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THE TERRITORIAL IN THE NEXT WAR

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THE NEXT WAR

a series edited by
CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART

The Territorial

in the next war

by
BT.-COL. W. E. GREEN,
D.F.C., T.D.

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MEN OF ENGLAND

Men of England ! who inherit
Rights that cost your sires their blood !
Men whose undegenerate spirit
Has been proved on field and flood—

By the foes you've fought uncounted,
By the glorious deeds ye've done,
Trophies captured—breaches mounted,
Navies conquer'd—kingdoms won !

Yet, remember, England gathers
Hence but fruitless wreaths of fame,
If the freedom of your fathers
Glows not in your hearts the same.

What are monuments of bravery,
Where no public virtues bloom ?
What avails in lands of slavery
Trophied temples, arch, and tomb ?

Pageants ! Let the world revere us
For our people's rights and laws,
And the breasts of civic heroes
Bared in Freedom's holy cause.

Yours are Hampden's, Russell's glory,
Sidney's matchless shade is yours—
Martyrs in heroic story,
Worth a hundred Agincourts !

We're the sons of sires that baffled
Crown'd and mitred tyranny ;
They defied the field and scaffold
For their birthrights—so will we !

Thomas Campbell, 1777-1844

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

MODERN war has too wide an effect for its practice to be treated as a "mystery." Statesmen may direct it; generals, admirals and air marshals may manage its operations—but every citizen, man or woman, is perforce a shareholder. The more they know about the way it is conducted the better for their security. The aim of this series is primarily to enlighten the intelligent public as to the probabilities of a future war in its various spheres, if it is hoped that the military reader also may find some stimulus to thought about his problems.

Although twenty years have passed since the last Great War ended, it left so deep an imprint that we are apt to overlook the fact that few of the men now under arms, and fewer still of those who might be called on, have any personal acquaintance with war. The natural consequences are to be seen in any of the exercises carried out by the Regular and the Territorial Army, during the annual training season. On those battlefields without bullets or shells, many things are done which would be impossible under actual fire—and without their impossibility even being perceived. The unreality is often increased because the situations on which exercises are based have themselves an air of improbability. This is due largely to a tendency, natural in those who are practising any particular technique, to think of war in bits instead of as a whole. They find it difficult to visualise the effect on their bit that others may produce, with the result that the picture is distorted. The best corrective to the particularist tendency is to view each aspect of war against a wider background.

This series of volumes, in which different aspects are treated as far as possible in relation to each other, may help to form such a background.

As warfare has grown from a professional military concern into a national affair, the importance of the citizen soldier as

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well as the civil technician has progressively increased. Recognition of that development has been shown in many reforms which have been made in the Territorial Army during the past year or so, with the general aim of improving its efficiency in the course of enhancing its status. They have been directed, especially, to the enlargement of the Territorial officer's opportunities for higher training and for rising to greater responsibility. A Territorial Officer is now in the War Office as Deputy Director-General, another has been selected to command the London Division, while an increased number have been given command of infantry brigades or divisional artillery. It now lies with the citizen soldier to justify this increase of opportunity by contributing to the current of military progress in peace as well as by demonstrating, if the test should come, the increased efficiency of "The Territorial in the Next War."

It was hoped that Major-General Sir John Brown would have contributed this volume of the series—for his prominence among the Territorial officers of the present time rests not merely on his selection to be the first Deputy Director-General, but on his previous record as a pioneer of new training methods. The fact of his holding a high position in the War Office was officially considered, however, to be a barrier to an unofficial expression of his own views in this form. An alternative contributor was then found, happily, in Brevet-Colonel W. E. Green, who served in the Royal Flying Corps during the war and subsequently in the 5th Northhamptons which he now commands. His own blend of experience is an asset in dealing with a force whose functions now embrace the sphere of air defence as well as a field army role. In addition, he has enjoyed a long-standing association with Sir John Brown, who commanded the famous East Midland Brigade of which the 5th Northhamptons was a constituent element. The seeds then sown have brought forth, in this book, an abundant crop of stimulating ideas as to the future of the Territorial Army.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE Territorial Army is unique among the armed forces of the world. No force, it may confidently be claimed, is so exacting in its demands on its members. Outside the British Empire, universal and compulsory military service is, apart from the United States and other less important exceptions, the rule : a man has to be a soldier whether he wishes or not. The United States which, like Great Britain, rely on a voluntary and professional Regular Army, have, it is true, a National Guard, whose volunteer, non-professional character has important points of resemblance with the Territorial Army. They also have a volunteer reserve, but this latter mainly consists of officers ; it supplies a framework around which, in a great emergency, the armed strength of the nation can be ranged ; it is not an independent force. Inside the British Empire, the structures of the militia forces of Canada and Australia, for instance, present many analogies to the Territorial Army. But the whole background is different, for these

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militias provide the only troops in their respective Dominions. The Territorial Army is non-political and is quite unlike the Nazi Storm Troops or the Fascist Militia. Alone among all the armies in the world except the U.S.A. National Guard, from which it is differentiated by its essentially *local* character, it exists side by side with a Regular Army, is manned by amateurs, and almost entirely officered by amateurs.

The Territorial Army stands between a professional army with the traditions, the conservatism, the exclusiveness which great and highly-organised professions generally acquire, on the one hand, and an intensely civilian population, interested in commerce and sport, with a rooted antipathy to military discipline and military habits of thought, which finds vent in good-humoured fun at the expense of retired colonels and serving sergeant-majors, on the other. It forms, or at least ought to form, a link between the two. Its members work side by side with men who are civilians pure and simple in offices and in workshops, in shops or on the land.

It is when the day's work is done, or when the holiday season arrives, that the Territorial soldier is most sharply differentiated from the remainder of the population, military and civil. Soldiers have summer leave ; civilians, in increasing number, a summer holiday. Both, in the evening

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or at the week-end, are able to relax, to devote themselves to recreation and pleasure.

The Territorial is in a different case. He always has to sacrifice some of his evening and week-end leisure. And there is a number of men who have no holiday apart from the annual training in camp ; for these there seems no respite. The day after the end of their year's work finds them on their way to new spheres of work with gun or rifle, lorry or searchlight. After a fortnight spent under canvas and military discipline the daily task claims them again, and so another year will start, with week-end exercises and evening drills making constant demands on the very limited amount of leisure which most men enjoy.

What do men get in return for these sacrifices ? Why do they join the Territorial Army ?

There is, of course, the material inducement of "Holidays with Pay." That this must exercise a certain attraction to men who draw the lower scales of wages in civilian life, and to young unmarried men in a rather better material position, no realist could deny. To what extent it actually operates as an incentive is, of course, impossible to ascertain. Common-sense suggests that it may overcome the reluctance of some men to assume the obligations which membership of the Territorial Army involves. It does not seem likely that there are many men to whom it would be the

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primary attraction or the decisive factor, for the rates of pay are not sufficiently high. And certainly the officer who was not a little out of pocket during the year, other than the annual training in camp, could, until a new scale of allowances was introduced this year, esteem himself lucky.

It is clearly necessary to take into account factors other than the financial in order to understand why men enlist in the Territorials. There is, first and perhaps foremost, the appeal of the comradeship of camp-life, of the social life centring on the drill hall. The Englishman may be reserved, but he is fundamentally sociable. He has what psychologists call the "herd instinct." He likes to be a member of a gang, and many men find their "gang," or, if you prefer, their niche in society, in the Territorial Army. Camp and drill hall save a man from being lonely, from being too absorbed in himself, and enable him to make friends with whom associations will endure long beyond the period when the men can belong to the Territorial Army. No doubt there is a certain justifiable, if rather boyish pride in wearing the King's uniform. If every nice girl loves a sailor, there is at least some cause for hope that in an inland town the junior Service will come off second best. Among officers, too, there is very occasionally to be found a rather less desirable

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pleasure in the trappings of military life, a certain basking in the reflected glory of the Regular Army's social prestige. But when we have said these things we are still a long way off from understanding how it is that the Territorial Army becomes officered and manned.

The most simple explanation, and probably the truest, is that there are men who like the work which membership involves. For the Infantry, tactics may have some of the appeal of a sport, while for the officer, commissioned and non-commissioned alike, it is also an art. In the more technical services, both officers and men enjoy the satisfaction of exercising a craft. We have said that the English are an unmilitary nation. That is true. It is also true that every generation throws up a certain, if limited number of Englishmen with military aptitudes and tastes ; men who formerly, like Clive in the eighteenth century, entered the service of the East India Company, to-day probably enter civil employment at home and serve in the Territorial Army. And there are men, particularly among the officers, who discover a taste for military things too late for them to join the Regular Army, or who are prevented by circumstances from following their true bent and taking Regular Commissions.

There is, too, the factor of the sense of duty. We shall probably be accused of cynicism if we

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do not give this first place among the factors which induce men to become Territorial Soldiers. It is, clearly, a very important factor ; it is also a factor which, in peace-time at any rate, it is unwise and undesirable to stress. A man who devotes long hours to political or educational work, or to spare time work which adds to his family's income, or whose daily work leaves him so exhausted that in his leisure hours rest is a necessity, will only be irritated and antagonised if it is suggested to him that duty requires that he shall join the Territorials. There are, of course, men who appear to devote an undue amount of time to the social pleasures or to mere amusement. Of some of these it is necessary to remember that social connections are essential to their advancement, of others that in the great crises of life and history it is not always the frivolous and pleasure-loving who show least of fortitude and endurance. The man who joins the Territorial Army solely on account of duty, and against his inclinations, will command our respect ; but it is doubtful whether duty is the sole incentive to most members of the Territorial Army, or even whether it is desirable that it should be so.

The Territorial Army is a body of enthusiasts, of natural soldiers. Let it remain so. Whatever criticisms may from time to time be directed against it, it is at least clear that the ever-increasing

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weight of the burdens placed upon the Territorial Army's shoulder is the most convincing testimony to that Army's strength. The passing of thirty years has seen a revolution in the Territorial Army's place in the scheme of National and Imperial Defence.

In 1908, whatever dreams Haldane may have entertained of its future, the Territorial Army appeared an uncertain experiment intended to effect a strictly limited purpose, that of home defence. The exponents of the "blue water" school carried the day in Cabinet, but the danger of invasion, of which Lord Roberts and Colonel Repington gave warning in season and out of season, gave the Committee of Imperial Defence cause for anxiety. The Territorial Army was to protect the country against this danger, while the Regular Expeditionary Force fought the country's battles on the Continent. In the ranks of the Territorial Army the volunteer for service overseas was distinguished by his Imperial Service badge.

To-day all this is changed. Every Territorial under 35 who has joined the Force since 1921 is liable for service overseas ; when once embodied, each Territorial will be under substantially the same liabilities as the Regular soldier, subject in some cases to his right not to be transferred from one unit to another without his own consent. If

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Home Defence supplies the *raison d'être* of the Territorial anti-aircraft formations, membership of these does not limit but rather extends the obligations incurred by the individual, for he is liable to be called upon active service at a moment's notice.

Increasing reliance is being placed upon the Territorial and increasing demands made of him. Keenness must be the Territorial's first qualification, for it is as unfair as it is childish to bring pressure to bear upon a man to enlist, and then to complain of his reluctance to undertake additional duties. On the other hand, it is clearly essential to make use of the whole of the interest in military things available to the nation, and to put no unnecessary obstacle in the path of the potential recruit.

The Territorial Army does not at present make full use of two at least of the available sources of supply of man-power. The first is the army of workers on the land. The second is a large number of healthy and capable men, with service experience, now between the ages of 45 and 55, fit, not, of course, for active service in the field, or for the more strenuous activities involved in home defence, but for work in the services, and even for manning anti-aircraft guns in places where it is not likely to become necessary to work them at high pressure.

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The principal obstacle which prevents the utilisation of the first class, and would make it difficult to use the second, is the annual camp. Rather different considerations apply in the two cases, but for each of them the fortnight under canvas in August is usually out of the question. On the farm, August is a busy month ; nor is it possible to say in advance at what time between the beginning of haymaking in the early summer and the collection of the harvest in the autumn it will be convenient or even possible to spare a given number of hands. For the countryman, too, the training during the rest of the year presents serious difficulties. There may be, and often are, long distances to travel between village and drill hall at times when men are tired by a heavy day's work. Animals, too, are exacting in their demands, and, particularly at such times as the lambing season, destructive of any attempt to adhere to a fixed time-table. If the Territorial Army wishes to make use of the countryman's services, it must make an effort to understand his problems. Quite a substantial amount of military training can be imparted without attendance in camp, desirable though this is ; and it is conceivable that it might be arranged for itinerant instructors to visit villages and conduct courses at the parish hall or in an outhouse of a large house.

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The annual training in camp is unsuitable for older men for different reasons. Life under canvas in bad weather would in most cases have a deleterious effect on the men's health. Apart from this, it is generally altogether too much to ask of men at that stage of life to give up their annual holiday with their families.

The moral in each case is the same : that if the Territorial Army is to achieve the best results the Army must adapt itself to the complexities of the life of the nation, not expect the nation to adjust itself to the standards and requirements of the Army. The only alternative is conscription, an expedient politically impossible in peace, and in war of doubtful military value.

An effort to cast the net of the Territorial Army as wide as possible will well repay both the Army and the nation. The personnel of the Territorial Army makes it fruitful ground for the testing of new experiments, and gives it a great reserve of strength by which to adapt itself to the changing requirements of new situations. For carrying out the accustomed military duties in the most efficient way probably no instrument could be so effective as the Regular Army. For blazing a new trail the multiplicity of experience which it contains in its ranks makes the Territorial Army peculiarly suitable. Each unit contains not only soldiers, but also the butcher, the tailor and the

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candlestick-maker, to say nothing of the motor engineer or the architect. Any crisis may give a man the opportunity to exercise the skill which he has acquired in civil life. The more of such skills are represented in the Army the fewer will be the difficulties which any given situation will present.

The Territorial Army of to-day springs from two sources, the Militia and the Volunteers. It has fewer affiliations with, and resemblances to the Regular Army than the former, a more thorough training and greater responsibilities than the latter. The Militia was rural in character, the Territorial Army is essentially urban; the one was manned largely by agricultural labourers and officered by country gentlemen; the other tends to be manned by artisans and clerks and officered by business men. On the other hand there are scarcely any Territorial units, except possibly the specifically officer-producing units, which have such a high educational standard as the best Volunteer units of the last century. It is a pity that the characteristic Militia and Volunteer elements are not more widely represented.

The Territorial Army is an outlet for the martial energies of the nation, an instrument for training the men who are to be the leaders in any future emergency, and a basis on which a national effort can be built if need arises. In each of these

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respects it could, perhaps, be bettered. In each of them a high standard of achievement has already been attained. It is our purpose in this book to study in outline the growth and nature of its organisation, and the uses to which it is likely to be put.

CHAPTER II

THE CITIZEN SOLDIER IN ENGLISH HISTORY

“CONSCRIPTION has no place, in peace, in our military, air, or naval system.”¹ In these words one of the greatest of our constitutional text-books draws a sharp distinction between the theory at the root of the defence organisations of the English-speaking states and the basic theory of the defence of practically every other country in the civilised world.

It is, indeed, possible to make this distinction appear sharper and also more important than it really is : if conscription has no place in peace, what place has it in war ? This question must be examined before it is possible to appreciate the true nature and scope of those organisations which undertake to train men, who have come forward of their free will in time of peace, to take part in war.

• The characteristics of the British system of defence derive in part from history, in part from the peculiar problems set by our insular position

¹ Anson's *Law and Custom of the Constitution*. Vol. II, Part 2, p. 199. 4th edition (A. Berriedale Keith).

and our Imperial commitments, and in part from English character and psychology. The sea is, for us, the primary weapon both of defence and attack : we use it to feed ourselves, to starve our enemies. Recruitment and equipment of our Navy, not the raising and maintenance of a land force to protect a long-drawn frontier, has been the vital problem. In the eighteenth century, a time when the expansion of overseas trade increased the demand for seamen in merchant ships, the sinister activities of the press-gang, from which Fielding's Tom Jones only escaped by wounding Mr. Fitzpatrick in the street, and so coming under the jurisdiction of the civil power, were found necessary in order to solve the manpower problem of the age. And the press-gang had all the vices of conscription without any of its virtues.

There is, and has been since Saxon times, a clear obligation on the citizen to bear his part in the maintenance of order and the defence of the country. It was expressed in olden times by the duty of bearing watch and ward, and it has an undoubted place in the Common Law to-day. Precisely what the extent of this historic obligation would be when translated into contemporary needs and conditions, is, however, not an easy matter to determine, and except in meeting a sudden or local emergency it is not likely that it

would prove a satisfactory means of recruiting the King's forces. In the words of Mr. Harold Baker¹, "The Territorial Force . . . is an alternative to and not an illustration of the ancient and undoubted prerogative of the Crown to require the service of its subjects for the defence of the Kingdom in time of danger." But the organisation, if it can be dignified with the name, to which this prerogative gave rise, has some importance in the long process of evolution of which the Territorial Army is the outcome. For the essential unit of the national levy, or the general levy as it is sometimes called, was the county, its principal officer at first the Sheriff, and later the Lord Lieutenant. It was one of many factors which made men regard the county as the proper basis for the Territorial Army. The absence of any obligation for foreign service may also be said to form some connection with the Territorial Army of pre-war days. But necessity, the tyrant's plea, proverbially knows no law, and there were several occasions on which Parliament found cause to complain of the Crown not honouring this exemption.

By the side of the general levy existed the feudal levy, which provided the Crown with some sort of a cavalry force.² Service in this force was

¹ *The Territorial Force. A Manual of its Law, Organisation and Administration.* By Harold Baker.

² There was also some light cavalry, of sorts, in the general levy.

limited, in theory at least, to forty days of the year. The obligation to serve was based on the doctrine that all land belongs to the Crown, and service was, in fact, a form of rent. Broadly speaking all rents in the Middle Ages were paid in service, and society was divided into two classes, those who paid rent by labouring in the fields and those who paid it by military service. The limitation of the period of service to forty days was, however, as inconvenient to the Plantagenet kings, with their Continental entanglements, as was the obligation to serve burdensome to their tenants. Arrangements were soon made by which the obligation to serve was commuted for a money payment, known as scutage, which enabled the king to pay mercenaries who would follow his standards without intermission.

The citizen forces of the Middle Ages were not satisfactory ; and, apart from this fact, the practice of raising fixed quotas from the counties by way of general levy, instead of calling out the whole population, left scope for volunteers. From the sixteenth century onwards independent military bodies began to be formed. One of these, the Honourable Artillery Company, which received a charter from Henry VIII under the style of the "Fraternitie or Guyilde of Saint George," survives to the present day ; these bodies really formed the germ of the Volunteers,

and so, indirectly, of the Territorial Army as it now exists.

The danger of Spanish invasion, acute in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, gave considerable impetus to the volunteer movement of that time. The general levy "had fallen into decay," but in the critical years 1585-1593 the Lieutenants of the counties received repeated injunctions to equip and prepare their musters: the Lieutenants preferred to rely on volunteers so far as possible, but deficiencies in the quotas required were made up by impressment.

The next phase of importance in the history of our Army as a whole, and of the volunteer movement in particular, was the Civil War. As a step in the evolution of the Territorial Army it is notable for two developments, both on the Parliamentary side: the part played by the "trained bands" of the towns, particularly London, and the part played by Cromwell's "New Model."

The trained bands, the direct descendants of the volunteer movement of the previous century, had become an established feature of city life. The apprentices trained in the use of musket and pike had been one of the objects of Beaumont and Fletcher's fun.¹ The relief of Gloucester showed that they were capable of carrying out

¹ In *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*.

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exacting military tasks of vital strategic importance. And their appearance alone was sufficient to deter the Royalists from attempting to pursue their advance on the capital beyond Uxbridge, the Valmy of the English Civil War.

But the "Captain, and Colonel, and Knight-at-Arms," who might be moved by the danger to their homes and the austere beauty of a Miltonic sonnet to organise themselves for the defence of London, or even to concentrate their energies on a single arduous and extended military operation, lacked the homogeneity and the singleness of purpose requisite in a field force which was to push the campaign to a successful conclusion. Each man had his garden to cultivate, his trade to follow. What was the use of a man fighting for the principle that he could not be taxed without consent of Parliament if the result was that his business disappeared and he had no assets to tax? And, so far as the religious issue was concerned, after the struggle already put up he might reasonably hope for a settlement which in practice would leave him liberty of conscience. The Presbyterians of London and Scotland desired a compromise; an army of enthusiasts, and an army of enthusiasts alone, could push the campaign to a successful conclusion.

The material which was needed was found in the "New Model." This was pressed by quotas

from the counties and paid by forced assessments. When organised into units, it derived its driving force very largely from the independent tenets and stern religious temper of its troops, who had nothing to gain, and everything to fear, from a compromise effected by Episcopalian Royalists and Presbyterian rebels. From the point of view of military organisation, its most interesting features were the dislike and distrust of a standing army which it bred in Englishmen, and the fact that it was raised by six County Associations of the East Anglian counties—a clear precedent for the administrative organisation of 1907 and to-day.

One other feature of the Civil War is perhaps worth notice for our present purpose. That is the extreme unreliability, proved on both sides from the earliest phases of the war, of the Militia, or general levy. This led to its reorganisation at the Restoration, when a statute of 1662 put it on a legal footing which was maintained, with certain variations, until the abolition of the force under the provisions of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907; the principal change was that whereas under the Act of 1662 chief powers over the Militia were transferred from the Crown to the Lieutenants of counties, by an Act of 1821 they were revested in the Crown. In practice, the history of the Militia was a history of ups and downs, short periods of comparative efficiency at times of

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crisis alternating with much longer periods of apathy and decadence when no immediate danger impended.

