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
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THOMAS HILL GREEN.

WORKS

OF

THOMAS HILL GREEN

LATE FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, AND
WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

EDITED BY

R. L. NETTLESHIP

FORMERLY FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

VOL. III

MISCELLANIES AND MEMOIR

WITH A PORTRAIT

SIXTH IMPRESSION

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PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

THE following portions of the contents of this volume have been printed before: 'The Force of Circumstances,' in a publication called 'Undergraduate Papers,' Oxford, 1858; 'The Value and Influence of Works of Fiction,' as a prize essay, Oxford, 1862; 'The Philosophy of Aristotle' and 'Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life,' in the 'North British Review' for September, 1866, and March, 1868; the reviews of E. Caird's 'Philosophy of Kant,' J. Caird's 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,' and J. Watson's 'Kant and his English Critics,' in the 'Academy' for September 22, 1877, July 10, 1880, and September 17 and 24, 1881. The addresses on 'The Witness of God' and 'Faith,' delivered in 1870 and 1877, and originally printed for private circulation, were published in 1884 by Messrs. Longman with an unfinished preface by Arnold Toynbee. The lectures on 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract' and 'The Work to be done by the new Oxford High School,' were published in 1881 and 1882; the first was given at Leicester under the auspices of the Liberal Association, the second at Oxford to the Wesleyan Literary Society; it is dedicated to Mr. Joseph Richardson, head-master of the Wesleyan School, 'in recognition of his great services

to education in Oxford.' The lecture on 'The Grading of Secondary Schools' was delivered to the Birmingham Teachers' Association, and published in 'The Journal of Education,' May, 1877, from which it was reprinted. Of the previously unpublished papers, the essay on 'The Influence of Civilisation on Genius' was probably written in early years at Oxford, and the essay on 'Christian Dogma' was read to the 'Old Mortality Essay Society,' of which Green was elected a member in May, 1858. The lectures on the New Testament were delivered several times while he was a tutor at Balliol; the extracts printed are taken from his notes supplemented by those of A. C. Bradley in the Galatians, R. W. Macan in the Romans, and C. E. Vaughan in the Fourth Gospel; these gentlemen completed their academical courses severally in 1873, 1871, and 1877. The date of the fragment on 'Immortality' is uncertain, as is also that of the unfinished address on 'The word is nigh thee,' but the latter is probably earlier than the other religious addresses. The four lectures on 'The English Revolution' were delivered for the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in January 1867; he did not intend them for publication, but they are printed on the recommendation of competent judges. The two lectures on 'The Elementary School System of England' were delivered at Oxford in the Central school in February, 1878.

The memoir is, from the nature of the case, little more than a record of his opinions; and I have given it, as far as possible, in his own words. The materials were derived from his published writings, his letters, and the recollections of those who knew him. His only continuous correspondence was with his family, between

1850 and 1870, and this his sisters have most kindly placed at my disposal. Neither these nor the other letters to which I had access were of a kind to be printed entire, but they have supplied a great deal of valuable information. For reminiscences and other assistance, I have to thank the following gentlemen: Professor J. Bryce, Mr. R. Buckell, Professor A. V. Dicey, the Rev. C. Evans, Mr. C. A. Fyffe, the Rev. A. Grenfell, Mr. D. Hanbury, the Rev. E. Hatch, Mr. A. G. Liddell, Professor H. Nettleship, Mr. W. L. Newman, Mr. J. Richardson, Professor H. Sidgwick, Sir E. Strachey, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Mr. J. A. Symonds, the Rev. A. R. Vardy. I am also indebted to Mr. C. H. Firth for revising the lectures on 'The English Revolution,' and to Professor E. Caird, Professor A. C. Bradley, and Professor A. Goodwin, for reading the proofs of the memoir and making suggestions. Lastly, I must express my great obligations to Mrs. Green, who has given me the constant benefit of her knowledge and judgment; to her it is largely due if I have succeeded in conveying to the outside world any adequate idea of a life which she alone knew from within.

OXFORD, *August*, 1888.

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MEMOIR.

A MAN who spends most of his life in thinking, speaking, and writing about philosophy and religion, and in quietly promoting the political and social interests of the town in which he lives, is not likely to supply material for a striking biography. His life is his work, and his work is to be found in books and pupils, in institutions which he helped to establish, and in the public spirit which he helped to create. To those who knew him these things speak for themselves, and to those who did not know him they cannot be made eloquent by description. The enthusiasm called forth by his death soon subsides, and the power diffused from his life resumes the quiet channels in which it had hitherto flowed. The object of this short memoir is not to depict an heroic character or an eventful career, nor to popularise or criticise a philosophical system; nor can it offer much matter of general interest drawn from correspondence or personal reminiscences. It seeks merely to record a fact which has never been common and which is especially rare in England, the fact of a life in which philosophy was reconciled with religion on the one side and with politics on the other; the life of a man to whom reason was faith made articulate, and for whom both faith and reason found their highest expression in good citizenship.

Thomas Hill Green was the youngest of four children, two sons and two daughters. He was born April 7, 1836, at Birkin, a village in the West Riding of Yorkshire, of which his father, Valentine Green, was rector. His paternal grandfather was a squire living at Normanton-le-heath in Leicestershire, who married a Miss Mortimer of Caldwell Hall in Derbyshire. An ancestor of this lady, John Mortimer, whose first wife was a granddaughter of Oliver Cromwell, afterwards married a daughter of one of Cromwell's officers, Colonel Sanders, and from her the Greens were descended. Mrs. Valentine Green was the eldest daughter of Edward Thomas Vaughan, vicar of St. Martin and All Saints at Leicester; her mother was a daughter of Daniel Thomas Hill of Aylesbury, whose son, vicar of Chesterfield and afterwards archdeacon of Derby, gave the living of Birkin to Valentine Green.

Mrs. Green died when Thomas was only a year old, and the children were brought up by their father until the boys went to school. Birkin was seven miles from any town, and they seem to have lived very much to themselves, with plenty of open air and freedom, doing not many lessons but doing them well, never questioning and scarcely feeling the authority of their father. He was not a man of whom the world knew much, but he was what few men succeed in being, the best friend of his children. Those who knew him speak of his deep religious feeling unencumbered with dogmatic learning, of his native eloquence, his love for the peasantry, his keen interest in politics, his humorous observation of men; and when further we hear his son in a letter regretting that 'the union of magnanimity, indolence, and a bad digestion' had prevented his father from making the best of himself, we understand how many points of affinity there must have been between the two. Thomas was not at all a precocious boy. He was slow in acquiring knowledge, and learnt by heart with difficulty; but his nurse, Hannah Carr, to whom he owed a great deal, always maintained that he would someday make his mark in the world. The few early letters which remain already show signs of the maturity, circumstantiality, and humorous sarcasm of his later correspondence. Nor does his moral judgment seem to have been less pronounced, for at the age of thirteen he writes of another boy, 'I dislike him very much still; his rudeness, greediness, impudence, and ingratitude are unparalleled.'

In the summer of 1850, when he was fourteen, he went to school at Rugby, then under the head-mastership of E. M. Goulburn. He was placed in the 'first fifth' form, where they were reading Herodotus, Sophocles, and Virgil. In the following summer he went into the 'Twenty,' and at the beginning of 1852 into the sixth form, where he remained for three years and a half. After the first annoyances which were sure to meet a rather odd, shy, and homebred boy, he settled down contentedly enough to his new life. But he never became a thorough schoolboy, either of the athletic or of the intellectual type. He played football indeed regularly, and ran in 'hare and hounds'; but more for the sake of health, or from a sense of duty, or to avoid singularity, than because he liked it. His ability soon made itself felt both by masters and boys, but in the regular work of the school, though he never fell below a fair level, he seldom gained great distinction. This was due to several reasons. In the first place he was always deficient in alertness and versatility, both of mind and body. Many boys who do not grow into intellectual men are stimulated to intellectual efforts at school by the competi-

tive impulse or by the simple pleasure of activity; but he was not appealed to by either of these motives. 'He is slow and easily puzzled'; 'there is a certain inertness about him; he has not much ambition'; 'I fear that he is constitutionally indolent'; such are the judgments of his masters in 1850, 1851, and 1853. He wrote slowly in examinations, was constantly behindhand with his exercises, and had great difficulty in getting up in the morning. But a stronger reason for his apparent want of success was the fact that his heart was not in the subjects in which distinction at school is chiefly won. He had not the interest either in language or in learning which makes a great scholar. He had indeed a genuine literary sense, and his own power of expression was far above the average; but he needed the presence of something great to make him put out his strength. This was strikingly shown on the single occasion (1855) on which, to the wonder of everybody, he gained the prize for Latin prose composition. The passage to be translated was taken from Milton's *Areopagitica*, and under its inspiration he produced a version in which he surpassed himself even more than his competitors. While he was thus indifferent to the study of literary form, except as a vehicle for his own best thought, he was also impatient of research and averse to diffuse reading. The first time that he competed for the Queen's medal he complains that, though the judges liked his essay the best, they gave the prize to another boy 'because his essay showed more labour, i.e. came out of thirteen books instead of his own head.' In the next competition he was successful, contrary to his own expectation, for the subject was one for which he had 'to consult a variety of fusty authorities, which I never can succeed in doing well; I always find that if I cram myself with the ideas of others, my own all vanish.' This love of mental independence remained with him through life, and when towards the end of his school career his father expostulated with him on his 'dilatory habits,' he was able (while fully admitting the charge) to answer with perfect sincerity, 'the reason why most people think me idle is that I cannot think it right to devote myself to the ordinary studies of school and college, which to me at least are of very little profit; and hence the fruits of my labours do not at present appear, but I hope they will do in time.'

There can be little doubt that if, while he was in the sixth form, he had come in contact with a dominating and sympathetic mind, his constitutional inertness would have been to a great extent overcome, and his deeper ambition developed and guided. But this was not the case. Of his house-master C. Evans, and of his two first form-

masters, G. G. Bradley, the present dean of Westminster, and R. L. Cotton, afterwards bishop of Calcutta, he speaks with respect and admiration; but between him and Dr. Goulburn there was little sympathy or mutual appreciation. As regards one point, indeed, the maintenance of discipline, the head-master freely recognised his services, and publicly thanked him for them when he was leaving the school. This is noticeable, because the exercise of authority under difficulties was peculiarly distasteful to him, and cost him a great moral effort. The weakness which in some form or another limits the strength of most strong characters, appeared in him as a tendency to shrink from things involving danger and enterprise. The sense of conflict between what he would have called 'the flesh and the spirit' seemed to be constantly present to him, but he felt 'the flesh' rather as something which tempted him to neglect or shun great opportunities than as a source of passionate impulse to do what he thought wrong. At the same time he showed, especially in youth, a 'certain solid wilfulness, a certain grave rebelliousness' (to use the words of one of his friends), which prompted him to go his own way regardless of conventions and rules. Thus the observance and maintenance of authority was made doubly difficult to him, and the sense of duty which enabled him to overcome this difficulty was always a prominent feature, perhaps the most obviously prominent feature, in his character. This sense of duty, combined with a strong sympathy with the weak and friendless, made him at school a staunch upholder of the monitorial system. Writing from Rugby to his father in 1854, on occasion of a letter from Dr. Vaughan to lord Palmerston on the subject, he says, 'The spirit of the age, raving against everything that sounds like oppression, seems likely to establish a worse tyranny in public schools, as everywhere else; for it is impossible for bullying to be stopped except by præpostors.'

Of the subjects other than school work and discipline which were occupying his mind during these years, there is very little evidence. That he was one of the recognised 'politicians' of the school, and that he was considered (in spite of his own protestations to the contrary) a 'dreadful radical,' we learn from his letters. They also reveal a constitutional antipathy to popery and everything that savoured of it. In 1854 we hear of his reading Maurice's 'Theological essays' and 'Prophets and kings of the Old Testament,' and of the former book he observes that 'its merits, as is usually the case, seem to be in exact counter-proportion to the abuse which has been heaped upon it.' Carlyle and Kingsley were also among his favourite authors. Of the beginnings of his interest in philosophy

only one or two traces remain; he refers himself in 1852 to a 'tough bit of Aristotle' set in an examination, which he was the only one to make out, and a schoolfellow tells of his attempt to impart some 'elementary metaphysical conceptions' in connexion with a bridge on the Newbold road; 'he endeavoured to make me understand that we each of us saw a different bridge.'

These meagre indications are to some extent supplemented by the general reminiscences of his contemporaries. Those who knew him evidently felt that in mind and character he stood outside and above them. 'I can remember,' writes one, 'that from the first I had an impression of him as living a life of his own, apart from the general stream of boy-life. It could not be said that he affected eccentricity or solitude, but he did not throw himself either into work or play with any ordinary boyish eagerness or ambition; so that he was not generally influential, nor exactly popular; and yet it was generally felt that this aloofness, this outside attitude, was not due to any want of energy; and it gave him a peculiar impressiveness to a small number. To me he was mainly impressive through his thoughtfulness and literary interests; the vigour of his interest and the independence of his judgment on subjects outside the range of ordinary school talk. It was largely due to his influence that I went up to Cambridge with aspirations and tendencies towards something other than classical scholarship.' Another writes, 'He was a boy apart, not mixing much in any of the ordinary life of schoolboys. He was not tempted by the common prizes, nor was he concerned with school games or school parties. He comes before my memory first as a good thinker and speaker at the school debating society. I remember the early attraction of his absolute freedom from the party jealousies and boyish forms of pride which were rife enough at Rugby, but of which he was incapable. I remember too the early independence of his mind, which did not run in the ordinary groove of studious boys, led by able tutors. He was a plant growing, not a brick being moulded.' Another friend, now headmaster of a school himself, thus described him in an address to his boys; 'In old days at Rugby we knew that we had a remarkable schoolfellow in the house. Even then he seemed to us boys (as in later days to others) to have some of the character of Cromwell about him, his favourite hero. A sixth fellow, who very seldom seemed to use his power, but yet in whose presence no one in the house would have found it possible to use a bad word or tell a ribald story; a water-drinker in those days, when he was probably the only one of four hundred to be so; never known to say an unkind word

or do an unkind deed to any other boy in the school ; going out even then on Sunday afternoons in the fields by himself, and not ashamed, when he was laughed at about it, to silence us by saying with a smile, that he could worship God best in the green fields by himself.'

With a boy like this it is not surprising that few of his fellows were intimate. He seems to have had only one great friendship at Rugby, and that was broken tragically by the illness, and ultimately the insanity, of his friend. He was not given to talking about his personal sorrows, but the little that he says on this occasion is enough to show how much he felt ; 'It is a great grief to me ; he was the only real friend I ever made at school, and I had always been in the habit of looking forward to our going through life together.' This experience came at the same time with family troubles of which he had to bear the chief burden, and the two together must have deepened his sense, already deep, of the serious side of life. His last year at Rugby he describes as very lonely and wearisome ; most of his acquaintances had left, the few who remained were too young to satisfy him, and the other boys seemed to him 'not only children but disagreeable children.' Yet he did not look forward very hopefully to Oxford, being, as he confesses, 'always inclined to find fault with his future lot.' He had been there in 1854, and formed views of the university which are not usual in a lad of eighteen. 'The insides of the colleges,' he writes, 'are strangely incongruous with the outside. The finest colleges are the most corrupt, the functionaries from the heads to the servants being wholly given to quiet dishonesty, and the undergraduates to sensual idleness.' And again : 'I shall be happy there if I can work hard. But the temptations to idleness seem innumerable. My chief one would be those most luxurious canoes, in which one can paddle for hours under the most delicious shade, without the least exertion, and undisturbed by eights or such abominations.' These apprehensions were not justified by the event ; but his innate dislike of luxury combined with his innate tendency to indolence made him to the end of his life feel strongly, perhaps too strongly, this side of the dangers of Oxford life.

In October, 1855, he entered Balliol college, where rooms had already been offered him after the examination for scholarships. Report had given him a favourable opinion of the college, as regards both cheapness of living and excellence of teaching, and to get a fellowship there was already his 'great hope at Oxford.' At first the hope did not seem likely to be realised. What had happened at school was repeated at the university. He admitted the excellence of the lectures, but classical scholarship had little attraction for him,

and after two years of comparative idleness interrupted by spasmodic efforts he only obtained a second class in 'moderations.' Stung by the sense of failure, and stimulated by his college tutor, Benjamin Jowett, and by Charles Parker, with whom he read privately, he now worked hard for a year and a half, and in the summer of 1859 gained a first class in the school of *literæ humaniores*, impressing the examiners as the ablest among several able candidates. He then read hurriedly for six months for the school of law and modern history, and though he only got a third class, added considerably to his knowledge. In 1860 he was employed to lecture on ancient and modern history at Balliol, and in November of that year he achieved his youthful ambition by being elected a fellow of the college.

The view which he himself took of his career at Oxford appears from two letters to his father, the first telling of his first class, the second of his fellowship. 'The chief pleasure I derive from my success lies in being able to tell you of it, and I am truly thankful for having been enabled to redeem to some extent the wasted years of my past life.' 'When I look back on my past career it seems to me that my improvement is mainly due to the society of the senior friends with whom it has been my happiness to fall in, viz. Jowett, Conington, and C. Parker. But for their constantly stirring me up, I should have sunk into permanent lethargy.' These self-accusations were perhaps only half deserved, but the sense of what he owed to his friends was none the less genuine; as he once said of himself in Johnson's words, 'the goodwill of my fellow-men is inexpressibly dear to me.' Of the three men mentioned here, Jowett was the one to whom he owed the greatest and most lasting debt. In his first term he wrote, 'my tutor is most kind to me, and I like him exceedingly. I breakfast with him occasionally, when he talks to me freely, and not the commonplaces which such men generally do to their pupils.' Experience confirmed and deepened these first impressions. Three years and a half later he says, 'the more I see of him the more I am convinced of his remarkable goodness and genius'; and this conviction he retained to the end of his life. In the period between 1860 and 1866, when the connexion between them became closer, Jowett's advice was probably the strongest among the various influences which determined his career; and in later years nothing cost him so much effort or such searchings of heart as the rare occasions on which he was obliged to disagree with his former tutor. His friendship with John Conington, the professor of Latin, was one in which the disparity of age was partly equalised by the unusual strength and maturity of the younger man. Conington

made a point of cultivating the acquaintance of remarkable undergraduates, and lived largely on their sympathy and society. In spite of many divergences in studies and interests, there was, says Green, 'a wonderful compatibility between us.' 'What was common to them,' writes one who was the friend of both, 'was a certain nobility of mental attitude, a great seriousness and love for the profounder aspects of things, and all the deep sympathies of the religious temperament.' It was with Conington that he spent parts of his first four long vacations, at Keswick, Freshwater, Instow, and Whitby successively; and those who know Oxford life know how integral a part of it is the long vacation 'reading-party,' in which books and lectures are digested and discussed, friendships are formed and cemented, and body and mind expand in beautiful scenery and congenial society. The country was to Green a source of many-sided enjoyment. Walking was his favourite exercise, and though he was not an adventurous mountaineer, nothing heightened his vitality so surely as mountain air. His topographical sense moreover was unusually strong; one of his first steps in a new place was to master its geography, and he took as much pleasure in finding a good route as other people do in finding a cheap one. A deeper source of enjoyment lay in his love of country people. He seemed to feel himself at home with them at once, and seized without effort the political and economical features of their life. 'What he most enjoyed in scenery,' says a friend who travelled much with him, 'was an upland prospect with some breadth of cultivated land. Those who have ever heard it will remember the peculiar smack of his utterance of the word *tilth*.' It was this interest in the country as the meeting-point of man with nature that specially attracted him to Wordsworth, and made him speak of the *Ode to duty* as 'the high-water-mark of modern poetry.' Nature appealed to his imagination, not, as it has done to some men, as a miracle of form and colour inviting and defying reproduction, nor, as it has done to others, as an elemental force in whose presence man finds peace by escaping from himself, but rather as the sympathetic background to human life and the kindred revelation of a divine intelligence.

While he was thus receiving influence from his elders, he was making himself felt by his fellow-students, some of whom have recorded their impressions of him. 'His appearance was striking in those days, and made him a familiar figure even to those who did not know him personally. Thick black hair, dark eyebrows, eyes of rich brown with a peculiarly stedfast look, were the features which first struck one; and with these there was a remarkable seriousness

of expression, an air of solidity and quiet strength. He knew comparatively few people, and of these only a very few intimately, having no taste for those sports in which university acquaintances are most frequently made, and seldom appearing at breakfasts or wine-parties. This caused him to pass for unsocial; and I remember having felt a slight sense of awe or alarm, the first time I found myself seated beside him. But as one came to know him better, one quickly perceived that under his reserve there lay not only a great capacity for affection,—no man was more tenacious of his friendships,—but qualities that made him a delightful companion. His tendency to solitude sprang not from pride but from the occupation of his mind by subjects which seldom weigh on men of his age. He had, even when a boy at school, been grappling with the problems of metaphysics and theology: and they had given a tinge of gravity to his manner. The relief to that gravity lay in his humour, which was not only abundant but genial and sympathetic. It used to remind us of Carlyle, but in him it was more kindly, and, above all, more lenient to ordinary people. While averse, perhaps too severely averse, from whatever was luxurious or frivolous in undergraduate life, he had the warmest interest in, and the strongest sympathy for, the humbler classes. No man had a truer love for social equality, or a higher sense of the dignity of simple human nature. He liked to meet farmers and tradespeople on their own level, and knew how to do so without seeming to condescend; the belief in the duty of approaching the people directly and getting them to form and express their own views was at the root of all his political doctrines. Though apt to be silent in general company, no one could be more agreeable when you were alone with him. We used to say of him—and his seniors said the same—that you never talked to him without carrying away something to remember and ponder over. On everything he said or wrote there was stamped the impress of a forcible individuality, a mind that thought for itself, and whose thoughts had the rugged strength of an original character wherein grimness was mingled with humour, and practical shrewdness with a love for abstract speculation. His independence appeared even in the way he pursued his studies. With abilities of the highest order, he cared comparatively little for the distinctions which the university offers; choosing rather to follow out his own line of reading in the way he judged most permanently useful, than to devote himself to the pursuit of honours and prizes.'[1] This was written in 1882, on a retrospect

[1] *Contemporary Review*, May, 1882.

of some twenty years; the following extract from a journal kept by another friend in 1862 gives us a contemporary view. 'Of all my college associates except one, none have a character better worth notice, few a character more difficult to seize, or to describe with truth. Maturity, ripeness, almost over-ripeness, is one of his characteristics. This marks him off from the men of his standing. He is never silly, never flippant. A certain weight hangs on what he says: you may disagree with it, you can never safely put it aside without consideration. A keen sense of humour and a tinge of dreaminess give a peculiar charm to his conversation when he is at his ease and in one of his best moods. A person who had known Clough told me that Green recalled Clough to him, but that Clough was at once more poetical and more indolently dreamy than Green. If this is true, Clough must have been oppressed by a large amount of "schwärmerei," for Green's most patent peculiarity is a special kind of indolence. No man is driven with greater difficulty to work not to his taste. At college simple inactivity cost him a "first" at moderations, an honour which though somewhat esteemed is constantly obtained by men of no ability and of infinitely slight acquirements. He wrote some of the best college essays: he never sent them in on the right day, and might generally be seen on the Monday pondering over essays which everyone else had sent in on the Friday night. As a set-off, his writings were well expressed and worth perusal, while the mass of writings composed or scribbled off between eleven on Friday night and one on Saturday could not be read, even by their authors, without some shame and disgust. Whether indeed Green's indolence could be separated from his maturity, is to me doubtful. They are both the two sides of the same disposition. His political views have always made a link between us. He is a philosophic radical, but of a very peculiar kind. Almost all his definite opinions might be endorsed by Bright or Cobden, but neither Bright nor Cobden could understand the process by which Green's opinions are obtained, nor the arguments by which they are defended. An idealist in philosophy, he argues for the most utilitarian of political schools on idealist principles; and attaching the greatest importance to national life, constantly expresses a contempt for so-called "national honour" and imperial greatness which might perhaps offend the nationalism of even Mr. Cobden. At the time when Mr. Bright had offended England by his "Perish Savoy," Green read a most able essay on "National life." One sentence still remains in my recollection, "Let the flag of England be dragged through the dirt rather than sixpence be added to the taxes which weigh on

the poor." This sentence contains a partial explanation at least of the apparent contradictions contained in his political ideas. The noblest feature in his character is a serious sympathy with the wrongs and sufferings of the poor. All those social facts, such as the suffering caused by taxation, the necessity of peace to ensure even a possibility of prosperity for the labouring classes, which rarely occur to the recollection, and never trouble the enjoyments, of university men, are, I truly believe, constantly present to his mind. Hence a contempt, more excusable and natural than philosophic, for those theories of national honour and greatness which are, it is true, only the expression of political vanity, and always tend to postpone social reforms to considerations of dignity and reputation. Green occasionally expressed his opinions to the Oxford Union. His two or three speeches, though badly delivered, were the most remarkable I heard during my residence at Oxford. Anyone who knows the Union will not need to be told that a society which would applaud claptrap, personalities, flippancy, and impertinence to the echo, would hardly give a hearing to Green. He was the most unpopular of speakers. Nor indeed, though much esteemed by a few friends, and much respected by everyone, is he generally popular. His indolence makes him neglect all care in cultivating or preserving friendships. Unsusceptible himself, he pays little heed to other persons' minor susceptibilities, and by some strange perversity of nature says things which at once hurt and amuse his friends. Thus, when I was greatly delighted by a university success, he told me that my pleasure would not last, and at a time when I was extremely anxious about the schools, informed me that men who (like myself) took part in the Union debates, rarely got firsts. A want of power to fling himself into the feeling of the moment, to "enter into things," and something which I must call a deficiency in romance, are to my mind the source of all that can be said against his agreeableness. And when all his social defects are reckoned up, he remains to me one of the most agreeable, as well as one of the most estimable, of my friends. He is one of the few men of my own age of whom I can truly say that his example has tended to keep up one's moral tone. When anyone remembers the flippant frivolity of the tone often prevalent at Oxford, it is impossible not to admire a man whose serious thoughtfulness tended to make his associates think seriously.'

The essay on 'National life' here referred to was written for an essay society called the 'Old Mortality,' to which many of the abler Oxford men of that time belonged. The essay itself is not preserved, nor is another written in 1858 on 'Political idealism,' which seems to

have made a great impression on those who heard it. In the minutes of the society it is described as 'designed to oppose views prevalent in the present day regarding the influence of general laws on national and social development. The writer asserted that human society could not be looked upon as a mere machine, and that the results of such doctrines were highly pernicious, as destroying individual effort, and preventing men of ability and virtue from engaging in politics. The opinions now in vogue were contrasted with those that prevailed two hundred years ago, representative passages being read from Milton and Buckle respectively. The essayist concluded by pleading for the recognition of a nation's moral responsibilities, and showed how infinitely important it was that lofty ideas on the duties of the individual to the state should be more widely diffused.' Of the essays, also referred to above, which he wrote as an undergraduate for the college authorities, a good many still exist, and an extract from one of them upon 'Loyalty' will serve at once to illustrate his maturity of thought and expression, and to show how early he had formed his characteristic views of political society. 'In no depth of their debasement have men consented to confine the range of the mind within the limits of the fleshly tabernacle, which is the seat of its imprisonment. The tendency to form societies, and the reverence for supernatural beings, which even in the darkest days have never been obliterated, are evidences that men were dimly conscious, at once, that their minds were not isolated mechanisms, but pervaded with a life properly the same in every part, and that this life in its turn had its foundations in the life of a higher being. It is in these instincts that loyalty has its origin, but before they attain to so high a manifestation, they display their power in several lower forms of the same principle. As the earliest and rudest of these we may perhaps reckon the love of home, which we find in Homer as a leading characteristic of the early Greeks, and which we still attribute to Indians and savage tribes. For this love of home was a great deal more than a phrenological organ of habitativeness. It could never have bound men together as it did, had it not been closely connected with reverence for the local or domestic shrine of God,—"the God that maketh men to be of one mind in an house,"—as displayed in their clinging to a common hearth. A higher manifestation of the same feeling may be found in chivalry and the feudal system, for the supposition of divine right in the king or chieftain shows that it had other than earthly sanctions, and the acknowledgment of reciprocal obligations between chieftain and retainer betokens the sense of our common life. I call it a higher manifes-

tation than the love of home, for ideally it requires obedience to a truly superior will, and embodies a reverence for plighted faith. But actually a superior will was generally confounded with a greater power of violence, and faith was often plighted for an evil end, and the reverence for it was blind and fitful. Chivalry therefore required to be superseded by loyalty, which demands the same reverence and obedience regulated and controlled by being directed towards a settled law, a law which at once proceeds from and has for its object the common nature of man, and is therefore endowed with the authority of the creator of that nature. . . The truly loyal man is not he who shouts for king and constitution, or who yields a blind obedience to the routine of existing institutions, but he who looks beyond these to the universal law of the common reason of man, and in reverence for this yields a willing and hearty obedience to the rules in which it embodies itself for the establishment of right dealing in society, rules which, except so far as they have been distorted by violence, have only varied to adapt themselves to the varying affairs of men. And if loyalty is the natural enemy of tyranny, as that which ignores the law founded in the reason of which all are partakers, so is it no less opposed to a selfish seeking for individual gain. Recognising the duty owed by all to the supreme power and common good of the state, the loyal man is bound to his fellow-citizens in the unity of a common object, which gives to the private pursuits of his daily life their value and spiritual meaning.'

A few of his opinions as an undergraduate on contemporary politics can be gathered from the letters to his father and sisters. His antipathy to Louis Napoleon, whom he regarded as no better than a 'successful brigand,' comes out strongly on occasion of the attempt of Orsini and the proposed Conspiracy bill. 'I see bishop Spencer has been preparing a form of thanksgiving for the preservation of the imperial life, in which the flunkeyism of English residents at Paris is skilfully compounded with religious phrases, the result being, to anyone who looks at the facts, blasphemy.' 'I was quite off my head with joy when I heard that Palmerston had been defeated. Indeed the prospect of the Conspiracy bill being carried had weighed so on my mind, that I almost forgot to eat my bread. If it had been carried, Belgium and Geneva and Sardinia would scarcely have been able to hold up a hand for freedom any longer.' His previous suspicions of lord Palmerston were turned into decided hostility by his action on this occasion, and on his death in 1865 he writes, 'I cannot pretend to be sorry, being persuaded that he did about as much harm as it is possible for an individual Englishman

to do nowadays.' But he distinguished strongly the anti Napoleonic from the anti-Gallican feeling, of which the *Times* was making itself the exponent, and he did not share in the sympathy felt at Oxford for Montalembert on his conviction for the pamphlet *Un dêbat sur l'Inde*. It was partly no doubt as a symptom of warlike feeling that he disliked the formation of the volunteer rifle corps, but also because he regarded it as hostile to the people. 'Fools talk at Oxford of its being desirable, in order that the gentry may keep down the chartists in the possible contingency of a rising. I should like to learn the use of the arm that I might be able to desert to the people, if it came to such a pass. After all we do not know what may arise from the hunger produced by a European war.' Of the war of 1859 he was an almost impartial spectator. He had already prophesied in 1856 that the conflicting interests of France and Austria in Italy, 'being the interests of rogues, must cause a quarrel, with the discontent of the people to embitter it,' and when the struggle came his chief hope was that 'it will at least teach Englishmen not to put their trust in despots, but in free national governments.'

His admiration for John Bright was fully grown in 1858, when he brought forward a motion eulogistic of him at the Oxford Union. 'It was frantically opposed, and after two days' discussion I found myself in a minority of two. I am almost ashamed to belong to a university which is in such a state of darkness.' The speeches of Bright to which he alludes with special enthusiasm are that on India in the House of Commons, June 24, 1858, those on reform and foreign policy, at Birmingham, October 27 and 29 of the same year, and at Rochdale, January 28, 1859, and that on the national defences in the House of Commons, August 3, 1860; the last he describes as 'that of a sober man among drunkards.' Many things combined to make Bright a statesman after his own heart; his belief in the moral responsibility of nations, his love of the people, his unclerical piety, the noble simplicity and restrained passion of his eloquence. In 1864 he had the pleasure of meeting him at Oxford, and writes, 'I can best describe him as a great "brick." He is simple as a boy, full of fun, with a very pleasant flow of conversation and lots of good stories. He does not seem to mind what he says to anybody, but though he is sufficiently brusque, his good humour saves him from ever seeming rude. There is nothing declamatory or pretentious about his talk; indeed, though very pleasant, it would not be particularly striking but for the strong feeling which it sometimes shows.'

Enough has been said to show the main bent of his political interests at this time. We have seen how one of his contemporaries

called him a 'philosophic radical'; it would be equally true to say that he was 'a religious radical.' He was 'philosophic,' in so far as he had already a coherent theory of life, and instinctively regarded new facts and events in the light of that theory; he was 'religious,' in so far as his theory required for its coherence the conception of a spirit which is revealed in nature and man, but is not contained in either; he was a 'radical,' in so far as he believed that participation in a common rational nature conferred on every man the right of free development and imposed on every man the duty of furthering that development in himself and others. And while he sometimes gave the impression of being divided between the interests of politics, theology, and philosophy, this division is not one which in his own heart he would have recognised or admitted. He could not indeed live at once the life of a member of parliament, of a minister of religion, and of a student of philosophy; and as each of these lives had a certain attraction for him, he was not free (though more free than most men) from distraction. But into whatever mould he had been by circumstances eventually cast, he would have left nothing of himself outside it; and it was this solidarity in his interests which gave its peculiar force to what he said and did. It was because he saw in history the self-development of an eternal spirit, because he regarded religion as the highest form of citizenship, because he believed reason to be at once the most human and the most divine thing in man, that he could be comprehensive without vagueness, elevated without loss of geniality, reverent without superstition. It is therefore worth while to see what religious and philosophical views he had formed in these early years at Oxford, and in what connexion they stood with his views on politics.

The writers from whom he seems at this time to have assimilated the most were Wordsworth, Carlyle, Maurice, and probably Fichte in his lectures on the 'nature' and 'vocation' of 'the scholar' and of 'man.' In them he found the congenial idea of a divine life or spirit pervading the world, making nature intelligible, giving unity to history, embodying itself in states and churches, and inspiring individual men of genius. A few quotations from the published papers on *The force of circumstances* and *The influence of civilisation on genius*, and from some unpublished essays, will illustrate his various applications of this idea. The keynote of much of his later writing is found in a passage already quoted, where he speaks of the 'tendency to form societies and the reverence for supernatural beings' as the twofold evidence of the higher nature of man, and the twofold source of loyalty. He there regards the impulse which has pro-

duced and maintained (however imperfectly) family life, the system of chivalry, and the free constitutions of modern Europe, as the same in kind with that which has produced and maintained true religion. Thus the spiritual appears to him as the natural at its highest, and the natural at its highest as that which carries men beyond the limitations of their bodily organisation into ever-widening circles of community with other men and ultimately with God. It was a partial obedience to this impulse, he thought, which made the political greatness of Greece and Rome. 'The spirit of the family, the unity of the state, were to the Greek and Roman citizen the divine realities by partaking in which he felt himself to be.' With christianity the impulse was carried to a higher power; 'the feelings with which the ancients regarded their political constitutions are now almost entirely transferred to the law of the church, whether that law be found in the bible, in councils, or in popes'; but the christian conception of the church added to the ancient conception of the state the thought of 'an ever-present spirit of life,' 'which does not operate here and there only, but wherever it will.' The good citizen of antiquity was naturally a 'conservative'; to him 'a change in the laws was rather profane than impolitic,' for 'the only divinity which hedged the state or elevated and protected individual life, was a divinity of the past, the divine or heroic act by which the city was founded and the laws framed; and which was perpetuated in the chain of constitutional usage.' But in a modern christian, who can 'believe in the immanence of a divine life in the church,' such 'reverence for the past and aversion to all that is new and untried' implies 'a distrust in humanity.' The true 'church,' then, as is here suggested, is that all-embracing spiritual life of which both civil and ecclesiastical institutions ought to be the vehicles, but which 'at times quits the shelter of positive laws, and takes up its abode in the conscience of individuals.' It is at such times that 'faith' or 'belief in the unseen,' so far from inculcating submission to established authority, becomes 'the source of that appeal to an inward witness by which individuals have at all times justified their rebellion against the church.'[1]

The same 'ever present spirit of life,' which to the individual soul is both the justification of loyalty and the spring of progress, is also the ground of its immortality. The growth of the conception of a life beyond the bodily life is parallel to that of the conception of the human self and of human society. 'Our view of the future world

[1] From college essays on 'Authority and private judgment' and 'Conservatism,' and an essay written for the Ellerton theological prize in 1860. He wrote twice for this prize, both times unsuccessfully.

and the present are so closely connected that no shadow can pass over the one which does not extend itself to the other.' Thus 'among a people who have no sense of a law superior to their own wilfulness' there can be no conception of 'permanent being or of absolute will, and one or other of these conceptions is the necessary condition of a belief in immortality.' The influence of the ties of the family, clan, or state, the desire to live in the memory of future ages, the sense of obligation and affection to the dead, are all proofs of the power of men to free themselves from the bonds of nature and animality, and to assert in fact if not in theory their participation in a larger life. In the Jews the idea of an eternal being who creates, befriends, and judges man, gradually working itself free from sensuous imagery, local associations, and national prejudice, led the way to 'that divinisation of the whole human nature, through the taking of the manhood into God, which is indeed eternal life.' For 'eternal life is not presented to the christian as an ultimate reward, but as a present reality. It is the heritage which he already enjoys as fellow-heir with Christ. "He that believeth on me," says our Lord, "hath eternal life." By thus believing he eats Christ's flesh and drinks his blood, he dwells in Christ and Christ in him. In Christ he becomes one with God, he partakes of the divine nature, and even in the flesh lives an eternal life by the faith of the Son of God.' But while life and immortality were thus for the first time brought to light by the life and death of Christ, they will not be 'fully shown forth in his children, till the entire human personality, body as well as spirit, affection as well as reason, sensation as well as thought, is brought into the divine unity.'[1]

In the paper on *The force of circumstances*[2] the relation of the divine spirit to the human individual is more particularly developed. The 'environment' or 'system' of which each man may be regarded as the centre, is not 'the outcome of the workings of the human mind,' nor on the other hand is the human mind its creature or slave. If rightly regarded, it manifests to us in various ways 'the spirit in whom we live and move and have our being'; through what we call the 'external world,' the divine mind, in whose likeness we are, is continually communicated to us, and in this communication we find ourselves and attain freedom. This is true whether by the 'external world' we understand physical nature, or that connected web of events of which the deeds of ourselves and our forefathers have made us an inextricable part. In the former case it is by the discovery of laws, which the human mind does not

[1] Ellerton Essay, 1860. [2] Below, p. 3.

make but which, when discovered, 'commend themselves to it as its proper inmates,' that it escapes from bondage to nature. In the latter case an analogous identification of himself with the law revealed in his surroundings enables a man to bring good out of evil; he becomes free, not by flying from the inevitable nor by blindly acquiescing in it, but by recognising in his very weakness and dependence the call of a being 'whose service is perfect freedom.' Thus man's liberty is proportionate to his originality; to the 'highest creative energy,' such as the faith of a martyr, all circumstances alike are a malleable material; to lesser men circumstances are divided into favourable or unfavourable according as they evoke or repress their limited capabilities; while to the great masses of mankind the national institutions which they inherit and which are the most important of their 'circumstances,' have practically the influence of an uncontrollable destiny, except so far as through them 'the spiritual energy of the liberated few introduces an element of good into the force to which the many are subject.'

It is these 'liberated few' who are called 'men of genius,' and in the paper on *The influence of civilisation on genius*[1] the limitations are considered which the special circumstances of 'civilisation' impose upon even the greatest men of the modern world. The point of departure is the same as before; it is assumed that there is a 'divine idea of the world,' which is 'manifested in every created thing, under certain limitations from which it is evermore working itself free; the mind of man is the only manifestation which can enjoy the consciousness of its perfect original; it alone can win its way to harmonious communion with the idea, and apprehend that living will, on which "its dark foundations rest."' Such an apprehension 'in its highest and most general form' is declared to be 'the property of all the truly good; "by faith they understand that the things which are seen were not made by things which do appear"; conscious that God has a purpose in their life, and in remembrance of their home in him, they travel through this mortal life as citizens of a better land, and look on nature with other than human eyes.' This moral insight seems to be the same thing as what in the paper on *Force of circumstances* was called 'faith,' or 'the highest creative energy which deals with circumstances as it will'; from it the apprehension of the divine idea through the intellectual faculties is distinguished as 'genius' in the more specific sense of the word. The leading idea of the essay is that the unifying impulse, which is of the essence of such genius, is variously

[1] Below, p. 11.

thwarted by 'the burden of divided knowledge' which modern civilisation imposes upon it; and it is characteristic that religion and politics are specially selected to illustrate this division. 'It is natural that the evil should be most noticeable in that "scientia scientiarum" in which genius ought to find the most direct approach to that home where alone it can rest. When our theological distinctions (or rather confusions) of justification and sanctification, of imputed and inherent righteousness, of actual and original sin, are no longer considered as so many metaphors, or logical forms, accommodated to the weakness of human thought, but have intruded themselves on the unity of divine truth, it is no wonder that genius should be excluded from the contemplation of the simplest and most sacred grandeur.' And again, 'the progressive apprehension of the divine idea must be closely connected with the hope of its fuller manifestation, and to one who is full of sympathy with his fellow-men, the most welcome manifestation would be in the political life of mankind. . . . In the days when, not in fancy but in sober seriousness, Vane built his splendid political theories, and Cromwell seemed about to embody them in act, when even the common people saw the dominion of the saints at hand, Milton might well "see in his mind's eye a noble and puissant nation rousing itself, like a strong man after sleep," and even rise in thought from the perfection of earthly politics to the city of the heavenly host. But it is hard for men who are versed in political theories which have all been found wanting, and whose eyes are dimmed with the dust that rises from the hubbub of modern life, to see the history of mankind "orbing itself to a perfect end."'

The unity of the world is the fact after which all philosophy is feeling. The character and circumstances of each particular thinker determine in what directions he most vividly realises the fact, and in what modes he most naturally expresses it. The strongest elements in Green's nature seem to have been the sense of public duty and the sense of religious dependence, and in the creeds of modern liberalism and modern evangelicalism he found a congenial language, which he had no difficulty in translating when he wished into that of German metaphysic. The passages quoted above indicate the position at which he had arrived at the age of four-and-twenty, and which he never really abandoned. The idea of a free personality, exercising its freedom under conditions which it has itself created, formed the meeting-point for his political and religious aspirations. In the light of this idea he interpreted to himself the problems of history, of morality, of theology. In the

approximation to it he saw political and moral progress, and in the eternal realisation of it the life of God. As he grew older the difficulties of his position made themselves more felt; enthusiastic conviction gave place to polemical justification, and the joy of anticipated attainment to the labour of preparatory detail. The fear of being misunderstood curbed his natural eloquence, and the consciousness of the unity of life receded under the pressure of special problems and the exigencies of exposition. With many of his natural allies, liberal politicians, religious enthusiasts, scientific investigators, he found that he could only go half the way. But under all these modifications the ideal of christian citizenship remained his ideal to the end; and in spite of frequent antagonism to the accredited representatives of physical science, he never relinquished his claim to be at one with the true scientific spirit. While however it was undoubtedly this fundamental unity in his interests which made him the man he was, it would be a mistake to infer from what has been said that now or at any time he was in the habit of talking the language of religion or philosophy in his everyday life. On the contrary, he shrank almost to excess from seeming to be above ordinary people, or to take a high tone on ordinary questions. The impression which he left on outsiders was generally that of a shrewd, practical, and (in no invidious sense) secularly-minded man. The deeper sources of his conduct and opinions showed themselves for the most part in a diffused seriousness and farsightedness, and in an instinctive sympathy or antipathy for certain types of character and modes of speech; it was only in rare expressions, sometimes naive, sometimes humorous, that he betrayed any consciousness of living on a height. And even in intimate conversation it was characteristic of him to express his deeper thoughts with a half apology, and by preference in the borrowed words of some favourite writer.

It is interesting to see how the leading ideas in his mind governed the treatment of an apparently alien material in his last piece of academic work, the essay on novels,[1] which gained the Chancellor's prize in 1862. The essay has also the additional interest of being almost the only record of his views on art and its relation to life. The fundamental conception upon which it is based is one with which we have already met. The world in its truth is a unity, governed by a single law, animated by an undivided life, a whole in every part. But to human apprehension it is fragmentary and mechanical, a chaos of elements of which each is external to the other and all are external to our minds, and in which chance tem-

[1] Below, p. 20.

pered by familiarity seems to be the only law. To exceptional men, or at exceptional crises in life, in the moments of intense insight or emotion which philosophy calls knowledge and religion faith, the weight of custom falls away, the truth breaks through the veil, and the most trivial object or accident comes to reflect in itself the whole system of nature or the whole providence of God. At such moments man realises that in order to live he must die, that in order to be free he must obey, and that only by surrendering his fancied independence can he enter into the divine unity. To this liberation of the self from its own bondage art contributes its share. The poetic genius, like the speculative and the religious, penetrates the monotonous disorder of everyday life, and lays bare 'the impassioned expression' which is there for those who can read it. The dramatist, for instance, with whom the novelist is here compared, shows us some elemental force of humanity, stripped of the accidents of time and place, working itself out in free conflict with other forces, and finally breaking itself against the eternal fact that no man can gain the world without first losing himself. It is this catastrophe which makes the real tragedy of life; it is this which the tragic poet has the eye to see and the words to portray; and in proportion as we can follow him in imagination, we come away from the spectacle with our own hearts broken and purged, but strengthened to face the fact and obey the law. The novelist does with inferior means, and for minds at a lower level, what the dramatist may do for a mind at its highest. He idealises enough to make us feel pleasure or pain, not enough to make us forget ourselves. He excites curiosity or suspense, not awe or hope. If the novel ends well, it flatters our complacency with the feeling that the world as it is is not such a bad place after all; if it ends badly, it strengthens the indolent conviction that aimless misery is the law of the universe. There are however two ways in which novels may be of real service and value. If they cannot teach men how to live, they may, through the wide range of their subjects, enable those who have already found a principle of life to give it a freer application than their limited circumstances would otherwise allow; the 'fictitious experience' may 'give expansion to the personal,' while the personal gives reality to the fictitious, and thus may be mitigated that 'sacrifice of the individual to society' which the modern division of labour tends to bring about. And secondly, by appealing to such various classes and capacities, and exhibiting the identity of human nature under such various circumstances, novels supply a vehicle through which the force of public opinion may work, fusing differences, breaking

down prejudices, and checking the 'despotism of situations.' The essay concludes characteristically with the refusal to believe that democracy is necessarily unpoetic. As 'we hold fast to the faith that the "cultivation of the masses," which has for the present superseded the development of the individual, will in its maturity produce some higher type of individual manhood than any which the old world has known,' so, though in the novel 'the creative faculty has taken a lower form than it held in the epic and the tragedy,' 'we may well believe that this temporary declension is preparatory to some higher development, when the poet shall idealise life without making abstraction of any of its elements, and when the secret of existence, which he now speaks to the inward ear of a few, may be proclaimed on the housetops to the common intelligence of mankind.'

Readers of the essay who are also novel-readers will be inclined to say that the writer was not much in sympathy with his subject; and he himself, on getting the prize, remarks that 'it is curious that I should have been successful in an essay on novels, about which I know and care little, and should have failed in both my efforts in theology, for which I care considerably.' At the same time it is probably true, as he once said, that he had read more novels than his friends gave him credit for, and it is certainly true that what his reading lacked in extent it made up for in intensity. As might be supposed, his taste in fiction was for forcible delineation and robust humour. The flavour of strong, healthy individuality was what attracted him; for rarities, niceties, and abnormalities of mental organisation he cared nothing. He liked things which he could take hold of with his mind, not things which merely gave him sensations, pleasant or painful. Both in his deepest and his lightest moods he was absolutely simple and 'above board,' and this simplicity made him keenly alive to the proximity of the sublime to the ridiculous or the exquisite to the grotesque. Though he had little of the animal in him, and was never troubled by his appetites, he was quite free from prudery. If obscenity moved him at all, it was to frank laughter or to grim contempt; he never dwelt upon it, either in the way of enjoyment or loathing. 'For rules of ascetic discipline,' says a friend, 'he had no need. The view of life suggested by so much of the best French literature, that thinking men are generally in a practical dilemma between the extremes of sensual excess and of spiritual exaltation, did not commend itself to him in the least.' The only forms of art to which he was keenly susceptible were those of oratory and poetry. He had no ear for music,

though he seemed to get a certain exaltation from listening to it. In regard to painting and sculpture he always professed himself incompetent, but he was not without decided tastes. On his first visit to the continent he was more attracted by Rembrandt, Holbein, and Dürer than by the Italians; 'these men,' he said, 'grasped the idea of christianity.' Of Dürer's four saints at Munich he writes, 'I could contemplate them with interest for hours; he has contrived to give St. John an almost perfect expression of "divine philosophy."' In later years when he went to Italy he spent a good deal of time in looking at early Italian pictures, and admitted that they would soon have got a great hold upon him. But on the whole his attitude to the arts (excluding those of language) was one of deferential ignorance. He had not himself any artistic gifts; he did not even write verses. Yet to his friends, as one of them says, 'he never represented the prose of existence. With all his gravity, with all his firm grip on fact and material interests, he had the enthusiastic movement of the world's poetry in him.'

The period which follows the degree and fellowship at the university is often one of some uncertainty and embarrassment to gifted men who are not determined by choice or circumstances to any definite profession. Green had no taste for the bar; his political and religious ideas were neither of a sort which naturally leads to a career; and his interest in speculation was not combined with the impulse to communicate which would have made him eager to teach. Teaching however was the means most ready to his hand for getting a living, and to make himself independent was his strongest immediate motive. Jowett too exerted himself to keep him at Oxford. As soon as he had completed his examinations, and before he had been elected to a fellowship, he was asked to lecture at Balliol college on Greek history for the school of *literæ humaniores* and on English and early European history for the school of law and modern history. 'They are not,' he says, 'the subjects to which I should have wished to devote myself if my own inclination alone were concerned, but I did not hesitate to accept the appointment, for any certain employment is better than any uncertain.' His predecessor in the post was W. L. Newman, 'the best lecturer I ever heard,' and this fact made him even more anxious than he would naturally have been. He seems however to have been very successful, especially with the Greek history, in which he felt a greater interest and for which he had a more intelligent and appreciative audience. Competent judges indeed think that he showed

no less faculty for history than for philosophy; but there can be no doubt to which his own inclination led him. In October, 1861, Newman came back to the college, and except as his occasional substitute Green gave up lecturing on history. In the summer of 1861 he took some of Jowett's lectures, among others one on the Greek Testament; at the end of the year he was 'busy with Aristotle and kindred subjects,' and in October, 1863, he was lecturing on the *Ethics*, and finding it 'uphill work trying to expound Aristotle to men who are only just through "moderations," and void of the least tincture of philosophy.' Meantime he was supplementing this somewhat irregular work for the college by taking private pupils, at first in modern history and philosophy, then in philosophy alone. His success was not greater than his moderate exertions and interest in the work justified; the number of his pupils varied on the average from four to six, and only once rose to ten.

His letters during these three years show that he was not yet at peace with his surroundings. A constitutional 'tendency to chafe against necessary work,' fits of physical depression, and a sense of unfulfilled aspirations, combined with domestic anxieties to make Oxford distasteful. He fears that he will 'never experience that enjoyment of work of which some people speak so strongly.' His lectures become 'more tedious' as they become 'more easy.' He is 'getting tired of coaching. At first it seemed to do me some good, but now I find that, while it takes up all my time and brings little money, it does nothing to improve the mind. After next term I think I shall give it up, for a time at least, and devote myself for a period to real study, away from Oxford. I daresay I shall never achieve much as a student, but as I don't see my way to the usefulness and satisfaction of other modes of life, the only course left is to study in earnest.' He is urged to be 'more genial and facile with undergraduates,' but he despairs of succeeding, for 'the breed is obnoxious' to him, and he thinks of seeking employment at the Owens college, Manchester, 'hoping to find it a more congenial atmosphere.' A few days after getting his fellowship he is 'beginning to feel a reaction; every success is followed by a certain depression, and a vague anticipation of nemesis.' In the summer of 1862 and the spring of 1863 he complains of sleeplessness, and 'a kind of oppression hangs over' him. In May, 1863, 'though far from depreciating, with the vulgar, a don's life,' yet he thinks it would 'do him good morally to have a break from Oxford for a time,' and is taking steps to obtain a school-inspectorship. A

few days later he was offered, through Sir Alexander Grant, the editorship of the *Times of India*, then being started at Bombay, with a salary of 1,200*l.* a year. 'It would stir me up,' he thinks, 'and give me new experience. I might return to England in three or four years with an amount of money that I could hardly earn in ten years at home, and able to write with authority on an important branch of politics.' But 'strong domestic objections, Jowett's opposition, and fears for health' determined him to decline the offer, though with the feeling that 'it will very likely turn out to be the only chance I shall ever have of saving myself from being a stick for life.' 'Ultimately,' he writes soon after, 'there seem to be three courses open to me; (1) to persevere in Oxford life, after a temporary absence, with a bare possibility of one day getting a professorship, but with more probability of writing a heterodox book and becoming a dissenting preacher; (2) to get on the staff of a daily paper, and make 500*l.* a year by squeezing my brain into five leaders a week; (3) to get an educational appointment of some sort under government. The last course seems to me the most unworthy, the first least so, though it would require much resolution and involve celibacy.'

Such were the alternatives that presented themselves to him in June, 1863. Of that which he calls 'the most unworthy' he had shortly afterwards sufficient experience to convince him that it was unsatisfying. The attractions of the second were largely counterbalanced by the reflection that it 'would involve living in London and hanging about clubs, which of all things I should hate,' and except in an occasional letter to the papers he never sought this outlet for his opinions. The position of a minister of religion offered him a 'stump,' as he liked to call it, of a more congenial kind. But though he confesses once (1861) that 'a modified unitarianism suits me very well,' there is no record of his ever having seriously thought of joining that or any other nonconformist body. Still less was he inclined to follow the advice, given to him as to other earnest young men at the time, to take orders in the established church. The only occasions on which such a step occurred to him as possible were when he paid visits to his uncle, the Rev. David Vaughan, whose character and work he regarded with enthusiastic admiration: but 'as soon,' he says, 'as I get out of the scope of such influence, my repugnance returns.' His repugnance was no doubt partly to accepting formulas which he could not accept without compromising himself or misleading others; but it was still more that of a political and religious republican to the system of social

and ecclesiastical privileges with which he associated the English establishment. He did, after some hesitation, bring himself to sign the thirty-nine articles in order to take the degree of M.A., and he did not sympathise with some of his contemporaries, who at considerable personal sacrifice definitely separated from the church; but his admiration for individual clergymen never quite overcame his antipathy to the anglican hierarchy. Thus in 1863, when there was a prospect that Stanley might be made archbishop of Dublin, he writes, 'I find it impossible to get up much interest in ecclesiastical affairs. The dead may bury their dead. Saving souls is one thing; making a fuss about an institution and a creed quite another.' And when Stanley exchanged the professorship of ecclesiastical history at Oxford for the deanery of Westminster, his comment was, 'He gives up a position in which he was doing great good, and was likely to do more, for one which may do him harm but in which he can scarcely do much good.' Yet, though in his youth he sometimes indulged in sarcasms against dignitaries of the church from which in later years he studiously abstained, we find him also admitting that 'though I admire and agree with the leaders of the unorthodox, I do not like the tone and spirit of their following.' It was this equal dislike of an unspiritual ecclesiasticism on the one side and of a shallow secularism on the other, which made him look coldly on a proposal in 1861 to petition parliament in favour of abolishing clerical subscription; 'there are few men who could say that they desired more religious freedom *as christians*, and to petition for it as a sort of intellectual luxury would be simply to frighten the religious public and make them think that by opening the church door wider they would be letting in general scepticism. The opening of the church as well as of the universities ought to be agitated for politically, as a matter of justice to the poorer classes and dissenters. But as long as the present separation continues between radicals and men of education, I have little hope of this being done. Would that I were less slow of tongue!' It is clear, then, that his refusal to take orders was not due to any intellectual or moral paralysis, such as sometimes besets reflective men at his time of life. As a friend looking back at him says, 'in his religious convictions he was sound and heart-whole: of the *pain* of doubt, so far as I know, he felt very little. He seemed to have no need of any change except such as was naturally brought to him by the course of ordinary criticism; he advanced naturally from one point to another with no loss, by the way, of strength or of necessary equipment. His steadiness of mind was, in so speculative a man, quite remarkable;

he knew nothing of mental cataclysms, and had none of the qualities which make interesting converts.'

Other possible alternatives being excluded, that of teaching and writing remained, and as he came more and more to feel that he had a vocation for these, the dissatisfaction which had been weighing upon him gradually passed away. In March, 1864, he 'feels much less rebelliousness against Oxford work.' In October he 'finds his work here much more agreeable and satisfactory than he has hitherto done.' He had now ten private pupils, whom he took in a class as well as separately: thus he was 'obliged to prepare a regular discourse for them, which is stimulating and results in the accumulation of a good deal of material for a possible book *in futuro*.' The increasing consciousness of having something to say and the power to say it coincided with, and no doubt largely caused, this increased cheerfulness. Already in April, 1862, when his efforts to reclaim his elder brother from drinking had ended unsuccessfully, causing him great depression, he had written, 'as I have failed in the object that lay nearest me, I must be the more zealous about such general good as is to be done here. I want to form some regular plan for writing a book. It is the great thing, failing a profession, for preventing one from wasting time.' A year later he says, 'if I could get up the steam to write something that should be worth reading, I should be at better peace with myself. According to my experience, the only satisfaction to the inward man which lasts longer than a week arises from getting something adequate written.' By the end of 1863 he had begun two pieces of literary work, which, though neither of them was carried to completion, contributed considerably in an indirect way to his mental growth. One was a translation of F. C. Baur's *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, the other was an edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. To Baur he had probably been first introduced through Jowett's edition of Paul's epistles; 'I have found him,' he says, 'nearly the most instructive writer I ever met with.' The fragment of translation which remains,[1] embracing about a third of the first volume, is a masterly performance. His plan was 'to make a tolerably literal translation first, and then, when I have forgotten the German, translate my own translation, so to speak. So long as one has the German before one, it seems impossible to get the proper swing of English writing.' 'Swing' was a favourite word with him to describe the movement of native eloquence, and he would express his

[1] The first part of the book has since been translated in the *Theological Library*, published by Williams and Norgate.

dissatisfaction with much contemporary English poetry by saying, with a characteristic gesture of the hand, 'There is no *swing* in it.' He was himself surprisingly susceptible to the effects of rhythmical and sonorous language; it was a genuine pleasure to him to declaim ballads such as *Kinmont Willie* and *Rosabelle*, and his sympathy with the minds of Milton and Burke was heightened by his enjoyment of their splendid rhetoric. But in his own writing the expansiveness of the rhetorician was fused with and dominated by the coherence of the thinker. 'He had a theory in composing,' says one of his friends, 'that all superfluous words should be extirpated, the fewest and most compressed used: that, if possible, an essay should consist of one indivisible paragraph, the connected expression of a single proposition or a single syllogism.' Hence, while it is true of his style, as another friend says, that 'whenever the subject left the region of bare statement or analysis, there was always an underglow of subdued eloquence,' it was apt to strike less sympathetic readers as merely difficult, laborious, or clumsy. But whatever opinion may be formed of it, it had the essential quality without which nothing deserves the name of style; it was the man himself in words. Of all occupations writing was to him at once the hardest and the most absorbing; and because it was so hard and so absorbing, it gathered into itself more of his massive, struggling personality than any other kind of work.

