

**TEXT LIGHT AND
TEXT FLY WITHIN
THE BOOK ONLY**

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_152021

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

Checked 1999

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 104/W63I Accession No. 4610

Author walgery, A. G.

Title Immortality and other essays

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

20 SEP 1955
6 DEC 1957

I M M O R T A L I T Y
and
OTHER ESSAYS

By
Alban G. Widgery

P R E F A C E

This small volume of essays does not profess to be anything more than a selection of papers more or less popular and untechnical. They are gathered together as giving some glimpses of an attitude to life as seen from the side of philosophy and religion. None of the essays pretends to be exhaustive. Most have been previously published; but these have almost all been modified and slightly enlarged. Essay I was an inaugural lecture as professor of philosophy at the College, Baroda, and was delivered before H. H. the Maharaja Sayaji Rao Gaekwar of Baroda and the British Resident in December 1915: it was afterwards published in the Indian Philosophical Review. Essays II and IV were printed in the Modern Churchman; III in The Interpreter (England); VI in The Free Catholic; VII in The Journal of the

PREFACE

Indian Institute of Philosophy; VIII in the Indian Philosophical Review; X in the Hibbert Journal; XIII in The Calcutta Review. The essay on The Psychology of the Christian Motive was to have been read at a Conference on the Psychology of the Religious Experience held at Cambridge in August 1918 but arrived too late owing to the delay in the mail. It was originally intended to elaborate this paper into something more technical and less incomplete, but its present form seems more suited to the purpose of this volume. Essay IX contains some extracts from a paper on The Teaching of the Creeds read at a Conference of Modern Churchmen in Rugby in 1915. The remaining papers are published here for the first time. I am indebted to the editors of the periodicals mentioned for their permission to reprint the essays.

CONTENTS

I.	Philosophy and Life	1
II.	Immortality	53
III.	Morality and Religion	48
IV.	Jesus and Modern Culture	65
V.	The Psychology of the Christian Motive	79
VI.	Free Catholicism and non-Christian Religions	105
VII.	Nietzsche and Tolstoi on Morality and Religion	110
VIII.	Sir Oliver Lodge on Science and Religion	129
IX.	The Value of Confessions of Faith ...	150
X.	The Idea of Resurrection	162
XI.	Religion and Beauty... ..	173
XII.	Religion and History... ..	189
XIII.	Principles of Reform in Religion ...	201
	Index	221

I

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE

What is Philosophy ? What is the philosophical attitude ? These are questions which in one form or another, at one time or another, present themselves to every thoughtful educated man. These are questions, moreover, which meet the serious student of philosophy on the threshold and persist throughout his reflections. For, the nature of Philosophy is one of the most difficult philosophical problems. That it has been raised so repeatedly in the past, and to-day is still earnestly discussed, suggests at once that no solution has been generally accepted as final. Nevertheless, it is equally evident to the most cursory reader that throughout the history of Philosophy, as in our own day, there is some agreement, perhaps an increasing agreement, as to the more general characteristics of Philosophy. To survey and carefully to examine the answers already

given to these questions is an essential part of all systematic philosophical training. It is, however, not my present purpose to embark upon this task. The following reflections are concerned with my own tentative attitude to the problem.

The popular misconception that there is something mysterious about Philosophy ought to be no longer possible. The human philosopher, insignificant or great, has simply the normal human functions, and exercises them in relation to normal human experience. Nevertheless, there are differences between the philosopher and the ordinary man who would not assume or be given that denomination. The former insists upon a continual and untiring quest for accuracy with regard to every detail of the problems with which he is concerned. The facts with which thinking starts in any particular instance, and the processes of reasoning by which conclusions are reached, are subjected to a scrutiny which to the unphilosophical mind is irksome. The philosopher finds that it is impossible to live without assumptions ; but he insists that they shall be recognised as such. He requires that all assumptions shall be critically examined, and he rejects those opposed

to reason or to empirical experience. One who is not prepared to track statements and beliefs to their ultimate grounds, and critically to examine them, will do well not to embark upon philosophical studies.

Philosophy is also characterised by its breadth of outlook: all that exists, or may exist, comes rightly within its purview. This is not to say that a standard encyclopedia would be the best introduction to Philosophy. No individual person in the span of an ordinary human lifetime could acquire a knowledge of the facts even at present systematised in the sciences. Yet, Philosophy has at least in a general way to take into account all points of view, and modifications may be introduced into it from any side of experience. In the times of Plato and of Leibniz the study of mathematics profoundly influenced Philosophy. With Aristotle and in our own age since Lamarck and Darwin, there is evidence of a marked influence from biological studies. Perhaps the most important of all recent influences have been due to the advance in psychology, especially in the emphasis on the volitional and conational aspects of consciousness. In all ages religion has been a factor determining the form of philo-

sophical conceptions, predominantly so in India. For Philosophy it is axiomatic that no side of life shall be neglected, that no facts shall be arbitrarily excluded from consideration.

Philosophy may be described in very general terms as occupied with the full knowledge of reality, but this description may easily lead to misconception. In the past "knowledge" has too often meant merely the knowledge of the senses and the intellect. No such limitation is justifiable. With reference to the problem thus raised, the recognition of the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description will be helpful. The latter is usually expressed in language, and will be theoretical. But the adequacy of all description must in the end depend upon actual knowledge by acquaintance. And knowledge by acquaintance will be as varied as experience. It will be of as many kinds as there are specific functions of the mind coming into specific relations with specific realities or aspects of reality. Though the account which is given in any Philosophy must be in theoretical terms, it does not follow that the knowledge by acquaintance which it represents is merely intellectual. The importance of this

contention will be seen more clearly when the relation of Philosophy to meanings and values is discussed.

The term "reality" in the above description might lead to misconception. For it is not infrequently taken to imply a whole of parts, in the sense that the whole has an individuality which in some manner transcends the parts which compose it. Even if this should be true, it is wrong to assume at the outset that it is so. It is better, therefore, to use the term "All the real", which might apply to a singularistic, a pluralistic, or a theistic ultimate. In view of its universality of scope, there should be no limitation of methods in Philosophy. The varied character of its data necessitates that any and all methods which may lead to knowledge and aid in the attainment of accuracy, may and should be applied.

According to the account so far given, Philosophy is concerned with a knowledge of facts, of what exists, of all the real. Such a statement, unless certain distinctions of language to be immediately mentioned are ignored, seems to omit the most important aspect of the philosophical problem. For that problem is not

simply: What exists ? but also: What is its meaning ? If we are honest with ourselves, we must confess that the question of meaning is what interests us most. Men would not occupy themselves very much with the knowledge of a reality which they considered to exist but to have no meaning. The existence of Philosophy, as it appears in history and at the present time, is evidence of the conviction of the human mind that experience, the real, has significance and is not bare matter of fact. The problem of Philosophy is therefore the knowledge of all the facts, of all the real : and of the meaning or meanings of what is real. It may be rightly maintained that " meanings " are themselves facts : but usage and philosophical convenience justify the retention of the two terms with a distinct reference.

To the question which may now be raised : What is the meaning of meaning ? the reply might, indeed, be made, that the putting of the question implies some understanding of meaning on the part of the questioner, since he requires that an explanation of the term " meaning " shall be given, which he shall recognise as meaning. Such an answer could not be accepted.

as satisfactory. Although many philosophers have regarded Philosophy as a quest for meaning or meanings, their efforts have far too often been directed to a logically consistent statement of matters of fact and of principles of knowledge, and these without reference to any associated meanings. There has been little discussion of "meaning" except with reference to the meaning of words. An attempt must be made to suggest what seems to be implied by meaning, though a thorough treatment is impossible in a popular essay.

From the tautological character of the question : what is the meaning of meaning ? it may be supposed that here an ultimate is reached. What is the nature of this ultimate ? It is what is usually called "value". That which has meaning is that which has value. Meaning depends upon value, implies relation to value. A fact is to be explained, if at all, by reference to its value : the statement of the antecedent conditions is no real explanation. There may be facts without values ; what might be called mere " matters of fact. " Neither are values to be limited in this connection to what are to men desirable. Facts which are undesirable, *i. e.* are " bads ", have

meaning just as clearly as the "goods." Philosophy seeks not merely to know facts, but also whether any facts have meaning or meanings and if so, what facts have what meanings. At the outset it is not to be assumed that all the real, taken together, has one meaning, or many meanings, or no meaning at all.

In this connection it is of importance to recognise explicitly that Philosophy for us is human, the meanings we seek and find have reference to values which are values for men. This human reference ought never to be left out of account, although it does not necessarily involve that the values known are only values for men. The range of human experience may be limited, but it does not follow that the particular values men experience are not in their own nature ultimate. There is danger here of falling either on the one hand into a mere relativism, or on the other into an absolutism, neither of which is capable of adequately accounting for the facts which were the starting point of the other. To recognise that Philosophy is human is important for that conception of it which relates it especially with values. For thus the task of Philosophy is to find the meaning of reality for men. But just

for this very reason, it should be admitted that the meaning which facts have for men may not be their only meaning ; and further, that it does not follow that if men are unable to find meaning in certain facts, those facts have no meaning at all. Facts which have meaning for us may also have other meanings, and facts which have no meanings for us may have meanings nevertheless. But until the facts of human experience are appreciated from the point of view of their value, their meaning is not known, and the task of Philosophy not achieved.

The test of a Philosophy is not simply logical consistency, nor this together with a reference to facts. It will include these but also a reference to one or more of the different classes of value. A consideration of the classes of value might be a starting-point for philosophical reflection. For such reflection is the activity of the mind, using the intellect, to indicate the meanings or meaning of experience. Many philosophical attempts to interpret facts have failed because they have recognised only one or two classes of values – either the logical, or the logical and the ethical. To avoid this a general survey of values is necessary. But before this is attempted the distinction

between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" values must be clearly stated. That which is of "extrinsic" value is a means to an "intrinsic" value. Extrinsic values are only secondary. Intrinsic values are ultimate : they are of worth in themselves, and do not necessarily imply any value beyond themselves. As in the past philosophical thinkers have urged the necessity of some final or absolute being or beings, so now final or absolute value or values must be admitted. These are the intrinsic values. But it should be remembered that a fact may have intrinsic value and also extrinsic value as a means to a still further intrinsic value, as *e. g.* the *pursuit* of knowledge is in itself a valuable experience, and it leads to the *possession* of knowledge which is also of value. Though some facts have meaning only as extrinsic values, they imply reference to intrinsic values and it is the classes of these latter which must be surveyed. Of such classes there appear to be five in human experience: physical, intellectual, aesthetical, moral and religious. It is not intended that this classification has finality ; it is put forward as a convenient tentative suggestion. Each of these classes has a distinct nature of its own ; each is a realm of intrinsic values. To find the meaning

of the facts of human experience is to bring them into relation with one or more of these five classes of values.

Physical values have a nature of their own. A colour-blind man can never be led to experience the colours to which he is blind, except by doing away with his colour-blindness. He may be an intellectual giant, and may know all that science has to say on the theory of colours, but that will not help him. You may lead a child to know blue in one way only—by showing blue to him. The different kinds of tastes, the feeling of vigour or of physical weakness, and other physical states have a distinctive character and are in themselves more or less desirable or undesirable, of positive or of negative worth. Physical values are often at the same time a means or a hindrance to the attainment of other values : their intrinsic character is not affected thereby. A good dinner is in itself worth having, and it may be a means to increased energy and thus to the production of intellectual or aesthetic values. It is in itself none the less worth having, even though it might be inadvisable to stay for it, if a higher value would thereby be lost. Healthy physical exercise is in itself worth having, even though on occasions

it may have to be sacrificed in order that the time may be devoted to intellectual aims. The same holds true of all kinds of physical goods. Only those who experience them can really know them. The physical values are real and to obtain the goods and suppress the bads is a legitimate object of human effort.

There is here a more practical problem in the detailed consideration of the constituent values of the healthy physical life. This is not the mere enumeration of particular experiences. For the problem is also one of proportion, of the relation of values to one another, of the attainment of the maximum of values of the best qualities. Seen from the point of view of practical activity the problem concerns an end to be achieved, the enjoyment of intrinsic goods, of what is best worth having on the physical side of life, and the eradication of the evils. In relation to all questions of the attainment of intrinsic values there will be questions of means or extrinsic values, as here, for example, of healthy parentage and birth, careful nursing in childhood, sanitary dwellings, etc. All these references to physical value may seem of a practical rather than a philosophical nature, and

it is important that this should be so, for the problems here are to be solved chiefly by practical activity. Nevertheless, the philosophical implication is also of great importance. For, from the standpoint of Philosophy as a quest for meaning, the conclusion is, that the meaning of certain physical facts is to be found at least in part in these physical values ; that any attempt to find the meaning of those facts which leaves these out of account is doomed to at least partial failure. For Philosophy it is necessary to insist upon physical goods as one class of values to which reference must be made in answering the question of the meaning of facts.

The physical has relation also to other values, as for example, when in the form of books it is a means of transmission of intellectual knowledge. These intellectual values come second in the list proposed. The fundamental principle here is that truth is of intrinsic worth : it has a value, rather is a value with a character of its own. It is in opposition to facts to suppose, as some profess to, that there is no pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or to maintain that such pursuit is foolish. Very many subjects are studied in which the intellectual interest far outweighs any other bene

fit which may accrue from the study; and many in which the satisfaction of the intellectual interest is the only end sought. Lord Avebury's study of ants, as one from many examples, appears to have been a purely intellectual interest. In fact, every genuine student has experienced the reality of the intellectual values as intrinsic and as with the physical values, so here it may be maintained that the intellectual values must be experienced to be really known.

The work of thought is divided into bodies of knowledge, such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, logic, ethics, history, and so on. Here again the problem is not merely an enumeration of the different branches of knowledge, but also a consideration of their relation to one another. The effort to bring the different branches of knowledge into a consistent whole has led to the necessity of a detailed examination of their presuppositions, and further, of the fundamental principles of all intellectual knowledge. These two tasks, the unification of the various parts of knowledge, and the critical investigation of the fundamental principles, are most important intellectual pursuits, and in their achievement may lie the highest intrinsic intellectual value.

There must be an effort to satisfy the demands of reason entirely. But sometimes Philosophy is identified solely with these two aims, (or even with one of them) ; sometimes Philosophy is considered to be occupied solely with intrinsic intellectual values. Such a contention is open to serious criticism, especially if it is at the same time maintained that the quest of Philosophy is for meaning. To avoid this conception it will be well to make a definite distinction between Philosophy and Metaphysics. The full nature of the former will be more apparent at the end of our discussion. The latter, Metaphysics, will be concerned with the discussion of ultimate principles and with the indication of the relations which the different branches of knowledge have to one another. Metaphysics, though universal, will be more formal and abstract than Philosophy. For in Philosophy the results of metaphysical reflection will be united to a wealth of facts which are not of the nature of ultimate principles.

All attempts, for example, to establish a conceptual view of the beautiful and the ugly have failed. A beautiful natural scene or a work of art may in a sense be analysed. One may say :

“ This landscape is beautiful because of the position and shape of those clouds, the colour of the foliage, the strong bold outline of those rocky cliffs.” Nevertheless, this is only to indicate the constituent elements which are beautiful in themselves, or in particular relations, or both in themselves and in particular relations. Analyse as we may, beauty (or ugliness), as experienced, always eludes expression in intellectual terms. As no theory of colour can make one experience colour, so no theory of beauty can make one experience beauty. Beauty and ugliness, like physical goods and bads and intellectual truths or falsehoods, are capable of interpretation in terms of nothing but themselves. They are thus a distinct class of intrinsic values : and Philosophy must recognise and allow for them in its consideration of the meanings of facts.

Equally distinct is the class of moral values. Recent ethical discussion has emphasised the fact that the good is indefinable and has insisted that the moral has a character of its own. The individual either experiences these values or he does not ; as in the previous classes of values, only through experiencing them himself can he really ‘ know ’ them. Veracity, truthfulness, is good ;

falsehood, lying, is bad. Even though it may be judged morally *right* to tell a falsehood in order to attain a higher good, the falsehood is in itself none the less bad. Benevolence is good, hatred is bad ; sincere honest work is better than laziness and subsistence on the labour of others. Such judgments are ultimate. If anyone should say, for example, that veracity is bad and falsehood good, there would be no other alternative than to agree to differ. Moral values are chiefly types of conduct and aspects of character ; to make a systematic survey of them is the task of an empirical science of ethics. The old question concerning sanctions of morality is from this point of view transcended. The only authority of the good is its own nature. Be benevolent, be honest, be chaste, just because benevolence, honesty, chastity, as types of conduct and character are in themselves good and their opposites bad. The beliefs in God, in immortality, or in karma and the transmigration of the soul are not necessary for the validity of morality. That there is no Supreme Being, or that tomorrow I may exist no longer, does not alter the fact that in my experience today affection is good and hatred bad. Thus in order to interpret some of the experienced

facts Philosophy will have to refer them to such ultimate moral values.

That moral values are intrinsic and not dependent upon theological conceptions does not imply that these conceptions and the experiences with which they are related are no longer of importance. Religion never has been a mere sanction for morality, except in the theories of a few thinkers. By his religion man does not mean simply his view of the world, his theory of life, his belief in God or gods, in immortality, in the transmigration of the soul, and karma : nor does he mean his moral outlook, the nature of the ideal of conduct and character he accepts. The ordinary man generally does think of these things as included in his religion, but the religious experience is something more. No theoretical description is adequate. As all the other classes of values, the religious values to be known have to be experienced ; and like them they are intrinsic ; they have a character of their own. They are related to a man's consciousness of his place in " all the real " ; what he feels and what he thinks of the highest power or powers as acting towards him, and the attitude he himself assumes to that power or to those powers. They

include mystical experiences, and certain attitudes of mind like those of supplication, communion with, affection for, fear of, and reverence for what is supreme in reality. The influence of religion upon Philosophy has been great, but this has not been through the scientific study of the values of religious experience. It is only within the most recent years that a truly independent and scientific consideration of religions has become possible. The influence of this scientific study of religions has not yet been fully felt in Philosophy. Dr. J. T. Merz, in his "*History of European Thought in the 19th Century*" says that the next great impetus to philosophical advance may come from the side of religion. At least this much may be said: that any attempt to find the meaning of facts, which leaves the intrinsic character of religious values out of account, will lack one of the most fundamental, perhaps the most fundamental, means of interpretation and must be only partially successful.

A careful consideration of these values leads to the recognition of the fact that they are actually experienced only as particulars, even while it becomes equally clear that they are related in various ways. What I enjoy is not a

“ good meal ” in general, but this or that good meal ; and so for other physical goods or bads. It is not truth in the abstract (if, indeed, that is at all an intelligible conception) but this truth and that truth, *i. e.*, true propositions, which are the object of intellectual effort and the source of intellectual value. In the realm of the beautiful, the objects of endeavour and of appreciation are particular,—beauties of body, of dress, of music, of poetry, of dwellings, of scenes of nature, and so on. The same holds true of the moral and the religious : What we approve of is this particular example of benevolence, or this instance of an affectionate or strong personality ; this experience of intimate communion with a higher being, this feeling of reverence and of gratitude, and so on. The examples given have been chiefly of “ good ” but the same contention applies to “ bad. ” The reply, that what we are appreciating in these particulars is the universal, appears quite beside the mark, for what is being urged is, that it is only in the form of some particular or other that values are experienced. Even if we consider the universals, there must be as many universals as there are *types* of values, and these universals would themselves be particulars

in relation to the *classes*, and these again would be particulars in relation to one another. Here therefore, we have at least to start with particular experiences of particular types of value, and as such these are many. But it is a simple fact of history that Philosophy has always represented an effort after unity ; that, indeed, this effort is one of its fundamental characteristics. The form the problem of unity assumes in relation to the foregoing exposition must now be considered.

The unity which Philosophy has striven for has been that of a system or scheme in which all facts have place, and the demand has at times been made that this unity shall have meaning. The type of unity philosophers have most frequently suggested has been abstractly universal, and this is ultimately found quite incapable of uniting any particulars, and appears to have little if any meaning, in any sense of that term. But if the conception of meaning and value previously put forward is valid, the final unity must be conceived quite differently from any which is abstractly universal. The nature and extent of the synthesis possible must be relative to the nature of " all the real ".

The problem of unity as it is implied by the previous exposition may be treated in three stages. First, there is the question of a unity of the particular values of a particular class ; the question whether they can, as members of a particular class, be so related as to form a whole, all the relations and constituents of which are good. In other words, is there an ideal of each class of values both with reference to the particulars in the class and their relations ? If so, this is the first type of unity to be considered. There are certainly efforts to attain such unities, but these efforts are not simply those of reflection. They are rather by trial and the elimination of error with the aid of reflection. In varying ages and climes men and women endeavour to obtain acquaintance with the best physical life, and this endeavour in the individual and the race is one of trial and the elimination of error, with the aid of reflection. In the realm of knowledge there is a similar effort to attain the widest system or unification of propositions of the highest individual accuracy obtainable. The aim of aesthetic unity is none the less real, although it is not so obvious. The history of the moral personality, from the point of view of moral values is-

that of a striving for an acquaintance with the types of conduct and disposition which constitute an ideal of good conduct and character, which the personality tries to embody in its own life as a consistent moral whole. The various religions also represent attempts to unite into consistent wholes the particular types of religious values. The unity for each particular class of values physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, or religious is of its own kind, and each kind of unity is inadequate to every other kind. It seems more or less obvious that in none of these realms of values has a final unity been attained. But even if it were attained in each, there would still be the second stage of the problem of unity to be considered—the unity of the classes, the relation of these to one another. What kind of unity could this be and is there any way of expressing it?

The first answer to this question is that the values are related in at least one form of unity in that they are the experiences of particular individual consciousnesses. Further, it might be pointed out that these values are not separated into classes in consciousness but as particulars aid or limit one another. That these values are the experiences of individual consciousnesses is

fundamental for Philosophy ; but this fact does not solve the problem of unity. What is here necessary is that the diverse values of different classes in the individual consciousness shall form a unity; that the full realisation of each class shall be in harmony with the full realisation of all the others. Such a unity might be expressed as a " type of life ". The various forms of relationship, the relative positions allowed to different values in particular consciousnesses, will constitute a variety of "types of life". Such a conscious unity appears to be the only unity adequate to the different values of experience. Though from its own point of view there may be an intellectual unity, no such unity is sufficient. And though these "types of life" include the apprehension of ultimate or intrinsic values, it does not seem that the highest unity of all of these has yet been reached by man. How may such a unity be attained ? Again, not simply by reflection, but rather by trial and the elimination of error with the aid of reflection.

The different types of life have different degrees of comprehensiveness and unity. The great diversity in the positions of philosophers, as of others, may be explained partly in this way. One gives the moral values the greatest

emphasis in his type of life, another the æsthetic, still another the religious ; while the materialist gives supreme, if not sole, attention to the physical. The predominant Philosophy of a country or an age is similarly related to its predominant type of life : one is more or less indifferent to religion, while another is inspired with religious fervour : one strives for the perfection of the physical ; another is essentially devoted to the cultivation of the arts. Philosophies are the theoretical expressions of these types of life : they can only be properly judged in relation to the content and the unity of the types of life they represent.