The basis of the militia was still the county. It was to be trained annually for four days, and in time of insurrection or invasion it could be marched out of the county, being entitled to pay from the Crown. Otherwise its area of service was the county, and its expenses were met by the property owners of the county, or by a parish rate. Its period of embodiment was limited by the fact that the Crown could not provide pay beyond the time approved by Parliament. It was limited as to numbers by the graduated scale according to which property owners were liable to furnish horses, arms and men. Substitutes were permitted. The Lieutenants could inflict a fine of five shillings or twenty days' imprisonment for neglect of minor duties, or a fine of twenty pounds, and in default three months' imprisonment, in case of desertion. The force was at no time subject to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War. Commissions to officers were granted by the Lieutenants, subject to a right of appointment and dismissal reserved to the Crown. The Lieutenants themselves were appointed by the Crown.

Between 1662 and 1757 the Militia was only called out on three occasions, in 1690, 1715, and

1745, and on each of them it was only called out in part. In normal times it relapsed into a gentle decline, and when the Young Pretender overran Scotland and invaded England its condition aroused grave concern. The Seven Years' War caused the elder Pitt to give the matter his attention, and 1757, the second year of that war, saw the next important step in its development. The tendency of this reform was to enlarge the scope of the county ; instead of the earlier principle, by which property owners furnished horses, arms and men according to a graduated scale, the county now had to raise, through its parishes, a fixed quota of men between the ages of eighteen and fifty. The quota was selected by ballot, the term of service was three years, and regiments had to be trained annually for twenty-eight days. The force was liable to embodiment in the case of actual or imminent invasion or rebellion, and, when embodied, was for the first time made subject to the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War ; except in these cases the area of service was the county. It was characteristic of the political thought and military organisation of the time that a property qualification was required from officers, according to rank.

Enthusiasm for service in the ranks of the Militia was as little in evidence after as before the reforms of the Great Commoner, and twenty-five

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years later "the force consisted of hired substitutes whose natural vocation was service in the Regular Army." But then, as in later days, each crisis brought forth its crop of volunteers. From 1758 onwards provision was made for the acceptance in Militia units of properly trained and equipped men, if willing to take the same oath and serve under the same conditions as the Militia so long as on active service. During the American War of Independence, commanding officers were empowered to form distinct companies of volunteers, in which the Lieutenant of the county might allot commissions to officers with the necessary property qualifications; and later on in that war Lieutenants were empowered to accept the services of independently raised companies.

The year 1782 is an important landmark in the evolution of the Territorial Force. The amalgamation of Volunteers with Militiamen presented several difficulties—the former were growing in numbers, they manifested a certain independence, and they were of a different social position from the Militiamen. The first step was now taken towards that separation of the Militia and the Volunteers, which was to subsist until 1907, by providing that authorised persons could, in case of invasion or rebellion, raise independent corps of volunteers, who should receive the same pay and

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be subject to the same discipline as Regular troops. Many such corps were formed, and although they were disbanded in the following year, a precedent had been established; its significance was to become apparent in the protracted dangers of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

In 1794 the menace of invasion again came into the foreground, and once again the formation of Volunteer corps was authorised, this time with the important provision that active service was extended "from actual invasion to the appearance of it and from rebellion to riots." The corps were now, as they had been before, of two types—those enrolled for local service, such as coast defence, and those enrolled for general service in any part of the Kingdom. Volunteers were exempted from service with the Militia.

From the standpoint of the Territorial Army, modern times date from 1907; the French Revolution brought us to the ante-room; the South African War brought us to the threshold. From 1794 down to the present day the organisation of the auxiliary forces was based on two distinct principles, on the one hand service which was purely voluntary, on the other a system of conscription modified by the chances of the ballot. While the settlement of 1907 adopted the voluntary principle as its basis, in other respects

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it adopted parts of the organisation and terms of service of the Militia. In order, therefore, to understand the quality and nature of the soil from which the Territorial Army has sprung, it is necessary from this point onwards to trace separately the histories of the Militia and the Volunteers.

Enlistment in the latter received, it is clear, considerable impetus from the tentative approaches towards compulsory service which were made by the Government in the early stages of the struggle with France. The alarms of 1797, whose naval mutinies and financial crisis so disturbed Wilberforce that he wrote that in these times it was impossible to contemplate marriage,¹ were followed in 1798 by a serious effort to organise the man-power of the country. Parliament empowered the Crown to find out the resources of each county; and the Lieutenants were directed to obtain returns of all men between the ages of fifteen and fifty, and of all stores and transport likely to be available. At first there was no attempt to impose compulsory training, but Associations were formed of the men willing to be armed and exercised for defence. These Armed Associations, as they were called, were composed not only of men who would undertake purely military duties, but also of firemen, boatmen,

¹ It is only fair to point out that he was married within a few months of so writing.

drivers, and so forth—" In their military capacity they were small emergency forces, designed to harass and obstruct an invader by creating a desert round his path. They were drawn from all classes, and comprised both horse and foot." Members of the Armed Association were exempted, it is interesting to note, not only from the Militia ballot but also, and equally important, from the duty on hair-powder. The organisation of 1798, in fact, combined the principle of compulsory registration, so vigorously canvassed at the present time, with the types of service associated respectively with the Territorial soldier and the air raid warden.

The renewed and increased danger of invasion which followed the insecure peace of the Treaty of Amiens was reflected by the passage into law in 1803 of the *Levy en Masse* Act, which provided for a general arming and drilling of the male population between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five. But the Act could be suspended where volunteers' corps had been formed, or where volunteers came forward in sufficient numbers.

In fact the development of the volunteer movement made compulsion superfluous, and it was not applied. The Volunteers' importance in the defensive structure of the State was marked, during the Peace of Amiens, by the passage of an Act enabling the Crown to accept offers of

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continued service from a number of Yeomanry and Volunteer regiments. After the renewed outbreak of war, the strength of the movement was so great as to produce a force of 380,000 men. The instruction given was elementary, their function in case of invasion being to operate as small bands of "guerrillas," harassing and hindering the enemy until he could be confronted with better-trained troops.

The government of these forces was at first elastic, but was reduced to some sort of order in 1804 by an Act, under which the Volunteers served till 1863 and the Yeomanry till 1901. Volunteers and Yeomanry were recognised as part of the permanent military system of the country, under the command of general officers appointed by the Crown. There was no fixed area of service, but troops subject to the Volunteers and Yeomanry Act were to be subject to military discipline when on active service; they were exempt from service in the Militia. Except when on active service, a Volunteer was entitled to his discharge after giving a fortnight's notice, and equally the commanding officer could discharge any man for sufficient cause. Corps property was vested in the commanding officer. The rules of a Corps had to be submitted to a Secretary of State, who might disallow them.

The greater the danger of invasion, the more

volunteers came forward. Numbers and enthusiasm reached their highest point in 1805, when Napoleon was encamped at Boulogne, and thereafter, with England's command of the seas undisputed, both declined.

The process of decline was accelerated by the Government as a matter of policy : it was felt that the Volunteers were too expensive, too undisciplined, that their military spirit was not sufficiently reliable, and that they competed too much with other forces. Windham's policy was to reduce the Volunteers' numbers by raising their social status, gradually making the Volunteers pay for their own training and creating a large national force out of those who could not afford the expense incurred. On Windham leaving office, Castlereagh attempted a solution on different lines, by instituting a Local Militia, raised by ballot from men between the ages of eighteen and thirty, to serve for four years. The ballot was to be universal, except in a place where the full quota demanded by the Act was met by voluntary enlistment.

The intention of the Local Militia Act was twofold, "to establish uniform compulsory service, and by pressure to reduce the Volunteers to a small self-supporting force." By inflicting fines as a penalty for avoiding the ballot and by offering a bounty for voluntary enlistment in the Local

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Militia, the second aim was virtually achieved. In the first object the Act completely failed, though at first recruiting was brisk and by 1812 over 210,000 men were serving in the Local Militia.

Taking the Volunteer forces as a whole during the period of the international disturbances created by the French Revolution and Napoleon, it may be said that from 1794 to 1805 there was an increase in numbers, enthusiasm and efficiency, and from 1805 to 1815 a decline in each: a history partly explained by the enthusiasm for the Volunteers of the younger Pitt, who died in 1806. The decline, however, applied much less to the Yeomanry than to the Volunteers proper. The Yeomanry, so called after 1795, a cavalry force in the main manned by farmers and officered by country gentlemen, was first raised in 1794. The social and financial position of the members of this force made it more independent of Government's grants, especially when the price of wheat was high, as it was in the later years of the Napoleonic Wars; and equally the Government took a more favourable view of a force so valuable in the maintenance of order.

Apart from the Yeomanry the Volunteer force was moribund from 1815 to 1859, the period of Tennyson's "The War!"¹: from the final defeat of Napoleon I to the panic engendered by

¹ Republished in 1892 as "Riflemen, Form!"

Napoleon III. The Yeomanry continued to serve, though not so many of them, and for shorter periods of annual exercise.

So far as the General Militia, as distinct from the Local Militia, was concerned, the years from 1794 to 1815 witnessed a gradual alteration in its character, from being the constitutional force for purposes of home defence to being, in a sense, an adjunct of the Regular Army. This result was due in part to the encouragement afforded by Pitt to the Volunteers, which made it natural to look to them for home defence, in part to the wastage caused by the Peninsular War. In 1811, it was made compulsory for all Militiamen, recruited thereafter, to serve in Ireland if required, while in 1814 whole companies and regiments were transferred to the regular forces and numbers of men volunteered for service in Spain and, according to Wellington, acquitted themselves very creditably. The Militia was in process of becoming a reserve for the Regular Army.

After the wars the Militia was virtually in abeyance, after a time the ballot being suspended. In the period of economic strain and dislocation which lasted from Waterloo to the end of the "hungry 'forties" a reduction in military expenditure was an obvious palliative. The Duke of Wellington and others from time to time drew attention to the weakness of the national defences,

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but it took the combination of the Duke's death with Napoleon III's accession seriously to disturb Victorian complacency. The panic was short-lived—indeed, Britain and France were shortly to become allies in the Crimea—but it had one important result in the reorganisation of the Militia.

The basis of the Militia ceased to be the ballot : voluntary enlistment was made the normal method of recruitment, with the ballot in the background in case of need. The establishment was fixed at 80,000, which the Crown had power to increase to 120,000 in case of emergency. Annual training was fixed at three weeks, but could be increased to eight weeks. The Militia, too, was made less of a county force, more a national force in character : War Office control was increased, and the property qualification for officers, subsequently abolished in 1869, was modified. Above all, the Militia became once again an effective force : in 1851 to 1852 annual training was given, for the first time, in some cases, since 1815.

The Volunteers soon followed the Militia out of abeyance. In 1859, a wave of patriotic feeling swept the country, due largely to vague fears of Napoleon III's intentions and to concrete information as to the increases in Continental armies. A great protest meeting was held in Long Acre and *The Times* published Tennyson's

“The War!”; whether in response to Tennyson’s invitation or not, form the riflemen undoubtedly did, and in large numbers. The War Office was as much alarmed by this display of military fervour in a pacific nation as it was by the exotic uniforms in which it sometimes found expression. The Government’s first and most decided reaction was not to spend money on this new movement. The formation was authorised of corps of men who were willing to pay for their own arms and equipment; a decision slightly modified by a later decision to supply a quarter of the rifles necessary. The War Office firmly suppressed any idea of the election of officers by the bodies in which they were to hold command.

The Volunteer force, which, though some of its units, such as the Honourable Artillery Company, had a much longer history, in the main owed its existence to the movement of 1859, remained in being down till 1907. It was the immediate forerunner of the Territorial Army. Both the similarities and the differences between the two forces are instructive, for, though the prosperous amateur rifleman of 1859 does not, at first glance, appear to have very much in common with the democratic and often highly-skilled Territorial of 1938, the process of evolution from the one to the other has been continuous.

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The Territorial of to-day is not so very far removed from the Volunteer of 1902, to whom the 1859 Volunteer's paternity is clear and unmistakable. The history of the Volunteer force from 1859 to 1907 is, therefore, of some considerable topical interest.

After the inception of the movement in 1859 it spread so quickly that by the end of 1860, 180,000 volunteers were enrolled. In 1861, a field day of the London Corps was held at Brighton, attended by 12,000 men. It rapidly became evident, even to War Office scepticism and Militia hostility, that the Volunteers must be effectively incorporated in the defence organisation of the country. This was done by the Volunteer Act of 1863 and by Orders in Council made in pursuance of it.

It was provided that Volunteers might be put under the command of Regular Generals or field officers, but that they should always be led by their own officers. These ranked with Regular and Militia officers as the junior of their rank, and with Yeomanry officers according to rank and date of commission. The local character of the Volunteers was at first emphasised by commissions being granted by the Lieutenants of the counties, but after 1871 commissions were granted by the Crown, the Lieutenants keeping, however, the right to recommend for first appointments to the

rank of subaltern : so that no man could start his career as an officer in the Volunteers without first receiving the seal of local approval.

Money was raised for the purposes of the units by a combination of subscriptions with a Government capitation grant. The commanding officer of the unit was in the last resort responsible for its debts, and this responsibility extended to his estate on his death : a system which was responsible for two manifest evils. In the first place the commanding officer was inevitably tempted to aim at swelling the size of the unit, to the possible detriment of its military efficiency, in order to earn a large grant. Secondly, it was only natural that well-to-do men who could make handsome subscriptions were preferred to others who might have been more efficient as soldiers.

There is no doubt but that the Volunteers were subjected to a considerable amount of more or less good-natured ridicule. The Volunteer sometimes assumed an air of military flamboyance which accorded ill with the staid chop-whiskers of the Victorian householder. He was, in fact, the Malvolio of the Victorian scene ; to those in a less comfortable material position than himself, his uniform, like Malvolio's yellow stockings and cross garters, appeared in the light of the extravagances of the almost professionally decorous ; to those whose position brought them within the charmed

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circle of Society and the Service clubs his earnestness and his amateurishness alike seemed awkward and ungraceful. Feeling about the Territorial Army is, even now, not quite free from these influences.

In spite of these drawbacks, the Volunteers gradually established a serious and important position in our defensive system. The part for which they were cast was that of position troops. It was not contemplated that they would be sufficiently efficient to take the field, but in days when fear of invasion loomed large it was thought that they would perform a useful service in manning the forts which surrounded London, and carrying out garrison duties, leaving the conduct of operations in the field to the Regular Army and the Militia.

In 1898, the year before the outbreak of the South African War, the effectives of all ranks in the Volunteers numbered 231,624. Comparing the Volunteers of 1899 with the modern Territorial Army, Colonel John K. Dunlop writes :¹ “ . . . fair comment would probably be along the following lines. In good Volunteer units there was a high standard of tactical knowledge among the officers, and among a fair proportion of the rank and file. . . .

“ The standard of shooting was good among the

¹ In *The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914*.

keenest men, but the qualification standard was lower than that which holds good in the Territorial Army.

“Partly because training was confined to Saturday afternoons and evenings and there was no summer camp to take men away from their families or their businesses, the Volunteers of 1899 were as a whole older then than the rank and file of the Territorial Army to-day. There were married men, small shopkeepers, skilled artisans or professional men. A great deal of emphasis was laid upon drill which was generally conducted by the Adjutant. . . .

“The culminating event of the Volunteer year was the Annual Inspection. On that day every man of the unit had to be on parade; if he were an absentee no capitation grant would be received by the unit that year on his account. The fact that the whole year’s training led up to this inspection and not to an annual training in camp as is the case with the Territorial Army of to-day had the almost inevitable effect of creating a certain formalism and attention to drill. . . .”¹

The whole essence of the matter is that the Territorial Army is, in most respects, designed to form part of a field army and that the Volunteers were not. “Like the Yeomanry and Militia,” as

¹ Any attempt to discuss the Volunteer movement as a whole runs the risk of ignoring the great influence which certain Volunteers, such as Spenser Wilkinson, exercised on the Army and on military thought.

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Colonel Dunlop says, " the Volunteers possessed practically no machinery for mobilisation or for taking the field. Regimental transport was non-existent. . . . Except for the batteries of the Honourable Artillery Company, there was practically no Volunteer Field Artillery—Volunteer Artillery Corps either manned coast defence guns, or were so-called position batteries, armed with the clumsy 40-pounder B.L. gun. Even for the occasional journey into the country, horses to draw these guns had to be hired from neighbouring contractors and were frequently led by their civilian drivers.

" It follows that there were no opportunities for Infantry and Artillery to practise together."

The Yeomanry, the mounted elder brothers of the Volunteers, consisted, on the eve of the outbreak of the South African War, of 11,891 officers and men (exclusive of Permanent Staff). They were liable to be called out for service in any part of Great Britain, but, like the Volunteers, could not be sent overseas.

The South African War, which was to prove of decisive importance in the history of the British Army as a whole, and especially so in the case of the auxiliary forces, found the Militia, the so-called " Constitutional Force," with a strength of just over a hundred thousand. The compulsory element in its recruitment had, as we have seen,

receded into the background ; and recruitment was now on a voluntary basis, slightly stimulated by the payment of bounties. In some respects it had more points of contact with the Regular Army than has the Territorial Army. The period of annual training was long—twenty-eight days ; training was usually done on a regimental basis, either in the depot barracks, or in a camp close to the main centre of the regiment, each Militia battalion being based on its regimental depot. And the Militia had many more Regular soldiers on its staff than has the Territorial unit, each Militia battalion having a total of thirty Regular staff.

The main components of the Militia were thirty-two brigades of artillery and one hundred and twenty-three battalions of infantry ; there was no cavalry, this, so far as the auxiliary forces were concerned, being supplied by the Yeomanry. As in the case of the Volunteers there were, apart from a small Militia Medical Staff Corps, no “services” whatsoever—a point of marked contrast with the Territorial Army. The Militia artillery was, in the main, coast fortress artillery, and not fit to take the field with the infantry. The Militia, in short, was a collection of units and not, as a force, organised to take the field.

The Militia was not liable for overseas service, but the regulations provided that if 75 per cent.

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of any Militia battalion volunteered for foreign service, the battalion would go as a unit. Militiamen had served in the Peninsular War, and during the Crimean War had undertaken the duties of several of the Mediterranean garrisons. It was also open to Militiamen to volunteer in peace-time for entrance into the Militia Reserve. A man doing this received a bounty of £1 and incurred no additional peace-time obligations; he had the same period of service, six years, and received the same training as any other Militiaman. In time of war he became liable for service overseas.

* * * * *

Such, in the very broadest outline, was the organisation and character of the auxiliary forces of the Crown when the South African War broke out. That war was destined to expose dangerous flaws in our military organisation and to set in train a movement for military reform, one of whose results was the Territorial Army.

The Stanhope Memorandum of 1891 had, in effect, defined the principal reasons for the Army's existence as being home defence and Imperial garrison duties. The altogether unexpected strain thrown by the Boer's resistance on the resources of the Empire showed the inadequacy of this conception. The Regular troops in this country were in many cases too

young to be sent on active service ; the Militia Reserve was used in filling the gaps in the ranks of the Regular troops in the theatre of war. The disappearance of the Militia Reserve, together with an alarming dearth of trained Militia officers, made it impossible in most cases to employ the Militia as fighting units, and they had to be used for the lines of communication and similar purposes. And, as a matter of law, Volunteers could not be sent abroad as such, but had first to enlist in the Regular forces. Nor, often, had they even the elements of the training required for field troops, for the minimum training required was very little, and everything, in fact, was left to the unit or individual. Colonel Dunlop quotes the orders of the Central London Rangers as an example : “ Six Company, three battalion drills, class firing and attendance at inspection are necessary to efficiency.” Efficiency for what purpose ? For manning the forts, perhaps, but not for very much else.

The various improvisations which enabled the country to surmount the dangers of the South African War do not concern us here, nor do the changes in the organisation of the Regular Army which ensued. But it was obvious from the first that the auxiliary forces of the Crown were not on a basis adequate to contemporary requirements, and from the outbreak of war down to the passage

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into law of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act the question of their reorganisation was much canvassed.

The position, shortly stated, was that the Militia could not supply effective fighting units because the best men were so often required to replace casualties in the Regular forces, and because it was impossible to improvise efficient officers, while the Volunteers were not eligible for foreign service and were not trained as a field force.

At first piecemeal reforms were attempted. The Volunteer Act of 1900 enabled Volunteers to go overseas as such, without enlistment in the Regular Army, should they so desire. An impetus was given to annual training in the modern sense. Mr. St. John Brodrick (now Lord Midleton) when Secretary of State for War conceived the idea of incorporating twenty-five selected Volunteer battalions, as well as a number of Militia battalions, in the Army Corps on which he intended the whole of the Army at home to be based. The Volunteer battalions so selected were to spend thirteen days in camp each year and were to receive a grant of 5s. per day per man in camp. Militia Field Batteries were to be raised.

In 1903 an attempt was made to survey the problem of the auxiliary forces as a whole. A Royal Commission was set up under the chairman-

ship of the Duke of Norfolk, whose terms of reference were :—

“To enquire into the organisation, numbers and terms of service of our Militia and Volunteer Forces, and to report whether any and, if any, what changes are required in order to secure that these forces shall be maintained in a condition of military efficiency and at an adequate strength.” Unfortunately the Norfolk Commission, instead of confining itself to its terms of reference, took the bit firmly between its teeth and recommended the introduction of conscription, having in mind not the export of man-power on the 1916 scale but the dangers of invasion. But it made a number of detailed recommendations as to Volunteer organisation and training which were largely carried out by the reorganisation at the end of the decade.

When Mr. Arnold-Forster succeeded Mr. Brodrick at the War Office, he planned a reorganisation of the Volunteers into two classes, based on “a reduction of the numbers and an increase in the efficiency.” The force was to be reduced to 180,000, of whom 60,000 would be expected to give a good deal of time to drill and training, would be organised into field formations in association with Yeomanry, Artillery and Engineers, and would receive a higher grant. The remaining 120,000 would be on a lower standard of efficiency

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and would receive a lower grant. These changes, like some others contemplated by Arnold-Forster, never became effective.