The studies which suggested a translation of Baur's work were condensed into an essay on dogma,[1] which expresses clearly, though in somewhat Germanised phraseology, the speculative basis of his conception of christianity. The object of the essay is to determine the nature of dogma as a specific product and phase of the religious spirit. This it does by tracing the development of the particular dogmas which relate to the personality of Christ. It shows how the consciousness of a God in man has passed from its 'intuitive' form in Jesus of Nazareth, the 'historical' Christ, through various stages, partly of spiritualisation and expansion, partly of confusion and contraction, represented by the epistles of Paul, the fourth gospel, the fathers, the councils, scholastic philosophy, and protestant theology, until it attains the 'ideal' form of the 'philosophical' Christ, the divine unity embodied in nature and humanity. The point upon which the whole argument converges is, that the end of this development is the truth and fulfilment of the beginning. The primitive historical 'fact' does not evaporate in the ultimate 'idea,' nor is the idea a merely glorified reproduction of the fact; the idea

[1] Below, p. 161.

is the fact in its full significance. Jesus of Nazareth was God and man, not because his physical birth and death took place under conditions impossible to the normal human organisation, but on the contrary because, having the normal human organisation in its entirety, he realised in and through it his absolute union with God, and became in actual fact what all men have it in them potentially to become. This divinisation of humanity, this 'incarnation,' took place in him at a certain time and place, under special historical conditions, which the gospel narrative enables us partially, but only partially, to reconstruct. The incarnation is not completed, the truth which Jesus proclaimed is not fully revealed, until the whole of mankind and the whole of nature become a perfect vehicle for the life which lived in him. Such a personality, human and divine, natural and spiritual, the concentrated self-consciousness of all the laws of nature and all the aspirations of mankind, is the 'ideal' Christ, the eternally 'self-objectifying' God. In the gradual education of the human race, in the growing mastery of the 'art of living,' this eternal personality reveals itself in time. It is because Jesus, under limiting conditions, lived a life which is limited by no conditions, and under special circumstances proclaimed a principle which is applicable to all circumstances, that his life and his principle are rightly called 'absolute.' But only in the life of God is their absoluteness an actual fact; to mankind it remains an ideal, an infinite possibility, slowly working itself out in ever-widening circles of human society.

The conception of christianity developed in this essay is only a completer form of what the writer had already indicated elsewhere. The sum of his utterances on the subject is inconsiderable in bulk, but it focussed more intensely than any other both his speculative activity and his moral enthusiasm. The principle which he so early assimilated and on which he was never tired of insisting, that the energy of reason is the ultimate and underivable reality, found here its deepest application. In the living consciousness of union with God he saw the highest effort of human genius; the highest, because it alone has power to transform the whole man, to mould all circumstances, to work through every organ. To such a consciousness there is no 'miracle' and no 'mystery'; it cannot seek to transcend the laws of nature, for it knows them to be its own laws; it need not fear to open its eyes wide to the light, for wherever it looks it knows that it will find the face of a friend.

The preparation for an edition of Aristotle's *Ethics* had no immediate result, though it must have furnished much material for subsequent lectures. He had been occupying himself with Aris-

totle for some time past, and had formed a project for editing the treatise *De Anima*. But the great expectations which he had formed of its value and fruitfulness seem to have been disappointed on a closer acquaintance, and a translation of portions, amounting to somewhat more than half the work, was all that he accomplished. The edition of the *Ethics* was undertaken in conjunction with Edward Caird; it was originally intended to be one of a series of books published by the University Press for use in the university examinations, but this arrangement fell through, and ultimately the work was abandoned. The publication in 1866 of an edition of the same book by Sir Alexander Grant was the occasion of his writing an article in the *North British Review* on the philosophy of Aristotle.[1] In this article he applies certain principles, arrived at by a study of Kant and Hegel, to the twofold task of recovering the truth, and pointing out the error, which he conceived to lie in Aristotle's metaphysical principles. He maintains that 'we may distinguish two really inconsistent theories of knowledge running through Greek philosophy, each of which arrives at its most complete formulation in Aristotle, though in him they are still so blended as to present constant contradictions throughout his writings.' The root of this inconsistency is found in the fact that he was not thoroughgoing with his 'idealism,' but allowed his conception of reality as the work of intelligence to be crossed by a 'dualism' which leaves something real and yet unintelligible. Hence the want of adjustment both between his logic and his metaphysic and between different parts of the metaphysic itself, the effect of which is that the logic lived but did not develop, while the deepest ideas of the metaphysic remained mere suggestions. Some students of Aristotle will probably think that the flaws thus criticised arise, not from confusion or weakness of thought, but from the want of system either in the original exposition or in the form in which his works have survived. They will prefer to regard his glaringly inconsistent statements rather as rough-hewn stones awaiting an architect, than as irreconcilable pieces of an ostensibly finished structure. From a biographical point of view the most interesting passages in the essay are those in which the personal convictions of the writer come to the surface. The conceptions of a 'distinguishing and unifying self' which 'makes the sensitive organs its vehicle,' and of 'the elements of the intelligible world' as being 'determinations of a creative spirit, which reflects itself in things,' have already been made familiar to us. In the reference to God as 'realising himself in the particularities of nature

[1] Below, p. 46.

and man's moral life'; in the description of man as ready 'to draw up ideal truth from the deep or bring it down from heaven,' but unable to 'believe that it is within and around him'; and in the parallel drawn between 'sin' as the substitution of the finite for the infinite self and 'intellectual error' as the taking a partially known for a wholly known object, we see how the principles which guided him in the essays on novels and on dogma followed him into metaphysic.

In 1864 the chair of moral philosophy in the university of St. Andrews became vacant by the death of J. F. Ferrier, and Green determined to compete for it. In writing to his father, whom he expected to look unfavourably on the step, he says, 'knowing my own aspirations and capacities, I feel pretty sure that it would be good for me to get it. I feel that, if I have a vocation, it lies in the professorial line, and in the special professorial line which this appointment would open to me.' The process of candidature half amused and half annoyed him; 'I find that in order to give oneself a fair chance, all sorts of private agencies have to be set to work. These appointments seem to be regarded with great interest in Scotland, and to be matters of discussion among the "educated classes." The electors are anxious to appoint the best man, but are a good deal influenced by public opinion on the subject, and by what they hear from people of consideration. Accordingly one has to get favourable reports of oneself into circulation, and also to obtain good words from influential people.' Among other things he writes to his sister that 'the St. Andrews professors have been told that, though not a monster in other respects, I carry Comtism and materialism to a degree hitherto unknown at Oxford. Happily you are ignorant about these 'isms, but they are a most unfortunate selection. Some heresies I might justly have been charged with, but against these I have been declaiming in a humble way for the last six years.' He had many friends and supporters in Scotland, and very strong testimonials from the most competent judges in Oxford; but the chair was given, not to Spencer Baynes whom he had considered his most formidable competitor, but to Robert Flint. He was rather downcast at first, but in three days had recovered his spirits, and two months afterwards he could say that he believed himself 'to have done more for his pupils, and got more from them in the way of his own intellectual and pecuniary profit, than in any previous term.'

The long vacations of 1862 and 1863 were partly spent with friends in Switzerland and Germany. The simplicity of life in

these countries had a special charm for him. 'I well remember,' says one of his fellow-travellers, 'the glow with which he greeted Swiss and German peasants, delighting in their homely patriarchal ways, their care for animals, the pious legends carved upon their chalets, the primitive love-making of their young men and maidens.' On his first visit in 1862 to Dresden, where he stayed at the pension Kretschmer, well known to Oxford men, he writes, 'I am very well here, and like the place and the people. Indeed if I had my choice and knew the language, I should be disposed to settle in Germany in preference to England. The social equality, and the apparent absence of vice and distress, relieve one's soul from many burdens, and personally I don't much mind about the stagnation. Some people might be annoyed by the unquestionable and universal ugliness of the women, but to make up for this they seem much more sensible, and more companionable for the men.' In the following year he was at Heidelberg, very apprehensive about the prospects of Germany, where Bismarck's ordinance against the press had 'shorn the liberal papers of leading articles.' Yet he has 'confidence in the future of Prussia, for the soldiers can all read, and the artisans (who are strong at Berlin, though I fear not elsewhere) seem to be free from the worse forms of socialism, and under the guidance of Schulze-Delitsch to be developing schemes of co-operation and self-help.' As to the Polish question, which he finds all-absorbing to the Heidelbergers, he confesses, 'I don't seem to see my way in it one bit, and therefore cannot get up much interest in it. I shall be very sorry if a *furore* is got up in England for Polish independence, which I take to be an impossibility, though the cry for it may be turned to account by France.' On the same grounds he was glad when Garibaldi's visit to England in 1864 came to an end; he 'did not want the English to get excited about the Danish and Polish questions, which they don't understand.' The course which events took in Italy in the autumn of 1860 had made him 'very gloomy'; 'Garibaldi is evidently not strong enough to take at all a high tone, and thus I fear the Mazzinian or federal program, which I have no doubt is really the best, will have to give way, for want of public virtue, to Cavour's. I can't think that a Piedmontese king of all Italy, without federal limitations, would ever be trustworthy, or that Italy can ever be permanently safe with Rome and Venetia in the hands of foreigners. But of course there is no good in attempting plans which there is not enough national spirit to carry out. The southern Italians are clearly a feeble folk.' In February, 1861, he 'delivered a longish

address at the Union in vindication of Mazzini, which was better received than my addresses used generally to be.' But the political event of these years which dwarfed all others in his view was the war of secession in America, in which he fervidly espoused the cause of the northern states. Almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities he writes to his sister, 'I should be sorry to have you believe the nonsense which the *Times* writes about the most important struggle that the world has seen since the French Revolution.' The seizure of the Confederate commissioners on board the 'Trent,' and the possibility of a rupture with the North, caused him the greatest anxiety; 'a war with them would make England a wretched country to live in for the term of our lives at least'; 'I trust a good deal to the religious public to keep us out of war; the leading dissenters I see are preaching peace vigorously.' 'It is a great thing,' as he wrote afterwards in 1865 in connexion with Jamaica and Governor Eyre, 'when the religious public, as seldom happens, really gets stirred up in the right direction.' At the end of 1862 5,000*l.* was raised in Oxford for the relief of the distress caused by the war in Lancashire, and 400*l.* came from Balliol; he speaks of himself as greatly 'refreshed' by the sympathy shown for the North by his brother-fellow Newman, and believes that 'in spite of our toryism here, there are more people sound on that point in Oxford than are to be found among the same number anywhere else in England.' In March, 1863, he is suffering from sleeplessness, perhaps brought on by 'a vehement speech which I made to the Union about American affairs late one evening. It is some satisfaction to know that it was successful, and actually made converts.' Two passages in this speech became memorable among his friends, one of grim humour, the other of fierce invective. The advocates of the South had urged that the Northerners were the aggressors in the war, and that republican institutions were to blame for it. In answer to the first argument he told the story of the rustic who received a ferocious dog on the points of his pitchfork, and, on being remonstrated with for not having used the other end, replied, 'I would have done, if the dog had come at me with the other end.' To the second he retorted, 'It is not a republic that is answerable for this war, but a slave-holding, slave-breeding, and slave-burning oligarchy, on whom the curse of God and humanity rests.' His own view of the situation he found expressed in various utterances of Goldwin Smith with a force and eloquence which he admired and envied. All his instinctive antipathy to war vanished before his conviction of the great issues at stake, and he followed the details

of each campaign with the ardour of a citizen-soldier and the prescience of a strategist. His enthusiasm gives an unwonted glow to his account of a meeting at Oxford with the American general Barlow, who had 'commanded a division in Hancock's corps (the fighting corps), and surprised the Confederate left in the mist of the morning at Spotsylvania Court House, and captured 5,000 men and eighteen guns. He is only twenty-seven, quite beardless, and looks like a grim boy. I hate ornamental officers, but the sight of a man who can command soldiers in a great war for a good cause brings back the sentiment with which I used to read the life of Nelson when I was a boy.' The assassination of Lincoln came on him like a personal shock; 'it is a fitting consummation of the greatest political crime of modern times. I wish I could think that no responsibility for it rested with English talkers and newspaper writers. They have been calling Lincoln "a bloodthirsty tyrant" every day for some years.' The prevailing judgment of educated English opinion upon the American question remained in his mind as the crying proof of its shallowness. 'The fabric of European society,' he wrote in 1868, 'stands apparently square and strong on a basis of decent actual equity, but no adequate rationale of this equity is generally recognised. The hedonism of Hume has been turned into utilitarianism, the jacobinism of Rousseau into a gentle liberalism, but neither *ism* could save the "culture" of England, in the great struggle between wilfulness and social right across the Atlantic, from taking sides with the wilfulness. Whatever might be the case practically, it had not learnt speculatively that freedom means something else than doing what one likes. A philosophy based on feeling was still playing the anarch in its thoughts.'[1]

In English politics at this period he could not find much ground for satisfaction. He rejoiced over the repeal of the paper duty in 1860; 'it is just what is wanted to secure the position of the penny papers and destroy the despotism of the *Times*'; and in the same year he comforts himself with 'the sure prospect of Gladstone's becoming a radical. He, Bright, and Cobden will form a fine triumvirate to lead the people's cause.' But at the end of 1861 he speaks bitterly of 'the temper which makes people rejoice in the "failure of American democracy," and makes them play at soldiers instead of agitating for reform bills.' The occasion of the marriage of the Prince of Wales leads him to reflect 'how much these festivities do to degrade the people. I take it this one royal wedding postpones the chance of real reform a decade or more.' Of Gladstone's de

[1] *Popular philosophy in its relation to life*, below, p. 117.

claration in 1864 in favour of extending the franchise he says, it 'has carried joy to the hearts of all earnest liberals'; but the next year he is afraid that the ministry, though 'the best we have ever had,' is 'too good to last; a government with a conscience in the present state of political lassitude is likely to have a hard time.'

In December, 1864, a royal commission was appointed to enquire into the education given in those schools in England and Wales which were not comprised within the two former commissions of 1858 and 1861, that is, practically, 'the schools attended by the children of such of the gentry, clergy, professional and commercial men as are of limited means, and of farmers and tradesmen.'[1] The commissioners conducted their enquiry partly by examining witnesses, partly by sending circulars of questions to the schools, and partly by appointing assistant commissioners to inspect personally certain representative districts of England and Wales. One of these assistant commissionerships, with a salary of 50*l.* a month and hotel and travelling expenses, was offered to Green, and he accepted it. He was a good deal surprised to learn through Dr. Temple, who was one of the commissioners and obtained the place for him, that his appointment caused some alarm to other members of the commission; they had heard that he was 'an extreme man, an ultra-radical in politics, an ultra-liberal in religious opinion.' 'This' (he says) 'vexed me a good deal when I first heard it. In the first place I am not an "ultra-liberal in religious opinion" in the ordinary sense of the words, and secondly, I have always prided myself on reserve in the expression of my opinions, not with a view to preferment, but from aversion to revolutionary notoriety. That the commissioners should know anything about them shows in what an inquisitorial age we live.' It is hardly necessary to say that if he had any tendencies in him justifying these apprehensions, they were conscientiously repressed during the execution of his office. The selected district which fell to his lot was Warwickshire and Staffordshire; and when subsequently the commissioners resolved to extend the enquiry to all endowed grammar schools in England and Wales, his share of this supplementary work was the counties of Buckingham, Leicester, and Northampton. Altogether he was occupied during the last three quarters of 1865 and from April to June, 1866. In Warwickshire and Staffordshire his instructions were 'to institute a personal inspection of the endowed, proprietary, and private schools for boys and girls; to test the attainments of the scholars by actual examination; to ascertain as far as possible the wishes

[1] *Instructions to assistant commissioners.*

and opinions of the parents respecting the education of their children, and thus to obtain as complete a view as the time admitted of the demand for education in this section of the community, and of the extent to which this demand is supplied.' He further had to make a special report on King Edward's school at Birmingham, one of the eight endowments selected by the commission for their size and importance to serve as examples, whether for imitation or avoidance, to similar schools throughout the country

His general plan of operations was 'to begin by spending an afternoon with the master, making out the general arrangements of the school. Then, having conciliated him as much as possible, and found out what the school-work will be on a given day, I go over again on that day, and spend it in school. Afterwards, if need be, I call on trustees or parents.' His official report was not printed until 1868.[1] The deep interest which he took in the subject, its intrinsic importance, and the fact that blue books are so little generally read, justify the insertion of some extracts.

His first headquarters were at Birmingham, and though at starting he had some difficulties, his friendly reception there answered to the favourable predispositions with which he came to the constituency of John Bright. After a month's experience he writes, 'I hope to get through my present work with decent energy and effort, and it will do me some good no doubt, but I have no real taste for "practical life." I shall go back to Oxford work, let us hope, with more contentment from having tried other work and found it wanting. The worst of my present position is its indefiniteness. I am haunted with a feeling that I ought to be finding something out which I am not finding out. Then there is the knowledge that one must fall foul of certain people. Some people here profess displeasure with the want of publicity in my enquiries, and the other day for the first time in my life I was made the subject of a leading article in a local paper, the drift of which was the unsatisfactory nature of private enquiries. There was nothing to complain of in it, and now I have made friends with most of the newspaper-writers, so that for the future I hope to be let alone. It was rather embarrassing at first to have to poke into back-shops and small manufactories (such as abound here), and explain to parents and old pupils of the school what one was about. Now I don't mind it much.'

It must be remembered that at this time he was, to use his own words,[2] 'looking forward in common with many of those with whom

[1] His general report is in vol. viii. of the *Schools Inquiry Commission*.
[2] *On the grading of secondary schools*, below, p. 337.

he associated at Oxford to a reconstitution, at no very distant time, of the middle and higher education, and, if not to a reconstitution of society through that of education, yet at least to a considerable change in its tone and to the removal of many of its barriers.' The hope of these young reformers was to enable the universities to draw from a new stratum of the population of England, and to put a stop to a state of things in which 'what we call the higher education is in effect only open to those with whom it is a matter of social requirement and expectation.'[1] In the same spirit we have already[2] heard him demanding that the opening of the universities should be 'agitated for politically, as a matter of justice to the poorer classes and dissenters,' and lamenting 'the separation between radicals and men of education' which prevented this from being done. It is not therefore surprising if, in spite of some repugnance to the actual work of inspection and sense of unfitness for it, he applied himself to it with a keenness of interest and a breadth of view which have left their mark upon almost every page of his report. The gross annual income from endowments of the grammar schools of Staffordshire and Warwickshire (not including Birmingham) he found to be nearly 9,500*l*. Of the boys on whose education this sum was expended there were less than a hundred 'who, with any amount of time allowed, and with unlimited use of the dictionary, would make out for themselves with decent correctness an ordinary passage of Cicero or Virgil.' Of these 'not more than thirty could be expected to rise considerably beyond their present standard of attainment; and of these thirty, again, not more than half would be likely to find their way to any university.' About twelve boys were reading mathematics above Euclid and elementary algebra, about ten showed 'an intelligent interest in English literature and a knowledge of history that would be likely to continue with them,' and twenty at most could translate for themselves a passage of ordinary French. In looking for a remedy for this state of things, he came emphatically to the conclusion that it 'is *not* to be found either in a radical change of the subjects of instruction, or in new methods of teaching as distinct from a greater general effectiveness on the part of the teachers. It is most important to notice that the boys in these grammar schools, even the select ninety-seven, have not reached the stage at which the controversy of systems (e.g. between classical and other methods of education, and between the English and continental systems of teaching classics) can rationally be raised. When a boy has got that acquaintance with grammatical forms, without

[1] *Ib.* p. 392. [2] Above, p. xxxvi.

which he cannot speak or write any language, even his own, with more than accidental correctness; when he has learnt to appreciate other distinctions than those which can be directly seen, and smelt, and handled; when he has learnt the difference between the word that first occurs to him and the right word; then a serious question arises as to the parts which the acquisition of positive knowledge and of skill in the use of words should severally fill in his education. The grammar school boy, however, nearly always disposes of the question by leaving school as soon as (often before) he has received the preliminary mental training without which neither real knowledge nor literary skill can be acquired at all.' Thus 'the primary question is, how boys of the sort frequenting the lesser grammar schools can be brought in larger numbers and at an earlier age to the level which is now only attained by the highest class at the best of them, and at which liberal education can first be said properly to begin.' This result is not to be attained by substituting for Latin 'modern' subjects, such as English grammar and literature, history and geography, modern foreign languages, or physical science. 'To that class of parents which forms the main constituency of the grammar schools, the shopkeepers and small manufacturers, the "modern" subjects are matters of equal indifference with the classical. What they want for their sons is an education which will qualify them for business (i.e. which will enable them to read, write, do accounts, and compose an ordinary letter) in the most compendious possible way. . . The great check on aspiration towards the university at present is the prevalent notion that education should be an easy and agreeable process, which will qualify the recipient for making money at fifteen. This notion the adoption of the "modern" system would sanction and enthrone. . . The real difficulties which have to be met on the part of the taught, are an absence of intellectual interest, an incapacity for intellectual effort, and an obtuseness for distinctions of thought. If the proposed "modern" curriculum appealed to the same intellectual interest, it would meet with the same passive resistance as the present; if it did not, to adopt it would be not to overcome existing difficulties, but to acquiesce in them.'

If then we would find the real reasons why the grammar schools are doing so little for liberal education, we must go outside the matter and method of the instruction which they give. And firstly, why do so few promising boys go to them? One reason is to be found in the frequent badness or unsuitableness of their buildings, playgrounds, and situations. Another is the fact that the head-masters, besides often

having other employments than that of teaching, have little motive, pecuniary or other, to push their schools or make them useful to the neighbourhood. They are consequently 'apt needlessly to trample on the notions of education current among the commercial class,' not seeing that, when once they have got hold of a promising boy, they may with a little management teach him almost what they like, provided that they make him a competent writer and reckoner. But the strongest reasons are to be found in the opinions and sentiments of the parents to whom the grammar schools should naturally appeal. First and foremost there is the general preference for large boarding schools, common both to professional and commercial men. This is due partly to the want of leisure, capacity, or interest, which prevents so many men of business from attending personally to the education of their children; partly to the success with which such schools develop the 'conventional character of the English gentleman'; 'they foster an early susceptibility to the club-law of honour; form habits of ready address towards equals and of contempt towards "those that are without;" lead to the concealment, if not to the suppression, of egotism and conceit in ordinary companionship; and by their organisation of games develop a muscular bearing suitable to such a temper.' The smaller grammar schools, again, in attempting to satisfy the special educational requirements both of the professional and the commercial class, generally fail to satisfy either. The lowness of the average intellectual standard of the boys who attend them prevents the master from giving the necessary attention to the few who might go to the universities, while yet he cannot compete with the private 'academies' which can throw their undivided strength into commercial subjects. As a rule the funds are not sufficient to keep up both kinds of education to a good standard; but even where they are, it is scarcely ever possible to adapt the system of teaching to both requirements. If the plan of alternative studies be pursued, and boys are exempted for instance from Greek that they may give more time to modern languages or history, 'it is found, according to the uniform testimony of schoolmasters, that they make hardly any additional progress in the subjects to which extra time is given, while they lose ground both in general intelligence and in habits of application. This is due partly to the intellectual slackness which results from the consciousness of having given up the hardest subjects, but mainly to the fact that the exceptional studies cannot be pursued under adequate supervision from the higher masters.' The plan of having separate departments, as generally worked, is still worse. The separation becomes social, not educa-

tional ; it means 'that those parents who wish their boys merely to learn just enough to act as clerks, or serve in a shop, place them in the commercial department, while those who wish them to learn a little Latin and mathematics, or possibly Greek, place them in the classical, without any reference in either case to the amount of knowledge which a boy possesses on entrance. I never met with a school where a system of transfer from the commercial department to the classical was effectively worked.' Lastly, the farmers have the aversion to grammar schools which is natural to a class who 'make a practice of keeping their sons at home and in ignorance till they are twelve or thirteen, and then want them to learn to write and keep accounts with the least amount of trouble and discipline. On the other hand, the fascinations of the private schoolmaster seem to take a special hold on the mind of the farmer.' The private schoolmaster 'touts for boys as a commercial traveller for orders. If his connexion lies with the farmers, he commonly goes round in a gig on a holiday afternoon, calls at the houses of parents who have sent him boys already, and gets leave to carry off any stray son that he finds hanging about at home, whose clothes are sent after him on the following market-day. He promises to give each boy a "practical education" of the exact kind he wants, makes a great fuss about "individual attention," and has to pay for his professions by submission to irritating interference from the parents, not so much in the way of regulating the boy's studies, for which they are generally too ignorant, as of withdrawing him fitfully from instruction altogether. No one who has observed the difficulties in which the private commercial schoolmaster is placed from inability to hold his own against parents and pupils, can doubt the possible utility of endowments in face of the present standard of intelligence on educational matters among the people on whom such a master depends. But the present effect of the endowment is often to prevent the master from making the grammar school as popular as it might be made without any sacrifice of principle.'

Such are the chief reasons which keep boys away from the grammar schools ; there are others which prevent those who go to them from getting much good from them. The most serious is the want of intellectual stimulus in most of their homes. 'The difference between the educational standard of the professional class generally and the commercial class generally forces itself strongly on any one conversant with provincial life. The explanation of it is to be found in the simple fact that while the education of the commercial man has stopped at the age of fifteen, that of the pro-

fessional man (setting aside the lower stratum of attorneys and apothecaries) was continued from three to eight years longer. The difference in amount of education which this implies between the parents of the two classes, must be conceived of as increasing in geometrical ratio if we are to appreciate the difference of educational impulse which they severally apply to their children. In the one case there are no books (except a few with gilt leaves, only moved to be dusted), no intellectual traditions, small opportunities of study at home. The father probably spends the evening with his friends at some place of social resort; the mother is tired with household cares, and if she had the will, has not often sufficient elementary knowledge to overlook even the studies of a small boy. The entire education of the son, therefore, has to be done in school. He goes there unable to read or speak correctly; as he grows older, he reads nothing for himself to quicken the unconscious perception of analogies on which good scholarship depends; nor does any gentle pedagogue at home supply the absence of the schoolmaster in the evening. There is nothing future to stimulate his intellectual ambition. The possibility of an education at the university never entered the horizon of the family imagination, nor has he ever heard anyone commended for knowledge or literary ability. The son of a professional man, on the other hand, learns his own language, it is to be hoped, in the nursery. He is early accustomed to the sight and use of books. There are those about him at home, who, if they like, can see that he does at home what his master sets him, and as he grows older, familiar example may accustom him to the notion of knowledge as a source of utility and estimation. Such general statements must be taken with due abatement for individual exceptions. They would be accepted by masters of grammar schools with a readiness, which, as these gentlemen are generally dissatisfied with their position, may be thought somewhat deceptive. They are confirmed, however, by my own observation of the general inferiority of the work done by the day-boys of grammar schools at home to that done under the master's eye; by the increasing difficulty of getting lessons learnt at home as the subjects become higher; by the fact that the use of an expression or illustration which would be familiar to boys bred among books or educated people, is often received by a grammar-school class with a stare; by the common inability of the upper boys in these schools to write simple English correctly; and by my general experience (to which there are some noticeable exceptions) that the only boys in them who have attained the elements of scholarship are the few

of professional parentage.' Another reason which lowers the standard of the grammar schools is the elementary ignorance of their lower classes. The education which these are receiving is generally 'the same in kind as that given in the national schools, but under a different name, and (on the whole) to a different grade of boys, while in all other but their highest classes they are giving the same education as the cheap private schools, and to boys in the same rank of life.' Thus, while 'the few boys of promise are kept back by the dead weight of ignorance in the lower classes, and by want of competition when they reach the upper, the mass, owing to the waste of some years, which might have been given to elementary learning before entry to the grammar school, lose all chance of availing themselves of the higher education which the grammar school has to give.' Most of them leave when they have got half-way up the school, and this means that 'when they reach the age at which they are fit for business, they have only learnt to read, write, and do accounts, with enough Latin to make them think it a nuisance.'

'The means of reconciling the opposite wants of classical and commercial education are to be found, I believe, (1), in the exaction of a larger amount of elementary knowledge at entrance to the grammar schools than is now required at the best; (2) in such a postponement of Greek as would render it possible, without trenching on the time given to Latin, to secure that the average boy should be perfect in arithmetic and able to write English correctly by the age of fourteen at latest. . . . The words "arithmetic" and "Latin" should be graven on the heart of every grammar-school master. The one represents the primary condition of popularity with the commercial class; the other the wicket-gate through which must pass every boy, not endowed with special gifts or the subject of some uncovenanted mercies, who is to attain an appreciation of anything high and remote in the intellectual world.' If these principles were acted on, and the money now spent in giving gratuitously an education which could be better provided in elementary schools, were saved for the purposes for which it was intended, it would be possible to establish 'a well-organised system, by which the poorer grammar schools should pass on their best boys with small exhibitions to the richer, and these again should transfer their *élite* with larger exhibitions to the university.' The latter or 'high' schools ought to have two departments, one preparing for the universities, the other devoted mainly to mathematics, physical science, and modern languages. Their existence would 'make it possible to simplify the work of the

smaller grammar schools, and remove the occasion for the mischievous separation into classical and commercial departments. It would be understood that the higher classical education was not to be attempted by the smaller schools; that they were to concentrate attention on English writing, arithmetic, Latin, and Euclid, with French in the higher classes, and that further classical or scientific education would be furnished elsewhere to such as were fit for it. . . . The high school might offer to the smaller schools the stimulus in the way of reward which they now lack, by instituting a severe entrance examination in the subjects which it is thought desirable for the latter to cultivate, and awarding exhibitions tenable at the schools to those who did best in it.'

Such a system 'would at once meet the aspiration of the few and raise that of the many. It would spread its net to catch boys who want a commercial education, and having caught them, while it gave them what they wanted, would, by a process of natural selection, keep for the higher learning all who were fit for it. It would bring every boy of capacity by the age of fourteen or so in contact with the mind of a scholar, and familiarise him with the prospect of an intellectual career. It would find parents amongst the poorer clergy, dissenting ministers, and the better sort of private and government schoolmasters, few in number but the salt of their class, who would be eager to avail themselves of it, and once inaugurated, it would, by its own operation, perpetually augment this class. Not only would it by degrees create a taste for the pursuit of science and literature in our large towns (where there might be plenty of leisure for it if only there were the will); it would constantly be increasing the demand for schoolmasters of high university degree, and thus be giving to the scholastic career more of the material encouragement which it at present lacks. If it is desired fairly to get rid of the notion ingrained in the mind of the commercial class, that high education is the perquisite of the clergy and gentry, this is the way to do it.'

The views here expressed were to a great extent those which the commissioners adopted in their report of 1868,[1] but they were not carried out in the way which Green had hoped for. Eleven years later, in a lecture delivered before the Birmingham Teachers' Association,[2] we find him complaining that the Endowed Schools Act of 1869 had 'made no provision, as the original commission recommended, for the establishment of provincial authorities having power to deal with schools in groups. . . . Without this their plan for grading

[1] *Schools-Inquiry Commission*, vol. i.
[2] *On the grading of secondary schools*, below, p. 388.

schools could not be realised, and the attempt to realise it tended rather to mischief than otherwise. Each school has had to be dealt with by the executive commission separately. Except in one or two cases, there has been no agency which they could bring to bear for establishing any vital connexion between one and another. They have been able to frame schemes making one school first grade, another second grade, another third; but these terms, which represent a valuable reality when the school of lower grade can be made to feed the higher, are apt to imply merely a harassing limitation upon the subjects of instruction, when each school, instead of being one member of an organism, has to act as an independent whole.' Besides this failure on the part of parliament to carry out the recommendation of the commission of enquiry, he also thought that the commission itself had erred in proposing to apply so large a proportion of endowments to the establishment of first-grade boarding schools, of which they contemplated eighty. Considering the educational traditions of the English middle class, and in the absence of provincial authorities who could secure by carefully regulated entrance examinations a real connexion between these first-grade schools and those below them, he could not believe that they would 'do very much towards raising to the higher learning those who do not now come within reach of it. They would be patronised by those parents, a large and growing class, who desire that their sons should have "the advantages of a public school education" at a somewhat cheaper rate than that at which Rugby or Clifton supply them, but who have the vaguest idea of what they mean by these advantages. Drawing on such a class and conducted by men trained in the traditions of such schools, they would continue the old system, well suited to those who go on to the university, and not altogether ill suited to those who without doing so remain at school till past eighteen, while in fact only a very small fraction of their pupils would go to the university, and the majority would leave for offices or counting-houses under seventeen. They will thus for the most part be educating second-grade boys on first-grade principles. The boys in them will only differ in respect of the social aspirations of their parents from those for whom, with a view to their destination and the age at which they leave school, the commissioners recommend the second-grade curriculum.'[1] It was rather to the increase of first-grade day schools in large towns that he looked for the development of higher education in England. 'It is scarcely among the most prosperous of the middle class that the needful sentiment in favour of liberal

[1] *On the grading of secondary schools*, below, p. 400.

education is likely to develop itself most quickly and fruitfully. The attractions of early money-getting are not friendly to it, and where these attractions are strongest, though there may often be a decided wish for the "education of a gentleman," a wish which will find its satisfaction in a more or less costly boarding school, there will be little of the instinct which leads to the prolonged pursuit of literature or science. It will more often be found among those who, while feeling the intellectual stimulus which the life of a large town supplies, find no very tempting openings into the life of prosperous commerce. Among such men there has long been a demand, I believe, for a higher education than under the *régime* of unreformed grammar schools there was much chance of satisfying, and of late years with the growth of libraries and literary institutions in the larger towns it has made rapid progress. The day school must always be much better fitted than the boarding school both to meet and expand it.' [1]

The plan of middle-class education which he proceeds to sketch [2] is substantially that which he had suggested in 1865 in his report on King Edward's schools at Birmingham. When the new scheme for those schools came into operation, he was elected as the teachers' representative on their governing body, and continued until his death to take an active part in their proceedings. 'There were two questions,' the headmaster writes, 'on which he took a decided line and rendered conspicuous service during his too short connexion with the school; these were the grading of the schools of the foundation, and the improvement of the position of the masters and mistresses. It was on the lines laid down in his lecture on the subject of grading that our schools were remodelled under the new scheme which came into force in 1878; but very soon afterwards it became evident that, in consequence of the great improvement in the public elementary schools, there was no longer room for schools of three grades above them, and in 1880–81 a further change was made, by which our lower middle and middle schools were fused into what are now known as the grammar schools of the foundation. In this work Professor Green, Dr. Harper (who represented the university of Oxford on the board), and the Rev. R. W. Dale (the representative of the university of London) took the lead, and it was mainly by their influence and educational experience that it was carried out. They chose the sites of the new schools and marked out the lines on which they were to be constituted. Professor Green did not live to see these schools at work, but their success has fully justified the wisdom

[1] *Ib.* p. 409. [2] *Ib.* p. 411.

of his plans. In the report which he made as assistant commissioner, he had written very strongly of the inadequate remuneration of the assistant masters of the Birmingham schools. Something had already been done to remedy this defect, but it was not till he became a governor that the whole question was fully and fairly dealt with, and the improved position which the staff has since enjoyed is mainly due to his firmness and tact. In this matter also, and indeed in all that concerned the school, Dr. Harper worked with him. Professor Green's influence on the governing body was very remarkable. Some people in Birmingham were at first disposed to regard with suspicion and jealousy the intrusion, as it was deemed, of the representative governors, most of them residents at a distance; but such feelings were soon disarmed by his ready perception of local wants, his unwearied attention to his duties, and, above all, his personal worth and goodness.'

It must strike anyone who reads his lectures on education and his report, that while as a matter of fact his teaching power was almost entirely spent in a university, his strongest sympathies were with the education of the middle classes, whom the universities were only just beginning to touch. An undercurrent of indignant pity for the intellectual condition of these classes pervades his writings. He is oppressed with 'the monotonous level of commercial intelligence,' and with the conviction that 'only by a special grace can anyone bred amid the keen interests, the obvious profits, the quick returns of prosperous commerce, be drawn into the devious and difficult paths which lead to the knowledge that is its own reward.' His heart goes out to 'the men not made to get on, the men whose heart is with their few books, or in the Lord's house, while they are behind the counter or at the clerk's desk'; to 'those who, having the instinct for letters, yet spend their life in teaching arts not "ingenuous" to the children of commerce,' and to 'the preachers who deal with the intellect of men of business at the intervals when it is open to other interests than those of the immediate present.'[1] He laments the absence among the middle classes of any 'clearly formed public opinion on the subject of middle education,' all that exists being 'a vague, though strong, feeling that while dead languages may be fine things for a clergyman or a man who has nothing to do, they are of no use to a man of business, and that to learn them is incompatible with learning what a man of business needs to know.' He points out that if it is suggested to apply charity money to the middle or

[1] Report of *Schools Inquiry Commission*, vol. viii. pp. 153 and 237.

higher education, 'a cry is raised of injustice to the poor. Education is thought to be an affair of classes, and all classes above the poor, it is said, can afford to pay for the teaching suitable to them. It is not yet a recognised idea, that educational endowments can be so worked as in some degree to efface the demarcations of class, to give a freedom of self-elevation in the social scale other than that given by money, and to keep "the career open to the talents." For a single man to be found having views about better education for the middle class, a hundred may be found having views about the education of the poor.'[1] He is constantly protesting against the false or superficial standard of social worth, which makes the discussion of educational questions upon their merits almost impossible in England. 'Such and such a course of study is settled on logical grounds to be the best adapted for boys who are being educated for a certain kind of career in life. It gets the name of being the education of gentlemen, and immediately the schools which give it are crowded with boys not destined for such a career at all; while others, who have more real aspiration for it, are virtually excluded on social grounds. Another course is projected with a view to a career which has to be entered upon earlier than the other, and requiring different qualifications. It gets the name of being less gentlemanlike, is ticketed as "second grade," and a great part of the boys for whom it is best adapted will not use it; while of those to whom, just because they make less social pretension, it is chiefly left, a considerable number could turn the higher course of study to account.'[2] It is to 'common education' that he looks as the 'true social leveller'; the separations of classes, unavoidable in any nation, 'have been fixed and deepened in England by the fact that there has been no fusion of class with class in school or at the universities. "Middle-class education" has come to be understood as the kind of education which, being divorced from the universities, having no stimulus from government inspection, and being generally conducted merely with a view to commercial profit by the principals, is seldom either of a thorough or of an elevating kind. On the other side the term "education of a gentleman," like the term "gentleman" itself, has acquired a meaning unknown in any other countries. The term would be intelligible if it retained the meaning of a man of a certain lineage, or of a man holding a landed estate according to a certain tenure. It would be intelligible again if it meant a man habitually honourable in feeling, conduct, and speech. But with us nowadays it means neither of these things. It seems chiefly to indicate a kind of manner and tone of feeling

[1] *Ib* pp. 232, 233. [2] Below, p. 403.

acquired by those educated at the miscalled "public schools," and borrowed from them with more or less perfectness of imitation by others. I do not depreciate the value of this manner and tone of feeling, but I regret that it should be a mark of social distinction. Whatever is really of value in it should be characteristic of all men of liberal education. A properly organised system of schools would level up without levelling down. It would not make the gentleman any the less of a gentleman in the higher sense of the term, but it would cure him of his unconscious social insolence just as it would cure others of social jealousy.'[1] To promote such a system by the establishment of a high school in his own town was his last public act, and almost his last public utterance was the expression of a hope that the time will come 'when the phrase "education of a gentleman" will have lost its meaning, because the sort of education which alone makes the gentleman in any true sense will be within the reach of all. As it was the aspiration of Moses that all the Lord's people should be prophets, so with all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen.'[2]

The sympathy which he expresses in these passages for the middle classes, both in their starved aspirations and their plethoric contentment, was intimately bound up with a sympathy with the nonconformists, of whom those classes are so largely composed. This sympathy, which was evidently strong in him when he wrote his report on schools,[3] soon found a more favourable opportunity of expression. In the spring of 1866 he was invited to lecture before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution on Cromwell and the English commonwealth. The subject, he says, was 'an old love of mine,' and no one can read the lectures without feeling it. The whole man comes out in them. He is at home in the apparent contradiction between the philosophical mysticism and the practical statesmanship of Vane; he breathes freely on the heights of aristocratic republicanism with Milton; while his sense of the greatness of these men is merged, half gladly and half reluctantly, in his enthusiasm for the larger humanity of Cromwell. The point of view from which he looks at history is essentially that of his early essays. With all his admiration for Carlyle's treatment of the subject, he objects that it gives too little prominence to 'the strength of circumstance, the organic growth of custom and institution, which acts on the individual from

[1] Below, pp. 457–459. [2] *Ib.* pp. 475, 476.
[3] See pp. 172, 173, 236, 237.

without and from within, which at once informs his will and places it in limits against which it breaks itself in vain. In modern life, as Napoleon said to Goethe, political necessity represents the destiny of the ancient drama. The historic hero, strong to make the world new, and exulting in his strength, has his inspiration from a past which he knows not, and is constructing a future which is not that of his own will or imagination.' The tragedy of life lies in 'the conflict between the creative will of man and the hidden wisdom of the world, which seems to thwart it'; and it is this which gives its interest to the history of the Great Rebellion. It was the last act in an inevitable struggle, which first took this specific form in the Reformation, but which is as old as human nature itself, and is renewed on ever wider fields and with ever clearer issues whenever its self-made environment of custom and institutions ceases to satisfy its needs. 'English puritanism originated in the consciousness of a spiritual life which no outward ordinances could adequately express.' But though the ordinance must always be inadequate to the spirit, the spirit cannot be a power in the world except through the ordinance; the two are mutually complementary, not mutually exclusive. In regarding the antithesis between them as absolute, puritanism ignored a law of human life from which it could not escape; by an inherent necessity it came to set up a new authority, calling itself spiritual, but really secular, and from its very 'sincerity and logical completeness' more heavy than that which it displaced. Thus the history of the English commonwealth is the history of the spirit of independency, 'of its inevitable conflict with presbyterianism on the one hand and the wisdom of the world on the other, of its aberrations and perplexities, of its brief triumph and final flight into the wilderness.' This was the spirit whose 'better genius' was represented in Vane, and of which the influence 'more than any other has ennobled the plebeian elements of English life.' It was the spirit which 'anticipates in moments of ecstasy and assurance that which must be to us the ever-retreating end of God's work in the world,' and 'its danger lay in the attempt to construct a religious life, which is nothing without external realisation, on an inward and momentary intuition.' Emerging from the struggle between 'the divine right of a sacerdotal church, applied to strengthen and justify a royal interest, and the divine right of the presbyterian discipline, claiming to be equally absolute over body and soul,' it asserted 'the divine right of individual persuasion, which, while the old recognised rights were in the suspense of conflict, became a might. But this might, though in a revolutionary struggle it could conquer, was unable to

govern. It was a spirit without a body, a force with no lasting means of action on the world around it.' Such organisation and stability as it did attain was due to Cromwell, the one man who 'shared its raptures, its wild energy, its scorn of prescription, and who yet had the practical wisdom, the wider comprehension, of which it was incapable.' But the only society which the pure sectarian enthusiasm could create was one founded 'not on adjustment of interests, but on unity of opinion'; a society which claimed 'not gradually to transmute, but suddenly to suppress, the feeling of the many by the reason of the few,' and which bred in its leaders the 'pride of exclusion' instead of that 'higher pride, which can possess itself in sympathy and comprehension,' and which truly represents 'the divine reason in the world.' The key to Cromwell's conduct as protector is found in his 'anxiety for a settlement which should reconcile the old interests with the new enthusiasm,' and the hopelessness of any such settlement was 'the tragedy of his later life.' Yet the struggle did not end, as it might seem, in a 'simple catastrophe.' 'The fifteen years of vigorous growth which his sword secured for the church of the sectaries, gave it a permanent force which no reaction could suppress, and which has since been the great spring of political life in England.' The enthusiasm of Vane 'died that it might rise again. It was sown in the weakness of feeling, that it might be raised in the intellectual comprehension which is power. "The people of England," he said on the scaffold, "have been long asleep. I doubt they will be hungry when they awake." They have slept, we may say, another two hundred years. If they should yet wake and be hungry, they will find their food in the ideas which, with much blindness and weakness, he vainly offered them, cleared and ripened by a philosophy of which he did not dream.'

In these concluding words the lecturer doubtless alluded to Hegel, of whose philosophy he spoke a year later as 'having for its professed object to find formulæ adequate to the action of reason as exhibited in nature and human society, in art and religion.'[1] They lead by a natural transition to the consideration of his work as a philosophical teacher, upon which he was just entering. In the spring of 1866 he had thoughts of standing for a professorship at the Owens College, Manchester, one of the motives being that it 'might give him openings in practical life, which he would be glad of'; 'but' (he continues) 'there is so much for me to do at Oxford, if I have but health and strength to do it, that I feel it would be almost a

[1] Below, p. 125.

sin to go away. I only wish it were a more healthy place.' In this year he held the office of 'senior dean' at his college, his duties being 'to set and look over the weekly essays, to manage the college examinations, and to overlook the hall and kitchen.' The death in September of James Riddell, 'one of the best men I ever knew,' made a vacancy in the teaching staff, and in the October term he was in full work, adding to his other functions lectures on the New Testament and the *Ethics* of Aristotle. In 1867 he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Waynflete professorship of moral and metaphysical philosophy, and having in the same year given up his intention of standing for a vacant philosophical chair at Edinburgh, he finally settled down to the work which occupied the largest continuous portion of his life, that of a college tutor. Circumstances combined to make his position at first a peculiarly responsible one. The death of Riddell in 1866 has been mentioned; in 1870 Edwin Palmer resigned his tutorship, and in the same year Jowett became master. Thus in the first four years of his connexion with the college the teaching body lost three of its most eminent and devoted members. The tutorial system, indeed, which these men had done so much to create and maintain, had acquired a stability and momentum which gave their successors a comparatively easy task. Yet it is not surprising if a man of anxious temperament, peculiarly sensitive both to the claims of duty and to the annoyances of official position, felt his responsibilities keenly when (as he says in 1870) 'practically the whole subordinate management of the college devolved upon him.' He was then only thirty-four; he was probably the first layman who had held the office of tutor; and while his predecessors had added the traditional distinction and serviceable attainments of classical scholarship to their other qualifications, his chief strength lay in a comparatively new and narrow branch of study, unconnected with much of the ordinary curriculum of the university.

The following remarks from a brother-fellow who was in constant communication with him between 1866 and 1870 will confirm and develop the impressions which have been derived from the reminiscences of earlier years. 'We became companions in the common-room during years of unsurpassed political interest, the years of the war between North and South America, the war between Austria and Prussia, and the movement in England for the extension of the suffrage. There were some keen politicians among those who gathered round the common-room fire in those days, and I remember that Green's knowledge and judgment were both of them excellent.

He had already written, or was then writing, articles for the North British Review, which showed the strength of his philosophical "grip" and his early maturity of view; but all this speculative profundity was compatible in him with the most patient and attentive discharge of small college duties. I remember the thoughtfulness about little things which he would throw into a college matriculation examination. Nothing was forgotten; everything went on without hurry or effort. He did not seem to be on the watch, yet nothing escaped him. I used often to note his quickness of vision; no one was more observant of what went on around him. I think this was partly due to his interest in other people and his wish to be helpful to them. I thought I sometimes noticed in those days, before 1870, a half-suppressed wish, very rarely and slightly indicated, for a position in which the many thoughts that were stirring in him would find fuller utterance; in which action would be more individual and less collective, and in which his relation to others would be of a more spiritual kind than that of a teacher to his pupils. I remember also however other remarks which seemed to show that he saw even then what a field Oxford opens to those who have a faith to communicate. His quiet good judgment and his perception of the right thing to be done made his assistance at college meetings and in the general work of the college most valuable. Few, I think, can have been more successful in avoiding conversational inadvertence, and the saying of things which had better not have been said. Conversation in him was all the more instructive and satisfactory, because he had a gift for saying neither more nor less than he intended to say, and also because his fairness and candour were infectious. His sense of humour was quiet but strong. I should guess that the people who pleased him most were people who had ways of their own. His playfulness came out in his kindly recognition of individuality in his friends. Little traits would linger long in his memory, if they were traits he liked. He had some powers of mimicry, though he very rarely exercised them, and never except in the kindliest way. His habitual dress of black and grey suited him well, and was true to his character. He was drawn to plain people, to people of the middle and lower class rather than of the upper, to the puritans of the past and the nonconformists of the present, to Germans, to all that is sober-suited and steady-going. One judged from his feeling for homely, unadorned, and solid worth what he must feel for things showy, brilliant, and hollow; but he spent few words on what he disliked. His aversion to things came out not in words so much as in a tacit distaste which one was left

to gather from his manner; it was indeed often rather from his silence, or the tone of what he said, than from any definite utterance that one inferred his opinion in conversation. His face expressed much; far more than he trusted his tongue to say; its rapid changes added to the interest of a talk with him; one saw in a moment whether he was with one or not. I have sometimes seen him, when something was said which called for reflection, walk to the common-room fire from his seat in the circle, and after leaning his forehead on the mantelpiece for a moment, make some remark which went to the heart of the matter. Occasionally, though sparingly, his enthusiasm for excellence and nobleness of character would come out. No gifts or talents would make up to him for a decided deficiency in this respect. One phrase of his dwells in my memory which is significant of the respect he felt for practical ability; "yes," he would say, "but after all he is one of those men who know what is the next thing to be done." Of his remarkable gifts of intellect and character I need say but little. His strength lay in a rare combination of deliberative, analytic, and systematising power, and of all with force and steadfastness of character. He was not a mere discoverer of sporadic good ideas; his tendency was to form his conclusions into a whole, in which nothing was isolated or out of relation to the rest. His individuality sought and found expression in a congenial philosophy, and was intensified by so doing and strengthened for the work of life. His force of character came out in the thoroughness with which he attacked a speculative question. His was not a sanguine, it was rather perhaps a cautious and somewhat anxious temperament, but there was an element of indomitableness about it. I think I never knew anyone who had so few of the "defects of his qualities;" he was thoughtful but not dreamy, always collected and practical; his intensity was not accompanied by impetuosity; his passion for abstract thought was combined with a remarkable exactness about matters of fact, and in no way interfered with his discharge of everyday duty. On the contrary, his hard abstract studies seemed to prepare him for dealing with practical questions; they gave him patience, perseverance, perception of the point, delicacy of touch.'

The functions of an Oxford tutor at this time, as they would appear upon paper, were to deliver a certain number of lectures and to see a certain number of pupils once or twice a week, looking over their exercises and otherwise helping them in their work for the examinations of the university. But behind these definite and narrow duties extended a general responsibility for their welfare, which

would be differently interpreted according to the character of the individual and the prevailing tone of his college. So that as a matter of fact the relation of a tutor to his pupils might vary from that of a teacher of grammar and composition to that of an elder friend and general guide in the work of preparation for life. When Green entered on his tutorship at Balliol, the traditions of the office were tolerably fixed, and fixed at a comparatively high level. As a student he had worked under men of exceptional abilities and attainments, who, while holding strong and discordant theological opinions, had been united by common loyalty to the higher interests of their college; and in his own tutor in particular he had experienced what 'goodness and genius' combined can do for pupils of the most various character and social position. The qualifications which he himself brought to the work did not lie upon the surface. He lacked the easy geniality, the high spirits, the striking accomplishments, which go so far to attract the English youth. He neither dazzled nor charmed. And his want of sympathy with many of the dominant characteristics of the great public schools tended to put a gap between him and a large proportion of the students with whom he had to do. But these drawbacks, which would have been fatal to mediocrity, disappeared before the native power and worth of his mind and character, and came in the end to give a sort of point and flavour to the very qualities which at first they had helped to disguise. One of his first group of pupils thus describes the way in which they regarded him. 'In 1864, when I went up to Oxford, he was one of the junior fellows of Balliol. He had then no office in the college, but among the younger men there was an impression that he had unusual ability and character; and his face, as I well remember, always excited our interest. He was then very unlike anyone else in general look and appearance. He was careless about dress, so much so, that in any one else it would have seemed an affectation; but in him it was evidently part of an unstudied simplicity. On the death of Mr. Riddell he was appointed to lecture in philosophy. We were then beginning our work for the final schools. His first lecture was on the *Ethics*. Though he had great difficulty in expressing himself at that time, his lecture was from the first extremely popular, and the men all conceived a strong liking for him. The reason of this was clear. Everyone saw that there was great substantial value and originality in the work; and the very difficulty of his utterance gave one the feeling that he was working the thing out, and not repeating other people's phrases or ideas. We often had our laugh about the perplexity of these earlier lectures, but it was invariably

with a feeling of affection and trust towards the lecturer. The men in fact took a sort of pride in the difficult process which he went through before he got things clear, as if it were in some way the joint action of us all. Without any of those qualities of fluency and eloquence which attract audiences, he possessed in a singular degree the sympathy of those men whom he taught. His first group of pupils went into the schools at Christmas, 1867. We were very fortunate; there were five of us in the first class, and he was very pleased about it. I well remember our all breakfasting with him on the day after our class-list came out. We had celebrated our success with rather more than the proper amount of high spirits on the evening before, and we saw that he knew something about this, (or had guessed it), from his smile, and from one of his characteristic good-humoured remarks as he handed us our tea. Though we knew how stern he was to himself, I do not think that any of us had the feeling that he would be distant or austere to us. So far as I remember, we all felt that he was kindly and tolerant.' The impressions here described were probably those of many undergraduates with whom he came into contact, both at this time and afterwards. But Balliol was a college composed of very mixed elements; it contained rich men and poor men, men from large schools and from small, English and Scotch, anglicans and nonconformists, pleasure-seekers and hard workers; and to such a society the new tutor offered many and various 'angles of incidence.' To a few he was an object of personal affection, to others of distant admiration, to others again of good-natured amusement; no one despised him, and though he was an uncompromising upholder of discipline, few, if any, disliked him. To many men in the college he was for a long time barely known by sight, for he lived much alone and entertained little. It was considered quite an event when in 1868 he invited two undergraduates to spend part of the Christmas vacation with him in the Isle of Wight. But from that time onwards he became more accessible and expansive, and seldom passed a year without having some companions with him in the long vacation. On these occasions his frankness and humour always made a genial atmosphere, and he enjoyed though he seldom originated the fun which such parties develop. He did not make many intimate friends, but those with whom natural affinity or special circumstances brought him into close relations never forgot what they owed to him. What he had been to his contemporaries, that he became to a few in each generation of younger men. Some perhaps wished that he had been less reserved; to some his candour might seem to border upon hard-

ness; some felt their weaknesses unduly rebuked in his presence; but all knew that if he was severe to others he was more severe to himself, and that whatever advice he gave, it was sure to be on the side of their own better natures.

The power which his teaching exercised upon others was the reflection of the power which he himself derived from what he taught. Philosophy was to him the medium in which the theoretic impulse, the impulse to see and feel things more clearly and intensely than everyday life allows, found its most congenial satisfaction. The strength, the repose, the mental purgation which comes to some men through artistic imagination or religious emotion, came to him through thinking. He was expressing something of his own experience when he wrote in 1866 of that 'anticipatory assimilation of the world as spiritual which is the privilege of the philosopher, and which he shares with the poet and the saint. As the poet, traversing the world of sense, which he spiritualises by the aid of forms of beauty, finds himself ever at home, yet never in the same place, so the philosopher, while he ascends the courts of the intelligible world, is conscious of a presence which is always his own, yet always fresh, always lightened with the smile of a divine and eternal youth. Everything is new to him, yet nothing strange. The results of art and science, of religion and law, are all to him "workings of one mind, features of the same face:" yet are the workings and the features infinite. No longer a servant, but a son, he rules as over his own house. In it he moves freely and with that confidence which comes of freedom.' And again, 'in those moments of our own experience, when our whole intellectual self, instead of slowly realising itself under painful conditions of sense and matter, seems to be before us at once, we have the faint image of the divine self-sufficiency.' It was seldom indeed that his habitual self-distrust and sense of practical requirements allowed him such moments of fruition. Much more often he was vividly aware how 'such freedom and confidence, if divorced from the moral life, become a ridiculous conceit, and are justly met with the reminder that "there was never yet philosopher who could endure the toothache patiently."'[1] So that while his own best moments were those in which the reason of the world most came home to him, he was far from wishing to drive everyone into speculation, or to disturb the satisfaction which others might attain through different modes of activity. Nor could anyone be more painfully conscious how little direct result can be expected from the study or teaching

[1] Below, pp. 85 and 90.

of philosophy. Starting with the accepted commonplace that this is a speculative age, he held that if there is to be theorising at all, it should be done thoroughly; but the notion that he or any thinker held in his hands a panacea for the ills of England, was of all the most abhorrent to him. Of the propagandist spirit, indeed, he had too little rather than too much. In his lectures it was conspicuously absent, and in his private work with his pupils it was hardly less so. He had neither the versatility which naturally adapts itself to various minds, nor the educational ardour which can be all things to all men in order to gain some. He often allowed those who had brought essays to him to go away with a sense that he was equally dissatisfied both with what they had written and with his own attempts to improve it. It was only men who were gifted with a certain intellectual impetuosity and aggressiveness who could draw much from him in conversation, and his very disinclination to dominate or grapple with minds which were out of harmony with his own made him ready, sometimes too ready, to acquiesce in the appearance of intellectual appreciation. Not that he ever had, or cared to have, a chorus of disciples. Upon the majority of his hearers the impression which he produced was probably little more than that he was in earnest with what he said, and that it referred to matters which he considered interesting and important. With those to whom personal experience had made a reality of some religious, political, or scientific problem it was different. He might rouse them to antagonism by his criticisms of their cherished doctrines, or furnish them with what seemed a solution of their perplexities. The latter was most likely to be the case with men who, having in them some strain of idealism, had found a difficulty in adjusting their lives to it; men in whom radicalism was seeking for a meeting-point with loyalty, or whose acceptance of a moral principle or a religious idea was crossed by a half-understood scientific theory or a half-disguised selfish impulse. Such men were naturally attracted by one who saw in a law-abiding community the realisation of true freedom, and in the simplest utterances of faith the deepest truths of reason, and who believed physical law to be an expression of the same intelligence as the forms of thought and the principles of morality. To the dangers incident to any such constructive view his own analytical power and his practical hold on life supplied the antidote; but in minds where these were deficient his spirit of comprehension was liable to degenerate into a spirit of accommodation, and his fusion of false antitheses to reappear as the confusion of true. Nor were there wanting other symptoms which

sually attend the fermentation of new and potent ideas. There re a few in every generation of men at the university to whom ontact with a real thinker is like a new experience. That which or want of a better name we must call the speculative impulse, a hing in its nature as distinct, unanalysable, and incommunicable as he passion for goodness or for beauty, was in Green so fused with he rest of his personality that ordinary observers hardly felt the dge of it; but when it touched minds of the same temper, it struck re. The enthusiasm so kindled was not for any definite project or lea, nor had the eight or ten men whom it brought together the esign of propagating any particular doctrines of their master. A ot unkindly wit named them 'a society for looking at things as a 'hole,' and perhaps the chief bond between them was a common ntolerance of superficiality. If they had been asked what they elieved in, they could only have answered 'in philosophy'; but the elief was not the less real because it was vague, and its gradual iffusion put a new life and seriousness into much of the teaching t Oxford. Philosophy, indeed, like other great subjects, cannot be ught without exposing itself to travesty; it becomes sentimental ı the weak enthusiast, mechanical in the able philistine. And ich form of the philosophical spirit has the special defects of its wn qualities; one lends itself to a superior cynicism, another to mplacent omniscience, a third to unctuous rhetoric. No system of aching or examination can avoid these incidental evils; the only efence against them lies in the constant apprehension of them; but herever the subject is taught by a person of more than ordinary rce, they will inevitably appear in one form or another, exciting ıe ridicule of enemies and the alarm of friends.