So far, however, only two of the three stages in this problem of unity have been considered, and this has brought us only to the unity of the type of life for the particular individual consciousness. In the effort to realise that unity the fact is constantly " brought home " that it is not to be obtained apart from the interaction with other particular consciousnesses, and if one will, with the so-called " inanimate " world. This, therefore, represents the third, and as it appears to us the final stage in the problem of unity. It is evident that from the outset of the conscious

experience of the individual there are relations of the individual with what is not himself. But what is the nature of the final unity and how can it be expressed ? The answers to these questions would necessitate the elaboration of one's attitude towards almost all the main questions of Philosophy. Here it can only be suggested : that ultimately there is nothing inanimate ; that the relation is between spiritual beings, but that, in so far as the relationship is experienced only in its effects in the consciousnesses of individuals, the essential question is the unity which such consciousnesses individually experience, and the best way of expressing that unity is, as stated before, as a " type of life ". If the conception of meaning as implying value is applied to this problem, and the question of the meaning of the final unity is raised, there is no other way for men to answer than by reference to the classes of values already discussed. It may be that one particular type of one of the classes of values will enable us to experience the final unity more than any other ; and it is suggested that this may be a particular type of religious value. But it had to be admitted with regard to the first and second stages of this

problem of unity that the unities they implied were not yet achieved—at least by men ; and it must be also confessed that a final unity of the nature required is not yet experienced. The relations even between human beings do not manifest such a unity, and the oppositions and disharmonies in other aspects of the world are obvious. This final unity, as a unity of the consciousnesses experiencing the highest values, is one which, as far as men are concerned, appears something to be attained. How is it to be attained ? Not simply by reflection, but by effort and the elimination of error, with the aid of reflection.

From the character of this problem of unity it must have become fairly clear that no treatment of the nature of Philosophy can be adequate which fails to emphasize the fact that Philosophy is a historical and social task. It is a work for ages and for the greatest co-operation. Only thus is there ground for any hope that the comprehensiveness at which it aims will eventually be satisfied. Particular individuals and races may make particular contributions. But no individual or age can really participate in any such contributions of other individuals or ages without

an effort of his own. Great as may be the achievement of outstanding individuals in relation to one or more realms of values, or even in relation to the attainment of a comprehensive and harmonious type of life, it is small compared with the difficulty and magnitude of the task. Nevertheless, it is out of the co-operation of individuals, each as it were making trial of a particular type of life, that the solution of the problem of the meaning of existence is to come.

The more the problem of the nature of Philosophy is discussed, the more clear it becomes that here we are faced by a final paradox. On the one hand, a man's Philosophy will depend upon his conception of what Philosophy is; while on the other, his conception of what Philosophy is will depend upon his Philosophy. The two are inseparable. Yet a man does not start out simply with a conception of what Philosophy is and develop his own Philosophy in accordance with that conception. Nor does he start out with a Philosophy and proceed to form from it a conception of what Philosophy is. Philosophy, as a theoretical expression, must depend upon some acquaintance with what it expresses. But the extent of a man's experience of the real and of

values is limited, even though it may increase continually: it is only in relation to this increasing experience, and the knowledge by description obtained from others, that his Philosophy may gradually become less incomplete. Similarly, he begins with suggestions towards a Philosophy and towards a conception of the nature of Philosophy. These he has obtained chiefly through intersubjective intercourse. They represent in large measure the results of previous attempts to solve the problems of Philosophy, and amongst these, the problem of the nature of Philosophy itself. Starting out thus, not *ab initio*, but with suggestions, however definite or indefinite, the individual philosopher attempts in the light of his own experience to re-view the problems of Philosophy, problems which have been set for him, though he may express them differently and find others. From the paradox referred to at the beginning of this paragraph, it follows that ultimately the justification of any view as to the nature of Philosophy can only be fully found in the Philosophy with which it is related. Every Philosophy ought to be able to account for its own existence, and also for the existence of those which are opposed to it. So, with regard to the

conception of Philosophy which has been here sketched in outline, its full justification is to be found, if it can be justified, in the actual Philosophy with which it is associated. Its claims to acceptance might also be supported by comparison with the other conceptions of Philosophy.

As no claim is made that the final unity has been attained by mankind, or that the theoretical expression of that unity in a Philosophy is evident, it follows that no claim of finality can logically be made for the answers proposed to the questions: What is Philosophy ? What is the philosophical attitude ? They are admittedly tentative.

Philosophy seeks a knowledge of facts and of their meanings. Meanings have relation to values, which, in human experience, appear to be of five classes, physical, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and religious. The meaning of facts must be judged primarily by their own particular class of values. With regard to the knowledge of facts, and the principles underlying such knowledge, as also with regard to the experience of values, Philosophy insists on the utmost accuracy. It rejects all unnecessary or irrational assumptions. It aims at comprehensiveness. It seeks a unity

consistent with the particular experiences of particular values in the consciousnesses of particular individuals. This unity it believes to be expressed most suitably as a type of life, but it is a unity which is as yet only partially attained. Its attainment, as far as mankind is concerned, is a social and historical task. But if this is so, Philosophy is not limited to the enquiries : What exists ? and what is its meaning ? but may also raise the question : What might be ? If the ethical "ought" is to be taken seriously, and the ideals of other values not regarded as unattainable delusions, it not only *may* but *must* raise that question. The relations of facts to values may not be, and certainly do not seem to be, fixed once for all. The future from the point of view of values may be left in some measure for us to determine. Thus, it again becomes clear how fundamental the study of values is for Philosophy and for life. For by its aid men may strive to make clear to themselves what are the experiences worthy of being made an object of endeavour ; what is the type of life most to be desired. It is seen, therefore, that Philosophy has an intimate relation with every side of life and with its unity. But, with this outlook upon at least a partially

open future, Philosophy as a theoretical representation of a type of life, while it may remain in some form or other, becomes subsidiary to the dynamic, the freer, more living, philosophical *attitude*.

II

IMMORTALITY

The beliefs which are most fundamental and intimate in our lives are generally those about which we speak least. They are too much our own to be made the subject of frequent discussion or of mere passing gossip. Yet in times of trouble and disaster men are led even against their will to consider the meaning of the convictions which in ordinary times lie in the background. Since the outbreak of the European conflict millions have raised their hearts and bent their heads in prayer to God. For the belief still remains that, rough hew them as we will, a divinity shapes the ends of nations; that God is in His heaven even though all is not yet right with the world. Faith in God, which becomes more vivid in times of catastrophe, is the conviction that the evils men suffer are mostly due to the foolishness and sinfulness of men, and that even these things will be turned by a

Supreme Power to the achievement of a higher good. Firmly held by those who strive to do the duty which lies before them, such a belief is at once a source of consolation and courage, of solace and hope.

The time is also appropriate for some reflection upon the idea of Immortality. Think but for a moment of the number of men whose physical life is being brought to a sudden, and a short while ago quite unexpected, close. Men just on the threshold of lives of social service and the realisation of individual ideals; men inspired with hope of what the future was to bring in the realm of manual toil, of business, of learning, and of art. Men also in the prime of life, in the midst of achievement, work half done, children half brought up, in homes filled with affection too deep and sacred for the idea of such separation—thousands of these have been hurried to that

“ undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns. ”

The question whether man is or is not immortal does not in normal times cause very great anxiety, and it is well so. True, for some it is the source from which springs their best

endeavour. Others are impressed by what they feel to be the insignificance of man, who to-day is and to-morrow is not, whose days are as grass. The earth is but one of myriads of heavenly bodies and must have existed for millions of years, so what is man that we are mindful of him, or the son of man that we should trouble concerning his future ?

Let us suppose that the life on earth is all that man can rightly expect. Is it true that this life is of no value, is not worth living ? On dull days we may really doubt it, but not normally or on days of joy. If we do not live on after physical death we shall not know of our non-existence. View life as we know it. Though none escape trials and turmoil, sorrows and suffering, it cannot be denied that this earthly existence contains much that is beautiful, and in affection gives an experience which fully repays man for the thousand ills that flesh is heir to. Suffering not infrequently makes us aware of goods to which we were previously blind. Life here can be made noble, and its happiness increased to an extent which few have ever conceived. If this existence is all, there is still reason to call it good. Lack of belief in the

ordinary idea of Immortality is not so very serious a state of mind to be in.

For what is the ordinary idea ? It is simply the notion that the person lives on throughout endless time; that after physical death, the spirit, a sort of airy nothing, persists and endures. What is the value or the meaning of such duration ? Not the length of life is of first importance, but the quality—the joy it contains. Life here has this paramount blessing—the duty to make it a life worth living, come what may after physical death. Some will adopt this attitude, always satisfied to leave the rest to God.

If we are honest we shall admit that the attitude just indicated is that of the majority during the greater part of the time. Nevertheless, there are occasions in the life of everyone when the consciousness is predominant that the best that is achieved falls far short of the ideals which are within. The vision of beauty which the poet tries to paint in words, or the sculptor to hew out in marble, is never quite what he intended. The dream of pure and perfect affection—towards some one person, or as the ideal for the life of the whole people of God—is always far above what we actually experience. The work of

man's hands, the products of his thought, his relationship with his fellow man, all alike manifest an imperfection when judged by the standard which unfolds itself to his inner consciousness. From his associations with others, from the results of his activity, he may turn his gaze to his own nature. And there—though no terms of condemnation are too severe for the mere repetition of conventional phrases of abasement—how true he often feels to be the cry, “ Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? ” But only apparently is this a cry of despair. It is the reflection of the yearning for heights unattained though seen ; for a perfection we would were ours. Here man, every man, is face to face with a task greater than that of the sculptor or the poet. Here not marble, but one's own personality has to be hammered into a masterpiece; one's whole life given the rhythm and beauty of a poem. Moreover, the task is not self-chosen. There is no waste basket into which may be thrown the fragments of the torn-up poem of our lives ; there is no rubbish heap upon which to cast the broken pieces of an unaccomplished masterpiece of personality, which in despair we have shattered

at a blow. Men may say they do not believe in Immortality ; they may say they never think of it, but one who does not feel a desire to become something better can be found only amongst the mentally defective. The desire may be weak but it is always there in the normal man. Most evident in the enthusiasm of youth, it permeates the steadier activity of the middle aged, and still lives on in those whose participation in the labours of this world may be over. The old man sitting at his garden gate watching others on their way knows that every phase of his three score years and ten has pointed to a something more. Like Ulysees, though "at all times he has enjoyed greatly, has suffered greatly, both with those that loved him and alone," he will still go on. "Life piled on life were all too little." His journey here reveals an infinite beyond. For,

" All experience is an arch wherethro'

Gleams that untravelled world, whose margin fades,
For ever and for ever when he moves. "

Not from the desire simply to live on, but from this yearning to rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things, is it that the conviction of Immortality is born. How irrational, how meaningless, the universe seems, if, having come so far up the ladder of progress,

each man is cast off so far from the goal. The idea of Immortality gives a significance to our lives and aspirations which otherwise they would not possess. The existence of the idea of Immortality is itself a fact that must be explained, and the explanation must be adequate. Without it many of our deepest longings must be in absolute contradiction with much of our earthly life. This alone is the ground of the belief, the reason of the faith which is in us. It is not proof, not the demonstration to be found in mathematics or physical science. It is less, theoretically, and it is more, personally. It is the soul of our activity, even when it is not thought about.

For those who look to Jesus as the greatest religious saint of the race, His attitude will be a source of instruction and support. He does not talk of proof. He simply trusts in God and is confident that the penitent thief will be with Him in paradise.

“ The steps of Time, the shocks of Chance,
The blows of Death, ”

are all met by him with the same fortitude.
And if we accept His life as containing the ideal
in the realm of religious values, we can follow,

we must follow, in adherence to His fundamental religious convictions. With Jesus we accept the principle of Immortality.

* * *

What then does Immortality mean for Him, for us? For Jesus it certainly was not mere duration after death: He barely speaks of life beyond the grave. Immortality is a scope in and beyond this life for the realisation of our highest ideals. What makes Immortality consciously desirable is the fact, paradoxical perchance, that we already possess it. The human personality is a centre of reality, whose force extends in many directions. In memory it holds to the past, and in hope it plans for the future: it looks before and after and pines for what is not. The future never satisfies. One more hill is climbed with the thought that from its height the beatific vision might be beholden and a triumphant entry made into the haven of final rest. But no. The scene is still more beautiful than ever before, but there are more and greater heights to climb. The forward movement, the eager gaze into a never ending future is not the soul of Immortality. Alas, that this earnest pressing forward, this straining glance

towards the things which shall be, is with some natures so keen that they miss the joys of the present. The past they discard as the realm of the ideal unachieved. The yearned-for future is experienced only as a "present" and passes away for them as nothing. This is the error of young and ardent natures. When life is far spent they wake up suddenly to the sad reflection that they have been chasing a phantom future ; that they have never really tasted the joys of their achievements.

Immortality is more than is implied by this gaze into an illimitable future, this sailing on

" That unfathomable sea
Whose waves are years. "

All the directions of the life of the spirit have their share in Immortality. From the past we may take up what we feel to be best, and there it lives on. Each generation selects and tries to preserve for itself all that is good from the generations which have preceded. The bad is gradually left to die. Immortality is here in the making; that becomes for us enduring which we take up into our own nature. And the goods of the future will only be enjoyed when they are made ours in a "present." Here in the present

we have to find and experience our Immortality. Immediately we grasp the significance of this fact, we may see that the movement from past to future is not the principal one. There are the movements upwards and sideways. Around us is the realm of personal relationships, the sphere of affection, in which, experienced at its highest, the flow of time is scarcely felt. So it is with earnest occupation in serious work, in the production or the contemplation of art, music, literature, and drama. We are, as it were, out of the mere flowing movement in an eternal present, an Immortality in the midst of time. All genuine affection, all true friendship, every earnest endeavour, reveals this Immortality. There is no question of proof; the Immortality that is worth having is here; though imperfect as we experience it, within it is the promise of still greater good.

The relationships to those around, the happy associations in which all cares vanish, do not exhaust the best of the soul's Immortality. As the movement fore and after, so that to and fro does not suffice. The individual soul, and indeed humanity, has also a movement upward. All human affection, all the past has given or the

future promises, bears the stamp of imperfection; only by ascending upward from within the heart to the realm of perfection itself is Immortality fully felt. And that is religion : the personal relationship of man with the perfect, with God; an experience to be had at any time, not a state of mind artificially cultivated, but a deep, earnest conviction and life in God; an experience transforming the goods of existence from a mere onward flow to a persisting value in the eternal realities; not just a state of mystical ecstasy, but an active life in all directions for the good, under the conviction of being a permanent and essential part in God's creation. At the basis of all individual hope for good and joy in existence, is the belief that in the purpose of the universe each individual has a unique place which he alone can fill. The course of the ages is the building of the temple of God, and personalities are the stones thereof. Realise yourself as occupying a position, lowly though it be, in that eternal fabric, and the question of what happens after death will trouble you no more. Man is born unto life, and death is not a sleep and a forgetting. The soul is one. The memory of the past, the effort to penetrate the veil of the future, the activity of the

present, are all of the essence of personal identity. Why should we doubt that the movements fore and after, the relationships to those around, and the gaze upward to God will be as real after death as before ?

* * *

It is well that the thought of Immortality in the usual sense of persistence after death is not very prominent in men's minds. For otherwise, occupied with the things which shall be, they would be diverted too much from the things which are. Immortality should mean to us the present experience of life's values and the conviction of their everlasting continuance in some form or other. But in a time like this, when physical death is severing visible bonds, it is profitable to think for a while on the aspect of Immortality as a life after death. Such a faith is a real foundation for peace of mind in face of the stupendous evils of the present, and though hope may still be blind she may at least hold up her head. Faith in God and Immortality alone enable us to bear this situation with equanimity; these ideas alone challenge our right to regard those lives as sheer waste. With these beliefs we may view the passing months in their true

perspective upon the background of eternal purpose.

Not the body, but the mind, the thinking, willing, feeling something we call "I" is what is most real, and what lives on. Death for a noble cause; it is a death few die in ordinary life. A noble death is but a golden link in the chain of existence. Mourn one may, and mourn one must, for loss sustained. For the loss is to those who remain. No longer can they show their love in the old way, no longer look forward to the accomplishment of plans eagerly awaited for many years. The loss is theirs, till the Immortality of a love that knows not death is felt.

Shelley expresses one aspect of what we might feel of one gone from the earth :—

" Peace, peace; he is not dead; he doth not sleep,
He hath awakened from the dream of life.
'Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife. . . .
He has outsoared the shadow of our night,
Envy and calumny and hate and pain,
And that unrest which men miscall delight,
Can touch him not, and torture not again.
From the contagion of the world's slow stain
He is secure. "

And the souls of those who have passed in this great conflict are secure. Like the sailors on the

Revenge, they would fall into the hands of God rather than into the hands of men. But they leave a task to those remaining here. On us depends the fruition of their sacrifice. Fame does not grow on mortal soil. Fame is for Immortality. Its thin spun threads have been cut: it is we who have to unite them again by bonds which will not break. A man's heaven or hell has been said to come from the knowledge of the consequences of his life in the past. The soul departed from this life goes on increasing in wisdom and stature, and sees more or less clearly the effects of its own conduct, and is pained or joyous according to the nature of these effects. The idea is a probable even a profound one. But the individual does not act alone. What he does is only a part, and if the consequences of his part are to bring him real joy the others must do their parts. The soldier sacrificing life and limb on the field of battle, the nurse enduring a strain of mind and body which may have serious after effects, do not achieve their heaven here. They will not have suffered or died in vain if their actions are carried on in ours to a state of things better than the mind conceives or the heart dare desire. Their Immortality will be a life worthy

of their sacrifice if we so do our duty that their
death knell shall be no dismal knoll of gloom,
but the peal of joy which shall

“ Ring out the thousand wars of old,
Ring in the thousand years of peace.

III

MORALITY AND RELIGION

We are in need of a new consideration of the relationship between morality and religion. Though the subject has been discussed time after time from almost every point of view, as the thesis of many learned treatises and the theme of innumerable discourses, two reasons make a further treatment necessary. The conflict between the great nations of the world has raised many questions of morality, and while in some it has led to a deeper and a fuller religious experience, in others it has tended to emphasise religious difficulties. In prevailing public opinion, as indicated in the expressions of individuals and the attitudes of large bodies of men, and as reflected in the Press, it is evident that there is a want of clearness of thought in these matters which tends seriously to affect conduct. The problem is at the present time a practical one. It is, however, primarily theoretical and philosophical. During the last

decade our views concerning morality and religion have undergone considerable changes, and the connection between them has now a different character to our reflection.

The relation between morality and religion obviously depends upon the nature of these in themselves, and our conceptions of them must not be arbitrary but conform to facts. The best modern thought definitely recognises that morality and religion both have a character and a value of their own. No longer is it adequate to regard religion as an appendage to morality or morality as the fulfilment of commandments dependent solely upon certain theological ideas.

Recent studies in ethics have been much occupied with the conception of value as applied to particular experiences. This is in accord with the movement, which has recently aroused much interest in the philosophical world, "Logical Atomism," or "New Realism". It insists on a clear analysis of knowledge and experience into their ultimate constituents. Applied to the treatment of ethics this method primarily raises the question : What are the constituent factors of the moral life ? Perhaps the most important result so far brought into prominence by this method in ethics is em-

phasis on the fact that "good" used ethically is indefinable. In its ethical implication the term refers to values to be found in the nature of human conduct and character. Values exist in life *as it is being lived* : they should not be thought of as a transcendent or future reward for "virtuous" conduct. Life is worth living just for the physical, intellectual, æsthetical, moral, and religious values which are contained within it. The only complete account which could be given of "good" would be an enumeration of experiences which are good.

The judgments "veracity is good," "purity is good," "benevolent feelings and actions are good" are statements that these possess a worth in themselves, quite independently of their utility for the achievement of any other end besides themselves. A man who feels a sense of satisfaction in having spoken the truth in face of grave temptations to do otherwise does so because he acknowledges a value in veracity itself, a value accepted by him as greater than any other values lost by taking this specific course of conduct. Veracity, courage, purity, the attitude of benevolence, while they may be aids to the attainment of other goods, are at the same time good in

themselves : they are moral values. Brutality, sexual vulgarity, the breaking of faith, the greed which endeavours to make big dividends and higher wages out of the conditions of national calamity, the wilful limitation of one's labour, are types of conduct and attitude in themselves bad. Whatever may be the nature of human destiny ; whether man be immortal or not ; whether there be a God or not, the same applies : veracity is good, falsehood is bad, the feeling of benevolence is better than that of hate, and hard honest work than a dishonest subsistence on the toil of others.

This insistence on the actual goodness or badness of particular experiences is a main characteristic of recent ethics. Moral teaching must make it fundamental. The only valid sanction of good is its own nature. Such a view of morality is more healthy than any based upon sanctions external to morality itself. The conceptions of heaven and hell must be revised accordingly. Heaven is just the enjoyment of all the values of life in their best relationship. Hell is the suffering of a great preponderance of evils; possibly of nothing but evil. The notion of ' eternal ' has been attached to these ideas : in times past, preachers have spoken of " eternal

torment " and " eternal bliss ". Though the practice has generally been discontinued, the idea should not be regarded as untenable. If a man can will what is good or evil now, there seems no conclusive reason why he may not progress or degenerate to a condition in which he wills only good or only evil, from which it might then be and impossible to change.

Yet, important as it undoubtedly is to recognise the moral judgment on particular experiences, it is erroneous to suppose that man can be satisfied with such analysis alone. Whether one will or not, the questions arise at some time or other in every reflective mind : What is the meaning of my life as a whole ? Is there not something more than the passing values of particular experiences ? What is my relation to the world, and is there any meaning in the world as a whole ? " Meaning " is at least as important as a knowledge of constituent " facts " and " relations. " The individual colours in a picture may justly be described as beautiful ; but it would be foolish to suppose that they and their formal relations are all that is of importance in the picture. The whole as such, the *toute ensemble*, has a meaning which analysis cannot grasp. A melody is more

than the individual notes and their relationship.

Moral judgments are thus also made on character, on the personality as a whole. The individual life, the family, the nation, the church, humanity, the world, are wholes the meaning of which man strives and must strive to comprehend. The problems here suggested are much more difficult than the logical analysis of knowledge, but it is pure dogmatism to say that no answers can be found. Perhaps none yet proposed are entirely satisfactory : here as elsewhere we have simply to accept and hold the most satisfactory, however far they may be from a full and final solution.

Judgments are made on the character and conduct of individuals : they may and should be made on the character and conduct of societies, not least on the largest of existing societies, churches, nations, and empires. Only in part is the statement of Burke true, that one cannot bring an indictment against a whole nation. The general character of a people and its public acts will be determined by the interaction of individuals, and moral judgments can be made in the form " This is good, " " That is bad. " But this does not mean that a judgment made on national policy or national character is to be applied parti-

cularly to each and every individual. It simply refers to the whole in its corporate aspect. The praise or blame will apply to individuals only so far as they are individually responsible for the general state of affairs of the nation, either by their activity *or their inactivity*. Sins of omission on the part of individuals are by far the greatest cause of national evils.

The moral life consists in the choice and enjoyment in any and every instance of the greatest and best value possible in that instance. Law and custom, formed partly arbitrarily, and partly by historical development through trial and the elimination of error, indicate in some cases the way of choice most productive of good. In other cases the judgment rests on the calculation made at the time by the individual or the community. The most difficult decisions to carry out in conduct are those in which a good relating to a larger whole appears to conflict with the more direct good of the individual or State. An experience may be intrinsically good, but it may be less good than another. The highest life known to most individuals is usually one containing a number of goods which from one point of view may limit and from another may enhance

one another. To get the full value out of a day, week, month, year, or lifetime, or out of a variety of circumstances, the different possible values have to be estimated in a proper perspective. To ascribe to each type of experience its due proportion of value is the difficult task of life. Such proportions are not settled once for all. A scheme of values is a historical product, and is liable to modification. It is elaborated by individuals, nations, the race, through trial and the gradual elimination of error. At the present day it would generally be admitted that a practical materialism and an excessive asceticism are alike evidence of a lack of proper proportion in the estimation of life's values. Such questions of proportion arise for the individual with reference to his own life : they arise again in connection with the aims and activities of social life—the nation and the empire. The relations between nations and empires also involve questions of proportions. Thus, even a purely ethical consideration of values may lead beyond selfishly imperial points of view.

