Bedouin tribes stand in a protective relation to their defenseless agricultural neighbors, but this protectorate has developed everywhere into the most brutal domination*.[6] We must likewise expect to find this same process repeated on a smaller scale within the matriarchal family as soon as the need of protection has for any reason become sufficiently great.

When once the Candace of the Ethiopians had to organize the men for her protection and intrust their leadership to a man, the necessity for such warlike preparedness needed only to last long enough, to make the military leader the actual ruler of the people. Then if this office were filled habitually by one of the sons of the queen-mother, there would develop the form of government, still represented in Central Africa and indicated, at least by survivals, among the early Hindus, where a man appears as the ruler in external affairs and in the most important internal matters, while behind him a queen-mother occupies only a place of honor.

What took place here on a large scale must have been repeated on a small scale in the family. The natural protective relation of the brother to his sister and her children passed over into a relation of authority and dominion, however this might afterwards be fitted into a developing legal system, for such systems only follow the facts. Family groups were formed under a paternal head, although he was not yet necessarily the physical father. But although a man ruled, he nevertheless did so only by virtue of his blood relationship to the mother, from whom his authority was derived and through whom it was transmitted. These two forms of man-rule,[6] therefore, did not yet signify any breach with mother-right in principle. On the contrary, they were still based upon it.

Both these forms are characteristic of the stage represented by the clan organization of the North American Indians. The clan apparently developed from the old joint family by the single married couples' separating as to residence while retaining their old familial unity. By "clan" we understand here what Morgan[7]
78 called the "gens" with reference to the Iroquois. Several such clans form the "tribe." We must regard the tribe here as the continua-

5 See Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 263-4. (Ed.)
6 Le., military leadership and the avunculate. (Ed.)
7 *Ancient Society*, pp. 62-87. (Ed.)

tion of the old primitive family, which had in its time dissolved into exogamous groups, joint or punaluan families, whose sons thereafter sought their wives outside their group among the other clans. But the old joint family, now dissolved into pair marriages, does not completely coincide in membership with the clan. The latter is rather only the core of the former, united by kinship in the female line. Not until the in-marrying men of other clans are included in this core and the out-marrying men are excluded, does a concrete group corresponding in membership to the joint family result.

Now it seems characteristic of the cultural stage of North America that the joint family did not develop into an organization under a male head on the order of the South Slav house community. The marriage alliance, the economic union of members of different clans, was regarded as so loose and unimportant that only the clan itself, the core held together by matrilineal descent, possessed a collective organization as a familial body. Hence the first attempts at man-rule could appear here only in the clan. These conditions are absolutely alien to everything which is commonly regarded as the foundation of the family with us, who always start with marriage. With the Indians, on the contrary, the marriage institution was still of very slight importance in comparison with the vigorous remnants of the old consanguine family. Even if we follow Morgan farther and admit the establishment of punaluan families, it nevertheless left behind no recognizable positive results. Its sole effect was to dissolve the old undifferentiated primitive family into a number of subsidiary groups, the core of each of which then formed a clan.

The Seneca tribe of the Iroquois, for example, was composed of eight clans, which were named after the wolf, bear, turtle, beaver, deer, snipe, heron, and hawk.[8] A son of the Wolf could unite his household only with a daughter of one of the other seven clans. But no matter whether he entered the house of the woman or brought her to his, all the children of the marriage belonged to the clan of the wife, while the husband still remained a member of his own clan. This arrangement found expression even in death. The wife and children were not buried by the side of the husband and father, but each was interred in the

[8] **Morgan, *Ancient Society,* p. 70. (Ed.)**

burial place set aside for his clan.[9] And in life the clan members, although dwelling in separate households, were held together by
79 the duty of blood revenge and common defense against aliens and by the bond of peace within the consanguine community.[10]

Here in this older form of the family the male protective function came to the fore in both the directions noted above, as the extended avunculate and as military leadership. The two types of authority were still kept quite distinct, just as they had different historical foundations. For the former office we have the terms sachem, peace head, and chief; for the latter, chieftain, war leader, and captain.

Among these Indians the old equality of the consanguine family was still so far preserved that all members, both men and women, participated without distinction in certain affairs of the community, and this included even the nomination of the two executives. However, the women were naturally debarred from the election of the war chieftain, since war was solely the affair of the men, while the election of the chief gradually gave way to a developing hereditary succession.[11]

The war chieftain or captain commanded only during the military campaign. In peace his authority was extinguished. At home he was like any one else. That the organization to which he belonged was of a different origin than the family, found significant expression in the fact that he did not even need to belong to the clan that chose him.[12] Indeed a true election did not always take place. A man who felt inclined formed a following of his own and tried his luck in a military career.[18] There could be several captains in one clan. In times of war the highest one was an actual ruler.

The sachem, on the other hand, was the peace leader of the clan, of which he was necessarily a member by blood. Even where a regular act of election was undertaken, tradition usually turned the choice to the former sachem's uterine brother or to his sister's son according to nephew-right.[114] Never, however, could a son succeed his father, because father and son could

• Morgan, *Ancient Society*, pp. 83-4. (Ed.)
10*Ibid.*, pp. 76-8. (Ed.)
11*Ibid.*, pp. 71-3. (Ed.)
12 "Peace-rulers come from clans by birth; war-chiefs from tribes by election" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I I I , 1969). (Ed.)
13 Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission*, pp. 184ff.
14 Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 72. (Ed.)

never belong to the same clan. It is inconsistent to deny this Indian chief the name "king," when it is readily bestowed on all the petty city heads of Crete and Phoenicia and the gentile chiefs of the early Greeks and Germans without reference to the extent of their sway. "King" etymologically is precisely such a natural head of a kin-group, the Gothic *kuni.*[16]

This king of the clan ruled exactly as if he were administering the office of a mother. He had above all to protect and **preserve** the peace, and even if the chieftains were eager for war, he had
80 to offer them resistance to the utmost. The captain served him as his "right hand."[M] But the king did not possess an independent punitive power or means of compulsion. He had to use amicable means and persuasion.

Thus the greater portion of the maternal authority passed to a man. Natural factors tended gradually to increase his position of power. As yet, however, the sachem could still be deposed if his labors of peace miscarried,[17] and his person could still be determined by election. That this office did not become a permanent one among the Indians was due to the conditions of the cult, a connection which we have yet to discuss.[1*] It was the cult that gave the corresponding office of patriarch or king in the Old World a high degree of security, because his person, as the seat of a divinity, was inviolable. Among the Indians, however, the organization of the men did not attain the stability which cattle raising brought to the male economic sphere in the Old World. Hence the cult of the men lacked organization and unity and consequently did not develop into such a mainstay of authority as it became in the Old World.

On the other hand, it is a law of nature that power accrues to power. Even under such simple and unmodified conditions, the Iroquois king was already almost in a position to name his successor. He designated him at least in a way that was little short of obligatory. The principal function of the clan king was to be a witness to all arbitrations and peace treaties. He had to remember the meaning of all the "peace belts," and it was necessary that this knowledge should pass to his successor. Conse-

*• See Freeman, *Comparative Politics,* pp. 105-6; *Webster's New International Dictionary,* under "kin" and "king" (Ed.)

16 Loakiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 170.

17 Morgan, *Ancient Society,* p. 74. (Ed.)

18 Below, pp. 603-43. (Ed.)

quently the succession seemed predestined to fall on the man whom the reigning king took into his confidence. "The successor of a chief is commonly a person who has always been near him in his lifetime and hence is familiar with the affairs of his office, and according to the laws of the Delawares it must be so."[19]

This gives us an insight into further phases of development. The king has it in his power to determine his successor during his lifetime. He does so within his kin-group in accordance with popular tradition. A hereditary right of succession begins. What will the result be when the father sees his genetic relation to his son beginning to be recognized? The red race of North America makes no reply to this question. Their development stopped short before that point was reached. Uninfluenced by the fate of the peoples of the Old World, they have preserved for us a picture of stages long outgrown, and with it the key to the
81 explanation of many a survival in other regions. How very different a form would have been assumed by the history of mankind, which is so intimately connected with the history of human organizations, had its further phases lain along the same path! Slavery and hereditary aristocracy in the forms familiar to us would probably never have seen the light.

The subordination of woman and through her of a large fraction of the population advanced much farther along another path. As we have seen, the original superiority of woman was based on two factors, her natural relation to her offspring and the relative importance of her economic sphere. On the first factor rests, the determination of kinship through women; on the second, female dominance in the household.

The custody of fire must have been a very important factor in woman's early position. We have seen how on a low stage an association of people was scarcely conceivable except as centering about a constantly maintained fire as a material focus.[20] Each of the Iroquois tribes called its place of assembly its "fire," and the "Six Nations" held their joint council at the "great fire" at Onondaga. In the same way the curiae of early Rome had each its common fire, while later their union found expression in the one fire of Vesta. This fire was still maintained in ancient fashion exclusively by female hands. But, while the Indian arrangement still represented merely a delegation of maternal au-

[19] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 173. [20] Above, p. 145.

thority to the men, in Rome the vestal virgins were **already** subordinated to a ruling priest. The implement for rekindling the fire whenever it went out through the neglect of the women was in his hands. The maintenance of fire is everywhere in woman's charge, but the later implement for generating it is, like the weapon, nearly always in the possession of the man. As we have seen elsewhere,[21] the art of making fire is later than the practice of preserving it. Without doubt, therefore, the status of woman suffered a severe blow with the spread of this art.

Furthermore, with every improvement in weapons and in skill in their use the man's economic sphere gained a certain impetus. If in this way the man's food-quest became relatively superior, so that the activity of the wife in the contractual union of the two economic spheres consisted chiefly in preparing what the husband acquired, woman's position necessarily became one of subservience, and this subservience inevitably passed over into
82 absolute dependence if it kept her from developing a livelihood of her own and put her largely at the mercy of the fortune of the man in hunting. We find woman on this stage of subordination among many peoples who have not arrived at any kind of agriculture.

But where the woman advanced to agriculture, she remained mistress for a longer time. To this circumstance we owe the preservation of the mother-right organization among the advanced northeastern Indians. But the men of the Old World, leaving the red race far behind in this respect, surpassed the women by new advances in the food-quest. With the domestication of animals, woman's economy, for all its high development, receded so far into the background that it even fell into contempt among most cattle raising peoples. The obligations of the mother were materially lightened when a cow's horn filled with animal milk became a nursing bottle, but the fact that the woman received this horn of plenty from the hands of the man depressed her status. The man, equipped with a steady source of food and with the ax with which he hewed the wood for the shelter, no longer saw any necessity for concluding an agreement to enter the household of the woman as a subordinate member in order to acquire a share of its advantages. On the contrary, he sought with all the means at his command to induce the woman to

21 Chapter III.

enter his house, where her position was necessarily a subservient, one to the degree in which her mode of livelihood was inferio. to his.

This advance reached its culmination in the harnessing of animals for work and in developed nomadism with its associated life of exploitation. On this basis there arose a new institution, that of property, which was calculated to lift the old organization off its hinges.[22] The Indian was certainly acquainted with a claim of the community to the usufruct of definite hunting grounds, but his concept of property went no further. He knew only possession, and he could possess, with but few exceptions, only the slain animal. The nomad, however, developed the idea of property in the living animal, and the animal became to him a living source of energy for his labor. Then gradually every relation associated with the obligation of labor was converted into a property relation. The tribal alien, since he was as unprotected by any rights as the animal, was likewise sought by the nomad in his food-quest and appropriated, where possible, as a source of energy for labor.[28]

In this respect the development in the Old World branched off from that among the Indians in a manner pregnant with consequences. Many observers have stressed the contrast in the war-
83 fare of the two hemispheres. Here is its basis. To the Indian the enemy was only an object to be exterminated; to the nomad he became, when appropriated, a source of energy for labor.[24] The redskin warrior wished to kill, to sate his revenge in blood; the nomad waged war for profit. The Indian had no conception of the usefulness of such booty, for he was unacquainted with the concept of property in human beings. Consequently the war captive either was tortured to death[25] or, if anger had evaporated, was accepted into the clan of the victor as an absolutely free and equal member by an artificial fraternization, which we call adoption. Among the nomads, on the other hand, he became an object of property, and on a higher stage he entered into the most diverse forms of dependency through the imposition of

22 See Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 434. (Ed.)

23 For a discussion of slavery and the domestication of animals from the standpoint of the appropriation of energy, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 205-45. (Ed.)

24 "It appears that slavery began historically with the war captive" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 262). (Ed.)

25 Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 196.

taxes and services. Thus by conquest there arose compound forms of organization, of which the stage of mother-right knew nothing.

The result of this whole change is that woman, whose economic contributions in relation to the vocation of the man are those of servitude, also becomes an object of property to the man, all the more so since henceforth the manner of acquiring a wife leads in the same direction. Since the husband now owns his wife, her children as her fruit are likewise his property. There arises a new concept of paternity, which, however, does not yet coincide with that prevailing exclusively today among ourselves. The name " father" is taken over from the older system to designate the man who exercises supreme authority over a group of persons who belong to him as property.[26] The father in this sense is the "lord" or "patriarch."

The concept of "sons" or "children," on the other hand, is correspondingly expanded. Without reference to age, all who are objects of property are now included in this category. This simple scheme, however, is complicated and distorted into the most diverse social forms by the influence of compatibility, for a number of features of mother-right do not die out with the social principle on which they are based, but are preserved in actual life as contradictory elements. A new series of complications is added to these when the idea ultimately emerges and secures the upper hand that the father as well as the mother is related by blood to the child, when the term "father" in its latest and last change is finally applied to the concept of the procreator.

The two farthest extremes are marked by the patriarchal
84 father and the father in the modern sense. The former during his lifetime exercises dominion over a whole group of children, grandchildren, and collateral relatives with all their wives and families as a strict logical consequence of the property principle, and in death he hands them down to another father like any other property. The latter counts in his family only his own

[26] Vinogradoff points out that "the fatherhood principle . . . centres on property. . . . In all cases the principle obtains that the children belong to the male to whom the wife belongs. In the mother's case generation remains the dominant fact, but the relationship between father and child is ruled by the fact of property, and procreation is subsidiary in a way we have almost ceased to understand. . . ." *(Historical Jurisprudence.* I, 197). (Ed.)

children, while the family bond has slackened to a loose tie of friendship. A multitude of stages lead from the one extreme to the other, and a multitude of social forms, caused by combinations of the old and the new, lie between them. One of these is the distinction between freemen and slaves, unknown to mother-right.

Before we follow this development, however, the nature of the origin of such marriages demands our attention. Where the patriarchal principle of nomadism has attained full sway, the woman necessarily enters the house of the man. Contrary to ancient law and custom she must tear herself away from her mother and follow her husband. Whenever under these conditions the wife still constructs the house or tent or receives it as a gift from her husband, these are slowly disappearing survivals, just as when matrilocal marriage now and then occurs in the South Slav house community.

The patriarchate carried out to its logical conclusion likewise involves the principle of exogamous marriage. We have seen that exogamy could also arise under mother-right, though only under special circumstances.[27] It is, however, a general characteristic of father-right, and the contrary an exceptional case. But this form of exogamy, the only one stressed by McLennan and greatly underestimated by Morgan, likewise originally follows an economic rather than a physiological principle. The latter replaces the former only by an indirect path. On this stage the woman is acquired by the man as property. She becomes the slave as well as the bedfellow of her lord. She also manages the household but does not rule it like the maternal mistress of olden times. The man's object in marriage is to acquire property to increase the laboring strength of the household. But this can no longer be accomplished within the family, where everything already has its patriarchal master and owner. A wife can be acquired as property only from an alien neighbor. To be sure, immediately after this revolution it can scarcely have been regarded as inadmissible to seek sexual gratification within the family. Indeed this is indicated by a large number of survivals. But to be cravenly satisfied with this, and to fail to become the master of a slave-wife and thus to increase the most valuable

[27] Above, pp. 244-6. For a discussion of the origin of exogamy, see Appendix C. (Ed.)

property of the house by a deed of daring, must have been regarded as disgraceful among peoples of Bedouin pride. Thus in this way exogamy became characteristic of the more vigorous tribes and conquered and spread with them.[28]

The numerous survivals soon to be mentioned put it beyond all doubt that it was the predatory economic ways of the nomads or something similar that brought the alien girl by craft or force into the possession of her captor as an object devoid of rights. Evidences of this once customary course of action have also been preserved in many different legendary accounts, and the Phoenicians, whose own organization shows so many traces of mother-right, even abducted women for the account of others in historical times.[29]

It stands to reason that in the period when mother-right alone prevailed, this practice, later so highly developed, could have appeared at first only in isolated cases. The man, as among the Arabs, still retained his old right in all the women of the tribe, even when he advanced to more daring enterprises and brought alien women home from his hunting excursions as desirable plunder. But the first case of this sort brought in its wake far-reaching consequences of a social nature. As long as forms of adoption had not yet been invented, the captured woman could not enter into any relation to the tribe, for she was excluded from community of blood. Consequently she was not subject to the common right in the women of the tribe.[80] But she enjoyed this liberation from the obligations of mother-right only in so far as she became subject to the new and harsh right of the husband. She entered into the same relation to her captor as that occupied by his private or personal property. Excluded from all connection with the primitive family, she became herself an object of property.

This property relation developed into a marriage only in so far as the position of the mother under mother-right was transferred to the woman acquired in this way. Otherwise, instead of a wife, she was a concubine or slave. But the position of the

[28] With regard to the motive of exogamy, we depart from the views of Morgan, McLennan, and Tylor, who were the first to treat the subject profoundly, and come closer to those of Lubbock *(Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 133-43), from whom a number of the following cases are taken.

[29] Herodotus *History* ii. 54.

[80] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 135-6. (Ed.)

husband was so obviously improved by such a marriage that the ablest men must certainly have been inspired to emulate him. When the majority of the men in a consanguine family had acquired such a private treasure, the old forms of the family must have crumbled from within.

But even though capture or the seizure of women as property outside of the primitive family, and hence outside the sphere of legal relations, was the beginning of all such forms of marriage, nevertheless only a very low stage of culture could have stopped at that point. The inevitable reaction of revenge on the part of the injured group impelled toward progress. In most cases, to be sure, it led only to fruitless warfare. But even if the war ended in a compromise in only a few cases at first, these cases necessarily gained the upper hand according to a controlling law in the development of custom. Tribes which were unable to compromise sealed their own doom. In the other event, however, woman became one of those universally desirable objects, like fire, water, and materials for ornament, which were calculated to lead to relations of intercourse between legally isolated primitive families.

A compromise agreement could be of two possible types. It might either settle the individual case only, or with greater foresight establish a bond of mutuality once and for all. Both types are met with in historical phenomena. The cessation of hostilities in consequence of the acceptance of a present by way of composition, leads to the form where it becomes customary to offer this compensation in advance in order to avoid hostilities. Under certain circumstances we call such a transaction purchase. Thus one certainly has a right, with McLennan,[81] to speak of marriage by capture, by exchange, and by purchase. But this classification has no bearing on the essential nature of marriage under father-right. These forms really characterize only the existing state of intercourse between tribes.

Groups of neighboring families which have thus established peaceful relations might already, with reference to their mutuality in the acquisition of wives, be called *connubial leagues.* Yet certain cases indicate that such a union could be carried even farther. It could be agreed once and for all that the taking of a
87 woman from the one family should go unrevenged, **because the**

31 *Ancient History*, p. 186. (Ed.)

other family in a similar case would make the same concession.[82] Family groups of this sort must then have resembled very closely the joint families of mother-right in which polyandry had given way to pair marriage. Morgan connects the one with the other and consequently treats the Roman gens and the Iroquois clan exactly alike. We admit that it would be impossible to make a decision in every individual case if there did not exist a considerable number of distinguishing traits. In all cases, however, the most essential distinction lies in paternal authority and patrilineal descent.

As soon as one primitive family had arrived at the point of accepting another's offer of compromise, it must also have been prepared for the transition to father-right. The obligation of blood revenge for the abduction of a girl was determined, to be sure, by matrilineal kinship, but its execution nevertheless rested entirely on the men. Hence the compensation also went to them. Accordingly the men of the family gradually came to dispose over the female members and to sell their sisters and nieces to suitors without heeding the maternal rights. Consequently in many survivals the arrangement appears to be ratified and acknowledged as far as the male blood relatives of the bride are concerned, while the mother continues to show unreconciled hostility to her son-in-law. Under these conditions the primitive family is transformed directly into a gens. The men actually obtain possession of their female relatives and a right of disposal over them, which they use to acquire wives from other gentes under conditions of subjection more congenial to them.

Polyandry ceases under the patriarchate, for it has become impossible. According to patriarchal principles a woman can no more be an object of common property than a personal weapon can belong to several men. The idea and the duty of marital fidelity on the part of the wife make their appearance. In the house of the man, as we have just seen, no other obligation stands in the way. This moral idea is gradually expanded to that of female chastity. The connubial agreement has the effect of elevating womanly virtue. The right which one group has stipulated operates to deprive the members of the neighboring tribe of a right they would otherwise enjoy. The female child now belongs from birth to her father, no longer to the tribe or clan. To her

[32] **See below, pp. 334-41.**

father, however, she has become a valuable object of a special sort, whose integrity he protects for her future husband. He does not acknowledge the right of his tribal kinsmen to the indulgence formerly customary, and the instinctive desires of the child are opposed by an egoistic and fundamentally economic interest of the father. In time this restriction is elevated to a moral requirement, an ethical idea.

With the expansion of the peace group and connubial league, and the amalgamation of peoples, it becomes exceptional for the individual to preserve his membership in his gens. Herein the organization of father-right shows much less durability than that of mother-right. The male sex is the more mobile, and the principle of authority, which is the sole basis of the new family at first, is by no means as immutable as the old principle of community of blood. The membership of the family fluctuates with the fortune of the house. Only the few who are born to authority as the children of the chief wife cling to their family tree. When the bond between them and the other members of the family relaxes completely, so that the latter cease to belong to the family in the old patriarchal sense, the great mass of the people is then without a family tree, i.e., without knowledge of their gentile membership.

In this way the principle of exogamy necessarily undergoes a complete change. Gentile distinctions having disappeared among the mass of the people, recognizable nearness of blood relationship alone remains as an impediment to marriage, and the surviving gentes bow to this rule. The tendency of further development is to diminish more and more the number of degrees of relationship within which marriage is prohibited. The old Saxon law code terminated blood relationship with the seventh degree. The kindred ended there. The canon law, however, had gone even further, to the scandal of the Germans, and already permitted marriages in the fifth degree, thus terminating the kindred with the fourth.[33]

This development is accompanied and promoted by a revolution in physiological conceptions. The principle of the equality and immutability of blood relationship was the logical inference from the idea that the child was the product of its mother alone. This notion was later replaced here and there by the opposite

[33] *Sachaenspiegel* i. 3.

one, which ascribed the child solely to the father. In reality, however, the unity of the Roman gens, for example, depended not only on an unbroken succession of fathers but also on a particular selection of mothers within the connubial league. The way was thus paved for the compromise which, after much vacillation, finally found expression in the physiological conception that the father and mother have equal shares in reproduction. The acceptance of this view, together with the indefinite expansion of the connubial league, inevitably gave rise to the idea that blood is diluted by continued mixture and that kinship accordingly diminishes by degrees, a conception absolutely foreign to mother-right. As a consequence, close consanguinity came to be, as with us, the only impediment to marriage.

On lower stages of culture, however, exogamous arrangements with respect to definite tribes and tribal groups are very prominent. We must stop a moment to revise and explain our terminology. When we read that the now extinct Tasmanians captured their wives from an alien tribe,[34] the word "tribe," while it suffices to indicate the existence of exogamy, really corresponds to what we have called the "clan" or "gens." Frequently, however, the peace compact between alien clans is not restricted to the establishment of connubium alone but also brings them into a union of trade and law, so that, in spite of their different derivation, they present the appearance of a unified organization in contrast with their neighbors who are not included in the compact. We shall endeavor to reserve the name "tribe" for such a union of kin-groups. If we adhere to this use of the term, we can readily see, as Lubbock[35] has pointed out, how easily observers may err when they describe all marriages within a tribe as endogamous. While the tribe as a whole may appear endogamous, it may be composed of a number of strictly exogamous kin-groups.[36]

90 Lubbock[37] has shown the existence of exogamy in this old form in Australia, Africa, Asia, and America. The Khonds of India "regard it as degrading to bestow their daughters in marriage on men of their own tribe; and consider it more manly to

[34] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 813.
[35] *Origin of Civilisation,* p. **147.**
[36] See Rivers, *Social Organization,* p. 40; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society.* III, 1614; Tozzer, *Social Origins*, pp. 157-8. (Ed.)
[37] *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 136-43. (Ed.)

seek their wives in a distant country."[38] In certain parts of Australia possession of the same family name is regarded as a sign of common sibship and an impediment to marriage.[89] In some places the possession by two persons of the same fetish has a similar effect. The division of tribes into exogamous clans has been observed in West Africa, still accompanied, moreover, by matrilineal descent.[40] In India many tribes are divided into exogamous and apparently matrilineal kin-groups called *thums, keelis,* etc.[41] The Kalmucks are similarly divided into "hordes," within which marriages are prohibited. The same holds true of the Circassians, Samoyeds, Ostiaks, and Yakuts.[42] In China the possession of the same surname is said to constitute a marriage impediment.[43] Many Indian tribes of North America and some of South America are reported to possess a similar system but one fundamentally different in origin. Here the kin-group or
91 clan is distinguished by its so-called totem. In the Seneca tribe the names wolf, bear, turtle, etc. designate both the clans and their totems. The rule is that persons of the same totem may not marry,[44] a phenomenon which corresponds closely to that in West Africa, where the same fetish constitutes a marriage impediment[45]

As through a veil we recognize a similar condition in classical antiquity among the Greeks. Wachsmuth[46] concludes from the evidence he cites that the old gentes of Attica lived under strict endogamy, favoring marriages between near relatives. This conclusion now seems incorrect. The fact that a brother could marry his sister if she were not by the same mother only indicates that matrilineal descent once prevailed here also. In that case the marriage of a brother and sister by different mothers need never have been a marriage within the same kin-group.

The oldest form of exogamous marriage, as it must have been

38 Campbell, *Khondistan,* p. 142.
39 Eyre, *Central Australia,* II, 329. (Ed.)
40 *Trans. Ethn. Soc,* N. S., I, 307. (Ed.)
41 See *Globus,* 1872, I, 193, 198; Dalton, *Bengal,* p. 115.
42 Pallas, *Voyages,* IV, 96, 69; Middendorf, *Sibirische Reise,* p. 72. (Ed.)
43 Davis, *The Chinese,* I, 282. (Ed.)
44 See Morgan, *Ancient Society,* pp. 74-5. (Ed.)
45 Lippert's inadequate data on exogamy with respect to tribal subdivisions may be supplemented from the collections of Frazer (*Totemism and Exogamy)* and Sumner and Keller *{Science of Society,* III, 1601-11: IV, 881-6). (Ed.)
46 *Hellenische Alterthumskunde,* II, 205.

concluded before peace agreements existed between alien primitive families, is that of capture.[47] It still survives in actual fact among only a few tribes, but eloquent symbols among many others prove that they too, however high their culture may now be, once passed through this lower stage. That the manner of acquiring a wife is not to be regarded as an inherent national characteristic is well shown in an isolated and racially homogeneous region like Australia. Here the differences in self-maintenance between certain tribes, though scarcely perceptible to the European, are nevertheless great enough to afford room **for** all the gradations from the crudest capture to mutual agreement.

92 Some of the features of so-called "capture marriage," as McLennan[48] has recounted them, seem so crude that we can scarcely believe even primitive man capable of them. All the more, therefore, are we astonished to find them preserved in an age when they appear absolutely unnecessary. However, among savage peoples the law is as starkly conservative as the cult. The apparently childish and pedantic nature of many of their legal forms is due to this fact, and the actions in question must be placed in this category. In order to establish anything as a right, i.e., in order to secure for it the permanent protection of all the members of the tribe, it must be carried out exactly in the traditional manner, for the member of the tribe does not wish to see his obligations increased by the continued extension of his protection to new cases. He therefore watches with jealousy, and with that lively distrust which still characterizes certain classes of the population today, lest perchance he become obligated in a new case masquerading behind some slight deviation from the established form. To this watchfulness we owe the preservation of forms which can be tolerated in their contradictory surroundings only as symbols.

The manner of acquiring a bride among certain Australian tribes is exactly like that of bagging an animal, except that only the girl of an alien tribe is without rights like the animal. The man undertakes a hunting trip, uses a ruse to surprise his victim unguarded, stuns her by a few blows with a club, drags her into a thicket, and when she comes to her senses forces her to follow him.[49] While here the captor has to fear the blood revenge of the

[47] Cf., Appendix C. (Ed.) **[48]** ***Primitive Marriage,***
49 ***Trans. Ethn. Soc,*** **I I I , 250. (Ed.)**

despoiled tribe, this is said to be no longer the case among the natives near Sydney, where the revenge of the relatives consists only in retaliating by a similar act when they find an opportunity.[50] In this way we reach the point of a tacit compact. A right of connubium develops between neighboring tribes under the old forms of violence.

The step next to be expected has been reported by Meyer.[61] To restore peace after abducting a twelve year old girl, a sister or near relative of the captor is given to the despoiled tribe. A
93 similar advance is described by Jung.[52] Often the capture is followed by a duel, and the victor retains the spoils. But frequently an indemnification is accepted, consisting sometimes of weapons and provisions and sometimes of a woman. If the captor himself owns such a woman, he has to surrender her as a peace offering. Otherwise the tribe gives up one of its women, presumably one who has not been appropriated by any one man but is still subject only to the authority of her mother. Jung, to be sure, denies that the blow with the club is obligatory, as many observers have alleged, but even without it things go badly enough with the poor bride. In many districts of New South Wales the act of capture must be enacted even when the union has become a matter of mutual agreement. The kinsmen of the bride then try to surprise the groom's party, and in the skirmish that ensues many, and not the least of them the bride, receive severe wounds. This is regarded among these advanced tribes as the wedding ceremony, and even the women do not wish to see it abolished.

Thus in a few reports a whole cultural sequence is outlined in an isolated and racially homogeneous region. All the more important forms are here represented, and they all rise appreciably above the sphere of mother-right, which is still authoritative with respect to relationship. It could scarcely be regarded as a breach of mother-right when a man appropriated a woman outside the tribe possessing no rights against him. But it did constitute a breach when the men of her tribe compromised for some advantage, neglected their obligation of protection, and made peace. They applied the proffered recompense to their personal property and thus abandoned blood revenge. Consequently

[50] **Collins, *New South Wales*, p. 362. (Ed.)**
51 in *Natur*, 1877, p. 88.
[52] ***Australien*, I, 86; id., in *Natur*, 1877, No. VII.**

this fell, unexecuted, as a burden on the mother alone, who was left in the lurch and unappeased. Hence as the "mother-in-law" she became a living protest against the new order, and between her and her son-in-law there persisted an unreconciled hostility. Practical considerations, however, require that this hostility be restrained from breaking out. Hence the son-in-law and mother-in-law must never again see one another. If they meet, the mother-in-law hides in the bush or grass, while the son-in-law holds his shield in front of his face. Jung asserts that even in the missions this custom has not yet entirely given way. Mother-in-law avoidance is extremely widespread as an evidence of the same social process.[53] The inevitable result of this gradual encroachment of the men is that finally all the women, and through them all the children as well, become the property of the men.
94 Consequently the mother can no longer break the peace. Nevertheless, despite this prohibition, custom still maintains her silent protest.

The old Tasmanians also captured their wives from other groups.[54] The same custom appears here and there in Polynesia. In Tikopia the bride is abducted by the friends of the groom, a genuine kidnaping expedition requiring a regularly organized company of men. Afterwards, however, her relatives are conciliated with gifts, and the affair terminates in the house of the bridegroom with a feast.[55] In New Zealand the suitor comes to an understanding with the father of the bride in advance, but nevertheless she puts up such a severe struggle before he takes her home that "both are soon stripped to the skin; and it is sometimes the work of hours to remove the fair prize a hundred yards."[M] It has evidently become a point of honor for the girl to show herself really plucky in this struggle, even if she feels no real inclination to resist. The protest of the mother-in-law also occurs here, even in marriages concluded in the missions.[57] Wife-capture is still found here and there in Melanesia. The Fijian acquires his bride by real or apparent force, and the feast which

[53]Lippert discusses mother-in-law avoidence in greater detail and cites a large number of cases in another place not herewith translated *(Kvltwr* geschichte,* II, 156-62). In his interpretation of the custom he follows Lubbock *(Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 11-14, 127-8). (Ed.)

[54]Waitz, *Anthropologie,* V, 813.

[55]*Ibid.,* V, pt. II, 191.

[56] Earle, *New Zealand,* p. 244.

[57]Yate, *New Zealand,* p. 96. (Ed.)

he afterwards gives to her relatives represents the subsequent composition.[68]

The Malay peoples, as we have already seen, still reveal oftentimes the organization of pure mother-right. Nevertheless various forms of a later type are also developing. In Bali it is stated that the girl is captured in all seriousness, but that as a rule a reconciliation is afterwards arranged with her relatives for a certain compensation-price.[59] As compensation comes to be more dependable, and as it begins to be settled in advance, the capture itself takes on more and more the appearance of a mere ceremony, wedding rite, or legal symbol. Among the Lampongs of Sumatra it is already regarded as disgraceful for a man to marry according to mother-right. They simulate a capture, usually after an agreement, and later conclude peace. Thus the new condition wins recognition.[60] Among the wild tribes of the Malay Peninsula the capture and struggle have dwindled to a foot race by the bride and groom within a circle formed by the relatives.[61]
95 Among the Aetas of the Philippines the old scenery is artificially reproduced by sending the bride into the woods before sunrise, whence she is brought back by the bridegroom.[62]

Some of the aboriginal peoples of India are on the same stage or at least preserve survivals of it. Among the Khonds, Campbell[63] saw a bridegroom carrying his bride on his back from a neighboring village to his own and being attacked by one party and protected by the other. Elliot[64] reports the custom among several other tribes of Central India. Even the Aryan Hindus were acquainted with marriage by capture, but by calling it *rakshasa* they apparently meant to indicate that it was characteristic of the aborigines in contrast to their own marriage forms. The Laws of Manu[65] describe it as "the forcible abduction of a maiden from her home, while she cries out and weeps, after her kinsmen have been slain or wounded, and their houses broken open." But it can only have degenerated into a lower form among

[88] Williams and Calvert, *Fijians,* I, 174.
[59] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 113; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 480ff. (Ed.)
[60] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 181.
[61] Bourien, "Malay Peninsula," p. 81.
[62] Earl, *Papuans,* p. 133.
[63] *Khondistan,* p. 44. (Ed.)
[64] *Trans. Ethn. Soo.,* 1869, p. 125. (Ed.)
[65] *Laws of Manu* iii. 32.

the Brahmans, for to the Aryan warriors, the Kshatriya caste, it was the traditional and correct mode of marriage and stood higher than two other forms, the *gandharva* and the *paisaca*.[66] The latter form was based on the rape of a girl by treachery or stealth while she was asleep or in a drunken condition. In contrast to the frank capture of the Kshatriya, this form met with contempt, and even at the time of the law it was regarded as too depraved even for the lowest class of the people.

Gandharva marriage, on the other hand, still existed among the lowest castes, the Vaisya and Sudra. In contradiction to Rossbach,[67] we can not regard this as the later form and as giving evidence of the increasing emancipation of woman, for in that case we should expect to encounter it first among the higher classes. Its nature, however, is unmistakably characterized by Manu[68] as that of the free love union of matriarchal times before the advent of father-right. "The voluntary union of a girl and a man is called *gandharva;* its object is pleasure and love." Thus in Hindu antiquity the *gandharva* form, which originally was certainly endogamous, was very likely followed by that of the Aryan warrior folk with its characteristic of frank capture, along with which the despised form of stealth continued for a period. The later forms will be discussed in their proper place.

96 When we turn to Africa, where we found so many traces of mother-right, the survivals of capture appear somewhat more scarce and occur most frequently among the predominantly pastoral tribes. Thus the Kaffirs still adhere to the old practice except that they do not fight the kidnaping skirmish until they have made certain of reconciliation. The man is assisted in the attack by all his friends and relatives and is resisted by the friends of the girl. Occasionally the attack fails, and then the girl is waylaid by a ruse.[60] Thus here in a case of necessity a form like that of the despised *paisaca* takes the place of the *rakshasa* mode. Among the Zulus the struggle is said to have been transformed into a foot race toward the gate of the kraal, whereupon some older women approach the bridegroom with reproaches and abuse. In the kingdom of Futa the relatives of the bride guard the door of her house, and while they are being bribed by

[66] *Laws of Manu* iii. 33, 26.
[67] *Romische Ehe,* pp. 210ff.
[68] *Laws of Manu* iii. 32. Cf., Strabo *Geography,* p. 699.
[69] Prichard, *Natural History of Man,* II, 403.

the groom, as it were, a friend of his rides away with the bride.[70] The more this custom has paled into mere ceremonial, the longer it has probably been since actual capture was replaced by various forms of compromise. In some cases nothing has remained save the ceremonial resistance of the bride, such as Nachtigal[71] found in Bornu, and in other cases, as among the Fulahs and Somali,[72] only the less attractive custom of beating the woman at the wedding ceremony together with some rationalized explanation or other.

Even among the American Indians the inferiority of the female food-quest must in many places have challenged man to attempt "to force woman into his service. Certain usages scarcely admit of any other interpretation. Unfortunately, however, in most cases we are unable to determine the age of such customs. Many tribes since their discovery have taken over cattle raising from the Europeans. In certain cases this may very likely have changed their customs, for undoubtedly the European by means of his firearms and domestic animals has helped the Indian man to acquire a great superiority over the woman's economic sphere. In other cases, however, a comparison with Australia would seem more apt. Among the Araucanians the man first comes to an agreement with the parents over the bride-price, but then gallops
97 up, takes the girl by force, and drags her into the bush.[78] Foreign influences may, of course, have given rise to this custom, since they first made the Araucanians and Patagonians a mounted people. But the whole procedure is certainly indicative of capture with a breach of mother-right, for the mother of the bride, and she alone, pretends to be angry, always turns her back on her son-in-law as a point of honor, and sometimes does not speak a word to him for years.[74] On the other hand, it is not entirely certain that the situation is the same among certain Canadian tribes, where the man, after an agreement was reached, took his bride on his back before the chief and carried her into his tent.[76] The Mixtecs of Mexico acted similarly.[76] The true interpretation might be that the girl, contrary to an earlier custom, was taken

[70] Astley, *Voyages and Travels,* I I , 240.
[71] *Sahara und Sudan,* I, 739.
[72] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* I I , 471, 522.
[73] Musters, *Unter den Pantagoniern,* p. 255.
[74] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* I I I , 506.
[75] Carver, *North America,* p. 374.
[76] Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 130.

from the household of her mother, represented by the chief, into that of the man, and that the compulsion lay solely in this.[77]

But certainly, when we find examples among the ruder tribes of South America similar to those found in Australia, we have to do with an analogous social development. Such cases have been found among the inhabitants of the Amazon Valley[78] and of the region around Concepcion.[79] Even the Fuegians should be included here, according to Fitzroy.[80] The Eskimos on Smith Sound likewise bring home their brides by main force,[81] and those of Greenland have retained at least a ceremonial resistance on the part of the bride.[82] Among the California Indians of San Miguel the newly married couples are said to have scratched one another till they bled.[88]

In Central Asia, the home of developed nomadism, the forms of capture marriage have been faithfully preserved. Among the Kalmucks the understanding is followed by a sham resistance on the part of the family of the bride to the bridegroom and his friends[84] or by a race on horseback in which the bride must be caught.[85] Among the Mongols, when a marriage is arranged, the bride flees to her relatives to hide. When the groom arrives, her father characteristically grants her to him but leaves it to him to find where she is hidden and to take possession of her with the aid of his friends "as it were by force."[86] According to Pallas,[87] in his time "marriage by capture prevailed also among the Samoyedes." Among the Tunguses and Kamchadales the public peace protected the women only so long as they stayed in the
98 house. After a matrimonial agreement the bride was overpowered by force and her clothes torn.[88] Among the Circassians, abduction by force constitutes the proper legal symbol of marriage. At a prearranged feast the bridegroom bursts in with his accom-

[77] **This is precisely Briffault's explanation of ceremonial violence, resistance, and resentment, namely, that they are survivals of the transition from matrilocal to patrilocal marriage *(Mothers,* II, 243-50). (Ed.)**

[78] **Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon,* p. 497. (Ed.)**

[79] **Durville, *Voyage au Pole Sud,* III, 277, 22. (Ed.)**

[80] ***Voyages,* II, 182.**

[81] **Hayes, *Open Polar Sea,* p. 432. (Ed.)**

[82] **Egede, *Greenland,* p. 143. (Ed.)**

[83] **Waitz, *Anthropologic,* IV, 243.**

[84] **De Hell, *Steppes of the Caspian,* p. 269. (Ed.)**

[85] **Clarke, *Travels,* I, 332, 433. (Ed.)**

[86] **Astley, *Voyages and Travels,* IV, 77. (Ed.)**

[87] ***Voyages,* IV, 97. (Ed.)**

[88] **Erman, *Siberia,* II, 442,**

plices and overpowers the bride.[89] The Arabs of the Sinai Peninsula do the same in the form of an ambuscade, which often results in wounds.[90]

Among the Russian Lapps, Frijs[91] found the custom of capturing a bride from an alien, preferably a hostile, tribe, with the rationalized explanation that this is the surest way to avoid the ecclesiastical offense of incestuous marriage. An agreement is usually reached with her parents, but even then the struggle and resistance are retained as part of the ceremonial. The groom with his band storms around the house amid uproar and shooting, "giving the impression that they are embroiled in the tumult of a raging battle." Meanwhile inside the bride is held hand and foot by some of her bridesmaids, while others force the resisting girl into her traveling clothes. Finally she is brought to a reindeer sleigh, "in which she is seated and then securely strapped with thongs, as though it were feared she might consider flight on the journey to her new home."

It should be apparent by this stage in our review that the forms of the social institution under discussion are not conditioned by race. The causative influences are far removed from those which produced the differentiation in physical structure. We must not, therefore, assume in advance that the stage of capture was skipped by those peoples of the white race which afterwards attained a higher culture. Its memory was obliterated among the ancients only in so far as they were separated from it in time and also to a certain extent in space. Thus the peoples of a higher but later civilization preserved far more survivals than those among whom civilization appeared early, developed slowly, and extended over long periods of time.

Among the Greeks, who were already beginning to divest themselves of purchase as an antiquated form, traces of capture had
99 nevertheless persisted. In conservative Sparta, at least, marriage is said to have been concluded by the capture of the maiden, to be sure after a regular agreement.[92] Rossbach [93] concludes that this was a general Dorian custom. The seizure of the maiden from the domestic hearth was compared with the manner in

89 Moser, *The Caucasus,* p. 31. (Ed.)
90 Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahabys,* I, 263. (Ed.)
91 "Waaderungen," pp. 52, 54.
92 Plutarch *Lycurgus* xv; Xenophon *Respublica Lacedoemoniorum* i. 5.
93 *Romische Ehe,* p. 213.

which a fugitive was violently torn from the altar affording him sanctuary.[94] Marriage was named from this act of violence (ἁρπάζειν, to rob or seize). Even in Athens it was part of the ceremony for the bride to flee to the hearth of the house and be seized there and taken home.[95]

Rome in its legend of the Sabine women preserved an unusually faithful tradition from the period of capture. The institution of the feast alone might be regarded as a slight anachronism, for such a feast implies an already existing treaty relation, while the story is supposed to explain the establishment of such a relation. Nevertheless even among low peoples a tacit and indefinite agreement seems to precede an express and articulate one. The bride-show at the feast, the capture of the maiden with her subsequent consent, the revenge expedition of her relatives, and the reconciliation through the mediation of the young woman may all be witnessed today in the folk life of the South Slavs. This familiar culture myth, however, lays its chief stress on the fact that out of this condition of capture marriage there issued the connubial league of Latin and Sabine tribes, a union which laid the foundation for the political organization of patrician Rome.

The Roman wedding ceremonies preserve only weak intimations of capture. Before the bride was taken home, she fled to the lap of her mother and was torn away with apparent force.[96] Perhaps this survival only indicates the reluctance of the bride to leave her mother's house, the husband having formerly taken up his residence there. But the Romans themselves remembered that it was really a case of mock capture when they decreed that no weddings should take place on holidays because the holiday peace forbade robbery of any sort.[97] On the way to her new home
100 the bride was guarded by two boys,[98] and at the threshold of the house she showed resistance and was lifted over by force.[99] By a marriage thus concluded the bride came into the possession, into the *manus*, of her husband, and it is characteristic of the early history of the patrician Romans that they prided themselves that

[94] Jamblichus *De vita Pythagorce* ix. 48, xviii. 84.
[95] Rossbach, *Romische Ehe*, p. 215.
[90] Dionysius *Antiquitates Romance*, ii. 30. (Ed.)
[97] Macrobius *Saturnalia* i. 15.
[98] Festus *De verborum significations* s.v. *"patrimus."*
"Plutarch *Qiwestiones Romance* xxix. (Ed.)

this sort of authority over the wife was an arrangement which distinguished the Roman citizen from all other peoples.[100] A comparison with the neighboring Etruscans, who preserved such striking remnants of mother-right, makes it extremely probable that the growing power of the little tribal union on the Tiber first manifested itself in the conquest of mother-right.

Among the Celtic peoples, the Welsh until recently practiced capture as a legal symbol in a manner very similar to that of the old nomads. The groom appeared on horseback with his friends to demand that the bride be given up. But her blood relatives had also taken to horse to protect her, and a regular mounted skirmish took place before the bridegroom achieved his purpose.[101]

Among the Slavs of an earlier period, and among the South Slavs well into modern times, we find almost all the forms of marriage as they have successively developed. Even the old union of free choice, analogous to the Hindu *gandharva* marriage for "pleasure and love," still survives from the age of mother-right but is compelled to adapt itself to the later forms of marriage with paternal authority. South Slav common law recognizes three types of marriage. A Serbian song assembles them in the form of a lover's questions:

"Oh I should like to sue for you,
But they will not give you to me.
Abduct you? I can not do it alone.
Entice you? You will not come."

The girl in replying places no hope in his suit and warns against capture with reference, not to her father, but to the host of her brothers and cousins according to true mother-right, but says, "Rather entice me; I'll come." And such a marriage is valid according to South Slav usage, except that the eloping girl forfeits her claim to a dowry. Montenegrin law has codified this custom. "But if a girl follows an unmarried man voluntarily without the foreknowledge of her parents, he can not be held liable, for love itself has united them."[102]

This freedom is reminiscent of the old report of Nestor[108] con-

[100] *"Manus jus proprium (Avium Romanorum est"* (Gaius *Institutiones* 108).
[101] Karnes, *History of Man,* II, 59.
[102] See Lippert, *Oeschichte der Familie,* p. 101. (Ed.)
[103] *Chronique,* p. 10.

cerning certain Slavic tribes of Russia. "Marriage did not exist among them, but games were held in the outskirts of the villages. They met at these games for dancing and every kind of diabolic amusement, and there every man carried off the woman with whom he had previously come to an agreement." The distinction, however, is that today even the union contracted in the ancient form becomes a real marriage, that is—and this is the essence of the matter—the man acquires a property right in the woman who yields to him in this way.

This comparison makes intelligible a very common form of Roman marriage, which the jurists call marriage by *usus.* That it came down from earliest times is shown by the fact that it was sanctioned by the law of the Twelve Tables, while it no longer existed at the time of Gaius, having been abolished partly by law and partly by custom.[10]* We can see nothing original'in fhis form of marriage over and above a union of the old type carried over into pair marriage. It was associated neither with capture nor with purchase. The woman remained a member of her own family and did not become, as in the later forms, the property of her husband. Since in time, however, the wife came to be generally recognized as an object of property, the ordinary law of chattels was applied to her. A year of actual and uninterrupted possession gave the husband in the eyes of the citizens a full property right, exactly as a man acquired a title to movables by usucapion. But the woman could continue the relation in its old form and escape the *marvus* of her husband by taking advantage of a loophole, the so-called *trinoctium.* If each year she absented herself three nights in succession from her husband's house, he did not obtain a property right in her.[106] This form of marriage thus began as an institution of earliest times and was converted into that of a later age if the wife did not preserve the right of her own family by an annual interruption.

The Slavs likewise preserved the old form of marriage in substance along with later forms. Among the latter, marriage by capture still exists today under circumstances where sham and reality are often hard to distinguish. Even in Dalmatia scenes of this sort are still quite common.[106] If an abduction takes place

[104] In our interpretation of the historical development we find it necessary to deviate from Rossbach *(Romische Ehe,* pp. 146ff.).
10[5] See Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 242-4. (Ed.)
[106] See *Juristische Blatter,* 1872.

without the consent of the girl's parents, all her blood relatives are called out for revenge, and the result may be a long feud or the surrender of the man to the authorities. As a rule, however, the young people reach an understanding in the meantime, and the girl makes peace with her relatives. They then go to the altar. But the man must carry off his bride by force even if her family has given their consent to the match. The pair then usually spend a part of the day or night under the open sky, and a money indemnity from the captor follows the reconciliation. But in this case likewise the girl has no claim to a dowry.

Even where these capture scenes have become rare, the friends of the groom at the South Slav wedding ceremony still form an armed body under a captain or voivode, an ensign, and similar military officers. They escort the bride to her husband. In Syrmia she is received with blows from a stick.[107] The custom reported by Nestor and Roman legends is also still preserved among the South Slavs, namely, the dance festivals, now church festivals, held in the summer, at which, according to custom, an inspection and selection of brides takes place.[108]

Among the Germanic peoples traces of the oldest marriage form, the *gandharva* marriage, are scarcer in proportion as paternal authority has become more firmly intrenched, and this has happened with all the logical consistency of a savage people little confused by sentimental considerations. Since we have found their presumable ancestors still under mother-right and the Germans themselves in possession of nephew-right, this somewhat abrupt change must seem surprising. Hence we are probably correct in assuming that this revolution was materially accelerated by the influence of the Romans, who indeed regarded themselves as the originators of father-right. The Slavs lagged behind in proportion as they were farther from Roman influence.

Wife-capture was, however, very general among the Scandinavians in earlier times, and this is confirmed by the very fact that it was strictly prohibited. Old laws[109] decreed that the maiden should be acquired from her relatives, not taken by force. How contrary this was to earlier ideas is shown by the emphasis on a special "peace of women;" woman had to be expressly placed

[107] Rajacsich, *sudslaven,* pp. 141, 159, 147.
[108] *Ibid.,* p. 137.
[109] *Uplanaslagen; Westmanndlagen; Helsingelagen.*

under the protection of the peace. In spite of this, capture did not cease. Individual families adhered to it exceptionally long as a family tradition. Thus it is related of the families of Storwirt and Storkaden that their men seized the finest ladies "out of pride."[110] It long remained customary, even in an arranged marriage, for the bridegroom to send an armed band of friends under a leader to the home of the bride's father to receive the dowry for him. The laws probably had good reason to decree that the master of the house should take their weapons and put them under lock and key.[111] The same armed band then escorted the bride to the house of the groom or, at a later period, to the church. While the rings were being exchanged in the church, a tournament was held outside.[112]

Wife-capture was likewise combatted by the laws of the continental Germans in a manner which shows that it can have been by no means a mere symbol at that time. The Frankish law[118] specifically classed as captors the man by whose orders the girl was sought, his associates, and especially the cooperating archers. This armed retinue, afterwards the "guard of honor" which followed the bridal couple, thus still acted at that time in a way which the law punished with severe penalties. The progress of the Germans under Roman legal and ecclesiastical influence is clearly revealed in this connection. While among the South Slavs, even today, the consent of the abducted girl makes the marriage valid, the Salic law sentenced a girl who acquiesced in her capture behind her parents' back to the loss of her free status. The later law of the Ostrogoths even went so far as to punish the consent of the maiden, like the act of her captor, with death.[114] While the old Frankish law still permitted a subsequent settlement with the bride and her parents and a marriage on this basis, the later law of the royal capitularies[115] went so far in opposing capture marriage that it finally repudiated such marriages, even if they had the subsequent consent of the parents, and in addition imposed ecclesiastical penance on the captor. The surviving remnants of capture decrease in this way from east

[110] Lagerbring, *Swea Rikes Historia,* I, 445; Rühs, *Skandinatner,* p. 167.
[111] *Ostgotalagen* viii.
[112] 01aus Magnus *Historia* xiv. 5.
118 *Lex Salica* xiii.
[114] *Edictum Theodorici Regis* xvii.
[118] *Capitularia* iv. 22, vi. 95, vii. 311.

to west. While they are still imbued with full life among a part of the Slavs and occur in considerable number among the Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Old Prussians,[116] there has survived in most sections of Germany and France scarcely more than the ceremonial resistance of the bride. According to McLennan, in certain parts of France in the Seventeenth Century the bride was still instructed to show resistance upon entering the house of the groom, and similarly in the poem, *Von Metzen Hochzeit,*[117] a German peasant bride of the Fourteenth Century is represented as being brought to her husband weeping and crying.

Wife-capture thus belongs on the whole to a time when the organizations derived from the primitive family had no social relations with each other and had found no means of establishing them. But such a means was found through capture itself. With it began the system known among Germanic peoples as that of "compositions," but which has been regarded very incorrectly as something peculiar to them alone. There seems to us no doubt that it was the one-sided advantage accruing to the man that favored this system. Greek tradition, to be sure, associates even the commutation of blood revenge in the case of murder with the destruction of mother-right.[118] But since, according to early cult ideas, shed blood actually "cried out for revenge," the blood relatives certainly could not in this case take the first step to exchange a stern duty for a material advantage. The situation was entirely different, however, with respect to the capture of a girl. Here no extinguished life cried for revenge. Here the chief incentive of uncivilized man, the idea of a soul demanding vengeance, did not exist. The duty of revenge fell to the man in his r61e of protector, to the brother or uncle, since the possession to be protected belonged to the mother, and in this case the temptation to betray the right of the woman to his own advantage, and to establish his own authority on the basis of this advantage, became too strong for him.

When once the man, assured by previous cases, could venture to capture a woman from a particular tribe with the confidence that a definite recompense would avert hostilities, it was only

116 Gaya, *Marriage Ceremonies,* p. 35. (Ed.)
117 In Lassberg, *Iieder Saal,* I I I , 399ff. (Ed.)
118 See Lippert, *Geschichte der Farnilie,* pp. 77-81.

a short step farther to make such an arrangement before the capture. Then, however, we enter the sphere of wife-purchase, where capture continues to exist only as a traditional legal symbol.[119] Many of the examples cited above belong in this category, which is often very difficult to distinguish from the earlier one. Two factors combined to make purchase prevail over capture. In the first place, this advance was in accord with the development of intertribal intercourse, and in the second, it was to the interest of both parties. The one must obviously have recognized an advantage in acquiring a desirable possession without producing a tribal feud. The advantage to the other was even greater. As soon as the protector, the brother and uncle in this case, could demand a purchase price in advance for a female relative under his protection, his relation to her changed from one of protection to one of ownership, naturally at the expense of the violated right of the mother.[120]

Never in any case known to us does the mother receive the bride-price. As long as mother-right or the avunculate survives, it is the brother or the uncle. But when all the men in two tribes practicing reciprocity enter into property marriages, and all the children are the product of such marriages, it is naturally only the "fathers" in the patriarchal sense who handle the transaction. Yet we must allot no short period of time to this transition. Examples are not lacking where endogamy and exogamy have existed side by side within one and the same tribe. And where, along with marriage by capture and purchase, we also encounter some form comparable to *usus* or *gandharva* marriage, the probability is that endogamy still exists.

Of all the continents today, Africa seems characterized more than any other by the condition of purchase marriage. It there appears in a very naked and consistent form, especially in the regions where cattle raising is profitably carried on. Purchase prevails throughout all South Africa.[121] Love relations hardly play a part, and the inclination of the girl is not taken into consideration. Indeed the object of the transaction is as a rule

119 See Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften*, I, 184-93. (Ed.)

120 Gumplowicz has remarked in his *Grundriss der Sociologie* that in my *Geschichte der Familie*, while I mention the fact of the transition to father-right, I have not explained the motives. A number of such motives are set forth herewith.

121 Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Sudafrikas*, I, 445.

scarcely more than a child. Only the interests of the parents are considered. These, however, are primarily concerned with the man's ability to pay.

The Bushman alone represents an earlier stage, indicative of the transition from mother-right. He has no cattle and no herds and can offer only his weapons and the spoils of the chase in negotiating for a woman. Moreover, he does not take his wife with him but attaches himself to her parents, whose household he supports with gifts of game. This would seem to be precisely the basis of the mother-right organization as we found it among certain Indian tribes. The Bushman, however, courts his bride with gifts, and her family receives presents from his relatives. Moreover, the father is apparently already supreme in the house of the parents-in-law, and the man doubtless regards himself as the master of the wife in consequence of the gifts, for between him and his mother-in-law all intercourse is barred.

As soon as we enter the region of cattle raising, we find purchase the rule and cattle the units of value. Among the Kaffirs Fritsch[122] found the value of a girl fluctuating between six and thirty oxen. Farther north, among the Latuka, a woman was on an average worth ten cows.[123] The custom of purchase extends northwards through the Somali tribes to the Bedouin Arabs and likewise through Central Africa to Bagirmi and the so-called heathen states. "The father of the chosen wife is paid by previous agreement a horse, a few slaves, a certain number of fat dogs."[124]

Even though woman was reduced to an object of property by such treatment, her economic value was nevertheless enhanced.[125] When the birth of a girl gives the Kaffir father a prospect of acquiring thirty cattle, he will certainly desire many such children, and in the decision as to whether the newborn child shall live or die the economic interest operates more and more in favor of life. Thus exogamy and purchase marriage have become a lever of progress by increasing population and restricting the negative foresight of infanticide. Exogamy and wife-purchase became an important factor in the struggle in the course of

122 *Dfe Eingeborenen Sudafrikas*, I, 112.
123 Baker, *Albert N'yanza*, p. 152.
124 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan*, I I , 686.
125 "It is a mistake to think that the custom of 'purchase' degraded women" (Sumner, *War*, p. *86)*. (Ed.)

which passive races were gradually replaced more and more by active ones.

While the old *gandharva* marriage was concluded merely for "pleasure and love," from now on the acquisition of children became the chief object of marriage—so much so, indeed, that the duration of the relation was often determined thereby. Thus in the "heathen states" the marriage is dissolved if the wife proves barren. She returns to her parental home, and the bride-price is refunded. On the other hand, it seems also to have been stipulated among some tribes that the wife should be free after bearing children of a value exceeding that of the bride-price by a certain amount. Thus among certain tribes of Central Africa the birth of five children is said to have given the mother the option of returning to her parental home.[126] Among the Songhay the wife is redeemed by bearing three children.

On this economic stage the girl again becomes a very acceptable object to her whole tribe, but in an entirely different way, for she is now regarded as its material property. In most cases, however, the organization of the tribe has changed in the meantime, and father-right has become established. If logical consistency is then carried to the extreme, which need not always be the case, the "father" becomes the sole possessor of all the rights which had formerly belonged to the tribe as a whole, including the right to the girls of the tribe. We can here indicate only in passing the new institutions which may be founded on this fact, and the survivals in a later period which are traceable to it. The old kings of Dahomey carried out with the utmost logical consistency the principle that the father-right of all the members of the tribe had passed to them alone. They regarded all the girls in the state as their property and derived a considerable profit by selling them in marriage to their subjects.[127] When Mosheshwe set himself up as chieftain of the Basuto in 1813, he likewise speculated in women. By using his cattle to purchase wives for the poorer men of the people, he not only won them over to his regime but also increased his capital by reserving the daughters of these marriages for further business.[128] Thus there arose a situation inimical to the female infanticide

[126] **Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan,* II, 685.**
[127] **Waitz, *Anthropologic,* I, 147.**
[128] **Fritech, *Die Eingeborenen Sudafrikas,* I, 483.**

once customary under the compulsion of an undeveloped care for life. Girls now became objects of high value. This was at first, however, of a very material nature, and the whole advance was achieved, as it were, by the circuitous path of a retrogression in humanitarianism.

In ancient Judah and Israel marriage was purely and strictly by purchase, just as it still is among the Bedouin Arabs. The Bible regularly uses the expressions "to purchase as a wife" and "the bride-price of a virgin."[129] The exceptions are only apparently such, for at most the price only deviates somewhat from the usual standards. Thus Jacob substitutes his service for the bride-price,[130] and Saul accepts David's military success in lieu thereof.[181]

A profoundly important distinction must have existed between the forms of organization of the Hebrews and those of the Phoenicians. The Hebrews enter history as pronounced Bedouins, as typical nomads. Hence they are characterized by the patriarchate. Their system of conquest and forced protectorates, involving the possibility of extensive political integration, is intimately associated with the ascendancy of father-right. The Phoenicians, on the other hand, seem to have preserved the elements of mother-right to a considerable extent. The whole ancient civilization of settlement in all its branches—advanced agriculture, pottery, the arts of weaving and dyeing, and the technic of fire applied to the manufacture of ornamental objects—could develop quite well on the basis of maternally regulated organizations, while the men *pari passu* developed the vocation of trade. This is in accord not only with the dual organization and inferences from legendary sources but also with the indubitable historical prominence of the female in the cult, a phenomenon completely suppressed among the Hebrews.

Whenever the Old Testament mentions the acceptance of Phoenician cults, it speaks almost invariably in terms of un-

[120] Exodus xxii. 16-17 *et passim.* These expressions are translations from the German. The English Bible renders them differently. "And if a man entice a maid that is not betrothed, and lie with her, he shall surely *endow her to be his wife.* If her father utterly refuse to give her unto him, he shall pay money according to *the dowry of virgins."* Manifestly, from the context, the English version is less accurate than the German. "Endow" and "dowry" plainly mean "purchase" and "bride-price." (Ed.)

[130] Genesis xxix. 16-28.

[131] 1 Samuel xviii. 22-7.

bridled love unions. This forces us to the conclusion that the Phoenicians must have preserved survivals of the old sexual communism within the tribe and probably also a free form of marriage like the Hindu *gandharva*, along with other later forms. On the other hand, both of these forms were proscribed to the Hebrews, who in so many other respects stood far below the Phoenicians in civilization. Their culture had begun on a different basis, and developing from this had arrived, when conditions of peace and settled life became established, at marriage by purchase as the only normal form of union. Its foundation was, as always, an exogamous one, and when the many gentes fused into one group with a single tribal mark,[182] this found expression in a series of restrictions upon consanguineous marriages.

Although the Hebrew woman, like every woman on this stage, was thus undoubtedly placed on a par with a purchasable chattel, there were nevertheless two factors in particular which distinguished her from any other form of live property. One went back to mother-right, a stage which the Hebrews had surmounted, to be sure, but not skipped. The glamor surrounding the queen-mother at the royal court,[188] a survival from that stage, must have been evident in more subdued tones in every house. No matter how many wives might be subject to the wishes of the husband, only one entered into household community with him. And this dignity of hers was elevated by a second factor, derived
109 from the later form of marriage, which gave her a rank superior to other wives purchased in the same manner but not to occupy a position of equal dignity. The Hebrew tribes formed closely knit peace unions, in which connubium must have been one of the most important stipulations. The old exclusiveness of these unions was so vividly remembered that the subject peoples and Phoenician neighbors were not admitted into them. While the Hebrew could purchase an alien woman for any menial position he liked, it was tacitly understood that the purchase of a woman from one of the equal families of the connubial league was for the sole purpose of installing her in the dignified position of ruling wife. There thus arose a deep cleavage between this one wife and the man's concubines from the class of servants.

This distinction is clearly expressed in the Hebrew law con-

132.Ie., circumcision. (Ed.) [133]See above, pp. 242-3, 249. (Ed.)

cerning divorce.[134] The strict logic of the patriarchal right would have permitted the husband to sell the wife whom he had purchased as his property, if his affection for her had ceased, or to use her for menial domestic services. This, however, was contrary to the conditions of the purchase. The husband had either to maintain the wife thus purchased in the position once tacitly stipulated by the connubial compact, or to restore her her former freedom, giving her evidence of the fact in writing. This Hebrew divorce law, which has been taken over by Islam, is thus documentary evidence of a significant advance on the stage of marriage by purchase. But this form of marriage itself raised the Hebrews above the social and moral dangers of the neighboring peoples of older races.

Among the medley of peoples which goes by the name of India, riiarriage by purchase has also been widespread. Strabo and Megasthenes report that the Hindus bought their wives from their parents for a yoke of oxen. According to the Laws of Manu, this was the old *arsha* form of marriage, in which the bride-price consisted of "a pair of cattle or two." [135] This form reappears somewhat modified in the widespread *asura* marriage. Here treasures of every sort took the place of cattle, the symbolic unit was replaced by an optional quantity depending on the capacity of the suitor to pay, and the girl herself received a share of the donation.

Among the Greeks the course of development is particularly clear. While the survivals mentioned above [186] suggest the custom of capture in prehistoric times, legends reveal purchase as the only proper form of marriage in the historical primitive age, and this is confirmed by Aristotle's [137] report that the forefathers of the Greeks had bought their wives from each other. As in India, cattle were the characteristic units of value among the Homeric Greeks.[138] With unusual liberality Iphid'amas gave a hundred steers for his bride,[139] while in another case four oxen constituted the purchase price of a capable woman.[140] As the Greeks accumulated capital in herds, girls more and more frequently escaped the fate of exposure, long before this was raised to a law. The true nature of this new esteem for the maiden found expression in the

184 Deuteronomy xxiv. 1-4.
185 *Laws of Manu* iii. 29. (Ed.)
186 Pp. 300-1. (Ed.)
187 *Politics* ii. 8.
188 See Keller, *Homeric Society*, p. 212. (Ed.)
189 *Iliad* xi. 244.
140 *Ibid.*, xxiii. 703-4.

praise of Homer,[141] who lauds her because she brings cattle to her father's household.

Here as in India the character of purchase gradually disappeared with the increasing diversity of property. Its place is taken in the *Odyssey* by a wooing "with gifts." Nevertheless the commercial nature of the transaction still appears now and then, as when a husband, deceived by the infidelity of his wife, demands from her father the return of all presents,[142] just as he would demand the return of the purchase price of damaged goods.

On the other hand, under more complicated life conditions a deviation from the strict form of purchase, a discharge of the usual price, was very natural. A friendly service might be infinitely more important to a shrewd father than a yoke of oxen. Just as David discharged his bride-price with the trophies of the Philistines,[143] so Neleus demanded that his son-in-law drive off the cattle of Iphicles,[144] and Othryoneus promised his services instead of a bride-price.[146] Agamemnon offered Achilles his daughter without compensation in anticipation of his assistance, and was even willing to add rich presents,[146] To Alcinoiis his liking for the famous stranger was remuneration enough to make him wish to give him his daughter Nausicaa without presents.[147] Thus with advancing civilization there necessarily arise more and more circumstances which cause the old bride-price to recede before new equivalents. This course of things explains why almost everywhere, in India as well as in Greece, the tendency of progress is to disavow and suppress the old form of purchase as a survival of outgrown barbarism.[148]

Among the Romans, however, purchase as a legal form was retained until the Third Century, A.D. It still existed at the time of Gaius, Papinian, and Ulpian and outlived the *usus* form, which had gone down before it. It did not become obsolete until the time of Boethius and Isidore. It succumbed together with the legal idea, created by nomad culture, that the married woman must be the property of her husband. As long, however, as this principle existed and the Roman paterfamilias possessed the

141 *Iliad* xviii. 593.
142 *Odyssey* viii. 318.
143 1 Samuel xviii. 27. (Ed.)
144 *Odyssey* xi. 289.
145 *Iliad* xiii. 366.
146 Ibid., ix. 147.
147 *Odyssey* vi. 313.
148 Marriage by dowry had completely replaced wife-purchase in historical Greece. See Briffault, *Mothers*, II, 337-8. (Ed.)

manus over the wife, purchase was the most usual of the forms of establishing this property right in such a way that it would be recognized as such, proved if need be, and guaranteed by the union of the Quirites. Or, in legal terminology, the gist of the transaction, the *coemptio,* was the "mancipation," by which the *res mancipi* (objects taken possession of) passed into Quiritarian ownership.[1*9]

Roman marriage by *coemptio* was just such a legal transaction. It was no transfer of a mild protective power, no manifestly impossible "mutual purchase," as some have tried to explain it in the endeavor to improve history. The Roman brought an ordinary object of property into his Quiritarian ownership by subjecting it to the formula of purchase—striking an *ces* on the scales before five witnesses and a scale-holder *{libripens),* speaking the definite words of purchase, and grasping with his hand the object bought. The same five witnesses, scale-holder, and *ces* also figured in the act of marriage, except that the formula of purchase had to be expressed differently by stating the specific object and purpose of the purchase.

A purchase without this qualifying statement would have made the woman a slave. But the ancient position of the wife in the house intervened. Its preservation created a great rift within the patriarchal family among peoples above the nomadic stage. The wife purchased for the position of materfamilias bore children who, unlike those of all the other wives of the same lord, shared with their father the capacity of succeeding to authority and inheriting property. As *liberi* they were distinguished from *servi.* The housewife purchased by *coemptio* entered immediately into this category. She received the right of a free daughter in the house; she was *filice loco.* This qualification as to purpose was the only thing that distinguished the *coemptio* of marriage from any other purchase.[150]

We can follow the course of development among the Germanic peoples almost step by step. Their presumable ancestors, although nomads in the strictest sense of the word, nevertheless preserved many a remnant of the ancient form of the family. At the beginning of our era the Germanic peoples were divided.

[149] See Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* p. 66.
[150] On the untenability of the hypothesis of mutual purchase, see Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* pp. 73S.

Some still retained the avunculate, including doubtless the reck-
12 oning of clan membership through the mother. Even this last remnant of mother-right vanished during the *Volkerwanderung* or the subsequent period which bequeathed us those precious cultural documents, the Germanic folk laws. The new Germanic family was based squarely and consistently on the property right of the father exactly like that of ancient Rome. The wife separated completely from her kindred and belonged absolutely to the family of her husband. According to the old strict right the "mund" (the Roman *manus),* which gradually changed into a mild right of protection, never reverted to her family except by repurchase. Like any other property it was inherited from the husband by his legal heirs, including the wife's own sons. As in Rome, her legal relation to her husband was that of a child. As yet, however, the state had not interfered in this relation. Apparently, moreover, no connubial league had as yet imposed any qualifying conditions, for the German husband could sell or even kill his wife.[151]

This absence of qualifying conditions, which vanished first from actual life and only then from the law, suggests the stage of capture marriage. The folk laws, however, reflect the energetic struggle of the time to establish marriage by purchase as the only legitimate form of obtaining the mund over the wife. Only with purchase marriage did it seem possible to preserve internal peace within the political unions, which had expanded greatly since nomadic times, and to consolidate the position of the new social order based on paternal property rights. Saxo Grammaticus[152] ascribes this intention to the Danish king, Frotho, who is said to have introduced purchase marriage by a law and to have permitted no other form, because he regarded the bride-price as a stabilizing factor in marriage. Marriage by purchase, long since obsolete in Rome, was here an advance and was directed against capture. It thus strengthened the "peace of women" in the confederation. It also elevated true marriage above the still numerous unions with concubines and thus contributed to the destruction of the remnants of the *gandharva* form. In another direction, however, it sanctioned the omnipotence of the paternal* right. It took from the daughters the last remnant of freedom in disposing

[151] **Cf., Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthiimer,* pp. 450, 455ff.**
[162] ***Historia Danica* v. 88.**

of themselves and made them a mere possession of their father, convertible at will into any other valuable property.

The current opinion that the Germanic peoples came into possession of Roman civilization as a man enters upon an inheritance, is absolutely incorrect. External habits of life must not be confused with the substance of civilization, and even the former, however faithfully imitated, were often converted into barbarities. Germanic culture developed slowly from within under the stimulus of Roman and Roman-Celtic culture. A very clear proof of this is offered by the subject under discussion. Without doubt the Roman clergy, the intermediaries of Roman civilization, were closely associated with the editing of the different folk laws. Nevertheless these laws themselves testify to the originality of Germanic cultural evolution. While Rome itself had long since abandoned the old legal form of purchase as a barbarity, the folk laws almost without exception strove to make marriage by purchase the only valid form. Thus purchase emerged from the folk life itself as an advance.

The laws of the Goths, Scandinavians, Saxons, Anglo-Saxons, Franks, Burgundians, and Lombards were all at this stage.[153] The Saxon and Lombard laws even sought to fix a tariff for the bride-price, the former 300 and the latter 200 solidi. The height of these prices indicates at the same time that they could not have been mere symbols. In earlier times, as in Africa today, the price consisted principally of cattle and other economic goods. Tacitus[154] mentions cattle, horses, and weapons. The Visigoth law speaks of slaves, maids, and horses. *Von Metzen Hochzeit*[155] cites as the bride-price three beehives, a horse, a cow, a goat, and a calf.

German reports speak of the "purchase" of the woman or maiden as late as the Fifteenth Century.[156] Nevertheless here too we can observe the transition to symbol and survival. The transaction first appears as a legal symbol in the Frankish law, where a fictitious value like the Roman *ces* took the place of the actual purchase price. Elsewhere, as among the Lombards, the bride-price lost its character. It became usual to spend it entirely or in part for the marriage portion of the daughter, so

188 See Kraut, *Vormundschaft,* **I, 171-2.**
154 *Germania* xvii.
155 Lassberg, *Lieder Saal,* III, 399ff. (Ed.)
156 Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer,* p. **420.**

that it was essentially merged with the morning gift.[157] In Scandinavia, "bride-purchase" *(Brudkaup)* has been retained until modern times as the term for the negotiations of courtship. The bride-price promised to the father, however, was concealed under the name *Vingaef*, which was looked upon as a friendly gift, although it might possibly recall the old compensation sum which
114 the captor paid to restore peace and friendship. Nevertheless the title *mundikjobt* was retained for the legitimate wife as distinguished from the concubine or love-wife.[168] The Elder Edda likewise speaks of the wife "purchased with gold," and the Visigoth law calls the true housewife one married "with gift and speech," i.e., purchase and agreement, suggesting the contrast to marriage by capture.

Marriage by purchase did not attain such exclusive currency among the Slavs. It appears only along with real and symbolic capture, free marriage, and elopement. It is obvious that these relatively backward conditions must have been closely connected with the state of development of patriarchal authority and must have varied considerably with the diversity of the latter among different tribes. Unfortunately these conditions have not yet been sufficiently cleared up. It would be of interest to learn, for example, what connection there might be between the development of a stricter paternal authority among the Russians and the influences of Scandinavian rule. Paternal authority among the South Slavs is, by comparison, infinitesimally slight. Among the Czechs, on the other hand, it grew more and more extreme during the course of the Middle Ages. Other tribes may have occupied an intermediate position. With such wide variations, therefore, we can not expect any such uniform evolutionary tendency as is found in Germanic regions.

According to Ibrahim ibn Jakub,[159] the Jew, marriage by purchase was already dominant among the Poles in the Tenth Century, He compares the high bride-price of these Slavs with that customary among the Berbers. This dearness of wives is of especial importance in view of the poverty of the means of subsistence. Girls were the true riches of the house. "If a man has

[157] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer*, p. 423.

[168] "The very name of a legitimately married wife in old Norse law, *mundi kjobt*, implies that the legal wife is one whose *mund* has been purchased" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 248). (Ed.)

[159] *Een belangrijk arabisch Bericht.*

two or three daughters, they make him wealthy; if, however, he has two or three sons, he is impoverished."

Among other Slavic tribes, on the contrary, marriage by purchase appears so rarely that the assertion has been made that it is foreign to the Slavs and that they are characterized by the marriage of free choice alone. This view, however, is by no means entirely correct. Among the South Slavs, courtship with gifts, which occurs along with capture and agreement, is nothing but a survival of marriage by purchase. This truth is somewhat obscured, however, by the fact that the office of paternal head in the South Slav house community is not for the most part hereditary and is not invested with such absolute power as, for example, among the Russians. Since, moreover, this "father" may possibly be only remotely related by blood to the girl to be given in marriage, her nearest blood relatives in the house community come to the fore in the ancient way. The presents are distributed among them, although the girl likewise receives a share. Thus the commercial form of the purchase transaction is lost.

Another important distinction still remains to be made. In true purchase marriage the inclination of the girl does not enter into consideration. Under the conditions in which it originally developed, indeed, she was usually still only a child when she was given or promised to her husband. Among the Homeric Greeks the father still selected and bought the bride for his son.[160] Love yields to expediency in this marriage of a "first wife." The fulfillment of obligations is demanded, and the experienced father has a better eye for the guarantee of such fulfillment than the susceptible son. Not until the paternal authority begins to weaken in consequence of the transfer of its various elements to the developing state, with the result that sons and daughters gain increasing independence, does the choice of a wife naturally fall more and more to the son. Then for the first time the motive of expediency, demanded by the organization, is united with the subjective motive in the heart of the suitor. What the well-to-do had formerly divided between wife and concubine the youth now seeks to combine in one person, wherein of course, as experience teaches, the heart not infrequently coincides with the reason.

[160] **See Keller, *Homeric Society*, p. 214. (Ed.)**

In the sphere of Roman civilization this process had already culminated about the beginning of our era. The old strict forms of marriage, the essence of which was the transfer of the *manus* from the father to the husband, thereafter fell more and more into disuse. In their place appeared the so-called "free marriage," which was similar to the Hindu *gandharva* form and yet essentially different from it, principally because it characterizes another phase of historical development. At the beginning of the Empire it was already the commonest form, and it gradually supplanted all others.

This Roman "free marriage" consisted essentially in an agreement which involved the subordination of the wife only in so far as the object of the marriage and the unity of household management demanded it. It did not, however, involve the acquisition by the husband of the *manus,* the property right in the wife and all her possessions. On the contrary, even the married woman henceforth remained under the paternal authority of her own father and a member of her natural family. The possessions of the wife, in so far as they were not set aside as a contribution to the common household, remained her property or that of her father and did not fall under her husband's control.[161]

This change in favor of the subjective element in man and in the direction of the emancipation of the individual, which we encounter so clearly in the development of Roman social institutions, ran parallel with the curtailment of paternal authority and the property right in slaves. In the imperial period this important cultural process was consummated slowly and steadily from within, only its phases being marked by the successive laws. By the time of Justinian it had gained its preliminary objective with the complete dissolution of paternal authority in the old sense. But the movement aimed further at the destruction of slavery, of the property right of man in man. Well could Ulpian,[162] foreseeing the ultimate goal of the development, arrive at the ideal of a natural right, according to which the slave is equal to the master. But this evolution in the actual conditions of life was brought to a halt by the invasion of the Germanic peoples. There came into power on Roman soil a people which

[161] See Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* pp. 43ff.
[162] *Digest* 1. 17. 32; Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* p. 49.

stood incomparably nearer the source of paternal authority than the highly developed Romans.

To be sure, the disintegration of paternal authority in Rome advanced *pari passu* with the development of the political organization, and the state exerted a restrictive influence in proportion as it elevated communal foresight. But behind all these phenomena, which appear with the regularity of natural laws, there lay yet another and deeper reason. Thus far it has been almost exclusively the pastoral or nomadic peoples in a broad sense whom we have found achieving an extensive political organization. The basis of this organization of human energies and labor into larger units was the property right of man in man. Only by means of this right was the ancient world in particular able to direct human energies in the mass towards goals which were not identical with the immediate care for life of the individual. The property right of one in many became such a mighty lever to all cultural achievement at a certain period that in the most advanced civilizations this fact inevitably gave rise to the idea that all organization of human energies is rooted exclusively in the property title, and that it is impossible to organize without ruling through property. On that stage no means had been discovered of subordinating any one to the will of another other than by depriving him of his own will, an idea which the North American Indians, for the most part, characteristically never grasped.

The consequence of further cultural evolution was to destroy again this idea, to which mankind theretofore had owed its grandest achievements. Further progress took the direction of solving the problem how to compound out of the thousand mainsprings of provident activity in all individuals the energy for the task of organization, and how to lead individuals by this thread, attached by nature to each in his* most sensitive spot, without ruling them through property. It is scarcely yet sufficiently appreciated how far mankind was led forward along this very path by the organization of the Roman Empire, which mastered such manifold conditions in ways so variously adapted. It had rediscovered, as it were, how to rule without owning. It even dared to introduce this principle into the germ cell of society, the family. This advance emancipated the wife from the property right of her husband, and her children from its harsher consequences, and it was on the point of transforming the lot of the slave.

Among the Germanic peoples, however, the old father-right, the product of nomadism, not only revived, but was intensified to the extreme under pressure of the tremendous task which the struggle with the ancient civilized world set for them. Then, however, the same process of dissolution set in, not in imitation of Rome, but independently from similar causes. Even the early medieval age was as yet unacquainted with any cycle of organized labor. It knew no other incentive to perform labors lying outside the range of immediate self-concern than that resting on a relation of force. For one man to labor for the objects of another he had necessarily to be subject to him through a property relation, and this principle was originally so firmly established that such labor became the mark of servitude; it was degrading.

Nevertheless social progress caused this principle to waver here also. Commercial enterprise and urban industrial activity opened up a new method of organizing labor. Force gave way to mutual profit and advantage as an incentive for the most diverse forms of activity. But even this activity was organized at first only in imitation of the old family organization. The great mercantile, families were patriarchal families in fact, and the guilds and crafts endeavored to personate the same form of organization. But their purposeful character continually produced new variations, and the outcome of the process was the rejection of the nomad-born idea that a property relation is the necessary basis of all organization. Finally, blossoming industrialism seeks to prove the contrary in practice, and slow-moving progress is followed by an all convulsing struggle for new forms of economic and social organization.

In the course of this process the paternal authority of the early Germanic peoples crumbled and fell in ruins. Its heirs were, on the one hand, the higher organization of the state and, on the other, the individual. But they did not share in the heritage without violent struggle and wavering victory. The omnipotence of the organization and the freedom of the individual are the extremes which man throughout history has striven to reconcile. Not until this stage is reached, however, are they a field for rational experiment and creative thought.

This survey should show on historical grounds why the general course of development necessarily included the institution of marriage, giving increasing rein to the individuality of both parties to the union and redeeming the old forms from the property right. We have introduced it in this particular place, however, for a special reason. There is a question whether the strikingly important share of the maiden among the South Slavs in arranging her marriage, in particular her contingent right to contract marriage even without the consent of her relatives, implies the same stage in this progress toward the emancipation of the individual, or whether it is to be regarded as a survival of an earlier form of the family under a less rigorous paternal authority. We admit that the diversity of conditions among the Slavs renders a clear understanding exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless we believe we can decide in favor of the second interpretation. The underlying cause of the redemptive development is wholly lacking here. Moreover, the fact to be explained is only one of many which are without question survivals of an earlier condition.

Thus in the vicinity of Karlstadt the courtship begins with a present to the maiden, and her brother receives a silver *zwanziger* for producing her. The fact that it is her brother undoubtedly indicates that the custom is a survival of the earlier form of the family. At the same time the bride receives an apple stuffed with money and the whole house receives gifts of food. After the negotiations between the fathers of bride and groom, the brother again produces the bride for a piece of money. Finally, shortly before the bride is taken home, her father receives his sum, consisting curiously enough only of a pair of boots, while her mother and sisters each receive a piece of money, allegedly for the food they have provided. In Syrmia the courtship likewise begins with mutual presents, but when the bride is to be fetched from her chamber, it is again her brother who admits the matchmaker in return for a certain sum of money. These and similar usages seem easier to interpret as the peaceful settlement which took the place of old capture marriage than as a survival of regular purchase. But this very prearranged settlement developed elsewhere into the legal forms of purchase.[168]

When some, misled by such local conditions, have asserted that

[168] See Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 184-93. (Ed.)

marriage by purchase is unknown to the Slavs, they have done so under the impression that purchase represents a cultural retrogression. And this idea, which can easily result from a superficial glance at the subject, is very widely held. Even German political and culture historians have thought they were absolving their forefathers from a fault in teaching that the object of the purchase has been from the very beginning, not the woman, but only the mund or paternal right over her. Rossbach has demonstrated the fallacy of this subtlety from the clear sources of Roman law, and not a shadow of a ground exists for seeking another origin for the development among the Germanic peoples.

The factor which must have done most to promote paternal authority in the form most closely associated with marriage by purchase, namely, the property relation of man in man, was, as we have seen, the relation of men to animals on the higher pastoral stage. Even though we, at the height of our civilization, can not be sympathetic toward this development, because it undoubtedly puts man on a plane with the animal, we must nevertheless not overlook the fact that it was the only possible starting point for the establishment of larger organizations, and that only within such organizations has there blossomed forth the higher civilization which today, with an enhanced appreciation of true humanity, disapproves of those transition forms.

In like manner we should suspend judgment with regard to marriage by purchase. It has been tried and found wanting. But we still enjoy the social advances it has brought about. We call such advances moral when they lie in the direct path toward our ideal, which is itself the goal inferred from the direction of that path. Otherwise we speak of them as aberrations. But culture history compels us to recognize that many an advance of great moral value has been born of an aberration. Thus we have long regarded paternal authority in the form of an unrestricted property right in men as an aberration, but the requirement of female chastity and marital fidelity, which was born of it, has been a moral attainment of lasting value.

This requirement, as we have already seen, could not have been established within the primitive family or the forms of organization directly derived from it and could not, therefore, have become a moral canon. Indeed the theoretically equal claims of all the members of the tribe to all its valuable possessions led in the opposite direction. Thus among the otherwise so decent North American Indians we have found ideas of female virtue which are the direct antithesis of our own.[164] In the domain of paternal authority and of purchase marriage in particular, such ideas and practices remain only as contradictory survivals which the later principle labors with more or less success to destroy.

First of all, the principle of strict purchase marriage precludes any polyandrous connection. The private property of one man in a woman, acquired in the recognized way, destroys all the old claims of her tribal associates. The bride-price and the presents to them legally release her. Out of this arises the wife's duty of fidelity in marriage. Even if this concept could arise under Indian pair marriage, it is now extended to limits which depend solely on the will of the husband.

But the integrity of the woman even before marriage, so far as survivals do not interfere with it, now becomes an object of many interests. The female child is an especially valuable possession of her father and is therefore closely watched. Her full value comes to be more and more dependent upon her full integrity. Hence this becomes an object of foresight and supervision.[165] Gradually the idea of the genetic relationship of father and child is added to the patriarchal distinction between the children born to succeed to authority and the dependent children excluded therefrom. The combination of these ideas results in the demand for integrity in the legitimate wife even before marriage. The culture of this stage completely suppresses the old survivals of an opposite character, so far as they are not fixed by the conservative power of the cult.

In both directions, with respect to fidelity in marriage and chastity before it, the loftier conception, the aspiration toward a high ideal, and its influence on the inner spiritual life develop very slowly and gradually on the lower cultural stages out of very materialistic social motives and ideas. Even moral ideals assuredly have their childhood when they cling to earthly things,

164 Above, p. 217.

165 "In the development of the father family fathers restricted daughters in order to make them more valuable as wives. Here comes in the notion of virginity and pre-nuptial chastity" (Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 358-9). (Ed.)

their growth, and possibly their decline. Our present subject reminds us of this. In the cloisterlike supervision of the girl and the wife, which is a familiar phenomenon among unsettled peoples, a subjective moral motive can scarcely be detected. The innocence of the Greek maiden in many a Homeric description seems charming in its unpretentiousness. Brooding thought does not as yet play with the concept. The maiden does not live in a
121 world closed to her senses. The demand of the society has become second nature. In innocent joy she hears of her nuptial fortune and of the noble husband who may sometime be hers, and, desirous of no other glory, she remains chaste for him. No reflection about motherhood casts a shadow on this picture. The idea of womanly virtue is still characterized by a clear consciousness of its purpose.

But moral concepts, like human ideas in general, easily lose sight of their material basis and come to lead their own independent lives. Thus several centuries later the concept of virginity is elevated to a moral ideal as an end in itself. In connection with ideas created in the meantime by the projection of foresight beyond life, it is erected into a cult, which would have been incomprehensible to true classical antiquity. The exaggerated virtue which consoles itself with a higher merit in a painful struggle between the refined ideal and the alleged dross of worldly things, is as far removed as possible from the charming picture which Homer sketches of the naive innocence of a Nausicaa.

To connect these sublimated phenomena with our materialistic starting point would certainly seem far-fetched, did there not exist an inexhaustible series of connecting links. All punishment of sexual transgressions within marriage is based originally on the conception of the property right of the husband. It is seen in the mildest form observable when the ancient Greek demanded the return of the bride-price from his wife's father on account of her infidelity, as Hephaestus is said to have done,[166] to be sure under modified conditions. In so far as revenge is directed against the guilty man, his act seems regarded as a trespass on the property of the husband under aggravated circumstances. Among the Malagasy sexual relations are still extremely unrestricted, but the adulterer is punished for trespassing on the marital prop-

[166] Homer *Odyssey* viii. 318.

erty right of the husband in exactly the same manner as the thief, namely, by the amputation of his hands.[167]

The concept of adultery is also found under mother-right,[168] but now its meaning has entirely changed. There was then no adultery within the same tribe or primitive family; only the intruder from an alien group was capable of it.[169] But now this very stranger, through the development of paternal authority and his composition with it, has obtained legal possession of the woman, and stranger and blood relative alike are guilty of the same crime against him, if they do not respect his private property.

At first the husband is the sole owner, guardian, and avenger of his property. The cooperation of his tribal comrades, the embryonic state, is still limited to the fact that they recognize his right and leave him free to execute his revenge. Similarly the burglar or thief according to old Germanic law was surrendered to the injured man when caught in the act, and at a later period the members of the tribe merely pronounced judgment on the evidence and left the execution of the penalty to the accuser.[170] The most advanced of the old folk laws, the Salic law, contains provisions for the abduction and rape of a woman but makes no mention of adultery. The union of the men, i.e., the state, rendered active assistance as yet only in cases extending outside the house; within the house the husband still exercised an unrestricted right of revenge against the interloper and of punishment over the undutiful wife. No interest of the .state had as yet forbidden even the death penalty. We know from the Adalbert legend that the West Slavic husband of the Tenth Century conceived of his paternal authority as including the right to kill the adulterous wife. At a still later period the old Gottland law[171] left it to the discretion of the husband whether he should take the wergild of forty marks or the life of the detected adulterer. The same strict application of the right once prevailed in Rome and in Athens. The *Lex Julia* and *Papia Poppoea* first

[107] Waits, *Anthropologic.* I I , 488.
[168] See Strabo *Geography,* p. 783.
[169] See Bachofen, *Mutterrecht,* p. 13. (Ed.)
[170] Execution was "left to a great extent in the hands of the individual litigant and his friends; it amounted to little more than self-help juridically sanctioned and approved by the tribe" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 354-5). (Ed.)
[171] *Quta-Lagh* xxiv. 5.

deprived the husband of this right even in *manus* marriages and transferred the punishment of the adulteress to the courts but did not disturb the father's right over his daughter. The right to kill the daughter was first abolished by Constantine.

The transfer of the punitive power from the housefather to the union of the men, the state, had also been accomplished in ancient Hebrew law. Adultery was punished with death in both man and woman.[172] The conception of this crime, however, was still that of the injured marital property right of the husband. The idea that the man could also be unfaithful to his wife did not as yet exist, from which we may clearly infer that the modern relation of mutual fidelity could not have been one of the original stipulations of the marriage union. On the contrary, the expansion of the concept took the direction of assimilating the betrothed to the wife with respect to the right of the husband.

The development can take the same course where the state has been formed by the simple transfer of the paternal authority to a chief. Thus the chieftain of the South African Karagwah punished every adultery within the tribe with fines in cattle, and other chieftains of the vicinity inflicted corporal punishment on the guilty parties.[178] Thus even under such simple conditions the prevention of adultery belongs in the sphere of the preservation of the peace.

Another outgrowth of this socially important principle is a variety of precautionary means found here and there in popular usage. Ranking with these means in their practical effect, although in one respect they merely give expression to the idea of the sanctity of property, are various precepts in the mores. The most primitive and brutal of these precautionary forms is the cloistering of women. It springs from undeveloped legal conditions and survives today especially in regions where customs have been firmly established by the cult.

Among the Tunguses and Kamchadales, as we have seen,[174] the women enjoy the protection of inviolability only within the house.[175] This is very suggestive of the development of legal protection in general. Originally protection is extended only to things which are in actual physical possession. This is expressed

172 Leviticus xx. 10. (Ed.)
173 Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen,* p. 289.
174 Above, p. 299. (Ed.)
175 Erman, *Siberia,* II, 442. (Ed.)

very clearly by the Salic law, which makes the amount of the fine exactly proportional to the degree of custody over the object, a principle, moreover, which has not yet died out in the law. Only gradually does legal protection venture, as it were, step by step out of the innermost confines of the house, from actual possession in the chest, the original seat and bed of man, to more and more immaterial forms of custody, to inclosed fields and meadows and animals in the open pasture. Only gradually, on the analogy of the "peace" in the innermost security of the house, is there developed a special peace for property at the market and on the street and for implements in the fields. The special "peace of women" of the Scandinavians belongs in this category.