Reference has already been made to his manner in lecturing. [e was in the habit of writing full notes for his lectures, and more ıll as years went on, but in delivering them he seemed to be ınking his thoughts over again, and this, while it added to their npressiveness, added also to their difficulty. Nor was his method : treatment calculated to make them more easy or more attrac- ve. There was no tendency to edification in his discourses, no ersonal reminiscences or applications, least of all any undertone : unction. Concrete illustrations were rare, and, when they oc- ırred, homely to a sometimes comical degree; equally rare were peculative flights of poetry or eloquence. He moved for the most art in the middle region of analysis and criticism. Naturally r-sighted, cautious, and ready to see difficulties, he always emed more anxious to point out the inadequacy, confusion, or pos-

sible aberrations of a theory than to elicit or emphasise its truth. This was the case even with views with which he was in substantial agreement, and as his energy was chiefly spent in confuting doctrines which he believed to be at the root of widely spread popular misconceptions, he laid himself open to the charge of being more 'critical' than 'constructive.' But the rarity of his positive professions of faith made them the more telling when they came, and their meagreness was supplemented by the conviction which they inspired that he said less than he lived. As a philosophical critic, the most distinctive feature was his impersonality, which made him seem to some people unappreciative or even unfair. He treated each philosopher as the vehicle of certain theories and nothing more. Whatever inward sympathy or antipathy he might feel for a writer or a book as a whole, he seldom allowed it to appear. He seized at once upon what seemed to him the leading lines in a doctrine, and followed them out through all their windings with unsparing conscientiousness, laying more stress upon the errors to which they logically led than upon the truths of which they might be the illogical expression. And thus upon those of his hearers who were less capable of this purely speculative treatment he sometimes left the impression that the subjects of his criticism were personally little better than fools or knaves. Yet friends and foes alike have borne witness to his remarkable candour in controversy, and few men have yielded less to the temptation to take unfair advantage of an opponent or to argue for victory. His own view of the true function and spirit of criticism is thus expressed; 'Those who understand the difference between philosophical failures, which are so because they are anachronisms, and those which in their failure have brought out a new truth and compelled a step forward in the progress of thought, will understand that a process, which looks like pulling a great philosopher to pieces, may be the true way of showing reverence for his greatness. It is a pharisaical way of building the sepulchres of philosophers to profess their doctrine or extol their genius without making their spirit our own. . . We best do reverence to their genius, we most truly appropriate their spirit, in so exploring the difficulties to which their enquiry led, as to find in them the suggestion of a theory which may help us to walk firmly where they stumbled and fell.'[1] Once only, in a criticism of Herbert Spencer,[2] did he allow himself to show a certain exasperation of tone, and to indulge in sarcasms which, though enlivening to his readers, caused him afterwards to say, 'while I cannot honestly

[1] Vol. i. p. 5.

[2] Vol. i. p. 373, foll.

retract anything in the substance of what I then wrote, there are expressions which I very much regret, as far as they might be taken to imply want of personal respect for Mr. Spencer.'[1] It was this perhaps that was in his mind in 1881 when he wrote, 'It is the inevitableness of irritation as an incident of controversial writing—an irritation not likely to render those who experience it more open to conviction—that suggests a doubt whether in any case the cause of philosophic truth is likely to be served by the method of answer and rejoinder. The independent statement of opinion, without apparent reference to other contemporary opinion from which it differs, though it may give rise to some confusion of issues, is perhaps more likely to lead to a profitable result.'[2]

The subjects on which he lectured were partly determined by the requirements of the university examinations, partly by his own choice. The teaching of philosophy in Oxford at this time centred round certain works of Aristotle, to which portions of Plato had recently been added. Modern philosophy was scarcely recognised officially as part of the course, but the writings of J. S. Mill, especially his *Logic*, were largely read, and either by direct assimilation, or through the discussion and criticism which they occasioned, were probably the most powerful element in the intellectual leaven of the place. The study of Plato and Aristotle had lately entered on a new phase. With an increased knowledge of German philosophy, and especially of German history of philosophy, working through men like Jowett and Pattison, it had become (to use a current antithesis) less 'literary' and more 'philosophical.' In other words, their works had begun to be treated less as instructive analyses or brilliant criticisms of the commonplaces of culture, and more as partial expressions of systematic views of human life and the world. At the same time the 'historical method' was asserting itself in every department of knowledge, and though, rightly used, such a method is only the complementary half to that of the philosopher, the two are perpetually tending in inferior hands to appear as mutually exclusive and antagonistic. 'The revived interest which is noticeable in the history of philosophy may be an indication either of philosophical vigour or of philosophical decay. In those whom intellectual indolence, or a misunderstood and disavowed metaphysic, has landed in scepticism, there often survives a curiosity about the literary history of philosophy, and the writings which this curiosity produces tend further to spread the notion that philosophy is a matter about which there has been much guessing by great intellects, but no

[1] Vol. i. p. 541.

[2] Below, p. 148.

definite truth is to be attained. It is otherwise with those who see in philosophy a progressive effort towards a fully articulated conception of the world as rational. To them its past history is of interest as representing steps in this progress which have already been taken for us, and which, if we will make them our own, carry us so far on our way towards the freedom of perfect understanding; while to ignore them is not to return to the simplicity of a pre-philosophic age, but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze of "cultivated opinion," itself the confused result of those past systems of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out.'[1] These words, written some years later, indicate the sense in which he regarded philosophy as contained in its history, and the spirit in which he thought that its history should be studied. It is probable that, if he had been free to choose, he would not have spent upon Aristotle so much of his force as a teacher. He was not one of those to whom the products of Greek genius have a unique attraction or interest; and though for all practical purposes he was a good scholar, he did not move freely in the language, and was constantly haunted by a fear that he was not giving sufficient attention to the detailed interpretation of the text. Being however led by circumstances to make the *Ethics* one of his principal subjects, he put his strength into the lecture, and made it as instructive and effective as any other. He did not do this by using the book as a peg on which to hang disquisitions on modern questions, nor by explaining how the ideas contained in it had been historically developed, nor by illustrating them from Greek literature and history. The theory of life which found its final expression in Aristotle appealed to him on its own merits, because it was based substantially upon the same principles as his own; the principle that the higher or rational nature in man is that in which the impulse to knowledge and the impulse to society have their common root; that this is what makes him most truly man and most like God; and that to promote the growth of this nature is the highest service that he can render to his fellow-men. Thus the points in the *Ethics* in which these principles are conspicuously involved were those upon which his mind naturally fastened, whether to enforce the truth of Aristotle's application of them or to point out where it was defective. And in his latest work, the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, the effect of these early studies is seen in the sympathy with which he returns to the leading conceptions of Greek moral philosophy. 'The habit of derogation from the uses of "mere philosophy,"' (he there writes), 'common alike

[1] Vol. i. p. 4.

to christian advocates and the professors of natural science, has led us too much to ignore the immense practical service which Socrates and his followers rendered to mankind. From them in effect comes the connected scheme of virtues and duties within which the educated conscience of christendom still moves, when it is impartially reflecting on what ought to be done. Religious teachers have no doubt affected the hopes and fears which actuate us in the pursuit of virtue or rouse us from its neglect. Religious societies have both strengthened men in the performance of recognised duties, and taught them to recognise relations of duty towards those whom they might otherwise have been content to treat as beyond the pale of such duties; but the articulated scheme of what the virtues and duties are, in their difference and in their unity, remains for us now in its main outlines what the Greek philosophers left it. . . Once for all they conceived and expressed the conception of a free or pure morality, as resting on what we may venture to call a disinterested interest in the good; of the several virtues as so many applications of that interest to the main relations of social life; of the good itself not as anything external to the capacities virtuously exercised in its pursuit, but as their full realisation. . . When we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful; to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e. to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to but what is due.'[1]

Besides the ethics, logic, and metaphysic of Aristotle, he lectured on Plato and the history of early Greek philosophy. But it was in the exposition and criticism of the English philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that he made his chief and most characteristic contribution to the cause of philosophical education, as he conceived it. Feeling in himself the fundamental unity of the human mind in its manifold activities and products, in science, art, and religion, in law and society, he could not rest in the false or shallow antitheses in which modern English culture seemed to him to be bound. This self-imposed bondage he ascribed to the want of an adequate theory of life, and this want again to the fact that

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, §§ 249, 253, 256.

speculation in England had never really advanced beyond the point at which it had been left by Hume. In an essay published in the North British Review in 1868, under the title *Popular philosophy in its relation to life*,[1] perhaps the most pregnant and eloquent of his writings, he traces the consequences of this fact. Philosophy is represented as originating in the demand of man, a demand which he cannot help making, to understand himself and his surroundings. Beginning with the question, 'What is the world that he knows, and how does he know it?' it goes on to the question, 'What is the world that he has made, and how has he been able to make it?' The first question is never long in leading to the second, for it is prompted by the same radical impulse to self-expression and self-satisfaction. 'It is by no avoidable error, as in the effort to escape from himself he may sometimes imagine, that he has infected nature with his theology or metaphysic. Its relation to himself is the condition alike of the impulse to know it and of the possibility of its being known. . . . He is as metaphysical when he talks of body or matter as when he talks of force, of force as when he talks of mind, of mind as when he talks of God. That which he calls nature is traversed by the currents of his intellect, and where intellect has gone sentiment has followed. . . . Nature is a labyrinth in which he has wandered at will till he has lost the clue, and which at the same time is so much his own that in its perplexities he seems at war with himself.' For a time the interpretation of this seemingly external world absorbs him; his personal relations to God, his fellow-men, and his own desires 'wrap him round too closely to be contemplated'; but as his power of analysis develops, they too become objects of his curiosity, and then it is that philosophy begins to pass from the possession of a few isolated thinkers, and to become an element in general culture and a power in influencing mankind. Thus transmuted it gradually forms that pervading intellectual atmosphere which, under the name of 'enlightenment,' is what the world at large usually understands by it. Philosophy thus popularized is 'the uncritical expression of the claim to be free, to enjoy, to understand. It is the abstract or result of the various methods, poetic, religious, metaphysical, by which man has sought to account to himself for the world of his experience, as they apply directly to human life.' It naturally tends to be both sceptical and destructive; sceptical, because it brings into relief contradictions which it is too much in a hurry to think out, and destructive, because, while purporting to explain the facts, it is too superficial to do

[1] Below, p 92

more than explain them away. The particular system of thought which still supplies English enlightenment with its formulas, is that to which Locke first gave classical expression and which Hume worked out to its logical issues. Hume showed conclusively that from the conception of the human mind with which he started none but a self-contradictory explanation could be given of what the mind does and experiences; but his successors in England, instead of being led thereby to reconsider his premisses, have gone on 'digging in the old vein which he had exhausted, and of which his final dilemma had shown the bottom.'[1] Thus whatever 'practical reconstruction of moral ideas' there has been, 'has come not directly from a sounder philosophy, but from the deeper views of life which the contemplative poets such as Wordsworth and Shelley originated, from the revival of evangelical religion, and from the conception of freedom and right which Rousseau popularized'; and while in these directions the better mind of England has outgrown the philosophical formulas inherited from the eighteenth century, the speculative Englishman of the nineteenth, who wants a theory of life, can still only find one which ignores or falsifies his most real experiences and leaves unsatisfied his deepest needs.

If then we would not 'condemn ourselves to grope in the maze of "cultivated opinion," itself the confused result of those past systems of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out,' we must go back to those systems, must disengage their conclusions from the 'forms to which adaptation to the needs of plausibility has gradually reduced them,' and must 'restore to their original significance the ideas which have since become commonplaces with educated Englishmen.' If we do this, they will 'carry us by an intellectual necessity to those truer notions which, in fact, have been their sequel in the development of philosophy, but have not yet found their way into the culture of our time.'[2] These words, which describe the purpose of his *Introductions* to Hume's *Treatise of human nature*, published six years after the essay just referred to, serve equally well to describe the purpose of the lectures on English philosophy which he had been giving in the interval. The *Introductions*, which embodied the results of these lectures, were his contribution to a new edition of Hume's works, brought out by Messrs. Longman in 1874–1875. From the point of view of the general reader, it is to be regretted that a work of 550 pages should be burdened with 380 pages of destructive criticism, more difficult to master than the work itself. But it will be long in England

[1] Vol. i. p. 2. [2] Vol. i. p. 5.

before the conditions of human experience are subjected to a treatment so patient and so penetrating; and the architectonic philosopher of the future will find in it foundations for his building where Hume had left a void. Taken together with the posthumous lectures on Kant's *Critique of pure reason*, and on logic,[1] the *Introductions* to Hume enable us to form a fairly complete idea of the writer's metaphysical principles, as they were in 1874, and as they substantially remained. All that can be attempted here is to disengage from the close web of criticism the positive ideas which underlie it throughout and occasionally come to the surface.

The central conception is that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is the essence to be self-conscious, that is, to be itself and not itself in one. Of this activity, 'self-distinguishing and self-seeking,' every particular existence is a limited manifestation, and, among other such existences, those which we call 'ourselves.' In so far as there is a 'we' at all and a world which can be called 'ours,' it is because the self which is the unity of the world is 'communicated' under the particular conditions of our physical organisation. It is this fact, the fact of a self-conditioned or free energy acting under limiting conditions, which makes our experience a continual self-contradiction between what we are and what we have it in us to be. To the consciousness of this contradiction, that is, to our partial self-consciousness, is due the impulse both to knowledge and to goodness; and the contradiction is overcome in proportion as we think what is true and will what is unselfish.

The conception of self-consciousness as the ultimate reality is one to which we are led by reflection upon our experience, or, in other words, by asking ourselves what we mean by a fact. It makes no difference whether fact be taken in the minimum or the maximum of its meaning, whether as the simplest possible fact, expressible as merely 'something,' or as the highly complex facts covered by such words as 'science,' 'art,' 'morality,' or as the all-inclusive fact which we call 'the world.' At whatever point it is considered, it is found to consist in relationship or relationships. That which is simply itself is nothing; the reality of everything lies in its pointing beyond itself to something else; in other words, the real is always something which is itself and not itself in one, a unity in difference or differentiated unity. If for instance reality be considered where it is at its least, where it can be indicated merely as 'this,' the fact so indicated can only be fully expressed as 'this not that,' in which each consti-

[1] Vol. ii. pp. 1–81, and 158–306.

tuent is nothing without the other and the two together make a unity which is both and neither of them. Take again the case of time, or reality in so far as it consists in succession, i.e. in the fact that one thing is before and after another. If the event *a* were simply over when *b* occurred, there would be no such thing as succession; if *a* is to be really before *b* and *b* really after *a*, they must coexist as well as succeed, and the full reality of time is a relationship in which something is both before and after itself. The same is true of space, or the real so far as it consists in outsideness or in things 'here' and 'there.' Outsideness implies separateness, but one thing would not be outside another if they were merely separate; they must also make one thing, i.e. they must be something which is both here and there. If we pass from these elementary forms of reality to those which constitute the mechanical or chemical or physiological world, it is equally clear that the facts expressed by these words are relationships of increasing complexity, each analysable into a number of distinct elements and a unity in which their distinctions are neutralised and yet survive. And if, leaving the physical world, we analyse a characteristically human fact, such as a state, we arrive at the same result. 'If all interests were identical, there would be no state. On the other hand, the state tends to overcome, and, so far as it approaches perfection, actually overcomes, separation of interests. In other words, just so far as there is a state, interests no longer are really separate. In the state separation of interests may be said to exist as one factor of the reality, but as in one sense neutralised by the other factor, which is its opposite, viz. the sense of common interest. Neither would be what it is without the other, but in the state neither retains any separate reality.' Lastly, if we ask ourselves what we mean by complete reality, the world or universe, the answer must be, 'a system in which every element, being correlative to every other, at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other,' a unity which distinguishes itself from and finds itself in, not this or that thing, but everything. All fact, then, or matter of experience, consists in relationship, and relationship implies self-consciousness, the only thing that we know 'in which a manifold is united without ceasing to be manifold.'[1]

The same result may be reached by another line of thought. 'The antithesis between "facts" and "things of the mind," like every form in which the impulse after true knowledge finds expression, implies a distinction between the seeming and the real, or between that which exists for the consciousness of the individual and that which

[1] Vol. i. pp. 35–36; Vol. ii. pp. 15, 73; Vol. i. p. 91.

really exists.' Reflection shows that such an antithesis is not really between consciousness and its unknown opposite, but between a less and more complete consciousness, and that it is only possible to a being partly self-conscious. For what do we mean by the distinction between reality and appearance? If we like to say so, every feeling is equally real, in so far as it is what it is. But it is not such reality that we have in view when we ask, Is such and such a feeling really what it seems to be? or, Do I really feel what I seem to feel? Such a question implies that the feeling asked about already goes beyond itself, that it is a feeling of something, or, in other words, a felt relationship. And accordingly the way in which we try to ascertain whether it is real or not, is not by merely feeling it over again, but by feeling it over again in a certain connexion; and we pronounce it real if we find it to be accompanied by other feelings which we expect to accompany it. The very question, then, which is the beginning of all knowledge, the question what anything is *really*, is one which can only be asked by a being whose experience is already a system in embryo and whose consciousness is a consciousness of itself and something else in one, i.e. a self-conscious being. To a feeling which was itself and nothing more, or rather, to a feeling which in being itself was not also something more, the distinction of real and unreal would have no application, for it would be a feeling of nothing. 'In order that any definite object of experience may exist for us, our feelings must have ceased to be "separate, perishing existences," and must have become related to each other as mutually qualified members of a permanent system.'[1]

Again, science begins in the attempt to explain things, and explanation means 'the inference from a change to something which accounts for the change.' Now 'an event, interpreted as a change of something that remains constant, is no longer a mere event. It is no longer merely in time, a present which next moment becomes a past. It takes its character from relation to the thing or system of things of which it is an altered appearance, but which in itself is always the same. Only in virtue of such a relation does it require to be accounted for, to be referred to a cause.' The cause of a thing is commonly said to be 'the sum total of its conditions'; that is to say, it is 'that system of things, conceived explicitly, of which there must already have been an implicit conception in order that the event might be regarded as a change, and thus start the search for a cause.' The simplest fact, then, which can be a begin-

[1] Vol. i. pp. 70, 75, 154, 266–268.

ning of knowledge, is 'not a feeling, but an explanation of a feeling, which connects it by relations, that are not feelings, with an unfelt universe.' Thus 'no fact can be even partially known without compelling an inference to the unknown,' and 'while it is true in a sense that in inference we do not go beyond experience, it is so only because in experience we already go beyond sense.'[1]

Self-consciousness, then, i.e. consciousness of system or relationship, one in many, identical in difference, is the condition of our having experience. But this consciousness only becomes ours piecemeal and by slow degrees, and it never becomes ours completely. So that while it is true that, so far as there is a world or unity of things for us at all, it is because we are potentially the consciousness which has the universe for its object, it is also true that we never get beyond the potentiality; our idea of system remains only an idea, a broken outline which gives such form as it has to all our experience, but which continually recedes as our experience fills it up. It is consciousness in this sense, partial and intermittent, that is rightly contrasted as 'merely ours' or 'subjective' with an 'objective world'; only it must be remembered that the objective world is not some unknown opposite of consciousness, but the ideal completion of that world of which we are already incompletely conscious, and that it is only the presence in us of a self not in this sense 'subjective,' that makes possible the consciousness of such a world and of our own subjectivity. What we call 'our' minds are events beginning with birth and ending with death, each again broken up into other events or mental states, into and out of which we are perpetually passing. When 'our consciousness' is spoken of, it is usually the transitions into these successive states which are thought of, while the contents or objects of the states themselves are supposed to be something outside or independent of consciousness. Whereas the truth is that a consciousness which was merely a series of transitions, of beginnings and endings, would be consciousness of nothing, and that the fact of transition itself can only be a fact to a consciousness which is not itself a transition. The parts or constituents of an object of consciousness are not before or after one another; there is an order of time in which they 'enter consciousness,' but there is no such order in them 'as in consciousness.' This is equally true whether the object be one of immediate perception, 'this table,' or one of memory, 'this is the table that I saw yesterday,' or one of reconstructive thought, such as a series of historical events or the prehistoric condition of the earth. For 'past experience is not an indefinite series

[1] Vol. i. pp. 127–126. 281–282, 267.

of perishing impressions of separate men, but represents one world,' and 'the antecedent conditions of life and sentience, revealed by science, are conditions of what we experience, determined just as much by relation to it as it is by relation to them.' While therefore everything that happens, whether inward or outward, whether a physical phenomenon or a mental state, is as such in time, 'the presence of consciousness to itself, which as the true *punctum stans* is the condition of the observation of events in time, is not such an event itself.' So that to characterise our consciousness as a succession of states is to characterise it rather by what it is not than by what it is, for just so far as it is merely 'here' and 'there,' 'now' and 'then,' it is not truly ours at all. [1]

The limitations which make our consciousness subjective in the above sense arise from the fact that we are 'feeling' as well as 'thinking' beings, or, (what is the same thing), that we not only have experience of a world but are ourselves parts of that world. The distinction between feeling and thought is not indeed an absolute one. Mere feeling, in the sense of that which is felt by no subject and is the feeling of no object, is not a possible element in experience; as soon as it is felt as a fact, it is already a consciousness of relation, i.e. thought. On the other hand, the first form in which we become self-conscious, the first channel through which the consciousness of a world is communicated to us, is the consciousness of some bodily change, i.e. feeling. In proportion as the communication becomes fuller, the limitations incident to its earliest forms are more and more removed, experience becomes independent of time and place, thought takes the place of feeling. But the limitations are never wholly removed. The animal organisation, in virtue of which we are parts of nature, conditions our knowledge of nature to the end. We partly understand time and space, but we partly are in them, and in so far as we are in them we do not understand them; they have us, not we them. Thus it is true in a sense to say that sensation is the test of truth in our experience of the natural world. Belief in the reality of a natural phenomenon means belief that under certain conditions a certain feeling will occur; and it is by trying whether it does so occur that we test the truth of our belief. But it is not to be supposed 'that any particular reality first comes into being on the occurrence of my feeling'; what is 'tested' by the feeling is not reality, but the adequacy of my conception of it. 'The conceived fact, the reality, that such a sensation occurs under such conditions, is unaffected by the circumstance that the sensation is

[1] Vol. i. pp. 267, 271, 478; vol. ii. pp. 32, 74.

not now occurring. Sensation vanishes, but not the fact that it has occurred under certain conditions, and this is its reality.' In a 'crucial experiment' a single experience is enough to communicate the fact, and the fact once is always a fact to the experimenter. To a being whose experience was wholly of this crucial character, i.e. to a perfectly intelligent being, 'the difference between an actual event in the way of sensation and the possibility of such an event, i.e. a true and adequate conception, would not exist.' But in most cases repeated sensations are needed to enable us to be sure under what conditions the sensation occurs, as well as to enable us to recover those conditions when the sensation is over. Thinking is the activity by which we free ourselves from these limitations, and realise facts independently of the circumstances under which they come into consciousness. To imagine, indeed, that we can ever be wholly free is 'the frenzy of philosophy'; it must remain true that to every man all nature but a little is 'expunged and void,' and that the little that remains to him is different from what it is to everyone else. But each fresh step in understanding the world is a step in the liberation of the self. In proportion as the supposed isolation and mutual exclusiveness of objects and events gives way before the growing discovery of the uniformity of nature, the false individuality of the self is fused in a common intelligence, and mind meets mind in a medium of truth which is the essence of all but the property of none. The true objectivity of things is seen to lie, not in being outside the mind, which could only mean that they were no objects at all, nor in their materiality or existence in space and time, which is only one and the most elementary of the differences of which self is the identity, but in the indissoluble unity of system which makes every thing a 'retainer to' something else and ultimately to the whole. On the other hand, the true individuality of the self comes to be understood, not as the imperviousness and incommunicableness of momentary feeling, but as the energy, at once self-contained and self-communicating, which 'spreads undivided' in knowledge and 'operates unspent' in love.[1]

These ideas are not new. In one form or another they are the common heritage of all true idealism, of all idealism which is, in Green's own words, 'not the admission of an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but the recognition of the empirical itself as ideal,' and which 'trusts, not to a guess about what is beyond experience, but to analysis of what is within it.'[2] The particular manner in which he expressed them was partly natural to him, as

[1] Vol. i. pp. 33, 74–75, 185–186. [2] Vol. i. pp. 179 and 449.

appears from his earliest writings, partly it was the result of a sympathetic study of Kant and Hegel. It must always be a stumbling-block to the appreciation of his or any similarly formulated theory, that some of its leading terms are embedded in associations the reverse of those which the theory is intended to convey. This is conspicuously the case with 'feeling' and 'thought.' The former is constantly used by English people to express the complete or vivid realisation of a truth, while the latter is used with equal frequency to describe any mental reproduction, however partial or faded, of a past experience. Philosophy, like other human utterances, must talk in metaphors, and one metaphor is as good as another if it be not misunderstood. The persons 'obscurely called transcendental' are not, as is often supposed, persons who have quarrelled with their eyes and ears, nor do they wish to discourage other people from the use of those organs. Rather they would draw their attention to the fact that much more than mere seeing and hearing is involved in the experiences generally so called, and that to hold feeling to be the test of reality is like holding the truth of a physical law or a moral principle to depend on their being understood in a particular room or in the words of a particular person. But if anyone likes to say that a thing must be 'felt' if it is to be real, whether in the strict sense that the reality of the physical world implies the actual or possible affection of the human organism, or in the general sense that if truth is to be operative it must come home to the individual, by all means let him continue to do so. Only do not let him first use the word to express the highest and deepest modes of consciousness, and then proceed to argue that, as all feeling is a physical process, truth and duty are after all nothing but neural tremors. True idealism and true materialism have their common root in the same ultimate fact, the fact that any piece of human experience is on the one side a certain combination of simpler elements or resultant of simpler forces, while on the other it is itself an element in a larger combination, a factor in a fuller result. Two lines of interpretation are thus open; it may be read backwards into what it implies, or forwards into what it suggests. Both are equally legitimate and equally necessary, and the interpreters, if they understand their business, are aware that, though they apparently diverge more widely at every step, they are really moving in the same circle and will find that they have met when they reach the end. But it is seldom that the work of explanation is carried on with this mutual intelligence. More often the man who sets about to explain human experience by analysing it into its simplest elements gradually

forgets or ignores the experience of which they are the elements, and while he continues to call them constituents, eventually leaves nothing for them to constitute. The thing to be explained is thus explained away, and is only reinstated by a side-wind of logical inconsistency or as a concession to vulgar prejudice. Meantime the speculative results get popularised, and minds which are attracted by their simplicity frame out of them a philosophy of life. But the logic of facts is stronger than that of theory, and the half-true abstractions of popularised materialism have to be accommodated to the concrete experience of its believers. The accommodation is effected in different ways. By some the elements of experience for which the theory has no room are disposed of as 'fictions,' 'conventions,' or 'mere ideas.' By others room is made for them by force, with various degrees of resulting dislocation and embarrassment. The facts into which the banished ideal element has been restored become 'mysteries' or 'miracles,' and the confusion reaches its climax in some form of disguised idolatry, which invests a material object or event with the spiritual attributes which materialism had eliminated. It was the pressing consciousness of these and similar features in the intellectual life of England that led Green to study with special interest the philosophical theories of which they seemed to him to be symptoms. Philosophy has its source in current opinion, and into current opinion it eventually returns. It begins by condensing and clarifying the sporadic and confused ideas of educated but unreflective people, and it ends by discharging them again, pregnant with new force, into the mental atmosphere from which they were drawn. It is the strength and the weakness of the most characteristically English metaphysic that it has been, or has been supposed to be, a metaphysic of 'common sense.' The language of Locke and Hume 'had none of that academic or *ex cathedra* character, which has made German philosophy almost a foreign literature in the country of its birth. They wrote as citizens and men of the world, anxious (in no bad sense) for effect; and even when their conclusions were remote from popular belief, still presented them in the flesh and blood of current terms used in the current sense.'[1] But while it was their boast to base themselves on the experience of plain men, and to reject everything that would not stand its test, they only half realised what they were professing. Starting from the position that all matter of experience is consciousness, and that all consciousness is ultimately feeling in various combinations, they attempted to deduce the combinations from that which was combined in them, not

[1] Vol. i. p. 4.

seeing that the 'reflection,' which they contrasted as secondary and derivative with 'sensation' as primary and original, was the very activity which made sensation into fact and lay behind the reality which they announced as ultimate. Locke's special contribution to the work was to 'formulate what everyone thinks,' and 'his essential merit was that, at whatever cost of confusion or contradiction, he at least formulated it fully.' Thus in him 'the dialectic, which popular belief implicitly involves, goes on under our eyes,' and in following his tortuous endeavours to derive mind from 'its own misunderstood creations,' we share the inevitable 'unrest which attaches to it in this self-imposed subjection.' From the 'chaos of antinomies' which he left Hume elicited order and consistency by a method which 'disposed of both the outward and the inward synthesis, both of the unity of feelings in a subject matter and of their unity in a subject mind, as "fictions of thought,"' and thus forced on philosophers 'the vital question whether a mind which thus invents has been effectively suppressed,—whether, indeed, the theory can be so much as stated without a covert assumption of that which it claims to have destroyed.'[1] But just because the full import of his method has not been understood, 'the failure to which it was foredoomed has not been generally recognised.' He is commonly supposed to have done nothing more than describe the historical process 'by which, given certain relations objectively existing, a knowledge of them on the part of the individual has been gradually formed'; whereas what he really tried to do was to explain how, 'in the absence of all such relations as objectively real, the "fiction" of their existence has come to be formed.' To this want of understanding is due the modern idea that his doctrine 'only required reinforcement from the discovery of the law of hereditary transmission to become proof against all attack.' It is supposed that 'by showing that constant experiences of the race become organised tendencies which are transmitted as a heritage,' the nature of space, time, causality, and other elementary constituents of those experiences is explained; and the supposition culminates in the attempt 'to imagine an evolution of the self-conscious subject from the gathered experience of the sentient organism, an evolution of the unifying agent from that which it renders one.' Such an attempt is in the strict sense 'preposterous,' because 'evolution implies some identity as well as differentiation, some continuance of the material of evolution into the evolved product; but there is no common element between the development through repeated sensation of the structure organic to

[1] Vol. i. pp. 111, 112.

sense and the development of consciousness in experience of facts,' nor can a sequence of feelings be made by any device to 'yield anything so antithetic to itself as a consciousness of a cosmos in which sequent feelings have become objectively localised facts.' It is not by investigation of the structure and processes of the sentient organism that the ultimate nature of human experience can be arrived at, for the very conception of the organism is itself an element in the experience and presupposes the explanation of it. 'For the ascertainment of what human thought and feeling are we have nothing to resort to but the analysis of what we ourselves are doing and have done. There are such things as knowledge, art, morality, which somehow are our work. By considering what we must have done in order to their existence, and in no other way, can we learn the ultimate nature of the thought and feeling realised in them. We have to ask, for instance, what our consciousness must have done, and been in order to do, that there should be for it what we call facts, and these connected in a single world. Till we have learnt something of what our consciousness is by such a method as this, however imperfectly carried out, the physiologist can tell us nothing about it, for there is no question in regard to it for him to answer. It is just in so far as some mental analysis, however crude, has disentangled some thread from the web we are ever weaving in knowledge and action, that there is something to suggest an enquiry into the particular neural processes that accompany particular mental ones. The enquiry may no doubt result in discoveries of the greatest importance for the benefit of man's estate. It is not, however, our conception of what our consciousness is, not our knowledge of knowledge, that will gain in clearness or fulness thereby, but our knowledge of the nervous organism that will be enlarged by the discovery of functions which it exercises in relation to consciousness. When we analyse any mode of consciousness, we do not come upon neural tremors. Nothing that the physiologist can detect, no irritation, or irradiation, or affection of a sensitive organ, enters into it at all. The relations which these terms represent are all of a kind absolutely heterogeneous to and incompatible with the mutual determination of ideas in the unity of consciousness. They all imply distinctions of space and time which that unity perhaps renders possible, but which it excludes from itself.' [1]

These latter passages are from essays published four years later than the *Introductions* to Hume, in which, feeling that 'each generation requires the questions of philosophy to be put to it in its own lan-

[1] Vol. i. pp. 383, 467, 474, 475, 476.

guage, and, unless they are so put, will not be at the pains to understand them,' he applied the same principles of criticism to contemporary English psychology as represented by Herbert Spencer and G. H. Lewes.[1] It is noticeable that the analysis of the actual achievements of man, which he here opposes as the true metaphysical method to that of a misunderstood materialism, is the same as that which he elsewhere opposes to an equally misunderstood idealism. If the facts of experience cannot be resolved into 'feeling,' in the sense of neural processes, he was equally clear that they cannot be resolved into 'thought,' in the sense of the particular processes of reasoning by which each individual arrives at his knowledge. If (he insisted) the statement that thought is the reality of things is to approve itself as more than 'a presumptuous paradox,' it must be made clear that it is based upon 'an analysis of the objective world, not upon reflection on those processes of our intelligence which really presuppose that world.' It must appeal for support, not to 'the discursive activity exhibited in our inferences and analyses,' but to 'things.' Such discursive activity varies with every individual mind; its whole meaning and value is relative to results which, as results, are not affected by it, and in the results, in the actual consciousness which is knowledge, the idiosyncrasies of method disappear. Thus what seemed to him the 'one essential aberration' in Hegel was that he had treated, or appeared to treat, the 'process of philosophising' as 'a sort of movement of the absolute thought.' The 'vital truth which Hegel had to teach' he took to be, 'that there is one spiritual self-conscious being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression; that we are related to this being, not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self-consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world; and that this participation is the source of morality and religion.' But the belief that 'the objective world, in its actual totality, is thought,' requires the constant reminder that 'the processes of our intelligence are but reflections of that real thought under the conditions of a limited nature.' Only if we can sustain ourselves at this double point of view do we appropriate the true spirit of Hegelianism, and unless we so sustain ourselves, our idealism, however much we may protest that it is 'absolute,' remains merely 'subjective.'[2] These remarks explain the noticeable fact that, while he regarded Hegel's system as 'the last word of philosophy,' he did not occupy himself with the exposition of it, but with the reconsideration of the elements

[1] Vol. i. pp. 373–520. [2] Below, p. 143

in Kant of which it was the development. In wrestling with the obscurity, awkwardness, and verbal inconsistency of the earlier philosopher, in tracking him through 'the vital play of opposing tendencies, constantly shifting their relations, but unable to arrive at a complete adjustment,' he seemed to feel his hold upon truth grow firmer, his confidence in reason more secure; while to the victorious flight of his successor, which seems to break through all dilemmas and absorb all antitheses, he could not abandon himself without a touch of misgiving. He had no liking for philosophical 'leaps in the dark,' and any necessity for distinguishing between an 'esoteric' and an 'exoteric' element in intellectual life excited his suspicion; if he was to be an Hegelian, it must not be with only 'a fraction' of himself, it must be on 'the weekdays of ordinary thought' as well as on 'the Sundays of speculation.'[1] The quality of mind which distinguished him in practical life followed him into philosophy. In both he showed the same combination of simplicity and depth, of homeliness and elevation, of limitation and comprehension. While the whole of his metaphysic might be said to be little more than a prolonged attempt to get to the bottom of the question, What is a fact of experience? an occasional remark shows that in his mind this apparently simple question involved that of the nature of the world and of God. And though he had neither the varied information which can illustrate and enforce the bare results of thought, nor the plastic impulse which divines the whole before it knows the details, yet even when he was most abstract and difficult he always gave the impression of having his feet upon the ground, and if there is little external system in his writings, there is hardly a page upon which the unity of his mind has not left its mark. As has been well said, he was a man 'who scarcely felt that he had a scientific right to any principle which he had not submitted to a testing process of years, and who never satisfied himself—as men of idealistic tendencies are too apt to satisfy themselves—with an intuitive grasp of any comprehensive idea, until he had vindicated every element of it by the hard toil of an exhaustive reflexion. Hence he was almost painful in the constancy of his recurrence to certain fundamental thoughts, which he never seemed to have sufficiently verified and explained, and which he was ever ready to reconsider in the light of new objections, even those that might seem to be comparatively unimportant to others. In this he showed how a deep faith in certain principles may be united with the questioning temper of science, and even with a scrupulous scepticism which is ever ready to go back

[1] Below, pp. 141, 142.

to the beginning, that it may exhaust everything that can be said against them. For such a mind there must always be a wide division between faith and reason, or (what in philosophy comes to the same thing) between a principle and its development into a system. Its appropriate activity must be rather to lay and to try the foundations than to build the superstructure. But it is the result of such work, and of such work alone, to secure that the foundations are immovably fixed upon the rock.'[1]

'For such a mind there must always be a wide division between faith and reason'; these words, eminently true in the context in which they are used, would be misleading if they were understood in the sense which theological controversy has given to them, a sense which would imply that to Green the truth of philosophy was different from or even incompatible with the truth of religion. That the reverse of this was the fact we have already indicated, and may now proceed to show more in detail. All who read his earliest writings must be struck with their religious tone, and will feel that this tone is no mere relic of early education or echo of a traditional phraseology, but is the natural reflex of the writer's inmost experience and convictions. They will also recognise the constant recurrence under different expressions of a single central idea, the idea that the whole world of human experience is the self-communication or revelation of an eternal and absolute being, and that dependence upon and identity with such a being is the source at once of the infinite littleness and the infinite greatness of man. 'The outer world,' we read in his first printed essay, 'is no independent existence, but a means through which man's own mind is ever more communicated to him, through which the deity, who works unseen behind it, pours the truth and love which transform his capabilities into realities.' This is the lesson which the observation both of man and nature has to teach; 'each, we may truly say, is a reasonable soul, one as being the living receptacle, the other the apt channel, of the influx of divinity.' When the good man studies the laws of the physical world, 'he finds that it is only what he gives to it that he receives from it, but yet by some mysterious affinity it evokes what he has to give, and then it bears witness with his own spirit that what he gives is not his own, but inspired from above'; and similarly when he reflects on the force of circumstances in his own life, he comes to recognise that while 'it cannot be evaded, it may become a power of good instead of evil,' and is conscious of being 'no longer the slave of the

[1] Professor E. Caird, in the preface to *Essays in philosophical criticism*, edited by Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane; London, 1883.

world, but of him whose service is perfect freedom.' It is the failure to learn this lesson that causes many of the disappointments of modern men of genius; 'they forget that all truth partakes of the nature of revelation, and that, though they are bound to work actively on their own part, yet it is only by humbly resigning themselves "in a wise passiveness" to the heavenly influences which are ever about them, that their minds can attain to that harmony with themselves and the divine idea which is the key of all knowledge.' To purge the soul of this false conceit is part of the function of great works of imagination. 'It is the littleness, not the greatness of man, which separates him from the divine; not intellectual pride, not spiritual self-assertion, but the meanness of his ordinary desires, the degradation of his higher nature to the pursuit of animal ends, keep him under the curse. From this curse tragedy, in its measure, helps to relieve him. For an hour, it may be, or a day, it raises him into a world of absolute ideality, where he may forget his wants and his vanity, and lose himself in a struggle in which the combatants are the forces of the spirit, and of which the end is that annihilation in collision with destiny which is but the blank side of reconciliation with it.' Such reconciliation, partly attained by self-surrender to the truth of science or art, is attained more fully in religion. 'The common doctrine, which connects the sense of sin with the confidence of salvation, has often been denounced by theologians; but it seems to have its root in the truest feelings which bind earth to heaven. When the force of circumstances has lost that hold on the spirit which cuts it off from communion with God, it will still limit our power in action, and prevent our outward walk and conduct from answering exactly to the motions of our purified will, and thus our very imperfections may win us to that childlike dependence on God which is only another aspect of the assurance of salvation.'[1]

The ideas thus expressed in youth recur, in less distinctively theological language, in his later writings. 'The common characteristic of all such modern philosophy as is not either sceptical or materialistic is, that it makes human thought potentially divine,'[2] and his own was no exception. In the essay on Aristotle, referring to the supposed unknowableness of God, he says, 'If in any true sense man can commune with the spirit within him, in the same he may approach God as one who, according to the highest christian idea, "liveth in him." Man, however, is slow to recognise the divinity that is within himself, in his relation to the world. He will find the spiritual somewhere, but cannot believe that it is the natural rightly understood. What is

[1] Below, pp. 4, 6, 7, 15, 25. [2] Below, p. 172.

under his feet and between his hands is too cheap and trivial to be the mask of eternal beauty. But half aware of the blindness of sense which he confesses, he fancies that it shows him the everyday world, from which he must turn away if he would attain true vision. If a prophet tell him to do some great thing, he will obey. He will draw up ideal truth from the deep, or bring it down from heaven, but cannot believe that it is within and around him. Stretching out his hands to an unknown God, he heeds not the God in whom he lives and moves and has his being. He cries for a revelation of him, yet will not be persuaded that his hiding-place is the intelligible world, and that he is incarnate in the son of man, who through the communicated strength of thought is lord also of that world.'[1] In the essay on popular philosophy, again, he speaks of the consciousness of sin as 'the consciousness of an infinite vacancy only possible to a being capable of an infinite fulness,' and declares that, 'only if we recognise in man a spirit properly infinite, because an object to itself, but which has gradually and with perpetual incompleteness to realise its infinite capacity, does this form of religious experience, of which all other forms are modifications, become explicable.'[2] In the first *Introduction* to Hume the consideration of the metaphysical proof of the existence of God gives him occasion to develop these ideas further. Locke had argued that if anything really now exists, something must have existed from eternity, and that thus the real existence of ourselves, of which we have immediate knowledge, is evidence of the real existence of God. The validity of such an argument is shown to depend on what we understand by the real existence of anything. If it means the occurrence of an event, the presentation of something here and now, then, as an event is something which happens after something else, we can doubtless argue from any given occurrence to a series of preceding occurrences, and to such a series no limit can be set, because a first event would be no event at all; it would be 'a contingency contingent upon nothing.' But such an 'unlimited addibility' of events clearly cannot be that which constitutes the 'infinity' of God, any more than an unlimited addibility of spaces can be that which constitutes his 'immensity.' Whatever else these words mean they imply totality, but a totality of times and spaces is from the nature of the case impossible; a number of things of which the sum can always be increased obviously cannot represent a perfect being, nor is a thing repeated an indefinite number of times in any way different from the same thing not repeated at all. Indeed the power which we have, or rather the

[1] Below, p. 87. [2] Below, p. 121.

necessity which we are under, of thinking of nature as infinitely divisible or infinitely addible, so far from implying an infinite capacity in us, 'arises from the presentation of objects under that very condition of endless, unremoved, distinction, which constitutes the true limitation of our thought'; it is because we only know nature under the conditions imposed by our sensitive organisation that it is an illimitable process, and, in this sense, the infinity of our experience simply means its perpetual incompleteness. But the truth is that when we argue from an event to something which accounts for it, we are no longer treating it as merely an event, as 'a present which next moment becomes a past'; we are treating it as something which 'takes its character from the relation to the thing or system of things of which it is an altered appearance, but which in itself is always the same,' and the complete 'account' of it would be nothing less than the fully realised conception of that system. 'In short, if events were merely events, no law of causation and therefore no knowledge would be possible. If the knowledge founded on this law actually exists, then the "argumentum a contingentia mundi" rightly understood—the inference from nature to a being neither in time nor contingent but self-dependent and eternal, that constant reality of which events are the changing appearance—is valid, because the conception of nature, of a world to be known, already implies such a being.' Applying these considerations to the particular thing called the self, we must say that, if the reality of the self is taken to consist in 'single feelings in the moments of their occurrence,' to prove a real existence of God from it is simply 'to prove one impossibility from another.' For just as each outer thing turns out to be (in Locke's language) a 'retainer to something else,' so is it with the mind, as long as by the mind is understood 'a thinking thing, different in each man, to which his inner experience is referred as accidents to a substance. The same law of thought which compels such reference requires that the thinking thing in its turn, as that which is born grows and dies, be referred as an accident to some ulterior substance. Such a dependent being cannot be an ultimate substance; nor can any natural agents to which we may trace its dependence really be so either.' 'The first result of such a consideration will naturally be an attempt to treat the inner synthesis as a fiction of thought or figure of speech'; but 'the final result will rather be the discovery that the single feeling is nothing real, but that the synthesis of appearances, which alone for us constitutes reality, is never final or complete; that thus absolute reality, like ultimate substance, is never to be found by us—in a thinking as little as in a material thing—

belonging as it does only to that divine self-consciousness, of which the presence in us is the source and bond of the ever-growing synthesis called knowledge, but which, because it is the source of that synthesis and not one of its partial results, is neither real nor knowable in the same sense as is any other object. It is this presence which alone gives meaning to "proofs of the being of God," to Locke's among the rest. For it is in a sense true, as he held, that my own real existence is evidence of the existence of God, since the self, in the only sense in which it is absolutely real or an ultimate subject, is already God.' The true infinity of God, then, so far from being infinity of duration, is inconsistent with the very notion of duration; 'it is not "the idea we have of perishing distance," derived from our fleeting consciousness in which what is once past can never be recalled, but the attribute of a consciousness of which, if it is to be described in terms of time at all, it can only be said that "it does now exist to-morrow."' And 'if it be asked, What meaning can we have in speaking of such a consciousness? the answer must be, Just as much or as little meaning as we have when, in like contradiction to the successive presentation of ideas, we speak of a self, constituted by consciousness, as identical with itself throughout the years of our life.'[1]

The result of these and similar passages is that God is the ultimate being or reality, that to which we come when we think out what is implied in the existence of a world to be known and a mind to know it, that of which there is already a forecast in the most elementary facts of human experience, and of which the fullest human experience is still only a forecast. We have now to see how this conception was connected in his mind with the christian conception of God. His view of christianity is to be gathered partly from courses of lectures on parts of the New Testament, delivered at frequent intervals during his tutorship, partly from occasional addresses of a distinctly religious character. The former, of which some extracts are printed in this volume,[2] were not intended to be original contributions to biblical criticism. He took the material for them chiefly from German works, especially those of F. C. Baur, and his main purpose was to enforce certain truths contained in the books of the New Testament, and at the same time to point out where they seemed to him to have been misunderstood or perverted by the writers themselves or by subsequent interpreters. Probably many of his hearers were incapable of appreciating at the time the deeper

[1] Vol. i. pp. 120–121, 124–125, 128–129, 227.

[2] Below, pp. 186–220.

ideas which he endeavoured to elicit from the epistles of Paul and the fourth gospel, and for that very reason they were likely to be disproportionately impressed by the unfavourable light which he sometimes threw upon the controversies of the early church. But if in these critical and expository lectures his intense sympathy with the spirit of Jesus and Paul was less obvious than his impatience of the mystifications with which party prejudice or ecclesiasticism had overlaid it, in the addresses on *The witness of God* and *Faith*[1] his positive convictions found unabated expression. It had been a custom with the tutors at Balliol to speak to their pupils on the evening before the Sundays on which the communion was to be administered, and when he became a tutor he had, as a layman, to consider whether he should continue the practice. The long-cherished desire to utter himself on religion, checked by the consciousness 'with how little of personal example he could enforce his words,' resulted in his speaking 'seldom and below his conviction'[2] on the subjects which of all others lay nearest to his heart. The first address was given in 1870, the second not until 1877, and he never gave another. But in these two is concentrated the essence of his religious experience, expressed with all his accustomed weightiness and with a simplicity and finish to which he seldom attained.

The study of them shows that the bond of connexion between his metaphysic and his religion lay in the conception of self-consciousness. By this, as we have seen, he understood a consciousness which is itself and not itself in one. Such a consciousness, operative in the simplest human perceptions and desires, reaches its highest forms in intelligence and love. The impulse to understand the world may be described with equal truth either as the impulse to make it our own or as the impulse to put ourselves into it. It is an impulse only possible to a being conscious of something which it is not, but in which for that very reason it feels an interest. Of this interest the emotions associated with understanding are various forms; the fear of the unknown, the distress of doubt, the pricking of curiosity, the ardour of discovery, the joy of vision, these can only be felt by a power which in missing, seeking, and finding truth misses, seeks, and finds itself. To this self-conscious power is due the fact that each fresh act of understanding, while it brings a keener sense of satisfaction, brings also a keener sense of more to be understood. For the growth of the subject in knowledge is also the growth of its object; the beyond which the self divines everywhere is no mirage, but the projection of its own infinity; and in this sense it is true to

[1] Below, pp. 230–276. [2] Below, p. 246.

say that man is what he understands, and that in coming to know the world he comes to be himself. In love the same activity is carried to a higher stage; here the self is conscious not only of a unity of being but of a unity of will with that which it loves; it finds its own good in that of its object, and in living for it lives for itself. Love is thus the consummation of self-consciousness; in it the activity which begins in the mere sense of self and something else, reaches the point at which absolute self-satisfaction and absolute self-surrender are one and the same thing. We may best conceive of God as such a completed self-consciousness, a being of perfect understanding and perfect love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realisation through self-sacrifice. The essence of christianity lies in the fact that it has expressed more articulately and enforced more practically than any other religion this conception of the divine nature. In the New Testament God is described as loving the world, as dying for it, and as living again in it, and these acts are represented not merely as events which took place once and were over, but also as an eternal life in which every man may partake if he will, and apart from which he is spiritually dead. In the latter mode of representation, as Green conceived, lies the permanent truth of christianity, and to realise this truth for himself and others was the object of all his thinking about religion.

'It has been sometimes remarked that if all the New Testament had been lost to us except some half-dozen texts, the essence of christianity would have been preserved in these, so that out of them everything in it that is of permanent moral value might have been developed; and if there can be an essence within the essence of christianity, it is the thought embodied in the text, "The word is nigh thee;" the thought of God not as "far off" but "nigh," not as a master but as a father, not as a terrible outward power, forcing us we know not whither, but as one of whom we may say that we are reason of his reason and spirit of his spirit; who lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for the brethren, even as in so living we live freely, because in obedience to a spirit which is our self; in communion with whom we triumph over death, and have assurance of eternal life.' These words give the keynote of his religious belief. In the unfinished address [1] from which they are taken he had intended to consider in what sense we are 'rationally entitled' to this conception, 'which was the kernel of St. Paul's christianity, and which still seems the only foundation for a religious morality.' The ultimate justification of it, the evidence, in other

[1] Below, pp. 220–229.

words, for the belief in God, in the only sense in which it admits of evidence, he finds in the moral nature of man, as in the *Introduction* to Hume he found it in his intellectual nature. As knowledge, with its implied distinction of degrees of truth, is only possible to a self to which every perception suggests a further unknown but knowable world, so moral action, i.e. action expressing desire to become better than we are, implies 'the conscious contrast between an actual and possible self, and the impulse to make that possible self real.' And as the desire to understand, i.e. to be more at one with reality, is its own evidence of an absolutely real in which through knowledge we increasingly participate, so the desire to be better, the desire for a more satisfying state of ourselves, is its own evidence of an absolute best, with which through unselfish life we more and more identify ourselves; and this best or 'possible' self is God. If such an account of him seem to imply that 'he does not actually exist at all, but is a mere name for an empty ideal of what each of us would like to become,' it must be remembered that in the moral development of the self, as in any other development, the result which is being developed is the true reality, while what we are accustomed to call our 'real' self, the self as it happens to be at any given point in its development, is only a stage on the way to a completer self, relatively to which it is unreal. Nor need we be alarmed by the thought that so to conceive of God is in a sense to identify him with man. The identity of two things not only admits but implies difference. The identity of the human with the divine consists in the consciousness which man has of a perfect being which is his own self and which yet he is not; the consciousness, if the paradox may be allowed, of being better than he is. Selfishness or sin is the attempt to find satisfaction in what cannot satisfy him, or, in other words, the attempt to live as if the limited self which he is at any moment were final or absolute. He escapes from sin in becoming conscious of it, i.e. in becoming conscious of his actual limitations and his infinite possibilities, of his difference from and his identity with a perfect being. While therefore it is true that but for his consciousness of God he would not be conscious of sin, it is also true that sin is not in God; the imperfection which in man is never wholly overcome, but remains a positive and final fact separating him from God, exists in God not as sin but as an element in the divine perfection, in which its finality, and therefore its sinfulness, is done away.

This conception of God as the ideal human self is worked out, on somewhat different lines, in the address on *The witness of God.*

Starting again with Paul's conception of Christ as God present and operative in man, he asks, 'Can we penetrate behind the cloak of theological artifice with which his language has been overlaid, to a meaning, true, permanently, and for us?' In declaring Christ to be one with God, 'so that what he did God did,' Paul implied that 'a death unto life, a life out of death, must be in some way the essence of the divine nature; must be an act, which, though exhibited once for all in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, is yet eternal, the act of God himself'; and in declaring further that man has to die and live again with Christ, he implied that man has continually to 're-enact' in his life this eternal act of God. This means that in order to get to God man must begin by surrendering all 'personal pretension'; he must recognise the fact that all that he truly is and does is derived, communicated, revealed; that what he calls his self, that which he hugs, that of which he is proud, that in which he shuts himself up against other men, is really dependent on a being which is not here or there, not of this time or that, not mine or yours. To recognise this is to die in order to live, to empty oneself in order to be filled; it is the putting on of a 'new man,' showing itself in a changed attitude of mind and character. A man so transformed 'looks even upon the natural world with altered eyes; it is no longer a field for complacent curiosity to roam in, but the first stage of God's revelation of himself.' For there is an intellectual as well as a moral selfishness. The indolence which makes us acquiesce in a superficial view of things, the conceit of knowledge which makes us 'pore upon ourselves and look askance at our fellows,' separate us from God no less than sensuality and self-indulgence; just as on the other hand the 'fabric of true knowledge is without figure of speech the work of the same spiritual yearning' as 'the temple of christian fellowship, where no man seeks his own, but everyone another's good.' God is perfect intelligence and love, and the only way to know him and prove him to ourselves is to become like him. 'We talk, half sorrowfully, half complacently, of the demoralising or unchristianising tendencies of modern life. Opinion, it is said, is fundamentally unsettled; science keeps encroaching on the old faith; the lineaments of the God whom our fathers worshipped are blurred by philosophy; and meanwhile an enlightened hedonism seems competent to answer all practical questions. It is no fault of the individual if, amid such influences, he loses the thought of God's presence and the consciousness of his love, which indeed can only be retained by taking refuge in mysteries or going out of the world.' But language like this is only 'the foppery of men who want new

excuses for old sins. It is still our sins and nothing else that separate us from God. Philosophy and science, to those who seek not to talk of them but to know their power, do but render his clearness more clear, and the freedom of his service a more perfect freedom. His witness grows with time. In great books and great examples, in the gathering fulness of spiritual utterance which we trace through the history of literature, in the self-denying love which we have known from the cradle, in the moralising influences of civil life, in the closer fellowship of the christian society, in the sacramental ordinances which represent that fellowship, in common worship, in the message of the preachers through which, amid diversity of stammering tongues, one spirit still speaks,—here God's sunshine is shed abroad without us. If it does not reach within the heart, it is because the heart has a darkness of its own, some unconquered selfishness which prevents its relation to him being one of "sincerity and truth."' The Pauline conception, then, of true religion, as the participation by us in 'an eternal act of death into life, manifested in Christ,' is not 'a mere piece of doubtful metaphysics'; rather it expresses the fundamental principle of human nature and experience, the principle that man, being self-conscious, can only realise himself by going out of himself, by assimilating and being assimilated to the being to whom at every point in his experience he finds himself related. It is a principle to which all that is best in human life testifies, and the only and sufficient way to prove it to ourselves is 'to share in the higher spirit' of the men about us. 'We need not make a rush after the heroic, or seek to jump out of our circumstances. The end to be attained is indeed infinite; but we need not therefore vainly try to swell our own effort to a like infinity, for it is already attained for us. The sacrifice has been offered, the goal has been won. God is for ever perfect light and love.' All that man has to do is to surrender himself to the eternal fact, to live in order to understand and to love what he understands. 'Such believing love, once wrought into the life and character, "not in word but in power," can survive all shocks of criticism, all questions as to historical events. It needs no evidence of the presence of God, or the work of Christ the spirit, for it is that presence and work itself. It *is* the crucifixion of the flesh, it *is* the new life, it *is* the resurrection of the dead.'

The writer was well aware that the above interpretation of the language of Paul would seem to many good people 'a substitution of moral philosophy for christianity proper.' 'A God who made us and knows us, as from without; a Christ who at a certain time did

certain miraculous acts on our behalf, and who now, having left us certain commands, is at the right hand of God exalted, to return again at some future time and judge us according to our obedience to his commands,—these, it may be said, are intelligible objects. There are strong grounds for believing them, and as believed in they influence our actions through fear, and hope, and gratitude. But an immanent God, a God present *in* the believing love of him and the brethren, a Christ within us, a continuous resurrection,—these are mere thoughts of our own; they are not "objective;" if there is nothing else to constrain and restrain us, we are left to ourselves.' His answer to these difficulties, indicated in the address on *The witness of God*, forms the main subject of that on *Faith*. It is briefly this. The faith or belief which is the essence of all real religion, which religious people represent as constituting the highest spiritual life, and which even those who do not themselves experience it cannot, if they are honest, help regarding with reverence, is absolutely independent of anything that can be called historical evidence. It is a certain disposition of a man's mind or character, consisting in the consciousness of his potential unity with God, and issuing in the effort to realise this unity in his life. It neither requires nor admits any external proof, for to the man who has it the certainty of God is inseparable from the certainty of himself. Any attempt to derive or account for it from antecedent events is necessarily fallacious, for it will always be found that the events from which it is derived owe their spiritual conclusiveness to the consciousness of the person who appeals to them; it is because his consciousness is already faith that the events are accepted and interpreted by him as evidences of his faith. Nevertheless it is true that the majority of persons calling themselves christians believe their christianity to depend upon the acceptance of statements purporting to record certain past events, in particular the miraculous birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus. So far indeed as such persons have really appropriated the essence of christianity, they are better than their own theory; the object of their belief, whatever they may say, is not any past event, but God present and working in them. And so long as they interpret the supposed evidences for their belief in this way, so long as, like Paul and the writer of the fourth gospel, they unconsciously identify the thing signified with the sign, the present death of selfishness and new life to righteousness in their own persons with the physical death and resurrection of Jesus in the past, there is no danger in their state of mind and no reason for attempting to disturb it. But it is otherwise when the two

factors in faith fall asunder, and the attempt begins to represent the spiritual life as an effect of or conclusion from a narrative of past events. The result of such an attempt is dogmatic theology, a phase of the human mind in which, having lost its hold on the original religious experiences of the founders of christianity, it substitutes for them chains of reasoning the same in kind as those by which it would explain or establish any physical or historical phænomenon. Here begins the opposition between faith and knowledge, which has gradually taken the place of the true scriptural opposition between faith and sense. The dogmatic theologian appeals to certain events as evidence for his religious belief. Events are particular objects of actual or possible experience, and every such object is experienced by us as a constituent of one world, to the other constituents of which it is necessarily related. The world conceived as forming one continuous system is what we mean by 'nature,' and the 'uniformity of nature,' which, whether consciously formulated or not, is the implicit condition of all knowledge, means that everything which happens is an element in a system, and is what it is in virtue of its place in the system. A 'supernatural event,' therefore, would be something which contradicted the conditions under which alone a thing can be an 'event'; it would be something which purported to be an element in a continuous order and yet at the same time to break the continuity of the order, a constituent which was a constituent of nothing; and as long as the truth of religion is supposed to depend upon supernatural events, science is right in pronouncing it a fiction and in identifying faith with unreason. On the other hand, faith and knowledge rightly understood cannot come into conflict, for both alike have their source in reason or self-consciousness. The impulse to knowledge is due to the consciousness, however dim, of a reality, 'one, complete, and absolute,' which the self potentially is. The growth of knowledge is the growing realisation of this consciousness, the growing apprehension of the way in which all objects and events are mutually related, and, as so related, make one world. A thing is properly speaking 'known' or 'an object of knowledge' in so far as we are aware of the relations or conditions which make it what it is; but the limitations imposed by our physical organisation, the fact that the reality of any object of knowledge must imply the possibility of sensuous presentation here and now, makes the complete apprehension of these conditions impossible. Thus however far the process of knowledge may have advanced, the idea of a discoverable unity or complete system of relations, which is the

motive power in the process, remains always an unrealised idea; it cannot be presented as an object of knowledge, because everything properly so called is particular, i.e. implies other objects, and these again others, and so on indefinitely. The known world, then, is never actually what it is in possibility, and if by 'nature' we understand the known world, we must say that nature and the knowledge of nature never satisfies the demand for complete reality which reason makes and cannot help making. This inextinguishable but unfulfilled demand is faith. Though it finds no object corresponding to it in experience, it is implied in all experience, and if reality be measured by power of work, it is the most real because the most operative of all things, being in fact no other than the energy of reason or self-consciousness seeking satisfaction under the limitations of a human organisation. This satisfaction it finds, though imperfectly, in knowledge, i.e. in the various activities by which the world is explained, and in a higher degree, though still imperfectly, in moral life, i.e. in the various activities by which the world is not only explained but made better. Thus what is called 'spiritual' or 'matter of faith' (in the language of religion), or 'metaphysical' (in the language of philosophy), is not something which makes itself known by overriding or interfering with what is 'natural' or 'physical.' The consciousness of one reality and one perfection, which is the consciousness of God, is the source alike of science and of religion, of understanding and of love; in both God communicates himself to us, in both we attain partial freedom from our limitations and come to our true selves. This consciousness is not something which 'proves' God to us, it is itself the presence of God in us. 'You complain that by searching you cannot find out God. No eye can see, or ear hear him. The assertion that he exists cannot be verified like any other matter of fact. But what if that be not because he is so far off, but because he is so near? You cannot know him as you know a particular fact related to you, but neither can you so know yourself; and it is yourself, not as you are, but as in seeking him you become, that is his revelation. "Say not in thine own heart, Who shall ascend into heaven or descend into the deep," to find God in the height of another world or in the depths of nature. "The word of God is very nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart." It is the word that has been made man; that has been uttering itself in all the high endeavour, the long-suffering love, the devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind, and that now speaks in your conscience. It is the God in you which strives for communication with God.'