It is one thing to make an intellectual or a moral judgment ; it is another actually to conform to the decision in conduct. The very nature of

social life, containing, as it does, so much that is emotional, itself supplies a motive power to lead the individual to subordinate his good to the greater good of the society. We feel not only "individually," but also "socially." A definite advance in moral life is made when individuals are concerned not merely with the cultivation of goods of moral character and conduct in individuals, but also with the elevation of the moral character and policy of the social whole—whether church, nation, or empire. States may in like manner subordinate their good to the greater good of a wider humanity: humanity has higher claims than any State or group of States. Of the influence of the idea of humanity there can be no doubt; but empirically only existing humanity and a few succeeding generations can be taken into account. The further question is still possible: Ought the good of humanity to be subordinate to that of any larger whole? And if so, how is humanity to know and to be swayed into the execution of a policy wider than its own apparent welfare? Humanity is indeed only partial: there still remains somewhat else in the Universe. Within humanity itself throughout the ages the longing has been expressed in divers

imperfect ways for a definite relation to something beyond man, a communion with the Supreme, thought of either as one or as many.

The only whole which cannot be transcended is the Universe itself: the meaning of the Universe is a legitimate object of intellectual effort. If the character and conduct of the individual person is to be considered in relation to the nation, and the meaning and activities of nations with relation to humanity, we may ask further: What is the significance of humanity in the whole in which it is part? The advantages of thoroughgoing analysis justify all the efforts some modern thinkers are expending on preaching it; but the meanings of wholes are just as important and legitimate an object of research. But these latter are not likely to be found by mathematical logic. Even mathematical logic has to admit that any number is not merely a sum of parts—that, in fact, no analysis entirely exhausts it.

At this point in the consideration of values we are led over to religion. The postulation of meaning and value in the whole of Reality is neither gratuitous nor nonsensical: it is but carrying to its logical conclusion a tendency of

thought applied to all other wholes. Like morality, religion is something *sui generis*, a definite factor in human experience. In its highest forms it has reference to the whole often conceived as a Divine Being in relation to a number of other beings. Nothing within experience, nothing within Reality, can be regarded as entirely outside the implication of religion. The religious life is many-coloured, and there is scope for a thorough-going treatment of its psychology. Already, however, the evidence is sufficient to show that in some form or other this effort to grasp the meaning of existence is characteristic of religion as distinct from morality. The endeavour to acquire a world-view, a philosophy of life, is more persistent in, and more important to, humanity than that directed to the untiring examination of the details and forms of knowledge.

In the past the Philosophy of Religion has been too speculative and formal : it has discussed the nature and validity of a few religious ideas, and has paid little further attention to the contents of the religious life. In the future it will have to rest more on the actual facts of religion : it will not be able to dispense with an empirical

study of religions. The comparative study of religions is bringing increasing evidence of the universality of this feeling of relationship to some power other than men, affecting their lives for weal or woe, and with which they desire to be in communion. The religious experience of the civilised man is conceived of as an immediate relationship between the worshipper and the Supreme. In it he feels himself in communion with the Spirit which predominantly determines the Whole, and in Whose purpose the world has its meaning and value or values.

The realm of the merely moral ends with the conception of humanity. If morality is the performance of duty to one's self and to humanity, religion is the enthusiastic pursuit of the world-aim. This enthusiasm for the ideal, found in the highest stages of religion, is the way in which religion acts as a motive power to the good life. Character and conduct can be looked upon just in themselves as good or bad : they may also be looked upon as the fulfilment or the negation (in religious phraseology) of the purpose or will of God.

The failure to remember the cosmic significance of conduct and character, of States no less than

of individuals, has led to the contention that there is no authority above the State, and that in consequence morality is not a term to be applied to States. Men obtain their knowledge of the goods of the society in which they dwell, by being members within it : States will come to a recognition of the good of humanity by a wider and closer intercourse. The knowledge of the goods of the Universe comes only by contact with the Spirit who dominates the Whole. Only in communion with God is the knowledge and the motive power obtained for the transcendence of the standpoint of individual States and even of humanity. Such communion is essentially religion.

Man has progressed in religion chiefly by the influence of prophets and saints. In their intense communion with God they have become acquainted with some new aspect of the Divine, and with a force of personal conviction, either in the manner of their lives or by the appeal and power of their utterances, have led the less inspired to a perception and appreciation of the same realities. Knowledge of moral values also increases in a similar manner. The influence is strongest when the ethical teacher speaks with religious fervour and conviction. It is a fact of history, of the present as of the past,

that having arrived at a certain stage of development morality and religion support one another. This needs adequate explanation. One suggestion is that in his communion with God, man, coming into relation with the Spirit and meaning of the Whole, also obtains increased insight into moral values. He is supplied with a motive power beyond any which the idea of humanity can give. Under the motive of religion the goods of the State are subordinated to the greater good of the Universe. The transcendent good of communion with God excels any goods of non-religious experience. More than one recent non-theological writer on ethics has recognised personal affection as the highest of moral values. In this fact of spiritual love is another transition to religion, which in its best form is love universalised and centralised in God.

Religion as a felt experience is also a redemption from the evils of the part in an optimism with regard to the Whole. The optimistic character of religion has all too often been misunderstood. It does not negate evil ; it does not regard evil as a mere appearance. The fact that evil is so evidently real to the individual and to the community has been one of the very

strongest motives to religion. On a basis of the darkest pessimism with reference to the material and intellectual, some of the most joyful and holy lives have been evolved.

Another misunderstanding of religious optimism is its interpretation in a passivistic sense. The faith that all will be well, the confidence that the Whole has meaning and value, the feeling of peace as to the ultimate achievement of the good has been taken to be the same as "God's in His heaven, all's right with the world." But man cannot for long forget the fact that the meaning and value of the Whole depends on the Whole, and that the individuals themselves, States, humanity, are parts of the Whole. The goods and values of existence are largely dependent upon the *effort*, physical, intellectual, æsthetical, and moral of those who are to enjoy them. What it is important to remember is that goods may be considered not only from the point of view of the person immediately experiencing them, but also from that of the meaning and value of the Whole.

In the confusions of the moment, influenced also by the legitimate philosophical contention that moral conduct and character are to be judged

in and for themselves, we are being led to assume a merely moral attitude towards our present situation. We are concerned too much with moral indignation against others, and too little with the wider constructive aims which religion should make evident. Have we as individuals risen to the consideration of national character and conduct as a definite aim? Have we as a nation recognised the importance of subordinating the national aim to the wider one of humanity? Are we as sons of God sufficiently thoughtful of the significance of the cosmos as revealed in the religious experience? Are we endeavouring, that is, to make clear to ourselves the positive aims which we as a nation among nations should try to champion for the cause of humanity, including those nations considered our enemies? Or are we simply and solely thinking of our own success, leaving those who will to think of the wider whole of things? Is it not time that we should endeavour to define as clearly as possible our positive attitude towards the question of the relations between States and the goods of humanity? Is it not time to inspire men with fervour for an ideal which, more even than merely national or human, is religious, insisting on the production

of positive goods, physical, intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious, emphasising the most important struggle of humanity as that for a realisation of its ideal place in the Whole, its relationship of communion with, and love of, God ?

IV

JESUS AND MODERN CULTURE

Age after age the Christian Churches have professed to lead men to the peace which the world cannot give, and age after age men have gone on living much as before, in indifference, avarice, and warfare. Nation after nation has arisen, and in the development of its culture, has promised to give satisfaction ; and nation after nation has been brought low just when its pride was at its highest. Nevertheless the Churches continue ; and culture, be it ne'er so reviled, always shows itself to be a necessity of the human spirit. Since the birth of Christianity there has been no time in which it has been so imperative as at present to consider the causes of such failure. The majority of men, swayed always by what is predominant at the moment, cannot investigate these things, and, unless a real effort is made to guide them to a truer outlook and a life inspired

by a greater hope, they will quickly fall back into the old ways of living and thinking. The thinker can and must, now while he feels the scourge of failure, put to himself the questions raised by the present conditions. There has been, it is true, some academic discussion of the compatibility or incompatibility of Christianity and war, but the name of Jesus has been barely mentioned, and culture has almost become a term for derision and scorn. Though Jesus is as nothing to those who pass by, call they themselves Christians or not ; and though culture, whether it be called German or not, is despised and rejected of men, in these two alone is the way of salvation for us and the ages to come. Liberal Christians have felt as none others of our day the centrality of Jesus as supreme over all else in Christianity, and they recognise that Jesus and modern culture have to be brought into a definite relationship of co-operation ; theirs is the opportunity of the present, and if they will make the best of this opportunity, theirs is also the future.

Clear thinking is essential for definiteness of action and for the possession of a calm confidence. It behoves us therefore to ask what is implied by culture. Two uses of the term may be distin-

guished. Culture may mean knowledge, as of literature and science, history and philosophy, and practical skill and appreciation as revealed in music and painting, architecture and sculpture. If we add to these things the organisation of the externals of life by the application of knowledge and skill, we have the German meaning of the term "Kultur," which approximates more to our "civilisation" than to our "culture. For in English the term "culture" has an essentially personal implication. We talk rather of a "person of culture," and though some intellectual and artistic capacities are usually supposed, we intend especially to refer to fineness and strength of character, sincerity of conviction, comprehensiveness of outlook, nobility of aim, and delicacy and refinement of manner. The defects of both views are evident. In the former, culture may be made subservient to aims ethically despicable; in the latter, through inadequate knowledge and skill, the finest character may fail miserably in the endeavour to realise its highest ideals. For the purpose of this paper we shall use the term for a combination of the two meanings.

The later in time is not necessarily higher in value than that which has gone before. Never-

theless, where there is continuity, as in scientific research, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be progress. and an examination of the available data may show that advances have been made. The same contention is also justifiable with regard to the arts, to history, and to philosophy. For, though it may be quite impossible to maintain that any living musician surpasses Beethoven, as musician, or any philosopher Plato, as philosopher, it would be foolish to argue on this ground that music in our day is not in advance of that of Beethoven's time, or that the least prominent of modern philosophers has not a source of knowledge due to past and present research that was not open to Plato. It is not at all improbable that Plato was the greatest philosopher who has ever lived ; yet there are reasons for believing that philosophy in our day is in advance of philosophy as he left it. This claim, though it cannot be justified here in detail, we extend to modern culture as a whole, as compared with that of earlier times. The pessimism of the contrary view, though no logical argument against its truth, is none the less a factor determining men against it.

In every period of history marked by progress in culture, men have tended to seek in it the complete satisfaction of all their needs. Never was this more the case than in the last century; and yet never was the "problem of culture" felt so acutely as then. Social organisation, intellectual and artistic achievements, proved, as always, to be inadequate to the demands of human nature. Man is an active self-conscious personality in a realm of personalities. He requires not only to know that life and the universe have a meaning, but more, to be and to feel himself in harmony with it. He demands that the universe shall give him scope for the realisation of his highest ideals, or shall modify those ideals to something better that may be realised. He seeks to attain a character and an attitude in which he may remain confident and at peace in all the storm and stress of life. Only when a man or an age feels this need can Jesus be rightly understood, and only then can his influence be fully felt.

The greatness and the supremacy of Jesus lie in the fact that he has to do with what is fundamental and central in man—his deepest relationship with the universe, to nature, to his

fellowmen, to God. The religious and the moral, the sphere of his appeal, are rooted in the metaphysical "core" of every man. The religious and the moral are not the manifestation of an ultimate relationship, but the very relationship itself. As a man may take up and develop an intellectual attitude towards the universe, so he may enter and cultivate a religious and moral attitude. The value of Jesus is in his being a revelation of and inspiration towards a character and an attitude that satisfy needs more profound than those of which mere culture is aware. For, he does not simply *teach* a theistic conception, but *lives* a life of filial trust in God: that is central. He leads men to this life, not by philosophical exposition, but by simple words and personal influence. His confidence is contagious; his disciples try his faith; and their eyes are opened. Faith in God, purity of heart, love of the brethren, are found to give a satisfaction that physical comfort, knowledge, and skill, culture in its widest sense, when taken alone, fails to give. Sinners, and those that search for truth, find here the way of their essential salvation. Apart from his own character and influence, the teachings of Jesus would probably have had no

more effect upon men than those of prophets and philosophers ; in relation to that character and influence, they have a significance and importance it is scarcely possible to over-estimate.

Inspired with his spirit his immediate followers went forth to unite men to themselves as he had united them to himself. The principles of his life and teachings were the soul of their message, but through all the ages the essential, overwhelmed and disregarded so often, has been the character and attitude learned in personal contact. The true mother, who, in simple words speaks of Jesus to the child on her knee, breathes his life-giving influence and resembles him more, perhaps, than any other. Unfortunately, the seeds so sown, instead of being cultivated in the wider atmosphere of the Churches, are often killed by ecclesiastical formalism. The supreme saint, he founded his Church as the school for saints. The supreme son of God, he revealed to men their nature as sons in relation to God as Father. To this, and to this alone, is to be traced the good the world receives from Jesus.

The movement of which he is the source and the centre sprang up in definite surroundings and took external form at a particular period of history.

It was impossible—and if it had been possible it would have been inadvisable—that the leaders of the Churches should ignore the culture in which they found themselves. They brought light and peace to the worshippers of “the Unknown God,” but their presentation of their doctrinal position was not unaffected by the culture of that time and place. Ecclesiastical organisation and dogma grew up gradually into a definite system, determined at least in part by temporary circumstances. Inevitable as was this association of the Gospel of Jesus with elements of, to them contemporary, to us ancient, culture, it was at the same time deliberate and beneficial. The whole of life is to be brought into relation with the Gospel.

Elements of ancient culture became embodied in the interpretations of the experiences of Christians, were retained through the very nature of ecclesiastical needs, and taught as essential parts of the faith. The acquisition of temporal power by the Churches increased the importance of unvarying theological statement, and efforts were made to check the onward march of culture. Any important conceptions regarded as differing from those of the Churches were dogmatically

negated and their advocates persecuted. The culture of a later age has been and is still rejected in favour simply of elements of the culture of an earlier age. Nevertheless, the need which led the Churches to present the Gospel in relation to the culture of the age in which Christianity was born, is the same which demands its presentation in relation to modern culture.

It is true that culture does not satisfy our deepest needs; but that is no argument against culture itself. Truth is better than error, and beauty than ugliness. Cleanliness, physical health and comfort (not an enervating luxury) are rational aims for all. Not less but more culture has been the need of every age and clime, as it is of our own. The danger begins when men make culture the primary or sole aim in life, and hope to find complete peace and joy in it. But it is also dangerous, though less so, to suppose that Jesus and his teaching alone will suffice for the requirements of human personality. Once we come within the sphere of his influence we cannot but admit that he reveals the highest and the most fundamental for men, for every man, but there is nothing at all in his life and teaching to suggest that there is no other source of revelation

of truth, beauty, and goodness. For example, Jesus did not leave us any music. Can we deny that music is often a revelation to us of the beautiful, the sublime, the divine? Why has it been so prominent a factor in religious worship? If I want music I do not go to Jesus, but to the great master musicians of the race. It is not a question of whether he *could* have given us the highest in this direction, but simply the recognition of the fact that he did not.

But though Jesus did not reveal to us all that is valuable in life; though he did not aid us in what has grown up during the ages under the name of culture, he taught us the central purpose of life in relation to which culture should be pursued. Human effort may be directed towards a type of life quite opposed to that embodying the ideal of Jesus. Thus, to-day it is foolish to try to deny the wealth of learning and the artistic and mechanical skill of the Germans, and it is foolish to pretend that in the future we may disregard what they have done or may do. Truth must be accepted by us, no matter whence it comes. So much the more, however, must we protest against the utilisation of knowledge and skill for ends directly opposed to those of Jesus,

as we believe to be the case at present with peoples under the influence of military and selfish financial ends. Culture is not wrong in itself, but in being enslaved to unworthy aims, and made a means by men of un-Christlike characters. But let us not forget the charge that has been made against ourselves. Let us recognise the fact that there is also a great divergence between the predominant aims of the English people and those of Jesus. The charge of commercialism is not entirely baseless. It may be just as true, applied to us as a people, as the charge of militarism made against the Germans. The results of modern capitalism, hidden away as they so often are in the hovels of our great manufacturing districts, may be as bad in their way, though less lurid, than those of war.

The remedy in both cases is the same. The central position of Jesus must be recognised, and all that interferes with the transmission of his influence and the realisation of his ideal, removed, and in this, modern culture must be given its due place. The value of German research may have been over-estimated, but it can hardly be doubted that it has championed the cause of freedom, and, up to within the last thirty years,

was, in most spheres, in advance of any other, both in its methods and the quality of its results. Within recent years great progress has been made in other countries, and Germany has led chiefly in the quantity of its research and the boldness of its hypotheses. The Professors in the German universities have, theoretically, perfect freedom as to the methods and the statement of the results of their work; but it is well known that little or no advancement came to a German scholar whose attitude was one of open opposition to the ruling bureaucracy. Ministers of religion had little freedom to present the comparatively modern views of religion taught them in most of the universities. Within the last few years there have been legal proceedings against heterodox ministers—the cases of Jatho, of Cologne, and Traub, of Dortmund, having caused most discussion in wider circles. The Protestant Churches of Germany show little evidence of appealing to the general masses of the people; and it can hardly be denied that they do not breathe the genuine social spirit of Christianity.

We are thus led to maintain that the present condition of things, so far from being a proof of the failure of Liberal Christianity, as has been

argued is rather a proof of the failure of all other kinds of Christianity, Protestant and Catholic. Neither Protestantism nor Catholicism has been able to mould the ideals and guide the activities of the age. The influence of the few scholars who have been presenting Jesus as central in Christianity, and endeavouring to bring Jesus and modern culture into definite co-operation, has been small. The reason is not far to seek. The essential in Christianity is a life chiefly revealed in the historical Jesus, and passed on by personal influence in Churches that are living social bodies. Mere theological exposition is of no avail; and that is why liberal theology has so far failed to affect markedly the ideals of the German people. If liberal theologians in England allow themselves to be deprived of their ministerial functions, the same failure must also be their lot. The Churches have failed very largely because they have been and are still too concerned to spend their energy and power upon the preservation of their traditional formulation of doctrine and traditional organisation. They have lost sight of Jesus and live on by a momentum of temporal rather than spiritual power. The only hope is that Liberal Christianity, as the expression of the significance

of Jesus and his teaching in relation to modern culture, shall become the definite attitude of the Churches. Jesus and his teaching is central ; and the Churches are indispensable, not only for the transmission, but also for the realisation of the Christian life ; and to be true to ourselves we cannot neglect modern culture. The Churches have to co-operate with culture in all ages for the attainment of the aim Jesus has revealed, that we all may be one, as children of God, in the Kingdom of the Father.

V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN MOTIVE

The thought of the latter half of the nineteenth century, as we are constantly reminded, was dominated in most spheres of its activity by the idea of evolution, and this interpreted most frequently in a biological fashion. During the same period there was also a marked development in the study of psychology. In the attempt to apply the biological conception of evolution to human history, its limitations have become particularly apparent. For in the intensive study of the forces which prevail in human history, we are led to what appears a more intimate and immediate knowledge of the cause of variations. Here the closer attention to psychology has helped immensely. So many of the small and so many of the great changes in human history are evidently due to psychical motives rather than to

physical forces, that there is serious danger of trying to understand history from the standpoint of a merely pluralistic philosophy, without doing justice to the stabilities of the world of nature or the relation to a dominant controlling Power. The attempts of some materialistically inclined historians to see in these motives nothing but the products of economic necessities have failed. For it is impossible to form an intelligible view of human life if eyes are shut to the persistent and powerful presence of the moral and the religious, in some definite sense of these terms. If, therefore, as we believe, human motives are the second greatest factor in human history, (the direct action of God being the greatest) it behoves us to consider the nature of the motive of our own religion, and, as far as is possible in a short time, to compare it with the motives of the other great religions of mankind.

It is not necessary to belabour the point that we cannot - with many well disposed but ignorant souls - regard religions other than our own as mostly wrong; nor - with the superficial theosophist - regard all religions as equally good. Students of the non-Christian religions will understand that in a paper so brief, it is impossible

to give detailed evidence of the position maintained

The first task is to consider the psychology of the Christian motive itself. At once the difficult question arises as to whether there is a complete knowledge of the Christian motive, and if so, where this knowledge is to be found ? The answer to this question depends largely on the meaning we give to the term " motive. "

For the present purpose it will be best to avoid all intricate discussions concerning the psychological nature of motives as such, and accept in a general way the position of many modern thinkers as represented by Professor Stout and Dr. Mackenzie. The former says : " Motives are not mere impulses. They come before consciousness as reasons why I should act in this way or that way. They are not independent forces fighting out a battle among themselves while the ego remains a mere spectator. On the contrary the motives are motives only in so far as they arise from the nature of the Self, and presuppose the conception of the Self as a determining factor. From this it follows that the recognised reasons for a decision can never constitute the entire cause of decision. Behind them

there always lies the Self as a whole, and what this involves can never be completely analysed or stated in the form of definite reasons or special motives."* Dr. Mackenzie, insisting on the ambiguity of the term in popular usage, describes motive simply as "that which induces us to act, the thought of a desirable end."† From both of these accounts it is clear that whatever else may have to be included in the meaning of the term, at least the aim, "the reason why I should act in this way or that," "the thought of a desirable end," is a main factor. It is, however, doubtful whether the most important factor which induces us to act is always a "thought of a desirable end," as Dr. Mackenzie maintains. Indeed, it may be some experienced influence which can with no propriety be called a thought. Dr. Stout's insistence on the Self as a whole as a determining factor seems to come closer to the actual nature of experience. Even he writes of the "conception of the Self" as "presupposed." Yet surely there are motives in which the "*conception* of the Self" is not concerned. In this point his position suggests rather a relic of Hegelian

* *Manual of Psychology* 3rd. ed. 1913 p. 709.

† *Manual of Ethics*. 4th ed. 1904 p. 64.

influence than an actual description of fact. By motive should be understood all that consciously induces us to act, including in most cases the thought of a desirable end.

The difficulty of the problem of the psychology of the Christian motive is associated with this distinction between a factor of conscious *thought*, (that of a desirable end), and of factors which cannot be so described. If the Christian motive were simply the thought of a certain desirable end the present task would be to outline the nature of this Christian end, and to show how it comes to be adopted by men. But it may reasonably be maintained that that which has in the past led, and still in the present leads men to Christian action is more than the thought of a desirable end. This, in fact, appears to be predominantly the case. What chiefly induces men to become Christian in conduct is some form of indefinable personal influence, due to the direct contact of personal consciousnesses. The Christian motive is partly an indefinable reality rooted in the inner nature of the self, coming generally through the influence of self on self, and partly a deliberate intention to achieve certain aims.

The question, previously raised, as to whether there is complete knowledge of the Christian motive, and if so, whence it comes, may now be raised with better advantage. For now it may be shown on the one hand how in some sense the power constraining to the Christian life has been present from the beginning of Christianity and on the other hand how the Christian motive may be said to be subject to expansion or growth.

The historical fact that the great religions have all been associated particularly with one or more great men, accords well with this conception of the various aspects of religious motives, as well as with the psychological and metaphysical theory that the essential in religion is the influence of personality on personality.

The Christian motive as associated with Jesus may be considered from both the points of view mentioned. What was it, for example, which changed the Magdalene and led her to Christian discipleship? If there was any thought of a desirable end, it came only later, after a powerful personal influence from Jesus had been keenly felt. The personal attraction came first, followed by the desire to learn what conduct should aim at to be in conformity with the purpose of the Lord

and Master. This kind of motive has been beautifully expressed by the Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford – though not in special reference to Jesus: “Not by the lips but by the life are men influenced in their beliefs, and when reason calls in vain and arguments fall on deaf ears, the still small voice of a life lived in the full faith of another may charm like the lute of Orpheus, and compel an unwilling assent by a strong, indefinable attraction, not to be explained in words, outside the laws of philosophy, a something which is not apparent to the senses, and which is manifest only in its effects.” * For the latest disciples of Jesus – as for the earliest – such personal influence is the chief factor in inducing men to Christian conduct: the contagion of the Christian spirit, produced by Christian upon Christian and having its most powerful source in God, though clearly felt among men through the person of the historic Jesus. If men are serious with their Theism, they cannot but suppose that the personal power of God – expressed in religious phraseology – His love, is ever present inducing men to act. Popular thought is, in fact, tinged very much by Deism : men only

* Osler : *Science and Immortality*, 1906 p. 69.

half-heartedly believe that God is working in the world. So again, if men seriously hold the doctrine of personal immortality they cannot but suppose that the personality of Jesus is still exerting its power in the world directly, and not merely through its Church.