The cloistering of women in the house, however, is characteristic of the earlier stages of this development. It is significant that we find it preserved most faithfully among those peoples of an originally nomadic mode of life who, clinging to many traditions of their old life, arrived relatively late or only imperfectly at the concept of property in land, which makes an extension of legal protection necessary. Among the ancient civilized peoples, the Greeks preserved relatively more survivals from that stage than the Romans. The peoples of Mohammedan culture have stopped at that stage and are strongly characterized by it, although the institutions associated with it are by no means peculiar to them. Moreover, the harem system of the rulers does not give an accurate picture of the situation. It lacks the combination of cloistering with the laborious but strictly limited sphere of activity of the housewife, a combination which, according to unanimous reports, makes life in such seclusion far more bearable than it appears to us. The woman whose horizon for untold generations has not extended beyond her circumscribed sphere of activity and who sees its apparently natural connection with the interior of the house, feels as a rule no dissatisfaction with her position. She is like a being whose natural inclinations have been completely transformed. Moreover, her intercourse is restricted, in accordance with the primary object of her seclusion, only with reference to the male sex.

But regions where preventive protection has not advanced beyond this very low stage have failed to develop a number of disciplinary social factors which have matured elsewhere, where the same protection, spurning forcible methods, has been sought of necessity, not merely in outward institutions, but also in the mastery of the mind and the will. The disciplinary influence of these factors is transferred from external bulwarks to the inner man.[176] This step is so important and so far-reaching in its influence that it might be called a parting of the ways of civilization. It is not accidental that the peoples who have followed the one course have often been accused of a lack of "inwardness." Even religion, it is said, has not made them more "inward," for it has itself been influenced by social factors in its development.

Among the external precautionary measures there must also be included the various conventional methods of veiling the wife outside the house, and also such disfigurements as have been practiced in Japan. Removing the eyebrows and blackening the teeth were probably first intended to discourage further masculine attentions rather than as a decoration. We also include here the removal or concealment of the hair upon entrance into matrimony, although the act itself, at least among certain Germanic tribes, had a special significance. In view of the importance of the hair in savage ornament,[177] to conceal it forever certainly meant to renounce all invitation to further attentions. Among the early Germanic peoples the hair characterized the individuality of a person—the original purpose of all ornament—to such a degree that its removal was associated with subjection to the authority of another. Hence the wife concealed her hair from the moment she came under the authority of her husband. For this purpose she assumed the coif, as is still customary in certain regions. Although in one respect this act constituted a legal symbol, it might also from its effect be classed as a precautionary measure.

Gradually the law takes over more and more of these measures and begins to protect the husband even from remote dangers and trivial encroachments on his property. We must not believe, however, that the forbidden acts became scandalous only when they were incorporated in the common law, as though custom were created by law.[178] Much less was it the law that first made

[176] "In fact, there is only a question of degree between an excessive harem system and our own code of propriety which lays restraints on women to which men are not subject" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 386). (Ed.)

[177] See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte*, I, 379-86. (Ed.)

[178] The contrary is the case. "Acts of legislation come out of the mores" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 55). (Ed.)

these acts punishable. On the contrary, so far as a general conclusion may be drawn from the development in Germanic regions, when the law first includes a particular act in its provisions, the intent is usually quite the opposite, namely, to withdraw the punishment for the act from the hands of the paternal authority and to prevent the outbreak of a long feud. This tendency is in many cases the reason why the law affords us an insight into the moral sentiments of its time.

Because of its significance, the coif which concealed the hair of the wife was naturally regarded by the Germanic peoples as especially inviolable, and this protected it without any law. When the Salic law[179] imposed a fine of fifteen shillings *(solidi) for* an attack upon the outer coif and twice as much for molesting the inner covering of the hair, it was less concerned with protecting the coif than with preserving the peace, which was endangered by every such act in view of the jealousy with which the husband guarded his property right in his wife. Without this law and before its enactment the husband took precipitate revenge even for this minor encroachment on his proprietary right, and thus plunged the kin-groups into a retaliatory feud. Thus the state had both a direct and an indirect interest in the coif. The community agreed not to permit disruptive blood feuds in such a case but to compel the husband to calm down and be content with a fine of fifteen or thirty shillings.

This has probably been the commonest way by which the law has extended its sway to more and more detailed cases having no direct connection with the interests of the community. In this way matters that were originally settled in the family at its discretion gradually came more and more before the forum of the public law. In other words the authority of the father of the family passed progressively and inevitably to the state. The development of legal rights precedes the law, however promulgated, but the law regulates and limits them from the standpoint of the preservation of the peace. Thus the foresight of individuals is shared with the common foresight in the work of social and moral progress.

It was still a long way from here to the development of inward moral principles which attempt to govern the will before the act. We need not be astonished, therefore, to find many savage

[179] *Lex Salica* **Ixxv.**

peoples, indeed even so-called civilized peoples, still far from the goal at some intermediate stage. We must not forget that under all circumstances it is the organization of the *men,* the incipient state, which seeks to curb and diminish disruptive private revenge by establishing laws. When the Salic law imposed an unusually high fine for falsely casting suspicion on a wife's fidelity, it was not at first to defend the wife herself, but to protect her husband and master from a rumor that made him contemptible. Indeed it was he and not the insulted wife who received the fine. He was the injured party. The height of the fine measures only the passionate power of the jealousy with which the Salian was wont to avenge an injury, even by words, to his property. In later laws these defenses around the wife are increased. The Gottland law[180] made the wife the object of a strict taboo and threatened every sort of contact with her with a proportionate fine. It did not, however, punish the wife for her connivance. Here the punitive authority of the husband still prevailed. That less advanced peoples have also arrived at this point, when once the paternal authority of the husband has arisen from other forms of organization, is evidenced by reports of the strict taboo on the wife among certain Malay tribes.[181] Traces of the like are also found in Polynesia. Only by degrees do these hedges about a material right and the respect for it, drilled into generation after generation, develop into an inhibiting secondary instinct, an ethical,sense of modesty.

Among many peoples the unmarried woman still lacks this protection of the married woman. Foresight begins to extend to her only indirectly. In the paternal authority over the daughter there does not by nature inhere the same jealousy with which the authority of the husband guards a possession which he has acquired by a sacrifice of hard-won property. Consequently
127 ethnography frequently reports the greatest strictness in marriage along with the utmost laxity outside.[182] Strict father-right prevails at first only in marriage; the unmarried girl still lives according to mother-right. Marital fidelity became an ethical principle much sooner than maidenly chastity. Even the concept of virginity seems, from the evidence of many folk usages where

18o *OutarLagh* xxvii.
181 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 157.
182 For a discussion of premarital license, see Appendix A. (Ed.)

it first appears, not to have had at first the meaning which it acquired later; intercourse was less heeded than the result. **But** in spite of these survivals of an earlier period, social foresight advances step by step in this sphere also. Proceeding from the same materialistic starting point, it has developed among the peoples of modern civilization into an ethical principle of great influence in the molding of the inner life.

We have already become acquainted in passing with the leading factors in this development. The most important are the natural right of the husband, as the purchaser for a high consideration, to fix conditions as to the quality of his purchase and the consequent advantage accruing to the father as the vendor from owning property of the desired quality. To our idealistic way of thinking this point of view might easily be regarded as a materialistic reconstruction of the past, unsubstantiated by anything in the modern world. But such is by no means the case. Nachtigal[188] had the leisure to study the folk life in the by no means entirely uncivilized Mohammedan state of Bornu, and he there witnessed just such conditions. In the capital city, Kuka, custom allowed even the daughters of the princes and the sultan a freedom reminiscent of the period of mother-right, and Islam, imported from abroad, placed no restriction on it. But a social and economic compulsion had begun to do so. Here too, with marriage by purchase prevailing, daughters were a source of wealth to their father. A prince could acquire great riches by gaining princely sons-in-law, and he commonly set out to do so. But a truly princely bride-price was offered only for stainless virginity. This fastidious requirement had given rise to a peculiar delicacy of feeling among the more cultivated people. It would have been a disgrace for a respected father of a family to lend a hand, even unwittingly, to a fraud. Hence it was customary to postpone the decision in each such desirable suit until a shrewd and experienced female relative had made an examination and discovered the necessary information. If this examination turned out unfavorably, custom demanded that the proposal be declined under some pretext or other. The suitor knew in most cases where he stood, but the father lost his rich bride-price. The girl was then given in marriage to a poor man or even to a slave. Poverty can not be so fastidious. Thus here too the development of higher

[188] *Sahara und Sudan,* I, 798.

morality is dependent upon the accumulated results of an extended care for life.

What is handled in Bornu with a certain degree of delicacy appears elsewhere in Africa in cruder forms. On the Gold Coast if the husband finds himself deceived in his expressed assumption, the parents of the bride must refund him all the expenses he has been put to, and among other tribes the marriage is thereby canceled.[184] It is said of the Zulus that a fallen maiden is never taken in marriage.[185] Among the Somali she can at least no longer become "first wife.[186] After the wedding the bridegroom appears before his hut and announces to all the world with proofs that he believes himself deceived, thus throwing scorn on the family of the bride.[187] Hence it is said of the Somali women that even the unmarried are modest.

The course of things from here on is quite definite. When the father learns in this way to prize the integrity of his children, he will avenge its destruction with a severity proportionate to its value, and the rising political organization will substitute for this revenge a corresponding fine. Thus the inviolability of the unmarried woman will also gradually be placed under the sanction of the law. The starting point of this whole development, however, is still the supremacy of paternal authority. Hence it is not surprising that the legal sanction may be even stricter in the earlier period of unshaken father-right than later at the time of its dissolution. As the principle of morality becomes more ingrained, its external supports give way in part.

The Frankish law punished the violation of a maiden in the same way as her abduction. But even if the girl consented, the thief of her honor did not escape without penalty, for even in this case the paternal right was infringed. The Gottland law sentenced the seducer of a virgin to an "amends" in money, which went to the brother or father who possessed the right over her. For the abduction of the maiden the man was fined his whole wergild; for enticing her to follow of her own free will, forty marks. These fines were shared by the district, the organization which here undertook to prevent revenge, with the injured father.

[184] Waitz, *Anthropologic*, II, **113.**
[185] *Ibid.*, II, 389.
[186] *Ibid.*, II, 522.
[187] Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen*, p. **286.**

129 The story of Dinah[188] shows how jealously the fathers and brothers of ancient Israel guarded the chastity of the maiden, and how savagely they avenged her violation. In the later law, however, revenge is taken over by the community as the right of punishment, and, as in Germanic law, is redeemed by a fine. The seducer of an unbetrothed maiden must give her father fifty shekels of silver and take her to wife, never to part from her. But she who conceals her fall and marries must be stoned to death by the community of men. If, however, the husband accuses his bride falsely of such deceit, he must atone with one hundred shekels of silver, which go to the father who has been injured through his daughter.[189]

Where this state of things appears, it naturally calls forth a certain amount of vigilance, which inevitably exerts a far-reaching influence on the forms of social intercourse, until finally the habit of observing these precautionary restrictions, transmitted from generation to generation, develops into a tender instinct of modesty. A survey of the status of this secondary instinct in different culture areas shows that it is always capable of development and also—it can not be denied—of perversion. Since, however, this whole movement came into being through the usurpation of authority by the man, it received a new impetus from the advance to the recognition of the physiological relation between the father and his own offspring.

Another social phenomenon, into whose history we are unable to gain as clear an insight as in the case of marriage by purchase, is indicated, without being clearly revealed, by numerous traces. We refer to *connubial leagues without purchase,* i.e., agreements between different tribes or kin-groups for a mutual exchange of daughters, in which the *quid pro quo* otherwise offered in each case in the form of the bride-price seems to be foregone.[190]

Such leagues with purchase in the individual case are amply substantiated historically. Unlike subsequently ratified capture, regularly arranged purchase of itself presupposes a previous agreement of a general nature. As a rule, moreover, it takes place only within established connubial leagues. As has already been pointed out, the need of acquiring wives peacefully, which

188 Genesis xxxiv.
180 Deuteronomy xxii. 13-29.
190 Cf., Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 562-3. (Ed.)

necessarily followed under man-rule from exogamous wife-capture with its train of perpetual feuds for revenge, contributed
130 materially toward the establishment of peaceful intercourse between alien groups.

A survival of the age when such peace unions originated is the phenomenon of the matchmaker, who goes back and forth with the sanctity of an ambassador between the two parties, who do not dare to approach in person until he has succeeded in arranging the preliminaries of the compact. Here and there it is still customary for the matchmaker on entering a strange house to seize a sacred object to render himself inviolable. This institution seems to be derived from a time when alien tribes were as yet united by no bond of peace save that of connubium, so that only a person recognized on all sides as an intermediary for this purpose enjoyed peace in approaching strangers. Consequently matchmaking became the business of definite persons and persisted as a special profession.[191]

The whole procedure of attempting to establish a connubial league, as Hebrew antiquity pictured it, is set forth in the Bible.[192] Jacob, the nomad, with his sons and flocks entered the land of the Hivites, who were Canaanitish city dwellers. One of the Hivites violated Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, and wished to keep her. Impelled by this individual case, they proposed to Jacob and his people, toward whom they had previously been hostile, the following agreement: "And make ye marriages with us, and give your daughters unto us, and take our daughters unto you. And ye shall dwell with us: and the land shall be before you. . . ." The Hivites, whose livelihood, we must assume, took the Phoenician forms of industrial enterprise and intensive agriculture, made the conclusion of a connubial league the condition for the use of the pasture land. We do not learn from the proposal, however, whether it was intended to establish strict mutuality or whether a purchase agreement was to be concluded in each case. The fact that a bride-price was offered for Dinah is not entirely decisive under the circumstances.

The Israelites showed themselves inclined—their deceitful

[191] Cases on the matchmaker, go-between, or marriage-broker are collected in Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* **I, 426-7;** Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 526-31; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1689-90; IV, 944-6, (Ed.)

[192] Genesis xxxiv. 8-24.

intention does not concern us here—to enter into the connubial agreement, but they set up as their supreme condition that the Hivites and Israelites must become one people and adopt a single tribal mark, circumcision. Of these two stipulations, the former is the usual result of a connubial union; the latter is not. The reason we so rarely gain an insight into this manner of forming tribes and nations is because, as soon as connubial peace is established, amalgamation takes place, producing a homogeneous
131 new tribe which we are only rarely able to resolve into its elements. We have no means of telling, for example, how many of the countless little Germanic tribes at the time of Caesar and Tacitus may have represented connubial leagues composed of still smaller and originally independent units. But for such amalgamation to find immediate expression in a single tribal mark, as the Israelites desired, is a rare though not entirely unexampled case. Thus we know that the Aryan Rajputs, when they forced themselves upon certain of the older tribes of India as war chieftains and kings, commonly adopted the marks of these tribes or at least submitted to a ceremony which had that significance in a survivalistic form.[198] This was not, however, a compact between equals.

Old patrician Rome, according to various indications scarcely intelligible otherwise, probably represented a connubial league
132 which rejected marriage by purchase and substituted mutuality under definitely stipulated conditions. The subsequent patrician gentes must first have united for freedom of connubium into three independent groups, which eventually coalesced into a single connubial league coextensive with the Quirites or patrician Romans. It is a well-known fact that these associated gentes were restricted to mutuality in the acquisition of wives, that they were bound by the agreement not to marry outside the union.[194] The ban was first raised in the year 310 of the city by the Canuleian law, which admitted the plebeians into the connubium of the patricians.

That this obligatory mutuality must have supplanted purchase within the old patrician union is indicated above all by a peculiar form of marriage, which was confined exclusively to the patricians, even when, owing apparently to the extension of the

193 Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 437. (Ed.)
194 See Briffault, *Mothers,* II, 344-5. (Ed.)

connubium to the plebeians, it had fallen almost entirely out of use. What distinguished this form fundamentally from others was the striking circumstance that it transferred to the husband the full paternal authority over the wife, the *manus,* without purchase, or a year's possession, or any symbol of the kind. It can be asserted with some positiveness that at least a rudimentary suggestion of the purchase or *coernptio* customary among the plebeians would necessarily have been preserved in this ancient form, if the patricians had also acquired their wives by purchase within their connubial league.

This form of marriage necessarily involved a social factor which has become of extreme historical importance through its indirect influence. Specifically it involved mutually recognized conditions with respect to the status of the patrician wife in her husband's house, conditions unparalleled, to our knowledge, on the same stage of culture. The position of the patrician wife as *gaia* by the side of her *gams,*[195] as mistress in her economic sphere as he was master in his, could have resulted, as has happened elsewhere, from a historical compromise between the mother-right and father-right organizations. But the connubial compact, which legend represented as the law of Romulus or as the achievement of the Sabine ancestresses, freed the patrician wife from confinement to the house, a restriction under which the Greek wife lived, and allowed her to appear at the theater, at banquets, and on the street without let or hindrance from her husband. Moreover, it liberated her from the menial labor of preparing the meals and thus distinguished her fundamentally from a wife acquired by the husband as property in any other manner. A house could have fixed such conditions for the daughter it surrendered, only if it contemplated no other compensation for her than that of mutuality.[196] After an agreement in accordance with the stipulations of the league, the father presented the *manus* over his daughter to the bridegroom under conditions to which the latter obligated himself.

[195] "In the ancient Roman ceremony the bride, on the giving of hands, says *ubi tu Gains, ibi ego Gaia"* (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 249). (Ed.)

[196] "The father's love reached out to follow his daughter into matrimony and to secure for her some stipulations which should free wedlock for her from pain or care which other wives had to endure" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 202). (Ed.)

An old Roman law, ascribed by legend to Numa,[197] necessarily presupposes, in our opinion, a connubial compact of this sort. A man, according to the unrestricted paternal authority of early Rome, was at liberty to sell even his son by his true wife into slavery. By this law, however, the father could no longer do so if his son had taken a wife with his permission. The wife, being in the *manus* of his son, would also have been drawn into slavery by the old right. Who could have had an interest in preventing this except the party to the compact who had given the woman only conditionally into the *manus* of her husband? Of the same origin unquestionably was the law, ascribed to Romulus,[198] which forbade the citizen—at that time, of course, only the patrician—to sell his wife. This limitation was entirely inconsistent with the husband's authority over his wife and could again only have been introduced by the contracting party as a restrictive condition. The institution of the kindred court, to which, according to ancient custom, the husband had to listen before he could punish his wife with death, can only have been derived from a similar source. If the state had introduced this limitation of paternal authority, it would in all probability have brought the case before its own court. Moreover, according to the strict logic of the paternal right, the relatives of the wife would have had no claim to be heard, if the compact had not also embraced this case. It is much more difficult to assume that these conditions were attached as exceptions to a formal purchase, which everywhere else gives the husband an unconditional property right.

Still another distinction compels us to encroach upon subjects which should properly be reserved for comprehensive treatment until later. The intercourse of alien groups for the purpose of marriage either presupposes other intercourse or gradually results in it. Hence we find the words *commercium* and *connubium* frequently associated in the mouths of the Romans.[199] When peaceful intercourse is thus extended to the exchange of different ob-
134 jects, the condition of legal isolation in which alien families find themselves by nature is gradually overcome, and protection is

[197] Dionysius *Antiquitates Romance* ii. 27; Plutarch *Numa* xvii.
[198] Plutarch *Romulus* xxii. In this passage we hold to the more usual interpretation.
[199] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 159. (Ed.)

extended to property acquired within the peace union in a recognized way and with the cognizance of its members. Trade must be witnessed by all, disputes must be judged, and protective measures taken. All this makes necessary a definite common meeting place for the members of the association, a sort of public house for this union of the men.

Just as, under a later phase of the cult, each private house makes provision for its own household spirits, so also an analogous cult is associated with the public meeting place. The Romans distinguished clearly between *sacra privata* and sacra *publica.* The former remained untouched by political developments; the latter followed them. It is reported that at one time each *curia,* or primary peace union of ten gentes, had its central meeting place with a Hearth for its *sacra publica.* But, as has frequently been the case, the need of further expanding the peace area compelled these associations to combine with each other into larger units for similar purposes. Thus from the union of ten *curioe* each arose the three ancient tribes of Rome, the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, the confederation of which established old patrician Rome. In accord with this advance, the thirty curial hearths were later combined under one roof and the public cults of the *curia* and tribes brought into association.

Now the patrician connubium was closely involved in these advances. Patrician marriage had to be placed under the protection of the union. It was therefore brought into connection with the stewards of the public sanctuaries, which was not necessary except under those peculiar contractual conditions. Ordinary wife-purchase was connected only with the domestic sanctuaries and consequently dispensed with all priestly mediation. But confarreation, as the patrician contractual form of marriage was called, concerned not only the *sacra privata* but also the *sacra publica* of the peace union or of the state which grew out of it. The public nature of the old patrician wedding is also indicated by the ten witnesses which it required. Rossbach[200] regards these ten men, an unusual number otherwise in Roman civil law, as the representatives of the ten gentes of a *curia.* And there is nothing to prevent our extending this hypothesis and assuming

[200]*Romische Ehe,* p. 118. With respect to the origin of marriage by confarreation, we find it necessary to depart somewhat from the view of this work, to which culture history is deeply indebted for its critical elucidation of an exceedingly important subject.

that the transaction originally took place before the ten patriarchal heads of the *curia* themselves, just as in Athens, where the phratry corresponds to the Roman *curia,* the bride had to be presented to her husband's phrators. This fact, moreover, suggests that the *curia*, like the Athenian phratry, once constituted the primary connubial league and that only later did the organization expand by means of a similar bond embracing a number of *curies.*

This Roman marriage by confarreation, the essential distinguishing characteristic of which is seen to be the absence of purchase, is not, however, entirely unique. Even in Australia we find the custom of offering a girl from one's own tribe in exchange for a girl taken in marriage from an alien tribe. By means of more comprehensive agreements an equitable adjustment could be reached on the basis, as it were, of an average, without necessarily involving a *quid pro quo* in each individual case. This would presuppose, however, a high degree of confidence and a familial solidarity in the contractual union of former foes, a phenomenon actually observable in the patrician germ of the Roman people.

In India we find the connubial league without purchase in that very social group which first shut itself off into a caste and thus sealed the intimacy of the union. Marriage by capture and by purchase are both represented in India even today in certain classes, but covenant marriage is characteristic of the Brahmans. Formerly, to be sure, the priests of Brahma also purchased their wives, but this form gradually dwindled among them to the survival preserved in *arsha* marriage. Even this survival, the pair of cattle which had once constituted the bride-price, is interpreted by a later commentary to the Laws of Manu as only a present to the girl.[201] Nevertheless this form of marriage later came to be regarded as less proper for the Brahmans than the *brahma, daiva,* and *prajapatya* forms. These are distinguished only by traditional forms of handing over the girl and involve no purchase of any sort. This mutuality is restricted, however, to the Brahmans alone; the other castes have no share in it.

The corresponding conditions in Greece are less clear but sufficiently so for our purpose. This much is plain: while marriage by purchase and survivals of capture were widespread in

[201] See *Laws of Manu* iii. 53. (Ed.)

Greece, purchase seems to have become obsolete in Attica in historical times, and precisely here we encounter an ascending system of group alliances very similar to that of Rome. The gentes were united by thirties into phratries, and the phratries by threes into tribes or *phyla,* of which there were four in Attica. No marriages took place within the gens. The frequently cited exception, namely, that a daughter who was the sole survivor of her family and the heir to all its property should be given in marriage only within the gens, really confirms the rule and might even be regarded as an indication that the origin of exogamy is to be traced back more to economic influences than to physiological observations. A dowry representing only a small fraction of the family property was gladly allowed to pass to another gens with the daughter, because by mutuality a greater prize might follow such a stake. As soon as the entire property of a single household was concentrated in the hands of one daughter, however, the probability of a compensating gain vanished, and the theory of exogamy could not hold its own against economic advantage. The associated gentes formed a connubial league amongst themselves, for the legitimacy of marriage in ancient Attica as well as in patrician Rome was dependent upon mutual connubium. Marriages took place within the union without purchase; the *kyrios* of the bride, i.e., the father, grandfather, or brother whose property she was, simply assigned her to the groom.[202]

One part of the patrician confarreation ceremony consisted of "definite and solemn words" spoken before the ten witnesses. The content of these formulas has not come down to us. We may conjecture, however, that they formed with the other rites the substitute for the act of purchase in the other forms of marriage.

Other elements of the confarreation ceremony were the introduction to fire and water, the common meal, which became a sacrificial meal in the presence of the gods, other sacrificial customs, the sitting of the bridal couple on one animal skin, and the presentation of the bride to the divinities of her new home. But all these are found in substance practically universally among even the most unrelated peoples, because they spring from the very nature of marriage. They have arisen from the simple fact of the introduction of the wife into household com-

[202] **Bossbach, *Romische Ehe,* p. 223.**

munity with her husband, and they substantially agree over such wide areas precisely because this was the chief motive for the establishment of the marriage institution in the strict sense.[208] All that is peculiar to patrician Rome in these rites is the preservation in individual cases of forms derived from high antiquity.

One of these ancient rites was the cult act of the wife, who on entering her new house smeared its doorposts with lard. The sense of this ceremony as a sacrificial act need not concern us here. The offering itself, however, carries us back to a time when the hog was the principal domesticated animal of the old Italic peoples. Then came the sheep as a sacrificial animal, and its skin served the newly married couple in ancient fashion as a seat. After a sacrificial rite the bride and groom partook of the staple ancient foods—fruits and salted spelt meal in the form of a cake. From this use of spelt *(far)* the whole ceremony received the name confarreation.[204]

Rome also preserved a very ancient form in the reception of the bride into household community "with fire and water." It was not understood by a later age and was consequently subject to variation, but the fact is nevertheless preserved clearly enough in the traditional ritual. The bride was received with fire and water after crossing the groom's threshold. This did not indicate merely that henceforth the fire and water in the house should be under the care of the wife. Still less did it consist with the harsh conditions of life thus to express symbolically an opinion of the value of these important elements. On the contrary, we must remember that, in the exogamy existing under father-right, the wife entered the house of her husband as a stranger to the tribe and also that the exchange of fire and water among tribal strangers was the oldest object of a dawning peaceful intercourse. The alien wife, having been lifted forcibly over the

[208] **Lippert discusses these wedding ceremonies in a section not translated herewith *(Kulturgeschichte,* II, 140-56). (Ed.)**

20*"The Roman ritual . . . gives the name to the whole ceremony: *confarreatio* is the sharing of a cake made of *far* (spelt). The use of spelt is characteristic, and points to a period when wheat was probably unknown, while barley and spelt were the only sown grains. The cake shared in the Patrician ceremony was not an ordinary one: it is described as *mola salsa,* i.e., a baked cake of roughly ground corn, and thus assigns the ritual to the later stone period" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 251-2). (Ed.)

threshold, thus received, therefore, the quieting assurance that she was not coming to savage strangers but that she enjoyed the protection of the peace union. At least this interpretation comes closest to the old formula, "to be received with water and fire."[205]

This ancient form was customary, however, not merely in confarreation but in every type of Roman marriage. It expressed, as it were, the lowest stage of a reception into community of life, just as the common meal gave expression to the higher stage of household community, the union of the separate economic spheres of the two sexes. The fact that the common household was made up of two elements was also well expressed in the wedding ritual. The bride entered the house of her husband bringing not only distaff and spindle but also a basket of cereals[206] as her share of the common food, the German *Musteil.*[207] Even though the Romans had early made the fortunate advance of transferring the cultivation of cereals to the hands of the man, all traces of the old division of labor by sex had nevertheless not disappeared. Rossbach says that grain might very properly have been called the food supply of the married woman, "for the principal business of the materfamilias consists, according to the ancient law of Romulus, in the preparation of the breadstuffs for the meals and private sacrifice, while the rest of the *cena*, the slaughtering of the animal and the preparation of the meat, was left to the man."[208] Even in the matter of sacrifices, the offering of meat was always the affair of the man, while the Vestalia, a feast which only the matrons celebrated, was called the feast of breads.

From the common property of the household, the joint store of food acquired by both sexes in their separate spheres of activity, one luxury, curiously enough, was omitted. Like seal blubber among the Greenlanders and pork and kava among the Polynesians, wine was reserved for the refreshment of the men alone. It was a capital crime for the woman of ancient Rome to

205 Sources cited in Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* pp. 36ff.

206 *"Cumerum in quo erant nubentis utensilia"* (Festus *De verborum significatione* s.v. *"cumerum"). "Utensilia ex quibus alitur hominum genus aut colitur"* (Columella *De re rustica* xii. 3). See Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* p. 320.

207 See above, p. 273. (Ed.)

208 Cf., Pliny *Naturalis historia* xviii. 11. 28.

taste this beverage, as the legend of Egnantius Mecenius shows, and Cato is said to have put it on a par with adultery.[209] This fact clearly indicates that the cultivation of the vine did not become known to the Romans until long after agriculture had ceased to be part of woman's economic sphere. In the ritual of marriage the bride brought cereals to her husband, but no wine. The man, as the agriculturalist and owner of the soil, had received it from abroad, and there was no old custom and no ancient agreement to force him to mingle this precious product of his economy with the fruits of the woman's labor as common property. It was likewise quite natural for a later age to interpret this custom as a social precaution and to attribute it to a moral motive.

[209] **Gellius *Nodes Atticoe* x. 23.**

CHAPTER IX

DISINTEGRATION OF THE PATRIARCHAL FAMILY

The chapters on religion [1] will show us repeatedly how incorrect it would be to attempt to reconstruct the evolution of social organization from the progressive advances of common foresight alone. The impulse and goal of progress reside, to be sure, in this factor. But the ways and means which we might rationally conclude from our store of ideas today to be the natural ones, by no means completely coincide with the actual historical ones. It is, on the contrary, characteristic of the evolution of mankind that on each stage it has been stimulated and directed by a subjective element, its store of ideas. We can not reconstruct this influential store of ideas from the objectivity of things as we know it today, but only in relation to the subjective capacity of man at a particular time to comprehend it. Undoubtedly man has gone astray on devious paths in his interpretation of objective reality. Nevertheless both individually and collectively the results seem to confirm the idea of Lessing that in striving lies blessing. Thus on these devious paths of trial and error man has created, or rather acquired incidentally, a series of means adapted to bring about social integration and an extension of foresight.[2] These factors have played an important role in the evolution of the patriarchal family.

Within the patriarchal family two developments in particular attract our attention, namely, the transition to monogamy and the victory of a new concept of paternity, the idea of the direct relationship of father and child. In the former case a number of different factors operate together, and the advance proceeds through countless almost imperceptible transitions. We must confine ourselves to indicating the most important.

Chief among these is the position of the "first wife," surviving

[1] In the original, the present chapter follows those on religion. (Ed.)
[2] I.e., the blood bond, cult union, etc. See Chapter XII. (Ed.)

from the time of mother-right.[8] This position arises from the fact that in the union of man and woman the chief emphasis is placed, not on the sexual relation, but on the mutually advantageous combination of two separate and complementary economic spheres. Consequently the relative status of husband and wife must logically depend upon the importance of their economic spheres for the maintenance of life. In particular the woman will become a mistress or wife coequal with her husband to the extent that her economic sphere, like his, requires management and supervision as well as labor. Even the Australian woman, to be sure, has her special economic sphere, but the performance of her labor requires no management. Hence she has fallen to the status of a beast of burden, the pack animal of her husband. Should, however, an advance be made in her sphere, even if only in the technic of clothing with all that it involves, this will so complicate the labor and the cares of maintenance and management in the household that a controlling will becomes necessary, the more so the larger the number of women in the household. And if on top of this appears agriculture with all the foresight it involves, this administrative head of the female economic sphere not only becomes all the more indispensable, but she likewise gains equal rank with the man as a support of the family. Hence we shall have to look for the first forms of domestic organization approaching monogamy in an agricultural civilization, and as a matter of fact there is where they are to be found.

Even if the fundamental idea upon which the whole patriarchate is based theoretically reduces the wife to a chattel of her husband, she nevertheless no longer enters his house without property like a captured or purchased slave. Her own economic sphere requires a nucleus of capital. This she draws in part from the stock of her maternal household in the form of the dowry. It is increased by the bride-price, which it gradually becomes customary for her father to turn over to her, and by the morning gift from her husband. According to strict legal theory, to be sure, all this is still the property of the husband indirectly through his wife. Nevertheless the profitable use of this capital, of which the wife alone is capable, gives her a high

[8] For a collection of cases on the "first wife," see Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* **III, 28-38. (Ed.)**

degree of independence, which another woman, bound to the man only by affection or a property right, could not enjoy.

This relation, however, also presupposes a connubial league. A woman acquired from an alien tribe by capture or unconditional purchase lacks all means of establishing such a position of independence. Within a connubial league, however, the opposite tendency inevitably asserts itself. A father who renounces the bride-price in one form or another and permits the removal of a dowry from his house, can not possibly tolerate a menial position for his daughter in return. He stipulates for her the position of *gaia* beside her *gains.* But it is implicit in the very conception of this position that it be unique and unshared.

We must therefore regard the monogamous form of marriage as peculiar to the economic stage of agriculture and the social stage of the connubial league,[4] and the facts of ethnography accord with this. Monogamy tends to prevail in proportion as these two conditions coexist and to lag behind as the one or the other is absent. The most backward among civilized peoples in this respect are for the most part those who, although their organization includes the connubial league, nevertheless still stand closer to nomadism or a kindred life of exploitation and dominion than to agriculture or the vocations which have followed it. And in one and the same nation, as among the Germanic peoples, the one condition alters with time exactly in proportion to the other.

The ancient Hindus, a people primarily devoted to conquest and cattle raising, were still a long way from monogamy. To be sure, we must regard law as the codification of custom, and the Hindu law permitted the lowest caste only one wife. Yet this was by no means an expression of a moral principle or even a recognition of the moral superiority of monogamy. Poverty everywhere practices monogamy by necessity. The higher classes were polygynous, and the Brahmans, who in conservative fashion retained a contempt for agriculture, were also allowed the largest number of wives, three or four. Poverty so extreme that it could not even support one wife must have seemed to the Hindu an incalculable calamity, for it deprived him of offspring to carry on his cult and thus of the prospect of a tolerable afterlife and a rebirth under more favorable conditions. The basis of this idea, the fear of childlessness as necessarily involving a future lack of

[4]Cf., Briffault, *Mothers,* II, 255. (Ed.)

a cult, prevails throughout the territory of Oriental civilization and reappears in an extreme form in Egypt. In this whole region it is a powerful check to celibacy, and even among agricultural peoples who have arrived at monogamy it can still bring back polygyny in exceptional cases.

This same fear has led in various culture areas to the custom of the *levirate*[5] whereby a husband who has died childless is replaced in the marriage union by his brother in order to raise up a son to the deceased to carry on his cult. This is enjoined as a duty by the Laws of Manu* As is well known, levirate marriage was also obligatory among the ancient Hebrews. This correspondence points to the same original motive. Since, however, among the Hebrews all private cults were suppressed in favor of hierarchical cult unity, this motive necessarily disappeared from the records. Hence a levirate duty like that of the Hindus developed into a levirate marriage, the first-born son of which succeeded to the name of the deceased brother "that his name be not put out of Israel."[7] Doubtless the Greek right of substitution once rested on the same basis,[8] and Grimm[9] has deduced an analogous Germanic custom from old peasant lore.

The principal Mohammedan peoples belong to conquering and predatory ruling tribes, only rarely regard agriculture as their chief source of food, and pursue it themselves even more infrequently. Hence the same condition prevails among them as in ancient India, namely, legal polygyny with a chief wife along with the actual monogamy of poverty. The ancient Hebrews were on the same stage. They too were a Bedouin-like folk, who in a long struggle seized the "protectorate" over the more advanced Canaanitish agricultural tribes and took up agriculture themselves only gradually and not in a thoroughgoing manner until their return from the Exile. After they had made this
609 transition, polygyny with a chief wife here too gave way to monogamy.

Among the Greeks and Romans, on the other hand, agriculture

[5] For a discussion of the levirate, see Appendix D. Cases collected in Briffault, *Mothers*, I. 766-81; Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*, II, 263-341; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, HI, 1901-4; IV, 1066-60; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, III, 207-21. (Ed.)

[6] *Law of Mann* ix. 59. 145; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, I, 780.

[7] Deuteronomy xxv. 5-6.

[8] Plutarch *Lycurgus* xv. 2; Xenophon *Respublica Lacedcemoniorum* i. 7.

• *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer*, pp. 443ff.

was early raised to a par with cattle raising, and among the former it was extended through Phoenician influence to the arts of settled life. Hence definite monogamy makes its appearance among them contemporaneously with connubial leagues. Greece still preserved a legendary recollection of the earlier condition and assigned the introduction of monogamy in Attica to the time of Cecrops.[10] Christianity, sprung from this soil, sanctioned the existing law, at the same time idealizing and intensifying it. Exclusive monogamy found especial support in its teachings since its first sphere of propagation was mainly among the poor, and monogamy has always been indigenous to poverty.[11]

The notion that the higher form of marriage existed in great purity among the Germanic peoples as a typical national characteristic, rests on a mistaken conception. Tacitus,[12] whose report might be so interpreted, had in mind those Germanic tribes which had been penned up on the Roman border for more than a century and were beginning through sheer necessity to seek their salvation in agriculture. Moreover, what he stresses is the monogamy of poverty. The wealthy and the noble still practiced polygyny at his time; hence it might even have been regarded as a mark of distinction. But among the tribes which, like the Norse, clung longer to the nomadic mode of life, polygyny remained in force more generally. Adam of Bremen[13] brings out the correlative factors in their close relation with reference to the Scandinavians. He commends cattle raising as the most excellent thing in the land, and he also dwells on honey, at which culture history always looks askance. Moreover, he says the land was full of "foreign wares," i.e., the booty of a predatory Viking livelihood. And—the chief pride of men on this stage—"in their relation to the women they know no moderation. Each has, according to the amount of his property, two or three or more of them at the same time; the rich and the princes have innumerable." That this refers to legal and coequal wives, not concubines and slaves, is indicated by an observation as to the status of the children.

[10] Athenseus *Deipnosophists* xiii.

[11] "It [pair marriage] existed, by necessity of poverty and humble social status, in the classes amongst whom Christianity took root" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 375). (Ed.)

[12] *Germania* xviii. (Ed.)

[13] *Historia ecclesiastica* iv. 21.

The spread of agriculture and Christianity aided in suppressing polygyny uniformly earlier among the continental Germans than among the Scandinavians. The practice vanished wherever a cereal drink supplanted mead. But the transition did not begin by restricting the man, even under Christianity. On the contrary, first of all the secondary and subordinate wife was depressed to a more and more unfavorable status in favor of the first wife. Custom continued to allow the husband to satisfy his desires without trespassing on the property of another, for, according to the historical origin of the marriage institution, sexual gratification was neither the only nor even the most important factor in the marriage union. But the position of the secondary wife sank lower and lower in the estimation of a more advanced age. The line of demarcation between the free woman obtained by agreement within the connubial league for true marriage, and the purchased slave woman, was drawn more and more strictly, until finally the chief wife, the mistress of the household, was separated insuperably from the concubines and handmaids, who were differently acquired.[14]

The children were the first to feel the effects of the differentiation in status. The secondary wives, according to Adam, did not as yet experience any sort of legal disadvantage among the early Swedes. But their children were classed with those of bondmaids, or at least approached them in condition. They were regarded as not legitimate, not entitled by birth to succeed to authority. The first wife had secured this important right exclusively for her children, the children of the contractual marriage. Naturally this distinction could appear only where the principle of paternal authority had developed, hence only under the strict patriarchal family. The Indians knew no such distinction. Even the ancient Egyptians, whose peculiar cultural development did not pass through the nomadic stage, are said to have been unacquainted with it.[15]

These consequences to the children must naturally in time have made the position of their mother seem undesirable to a self-respecting house for its daughter. Thus the reproach of inferiority fell upon the position itself, and more remotely,

[14] "The ideal transition from polygyny to monogamy is formed by the legal limitation of the wives and the preference accorded to a leading wife, the real mistress" (Muller, *Das sezuelk Leben,* p. 37). (Ed.)

[15] Diodorus *Bibliotheca historica* i. 80. (Ed.)

aided by ecclesiastical teachings, a shadow of condemnation must also have fallen on the man who created and maintained such a position. But the ethical vision of man had still to be greatly sharpened before he recognized this shadow, and perceived a disgrace in what had formerly been a mark of distinction. This refinement had not yet advanced far in the early Middle Ages. Eginhard, the biographer of Charlemagne, mentions four of the latter's secondary wives by name and has forgotten that of a fifth.

The lower classes naturally took the lead in this development, not merely on account of their relative poverty, but primarily because only in their households did the leading wife take a place beside her husband as an indispensable helpmeet in production and management. The recognition of her equal rank obtained in this way began to create a mental and emotional intimacy between husband and wife which, in a refined civilization where the laws of peace were extended even to the impulses of the emotional life, gradually induced the husband, who was less fettered as a result of the historical development, to assume out of fairness the same obligations of restraint which the wife bore for his sake. In classical antiquity we should find few examples of this latter advance.

The celebrated "woman cult" of the Middle Ages likewise had nothing in common with it.[16] It was, on the contrary, a dying echo, though often a shrill one, of a decadent form of life. Moreover, however paradoxical it may seem, it was not entirely incomparable to the longing for this and allied antiquated forms which were reflected from out the dim past in the nightmare of witchcraft. The sunset glow presents forms and colors in glaring exaggeration. The image of this cult, only rarely beautiful, fluctuated between extravagant fantasy and crude reality. It often revealed itself clearly enough as the negation of the marital and paternal right and its train of social laws. Every social advance involves some restriction, some loss or other. The gain is purchased at the cost of such sacrifices. Man often does not truly appreciate the value of a thing until it begins to disappear, and then, seized with longing, he idealizes it and wraps himself in his ideal. This frame of mind is reflected in the phenomenon of

16 "The woman cult was a cult of free love and was hostile to honorable marriage" (Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 370). (Ed.)

chivalrous *Minne* service. An aristocratic social class which frequented the courts of the lords sought to bring back into life once more, not the simple past, but an ideal of it—without success. The ideal melted away,, and a later age lifted in another way the irksome pressure of social restrictions.

It is in accordance with the nature of things, however, that the sensuously stimulated *Minne* period gave rise to an abundance of literature, while the secular evolution of social forms found no singer, no historian, indeed not even an observer. The guardians of custom and morality, who might have been stimulated to observe it, had their glance turned toward the past, as is regularly the case. For this reason the censors never see the progress of their own age. Now it is the regular course of events for us to infer the goal of socio-ethical movements from their direction and to set up this goal as the ideal of the law. This is, of course, in itself a thing of the future and still to be attained. But the masses of mankind do not act from rational grounds and do not find a motivating force in a future something which will redound to the benefit of society at the expense of the individual. Indeed this connection is, in general, never recognized save by a few. Hence there is need of another motive for approaching the ideal or—what is the same thing—for promoting social progress.

Throughout the range of social organization man has found such a motive, one peculiar to him, in the sanction of the cult, i.e., of religion. Everything which man finds by experience to be advantageous, yet which does not possess a sufficiently effective incentive to activity in the knowledge of its causal relations, is attached to this universal motor.[17] The universal importance of the cult, however, is correlated with its antiquity. This in turn, since it extends back beyond human memory and is therefore beyond criticism, is the main support of the cult. This relation leads of necessity to the contradiction of ascribing, in all complex cases, the law, its acceptance, and its model observance to a dim primitive age. An equally necessary consequence thereof is that each succeeding generation appears to be miserably decadent with respect to the fulfillment of the law. Hence civilized man seems

17 "Every code of human morals from the earliest times to the present day has this thoroughly characteristic peculiarity: the product of actual occurrences and real relations is everywhere explained by and derived from imaginary circumstances, and men cannot comprehend a moral idea otherwise" (Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 173). (Ed.)

from stage to stage to approach moral degeneration, while actually with ever new sacrifices of self-restraint he is building toward the perfection of a universal human foresight and a moral order of a scope and complexity never attained in the past. Therefore the moral teachers, who at all times in the same tenor complain of our relapses and never speak of the faintest improvement, are themselves acting in accordance with a compelling law.

But this is, of course, not the only contradiction by which the artificial regulation of the principle of human culture may be recognized. The whole relation conceals a contradiction in itself, and this must gradually come to be felt and eventually even clearly recognized by man, as advancing morality and the cult sanction ascribed to the remote past draw farther and farther apart. The more abundant and circumstantial is the cult literature, the more faithfully piety has fixed its content, and the more conscious thinking humanity becomes of its moral advances and their underlying principle, the more dubious the established cult literature will seem as the history of our ideals. Thus the contradiction inherent in the social structure will come to light in this way also. In the Sixteenth Century it was still possible to refer the observance of the canon of morality to the standards set by the Old Testament biographies, but today it is becoming extremely difficult to do so without doing them the greatest violence.[18]

But this phenomenon is characteristic not alone of the contradiction between our civilization and the cult literature prescribed for it, as though the peculiar nature of both were its cause; it necessarily appears wherever life has advanced to a certain level. The first record of the recognition of this contradiction is found at the very beginning of all classical historical writing, in Herodotus. He indicates his doubts concerning the cult literature of his time, the myths ascribed to the redaction of Homer and Hesiod. Indeed from the moral tendency of his entire work he regards this type of religious ideas as incapable of acting as the sanction of the prevailing principle of morality.

At the time of Strabo, his successor in the attempt to formulate an ethnological account of culture, the contradiction was no

18On this whole subject see Sumner's illuminating essay on "Religion and the Mores" *(War*, pp. 129-46). (Ed.)

longer discreetly intimated; it was the common knowledge of the educated world. Indeed the contradiction had become so apparent that men refused to acknowledge any conformity to law in the formation of cult legends, but regarded them merely as conscious fabrications. But the knowledge of the time had not forgotten their object, the sanction of the moral law. Indeed Strabo [19] was acquainted with it in the crude form aimed at by certain African cults today. "The great mass of women and common people cannot be induced by mere force of reason to devote themselves to piety, virtue, and honesty; superstition must therefore be employed, and even this is insufficient without the aid of the marvelous and the terrible. For what are the thunderbolts, the aegis, the trident, the torches, the dragons, the barbed thyrses, the arms of the gods, and all the paraphernalia of antique theology, but fables employed by the founders of states, as bugbears to frighten timorous minds. Such was mythology; and when our ancestors found it capable of subserving the purposes of social and political life, and even contributing to the knowledge of truth, they continued the education of childhood to maturer years, and maintained that poetry was sufficient to form the understanding of every age. In course of time history and our present philosophy were introduced; these, however, suffice but for the chosen few, and to the present day poetry is the main agent which instructs our people."

Are these not to the word the very same antitheses and considerations which come into conflict even in our own age? But they are not characteristic alone of Strabo's time, nor of ours. The conflict is inevitable in every advanced civilization, and the antitheses are inherent in the laws of human history. The insight into the causal relations of moral phenomena, "history and philosophy," necessarily increases, but with it grows the fear of weakening the sanction which promotes obedience to the moral law. .Even the attempts at reconciliation seem to reveal the same conformity to law at all times. The true moral Philistine will always regard himself with a few friends as the only portion of mankind whom the revelation of the causal relations of the moral order can not injure but can suffice as a motive of action. He will, however, be in great apprehension lest the rest of mankind should also wish to lean on the same staff. He will claim

[19] *Geography,* p. 19 (i. 2. 8).

one philosophy of life for himself and desire another for the "women and common people."

Classical antiquity, however, did not have the results it desired from this cleavage. Christianity penetrated through the "women and common people" and destroyed all belief in the old cult literature. But the distinction itself was still feasible in antiquity, for it rested on the basis of the whole organization of society. Since the dissolution of the property right of the father and the consequent restriction of his authority, however, we modern civilized men lack any substantial foundation for such a cleavage. The border line between those whom we should like to educate by reason and those by the authority of the cult is in a constant state of flux, and we can not deny that its mobility is itself a factor in cultural progress, for the peoples among whom it has been drawn the lowest are certainly not the most backward. We must admit that it is not entirely illogical to see a social utility in a stabilization of the border line, but it is beyond the range of possibility. All that man in his subjection to the laws of social evolution can do to avoid the dangers of this inevitable cultural struggle is to proceed wisely from a full and clear understanding of historical continuity. It is not to be denied that there are social dangers in this conflict, but they are not as great as is commonly feared. We can not overlook the fact that thousands of years of discipline by a principle, the forms of interpreting which have necessarily been convulsed again and again, have created and left behind among peoples of self-achieved civilization a sum of social and moral instincts which, while they afford, to be sure, no guarantee against every misstep, nevertheless must constitute a powerful support of morality.

Experience shows that standards of morality have been improved and elevated even during the periods when civilized peoples have begun to divest themselves more and more of the last remnants of a daimonistic world philosophy. This can not possibly be denied with respect to the subject we are just leaving. From another aspect, however, the statistics of crime might seem to give grounds for fear that the actual practice of morality does not conform to the elevated code to the same extent as formerly, that this difference will increase more and more to the great detriment of society, and that this is the downward path which our civilization is following. So long, however, as we admit—and we must do so unconditionally with respect to the last few centuries—that moral demands and moral delicacy and refinement of feeling are rising in any degree whatsoever, no statistics can destroy the conviction that by and large the extent to which they are practiced is also on the increase. For, as all the facts which we have adduced show, it is an inverted conception of history and society which regards the moral law as preceding and, by some supernatural power, creating the practice of morality. Historically the opposite is the case; the law blossoms out of practice. Hence in centuries during which moral sentiments have been refined, practice can not, on the whole, have declined.

Another point of social significance is the revolution in physiological notions concerning the share of the parents in the new life. To this subject also no historian has turned his attention. Only the results of the change can be ascertained, and they indicate that opinion first of all swung from the older and widespread idea of strict matrilineal descent to the opposite extreme, before it arrived at an equitable compromise. From this peculiar evolution we may conclude that the ideas in question were not determined by the nature of the case but were at least stimulated by the conditions of family organization actually existing at the time.

Egypt in its thousands of years of cultural evolution passed through the various phases. While it clung to striking survivals of mother-right, it nevertheless, if we may believe Diodorus, arrived at the most extreme view of patrilineal descent and applied it with the strictest logical consistency. The office of nomarch or governor of a district was undoubtedly older than that of the institutional priest, for certainly here as elsewhere the heads of peace unions combined the priestly and governmental functions before an established priesthood was differentiated. The hereditary succession to the two offices, moreover, illustrates the two successive principles. The older office was transmitted according to mother-right or nephew-right; the younger passed from father to son. Thus while the district unions, like the Iroquois League, were established at a time when the man undertook the preservation of the peace only as a support of the woman, with whom the true authority rested, a paternal authority similar to that of the patriarchate had developed before the origin of a hereditary priesthood. This new authority found, and perhaps even sought, a support in the changed conception of the shares of the parents in reproduction. According to Diodorus,[20] the Egyptians of his time, who except for the priests were polygynous, believed that the father was the sole agent in generation while the mother merely carried and nourished the child. Moreover, they drew the logical inference from this one-sided conception. To them no children were illegitimate. Even those born of a purchased slave woman were the legitimate children of their father.[21]

The ancient Hebrews seem to have arrived at an intermediate conception. Nevertheless the more essential parts, the bones and flesh, were apparently ascribed to the father, while the blood supply was attributed to the mother. This view, however, is supported only by weak intimations, as when the relationship of men is indicated by expressions like "thy bone and thy flesh,"[22] which contrast strikingly enough with the more usual emphasis on common blood. This idea seems to appear somewhat more clearly in the complaints of Job.[23]

The theme of the *Eumenides* of AEschylus, the social significance of which Bachofen was the first to point out, would seem to imply that the Greeks had arrived at the same extreme view as the Egyptians.[24] It should also be noted, however, that this remarkable tragedy portrays the conflict between the two principles, so that the contrasts are necessarily brought out rather sharply. The Eumenides or Erinyes are the old deities of blood revenge; Apollo is the *patroos,* the paternal tribal god of his people. The former recognize only mother-right and matrilineal descent; the latter enforces patrilineal kinship with similarly one-sided zeal. A new god overthrows an old right in order to elevate a new one to the throne.[25] There is an unfailing touchstone for distinguishing the two rights, namely, the duty of blood

[20] *Bibliotheca historica* i. 80.

[21] The interpretation here is clearly incorrect. Egyptian society **was** characterized by matrilineal descent and marked matriarchal features. Illegitimacy was unknown, therefore, because of the prevalence, not of strict father-right, but of mother-right. See Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 380. (Ed.)

[22] 2 Samuel v. 1.

[23] Job x. 11.

[24] See Lecky, *European Morals,* II, 280; Sumner, *Folkways,* p. **498.** (Ed.)

[25] AEschylus *Eumenides* **748.**

revenge. Clytemnestra has slain Agamemnon, her husband. Which law shall their son Orestes follow? Is he the son of his mother or of his father? In the latter case the duty of revenge falls upon him; in the former it does not. The Erinyes do not recognize the son's obligation of blood revenge, for his mother was not blood-related to her husband. Apollo the new god, however, demands revenge of the father's son, for "she is not the mother who is called the parent of the child, but nurse of the newly-sown offspring. But the male is the generative source, and she like a stranger preserves the plant for a stranger, for those whom the god may not have injured."[26]

What the poet here portrays in a striking and tragic case had actually come to pass. A complete revolution in physiological ideas had occurred, as is proved by other sources. At an early period the sperm took the place of the blood in Greek speculation. It seemed as though in this transition man had taken a long step nearer to the first cause of things. The generative power of water is more universal than that of blood. All things, even the inanimate, could be traced back with greater probability to this primary substance, which was considered essential even in the sperm. Hence Anaxagoras had already called the elements of things seeds,[27] and Aristotle[28] regarded the idea that everything has developed from a seed as already very old. These speculations are without doubt connected with our subject.

To Plato[29] also the question has long been decided in the later sense. In his peculiar and much admired cosmic system the man, in contrast to earlier popular notions, has the first place even in time. The reader will recall that man was also created first and woman from him according to the Hebrew tradition, while the myths of all peoples on a low stage seek the origin of the race in a maternal ancestress. The social and ethical abasement of woman in Plato accords with the above idea. She who for untold thousands of years had been the pillar of the history of young mankind now became a weak vessel devoid of a will of her own. No longer did she manage her husband's household; these services were forgotten in a slave state. She was merely an apparatus, not as yet replaced by another invention, for the propagation of the race, a receptacle for the homunculus.

[26] AEschylus *Eumenides* 628-9.
[27] Simplicius *De coelo* 148b.
[28] *Meteora* xii. 7.
[29] *Timosus* xliv.

Although the Bible, like Plato, has woman created later than man, it nevertheless does not make her morally lower. On the contrary, it reflects the actual condition in an agricultural state, for she is created as "an help meet for him" after he has sought in vain among all the animals placed at his disposal for one that might be such a help to him. This juxtaposition, to be sure, is not entirely flattering. Nevertheless the woman appears as mistress in her economic sphere as the relation is regarded by an agricultural and formerly patriarchal people.

The strange manner of Eve's origin, mentioned incidentally, might be regarded as a substruction of the later conception of parenthood expressed in the figure of speech alluded to above. According to this, the Hebrews designated the direct physical relationship with the man, which had taken the place of "blood" relationship, as "bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,"[30] and a kindred expression speaks of offspring issuing "from the loins" of the man. Under matrilineal descent there had been no difficulty in deriving the first man from an original mother. The epic representation of the reverse process, however, set a much harder task. Yet some substruction or other had to be made in order to give epic expression to the conceptions of the time. The contemporary physiology, however, offered no assistance for the solution of this task other than that incorporated in the above figures of speech. Hence the woman had to issue from the loins of the man as a piece of his bone, and thus, by a combination of the two, from a rib. When Adam saw the creature thus formed, he could actually say, "This is now bone of my bones." The peculiar physiological and epic problem was thus solved; the first woman was now descended from the first man—an inversion of the earlier conception.

Plato had no choice but to make woman also morally lower. He required a degeneration of the men in order to form women from the cowardly among them. These traits of the Platonic world philosophy reflect a social condition where, with increased wealth, woman's sphere of economic activity had been placed in the hands of a slave hierarchy, so that the woman actually served only for breeding, never as a housewife, and could become prominent only as a hetaira. Perhaps these very traits contributed to make Plato the favorite of medieval scholas-

[30] Genesis ii. 23.

ticism, the child of monasticism. Even today his ecstatic "idealism" can not be coolly and critically examined with impunity.

In Greece, and especially in Athens, a deterioration in the status of women went hand in hand with these notions on the one hand and with the above-mentioned economic factor on the other. This is shown by the contrast between the Athenian housewife and the poetic pictures of the women of an earlier and ruder age, "pictures of perennial beauty, which Rome and Christendom, chivalry and modern civilization, have neither eclipsed nor transcended."[81] We look in vain for such pictures at the time of the height and power of Athens. They may possibly have continued in those circles which afterwards first turned to Christianity, but that this was not the case in higher circles is clear and comprehensible.

As a result of the hegemony of Athens in Greece, politics had become the exclusive work of its aristocratic families. In this work, however, the wife could no longer be the helpmeet of her husband. Moreover, even such conduct of the household as she still retained was now no longer equal in value to the work of the man. Conditions appeared which were later repeated in Rome in a similar way but on a larger scale. The political occupation of the men brought to Athens, directly or indirectly, treasures by comparison with which the products of agriculture and domestic economy seemed as naught. Hence the prestige of these latter occupations necessarily sank proportionately. The Homeric kings and the Roman patricians of early times were husbandmen who did not scorn to put their own hands to the plow, but the Athenian citizen in the age of splendor was ashamed at the thought of such labor. The increasing wealth was converted into an abundance of slaves. The domestic occupations developed into industries carried on by manufacturing, and slipped from the hands of the housewife. Her place was taken by managers and foremen from the ranks of the slaves, who were trained for their services in a division of labor. This economic organization left no place for the woman. She retained only the charm of sex, and whenever woman is or must be content with this alone, her status sinks. What had elevated her to her earlier position was her labor and its value.

To be sure, it is possible for woman to advance to a new type

[51] **Lecky, *European Morals,* II, 279.**

of valuable service when her material contribution is debased by economic and social influences. She can again become the helpmeet of man in some new form of division of labor. Indeed she must do so to maintain her position. This, however, presupposes a more symmetrical development of her intellectual education and a more adequate expansion of her horizon than was permitted by the old Greek house, which still clung to an ancient form of segregation of the sexes. Just as all preoccupation with politics was the exclusive affair of the union of the men, i.e., of the state which had developed from it and with which woman had no direct connection, so also the educational facilities were exclusively limited to the men. Created by them alone, they were accessible to them alone. Hence the Athenian woman found every path barred to a sphere of activity which might have been comparable to that of the man.

Rome no longer shows signs of the old segregation of the sexes. Its history begins with an intimate union of the two economic spheres on the basis of an equality impaired only by abstract legal concepts. Hence the status of woman was here never so vastly inferior to that of the man, although the same influences of a later age asserted themselves here in an infinitely greater degree. According to Legouve,[32] we must include the Romans, as well as the Hindus, among the advanced peoples who supported the social relation between man and wife by the later physiological theory. Thence it found ready acceptance among the teachers of Christianity, especially since the Bible did not seem to contradict it and since monastic asceticism saw the image of woman only in the distorted mirror of tormentingly resisted lust. Brave resistance was stimulated by means of an artificial hatred, and the victor could indulge in contempt. Legouve refers to a place in Thomas Aquinas where the latter derives from this physiological idea the proposition that one should love one's father more than one's mother,[83] a principle contrary to the practice of all savage peoples.

Among the early Germanic peoples we have already found clear traces of matrilineal descent, and this principle was even incorporated to some extent in the folk laws. The child belonged, to be sure, to its father, and its fate was decided immediately after

[32] *Histoire morale des femmes,* pp. 216-28.
33 See also Lecky, *European Morods,* I I , 280. (Ed.)

its birth by its being "taken up" or not taken up.[84] It belonged to him, however, not in consequence of any idea of patrilineal descent,[35] but only because and in so far as its mother belonged to him.[36] The principle was the same as that expressed so bluntly and unequivocally in the Hindu Laws of Manu, namely, that the child belongs to its father just as the owner of a cow becomes the owner of its calf.

The German legal relation, although based on this principle, did not remain unshaken, and the change can probably be ascribed to intercourse with the Romans. Among the Franks we find it emphasized at first in so extreme a fashion that we are reminded of the report of Diodorus concerning the ancient Egyptians. In the second half of the Fifth Century King Guntram had elevated Austrigilde from the status of servitude to be his wife. Sagittarius was accused of having disputed the right of the children of this marriage to the royal succession, and in this he undoubtedly represented the old principle correctly. But Gregory of Tours [87] counters with the significant observation: "He did not realize that now, without regard to the family of the wives, all are called king's children who are begotten by kings." And from the later history of the same century he cites an example which shows that this extreme principle certainly prevailed at that time. Since this principle necessarily presupposes the recognition of the relationship between father and child, a reversal in genealogical ideas had taken place here also, and indeed not long before this time.

This matter was also of great practical importance in another way with regard to the status of the children of mixed marriages. The confusion on this point, evidenced by the law, seems to have arisen from the fact that in each case the interested parties seized upon the legal conception which was the more favorable to them. It is stated that the princes had at one time decreed that

[34] "One of the further results in law is the necessity of acknowledging the relationship between father and child when it is not regarded as natural. Primitive tribes demand a special acknowledgement, a 'seisin' of the child. In the common form the taking up of the child by the father directly after birth . . . constitute[s] the establishment of the legal relationship" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 198). (Ed.)

[35] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer,* p. 449.

[36] "In all cases the principle obtains that the children belong to the male to whom the wife belongs" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 197). (Ed.)

[37] *Historia ecclesiastica Francorum* V. 20.

in the marriage of a free man with a slave woman, who in this case must naturally also have been his property, the children should in all cases inherit the status of their father,[88] hence that patrilineal descent alone should prevail. Then it is said to have been decided that the children of mixed marriages should be divided according to their sex. Again at the time of Emperor Frederick I it was decreed that matrilineal descent alone should prevail, and this principle was reaffirmed by Archbishop Wichmann with the declaration that it should be valid—naturally within his jurisdiction—for the Germans as well as for the Wends. From the stress on the latter point one might conclude that the appearance of the Slavs had caused the principle of patrilineal descent, which had already been adopted by the Germans, to falter again, so that the possibility offered itself to the great lords to hark back to matrilineal descent in keeping with their advantage. Since the Slavs in this conquered territory, even though left on their estates, had nevertheless become unfree, it would naturally be more frequent for a German colonist to marry a Slav girl than for a Slav to marry a free German woman. Consequently, by applying the principle of matrilineal descent, the feudal lord gained a considerable number of subjects who would otherwise have been freemen. Thus the idea of patrilineal descent advancing from the west suffered a check from the east.

The Christian church as such, so far as we know, made no decision on this question. In another way, however, it exerted an important influence on social development in the territory of the modern civilized states. The ecclesiastical law did not decide the question of descent in marriages between freemen and slaves, but it gave the force of law to the incipient monogamous limitation of marriage and thereby in a very decisive manner finally decided the fate of a considerable portion of the population, to be sure in a way quite in accordance with the tendency of the whole development.[89] The church sanctioned only what already existed as law. Nevertheless this sanction of an authority,
522 now so generally recognized, was of practical importance.

There can be no doubt that, in Scandinavia at least, polygynous unions were still frequent even after the introduction of

[33] *Weichbild* iii.
[39] **See Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 415. (Ed.)**

Christianity, and that they had not been entirely eradicated even among the continental Germans. The institution of the first wife and the tendency of the connubial leagues had, to be sure, already restricted the succession to authority to the "legitimate" children of this one wife. This limitation has elsewhere become an established fact even without the influence of Christianity. Nevertheless it long lacked a higher sanction and, as a result, universality of observance. The laws which have developed from the customs regarding paternal and patriarchal succession among different peoples, are of the greatest diversity, and they change in time and space even with one and the same people. It was thus always possible to contravene the tendency to exclude all offspring except those of the chief wife from the succession to authority. Time and time again fathers have naturally endeavored to secure an equally high status for their other children and their descendants. Now, however, an insuperable social chasm was opened up between the two classes of children. Legitimate and illegitimate sons were strictly distinguished, even if the status of the mother of the latter was not unfree, and this distinction had legal consequences. All this was definitely decided by Christianity in the territory of the modern civilized nations of the West.

The development of authority and its mode of transmission under the patriarchate has exercised a decisive influence on the evolution of society. The dual form of authority, as we find it expressed in the peace chief and war captain in the organizations of the North American Indians, reappears on different stages. The latter, to recapitulate briefly, is the leader in an enterprise the participants in which are not necessarily united or limited by family ties. The leader need not belong to the same tribe as his followers, and he holds power, not for life, but only for the duration of the enterprise. At its expiration he returns to private life. There exists no obvious incentive to make such an office in any form hereditary. The chief, on the contrary, is depicted characteristically as the guardian of the peace. The "peace" is, of course, the real object of the permanent organization and the basis of the law created by it. Peace and law are in this sense synonymous. The chief is the preserver and protector of both, the arbiter of the peace in the clan or peace union. He must necessarily belong to the group by birth and be installed by the whole community. But this appointive right of the community, which is clearly shown by Indian evidence to be the original form, soon meets with limitations of a natural sort. Even under the simplest conditions the administration of the peace requires certain positive knowledge, which as a rule can be best found in the experience of age or among those who are most closely in touch with the existing judge. Thus there arise three possible considerations in determining succession: election, seniority, and close connection with the preceding chief.

Among the Indians the last factor was especially important because of the peculiar nature of their records of alliances and treaties. Yet all peoples probably possessed a similar form of documentary evidence before the invention of writing. It consists essentially in mnemonic tokens, which bear no relation to the matters of which they are the reminders except that of simultaneous appearance. This relation must have witnesses, and its knowledge must be transmitted from one to another, so that the sight of the visible token will serve to recall the matter requiring authentication. The nature of the object thus used as a memorial is quite immaterial. When Abraham and Abimelech came to an agreement over the property right in a certain well, a flock of live animals, seven ewe lambs, constituted the token. Abraham said: "For these seven ewe lambs shalt thou take of my hand, that they may be a witness unto me, that I have digged this well."[40] These animals were certainly kept separate from the herd, forming a little flock by themselves. Then if the old dispute over the ownership of the well had arisen again among Abimelech's people, Abimelech as the guardian of the peace would have pointed out that these animals would not have been in their possession if the dispute had not been settled in the aforesaid way. They were a witness of the fact.

The Indians had come definitely to use strings of shells, belts of wampum, for this type of documentary evidence. They could be so varied in form and color that each girdle by its individuality could recall a particular fact. Whenever a diplomatic communication or a treaty was made, a special belt of this sort was presented, and its peculiar design was associated in the memory of the witnesses with the content of the communication or treaty. The arbiter of the peace preserved all these belts as

[40] Genesis xxi. 30.

a sort of state archives, and his memory could read from them at any time the diplomatic history of his tribe. This knowledge was an indispensable requirement in a peace chief. Consequently the living chief had it in his power, in transmitting this knowledge, to exert an influence on the choice of his successor. This inevitably became more and more decisive, the more the material to be committed to memory accumulated with the progress of the historical life thus initiated. Thus even on this stage of historical development there already exists a tendency to limit more and more the elective right of the whole group in favor of an individual, and gradually to substitute for it a right of appointment.

The same conditions doubtless once played a role among the peoples of the Old World. In historical times, however, their place is there taken by the interests of a more permanent and highly developed cult. The succession was closely associated with the transmission, not only of the fetishistic insignia of office, but also of the knowledge of the increasingly detailed forms of the cult. If, in one way or the other, the will of the incumbent once became decisive in the selection of his successor, then considerations of kinship would inevitably obtrude themselves at the same time, for none could be more easily initiated into the requisite knowledge than those closely associated with the wielder of authority by natural ties. Thus we are here confronted with the development of a hereditary right of succession. The nature of this right is necessarily dependent upon the conception of kinship, and can therefore vary as much as the latter. Among the North American Indians election still predominated in general, even with respect to the peace chief. But where hereditary succession had begun to appear in connection with it, it followed mother-right; the deceased was followed by his sister's son. Similarly in ancient Egypt the nomarchs or district princes, who before the formation of the empire must have been the heads of local organizations, succeeded according to nephew-right.

The Germans were divided by Tacitus into two large groups according to which of the two types of authority they submitted to. The "duke," a leader in the enterprises of war and migration, corresponded to the Indian captain; the "king" *(kuning),* the head of a *kuni* or kin-group, to the peace chief. The latter had to be a member by birth of the group over which he presided;

the former did not. The king was the protector and custodian of the cult sanctuaries of the kin-group; the duke was not so consecrated. The former as cult guardian was, as it were, the source of the peace and exercised a paternal punitive power, which the latter lacked.

This distinction, however, needs a further qualification. The single patriarchal family, the gens, always had a *kuning* in any case, even if he was only a family head and not a "king" in our sense. But a union of gentes or kin-groups could be led by either a royal or a ducal sovereign. In the former case, one of the patriarchal heads with all his dignities and his sanctity became the head of all and combined with his other functions the duty of military leadership. He was then a true "national king," a father not merely of a gens but also of a nation sprung from a union of gentes. In the other case, however, the many little kings—whether or not they bore this name—were mere family heads subordinate to the duke, and the unity of organization was in general created only for an emergency.

The kingship is closely related to and genetically descended from the fatherhood in the true patriarchal family and is distinguished therefrom only by the extent of its authority. But even in this respect the standard varies widely at different times. The Alemanni, Burgundians, and similar tribes, which even in their entirety represented nations of very moderate size, were nevertheless themselves made up of a considerable number of individual kingdoms, which could thus have been scarcely more than large gentes or at most peace unions of a few gentes each. The "kingdom" of Odysseus represented a single union of this sort with an extremely modest compass, and on the one island of Cyprus there existed a number of "kingdoms." In Phoenicia as well as in Greece the heads of the tiniest city-states were "kings," and the gentile chiefs of the Semitic nomads often bore the same name. It did not pass out of use in connection with individual kin-groups and small unions of such until, after the development of large and extensive organizations, their heads usurped it for themselves.

Because of these circumstances, the conditions prevailing with regard to royal succession afford us at the same time an insight into the forms of succession in the patriarchal family in general, and into their evolution up to the point where patrilineal kinship and monogamous marriage gained headway. This insight shows us that the patriarchal family attempted to fix the succession of the peace chief in various ways in different cases, and that in this the relationship of father and child was originally by no means decisive. Naturally this unregulated mode of succession to authority must also have influenced the transmission of property. Thus the earliest German law of inheritance impressed Grimm[41] very correctly as characterized by a lack of consistency and principle. The great diversity of the provincial laws of inheritance accords with this. All these phenomena are due to one and the same cause, namely, that matrilineal descent was not immediately replaced by a principle of equal natural simplicity and clarity.

Even in the same family different forms of succession to authority follow one another, and with changing conditions new modifications arise. The South Slav house community has preserved quite faithfully a picture of the old patriarchal family. No one is the born head of the family. The mode of selection, however, is still extremely varied. Frequently the head is elected. Often the choice falls by tradition on the oldest man of the whole group in point of years. In this case unrestricted succession by seniority prevails. Unfortunately we can not determine whether this South Slavic arrangement is a direct survival or a mere imitation of earlier conditions.

In the house of Odysseus a dual form is revealed. The kingship over the small peace union of the families of Ithaca was an elective office and not necessarily limited to the family of Odysseus. The choice lay among the heads of the individual families, the "princes" of the island. Nevertheless, close relationship to the preceding king already exercised a determining influence, founded, not on any law, but only on the nature of things. This influence, however, was still so uncertaih and so indefinite that the suitors could hope to exclude the son of Odysseus and secure a claim to his office by marrying his widow.[42] But while the principles with regard to succession to the kingship were still so unsettled, in the family of Odysseus itself the succession to the fatherhood in the patriarchal sense was already firmly established. It passed from the father to his own son by the legitimate

[41] *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer,* pp. 477ff.
[42] Homer *Odyssey* xv. 590.

mistress of the household. No one challenged the authority of Telemachus in the house of his absent father, even over his own mother.[48]

Before this latter form of the right of succession arose in connection with the later conceptions of kinship, however, the most widespread form seems to have been the succession of the oldest man in the entire union of families without reference to his kinship to the former chief. What Strabo[44] says of the succession to the kingship among the old Arabs harmonizes far less with their stage of organization as otherwise characterized by him than does the statement that relatives held all their possessions in cmomon and that this common property was always administered by the eldest among them. This administrator of common property is, however, the "father" in the patriarchal family.

The Roman family seems at an early period to have been distinguished above all others by the fact that this administrative authority of the father was so unlimited that it was equivalent to sole ownership of the family possessions. This paternal property right included an unlimited right of disposition after death, and it is therefore probable that the determination of the successor also commonly resulted in this way. The succession might thus have been kept in fact within the circle of the physical offspring of the father until regular usage developed into law. Tacitus[45] accurately observes a contrast between the unlimited testamentary power of the Roman father, evidenced by the law of the Twelve Tables, and the condition in the German family. It stands out even more strikingly in the case of the Slavs. Here again we have before us three distinct stages of development. Before a single established order of succession had developed among the Slavs and Germans, the further tendency appeared in Rome of withdrawing the right of inheritance more and more from the unlimited influence of the father and basing it on the modern conception of relationship in accordance with the degrees thereof. At a time when this goal had in large measure been attained in Rome, the German father, though the actual administrator of the family property, apparently could make no

[43] Homer *Odyssey,* i. 355ff.
[44] *Geography,* p. 783 (xvi. 4. 25).
[45] *Germania* xx. (Ed.)

definite arrangements for its disposition in the event of his death.[46]

Gradually, however, attempts to exercise such a power also appear in Germanic and finally even in Slavic territory. They find their most eloquent expression in the repeatedly recurring efforts of individual rulers to establish a definite order of succession. The intrepid conqueror Genseric instituted such a system of succession with respect to the Vandal kingship about 477 A. D. He chose the old right of seniority as the norm but restricted the succession to the members of his own family according to the idea of patrilineal kinship, so that within the family the eldest in point of years should always become king.[47] Thus Genseric was followed first by his eldest son Hunneric, then, not by the latter's son, but by a second son's son, Gunthamund, as the eldest surviving member of the family, and then by the latter's brother, Thrasamund.

Centuries elapsed before the westernmost Slavs arrived at a similar systematization. Brzetislav of Bohemia in 1054 established an order of succession exactly like that of Genseric. Bohemia was to constitute an undivided whole, and its prince was always to be taken from one family, the Przemyslids. Within this family, however, the eldest member was always to inherit the throne, as is still the case in certain South Slav house communities with respect to the paternal office. But now history shows very clearly the tendency to infringe this law and limit the succession more and more to the immediate relatives of the incumbent according to the existing conception of the blood bond, until finally the natural influence of the reigning princes succeeded in assuring the succession to the next of kin. Not half a century had passed before the law was violated; Brzetislav II gave his own brother the preference over the eldest member of the family. Sobieslav similarly attempted to secure the crown for his own first-born son. After a long series of struggles the principle of primogeniture first conquered at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century, and these struggles were probably typical of the same development in much wider circles. What gained the victory

46 "One fundamental difference between the treatment of inheritance by tribal custom and by modern law consists in the fact that primitive organization leaves no room for the disposal of property by testament" (Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 288). (Ed.)

47 Procopius *De hello Vandalico* i. 7.

here for the new principle was the method of determining the successor in the lifetime of the incumbent and the higher sanction conferred upon this procedure, in the present case by the Holy Roman Emperor, and in the latter's analogous effort at times by the church.

The struggles through which this revolution was effected were, however, well motivated, for the social consequences of the successive restrictions necessarily affected seriously a wider and wider circle of family members. In this concrete picture we can again recognize a social development which must have taken place in exactly the same way in thousands of other cases, even though kingdoms were not at stake. After the Slavic colonization of previously Celtic and Germanic regions in Bohemia, a large number of small tribes dwelt there side by side. We need not decide here whether individually they represented patriarchal families or small peace unions, although the character of their names argues in favor of the former. If they had all united into a single large peace union embracing the whole country by a process of peaceful confederation, each of the individual kin-groups would have had an equal claim to have the arbiter of the peace, the prince, appointed from its midst. The unification was accomplished for the most part, however, by war and conquest, and the Czechs emerged as the victorious tribe. Hence there appeared a first restriction of social equality. Not all the family heads had a claim to the headship of the union; many lost
529 it in favor of a few tribes, eventually of one. Then the same process was repeated within this tribe. Only one kin-group, the Przemyslids, maintained hereditary princely rank. Princes were no longer taken from the other families, who had once been equally privileged in all things; hence they fell farther in rank, the more it rose. Their exclusion was sealed by the above-mentioned law of succession by seniority. No one who did not belong to the Przemyslid branch could achieve the sovereignty. Within this branch, however, each one still had the same prospect. By whatever father he were begotten or whatever mother borne, it was possible for him sometime to be in the position of the oldest of all when the throne became vacant. Hence all were of equal princely rank. But the right of succession by primogeniture introduced a new cycle of sifting and exclusion. The wheel of fortune now rolled along only one line of the family.

All other and equal lines became side-lines and sank lower in rank and claims the more the family tree grew in breadth. Thus society, which had been a homogeneous mass under the conditions of the primitive family, was subdivided and differentiated by the progressive restriction of the succession to authority.

We should not have introduced this detailed description here, if authenticated history did not reveal clearly in this example in higher circles what it commonly veils from us in lower circles, whose destinies are of far greater importance in social development. For a process of restriction and differentiation, precisely like that which took place with regard to the succession to the princely office in the higher organization, likewise occurred from the same causes and motives with respect to the succession to the fatherhood in the individual patriarchal family. This process was, moreover, of considerably greater social consequence because it resulted in an intensification of the paternal property right. In exact proportion as the succession to fatherhood was restricted, the administration of property, which has been associated with fatherhood on every economic stage, necessarily developed into a more and more unlimited right to dispose of all the family possessions and finally into an exclusive property right therein. As a consequence, a differentiation into classes, like that which took place in higher circles with respect to the succession to authority, also occurred within the family over the title to its property.

It was even possible for the two developments to coincide in ruling or dynastic families. Political sovereignty is either the direct descendant of the authority in the kin-group, as when one patriarchal family grows to the size of a state by the absorption of others, or it is a creation on the analogy of such. In either case the supreme authority can be combined with a supreme administration of all property and, as a result of the same advance, with an exclusive title to all the property of the society. This has been done, to indicate but a few examples, by the Incas of ancient Peru, by the civilized states of eastern Asia, and by the conquering Normans in Britain. The reader will divine how diverse and tangled is the web of factors which have created the institutions of property in the sphere of higher civilization.

The cases cited by no means exhaust the number of possible variations. Among the Franks, after the dukedom of the Viking hosts had been replaced by a kingdom, the kings were likewise chosen from a single kin-group only, that of the Merovingians. Since, however, the idea of patrilineal descent found entrance here in the extreme form noted above, the Franks neither stopped at succession by seniority nor arrived directly at primogeniture. On the contrary, every child of the king without regard to the order of his birth or the rank of his mother, provided only his father recognized him as his son, was a legitimate royal child. Moreover, as a logical consequence of this conception, giving evidence also of how closely the idea of government and authority was connected with that of the right to property, every son of the king now raised a claim to a corresponding share of the dominion. Hence came those continual disastrous partitions in the Merovingian kingdom, which sacrificed the interests of the state to those of the royal family, just as they were contrary to the original idea of the kingship as the mainstay of peace in a union of kin-groups. The same principle passed from the Merovingians to the Carolingians, and it is found again in German princely families.

This system points to a like practice in family life, especially since it really represents the reduction of the interest of government to a family interest. The form must therefore have arisen first of all in the family. Thus we see how under certain circumstances the intrusion of the later physiological conception could operate as a disruptive element in the old patriarchal family. In the Slavic house community only a single person succeeds to the office of father. In the Frankish family, however, each of the sons began to lay claim to his share of the paternal authority and property, and in this way the modern concept of paternity began to take the place of the old patriarchal one. The brothers, to be sure, could still remain in joint and undivided possession of the property, but they could also choose to divide it. In this case the old patriarchal family dissolved into a number of tiny separate families.

The precondition for this in every way consequential dissolution of the patriarchal family was certainly the oft-mentioned later physiological conception of the genetic relationship of father and child. Since through this the father acquired a new property title, the old relation of authority, upon which the patriarchate was based, collapsed from within. But the abstract idea alone would probably have been too weak actually to bring about the great revolution, if it had not been promoted by especially favorable circumstances of social life, just as it was checked by others. The extremes of these circumstances are easy to recognize, but between them lies a diversity scarcely to be disentangled.

As the patriarchal family was born of nomadism, so a roving pastoral life, even if it only revolves about fixed winter quarters, is likewise the most favorable for the preservation of the old undivided form of the family. This economic pursuit permits only a slight division of labor and thereby precludes the possibility of a great differentiation in results, of an inequality of profit according to the enterprise of the individual. No one will readily detach himself from such a patriarchal family except under compulsion, for separation from it threatens the individual untrained in private initiative with the dangers of an independence which means the absence of rights in the midst of strangers and enemies. Moreover, this form of the family affords every member in high degree a homelike feeling of security and peace. To be sure, each wears the yoke—not always a light one—of obedience; no one is his own master except the patriarch, who is omnipotent
532 for the period of his reign. But this subjection is tempered by the sense of freedom from care associated therewith, which can be so gratifying even to civilized man. It is easier to suffer occasional want than to exercise provident foresight year in and year out. Hence the nomad gladly surrenders this care and the entire ordering of the economic life to the master of all, and each task assigned to him becomes easy in view of the lifting of this burden. Thus a psychological factor protects and preserves this form of the family wherever it has arisen, so long as it is not destroyed by some external force.

Such a force inheres, first of all, in every restriction of the economic pursuit of extensive nomadic cattle raising. Every other occupation makes apparent in greater measure the relation of individual expenditure of labor to its results and accordingly impels the more energetic individuals, who are necessarily the ones who ultimately set the pace, to strive for an individualization of activities. The plains of Central Asia and eastern Europe are regions eminently adapted to a pastoral economy. Lands cut up extensively by mountain ranges and river systems, on the other hand, present obstacles to such a livelihood; they inevitably bring roving peoples to a halt and force them to an increasing individualization of occupations. Thus in early Greece and Italy the kin-groups or old patriarchal families appear diminutive in size compared with those of Asia. Even with this reduction in size they were able to maintain their identity only when they derived their principal source of livelihood from a relation of authority over other classes of the people. In this case only a slight individualization of labor was required, while other classes of the population, who did not enjoy this advantage, had continually to develop new occupations and establish new enterprises, the nature of which was such that they resulted in a dissolution of the patriarchal family in favor of groups united only by the closest degrees of kinship. Thus while it was characteristic of the Roman patricians that they preserved their gentile organization, it was characteristic of the plebeians that they dissolved theirs at an early date.

The same law also prevailed in Germanic regions. In their long settlement in the mountainous and coastal districts of the west and north, the Germanic kin-groups were also reduced to small groups by the nature of their economic activities. When in their enterprises they succeeded in obtaining possession of subject land along with its tillers, so that with such authority they could dispense with any other economic activity, these reduced kin-groups—for example, the Norman aristocracy in Great Britain—were able to maintain themselves as such. On the other hand, where neither an extensive nomadic economy was to be pursued, nor already cultivated land with a laboring force to
533 provide a steady succession of new crops was to be conquered, the patriarchal family was utterly unable to maintain itself.

This was true in Scandinavia to an extreme degree. Certain Norwegian families, to be sure, imposed a tribute in reindeer on the aboriginal Finns, but it was difficult to collect, and the conquerors could not live securely on it. The Finns did not practice agriculture, nor could they have engaged in actual cattle raising before they learned it from the Germanic peoples. Moreover, they steadily retreated before their conquerors into higher altitudes and latitudes.

The Scandinavians were therefore entirely dependent upon the yield of their own agricultural activities and upon gains from piracy, sea commerce, and military enterprises far afield—pursuits which presuppose an emergence of individualism and do not permit the linking of the destinies of many with the fortune of one. No natural impulse could compel the individual to put what he had gained in his own venture into the common store of property of a community which had taken no part in his labor, and the community was unable to raise such a claim since it had itself forced him to withdraw through its inability to support all its natural increase of population in its restricted territory.

Consequently the social conditions of Scandinavia in the early Middle Ages stand out in sharpest contrast to those among the Slavs. It is as though here before our eyes the process of the differentiation of active and passive races were once more taking place, and indeed in such a manner that we can easily recognize its immediate cause. The "Slavic *Volkerwunderung"* has taken place quietly. The tribes remain in snug contentment on land suitable to their economic pursuits and cling to their old occupations and old family constitution. In every group all the members serve one will, enjoy their freedom from care, perform the tasks assigned them through a rotation of seasons eternally alike in a communistic fashion which has become indispensable to the Slavs, and bear even misfortune with quiet resignation as an inevitable lot.

How strange the idea of the Italian "sacred spring"[48] would have seemed to such a conception of life! And this phenomenon certainly did not come into existence in the mountainous districts of Italy without some economic compulsion. Excessively enlarged families had to be relieved by throwing a portion of their members upon their own resources. The principle of the dissolution of the patriarchal family as a social necessity is here revealed in a peculiar half-legendary manner. Greek colonization emanated from the same compulsion, and it likewise resulted in

[48] "Among the ancient Italian peoples, especially of the Sabine stock, it was customary in seasons of great peril or public calamity, as when the crops had failed or a pestilence was raging, to vow that they would sacrifice to the gods every creature, whether man or beast, that should be born in the following spring. To the creatures thus devoted to sacrifice the name of 'the sacred spring' was applied. 'But since,' says festus, 'it seemed cruel to slay innocent boys and girls, they were kept till they had grown up, then veiled and driven beyond the boundaries'" (Frazer, *Golden Bough*, IV, 186). (Ed.)

the weakening and disintegration of the patriarchal family. No
colonization of this sort is known to the Slavs; the forced settle-
634 ment of Siberia is in no way comparable to that social phe-
nomenon.

This process of disintegration, however, appears in a very pronounced form in Scandinavia. Here every free-born man was characterized by the ambition to shake off the paternal authority and become a "man for himself," and this wish coincided with that of the house community. Scandinavia was even acquainted with a kind of "sacred spring," since from time to time a number of surplus youths were banished abroad by lot. Indeed even the father of the family himself would occasionally send away his sons, with the exception of a single one for whom the family inheritance seemed sufficient, and the Ostrogothic law even sanctioned this usage indirectly by forbidding only peasants to send their sons away to sea or to the royal court.[49] The principal means of thus achieving independence were offered by "internal colonization," i.e., the cultivation of newly cleared forest lands, and by Viking expeditions, i.e., war for plunder and gain at sea and on alien coasts, a local adaptation of the old predatory ways of nomadic times like that which characterized the heroic age of Greece.

[49] Additional evidence is to be found in Odo *De Danorum in Galliam irruptionibus;* Paulus Diaconus *Historia Langobardorum;* Dudo *De moru bus et actis Normannorum;* Gulielmus Gemeticensis *Historice Normannorum;* Snorri Sturluson *Ynglinga-saga.*

CHAPTER X

ADVANCES IN THE CULT AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS

In nearly every subject which we have thus far considered we have had either to touch upon or to discuss at length matters connected with the cult, a peculiarly human phenomenon which, though distinct from all the forces of nature, has been an exceedingly important factor in cultural evolution. This has happened so frequently that little more than a comprehensive recapitulation is needed here.

There are three main points to be brought out in connection with the periods of human development thus far discussed. We shall first turn our attention to the survivalistic forms of the primitive defensive cult in so far as they retain currency and importance on succeeding stages. Next we shall consider the nature of positive or propitiatory cult activity. Thirdly we shall see how the changes in the forms of human society have been mirrored in cult ideas. Then it will be possible to return to our second point and follow the history of a few special cult forms in somewhat greater detail. Here again in our choice of material we must confine ourselves to those forms which have operated as persistent causal factors and have influenced later stages of development. Isolated phenomena, in which such a persisting force does not inhere, must be left to another type of historical writing. Likewise we need not advance here anew the mass of evidence which we have adduced elsewhere in analyzing other theories and interpretations, some of them widely current. The conscientious reader must be referred to our preliminary works themselves.[1]

What we have termed the defensive cult, and have treated above as characteristic of the lowest stage of human culture, might be criticized as really not a cult at all but its very antithesis, were it not for the fact that it is connected with the positive cult by various gradual transitions. When the savage on

[1] ***Seelenkult; Religionen; Christenthum; Oeschdchte des Priesterthums.***

the lowest stage abandons his dwelling, hunting grounds, and food sources every time a death occurs, he acts in a defensive manner, since he is impelled by fear to avoid the annoyances to be expected from the deceased. But from the point of view of the dead man, i.e., of his ghost, such avoidance is equivalent to a positive gift. Since those acquainted with the circumstances, primarily the members of the family, are afraid to enter the dwelling or appropriate the ornaments and gear of the dead man, to capture the animals or gather the fruits of the vicinity, the deceased receives all these things by default as his exclusive and inviolable property. Only a slight modification of the idea is then needed in order to say that the living give, "dedicate," or "consecrate" them to him. These two words harbor the original germ of the concept—to be sure still very exceptional on this stage—of private property and its attendant sanctity. Thus the same course of action can be regarded from two points of view.

Progress in the care for life, including the development of thrift, forces man to advance beyond this stage. The old practice continues, however, in the survivalistic forms of fasting and rest days. Although man does not actually give of his food or his labor, he nevertheless abstains from both in favor of a ghost. Finally even this last remnant of materialism dwindles away, and he then fasts or rests "in honor of" some spiritual being.

Both of these forms, since they are equivalent to positive propitiation, were carried over into the cult in its narrower and later sense. Other defensive acts, which do not manifest such a reverse side, survived as "mourning customs" or degenerated into "superstitions." Still others passed over into the later forms of the cult in subordinate roles. Savages on the lowest stage everywhere reveal great uniformity in these customs and usages. On higher stages, however, local variations necessarily arise according to which of the three courses a particular practice pursues.

The cult custom of rest days has two roots. It arises not only from the abstention from competition for the means of subsistence in favor of the ghost, but also from an extension of the taboo against arousing the ghost by noise of any kind. Savages, in order to avoid the ghosts and the menace of their presence, resort to various naive forms of deception and concealment. One of these is silence. Man must not betray his presence to the lurking specter. He must utter no sound so long as danger threatens, least of all pronounce the name of the ghost. The Kaffir *hlonipa* forbids, not only mentioning the ghost by name, but even using words of similar sound. The custom, widespread in Indonesia and Polynesia, of placing a taboo on a period of time after the death of a chieftain connects this precaution of silence with the cessation of economic activity. Among the Makassars and Buginese no market may be held during this period, not even a cock is allowed to crow, and no sound of labor is to be heard. The country is said to appear deserted or transformed. In another district of Celebes no ship may approach the harbor. In the Babar Islands no spoken word, much less any laughter, is permitted, especially in the house of death.

The same custom is found in Hawaii, where its two component parts may still be distinguished. "Certain fruits, animals, and fish and special places were sometimes tabooed to men and women for months at a time."[8] In other words, the labor ordinarily expended on these things was suspended. The basic idea must have been to relinquish them to the ghost. A distinction was also made between the ordinary taboo, in which the men had to abstain merely from their usual occupations, and the strict taboo, in which the second element was added to the first. During such a taboo every fire and light on the island had to be extinguished, and no one might leave his house. The mouths and eyes of the animals were bound, lest they disturb the quiet.

We ourselves discountenance festivity and undue noise during the period of mourning, a custom surviving from a time when it had quite a different meaning. If we wish to unearth a buried treasure, i.e., snatch it from the possession of watchful ghosts, tradition tells us that we must observe absolute silence. Any noise attracts them and frustrates the undertaking. On feast-days, when the ghosts of the dead return to the living, they must not be mentioned by name, and if they assume the forms of certain animals, the names of these animals must also not be spoken but must be expressed by circumlocutions.

Another modification of this taboo prevailed among the Romans; they might speak of their dead but must say "nothing

[2] The special connection of these precautions with the funeral customs of savage peoples has been demonstrated by Prazer *(Burial Customs)* and Wilken *(Haaropjer,* pp. 12-13). See Lippert, *Chmtenthum,* pt. I I .

[8] Ellis, *Reise dutch Hawaii,* p. 217.

but good" of them. Nor did they perceive the contradiction in their customs when they summoned the gods to the sacrifice in accordance with the later form of the cult and yet, when they came, obeyed the command, *"Favete Unguis!"* The Hebrews were more consistent; in accordance with a taboo they never spoke the true name of their God but resorted to circumlocutions.

It was a belief of ancient Greece that a person might be blinded by the sight of a deity.[4] A whole group of notions, of not inconsiderable historical importance, is connected with this idea. In Egypt the local divinities of the formerly independent nomes appeared at different times for their festivals and then roamed through the land. Consequently the Egyptian calendar recognized certain days on which it warned people against leaving their homes because of the danger of blindness should they encounter these divinities. Likewise on a certain day of the year the name of the god Set might not be spoken aloud.[5] The unlucky days of the Roman calendar derived from a similar source. On such days, as experience showed, evil demons wandered over the earth, and the cautious man observed them.

Besides silence, various forms of disguise and disfigurement are regarded by the naive savage as effective means of escaping the unwelcome attention of the ghosts and spirits. Adam and Eve seem to have had a similar idea, for when they wanted to hide from God, it occurred to them to clothe themselves.[6] Peoples in a condition of primitive nakedness resort, first of all, to the destruction of those marks of ornamentation which lend one individuality. The Hawaiian ordinarily shaved his beard; when a death occurred, therefore, he allowed it to grow, that he might be unrecognizable.[7] Where men are distinguished by their headdresses, they take their hair down and let it go untended, as the
240 Alfurs, Kei Islanders, and others still do. Better still, the telltale hair is entirely removed or is plucked out in spots. The practice continues but the interpretation changes, and the hair is "sacrificed" or is torn from "grief." We shall see elsewhere why man from a similar motive beats his breast or his head in sorrow. These gestures, as the expressions of definite emotions, have become almost instinctive through constant repetition of motive

[4] Herodotus *History* vi. 117.
[5] Lippert, *Oeschichte des Priesterthums,* I, 549-50.
[6] Genesis iii. 7.
[7] Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 217.

and act, but they are nevertheless acquired and have their demonstrable history. No lower animal has similar expressions for emotions—such a history is entirely alien to the animal world.