Thus we are brought round again to the idea which was never far off in the mind of the writer, the idea of God as the 'possible self,' which is gradually attaining reality in the experience of mankind. The mere statement of any such conception can never convey the concrete form which it takes in the mind and life of the person who holds it; nor will it help us much to affiliate it to any of the current terms of theological classification. To the question which is sure to be asked by those who hear or read of Green, Was he a christian? the answer must depend on what 'to be a christian' means. If it means to believe that every man has God in him, that religion is the continual death of a lower and coming to life of a higher self, and that these truths were more vividly realised in thought and life by Jesus of Nazareth and some of his followers than by any other known men, then without doubt he was a christian. If it means to believe that the above truths depend upon the fact that Jesus was born and died under conditions impossible to other human beings, then equally without doubt he was not a christian. If he had been asked, why then he so habitually used the language of orthodox christianity, he would probably have answered that language is not the private property of any man or set of men, and that much of the phraseology of Paul and the fourth gospel, though freely adopted by the orthodox, is quite incompatible with some of the doctrines of orthodoxy. But the truth is that the distinction of orthodox and heterodox, with all its attendant babel of controversy, had but little interest for him; not because he wished to shirk unpleasant questions, nor because he was not clear as to what he believed, but because he cared about the reality of religion and not about its accessories, and was convinced that its reality does not depend upon its dogmatic expression. He had indeed strong natural prejudices, which attracted him to certain forms of religious experience and repelled him from certain others; but he was quite free from the gladiatorial spirit which regards opinions, not as vehicles of truth or falsehood, but as weapons for attack or defence. If people (to use one of his favourite phrases) 'had the root of the matter in them,' he cared little that it branched out here and there into conclusions which personally he might consider heterogeneous. The enemy which he dreaded for religion was not either orthodoxy or unorthodoxy, but selfishness and indifference. In rejecting the doctrine that spiritual life depends upon the belief in miracles, he was not reluctantly abandoning, in deference to the requirements of modern science and culture, a cherished and once tenable position; he was recovering, as he conceived, the position which the true genius of

religion had always held, and which was only weakened by the irrelevant or fictitious outworks of theological argumentation. But he would readily have admitted what the history of mankind abundantly shows, that ignorance and superstition may coexist with great and genuine spirituality of character and life. If a man's consciousness of God is awakened by the occurrence of unusual physical phænomena, or if, following the same impulse to find God in nature, he sustains that consciousness by imagining physical impossibilities, this is only one of many illustrations of the confused and imperfect way in which we receive the communication of the divine spirit; and he warns us emphatically against 'rashly tampering' with such a state of mind.[1] The weak point in it, as he conceived, is not that it believes God to be the cause of nature, but that it misunderstands the sense in which this is true. Two events are causally connected when they reciprocally imply one another, and such reciprocity is only possible if the two things are one as well as two, one thing acting and reacting on itself. That 'everything has a cause' means that everything is a particular form of reciprocal action and reaction, each agent and reagent being indifferently regarded as the cause or the effect of the other. If we say that God is related to nature as cause to effect, it must be in the sense in which 'the cause is the effect in unity';[2] in other words, we must conceive of God as the single indivisible but self-differentiating energy, of the eternal action and reaction of which all events are partial forms. From such a point of view the assertion that God causes any particular phænomenon 'is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning';[3] for in whatever sense he is the cause of any one phænomenon, he is the cause of all. If then a belief in the supernatural means that the full explanation of any natural event, involving as it does the system of the universe, cannot be exhibited by any human intelligence, it is true, but then it gives no ground for calling one event more or less supernatural than another; in any other sense it can only mean a belief that the energy which creates the order of nature 'reveals itself by annulling the order in which it is implied and apart from which it has no reality,'[4] in a word, that God uncreates himself.

It was this misconception of the relation between God and nature that seemed to him to have produced the dogmas relating to the person of Christ. To him the incarnation and resurrection could only mean that the divine spirit, the spirit whose activity is an

[1] Below, p. 244.
[2] Vol. i. p. 130.
[3] Below, p. 264.
[4] Below, p. 128.

eternal death into life and life out of death, is perpetually being manifested, in various degrees and under various forms, in all that is good in human experience. He believed indeed that in Jesus of Nazareth this spirit was present in an exceptional way, but he deprecated the attempt to reconstruct from uncertain documents the precise details of his teaching and character, contenting himself with gathering their most salient features from such sources as the sermon on the mount, and preferring to dwell more at length on the form in which they are presented in the Pauline epistles and the fourth gospel. In these writings he found the beginning of that fusion of ideas to which so much both of the power and of the degeneration of christianity may be traced. Paul represents the bodily death and resurrection of Jesus as in some sense the condition of the moral death and regeneration which he experienced in his own person; the 'putting off of the flesh' which consists in deliverance from selfishness is identified in his mind with the putting off which consists in the dissolution of the body, and the putting on of the 'new' or spiritual man with the assumption of a 'glorified body.' Similarly the fourth gospel insists at one moment that God 'became flesh' in Jesus, that is, was manifested in a bodily form to the senses, at another that he is only manifested in a spiritual life and only apprehensible to a spiritual consciousness. This fusion of the physical and the spiritual results from the attempt to conceive the revelation of God as having taken place once for all within the limits of an individual human life. Religion cannot dispense with such attempts, for 'all religion (as distinct alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination. The value of the religion depends on the adequacy of the imagined form to the object thought of (to which it never can be quite adequate).' The fourth gospel has fulfilled 'the special function of presenting the highest thought about God in language of the imagination, and has thus become the source of the highest religion'; for the most nearly adequate way in which we can imagine God is 'as a man in whom that which seems to be the end of moral discipline and progress has been fully attained, viz. the union of the will with God, perfect unselfishness, the direction of desire to ends which one rational being can consciously share with all other rational beings. Such a "man" would not be a man as we know man, because the conditions of human existence in this world are such that this end can never be completely attained. Thus the religious imagination of God as Christ has to become the imagination of him as a "glorified" Christ; a Christ such as Jesus

of Nazareth was potentially, not actually; a Christ "put to death in the flesh," but alive and giving life in the spirit.'[1] It is by giving such an interpretation to the person of Christ that the writer of the fourth gospel 'has for ever taken it out of the region of history and of the doubts that surround all past events,' and has made the worship of Jesus 'amount to the worship, through love and knowledge, of God as a spiritual being, immanent in the moral life of man.' On the other hand, in proportion as men have been incapable of understanding the spiritual element in this gospel, they have fallen back upon the other, the sensuous and miraculous. The presence of God in Jesus has been supposed to have shown itself in the fact that he was free from the ordinary conditions of physical birth and death, and the incarnation and resurrection to be past events, the acceptance of which upon evidence constitutes salvation; 'Christ,' as he pregnantly expresses it,[2] 'has been gradually externalised and mystified,' taken out of the consciousness and life of the believer and put into 'objective facts' which cannot contain him except by becoming no facts at all. The same inability to conceive God except by the aid of sensuous presentation seemed to him to have given rise to the notion 'that the work of the quickening spirit is not complete without the raising of the body. Paul's doctrine on this point commends itself to the conscience of most christians, because by the "unbodied spirit" they understand something out of relation to the world. Some constituents of human worth, they think, would be wanting to such a spirit. The "glorified body" represents to them those relations, which make us what we are as men, in some higher form.'[3] In this case as in the former the value of the imaginative form depends on how far it is adequate to the reality which it suggests. The symbolisation of thought takes place in infinitely different ways in different persons. To some minds the tones of a voice, the features of a face, the lines and movements of a figure, are the natural medium through which they focus to themselves a personality which they love or reverence, while to others it is necessary to get rid of such sensible reminiscences in order to recover the whole of which they are fragments. Green was by no means unobservant or unappreciative of physical characteristics, but they did not supply the material with which his constructive imagination most naturally worked. It was on the typical products of mankind rather than on the individual producers that he liked to dwell, and in contemplating the organisation of societies, the forms of laws and institutions, or the structure of thought in

[1] Below, p. 219. [2] Below, pp. 215 and 242. [3] Below, p. 205.

systems of knowledge and morality, his mind found the imaginative expression and sustenance which others get from the sights and sounds of art or nature. The passage just quoted continues as follows; 'Moral life is a process in which we become less and less mere parts of the world, determined by natural influences, but not thereby less related to the world. That relation to it which consists in understanding, and love determined by understanding, gradually takes the place of that which consists in animal affection. The "glorified life" must be thought of as the completion of this process. A renewed "embodiment," if it means anything, would be but a return to that condition in which we are but parts of nature, a condition from which the moral life is already a partial deliverance.' The words 'but not thereby less related to the world' are here all-important. Most of the many misconceptions of 'spirituality' may be traced to the notion that it is attained by eliminating, leaving behind, and transcending what is 'natural,' instead of by absorbing, using, and developing it. Bodily sensibility and want do not perish in intelligence and love; they pass into them as the lower passes into the higher form of energy. And conversely, in understanding or in loving we are not less in contact with the real world than in the feeling of touch or of hunger, but infinitely more. It is in this sense that he speaks elsewhere [1] of 'moral self-abandonment' as being 'the completion of all the processes of the world'; the self-conscious spirit which works itself out in the various forms of physical energy seemed to him to reach the highest power known to man in the unselfishness which is for ever striving to make the world better. And if we would try to conceive a perfectly spiritual life, he would have us do it rather by thinking of what we are when we love and understand, than by picturing our bodily conditions indefinitely purged or amplified. His view of death seems to result from the same line of thought; it is 'the transition by which the highest form of nature, i.e. the highest realisation of spirit, short of its realisation in itself, passes into a perfectly adequate realisation, i.e. a spiritual one.' [2] As the moral life of each individual is a process in which the animal activities are continually passing out of themselves and finding their 'completion' in human ends, so death is not the interruption of a life which can only be resumed by a fresh 'embodiment,' but the consummation of the process by which the higher life uses up the lower and in so doing attains freedom. It is in this light that he interprets the saying of Christ that unless he went away from his disciples 'the comforter' could not come to

[1] Below, p. 214. [2] Below, p. 160.

them; 'while present to sense he could not communicate himself spiritually.'[1] And it is only an extension of the same view from the individual man to the whole of the physical world when, in Pauline language, he speaks of nature as 'groaning and travailing after God, dying because it cannot contain him, yet waiting for, and leading up to, his manifestation.'[2]

The impressions produced on many people by such language as this will probably be summed up in the judgment that the writer was a 'mystic.' If this vague phrase merely means one who believes in some other reality than what he can see or touch, it applies to all religious men; but if it be understood to imply a general cloudiness of mind, or an inability to estimate ordinary evidence, or a belief in occult properties of matter, it has no application to Green. He was the last man whom anyone could think of calling a visionary. It would indeed be hard to say at what points his religious beliefs made themselves most felt in his life, for he seldom spoke of them, and except a general seriousness there was little to suggest them in his manner or bearing. A pervading religious consciousness does not necessarily show itself in moments of observable exaltation; when and how frequently such moments are experienced is largely a matter of temperament; to one man they come only when he is in church, to another when he is in battle, to another when he is in love. The rare individuals who 'whether they eat or drink do all for the glory of God' are often unrecognisable by their contemporaries, and when recognised often seem to them either madmen or impostors. There was nothing in Green to suggest either the one or the other, nothing ecstatic or stormy or mysterious, nothing of the air of a man who had a 'new religion' to communicate. His religion was christianity, and 'the roots of christianity' as he conceived it 'are as old as mankind.' 'We cannot say of it, lo, here it is, or lo, there; it is now, but was not then. We go backward, but we cannot reach its source; we look forward, but we cannot foresee its final power.' He believed indeed that 'the "visible church" of one age is never essentially the same as that of the next, and that it is only in word, or to the intellectually dead, that the creed of the present is the same as the creed of the past'; and he looked forward to a time when the religious needs of men 'will be rather met by the sympathies of a society breathing the christian spirit than by the propositions of an anthropomorphic theology.' But with all his insistence upon the inward and personal nature of religion, he was no despiser of existing ordinances. 'We cannot

[1] Below, p. 210. [2] Below, p. 234.

afford,' he says, 'to individualise ourselves even in respect of outward symbols. We do wrong to ourselves and them, if we allow any intellectual vexation at the mode in which they may be presented to us to prevent us from their due use.' He did not disguise from himself that 'an inability to adopt the received dogmatic expression of christian faith' necessarily entailed a certain amount of 'estrangement from christian society,' but he urged that the estrangement should not be unnecessarily widened. Thus though he saw objections to using the words of a creed 'in any other meaning than that which they are ordinarily understood to bear,' he did not admit the same of prayers. 'So long as our prayers express the effort after a higher life, recognised as proceeding from, and only to be satisfied by, the grace of God, the theological formulæ in which they are clothed are of little importance. The fact that others who use them have beliefs as to historical occurrences which we do not share, need not prevent us from sharing with them what is not the expression of an historical belief but of a spiritual aspiration.' Prayer in this sense does not look for any external answer; 'it will be its own answer, even as virtuous action is its own reward. Prayer indeed, if of the right sort, is already incipient action; or, more properly, it is a moral action which has not yet made its outward sign.' It finds its 'outward sign' or fulfilment in unselfish activity, in 'the life of charity,' and in this life he saw the one unfailing mainstay of religious belief in those who cannot adopt the traditional dogmatic expression of it. It was, he thought, one of the misfortunes of university life, 'that it tends to make us overrate the importance of opinions as compared with the practical principles of the inner life; and even though as a matter of theory we avoid the mistake, yet our position and employment allow us few openings into that active life of charity in which christian faith is most readily realised. Even here, however, in our intercourse with each other, there are opportunities for us "to bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ;" nor, because much of our intellectual activity is the result of mere curiosity or emulation, should we forget that there is such a thing as a pursuit of truth, in principle identical with the striving after God which animates the moral life. Those of us to whom university life is merely an avenue to the great world, would do well betimes to seek opportunities of co-operation with those simple christians whose creed, though we may not be able exactly to adopt it, is to them the natural expression of a spirit which at the bottom of our heart we recognise as higher than our own. In the everyday life of

christian citizenship, in its struggle against ignorance and vice, such opportunities are readily forthcoming.' [1]

If after this review of his metaphysical and religious principles we would see how he himself tried to live 'the life of christian citizenship,' we must turn back a few years and take up again the thread of events. His position as a tutor does not indeed offer much material for narrative, for he seldom took an active part in university politics, and the ordinary administration of a college consists of details which, however important in themselves, cannot be made interesting or even intelligible to an outsider. In 1866 he had been put on the delegacy for managing the Oxford Local Examinations, and he was one of the promoters of a scheme by which in 1867 exhibitions were offered at Balliol to candidates who had distinguished themselves in those or similar examinations, with the object of helping men who would otherwise be unable to bear the expenses of a university education. A house was taken in St. Giles' street where the exhibitioners were lodged, and he left his rooms in college to preside over it. In the following year he welcomed the statute by which students were allowed to come to the university without belonging to a college; 'Balliol,' he thought, 'will avail itself of the opportunity to undertake the instruction of a large number of out-students.' This expectation was not fulfilled, but the audiences at his own lectures were considerably increased about this time through a combination of Balliol with New College, which was afterwards extended to include other colleges. In the same year he was instrumental in getting compulsory attendance at chapel abolished, and a roll-call substituted for those who preferred it. His letters in these years show that his old enemy sleeplessness was again harassing him; 'I am so poor a creature in nerves and stomach,' he writes in 1868, 'that, though silent and abstemious enough, I am always the worse for dinner-parties'; and the resulting depression breaks out in the remark, 'I am always chafing against necessary work, but at least it staves off melancholy.' Under these circumstances the election of Jowett to the mastership in 1870, while it rejoiced the heart of him and his friends, made the responsibilities of his position weigh heavily on him. 'This,' he writes, 'practically devolves the whole subordinate management of the college on me at a very difficult time.' 'We shall have a *régime* of strong "personal government," and in many respects shall be the better for it. But a "constitutional opposition" is desirable, and I don't feel much energy or inclination for it.' A

[1] Below, pp. 241, 251, 273-276.

short experience of the new *régime* partly confirmed and partly alleviated his apprehensions. 'Instead of the two hours daily which I used to spend over the papers during the vacation, I can scarcely find a quarter of an hour for them now; and what is worse, there is a lot that I feel ought to be done for the proper working of the college which yet I cannot do. Meanwhile I find comfort from the admirable conduct of the new master, which is really without a flaw, all minor defects having disappeared with his elevation.'

He was soon to find 'comfort' of a more intimate and sustaining kind. In January, 1871, he became engaged to a lady to whom in his heart he had long been attached, Miss Charlotte Symonds, daughter of Dr. Symonds of Clifton, and sister to John Addington Symonds, one of his oldest friends. All minds are unlocked by love, and some extracts from letters to his future wife enable us for once to penetrate the reserve which he habitually maintained about himself and his feelings. 'When I am at my best I am a very genial and joyous person. Ask anyone who has been with me during a long vacation whether it is not so . . . Almost from boyhood, behind all anxieties, I have had a consciousness analogous to that which our religious ancestors used to describe as "being at peace" or "under grace." As the philosophers say, I have had a great interest in the "objective world," regarding it almost instinctively as a manifestation of God, and letting it have its way with me without question as to the "state of my soul" or as to whether I was making the best of myself. This has not tended to make me either a more useful or a more complete man, but it has bound my days together with "natural piety," and made my life, on the whole, though void of active enjoyment, and subject to some great trials from without, very peaceful. If I am rather a melancholy bird, given to physical fatigue and depression, yet I have never known for a moment what it was to be weary of life, as the youth of this age are fond of saying that they are. The world has always seemed very good to me. I have never felt ajar with it, and hence have had no varied or tragic inward experience.' Dr. Symonds was very ill at the time of their engagement, and his daughter was wrapped up in nursing him. The following passages are from letters written to her just before and after his death. 'Compare Romans viii. 16 and 26,[1] the greatest verses in the bible, very good "to feed on," as

[1] 'The spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God . . . Likewise the spirit also helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.'

Cromwell would have said. You must cultivate a "waiting spirit," as he again would have said. If the last hour is coming, let us try to think of living in years to come as your father would have wished us to live.' 'I think of how impossible it is, at least to our present consciousness, to make up for what death takes away. I never needed to be reminded by the preachers of "the fleeting nature of temporal blessings." Somehow, though I never yet knew any great personal loss, the sense of death has always been about me from my childhood, and to look through death I find the great permanent trial of reason. It can be done, but sometimes "the flesh is weak," and it is in overcoming the "spectacle of mortality" that I am apt to find it weakest. To have been with you during this trial has done me a great deal of good, and in spite of the present sadness gives me more peace in thinking of death. It helps me to see that after all there is no waste in a good man's death. Your father's character, through his death, re-lives more strongly in you than it could during his life, and doubtless through the eyes of God, with whom he is, he sees this; even as we in virtue of the same spiritual sight, though more faintly, can still look across the grave to him. That is a wrong saying about the dead, "we shall go to him, but he will not return to us." It should be the other way. We can go to him at intervals and by effort, as the weakness of our animal nature allows, but he is for ever returning to us.' 'To lose the enjoyment of one's own present happiness from the thought that it is perpetually disappearing, is really a sign that one is hugging it too much. It is well to be happy, but the man in moral health does not think about his happiness, though a great deal about the persons that cause it. As soon as we begin to live consciously for happiness instead of for the persons or interests that make us happy, the happiness itself is vitiated; and when I find myself much affected by reflection on the fleeting nature of happiness, though it is supposed to be philosophic, I know that it is morbid, and that I am really brooding unwholesomely over my own pleasures.' 'In thinking about a future life, you may find it of help to reflect that even in this life sensations are to what we experience through them only as words to the ideas which come to us when we read or hear the words. . . I think the best notion we can form of the state after death is that it is one in which all the spiritual result of our present sensuous life remains in a higher and freer form; in which all that the good have been to each other by means of sensuous symbols here, they will still be, though the symbols are different. . . Don't you sometimes feel that communion "spirit to spirit" may be purer and freer when it is not

"face to face"? Such a feeling soon becomes unreal, and must do so while we are in nature, but it has its value.'

He was married July 1, 1871, and his life from this time, though latterly marred by ill health, was brighter and more serene. The cultivation and social gifts of his wife made it easier for him to expand in company, and hospitality became less of an effort; he worked on at his philosophy, she at helping and making friends of the poor of Oxford, the work which she best liked and which he best liked her to do. In April, 1872, he was re-elected to a fellowship at Balliol, and continued to teach there with increasing effect. It was perhaps inevitable that as the influence of his ideas became stronger, and his phraseology more fixed and more familiar by repetition, crude forms of his theories obtained a wider circulation, and any failures of his pupils in the university examinations attracted more attention. Always liable as he was to mistrust the value of his teaching, he felt acutely the discredit which he might seem to be bringing upon philosophy, and the coolness or opposition of some of those with whom originally he had been most in sympathy. But if this sometimes cast a shade across his work as a college tutor, his new position as a householder gave him greater opportunities of civic activity. His first appearance on a political platform had been in 1867, when the Oxford Reform League held a meeting to consider the reform bill which the conservative government had just introduced. 'My speech,' he writes, 'was very successful. At least I spoke for half an hour amid the great applause of the citizens, and without saying anything that I afterwards regretted. It was very unlike my old experience at the Union, where I used to be always groaned at and interrupted.' The resolution which he had to move was, 'That this meeting, considering the constitution of the present house of commons, is convinced of the necessity of the continued agitation of the question of reform.' Speaking of the opposition to be expected from the capitalists and the educated class, he said, 'We have reached that stage in our history which Lord Macaulay, I think, is said to have prophesied, when the conflict is no longer between the house of commons and the crown or the lords, but between the people and the house of commons. . . I speak within the mark when I say that four-fifths of the lower house are either great landowners or belong to the families of great landowners. . . The English aristocracy, we are told, is not an exclusive aristocracy. In one sense that is true, and that is what makes it such an awkward customer to deal with. A great capitalist generally ends by buying a great estate. When the recollections of the counter have suffi-

ciently passed away, he or his son is made a baronet. Perhaps in the next generation the family mounts a step higher still. Thus the oligarchy has a constant means of bribing the capitalists to its support. This corruption is eating out the heart of the upper commercial class, and it is but the highest outcome of a flunkeyism which pervades English society from the top to the bottom, and is incompatible with any healthy political life. The English gentleman, we are sometimes told, is the noblest work of God, but one gentleman makes many snobs. As to the educated class, it is hard to know what that means. Everyone who wears a good coat, or reads the *Times* or the *Saturday Review*, believes himself to belong to the educated class. If it means those who share in the higher education as represented by the universities, we know something of them. We see them here at close quarters in the making. I should be the last person to say anything against the higher education in the true sense, which it is my business to the best of my power to impart. But the present system of higher education in England is a protected and exclusive system. It is so in consequence of the artificial system of expense which is kept up at the universities, and of the endowments—the unequally distributed endowments—of the established church. Thus those who share in the higher education, while they gain little enough learning by it, gain a great deal of the spirit of protection and exclusion which it fosters. We must make up our minds then to the opposition of the capitalists and the educated class.' A passage in which he defended John Bright is also very characteristic. 'If he had not kept his light burning through the thick darkness of the Palmerstonian *régime*, I know not whether the nation would have emerged from its political apathy during this generation. For many years he stood virtually alone,

> "Against example good,
> Against allurement, custom, and a world
> Offended, fearless of reproach and scorn."

This is the man who the "educated liberals" tell us is not a statesman. I want to know who shall have most credit for statesmanship, men who "take upon them the mystery of things, as if they were God's spies," and who yet cannot see one inch beyond their nose, men who for these years past have been writing themselves down asses in prophecies which the next week's news refuted, or the man who throughout his career, whether in regard to the Crimean war, or India, or America, has showed a foresight that has been verified by events. They call him a demagogue, but whom does

that name best fit? Men whose trade it is to prophesy smooth things to anyone who has aught to give, or one who has been a butt for more insult and contumely than anyone in this generation? They say he is a revolutionist, when they themselves advocate a system which empties the country of its yeomen, the natural support of true conservatism, and by treating five-sixths of the people as political aliens, leads, by inexorable necessity, to revolution.'

About a year afterwards, in February, 1868, when the conservative bill had become law, he proposed the toast of 'parliamentary reform' at a dinner of the Wellington Lodge of Odd Fellows, Goldwin Smith being in the chair. Referring to the current saying that the government by their measure had 'dished the whigs,' he said; 'On such a question it is idle to talk of who wins or who loses. The winner is no party, whig, conservative, or radical. The whole nation wins by a measure which makes us for the first time one people. We who were reformers from the beginning, always said that the enfranchisement of the people was an end in itself. We said, and we were much derided for saying so, that citizenship only makes the moral man; that citizenship only gives that self-respect, which is the true basis of respect for others, and without which there is no lasting social order or real morality. If we were asked what result we looked for from the enfranchisement of the people, we said, that is not the present question; untie the man's legs, and then it will be time to speculate how he will walk.' Among the tasks which lay before the reformed parliament he dwelt specially on the reform of the land laws. 'Our present system of great estates, as I believe, gives a false set to society from top to bottom. It causes exaggerated luxury at the top, flunkeyism in the middle, poverty and recklessness at the bottom. There is no remedy for this poverty and recklessness as long as those who live on the land have no real and permanent interest in it. . . It is this debased population that gluts the labour-market, and constantly threatens to infect the class of superior workmen, who can only secure themselves, as I believe, by such a system of protection as is implied in the better sort of trades-union. This is an evil which no individual benevolence can cure. Ten thousand soup-kitchens are unavailing against it. It can only be cured by such legislation as will give the agricultural labourer some real interest in the soil.'

Among those who appealed to the new constituencies in 1868 were several Oxford liberals, and his next address was delivered to a meeting of agricultural labourers at Wootton on behalf of G. S. Brodrick, who was standing for Woodstock. His subject was 'The

condition of the labouring classes, what it is and what it might be.' 'I spoke for an hour,' he says, 'on the effect of bad laws upon their condition, and (a harder task) on the possible good to be done them by good laws. They seemed to understand me better than I expected.' The meeting was held in a 'sort of cart-house,' and 'sometimes my best sentences were greeted by the neighing of a horse.' Of his friends who were standing for parliament, none were successful except his former private tutor, C. S. Parker; 'not however,' he remarks, 'because they were "philosophers," but because, being unknown and without local connexion, they were trying on "purity principles" for boroughs either corrupt or virtually close.' 'The vehement tory partisanship shown by the clergy at this election, though to some extent effective for its present purpose, will,' he thinks, 'damage the church very much in the long run.' The new ministry did not altogether please him. 'I wish,' he writes at the end of 1868, 'that Bright had either not been prevailed on to join it, or had insisted on having more backing within it. I much dread Lowe's influence in it. Among other things he will probably prevent the government from undertaking legislation on the basis of the report of the Schools Inquiry Commission. He has published a vehement pamphlet against the said report, and on the side of leaving middle-class education to take care of itself on the simple "private advantage" or supply and demand system. I have not seen it, but am told that he falls specially foul of certain passages in my report. As I wrote them with conscious antagonism to his views, I have no right to complain, but I heartily wish on public grounds that he were out of the way. Indeed for some years I have regarded him as the most mischievous politician going. The worst of it is,' he adds humorously, 'that I share this opinion, though on quite different grounds, with Dr. Pusey.' This was not the only collision into which he was brought by his report. In May of the same year he writes, 'I am beginning to get angry letters from private schoolmasters, complaining of the "violent animus" which I exhibit against them.'

The year 1870 brought elementary education to the front. On January 27 a meeting was held at Oxford to consider the best means of promoting it, and he spoke in favour of the program of the National Education League, with its three points of 'compulsory attendance, the maintenance of the schools out of the public funds, and unsectarian instruction.' By the last he explains that he does not mean secular education. 'I am not the least frightened by the dictum of the pedants, that unsectarian christianity cannot be

taught.' His eyes, he declared, had been opened on the subject by reading fourteen years before an essay by Dr. Temple, 'the material parts of which were embodied in the scheme of the League.' When Forster's bill came, it did not at all satisfy him; in respect of compulsion he thought it 'wholly insufficient,' nor was his opinion changed when eight years later he reviewed its operation in two lectures delivered in the Liberal Hall at Oxford on the elementary school system of England.[1] 'The authors of the act,' he there complains, 'seem only to have looked at one of the faults of the system already in operation. They allowed their attention to be concentrated solely on the palpable fact of its insufficiency for providing schools in the less favoured districts, and in their hurry to remedy this evil, did not consider that the plan which should supply schools most quickly might not, in the long run, be the best for the education of the country.' The chief defects in the act he considers to be that it did not make school boards universal, and ('a point which has been very little noticed') that it 'left denominationalism undisturbed in its possession of the training colleges.' The provisions in regard to religious instruction he thinks fair enough, and regrets that 'the nonconformists, having a real grievance, should have put it on the wrong ground by objecting to them.' He looks forward to a time when 'it will be considered that the state, by long continuance of a subsidy to voluntary schools, far exceeding the voluntary contributions to them, has fairly bought out all private claims to their use, and is entitled to regulate them as it likes.' In the meantime he advocates an extension of the powers of existing school-boards in towns, by which they should be enabled to superintend, not only the attendance, but the general system of instruction (the religious excepted) in voluntary schools. In this way might be avoided some of the waste of power resulting from the fact that each parish in a town has its own school, 'worked entirely without reference to another parochial school a few hundred yards off,' and that one master consequently has to teach pupils in all stages of knowledge and ignorance. The rational plan, where there are several schools in a small radius, would be 'to combine the more advanced scholars in one, those of standard IV. in another, and so on with the other standards, each group having the individual attention of one or more masters.' Something, though less, of the same kind might be done in the country by district boards corresponding to unions or larger areas. He had hopes himself of getting on the school-board which, after considerable opposition, was established at Oxford in 1871, but it was not until the second election in

[1] Below, p. 413.

1874 that he succeeded. As however sufficient school accommodation had been provided by voluntary efforts during the term of grace allowed by the act, the work of the board was confined to promoting attendance, and there was comparatively little scope for those who would naturally have been most active upon it.

Next to popular education the social subject which interested him the most was temperance. He seems to have begun his decisive connexion with the movement in its favour in 1872, when he joined the United Kingdom Alliance, of which he afterwards was made a vice-president. In 1875 he set up a coffee tavern in St. Clement's, and when in the same year the Oxford Diocesan branch of the Church of England Temperance Society was instituted, he was induced to be its treasurer in spite of his protestations that he was 'a questionable churchman and little known to the clergy.' The following year he became president of the Oxford Band of Hope Temperance Union. His views upon the legislative side of the subject may be gathered from a paper which he read[1] at the conference of the United Kingdom Alliance held at Oxford in February, 1882. Assuming the desirability of local option as an abstract principle, he there discusses the best way of giving effect to it. 'There have been three main proposals on the subject. According to one of these the functions now exercised by the licensing magistrates would be transferred with more or less extension to the town councils of boroughs, and to those corresponding municipal bodies which we hope shortly to see constituted in the counties. According to another, these powers would be given, not to the general municipal authority, but to boards elected specially for the purpose. A third plan would leave the licensing power in the hands of the magistrates so long as any licences at all were issued, but would give the ratepayers of each locality the right to decide by a certain majority and under certain conditions how many licences should be granted, or whether any at all.' The main advantage of the first plan seems to him to be this; 'if it is conceded that, in the event of licences being withdrawn from well-conducted public houses, compensation would be due to the owners, (a concession which there are very strong grounds for refusing to make), the compensation could be more easily arranged through the action of municipal bodies than in any other way. On the other hand there are grave objections to placing the licensing power in the hand of town councils. We never should get a municipal election taken on the liquor question pure and simple. All sorts of other issues, affecting not merely local adminis-

[1] Printed in the *Oxford Chronicle* for Feb. 4, 1882.

tration but general politics, would inevitably be mixed up with it. It would only be when excitement upon the liquor question came to supersede all other local or national interests, that we should get town councils prepared to go so far in dealing with the question as the ratepayers really desire. Meanwhile that the judicial functions now exercised by magistrates (functions which must be of the greatest importance, so long as the licensing system continues, and in the exercise of which impartiality is the prime requisite) should be transferred to town councils, would be a very doubtful advantage.' To the plan of specially elected licensing boards he has no objection, provided that 'powers be given them for the suppression of existing licences, which practically the magistrates do not at present possess. But I am not sure that the principle of local control might not even more advantageously be carried out, without an alteration of the present licensing authority, by an extension of the plan which the liberal government of 1871 proposed. That bill, I have always thought, only needed the principle of the permissive veto to be engrafted upon it to form the best possible settlement of the question. Existing licences were given ten years to run. During that period they were only to be forfeited for offences against the law, but the bill proposed to make the law regulating the conduct of public houses much more stringent than it then was, or than it has since become; and what is more important, it proposed more effectual means for enforcing the laws than we have ever actually had. At the end of this period the ratepayers of each district would have had full control over the number of licences to be allowed, subject to the proviso that one be left for every thousand inhabitants in towns, and one for every five hundred in rural districts. In Oxford, for instance, where the licensed houses now are considerably over three hundred, it would have empowered the ratepayers, at the end of ten years from the passing of the act, to decide that for the future there should be only forty. We may think that this proposal was not so thoroughgoing as we should wish. But it will be well for us to reflect how much better our position would now have been if that bill (to which the Alliance at the time, I fear, gave very lukewarm support) had been already passed and maintained in force. I cannot help thinking that when we come to think out the best means for giving effect to the principle of local option, now twice affirmed by the house of commons, we shall find them in following the lines of Mr. Bruce's bill of 1871.'

The question of the liquor traffic was the only one upon which he was ever drawn into anything like political controversy. Indig-

nant at a speech made at the end of 1872 by Sir William Harcourt, then one of the members for Oxford, which seemed to him 'to pooh-pooh the drinking evil altogether and to run down all legislative attempts to check it,' he wrote to the *Oxford Chronicle*, announcing that 'a representative who bid for the votes of the publicans could not have his.' A letter which he received from Sir William drew from him an answer gentler in tone but not less explicit. 'I must say plainly that I do not think there is a greater mischief a public man of authority can do than to depreciate the magnitude of this particular evil. It sounds rather impertinent in me to say so to one who has had so much more experience of the world than I have had, but I can scarcely think that, if you had seen much of the life of the working classes at close quarters, you could have had the heart to speak as you did. Even here in Oxford, which has of late been strangely trying to get up a reputation for sobriety, anyone who goes below the respectable classes finds the degradation and hopeless waste which this vice produces meet him at every turn. It is idle to say that education and comfortable habits will check the vice in time. The education of the families of the sober has no effect on the families of the drunken. Unless the vice is first checked by a dead lift of the national conscience, education and comfortable habits are impossible in those very families which are to be saved from drunkenness by them. Meanwhile an immense commercial interest is fattening upon the evil, and of course doing all it can to disguise it. All those whom this interest can influence, the rowdy "pot-house" party which prevails in all boroughs, and is specially strong in Oxford, of course catch eagerly at every utterance likely to command attention, which may put us off the scent of the nuisance which they themselves constitute. They were the people who cheered you when you denounced the licensing bill. If any expression in my letter seemed to impute to you an unworthy motive, I gladly withdraw it. But the motive of a speech is one thing, its effect is another; and the effect of yours was simply to raise the spirits of the men who a few months ago were screaming about the streets and breaking windows to the tune of "Britons never shall be slaves."'

Though naturally abstemious, he was not originally a total abstainer; but personal grounds combined with public ones to bring the subject of temperance home to him. The disastrous career of his elder brother constantly weighed upon his mind, and the conviction that the political morale of the poor was being sapped by drink came later to reinforce his private experience. A friend

recalls that 'looking back from the time of the conservative reaction in 1874, he once said, "We held our heads too high during Gladstone's ministry. We thought the working classes had made more moral progress than they really had." He dwelt with great disappointment on the use made by the workmen of their half-holiday and their shorter hours. I believe it was this strong disappointment that fixed his attention upon the temperance question above all others.' This impression is fully borne out by his words on another occasion. He had long felt the want in Oxford of a proper room for political meetings and discussions, which it was the custom to hold in public houses, and he was an active promoter of the scheme which resulted in the building of the Liberal Hall. Speaking as chairman of the meeting which in September, 1876, finally gave shape to it, he said, 'I have always felt that the defeat of the liberals at the last election to a great extent served them right. Ever since the great majority they obtained in 1868, they had been living in a sort of fool's paradise. While the government was at its work in a spirit in which perhaps no government had been before, nothing was done to teach the newly enfranchised people in political matters. What was the result? The country had been passing through a phase of sudden and unexampled commercial prosperity, and political enthusiasm had been lost in what I may call a general riot of luxury, in which nearly all classes had their share. The money and the beer flowed freely. Money quickly made was quickly spent, and it seemed as if all classes were disposed, not exactly to rest and be thankful, but at least to take their ease, eat, drink, and be merry. In this state of things, in the middle of this general political inertness, came the election of 1874. It found the liberal party everywhere disorganised. It found the constituencies politically asleep, but it found what are called the vested interests, which the late government had harassed, alive and vindictive.' The corollary of this, upon which he was never tired of insisting, was that the liberals of Oxford should keep their eyes upon the future, and be educating themselves to retrieve the disaster of 1874 when the opportunity came. This was the burden of his speech in November, 1876, after he had been elected by the North Ward to represent them on the town council. 'I hope,' he said, 'I shall not be thought an ungenial person if I say that I hope you will dwell rather more on the struggle in the future than on the past triumph. There has been running in my head for the last few hours the old text of scripture, "Let not him that buckleth on his armour boast himself as he that taketh it off."' But his election on this occasion had more than

a political interest. It was the first time that a college tutor had been a town councillor, and he may be fairly said to have laid the foundations of the bridge, since carried on by others, which is gradually spanning the gulf between the city and the university of Oxford. In addressing his supporters before the election he had deprecated the introduction of party politics into the council. 'He was,' he said, 'a liberal by conviction,' but 'he knew that there were many conservatives quite as anxious for the good of the people as he was, but in Oxford at present they were hampered by their following. With old-fashioned, decorous conservatism he had great sympathy, but not with the new style of rowdy toryism. . . . If elected he should always bear in mind that an extra penny in the pound on the rating meant a great deal more to poor men than to him, and should remember the rule, "be just before you are generous." But, under this restriction, he should not shrink from a wise outlay in the cause of health and education. He had paid great attention to schemes for raising boys from elementary schools to higher ones, and would try to make the proposed grammar school useful for this purpose.'

The 'proposed grammar school' or high school, as it was eventually called, was of all public objects that in which he took the keenest interest, and to which he gave the most material support. Sufficient reference has already[1] been made to the motives by which he was influenced. When the scheme had taken practical shape at the end of 1877, he contributed 200*l.* to the building, and founded a yearly scholarship of 12*l.* tenable at the school by boys from the elementary schools of Oxford. Whether his far-reaching views of what the new school might do for the town are destined to be realised, is still a question for the future.

Closely connected in his mind with education and temperance, as means to the moralisation of the people, was the purifying and cheapening of parliamentary elections. Speaking[2] of the Corrupt Practices bill at the beginning of 1882 he said, 'We ask for that measure, not merely as a means of putting a stop to that disgraceful traffic in votes of which we have been spectators in this city, but also as a means by which access to parliament might be made cheaper. . . . As long as we have a parliament which is in fact a sort of club of rich men, we shall not have a parliament which has the interest of the struggling and suffering classes of society at heart. . . . In past parliamentary elections in Oxford we have

[1] Above, p. lviii.

[2] At a meeting of the North Ward Liberal Association, Jan. 10, 1882.

trusted too much to the services of paid men, and not enough to unpaid but disinterested enthusiasm. . . . I have long been asking myself why it is that whereas a municipal vote costs about one shilling, it should cost one pound or rather more at a parliamentary election. . . . The liberal electoral expenditure at the recent election did not, it is true, amount to one half of the conservative; but I still say deliberately that it was at least three times as great as under a healthy system it would have been.' The contest to which he refers was that in which Sir William Harcourt, having won the seat by a majority of 112 in April, 1881, and resigned it on his appointment to the home secretaryship, was turned out by Mr. Hall by a majority of 54 in the following May. He had taken an eager part (to the detriment of his already failing health) in getting up the petition by which Mr. Hall was unseated for bribery by his agents, and which brought about the commission of enquiry into corrupt practices at Oxford. As his sole object was to have the facts fairly exposed to the light, he did not resent the impartial severity with which the commissioners included some of his friends in their condemnation, though he did not allow it to diminish his conviction of their comparative innocence.

Enough has been said to show what were the objects to which his civic activity was chiefly directed. They may be summed up, in the words in which he once described[1] his idea of a true liberal program, as 'the removal of all obstructions which the law can remove to the free development of English citizens.' Naturally therefore it was comparatively seldom that he expressed himself in public on questions of general policy, domestic or foreign, though he followed them attentively and formed emphatic opinions on them. The distinctive policy of lord Beaconsfield's government between 1874 and 1880 roused all his strongest antipathies. He denounced[2] the 'additional outlay of 8,000,000*l.* a year' which had only resulted 'in making England more talked about in Europe'; the application of Indian taxes, avowedly raised for the prevention of famine, to pay for a 'wanton and needless Afghan war'; the anti-Russian policy which 'had played into the hands of Russia at every turn'; the 'refusal to act in concert with Europe for the coercion of Turkey'; the 'betrayal of Greece at the congress of Berlin'; the 'departure from honesty and straightforwardness in national dealings.' Of the new liberal administration he only lived to see the beginnings, but he had time to speak clearly on one important

[1] In the speech in the North Ward just referred to.

[2] Notes for a speech at Abingdon in 1880.

question of principle, which had been directly raised by recent legislation, and which, as he foresaw, would be raised still more seriously in the future. In a lecture delivered early in 1881 at Leicester on *Liberal legislation and freedom of contract*,[1] he starts from the 'noticeable difference between the present position of political reformers and that in which they stood a generation ago. Then they fought the fight of reform in the name of individual freedom against class privilege. Now, in appearance, the case is changed.' The object of the lecture is to show that this change is only apparent. It proceeds upon the principle that true political freedom means 'the power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves,' or (which is equivalent) 'to contribute equally to a common good,' and that 'freedom of contract, freedom in all the forms of doing what one will with one's own,' is only valuable as a means to freedom in its 'positive' sense. No contract, then, is valid which 'defeats the end for which alone society enforces contracts at all,' i.e. 'that equal development of the faculties of all which is the highest good for all.' On this principle he justifies interference in the past with individual freedom in the matters of labour, health, and education, and advocates it in the future in regard to the disposition and letting of land and the sale of alcohol. 'The temptation to excessive drinking is one which upon sufficient evidence we hold that the law can at least greatly diminish. If it can, it ought to do so. This then, along with the effectual liberation of the soil, is the next great conquest which our democracy, on behalf of its own true freedom, has to make.' The Irish land question, which at this time was in everybody's mind, comes in for a brief consideration. 'The agitation of the Land League strikes at the roots of all contract, and therefore at the very foundation of modern society; but if we would effectually withstand it, we must cease to insist on maintaining the forms of free contract where the reality is impossible. We must in some way give the farmers of Ireland by law that protection, which, as a rule, they have been too weak to obtain for themselves singly by contract.' About a year later, in the last public speech[2] which he made, he confessed that the state of Ireland had contributed to produce in him a 'certain political depression.' Still, 'when we are told that nothing yet has been gained by the Land Act, I reply that the province of Ulster, containing one-third of the population of Ireland, has regained its loyalty: and there is no reason why in

[1] Below, p. 365.

[2] To the North Ward Liberal Association, March 7, 1882.

time the same result should not take place with regard to other parts of Ireland.' The same speech contains a declaration upon another subject which had been greatly occupying the public mind. '1 suppose I need not say that with regard to Mr. Bradlaugh's opinions, not only on religious questions, but on some others, they are as repugnant to me as they can be; and I will go further and say, if once the liberal party loses anything of that religious spirit which has hitherto animated its most vigorous and self-sacrificing members, it will be a bad look-out for them. But at the same time I must say I never believed in maintaining the cause of religion by oaths and tests. I believe the religious spirit of the house of commons would not be a jot or tittle less if in the future no oath was required. All I say is that, so long as oaths are required, if Mr. Bradlaugh, after being duly elected, chooses to take the oath, the house of commons has no right to say that he shall not. If I had been at Northampton at the general election in 1880, so far as I can judge on looking back, I should not have voted for Mr. Bradlaugh, because there are opinions of his, not so much on religious matters, (because it seems to me that religious matters hardly come within the province of the house of commons), but on other matters, which seem to me to be those of a man whom I could not trust as a politician, while no doubt there are other opinions of his with which I heartily agree. But the question is totally different now. If I had had a vote at the election the other day, I should have given it without a moment's scruple in favour of Mr. Bradlaugh, by way of asserting the right of every constituency, so long as it and the representative conform to the law, of returning whom they please. If once the house of commons assumes the right of ejecting a man duly elected, who is willing to conform to its own regulations, the whole system of representation is a mockery.'

One other public question remains to be mentioned which interested him deeply, though he took no active part in its solution, that of the reform of the established church. His opinion, as expressed at a meeting held at Merton college in December, 1881, was on the whole against disestablishment, though he was not sanguine of the success of any other policy. The occasions for reform he classes under three heads;[1] 'firstly, the fact that half the religious life of the nation is outside the church, which leads to friction, jealousy, and waste of energy in attack and defence; secondly, the existence of a large body of men, neither highly speculative nor

[1] The following passage is taken almost *verbatim* from the notes which he wrote for his speech.

hostile to the established forms of worship, who are kept out of the church by the requirement of declarations, and (in a less degree) by the exclusive and hierarchical tone of clerical opinion; thirdly, the want of congregational life in the church. What is the remedy? Shall we leave the movement in the direction of disestablishment and disendowment to take its course? There is much to be said for this alternative, but the evils connected with it are so great that we should think twice before we acquiesce in it. Firstly, there is the embittering of social relations which must take place in the struggle. Every clergyman with a wife and family will regard the movement as a personal wrong. Secondly, the most drastic measure of disestablishment and disendowment must leave the fabrics at least to the episcopalian sect. There would be a great struggle as to whether it should be a catholicising or an evangelical sect which should retain them, and whichever prevailed, the result would be lamentable. Probably it would strengthen the romanizing movement, and cause many to break altogether from the offices of religion, who otherwise would not do so, and make any *via media* between evangelical religion and current enlightenment more difficult. Lastly, it would make the clergyman of the future either a mere priest or a mere preacher, instead of the leader in useful social work and in the administration of such public business as is not directly administered by the state, as he now often is. What is the alternative? To congregationalise the church, without disestablishment and disendowment. Subject to a general control by the bishops, who should see that no unfit persons were ordained, and that a certain elastic uniformity was maintained in the order of worship, we would give congregations control over the appointment of the clergy, over the ceremonies, and over the formulas used in worship: as regards the last, there might be alternative forms and optional omissions, the congregation to decide which should be used and which omitted. We would further not require any declarations of opinion at ordination. This proposal excites great suspicion, because it is thought to be designed to enable "infidels" to enjoy the loaves and fishes. But a man who did not desire to perform the work of a clergyman efficiently, and who did not feel that he could do so, (which implies that he is in harmony with his congregation on the main points of christian feeling), would have no temptation to take orders. The success of any such plan manifestly depends on the possibility of restoring congregational life in the parishes. Perhaps it is too late, but we may begin by trying to do this.'

It must often have occurred to observers that a man of these

interests and capacities was marked out to represent Oxford in parliament, and pressure was put upon him to do so. But in one of his last speeches[1] he declared that 'since the days of his youth he had not seriously entertained any such idea, and that for personal reasons it was absolutely out of the question.' The prevailing reason was doubtless his weak nervous organisation, which he felt could not bear the strain of political life. Even in municipal affairs he was frequently obliged to excuse himself from work on this ground. The exertion of speaking, the atmosphere of crowded rooms, and his constant anxiety to keep the peace exhausted him and took away his sleep. Had he been made of tougher material, it is very doubtful whether philosophy or politics would have secured his allegiance. He was a weighty speaker, but not fluent or eloquent, nor would he probably have been a ready debater. But he had the statesman's eye for situations and insight into the real forces which move society. He could be conciliatory without compromising himself, and knew how to work upon principles without talking about them. If he was not what is ordinarily called 'a man of the world,' he had the intuitive knowledge of human nature which comes of great reflective power and keen observation combined with singleness of aim, and which sees through the concealments of others because it has itself nothing to conceal. A friend who was often with him between 1874 and 1882 writes; 'It was after I left Oxford and settled in London that I really enjoyed most of his society and friendship, having formed the habit of visiting Oxford for some weeks each September, when he was back from his summer holiday. Perhaps the difference of our pursuits, and the absence of the professional sense which Oxford residents have for one another, gave freshness to our old familiarity. My recollection of these last eight years of his life is that in his presence I never felt a moment's dulness or found conversation for a moment flagging. He seemed always full of curiosity to know everything that one was doing or thinking, and he had then himself acquired so large a practical experience as a citizen of Oxford, and in matters of general interest, that his conversation gained a fulness and variety which it had not had before. Our intercourse at these times was not cheerful only, but merry and full of laughter. And I must say that, to appreciate him as he deserved, it was necessary to have seen and known something of the mixed society of London, and of the people who work there. Much as he was reverenced in Oxford, I do not think that his immense superiority

[1] To the North Ward Liberal Association, Jan. 10, 1882.

is even now understood by those whose life has been passed mainly in the university. My own admiration for him was greatly increased, not lessened, by forming some acquaintance with men who stand high in London.'

It remains to complete the sketch of his work as a teacher and writer, which, whatever other possibilities may have lain in him, was as a matter of fact the chief work of his life. In 1878 he obtained the position in the university which many had long considered to be his due, the Whyte's professorship of moral philosophy, and was able to develop his principles more systematically than the position of a college tutor and the requirements of the examinations had hitherto allowed.

The subjects on which he lectured during the four years of his professorship were as follows; *Moral philosophy*, in the summer term of 1878, *The theory of duty* in the three following terms, *The principles of political obligation and the social virtues* in the October term of 1879 and the Hilary term of 1880, *Some metaphysical and psychological questions preliminary to moral philosophy* in the October term of 1880, *Desire, reason, and will in their relations to morality, Duty and conscience, The ideal of virtue in Plato and Aristotle compared with that by which we are now influenced*, in the three terms of 1881, *The application of moral philosophy to the guidance of conduct* in the Hilary term of 1882. All these lectures were delivered from carefully written manuscripts, and the greater part of them formed the substance of a book, entitled *Prolegomena to ethics*, which he was composing at the same time and which was published after his death. The course on *Political obligation* and those parts of the other courses which were not incorporated in the *Prolegomena* have been printed in the second volume of his collected works. During the same period he engaged some of his pupils and friends on a translation of Hermann Lotze's *Logik* and *Metaphysik*, and himself translated Book I. of the latter and the third chapter of Book II.; the work was completed and published in 1884. The influence of Lotze is probably to be traced in his increased sense of the necessity for a reconsideration of Hegel's principles, expressed in a review of John Caird's *Philosophy of religion* in 1880.[1] He also read more of Fichte in his later years, and made frequent resolves to study Herbart, but these were not carried into effect. Though he was constantly reproaching himself with his ignorance of philosophical literature, he never overcame his native repugnance to wide reading. He liked, as he used to say, to 'browse' amongst books, and it was by brooding over the great sayings of philosophers rather than by

[1] Below, pp. 138–146.

traversing their systems in detail, that he seemed to get most of his intellectual nourishment. His mind was reflective, not accumulative. He always seemed to be strengthening his hold upon certain fundamental truths, and this tenacity arose, not from prejudice or the force of habit, but from a growing experience of their reasonableness. Probably no amount of extraneous reading would have materially affected his ultimate convictions, but it might have given him greater power of expressing and illustrating them, and have diminished the monotony and iteration which sometimes characterise his later writing. It must be remembered, however, that his appointment to the professorship coincided with a marked failure in his health. Already in 1876 he had found it advisable to take a holiday, and was in Italy, chiefly at Florence, from February to May, with his wife and Mr. and Mrs. A. H. D. Acland. In 1878, besides the sleeplessness which had long troubled him, he became subject to fits of giddiness, and other symptoms of congenital disease of the heart began to show themselves. Nervous as he was, it was remarkable that he was able to go on with his regular work as well as he did, but he could not fail to show occasional depression. In a letter of August, 1879, he says, 'I have been getting a little writing done, preparatory to a book on moral philosophy, but as soon as I seriously begin it, I find how long it will take to do what I want to do and how little equal I am to it. Writing now is very different from what it was ten years ago. Then there were much larger vistas of possibility, and I thought I had got hold of a key which I find now will not unlock so much as I fancied it would. But I must make a push now, or I shall leave the world with nothing done.'

It was eleven years before the date of this letter that he had published his essay on *Popular philosophy in its relation to life*, and it certainly breathes greater freedom and confidence than the *Prolegomena to ethics*. Yet it is interesting to notice that in both the necessity for a more adequate philosophy of life is urged upon the same grounds. The *Prolegomena* begins by pointing out that it is in the poetry of our time, poetry such as *In memoriam* or *Rabbi ben Ezra*, that many thoughtful men find the expression of their deepest convictions, and that, though the convictions thus expressed seem to be logically irreconcilable with many of the conclusions of popularised science, they are content to hold the two side by side in their minds, and rather resent than welcome any attempt of philosophy to adjust their respective claims to acceptance. 'Poetry,' he imagines them to say or think, 'has a truth of its own, and so has religion — a truth which we feel, though from the scientific point of view we may

admit it to be an illusion. Philosophy is from the scientific point of view equally an illusion, and has no truth that we can feel. Better trust poetry and religion to the hold which, however illusive, they will always have on the human heart, than seek to explain and vindicate them, as against science, by help of a philosophy which is itself not only an illusion but a dull and pretentious one, with no interest for the imagination and no power over the heart.' 'With such opinion in the air all around him, it must be with much misgiving that one who has no prophetic utterance to offer in regard to conduct, but who still believes in the necessity of a philosophy of morals which no adaptation of natural science can supply, undertakes to make good his position.'[1] These passages indicate the main drift of his thinking about ethics in these years. As in religion what most exercised his mind was the prevalent divorce between reason and faith, due as he conceived to a misunderstanding of both, and culminating in scepticism on the one side and superstition on the other, so what he saw with the greatest concern in current theories of conduct was the banishment of all higher aspirations to the region of fancy and sentiment, and the growing claims of natural science to occupy the ground thus left vacant by reason. And what he felt prompted to attempt was not a 'prophetic utterance' that should pierce men's hearts with a sense of their sins, or kindle them by a picture of perfection, but the humbler though not less difficult task of showing them that in their everyday life and language there was a power at work which, if they would follow its lead, would open out to them all the heights and depths of spiritual life. The right way to find a rational basis for a higher morality is not, he held, to depreciate the lower, but to show it what it really is; 'there is no other genuine "enthusiasm of humanity" than one which has travelled the common highway of reason, the life of the good neighbour and honest citizen, and can never forget that it is still only on a further stage of the same journey.'[2]

In the *Introduction* to the ethical part of Hume's *Treatise of human nature* (1874), from which these words are taken, the elementary principles of his theory of morality are already clearly expressed. So far as the statement of them there differs from that in the *Prolegomena to ethics*, the difference is mainly due to the fact that in the latter work he wrote with constant reference to what he considered the unjustifiable claims of certain representatives of natural science, claims which he had already examined in a different

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, pp. 2, 3; cf. below, pp. 117, 121.
[2] Vol. i. p. 371.

context in the essays on Herbert Spencer and G. H. Lewes. The basis of the theory is the conception of self-consciousness. A self-conscious being, as we have seen, is one which in being conscious of itself is also conscious of another than itself. In a being perfectly self-conscious this double but undivided activity might be indifferently represented as the continual putting of itself into another or the continual taking of another into itself. In a being, like man, of imperfect self-consciousness the imperfection may similarly be represented in one of two ways, either as an incomplete appropriation of its object by the subject or as an incomplete realisation of the subject in the object. Such imperfect self-consciousness constitutes want, the consciousness of a something better to be or do, in the being or doing of which the self would find satisfaction. Of the resulting impulse to get rid of the want there are two chief forms, usually distinguished as the theoretic or speculative and the practical or moral. To the first are due the various efforts to observe, explain, and express the nature of the world, from the first crude essays of the child or savage up to the highest constructions of science, philosophy, and art; in all such efforts the subject begins by being conscious of its object as something over against and alien to it, with which it desires to feel itself at one, and in so far as it does so finds satisfaction. From the second form of impulse arise the various activities which aim at bringing into existence some object which the self is conscious of wanting, and the production of which would make it better off than it actually is; in this case that of which it is primarily aware is a deficiency in itself, and it regards the world over against it as a medium for supplying this deficiency and giving reality to the completeness which is as yet only an idea. In both forms of impulse it is one and the same self which is active; in both it is seeking some more adequate or perfect state of being; in both that which moves it to activity is an object which is the other of itself, its own necessary correlative and complement.[1]

Self-consciousness or reason, then, is practical or moral in so far as it seeks satisfaction in giving existence to an object adequate to itself; as man is capable of knowledge because he is a being for whom there are facts, so he is capable of conduct or morality because he is a being who has objects. And as the primary question in a theory of knowledge must be, What makes a 'fact'? so the primary question in a theory of morality must be, What makes an 'object'? The analysis of knowledge led to the conclusion that all fact is relationship, that is, that every feeling which is a felt fact or feeling of a thing is so because it qualifies and is qualified by other feelings, actual or possible;

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book ii., Chapter 2.

and this mutual qualification was found to imply a single and self-same subject which is present in but distinct from its feelings, and in virtue of which they make one system of interrelated elements. The analysis of action leads to an analogous result. An object of desire is always in the last resort an idea of self-satisfaction. The object of which hunger, for instance, is the desire, is not, speaking strictly, food, but the particular kind of satisfaction which is got through eating the food. To have an object, then, is to be conscious of something which we are not but which we wish to become, and the existence of objects of desire implies the existence of a self conscious of unrealised possibilities. Only in virtue of such consciousness do the various wants to which we are subject become wanted objects. Thus hunger considered simply as a certain state of discomfort, accompanying a certain condition of the body, is an event which comes and goes, without qualifying or being qualified by any previous or subsequent feeling; and in this sense it may be called a merely animal appetite, leading to certain bodily movements, but having no moral character whatever. But hunger is a very different thing when it is felt in a context of other feelings, when, for instance, it carries with it the remembrance of past and anticipation of future pleasure in its satisfaction, and when this pleasure is thought of as conducive or not conducive to health, and through health to some ulterior object of which health is a necessary condition. In order for this to be the case the hunger must have ceased to be simply a feeling preceded and followed by other feelings, and must have become an element in a consciousness to which past and future form one present; instead of being an isolated sense of discomfort prompting to its removal, it is now one among other constituents in a permanent desire for satisfaction. Thus the existence of a world of desirable objects, no less than that of a world of knowable facts, is due to self-consciousness; for it is the presence of self-consciousness in wants, distinguishing itself from them in the act of experiencing them, that makes them into more than wants, into wants of something, acts of a desiring subject and elements in a desired object. This object may be most generally expressed as personal satisfaction or well-being, the desire for which constitutes personal 'interests' as distinct from mere recurrent wants, and makes the most objectless human life into a sort of system, in which the particular desires meet and are mutually qualified in the conception, however vague or inconstant, of something desirable on the whole.[1]

[1] *Ib.*, Book ii., Chap. 1 and 2.