The military reforms carried out by Arnold-Forster's successor, Mr. R. B. Haldane, K.C. (afterwards created Viscount Haldane of Cloan) were, of course, of historic importance. So far as the auxiliary forces are concerned, their essential features were the supersession of the Militia and the Volunteers, the creation of the Territorial Army based on County Associations, and the formation of a Special Reserve which virtually took the place of the old Militia Reserve. The account of the Territorial Force of Haldane's creation belongs, on such firm foundations did Haldane build, to the description of the Territorial Army of to-day.

In sanctioning the Haldane policy, the Liberal Cabinet definitely repudiated the doctrines of the National Service League and the Norfolk Commission, that the object of the auxiliary forces must be to train every able-bodied man to protect the country from invasion, and adopted the teaching of the so-called "blue water school." This was that the Navy was the first line of defence, and that reliance could and must be placed upon it to protect these shores from a large-scale invasion; the rôle of the Regular Army must be to assist the Navy to enforce the national will in operations

overseas, that of the auxiliary forces to leave the Regular Army's hands free for this purpose.

Such was the background against which the Territorial Army came into being. Its creation was the work of many devoted hands, besides those of Haldane. There was Lord Esher, who presided over a committee composed of representatives of the Regular Army, the Militia and the Volunteers which was officially called "The Territorial Force Committee," but appropriated, or received, the nickname of "Duma," after the then representative assembly of Russia. There were, amongst other members of the "Duma," Lord Derby, Lord Willingdon, Lord Mottistone (as they now are) Lord Roberts, Lord Methuen, Lord Bingham (afterwards Earl of Lucan), the Duke of Bedford and Colonel (now Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald) Ellison. Last but not least, there was King Edward VII himself, whose support helped to allay anxieties caused by the disappearance of the Militia, and to induce, almost compel, the Lords Lieutenants of the counties to transfer their affections to the Territorial Army.

CHAPTER III

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY PAST AND PRESENT

THE PAST

THE Territorial Army was born into a wintry world, and it found itself at once the storm-centre of a politico-military typhoon. The advocates of universal military service, while willing enough to extend their blessing to the public-spirited individuals who volunteered for service in the Force, condemned the Force itself as inadequate. On the other hand there were not wanting military experts who, concentrating on the performance of individual tasks, were doubtful of the Territorial soldier's capacity to fulfil the more intricate requirements imposed by modern warfare. The greatest military figure of the pre-war years, Lord Roberts, took a leading place in both categories of critics. Not only did he preach without remission the danger of invasion and the consequent need of a large conscript army, but also, in particular, he gave vehement expression to his doubts as to the efficiency of the Territorial gunner.

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“I say emphatically,” he told the House of Lords, “that the 196 Territorial batteries, by reason of their unsatisfactory composition, the want of proper organisation, and their lack of anything approaching sufficient training and gun practice, would not, in spite of their numbers, be the slightest use in the field ; and not only would not be of the slightest use, but they would be a positive danger. . . . Believe me, my Lords, to trust to amateur artillerists would be to court disaster.”¹

Such views were not universally held. That one of their most forceful exponents was the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson² will, it may be said without undue lack of respect for the memory of an extremely able man, whose brilliancy of address was marred by an absence of sober judgment, go far to make the modern reader suspect that they were wrong-headed. Experts who came prepared to curse, but without personal bias, sometimes remained to bless. Major-General (then Colonel) F. D. V. Wing made a favourable report on the potentialities of the gunners,³ and the future Field-Marshal Earl Haig also gave the Territorial Army active and invaluable support.

¹ House of Lords, March 15th, 1908—P-D-1908, p. 45.

² Wilson's admiration was reserved for the Ulster Volunteers, formed not to defend the Empire but to frustrate the lawful enactment of Home Rule.

³ See Duff Cooper's *Haig*, Vol. I, Part III.

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The existence of scoffers and serious doubters in the Regular Army, with its vastly different traditions and mental approach, can be no source of surprise. In spite of them, the Territorial Army of before the war flourished exceedingly, and gave training for the supreme test which was to follow, to great numbers of officers and men. It was composed then of 14 divisions ; there were 14 cavalry brigades, and corps troops. It is well to emphasise that most of the new Territorial units were direct descendants of Volunteer units and were, in fact, the old Volunteers writ large. "Some of the old Volunteer units disappeared in the conversion ; on the other hand, many of the Royal Horse Artillery batteries, Territorial Force, which formed the artillery of the cavalry brigades, were raised as new formations. With the exception of these horse artillery batteries, practically every unit of the Territorial Force traced a direct descent from a unit of the former Yeomanry or Volunteers."

Stimulated by Royal encouragement and a campaign in the *Daily Mail*, recruits for the new force poured in. It came into existence with an establishment of 302,199 officers and men ; on April 1st, 1908, it amounted to a total of 276,618 all ranks. This progress was not quite maintained, and for the next three years the

strength remained pretty constant at a little less than 260,000.

The doubts which Regular officers had entertained as to the efficiency of the Territorial Army soon manifested themselves when, in August, 1914, war was declared. To trace in any detail the history of the Territorial Army in the Great War is no part of our purpose, for in truth it throws very little light on the problem of what the rôle of the Territorial Army in any future war is likely to be. The force was embodied and, few indeed of its members refraining from offering themselves for service overseas, its units from time to time despatched to the various theatres of war or to garrison duties in India. But whereas to-day it is part of the settled military policy of this country that in any future emergency the Territorial Army will, if need arise, be the basis for an expansion of the national effort, in 1914 this was not the case, and in the early and, for this purpose, crucial phases of the war, control of the War Office was vested in the hands of Kitchener, a Regular imbued with distrust of the Territorial Army and in particular of its officers. Kitchener's Army, and the new armies which followed it, had no connection with the Territorial Army, and their officers held not Territorial commissions, but temporary Regular commissions. For these reasons the chief importance of the Great War

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in the history of the Territorial Army is that such of its units as were tried were not found wanting, and in consequence Kitchener's policy has been definitely rejected for future use.

In Kitchener's mind the Territorials were too closely associated with the exotic uniforms and the erratic efficiency of some of the old Volunteers. From the outset men like Sir Ian Hamilton, whose knowledge of English life was so much more up to date than Kitchener's, with his long service overseas, held other views. Events justified their faith, and even Kitchener, at first horrified at the bare idea, was induced by the high performance of individual units overseas to despatch a Territorial division as such. But this change of mind came too late to alter the general character of our war effort.

THE PRESENT

The post-war era brought many changes to the Territorial Army. One feature remains substantially unchanged since its inauguration by Haldane in 1907 to 1908: its basic organisation.

The clearest account of the administrative framework of the Territorial Army is to be found in a pre-war text-book.¹ Its essential feature is the separation of the sphere of command from the sphere of administration. The training of the

¹ *The Territorial Force.* By Harold Baker.

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Territorial divisions is the responsibility of the respective commanders-in-chief part of whose commands they form.

Apart from certain duties connected with the annual training in camp the administration of the Territorial Army is conducted by decentralised and civilian County Associations over which presides the Lord Lieutenant of each county.² The co-ordinating authority at the War Office is the Director-General of the Territorial Army, a general officer and now a member of the Army Council.

The duties of the County Association, as Mr. Baker points out, are strictly limited to the civil and financial administration of the units in its charge at all times other than those of annual training in camp, of embodiment, and of actual military service. Its function is to raise its quota by voluntary enlistment, and hand it over equipped and complete when required for the general officer commanding-in-chief to train and handle in the field. For this purpose it receives certain grants, which it may apply within wide limits. The governing idea of the County Association is that enlistment and administration shall be in the hands of men conversant with civil conditions in each locality. It administers a civilian area

² The President of the City of London Territorial Associations is the Lord Mayor.

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independent of the area in respect of which each Territorial division is organised.

The County Association is composed partly of military members, who are officers representing the various units in the county, partly of civilian members, who represent the County Council and various municipal authorities.

* * * * *

The Territorial Army of to-day may be said to date from 1921. The experience of 1914 to 1918 had shown that in certain circumstances—whether likely to be repeated or not—home defence was not an adequate conception of the rôle of the Territorial Army. In 1921 it was decided that all members of that army, except those over thirty-five years old, should be liable on embodiment for service overseas. “The Territorial Army of to-day is an Expeditionary Force.”¹

History seldom repeats itself, and the recurrence of a situation similar to that of 1914 is a matter for conjecture. What is certain is that the Territorial Army, from being the third line of defence with limited liability, has become the second line with unlimited liability. Indeed the anti-aircraft divisions are in the first line of defence, and not only so, but also, as has been said,² the outposts of the first line.

¹ Dunlop, *The Problems and Responsibilities of the Territorial Army*.

² By Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart.

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The Territorial Army is a force of citizens who have voluntarily assumed this unlimited liability in the event of war. Further, as stated above, it is to be the foundation on which any increased national effort will, in any future war, be built. It has been recognised as a force fit not only to train men to carry out the tasks appropriate to their arm of the service, but also to train men to prepare others for the performance of these tasks. "The man who can, does ; the man who can't, teaches." The duty with which the Territorial Army is entrusted is that of producing men who can both do and teach. How have the critics of pre-war days been confounded !

* * * * *

There are two main reasons for supposing that the methods of our intervention in any future war will not closely resemble the methods adopted in 1914. The first is that there is a growing tendency to believe that the extravagant profusion of blood and treasure which characterised our efforts in 1914 to 1918 was altogether out of proportion to the results obtained, to believe that a more conservative expenditure of man-power in the field will yield richer results, and that mass armies of the 1918 model will prove more of a hindrance than a help. The second is that the development of the air arm has not only revolutionised war,

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but has also brought the wheel full circle and made home defence once again one of the main purposes, if not indeed the primary reason, for the Territorial Army's existence.

The paradox inherent in the situation is that while the Territorial Army has become an expeditionary force it has also become much less likely to be employed, in a European war on a first-class scale, on an expedition. Indeed it is axiomatic that in such a conflict a large and increasingly important part of the Territorial Army will not in any event be sent abroad until the supremacy in the air of Great Britain and her Allies is assured beyond possibility of doubt. The reference is, of course, to the anti-aircraft units.

These, which consist of the two types of unit, the anti-aircraft batteries and searchlight companies, are in a class apart from the rest of the Territorial Army. They exist primarily for home defence, and only in quite exceptional circumstances is it possible to conceive of them, or at least of a large number of them, being sent abroad. The rest of the Army, on the other hand, may perhaps envisage the possibility of being despatched overseas in bulk as being much less remote than in fact it appears to be. The members of the Territorial anti-aircraft units assume liability to be called upon active service without hostilities being declared or general mobilisation being

ordered—a liability necessitated by the modern practice of making war before declaring it. They remain, however, liable to be ordered overseas in the event of war equally with the other members of the Territorial force.

The Territorial Army has also been charged with responsibility for the coastal defences of the country. The men engaged in this work are broadly in the same position as men in the anti-aircraft units.

The Territorial Army has been saddled with fresh obligations.

The purpose of this book is to discuss the various parts which the Territorial Army may be called upon to play ; before we can answer the question whether it is suitably organised for the fulfilment of its obligations we must find out what forms those obligations are likely to assume. We shall not, except incidentally, discuss any shortcomings which there may be in the Territorial Army's organisations, or offer suggestions as to their remedies. We shall confine ourselves to focusing attention on the tasks which the Territorials may be required to perform and on the problems which seem likely to arise in the course of their execution. We hope that we may present material which will be useful to any further enquiry ; we do not propose ourselves to make it.

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It is necessary here to emphasise that one of Haldane's chief ambitions for the Territorial Army has been almost entirely attained : it is an army of all arms, of all services. There are infantry, cavalry (some now mechanised), and artillery ; there are Royal Engineers, Signals, Royal Army Service Corps and R.A.M.C. Both in its composition, and in the obligations which it imposes on its members, the Territorial Army assumes on mobilisation the characteristics of a Regular force. It is the country's duty to make the conditions of service for the Territorial as pleasant as possible, but still more is it the country's duty not to conceal from the Territorial the extent of the obligations which he is incurring by virtue of his service. Nothing is so likely to kindle resentment as legal or moral compulsion to waive any right which the soldier has been led to regard as inviolable.

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The piling of military burdens on Territorial shoulders has naturally proceeded side by side with a growth of official recognition by the Government, the War Office and the Regular Army itself of the changed status of the Territorial Army. Most important of all has been the changed attitude of the public. To the general public the Volunteer, however praiseworthy, was still faintly

ridiculous. After thirty years almost the last vestige of this feeling about the Territorial seems to have disappeared. There is a certain suspicion of the Territorial sometimes to be found among those who are on the Left in politics, who tend to dub the Territorial a Fascist. This is due in part to the somewhat invidious association of the old-time Yeomanry with the magistracy, which reached its culmination at Peterloo, the recollection of whose events have tinted if not tainted the minds of many Radicals and Socialists ever since. There is also a more subtle feeling that there is a danger of over-regimenting the leisure hours of workers already often over-tired, a tendency typical of the Fascist States, for whom, as for the Communist, organisation is often an end in itself, and independence of thought an object of mistrust. This attitude towards the Territorial Army, mistaken though it may be in its facts, is fundamentally a healthy one. It shows that the individual desire to think for himself is still alive in spite of modern standardisation, and it teaches the Territorial Army that in its own interest it should not make too many exacting demands on its members ; it should, rather, leave them as free as possible to cultivate their own personalities and that versatility of interests and aptitudes which will prove, as it already has proved, of primary importance to the complex life

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and organisation of a modern army. For the rest, the general attitude is to regard the Territorial as he regards himself ; a man with a job to do, in whose adequate performance he and the public have a common interest.

The importance of official, as distinct from public recognition is not so much that it gives the Territorial Army prestige as that it enables it to do its work, and to make its own distinctive contribution to the pool of military knowledge and the development of the military art ; and also that it shows that the military authorities are prepared to take note of the citizen soldier's civilian problems—a condition precedent to the Territorial Army attaining the highest state of efficiency possible. Thus one aspect of the growth of official recognition is the appointment of Territorial officers to ranks and appointments previously reserved for officers in the Regular Army ; the other is the grant of concessions to all ranks.

Since the Great War, in a limited number of cases, a Territorial officer has been appointed to command a Territorial Brigade or to be the C.R.A. of a division. The command of a Territorial brigade did not, either for a Regular or a Territorial officer, carry the rank of Brigadier as in the Regular Army. Under Mr. Hore Belisha's direction this has been altered ; the command of a

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brigade or similar appointment in the Territorial Army carries with it the same rank as in the Regular Army and, further, Territorial officers who have the time and energy to spare and who have shown the necessary ability now know that they can aspire to promotion to the rank of Brigadier¹. Nor has it stopped at that : the rank "Major-General, Territorial Army" has been instituted, and two officers have been promoted to it. But perhaps it is even more revolutionary than placing Territorials in the higher executive positions, to appoint them to places on the Staff. Two officers have been appointed to positions in the Directorate of the Territorial Army at the War Office. Further, the doors of the Staff College and of the Imperial Defence College have been thrown open to the Territorial.

The significance of these changes is to show the existence of a trend away from regarding the Territorial Army as a second-hand imitation of the Regular, and towards regarding it as a force with its own character which has a distinctive contribution to make to the security of the country, the Empire, and maybe the world. Aldersgate can never be Aldershot, nor Camberwell Camberley ; attempts by the one to

¹ Out of fifty brigade commands in the Field Force of the Territorial Army in August, 1936, there were eight Territorial officers ; in August, 1938, this had been increased to ten, and by the end of the year it will be fourteen.

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approximate to the other can but receive, and deserve, ridicule. The conventions of the one are entirely inappropriate to the other. To take only one instance, the social segregation of the officer from his men which, whether it be suitable to the modern Regular Army or not, is firmly rooted in the Regulars' traditions, has scarcely any parallel in the civilian life of to-day ; and it can have no part in the structure of the Territorial Army. In a unit like the Sharpshooters (The 23rd Armoured Car Company) for instance, the officers would be the last to assert any differences of social status between themselves and the men whom they command, who are, in fact, professional and business men just like themselves ; in one London anti-aircraft unit, to take another example, a section in which one of the men is a partner in an eminent firm of solicitors, and another a director of an old and prosperous company of City tea merchants, both of them being Cambridge graduates, is commanded by an N.C.O. who is a door-keeper in an hotel. To units of these types the military tradition, which dates from the days when the victims of outrageous economic fortune were officered by the younger sons of the landed gentry, is hopelessly inapplicable. For good or ill, it is essential for the Territorial Army to regard itself, and to be regarded, as a force radically different in structure and aim from the Regular

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Army, which must be for it a model for the performance of a number of its technical duties, but nothing more.

With Territorial officers on the War Office Staff, there are now, as there have never been before, men with direct experience of the problems involved by the dual nature of the Territorial Army who enjoy direct and regular access to the highest authorities in the British Army. The Territorial Army's case can always be put by men who have had the best possible opportunity of understanding it.

The other aspect of the changing status of the Territorial Army, the concessions to the men, shows that the sacrifices which Territorials have to make are becoming understood in high places. That the married Territorial now receives an allowance for his wife and children in respect of each week which he spends in camp, that he also receives an allowance to compensate him for his out-of-pocket expenses during the rest of the year, are welcome signs that the War Office Authorities are alive to realities and that the public is willing to do its share by making a better recompense for the service which it receives.

The recent improvement in recruiting shows that the men who are willing to serve are not lacking. This is a good beginning, but in addition to good will on all sides it is necessary to see that

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it, and the energy which it generates, are directed into the right channels. What those channels are is determined by the tasks which the Territorial Army will be required to execute in war. Is the organisation fitted for those tasks ? Is the training the best possible for training men as leaders, or as fighters, or as assistants in the services ? Before attempting to answer those questions, we must first consider the character which the next war is likely to assume, and then see what rôle the Territorial Army will be required to fill in it.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHARACTER OF THE NEXT WAR

THE character of a future war has, not unnaturally, been the subject of a great deal of speculation and not a little rhetoric. Discussion has ranged from the wildest flights of fancy to sober if unimaginative anticipation of a struggle similar to that of the closing phases of the war of 1914 to 1918. The theatre-going public has been treated to plays dealing with annihilating death-rays, the cinema-going public has been given an uncomfortable jolt by the picture of the destruction of modern civilisation by aerial bombing painted by Mr. H. G. Wells in the film "The Shape of Things to Come." Lord Baldwin, when Prime Minister, intrigued us by remarking that the Rhine was the frontier of Britain, and terrified us by announcing that the bomber would always get through, while Mr. Beverley Nichols has harrowed our feelings by his forecasts of the effect of chemical warfare on civilian life. Meanwhile the spectators of military exercises in most countries have been treated to spectacular frontal

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attacks suggestive of the tactics of the Somme—without the casualties of 1916.

Experience of warfare since 1918 does not throw a great deal of light on the problem of what a future war between the Great Powers will really be like. The Abyssinian War showed that a combination of air power and chemical warfare with engineering skill could spread panic among a half-disciplined army and a semi-barbaric people possessing neither an air force, nor the knowledge with which to counteract war gases. The Sino-Japanese War and the Spanish Civil War seem to suggest that there are definite limits to the advantages conferred by up-to-date armament and equipment when employed against a resolute, people in country which confers advantages on the defenders either, as in Spain, by its rough character and broken conformations, or, as in China, by the almost limitless opportunity of retreat which its mere vastness confers on the defenders : the longer the line of communications, the greater the opportunity for guerrilla warfare. There are interesting lessons, too, to be learned in the use of particular weapons, such as the anti-tank gun, and the machine-gun when mounted in an aeroplane. There are pieces which enable us to fit together parts of the pattern of the puzzle ; there is no solution offered us of the problem as a whole. One thing, however, stands out : the

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strength of the defence which, at the end of the Great War, was to some extent impaired by the invention of the tank, has now, as a consequence of the improvement of anti-tank weapons, been regained.

If, therefore, we would seek to create in our own minds a picture of the character of future warfare, we must work on the existing data as a basis without losing consciousness of the fact that future events and inventions may make our knowledge quite useless for the purpose; and we must seek to interpret these data, not only in the light of our knowledge of past history, but also in the light of our imaginations and of our knowledge of the rapid changes which are continually taking place in industry and civilian technique.

Certainly it is fairly safe to say that the characteristics which a future war between Great Powers will present will depend on the time in the future when, if at all, such a war occurs. Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, in a section contributed to *What Would be the Character of a New War*,¹ states that "the law of military development has been the interdependence of the progress of war and the progress of civilisation," and that "Starting with the Industrial Revolution, which heralded in modern warfare, we may divide this epoch of war into three periods, namely, the periods of

¹ Published by Victor Gollancz, Ltd. in 1933.

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coal power, oil power and electrical power.” According to General Fuller the period of coal power belonged to the immediate past, that of oil power faced us to-day, that of electrical power was in its infancy ; these general conclusions appear to be as valid to-day as they were when first written.

Piotr Pavlenko, the author of *Red Planes Fly East*, has painted a probably fanciful and certainly symbolic picture of the annihilation of a Japanese cavalry division by electrical batteries operated by Soviet technicians. This type of warfare may have a future—indeed it is difficult to imagine that the vast power of electricity will not in some form or another be utilised for engines of war—but the military facts which confront us and for the next few years at least will continue to confront us, are the problems raised by the motor, the aeroplane, and by chemical, not electrical warfare.

In discussing the rôle which the Territorial Army is likely to be required to fill on the outbreak of hostilities we shall endeavour to resist the temptation of discussing the war after next, or even the next war if that, as let us hope will be the case, is postponed to an indefinite future in which the present members of the Territorial Army will have ceased to be of serving age. The war which we shall discuss will be a war which in its main features is comparable with the sort of war which

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would, as we imagine, take place were hostilities to break out to-day.