Where painting the skin serves for distinction, it is radically altered. Thus many peoples who ordinarily daub their faces with bright colors, blacken them following a death. Some, like the inhabitants of New Guinea,[8] do this to the entire body. Oftentimes this intentional disguise is effected by rubbing with charcoal.[9] The use of ashes in mourning is unmistakably akin to these practices, although it has another root as well. Ornaments worn on the body are removed with similar intent, or when this is not possible, as with certain rings, they are rendered unrecognizable by blackening or concealment. We ourselves put aside ornament in mourning and wear special decorations like the tarnished sword and the crape band on the hat or sleeve.

When ornament develops into clothing, the latter becomes the main object of change. The custom among certain Papuans of New Guinea illustrates this point and at the same time confirms strikingly our view[10] that tropical clothing is nothing but an outgrowth of ornament, and that, in particular, the amount and distribution of women's clothes are determined by the need of adornment. When a death occurs among the Papuans of Dorei Bay, the women shorten their sarongs at the top and bottom, exposing the breasts and knees in a manner contrary to ordinary custom.[11] Instead of bright colors they choose black or blue. The men do not change their loin cloths but let them become dirty. Among the Papuans of Kaimani Bay the women muffle their heads in a cape, and on the island of Rhoon in a sack. The natives of Papua Gulf, who normally go about practically naked, after a death wrap the entire body in a woven garment. Special mourning costumes have been developed in other places, as on Keppel
241 Bay,[12] and elsewhere, as in the Society Islands, a mourning mask has been added. The Alfurs of Ceram wear old clothing, and the inhabitants of Makassar and many others do the same. Most peoples agree in this respect and in the choice of the colors white or black (occasionally also blue). It is likewise very common for

[8] Finsch *Bekleidung, Schmuck und Tatowirung,* p. 12.
[9] See Wilken, *Haaropfer,* p. 17.
[10] See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 430.
[11] See Wilken, *Haaropfer,* p. 18.
[12] Finsch, *Bekleidung, Schmuck und Tatoirirung,* pp. 13-14.

widows to muffle the head with a cloth, though men in mourning often do the same. Some peoples, like the Tring Dyaks, tear their clothes to alter them.

Ghost-fear has bequeathed us our own custom of wearing mourning garments and a mourning color. Although the latter is black at one end of the earth and white at the other, the principle in both cases is the same, namely, the substitution of drab colors for the brighter hues of ordinary clothing. Within historical recollection sackcloth has been a garb of mourning, and the Romans muffled their heads in the act of sacrifice, i.e., in the presence of the spirits. Obscurely connected with this is the widespread belief that a mortal can not see a god face to face without dying. Still further removed are the widow's veil and the medieval widow's cap. The Jewish custom of cutting the seams of the coat is a survival of the older practice of rending the clothes, and the Poles and others have analogous methods of indicating mourning.[18]

Of the naive attempts to mislead the soul in removing the corpse, and so rendering its return difficult, there are many survivals in colorful popular superstitions, particularly in the customs of eastern Europe,[14] but we are unaware of any significant further developments along this line.

On the other hand, of the various no less naive methods of exorcising the ghosts, a few have in their development attained historical importance. They are grouped about water, fire, and noise. In view of the way in which all these customs lead their separate and independent lives, we need not wonder that the same spirits who can be deceived by silence into leaving a district, indeed the very same ones that are able to terrify men with hail and thunder, are also capable of being frightened by human actions.

It is remarkable what a fear of water savages attribute to the ghosts. This almost universal notion must go back to a time when this element was still unsubdued by any artificial means and seemed to man predominantly hostile and restrictive. It is customary among a great many peoples to transport the dead across a river in order that the stream may prevent their return. Thus

[13] For additional cases of disguise in mourning see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 868-73; IV, 870-7. (Ed.)

[14] See Lippert, *Chriatenthum,* pp. 386-98.

in Egyptian Thebes the Nile lay between the celebrated city of the dead and that of the living, and the Greek conception of the rivers of the underworld had a similar origin. From this probably comes the derivative notion that the ghosts are afraid of contact with water itself. It is an astonishing coincidence that the Lithuanians and the Sea Dyaks in identical fashion shatter a vessel of water behind the corpse as it is carried out of the house. In other places the floor is sprinkled with similar intent, and it is an old Jewish custom to place a vessel of water in front of the tomb. In order to keep the ghost at a distance it is only necessary to sprinkle oneself with water. Hence it is a very widespread practice for the participants to wash or bathe after a funeral or death festival.[16] One tribe in Celebes calls the funeral ablution "parting with the dead."

As is always the case, the act remains and only the interpretation changes.[16] Among advanced peoples the concept of "purification" has come to prevail and has completely obscured the original idea. As its necessary complement, there developed the concept of the uncleanness of the ghost and of the things with which it comes into contact. According to Herodotus,[17] the Scythians always took a steam bath after a burial. If the beliei is that the blood is the seat of the soul, then naturally blood too must be contaminating. In ancient Greece, whoever was polluted by killing a man sought purification from his blood, i.e., protection from his vengeful soul. It was in this sense that Pilate washed his hands in advance to rid himself of anxiety for shedding the blood of an innocent person.[18] Likewise Odysseus, after the murder of the suitors, purified his house—not, to be sure, by means of water but by the parallel method of fumigation.

This suggests a transition to the idea of sanitation. Hygiene is, however, even more directly derived from cult ideas. This seemingly strange connection is by no means an accidental nor an illogical one. It seems strange to us only because we have destroyed its premise, namely, that it is the nature of the spirits to torment man with pain and sickness and that all such

[15] For examples see Wilken, *Haaropfer,* pp. 25ff.

[16] "A study of the behavior of man shows that actions are on the whole more stable than thoughts" (Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life,* p. 148). (Ed.)

17 *History* iv. 73-6. (Ed.)

[18] Matthew xxvii. 24. (Ed.)

abnormal and otherwise inexplicable phenomena can only be due to these beings, the only invisible powers which inexperienced man had as yet conceived. Granted this premise, the connection is not without logic.

The water cure is a very old healing method, in fact one of the most ancient. The demons are afraid of water. Hence one who plunges into the water is not followed by them, or—what amounts to the same thing—his sickness leaves him. Among the Alfurs water is even today the means of "driving away evil and misfortune." They say while bathing, "May the water take away sickness, fatigue, and bad dreams and visit them upon the wicked."[19] Every ordinary illness is banished by means of water, either by bathing or by sprinkling. Epidemics are due to the invasion of whole hosts of demons. Mass bathing is then the proper healing and protective method.

Experience shows that children in particular are threatened by many diseases. A bath or a sprinkling serves to protect them. An Alfur child is bathed with the formula, "May disease flee with the water." In other places older children are immersed in a stream for the purpose of warding off all misfortune from them. Prophylactic bathing of the child is also found in America. This widespread custom[20] has been aligned with baptism, especially since it is so often associated with name-giving. Peoples newly converted to Christianity commonly preserve the old interpretation,[21] and the Church itself associates baptism with exorcism and emphasizes the "expulsion of demons."

We may observe among savages and likewise in the Middle Ages a strange contradiction between the lack of a sense of cleanliness on the one hand and a certain development of bathing on the other. Although daily ablutions were still unknown in certain circles in the Middle Ages, the endowment of baths, called "soul baths," was counted as one of the most meritorious works of piety. The key to an understanding of this matter would seem to lie in the fact that here too the object was originally something else than the desire for cleanliness. The practice underwent a sort

[19] Wilken, *Haaropfer,* p. 30.

[20] Discussed fully in Ploss, *Das Kind,* I, 257ff; Ploss, *Wassertaufe;* Grimm, *Deutsche Mythotogie,* p. 559; Weinhold, *Altnordisches Leben,* p. 262.

[21] For instance, among the Tagalogs (Blumentritt, *Ethnographie der Philippinen,* p. 14).

of rationalized reinterpretation when later the idea arose that it is the cleansing effect of bathing which promotes or restores health. Moreover, we find it a very widespread custom to give prominence to the bath in the various ceremonies held at the important crises of life,[22] a fact quite in keeping with the popular belief that it is at these same times that the onslaught of the spirits is most severe. However appropriate it may seem to us to pay a special tribute to the sense of cleanliness on such occasions, the original object must nevertheless have been that of precaution. Rarely straight and often very devious are the paths along which cult discipline has led mankind.

With fire as a defense against the spirits we are already acquainted, and little need be said here. On festive occasions, when spirits swarm the air, popular usage still protects the earth from them by lighting fires, and the peasant woman still kindles a fire on the hearth or lights candles to ward off the thunder demon.

Noise or uproar to drive away "witches" is another exorcistic practice. Certain peoples of the Indian Archipelago begin an alarm immediately after a death has occurred and increase it appreciably during the funeral by shooting off firearms, beating gongs, and playing musical instruments. They do this, however, only on the way to the burial, in order to drive away the departed soul. On the way back they observe the deepest silence, in order not to betray to it the destination of the return journey. According to another conception, however, noise protects the departing soul from the attacks of other spirits, which commonly congregate on such occasions, by driving them off. When plagues and epidemics give evidence of the presence of evil spirits, the civilized peoples of eastern Asia arrange alarum scenes to keep them away. We commonly do the same thing in another **form** at weddings and festivals, occasions when spirits throng. The tolling of bells at a death or funeral and in "ringing in" holidays is an important, and the wedding charivari an unimportant survival of these practices.

There is common to all savage peoples another precautionary measure of a more negative nature, namely, that everything belonging to the deceased must follow him in death. Nothing may be appropriated by the living; otherwise the ghost will pursue

[22] The so-called "rites of passage." Cf., Gennep, *Rites de passage.* (Ed.)

the latter and work mischief. As a consequence it is also possible to bring about evil with the belongings of the dead. The idea was probably generated by indefinite ghost-fear at a time when there was still so little personal property that such as there was seemed almost a part of the individual. In petty details popular usage still clings to the principle. The bedding of the corpse is burned, the funeral table is removed to a lonely spot, the needle is left in the shroud, and so on. But the more valuable property of man early became the object of a conflict between steadily increasing economic foresight and the restrictive obligations of the cult.
245 This struggle has been of great, and heretofore considerably underestimated significance in culture history. Its varied phases have been marked by a long series of concessions, adjustments, and compromises. Complete emancipation from the cult burden finally appears as the momentous consequence of the establishment of new religious systems in India and Syria. With the passage of time, however, a reaction sets in again, and the battle of life with the "dead hand" is fought on.

The advance to the positive cult, to which we shall now turn our attention, seems to have some connection with the conflict between these two principles. With economic progress the abandonment of the entire productive area to the dead necessarily came to be felt as too burdensome a sacrifice. While certain roving tribes of Brazilian Indians still endure it easily, some rather low tribes of the Old World have devised means of escape. The idea of a realm of the dead in a remote place made a particular locality again available to the living as soon as the ghost had departed thither. The perception that the deceased faded from memory after a certain time may have suggested fixing definite periods for his sojourn in the two places assigned to him, the abandoned dwelling place and the general spirit world. Sometimes the different transitional stages are found in close proximity. Among the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula, if several deaths occur suddenly, the entire tribal group often flees from the place.[28] The same custom still prevails among many peoples of the eastern part of the Indian Archipelago, among others the Alfurs of Buru. The latter people, however, already perceive the economic pressure of the system and seek to escape it by the precaution of assigning a worthless dwelling to a person mortally

[23] **Wilken, *Haaropfer*, p. 6, citing Miklucho-Maclay.**

ill. They drag him out of the house and let him perish in solitude. Here a cult motive is associated with a widespread form of primitive foresight. The practice is not humane, but humanitj is often attainable only by an open breach with cult ideas. The Kubu tribe of Sumatra is divided into savage and settled clans. The former abandon the whole region after a death, though no longer permanently, for after a moderate period they dare to return. The latter and more advanced branch, however, as a rule remain in their homes after a death has occurred and only
246 in exceptional cases revert to the old custom. Similar transitions may be observed in Brazil and on the west coast of Africa.

But even a temporary abandonment of the habitation with the accompanying impairment of the opportunity to gain a living must in time have become intolerable or even impossible, especially with increasing population pressure. A realization must have dawned that the person now resting under the hearth had even in his lifetime enjoyed only a share in everything, not the whole. Thus from sheer necessity a *modus vivendi* with the dead was discovered. The living took charge of the dead man's property, cultivated his fields, hunted on his hunting grounds, and gave him his share of what was raised and killed. Thus certain tribes of Central Africa feel bound to leave for the spirits definite portions of all game caught, usually determined by a chief. This too is the origin of the idea that the ghost residing in the hearth is the true master of the household and that the living head of the family is only the representative of the invisible master. According to this idea, for example, the Egyptian king held power on earth only as an "image" of the ruling god.

Thus the ghost still keeps his personal property, but instead of land he is allotted a supply of provisions. This will vary with economic conditions among the living. Normally it will be meager and irregular; in times of good fortune, superabundant. The latter are the festivals, to which the ghosts flock no less eagerly than the living members of the group. A special offering to the ghosts is commonly known as a *sacrifice.* Hence we may call this general type of propitiatory cult the cult of sacrifice. An enumeration of the actual objects offered up under this cult would be unprofitable; anything which at the time promotes the mainte-
247 nance of life may be sacrificed. Likewise the forms of the offering are not important to us. The wide possible variety of both

these factors, however, necessarily produces a great diversity of superficial phenomena. But fundamentally they are all alike. We have shown elsewhere [24] how even the very conspicuous sacrificial activities at Jerusalem represent in their aggregate merely a magnified household economy with its daily meals and its regular slaughtering and baking. Meat offerings predominated, as might be expected from the national economy. Even the apparently unusual acts, like the libation of blood at the foot of the altar, have their analogies in the simple customs of savage peoples. Thus the West Africans make a funnel-shaped opening into the grave in order to pour in blood, their favorite food.[25] In the Greek sacrifice to the dead a hole was dug for the same purpose. Similarly the sacrifices of the Brahmans, however embellished with ritual and song, were closely bound up with their milk economy. The form made so familiar to us by classical antiquity, i.e., the conception of sacrifice as a burning of the portions of the meal set aside for the spirits, is not an essential feature. On the contrary, it is confined to a relatively small area of distribution. Much more common is the idea that the summoned spirits mingle with men and participate in the meal with them, without a special share being set aside and conveyed to them through the fire.

These advances in the ghost-cult inevitably gave rise to different classes of spiritual beings, and this differentiation led to the conception of divinity proper. It is necessary to reiterate here that our exposition must be clearly distinguished from an examination into the objective reality of the divine. What we are able to trace historically is not a progressive revelation of divinity to mankind, but a history of ideas. The source of these ideas is to be found, not in objective reality, but in the current elements of human thought and their traditional combinations.

The conception of spiritual beings of an order higher than human, i.e., the conception of relative divinity,[26] arose inevitably from an association of the idea of ghosts as invisible agents with the invisible causes of disease, rain, thunder, storms, and other phenomena which affect the condition of man. This conception could not but assume objectively a polytheistic form, since it was

[24] *Geschichte des Priesterthums,* II, 113-54.
[25] Cf., Kingsley, *West African Studies,* p. 486. (Ed.)
26 See above, pp. 99-100. (Ed.)

engendered of a host of ideas and was associated with a multi-
248 plicity of spiritual individuals. However, a process of unification set in as soon as man's attention became focused on the causation of phenomena rather than the individuality of the supernatural agents. Zeus as the inferential tribal ancestor was originally identified by different groups with different spiritual personalities,[27] and these could be kept distinct even when the members of such groups dwelt together. With Zeus as the thunderer, however, such was not the case. As this attribute of his personality came to be stressed more and more exclusively, it became increasingly natural for the intermingled members of different groups to recognize one and the same personality as the cause behind the same phenomenon.

This was the course pursued by speculation among the classical peoples, especially the Greeks, though not, to be sure, without allowing free rein to the principle of compatibility. Herodotus clearly distinguishes the Carian from the Hellenic Zeus, but to the Greeks of his time the god of thunder was a single personality. Once logical thought had turned to speculation about nature, it was inevitable that the various tribal deities bearing the same name should ultimately be amalgamated into a single tribal father for all the groups, however distinct historically. Among a speculative people the factor of behavior in the older conception of divinity forces the factor of personality into the background. Once this path were taken, even a difference in name could no longer prevent the conclusion that deities are one when their attributes are identical. A cosmopolitan people, like the Greeks, was fitted to blaze the way in this direction. To the extent that the progress of physical knowledge revealed the unity of the causes behind diverse phenomena, the tendency was to advance still further in the direction of monotheism. Here, however, the ancients were held back by compatibility and cult obligations.

The insuperable obstacle of the cult produced in the religious ideas of Greece a conflict quite alien to the lower stages of culture but not unlike that which preoccupies many people today. Herodotus,[28] who found no satisfaction in the ideas of divinity popularized by Homer and Hesiod, is obviously thinking of that

[27] **For the evidence see Lippert, *Religionen,* pp. 354-6.**
[28] ***History* ix. 100.**

higher unity when he speaks of a divine intervention in human affairs without attributing it to any of the Olympian gods. The same conflict compels him to seek a unified cause of phenomena in a "destiny" superior even to the gods.[29]

Nevertheless Herodotus' own views clearly reveal the true origin of the very gods whose power and sway satisfy his ethical demands so little. The concept of God proper, as we shall soon see, is dependent upon the development of the positive cult. This cult, as we already know, really originated as a redemption from the much vaster claims of the dead, ever since which time the divine beings have been jealously alert to receive their due and have regarded every unusual stroke of fortune on the part of man as an abridgment of their rights. Consequently all peoples on this stage are oppressed by the paralyzing anxiety lest they have not sufficiently fulfilled their cult obligations. Similarly, an idea of the insatiable envy of the gods, threatening all human fortune, runs as an ethical keynote throughout the great work of "the father of history/' In this, for all his perspective, he stood squarely on the level of his age. How could such an idea have seized mankind if the concept of God had from the very beginning been derived from the phenomena of the heavens?

The same conflict which Herodotus arrived at through his ethical approach, limits the physico-cosmic speculations of Plato. Above the gods of the people he sees a higher first cause of things, but when he tries to construe its nature he is forced to resort once more to the same analogies according to which the people had long before created their gods. What gave support to these gods, in spite of their ethical and physical inadequacy once the idea of unity had been grasped, was the cult, clinging with a thousand tentacles to all the activities of human life. The struggle for theistic monism, consequently, could not succeed until man was emancipated from the cult.

Jewish monotheism is different in nature and history, and the more acurate name of "henotheism" has been given to its earlier stage. It takes us back to our starting point, for it rests, not on the victory of the factor of behavior in the concept of divinity over that of personality, but upon a selective process of another sort. In the light of a critical interpretation of the truly historical books of Israel and Judah, the Hebrews at the time of the early

[29] Herodotus *History* i. 91; iii. 43, 64-5; ix. 16.

kings seem still to have possessed a cult not essentially different from all the other peoples of the earth.[80] But the process of selection among different classes of spiritual beings, and among cult divinities and cult places, culminated here in the struggle of a priestly caste, striving for supremacy, to suppress all cults and dethrone all cult divinities with the exception of the one spiritual
250 overlord of the state and his cult. This very limitation, however, betrays the origin of the henotheism of the Hebrew tribal state and race, and remained characteristic of it in actual practice even on its higher stages of development under the prophets. The fact that the creation narrative gave this henotheism a broad foundation does not alter the matter, for many peoples on the lowest stage of culture likewise call their ancestral spirit the creator of all things. Indeed this is characteristic of a primitive point of view. The primitive family had no bonds of association with strangers. Consequently each tribe looked upon its members as the only true men and regarded the world as specially created as the stage of its existence. The absolute conception of God, which the Greeks approached by way of ethical and physico-cosmic speculation, was by its very nature accessible to all men. Even the barbarian could embrace it without becoming an Ionian or a Dorian. The Hebrew God, however, could not be accepted by any one outside of his chosen group.

The different classes of spiritual beings, as they have developed in accordance with the economic and political conditions of a people, have always retained a certain indistinctness, even in the lofty realm of mythology. It is in general difficult to draw a boundary between ghosts and spirits, and even between spirits or daimons in the Greek sense and gods no hard and fast line exists.[81] Cases are known where a change has been introduced by the decision of a community. The first differentiation is determined by the status of the living. The head of a family naturally occupies a different place than a subordinate member of the house in the memory of the survivors. Under a patriarchal regime people scarcely bother about the fate of women, children, and slaves in the other world; they have no status in the hierarchy of ghosts. But even the future fate of the patriarch himself is de-

[80] For the evidence on this point, see Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthrum,* II, 1-290; id., *Seelencult,* pp. 88-181.

[31] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 931. (Ed.)

pendent upon that of his family. If the latter is broken up and scattered, a divinity comes to an end, for he is no longer remembered.

The most important influence upon the rank of the ghost, however, is that exerted through his cult. By this means man has it in his power to banish the ghost to the spirit world or to permit him to live on near at hand and grow powerful, in which case he becomes a god. The Greeks, for instance, distinguished between the cult of a hero and that of a god. The former, like the ordinary dead, was summoned from the spirit world from time to time to receive sacrifices and was then speedily dismissed; the latter received continuous attention. It was thus actually
51 possible for a Greek community to make its hero a god by establishing for him an enduring cult.

The permanence thus assured in an organized community is lacking, however, in an Indian or Negro family with its fluctuating fortunes. Under such conditions it is much more common for an individual to withdraw from his fellows, alter his entire mode of life, and seek his own advantage in maintaining a continuous cult for some one spirit. This is the basis of the essentially similar phenomena of the American "medicine man," the African "ganga," and the Asiatic "shaman," in short of the institution of shamanism. The relation is a reciprocal one. The spirit supposedly condescends to support the various projects of his priest only because he enjoys a continuous cult, and the priest in turn only consents to maintain the cult in order to secure such support. Consequently the nature and origin of the spirit are matters of complete indifference to the shaman. Experience teaches that there are always some available. In this manner an otherwise very inferior ghost may prosper with the fortune of his priesthood and even attain the highest prestige in the spiritual hierarchy.[82] Because of the mutual dependence, the relationship is usually characterized by a high degree of intimacy between priests and god, mixed with scarcely a trace of reverence.

In more stable societies, however, where the cult has preserved intact the relation of the group to its ancestral divinities, it has given rise to ideas of another sort. Such a cult has been termed "ancestor worship," and a conviction has gradually arisen that

[32] For an excellent example see Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* II, 150-1. (Ed.)

it still survives today among most savage peoples. But when we examine the situation more closely, its commonest interpretation, one verging on euhemerism, proves in the most significant cases to be incorrect. There are still, to be sure, savage peoples who preserve the ancestor cult in its simplest form. There are even some who carry about with them the corpses or skulls of their parents to be assured of the protection of their ghosts, and there are others who expressly include parents and relatives in their invocations. Far greater, however, is the number of those who expedite their recently dead to the peace of a spirit world by means of purposive cult forms, maintaining a cult only for the supposed divine ancestor of all.

This arrangement, which gives man peace from the ghost without the need of providing a permanent cult, is found all over the earth in strikingly similar forms. They all seem to consist in a combination of the positive propitiatory cult with a time limit. The idea of a spirit world provides a substitute for cult observance. Once the deceased arrives there, he no longer has need of sacrifices. The land supports him, either by its own products or by the treasures it has accumulated from previous cult gifts. The former is characteristic of peoples who pursue their livelihood in the open country, the latter of more advanced peoples, notably the Egyptians and Hindus.

In keeping with the above is the double funeral, traces of which are found all over the earth. The first ceremony is held for cult purposes during the limited period of the ghost's sojourn among the living, the second to send him finally to the spirit land. The length of the intervening period is dependent upon many circumstances and consequently varies widely in individual cases. Indeed even the basic tendencies may be contrary under different life conditions. One people may desire to prolong the traffic with the ghosts of the departed, while another may see an advantage in terminating it as quickly as possible. Often too a special idea makes its appearance as a gauge, namely, the belief that the soul feels attracted to the vicinity of the body as long as a shred of flesh still clings to the bones.

This conception is held by many peoples of Oceania. In Tahiti, for example, at the first funeral the corpse was placed upon a raised platform (*tupapau*) in order to protect it from rodents. As long as it lay there exposed to putrefaction, all the honors of the cult were paid to it and the fruits of the land were tendered on special smaller platforms, for during this period the ghost remained in the vicinity of the *tupapau.* When nothing remained but the dry bones, the second funeral took place. With the burial of the bones the soul took leave of his fellows and went to the realm of the dead.[33]

In some parts of South Africa the corpse is actually buried at the first funeral, but after a certain period it is exhumed and the bare bones are buried again with great ceremony. But however the corpse is treated, this ceremony, commonly known as the "feast of the dead," survives everywhere as a means of paying the last honors to the deceased before he enters the spirit world. In essence the feast of the dead is a bountiful cult offering. Besides the indispensable common meal, it includes other donations to equip the ghost for his new home and finally in most cases defensive measures to prevent his return.

The time allotted to the ghost on earth sometimes varies, even with the same people, according to the rank of the deceased. Thus the Scythians did not celebrate the second funeral of their kings until a year had passed, while an ordinary man was buried after an interval of only forty days, during which time his corpse was feasted in turn by all his friends.[84] Both these periods are still very widespread. That of a year is often found among the semi-civilized tribes of the Old World and is also native to North America. Loskiel[35] says that the Indian widow may not remarry before a year has elapsed, "for her husband, as the Indians say, does not leave her for a year, when his soul goes to its resting place." The forty day period may once have been usual in Syria, for it stands out even in the life of Jesus. For forty days the dead Savior wandered on earth, appearing and vanishing like a ghost, but on the fortieth day he ascended into heaven.[86] The Christian Church has adhered to this period in most regions. Among the Germans, however, a period of thirty days survived along with it. According to the *Sachsenspiegel*[37] the widow retained possession of the undivided household property for thirty days, as though her husband were still among the living. Even today in many parts of Germany the church obsequies are repeated on the thirtieth day, when the obligations toward the

33 Forster, ***Seereisen,*** **I I , 142, 242.**
34 Herodotus ***History*** **iv. 71-3.**
35Geschichte der Mission, **p. 83.**
36 Acts i. 3-10. (Ed.)
37 ***Sachsenspiegel*** **i. 21, 22.**

deceased are fulfilled in a sort of Christianized feast of the dead. Thirty days probably represent in round numbers the interval between two similar phases of the moon. The ancient Hindus likewise adhered to the period of a month.[38] The double funeral is also a Parsi practice. First the bodies are exposed to birds of prey, which strip off the flesh, and then the bones are collected in a pit. With this the cult obligation is extinguished. In Egypt the period seems to have lasted considerably'longer.

Under different circumstances, however, it may be thought that the shorter the period is, the better. It seems highly probable that this need gave rise to the sporadic and often temporary custom of cremation. It was practiced by the ancient Italic peoples, the Romans, the Greeks of the heroic age, and the Scandinavian Vikings. The latter spent their time on expeditions of conquest and plunder and hence were not always sure of being able to comply with cult obligations extending over a long period. But if the corpse were laid out in state, provided with all necessary cult equipment, burned till only the bones remained, and the bones buried, then the two ceremonies, formerly separated by the time consumed in decomposition, were combined into one, and the warrior could proceed on his way without the terrifying consciousness that he had neglected a cult duty.

Homer[39] himself stresses the need of haste as the reason for cremation. The ghost remains with the body until it is destroyed, and this can be accomplished most expeditiously by fire. The soul of Patroclus complains to Achilles of not being admitted into the realm of the dead, but promises never to return from Hades once he has been done the honor of cremation.

Faced with a situation like that of the Hellenic Greeks on their military expeditions, the Scandinavian Russians in Sarmatia, according to Ibn Fozlan, likewise burned their dead chieftains. Even in the early Middle Ages it was still customary to cremate the bodies of unknown warriors on the battlefield,[40] a practice probably prompted less by ideas of sanitation than by ghost-fear. A parallel is offered by the custom of boiling the corpse of a leader dying in the campaign, so that the loosened flesh might be buried on the spot and the bones brought home.[41]

[38] *AtharvarVeda* i. 82. 4; Ludwig, *Rigveda,* **III,** 492.
[39] *Iliad* vii. **410;** xxiii. 50-1, 65, 75.
[40] Schultz, *Das hofische Leben,* II, 265.
[41] *Ibid.,* **II, 266ff., 406.**

The practical utility of these ideas and practices was that they protected the pantheon of primitive man from excessive overpopulation. Even the later Romans still understood well enough that the concept of divinity in its stricter sense is dependent upon the maintenance of a permanent cult. Only in this sense is there any logic in their apparently strange provision that none might be a god without the consent of the Senate and in their elevation of the *manes* of certain emperors to the rank of gods. Since the state had it in its power to establish a perpetual cult or not, it was in actual fact able to determine the status of ancestors.

Thus out of the countless multitude of ghosts two groups emerge as gods, namely, those favored by an independent and enterprising priesthood and those possessing a guaranty of cult observance in the continuance and expansion of their people. The first group quite naturally is found chiefly among those races which have developed few permanent and extensive political organizations and is best represented by the shamanism of the Indians, the Negroes, and the Mongolian peoples of northern Asia. The second group is characteristic of the races which have advanced farther politically. The eminence of divinities of this type increases with the splendor of their cult, and this with the prosperity and power of the state. Consequently it is the natural wish of rulers to enrich the cult and its sacred places above all else. The most ambitious and capable of ancient monarchs vied with each other in so doing. For the same reason it was entirely consistent with the anxious piety of antiquity to remind the gods, as Croesus did,[42] of their duty of gratitude. Similarly the Egyptian kings and Homeric heroes could naively boast to their gods of their cult performances and could remind them that the ruin of their people would also mean their own downfall, unless they could find a sanctuary among strangers.

In turbulent Greece the two groups seem to have been evenly balanced. In India the gods of the hereditary priestly castes attained supremacy within historical times. In Rome and Egypt ruled the gods of the state, the divinities of the prehistoric tribal unions and those of the political organizations of later times.

We are now in a position to see the fallacy of euhemerism as a principle of general application. We can understand why, although the contrary is not always necessarily excluded, the throne

[42] **Herodotus *History* i. 90.**

of divinity is usually occupied, at least in highly organized states, not by a historical personage remembered by tradition, but by an abstraction from the fact of authority. No matter how high a historical person may rise as the head of a family or state through his services to the society, he can nevertheless only appear as the trustee of an authority delegated to him by his progenitor. His fortune and success are thought by his contemporaries, who are unable to understand the mechanism of causality, to be due to power won through the cult. Hence the cult, ever self-interested, must turn from the historical personage to the superior power behind him. Consequently the object of an abstraction must appear at the head of every remembered dynasty, and conversely every ruling family must be ultimately descended from a divinity of whom history can find no traces. Thus the families of the Greek heroes and kings are all "god-begotten," and the kings of Egypt and the rulers of eastern Asia are similarly sons of the gods.

By a slight shift, not in the basic idea, but only in its mode of expression, the tribe itself attributes its origin to a divinity, or regards its first father as a god. If, moreover, the tribe naively considers its members the only true men, then it follows that god and the first man are identical. This form of naivety is, however, extraordinarily widespread and, as we have often pointed out, is excused by social isolation. In primitive times no man's horizon extended beyond the limits of his family group. The tribal stranger, lacking the protection of common blood, was comparable to a wild beast. Consequently even today it is a very common phenomenon for a tribe to call itself by a name which in its own language is the general term for "man." The Eskimo name for themselves is *Innuit,* which means "men." A similar significance attaches to the tribal names of the Tinneh peoples, the Tlingits of southeastern Alaska, and the ancient civilized Chibchas of South America. Other instances are the Hottentots *(Koi-Koin)* and Bantus in Africa, the Kanakas and Tongans in Polynesia, the Ainus and Tunguses in Asia, etc.[48]

[43] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 409-10; Jette", "Medicine-Men of the Ten'a," p. 157; Hitchcock, "Ainos," p. 432; Hiekisch, *Tungusen,* p. 48. See also above, I, 92; Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 14; Keller, *Societal Evolution,* p. 68; Parsons, *Social Freedom,* pp. 68-9; Howitt, *South-East Australia,* p. 41; *Handbook of American Indians,* I, 270, 941; II, 211, 276, 327, 920, 963, 964, 1012. (Ed.)

If we bear in mind the transitional steps, we need not wonder at the frequent recurrence of the idea that the ancestral deity of a tribe was at the same time the first man. Thus the ranking divinity, or Great Spirit, of certain Indian tribes was usually called "the first man."[44] The simplest expression of this process of ideation is found in the myth of the Indians of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, according to whom "the first man
257 ascended into heaven and thunders there."[45] If the concept of humanity is derived from the individual tribe, then the original ancestor of the tribe naturally becomes the creator of man, and mythology does not shrink from the difficulty of making the first man the creator of all things. Thus "among the Dogrib Indians the first man is the creator of mankind, the sun, and the moon." In a Carib myth the first man came from heaven, created the earth, and then returned to heaven. The Greenlanders also ascribe the origin of things to the first man. The Hawaiians regarded the gods as the first inhabitants of their islands and traced their descent from them.[46] The same idea lies back of the Scythian legend, reported by Herodotus,[47] that in their country the first man had been Targitaus, whose father was the supreme god.

If the matriarchal family, or at least the principle of matrilineal descent, preceded the patriarchate in point of time, then the older ideas of gods, so far as they are preserved in cult or myth, should express this relation. A brief survey will show that this is actually the case. Female divinities, in complete accord with the history of the family, appear everywhere as the older ones, and myth frequently represents them as supplanted and suppressed. Conquering tribes are characterized for the most part by male deities, but while these occupy a dominant posi-
258 tion in dynasties and states, the female divinities survive in the cults of the subject masses and of the household. In some cases, however, the earlier cult is preserved in the later age. This has been more often the case where a new political organization has developed gradually by the union of neighboring tribes than where a nomadic conquering people has set up a new government. The Persians among the Aryans and the Hebrews and Arabs among the Semites entirely sloughed off the female cult in this

[44] **Muller, *Urreligionen,* § 25.**
[45] ***Ibid.,* p. 133.**
[46] **Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 243.**
[47] ***History* iv. 5.**

manner. The Aryan Hindus were approaching this condition by the time of the origin of Buddhism.

The Indians of New York believed in a creatress who existed before the beginning of things. From her were descended the deer, bear, and wolf, and from these came men.[48] "Most Indians regard the earth as their common mother and hence call themselves earth-born."[49] Older even than their Great Spirit, according to the Hurons, is his grandmother, Ataensic. She is regarded as malevolent and hostile toward men, as the cause of human death and the ruler of the realm of the dead—notions which reflect the conflict between the maternal and paternal systems. This grandmother of the Great Spirit is also known to various other tribes. The Mandans and Hidatsa call her "the old woman." In keeping with the female sphere of economic activity, she is the protectress of the crops. To the Eskimos the mother of the Great Spirit is the highest deity. Substantially in agreement with the protesting position of the mother-in-law in the new order of things, this female divinity in a great many tribes stands out as at the same time the older and the more malevolent deity. This was the case in the myth of the Chibchas, and Catlin was assured by the Indians that their evil spirit was a female and older than the good spirit.[60] Here and there in Polynesia, as in the Tonga Islands, a female deity is found at the head of the hierarchy of gods, and a Hawaiian myth gives the highest place to the mother of the first man.

In Mesopotamia, cuneiform inscriptions describe the conflict between the younger gods and Tiamat, the old female deity, reflecting the struggle of the conquerers with the primitive population. Greek myth recounts a similar struggle between the old earth-goddess Gaia, represented by her sons, and the younger gods. Everywhere the male god is victorious. Phoenicia, however,
259 always remained a land with a richly developed female cult. The Astarte of the Bible, the legendary Semiramis, and the cult of Aphrodite with its strong Phoenician influence are reminiscent of the earlier population. It can scarcely be a mere accident that Greek tradition assigns many of its heroines, among them Semele, Ino, Autonoe, and Agane, to the family of Cadmus, which was

[48] Muller, *Urreligionen*, p. 108.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 110.
50 *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 149-60.

regarded as Phoenician in origin. An ancient survival was preserved in Greece in a very popular form in the cult of Demeter.

In Roman territory, in part formerly Etruscan, the oldest cults —those of Dea Dia, Acca Larentia, Mater Matuta, Ceres, and Tellus Mater—belong to the earlier stage. Indeed even in the later history of Rome, when the state was represented by the cults of Jupiter and Mars, the idea of a mother of the gods must still have had a strong hold on the masses of the people, for Augustine[51] directed his chief protests against it. The state cult of Vesta likewise preserved a suggestion of the earlier period, although Juno appears only in the role of a wife.

A similar "mother of the gods" was, according to Tacitus,[52] the highest cult divinity of the Germanic peoples then living on the Baltic coast. One of the most vivid mythological traditions of the German people is that of the ancestral mothers Holda, Perchta, and Frau Gode, and this must have been a predisposing factor in their welcome reception of the Christian cult of the Virgin, the Mother of God. That there inheres in woman a peculiarly religious quality is due to her position in the household and her relation to its divinities. It is, as we have seen, careful, solicitous, and constant attention to the cult which propitiates the spirits and keeps them well-disposed. Woman, who maintains order in an established home, fulfills these requirements better than man, who frequently leads a more unsettled life. Hence, under conditions such as Tacitus found, she is the real custodian of the cult, the priestess in the house, and likewise the interpreter of the divine will.[53]

In the remnants of Slavic mythology preserved in folklore a grandmother or ancestral mother, the Baba, Zlata Baba, Jedzi Baba, etc.,[54] stands out as the foremost figure. Under various names she is, like the Indian and Germanic ancestral mothers,
260 the agent or herald of death and the ruler or princess of the dead. The Lapps also honor and fear their "mother of the dead" in the very same sense.[55]

The several lines of investigation which we have been following individually may now be briefly brought together. We have

51 *De civitate Dei* vi. 8. 1.
52 *Germania* xlv.
53 Caesar *De hello Gallico* i. 50.
54 Cf., Frazer, *Golden Bough*, VII, 144-5. (Ed.)
55 Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken*, p. 215.

seen that the principal manifestations of the ghosts are the various influences that affect the condition of man. All sickness is attributed to a spiritual agency, and therefore necessarily also its result, death. Consequently, if a tribe conceives of an ancestral mother as the first spiritual being, she naturally comes to be regarded as the original cause of death. She it is, then, who ever gathers to herself again the souls of the living. Then, with the increasing strength of the men's organization and the transition from mother-right to father-right, male divinities appear beside the female and a state of hostility develops between them. These circumstances necessarily find expression in the differentiation of the qualities of divinity. When father-right has finally overcome that state of hostility, a god appears beside the goddess in a precisely identical role, or, if the transition is completed, usurps her place entirely. Then he is the cause of death and the prince of the dead, either along with her or by himself. Thus in Egypt by the side of Isis, the goddess of death, appears the death-god Osiris.

The Hindu parallel to Osiris is Yama, "the prince of the blessed," "the king of the dead and the gatherer of men in the hereafter."[56] In his person there is repeated a process frequently occurring among the American Indians, who sometimes raise the first man himself to the status of a god and sometimes conceive of a paternal spirit above him and assign the attribute of divinity to the latter. Of these two possible courses, the Hindu branch of the conquering Aryans took the one and the Iranian branch the other. Before their separation they must have used the same name for the concept of divinity.[57] To the Iranians Yima was their first king and thus the ancestor of the nation, although this fact is obscured by the later myth which makes him merely the culture hero of his people. While, to the Hindus the first man himself became the highest divinity, the father of all,
261 the first cause of death, and the judge of the dead, the Iranians distinguished from their first king his paternal guardian spirit, Ahura Mazda or Ormazd, and thus acquired, not Yima, but Ormazd as their highest divinity.[58]

The pre-Yahwistic Hebrews must have honored an identical

[56] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 621.
[57] The Avestan *Yima* is cognate with the Vedic *Yama.* (Ed.)
[58] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 619.

divine figure in Abraham. Possible meanings of his name are "high father" and "father of the high place."[59] The former is of itself a name very appropriate to the idea in question. Moreover, in Palestine "high place" was the name for a grave-hearth or altar, and in this sense either Yama or Osiris would also have been the "father of the high place." That Abraham had once been such a figure is also apparent from the Biblical idea that the members of his people returned to his bosom.[60] The prophet Isaiah is clearly connecting the earlier idea with the later when he solemnly insists that Yahweh alone, and not Abraham, is the father of the people.[61]

In Greece the same type of idea is represented by Hermes, who derives from an older stratum of population than the conquering race. Hades and Ares, on the other hand, were mere poetical personifications, enjoying no cult and hence no real existence as gods, even in the realm of ideas.[62] Hermes was reduced by the gods of the conquerors to a servile status. His sovereignty was taken from him, and he was made the messenger of the underworld, the conductor of souls. In Rome the tribal divinity Mars was a true god of the dead, who, however, rose to a state god, though not to the first place. Similarly Apollo, the male death divinity of the Dorian invaders of Greece, rose with the fortune of the latter to a state divinity. Thus he experienced a fate opposite to that of Hermes. In reality, as the ancients well knew, the fate of a god and his people are one.

Other male divinities have such special histories that they do not parallel the earlier divinities, and either slough off or never assume at all the character of god of the dead. To this group belong, among others, the gods of conquering warrior tribes and successful dynasties. As the military fortune of a chieftain rises, so does the prestige of his god. With the consolidation of the authority of the former, the cult of the latter is intrenched and his prestige reaches as far as the splendor of his cult.[68]

Even in modern times we might see similar developments if we did not deliberately shut our eyes to them. Before the intrepid

59 Cf., however, Genesis xvii. 4, where the reading is "a father of many nations." (Ed.)

60 See, for example, Luke xvi. 22. (Ed.)

61 Isaiah lxiii. 16.

62 Cf., *Cambridge Ancient History,* II, 638. (Ed.)

63 Cf., *ibid.,* I, 329. (Ed.)

262 Kamehameha I became lord of all the Hawaiian Islands, Tairi, the domestic god of his family, was an almost unknown figure in the Hawaiian pantheon, and a miserable heap of stones was his only monument. But when his servant Kamehameha became ruler of all the Kanakas, Tairi inevitably became the most highly esteemed of all their gods. Kamehameha, who felt obligated to him for his rare good fortune, built him a relatively enormous temple and endowed him with a resplendent priesthood.[64] Had the succeeding monarch not broken with the entire oppressive cult system, Hawaiian mythology might now be telling us through what circumstances the various gods became related to and dependent upon Tairi.

Only through similar developments can the history of the Hindu deities be explained. Mitra, as well as Yama, was common to the undivided Indo-Iranians,[65] but the laurels of the Aryan invasion of India did not fall to him. He became almost exclusively a god of rain, while to the Persians he recalled the time when they still dwelt in an uncultivated land. With the conquest of India, Indra emerged as the new and powerful god of war. In the course of time, aided undoubtedly by the events and needs of the conquest, he became the dominant figure, as is explained in the myth that the devas or gods of the different quarters of the earth made him their king.[66] As long as the victorious people remained united under him, no cult of Vishnu or Siva is discoverable. However, as enterprising tribes or bands broke away from the midst of Indra's settled people to bear their victorious arms farther toward the east, there emerged among them new gods of war and sovereignty. Indra, eclipsed, began to decline. To the Buddhists the old soma tippler is little more than a clown. In the Rig-Veda only a few hymns recognize Vishnu as well as Indra; a few wars waged jointly by them[67] indicate that the tribes in the vanguard were supported by the parent stock. Siva is unknown to the Vedas. He is the youngest god, and his cult makes its appearance in the latest conquered region to the east. But it was precisely here, in the Ganges region, that the center of gravity of Aryan power afterwards fell, and a myth relates how

[64] Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* pp. 160, 163.
[65] The Iranian *Mithra* is cognate with the Vedic *Mitra.* (Ed.)
[66] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 911.
[67] *Rig-Veda* vii. 99. 5.

Siva, the youngest deity, compelled the gods to cede him the best portion of the sacrificial animal.[68]

In the same class of deities we must include Ashur of Assyria, Marduk and Bel of Babylonia, the dynastic god Amon of Egypt, Poseidon, Zeus, and the later form of Apollo in Greece, Jupiter and the later forms of Mars in Rome, and above all Odin, the god of the Norse Vikings. From the history of these gods it was natural to recognize in them the chief supporting power of the state and to endeavor to strengthen this power through their cults, as the Egyptian kings, for example, did on an unparalleled scale. The dominant idea developed in man by this class of deities was, therefore, that of might, an idea which contrasts sharply with the concepts of divinity engendered by intercourse with the divinities of shamanism. The intensity of fear is greater with the savage than with civilized man. It is the latter, however, who first begins to magnify the idea of divine might. Where this tendency continues, polytheism must gradually disintegrate or collapse in self-created doubt. All this appears, however, only as a consequence of advances in culture. It is clear, therefore, that all progress in the purely spiritual realm is conditioned in the last analysis by progress in social forms. The manner in which the Old Testament emphasizes the idea of the utter frightfulness of God has probably already occurred to every Bible reader. This is not sufficiently explained by the so-called anthropomorphism of the narrative. If by this it is meant that the author stooped to the contemporary mode of thought and imagery of men, then it is surely simpler to say that the state of the idea of God is characteristic of the cultural phase of the time.

The important differentiation in the concept of divinity induced by social development in this one direction also involved differentiation in another respect. To the Patagonian his Great Spirit is still all in one—a "sacred tree," the "lord of death," the "ruler of the land of the dead," and the "regent of the people."[69] On a higher social stage, however, when the aspect of regency in a divinity is stressed to the exclusion of the rest, the people tend to bestow the other attributes of the original concept upon divinities of a different origin, so far as it can be done without restricting the idea of might. This is particularly likely to happen

[68] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 675.
[69] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 265.

when a sovereign deity is unable to drive out of popular consciousness an already established divinity. Thus in Egypt, when the sovereignty fell to a later god, the realm of the dead fell to the older one. In many cases, however, this latter office falls to a primitive maternal divinity, with whom the concept of wickedness is then associated in the manner already indicated. Thus Greek tradition preserved its Hecate, Rome her Mania, and nearly every other people some figure of a similar nature.

Finally, the influence of language has contributed much to the development of these ideas. To be sure, it is vain to seek the solution of profound problems in an analysis of the names of individual deities. In most of them the meaning remains itself a riddle or else deceives by its simplicity. Among the names Which are capable of interpretation, three groups stand out in particular. One, which includes the name of our own God, gives expression to the concept of "master," "lord," or "father" in the patriarchal sense. Analogous to .these are the names "mother" or "ancestress" and, on a later stage, "wife" or "mistress." Also to be included here are the indefinite terms like "he," which are ready substitutes for the above. The second group conveys the concept of "ghost" or the related ideas of "soul," "breath," or "spirit." The names of the third group are the most numerous. In general they do not seek to define the nature of the divinity himself but rather denote some particular object with which he is thought to be associated. Here we may include the familiar names Tien, Agni, and Brahma.[70] A combination of the first and third groups produces "mother earth."

Of greater importance in the development of ideas is the wealth or poverty of a language in synonymous terms. This may exert an inhibiting or encouraging influence on the syncretism of deities within a peace group. Egypt possessed an abundance of divine names. Most of them have come down to us as the terms for provincial divinities, i.e., for those provided with cults at common meeting places as the protecting deities of the tribes there associated for peaceful purposes. Some of these names were confined to a single nome, some were common to several, and some to many. In addition there were names applied only to the gods of individual tribes, and these too could be more or less general. The name Osiris seems to have been common to most of the

[70] Le., heaven, fire, and sacred word. (Ed.)

tribes, for even in later times it was not forgotten that every dead person with a cult adequately endowed and properly maintained was really an Osiris—or an Isis. This name was borne especially by the divine heads of the tribes, indeed by many of them at the same time. Consequently, with the development of the idea of a united Egyptian people, the conception necessarily arose that Osiris was one and the same person, to be sure not the imperial deity, but the popular death-god of the whole nation. This conception remained in existence in spite of the very contradictory fact that Osiris had graves or mortuary temples all over the country, so that, if he were actually one person, he must miraculously have been buried in many places at the same time.

To reconcile such contradictions in a logically consistent fashion is the function of mythology. Even though myth is in some respects freely poetical and inventive, it is nevertheless bound by the facts of popular knowledge. It can introduce only such new facts as are logically necessary to resolve contradictions. The conversion of this logical necessity into an epic account we have called "mythological substruction."[71] If the logical compulsion is of such a nature that only a single explanation is possible, then there is no need of an individual poet to formulate a myth; it will spring up everywhere of itself like a natural growth from the soil of the people. The Osiris myth, in the form given currency by Plutarch,[72] is apparently a case of this sort. If Osiris lies buried in many places, then he must likewise have been buried in all of them. If the one is a fact, the other may also be told as a fact. In explanation of this further fact, however, it was possible for any one, be he priest or layman, to draw on common knowledge and established tradition. If a league of tribes in Fayum, practising the cult of Set (Typhon), carried on a hereditary feud with the Osirian tribes, then in the sense of the age it was not merely an allegory but a pure fact that Set was the hereditary enemy of Osiris. To him, then, was inevitably attributed the hostile act of dismembering and scattering the corpse of Osiris. These are, in fact, the main elements of the myth. If Osiris is represented in the myth as the founder of Egyptian culture and law, it is but a common variation of the old idea of the first man, which has a parallel in India in the myth of Manu. The fact that Isis is made at the same time his sister and his

[71] See above, p. 99. (Ed.) **[T2] *Isis et Otiris* xii-xx. (Ed.)**

wife reflects the conditions of mother-right.[73] In the adaptation of other parallel divine figures and their mutual relationships; poetic license is always restrained by the facts.

We have already seen how, with social progress, divinities with different names but identical activities inevitably come to be identified. It is clear, however, that with the completion of this identification the original knowledge of the divine personality is necessarily obscured; his actual history is forgotten, or the traditions about him are modified. But in this process the other factor in the concept of divinity, the attribute of behavior, becomes more and more prominent, and myth-making is succeeded by a rationalistic interpretation of myths in accordance with that attribute. The Osiris myth entered this phase relatively early. Herodotus treats everything which concerns this god as a secret of the initiated. Plutarch sees in the act of Set and his companions in putting Osiris into the coffin a symbol of the subsidence of the Nile's waters, and in the struggle of the two brothers an allegory of the conflict between the creative and destructive forces of nature. On these foundations the meaning of the myth has been zealously reconstructed ever since. Had the cult alone continued to uphold the historical religious ideas in the face of the new interpretation, the latter would have struck at its very roots. If the view had once become thoroughly popular that Osiris was nothing but an allegory for the fluctuating Nile or the reproductive forces of nature, awakening in the spring and dying in the autumn, then Osiris too would certainly have found in every thinking man a prophet for the revelation, "Bring no more vain oblations."[74] How could the kings have continued bluntly to call their rich offerings the sustenance of the gods?[75] A new sacrifice would not then have been necessary to redeem men from sacrifice, to overthrow the cult and with it the old naive world-philosophy of mankind.

But even though this incipient disintegration was a natural link in the chain of evolution, nevertheless, at the time when civilized men were concerned with the question of redemption

[73] Mother-right was still strong in ancient Egypt. See Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 377-88. (Ed.)

[74] Isaiah i. 13.

[75] One such place reads: "The gods were delighted with the proofs of his love, that he tendered them the due sacrifices by which they live, just as a good son acts toward his father" (Lauth, *Aegyptens Vorzeit*, p. 370).

from the cult, of the emancipation of mankind from the intolerable fetters in which it had ensnared itself, such revolutionary speculation had by no means affected the masses of the people to the extent commonly believed. Aristophanes in his *Birds* shows us that crude religious or rather cult ideas, like those which characterize the superstitious African Negroes today, still possessed great vitality in the populace of Athens at a time which we are accustomed to regard as the heyday of intellectual life. Never has there been a time when the masses of the people have been able to follow the rational thinking of a group of advanced intellects, and never, moreover, have there been lacking advisers of the people who have had a personal interest in seeing that they should not follow.

The cult itself, however, under the influence of social progress, constrained to the oldest type of mythogenesis. This is shown, for example, in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, where, in the myths created under the necessity of reconciling contradictions, the old substance is revealed under ever new and luxuriant trappings. Greece had a somewhat similar document in the *Theogony* of Hesiod. He ignored entirely the practical aim of the cult. Impelled by an inner need, he sought instead to assemble and systematize the infinite number of disparate and independent conceptions current within the reach of the expanded Greek horizon. But this early age was still deeply imbued with the feeling that the unifying principle was discoverable only in genealogies, and it was thwarted by the material itself.

A similar development must already have been initiated in the popular mind. As has already been stated, there are distinct indications that the name Zeus originally served many tribes of related stock as the designation of a special divine personality in each. With the development of a consciousness of Hellenic unity, however, an identification and amalgamation of the different personalities of Zeus was inevitably accomplished step by step—not, according to modern judgment, to the advantage of his moral character. As many myths as there had formerly been tribes designating their immortalized ancestral heads by the same name, were now necessary to reconcile the historical heterogeneity with the personal homogeneity of the tribal father. The various tribal mothers, however, were still characterized by heterogeneity. Consequently it was necessary for Zeus frequently to desert his marital consort, a conception popularized by the poems of Homer and Hesiod and criticized by Herodotus. The latter, it seems to us, would rather have restored the unity of ideas by borrowing from the common Egyptian source, which impressed him by its antiquity.

It is in harmony with the mosaic composition of the Greek population, with its acceptance of so many foreign elements, and with its relations with all sorts of alien peoples, that the Greeks should have amassed an unusually rich treasure of myths of the most diverse character, and that the Greek spirit should have
268 been led to immerse itself in the poetic exposition of the materials so abundantly available. To the extent to which this happened, the Greeks worked toward the isolation of the cult and the cult religion, preparing the way for an eventual admission of their inadequacy. The cult of Greece was robbed of a logical foundation by its mythology and became barren of ideas and meaning, while to the serious student its gods sufficed to explain causality neither in cosmic nor in ethical life. Hence Greece was the true cradle of Christianity. Just as Jesus of Galilee was in many respects more Syrian than Jew, so also the Greek-speaking Pauline Christians, far more than the Hebrew Christians, became the true bearers of the great revolution.

Of an entirely different nature were the conception and treatment of religion in Rome. Even myth-making preserved here a more historical character. It was completely overshadowed, however, by the scrupulous recording of cult duties. This found expression in the creation of special officials to keep account of the cult obligations assumed through political expansion and to supervise their fulfillment. The old idea was ineradicable that the fortune and existence of Rome were dependent upon the faithful performance of its cult duties. The dominance of this practical consideration made the effort to establish by mythopoesis the genealogies of the divinities toward whom Rome had incurred cult obligations as a result of its expansion, seem very unimportant. When its poets did eventually concern themselves therewith, it came about through the borrowing of Greek materials.

On the other hand, the clear delimitation of all these obligations led to a unique classification of divine beings, which adhered firmly to the earliest principles. *Genius* and *divus* were comprehensive terms for spiritual beings. The latter was the ghost of a dead person, who was assured of continued existence in the other world by the adequate observance of his cult. The *genius* appears in two historically authenticated connections, first as the soul in the living body, and second as a disembodied ghost which attaches itself to man as an external guardian spirit. In both directions a later age drew more exact distinctions. From the time that the better educated, following Plato, distinguished three souls in man—a vegetative soul in the digestive organs, an animal soul in the breast, and a rational soul in the head—the *genius* was also the reasoning soul in man,[76] the spirit as intelligence. It was likewise following an old line of reasoning to conceive of the supreme deity as a qualitatively similar rational soul of the world, a universal *genius.*[77] Although apparently far removed from the naive speculation of savage peoples, this lofty conception of a world-soul as the creative spirit nevertheless still reveals its genetic connection with the naive primitive concept of the soul. This concept, the only analogy by which even civilized mankind is able to conceive of a creative force in nature, is derived from no facts observable in external nature but only from those inferred in man himself. Their agreement here still unites civilized man with the simplest savage.[78]

Corresponding to the *genius* but limited to the female sex was the *juno,* the *genius* of woman. Each woman harbored one *juno* within her and was protected by another above her. And just as in the individual household the status of the Roman wife beside her husband was assured by contract, so also the state cult recognized a supreme Juno by the side of the supreme god. The *manes* and *lemures* were departed souls without reference to sex, though otherwise differentiated. By *manes* the Romans understood mainly the *divi,* the well-disposed ghosts propitiated by a fitting cult; by *lemures,* the haunting specters not set at rest by a cult. *Larvce* denoted the same ghosts with reference to their external appearance.

The *lares* were the *manes* which stood in the relation of over-

[76] Augustine *De civitate Dei* vii 23, citing Varro.

[77] *"Talem autem mundi animum Deum esse—ut tanquam universalis genius ipse mundi animus esse credatur"* (Augustine *De civitate Dei* vii. 13).

[78] "The theory of the soul is one principal part of a system of religious philosophy which unites, in an unbroken line of mental connexion, the savage fetish-worshipper and the civilized Christian" (Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I, 501-2). (Ed.)

lords to the house, the ghosts of the paternal household heads. These divine housefathers had driven from the domestic cult the earlier housemothers, for the *junones* did not correspond to the household heads under mother-right. The latter were preserved only in the state cult, first as the heads of the thirty curial hearths, then, after the reform of Servius Tullius, as the one Vesta of the state hearth.[79] Similarly analogous to the domestic *lares* were the *lares compitales,* the divine heads of the local unions of households. Finally, the highest *lar* of the state was Jupiter, distinguished from other gods of the same paternal name by the title *optimus maximus* (the richest and greatest). He was likewise the highest of the divinities of the three ancient tribes, along with Mars and Quirinus. A still older confederation, consisting chiefly of Etruscan elements, had recognized the maternal
270 sovereignty of Dea Dia. The *penates* were originally the guardian spirits of outbuildings serving chiefly as storehouses. Later they took their place with the *lares* at the great hearth in the atrium. The *penates* of the collective Roman people resided similarly at the state hearth in the Temple of Vesta.

Still another advance in the ideas of divinity brought about by the cult of propitiation can be observed in the development of Roman religion. Among many peoples, every time a guardian spirit has to be won for a definite purpose, it is found necessary to go back, as it were, to the very root of the idea, and to create a ghost in the original manner by separating the soul of a man from his body and intrusting it with the protective office. This has happened in Siam within the past century. In order to provide a newly constructed gate with an invisible watchman, a man was put to death after being ceremoniously entertained and impressed with the duties of his future office.[80] That the same usage formerly prevailed in Europe is established not merely by legendary traditions but also by historical evidence. Human beings, occasionally beggar children purchased for the purpose, were killed or immured with like intent, especially in the construction of ramparts, bridges, and dikes. These are all structures where a timely warning of danger may avert disaster. The intention was to make of the victim, not a guardian spirit who would

[79] Cf., Mommsen, *Romische Geschichte,* I, 113.
[80] *Bericht der preusmchen Expedition nach Ostasien,* IV, 333. See below, p. 467. (Ed.)

repulse the enemy from the wall or the water from the dike, but a watchful ghost who should announce the danger visible to it in the usual way by signs or portents.

The Roman, on a higher stage of religious ideas, did fundamentally the same thing when he constructed a niche in a house or a sacrificial cavity under a boundary stone. However, the idea here has undergone a not unimportant modification. The throng of ghosts which fills the earth and air to the eternal terror of the savage can be turned to his own advantage by the man conversant with the cult. The farther back the historical knowledge of a people reaches, the more immense that throng must appear, and the more attentively man devotes himself to the observation of nature, the more numerous must become the proofs of its existence, for on the path which his speculation has once taken man can not conceive of any other cause of changing phenomena than the agency of spiritual beings, and the number of these, therefore, necessarily increases with the sum of knowledge. That the sum of knowledge mounts steadily with the development of culture needs no proof. Consequently at the peak of classical civilization man was faced with such an immense host of spiritual beings that he did not have to create new ones for special purposes but needed only to win over those who presented themselves in hordes at every point on the earth. It was enough to place an offering in the niche; that there was a ghost at hand, who would be attracted by it, was no longer doubtful.

Just as in this way a special guardian spirit was won for a new house possessing no grave, so also artificial associations of any sort, not bound by genealogical ties, could enjoy the protection of a spiritual overlord acquired by means of the cult. The *lares compitales* belonged in this class. They were acquired through the cult as protecting divinities by people brought together in a neighborhood by chance and thus possessing no common ancestral head. Similarly each guild and profession had its god, Vulcan and Minerva being familiar examples.

Like the African priest, who is never at a loss to secure a spirit for any desired function by means of dubious cult benefits, the Romans thought that every life activity had its spiritual overlord, and that it was only necessary to know how to approach him with the proper invocations and sacrifices in order to influence those activities in the desired fashion. This is the **basis** of the peculiar conception of the *indigetes,* which we might call vocational *genii,* and of the *indigitamenta* or books of ritual.

When these tendencies are accentuated with the increasing complexity of life, the cult takes on an importance impossible to exaggerate. To realize the extremes to which the emphasis on the cult may be carried, we must listen to the vainglorious Brahman. "The whole world is only the fruit or the ripened product of sacrifices."[81] Sacrifice alone maintains life on earth. This oriental extravagance culminates in the myth that heaven, earth, sun, moon, stars, men, animals, plants, and everything else originated in a sacrifice.[82] The Occident, although to be sure somewhat more temperate, was nevertheless swayed by a fundamentally identical point of view. The state was absolutely dependent upon the cult. It unquestionably suffered harm with every lapse in the cult, and this was the case even if a mere private individual neglected his cult duty. Consequently Rome, quite consistently, created in the *pontifex maximus* a supreme official of public welfare to watch over the fulfillment of the cult obligations of every individual. Later the emperors themselves took over this office. Many powers they willingly relinquished, but not this.

Of equal weight with the importance attached to the cult, however, is its burden.[83] By the very nature of the case this burden grows with civilization, so long as no explanation of causality other than daimonism is known. In the American Indian, foresight is called forth only infrequently in the face of special crises. Consequently his cult is limited to occasional sacrifices and funeral provisions. At the most he celebrates a general feast of the dead from time to time, in order to dispel his ghost-fear for a while in a lump. Only rarely is his anxiety sufficiently intense to impel him to resort to his Great Spirit. If he needs the help of a special ghost in case of sickness or similar emergency, he has recourse to the mediation of a man who, too weak or too lazy to hunt, has made it his specialized calling to control such spirits by means of a continuous cult. The wretchedness of life, with its recurrent periods of want, fosters such a conception of hungry lurking ghosts.

[81] *Vishtmpurana* i. 13; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* VII, 299. Cf. also Ludwig, *Rigveda,* III, 259.

[82] Cf., Hopkins, *Religions of India,* pp. 187-8. (Ed.)

[88] On the economic burden of the cult see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* **II, 1219-22,** 1467-72. (Ed.)

With advancing culture this situation is reversed. A more comprehensive care for life is followed by a more expensive provision for the dead. Foresight over longer periods leads to endowments of increased size. The cares of cultured life, augmented by a thousand new social relationships in as many directions, create a continuous succession of occasions for cult activity. When the conditions of life have reached the degree of stability first attained in history by the Egyptians, the dead begin in reality to suck the lifeblood of the living. Capital saved up as an equipment for life, which should have been passed on from one generation to the next, was in Egypt almost entirely diverted to the purposes of the cult. Inheritance was practically non-existent; the dead, as in primitive times, held fast to their property, except that they left a portion to the survivors for the cost of managing
273 it. Thus most of the property of life gradually fell under the dead hand. All luxury and wealth piled up in the cemeteries and temples, and their splendor was such as even to blind posterity to the naked poverty of the life of the exploited classes. To be sure, the gods and the dead, through their vast and in part still productive wealth, did give employment to the living. But even so, only one class lived in luxury, namely, that which administered the cult property. Even the rulers were careful to provide for the princes of royal blood by placing them in such offices, and in prospect of coveted berths a stream of applicants poured from the entire land into the temples.

The leisure furnished by these numerous sinecures has been an important factor in human progress.[84] Among other things it made possible writing, which spread from Egypt to the civilized peoples of Europe and Asia by way of the Phoenicians, and astronomical knowledge, which resulted from observations to fix periods of time with exactness, an important desideratum of a punctilious cult. But although this system of life created room and provided means for these and similar advances, it also set limits to them. When these were reached, torpor set in. If Egypt made these advances early in a brilliant flight, it remained all the longer in stagnation.

Cultural development took a similar course in the lowlands of eastern Asia. In spite of many advances in certain technical fields, the world-philosophy of the people of China is still today

[84] **See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1477-8. (Ed.)**

that of daimonism,[85] and both political and individual life are governed strictly in accordance with this point of view. Along with similar virtues, China shows the same stagnation as ancient Egypt. The first attempts at railroad building were wrecked by the apprehension that the ghosts residing in the earth with their bodies would be disturbed by the projected excavations. Such disturbance would inevitably result in incalculable harm to men. In another direction, however, China discovered how, without breaking with the system, to make its lot more endurable by means of a very primitive form of redemption from many cult obligations.[86]

The burden of the cult likewise increased with advancing culture in the Roman Empire and in India. Examples have been cited here because its very weight gives an indication of the importance attached to the cult. This weight, moreover, is a measure
274 of the magnitude of the eternal struggle between progress in life and the traditional precepts of the cult. Here is the explanation of why the cult so often contains survivals which stand in glaring contradiction to the thought and feeling of its time and which frequently have their origin in a remote age of savagery. We shall introduce the reader to a few of these cult forms before we take up the further development of the concept of divinity.

[85] Daimonism is "the doctrine of spirits, both good and bad." On daimonism as a world-philosophy, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 932-8. (Ed.)

[86] I.e., by the use of paper models of sacrificial objects, etc. (Ed.)

CHAPTER XI

HUMAN SACRIFICE

275 If in one direction the burden of the cult mounted with advancing culture, it fell in another. By the time full civilization was attained, emancipation had been almost completely achieved in one respect. Previously, not only had man been burdened as the sacrificer, but his body and life had also been the objects sacrificed. This cult obligation is derived from two sources.

The first source can not be older than the patriarchate, for it arises from the property right in men, a right unknown to mother-right. If a man's personal possessions still remained his even after death because his soul clung to his treasures, then logically no distinctions could be drawn between them. Even his living property had to follow him to the grave, and his slave and his wife bore the same relation to him as his horse. This logical conclusion was actually drawn, and the grave-escort of slaves and widows was very widespread. It is characteristic of the patriarchate in its prime, and accordingly attained its highest development among the nomads of the Old World. The suttee, as is well known, continued to exist in India until very recently. The same practice, as well as the grave-escort of slaves, was indigenous among the Germanic and Slavic peoples. According to Herodotus,[1] fifty youths were dispatched at the second funeral of Scythian kings. The grave-escort is unknown to peoples who stand nearer to mother-right. To the American Indians it was as alien as slavery itself.

In the beginning, these sacrifices, whether in the grave or on the funeral pile, were probably based only on a simple inference from the indissolubility of the property relation. When it is reported that sometimes the widows are eager for the sad honor,
276 this strange fact may be partially explained by primitive fear of the dead. If every bit of his property attracts the ghost and

1 *History* **iv. 72. (Ed.)**

thus brings suffering and harm to whoever appropriates it, then the possessed object itself, if it lives and feels, has in prospect only a life of terror.

That this idea actually exists among savage peoples is proved, where a suttee does not take place, by the mourning customs of the widow.[2] She becomes a source of danger anxiously avoided by every one, while she seeks to safeguard herself from the ghost by all those methods of avoidance which have been discussed above. Among the North American Indians the widow sinks into the deepest distress because she keeps none of her husband's property, while fear of contact with her is so strong that nobody dares to give her a gift. The rationalized superstition here is no better than the primitive one. "She can not get meat even for money, for the Indians have the superstition that their weapons would be spoiled so that they could kill no more game, if a widow ate of an animal which they have shot."[3] Among some tribes of Indonesia the widow must spend her mourning period in complete seclusion and may least of all let herself be seen in a strange village. The same practice recurs among the Araucanians of South America.[4] The Arabs have carried over into Islam the custom of confining the widow in the death chamber of her husband. Finally, a certain degree of retirement has everywhere remained as a survival with a new interpretation, Usually, moreover, the widow is obliged to make herself unrecognizable by removing all ornament and by disfigurement of some sort.

The duration of this widow's status differs. We can not assume that it originally covered the entire balance of her life, although it has certainly been carried that far by some peoples. At first, the idea of the continued existence of the dead was assuredly neither restricted to definite time limits nor expanded to eternity. Vividness of memory could have been the only criterion. Consequently the "mourning period" usually ended with the second funeral, with the departure of the ghost to a spirit world. As a rule, too, the period during which no other man can take possession of the widow coincides with the mourning period. In Rome its duration was ten months, later a full year, and the original

[2] For a full treatment of the widow's status, with ample illustrations, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1841-54; IV, 1012-23. (Ed.)

[3] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 83.

[4] Mantegazza, *Geschlechtsverhaltnisse,* p. 229; Wilken, *Haaropfer,* p. 15, Appendix IV.

277 significance had not yet been entirely forgotten. Apuleius[5] has a widow dissuade her suitor from too early a wedding, because a marriage within the mourning period would provoke the *manes* of her dead husband and might thus lead to harm to the bridegroom. This is the original basis of that religious ing" *(luctus religio)* of which the laws speak. The identity of the year of mourning and the period of widowhood was still preserved at a later age in Roman history, but Ulpian knew only of a rationalized basis for it in connection with the determination of the kinship of children.

But just as the idea of the entrance of the ghost into a spirit world after a definite period is only one of several parallel forms, so also the above conception of the duration of the widow's status has not remained the only one. On the contrary, a tendency may be recognized to extend it to her entire life. The ancient Germans, according to Tacitus,[6] must be included among the peoples who do not allow the widow to marry a second time. Hindu public opinion attaches a certain stigma to remarriage, and the same is also the case among the Chinese. Such cases are rare among lower peoples, although by no means entirely unknown.[7]

This exaggerated widow's mourning can not be regarded as a redemption of the suttee, for it is found among tribes which do not sufficiently emphasize the property relation and are simply concerned with avoiding the evil that may come from contact with an object to which the ghost clings. Consequently mourning by widows occurs practically universally, whereas the immolation of widows is more restricted. The latter, however, is rooted in the former. If it is thought necessary to protect the property of the dead from any alien contact, then the most effective means of accomplishing this is burial or burning.

Uncivilized man, unused to thinking in matters not connected with his immediate care for life, is unable either to apprehend vividly the agonies of death or to sympathize with the sufferings
278 of others. This relative callousness of the savage removes from the way of certain barbarous customs an obstacle which seems insuperable to our practiced thinking. What we call our "sensitiveness" in these matters is actually the result of thought. If a man lacks practice in thinking, then he also lacks this sensitiveness.

[5] ***Metamorphoses* viii.**
[6] ***Germania* xix.**
[7] **Wilken, *Haaropfer,* pp. 45-6.**

The subjects and facts with which we have to deal in this entire chapter are proof that such a sensitiveness is not innate in mankind. Otherwise they would be inexplicable. Here we strike the source of the eternal conflict between the cult and humanity, between death and life. The former by its very nature asserts every old usage as its right and has its support in the past.[8] When, however, advancing culture and heightened foresight stimulate thought, even though it is directed only toward material ends, this mental exercise gives rise to progress in understanding and sympathy, and this increasing sensitiveness must again and again reject what the cult by its nature must demand. The immolation of widows in its earlier stages is not only comprehensible in itself as a cult law, but is also explicable under the actual circumstances. The Hindu widow was given her choice. The Slavic widow, according to the reports of missionaries, also followed her husband voluntarily, and the Edda portrays a similar scene. But the alternatives were the sad status of a widow with its train of anxiety and hardship, and the comparatively brilliant lot of a wife beside her husband in the hereafter. What was once, given the premises, a rational choice is preserved by custom as a law.

When the above ideas have advanced so far beyond a simple inference from the property relation and a desire to avoid harm as to define the fate of the victims, the view is that they are persons whose souls are dispatched to accompany and serve the ghost of their master. The term "human sacrifice" is sometimes employed for these cult practices. If this is done, it is necessary to distinguish human sacrifice of another type.

The theology of savage and civilized peoples teaches us that ghosts and spirits are eager to devour souls as food. Even among the Negroes we meet a refined interpretation of sacrifice, according to which the ghosts nourish their spiritual natures by eating only the souls of the food set before them. This interpretation is even more obvious when animate beings are sacrificed. Ideas of this sort are common to peoples as far apart as the remote tribes of Polynesia and the civilized peoples of ancient Egypt. The Eskimos believe that the departed soul is exposed to great

[8] "When men change, the gods do not. Hence the rites of human sacrifice and cannibalism continue in religion long after they disappear from the mores, in spite of loathing" (Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 366). (Ed.)

dangers and can only escape a "second death" by a five-day fast on the part of the survivors.[9] The object of the elaborate cult practices of the ancient Egyptians was, according to the *Book of the Dead,* to enable the souls of the dead on their journey to the other world to escape the perils which threatened them with a second death and complete annihilation.[10] The same conception animates a number of the medieval tales related by Caesarius of Heisterbach; whenever a man lies dead, the demons, often in the form of ravens, gather in throngs to devour his soul.

What is the source of this strange idea of the eating of souls, of a second death and complete annihilation of the soul? It, too, has a materialistic foundation in the life of man. It is rooted in the practice of primitive man not to avoid on principle the use of the flesh of his own species as food, a practice which, under certain circumstances, instead of vanishing, could even rise to a gaudy passion for such food. In short, it is rooted in cannibalism.

Andree, who has exhaustively studied this subject, arrives at the conclusion that "all extant anthropophagy seems only a remnant of a once universal practice." Even if certain philanthropists should succeed in clearing this or that existing tribe of the accusation, or if all the evidences for the cannibalism of prehistoric man[11] should be rejected as questionable, it would not detract from Andree's well-founded judgment. The fact would still remain that those very regions of the earth where we find the oldest races of man have always been down to the present day notorious breeding places of cannibalism. It radiates far and wide from the heart of Africa and from Australia. It is widespread over the whole of Oceania as far as Malaysia, and in America it extends from south to north, reaching its climax in the civilized states of the center. Only Asia and Europe, the classic ground of true pastoral culture and the civilizations arising therefrom, are free from the custom in historical times. Here, where the grave-escort is indigenous, cannibalism became extinct at an early date. Otherwise it once covered the entire earth, as Andree correctly concluded. But even Europe and Asia were not always exempt. The practice was still familiar to the ancients beyond the borders of their civilization, and it is even yet traceable in their own

[9] Cranz, *Gronland,* p. 243.
[10] Cf., *Cambridge Ancient History,* II, 197. (Ed.)
[11] See the chapter on this subject in Andree, *Anthropophagie.*

folklore. If we add to the material from which Andree drew his conclusions the actual survivals of previous cannibalism preserved in the cult, there remains no alternative save to admit that there was once a time when mankind as a whole did not regard the eating of human flesh with that abhorrence which characterizes most of its members today. The opposite view, namely, that an instinct of repugnance was innate in primitive man, rests largely on the parallel so often drawn with the animal kingdom, where cannibalism is alleged to be non-existent. It seems to us, however, that it still remains to be proved whether this allegation does not spring from too superficial an observation, and whether it is not merely greater ease in hunting which has led the carnivorous species to prey on the ruminants rather than on animals which can meet them with weapons as efficient as their own.[12]

Just as there are two types of cannibalism, that practiced even within the tribe or primitive family[13] and that directed only against outsiders, so also there are two ways by which mankind could gradually have acquired its abhorrence of the custom. Forster[14] recognizes only the influence of a social factor. What he deplores is the fact "that the social sentiments of sympathy and love of humanity could so easily have gone astray. Since, however, no human society can exist without these, the first *[sic]* step toward civilization among all peoples must necessarily have been the renunciation of cannibalism and an attempt to arouse disgust with it." Love of humanity does, in fact, play a role. We know, however, that this concept can not possibly be older than the idea of the social unity of mankind, which is relatively very late. The development of sentiments of sympathy and understanding gradually eliminated cannibalism within the tribe, but they could hardly have extended beyond the limits of the group without some corresponding expansion of social ties.

Here emerges a second factor which has promoted a feeling of abhorrence, namely, fear, which again appears as a rude element in the care for life. The process may be demonstrated by an example. In the Hudson Bay country, according to

[12] Cannibalism among mice may be easily confirmed, and male cats and wolves frequently practice it on their own young (*Globus,* 1874, II, 123).

[13] This form is often called "endocannibalism." See Steinmetz, *Endokannibalmus.* (Ed.)

[14] *Samtliche Schriften,* I, 407.

Hearne,[15] certain Indians were driven to cannibalism by necessity. A popular notion prevailed, however, that a person who had once eaten human flesh retained a craving for it, so that no one felt safe in his company. This fear caused such people to be shunned. No one wanted to pitch his tent near them. Indeed, fear for self-preservation sometimes led to the secret murder of one of them. In other cases, however, it resulted in contempt and abhorrence.

As long as neighboring tribes are hostile and unrelated by any social ties, as in primitive times, each tribe finds it advantageous and flattering to spread fear among all its neighbors. Under such circumstances cannibalism receives a powerful impetus. Thus we find it among unorganized groups in Australia and New Zealand. The same principle is illustrated by the Bellacoola Indians, among whom cannibalism was kept up as a mark of distinction of a higher social rank and was limited to a secret society.[16] A reputation for ferocity pleases the savage and accords with the prevailing idea of perfection. Moreover, with isolated tribes it forms a bulwark of protection against outsiders until some form of peaceful intercourse takes its place. Then, however, it becomes a handicap and gradually destroys its bearers through isolation and persecution. Cannibalism is confined first to individual tribes and then to a few disreputable families, until eventually it dies out altogether. Abhorrence, originally the child of fear, becomes deeply ingrained and can be aroused by the mere idea. In this way all civilized mankind finally acquired a deep-seated loathing toward the eating of human flesh.

But this inhibiting feeling of abhorrence, since it is the product of a social advance which we can trace in ethnography, could not have existed at the beginning of the development. Primitive peoples did not have to overcome it in order to become cannibals. It disturbed them not at all in their constant effort to provide themselves with new sources of delectable meat food. No more were they checked by any social restriction. In the absence of any aversion or bond of peace there was nothing to hinder the savage from treating the men of hostile tribes like animals to be hunted.

[16] *Hudson's Bay to the Northern Ocean*, cited in Andree, *Anthropophagie*, p. 91.

[16] Jacobsen, *Nordkuste Amerikas*, pp. 47ff.

It has been both asserted and denied that cannibalism has been influenced by a lack of food. When the proposition is stated in such general terms, the denial is certainly correct. In a more qualified form, however, the assertion seems to be valid.[17] Although on certain Polynesian islands and in some regions of Australia fruits and fish are plentiful, there is nevertheless a lack of warm-blooded animals available for food. Among many cannibal tribes it is customary to debar women and children entirely from the enjoyment of human flesh, or else to silence them with a trifle. *The* .cannibal repast is in its origin a meal of the men .only. An abundance of food gained in the female sphere of economic activity can not quiet the hunger for meat acquired by the men in their own economic sphere. The success of hunting, however, is always uncertain, even in regions better supplied with mammals than Oceania. There can be no doubt, therefore, that in this chief center of anthropophagy the relative lack of warm-blooded meat has given rise to the custom of organizing hunting expeditions against hostile tribes to secure human flesh. Although cannibalism occurred widely in America, it reached its climax in the uplands of Mexico, where an agricultural civilization had displaced hunting without, however, supplying any domesticated animal in its stead. That such a correlation exists is shown by the reverse situation. Wherever cattle raising stabilizes the food-quest, as in Egypt and among the northern nomads, cannibalism disappears.

An added incentive is the savage's passion for distinction. It is regarded as a highly laudable act to kill human game in foreign hunting grounds or even merely to have participated therein. Souvenirs of the deed are worn on the body throughout life. Still other motives are enmity and lust for revenge, which, when nourished by the repeated encroachments of tribes on each other, develop into a literal thirst for blood. From this point the behavior of the savage is determined by the simple cult ideas with which we are already acquainted.

When some tribes eat the flesh of their deceased members, this indicates of course an, as it were, innocent stage of cannibalism, which sees no horror in such an act. The intention, however, is that of a defensive cult. That the soul resides, not in the bones, but somewhere in the soft parts of the body, is a widespread con-

[17] **But see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1230-3. (Ed.)**

ception. Eating the flesh consequently has the same effect as cremation; the soul is separated from the body, and thus man is freed from fear of the ghost. It has, however, still another peculiar effect. The soul, its separate existence destroyed, is transformed into vital energy in the survivors.[18]

The same idea is present in the cannibalism of revenge, and again fear underlies its barbaric aspect. From the blood of the slain there arises an invincible avenger, who visits the slayer with all the torments which ghosts can inflict on mortals. Classical antiquity was impregnated with this conception and could tell stories of murderers whom no purification could save from the avenging ghosts. Revenge against an enemy was therefore incomplete if his soul was not also destroyed. This was accomplished by anthropophagy. "When the fetish-man of Ashanti devours the heart of a captive enemy, he does so in order not to be tormented by the spirit of the dead man, which he supposes has its seat in the heart."[19]

This idea is the basic one. Considerable diversity of opinion prevails only as to the specific location of the soul. The most widespread view is that the soul resides in the blood. Hence the cannibal thirsts for blood above all else; a drink of warm blood destroys the adversary and increases the vital energy of the victor. It is a fundamentally identical conception which sees in the heart the receptacle of life. In Polynesia and in European legends the heart and eye together are similarly regarded as the seat of life. The soul is located by other peoples in the kidney fat, and by certain Amazonian Indians in the marrow of the bones. The forms of the practice vary correspondingly, to be sure, but^the main idea is always the assimilation of the soul of the slain by the victor, who thereby receives an accretion of vital force. Dyak boys are accordingly made bold and courageous by being given the hearts of slain enemies to eat. The same belief has been found in North America and South Australia.[20] According to a modified form in Germanic legend, some special insight or spiritual power can be gained by such an act. The Tupi Indian, according to Hans Stade, after incorporating the soul of a slain enemy, exchanged names with .the latter.. In this he was follow-

[18] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I I , 1237. (Ed.)
[19] Andree, *Anthropophagie*, p. 102; Bowdich, *Aschantee*, p. 402.
[20] Andree, *Anthropophagie*, p. 102.

ing the basic idea with entire logic, for by acquiring a new soul he had become a new man.

When the negative aspect, the complete destruction of the man, was stressed, ideas and usages developed in another direc-
284 tion. Even though the cult was originally the child of fear in the survivors, it nevertheless soon made the transition to a provision for the deceased and for the continued existence of his ghost. Man, to whom earthly life often offered so little satisfaction, came to look forward eagerly to this future life and consequently to fear its opposite, a second death, as the greatest of evils. To make the necessary cult provision for the departed soul, therefore, was a gratification of an ardent wish, while to deprive the ghost of a proper funeral was an extreme expression of revenge. Hence many peoples endeavor to rescue all who fall in battle in order to give them the benefit of a funeral, and the Homeric hero swore to destroy his adversary without burial. Even the Bible uses the expression, "to kill the soul,"[21] as a threat of supreme punishment. However, what is here only a figure of speech, or is attainable in a passive fashion by a mere denial of cult attention, has been made by some peoples an active means of intensifying punishment. They not only kill the criminal but also bring about a second death for his soul by devouring his body.[22] It has always aroused astonishment that a people as advanced as the Battak of Sumatra, with their own writing and literature, could preserve such a custom. But their law is logically entirely consistent with the above conception when it prescribes that the criminal and the enemy captured in arms shall be not only killed but also completely destroyed by eating their flesh.[28] Only by this act and by the participation of every one in it is the community safeguarded against danger from internal and external enemies.

Andree has demonstrated that the Battak are not alone in drawing this logical conclusion and in thus conserving moribund cannibalism in the form of a legal institution. The Quissama of Angola, for example, practice anthropophagy regularly in the case of condemned criminals though but rarely otherwise. In New Caledonia it is the lack of any other meat food which has pre-

21 Matthew x. 28. (Ed.)

22 This is sometimes called "judicial cannibalism." See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1241. (Ed.)

23 Andree, *Anthropophagie*, p. 17.

served cannibalism. "War is waged for no other reason than to obtain meat." Military or rather hunting expeditions are undertaken against neighboring tribes, often with great regularity, for the land furnishes no mammals except a single inedible species of bat. Human flesh is also procured in other ways. According to Gamier, surplus children are eaten by the members of their families, old people are treated similarly with their own consent, and, above all, criminals are punished with the same fate.

The original impulse to cannibalism, the avidity for warm-blooded meat, may be extinguished in time as a result of the
285 advance to cattle raising, or of the development of a social sentiment of abhorrence, or of both together. But cannibalism does not thereby become extinct, for the secondary impulses resting on popular physiological conceptions continue to operate. We notice, however, that its sensual attractiveness is gradually lost, with the result that the practice begins to become survivalistic. Such a transition seems to be foreshadowed in the many cases where human flesh is no longer eaten for itself alone but is mixed with other foods. Even the addition of condiments, like lemon juice in Sumatra and some of the Philippine Islands, might be included here.

As a further step, the practice is limited to the eating of a few special parts, and finally even the indulgence demanded by convention becomes a pretense. Thus the Gaddans of Luzon are said to devour only the brains of slain enemies. The Ashanti of West Africa eat the heart, the inhabitants of Northern Australia the eyes and cheeks, and the aborigines of New South Wales the kidney fat, which is also highly prized by the cannibals of Central Africa. Faraud accuses the North American Crees and Blackfeet of tearing out and consuming the hearts of slain enemies. Among the Jagas of Angola, as late as the period of Portuguese rule, a man was ceremoniously slaughtered at a special feast. The heart was given to the chieftain, who took a bite but spit it out again. In the Marquesas Islands in time of war the eyes and heart of an enemy were still devoured raw, but the same custom had already become a survival in the Society and Hawaiian Islands at the time of their discovery. When the king of Tahiti was given an eye, he opened his mouth as though to swallow it but without doing so.

In the latter case we also see how the weakening of such usages may influence popular beliefs. The original interpretation is necessarily supplanted by one adapted to the newer circumstances, and thereby arise rationalized conceptions which are scarcely explicable of themselves. The Tahitians believed that the ceremony conferred upon their king an "increase of wisdom and sagacity."[24] We can still easily recognize here the primitive conception of the effect of incorporating in oneself a soul with its powers. But the original premise had actually been forgotten, and the explanation followed an indirect path. "They also believe that a protective divinity attends this ceremony, accepts the sacrifice, and strengthens the soul of the king by a new gift of vital energy."

The survival to which cannibalism most frequently shrivels is the drinking of blood. Prehistoric man must have had a keen craving for fresh animal blood for both refreshment and invigoration. In human blood everything that was desirable was combined and raised to a higher power. But even with regard to this fluid, the commonest seat of the soul, mankind gradually acquired scruples. The idea of the restorative power of the drink was the first to give way; that of the incorporation of the soul lingered on. From here the custom pursued two paths. According to the first of these, a man would introduce the blood into external incisions on his body, thus mixing it with his own. As this custom gradually declined, the same effect was anticipated from sprinkling the skin with blood. The Jagas, who would no longer eat even a piece of the heart, poured human blood over the breast and body in order to gain new strength. The second path led to the dilution of the blood with other drinks, chiefly with wine where this was the prevalent beverage. This survival, too, gradually became a mere symbol through a diminution in the proportion of blood.

We should need only to touch lightly upon these gruesome matters if they were solely characteristic of savages and if the ancestors of the civilized peoples, as was once generally assumed, had risen far above such practices. That the contrary is the case, however, we shall now indicate briefly. The Scythians, for instance, had preserved a very significant relic of cannibalism. "The Scythian soldier drinks the blood of the first man he overthrows in battle."[25] Early Scandinavian accounts reveal similar

[24] Wilson, *Missionsreise*, p. 338. [26] Herodotus *History* iv. 64.

practices. The Edda[26] relates how Reginn cut the heart out of Fafnir's body and drank the blood from the wound. Sigurd then did the same to Reginn, drank his blood and that of Fafnir, and ate the heart of the latter. He thereby gained a new spiritual power—he learned the language of the birds. The latter conception is the only deviation from the standard pattern. This case is by no means an isolated tradition. Both Hogni and Hialli had their hearts torn out, and Gunnar ate his son's "bloody heart with honey."[27] The significance here of honey has been indicated already. The Scandinavians at the time of these legends were still outside the area of vine culture, and mead, a drink fermented from honey, took the place of wine. Just as in the transitional stage farther south blood was drunk only when mixed with wine, so Norse legend spoke of bloody mead and regarded this drink as the inspiration of scaldic poetry.

Danish legends attach the same significance to "heart and eye" as is prevalent among certain Polynesians and other savage peoples. Esbern Snare concluded a league with a demon, pledging his "heart and eye," i.e., his life.[28] In consequence of a similar pact Germer Gladensvend belonged from birth to a demon, who, on meeting him, took from him one eye and drank half of his heart's blood. A corresponding though later conception of a cannibalistic demon is that of the vampire. According to Serbian popular beliefs the vampire opens up the left side of a sleeping person, removes the heart, and eats it.[29]

The folk laws disclose the significant fact that Germanic tribes once practiced in certain cases the same judicial cannibalism as the Battak of Sumatra. Thus the Paderborn capitulary[80] forbids the Saxons to burn to death and eat the flesh of any one for suspicion of witchcraft. Survivals extending back even to classical antiquity indicate that judicial cannibalism was once much more widespread. Tertullian 3[1] knew of the custom of using the blood of executed criminals for healing purposes, especially against epilepsy. An almost identical folkway has survived in Europe from the Middle Ages to the present day. At executions the

[26] *Fafmsmal* xxvi, xxxix.
[27] *Atlakvidha* xxii, xxiv, xxxvi; *Atlamal* lv,
[28] Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie,* p. 856.
29*bid.,* pp. 901-2.
[30] *Capitulatio de partibus SaxonicB* v.
[31] *Apologia adversus gentes* ix.

people press forward to catch the blood of the criminal in a cloth or to snatch some piece of his body. To these relics various magical potencies are attributed. Even the hangman's rope has finally been invested with these properties. It is clear that the underlying idea here is an essentially cannibalistic one. At some prehistoric time it was probably customary to surrender the bodies of certain criminals, especially sorcerers, to the people as a whole to be destroyed. Each person consumed a portion and believed that he gained thereby an increase in vital energy. This belief was then preserved in a corrupted form in the idea that sickness could be cured or success in business assured by the use of relics obtained from executed criminals.

Greek mythology, like Germanic legend, preserves clear reminiscences of an earlier age of anthropophagy. Of many examples the myth of Dionysus (Zagreus) will suffice. The Titans murdered Dionysus, dismembered him, and boiled and ate his limbs, while Hera brought the heart to Zeus, who devoured it.[82] This scene is the exact counterpart of a cannibal meal, the chief receiving the heart. But the myth also reveals the further ramifications of this cycle of ideas. Men, as the descendants of the Titans, are of Dionysian as well as Titan origin, for the simple reason that the Titans consumed Dionysus. The idea is identical with that according to which the Brazilian cannibal took the name of the person he had eaten. In connection with these myths were corresponding cults, said by Porphyry to have been maintained especially in Chios and Tenedos.

Herodotus33 reports a tradition that Greek and Carian mercenaries had drunk human blood before a battle. The early Irish have frequently been accused of anthropophagy,[84] and we are not surprised when Diodorus attributes the practice widely to the northern peoples and when Strabo calls it outright a Scythian custom. Herodotus 3[5] also tells of peoples in India who practiced at least the cannibalism of love, since they killed and ate their sick and aged members. Even in the later legendary traditions of the Hindus we find traces so reminiscent of the cannibalistic formulas of Polynesia and the Germanic north that

[32] See Preller, *Griechische Mythologie,* I, 553-4.
33 *History* iii. 11.
[34] See Strabo *Geography* iv. 6; Gomme, *Ethnology in Folklore*, pp. 121, 148-9, 152. (Ed.)
35 *History* iii. 99. (Ed.)

we must conclude that the cannibalism of hate likewise was not always unknown to the Hindu people. Thus a Buddhist myth makes its hero declare that once in a previous existence he had "his eyes and his heart-flesh torn out for others."[36]

Unfortunately we can not even yet conclude our discussion of a gruesome subject. We must cover so much of it as has become an important element in culture history through its continued existence in the form of survivals. It would be unnecessary to return again to cannibalism within the family were it merely to explain an insignificant survival which has lived on, even in modern times, in the ideas of the lowest classes. We refer to the well-authenticated cases of the profanation of graves to secure from the corpses blood and pieces of flesh to administer to the sick,[87] which again reveal the old belief in the access to new vital energy through cannibalistic indulgence. More numerous, however, and often even more horrible in their circumstances than such treatment of the dead and the aged are the cases in which the same survivalistic superstition has led men to seize upon a child or parts of a child's body for similar purposes.[88] This is the subject at the gruesome history of which we must now cast a glance.