Thus, the Christian motive "that which induces us to act" as Christians, is highly complex. The more important factors appear to be of the character such as Dr Stout has described as relating to the self as a whole, something that "can never be completely analysed". Yet, though they may never be completely analysed, their source may not be entirely hidden : Maeterlinck, for example, makes his Magdalene say : "He fixed his eyes for but a moment on mine; and that will be enough for the rest of my life". What induces the Christian to act includes the direct influence of God, the influence of Jesus, and of all implied in the term "the holy Catholic Church, the communion of Saints". The more true Christian conduct spreads, the stronger will this aspect of the Christian motive become. Even here, therefore, is room for a real evolution.

Turning now to the motive as the thought of a desirable end, it may be said that it is in the

broadening and the deepening of this thought that the development of the Christian motive is to be chiefly seen. Development here suggests movements backwards and forwards: assimilating good and bad, rejecting tares and losing wheat. The main principle of the Christian end ought to be obtained by a consideration of the life and teaching of Jesus. And in this direction what impresses one more than anything else is the great contrast brought before the mind by a simple reading of the Synoptic Gospels on the one hand, and the works of Paul, Augustine, Luther, and John Bunyan, on the other. Rightly or wrongly, from the latter the impression is obtained that the leading motive of Christianity is redemption from sin : while from the former the impression is quite different. It argues much for the greatness of Jesus that his motive shines out so clearly in spite of its representation – rather partial misrepresentation – by some of his most prominent followers.

None will deny the importance of a psychological study of sin, of repentance and forgiveness, but these should not be placed in the very forefront of Christian attention. Religion is a cure for the sick and the diseased simply because it is

the vital principle of the good life in all its fulness; simply because it represents the highest experience. Psychologically it is false to suppose that a person becomes physically or morally well by much reflection or occupation with his illness, bodily or spiritual. Redemption from suffering and salvation from sin, are simply secondary results, parts of the consequences of the realisation of the Christian motive as such.

In trying to indicate the motive of Jesus which is to be regarded as the starting point of the Christian motive as the "thought of a desirable end," the only justifiable method is to yield ourselves to the general impression which the Gospel narratives give, and not to suppose that much more can be obtained by a close detailed discussion of individual passages. From the outset the essentially optimistic attitude is shown in the later story of the angels singing at his birth: "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, good will toward men"; and by the saying put into the mouth of Jesus by the writer of the fourth Gospel: "I came that they might have life and might have abundance" * Undoubtedly there are

* *John X. 10.* as read by Dr. J. H. Moulton: Vide "*The Treasure of the Magi*" 1917 p. 40.

dark passages in his life, and there are the pronouncements of woe, but through all it is clear that "the desirable end" is that men shall share with the Father in the Glory of the kingdom. That in his conception of the kingdom, there were some eschatological traits of the character of those prevalent at the time, may be granted; but that his view was mainly such is far from being established. "Jesus lived so much in God; he had so strongly the feeling of being in contact everywhere in our world with the reality of this good Will; in all his work he received so much power from prayer and his whole life of communion with God; he experienced so often the power in his working upon the hearts of others, humiliating some, raising the sick and sinners, that in his mind disease and sin were banished before the goodness and power of his Father."

The Hebrew was not much given to asceticism: the desirable end as it appeared to Jesus was neither in itself ascetic nor to be obtained by the path of asceticism. Yet there is no question as to what values come first in the motive of Jesus: they are those of the kingdom of God and righteousness, though with these all else that is good will eventually come. Admittedly there are

passages which suggest the idea of an "*interimsethik*," but these make the impression they do because of a certain contrast with the predominant attitude. Yet nearly all such passages may be interpreted as instances simply of emphasis on the spiritual as higher than the material. The same elements of the Gospels have been made the basis of a view of the Christian motive as "other-worldly," and the same reply can be made to such an interpretation.

Expressed in modern terms it might be said that the motive of Jesus includes attention to all types of value. In his healing the sick and in many other ways his appreciation of physical values is marked. Legend tells of his youthful interest in knowledge in discussions with the rabbis in the temple. He knew the beauty of the lilies of the field and of the birds of the air. In the joyful simplicity and absence of duplicity in the child, he saw the best type of the moral attitude necessary for entrance to the kingdom of heaven. The heights of religious communion with God, he felt not only in lonely prayer but also in sharing in the Jewish festivals with his disciples.

In its development in the Christian Church, the conception of the desirable end has maintained

in some way or other all these features. The social aspect, the fuller life of the kingdom, as aimed at in the Church, has enabled greater differentiation on each of these sides : physical, intellectual, aesthetical, moral and religious, than the life of the mere individual will allow. For the advancement of one or more of these sides of the life of the whole, an element of asceticism to other sides has been justified for some individuals. In some few instances, asceticism may have appeared as an end in itself, or as a means of the acquisition of merit, but it is true to say that the ground of justification of so-called "other-worldliness," as emphasised in Christian monasticism has been that through it there should be a greater intensity and abundance of spiritual life in the whole. It is fully in accord with this developing conception of the desirable end, that for the higher and richer welfare of the whole, individuals, singly or in groups, shall be more or less indifferent to all except the moral and religious values. This life of renunciation has been advocated in the monastic sense as only for the few, and rarely has the monk been lauded as a much higher religious type than the layman. Throughout its development the Christian motive

suggests change to a more and more social conception of the "desirable end".

Again, in the first Christian centuries it was imperative to assimilate Greek thought: the impulse to know had to be assimilated to the Christian motive. In the Middle Ages and especially in the period of the Italian Renaissance the passion for the beautiful demanded and obtained scope. The Protestant Reformation lost for northern Christianity some of these things but it gained undoubtedly in its making clear the intrinsic character of moral virtue, as distinct from the following of ecclesiastical and theological maxims. During the modern era the Christian Church has to do in an especial degree with the question of social organisation in relation to the Christian motive. The place, if any, of nationality in the Christian end is not yet clear. A man may feel intensely the power of his religion, as he experiences it in prayer, in meditation, and in social religious worship; and he may feel intense patriotism, but can it yet be said that these overlap, or that one includes the other? Where the Christian motive is concerned there seems be no distinction of Jew and Greek, English and German - let the past - or for that

matter the present – be what it may. In any case, nationality is to be subordinated to the wider Christian motive. With intense grief at the attitudes of the Christian Churches in the present conflict, one must ask : “ When the Son of Man cometh shall he find faith on the earth ? ”

The psychology of the Christian motive, as that “ thought of a desirable end ” which induces us to act in a specific manner, is thus a genetic psychology. Spiritual development is not, however, something which occurs willy nilly, but only as the result of deliberate spiritual effort.

As in the Christian Church so in the mind of the individual there is a development of the apprehension and the acceptance of the Christian motive. And this on its two sides. The person who is growing in Christian character feels and himself exerts more and more that subtle personal influence which has been referred to earlier in this paper as the chief factor moving us to act. So again, though it is true that the Christian is to become as a little child, the little child as such, does not know and appreciate all that is included in the “ thought of the desirable end ” as it is, or should be, for a more or less mature mind. The individual will be receptive of the power of

Christian love from others, and this, through the spiritual decision of his own will, should lead to its exertion upon others.

The position indicated may be briefly summarised before passing to the second part of the paper. The Christian motive, psychologically considered, may be said to be those realities which induce a person to act in a manner or to develop a character which for one reason or another is called Christian. These realities are twofold: one a subtle personal influence, most frequently called love, and the other a conception of the content of the Christian aim. In both there is an expansion and development. The latter is a positive conception, inclusive of the goods on all sides of life. The former is the emotional and impulsive power leading to the carrying out of the desirable end, but this as something which goes beyond the welfare of the particular individual, being done in service for the other towards whom the love is felt. In the course of history the growing conception of the desirable end comes gradually to a reconciliation of the claims of the different values, which, though each is final in its own sphere, may in comparison be regarded as of higher and lower worth.

The preceding treatment has been in the highest degree inadequate: the grounds for the positions assumed being scarcely referred to. The comparison with other religions must be even more cursory. It is the religions as represented by modern liberalising tendencies that should be considered. If the psychology of the motive of Liberal Judaism, be looked at from this point of view it must be admitted that the content of its "thought of a desirable end" which induces to action is to all intents and purposes identical with that of the Christian. The more comprehensive this thought becomes in the mind of the Christian with relation to the different types of value, the more it tends to co-incide with a similarly expanding conception from the side of Liberal Judaism. For the Messianic Kingdom, the restored Israel, is not conceived in Zionist fashion, but as the time and condition in which the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord. The two great commandments of love are definitely accepted as the emotional and impelling aspect of the motive. The optimism of the Jewish spirit - in spite of the many sufferings through which the race has gone - colours the motive in that the end conceived is still not

ascetic, but the perfection of all sides of life. The fervent faith that the race is a chosen people standing in a particular relation to a personal God has been and is a chief source of motive power.

Once more it may with good grounds be maintained that the thought of the desirable end as the motive of the Liberal Zoroastrian or Parsi, as found in India, tends to express itself more and more in modern terms as an all-inclusive type of life. This spirit goes back to the founder of the religion, who in the Gathas, or sacred hymns, prays for immortality and the triumph of the good, for wisdom, and also for the physical goods associated with the agricultural type of life of the people among whom he lived. We may quote the following passage, charming because of its genuine, frank simplicity: "Shall I indeed, O thou the Right, obtain that reward, even ten mares with a stallion and a camel, which was promised to me, O Wise one, even as through thee the future gift of Health and Immortality."* The interrelation between physical welfare and spiritual progress is seen; and it is continually

* *Yasna* xlv. 18. Quoted by Dr. J. H. Moulton in "*Early Religious Poetry of the Persians*" 1911 p. 193.

maintained that he who sows corn sows righteousness. The emphasis on right thought, right word, and right deed, and the representation of the triumph of the good over evil as affecting all factors of life, reveal the motive again as embracing all the good. In this religion also asceticism is almost entirely absent: the movement and influence of Mani is the only prominent example, and it is still a question whether Mani was ever in any sense a Zoroastrian. The desirable end as conceived by Zoroastrianism is inclusive of all good: and for this and with this the true believer fights against all and every form of evil. Reverence for the prophet has undoubtedly developed into an emotional power aiding in the conflict, but the real impulsive force of Zoroastrianism appears to be simple love of the good as such.

To indicate briefly the psychology of the Muslim motive is more difficult. The correct name of the religion taught by Mohammed should be considered as suggesting something definite in this connection. *Islam* means the peace which comes through submission to God. *Allahu Akbar*: God is great. But he is also the Compassionate, the Merciful. To be in accord with the will of

God as it is revealed in the Koran, that is the main motive – for on that depends the welfare of man here and hereafter. The most powerful force inducing men to Islam in the sense of adopting the “thought of the desirable end” given in the Koran, is the unshakable conviction that the Koran is indubitably the perfect and final revelation from God. About the religious attitude of the Liberal Muslim there is a strong, confident, sublime simplicity, but it does not seem possible to say that the thought of the desirable end is very comprehensive.

To the Christian and the Westerner, Buddhism is perhaps the most interesting of all non-Christian religions. On the question of the psychology of the respective motives of Christianity and Buddhism at the first glance the attitudes appear to be radically different. The motive which inspired Gautama Buddha presents a marked contrast with that of Jesus. The whole of the records agree that the former sought redemption from suffering and freedom from the possibility of future suffering. The enlightenment which came to him under the Bo-tree was the sacred truth of the cause of suffering and the means to prevent it – the chain of causes and the

way to break it. For him sin is to be avoided not as in itself bad, but as a certain inevitable cause of suffering. And in contrast with this it will be said that the Christian motive seeks salvation from sin, because of the nature of sin itself, much rather than redemption from suffering. Though, as previously maintained, this aspect is too frequently exaggerated, it is correct to say that the true Christian mind shuns sin more definitely than suffering. The Christian motive leads the individual deliberately to take suffering upon himself in order to reach the desirable end. Now it is sometimes supposed that in this Christianity and Buddhism are poles apart. Nothing could be further from the truth. Of course, it may be said that having reached enlightenment suffering could have no effect on the Buddha, but so it might be said with regard to Jesus that having complete confidence in the Father he was raised above suffering. Even if it be admitted that Buddha in taking upon himself the task of going to Benares "to turn the wheel of the law" for the sake of suffering humanity, was not impelled by the same motive as is implied in the Christian idea of suffering for others, to maintain that such a motive is not to be found in Buddhism

would be unjustified. The stories of the Jatakas, the tales of the Buddha's previous births, contain many examples of suffering and self-immolation for the sake of others, and the idea is real even though enshrined in mere fiction. In the doctrine of the Bodhisattvas, which was developed in Mahayana Buddhism, the form of Buddhism which arose in China and Japan, the acceptance of suffering for the good of others is taught as a part of the motive.

Early Buddhism had the felt need of freedom from suffering as its motive. The thought of the desirable end was that of a condition of peace, restfulness, absence from the feeling of anxiety associated with the existence of unsatisfied desire in the mind. Further, this desirable end was conceived as attained chiefly through membership of the Order. Thus, though the Buddha had risen above the false way of extreme asceticism, the way of the monk was nevertheless considered that most in harmony with the motive. The motive of Buddhism – in the sense of the thought of a desirable end – has undergone a development. Especially in Mahayana Buddhism it has assumed a more positive character. Not only has a careful consideration of morality been

produced by Buddhism, it has also been responsible for no insignificant advance in forms of painting and of architecture. Compared, however, with the other religions so far discussed, and especially with Christianity, Buddhism cannot be said definitely to teach anything of an actual taking up of all sides of life to bring them to a perfection.

To group the many varieties of religious life of Indians (apart from Muslims, Parsees, Christians and Jains) under the common term of Hinduism may at first seem ludicrous. Nevertheless, this has the sanction of usage, and there is also some justification for it in that the fundamental motive appears to be the same. The thought of the desirable end is "*moksha* " or redemption. This is especially release from the bonds of *karma*, that is, the fruits of selfish action, and especially rebirth in finite form, which such bonds involve. In the exposition of a careful student of the Vedanta, in the *advaita* or monistic form of the teacher Sankara, this may be expressed in a manner as not to be negative. Freedom from finite form is thought of as a mode of expression of the desire for infinitude, the putting off the cloak of human mortality for an eternal unlimited existence. The Hindu may

talk much of God-realisation. By this he does not mean an experience of God as another Being, but rather the realisation of the identity of his own true nature with that of God. Only then are the bonds of attraction to this rather than to that broken : for then there is no distinction of this and that. Here the thought of a desirable end has reached its utmost limit since it is to include all – nothing can be beyond it. How such a position can recognise any vital distinction between good and bad is the difficulty. The thoroughgoing consequences of the Hindu motive as seen in this light are rarely, it would seem, the actual factors in the life of the Hindus. The actual motive is much more often extremely individualistic : the escape from re-birth. For re-incarnation is due to the accumulation of the results of karma, good or bad action, which is in any way “attached” that is, done with the feeling of selfishness. The opposition implied in these two sentences is one of the paradoxes of Hinduism : to achieve redemption depends entirely on one’s own endeavour, but no particular individual’s welfare, not even one’s own, must be in view.

A glance may be cast at the interesting religion of Jainism. This is dependent very

largely upon a distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, *jiva* and *a-jiva*. Much of the literature is extremely complex, being taken up with curious psychological analyses, primitive cosmology, and doubtful metaphysics. But through all, the motive is the attainment of the purely conscious or spiritual as opposed to the unconscious and unspiritual. This, in the end, seems the explanation of the Jain aversion and antagonism to the destruction of life in any form. Jainism has been influenced by ascetic tendencies and it is difficult to give a Jain conception of a positive comprehensive end of spiritual values. Some day the Jains will themselves strive to elaborate such a positive view of their motive, "the thought of the most desirable end." The more it does so the more it will come into line with the religions of the West.

The brief reference to these few religions has endeavoured as far as possible to show that the tendencies represented by their liberal adherents converge more and more to the same comprehensive view of the desirable end, towards which Christianity has continually tended. The similarities have been emphasised rather than the

differences – not because the differences are not great or important – they are both – but because for the peoples of the West it is necessary to bring out the similarities, just as for the peoples of India it is equally necessary to emphasise the aspects of difference.

In conclusion, one – and that the main difference – may be again referred to : the place occupied by the person of Jesus, and the influence which comes from love from and to him. This subtle personal power, transmitted to us in many ways, was stated in the first part of this paper to constitute one of the greatest factors in that which induces one to Christian action and Christian character. It is undoubtedly at the same time the greatest difference between Christian and non-Christian religions. This is quite apart from any question of the orthodox dogmas concerning the divinity of Jesus. The adherents of other religions show few signs of accepting those dogmas in the manner the Christian theologian, and more especially the Christian missionary presents them. That is cause for satisfaction rather than despair. When the time comes they will feel the sufficient love of God and of Jesus, working eternally, even though both be not identical.

VI

FREE CATHOLICISM AND NON- CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS

With the universal intercourse which modern modes of communication have made possible, the question as to the relation between the different ideals of life and of religion has become inevitable and urgent. A Free Catholicism * just because it is catholic or universal ought to make a really comprehensive survey of this question, and just because it is free its attitude towards it should not suffer from external and arbitrary limitations.

A Free Catholicism must seek the whole truth. It must admit the possibility, even the

* Free Catholicism is a movement recently inaugurated in England chiefly in connection with the liberal wing of Unitarians. It is an attempt to evolve a comprehensive religious life, with all possible use of meditation, the sacraments and the arts, while retaining a freedom for development in the intellectual and any other side of life.

probability, that no part of humanity has been left by God utterly devoid of religious truth. It must admit the possibility that each portion of humanity has possession of some distinctive aspect or aspects of truth. It must make earnest enquiry whether any other religion contains elements of truth and value not contained in Christianity.

The attitude of the Free Catholic to those of other faiths must be an attempt sympathetically to enter into their points of view, to see reality as they see it, to feel life as they feel it. What holds men to a faith is pre-eminently the good it contains, although uncultured minds may regard as good practices and beliefs which the educated reject. Free Catholics must be prepared to admit, for example, that though ceremonial purifications before prayers may become mechanical, they may nevertheless have a valuable psychological influence in religion. The feelings cultivated by certain postures of the body during prayer may aid in the growth of humility and a spirit of submission to the divine purpose. The contemplation of sacred pictures or images may exert an influence towards peace and inner joy.

The Free Catholic should seek spiritual nourishment in the devotional and didactic literature of other religions. Not that he will undoubtedly find there something not to be found in Christian literature, but that through the new form if not through new ideas he may be impressed in a manner different from his own sacred books. He may thus experience an emotion which is quite new, or an old emotion may be stirred afresh by its being aroused by a different mode of expression. The literature of his own religion may have become to him commonplace on account of its familiarity: after reading other scriptures he may return to it and find there again a freshness and a beauty which he had long since lost.

The Free Catholic will ask how far the mode of expressing and interpreting Christian truths is responsible for the rare acceptance of Christianity by the cultured and educated of non-Christian lands. A religion which is truly catholic and genuinely free ought to compel their adherence. Let us take an example. The educated non-Christian is repulsed by the assertion that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, because this is put forward in an exclusive manner, as though there

is a sense in which Jesus is alone the Son of God. The result might be very different if a catholic interpretation were given, according to which all men may become sons of God in every way that he is, by becoming morally and religiously like him, that is, by framing their lives absolutely on the principle of active love.

Religions have always been influential in social and practical matters. Even if there remain a difference in the fundamentals of belief and ceremony the adherents of the different religions might strive to co-operate for the elimination of universally recognised social evils.

There is nothing in the attitude of the Free Catholic as indicated above which is opposed to the frank recognition and even open criticism by the adherents of one religion of the differences between the religions. Such criticism will, however, not be on the basis of uninformed prejudice but with the most careful examination of the facts and the clearest statement of the grounds of the rejection or disapproval of any particular doctrine or practice. Misrepresentation of other religions will be strenuously opposed.

The consideration of other religions is not only of importance in itself, but, pursued in the

right spirit and with the proper methods, it should react upon the positions of Free Catholics. For, the sympathetic study of religions other than one's own, like the study of history, broadens the outlook and throws into relief the values which are truly universal or catholic.

VII

NIETZSCHE AND TOLSTOI ON MORALITY AND RELIGION

Our estimate of the worth of men depends largely upon the standard which we apply to them. A survey of the history of humanity shows that those who have been regarded as the most prominent figures have been powerful and vigorous personalities rather than men conspicuous simply for clearness of thought or a high perfection of mere skill. The great leaders, of philosophy of science, of art, of morality and of religion, have been swayed by some outstanding ideas, which they have striven to bring into a relation with the facts of experience ; and they have possessed an extraordinary amount of personal power. The errors of such great men are often patent to the calm reflection of even the ordinary man ; yet the errors are themselves but one more piece of evidence of the concentration of the great mind on the leading ideas to the neglect of matters of

detail. It was thus with Tolstoi and Nietzsche : there are fundamental and important ideas in their teaching, notwithstanding their obvious one-sidedness. Their respective positions will be more emphasised by comparison and contrast.

Nietzsche's literary activity may be divided into three periods. In the first of these he was a staunch disciple of Schopenhauer and of Wagner to the consideration of whose work at that time he devoted most of his literary endeavours. His outlook in this period is accordingly coloured with the profound pessimism of his masters. Later, under the influence of natural science, he adopted the attitude of positivism. Finally, in the third period he broke away from his earliest teachers, and, inspired by the Darwinian theory of evolution, preached a voluntaristic optimism. To this last period his characteristic teaching concerning the Superman essentially belongs. For the understanding of Nietzsche it is of the utmost consequence to pay attention to the development of his thought in this final period and the changes which the conception of the Superman underwent in his mind.

The idea of the Superman arose from the conviction that in the same way that the position

of man has been reached from lower forms of existence, through conflict expressed in the struggle for existence and in natural selection, so in the future a new and higher type of being may be evolved. To make this higher type possible, to strive towards it, that is the task of mankind in the present. The meaning of history is to be sought in its relation to the ultimate production of this higher type. Pessimism is rejected: optimism reigns supreme in the faith in the triumph of the best in the struggle. Here man is concerned not with a mere "will to live", but more, with a "will to power," a "will to progress."

However inadequate the reflective philosopher may deem materialism to satisfy the metaphysical problems raised by the conceptions of biological evolution, Nietzsche's view of the Superman was at the beginning and in the main continued to be expressed in materialistic terms. Man's soul being simply a function of his body, his thought is conditioned chiefly by its feelings of pain and pleasure. The perfection of the psychical will be attained only by the evolution of the physical organism. All attention and activity are therefore to be directed to the improvement of the

animal nature. The individual is to be the object of his own activity; all others are to be used as means as far as that is possible. The Superman must be as proud as an eagle and as cunning as a snake. Alexander of Macedon, Nero, Cæsar Borgia and Napoleon, are forerunners of the Superman as he is pictured in the earlier representations.