Action, in the only sense in which it has any moral quality, takes place when the self identifies itself with some object of desire; in other words, when it makes real the idea of some better state of being, and in satisfying a want satisfies itself. Only when this is the case, or is assumed to be the case, does a man consider himself, or is he considered by others, a moral agent, responsible for what he does. A man may, in a sense, experience wants and perform acts without having an object or being an agent; such are what we call 'unconscious' or 'instinctive' wants and acts, which give rise to physical effects but are not qualified or determined by any previous consciousness, and which may therefore be said to happen to the subject but not to be his. As we are only aware of such cases through subsequent reflection, they are not, as such, elements in our moral experience; it is only when they have been taken up into self-consciousness that their nature, apart from self-consciousness, can be inferred. Moral responsibility, then, with the various feelings and note to which it gives rise, is a consequence of self-consciousness; shame, remorse, repentance, praise and blame, reward and punishment, and all the agencies of moral education, owe their existence to the fact that each man is conscious in himself, and assumes others to be conscious in themselves, of originating the objects for which he and they live and act, in other words, their motives. A motive is a desired object, and a desired object is an idea of self-satisfaction. A motive, therefore, is not something independent of a man which acts upon him from without; it is the conception of himself as capable of something other than that which at the moment he is. And conversely, when the self is said to originate its motives, it is not meant that the self is something which first exists on its own account and then brings into existence something else called objects. Where there is a self there is an object, and where there is no self there is no object; and again, where there is a self there is action with a motive, for self-consciousness in its very essence is conscious activity, an activity which is kept in motion by the consciousness of something which it is not.

In the same sense in which man originates his motives, he is a 'free' agent. An agent is free when it is self-determined, i.e. when it is not determined by anything outside itself. Now that which determines the self to act is a motive, and a motive is some idea of itself as a subject to be satisfied, so that the action of a motive upon the self is really a form of that interaction of self and not-self which constitutes self-consciousness. Free action, then, does not mean unmotived action; it does not mean that a man first has a number

of motives before him, and eventually acts independently of any of them; on the contrary, it is just the adoption of a motive which constitutes action, and what are called motives when a man is yet in suspense are not real but only possible motives, possible states of himself which he presents to himself without as yet becoming any one of them. On the other hand, while it is true to say that all action is 'determined' because it has a motive, this does not imply that it is determined as one event is by another event outside itself, but on the contrary that it is self-determined, for the determining force or motive is nothing but the conception of the man's self. Now action on its inner side, considered apart from its sensible manifestation, is will, the decisive adoption of a certain object of desire. Thus the question whether the will is free, or whether man is free to will, is strictly speaking a question which admits of no answer because it is asked in inappropriate terms. In the terms in which it is asked it implies 'some agency beyond the will which determines what the will shall be, and that as to this agency it may be asked whether it does or does not lie in the man himself.' But 'in truth there is no such agency beyond the will, and determining how the will shall be determined; not in the man, for the will *is* the self-conscious man; not elsewhere than in the man, not outside him, for the self-conscious man has no outside. He is not a body in space with other bodies elsewhere in space acting upon it and determining its motions. The self-conscious man is determined by objects, which in order to be objects, must already be in consciousness, and in order to be *his* objects, the objects which determine him, must already have been made his own. To say that they have power over him or his will, and that he or his will has power over them, is equally misleading.' It follows that there is no point in urging, as is sometimes done, that moral freedom 'merely' rests on the evidence of consciousness, and may therefore be an illusion because the consciousness may possibly not correspond with reality; for the only reality in question, the only reality which moral action requires or admits, is a reality of consciousness.[1]

The same line of thought will show why man as a moral agent cannot rightly be represented as a part of nature, or the theory of morality as a branch of natural science. The attempt to do so involves the confusion of supposing that the principle or activity to which nature is due can be contained in and derived from its own partial manifestations. The word 'nature' may be used in many senses, but in the sense in which it is applied to the

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book ii., Chapters 1 and 2; Vol. ii., p. 320.

subject of natural science it means the world of possible experience or sum of verifiable facts. Now experience or consciousness of fact involves two things; on the one hand, the presentation of objects under the conditions imposed by our physical organisation, the conditions of time and space, on the other hand, the presence in such presentations of a principle which is not temporal or spatial, in virtue of which successive and coexistent phænomena make one world. This double way of describing experience, to which we are driven by analysis, must not be understood to mean that the consciousness of reality is a double consciousness, one *and* many, same *and* diverse, for the very essence of it is that it is one *in* many, same *in* difference. But the incompleteness of human experience brings with it a perpetual contradiction, which may be expressed by saying either that the unity of the world always remains for us an unfilled form, or that the multiplicity of the world always remains for us an infinite series. If we say that we are conscious of the world as one, we have also to say that we are only conscious of it gradually and piecemeal, that is, as merely manifold; if we say that all our experience is particular, that is, of a number of independent events or objects, we have also to admit that every particular experience goes beyond its particularity, and gets all the qualities which particularise it from relation to a whole of which it is part. This may be summed up in the statement that a fact of science is never the whole fact; that is to say, if science means the consciousness of the ascertainable conditions of phænomena, completeness can never be found in it, because the self of which it is the activity is always potentially more than it knows. And for this reason, because in knowing nature we exercise an activity which is more than nature, we must say that nature, as the subject of science, implies a principle that is not natural, i.e. a principle which is not contained in any one or any number of the particular phænomena which together make nature, and therefore is not derivable from them. If this is true of self-consciousness in its intellectual experience, it is equally true of it in its moral experience. Moral facts are no doubt in one point of view facts of nature; the motives and acts which constitute them are occurrences preceded by other occurrences in an endless series, each of which would not be what it is but for those which precede it. But the question is, to what this necessary connexion is due, and what the nature of the antecedents is with which a motive can rightly be said to be necessarily connected. The mutual determination or causal connexion of any two events is only possible through the medium of a unity in which

both are factors; and if this is true when the relation between the events is one of simple succession, still more obviously is it true when they are related to each other as elements in a personal life and character. A motive is a desire for personal well-being, and it can only be qualified by an antecedent event if that event is also a constituent in the same personal consciousness. If it be said that the personal consciousness must have had a beginning, and that on its first emergence it was developed from a previous occurrence which did not consist in personal consciousness, it must be answered that 'development,' if it means anything, implies some identity in that which is being developed, and that there is no identity between e.g. a desire for self-satisfaction and a nervous process, unless the nervous process has already been conceived as an element in the self-satisfaction. The same holds good of the attempt to explain moral action as the result of 'circumstances.' A circumstance is nothing if it is not a circumstance of or to something, and it is only when it becomes a circumstance to a consciousness of unrealised possibilities, i.e. to self-consciousness, that it becomes a determining factor in moral development. Should the question be still asked, If the self-consciousness implied in moral action is not derived from nature or circumstances, what then is its origin? the answer must be that it has no origin. 'It never began, because it never was not. It is the condition of there being such a thing as beginning or end.'[1]

It seems then that the moral activity of man can only be explained by supposing that an eternal mind or self-consciousness reproduces itself as human personality, using as means various processes of nature; and that though its reproduction is qualified and limited by these processes, the human experience which is its product nevertheless carries with it through all such qualifications and limitations the essential characteristic of that which produces it, the characteristic of being an originative and free activity, conscious of itself as its own object. Why the eternal mind should so reproduce itself in humanity we cannot know, any more than we can know why there is a world at all. 'We can only say that, upon the best analysis we can make of our experience, it seems that so it does,' and that only by means of such a conception can we understand 'how (not *why*, but *how*) we are and do what we consciously are and do. Given this conception, and not without it, we can at any rate express that which it cannot be denied demands expression, the nature of man's reason and man's will, of human progress and human shortcoming, of the effort after

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book i., and Book ii., Chapter 1.

good and the failure to gain it, of virtue and vice, in their connection and in their distinction, in their essential opposition and in their no less essential unity.' If then all human action properly so called, whether good or bad, implies this conception, the next question is, How does a good act differ from a bad one? To will, as has been seen, is to adopt a certain motive, to make a certain object one's own, to become something which one had desired to be. The will is good so far as the motive or object or state of being is good, i.e. is such as the self, having regard to its essential nature, ought to find satisfaction in. What then is that essential nature, and what obligation does it impose upon the self? Its nature is to be self-conscious, to be itself and another in one, and it fulfils its nature so far as it achieves this. To achieve it absolutely is impossible for man; to him the antithesis between self and not-self is never fully overcome; it always remains to some extent a consciousness of self *and* another, not of self *in* another. The utmost then that man attains to is the simultaneous consciousness of possible perfection and of actual imperfection, and in proportion as he lives habitually in this double consciousness he lives well. In other words, an act is good in proportion as in doing it the agent is conscious that he is doing his best and at the same time that there is infinitely better to be done, conscious that he is realising himself and finding satisfaction and yet that he is infinitely far from being what he has it in him to be. And conversely an act is bad in proportion as the agent regards the particular object attained in it as the only thing worth having in the world, and himself in attaining it as complete; in proportion, that is, as he identifies his actual with his possible self, and invests the former with the absolutenesss which only belongs to the latter. Thus virtue and vice, unselfishness and selfishness, owe their existence to the same activity, working under limiting conditions; it is because man is conscious of himself as an end to himself that on the one hand he is able to find himself in any object, however trivial, and that on the other hand no object, however great, can ever give him complete satisfaction. The scale of selfishness and unselfishness may vary indefinitely according to the powers and opportunities of the individual, but the principle in both is always the same. The best life is that in which the consciousness of possible perfection is the most operative, i e. in which it leads a man to have the greatest amount of objects and do the greatest amount of acts with the fullest consciousness that they are each and all only means to a more absolute end and elements in a larger activity. This may be otherwise expressed by saying that the good will is that which

wills the unconditionally good or desirable ; which does not mean a will which wills nothing in particular, but one which in every particular thing that it wills is conscious of something of absolute value which gives whatever value it has to that particular act. Or we may say that a man is good in proportion as he lives in the consciousness of a vocation, i.e. of some work which makes a continual demand upon him, a demand which he can never satisfy but to which all that he does is an imperfect response. Or again, a good man is one who recognises everywhere a law which has to be obeyed at all costs, a law which is the expression of his own best self and in obeying which he is therefore free, but which he can never perfectly obey, and which therefore always exercises a certain constraint upon his inclinations. Or, once more, a man is good in proportion as his will is at one with his reason ; i.e. in proportion as the several objects which he makes his own, and the several acts which he does, embody that idea of perfect self-satisfaction through perfect self-sacrifice in which the self-conscious reason makes itself known in him. These various expressions may be summed up in the formula, that the only absolutely good or desirable or valuable thing in the world is good will, and, conversely, that good will is that which wills what is absolutely good, desirable, or valuable. It is not a defect but a necessity of any such formula that it should be 'circular,' for to a subject which is its own object nothing can be absolutely satisfying except the best state of itself, and the best state of itself can only be that in which it attains absolute satisfaction. And similarly it is no defect but a necessity of any adequate conception of goodness and the good that it should be entirely ideal. The demand to have it proved from some prior conception or verified in particular objects of experience implies a radical misconception of its nature ; in the only sense in which it admits of proof or verification, we prove it in every moral judgment that we make and verify it in every responsible act that we do, for it is nothing more or less than our own personality in operation.[1]

The apparent indefiniteness which attaches to the account just given of the end of life cannot be got over by ignoring self-consciousness or substituting for it one of its partial products, as is done by the doctrine that the object of all desire is pleasure and the best life that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure on the whole. The prestige and influence which this doctrine has had in England is due to its adoption by men of noble character and conspicuous ability, who 'had the great lesson to teach, that the value of all laws and institutions, the rectitude of all conduct, was to be estimated by reference

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book iii., Chapters 1 and 2.

to the well-being of all men, and that in the estimate of that well-being no nation or class or individual was to count above another.' It is the enforcement of this lesson, not the theory that the end of life is pleasure, that has made utilitarianism a power for good. Its most illustrious representatives have been preoccupied with great projects of political and social reform, and with this preoccupation 'it has mattered little for practical purposes that they held the well-being of society to consist simply of the net aggregate of pleasures enjoyed by its members, and that they founded this view on the principle that some pleasure or other is the sole object of any desire.' The attractiveness of such a principle (quite apart from any countenance which it might be made to lend to a low view of life) lies in its apparent definiteness; in pleasure, which everybody supposes himself to understand, it seems to furnish a criterion, at once simple and exact, by which the good and evil of actions may be estimated. But this definiteness turns out on examination to be illusory. Pleasure, as such, is the feeling which accompanies the satisfaction of desire or attainment of an object. When then pleasure is said to be the motive of desire, it is not actual pleasure that can be meant, (for so far as we are pleased we have ceased to desire), but pleasure remembered and anticipated; the motive to action is always a consciousness of want, and in some cases the want may be for a certain kind of pleasure. Thus while hunger cannot be excited by the pleasure experienced in its satisfaction, it may be accompanied and reinforced by desire for a particular kind of pleasure anticipated in eating a particular food. Strictly speaking, then, it is never pleasure as such, but pleasure conceived as an element in self-satisfaction, which is the motive in desire. The importance of this apparently minute distinction is that it brings out the fact, insisted on above, that in all desire and satisfaction of desire there is more than simple feeling. Pleasure in the sense of a feeling which comes and goes and never recurs, can be no element in human happiness; a being which had had a million such pleasures would have had no more enjoyment than if it had had only one. But this is not what anybody really means when they talk of pleasures as objects to be sought or avoided; they mean states of themselves, each of which increases or diminishes the other, and thus modifies the whole which they call their happiness. And this implies a self which in the act of experiencing the pleasures distinguishes itself from them, compares them as sources of satisfaction, and remains with its demand for satisfaction unexhausted when they have passed away. It is only the tacit assumption of this self that gives any meaning to the phrase 'sum of pleasures,'

or any plausibility to the theory that the good and evil of life can be calculated in terms of pleasure and pain. Pleasures cannot be added together, still less can they be distinguished as better or worse, unless they are present to a subject which measures them by reference to its own development and judges of them by reference to its own interest. So far then from pleasure being the sole object of desire, it seems that pleasure pure and simple is never its object, and so far from its supplying a definite standard of moral value, it seems that whatever definiteness it has is due to something in it other than pleasure, to that very desire for perfection or self-realisation the indefiniteness of which hedonism proposes to remedy.

Pursuing the same line of thought we see why it is that pleasure, so far as it is made the object of human life, is necessarily an inadequate one. Man in virtue of self-consciousness is an object to himself, his own beginning and his own end; he is thus essentially originative, has a permanent initiative, is ever passing from possibility to realisation, and from this again to a new possibility. Now pleasure is the feeling of self-satisfaction; it is the moment in which he is what he wants to be, in which he has no longer any object, any consciousness of unrealised possibilities. The more active his self-consciousness is, the more impossible it is for him to stay in such moments; and the more he deliberately tries to stay in them, the more the satisfaction to which he clings slips away from him. For in order to live for pleasure, in the strict sense of the words, he must detach the feeling which accompanies the attainment of objects from the objects attained and make it into an object itself. Each time that he does this the object becomes more attenuated; the self returns upon itself instead of going out of itself; it tries to maintain its interest while the source of the interest is evaporating; it becomes less originative, more reproductive. If he could be entirely unoriginative, he might be at peace, might live, as we suppose some of the lower animals to do, 'in the moment'; but his nature makes this impossible; he cannot simply be pleased, he must needs seek pleasure. Hence the proverbial unrest of the systematic voluptuary, and the advice not to think about pleasure if you wish to get it. While then there might seem to be but little difference between the maxim, 'Get the greatest possible amount of pleasure,' and the maxim, 'Realise your possible self,' and while the practical applications of both maxims might often coincide, yet, strictly interpreted, they start from opposite points and give opposite directions. Both place the well-being of man, not in anything external to him, but in a desirable state of himself; but the one tells him to desire to be perfect, the other to desire to be satisfied;

the one sets before him the infinite aspirations of the self, the other its limited fulfilments. We naturally indeed think of the life of a perfect being as one of bliss, in which the joy of attainment is not marred by any sense of imperfection; but in such bliss we must conceive, however hard it may be to do so, that self-realisation is only the other side of self-devotion, and we shall come nearer to it by thinking of that sort of human happiness which, in the words of George Eliot, 'brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before anything else, because our souls see it is good,' than of that which consists of any amount of continued or repeated pleasure.[1]

Though however the conception of the good is not to be rendered more concrete or definite by the attempt to express it in terms of pleasure, or in terms of anything except good will or goodness, it need not therefore remain a mere empty formula. 'The practical struggle after the better, of which the idea of there being a best has been the spring, has taken such effect in the world of man's affairs as to make the way by which the best is to be more nearly approached plain enough to him that will see. In the broad result it is not hard to understand how man has bettered himself through institutions and habits which tend to make the welfare of all the welfare of each, and through the arts which make nature, both as used and as contemplated, the friend of man.' That this should be the general form of spiritual progress follows from the conception of self-consciousness. If that which makes man human is the power of being an object to himself, i.e. of seeking and finding satisfaction in something not himself which yet he recognises as his own, human progress must lie in the development of this power. And as there are two main forms in which he is conscious of this other self, the physical world and the world of persons, his progress will lie in the growing consciousness of unity with nature and with man, a consciousness which begins with understanding and passes into love. The conception of something good in itself or for its own sake, which moral life implies, is inseparably bound up with the conception of something good for others as well as for oneself; for the same thought of a man's self as something permanent, which carries with it the thought of a good which gives value to and survives all his transitory interests, carries with it also the thought of a continuous life in which other men participate with him and in contributing to which he survives along with them. Some such consciousness has been operative in the most primitive forms of life which can be

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book iii., Chapters 1 and 4, Book iv., Chapters 3 and 4.

properly called human and from which we can rightly describe ourselves as developed, and the increasing operation of the same consciousness constitutes moral progress. That progress is traceable partly in the widening of the range of persons conscious of themselves as sharing in a common good, partly in the growing distinctness with which such consciousness has expressed itself in the organisation of life. The conception of self as related to other beings who are also selves, with whom therefore there is something to be shared, to whom there is something to be given, and from whom there is something to be received, has expanded from its germ in the simplest forms of family feeling into the recognition (at least in theory) of a brotherhood of mankind and a duty to humanity. It has developed in and through a continual struggle with selfish impulses, the impulses which prompt man to surrender his moral initiative, to acquiesce in what he is and to cling to what he has got, and which assume more imposing dimensions as the organisation of life becomes more elaborate and its command of material greater. And hand in hand with this conception that there is a good common to all men has grown the conception that the only real good or thing of real value is personal worth or virtue. The two conceptions are complementary to each other, for the only good thing which is absolutely common, i.e. in the pursuit and possession of which there can be no competition of interests, is goodness of character. All external or material goods are in their nature limited and conditional; what one man has of them another cannot have, and what is valuable in one set of circumstances is valueless in others; that only which no one can give to a man or take from him, that which does not happen to him but which he is, the will to be good and to do good, has a value at once intrinsic and inexhaustible. Progress in the recognised standard and practice of morality has lain in the increasing articulation of this conception of personal worth, from simple valour in the struggle for the life of a family or tribe up to the many-sided devotion of all the faculties of the civilised man to the bettering of himself and mankind.[1]

The attempt to interpret moral progress cannot be separated from the attempt to conceive the end or perfect life to which it tends and in the light of which alone it can be interpreted. If the ideal of human goodness be defined as the devotion of the whole self to the perfecting of man, we cannot forget that such expressions as 'self-devotion' or 'self-sacrifice' seem to apply only to the impeded activity of an imperfect being; and the question must arise how, if at all,

[1] *Ib.*, Book iii.

goodness so defined could constitute or even be an element in a life, such as we conceive the perfect life, a life in which all that is good in human nature, the artistic and scientific no less than the moral capabilities, should find complete realisation. It must be admitted that such complete realisation has not taken place, and, as far as we can see, cannot take place, in any life of man as we now know him. 'Granted the most entire devotion of a man to the attainment of objects contributory to human perfection, the very condition of his effectually promoting that end is that the objects in which he is actually interested, and upon which he really exercises himself, should be of limited range. The idea, unexpressed and inexpressible, of some absolute, all-embracing end is, no doubt, the source of such devotion, but it can only take effect in the fulfilment of some particular function in which it finds but restricted utterance. It is in fact only so far as we are members of a society, of which we can conceive the common good as our own, that the idea has any practical hold upon us, and this very membership implies confinement in our individual realisation of the idea.' Yet, if human progress means anything, it must be a progress which takes place in and through human personalities; no development of the race, 'which individuals unwillingly promote but perish in promoting,' will satisfy the conception. The life of a nation or of humanity is nothing if it is not a life lived by certain individuals, and realised in the habits, institutions, and laws through which they are related to each other. Nor can progress be thought of as an endless series of events, 'unless the series is relative to something beyond itself, which abides while it passes,' i.e. 'unless it means a progress *of* personal character and *to* personal character'; and whatever else 'personality' may mean, it must at least imply self-consciousness, 'the quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself.' The difficulties which these considerations raise cannot be removed by any theory; yet the idea of a development from less to more perfect life remains ineradicable and insuppressible, dominating our whole interpretation both of natural processes and of human history. 'The important thing is that we should not, in eagerness to reconcile the idea with facts known only bit by bit and not in their real integrity, lose sight of the essential implications of the idea.' Now development implies two things; firstly, that what is being developed is already somehow and somewhere a completed reality, and secondly, that this completed reality is the fulfilment of the successive stages or possibilities which constitute the development. If then we are in earnest in speaking of a 'development' of humanity, we must suppose an eternal self-

consciousness which is all that the human self-consciousness has it in it to be, and which is conscious of the latter, not merely as a fact, but as an integral element in its own being and life. And secondly we must think of the end of human development as one in which what we know of our personality is not extinguished but survives in a more adequate form, as a state of being in which 'that reconciliation of the claims of persons, as each at once a means to the good of the other and an end to himself, already partially achieved in the higher forms of human society, is completed.' Such a conception, so far from excluding society, implies it, for personal life *is* common life, the consciousness of self in and through other selves; and when we speak of devoted will as the true end of moral effort, we understand it not as the mere abstract recognition of a law, but as 'implying a whole world of beneficent social activities, which it shall sustain and co-ordinate.' Such a world, as far as we can conceive it, must always imply differentiation of functions in the persons composing it, so that the best for one would not be the same as the best for another; but in so far as contribution to the perfection of the whole was the object in living for which each lived for himself, it might be said to realise the ideal of human society. 'There may be reason to hold that there are capacities of the human spirit not realisable in persons under the conditions of any society that we know, or can positively conceive, or that may be capable of existing on the earth. Such a belief may be warranted by the consideration on the one hand of the promise which the spirit gives of itself, both in its actual occasional achievement, and in the aspirations of which we are individually conscious, on the other hand of the limitations which the necessity of confinement to a particular social function seems to impose on individual attainment. We may in consequence justify the supposition that the personal life, which historically or on earth is lived under conditions which thwart its development, is continued in a society, with which we have no means of communication through the senses, but which shares in and carries further every measure of perfection attained by men under the conditions of life that we know. Or we may content ourselves with saying that the personal self-conscious being, which comes from God, is for ever continued in God. Or we may pronounce the problem suggested by the constant spectacle of unfulfilled human promise to be simply insoluble. But meanwhile the negative assurance at any rate must remain, that a capacity, which is nothing except as personal, cannot be realised in any impersonal modes of being.' And if this is so, we cannot conceive that in any such realisation, whether human or divine, the

spirit which is the very essence of personality, the spirit which seeks self-satisfaction in self-devotion, would be eliminated. 'There is no contradiction in the supposition of a human life purged of vices and with no wrongs left to set right. It is indeed merely the supposition of human life with all its capacities realised. In such a life the question of the reformer, what ought to be done in the way of overt action that is not being done? would no longer be significant. But so long as it is the life of men, i.e. of beings who are born, and grow, and die; in whom an animal nature is the vehicle through which the divine self-realising spirit works; in whom virtue is not born ready-made but has to be formed (however unfailing the process may come to be) through habit and education in conflict with opposing tendencies; so long the contrast must remain for the human soul between itself and the infinite spirit, of whom it must be conscious, as present to itself but other than itself, or it would not be the human soul. The more complete the realisation of its capacities the clearer will be its apprehension at once of its own infinity in respect of its consciousness of there being an infinite spirit—a consciousness which only a self-communication of that spirit could convey—and of its finiteness as an outcome of natural conditions; a finiteness in consequence of which the infinite spirit is for ever something beyond it, still longed for, never reached. Towards an infinite spirit, to whom he is thus related, the attitude of man at his highest and completest could still be only that which we have described as self-abasement before an ideal of holiness; not the attitude of knowledge, for knowledge is of matters of fact or relations, and the infinite spirit is neither fact nor relation; nor the attitude of full and conscious union, for that the limitation of human nature prevents; but the same attitude of awe and aspiration which belongs to all the upward stages of the moral life. He must think of the infinite spirit as better than the best that he can himself attain to, but (just for that reason) as having an essential community with his own best. And, as his own best rests upon a self-devoted will, so it must be as a will, good not under the limitations of opposing tendencies but in some more excellent, though not by us positively conceivable, way, that he will set before himself the infinite spirit.'[1]

The *Prolegomena to ethics* must be read in connexion on the one side with the addresses on *The witness of God* and *Faith*, on the other with the lectures on *Political obligation*, if the solidarity of the writer's view of life is to be appreciated. Variations of phraseology and tone are not indeed wanting; as regards, for instance, the know-

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book iii., Chapter 2, A; and pp. 311 and 329.

ableness and nature of God, it has been truly observed that he speaks more confidently in his religious addresses than in the *Prolegomena*. Such differences in the utterance of ultimate convictions may often be noted in speculative men. There are times at which the mind will bring into play all its dialectical subtlety, all its exuberance of fancy, all its laboriousness of illustration, in the effort to seize and express the presence of God in the world. There are other times when all such resources seem to be vain, and it takes refuge from its incapacity in a monotonous phrase, or in the absolute dumbness of concentrated action. The apparent inarticulateness or hesitation with which the *Prolegomena* treats of topics on which many persons will demand the greatest explicitness, does not arise from any decrease of conviction in the writer, but from the dread, always present to him and increasingly so as he grew older, of using strong words with little meaning. There is a sense in which the more a man realises a truth the less he can do anything except repeat it, and this would seem to have been the case with him. As he advanced in experience and reflection the central idea of the unity of all things in a self-conscious being forced itself upon him more and more irresistibly, while at the same time the vista of possible modes in which such a being might exist and work grew more and more indefinite. This produced a tendency to insist rather on what spiritual life cannot be than to attempt to picture what it is, a tendency which was further increased by the necessity of justifying his position polemically against competing doctrines. The controversy with 'naturalistic' ethics which is waged in the *Prolegomena* must not lead us to suppose that he had abandoned the view expressed in earlier writings that nature is 'the first stage of God's revelation of himself,' and that the pursuit of truth is 'in principle identical with the striving after God which animates the moral life.' The 'non-natural' or 'spiritual' principle to which the analysis of natural existence seemed to him logically to lead, is not a principle which supersedes, but one which fulfils, the truth of nature; by 'the spiritual' he still meant, as he had written in 1866, 'the natural rightly understood,' and by moral life not an escape from, but the 'completion' of, physical processes. In his own mind there could be no competition between laws of nature and laws of morality, for he regarded the former as stages in the self-development of the same mind as the latter; but when men of science first treat the facts which they have established as final and independent existences, and then proceed to include among them the principle of

which they are the partial expression and without which they would not be facts at all, they seemed to him to be misunderstanding their own procedure, and to be on a track which must lead to the stultification not only of moral aspiration but of the scientific impulse itself. He would have adopted the saying that science tells us what is, not what ought to be, not in the sense that the actual and ideal are two independent worlds, but in the sense that any particular branch of experience, while it may be, and for scientific purposes must be, treated as self-contained, is in truth related at every point to something which goes beyond it, something which is in it but not of it, and which necessitates the conversion of the mere 'is' into an 'ought to be.' 'If,' he writes, 'it is true on the one hand that the interpretation of nature by the supposition of ends external to it, with reference to which its processes are directed, has been discarded, and that its rejection has been the condition of growth in an exact knowledge of nature, on the other hand the recognition of ends immanent in nature, of ideas realised within it, is the basis of a scientific explanation of life. The phenomena of life are not ideal, in the sense in which the ideal is opposed to that which is sensibly verifiable, but they are related to the processes of material change which are their conditions, as ideas or ideal ends which those processes contribute to realise, because, while they determine the processes (while the processes would not be what they are but for relation to them), yet they are *not* those processes, *not* identical with any one or number of them, or all of them together.'[1] His polemic against hedonism is animated by the same idea, the idea that it ignores the 'self-objectifying' principle involved in human action, and substitutes for a true theory of that action a spurious branch of 'anthropology.' In his examination of Hume's moral theory he had pointed out that his vital error lay in ignoring the 'originativeness' of thought or self-consciousness and attempting to explain its work as a mere reproduction of feelings, and that this attempt necessarily defeats itself; for when we have left 'nothing of the beautiful in nature or art but that which it has in common with a sweetmeat, nothing of that which is lovely and of good report in the saint or statesman but what they share with the dandy or diner-out, yet we cannot present even this poor residuum of an object by which all action is to be explained, except under the character it derives from the thinking soul, which looks before and after, and determines everything by relation to itself.'[2] And similarly in the *Prolegomena to ethics*, while the speculative

[1] Vol. ii p. 437. [2] Vol. i. p. 353.

weakness of modern modifications of hedonism is traced to the same source, their practical insufficiency is also urged on the ground that, if consistently applied, they tend to weaken the 'moral initiative.' The fact that the great utilitarians had not, as he conceived, applied their theory consistently, did not diminish his respect for them. One of the last books that he read was the *Journals and letters of Caroline Fox*, and it drew from him the remark that he would rather have been Mill than Carlyle, 'he seemed to have been such an extraordinarily *good* man.'

By 'moral initiative' he understood what he elsewhere calls 'the sense of personal responsibility' or 'conscientiousness,' meaning by the last, not the tendency 'to be always fingering one's motives,' which is 'a sign rather of an unwholesome preoccupation with self than of the eagerness in disinterested service which helps forward mankind,' but the ever-present 'idea of a perfect life with which our own is contrasted.' Such an idea, whether it issue in the 'reforming zeal' which produces observable effects, or whether it remain a hidden aspiration of the 'obscure saint,' makes a different man of him who has it. Though he may seem to be merely conforming to current opinion, he will be found on a closer scrutiny to be really reconstructing it; 'he is like a judge who is perpetually making new law in ostensibly interpreting the old.' And even if no traceable results flow from the idea, it must still be held to have that intrinsic value which belongs to every factor in human perfection, a value by which the results of the practical reformer must in the last resort equally be estimated. Conscientiousness in this sense does not depend on the amount of information or analytical power which a man possesses. The ultimate effects of any action can only be known to an omniscient being, to whom the universe of action is open, and it is not important that we should be able to trace them far; the question, 'Was I what I ought to be, or shall I be what I ought to be, in such and such an act?' can be answered by anyone who is honest with himself; for all that is required for the answer is the general consciousness that we might do better, and such a consciousness is already implied in the question, rendering superfluous all remote inquiries into particular possible shortcomings or mistakes. On the other hand, no such inquiries, however great the information or enlightenment in which they result, can do any real good to mankind, unless they are conducted and applied in a spirit which, whether it call itself 'conscientious' or not, is practically the spirit which seeks to be perfect. 'The lesson, for instance, of the mischief done by indiscriminate almsgiving, or by the sale of spirits, may

have been most plainly taught by social or physical analysis, but it would be practically barren unless certain persons, each under a consciousness of responsibility for making the best of himself as a social being, charged themselves with the task of getting the lesson put into practice by society.' The action of conscientiousness will be 'partial in various degrees of partiality. It may appear as a zeal for public service on the part of some one not careful enough about the correctness of his own life, or on the other hand in the absorbed religious devotion of the saintly recluse. In the average citizen it may appear only as the influence which makes him conscientious in the discharge of work which he would not suffer except in conscience for neglecting, or as the voice, fitfully heard within, which gives meaning to the announcement of a perfect life lived for him and somehow to be made his own. Taking human society altogether, its action in one mode supplements its action in another, and the whole sum of its action forms the motive power of true moral development; which means the apprehension on our part, ever widening and ever filling and ever more and more fully responded to in practice, of our possibilities as men and of the reciprocal claims and duties which those possibilities imply.'[1]

Conscientiousness in the sense explained makes an act good, and the question whether its goodness is to be estimated by its motive or by its consequences has little meaning. Action in the full sense is both the adoption of a motive and the production of effects. It is only by an abstraction, due to our imperfect knowledge, that we habitually draw a circle round part of an act, and call that which is within it the act and that which is beyond it the consequences. In judging of others, indeed, we are compelled to make this abstraction and to leave out part of the whole fact, for we can never really know the motives of anyone except ourselves, and 'where we can do no more than guess it is wiser not to make guesses, and to confine ourselves, where no question of self-condemnation or self-approval is involved, to measuring the value of actions by their effects without reference to the character of the agents.' In so doing, however, we must not allow ourselves to be the victims of our abstraction, and to treat the act as if it were really separable into two parts, one of which can be judged by a different standard from the other or from the whole. There can be only one standard of absolute value, and if goodness means the quality of contributing to human perfection, the moral value of the observable effects of any act must be estimated by the degree in which they seem so to contribute. When then we

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book iv., Chap. i.

are told that an act which was bad in motive has had good results, we must ask, Who really produced the results? Was the motive wholly bad? Were the results wholly good? A closer scrutiny will probably show that the selfish politician, for instance, 'was himself much more of an instrument than of an originating cause, and that his action was but a trifling element in the sum or series of actions which yielded the political movement,' or that what is good in the result was due to some higher influences with which the selfishness of the agent was inextricably fused. And if, conversely, the 'best motives' sometimes seem to give rise to mischievous results, we shall find that this is only because 'these "best" motives have not been good enough. If there has been no other taint of selfishness about them, yet they have been acted on inconsiderately, which means that the agent has been too selfish to take the trouble duly to think of what his action brings with it to others.' Whether then it be judged by its motive or by its consequences, an act of self-devotion is necessarily good throughout, and 'the degree of its value will only be doubtful, so far as there may be uncertainty in regard to its tendency to yield more or less further good of the same kind in the sequel We say "more or less," for that it tends to yield some further good of the same kind can never be really doubtful. Self-sacrifice, devotion to worthy objects, is always self-propagatory. The good will in one man has never failed to elicit or strengthen such a will in another.'[1]

It is to be regretted that in the discussion of moral value in the *Prolegomena* the contribution of scientific and artistic activity, to the good of man was not, as was originally intended by the writer,[2] more fully considered. He has however given sufficient indications of the lines upon which he would have treated the subject. We have already seen[3] how he represented 'understanding' as, along with 'love,' the activity in which the self realises itself, and as one of the attributes under which we best conceive the divine nature; and in the *Prolegomena*,[4] in summing up the general characteristics of the progress of mankind towards perfection, he places 'the arts which make nature, both as used and contemplated, the friend of man,' by the side of 'the institutions and habits which tend to make the welfare of all the welfare of each.' Recognising as he did in the effort to assimilate truth or to appreciate beauty a liberation of the human spirit from its own littleness, a self-development through self-renunciation, not different in kind from that which

[1] *Ib.*, Book iv., Chap. 1, and p. 420.
[2] P. 312.
[3] Above, p. xcii.
[4] P. 186.

takes place in moral discipline, he could not but see in the men who have lived to find what is true or to express what is beautiful, fellow-workers with prophets and statesmen in the furtherance of human freedom. Of the former no less than of the latter he held it to be true that their efforts have been governed by the impulse, not to make life as pleasant as possible, but 'to make the most and best of the human soul,' and that their real success has been proportionate to the devotion with which they obeyed this impulse. And of the former no less than of the latter he implies that, however little they may articulately think of themselves as working for the good of mankind, the ultimate value of their work, like that of all other work, depends on the degree to which it contributes to the stock of better life in which all men share.[1] On the trite observation that great artists and men of science often do many selfish things, he would doubtless have made the same sort of comment as he makes on an analogous observation about Napoleon; 'it was not his selfishness that made France a nation, or presented to him continuously an end consisting in the national aggrandisement of France, or at particular periods such ends as the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, the establishment of a centralised political order in France on the basis of social equality, the promulgation of the civil code, the maintenance of the French system along the Rhine. His selfishness gave a particular character to his pursuit of these ends, and (so far as it did so) did so for evil. Finally it led him into a train of action altogether evil. But at each stage of his career, if we would understand what his particular agency really was, we must take account of his ends in their full character, as determined by influences with which his passion for glory no doubt co-operated, but which did not originate with it or with him, and in some measure represented the struggle of mankind towards perfection.' It is in this sense that we may say that 'actions of men, whom in themselves we reckon bad, are "overruled" for good.' Not that there is anything 'mysterious' or 'unintelligible' in such overruling, for 'there is nothing in the effect which we ascribe to the overruling, any more than in any effect belonging to the ordinary course of nature, which there was not in the cause as it really was and as we should see it to be if we fully understood it.'[2] Here as elsewhere he conceives the 'spiritual' as 'the natural rightly understood,' and the lower as serving the higher, not because of some miraculous conjunction, but because they are already one in principle. In order that human objects should be attained the nature that works for them must be

[1] *Prolegomena to ethics*, pp. 405, 415, 416, and Vol. ii. 145. [2] Vol. ii. p. 446.

human, and it is only as fused with something other than themselves that physical influences and animal impulses contribute to make human history. 'Some approach to this fusion we may notice in all good men; not merely in those in whom all natural passions, love, anger, pride, ambition, are enlisted in the service of some great public cause, but in those with whom such passions are all governed by some such commonplace idea as that of educating a family';[1] and what is true of relatively good men is true also of relatively bad men, so far as they produce results which are in any real sense good.

But whatever might have been his views in detail of the functions of science and art in the spiritual progress of mankind, there can be no doubt that it was not to these, but to political and social life, that he naturally turned for the concrete embodiment of his theories. Thus the lectures on *The principles of political obligation*[2] form in some degree an illustrative commentary on the *Prolegomena to ethics*. His object in these lectures is to consider 'the moral function or object served by law, or by the system of rights and obligations which the state enforces, and in so doing to discover the true ground or justification for obedience to law'; and the conclusion which he seeks to establish is that 'the value of the institutions of civil life lies in their operation as giving reality to the capacities of will and reason and enabling them to be really exercised,' and that 'so far as they do in fact thus operate they are morally justified.' He does not write as the advocate or opponent of any particular rights or institutions, but with the aim of bringing out the significance of the fact that such things as rights and institutions exist. Here as in the rest of his philosophy he is endeavouring to awaken a consciousness of what man actually is and does in certain functions of his everyday life, this being, as he conceived, the true way to awaken the further consciousness of what he ought to be and do. The parts which will probably be read with the most interest are those which treat of the general relations of subject to sovereign and of the special cases of war and property. The point of view from which he regards political society throughout is as a product, the most conspicuous product, of self-consciousness. The essential feature in it as compared with other products is that the identity in difference which all self-consciousness implies is here an identity of personal life. The 'other' of which each individual is conscious in belonging to a society is other selves or persons, beings from whom he distinguishes himself, but whom also he recognises as in some

[1] Vol. ii. p. 327.

[2] Vol. ii. pp. 335–549.

sense the likes and equals of himself, and from whom he expects a similar recognition. It is this reciprocal recognition which constitutes a 'right.' Rights only belong to a being capable of conceiving a good or interest as the same for himself and for others, and of acting for it, and conversely any being capable of such conception and action is (in the moral sense of the word) a 'person' and a proper subject of rights. No power ought to be a right, i.e. secured to the individual by society, unless it directly or indirectly furthers the exercise of this capacity, and every power which is necessary to such exercise ought to be a right. The ultimate justification of all rights, then, is that they serve a moral end, in the sense that the powers secured in them are essential to the fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being, i.e. as a being who in living for himself lives for other selves Applying this conception to the relation between sovereign and subject, he is equally opposed to views which base the rights of the former upon superior force and those of the latter upon a supposed 'natural' claim to do whatever one is inclined to. Admitting that the power to coerce is an essential element in sovereignty, he urges that 'to represent fear as the basis of civil subjection is to confound the citizen with the slave, and to represent the motive which is needed for the restraint of those in whom the civil sense is lacking, and for the occasional reinforcement of the law-abiding principle in others, as if it were the normal influence in habits of life of which the essential value lies in their being independent of it.' Civil subjection has a common source with subjection to the law of conscience, in so far as both spring from 'the rational recognition by certain human beings, it may be merely by children of the same parent, of a common well-being which is their well-being, and which they conceive as their well-being whether at any moment any one of them is inclined to it or no.' And from this common source they both retain two elements in common, 'one consisting in antagonism to some inclination, the other consisting in the consciousness that the antagonism to inclination is founded on reason or on the conception of some adequate good.' Thus to the very existence of a political society it is necessary, 'not indeed that every one subject to the laws should take part in voting them, still less that he should consent to their application to himself, but that it should represent an idea of common good, which each member of the society can make his own so far as he is rational.' He is indeed vividly aware how imperfectly the idea of common interest actually regulates the conduct either of sovereigns or of subjects; but he maintains that however 'mixed' the motives are which lead to the formation or the

maintenance of states, the results can only be explained by supposing that the 'mixture' is dominated by influences comparatively unselfish. The passage quoted above about Napoleon illustrates his view of this fusion of motives on the side of a sovereign power; in the ordinary citizen, as he is quite ready to allow, the consciousness of a common good is correspondingly limited; 'very likely he does not think of it at all in connection with anything that the term "state" represents to him. But he has a clear understanding of certain interests and rights common to himself with his neighbours, if only such as consist in getting his wages at the end of the week, in getting his money's worth at the shop, in the inviolability of his own person and that of his wife. Habitually and instinctively, i.e. without asking the reason why, he regards the claim which in these respects he makes for himself as conditional upon his recognising a like claim in others, and thus as in the proper sense a right. Without this instinctive recognition he is one of the "dangerous classes," virtually outlawed by himself. With it, though he has no reverence for the "state" under that name, no sense of an interest shared with others in maintaining it, he has the needful elementary conception of a common good maintained by law. It is the fault of the state if this conception fails to make him a loyal subject, if not an intelligent patriot. It is a sign that the state is not a true state; that it is not fulfilling its primary function of maintaining laws equally in the interest of all.'[1]

Where this is the case, where the individual citizen honestly believes that some command of his political superior is not for the common good, the question may arise, how he ought to act. To this he replies unhesitatingly that in a country where there is a popular government and settled methods of enacting and repealing laws, 'he should do all he can by legal methods to get the command cancelled, but till it is cancelled he should conform to it'; for 'the common good must suffer more from resistance to a law or to the ordinance of a legal authority, than from the individual's conformity to a particular law or ordinance that is bad, until its repeal can be obtained.' In cases where no repeal by legal means is possible, he points out, consistently with his general view, that the 'right of resistance' should rather be called the 'duty of resistance'; that the question ought not, as has often been done, to be put in the form, What sort of injury gives the citizen a natural right to disobey the law, but in the form, When, for the sake of the common good, the citizen ought to disobey it; and that 'instead of discussing the right of a majority to resist,

[1] Vol. ii., *Principles of political obligation*, F and G.

we should discuss the duty of resistance equally possible for a minority or a majority.' The considerations (necessarily general) which he offers on this point are such as to throw upon the individual the burden of proving that he is in the right. 'The questions which the good citizen should ask himself in contemplating such resistance will be, (*a*) What prospect is there of resistance to the sovereign power leading to a modification of its character or an improvement in its exercise without its subversion? (*b*) If it is overthrown, is the temper of the people such, are the influences on which the general maintenance of social order and the fabric of recognised rights depend so far separable from it, that its overthrow will not mean anarchy? (*c*) If its overthrow does lead to anarchy, is the whole system of law and government so perverted by private interests hostile to the public, that there has ceased to be any common interest in maintaining it?' The principle underlying these questions is that 'the individual has no rights founded on any right to do as he likes.' If he claims a right which is unrecognised by his state, he must be able to show that it would 'contribute to some social good which the public conscience is capable of appreciating; not necessarily one which in the existing prevalence of private interests can obtain due acknowledgment, but still one of which men in their actions and language show themselves to be aware.' The practical corollary in his own mind was not, as might be suggested, that probably there is always more to be said for than against the continuance of any given law or political institution, but that it is the duty of citizens so to keep alive and active in themselves the consciousness of the common interest that the institutions which purport to embody it shall really do so, and when they cease to do so shall admit of modification by the progressive action of the same unselfish reason which originally brought them into existence.[1]

In treating of the various elementary rights implied in a political society he begins with the most elementary of all, the right of 'life and liberty,' or, as he prefers to express it, the right to 'free life,' and this brings him to the question, what grounds there are for overriding this right, i.e. for intentionally having men killed, as is done by the state in war. At first sight the drift of his discussion might seem to be 'peace at any price'; but the point which he is really trying to enforce is that war, which is generally palliated as an unavoidable evil, is *not* unavoidable, and that we are all in various degrees responsible for the wrong which it involves. He admits that there may be circumstances under which war is the

[1] Vol. ii., *Principles of political obligation*, F and G.

only means of maintaining the conditions necessary to the moral development of man, but he urges that there have been very few cases in which this plea could be truly made, and that even in those cases (as in a war for the preservation of political independence), though it may be hard to say precisely where the guilt lies, this is 'only a reason for more general self-reproach, for a more humbling sense (as the preachers say) of complicity in the radical (but conquerable, because moral) evil of mankind which renders such a means of maintaining political freedom necessary.' Nor does he deny that many virtues are called into exercise by war, but of those persons 'who from time to time talk of the need of a great war to bring unselfish impulses into play' he observes that they 'give us reason to suspect that they are too selfish themselves to recognise the unselfish activity that is going on all around them,' and that 'till all methods have been exhausted by which nature can be brought into the service of man, till society is so organised that everyone's capabilities have free scope for their development, there is no need to resort to war for a field in which patriotism may display itself.' In the same spirit he denies emphatically that 'the wrong which results to human society from conflicts between states can be condoned on the ground that it is a necessary incident of the existence of states.' A state is 'an institution in which all the capacities that give rise to rights have free play given to them, and the more perfectly each state attains this object, the easier it is for others to do so'; thus 'it is not the state as such, but this or that particular state, which by no means fulfils its purpose, and might perhaps be swept away and superseded by another with advantage to the ends for which the true state exists, that needs to defend its interest by action injurious to those outside it.' On this ground he regards the present military system of Europe as a consequence, not of the existence of independent states, but of 'the fact that the organisation of state-life, even with those peoples that have been brought under its influence at all, is still so incomplete,' and points out that though 'the dream of an international court with authority resting on the consent of independent states' is very far from realisation, 'it is important to bear in mind that there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of a system of independent states incompatible with it, but that on the contrary every advance in the organisation of mankind in states in the sense explained is a step towards it.' [1]

In dealing with the right of property he starts with the conception of property as the means or instrument of free life. Its rationale

[1] *Ib.*, K.

is 'that everyone should be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the means of realising a will, which in possibility is a will directed to social good.' Such power is the condition of attaining 'free morality,' and the fact that the power is often abused is not, any more than the abuse of any other liberty secured by society, a valid reason for not maintaining it. It is only when the possession of property by one man interferes with its possession by another, and thus diminishes that power to live for a common good which it exists to increase, that it loses its justification and becomes 'theft.' Now such a theory necessarily implies freedom in the acquisition and disposition of property, so long as it does not interfere with similar freedom in others, and freedom in acquisition and disposition necessarily leads to inequality; for whether property be considered 'as representing the conquest of nature by the effort of free and variously gifted individuals,' or 'as a means by which individuals fulfil social functions,' it must vary with individuality. The question then arises, whether the full development of such freedom inevitably carries with it the existence of a proletariate such as we see in modern England, 'practically excluded from such ownership as is needed to moralise a man.' If it does, the theory of property just laid down is self-contradictory; in asserting the necessity of property as a means to free moral development it is at the same time asserting that it makes such development impossible. To this dilemma he replies that the undoubted evils which attach to the present institution of property are not due to the institution itself, but to incidental circumstances which vitiate its working. There is no reason in the nature of things why the increased wealth of one man should mean the diminished wealth of another; on the contrary, supposing trade and labour to be free, the development of capital must mean developed distribution and greater possibilities of ownership. Nor need the employment of large masses of hired labourers, to which the accumulation of capital naturally tends, prevent the labourers, if they have sufficient education and self-discipline, from combining and becoming capitalists themselves. The recent multiplication of 'an impoverished and reckless proletariate' is not therefore to be ascribed to the maintenance of the right of individual property and the consequent unlimited accumulation of capital, but to the conditions under which the right has been acquired and the way in which it has been allowed to be exercised. The appropriation of land by individuals has in most countries been originally effected, not by the expenditure of labour or the results of labour on the land, but by force. The original land-

lords have been conquerors.' From this fact have followed at least two important consequences. One is that 'when the application of accumulated capital to any work in the way of mining or manufacture has created a demand for labour, the supply has been forthcoming from men whose ancestors, if not themselves, were trained in habits of serfdom; men whose life has been one of virtually forced labour, relieved by church charities or the poor law; who were thus in no condition to contract freely for the sale of their labour and had nothing of that sense of family responsibility which might have made them insist on having the chance of saving. Landless countrymen, whose ancestors were serfs, are the parents of the proletariate of great towns.' A second consequence of the same fact is that 'rights have been allowed to landlords, incompatible with the true principle on which rights of property rest, and tending to interfere with the development of the proprietorial capacity in others. . . . Landlords have been allowed to do what they would with their own, as if the land were merely like so much capital, admitting of indefinite extension. . . . In fact, the restraints which the public interest requires to be placed on the use of land if individual property in it is to be allowed at all, have been pretty much ignored, while on the other hand that full development of its resources, which individual ownership would naturally favour, has been interfered with by laws and customs which, in securing estates to certain families, have taken away the interest and tied the hands of the nominal owner in making the most of his property.' His conclusion is that it is unfair 'to lay on capitalism or the free development of individual wealth the blame which is really due to the arbitrary and violent manner in which rights over land have been acquired and exercised, and to the failure of the state to fulfil those functions which under a system of unlimited private ownership are necessary to maintain the conditions of a free life.'[1] What these functions are in the case of property he does not consider in detail. On the general subject of 'state interference' he is at pains to point out that the state not only should not but cannot enforce 'morality' in the proper sense of the word; that any attempt to compel conduct which ought to flow from social interests 'interferes with the spontaneous action of those interests,' and that thus 'the action of the state for the promotion of habits of true citizenship seems necessarily to be confined to the removal of obstacles.' But he argues that under 'removal of obstacles' much ought to be included 'that at first sight may have the appearance of an enforcement of

[1] Vol. ii., *Principles of political obligation*, N.

moral duties,' and that this applies to some public regulation of the rights of landed proprietors, in so far as their exercise at present involves the disqualification of many others, or of a succeeding generation, for due participation in them.[1]

Such considerations may suggest the remark that moral philosophy cannot be of much value if all that it can do for the evils of human society is to show that they are not irremediable, and that it is the fault of everybody if they are not remedied. The account of a moral philosopher may fitly conclude with his opinions on this point.[2] His conception of the value of moral ideals or principles in general has been already referred to. The common notion that they give no help in actual life probably arises, as he points out, from the necessity of expressing them in the form of abstract definitions. From such a statement, for instance, as that 'the true good for man is the perfection of human life,' it seems as if no one could deduce what he ought to do under any particular circumstances. This depends on what is meant by 'having an idea' such as is embodied in such a proposition. Do we mean merely 'the acquaintance of educated men' with the definition in question, or do we mean 'the practical consciousness of an ideal' which the definition formulates? The difference is as great as that between a proposition in geometry or a rule of law when they are simply reflected on, and the same proposition and rule when 'applied by the geometer to a new construction' or 'interpreted by the judge in application to new cases.' What are usually called 'ideas' or 'thought' are partial or faded aspects of some fuller experience, but ideas in the sense in which they move mankind are the very experience of mankind in the making. The idea of a geometrical or legal principle is not something which the geometer or the judge first has and then applies; until it begins to be applied it is a mere otiose possibility, something which a man cannot be said really to 'think' but only to 'think about.' The value of a moral formula, then, lies, not in the fact of its formulation, but in the aspiration and activity which must be there before they can be put into words, and which are continually extracting from the words a wider and deeper meaning.

Few people however would dispute that everyone who is to do anything worth doing must in some sense have an ideal; but a philosophical formula expresses a certain *theory* of an ideal, and the question still remains, What is the practical value of having such a theory? In other words, how far can the effort to think out the principles on which we are living help us either to avoid moral per-

[1] Vol. ii., *Principles of political obligation*, M. [2] *Prolegomena to ethics*, Book iv.

plexities or to solve them when they occur? Such perplexities, he reminds us (if we exclude from them those 'self-sophistications which arise from a desire to find excuses for gratifying unworthy inclinations'), will not be really many for persons living in a christian society; to most of us our particular duties are sufficiently obvious, and 'the function of bringing them home to the consciences of men is rather that of the preacher than of the philosopher.' Still in a speculative age there is always a certain amount of 'moral anarchy,' due mainly to the inadequacy of the inherited formulas in which the practical principles of the age find expression. Owing to this inadequacy different formulas, each claiming authority over the conscience, will sometimes seem to reflective men to conflict with each other, and such conflicts may lead to a genuine doubt what they ought to do, or may afford a pretext to their selfishness for ignoring conscience altogether. In such cases he thinks that philosophy may supply an antidote, an antidote which consists not in repressing but in developing and disciplining the free thought to which the danger is due. For instance, 'it is in the form of imagination, the imagination of a supreme invisible but all-seeing ruler, that, in the case at least of all ordinary good people, the idea of an absolute duty is so brought to bear upon the soul as to yield an awe superior to any personal inclination.' But 'it is a necessity of our rational nature that these forms of imagination, in which our highest practical ideas have found expression, should be subject to criticism,' and the result of such criticism must be the admission that 'statements, which in any strict sense could only be applied to an imaginable finite agent, cannot in any such sense be applied to God,' or at any rate that, if they are so applied, 'they must not be reasoned from as we reason from statements about matters of fact.' Here philosophy may meet criticism by carrying the critical spirit further; it may 'disentangle the operative ideas from their necessarily imperfect expression,' it may 'show when and how the figures of speech, being derived by metaphor from sensible matters of fact, are liable to mislead us,' and it may 'point out what is the sense in which alone the question as to the truth of such language can be properly asked or answered.' Thus it may justify the conclusion, that 'if the infinite spirit so communicates itself to the soul of man as to yield the idea of a possible perfect life, and that consequent sense of personal responsibility for making the best of himself as a social being from which the recognition of particular duties arises, then it is a legitimate expression by means of metaphor—the only possible means, except action, by which the consciousness of spiritual realities can express

itself—to say that our essential duties are commands of God.' By thus vindicating the ultimate authority of a practical idea, philosophy may strengthen a speculative mind against its own illusions and 'counteract the advantage which scepticism may otherwise give to passion against duty.'

It is only a different application of the same function which he assigns to philosophy in cases of what is usually called the 'conflict of duties.' Strictly speaking, as he points out, no such 'conflict' is possible, for 'a man's duty under any particular set of circumstances is always one.' What really happens in such cases is that a person who has been in the habit of identifying his duties with the injunctions of certain external authorities, finds in some particular instance that those injunctions compete for his obedience. There are very few people whose principles of action are not to some extent blended with the idea of an external authority imposing them. As a child cannot separate the duty of speaking the truth from the command of its parents to do so, so to the grown man his moral obligations are as a rule so inseparably associated with some external imponent, a prophet, a priest, a king, a sovereign people, that the disappearance of the imponent would seem to him to annihilate the obligation. When the injunctions of such authorities collide, it will not serve to point out to the perplexed individual that 'external' authorities are no authorities and that he must go for guidance to his own conscience, for his whole difficulty arises from the fact that to him they are not 'external,' that he accepts them, not from fear of penalties, but because they enjoin what he personally feels to be good. Rather the object of philosophy should be to strengthen him for such emergencies by leading him, before they occur, 'to distinguish what is essential in the duties from the form of their imposition, and to guide himself by looking to the common end to which they are alike relative'; he will then be 'prepared for the discovery that the conflict is not really between duties, but between powers invested by the imagination with the character of imponents of duty.' In this way the moral philosopher may exercise a practical influence for good 'by enlisting in the real service of mankind the zeal which would otherwise become a misdirected loyalty or a spirit of unprofitable rebellion.' The method (and we are warned that it is the only method) by which he exercises this influence must be that of analysis, the analysis of 'human conduct,' of 'the motives which it expresses, the spiritual endowments implied in it, the history of thought, habits, and institutions through which it has come to be what it is. He does not understand his business as a philosopher, if he claims to do

more than this. He will not take it for a reproach to be reminded that no philosopher can supply a "moral dynamic." The pretension to do so he would regard as a great impertinence. He finds moral dynamic enough in the actual spiritual nature of man, when that nature is regarded, as it is his business to regard it, not merely in its hitherto performance, but in its intrinsic possibilities. If he cannot help wishing for more, that is an incident of the very aspiration after perfection of conduct which constitutes the dynamic. His immediate business as a philosopher is not to strengthen or heighten this aspiration, much less to bring it into existence, but to understand it. As a man and a citizen, indeed, it is his function to serve as its organ; to give effect to it in his own conduct, to assist in communicating it to others. And since in being a philosopher he does not cease to be a man and a citizen, he will rejoice that the analysis, which alone forms his employment as a philosopher, should incidentally serve a purpose subordinate to the "moral dynamic"—that it should help to remove any obstacle to the effort of the human soul after a perfect life.' This it can do by supplying to the persons who need it (they will always be comparatively few) 'a really available criterion for estimating those further claims upon them which are not enforced by the sanction of conventional morality, and a criterion which affords no plea to the self-indulgent impulses.' Such a criterion, he submits, 'is afforded by the theory of ultimate good as a perfection of the human spirit resting on the will to be perfect (which may be called in short the theory of virtue as an end in itself), but not by the theory of good as consisting in a maximum of possible pleasure.'