We shall, too, so far as is possible, try to describe the evils which we know rather than the horrors about which we may dream. The reality of modern war is sufficiently grim for efforts to exaggerate it to be superfluous. About two of its aspects in particular it is necessary to think and write as coolly and calmly as possible: namely chemical warfare and air raids.

It is probable that in a future European war chemical warfare will play an important part. Its use has been expressly repudiated by most of the civilised States in the world, but from the care with which these same States are one and all making preparation for combating it and developing it, it is perfectly clear that none of them trust the other's intentions not to employ it, and that in an emergency it may in fact be employed; unless the fear of retaliation, and of the effects on neutral countries of hostile propaganda based on its employment, outweigh the hopes of a rapid decision, the ban of its use is likely to prove no more effective than the Lateran Council's prohibition of the cross-bow.

"Nor is this," writes Mr. John Bakeless,¹ "quite so regrettable as the squeamish may imagine; for dreadful though gas warfare may be,

¹ *The Origin of the Next War*, p. 276.

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its horrors are in no wise comparable to those caused by other weapons." Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart in his book *The Remaking of Modern Armies*, actually entitles one chapter "Humanity of Gas." After comparing the proportions of deaths from gas with deaths from bullet or shell amongst casualties in the British and American Armies, "What," asks Captain Liddell-Hart, "is the clear deduction from these statistics? That 'poison gas' is from ten to twelve times as humane a weapon as bullets and high explosives." This would be so, even with acutely painful forms of gas. The argument can be further illustrated from the German bombardment before the offensive of March, 1918, in which the Germans fired a hundred and fifty thousand mustard gas shells into an area of about twenty square miles near Cambrai: an area approximately equal to that of Central London. These shells caused 4,500 casualties, of whom only fifty, or one in ninety, died, and these deaths have been attributed to undue haste in removing respirators.¹

"Of a hundred and fifty thousand mustard gas casualties in the British Army, but one in forty died, and but one in two hundred was permanently incapacitated." The heavy casualties caused by gas when first used were due to the lack of

¹ See J. B. S. Haldane: *Callinicus. A Defence of Chemical Warfare*, pp. 26-27 and 50.

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respirators. Later casualties were often inflicted by tear gas irritating men to such an extent that they cast aside their respirators, when the more noxious gases began to overpower them.

To-day the respirator has been so perfected that it affords complete protection against all known gases except the so-called blister gases, mustard gas and Lewisite, which are not true gases at all. Knowledge of the prevention and treatment of casualties from the blister gases is becoming increasingly widespread. On the whole it may be said that chemical warfare will perhaps be rather less a menace in a future war than it was in 1916 to 1918, and that it is unlikely that in a war between peoples of advanced material development it will be a factor of decisive importance.

This, in turn, has its bearing on the question of air raids. There is not the smallest likelihood that any enemy will be able to pour bombs into Central London, or Greater London for that matter, containing a quantity of mustard gas even distantly approaching that discharged into Cambrai on the eve of the March Offensive. The real danger arises from the spraying of mustard gas, as in the Abyssinian War, and while this would cause suffering and great inconvenience, a public which is educated as to preventive measures and remedial treatment can reduce the danger to within manageable proportions.

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This is not the place to examine in any detail the question of Air Raid Precautions. It is, however, necessary to consider them as part of the framework within which the Territorial will have to operate. It seems clear that if efficiently organised throughout the country, Air Raid Precautions will be able to eliminate, or at least to reduce within controllable proportions, the dangers of mere unreasoning panic, and of casualties from gas and from incendiary bombs. The fearful menace of the high-explosive bomb remains ; it can be mitigated by air raid shelters and by such measures as the evacuation of children. But both for the anti-aircraft unit, which is concerned to destroy the enemy raider, and for the rest of the Territorial Army, which may have to be engaged in whole or in part in maintaining order and essential service in parts of the country disorganised by air raids, the high-explosive bomb must be one of the conditioning factors of a future European struggle. There is no doubt that the air raid menace has in the last twelve months or so been greatly exaggerated. The wastage rate of an Air Force occupied mainly in long distance bombing is extremely high, and the rate at which replacements of pilots and machines, particularly the former, could be made, would limit most effectively activities under this head. It is likely that the main endeavours will be centred upon the

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bombing of concentration areas and lines of communication. Further, since it is extremely difficult to visualise this country engaged in war without France as an ally, it must not be forgotten that French manufacturing towns, ports, and great centres of population will be far closer to the bases of a probable enemy in Central Europe, thereby enabling that enemy to drop a greater weight of bombs with much less risk of casualties to itself. We are therefore inclined to believe that enemy air action, so far as this country is concerned, will be confined to raids on ports, particularly London, and to a lesser degree on large manufacturing centres and aerodromes from which our own Air Force is operating.

The danger of preparing for the war after next has been emphasised ; the danger of preparing for the last war is even greater. The common assumption is, or at least was until recently, that the next war will be very much like the last, but simply a good deal worse. Men of serving age, it was thought, who had not previously belonged to any of the fighting services would immediately on the outbreak of war be conscripted and drafted into one of them ; and, assuming that the *casus belli* was a breach by Germany of the conditions of the Treaty of Locarno, be shipped off after a period of training to form part of a human wall of warriors stretched from the

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Channel to the Alps. Meanwhile the air forces of each State would bomb its enemies' cities until, presumably, one or other of the parties had struck a knock-out blow, after which anybody who survived would be at liberty to return to his home, or its crumbling ruins.

Such a picture has only to be painted for its absurdity to become apparent. For if aerial warfare holds the menace for the "Home Front" which this picture suggests, it is clear that the character of the fighting front also must be radically altered. In 1914 to 1918, operations of war interfered but little with industrial production or, except in the final stages of distribution to the combatants, with the transport of men, stores and supplies from the Homeland to the front.¹ Either the menace from the air has been grossly exaggerated, or else a very different state of affairs will obtain in the future. With the bombing of the centres of population, of harbours, railways and roads not only, as the very fact of the existence of anti-aircraft units testifies, will a substantial amount of the man-power of the nation have to be set aside for the protection of vital centres, but also it will be a matter of appalling difficulty and danger to transport a large army to the field, or to maintain it there when once transported.

¹ Of course the submarine menace interfered with the despatch of materials to this country.

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The greater the army, the greater the difficulty and the greater the danger. The more troops that have to be armed, equipped, and fed, the more serious is the destruction of one piece of railway track or of one piece of road. And this argument applies with as much force to the transportation of troops to the theatre of war as to the conveyance thither of stores and supplies.¹

Apart from the question of the maintenance of massed armies in the field is the question of whether there is work for them to do there. The only chance of success, if offensive tactics are adopted against a foe of relatively equal strength and capacity, seems to lie in the combination of mechanisation—that is to say the use of armoured fighting vehicles propelled by a motor—with surprise. In 1914 to 1918, most of the successful offensives on the Western Front were helped by mist, and in the future the combined exploitation of obscurity and mobility holds great promise. A high degree of both technical and tactical ability will be required of troops called on to take the offensive ; in other words the offensive will require

¹ "Let us depict," writes Lieut.-Col. G. C. Shaw, in *Supply in Modern War* (p. 203), "the modern horde army on the move. 'Their sprawling columns stretching for tens of miles along congested roads, their acres of horse lines and the still larger areas covered by supply parks and depots at the bases and on the lines of communications, all offering splendid targets to aircraft'. Colonel Shaw paints a vivid picture of the havoc which modern aircraft would work on the bases, depots and communications necessary for the supply of an army on the 1918 scale.

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expert troops, a real *corps d'élite*, and the demands which it will make will certainly prove too exacting for the rank and file of a conscript army. And the advantages conferred by a successful offensive as a result of mechanisation will be greater than those conferred by a successful offensive in any previous wars, for the attackers may well be enabled to strike paralysing blows at the enemy's industrial centres and to occupy as the result of a single operation territories which would formerly have been the prize only of a campaign.

Reasons of this nature led General von Seeckt to insist on the necessity of an army of quality, whatever might be the rôle of an army of quantity in garrison duties and occupying positions previously seized by the army of quality. General Weygand envisages the war of the future as a war divided into two phases, a war of quality to be followed by a war of quantity : which might well be the case, were the army of quantity allowed to mobilise and leave its bases.

There are reasons, however, which may well make us doubtful whether an army of quantity will ever again leave these islands. Some of these reasons are based on our historic strategy of holding our enemy by the throat with our Fleet, while using the Army to strike him at vital or exposed places. The appalling cost of our one departure from this strategy, together with the

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meagreness of the results obtained, may well induce us to revert to a method which has yielded great results at a comparatively low price.

Apart from questions of strategy and of the supply of materials, there is the problem of production. In the last war the Home Front was undoubtedly an uncomfortable and strenuous place compared with peace-time Britain, but interference with industrial production, except by the removal of skilled workers to the front, was virtually non-existent. In a war with any important European Power, except perhaps Italy, it is to the highest degree unlikely that such comfortable conditions will obtain.

The maintenance of conditions in which industry will produce supplies and munitions adequate for the military and civil life of the nation is obviously essential to the conduct of war. The danger of air raid casualties among industrial workers necessitates the existence of an industrial reserve. The danger of destruction to factories and plant necessitates provision for more constructional work than industry normally requires. "War," as the commissar says in *Red Planes Fly East*, "is construction in the conditions of an incredibly increased rate of mortality." In these circumstances the prospect of the Government sending large bodies of men overseas either to act as cannon-fodder for repetitions of the Passchendaele

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Offensive, or merely for garrisoning territories captured by the spearhead mechanised forces in the course of their operations, seems remote.

If we seek to answer the question, "What will be the character of the next war?" with catchwords such as 'absolute warfare,' "total warfare," or, to be more fashionable, "totalitarian warfare," we find that we have raised questions rather than answered them. A nation in arms will in the circumstances of modern warfare rapidly become an army without arms; and a "national effort" in that sense is a thing of the past. If, on the other hand, we simply mean by totalitarian warfare that all the strength, military, commercial and industrial, which the nation can command, will have to be mobilised in any future struggle of major importance, we are merely expressing a platitude. The questions are how to mobilise that strength, and how to use it to the best advantage.

We are concerned in this book only to answer these questions in so far as they affect the Territorial Army. What will be its functions and its size? Its functions will be influenced both by the number and the calibre of the men in its ranks. Its size will be determined on the one hand by the fact that it is to be the sole basis for the expansion of the Army, on the other hand by the need for keeping skilled men in industry; by the require-

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ments of the industrial reserve, and by the extent to which it is thought desirable to organise and maintain an army of quantity.

But whatever we may mean if we say that the next war will be a totalitarian war, it seems clear that we imply that conscription, whether military or industrial, will be the rule, and that the voluntary principle, which is the hall-mark both of the Regular and of the Territorial Army in peace, will be abandoned in war.

This issue is so fundamental that it may well be thought to be a matter beyond the scope of the present volume, and to be solely a political question. It will, in fact, influence profoundly the character of the Territorial Army in the next war.

The case for conscription in war is extremely simple and extremely strong. Its advocates often suggest that its application to the future should take place in something like the following way :

On the outbreak of hostilities, if not before, there is prepared a national register of the country's man-power. This contains the details of each individual case, stating each man's age, family ties, and civilian occupation. Power is taken by the Government either to enrol any male citizen of serving age in the Army, or perhaps to determine what occupation such citizen shall follow during the war, if he is not required for the armed forces. In other words, there may be industrial as well as

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military conscription.¹ Tribunals would probably be appointed to determine the occupation proper for each man. Those with special qualifications, or who were required by industry, would be kept in civil life, the rest, if health permitted, would be drafted into the armed forces. Thus, it is claimed, would each man be allotted the task for which he was most fitted, there would be equality of sacrifice, and there would be some measure of confidence that research chemists and others, whose services to the State were essential, would not lose their lives in battle.

The apparent simplicity of such a scheme is a great merit ; some will say its principal, or even its only merit. The question deserves close examination, not only on general grounds, but also in particular because in considering the rôle of the Territorial Army in war it is of paramount importance to know of what sort of men that Army is to be composed.

We need not discuss the desirability of conscription as a general proposition. Peace-time conscription has had powerful advocates in this country ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, and the realisation of our military

¹ It is perhaps significant that the Government has announced (1) that a plan for military conscription in the event of war has been in existence for many years, but that no decision has been made as to its adoption. (2) That industrial conscription is not in contemplation.

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weakness induced by the early disasters of the South African War. It is the rule in most foreign countries at the present time, and its social as well as its military merits seem to vary in accordance with the national character and the strategic requirements of each country. In a country such as France, with a national character profoundly individualistic, it probably has great disciplinary value; in a country like Germany, with its authoritarian traditions, it has been of great value as a political weapon. In England these considerations simply do not arise, for it is almost impossible to conceive of any Government courting disaster at the polls by invoking conscription in time of peace. Voluntary service is, and will remain, the basis of recruitment of the Territorial Army in time of peace.

This fact gives it a character which has probably never been borne by any force in history. Its members are men who have taken upon themselves the responsibility for defending their country and its interests; they have accepted this responsibility as men should, with their eyes open and, except in isolated instances, without any form of external pressure.

Putting the problem in technical terms, will quantity or quality be the predominant requirement of the next war? If quality, must we not pause before we throw away this rare and precious

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character of the Territorial force by watering it down by drafts of unwilling soldiers ? If quantity, does not the experience of 1914 to 1916 suggest that in a grave emergency sufficient numbers of men will come forward as volunteers for service in the fighting forces, particularly in view of the increased numbers of men who will necessarily remain engaged in civilian production, distribution or administration ?

The answer adduced to the suggestion that sufficient volunteers will come forward is, of course, to say that even if it be true, it is not fair on the volunteers, and that there will be a complete inequality of sacrifice between a married man with a family, launched on his professional or business career, who enlists, and a young unmarried man for whom service implies not an interruption but only a postponement of his civil career.

It is a perfectly fair answer, and quite true so far as it goes ; but it leaves out of account certain factors of great and perhaps decisive importance from the point of view of the Territorial. Before considering these it may be well to point out that on the moral plane there is one factor which has greatly altered since 1914 to 1918. This is that in the conditions of modern warfare the man who stays at home may well, if his house or place of work be in London or any city manufacturing centre, be in as great danger as—perhaps even in

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greater danger than—his fellow who joins the Army.

The volunteer for service in a major European war is, it may be said, sacrificing his career rather than his life, for the acceptance of danger is something which no man or woman can escape. The decision as to risking his career may perhaps be safely entrusted to the individual man in consultation with his wife, if he has one. They will consider all the circumstances, as they do on other occasions, and the State must accept responsibility for providing a subsistence for the dependants of a man killed or disabled, just as the employer in civil life has to provide for Workmen's Compensation. Apart, then, from any moral factors, the questions to be answered in the recruitment of the Army in war are three, and in the following order of importance :—

(1) Whom, by reason of his special knowledge or skill, is it imperative to keep outside the fighting lines ?

(2) Who will make the best soldier ?

(3) Whose absence, apart from that of the few indispensables, from the economic or administrative life of the country will be most missed ?

That there are certain men who must be kept out of battle at almost all costs is axiomatic and requires no discussion. The question is whether we are right in saying that it is more important

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to have the best soldiers in the Army in time of war than to choose the men most suited to stay in business or industry, apart from those specialists in respect of whom the question does not arise, and then to send to the Army those men who are not otherwise required. In examining this question it is important to bear in mind that owing to the growing importance in industry of semi-skilled men as against craftsmen, industry can now cast its net wider in its search of men than it could do in earlier times. This means that it becomes of less importance to determine the respective merits of Smith and Brown before deciding which man to retain. We are confronted with the paradox that whereas the mechanisation of war puts a premium on quality rather than quantity, the mechanisation of industry, in spite of labour-saving devices which call for semi-skilled rather than unskilled labour, puts a premium on quantity rather than quality. Thus the balance, so far as the pool of man-power is concerned, is restored. There is no doubt that, at the present time, an insufficient use is made of the assistance which women can give, particularly in the air defence of this country, and it would be well if the rather difficult problem of enrolling women in the service were tackled at the earliest possible moment.

And whatever view we may take of the probability of this country being engaged in a war of

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quantity, it seems clear that, with the increasing demands both of the Air Force and the Army on industry, the Army employed by this country must be smaller than in 1914 to 1918, so that while a war of quality can only be waged by troops of quality, even in a war of quantity we shall have to insist more on quality than in the last war ; fewer men being available for the purpose, they must be better soldiers. This is said, it need not be emphasised, with no intention to disparage our 1914 to 1918 Army, whether volunteer or conscript, but only with the purpose of showing that in a future struggle we shall need the men who are the better soldiers of the community to be in the Army.

Whether a willing soldier is to be preferred to a reluctant soldier is a question that only has to be put, before it is answered.

Shortly, therefore, it may be said that it seems undesirable, both from the point of view of the mechanised character of warfare itself, with the intolerable strain which the supply of a large mechanised Army would place upon industry and upon the supply services, and from the point of view of Britain's historic strategy, that a large army according to the 1918 standards, will be raised or at any rate put into the field. Recognition of this was implicit in Mr. Hore-Belisha's speech introducing the Army Estimates for the year 1938-39, and, while official policy may change,

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it does not seem particularly likely that in the near future it will in this respect do so. For the sake alike of the Army and of the nation, it is earnestly to be hoped that the Army at war will be a Volunteer Army. Against this, are those who consider this country should raise and train a large conscript army in time of war as an insurance against the failure of one of our allies in the field. It must be remembered, however, that if such an army was in existence, it would prove extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid sending it abroad before such failure, in the face of the strong and determined pressure which would undoubtedly be exerted by an ally.

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The face of the international situation is subject to relatively swift changes. If history be a process in which great forces work out to logical and inevitable conclusions, it is at least extremely difficult to follow this process over a short term of years. It may be that the relations, to take two spans of ten years each, between the state of the world in 1918, the last year of the War, and 1928, the year of the Kellogg Pact, and equally between 1918 and the international anarchy in which we have the misfortune to live in 1938, are clear enough to give colour to the theory of an ordered evolution, but the relation between 1928 and 1938,

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though explainable, is difficult to interpret in the light of such a theory. So it may be that in a few years' time the fear which now overcasts the whole of our national life, that of a Continental war, may become something remote and almost unimaginable. In 1852, and again in 1859, Louis Napoleon caused a wave of panic to flow over the country ; the wave passed, leaving, as we have seen, the Volunteer movement, from which the Territorial Army was ultimately to spring, behind it. In 1878, Russian ambitions in the Near and Middle East brought us to the threshold of war ; but instead we had " peace with honour." And the Fashoda incident was almost the immediate precursor of the *Entente Cordiale*.

As it has been before, so it may be again. There are not wanting observers, whether we agree with them or not, who say that now that Germany has achieved some sort of political union among the German peoples, and when she has obtained satisfaction on the Colonial question, she may consider that she has obtained her natural ethnographic frontiers and her proper status, and so devote herself to peaceful internal consolidation. We must not think solely in terms of one danger which may never arise, while failing to provide against other dangers which may at any moment arise. Great Britain has to guard, broadly speaking, against three types of military danger, of which

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the major European war is one : the others may be classified as the major non-European war and the small non-European war. The possibility of a small European war in which this country is involved seems, at any time in the near future, extremely remote ; if we become involved the war will cease to be small.

Each of the three types of war raises quite a separate problem for the Territorial Army, though certain factors may emerge common to each.

The nineteenth century was the Golden Age of the small non-European war : the annexation of Sind, the various Afghan and Burmese campaigns, wars with dervishes, wars with Zulus, the campaigns against Coffee, King of Ashanti : " We must, with our Indian Empire and large Colonies be prepared for attacks and wars, somewhere or other, continually," wrote Queen Victoria. And some of the great military reputations, such as those of Roberts and Kitchener, were made in operations of this character, while other great personalities, such as Napier himself and Gordon, came before the public eye on account of them. These operations had a definite character of their own, due to the enemy's great advantages in mobility and knowledge of the country, and to the enormous superiority enjoyed by British or other civilised troops when at actual grips with the enemy on account of their armament and fire-power.

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They required a certain technique which was beneficial to the preparation of the British Army for a major war in that it required constant adaptability, but detrimental in that it put the advantages of taking the offensive at a premium, on account of the moral effect on the enemy, and the disadvantages of doing so at a discount, because of his negligible fire-power.

The British Empire's age of expansion is over, and this type of warfare is, and is likely in the near future to remain, somewhat infrequent. There are, however, post-war examples of small wars within the Empire ; in Afghanistan in 1919, in Waziristan and in Palestine (if a Mandated Territory may be described for this purpose as part of the Empire), and it is possible that we might be involved in a campaign of this sort at any time.

In warfare of this type the Regular Army is quite large enough to be made responsible for the conduct of operations in the theatre of war. The Territorial Army's variety of experience and its essential flexibility might, indeed, prove most valuable, but only necessity can justify removal of men from their homes and civilian occupations, and this necessity would probably, unless the adjective "small" were to become unmerited, not arise. Nor, of course, would there be any danger of air attacks on the centres of population in this

¹ See Callwell : *Small Wars*.

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country, so that there would be no need to embody the anti-aircraft units.

It is possible, however, that without the war losing its small character, the extended area in which operations had to be conducted, the drainage of man-power by casualties, or the disturbed nature of the international situation might necessitate some call being made upon the services of the Territorial Army. Units might be required to undertake garrison duties in this country, thus releasing Regulars for active service ; they might be required to proceed overseas to act as reserves ; or they might be ordered to strategic positions of importance in order to diminish the temptation given to unfriendly powers to indulge in the sport of fishing in troubled waters. Apart from these possibilities, it is likely that the small war of the future will resemble a small war of the past in that it will not necessitate any calls on the civilian soldier.

The second eventuality which we have to consider is the major conflict outside Europe. The most obvious example of this is the South African War, whose importance in exposing the then defects of our military system we have already remarked. This war stripped the country of troops, absorbed practically the whole of the Militia, and yet could not have been carried to a successful conclusion without the help of the units of

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Volunteers which were raised for the purposes of the war.