In later writings the Superman is accorded qualities raising him above the stage of merely physical conflict. He has magnanimity, nobility, and majesty. He gives to others of the riches of his superabundant wisdom. He "loves" humanity. Nietzsche is careful to state that by "love" he means something different from that which he supposes Christians to imply by the same word. His pietistic upbringing by his parents, and the influence of his teachers, Schopenhauer and Wagner, led Nietzsche to the view which he never transcended, that for the Christian, "love" means a sentimental and feeble sympathy, pity and mercy. To such an attitude he was opposed on two grounds: first, that in reality it was nothing but hypocritical self-love on the part of the stronger and more fortunate sympathiser; and secondly, that it led to the

persistence of the unfit and to weakness in face of evil instead of conflict against it. The Superman "loves" because he feels the necessity of exerting himself for the good of others. Towards his enemies he feels grateful, because they rouse him to conflict. His love is "triumphant;" it is unselfish and universal. "I give no alms," says Nietzsche's Zarathustra, "because I am not poor enough." The Superman is also to be of childlike innocence. Nietzsche refers to three transitions in the spirit of man in reaching this higher stage: to the nature of a camel, to that of a lion, and finally to that of a child.

As naturalistic in his ultimate principles, Nietzsche rejects the belief in God and in the continued life of the soul after the death of the body. But it should be remarked that he nowhere makes an independent critical examination of naturalism or seriously considers the philosophical justification for a spiritual view of reality. As so many before and after him in the West, he tended to identify a spiritual conception of existence and life with belief in the popular ideas of God, especially as found in an uneducated type of Christian orthodoxy. He could not acknowledge a God, who, as he conceived it,

allowed his "son" to be executed, and robs men of the free development of their natural powers by commandments which require the curbing of the passions. He wished for something higher than that. "It is," he says to himself, "thy piety itself which allows thee to believe in a God no longer." Though there is some sadness in his mood when he says that God is dead, he has a faith of his own: "Behold what plenty is around us! It is beautiful to gaze on distant seas in the midst of plenty. Once people said 'God' when they gazed on distant seas, now I have taught you to say 'Beyond man'". He is, as he seems to confess, "more pious than he thinks;" indeed, his whole manner of writing suggests a type of almost religious ecstasy.

Nietzsche calls himself the mortal enemy of Christianity, which to him stands for a "slave-morality" of submission and sympathy, for the rejection of the earthly, for the equality of man. It is the religion of decadence and degeneration, a castration of the human spirit—for it would preserve the unfit and eradicate the passions which lead to struggle and thus to progress. It brought the downfall of Hellenism: it has been a continual hindrance to human endeavour. Of

all forms of Christianity Nietzsche considers Protestantism the most dangerous, because by a compromise with reason it assumes an appearance of truthfulness and so is better able to lead men astray. The Christian dogmas are irrational, especially those concerning the nature of sin, and they are to be rejected. In fact, Christianity is a "scandal to humanity."

The person of Jesus arouses other feelings in Nietzsche : he finds in the carpenter of Galilee a freedom of spirit in common with his own. Except in the chapter entitled "The Ass's Festival" in *Thus spake Zarathustra*, there is no apparent intended perversion or ridicule of the sayings or of the personality of Jesus. But Nietzsche interprets Jesus in Buddhistic fashion regarding as unauthentic the passages of the Gospels which do not fit into this conception. Melancholy and longing for death, tears and an inability to laugh, that is what Nietzsche sees most in Jesus, together with an inner life of great spiritual wealth. In *Anti-Christ* he depicts Jesus as a decadent, manifesting a mixture of the sublime, the feeble, and child-like. Jesus did not negate the "world," because he never had any idea of the ecclesiastical conception

implied by this term. Life, truth, light, inner experience, are central : all else is symbolic. The conception of guilt, of reward and punishment, are lacking in his teaching ; the glad tidings is simply the transcending of any relation of distance between man and God. Jesus' chief purpose is practical : "The profound instinct for the problem how to live in order to feel oneself 'in heaven,' to feel oneself 'eternal,' while in every other relation one feels not in the least in heaven : this alone is the psychological reality of salvation. A new mode of conduct, not a new faith. " The same is to be seen in the death of Jesus : " This bringer of glad tidings died as he had lived, as he had taught—not to save men, but to show them how they ought to live. What is important is the attitude here revealed to mankind, his behaviour before the judges, before the lictors, before his accusers, and in presence of every kind of calumny and mockery,—his behaviour on the cross. He does not resist, he does not defend his right ; he takes no steps to avert from himself the extremest consequences—yet more—he exacts them . . . and he entreats, he suffers, he loves with those, in those, who do him wrong. Not to defend himself ; not to be angry ; not to

condemn . . . not even to resist an evil one—but to love him” “ We see what came to an end with the death on the cross : a new thoroughly original commencement of an actual, not merely promised happiness on earth.” The greatness and heroic fortitude of Jesus Nietzsche recognises, but he thinks that had he lived, Jesus would have changed his doctrine. “ Believe me, my brethren ! he died too early ; he himself would have revoked his doctrine had he reached my age. Noble enough to revoke he was ! He was still immature. Immaturely the youth loveth and immaturely also he hateth man and earth. His mind and the wings of his spirit are still fettered and heavy. ’

This is not the place to dwell upon Nietzsche’s profound misunderstanding of Christianity or upon his distorted view of him who could see the beauty of the lilies of the field and the birds of the air ; the humour of the small man wishing to become taller, and of the woman filling the ears of the unjust judge, upon his failure to recognise that Jesus’ life was centred fundamentally in faith in God. Here we would draw attention to the fact that a change of attitude is just what later writers have believed to have been imminent

on the part of Nietzsche himself when illness overcame him and made further literary work impossible. The changes from the naturalistic egoism of the earlier conception of the Superman towards a more ethical and idealistic attitude have already been described. The same tendency is also implied in the language he uses with regard to Jesus. We believe that Nietzsche was "noble enough to revoke" the naturalistic traits of the Superman had he been able. What the real direction was in which Nietzsche was tending is, however, a disputed question. Arthur Drews has suggested that he was about to become a member of the Roman Catholic Church, the aestheticism and the aristocracy of which appealed to strong feelings of his own. Wadkowsky, on the other hand, thinks it more probable that he would have sought the needed rest in Buddhism, for, exhausted by illness and pain he was ready to sink into the calm of Nirvana. If this supposition be true, * we might well ask whether any change could be

* There does not seem much reason to believe that this was the case. Mr. Loftus Hare has shown in an article in *The Buddhist Review*, Vol. VIII, 1916, pp. 21-35, entitled "Nietzsche's Critique of Buddhism" that Nietzsche's attitude to Buddhism was mainly antagonistic.

more complete than this from the attitude of the preacher of egoistic self-assertion in conflict and struggle, the affirmation of the "will to power", to that of the suppression of all desire, the overcoming of the delusion of self-hood? He certainly had an admiration for Buddhism. He refers with approval to the Buddhist precepts of life in the open, moderation in food, abstinence from intoxicants and anything likely to heat the blood. In *Anti-Christ* he says, "Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic than Christianity Buddhism is the only truly positivistic religion, which history shows us It does not say 'Fight against sin,' but quite rightly in relation to reality, 'Fight against suffering'. It has already left behind the self-deception of moral conceptions—this differentiates it profoundly from Christianity—it stands, expressed in my words, beyond good and evil".

* * *

Tolstoi was only half a Westerner, for there is much that is oriental in the Russian character, especially as influenced by the Eastern Christian Church. Like Nietzsche he passed through definite stages, which he himself refers to in his book *My Confession*. He had lived long in an

attitude of haughty scepticism engendered by worldly success. Then doubt came upon him, similar, as Weinel remarks, to the way in which it came upon the Buddha. " Sooner or later there will come disease and death (they had come already) to my dear ones and to me, and there will be nothing left but stench and worms. All my affairs, no matter what they may be, will sooner or later be forgotten, and I myself shall not exist A person can only live as long as he is intoxicated with life, but the moment he becomes sober he cannot help seeing that all is only a deception, and a stupid deception at that! " He was worried with the question of the meaning of life. Overcoming the temptation to commit suicide, but thinking of that as a last possible way of escape he turned to the sciences and to philosophy. The sciences could not help him in his difficulty : " We have no answers to what you are, and why you live, and we do not busy ourselves with that : but if you want to know the laws of light, of chemical combinations, the laws of the development of organisms, if you want to know the laws of your mind, we can give you clear, definite incontrovertible answers to all that. " Philosophers

seemed to tell him what he had himself discovered, that life at best is a mean jest, a vanity of vanities.

Then he turned to the Christian Churches and to the theologians to see what they could tell him of the meaning of life, and the way it should be lived. What he found in this direction repulsed him. The dogmas of the Church seemed irrational, and its rites meaningless: but far above all that, his moral feelings were shocked at the lives of professing Christians. He was horrified at what was done in the name of religion: wars, the duel, capital punishment, the taking of oaths, were justified by so-called Christian men. And of course, the official Church of Russia excommunicated him as an enemy of God! Nevertheless, Tolstoi strove to be, and was far more Christian than Nietzsche. It was with pain that he was forced to separate from the organised Church. "It was not with frivolity or from pride that I have separated myself from the Orthodox Church," he wrote, "but with suffering and pain I have separated from it because I could not do otherwise."

Finally he came to the conviction, to some extent by watching the lives of simple folk, that the

root of his difficulty was not in reasoning incorrectly but in living badly. The pursuit of the satisfaction of his passions had led him astray. Repentance, change of mind, change of attitude of will, that was to be the beginning of the attainment of truth and happiness. A forceful presentation of this necessity and of the reality of conversion he gives in the famous novel *Resurrection*. On this conviction he based his religious belief: "The life of the world is dependent on a Will, on Someone who strives to realise something with the life of the world and with our lives. To understand this will it is first of all necessary to fulfil it, to do that which is required of us." But how can we know these requirements? Tolstoi would have replied: Through reason and conscience which are intimately related, if not identical.

After he turned away from the theologians and orthodox Christianity, he made an independent examination of the Gospels. In them he thought he found, "in spite of the false interpretations of the Churches," much which agreed with the demands of reason, with the conscience of men, and with the truths of all the great world religions. He interpreted the Gospel allegorically

in agreement with his own particular views. The teaching of Jesus is rational because it is moral, and moral because it is rational. Human life is to realise itself in abundant love. From his earliest childhood what charmed Tolstoi most in the teaching of Jesus was the love and meekness, the humiliation and self-sacrifice, together with the overcoming of evil by good. So, come to mature years after much doubt and many struggles he develops his doctrine of non-resistance. To reward evil with evil is irrational and useless: evil is not diminished thereby but increased. A fire is to be extinguished with water, not with more fire; hatred is to be overcome by love. Wealth is deprecated, and poverty glorified, the equality of men preached and the simple life advocated by Tolstoi. He teaches not only a love for all men, but also an intense sympathy for all living creatures. Progress is possible only through mutual trust and sympathy. Love brings happiness: that is its chief claim: thus, as Wadkowsky points out, a utilitarian phase is apparent, notwithstanding Tolstoi's endeavour to keep his doctrine pure.

Thus Tolstoi's ideal may be said to be essentially the opposite of that of Nietzsche, especially before the changes in the latter's point of view.

Tolstoi's " true Christian " and Nietzsche's " Superman " are contraries. For the former the animal nature of man represents the lowest stage of his evolution. From the standpoint of the principle of reason, the spirit must triumph over the flesh. Virtue is rational : it gives to human life a meaning : it is the basis of human happiness. In contrast with the naturalism of Nietzsche, Tolstoi preaches idealism. In contrast with Nietzsche's atheism he maintains the position of Panentheism, possibly under the influence of the philosophy of Hegel. God is not to be understood or defined by man, yet He reveals Himself in nature. Everything lives and moves and has its being in Him. Man, as a rational being, is the " son " of the heavenly Father. After the recognition that it was a conversion of will, repentance, that he needed, he felt secure in faith : " ' What else do you look for ? ', a voice called out within me. God is here. He is that without which one cannot live. To know God and to live is one and the same thing. God is life. Then live, seek God, and there will be no life without God. " " And stronger than ever all was lighted up within me and about me, and that light no longer abandoned me I returned to

everything, to the most remote, to the things of childhood and youth. I returned to the belief in that Will, which produced me and wanted something of me : I returned to this that the chief and only purpose of my life was to be better, that is, to live more in accord with that Will : I returned to this, that the expression of this Will I could find in that which humanity had worked out for its guidance in the vanishing past ; that is, I returned to faith in God, in moral perfection, and the tradition which has been handed down concerning the meaning of life. "

* * *

The conception of the Superman is only partially based on science. The sufficiency of conflict and natural selection to account for evolution has long been seriously questioned. Intelligence, rational selection, social co-operation, are factors the importance of which cannot be over-estimated. The calm irresponsibility of the Superman treading others under foot is really a stage in evolution which we have passed; and Nietzsche himself was coming to see that it is so. In fact, the logical refutation of at least the earlier conception of the Superman lies in this, that a being who is to be as far beyond man as man is above the animal

is represented just with the one characteristic of increased physical force and a more pronounced animal nature. Instead of getting further from the brute to become Superman we are to return to it! The value of the work of Nietzsche is none the less very great. His was a healthy reaction against the enervating pessimism of Schopenhauer and Wagner, the power of which in Germany he certainly broke. His was a healthy reaction also against a feeble sentimental type of miscalled humanitarian Christian pietism. At his best Nietzsche stood for strength, activity, effort: his message was a call to struggle against any odds to reach a higher life, however mistakenly and inadequately he himself perceived the true character of the ideal. After all, the conflict he preached was meant by him to be a noble one in which each of the conflicting factors willed that the best should triumph, as triumph it would, as he believed, if the fight be fair. He had no sympathy with the feeling of revenge or personal enmity. There is even an echo of Tolstoi and of the Buddha in his saying that it is "not through enmity that enmity is brought to an end."

To most men of our age, as indeed of all ages since men learned of Gautama and of Jesus, the

ideal championed by Tolstoi, that of communism based on love appeals far more strongly than the naturalistic individualism, based on force, as presented to our age in the writings of Nietzsche. Nevertheless, so far it has seemed impossible for us to make up our minds to strive definitely towards this aim. Though humanity, the war notwithstanding, is rising above the stage of mere physical conflict, the means of non-resistance it is not yet prepared to use, perhaps it will never be able to. It will, however, remain a lasting contribution that, with the tremendous force of his personality Tolstoi presented the ideal of love, the clear perception of which he only reached through much pain and effort. And if we had to recognise the noble qualities with which Nietzsche began to modify the conception of the Superman, so also we must remark that there was a boldness and a courage, a strength and a sense of conflict for his ideal, in the ageing Tolstoi. Strength and love these represent two most fundamental factors in progress and in the ultimate ideal, and it is of these that we have to learn from Nietzsche and Tolstoi.

VIII

SIR OLIVER LODGE ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION*

At every stage of human development, beliefs, whether religious or philosophical, are a result of an effort of the human mind to express the nature of the universe or some particular constituents of it and of the relation of man to it. This is as true of the most primitive ideas as of the more definite conceptions of modern science. In the Western World during the Middle Ages the prevailing and almost sole beliefs were taught by

* The large Roman numerals in the text refer to the corresponding numbers of the following books ; the small numerals refer to the pages.

- I. REASON AND BELIEF. 6th ed (1. s.) 1914. Methuen & Co.
- II. LIFE AND MATTER. *An Exposition of part of the Philosophy of Science.* 2nd ed. (Paper covers) Williams & Norgate.

the Christian Church, which claimed to speak with the authority of a supernatural revelation. The earth was conceived as the centre of creation and man as the supreme being upon it, standing in a unique relation to God, being made in His image. At first perfect, man fell through sin, but in the course of time God sent forth His Son Jesus to redeem mankind. Jesus founded a Church and the eternal bliss of any outside of it was considered to be in serious doubt.

At the Reformation of religion many broke away from an organisation which seemed to them hurtful to their intellectual and religious life. Inspired with the spirit of freedom scholars began to claim the right to make an empirical study of man and the world untrammelled by the dogmatic utterances of ecclesiastics. Descartes and Bacon established the independence of this research and indicated methods. Progress was made in many

- III. MAN AND THE UNIVERSE. *A Study of the Influence of the Advance in Scientific Knowledge upon our Understanding of Christianity.* 11th ed. 1912, Methuen.
- IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF FAITH ALLIED WITH SCIENCE: *A Catechism for Parents and Teachers.* 5th ed. 1907. Methuen.
- V. THE SURVIVAL OF MAN. *A Study in Unrecognised Human Faculty.* 5th ed. Methuen.

directions, but it was only in the nineteenth century that the question of man's relation to the universe became explicitly prominent as a pressing problem. Copernicus had already shown that the earth does not occupy the central position which theologians claimed for it ; now, the theory of evolution represented man and all other organisms as having been produced by gradual change from earlier and simpler forms. The older view of creation, according to which man is a spiritual being quite distinct from all other creatures on earth, appeared to be no longer tenable. For, now, man was described as the last known link of a physical chain, a mere being of earth, and the whole universe as a realm of immutable, inexorable law, in which there could be nothing spontaneous or contingent. Leading scientists such as Tyndall, Clifford, Huxley, Haeckel, and Romanes, together with Buchner and Spencer fought long for this view against unflinching supporters of the traditional conception. Though unwavering as to the principle of evolution and the reign of law, most of these men came to doubt that they had said the last word concerning man when they had described him in a naturalistic, almost materialistic, fashion. Intent

on the study of the "material" they far too often forgot the fact that their theories were the "thoughts" of "thinkers" and concerned "matter" only in relation to "minds." Huxley oscillated between a position predominantly naturalistic and one predominantly idealistic. In his defence of man's moral effort he contended that man must fight against Nature. Spencer wrote quite an elaborate philosophy concerning the "Unknowable." Romanes, who had published "*A Candid Examination of Theism*," mainly negative, in his posthumous "*Thoughts on Religion*" admits the essential truth of religion. Russel Wallace persistently held the view that in the transition to man a new, spiritual factor makes its appearance in organic evolution on earth.

After an enormous amount of discussion two problems became clear: What is the relation of life and matter? and What is the relation of life and mind? If mind and life are essentially related and are fundamental, then man has a certain intrinsic worth, and his moral effort and religious hopes are not vain delusions. If, however, matter is fundamental and life and mind mere transitory phenomena, man's relation to the

universe is no more than that of being part of a material body. In spite of hesitation on the part of even great scientists, there was in the nineteenth century a widespread feeling that science was committed to the latter of these alternatives, and the whole teaching of religion with reference to man and the world appeared to many to be a mere play of the imagination.

i.

The importance of the writings of Sir Oliver Lodge in this connection is not on account of any markedly novel ideas, but that in them a scientist of repute unhesitatingly rejects the view that matter and force as Science conceives them can fully account for the total contents of experience. His attitude towards the nature of scientific knowledge is typical of a large section of modern scientists. Further, he recognises the necessity for according more attention to the fact and the character of those aspects of experience which we call religious. He is fundamentally opposed to all arbitrary limitation to enquiry, whether at the open behest of ecclesiastical authorities or the

more hidden and subtle prejudice of the traditional attitudes and teachings of Science.

Like many of his brother scientists Dr. Lodge manifests an evident shyness towards Philosophy. The propositions of the philosopher are not "Science as now understood." But the works mentioned above give varying ideas as to the meaning of "Science" and "scientific." At one time we are told that to be scientific "means being clear and honest and as exact as we know how to be;" at another, "An expression of phenomena in terms of matter and force alone is the basis of science." (II. 31.) Philosophers are as certainly scientific in the former sense as they are not in the latter. But if this is Science as now understood, then Sir Oliver Lodge's treatises contain much which is not Science, in fact, most of the fundamental propositions of the above works. He is more of a philosopher than he is willing to admit; and less than he implicitly intends. The chief difference between himself and ordinary philosophers is that the latter insist upon a more thoroughgoing treatment, and express themselves in a more technical manner. The fact that though among the philosophers he writes not as the philosophers constitutes one of the

grounds both of the value and of the popularity of his books. But this advantage is obtained only at the cost of inadequacy in the discussion of difficult problems, leading to too great a certainty in some instances and too little in others.

There is considerably less dogmatism than formerly on the part of scientists concerning the extent of scientific knowledge. The attitude maintained by Dr. Lodge is a common one. "We have no access to infallible information concerning matters of fact" (I. 103.) "Modern Science knows nothing of ultimate origins. It never asks the question. It starts with matter in motion it traces its past and to some extent its future." (I. 117-8 cf. III 31 ff.) The conception "the entire universe" is beyond the grasp of Science; and the "eternity" of matter and force or of anything else is not within the scope of legitimate proof. (II. 8.) Nevertheless, human knowledge is true as far as it goes (I. 106), although absolute truth is always beyond us. (I. 125.) What exactly is meant here by absolute truth is not clear, nor what is the basis of so absolute a statement. What the author appears in part to mean is that "the whole of truth is unattainable by us." (I. 99.) Religious knowledge is evidently

not of the same kind as that of the sciences. Though all men may in some degree obtain it directly, God is apprehended chiefly through "the saints and the pinnacles of the race". Yet in all knowledge new ideas arise first 'even, e g. in the hypotheses of science as a kind of inspiration. (I. 187.)

The outstanding problem is stated by Sir Oliver Lodge not in terms of a conflict between Naturalism and Idealism, but in the more popular form of a conflict between Science and Religion. The controversy, which he regards as not yet dead, he states thus: "Is the world controlled by a Living Person, accessible to prayer, influenced by love, able and willing to foresee, to intervene, to guide, and wistfully to lead without compulsion spirits that are in some sort akin to himself? Or is the world a self-generated self-controlling machine, complete and fully organised for movement, either up or down, for progress or degeneration, according to the chances of heredity and the influence of the environment?" (III. 25-6.) The form of reconciliation which the author wishes to suggest is one to be based on experienced facts.

ii

Life and Matter is in part a criticism of Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*. In it the author states briefly his position with regard to the first of the two questions previously stated. To us it seems that the lack of thoroughness is evident in the expression he gives to the meanings of the terms "Life" and "Matter." "Matter is known to us by our sensations, but it is not dependent on them, nor is its nature the least like them." (II. 54.) In discussing the question of the conservation of matter, he asserts that no specific single material property can be specified as really and genuinely constant. (II. 11) "We should prefer to say that at least the *basis* of matter was fundamentally conserved." (II. 15.) The writer gives no plain statement concerning what he takes matter to be, and we are left to find out for ourselves what this *basis of matter* might be. The most important thing about matter is that it is "the instrument and the vehicle of mind." (II. 59) The position is similar with regard to "life": "to the question what life is, we have as yet no answer." (II. 95.) Life is neither matter nor energy

(II. 68.) It would have been better if the author had enquired more deeply into what we really mean when we talk of energy. "All that we have actually experienced and verified is that a complex molecular aggregate is capable of being the vehicle of or material basis of life" (II. 95.) In passing it may be observed that it is not once made clear what kind of answer is sought or desired. That it should be "clear" and "exact" and obtained by "honest" research we may be sure, but if it is to be one in terms of "matter and force alone," then it is an urgent necessity that these terms themselves be more clearly and exactly understood.

Of far greater consequence for Sir Oliver Lodge is the consideration of the important characteristics of life as we know it. It appears to have no law of conservation or constancy such as that predicated of matter. (II. 73.) One acorn with the necessary conditions is capable of giving rise to a whole forest of oak trees. Even more important is the aspects of guidance which life manifests. Such guidance and control alone give it intelligibility. Where there is life there is guidance, and guidance implies something other than the

mechanical equivalents of the physical sciences, it implies mind. The author pertinently remarks that in order to explain life, mind, consciousness, in terms of matter, naturalistic writers themselves assume that matter possesses these unexplained attributes. The material constituents of a living being are "organised," that is, they have a definite specific relation one to another, and though the actual materials change the form remains in essentials unchanged. That therefore which organises them must be as real as they are. This reality is the soul.

When the fact of guidance is once definitely admitted, the question is inevitable with regard to evolution: "Do variations arise by guidance or by chance? Is natural selection akin to the verified practical processes of artificial selection? Or is it wholly alien to them and influenced by chance alone?" (II. 26 cf. III. 38.) The answer given by Sir Oliver Lodge is unhesitatingly in favour of belief in guidance. "The conclusion at which I am arriving," he says in another book,

* The author's conception of guidance "without work" or the expenditure of energy again suggests the need of a more careful consideration of the nature of energy than he gives. (See III. 58-61. II. 81-87).