He had written the *Prolegomena to ethics* as far as these words and only twenty or thirty pages were wanting to complete it. The new house which he had been building in the Banbury Road was just ready for occupation, and he was to move into it in March, 1882. On the evening of March 15 he was taken suddenly ill; at the end of a week dangerous symptoms of blood-poisoning appeared, and on the night of the 25th he was told that he could not live more than a few hours. Though he had often expressed a shrinking from death, and the announcement took him by surprise, he received it without any disquietude, and at once began to think of the various things that had to be done, such as the payment of pupil-teachers in a school of which he was the treasurer, and the publication of his book. He spoke to those about him of his belief in God and immortality, adding in a characteristic way that he did not know what the life beyond might be; 'if we did, we should walk by sight, not by faith.

He asked to have the eighth chapter of the epistle to the Romans read to him, but found the effort of listening too great. He said he should like to be buried in the Jericho cemetery, 'in the North Ward.' As the night went on his mind began to wander; he talked about current politics, the Irish Land Bill and affairs in Bulgaria; and at nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday, March 26, he passed quietly away.

He had left directions that the *Prolegomena to ethics* should be given to A. C. Bradley for publication, and the addresses on *The witness of God* and *Faith* to Arnold Toynbee to deal with at his discretion. He had no children, and his frugal habits and natural gift for managing money had enabled him to save a considerable sum. Among the legacies to be paid after the death of his wife he left 1000*l.* to the university for a prize essay on some subject of moral philosophy, 1000*l.* to found a scholarship at the Oxford high school for boys, and 3500*l.* to Balliol college to be used in the first instance for the promotion of higher education in large towns. The university and the city joined hands to mourn his loss and honour his memory. Though he had been too shy and retiring to be widely popular, to those who knew him at close quarters he was attractive as well as impressive. 'He had,' as has been well said, 'that courtesy of manner which we are wont to praise as "old-fashioned," and that dignified simplicity which we associate rather with the country than with town life.' To the citizens of Oxford he had specially endeared himself. 'After spending an hour with him,' writes one of them, 'I always felt I had come under the influence of a superior being, and came away with a higher ideal of life.' By the transparency of his character, by his tact and wisdom, by his power of taking trouble and his liberality both in money and time, he had done more than any man of his generation to elevate and sweeten the tone of Oxford politics. The memorial fund raised was chiefly applied to found another scholarship at the high school, and probably there is no way in which he would have preferred to be remembered.

'We shall never know a nobler man'; so wrote one of his friends on hearing of his death, and with this simple expression of what many feel we may best take leave of him. It would be an idle task to attempt to measure his work, or to speculate as to the influence which he has had or will have. If the cause which he loved is going to triumph in England; if a time is coming when 'all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen'; when 'the secret of existence, which the poet now speaks to the inward ear of a few, will be proclaimed on the housetops to

the common intelligence of mankind'; when 'the scientific impulse on the one side and the faith that worketh by love on the other' will be felt to be 'the same spirit in different relations'; when God will be worshipped, not 'in vision, or miracle, or mystery,' but as a real presence in all the better life of man; if such a time is coming, we need not fear to think that he has helped and is helping to hasten it. And if not, we may still say of him in words of his own, 'he let the world have its way, not from the hopelessness of the sceptic or the indifference of the epicurean, but because he knew that his own way, however lamely and blindly he pursued it, was yet that to which all the world's ways converge, and that it was the way that leadeth to eternal life.' He would not have liked high language such as this to be applied to himself, but it is true. It was the consciousness of something eternal, within and without him, that made him what he was. His wife once told him that he was like Sir Bors in the *Holy Grail*, and the likeness holds in more senses than one. A 'knight of the spirit' he assuredly was; not Galahad, 'crowned king far in the spiritual city'; not Percivale, sadly resolved 'to pass away into the quiet life'; not Lancelot, with 'the fire of madness in his eyes'; but

> 'Sir Bors it was
> Who spake so low and sadly at our board;
> And mighty reverent at our grace was he;
> A square-set man and honest; and his eyes,
> An out-door sign of all the warmth within,
> Smiled with his lips—a smile beneath a cloud,
> But heaven had meant it for a sunny one.'

And if we had asked him whether he had seen the divine vision, we can fancy that, like Sir Bors, he would have answered,

> 'Ask me not, for I may not speak of it;
> I saw it.'

MISCELLANEOUS WORKS.

THE FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE mere phrase 'force of circumstances' seems to remind us that there is some want of harmony between ourselves and the outer world. Such an expression would be unintelligible to a child, for it implies the consciousness of some law external to us 'warring against the law of the mind,' which in childhood is as yet undeveloped. Our new existence seems then to fit so exactly with existing things that the delights of sense are inseparable from those of the intellect, our whole being is absorbed in external objects, and we have no feeling of the gulf that is fixed between ourselves and that complicated power, the result of human action from the first foundation of the world, which assumes at one time the form of an irresistible compulsion to sin, at another that of the moral law of society. But meanwhile the yoke is forming whose weight we are soon to find so heavy. The senses become more gross as our mental sight becomes more refined, our habits grow in strength and complexity as our perception of the law which ought to regulate them attains greater definiteness, and external suffering gets its first strong hold on us just when we are beginning to discover that this world is not our home. What terms ought we then to make, and what do we habitually make, with this power which is foreign to us, and yet asserts its dominion over our inmost souls? In other words, how are mankind in general affected by circumstances, and how is the good man affected by them?

Looking at men as separate individuals, we may consider them as severally the centres of a system of external powers which widens as we contemplate it till it seems almost coincident with the universe. We may pass from the 'portions of matter in which we are more nearly interested' to the whole physical world around us, and from our own past actions and habits to the morals of all generations of men.

To regard this vast environment merely as the outcome of the workings of the human mind, seems nearly as far from the truth as to regard ourselves as its creatures or its slaves. Its true influence on us is to raise our thoughts in various ways to the spirit in whom 'we live and move and have our being,' while it teaches us at once that he made us and not we ourselves, and that he made us after his own likeness.

When the unconsciousness of childhood has passed away, and the growing man, from the discovery that nature will not always suit his will or fancy, begins to realise practically the difference between 'the subject' and 'the object,' he naturally speculates on the relations between himself and the outer world. Such speculation is not confined to philosophers. The language we hear from religious people on the one hand, about the fleeting objects of sense, and from men of the world on the other, of the unsatisfactoriness of everything but material facts, shows how thoroughly it is inwoven with practical life. It often divides the life of the individual into two distinct states, not indeed definitely marked off, but each constantly recurring. At one time he asks himself what would be left to him if he were cut off from the outer world but inoperative powers, unsatisfied tendencies, capability without realisation; at another, turning his thoughts inward, he wanders in the mazes of his own consciousness, till 'housed in a dream' he loses all sense of the reality of life. By degrees he learns the true reconcilement between the opposing states of consciousness. He finds that though in himself he has nothing more than barren powers and tendencies, yet it is not in the outer world that truth and reality lie. This outer world is no independent existence, but a means through which his own mind is evermore communicated to him, through which the deity, who works unseen behind it, pours the truth and love which transform his capabilities into realities.

It is in the circumstances of physical nature that this lesson is most plainly written. We find on the one hand that the purely *a priori* notions which we form of the order of the physical universe do not correspond with facts afterwards discovered, while on the other hand our examination of phenomena does but evoke laws which have previously been latent in our minds—which have only to be suggested to us, and we recognise at once their fitness and necessity.

The law of gravitation, for instance, once discovered, commends itself to us as a proper inmate of the mind, with a certainty which belongs to no mere result of generalisation from external facts. It is not a material, but a mental law, capable of being expressed in mathematical formulæ, and thus essentially differenced from anything like a botanical classification. But even when we describe it as 'a law previously latent in our minds,' we are still speaking rather phenomenally than correctly. More truly it is a law of that divine mind which began to be communicated to us with the first mother's smile, with the first flash of sunlight on our opening eyes. The joy of the religious naturalist, when, after weary observation and generalisation, that knowledge of law which to him is liberty breaks like the day on his soul, is no vain triumph at the discovery of some hidden treasure of his own mind. It is like the feeling with which we catch sight of the handwriting of a friend, when wide seas roll between him and us. Thus we see that the human mind is not the only real existence, but that it is the creation of a higher mind, which has surrounded it with hidden signs and wonders that it may learn at once its greatness and dependence; its greatness, as being itself a creative power, and its dependence, as being unable to put this power forth till its author evokes it by giving it an object in the works of his own hands. It is a similar lesson which the good man learns from the power of external nature in all its aspects. He finds that it is only what he gives to it that he receives from it, but yet by some mysterious affinity it evokes what he has to give, and then it bears witness with his own spirit that what he gives is not his own, but inspired from above. There is no chasm between man and nature. Each, we may truly say, is a reasonable soul, one as being the living receptacle, the other the apt channel, of the influx of divinity.

But when we pass from external nature to those circumstances with which sin seems to be inseparably blended, the lesson is written in less plain characters. We seem no longer masters but slaves, unable to free ourselves from the chains of cause and effect with which the sins of our fathers and our own past actions bind our present life. As soon as we awake from the slumbers of childhood, when we were 'alive without the law,' to a sense of its full requirements, 'the

days gone by return upon us' with all the terrors of a forgotten fear, and make us feel that, however it may be in thought, in act it is impossible to separate the present from the past. The spiritual law of which we are conscious witnesses to us that we are properly free, but the antagonistic law which regulates the universe seems irresistibly dominant. At last we find that reconciliation is possible. The chain of cause and effect cannot be shuffled off, but it may bind us to heaven instead of to earth; the force of circumstances cannot be evaded, but it may become a power of good instead of evil. To admit that a given combination of circumstances must produce a certain effect on a given state of mind is not to deny the mind's freedom, for the effect may be a resistance, not a submission to circumstances. The same craving of sensual appetite will move one man to a surrender of the mind to the body, another to humility and self-abasement. The effect in both cases might be known beforehand, if we knew the secret state of the two minds; but the good man, by manifesting the power of the creative spirit to bring good out of evil, asserts the freedom which the other abdicates. He is indeed still a slave, yet no longer the slave of the world, but of him 'whose service is perfect freedom.' In the same spirit he meets all the shocks of circumstance. Bodily suffering has always been considered by religious men as chastisement from a father's hand, which curbs the overweening conceits of their childish assurance; and even the infection of past sin, which they cannot wholly purge away, becomes part of their spiritual training. It is not those who talk most boastfully of the independence of their spirits who have really rid themselves of the yoke of circumstances. Such men implicitly confess that they are still kicking against the pricks, still trying to avoid the inevitable influence which we may wholly transmute but cannot put aside. The best men will confess that their performance falls far short of their promise, and that, whatever may be their spiritual exaltation in their private moments, yet in their dealings with the world their old habits return, and combine with an imperfect social morality and the cares of this life to drag them down again to the earth. But 'when they are weak, then are they strong.' The common doctrine, which connects the sense of sin with the confidence of salvation, has often been denounced by theologians; but it seems to have its root in the truest

feelings which bind earth to heaven. When the force of circumstances has lost that hold on the spirit which cuts it off from communion with God, it will still limit our power in action, and prevent our outward walk and conduct from answering exactly to the motions of our purified will, and thus our very imperfections may win us to that child-like dependence on God which is only another aspect of the assurance of salvation. The end of our life-long struggle is a state analogous to that in which we rested before it began, but our final repose does not arise from unconsciousness of the law, but from reconciliation with it. The solid walls of circumstance which shut in our energies stand firm as ever; but instead of chafing against them we see them reflecting the brightness of our deliverer's coming.

But there are few who attain to this final conquest. The greater portion even of the better sort of men are in a kind of middle state, half the creatures and half the creators of circumstances. These are the men who 'bow themselves in the house of Rimmon' in remembrance of the true God, who always 'go with the multitude,' often 'to do evil,' but yet have an indistinct feeling that in conforming to the customs of men they are doing their duty in a state to which God has called them. To such men their worldly environment is not merely 'of the earth, earthy,' but has in some degree the character of a divinely-appointed discipline. Better than those who exalt themselves against God by quarrelling with his universal law, they acquiesce contentedly in things as they are, often, indeed, as slaves to them, when they yield passively to their influence, yet sometimes as free creative spirits, when they read in them the living law of a supreme creative spirit, whose will is also theirs. It is on minds of this stamp that favourable circumstances seem to exercise an independent influence for good. The question often arises, how far that improvement in the outward life of man, which we commonly understand by 'civilisation,' has been accompanied by a corresponding growth in spiritual religion. There are times when it seems as if the corruption of the world contributed to the purity of the church, and the more adverse the circumstances, the mightier the spiritual power which transmutes them. Have we now amongst us the strength to earn a martyr's glory, or have the charms of this world, purer now than of old, divided the love of men whose sole

affections in days of grosser wickedness would have been set on things above? In answer to this it may be said that the faith of a martyr, being that highest creative energy which deals with circumstances as it will, is unaffected by altered times. It operates alike on the lofty and the low, not more in the momentous struggles of good and evil than in the quieter traits of an ordinary life. But it is different with those weaker spirits who follow very much as circumstances lead, and yet are able at favourable times to recognise in them the law of God. They can only exercise this measure of free power when its object is specially adapted to evoke it. They cannot ordinarily raise themselves above the earth, but the purer the character of earthly influences the lighter is the bondage which they have to suffer. And great as is the power of the renewed spirit to bring strength out of weakness and to make the chains of old habits the signs of its newly-won freedom, yet, lest we should suppose that evil of any kind can ever lose its character, we always find that the victory is least complete when the influence of circumstances which has to be overcome is in itself peculiarly evil. In men who, late in life, have shaken off their habits of sin, we often see a narrowness of view, a lingering remembrance of their former bondage, which tinges all the aspects of former life. Those circumstances which seemed most mixed up with their old sin they can never regard as other than unclean. The lesson of their past life is too terrible for them to contemplate; and the effects of their past actions, which constantly reappear, instead of confirming their freedom by teaching them dependence on God, have still something of their old enslaving influence, for they revive that tormenting fear which is next of kin to bondage. Half the sphere of human thought and action is still dark to them, incapable of manifesting the divine goodness.

When we turn our thoughts from such characters as we have hitherto been contemplating to the state of mankind at large, we seem to pass from victory over circumstances, approaching or complete, to an unresisting submission to them. Looking at men individually, we find that they are, for the most part, in greater or less degree, the slaves of their own passions, or of the evil influences in which they have been born and bred; when we regard them as nations, they seem to be the victims of an uncontrollable destiny. When we

speak of the progress of a nation, we do not mean any free progressive energy of the national mind, but a certain regular succession of circumstances, to which the nation is forced, by a resistless attraction, evermore to conform itself. Feudality passes into plutocracy, local characteristics and provincial governments are merged in a general centralisation, not by any process of mental development, but by bare force of circumstances. Political constitutions seem often the result merely of physical geography, the cause, rather than the effect, of the temper of the people. Without coal a country cannot pursue manufactures to any great extent, and without manufactures, with a population of scattered agriculturists, can it ever be fit for self-government? Can insular England ever be subject to military tyranny, and can Austria, overhung by Russia and without a seaboard, ever be free from it? If we turn to influences less purely physical, the bondage is still the same. The combined motions of a mass of minds, working and counter-working, form a complex external power, which is by no means analogous to any one of its component parts, and is carried along the path of necessity, to which past crimes or old usage bind it, by a sort of inherent compulsion. If once the national mind quit this path, it is only to be carried away, as in the French Revolution, by an involuntary madness. The recognition of the laws of political economy is in itself an admission that men have no control over the results of their own combined energies, which operate in a system as independent of human will as that which regulates the motion of the heavenly bodies. But does this force of circumstances, affecting nations so variously, cause any inequality of good and evil among them, or does it press with equal intensity on all, differing in its results only so far as it is modified by the spiritual freedom of ten righteous men in this city, and twenty in that? If we look at the state of European nations, it would seem that the effect of external influences upon them, though various, has not been unequal, and that their political constitutions have been alike as powers of evil, but very different in the amount of living beneficial power which they have received from men who were raised above them. The spiritual energy of the liberated few introduces an element of good into the force to which the many are subject. We see everywhere, in the abolition of serfdom, in the reconcilement of nations, in the

general recognition of personal equality, how Christianity, as an external influence, has lightened the worldly burden of multitudes who were ignorant of its inward power. The men whose souls its positive truths have liberated exercise a negative influence in removing the most oppressive evils from the outward circumstances of life. From time to time, in a crusade or reformation, their enthusiasm opens some new spring of national life, which in its turn mingles with the onward stream of national progress. But they must themselves be wholly free from the dominion which they only modify for others. It is one of the effects of our fondness for excessive generalisation that we identify the reformers of bygone days too much with the spirit of their age, and seldom sufficiently appreciate the independence of their position or the isolated eminence of their greatness. The world is ever claiming as its own those who have indeed been in it but not of it. The very essence of a true reformer consists in his being the corrector and not the exponent of the common feeling of his day. The breath of his life is inspired from above, not drawn up from below. Those flashes of religious enlightenment which from time to time break on the slumbers of mankind often resemble in their history the discoveries of scientific truth. The wants of the age, or some unknown influences from above, set the minds of thinking men in motion, they know not whither, till at last the master mind among them reaches the wished-for light, and reflects it on his fellows. Immediately they recognise it as that after which they have been striving, while the world at large finds its darkness broken, but knows not whence the light has come. It has its own way; its antagonistic forces work along the winding pathway of 'human progress,' but they move on a different plane from the spiritual energy which animates the true reformer. Its rival parties adopt him as their own, or cast him from them, as may suit their purpose; but he is fulfilling a work which they know not of, a work which has many points of contact with the political and social movements of the day, but which is yet distinct from them both in origin and end. He must needs be raised above that atmosphere of circumstances, on which he throws the light of his own being, penetrating even to those who still wander beneath it.

THE INFLUENCE OF CIVILISATION ON GENIUS.

It may seem a vain attempt to inquire into the influence of circumstances on a power whose nature most men have agreed to leave undecided. It is true that we have little hesitation in asserting that this or that form or work of art displays genius, for there are certain indications of a master's hand which no one can mistake. But the genius of the ruler seems different in kind from that of the poet, and even in the same person the power shows itself in such irregular flashes that we are both unable and unwilling to bring it under any general law. Some such attempt, however, is necessary for my present purpose, and the best theory will be that which explains those phenomena which all men have observed, though the proof of it may be too hard a task. We set out then with the hypothesis of a divine idea of the world, by which we mean, to speak after the manner of men, the purpose of God in the creation of the universe, that conception of his works which is ever present to his mind, not as we see them 'through a glass darkly,' but in that perfection which even to our eyes they are destined one day to attain. This idea is manifested in every created thing under certain limitations from which it is evermore working itself free; but the mind of man is the only manifestation which can enjoy the consciousness of its perfect original; it alone can win its way to harmonious communion with the idea, and apprehend that living will on which 'its dark foundations rest.' This apprehension in its highest and most general form is the property of all the truly good. 'By faith they understand that the things which are seen were not made by things which do appear'; conscious that God has a purpose in their life, and in remembrance of their home in him, they travel through this mortal life as citizens of a better land, and look on nature with other than human eyes. But when the divine idea manifests itself in

the mind of men in an intellectual form, or when, to reverse the picture, man apprehends the idea through the medium of his intellectual faculties, then we discern the man of genius. From genius, as thus defined, there naturally flow all those characteristics which are generally recognised as indications of its existence. If a man has indeed insight into that divine idea of which the outer world and the opinion of men are but the feeble expressions, his knowledge is no longer merely a generalisation from external facts, nor is his belief filtered from the stream of ordinary thought, but he has himself a truth from above to reveal to mankind; he is indeed an original man. If he has found entrance into the inner shrine of the counsels of God, and there seen knowledge in its unity and as a whole, he no longer views objects 'in isolation dead and spiritless,' or separates the different branches of study from their common origin and end, but he sees the end in the means, and the 'universal in the particular'; he has a light from heaven to shed on the meanest concerns of life. Such a man is in fact but an impersonation of the divine idea, and, as love is the element in which the idea lives, he cannot fail to recognise it with affection in all its other manifestations, loving truth for its own sake. This would be the account of genius in its full development, whereas we never see it but in various stages of imperfection. For not only does the idea refuse fully to reveal itself without long and laborious culture on our part, but its manifestation in the mind of man is necessarily attended by numerous obstructions and limitations from which it is ever tending to free itself. Keeping this thought in mind, and remembering that genius, according to our explanation of it, partakes of the nature of revelation, we shall be better able to account for the fitfulness of its appearance. How then do these obstructions differ at different periods of the world's history, and what is their peculiar strength in our own day? If we trace the history of intellectual progress during the last seventy years, casting our eyes from the authors of that new birth in literature of which the French Revolution was either the cause or the counterpart, to those in whom England must now make her boast, or not at all, we can scarcely fail to be struck by the strange revulsion which has taken place. In that bright era of hope, when 'to be young was very heaven,' when it seemed that not merely in the

spirit of the recluse, but in the very waking world of social and political life, old things were passing away and all things were becoming new, poets ceased to look back on a golden age gone by, for they were themselves entering on a golden age, not of childish innocence, but of triumphant and perfect manhood. Sixty years of 'human progress' are past and gone, and the dream has fled. Of those very men whose youth was so joyous, some spent their age in complete seclusion, others in discontented intercourse with the world; and of their successors one may be sighing for the simple great ones that are gone, another for the old feudal system, another for a theocracy of hero-worship; but all of them speak of something that is gone, all seem to feel, as none have felt before them, the burden of the world. We may call this feeling a morbid quietism or an intellectual epicureanism, but we cannot deny that, if we have any men of genius among us at all, it is they who are infected by it. Nor need we stay to inquire whether the censure of it, which we commonly hear, is the pity of a superior or the railing of an unsympathising mind. It is enough to know that those most influenced by the feeling would confess that it is a clog on the full development and free activity of their genius. Nor is it merely their keen perception of the evils of life around them which weighs down their mind, but the consciousness that they are themselves in some degree infected by the disease. Even in youth the inevitable yoke begins to press heavily upon us.

We have already observed that one of the chief characteristics of developed genius is the power of viewing knowledge as a whole. The world, in its intellectual progress, takes the opposite direction. As men advance in civilisation they see more and more clearly that it is not by physical but by mental force that they can subdue nature to their will and work out their purposes on each other. The phrase that 'knowledge is power' passes from the philosopher to the shopkeeper, and every man must cultivate his understanding if it be only to strike his bargains with a harder head or to appear to advantage in society. The discoveries of science with which the young man must be conversant if he would be master of the various appliances of life are daily accumulating; the philosopher is daily spinning theories of which some knowledge but no appreciation is necessary for that familiarity with the opinions of men which enables one most

plausibly to influence them. Meanwhile the systematising tendency of the human mind is at work, civilisation tends to the division of labour, and gradually certain schemes of education are developed which divert the intellectual tendencies of the nation, and absorb in themselves its learned element. The different branches of knowledge and thought which are separately evolved as civilisation advances are, as it were, separately ticketed by men who are ignorant of their common principle, and take their places as so many means of strengthening the mind for its worldly occupations, while their true end is as clean forgotten as their true significance. Let us consider the effect of this state of things on one whom nature has marked for a future genius, and who already feels some yearning after a common principle that may explain all things to which he turns his thoughts. He naturally falls in the way of the learned education of his day. Others about him are seeking to arrive at such mental power as may serve them in life, and they have a course marked out before them which will take them by the shortest road. At stated intervals one study succeeds another, of a kind and in an order which experience shows to be the most useful for the majority. But he is not as they. He is seeking to solve the riddle of the universe, and to contemplate its excellence. Intellectual power is an object to him only so far as it may contribute to this end. He finds no rest for his soul in the different branches of knowledge till he has the key to their meaning, and it is at heaven-sent moments and by heavenly influences, with which no external system may intermeddle, that the light from heaven within him is quickened into flame. If on the one hand he set himself free from the learned education of his day, there is the obvious danger of his neglecting that steady cultivation which is undoubtedly necessary to the development of genius, however hard or impossible it may be to reduce it to rule. He to a great degree excludes himself from sympathy with those in whom he should find the nourishers of his strength, and though he may fully apprehend the divine idea in itself, he may shut himself out from the view of that which to him should be its noblest manifestation, the higher minds among his contemporaries. If on the other hand poverty, or ambition, or some nobler motive, constrain him to follow the beaten track, then arises the danger lest his genius, diverted from its

natural course, should lose itself amid the objects to which it is directed without inclination and before its time, or, chafing at its bondage in unworthy chains, should indeed in some sort 'see into the life of things,' but with a distorted and unloving gaze. Or perhaps, carried away with the blind race after 'knowledge' in which those about him are engaged, he imagines that in each branch of study on which he enters, he is on the high road to the truth for which he naturally yearns. He forgets that all truth partakes of the nature of revelation, and that, though he is bound to work actively on his own part, yet it is only by humbly resigning himself 'in a wise passiveness' to the heavenly influences which are ever about him, that his mind can attain to that harmony with itself and the divine idea which is the key of all knowledge. Hence 'new beginnings, disappointments new.' He loses the unity of truth amid a crowd of separate truths, and finally either wanders into scepticism or wastes his strength in a variety of unavailing pursuits, seeking the divine idea in theories which men have spun. How different was the path of genius in older times, ere yet a semblance of learning was deemed a necessary qualification for success in life, or the teaching of the day had hardened into systems with no bond of unity! Genius might then take her free course without alienating herself from the influences of learning, for learning still retained her freedom and native dignity; the mind might work actively in itself, and yet remain open to the impressions of external powers, for that absorbing and hurried exertion was not then rife, by which alone we can keep pace with the intellectual movements of our day. We cannot wonder that we have still to revert to the wisdom of our forefathers, no less for the primary principles of knowledge, than when we seek to breathe its finer spirit. For the same influences which we have noticed in education work throughout all stages of life. Men who have been accustomed in youth to proceed from study to study with no method but that of temporal succession, and to acquire manifold information with no principle of unity to explain it, carry the same habit, or its results, with them to the grave. They are content to follow one opinion in this matter, and the exact contrary in that, for they have never learnt that all true opinions proceed from the same source; nor do they care to bridge over the chasm between the several

divisions of knowledge, for each has its separate corner in their mind where it never jostles its neighbour. They are astonished at the mere thought of seeking any absolute identity between their moral and intellectual natures, between wisdom and religion, for they learnt moral philosophy and the laws of thought as separate things in their youth, and they have never dreamt of connecting them since. Meanwhile, independently of education, civilisation in its onward course is producing the same effects. The food of the mind is ever accumulating, while its digestive power remains as it was. Discoveries in the storehouse of nature, observations on the variety and complexity of external facts, all kinds of knowledge, in short, that come to us through the medium of the senses, increase with the growth of experience; but our insight into the common principles of knowledge, and the unity of truth, is certainly not greater than that of Bacon or the Hebrew prophets. Hence innumerable distinctions, which have only a relative value, become as fixed in common language and opinion as if they were parts of absolute truth, and unity of thought is lost amid unreal and bewildering diversities.

While talent daily gains a wider field and a more polished keenness, the nascent genius, which should develope into a full apprehension of the divine idea, is weighed down by the burden of divided knowledge which it cannot restore to harmony. It is natural that this evil should be most noticeable in that 'scientia scientiarum' in which genius ought to find the most direct approach to that home where alone it can rest. When our theological distinctions (or rather confusions) of justification and sanctification, of imputed and inherent righteousness, of actual and original sin, are no longer considered as so many metaphors or logical forms accommodated to the weakness of human thought, but have intruded themselves on the unity of divine truth, it is no wonder that genius should be excluded from the contemplation of the simplest and most sacred grandeur. In poetry we find the same evil in another form. 'Still dividing, and dividing still,' we 'break down all grandeur.' Searching without reverence among the phenomena of nature, and dividing it into a multitude of separate agencies, we can no longer regard it as a single power working with kindly influence on the heart of man, or relentlessly binding down his destiny. When we

have split up the affections into a quantity of organs, balancing and checking one another, and, in the hurry of modern life, have scarcely leisure to give ourselves up to any strong emotion, it is hard to appreciate the dramatic unity of the divers workings of some intense passion. It is true that the man of genius, to be worthy of the name, must be in a great degree superior to these faults of the general mind; but till he can achieve the impossibility of entirely freeing himself from the spirit of his age, they must check the free development of his power, if it be only by rousing him to constant rebellion against them. Thus it is that in our modern poets we find the constructive and combining power so much inferior to that of catching at isolated beauties. They have many noble thoughts and happy expressions, but they lack the power of combining them all to produce one grand impression. But in a more obvious way our advanced civilisation tends to confine their range of vision. The progressive apprehension of the divine idea must ever be closely connected with the hope of its fuller manifestation, and to one who is full of sympathy with his fellow-men, the most welcome manifestation would be in the political life of mankind. In our days the hope of this naturally grows more feeble, and therefore the apprehension of the idea becomes less clear in proportion. In the days when, not in fancy but in sober seriousness, Vane built his splendid political theories, and Cromwell seemed about to embody them in act, when even the common people saw the dominion of the saints at hand, Milton might well 'see in his mind's eye a noble and puissant nation rousing itself, like a strong man after sleep,' and even rise in thought from the perfection of earthly politics to the city of the heavenly host. But it is hard for men who are versed in political theories which have all been found wanting, and whose eyes are dimmed with the dust that rises from the hubbub of modern life, to see the history of mankind 'orbing itself to a perfect end.' Poets withdraw their gaze from the struggling progress of mankind and fix it on the narrower sphere of their own sufferings and destiny, ruthlessly dissecting the minutiæ of individual life. This self-consciousness, and the conceit which it naturally produces, are fostered by that hundred-handed prodigy of our times, the 'reading public,' with its attendant reviewers. Even the man most absorbed in the objects of his genius can scarcely help some-

times looking away from the idea on which he should centre his whole attention, to the eager critics who are hanging on his words. Our restless intellectual emulation tends the same way. A man who has been constantly taught that he must get something by his natural gifts and use them to outshine his fellows, is gradually brought into a state of intellectual isolation, quite different from that free spirit with which Shakespeare walked this earth, drinking in every hue of many-coloured life, and plunging into the common stream of human existence unfettered by the consciousness of superiority. This isolation is the death of genius, which goes hand in hand with sympathy, for it is when we see it manifested in the common affections of men that we most lovingly and reverently apprehend the divine idea. Yet in this very sympathy the man of genius may in these days find a heavy burden. It is not merely in its direct operation on himself that he has to fear the evil influence of the age. When literature has been degraded to the purpose of amusing the public, and when mental endowments and words of the highest meaning have been profaned by men ignorant of the significance even of their own powers, there flows forth a stream of intellectual life through society cut off from its true fountain and diverted from its proper object. Even among our academic youth we may often see the treasures of philosophy appropriated for purposes of the market, and we have only to read a French despatch to see how the lies of diplomacy may be tricked out in an almost poetic garb. To the man who closely combines genius and sympathy these intellectual corruptions are like a wound rankling in his own soul. He is indeed independent of general opinion, but it is on him of all men that the intellectual tendencies of the age have in one sense the most potent influence. He alone can grasp them as a whole, and carry about with him a constant and intimate perception of their faults. He feels the pulse of the whole nation beating in his own veins, and hence the casual expression of a false opinion speaks to him of the corruption of that 'intellectual public' which is the peculiar product of our modern civilisation. We sometimes hear the inactive life of our modern poets contrasted with that of Milton, whose stern spirit shrank not from the loudest turmoil of life. But what would have been the effect on Milton if in his day there had been a 'literary world,' daily putting

forth its false notions of poetry and philosophy, and living, as it were, a life of falsehood in its intellectual capacity? Would not he too have been driven, for mere safety from infection, to a life of seclusion, to morbid complaints against the spirit of his age, and even to a sort of self-assertion to protect himself against the inroads of the obtrusive foe? Better an old age of poverty and neglect, with five pounds for the poem to keep the poet alive, than a literary life in a time when the intellect is vexed with the spur of competition, and the inspiration of heaven is bargained away in the dearest market. The man of genius may bow in submission to the inseparable accidents of his earthly imprisonment, but he must needs feel the growing burden of an age of intellectual commerce.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE AND INFLUENCE OF WORKS OF FICTION IN MODERN TIMES.

We commonly distinguish writings which appeal directly to the emotions from those of which the immediate object is the conveyance of knowledge, by applying to the former a term of conveniently loose meaning, 'works of imagination.' Of the kinds included in the wide denotation of this term there are three, between which it seems difficult at first sight to draw a definite line; which appeal to similar feelings, and excite a similar interest, in the different ages to which each is appropriate. These are the epic poem, the drama, and the novel. Each purports to be, in some sort, a reflex of human life and action, as obeying certain laws and tending to a certain end. In each men are represented, not as at rest, or in contemplative isolation, but in co-operation or collision. In each there is a combination of two elements, an outer element of incident, an inner of passion and character. In view of these common features, we might be tempted at first sight to suppose the difference between the three kinds to be merely one of form, merely the difference between the vehicle of prose and the vehicle of metre. We shall find, however, on deeper inquiry, that to the true artist, who does not find his materials in the world, but creates them according to the inner laws by which the world and himself are governed, the vehicle is not more a part of his creation than the 'impassioned truth' which it conveys. Here, as elsewhere, form and substance are inseparable; and the difference of form that distinguishes the novel from the other kinds of composition which it seems for the present to have superseded, symbolises, or rather is identical with, a different potency in the art by which the substance is created.

Mere copying is not art. The farther the artist rises above the stage of imitation, the higher is his art, the more

elevating its influence on those who can enter into its spirit. If the landscape-painter does nothing more than represent nature as seen by the outward eye, the vulgar objection against looking at pictures—'I can see as fine a view as this any day'—is unquestionably valid. But if the painter is anything better than a photographer, he does far more than this. He brings nature before us, as we have seen it, perhaps, only once or twice in our lives, under the influence of some strong emotion. He does that for us which we cannot do for ourselves; he reproduces those moments of spiritual exaltation in which 'we feel that we are greater than we know'—moments which we can remember, and of which the mere memory may be the light of our lives, but which no act of our own will can bring back. It is not till the distinction has been appreciated between nature as it is and nature as we make it to be, between that which we see and that which 'having not seen we love,' that any branch of art can be reckoned in its proper value.

In one sense of the words, it would no doubt be true to say that nature is simply and altogether that which we make it to be. Modern philosophy has discarded the language which represented our knowledge of things as the result of impressions and the transmission of images. If we still not only speak but think of ourselves as primarily passive and in contact with an alien world, this arises simply from the difficulty of conceiving a pure spontaneous activity. Driven from the crude imagination which found the primary condition of knowledge in the reception of 'ideas' from without, 'common sense' took refuge in the more refined hypothesis of unknown objects, which cause our sensations, and through sensations our knowledge. But this standing-ground has been swept away by the consideration that such a cause may be found within as well as without, in the laws of the subject's activity as well as in objects confessedly beyond the reach of cognition. Our ultimate analysis can find no element in knowledge which is not supplied by ourselves in conformity to a ruling law, or which exists independently of the action of human thought.

But though the world of nature is, in this sense, a world of man's own creation, it is so in a different way from the world of art and of philosophy. Thought is indeed its parent, but thought in its primary stage fails to recognise it as its own, fails to transfer to it its own attributes of universality,

and identity in difference. It sees outward objects merely in their diversity and isolation. It seeks to penetrate nature by endless dichotomy, glorying in that dissection of unity which is the abdication of its own prerogative. It treats outward things as ministering to animal wants, as the sources of personal and particular pleasures and pains; and thus induces the sense of bondage, of collision with a world in which it has not yet learnt to find itself. It places the end of human life not in harmony with the law which is the highest form of itself, but in happiness, *i.e.* in the extraction of the greatest possible amount of enjoyment from a world to which it seems to be accidentally related. The view of things corresponding to this stage of thought is what we commonly call their outward aspect. It is the aspect of matter-of-fact, of logic, of 'mere morality,' as opposed to that of art, of philosophy, and religion.

The perfection of this latter and higher view involves the absolute fusion of thought and things. Its full attainment is a new creation of the world. Yet it is but the discovery of a relationship which was from the beginning, the adoption by thought of a child which was never other than its own. The habitual interpretation of natural events by the analogy of human design, to which every hour's conversation testifies, is the evidence that to the ordinary man nature presents itself not as something external, but, like a friend, as 'another himself.' The true conquest of nature is but the completion of the reconciliation thus anticipated in the everyday language and consciousness of mankind. When the mind has come to see in the endless flux of outward things, not a succession of isolated phenomena, but the reflex of its own development into an infinite variety of laws on a basis of identity—when the laws of nature are raised to the character of laws which regulate admiration and love—when the experiences of life are held together in a medium of pure emotion, and the animal element so fused with the spiritual as to form one organisation through which the same impulse runs with unimpeded energy—then man has made nature his own, by becoming a conscious partaker of the reason which animates him and it. The attainment of this consummation is the end of life: but it is an end that can never be fully realised, while 'dualism' remains a necessary condition of humanity. To most men it is as a land very far off, of which

occasional glimpses are caught from some 'specular mount' of philosophic or poetic thought. It can only approach realisation through the operation of a power which can penetrate the whole man, and act on every moment of his life. But that power, which in the form of religion can make every meal a sacrament, and transform human passion into the likeness of divine love, is represented at a lower stage, not only by the unifying action of speculative philosophy, but by the combining force of art.

The artist, even at his lowest level, is more than an imitator of imitations. Abridgment, selection, combination, are the necessary instruments of his craft; and by their aid he introduces harmony and order into the confused multiplicity of sensuous images. He substitutes for the primary outward aspect of things a new view, in which thought already finds a resting place. Just as strong emotion tends to make all known existence the setting of a single form; just as intense meditation sees in all experience the manifestation of a single idea; so the artist, even if he be merely telling a story, or painting a common landscape, puts some of his materials in a relief, and combines all in a harmony, which the untaught eye does not find in the world as it is. He presents to us the facts in the one case, the outward objects in the other, as already acted upon by thought and emotion. In this sense every artist, instead of copying nature, idealises it. In degree and mode, however, the idealisation varies infinitely in the various kinds of art. It is by considering the height to which it is carried in the epic poem and the drama that we shall best appreciate its limitations in the novel.

In outward form the epic poem is simply a narrative in verse. Historically it seems to have originated in the records of ancestral heroism, which passed from mouth to mouth in metre, as the natural form of oral communication in an unlettered age. In the Iliad and Odyssey we first find this outward form penetrated by a new spirit, which converts the narrative into the poem. There is no need to do violence to historical probability by supposing that Homer was a conscious artist, or that he imagined himself to be doing anything else than representing events as they happened. We have simply to notice that in him facts have become poetry, and to ask ourselves what constitutes the change. How is it that the epic poet, while 'holding up the mirror to nature,'

yet shows us in the glass a glory which belongs not to nature as we see it, in its material limitations? The answer is, that though he follows the essential laws of the human spirit, his scene is not the earth we live in. He fills it with actors other than the men who 'hoard and sleep and feed' around us. He places the action either in heroic ages—in the 'past which was never present,' when gods were more human and men more divine—or in heavenly places, and among the powers of the air. The action is simple in proportion to its remoteness from the reality of life, and rapid in proportion to its simplicity. It arises from the operation of the most elementary passions, the wrath of Achilles or the pride of Satan, in collision with an overruling power. For the animal wants and tricks of fortune, which entangle the web of man's affairs, it has no place. The animal element, if not banished from view altogether, becomes merely the organ of the ruling motions of the spirit; and fortune is lost in destiny or providence. Thus the incidents of the narrative cease to be mere incidents. They are held together by passion; they are themselves, so to speak, manifestations of passion working with more and more intensity to the final consummation. Not the laws which regulate curiosity, but those which regulate hope and awe, are the laws which they have to satisfy.

In tragedy, as the product of a more cultivated age, these characteristics appear more strongly than in the primitive epic. The Homeric poems are still legendary narratives, though narratives unconsciously transmuted by the highest art. Tragedy, on the contrary, has no extraneous elements. It implies a conscious effort of the spirit, made for its own sake, to re-create human life according to spiritual laws; to transport itself from a world, where chance and appetite seem hourly to give the lie to its self-assertion, into one where it may work unimpeded by anything but the antagonism inherent in itself, and the presence of an overruling law. This result is attained simply by the action of the proper instruments of thought, abstraction and synthesis. The tragedian presents to us scenes of life, not its continuous flow of incident. In 'Macbeth,' for instance, there is an hiatus of some years between the earlier and later acts; but we are not sensible of the void; for the passions which lead to the catastrophe are but the development of those which appear at the beginning, and to the law against which they struggle 'a thousand

years are but as yesterday.' Time, however, is but one among many circumstances which the tragedian ignores. The common facts of life as it is, and always must have been, the influence of custom, the transition of passion into mechanical habit, the impossibility of continuous effort, the necessary arrangements of society, the wants of our animal nature and all that results from them, these are excluded from view, and so much only of the material of humanity is retained as can take its form from the action of the spirit, and become a vehicle of pure passion. But the synthesis keeps pace with the abstraction, for the tragedian creates not passions but men. The outer garment, the flesh itself, is stript off from man, that the spirit may be left to re-clothe itself according to its proper impulses and its proper laws. The false distinctions of dress, of manner, of physiognomy, are obliterated, that the true individuality which results from the internal modifications of passion may be seen in clearer outline. These modifications are as infinite and as complex as the spirit of man itself; and if the characters of the ancient dramatists, in their broad simplicity, fail to exhibit the finer lineaments of real life, yet in Shakespeare the variations of pure passion are as numerous and as subtle as those of the fleshly or customary mask by which man thinks that he knows his neighbour. The essential difference lies in the fact that they are variations of the spiritual, not the animal, man; that they arise from the qualifications of the spirit by itself, not from its intermixture with matter. It is this which gives tragedy its power over life. The problem of the diabolic nature, of the possibility of a 'fallen spirit,' is not for man to solve. He may be satisfied with the diagnosis of his own disease, with the knowledge that it is his littleness, not his greatness, that separates him from the divine; that not intellectual pride, not spiritual self-assertion, but the meanness of his ordinary desires, the degradation of his higher nature to the pursuit of animal ends, keep him under the curse. From this curse tragedy, in its measure, helps to relieve him. It 'purifies his passions' by extricating them from their earthly immersion. For an hour, it may be, or a day, it raises him into a world of absolute ideality, where he may forget his wants and his vanity, and lose himself in a struggle in which the combatants are the forces of the spirit, and of which the end is that annihilation in collision with destiny

which is but the blank side of reconciliation with it. And though his sojourn in this region be short, yet, when he falls again, the smell of the divine fire has passed upon him, and he bears about him, for a time at least, among the rank vapours of the earth, something of the freshness and fragrance of the higher air.

In this sense, then, tragedy satisfies its definition as 'the flight or elevation of life.' The two indispensable supports which render this elevation possible, are metrical expression and great situations. 'In the regeneration' the language of the market-place and the morning call may answer to the realised harmony of life; there may, indeed, be 'the fifth act of a tragedy in every death-bed': there may be no distinction of great or little, high or low. But it is an affectation to confound what shall be with what is. We cannot dissociate ordinary incidents from the petty wants out of which they ordinarily spring, nor common language from the common-place thoughts which it usually expresses. The action in tragedy must be relative to the situation; and if the situation be one which we are unable to separate from matter-of-fact associations, neither can the action be so separated except by an effort which of itself depresses the soaring spirit. Nor, again, if the action be high-wrought, above the measure of man's ordinary activity, can it find expression in the unrhythmical language which corresponds to that ordinary activity. New wine must not be put in old bottles; nor must the motions of disenthralled passion be confined in vessels worn by the uses of daily life.

These considerations may explain to us why the production of a great tragedy is almost an impossibility in our own time. The age most favourable to it would seem to be one in which men stand on the edge of an old and but half-known world —as Æschylus and Sophocles stood on the edge of the mythologic, Shakespeare on that of the feudal world—an age of sufficient culture and reflection for men to be conscious of the glory they have left behind, while yet civilisation has not reached the stage of acquiescence in things as they are, and scepticism as to all beyond them. Those great situations furnished by the mysterious past, in which passion quits the earth, soon lose their charm, and with the reign of wonder that of tragedy ceases. At Athens it gave place to the new comedy, whose highest boast was to copy present life

(ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;): in modern Europe it has yielded to the novel.

The novel in its proper shape did not come to the birth in England till the time of Fielding and Richardson, but it had long been in process of formation. The seventeenth century at its close had lost the tragic impulse of its youth. The ecstatic hope of a new world, combined with the sad and wondering recollection of the old, which had raised the human spirit to the height of the Shakespearian tragedy, had died out, and the age had become eminently satisfied with itself. Wits, philosophers, and poets, alike were full of the present time. While the wits complimented each other on their superiority to the weaknesses of mankind, they made no scruple of indulging those weaknesses in their own persons. It was part of their business to do so, for it was part of 'life.' The only difference between them and other men was that they were weak and laughed over it, while others were weak and serious. Philosophers congratulated themselves on their new enlightenment; but it was an enlightenment which gave them insight into things as they are, not as they are to be. 'The proper study of mankind,' they held, was 'man'; man, however, not in his boundless promise, but in the mean performance with which they proclaimed themselves satisfied. The poetry of the time was, at best, merely common-sense with ornamentation. It was neither lyrical nor tragic, though it may have tried to be both. It represented man neither as withdrawn into himself, nor as transported into an ideal world of action, but as observing and reasoning on his present affairs. The satire and moral essay were its characteristic forms.

The most pleasing expression of this self-satisfaction of the age is found in the *Spectator*, the first and best representative of that special style of literature—the only really popular literature of our time—which consists in talking to the public about itself. Humanity is taken as reflected in the ordinary life of men; and, as thus reflected, it is copied with the most minute fidelity. No attempt is made either to suppress the baser elements of man's nature, or to transfigure them by a stronger light than that of the common understanding. No deeper laws are recognised than those which vindicate themselves to the eye of daily observation, no motives purer than the 'mixed' ones which the practical philosopher delights to analyse, no life higher than that

which is qualified by animal wants. The reader never finds himself carried into a region where it requires an effort to travel, or which is above the existing level of opinion and morality. It is from this levelness with life that the *Spectator* derives its interest—an interest so nearly the same, barring the absence of plot, with that of the novel, as to lead Macaulay to pronounce Addison 'the forerunner of the great English novelists.' The elements of the novel, indeed, already existed in Addison's time, and only required combination. Fictitious biography, which may be regarded as its raw material, had been written by Defoe with a life-like reality which has never since been equalled; and the popular drama furnished plots, in the shape of love stories drawn from present life. Let the adventures of the fictitious biography, instead of being merely external to the man, as in Defoe, be made subservient to that display of character in which Addison had shown himself a master, and let them become steps in the development of a love-plot, and the novel—the novel of the last century, at any rate—is fully formed. As was the self-contented, and therefore uncreative and prosaic, thought of the age, which produced the novel, such the novel itself continued to be. Man, comfortable and acquiescent, wished to amuse himself by a reflex of the life which he no longer aspired to transcend. He wanted to enjoy himself twice over—in act and in fancy; or, if the former were denied him, at least to explore in fancy the world of pleasure and excitement, of which circumstances abridged or disturbed his enjoyment in fact. In 'the smooth tale, generally of love,' the novelist supplied the want.

This Johnsonian definition may be objected to as merely accidental, and as inconsistent with the romantic character which the novel assumed in the hands of Sir Walter Scott. It expresses, however, adequately enough the view which the popular novelists prior to Scott took of their own productions. Cervantes, though in his own great work attaining that rhapsody of grotesqueness which lies on the edge of poetry, had yet established the idea of the novel as the antithesis of romance. These novelists, accordingly, if they are not always telling the reader (like Fielding), seem yet to be always thinking to themselves, how perfectly natural their stories are. It is on this naturalness they pride themselves; and naturalness, in their sense, meant conformity to nature as it is commonly

seen. This is the characteristic feature of the class. Whether, like Richardson, they analyse character from within, or, like Miss Austen, develop it in the outward particularities of an unruffled life—whether they describe, like Fielding, the buoyancy of a generous animalism, or, like Miss Edgeworth and Miss Burney, the precise decencies of conventional morality—they deal simply with eighteenth-century life as seen by eighteenth-century eyesight. All romantic virtue, all idealised passion, they rigorously eschew. Prudence they make the guide, happiness the end, of life. And they do well. They undertake to copy present life, and they do so. They have to reflect man's habitual consciousness: it is not for them to anticipate a consciousness which has not yet been attained, or to represent man's lower nature as absorbed in a spiritual movement which, because we cannot arrest it, we habitually ignore. It is just their deficiency in this respect which gives them their peculiar fascination. Man is not really mere man, though he may think himself so. He is always something potentially, which he is not actually; always inadequate to himself; and as such, disturbed and miserable. The novel, on the contrary, represents him as being what he vainly tries to be—adequate to himself. It offers to his imagination the full enjoyment of earthly life, unchallenged by obstinate surmises, untroubled by yearnings after the divine. Ordinary men are satisfied with this enjoyment; the highest are allured by its temptation. The 'reading public' is charmed with the contemplation of its own likeness, 'twice as natural' as life. Its own wisdom, its own wishes, its own vanity, are set before it in little with a completeness and finish which the deeper laws of the universe, vindicating themselves by apparent disorder and misfortune, happily prevent from being attained in real life. It is thus pleasantly flattered into contentment with itself—a contentment not disturbed by the occasional censure of practices which good taste condemns as ungraceful, or prudence as prejudicial to happiness. But the man of keener insight, who, instead of wrestling with the riddle of life, seeks for a time to forget it, and to place in its stead the rounded representation of activity which the novelist supplies, cannot but find the vanity of hiding his face from the presence which he dreads. Out of heart with the world about him—conscious of its actual meanness, and without vigour to re-cast it in the mould of his own thought—he

fancies that after a sojourn in the world of fiction he may come back braced for his struggle with life. In his study, with a novel, he hopes to overlook the walls of his prison-house, to see the beginning and the end of human strife. But he soon finds himself in the embrace of the very power which he sought to escape. Here is the world itself brought back to him. Here is a perfect copy of that which in actual experience he sees but partially. The mirror is but too truly held up to nature. The getting and spending, the marrying and giving in marriage, the dominion of fortune which makes life a riddle, the prudential motives and worship of happiness which hide its divinity, these meet him here as they meet him in life, untransmuted, unidealised. Yet the charm of art overcomes him. The perfectness of the representation, the skill with which the incidents are combined to result in a crowning happiness behind which no sorrow seems to lie, make him find a pleasure in the copy which he cannot find in actual life, when in personal and painful collision with it. But meanwhile he gains no real strength, he reaches no new height of contemplation. He comes back to the world, as a man with a diseased digestion, after living for a time on spiced meats, comes back to ordinary food. He has not braced the assimilative power of his thought by a flight into the ideal world, or learnt even for a time to turn 'matter to spirit by sublimation strange.' He has remained on the earth, and though his fancy has for the hour given the earth a charm, he is no better able than he was before to raise his eyes from its dead level, or remove the limits of its horizon.

Thus, then, the old quarrel of the philosopher with the imitative arts seems to be revived in respect of the novel. But though novel-writers might be banished from a new republic, it would not be as artists, but for the inferiority of their art. An artist indeed the novelist is; he combines events and persons with reference to ends; he concentrates into a dialogue of a few sentences an amount of feeling and character which it would take real men some hours to express; he imparts a rapidity to the stream of incident quite unlike the sluggishness of our daily experience. In this sense he does not copy what we see, but shows us what we cannot see for ourselves. Our complaint against him is that the aspect of things which he shows us is merely the outward and natural, as opposed to the inner or ideal. His answer

would probably be either that the ideal, in any sense in which it can be opposed to the natural, must be false and delusive; or that it is merely an accident of novel-writing, as hitherto practised, and not anything essential to this species of composition, which has prevented it from exhibiting the highest aspect of things; or, finally, that admitting the view which the novel presents to be necessarily lower than the poetic, it yet is a more useful view for man to contemplate.

Much fruitless controversy between naturalism and idealism in art might have been saved by a consideration of the true character of the antithesis. It becomes unmeaning as soon as nature is expanded to the fulness of the idea. And so expanded it may be, for, according to the old formula, it is always in flux. It is never in being, always in becoming. As has been already pointed out, it is what we see; and we see according to higher and lower laws of vision. We may look at man and the world either from without or from within. We may observe man's actions like other phenomena, and from observation learn to ascribe them to certain general but distinct motives and faculties, which we do not refer to any higher unity; or, on the other hand, by the light of our own consciousness we may recognise that in man of which no observation of his actions could tell us—something which is in him, but yet is not his own; which combines with all his faculties, but is none of them; which gives them a unity, to which their diversity is merely relative. So again with regard to the phenomena of the world; we may look on these either simply as phenomena, or as manifestations of destiny or divine will. The former view of man and the world we may conveniently call *natural*, because the only view that mere observation can give us; the latter *ideal*, because making observation posterior to something given in thought.

The tragedian, then, idealises, because he starts from within. He reaches, as it were, the central fire, in the heat of which every separate faculty, every animal want, every fortuitous incident is melted down and lost. We never could observe in actual experience passion such as Lear's, or meditation such as Hamlet's, fusing everything else into itself. Facts at every step would interfere to prevent such a possibility. But let us place ourselves, by the poet's help, within the soul of Lear or Hamlet, and we shall be able to follow the process by which the spiritual power, taking the

form of passion in the one, and of thought in the other, and working outwards, draws everything into its own unity, according to the same activity of which, however impeded by the 'imperfections of matter,' we are conscious in ourselves. The incidents of the tragedy are wholly subordinate, issuing either from this spiritual energy of the actors on the one hand, or, on the other, from destiny, to whose throne the poet penetrates. They thus present an aspect entirely different from that of events which we approach from without. The novel, on the contrary, starts from the outside. Its main texture is a web of incidents through which the motions of the spirit must be discerned, if discerned at all. These incidents must be probable, must be such as are consistent with the observed sequences of the world. The view of man, therefore, which we attain through them, can only be that which is attainable by observation of outward actions and events; or, in other words, according to the distinction which we have attempted to establish, it is the natural view, not the ideal. Its character corresponds to its origin. Observation shows us man not as self-determined, but as the creature of circumstances, as a phenomenon among other phenomena. As such, too, he is presented to us in the novel. We do not see him, as in tragedy, standing in the strength of his own spirit, re-making the world by its power, determined by it for good or evil, dependent on it for all that may be attractive or repellent about him. The hero of a novel attracts in part by his physiognomy, his manner, or even his dress; his character is qualified by circumstances and society; his impulses vary according to the impressions of outward things; he is the sport of fortune, dependent for weal or woe on the acquisition of some external blessing which the development of the plot may or may not bestow on him. As circumstances make his life what it is, so the particular combination of circumstances, called happiness, constitutes its end. Instead of losing his merely personal and particular self, as in the catastrophe of a tragedy, he satisfies it with its appropriate pleasure. 'He that loveth wife or children more than me, is not worthy of me,' are the words of the Author of the Christian life. 'Marry, enjoy domestic bliss, and thou hast attained the end of virtue' —such is the ordinary moral of the ordinary novel; nay, the only consistent moral of the consistent novel. As the novelist sows, so must he reap; as his plot is, such must its consum-

mation be. In the body of the work he must, from the nature of the case, represent men as they appear in fact, and he cannot fitly round it off by representing them as they are only in idea. He cannot step at pleasure from one sphere of art to another; by attempting to do so he destroys the harmony without which there is no art at all, and leaves us with a sense of dissatisfaction and unreality. The reader, who through the whole three volumes till close upon the end has been travelling in an atmosphere of ordinary morality and every-day aspiration, knows not how in the last chapter to breathe the air of a higher life.

It may be objected to this limitation of the capabilities of the novel, that it must stand on the same footing with the epic poem, which is no less made up of a texture of incident, and which, therefore, according to the present argument, can only reach the springs of man's actions from without. Such an objection has some truth with reference to the Homeric poems. These, as we have seen, have the legendary narrative for their primitive element, and in so far as they are merely a reflex of Greek life in the Homeric age, their interest is that of a novel, not properly of the epic. The true epic (of which the 'Paradise Lost' would seem to be a less mixed form than the Iliad or Odyssey), no less than tragedy, seizes the idea of a self-determined spirit on the one hand, and of destiny or divine law on the other. These are the primary springs from which it makes action and incident issue, with a perfect subordination which the laws of our lower nature and of social life must prevent from being realised in the world of experience, and which the novelist therefore, tied down to the world of experience, only offends us by attempting to exhibit. The essential character of the novel is not changed by its assumption of the form of a romance. In the romantic world of the middle ages, the great Italian poets did indeed find their materials. To their eyes it was a world in which hope and wonder might roam at large: it furnished actions which, glorified by them, became manifestations of the divine and heroic in man. But it is another world as seen by the novelist, even by such a one as Walter Scott. The romantic life which he depicts is simply the life which we see our own neighbours live, with more picturesque situations, with more to excite curiosity in the reader, and activity in the imaginary hero. We gain more from him, it is true, than from those copies of

the too familiar faces around us which are the staple commodity in novels of the day. He at least carries us into scenes of adventure, where we may forget the 'smooth tale' of our nineteenth-century life. But further he cannot go, for he approaches men from without. He does not reach, by other methods than observation, to any *a priori* affection of the spirit, and to this subordinate incident. Had he done so, he could not have uttered himself in the language of common life. In the world of heroes or angels, *i.e.* of men idealised, to which the epic poet raises us, he sustains us by the power of verse. The exalted action and the poetic expression are as essentially correlative in the epic, as are the natural incident and the prosaic expression in the novel.