It is perhaps difficult to envisage the circumstances in which this country should become involved in a major conflict which did not develop into a world war. But clearly it might happen. The Japanese might attack Australia at a time when the international situation did not encourage their European allies to assist them. Or at a time when internal disturbances prevailed in India large-scale operations might become necessary on the North-West Frontier, while the Japanese adopted an attitude which led the Government to fear disturbances in the Far East or even direct attacks on Australia or India itself.

The situation which we envisage may appear fanciful, but it is necessary to have some such picture in mind in order to appreciate the nature of the calls which may be made upon our armed forces. We must particularly bear in mind that in view of the air menace we can scarcely ever rely exclusively upon sea power, and that in the near future we shall never be able to take the risk, which we took in 1899 to 1902, of reducing the number of troops at home to a bare minimum of immature or untrained men. Let us imagine the situation to be that outlined above, of Indian disturbances combined with Japanese threats. What will such a situation require ?

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In the first place it is quite conceivable that, with India in ferment, few troops could be spared for the Frontier operations, which might require the assistance of one, two, or even three divisions of the Regular Army at home. In view of the possibility of operations being prolonged and casualties severe, preparation might also have to be made to reinforce these divisions from time to time.

In short, such a situation would be likely to require, at some time or another, the despatch of an expeditionary force similar in size and composition to that which sailed to France in August, 1914. This would cast upon the Territorial Army practically entire responsibility for home defence, and in addition, perhaps, necessitate part, at least, of the Territorial Army being brought to such a state of preparedness as to be able to act as an expeditionary force in case of disturbances breaking out in other parts of the globe; in particular, Territorial units might be required to assist the Regulars engaged in the original theatre of war.

The third possibility with which we have to deal is that of the World War, or major European war. On military and economic grounds we have rejected the probability of the "horde army" of the 1918 type, of the "nation in arms" so dear to nineteenth century theory and to early twentieth

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century practice. We have to face the question of what shape such a war will really assume.

This, of course, depends partly on general considerations arising out of the nature of modern war, and partly on particular considerations arising out of the circumstances in which a war of this character breaks out ; who will be our enemies, who our allies ?

Both the general and particular considerations are difficult to estimate, but it is necessary to make an attempt at doing so in order to arrive at any useful conception of the rôle of the Territorial Army.

What will happen on the outbreak of war ? Will the air-forces of each side concentrate on spreading panic among the civilian population ? Or will they attack each other ? Or will they attack the land armies of the enemy ? It is a matter of conjecture. But at all events two things are clear : that until either side has obtained a definite preponderance in the air the risks to which its centres of population and production will be exposed are extremely grave ; and that each side will do its utmost to prevent the mobilisation of the forces of the other.

It is impossible, in this case as in the other cases which we have been considering, to make accurate forecasts as to the identity of our future enemies and allies. At the same time it is

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impossible to dismiss from our minds, and it can serve no useful purpose to conceal, that the only great powers against which most Englishmen imagine that they are likely to find themselves ranged in a war in the near future are Germany, Italy and possibly Japan, and equally that they are unlikely to find themselves involved in a major war without France as an ally. Without attempting a General Staff appreciation of strategic problems, it is necessary to have in our minds some conception of the dangers to which we are likely to be exposed and of the burdens which we may have to discharge.

Then there would be the Mediterranean question. Here again it is difficult to forecast its precise form, especially in view of the still uncertain issue of the Spanish Civil War. If the insurgents win, and General Franco, or his successor, remains faithful to his totalitarian allies, a very substantial part of Britain's war effort, naval, military and aerial, must be devoted to the attempt to save Gibraltar, to keep the Eastern Mediterranean free and gradually so to secure the central part of the Mediterranean as to make it safe for an ally to transport her African levies to the Continent of Europe and impossible for an enemy to do so. The cost of achieving such a result cannot be estimated as anything else but very heavy, though it is probable that after one or

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two naval actions, the Allied Fleet co-operating with part of ours, and with another part of our fleet blockading the northern coasts of Spain, we should be able to hasten the end by preventing the supply of any but air-transported armaments and supplies to the Spaniards.¹ Further it is reasonably certain that were the democratic powers at war with totalitarian Spain, democratic Spain, then armed and equipped by us, would rise against its Fascist conquerors.

If General Franco is not successful, or if, being successful, he feels strong enough to play for popularity by ignoring the claims of his foreign supporters, the strategic position of this country will be considerably stronger; though in the former event another Fascist rebellion encouraged and financed from abroad will probably be one of the minor difficulties with which we shall have to contend. At the same time history shows that foreign influence in Spain has never been acceptable or successful once the immediate need has passed.

But in any event the Mediterranean struggle will be a serious one, although, given reasonable success in other theatres of war, there should be no doubt as to the final issue. While the brunt

¹ Though enemy submarines based on the Spanish coast would probably be a thorn in our flesh until the forces favourable to our cause were finally victorious.

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of the fighting would fall on the fleets of Britain and her Allies with their respective air arms, reinforcements, especially of anti-aircraft detachments, would be required in Malta and Cyprus ; and hostile forces based on colonies in the Near East would create disturbances in the Near East which would at least call for the despatch of considerable bodies of troops to Palestine and Egypt.

Thus there would be hostilities on the land frontiers of our Allies throughout the Mediterranean, and in the Near East, apart from the possibilities of raids and disorders elsewhere. There would be constant danger from the air at home, creating a problem of internal security whose precise extent it is impossible to gauge. And in addition there might be a war in the Far East. In such an event, however, it is extremely probable that the main brunt of the operations against our Far Eastern enemies will be borne by our Far Eastern Allies, and quite possible that material assistance will be forthcoming from the United States of America. The main effect, therefore, of a war with an enemy in the Far East as part of a world war would, so far as the British Army is concerned, be largely negative. It would throw a heavier burden on the rest of the Empire by detaining in the Far East Australian, Indian, and conceivably Canadian troops who would

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otherwise be available to relieve the pressure elsewhere.

There may, in addition to the campaigns and diversions outlined above, be small campaigns in other parts of the world ; especially if it is thought wise on political ground to concede the German colonial claims, or any of them. It is useless to try to anticipate these, except by making constantly available, so far as possible, a strategic reserve ready for employment in any part of the world from Hong-Kong to Hampstead. We have a general idea of the uses for which our forces will be required ; how many men will be wanted in what places and at what times ?

Reasons of strategy, of supply and of national man-power have compelled us to abandon the idea of the horde army exported to Flanders or elsewhere. We have seen, too, that the enemy probably will have the power, and will certainly have the wish and intention, to prevent mobilisation ; such will be the effect of air attacks and the efforts to evade them and to minimize their havoc that, in the words of Colonel Shaw,¹ " Mobilisation will mean immobilisation."

How, then, will the nation's military effort be organised ?

The first duty will be the maintenance of internal security. In the districts particularly exposed to

¹ Op. cit.

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air attack it may be necessary to proclaim and enforce martial law. Troops may be required to maintain order among a panic-stricken population, to assist with the evacuation of children and others whose presence in the dangerous areas is unnecessary and therefore undesirable, and to assist in the maintenance of essential services. In particular, the anti-aircraft units will be constantly on duty to protect localities, on which they are based.

So far as the military are concerned, these will be primarily local tasks, not requiring troop movements on a large scale or "mobilisation" in the 1914 sense of moving along defined routes to a concentration area. But, assuming that in the opening stages of a war either side does not strike vital blows which compel the other side to submit or make organisation for war mutually impossible, the collection of troops for despatch overseas will soon become necessary.

In what theatres of war troops will be required does not, in one sense, here concern us. But in the case outlined above it is clear that the whole of the Regular Army at home would be required either in France or the Mediterranean, or part in both. This, as stated above, would cast upon the Territorial Army the whole of the responsibility for home defence. And this alone would absorb at least the whole of the Territorial Army at its present strength.

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But, in fact, the duties of the Territorial Army can only be said to begin here. For, to whatever extent mechanisation may be the basis of the British military effort in a future war, and even if garrison duties behind the mechanised forces are left to our allies, casualties among our troops will occur and will require replacement. In a crisis, too, several divisions must be available for transfer to any theatre where substantial reinforcements are urgently required. And to whatever extent quality may in the ultimate future replace quantity as the criterion of military strength, for the next few years, at any rate, it is plain that in a major European war a considerable expansion in our existing Army must take place.

Particularly will expansion be required in the anti-aircraft units, for not only will a constant flow of trained men be needed in order to replace casualties and fill gaps in our anti-aircraft defence at home, but also anti-aircraft units will be needed to protect our bases and lines of communications, however simplified these may be in comparison with the vast organisations of 1914 to 1918. For the rest, in the event of such a war as we have in mind, demands will be made of the Territorial Army for the maintenance of internal security, for the reinforcement of the Regular Forces overseas, and perhaps, later on, for the supply of trained men to

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constitute, in their divisions, one or more independent expeditionary forces.

Expansion of personnel will be the first necessity. If there is no reason to anticipate that the voluntary principle will not suffice to raise a number of men adequate to war-time needs, it is at least clear that not only will a great effort be required of the nation, but also that a very heavy burden of responsibility will be laid upon the organisers of the Territorial Army to decide on what principles units and men are allotted to the respective spheres of duty, and having decided the correct principles on which to proceed, to carry them into execution. The decision on questions of principle will be a matter of policy, in which the Cabinet may well intervene. The carrying into execution of whatever decision or decisions may be reached will be the responsibility of the War Office, and in particular of the Territorial Army's representatives at the War Office.

There will be broadly three types of duty which the Territorial Army will have to carry out ; home defence, military duties overseas, and training : the conversion of untrained or half-trained men into trained soldiers. This is a process which takes time, and one of the most difficult decisions to be reached is the extent to which at any given time it is wise to sacrifice immediate results to future efficiency.

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The selection of the officers and N.C.O's best fitted to carry out the training of recruits will be one matter of difficulty. The decision of the principles on which to proceed in allotting units and men to home defence and overseas service respectively will be even more far-reaching. Is the guiding principle to be the quality of men, or their age, or what ?

These questions must remain for discussion in a later chapter. One observation may now be made : that many of the troops needed for home defence, whether in anti-aircraft units or otherwise, will probably not be required, at any rate after a period of preliminary training, to devote the whole of their time to their military duties. They will be able to devote part of their time to the ever-essential work of the factory and the office. This raises the question, on which we have touched before, of the need for adapting the forms of military routine and discipline to the exigencies of civilian life. In the last war civilians who entered the Army had to adjust themselves to it. In the next war this will again be necessary, but it will also be necessary for the Army to adapt itself to the civilians whom it receives.

CHAPTER V

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY AND THE NON-EUROPEAN WAR

IN the previous chapter we have discussed, among other things, three possible types of future war : the small European war, the major non-European war, and the major European war. In their repercussions on the Territorial Army the first two types of war will in many ways be similar, whereas those of the major European war are almost certain to be fundamentally different. The problem in the first two cases will be that of obtaining the best results within the existing framework. The problem in the third case will be that of enlarging the force and yet not sacrificing its characteristic qualities and traditions.

As a matter of definition, a small war does not require a great army. On the one hand nothing but dire necessity can justify the removal of men from their homes and their civilian careers ; on the other, the question of supply will generally make it impossible for a large army to take the field. " So great indeed," wrote the late Major-General Sir

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Charles Callwell in his classical work,¹ “are the difficulties that arise in small wars from supply, that it becomes necessary to cut down the forces engaged to the lowest possible strength consistent with safety, and that campaigns have to be embarked upon with armies barely capable numerically of performing the work which they may have in hand. A condition of things is evolved, in fact, such as called from Henry IV of France the remark with regard to campaigns against Spain in his day :—‘ Invade with a large force and you are destroyed by starvation ; invade with a small one and you are overwhelmed by a hostile population.’ ”

Unless it happened that the Empire were embroiled in two small wars at the same time, it is extremely unlikely that, at the most, more than a division or two of the Territorial Army would be required to take part in operations. It is, on the other hand, not only conceivable but also likely that, a substantial part of the Regular Army being needed to take part in operations, it might be thought unwise for the country to be left with only such part of the Regular Army as was not sent abroad available for immediate duty at home. As Colonel Dunlop writes² “ It is clear from all the history of the last century that the breaking of peace at one point on the frontier of the Empire

¹ *Small Wars : Their Principle and Practice*. By C. E. Callwell.

² In *The Problems and Responsibilities of the Territorial Army*.

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sets up sympathetic vibrations at other points, whether in Europe or the East."

In the present disturbed state of the world it seems extremely likely that, if the military operations exceeded those in Palestine in scale, this would be the case. "Considering this aspect of the problem," says Colonel Dunlop, "one might say the despatch of any Expeditionary Force from these islands two divisions strong, would set up stresses on the Territorial Army, and that if four divisions of Regular Troops left this country, some form of precautionary mobilisation would have to take place."

In these circumstances it would be necessary to embody part at least of the Territorial Army. The question would be, if not the whole, which part? How would the embodiment and mobilisation be carried out?

In the first place, it might be desirable that the troops should be called up in their divisions, not in other units; for on the division the whole military, as distinct from civil organisation is based. The Divisional Commander and his staff have supervised the training of the units, are familiar with the various brigades and unit commanders, the characteristics and state of training of the men. There are some who say that the existing divisions are the only formations in which the Territorial Army could take the field without a considerable

interval of time elapsing to allow for the difficulties created by the adjustments required by re-organisation.

In the case of the Territorial Army military convenience cannot, except in a major war, be given the first consideration. Its divisions are built upon a regional basis. To divert a large part of the man-power of one region while leaving that of another region intact may be to create a lasting dislocation in the economic structure of the country.

Apart from the regional factor, there is also the personal factor. What will be the feelings of a Territorial, particularly a Territorial with a family, who is compelled to leave a good job when he knows that Territorials in other parts of the country are continuing their peace-time routine without let or hindrance ?

The difficulties raised by a partial embodiment of the force, real though they are, are less acute in the case when the embodied troops remain at home than in the case when they are likely to be sent on active service overseas ; expensive though this might be, one obvious solution of the problem in the former case would be to embody the force division by division for periods of, say, three months each, releasing one division as another came on duty. This would have the advantage of giving each division a greatly prolonged annual

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training which would make it fit for active service at considerably shorter notice than would otherwise be the case. In order to cause the minimum economic dislocation, which must always be of primary importance to the Territorial Army, it would be necessary to ascertain beforehand which seasons of the year would be least inconvenient to the regions from which the respective divisions are drawn. Such a plan would not eliminate the difficulties caused by a man having to leave his job, but it would mitigate them in making it easier for an employer, knowing when the man was likely to return, to keep his place open. The problem of reinstatement in civilian employment is a very serious one, and must be discussed later on.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that a war of this type would not have any effect on the anti-aircraft formations, who would pursue their normal training as in peace.

There is one other aspect of the small war which requires mention. If the war should be prolonged, reinforcements would be required; if general conditions permitted, these might be forthcoming in part or in whole either from the British Army in India or from the Indian Army. But it is at least extremely likely that volunteers would be called for and, if so, that members of the Territorial Army would be included among, even if they did not provide the bulk of such volunteers. These

volunteers would presumably be drafted, for the time being, into Regular units, thus leaving Territorial units the weaker. Even a small war is likely to cause a need not only for intensified training, but also for intensified recruiting.

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In a major non-European war, as in a small war, no additional duties at home would be imposed on the Territorial Anti-Aircraft Divisions. It is, however, possible and indeed likely, at any rate in the later stages of such a war, that anti-aircraft troops might be required for the protection of bases, lines of communication, and other places of importance in or near the theatre of war overseas. As it is painfully and abundantly clear that for the next few years, at least, it will be impossible to reduce the number of anti-aircraft troops available in this country, on the outbreak of war against any enemy who has, or is likely to obtain, an air force of any considerable size, it will become necessary to raise a certain number of recruits for anti-aircraft formations in order to ensure that there will always be a sufficient number at home in addition to those required abroad—a task which should prove of no great difficulty.

So far as the remainder of the Territorial Army is concerned, the problems involved would in a

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sense resemble those of the South African War. There might well arise, as then, a situation in which these islands would be stripped bare of Regular troops, and yet in which the Regulars on the scene of operations would not be sufficient in number to drive home a victory. In the Territorial Army of to-day exists an organisation which removes the necessity of those improvisations of Imperial Yeomanry and City Imperial Volunteers which alone, in the opinion of the Adjutant-General of the time, saved us from disaster in 1899 to 1902.¹ At the same time the Europe of the late nineteen-thirties is, and that of the nineteen-forties promises to be, a far more dangerous place than the Europe of the turn of the century, for all the anti-British feeling of the South African War period; and it will be quite impossible to leave these islands without at least a force adequate for purposes of internal security, and perhaps also a small force ready to go to the help of a Continental ally in the event of a major conflagration bursting forth.

Thus in the event of a war breaking out which is comparable in scale to the South African War, not only must considerable numbers of Territorial troops be prepared for service overseas, but also the force itself must be expanded in order always to leave a number of trained, or at least half-trained

¹ See Dunlop: *The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914.*

men available at home. "A war which in the view of the Cabinet," writes Colonel Dunlop, "would require eight infantry divisions, would involve the sending overseas of three or four Territorial divisions as part of the Expeditionary Force, and the embodiment, if not the mobilisation, of another eight at home." We may not agree with these precise figures, but for the sake of illustration we may adopt them. Of the eight divisions sent abroad, it is a fair inference that four would be drawn from the Regular Army, and four from the Territorial Army: fair, but not irresistible, for with an international situation at all similar to that of the spring and early summer of 1938, it might well be that the Cabinet would decide that it was unwise to put so many Regular eggs into an extra-European basket; and in this case, of course, the deficiency would have to be met out of the Territorial divisions. But in either case, with twelve Territorial divisions embodied and in some cases mobilised, only the two anti-aircraft divisions of the present, or the five of the near future, remain untouched, and as we have seen above it may be necessary to call upon them for some measure of assistance in the operations overseas. In the case envisaged it may almost be taken for granted that some expansion of the Territorial Army will be required.

A war of the type under consideration thus

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raises two fundamental problems for the Territorial Army: by what means is it to be expanded? On what principle is the decision to be made as to whom to send abroad, whom to retain at home?

The question of expansion is a double problem: there is first the problem of expanding the division from peace strength to war strength; there is secondly the problem of so expanding the Army as a whole as to make it fit to serve its double purpose as an Expeditionary Force and Home Defence Force.

The nature of the problem of expanding the division to war strength has been altered, and in a sense the problem itself has been rendered less acute, by recent changes in the structure of the Army. "It is not our intention," announced the Secretary of State for War in introducing the Army Estimates for 1938 to 1939,¹ "to retain a fixed division, but one flexible for the different objects in view. There will be two types of division and variation within the types. One type, a Motorised Division, based on the Light Machine-Gun, and the other, a Mechanised Armoured Division, based on the Tank." Mr. Hore-Belisha went on to state that the strength of the motorised division might be estimated at six battalions, together with ancillary troops, when employed for internal

¹ *Parl.-Deb. 5th Series. Vol. 32.*

security purposes, and nine battalions for war purposes. At the moment of writing, only one fully mechanised division is in existence, and while this state of affairs will doubtless soon be changed, so far as the Regular Army is concerned, it must be some considerable time, unless a major war breaks out, before mechanised divisions form part of the Territorial Army; although our industrial districts must contain some of the finest raw material for mechanised divisions in the world. For the time being the aim will be to convert the Territorial divisions into motorised divisions; and for these the number of infantry battalions, in spite of recent transformations of certain infantry battalions into specialised units such as searchlight battalions, still suffices with the new establishments proportion of battalions to divisions.

Thus expansion would probably not involve the dislocation of the existing divisional organisation, flexible as it is intended to make it, by the transfer of battalions, normally forming part of one of the divisions to be kept at home, to one of those earmarked for service abroad; that is to say, unless a war of the type under consideration breaks out before the transformation of the infantry division into the motorised light machine-gun division, with fifty Bren guns per battalion, is carried out.¹ Should this in fact occur, the con-

¹ See Mr. Hore-Belisha's speech quoted above

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sequences are hard to foresee. Would the divisions be sent to war as organised and armed at present, or would the change be effected first ?

The answer to this question would probably depend in part upon the urgency with which troops were required in the theatre of war, and in part upon the character and equipment of the enemy. It would perhaps also depend to some extent on the nature of the duties with which it was intended to entrust the Territorial troops taking part in the campaign. The importance of reorganising the Territorial divisions would assume a different aspect according to the extent to which they were to be actively employed in operations or to be used mainly as holding troops ; war demands, so many improvisations that, although questions of transport and supply make it in any case desirable that a smaller number of highly-equipped troops be sent abroad rather than a larger number of troops less well equipped, it is asking too much of human nature to suppose that any will be made which are not strictly and immediately necessary.

The problem of expansion which is likely to confront us is not so much the addition of battalions to the combatant division as the strengthening of the units of which the division is composed. Here again quality is in every case to be preferred to quantity ; but a certain number of

men is essential even in the most highly-mechanised force to operate the machines ; and in all wars casualties are inevitable. Whatever the peace strength of any unit may be, its war strength must be greater in order to allow for necessary replacements.

When there is no immediate urgency for the despatch of Territorial troops it is fairly clear that the best way to strengthen the various battalions is by drafting volunteers into those which are being sent overseas, leaving these volunteers, after their early recruit training has been completed, to continue their training side by side with men who enlisted before the outbreak of war. As Colonel Dunlop points out in his book on the Territorial Army quoted above, the delays involved in obtaining the transport necessary for the conveyance of a force of any size to a destination outside Europe must be considerable, and the period intervening between the despatch of the Regular troops and that of the Territorial may quite possibly be long enough to enable newly-joined volunteers to go on active service with their more seasoned comrades.