"is that future events are planned and are not haphazard and unforeseen" (I. 80.)

iii

The absence of philosophic thoroughness is very evident in the indefinite and varying use of such terms as mind, soul, spirit. Some attempt is made to describe what these terms mean but the exposition is little helped thereby. Again, the unphilosophic lack of caution is apparent (as he himself sees elsewhere: cf. II. 15 quoted above) in the latter part of the statement: "a really existing thing never perishes, but only changes its form. Physical science teaches us this clearly enough concerning matter and energy." (III. 83.) The soul is also such a reality (see above). It therefore is permanent; it existed before this life and will persist after it. The question for Sir Oliver Lodge is whether the nature of the soul as personal, as possessing individuality and a character of its own, is permanent. His method in this discussion is to present a number of "reasons" pointing to the validity of an affirmative answer. (See III. Chapter V.) These include

the postulate that nothing of real value, nothing representing an advance, is lost. There are arguments from praeternormal psychology and mental pathology. The suggestion that genius is a ground for believing in the pre-existence of the individual soul has always failed to impress me, except by its obvious metaphysical weakness. For if pressed to its logical conclusion it suggests that all souls have ultimately the same character and that the particular quality of the genius has been developed in previous lives. But why did *this* individual develop the quality and not the others? If it is said: "On account of environment," then there must be differences of environment, and these must be ultimate. But then why not admit also ultimate differences in the souls? In fact if they are not identical, that is if they are a many (as the suggestion—genius and lack of genius—involves) they must be ultimately different. The ground of the genius of any particular kind may exist in the ultimate character of the soul, may be one of the qualities which differentiate it from other souls. And on this view this particular distinctiveness may be conceived as real even if the soul were created at the beginning of this life. As a matter of fact,

viewed metaphysically, the reality of genius gives us no ground to infer pre-existence, nor does pre-existence give us any genuine aid in the understanding of genius.

Sir Oliver Lodge, as is well-known, seeks for evidence of the survival of personality after physical death from what is called Spiritism. He starts his consideration of these facts, alleged or real, with an insistence on the reality of telepathy. "Telepathy" he says "means the apparently direct action of one mind on another by means unknown to science." (V. 96.) By the same process departed souls may be able to communicate with us. But it must be confessed that in the writings in which Spiritism is discussed by Sir Oliver Lodge, the communication does not always appear to be of this kind. Rather there is something like a form of spirit possession of the body of the "medium," or of part of it. We do not intend to examine whether the interpretation put upon the alleged facts is the correct one. Possibly all might be accounted for by telepathy and suggestion on the part simply of the human beings visibly present. Yet even if we are not willing to spend our time in such pursuits we must admire the spirit of broadmindedness with which Sir Oliver Lodge has

taken up the investigation. Meanwhile we await evidence of some really valuable result from it. He himself has great faith in the future possibilities. There are signs that man's mental intercourse "will some day be no longer limited to contemporary denizens of earth, but will permit a utilisation of knowledge and powers superior to his own, even to the extent of ultimately attaining trustworthy information concerning other conditions of existence." (V. 334.) From the experience hitherto "The first thing we learn, perhaps the only thing we chiefly learn in the first instance is *continuity*." "Memory, culture, education, habits, character, and affection—all these and to a certain extent tastes and interests—for better, for worse, are retained". (V. 339.)

iv

The argument concerning life (see section ii) only brings us as far as the reality of the human and the infra-human soul. The aspect of guidance would, however, seem to require us to go further and to postulate some higher powers or power. Most will be prepared to agree that "it is im-

probable that man is the highest type of existence " (II. 27.) By means of what we may call an epistemological principle which deserves more discussion than the author gives to it, the belief in God is easily justified. " Our highest thoughts are likely to be nearest reality ; they must be stages in the direction of truth, else they could not have come to us and been recognised as the highest. Whatever we can clearly and consistently conceive, that is *ipso facto* in a sense already existent in the universe as a whole and that or something better we shall find to be a dim fore shadowing of a higher reality" (II. 46-7). In the *Catechism* more definite statements are made about the belief in God, though they are not very clear, even if they are consistent. "There is a Power in the Universe vastly beyond our comprehension and we trust and believe that it is a Good and Loving Power, able and willing to help all creatures, and to guide wisely without detriment to our incipient freedom." (IV. 84) The non-Absolutist view of God is mentioned, though the author does not plainly adopt it. Rather, God for him is the sum total of existences, and so we have a form of Pantheism. " It is permissible reverently to use the term (God)

for a mode of regarding the Universe as invested with what in human beings we call personality, consciousness, and other forms of intelligence, emotion and will." (IV. 37.) For the rest the author's view concerning God is closely bound up with his conception of Christianity.

Sir Oliver Lodge's attitude to evil is concisely stated in *The Substance of Faith* : he treats it largely as a practical problem. The term " evil " is relative. (47) . " The fact that we regard excessive cold as an evil is only because our organisation demands a certain temperature for life ; it is only evil in its relation to organisms sufficiently high to be damaged by it. " (49) . Now who ever heard or knew what " cold in itself " is ? While our organisms are as they are, and while we experience cold, we suffer pain. That pain, that suffering, is as experienced as real, as absolute, as any experience. On page 48 it is admitted that " pain is an awful reality. " In fact, we would say that though we know many things as real, we know none more so. The ugly is said to be due to " unsuitable grouping. " But just what does the term " unsuitable " imply ? From the point of view of beauty that is unsuitable which is ugly. All

we have here is no explanation, but a vicious circle. "Many social evils are due to human folly and stupidity." (47) Quite so : but is not " folly and stupidity " itself a great and present evil ? Hunger is not simply " the absence of a good " (food), but is a positive pain. The following statement needs no comment : " Contrast is an inevitable attribute of reality. Sickness is the negative and opposite of health : without sickness we should not be aware what health was." (*sic*) (50). Sin is due to the advance to conscious freedom; it is the choosing of a course of life already transcended. But Sir Oliver Lodge appears to associate it rather with error than with a perversion of will.

At times we are inclined to think that the theory of evolution mitigates for us the problem of evil. In some senses it does so in that it suggests the possibility that in the course of time we may overcome evils; possibly all evil. But it has to be borne in mind that an empirical examination of experience shows that though we are becoming capable of higher and more extended goods we are also becoming capable of greater and more extended evils. This aspect of the treatment of evil from the point of view of evolu-

tion Sir Oliver Lodge does not sufficiently consider. But insist on the reality of evil as we may, it is not philosophically impossible and certainly is practical to "hope that" "As we rise in the scale of existence...things will get better: we have experience that they do. It may be said that up to a certain point in the scale of life, vice and caprice increase; that the lower organisms and the plant world know nothing of them, and that only man has been consciously wicked. But wickedness reaches a maximum at a certain stage—a stage the best of the human race has already passed—and we need not postulate either vice or caprice in our superiors." (III. 6)

It has been seen that the view of God entertained is that which identifies Him with the Absolute, the Whole. Thus the evil must be within God. (see III. 35.) The type of answer to the difficulty thus implied is that "there are grades of existence" (III. 35.), an answer which we do not profess to understand.

v

It is significant of the change that has taken place since the sixties of the last century that a

leading scientist should set out seriously to seek and to state the truth he finds in Christian doctrines in the light of modern Science. We have insufficient room here to discuss in detail this interesting side of his work. But Sir Oliver Lodge evidently has little knowledge, and could not be expected to have much knowledge, of the discussion in the most advanced schools of modern Theology, and in the minds of the theologically informed his views here suffer in consequence. In the doctrine of the Incarnation he finds an insistence on the worth of the "material" as a means of expression for God and man. Though the idea of incarnation is older than Christianity, it is in the person of Jesus that the supreme revelation and incarnation of God is to be found. But, Sir Oliver Lodge, rightly as it seems to us, deems it unwise to suppose that the worth of Jesus and his teaching stands or falls with the historicity of a Virgin Birth. Nor does he see any reason for believing that the hope of immortality is vain if the earthly body of Jesus did not rise from the grave. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, as applied to all men, is to be interpreted to mean that the soul will always have some form of external

manifestaion. Christian salvation is for soul and body, for now and hereafter. It does not consist in a mystical transaction between Christ and God, but in an upward struggle of the whole of humanity co-operating with God. Members one of another we have to bear one another's burdens: this is the truth of the idea of vicarious suffering, to which Sir Oliver Lodge, with good reason, pays much attention. Jesus is supreme in saving men from sin both by the nature of the ideal he taught and by the inspiration of his life and death. The deficiency in the author's theological knowledge shows itself most in the hesitation and uncertainty he manifests when treating of the person of Jesus, whom he treats at one time as not absolutely different from other men, and at others as quite unique, "a crucified, an executed God" (III. 186). This is, in my estimation, the weakest part of Sir Oliver Lodge's treatment of Christianity, but I may be spared criticism here, having discussed the matter briefly in "*Jesus in the 19th Century and After.*"

IX

THE VALUE OF CONFESSIONS OF FAITH

The revolt from dogmatism, one of the leading characteristics of the development of the highest human culture of the last half century, has had the tendency when exaggerated to lead to the abandonment of all forms of creeds or confessions of faith. It is an important question, therefore, whether there is any value in a confession of faith as such and if so, what it is. The former question will be answered if an indication is given of the good which comes with the enunciation and the acceptance of a creed.

A confession of faith is a statement of some of one's beliefs with the resolute affirmation of them as one's beliefs. There may be confessions of faith about all sorts of things. Yet some beliefs are so general, are so firmly fixed in the minds of all, that no need exists for any statements of them. Although we do not formally

recite articles of belief concerning the world of nature and society, implicitly they guide our actions and enable us to make advances into new regions of experience. Before children can adjust themselves to the physical and social worlds in which they live they must be taught some general statements about them. Many of these are and must be received on authority. Later, under the influence of social education and individual reflection some of these may be modified and others entirely discarded. With regard to these sides of life, beliefs are inevitable for a consistent and rational attitude. But the term *confession of faith* has more frequently been applied simply to a set of convictions concerning the fundamental meaning of life. It is in this sense of a religious and philosophical creed that it is understood here.

Two requirements, or two aspects of one requirement in this connection, are that a confession of faith shall be i. a confession, and ii. a faith. Creeds learned by heart and recited by children (and often by adults) are not genuine confessions of faith as far as these persons are concerned. To be such there must be the explicit acceptance as a definite act, or as a con-

tinual frame of mind beginning with a more or less definite act. This requirement can only be satisfied when individual propositions are clearly understood and are seen to fit into the scheme of one's experience. Without this understanding, which can only come with the attainment of a considerable amount of education, the personal acceptance as parts of a creed cannot be truly genuine. However insignificant or badly stated, a confession of faith, which is the real conviction of the person making it, is of far higher value than any mere or only half intelligible repetition of a statement of beliefs formulated by someone else. In fact such repetition which does not represent genuine personal conviction is of no real value.

Admitting these contentions it is still pertinent to ask : Why make a confession of faith at all ? Certainly there is no compelling reason why the confession should be a public one : though there is nevertheless a value in such open confession. To that we shall return: for the present it may be left out of account. Whether there is any value in making a confession of faith at all depends to some extent on the character of the confession which is made.

In systematising his fundamental beliefs into

a consistent whole a man is to a very large extent concerned with the nature of the world and of its meaning and of the nature and meaning of his own life within it. To have come to a more or less stable conception of these things, stable but not static, a conception capable of growth and modification, is in the first place a satisfaction from the standpoint of the intellect. A confession of belief in a particular set of propositions is at least the affirmation of some intellectual value. We may insist, with Dr. McTaggart,* that in the ordinary sense of the word there is something inexplicable in every attempt to formulate a view of the universe. But for the rest the relation to the physical world, to society, to one's own nature in its striving to realise certain ideals, may be richer and higher the greater and clearer one's understanding of these things is. It is not otherwise with regard to religion and our fundamental view of an attitude towards ultimate reality. Religious and philosophical creeds are accepted because they make life more intelligible than it would be without them. The presence of the inexplicable ultimate has to be admitted : but the admission gives little help in life. Apart

* *Mind* xvi. 433.

from that, once a man can formulate for himself the conception of life and the world which justifies itself most to his judgment he will experience more intellectual peace and calm, or at least less intellectual unrest.

A philosophical or religious confession of faith is often a statement of the fundamental principles of a *type of life*. The more explicit and secure those principles seem, the more they satisfy the demands of the individual judgment, the more consistent and stable will be the adherence to the type of life which they represent, and the more enlightened will be the championship of it. Further, the emotional and ethical attitude is enormously influenced by the acceptance of a broad and rational conception of reality. The way we act and the kind of character we try to cultivate depend largely on what we believe. To make beliefs clear in a confession of faith aids in decisions as to the best course of conduct. The effort to achieve an ideal of character is then more effective as it is more direct. Individual conduct is then considered in a definitive relation with other aspects of existence.

A confession of faith indicates the attainment of a certain conscious attitude towards life : it

shows that the person who makes it is not entirely swayed by custom and habit and a mechanical adherence to the prevailing opinions of the society in which he lives. If these opinions are to be accepted they should be accepted intelligently, what may in two senses be called "deliberately", that is, both with deliberation and with resolution of will. Indeed, it is a moral duty to endeavour to come to as intelligent a conception of life as we are at all capable of, for on this will depend conscious co-operation with or opposition to other forces in the universe.

Clear statements of one's fundamental beliefs, when publicly made, challenge clear statements from others. Thus it becomes more easy than otherwise to find on the one hand the points of agreement and the basis of co-operation, and on the other the points of difference and the grounds of opposition. And such clear statements should facilitate discussion with the object of eliminating as far as possible detrimental opposition. Frequently it may be found that the elements of difference are due to one-sided conceptions of valuable truths. Discussion may lead rather to the formation of a more comprehensive view than either of the opposing parties independently maintained.

That way lies progress. That is one value of a public confession of faith. Further, public confession enables men to see more or less where we stand, what our attitude is, what we are striving towards. In the struggle for the achievement of the good and the elimination of the bad it is well to know what the fundamental principles of men are. Open confession would be beneficial on all sides of life. Secret diplomacy is essentially deplorable whether it be in international politics or in any of the ordinary affairs of government, business, or personal relationships. If selfishness is the root evil, the lack of frankness is one of its most despicable and most diabolical off-spring. Men sincerely convinced of the power of the good will not fear to shout it from the house-tops, and publish it in the market-place. It is that which bodes evil, which men keep in the darkensses of their own minds; which governmental and business groups of men hide from the public gaze; it is secret diplomacy which leads to unfairness and injustice to individuals.

Again, the superstitions which are never made the subject of a definite statement are those which are the most difficult to fix, to fight, and to eradicate. In order that we may come to some more

distinctly explicit comprehension of the highest human ideals and more direct and general opposition to superstitions the formations of confessions of faith should be encouraged.

Religious confessions of faith, in the form of creeds, have been and are the means of expressing adherence to a type of life and view of reality maintained by a particular religious community. Such creeds have always been used also in the education of the children of the members of the community. In this instruction it is evident that much must be learned by rote the real and full meaning of which is not understood by the child. That is similar to what happens in instruction on all sides of life. Much information thus learnt becomes useful at a later time. But the learning of a creed is quite different from its definite adoption as a genuine confession of faith. The adherents of most religions learn the creed but do not confess the faith implied by the creed. And learning the official creed not infrequently prevents them making their own real confession of faith.

It is obviously here that the chief problem with regard to confessions of faith really lies. For, after all, an individual believes predominantly

what he has come to understand through his own experience and reason in relation to the social conditions in which he lives. One important factor in these conditions, especially important in relation to his confession of faith in fundamental principles of life, is the religious organisation, just that organisation which has a creed or something corresponding to a creed to teach him.

The problem of the adjustment of the individual's confession of faith with the professed creed of his religious community is aggravated in our day by the fact that all large organised bodies being much more conservative than particular individuals or smaller groups of individuals, they have not yet, at least as represented by the majority of their priests and officials, entered into the real spirit of the revolt against dogmatism with a reference to which this paper began. There is a fundamental difference of attitude, all the more marked by the comparatively few individual exceptions, between the authorities of the religions and the leaders of thought not officially connected with them. The spirit of modern knowledge is the reverse of dogmatism. In every sphere, except that of orthodox theology and the defence of official religious creeds, the results of

scientific and historical research and philosophical speculation are put forward not so definitely as absolute truth, but as the most probable position which suggests itself. A confession of religious faith need be no more dogmatic than that. Such an attitude alone implies an openness of mind and the possibility of advance to a more worthy view.

The attempt on the part of individuals, as individuals, in any particular religion to formulate their individual confessions of faith must tend to make the problem of the most exact and justifiable confession of that particular religion more consciously recognised as a communal duty. Laymen will demand a higher degree of understanding of their religion from the priests and religious ministers. There will also be aroused spontaneous attempts to think out afresh the principles of the religious life, in contrast with the re-iteration of the systems and phrases of past ages. Each must endeavour for itself to confess its faith. What has been said by the prophets and saints of days now gone will be often of undoubted value. But if the age makes no attempt to make clear to itself its own beliefs independently, these other contributions will

represent no really strong conviction, however definitely it asserts its acceptance of them.

With the serious and independent effort by the thinkers of the different religions to consider afresh what they would regard as the confession of faith of their respective religions would also come an opportunity for a further wider attempt to formulate a conception of religion which, out of a comparison of all these particular confessions, would evolve a more comprehensive and richer whole of religious principles, feelings, and practices. The Comparative Study of Religions might then have a more direct relation to living religions and play its proper role in the development of the religious life of the world. This wider task

a universal confession of faith may be approached by each individual and community from its own standpoint, with the particular emotional attitude of the distinctive religion. This will be an advantage if the task is taken up as a duty and a privilege, with the tolerant spirit of those with the widest and highest hope. The more earnestly the problem is taken up and the nearer men get to its solution the more secure will be the co-operation between men and nations of all parts of the world. A universal confession of

faith, sincerely accepted, is not a dream but a vision-and it is young men who see visions-and it is especially they who are called upon to ask themselves what are their confessions of faith, what are the principles in accordance with which they would mould their lives.

X

THE IDEA OF RESURRECTION

The most urgent question in the religious thought of today is the nature and the relation of the values of individual religious doctrines. For the greatest, though not the most conspicuous, enemies of the religious life are those who lead men to fix their gaze on the insignificant or worthless to the neglect of what is fundamental. Opposition to, and even entire rejection of, the religious view of life is not seldom due to a misunderstanding of the relative significance of the elements of the usual theological exposition. The submission of a religious belief to critical examination has the same purpose as the placing of metallic ore into the furnace: to separate the valuable material from the undesirable elements associated with it in its original form.

Theology has three tasks: the description and analysis of the religious experience; the critical

examination of the contents of this experience in consideration of the truth of religious doctrines and the validity of religious value-judgments; and the constructive elaboration of an ideal of religious life, with its fundamental principles and ideas.

Though there appears a super-temporal aspect in religious experience, the attainment of new ideas and new feelings in the religious life occurs in "time." A doctrine may be true apart from any particular time relationship, nevertheless every doctrine arises or gains power in the minds of men first at some particular period. This is the case with all kinds of knowledge. The law of gravity, for example, is valid apart from any particular time-relationship: the fact it indicates was real before it was discovered. There was a period before any human being was aware of it, so that its appearance as an element of human knowledge was at a particular point in time. How an idea first came into the mind of any man, or how it came to exercise a marked influence over the lives of men, are questions quite distinct from that of its truth or validity. The origin of an idea is often of no vital consequence to us now, and in no way affects its value.

* * *

Through nearly two thousand years the idea of resurrection has formed an integral part of Christian doctrine, having an importance and exercising an influence that cannot be denied. But it has been almost inseparably associated with the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus. Without entering at all into the vexed question of the validity of that belief, it is certainly allowable, justifiable, and, indeed, necessary to examine its religious implications.

What is the value for theological thought and the religious life of the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus? As a matter of logical method one instance to the contrary suffices to refute a universal statement. The resurrection of Jesus, if true, is adequate to overthrow the view that men are all merely physical and entirely cease to exist after physical death. It implies that man is more than body and is not absolutely dependent upon the physical. On the other hand, however, it is quite insufficient to warrant the view that "all men are immortal," or that "all men shall rise again." What is told us of Jesus involves his spiritual persistence for a length of time after his physical death; and manifests the power of his spirit to enter into

relation with his material body ; but his continued existence is not thereby established, nor is the view of the persistence of others after death made secure. Though it may generally be thought improbable, it is not impossible that only those who reach a certain degree of spiritual power and character will survive. To recognise the limits of the implications of the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus in its bearing upon the question of immortality need not in the least lessen one's faith in immortality, as so many Christians have seemed to imagine.

The physical resurrection of Jesus, it may be contended, has a special significance in relation to his character and his claims. Here theology is faced with a question which no thinker who is at all impartial can regard as settled ; a question which at this date appears almost impossible of final answer : "What claims did Jesus actually make ?" That he regarded himself as in some sense the Messiah cannot reasonably be doubted, but that by this or any other expressions he used he meant to proclaim himself co-equal with the Father, "very God of very God," there seems no adequate evidence to assert or to deny. But suppose he made the highest of these claims. The

resurrection of his body is no evidence of their validity; there is no logical connection between the two. It is not open to a Christian to put forward the suggestion that one who rises from the dead is God. In the Apostles' Creed the idea of the resurrection of the body is applied to men generally. Yet, on the other hand, disbelief in the physical resurrection does not necessitate the denial of the Deity of the Jesus.

No greater strength of argument for the validity of the claim to Deity is obtained by combining the belief in the physical resurrection with other beliefs. Virgin birth is no ground upon which to argue that one so born is "very God of very God." Dr. Gore, who ardently defends the doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus, takes it as a consequence of belief in his Deity rather than as a ground for that belief. For the Incarnation of the Son of God there would be, we are to suppose, an extraordinary birth. Again, unless it is assumed at the outset that no merely human being can be sinless (an assumption we do not seem warranted in making), there is no logical transition from the alleged sinlessness of Jesus to the doctrine of his Deity. Virgin birth, sinlessness, physical resurrection, taken separately

or all together, do not justify the attribution of Deity. No valid reasons have ever been given why these doctrines may not be true of a merely human being. None of these things really affect the question of the Deity of Jesus. And his physical resurrection, if Deity, can hardly argue human immortality, for the question may be asked, though with difficulty answered: "How can the spiritual persistence and physical resurrection of God be evidence of the immortality of man?"

On an analogy with the physical resurrection of Jesus, the orthodox Christian also believes in "the resurrection of the body," as applied to all mankind. The record of the empty tomb and the form of his appearance suggest that the resurrection body of Jesus was that of his crucifixion and burial. Thomas, the doubter, was bidden to behold the hands of Jesus and to thrust his hand into his side.* Apparently it had new qualities—he appeared suddenly in the midst of his disciples in a room with locked doors—but is certainly represented as the same body. Yet the view that all human beings will rise again with the bodies with which they died is quite

* John xx. 27.

untenable. The analogy between the resurrection of Jesus and that of any other person can only be accepted in a general sense, if it is accepted at all. To one who has faith in spiritual persistence after physical death, it may suggest simply the idea that the spirit always has some form of manifestation corresponding to what is meant by body.