So far has humanity surmounted its dark beginnings that it seems difficult, indeed well-nigh impossible, to convince the reader, without wearying him with all the documentary evidence, of the actuality of the folkway of child cannibalism in its wide range. Yet against this fact no objection can be raised in advance except by reference to an instinctive revulsion which mankind can only gradually have acquired. It is possible, to be sure, to point to a still earlier instinct, that of mother love, which man for the sake of the continuance of his species must necessarily have shared with the animal world. We have, however, already shown[39] intentionally in considerable detail how often and to what extent in primitive times this species-interest had to succumb in the struggle of the individual for existence.

To the extent that infanticide was formerly a common and widespread form of primitive social foresight, there was no effective obstacle to the gruesome practice of child cannibalism. As

[36] Cf., Kern, *Buddhismus,* I, 94.
[37] See collection of cases in Andree, *Anthropophagie,* p. 11.
[38] Mannhardt, *Folgen des Aberglaubens,* pp. 17ff.
[39] *Kulturgeschichte,* I, 204-26, in a discussion of infanticide.

long as even the instinct of mother love—there could as yet be no question of parental love—could be silenced in so many cases by the exigencies of life and the untamed selfishness of the individual, the conditions were certainly not yet ripe for the development of an instinctive revulsion. It was the first child in particular who was most regularly exposed to the danger of not being reared. The motive which had worked in this direction under mother-right continued to operate in similar fashion even under the patriarchate, until the latter had made great advances in the accumulation of living capital. The twelve- or thirteen-year-old mother did not wish so soon to renounce all sexual pleasures for a long period of nursing, and she seemed to be borne out in this by a certain reasoned reflection. Should she sacrifice herself now to rear a puny first-born child, instead of rejoicing in stronger offspring in later years? This train of thought was also, as we shall see, strongly supported by the popular conception of anthropophagy. Moreover, the husband as the owner of the woman must also have shared the same wish, before he was in a position to acquire several wives. But if the fate of a child had been decided in this way, then there was nothing to hinder its utilization for food purposes.

Such a course of action, indeed, was suggested by popular physiological conceptions. That these are fundamentally involved might be adequately proved from surviving European superstitions alone. It is exceedingly difficult to discover by questioning savage peoples the primary motivating ideas in their behavior. As a rule, indeed, these are no longer remembered. At best we can expect success only with very low tribes, such as the Australians. Thus in Queensland, according to the scientists of the Novara expedition,[40] the native mother, when she devours her own child, is of the opinion "that the strength taken from her by the fruit of her body is in this manner restored to her body." While it is probable that in general children are only eaten when it has already been decided to kill them, Stanbridge, who lived eighteen years in contact with the aborigines of South Australia, knew of cases where parents killed their newborn children primarily in order to eat them.[41] What they expected from such an act is revealed in the belief of the same tribes that a brother

[40] *Reise der osterreichischen Fregatte Novara,* III, 32.
[41] Andree, *Anthropophagie,* p. 44.

doubles his physical strength by devouring his younger brother. Consequently these deeds of horror were often incited by parents. On Peal River, where the flesh of children dying a natural death is commonly eaten, the brothers and sisters participate in these meals "that they may grow shapely."[42] A German missionary from Cooper Creek asserts that a mother there "devours her own child with a smiling countenance."[43]

In Africa, where a better use for human merchandise is known, the custom is in general rare, yet among the Niam-Niam Schweinfurth[44] saw newborn children of slave women selected as delicate articles of diet. In Darfur within the past century two boys were devoured on special feast days by the sultan and the highest officials, a custom which had persevered even under Islam.[45] Among the Negroes of Haiti the old horror has been revived. As late as 1878 two women were caught in the act of devouring the body of a child, and a mother who had eaten her own child insisted that she had a perfect right to do so. Bishop Cox has flatly accused the Haitian blacks of slaughtering and eating their own children at their annual feasts.[46]

Should one be inclined, since these and similar facts are encountered today only in isolation, to regard them for that reason merely as isolated aberrations from the pragmatic path of culture history, such an attempt to vindicate the honor of mankind would be confronted with a strong witness for the prosecution in the cult, which gives the most indisputable historical evidence against all the branches of the human race. Its strongest testimony is raised against the early civilized peoples of the Old World, notably the Phoenicians. In spite of their high technical achievements in so many directions, they must be included in their original state among the cannibalistic peoples. This fact might seem to contradict our representation of the factors operating to suppress cannibalism, but it does so only apparently. Cannibalistic forms were preserved, not in the life of this highly gifted people, but in their cult. The factors making for progress in life not .prevail in the cult. This irreconcilable opposition, indeed, is the basis of the eternal struggle,between life and the

42 *Verhandl. d. Berlin. Ges. f. Anth.*, 1870, p. 237.
43 *Globus,* XVI, 15.
44 *Im Herzen von Afrika,* II, 240.
45 Andree, *Anthropophagie,* p. 36, citing Munzinger.
46 *Globus,* XXIV, 48; Andree, *Anthropophagie,* p. 43.

cuty,. between the living and the dead. The cult by its innermost nature is under all circumstances conservative.

Why, however, should the Phoenician cult have conserved what the cults of lower peoples had earlier put aside? The explanation is to be found in life conditions. The prominent features of Phoenician culture had their roots in the period of mother-right. The younger and more vigorous Semites and Aryans, however, carried over from that stage scarcely more than a rude barbarism and built their culture on the activities of the male economic sphere. They were preeminently nomads, and therein lay their superiority. On the other hand, the outstanding achievements of the Phoenicians, the cultivation of the palm, the olive, aad the vine, all lay within the female sphere of economic activity.

The cult by its very nature can not rise above the basic ideas which created it, even if it threatens to stifle life. At the most it permits redemption by the substitution of like for like. When we realize that within the white race redemption has in general been accomplished by the substitution for man of an available domesticated animal, it is easy to understand why the pastoral peoples achieved redemption so early, while civilized peoples like the Peruvians, Aztecs, and Phoenicians, more advanced in many respects, languished under the burden of the old cult obligation. Just as the domestication of animals in its higher stage first removed cannibalism from life, so also it early provided redemption in the cult. In Palestine the old and the new cult forms came face to face in the Phoenician and Hebrew populations. The Jews became the champions of the cult of redemption against the cannibalistic cults, but neither they nor the pastoral peoples in general achieved this advance at a single step. Everywhere the battle of the old and the new long fluctuated back and forth, and all over the earth we see the traces of cannibalistic cults.

Once it had come into existence and was practiced, cannibalism necessarily found its way into the cult. The ghosts, spirits, and gods crave everything that supports and gratifies man; the supplying thereof is the cult. If the eating of human flesh and blood gives man the highest and most complete satisfaction which he can imagine, and if a prominent portion is awarded to the earthly chieftain, then naturally such a feast can not be held without the participation of the divine beings. Whether invited **or not, they** are thought to be present and sharing in the best portions. Thus a cannibalistic repast, even more than any other, must be a sacrificial meal.[47] Whether or not a special portion is reserved for the divinity alone depends solely upon the development of the outward forms of sacrifice.

Then comes a time when man begins to turn away from cannibalistic indulgence. He may do so as far as he himself is concerned, but the gods demand their ancient right, and they will torment him with the fear of calamity if he remains in debt to them. The relation is now reversed. Man must arrange the sacrifice for the sake of the gods, however unpleasant it may be to him, and he must take part in it, even though loathing and horror seize him. The human representatives of the divine right will then naturally interpret the fear-maintained tradition in the light of reason. They will exalt the overcoming of a natural human sentiment and make it the very essence of the sacrifice. Thus conservatism brings about its own downfall, for it leads in this way from an objective to a subjective basis for the sacrifice. If the definition of the sacrifice is once shifted in this manner, if the subjective motive in man is exalted as its very essence and meaning, and if its necessity is found in this motive, then sooner or later the old sacrificial form must become a hollow shell. Then a prophet may arise and say in the name of his god: "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? . . . I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats."[48]

This extremely significant shifting of the idea of sacrifice finds its most pregnant expression in the New Testament story of the mite of the poor widow, which is worth more in the eyes of God than the rich gifts of the Pharisees.[49] It did not take place in Rome and Greece. The peculiar conditions on the battle ground of Palestine seem to have been necessary for its development. In Greece, and even more so in Italy, the redemption of society from the most oppressive forms of sacrifice was accom-

[47] "As a general rule, human sacrifice attends cannibalism just as the sharing of any other sort of food with the spirits accompanies the eating of it" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I I , 1251). (Ed.)

[48] Isaiah i. 11.

49Mark xii. 42-4; Luke xxi. 1-4. (Ed.)

plished at an early period and apparently without great struggle. In Palestine, however, the Phoenician neighbors and an intrusive Phoenician element in the population kept the ancient tradition always fresh. Even in later cult usage the vicarious character of sacrifice was kept in the foreground. In all the magnificent forms their true sense as human sacrifice was always implicit. Special conditions, among them notably the struggle of a state priesthood to achieve monopoly, contributed to placing in the foreground the redemptive character of the cult forms, which Rome had long forgotten. Thereby, no less than by the continuing presence of human sacrifice in his immediate vicinity, the Jew was constantly reminded that he himself was really the object of the sacrifice and that everything he offered was only a substitute for himself. In this way the idea of the cult was inevitably permeated by a subjective principle, which acted as a ferment in transforming the entire cycle of ideas. Rome, so far as that cosmopolitan city was not inundated by foreign elements of population, escaped any such transformation down to the very end of its heathen cult. With the most scrupulous exactitude the Roman weighed his cult like the wares in a shop or a debt in court. Objective performance alone was valid to him; his gods were not served by good intentions.

In civilized India, too, no such revolution was accomplished before the time of Buddhism. Brahmanism in particular stressed positive cult performance with the utmost baldness. "If the sacrifices to the ancestors are neglected, they lose their seat in the higher worlds and must be reborn too soon."[50] not.only did poverty thus stand irrevocably in the way of future fortune, but the gods could not be approached with empty hands. To the Brahman, therefore, poverty was no object of esteem. It. was
294 hateful to him on account of its inability to give- No desire of the heart could take the place of filled hands.[61] But a similar revolution was brewing in another direction. The poor man, who could store up nothing for his future either directly or indirectly through the gods, recalled an earlier form of cult activity, thecult of renunciation. He could fast, rest, and make pilgrimages, and thereby remedy his earthly poverty. Pilgrimages were highly favored by the theologians in charge of the holy places. He who

[50] **Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 780.**
[51] **Cf., Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums,* II, 379-80.**

undertook a pilgrimage to a certain sacred lake stored up for himself as much merit as if he had given the Brahmans a thousand cows.[82] It is immediately apparent that the Brahman doctrine was vulnerable. There lived on in the poorest classes of the people an old tradition which gradually gave rise to a hostile opposition to the prevailing cult principle and which in Buddhism achieved victory for a time. The course of development here is similar to that in the West, though not exactly the same. In place of the subjective factor in the attitude toward the cult, there appeared a principle of self-torture. The two principles, however, are so closely related that they can scarcely escape confusion.

After this survey it still remains for us to indicate by a few facts the former extent of human sacrifice. We naturally find it wherever cannibalism exists or has existed. As an independent and regular practice, however, it becomes prominent only with the development of a higher stage of social organization. It is known to mother-right only in the form of child sacrifice. The women as a rule have no share in the sacrifices of the men's organization and consequently participate either not at all or but seldom in human sacrifice. It occurs only occasionally as a household sacrifice and among tribes with only a domestic cult. In large and highly integrated societies, on the other hand, it recurs with regularity as a public or state sacrifice.

Among the American Indians it was the most civilized tribes, those that had arrived at complex political organizations, which carried the cult of human sacrifice to a ghastly perfection. The comparatively enlightened Incas of Peru were not free from the practice of human sacrifice, and their ancestors, according to Garcilasso de la Vega, had practiced a truly barbarous cult of this sort. At the time of the conquest this cult was already on the wane, and it may be presumed that the domestication of the llama was an influential factor in its decline. Thus in Cuzco a llama constituted the regular daily meal of the highest state god, and the form of the sacrifice shows very clearly that we have here a case of the redemption of human sacrifice by the substitution of an animal. The heart and lungs were cut from the body of the living animal and, together with the blood, were offered to the divinity, "who, they were firmly convinced, ate and

" *Mahabharata* iii. 8199-8200.

drank these gifts."[68] The blood was tendered to the deity by smearing his images and the posts of his temple. The Inca shared the meal, supposedly at the invitation of the god, and it was customary to eat the sacrificial meat raw. All these are the forms of true cannibalism and have no sense except as survivals, for it could not have been the original belief that the divinity gained a welcome increase of strength from the soul of a llama.

Farther north we do not find such attempts at redemption; neither do we find any effort to tame and domesticate a large animal. In Nicaragua, according to Oviedo, a gross form of human sacrifice existed. Here too it was a state sacrifice; hence only the caciques and chieftains partook of it, not the men of the people. Women were excluded from everything connected with the state cult.

Most spectacular of all was the cannibalistic cult of the Aztecs of Mexico. The very existence of the state, it was believed, depended upon the uninterrupted abundance of human food which could be offered to the supporting gods. All prisoners of war were sacrificed, the tribute of entire subjugated peoples consisted in the delivery of human beings to be fed to the gods, the state itself held slaves for this purpose, and private citizens and guilds vied with one another in buying men to be dedicated to the sanctuaries and slaughtered after being ceremoniously feasted. Here too the meal was shared by gods and men. The heart, which constituted the divinity's portion, was cut from the breast of the living victim with an obsidian knife, while the priests sprinkled themselves with the blood. The flesh was then prepared and eaten by the priests or those who had provided the victini.[54]

The rest of the Indians must have been no less familiar with human sacrifice than with cannibalism, but it has been less apparent as such to the ethnographers because the cult had not yet become a state institution. Thus we find the human meal in which the ghosts take part rather than the sacrifice in which men participate. The earliest form of the latter is where captives are spared for definite, regularly recurring ceremonies.[55] These were widespread in both continents. Their original sense

[53] Müller, *Urreligionen*, p. 375.

[54] For further details see Biart, *Aztecs;* Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico;* Bancroft, *Native Races.* (Ed.)

55 Cf., Müller, *Urreligionen*, pp. 282-3.

is expressed clearly enough in the Iroquois invocation to their great spirit to come to the sacrifice, "enjoy the meat," and be moved thereby to bestow upon them fortune and victory.[56] At a later period with disappearing cannibalism, however, the idea had shifted to the belief that the Great Spirit came in order to enjoy the death pangs of the tortured enemy.

In Africa we find the same relation between human sacrifice and cannibalism. In Grand Bassam as late as 1850 the foundation of a new village was celebrated by a human sacrifice. Here, however, the cult occupied the foreground, while primary cannibalism was already declining, as is indicated by the circumstance that the vital organs of the victim might be eaten only in a mixture with the flesh of fowls, goats, and fish. The notorious human sacrifices of Dahomey had likewise survived anthropophagy. The king a century ago merely dipped his finger in a bowl of sacrificial blood and licked it off.[57] In Bonny the divinity received the viscera in all cannibalistic meals. Among the Kimbunda and Jagas, also, the cult was prominent along with receding cannibalism. They too ate the human flesh of the sacrificial meal only when mixed with the meat of dogs, fowls, and cattle. The cannibal meal which until about 1850 marked the inauguration of the sultans of Darfur, was also able to survive so long more as a sacrifice than as a banquet. Thus Central Africa, a seat of primary anthropophagy, is bounded on many sides by peoples who actually still adhere to the older usage only through the cult.

A similar condition is revealed in Oceania. In Australia and wherever else primary cannibalism is especially prominent, its cult form, in keeping with the meager social development, is less noticeable. Among the advanced tribes of the Society and Hawaiian Islands, on the other hand, human sacrifice was found, but only weak traces of expiring anthropophagy.

Asia and Europe, in the earlier periods of their history, stood in a not dissimilar situation. As the original home of nomadism and animal domestication they were relatively early in a position to give up primary cannibalism, and as the scene of the earliest extensive political organizations on a pastoral basis they were compelled to do so from social reasons. Consequently

[56] **Muller, *Urreligionen*, p. 142.**
[57] **Labarthes, *Kuste von Guinea*, p. 238.**

on these continents cannibalism appears only as a faded picture of a long forgotten age revealed in fragments of legendary tradition and in pale survivals in the folkways. Even here, however, its colors have been kept fresh in the tradition of its conservation in the cult; here too human sacrifice has been widespread if not universal.

The Aryans of India, not.to mention, the darker inhabitants, were familiar with human sacrifice—not merely the grave-escort, which survived until very recently, but also the cannibalistic type, In spite of opposition arising from modern scruples, this fact has been established for some time.[58] The number of such sacrifices was very large in early times, and it was augmented in crises by criminals and cripples. From intimations in the *Mahabharata* it is probable that the first sacrificial victims were prisoners of war. Here too it was thought that the divinity the soul of every, sacrifice as his share.[59]

That the Persians were likewise familiar with human sacrifice is shown by instances cited by Herodotus.[60] Although the cannibalistic connection is not entirely obvious in these cases, it is nevertheless the only possible basis of the modern Persian survival of blood sacrifice.[61] A still more definite indication is the slaughtering of the first captive taken in war.[62]

Among the Semites, the Arabs, according to Pococke,[68] were especially given to the practice of human sacrifice. Even today, when that custom has long since been sloughed off, it is still suggested by the nature of the ghost-cult. "The souls of the dead," says Palgrave,[64] "are not much better [than their demons]; they are pleased at the sacrifices on their graves, they even crave the same, and they feed and satiate themselves with the shed blood."

The Phoenicians and nomadic Semites did not differ on this point. Where these two peoples came into contact there arose a sanguinary cult which recalls to some extent those of the Indian

[58] *Weber.* in *Jeitsch. d. deutsch. morgerd. Ges.*, XvIII, 262ff.

59 see atharva-Veda ii. 34. Additional evidences of human sacrifice in India are collected in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, IV, 670-2. (Ed.)

[60] *History* vii. 114.

61 De Laet, *Persia*, p. 146.

[62] Herodotus *History* vii. 180.

[63] *Specimen historioe Arabum*, p. 335.

64Reise in Arabien, I, 1.

civilized states and for a not dissimilar reason. The peculiar mixture of peoples led to the establishment of self-contained city-states, which raised the cult, and with it human sacrifice, to a permanent institution.

While this usage is sufficiently well known among the Phoenicians, people frequently hesitate to accept literally the Biblical reports of the same practice among the Hebrews, or else they believe that in such cases the latter were only imitating their Phoenician prototypes. But an unprejudiced examination of these accounts must convince us that even in Israel and Judah we must not ascribe the end result of the development to the beginning. The King of Moab, who slaughtered his own son on the city wall,[68] was remote from Phoenician influence. So was Jephthah, when he sacrificed his virgin daughter.[66] David surrendered seven sons of Saul to the Gibeonites, "and they hanged them in the hill before the Lord." If this was not a sacrifice, why is it then stated, "And after that God was intreated for the land"?[67] To be sure, the Gibeonites were originally Canaanites, but the Jews themselves repeatedly acted toward their captured enemies in exactly the same way.[68] Further evidence that the usage was original among the Hebrews lies in the strongly redemptive character of certain forms of the later cult, which we shall discuss below.

Egypt too had its age of human sacrifice, even though all factors united here to terminate it earlier than elsewhere. Lauth[69] regards it as "proved from many angles," and many a place in ancient Egyptian literature clearly reveals cannibalistic features. Particularly in myth the gods were frequently, cannibals. Such, above all, were the hostile gods of alien tribes; they were not propitiated by the cult, and they strove to devour the souls of dea,d Egyptians. Hence the *Book of the Dead* prays for the Osiris (i.e., the deceased) thus: "Deliver the Osiris from the god who overcomes souls, devours hearts, and nourishes himself from the dead." [70]

Even the friendly Egyptian gods, however, were regarded as

65 2 Kings iii. 27.
66 Judges xi. 30-39.
67 2 Samuel xxi. 6-14.
68 See Joshua vii. 25, viii. 25-29, x. 26, xi. 11. (Ed.)
69 *Aegyptens Vorzeit,* p. 70.
70 Lepsius, *Todtenbuch,* p. 17.

cannibalistic toward their opponents and the followers of the latter. According to the Bulaq Papyrus,[71] the god Ra gorged himself on "the godless" till he vomited from excess. Egyptian antiquity was also acquainted with the drink of blood mixed with the prevailing intoxicating liquor. When the death goddess Suchet was running amuck among men, Ra decided to protect the rest of them and set a trap for her by means of such a drink. He had grains and fruits brought from Elephantine. From them slave women prepared seven thousand buckets of beer, which were mixed with human blood in great jars. The liquor was then poured on the earth, flooding it. The next morning, when the goddess saw it, "her face lighted up with pleasure; she began to drink and became of good cheer inside, for she went away drunk without noticing the men."[72] These conceptions are better evidence of a former cult of human sacrifice than isolated historically attested cases could possibly be, for if the gods were refreshed by devouring the hearts of enemies and drinking their blood, then those who tended their cults would certainly have taken pains to provide slain enemies for their enjoyment.

Among the circumstances which obliterated cannibalism so early in the life and cult of Egypt, the most important were the social and political unification of the race and the advance to the domestication of animals. The latter provided a redemptive substitute. The process of redemption may be rather clearly inferred from a statement by Herodotus.[78] No Egyptian was allowed to eat the head of any animal. As the head of the enemy had once been presented to the chieftain or to the god, so now every head became tabooed to man, even though a later age no longer knew or entirely misunderstood the sense of this dedication.

The Greeks and Romans do not need to be exhaustively treated, for no one any longer attempts to deny that both these civilized peoples were once very well acquainted with human sacrifice. Greek mythology, legend, and history associate the praise or blame of human sacrifice with many cult places.[74] We need mention only the cults of Lycaean Zeus, Artemis Triclaria

[71] Lauth, *Aeayvtem Vorzeit,* p. 79.

72 *Ibid.,* pp. 71ff.

[73] *History* ii. 39.

74 Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthumakunde,* II, 224ff; Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 403.

in Achaea, Artemis in Lemnos, Artemis at Phocaea, Demeter at Potniae, Dionysus in Achaea, Laphystian Zeus in Thessaly, Zeus in Crete, Amphitrite in Lesbos, Dionysus in Chios, Palaemon and Dionysus in Tenedos, and Apollo at Leucas.[75] The act of Themistocles, who sacrificed three Persian captives to Dionysus before the battle of Salamis, is excused as an ancient Hellenic custom,[76] and this explanation is certainly the truth. Achilles promised the soul of Patroclus the head of Hector and twelve Trojan youths as a sacrifice.[77] The latter sacrifice can not be regarded as a grave-escort, nor can it be maintained that later generations had forgotten the cannibalistic motive in such sacrifices. Classical antiquity was fully alive to cannibalism of this sort even as late as the Christian era, as is evidenced by a story of the heathen poet Philostratus. In his *Heroica* the ghost of Achilles is given a Trojan slave woman, and he tears her limb from limb. The sacrifice of criminals, a relic of judicial cannibalism, also appeared in a survivalistic form in Athens, Leucas, and Rhodes. Under these conditions the Theseus legend in its essence appears by no means incredible. Just as the Aztec government compelled subject peoples to pay their tribute in sacrificial wares, so also in the Mediterranean region a conquering group could have imposed similar burdens upon the conquered. Where the cult had once become established, it demanded its due. Shipwrecked persons were sacrificed with the same legal right as conquered enemies; they were aliens in every respect like the latter in their lack of social and legal ties.

Among the ancient Italic peoples, with their extensive cattle raising and their complex system of peace unions, hostile cannibalism must have disappeared relatively earlier than among the more nomadic Greeks. But even here it did not vanish without leaving its traces in the cult. The Etruscans, like the Phoenicians, adhered to a true cannibal cult longer than their semi-nomadic neighbors. They sacrificed their Phocaean captives at Caere and their Roman prisoners at Tarquinii.[78]

The Roman state cults, on the other hand, must have arisen at a time when the majority of the local cults had already given

[75] See *Cambridge Ancient History,* II, 619ff. (Ed.)
[76] Plutarch *Themistocles* xiii; id., *Aristides* xi.
[77] Homer *Iliad* xviii. 334ff.
[78] See Mommsen, *Romische Geschichte,* I, 183: *Cambridge Ancient History,* IV, 420-1. (Ed.)

up human sacrifice. The Latin League, however, with its social and religious center on the Alban Mount, still practiced it, and pious Rome, as the legal successor of the league, dared not discontinue it. Until late in the imperial period, at every annual festival of the league, its overlord, the Latian Jupiter, received his human sacrifice, chosen from among the condemned criminals.[79] We need barely call attention to the fact that the gladiatorial games are to be regarded as a specifically Roman modification of that bloody cult. This is proved conclusively by their character as secular games.[80] Their object was to expiate obligations toward the dead which for any reason had not been discharged for some time. Hence blood had to flow. In form they were an ingenious combination of funeral games, such as the Homeric heroes conducted to cheer the ghosts of the dead, and human sacrifice. Fundamentally it makes no difference whether captive enemies or slaves are slaughtered. The same basic idea appears in the rumors that Octavius prepared a funeral sacrifice of three hundred captives for Caesar[81] and that Sextus Pompey had men thrown into the sea as sacrifices to Neptune.

In some of the provinces of the Roman Empire human sacrifice was much more extensive and could not be repressed until the time of Hadrian. Especially notorious for the number of its human sacrifices was the cult of the Celts.[82] With a sort of careless indifference they sacrificed men on every occasion of sickness or similar accident, betraying a state of tribal disorganization and mutual hostility almost suggestive of former conditions in New Zealand.

The culture historian smiles at the naivety with which certain nations delight in deluding themselves with the belief that they have never passed through some lower stage of culture which they regard in others as a blot on their history. Whenever some pedantic apologist endeavors to prove something of the sort, e.g., that a certain religion lacks fetishes and idols, his evidence on its face invariably gives proof only of the incompleteness and inadequacy of his source material. A stage which even the Greeks

[79] Porphyry *De abstinentia* ii. 66; Lactantius *Divinos institutions i* 21. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* IX, 312n. (Ed.)

[80] See Preller, *Romische Mythologie,* p. 471.

[81] Suetonius *Divus Augustus* 15.

[82] Caesar *De hello Gallico* vi. 16-17. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough.* IX, 31-3. (Ed.)

and Romans could not skip might be assumed, even without proof, for all the peoples of northern Europe without exception. Nevertheless we may advance some of the evidence, at least with reference to the most important of these peoples. The custom of human sacrifice is attested by Herodotus[83] of a Thracian tribe. The Scythians developed it into a regular cult at their communal meeting places. Here they constructed an artificial mound, on which was planted a sword as the symbol of the communal god. One out of every hundred captured enemies was sacrificed here; the blood was caught in a vessel and poured on the mound over the symbol.[84] A numerical limitation on the practice, however, had already appeared, due probably to the increased value of captured enemies to a pastoral people as slaves.

Among the Scandinavians, human sacrifice was similarly an important element in the public cult. Within historical times the necessary victims were chosen from slaves and criminals, the former originally prisoners of war, the latter outcast enemies of the society. The peasants at Trondhjem, who preferred their bloody sacrifices to baptism, were warned by Olof Tryggvason
303 that if they continued these sacrifices he would see to it that the gods were appeased no longer with slaves and wrongdoers but with leading citizens.[85] In exceptional emergencies, indeed, such sacrifices were actually resorted to. A truly cannibalistic feature, which frequently recurs in Danish legends,[86] was to promise some spirit, in return for his assistance, the souls of the enemies one might slay in the future. As King Syward lay on his sick bed, there appeared before him a demon who promised him recovery in return for the souls of all whom he should kill by arms. These originally cannibalistic vows have had a still further historical development. We have already occasionally alluded to similar vows by which parents with nothing else to dispose of have pledged the souls of their children. Suppose, however, that one were so poor that he had only his own soul to dispose of, and that some great prize allured him. Here the reader stands before the source of the leagues with the Devil, so celebrated in the Middle Ages.

Concerning human sacrifice among the Germans we possess a

83 *History* ix. 119. 84 *Ibid.,* iv. 62.
85 Snorri Sturluson, *Olof Tryggvasons Saga.*
86 See, for example, Saxo Grammaticus *Historia Danica* ix. 170.

little literature,[87] headed by the clear report of Tacitus.[88] Even the Christianized Germans resorted to the old traditional means in special emergencies.[89] When Christianity had already spread through western Germany, human sacrifice must still have been in full swing in other parts, for the German Christians sold prisoners of war to the heathen tribes for sacrificial purposes.[90] As late as 785 it was necessary to prohibit human sacrifice among the converted Saxons by a death penalty.[91]

Special consideration must be given to the distribution and history of child sacrifice. Although this too is of cannibalistic origin, it is nevertheless of a very special nature and has nothing in common with the cannibalism of hostility. Just as this sacrifice seems to us the most unnatural of all, so also it was the first of all, when a social sentiment of abhorrence began to gain ground, to wring redemption from the rigid cult. Only gradually, however, did all classes of mankind come to share in this benefit. It can hardly be doubted that human sacrifice in general would not have been abolished until long afterwards if it had not included child sacrifice. Though certainly cruel in itself, it nevertheless could not have seemed exactly unnatural to kill the enemy of the society as a sacrifice to its patron divinity. Indeed, "society" still makes essentially the same sacrifice. The process of evolution is actually visible in America. Almost everywhere, except for the old civilized states with their established cults, we can observe the appearance of a form of redemption for the child in general or for the first-born in particular, although among the same tribes the cannibalistic sacrifice of revenge is still in full swing.

The origin of child sacrifice is, if we accept what has gone before, not difficult to recognize as inevitable. If it was a practically universal custom of mankind to put to death a number of first-born children, and if necessity and physiological notions led men to utilize them for food, then the divinity of the family participated in this strange meal as in any other. It thus became inevitably a sacrificial meal. Even when sentiment began to oppose it, it remained as a sacrifice; though man might withdraw

[87] Mainly collected in Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie,* pp. 36-7.
[88] *Germama* ix, xxxix. (Ed.)
[89] Procopius *De bello Gothico* ii. 15.
[90] Boniface *Epistoloe* xxv.
[91] *Capitulatio de partibus Saxonice* viii.

from participation in horror, there still remained the harsh command of a divinity whose prestige lay in his frightfulness. It was enough if the sacrifice were confined to the first-born, who was also in fact the commonest victim of infanticide.

The facts of life, moreover, seemed to argue for the necessity of this sacrifice. The premature imposition of the cares of motherhood upon a young woman must often have affected adversely her whole physical life, and the first fruits of untimely unions must frequently have succumbed to sickness and death. Such misfortunes would then have been attributed to the revenge of the injured divinity. If, however, the child were killed, the
305 mother was spared. If it were eaten, her lost strength was abundantly restored by the incorporation of its soul, and she was fortified to bear healthier offspring in the future. When the cannibalistic meal had become a sacrifice, this idea, still preserved among the Australians,[92] underwent a still further and very definite expansion. The interpretation then necessarily arose that the ancient divinity of the house, who exacted and received the sacrifice, granted the mother compensation and abundant future offspring.

These ideas were still current among the ancient Hebrews. The conservative priestly prophet Ezekiel could not deny that in Palestine the Jews themselves, and not merely the Canaanites, had been accustomed to sacrifice their first-born, and he called attention to the law of their God sanctioning it. But at his late period he could not possibly include this divine command among those through which men live. For this contradiction between fact and ethics, consequently, he sought a rational explanation and one worthy of God, and he finally found it only in the familiar conception of the frightfulness of the Divinity. Yahweh had imposed this commandment upon the Hebrews as a punishment, because in Egypt and the wilderness they had continually forsaken His beneficial laws. "Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am the Lord."[98] This attempt to rationalize a cult command which had become almost incomprehensible accords with the extremely

[92] See above, pp. 432-3. (Ed.) 93 Ezekiel xx. 25-26.

ancient conception that a divinity, to heighten his frightfulness, will even demand things that are already recognized as immoral because they undermine the foundations of social life. The simple unadorned conception of primitive times, however, is embedded in a still more ancient account. Since Abraham, when God demanded his son as a burnt offering, did not refuse, he was promised: "Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son . . . I will bless thee and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed. . . ."[94] Thus the Hebrews were still familiar with the original dual motive of primitive peoples: first, the frightfulness of God, which keeps them from omitting an act once practiced, even if it is contrary to humanity, and second, the acquisition of abundant offspring in return for the surrender of the firstling.

Child sacrifice should, theoretically, occur wherever we find infanticide coupled with the eating of the body. Usually, however, ethnographers overlook the cult motive among peoples on the lowest stage of the care for life, however much it is stressed by the latter themselves. The lowest savages do not hold a specific sacrifice, but only a meal for themselves, at which the presence of the divinity is taken for granted. Only in rare cases does this act appear as an express sacrifice. Thus in former times the Hawaiians of the coast, who honored the shark as their divinity, are said to have thrown their children to this creature.[95] The Arreoi society, which extended over many of the Polynesian islands, enforced among its members a strict obligation to kill their children.[96] This seems to have been primarily a cult duty, and the sacrifice once lent the society considerable prestige.

In America we encounter a peculiar but understandable condition. The tribes that had attained a higher culture not only kept up child sacrifice, but elevated it to an important element of the cult, whereas most of the lower nomadic tribes were on the road to redemption. But redemption appears only to the extent that the father has attained mastery over the woman and child, from which one must conclude that the sacrifice of the first-born was generally in vogue during the period of unrestricted mother-right. This distinction has a natural basis in the fact that the mother

94 Genesis xxii. 16-17.
95 Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii*, p. 173.
96 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, IV, 1047. (Ed.)

was more in a position to consider the burden, the father the advantage, of rearing the child. How slight is the influence of parental love among the lowest tribes is shown by an observation of the Prince of Wied.[97] While the savage Puris of Brazil on occasion showed a very lively emotion toward members of the tribe without reference to kinship, parents and children parted easily without a word of farewell and did not notice one another on meeting again. Nevertheless, a father clearly recognized his own advantage in extorting as many gifts as possible in selling his son. "Joys and sorrows make no vivid impression upon them. One rarely sees them laugh and seldom hears them talk very loudly. Their most important want is food; their stomachs crave constantly to be filled." But any one who believes that this single natural need is easily satisfied by hunting alone, even in a land so proverbially abounding in game as Brazil, has a very false conception of the life conditions of these notorious cannibals. The chase is ever capricious, and even hunting expeditions equipped with the best weapons of Europe have occasionally come near to death from hunger in this land of plenty.

The cult of child sacrifice was enormously developed in ancient Peru and Mexico. The tribes of Quito in the pre-Inca period sacrificed every first child. In Peru it is alleged that at the accession of a new Inca as many as a thousand children were sacrificed, and other cults demanded periodic offerings of children. Here too the blood of the victims was smeared on idols and doors. At the festivals of the state god little children were slaughtered, and when the Inca was dangerously ill one of his own sons was sacrificed.[98] A similar situation existed in Mexico. Even the milder Toltecs petitioned for rain by a sacrifice of five or six little girls; its cannibalistic origin is revealed by the fact that their hearts were torn out.[99] The Aztec gods also demanded children as sacrifices in order to grant increase to the crops. Indeed, according to Cortez, they considered the heart of a child the greatest sacrifice of all.

From time immemorial ancient Egypt had been free from the burden and curse of child sacrifice. Social foresight had early developed to the point of prohibiting any oppression of the child. Perhaps, however, a memory of former child sacrifice is to be

[97] *Reise nach Brasilien,* I, 144.
[98] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 58.
[99] Waitz, *Anthropologie,* IV, 17.

recognized in the redemptive hair sacrifice mentioned by Herodotus.[100]

The unredeemed child sacrifice of the Phoenicians is abundantly attested by the Bible. When we also consider what Plutarch[101] relates of the daughter people of Carthage, it becomes probable that the Phoenician cult demanded every first-born as the share of the altar. Apparently the obligation did not stop even here, for Carthaginian families who themselves possessed no children purchased them from poor people in order to offer them up.[102]

The attempt to acquit the Hebrews of the taint of child sacrifice can not withstand an unprejudiced analysis. The assumption that the Jews acted only by way of apostasy or in imitation of the Phoenicians is exploded, not only by the words of the prophet Ezekiel cited above, but also and even more definitely by the fact of the idea of redemption, which was the basis of a goodly share of the later cult at Jerusalem. The same holds true of the plea that the oft recurring expression, "to cause to pass through the fire," denotes only a symbolic act; redemption from a mere symbol which oppressed nobody would have been unnecessary. This subterfuge, moreover, is opposed by direct evidences. As late as the time of Micah the old sacrificial sense of the act must still have been entirely familiar in Judah. According to the prophet,[108] the Hebrew people in their contrition ask their God what kind of a sacrifice he desires, whether cattle, rams, or oil, or "shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" With the development of the Yahwistic priesthood into an exclusive caste, of course, an attempt was made to interpret this offering, not as a bloody sacrifice, but as the consecration of a man to the temple. But if this view, adapted to postexilic times, had also been the popular one at an earlier date, the figure of passing through fire would have had no sense, and Yahweh would not have been led to deny through his prophet Jeremiah that he commanded any such dedication. The law, moreover, would not have needed to declaim against the burning of sons and daughters in the fire.[104] Furthermore, the firstling of man is mentioned along with the first fruits

[100] *History* ii. 65. (Ed.)
[101] *De superstitione* xiii.
[102] See also Frazer, *Oolden Bough,* IV, 166-8. (Ed.)
[103] Micah vi. 7.
[104] Deuteronomy xii. 31.

of the harvest and of the vintage: "Thou shalt not delay to offer the first of thy ripe fruits, and of thy liquors; the firstborn of thy sons shalt thou give unto me." [105] What it once meant to dedicate a man to God is explained by another law: "None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed, but shall surely be put to death." [106] In harmony with this, too, are the historical accounts, where the expressions "to cause to pass through the fire" and "to burn" are so often alternative. And it is related still later that King Ahaz "burnt his children in the fire."[107]

Greek myth and legend abound in traces of child sacrifice, some of them preserved in very crude cannibalistic forms.[108] The natural conclusion is that a prehistoric period was actually acquainted with such practices, although their unusual prominence may be due somewhat to Phoenician influence. Indeed the history of the gods of a later age begins with the overthrow of the old child-murdering god, i.e., of a cult of child sacrifice. The early Pelasgians seem characterized as a people with child sacrifice by the myth of Lycaon, the son of Pelasgus, who sacrificed a newborn child to Zeus and offered him its blood to drink.[109]

In Rome, where infanticide and the exposure of children were greatly in vogue until late in the imperial period, the victims were not utilized for sacrificial purposes in the public cults. In domestic life, however, the contrary had once been the case, as is shown by the tradition and practice of redemption. With the early discarding of the cannibalistic motive, it is probable that simple exposure or infanticide took the place of the sacrificial act. This conception must then have lived on under cover, for it occurred to the Roman women to expose their children as a token of mourning at the death of Germanicus.[110] This was undoubtedly a survival of child sacrifice. Another similar vestige in ancient Italian folkways was the remarkable custom of the

[105] Exodus xxii. 29.

[106] Leviticus xxvii. 29. Parallel passages in the historical books show **that** this refers to a dedication through vows, a practice as common among the Hebrews as we have found it in Danish legends.

[107] 2 Chronicles xxviii. 3; 2 Kings xvi. 3. For further discussion of **the** subject, see Lippert, *Seelenkult,* pp. **154-63;** Wheless, *God's Word,* p. **xiv;** Frazer, *Golden Bough*, IV, 166-79. (Ed.)

[108] Collected in Preller, *Griechische Mythologie,* II, 384; Bachofen, ***Mut-*** *terreoht,* pp. 212ff., 229ff.

[109] Pausanias *Descriptio Groeciae* viii. 2.

[110] Suetonius *Ccligula* v.

ver sacrum. In times of severe distress all the human first-born of a year were dedicated to Mars, i.e., to death, but they were allowed to save their lives, if they could, outside the tribe.[111] This was an organized exposure on a large scale. The idea that exposed children were sacrifices consecrated to the god must have been widespread during a definite transition period, for it is the basis of many similar myths of exposed men, such as Sargon, Cyrus, Moses, Romulus, and Remus, whom their gods took to themselves in another than the original sacrificial sense and raised aloft to positions of eminence. These likewise represent one form of redemption myths.

We may assume then that exposure, with the ultimate fate of the child left in the hands of the divinity, was the transition form which child sacrifice assumed in the domestic cult of Rome when the cannibalistic motive was sloughed off. But when Rome became the gathering place of all nations, when the emperors themselves came sometimes from the Orient and sometimes from the barbarian peoples, and when in the anxious times of the impending downfall every one began to seek his salvation successively in countless alien cults, the old cannibalistic form of child sacrifice emerged once more. To be sure, after the time of Hadrian child sacrifice in particular, along with human sacrifice in general, had vanished from every cult in the broad empire which risked publicity. Nevertheless, as was inevitable under the circumstances, it had merely withdrawn into secret hiding places, and it lived on, recommended by its darkness, as a miraculous cure for all the difficult crises of life.

In this form it emerged again in Rome, sometimes even under the protection of certain emperors. That popular opinion did not rise more strongly against it than seems to have been the case, is really not to be wondered at particularly in a city where countless children perished every day in one way or another. The memory of Heliogabalus has become infamous for his butchery of children.[112] An army of magicians, mostly of Oriental origin, made their living from this mania of the Romans for salvation inspired by the terror of the time.[113] All were regarded as child-

[111] See above, p. 376; Frazer .*Golden Bough,* IV, 186-7; Ihering, *Evolution of the Aryan,* pp. 249ff. (Ed.)

[112] See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* VI, 248. (Ed.)

[113] Sources cited in Preller, *Romische Mythologie,* p. 767. Cf., Cassel, *Symbolik des Blutes,* pp. 152ff.

butchers, the majority probably not without warrant. The early art of healing, as we shall see later, was entirely based, and logically had to be based, on cult activities, for according to the daimonistic world philosophy sickness was unnatural and could be caused only by a demon. Hence the cult of child sacrifice could likewise be used for healing purposes, and its priests were looked upon by the world, which had forgotten the basic connection, as magical physicians. Finally even the idea of sacrifice fell into decay, and all that was remembered was the object of the sacrifice, especially the sacrificial blood, and its relation to the sick person. The former then became "medicine" in the sense of the Indian medicine man.[114] It was probably such a magic physician who as late as 1492 promised to cure Pope Innocent VIII by means of the blood of three boys. The children died; the pope did likewise; the physician fled.[115]

That these gruesome things still occurred under the mantle of secrecy at the time of the Roman Empire and for an indefinite period thereafter, and that, as in modern times, the Jews were popularly accused of them, are historical facts as explicable as they are indubitable. It is well established that the influx into Rome brought many Jews from their home and that they propagandized successfully for their cult forms. It is highly improbable, however, that the ancient Semitic cult ideas still found adherents at this late period among the Jews themselves, even in individual cases. On the other hand, the Romans can not be blamed very much if they were unable to distinguish clearly between the Syrian, Phoenician, and Jewish elements of the population at a time when they all seemed united by the use of a common world language. They were not tempted to delve into the exclusive henotheistic conceptions of the Jews, and hence naturally included them in the great swarm of Oriental adventurers who, like the Gypsies of today, found their easiest means of livelihood in utilizing the strangeness of their cult forms to exploit universal human credulity. Since the first Christian communities were historically connected with the Jews, they were similarly regarded. People did not examine into the mysterious formulas of their cult redemption, but saw in their secrecy only the mask of child sacrifice; hence this sanguinary cult became

[114] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1296. (Ed.)
[115] Reumont, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom,* III, 1, 198.

the chief reproach against the Christians. Even a popular delusion must have some historical basis.

The Germanic peoples, or at least their Scandinavian branch, still knew and practiced child sacrifice at a later period. At about the time of the conflict between Christianity and paganism, Haakon of Norway, in order to assure himself of victory in his struggle for independence against his liege lord, Harald Blaatand, the king of the Danes, slaughtered two of his own sons on the altar.[116] Several examples of this sort occur in earlier legend. King Oen is said to have sacrificed nine sons one after the other.[117] The custom of vowing unborn children to the spirits likewise found frequent expression in popular tradition. Many of the dark images which rose from the distorted imagination of the Middle Ages to become the motives of horrible deeds, had their roots in historical facts.

We now approach the far more congenial task of showing the reader how man gradually attempted to free himself from the noose which the inevitable course of his own thought had wound about his neck. In time, as we have already observed, the paternal head of the family must have realized that it was to his own interest to rear the children and to liberate himself from the menace of the traditional cult. Yet this did not lie unconditionally in his power, for observation of the facts of infant mortality led irresistibly to the opinion that the divinity seized and killed the first-born children that were denied him. Though unable to prevent this, man could nevertheless take a chance and, without sacrificing the child, try to appease the divinity by a substitute sacrifice. The result of such an attempt revealed the will of the divinity. If, in an increasing number of cases, the redeemed children lived, then the divinity had clearly decided
312 in man's favor and had approved the redemption. Such favorable decisions, however, would necessarily occur more frequently as the infant mortality rate declined from natural causes, and this depended upon cultural advances, especially that to cattle raising. Hence the redemption of child sacrifice is directly connected with progress in material culture.

What substitute performances were available to man in his attempt to invite a divine revelation? We have already become

[116] Saxo Grammaticus *Historia Danica* x. 183.
[117] Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie,* p. 37.

acquainted with the different forms of sacrifice on the different stages of culture. The oldest was that of renunciation, or fasting. Then emerged the idea that the ghost desired the blood of the child as food; it had to be human blood, but the adult could, without losing his life, sacrifice as much blood from his own body as a child could furnish. Hence the first attempts at redemption consisted in fasting and bloodletting. Peoples who, like the American Indians, had not reached the stage of animal domestication, necessarily stopped at this point, but the pastoral peoples went farther and attempted to substitute the blood of their valuable animals for that of man, to offer an animal in place of the child.

The first two of these forms are still widespread in America, especially among the savage tribes of South America. They were also formerly prevalent among the pre-pastoral inhabitants of Europe—proof that they too had once been oppressed by child sacrifice. Sometimes one of these redemptive forms is found alone; sometimes both occur together. The father may abstain from hunting certain animals and from eating certain or even all foods for a period after the birth of his child, i.e., he may rest and fast,[118] or he may wound himself and draw off a considerable quantity of blood to be poured out as a sacrifice, or he may do both together.

In South America, when a child dies, the father is usually blamed for not having scrupulously adhered to this usage. After a Carib of Guiana has become a father, he may not shoot any large game for a time.[110] The Carib of Martinique is even worse off. He must fast for the first ten days. After a month his friends and relatives come, make incisions all over his skin and draw off blood. Then he remains six months longer on a meager diet and may eat neither fish nor birds. Some reports, however, limit this procedure characteristically to the birth of the first son. The fact that the man, resting in this way and rendered unfit for work by fasting, lies stretched out in a hammock was certainly originally only incidental, though -it has come to be regarded as the main feature where the sense of the act has been lost.[120] Re-

[118] On account of the resemblance between this behavior and that of the lying-in mother, ethnologists have very inappropriately called **the** usage "male childbed" or "couvade." For an excellent survey, with instances, see Ploss, *Mannerkindbett*

119Quandt, *Surinam,* p. 252.

[120] For a discussion of the interpretation of the couvade, see Appendix E. (Ed.)

demption from child sacrifice is effected by means of essentially identical customs among the Carib and Guarani peoples, the tribes of northern and southern Brazil, those of Peru, and the Abipones of Paraguay. Among several tribes the father is permitted vegetable but not meat food. Always, the idea is visible of indemnifying the spirit for his loss of the child's blood. Every breach of these strict rules results, according to popular opinion, in the death or sickness of the infant.

The "couvade" also occurs in other parts of the earth, though not so commonly or so uniformly over large areas as in South America and often only in stunted survivals.[121] In Indonesia, the custom has been found in Buru and among the Land Dyaks of Borneo. The Dyak father may eat only rice for eight days, because otherwise the infant's body would swell up.[122] This also shows how rationalized interpretations often produce absurdities. Marco Polo[123] describes the same usage with equally preposterous embellishments among a Tibetan or Mongolian people in the southwestern part of China, where Lockhart has observed something similar in recent times. In Africa, an analogous practice has been encountered among the Congo Negroes in the vicinity of Cassange.[124]

Many lines of evidence indicate that an older stratum of population in southwestern Europe also sought redemption from child sacrifice in this ancient fashion. The reports that the husband by his inactivity and renunciation intended only to imitate the wife's pangs of childbirth may be distorted, or the custom may actually already have been such. It is attested by Strabo[125] of the ancient Celtiberi and Cantabri, who may be regarded as comparatively the oldest population of Spain. He says, of course, only that after the birth of a child the father goes to bed and is waited upon; in other words, he rests from activity. The custom is still preserved in this form among the Basques. The ancient

[121] Instances of the practice are collected in Roth, "Couvade;" Bouwman, "La Couvade;" Casas, *Couvade;* Crawley, *Mystic Rose,* pp. 416-28; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 14-18; Ploss, *Das Weib,* II, 435-40; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1907-12; IV, 1063-5; Tylor, "On a Method," pp. 255-6; Wilken, *Verspreide Goschriften,* I, 274-83; II, 143-58. (Ed.)

[122] See Roth, *Sarawak,* I, 97. (Ed.)

[123] *Travels,* p. 199. (Ed.)

[124] See Bastian, *Afrikamsche Reisen,* p. 194. (Ed.)

[125] *Geography,* p. 165.

Corsicans, of whom Diodorus[126] reports the same practice, perhaps belonged to the same stock.

But compatibility prevailed in these customs also. Even though it was the characteristic practice of nomadic tribes to offer an animal sacrifice by way of redemption, the earlier custom might still endure beside it. That such was the case among the Hebrews is shown by the Bible. When David feared that the child borne to him by Bathsheba would die, since it was very sick, he fasted and lay all night upon the earth and did this for six days, because he thought, "Who can tell whether God will be gracious to me, that the child may live?"[127]

How intensely the question of redemption must once have preoccupied mankind is shown, not only by the variety of forms, but also by the large number of myths to which it gave rise. The essence of these is always the assurance, demonstrated in some historical case, that it is the will of the deity himself to forego his strict right and take a liking to some cheaper substitute. If we project ourselves into the mental atmosphere of savage peoples, it is easy to comprehend why they are always eager to discover new proofs of this kind for their reassurance. As a result, one and the same people could preserve a whole series of redemption myths of identical purport.

Redemption had even found its way into the bloody cult of ancient Mexico at the time of its discovery. Although the Aztecs still regaled themselves on the bodies of their enemies, they left untouched the fallen of their own tribe even during the dire famine in their beleaguered city. They had also begun to redeem the lives of their own people from the gods, though this could as yet be done only with human blood. We have already seen how the ancient Egyptians, in order to escape being killed, had to avoid meeting certain divinities when they came to earth at their festivals. Similarly to the Mexicans the divine ancestral mother, Centeotl, was a dangerous goddess when she wandered among the dwellings of men at her festival, but they found a means of protecting their lives against her by sacrificing a part thereof. They pierced their ears, eyebrows, noses, tongues, arms, and thighs, collected the blood in fresh leaves (the vessels of primitive times), and hung it in these on the door posts of their

126 *Bibliotheca historica* v. 14.
127 2 Samuel xii. 16, 22.

houses.[128] If the goddess then passed by without harm, she obviously accepted the blood on the door posts as a ransom sacrifice. A culture myth of a familiar pattern inevitably arises when the hypothetical first case of such a practice is described in epic form, as was the general custom of ancient times.

Another type of redemption was slowly developing in Mexico through the introduction of edible imitations of the sacrificial objects, the human victims in this case. To be sure, they had by no means as yet replaced human sacrifice. Nevertheless they saved lives, for they enabled a far larger number of people to participate in the sacrificial meal. Edible seeds were kneaded with human blood into figures of human shape, these were distributed among the people, and all who ate of them partook thereby in the sacrifice.[129] Other peoples have advanced farther along this path, until they have completely replaced the saerificed object by its symbol. The Greeks and Romans were acquainted with vicarious sacrificial images.[180] The shrewd Chinese, however, have brought this form of redemption to its highest perfection by substituting images of paper.

Pastoral peoples went a long step farther by ascribing a:redemptive value to the animals which they had, as it were, adopted into the family. The most famous of all redemption myths is that of Abraham. God in person commanded him to slaughter his first-born son and, after he had passed the test, undeceived him through an intermediary. The patriarch "took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son."[131] Redemption of this kind long continued in actual use. Even the mother of Jesus went to the temple in order that the child should "be called holy to the Lord," and she offered a redemption sacrifice of two doves instead of the lamb which wealthier people had to provide.[182] This traditional usage is expressly connected with the command: "Sanctify unto me all the first-born, whatsoever openeth the womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of beast: it is mine."[188] But the law,

[128] Clavigero, *History of Mexico,* I, 298; Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 492.

129 Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 640. See also Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* 1,280.

[180] Hermann, *Alterthumer der Griechen,* pp. 27, 16; Hartung, *Religion der Romer,* I, 63.

[181] Genesis xxii.

132 Luke ii. 23-24.

[188] Exodus xiii. 2.

redacted in favor of the later theory of redemption through the Levite caste, attempted to suppress that connection and to make the offering of a lamb or a pair of doves a purification sacrifice.[184] Nevertheless, it is clear from Luke that the earlier conception was not entirely banished from the popular mind.

The same subject appears in another guise in the Passover myth, and here again the lamb is the price of redemption. The scene of the myth is shifted to Egypt. It is a festival, and, as we have repeatedly seen, the Divinity comes to men and wanders among their dwellings in order to kill all the first-born. The Egyptians, who in the myth know of no means of redemption, actually lose all their first-born children in a night of horror; the God of the Jews "smites" them. But through Moses he has given his faithful a means of redemption. A lamb is to be sacrificed in each Hebrew house—there is as yet no temple monopoly. The sacrificial meal is to be prepared in ancient style; the lamb is not to be dismembered and boiled, but roasted whole, seasoned with "bitter herbs," and eaten with unleavened bread, and what is not eaten must be burned in the fire. Moreover, the Jews are to smear the blood of the lambs on the door posts of their houses, "and when I see the blood, I will pass over you, and the plague shall not be upon you to destroy you, when I smite the land of Egypt."[185]

Pursuing the subject a little farther, we encounter another example of compatibility. The Hebrews, in arriving at a form of redemption by means of domestic animals, nevertheless did not thereby give up an earlier and still very widespread form, that of blood sacrifice. We shall defer treating it thoroughly until our next chapter, because it involves an additional factor, that of a covenant. Redemption by its very nature presupposes not only an offer on the part of man but an acceptance by the divinity, together with the conditions imposed by the latter and his renunciation of his full right. Here are the elements of a compact or Igflfiue. Such a covenant is necessary to man for his assurance. At the same time it Jays the foundation for a new type of association,the cultunion; those who are bound to one god in the same way and by.the same token also form a society one with another.136 such,a society is at first, of course, coextensive with the

[134] Leviticus xii. 8. [135] Exodus xii.
[136] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I I , 1270. (Ed.)

earlier natural association based on blood relationship. It is able, however, as Hebrew history shows, to expand by the inclusion of strangers and thus eventually to outgrow and supplant the consanguineous association. Through the factor of covenant, therefore, redemption by blood sacrifice has become of considerable social importance.

Of the many examples to be cited later, we shall here refer, by way of illustration, only to that of ancient Mexico. While in South America the father generally redeemed his child by means of his own blood or by a sacrifice of renunciation, in North America another form of redemption prevailed. A corresponding quantity of blood was taken from the young man himself and sacrificed in exchange for his life. Many tribes preserved a clear realization that the divinity concerned came in person to accept the sacrifice, drink the blood, and then consider the debt to himself discharged. The term "mutilation" has for superficial reasons been given to this form of redemption. In ancient Mexico the mutilations by which the Aztec children were consecrated to their national god were blood sacrifices of this type. While many aboriginal tribes mutilated the tongue and sex organs, the Aztecs merely gashed other parts of the body, usually the breast. In Nagualism,[137] a form of heathenism surviving among the Mexican Indians, these blood sacrifices have been preserved until modern times in the dedication of children to their guardian spirits. "From behind the ear or under the tongue blood was drawn and sacrificed."[138] We may here warn the reader that all symbolization and rationalization based on the particular part of the body which is mutilated, while they may illustrate the attitude of a later age, do not explain the matter.

A cult myth in the Bible shows that circumcision among the Hebrews was originally a similar redemptive blood sacrifice, by which in accordance with a covenant the Divinity was restrained from killing men who had submitted to it, and that this sense was recognized at an early period though afterwards lost. Zipporah, the Midianite woman, had borne a son to Moses in the land of Midian, and was on her way with him to join the Hebrews. "And it came to pass by the way in the inn, that the Lord met him [the son of Zipporah], and sought to kill him,

[137] See Brinton, *Nagualism.* (Ed.)
[138] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 640; *Ausland,* **1864, 306a.**

Then Zipporah took a sharp stone, and cut off the foreskin of her son, and cast it at his feet, and said, Surely a bloody husband [blood brother] art thou to me. So he let him go: then she said, A bloody husband thou art, because of the circumcision."[189]

Redemption by circumcision and redemption through the Passover lamb belong to two very different cultural periods. The former is considerably the older. That they are both found among the same people simply reflects the law of compatibility. The earlier form, however, showed the greater vitality; the later one was made conditional upon it and became an auxiliary symbolic act of remembrance. No one might partake of the Passover Lamb or participate in its redemptive power unless he had become a party to the covenant through the sacrifice of circumcision. The purchased slave had to be circumcised in order to participate. The hired servant and the foreigner were excluded, unless they submitted themselves to that sacrifice. The circumcised stranger, however, was to "be as one that is born in the land."[140]

Even this combination does not exhaust the various attempts to arrive at the same goal. Redemption by the blood sacrifice of mutilation and that by the substitution of a domestic animal are common to numerous other peoples, the former especially among the African herding tribes and the latter among the pastoral peoples of Asia and Europe. A third form, however, is apparently peculiar to the Jews alone and is largely responsible for impressing upon them their singular ethnic character. This is the surrender of all blood to the Divinity as the price of redemption. Egypt presented a parallel redemptive form, if Herodotus[141] was correctly informed. In both cases man offered the life and soul of everything he ate in exchange for his own life. Only the physiological conception was different, for the Egyptians located the soul in the head, the Hebrews in the blood. Thus in Israel and Judah all blood was dedicated to the Divinity for the redemption of human life, while the Egyptians refrained from eating the head. The parallel extends even further, for in both cases the original sense of the dedication was later forgotten. The Egyptians sold the heads, useless to them, to the Greeks, and the Jews on occasion have dealt similarly with blood.

This special form of redemption has also been the most im-

139 Exodus iv. 24-26. 141 *History* *ii* 39. (Ed.)
140 lbid., xii. 44-48.

portant factor in the isolation of the Jew from table community with other men, which has given him the appearance of misanthropy. Since all animal food became in part a sacrifice, the conservative cult came to exercise a limiting influence upon the selection of food from the animal world. The canon of available foods was closed in the period when this type of redemption became a characteristic of the Hebrew people. The story of the Deluge has preserved the cult myth of this form of redemption. After God had destroyed all mankind with the exception of a single family, he promised to spare its descendants under the conditions of the following covenant: "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things. But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat. . . . And I will establish my covenant with you; neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood."[143] This epic expression is followed by a dogmatic statement in the law. No one may eat blood, "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul."[143]

But Israel and Egypt are not alone in applying this principle of redemption. On the contrary, it goes back to the lowest levels of culture and finds expression in the widest variety of forms. The very same principle emerges in the food taboos so widespread in West Africa under the name of *quixilles* and in America and Australia under other names. It is easily recognizable as a form of the old sacrifice of renunciation, which can appear in myriads of forms in connection with different objects. The substance is always the same. A man seeks protection against some special danger or against the ills of life in general by means of a compact with some particular divinity, and in exchange he assumes for life some definite type of renunciation. One individual refrains from eating birds, another abstains from fish or certain fruits, etc. Every covenant of this sort is characterized by its association with some such taboo. Only through social progress does anything distinctive appear in this arrangement. In West Africa the individual has a choice between a number of different divinities, each of which insists upon a particular *quixilles;* the Indian through dream interpretation seeks a spirit without name

[142] Genesis ix. 3-4, 11. [143] Leviticus xvii. 11.

or history for his covenant and fixes his own *quid pro quo;* with higher political development, however, a whole people comes to be united and characterized by one and the same taboo. Thus the Hebrew redemption through blood belongs in principle to this group of cult obligations.

The latest and best known of the Hebrew redemption forms is that through the priesthood. The efforts of an exclusive state priesthood to achieve monopoly had finally culminated after the Exile in complete success. By this time the old conception of the fate of the first-born, as it has been preserved among savage peoples, had been completely forgotten. The expression "it is mine" was understood only in connection with temple service, and this was now in the hands of the priesthood alone. In an attempt to give these facts a historical foundation, it is related how one tribe, the priestly tribe of Levi, had assumed the obligation of temple service for all the first-born.[144]

We can still recognize different stages of redemption among the Aryans of India. Lassen[145] shows how human sacrifice had become a fiction in individual cases. Instead of slaughtering a man, a human head was bought for a certain price and offered up. Heads were certainly always obtainable among the neighboring aborigines. Venturing further, man here too attempted to substitute human images of gold or the like and apparently also sacrificial cakes modeled from dough in human form. These advances were accompanied by legends proving the efficacy of such substitutes in individual cases, and by others telling how men doomed to human sacrifice had been rescued by the gods themselves.[146] According to other legends redemption had already been accomplished among the ruling Aryans, and they are made to appear as the liberators of tribes still languishing under the oppression of human sacrifice. Thus the Pandava king vanquished the giant who had to be furnished daily with a man for a cannibalistic meal.[147] The luxuriant and peculiar, development of the priesthood led to a redemption even ,fycra animal sacrifice. Tha more the success of the sacrificialact **came** to.depend upon the accompanying words of the priest, the less, important became the-quality of the offering, the object actually sacrificed shriveled

[144] **Numbers iii. 39-51.**
[145] ***Indische Alterthumskimde,* I, 935.**
[146] ***Ibid.,* I, 936.**
[147] ***Ibid.,* I, 813, citing the *Mahabharata.***

more and More. into a mere symbol. But the Brahmans alone profited by this tendency; the burden of sacrifice remained the same for the people. The priest accepted the cow and sacrificed sesame, assuring the donor of the animal that the sesame was changed into a cow which would furnish the deceased with inexhaustible nourishment in the land of Yama.[148] Myth sometimes ascribes the introduction of similar substitutes to particular persons and motives. Thus a certain King Matrigupta is said to have offered gold dust and cakes made of flour and milk instead of animal sacrifices, and later a king of Kashmir, Meghavahava, is reputed to have had animal heads made from flour and butter "in order to spare the life of the animals."[149] It is characteristic that this redemption did not immediately extend to the second main type of human sacrifice, that of the grave-escort. The latter still continued to be held in honor in India when human sacrifice of the cannibalistic type had already long aroused horror.

The course of evolution in the civilized empire to the northeast may well have been similar. The Chinese assert that they have not practiced cannibalistic human sacrifice since the beginning of their history, which goes back three thousand years. There are historical objections, however, to extending this assertion to the sacrifice of the grave-escort type. It is known from Chinese literature itself[150] that the custom was practiced at least in the land of Chin and during the reign of the dynasty which came from there in the third century B. C. The Chinese maintain, however, that it became extinct with the fall of this dynasty. As a matter of fact, the unrivalled advances made by the cult of China in the direction of symbolization give evidence of a relatively very early redemption.

In Greece, redemption and the struggle to achieve it are frequently depicted in the garb of myth, but these myths lack the dogmatic character of the Hebrew account. The Cronus myth we have already touched upon. Cronus was to a later age only a god of prehistoric tradition. He was denied a cult. Consequently, according to the ancient conception of the fate of gods, he had descended into Tartarus with other departed souls, or—what

148 *Atharva-Veda* xviii. 4. 32; Ludwig, *Rigveda,* III, 490.
149 Lassen, *Indische Alter thumskunde,* I, 900.
150 See a translation from the *Shi King,* entitled *"Klage uber die mit Furst Mu begrabenen Brüder"* in *Globus,* 1873, p. 61.

amounts to the same thing—the gods of the later age had conquered him. With him child sacrifice had also been overthrown, for he had devoured his children. Other myths closely parallel the Biblical narrative. Sometimes it is Helena, sometimes the Italian Valeria Luperca, who is about to be slaughtered when an eagle, corresponding to the angel that appeared to Abraham, snatches the sacrificial sword from the altar and lays it on a heifer.[151] A more familiar parallel is the sacrifice of Iphigenia and the substitute which the goddess provides. Along with this vicarious animal sacrifice there also appeared in Greece the much older form of shedding a limited quantity of human blood. An example is the scourging of Spartan youths at the altar of Artemis Orthia, which is identical in sense with the redemptive blood sacrifices of Aztec and Hebrew boys.

A large cycle of redemption myths was associated with the cults and cult traditions of Dionysus. An old tradition, coming down from a sanguinary prehistoric age, connected Dionysus with the introduction of the vine and with cannibalistic child sacrifice. Associated with it was a later tradition of redemption. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other element seemed to predominate in the Dionysiac festive cults. Taken as a whole, however, they must have been mainly redemptive festivals of atonement. The Arcadian women redeemed themselves at the festival of Dionysus, in Aztec fashion, by bleeding.[152] The following redemption myth was preserved at Potniae. In the temple of Dionysus there the people had once been carried away by a Bacchic orgy and had sacrificed their own priest. To protect the city from the ensuing punishment, the god of Delphi had called for the sacrifice of a youth. Thereafter boys were sacrificed as a regular cult, until the god himself demanded that a goat be substituted for the youth. Hence he was called Dionysus Aigololos, the goat killer.[158]

At Orchomenus, legend associated the sanguinary cult with the Oleae family. Once in a Bacchic frenzy three sisters had cast lots to determine which should give up her child for a cannibalistic orgy and had then torn the unfortunate victim limb from limb. Along with this legend an analogous custom was kept up.

[151] Plutarch *Parallela* xxxv.
[152] Pausanias *Descriptia Grcecice* viii, 23. 1.
153Ibid., ix. 8.2-3.

At a certain festival the priest of Dionysus was wont to rush with drawn sword upon the assembled women of that family, and he had the right to kill those whom he could actually catch—a type of blood sacrifice exactly like that still practiced in certain Polynesian islands and closely related to the notorious "running amuck" of Malay tribes. In Plutarch's[154] time a woman fell victim to the sacrifice in an actual case. The priest who slew her was named Zoilus. But the community was moved by the case to do away with the hereditary priesthood of his family and to choose the cult guardian thereafter by election, naturally abol-
323 ishing the sacrifice. That this was likewise the wish of the divinity was inferred from the fact that Zoilus fell ill and the city met with various misfortunes. Redemption may actually have been accomplished in this way in one case after another until eventually the views of a majority came to prevail over the conservative minority and a stigma was attached to the traditional practice.

Rome too associated its redemption myths with different personalities. A remarkable myth of this sort contrasts Brutus as the mitigator with the evil Tarquinius as the representative of the bloody cult, perhaps reflecting the prominence given to human sacrifice by the Etruscans. Mania, the grandmother of the *manes,* demanded the sacrifice of a boy, and this is said to have been performed until the time of the emancipation by Brutus. Thereafter the heads of poppies or leeks were vicariously sacrificed at the festival of Mania, or dolls *(manioloe)* were hung up at the doors.[155] This designation of the door for defense and protection agrees thoroughly with the Biblical conception, though the type of redemption is different. A second form of the myth had forgotten Mania and her old claim to the children; in her place appeared evil spirits *(strigce),* who endeavored to suck the blood from the hearts of sleeping children. But Carna, a good fairy of the nursery, had discovered a means of escape. She took the viscera of a young boar and offered them to the *strigce* with a speech which preserves excellently the sense of vicarious animal sacrifice: "Take this little victim for the little boy; accept a

[154] *Symposiaca* viii. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* IV, 163-4. (Ed.)
[155] Macrobius *Saturnalia* i. 7. 14. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* VIII, 94-6. (Ed.)

heart for a heart and entrails for entrails; we give you this soul for a better soul."[156]

Among the Germanic peoples, redemption from child sacrifice had already long been accomplished when they entered their present home, although that from human sacrifice in general did not take place until considerably later. That the former had been effected through vicarious animal sacrifice is indicated by a number of survivals. The sense of immuring men in the foundations of new buildings has been clearly apparent to travelers in Siam in modern times; King Maha-Mongkut at a splendid banquet admonished three such sacrificial victims, whose souls were about to be released, "to guard the gate faithfully and to report any threatening danger."[157] Survivals indicate that the Germanic peoples were also acquainted with this practice, that children were chiefly used for such sacrifices, and that they were later replaced by various animal substitutes. According to Danish tradition, it was necessary to immure a lamb in erecting a church and a living horse in founding a new cemetery. If these animals were then seen in spectral form, some evil was imminent. Thus they acted as faithful sentinels like the human ghosts in Siam. In the foundations of old houses there have repeatedly been found the remains of chickens and other animals, which had been buried alive with similar intent at the time of construction. It was also regarded as advisable to bury a living dog under a stable door to protect the cattle.[158]

156 Ovid *Fasti* vi. 160-2.

157 *Bericht der preussischen Expedition nach Ostasien,* IV, 333. See above, p. 412.

158 Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, pp. 956ff.

CHAPTER XII

CULT IDEAS IN RELATION TO SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

325 Rigious conceptions do not form an-isolated group of ideas. As they arise from popular physiological notions, they in turn vitally affect life in all its aspects. It is impossible to understand the early history of mankind without a comprehension of the early forms of religious belief and practice. In the preceding chapter, for example, we have touched upon a culture complex which, to be sure, arises and develops primarily in the cult, but which also exerts a creative influence in other spheres of life, so that the portrayal of these different aspects of its importance can scarcely be separated. We refer to the use of blood with all its manifold derivative forms and survivals. It was viewed above merely as one of the forms of redemption from human sacrifice. However, it leads an entirely independent existence in the cult, and in these forms and their survivals it reaches from the earliest beginnings of culture to the heights of civilization. The same popular physiological conception, moreover, emerges with its consequences, not merely in the cult, but also in social life, where it leads to the creation of associations based on an artificial community of blood, which replace the natural and only original social bond of consanguinity. Since, however, in accordance with the origin of cult practices and religious conceptions, every social union is necessarily also a cult union, religious and social factors are here combined anew. Accordingly we shall first consider blood sacrifice itself in its distribution and a few of its survivalistic offshoots, then in similar fashion the blood pact for creating artificial blood relationship, and finally the cult union resting on the same foundation.

From the cult necessity of providing the departed soul with human blood, in order that it may come to rest, have arisen three
326 major groups of social phenomena: namely, blood revenge, headkunting, and bloodletting initsvarious forms. The first of these will now engage our attention.

The ghost of a murdered person craves the blood of his slayer with a cannibalistic thirst for revenge and is unable to come to rest so long as this wish is unsatisfied.[1] The reason why the duty of gratifying this wish falls upon those who are bound to the deceased by community of blood, is a purely psychological one. The murdered individual is vividly remembered only by his own group comrades. It is chiefly they, consequently, who are disturbed and alarmed by his memory and are impelled thereby to attribute to his ghost all the discomforts and misfortunes which they encounter. Every such misfortune is a new reminder that the deceased has not yet received his due, or been offered "atonement," or been "appeased;" it therefore constitutes a spur to accomplish this, a stimulus to blood revenge. Since, however, each social group bearing such a memory could originally have been united in no other way than by community of blood, the fear-engendered duty of blood revenge inevitably follows the bond of blood relationship.

This duty in turn must have augmented considerably the importance and appreciation of community of blood in ordinary life. By thus cementing more strongly the natural consanguineous association, it sharpened the distinction between neighboring societies and intensified their estrangement. The savage duty of blood revenge is the germ of all the protective obligations which the community owes to the individual, but it does not cross the boundary between primitive families. On the contrary, it first makes the importance of this boundary very obvious.

The original stage may still be recognized among tribes, like the American Indians, which have made little advance in social and political organization. "Terrible is the vengefulness of the ghost of a murdered man, who longs for the blood of the murderer and spurs his kinsmen to revenge."[2] For this reason the Dakotas feared the ghosts of the dead more than their Great Spirit, who was not concerned with the punishment of crime.[8] This crude idea has tremendous possibilities of development. As the state evolves out of the family, it assumes the old legal obligation of vengeance in order to regulate carefully its execution.[4] Finally the idea that this legal protection is the most valuable

[1] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 644. (Ed.)
[2] Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 73.
[8] Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes,* II, 195.
[4] See Jenks, *The State and the Nation,* pp. 166-7. (Ed.)

function of the society is freed from its limiting association with community of blood, however artificially supported, and becomes itself the foundation of expanded organizations. Then, to be sure, the original impulse is forgotten, but not, however, until it has passed through various survivalistic phases.[5]

Greek religion reveals the same basic conception, but also a number of interesting advances. It was characteristic of Greek religious evolution, as we have seen, for ideas to rise above their crude origins and develop into refined concepts of causality. Thus to the later Greeks it was no longer the ghost of the murdered person who brought fear and anxiety to the living; it was a god who did so, an avenging Zeus or Erinys. The amalgamation of kin-groups into compound organizations of a later type led to a further notable advance. With the development of the concept of guilt, memory no longer tormented chiefly the kindred of the deceased, but rather the murderer and his kinsmen. The Erinyes relentlessly dogged the footsteps of the murderer. How far custom lags behind advancing ideas is well shown in this case. In spite of the later conception, it was still believed possible to "purify" the guilty one by means of water and fumigation as well as by expiatory offerings, i.e., to attempt to avoid the tormenting spirit in the primeval fashion.

But the dead man who had not fallen by the hand of a murderer also craved human blood on the stage of cannibalism, and continued to do so even when men had ceased to be cannibals. As a consequence, in no case of death does the savage regard the ghost as appeased until he has shed human blood for him. The obvious place to do this is the territory of the nearest tribe which is not protected against such incursions by any legal tie. This notorious custom has been preserved rather widely, especially among the Malay tribes, in the form known as "head-hunting." [6] After every death the blood relatives of the deceased place themselves in ambush and treacherously surprise and murder the first man who comes along. The head, the seat of the soul, is then cut off as a votive offering to the deceased, who can not come to rest until the head-hunt is successful. In the analogous form of "running amuck," the head-hunters, as though driven by madness,

[5] For an extensive collection of cases on blood vengeance, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 643-51; IV, 263-72. (Ed.)

[6] For a discussion of head-hunting, with copious cases, see Davie, *Evolution of War,* Chap. XI. (Ed.)

rush on to the street with drawn swords, spreading murder and terror. Only with great difficulty have European administrations in Indonesia been able to suppress this dangerous form of mourning.

328 Vestiges of this practice indicate that it was once general in Oceania wherever actual cannibal meals were not preferred. Nevertheless, in certain Polynesian islands redemption has already been effected, and it appears only in a survivalistic form. Thus in Tahiti for about five months after a death the mourners made repeated sallies under the leadership of a man disguised in a mourning mask with a long flat staff studded with seal teeth in his hand. All took flight before these excursions, for those who did not escape were lacerated with the toothed weapon.[7] That similar survivals persisted in Greece is apparent from the story of Zoilus.[8]

Another source of blood is made available by self-mutilation. The original object is still frequently preserved. The Tahitians after a death gashed their heads with seal teeth, caught the gushing blood in rags, and laid these beside the corpse.[0] The same proceeding was found among the Quiche of Guatemala in the cult of the gods. The people pierced their ears and shoulders, collected the blood with a sponge, and pressed this out into a sacrificial cup which stood before the idols of the gods.[10] Only from this original usage can we understand the meaning of the modernized versions, to draw blood "in honor of the gods," "for the sake of the dead," or for "atonement." The Aztecs at the festivals of their gods used to sprinkle the altars with blood obtained partly as above described and partly from incisions on the breast and body.[11] Bloodletting was common everywhere from Mexico to Peru,[12] especially in the case of children. In Nicaragua, maize was sprinkled with the blood thus obtained and was then distributed and ceremoniously eaten, the sacrificial meal becoming in this way a substitute sacrifice. The parts of the body preferred for bloodletting were the breast, cheeks, ears, and sex organs.[18] The Peruvians also combined the sacrificial meal with the blood sacrifice by opening the veins of young boys at their festivals and mixing their blood with bread. This blood-bread, in

7 **Hawkesworth, *Seereisen*, II, 233.**
8 **See above, p. 466. (Ed.)**
9 **Hawkesworth, *Seereisen*, II, 141.**
10 **Bancroft, *Native Races*, III, 52-3.**
11 **Cf., Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 270-1. (Ed.)**
12 **Waitz, *Antkropologte*, IV, 365-6.**
13 **Müller, *Urreligionen*, p. 479.**

accordance with a conception already familiar to us, was a protection against demons. It was therefore smeared on the body, and the housefather rubbed it on the door of the house.[14]

This practice takes its first step on the road to becoming a survival when the blood is no longer specifically used, although the act of bloodletting is still kept up. In this form the custom is extremely widespread.[15] It is the usual "sign of mourning" in New Zealand, the New Hebrides, and the Tonga, Society, Marquesas, and many other islands. Immediately after a death and at frequent intervals during the mourning period the relatives lacerate their heads, faces, breasts, and arms with a shell or some other suitable instrument, drenching themselves with blood. Perhaps many of these islanders no longer know any reason for their action other than that they do it in mourning. The Scythians had apparently already reached this stage, for in mourning for their king "every man chops off a piece of his ear, crops his hair close, and makes a cut all round his arm, lacerates his forehead and his nose, and thrusts an arrow through his left hand."[16] The Huns acted similarly at the death of Attila. "They cut off a portion of their hair, as is the custom of their people, and gashed their hideous faces with deep wounds."[17] De Laet[18] saw the same expression of mourning at a funeral in Persia in the Seventeenth Century.

Special forms of bloodletting have given rise in many regions, especially in Oceania and Africa, to circumcision, in others to the lopping or piercing of ears, and in still others to the maiming of the hand by the removal of fingers.[19] We find traces of the latter in Paraguay and California, among the Hottentots of Africa, in the Tonga Islands, and in Australia.[20] In the Tonga Islands the shortening of a finger was regarded, for example, as a sacrifice to insure recovery from an illness.[21]

Next to death, sickness is in fact the most pressing occasion for

[14] Müller, *Urreligionen*, p. 391.
[15] See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 167-8. (Ed.)
[16] Herodotus *History* iv. 71.
[17] Jordanes *De Getarum sive Gothorum origine* xlix.
[18] *Persia*, p. 146. (Ed.)
[19] Instances of these mutilations are collected in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1283-7; IV, 688-96; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, II, 52-82. (Ed.)
[20] The same practice was current among the Upper Paleolithic inhabitants of Europe. See MacCurdy, *Human Origins*, II, 172-4. (Ed.)
[21] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen*, VI, 292.

propitiating the ghosts by sacrifice. Moreover, as we have seen, medicine passed its infancy in the cradle of the cult. It is consequently very probable that the once very important medical practice of bleeding goes back originally to the cult form, even though the first crude empiricism gave it a rational foundation. At least this explanation seems preferable to that of Pliny,[22] according to which the hippopotamus is to be honored as the discoverer of bloodletting. Certain medieval institutions made bleeding and cupping available to the poor on All Saints' Day.

The Hebrews had to be warned against bloodletting, since their Phoenician neighbors still practiced it, probably with a full knowledge of its sense. The priests of Baal "cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till the blood gushed out upon them."[28] The Hebrews, however, as a result of their unified cult, were forbidden both hair sacrifice and blood sacrifice. "Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard. Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you."[24]

The Greeks were likewise once acquainted with bloodletting, as we have already seen. Survivals of such practices were certainly much more common in ordinary popular usage than the actual history of the cult would lead us to suppose. An indication of this is afforded by Seneca's[25] account of a strange custom among certain inhabitants of Argolis. What did these curious people do when it hailed? Did they run "off to get their overcoats or cloaks? Nay, they each offered sacrifice as fast as they could, one a lamb, another a chicken," or—what cost nothing at all—"one merely pricked one's finger with a well-sharpened style and made atonement with his blood." The Romans were still acquainted with the custom in connection with death. Servius[26] speaks of a funeral procession whose members wounded themselves "in order to shed blood."

Savage peoples are usually greatly concerned to preserve the marks of their blood sacrifices as lasting evidences of their mourning. For the safety of the living, the ghost of the deceased must be satisfied thereby once for all. Lest he return sometime to his attacks, therefore, he must be reminded by the marks

[22] *Naturalis historia* viii. 40.
[23] 1 Kings xviii. 28.
[24] Leviticus xix. 27-28.
[25] *Naturales questiones* iv. 6. 7.
[26] *Commentaru in Virgilium* v. 78.

which man bears on his body that he has received his due. If a covenant has been sealed by the sacrifice, the marks serve as a lifelong symbol and token of the covenant.[27] A very common method of preserving the mark of an incision is to rub ashes into it. This raises a prominent scar and at the same time imparts a contrasting color to the wound. Sometimes, as a refinement, oil is applied with the ashes.[28] The ashes survive, even when the wounds under them are merely suggested. For instance, they are strewn on the head in mourning. The ashes, which no longer serve any special purpose, can then be replaced by any similar substance. Thus Laertes mourned by strewing dust on his gray head.[29] When parts of the body, like the lips, nose, and ears, are pierced through in bloodletting, the marks of the wound may be kept apparent by inserting foreign substances. Here again, however, the custom starts down the steep path toward becoming a survival. The plug in the lip and the ring in the nose and ear become the chief consideration, and survive as savage ornaments even when the bloodletting motive is no longer remembered.

Gashing the skin degenerates into beating it with a blunt weapon or even finally with the bare fist, and history can frequently follow these transitions. Before offering a burnt sacrifice the Egyptians were accustomed to fast, while during the ceremony "the whole assembly beat their breasts." Herodotus,[30] who certainly saw this himself, observed at the same time a significant distinction. Certain Carians living in Egypt, probably as mercenaries, participated in the sacrifice, but they cut their faces with their knives, whereas the Egyptians merely beat their breasts with their fists. Thus the Egyptians in familiar fashion combined with a late form of sacrifice, the burnt offering, three different earlier forms: a sacrifice of renunciation, bloodletting in a survivalistic symbol, and a gift offering proper. This ancient Egyptian combination has been preserved with striking fidelity in the forms of Catholicism. The priest who offers the sacrifice of the mass and the communicants who receive it fast beforehand, and at the climax of the ceremony all strike their breasts in confession of their guilt.

The same usage, moreover, still held its proper place in the

27 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1287. (Ed.)

28 Tylor, *Anthropology*, p. 238; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 59.

29 Homer *Odyssey* xxiv. 315.

30 *History* ii. 40. 42. 61.

Egyptian mourning for the dead, though in the same attenuated form. In keeping with the primitive precautionary regulations of mourning disguise, the relatives of one who had just died plastered their heads and faces with mud, deranged their clothes, and bared their bosoms. As they wandered through the city in this condition, they likewise beat their breasts.[31] All this reveals, moreover, that even the enlightened Egyptians must once have passed through the stage of cannibalism, and that they rose above it only through the early appearance of social advances. The conservative Dorian element in Greece preserved the same usage. After the death of a king of Sparta, the Periceci, Helots, and Spartans assembled and smote "their foreheads violently," a custom which they shared "with the barbarians of Asia."[32]

Let us now turn to another fruit of the primitive conception of life and soul. The primitive age is characterized by an unbounded confidence in its paltry stock of ideas. It has no suspicion of any possible difference between an object itself and man's conception of it. From this confidence, this complete innocence of doubt and criticism, springs that seemingly foolhardy way in which the savage deduces the logical conclusions from his ideas and unswervingly converts them into actions. The motivation of human behavior has always been of two sorts. We decide upon an action, either by mentally reviewing its train of consequences in the light of all known factors and choosing with reference to these consequences and in accordance with their relative expediency, or else by merely drawing the logical conclusion from an accepted idea without considering the possible results.[33] The rational merchant today acts in the former fashion, and progress demands that the behavior of the farmer be placed upon the same basis. But it is well known that the peasant a century ago still acted almost exclusively in the latter fashion; he was swayed by local tradition in choosing the days when it was advantageous to hew wood, spread manure, and wash his children's heads. Indeed, the same individual may act in both ways, as when, for example, he decides upon a business trip by a rational calculation in advance but selects a lucky day on which to start. But the more a man engages in rational activity, the more he will

[31] Herodotus *History* ii. 85. [32] *Ibid.,* vi. 68.
[33] Cf., Sumner, "Purposes and Consequences," in *Earth-Hunger*, pp. 67-75. (Ed.)

tend to reject traditional notions, though not always without a conflict. The savage, however, stands at the opposite pole. Only rarely does he stop to consider a long train of consequences, and the more remote ones do not impress him intensely enough to become motivating factors in his behavior. The few ideas with which he is imbued, however, drive him with the force of an instinct to behavior logically consistent with them, and he simply takes the consequences for granted with imperturbable confidence, without ever testing out the correctness of his assumptions by the course of events.[34] Crammed with traditional notions, he reacts like an engine under a head of steam. To find a transition from one type of behavior to the other, to offer rational thinking an ever more extensive experience for a foundation, to test, to sift, and if necessary to discard traditional ideas in full recognition of their nature—these are the essence of the great struggle for civilization on earth.[35]

We have seen that primitive man as a result of his limited experience arrived at the physiological opinion that by drinking the blood of another man he could incorporate the latter's soul in himself. He even bore witness to his confidence by assuming the name of the other. We also recall that originally all association was based upon the hypothesis of consanguinity, of community of blood. Social organization among low peoples is thus characterized by a strong consciousness of tribal ties[36] contrasting strikingly with an indifference toward closer degrees of kinship, and likewise by a rigid incapacity to expand beyond the limits set by nature. Through a combination of the two conceptions, however, an improvement and advance is ushered in. If kinship rests on community of blood, then it may also be created by artificially establishing the latter. Identity of blood may be brought about by exchanging or mixing blood.[37] The most natural way to do this is for two people to introduce each other's **blood** into the wounds from which they have drawn their own

[34] Compare and contrast Lippert's view of the mind of primitive man with the "prelogical mentality" of Levy-Bruhl *(Fonctions mentales).* (Ed.)

[35] See Robinson, *Mind in the Making,* and Martin, *Meaning of a Liberal Education,* for excellent recent expositions of the ideas here expressed. (Ed.)

[36] Cf., the "consciousness of kind" of Giddings (*Principles of Sociology,* pp. 17-19 *et passim; Theory of Human Society,* pp. 17-18 *et passim).* (Ed.)

[37] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 440. (Ed.)

blood, so that supposedly an identical mixture is produced in the two bodies. A second way was suggested by cannibalism. A union of blood and soul was accomplished by drinking one another's blood. This usage has become the more widespread and has followed the same history as the drinking of blood itself. The blood has been mixed with other drinks catering to the taste of the age and has gradually been diluted more and more until finally the latter alone survives as a symbol of the establishment of the blood bond.

A few examples will reveal the methods and distribution of these practices.[88] Artificial blood brotherhood is still very widespread among the Negro tribes of East, West, and Central Africa. Almost everywhere the cannibalistic form predominates, although there are exceptions. The Wanyamwezi and Wajiji of East Africa make an incision under a rib on the left side or below the knee, catch the blood in a leaf, exchange it, and rub it into their wounds.3[9] Among the neighboring Wazaramo, Wazigua, and
334 Wasagara, however, the other method prevails. The prospective blood brothers sit down opposite each other, and each with his dagger pricks the other's skin below the navel. They let the blood trickle on a piece of roasted meat, usually the heart of a small animal, and eat it thus. A similar custom has been observed west of Lake Tanganyika. When Storms became blood brother to Chief Mpala there, an incision was made with a spear head in the breasts of both, and they consumed each other's blood on roasted chicken liver, while a third party administered an oath of brotherhood with admonitions and warnings. Without such an exchange of blood it is very difficult to gain the confidence of the natives of these regions, while to undergo the ceremony affords great advantages. Hence Stanley became blood brother to Mirambo, and Hanssen to many chieftains of the Upper Congo.[40] In Kamerun reconciled enemies have been seen to conclude peace by means of such a ceremony. "Each of the kings drank the blood of his opponent, which the medicine man took from the upper arm of each and diluted with water."[41] The form on the

[48] Many additional cases are collected in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I, 441-3; IV, 162-7. (Ed.)

[39] Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen,* pp. 94, 238.

40Cf., Brunache, *Centre de l'Afrique*, p. 85; Junker, *Reisen in Afriha,* I I, 499-500; Stuhlmann, *Herz von Afrika,* p. **162.** (Ed.)

[41] Thormahlen, in *Deutsche Kolorualzeitung,* **1884,** p. **418.**

Gazelle River is more primitive; each sucks from an incision in the arm of the other. The Mohammedans in the same region prefer the still earlier form of a direct blood transfusion. Among the Niam-Niam the blood is allowed to trickle on to a leaf, from which it is drunk unmixed.[42]

The Papuans of New Guinea are acquainted with the same usage and practice it to make agreements more binding. They drink the blood mixed with sea water.[48] Sometimes an exchange of names accompanies that of blood, and often it remains as a survival when indulgence in blood has fallen into disuse. This form has been preserved in the Society Islands, in the New Hebrides, and among the Mohawks of North America.

Numbers of peoples of intermediate and higher culture have likewise been acquainted with the blood pact. The Scythians concluded such a pact in the very same way as the Africans of today. The parties drew blood from each other with a knife or an awl and mixed it with wine in a bowl. Into this they dipped swords, arrows, and other weapons and drank the blood with solemn oaths.[44] The probable significance of the dipping of the weapons is suggested by Lucian,[45] who reports a Scythian as saying that in his country a friendship between two men was indissoluble when established by cutting their fingers, collecting the blood in a beaker, and licking off a dagger dipped into it. The Lydians, in a still more primitive fashion, took oaths of amity by wounding themselves in the arms and sucking each other's blood.[46] The Armenian princes concluded sacred alliances by drinking blood drawn from their thumbs.[47] The early Irish did precisely the same,[48] and no other interpretation can be placed on the statement that the Magyar princes swore fidelity to their duke Alanus "after they had poured their own blood into a vessel according to heathen usage."[49]

Though this custom seemed strange to the Greeks, it was not entirely alien to them. Diodorus[50] tells how a certain Apollodorus confirmed a conspiracy by means of a drink of "blood mixed with

[42] See *Globus*, 1872, pp. 132-3.
43 *Ibid*., p. **216.**
[44] Herodotus *History* iv. 70.
[45] *Toxaris* xxxvii.
46 Herodotus *History* i. 74.
[47] Tacitus *Annals* xii. 47.
[48] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer*, pp. 193-4, citing Gyraldus.
[49] Cassel, *Symbolik des Blutes*, p. 37, quoting the anonymous notary of Bela.
[50] *Bibliotheca historica* xxii. 4.

wine." The Homeric heroes were acquainted with the custom in the form of a survival; the blood had dropped out of the mixture, and the wine alone remained to suggest it. When the Trojans and Achaeans wished to conclude a truce, they mixed wine in a flagon.[61] Since only unmixed wine was used for the sacrifice, the meaning must be that the two parties brought wine to be mixed as though it still contained their blood.

The Romans were no further advanced. Legend tells of a conspiracy against Brutus and Collatinus, which is said to have been concluded with fearful oaths and the use of human blood as a sacrificial drink.[62] It is of no consequence to us here whether Cataline actually sealed his conspiracy with an oath sworn in wine mixed with blood; it is enough that the Romans of his time could believe it.[63] Of course the reports show that people no longer possessed a true conception of this antiquated practice. Sallust mentions only that the blood was allegedly taken from a human body while Dio Cassius[64] says that the conspirators were supposed to have eaten a slaughtered boy. Thus the custom had come to be confused with the then entirely extinct cult of child sacrifice.

The practice was by no means entirely unfamiliar to the Hebrews, even though the sacerdotal editors of their history took pains to veil every reference to it. Of the intimate alliance of friendship between Jonathan and David, the Scripture says that "the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David."[66] This is at least the actual effect of a blood pact according to the popular conception. In another place[66] this pact is called "a covenant of the Lord," and it can be so regarded in the somewhat divergent form known to Hebrew antiquity. In this form such a pact is established by any sacrifice of blood. The parties, by both offering the blood to the divinity and drinking of it themselves, enter into a community of blood not only with each other but also with the divinity, and the latter thereby becomes the avenger of the pact. The transaction thus becomes somewhat more artificial. It also becomes more survivalistic when the drinking of the blood is omitted or is only suggested. Thus, according to Xenophon,[57] the Greek and foreign warriors concluded a solemn

[51] Homer *Iliad* iii. 269. **551 Samuel xviii. 1.**
[52] Plutarch *Valerius Publicola* iv. **5[6] *Ibid.*, xx. 8.**
[58] Sallust *Catilince conjuratio* xxii. **57 *Anabasis* ii. 2.**
5[4] *Historia Romana* 1. 37.

alliance by slaughtering several sacrifices and dipping their weapons in the blood. According to AEschylus, a similar ceremony was performed by the "Seven" before Thebes; they collected the sacrificial blood in a shield and dipped in their right hands as a pledge. It was precisely this form of the blood pact with which the Hebrews were acquainted. Moses divided the sacrificial blood into two halves: one as the share of God he sprinkled on the altar; the other he sprinkled on the people, saying, "Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words."[58]

Here the popular conception is associated with one previously discussed, namely, that every sacrificial meal establishes a fellowship among the participants and a compact between them and their divinity. Originally, of course, the chief consideration was the indulgence in blood, especially in the redemptive or vicarious sacrifice, and the conception was founded on this; gradually, however, it attached itself without distinction to every sacrificial meal. When Paul warned the Corinthians against partaking of the blood sacrificed to devils, he said, "I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils."[59] That by participating in a sacrifice man becomes the temporary table companion of the gods or demons follows, as we have so often stressed, from the original concept of sacrifice. Through the accession of these other ideas, however, the relationship is expanded into an intimate union. Maimonides[60] comes back to the correct fundamental view in speaking of the Sabseans of the lower Euphrates, the so-called "Christians of St. John" or Mandaeans. "The Sabseans greatly abominate blood as an accursed thing, but they nevertheless eat it, for they regard it as a food of demons and suppose that one who has eaten of it becomes a brother and comrade of the demons, who then come to him and foretell the future, an art which the people are wont to ascribe to the demons. To others, to be sure, the eating of blood is a disagreeable thing (as it is contrary to nature), yet they slaughter an animal, collect the blood in a vessel or in small holes, seat themselves around it, and eat the flesh in the opinion that the demons are meanwhile drinking the blood as their food. And thus they believe a bond

•• Exodus xxiv. 6-8.
59 1 Corinthians x. 20. (Ed.)
60 *More Nebuchim* iii. 46; Cassel, *Symbolik dea Blutes,* pp. 86-6.

of friendship is established, because they all sit at one table and in one gathering."