The hostility of Wordsworth to the 'poetic diction' of his time rested on principles of which he scarcely seems himself to have been conscious. The poets of the last century had lost the genuine sense of their high calling. Their productions for the most part were, at best, practical philosophy in verse. They observed the outer aspect of things, and to make their observations poetry they clothed them in 'poetic diction,' which thus became offensive, because artificial—because a superadded ornament, and not the natural expression of exalted passion or the emotion which accompanies our passage 'behind the veil.' Repugnance to this artificiality misled Wordsworth into the celebrated assertion that 'between the language of prose and that of metrical composition, there neither is, nor can be, any essential difference': an assertion which, as prompted by a feeling of the incompatibility of poetic language with prosaic thought, is really a witness to the essential antithesis between poetry and prose. Verse is simple, harmonious, and unfamiliar. It is thus the fitting organ for that energy of thought which simplifies the phenomena of life by referring them to a spiritual principle; which blends its shifting colours in the light of a master-passion, and passes from the contradictory data of the common understanding to the unity of a deeper consciousness. Even the spiritualist philosopher, no less than the poet, would have to speak in verse, if, instead of making statements, he portrayed: if, besides asserting that 'all things are to be seen in God,' he sought to excite in the reader the emotion appropriate to the sight. Prose is the 'oratio soluta.' It is complex, irregular, inharmonious. It

thus corresponds to the natural or phenomenal view of life; the view of it, that is, in its diversity, as qualified in innumerable modes by animal wants and apparent accident, and not harmonised by the action of the spirit. The novelist must express himself in prose, because this is his view of life: and this must be his view of life, because he thus expresses himself. It is indeed a view which may vary according to the circumstances of the case, but only within definite limits. There is an 'earnestness' about some of our modern novelists, Miss Brontë for instance, which would have seemed out of place to those of fifty years ago; but this is merely because the life they see around them is more 'earnest.' It presents to them scenes of sterner significance than were to be found among the coquetry and dissipation of the fashionable world or the dull courtesies of a country house. But that they do not transcend this outward life we have one crucial proof. Just in so far as each of us learns to regard his own individual being from within, and not from without, does he discard dependence on happiness as arising from external circumstances, and becomes already in idea, as he tends to become in reality, his own world and his own law. No novelist attains to the assertion of this spiritual prerogative. As we follow in sympathy the story of his hero, we find ourselves lifted up and cast down as fortune changes, our life brightening as the clouds break above, and darkening as they close again. If the author chooses to disappoint us with 'a bad ending,' he leaves us, not as we are left at the conclusion of a tragedy, purified from personal desires, but vexed and sorrowful, sadder but not wiser men.

By the mere explanation of the difference between the ideal and the natural, the poetic and novelistic, views of the world, we may seem to have already settled the question as to the beneficial effects of each. The question, be it observed, is not as to the comparative influence of the discipline of art and that of real life. The man who seeks his entire culture in art of any kind will soon find the old antagonism between speculation and action begin to appear. There will be a chasm, which he cannot fill, between his life in the closet and his life in the world: his impotence to carry his thought into act will limit and weaken the thought itself. But this ill result will equally ensue, whether the art in which he finds his nurture be that of the novelist or that of the poet.

The novel-reader sees human action pass before him like a panorama, but he feels none of its pains and penalties; his fancy feeds on its pleasures, but he has not to face the struggle of resistance to pleasure, or the suffering which follows on indulgence. Nor is it merely from that weakness of effect which, in one sense, must always belong to representation as opposed to reality, that the novel suffers. The representation itself is incomplete. The novelist, like every other artist, must abridge and select. For many of the elements whose action builds up our human soul, there is no place in his canvas. A great part of the discipline of life arises simply from its slowness. The long years of patient waiting and silent labour, the struggle with listlessness and pain, the loss of time by illness, the hope deferred, the doubt that lays hold on delay—these are the tests of that pertinacity in man which is but a step below heroism. The exhibition of them in the novel, however, is prevented by that rapidity of movement which is essential to its fascination; and hence to one whose acquaintance with life was derived simply from novels, its main business would be unknown. They are perhaps more brought home to us by Defoe than by any other writer of fiction; but this is due to that very deficiency of artistic power which makes his agglomeration of details such heavy reading to all but schoolboys.

The novel, then, as being a work of art, must fail to teach the lesson of life in its completeness: as an inferior work of art, it has peculiar weaknesses of its own. However extensive the influence of the literature of fiction may have been, its intensity has been in inverse proportion. A great poem, once made our own, abides with us for ever.

> 'Amid the fretful stir
> Unprofitable, and the fever of the world,'

the spirit, returning to it, may gain a fresh assurance of its *own* birthright, and purify itself, as in a river of Lethe, for an ideal transition to its proper home. The novel, itself the reflex of 'the fretful stir unprofitable,' can exercise no such power. It can but make us more at home in the region from which a great poem transports us. The value of that experience of the world, which it is its object to impart, is commonly over-rated in our day. In the form in which it is imparted

by the novelist, we have perhaps had too much of it without his aid. Our external environment is quite enough in our thoughts: we are not too reluctant to admit that we are what we seem to be, dependent for good or evil on circumstances which we do not make for ourselves. This dependence is in itself, no doubt, a fact; but it ceases to be so for us when we contemplate it in forgetfulness of that spring of potential freedom which underlies it, and of the law of duty correlative to freedom. To the exclusive consideration of it we owe those profitless recipes for eliciting moral health from circumstances which are the plague of modern literature, and which one of our ablest writers has lately condescended to dispense, in an essay on 'organisation in daily life.' This circumstantial view of life, if we may use the term, being the only one that the novelist can convey, prudence is his highest morality. But it may be doubted whether prudence is what any one has great need to learn. The plain man, who fronting circumstances boldly on the one hand, looks reverently to the stern face of duty on the other, can dispense with its maxims. For the moral valetudinarian small benefit is to be gained from a doctor who will

> 'Read each wound, each weakness clear
> Will strike his finger on the place
> And say, "Thou ailest here and here."'

It is far better for him, instead of poring over a detail of the causes and symptoms of the disease which he hugs, to be stimulated to an effort in which, though it be but temporary, ecstatic, and for an end not actually attainable, he may at least forget the disease altogether. Such a stimulus a great poem may afford him; but in the whole expanse of novel-literature he merely sees his own sickly experience modified in an infinite variety of reflections, till he fancies that the 'strange disease of modern life' is the proper constitution of God's universe.

Novel-reading thus aggravates two of the worst maladies of modern times, self-consciousness and want of reverence. Many a man in these days, instead of doing some sound piece of work for mankind, spends his time in explaining to himself why it is that he does not do it, and how, after all, he is superior to those who do. Even men of a higher sort never seem to forget themselves in their work. Our popular writers

generally take the reader into confidence as to their private feelings as they go along: our men of action are burdened by a sense of their reputation with 'intelligent circles.' No one loses himself in a cause. Scarcely understanding what is meant by a 'divine indifference' as to the fate of individual existences in the evolution of God's plan, we weary heaven with complaints that we find the world contrary, or that we cannot satisfy ourselves with a theory of life. Thus 'measuring ourselves by ourselves, and comparing ourselves among ourselves, we are not wise.' The novel furnishes the standard for the measurement, and the data for the comparison. It presents us with a series of fictitious experiences, in the light of which we read our own, and become more critically conscious of them. Instead of idealising life, if we may so express ourselves, it sentimentalises it. It does not subordinate incidents to ideas; yet it does not treat them simply as phenomena to excite curiosity, but as misfortunes or blessings to excite sentiment. The writer of the 'Mill on the Floss' reaches almost the tragic pitch towards the close of her book, and if she had been content to leave us with the death of the heroine and her lover in the flood, we might have supposed that in this case, as representing the annihilation of human passion in the struggle with destiny, the novelist had indeed attained the ideal view of life. But the novelistic instinct does not allow her to do so. At the conclusion we are shown the other chief actors standing, with appropriate emotions, over the heroine's grave, and thus find that the catastrophe has not really been the manifestation of an idea, but an occasion of sentiment. The habitual novel-reader, from thus looking sentimentally at the fictitious life which is the reflex of his own, soon comes to look sentimentally at himself. He thinks his personal joys and sorrows of interest to angels and men; and instead of gazing with awe and exultation upon the world, as a theatre for the display of God's glory and the unknown might of man, he sees in it merely an organism for affecting himself with pains and pleasures. Thus regarded, it must needs lose its claim on his reverence, for it is narrowed to the limits of his own consciousness. Conversant with present life in all its outward aspects, he forgets the infinite spaces which lie around and above it. This confinement of view, which among the more intelligent appears merely as disbelief in the possibilities of

man, takes a more offensive form in the complacent blindness of ordinary minds. We have no wish to disparage our own age in comparison with any that have preceded it. Young men have always been ignorant, and ignorance has always been conceited. There is, however, this difference. The ignorant young men of past time, such as the five sons of Sir Hildebrand Osbaldistone, knew that they were ignorant, but thought it no shame: the ignorant young men of our days, with the miscellaneous knowledge of life which they derive from the popular novelists, fancy themselves wiser than the aged. Whoever be the philosopher, the coxcomb nowadays will answer him not merely with a grin, but with a joke which he has still in lavender from Dickens or his imitators. The comic aspect of life is indeed plain enough to see, nor is the merely pathetic much less obvious; but there is little good in looking at either. It is far easier to laugh or to weep than to think; to give either a ludicrous or sentimental turn to a great principle of morals or religion than to enter into its real meaning. But the vulgar reader of our comic novelists, when he has learnt from them a jest or a sentiment for every occasion of life, fancies that nothing more remains unseen and unsaid.

But there is another side to this question which we must not allow ourselves to overlook. We have shown what the novel cannot do, and its ill effect on those who trust to it for their culture. We must not forget that it has a proper work of its own which, if modern progress be anything more than a euphemism, must be a work for good. Least of all should it be depreciated by the student, who may find in it deliverance from the necessary confinement of his actual life. For the production of poetic effect, as we have seen, large abstraction is necessary. It is with man in the purity of his inward being, with nature in its simple greatness, that the poet deals. The glory which he casts on life is far higher than any which the novelist knows; but it is only on certain of the elements of life that it can be cast at all. The novelist works on a far wider field. With choice of subject and situation he scarcely need trouble himself, except in regard to his own intellectual qualifications. Wherever human thought is free, and human character can display itself, whether in the servants' hall or the drawing-room, whether in the country mansion or the back alley, he may find his

materials. He is thus a great expander of sympathies; and if he cannot help us to make the world our own by the power of ideas, he at least carries our thought into many a far country of human experience, which it could not otherwise have reached. We hear much in these days of the sacrifice of the individual to society through professional limitations. In the progressive division of labour, while we become more useful as citizens, we seem to lose our completeness as men. The requirements of special study become more exacting, at the same time that the perfect organisation of modern society removes the excitement of adventure and the occasion for independent effort. There is less of human interest to touch us within our calling, and we have less leisure to seek it beyond. Hence it follows that one who has made the most of his profession is apt to feel that he has not attained his full stature as a man; that he has faculties which he can never use, capacities for admiration and affection which can never meet with an adequate object. To this feeling, probably, are mainly due our lamentations over a past age of hero-worship and romance, when action was more decisive and passion a fuller stream. Its alleviation, if not its remedy, is to be found in the newspaper and the novel. Every one indeed must lay in his own experience the foundation of the imaginary world which he rears for himself. There is a primary 'virtue which cannot be taught.' No man can learn from another the meaning of human activity or the possibilities of human emotion. But this *πού στῶ* being given, even the cloistered student may find that, as his soul passes into the strife of social forces and the complication of individual experience, which the newspaper and the novel severally represent, his sympathies break from the bondage of his personal situation and reach to the utmost confines of human life. The personal experience and the fictitious act and react on each other, the personal experience giving reality to the fictitious, the fictitious expansion to the personal. He need no longer envy the man of action and adventure, or sigh for new regions of enterprise. The world is all before him. He may explore its recesses without being disturbed by its passions; and if the end of experience be the knowledge of God's garment, as preliminary to that of God Himself, his eye may be as well trained for the

'vision beatific,' as if he had himself been an actor in the scenes to which imagination transfers him.

The novelist not only works on more various elements, he appeals to more ordinary minds than the poet. This indeed is the strongest practical proof of his essential inferiority as an artist. All who are capable of an interest in incidents of life which do not affect themselves, may feel the same interest more keenly in a novel; but to those only who can lift the curtain does a poem speak intelligibly. It is the twofold characteristic, of universal intelligibility and indiscriminate adoption of materials, that gives the novel its place as the great reformer and leveller of our time. Reforming and levelling are indeed more closely allied than we are commonly disposed to admit. Social abuses are nearly always the result of defective organisation. The demarcations of family, of territory, or of class, prevent the proper fusion of parts into the whole. The work of the reformer progresses as the social force is brought to bear more and more fully on classes and individuals, merging distinctions of privilege and position in the one social organism. The novel is one of the main agencies through which this force acts. It gathers up manifold experiences, corresponding to manifold situations of life; and subordinating each to the whole, gives to every particular situation a new character, as qualified by all the rest. Every good novel, therefore, does something to check what may be called the despotism of situations; to prevent that ossification into prejudices arising from situation, to which all feel a tendency. The general novel literature of any age may be regarded as an assertion by mankind at large, in its then development, of its claims, as against the influence of class and position; whether that influence appear in the form of positive social injustice, of oppressive custom, or simply of deficient sympathy.

To be what he is, the novelist must be a man with large powers of sympathetic observation. He must have an eye for the 'humanities' which underlie the estranging barriers of social demarcation, and in relation to which the influence of those barriers can alone be rightly appreciated. We have already spoken of that acquiescence in the dominion of circumstance, to which we are all too ready to give way, and which exclusive novel-reading tends to foster. The circum-

stances, however, whose rule we recognise, are apt to be merely our own or those of our class. We are blind to other 'idola' than those of our own cave; we do not understand that the feelings which betray us into 'indiscretions' may, when differently modified by a different situation, lead others to game-stealing or trade-outrages. From this narrowness of view the novelist may do much to deliver us. The variations of feeling and action with those of circumstance, and the essential human identity which these variations cannot touch, are his special province. He shows us that crime does not always imply sin, that a social heresy may be the assertion of a native right, that an offence which leads to conventional outlawry may be merely the rebellion of a generous nature against conventional tyranny. Thus, if he does not do everything, he does much. Though he cannot reveal to us the inner side of life, he at least gives a more adequate conception of its surface. Though he cannot raise us to a point of view from which circumstances appear subordinate to spiritual laws, he yet saves us from being blinded, if not from being influenced, by the circumstances of our own position. Though he cannot show the prisoners the way of escape from their earthly confinement, yet by breaking down the partitions between the cells he enables them to combine their strength for a better arrangement of the prison-house. The most wounding social wrongs more often arise from ignorance than from malice, from acquiescence in the opinion of a class rather than from deliberate selfishness. The master cannot enter into the feelings of the servant, nor the servant into those of his master. The master cannot understand how any good quality can lead one to 'forget his station'; to the servant the spirit of management in the master seems mere 'driving.' This is only a sample of what is going on all society over. The relation between the higher and lower classes becomes irritating, and therefore injurious, not from any conscious unfairness on either side, but simply from the want of a common understanding; while at the same time every class suffers within its own limits from the prevalence of habits and ideas, under the authority of class-convention, which could not long maintain themselves if once placed in the light of general opinion. Against this twofold oppression, the novel, from its first establishment as a substantive branch of literature, has made vigorous war. From Defoe

to Kingsley its history boasts of a noble army of social reformers; yet the work which these writers have achieved has had little to do with the morals—commonly valueless, if not false and sentimental—which they have severally believed themselves to convey. Defoe's notion of a moral seems to have been the vulgar one that vice must be palpably punished and virtue rewarded; he recommends his 'Moll Flanders' to the reader on the ground that 'there is not a wicked action in any part of it but is first or last rendered unhappy or unfortunate.' The moral of Fielding's novels, if moral it can be called, is simply the importance of that prudence which his heroes might have dispensed with, but for the wildness of their animal license. Yet both Defoe and Fielding had a real lesson to teach mankind. The thieves and harlots whom Defoe prides himself on punishing, but whose adventures he describes with the minuteness of affection, are what we ourselves might have been; and in their histories we hear, if not the 'music,' yet the 'harsh and grating' cry of suffering humanity. Fielding's merit is of the same kind; but the sympathies which he excites are more general, as his scenes are more varied, than those of Defoe. His coarseness is everywhere redeemed by a genuine feeling for the contumelious buffets to which weakness is exposed. He has the practical insight of Dickens and Thackeray, without their infusion of sentiment. He does not moralise over the contrast between the rich man's law and the poor man's, over the 'indifference' of rural justice, over the lying and adultery of fashionable life. He simply makes us see the facts, which are everywhere under our eyes, but too close to us for discernment. He shows society where its sores lie, appealing from the judgment of the diseased class itself to that public intelligence which, in spite of the cynic's sneer on the task of 'producing an honesty from the combined action of knaves,' has really power to over-ride private selfishness. The same sermon has found many preachers since, the unconscious missionaries being perhaps the greatest. Scott was a Tory of the purest water. His mind was busy with the revival of a pseudo-feudalism: no thought of reforming abuses probably ever entered it. Yet his genial human insight made him a reformer against his will. He who makes man better known to man takes the first steps towards healing the wounds which man inflicts on man. The permanent

value of Scott's novels lies in his pictures of the Scotch peasantry. He popularised the work which the Lake poets had begun, of re-opening the primary springs of human passion. 'Love he had found in huts where poor men lie,' and he announced the discovery; teaching the 'world' of English gentry what for a century and a half they had seemed to forget, that the human soul, in its strength no less than in its weakness, is independent of the accessories of fortune. He left no equals, but the combined force of his successors has been constantly growing in practical effect. They have probably done more than the journalists to produce that improvement in the organisation of modern life which leads to the notion that, because social grievances are less obvious, they have ceased to exist. The novelist catches the cry of suffering before it has obtained the strength, or general recognition, which are presupposed when the newspaper becomes its mouthpiece. The miseries of the marriage-market had been told by Thackeray, with almost wearisome iteration, many years before they found utterance in the columns of the 'Times.'

It may indeed be truly said that, after all, human selfishness is much the same as it ever was; that luxury still drowns sympathy; that riches and poverty have still their old estranging influence. The novel, as has been shown, cannot give a new birth to the spirit, or initiate the effort to transcend the separations of place and circumstance; but it is no small thing that it should remove the barriers of ignorance and antipathy which would otherwise render the effort unavailing. It at least brings man nearer to his neighbour, and enables each class to see itself as others see it. And from the fusion of opinions and sympathies thus produced, a general sentiment is elicited, to which oppression of any kind, whether of one class by another, or of individuals by the tyranny of sectarian custom, seldom appeals in vain.

The novelist is a leveller also in another sense than that of which we have already spoken. He helps to level intellects as well as situations. He supplies a kind of literary food which the weakest natures can assimilate as well as the strongest, and by the consumption of which the former sort lose much of their weakness and the latter much of their strength. While minds of the lower order acquire from novel-reading a cultivation which they previously lacked, the

higher seem proportionately to sink. They lose that aspiring pride which arises from the sense of walking in intellect on the necks of a subject crowd; they no longer feel the bracing influence of living solely among the highest forms of art; they become conformed insensibly to the general opinion which the new literature of the people creates. A similar change is going on in every department of man's activity. The history of thought in its artistic form is parallel to its history in its other manifestations. The spirit descends, that it may rise again; it penetrates more and more widely into matter, that it may make the world more completely its own. Political life seems no longer attractive, now that political ideas and power are disseminated among the mass, and the reason is recognised as belonging not to a ruling caste merely, but to all. A statesman in a political society resting on a substratum of slavery, and admitting no limits to the province of government, was a very different person from the modern servant of 'a nation of shopkeepers,' whose best work is to save the pockets of the poor. It would seem as if man lost his nobleness when he ceased to govern, and as if the equal rule of all was equivalent to the rule of none. Yet we hold fast to the faith that the 'cultivation of the masses,' which has for the present superseded the development of the individual, will in its maturity produce some higher type even of individual manhood than any which the old world has known. We may rest on the same faith in tracing the history of literature. In the novel we must admit that the creative faculty has taken a lower form than it held in the epic and the tragedy. But since in this form it acts on more extensive material and reaches more men, we may well believe that this temporary declension is preparatory to some higher development, when the poet shall idealise life without making abstraction of any of its elements, and when the secret of existence, which he now speaks to the inward ear of a few, may be proclaimed on the house-tops to the common intelligence of mankind.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

THE great merit of the work before us [1] lies in its being a first, and in many respects a very satisfactory attempt, to exhibit in English one part of the Aristotelian philosophy in its connection with the rest, and the whole in connection with Platonism and the general course of philosophical speculation in Greece. It affords a corrective to the strange notion that Aristotle was a common-sense philosopher, uninfluenced by metaphysical 'abstractions,' and intelligible to those who are wholly unversed in them. The saying that every man is born a Platonist or an Aristotelian has become almost a commonplace of literature. Its originator probably meant to express by it a distinction not so much of philosophical systems as of personal capacity; a distinction between the philosopher who is next of kin to the poet, and the one who is farthest removed from him. It is in the former sense, however, that it is generally received. It represents a current notion that there is a Platonic system and an Aristotelian, which are antagonistic; that the Platonic is 'ideal,' the Aristotelian 'empirical.' So erroneous a notion is in some measure excused by the difference of form with which the two philosophies are presented to us, but on closer examination even this difference does not appear so complete as at first sight.

Greek philosophy lived on discussion, and never took dogmatic form till its prophets had passed away. The dialogue was not a form into which the Platonic philosophy was artificially fitted. It was the reflex of that evolution by antagonism in which the philosophy originated. The same outward form is not retained by Aristotle, but the mode of philosophising which it expressed is still unchanged. We have still the discussion going on under our eyes, but the speakers are not distinguished from each other. Under cover of the familiar δοκεῖ the philosopher pours out a string of detached propositions representing various points of view, without any

[1] [Sir Alexander Grant's edition of the 'Ethics' of Aristotle.]

express notice of their agreement or discrepancy, and the bewildered reader who fancies that he has reached his author's final meaning in one paragraph, finds it virtually contradicted in the next. It is as if the Platonic dialogue had been 'sawn into lengths,' and all the *callida junctura* given by the play of conversation left out. As with the form, so with the substance. The organism, which in Plato is presented to us instinct with the gracious activity of life and growth, we find in Aristotle fixed in the rigidity of death, to be taken to pieces and pondered in detail by anatomising posterity. But it is the same organism. There is no joint or member in the system of the master which does not reappear, stripped to the bone, in that of the pupil. The great doctrine that the real is the intelligible and the intelligible the real, however imperfectly developed, is the foundation of both. If Plato is 'idealist,' Aristotle is more. If Aristotle is limited and thwarted in his idealism by the want of formulæ more elastic than those proper to number and magnitude, he less frequently lapses into the false dualism of soul and body, mind and matter, ideas and things, which made Plato, against his principles, a mystic, and which has clung like a body of death to Platonising philosophy ever since.

The community of view between Plato and Aristotle is the necessary result of their common relation to the earlier philosophers, and specially to Socrates. By his search for definition, Socrates had established as the primary question for philosophy, What is the nature of the object of knowledge? The thought which knows being found to be an essential factor in the object known, this question necessitates the further one, What is the nature of the activity of thought? On these correlative questions all subsequent Greek philosophy turned, till under the Stoics and Epicureans it exchanged the task of understanding the world for that of making life bearable. As in a special sense their originator, Socrates is the father of metaphysic and logic.

This may seem strange credit to take to one who is popularly known as having brought down philosophy from heaven to earth, as having discarded all speculation about the 'nature of things,' and directed man to know himself. It was, however, the very humility of his mission that forced upon him this high problem. In this lay its practical irony. He only wished to begin at the beginning; but in asking the most

primary, and therefore apparently the simplest question, he was found to have raised the most profound. In and before his time there was abundant speculation in Greece as to nature and man's affairs. A sophist who had made the most of his opportunities, who had had a good report of the dicta of Democritus, and had studied the dramatists and political oratory of Athens, might reproduce in the Athenian market-place a philosophy of nature adequate to Lord Bacon's, and a theory of human rights and happiness at least as good as some that find admiring acceptance in our House of Commons. Such a reproduction, however, would be stopped at the outset by the Socratic requirement of definitions, involving, as it did, the question, What do I know, and how do I know it? It is as if the popular philosophy of our time were to be interrupted in its 'generalisations from experience' by the question, with which no Socrates has yet constrained it to deal, What constitutes experience? By a short review of the position which this question has held in the course of modern speculation, we shall gain a vantage-ground for considering its relation to the old.

The great difficulty which now, as in ancient Greece, besets the entrance on the true path of philosophy, is that of reducing the 'sensible thing' to its primary simplicity. Philosophy does not precede, but follows, that actual knowledge of things, which it is its office to analyse and reduce to its primitive elements. It finds man, not as a child first opening its eyes on the letters of the alphabet, but as the scholar no longer conscious of the letters as distinct from the ideas which they represent. It finds him, that is, no longer simply receptive of sensations, but spontaneously referring them as properties to things, and regarding these things, like the words in a sentence, as determined in import by their relation to each other. When philosophy speaks to him, then, of the 'sensible thing,' he thinks of it as the individual basis of definite properties, of which he believes himself to have a direct knowledge through the senses. As such it is treated in those best samples of popular philosophy, the writings of Locke and his followers. From this view of the office of sense, a certain view as to the action of thought and the generality represented by common nouns necessarily flows. If sense gives the knowledge of the thing, as a definite complex of attributes, nothing remains for thought

but to detach these attributes from the sensible thing and from each other, and recombine them. The residuum of this process is the 'universal,' whether regarded as an 'essence' in the real world, or as a property which can be separated in thought from other properties, and from the thing to which it really attaches.

A more thorough analysis of the act of sensuous apprehension leads to a different result. Such an analysis, though the way to it was indicated by Berkeley, was first really attempted by Kant. Berkeley showed conclusively that the 'sensible quality' of Locke was simply a sensation. Sense, as such, gives nothing beyond itself; it tells nothing of a matter to which sensations are referable as secondary qualities. This is the sum of the Berkeleian philosophy, which, taken by itself, is simply a reproduction of the old doctrine of Protagoras, that the only reality is the momentary sensation, that each act of sense is the measure or test of truth. Just, however, as the modern sensationalist, having disposed of substance as a scholastic fancy, reproduces it under the name of a uniformity or permanent possibility of sensations, which, as sensations do not retain and compare themselves, presupposes a conscious subject to retain and compare them, so Berkeley reinstates the outward synthesis of sensations under the form of God, in whom they reside when we are unconscious of them, and throughout assumes the existence of a spiritual subject, without apparently observing that a sensation which is relative to such a subject is no longer a mere sensation at all.

The fault of the pure sensationalism of Berkeley is that, except so far as it resorts to something beyond sense, it will not account for the facts. It leaves the language and actual knowledge of men unexplained. It is clearly not enough to show that sensation gives no knowledge of a thing causing it, unless it is also shown how the notion of outward things which all human speech supposes came about. We do not talk of sensations, but of things, which our language assumes to be permanent, while sensations are transitory. As permanent we name them. If the permanence or generality corresponding to the name is not to be found in an outward thing, whence is it? Berkeley's answer is, that when we apply a general term we have before us an individual sensation, or image of a sensation, which we take as a sign for a

multitude of other sensations, which we know to be like it. To this his present followers would add, that we take it also as a sign for other sensations, not like it, which have accompanied it in our past experience, and would accompany it now if the requisite conditions on our part were fulfilled. It is obvious that here the permanence corresponding to the general name, which is denied to the 'thing,' is simply transferred to a relation between sensations or a property which they have in common. This permanent relation, however, could not have been so observed as to give occasion to the employment of the name, unless the sensations themselves had been retained by us as permanent objects of consciousness. No doctrine of 'association of ideas' will account for this retention. It will explain why a present sensation spontaneously calls up the image of a past one, as the sight of a whip recalls to a horse a past sensation of being beaten, and this again may account for an involuntary succession of noises. But a succession of similar noises is one thing, the appropriation of one such noise as a sign is another. Till I consciously presented a sensation to myself as a permanent object, no need of a permanent name for it could suggest itself to me. Now, a sensation transformed to a permanent object, which is there when my sensation is over, is no longer a sensation, but a 'thing.' If it be said that the object, like the application of the name, is not permanent but recurrent, still the sensation, as an object of which the recurrence is known, has ceased to be a sensation. Either in a 'thing,' or in a knowing subject, the permanence which does not belong to the sensation must reappear.

Nor is the actual knowledge of men any more explicable on this theory than their language. The exact sciences stand or fall with the 'primary qualities of body.' From these Berkeley withdraws the foundation on which Locke had established them without supplying any other. He shows clearly enough that mere sight cannot give the idea of 'outness,' nor, what it cannot do by itself, can it do in combination with the sense of touch, to which a similar criticism is applicable. Unless I refer the sensation of touch to a thing as its cause, of which it does not in itself give any knowledge, I cannot infer that that which I touch is the cause of the image on the retina of my eye. Now, extension has no meaning except as a property of an outward body.

Either, then, the idea of extension, and with it geometrical science, must vanish, or some other source of ideas than mere sensation must be present in man.[1] Physical science, again rests on the distinction between what seems and what really is, between the nature of the thing and our sensation of it, which logically vanishes with Berkeley as it did with Protagoras. Why, when I thrust my hand under certain conditions into snow, do I say that it seems not, but really is, cold, unless I regard heat as a property in a thing which is there whatever my sensation may be? If it is answered that I say so because I *see* the mercury in the thermometer at freezing-point, this only throws the difficulty further back. Why was the thermometer invented to serve as a test of heat when the sense of touch failed, unless heat was regarded as a property, or dependent on a property, in a thing of which sensation was merely the sign? If it be said that the thing is resolvable into a general uniformity of sensation, the question will again arise, how, without the action of something other than sensation itself, the contrast between the present sensation and the general sensitive experience is to be accounted for?

The result, then, of the Berkeleian speculations, and the further questions which they necessitate, is that the 'sensible thing' is merely a sensation, and that a flux of sensations does not constitute knowledge. If an 'observed uniformity of sensations' does, such uniformity must be relative to a uniting and discriminating subject. This result is simply a paraphrase of the barbaric enunciation of Kant, that a 'synthetical unity of apperception' was the condition of an experience of things, which synthetical unity was supplied by the 'ego' or thinking self. A knowledge of things is a knowledge of their properties; the knowledge of a property can only be given in a judgment, and in every judgment is a colligation of terms by thought.

[1] Professor Bain (as quoted with approval by Mr. Mill in the *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 233 and ff.) holds that the sense of muscular effort involves a sense of 'degrees of range,' which amounts to a measure of extension. This view derives its plausibility from the fact that when we talk of the contraction of a limb or muscle, we have before us, not merely a sense of effort, but (as we suppose) a visual image of a certain portion of extended matter enclosed by the limb and divisible into 'degrees.' To this, as visual, the Berkeleian proof, that mere sight cannot give an idea of an outward body, applies. The sense of muscular effort, as such, is a sense of pain and no more.

If we take as the germ of intelligent experience the simple consciousness of a sensation, this can only be expressed as the judgment, 'something is here.' The 'here,' however, is the next moment a 'there'; the one sensation is superseded by another. How, then, comes the one to be retained so as to qualify and be qualified by the other, unless there be a common and abiding unit to which each is relative, and which is a factor in the successive judgments, 'this is here'? It will not do to say that this unifying factor is a like property in the sensations; for there can be no consciousness of their likeness without comparison of them, and this presupposes just that retention of one sensation in relation to the other which it is the problem to account for. The stable element, then, must be the conscious subject, and the primary judgment must be not merely 'this is here,' but 'this is here as an object to me.' The simple judgment that a sensation is present—and it is only as judged of that a sensation can be the beginning of an intelligent experience—involves the presence of a permanent something to which the sensation is relative, which is a 'universal,' as being necessarily present to all other sensations with which the given one is to be compared and contrasted, and the most abstract of abstractions, as being that of which as yet nothing can be predicated, but simply that it 'is.' It is the possible substratum of all attributes, because the possible subject of all sensations. It is the mere 'thing,' the pure 'being,' the ultimate 'matter,' because it is thought, as yet indeterminate and merely potential.

The 'sensible thing' thus reappears, no longer, however, as a 'sensibile' but as a 'cogitabile,' not as a complex of attributes, but as the emptiest of abstractions. The antithesis between thought, as that in which we are active, and experience, as that in which we are simply receptive, vanishes, for thought appears as a factor in experience even in its remotest germs. Thought again appears as a process of concretion, at least as much as of abstraction. Its progress is fr m, not towards, the most abstract universal. Its first assertion is that 'something is,' its earliest predicate is 'pure being.' Its subsequent process is one of abstraction, only if this term is used as equivalent to an analysis, which creates the order that it investigates, and every step in which is a further synthesis. By a succession of judgments, each mani-

festing in the copula the presence of the same unifying and distinguishing agent as the most primary, the chaos of sense is resolved into definite elements. One indeterminate sensation after another is determined by comparison and contrast with others, and as determinate is referred as a property to a thing, to become in its turn the subject of other predicates, the substratum of other properties, as the range of knowledge increases.

The unscientific man, if asked what an acid is, will say, perhaps, that it is that which sets his teeth on edge. The sensation is not merely such even to him. He has determined it by bringing it into relation to a certain phenomenon, which is itself the determinate result of a comparison of sensations. This relation, as something permanent, is expressed by a common name, and referred as a property to the things to which the name is applied. If the man of science defines an acid as a substance containing hydrogen, which when brought into contact with certain metals exchanges hydrogen for the metal, he has only carried the same process a long way further. He has determined a sensation by bringing it into relation to a long series of phenomena. Each determination has enabled him to apply a definite predicate to it, and at last he has reached that on which all the rest depend, which is present when any one of them is present. All thinking, from the simplest definition of one sensuous image by another which suggests a name, to the ultimate speculations of science, is of this kind. It is not a progress from the less to the more abstract, but from the less to the more determinate. It does not begin with determinate attributes which it abstracts from each other, but has itself to create them. If it separates one attribute from another, it is to make each not less but more definite in virtue of a new relation.

We are thus brought to a point of view whence we may distinguish two really inconsistent theories of knowledge running through Greek philosophy, each of which arrives at its most complete formulation in Aristotle, though in him they are still so blended as to present constant coniradictions throughout his writings. On the one hand, there is the view which first finds distinct utterance in the dictum of Heraclitus, that objects of sense, as such, cannot be known. The sensible is the indeterminate (*τὸ ἄπειρον*), and the becoming (*τὸ*

γιγνόμενον). That which is known must be susceptible of definition and description. If I say that I have a knowledge of 'this bed,' as an object of sense, and try to describe it, it appears that I do this by its properties. These, however, as has been shown above, are not properly sensible, but intelligible. They are known in acts of judgment, in the very first of which the sensation is held in relation to a subject which is not sensible, while in the rest of them this bed is compared with other things, ceasing in the comparison to be seen or handled at all. In the technical language of Greek philosophy 'this bed,' as known, is not merely this bed, but a kind of bed, the subject of attributes which it has in common with other things. It is not a τόδε, but a τοιόνδε. If it is said that no description of the properties of a bed can be adequate to *this* bed, as present to my senses here and now, I must ask myself in what this presence consists. I can only know it by describing it, and can only describe it as an affection of sensitive organs at a certain moment of time, and in a certain circumscription of space. This again is a judgment in terms, expressing not what is sensible, but what is intelligible. The attempt to know the sensible at once transmutes it into the intelligible, or, as a Greek might express it, the object of sense, as such, is evermore *becoming* something which it *is* not. It can only be described as that which is incapable of description, only determined as the indeterminate, or, to take a figure from the sphere of art, it is a matter as yet without form; not, however, such a matter as the artist uses, already formed by the eternal Demiurge, but the negation of all form. In other words, it is nothing, for to be anything it must have a form of some kind. That, therefore, which alone is and alone can be known is the 'form' (ἰδέα or εἶδος). The object of knowledge and the true reality coincide.

Such in outline is the result of the Greek 'criticism of the sensible,' a result which to the modern reader, floating far down the stream of experience, and careless of tracing it to its source, seems either wholly unaccountable, or to be accounted for only as an expression of religious mysticism. With mysticism, however, the philosophy, which defined itself as a search for 'the reason why' in all things, could in its period of health have no fellowship, and if its conclusions sound strange to our ears, it is not because the process by which they were arrived at has long ago been refuted, but

because it has long been ignored. There is a sense in which, as the domain of positive knowledge advances, the difficulties of metaphysical philosophy increase. The metaphysician, as he is told in depreciation, but with a certain truth, adds nothing to the sum of existing knowledge. His concern is with the analysis of that which is already known, and with the new synthesis of spirit and its object which results therefrom. Penetrating the intelligible world, he seeks to disentangle its elements and to 'put them together' again, not as a ready-made material, but in the order of their origination. The more complex this world has become, the harder is it to 'begin at the beginning.'

The Heraclitean theory of the sensible (in itself not so much a theory as a prophecy), and the Socratic practice of definition, are said by Aristotle to have formed the philosophic parentage of Plato. The correlation of the two is obvious. The Socratic method implied that something was knowable, in such a way that its nature could be fixed in a definition. This could not be the object of sense, which, according to Heraclitus, was always in flux. What then is it that I know in a thing in virtue of which I apply a name to it? The answer of Socrates or his interpreters would be: It is the form, which is at once the thing as known and the thing in itself. This again is a 'universal.' The thing, as merely sensible, is merely individual. It is given in a multitude of acts of sense, each separate from the other. The form, on the other hand, the sum of properties which make the thing what it is, remains the same throughout the succession of sensuous presentations, and is predicable of the whole of them (*καθ' ὅλου κατηγορεῖται*). As the thing is known under the sum of its properties, so also it exists as their unity. They at once account for it, or are its definition, and make it what it is, or are its cause. They are further the 'mean' (*μέσον*) or possible middle term, by which it may be connected with other objects of knowledge. Thus the Socratic question, What is the thing? (*τί ἔστι;*) is equivalent to, What is the meaning of its name? and that which answers the question is at once the thing in its essence, the thing as universal, the form of the thing, its cause, and its connection with the general world of knowledge. On the conceptions involved in these terms, the antagonisms of the Aristotelian philosophy, its truth and its error, really depend.

The term 'universal,' correlatively with the 'sensible thing,' is the *crux* of philosophy. When a sensible thing has been so far defined by thought as to be an object of knowledge, it is at once a 'form.' This form is real and essential, as contrasted with the mere object of sense. It is determinate, and therefore something, while that was nothing. It is also a 'universal,' for it is constituted by a relation to the thinking subject; in other words, by an intelligible property, in virtue of which it can be held together with any other objects presented to the same subject. So far the Platonist is right. But this determinate form is capable of infinitely numerous other determinations as it is brought into other relations. In other words, our first knowledge of a thing is not our ultimate knowledge of it; the first 'form' is not the final one; the mere universal is a shell to be filled up by particular attributes. But it is our first knowledge of the thing that suggests a name, and it is on the insignificant superficial property connoted by the name that a class is constructed. Classification, it is to be observed, is of two kinds. The interest of scientific classification consists in the fact that the individuals formed into a class are known to possess other properties than that in virtue of which they are included in it. The classification thus constitutes a further determination of that property, and a further step in knowledge. It may be of scientific interest, for instance, to know how many animals are 'mammal,' because they are known to possess other properties the connection of which with 'mammality' may be of importance. The class, however, which may be formed in correspondence to any general name, is of a different kind. There is nothing in it which is not in each individual constituting it. The class as known and the individual as known each involve a universal, and the class is but an 'envisagement,' by way of accommodation to sense, in a multitude of sensible things of the properties which constitute the object of knowledge. Now it was with the class of the latter kind that the Platonic philosophy, in a lapse of reason, came to identify the essential form and the universal. Hence two correlative errors. The identification of the essential form of a thing with the class corresponding to its name, implies that the form under which the thing is first known, which is only 'essential' relatively to the nothingness of mere sense, is its true and ultimate form. To revert

to an instance already given: the essence of an acid will be that it sets the teeth on edge, that being the obvious property by which the sensation is first defined in thought, and which is thus associated with its name. By the identification of the universal with a class, the true view of it is lost as soon as it is gained. In the 'critique of the sensible' it appeared as the relation to the knowing subject under which even the simplest objects are known. As such it is a property, as yet abstract, but capable of determination, by becoming in its turn the subject of successive judgments. As a class, however, it can only be the subject of judgments in which it is brought under a class more extensive than itself, *i.e.* in which that is predicated of it which is already involved in it. By such a process its emptiness becomes yet more empty, and meanwhile the individual thing is asserting its independence. Instead of being regarded as that which becomes universal so soon as it is judged of or known, in virtue of the property under which it is known, it is connected with the universal as a thing with the class to which it belongs. In this position it is vain to deny its priority and independence. Thus individuals come to be regarded as one set of knowable things, universals another. But the 'sensible,' according to the ideal theory, is the merely individual. It is so because it is in no determinate relation to anything else, and therefore nothing positive. The mere individual, however, having by the wrong path just traced been raised to the position of a real entity, the 'sensible' is so raised likewise. The ideal theory has built again that which it destroyed, and the sensible thing becomes, as such, the determinate subject of properties.

It is from this false view of the universal and the form—a view preserved in the ordinary use of the term 'species'—that the syllogistic theory of Aristotle, with the whole scholastic logic based on it, is derived, and it is this that has made it such a barren mother of science. Its futility in the direction of physical research was the result of a metaphysical mistake, and of a mistake which originated, as we have seen, in an accommodation to sense. The syllogism is properly a mere formulation of the answer to the Socratic question, τί ἔστι; We may suppose Socrates to have heard Aristides called 'the Just,' and to have interposed with the inquiry what justice was. It would be defined, perhaps, to

consist in giving every man his due. This definition is the 'reason why' (λόγος) the term 'just' is applied to Aristides, or it is the middle term by which Aristides is brought under the general appellation. We thus get the syllogism, Whoever gives every man his due is just; Aristides gives every man his due; therefore Aristides is just. In order to get to such definitions, Socrates employed, we are told, 'inductive arguments' (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι). The term expresses the exact nature of the process as pursued by him. It consisted in bringing forward various cases in which a certain name, expressive of praise or blame, was applied. The consideration of what it was that these cases had in common, gave the essence of the virtue or vice in question. Now, it is clear that this process does not in itself constitute a further determination of an object imperfectly known. It supposes determinate knowledge of which the features have become dim, and have to be recalled into distinct consciousness. In order to ascertain the nature of a thing, it goes over the various instances in which its name has been applied, considering what in each case it was meant to convey. The only 'essence' at which it can arrive is thus that which is involved in our existing knowledge of the thing, in virtue of which we have given it a name and made it the basis of a class.

Incidentally as applied to morals, the method had a far higher value. It was the correlative of the Socratic doctrine of innate moral ideas, and the method has a practical value, as the doctrine a practical truth. The truth of the doctrine lies in the fact that an unconscious always precedes a conscious morality; that men act on moral principles, embodied in law and custom, which have never distinctly become part of their individual consciousness. The value of the method lies in its power, as a process of self-examination, to awaken in a man the consciousness of the law on which, under higher guidance than his own, he has already been acting, and thus to transform it from an outward to an inward law, to be obeyed not on authority but in freedom, not under the limitations of local or temporary enactment, but in the open atmosphere of reason.

As systematised and applied, however, by Plato (under the term συναγωγή) and by Aristotle (under the term ἐπαγωγή), the method professes to be that which thought

necessarily follows in learning to know, or, more properly, since with them things exist as they are known, in creating, the universe of things. It is that by which it ascends from sensible things to forms, and from the lower, *i.e.* the less abstract and extensive forms, to the higher, *i.e.* the more abstract and extensive. The process begins with the observation of a multitude of sensible things to which a common name is applied. Abstraction is made of the qualities in which these differ, and those in which they agree are retained as constituting their form. Another form having been arrived at in the same way, comparison is made of the two; that in which they differ is left out, and the like qualities which remain constitute a higher form, and so on. Thus a series of forms is obtained of the kind known to school-logicians as the 'logical tree' of Porphyry. The reverse process to this 'scala ascensoria' is the 'scala descensoria,' in which an individual is brought under a previously given species, or a lower species under a previously given higher one, through a 'middle'; the lower, middle, and higher being so called in respect of extension.[1] This process of descent is called by Aristotle syllogism, by Plato division. According to both philosophers alike, the intelligible world consisted of a series of such forms, related to each other as the less and more abstract or extensive classes, along which thought moved up and down, in the manner here indicated.

The futility of this view, to which alone the scholastic syllogism is adapted, is so obvious as scarcely to need pointing out. It supposes the process of thought to begin where it really ends, and end where it really begins. It supposes it to begin with a knowledge of the thing, as a complex of determinate attributes, for unless the attributes are there, they cannot be abstracted; and to end with the simple predication of being, which, as excluding all definite attributes, is virtually nothing. As has already been shown, and as the Platonic 'criticism of the sensible' implied, the real process is just the reverse. The first act of thinking or knowing is

[1] That the terms 'major,' 'middle,' and 'minor' refer properly to extension is clear from Aristotle's account of the 'inductive syllogism,' as that which proves a major of a middle through a minor. Here the minor term, which represents the individual things in which the property represented by the major is found, is middle in respect of position, but is called the minor, because the individual things separately are less in extension than the class which they constitute, and which is thus called 'middle.'

the judgment 'something is,' and the predicate of this judgment, 'being,' or the simple relation which it expresses, becomes gradually a subject of more and more determinate properties, as in successive judgments it is brought into new relations. The syllogism or deduction, moreover, is simply the induction, so to speak, upside down. It adds on again the attributes which the induction had taken away. The induction having abstracted from 'this, that, and the other' magnets all particular properties but that of attracting iron, the syllogism, or series of syllogisms, by dividing the '*summum genus*' in which this abstract property is envisaged, brings it again into connection with the complex particularity of 'this, that, and the other.'

The fault of this crude 'realism,' it will be observed, whether Platonic, Aristotelian, or scholastic, is that it is virtually nominalism. It holds the universal to be real, but it finds the universal simply in the meaning of a name. That the 'sensible,' as such, is unreal in so far as nothing can be predicated of it;[1] that it becomes real, or a possible subject of properties, only by being fixed in relation to the thinking self, which relation constitutes a universal or common element between it and all other things; that thus the universal is real and in things, can be established by the most exact dialectic. Such realism is no enemy either to common sense or to scientific investigation. It admits in the fullest measure that the individual thing is real, and an object of knowledge, but maintains that it is so only in virtue of a relation which is universal, and without which the thing would have no intelligible properties at all. Its real universal is not, like the scholastic, bounded by the rigid limits of a class, and capable only of the relations of a geometrical magnitude. It is a unity essentially relative to a multiplicity. Like the thinking self, of which it is the reflex, it is capable of infinite determination, as in the motion of knowledge it is brought into new relations. It 'lives through all life, extends through all extent, spreads undivided, operates unspent.' But the realism of the ancient logic, taking for its reality the species denoted by a common noun, is doubly at

[1] If it should seem absurd at first sight to speak in this way of the 'sensible,' when a physiologist can tell us so much about sense, describing minutely its conditions, a moment's consideration will show that sense as known and thought of by the physiologist, is one thing; sense, as the germ of consciousness preceding thought, quite another.

fault. It makes its universal a class instead of a relation, and it takes as the essential attributes of the class those only which are connoted by its name, *i.e.* the most superficial. Having thus begun with a meagre conception as its first reality, it passes on in its process of abstraction to what is more meagre still, ending in that which has no properties at all. It is thus set at war at once with the common understanding and with actual science. The common understanding is scandalised by a doctrine which, allowing the sensible thing to be a complex of attributes, finds 'reality,' not in it, but in a class to which it belongs. It maintains irrefragably that such a class is a mere compendious sign for a multitude of individual things. Science discovers that thought, according to the path marked out for it by the logician, can never arrive at anything new, but is for ever retracing the first steps of its childhood, which are represented by terms in received use; that it is working a treadmill, which, when it fancies itself laboriously ascending, brings it back to the simple predication of being with which it really began.

The inadequacy, then, of the Aristotelian logic to the real world of knowledge, which led to the Baconian revolt, does not result from its being too 'idealistic,' but from its not being idealistic enough; from its virtual admission that there is a reality—the sensible thing as the complex of attributes—which is not an idea. False to the 'criticism of the sensible' which showed the form, or thing as known, to be the sole reality, it has allowed that sense, as distinct from thought, gives an experience of things having definite properties. Give sensation this first inch, and it takes an ell. If sense gives a knowledge of properties, nothing remains for thought but to abstract and combine them, and it is vain then to re-assert for the data of thought, for its abstractions and 'mixed modes,' the dignity of the 'things themselves.' Thought has abdicated its proper prerogatives. It has admitted that experience is something given to it from without, not that in which it comes to itself. It inevitably follows that in what it does for itself, when not simply receptive of experience, it is merely draining away in narrower and more remote channels the fulness of the real world. We cannot know by abstraction, for properties must be known before they can be abstracted. If thought, then, is a process of abstraction—as it is according to the Aristotelian logic—we

think by other methods than we know. Thought, therefore, cannot give us knowledge, but only lead us away from it.

A philosophy, however, which had begun with the principle that the definite alone is knowable, and that thought alone defines, could not thus be lost in the shallows of a false antithesis. It is only because Aristotle has been known to the modern world chiefly through his logic, and through his logic as interpreted by the schoolmen, that his name has become associated with a splendid failure. In his other, and probably later writings, especially the treatise 'De Anima,' and the 'Metaphysics,' we find a more thorough and therefore truer idealism, which, inconsistent as this may seem with the ordinary notion of his relation to his master, sometimes appears most clearly in his polemic against Plato. It may already be disentangled, though amid much apparent confusion, from his theory (or one of his theories) of definition. The place which the conception of 'matter' fills in this theory is inconsistent with its place in the theory of induction. According to the latter, 'matter' is constituted by the individual things which 'are nearest the sense,' and from which thought abstracts the properties which constitute the 'form' or species. By a further abstraction of properties the 'genus'—ultimately the 'summum genus'—is arrived at, which thus stands at the end of the process farthest from 'matter.' In the 'Metaphysics,' on the other hand, the 'summum genus' itself appears as the 'matter' which is *formed* by successive *differentiæ* till the most determinate complex of attributes has been reached. Here we see that matter has changed places. It appears itself as that abstraction of being which was most remote from matter according to the theory of induction. We are now on the traces of a true theory of knowledge as a process of definition. 'Matter' with Aristotle is a relative term. It may either be the simple negation of all form, the absolutely unknown, or it may be the less completely formed or known in contrast with the more completely. Matter, if of the former kind, may be called, in Aristotle's phraseology (with an unessential variation of its meaning), 'matter as an object of sense,' ὕλη αἰσθητή; if of the latter, 'matter as an object of thought,' ὕλη νοητή. It is in the latter sense that the 'summum genus,' being, is matter in relation to the formative process of definition. It is the predicate in the judgment

'something is,' which, as we have seen, is itself determinate or formed in relation to the absolutely formless matter of sense, but which has the minimum of form consistent with its being an object of knowledge at all. It is as yet void of all the qualities which will attach to it, as the process of differentiation, in which, according to Aristotle, definition consists, goes on. In the succession of forms which this process creates, each is a 'matter' relatively to the more complex essence, which results from the addition to it of a differentiating quality, and, on the other hand, a form relatively to that which preceded the last step in its own differentiation.

Matter and form, then, are related to each other respectively at once as the more abstract and more concrete, and as the less and more perfectly or definitely known. The process of thought appears as one not of abstraction but of concretion. It 'integrates' just so far as it 'differentiates.' Beginning with a simple assertion of being or identity with self, A is A, it goes on to bring A into relation to some other object, which in like manner has been arrested in its flux, 'won from the void and formless infinite' of sense, by the magnetic ego. This relation gives a contrast and difference. A is not B. But as not B it is something more than mere A. The difference has not taken something from it, but added something to it. It has not become a fraction of what it was before, but a fuller integer. It is no longer a bare unit, but a unity of differences, a centre of manifold relations, a subject of properties. It is not an 'abstract universal,' but it has an element of universality in virtue of which it can be brought into relation to all things else. Its universality is the condition of its particularisation.

Such a theory of the process of thought does away with the false antithesis between experience and reasoning, between induction and deduction, between relations of ideas and relations of things. The first act of experience is the same in kind with all reasoning not simply rhetorical, and thought is as active in the creation of its materials as in their arrangement. A 'determination by negation' is involved in the judgments 'nearest the sense,' as in those that are most remote from it. An object of sense, in being known, is determined as the negation of the knowing self, as at once related to it and distinct from it. Only as thus determined can it form the beginning of an experience, and

act in turn as a determinant to other things, which are presented as different from it and its negation. Whether we are occupied in the acquisition of what we call new experience, or in the more thorough understanding of the old, the same process of affirmation by negation, of new assertion through new distinction, goes on. It cannot therefore be said that any reasoning which gives a new result is either purely *a priori* or purely *a posteriori*, that any knowledge is given either by simple induction or simple deduction. In the experience which seems most primary there is yet a *prius*, a something given to, not derived from, the experience, for there can be no experience without distinction, and no distinction without something from which to distinguish. In like manner, the 'new instances' of induction, whether given by observation or experiment, would have no meaning unless in previous knowledge we had something by which to interpret them, and for them in turn to qualify. On the other hand, if deductive reasoning is to do anything more than, like the scholastic syllogism, state of individuals what has previously been stated of the class which they constitute, it must apply a received conception to a new case, whether the new case be given by construction, as in geometry and jurisprudence, by experiment, as in physical science, or by a disentanglement of that which is implicit in the language, knowledge, and acts of men, as in metaphysics.

The antithesis between relations of ideas and matters of fact, the treatment of which by Hume was 'the occasional cause' of Kant's 'Critic,' though latent in the opposition between 'necessary and contingent' matter, can scarcely be said to appear in Greek philosophy till after Aristotle. By Plato and Aristotle alike, things are supposed to exist as they are known, and to be known as they exist. Hence if 'universals' are the proper objects of knowledge, which Aristotle, no less than Plato, constantly affirms, they are also the real things, and if the cogitable world consists of a series of forms, corresponding to general names, and related to each other as the less and more abstract, such also is the real world. Scholasticism did actually proceed on this doctrine, and hence its philosophy of nature was a string of verbal propositions. The popular philosophy of modern times, so far as it has retained the old doctrine as to the procedure of thought, has only done so by regarding its order as the

reverse of the order of real existence. Real things exist as individuals having properties, not as classes of greater or less extension. The process of life is one evermore leading to a greater complexity of attributes. Thought, then, as a process of abstraction, can only lead farther away from reality and life. Science, however, follows the order of nature. Its concern is with the relations of individual things to each other, with the simplest of which it begins and advances to the more complex. Its method, therefore, is at variance with the supposed method of thought, and while the one comes to be regarded as a simple registration of sensible experience, the other, as having nothing to do with the world, is relegated to the limbo of words mistaken for things. Ideas are 'abstract universals,' there are no 'abstract universals' in reality, therefore the real and ideal must be mutually exclusive.

The view of thought as a process from the less to the more determinate avoids this antagonism. It exhibits the first idea equally with the first datum of experience, as the most simple and abstract possible, as having a minimum of form, *i.e.* as relatively matter. It exhibits the idea, moreover, as no less individual than universal. As determinate, it is distinct from all other ideas, or individual; but this very distinction is only possible in virtue of a common relation to the thinking subject, which constitutes a universality. The real thing of intelligent experience unites the two sides of individuality and universality in precisely the same way. It is a centre of relations, which constitute its properties. As differenced from all things else by the sum of these relations, it is individual, but to be so differenced from them all it must have an element in common with them. If it be said that it is individual, as momentarily presented to the sense, this very presentation can only be known or named, *i.e.* can only have any meaning, as one property or relation of the thing amongst others. If then the thing of experience turns out to be what 'thinking makes it,' while, on the other hand, the motion of thought is no other than the correlative 'differentiation and integration,' which constitutes the evolution of the phenomenal world, where is the obstacle to the admission that the world of experience is a world of ideas, or things as thought of, that its order is an order of thought, that in knowing it we do but realise ourselves?

It may be reckoned an extravagance to fasten such a view

upon Aristotle on the strength of one aspect among many under which his theory of definition is presented to us. It must be remembered, however, that with Aristotle, as with Socrates, the object of definition is to ascertain not merely the meaning ordinarily attached to a name, but the nature of a thing at once as known and as it exists. So far then as definition consists in the gradual differentiation of an indeterminate matter, this represents also the order both of thought and of the world. It is quite true that in Aristotle himself there is no clear account of this differentiation except as a re-addition of qualities previously abstracted in the process of induction. In putting the most abstract universal as 'matter,' according to the theory of definition, in the same place which the sensible thing, as a concretion of properties, occupies in the theory of induction, he merely after his manner 'shoots from a pistol' a proposition, which properly carries with it a complete transmutation of his theory of knowledge, but which he himself never followed to its consequences. The same antagonism, pointing for reconciliation to a higher philosophy than Aristotle's own, appears under several other forms in his writings, especially in his controversy with Plato on the conception of 'substance' (*οὐσία*).

The Platonic doctrine of ideas rested on the view that the 'sensible' was properly no *thing* at all, but the possibility of becoming something through the determining action of thought. The Greek language, by its use of the neuter gender in place of the substantive 'thing,' had special facilities for the statement of this view, which, on the other hand, can only be stated in English (as a reader of the present article will observe) by what seems a pedantic use of the term 'sensible.' Notwithstanding this Plato is constantly lapsing from it into the notion that the 'sensible' is equivalent to the individual thing, as qualified by properties. We thus get two separate sets of things, individuals which are objects of sense, on the one side; universals or ideas, which are objects of thought, on the other. To take one of Plato's own examples: this individual bed is one thing, an object of sense. The universal or ideal bed, which corresponds to the general term 'bed,' is something else. Having lapsed, however, from the view that the 'sensible' is nothing, he still holds it to be something unreal, a mere shadow of the truth;

while the idea having become nothing in particular, is still asserted to be alone real and an object of knowledge. It is just this failure, through want of adequate formulæ, to maintain himself in his idealism, not the idealism itself, which justifies the popular notion that Plato was a dreamer who mistook shadows for things, and things for shadows.

The error is detected by Aristotle more clearly than its source. The universal, he says, cannot, as Plato supposed, be a separate, self-existent entity; it must attach as an attribute to things individual, and individual all things known as 'substances' necessarily are. It is not something apart from, above, and beyond, sensible things, but in them, and, as such, predicable of them. The so-called thing in itself, or ideal thing, is simply the sensible thing, *minus* the attribute of being sensible.

In meeting these objections, the ideal theory necessarily comes to a better understanding of itself. That the idea, as Plato constantly treats it, is simply the sensible thing after abstraction of its sensibility, cannot be denied. Whatever can be predicated of 'this bed' can be predicated of 'bed in general,' with deduction of the peculiarities of this bed, as distinct from others. But of 'this bed,' as sensible, nothing can be predicated, or, more properly, as merely sensible it is not a bed or anything else at all. According to Aristotle's own phraseology, it is absolutely indeterminate matter, and therefore has no properties, is unknowable. If by the sensible thing is meant the thing as first known—known, *i.e.* under the minimum of determination requisite to any knowledge at all,—then Plato's 'thing-in-itself' is simply identical with it. As it is constituted by the properties which are connoted by the general name first applied to the thing, and as the application of such a name is coincident with the earliest knowledge of it, it is nothing more than the thing in its most obvious aspect. It is indeed, unlike the merely sensible, a real object of knowledge, but the poorest possible, and a method like the Platonic, which takes it as the fullest and ultimate object, contains no principle of progress.

The assertion of Aristotle against Plato, that the universal is not to be found apart from 'sensible things,' but attaches to them, has been strangely thought to be an abandonment of the doctrine of the reality of universals. It can only be so on the supposition that a thing is more real than

its properties. It can only be on such a supposition that Mr. Mill, having maintained that names are names of *things*, treats the doctrine of 'general essences' as a scholastic absurdity. Yet a common name, to use his own language, connotes an attribute or attributes. If it is also the name of a thing, the attributes or general essence must constitute a thing. It makes no difference to say that the common noun 'denotes' a thing, while it 'connotes' an attribute, for it denotes the thing only in virtue of connoting the attribute. If the individual 'bed' is something apart from its properties, if it alone is properly real, while they are not, then to say that the general essence 'bed' means the properties which attach to individual beds, is to admit that general essences are not real. This doctrine, however, is simply to restore the notion of an 'unknown substratum of attributes' (for such is the individual bed without properties), against which the enemies of realism are apt to be severe. If, on the other hand, the individual thing is what it is in virtue of its attributes, if these constitute its reality, then the Aristotelian doctrine, by treating the universal as a property or sum of properties, while it in no way modifies the reality which Plato ascribed to it, avoids the error of admitting a quasi-reality in distinction from it. That which can be predicated of the sensible thing, in other words, that which can be known about it, is the essence, and an object not of sense but of thought. This view of the essence or form properly prevents (though it did not always prevent with Aristotle) the shallow conception of it as a class, and renders it capable of further formation or development with the progress of knowledge.