The significance of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus cannot be truly estimated apart from the fact of his crucifixion and the nature of his life and teaching. He had preached the advent of a new world of love, the Kingdom of God, to inaugurate which was his mission. Nothing represented this kingdom so well as the family: all are brothers as the sons of God. In their close personal attachment to him, his disciples felt something of the reality of his ideal and of his confidence. Whatever eschatological elements there may have been in his conception of the kingdom, it is from the moral and spiritual fundamentals that the good and great in Christianity has sprung. His disciples certainly looked forward to an early triumph and the accomplishment of his mission in an external manner. He went to Jerusalem, and some of them followed

him. Then, with a diplomatic suddenness, he was taken and crucified. Their hopes shattered, the disciples fled. The aims of Jesus, the kingdom he was to set up, seemed a dream that was past. But it was not so : they recovered faith. The existence of Christianity to-day is an absolute proof that, whatever the truth about the body of Jesus, in the minds of the disciples there was indeed a resurrection to a more abundant life and a wider faith than they had felt before. This new life wove itself around the belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus ; but the question whether that belief was a factor leading to the wider resurrection or was itself a product of their faith cannot be indisputably answered to-day. For the determination of the nature and the value of the idea of resurrection, the question is not a vital one. The validity of the idea of resurrection cannot depend on the resuscitation of a particular body. What is essential for Christianity in this connection is that the crucifixion did not mark the end of the mission of Jesus, but was the way through which the narrower organisation and messianic hopes died to give rise to a universal movement.

The experience of these first members of the Christian Church has given to it the principle of its life. At every stage of its advance there has been a break from some form of narrowness. The Reformation achieved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the death of much which limited the religious spirit and it was a resurrection to a life of greater freedom and wider outlook. The Protestantism which then arose has itself to die, is indeed dying at this hour ; and not a few stand by looking on as did the Roman soldiers and the Jews of old at the death of Jesus. Leaders of the Churches seal down the stone of tradition and set a guard. Nevertheless men look forward to a fuller life which will assuredly come. If the earlier Reformers unwound the mediæval shroud from the feet of Christianity and thus allowed it freedom of movement, the ardent souls of the new Reformation have to uncover its head, that, in the light of intellectual truth, it may see clearly the needs of mankind. Of a certainty resurrection is a fundamental principle of Christianity.

No one has a right dogmatically to deny the resurrection of Jesus. Whatever be the value of its assertion now, its influence on some minds in

the early spread of Christianity cannot be disputed. The idea of resurrection, whether it was independently conceived or not, has become a force in the thought and life of Western peoples though the preaching of the physical resurrection of Jesus. But far too often the attention of mankind has been directed to the transitory rather than to the vital and eternal. Not belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus but the idea of resurrection in its fullest and widest application is the source of moral energy and religious hope. Though a man declare himself agnostic with regard to the former, or even if he reject it outright, all that the latter implies is still open to his faith.

That death is a necessity and resurrection a reality is the import of much of the teaching of Jesus, and it is as valid of individuals as of societies and movements. He came that men might have life and that they might have it more abundantly. Each must take up his cross and follow him – to crucifixion and death – and resurrection. The prodigal morally degraded and reduced to poverty, finds the power to arise and go to his father. Zacchæus dies to his old ways and starts anew on the path of justice and love. Mary Magdalene, under his influence, looks up from her death of

sin and lives afterwards a life of pure devotion. That was the resurrection with which Jesus was concerned. "There is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine self-righteous persons." The way to life is through death : "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it : and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it." In a world of moral values, such as ours, the reality of resurrection is the only ground of a universal hope.

XI

RELIGION AND BEAUTY

The close relation of religion and art has been apparent in some form in most ages and climes. The recognition of this as a fact of experience and history does not blind us to the distinction between the two. Art has been, and is today more than ever before, pursued for the sake of beauty itself. So also there have been and are forms of religion in which beauty is conspicuous chiefly by its absence, or in which art has been reduced to very narrow limits. Nevertheless there are deeply rooted relationships between the innermost essence of religion and the ultimate springs and nature of beauty. To bring these into bolder relief should aid towards a better appreciation of the character of both religion and beauty.

In the earliest form of religion and always to the unsophisticated mind the apprehension of beauty has associated itself with the feelings of

awe and sublimity engendered by the great facts of nature, the sun, magnificent rivers and mountains, vast expanses of sea and plain. About all these experiences is the quality of greatness : the trivial, the insignificant, is entirely transcended. Beauty here is associated with something of the universal and as such it touches the same aspect of the human spirit as does religion. After the first feelings of fear are overcome a beauty, if only a beauty of apparent power and directness, is felt in the lightning. And the thunder and the lightning were for early men manifestations of the power of the highest gods. Thor with his hammer, Indra with the *vajra*, Jove with his thunderbolts, also as Zeus with his lightning, these are factors in the realm of early religious ideas as in that of the poetic art of myth making.

A fact which rarely escapes notice is that monasteries and other religious institutions, and sometimes temples, have been very frequently built in the most beautiful parts of the country. In Britain one may think of the abbeys of Furness, of Glastonbury and Melrose, and Fountains Abbey as supreme examples. In India the temples are as often as possible near some mighty river, and the ghats, the river slopes with steps rising out of the

water right up to the temples, give a magnificent impression. A sense of the artistic effect as well as religious appreciation of the supreme importance of the building, has led to the building of temples often on the highest available position. The association of "high places" with religion goes back to the times when from the highest mountain top the dawn with its splendour and its heralding of the joys of a new day was first seen. Further, religious feelings have more often led men to look up towards heaven, in joy, supplication, and hope than downwards in excessive humility and resignation. Some such ideas may be applied in explanation of types of the beautiful in architecture. The Gothic arch and the spire have been regarded as expressions of the soul's aspiration.

A characteristic of early art, and especially of that associated with religion, has been the frequency of repetition. This is evident in forms of decoration in religious painting and sculpture. It is even more impressive in early religious hymns and prayers. But this repetition in its religious form is not exact: rather the fundamental idea or feeling is expressed with a number of variations, slight but nevertheless real. With

the insistence on absolutely exact repetition the attitude of magic is apparent : beauty also is then lost, for repetition without variation is mechanical, producing a feeling of monotony.

The psychological connection of this repetition with the feelings of religion is as interesting as instructive. That which is repeated becomes known and there is an ease in the repetition : little effort is required. Thus a feeling of success, of triumph is uppermost. There is no sense of failure or incongruity. This is of the essence of the appreciation of the beautiful. No tune, no picture, no scene of nature, which contains incongruous elements is felt to be beautiful. On the other hand the sense of power, of confidence and trust, is at the basis of all religious experience.

The truth of this contention may be seen even by an examination of early art in relation to those aspects of early religion which led some of the Greeks and not a few modern writers to maintain that fear is the primary basis of religion. Anyone who has seen a simple dance of a primitive type of people, such as the Todas of the Nilgherry Hills, will very soon feel something of the condition into which the continual repetition of one or two sounds and one or two

movements brings the mind. As children, in the dark or in other circumstances of fear many must have repeated something time after time, and thus taken the attention from the object of fear. The same psychological fact may be used as one factor in the explanation of the religious use of dances, and repetitions in songs and prayers. The process has had the effect of relieving the feelings, and of cultivating other feelings, those for example, of confidence and joy. With the rhythm that comes with repetition comes also the feeling of the triumph over fear, and thus of strength and confidence, the fruits of religion. Rhythm, as in some forms of music and of poetry, forms a considerable part of the nature of art.

An important stage in the relation between religion and art is when the gods or god begin to be definitely represented in human form. There are, it is true, many examples of the grotesque in images, but the conception of the relationship should be judged rather by the best forms. To the uncivilised mind something grotesque, especially if it is old and has a long tradition, has an attraction in religion, and its removal for some more beautiful form of image would be strongly resented. The monstrous, as half-human, half-

animal figures, often represents steps towards more appreciation of beauty. The religious influence of the grotesque is generally due to some traditional belief that the object is the abode of a spirit.

The higher the religious feelings and ideas developed the more definite was the attempt by the images of the divine beings to express something of the nature of the ideal. In Greece and in India the beauties of sculpture, and much of the best of the poetic, have been associated with religion. Some of the Indian cave mural paintings appeal even more than the sculptures. An analysis of Greek and Indian art in religion is here out of the question: one or two quotations from authorities on art and antiquities will best serve our purpose. "The highest ideals of every national art," says Mr. Havell,* "have always centred themselves round the national conception of the deity, and it is the Indian conception of divine beauty which gives the key to all Indian aesthetic thought." This representation of the divine the writer regards as that of the idealised *yogi*: "the grim, shrivelled *yogi* is....transformed into a spiritual being of a higher sphere...a form

* E. B. Havell : *Indian Sculpture and Painting*. 1908.

more subtly made than human ever was, and wrapped in the ideal beauty of divinity. " There is a " deliberate intention " to suggest a beauty " far removed from worldly passions and desires." He refers to the " quiet, restrained dignity, calm conviction, and effacement of physical detail " of a sculpture of a Nepalese Maitreya. The imagination is directly appealed to with the essential motive of purification through contemplation. Only when, through its immediate appeal, a statue expresses an ideal can it be in real touch with religion. So it was with the statue of Athena by Phidias in the Parthenon, to look upon which helped to bring the worshipper into communion with the goddess and to fit him to carry out her will. †

Amongst no people has the connection between religion and beauty been so intimate as amongst the Hindus. If the judgments of scholarship may be accepted, – and we strongly believe they may – Hindu religion began in a worship of various aspects of Nature and in large measure has retained in one form or another the same character, in spite of all the modifications and additions which have now moved the centre of

† See E. A. Gardner : *Religion and Art in Ancient Greece.*

vision. The cities which have become the sacred cities of Hinduism, before all, Benares, have been on the great rivers, which have impressed not only by their indispensability to life in a tropical country, but by their grandeur and their immense reserve of power. The pilgrimages to these places probably began as journeys made to the beautiful, and even after another significance had been given to the pilgrimage to and the bath in the sacred river, right up to our own time the desire to see what is reported as of beauty remains a factor. The Hindu temples, especially in the south of India, have a wealth of ornament, including figures in relief representing gods and goddesses, which while to the Western eye too profuse, too luxuriant, expresses the fullness of feeling characteristic especially of a Vaishnavite form of religion, in which devotion and emotional love and adoration predominate. The similar aspects of Shaivite temples may be accounted for partly by the influence of existing temples as due to imitation and partly to a similar need of the Indian temperament.

The art of the Jain, as seen for example in the Dilwara Temples at Mt. Abu, has the characteristic of frequent representation of geometrical

designs. Even the images of the conquerors, the world teachers, the Tirthankaras, are made almost as identically alike as one would suppose possible. There appears in these images little to arouse feelings such as those called forth by so many of the images of the Buddha. Incidentally it is interesting to note that in some Jain temples are also images of the mother goddess, and of other gods bound up with the sentiments of Hindus from the times of the formation of primitive mythology. Some wider appeal to the sense of beauty than that of Islam is found in the freer use of the human figure in the artistic decoration of the temples, though it must be confessed that it is rather restraint than spirituality which seems to be suggested. The religious ideal of Jainism does not make clear the relation between religion and beauty. This ideal being the freedom of the spirit from its contact with the non-spiritual, it is difficult to find place for a theory of religious art which is essentially the endeavouring to mould the material to spiritual ends, rather than to discard it. Nevertheless in the past much energy has been spent on the building of fine Jain temples and this must indicate some appreciation of the fact that the conquering of

the non-spiritual lies largely in binding it to spiritual purposes.

The contemplation of the beautiful usually brings a condition of calm and peace to the mind. In this again is seen its close kinship with religion. The two have become definitely associated in examples of persons whose religious life has produced features manifesting holiness, and the peace and calm attained by religion. The chief of these instances, the prophets and the saints, especially the founders of religions, have been made the subject of artistic representation for adoration or use in religious worship. The statues of the Buddha, the many and various representations of the Bodhisattvas, have an appeal which is at once beautiful and religious. The images of the mother of Jesus, with the child Jesus in her arms, the paintings of the same subject as also of the crucifixion, have been tasks for the artist, calling forth his effort to realise the beautiful. In minds of any range of civilisation the contemplation of such works of art tends to produce something of the same types of feeling and affection, renunciation and resignation, as are represented.

In the power of the artistic object, painting,

sculpture, music, or the dramatic art, to arouse the special types of feelings represented lies the ground of its frequent use and its very great value in religion. The extent of the use or the neglect of forms of art in the religions has an effect on the type of attitude which the religion develops in its adherents. Examples of this are not difficult to find. The religious life of the Roman Catholic Christian is intimately associated with the celebration of the Mass. The quiet dignity of the whole ceremonial, the simple yet rich and powerful tunes of the chants, the use of lights and of coloured vestments, and of incense, all make an appeal the total effect of which is one of peace and satisfaction. The whole is in distinct harmony with the religious frame of mind associated with this ceremony in its principle. Again there is undoubtedly a warmth of character induced by the position which is accorded to Mary, the mother of Jesus, and the use made of the artistic representations.

How far the dervishes have made use of singing, if at all, is difficult to say, but it is evident that singing forms practically no part of the religious life of the Muslim. In his worship he is mostly absorbed in silent prayer, and the effect

can be observed in calm, confident, reserve, in a dignity of character marked by its extreme self-restraint. There is undoubtedly a quiet joy, but there cannot be said to be the warmth and the ecstasy which come with the use of instrumental music and singing. About Indian Muslim works of architecture such as the Taj Mahal at Agra or the mosques of Ahmedabad, there is often a wealth of artistic detail but it has no warmth of appeal, and cannot be said to arouse any religious sentiment. The absence of all presentation of the human in the religious art of the Muslim has prevented its use as a means of expressing human sentiments.

The ancient Hebrews and the modern Jews have also almost without exception, followed the precept of their religion and have used no forms of images in worship and in any form of religious exercise. Since the fall of the last great temple at Jerusalem we hear little of any attempt on the part of Jews to construct beautiful buildings for religious worship. There has been and usually still is something of a bare simplicity about the synagogues, almost suggestive of the belief entertained by most orthodox Jews that they are still only in exile. But though the

appeal to the eye is not a means of arousing religious feelings among Jews, they cannot be said not to appreciate the place of beauty in religion. It is in the Hebrew scriptures that we are told : Worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness. The holiness of genuine beauty the Hebrew does not appear to have recognised quite so much as this beauty of holiness. The beauty which the Hebrew has most cherished is that of his religious hymns, the psalms, and fine passages of his sacred scriptures and later books such as the Talmud, pearls of literary beauty at the same time expressing and calling forth religious fervour.

The influence of prayer on human character has been partly due to beauty of expression, just as the most impressive sacred hymns are usually not merely religious in sentiment but also beautiful in form. Sublime thoughts in religious discourse demand a fine and powerful phraseology if they are to arouse the souls of men. The symbols of religions make appeal to the aesthetic feelings. Of these, perhaps, fire has been the most common, either in the form of a perpetually burning sacred fire or in lights. Who is there who does not experience an impression of wonder

and awe in contemplating fire ? Is there not something joyous about an array of lights, a joyfulness to which is added an aspect of dignity when used in connection with religious worship ? Colours have also been almost universally pressed into the service of religion : and what offering is more common to the gods than the offering of flowers ? There is a further keen appreciation of a connection between beauty and religion in some parts of the Hindu temple worship, in which the god or goddess, treated as king or queen, is bedecked with jewels. Perhaps after all it is only to the childish mind which cannot see these things in a proper proportion with other parts of life that these things are childish. The custom of tree worship undoubtedly goes back to and implies an attitude of Animism, but though we have given up the Animism it is well to recognise definitely the beauty and sublimity of a great tree, its calmness and its continuity beyond the range of the normal human life. The practice of using incense and burning sandal wood with a religious significance in temples and houses again suggests that the beautiful in odours has been and is conceived as worthy of association with religion. It is even possible to

go further and to say that the offering to the gods and goddesses of the best of sweatmeats and fruits is a sign of a recognition that in the realm of tastes also there is something more or less divine. The question seems to be why there should not be rather than why there should be. Surely it is not without some significance that festivals in almost all religions have been associated with feasting. The beautiful on all sides of life may and should be brought into the closest relationship with religion.

On close examination beauty in nature and in art suggests the belief that it is a result of a superabundance of energy or vitality over that required for mere continuance. Any deficiency of power in face of life's necessities tends to produce in the person or object so deficient an appearance of unsatisfied struggle and thus of the incongruous: but this, of course, in varying degrees. Religion, also, in its ultimate character is an expression of a superabundance of power in reality over forces of evil. It tends to raise men above suffering and to lead them to the conquest of sin. Thus it may be suggested that the higher mankind advances, the more rationally it uses its power, the richer will its art become, and if they

are both conceived in the manner expressed, religion and art will come to be the sublimest experiences of the highest life.

XII

RELIGION AND HISTORY

The adherents of most of the great religions of the past and of the present have claimed that their religions have the characteristic of finality. In them are to be found the eternal truths of the spiritual life. If there has been any development, if there is development, it is nothing but the application of these fundamental principles to the increasing differentiations of advancing civilisation. Yet, notwithstanding this claim to be in possession of eternal truth, they have also continued, and continue to insist upon historical facts as important in their religions, as e. g., in Buddhism the attainment of Nirvana by Gautama Buddha ; in Jainism the historicity of the twenty-four Tirthankaras of this age and their final perfection ; in Vaishnavite Hinduism at least the incarnation of Vishnu in Rama and Krishna (if not also in the other avatars) ; in Zoroastrianism

the divine revelation to Zoroaster as a historical personage ; in Judaism a similar revelation to a historical Moses ; in Christianity the person of Jesus in his life, teaching, and death on earth. In these and in other ways the religions are associated with the historical and the question suggests itself as to how the eternal aspects (supposed to be immutable) are to be conceived as related to individual facts of history, and to the historical generally, which through and through appears to be a realm of change. The whole problem of the relation of religion and history is one of interest and considerable importance, but fraught with difficulties ; here only a few scattered remarks are made, in view of a more systematic study in preparation.

The rationalist thinkers of the eighteenth century maintained that truth may all be learned through the reason with no definite relation to any particular facts. But the historical is constituted of individual facts. So it was thought possible that reason could itself, without the recognition of historical facts, come to a complete understanding of what religion is. This religion known by reason - called by them " Natural Religion " - they considered to have always existed as an

element in human nature, which always itself remains the same. Indeed, this "Natural Religion" was held to be the only religion, and so-called "Historical religions" were regarded simply as particular versions of the one religion—generally in some way distorted. For the essence of religion, for the truth in religion, the facts of history were considered to be of no account, whether they referred to humanity in its mass movements or to particular individuals such as the Buddha (to so many in the Eastern) and Jesus (to so many in the Western) world something more than human. Nothing of worth, it was contended can be obtained from history which might not be learned directly through reason. There seems here a recognition of a truth, but at the same time the attitude is also undoubtedly in part erroneous. To endeavour to obtain glimpses of a more correct conception of the relation is the present task.

Strange as it may seem to the mind dominated by the belief in evolution, the element of truth is embedded in the contention of the stability of human nature. For true to their rationalism they maintained – like the ancient Greeks – that reason is the central fact in man, though not necessarily the most important. Now, every

theory of knowledge must finally admit an absolute nature in reason: without that it is even in itself impossible. Further, it is at least in part by possession of such absolute reason that man is able to grasp the eternal truths of religion, and be religious. But although all theories of knowledge must, if they will escape self-contradiction, admit an absoluteness in reason, it is also imperative to recognise the fact that there is an evolution of knowledge. The error of the rationalists of the eighteenth century was due to a failure to realise that the growth of knowledge in most spheres of thought was through the contact of reason with historical facts.

The growth of knowledge by the *increasing* contact of reason with its object is as true of religion as of other regions of knowledge. The attainment of the ideas forming the various sciences, as e g. astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, biology, has occurred at different points in time. However true a particular principle of any of these sciences, it was first expressed in some form or other by some individual during his particular life history. Others have learned it directly or indirectly from him, and have been able to accept it on account of their own rational-

ity. Whether their own reason would have learned the truth independently in relation to the necessary facts is a question for which there is no ground for an answer: the important thing is to admit that actually this person or that in particular circumstances in history learned and taught others some particular truth. From this point of view therefore the study of historical fact appears necessary in order to find out what truths others came to by the use of their reason in contact with the facts.

Further than this, however, all historical facts are themselves data upon which our reason may exercise itself in its task of acquiring knowledge, of coming to recognize truths. In other words, it is not justifiable to suppose that reality can be understood without an intimate acquaintance with the historical. The course of events in time as a part of human experience demands recognition as part of universal experience or fact which philosophy endeavours to understand. If the outlook is a religious one, the course taken by events in time should appear to be of the utmost significance for human religion, seeing that with his conative nature man is especially a historical being, and his life is largely that of a factor in

what we like to regard as a developing process.

Religion is to be considered as in some manner subject to development in history. But if on the one hand human reason is absolute by nature, and to come to truth requires contact with its object, the question is: What is the Object of religious knowledge? The full answer to this question would include a survey of the historical religions and a philosophy of religion in relation to that survey. Here it must suffice to give the answer: The Object of religion is God and the nature of the relation of other consciousnesses to Him. Religious knowledge increases therefore by contact of the human mind with God. But it is a simple fact of experience that no increase of knowledge is obtained without effort: even to apprehend the truths which others have discovered some activity is essential. And this activity must be directed towards that particular quest. So also, the knowledge of God comes to the mind which directs itself for that quest, and not to the mind which neglects it.

The great religious teachers and most of the philosophers of the human race who have talked or written of God, have in common with the majority of mankind, conceived of Him as an active Spirit

as exerting power. Only a few philosophers (?) have appeared to maintain that He is passive—with some notion that pure activity and pure passivity are identical in Him. If God is conceived as active, knowledge of Him will depend not simply upon the efforts of men to know Him but also on what He does to make Himself known. Two ways suggest themselves as to how this may be done i. indirectly through the predominance of His power in what we call Nature, and ii. directly through contact with the souls of men, especially those who seek Him most.

The knowledge and understanding of the predominant aspects of Nature comes and has come gradually and as the result of human effort in the course of history. Contemplation on Nature has undoubtedly from the earliest times affected the religious beliefs and outlook of men. From more systematic and continued study the predominant unity, rationality, and beneficent power implied by it have become more evident. The study of Nature has strengthened the tendencies to a clear monotheistic religion, and has led to some greater appreciation of the attributes of the divine.

The chief method of acquiring knowledge of

the divine is however that through direct contact with God. The way is open to each and every being in history, the chief obstacle is the attitude the being assumes. Experience shows that some minds have been more definitely set in this direction. Such minds are of two kinds - i. the saints, great religious teachers and prophets: and ii. the reflective philosophers and theologians. These have lived, discovered, and taught, at various times in the course of history. The truths they have revealed may have been of eternal implication and worth, but that has not affected their becoming known to men at points in time. Chief among such men are the founders and reformers of the great religions of the human race, and an adequate statement of their work for mankind as far as knowledge is concerned would consist essentially in a complete survey of their teaching concerning God and the relation of souls to Him.

Religion is not simply a *knowledge* of God, and the relation of knowing subjects to an Object known can hardly be considered the sole or the main aim which the divine has in its active contact with men. This fact affects the ways in which we regard both Nature and the work of

the saints and prophets. The purpose of God through the predominant characteristics in Nature is not simply to reveal aspects of His own nature, His own attributes. If it were, even allowing for the actions of other minds, it would not be easy to accord to Him the description of unsullied goodness. Nature seems, however, to be also an indirect means of arousing men to a closer contact with the divine. In this, the catastrophes and the cataclysms which have occurred in Nature, within the period of human history have certainly played a part. Though some minds are repulsed and shocked, even to the extent of rejection of all religious beliefs, it is an indisputable fact that such events do arouse mankind to more earnest consideration of religion. So also the good aspects of Nature not only suggest intelligence and power but they also call forth feelings of awe, beauty, joy and thankfulness in the human mind.

As through Nature indirectly so directly in contact between man and God, the object is not simply knowledge. Religion is more: it is an attitude also of an emotional kind and requiring in its highest forms moral character. The saints and religious teachers have had a less or greater

influence on men not simply according to the degree in which they could give a knowledge of the divine which might appeal to the reason, and be accepted by the reason, but in the degree in which they have stimulated men to moral effort and to the cultivation of higher moral character, and led them to the satisfaction of their emotional religious needs, brought them, in short, to a sense of more intimate and more explicitly conscious communion with God.