The early Germanic peoples established blood brotherhood exactly as do the native Africans today. A medieval account[61] describes the proceeding with great precision. One knight proposes to another that they conclude a pact which will be advantageous to both, and says, "Each of us will draw blood from his right arm; I will then drink your blood and you mine, so that neither shall abandon the other either in fortune or in distress, and the one shall possess the half of what the other may acquire." Similar pacts with artificial blood relationship in view are known and often mentioned in the old Norse legends as "foster-brotherhood," although the mingling of blood is frequently obscured by various other forms.[62] In certain cases a special object of the pact is stressed, namely, the obligation of blood revenge should the friend be slain—a logical consequence of the union of blood. This substitute for natural blood relationship was very common in the age of the Vikings, when men of different kin-groups associated in the same dangerous enterprise and needed that confidence in one another which uncivilized man finds guaranteed only in community of blood. A number of sagas preserve exalted instances of unswerving fidelity and devotion in these intimate friendships, which doubtless contributed much to making the Vikings appear so formidable. The gods of the Edda concluded similar pacts with one another, perhaps indicating that alien tribes were sometimes brought together in this way through their divine heads. Loki reminds Odin: "Do you recall, Odin, how in olden times we mingled our blood? You vowed never to refresh yourself with drink unless it were brought to us both."[68] The historian Saxo Grammaticus[64] was aware that pacts of friendship were established in this way—*cruoris commercio*—in early times.

Well preserved survivals still exist in Germany to this day. We have already seen how the blood is rendered more palatable by mixing it with the customary liquor of the country—beer in ancient Egypt, mead in northern countries, wine in the south—and how finally the liquor alone suffices to symbolize the blood.

61 *Oesta Romanorum* lxvii.
62 Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer,* pp. **192-3.**
68 Simrock, *Edda*, p. 73.
64 *Historia Danica* i. 12.

In the lowest classes of the German people, as we know from the trial of Grete Minden, there lived on an ancient usage suggestive of the dipping in and licking off of weapons. To be sure, blood was no longer used, but only unmixed beer. When several wished "to drink brotherhood," beer was poured on the table, and while one pronounced the oath, the others dipped their fingers in the liquor and then raised them to take the oath. The expression *Brüderschaft trinken* is, however, sufficiently suggestive in itself.

The Norse legends give us a clear picture of the value attached by an organization united for hazardous enterprises, not only to natural blood relationship, but perhaps even more to the artificial establishment of community of blood among associates not naturally related. The reason for this seemingly strange phenomenon lies in the attitude toward tribal strangers inculcated in man by his social history. Even though, as the result of peace agreements, this attitude gradually ceases to be one of absolute hostility, the savage can apparently never acquire toward the blood stranger that degree of confidence which seems innate in the members of a natural consanguineous society and which is at the same time an essential requirement for dangerous communal undertakings such as those involved in the special male sphere of economic activity.

The blood bond, which in the primitive family embraced all its men, was completely destroyed by the development of the patriarchate and the exogamous forms of marriage associated therewith. To be sure, all the children of a family, together with their mothers, were now the property of the father, but through their mothers they were alien in blood both to each other and to their own father, so long as the later physiological conception of kinship through males had not arisen to taken the place of blood relationship. This is not yet the case, however, with many tribes in Australia, America, and Africa, and a few in Asia. Thus the new form of the family lacked that very bond which mankind had come to regard as the only foundation of an association for mutual aid, as the only source of confidence between associates, and as the indispensable condition of the duty of blood revenge. Here was a great need, and in response to it there appeared all over the earth some form of artificial substitute.[65] The new form

[55] **"Needs have . . . served as the primary stimulus for invention" (Dixon, *Building of Cultures,* p. 45). (Ed.)**

of organization under paternal authority was itself an artificial creation, and only in an artificial manner could it regain the old legal basis of all previous social order.

The form of the blood pact last described suffices in many cases, such as the organization of associations for particular objects and the conclusion of peace unions through the leaders of the parties concerned. Mohammedan merchants make use of it in Africa for safe-conduct through the territories of certain tribes. But in order to induct all the children born to a patriarchal family or tribe into blood relationship with its members, use is made of another form. The redemptive blood sacrifice of the child is in most cases taken as the starting point, and to it are attributed, in the manner described above, the force and effect of a sacrificial alliance. The young man, who purchases his life by the sacrifice of his blood, thereby enters, just because this sacrifice is of
340 cannibalistic origin, into a community of blood with the divinity who accepts it, and indirectly he becomes thereby related by blood to all the members of the tribe, because they have all entered into the same community of blood with the same divinity. Henceforth this blood sacrifice, establishing' indirectly an intimate relation between all who have undergone it, takes the place of natural blood relationship, which could exist only under mother-right. Consequently the mark left by the sacrificial act constitutes the tribal mark, and every one who does not wear this badge is an alien and a barbarian.

However artificial this invention may seem, it was nevertheless of the greatest importance, for it made it possible to form organizations far exceeding the bounds of genealogical groups, and it invested them with the same firm cohesion, the same dependableness, and the same obligations of mutuality as the more limited community had developed under the mother family. It now becomes apparent, moreover, how incorrect it was in earlier times to speak in our sense of an ancestral father of a whole people. On the contrary, the very possibility of uniting with the tribal stranger was the essence of the great advance correlative with the destruction of the old system of matrilineal descent. Even the Hebrews, who stressed so strongly their common descent, are shown by their historical books to have been quite ready, if it offered an advantage, to accept slaves and strangers into their union. It was not until the sacerdotal editing of their history that an attempt was made to efface from their system the traces of the composite character of the people.

The report of the establishment of such a union of god and people has been preserved in the Biblical story of Abraham. Yahweh appears to Abraham and says: "And I will establish my covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generation for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. . . . This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me and you and thy seed after thee; Every man child among you shall be circumcised. And ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you." So Abraham circumcises not merely himself but also "all that were born in his house, and all that were bought with his money."[66] The provision and promise of this covenant, however, is that Abraham, who has hitherto been without offspring, shall in his descendants become a nation, and that Yahweh shall always remain the God of their cult union. Even the further circumstances correspond closely with those in similar compacts among savage peoples. The recipient acquires a new name; Abram is changed to Abraham. Moreover, the new blood bond supersedes every older one, and the new relationship extinguishes every other, for Abraham's covenant is preceded by the order: "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house,"[67] and it is not concluded until after he has also separated from Lot, his nearest relative.[68]

Depending upon whether the act is viewed more as a sacrifice for the preservation of the life of the child or as an initiation into kinship with the men, it is fixed either soon after the birth of the child or when he becomes a youth, an age attained very early in tropical climates. Although the Hebrews of historical times serve as an example of the former alternative, the latter is much the more widespread. The dependent infant is left to his mother, as though he still belonged to her, but as soon as he appears capable of participating in the undertakings of the men, he is accepted into their kin-group by means of the cult act. Hence this act has in many places been called not inaccurately a "second birth." The first or actual birth assigns the child to his mother's group;

[66] Genesis xvii. 7, 10-11, 23.
67*Ibid.*, xii. 1.
*68*Ibid.*, xiii. 11/ For the way in which circumcision dissolves the old relationship, see Winer, *Realworterbuch*, I, 286.

the second or artificial one initiates him into the organization of the men, into their tribe, or into the state. He is "reborn" another man and therefore receives a new name. Because the beginning of youth coincides, at least in the south, with the appearance of puberty, these cult acts have often been misinterpreted as a celebration of puberty.[69] The connection, however, is only an accidental and superficial one.

In certain sections of Africa almost every tribe, in so far as it represents a primitive state, is at the same time a cult union. One point, however, has not yet been sufficiently cleared up. Certainly many of the schematic skin markings, such as most African tribes wear, are the marks of the cult union of a patriarchal gens or of a tribe which has arisen on this basis, but not all of them can be claimed as such. On the contrary, certain evidences lead us to conclude that oftentimes an earlier type of mark representing the maternal kin-group coexists with the later one for the patriarchal gens. This is entirely in harmony with the fact that many peoples still reckon kinship through the mother, while close at hand exist organizations with a later basis. Without further evidence, therefore, we can not tell from the different designs on African faces whether they denote the maternal kin-group or the cult union of the men. Indeed, a well informed person might even be able to find both kinds on the same individual.

The true initiation into the cult union, of which we are speaking here, is indigenous throughout West Africa in an old form.[70] According to Bastian, the Negroes in describing the essential nature of the ceremony use expressions like those widely current in higher civilizations. They say that every one must first die, in order to become a man. The priest is thought to bring this about. He supposedly kills the youth torn from his mother and buries him in the forest, so that he may then arise a new man. The youth is thus reborn, as it were, into blood relationship with the paternal god. Since, however, the men's organizations in Africa are rarely of long duration, the cult unions are characterized by a certain laxity. The rights of the paternal divinity can

[69] The subject of initiation ceremonies is excellently treated, with **ample** illustrations, in Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies,* pp. 20-73, **191-221;** Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* **I, 546-60; IV, 232-52; Schurts,** *Altersklassen und Mannerbunde.* (Ed.)

[70] See Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies,* **pp. 207-11.** (Ed.)

not be enforced as they were among the Caucasian nomads. The youth is free to withdraw and join another association.

Among the Balunda and tribes farther south[71] there exists an institution of initiation for the purpose of uniting a voluntarily assembled band of warriors by means of a cult union, i.e., of endowing it with the exclusiveness which holds a consanguineous family together. The chieftain planning the enterprise erects a house, called a *quirnba*, where the participants come together to undergo the ceremonies of alliance, which are commonly associated with the appropriate preparations for war. Farther north this *quimba* ceremonial is associated with the regular rite of circumcision, of union with the paternal divinity, by which the latter is able to maintain a stronger hold on his adherents. The ceremony, which here takes place at the entrance of the youth into the society and rights of the men, consists, in addition to the essential blood sacrifice, of general sacrifices of renunciation and special food taboos, all of which may properly be classed together as forms of mortification. Bastian was told that the initiates were buried in the *quimba* in a deathlike condition and were then resuscitated, after which experience they forgot the past and their parents and kin and could not even remember their own names any longer, so that they had to receive new ones. This well expresses the idea behind the ceremony. In West Africa, as well as among the Basuto and other tribes, the bloodletting is accomplished by circumcision, in Majumba by shoulder incisions, and elsewhere by similar means. The learning of secret accomplishments, special dances, and a secret language is associated with the sojourn in certain *quimbas*.

In Australia, Polynesia, and Indonesia the same custom appears everywhere, either as a general practice or as an isolated survival. In Australia the blood sacrifice of circumcision or skin cuttings is likewise associated with definite renunciation sacrifices, represented chiefly by prohibitions against catching certain animals.

The usage also extends throughout America, reflecting in its forms all the gradations of social organization there. Sometimes the individual is free to make a private cult compact for his own advantage with any spiritual being; sometimes a whole tribe turns to its Great Spirit. The ceremony by which the boy leaves

[71] **Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* II, 17.**

his maternal home and enters the society of the men is appropriately known as "making him capable of bearing arms," for the ability to bear arms is in fact the characteristic of the life and economic sphere of the men. It is very common for the Indians to inflict wounds on the boy in this ceremony.[72] In Virginia this was still done with a full understanding. The boys were consecrated to the Great Spirit "by drawing blood from a wound in the left breast, and it was said that the Great Spirit 'relished' this blood and often continued to suck at the wound until the boy died." [78] The warlike Caribs laid great stress on such initiations. The usage likewise prevailed among the more advanced peoples. When the Aztecs made incisions on the breast or in other places, in the case of girls as well as of boys, they said that they thereby "consecrated them to the highest god, Huitzilopotchli." [74]

Among the many ceremonies of a like nature or meaning, that practiced in the Inca household deserves special emphasis. Through this ceremony the children born to the Inca first became in actuality his sons. It was preceded by the usual fasts and by a test of manhood. If the youth were found worthy of initiation, his ears were pierced by the king. Earrings, worn as a token of such a pact, were the distinguishing ornaments of the higher officials of the state who belonged to the Inca family.[75] The subject peoples of the Inca Empire concluded similar cult unions
344 with their gods in a somewhat different form. Its essential identity in theory with the ideas which we found in Africa is revealed by the presence of two name-giving ceremonies. A few days after birth the child was baptised in water—in order to protect his life from the attacks of greedy ghosts—and was given his first name. The child was thereby given over, as it were, to his mother, and the name was used only within the sphere of maternal authority. Then when the child became capable of bearing arms, his hair and nails were ceremoniously clipped as a "sacrifice to the guardian spirits," and he was given a second name, which he thereafter bore in public life, in the sphere of the men. Even today the Peruvian Indians customarily cut off a small lock of hair at the name-giving ceremony.[76]

[72] MUller, *Urreligionen,* p. 212.
[78] Arnold, *Abraham Rogers,* p. 949; Baumgarten, *Lander und Volker von Amerika,* I, 135.
[74] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 479.
[75] Vega, *Commentaries,* I I , 175.
[76] Authorities cited in Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 389.

Many other peoples select the ears for bloodletting; like the foreskin and lips they can be mutilated without great danger. Thus the tribes on the Orinoco formerly clipped their ears. The Botocudos are distinguished by a rich combination of forms. They pierce the lower lips and ears and cut off the hair around the scalp. The slits are kept open by inserting large flat wooden plugs,[77] which render them, as is the intention, more conspicuous than beautiful. Although each individual is free to follow his own artistic inspiration in painting his body, the above mutilations are definitely established for the tribe and for it alone, so that a Botocudo can be instantly distinguished from all his neighbors. Among the North American Indians, the totem mark, which is associated with a similar cult union, is likewise to be differentiated from the body paintings which each individual undertakes voluntarily for adornment.

The double ceremony, one at birth and the other at puberty, corresponds so closely in nature to the double name-giving that it must be regarded as the original form. It is a means whereby father-right effects an equitable compromise with mother-right, taking possession of its property only after some years. But where, as among the Hebrews, the mutilation establishing the cult bond with the divinity of the men's organization is advanced to the beginning of life, father-right takes immediate possession of the child, and the earlier dual form is either entirely suppressed or is amalgamated with the later one.

According to strict Moslem rule, as among the Jews, the circumcision is supposed to take place on the seventh day of life, yet the Arabs of northern Africa and the Turks cling to the later date and postpone the act until between the eighth and twelfth years. It is worthy of note, moreover, that the Moslems, either through advances in social organization or because of the natural passion of man to seek salvation in every available way, combined and amalgamated a number of different forms which originally arose contemporaneously or successively and served the same purpose. Aside from prayers and name-giving, the Arab has given hospitable acceptance to no less than two parallel forms of the first and three of the second ceremony. The first consecration may be recognized in the familiar baptism for defense against demons, which is accomplished once by washing

[77] Wied, *Reise nach Brasilien,* II, 5ff. (Ed.)

and again by sprinkling with water. The second ceremony includes circumcision, piercing the ear lobes, and cutting the hair. Charity and entertainment might also be added as survivals of the now obsolete sacrifice and sacrificial meal.[78]

Almost all the forms characteristic of the Arabs are found again among the Hebrews, where they were either tolerated under special circumstances along with the form officially sanctioned by the later sacerdotal order or else prohibited with a sharpness that betrays how popular they must once have been. Among the latter were lacerating the skin and cutting the hair as cult acts.[79] That baptism as a cult practice had never been completely forgotten by the people of Palestine is shown by the way they flocked to John the Baptist to try his means of salvation.[80] Circumcision was elevated to the official form of the cult union with the state Divinity and was even forced on the slave. The concurrent form of ear piercing, however, seems to have been debased, so that it came to be used only with slaves, but in this form it appears in its original sense. The divinities of the household, according to a very ancient conception, were thought to dwell either under the hearth or under the door posts. Among the early Germans, slaves and brides were introduced and dedicated to these gods at the hearth.[81] Similarly the Hebrew servant who chose to attach himself permanently to the house was joined to the same gods at the door posts by the blood sacrifice of ear piercing.[82] It is to be noted that this form could not have been borrowed from the Gentiles, for it was practiced only with slaves of Hebrew descent, since others never had the choice of freedom. "But if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free: then his master shall bring him unto God, and shall bring him to the door, or unto the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him for ever."[88] It is obvious that we have to do here with an early text in the priestly collection. In the later law, when it deals with the same point, the cult connection is

[78] Maltzan, "Sudaxabien," p. 27.
[79] Leviticus xix. 27-28. (Ed.)
[80] Matthew iii. 5; Mark i. 5; Luke iii. 7. (Ed.)
[81] See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* II, 146; Weinhold, *Frauen in dem Mittelalter,* I, 352; Montanus, *Deutsche Volksjeste,* p. 100. (Ed.)
[82] This custom, with parallel practices, is discussed at length in Eraser, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament,* III, 165-269. (Ed.)
[88] Exodus xxi. 5-6. (Revised Version),

suppressed and the piercing of the ear is twisted into a symbol of the attachment of the servant to the house. "Then thou shalt take an awl, and thrust it through his ear unto the door, and he shall be thy servant for ever."[84]

The earring once served to preserve the mark of this cult union and then became itself regarded as such a mark. Later, when it was worn only by women, this meaning seems to have been lost. Nevertheless the old patriarchal legend was still familiar with it and also knew that the union it betokened was not that of Yahweh. When Jacob went to build an altar to Yahweh and, since he was faced with a dangerous military expedition like the aforementioned African chieftains, to unite his followers in a league with Yahweh, he made them cast off all marks associated with other cults. "And they gave unto Jacob all the strange gods which were in their hand, and all their earrings which were in their ears; and Jacob hid them under the oak which was by Shechem."[85]

The old cult union with the earring as its symbol crops out again in Christianity, which attempted to preserve its monotheism by incorporating the cults of the saints in its system and thus relaxed its opposition to earlier cult traditions. Down to modern times, in order to cure certain afflictions, the people have been wont to unite themselves with certain saints by means of vows equivalent to the African *quixilles* and to wear earrings as the sign of such unions. Before the usage entirely disappeared, it was rationalized. Keeping the ear open was said to be a remedy against eye troubles. Guilds, corporations, and similar associations organized in imitation of the family resorted to the familiar forms of the cult union for the means of establishing an artificial bond. Every medieval guild united under some patron saint, like an older cult union under its god. The saint, like the god, was honored in an annual festival, at which his deeds and sufferings were set forth in dramatic form, and in many guilds each member received earrings at his ceremony of initiation into the union.

Another external mark of the cult union consists in printing the symbol or name of the cult divinity indelibly on the skin. This type of mark is obviously of late origin; it makes use of a high cultural advance and thereby obscures the origin of the whole

[84] Deuteronomy xv. 17. [85] Genesis xxxv. 4.

custom. It was known to the ancient Egyptians along with circumcision and the hair sacrifice. The Libyans, who with the Egyptians worshiped the goddess Neith at Sais, used to stamp her name on their skins.[86] The Egyptian kings seem to have treated similarly the prisoners of war which they presented to their gods as slaves. Ramses VI, in an inscription to Ptah, says: "I brand thy name with a hot stamp on the foreign people of the whole earth; they belong to thy person forever."[87] That this form was also in use among freemen is indicated by the Hebrew prohibition of such skin inscriptions.[88] Even the Apocalypse is acquainted with it and imputes to it precisely its old meaning as the sign of a cult union. It protects those who are marked, when the Deity is bent on destruction. An angel appears with the "seal of the living God" and commands the angels of destruction to stop "till we have sealed the servants of our God in their foreheads."[89] This variation also shows how the externals of a custom remain after its sense and spirit have vanished.

The same tendency is observable among peoples of more northern origin, among whom protective clothing from the beginning threatened the practical value of the skin mark. As though this had always been the chief consideration, it was preserved by an adaptation, and the mark tended to be transferred from the skin to an article of clothing.[90] An example is furnished by the so-called "Brahman string" in India.

The cult union, once it has expanded beyond the limits of the patriarchal family, can naturally have an extremely varied history. The possibility of such an expansion is the characteristic feature of this new social product. Whether a cult union will become coextensive with a political organization, or whether it will develop into one, will depend upon many factors. That the Hebrews after their return from the Exile arrived at such an exceptional identification of cult union and state, was the result of their peculiar history and at the same time the basis of their later history and unique national character. In India there arose numerous cult unions, and their fate tended sometimes toward one and sometimes toward the other of the possible extremes. If the

86 Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens,* p. 262.
87 *Ibid.,* p. 540.
88 Leviticus xix. 28.
89 Revelation vii. 2-3.
90 See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 54. (Ed.)

cult union coincides approximately with the political organization, we speak of its marks as tribal marks. If this identification is not attained, it is customary to speak of such unions as sects.

Lassen[91] says of the Bhils, a tribe in the Vindhya region of India: "When a Rajput of these lands takes over the government, a mark is made on his forehead with blood from the toe or the thumb of a Bhil; this is the recognition of his authority on the part of the original owners of the land." More correctly interpreted, the marking with Bhil blood makes the alien Aryan Rajput blood-related to the tribe so that he may rule over it. The form, however, has already become a survival. It must certainly once have been necessary to make an incision on the brow of the alien lord for the purpose of rubbing in the blood. This act, being the more disagreeable, was the first to give way, and it is not surprising if even the blood soon came to be applied only symbolically. The Mina likewise impose the mark of their tribal union upon their alien king.[92]

These cult marks appear even more frequently in connection with sects. Thus the Yogins in general possess "initiation marks," and one particular group "in their initiation have their ears pierced and earrings inserted in the holes." In some sects a line is drawn across the forehead with ashes.[93] The incision has lapsed and only the application remains, a development characteristic of survivals. The Brahmans of Surat also wear a stripe of ashes across the brow, while another sect of the same district wears a red spot with two yellow lines over the nose and a yellow dot on each ear lobe.[94] Here paint has replaced skin laceration.

The special ceremony of initiation into the cult union, in spite of the diversity of its forms, is of vital importance to the Aryan Hindus, as is shown by a characteristic provision of the Laws of **Manu.**[98] Although birth is, of course, a necessary condition for acceptance into one of the three higher castes—Brahman, Kshatriya, and Vaisya—it does not of itself effect acceptance. **Any** one who neglects the artificial introduction, whatever his claim by birth, belongs to none of the upper castes but falls into the excluded Vratya caste. As to the nature of the initiation, we

91 *IndUche Alterthumskunde,* I, 437.
92 Ibid, I, 439.
93 Ibid., II, 626.
94 Osbeck, *Reise nach Ostindien,* p. 460.
95 *Laws of Manu* x. 20-23; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 971.

here encounter once more the African conception. It is a "second birth," and those admitted by birth and cult act into one of the three upper castes are consequently called *dviga,* the "twice born." The identical conception is expressed by the Scripture when it says: "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. . . . Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."[96]

In the territory of Buddhism the rejection of the blood sacrifice has led logically to the suppression of the body mark and has brought to the fore the hair sacrifice instead. The Siamese differ from the ancient Egyptians only in that they have given up circumcision and use the hair sacrifice alone in the initiation of youth. This is undertaken between the eleventh and fifteenth years of life, until which time a lock of hair is allowed to grow on the fore part of the head (the young Pharaohs wore their "prince's lock" on the side). It is then cut off with great solemnity. In Bangkok the king maintained expressly for this purpose a pair of priests, who undertook the ceremony with baptism, a proof that it derives from pre-Buddhist times.[97]

The great priestly and monastic orders of eastern Asia are either actually cult unions of the same sort, or, with those of the Occident, they are imitative of them, like the guilds and crafts. The cult mark of the Buddhist monk is the shorn head. The Christian monastic orders have likewise clung to the hair emblem. Thus each has its special kind of "tonsure." The following statement, moreover, applies as well to the Christian as to the Buddhist monk: "The monk . . . no longer has parents or relatives, has cast off the family bond, and has become a member of a new spiritual society."[98] This effect of initiation into a cult union we are already acquainted with; it could exist logically only as the result of a blood pact. The Gentile received into Judaism by circumcision likewise withdrew from his natural kinship ties, and Jesus similarly characterized the nature of the later Christian cult union when he so strikingly repudiated his blood relatives. "Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren!"[99]

96• John iii. 3, 5.
97 Finlayson, *Gesandtechaftsreise nach Siam,* pp. 152, 177.
98 Kern, *Buddhismus,* p. 220n.
99 Matthew xii. 48-49.

The development in Persia was similar to that in India. Here too physical birth did not make one a full Persian, at least after unity had been achieved under Zoroastrianism. According to the law of Zoroaster,, each Persian had to be accepted into the cult anion in his fifteenth year with definite ceremonies. Not until this had been done did he enter the class to which he was eligible by birth. The most important act of the initiation was the assumption of the girdle *{koshti),* which corresponded to the Brahman string and which the Zoroastrian could never again take off day or night.[100] This "crown of the clothing"[101] was narrow, encircled the body several times, and ended in little tassels. Like the skin marks among less clad peoples, it was the peculiar badge of the servant of Ormazd. In praying he held it in his hands and made various motions with it, and in naming the evil demons he shook its ends against them.[102] They must obviously have been afraid of it, while Ormazd by seeing it in the hands of the supplicants immediately recognized those toward whom he had assumed obligations.

This practical use of the girdle leads us involuntarily to the phylactery of the Hebrews. During the Exile they must have come into close contact with the Persian conquerors of their masters. It was to the Persians that they owed their liberation and the possibility of reestablishing their kingdom. The Bible in general expresses friendliness toward the Persians, and it is highly probable that the Hebrews enlarged their store of religious ideas and practices by borrowings from Zoroastrianism.[108] Among these we may include here, besides a few suggestions of Persian fire fetishism in Hebrew accounts, the phylactery and the northern custom of wearing a mark of the cult union on or over the clothes. The latter may be recognized in the fringes of which the law says: "Speak unto the children of Israel, and bid them that they make them fringes in the borders of their garments throughout their generations, and that they put upon the fringe of the borders a ribband of blue: And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that ye may look upon it, and remember all the commandments

100 Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta,* III, 223-4.
101 *Bundahish* xxiv.
102 Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta,* II, 100.
103 On this point see Hume, *World's Living Religions,* pp. **191-2;** Hopkins, *History of Religions,* pp. 405-6; White, *Warfare of Science with Theology,* **II, 377-8; Tylor,** *Primitive Culture,* **II, 330-1.** (Ed.)

of the Lord, and do them."[104] Here too there is suggested the remnant of a cult union and its emblem.

In Europe, the ancient Thracians still preserved the original custom of skin marks,[105] and the circumstance that they are said to have indicated the rank of a man does not militate against their significance as cult marks of the oldest type. The Greeks discarded skin marks and, so far as we know, sought no substitute for them. However, the ancient bloody initiation of youths into the men's organization was not unknown to them, as is shown by the treatment of the Spartan ephebi. The custom of the double name-giving, attested by Homer,[106] is another survival of the same sort. "Arnaeus was his name; for this his venerable mother gave him from his birth; but all the young men called him Irus." The sacrifice of hair, which youths and maidens were accustomed to vow to individual divinities and the women to Eileithyia or Hygeia, is, as respects its form, another survival. Indeed the custom was here practiced quite as in Egypt, when a son was taken to Delphi and his locks shorn and dedicated to the divinity.[107]

The development of Greece in respect to these things forms a striking contrast to that of the Hebrews and Persians. Out of the old cult unions there here arose in undisturbed freedom sometimes political unions or friendly alliances and sometimes voluntary cult communities, which might be compared to the Hindu "sects" if that term were well chosen. The latter type, which is characteristic of Greece in contrast to Rome, embraces the cult unions which have become celebrated under the name of "mysteries." When we call the mystery a cult union of this type, we accurately characterize its nature.[108] Its members were united as brothers through the intermediation of a common cult divinity. In Judea there were no mysteries, because the jealous state cult did not tolerate voluntary cult unions. In Rome there was no place for them, because the firmly intrenched family and community organization dominated the cult. In Greece, however, with its communities of heterogeneous composition and their disintegration through colonial enterprises, and with the great mobility

104 Numbers xv. 38-39.
105 Herodotus *History* v. 6.
106 *Odyssey* xviii. 5.
107 See Hermann, *Alterthumer der Griechen,* p. 143n.
108 Moreover, "the central idea common to these ceremonies and to the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries is the idea of a renewal of life" or a "new birth" *(Cambridge Ancient History,* IV. 524). (Ed.)

of its people and their dissemination among Phoenician, Carian, Phrygian, Scythian, Thracian, and other populations, the voluntary cult union flourished.

It is now known that the often overrated "secret knowledge" of the mystery cults was limited to the knowledge of the forms of divine service of the particular cult and to the meaning of the
353 myths about its divinity.[109] The essence and aim of the individual mysteries was simply that of every cult, of the cult in general, namely: release from all sin and hence deliverance from all the ills of life which are directly caused by sin, protection against sickness and evil, removal of the burden of cult care which oppresses mankind under a daimonistic world philosophy and hence a certain confident joy in life, and finally assurance of cult attention to oneself after death and hence certainty about the hereafter. All this, as it appears in the individual mysteries either in its totality or with special stress in certain directions, is the object of the cult in general in that conception of it which man necessarily acquires as soon as he has risen high enough to find the correlate of his daimonistic world philosophy in a systematic organization of the cult.

The countless family and community cults of Greece, varying widely in the development of their forms, the adequacy of their endowments, and the character of their legends and traditions, inevitably inspired men with varying degrees of confidence in them. Hence from the natural aspiration for reassurance there sprang a desire to join effective cults outside of the inherited ones of the family and community, a development which was later to pave the way for Christianity in Greece. The cult union provided the means for gratifying this desire. But the hospitality with which almost all cults accepted brothers of alien kin, and the number of the latter who flocked in from other cult hearths, remain characteristic of Greece alone and are a proof of how greatly the progress of Greek civilized life had diminished the importance of the barriers between tribes and kin-groups, even without political amalgamation of the same.

Although no Greek cult was opposed on principle to the acceptance of *mystae* or initiates, it was nevertheless mainly the older and more popular chthonian gods rather than those of the rulers and states which gathered about them the greatest number of

[109] **Hermann, *Alterthumer der Griechen,* § 32.**

adherents.[110] At first the large cult unions developed out of existing family or community cults, like the celebrated one at Eleusis, but later mysteries, like the Orphic, freed themselves from the local limitation originally characteristic of all cults and attached themselves only to the persons of the participants. This circumstance also helped to pave the way in Greece for an understanding of the Christian mystery.

We should not expect to find the original forms of initiation among the advanced Greeks, although we know that water played its familiar role. The not readily imitable cult marks which provide ruder peoples with a guarantee of membership in the union, had disappeared. There necessarily appeared, as a substitute for them, a demonstration of a knowledge of things withheld from the uninitiated, and thus the maintenance of secrecy about a limited range of subjects became the only means of preserving the exclusiveness of the union.

But even if the mystery union of the highly civilized Greeks had to invent new signs of recognition or symbols, it nevertheless remained true to the fundamental idea in the most significant connection. Thus Hermann[111] has recognized, from statements by Pausanias, Plato, and others, that the participants in the initiation at Eleusis, although they could belong by birth to all the tribes of Greece, were regarded as relatives of the priests there. It is to be noted that this priesthood was hereditary and thus always represented the family to which the famous cult had originally belonged as a domestic cult. Thus the initiate into the mystery became artificially related to the members of the cult union, exactly as if he had concluded an old blood pact. Gradually the concept of brotherhood could be imbued with a more ethical significance, but the artificial creation of fraternities remained for all time an important cultural factor.

Rome pursued an entirely different path. The old cults, instead of becoming mysteries and owing their support and reputation to the voluntary accession of trusting people, were taken over by a class of regular cult officials whose duty it was to render their gods the honors due them. The people took at most only a passive part in these cults by attendance at the festivals managed by these officials. In former times, however, these cults had been sup-

[110] **Cf., Hatch, *Griechenthum und Christenthum*, p. 210.**
[111] ***Alterthümer der Griechen*, § 32.**

ported by cult unions or fraternities, like the Arval Brethren of Dea Dia. But later Rome recognized only one valid cult union, the community or state. The older unions were reduced to colleges of fixed and limited membership for the purpose of discharging the cult obligations already assumed. They could replace by election a deceased member but could never expand. This restriction was the result of the competition of a state cult which, as in Judea, had elevated itself to sovereignty over all earlier cults. But the ancient Roman did not have behind him the spiritual struggles of the Hebrew or the discipline achieved during the Exile. In timid fear of all divinities, he did not dare to place his warlike state gods so high above all others as to suggest to him the idea of denying the power and finally the very existence of the latter. Therefore by the same expedient by which he provided for the faithful fulfillment of every cult duty, he closed the door to unions outside the state. In pre-Roman times, however, even such voluntary cult unions had stood open, as is evidenced by the legend of Romulus, who is said to have found acceptance as a tribal stranger in the union of Dea Dia. The character of a family association was also transferred to the closed college, which annually elected a master *(magister)* as its paternal head and dined at his house on festive occasions.[112]

In the truly Roman cult union, however, into which the youth was introduced at about his fifteenth year by the so-called *tirocinium fori,* the cult had already been largely superseded by the state, and all the old crude forms had vanished. The youth received the clothing and likewise the arms of the men and was entered in the register of citizens; he was thus admitted into the union of the men, into the state. The cult connection, however, is revealed in the following. As a boy he had worn a bulla around his neck. On the day of his initiation he removed this before the *lares* of the house. From the Forum he was conducted to the Capitol, where a sacrificial act took place before the gods of the state. The bulla was a kind of fetish in which resided the protective power of the *genius* of the house. By laying it aside the boy withdrew from the protection of the gods of his childhood in order to attach himself to the gods of the men's organization.

The traces in the territory of the Germanic peoples are so scarce and obliterated that we should not hazard an interpreta-

[112] Hoffmann, *Arvalbruder.*

tion were it not for the numerous analogies with so many different peoples. Here too, as we have seen,[118] children were once sacrificed to the gods in cannibalistic fashion. Accordingly the basis existed for redemption through a cult union. Regarded from this point of view, a few legendary fragments appear in a significant light. The Scandinavians practiced the double name-giving. While the first name, given immediately after birth, was associated with baptism, we do not know the form under which the second was conferred. It appears, however, in a familiar light. The Eyrbyggia Saga[114] relates the bare fact that Thorstein raised a son, who received at baptism the name of Grim. His father, however, "gave him" to the god Thor and named him Thorgrim after the latter. In the same way Thorstein had himself been "given" to the same god and consequently bore his name, while his father in turn had been called Thorolf for the same reason. An old commentary on this legend informs us that it was customary among the Norsemen to bear two names, of which the second referred to some divinity, and that it was regarded as "bringing fortune and long life" to bear such a second name.[115] These elements indicate that the "giving" of the son was no longer understood as a human sacrifice but as the conclusion of an intimate cult union involving a change of name and made in anticipation of special advantages. We do not learn what form of redemption or what cult mark were customary, but an obviously corrupt report with reference to another god is reminiscent of familiar popular usages. Odin was the god of a picked warrior band. In order to join him in a warriors' hereafter, the legends say, it was necessary to die by arms, as a substitute for which the followers of Odin, when another death threatened to overtake them, gashed themselves with a spear. In another form the legend runs that "Odin himslf chose his followers on the election place and marked them as his with a spear." Perhaps the basis for all this is the dim tradition of a cult union concluded by some sort of skin laceration.

Among the continental Germans the old cult union was even further suppressed by Christianity with its analogous forms. Originally baptism and unction constituted parallel forms of

113 Above, p. 454. (Ed.)
114 *Eyrbyggtasaga* xi.
115 Petersen, *Gottesdienst und Gotterglauben*, p. 26.

acceptance into the great cult union of Christendom. Later, when baptism ceased to be employed with adults alone and came to be used more and more generally with the newborn, the two forms
357 of baptism and unction were separated and assigned to two distinct occasions; thenceforth "confirmation," which still adhered to the second name-giving, marked the entrance into the society. The forms of the pre-Christian cult unions succumbed at an early date and consequently remain unknown to us. Only a few analogies dared to live on in the light of day, and a few true survivals took refuge in the sinister night of popular superstition. Among the former may be included the medieval celebration of acceptance into the union of the knighthood by investiture with the sword.[116] It is striking how strongly many reports stress the "girding" and the "knight's girdle," the *cingulum militare.* Perhaps this girdle once constituted, as among the Persians, the external mark of the union and only later became regarded as subordinate to the sword. In some regions the cutting off of a lock of hair had also been preserved, appearing as the tonsure of the knight.[117]

Certainly, however, the tonsure and girdle were not always the only marks of a cult union among the Germans. This is evidenced by the survivals, lasting on into the Middle Ages, against which Christianity waged such a murderous war of destruction. The league with the Devil, first reported by the poetess Roswitha (born c. 920), was nothing other than a cult union of very limited extent. It was originally concluded by bloodletting, although a later age, conversant with writing, could make of the blood nothing but ink. In the case of the witch-pact, however, the blood and the blood operation were forgotten, but the mark survived as the token of the union, a fate common among mutilations. That the witch-pact was nothing else than an echo of the old cult union lingering on in the realm of the imagination, is beyond all question. At an early period, indeed, it is not even necessary to attribute it to the imagination of poverty longing for bygone
358 modes of life or to the universal human passion for clinging superstitiously, i.e., without critical rational thought, to every possible means of salvation. Christianity by no means taught that the heathen gods did not exist or that they were creatures

116 See Schultz, *Das hofische Leben,* I, 142ff.
117 *Ibid.,* I, 147.

of the imagination or of an inevitable process of thought provoked by the nature of external stimuli. The church fathers denied them, not existence, but only a measure of power and moral goodness. It was but natural, then, if the common man believed that even this remnant of power and goodness in his former trusted comrade from the spirit world was sufficient for his moderate life demands. The Carolingian capitularies show us how anxious the Saxon Christian was not to lose the favor of his "demon." Helge the Thin was a Christian, but in undertaking a sea journey or other dangerous enterprise he turned to Thor.[118] Thus he certainly did not renounce the union with that god. This entire period of transition was still far from being permeated by the idea of the incompatibility of the one union with the other,[119] because its whole outlook on things was still a daimonistic one.

The thing that stands out in the fantasies of the witchcraft mania is essentially the substance of an old cult union, driven into the secret recesses of the popular consciousness together with the longing for its advantages and for the enjoyments and pleasures which its festivals had once offered to great and small, rich and poor. The crossroad, the scene of these festivals, is the old grave cult place, the Brocken only another name for the communal meeting place. The whole matter is clinched, however, by the "stigma" or "witch's mark," the cicatrized skin incision which the *Hexenhammer* taught should be sought on the accused as the surest evidence of a league with the Devil. Thus popular tradition preserved the memory of this old form down to the end of the Middle Ages, when the snooping Dominicans, probably through the confessional, discovered what the local pastor must long have known, and a popular malady, which the influence of time was gradually healing, was succeeded by the devastating epidemic of the persecution itself.

We can not leave the subject without pointing out the tremendous importance of the cult union in social evolution. We are here faced with another of those cases where rational thought would have led us to choose another path than that actually taken by human history, since we tend to assume that the end result has been the objective from the first. But no uncultured

[118] *Landnamabok* iii. 12.
[119] See 1 Corinthians x. 21.

359 people, ignorant of everything outside the group and beyond its immediate range of experience, could possibly conceive of the establishment of a state of peace among men as the ultimate goal. As has been pointed out on numerous occasions, the natural relation of alien tribes is one of hostility and not of peace. Whereever a state of peace exists, it rests on a previous agreement. The desirability of such an agreement could make itself felt in many ways even to the lowest savage, for rarely is a tribe self-sufficient in all things. The materials for ornaments and weapons could often not be procured without trespassing on the territory of an alien tribe. The reciprocal lending of fire and the common utilization of water could make life infinitely easier. But to find a way to, and a form for, such an agreement was more difficult than we conceive. The conditions of primitive times had inevitably inculcated in man social impulses of cautious timidity and mutual distrust such as wild animals possess for their protection and savages today betray so prominently in their intercourse with outsiders. Where was there to be found a guarantee strong enough to outweigh these lively impulses? We may place confidence in the word of honor of an opponent, although certainly not always and only on the assumption that his code of ethics is the same as ours. But the social condition of prehistoric times was characterized by the lack of any canon of morality between alien tribes. All confidence was rooted solely in the sanctity of the family bond. How then was a guarantee to be created which would match this? In view of these facts it is apparent how exceptionally important was the invention of a means of extending to the alien the family bond and the confidence and moral obligations which had previously been cultivated by necessity only within the narrowest circle.

At a later time the amalgamation of kin-groups and tribes into larger organizations apparently took place in another way, but only apparently so. Such peace alliances always involved a union under a new cult of a higher order. Hence they were at bottom cult unions, even though their forms are no longer recognizable as such. There was no other way of overcoming the natural impulse of distrust than by an appeal to a higher court recognized alike by all men. In this way the originally essential establishment of community of blood disappeared. The unity of the cult
360 sufficed to create confidence. The diversity of the forms of the

cult union effaced the memory of the fact that in essence it was identical with the unity of blood.

The practical effect of a cult union is summed up in the one word "peace." Peace is a social state, in contrast to the utter lack of social ties between tribal strangers. It is also the source of all law. But although a cult union laid the foundation for a state of law in a wider group, it did not of itself institute such a state. Hatred and strife can arise even among actual brothers—according to the Scripture there was a fratricide in the first family. Similarly the peace of the expanded family is not safeguarded against every disturbance by the fear of the avenging common divinity alone. As long as institutions adequate to cope with such cases have not arisen, the union is liable to split asunder. The idea of common blood breaks down, and the elements regroup themselves according to degrees of actual kinship. Such dissolution results the more easily if the blood bond uniting whole groups for generations has shrunk to a mere symbol or has been forgotten entirely. The Norse legends relate cases where men, faced with the choice between a "foster brother" and their natural blood relatives, kept faith until death with the former, so powerful was the influence and memory of the pact which they had themselves concluded. But we can not expect anything of the kind when the union is merely handed down as a legacy from one generation to the next. It then necessarily loses so much in intimacy that the concept of fraternity between individuals shrinks to a conventional friendship and regains its real meaning only in the narrowest circle of actual blood relationship. A complete estrangement can occur again all the more easily if the cult union has not at the same time taken the form of a unified political organization. Thus in Greece even the amphictyonic leagues repeatedly fell apart in open hostility, and one member took the field against its former allies.

But these laborious efforts toward peace were not entirely devoid of permanent achievement. In Greece, and also elsewhere under similar conditions, a remnant of the old peace survived estrangement, even though restricted as to time, place, and means. Fraternity still prevailed at definite times of common intercourse, which, because of the interruption of everyday life, inevitably became festive occasions or holidays. The peace of the temple, originally analogous to the sanctity of the grave and the peace of the house, had expanded, with the enlargement of the cult union, into a cult peace. As such it at least furnished general protection to the temple domains, even though they were often of considerable extent as at Delphi and Elis. It likewise protected the festivals and imposed an armistice throughout the particular cult union at the time of the amphictyonic games, the greater mystery ceremonies, and other similar occasions. Finally it safeguarded the pilgrims to these festivals on their entire journey. Even though this cult peace seems very limited in time and space in view of the broad principle on which it was based, it nevertheless became through mutual recognition a unifying factor throughout the Greek world.

Rome likewise knew and respected its periods of holiday peace, and the warlike Germans laid aside their arms on entering their temples. In conquered Saxony, Charlemagne's first concern was to transfer this cult peace to the Christian churches and festivals. With respect to peace, each Saxon house was like a temple. Even in a legitimate feud, inspired perhaps by the duty of blood revenge, the enemy could not be killed in his own house on penalty of outlawry or death.[120] The same peace was now extended to every one in church and on his way to and from church on holy days.[121]

Christianity, conceived as the universal cult union of mankind, was compelled on principle to raise the claim that it gave men peace, at least in the regions where it prevailed, and united them in a single peace group. But it too encountered the process of attenuation already noted; the realization of the concept of fraternity was inversely proportional to the size of the union. Thus it was content, among the Saxons, to apply the Peace of God to Sundays, three great annual festivals, and four saints' days.[122] Later it tried to give effect to the principle in wider and wider circles. This was first attempted, not unsuccessfully, by a serious movement within the church, in Burgundy, and then less rigorously throughout Christendom by the Church itself through its head. The Truce of God, proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 as universally binding, extended the Sunday peace over the greater part of the week and the holiday peace over long periods and protected among others all women and travelers.[128]

[120] *Lex Saxonum* iii. 4, 5. [121] *Ibid.*, ii. 8, 10. [122] *Ibid.*, ii. 10.
[123] Kluckhohn, *Geschichte des Gottesfriedens.*

Through such efforts, which are entirely in accord with the nature of a cult union, the Church attempted with temporary success to occupy the first place among all the social organizations in its territory and to make all political organizations dependent upon and emanating from itself. The attempt is entirely comprehensible in view of the historical identity of cult union and society. In early times the unity here aspired to was an actual fact among many different peoples. Almost everywhere, however, this unity, in which the most conservative factor in world history was chained to the ever changing forms of society and social life, has been dissolved by advancing civilization. Never has there been a cult union of such magnitude as that conceived by the Christian Church in the Middle Ages. The struggle of its component organizations for independence was, therefore, of unparalleled historical importance. Its end meant the collapse of the unity it aspired to. Thereafter national peace unions emerged in a purely political guise, and the king's peace in its various forms took the place of the no longer universally tenable cult peace,[124] In the meantime the political organization developed independently its own legal forms for providing protection, making the aid of cult institutions more and more unnecessary. Only in the legal instrument of the oath does the political organization still have recourse to the cult.

[124] **Cf., Jenks, *The State and the Nation*, p. 166. (Ed.)**

CHAPTER XIII

PRIMARY FETISHISM

363 In a special work on the subject, Schultze[1] has sought to explain fetishism as the result of empirical and psychological factors, as an "anthropopathic conception of the object." We, in tracing its historical development, arrive at another interpretation. Even Schultze, however, departs from the narrow and crude concept of fetishism in the form first observed and named on the West African coast.[2] He shows that the underlying conception is far more widespread than the phenomenon first accidentally associated with the term, and that its essential nature is by no means to be derived therefrom. He correctly includes as fetish objects, not only animals and plants, but also water and fire, sun and sky, and even the human body itself. Thus he gives to the concept that necessary breadth of meaning to which we shall henceforth adhere.

The view that fetishism may have arisen through man's attribution of life to inanimate things in an erroneous generalization from his experiences, has been thoroughly refuted by Spencer.[3] Such a poetic mode of conception, even though it may occasionally be found, does not underlie the nature of fetishism. The explanation is rather to be found in terms of the same classes of spiritual beings with which we have dealt in the foregoing chapters. It involves no conceptions acquired in any other
364 way. The only new element in fetishism is a special relation between the soul or ghost and particular objects of the human environment. This relation may be described most generally and accurately as the "possession" of the object by the ghost, actual possession in both senses of the word: indwelling and property.[4]

Livingstone[5] was inclined to absolve the Africans of the stigma

[1] *Fetischiemus.*
[2] For the history of the term, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society.* II, 982. (Ed.)
[3] *Principles of Sociology,* I, 129-33, 307-28.
[4] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 979-81. (Ed.)
[5] *Neue Mi88ion8rei8en,* p. 244.

of fetishism, because he had observed how they discarded a fetish as useless as soon as they thought they had found it ineffective. By this, however, the blacks only showed that they still preserved the correct conception of fetishism, namely, that not the thing in itself but its indwelling ghost produces the anticipated effect. From the non-appearance of the latter they inferred that the ghost had departed, and thus the object which its presence had rendered sacred became an indifferent thing. A fetish is "sacred" in the sense that it is consecrated to a ghost through a property relation and is thus distinguished from the general run of things in which all have an equal right. To be sure, even this conception has here and there become so corrupted that the basic idea can scarcely be recognized any longer, and the fact that the name was first applied to such a corrupt form has contributed not a little to the confusion of the subject. It is incorrect to speak of a special "religion of fetishism." There is no such thing. Probably, however, every religion at some stage in its evolution has passed through the ideational phase of fetishism, and even those furthest developed have preserved survivals from that age.

The original germinal form of fetishism seems to have been the fetishism of the grave and of all objects connected therewith.[6] On the lowest stage a vague fear impelled the living to abandon and avoid the burial place of the dead and everything near it. This usage must sooner or later have given rise to the idea that the fear had a rational basis in the inviolable property of the ghost in the grave and its appurtenances. The concept of property was originally an extremely limited one, as we have already seen, but it was for that reason all the more intimate. A man possessed only what at any moment he could hold with his hands or cover with his body. If the ghost was in possession of the grave and all its associated objects, a conception which seems established beyond doubt by the mortuary customs of all peoples, then he was also connected with these objects in the same intimate way as was primitive man with his property. The ghost was unquestionably with or in them, or he returned to them from time to time. This is the original sense of fetishism. From it man has drawn many conclusions for the practical side of his cult.

Primitive man certainly did not worry his brain about the

[6] **Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* I I , 985-6. (Ed.)**

physical or physiological nature of the close union of ghost and fetish. He simply took the union and its special, though undefined, intimacy for granted. This presumed intimacy had the practical consequence of making it possible without misunderstanding to distinguish a ghost or divinity by the name of its fetish, a thing often difficult to do in other ways. Hence, whenever early man in his naive speculation about the nature of the ghost chanced to make an advance, this necessarily influenced and molded his conception of its relation to the fetish.

The outstanding characteristic of the ghost was its invisibility, and this led to an inference as to the exceeding fineness of its substance. It was not only compared but often identified with the human breath or its warmth or moisture.[7] But the breath comes from within the body and in the sensation of warmth and dampness seems to return within. Hence the conception appears that the ghost penetrates within the fetish body, that he indwells in it. Nevertheless, this indwelling is very different and is often clearly distinguished from animation. The indwelling ghost does not constitute the soul of the fetish object in the manner in which the soul animates the human body. Had this belief existed, as for example it was imputed to the heathen idol-worshipers by the later Hebrew prophets, man would certainly have been shocked that a god habitually residing in a fetish image did not set it in motion like his body. Moreover, animal fetishism in particular would not have been a matter of pride to its adherents, if the divine spirit in the animal body had been regarded merely as its animal soul. Actually, however, the animated animal frequently appears very distinctly as the bearer of a divine spirit from without.

With the amalgamation of a number of originally distinct conceptions of divinity, it often results that one divinity presides over, not a single fetish, but a whole series of different ones. The popular mind finds no difficulty in this; it simply concludes from the accepted fact that it is possible and agreeable to the divinity to preside over different and even distant seats, or that its substance possesses a certain divisibility. From here there branches off a new series of concepts; it is believed that fractional powers of the divinity can be attracted to individual fetishes, and the class of fetishistic amulets and remedies arises.

[7] See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I, 432-3. (Ed.)

The first and most important grave object is, of course, the corpse itself. We are already familiar with the view that it is particularly the fleshy parts suffused with the blood which contain the soul. Consequently people who wish to drive the ghost from their neighborhood as rapidly as possible hasten the destruction of these parts. Others from the opposite motive endeavor to preserve them, at least in part. The head is most frequently selected for preservation. The Papuans of New Guinea customarily sever it from the trunk, which is exposed to decay on a platform (*prahu*), dry it, and restore the lost parts artificially. These mummified heads then remain in the house as the seats of the protecting ghosts or accompany the family on its wanderings.[8] According to our informants, they are the house or family "idols." Customs based on the same fundamental idea have a wide distribution. Some tribes even wear the skulls suspended on the body. Others have begun to extend the fetishistic concept to the repository. Thus the inhabitants of the Ladrones formerly preserved the skulls of their princes in baskets adapted for the purpose, and these with their contents constituted the fetishes of the people.[9] Skull fetishism also existed among the early peoples of Europe. The Tauri, following a conception already familiar to us, made their enemies guardians of their houses. They fixed the heads of slain enemies on a tall pole over the chimney of the hut "in order that the whole house may be under their protection."[10] The Issedonians acted much like the Papuans. The head of the dead father "is stripped bare, cleansed, and set in gold. It then becomes an ornament on which they pride themselves, and is brought out year by year at the great festival which sons keep in honour of their father's death."[11] In a Norse legend Odin prophesies with Mimir's head, as is often done with such fetishes.

Favorable circumstances—an ordered sedentary life and a dry climate—enable man to preserve the entire body. Egypt, influenced also by the conception that the soul remains in the neighborhood of the body as long as the latter is preserved, furnishes the best known example of a developed mummy cult. Even some of the important local and national gods, like Ptah, still clung to

8 Cf., Hamlyn-Harris, "Mummification in Papua." (Ed.)
9 Hawkesworth, *Seereisen*, VI, 430.
10 Herodotus *History* iv. 103.
11 *Ibid.*, iv. 26.

the mummy fetish. In the arid zone of America, among the more advanced peoples, especially in Peru,[12] similar expedients were developed. The inhabitants of Yucatan placed the ashes of great lords in hollow clay statues.[13] This practice and the widespread use of "effigy urns" can be regarded as survivals of the old custom of preserving the entire body adapted to the later practice of cremation.[14]

The interior of the grave, by the very nature of the case, can acquire special fetishistic associations only under certain circumstances, for example where caves are used for burial. The Dakotas regarded as sacred a cavern near which they had their burial place, to which they brought their dead sewed in bison skins, and at which they held a great tribal gathering every year in April.[15] Where cave burial is regular and traditional, the general conception must arise that the abode of the dead is a cave and also that the primeval divinity, who calls the dead to himself, dwells in a cave. The great cavern of the Dakotas was actually called "the dwelling of the Great Spirit." The Apalachee of Florida practiced their cult in a sacred cave, and the Caribs of Haiti treated caves as cult places. Abysses and caves were venerated in Peru, and divination was practiced in certain caverns.[16] Greece, as is well known, likewise possessed caves with a cult character and abysses from which oracular spirits ascended, although here the older explanatory connection was not preserved. *Sheol*, the familiar Hebrew term for the underworld, literally signifies "cave."[17]

When we recall that the Great Spirit, regarded from another angle, is at the same time the "first man" or tribal father of his group, it immediately becomes clear why so many tribes trace their origin to a sacred cave. The cave is the abode of the divinity, and the home of the original ancestor is always regarded as the cradle of his people. According to a South American myth, all peoples, the Quichuas, Chiriguanos, Mansinnos, Solostos, etc., came from a cave.[18] The inhabitants of the mountains east of

[12] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 306.

[13] Landa, *Yucatan*, p. 198. (Ed.)

[14] For additional cases of the preservation of the body or parts thereof, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 915-18; IV, 399-403. (Ed.)

[15] Muller, *Urreligionen*, p. 141.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 177, 205, 311, 399.

[17] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 208n.

[18] Andree, *Westland*, I, 125ff.

Cuzco had a legend that the earth was populated by the descendants of four brothers, who had ascended from the caves of Pacari-Tambo.[19] Different branches of the Collas asserted that they had sprung from rock crevices, graves, and springs.[20] This conception is also found among the more primitive peoples of the Old World. Thus the Juangs of India state that they are the original inhabitants of the land and that their ancestors came out of the ground by a double cave.[21]

The construction of an artificial cavity in the earth is the most widespread of all types of care for the dead. Even where the flesh is given over to animals or fire for destruction, the bones are buried. There is no need of explaining how in this way there inevitably arose the conception of a spirit world in or under the earth, an "underworld" of ghosts. Through an association of the ideas of the cave and the grave, this ghostly abode was pictured as a subterranean cavern.

But since the ghosts thus take possession of the earth everywhere, the earth as a whole becomes a fetish, indeed the oldest one of such tremendous size. The high antiquity of this fetish is proved by the notion that it is female. Since the younger ghosts in the earth are, on the analogy of human relationships, descended from and subordinate to those who have gone before, it is necessarily the first and chief ghost who is in actual and direct possession of the earth, and this individual appears almost everywhere as an ancestral mother. While here and there a tribe, like the Lapps,[22] speaks of a "mother of the dead" in the earth, most peoples use the language of fetishism and speak of the goddess Earth, indeed almost without exception of Mother Earth. In this fetishistic sense certain Indian tribes honor "the earth as the ancestral mother of all things" and call themselves "earthborn." To the Peruvians, Mamapacha, "Mother Earth," was the ancestress of men, and in ancient Mexico there also existed a cult of the ancestral mother in connection with the same fetishistic idea.[28] We encounter the same conception in the Greek Gaia and Demeter and in the Roman Tellus Mater. Tacitus[24] attests its

[19] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 308.
[20] Vega, *Commentaries,* I, 168; Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. **312.**
[21] *Globus,* **1873, I I , 253.**
[22] Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken,* p. **215.**
[23] See Muller, *Urreligionen,* pp. 56, **110, 369, 494.**
[24] *Germania* xl. (Ed.)

presence among the Germans, and he also calls their highest god the "earthborn."[25]

The mountain as a fetish is linked in many ways with the grave. It is often sought as a burial place because it offers the desired caves and crevices. Its exalted summit, visible from afar, appeals to man's vanity as a seat of the dead. It seems for a similar reason a natural monument over the grave. Finally, with' the dawn of economic foresight, it is preferred as a burial place because the living can renounce its unproductive slopes to the dead more easily than the fertile plains. Thus the old inhabitants of Haiti transported their dead to the mountains, and many tribes concluded formal agreements with the poorer mountain peoples for the removal of their dead. The Kafirs of Kafiristan exposed their dead in wooden coffins on the peaks of mountains.[26] Many of the innumerable sacred mountains may once have been burial places. Naturally, then, the mountain fetish plays the same role in myth as the cave. Thus the ancient Mexicans "were wont to visit a hill called Cacatepec, for they said it was their mother," and the tribes of California believed that "the Navajos came to light from the bowels of a great mountain near the river San Juan."[27] The mountain fetish has preserved very faithfully its original sense. Seldom can even the most biased ethnographer so misunderstand the savage as to take the mountain for its divinity. It is always clearly only the seat of the latter, no matter if he lives on it or in it. To locate the world of the gods on the lofty height of a mountain, as Homer did, must be regarded as an advance in the concept of divinity. Tearing itself free from its gloomy connection with the grave and the dismal source of its history, the realm of the gods ascends to the bright expanse of the heavens; on the way, however, it rests for a while on this intermediate stage, hovering like the Greek Olympus between heaven and earth yet nearer the latter. We can not as yet, however, follow this course of development.

To make the grave itself conspicuous by means of a monument was prompted by a twofold interest. Vanity everywhere desires an imposing grave. We have evidences of this from Indonesia and Polynesia, as well as from ancient Germany and

[25] For further examples, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 270-4.
[26] Lassen, *Indische Alter thumskunde,* I, 612.
[27] Bancroft, *Native Races,* III, 121, 155.

Gaul, and it was a heartfelt wish of the ghosts of Ossian's heroes to linger near a towering cairn. To the traveler, however, it is a necessity to see the mark of the sacred place from afar; to him it is not only a memorial but a landmark. As we have shown elsewhere,[28] the heap of earth over the grave may itself become a monument, and from it or in imitation of it may then arise the altar. Such an altar is also a fetish, so long as the cult connection is remembered. The Greeks, Phoenicians, and Hebrews all developed altars of this type. Both the Greek and Roman Churches have preserved significant survivals. The former represents in the altar the grave of Christ with its paraphernalia, and both of them make obligatory the inclosure in the altar of the relics of saints.[29]

Elsewhere the monument was developed into the mound. The Mongols erected heaps of stone, sand, and earth, called *obos* or "hills of worship," at the intersections of steppe trails.[30] The Scythians also possessed mounds at their district cult places, although they consisted strangely enough of heaps of brushwood, which were replenished from time to time.[31] A further development of the grave mound is seen in the barrows or tumuli which the Neolithic inhabitants of Europe erected over platforms of rough stones or dolmens.[32] Even the classical peoples were not always exempt from this crude type of architecture. Over the grave of Hector were heaped "goodly blocks of well-hewn stone together closely bound."[33] The celebrated graves of Mycenae were barrows of somewhat improved technic—stone shells covered with earth.

The notion is widespread over the earth that it is a meritorious labor of love to take some part, however small, in the piling up of the mound.[34] On the Mongolian *obos* every passer-by deposits his small contribution of earth, sand, or wood and performs "thereby his devotion." The Peruvian Indian similarly adds his stone to the heap, together with a quid of coca as a sacrifice. The Bedouins of Arabia practice the same act of piety, so that

[28] *Kulturgeschichte,* II, 167-9. See also Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 258-61. (Ed.)
[29] See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 261. (Ed.)
[30] Timkowski, *Travels,* pp. 36ff.
[31] Herodotus *History* iv. 62. (Ed.)
[32] See MacCurdy, *Human Origins,* II, 28-34, 109-23. (Ed.)
[33] Homer *Iliad* xxiv. 795-6.
[34] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* IV, 489. (Ed.)

the monument gradually increases in size.[85] In the old Jewish cemeteries of Europe one may still see on the tombstones of distinguished men the pebbles which pious visitors have deposited.

In the subtropical zone of early civilization the mound developed into a masonry structure. Cult architecture of this type has arisen independently all around the earth.[86] In Polynesia, although we still meet the rude heap of stones on the grave, we also find it developed in some regions into a pyramid of coralline limestone, which still shows, however, the elongated form of a grave mound with steps on one side. A similar form occurs in Peru, and the pyramidal burial mounds and temples of ancient Mexico are of the same fundamental type.[87] India is characterized by the tope or stupa, a circular mound consolidated by a terraced wall.[88] This type of construction is carried further in the terraced temples of Babylonia and Assyria, which, like the pyramids of Egypt, arise from a square foundation.

The simplest and hence the most widespread fetish monument, whether in connection with the grave or by itself, is the upright stone.[89] In some form it is widespread in North and South America. Man must early have become desirous of making manifest his hand in the stone and thereby making its meaning recognizable. At first it was enough to set it in place artificially; later he began to decorate it. The painted stones of the Dakotas they significantly called their "grandfathers,"[40] transferring the name of the ghost to the fetish in accordance with a common principle. The mythological theme implied in such a fact could be developed in two possible directions, according to the point of departure. It could be said that men are descended from stones or that the first men became stones. In North America we often encounter the former version. There are tribes, like the Oneidas, which call themselves the sons or descendants of stones.[41] In Peru the other version prevails. The four brothers

[85] Andree, *Burtons und Spekes Reisen,* p. 224.

[86] Cf., however, the extreme diffusionist or "heliolithic" theory of Elliot Smith *(Migrations of Early Culture)* and Perry *(Children of the Sun).* (Ed.)

[87] Cf., Wissler, *American Indian,* p. 105; Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico,* I, 44-5. (Ed.)

[88] See Cunningham, *Bhilsa Topes.* (Ed.)

[89] For additional examples, see Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 306-16. (Ed.)

[40] Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes,* II, 196.

[41] Schoolcraft, *Iroquois,* pp. 77ff.

with whom a Peruvian myth makes mankind begin, were successively transformed into stones. Accordingly the sources all speak of an earlier "stone cult" in Peru. Actually, of course, a classification of cults on the basis of such criteria is just as incorrect as the practice of Gorres, Stuhr, Wuttke, and others in ranking shamanism and fetishism as separate religions. Such distinctions are derived from things so superficial that they are without import for the nature of the case. One might as well distinguish stone, wood, and metal cults as stone, tree, and idol cults. They are all, of course, only one and the same daimonistic cult.

In Oceania the stone occurs as a monument and fetish in three forms—rough, upright, and carved. It is natural that the carving in most cases takes the form of inscribing on the stone the features of the man whose ghost resides in it. Thus the well known monumental stones of Easter Island are characterized by crudely chiseled human faces.[42] Each stone bears the name of him whose ghost it harbors. However, just as the remains of the dead are not always consigned to the earth but are in some places carried about by the living on their persons, so fetish stones may also be used in the same way. In many parts of Oceania, small carved stones, bearing names which serve equally for image and ghost, are worn on the body.

In India both aboriginal and Aryan tribes have preserved the early simple practice as well as higher forms. Certain hill tribes in Assam erect a rough stone as a monument for every one who dies.[48] The Bhils mark their temple sites by a similar stone set up on an earth terrace, and the Aryan Kafirs worship black stones as the images of their gods.[44] According to the Atharva-Veda,[45] a stone monument of the death god Yama stood on the Hindu cremation places, and invocations here too identified the names of god and stone.

The prevalence of upright stone monuments in Palestine is revealed by many Biblical accounts. Even under Yahwism many of them enjoyed reputations for holiness or evil. This "stone cult" also extended to Arabia and Egypt. The most famous fetish stone

[42] Geiseler, *Oater-Insel*

[48] See Godwin-Austen, "Stone Monuments of the Khasi Hill Tribes.* (Ed.)

[44] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 438-520.

[45] *Atharva-Veda* xviii. 4. 64; Ludwig, *Rigveda,* III, 491.

in Arabia is that enclosed in the Caaba at Mecca. In pre-Islamic times it stood as the "memorial of the national union of the Arabs consummated under the protection of the divine powers." 46 The Caaba stone was thus, strictly speaking, the fetish of the divinity through whom a cult union of Arab tribes had been concluded, a divinity like the Biblical Baal-berith or "god of the covenant" of Shechem.[47] When Islam, from reasons identical with those of Yahwism, destroyed the fetish sense of this stone, it became a "memorial" of the union. In the very same way the stone monuments of Palestine are represented in the Yahwistic narrative as mere memorials of some past event. Nevertheless, a suggestion of a cult union is not infrequently revealed in the account. Sometimes, indeed, we even read of the anointment of the stone, a specifically fetishistic feature. When Jacob saw Yahweh in his dream, he erected a stone "for a pillar, and poured oil upon the top of it," and vowed that, if Yahweh would be with him in his undertaking and protect him, he would return and found a "God's house" there.[48] To the general conditions of a cult union, therefore, he added the promise to establish a cult place. This God's house, erected over the testimonial stone, must have corresponded very closely in nature to the temple at Mecca. Even their names were the same—Beth-el in the one case and Beit-Allah in the other. In Egypt we again meet the monument stone architecturally conventionalized as the obelisk.

Among the Scandinavians rough stones set up on end long remained in use.[49] Runes took the place of sculpture for the identification of the monument. Here too we can observe from the inscriptions themselves how the fetish monument changes into a memorial.

In ancient Greece there survived not merely the stone fetish but also that peculiar "consecration" of the same which distinguishes an image in the earlier cult sense from an image in the modern profane sense. Consecration means the giving of something into the possession of the divinity. Since the substance of fetishism lies in this relation of possession, an unconsecrated stone is logically only a stone; by consecration, however, it be-

[46] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme,* pp. 402ff.
[47] See Judges ix. (Ed.)
[48] Genesis xxviii. 18-22.
[49] Cf. the comments and illustrations of Stephanius in his edition of Saxo Grammaticus.

comes a fetish. The act of consecration consists essentially in the presentation of the fetish object on the tacit assumption that it will be accepted by the divinity. It seems to have been believed that a divinity could be induced thus to enter into the fetish relation by means of certain externals, among them the anointment of the object with oil. The Egyptians and Greeks, as well as the Hebrews, were acquainted with this form.[50]

Greece preserved a whole series of stone fetishes ranging all the way from the rough stone to the human image. One of the intermediate forms has achieved a certain independence. If a potter wished to indicate on his urn that it contained the ashes of a human being, he was satisfied with the crude portrayal of the distinctive features of a human face. The memorial stone was similarly treated with the same purpose. If, however, it was desired to indicate the sex of the individual, this was done in the frankest and most naive manner by picturing the natural distinguishing marks of sex, either alone or in conjunction with a head. In this way the sex organs, relatively insignificant in the natural proportions of the body, came to be given undue prominence and to constitute of and for themselves the task set for the artist. It would be possible to adduce enough connecting links to show that only in this way could the widespread phallic fetishes have arisen. Hence phallicism, so often emphasized, can not with right be set up as a special cult.[51]

It is quite understandable, moreover, that a crude image of this sort, doubly sanctified by high antiquity, would inevitably give rise to a series of special allegorizations and interpretations. A rough smallish stone at Delphi had once been the fetish of Zeus and even in later times received its special cult.[52] In view of the existing myth that Cronus until the birth of Zeus had devoured all his children, it is easy to see how the fetishistic identification of this stone with Zeus, no longer correctly understood, could give rise to the elaboration that the cannibal father had been deceived by being presented with the stone instead of Zeus. Thus Zeus was rescued, and the stone was preserved in the sanctuary of Apollo allegedly because of its peculiar history. Where a fetish appears in such a connection with a myth, the former is always

[50] Hermann, *Alterthilmer der Griechen,* § 24, 15-16.
[51] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1014-16. (Ed.)
[52] Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecice* x. 24. 6. Cf., Hoffmann, *Kronos und Zeus,* p. 106.

the original and the latter the subsequent fact. In Orchomenus the oldest sanctuary was that of the Charites, whose fetishes were rude stones. Myth explained the strange and no longer understood sanctity of these stones by asserting that they had fallen from heaven.[53]

In Pharae in Achaea there stood in the market place "about thirty square stones: these the people of Pharae revere, giving to each stone the name of a god. In the olden time all the Greeks worshipped unwrought stones instead of images."[54] The image of Apollo at Megara was a stone pyramid.[55] The pillars of Hermes and the stones of Terminus were primitive fetishes; the gods attracted to them through sacrifice and consecration furnished protection to guideposts and boundary stones.[56]

In Rome the highest divinity among others clung to the ancient fetish in the form of a small stone, Jupiter Lapis. This the *fetiales* took with them for the formal ratification of treaties, in which it played the part of the god of the union. Magna Mater likewise undertook her cult journeys in a fetish stone.[57]

The monument or fetish of wood is still more widespread and in a certain sense more susceptible of development. The Iroquois and Delawares in their simple way had already foreshadowed the whole evolution from the rude post to the artistically carved image, in as much as they attempted to give the post a lifelike appearance by the use of artistic means and personal emblems. They erected a tall pole at the head of the corpse. A calabash or tortoise shell attached to it advertised that here dwelt the medicine man who in his lifetime had used this emblem and had been known by it. If the post marked the resting place of a peace chief, it was polished but was without emblems. If that of a war chieftain, the post had a face painted on it and was daubed red; moreover, the identity of the chieftain was indicated by his insignia and his military exploits by trophies.[58] The "idols" of these Indians, named "manito" along with their divinities, were similarly manufactured. "Most frequently they are posts, called magic logs, with either a human head or an entire human

[58] **Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecice* ix. 38. 1.**
***54Ibid.,* vii. 22.**
***55lbid., i.* 44. 2.**
[66] **See *Cambridge Ancient History,* I I , 637. (Ed.)**
[57] **Preller. *Romische Mythologie,* pp. 447, 736.**
[58] **Loskiel. G*eschichte der Mission,* D. 155.**

figure."[69] The early inhabitants of Florida showed an advance to the human image equipped with weapons. In Yucatan monumental pillars were likewise erected, often with a crossbar at the top for the display of some other object. The discoverers were consequently delighted to find there the worship of the cross.[60] Ordinary posts are found everywhere in South America as objects of veneration, even though they are commonly erected only for temporary use. Only among a few of the rudest tribes, like the Botocudos, has such fetish worship not been observed. Other Brazilian tribes have been seen to drive a post into the earth and deposit food before it.[61] Richly carved and painted totem poles, often over thirty feet high, constitute the fetish monuments of the Tlinkits, Haidas, and other northwestern Indians.

The same development is known to the peoples of Oceania. The Papuans erect a wooden image a foot high to the deceased and believe that the ghost of the latter moves into it during the mourning period, i.e., before entering the spirit world.[62] They thus still preserve the true fetishistic sense. On the Society and Hawaiian Islands the transition to the carved image was brought about, first by clothing the plain short post with a personal emblem, the maro, and then by carving a helmet and face on it. The carved figurehead on the prow of ships belongs to the same group of fetishes, and perhaps, even, the first mast was set up, not to support the first sail, but to hold aloft some emblem or trophy as the seat of a protecting ghost.

The Aryan Hindus marked their cult places on the banks and islands of rivers with pillars.[68] The Cochin Chinese and the insular Malays are acquainted with the same fetish in manifold forms and combinations. Among the shamanistic peoples of northern Asia it plays a prominent role. The Finnish Chuvash before their conversion used to erect poles on their village squares, which were at the same time their cult places, and to drape them with skins. If, as reported by Gmelin,[64] they did so in order to avert the influences of malevolent ghosts from their dwelling places,

59 Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 97.
60 *Ibid.,* pp. 498-9. Cf. also Quiroga, *La cruz en AmSrica.*
61 De Laet, *Novus orbis,* XV, 2.
62 Meyer, in *Globus,* 1874, p. 165.
63 *Laws of Mann* iii. 206-7.
64 *Reise durch Siberien,* pp. 45, 52, 92, 100. (Ed.)

this could only be because the poles themselves marked the seat of a benevolent guardian spirit. They were thus true fetishes. The Buriats protected their sheep pastures with similar skin clad poles.[65] These may also be seen on the lonely tundras of the north and in the forests, where they are looked upon as magic powers "by which are dispelled the evil spirits who lead men astray."[66] Thus, like the *obos* and the pillars of Hermes, they have become guideposts. The Buriats also protected their individual yurts in the same way. Two birch saplings, joined in the form of a yoke by a third, ornamented with ribbons and ermine pelts, and placed at the door, formed a fetish before which the inmates prostrated themselves every morning and evening.[67]

Nachtigal[68] found "sacred poles" by the huts of the heathens of Bagirmi, and Bastian speaks of a Negro "house pole." Among the natives of Kakoma, east of Tanganyika, has been found the custom of placing beside the highways as charms poles with straw bundles, obviously fetishes of the same kind. It is probably correct to place in the same category the masts with streamers at the entrances of the Egyptian temples.

The pole on the Greek grave is often mentioned by Homer, and the deceased is even identified in a manner not unlike the Indian practice. The oarsman Elpenor wished the oar with which he had rowed when alive planted on his grave. This his companions did. They built him a mound, erected upon it a pillar, and at the top of this fastened the oar.[69] The origin of the Greek art of sculpture reminds us of the Polynesians. The first Greek statue was the rude pole, hung with the individual's weapons and capped with his helmet. Pausanias still saw monuments of this sort. The Roman *cippus* or short grave pillar is easy to classify.

In the villages of the Slavic Wends until recently a pole with all the earmarks of a fetish marked the communal square.[70] Similar monuments in Germany were transformed into symbols of imperial authority to preserve peace for justice and trade. In the North German *Roland* this image appears in different stages of development—as a bare post supporting a shield, as a column

[65] Georgi, *Nationen des russischen Reichs,* III, 384. (Ed.)
[66] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme,* p. 254.
[67] Gmelin, *Reise durch Siberien,* p. 465. (Ed.)
[68] *Sahara und Sudan,* II, 685.
[69] Homer *Odyssey* xi. 77; xii. 14-15.
[70] Kuhn, *Markzsche Sagen,* p. 332. (Ed.)

with a carved head, and as a partially or entirely completed heroic statue.[71] It is not long since the people could not celebrate a festival without erecting at least a temporary pole. Today only degenerate survivals exist here and there, notably the May-tree or Maypole.[72]

The living as well as the dead tree often serves as a monument, becoming both grave memorial and fetish.[78] The Egyptians planted trees on the sites of their future graves, for they believed that the departed soul liked to rock in the shady branches. Such a tree shares the history and fate of its ghost. The Indians on Lake Superior possessed a "manito tree," in which the Great Spirit dwelt.[74] The Patagonians sacrificed to a sacred tree.[75] "In Central America the worship of the cypress in particular was widespread."[76] Every plant in a place which is sacred to the dead or to a ghost derives sanctity from the latter, no matter whether it receives a cult or, for fundamentally identical reasons, serves man as a magical herb. Where the Great Spirit, as well as other ghosts, has a tree as his fetish and is identified in the familiar way with the "first man," the myth naturally arises that men are descended from the tree. The Indians are actually acquainted with this type of myth as well as with the corresponding one which treats of the metamorphosis of earlier men into trees.[77] The Damaras of South Africa relate the following myth: "In the beginning of things there was a tree, . . . and out of this tree came Damaras, Bushmen, oxen, and zebras. . . . The tree gave birth to everything else that lives." A particularly fine tree is regarded as "the parent of all the Damaras."[78] The hypothesis that this conception has sprung from the presence of a tree fetish appears to us much more convincing than the attempt of Spencer[79] to explain such facts by a confusion of names. One must agree with him, however, that tree fetishism is not the product of simple animism, as some have attempted to

[71] Zopfl, *Rolandssaule.* (Ed.)
[72] See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 59-71. (Ed.)
[73] Additional cases of tree fetishism and tree worship are collected in Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 7-96; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 292-9; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* IV, 490-1. (Ed.)
[74] Schoolcraft, *Wigwam,* p. 78.
[75] Darwin, *Beagle,* p. 79. (Ed.)
[76] Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 494.
[77] *Ibid.,* pp. 107, 109, 180.
[78] Galton, *South Africa,* pp. 188, 204. (Ed.)
[79] *Principles of Sociology,* I, 361-8.

explain it without sufficiently establishing the facts. Man was **not** carried away by considerations of beauty or utility to worship the imagined vegetal soul of a tree.

Polynesia was also acquainted with memorial tree fetishes. In Tahiti, Cook saw "a variety of tree, which is here called *eatoa* and is commonly planted only at the places where the inhabitants bury the bones of their dead."[80] *Eatoa* is, however, at the same time the term for "god," a fact which sufficiently indicates the fetishistic character of the trees. The analogy with other fetish objects shows that it is not normal in the first instance for an entire species of plants to become a fetish by virtue of some innate quality, but rather for an individual plant to become such through its use as, or intimate association with, a monument. The present example, however, apprises us how from natural causes the choice of a memorial tree may repeatedly fall to individuals of the same species, until finally the latter itself necessarily acquires a vague sort of sanctity. Thus in Egypt whole species of trees, since they were habitually planted in the precincts of the dead, acquired the character of sanctity. Cult notions of this type became an important factor in the dissemination of plants and animals, though one which has hitherto been entirely overlooked.

Among the manifold forms of fetishism in India, we find a particular species of tree, the "sacred fig" *(Ficus religiosa),* especially respected.[81] With its thick and extraordinarily broad shady roof, supported by the columns of its aerial roots, it is capable of sheltering a multitude. It is thus of great value at places of assembly, which are at the same time cult places. Hence it has been planted at such places, or else they have been located in its shade. Whenever a traveler sees a sacred fig tree, therefore, he can presume that he is entering a sanctified place. The fetishistic character thus extends to the whole species. The Aryan Hindus share tree fetishism with their darker aboriginal neighbors. The savage Saoras still cling to the forms of primitive times, since rock crevices, heaps of stones, and tree stumps are their sanctuaries. The Bhils surround the living tree with an earth terrace and indicate it as a monument by means of a stone. The same holds true of the Khonds, who moreover have

[80] **Hawkesworth.** ***Seereisen,*** **I I , 165.**
81 See Eraser, ***Golden Bough,*** **I I , 43. (Ed.)**

whole groves of sacred trees.[82] The cult of the sacred fig is also found among the Malays.[88] Tree fetishism survived even under Buddhism, whose legends frequently mention the "bo tree" and represent it in its true fetishistic sense as inhabited by a spirit.[84] The Buddhist king of Ceylon and his kingdom were under the protection of a bo tree.[85] The "sacrifice tree" of the Mongolian Buddhists is identical.[86]

Zoroastrianism, since it tolerated only one cult, also permitted but one fetish, that of fire. In reality, however, the people can never completely have forgotten all other fetishes. Before the great fire-temple at Kishmer stood the far famed sacred "cypress of Kishmer," which stood in approximately the same relation to the later dominant fetish as the mast and obelisk before the later Egyptian temple. From far and wide pilgrims came to Kishmer to visit this cypress, but its sanctity was said by a Zoroastrian myth to be based only on the fact that it had grown in paradise, whence Zoroaster had transplanted it to the temple.[87] A deep-seated popular conception can, however, be more easily banished from a doctrine than from life. Tree fetishism has victoriously held its own in Persia against Zoroastrianism and Mohammedanism successively. A recent traveler in Persia writes: "If there is a shrub on a mountain, one can be certain that its aspect will be made repellent by a disgusting superstition, for thither wander all sick persons, who are not healed by nature, and drape the bush with bits of their clothing as sacrifices for the implored recovery."

The reader of the Bible will perhaps find analogies on this point also. The palm of Deborah[88] and the various terebinths had no place as fetishes in the doctrine of Yahwism, but they are mentioned in such a way as to suggest that they might once in another sense have been monuments of the localities still marked by them. In ancient Greece, on the other hand, tree fetishism was still in full bloom even at a late period. We need mention only the sacred olive tree on the Acropolis at Athens,

[82] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 451, 438, 430.
[88] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme,* p. 304.
[84] Cf., Kern, *Buddhismus,* pp. 78, 329.
[85] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* II, 420. See also Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship,* p. 66.
[86] Schiefner, *Buddhismus,* p. 102.
[87] Vullers, *Religion des Zoroaster,* pp. 71-2.
[88] Judges iv. 5. (Ed.)

the palm of Delos, the oak of Dodona, and the ancient willow tree in the temple at Samos.[89] There should likewise be included here the many "sacred groves," cults of which were common to both Greece and Rome. Classical mythology was also well acquainted with the theme of the transformation of men into plants. To be sure, Ovid's metamorphoses obviously can not be regarded as genuine in the sense that their mythological figures were actually cult objects, but in type they nevertheless belong to those fictions the simpler forms of which we have encountered among the Indians.

The Celts, Germans, Slavs, Letts, and Finns similarly knew and favored the tree fetish in an age of meager material advance. They too selected particular trees in such a way that a measure of sanctity spread to the entire species. The sacred oak of the Gauls bore a second fetish plant in the mistletoe.[90] The oak, elm, linden, juniper, hazel, and elder have preserved remnants of their ancient sanctity among the Germans. In Lusatia, Neumark, and adjoining regions the stately wild pear tree frequently occurs as a monument; it has disclosed many an old burial and cult place. The sacred trees and groves of the Slavs are abundantly attested historically.[91] In all early accounts of paganism based on ocular evidence, this particular type of cult stands out concretely, though other statements often appear conventionalized. Thus the chronicler Cosmas knew of nothing with which to charge the heathens then living in Upper Lusatia except the cult of sacred groves and holy trees and the custom of burying their dead in the woods and fields. The carved image can also be approached through the tree fetish. Thus the Lapps used to carve figures on living fetish trees.[92] Among the late survivals of tree fetishism are the custom of planting shade trees over the grave and the attribution of various magical powers to plants of a particular species or those growing in special places.

We must now consider for a moment a somewhat divergent group, that of exuvial fetishes. We use this term because weapons and ornamental clothing are most prominent among them, though nearly any object of movable property can attain the same

80 Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecice* viii. 23. 5.
90 Cf., Frazer, *Golden Bough*, I I , 358, **362.** (Ed.)
91 Cf., **Leger,** *La mythologie slave,* pp. **73-5, 188-90. (Ed.)**
92 **Leem,** ***Lappen*** *in Finnmarken,* p. **215.**

honor.[93] Originally the concept of the exuvial fetish coincides with that of the oldest personal property, but with economic progress it gradually deviates from the latter. It is then limited, strictly speaking, to those articles which actually follow the dead into the grave. Another group of objects, now claimed by the dead only in principle while actually used by the living, retains a vague magical quality. A third group of exuvial fetishes serves the living, not as the result of a conflict, but by the express intention that the power and authority and every legal right of the deceased, i.e., of his ghost, shall pass with them to his living successor.

The staff and shell, as we already know, represent the earliest property of man and consequently his most ancient personality symbols. Scepter, spear, and sword are developments of the former; the manifold forms of beaker and bowl, of the latter. The "sword and drinking-cup," according to Strabo,[94] are the oldest objects of private property among lower races. Where everything else still belongs to the community, these two articles are nevertheless already attached to the individual. We should therefore expect to find the oldest exuvial fetishes in the same range of objects.

Timaeus of Tauromenium designates staves (herald's wands) and a clay vessel as the penates, i.e., the fetishes of the penates, which iEneas brought from Troy to Lavinium.[95] An earthen vessel was also one of the fetishes in the Temple of Vesta. Elagabalus found it empty and smashed it. The existence of a number of others of identical shape, however, allowed the Roman people to hope that they still possessed the genuine one.[96] Other Roman cults possessed exuvial fetishes, e.g., that of Jupiter Feretrius a scepter, and that of Mars lances and shields *(ancilia).* In the Temple of Hercules reposed his club and tankard, other forms of the staff and shell.[97] Servius[98] also includes in this group of

[98] The term "exuvial fetish" is employed in a somewhat different sense by Sumner and Keller *(Science of Society,* II, 994 and ff.), who refer it primarily to "outlying, dispensable, or discarded portions of the body such as skin, hair, blood, or excreta," rather than to articles of personal property. (Ed.)

[94] *Geography,* p. 300.

[95] Cf., Mommsen, *Romische Geschichte,* I, 472.

[96] Goll, "Geheimnisse der Vesta," p. 153.

[97] Solinus *Collectanea* i. 18.

[98] *Commentarii in Virgilium* viii. 276.

sacred objects the girdle of the mother of the gods, the scepter of Priam, and the dress of a Trojan princess.

The ornamental garment, in comparison with the weapon, has only sporadically attained high importance as a fetish. At the head in this respect stands the broad loin cloth or maro of the Polynesians. In Tahiti the possession of royal power hinged upon a fetish maro, which was preserved, rolled up in a bundle, as both fetish and royal emblem.[99] The peculiar property of this garment is also suggested in the mantle of the Persian Sufis. The latter, however, had only sacerdotal importance; succession to the priestly office depended upon its transfer.[100] The Hebrew Scripture is acquainted with the same significance of the mantle in that of the prophet Elijah.[101] Diadems and crowns arise from the brow band or fillet, which must once in certain cultures have distinguished the patriarch. When the paternal office had differentiated into a priestly and a kingly office, the older form of bands and wreaths characterized the priest, the younger and richer ornament the prince. The fetishistic character of this distinctive ornament is based on the conception that it always remains in the possession of its earlier wearer, who lingers invisibly near it and communicates to the actual wearer the power that resides in himself. If this power is that of political sovereignty, then it is believed that the divine ancestor of the royal family or the original ruler of the country always continues to reign through the insignia and their temporary wearer.

This conception runs through history in every conceivable form from the crudest to the most refined. On the lowest stage it attaches to the mummy fetish and the associated notion that through it man assures himself of the protecting power of the ghost. On this stage, of course, there is as yet no question of political power and protection; these come to the fore, however, with advancing organization. The custom of the Sakalavas of Madagascar marks a noteworthy transition, in that the mummy fetish appears much reduced. In the royal family before the second funeral of the king a cervical vertebra, a nail, and a tuft of hair are taken from his crumbling corpse, and these relics are preserved in a crocodile tooth. The right to the kingship is then

[99] Hawkesworth, *Seereisen,* VI, 332.
[100] Malcolm, *History of Persia,* II, 394.
[101] See 2 Kings ii. 8-15. (Ed.)

dependent upon the possession of this fetish. "The Hovas, who are acquainted with this superstition of the Sakalavas, have since their invasion south of Menabe concerned themselves less with the person of the king than with these relics, which they always guard most carefully under the pretext of showing them the honor due them."[102] With advancing culture the mummy fetish generally gives way to the exuvial fetish, and relics are gradually replaced by insignia. But even in regions of comparatively high civilization the two are occasionally found combined. When Emperor Charles IV had a new crown made for his kingdom of Bohemia, he surrendered it into the possession, not of his successor, but of the national hero, St. Wenzel, from whose relic-head it was to be loaned to the actual successor only for limited periods. It became in a strictly juristic sense, and not merely figuratively, the crown of St. Wenzel. Beyond this the conception of the time did not extend, only because it was in the Christian era.

The majority of all exuvial fetishes, however, are weapons. In the *Odyssey*[103] the patriarchs in the assembly are recognized by a staff or scepter. The primeval staff appears here only as the personal emblem of the ruler, and as such it has been, and in part still is, extremely widespread. In West Africa, according to Zoller, the old practice still exists. When a chieftain sends a message to the merchants, he accredits the messenger by sending along his staff. The chieftain is represented by his staff exactly as a ghost by his fetish, and through a similar intimate property relation. The merchants likewise send out their messengers with their staff. Staves used in this way are often of great value, because they inevitably become stamped as individualities. In other regions the signet ring through its incised symbol of personality is used for the same purpose and with the same significance. Rings of similar type were exuvial fetishes in the Scandinavian temples. In the *Iliad* certain staves or scepters have a formal history reaching back into the twilight of the gods; they thus become not merely personal emblems but also fetishes.[104]

The origin of fetish weapons is related in numerous legends.

[102] Grandidier, in *Globus*, 1872, II, 270.
[108] Homer *Odyssey* ii. 37. (Ed.)
[104] Cf., Keller, *Homeric Society*, p. 255. (Ed.)

Often a son seeks his fathers weapon in his father's grave and extracts it therefrom. This conception is entirely appropriate in an age which knows no spiritual beings except such as rise from the grave, but it becomes impossible with reference to higher spirits and on more advanced stages of fetishism. When the higher spirits have their seat no longer in the earth but in the heavens, exuvial fetishes can no longer be derived from the earth. Then the myths are forced to the explanation that they have "fallen from heaven," or else legend weaves about their origin a colorful web, as in the case of the Holy Grail and the Holy Lance. The sanctifying thing in both these cases is the contact with the blood of the Savior. Otherwise the Grail obviously belongs to the group of exuvial fetishes first considered.

The weapon may be a fetish in two ways—either as a fixed monument or as a movable object. The sword, according to Herodotus,[105] was a true monument fetish among the Scythians. Upon the great wooden mound marking the communal meeting place of the district was planted "an antique iron sword" as the image of the divinity of death and brutal warfare; "yearly sacrifices of cattle and of horses are made to it, and more victims are offered thus than to all the rest of their gods." In the same region at a much later period, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, the Alani worshiped the sword, and the Huns seem to have taken up the same cult according to the legend that a shepherd discovered and brought to Attila the "sword of Mars" of the Scythian kings.[106] The lance shares with its ancestor the staff the widest distribution as a fetish. It is found among savage peoples[107] and also among the Greeks and Romans. It serves in particular as a portable fetish in war,[108] and in earlier times it held the most prominent position among the insignia of the Holy Roman Empire.

Throughout northern Europe the fetishistic character of hereditary weapons is revealed by their use in the oath. The sense of the custom among the Quadi of taking oaths upon their weapons is correctly explained by the statement that they worshiped their divinities in their blades. The same usage has been established for the Scandinavians of Russia, the Danes, Saxons, and

105 *History* iv. 62.
106 Jordanes *De Getarum sive Gothorum origine* xxxv.
107 Nachtigal, *Sahara und Sudan,* II, 695.
108 See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte,* II, 503-4. (Ed.)

Czechs.[109] Even the Christian Franks, according to the evidence of their folk laws, could be brought only with difficulty to substitute relics of the saints for their arms in the oath.

The last echo of exuvial fetishism is the hazy notion that heirlooms have a special value, that some magical power or luck inheres in them. This belief, still current among the people, goes back to pagan times. Wigfus, a hersir in Norway, in his farewell to his grandson whom he expects never to see again, says: "I wish to give you these treasures of our family, a mantle, a spear, and a sword, in which our ancestors and relatives have had great confidence; so long as you keep them, I trust you will want nothing; but if you part with them, I fear for your fortune." 110 On the Kurisches Haff the kettle hook, an heirloom which for generations had been in contact with the hearth, was long a fetish in ancient fashion. In **1709,** when the plague threatened, the inhabitants of Sarkan drew a circle around their place with a kettle hook, and the plague could not pass it. In other cases old keys are regarded as helpful, for example, in seeking an unknown thief, as is done in Africa with the aid of actual fetishes. Heirloom books, especially "family Bibles," have been added to the list in modern times, and it is significant that they are likewise used for divination.

We already know that earth burial is not the only method of disposing of the dead body, nor even the oldest or originally most widespread. A much earlier form, preserved as a developed dogma in Parsiism, consists in giving the fleshy parts to the animals. Other widespread early methods, such as abandoning the corpse, discarding it on the heath, throwing it into the river or sea, and exposing it on the mountains, necessarily have the same result. Even burial does not prevent burrowing and creeping animals from carrying on their work of destruction. Indeed in popular conception the body in the earth is always thought of as the prey of worms and snakes, which are usually not distinguished in primitive language. Even the elevation of corpses on high platforms, as is common in Oceania, does not afford protection against all animals. Only complete mummification and cremation rescue man from the animal kingdom. They are, however, the least original methods of disposal, and the existence of

[109] Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthumer,* p. 515.
[110] *Viga Olums Saga.*

the animal cult in the regions where they have prevailed proves that even there they have succeeded other methods.