But the case may well occur when this will not be so. The question then will be, whether to take the risk of sending Territorial units overseas at peace strength, or at a strength only slightly exceeding peace strength, or whether to take the

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alternative risk of taking experienced Territorials away from units which are destined to remain at home, thus leaving the latter weak in numbers until the newly-enlisted volunteers are adequately trained. In such a case it would be necessary to take one of these risks ; but which of them would be preferable it is clearly impossible to forecast. It would depend on the nature of the campaign, the equipment and resources of the enemy, the character of the country ; and still more on the political conditions which prevailed in the world at the time. It is to be hoped that the modernisation of the organisation and equipment of the Territorial Army may be completed within the next few years ; it is to be feared that within this period the international situation will never be wholly free from anxiety.

If such a war breaks out after the Territorial Army, apart from the anti-aircraft divisions, has been grouped into motorised divisions of light machine-gun battalions and mechanised armoured divisions, respectively, a new set of problems may arise. Motorisation is expensive. Mechanisation is still more so. It may, when the time comes for the Territorials to be organised and equipped on the same lines as their Regular brethren, be decided that reasons of economy make it necessary to cut down the peace-time establishment of Territorial motorised and mechanised divisions to a level

lower than that which has been pronounced as being appropriate to these divisions in war. If the international sky clears, it is a reasonable guess that this will be so ; though owing to the local character of the Territorial Army the reduction in the number of infantry battalions would present a number of difficulties, both administrative and psychological ; and the outbreak of war would almost certainly necessitate bringing the disbanded battalions back to life.

This would take time. If certain Territorial divisions were required to be sent overseas immediately, for participation in important active operations, it might be necessary to detach battalions from the divisions which were to be kept at home in order to attach them to those which were being sent abroad. Divisional and brigade commanders would have to issue orders to battalion commanders with whose capabilities they were not familiar, while a tremendous responsibility would be imposed on the County Associations and divisional staffs of the divisions left at home.

It is not seldom that the two main rôles of the Territorial Army, to provide a force of men sufficiently trained themselves to go on active service at short notice, and at the same time to provide a frame on which the strength of the nation can expand at need, are, or appear to be, in

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conflict. If certain Territorial divisions were sent out of the country, and other divisions were reduced in strength in order to supply deficiencies in the strength of those on active service, two results would follow. The already weakened divisions retained at home could ill afford to spare officers and N.C.O's for the training of recruits. The regions from which those divisions which were on active service were drawn would be bereft of the very military organisation which is designed to serve as the basis for the training of recruits.

This involves a question of the first importance : will it be necessary, in a future war on the scale contemplated, or on any larger scale, to create special divisions for service overseas, retaining the present divisional organisation not as the organisation of the combatant army but as the organisation for the conduct of military training ?

The question of finding commissioned officers, it may be said at once, in a war short of the greatest magnitude, is less serious than of finding N.C.O's. The officer-producing units contain a number of men qualified immediately to receive commissions, and during hostilities they would continue to produce officers as in time of peace, only at an intensified pressure. But the good N.C.O. is not made in a day ; nor can a unit

become an effective fighting unit without a leaven of experienced private soldiers.

These considerations may perhaps lead us to the conclusion that it will be necessary, in any war when a Territorial Expeditionary Force is required, to abandon the existing divisions as the basic organisations of the force. This would certainly involve, if delay and possible embarrassment were to be avoided, preparing beforehand an organisation which could be applied on the outbreak of war. The precise form of such an organisation would call for careful thought and, probably, elaborate research, and it is a question which obviously does not come within the scope of a volume like the present. It is clear that its first requisite would be its capacity of immediate application, so that the newly-organised divisions could be mobilised and sent abroad without loss of time ; and also that it should, so far as possible, approximate to the present regional basis of Territorial organisation. Men should, in every case where it is possible, serve under officers whom they know, and junior officers under senior officers whom they know. The services of the County Association, that spring which constantly refreshes and renews Territorial units, should be directed towards the maintenance of one or more units, not towards the Territorial Army as a whole. This is desirable from every

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point of view : and local patriotism must be called in to assist national patriotism in the recruiting effort.

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We have been discussing the question of the form of military organisation through which the Territorial Army shall make its contribution to the waging of a small war, or of a larger war which, by reason of the remoteness of the scene of hostilities, does not directly expose these islands to attack. It is, of course, important to have the best organisation possible for the campaign to be fought. It is perhaps even more important to ensure that the most suitable men take part in the campaign, and, in judging the question of suitability, we have to take into account, except when the very life of the nation is at stake, factors other than the purely military. How can the campaign be won with the smallest loss to the nation ?

The nation, properly regarded, is no mere abstraction ; nor is it, in itself, a mystical association of human beings which has some magical right to demand living sacrifices from its members. Its reasons for existence are, first, to preserve a particular way of life and, secondly, to better it. Its welfare depends on the welfare of the individuals who compose it, and while in one

sense it is, like a limited company, a corporation which has annually to present a balance-sheet, it is, unlike a limited company, vitally interested in every aspect of the lives of its citizen members. Thus a Government which adopts the methods best adapted to bring a campaign to a rapid and successful conclusion, but ignores the repercussions which those methods may have on the civilian life of the nation, is like a Board of Directors which, in order to show a higher rate of profit, or a lower rate of loss, destroys its hidden reserves. For these are what the loyalty and contentment of its citizens are : sacrifices which are necessary make men proud of those who have made them ; sacrifices which are not necessary may have the same effect, but they also, and chiefly, create resentment against those who have allowed them to be made.

A principle is comparatively easy to enunciate ; to apply it in practice is an entirely different matter. It is necessary to decide what sacrifices are necessary in any given context and, having decided, to see how it is possible to make them with a minimum of dislocation ; and the facts differ in each case. The nature of war is to demand sacrifices, and it is not always possible so to adjust them that they are made in the quarters where they are least felt. Those who suffer from incurable diseases have shorter expectations of life than have

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healthy men ; but it is impossible to recruit an army from the hospitals. Criminals are probably the members of the community whose absence will least be missed ; but it is impossible to fill the firing line with persistent offenders. Neither the community nor the individual can escape the price of war ; the price can sometimes be reduced, and in any case can be distributed equitably as between different interests and individuals.

As an individual, the Territorial can have no complaint, whatever sacrifice is demanded of him. He has joined the force of his own free will and with a liability to service which he well knows to be unlimited in case of war. He may and probably does detest war, but he cannot wish to avoid active service if it should break out. Left to himself, he could not have the smallest legitimate complaint if in any emergency his was the only division, brigade, or even battalion to sail from these shores.

But in most cases he is not left to himself, and we must not pretend to be able to leave him there. In a war in which these islands are exposed to attack, all its inhabitants are in danger, and the task of deciding whom to send abroad, whom to retain at home, loses a great deal of its significance. In any other war the responsibility of the Government, and in the last resort of the citizen, is as terrible as that of the commander in the field when

selecting the men who are to carry out a task of particular difficulty and danger.

In the first place, many Territorials have the responsibility of feeding, housing and also educating a family. The tactlessness of some officers who, in 1914, called upon their men to volunteer for service overseas upon the grounds that they were "all in the same boat now," when the men well knew that these officers' private fortunes saved them from all real anxiety for their families, is a memory which sometimes rankles to this day. The absence of the breadwinner means a measure of hardship for most families, a genuine privation for very many. His death opens up the prospect not only of the family having to abandon its former standard of living, but also threatens to impose upon the children the psychological dangers often inherent in the absence of a father's control. And what can be more unspeakably bitter than the lot of those men who, having been disabled in the Great War, have had since to make their families eke out their living on disablement pensions, having all the time the knowledge, or at least the strong suspicion, that their families' position might well have been improved if they themselves had been dead?

It is probable that, on the whole, family ties are, and in any future emergency will be, given their due importance. The infinite differences in the

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economic sacrifices involved by men leaving their careers, according to their respective ages and occupations, are perhaps less well understood. Let us consider a few examples, assuming, for the moment, that a few Territorial Divisions are being sent overseas, while those divisions which remain at home will be called up only for short periods of training, during which they are virtually to fulfil garrison duties.

A schoolmaster, teaching in a State school, is likely to find the break in his career much less serious than a solicitor in private practice. The former, in the nature of the case, is virtually certain to have his re-employment guaranteed on his return, without even a loss of increments. The latter may have just acquired a valuable connection after years of struggle ; on his return the connection will probably be lost, unless he has a reliable partner who does not take advantage of his absence to terminate the partnership agreement; and he will have to start again from the beginning. On the other hand the solicitor, who has a professional qualification which is always likely to have a fairly substantial economic value when allied with practical experience, is in very much better case than his clerk, who having no professional qualifications is dependent partly on his own tact and skill in performing tasks more or less of a routine nature, and partly on his

employer's success ; competent solicitors' clerks are not particularly hard to find or to train, and it is largely a matter of chance whether, at the conclusion of hostilities, any such clerk will find employment as good as that which he had before the outbreak of hostilities, or indeed any employment at all for some considerable time. The brother of the solicitor's clerk, who is a clerk in one of our great banks, will be far more fortunate : he will probably be in as good a position as the schoolmaster.

To take another set of examples, a skilled workman who goes on active service will find it easier to find employment on demobilisation than his semi-skilled brother, provided that economic conditions have not changed so greatly that there is no longer any demand for his particular type of skill. Among semi-skilled workmen, a garage hand is in these days much more likely to find employment than a worker in a Lancashire cotton mill. Again, a man who has set up in life as a tailor, depending, like the solicitor, on his connections as well as on his skill, will find it much harder to re-establish himself in civil life than will a greengrocer, who can leave his wife or mother or sister to take care of the shop. It would be possible to multiply examples to an indefinite extent : here it must suffice to draw attention to the existence and nature of the problem. A period of economic

dislocation, accompanied by unemployment with its habitual miseries accentuated by the inevitable resentment which it engenders among those whose displacement is due to their having gone on active service, is a dear price to pay for victory. Ultimately the strength of the country is based on a number of men making successes of their careers in the professions, in business, and in industry, and this is an aspect of our military problem which must constantly be borne in mind—except, perhaps, when the country is engaged in a life-and-death struggle.

Another factor which must be taken separately into account, in spite of the fact that it is closely related to the problem of family ties, is the question of age. It is usually assumed that, after the ages of nineteen or twenty at any rate, the younger a man is, the fitter he is to undergo the rigours of a campaign, and the less likely he is to have his economic life dislocated by his absence from civil life during the continuance of hostilities. There is certainly a large measure of truth in these assumptions, but since they are particularly convenient assumptions from the point of view of society as a whole, they ought to be considered a little critically before they are accepted.

Physically, it is at least highly questionable whether a young man of twenty has reached the height of his powers. At that age, or soon after,

it is true that his powers as an athlete or a football player are likely to reach their height, though twenty-five rather than twenty is probably the best age even for this purpose. But the type of endurance which a campaign requires is different from that for which the football field calls. A campaign may, very often does, require that a man shall be able to carry out duties far more exacting than those to which he is accustomed, with a very much smaller allowance of food and sleep than he normally has. It is probable that up to the age of thirty, if not thirty-five, most men's powers in this respect increase rather than decrease, even though they may be becoming rather stiffer of limb or shorter of wind.

From the economic and psychological points of view, too, there are, to say the least, grave disadvantages in a young man on the threshold of his career being snatched away from it and sent into the Army on active service. His mind on his return may be less flexible; he may find it harder to master the details of his work or to form the habits which are suited to it. He may become set in a mould which will not easily be compatible with his civilian duties.

These drawbacks in the military employment of younger men exist. Unfortunately some dislocation, some inconvenience is inevitable in war, and it is necessary to choose among its evils that

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which is least widespread, has fewest repercussions. It is undoubtedly true that society on the whole is more injured by the withdrawal of slightly older men, with children and a more or less settled economic position, than by the withdrawal of their younger brothers, and so in many cases it must be better for these latter to bear the brunt of the day. Young men, it must be remembered, can adjust themselves to a tropical climate more easily than older men who are not accustomed to it. But when an older man can be sent on active service without undue economic repercussions, and without a family to be injured by his absence, it may well be wiser to send him rather than a more athletic stripling. Maturity of mind, breadth of experience and steadiness of nerve are factors which count for at least as much in war as in peace. A corps of veterans has always been preferred to a corps of raw recruits, and with warfare gradually changing in character in such a way as to call for more civilian experience of more diverse types, the trained civilian becomes so much the more easily convertible into the trained soldier than is the untrained civilian.

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We have considered some of the factors which have to be borne in mind in deciding which man,

in the event of war, should be sent on active service, which retained at home, probably only to be called up for relatively short periods of service, and in any case with opportunities of keeping an eye on his business if he has one of his own. But, as has been pointed out above, it may not be possible, if an emergency arises, to discuss the matter in terms of individuals. It may be necessary to despatch overseas without delay divisions as at present constituted, and it may be argued that there will be disadvantages, from the organisational point of view, in splitting up the divisions. Even if the present divisional system were jettisoned in the event of war, and service divisions created out of the existing units, the difficulty remains with these latter that they cannot, without sacrificing their strength, leave some of their members at home on account of the private and economic problems which their absence would raise, unless either men are transferred to them from units retained at home, which is undesirable where not absolutely necessary, or men volunteer for transfer, or else volunteers are trained and drafted into units going abroad, which the amount of time available might not allow.

We are brought face to face with the question whether, in the light of our knowledge of the complex factors which are liable to affect the family and career of each man who is sent abroad, the case

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of each member of the Territorial Army ought not to be reviewed separately before he is sent overseas. The War Office, for instance, might decide how many men were required for service overseas and direct each unit to find a certain quota. The commanding officer would then have to find the quota, either by preparing a list of men whom he considered most suitable, in all the circumstances for the purpose, or by calling for volunteers, or by some method which combined some of the features of the two.

If some such system were adopted, it would require very careful preparation. In the first place it would necessitate the existence, side by side with the present organisation, of a certain number of skeleton foreign service divisions, consisting of divisional and brigade commanders and staff, and commanders of units, who would proceed, on the outbreak of hostilities, to organise their commands, give whatever training they could to their troops, and prepare them for embarkation. If this were done, it would have to be decided, in the first place, how many such divisions there would have to be. Only a very small number would be necessary, certainly not more than three ; for difficulties of transportation would almost certainly prevent it being possible to send more than this number of Territorial divisions, together with Regular divisions, before a considerable

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Then, too, it could not with fairness be left to the commanders of units to determine the principles on which to proceed in obtaining the necessary quotas for foreign service. It is suggested that the proper method would be for the War Office to prepare a questionnaire, so framed as to elicit from each man who had to answer it what were his age, occupation and professional qualifications (if any), whether he was married, whether he had any, and if so how many, children or other dependants. The commanding officer would cause the questionnaire to be submitted to all the officers and men under his command and, having done so, would call for volunteers. If the number of volunteers exceeded the quota required, he could select his quota on the basis of the answers to questions ; if there were not enough volunteers, he could supplement their number by selecting, again on the basis of the answers to questions, men who were efficient soldiers but whose departure would have the fewest harmful repercussions. This system would combine the voluntary principle with the most economical use of manpower.

These are very strong arguments in its favour. The arguments against it depend on factors which are largely intangible and imponderable, not therefore the less important, but whose value is

certainly the more difficult to assess. They depend partly on the personal confidence and even friendship which should exist between the individual member of the fighting unit and his officers and colleagues, partly on the unit's traditions and its pride in itself as factors conducing to its success in war and its efficiency in peace. Would officers and men brought together from different units in war, if submitted to an exacting test in the early phases of a war, behave with the same confidence and emerge with the same credit as would a unit which had been trained as such, with each man understanding the others' characters and appreciating their different capacities? Would there be the same incentives to good conduct with the factor of personal knowledge eliminated? On the other hand, would officers in peace-time take the same interest in the training and general welfare of their men if they knew that the unit was nothing more than a training battalion or battery, as they now do, knowing that, in all likelihood, it will be transformed into a fighting unit in which nearly all the present members of the unit will play a part?

It is at least doubtful whether the interest of the officers in the training of the men would be seriously diminished if existing units were not intended to take the field as such. In saying this we are judging by experience, not only by con-

jecture: for there are in the Territorial Army to-day units which it is well known are not intended ever to become fighting units, namely the officer-producing units, the H.A.C., the Inns of Court Regiment, the Artists' Rifles and the Westminster Dragoons. These units, by reason of their personnel and their purpose, are not, of course, to be judged entirely by the same standards as the rest of the Territorial Army. But in the present respect they afford an example which is certainly encouraging so far as it goes.

The other difficulty, that of men who have no previous acquaintance with each other having to act together amidst the stresses of battle, is a greater one. But is it, in spite of our projected abandonment of the existing units as fighting units, absolutely inevitable that it should exist?

So far as Territorial infantry and artillery are concerned, these habitually are organised for their annual training in brigade camps, in which many of the officers, particularly the senior officers, get to know each other both through the social life of the messes and through conferences held in connection with different aspects of the training. If a foreign service battalion were formed out of each brigade of infantry, and a foreign service battery from each brigade of artillery, it is probable that quite a sufficient step would have been taken towards ensuring that degree of

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knowledge and mutual confidence between the officers and men of the fighting units. Where brigades are formed, wholly or in the main, from battalions of the same county regiment, even the sentimental objections to such a scheme seem to disappear.

We have suggested that an arrangement of this sort may be worthy of consideration mainly on grounds which are of importance in civil life, questions of family responsibilities and careers. It seems, however, that there might be important advantage in it on purely military grounds also.

On the outbreak of war on a sufficient scale to warrant the employment of Territorial troops in the theatre of operations at all, it is almost certain that further volunteers for service in the Territorial Army will be called for, and there is no reason to doubt but that, in the future as in 1900 and in 1914, a number of volunteers will be forthcoming. What is to be done with them? How is their essential training to be carried out?

If it were possible to transport a large number of Territorial divisions to a distant theatre of war within a very short period of its outbreak, it would probably be decided to send some of the existing divisions immediately, in which case the newly-joined volunteers would have to be formed into new divisions; to train these new divisions would, for all the help available from the Regular Army

Reserve of Officers, and from the officer-producing units of the Territorial Army, place an intolerable strain on the Territorial divisions left at home, if they were to be trained and officered within a reasonable time. It is in fact almost impossible to transport a large number of divisions to a distant destination without a long period elapsing for the collection of the necessary vessels : if, then, there must be this delay, the removal from existing units of the men required for the foreign service divisions leaves gaps which the new volunteers can fill without further dislocation of personnel and organisation. And if it is decided to organise fresh foreign service divisions from the troops in this country, the selection of the men for them can proceed along the same lines as before from among both the old and the new soldiers of the Territorial Force. Thus, while divisions of comparatively seasoned Territorial troops will be available in the original foreign service divisions, no general will be compelled to handle divisions of completely raw and inexperienced men ; and a leaven of experienced men will always be available for the divisions of volunteers being trained at home, however numerous, within reason, these might be.

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We have endeavoured, in this chapter, to consider some of the problems which a non-European war might involve for the Territorial soldier, and some of the ways in which his services might be utilised. We have seen that circumstances will differ in accordance with the size and character of the war and with the actual time in the future at which it may be waged. From our study one broad conclusion emerges: that individual circumstances, in the highly complex society in which we live, vary so greatly that in order to avoid social dislocation and individual hardship we ought to evolve some machinery which will enable the case of each soldier to be considered separately before it is decided how he shall be employed. And, in tentatively suggesting one form which this machinery might take, it is submitted that we have also found that in seeking to obtain social and individual justice we may also have done a service to the cause of military convenience.

CHAPTER VI

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY AND THE EUROPEAN OR WORLD WAR

IN the preceding chapter we have considered certain aspects of the possible war which, while it may present military difficulties or bring serious consequences in its train, is not likely, from its nature, to threaten the security of the homeland or the existence of the Empire. Such a war must, inevitably, involve different considerations from those raised by a war in which the very national existence is at stake. In the former we are able and, being able, it is our duty to take into account questions of personal convenience. In the latter such considerations must be swept aside or, at least, be relegated to a definitely subordinate place. Victory is the paramount consideration, and all other considerations are secondary to it. Leaving aside, for the moment, all questions of the moral right to compel men to take their places on the battle-field, the important question becomes, not whose absence will have the fewest repercussions on civilian life, but in what capacity can

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each individual make the most effective contribution to the common cause ?

In trying to assess this it will be necessary to remember certain factors, not present to the same extent in any war of the past, which will predominate, as it seems, in a war of the future. Unless we accept the somewhat unlikely hypothesis of a rapid " knock-out blow " from the air, in a future war the maintenance of industrial production and economic power will be both more important and more difficult than ever before. At the same time the maintenance of internal security and of the essential services will constitute a greater drain on man-power, and will entail a greater strain upon the resources of industry than it is easy, even in the light of our knowledge of conditions in the Spanish Civil War and of the Sino-Japanese War, to imagine. Streets plunged in darkness, with their surfaces dented with bomb-holes ; gas leaking from destroyed mains, little floods caused by the destruction of water-pipes, with ambulances groping through darkness and chaos with screened lights, carrying their loads of casualties to the nearest hospital : the evacuation of women, children and others from centres of danger, their housing and feeding elsewhere. These are a few of the problems which the next war, if it is of the type with which we are

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dealing in this chapter, will involve for the so-called non-combatant.

Thus, on the one hand, we are able with a clear conscience to leave "equality of sacrifice" as between combatants and non-combatants to the limbo of mediæval dialectics which is the home and eternal resting-place of such problems as the number of angels which can dance on the point of a needle. On the other hand, we are able to concentrate our attention on the tasks, so eminently suited to the genius of the Territorial Army, of finding the best men for military service and of training them for it. Few responsible commentators envisage the possibility of Great Britain making her contribution to a future war in the same form as in 1914 to 1918; most observers whose opinions carry weight are of the contrary view.¹ "As soon as public service ceases to be the principal business of the citizens," writes Rousseau,² ". . . the State is already tottering to its fall. When fighting is needed, they pay troops and stay at home; when counsel is needed, they pay deputies and stay at home. By dint of laziness and money, they at last possess soldiers to enslave the country, and representatives to sell it." It will not, in the next war, be a question of laziness. On the contrary, a higher standard of

¹ See, for instance, the *Sunday Times* of the 5th June, 1938: article by "Scrutator."