From these points of view it may be seen that religion may undergo development in the human mind in the course of history. While each individual is called upon to test for himself, by his own reason and in his own life, the truth of the principles he is taught by others, students of Nature or saints, prophets, philosophers and theologians, unless he himself is able to come directly to these truths he must depend upon the degree and extent of progress in these directions which may so far have been made in history, with which he has come into relation. Unless there is a study of the history of the past it is not certain that all the knowledge which has been gained will be shared. The knowledge gained by the thinkers of the past, the stimulus which the

great religious teachers gave, the moral ideal which they endeavoured to realise in their own conduct and character, all this involves the activity of appropriation by the mankind of the present.

The history of religions thus obtains significance as a record of the attempts and the degrees of success of men to come to know God and their relation to Him, and to adapt their lives in accordance with this knowledge. The religious teachers have a relation to one another as engaged on the same task, and it is not unfair to any of them to bring them into comparison with the others. The study we devote to them and their work is mainly a part of our own effort for the fullest and highest knowledge in this sphere. Most men find it difficult fully to appreciate the teachings of these great men, and most probably from this has arisen the theory that they have attained to absolute truth, to perfect knowledge, to omniscience. But it seems unlikely, though not impossible, that such perfection has been attained. If it had been one would expect that it would compel acceptance immediately it were presented. Of the teachings of no religious teacher does it appear possible to affirm this; for it is quite impossible to give any evidence that

all those who have not been convinced of the perfection of any teacher are themselves responsible for this on account of a wrong attitude of will on their own part. Such an attitude of will must constitute an important factor in many cases, but it is not obviously present in all.

The course of human history is humanistic, that is, in one form or another it has been occupied with the attainment and enjoyment of values on all sides of human life, physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetical and religious. In so far as religion represents a universal attitude, dominating the whole, the effort for the highest and most comprehensive development of these goods and the elimination of the corresponding bads in the course of history has a religious significance. But even keeping to religion in the more specific sense, history is a sphere in which men seek for knowledge of God, and learn; in which they strive for moral character, and attain; in which they long for personal emotional relation with God, and in a measure succeed. And one of the factors in history is the study of history itself.

XIII

PRINCIPLES OF REFORM IN RELIGION

In almost every age and in almost every religion there are some earnest minds who have a keen feeling of dissatisfaction with the prevailing forms of religious life. If these are men of power they become active reformers who leave some mark upon the religious life of a small or a large circle of their religious confrères. If they do not possess this power they live a quiet life of mysticism, often conforming in externals with their brethren, but in their hearts experiencing a deeper faith. In our age with its general advance of higher education in nearly all countries, and with the intercourse which exists between all peoples, there is evidence in most religions of a desire for a better condition of religious life. This is the desire not merely of a few reformers but is shared by a very large proportion of educated men who are brought to

think about religion. The question of the nature of reform in religion is thus becoming more and more felt to be an important social problem, for not infrequently the prevailing conditions of religion are opposed to social progress in other directions. All attempts at actual reform, however much their success may depend upon the enthusiasm and vigour of those who strive for it, will also be affected by the amount of intelligent comprehension of the principles which should control such attempts. The following discussion of these principles must, of necessity, be brief.

Two views, very largely opposed one to the other, have usually been, and still are held as to the main problem. According to one, the position of the rigidly orthodox, there is nothing at fault with the religion itself, with its doctrines and practices or the feelings associated with them. What is wrong is the attitude of men and women to these: their mere repetition of doctrines with no real attempt to understand their import: their mechanical observance of the practices; their lack of genuine religious feeling. Here the way of reform does not lie at all in the consideration of the nature and the forms of the religion, but in the adoption of means to arouse men from their

apathy and indifference. Frequently those who have adopted this view have strongly opposed all interference with doctrinal formularies and practices, as simply implying a compromise of whole-heartedness with indifference. According to the other view men and women are by nature essentially religious, but their dissatisfaction with its prevailing forms has led to neglect of them, and often to a consequent lack of forms of social religious worship so necessary for the religious life of most men. Here the way of reform lies chiefly in the modification and re-interpretation of doctrines and practices, and there seems no hope of a wide and deep revival of religion until it has itself been moulded more to the needs of the age. The adherents of this second view resent the suggestion that men are in general apathetic to the higher demands of life. Careful observation will, we think, justify us in believing that each of these views represents on the positive side a part of the truth, but is wrong in rejecting or placing too little importance on the contention of the other view. It seems impossible to deny that men have become so engrossed in what we may call the secular sides of modern civilisation that the practical observances of religion have

become all too frequently a matter of indifference. On the other hand, as this fact itself suggests, it is equally clear that the traditional forms of the religions do not make an appeal strong enough, rather in many instances they arouse keen opposition. Serious attempts at reform will take into account these two sides of the problem, and endeavour to meet them intelligently.

Taking up the consideration of the requirements urged in the second view we may distinguish between the three interrelated aspects of religion; the doctrines or beliefs; the practices, especially the rites and ceremonies; and the feelings or emotional tones cultivated. Although all these are so closely bound together in actual religious life it is inevitable to treat them separately. All questions with regard to doctrines eventually lead back to the fundamental one of the source from which doctrines are to be obtained. The conception of a sacred book which is dogmatically regarded as a direct revelation from God is, it should be frankly confessed, not one which appeals to the modern mind. That there are books of high spiritual value will be eagerly admitted, but they are no longer acceptable as a sort of external authority to the human spirit.

On the other hand the reliance on mere reason has not led to a satisfactory result. The rationalism of the eighteenth century in the West reached its logical conclusion in the Scepticism of Hume and the Criticism of Kant. Very much of the nineteenth century Idealism rested ultimately upon the recognition of some form of spiritual intuition, and the arising of new ideas in the human consciousness making for a higher life. In this, as well as in the more recent insistence on intuition* there is a similarity with what the Greeks seem to have meant by knowledge in its highest sense *gnosis*, as well as with much which is suggested in Eastern thought. Thus we are turned again to the sacred books : for in these we may find ideas which have come to the saints and religious leaders of humanity in the intensity of their religious experience, in the form, we might say, of intuitions. The question then arises as to the principle upon which these ideas are to be accepted or rejected : for the merely external authority of book or person no longer seems acceptable. The first test in actual life, whatever theoretical

* As in the philosophy of Bergson, Eucken's spiritual immediacy, and James' radical empiricism.

philosophers or theologians may say, is the test of essential harmony with the individual's own religious intuitions. In the second place there will be the test of reason, by which will be meant the question of the consistency of the particular religious doctrines with propositions accepted on other sides of life. If there is definite agreement, or if there is at least no opposition between these, the religious doctrines will be at once accepted. If however, there is apparent contradiction, doubt will be felt and though the religious doctrines may not be rejected they will be closely examined and an attempt made to solve the contradiction.

The modern attitude towards religious practices is becoming more and more clear as the nature of religion is empirically studied. Religious rites and ceremonies have to find their justification in relation to the beliefs and the feelings with which they are associated. On the one hand they may be forms of expression of the feelings, or an active embodiment of the logical implication of the beliefs. Or, on the other hand, they may be means taken to arouse and cultivate certain feelings or attitudes toward the Object of religion or towards human beings. The question

whether any particular religious practice should be purposely continued will thus depend upon its harmony or contradiction with the beliefs held, and upon the goodness or badness of the feelings or attitude it encourages. There are undoubtedly religious practices which cultivate the feeling of reverence and quiet dignity as does sincere prayer ; or joy and gladness as does frequently the chanting or singing of hymns. Some rites have a moral effect, emphasising certain moral responsibilities, and arousing feelings in reference to them, as those associated with the sacred-thread ceremony and marriage. Some religious practices have no positive value, being the expression of superstitious beliefs. Frequently these are productive of no particular harm : they are to be discouraged only if they prolong the life of superstitions, and stand in the way of higher beliefs. The keener appreciation of moral principles as such has led to the definite unflinching demand in modern times that so-called religious practices which are in conflict with these principles shall be entirely rejected. It is chiefly by consideration of the nature of the beliefs and the feelings associated with practices that true religion may be distinguished from magic.

The danger against which the reformer has to guard himself and his followers is that of a rationalistic and utilitarian erastianism. This is especially the evil of an unenlightened treatment of rites and ceremonies. The question here is essentially: Is the practice positively harmful morally or otherwise? If it is harmless then the reformer must think long before he decides to urge its discontinuance. In such instances, or in those in which there is doubt, he does well not to oppose the rite. For the more one examines the festivals and ceremonies of the religious life in different countries, the more one finds what wealth of colour and of joy centres in them. Think, for example, of the interest which a religious procession often arouses. Occasions, such as the sacred thread ceremony of the Hindus, are times of joy. In fact, not only should no attempt be made to take away the practices which give any happiness to life, but the reformer might try to learn from other religions of means of increasing the occasions of such joy, or he might even propose new ones. The Positivists, who considered themselves far above the theological and philosophical stages of humanity, saw the advantage of making a calendar in which days

were set apart for the commemoration of those who had aided in the forward march of struggling humanity. Religion lives and has an influence on life partly because it is not just theological propositions, or moral precepts, but is an emotional attitude in which reverence for great personalities plays a great part. A religion without saints, or one which does not revere its saints, commemorating them in times of festivity, not merely setting them up as models for imitation but personalities to love, such a religion lacks warmth and must lose much of what makes for human progress. Festive occasions are needed in order to cultivate a feeling of admiration, even adoration of the saints and a joyful sense of communion with them.

A widespread conviction regards religion as essentially a matter of feeling, and this conviction appears in the main correct. This is not to say that the ideas depend upon feelings, rather particular feelings are inseparately associated with certain ideas. Feelings and ideas very largely determine the nature of action, but action leads again to some form of feeling. The principle of religious reform in this connection is that good feelings shall be aroused and cultivated and bad ones suppressed. The chief question concerns

what feelings are to be approved and what disapproved. Theoretical difficulties may be raised here, but practically the question does not appear very difficult to answer. The attitude of faith, trust, and hope is essentially that of religion as found in the forms which are recognised as the highest. Connected with these are joy and gladness, equanimity of mind, peace and calm. Above all are the emotions of benevolence and love, expressing themselves in active service, leading to joy and more love. Religion has to fight against certain feelings with which man is afflicted, as with those of fear and despair, of gloominess and restless anxiety. Even for feelings of grief and sorrow, it has its antidote of faith that through them a more profound peace and joy is to be attained. In modern life the solidarity of the individual with the society and the race is a fact borne in upon us from all sides. One of the demands of the modern reformer in religion is that religion shall aid in the development of a consciousness of this solidarity, and in the intensifying of the social feelings. Now, though the aim of reform in religion will be to emphasise the good feelings, it must not be supposed that all experience of the other feelings

will be entirely and absolutely avoided. As history has proved, both positively and negatively, this would lead to an almost inevitable superficiality. Some of the greatest religious saints and reformers have experienced depths of bitterness before attaining the heights of eternal peace, however differently they have represented the latter. We may think, for example, of the Buddha, of Paul, of Mahommet, of St. Augustine, and of Luther. The main principle of reform being as above stated, it is still clear that before the detailed policy can be adequately formulated a careful study of the emotional side of the religious lives of the great spiritual leaders of humanity is necessary.

Passing now to the consideration of the methods which might best serve in aiding the reform of religions we shall at the same time be able to indicate how the apathy and indifference of men, so far as it exists, may perhaps be overcome. Undoubtedly the first of all requirements is an enlightened and earnest priesthood. Without this, most other forms of endeavour to bring about reforms are doomed more or less to failure. If the priests are to be able to impress the doctrines upon religious laymen they must seriously and

sincerely believe them. But according to the requirement of an enlightened modern judgment this can only be if a man has spiritual intuition and the knowledge and capacity to judge doctrines. Thus the priest must have opportunity for religious meditation, and in addition he should have as broad an acquaintance with modern knowledge as is possible. The reformer will also strive to secure priests of known moral integrity and enthusiasm. To obtain cultured spiritual priests is the task of tasks. In the past the limitation of the priesthood to particular groups of families* probably served a very useful purpose: it may reasonably be maintained that today this custom militates against the best being achieved, and should in consequence be discarded.

The recognition of the part placed in human life by ideas and by an enthusiasm for high ideals must also lead to an admission, as a corollary, of the importance of an enlightened priesthood in the community. As religion has been sometimes used to promote loyalty to the political head, as in the Roman Empire when the bust of the emperor was given a place by the side of the images of the gods, so now it must be turned to-

* As still amongst Parsis, Brahmins, and Jews.

wards promoting loyalty to all good causes. If it is accepted as an important public function for certain persons to occupy themselves in the religious organisation for the cultivation of high ideals, then there must be adequate provision for those persons to obtain the means of a worthy type of life for themselves. The reformer must insist that so long as the means of livelihood of the priests depend on their adherence to traditional doctrines or on the perpetuation of harmful, obsolete and uninteresting rites, so long will reforms be strenuously opposed in one way or another, chiefly as experience has shown, by misrepresentation of the motives of the reformer. The rank and file of the priesthood – with most exceptions amongst Roman Catholic Christians, the officers of the Salvation Army, and Buddhist monks, are not renowned for the spirit of renunciation. Priests are naturally and quite reasonably as much concerned with the needs of physical sustenance, intellectual enlightenment, aesthetic enjoyment, as most other individuals of their social level, and the reformer has to remember this fact. For example, in India, the Brahmins will give little support to the discouragement of extravagant expenditure in the celebration of

private religious ceremonies if no other means are provided for them to obtain what they now obtain in this manner towards their livelihood, either in money or in kind. There is a sphere of undoubted social usefulness for the priest, and the reformer has to aim at a condition such that only in the performance of useful functions shall he obtain the necessities of a good life. So again the education of many if not most priesthoods has been lamentably narrow : it has seemed as though the preparation of the mind for its spiritual tasks has required all the available time and attention. Such a view can hardly justify itself in the light of the modern attitude towards religion. If, as we maintain, there is something divine in physical health, in intellectual truth, in moral achievement, and in beauty, then instruction and training in all these sides of life should be included in the education of those becoming priests.

Associated in some degree with the demand for cultured priests is another for the provision of sound education in religion. Despite the practical difficulties, something should be done in this direction from the village schools right up to and including the Universities. In a country, as

India, with a number of religions, each of these should be represented in the Universities by at least one professor or lecturer giving the most enlightened instruction possible concerning his religion. If the intellectual consideration of religion were taken up in the Universities we might hope after a short time for the beginning of a religious literature suited to the needs of the modern man, and bearing in it the inspiration for further progress. For the traditional forms of religion make always for conservatism, the liberal forms almost always for progress and advance.

The problem as to how the practices of religion in their popular form are to be modified is perhaps the most difficult of all. There is most to be hoped for from the spread of education. But much might nevertheless be done if those who are earnestly religious and advocates of reform take an active and continuous part in the religious life of the community. Unfortunately the enlightened tend to neglect the practical observances of religion : that is simply abandoning the citadel to the forces of conservatism. The example and the careful judgment of the enlightened ought to be brought continually before their less educated brethren. More than

this, the sincerely religious should actively concern themselves with raising for discussion in their communities subjects of reform which appear to them urgent. For in many cases it is only in this way that the "traditional" priests will be aroused from their apathy and indifference to genuine religion. By a decision of the community practices might eventually be changed and the unconsidered hostility of the majority of members of a community to individual progressive members lessened, if not entirely overcome.

Into the question of the cultivation of good religious feelings it is impossible to enter here in detail : and as we suggested before, it will be largely met by the treatment of the doctrines and the practices of a religion. So much must, however, be said here : that if there is a reasoned desire for a deeper and more widely diffused social feeling, this can only be obtained by some form of corporate act or acts in which the individuals concerned will feel that they are in a real harmony of activity. In other words, there must be some definite and regular forms of corporate worship. The social effect, for example, of the combined prayer of the Muslims, or the congregational singing of Christians, cannot be

denied. Many of the undesirable feelings at present evident in the religious lives of the more or less uneducated will be outgrown only by the overthrow of the superstitions with which they are associated.

For the achievement of the most thoroughgoing reform and for the development of the highest and most comprehensive form of religion, the reformer in any religion must not keep his attention too closely fixed on his own religion. There is no better means by which a man may come to appreciate the strong and the weak points of his own religion than by the study of one or two others. Further, such study should teach him something of factors of religion which he has previously neglected altogether, or to which he has given insufficient attention. A few examples may be mentioned. Most Protestant Christians might be expected to learn something of the value of meditation and contemplation from Hinduism and even from Catholic Christianity. Orthodox Muslims might be brought to appreciate more the value of music as a form of religious expression and a means to cultivate a more joyous type of religion. The reformer should especially interest himself in the tendencies of

the reform movements in other religions. For in them he will find in many instances something to learn with regard to the methods which the reformer may best adopt, and he will frequently obtain some encouragement in his own efforts in so far as he comes to feel that he is working not merely alone in his own community but in sympathy, expressed or implied, with those working for reform in other religions. Thus, at the present, he may justly feel that he belongs to no simple isolated movement, but is taking part in a great world-wide advance. The attitude of the reformer is to welcome good wherever he finds it. He should be engaged rather with the advocacy of the good rather than with mere opposition to the bad. Thus the spirit he will endeavour to cultivate in himself and in others should be that of seeking the good in all religions, to the more general diffusion and enjoyment of the spiritual goods of humanity.

The need for reform in religions in India is indeed great and it will require the thought and the energy of all earnest men. Here it has been possible to consider only in a general manner the principles which seem to underlie reform. The actual steps to be taken in the particular cases

must be left for those to decide who are intimately concerned with the particular religious communities. That in their attempts, if guided by common principles, the reformers in the different religions will come to appreciate religions other than their own in a truer light and with more respect will be not the least of the benefits of trying to make clear what these principles of reform in religion are.

INDEX

- | | | |
|------------------|-----|---------|
| ANIMISM, | , , | 186. |
| Aristotle, . | , . | 3. |
| Asceticism, | , , | 89, 91, |
| St. Augustine, . | , , | 87, 211 |

- | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|------|
| BACON F. | . | . | 130 |
| Beethoven. | . | . | 68 |
| Bergson H. | . | . | 205n |
| Buddha, Gautama | 98; | 182 | |
| Buddhism, | 98-100; | 119-20; | |
| | | 189 | |
| Bunyan J. | . | . | 87 |

- CHRISTIANITY, 76-79;
105-9; 114-6; 122; 147-9;
168-9; 183; 190; 216-7
Church, the Christian, 71;
72-3; 78; 86; 90-93; 130
Clifford W. K. . . . 131.
Copernicus 131
Culture, the meaning of, 67

- | | | | |
|--------------|---|---|-----|
| DARWIN C. | . | . | 3 |
| Descartes R. | . | . | 130 |
| Drews A. | . | . | 119 |

- EUCKEN R., . . . 205n
Evil, . . . 6I; 145-8

- FEELINGS in Religion 208-211; 215-218**

- GOD, 33; 43; 44; 59-64; 80;
85; 125; 130, 143-5; 194-200
Gore Dr. C., , 166

- HAECKEL E., . . . 131
 Loftus Hare W., . . . 119n
 Havell E. B., . . . 178-9
 Heaven, ... 51
 Hebrew religion and art 184
 Hegel G. F., . . . 125
 Hell, ... 51
 Hinduism, 101-2; 178-80;
 186; 189; 217
 History, 79-80; 189-100
 Hume D., ... 205
 Huxley, ... 131-2

- IMMORTALITY, 33-47;
142-3; 164-5
Islam, 97-98; 183-4; 216-7

JAINISM, 102-3; 180-2; 189
 James W., . . . 205n
 Jatho of Cologne, . . . 76
 Jesus, 40; 65-78; 84; 90;
 104; 107-8; 116-8; 124;
 148-9; 163-172; 182
 Liberal Judaism, . . . 95-6

KANT I., . . . 205

LAMARCK, . . . 3
 Leibniz, . . . 3
 Life, . . . 138-140
 Luther M., . . . 87; 211

MACKENZIE J. S., . . . 83
 Mc Taggart J. E., . . . 153
 Maeterlinck M., . . . 86
 Mani, . . . 97
 Matter, . . . 137-8
 Moulton J. H., . . . 88; 96

NIETZSCHE F., 110-120;
 126-8

OSLER W., . . . 85

ST. PAUL . . . 87; 211
 Plato, . . . 3, 68
 Philosophy . . . 1-32; 134
 Prophets and saints, 60-61;
 196; 198

NEW REALISM or
 Logical Atomism' 49
 Redemption . . . 87-88
 Religion, 18-19; 57-64; 136;
 157-61; 173-188; 190-1;
 201-19
 The Reformation of Religion
 130.
 The Italian Renaissance, 92
 Resurrection, . . . 162-172
 Romanes G. J., 1 . . . 131-2

SCHOPENHAUER A., 113,
 127
 Science, . . . 133-6
 Shelley P. B., . . . 45
 Spencer H. . . . 131-2
 The State and morality, 34;
 56
 Stout G. F. . . . 81-82
 The Superman 111-4; 119;
 126

THEOLOGY, its tasks, 162
 Traub of Dortmund, 76
 Tyndall, . . . 131

UNITY, the problem of,
 21-28

VALUE, (values), 6-8;
 11-21; 50-55; 163

WADKOWSKY,	119,	124		ZOROASTRIANISM,	97;
Wallace A. R.,	.	131			189-0

By the same Author

LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL

The Fundamentals of a New Philosophy of Life

By

RUDOLPH EUCKEN

Translated with an Introduction

By

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Second Edition : Cloth 10s. 6d. net

A. & C. Black Soho Square, London

JESUS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

By

HEINRICH WEINEL

and

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Cloth 12s. 0d. net

T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh

**HUMAN NEEDS AND THE JUSTIFICATION
OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS**

**The Burney Prize Essay, Cambridge 1909
Together with**

**PERSONALITY AND ATONEMENT
An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion**

By

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

**Professor of Philosophy and the Comparative Study
of Religions, Baroda**

Cloth : 7s. 6d.

The Manager, The College, Baroda.

NATURALISM OR IDEALISM ?

The Nobel Lecture

By

RUDOLPH EUCKEN

Translated by Alban G. Widgery

W. Heffer and Sons, Cambridge

Out of print

New edition in preparation as an appendix to

**SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RUDOLPH EUCKEN**

In preparation

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

A Systematic Survey

By

ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

With maps and illustrations.

Cloth : 15s. Od.

In the press

NITI — VIVECHANA

A Study of Ethics and the Moral Life in Gujarati

Together with Professor A. K. Trivedi

and M. M. Jhalla M. A.

RELIGIONS AND THEIR MODERN
TENDENCIES

An Enquiry concerning the Directions of Reform

By

ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

In preparation

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

A Quarterly devoted to the philosophical thought of the East and the West, chiefly of the East.

Edited by

ALBAN G. WIDGERY M. A.

Professor of Philosophy, Baroda.

and

R. D. RANADE M. A.

Professor of Philosophy, Poona.

Articles have appeared on The Psychology of the Upanishads; The Sankhya Philosophy. The Multiple Authorship of the Vedanta Sutras; Is Vedanta Theology or Philosophy?; Shakti and Maya; The Ethics of the Gathas and the Vendidad; etc.

*Vol. I. 1917-18. Six rupees
eight annas.*

Vol. II. 1918-19, in progress.

The Manager,
The College, Baroda.

THE GAEKWAD STUDIES
IN
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Edited by

ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

This series is established by His Highness the Maharajah Gaekwad of Baroda to provide an opportunity for the publication of books on religious and philosophical subjects. Only books written in the tolerant spirit of genuine scholarship will be included. Enquiries as to the admission of volumes in the Series should be addressed to the General Editor.

Write for a prospectus to

The Manager,
The College, Baroda.