An animal eating the flesh of a corpse incorporates in itself precisely those parts in which the blood and hence also the soul inheres. Primitive man logically concludes, therefore, that such an animal is related to the ghost of the dead man in the same intimate way as are the grave and the monument on a later stage, though he is not led to speculate as to the possible nature of the connection between them. The animal, in short, becomes the fetish of the ghost.[111] This origin of the conception is indicated very clearly in a large number of the commonest fetishes. It is not, however, the only one. If an animal is an object of property, it can, like the other personal chattels of a man, enter into a fetishistic connection with his ghost through this property relation. The fetish animals of the first group are recognizable as those which actually or supposedly eat the body, like the carnivores, birds of prey, sharks, crocodiles, and snakes. To the second group belong those which early entered into a relation to man of partial or complete domestication, such as goats, sheep, cattle, pigeons, peafowl, and the like*. If the domestic animal is actually useful, like those first named, the fetishism remains individual or is limited to definitely marked varieties, such as the Apis bull, the white elephant, and the white horse. In the other case it often embraces the whole species. Sometimes both factors in animal fetishism, consumption of the body and the property relation, coincide, as in the dog, the cat, and the domestic fowl. Finally, once the conception has developed and a large number of animals have become fetishes in the above-mentioned ways, the door is opened to the rest. Just as any stone can presumably be or be made a fetish, so also there is hardly a species of animal to which man has not applied the conception at some time or place.[112]

The original association of ideas appears only slightly obscured when in Horapollo [118] the fetishistic character of the hawk is explained by the belief that it is an image of a soul because like the soul it nourishes itself from the blood. In the cult, an

[111] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II 990. (Ed.)
[112] Instances of animal fetishism are collected in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 991-2, 1028-35; IV, 497-511; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II, 230-42; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 329-53. (Ed.)
[118] *Hieroglyphica* i. 6.

"image" is originally a fetish without reference to the factor of resemblance. The naive conception of primitive times that the soul is bound to the flesh of the corpse, was preserved not only by the Egyptians but by the Greeks as well. The soul does not abandon the corpse until dogs and birds have gnawed it to the bone.[114] Homer, however, no longer adheres to the logical inference that the soul necessarily passed into the animals with the flesh. Yet the position of the eagle, owl, and wolf in mythology reveals that even in Greece this conception once existed. In Tibet, where corpses are gnawed to the bone by crows and vultures, the original idea is already half obscured. "The Tibetans believe that the vulture, when he soars into the air, bears into the sky a part of the ghost of the deceased." Hence the rich man aspires to have his corpse prepared for these birds by the priests, while the poor man, who can not afford the cost of such preparation, is buried.[115] Thus at least so much of the logic of the old conception has been preserved that the bird which devours the body also carries away the ghost.

The Aryan Iranians also clung tenaciously to this type of fetishism, although their very advanced religious forms necessarily obscured its meaning. Even the systematized cult conceptions of Zoroastrian Persia reveal clearly that the dog, the vulture, and even the fly had formerly been potent fetish animals. The insignificance of the fly by no means excludes it from fetishism, for it too is a notable scavenger of corpses. "Among the magical instrumentalities of the Lapps there also belonged the magic flies, which were a type of evil spirits in the form of flies."[116] Tumors, swellings, and even hemorrhages were ascribed to these fly demons. They were kept in boxes, to be let out on occasion in order to injure enemies. The same conception must also have survived among the Germanic peoples, for not infrequently, when a Christian missionary had the fortune to overthrow a pagan idol, he saw with his own eyes the evil demon escape from it as a fly or swarm of flies, and similar experiences have been reported in the exorcism of devils.[117] According to the Zoroastrian view the fly was the fetish, either of the wicked

114 Homer *Odyssey* xiv. 133.
115 *Globus,* 1872, I, 169.
116 Leem, *Lappen in Finnmarken,* p. 239.
117 Cf. also the Biblical Baal-zebub, "lord of flies" (Wheless, *God's Word,* p. 199). (Ed.)

Ahriman himself, "who in the form of flies roams through all creation,"[118] or of the evil demon Nesosh, who rushed down from the north upon every dying person in the body of a fly.[119]

Only a dog of a particular breed was able to smite the fly demon. It was thus important that a dead person be "seen" by such a dog before the demon arrived. Consequently the Zoroastrian wished to die in the sight of a dog, and a dog was therefore held up before a dying man. No other interpretation is possible here than that the dog had formerly been a fetish animal supposed to incorporate the souls of the dead and thus to save them from other ghosts hungering for them. When the dog is extolled in clearly rationalistic fashion as the guardian of the world, which exists "through his sagacity,"[120] this too is a conception which early man with his daimonistic world philosophy could have arrived at only through dog fetishism. The dog is mentioned and praised in this way by Ormazd in reply to the characteristic question of Zoroaster: "What [creature] every midnight opposes Ahriman, who assaults from a thousand sides?" Homer and Ossian similarly attest the widespread popular belief that the dog is an exceptionally useful guardian because he is able to see the ghosts, the source of all dangers.[121] This very power, however, betrays his fetishistic nature. The dog is in this respect like fire, which also scares the ghosts away from human habitations at night. To the Persians the two were fetishes in the very same way. With the development of Zoroastrianism, however, the tendency was to elevate the divinity of fire for the sake of cult unity and to suppress that of the dog. The former usurped the whole cult; the dog officially ceased to be a cult object. Actually, however, this was never accomplished, for the rules governing the feeding and care of the dog covered everything essential to the cult in its earlier sense.

The cock was associated by the Persians with the dog in both connections; he too is a destroyer of bodies and a crier in the night. The dog and the cock combat the demons.[122] But Zoroastrianism also reinterpreted this conception. Since it recognized

[118] *Bundahish* iii.
[119] *Vendidad* vii. See also Geiger, *Ostiranische Kultur*, p. 161. (Ed.)
[120] *Vendidad* xiii.
[121] See Homer *Odyssey* xvi. 159-163; Keller, *Homeric Society*, p. **169;** Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, IV, **72-3.** (Ed.)
[122] *Bundahish* xix; *Vendidad* xviii.

only fire as a true fetish, it attempted to rationalize the service of the cock. An evil demon sends men sleep to destroy them, but the cock wakens and thus protects them. The cock likewise made his way into Christendom as the symbol of watchfulness. It is scarcely to be doubted that in this case, as with many other domestic animals, an actual cult aided in the original domestication and dissemination. If fowls were introduced into Rome to be used for divination, this was a true cult purpose. The cock, who still keeps watch against demons on our spires, is similarly regarded in Buddhism. In Tibet he is "consecrated to Buddha;" on the roofs of the monasteries roost thousands, none of which is ever killed.[123]

In Hawaii the shark was prominently worshiped as a fetish. Here in isolation the original fetishistic sense was still preserved in all clearness, even though cult and mythology were by no means undeveloped. "The fishers sometimes wrap their dead in rough garments and throw them into the sea to be devoured by sharks, because they are of the opinion that the ghost of the deceased passes into the shark which devours his body, and **that** the survivors will thereby be spared by these voracious monsters in any accident at sea."[124] It is instructive to note that the Hawaiians, in spite of the clarity of this conception, nevertheless called the divinity by the name of his fetish without further distinction, a custom which among less remote peoples has greatly confused investigators. The very clarity of the notion made any distinction unnecessary. To a European, however, who had outgrown these ideas, it would necessarily seem entirely irrational, when a man appeared before him, "who wished to be regarded as a prophet, since he asserted that a shark had inspired him, so that he was able to foretell future things."[125]

With the shark we must doubtless align the crocodiles which enjoy a fetishistic reverence in Indonesia, even among the Mohammedan peoples. The Malays also believe that the soul passes into tigers, which are consequently held sacred.[126] Even the civilizations of eastern Asia have retained traces of animal fetishism. In China, tigers and dogs were worshiped, though only

123 *Globus,* **1872, I, 45.**
124 Ellis, *Reise durch Hawaii,* p. 200.
125 *Ibid.,* p. **27.**
126 Waitz, *Anthropologic,* V, 167.

as individuals, with the tacit consent of the officials.[127] In Japan the fox fetish has survived in connection with the old Shinto religion.[128]

In America animal fetishism, even in obvious forms, is widely prevalent, although the restrictions implicit in its basic idea have lapsed. In keeping with the stage of organization of many tribes, even the cult unions are entirely individual, mostly comprising only a man and a divinity. The Indian usually leaves the choice of this divinity to the suggestion of a dream. Since it can appear in this way only in connection with some visible fetish object, there is absolutely no material object, and consequently no animal, which can not become a fetish, no matter whether it has any other connection with the cult or not.[129]

The Great Spirit, Kitchi Manito, of certain North American tribes is borne through the clouds by the bird Wakon.[180] In this conception the correct sense of fetishism has been preserved. Moreover, Wakon itself is characteristically regarded by the Dakotas as their Great Spirit or god.[181] If it is believed that this spirit causes the thunder in the clouds, the way is paved for the nature myth which explains the clash of the thunder as caused by the flapping of the wings of the bird. This myth is also current among the Mandans, Hidatsa, and Assiniboins and implies a similar fetishism among these tribes. Assiniboins who have seen the bird describe it as very small. Similarly the Aztecs once worshiped their great Huitzilopotchli as a tiny humming bird and named him after it. Among other Indians the turkey is the divine bird. We are not surprised, then, by the myth that it is to this bird that we owe the creation of the world, nor by the belief of certain western tribes that the crow created the world.[182] Many Indians preserve a raven's skeleton as a fetish, and others revere the owl. The Delawares and the early inhabitants of Florida preserved deerskins as fetish relics. The first tribe of the **Delaware** league had a tortoise as its original ancestor; hence this animal had once been the fetish of the first man or of the Great Spirit. The myth arising therefrom far exceeded the bounds

[127] Stuhr, *Schamanentum,* p. 120.
[128] See Hearo, *Unfamiliar Japan,* **I, 368-94, (Ed.)**
129 Waitz, *Anthropologic* III, 127-8.
180 Müller, u*rreligionen,* p. 120.
[181] /bid., pp. 71, 106.
[132] *Basler Missionsmagazin,* 1834, p. **631.**

of the cult. The whole creation rests on the tortoise; earthquakes and floods are the manifestations of its movements.[188]

Widespread among Indian tribes is the fetish of the hare. As the Great Hare it tot) shares the name and honor of the Great Spirit.[184] It brought forth the human race and created the earth itself from a grain of sand which it fetched from the depths of the water. The bison is called by many tribes "the animal of the Great Spirit," and the white skin of a bison cow forms a fetish relic.[185] On Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron the Great Spirit lives as a beaver. This does not, however, protect beavers in general from molestation, for only one, the Great Beaver, is a fetish and receives sacrifices of tobacco before the hunt. This beaver, too, is the creator of the world. Other fetish animals are the snake, alligator, wolf, otter, and squirrel.

The tribes of South America are on the same stage. When a tribe even believes that all sicknesses originate from an "evil animal,"[136] this indicates an almost exclusive dominance of animal fetishism. The ounce and other cats among mammals and the vulture among birds are prominent here.

Among the civilized peoples of Central America, animal fetishism, even aside from the snake cult which is everywhere exceptionally tenacious, remains in force more than one would expect according to a generally valid principle. This principle establishes a gradation among classes of fetishes, certain of which are commonly preferred by advancing culture. The position of some members in this evolutionary scale may be doubtful. It is certain, however, that the celestial fetish and the artificial image are later members, in contrast to the older grave and animal fetishes. When a people with a higher civilization advances to one of the later classes, this comes to be regarded as superior. The older form gradually gives way and becomes the custom of barbarians and the lower classes. Among the dominant stock, however, it is assimilated by the later forms in a peculiar fashion, later to be mentioned, since the conservative character of the cult does not permit its complete annihilation. It is easy to understand how a higher culture would necessarily look with disfavor at the identi-

[188] Klemm, *Cuiturgeschichte,* I I , 164.
[184] Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 63.
185 Wied, *Innere NordrAmerikas,* I, 169-70. Cf., Grinnell, *Cheyenne,* I, 270ff. (Ed.)
[186] Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 257,

fication of its divinity with animals, in view of their lowly connections, sooner than at the idea that the divinity hovers near the lifeless image of an animal as it lingers in the vicinity of its monument. But practice advances only gradually, lingering on many intermediate stages. In Mexico the assimilation had already been largely accomplished. The live animal fetish had been supplanted by the animal image, which even appeared in combination with later forms of the image. The cult of the living animal, however, was not entirely suppressed, for fetish snakes were preserved not only in Mexico but also in Yucatan and Guatemala.

We must here dwell for a moment upon a curious product of this cult, namely, the calendars of the Mayas and Aztecs. In both of them the months and days are denoted by animal images, which unquestionably represent divinities.[137] How these various divinities came to "govern" in rotation definite periods of time is suggested by an Egyptian analogy[138] As in Egypt, the population of ancient Mexico was not descended from one ancestral pair but, like every great people, formed a mosaic compound of numerous coequal or superimposed kin-groups. The cults of these various elements were not engulfed by the new unity of the state cult, a development unique to Zoroastrianism and Yahwism. They all lived on with their different divinities and fetishes. Their subordination, however, was revealed in one thing. While the state cult, so to speak, never closed its eyes or allowed its gods to nod in the service of the state, and while the family cults were similarly wakeful, the cults of the intermediate kin-groups and tribal unions, which on a lower stage of political integration had themselves been state cults, ordinarily lay dormant. They awoke only at special times, their festivals, quite independently of one another. On these occasions the cult divinities of the groups historically intermediate between family and state in political development came among men to visit their cult places and roam the land. In a very real sense, therefore, these divinities "governed" the dates of their festivals.

Many early civilized peoples have had good reason to keep close track of such days. The Egyptians, for example, avoided with a holy fear the dread consequences of meeting the divinities

[187] Mutter, u*rreligionen*, p. 481.
[138] Cf., Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums*, I, 549-50.

abroad at such times in their visible—i.e., fetish—forms. "Go not out of thy house on the fifteenth of Paophi in the evening, for the eye of him who beholds a snake coming forth on this evening suffers harm on the spot." [139] Hence the Egyptians kept an accurate account of such days. A systematic record of the various gods and the times they govern is what we call a "calendar" on this stage. The Mayas and Mexicans kept a similar record, but for a different reason. They did not so much wish to avoid the divinities as to take advantage of their presence for the establishment of effective cult unions.

In America, in contrast to most of the peoples of the Old World, cult unions were always mainly individual. Even among the more civilized peoples there arose no extensive unions like the Greek mysteries. Each man sought to ally himself with a private guardian spirit, whom he recognized without exception in some fetish.[140] This fetish with its spirit is the *rvagual* of the Mexicans and forms the basis of the doctrine of Nagualism,[141] which still survives in secret and which, like Japanese Shintoism, corresponds closely to the original and genuine form of all daimonism. As a result of the nearly universal practice of calling the ghosts by the names of their fetishes, numbers of entirely different guardian spirits necessarily received identical names. Political integration then inevitably produced the same effect on cult doctrine as we found in Greece. A thousand different but like-named spiritual personalities were amalgamated into a single divinity, who, in turn, enjoyed a cult from a thousand human individuals and in one or perhaps several cult places. In any case, the divinities with whom individuals entered into cult relations were now superior beings associated with communal cult places and definite festivals. The Mexican kept trace of these festivals so that he might know exactly which of the numerous divinities lingered among men on particular days and hence which were to be won over for his cult union. The Maya and Aztec calendars, then, formed the basis for the successful conclusion of individual cult unions, "since the children are dedicated to that *nagual* in whose sign they were born."[142] Thus the

[189] Le Page-Renouf, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, p. 148.
[140] Cf., Benedict, "Concept of the Guardian Spirit"; Wissler, *American Indian*, p. 197; Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 184-93. (Ed.)
[141] See Brinton, *Nagualism*. (Ed.)
[142] Müller, *Urreligionen*, p. 482, citing Minutoli.

selection of a guardian divinity, which the Indians farther north made according to a chance encounter or dream interpretation, was here regulated by a system, and this system was a product of social development.

In order not to have to return to the subject again, we may anticipate somewhat and indicate here its connection with the astrological calendar which still prevails in some measure even with us. Its most important elements, to be sure, originated in ancient Babylonia, where, however, the same ideas were once operative. But even the Mexican calendar can be called an astrological one. While the older strata of population on the plateaus of Central America were characterized mainly by animal fetishism, the ruling stocks, as is so often the case, had advanced beyond it to the fetishes of the heavens, to the sun and star fetish. They associated the ruling divinity of the tribe in a similarly fetishic fashion with the sun and heaven, or assigned him the sun and heaven as his dwelling place. Thus they raised themselves, not only above the conquered and their gods, but also above their own prehistoric period. Even though the sun as a fetish now took the place of the humming bird, snake, or other fetish animal, the nature of the cult did not permit the rejection of the latter. The problem was solved in a simple fashion through the identity in name of the ghost and fetish. The snake henceforth took his seat in the sun, and the scorpion and fish in some star or constellation. Thus, besides names of gods derived from other fetish objects and those not taken from fetishes at all, numerous animal names appear as the designations of many of the most striking constellations.

These elements were also present in great abundance in Babylonia. The Chaldean priesthood, however, advanced farther than others in the direction of developing from the same foundation a scientific graduation of time. Even the Chaldeans, however, were unable to doff the old garb. The "government" of the days, to say nothing of longer periods of time, fell in rotation to the seven supreme planet gods of Babylon. This artificial graduation of time with the seven day cycle gradually found acceptance among the civilized peoples of the west, who translated more or less appropriately the names of the divinities, and supplanted the old reckoning according to the phases of the moon.[148] It did

[148] **See Kroeber, *Anthropology*, pp. 253-7. (Ed.)**

not, however, suppress the festival calendar. Indeed, even under Christianity the old principle emerged again with a new interpretation in connection with the cult of the saints. The calendar determines the succession of saints' festivals, and in many regions it is still customary to dedicate the child by baptism to the "patron saint" on whose festival it is born. Thus exactly as in ancient Mexico the calendar furnishes the clue for the selection of a divinity in concluding an individual cult union.

Animal fetishism in the more northern of the civilized states of America is thus established beyond doubt. In Peru, the number of fetishistic species to which the cults of the people adhered, was very large. Foxes, dogs, bears, the great cats, eagles, condors, parrots, and snakes are all mentioned. The conditions in Peru show how strong an influence the assimilation of the earlier fetishes by the later necessarily exerted on myth formation, and through this on the serious speculation of man. While the older strata of the population paid homage to a variegated animal fetishism, the Inca rulers were pronounced representatives of celestial fetishism. In pre-Inca times the condor, which more than one tribe worshiped as its divine ancestor, had been the prevailing fetish; the Incas themselves bore its image on their scepter.[1*4] The Incas, who were "sons of the sun" in the same sense in which those tribes must have called themselves "sons of the condor," combined the condor fetish with the sun fetish. The relative rank of the two was not incorrectly indicated by the myth which made the condor the "messenger of the sun."[145] In exactly the same way Hermes, the god of the vanquished pastoral people, became the messenger of the gods of the conquering Greeks, and the eagle became the messenger of Zeus. Similarly all the other animal fetishes of ancient Peru were associated and identified with stars. Thus it seemed to later generations "that every animal species had an individual in heaven, which was a star."[146]

Whether or not this was still intelligible, it was an element in the body of traditional knowledge and became inevitably the point of departure for further speculation about the origin of things. Another transfer of ideas followed immediately. In accordance vith a familiar attribute of the supreme spirit, each fetish animal identified with him bore in itself the character of

[144] **Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 327.** **146** ***Ibid.,* p. 365.**
***145Ibid.,* p. 367.**

an original ancestor. If we now transpose this concept to the heavens, we can understand why the star given an animal name was called "the mother of the other animals, the mother of the species"' From here it is only a slight step to the "conception of heavenly prototypes for the animals." In such cases, however, it is always difficult for us, who likewise live under a body of traditional knowledge and think in the channels laid out by it, to determine whether this step has actually already been taken by the people described, or whether it has only been carried out unconsciously in the mind of the reporter. To question a people with an alien mode of thought in an objective manner is a rare art, and our science seems to teem with the unavoidable errors of such interrogation.

In Africa, besides the widespread snake fetish, various others have still been preserved. Both on the Zambesi and on the Congo it is believed that the souls of dead chieftains dwell in lions.[147] Elsewhere the souls are thought to reside in apes.[148] Lizards and crocodiles enjoy individual cults.

The wide extent of animal fetishism in Africa is best shown, however, by its survivals in ancient Egypt, although here even more than in Mexico and Peru the living fetish had been superseded by the image and the celestial fetish. The process of assimilation, initiated in this way, was essentially the same here as there, but in Egypt it is even more clearly revealed that the different animal fetishes were originally worshiped only locally. Thus a whole animal species was sometimes respected and spared by one district on account of assumed kinship with one fetish individual, while it was persecuted by a neighboring district for its noxiousness. Since a god is often known by the name of the animal which serves as his fetish, cult places frequently bear the animal name of the divinity of the district. These cult places, however, become the nuclei of urban settlements. Consequently many Egyptian cities bore names derived from animals as evidence of former animal fetishism.

We shall consider here only those animals which might have become fetishes through the devouring of corpses. Preeminent among them were the widely worshiped jackal and the closely

[147] Livingstone, *Neue Missionsreisen*, p. 176; Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition*, II, 244.

[148] Livingstone, *Neue Missionsreisen*, p. 211.

related doglike animal of Set.[149] The living crocodile as a fetish could still be seen by Strabo[160] in the old district of Arsinoe in Fayum. Both animal and god bore the name of Sebek, and the cult place was called Pi-sebek (crocodile city). In a neighboring district the ichneumon was the fetish. The ancients were struck by the contradiction that, while some protected the crocodile in Lake Moeris and the canals around it, others attacked him to protect the ichneumon. The nature of fetishism permits such a contradiction. Archeological discoveries confirm the further statements of Strabo[151] concerning the vestiges of primary animal fetishism surviving long after the period of Egypt's splendor. Latopolis had its name from the Nile fish called *latos.* Lykopolis means "city of the wolf." Hermopolis worshiped the dog-headed baboon, the district of Thebes the eagle, and Leontonpolis the lion fetish. Even the shrew found its adherents in one district, and sculptures bear witness that the scorpion, the vulture, the snake, and many other animals were fetishes, although we no longer know whether they were worshiped in living individuals or only in images. Most celebrated of all was the scarabseus.

In Strabo's time the sense of animal worship was already variously interpreted. It has been falsely derived by science from the animal pictures chosen in Egypt as hieroglyphs to represent the names of divinities. But the earlier existence of living fetishes, which is further and irrefutably proved by many mummified bodies of animals, demonstrates, in connection with analogous phenomena from the whole sphere of ethnology, that genuine animal fetishism was the original form, and that it made these characters, pictures, and symbols available to a later age.

The existence of the same fetish in several districts, like that of identical divine names, was a factor which could pave the way to a general acceptance of the fetish throughout the empire.
402 The historical fortune of a district and of its ruling family or priesthood could exert a similar influence. Thus, according to Strabo, the dog, the domestic cat, the hawk, the ibis, and two species of fish were regarded as fetishes throughout the country, although earlier sources show that they too originally possessed only localized cults.

149 Cf. also *Cambridge Ancient History,* I, 328ff.
150 *Geography,* p. 811.
151 *Ibid.,* pp. 812ff.

Among peoples on a later cultural stage the traces of this type of cult become more and more rare, but they suffice to convince us that the primary animal fetish was also once current among the Semites, Hindus, Greeks, Romans, and Germans. The evidence survives either in images, like those of the fish among the Phoenicians and the snake among the Hebrews, or in myths, as when a Hindu myth makes Vishnu appear in his earlier avatars as a fish, tortoise, or wild boar.[152] Some have thought, however, that the culture of the Aryan Hindus is acquitted of the crudity of animal fetishism if the animals were represented as the "vehicles" or "bearers" of the divinity, if, for example, the divinity soared above the wings of the eagle which served as his seat. But in this very respect the popular conception adhered closely to the true basic idea of fetishism; the animal and the divine spirit remained two distinct concepts, connected only externally. The conception which sees the divinity in the animal itself, is to be regarded as the corrupt one.

In Greece, to mention only a few instances, the eagle of Zeus, the wolf of Apollo, and the owl of Athena clearly suggest this type of fetishism. These animals stand in the very same relation to the later images of these gods, and to the conceptions derived therefrom, as do the humming bird and snake to the images of the Mexican gods. In the Greek image the animal appears somewhat more subordinated than in the ancient Egyptian forms; it no longer forms the head, but only an accessory part of the image. Even Greece, however, did not skip the stage which characterizes Egypt, as is proved by the idols with animal heads reported by Schliemann. The *Birds* of Aristophanes shows to what extent the ideas of the people, even in the classical period, were still connected with those of primitive animal fetishism. The only question is whether these themselves or their rationalized interpretations roused more the derision of the poet.

The Roman wolf image, the woodpecker legend,[168] the crows consecrated to Juno,[164] the fish *moena* as the "image of the soul," and the fish forms of the gods mentioned by Augustine[155] point to the same basic notions, as do also the wolf and raven in Norse mythology. With reference to the carrion birds, the vulture and

[152] Lassen, *Intdische Alterthumskunde,* **IV, 579-80.**
153 See Fraser, *Oolden Bough,* IV, **186** n[4]. (Ed.)
[154] Preller, *Romische Mythologie,* p. 90.
[155] *De civitate Dei* vi. 10. 1.

the raven, the fetishistic conception had not yet died out even in the late Middle Ages. When in 1214 at a tournament at Neuss a hundred knights perished from heat and dust, it was observed that "the evil spirits" flew about in the form of vultures and ravens.[156] Csesarius of Heisterbach,[157] in accordance with the belief of his time, regards ravens and crows in general as seats, sometimes of human souls, sometimes of demons. The latter gather in the form of ravens about a house where a death has occurred, in order to devour the departing soul. A similar idea is also the basis of the popular notion that the appearance of the "owl of death" forebodes the approach of a death.

If these survivals are insufficient to convince the reader of the general prevalence of animal fetishism, there remains the proof from snake fetishism, which is so unexceptionally common to all peoples that it is enough here to cite a few cases from the sphere of civilization, where doubt might most legitimately exist. What recommended the snake so generally as a fetish of the primary type is its entire nature and mode of life. It dwells in caves, crevices, and abandoned huts—all places where man once deposited his dead. It lives as the savage and the Ossianic Gael conceive the ghost to live; sometimes it suns itself on the top of the grave, sometimes it vanishes within it, and another time it visits the houses of the survivors. Moreover, according to a popular notion, it feeds on the dust of the corpse. When primary fetishism is abandoned with higher civilization, that of the snake undergoes a slight transformation, which preserves it in another form for a long time. The snake becomes the image of the soul—a later conception evidences of which are still found in the early centuries of Christianity. It is no longer the seat of a human soul, but the form of the soul itself when detached from the body. As such it has often been seen leaving and entering the bodies of dying and sleeping men. Nocturnal birds and bats were similarly regarded by the ancients, for they too, in common with the dead of early times, live in caves and rock crevices.[158] But the snake's lack of limbs, its rapid and noiseless gliding motion, and its now harmless and now dangerous character everywhere attracted the special attention of men to it. At the

156 Schultz, *Das hofische Leben,* II, 98.
157 *Diologus miraculorum* ii. 21, 319, *et passim*
188 Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 335-8.

same time the snake is the oldest among animal fetishes, **and** therefore in comparison with others it often occupies an inferior position. Thus it is frequently characteristic of subject peoples with a lower culture.

Among the Mayas the snake cult stood supreme. In Mexico it formed the basis of the cults which were combined with political integration.[169] As soon as fetishism has advanced to the artificially constructed image, it is able to express such a combination therein. The fetish of Huitzilopotchli, the humming bird, mastered the snake, and his image combined the two animals. Another god, Quetzalcoatl, possessed fetishes in the flint, the snake, the sparrow, and finally the image in human form. His image was able to unite them all. Indeed his very name is derived from a combination of fetishes; as usually interpreted it means "the plumed serpent."[160]

In India, *nagas* are spirits in the form of snakes. Their fetishism naturally does not prevent their being the causes of thunder, rain, and storm.[161] Here too the snake fetish is especially characteristic of the aboriginal tribes, subject or hostile to the Aryans. The name has therefore passed to these peoples themselves, in accordance with a principle to be discussed later. The Nagas are the sons of snakes, the serpent people. Seshnaga is king in the subterranean realm of snakes. Struggles and alliances with serpents play a prominent part in the history of the conquering Aryans. Krishna conquered the snake; Vishnu made it his couch. The bird is the superior fetish of the Aryans; the hawk Garuda is the "bearer" of the divinity Vishnu. The "divine birds" are the enemies of the snake gods; they kill them and live on their flesh.[162]

Space does not permit an exhaustive discussion of snake fetishism in Greece. The myth that Cadmus and Harmonia were transformed into serpents and lived on as *genii* by their graves,[168] points to snake fetishism among the earlier population. According to Herodotus,[164] the ancient Athenians believed that a ser-

159 Müller, *Urreligionen,* pp. 482ff.

160 *ibid.,* p. 585.

161 Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* II, 247.

162 *Ibid.,* I, 929.

163 See Apollodorus *Bibhotheca* iii. 5. 4; Hyginus *Fabulce* vi; Ovid *Metamorphoses* iv. 563-603. (Ed.)

164 *History* viii. 41.

pent dwelt as a guardian in the temple on the Acropolis, and when, during the Persian War, they noted its absence, they asserted "that the goddess had already abandoned the citadel." Old myths actually identified the snake on the citadel with the ancient hero Ereehtheus.[165] The serpent also appears, along with the owl, as an "attribute" or "symbol" of the later goddess, Athena. In exactly the same way the urseus or sacred asp became an attribute of the ruling gods and kings of Egypt.

The cult of Asclepius was associated with the most elementary snake fetishism. Live serpents were kept as fetishes in his temple at Titane.[166] The god was carried in the form of a snake from Epidaurus to Sicyon.[167] Legend preserves the correct fetishistic mode of expression when it shows us how the community of Epidaurus in Argolis, whose cult divinity Asclepius was, was under the "leadership of the serpent." When a colony set out from here to found Epidaurus Limera, the colonists took along a sacred snake, and where it crept ashore from the ship they built an altar to Asclepius and around it their city.[168] Such is the mythological substruction of the "leadership of the serpent." The later image of the god bore a staff and a pine cone, while the living snake still served as a parallel fetish. The development here also pursued a familiar course when the snake image afterwards became an "attribute," entwining the staff of the god. On a higher evolutionary stage, when man has completely forgotten the original sense of fetishism, he necessarily reaches out for a rationalized explanation and seeks in or ascribes to the snake the properties by which it is able to promote human health. But the promotion of health was originally the affair of the god. Of course, in consequence of the disappearance of the original conception, there comes an hour when even the god himself must dissolve into air and vapor. The ancients, on the path first blazed by the Greeks, had already come to suspect that it was the air at the health-giving cult places of Asclepius which cured the ailments, and that the god was nothing but an allegory of this process.

The snake emblem in the cult of Dionysus must have had a

165See Frazer, *Golden Bough,* IV, 86; V, 87. (Ed.)
166Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecice* ii. 11. 8. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* V, 80-1. (Ed.)
[167] Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecwe* ii. 10. 3.
163*Ibid.,* iii. 23. 7.

similar origin. To call it the "symbol of the annual renewal of life in nature"[169] is pure rationalization. A snake led Antinoe to the spot where she founded Mantinea; the hero Cychreus appeared as a serpent in the battle of Salamis; the patron spirit of Elis appeared in the form of a snake before the army of Sosipoli.[170] The snake was the oldest "symbol" of a daimon or Tyche.[171] Even snake totemism was not, and could not be, alien to Greece. Once an ancestral god is remembered in the fetish of the snake, his descendants must be "sons of the serpent." The lively imagination of the Greeks, however, characteristically resolved all these facts into explanatory stories and transmitted them exclusively in this form to later generations. For example, Nicoteleia, the mother of the Messenian hero Aristomenes, is said to have conceived him after intercourse with a god in the form of a snake.[172] By an identical mythological substruction a Macedonian legend accounts for the divine extraction of Alexander, and a Sicyonic myth for that of Aratus.[173] The reader may note in passing how much this advance, this departure from the naive views of savage peoples, must necessarily have contributed to the disintegration of religious beliefs in Greece.

In Rome, living snakes were kept in the temple of Bona Dea. Juno had a still more ancient cult at Lanuvium; the snake lived in a cave in the sacred grove.[174] The *genii* in the house and the ghosts at the grave were still regarded as snakes at a very late date. Like the owl in Athens, the snake in Italy was generally protected in houses and sleeping rooms as a bringer of luck; indeed Pliny[175] ascribes it only to the periodic conflagrations that men were not overwhelmed by the progeny of snakes. It can scarcely be said that the ubiquitous image of the snake had suppressed the living fetish. The same reinterpreted totemic conception is found here as in Greece. Scipio[176] and Augustus were reputedly the sons of snakes. The mother of the latter approached the snake in the temple of Apollo, and the legend, newly invented according to an old model, relates that she bore there-

--- Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, I, 549.

170 Pausanias *Descriptio Grcerice* viii. 8; i. 36; vi. 20.

171 Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*, I, 423.

172 Pausanias *Descriptio Grcecice* iv. 14. 7-8.

173 See Frazer, *Golden Bough*, V, 81. (Ed.)

174 Preller, *Romische Mythologie*, p. 246.

175 *NaUiralis historia* xxix. 4. 22.

176 Iivy *Ab urbe condita* xxvi. 19.

after on her body the mark of a snake,[177] as though there still survived a dim recollection of the mark of a cult union or totem.

In the remnants of Germanic legendary tradition the Midgard serpent, the snake under the mythical tree Yggdrasill, the house snake of popular superstition, and countless dragon legends are self-explanatory. The snake, dragon, and griffin, a winged serpent, become guardians of treasure in connection with the grave cult of earlier times, which placed the entire treasure of a man in his grave. His own ghost, jealous and formidable, watches over it in the fetish of a snake. With the advance of economic foresight man withholds his treasure from the deceased, and even unearths the treasures of earlier times. Such grave robberies must have been frequent in the transition period—in northern Europe perhaps about the time of the *Volkerwanderung*—from the intimations of certain folk laws and from the number of legends which are preoccupied with tKem. There was an added incentive since, according to primitive ideas, the undertaking by its daring brought glory as well as plunder. Even the Romans were familiar with the snake as a guardian of treasure.[178] The early Middle Ages celebrated heroes of this sort in Beowulf and Sigurd, and the old historian of the Danes[179] extols their heroic deeds.

With Christianity there appears another group of dragon slayers, including St. Michael and St. George, whose object is not the treasure but the destruction of the demon, whereupon the Christian cult takes possession of the old cult place. The once extolled heroic deed finally dwindles away in the popular superstitions surrounding treasure hunting. Here the magical means consist as a rule in an appropriate sacrifice, which entices the watchful ghost away from the treasure, and in the *"Favete Unguis"* The slightest noise calls him back, and the treasure is lost. One step farther toward Christianity and the ghost longs for deliverance by the removal of his treasure. The old conception that every ghost clings inseparably to his treasure continues to exist, but according to the later view, influenced by Christianity, a ghost who is compelled to linger in the darkness of the grave is necessarily excluded from the place where the blessed are united. Consequently he now longs for deliverance. He is in a

[177] Suetonius *Divus Augustus* 94.
[178] Preller, *Romische Mythologie,* pp. 810ff.
[179] Saxo Grammatieus *Historia Dardca* ii.

position like that of the ghost of former days whose survivors had not performed their cult obligations at his grave. The deliverance, however, is conditional upon the overcoming of the old terror of the grave; the hero must not shudder to kiss the snake, as legend often puts it. Thus from the simplest elements, which like the seeds of life are diffused through the air over the entire earth, there have arisen, with progress in their comprehension and combination, series of ideas which have nourished the soul of the people for centuries and have stimulated it repeatedly to new creations in the most diverse forms.

The second main group of animal fetishes arose exclusively from the property relation and represents in general a later and, if one may say so, a nobler stage. To it belong for the most part animals which have been domesticated either for use or for pleasure. Man assumed that the divinity must find the same pleasure as himself in their possession, and he therefore "consecrated" them to him. In this way certain temple inclosures became the centers of a peculiar form of domestication. The animals were diffused with the spread of their cults, and perhaps sometimes the dissemination of a cult was promoted by the striking beauty of its animals. From the feathered world there must be included here the domestic fowl, the pigeon, the goose, the peafowl, the guinea fowl, and perhaps also the domesticated swan.[180] Some did not spread to the west until the image fetish had become prevalent, and they consequently appear as "attributes" of their divinities. Often, it appears, sports of white color were first chosen as curiosities for dedication to the temple;[181] from them by careful breeding varieties of stable color were then produced.

Among the useful animals, with rare exceptions, only individuals with special distinguishing characteristics, as proofs of their sanctity, are consecrated to the divinity. In this way the cult effects a compromise with economic life. In India the white elephant was a fetish animal, furnishing an abode to different spirits. This fetish was even associated with Buddha, as the myth of his conception shows, and it was afterwards his "sacred animal." The old cult has been kept alive in Siam, where it is be-

[180] The swan and the stork, however, may owe their fetishistic character to another connection. Cf., Mannhardt, *Germavische Mythen*, p.. 342.

[181] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, IV, 510-11. (Ed.)

lieved that white elephants "are inhabited by the souls of great heroes and kings."[182] The bull must once have been a common fetish animal in the Asiatic cradle of civilization and among the western peoples of kindred culture. Its image was preserved in anceint Mesopotamia. In Zoroastrianism, according to a myth which we are now well able to comprehend, the primeval bull Kajomort was at the same time the "first man," the **progenitor** of the kings, and the original ancestor of the entire human race.[188] In India, Siva was associated with the bull Nandi. The sanctity of the Hindu sacred cow, however, is of somewhat different origin. In Egypt, on the other hand, the cow was regarded as a fetish throughout the land in connection with Hathor and other divinities, and was consequently never slaughtered. At Memphis a specially marked bull received a cult as "the living
409 image of Ptah-Sokaris."[184] Not less familiar are the ram of Amon and the goat at the cult place at Mendes.[185] In almost every house the cat constituted the "living image" of a household divinity.[186] A similar case is furnished by the Israelite cult of the calf, which is known, to be sure, only from the time of image fetishism. Among the early population of Crete the bull fetish appears as the Minotaur in connection with the name of the hero Minos.[187] In Greece the cult of Hera was associated with the image of the cow, although this naturally did not prevent the consecration of the peacock, a later importation from abroad, to the same goddess. Once a "goat people," i.e., a tribe with the goat as its fetish or totem, harassed the lands about the iEgean Sea. The bronze image of a goat on the market place at Phlius enjoyed special reverence. However, the fact that this "sacred goat" appeared at the same time as a constellation, a connection with which we have become acquainted above, had already become so puzzling at the time of Pausanias,[188] that the following rationalized explanation was invented. Because the constellation of the goat in its ascendance had blighted their vines, the people of Phlius to propitiate it had set up the bronze goat and honored it with presents.

182 *Bericht der prevxsischen Expedition nach Ostasien*, IV, 275.
183 *Bundahish* iii, xxiii, xxxii.
184 Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens*, p. 662.
185 Herodotus *History* ii. 42. (Ed.)
186 See Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte*, I, 556. (Ed.)
187 Cf., Frazer, *Golden Bough*, IV, 70ff. (Ed.)
188 *Descriptio Grcecice* ii. 13, 6.

A few logical deductions which have been widely drawn from fetishistic premises may be interpolated here. To be sure, they are not confined to the groups of fetishes already discussed, although they relate most frequently to them. First of all, the concept of fetishistic possession has been very generally extended to the souls of the living, influenced by the phenomena of sleep and dreams as they are popularly conceived. According to this conception, the soul can leave the sleeper as it leaves a corpse and can then act in the same ways that are characteristic of the ghost. Thus, among other things, it may temporarily take possession of an animal. Thus arises the conception of lycanthropy, of the werewolf. The cannibalistic lust for blood, repressed by social inhibitions, is indulged by the human soul at night in the body of a wolf. This belief is common in Africa, where suspicion falls chiefly on the smith. The classical peoples were likewise acquainted with it,[189] and among the Slavs and Germans it still survives in folk tradition. The Germanic werewolf (man-wolf) is bloodthirsty and bent on the abduction of children, an echo of suppressed cannibalism.

Shamanism[190] is the product of the related conception that man can find artificial means which will permit the soul to leave and enter the body as in sleep. These means are derived from experiences with the suspension of conscious volitional thought and consequently draw upon all those banishers of care with which we are already acquainted. One group makes use of indulgence in narcotics or stimulants. A second shackles the thought processes through the obtrusion of rhythm in music and the dance. A third similarly fetters the mind through fixed gazing at a motionless or uniformly moving object. The first two means are employed by the priests of magic everywhere; even the prophet of Judah craved harp-playing when he was to prophesy. **The** third has been turned to account mainly by Buddhist monasticism. The desired result is to become literally "beside oneself." Rapture, ecstasy, intuition, contemplation, and vision constitute a series of sublimated versions of an originally very real-

[189] See Herodotus *History* iv. 105; Pliny *Naturalia historia* viii. 34; Mela *De chorographia* ii. 1; Augustine *De civitate Dei* xviii. 17.

[190] For excellent general studies of shamanism, see Maddox, *Medicine Man;* Bartels, *Medicin der Naturvolker;* Radloff, *Schamanenthum;* Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1335-1420; IV, 730-830; Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums,* I, 13-284. (Ed.)

istic idea.[191] This basic idea is the product of the primitive conception of dreams, which among savage peoples everywhere involves a double assumption. Either the soul leaves the body and visits the objects remembered from the dream, or else another soul enters the body and discloses such a vision. Into these two categories are divided the habits of those who professionally hold intercourse with spirits.

Bastian[192] visited a West African priest for whom, when summoned by the noise of a rattle, a ghost would rise from its usual abode in the grave and enter his head. He thus became "inspired" and was able to reveal the thoughts of the ghost. This form predominates in Africa. The prophets of Judah were similarly visited by Yahweh in dreams. Not infrequently, however, their own souls were carried off to see distant objects. Both forms were still known to the Christian Middle Ages. In "revelation" the revealing spirit appeared before the sleeper; in "contemplation"[193] the soul went forth from the sleeper to see the objects themselves. The latter was preferred by the monks as less deceptive. It is the form prevailing among the shamanistic Mongolian peoples of northern Asia and Europe. The shaman puts himself into a trance, during which his soul leaves him, visits other souls and ghosts often in remote places, and enters into such intercourse with them as seems profitable to men living under a daimonistic world philosophy.

In its application to man the concept of possession has varied widely on different stages of culture. The entrance of an alien spirit into man is possession in the broader sense. It is more customary, however, to use the word in a narrower sense for the indwelling of a tormenting spirit. In a still more restricted sense it has reference to a particular type of disease phenomenon. Originally man knew no cause for the abnormal state of sickness except invasion by an evil spirit.[194] Not until a comparatively late stage of culture did wider experience and keener judgment set apart a number of diseases and attribute them to a proximate cause outside of the spirit world. With this step began the disintegration of daimonism, though of course this did not become

191 Cf., Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 145-52. (Ed.)

192 *Deutsche Expedition,* I, 85. (Ed.)

193 *'Quae fit per mentis excessum"* (Csesarius of Heisterbach *Diologus miracidorum* ii. 83, 20, 27, 29, 117, *et passim).* (Ed.)

194 Cf., Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 24-6.

perceptible for a long time. The greater the number of such experiences, the more limited becomes the sphere in which daimonism prevails. It sounds paradoxical that all human civilization has had its cradle in daimonism, and yet that civilization and daimonism are inversely proportional. With the compulsion of economic life, medicine would have been in a position at a very early period to lead mankind to a new world philosophy, if, wherever it abandoned daimonism, it had not again followed empirical methods almost exclusively, so that the investigation of the actual causes of disease was postponed a very long time, indeed on the whole until our modern age. When, however, the first attempts to tear loose from daimonism already appear in Greek antiquity, certainly by the fifth century B.C., this only shows very clearly how infinitely slowly mankind, reared in such a peculiar and almost mechanical historical process, is able to absorb new ideas and points of view.

Hippocrates can with good right be called the father of an art of medicine which no longer rests upon a daimonistic and fetishistic foundation. Yet even his teachings stand in the closest causal relation with the ideas and phenomena from which they freed themselves. In this they are very like Greek philosophy, which lifted the old faith from its hinges, though it was fundamentally only an outblossoming of the latter's treasure of ideas. The cult idea destroys itself in its own development; therefore, with correct intuition, it resists development. Just so the world philosophy which overthrows daimonism and fetishism nevertheless has its roots firmly planted in them. Never has there arisen anything absolutely new. Even the external connection between Hippocrates and the cult is noteworthy enough. He was himself descended from the Asclepian line, a priesthood which for centuries had healed mankind by cult methods logically consistent with the daimonistic conception of disease. The heart of his doctrine is the principle of vital warmth, which is clearly not unconnected with the popular conception of the soul as situated and manifested in the warmth of the blood. The moment of cure is to him the "crisis," the elimination of the substance which has forced its way into the organism to cause the ailment and which the vital warmth has, as it were, boiled out and overcome. Here both the connection and the distinction between the old and the new are brought together. We must therefore cast a glance at the therapeutic procedure of pre-Hippocratic times and non-Hellenic cultures.

A very simple logic in this respect unites the tribes or rather the priests or "sorcerers" of New Zealand, Australia, Africa, America, and northern Asia. The "medicine man," the "ganga," and the "shaman" all act and treat the sick with the utmost unanimity as respects the fundamental idea, and this has produced forms which are identical even to minute details. That a demon is the cause of the complaint is taken for granted from the outset. The diagnosis has only to establish what kind of demon and how to attack him.[195] This is done, not by an examination of the patient, but with the aid of the demon which the sorcerer by cult performance has bound to himself to render such services.[196] In other words, the medicine man begins by obtaining an "oracle" from his cult spirit. With reference to its form the Aristotelians were by no means so wrong when they regarded the oracle as the product of a delirium induced by narcotic vapors,[197] although they delimited the means somewhat too narrowly. Tobacco, coca, smoke, music, and dancing all operate to induce the delirium with which the ministration begins among the Mongols, Indians, and Negroes. This delirium is the preliminary condition for "inspiration," through which the diagnosis comes.

The second step is to get the demon causing the complaint **out** of the sick man. For this there are available as aids all the various means which the cult uses in dealing with spirits. The priest may attack the demon with his amulets, charms, or "medicines," i.e., expel or exorcise spirit with spirit, fetish with fetish. Or he may attempt it in an amicable fashion through bribery or propitiation, by fasting, taboos, bloodletting, and similar cult means.[19*] One method, however, seems to have found great favor everywhere, in both the Old and New Worlds. The patient is reassured by being shown the incarnated cause of the disease which has been conjured out of his body. Now this is not possible with respect to the spirit itself, but its fetishistic connections afford the possibility. In the teachings of Ormazd the name of *khar-*

196 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1392. (Ed.)

196 See Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums,* **for** detailed proofs **of all** this.

197 **Cicero** *De divinatione* i. 19; Pliny *Natwrolis historia* ii. 95.

198 See Maddox, *Medicine Man*, pp. **167-226.** (Ed.)

festers is given to the whole brood of scorpions, flies, beetles, toads, and the like, which, when possessed by evil spirits, bring all evil to the earth. The medicine man similarly turns to these things, and also to small inanimate objects, when he wishes to unite the disease demon with its fetishes and thus to expel it from the patient with them. We must assume that this was the original sense and purpose of an action which later degenerated through thoughtless professional practice to the familiar humbug where the priest produces a fetish object from the body of the sick man and claims to have extracted the evil spirit. For all this, nevertheless, the treatment culminates in an elimination or "crisis." When Hippocrates entirely discarded the daimonistic diagnosis and replaced it by a search for the physical cause, he also divested the crisis in the same way of its daimonistic interpretation.

The advance which Hippocrates here represents was gradually accomplished on a broad basis. In order to understand it, we must recognize the part played by the cult. Among the various means with which empiricism first gropingly experimented, were many which the cult had employed in its own way. Not until experience had pronounced its judgment on these means were their physical causes subjected to a rational investigation. Even in modern times some of our most effective remedies have first been introduced empirically and only later analyzed and their mode of operation explained. In the very same way the cult has furnished methods which are still in vogue today, though differently explained.[199] We have already mentioned bloodletting in this connection. Cupping also is known in other forms to entirely uncivilized peoples; it does exactly what the medicine man accomplished by sucking out the noxious substance. The ordinary bath is of the same origin; as the health bath, it has been carried over from one stage to the other. The same thing is also true of the steam bath, which had been discovered at least by the
414 ancient Scythians and the American Indians. Herodotus[200] expressly states that its use among the Scythians was occasioned by a death; hence its object was defense against the ghost. The Indians were accustomed to prepare themselves for some im-

[199] A full discussion in Maddox, *Medicine Man*, pp. 227-93. (Ed.)
200 *History* iv. 73-75. (Ed.)

portant business by a steam bath,[201] as is commonly done by cult activities. In conjunction with the bath the Scythians also made use of fumigation, a means likewise employed for the expulsion of spirits. The young Tobit was taught by the angel Raphael how a tormenting spirit could be exorcised by fumigation. Tobit made smoke, and Raphael captured the demon and bound him in the wilderness far away in Egypt.[202] In exactly the same way the shaman in effecting his cure drives the captured spirit into the desert. Popular medicine still attaches great importance to fumigation. Kneading, which has developed into the rational method of massage, also goes back to shamanism.[203] Still more frequently than in these direct ways, the disease demon is driven out by another and supposedly superior spirit, whose aid the priest secures in one way or another.[204] We are already acquainted with one method by which a spirit is introduced into a body; it was employed by the Egyptians and Semites in order to make an object a fetish. The Larka Kols of India still use it in connection with the original purpose; when they wish the ghosts of the buried dead to appear in the monument stones, they sprinkle these with oil.[205] Anointment is similarly used to bring into contact with the sick man the spirit before whom the noxious demon is to yield. But ointments have also found acceptance in rational treatment. Incantation or exorcism by the use of words, on the other hand, survives only in popular superstition.

Although in practice Hippocrates seems everywhere to have divested therapeutics of the daimonistic idea, he nevertheless still adhered in theory to the daimonistic original cause of disease, or else he did not dare to run counter to the general popular belief and therefore sought a compromise with it by admitting two parallel classes of causes. When he writes that the Scythians ascribed certain diseases to a god and therefore feared and honored in the true fetishistic sense a man so afflicted, he adds that he himself regards these and all other diseases as "divine," i.e., of daimonistic origin, but that nevertheless each illness also has its own physical basis.[206]

201 Loskiel, *Geschichte der Mission,* p. 139.
202 Tobit vi. 9, 20; viii. 3. Cf., Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, **242.**
208 See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* **II, 1400-2.** (Ed.)
204 See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, **242.** (Ed.)
205 Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, **447.** Cf ,, Lippert, *Geschichte **des** Priesterthums,* II, 19, 353.
206 Hippocrates *De aere, locis et aquis.*

This unreconciled compromise was gradually effected in another way in popular beliefs. On the one hand, the general daimonistic conception gave way in the case of those diseases in which a physical cause could be easily recognized and which could be treated by empirical means. On the other, it survived longest in connection with those which revealed phenomena apparently independent of human will. Between these two extremes fall a number of diseases which are classed sometimes in one group and sometimes in the other, according to the stage of culture.

The harmless phenomenon of sneezing has always fallen, either directly or as a survival, into the second class. As an organic activity not under the control of the human will, it gives evidence of an indwelling demon who has gained mastery over the body. The sneezer must therefore be "possessed," and a sickness is to be expected as the result. Hence the Moslem, when he sneezes, prays to Allah for protection against Satan, who has thus announced his presence, and the brief and fervent Christian prayer, "God bless you," has the same original sense and motive.[207] The spirit manifesting himself through this action need not, however, necessarily be an evil one. The Khonds of India recognize by the sneezing of their priest that he is possessed by a spirit and thus inspired in a beneficial way.[208] This form is still preserved in the popular belief that sneezing after an utterance is a confirmation of its truth, i.e., an evidence of inspiration. In one of the two forms the idea is familiar to Homer,[209] Aristotle,[210] Pliny,[211] and the Jewish rabbis, and it has been observed in Florida, Tahiti, and the Tonga Islands.[212]

Among the diseases which appeared longest to be consequences of possession belong sudden epidemics, mental disorders, epilepsy, hysteria, gout, rheumatism, St. Vitus's dance, paralysis from unknown causes, and, according to the evidence of the New Testament, even deaf-mutism.[218] The healing of such diseases there-

207 Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 500; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 229.

208 Percival, *Land of the Veda,* p. 333. (Ed.)

209 *Odyssey* xvii. 541. (Ed.)

210 *Problemata* xxxiii. 7. (Ed.)

211 *Naturalis historia* xxviii. 5. (Ed.)

212 For references and additional cases, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* I, 97-104; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 227-9; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 499-501. (Ed.)

218 See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 226-32.

fore remained fundamentally an exorcism of demons and followed the methods of the latter.[214]

The idea of the "transmigration of souls" is implicit in the theory of fetishism, for the spirits dwelling in their various fetishes, yet not bound to them, have themselves once been human souls or have been conceived by an analogy therewith. Lycanthropy likewise is a transmigration of souls. This principle, inherent in fetishism, has been developed into a doctrine in ancient Egypt and in India. Between the two doctrines, however, there exists a not unimportant distinction, which, it seems to us, arises from the social conditions in the two lands.

The comparatively ancient civilization of Egypt looked back upon a long series of forms of cult provision for the dead, each of which had necessarily bequeathed a different conception of the continued existence of the soul. The grave fetish, the memorial stone conventionalized into the obelisk, the sacred sycamore, and the garden surrounded by water all became seats of the soul —even at one and the same time, in consequence of the law of compatibility. From another aspect, moreover, the departed soul was thought to be united with the god of death or the divinity of the cult place himself, in a way which opened wide the doors to later speculation. The soul became Osiris, or Ra, or Turn, or whatever the divine hero of the old district cult place was called. It thereby became connected with all the different animal and even celestial fetishes that were peculiar to these divinities. These ideas arose in their various forms not only at different times but also at different places and at first had only a local currency. But as the entire population of the Nile valley finally became amalgamated into a single people without incorporating alien elements of subordinate status, these disparate conceptions were all fused into a single Egyptian national tradition. Moreover, however difficult it may seem to reconcile them all, it is nevertheless a fact that in Egyptian thought they were all of equal value. One fate alone was the antithesis of all the rest, namely, to die a "second death," to be devoured by hostile barbarian fetish demons, to be condemned never again to rise from subterranean darkness as one "justified." This "justification" was the adequacy of the cult works accumulated to assure the continued existence of the soul. The substance of this elevated concept depended

[214] See White, *Warfare of Science with Theology, II,* 97-124. (Ed.)

upon the culture of the time and need not engage us further here. If the divine judges in the realm of the dead declared the cult works sufficient to merit an everlasting life for the deceased, he went forth to another life as one "justified," "transfigured," or "resurrected." The soul then enjoyed full liberty of choice as to its seat. It could sway in the branches of its sycamore, glide through the waters, visit its relatives in any desired animal form, or sail through the heavens on the sun-bark. Such was the nature of the Egyptian transmigration of souls.

India has not experienced a similar amalgamation of its tribes into a unified people. On the contrary, they constitute a complex of strictly separate and unequal units, and these frequently differ in their choice of fetishes. Consequently the different classes of fetishes appear by no means of equal value in the Hindu religious system, as they were in Egypt. They have been arranged into a vast hierarchical scale through the speculations of the priests, who as administrators of the cult share heavily in the accumulations for the hereafter. It is thus possible to determine accurately the fate of the soul. Cult works are not judged merely as adequate or inadequate, but are weighed ounce for ounce. The fate allotted to the soul corresponds exactly to the slightest difference in the weight of the accumulated merit, which is very inappropriately expressed by the phrase "reward of virtue." The graduated hereafter is composed of subterranean caverns, derived from the conceptions of the old "chthonian" grave cults, the mountain and animal fetishes on the surface of the earth, and the vault of light crowning the whole, derived from ideas in the sphere of the "uranian" cults. In value as in location the former naturally stand lowest, the latter highest. Unlike the soul of the ancient Egyptian, the Hindu soul can not soar up and down the scale at its pleasure. Even in the hereafter the cult burden presses heavily upon it. The exactly measured weight of its own cult performances, increased by the piety of its descendants, assigns it its precise place and rank, which it can not leave nor even retain forever. The Brahman cult administrators are uncommonly exacting. It is impossible for any one to accumulate enough merit to pay the rent, as it were, of a high rank for all eternity. Any cult merit, unless eternally nourished by an eternal succession of sons, is in time consumed. Then the soul is evicted and sinks down, while others with higher merits soar above it.

Hence the "Buddhas," ghosts who have attained the highest rank through the highest merit, tower above the older gods of India, who once reigned so high. Every one is rising and falling in this unstable spirit world. Nevertheless the depth to which one sinks depends upon the height to which one has once climbed. From a certain stage the soul can no longer sink into the underworld or enter a fetish animal, but can only be reborn as a human being, to struggle upward anew to a higher stage by the number of its cult works.

This is an approximate picture of the ancient Hindu conception of the transmigration of souls. The doctrine is excellently suited to elevate cult righteousness to the throne as the dominant principle of life. This one-sided development, inimical to all social foresight, is in complete accord with the one-sidedness of the daimonistic world philosophy, whose most perfect fruit it is. Such a closed system leaves no room for righteousness in our sense. A poor man, a member of a lower caste, can only look forward to an animal as his future refuge. His poverty can not meet the higher rents of heaven. He can not afford sacrifices and remuneration to the Brahmans for sacrifices. If we ask why this is so, the Hindu doctrine replies that his misery is only the result of deficient cult performance in his earlier existences. His cult merits were accordingly such that he could not be reborn into a higher status or one more favorable for his future. These rebirths or reincarnations, these avatars or different manifestations of the same spiritual being in the visible world, constitute a leading theme of Hindu myth. Among other things they are used to explain the different fetish forms of one and the same divinity. Each form is ascribed to a different avatar of the god, for even the gods, according to earlier beliefs, do not occupy their seats eternally, or else they could not do so if the cult of men, their descendants, did not maintain them there. Here the refined conception of relative divinity attaches once more to the most primitive ideas of the cult, to which it is ever firmly chained by a genetic connection. It can rise no higher. It is curious that Plutarch, in a similar situation, explains the fall of the oracle once so useful to mankind by the hypothesis that the daimons who had once transmitted oracular revelations to the forefathers must have died. From the same point of view he was certainly right. The disintegration of the religious tradition of his time, the essential nature of which we have already touched upon, had as its consequence a collapse of the cult, and divinities left without a cult must necessarily die. In India they would have sunk to the lower regions of fetishism, to seek a miserable sustenance by means of their borrowed bodies. It is questionable which lot is the more enviable. By comparison with either conception the serene confidence of the Egyptian stands out as beautiful. The highly developed care for life of this earliest firmly organized state is mirrored in this assurance as to the future lot.

Another outgrowth of the fetish idea, which on a higher stage attains a considerable social importance, is totemism.[216] It extends to all types of fetishism but emerges most strikingly in the sphere of the animal fetish. Hence it may properly be discussed here, although frequently alluded to elsewhere. The word "totem," borrowed from the Indians, is used for two different things.[216] The first, corresponding to the *kobong* of the Australians,[217] is the fetish with which the individual concludes his personal cult union. The second and more important, however, is the fetish with which the ancestral ghost of the clan is thought to be associated. Since the fetish lends itself readily to pictorial representation or suggestion, each individual through his fetishistic connections acquires a hieroglyph or coat of arms. By inscribing them on a house post, as was done by the Haidas and other northwestern Indians, whole genealogies may be depicted. In this case the uppermost emblem is that of the original ancestor and hence that of the entire clan. By means of this fetish symbol, moreover, the clan or tribe as a whole may be designated and inscribed by name. The Indians had already begun to employ both types of totems for a kind of picture writing. Schoolcraft213 has reproduced the census-roll of a clan, sketched by an Ojibwa in 1849. It contains among others the figures of a catfish, a beaver skin, a sun, an eagle, a snake, a bison, an ax, and the medicine

[215] Sumner and Keller *(Science of Society,* II, 1052-9) follow Lippert in regarding totemism as "basically a religious phenomenon" intimately related to fetishism, but, unlike Lippert, they do not neglect its important social aspects, of which the most important is exogamy. For an analysis of the essential features of totemism, see Goldenweiser, "Totemism." The classic monumental work on the subject is Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy.* (Ed.)

[216] Cf., Chapin, *Social Evolution,* pp. 246-6. (Ed.)

[217] Cf., Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* II, 166. (Ed.)

[218] *Indian Tribes*, I, 352ff. See also Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 46-54.

man. Under each figure a number of strokes indicates the number of persons in the respective families of the catfish, bison, or ax (even an implement can be a fetish and totem). On grave posts the inverted position of the totem symbol indicates that the person thus named is dead. A petition in picture writing, reproduced by the same authority, besides showing the object of the petition, a group of lakes in the neighborhood of Lake Superior, represents a number of clan totems: crane, marten, bear, man-fish, and catfish. The crane is the leader of the deputation, and the personal totems, as is often the case, are replaced by the clan totems. Even on the grave monument often only the clan totem is inscribed, the person being revealed to one well informed by tokens or trophies indicating his life history, his battles, hunts, peace treaties, and the like.

Following these facts, we will use the word "totemism" in our further discussion only with reference to clans and tribes. Understood in this sense, the totem designates or names the fetish object of the presumed ancestral ghost of a clan or tribe. But, as we have repeatedly observed, it is a general practice to call the ghost by the more concrete and familiar name of his fetish. Among the Indians, indeed, such names are often given even to
420 individual men. The reader will thus immediately see the meaning of the apparently strange assertion that an Indian clan or tribe is descended from the turkey or that the turkey is its original ancestor. Logically, then, each individual of the group is also a turkey. To the Indian this does not sound any stranger than to hear his white neighbor called Fox or Wolf.

Thus the Haidas, according to Jakobsen,[219] are divided into four clans—bears, ravens, wolves, and eagles. The Dogribs are descended from a young dog, the Ojibwa from a dog skin. Other clan or tribal ancestors are the hare, the bear, the wolf, the beaver, the turtledove, the tortoise, the alligator, the toad, and the rattlesnake.[220] The Hidatsa express the same idea more accurately when they say that their grandfather is a snake transformed into a man.[221] A further enumeration of North American Indian totems is given by Spencer.[222] The conception is by no

210 *NordKüste Amerikas.* Only two clans, however, the Raven and Eagle, are listed in *Handbook of American Indians,* I, 523. (Ed.)

220 A number of examples are cited in Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 65.

221 Bastian, in *Zeitsch. f. Ethnol.,* I, 48, 61-2.

222 *Principles of Sociology,* I, 344-7.

means peculiar to these Indians, although it has remained most undimmed among them, while elsewhere its former existence can often only be inferred from decadent survivals. Totemism flourished in Peru at the time of the conquest.[223] According to Garcilasso de la Vega, an individual did not pass as a man of position and honor unless he could trace his descent to a spring, stream, lake, or the ocean, or to a bear, cougar, eagle, condor, or other animal or bird, or to a cave or a wood. These objects were called *huacas,* a general term which in this sense is identical in meaning with fetish and totem.

In Africa, Livingstone[224] observed clear traces of totemism among the Bechuanas. Among their subsidiary tribes are the Bakatla, i.e., "they of the monkey," the Bakuena, "they of the alligator," and the Batlapi, "they of the fish." The fetishistic sense of these names is indicated by the superstitious dread which each tribe has of the animal after which it is named. "A tribe never eats the animal which is its namesake." The Sea Dyaks
421 betray their totemism by the same fear. "They suppose these animals bear a proximity to some of their forefathers, who were begotten by them or begot them."[225] Totemism still survives among the hill tribes of Assam; the Khasi clans are designated by animal names.[228] Moreover, a myth of the descent of the human race from apes has been discovered in Tibet.[227] This is more likely a survival of totemism than a theory of evolution.

As for Europe, only in myths and legends do we find a suggestion of former totemism. Animal names and coats of arms with animal symbols, the latter at first fastened to the lance like a war emblem and later painted on the shield, may often go back to such an origin, but rarely is the connection demonstrable, for the more heraldry developed, the more it separated from the old root to pursue new objects, thereby becoming independent. In ancient Greece and Italy the numerous myths telling of animals leading tribes on their migrations suggest a totemic interpreta-
422 tion. Thus a cow led Cadmus to Thebes, Apollo in the form of a dolphin the Cretans to Delphi, and a raven Battus to Cyrene, The Piceni were said, in a Roman legend, to have been guided by

[528] Cf., Lateham, "Totemism of the Ancient Andean Peoples." (Ed.)
[224] *Missionary Travels,* p. 13.
[225] Brooke, *Sarawak,* I, 62.
[226] Bastian, "Hügelstamme Assams."
[227] Schmidt, *Volker Mitteksiens,* pp. 23ff., 193, 214.

a woodpecker *(picus)*, the Hirpini by a wolf *(Mrpus)*, and the Samnites by a bull, the two former tribes receiving their names from their respective animal leaders.[228]

To a still more survivalistic stage must belong a class of myths in which the old tradition is preserved but is construed from the point of view of a later age to make the relation to the fetish animal merely one of adoption. The wolf stood in a fetishistic relation to Greek and Italic divinities and was the totem animal of a Sabine tribe. Would it, then, have been so unprecedented, had a she-wolf, in an equally early conception, been the totem animal of the infant Roman tribe? Lupa, the she-wolf, is identified in myth with Acca Larentia, the mother of the *lares*, and may very well once have been her fetish. But a later age, which had sloughed off fetishistic conceptions except for a few survivals, would feel a comprehensible reluctance in reporting that their tribal heroes had in all actuality had a wolf for their mother. Since, however, the fact could not be stricken from the tradition, the plausibility of the connection could only be restored by the device of making Romulus and Remus the foster children of the she-wolf. The myth of Cyrus offers a parallel. If we read the account by Herodotus[229] backwards, as it were, the first fact to appear is that in the family of Cyrus the legend existed that he, when exposed like the Roman heroes, had been suckled by a bitch. Indeed this tale is even said to have been spread in order to place the hero in the light of enjoying a special relation with divine providence. When we recall the importance which the dog possessed in Persia, even under Zoroastrianism, a dog as a totem animal does not appear at all improbable under earlier conditions. But the rationalism of Herodotus went so far as to find even this reinterpretation no longer credible enough, so he tells a whole story to show that the dog came into the legend simply from a confusion of names between Kyno, the human foster mother of Cyrus, and *kyon*, the word for "dog." We can infer from this, at the same time, how far from the source we are in drawing religious conceptions even from the "father of history."

228 Preller, *Romische Mythologie,* p. 296. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* IV, 186 n[4]. (Ed.)

229 *History* 1110-122.

CHAPTER XIV

ADVANCED FETISHISM AS A SOCIAL FACTOR

We have now to become acquainted with another series of fetish types, which are less directly derived from the property relation or the connection with the corpse, or which involve ideas somewhat less easy to comprehend. In the gradual advance outlined above, man inevitably arrives at the point where he ventures to spring from solid earth on the wings of fancy. And he becomes the more fitted to do so, the more his imagination is stimulated by the influences of civilized life. Only the peoples of higher culture, therefore, possess fetishism of the more elevated type, with the chief representatives of which we shall now become acquainted. But although this group in the end forms the transition to sublime conceptions and lofty ideas which seem completely dissociated from the concept of fetishism, in the beginning it is nevertheless intimately connected with the true fetishism of the children of nature.

First to be included here are the water fetishes, those of rivers and lakes and even of the great sea. In India, cremation is by no means the only prevalent method of disposing of the body. Many tribes prefer to throw their corpses into the rivers, which then, like the Ganges, come to be regarded as sacred. Lakes and oceans similarly become holy objects. The seafaring Caribs threw food into the ocean, because they believed that the ghosts of those buried, intentionally or accidentally, in the sea must naturally
424 dwell in its depths.[1] Thus in popular beliefs it is certainly considered possible for a ghost to associate himself with water as with other fetishes.[2]

Among the Greeks and kindred peoples the fetishism of rivers and springs must have been especially prevalent. Even though the primary nature of this fetishism was veiled to the civilized

Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 207.
[2] **Cf., Tylor,** *Primitive Culture,* **II, 208-14, 274-7. (Ed.)**

people of later times, the cult always preserved the distinction between the fetish object—here the river—and the indwelling spirit, while it nevertheless included both under the same name. When, as often happens, rivers are praised as the founders of the civilization of a land,[8] this may be explained as a poetic fiction in consideration of their natural advantages. When, however, they are named as the oldest kings of the land and as the original ancestors of its tribes and are honored in the cult, like the Scamander in the Troad, the Inachus in Argolis, the Asopus at Phlius, the Kephissos in Boeotia, and the Peneus in Thessaly, and when the Strymon has its temple at Amphipolis, and when, moreover, the inhabitants of Drerus in Crete, in taking an oath, mention the names of the rivers among those of the gods, then we are inevitably reminded of fetishism alone and of its ramifications as they have already been described. Indeed the wide diffusion of this very type of fetishism led the roving Greeks to presume and honor a god in every river. Thus Odysseus invokes the to him unknown river in the land of the Phsecians as a god, although by his mode of address he shows very clearly that he is thinking of its divinity.[4] By itself, it would be just as difficult to comprehend how Orsilochus could be said to have the river Alpheus as his father[6] as for an Indian to be descended from the muskrat, but in the language of totemism there is nothing unintelligible about either. The ocean was also sacred to the Greeks, and likewise inhabited by spirits and gods. The Romans thought of their Pater Tiberinus as an old king.

Gods of springs and wells have been known nearly everywhere. In view of the great value of wells in the extensive grazing areas of the true nomads, a value enhanced not a little by the expenditure of labor in their construction and repair, we must align this type of fetishism with that of property. The ghost of the builder clung to his property, and conversely tribes inevitably ascribed the benefaction of their construction to those whom they worshiped as their original ancestors. Thus, in the history of the Biblical patriarchs, wells are mentioned in a way which places them on a par with sacred cult places and brings them into connection with the ghosts of the underworld.

[8] Cf., Preller, *Griechische Mythologie,* I, 421.
* Homer *Odyssey* v. 444-5.
[5] Homer *Iliad* v. 544-5.

When the Tahitians after considerable intercourse with the whites began to formulate a conception of their long sea voyages, they once asked one of them whether on his journey he had not also "gone to the sun and moon."[6] This idea is very natural to the savage. Even the Biblical account of the creation still makes the sun and moon appear as appendages of the earth. Somewhere, judging from all appearances, the sun and moon must be attainable from the earth or the sea. For each tribe, however, this region lies far from its own. As a rule, therefore, it is conquering peoples coming from afar, peoples who know how to spread terror of their power, of whom popular imagination readily acknowledges that their land of origin lies at the edge of the sun or even in the sun. The land of origin, however, is regarded in general and not without logic as that in which the graves or seats of the original ancestors are located, and likewise as that to which the souls return after death. Hence the ghosts of ruling tribes commonly take their seat in the sun, in the stars, or in the heaven. These are the noblest of all fetishes, and the natural human passion for distinction could alone have led man to this fetishism. It is striking, nevertheless, how generally subject and conquering peoples are distinguished respectively by chthonian and uranian cults. Only invaders from afar, conquering with their superior might, can count on seeing their celestial fetishism, including their heavenly origin, recognized by an awe-struck subject people.

With the introduction of this universally later form of fetishism, the conception of the other world begins to split in two. Among the Apalachee and Natchez only the brave secured a seat in the sun after death; the others went down below as before.[7] This tendency toward cleavage appears everywhere on this stage of social development. Even the Aztecs, whose former chthonism is evidenced in their origin myth, embraced the sun fetish as conquerors, but only their military heroes went to the sun. The old and the new, the animal and the celestial fetish, were combined in the idea that in the sun the heroes, transformed into humming birds, would lead an airy existence. Likewise among the Indians of Florida and Peru the nobles and rulers went to their last rest in the sun.[8] The conquering Caribs after death mounted

[6] Forster, *Seereiaen.* II, 97.
[7] Meiners, *Geschichte der Religionen,* II, 770.
[8] Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 505.

into the stars. The Hindu doctrine of heaven, to which we have alluded above, was naturally not born full-fledged in that form. The conflict between the two conceptions was still well known in Vedic times. The early period was characterized by gloomy chthonism. Only later was the final resting place elevated to the skies. One hymn mentions the sun in this connection.[9] Others tell "that the Rishis or priestly sages of olden times, like Varishtha, Brigu, and Atri, received the brightest constellation of the northern heaven as their abode."[10] When Krishna was overcome, his spirit rose to heaven, where it was received with great honor by the gods and Rishis.[11]

Where these ideas penetrated, human society in the hereafter was split asunder. The basis of the cleavage, however, varied according to the further development of religious ideas. The separation of rulers and subjects, of warriors and men of peace, is the oldest form. Thus among the Norse those who had fallen in battle went to Odin in his castle in the clouds; the men of peace went down to hell, or, according to another notion, they were Thor's portion, the "slaves." In India, fundamentally the same distinction separates the upper and lower classes, for only the rich and noble can afford abundant cult benefactions. Originally, expressions like our "hell" and "heaven" meant simply the abode of departed souls in general and without reference to location; now they are separated into the gloomy hell below and the heaven above. The Hindu heaven, for example, still appears in old sources sometimes below in the interior of the universe and sometimes above in the region of the stars, but in the later doctrine the two are distinguished, the older deities becoming gloomy chthonian gods of the depths, the younger, uranian gods of light. Sometimes the same divine name is found in both places. Thus the Greeks here and there preserved their "chthonian Zeus" beside the Olympian. Similarly the pre-Buddhistic priests of Tibet, the *boribos,* were divided into *bonbos* of heaven and *bonbos* of the earth.[12] Moreover, just as the gods of mother-right are older than those of the patriarchate, so a "Mother Earth" survives even in linguistic usage along with the later "Father in Heaven" or "Heavenly Father." In harmony with this, a large number of

[9] *Riff-Veda* viii. 90. 14.
[10] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* II, 904.
[11] *Ibid.,* I, 853.
[12] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme*, p. 262.

myths, in attempting to explain the origin of the gods, unite earth and heaven as the first married couple.

The contrasting properties of the two seats of the gods could not but influence the conception of the gods themselves and the forms of the cult. In the oldest sacrifice, the offering of means of subsistence to the ghosts in the earth, there was no destruction of the sacrificial portion by fire. Either the ghosts came forth and participated in the meal with men, or their portion was placed in their fetish places, in front of the monument or under the tree, or it was introduced directly into their abode. Thus certain tribes of West Africa insert tubes and funnels in their graves, in order to pour down to the dead their cherished liquors.[18] Other peoples pull up the turf, so that the earth may receive the delicious sacrificial blood, and the Homeric Greeks still sacrificed blood and wine in holes for those in the earth. A survival of this ancient type of sacrifice was the pouring out of the blood at the foot of the altar at Jerusalem.

Beside this chthonian sacrifice there now appears, over a wide area though not universally, a new form based on the assumption that the gods have their residence in the air or on high. It was perhaps first used in burning the remnants of the meal before the *lares* at the household hearth to prevent their being employed to work magic. It was then seen that fire was well Adapted to waft the fumes of the sacrifice to the divinities above. Since, however, this cult form always remained only a specialty, with different historical fates in different lands, it never entirely suppressed the older form. In Greece the two, so long as there was a direct cult, existed side by side.

This fact has led to a peculiar conception of the religion of antiquity and, through a generalization based thereupon, to an erroneous explanation of all religion, but one which has nevertheless been widely accepted. From the double cult a dual form of religion has been inferred, an antithesis between a religion of light, supposedly represented in Greece by the cult of Apollo, and a religion of the dark forces. And it has been believed, furthermore, that it was the existence of such an antithesis in the forces of nature which first stimulated the human mind to religious thinking and to the formulation of religious ideas. But the antithesis in the cults actually makes its appearance much too late

[13] Cf., Kingsley, *West African Studies,* p. 485. (Ed.)

to admit of such an interpretation, and it is impossible to deny the existence of religious concepts where it does not appear at all. Even Apollo was not always associated with the sun fetish; he was once a death divinity and possessed the wolf as his fetish, as is still suggested in the name of the Lyceum at Athens.[14]

Greece by no means arrived at such a thoroughgoing uranism as Babylonia, Egypt, and India. Still less did the two principles here enter into hostile opposition, such as might perhaps have been caused by a competitive struggle between rival priesthoods. In Greece there remained room for all cult forms, and no central authority restricted the free competition of priesthoods. Even though the older hero-cult became to a certain extent less important than the predominantly uranian cult of the gods, nevertheless divinities recognized and accepted on Olympus, like Demeter, always continued to receive sacrifices of a markedly chthonian character. If any perceptible cleavage appeared, it was one which shows clearly the origin of the entire divergence: the cults of the government and the rulers were uranian in type, whereas the people flocked *en masse* to those cult unions, the mysteries, which were centered almost exclusively about chthonian divinities. We have elsewhere[15] observed a similar cleavage in Rome, where in the wedding ceremonies the religious needs of the household were referred to the chthonian and those of the public to the uranian gods—the family is older than the state.

Herodotus must have been in the right when, in considering religious conditions, he said that in comparison to the age of the Egyptian religion that of the Greeks was as of yesterday and today, for uranism had had as yet so slight an effect in Greece that it scarcely perceptibly influenced the notions of the hereafter. The conception of an underworld seems always to have remained the popular one. Even if an Elysium was separated from it for the favorites of the higher gods, this was nevertheless, like Olympus with which it shared eternal spring, never a truly uranian abode.

The conceptions of the Hebrews were not entirely dissimilar in this one respect. Their development with regard to fetishism was interrupted by the establishment of Yahwism before it had yet arrived at the goal from which other peoples advanced to new

[14] See *Cambridge Ancient History,* II, 632. (Ed.)
[15] *Kulturgeschichte,* II, 151-2. Cf., Rossbach, *Romische Ehe,* p. 301. (Ed.)

developments. For a certain distance Yahwism also followed the general path. Doubtless according to an earlier conception the power of God had dwelt directly in the ark or sacred chest, contact with which struck men dead.[16] Other seats of the same Divinity were the cell of the temple surrounded by graves, winged animal forms, the flame of the burning bush and the pillar of fire, and the sacred mountain from which He descended to have intercourse with men. He was also thought to have His seat in high heaven, but here the comparison with the fetishistic conceptions of heaven of other peoples stops short. The cult, jealous of its singleness, did not permit even speculation to go farther and link the fate of the common human soul with that of the divinity, as all other peoples do. Consequently no definite conceptions of a uranian hereafter were developed. Even the late Jewish philosopher speaks only in tones of conjecture and doubt, leaving us to infer that popular opinion recognized a strange sort of cleavage, the soul of the animal possibly going below while that of man followed the path of uranism.

On the other hand, Egypt, as we have seen, resolved the threatening split into perfect harmony. The soul, freed from the dust of the earth, had its choice of any chthonian or uranian abode. The condition of this freedom, however, was the cult. It held the key to the universe, and as it increased in magnitude there naturally grew up the idea of the omnipotence and supreme importance of cult works. In Judea, however, the cult was a broken tool. First, Yahwism had absorbed into itself and completely destroyed all the rival cults of the community, the kin-group, the family, and the dead, such as continued to flourish so luxuriantly in Egypt, and then, with the dispersal of the people and the destruction of the one cult place, even the Yahwistic cult had collapsed. All that remained was a few remnants of cult works—a cultless burial of the dead, almsgiving, and the observance of the word of God.

India in the course of time, as we have seen, combined the elements into a unified system in a very different way. From them it created a cosmos with caverns in the depths, with the
430 forms of supporting animal fetishes on the earth, and with heavens rising in tiers above. Here the soul rises and falls according to the measure of its cult merits, ever again returning to the

[16] Cf., 2 Samuel vi. 6-7 (Ed.)

troubles of human life in order to replenish its exhausted merits, which can never suffice for eternal salvation. According to the Atharva-Veda, the cremation of the body formed the necessary condition for ascending into the uranian seats, whither Yama, once the subterranean god of the dead, had himself removed. If not released by fire, the soul entered into the old fetishes of the cult place, especially .lingering with the body or in the sacred fig tree. Here, in fact, it always dwelt after death, until cremation released it. Hence the priest says to the soul: "Hasten to the fathers. May thy ghost not remain behind, nor aught of thy vital strength, thy members, thy fluid, nor aught of thy body. Let the tree not constrain thee, nor the goddess, the great earth. Find thy place with the fathers, prosper with them and with Yama their king."[17]

The astronomical advances, which spread from the Babylonian temples to all civilized peoples, could not but influence the comparative clarity of the conception of the uranian heaven, or rather heavens. The conceptions associated with the seven celestial spheres formed by the seven planetary orbits, thus developed and disseminated, were taken over bodily by early Christianity.

In Iran, the antithesis in fetishistic conceptions led, under the influence of historical events, to an entirely different view, that of a developed dualism. Yet the transition thereto was abundantly prepared.[18] Man has always known both good and evil spirits. But no moral quality attaches to their antagonism any more than to the natural hostility of tribal strangers. One and the same spirit is good to those who have propitiated him through the cult, and evil to every one else. But this very fact affords a criterion of the habitual character of divinities. The gods of one's own cult, so long as they are not angry at men for their cult omissions and unfulfilled obligations, are good gods; those of alien tribes are unconditionally and habitually evil. In states established by the forcible subjection of one stratum of population to another, this condition may easily continue. On top of this there then appears the antithesis of fetishism. The younger conquering gods are those of the heavens; the deities of the resentful subject population are those of the earth and inferior fetishes, among which the snake or dragon is especially promi-

17 ***Atharva-Veda*** **xviii. 2. 23ff.**
18 Cf., Sumner and Keller, ***Science of Society,*** **I I , 969-70. (Ed.)**

nent. Thus in India the snake gods are in the main evil, and in Babylonia the snake, Tiamat, was defeated by the gods of the Semites. Sometimes there is added the conflict between forms of social organization, the original population rallying about a female divinity. Hence the goddess of the underworld, the female snake, is often the evil principle opposed to the celestial god. It is inevitable from their fetishes that the opposing gods of the upper and under worlds should be arrayed against each other as light against darkness, white against black.

In spite of all this, however, the antithesis does not necessarily become the basis of a dualistic system. Egypt, Greece, and Rome show us how it can be reconciled. Zeus concludes peace with Gaia and admits her and Demeter to his mountain heaven. Persephone divides her life between the under and upper worlds. Rome indemnified the old gods with endowed cults. Even the Hebrews preserved a survival of such a cult in the scapegoat sacrificed to Azazel, the demon in the wilderness, on the day of atonement.[19] In other respects, however, the Hebrews and Persians stand together.

The Avesta in many places denounces the "sorcerers" as worshipers of the daevas (demons) and the Magi as thieves[20] with a zeal like that with which Yahwism in Judea after the time of Josiah persecuted and annihilated the cults and priesthoods of the country. Just as the high priest Hilkiah sent to the astonished king the newly discovered book of the law,[21] which legally established the claims of the Yahwistic priesthood and the necessity of the destruction of its rivals, so Zoroaster came before King Gustasp with his law of similar import on this point.[22] The young Persian dynasty, which first freed itself from Media, then overcame Babykmia, and out of gratitude sent the captive Hebrews home laden with presents, actually came into conflict with the Magi. History records a reactionary insurrection by the Magus Smerdis,[23] and tradition remembers a Persian "feast of the slaughter of the Magi."

A reason for this struggle! of the new government established by Cyrus can probably be found in the importance of the priest-

[19] **Leviticus xvi.**
[20] **Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta*, I, 103; II, 314. (Ed.)**
[21] **2 Kings xxii. 8-11. (Ed.)**
[22] **Cf., Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums*, II, 322**
[28] **Cf., *Cambridge Ancient History*, IV, 173. (Ed.)**

hood. After the separation of the political and ecclesiastical powers, the position of the consecrated king, as we shall see later, was such that he easily became a kind of cult tool in the hands
432 of the priesthood. The authority always tended to revert to the latter as the stable power. Thus it was that in Egypt and Judea —and it could scarcely have been otherwise in Media and Babylonia—the overthrow of the king by no means assured possession to the conqueror, unless he also won over or supported the priesthood. Thus the Persian dynasty could expect to complete and consolidate its conquest only by elevating the cult of Ahura-Mazda (Ormazd) as the sole state cult. Moreover, the priesthood of Zoroaster, whose law was only a compendium of the old customary law in the sphere of religious and social life, had a strong material interest in acquiring power without rivals.

However it might happen in individual cases, the inevitable consequence of the exclusive validity of a single public cult, in connection with the hostile position of the repressed cults, was certainly to invest the divinities of the latter with the character of hostility. It was impossible to repudiate the host of spirits worshiped in Persia itself. Mithra and Homa, gods of an earlier age, and the fetishes of the cypress, the bull, the dog, and the cock, like the pre-Yahwistic cult divinities of Judea, were repressed into a mythical background, in part with rationalized explanations of their value and sanctity. One name and one fetish were placed at their head. The army of the opponents in the spirit world was organized in similar fashion. Thus Ormazd, the divinity of light, was pitted against vanquished chthonism headed by Ahriman with his snake fetish and underworld residence. The concepts of good and evil, associated with the two opponents, acquired as much ethical meaning as the social stage of the time had developed. But the Persians, although to be sure they developed a special type of fetishism, nevertheless did not advance to actual uranism.

433 The unique and celebrated dualism of Persia did not involve any essential elements, other than the foregoing, of a new or original character. That the good go to Ormazd and the wicked to Ahriman was simply a variant of the widespread notion that the souls of the dead go to live with the divine head of their cult union. No less general is the conception that the departed souls assist the living in their struggles and needs. From this

idea, in conjunction with the above elements, arose the conception of the two warring kingdoms.

One must be on one's guard, however, against regarding the goodness and "purity," stressed by Zoroastrianism as the weapon in the struggle, as a purely ethical consideration. On the contrary, like the cult righteousness.with which the Egyptian armed himself, it consisted in a number of purely objective cult works definitely prescribed by custom and the invention of the priests. The purity of which the Zoroastrian makes such a pharisaical display by no means always coincides with cleanliness, much less with moral integrity. By comparison, the cult faith of the ancient Egyptians, as a consequence of their social development, came to sanction a much greater number of really ethical motives. Thus it paved the way for the process which was destined gradually to give the concept of righteousness a new socio-ethical meaning, a process into which the later struggle of the Galilean with the Pharisees of the cult place fitted so significantly.

We may now pause for a moment to consider the most important celestial fetishes themselves. The entire visible heaven, the illusory blue vault with its stars, serves as a fetish only in exceptional cases.[24] When it does, however, it too reveals all the logical consequences of the idea. Whether the Hindu Indra was regarded as a heaven god in this strict sense can not be settled by the etymology of the name alone—"blue air" according to Kuhn, "the luminous one" according to Roth. In China, on the other hand, the heaven (Tien) is in the truest sense the fetish of
434 the supreme god. Apparently here too celestial fetishism developed only in the course of time as a later cult form.[25] The oldest emperors gave the name of Shang-ti to a spiritual personality, afterwards replaced by Tien. As is well known, the Jesuits and Dominicans fell into a violent dispute over the choice of these names in translating our term for the Deity, the Jesuits making the more practical selection. Tien, to be sure, means the visible physical heaven, but it becomes the name of the god in accordance with the general principle by which the divinity is called by the name of his fetish. With it there is associated a kind of totemism, when China is called the "Celestial Empire." It has just as good a right to this title as an Indian tribe to the

[24] For examples, see Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 255-9. (Ed.)
[25] *Bericht der preuasischen Expedition nach Ostasien,* IV, 116.

name of Crows. With even greater consistency the logic of totemism demands that the emperor be called the "Son of Heaven." The ancestor cult, still vigorous throughout China, by no means precludes this uranism. In the Temple of Heaven at Peking the tablets of the imperial ancestors are set up while the emperor prays; Heaven is the original ancestor. The cult of heaven is, nevertheless, not general in China. On the contrary, as is so often the case, it is only a cult of the empire and the ruling family; the people have nothing to do with it.[26] In keeping with this, the future state of the soul was left indefinite by Confucius, although the belief was permitted that the soul goes to its last rest in heaven.[27] Moreover, the honor accorded the great dragon, as the guardian of the empire and its emblematic animal, recalls the earlier stages of fetishism.

In India we encounter the sun, the moon, and the planets as fetishes. That the Aryans did not acquire these exalted fetishes until their conquest of India, however, is shown by the situation among other peoples of the same linguistic stock. The Iranians, as we have seen, took another path. They first became acquainted with the celestial fetish through contact with the Semites. The Germans and Slavs were likewise unacquainted with an actual cult of the heavenly bodies, although they wove them into their
435 myths and legends. The Valhalla of Odin, to be sure, occupies an exceptional position in contrast to the more widespread hell, but its name means only "hall of the slain," and it was not thought of as situated in the sun. Since, therefore, certain peoples of the Indo-Germanic linguistic stock are acquainted with uranism, while others are not, the former can not have reached this stage before their emigration from Central Asia.

A widespread theory of the history of religion persists in assuming that man, in an outwelling of poetic sentiment, worshiped the objects of nature themselves in symbolic fashion with gifts of life-necessities. In contradiction to this theory, however, the Hindus of Vedic times were still well aware of the real facts of the case. There are many evidences that the conception of Indra once existed without any connection with the sun, and even after this connection appeared, the sun was thought of, by no means as the god, but only as a celestial fire which Indra

[26] Schott, *Litteratur des chinesischen Buddhismus,* p. 38. (Ed.)
[27] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme*, p. 16.

accompanied.[28] Obviously the entire Hindu people could not all at once follow the advance of a single tribe, and, on the other hand, other tribal divinities than Indra could become associated with the sun at either the same or a later time. Then, of course, a later age of amalgamation and of the development of a unified national tradition must identify the two or more inhabitants of the same fetish. Thus Siva, for example, becomes only another manifestation of Indra. It is left to mythology to explain these differences of form—an easy and congenial task.

Concerning the Hindu worship of the planets we may turn to Lassen[29] for information. "The planets can not be numbered among the Vedic gods; even according to the later epic mythology they do not belong to the true gods,[80] because the two most brilliant of them, Venus and Jupiter, have been made sons of Vedic Rishi and brothers of human Rishi. Buddha (Mercury) is a son of the moon, which first becomes important in post-Vedic times. . . . The name of the Vedic Kavya Usanas has been transferred to Sukna or Venus. Kavya is the son of the Vedic Rishi Brigu. Thus in this case a human sage has been elevated to the rank of a divine being. . . . Mars and Saturn have no place at all in the older mythology, and only in later myth is Saturn a son of the sun, Mars of the earth. . . . The belief in the influence of the planets upon the fates of men first appears in the younger law book, which is to be placed about 360 B. C. It says that on the planets depends the rise and fall of kings and the existence and non-existence of the world, and that consequently the planets are to be worshiped scrupulously." The origin of the last conception is revealed in the word for "planet" itself. The planets as gods are here called *graha,* "a name which is derived from *grah* (to seize), with the special meaning of possession by evil influences."[31]

In Egypt a considerable number of gods, together with their earlier fetishes, were raised to the sun. Foremost among them, once more, were the gods of victorious dynasties. Even Ra, who throughout the period of Egyptian splendor stands in such a close connection with the sun that his name is regarded by many

28 Cf., *Rig-Veda* x. 35. 1.

29 *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 989.

80 Lassen's concept of divinity here is narrower than that of the Hindus themselves.

81 Weber, *Indische Studien,* I, 239n.

as the common term for that heavenly body, although Lauth[32] explains it differently, had formerly, according to the *Book of the Dead,* been content with the fetish of the cat. But once the sun fetish had been adopted by one dynasty, it passed to each succeeding one. When Amon with his ram fetish became the divine ruler of Egypt, his name was combined with that of Ra to form Amon-Ra, and the ram was united with the solar disk. Thereafter the Theban kings were also "sons of the sun."

In Peru, the Inca family likewise consisted of "sons of the sun," for here too the sun had become the fetish of the mighty ruling house. The moon was the fetish of Mama Quilla, the sister and wife of the sun god.[33] The sun had also been preceded here by earlier fetishes—the simple stone monument, the burial cave, Lake Titicaca, etc. Their combination produced unintelligible concepts and a quantity of material for mythological interpretations. In this way an unwrought stone became "the sun;" more exactly stated, the divinity of this old fetish stone was the sun; or, still more accurately, the same divinity that had once possessed the stone was now also in possession of the sun. But the cult does not usually speak in such precise language, and it thereby accustoms younger generations to regard the unintelligible in the cult as something superrational. It thinks it is making a sufficient concession to human weakness if it calls such a stone, which is at the same time the sun, an "image of the sun" or a "sun-stone."[34] Thus a wide field is opened up to myth. Manco Capac and his sister, who, according to one of the many local versions of the legend, had been the first children of heaven and had founded civilization, went to the sun and moon after the completion of their work. In regard to the association of the sun with the earlier lake fetish, another myth states that it had formerly been dark on earth but that the sun had then risen from Lake Titicaca.[35] Again the Viracochas, the first "children of the sun," are said to have come out of a cave.