² *Du Contrat Social*. Book III, Chapter 15.

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courage, energy and endurance will be required from the whole population than armies themselves have usually been called on to maintain. The soldier will be a specialist, carrying out his part of the common task in the way which has been assigned to him.

The problem of the expansion of the Territorial Army will, it seems likely, differ only in degree, not in kind, from that which will arise in a smaller, less vital war. But it is impossible to make predictions of this sort with complete confidence ; and there emerge three possible lines of development, any of which the Territorial Army may have to follow in a major war of the future. These three are, broadly :

(1) Expansion, including the creation of new divisions, to permit of the Territorial Army ultimately accepting complete responsibility for the maintenance of internal security, so far as this may be the task of the military rather than of the police and air raid precautions officials, and also to permit of it providing substantial reinforcements for any overseas expeditions which the Regular Army may be ordered to undertake.

This type of expansion, it may be hoped, would be based on the recruiting of volunteers, but the possibility of the Government deciding to enrol drafts of young conscripts into the existing Territorial Army cannot be ruled out.

(2) Less likely, but still possible, is an expansion comparable to that of Kitchener's Army in the early days of the Great War of 1914 to 1918. This type of expansion would seem to be most probable in the event of the collapse, or imminent threat of collapse, of the forces of a Continental ally, when it might be felt that only the presence of a substantial number of British divisions would have the effect of reviving our ally's *morale* and stiffening his resistance. Here, again, either the voluntary or the compulsory principle might be adopted.

(3) Extremely remote, but perhaps not quite out of the question is the prospect of our once again transporting the bulk of the man-power of the nation to a foreign theatre of war. If this were done, it is reasonably certain that the method of conscription would be adopted.¹

In the first, and most likely case, the fundamental problems would not be very dissimilar from those considered in the previous chapter; but there would be two differences which would probably condition the whole treatment of the question. In the opening stages of the war, the importance of maintaining internal security would outweigh all other considerations: this would clearly be a factor militating against the immediate

¹ The extent of such an expansion as is contemplated either under heading (2) or under heading (3) is inevitably limited by the demands of the Navy and Air Force on our industrial resources as well as by the strain on our shipping, naval, and air resources involved in transporting and maintaining such great numbers abroad.

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despatch of any Territorial troops, or possibly, indeed, of any troops at all, to overseas theatres of war. On the other hand if, as is probable, some such theatres to which it might be decided to despatch troops were situated in Europe, not farther distant, perhaps, than France or the Low Countries, the difficulties of transport would be considerably less than in the case of operations farther afield.

On the outbreak of war with a great European Power we may take it for granted that the whole of the Territorial Army will be embodied and mobilised. Its immediate and most important duty will be to maintain internal security against the danger of air attack. Secondly, it will have to train recruits in order to bring the mobilised units up to war strength (where necessary) and to replace casualties. Thirdly, a certain, if indefinite, number of divisions will require to be brought to that pitch of training which will enable them to go on active service overseas.

It is clear that the execution of the two last-named tasks cannot be allowed to interfere with the effective performance of the first. The maintenance of internal security will, in all probability, tax the whole strength of some of the units engaged in it. But it is possible that other units will not find the task so exacting. London, provincial cities and centres of manufacture,

especially those on or near the south or east coasts, will be more or less continuously exposed to, and expectant of attack. The west, the far north, and small provincial towns and rural areas generally are much less likely to be so exposed. Thus troops in the Western Command, the Highland Division, and to take one example more or less at random, the 130th (Devon and Cornwall) Infantry Brigade among troops in the Southern Command, might well be able to devote most of their energies to preparing themselves for participation in operations overseas. Troops in the London district, on the other hand, would not only have to devote themselves entirely to internal security duties but also might well require reinforcements from outside. In other large towns the requirements of internal security might prove to be less exacting, but the mere fact of their having to remain in an urban area would make it impossible for units, other, perhaps, than technical units, to advance very far in their training for operations in the field.¹

Nobody can foresee with any degree of accuracy exactly what shape internal security duties will assume, or what demands they will make on the armed forces of the country. In the early stages of

¹ Troops required for internal security duty in the first phase of a war might later be released for overseas service. Whether this was so would depend on the extent to which we had established supremacy in the air.

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a conflict, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that the troops available in areas likely to be exposed to attack from the air will be required to remain in them, and that troops in less exposed areas, while constantly available for internal security duties in their own areas or for giving assistance in other areas, will be able to devote a large part of their energies to training.

With many divisions engaged in internal security work, and the rest training to take part in an expedition, which may at any moment become an urgent necessity, what of the newly-engaged recruits? On the one hand existing units will not be able to spare instructors, who will be required to carry out even more urgent duties, and on the other it will be essential to have available, if not necessarily to employ, fairly considerable numbers of men outside the framework of the Territorial Army of peace.

It has been pointed out above, but it may be well to reiterate, that in a future war all expansion will take place, unless there is a drastic and at present quite unforeseen reversal of official policy in this respect, through the medium of the Territorial Army. And the Territorial Army of peace is not unprepared—though whether it is as yet fully prepared is another matter—for the discharge of its duty to train men in the event of war.

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There have been incorporated in the Territorial Army certain units which, by reason of their history, their associations, and the types of men from among whom they find their recruits, stand out from the rest of the Army as *corps d'élite*. Of these the following are now known as "officer-producing units": namely the Honourable Artillery Company, the Inns of Court Regiment, the Artists' Rifles, and the Westminster Dragoons.

Each of these has a history which dates back far beyond the formation of the Territorial Army. The Honourable Artillery Company, or H.A.C., as it is invariably called, and the Inns of Court Regiment both have origins which can be traced back to Tudor times. The H.A.C. was incorporated by Royal Charter in Henry VIII's reign, and has an unbroken history since that date. The Inns of Court Regiment's existence has been intermittent, but a unit with some form of connection with the Inns of Court has generally been in existence at any time of military crisis; and a regiment has been in continuous existence since the Volunteer movement of the nineteenth century. The latter also gave birth to the Artists' Rifles.

With certain features in common, each of these regiments have well-marked characteristics of their own. The H.A.C., which consists both of artillery and infantry, has a definite "City" flavour: the apprentices to the crafts of former days have been

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replaced by young men, mainly with a public school education, who are beginning their careers on the Stock Exchange, in the great banks and in similar walks of life. The Inns of Court Regiment, which contains a squadron of cavalry as well as infantry companies, is more professional in its composition. It is not to any very great extent manned by the profession from whose institutions it derives its name. There are a number of reasons for this : the itinerant life and erratic hours of work of the young barrister are not always easily compatible with fixed engagements such as those which the Territorial Army imposes ; the Bar is chiefly drawn from a well-to-do class to whom the time-consuming delights of London society are open ; and it has an aristocratic tradition which is not always conducive to service in a democratic army. Further, there are not a great number of young barristers in practice in London, and so available for service in the " Devil's Own," as the lawyers' regiment is appropriately called. In spite of these factors there is a sprinkling of barristers and Bar students, particularly in the cavalry squadron ; and for the rest there is a number of young solicitors, accountants, and other well-educated professional and business men. The Artists' Rifles, an infantry regiment whose arms drill is assimilated to that of the Rifle Brigade instead of to that of the line regiments, has, like

the Inns of Court Regiment,¹ a name which does not reflect with accuracy the civilian occupations of its members. In the early days of the Volunteer movement members included, among other well-known men, Dante Gabriel Rossetti and Holman Hunt. To-day, for the most part, recruits appear to come from among the well-educated clerks in banks, insurance offices, stockbroking firms and so forth.

All these units are composed of men who are of the very type from which the Territorial officer is most frequently drawn. Boys fresh from school, plunged into the vortex of London life and office routine, frequently join them as much from the desire to have an opportunity of meeting others of their own type as from purely military motives. They remain to make actual or potential officers of great value.

In the last war these regiments supplied fighting units which served with distinction. It came to be realised, however, that to use potential officers to perform the duties of private soldiers was wasteful in the highest degree : the Inns of Court Regiment was transformed into an O.T.C., and, while in name this has now been reversed, it is a part of the settled military policy of this country that neither H.A.C., Inns of Court Regiment,

¹ Which at least has its headquarters in Lincoln's Inn, the home of the Chancery Bar.

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Artists' Rifles nor Westminster Dragoons shall again be employed as fighting units. This decision is perhaps too recent in date for its full implications to be realised, or for all the steps to be taken which are necessary to give full effect to it. It has already had far-reaching effects.

For training the moderate number of recruits which we are contemplating as necessary for the restricted type of expansion which we are now considering, that is, for creating two or three new divisions and keeping the pre-existing divisions supplied with recruits, it is probable that the officer-producing units would suffice. Those of their members who were in possession of Certificate A on the outbreak of war would be given commissions and either drafted into fighting units, thus relieving more experienced officers for the work of instruction, or be made responsible themselves for the training of recruits. If the latter were the case it might conceivably provoke some comment on "The blind leading the blind," but in fact there is no means by which a man can learn so thoroughly and quickly as by having to teach. In the meanwhile fresh recruits mainly of the same type as the peace-time members of the officer-producing units would be enrolled in them and would be prepared to take the places of serving officers, or to act as the officers of new formations, should need arise.

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If expansion should take place on a larger scale than contemplated above, fresh problems would, of course, arise. The Territorial Army in the circumstances of a great war might have to train and organise twelve second-line divisions, exclusive of anti-aircraft formations, and possibly, later on twelve third-line divisions. Thus the officers and men who were in the Territorial Army at the outbreak of hostilities would be but a small proportion of the vast army created by the influx of recruits. So overwhelming has the difficulty of training these recruits appeared to some of those who have devoted thought to the problems of the Territorial Army, that they have been led to suggest that the character of the whole force should be so altered in peace-time as to make it merely the frame on which the national strength should expand ; that it should become an army of officers and N.C.O's, virtually, in fact, an aggregation of officer-producing units. This, of course, is a suggestion which could not possibly be adopted without abandoning every intention of using the Territorial Army for the other purposes which it now serves, and must be rejected.

The difficulty of officering new divisions, while conserving the character of the existing units, is admittedly considerable. But it should be remembered that there exists outside the Territorial Army a very substantial reserve of

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potential officers in the large numbers of young men who pass through university and school O.T.C's, many of them with Certificate A and a somewhat limited number with Certificate B. It is not suggested that all of these men could properly be granted a commission and entrusted with the training of troops immediately war broke out ; probably only those who had passed the Certificate B examination within the three or four years prior to the outbreak could be so. But a short period of intensive training in an officer-producing unit would probably be all that would be necessary for the purpose, for, as suggested above, able and conscientious men could be relied upon to learn while teaching ; in fact it might be well, instead of placing all the men of this type in officer-producing units, to attach some of them to newly-formed battalions as N.C.O's, for whose duties most of them would already be competent, gradually promoting them to commissioned rank as their own efficiency and the Army's expansion warranted. This would go far towards solving at one stroke the double problem of finding officers and N.C.O's for the expanding Army.

It is very often made a matter for reproach of the O.T.C's, particularly the university O.T.C's, that they do not provide a higher proportion of officers for the Territorial Army. There may be many reasons for this. A number of men go abroad to

pursue their careers, while in certain cases the difficulties of reconciling the aristocratic temper of some of the older educational institutions with the democratic spirit of the Territorial Army makes itself felt; and on the other hand the aping of certain of the forms and conventions of the Regular Army in an entirely unsuitable social and military context arouses, whenever it is found to exist, a certain amount of derision and repulsion: full dress uniform and spurs go ill with a demonstration of oily machinery. But in recent years the Territorial Army seems to have attracted a higher proportion of university men.¹ Indeed the Territorial Army itself is partly to blame for not making full use of its opportunities of drawing on potential sources of supply of officers.

There is another, and more serious type of criticism of the O.T.C's as nurseries for officers. This was expressed in its most sensational form by Mr. Beverly Nichols in *Cry Havoc*, where he accused the O.T.C's of the public schools of deliberately presenting a distorted picture of modern war, and glorifying it for the benefit of boys of an impressionable age. That the type of training which the O.T.C. tends to give, with its emphasis on smart close-order drill and a good "turn-out" at the annual inspection, is not the best possible mental or physical preparation for the

¹ See, regarding Oxford, *The Times* of July 4th, 1938.

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tasks of modern war has been suggested by many critics, notably by Captain Liddell-Hart, who has said that in a future war he would prefer our infantry officers to be drawn from the Scouts' organisation rather than from the school O.T.C.'s.

For this sort of criticism there is undoubtedly a strong case, though it is at least very doubtful whether there is much militarism, of the character which 'Mr. Nichols attacked, in the majority of schools; where it exists it undoubtedly causes strong revulsions of feeling, and it is in the highest degree unlikely that many former members of O.T.C.'s where militarism was a dominant characteristic would be tarred with the same brush. The O.T.C. tends to represent a type of military training, which is becoming obsolete, but those who are trained in it are men who, from the superior educational opportunities which they enjoy, are on the whole best suited to act as officers in the Army of the present day or of the near future. The Scout's training as a Scout may prepare him for war better than the public schoolboy's training as a member of an O.T.C., but the latter's general education as a rule gives him an undoubted advantage, which proper technical training can greatly enhance, and bad technical training cannot altogether destroy. The remedy is, therefore, not to deprive him of the opportunity for leadership, but to prepare him for

it by raising the standard of military training in the schools. This can be done by drastic reductions of the time devoted to ceremonial parades and close order drill, by concentrating study on the use of weapons and on the groundwork of tactics. A tendency to follow this type of programme has lately been noticeable in certain of the junior O.T.C.'s, and in O.T.C. camps, but a great deal of further progress in this direction will have to be made before the junior O.T.C. can become a really satisfactory institution.

The criticisms levelled with some justice at the junior, or school O.T.C., cannot, in the main, be directed at the senior, or university O.T.C. The latter is genuinely a voluntary institution, whereas the former, in most cases, is not.

The member of the senior O.T.C. makes a genuine, if not very great sacrifice of his liberty and leisure ; the public schoolboy has to choose between membership of the O.T.C., with the approval of the school authorities, on the one hand, and one or more periods of extra work or physical training, with their scarcely concealed irritation and annoyance, on the other. Further, the very nature of the senior O.T.C., the more mature and more select character of its membership, its larger and more expert staff, and the absence of any attempts at discipline of the proverbial "sergeant-major" type, which only leads to breaches of

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discipline in the junior O.T.C., confers on it a degree of efficiency as a military school which is entirely beyond the resources of the junior O.T.C. At the same time, different individuals in the senior O.T.C. pursue their military studies with different degrees of seriousness, and in any case it would be foolish to base too great expectations on the very limited amount of time which the senior O.T.C. and its members have at their disposal.

In conclusion, it may be said that while the provision of the number of officers necessary either for a military expansion comparable to that which took place in the Great War, either before or after the enactment of conscription in 1916, presents a very grave problem, there is a number of suitable and partly-trained men available who can, through the instrumentality of the officer-producing units, be converted into junior officers with greater or less speed according, in part, to whether or not their previous service included membership of the senior O.T.C. While a certain number of officers for the higher ranks is available both from the Regular Army Reserve of Officers, such officers are, for the greater part, not only comparatively advanced in years but also lacking in experience of recent changes in weapons and in organisation, and would at least require

“ refresher ” courses before being entrusted with a command in field operations. In general it is probable that most of the higher ranks will be filled by promotion from the junior ranks when newcomers into the Army, together with suitable “ rankers,” are ready to take their places as junior officers. In all armies an officer has to be adequately prepared to take a higher rank in war than he holds in peace : but in the small British Army he has to be ready to fulfil the duties proper to an officer at least two steps higher in rank.

The whole pivot of the system is the officer-producing unit. The decision never to repeat what is now universally recognised as the error of the Great War, in sending detachments of potential officers into battle as privates, is of cardinal importance. Without it the task of finding suitable officers for an expanding army as well as for the Air Force, which will in all probability have to expand even more rapidly, would be almost an impossible one.

Leaving the problem of the officers, how will the men under their command be organised ?

A major European war would from this point of view impose two principal tasks : the expansion of existing divisions on to a war footing and the creation of new divisions. For the sake of argument we will assume that the number of new divisions created will be large, for otherwise the problem of

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expansion differs only in detail from that considered in the previous chapter. The estimate, to which reference is made above, may serve as a basis for discussion: twelve divisions of the second line, and perhaps a further twelve divisions of the third line.

As explained in the previous chapter, it is impossible, in view of recent statements of policy, to say in terms of numbers of effectives exactly what the term "war strength" means. Formerly the war strength of an infantry division was regarded as 15,000, whereas its peace strength was, and is, approximately 10,000. With the strength of the division undefined, it is clearly impossible to say how many men will be required in an emergency even given the number of divisions. Nor is it easy to see on what basis the expansion of the Army is likely to proceed. Will it be decided first to augment the numbers of existing units, or will it be decided first to create effective new divisions before swelling the ranks of the old? It will clearly depend on the character of the opening stages of the war. If heavy casualties are incurred in the course of executing internal security duties or if, on the contrary, these prove so unexpectedly light that it is possible, and thought desirable, to despatch Territorial troops in an expeditionary force, the primary task will be to reinforce those units which have suffered the

severest casualties, or those which it is intended to prepare for active service on a campaign. On the other hand, if it is decided not to send overseas an expeditionary force containing Territorials, and the divisions engaged in internal security duties, though fully occupied, do not suffer great losses, it may be thought better rapidly to create the framework of new divisions so that these may the more readily be expanded at a later date, without the friction and waste which improvisation usually causes.

The circumstances which may arise may be so diverse from anything which we are able to imagine that it is useless to attempt to do anything more than forecast the general form which the problems of expansion present. In fact the dislocation caused by the outbreak of a major war may be so great that a neatly dovetailed military organisation may cease, in many parts of the country, to exist, and that all that can be done will be to enrol such men as are available, give them a minimum of training, and set them to a prescribed task with the smallest loss of time available. In such a case, with civil order in disruption and the State in agony, questions of divisional organisation would probably cease to have even an academic interest. And it is in such a situation that, if the Territorial Army does not allow the weight of its new responsibilities to crush its native genius by

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substituting the conventions of military formalism for its powers of adaptation, it should be able to rise to the occasion and, by commanding the confidence of the population of the area in which each part of it is on duty, prevent the dissolution of society.

It is the duty of a general staff to devote part of its energies in peace-time to imagining every contingency which can possibly occur in the event of war, and to prepare schemes in accordance with the exigencies of each contingency. Actually, as a war progresses, it has usually led to such unexpected results that the value of such schemes lies rather in the mental processes necessary for their preparation than in the completed schemes themselves. The German General Staff, probably the most thorough in the world, never anticipated the 8th of August, 1918, or the disillusionment and sufferings of the civil population ; so it lost its nerve, and with it, the war. Improvisation is of the essence of war, and all that we can usefully attempt here to do is to envisage certain possible lines of development and to see what they imply.

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We have considered the organisation of the Territorial Army and its expansion in time of war. It is necessary to devote a certain amount of attention to the particular case of the anti-aircraft

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units, which stand in a category apart from the remaining units of the Territorial Army.

The calling-up of five anti-aircraft divisions will probably be the first official sign to the general public of the imminence of this country's entry into a European war, and on them, undoubtedly, the brunt and strain of the first few weeks will be the heaviest. Nor will they ever, so long as war lasts, be able to relax their vigilance ; but at the same time service in them will be very different from service in any unit of the Army in the Great War, 1914 to 1918.

A week, a fortnight or even a month of intensive attacks on London, or on other great centres of population, is a possibility on which we have to reckon. But experience neither in Spain, nor China, nor in such places as Dunkirk, whose proximity to the enemy lines exposed them to attack in the last war in something the same measure as London in the present development of aircraft, nor a consideration of the factors which are likely to be present in future wars, suggest the likelihood of a very prolonged period of intensive attack. The strain which it would impose on flying personnel and ground personnel alike, the impossibility, after a time, of replacing the wastage of men and material without a drastic deterioration in quality which would in itself conduce to still greater wastage, the dislocation of economic organisation

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and the injury to non-combatant *morale* which would be wrought by the almost inevitable retaliation, all put a term to the continuance of intensive attack.

When the period of intensive attack is past, the urgent problem will be to combine preparedness for its renewal with the rapid repair, physical, economic and moral, of the damage which has already been inflicted. This will involve, among other things, a considerable renewal of economic activity—whether on the part of the Government or on the part of private business makes for our purpose very little difference, for in either case men will be required to do the work. It would be an unpardonable waste of the available man-power of the nation, if members of anti-aircraft units were, in a period of necessarily feverish activity, restricted to devoting their whole time to routine military duties, preparing for a renewal of attacks, which may never come at all, or which may well be long delayed. Some provision must be made for other utilisation of the services of members of anti-aircraft units. The questions are, what use can be made of them, and how shall the use which is to be made be reconciled with the maintenance of the units in a state of preparation ?

The principle which should guide the decision as to the use of each man's services should, in our submission, be that the cobbler should stick to his

last. Let the cobbler mend boots, and the plumber repair drains and pipes, let the architect be busy planning and supervising the reconstruction and repair of damaged buildings, and the journalist devote himself to an art which he should understand—propaganda. The minimum of work and effort should be spent in teaching men new jobs.

But, it will be said, how is this possible? The members of anti-aircraft units follow most diverse occupations. How, without disrupting the units, can each man be allowed to follow his accustomed trade?