The solar fetish extended from Peru northward through the relatively advanced peoples of Central America as far as Mexico, and wherever it appeared it took precedence over all other cults and incorporated or combined with the earlier fetishes. As there

[32] *Aegyptens Vorzeit,* pp. 46-7. (Ed.)
[33] Cf., Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* II, 301. (Ed.)
[34] Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 362.
[35] *Ibid.,* pp. 305-6.

were sun-stones in Peru, so there were "solar columns" farther north, and a snake was "regarded by the Indians of Nicaragua as a symbol of the sun."[36] Thus in the one case the monument, and in the other the snake, was the older and then the contemporary fetish of the sun god. It is a mistake to believe that the form of the coiled snake suggested to the Indian a likeness to the sun. A pure fancy of this kind would certainly never have possessed the compelling power to impose an obligation upon man.

That the souls of the dead are able to take up their abode in the stars—a view also shared by Augustus and mentioned by the New Testament in connection with the Devil—was a notion prevalent among Indian tribes as far north as Canada. The Caribs believed that their ghosts and spirits dwelt in the stars.[87] But here the desire for distinction must be taken into consideration to some degree, as is shown by the savage Guaycurus of Brazil, among whom ordinary human souls linger in the vicinity of the burial places, while chieftains and medicine men go to the stars.[88]

Although the enterprising Caribs had advanced to solar fetishism, they still preserved a vivid recollection of their old chthonism. From this arose, on the one hand, the curious idea that the sun god dwells near the subterranean abode of the dead, and the designation of the underworld as the "house of the sun," and, on the other hand, with reference to the old burial and cult caves in Haiti, the myth that the sun and moon had once issued from these caves and only later had risen into the heaven, sending substitutes to Haiti.[39] The mother of the gods became the moon goddess without, however, entirely losing her character as earth goddess. A similar uncertainty exists, and certainly for similar reasons, in the mythological conceptions of the Asiatic Astarte and Asherah as well as the Egyptian Isis. That this particular class of myths was intended to illustrate "cosmologic and cosmogonic ideas" we are forced to deny, in view of their obvious mode of origin, but without thereby disputing that actual attempts to construct cosmologies can make use of the apparatus of figures created by mythology.

As the heaven is the highest, so the image is the most compre-

[36] Muller, *Urreligionen,* pp. 471, 475.
[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 175, 220.
[38] Eschwege, *Brasilien,* II, 280.
[39] Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 177.

hensive fetish. In our language the term "image" has long since become ambiguous. It embraces two very different concepts, the fetish and the likeness. The idea of imitation is now implicit in the word, but it is irrelevant as regards the nature of the fetish. Only the ancient Egyptian language, so far as we know, still uses the word in the earlier sense, as when, for example, it calls the living animal fetish as well as the inanimate statue an "image." Thus it speaks of an animal as the "living image" of a divinity. In this older fetishistic sense, an image of a god is not an attempted imitation of the imagined form of the god but rather a seat of the latter—in a word exactly what we are forced to express by the loan word "fetish."[40] Consequently all the afore-
439 mentioned objects with which a spirit is connected are images in the old sense, whatever their external form. The Apis bull is a "living image" of the god, not by reason of any likeness, but as a seat of the divinity.

Gradually, however, the image in another sense makes its appearance. Man attempts to make the rude monument stone or pillar recognizable as representing a particular person. With the perfection of technic there arises an object which externally resembles the human figure. This too is an image, and the only kind that most languages imply. But such an image is something essentially different from that first named. In Greece and Rome at their height there were set up in houses, gardens, and squares many delightful statues or images of gods, which served purely and simply for ornament and esthetic exaltation but were not images in the cult sense. On the other hand, there were ancient little figures of the rudest sort which enjoyed the highest prestige as idols or images of gods in the old sense, like the African images which consist of a bundle of grass, a piece of wood, or a bit of cloth. A statue becomes a cult image only when an indwelling spirit is assigned to it by tradition or is linked with it by a conventional act of consecration. It is then an image in both the younger and the older sense.

Before the practice gave rise to an independent fine art, the ancients knew only images in the old sense; these alone were of practical importance. Hence even the refined Egyptian was not in the least shocked at the animal heads of his cult images. He knew that his gods would be inclined by their historical experience to

[40] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, II, 1013. (Ed.)

establish themselves in seats thus shaped, and this was the chief concern of the cult.

Lassen[41] has deduced the correct idea from Hindu sources. "These images were set up in the temples, and the superstitious people believed that they were animated by the gods which they imagined." But this "animation" could very easily be misunderstood. The oldest Hindu sources prove that this happened at an early period and that the guardians of the images did not feel inclined to combat the idea that the images themselves exhibited manifestations of life. The ceremony, called *pranapratishtha,* "through which the idols are said to be endowed with life,"[42] is equivalent to the Egyptian and Greek consecration of images,[42] and is simply the introduction of the divine spirit into possession of the image fetish. Logically correlative with this is the "desecration" of images, which may sometimes appear expedient. Harsha, a king of Kashmir, sought to convert to his own use the gold and silver images of the temples, but in order not to bring upon himself thereby the wrath of the gods he found Brahman monks who were willing to "desecrate" the images beforehand.[44] They knew a way to lure the spirits from the images, which then became ordinary metal.

That the Greek conception of cult images was no different is shown by the very existence of the consecration ceremony. The same true fetishistic sense is substantiated by Augustine[46] with reference to Hermes Trismegistus. The latter is said to have asserted that cult images *(simulacra)* are, as it were, the bodies of the gods, that in them dwell invited spirits, which are able either to harm or fulfill the wishes of those who render them the honors of the cult, and that in this sense, through the introduction of spirits into the images constructed for them, man even has the power to create gods.

The artificial image is naturally chronologically later than the more primitive fetishes. This is the sense to be understood in the statement of Varro[46] that the Romans had practiced their cult one hundred and seventy years without images of gods *[simu-*

[41] *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 939.
[42] Ibid., III, 769.
[43] See Hermann, *Alterthiimer der Griechen,* p. 91.
[44] Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* III, 1079.
[45] De *civitate Dei* viii. 23.
[46] Cited in Augustine *De civitate Dei* iv. 31.

lacra). With reference to Egypt, Herodotus[47] makes the statement that up to the time when a certain high priest of Ptah (Hephaestus) came to the throne, a period of three hundred and forty one generations, and also thereafter, "no god had ever appeared in a human form." In fact Ptah himself is one of the very few Egyptian divinities whose cult image shows a human form without any indication of an antecedent animal or celestial fetish.

The artificial image incorporates in itself, as it were, all other types of fetishes and brings to completion that oft mentioned process of amalgamation among fetishes originating at different times and places. Thus Egyptian images sometimes imitated the whole animal fetish; images of the jackal, hawk, and ibis were fastened to portable poles. The image of the ruling divinity, used more as a symbol than as a cult image, was compounded from the snake, hawk, and sun fetishes to form the familiar winged disk with the uraeus snake. Most frequently, however, tokens of the earlier fetishes were attached to a true image of a human body. Thus arose strange combinations like that of the human body with the head of the hawk, surmounted by the snake and the solar disk, forming an exact parallel with the images of the Mexican gods.

It is not the place here to follow the artistic development of such sculpture. The esthetic value of the image is a matter of complete indifference to the cult. The most celebrated cult images of antiquity often possessed no artistic merit at all, and when Greece created immortal works of art, the gods forsook her. We must distinguish two groups, the stationary and the movable image fetishes. The former develop from a progressive differentiation of the monument pillar; the latter seem to be originally derived from dolls. It is not inconsistent with the fetishistic mode of conception to provide the divinity with seats of both sorts, fixed and movable, at the same time. Thus we know from an Egyptian story that Chunsu, the celebrated god of healing, had, besides his stationary image, a movable one in which he made distant journeys.[48] Thus, too, image fetishes fastened on poles served to transport the divinity in ceremonial proces-

[47] *History* ii. 142.
[48] Lauth, *Aegyptens Vorzeit,* pp. 381-2; Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens,* pp. 638-9. (Ed.)

sions. If the justified soul was at liberty to wander from one body into another, then naturally in the case of the gods the plurality of their images was no hindrance to their presence. The Romans carried the images of gods to the games on wagons and litters. Since transportation of this sort is very widespread, double fetishes became necessary as soon as sculpture had advanced to the creation of colossal images. The divinity then changed his residence, as it were, for the purpose of making **a** journey.

Apparently contradictory creations arise through the combination of the simpler monument forms with the more exalted fetishes. It might seem difficult to explain the statements of the ancients that the Egyptian obelisk was an "image of the sun." However, as a conventionalized monument pillar, the obelisk was really an image in the old cult sense like any other. If it was consecrated to the god in possession of the sun fetish, and if this god was simply called "sun," then the obelisk was certainly a solar image in the cult sense. Similarly there were "sun-stones" **and** "solar columns" in America. The Egyptian priests at Thebes likewise preserved a solar image, on the possession of which, as the highest crown jewel, the government of the empire was believed to depend.

Excavations in Mesopotamia have brought to light a considerable number of composite images. Winged men with the heads of cocks and men combined with fish appear frequently. An Assyrian standard shows figures of the bull and the snake besides that of man. Especially characteristic, however, is the winged bull with the human head. These bulls were set up as guardians at the entrances of gates, and it follows from the general fetishistic conception that they were thought to attract spirits to watch the gates. Alcinoiis similarly placed images of dogs, fashioned by Hephaestus, on either side of his gate to guard his dwelling.[49] Not the image, but the spirit in it was thought to furnish protection, just as in Siam and elsewhere a human soul was installed for this service.[50] In Assyria these animal images **bore** the name *kerubu.* They reappear under the same name and, so far as we can tell from the description, in the same fundamental form as cherubim in the temple at Jerusalem, where they

[49] Homer *Odyssey* vii. 91
[80] See above, pp. 412, 467.

stood in the holy of holies and bore on their outstretched wings the spirit of God.[51]

Man's advance from earthly to celestial fetishes must have effected a certain unshackling of the imagination in the realm of cult ideas. Thought ceased to grope from one subject to another and began to fly. The conception of the nature and properties of spirits, when they were associated with the sun and with phenomena like the aurora, inevitably became nobler than it was at any rate with a people predominantly habituated to animal fetishism. On the path of this advance there lie connections which remind us scarcely at all of the nature of primitive fetishism, indeed which actually diverge entirely therefrom, even though for the sake of consistency we must retain the word.

It is on this path that we first encounter the fetishism of fire.[52] The grateful esteem for fire in general is not fire fetishism. The latter is confined to only a few groups of peoples, while the former is general. The flames of Hestia and Vesta in Greece and Rome were not fetishes. The hearth under them was the fetish, and gave its name to the divinity. The eternal fire upon it was only a hearth fire in the home of the divinity, which the unmarried daughters of the house had to maintain. The state hearth in Rome, in imitation of the domestic hearth, was tended by daughters selected from the homes of the citizens. These vestals were consecrated to the divinity in the character of unmarried daughters and were thus obligated to virginity for the period of their consecration. Fire fetishism, however, did not exist in these regions.

Yet even here, as we have already seen on one occasion, the idea could approach fetishism. The fire, which in northern climates was constantly preserved and obtained preferably and almost exclusively by borrowing, must have appeared as an extremely precious possession of the house, one to which the ghosts could cling as to any other property. In the region of true nomadism a secona circumstance supervened. The early Greeks and Romans lived behind fences and walls, but the pastoral peoples of Central Asia were tent dwellers and as such treasured the fire

[81] See Exodus xxv. 18-22; 1 Kings xxiii. 23-29; Psalms xviii. 10; Ezekiel i, x; *Cambridge Ancient History*, III, 427. (Ed.)

[62] For further discussion and additional cases of fire fetishism, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I, 199-203; IV, 62-5; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II, 277-85. (Ed.)

as their guardian. What their fetish poles were thought to effect, and what the dog and cock fetishes performed, was accomplished by fire in a much more effective way. It kept watch and drove away the dangerous animals and the sinister spectral forms of the night, the evil spirits. Under these conditions of life, therefore, it acted to all intents and purposes like a fetish, and this fact led inevitably to the conception of a fetishistic connection.

This hypothesis that the cradle of true nomadism was at the same time the home of the fire cult is actually corroborated, moreover, by a series of radiations which spread out from this center in all directions, representing peoples emigrating thence. In northern Asia, vestiges of the fire cult extend from the habitat of the Buriats through the Amur region to the extreme east. Unfortunately the reports do not sift the facts sufficiently. That people sacrifice in the fire or renew it periodically is no proof of fetishism or "fire worship." But when the Buriats forbid extinguishing the fire with water, and even hesitate to give fire from their huts,[58] the conception of fetishism is to be inferred with greater certainty.

The Aryans of India carried fire fetishism farthest abroad from its original home. Yet even among them it was only one of many cult forms which spread with the Aryans and showed a contrast to the cults of the aborigines. As everywhere, a special priesthood centered about this special fetish, finding distinction in its distinctiveness and seeking fortune in its fortune. In earlier times these fire priests were called Atharvans, a name parallel among the Avestan people. They placed an Atharvan at the head of their caste as their divine ancestor. As such he naturally became, like Noah, the inventor of sacrifice. Hence the caste, with customary modesty, made him likewise the "original father of men."[54]

The fire, both as fetish and god, was Called Agni. Among the **old** Rishis or independent priests the Angiras family in particular devoted itself to the service of Agni; in the Rig-Veda the fire is invoked by them alone.[55] Naturally their tradition in turn made the first Angiras the true god of this fetish.[56] Later four priestly families built their fortune on the fire cult.[57] When this

"Cf., Bastian, *Bilder*, pp. 399-400.
[54] See Ludwig, *Rigveda*, III, 327.
55 *Ibid.*, IV, xxix. (Ed.)
56 *Rig-Veda* i. 31. 1. (Ed.)
[57] Ludwig, *Rigveda*, III, 329. (Ed.)

cult was outstripped by the, so to speak, still more abstract one of the Brahmans, and when the cult obligations performed through the priests had become increasingly extravagant, the priests of Agni and hence Agni himself fell into a subservient position in the sacrificial system as a whole. They had charge of only one part of the sacrificial act, the invocation of the gods. "Agni we choose as our messenger." "Agni, bring hither the gods."[68]

Fire fetishism reached Iran from its northern home, as we have already seen, only along with many other forms. Later, however, when the unified Persian empire sought a support in a unified public cult and the suppression of refractory priesthoods, the fire cult came to the fore. This choice does not appear entirely incomprehensible. We have seen how fetishes are graded in accordance with the esteem in which they are held. In this scale the apparently immaterial flame was necessarily accorded a high rank. Moreover, a fundamental object of the Zoroastrian system was the suppression of the cult of the daevas, and fire had already been used in the old home to suppress demons. At the same time the cult of the flame approached uranism, and the antithesis thus arising was expressed by the legend that the appearance of Zoroaster had banished the demons from the earth to the underworld.

The cult of fire and that of Ormazd were identical. Ormazd was the "Great Spirit" in the fire fetish. The Persian preserved a clear recollection of this true fetishistic relation. He spoke of the "fire of Ormazd" and of the "fire of the living soul," and he addressed the fire thus: "I place myself before thee, 0 Ormazd." '• Still another fetishistic mode of expression was very prevalent in Zoroastrianism. In Egypt it was a common practice to call the image fetish the "son" of the divinity. With the human fetish this identification would be self-explanatory; with the animal fetish it seems to have been derived from the fact that the divine bull, for example, was regarded as the ancestor of all bulls. This conception was general in the civilized countries of America;
445 every living animal that chanced to be a fetish of the divinity was at the same time a "son" of the latter. The same thing happened with plant fetishes. In Peru the divinities of certain plants

58 *Rig-Veda* i. 1. 3; i. 12. 1. Cf., Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 247-9. (Ed.)
59 Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta,* II, 36.

were named "maize mother" and "coca mother;" hence individual plants were necessarily called their children. If such a plant was the fetish of the divinity—and this was really the origin of the conception—the terms "daughter" and "mother" represented respectively the fetish and the divinity.[60] From this or a similar conception may have arisen the custom of using the word "son" as a general synonym for image or fetish. Thus in Zoroastrianism the fire was invoked as "the son of Ormazd."[61]

Whether an actual cult of fire extended from Iran to the western Semites, in particular to the Hebrews, we are unable to ascertain. Certainly the mode of conception of such a cult was current among the Hebrews. It is probable that the friendly contact between the Jews of the Exile and the Persians contributed to its diffusion, perhaps even was the sole cause of the same. Nevertheless it remains problematical whether the mode of conception had penetrated the mass of the people, or whether it is to be regarded merely as a coloring of the report due to the redactors. The fact remains, however, that the Biblical account is acquainted with it and gives expression to it. Yahweh or an angel of Yahweh appeared "in a flame of fire" on Horeb, the "mountain of God,"[62] and both here and later on Mount Sinai Yahweh held intercourse with Moses precisely as Ormazd delivered the law to his prophet Zoroaster on the mountain.[68] The Hebrews were led by Yahweh into another country exactly as, in myth, colonists are so often led by particular gods in their fetishes. In this case, however, the seat of Yahweh is again the flame; he went before them "by night in a pillar of fire."[64] Yahweh likewise descended upon Mount Sinai "in fire."[65] Similar conceptions emerge in the story of Elijah, and that they were not entirely alien to popular tradition is indicated by the flame in which the spirit of God came over the apostles.[66]

Even more winged and intangible than fire is the "word." Yet even this incorporeal thing became a fetish.[67] If experience showed the effectiveness of fire, this was true to an even greater degree of the word. As the most exalted of fetishes, it is

60 Cf., Müller, *Urreligionen*, pp. 367-8.
61 *Vendidad* v, xv.
62 Exodus iii. 1-2.
68 Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta*, III, 23.
64 Exodus xiii. 21.
65 *Ibid.*, xix. 18.
66 Acts ii. 3. (Ed.)
67 The concept of the word-fetish has been borrowed from Lippert by Sumner and Keller (*Science of Society*, II, 1008-11). (Ed.)

characteristic of only the most advanced nations. Beyond it on the path of fetishism religious fancy has never soared. It was not, of course, regarded as entirely immaterial and insubstantial by the ancients. Even fire is often transformed into a tangible cloud, and Mexican images similarly represent the spoken word as a flying cloudlet. That a spirit dwells in such a cloud is in accord with one of the oldest popular conceptions, which seeks the soul in the moist breath of man.

Yet experience necessarily pressed forward still farther. We have already observed in the most primitive forms of the cult how their effectiveness resides in two main constituents, the offering and the invocation. These two elements can engage in a struggle for ascendancy, especially if they are differently stressed by rival priesthoods. The offering is utterly in vain if the gods are not summoned to receive it. But this can be done, according to a universal conception, only by a correct invocation, one which trial and experience have shown to have been agreed upon, as it were, with the divinity. The correct invocation is, like any other token, a symbol of the cult union. The divinity pays no attention to any random appeal; he must recognize his people in word and tone. Even classical antiquity still adhered to this conception. The importance of the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* rested in large measure on this consideration, as its subject matter shows. The dead man, equipped with this passport to the hereafter, was able to call by their right names each of the gods of his nation-wide cult union. The ghost repeatedly says to the god: "I recognize thee; I can call thee by name." He recounts his deeds, his myths. The sole object of all this, however, was to prove his identity as an initiate, a member of the union; "I am a knowing one," the deceased assures the god. Hence in cult unions of a more restricted compass these invocations and symbols are a secret of the initiated and must not be betrayed. They form an essential part of the mystery. Sometimes not even the true name of the god associated with the cult actions may be disclosed. Thus Herodotus repeatedly declines to mention the name of Osiris, into whose cult union he seems to have been initiated. He likewise reveals that there were myths which might not be told to the uninitiated. These secrets were withheld in order that they might remain a secret sign of recognition, for the idea of interceding with the divinity for all men through the cult, of reconciling him with all, was entirely alien to the earlier period of isolated organizations.

From this conception is derived the great importance of correct formulas in invocation and prayer. For this reason the chant, with which savage peoples associate memorized words, was customary in reciting prayers even in Rome. An accompanying flute gave the rhythm and the cue. The slightest hesitation on the part of the priest or the omission of a single word was an "evil omen;" it invalidated the proceeding. The old invocations of the Arval Brethren were recited in dance step for the same reason, for the correct rhythm was a fundamental part of the successful recital. The words themselves, as in the invocations of the Arval Brethren, might long since have become incomprehensible to younger generations, yet they had to be kept up in this unintelligible form because the purpose of prayer was not to edify oneself but to summon the divinity by conventional sounds.

Many survivals of this conception, which has its basis in the isolation of cult unions and in a correspondingly undeveloped concept of divinity, have lasted on into our own time, which some future and truly modern age of mankind, smiling at our conceit, will regard as the fermenting medieval period of culture history. Among these survivals are the rhythmic chanting of Hebrew prayers, the development of ecclesiastical languages, and the recitation of invocations in foreign tongues. Analogous to them is the frequently recurring idea that the language of the gods is different from that of men of the living generation. Both the Greek and the Avestan languages survive as individual proofs of this bilingualism, and it is to fundamentally the same mode of conception that we owe the preservation of Hebrew and Sanskrit. To point to a more trivial case, the old conceptions still survive in popular superstitions. The curing of disease by magical means relies very largely upon correct formulas or "spells." Deep wisdom is sought in vain in all magical sayings, for their meaning is quite immaterial. It is only speaking them always in the same way that produces the magical effect. The attitude toward "conjuring" still reveals the old conception of spirits and the power of the "word."

In India two outstanding priestly guilds contended for the palm. The Angiras priesthood emphasized their fire fetish, whose light shining through the world carried their message to all the invited gods; the Brahmans, however, stressed the word. To be sure, the word *brahma*, owing to its prestige, has retained an almost bewildering number of meanings. In its old meaning, however, it was equivalent to the word *veda* and like it denoted the cult saying, the genuine effective formula to which the gods yield. As the omnipotent "word" it was distinguished from all other cult means, and the priest whose entire cult was concentrated on this word bore after it the name "Brahman," the speaker of sayings.[68]

It must naturally seem to us like a flight of the imagination to regard the omnipotent "word" as the insubstantial fetish of a divine spirit analogous to the fire fetish of the rival priesthood. But this flight was actually made; in Brahmanism the "word" became in all actuality a god. As is so generally the case, he bore the name of his "image"—Brahma. Nothing now prevented saying of him, as had once been said of the sacrifice, that the world exists and is maintained through him. As the youngest of the gods he rose to the head of them all. The meaning of his name expanded to connote law, world order, and universal reason. The classical age of Hinduism possessed no state or national cult of Brahma, and even the Brahman guild formerly designated its cult divinities by other names. Indeed the very name of the god, which does not coincide exactly in grammatical form with the word *brahma*,[69] may have arisen in a roundabout way; the Brahman priesthood may, as so often happens, have derived the name of its eponymous hero from that of the guild. In any case, however, the word fetish was ascribed to him.

Agni, Soma, and Brahma—fire, sacrificial drink, and sacred saying—the divinities originating from priestly practice, far surpassed all other fetish gods. Above them all, however, soared Brahma, the most incorporeal of the gods, spiritualized even in his image. The flight of the imagination which produced this exalted concept would almost make us forget the earth under men's feet, if the rattling of the professional tools of the priesthood did not resound even at this height and disturb the spiritual mood of the sacred hymnody with very earthly sounds. The word, the speech, may have become the omnipotence ruling the

68 Ludwig, *Rigveda*, III, 220, 222-3, 298.
69 Cf., *Webster's New International Dictionary*, under "Brahma." (Ed.)

world, but the Brahman does not forget in the meantime to remind us of his immediate sphere of action, when he prefaces his ritual with the sigh: "May I speak a cattle-winning speech."[70] And this prayer has often been answered.

With his saying and his god, serving all other cults, the Brahman has driven all other priesthoods from the field. Yet we can not ignore the fact that his materialism resulted in an advance in the concept of divinity. The inherent tendency of Brahmanism was to suppress everywhere the lower fetish forms and by stressing the "word" to make the more materialistic forms of sacrifice seem more and more inessential. Thus a redemption from the cult and its transformation into subjective worship would have been in sight, had material cult performance not been entirely diverted into rewards to the priests for sacrifice. For this reason, however, the Brahman disliked symbols. His hymn prayed: "Make transitory the property of those who enjoy it without making us presents for the songs to summon the gods."[71] Even this tendency, however, is in keeping with the course of development in a much wider sphere extending into higher civilization.

With the refinement of the concept of divinity, the material cult requirement of the gods declines. But man's duty of propitiation, his cult obligation, does not diminish. The difference between what man still owes and what his divinities now require is everywhere devoted to tithes, almsgiving, or charity under whatsoever name. At first, however, charity has nothing at all in common with the social effort to diminish human want. It is nothing other than the old cult donation, and like the latter it operates to win benefits for the giver in the hereafter. Charity appears in this role of a substitute for the cult even in the Laws of Manu.[72] "He who gives clothes gains the world of the moon; he who gives horses, the Asvina world; he who gives a yoke of oxen, abundant magnificence; he who gives a cow, the world of the sun." The proper recipients of charity are thought to be those who are in the position through their cult advantage to bring about its anticipated result. Hence in India they are the Brahmans, in Israel the Levites. Indeed it is strictly enjoined by the Hebrew law, as well as by that of the Hindus and Iranians, that

[70] *Atharva-Veda* iii. 20. 6, 10; vi. 71. 2.
[71] *Rig-Veda* v. 42. 9.
[72] *Laws of Manu* vi. 231.

they shall not suffer hunger "within thy gates."[78] Only gradually does charity extend beyond these limits and become a benefaction to the poor. But a survival always remains. With charity one purchases the prayers of the poor, and in Catholic countries today the poor offer prayers in asking for alms. The essence of the transaction is still the same; charity has become, through an extension of the cult expedient of prayer, a way to cult righteousness—a concept which still implies a full measure of foresight for the hereafter. Nevertheless, in this direction too the way is paved for an advance.

Foresight for the hereafter, which formerly found expression only in direct provision for the departed soul, is now exercised indirectly with reference to a higher divinity presiding over the cult place. The "righteousness" upon which depends man's "justification" for entrance into the hereafter has, to be sure, no relation to his fellow men. But it does have a relation to a god who, as lord of the other world, distributes places there, prescribes the requisite amount of cult performance, receives what is rendered, tests its adequacy, and confers or denies "justification." All moderately advanced peoples have progressed to this stage. It is easy to see that this advance rests fundamentally, not on subtleties of speculation, but on social forms. Roving peoples on the lowest stage of social organization have no cult places and hence also no maternal or paternal divinity presiding over a household there. Even the Great Spirit of many Indian tribes does not as yet concern himself with such matters; each dead man must be provided for directly, in accordance with the extent of traditional foresight.

The next great advance is shown by Egyptian society with its firmly established cult places and their cults. Even here a very great deal was done directly for the departed soul, both by a man during his lifetime in the way of deposits for future credit and by his descendants in fulfillment of their sacred obligations. But along with this the indirect path was already exceedingly well frequented. The superabundance of the cult offered to the divine housefather of the cult place far exceeded his needs, and all the surplus accumulated in the ghostly household to form a treasure which was shared in by all the souls admitted there by the ruling master of the house. In this way every cult attention

73 Cf., Deuteronomy xii. 18-19; xviii. 1-8. (Ed.)

to the divinity, every act of divine worship, became indirectly a work of foresight for one's own soul, a work of "righteousness," and the soul entering the hereafter came to depend upon this worship for its "justification."

This development enhanced the efficacy of prayer with reference to the fate in the afterlife. Since the Egyptian cult places had at their disposal such a superabundant accumulated treasure of provisions, it was no longer necessary to dispatch to the dead man from time to time a roast goose or some similar favorite article. It was sufficient merely to recite the *suten-hotep-ta* or funerary prayer, the "Egyptian paternoster" as it has been called by way of comparison, which was inscribed on nearly every grave as an aid to the memory. This potent prayer was, of course, of a very material nature. The god presiding over the cult place was besought to present to the deceased "a thousand oxen, geese, loaves of bread, and beer." Even if a gift was offered to the dead man, this was no longer done directly, but a little present was given to the god, and he was entreated in a prayer to bestow on the deceased in return a larger present from the common household. Two such prayers may be cited by way of illustration. "This is a sacrificial gift to the god Anubis in the blessed hall. May he grant that everything may appear on his sacrificial table each day for the fan-bearer at the right of the king, the royal scribe, the great head of the house Apii, the son of the royal scribe and great head of the house Amon-hotep."[74] "This is a sacrificial gift to the god Osiris in Amenthes, the great god, the lord of Abydos. May he provide funerary sacrifices, consisting of thousands of bulls, thousands of geese, thousands of grains of divine frankincense, thousands of garments, thousands of jars of wine, thousands of jars of milk, all good and pure objects and all sweet objects, in which the living god is, for the person of the Osiris, the priest of Amon, the molder in the house of Amon, Chalun the justified."[75]

Naturally, however, only the prayers of the "just," i.e., those who can point to the abundance of their own cult performances, are effective, for those who have contributed nothing to the treasures with which the god maintains his household have very properly nothing to say in the matter. Consequently in India

[74] **Lieblein, *Die Aegyptischen Denkmaler,* p. 27.**
75*Ibid., p. 17.*

the charity with which effective prayers are bought is directed chiefly to the Brahmans, who are known to spend their entire lives solely in cult activities and who are supported for the good of all by every gift in the collection of treasures. These subsidies, however, enable the entire guild to devote itself without other labor to this altruistic vocation alone. Thus all parties get along excellently—only the exploitation of life by death still continues in an altered form.

A fixation of this condition would have obvious consequences, but the wheel rolls on, and the next advance appears. The concept of "righteousness," which at first involved absolutely nothing but the fulfillment of cult obligations, gradually acquires a different meaning. The cause of this change is to be sought in the cult union, which, as we have seen, is the basis of every historical religion. A tacit but self-evident prerequisite for the entrance of the deceased into the cult place to share in its treasure of provisions, is his membership in the union of the divinity in ques-
452 tion. Indeed this is exactly what the ancient Egyptian, whose cult union had expanded to include all the cult places and divinities of the united nation, had to prove by his knowledge of the secrets of the *Book of the Dead.* On the West African coast, according to Bastian, this requirement appears in a much cruder form. No one who does not bear the skin mark of the union may even set foot on the cult place. Otherwise he will be killed by the god, who, however, spares those who are marked, exactly as Yahweh spared Zipporah's son.[76] An active survival of this conception still persists today. Certain churches do not allow any one who is outside their cult union or has been excluded from it to be buried in the churchyard, and the people say that those not buried there have not gone to their "eternal rest" but live on as haunting ghosts exactly like cultless heathen souls. So vivid was this conception a few centuries ago, that people like Wycliffe were even exhumed by decree of council; they had no right to partake in the accumulated cult treasures of a cult union which they had not recognized during their lifetime.

Now the cult union, which as we know made possible all advance in organization above the primitive family with mother-right, has two aspects. It is a league with a divinity, but through him it is also a fraternal union of the participants among them-

[76] **Exodus iv. 24-26. See above, pp. 460-1. (Ed.)**

selves, and the divinity is the avenging guardian in both aspects. Consequently conduct toward one's cult brother, the Biblical "neighbor/' is also credited to righteousness. We already know what are the obligations toward the divinity, which determine cult righteousness. What, now, are the duties toward the cult brother? They are all included in the concept of "peace," which denotes the contrast with the tribal stranger. The union confers peace upon persons and upon their property in so far as a right of personal property has developed. When cult brothers meet, they recognize one another by their cult mark, but they also bear witness verbally to their relation and to their recognition of it. According to an Oriental custom of genuine antiquity, they bid one another "peace," or more accurately the "peace of the Lord" or the "peace of God," for the guardian and avenger of this peace is the divinity of the union. This is the original sense and meaning of the greeting or salutation. Even if the assurance of peace later disappears, as in the formula disseminated by Mohammed, it is still implied in the word "greeting" itself—"The greeting [of God] be with you." In Islam even today this formula bears so strongly the stamp of a symbol of cult brotherhood, that the true Moslem will not address it to those outside his union. When he enters a company in which he observes persons of other faiths, he uses the formula, "Greeting to my people," or "Greeting to the people of the greeting," i.e., to the members of his cult union, the Mohammedans.[77]

The cult of the divinity and peace among men—honor to God on high and peace to men on earth—are necessarily the substance of every cult union, the "law of the covenant," the common law prevailing from time immemorial. They constitute the basic condition of the union with God and hence are a mandate from God himself. The simplest and most original definition of the injunction of peace with respect to persons and their property takes the form of two commandments, inevitably the oldest in every cult union, namely, "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not steal."[78] Plundering has no place here, for it is the acquisition of property outside the union; therefore no injunction of peace can affect it. The Hebrew account boasts frankly of the spoliation of the Egyptians. Although the embezzlement of their

[77] Rohlfs, "Hoflichkeitsformeln," p. 105.
[78] Cf., Exodus xx. 13, 15; Deuteronomy v. 17, 19. (Ed.)

valuables took place under circumstances by no means suggestive of chivalry, it was nevertheless ordered by Yahweh himself and was thus certainly not covered by his commandment.[79] The Egyptians were simply not the people of his union. Under the developed patriarchate—and not until this stage do cult unions expand into larger organizations—woman also becomes property. The injunction of peace with respect to property must therefore further specify: "Thou shalt not commit adultery."[80] These are the three most original commandments of the law of the union. Hence they occur in literal agreement in the canons of the Egyptians, the Hebrews, and the Buddhists, and are in fact necessarily practically universal. Still a fourth commandment makes its appearance in like fashion in all these centers of culture. The power of enforcing property claims within the union, which the individual must renounce in the interest of peace, continues to be exercised by the community. Since, however, by false witness before the community the individual could still attain indirectly what he was forbidden to do directly, there arises inevitably the commandment: "Thou shalt not bear false witness."[81]

Further specific provisions can naturally arise only *pari passu* with the development of economic and social life. Not until the domesticated animal has become an object of individual property, can it be placed under the protection of the peace, and only a more advanced care for life can forbid by way of precaution actions which do not disturb the peace but merely jeopardize it. The Egyptian canon developed a large number of these preventive commandments; that of the Buddhists forbade indulgence in intoxicating liquors; that of the Hebrews on the earliest stage confined itself to threatening with the vengeance of the union God the coveting of the property of another—within the union. Except for this slight difference, the canon preserved in Buddhism—thou shalt not kill, steal, commit adultery, lie, become intoxicated—coincides strikingly with that of the Hebrews.

What distinguishes the Hebrew canon, which has found such a wide diffusion with Christianity, is its explicit provisions setting forth the first part of the obligations of the union, those

79 Exodus xi. 2; xii. 35-36. (Ed.)
80 Cf., Exodus xx. 14; Deuteronomy v. 18. (Ed.)
81 Cf., Exodus xx. 16; Deuteronomy v. 20. (Ed.)

toward God. These cult obligations are usually not added, because they are taken entirely for granted as the *sine qua non* of the union. Among the Hebrews, however, it was necessary to emphasize and establish in them the special nature of Yahwistic henotheism, so they were not omitted in the usual way as self-evident but were placed in an emphatic position at the head of the law. This special part of the law demands the repudiation of all cults and cult unions except that of Yahweh. It does not require the cult of Yahweh to forego images, but it prohibits the making of fetish images for any other cult.[82] It also forbids unlawful invocation of Yahweh's name. It further orders rest on the seventh day, which can scarcely be interpreted otherwise than as an innovation imported from Babylonia.

Midway between these specifically Jewish cult commandments and those defining the union peace is inserted a commandment which seems to unite both groups while strictly belonging to neither. It is expressed in one version: "Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long. . . ."[88] In the other version, however, there is interpolated a qualification which calls attention to the way in which the honor is to be rendered. "Honour thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee: that thy days may be prolonged. . . ."[84] Moreover, the consequence to man of the fulfillment of this one commandment is specified, though no promise is attached to any of the other commandments.

This anomaly may be explained by a return to Brahman and Egyptian cult practice. Here it was still invariably the duty of the son to carry on the cult of his parents in the hereafter, and to found a family specifically that this cult might be further continued for both himself and his forefathers. It was therefore considered a great misfortune to lack a son; with the extinction of the family, the cult came to an end and the ghost perished. For this reason the Greeks did not select for mortal combat at abandoned posts, as one might expect, men with no progeny to lament their loss, but fathers with a son. Only such could go calmly to their death. This was the meaning of honor toward parents in the old cult sense.

[82] Exodus xx. 3-5; Deuteronomy v. 7-9.
83 Exodus xx. 12. (Ed.)
[84] Deuteronomy v. 16. (Ed.)

According to a naive popular conception, however, the cult was always based on a reciprocal interest. Hence the son who distinguished himself by keeping up an abundant cult had the certain prospect of being carefully protected by the influence of his cult spirits and of being granted a long life on earth. This train of thought is attested by inscriptions on Egyptian monuments. Ramses II reminds the ghosts of his parents very frankly that it will be to their own advantage to keep him alive a long time as a sedulous cult patron. He says, in one inscription to his father, "It will be well for you that I remain king for a long time, for you will be honored by a good son who is mindful of his father."[85] Consequently it was a traditional expectation of the Egyptians that cult fidelity toward parents was requited with long life. It was even established in myth, since the first Osiris had acted thus toward his pious son Horus. The king refers to this farther on in the above inscription: "My father Osiris will reward me with long life like his son Horus." The dead are also grateful for prayers to the gods to support them from the cult stores, and they endeavor to reward their well-wishers with prosperity. Thus inscriptions on mausoleums address the passers-by: "If you wish to fare well on earth, and if you yearn finally to go to the blessed, then say a *suten-hotep-ta.*"[86]

We thus see very clearly whence that middle member of the Decalogue is derived. It is not a specific application of the injunction of peace but an old cult demand with its special sanction appended to it, a demand which Yahwism, in order to suppress it as such, elevated to an ethical commandment. Honor to parents "as the Lord thy God hath commanded" is now something quite different from cult honor, which is accorded to Him, the "jealous God," alone.

The above-mentioned primary definitions of the "peace" are found practically universally in strikingly similar form because they are absolutely necessary. But advancing social and economic life naturally demands ever more specific definitions. These consist in principles and arrangements embodied in the common tradition and familiar to all. They are the principles and forms of social life itself, but they appear, codified in oral tradition or in writing, as the "law." Already distinguished by an abundant

[85] Brugsch, *Geschichte Aeqyptens,* p. 489.
36 Le Page-Renouf, *Religion der alien Aegypter,* p. 139.

casuistry are the laws of the Hebrews, the Iranians, and the Hindus—those of Moses, Zoroaster, and Manu. Not merely remotely comparable to these, but identical in germ and essence, are the old Germanic folk laws. They too contain essentially nothing that did not derive from the concept of the union peace or seem calculated to realize it. Yet they lack, in keeping with the circumstances under which their recording took place, the whole part relating to the cult and the sanction placing the entire law under the protection of the union divinity.

This sanction, however, stands out prominently in the laws first mentioned. They all appear as the law of God. And this is precisely what they are in nature and origin. The agreement of the divinity, the sole condition under which the union with him could be concluded, must by inevitable logic be interpreted as his will and command. The "law" is the exposition of this will. The simplest principles necessarily go back to so remote an antiquity, and are so evidently laws "whereby we live,"[87] that no one could ask for an outward proof of their authenticity. This is the basis of the entire Hindu law. It is as old as the tribe. Hence it derives from Manu, the tribal ancestor and "first man," and God is necessarily its author.

The situation is otherwise with the law of the Persians and the celebrated and exceedingly influential law of the Hebrews. They are both the products of conflict. Hence they repudiate the old and give prominence to the new. To be sure, their provisions also cover the whole range of social achievements, but this primary material is overshadowed by the emphasis on the new form of the cult, for the sake of which the entire redaction took place. With this stress on the new and on the conflict with the old, the law could not appear to its contemporaries otherwise than as an innovation. Consequently the "word of God" necessarily appeared in both cases as a "revelation."

The daimonistic cult is thoroughly familiar with the conception of revelation. A very important incentive to cult performance is the fact that it moves the divinity to expressions useful to man. But the divinity is impelled thus to declare himself only by a cult maintained in the stipulated way with unremitting devotion to duty. Hence only a professional patron of such a cult, only a priest or a "prophet," can obtain and transmit such decla-

87 Cf., Ezekiel xx. 11, 13, 21, 25. (Ed.)

rations. A prophet or oracle is associated with every cult. Not all of them, of course, are renowned and sought after. Like the gods themselves, they have their individual fates. It is not necessary to assume a pious fraud as the explanation of the transaction. To be sure, we know of no cult means which could have made the gods actually speak themselves. But hundreds of means have been used which were calculated to secure unequivocal decisions on questions suitably propounded, and prophets had a right to submit the general tenor of such a decision as the word and command of the god.

The laws of the Persians and the Hebrews, therefore, are distinguished from that of the Hindus in that they were revealed within historical recollection through the mediation of prophets. In form, however, the two are themselves distinguished. The Vendidad, the revelation of Ormazd, still reflects faithfully the procedure of the oracle. On a solitary mountain, the cult place of the fire god, Zoroaster, the high priest of the Persian court, submitted the entire material of the law to the god in the form of questions and received his decisions. The procedure was a natural one, for there had come into actual use a body of new cult usages, social arrangements, and even cosmic conceptions, and what was wanted of the divinity of the new cult union was a divine sanction of these ideas and forms of life, an assurance that they enjoyed his vigilant protection. Thus the Persians looked upon their law, though it was composed of questions and answers, as if it had been spoken by the divinity in human words. Zoroaster is expressly called "the promulgator of the answers of Ormazd in Iran."[88] The believer calls the law the "heavenly law which thou, Ormazd, hast given in answer to thy Zoroaster/' and he attests his faith in "the word of Zoroaster, the law of Zoroaster, his accepted oracle."3[9]

Moses similarly appears in the old cult relation of an oracle to Yahweh. The law of Moses is likewise the "word of God." The familiarity of the Bible with the relation between a God who does not speak but merely indicates his will, and his fluent prophet, is shown when it calls the prophet the mouth of God and compares Moses with his "slow tongue" to God, and Aaron, his spokesman, to the prophet.[90] The Hebrews practiced divination no dif-

88 Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta,* I, 94. [89] ***Ibid.,* I, 105.**
90 Exodus iv. 10-16.

ferently from other peoples. The Egyptian priest, when he intervened with his cult divinity in court to ascertain the truth, carried a portable fetish with lots, a common though by no means the only method of divination. The question was necessarily phrased for an affirmative or negative decision. The Hebrew analogy to this oracular device was the ephod. When David got into a bad predicament and was in doubt as to his course of action, he said to Abiathar, "Bring me hither the ephod." When the latter gave it to him, David inquired of Yahweh: "Shall I pursue after this troop? shall I overtake them?" The oracular decision, given in the affirmative, is naturally amplified in the report into a complete answer.[91]

As the result of its redaction, however, the Hebrew law differs in form from the Persian. No division into questions and answers is visible in it. The report and the law are from one mold, and the former relates that the Divinity came forward to reveal the latter directly. This difference is, however, of no consequence for our subject. In the one case as in the other these laws constitute the "word of God." If, now, the spirit of God can reside in the word in general, then it will do so above all in this word in particular. Thus fetishism, which originally led to this development, soars into a realm where only the imagination can follow it; it opens up the path to mysticism.

There is no doubt that Brahmanism through its extraordinary emphasis on the "word" has contributed much to the bringing about of this peculiar advance in the concept of divinity. We have already pointed out how the Greeks attained a similar goal by another path. But, as the paths were different, so inevitably were the results. Greek speculation sought for a first cause of things, which it could not discover in the relatively divine nature of the cult beliefs, and arrived at the conception of an indefinable power superior to them. There eventuated attempts to construct a cosmic and ethical world order. India, however, climbed one and the same ladder to the dizziest aerial rungs. Its advance led into the lawless realm of fantasy, to which there fell the task of arranging the enormous chaos of ancient conceptions into a system. Consequently an extravagant imaginativeness is characteristic of this civilization. Greek thought, on the other hand, was on the way to assigning to two different categories the two

91 1 Samuel xxx. 7-8.

types of conceptions, namely, those developed in connection with the cult and those arising from speculation about the cause of things. It was thus on the way to eliminating daimonism from the conception of the world. We say "on the way" advisedly, for the most imaginative of Greek thinkers, Plato, attempted to place daimonism in the service of cosmic speculation and to reconcile the two categories. In view of the long rearing of mankind under the cult idea it is easy to understand why this philosophy of imagination, the philosophy of idealism as it is called, has met with such great approval from generation to generation ever since. Metaphysical idealism allows every one to share with his small outfit of ideas in building the temple of the world, and it is consequently inviting to all.

The cult of the "word," which we first considered in the East, also spread in various forms to the regions in contact with the Greek spirit. From this contact and from the attempt to elevate daimonism even in speculation to the principle explaining the world, blossomed the theological philosophy of the Alexandrian school, and Neoplatonism impregnated the Occident with a similar mode of conception. Both enmeshed early Christianity.[92]

The fetishistic significance of the word seems to characterize the Iranian branch of the Aryans as well as the Hindus. The Vendidad distinguishes three ways to cure disease, by surgery, by medicine, and by spells, or, as the law expresses it, "by knife or trees [herbs] or word." It gives the preference, however, to the last. "Through the celestial word healing proceeds most certainly. The pure man, healed by the word, is cured most completely."[93] The "living word of Ormazd" is said to have existed before all good and evil beings.[94] The formula, "It is the will of Ormazd . . . ," was an omnipotent power. Spoken twenty-one times by Ormazd in his first struggle with Ahriman, it vanquished the latter. The "living word" of Zoroaster is said to have given the earth, when it was wasted by the demons, new life, blood, moisture, and strength, like a rain.[95] The demons in their fetish beasts fled before the "book" in the hand of the prophet. By reading the Avesta in the Zend, demons and sorcerers

[92] Cf., John i. 1—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." (Ed.)

[93] *Vendidad* vii.

[94] Cf., Kleuker, *Bundehesch,* p. 59.

[95] Kleuker, *Leben Zoroasters,* p. 4.

were put to flight. When Zoroaster descended from the oracular mountain of Ormazd, the magicians and an army of demons faced him. "Then Zoroaster became angry and began with the Avesta in the Zend; then all the daevas fled and hid in the abysses of the earth. The Magi were filled with terror and despair; a part died, and the others begged for mercy."[96] The "word," in all this, is invested with the very same power that indwells in any other fetish, and it finds exactly the same use as other fetishes in exorcising hostile spirits and hence naturally also in healing the sick. In this use, however, the actual fetishistic sense necessarily becomes more and more obscured, and the conception gradually gives rise to a new type of supernatural influence.

Torn from their temple and temple cult and detached from the crude fetish cult by their henotheism, the Hebrews clung with all the fervor of a soul shaken by severe misfortunes to the cult of the "word." Of the old ways of accumulating cult merits, of achieving "righteousness," only charity and similar pious works had survived. Above them all, and surpassing them all in meritoriousness, rose the teaching and acceptance of the word. The conception departed much further even than did the Persian from fetishism, but this did not prevent the survival of many echoes of the latter. Deprived first of his domestic and gentile cults and then even of his state cult with its attachment to a single cult place, the Jew found almost the only substitute for all he had lost in preoccupation with the word of God. This preoccupation consequently had for him the same force as the cult works of other nations. It had the effect of storing up cult merit for the hereafter; it served to "justify" a man. With the final dispersion of the Jews this belief naturally rose in the rabbinical teachings to the status of the highest religious idea. Rabbi Abba bar Acha is said to have announced as a teacher of the Torah: "Whoever wishes long life and riches, let him come to me and learn." The object of learning the Torah was "to achieve heavenly reward in everlasting life."[97] From this belief Maimonides could say: "They placed their entire trust in God and the Torah, through which alone man participates in bliss." To teach was as meritorious as to learn. "He who instructs his fellows

[96] **Kleuker,** ***Leben Zoroasters,*** **pp. 16, 21.**
[97] **Strassburger,** ***Geschichte der Erziehung,*** **p. 53.**

will be well received in heaven."[98] Even the later Jews have acted accordingly, and the practice has had no slight influence upon their formal intellectual development. No other people resembles them in the way in which they have, under almost all conditions of life, compelled nearly every individual from childhood on to assimilate such a mass of memorized knowledge and to undergo such a formal schooling first of the memory and then also of the judgment. With no other people has learning been for so many generations and centuries a cult work.

The actual fetish of the word is still found in a corrupt form among certain peoples. Frequently the words of the Koran are thus used. Moreover, just as a single divinity may inhabit an artificial image as well as a "living image", so there may appear beside the "living word" its dead image, writing. It is obvious, therefore, that men on a sufficiently high cultural stage can readily pass from the cult of the word to that of writing as well. The Kirghiz pays a sheep for a scrap of paper with a few words written on it as an amulet." In essence this is simply a portable fetish. Among the Turkomans and Afghans similar charms are much sought after.[100] In Africa, written prayers from the Koran are worn for the same purpose of protection from all kinds of dangers.[101] The reader will recall that even with us printed prayers and blessings were once thought to make the wearer bullet-proof.[102] The Book to which the Christian missionary so often refers for authority has repeatedly been regarded by savage tribes as a fetish, and the Church itself in the Middle Ages fostered a practice which came very close to this conception. When the Franks, who had previously sworn on their weapons, were instructed to touch the Gospel in taking oath, the analogy could only have given them a fetishistic conception of the latter.

We must now return to a grosser type of fetishism, but one which has been just as important in social evolution as the last considered offshoots of fetishism have been in religious development. The fetish in question is man himself. This idea can no

98 Strassburger, *Geschichte der Erziehung*, p. 56.

"Atkinson, *Siberia*, p. 310. (Ed.)

100 Vambery, *Central Asia*, p. 50; Masson, *Journeys in Balochistan*, I, 74, 90, 312; II, 127, 302. (Ed.)

101 For references and additional cases see Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 23-4.

102 The recrudescence of analogous beliefs in the recent World War is a matter of common knowledge. (Ed.)

longer really surprise us. If a spirit temporarily enters into a priest, if it seizes an unfortunate man and plagues him with sickness, and if it returns from the hereafter after the exhaustion of its cult merits and again animates a human body, then these are just so many evidences for the familiarity of the conception that a living man can also be the abode of an alien spirit. We should not forthwith call him a fetish, however, if an idea of cult reverence were not involved. But this too happens in certain cases; man becomes the "living image" of a god worshiped in the cult.

Not only is man sharply distinguished from all other earthly beings by the fact that he has invented and developed the idea of the cult, but the historical evolution of his social and political organization, upon which all further development of the care for life and accordingly all civilization rests, has been of such a nature that it could not have taken place in the way it has, without the influence of the cult. Without the institution of the cult union, which history has allowed to sink into oblivion, the law, upon which the life and the existence of society rests, could have been enforced only in organizations of very narrow compass by the supervisory power of a patriarchal head. By being placed under the sanction of the union god in the way above described, however, it was protected and supported by the power of fear far beyond the reach of the paternal arm. Thus the creation of a cult union became the basis for the establishment of the state. In early times, consequently, there was never a state without a state cult. The last of the great states of antiquity fell in the struggle for this principle, upon which it was built. In the tragedy of its fall, however, its principle conquered. Christianity and Islam sought once more to realize the old ideal of the coextensiveness of cult and government on the new basis of a universal idea of God. From the new idea of the unity of God, in conjunction with the old conception of the necessary unity of cult union and political organization, flowed the claim of both to world dominion.

The authority of the father also received its first support from the cult idea. It was particularly in need of this since originally, as we have seen, it did not have the support of the idea of descent. Among low tribes, adult children show little or no submission toward their father. The cult union, to be sure, replaced blood relationship with an artificial bond uniting all the men and made possible the creation of an efficient organization within certain limits, as in the case of certain Indian tribes. But the commanding position of one man, the patriarch, had its basis in the property idea. Even this, however, did not provide a sufficient support against insubordination. The political organization of the advanced peoples of the Old World, based on the property right, would scarcely have possessed a power commensurate with its underlying legal principle without the further assistance of the cult.

A crude way in which the cult may come to the assistance of the paternal property right has been observed in West Africa.[108] The Negro, whose household contains as many wives and slaves as possible, often assembled from a number of different tribes, has need of a very special authority in order to overawe and control this heterogeneous aggregation. So he calls to his assistance a powerful god who, according to experience or reputation, provides effectual protection in marriage. He builds for this god and his fetish a special hut near his own, and gives the wife into his possession. This property relation is insured by lifelong obligations on the part of the wife; besides observing all sorts of taboos, she must tend a cult in the hut of the god all her life. Thereafter husband and wife live believing that the god will punish in a frightful manner any infidelity or disobedience by the wife as an affront to himself, and this idea exercises a dominating influence upon their lives.

Another form of cult support for paternal authority is the familiar conception, rooted in the cult idea, that the divine ancestral spirit and original father himself in actuality always continues to cling to his property with the awful power peculiar to the older conception of divinity, and that he merely allows it to be administered temporarily by one of his descendants. This idea splits in two directions in different centers of culture. One form we are already acquainted with; the ruling divinity is with him who has possession of its exuvial fetishes. Whenever the

[108] Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition*, I, 173. Lippert merely refers to this case here, since he has already cited it previously *(Kulturgeschichte,* **II, 150-1).** The earlier reference, however, occurs in a chapter not translated herewith. For the sake of completeness, therefore, it has been inserted in somewhat condensed form by the editor at this point, where it **takes** up the balance of the paragraph. (Ed.)

patriarchal head wears or carries these, or, to use a later expression, whenever he assumes the insignia of authority, the divinity of the family or cult union is with him. In the other form of the idea, the head of the family or union himself becomes, in his own body, the fetish of the divinity. He is then, in the familiar cult sense, the earthly "image" of the ancestral divinity and, in the same sense but otherwise expressed, the "son" of the latter. The two conceptions also occur commonly in combination. Then the relation is expressed in the same way as when one divinity possesses both a living fetish and an image; the head of the family is the "living image" of the god.

We must expect, moreover, that under primitive conditions every logical inference will be drawn from these ideas. In the one case, he who obtains possession of the insignia will become the head of the family. Under ordinary conditions, however, they will be transmitted like other personal property; the holder will surrender them before his death to the person he has chosen to succeed him. In other words, the succession to authority, since there is originally no legal mode of inheritance, will take place through nomination by the predecessor. In a union of families, however, the wishes of the members of the union can scarcely help influencing the nomination. Thus two principles will struggle for domination, and the results will consequently show considerable diversity. So far as the predecessor has the more decisive influence, the idea of nearness of kinship will produce an effect which may through repetition become convention and law. Then the nephew, so long as matrilineal descent prevails, or in later times the son, will under ordinary conditions have the greatest prospect of being appointed, i.e., of being placed in possession of the authority through presentation with the divine emblems. In a clan or gens, united by natural kinship and descent, the will of the possessor or existing paternal head will usually be decisive in the determination of his successor, and the nature of this determination will tend to give rise to a hereditary succession. On the other hand, in an organization originating by way of a union or confederation the will of all may remain effective, and a right of election can develop.

If, however, the supreme chief is the "image" of the god, then a logical inference from this conception renders necessary the same act with which we are already acquainted in the transformation of any object into a fetish, namely, the "consecration" of the image and the introduction of the spirit into it. The man, like any other fetish, must be given into the possession of the divinity, i.e., he must be consecrated and filled with the spirit of the latter. Thus we arrive at the question: Who can do this? Who disposes in this way over the divinity?

For tribes of lower culture this question is of no consequence; their organization either still lacks entirely the support of the cult idea or finds the means in very primitive fashion. The higher stages of culture, however, are distinguished, as we know, by the fact that the cult has become consolidated into a permanent institution. On a still higher stage, moreover, we find it separated by an advanced division of labor from the temporal concerns of government. In groups united by kinship ties this is, as a rule, not yet the case; the chief is at the same time the priest.[104] With expansion of organization, however, a separation of these functions may at any time become necessary. The increasingly pretentious cult demands uninterrupted activity and vigilance, but the business of governing leads to interruptions and into dangers which might disrupt the continuity of the cult and thereby endanger the existence of the entire organization. The separation may take place in a wide variety of forms and consequently lead to different institutions. This on the whole little heeded subject is of the highest importance for the further history of society.

465 As soon as this separation of functions, which inevitably becomes a separation of powers, has come about in any way, the steady, permanent, and secure power is always that associated with the cult. Thus it is necessarily the cult guardian, the priest, who introduces the divinity by the act of consecration into his "living image," the ruler. However the succession may be determined, it can scarcely be entirely uninfluenced by the cult, for the divinity necessarily has a right to a word of consent or disapproval, and this can only be solicited through the cult by way of an oracle. Through this connection the ruler gains, to be sure, a considerable accretion in authority; nevertheless cases can now arise which will remind him harshly that this authority is really only a borrowed one. Every fetish, when its spirit has

[104] Rivers *(Social Organization,* p. 165) considers the functions of primitive chieftainship to be primarily religious and only to a very minor extent governmental. (Ed.)

deserted it, is an ordinary thing, which can be discarded without hesitation, and history shows that this logical inference has also been drawn in the case of the "living image." Defeats, failure of crops, and other misfortunes are signs that the ruler has been abandoned and repudiated by the god. In other cases the divinity speaks through its oracle or priests.

Many a peculiar fact is explained by these hitherto neglected ideas and the conditions they create. We shall now consider them in some detail in a few of the more important centers of culture. In itself it would certainly seem very remarkable that in many regions the government is thought of sometimes as in the hands of a man and then again as residing in an inanimate object. When regarded from the above point of view, however, there is nothing unusual about it. The same spirit quite generally possesses not only a "living image" but also a lifeless fetish. Indeed it can possess a whole series of them. The Egyptian god, Amon-Ra, was able to preside over the actual sun, the ram, and the living king, as well as over images of them all, including a golden solar disk in the temple at Thebes. In each of these images he was the ruler of the empire. Paulaho, the first king of the Tonga Islands to entertain European guests, left a shell or a bowl behind him as ruler of one island when he visited another.[105]

In the African kingdom of Kakongo, the ghost of a long deceased king ruled from one of the fetishes in the capital. Naturally he was represented by his cult caretaker or priest.[106] In Angoy, the prepared body of the deceased king could not be consigned to the earth until a successor had taken over the government, because until that time it was necessarily regarded as the fetish of the ruling divinity.[107] Hence in many of these petty West African kingdoms the corpse of the dead king also plays an important role in the consecration of his successor. From it he must receive the spirit. This was the case in Loango and in Chinsolla. In Bonin, when "the king feels his death approaching, he imparts to his *oneywa* or privy councilor the tokens whereby the latter can recognize that one of his sons with whom his spirit will again unite."[108] The position of these sovereigns, on account of the great restrictions resulting from the strictly logical appli-

[108] See Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums*, I, 180. (Ed.)
[106] Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition*, I, 230-1.
107bid., I, 237.
[108] Bastian, *Bilder*, p. 175; id., *Deutsche Expedition*, I, 82, 69.

cation of the cult idea, is so little desirable that it often lacks a candidate for a considerable time. The consecrated man is kept in custody like a real fetish and is surrounded with a cult which destroys his liberty. Moreover, he is always in jeopardy of being repudiated. "If the harvest and fishing are not productive, the king of Loango is accused of being of evil heart, and his removal is demanded."[109] "Heart" here means spirit: such a king does not have the right spirit in him; he is an abandoned fetish.

Distinct traces of this fetishism are also found in Oceania in the region where monarchies prevail. In Tahiti it had assumed a singular form, brought about apparently by a combination of the fetishistic idea with patrilineal succession. The passing of the ruling spirit from person to person was conceived as a reincarnation. The Tahitians believed not illogically that when the ruling spirit reappeared in a child, he necessarily at the same moment deserted the fetish he had previously occupied. Thus the latter could no longer be the ruler. Hence the curious phenomenon that the former sovereigns of Tahiti ceased to be kings from the moment when a son was born to them. The spirit had abandoned them and entered into a new fetish. The newborn child was thenceforth the actual king and received like a god the homage of the people, that of his own parents not excepted. His father became merely a regent and stepped into complete retirement at
467 the majority of his son.[110] We must note here that fitness, which is necessarily the chief consideration in the selection of an Indian chief or sachem, can not be the sole criterion in cases like the above. Between the two forms of organization there has intervened the idea of possession, and the more strongly this is stressed, the less important do personal qualifications inevitably become. What is now wanted is not so much a "ruler" as a pledge of the presence of the divinity. A monarch is, entirely irrespective of his personal qualities, a valuable possession for a people, and even, if the custom has once become established, a necessity.

The civilized states of America were likewise familiar with the conception of the "living image" of a god. There are a few clear indications in connection with the elective kingship of Mexico. In the first place, it was the function of a hereditary high priest,

[109] Bastian, *Deutsche Expedition,* I, 268.
[110] Forster, *Seereisen,* II, 153, 241. Cf. also Frazer, *Golden Bough,* IV, 190. (Ed.)

who bore the modest title of "divine lord," to anoint the elected sovereign and thereby to confer upon him the authority. We now know, however, what this anointment means. That our interpretation is the correct one here is proved by the customary promise* of the king that he would cause the sun to pursue its course, the clouds to rain, the rivers to flow, and the fruits to ripen.[111] He could give this promise only as the living image of the sun god, the divinity of the imperial cult.

The Inca of Peru was very explicitly the fetish of the ruling god, the lord of the people and the empire. He was, however, in a far more favorable position than a fetish king in West Africa or even in Mexico. His office was hereditary and independent of any priesthood. Even though an earlier age may have doubted the possibility of hereditary succession from father to son because the blood bond between them was not yet recognized, this objection was overcome by the consistent brother-and-sister marriages in the Inca family; the son of the Inca succeeded him according to ancient nephew-right as well as father-right.[112] In accordance with the common practice of designating the fetish by the name of the god, the Inca himself was "God," the "living image" of the sun, the sun on earth. Instead of yielding to priests, the Incas themselves tended the cult of the sun. For their own service they established a priesthood, the highest office of which was always in the hands of a member of the family. The divine rank of the Peruvian ruler is placed beyond any doubt by the fact that even the living Inca received sacrifices and divine honors.[118] To him, moreover, were consecrated portable fetishistic images bearing the significant name of "brothers," he himself being called the "son" of the sun. These images were carried at the head of the army and were transported about the country in a ceremonial procession in order to promote favorable weather.[114]

The Egyptian sun god, Ra, similarly ruled in his "image," the king. However high the concept of divinity was elevated in Egypt, it was never able to lose entirely its terrestrial basis. The old identification of "god" and "first man"—in this case the

1111 Clavigero, *Geschichte Mexikos,* I, 465.

112 "If now son and sister's son are the same person, there can be no flaw in the title" (Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1575). (Ed.)

118 Müller, *Urreligionen,* p. 364.

114 Vega, *Commentaries,* I, 15ff.

first prince—had not been entirely forgotten. Thus the assumption was inevitable that Ra himself must once have reigned on earth in person and without an image, before leaving it to govern his kingdom only through his image, the mortal king. But Ra was not the only god. All the originally independent clan and district unions boasted of similar gods who had likewise once ruled in person at the beginning of things. These groups, however, had been united from time immemorial into a unified state and nation, and all their gods formed a hierarchy, whose members were ranked according to the former social importance of their cult communities and were connected with one another, in the only way known to myth, by genealogical ties.

If now the idea originally associated with an isolated divinity is transferred to this grouping of gods, there follows with a certain logic the inference that before the succession of human kings there reigned a succession of gods, arranged in dynasties according to rank and in an order determined by the mythical genealogical system. Egyptian history actually adhered to this mythological substruction as a fact. It arranged the gods into groups and told how these had ruled successively on earth. First reigned a dynasty of the great gods, then one of deities of the second order, then one of heroes and *manes,* and finally the dynasties of human kings. It was merely the idea of the greatness of the gods which extended their reigns over such immense periods.

A similar substruction of early history is found in a mutilated yet unmistakable form in a Hebrew myth.[116] An apparently interpolated account, unrelated to its context, presents the same sequence—gods, giants, men. Immense periods of time are followed by shorter ones; the span of life for the race of "giants" is stated as a hundred and twenty years. These giants, who are also called "mighty men which were of old, men of renown," plainly have their prototype in the category of heroes or demigods. Indeed they are designated outright as the latter, since they are said to have sprung from intercourse between "the sons of the gods"[116] and "the daughters of men." Moreover, the account must originally have had in mind the successive rule, rather than the successive existence, of these classes of beings, for men were admit-

115 Genesis vi. 1-4. (Ed.)

116 The King James version here incorrectly translates the Hebrew plural, *Elohim* (gods), as a singular, "God." (Ed.)

edly already in existence. But however it is analyzed, the passage still reveals the same popular conception as in Egypt. The reign of the gods was followed by that of heroes, and this by that of men, beginning in the one case with Menes, in the other with Noah.

The Egyptian king was called preferably the "son" or the "living image" of Amon-Ra. The name of King Tutankhamon means literally "the living image of Amon."[117] King Piankhi similarly called himself "a living image of Turn."[118] The name of the divinity could change with the seat of the government, but the relation to the king remained ever the same. As an image in the cult sense, he was the abode of the god. That this was the case, not in a metaphorical, but in a truly fetishistic sense, is shown by the parallel designation of the sun as the "celestial image" of Amon. In relation to the god, therefore, the king was on earth what the sun was in heaven—his fetish.

The Egyptian king also called himself the "son" of the imperial divinity, and this not merely in the old sense of the ancestor cult but also in a special sense developed through fetishism. In an inscription at Ipsambul the divinity, speaking himself, compares the creation of the king with that of his fetish animal at Mendes, the sacred ram. "I formed thy figure like that of the god of Mendes."[119] The idea is that the god himself created the earthly image for his abode. Indeed, he actually did so by procreation. "I begot thee by thy venerable mother," he adds. Even this conception is admissible, because the god himself had also dwelt in the former king, the human procreator of his successor. Thus the identity of fetish and "son" is also revealed in this way. But only judged as a man was the king the "son" of the god; judged by his indwelling spirit he was himself divine. Hence the same god says to him further: "Thou art a lord even as the majesty **of** the sun god Ra. The gods and goddesses praise thy good deeds and pray and sacrifice before thy image. . . . I give thee the firmament and all that is therein; I lend thee the earth and all that is thereupon. . . . I demand of every creature which goes on two or **four** legs, which flies or flutters, of the entire world,

[117] Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens,* p. 436. Cf., *Cambridge Ancient History,* II, 129. (Ed.)

[118] Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens,* p. 287.

[110] Le Page-Renouf, *Religion der alten Aegypter,* p. 153.

that it offer thee its products." The logical implications of the idea could scarcely be extended farther.

In a single kin-group the chief might boast in principle of the same relations to its deity; such extravagances, however, would necessarily be impossible with him, for the extent of the power of a god is always closely dependent upon that of his group. But in a state which regarded no other on earth as its equal, such a flight of fancy is comprehensible. The extravagances of court ceremonial are to be considered from the same point of view. The origin of this ceremonial rests in the cult; indeed it is a cult. Ramses II gave himself the title *Nuti-aa,* "the great god." In the poem of Pentaur[120] the god Amon says to Thothmes III: "My crown upon thy head, it is a consuming fire; my royal snake shines on thy brow. Thou shinest in their [the enemies'] sight in my form." The impression made upon the alien is that of the Rightfulness of a god. Thus even within the past century official reports from China have asserted that the "barbarians," finally admitted to audience with the ruler, had fallen to the ground bewildered and crushed by the radiance of his countenance.

The principle remained the same in Egypt, no matter from which cult place the dynasty came or upon which it based its power. Only the name of the indwelling god, naturally, altered accordingly. Thus the kings of the XXIInd Dynasty, which hailed from Bubastis in Lower Egypt, the cult place of the goddess Bastet, called themselves *Si-Bastet,* "son of Bastet,"[121] while members of the Saite (XXVIth) Dynasty called themselves *Si-Nit,* "son of Neith." The Ptolemies appear purposely to have associated their authority with no single cult place, but they nevertheless admitted the old principle in their titles. Ptolemy II called himself in old Egyptian fashion *P-nuter-anut,* "the helping god;" Ptolemy IV, *P-nuter-tenuu-tef-ef,* "the god whose
471 father is great." Ptolemy XIII sometimes represented himself as a reincarnation of Osiris, calling himself *Osiri-nuun,* "the new Osiris." In the same sense Cleopatra was called "the new goddess Isis."[122]

To apply all titles of the divinity to the king is only a logical extension of this conception. Senusret I is called on the obelisk at

120 Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens,* pp. 353ff.
121 Cf., *Cambridge Ancient History,* III, 265n. (Ed.)
122 Lauth, *Aegyptens Vorzeit,* p. 496.

Heliopolis "the kindly god" and "the giver of life." Ramses II is addressed by his officials in an inscription at Abydos: "Lord of heaven, lord of the earth, sun, life of the whole world, lord of time, measurer of the course of the sun, Turn [god] for men, lord of welfare, creator of the harvest, sculptor and molder of mortals, dispenser of breath to all men, vivifier of all the host of gods, pillar of heaven, support of the earth. . . . Here we are all together before thee; bestow upon us life from thy hand, Pharaoh, and breath for our nostrils."[123] Thus in Egypt as in Mexico it was the king who maintained the proper course of the world and gave the people their crops. It was only logical, therefore, for ceremonial to prescribe that all should prostrate themselves before him.

In keeping with the mosaic composition of the empire, the true imperial authority resided in a pantheon composed of the chief gods of the formerly separate districts, headed, to be sure, by the particular dynastic god. The combination and identification of these individual divinities found expression in the nature and external appearance of the king. Hence he really had at the same time many divine fathers, who nevertheless were miraculously one. Thus the divine father says to his son Thothmes IV, "I am thy father Horus, Chepra, Ra, Turn."[124] A corresponding number of inanimate images were worn by the king on his person as imperial insignia. From earliest times a double headdress, shaped somewhat like a hat, characterized the king as the lord of united Upper and Lower Egypt. The one region provided him with the "crown" of the god Horus, the other with that of Set. Not always —witness the legendary struggle between Horus and Set—had the two crowns covered the same head. After the union, however, they appear, distinguished as to height and color (white and red), combined into a single headdress.[125] Gradually this fetishistic ornament was enlarged by a no less curious combination of the emblems of all the divinities over whose territory the government had extended its authority. Rhampsinitus says of himself that he has been crowned with the *atef* and the urseus snakes, and has worn the ornament of the double feather like the god Ptah and the splendid garment of the sun god Turn.[126] The *atef* was a sym-

[123] Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyvtens,* pp. 125, 481.
[124] *Ibid.,* p. 403.
[125] Cf., *'Cambridge Ancient History,* I, 266. (Ed.)
[126] Lauth, *Aegyptens Vorzeit,* p. 367.

metrical structure to be worn on the head, consisting of varying combinations of the emblems of the different cults. Usually its basis was the horizontally outstretched horns of the ram, common to Amon and Chnemu. Curving upwards from this were the horns of the bull of Memphis and Heliopolis. Above the former reared, usually at both sides, the uraus snakes, the oldest and commonest fetish. In the center rose the two feathers of Ptah. Between them appeared the emblems of the celestial fetishes and sometimes those of plant fetishes as well.[127]

In spite of all their favors, the gods did not grant the king full liberty of person—for he was their fetish—nor absolute security. These he enjoyed only according to the measure of his personal sagacity and strength. Even Ramses II, according to the heroic poem of Pentaur, bears witness to his own dependence, a correlate of his position. "Have I done something without thy knowledge?" he says to the god Amon, "or have I not acted and abided by the utterance of thy mouth?" But this utterance of the mouth of the god is an oracle, and the medium and interpreter of oracles is the priest. Montezuma, too, was entirely in the hands of his oracle priests, until in their perplexity his god deserted him.

The Egyptian colony in Meroe illustrates the possible vicissitudes of such a monarchy. As indicated by its designation as a theocracy, its priests occupied a position superior to the king. In theory, to be sure, the king as an "image of the god" necessarily stands higher than the priest of the god. But the actual relationship can assume a very different form. It is a fact of paramount importance that the living image is not the only image, but rather only a temporary one in comparison with the permanent images which are served by the priests in their hereditary position unaffected by the fate of the ruler. Oracles are elicited by the priests, not from the living image, but from the inanimate ones, and the king submits to them as the expressions of the will of his father. The high priests of Meroe were able to conserve this position with better fortune than those of Thebes. The kings were appointed, and likewise deposed, by the priesthood. Strabo's[128] account, aside from a few obvious misconstructions, coincides with what the Egyptian monuments tell us

[127] See Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthums,* I, 495. (Ed.)
[128] *Geography,* pp. 822-3 (xvii. 2. 3).

directly. The kings of Meroe, though they were worshiped "as gods" and regarded as "the common saviours and guardians of all," were sequestered and impotent. The priests "sometimes sent orders even to the king, by a messenger, to put an end to himself, when they appointed another king in his place." In this case, of course, the god had repudiated his image and designated another. At the time of Ptolemy II, however, a revolution in this state of affairs took place in Meroe. The king at that time took possession of the sanctuary by force, slaughtered the priests, and set up a hereditary dynasty.

In Egypt, too, the king was made the actual living image of the divinity by a form of consecration. In spite of the dominant power of the cult idea in the world of antiquity, however, it must not be imagined that social needs and influences and the will and energy of individuals did not find any effective expression, or that they did so only through the medium of the guardians of the cult. On the contrary, the cult idea was often powerless enough against them. But their victory did not destroy its foundation. Antiquity always found instead some form of compromise and reconciliation. One way in which this could happen is shown by another example.

Horemheb (Horus of Chebi), an official under King Amenophis IV, favored by the anarchic conditions of the time, had snatched the scepter. He was, as his name indicates, no scion of the Amon kings, no born son of Amon; indeed, he was not the son of a king at all, but a descendant of a family of the Horus cult in Alabastronpolis in Lower Egypt. He did not even intend to remove his government to Thebes, but to rule from the northern country. The priests of Amon in Thebes, long accustomed to see an "image" of their own god upon the throne, could not resist the force of the circumstances; but it was clearly to their interest that Amon himself should not be supplanted as the imperial god by Horus. Mutual advantage dictated a compromise. The new Horus king journeyed to Thebes, submitted to a coronation by the Amon priests, and even took to wife a relative of the earlier Theban royal house. Thus he gained legitimacy, while the priests of Amon saved the supremacy of their god. In the cult version of this political transaction, fabricated in a manner typical of the process of mythogenesis, Amon himself—impersonated probably by a priest—appeared at the ceremony and showed his pleasure at the arrangement by embracing Horemheb and presenting him with the golden image of the solar disk.[129]

The Hebrew kingship rested on a similar foundation. Consecration by means of anointment was emphasized, and the king was consequently spoken of as "the Lord's anointed."[130] In the period preceding the kingdom, the conquering Semitic tribes in the Canaanite country seem, according to the Book of Judges, not to have been as yet united into a single permanent organization but to have formed alliances of varying magnitude according to need. It was sometimes the leaders and sometimes the priests of these unions who came to the fore as "judges." As soon as the alliances acquired a more permanent form, they became at the same time cult unions, and consequently their judges were necessarily in the main the custodians of the union cult. Thus it was at the end of the period. Samuel, however a later terminology may obscure the fact, appears preeminently as the priest of the union.

But the confederated people in distress demanded a king. They wanted a king like other nations, and believed, entirely in accordance with the general cult idea, that the possession of such a king would rehabilitate their lost fortune. The priest yielded to their insistence, though not without serious hesitation, and consecrated Saul as king in the manner just alluded to. From the sanctuary of the union God he took a vial of oil, poured it on Saul's head, and then kissed him.[131] Kissing, like breathing upon, is a visible symbol of the transfusion of a spirit. Indeed this result, the introduction of the new spirit, is expressly attested by the statement that "God gave him another heart."[132] Thenceforth Saul was "the Lord's anointed," as the Hebrews designated their genuine Yahwistic king; alien kings were not "Yahweh's anointed." The effect of this consecration was soon seen. As soon as the spirit of God came upon him, he who had formerly been an ignorant peasant "prophesied among the prophets."[183]

But in an organization unprepared and threatened by enemies on all sides, the first attempt miscarried. Saul, capable as a leader and man, was an unsuitable "image;" he retained his own will. An oracle, communicated by the priest, was not obeyed by the

[129] Lauth, *Aegyptens Vorzeit*, p. 269; Brugsch, *Geschichte Aegyptens*, p. 439.

130 Cf., 1 Samuel xxvi. 9. (Ed.)

131 Ibid., x. 1.

[132] *Ibid.*, x. 9. (Ed.)

133 *Ibid.*, x. 11. (Ed.)

king. As a result the fetish was repudiated. "Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being king."[184] The priest secretly anointed David king. After long warfare the authority actually devolved upon the latter, and he was able with sinister craft to maintain himself in his difficult position and even to bequeath to his family a throne somewhat freed from priestly influence.

At first David was king only in Judah, but after the death of Saul he also became, through the conclusion of a league, the king of the united tribes of Israel. "David made a league with them in Hebron before the Lord."[185] This "league before the Lord" reveals its meaning on its face. It was a permanent alliance concluded through Yahweh as its avenger, and consequently it assumed the form of a cult union. Strictly speaking, to be sure, the divinity of the union could not have been Yahweh alone but Yahweh-Elohe, in a fusion like that of the Egyptian Amon-Ra. The Bible itself still preserves both names, Yahweh and Elohe (El, Elohim), and employs them as synonyms. Israel means "champion of El," the warrior of the god of that name and of his union, while Judah (Yehudah) is similarly connected with Yahweh. The fusion of Yahweh and Elohe was, however, only embryonic at the time of which we speak, for David was twice anointed as king, first by Samuel for Judah, and then, at a much later time, for Israel. "Samuel took the horn of oil, and anointed him in the midst of his brethren: and the Spirit of the Lord Yahweh came upon David from that day forward."[136] Then, after the conclusion of the league with the tribes of Israel, "they anointed David king over Israel."[137] Yahweh-Elohe as the God of the cult union became at the same time the God of the united state thus established, and His cult became the state cult, although this did not at first involve the destruction of the local and domestic cults.

Thenceforth the struggle for cult unity, which of course necessarily involved the supremacy of the state priesthood at Jerusalem, had two objectives, namely, the suppression of the domestic and local cults and the transfer of the sanctuaries of the Israelite cult of Elohe to Jerusalem. Not until then could Yahweh entirely supersede Elohe. Actually, however, this goal was never com-

134 1 Samuel xv. 23. (Ed.)
135 2 Samuel v. 3. (Ed.)
136 1 Samuel xvi. 13.
137 2 Samuel v. 3.

pletely attained so long as Israel existed as a nation. Not until it was destroyed could Judah enter into the heritage. But even at the time of Jesus there still survived in popular tradition the question whether it was better to pray to God at the imperial cult place in Judah or at that of Israel.

The Biblical narrative gives us a few indications as to the means by which David disengaged the kingship, in spite of the quality adhering to it from its origin, from excessive subservience to the priesthood. The foundation of the new unified empire, which David was successful in accomplishing, necessarily provided him also with the opportunity of establishing a new imperial priesthood. Thus he was in a position to place this dangerous source of power in the hands only of men of his family or in his confidence. Just as the Egyptian kings at every opportunity intrusted important priestly positions to their sons, so also we read that "David's sons were priests/'[138] in contradiction, to be sure, to the later theory of the caste extraction of the Hebrew priesthood.[139] Other prominent priestly positions were filled by men who held posts of confidence in the house of David. Thus it was Nathan, the tutor of the prince Solomon, who was chosen, with Zadok, to anoint Solomon king during the lifetime of his father.[140] Moreover, this method of transferring the authority necessarily established a hereditary right of succession, a custom which could by no means have been self-evident at that time, but one which inevitably bound the hands of the priests.

The priesthood during the reigns of many kings thus remained very far from its goal. Naturally the hieratic historical account represents these conditions as those of backsliding and defection. But this apostasy remained the rule in Israel and Judah. Nevertheless the struggle continued and was carried on in the two kingdoms after their separation, even though we can not clearly determine whether and when the two priesthoods, united by their common opposition to the independence of the kingship, joined hands. The Israelite king, Joram, the last of the house of Ahab, fell like Saul as a "rejected" image through the agency of a priest, the prophet Elisha. The latter sent a daring pupil to anoint Jehu, the king's commander-in-chief, and "Jehu . . . conspired

[138] 2 Samuel viii. 18. For the translation "priests," instead of "chief rulers," cf. Genesis xli. 45; Exodus ii. 16. (Ed.)

139 for further details, see Lippert, *Gesehichte des Priesterthums,* I I , 75ff.

140 1 Kings i. 34.

against Joram."[141] Like Saul, Joram showed himself to be a capable man—and consequently a poor image. He had just returned home, weak from the honorable wounds of a campaign against the Syrians, when he was opposed by the conspirator, and in his feeble condition was pierced by the cowardly arrow of the traitor. The priestly account, however, eulogizes the murderer as the one "whom the Lord had anointed to cut off the house of Ahab."[142] The conspiracy also extended to Judah. Ahaziah, the king of Judah, when he was visiting his sick friend, fell at the hands of the same conspirator. His little son Joash was abducted from the palace, hidden in the temple sanctuary, and brought up by the priests. When this boy became king, he ruled according to the will of his priestly tutor, Jehoiada, as long as the latter lived. Then he too backslid and "served groves and idols."[148] He was killed by "his servants."[144] What Jehu was supposed to do in Israel, he did. He destroyed all the non-Elohistic cults; he enticed their priests to a great assembly and had them murdered.[145] But even this was not enough to suit those from whose hands the historical account comes down to us, for he allowed the two Israelite state cults of Elohe at Dan and Beth-el to continue. But in Judah, not even under the successors of Joash did the priests succeed in having the gentile and private cults abolished.

These conditions, strangely distorted by an interpretation of history in accordance with preconceived ideas and thus transmitted through the centuries to us, lasted until the time of Hezekiah, king of Judah. The sudden destruction of the brother state, Israel, and the transplantation of its kindred people, removed the last obstacle to the complete identification of Yahweh and Elohe. There was now actually no state cult other than that of Yahweh at Jerusalem. Nowhere else could the abandoned remnants of the poor people of Israel find religious satisfaction. Now or never seemed the time to establish the unity of the cult and the authority of the one state priesthood. Hezekiah was won over to the great plan. He demolished the local cults with their "high places," "groves," and "pillars," and formed the registered

141 2 Kings ix. 14. (Ed.)
142 2 Chronicles xxii. 7.
143*Ibid.*, xxiv. 18. (Ed.)
14 2 Kings xii. 2L (Ed.)
i« *Ibid.*, x. 18-28. (Ed.)

priests into a single great organization for the state cult, assigning to them a fixed dotation.[146]

The priests, richly indemnified, were easily won over, but not so the people, whose familiar usages were destroyed and whose festivals were robbed of their significance. Hezekiah's son, Manasseh, lent his hand to the reaction. The high places and altars were again erected, and a cult of celestial fetishes, perhaps a result of contact with Babylonia, came into being. The unregistered, non-Levite priests, the soothsayers, necromancers, and wizards, again emerged.[147] Manasseh's son, Amon, pursued the same course; a conspiracy put him out of the way.[148]

In the following reign, that of Josiah, a boy eight years of age, fell the decisive event. The high priest Hilkiah "found the book of the law in the house of the Lord."[149] As Zoroaster's law was presented to Gustasp, so the law of Moses, our Deuteronomy, was now delivered by Hilkiah and the scribe Shaphan to King Josiah. Its demands and urgent warnings must have been completely new and amazing to the king, and its threats shocking, for "it came to pass, when the king had heard the words of the book of the law, that he rent his clothes."[150] On the strength of this law Josiah concluded with Yahweh and the whole people a new covenant, whereby the people abjured the last vestige of their independent cults. The ambition of the Yahwistic priesthood was now accomplished in both its aspects. A formal campaign destroyed the wicked rival, the ancient cult place of El at Beth-el in Israel, and a new decree tore from their cult places the independent priests, "the priests of the high places," who "came not up to the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem, but . . . did eat of the unleavened bread among their brethren."[151] What would have been inconceivable in the united empire was now realized in Judah; the festivals, upon which the local cults most depended, were transferred to Jerusalem. Thither now came the entire people for the first time to celebrate the first Passover "as it is written in the book of the covenant." "Surely there was not holden such a passover from the days of the judges that judged

146 2 Chronicles xxxi. (Ed.)
147 2 Kings xxi. 3-6; 2 Chronicles xxxiii. 3-6. (Ed.)
148 2 Kings xxi. 20-23; 2 Chronicles xxxiii. 22-24. (Ed.)
149 2 Kings xxii. 8; 2 Chronicles xxxiv. 15. (Ed.)
150 2 Kings xxii. 11.
151 *Ibid.*, xxiii. 9-18. (Ed.)

Israel, nor in all the days of the kings of Israel, nor of the kings of Judah; but in the eighteenth year of king Josiah, wherein this passover was holden to the Lord in Jerusalem." [152] The priesthood celebrated this great triumph in the year 621 B. C. With it the domestic and local cults were finally annihilated. In 588 Judah fell, the temple was destroyed, and the people were carried into exile, from which they were not released until their descendants were befriended by the conquering Persians.

The schism did not, however, cease even therewith. The Exile was favorable to the idealized dream of a sacerdotal state under the direct government and leadership of Yahweh; the restoration under dependent circumstances, to its realization. Discretion and jealousy held the kingship in abeyance. The priesthood ruled unchecked. Its good fortune, however, did not beguile the people out of their recollection that theocracy meant the impotence of the state. On the contrary, in wide classes of the nation there survived the fond hope that Yahweh would not always rule his people merely from the Scripture through the mediation of the priests, but would reappear at some future time in a "living image," in a "son," that sometime a king would arise as the "anointed of the Lord," as the "Messiah." This is the materialistic root of the Messianic faith of the Hebrews, as it developed with the waxing and waning of their hopes. All its terms, like "Messiah," "the anointed," and "the son of God," were in keeping with and derived from the class of ideas just described.

Two great parties were thenceforth pitted against one another. The party of the people was represented by the Pharisees, that of the ruling priestly aristocracy by the Sadducees. The latter naturally regarded the temple cult as of paramount importance, denied every private cult, rejected the Messianic hope, and were satisfied with the enjoyment of theocratic rule. In all these respects the leading spirits of the popular party presented a strong contrast. They had not entirely lost the tradition of the private cults, they preserved their own ancient customs with respect to festivals, they still regarded the domestic meal as a sacrificial meal, they concerned themselves with the future state of the soul, and they believed in the resurrection of the "righteous." This "righteousness," however, they sought in observance of the "law."

152 2 Kings xxiii. 21-23.

To them the law stood higher than the sacrificial cult; the exclusion of the people from direct participation in the cult had produced this inevitable reaction. Moreover, this party was always the bearer and preserver of the Messianic idea. Princes and kings the Jews of course saw again, but the "anointed of Yahweh" was not among them.[158]

A similar struggle, though less familiar and less far-reaching in its influences, took place in the individual states of India. In some reigned priestly princes, in others warrior kings were at variance with the priests, but as a rule there existed a kingship of the Egyptian type. External indications of this are the consecration performed by the priest and the restrictive taboos imposed upon the kings in regard to their food and distribution of time.[154] Moreover, the Hindu conception of the kingship was precisely like that of the Egyptians. Thus a Pandava king, at his accession to the throne, says to his people of his still living and coregnant father: "The great King Dhritarashtra is my father, the highest divinity; . . . if you and your friends wish to gain my favor, then observe toward Dhritarashtra the same behavior as formerly; for he is the lord of the world and of you and me; to him belong the entire earth and all Pandava."[155]

In India, however, there was nothing remarkable about the phenomenon of the human fetish, because cult notions had given wide currency to the idea of reincarnation. Not merely was this carried over into Buddhism, but it finds especial emphasis there. Every eminent man is regarded as the reincarnation of one who has also been not unimportant in former existences. As we speak of the deeds of our ancestors, so hundreds of Buddhist legends recount the exploits of heroes in their earlier manifestations. Priests and monks in particular are the vessels of divine spirits or the incarnations of divinities. A favorite class of monastic legends makes the monk entreat and adjure the divinity until it finally incorporates itself within him; it thereby raises him to its own rank and works miracles through him.[156] In the animal fetishism of Egypt we found that only those individuals of a species which were distinguished by certain peculiarities were

[153] Cf., Wellhausen, *Pharisaer und Sadducaer.*
[154] Cf., Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* II, 719.
[155] *Mahabharata* xii. 41, 1469ff.; Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde,* I, 789.
[156] Schiefner, *Buddhismus,* p. 245.

regarded as fetishes. In the East the same principle is extended to man. Thus Buddha in his last manifestation bore certain marks and tokens on his body, and similar tales are told of Tibetan kings. The incarnations in the high priests of Tibet and Bhutan are well known. In each dwells a Bodhisattva—a spirit next in rank below a Buddha—who is a tutelary divinity of the country. At the beginning of the Seventeenth Century the high priest or Dalai Lama of Lhassa in Tibet also acquired the temporal authority. Hence since that time the tutelary divinity has ruled the land through him. This brings us to another widespread development.

The phenomenon of the priestly kingship, with its more or less strongly emphasized fetishistic nature, is based on'the original conception of the retention by the ancestral spirit of his authority and on the vicarious character of his successors. Since the latter administer his authority, they must at the same time be the custodians of his cult. Originally, therefore, every housefather occupies a priestly position in his family. Then, as a result of social advances, there is initiated a process of differentiation, which leads to manifold developments. A division of labor obtrudes itself even here; it separates the "priest" and the "king" and assigns them specialized functions. This advance may follow either of two paths.

As soon as some private priesthood has developed a certain refinement in the forms of the cult, a family whose head is unable to provide similar performances must feel uneasy. Such a refined cult technic is not, however, characteristic of the shaman alone; we have found it also in the Hindu fire-priest and, in an even more peculiar form, in the Brahman. All the invocations which we now read in the Vedas were once the trade secrets of the guild. To acquire them one had to devote a considerable portion of one's life. It became more and more indispensable to have a man thus educated in the family. We learn from the Book of Judges, moreover, how youths who could expect to inherit nothing from their fathers devoted themselves to similar studies in order to offer themselves to some rich man as a professional cult custodian. Hindu legends reveal the evil plight of a king who does not provide himself with an assistant versed in the art of sacrifice, with a Brahman.

But if the king is not self-sufficient, neither is the priest.

If the paternal head of a tribe or kin-group inclines in this direction and devotes himself entirely to the duties and advancement of the cult, a number of other affairs must be placed in other hands. Divine authority is conducive to dominion, but not in like measure to government. Many affairs and activities of this world are incompatible with the proximity of a divine being. Thus the Dalai Lama, who in the Seventeenth Century united in himself the entire authority over Tibet, found himself forced to shield his divinity from the bustle of the world and to appoint an ordinary man, the so-called "law-king," to administer the affairs of government.[157]

Thus the evolution of political organization pursues different paths depending upon whether the ruling sovereign differentiates more toward the priest or toward the king. Nevertheless, in the one case a king obtrudes himself upon the priest; in the other a priest upon the king. Their relative positions are necessarily somewhat different in the two cases, and new variations result from struggles over their demarcation. When the Dalai Lama died in the year 1682, his "law-king" was able to conceal his death for sixteen years and to reign independently. Under Chinese rule—since 1720—the Dalai Lama, whose indwelling Bodhisattva is always reincarnated in a boy, became nominally the viceroy of the country, while Chinese mandarins assumed the authority of the law-king.

This development has been repeated in Japan with the opposite outcome. Here the conception of human fetishism still flourishes in all clarity and consistency. The emperor or mikado traces his descent directly from a mother of the gods and is in fact the existing incarnation of the divinity who rules the empire. His personal name may not be mentioned by any one during his lifetime; he bears only the general name *dairi,* which is said to mean "the palace." It is a striking parallel that *pharaoh,* in Egyptian, meant "the great house." Perhaps both originally denoted the residence, the "image," of the imperial divinity. The seclusion and sanctity of the person of the mikado, maintained until recent times, also clearly attest his fetishistic character. The same thing is indicated more or less conclusively by certain legends. Thus it is related that formerly the mikado had to sit for several hours every morning, motionless like a statue, with the crown on his

[167] Schlagintweit, *Konige von Tibet,* p. 18.

head. This was thought to bestow peace and repose on the empire, and every neglect thereof to result in famine, war, or some other national calamity. Later, however, the crown alone is said to have been placed on the throne, and the king relieved of the inconvenience.[158] All this is simply an expression of the same fetishistic conception that we met in Loango and ancient Mexico; the king is expected to insure fortune to his country and is answerable for its misfortunes.

Closely associated with this quality of the mikado is the taboo respecting his person. Every vessel which he has touched is broken, and the clothing worn by him is burned. Contact with such objects would bring one sickness and death. These restrictions made it necessary for the mikado to appoint a less inaccessible agent, a "law-king," for the affairs of government. This official was primarily regarded as the military commander and bore the title of "shogun" or "tycoon." The two authorities conflicted, and their powers fluctuated, precisely as in Tibet. By the end of the Twelfth Century the divine king yielded primacy to his commander-in-chief, and after the end of the Sixteenth Century he was thrust more and more into the background. The shogun was now the virtual ruler of Japan, while the mikado retained nothing except his sanctity, his seclusion, and the constraint of the cult ceremonial. In modern times—since 1867—the relation has again been reversed, and the mikado has himself seized the reins of government.

The position of the emperor of China has already received mention. We need only add here that in this whole eastern Asiatic culture area, aside from the complicated conceptions of Buddhism, the unadulterated idea of the pure ghost-cult prevails. From the European point of view, surprise has often been expressed at the fact that Chinese religion is not brought in for the support of ethics, that the books prescribed for the education of Chinese youth lack "any instruction in or reliance upon any religious belief."[159] This is, however, very incorrect. Of course, in so far as the origin of religion is sought in heavenly phenomena, Chinese ethics betrays no connection with religion. But with the simple ghost-cult it stands in so close and intimate a connection that this does not need to be taught in school-

[158] Kaempfer, *Geschichte und Beschreibung Japans,* pp. 174-5.
[159] Cf., Schott, *Litteratur des chinesischen Buddhismus.*

books. If the Chinese textbook *San Tze King* mentions as the foundations of all earthly welfare the three so-called "relations of piety"—those of the child to the parents, of the wife to the husband, and of the subject to the prince—it is because the whole essence of the cult and religion is built up along the same parallel. This ethics is rooted in the condition of the primitive family, in the fraternal behavior of the members within such a family on the basis of their consciousness of unity in contrast to their lack of duties toward outsiders. It is this behavior, necessary for the very existence of the primitive family, from which are derived also the duties of the individual in the expanded organization, the state. If the organization of this expanded family is expressed in the relations of the paternal head to his children, to his first wife, and, in further extension, to the other elements of the population, then morality in the larger group also manifests itself in those same three relations of piety.

Equally unfounded is astonishment over the fact that the same textbook has not a word about "the relation to God." [160] The first and most sacred commandment of the Chinese, that regarding honor toward the parents, is here as well as in Egypt an injunction of the cult. Children are the born cult patrons of their parents. Consequently, to the Chinese as to the Hindu, it is regarded as a terrible misfortune to die childless. Hence, contrary to the general custom, a housefather who is threatened with this fate may, after his fortieth year, take several wives.[161] Moreover, the relation to the prince includes that to God. The emperor, as the "son" of Heaven, is at the same time the living image of the divine spirit who also inhabits the heaven. He is likewise, aided by his high officials, the direct cult custodian of the imperial god. Accordingly he combines the undifferentiated powers of the old patriarchal priestly kingship.

That the imperial sovereign was once regarded as a fetish as clearly and consistently as in Egypt, appears from the very manner in which this conception was reinterpreted by Confucius. From the teachings of this sage it becomes manifest that formerly the emperor of China caused "the streams to flow and the fruits to ripen," and that the welfare of the country depended on the

[160] Cf., Schott, *Litteratur des chinesischen Buddhismus,* p. 39.
[161] Osbeck, *Reise nach Ostindien,* p. 237.

right spirit having its seat in him. It is also apparent that he was repudiated if the right spirit was not in him.[162]

The Chinese sage of the Fifth Century B. C. established no new cult union, nor did he give grounds for so doing. Nevertheless his doctrine marks a notable advance in the general evolution of religious ideas. His teaching of religious reform seems to have been stimulated by a perception of the inadequacy of the daimonistic world philosophy, such as is gradually but inevitably engendered in thinking men when, with union into larger organizations, mankind comes to dispose over a richer store of experiences. The more stifling the burdens of the cult become, the more urgently must these experiences be searched for an answer to the question whether the world-ruling omnipotence traditionally attributed to the cult and to daimonism actually inheres in them. Confucius, Gautama Buddha, and young Christianity concur in facing this question. Greek philosophy tackled it without naming it, for a confession of the inadequacy of daimonism is implicit in its search for a first cause of things.

The Orient is characterized by a complete failure to take account of the physical causes of things. No impulse has led its peoples to an attitude which would have granted these proximate causes their proper sphere; or rather nature was already too saturated with daimonism to allow it ever to become the object of investigation. Hence the daimonistic hypothesis itself was never put to the test. The Orientals, entirely in accordance with a characteristic of savage peoples, took an interest in the objectivity of nature only where it caused suffering or affected man's actions. What was put to the test, therefore, was only man's cult activity, by which he believed, in accordance with the traditional assumption, he could influence the course of events. Daimonism seemed to lie too deep in the objectivity of nature itself to become, on that stage, an object of investigation. This limitation is the cause of the fantastic element in Buddhism, and—so far as we can tell from fragments—of a certain one-sidedness in the system of the Chinese sage, which otherwise implies a tremendous advance.

We do not know what Confucius taught positively concerning the nature of the cult. At any rate he did not repudiate it, since to him the subjective motive of piety in it must have

[162] See Lippert, *Geschichte des Priesterthwns,* I I , 485. Ed.)

seemed of the highest value. Moreover, the Chinese cult, though with its daimonistic basis unshaken, actually takes this subjectivity into account in large measure in its far-reaching redemptive forms. But in his doctrine concerning the influence of the cult on the course of the world and the importance of cult righteousness in the narrowest and oldest sense of the word, he certainly appeared as a radical reformer, and the nature of his reform necessarily had an ennobling influence on the moral development of the culture area in question.

What Confucius substitutes for the influence of the cult, namely, the ethics derived from social foresight, is not, however, entirely unprecedented. A parallel is offered by a development already discussed, namely, the placing of the "law" under the sanction of the cult union and the reckoning of its observance as cult merit. In its chief features the substance of Confucian
9 ethics is identical in origin—a definitive exposition of the main factors of social foresight. Everything which was once ascribed to the influence of the cult is made to depend rather on man's behavior with reference to these ethical demands. Thus the law is not so much included in the cult as placed above it. To be sure, the Pharisees also did something of the kind. Nevertheless their law was for the most part a cult law, and provisions of a cult nature lay nearest their hearts.

How far the Chinese sage had advanced, however, may best be illuminated by the way in which he invested the fetishistic conception of the kingship with a new and exclusively ethical purport. It was a bold step to transform the "right spirit" in the ruler, on which the weal and woe of his subjects depends, into its ethical counterpart. If true moderation vanish from man's
486 breast, the weather, the course of the seasons, and all that benefits man must fall into disorder.[163] The prosperity of all things rests on the well-ordered life of man.[164] If the "son of Heaven" promotes this well-ordered life, he has the right spirit in him. The reverse aspect of the old fetishism was the threat of "rejection" if the right spirit no longer inhabits the image. But Confucius teaches that it is the conduct of the king that brings about his repudiation, and that Heaven's agent is the people. The ruin which befalls the ruler takes the form of rebellion in the empire

[163] Stuhr, *Religionssysteme*, pp. 11-12, citing the *Shu Ching.*
[164] *Y-King (Yi Ching),* ed. Mohl, I, 106, 168-9.

and the defection of officials. It is, to be sure, sent by Heaven. But "Heaven speaks not, but only intimates; he sees through the eyes of the people; he hears through the ears of the people; he makes known his will through the voice of the people; and what no one does, yet still happens, comes from him who distributes rewards and punishments." Hence it is imperative for the king to act well and wisely. Good actions have good consequences. "If, however, the right law is violated, then discord appears, the mighty usurp the power, and the stronger exercise tyranny over the weaker. From Heaven it comes both that he who obeys is upheld, and that he who opposes is overcome by ruin."[165] The sage thus fathoms the natural relation through which the welfare of man within an organization is preserved, i.e., the "peace." The violation of the law of the organization is in itself the negation of peace, it is discord, and this necessarily brings in its train the evils of violence and tyranny. Therefore it is the duty of the paternal head to uphold the law, of the citizen to subordinate himself willingly to it. However evident these propositions, they must nevertheless have seemed new. What was new in them, however, was the elimination of the cult links from the chain of causality.

The validity of these propositions is also doubtless unquestionable—but only within the compass of the human organization and the sphere of operation of social foresight. The one-sidedness of the doctrine of Confucius consists in their extension beyond these limits. What it affirms does not completely cover what it denies. Its weakness lies in this residuum. The old cult theory explains not only social, but also natural physical events, since they are always of a daimonistic nature, as dependent upon human cult activity. The latter group of phenomena thus remained still unexplained and uncomprehended; or rather, in respect thereto, one error was merely replaced by another, since the explanation in terms of morality, as is the nature of new discoveries, was extended beyond its sphere of validity. But the credit it deserves for the progress of humanity in a great civilization, remains undiminished thereby. With it the conquest of the cult idea was initiated by a wholesome morality, not by the arts of asceticism.

From this point on, two fields still remained to be opened up

[165] Meng-tse (Mencius), ii. 1. 4, 3, 22; *Y-King*, I, 35.

by man, namely, that of the physical government of nature and that of the principles involved in human economic activity outside the circle of the narrowest family organization. Further advance in both spheres necessarily consisted in man's acquisition, first of a knowledge of their nature, and then of a measure of control, within the limits of possibility, of the forces prevailing in them. In actuality, of course, the path has commonly been the reverse; attempts to exercise control, provoked by the opposition encountered by man, have come first and paved the way for the search after knowledge.

Confucius certainly thought he had included the sphere of economic laws in his system when he demanded wisdom of action as well as righteousness. As a matter of fact, within the primitive family organization the laws of morality and economy do coincide; in the family, what is unwise is rejected on moral grounds, and what is morally objectionable is certainly also unwise. But Confucius really has only such a primary association in mind, for however large the Celestial Empire may be, its organization is still based squarely on that of the patriarchal family. Hence the sage appeals with his teachings chiefly to the paternal heads and princes, for if they practice wisdom as well as righteousness, the economic laws still remaining unexplained appear in fact to be carried out.

If, however, through trade and reciprocity, economic life is extended beyond the circle of the patriarchal organization, wisdom must be given another meaning. We follow the ideal of setting no social limits to our principle of morality. But even if we approached this ideal of humanity far more closely than is actually the case, we should nevertheless have to confess that our moral laws, by themselves alone, do not suffice to conduct economic relations into the channel that would be relatively most advantageous for all. Our moral laws direct us toward this goal, to be sure, but they do not furnish us the requisite knowledge of economic interrelations. The moral quality of our actions, however blameless, can in no way insure us in this sphere against doing the greatest harm.

The reason for this phenomenon is easily to be recognized in the fact that morality first developed, not in early intergroup relations, but within the narrow circle of the family. In spite of all attempts to extend its sway, the distinction is nevertheless still observable. Here and there, in the "house community," there still persists a survival of the earlier family with communism of property. In this case it is immoral for one member to relinquish to another his share in the enjoyment of goods produced by him for the community in return for more in proportion than the cost to himself of their production. With a person outside the house community, however, such a transaction is not immoral. Here the prevailing value of the thing is not its cost of production but the advantage which the profit-seeker anticipates from it. Although among ourselves the house community has long since been dissolved, we nevertheless still speak of a price "between brothers," and we still distinguish it in approximately the same way from the price morally admissible in a transaction with outsiders. Profit-seeking within the family carries a stigma, which it does not have outside.

But morality in this narrower sphere has in individual cases been modified by practices in the wider sphere of economic life. The farther our commerce has spread abroad, the more it has influenced the attitude within the family. This change has gone hand in hand with the dissolution of the family and the emergence of the individual. The Old Testament prohibition of usury,[166] for example, still rests on the family principle, extended to the whole cult union. But what was here inadmissible on the basis of the family idea could become unhestitatingly a source of profit in transactions with the tribal stranger, for the latter had no claim to the borrowed money unless he paid for the advantage offered him. We point to this example because in this particular sphere the conflict of the two principles is sufficiently familiar.[167] Finally, here as elsewhere, the family morality was modified by that of intercourse on a wider basis. Today an interest-bearing loan is regarded as admissible even among actual brothers, and under certain circumstances one offered without interest might be immoral.

Thus the Chinese national teacher extended the dominant influence of personal morality improperly, not only to the realm of physical phenomena, but also to that of economic phenomena. Since, however, this necessarily happened at the expense of cult righteousness, Confucius played his part in the great expulsion

[166] **Deuteronomy xxiii. 19. (Ed.)**
[167] **Cf., White,** *Warfare of Science with Theology,* **II, 264-87. (Ed.)**

of spirits which led to the correction of the daimonistic world philosophy.

It still remains for us to investigate the influence of the old fetishistic conception on the more important peoples of Europe. Greek legend affords us an insight into an age whose kings were descended from gods, were at the same time the priests of their ancestral fathers, and were distinguished from the people by their sanctity. Here are all the elements of the conception in question. The earlier king—*anax, basileus*—was the paternal head of a patriarchal family or kin-group. Later, however, Greece was also acquainted with the kingship of a confederation of families, whether a king was elected by such a union on the analogy of the family or whether he was forced by his own kin-group through conquest on several others. In either case the earlier patriarchal kingship then tended to disintegrate in the manner already described. The most conspicuous of its temporal powers, the leadership, passed to the superior king, while scarcely more than the priestly function was retained by the head of the kin-group. Numerous hereditary priesthoods, whose families boasted of both royal and divine origin, necessarily resulted from this disintegration. Their intimate relation to the divinity made them so valuable and indispensable to the people in this peaceful and secure position that they were able to accumulate more than regal riches through cult contributions and, if fortune favored their cult, to achieve even higher renown. This is at the same time the source of those many enviable priestly states in Greece, whose independence and wealth contributed not a little to the peculiar cast of Hellenic national life.

A conception of the process is afforded us by the plan of Maeandrius, the deputy of Polycrates. While he believed himself qualified, after the (death of the latter, to carry on the government of Samos, he was nevertheless willing to give up the uncertainty of such a tyranny in exchange for the certainty of a lucrative hereditary priesthood. He therefore made the Samians the proposal that he would restore the government to their hands if they would promise him and his house, besides a sum of money from the treasures of Polycrates, the hereditary priesthood of an altar to Zeus which he had just erected.[168]

This dissolution of the old kingship into priestly and other

[168] **Herodotus *History* iii. 142.**

functions plays an extremely important role in the history of Greek political organization. Frequently such priestly families retained their royal character and even name. The Eumolpids traced their family tree back to a Thracian king, the Melampodids to King Amphiaraos. Even Orpheus had been "king." The priests of the Eleusinian Demeter at Ephesus still called themselves kings and descendants of Codrus.

With the establishment, under the later kingship, of new states, and thus also necessarily of new state cults, the kingly and priestly offices could again be combined. Odysseus appears, not as a patriarchal king of the oldest type, but as an elective king ruling over a union of kin-groups. Nevertheless, like Agamemnon, Priam, and Nestor, he also performed the sacrificial acts himself without the intervention of a priest, although even at that time there had already long been specialists of this sort. Each of the two kings of Sparta was at the same time the state priest of one of the two state cults. The skin and chine of each sacrificed animal constituted their established sacrificial remuneration.[169]

But this later kingship, which combined the functions of priest, judge, and military commander in the larger group, could also dissolve again into its constituent powers. If the united or confederated kin-groups then reserved the last two offices for themselves, to fill by election in case of need, there arose "republics" with hereditary priesthoods. We are made acquainted with such a process by a historical example.

The Greek colonists of Cyrene consisted of three groups, differing in origin, and over them all ruled a hereditary king. Under royal leadership their situation declined greatly, the fortune of war completely deserted them, and the throne passed to a lame and perhaps otherwise incapable man. Among the peoples previously considered, such misfortune would have been interpreted as an intimation of the god and would have led to the repudiation of the cult king. But the Greeks, even in the Sixth Century B. C, had already gone far toward changing from the daimonistic point of view to a rational one, as is shown by their fundamentally different attitude toward these matters. To strike at the priesthood was highly injudicious;[170] the consequences to man were too incalculable. But the misfortune in war could have a natural

[169] Herodotus *History* vi. 56. [170] Cf., Plato, *Lam.*

cause in the unfitness of the commander-in-chief; hence the military command was to be separated from the priesthood. In their misfortune the Cyrenians, on the advice of the Delphic oracle, petitioned the Mantinean, Demonax, to intervene, and he effected a compromise whereby the royal house retained the priesthood together with an endowment of lands, while it ceded the governmental powers to the people.[171]

This agreement is the same as that which Mseandrius proposed to the Samians, and it may be regarded as typical of the conversion, not rare in Greece, of monarchies into republics on account of the advantages obviously offered to both parties. From this point of view, moreover, the essential distinction between the king and the tyrant may be clearly recognized. The tyrant could unite in himself the powers of government without election and even bequeath them to his descendants, but he was not, like
491 the king, at the same time born to the priesthood, and he did not derive his authority from his relation to the highest divinity of the state cult. Thus he lacked this religious sanction and with it the high degree of sacred inviolability of the early king.

An agreement of the same type may also have underlain the transition of Athens from the monarchy to the republic. The priestly office, divested of the temporal affairs of government, retained the royal name, *basilew*, and indications are not lacking that the first king archons at Athens belonged to the royal family of Codrus. Later this office too was converted into an elective priesthood. Another circumstance shows us that this socially important process must have been repeated even more frequently. It is certainly not without significance that the high priests at Olympia also bore the name of king. Moreover, the priest of Hera in Argos, that of Apollo in Sicyon, that of Athene Alea at Tegea, and that of Dionysus at Naxos lent their names, as eponyms, to the designation of chronology,[172] and this points definitely to an originally kingly character. It is a natural thing for the members of a kin-group to remember a particular date by the name of the contemporary paternal head; thence the custom of eponymy was transmitted to the kings.

Thus, in sharp contrast to the development in most of the Asiatic states, the Greek kingship very generally and rather early

[171] **Herodotus *History* iv. 161.**
[172] **Hermann, *Alterthiimer der Griechen*, §44, note 10.**

bequeathed its fetishistic quality to a hereditary priesthood, while its functions of judicature and military leadership developed in a manner unconnected with the old cult idea. But this involved, in the most important spheres of organization, a breach with the cult idea, a disregard of daimonistic causes, and a reckoning with the natural concatenation of things, and these factors are in closest harmony with the tendency of Greek speculation to recognize the nature and physical causality of things. Through the elimination of the priest from the courts of justice, the ordeal receded so far into the background that, when discovered among other peoples, it seemed from the point of view of classical civilization an isolated curiosity, though it really falls everywhere into the natural course of development. When we also take into account the fact that it was a Greek school which raised medicine from the sphere of the cult to a physical or physiological plane, the peculiarity, and in this the significance to culture history, of the Greek spirit are revealed to us. To it is due the dissemination of a new world philosophy.

Rome makes its entrance into history with a similar separation of powers. In early Rome as in Mexico the king was elected. In neither case, however, did this deprive the kingship of its truly fetishistic quality. The real immutable king in Rome was Jupiter Rex on the Capitol. The elected king, who was like an image of the god even in externals, was placed by him in possession of the *imperium* and *auspicia;* he thus became both ruler and priest. He received the delegated power through the insignia of the scepter with the eagle image and the priestly diadem. He was himself a "living image" of the divinity. Like the Roman god, the Roman king was entitled to ride a chariot even in the city, where every one else went on foot, to carry the ivory scepter with the eagle, to paint his face red, and to wear a chaplet of oaken leaves in gold.[173] These indications can leave no doubt as to the quality of the old Roman conception of the king.[174] Here too, however, the true fetishistic sense must have been lost at an early period, paving the way for a separation of powers and the transition to the republic. When the ruling divinity no longer personally took his seat in his dedicated image, the king, but only granted him the *imperium* and *auspicia,* i.e., government

[173] Mommsen, *Romische Geschichte,* I, 66.
174 Cf., Frazer, *Golden Bough,* II, 174ff. (Ed.)

and communication with the gods, this did not in principle preclude the idea that the two things might be granted separately. And this separation took place here as well as in Athens. Both before and afterwards a *rex*, a person held sacred in the state, was elected for life. But he was now deprived of the *imperium*. Henceforth the "king" was exclusively a priest of the ruling god.

The true divine kingship, while it thus disappears in the course of higher political development among the cultured classical peoples, might be expected to endure longer among peoples of retarded civilization. An obviously fetishistic characteristic still inhered in the Scottish kingship and was carried with it to the English throne. The healing of the sick through contact with a fetish was familiar to the Indians of Quito,[175] and Egyptian priesthoods were celebrated far and wide for such cures. In so far as sickness was daimonistically caused, the logical implication of the conception was that the spirit dwelling in the image, and rendered more powerful by the cult, expelled the spirit from the sick person by its approach. The touch of the Scottish king was believed to operate in this very way. "The belief that the king's touch can cure scrofula flourished in the most brilliant periods of English history. It was unshaken by the most numerous and public experiments. It was asserted by the privy council, by the bishops of two religions, by the general voice of the clergy in the palmiest days of the English Church, by the University of Oxford, and by the enthusiastic assent of the people. It survived the ages of the Reformation, of Bacon, of Milton, and of Hobbes. It was by no means extinct in the age of Locke, and would probably have lasted still longer, had not the change of dynasty at the Revolution assisted the tardy scepticism."[176] The healing ceremony took place on appointed days with a special church liturgy. Charles II in the course of his reign touched nearly 100,000 persons in this way, 8,500 in the year 1682 alone. Even in exile he retained the miraculous power.

The same fundamental conception is found among the Germanic peoples in different stages of development. Among the Scandinavians, the heads of both kin-groups and larger associations were kings in the old Greek sense, heirs at the same time of the authority and of the cult obligation. In early times the fetish-

[175]**Muller, *Urreligionen,* p. 335.**
[176]**Lecky, *European Morals,* I, 363-4.**

istic element stood out very clearly, and long afterwards it was still recognizable in a divided public opinion. Fruitfulness of the land and rain from heaven were expected of the old Norse king. A year of famine or disaster could lead the people to consider "sacrificing" their king to the gods as an unserviceable vessel; popular wrath, from the names it bestowed on him, held him responsible for things over which only a divinity possesses an influence. Indeed, one who scrutinizes closely the later history of the Norse kingdom can not escape the thought that the endless internal struggles which exhausted the energy of the people were due to notions inherited from ancient times. The Christian hierarchy had assumed all priestly functions and removed them from the social and political life of the Scandinavian nations. Hence it is difficult to determine clearly what the much mooted "king," eternally longed for and eternally combated, really meant in Sweden and Norway. That he did not possess an actual *imperium* is the only clear and unequivocal sense of all those internal struggles. The people wanted to reserve this *imperium* for themselves and to exercise it through their own vice-regent, who was not king. Yet this unconsecrated ruler did not satisfy them. Bereft of a king, they sought for an anointed sovereign among all the landed lords. And scarcely had they found one, when the struggle to limit his power began anew. All these contradictions, however, seem to be based on the old popular belief that it is a tremendous advantage for every people to possess a king, not as a ruler and sovereign, but as a mystic pledge of security and welfare.

If these "constitutional struggles" had attained their goal, and if Christianity had not intervened to eliminate the cult factor, we should very probably see in the former Scandinavian king a parallel to the mikado. The actual impotence of the king was doubtless a consequence of the fact that even the *auspicia* were wrested from him through the intervention of the church. If, like an old pagan king of the same type, he had kept his relation to the ruling divinity intact, and if, as its priest, he had revealed its will in cases requiring its decision, he might even, so long as the confidence of the people in his mediation continued, have reduced the regent or "law-king" to dependence.

A similar condition is reported by Strabo 177 of the Getae. A

[177] ***Geography*, pp. 297-8, 304 (vii. 3. 5, 11).**

dependent kingship was separated from a ruling priesthood. It was the priest, however, who bore the fetishistic character of the early king. Hence the relation of the king of the Getse to the priest was not like that of Saul to Samuel, but like that of the shogun to the mikado or the "law-king" to the Dalai Lama. The chief cult place was a cave in a sacred mountain. Here, isolated from human intercourse, dwelt the priestly king, who advised the king through oracles and was called a god by his subjects. When the Romans were menaced by King Boerebistas, they credited the high priest with having secured for the king the unconditional obedience of the savage people. Nevertheless, this did not prevent later on the dethronement of Boerebistas, a fate which so often threatens such a king.

The same form of government also existed among the Burgundians. Here, however, the fetishistic character was conferred upon the king himself by the priest; hence the relation was that of Saul and Samuel. "The king is called by one general name of 'Hendinos,' and according to a very ancient custom of theirs, is deposed from his authority if under his government the state meets with any disaster in war; or if the earth fails to produce a good crop; in the same way as the Egyptians are accustomed to attribute calamities of that kind to their rulers. The chief priest among the Burgundians is called 'the Senistus.' But he is irremovable and not exposed to any such dangers as the kings."[178] The Swedes treated their kings in precisely the same way,[179] and Gregory of Tours[180] stresses as characteristic of the Goths in Gaul the custom of repudiating their kings if they "displeased" them, and installing new ones.

The Franks likewise preserved distinct survivals of a kingship resting on similar conceptions. Old Frankish legends lay peculiar stress on their genuine long-haired king *(rex crinitus)* [181] as contrasted with the dukes under whose leadership the Frankish bands entered Gaul. Tacitus[182] had previously noted fundamentally the same distinction, when he ascribed the right to punish, not to the leader of the army, but to the priest. This

1T8 Ammianus Marcellinus *Rerum Gestarum* xxviii. 5. 14.

179 Snorri Sturluson *Ynglingar-saga* xviii.

180 *Historic ecclesiastioa Frcmcorum* ii. 19.

181 "The Prankish kings were never allowed to crop their hair; from their childhood upwards they had to keep it unshorn" (Frazer, *Golden Bough,* III, 268). (Ed.)

182 *Germania* vii. (Ed.)

priest was the supreme paternal head; the duke, the leader of an army or a people on a military expedition without such authority. The relation of the two was like that of the Indian sachem and war chieftain, except that among the Indians the cult connection was not so prominent. The Franks also found it propitious, after they had long lived under dukes, again to possess true kings with long hair. Unshorn hair still constituted the distinguishing mark of the Merovingian kings, even when they had renounced all actual governmental power. That an attitude similar to that of other peoples must also have been current among the Franks is shown even at a later period by the phenomenon that the same healing power was ascribed to the person of the French king as to that of the English sovereign.[188] The relation of the Frankish king to the Mayor of the Palace might be compared to that of the mikado to the shogun. Like the mikado, the king enjoyed a high degree of respect. Nevertheless, his impotence was even more complete and pronounced, since he was also despoiled of his priestly character by the church.

Christianity, as has already been pointed out, forms a great cult union, indeed one with the claim to universality. Its high priest is animated and inspired by the "Spirit" of God in a way not noticeably out of the ordinary. He is the representative of God on earth. Like a Senistus of the entire earth, he asserts the right to install and depose the organs necessary for the temporal government of its peoples. The papacy is merely the resurgence of a very ancient institution, derived from the sphere of ideas under discussion. It is superficially connected with the Roman political office of *pontifex maximus,* and it seeks evangelical justification in the image of the two swords, both of which are lent directly by God to the high priest. Only the universality of the claim is new and epoch-making, and this is clearly based on the conception of the unity and singleness of God, the necessary correlate of which is a universal cult union of all men.

Otherwise there was nothing new and unprecedented for its time about the whole conception. The attempts to realize it would not have found sympathetic responsiveness, but would probably rather have provoked the opposition of all mankind, if such had not been the case. Besides the idea that the divine "Spirit" takes His seat in the high priest of the universal cult

[188] See Brown, *Charisma Basilicon.*

union and necessarily makes him infallible whenever He speaks through him—only the definition of this dogma is new—there appears the no less familiar conception that this authority is really always exercised only by its first holder through the medium of his successors. It is always St. Peter who rules in Rome, who owns the country and receives embassies, indeed who even reads the letters and dictates the answers. The forms and formulas of papal intercourse attest this conception.

The fact that actually a single "law-king" did not suffice for the leadership of all the peoples of the new cult union, is not an essential distinction. Although there were attempts to the contrary, a division of the political power became necessary, while the unity of the supreme priesthood remained intact. The advantage of this division was obviously one-sided. The consecration of the kings still remained characteristically the affair of the church. In its essence, the relation between the two powers preserved its old meaning. In *Unam Sanctam* Pope Boniface VIII expressed it in these words: "The spiritual power must install the temporal and judge when it has not been good."

The first attempt to realize this latent conception was made in the removal of the Merovingians and the elevation of Pepin to the throne. Pepin could not have expected to appear guiltless in the eyes of the Frankish people, had there existed no traditional precedent for such a procedure. Indeed we must assume that the conception was first introduced to the papacy through contact with the Germanic peoples. The Greeks and Romans, as we have seen, had early deviated therefrom so far that it could scarcely have been transmitted through them to the Christian supreme priesthood. After the peculiar development in Greece the priesthood was divorced from the political powers. Even Paul, in advising submission to the existing government,[184] speaks of the latter as derived from God directly and not through the mediation of the priest. The Roman pontificate had itself been an office of the state. The Hebrew Messianic hope, moreover, culminated in an opposition to the domination of the priesthood. Only through contact with Egypt and with the northern peoples of later civilization, could the Christian church revive the old conception and bring it into association with the priesthood which considered itself the heir of the Roman pontificate.

[184] **Romans xiii. 1. (Ed.)**

The far-reaching influence which this pontificate had acquired, and which became the foundation of the dominant position of the church in the life of the people, was rooted in the cult notions of pre-Christian times. The office was at bottom not merely a priestly one; it was also an office of public welfare with functions based squarely on the daimonistic point of view. Two classes of cults seem always clearly distinguishable, namely, the cults which organized groups as a whole owe to the divine heads of their union, and those to which individuals are obligated by the connections of their birth. Though organizations may create organs and make endowments for their cults, the cults of private persons are, according to early notions, no less important for the community.

To us today it seems incompatible with the concept of divine justice that descendants and neighbors should be punished for the sin, or undischarged cult obligation, of a man upon whose actions they could have exerted no influence. But the concept of punishment here is a modern interpretation. We must remember that originally, not the subjective motive in man, but the objective performance, was the important thing in sacrifice, and the train of consequences is based on this original conception. If a spirit is deprived of his cult, he turns against the whole kin-group, and later generations are necessarily involved in this natural result, which at first bears no relation to the idea of a moral punitive judgment. But once the undischarged obligation is comprehended as "sin," and its inevitable consequences as "punishment," one arrives at the proposition, so often repeated in the Old Testament,[186] that the divinity visits the sins of one man on many succeeding—and in the moral sense innocent—generations. The same situation prevails with respect to the acts of vengeance of the divinity, which every neglect of the cult brings down. Experience shows that this vengeance assumes the form of havoc-making storms, scarcity of crops, famine, epidemics, and the like. But the nature of these consequences is such that they nearly always afflict the whole group of men in which the guilty individual lives. A person pursued by the gods is a danger to the whole community, and this is the point to which social foresight attached.[186]

[185] Cf., Exodus xx. 5; xxxiv. 7: Numbers xiv. 18. (Ed.)
[186] Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, I I , 1136-40. (Ed.)

The *asebeia* of the individual was feared by the Greeks as a danger to the community; consequently they placed the cult fidelity of the individual under state supervision. The state did not demand of the individual that he believe the myths of the gods, for righteousness was still dependent not on faith but merely on cult works; it demanded only that he fulfill the cult obligations of the household. Surveillance over this was allotted in Athens to the king archon, as it must once indeed have been a duty of the paternal head.

In Rome under the republic this function of supervision was dissociated from the office of the sacral king and assigned to the Pontifical College headed by the *pontifex maximus*. The extraordinary influence of this office, penetrating every household, led the emperors to have it transferred to themselves in preference to all others. The personal union of the emperorship and the pontificate was carried over into the Eastern Empire, where it secured for the emperor a decisive influence on the conduct of religious affairs. In Rome itself, however, the union was dissolved with the collapse of the empire, and the pontificate naturally passed as an extremely valuable heritage into the hands of the Christian bishop. The pontificate already embraced the right of surveillance over all the Christians of the former Roman Empire, and the cult union idea necessarily extended it even beyond these limits. With the pontificate was now associated the old idea of the priestly kingship, and there is little to contradict the hypothesis that it was Pepin himself who brought about this association for his own advantage. By virtue of this idea the pontiff was soon able to bestow the emperorship. He emerged as a new Samuel, with power to anoint and repudiate. For a time, indeed, the hope seemed admissible that under the one high priest one "law-king" would again rule mankind in the territory of the Christian cult union. But the hope vanished, and the church returned to a plurality of temporal kings.

APPENDIX A

PRIMITIVE PROMISCUITY

Lippert's conception of the original condition of human society[1] aligns him with the adherents of the theory of primitive promiscuity, a theory over which has raged one of the severest controversies in the history of social science. The earliest form of society, according to Lippert, was the primitive or consanguine family, a tiny group united by the bond of common blood, hostile to all outsiders, pursuing the food-quest collectively, and undifferentiated except for differences in age and sex. Within the primitive family marriage did not as yet exist. Sex relations were unregulated but confined to the group. Associations between the sexes other than transient ones were not conventional or institutional but based on inclination alone.

The theory of primitive promiscuity originated, of course, with Bachofen.[2] Lippert, though strongly influenced by him, takes exception to some of his extreme views[8] and in general adopts a more moderate position. A more uncritical follower of Bachofen is Giraud-Teulon.* Many other earlier writers takes a similarly extreme position. Gumplowicz,*[5] for example, says: "The simplest form of sexual relations is promiscuity, transient connection within the horde according to accidental encounter or stronger momentary attraction." Ward takes an equally positive stand. "That the sexual relations of our most remote ancestors under such circumstances should be what would now be called lax, or even promiscuous, is nothing more than we should expect, and notwithstanding the laudable efforts of certain ethnologists to prove the contrary, or at least to palliate the supposed humiliation involved in such a state of things, the facts we have, even among the relatively advanced existing races, abundantly establish inductively the conclusion that can alone be reached deductively." Even Letourneau,[7] in spite of a certain inconsistency on this point, says in one place: "In the lower grades of civilization, in the most primitive human hordes, there is nothing yet that deserves the name of marriage. It is by the hazard of necessity that sexual unions, or rather couplings, take place."

[1] Above, pp. 66-88, 201-22.
[2] *Mutterrecht*, p. 10 *et passim*,
[8] See above, pp. 68, 86-7.
[4] *Origines du manage*, p. 70.
[5] *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 111.
[6] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 340-1.
[7] *Sociologie*, p. 375.

True marriage, thinks Lubbock,[8] was unknown to primitive man, who lived in a state of promiscuity to which he gives the name of "communal marriage." Kohler[9] and Kulischer[10] take similar views. Morgan,[11] by whom Lippert was strongly influenced, reveals an analogous conception. "Communism in living," he says, "must, of necessity, have prevailed both in the consanguine and in the punaluan family, because it was a requirement of their condition." Engels[12] follows Morgan in this as in other respects. Among the other writers who uphold the hypothesis of original promiscuity are Bastian,[18] Bloch,[14] Kropotkin,[15] Post,[16] Spencer and Gillen,[17] Wilken,[18] and Wilutzky.[19]

Other authorities adopt a modified view of primitive promiscuity. While accepting a state of unregulated sex relations, they maintain that it was relieved by voluntary non-institutional alliances of some duration. Spencer[20] takes his stand here. "Everywhere promiscuity, however marked, is qualified by unions having some persistence. . . . We must infer that even in prehistoric times, promiscuity was checked by the establishment of individual connections, prompted by men's likings and maintained against other men by force." According to McLennan,[21] "the unions of the sexes were probably in the earliest times loose, transitory, and in some degree promiscuous." "Among these habits," says Hartland[22] in speaking of primitive society, "something like sexual promiscuity may probably be reckoned, relieved perhaps by temporary unions in the nature of monogamy. . . . Absolute promiscuity we find nowhere in human society. But in the so-called classificatory system of relationship, and in the institutions and customs of savage life, what seem to be traces of such a condition are abundantly discoverable." The evidence also seems to Sumner and Keller[23] to point to an original absence of sexual regulation in the mores—a state modified, however, by non-institutional unions of greater or less duration, to which they give the name "monandry," defined as "a more or less durable informal monopoly of a woman by one husband (at a time), occurring in a setting of unregulation."

A still more qualified stand on primitive promiscuity is taken by

[8] *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 86-98; *Marriage, Totemism and Religion*, pp. 3-38.

[9] "Frauengemeinschaft," p. 336.

[10] "Geschlechtliche Zuchtwahl," p. 140.

[11] *Ancient Society*, p. 416.

[12] *Ursprung der Familie*, p. 17.

[13] *Rechtsverhaltnisse*, pp. xviii, lix.

[14] *Sexual Life*, pp. 188ff.

[15] *Mutual Aid*, pp. 313ff.

[16] *Geschlechtsgenossenschaft*, pp. 16ff.

[17] *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 92-111.

[18] *Verspreide Geschriften*, I, 121-286.

[19] *Vorgeschichte des Rechts*, I, 12ff.

[20] *Principles of Sociology*, I, 646-7.

[21] *Ancient History*, p. 130.

[22] *Primitive Society*, pp. 11-12.

[23] *Science of Society*, III, 1559.

other authorities. Thomas,[24] for example, believes that the unique qualities of the mind and culture of man, as contrasted with the lower animals, resulted "in a constant tendency toward promiscuity, whether this state was ever actually reached or not." Vinogradoff[25] similarly "cannot say with certainty whether there has ever been a definite period of sexual promiscuity," but he admits "that there is plenty of evidence from all parts of the world as to states of society in which the operations of the sexual instinct are not firmly restricted by regular marriage arrangements, but find outlets in various forms of sexual license and communalistic custom."

A number of eminent writers reject the hypothesis of original promiscuity proper, adopting in its stead a modified theory of a primitive state of "sexual communism" or "group marriage." Rivers,[26] for example, maintains that "we have clear evidence that existing varieties of mankind practise sexual communism, and man must therefore have tendencies in that direction." Howitt[27] predicts that group marriage "will be ultimately accepted as one of the primitive conditions of mankind." Briffault[28] similarly supports the theory of an original state of group marriage and sexual communism. To Frazer,[29] "it appears to be a reasonable hypothesis that at least a large part of mankind has passed through the stage of group-marriage in its progress upward from a still lower stage of sexual promiscuity to a higher stage of monogamy."

Primitive promiscuity first encountered serious opposition in the work of Westermarck,[80] who devotes the better part of a volume to a refutation of the theory. He and his numerous followers believe that marriage has always existed and that its natural and original form is monogamous. Howard[31] clearly sums up the three principal arguments against the theory of promiscuity. The first or zoological argument is based on an inference from the monogamous sexual relations among many of the lower animals. The second or physiological argument maintains that promiscuous sexual intercourse lowers fecundity and would thus lead to the destruction of any group practicing it. The third or psychological argument is founded on the universal prevalence of sexual jealousy as an innate human characteristic. To these should be added a fourth or ethnological argument, since Westermarck,[32] for

[24] *Sex and Society*, p. 176.
[25] *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 170, 176.
[26] *Social Organization*, p. 80.
[27] *South-East Australia*, p. 281.
[28] *Mothers*, I, 614-781.
[29] *Totemism and Exogamy*, IV, 151. Cf. also *Folh-Lore in the Old Testa" ment*, II, 336.
[30] *Human Marriage*, I, 103-336.
[31] *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 93-107,
[32] *Human Marriage*, III, 1-38.

example, maintains that most savage peoples either are actually monogamous or else tend in that direction.

For these reasons, Howard[88] thinks the theory of promiscuity should be rejected in favor of that of an original pairing or monogamous family. Essentially the same attitude is taken by Goldenweiser[34] and Wundt.[35] Tozzer,[36] like Westermarck,[87] believes that "a monogamous family, found among many of the lowest savages, is a direct inheritance from the non-human animal world." Darwin[38] regards primitive promiscuity as an improbable hypothesis because of male jealousy and the monogamous habits of the higher apes. Starcke[39] likewise places himself squarely in opposition. "These primitive connections were unquestionably monogamous, since the motive for wishing for a plurality of wives was absent. But they were also, although the fact has not been generally noticed, of an enduring nature." Other opponents of the theory of original promiscuity include Carr-Saunders,[40] Crawley,[41] and Lang[42]

This school has certainly put the quietus on the exaggerated notions of primitive promiscuity held by the earlier writers, but it has by no means succeeded in silencing the theory entirely. In modified forms it is still held, as we have seen, by recent writers of the caliber of Briffault, Frazer, Hartland, Keller, Rivers, Sumner, Thomas, and Vinogradoff. These authorities do not recognize the validity of the arguments advanced by Westermarck and Howard. The zoological argument, they maintain, confuses marriage and mating[43] and involves the "animal-series fallacy."[44] The physiological argument, they believe, rests on an unproven assumption and greatly overemphasizes the sexuality of the savage.[45] The psychological argument is seemingly based on the "instinct fallacy."[46] The ethnological argument is rejected as contrary to fact. Briffault[47] takes great pains to show that monogamy is altogether exceptional among lower savages, while Sumner and Keller[48] maintain that the alleged instances are actually cases of non-institutional "monandry," the superficial resemblance of which to monogamy "has been construed by the type of person who hates to think of the crudity of human and institutional beginnings to be the genuine pair-marriage which he admires."

A number of positive arguments are also advanced by the proponents

88 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 90-110.
84 *Early Civilization*, p. 24.
35 *Folk Psychology*, p. 47.
36 *Social Origins* p. 145.
37 *Human Marriage*, I, 72.
38 *Descent of Man*, pp. 600-5.
39 *Primitive Family*, p. 258.
40 *Population Problem*, p. 132.
41 *Mystic Rose*, pp. 478ff.
42 *Social Origins*.
43 See Introduction, pp. xxi-xxii.
44 Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1547.
45 Cf., *ibid.*, I l l, 1496-7.
46 Cf., Introduction, pp. xvi-xvii.
47 *Mothers*, II, 276-306.
48 *Science of Society*, III, 1560.

of an early stage of sexual unregulation. In the lower animals the sexual impulse is biologically regulated by the periodicity of the female, which takes the form of a "rutting period." The same must have been true of man's brute ancestors.[49] But the human race has lost this instinctive check; the female is always susceptible. Biological regulation has been supplanted in man by social regulation of various kinds. But social regulation was of slow growth, and even yet it is only slightly developed among lower peoples.[60] Hence something on the order of promiscuity is the logical inference for the period when instinctive regulation had disappeared and social regulation was still relatively undeveloped. Another argument is founded on the conception of the economic basis of marriage,[51] on the view that marriage had its origin, not as a sexual union, but as a form of economic cooperation between a man and a woman based on a division of labor by sex. In this union, it is maintained, the element of sex played a very subordinate role at first and for a long time thereafter. If even the institution of marriage was not originally concerned with the regulation of sex, the conception of a primitive state of unregulation would seem to be by no means inadmissible.

But the modern proponents of a modified form of primitive promiscuity do not rest their case on theoretical grounds alone. Their principal argument is based on the widespread prevalence among lower peoples of a comparatively slight degree of sexual regulation. This argument is well summed up by Sumner and Keller.[52] "Since available evidence leads to the conclusion that there was less of regulation upon the earlier stages of institutional evolution than later, it is a logical inference that the slight restriction encountered under the most primitive of conditions was preceded by no regulation at all—none, that is to say, in the mores." Much of this evidence is susceptible to other, and often preferable, explanations. But its effect is cumulative; to explain away any single group of cases is vastly easier than to reject them all. Many readers of Westermarck,[58] indeed, have been more impressed by his imposing array of instances of unregulation than by his effort to interpret them.

Several classes of cases deserve special mention in this connection. Of these, the first embraces customs of premarital license. Complete sexual freedom in the unmarried, whatever the degree of regulation within marriage, is certainly a widespread custom among savage peo-

49 Cf., Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 81-97.
50 Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1647.
51 See Introduction, pp. xxii-xxiii.
52 *Science of Society,* III, 1647.
53 *Human Marriage,* I, 103-336.

pies.[64] "We have," even Westermarck[65] admits, "too many and too positive statements to the contrary to allow us to doubt that promiscuity outside marriage does exist." He nevertheless denies that it is a survival of primitive unregulation, preferring to explain it as a preliminary to marriage or as due to the difficulty of procuring wives.5[6] Sumner and Keller,[67] however, maintain that these practices decline in general with advancing civilization and "support in some degree the inference as to primordial unregulation."

A second type of unregulation is seen in the custom of sexual hospitality or the lending of wives to guests.[68] Lubbock's5[9] view that this practice "seems to recognize the existence of a right inherent in every member of the community, and to visitors as temporary .members/' is followed by Lippert,[60] Briffault,[61] and others. Westermarck,[62] however, regards it as "only an incident of the general rule of hospitality, which in some form or other seems to prevails universally at the lower stages of civilisation."

Another instance of unregulation is the license often practiced on special occasions such as festivals, religious ceremonies, or times of disaster.[63] These practices have been interpreted as survivals of promiscuity preserved by the conservatism of religion or as reversions to ancient customs in times of crisis. The Australians, for example, exchange wives when frightened by the aurora australis or a pestilence.[64] Spencer and Gillen[65] believe such practices are "only capable of any satisfactory explanation on the hypothesis that they indicate the temporary recognition of certain general rights which existed in the time prior to that of the form of group marriage. . . . We do not mean that they afford direct evidence of the former existence of actual promiscuity, but they do afford evidence leading in that direction."

54 Cf., above, p. 217. Cases assembled in Briffault, *Mothers*, II 2-13; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 617-21; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1553-8; IV, 851-8; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, I, 126-60.

55 *Human Marriage*, I, 136.

56 *Ibid.*, I, 131, 160.

57 *Science of Society*, III, 1555, 1558.

58 Cases collected in Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 635-40; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 132; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1761-2; IV, 974-5; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, I, 225-30; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften*, I, 199ff.

59 *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 132.

60 Above, p. 217.

61 *Mothers*, I, 635.

62 *Human Marriage*, I, 226.

63 Cases collected in Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1551-2; IV, 852-8.

64 Howitt, "Australian Beliefs," p. 189; Cunow, *Australneger*, p. 69.

65 *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 111.

Similar licentious practices at wedding festivities[66] and certain forms of religious prostitution, notably the prostitution of a woman at the temple before marriage,[67] have been interpreted by Lubbock,[68] Lippert,[69] and others as acts of "expiation for marriage," giving evidence of an earlier stage of unregulation. "According to this theory," says Howard,[70] "marriage, the individual possession of a woman, was originally regarded as a violation of communal right, for which some compensation or expiation must be rendered." "Formerly, perhaps," says Frazer,[71] "every woman was obliged to submit at least once in her life to the exercise of those marital rights which at a still earlier period had theoretically belonged in permanence to all the males of the tribe." These customs are interpreted by Westermarck,[72] however, as defloration practices, prophylactic measures, or marriages with a divinity. The somewhat variant practices of defloration and *jus prima noctis* are not usually regarded as evidences of promiscuity, since they are susceptible of other and more plausible explanations.[73]

Another custom sometimes regarded as a survival of original unregulation is polyandry.[74] McLennan[75] views polyandry as, in general, the first stage in advance after promiscuity and as due to infanticide and the resulting scarcity of women. Lubbock[76] thinks it is often "far from easy to distinguish between communal marriage and true polyandry." Spencer[77] regards polyandry "as one of the kinds of marital relations emerging from the primitive unregulated state; and one which has survived where competing kinds, not favoured by the conditions, have failed to extinguish it." To Briffault[78] it is a remnant of group marriage. Perhaps the majority of authorities, however, consider polyandry an exceptional practice necessitated by harsh life conditions.[79]

Another class of customs, regarded by many as giving support to the

66 Cf., above, pp. 212-21. Cases collected in Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 535-7; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1550-1; IV, 846-7; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 196-206; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 205ff.

67 Cases collected in Frazer, *Golden Bough,* V, 36-41, 57-72; Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 536-7; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 207-18.

68 *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 131.

69 Above, pp. 212-21.

70 *Matrimonial Institutions,* I, 50.

71 *Golden Bough,* V, 40.

72 *Human Marriage,* I, 200, 218, 223.

78 Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1551; Schmidt, *Jus primae noctis,* pp. 41ff., 365ff.; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 166-96.

74 Cf., above, p. 210. Cases collected in Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 629-34; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology,* I, 654-63; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1857-63; IV, 1023-8; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* III, 107-222.

75 *Ancient History,* pp. 132ff.

78 *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 145.

77 *Principles of Sociology,* I, 656-7.

78 *Mothers,* I, 628-9.

79 Cf., Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 351; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1862-3; Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 199-200; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* III, 187-91.

theory of promiscuity, is group marriage or sexual communism.[80] "Group-marriage," say Sumner and Keller,[81] "is not the same as communal marriage; it is a narrowed and evolved arrangement which points back to the latter." These practices, as we have seen, have impressed Briffault, Frazer, and Rivers so strongly that they regard them as typical of an earlier state of comparative unregulation. Some writers, however, have attempted to derive them from individual marriage.[82] But Tozzer,[88] a strong opponent of the theory of promiscuity, after explaining the other alleged evidences on different grounds, says of group marriage: "Here, it must be confessed, there is far more difficulty in finding an explanation pointing away from promiscuity."

From the above survey of the arguments and evidences, it will be seen that primitive promiscuity is not yet a closed question. ,It is not inconceivable, indeed, that the views of Westennarck and his school are as one-sided in one direction as those of Bachofen and other early writers are in the other. Should this finally prove to be the case, it is quite possible that Lippert's exposition, though perhaps somewhat too extremely expressed, represents a reasonably accurate picture of the sexual conditions of primitive times.

80 Cases collected in Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 614-765; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* II, 1663-5; IV, 858-9; Westennarck, *Human Marriage,* III, 223-66.

81 *Science of Society,* III, 1565.

82 See, for example, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* p. 24. This interpretation is criticized in Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 743-4.

88 *Social Origins,* p. 139.

APPENDIX B

PRIORITY OF MOTHER-RIGHT

In his discussion of marriage and the family, Lippert considers mother-right to have been an earlier form of social organization than father-right. It existed in germ form, he believes, even in the primitive family, although it did not reach its fullest development until the next stage of social evolution. The sequence of forms of social organization, in particular the question of the priority of mother-right, has been the subject of a heated controversy for over half a century.

This controversy has been due in part to the failure of both sides to distinguish clearly the basic factors involved in mother-right and father-right. The long-standing confusion on this point has recently been dispelled, and the whole situation clarified in admirable fashion, by Rivers.[1] Following him in the main, we may distinguish six fundamental factors by which the two forms of social organization may be distinguished. They are descent, ownership of property, inheritance, authority, succession, and residence.

Descent, properly speaking, has reference to group membership.[2] It is thus not necessarily identical with kinship. Descent is patrilineal when a child belongs to the social group—family, gens, moiety, or the like—of his father; matrilineal if he belongs to his mother's group. Patrilineal descent is a constituent of father-right; matrilineal descent, of mother-right. Descent may also be bilateral, as where a child belongs to a group or "kindred" including relatives on both his father's and his mother's side, or asymmetrical,[8] as where both lines are recognized but one is given precedence.

Ownership of property, in this connection, has reference only to household property: the dwelling itself, its furniture, its accumulated stores, and the domestic instruments of production. Under father-right these are normally owned by the husband; under strict mother-right, by the wife or mother.[4] The influence of property is seen in the fact that it sometimes determines descent and residence. Thus there are instances where descent is either patrilineal or matrilineal

1 *Social Organization*, pp. 85-90.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 86.
3 Cf., Seligman, "Asymmetry in Descent."
4 Cf., above, pp. 233-4, 269-73; Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 436.

and residence either patrilocal or matrilocal depending upon whether the husband or the wife is the wealthier.[5]

Inheritance refers to the transmission of property. Patrilineal inheritance or transmission in the male line, i.e., from father to son, is characteristic of father-right. Similarly, matrilineal inheritance, or the transmission of property from mother to daughter or from maternal uncle to nephew, normally accompanies mother-right. It should be noted that inheritance by brothers and sisters is consistent with either father-right or mother-right; the criterion in such cases is who inherits in default of brothers and sisters as heirs.

The fourth factor is authority. "In father-right the case is usually simple, authority being exerted by the father, or some other more senior relative on the male side."[6] With reference to mother-right it is helpful to distinguish authority in the family or household from that in the larger group, the tribe or state. A condition of society in which the women wield political authority is called "gynecocracy" or the "matriarchate," Such a condition exists only in theory; nc actual instances are known. The matriarchate, therefore, can not b 'regarded as an essential constituent of mother-right. That politica I authority should always be vested in males, even under strict mother-right, is what one would naturally expect in accordance with Lippert'j view that government developed out of the men's organization for hunting and war.

The situation is different with regard to domestic authority. There are actual instances where women are the heads of households.[7] It is far more common, however, for authority in the household to be vested in the mother's brother, an arrangement known as the avunculate. Indeed, many if not most authorities regard this as normal under mother-right. "No family can do without the support of the man, for economic purposes and the performance of hard tasks, for defense and for protection before the tribunals, but the protector need not in all cases be the father. The standing protector is the brother. The mother remains in her own family and looks to him as her natural helper."[9] Maternal or avuncular domestic authority, along with male political authority, is, therefore, the typical situation under mother-right.

Succession has reference to the way in which authority is transmitted. "When a man succeeds his father, succession is patrilineal. When succession is through the mother, it will be matrilineal. It will

• See Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy,* I, 72; Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 195; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 365.

[6] Rivers, *Social Organization,* p. 88.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 89.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 89.

[9] Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 191-2.

be noticed that I have used somewhat different language in referring to the two kinds of succession. I have spoken of a man succeeding his father, but of succession through the mother. This phraseology is adopted because it is exceptional in matrilineal succession—and the same holds good of inheritance—for a person to succeed, or inherit from, his or her mother. The usual case is that he inherits from, or succeeds, his mother's brother, this being one of a number of important functions which fall to the lot of this relative in matrilineal systems."[10] For this mode of succession or inheritance Lippert[11] uses the term "nephew-right." Patrilineal succession is characteristic of father-right, and matrilineal succession of mother-right.

The factor of residence refers to the location of the household of a married couple. Residence is patrilocal when the wife goes to live with her husband, and matrilocal when he joins her household. "As a general rule patrilocal marriage is associated with father-right, and matrilocal marriage with mother-right, but the association is far from invariable. Even when marriage is patrilocal, the married couple often reside with the wife's people for a time, or the wife may return to her parent's home for the birth of her first child."[12] Residence of this mixed type is called "intermediate."[18] Where the married couple sets up a new household, and neither goes to live with or near the other or the other's parents, residence is called "independent." Some authorities consider residence the most important factor of all. Among them is Briffault.[14] "While the reckoning of descent through females does not necessarily imply a matriarchal type of society, matrilocal marriage does; and accordingly, while we may find many matriarchal features existing where marriage is patrilocal, it is exceedingly exceptional to find patriarchal customs associated with an established practice of matrilocal marriage. Of the various features of the matriarchal order of society the practice of matrilocal marriage is, then, the most distinctive and important." Tylor[15] and Vinogradoff[16] likewise regard residence as basic, and Westermarck[17] derives matrilineal descent from matrilocal marriage. Tozzer,[18] however, thinks residence depends largely on the line of descent, and Siimner and Keller[19] consider it a factor of relatively minor importance.

The above six factors form the basis for an accurate definition of father-right and mother-right. Thus father-right may be described as characterized by patrilineal descent, inheritance, and succession, patrilocal residence, and paternal or patriarchal property and authority.

10 Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 87.
11 Above, pp. 255-64.
12 Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 90.
13 Cf., Tylor, "On a Method."
14 *Mothers*, I, 310.
15 "On a Method."
16 *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 195.
17 *Human Marriage*, I, 296-7.
18 *Social Origins*, p. 173.
19 *Science of Society*, III, 1952-3.

Strict mother-right, on the other hand, may be defined as consisting of matrilineal descent, inheritance, and succession, matrilocal residence, maternal or avuncular property and domestic authority, and male political authority.[20] To these elements of full mother-right Hartland[21] also adds exogamy, a clan organization united by the bond of blood, and the obligation of blood-revenge, but these features seem either derivative or not confined to mother-right. The six factors in question, however, are by no means always consistent. All the elements of father-right, to be sure, are often found in conjunction. Strict mother-right, however, is comparatively rare. It is far more common to find certain features of mother-right associated with others which are characteristic of father-right. Thus matrilineal descent may coexist with patrilineal inheritance and succession,[22] or matrilineal descent and inheritance with patrilineal succession.[28] The interpretation of these mixed forms is bound up with the question of the priority of mother-right in general.

As Lippert[24] points out, the very existence of mother-right was entirely overlooked from classical times until a little more than half a century ago. Father-right was firmly established in the mores of western Europe, and it had the authoritative sanction of the rigidly patriarchal Roman law and Hebrew Scripture. Under these circumstances, naturally enough, it was assumed that the earliest form of family organization was father-right—indeed father-right in its most extreme form, the patriarchate. The attitude of this early period finds its best expression in the works of Maine.[25] The "patriarchal theory," however, has been severely criticized by later writers[26] and is now generally discredited.

The rediscovery of mother-right by Bachofen[27] in 1861, and independently by McLennan[23] a few years later, initiated a second period in the history of the matriarchal theory. The new conception was eagerly taken up by many writers, some of whom in their enthusiasm carried it to extremes. "As often happens when a new idea comes to the

[20] This conception of mother-right accords completely with the "mother family" of Sumner (*Folkways*, p. 364). Cf. also Haberlandt, *Ethnology*, p. 52.

[21] *Primitive Society*, pp. 324.

[22] See Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1941, 1955; Tozzer, *Social Origins*, p. 168; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, I, 276.

[23] See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, II, 345.

[24] Above, p. 223.

[25] *Ancient Law; Early History of Institutions; Early Law and Custom.*

[26] See Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 14-32; McLennan, *Patriarchal Theory;* Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, 713-37.

[27] *Mutterrecht* For a recent appreciation of Bachofen, see Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 408-9.

[28] *Ancient History*, p. 124.

fore, when recognized by Bachofen, Morgan, and McLennan, the importance of the principle was exaggerated in the sense that they spoke glibly of matriarchal institutions and pictured a society in which the family, centred round the mother, was ruled by women on the pattern of an Amazon commonwealth/'[29] By no means all the writers of this period, however, went to such extremes. Many, Lippert among them, adhered to a much more moderate conception of mother-right. But, extreme or moderate, the authorities for many years were all but unanimous in accepting the priority of mother-right. Among them were Bastian,3[0] Bloch,3[1] Dargun,3[2] Giraud-Teulon,33 Haberlandt,3[4] Kohler,[85] Lang,[86] Lubbock,[87] Morgan,[88] Spencer,[89] Sumner,[40] Tylor,[41] Ward,[42] Wilken,[43] and Wilutzky.[44] The status of the question during this period is well summed up by Gumplowicz.[45] "Only recently have ripened reflection and acute observation discovered that the 'father family' was preceded by a period in which a very narrow consanguineous group flocked about the mother as its founder. The evidence collected by Bachofen, Giraud-Teulon, McLennan, and more recently by Lippert, Dargun, and Wilken, must be considered conclusive."

With the increase in ethnological knowledge, however, the question was seen to be less simple than the earlier writers conceived it, and a third period began, characterized by criticism of the theory of the priority of mother-right. "In the reaction against the exaggerated views of early investigators, Westermarck and Malinowski have maintained that there is no matriarchal arrangement, only matrilineal descent, and that the family is always patriarchal." *• This reaction was sometimes carried to an equal, though opposite, extreme. Starcke,[47] for example, regards father-right as the earliest form of society and mother-right as a transitional form. "The social life of man begins with the partially agnatic family, and the family group which is ruled by the father in virtue of his physical superiority." Of the critics of original mother-right, the unquestioned leader is Westermarck.[48] The usual attitude of the school that follows him is that neither mother-right nor father-right can claim priority, but that the two are parallel developments.

29 Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 188.
80 *Rechtsverhdltnisse*, pp. 183ff.
81 *Sexual Life*, p. 194.
82 *Mutterrecht und Vaterrecht.*
88 *Origines du manage*, Chaps. VII-X.
84 *Ethnology*, p. 52.
85 "Urgesehichte der Ehe," p. 62.
36 *Social Origins*, p. 21.
87 *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 150-61.
88 *Ancient Society*, p. 63.
39 *Principles of Sociology*, I, 647-9.
40 *Folkways*, pp. 354-5.
41 "On a Method."
42 *Pure Sociology*, p. 340.
48 *Verspreide Geschriften*, I, 307.
44 *Voraeschichte des Rechts*, I, 23.
45 *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 110-11.
46 Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 194.
47 *Primitive Family*, p. 53.
48 *Human Marriage*, *f*, 275-97.

This is the view of Boas,[49] Kroeber,[50] Tozzer,[51] and other American anthropologists. Rivers[52] likewise believes that "we cannot regard the early state of human society as one in which it is possible to speak either of father-right or mother-right." Among the other authorities with more or less similar views are Bernhoft,[58] Crawley,[54] Frazer,[55] Grosse,[56] Howard,[57] and Kautsky.[58]

Despite the criticism by the foregoing authors, the theory of original mother-right has never lacked adherents. In a moderate form it is held by a number of eminent contemporary writers. The priority of mother-right is the primary thesis of the massive work of Briffault.[59] Thomas[60] thinks "we may safely conclude that the so-called 'mother-right' has everywhere preceded 'father-right/ and was the fund from which the latter was evolved." Hartland[61] expresses a similar opinion. "The result of anthropological investigations during the past half-century has been to show that mother-right everywhere preceded father-right and the reckoning of descent in the modern civilized fashion through both parents." The priority of mother-right is also supported by Vinogradoff[62] and Sumner and Keller.[68] Most of the works just referred to have appeared within the past decade, and they may conceivably indicate that the pendulum is once more swinging back in the direction of Lippert's point of view.

The opinions of the authorities have been reviewed above without reference to the arguments advanced by both sides. No real understanding of the question is possible, however, without an acquaintance with the respective arguments. Of those advanced for the priority of mother-right, the first is the ignorance of paternity in primitive times.[64] Even Maine[65] admits that "circumstances long prevented savage men from discovering and recognizing paternity, which is matter of inference, as opposed to maternity, which is matter of observation." It has been pointed out by many writers that "the existence of a causal relation between the reproductive act and its biological consequences was, for

49 *Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 185.
51 *Social Origins*, p. 177.
60 *Anthropology*, p. 331.
52 *Social Organization*, p. 98.
53 "Geschichte der europaischen Familie," pp. 401-2.
54 *Mystic Rose*, pp. 460ff.
55 *Totemism and Exogamy*, I, 167, 249, 335ff.
56 *Formen der Familie*, pp. 61, 166-6.
57 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 116.
58 "Entstehung der Ehe," pp. 256ff., 388ff.
59 *Mothers*, I, 250, *et passim*.
60 *Sex and Society*, p. 67.
61 *Primitive Paternity*, I, 299-300; *Primitive Society*, p. 36.
62 *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 188-212.
63 *Science of Society*, III, 1954-5.
64 See above, pp. 75-6.
65 *Early Law and Custom*, p. 202.

very long periods, not realized."[66] This ignorance has been established for many existing tribes by indubitable ethnographic evidence.[67] Sir Baldwin Spencer,[68] one of the most reliable of ethnographers, gives a graphic description of the situation in Australia. "In the first place it is essential to remember that there is no such thing as a virgin amongst the women of the native tribes from one end of Australia to the other. As soon as a native girl reaches puberty, she is handed over to her allotted husband and has continuous intercourse for the rest of her life. In that respect there is no difference between any two native women, and yet the native sees that some women have children, some do not. The intercourse is continuous, the bearing of children is sporadic. It is long sifter a woman has had intercourse before she becomes aware that there is a child within her. Seeing that every woman without exception has continuous intercourse; that some have children, some do not; that those that have them bear them at varying intervals which have no relationship to the time of intercourse, and that the woman only knows she has a child when the quickening takes place, which, again, has no reference to intercourse, it is not a matter of surprise that the savage man, who is, according to his lights, a very logical being, should seek some other explanation of the origin of children than that of sexual connection." The argument is, therefore, that with paternity unknown, while maternity was of course obvious, matrilineal descent would have been practically inevitable in primitive times.[69]

"But descent through females is not, in fact, fully explained by uncertainty of parentage on the male side. It is due to the larger social fact, including this biological one, that the bond between mother and child is the closest in nature, and that the group grew up about the more stationary female."[70] This argument is summed up by Sumner and Keller.[71] "The reason for beginning with the mother-family, as the prior number in the series of evolutionary forms of family-organization, is that relationship through the mother is definite and obvious." "The unborn child belongs with and to the mother just as any other part of her body belongs to her. At birth there is removed from her something that has been part of her and which still remains connected with her until artificially separated. Thereafter she and her child must

[66] Keuter, *Population Problems,* p. 39 (quoted); Hartland, *Primitive Society,* pp. 18-19; Robinson, *Mind in the Making,* p. *88;* Sumner, *Folkways,* p. 497; Ward, *Pure Sociology,* p. 340; Wilken, *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 307.

[67] For a collection of cases, see Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1498-1502.

[68] *Northern Territory of Australia,* p. 25.

[69] Cf., McLennan, *Ancient History,* Chap. VIII.

[70] Thomas, *Sex and Society,* p. 66.

[71] *Science of Society,* III, 1954.

be together periodically or the child will die. . . . No two other human beings are so associated by nature as are the mother and child; theirs is a primordial and unique form of relationship."[72]

A third argument for the priority of mother-right is based on the nature of the primitive division of labor by sex. "As a hunter, as a natural wanderer, the unattached male is by disposition a confirmed and restless rover. . . . It is the woman who is the maker of the home and the home-dweller."[73] It is she, as Lippert[74] points out, who tends the fire, cares for the children, collects vegetable foods, conducts the primitive agriculture, and carries on the domestic arts. While the man is still a roving hunter and fighter, the home grows up about her, as the stable element. The children remain with her and belbng to her group, and the man attaches himself to her household. In short, descent is matrilineal and residence matrilocal. This argument is clearly stated by Vinogradofif.[76] "It is the effect of the division of labour that makes for the matriarchal arrangement of the household. Men are by nature destined for outside pursuits and women for housekeeping and inside pursuits. In primitive society also the woman not only cooks and carries, but manages the whole rudimentary culture of the soil, so that the characteristic implement of the Australian woman is the digging stick with which she digs round the house for roots, and that of the man is the boomerang. Even when the culture of the soil becomes less primitive, the sowing of the maize is regarded as woman's work, and the women and children hunt small animals such as mice and opossums, while the man is the big hunter, of the kangaroo, buffalo and deer. The women rule the house, because the men do not care to meddle with small domestic matters. Thus the position of the mother as the economic centre is maintained in the altered situation."

Another argument for the priority of mother-right is based on the fact that there are numerous historical instances of a transition from father-right to mother-right, e.g., the case of Egypt, whereas "no trustworthy examples of the opposite evolution have been discovered."[76] Almost the only historical instance of a transition from the paternal system to the maternal, and that only a partial and inconclusive one, is the case of the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia.[77] The evidence on this point is so one-sided that Frazer,[78] who does not regard matrilineal descent as necessarily older than patrilineal, nevertheless states that "whenever we find a tribe wavering between female descent and

[72] Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1937-8.
[73] Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 251. [74] Above, pp. 228-35.
[75] *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 194-5.
[76] Kohler, "Urgeschichte der Ehe," p. 62.
[77] Cf., Boas, "Kwakiutl Indians," pp. 333-5.
[78] *Totemism and Exogamy,* IV, 132.

male descent we may be sure that it is in the act of passing from mother-kin to father-kin, and not in the reverse direction, since there are many motives which induce men to exchange mother-kin for father-kin but none which induce them to exchange father-kin for mother-kin."

Finally, it is argued that mother-right "must be antecedent inasmuch as it reveals no survivals of the father-family, while the latter shows not a few reminiscences of the matrilinear system."[79] Briffault[80] has assembled a full collection of alleged survivals of mother-right in civilized societies. A striking survival in our own society has been pointed out by Vinogradoff,[8X] namely, the "rule that illegitimate children follow the mother's conditioning belong to the mother's farqdly." Tylor,[82] in a masterly amplication of the statistical method to social phenomena, compares a large number of cases of mother-in-law avoidance, couvade, levirate, teknonymy, etc., taken from peoples on all stages of culture, and finds that their correspondence respectively with features of father-right, mother-right, and an intermediate form of the family is such that they are "only compatible with a tendency of society to pass from the maternal to the paternal system, the maternal being placed as earliest from the absence of survivals from other stages extending into it, as they freely do into the paternal, which is therefore placed as latest."

Opposition to the theory of original mother-right is based, first of all, on a negative argument, a criticism of the reasons advanced in support of the theory. It finds its best expression in the work of Westermarck.[88] Some writers have assumed, rather carelessly, that it is based primarily on the theory of primitive promiscuity, on the notion that "a man must know his mother, but in a condition of promiscuity would not know his father;" hence they maintain that "the belief in the antecedence of the matrilineate has remained founded solely in hypothesis." [84]

A second argument is that the theory of the priority of mother-right is merely one expression of the early evolutionist point of view, which has recently been severely criticized.[85] Boas,[86] for example, says: "If we do not make the assumption that the same phenomena have everywhere developed in the same way, then we may just as well conclude that paternal families have in some cases arisen from maternal institutions, in other cases in other ways."

[79] Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society.* I l l , 1954-5.
[80] *Mothers,* I, 345-432.
[81] *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 188.
[82] "On a Method," p. 256.
[88] *Human Marriage,* I, 275-97.
[84] Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 331. Cf. also Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* I, 283-5.
[85] Cf., Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* pp. 20-27.
[86] *Mind of Primitive Man,* p. 185.

By far the strongest argument, however, is that based on the distribution of the elements of mother-right and father-right. Kroeber[87] maintains that "the indirect evidence of distribution indicates . . . that definitely matrilinear and patrilinear institutions have tended to be closely associated." "No correlation," says Tozzer,[88] "exists between stage of culture and rules of descent. Father-right and mother-right are both found among some of the highest and also among some of the lowest savages." "If mother-right had everywhere preceded father-right," argues Westermarck,[89] "we might expect to find it particularly prevalent among the lowest savages," whereas in actuality many of them reveal patrilineal institutions. In an admirable statistical study, Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg[90] have demonstrated that, while mother-right predominates among the lower hunting peoples, a by no means inconsiderable minority practices father-right. Pastoral peoples, on the other hand, are mainly patrilineal, while the two systems are evenly balanced among agriculturalists. Probably the best attempt to reconcile these facts of distribution with the theory of original mother-right is that of Lippert himself.[91] Nevertheless, the fact remains that the chief obstacle to the acceptance of this theory is the prevalence of father-right among a number of backward tribes.

In view of the conflicting evidence and the divergent opinions of reliable authorities, it can not be said that the question is as yet definitely settled. The drift today, if any be discernible, is probably in the direction of a moderate acceptance of the theory, but what is urgently needed is less idle theorizing and supercilious scorn of opposing views and more inductive research, especially by quantitative or statistical methods. The present status of the controversy reveals, however, at least one advance: extreme views are being abandoned by both sides in favor of more moderate ones. The proponents of original mother-right have discarded Bachofen's concept of a matriarchate; Lippert's[92] statement that "a government among savage peoples exercised exclusively by women is certainly a conception inadmissible from the outset" finds universal acceptance today.[93] The moderate attitude of the opposing school is probably accurately represented by Howard's[94] characterization of mother-right as "very archaic, yet not necessarily primitive."

87 *Anthropology*, p. 331.
88 *Social Origins*, p. 177.
89 *Human Marriage*, I, 280, 281-3.
90 *Material Culture and Social Institutions*, pp. 151-3.
91 See above, pp. 237-8.
92 Above, p. 223.
93 See, for example, Haberlandt, *Ethnology*, p. 52; Starcke, *Primitive Family*, p. 65; Sumner, *War*, p. 49; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1990; Tozzer, *Social Origins*, pp. 168-9.
94 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 116.

A number of authorities on both sides postulate a "prematriarchal stage," antecedent to mother-right and superficially resembling father-right, but characterized by feeble or undeveloped ideas of kinship. It is at least conceivable that the opposing schools may eventually be reconciled on some such basis. "There is," says Thomas,[95] "a stage of human society which may be called the prematriarchal stage, from the fact that ideas of kinship are so feeble that no extensive social filiation is effected through this principle, in consequence of which the group has not reached the tribal stage of organization on the basis of kinship, but remains in the primitive biological relation of male, female, and offspring. The Botocudos, Fuegians, Eskimos, West Australians, Bushmen, and Veddahs represent this primitive stage more or less completely; they have apparently not reached the stage where the fact of kinship expresses itself in maternal organization. They live in scattered bands, held together loosely by convenience, safety, and inertia, and the male is the leader; but the leadership of the male in this case, as among animals, is very different from the organized and institutional expression of the male force in systems of political control growing out of achievement." Rivers[96] holds that neither "father-right or mother-right characterised the earliest forms of human society. If I am right in supposing that, in the collecting stage, man went about the world in small loosely defined bands, the social processes we call descent, inheritance and succession would be of a vague indefinite kind, and might, in many cases, hardly be said to exist at all." Many American anthropologists[97] similarly believe that the American Indians before they developed matrilineal or patrilineal kin-groups, were organized in bands without unilateral reckoning of descent. Lubbock[98] thinks that matrilineal descent was preceded by a stage when the child was regarded as related only to the tribe. Dargun[99] conceives that the mother family was preceded by a parental group *(Elterngruppe)*, superficially resembling a patriarchal family. Howard[100] similarly holds that "there is evidence that in the lower hunting stage, before rules of descent were yet subjects of reflection, a kind of patriarchate or androcracy generally prevailed." "In the organization of human society," says Hartland,[101] "the earliest form to develop seems to have been the power and control of the man as provider and ruler of dependent wife and children." The point is clearly expressed by Sumner and Keller.[102] "A large part of the controversy waged over the subject is due to the fact that, although all

95 *Sex and Society,* p. 68.
96 *Social Organization,* pp. 98-9.
97 See, for example, Kroeber, *Anthropology,* p. 357; Wissler, *American Indian,* pp. 160-6.
98 *Origin of Civilisation,* p. 150.
99 *Mutterrecht und Vaterrecht,* pp. 28-42.
100 *Matrimonial Institutions,* I, 117.
101 *Primitive Society,* p. 25.
102 *Science of Society,* **III, 1967.**

might agree in accepting the sequence: father-family (meaning really monandry)—mother-family—father-family, yet some are talking of the first two members of the series and others of the last two when they dispute *as* to the priority of mother-family or father-family. If, now, monandry be distinguished from the father-family, it seems clear enough that mother-descent and the mother-family arose out of primitive monandry by direct evolution,"

APPENDIX C

ORIGIN OF EXOGAMY

Endogamy, or the practice of marrying within the group, and exogamy, or marrying outside, are no longer regarded as mutually exclusive customs. On the contrary, as Lippert[1] himself points out, they may exist side by side among the same people, with reference, however, to different social groups. In the normal case, indeed, a people is endogamous with respect to the tribe but exogamous with respect to its constituent clans, gentes, moieties, or totem groups. On this point the authorities agree,[2] but on little else. The problem of exogamy is exceedingly complex and obscure, and the theories advanced as solutions are manifold, conflicting, and in general unsatisfactory. This is particularly true on the question of the origin of exogamous practices, where the diversity of views is made apparent by even a cursory survey of the authorities.

Thomas[3] seeks the origin of exogamy "in the restlessness of the male, the tendency to make new co-ordinations, the stimulus to seek more unfamiliar women, and the emotional interest in making unfamiliar sexual alliances." Starcke[4] takes an extreme legalistic point of view. Marriage, being itself a legal relation, would have been, he thinks, impossible between members of the same clan or family, since they already stood in a legal relation to each other. The development of a clan organization, therefore, automatically led to exogamy. Durkheim[5] derives exogamy from exaggerated primitive superstitions regarding blood, especially female menstrual blood. It was the fear of shedding the blood of a member of the group which led, he believes, to the prohibition of sexual relations within the clan. Atkinson[6] attributes exogamy to paternal jealousy; the old men of the group usurped all the women, forcing the young men to obtain wives from outside. Briffault,[7] on the other hand, derives exogamy mainly from maternal

[1] Above, p. 291.
[2] See Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 147; Maine, *Early Law and Custom*, p. 222; Rivers, *Social Organization*, p. 40; Starcke, *Primitive Family*, p. 222; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1614; Tozzer, *Social Origins*, pp. **157-8.**
[3] *Sex and Society*, p. **57.**
[4] *Primitive Family*, pp. 230-3.
[5] "Prohibition de rinceste."
[6] *Primal* ***Law,*** pp. **229-38, 250-60.**
[7] *Mothers*, I, 251-9.

jealousy. Under the matnarchal family organization, he thinks, the men were relatively free and were driven to seek sexual relations in other groups because the mothers jealously resented such relations within the group.

Perhaps the most prevalent class of theories attributes exogamous restrictions in whole or in part to the recognition by the savage of the harmful effects of close inbreeding. Among the authorities who take this position are Frazer,[8] Maine,[9] Morgan,[10] Simmer,[11] Vinogradoff,[12] and Ward.[13] The principal objection to these theories is that modern science seriously questions, if it does not reject, the assumption that close consanguineous unions *per se* involve material injurious effects in man.[14] In any event, a proposition over which modern scientists are in dispute could scarcely have been clearly perceived as a fact by primitive man.[15] Moreover, as Lippert[16] has pointed out, exogamy does not actually prevent inbreeding, since it permits such close consanguineous unions as those between first cousins and between half brother and sister. Westermarck,[17] while admitting that the ills of inbreeding could not have been recognized by savages, nevertheless assumes their existence and holds them responsible for exogamous restrictions. They led, he believes, to the extermination of endogamous tribes by natural selection and to the development in man of an instinct unfavorable to endogamy, expressing itself in the form of "a remarkable absence of erotic feelings between persons living very closely together from childhood." Howard[18] agrees with Westermarck. Wissler[19] likewise attributes exogamy to a universal aversion to incest, though he refuses to assume that the aversion is instinctive rather than conventional.

Another considerable group of authorities, including Lippert, assigns to wife-capture an important role in the origin of exogamy. According to McLennan,[20] female infanticide was general among primitive peoples, leading to a scarcity of women and forcing the men to capture women from alien groups. Wife-capture thus began as a necessity, developed into a custom, and eventually gave rise to a prejudice against endogamous unions. The same theory is presented in a less extreme and somewhat more plausible form by Spencer.[21] In the warfare between

8 *Totemism and Exogamy*, IV, 105-37.
9 *Early Law and Custom*, p. 228.
10 *Ancient Society*, p. 459.
11 *Folkways*, p. 350.
12 *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 211.
13 *Pure Sociology*, pp. 356-7.
14 See, for example, Briffault, *Mothers*, I, 204-40; Holmes, *Trend of the Race*, pp. 238-47; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1585-94.
15 Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1587; Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, II, 174; Wilken, *Verspreide Qeschriften*, I, 140ff.
16 Above, p. 245.
17 *Human Marriage*, II, 192.
18 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 130.
19 *Social Anthropology*, pp. 144-5.
20 *Ancient History*, pp. 50-77, 127-40.
21 *Principles of Sociology*, I, 631-4.

primitive groups, he maintains, women must have been carried off like any other booty. They were regarded as trophies which it was an honor to possess. In tribes habitually at war a situation might well arise where most of the men owned captive wives, and it would then be considered dishonorable not to possess such a woman. In the hands of Hartland,[22] the theory finds even more moderate expression. "The capture of women has doubtless always been going on. Thus side by side with marriages in which the husband resided with or visited the wife, arose the practice of keeping one or more captive women at a man's own home for his use and benefit. The power in the household given to him by such an arrangement would be desired by others who had not the opportunity of making hostile raids for the purpose of capture. It was obtained by elopement, by simulated capture, by exchange, by the payment of what we call a bride-price." Lubbock's[23] opinion is that "under the communal system the women of the tribe were all common property. No one could appropriate one of them to himself without infringing on the general rights of the tribe. Women taken in war were, on the contrary, in a different position. The tribe, as a tribe, had no right to them, and men surely would reserve to themselves exclusively their own prizes. These captives, then, would naturally become the wives in our sense of the term." Sumner and Keller,[24] while they refuse to commit themselves on questions of origins, nevertheless lean in the same direction. "To have a woman from outside was to possess a wife without rights guaranteed by her relations. Property obtained by raiding could be handled with small regard for intra-group regulations. There was no title to it that was so little encumbered by obligation as that which arose from seizure by force; for there were no counter-claimants recognized. There is no question but that the introduction of stolen women had characteristic effects upon any local form of marriage."

In support of this group of theories it is pointed out that wife-capture is moderately common in ethnography.[25] "In archaic times the practice of marriage by *capture* was exceedingly prevalent. In all forms of marriage some traces of this may be found."[26] "The forcible capture of women certainly occurs, and has occurred to a greater or less extent, in every part of the world and at all epochs. It is the natural accompaniment of primitive and barbaric warfare, and with several tribes

[22] *Primitive Paternity,* I, 95.
[23] *Origin of Civilisation,* pp. 135-6.
[24] *Science of Society,* III, 1615.
[25] Cases are collected in Briffault, *Mothers,* II, 230-50; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1624-36; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* II, 240-77.
[26] Vinogradoff, *Historical Jurisprudence,* I, 209.

has become the chief object of such warfare,"[27] "Though genuine capture is not so common in ethnography, all the indications point to its prevalence on the earliest stages. Mock-capture and other survivals cannot be accounted for without inferring that there was a period during which the stamp of violence had been firmly impressed upon the mores."[28]

The opposing authorities, on the other hand, maintain that wife-capture, however well authenticated, has never been the normal mode of contracting marriage.[29] But the weightiest objection to the capture theory of the origin of exogamy is that raised by Tylor[30] as the result of his admirable statistical study. "There are conditions of society under which exogamy is found side by side with wife-capture; so that a barbaric marriage often involves both in one and the same act. . . . But on reckoning up the peoples among whom this combination of capture and exogamy is found, the number, though enough to show that they co-exist freely, falls short of what would justify the inference that they are cause and effect. . . . The schedules show that there are in different parts of the world twelve or thirteen well-marked exogamous peoples whose habit of residence is for the husband to join the wife's family. This state of things seems to me to prevent our regarding exogamy as a result of capture, it being plain that the warrior who has carried a wife captive from a hostile tribe does not take up his abode in her family. If capture leads to any form of exogamy, this must, I think, be a paternal form, and if it be admitted that the maternal form is earlier, then it follows that capture is inadmissible as the primary cause of exogamy."

These objections effectually dispose of the capture theory as ordinarily expressed. The theory of Lippert alone can be said to meet them at all successfully. In the first place, he does not assume a definite stage of regular capture marriage. Capture was only an opening wedge, leading to composition and wife-purchase. It was not itself the important thing; it merely characterized a low stage of intergroup relations.[31] Moreover, Lippert does not attempt to derive all cases of exogamy from wife-capture. He explains in this way only the form of exogamy appearing with incoming father-right, while expressly admitting the development of another form under mother-right.[32] Thus his theory is entirely consistent with Tylor's findings, and at the same time it ab-

27 Briffault, *Mothers,* II, 230.

28 Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1627.

29 See Briffault, *Mothers,* II, 230; Crawley, *Mystic Rose,* pp. 367-70; Rivers, *Social Organization,* p. 46; Thomas, *Sex and Society,* pp. 187-9; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* II, 254.

30 "On a Method," pp. 265-6.

31 Above, pp. 288, 306-7.

32 Above, pp. 243-5, 286.

solves him from criticism for trying to fit all the diverse facts into a single category. Nevertheless, however superior it may be to most other theories and however deserving of consideration for that reason, it can by.no means be regarded as an entirely satisfactory explanation. The whole problem of the origin of exogamy must be admitted to be still unsolved, if not insoluble.

If, however, we lay aside the question of its origin, it is easy to see how the practice of exogamy, once initiated in any way, was bound to prevail. Exogamy has "survival value;" it is a better adjustment than endogamy. Its social advantages are such that, as Lippert[33] points out, "exogamous tribes necessarily became superior to endogamous ones in the competition of life." Tylor[34] makes much of this point. "Endogamy is a policy of isolation, cutting off a horde or village, even from the parent-stock whence it separated, if only a generation or two back. Among tribes of low culture there is but one means known of keeping up permanent alliance, and the means is inter-marriage. Exogamy, enabling a growing tribe to keep itself compact by constant unions between its spreading clans, enables it to overmatch any number of smaller intermarrying groups, isolated and helpless. Again and again in the world's history, savage tribes must have had plainly before their minds the simple practical alternative between marrymg-out and being killed out. . . . Exogamy thus shows itself as an institution which resists the tendency of uncultured populations to disintegrate, cementing them into nations capable of living together in peace and holding together in war, till they reach the period of higher military and political organisation." The expediency of exogamy is similarly stressed by Sumner and Keller.[85] "Out-marriage was a prime factor in acculturation at a time when other acculturative agencies were feeble or non-existent. Trade -and the practice of exogamy were the main factors in breaking down the barriers that separated one community from another.' It is not by chance that the Latin terms *commercium* and *connubium* came to be linked together in a formula; interchange of goods and of wives went along side by side. The reader will recall that civilization is a function not alone of numbers, but of the contact of numbers as well. Endogamy provided for no contacts, while exogamy secured them in regular, frequent, and peaceable form; then followed the contagion of ideas or what has been called the 'cross-fertilization of culture.'"

[33] Above, p. 245.
[84] "On a Method," pp. 267-8.
35 *Science of Society,* III, 1618.

APPENDIX D

THE LEVIRATE

The levirate, or custom whereby a widow marries the brother of her deceased husband, is a very widespread phenomenon[1] and one which has received much attention from social theorists. Lippert,[2] apparently taking his cue from the well known Old Testament injunction,[8] seeks its origin in the desire to raise up a son to carry on the cult of the deceased and childless husband. Starcke[4] likewise thinks "the obligation was founded upon the ardent desire of having heirs to offer sacrifice," and Maine[6] in similar fashion connects the custom with ancestor worship.

According to McLennan,[6] the levirate is a survival of polyandry. Briffault[7] also connects it closely with fraternal polyandry and derives it ultimately from group-marriage. To Frazer[8] it is a survival, not of polyandry, but of group-marriage, and Kohler[9] likewise regards it as reminiscent of group-marriage.

The theory of Tylor[10] is still different. "The levirate . . . seems sufficiently accounted for as a custom of substitution, belonging to the period when marriage is a compact not so much between two individuals, as between two families, often made when the couple are infants unable to understand it, in fact sometimes before their birth. That the levirate forms part of this family transaction is consistent with other customs more or less associated with it, viz., that when a wife dies or turns out ill her family are bound to replace her by another, a rule which sometimes even holds for betrothal, and that the widow is not allowed to marry out of her husband's family unless by leave of his kinsmen, who have the choice of keeping her, or parting with her, usually for a price." To Tozzer[11] also the levirate is "the result of the

[1] Cases are collected in Briffault, *Mothers,* I, 767-81; Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament,* II, 265-203; Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society,* III, 1901-3; IV, 1056-60; Westermarck, *Human Marriage,* III, 208-22.

[2] Above, p. 348.

[8] Deuteronomy xxv. 5-6. Cf. also Ruth iv. 10.

[4] *Primitive Family,* p. 160.

[6] *Patriarchal Theory,* pp. 156-60.

[5] *Early Law and Custom,* pp. 100-8.

[7] *Mothers,* I, 766-81.

[8] *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament,* II, 338-41; *Totemism and Exogamy,* I, 501-2.

[9] "Urgeschichte der Ehe," p. 321.

[10] "On a Method," p. 253.

[11] *Social Origins,* p. 138.

idea that marriage is a cont [r] act between groups rather than between individuals, and the support of the widow is incumbent upon the family of the dead husband."

The levirate is associated by some authorities with property considerations. Vinogradoff,[12] for instance, regards it as "the outcome of the fact that the brother is under an obligation to take care of the widow and the property and movables connected with her and to prevent their dispersion." Rivers[18] thinks that "in most parts of the world the levirate is probably nothmg more than a means of keeping the care of the children and any property belonging to the wife within the clan or family in one form or another. It is probably only very exceptionally that there,is any relation between the levirate and polyandry."

To Westermarck[14] the levirate is merely a special case of the inheritance of property. "Wives may be inherited like other belongings. . . . Even when a son inherits the other property of his father it is easy to understand why he does not inherit the widow, apart from any considerations of age. To inherit her is, generally speaking, to marry her. But nowhere is a son allowed to marry his own mother; hence it is natural, at least where monogamy prevails, that the right of succession in this case should belong to the brother." Spencer[15] takes a similar view. "Under early social systems, wives, being regarded as property, are inherited in the same way as other property." Wilken's statement that the levirate may be "nothing else than the inheritance of the woman as of a thing by the brothers or other relatives of the deceased" is quoted with approval by Sumner and Keller,[16] but these authors believe that in some cases the interpretation of Lippert and Starcke may be more nearly correct.

On the whole, most of the above theories seem to possess elements of strength. Possibly different factors or combinations thereof may be operative in different cases. Lippert's interpretation, though it may be correct in individual cases, is almost certainly too narrow as a general explanation of a very widespread practice.

12 *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 199.
13 *Social Organization*, p. 82.
14 *Human Marriage*, III, 210, 212.
15 *Principles of Sociology*, I, 661.
16 *Science of Society*, III, 1904.

APPENDIX E

THE COUVADE

In the curious but surprisingly widespread custom of the couvade or "male childbed," the mother, before and after the birth of the child, goes about her ordinary work as though nothing had happened, while the father behaves as though ill, observes various taboos as to diet and activities, often takes to his bed and receives the solicitous attention of friends and relatives, and sometimes specifically simulates the pangs of childbirth. This mirth-provoking practice has been made the subject of much speculation. Some of the explanations advanced are mere curiosities. Thus Lafitau[1] regards the couvade as motivated by a dim consciousness of original sin, and Max Müller[2] thinks that the prospective father was so harassed and henpecked by the women of the house that he imagined himself a martyr, felt really ill, and took to bed. The serious attempts to explain the custom, however, fall for the most part into three groups.

One type of theory interprets the couvade as a deception of the lurking evil spirits by substitution. If the father, says Crawley,[8] "pretends to be ill, and if his wife makes no fuss, but goes about her work quietly, the evil influences and agencies may possibly be deceived." Similar theories are advanced by Bastian[4] and Casas.[6] Hellwald[6] views the practice as an expiatory sacrifice offered to the threatening evil spirits.

A theory of another type was first advanced by Bachofen,[7] who held that the couvade originated as a fiction to indicate symbolically the relationship between father and child during the period of transition from mother-right to father-right. Bachofen has been followed by Giraud-Teulon,[8] Ploss,[9] Ward,[10] and Wilken.[11] Tylor,[12] as a result of

1 *Moeurs des sauvages,* I, 259.
2 *German Workshop,* II, 279.
3 *Mystic Rose,* p. 428.
4 *San Salvador,* pp. 194-6.
5 *La couvade.*
6 *Menschliche Familie,* p. 362.
7 *Mutterrecht,* pp. 255-6.
8 *Origines du manage,* p. 138.
9 *Das Weib,* II, 436-8.
10 *pure Sociology,* 200, 342-5.
11 *Verspreide Geschriften,* I, 279; II, 143-58.
" "On a Method," pp. 255-6.

a statistical study, likewise accepts Bachofen's interpretation, and he calls the couvade "not merely incidentally an indicator of the tendency of society from maternal to paternal, but the very sign and record of that vast change." Vinogradoff[18] gives a similar explanation. "This peculiar ceremony by which, when a child is to be born, the father goes into child-bed and undergoes a fictitious treatment, can have only one meaning, that of proving the right of the father in the child. Agjaiher-hood is not a fact ofnature it must be established by an artificial ceremony, for property is the root of ancient fatherhood."

The interpretation by Frazer[14] is typical of the third main group of theories. "In fact the custom is merely one of the innumerable cases of sympathetic, magic The father believes that there exists between him and his child a relation of such intimate physical sympathy that whatever he does must simultaneously affect his offspring; for example, if he exerts himself violently, the child will be fatigued; if he eats food that disagrees with him, the child will be sick or have a pain in its stomach; and so on." Tylor[15] originally held a similar view but abandoned it later in favor of Bachofen's theory. Analogous interpretations are advanced by Dargun,[16] Lubbock,[17] Roth,[18] and Sumner and Keller.[19] Starcke[20] adds that the practice is a test of the father's courage and endurance, qualities which will be transmitted to the child. Howard[21] and Westermarck,[22] though their opinions are somewhat vaguely expressed, are apparently also in agreement with Frazer. The theories of this type possess certain manifest advantages over the rest. They align the couvade with other, and in many respects not dissimilar, practices designed to secure healthy offspring,[23] and they apply equally consistently in the exceptional cases, like the Arawaks and Macusis of Guiana, where matrilineal tribes observe the couvade.

Lippert's[24] interpretation of the couvade as a redemption sacrifice offered by the father in lieu of an actual sacrifice of his first-born, differs widely from any of those cited in the above survey. It stands alone. No other author has adopted it, and the most that has been said in its favor is that it is "plausible."[25] It is much too narrow to explain all the known facts, and it must therefore be rejected as unsatisfactory.

13 *Historical Jurisprudence*, I, 198. 14 *Totemism and Exogamy*, IV, 247.
15 *Early History of Mankind*, pp. 297-300.
16 *Mutterrecht und Vaterrecht*, pp. 18-26.
17 *Origin of Civilisation*, pp. 15, 18. 20 *Primitive Family*, pp. 51-2.
18 "Couvade," pp. 224-40. 21 *Matrimonial Institutions*, I, 112.
19 *Science of Society*, III, 1912. 22 *Human Marriage*, I, 287.
28 Cf., Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1911.
24 Above, pp. 455-6.
26 Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, III, 1912.

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Complete references have been given below in so far as possible. Subtitles, however, have been omitted in the main for the sake of brevity. Since Lippert does not include a bibliography in the original edition, and since the references in his footnotes are usually abbreviated or mutilated, the editor has been unable to trace or verify a few of his more obscure references, and they consequently appear below in incomplete form.

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