The answer must be that each man is likely to be, and so far as possible it ought to be arranged that he should be, engaged in military duties at places within reach of his home and place of work. When attacks are not being made at short intervals he should, apart from certain prescribed periods of duty, be allowed to live in his home, if not destroyed or evacuated, and either to continue his civilian work, or else to be employed in some capacity, quite distinct from his military capacity, in which use can be made of his civilian experience. In fact each man would live to a large extent in war in the same way as in peace, but with longer and more frequent spells of military duty. In many cases, indeed, it could be arranged that at particular positions which required special protection, such as important factory sites, the guns

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could be manned by men working in the factory, thus providing a minimum dislocation of the all-important processes of production. It is possible that arrangements similar to those suggested above may be possible for troops, other than anti-aircraft, engaged in internal security operations ; but our present state of knowledge as to the character of these does not justify the expression of a definite opinion.

That arrangements of this sort should be suggested for soldiers on active service may strike the conservative-minded as revolutionary. In modern war it is so, although if we must look to precedent, very effective work, both of local defence and otherwise, was done by the London apprentices of the Civil War period who both served in the train-bands and followed their trades. But revolutionary or not, we must consider realities, not the traditions of the Regular Army, on which duties quite different in nature are imposed, nor the example of the last Great War, in which the air menace only existed in a form with which its present extent is not comparable.

The air menace, however, will be as much present to any field force which may be sent abroad as it will be at home ; and any such force would have to be accompanied by a certain proportion of Territorial anti-aircraft units for the protection of bases, communications and so forth. These ought to be

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selected from units in areas not likely to be particularly exposed to air attack and, apart from this, the men ought to be selected on the basis indicated in the previous chapter; they should be men whose absence from the country would cause a minimum of social and economic dislocation and, subject to this, they should be the best soldiers available.

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We have discussed the question of conscription in a previous chapter. Though this will affect to an enormous extent the spirit in which any expansion is carried out, it will not, especially since an indiscriminate acceptance of men without enquiry as to whether they can be spared for military service is in a future conflict unthinkable, of necessity affect its form.

One question, which is likely to arise in an acute form in any future conflict, is the equipment of Territorial divisions, and coupled with that there is the question of the form which their organisations shall take.* Apart from the five anti-aircraft divisions and coast defence troops, the Territorial Army, at the time of writing, is composed of twelve infantry divisions: their conversion into armoured divisions and light machine-gun divisions may be costly, but, in so far

¹ Since the above was written reorganisation of T.A. has taken place and its mechanization and motorization are proceeding.

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as the Territorial Army becomes incorporated in a future field force for use in a major European war, it must take place. If the conversion does not take place till war breaks out, delay in preparing Territorial divisions is inevitable: mechanised divisions cannot be equipped in a night, nor can the men learn how to use the machinery, nor officers the strategic and tactical uses to which mechanised divisions can be put. Thus while the Territorial Army as at present organised and equipped is competent to carry out internal security duties at home or, in a lesser degree, garrison duties overseas, it cannot be said to be convertible into an effective part of a field force except after a prolonged delay, at any rate unless its duties were confined to a purely defensive rôle.

In forming an estimate of the value of the Territorial Army it is necessary to bear in mind recent developments in the sphere of military policy. In this connection it is worth while again to refer to the speech of the Secretary of State for War in introducing the Army Estimates, as quoted in an article on "The Field Force Question," by the Military Correspondent of *The Times*:¹

"The rôle of the Army is known to comprise a number of different purposes. But in the view of the Government it is now possible to classify them in order of importance; and

¹ *The Times*, June 17th, 1938.

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further to subdivide the priorities within each purpose. The first purpose of our Army is home defence. . . . The priorities in home defence are, in their order, air defence, internal security . . . and coast defence. .

“Second in classification to home defence comes the discharge of British commitments overseas including ports on the trade routes. The size and type of garrisons are being made to conform to the principle . . . that each one where communications can be interrupted should be maintained in peace at a strength adequate for its responsibilities of defence at the outbreak of war.

“The final head . . . concerns the uses to which the strategic reserve can be applied. . . . These uses are a reinforcement, wherever required, of internal security ; defence from external attack of territories for which we may be responsible overseas ; and, next, co-operation in the defence of the territories of any allies we might have in case of war.”

As *The Times* Military Correspondent¹ comments, “It is clear that in last winter’s review of military policy the despatch of a field force to the Continent was relegated to the background, while the idea of repeating the mass effort of 1914–1918

¹ Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart.

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was excluded altogether." But he goes on to say : " Since then . . . the increased tension in Europe has produced significant changes of outlook. It may lead to still larger changes. We should be wise to watch such developments, and weigh their possible consequences carefully." The guarantee which this country has recently given to Czechoslovakia, as a result of the Munich agreement, might lead to a larger commitment of our land forces on the Continent than the Secretary of State had in mind. In the event of France and ourselves being allies, we may be quite certain that the greatest pressure will be exerted in order to compel this country to take a large and ever-increasing part in the main theatre of war in Europe. This pressure will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to resist, if we are to work harmoniously with our ally, whose people will need to be convinced that we are doing our full share.

While the Territorials in a future war, like the Militia in the Crimean and South African Wars, and certain Territorial units in India in 1914 to 1918, might be employed for garrison duties overseas, thus releasing the Regular garrison troops for participation in a field force, there are certain disadvantages in this course in the difficulty which Territorials may find in adapting themselves both to the climate and psychological conditions of

garrison service in the Empire. And apart from this, it is reasonably certain that some Territorial divisions at any rate would be required, sooner or later, to form part of a field force and, from a very early date indeed, to be ready in case of emergency to reinforce it.

For this Territorial divisions are not ready, and cannot quickly be made so. Further, owing to mechanisation, the industrial, economic and military strain of preparing them is greater than ever. We cannot close this chapter better than by another quotation from the Military Correspondent to *The Times*¹: "We must take the measure of our responsibilities and resources if we are to avoid the alternative risks of falling short in the two spheres that matter most (viz., of course, the sea and the air) or breaking down under a triple strain." Could this country stand the burden of preparing a large number of land divisions while conducting intensive warfare on the sea and in the air? We cannot here attempt to answer this question, but it must constantly be borne in mind in any attempt to assess the rôle of the Territorial in a future war.

¹ In the same article as above, of June 17th, 1938.

CHAPTER VII

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY AND THE OUTLOOK

AN Army is, in the case of a nation whose will is disposed to peace, a form of insurance against war. It is sometimes prone to bring about the contingency against which it is designed to protect, partly because a strong army is a temptation to the nation which possesses it to rely on force where diplomacy might still avail, partly because war enhances the importance of an army's leaders, and so predisposes them to favour warlike solutions of political problems. An army is sometimes the tail which wags the dog: it was so on the German side in 1914, when the younger Moltke represented to the Kaiser, with fatal success, that for technical reasons it was impossible to attack Russia without at the same time attacking France. In a lesser degree the same phenomenon was observable in this country, for the failure of the Cabinet to exercise a firmer control over the Franco-British staff conversations of pre-war days and, in particular, the manner in which it allowed the French General Staff to influence, through the medium of the late Sir Henry Wilson,

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the grand strategy of Britain, led us step by step into a military effort altogether beyond the scope that the responsible political directors of the country had ever contemplated. In the Bismarckian phrase, a general wishes to make use of his machine or, as Prince Henry of Prussia once put it, "our captains are thirty-five, and need promotion."

Of influences of this nature and of the desire to exert any political influence of any kind except in his capacity as a citizen, the Territorial's most severe critic must acquit him. For him promotion holds no charms in comparison with his desire to follow his civilian employment and advance his civilian career. He is an insurer pure and simple, and the premium which he charges is exceptionally low in that he receives no pay for himself (except during camp and courses), apart from certain allowances for expenses. He makes a voluntary sacrifice of his time and energies for the sake of the public.

Of course, he is far from being the only person who does this. There are innumerable forms of public service other than service in the Territorial Army. But the latter, it may reasonably be claimed, is an exceptionally exacting form of service in that it requires constant self-discipline, a willingness voluntarily to waive the right to enjoy long and specified periods of leisure and

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convert them virtually into hours of work. On any showing the public is enormously in the Territorial's debt ; and this debt the public should endeavour to discharge.

So far as civilian life in peace-time is concerned, the most important concession which should be made to all Territorials relates to holidays. It is, of course, no small thing to ask of employers that in addition to releasing their employees for a fortnight while they are in camp they shall also allow them to absent themselves from work for a further period while they are on holiday ; but it is not a burden which should prove intolerable. There are approximately 180,000 men in the Territorial Army to-day,¹ a comparatively small proportion of the total population in employment : approximately 1 in 60. If it were made the rule in all cases to allow holidays to Territorials, so that all employers did it, few large-scale employers would feel it seriously. The small employer, whom the absence of one man may place in a serious difficulty, remains a problem which does not admit of a clear-cut solution : it is a question of finding the best possible solution in individual cases—a task whose existence shows how necessary public good will is to the successful working of the Territorial Army.

Many employers have set a magnificent example

¹ In June, 1938.

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in dealing with the holiday question, and the practice of granting an extra holiday is becoming increasingly widespread. But it is still far from universal. There was recently a noteworthy example of the extra holiday not being allowed in the case of that very large employer of labour, the Glasgow Corporation. It is regrettable that in a direction in which private employers are making great strides forward a great public employer should lag behind. It is a pity that more active steps have not been taken in all parts of the country to secure the Labour Party's support. It is a good sign to see the recently formed Territorial Army Public Interest Committee so active and helpful under the Chairmanship of Colonel H. L. Nathan, a Labour M.P. The members of the Territorial Army make not inconsiderable sacrifices in peace ; they may have to make even greater sacrifices in war. They make them willingly, but they should not be allowed to suffer under a sense of injustice.

This consideration makes it important that reasonable provision should be made that service in the Territorial Army in war should not be allowed to prejudice men's civilian prospects more than is absolutely necessary. A man disabled by wounds cannot, of course, be reinstated in a post which requires physical fitness and activity, nor, in a major as distinct from a minor

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war, is it reasonable to expect that the respective inconveniences and disadvantages incurred by each individual should be too nicely estimated before any particular form of duty is allocated to him. Nor can it be avoided that in the cases of men in the independent professions prolonged absence on military service will have an adverse effect and that their competitors who remain at work at home will benefit proportionately.¹ There remains much that can be done both to meet difficulties of a general nature and to mitigate individual cases of hardship. Disablement pensions should be on a generous scale ; some system of bounties, perhaps even of loans carrying a low rate of interest, should be devised to meet the case of the professional man and enable him to find his feet after the war. Above all, Government pressure should be exerted with the utmost vigour to ensure that wherever possible Territorials who have been on service should be reinstated with a minimum of delay. On municipal authorities, largely dependent on Government grants-in-aid, and on Government contractors, the forms which this pressure might take are too obvious to require discussion. On the other hand, a legislative measure would necessarily be so complex, and have such unpredictable repercussions,

¹ Though, of course, men who have been on service themselves are more likely to employ professional men whom they have got to know while on service than others.

that it would probably be unwise to attempt. Moral pressure, which would be powerfully aided by public opinion, together with a very large extent of preference for ex-Service men in all Government employment for a few years after demobilisation, will probably be the most practical means of achieving the desired end.

In order to give the Territorial justice, it is necessary to supply him with up-to-date equipment, and the public must be prepared to foot the bill. To expect an armoured-car-company, whose principal task is to collect information and transmit it to the appropriate quarter with the smallest delay, to do its work with either the greatest possible enthusiasm or the utmost efficiency if it is not supplied with wireless sets, would be unreasonable, for such a deficiency inevitably robs training of reality, and so makes it dull, as well as making it in itself imperfect. The efficient handling of machinery, such as a Bren gun, requires such complete familiarity with the processes involved that to carry them out quickly and correctly is second nature, requiring no undue effort of thought or concentration. This is particularly necessary amid the strain of battle, which is an occasion entirely unsuited for the learning of a new process or the execution of an imperfectly familiar one. Complete and effortless efficiency can come only from constant practice,

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and unless equipment is available practice is impossible.

The Territorial Army deserves fair treatment from the public. But if it wishes the public to take an interest in, and understand its problems, it must also itself make an effort to understand what the civilian population thinks of it, and how civilians re-act to its wants, its grievances and its general behaviour.

The first thing which the Territorial should remember is that the civilian often thinks of him not so much as a man making a sacrifice of his time and leisure as a man who is pursuing a hobby at the public expense. The old suspicion of "playing at soldiers" always lurks in the background of the civilian's mind, and any attempt which a Territorial may make to emphasise his military character outside, so to say, military hours, brings it forward and makes it active. There is no doubt but that, as we suggested at the beginning of this book, there is a certain type of Territorial who loves to wear uniform, to attend church parades, to line the streets on ceremonial occasions and to wear mess dress when either a dinner jacket or dungarees would be more appropriate. This is probably not very harmful in itself, but it invites the question, "Is the Territorial Army doing its job?" to which there

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can be no objection, and it tends to provoke ridicule, which everybody concerned must deplore.

This love of "dressing up" not only injures the Territorial Army's prestige outside its ranks, but also creates a certain amount of friction inside them. In the face of the critical international situation, types of men are joining the Army who, ten or even five years ago, would never have dreamed of doing so. There are men who detest having orders shouted at them on a parade ground, who feel foolish and self-conscious when wearing elaborate uniform, who do not enjoy giving up the whole or a part of their holidays to training in camp and their leisure during the rest of the year to weekly drills. They do all these things simply to avoid a greater evil: they believe that if England is weak she will be exposed to international blackmail, and that there is danger of war: a war for which their own preparedness will be a source of England's strength. They are men often comparatively mature in years, with formed habits and definite interests; though they would prefer that they did not feel called upon to give them, they give their services willingly; but they are extremely jealous of anything which they regard as a waste of time.

A certain conflict of view is thus apt to develop between the "Old Guard," which regards

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membership of the Territorial Army as an interesting hobby, and the "Young Guard," which regards it mainly as a sacrifice on the altar of duty.

The differences in the points of view of the two are particularly apt to manifest themselves on ceremonial occasions which the "Old Guard" view with pride and the "Young Guard" openly avoids, thus causing the former to complain that the latter is "letting the regiment down."

The man who reasons thus may well be taking a too materialistic and unemotional view of his duties. The fact remains that it is the sort of view which appeals to a type of man who, to-day, and for the first time, is enrolling in the Territorial Army. If his duty is to operate a searchlight and to be prepared to help fire a machine-gun, he will be apt to resent, and rightly so, any attempt to teach him anything more than the rudiments of close-order drill or to give him instruction in musketry. And the kind of incident narrated above is calculated neither to inspire confidence in the judgment of the commander, nor to improve recruiting.

Full-dress uniform may or may not be an incentive to men to join the Regular Army. But with the Territorial the best way is usually to persuade a man that there is a job to be learnt and that competent instructors are available to teach it.

The man who loves military display is one type

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whose proclivities must be restrained: the "hearty" is another. That young men, carried away for the moment by sheer joy of living, sometimes a little heightened by alcoholic stimulants, should on occasion do what older men would not is natural and inevitable. The evil only begins when this sort of thing is carried to excess. A guest-night when the revelry is prolonged into the early hours of the morning is not only likely to impair the efficiency of the hosts during the training of the next day, but also to create an unfavourable impression on some of the guests.

These problems exist, but their importance should not be exaggerated. The marvel about the Territorial Army is not so much the divisions, disharmonies and conflicts which arise, as the manner in which almost all sorts and conditions of men succeed in adjusting themselves to it, and serving with tolerance of and even affection for men of the most diverse casts of mind and most dissimilar ways in life. But the Territorial Army should be a national army, and it is important that no section of the population should be estranged from it. Thus only can it fulfil its widest purpose and attain the highest standard of efficiency.

At the present time there are undoubtedly certain elements in the national life which are in fact estranged from the Territorial Army. There are the "intellectuals"—writers, artists, university

teachers : the men for whom the Artists' Rifles and the Inns of Court Regiment were intended, but who do not in fact enrol in them to the extent that might be expected. There is also the great bulk of the Labour Party : for a certain aversion to the Territorial Army is not only confined to extremists. And how invaluable would be the assistance of the more trusted among the trade union leaders if they exerted their great influence on behalf of recruiting !

The apathy or even hostility of these sections may be due to a certain extent either to some misconception on their part or to some defect in their composition. It is inconceivable that the blame is not to some extent to be laid at the door of some deficiencies on the part of the Territorial Army itself. If there are misconceptions, it is the Territorial's duty to try to remove them. So far as the Labour Party is concerned, the open support quite properly given to the Territorial Army by the Conservative Party is, equally naturally, enough to kindle Labour suspicions : there is a lurking suspicion that, were a Labour Government to enact measures unacceptable to the capitalist classes, Territorial officers might prefer class loyalty to the orders of the War Office, and that the men might carry out the officers' unlawful orders. No pains should be spared to remove such an impression wherever it exists, to show that the

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Territorial Army is genuinely and entirely non-political, and that the officers would neither give such orders nor the men, in all probability, obey them. As for the "intellectuals," there is all too much room for misunderstanding in the different lives that are led on the one hand by the type of young man most often associated with the Territorials, passing busily from office to drill-hall or to playing-field, who yet manages to combine his activities with genuine if unformed interests which often do not come to flower till quite late in life, and on the other by the type of young intellectual, who behind a possibly affected pose of superiority and a passion for membership of numerous learned or artistic societies, often conceals a genuine liking for open-air life and the simple pleasures. If the latter discovers the former's real, if latent, intelligence, many difficulties may be removed ; and the Territorial will do well to remember that while a love of military display will widen the rift, an obvious desire to learn a job will, by earning respect, narrow it.

Its composite character is, next perhaps to the voluntary system, the Territorial Army's greatest asset. For on it depends, not only its capacity quantitatively to be a national army, but also the extent to which it is able to make a distinctive contribution to the solution of our military problems, by reasons of its wealth of experience,

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its ability to produce, as each fresh crisis arises, the man who is fitted by his civilian experience to find the solution. Its value as a nursery for new military ideas depends as much on the variety of types which it can attract as on the quality of the training which it can impart.

This factor raises a question of far-reaching importance: is the method of promotion by seniority, however watered down, a suitable one for the Territorial Army? There are certain respects in which the system so operates as to exclude valuable men, and others in which its workings tend to create friction among men who have already joined.

Promotion by seniority involves, unless the higher ranks are to be held by officers distinctly advanced in years, that the subalterns should all receive their commissions when definitely young men. Thus a man of twenty-eight, still more of thirty-two, is considered too old for a commission. A man of education and comparatively ripe experience, anxious to make some contribution to the defences of the country, may well hesitate before committing himself to a service in the ranks which does not really enable him to make use of his faculties; and apart from this, he is just the man who should be entrusted with command, for his judgment both of men and situations must

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necessarily carry more conviction than that of an otherwise equally able youngster fresh from school.

If William Pitt could be Prime Minister at twenty-four, it may be argued, a man is certainly ready to be a subaltern at nineteen. And so he is. But elder men placed under his command do not always appreciate this ; and they feel, in some cases perhaps with justification, that they are the better qualified to hold commissioned rank. Let them have an opportunity of proving it—or of proving the reverse. More elastic conditions of promotion should have the effect both of increasing efficiency, and removing grievances.

Another step which might well enhance the value of the Territorial Army would be the compiling of an accurate and complete register of its members' civilian occupations. This would facilitate the choice of the proper sphere to which each man should be allocated on mobilisation so as to obtain the fullest benefit from each man's civilian experience, apart from the use to which it might be put, as suggested in a previous chapter, as a basis for the decision whether to employ any particular man at home or abroad.

It has been said before, and it may be repeated, that elasticity and flexibility are invaluable qualities in the Territorial Army. The relative importance of the different parts of that army's rôle in the

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national life varies from time to time. Its importance as an army trained to perform specific tasks may, outside the officer-producing units, be predominant in war. And discipline, and stereotyped ways of performing routine duties, are essential to a successful army. But in peace it is even more important to stress the fact that the Territorial Army is a nursery of ideas and a school of men : and the nursery and the school require even more than discipline, essential though that is, a condition of freedom in which, so to speak, water finds its own level ; each man finds the task which he is best qualified to fulfil, and learns how to fulfil it ; further, in learning, he discovers new methods, which he discusses with his colleagues, and may lead to revolutionary changes.

Thus the Territorial should have a sense of mental adventure, which is compatible with the sternest self-discipline, but not with a discipline that is imposed from outside. He should combine the grim resolution of the New Model with the *élan* and enthusiasm of the armies of the American and French Revolutions ; and he should have a sense of individual power to initiate peculiar to himself. Above all, he must ever be prepared to shoulder a new burden, to learn a fresh task.

For just as the writing of this book is nearly finished, the Territorial Army finds itself given

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more work, greater responsibilities. It has to raise three new anti-aircraft divisions. It is thus made at the same time both more of a first line force and of a home defence force. In one sense Lord Haldane's most advanced conceptions are being given form by Mr. Hore-Belisha, in another sense the wheel is coming full circle and we are returning to the garrison duties of volunteer days. What will the morrow bring ? None can tell.

In a pamphlet on Chemical Warfare published by the League of Nations Union in 1924,¹ the following somewhat prophetic passage occurs :—

“ Noting, therefore, on the one hand the ever-increasing and varying machinery of science as applied to warfare, and, on the other, the vital danger to which a nation would expose itself if it were lulled into security by over-confidence in international treaties and conventions, suddenly to find itself defenceless against a new arm, it is, in the opinion of the Commission, essential that all nations should realise to the full the terrible nature of the danger which threatens them.”

The British are in no sense a military nation, certainly not a militarist nation. They do not seek the occasion for war, but, when it arises, they

¹ “ Chemical Warfare ” being Chapter IV of the Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments.

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are equal to it. It is the function of the Territorial Army to train and encourage the latent military talent of the nation so that against no new arm, in no sudden emergency, shall it find itself defenceless.

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