Aristotle's reiterated statement, then, that the universal is not 'separable,' but implies something to which it attaches as an attribute, really amounts not to an abandonment of the Platonic 'idea,' but to a resolution of it into two correlative elements. What Plato had spoken of indifferently as 'form,' the 'universal,' 'essence,' and 'substance,' emerges from the Aristotelian crucible, as, on the one hand, 'substance,' which is individual, 'separable' (*χωριστόν*), and 'subject' (*ὑποκείμενον*); as on the other, 'form' or 'essence,' which is universal and the attribute of a subject. The conception of individual substance having thus presented itself, requires the same purgation from sense as the 'real thing' of experi-

ence, a purgation which at Aristotle's hands it only partially receives. Hence his statements concerning it seem at first sight to be in hopeless contradiction with each other. Substance, he tells us, is necessarily individual, and as individual, it 'has matter.' Matter, however, is properly unknowable, because indeterminate. Yet, elsewhere, he speaks of individual substance as the proper object of knowledge, and as determinate in opposition to the kind (*τὸ τοιόνδε*). Substance, again, according to him, as individual, is an object of sense; yet, for the same reason, it is a definite something, while the sensible is the indefinite. Substance is that which remains when all attributes have been abstracted, yet it is also the concretion of attributes, supposed to be given by sense, with which the abstracting process of thought begins. To this web of apparent contradictions (which might be greatly extended) Aristotle supplies no sufficient clue. In the 'Metaphysics,' indeed, he twice sums up the significations of 'substance.' It is either, he says, the 'subject-matter,' the 'form,' or the individual thing compounded of the two, *i.e.* the subject-matter as formed by properties. As the mere form substance is the so-called 'secondary' or improper substance of the treatise on the Categories; as the individual thing, having properties, it is the 'primary' or proper substance of that treatise. So far the two passages in the 'Metaphysics' agree; but there is an important difference. According to one passage, substance, as 'subject-matter,' has sensible or phenomenal qualities; according to the other it is the negation of all qualities, the *caput mortuum*, or 'unknown substratum,' from which everything determinate has been abstracted.

The truth is, that the elements into which Aristotle resolves the intelligible world, are not fully conceived of by him as determinations of a creative spirit, which reflects itself in things. To him they are rather fixed elements in a world presented from without. Hence the sequence and dependence of one on the other are not clearly seen. The thread of spiritual unity on which they all hang escapes his grasp. They appear in hard juxtaposition, instead of as a rhythm where each member is different from the rest, but different solely in virtue of its relation to them. The thinking self is individual, as exclusive of all things. But it excludes all things as the negation of each in particular, and such nega-

tion is a relation. Therefore, as exclusive of them all, it is in relation, or present, to each of them: it is an omnipresent element or universal. The individual has thus transformed itself into the universal in virtue of its particularity or definite relations. The process may be reversed. The thinking self is present to all objects of consciousness, not here or there, but continuously. It is only in virtue of this presence that they are what they are; without it they would be in 'disconnection, dead and spiritless'; and thus it is a universal element. But it is related to all these particular objects as their negation; it is not any one of them in particular. Thus it is exclusive of them all, or individual. As the individual self is universalised, so the universal is individualised, through its particular relations.

'Substance,' as the outward thing, is but the reflex of the inward subject, and involves the same correlative opposites. It is individual or exclusive of all things but itself; otherwise it would be no object of definite knowledge. But it is not *merely* individual. If it were, it would be, as it is sometimes presented to us by Aristotle, an indeterminate, and therefore unknowable 'matter.' It would be out of relation to other things, and relations alone constitute the determinate properties in virtue of which a thing is known. As known, it is in implicit relation to all things else, on the principle that one item of knowledge ultimately qualifies every other; in other words, it involves an element in common with them, a universal. It is an individual universalised through its particular relations or qualities. Here again the process may be reversed. If there is no universal element in things known, there can be no unity of knowledge or community of thought. But this universal is not merely such. If it were 'ever the same,' so as to be void of all distinction, like the shadowy goal of the Platonic dialectic, it would be, as it in turn is exhibited by Aristotle, the indeterminate and unknowable. It must be that which is the negation of all particular relations so as to be determined by the sum of them. In virtue of this negative relation, as identical with itself in exclusion of all things, it is individual. It is a universal individualised through its particularity. Thus we see that the *πρώτη οὐσία*, or individual substance, and the *δευτέρα οὐσία*, or essence constituted by general attributes, are not to be placed, as Aristotle placed them, over-against each other,

as if one excluded, or even could be present without, the other. They are as necessarily correlative as subject and object, as the self and the world. Each, by its native energy, which is the hidden 'spontaneity' of thought, necessarily creates its opposite. Nor is one, as Aristotle supposed, in any special sense 'matter,' the other 'form.' Each, taken by itself, is matter, as the indeterminate and negation of the knowable. Each, again, so taken, is matter, as the 'subject' (*ὑποκείμενον*), receptive of a form—of a form, however, not imposed from without, but projected from within. Each, lastly, may be regarded either as a void 'substratum,' or as a complex of attributes, according as it is isolated or regarded in the realisation which it only attains by passing into its opposite.

The crudity in the philosophical digestion of Aristotle, which prevented the due fusion of the correlative meanings of *οὐσία*, was the notion—our old enemy—that the individual substance, as matter, was given by sense, and yet had determinate properties. This brings him into collision with his own principle, that the matter of sense, as indeterminate, was unknowable. The 'object of sense' and the 'individual' he constantly uses as equivalent terms. Yet he could not but see that the mere individual, as out of relation, and thus unqualified, afforded no beginning for knowledge. Thus when he treats the 'sensible thing' as constituting such a beginning, he is obliged to explain that it is not merely individual, not a simple 'this' (*τόδε*), but of a kind (*τοιόνδε*). The general essence, however, which makes it a *τοιόνδε*, and which it must involve in order to be an object of knowledge, is given, says Aristotle, in a definite 'here' and 'now.' This individuality of presentation in space and time he seems to have considered the differentia of the 'sensible thing.' It at once constitutes its materiality, and is a determination of it. Hence the contradiction between his view of matter, or the sensible element, as indeterminate, and his view of it as determining, in the sense of individualising, the thing known. The *αἰσθητόν* with him, as the qualified object of knowledge presented in limits of space and time, thus corresponds to the object of intuition, as distinct from sensation, of Kant.

Presentation in an individual 'here' and 'now' is undoubtedly the condition of the first objects of knowledge. If, then, it is itself sensible, sense must at least be an ele-

ment in the constitution of intelligent experience. The 'here' and 'now,' however, are not seen, or heard, or handled. As has been pointed out, the sensible 'here' has, while I write it, become a 'there,' the sensible 'now' a 'then.' We may call the sensible 'heres' and 'nows' an 'indistinguishable succession of points or moments,' 'each changing place with that which goes before'; but in the very act of naming, *i.e.* of knowing them, we transmute them. For the flux of points and moments we have fixed categories, the 'here' and the 'now' in general, objects of intelligent consciousness. In like manner, the 'presentation,' as soon as named, becomes a general attribute of things. As it is to the sense, momentary and isolated, it is unnameable, for a name is permanent, and represents a permanence, while it is the negation of permanence, yet not determined by this negation; for if so, it would cease to be momentary and individual.

The 'presentation in a here and now,' to which, according to Aristotle, the sensible or material element in knowledge reduces itself, is thus a general predicate, expressing a general attribute of objects of knowledge. It is a predicate, however, which is in perpetual process of self-negation. As the individual necessarily passes into the universal, so the limitation in space, which is but a first (though necessary) envisagement of individuality, as a condition of things known effaces itself. It is true that I necessarily present to myself all things, which I regard as outward, as external to and limited by each other, *i.e.* under the form of space; but this very limitation implies a relation of each to the other, which constitutes an element of absolute continuity, the negative of spatial limitation. If again I am necessarily conscious of my own thoughts and feelings as in succession to each other, *i.e.* under the form of time, this of itself implies the undivided presence of the thinking self to each as an absolute stability in relation to which alone succession has any meaning.

Thus placing ourselves outside the process by which our knowledge is developed, we see that its sensuous conditions are only knowable under categories which sense itself does not supply. But to us, who are within the process, these conditions have a different meaning. They form the element of imperfection in our knowledge. In us, as not simply contemplative of animal life in its properties or essence, but

ourselves animals, knowledge is developed through the action of sensitive organs. These, indeed, can of themselves give no knowledge apart from the distinguishing and unifying self which makes them its vehicle. Except in relation to this self, their 'reports' are in the strictest sense unmeaning, for they present things either in mere detachment or mere continuity. Yet, as acting through them, it is subject to a necessary delusion, the continued removal of which, never ending, still beginning, gives an essential character to human knowledge as at once imperfect, and, through its imperfection, progressive. We learn to know things 'piecemeal,' and inevitably mistake the piece for the whole. Each object, as known, is indeed in relation to all other things; the divine æther which permeates the world is also in it; but the relation is to us at first potential, not actual, and must always remain so in proportion to the limitation of our knowledge. Its universality, like that of the self of which it is the reflex, is thus *so far* an abstract universality. It is not yet all things in one; not yet a centre on which all relations of the intelligible world actually converge, any more than the subject in us, though that to which the whole variety of the world is relative, is yet actually so determined. As the self can only realise its universality through the experience of the world, so each substance only gathers to itself the full universe of its attributes in the progressive development of knowledge. Yet, through the delusion of sense, each successive accretion of attributes is taken for the last. As sin consists in the individual's making his own self his object, not in the possible expansion in which it becomes that true will of humanity which is also God's, but under the limitation of momentary appetite or interest, so intellectual error consists in regarding the relations under which, at any given time, an object is presented to us, and which, through the limitations of sense, are necessarily partial, as the totality of its relations. As, moreover, to one looking on the process of moral action from without, evil would be 'inchoate good,' though it is not so to us who are within the process and will the evil, so, although to one looking at the development of knowledge from without, error might be partial truth, yet it is not so to us who believe it to be complete.

We are now in a position to review the senses in which, according to Aristotle, matter attaches to the individual

substance, and to show their mutual relation in a way which, from his point of view, was impossible. The matter, which attaches to it as individual, does indeed determine it, but only as a matter which ceases to be matter, for, as we have seen, it is only the individuality which transforms itself into the universal, not one simple or absolute, that belongs to anything known. The matter, which consists in a presentation in a particular 'here' and 'now,' is a determination of substance only as a mode of the individuality just described, and 'sublates' itself in the same way. Finally, the matter, which attaches to it as a supposed object of sensuous perception, unknowable because indeterminate itself, can only be described by its relation to the knowable as that which makes knowledge imperfect. Thus matter has really the same meaning throughout. It is in itself the indeterminate and unknowable, which becomes determinate and knowable either as passing into the formed, or as the chaos of ignorance which for us surrounds each spot of dry land won to the orderly world of intelligence, but of which the shore is evermore receding.

It is as the element of imperfection that 'matter' appears in the Aristotelian definition of the form or essence as the proper object of knowledge. This, he says, is 'substance without matter' (*οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης*). It would be easy to show, taking our account of matter from Aristotle himself, that this definition involved a contradiction in terms. If, as he says, the individual is the sensible, and the sensible is 'in matter,' that which is without matter cannot be individual, and as substance is necessarily individual, cannot be substance. In his definition of the essence, however, or thing so known, Aristotle attains the true view of matter, as simply the negation of the knowable. We have previously seen that the minimum of knowledge, which can form a beginning of conscious experience, may be expressed as the judgment 'something is.' Here, in the first place, we have an individual substance, as subject of the judgment. As merely individual, however, it is indeterminate matter, and unknowable. In the act of knowing it, we universalise it. We predicate 'being' of it, which means that we fix it as an object to the self, and in virtue of this relation it has a universal element by which it may become related to other things. In other words, in knowing it, we strip it of its

mere individuality or matter, and substitute for this an intelligible individuality formed by its relations, which involve a universal. Thus, because individual, it is still *οὐσία*, but because intelligibly individual, or as the subject of general attributes, it is without matter. The attributes of the thing, however, or the relations which constitute them, are still not actually known. To know the thing at all—to know that *it is there*—we must individualise it as the subject of infinite relations; but these are still to us potential, not actual. Thus though, as known to a certain extent, it is 'without matter,' yet as girt with an infinite margin of indeterminate darkness, it is still deep in matter. In other words, every form relatively to the unknown, or less known, is an *οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης*—relatively to what will ultimately be known, or the higher form, it is *μετὰ ὕλης*.

It is as thus conceived of—as individual substance, yet individual only as the subject of general attributes—that the formal essence takes the place in the Aristotelian system, which the idea, as a mere universal, or as a class without individuals constituting it, held in the Platonic. It is at once the object of knowledge and the real thing. The philosophical advance involved in this substitution will become clearer after consideration of another pair of correlative terms, the application of which is the most purely original contribution of Aristotle to philosophy. These are the 'potential' and the 'actual,' of which we have already availed ourselves by anticipation in exposition of his view.

The terms *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, as used by Aristotle, are only to be understood in the strictest relativity to each other. The *δύναμις* is to the *ἐνέργεια*, for instance, as the shapen block to the finished statue. The shapen block in turn, would itself be an 'actuality' relatively to the unshapen, which again would be one relatively to its constituent elements. The 'potentiality,' as such, is indeterminate. The sculptor's block is relatively to the statue indeterminate, for it may be fashioned to the likeness of this man or that. As compared with the rock, on the other hand, from which it was hewn, it is itself determinate. This conception of the 'potentiality' Aristotle distinctly identifies with that of matter, which thus becomes relative in the same sense. If we can find a *δύναμις*, which is so absolutely, *i.e.* which is not an *ἐνέργεια* relatively to anything more simple, this is the *πρώτη ὕλη*. A box,

though made of wood, is not simply wood, but a 'form' of wood. It is not wood, but wood-en. The wood again, though formed, to use Aristotle's language, of constituent elements of earth, is not simply earth, but earth-en. The earth in turn may perhaps be resolved into something else. When in the backward process we come to that which we cannot describe as a form of something else, or as the something else with the addition *en* (*Græcè ινον*), then we have a 'primary matter,' a potentiality which is merely so, a substance which cannot be a predicate.

The account of the form or essence, then, as a 'substance dematerialised,' may be replaced by an account of it as a 'potentiality actualised.' The former account was compatible with the supposition, in which indeed it originated, that the form was arrived at by abstraction, that the matter was something positive to be stripped off it, like the coatings from an onion. The 'potentiality,' however, is nothing apart from that which it becomes. Thus the 'sensible' is nothing by itself, but determined as being, *i.e.* as an object to a thinking subject, it is the primary δύναμις of which all knowledge and reality is the gradual actualisation. This actualisation is not a process of abstraction but of addition. As whatever is predicable of the wood of which the box is made, is predicable also of the box itself with much more besides, so the process of thought, as a process from a δύναμις to an ἐνέργεια, and from this again as δύναμις to another ἐνέργεια, is one from the less to the more determinate idea, from the minimum of comprehension to the maximum.

An application of this doctrine might have saved the Aristotelian philosophy from the notion, which the scholastic logic derived from it, and which has received its final elaboration in the 'quantification of the predicate,' that thought has to do with 'wholes of extension.' It is only as such a 'whole,' that the universal is opposed to the cause, according to the common saying that the ancient philosophy was a search for universals, while modern science is a search for causes. With Aristotle, as a true follower of Socrates, science is a search for 'middle terms,' or definitions. Now it is quite true that according to the theory of 'induction and syllogism' the μέσον is a mean of extension, and though, in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle apparently seeks to adapt the syllogism to a different conception of the mean, it will

not really fit any other. The 'universals' to which such a theory leads, as predicable only in identical propositions, are no doubt opposed in the strictest sense to the 'causes' for which modern science seeks. The *μέσον*, however, is that by which a thing is defined, *i.e.* according to Aristotle, it is the essence or form of the thing. Whatever elevation, then, the conception of the essence has received by its identification with the *ἐνέργεια*, accrues also to the conception of science as a search for middle terms. In the simplest act of knowledge, a sensation, which is in itself a mere potentiality, becomes actual through being determined as an object to the thinking self. The fact of its being such an object is as yet the only one by which it can be defined. It is its sole condition, or, in Aristotelian language, its formal cause. It is also the 'mean' by which this one known thing may be connected with others. The mean, however, is not more abstract than the sensation itself, for something can be predicated of it, while nothing can be predicated of the sensation. Our further knowledge of the phenomenon is a progress at once to 'forms' more free from matter, *i.e.* which we know more about, to more complex 'actualities,' and to 'means' by which it may be connected with a greater number of other phenomena. Each successive conception of it is a 'potentiality' relative to that which further knowledge brings, because it involves a smaller sum of conditions. When the full sum of its conditions is arrived at, we have the phenomenon in its most complete actuality, the *tota essentia* or formal cause of it. But we have also the *μέσον* by which it may be held together in thought with the greatest number of other phenomena, which depend more or less on the same conditions. The sum of the conditions of the phenomenal motion of the sun, for instance, involves the relation of that motion to other celestial appearances. If then the scientific search for the cause of a thing is equivalent to a search for the sum of its conditions, the Aristotelian search for the universal, not as a bare unity, but as an 'all-in-one,' as a middle term, which is the most determinate essence because related to the greatest number of other essences—in which accordingly the greatest extension and greatest comprehension meet—follows the same track.

So far as Aristotle maintains himself at the level of this conception, which it must be confessed he does but fitfully,

he remedies the fault which Bacon noted in the ancient logic far more philosophically than Bacon himself. The fault was that it flew off at once from the senses to the 'axiomata maxime generalia,' instead of ascending to them 'sensim et gradatim,' through the 'media axiomata.' Of this objection, it is to be noticed, in the first place, that it falsely supposes mere sense to give a basis or starting-point for intellectual progress; and, secondly, that the 'axiomata maxime generalia,' to which the ancient philosophy flew off, only most general because most empty, were really those nearest the sense as being first arrived at and least determinate. Bacon was still sufficiently under the dominion of scholasticism to regard thought as that process of abstraction of which the goal is the pure attribute of being, involved in every act of judgment. His objection to the ancient philosophy was that it got to this by a jump instead of 'sensim et gradatim.' If the office of metaphysic, however, is to unflesh the skeleton on which the accretions of our actual knowledge have been gradually gathered, it is its greatest merit to detach that member first on which the rest of the framework is constructed. If the ancient philosophy, therefore, flew off at once from 'sensible things' to pure being, it did that which every true philosophy must do. Its defect was that, regarding this being as a dead element in things instead of as the first 'objectification' in which an active principle of thought becomes conscious of itself, it was unable to conceive a process by which this empty form or mere potentiality is actually determined 'sensim et gradatim' to a complexity adequate to the fulness of the real world. Thus, when Plato, soaring in the higher region of his philosophy, has carried us to the conception of an ultimate idea, the creative source of beauty, truth, and goodness, the beginning and end of all things, we find no realisation of the conception. If we look for an account of a process by which the divine spirit, emptied of its fulness, evermore refills the shell of being, which is itself as beginning, up to the measure of the intelligible universe, which is itself as end, we soon find ourselves cheated of our hope, and 'drop astounded' to the level of logical abstraction, which takes the determinate world as the beginning of its process, and reaches 'pure being' at the end. When, as in its later Alexandrian stage, Platonism became a religion, this defect in its logic appeared as a limitation on the spiritual

life of man. It is not a mere paradox to say that its antagonism to Christianity was the reflex of its metaphysical insufficiency. The philosopher could not accept the idea of a God, who realised himself in the particularities of nature and man's moral life. God, as the *ἰδέα ἰδεῶν*, was not the negation of all particularity, determined by this negative relation, but the indeterminate residuum which remains after abstraction of all that constitutes the world of experience. From this world, therefore, the soul must dream that it detached itself, if it would attain the 'ecstasy' in which alone it could approach him. The same false notion of God's relation to the world, whether conscious or not of its philosophical source, has appeared as Manichæism, asceticism, and under other forms in the religious life of Christendom. In the East it presents itself in the religion of annihilation, Buddhism. It reappears in those of our own day, who, from a metaphysical misapprehension, would efface all definite predicates from the language of religion, and reduce it to a prolonged monotonous sigh; who lift their eyes upward, but they know not whither; who are thrilled with an awe, but are forbidden by their philosophy to say of whom. Like the pilgrim who seeks 'in Golgotha Him dead who lives in heaven,' they fancy the divine to be in the grave of a universal, from which all the life of particularity is withdrawn. They do not see that in the relation of their own self to the world of experience—as distinct from it, yet realised in it, as the unity of the world's manifold—they have the counterpart of God's relation to the world, as determining himself in it, yet unbounded by the determinations, because in their totality they are himself. That the counterpart differs from the original, as that which is in process of development from the eternal completeness which it presupposes, is indeed a ground of rational humility, but not of a forced suspense of reason, in the religious approach of man to God.

For the false dualism, which we have noticed, the Aristotelian formulæ go far to provide a substitute. The world of knowledge is a series of forms, each a potentiality and involved in matter on one side, an actuality and clear of matter on the other. Each again is at once individual and universal, a substance generalised by its attributes. The primary form in the series is the simple conception of being, or the judgment 'something is.' Every act of conscious sense in a man

is the δύναμις relative to this ἐνέργεια, the matter relative to this form. It, on the other hand, is a potentiality or matter relatively to every other object of knowledge. As the thing first known is brought into new relations, it becomes a more determinate form, a more complex actuality, but each such successive judgment is but a gradual qualification of the first. The πρώτη ὕλη of being, the primary subject, is present when the predicate expresses the most complex universe of attributes as much as when it expresses the simplest. It is the thread on which all hang, for it is the expression of the activity of thought which creates them all. It is the expression of it, however, in its lowest 'potency.' As, according to the Hegelian dictum, God without the world would be no God, so the 'pure thought,' of which pure being is the reflex, as thought about nothing is no thought. Like the abstract idea of Plato, it may be a beginning, but it is a beginning from which, as abstract or taken by itself, nothing can originate. It is only because, just as the principle of life is said to be complete in the least particle of the living body, so the thinking self, the divine subject, is present in the primary judgment 'something is,' and from it projects an opposite, 'something else is,' which becomes a determination of the first, that pure being, instead of being dead matter, is a 'principle of motion,' instead of mere substance a creative subject. As the man is said to be the series of his acts, so that the first of these contains all in germ, because an outcome of the will of which the whole series is the realisation, so the simplest form of the intelligible world, taken not in abstraction but as a determination of a subject, is not a beginning merely, but a beginning which is potentially the end. For intercourse with such a self-realising spirit there is no need of 'ecstasy,' for its realisation is the world of our experience, as a series of 'forms without matter,' *i.e.* as known in the totality which is its truth, and though distinct from its realisation, it is so only as a man is distinct from his acts.

In the latter statements, it must be confessed that we are going far beyond our record as expounders of Aristotle. We are so combining his isolated formulæ as to extract a meaning from them which he did not extract himself. It is just from his failure to recognise the identity of the 'being as being,' which is the object of his 'first philosophy,' with

'thought as thought,' that his shortcomings arise. He did not clearly see that being, as the matter or subject (*ὑποκείμενον*) which is involved in all predication, and to which the whole intelligible world is related as attribute, was the indeterminate thinking self, which becomes determinate speculatively in actual knowledge, as it does practically in the moral life. When he speaks of thought (*νοῦς*) as 'potentially all things,' he is really placing it in the same relation to the world which is held by substance or being as the primary matter or ultimate subject. But the identity of the two conceptions is not explicitly noticed by him. His psychology, like his logic, remains to a great extent apart from his metaphysics, and the clearest lights of the one are scarcely ever thrown on the other.

The conception of potentiality and actualisation, as correlative, is the basis of the Aristotelian psychology, which anticipates most that is of permanent value in the philosophy of Locke and Berkeley. In his distinction between the objects appropriate to the several senses (*ἴδια αἰσθητά*), and those given in the intelligent consciousness of all (*κοινὰ αἰσθητά*), he anticipates the secondary and primary qualities of Locke. In maintaining that the 'sensible thing' was simply the sensation as actual, he avoided the error which Berkeley had to correct in Locke. Whatever Berkeley, again, had to say on the necessity of a combination of present with the images of past sensations in order to the apprehension of an outward thing, is anticipated in the Aristotelian theory of imagination (*φαντασία*). Aristotle, however, was quite aware of the distinction between sensation and the intelligent consciousness of a sensation, which Locke practically ignored, and insists that a 'unity' must exist in the soul, apart from the several senses, to combine in things the properties which are given by them in mere detachment, and therefore not as properties of a thing at all. On the nature of this unity he expresses himself very vaguely. He does not speak of it explicitly as giving a 'thing' of which the *κοινὰ αἰσθητά* are the necessary properties, nor does he distinctly call it thought or reason (*νοῦς*). He saw that every act of judgment, because an act of synthesis, implies the presence of thought, but he did not clearly see that a 'synthetical apperception' was involved in the simplest act of intelligent consciousness. Here again his vision was obscured

by a false notion of matter. Thought he held to be properly 'unmixed with matter,' and therefore incapable of affection from without. Sensuous perception, on the other hand, was involved in matter. It implied at once material limits in the object perceived, and an impression on an organ, which, to be capable of impression, must be material. His way out of the difficulty was to speak of thought as of two kinds, 'active' and 'passive,' related to each other as actuality and potentiality. As it exists in us, it is passive; it is immanent in the affections of our several organs, and realised through them. Properly, however, it is active, not receptive of impressions, but exclusive of them, and itself creative. This is an explanation which in itself explains nothing. If thought is essentially impassive, to say that there is such a thing as passive thought is simply a re-statement of the difficulty.

Thought is that which is complete in itself, indivisible, absolutely continuous; its action is unaccountable on any other supposition. Matter is the opposite of this. How, then, can thought be present in the reception of impressions, which imply that both agent and patient are material? Such is the Aristotelian difficulty. Now it is clear that our first consciousness, the beginning of our experience, is not in itself a consciousness of an 'impression.' The impression on a sensitive organ is a mode by which we explain it, and, like every explanation, involves a metaphor; for if the object to be explained were the same as that employed to explain it, there would be no explanation. It is a metaphor taken from an object of which sensation gives no knowledge, for the outward thing, without which there can be no 'impression,' cannot, as Berkeley showed, be apprehended by sense at all. The metaphor of impression by an outward thing is thus a mode under which we know or think of that which, as supposed to precede all knowledge, cannot in itself be known. It is a mode, moreover, which carries with it its own negation, for an outward thing, as merely outward, could not be a qualifying element in our consciousness. It is a matter which, in being known, ceases to be a matter; or, as Aristotle expresses it, 'it is the form without the matter that is in the soul.' When we describe our knowledge, therefore, as dependent on matter, because developed through sensuous impressions, all that we really do is to describe it as begin-

ning with what is actually nothing, as becoming what it is not, in short, as progressive. The difficulty of conceiving the *νοῦς*, as the immaterial, to be affected by matter in our sensuous experience, is simply the difficulty of conceiving that which is complete in itself as in process of development, or, in Aristotelian language, as a *δύναμις* becoming actual. The general idea must be immanent in the 'simple apprehension,' or it could not be got out of it, yet the simple apprehension seems to precede it. In the history of our intellectual life, as we look back upon it, our earlier conceptions are only explicable by later ones; they presuppose them, yet in our conscious experience have preceded them. Thus the 'passive reason,' or reason as developed in us, presupposes an 'active reason' as the condition of its development. Yet no less does the 'active' presuppose the passive, without which it would be force without matter, thought with nothing to think about. The *ἐνέργεια* in abstraction from the *δύναμις* is as unreal as the *δύναμις* in abstraction from the *ἐνέργεια*.

This conception of the ultimate actuality as immanent in every potential stage that precedes it, of the form as in the matter, is as necessary to a theory of animal life as to a theory of reason. Aristotle describes life as the actuality of an organic body, which, *as body*, has life only potentially. Take the body as a collection of separate members, each merely external to the other, and it has no life at all. It is only so far as they are not merely outside each other, but are pervaded by a breath of life, which is not in one to the exclusion of another, that they form a living body at all. So our sensuous impressions, as strictly material or detached from each other, are no potentiality of reason at all. They are only so in virtue of the pervading presence of thought in each; or, in Aristotelian terms, the 'passive thought,' as merely such, is no potentiality of the 'active,' but only so far as it is active in every moment of its passivity.

We are here saying for Aristotle, however, what he did not say for himself. The notion that matter was a fixed and absolute element in things, instead of an imperfection in knowledge, evermore removing itself, as it introduces contradictions into his doctrine of the formal essence, so prevents him from reconciling the opposition between the two aspects of thought. Whether it was himself or an

Alexandrian editor that applied to them the formula of the *ἐνέργεια* and *δύναμις*, it is certain that the application is merely suggested, not carried out. The void between them remains unfilled. His highest utterance on the subject is that 'thought is a form of forms, as sensuous perception is a form of sensible things'; *i.e.* thought is the unity to which all objects of knowledge are relative, as our consciousness of outward things is a unity to which those things are relative. The objects of thought, he proceeds, are involved in 'sensible forms,' *i.e.* in sensible things as known. Such a statement is in itself ambiguous. It may be taken as equivalent either to the 'nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,' or to the 'nihil in sensu quod non prius in intellectu.' Neither maxim by itself would adequately express its meaning. Knowledge in its actuality or completeness is, according to Aristotle, essentially prior to knowledge as potentiality or in the making. As conveyed through the senses, it is of the latter kind; and thus the 'cogitabilia,' though in the sensible things, are prior to them; thus 'nihil in sensu quod non prius in intellectu.' But in the order of our experience, he says, knowledge through the senses comes first; accordingly, 'nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.' Yet this is knowledge only so far as the *νοητόν* is *in* the *αἰσθητόν*. The 'form,' under which alone we can know the simplest thing as distinct from another, is given by the same unifying and distinguishing self, of which the whole series of forms is the realisation. Thus (though this is a result at which Aristotle never clearly arrived himself) the world is not composed of two opposite sets of things, the sensible and intelligible, the material and ideal. There is but one real world, the intelligible, which, however, is an actuality, of which to us sense is the potentiality. The thought, which pervades it, on its potential side is 'passive,' on its actual 'creative.'

It should follow from this that a knowledge of the divine and eternal is not to be attained by turning away from the world of experience, but by understanding it. The 'dualism,' however, from which Aristotle only escapes fitfully in his theory of reason as developed in us, overmasters him more completely in his theory of reason as divine. With him, as with Plato, the divine reason is related to the world as that which is unmoved itself; but a source of motion is related to that which it moves. When they spoke of the motion of the

world, they probably had before them chiefly the motions which are the object of what, with them, was the highest of sciences, astronomy. The conception, however, admits of a far wider application. Through all the compass of its notes, 'till the diapason closes full in man,' the world is essentially in process. It is constantly becoming something which in itself it as yet is not. Now, with Aristotle everything that moves is, as such, a potentiality of that which it is not actually. The moving world, therefore, though in each stage an actuality relatively to the stage that preceded, is for the same reason for ever a potentiality in relation to one which is to follow. The end, or 'final cause' of its motion, is also its source or efficient; for a process of actualisation presupposes a complete actuality, which is at once its beginning and its end. Such an actuality in relation to the moving world is God, a source of motion, but immovable himself. He is the eternal living being, whose life is absolutely continuous, 'in whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning.' As thus complete, he is the absolute good to which 'the whole creation moves.' Such attributes are not to be found in anything material, for all matter must have something outside it which is not itself; nor in the highest forms of human action or production, which all involve a gradual realisation of an end not yet attained. They are only to be found in pure 'contemplation' (*θεωρία*), in that action of thought where it is its own object; and where, accordingly, it has no void to fill, but is self-contained and its own fulness. In those moments of our own experience, when our whole intellectual self, instead of slowly realising itself under painful conditions of sense and matter, seems to be before us at once, we have the faint image of the joy of the divine self-sufficiency.

We have not here in the slightest degree gone beyond Aristotle's own statements. We seem to have before us the Platonic idea of good, with new formulæ for expressing its activity and relation to the world. At first sight these formulæ seem to be greatly in advance of the Platonic, and to present the deity as the fulness of the world instead of its emptiness, as immanent in it, yet distinct from it, as a man from his acts. The divine reason, says Aristotle, moves the world as an object of 'intellectual desire.' Now, as such desire implies a complete reciprocity between the subject and object of it, this properly conveys the idea that God is in the world,

'desiring' his own realisation, and that this desire underlies its process of development. This idea, however, if it once appears, is in no way carried out by Aristotle. Having apparently idealised the world as a series of the 'thoughts of God,' which we may think after him, and of which each is in necessary relation to, and qualified by, all the rest, he cannot sustain himself at this conception, but habitually treats the world as subject to conditions, which have a reality other than as objects of thought, and so cease to form an organic whole, which is the negation of each in particular. Thus limitation in space, instead of being a mode under which things are thought of, and which, when *thought out*, effaces itself, is to him a fixed property of the real world, which of necessity excludes from it the indivisible God. So in a region of more practical importance, the moral action of man, as prompted by an unsatisfied desire, which implies something outside of, and as yet unappropriated by the subject, is, according to Aristotle, exclusive of the divine. Here again the externality effaces itself when thought of. However absolute it may seem to the subject of the desire at the time, we know that an object of desire which a man does not take into himself is no such object; that his character makes it what it is to him, while it on the other hand is an element in the formation of his character. The whole moral life is, in fact, a process in which, though it be sometimes like a stream that seems to run backward, man, as an unrealised self, is constantly fusing the skirts of the alien matter that surrounds him, and fashioning the world of his desires to a universe adequate to himself.

To the individual man, no doubt, the absoluteness of his limitations never wholly vanishes. The dream that it can do so is the frenzy of philosophy, and its practical effect may be seen in the immoral heresies of early Christendom, which were mostly crude attempts to realise in action ideas which for us have only a regulative and anticipatory truth. To us who in virtue of our animal properties are limited stages in the world's process, the process cannot be complete in the stages; the whole can never be fully seen in the part. Yet if we were simply thus limited, we could never raise a question about our limitation. We should be as incapable of error as of true knowledge, of sin as of moral perfection, if we could not place ourselves outside our sensations and dis-

tinguish ourselves from our desires. As it is, there is that in us which is the negation of each of our acts, yet relative to each of them, and making them what they are. In virtue of this presence, and not otherwise, can we conceive of a God who is in the world but not of it; the 'causa immanens' of each stage in its development, yet not interchangeable with any; realising himself in its totality, yet prior to it as that without which it would not be a whole at all. If God cannot be described but by negatives, neither can the self within us; and if we can yet gradually come to know ourself through the acts of which it is the negative, so far may we come to know God through the works which are his, though not himself. If in any true sense man can commune with the spirit within him, in the same he may approach God as one who, according to the highest Christian idea, 'liveth in him.' Man, however, is slow to recognise the divinity that is within himself, in his relation to the world. He will find the spiritual somewhere, but cannot believe that it is the natural rightly understood. What is under his feet and between his hands is too cheap and trivial to be the mask of eternal beauty. But half aware of the blindness of sense which he confesses, he fancies that it shows him the every-day world, from which he must turn away if he would attain true vision. If a prophet tell him to do some great thing, he will obey. He will draw up 'ideal truth' from the deep, or bring it down from heaven, but cannot believe that it is within and around him. Stretching out his hands to an unknown God, he heeds not the God in whom he lives and moves and has his being. He cries for a revelation of him, yet will not be persuaded that his hiding-place is the intelligible world, and that he is incarnate in the Son of Man, who through the communicated strength of thought is lord also of that world.

With Aristotle, as the creative reason is at once before and after the development of the passive reason in us, its beginning and its end, so God is at once the 'prime mover' of the world and the end to which it moves. But as the rigid limits of matter, in which, according to him, every act of 'passive' thought is bound, prevent him from conceiving of the creative thought as present in its development, so his conception of the world of nature and man's affairs as subject to limitations, not transient, but fixed and final, prevents his

thinking of God as immanent in it. God with him, as *χωριστός*, is not merely distinct from the world, but virtually out of relation to it; not the perfect actuality of which the world is the *δύναμις*, but an actuality absolutely *ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. His own conception of substance might have shown him a more excellent way, for substance, as we have seen, is *χωριστός*, as individual and separate from all things else, yet known through relations which are the negative of this mere individuality. This conception, however, he never works out. God with him is a mere 'first cause,' not a 'causa immanens,' and it inevitably follows, if the divine presence is not found in each link of the chain of 'secondary causes,' that it is worth little when found at their ever-receding end. He dwells apart, 'thinking on thought,' contemplating 'necessary matter,' and our world, as 'contingent,' is excluded from his regard.

It is in this unfused antithesis of the 'necessary' and the 'contingent' that the Aristotelian dualism is most conspicuous. Like the 'world of opinion' and the 'world of true knowledge' with Plato, the 'necessary' and the 'contingent' with Aristotle are opposed not as the perfectly and imperfectly known, but as distinct sets of things. In his own language, everything 'that has matter' is contingent. Taking matter in the sense which we have shown may be elicited from Aristotle himself, as the unknown, no statement could be truer. Our conception of that of which the relations are only partially known, must constantly vary with the discovery of new ones. Thus, 'physical necessity' is never absolute, not, however, because it is doubtful whether what happens now—for instance, the phenomenon of sunrise—will continue to happen, but because we can never know exactly what it is that happens now, since it may depend on conditions which cannot be fully ascertained. Mathematical necessity is only more absolute because it makes hypothetical abstraction of certain conditions which are fully known. The straight line, for instance, can be fully known, because it is the abstraction of that property of limitation in space without which there can be no knowledge of things as outward at all. Of every new case with which the geometrician deals the conditions can be fully known, because constructed by himself. Once let the conditions of a physical phenomenon be known with the same completeness, which in the nature

of the case they cannot be by us, and it in like manner becomes necessary with the necessity of thought. That there is a necessary connection in nature, if once it can be discovered, all science supposes. But for such a supposition it would never have opposed the 'propter hoc' to the 'post hoc.' It would still be pursuing the ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων, still endeavouring to show that, because A always has followed the complete phenomenon B, it probably always will, instead of to ascertain by elaborate analysis of B what it is in it with which A is in a single instance connected.

According to Aristotle, however, who regarded matter (except in his better moments) as a fixed property in things, in virtue of which everything has a world outside itself, and may become that which it is not, nature and human life, moral as well as animal, being essentially 'in matter,' are essentially 'contingent.' 'Pure thought,' on the other hand, as self-contained, has nothing outside it. It is its own object, and its object is therefore 'necessary.' If the question is raised, however, *What* such an object is? an answer is from the Aristotelian point of view impossible, for all things that we know, as incomplete, and therefore, according to him, 'contingent matter,' are excluded. He endeavours, indeed, sometimes to find an adequate object in the exact sciences. Now, the exactness of a science, according to his own statement, is in exact proportion to the simplicity of its elements. Arithmetic, he says, is more exact than geometry, because it assumes a single element, the monad, while geometry assumes a double one, 'the monad having position.' Thus the highest thought with Aristotle—the thought of God, and of the philosopher in his moments of divine abstraction—is either thought about nothing, or thought about the barest and emptiest of sciences. We are here again on the track which leads to a 'religion of annihilation.'

This may seem a strange result to follow logically from the doctrine of the 'most practical of philosophers,' and, as we have seen, it is only the result of a dilemma in his philosophy, the way of escape from which he himself indicated, but did not pursue. The development of civil life in Greece prevented it from taking practical effect there as it did in the East, but we may observe its operation in Aristotle's exaltation of the 'contemplative' above the 'practical' life, the

fitting accompaniment of the contemporary political decadence. The ground of this exaltation is, that while in moral action the subject has always something outside itself, to which the action is related as a process of appropriation, in contemplation the subject is self-contained. Its action is consequently continuous, while that of the moral life is ever failing for weariness. Pleasure is the reflex of activity. Thus, while the pleasure which accompanies contemplation is continuous, that of moral action implies a previous and a sequent pain. One is 'for ever panting and for ever young'; the other

> 'Leaves the heart high, sorrowful, and cloy'd,
> The burning forehead, and the parchèd tongue.'

Now, if with Aristotle the object of the philosopher's contemplation were the world as a manifestation of spirit, and thus 'another himself,' there would be truth in this view. It would express that anticipatory assimilation of the world as spiritual which is the privilege of the philosopher, and which he shares with the poet and the saint. As the poet, traversing the world of sense, which he spiritualises by the aid of forms of beauty, finds himself ever at home, yet never in the same place, so the philosopher, while he ascends the courts of the intelligible world, is conscious of a presence which is always his own, yet always fresh, always lightened with the smile of a divine and eternal youth. Everything is new to him, yet nothing strange. The results of art and science, of religion and law, are all to him 'workings of one mind, features of the same face'; yet are the workings and the features infinite. No longer a servant, but a son, he rules as over his own house. In it he moves freely and with that confidence which comes of freedom. Such freedom and confidence, indeed, if divorced, as the Aristotelian doctrine divorced them, from the moral life, become a ridiculous conceit, fit for 'the budge doctors of the Stoic fur,' and are justly met with the reminder that

> 'There was never yet philosopher
> That could endure the toothache patiently,
> However they have writ the style of gods,
> And made a push at chance and sufferance.'

In their proper correlation to the moral life, however, as

giving fruition beforehand of that of which the moral life is the gradual realisation, they have the weakness, indeed, which belongs to all ideas not actualised, to all forms not filled up; yet are they not like faith without works, dead, but like faith as the Christian knows it, a permanent source of unhasting activity.

POPULAR PHILOSOPHY IN ITS RELATION TO LIFE.

In the controversy as to the true character of the Sophists, raised by the publication of Mr. Grote's 'Greece,' much stress was laid upon the distinction that the Sophists were not a sect holding a mischievous system of philosophical doctrine, but a profession. It was found, however, that the distinction did not materially affect the view formed of them by students of Plato and Aristotle, for their profession was to teach rhetoric, and a 'rhetoric that used philosophy as its instrument.' That rhetoric should thus use philosophy implies that the latter has become popular, and popular philosophy, however various its doctrines, has yet by the necessity of its nature a uniformity of type, than which the system of the straitest sect is not more unmistakable. It fixes in coarse lineaments the antithetical ideas, which genuine speculation leaves fluid and elastic, and on the strength of them gives a positive answer, Yes or No, to questions as to the world of thought, which, because asked in terms of sense, true philosophy must either leave unanswered or answer by both Yes and No. It abhors the analysis of knowledge. It takes certain formal conceptions ready-made, without criticism of their origin or validity. These—which, because familiar, are apparently intelligible—it employs to cast a reflex intelligibility on the general world of knowledge. By their aid it can always distinguish and divide, and the matter in which we can make distinctions seems already intelligible and our own. Such philosophy must needs ultimately be both sceptical and destructive: sceptical, because, too much in a hurry to be consistent, it finds its dogmatic 'Yes' contradicted by its equally dogmatic 'No,' and its uncritical distinctions, which seemed at first to convey such delightful clearness, turn out to have merely made darkness visible; destructive, because, while its exis-

tence implies a conscious claim on the part of the human spirit to comprehend that which it obeys, its dichotomous formulæ are inadequate to comprehend the real world of morals, religion, and law.

The parallel between our own age and that of the Sophists has been often drawn. The historian of philosophy, indeed, finds the modern counterpart to the epoch of Protagoras some way further back, in the so-called *Aufklärung* of the last century. The popular philosophy, whose parent was Locke, no doubt asked the same questions that were in debate among the companions of Socrates; it set them in the same glory of rhetoric, concealing a depth which it could not penetrate, that provoked the irony of the Socratic dialogue. Its sceptical and revolutionary result, as represented by Hume, Rousseau, and Priestley, has an aspect familiar to the readers of Plato; and the question, 'How are experience and moral action possible?' which Kant set himself to answer, recalls the more simple, 'What is justice, and how do we come by the idea of it?' which forms the text of 'The Republic.' But modes of philosophy do not really supersede each other 'as Amurath to Amurath succeeds.' Philosophy does but interpret, with full consciousness and in system, the powers already working in the spiritual life of mankind, and as these powers at every stage gather a strength which they never finally lose, so the philosophical expression which they have found in one age, is not lost, however it may be qualified, in the ages that follow. In Greece, as the elements of life were far more simple, so the various forms of philosophy followed each other more rapidly than in modern Christendom. Yet the sophistical mode of thought, having once found a home, was only dislodged with philosophy itself. The doctrine that man, the sensitive man, is the measure of all things, which as being *par excellence* the doctrine that fits philosophy to be an instrument of rhetoric, may be taken as characteristic of the Sophists, survived the criticism of Plato and Aristotle. It was virtually common to all the popular and practical schools so long as Greek philosophy lasted. So in the modern world, the doctrines of the *Aufklärung* are not to be supposed dead and done with, because Kant outgrew them nearly a hundred years ago. From the pulpit and the senate, from the newspaper and the journal of science, from saint and from sage, the disciple of Kant finds them smite him in

the face whichever way he look. Nor can he account for this experience by the complaint that 'our tardy apish nation' has not yet appropriated the highest thought of Europe. In Germany itself the people now venture to assert a philosophy of their own, and it is not the philosophy of the German philosophers, but of the school of Locke. The truth is, that the doctrines of the *Aufklärung* are as much of the essence of the modern world as the principles of the Reformation, or the ideas of 1789. They are as old as the Renaissance, as old as the epoch when the citizens of Christendom, slowly emerging from the painful discipline by which the new civilisation was wrought out of the chaos of the old, first ventured to look with open eyes on their surroundings, and to ask why they should not move freely, and take their pleasure in a world that was very good.

To be free, to understand, to enjoy, is the claim of the modern spirit. It is a claim which is constantly becoming more articulate and conscious of itself. It is constantly being heard from new classes of society, and penetrating more deeply into the circumstances of life. At the same time, it is constantly finding new expression in practical contradictions of thought, which rhetoric, itself the child of the claim, is always at hand to manipulate, to entangle, to inweave into the feelings and interests of men. The result is the diffusion over society of a state of mind analogous to that which we sometimes experience when discussion has carried us a long way from our principles, and we find ourselves maintaining inconsistent propositions, which to us are mere words, yet confuse our views and weaken our hold of the principles from which they seem to follow. The age, we may say, has overtalked itself: yet to prescribe a regimen of silence is but to mock the disease. Definite thought is already speech. That a thought, when spoken, has lost half its power, is as false as the notion that the will, so soon as we act, ceases to be free, because under the incipient control of habit. The power in the one case, like the freedom in the other, except so far as it is expressed, is a mere indefinite possibility. As freedom is freedom to do something only so far as it gains a body and reality from habit, so it is only through speech that the thinking spirit can know what is in itself and in the world. Only through the process of naming and metaphor, from the stage where it is nearest the sense to that where it is most

remote, are phenomena held together, distinguished, and wrought into an intelligible universe. Only, again, as uttered can thought know or act upon itself. Spoken thought is thus the medium through which the individual man at once receives his intellectual being from without, and develops it from within. The greater its fulness, the wider the range of its distinguishing and comprehending energy, the more completely is the world transformed from a brute matter to a rational organism, to which the spirit of man answers as closely and immediately as feeling to the nervous currents.

To the world, so far as it is thus transformed, man no longer stands in the attitude of blind terror at the unknown. But he is not therefore at peace. By names and theory, by distinction and comparison, by substantiating relations and bringing substances into relation, he has penetrated nature, and in penetrating it has sown himself broadcast over it. It is by no avoidable error, as in the effort to escape from himself he may sometimes imagine, that he has infected nature with his theology or metaphysic. Its relation to himself is the condition alike of the impulse to know it and of the possibility of its being known. It is in vain that he seeks to place himself in the attitude of pure receptivity. Without being active, without origination, he cannot judge, and he must needs give an account to himself of his activity. He must theorise upon his judgments, must seek for a science of his sciences, for the unity of principle which must be in that which he knows as it is in himself. He is as metaphysical when he talks of body or matter as when he talks of force, of force as when he talks of mind, of mind as when he talks of God. He goes beyond sense as much when he pronounces that he can only know things individual, or phenomena, as when he claims to know substances and the universal. That which he calls nature, therefore, is traversed by the currents of his intellect, and where intellect has gone sentiment has followed. The outward world, about which he speculates, has become an object of interest to him, inseparable from his interest in himself. If his speculation might run smooth and evenly, he would be at peace. Being, as it is, for ever thwarted and baffled—leading his thoughts along paths which diverge before he is aware of it, and at length seem so far apart that he cannot see the common ground whence they come and to which they converge—it gives him

the privilege of a sorrow, intense in proportion to the range of his intellectual sympathy. He is no longer, like the barbarian, afraid of nature, as of an unknown power, but oppressed by it as by the excess of his own activity. It is a labyrinth in which he has wandered at will till he has lost the clue, and which at the same time is so much his own that in its perplexities he seems at war with himself.

Meanwhile his relations to God, his fellow-men, and his own desires, which at first wrapped him round too closely to be contemplated, became objects of his curiosity. He separates himself from them to reappropriate them by the intellectual consciousness. They, too, become recognised elements in the world of knowledge, which thus gains at once an infinite complexity and an absolute dominion over the happiness of civilised mankind. As a theory of being, or of merely speculative thought, philosophy scarcely touches what we call the popular mind. It has pleasures and pains of its own, but its uncertainties, being the burden of a few, do not diffuse themselves into that general sympathetic atmosphere of scepticism, through which alone it becomes oppressive to peace of mind. It is not until it approaches the moral life that it can become popular, and in consequence can be rhetoricised. This further plunge into the concrete it must inevitably make. The question, 'What is the world that man knows, and how does he know it?' cannot long remain apart from the question, 'What is the world that he has made for himself, and how has he been able to make it?' The interest in the moral world, and the interest in the so-called world of nature, tend more and more to fusion with each other. In the Greek age of sophistry, as it is presented to us by Plato and Aristotle, the unsettlement of practical ideas resulted from the application to 'the good, the beautiful, and the just' of the Democritean theory of nature and our knowledge of it, and it was by a counter theory on the same subjects that Plato sought to achieve the reconstruction of morals and politics. In modern times it is the philosophy of nature and knowledge inherited from Bacon and Locke that appears in the numerous 'Natural Histories of Ethics' with which the world has been beset during the last century and a half; and, conversely, it was a moral interest—the desire to find room for freedom and immortality—that moved Kant to attempt a more profound analysis of knowledge. The moral

philosophy which he set himself to reform is still the popular philosophy. It was not, nor is it, an harmonious system. It is divided by the current opposition between intuition and experience, between the 'moral sense' and the 'principle of utility.' But an element of identity pervades it, implied in its being the popular philosophy. It is the uncritical expression of the claim to be free, to enjoy, and to understand. It is an abstract or result of the various methods, poetic, religious, metaphysical, by which man has sought to account to himself for the world of his experience, as they apply directly to human life. Inconsistent with all the inconsistencies of these methods, which it takes not as criticism would reconstruct but as rhetoric has overlaid them, it brings its contradictions home to the average man at the most vital points, and is the natural parent of the modern 'unsettlement.' It is proposed here to trace the history of its more importunate questions, and to inquire how far a philosophy, not yet, if ever it can become, popular, has already met them.

The ethical theories of popular philosophy, however various, have this in common, that they rest wholly on feeling. Of feeling, as such, they give no account. As in the popular theory of knowledge, no distinction is made between sensation itself and the intellectual judgment of which sensation is the occasion or accompaniment, so in the corresponding theory of morals, feeling is treated as the exhaustive account of all modes of consciousness with which it is associated. Taken thus ready-made, with 'reflection' for its servant, it is the principle of construction in all the doctrines by which English and French philosophers, from Hobbes downwards, have accounted for 'conscience,' the rational will, and the actual fabric of moral custom and law. These systems vary as the import of feeling itself varies, and according to the range of the service which reflection is supposed to do it. With Hobbes, the feeling on which morality rests is the mere animal appetite, the sense of want, with the impulse to appropriate that which will satisfy the want. This appetite, however, has to lose its merely animal character before it will account even for the state of universal warfare in which, according to Hobbes, society begins. '*Homo homini lupus*,' but the wolf eats when he is hungry, and has done with it. The wolfish appetite is not the permanent impulse to get as much as he can for himself, which Hobbes supposes as the source of the wolfish

or primary state of society. Having made this covert introduction of self-consciousness into the primary appetite, and supposing a faculty of calculating means to ends as its instrument, it is not difficult to represent the strife of appetites as ending in a balance, which the calculating faculty of the many perceives to afford the maximum of possible gratification, and fixes in positive law. Nor does it require any great ingenuity to trace in the 'social affections' secondary forms of the selfish appetite, taught by accumulated calculation to anticipate its own satisfaction or apprehend its own loss in the pleasure and pain of others, and disciplined by long habit to do so instinctively.

The origin, then, of the judgment 'I ought,' Hobbes finds simply in the command of a ruler, and the ruling power in the last resort turns out to be the appetite of some one strong enough to enforce its satisfaction, in submission to which the appetites of others gain more than they lose. Appetite, transformed (it is not explained how) into deliberate self-interest, is thus the source at once of the idea of duty, and of the 'moral sentiments,' or the affections which dispose us to realise the idea. This was good hearing for the courtiers of Charles II., and, to judge from Butler's sermons, it appears to have continued the fashionable philosophy during the first part of the eighteenth century. A superficial analysis of composite feeling was clearly to the taste of the age. As if exulting in deliverance from the idea of an absolute divine law, expressed either in the Church, or the Bible, or the conscience, which had haunted the thoughts and troubled the peace of the previous age, men would not only please themselves (as they had always done), but take credit and account to themselves for their pleasure. As the talk of a woman or a child is tedious from the iteration of 'I like' and 'I don't like,' so the literature of that time nauseates with the description of agreeable sensations and reflections, and with easy theories of their production. In particular, fashionable controversy busied itself with the question of the element of self-interest in the social affections. Throughout his sermons, Butler stands in an attitude of defence against 'that scorn which one sees rising upon the faces of people who are said to know the world, when mention is made of a disinterested action.' He meets them, it is to be observed, by treating the actions in question, not as the realisation of an idea of duty from which all merely personal interests are

excluded, but as issuing from an immediate spontaneous affection, which self-love does not generate any more than it generates hunger, but for whose gratification, as a source of happiness, it may and ought to provide. Of self-love itself he gives no consistent account. Sometimes it appears as one affection among others, co-ordinate with benevolence or resentment; sometimes as a reflective desire for one's good as a whole, regulating the other affections (benevolence among them), the harmonious satisfaction of which constitutes the good that it seeks.

Benevolence, in its turn, is treated sometimes as a natural affection, sometimes as a 'principle of virtue.' The relation between its two forms is nowhere intelligibly explained, for an explanation of it supposes a theory of the will, as the condition of moral in distinction from merely natural action, which nowhere appears in Butler. The failure to trace benevolence to its source in the active reason necessarily leads to a difficulty as to its relation to self-love. Generally in Butler we find a co-ordination between love of self and love of one's neighbour, as separate 'principles of our nature,' the proper balance between which constitutes virtue. If, dissatisfied with such dichotomy of the individual man, we ask for an ultimate unity which may account for the two opposite principles, Butler can give us no sufficient answer. Ultimately he abandons the co-ordination, and claims for benevolence by itself the prerogative of being the spring of all virtue. But in so doing he transfers to it without explanation, a supremacy previously assigned to self-love. The essential identity of the two he cannot explain, for he has no formula elastic enough to suit the reality of the rational will, which, in making itself its own object, takes others into itself. No one, indeed, insists more strongly on the unity of constitution of the individual nature. It is necessary to his stoical conception of virtue as the life according to nature. Now, since the moral nature, as a single whole, is the self, to live for the satisfaction of one's nature as a whole must be to live for self. According to this view, then, self-love must be the ultimate, the ruling moral principle, and such, in the sermons on 'Human Nature,' Butler admits it to be. But on this admission, unless the self be regarded as at once individual and universal, according to a conception beyond the reach of his popular logic, it becomes difficult to maintain the 'disinterested'

character of benevolence. As a simple 'propension' no doubt, like every other, it rests in its immediate object as an end, and this object may be the gratification of another. But in order to become a 'principle of virtue,' to hold its proper place in the moral system of man, it must be reflected on. Its satisfaction must be relative to that of the entire man or self. This being so, it becomes 'selfish' or interested, in the ordinary sense, except so far as the self, to which it is relative, is consciously identified with something beyond the mere individual, with a public cause, duty, or the will of God. This identification, however, popular philosophy, clinging to material divisions, and treating the spiritual self as a thing exclusive of other things, will not trouble itself to apprehend, and Butler either had no conception of it himself, or did not attempt to explain it to the men of the world who listened to him in the Rolls Chapel. He never represents self-love as anything more than the reasonable desire for personal happiness; and personal happiness, desired as such, is none the less a selfish or interested motive because the gratification of others is one of its constituents. Thus, in the sermons on the 'Love of Our Neighbour,' to save the credit of such love for disinterestedness, he has to take refuge in the unphilosophical representation of it noticed above, as parallel, not subordinate to self-love, and, in the good man, justly proportioned to it. He lapses, that is, into the raw empiricism of popular philosophy, which explains the moral man as a ready-made compound, not as the many-sided development of a single spiritual principle.

The same want of ultimate analysis confuses his conception of self-love in relation to 'conscience.' Here again we find an unexplained co-ordination of two separate principles, instead of a twofold relation of one and the same. 'Conscience,' indeed, with him is scarcely, as with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, a mere sense. It is an authoritative faculty of judgment. He seems constantly on the verge of identifying it with reason or thought, as that which creates its own object and constitutes the unity of the self-conscious man. But he never actually does so. Human nature, he holds, is an organic system, in which 'the faculty of reflex approbation and disapprobation' has a proper supremacy. Because of this authority, an act which does not accord with conscience is wrong in itself, apart from any consequence in the way of

unhappiness. How this comes to be so, however, he does not -perhaps it should be said that to an audience believing in Locke he could not—explain. He was, in fact, the victim of the current psychology, which, as in regard to knowledge it assigned to thought no other office than that of combining the perceptions of things given complete by sense, so in regard to action, left it merely to balance against each other, and find means to attain, objects of desire given independently of it. On such a theory the 'authority' of conscience, which as a faculty of judgment can be no other than thought, is unaccountable, and therefore unreal. Conscience is not supposed to constitute the man; it is 'a part of our nature,' alongside of another part, called appetite or affection. Why should it claim supremacy over the other part, when, after all, it can only be from this other part that it derives the object with reference to which it judges? What meaning can there be in saying that what is 'against conscience' is wrong in itself, apart from resulting unhappiness, unless conscience as a creative idea gives an object to itself? If it does so,—a conception, for better or worse, beyond the reach of Butler's psychology,—then adaptation to the attainment of this object may render an action right in itself. If, on the other hand, the object of man's action is necessarily given by desires which thought may regulate, but can in no way constitute, then conscience in itself can give no measure of rightness; and that which is merely right in itself as consistent with conscience, not as satisfying desires or causing pleasure, is that which is right with reference to nothing, *i.e.* a nonentity. Thus Butler, when he wants to find some reality corresponding to the right in itself, has to seek it in happiness. He has to represent interest and duty as coinciding, which really means that conscience approves or disapproves with reference to an object given by self-love. This, however, in the absence of any adequate conception of the self as the reason which can 'spread undivided,' and make a universal good its own, is to make conscience the servant of enlightened selfishness. From such a result Butler shrinks, but he only escapes it by keeping conscience and self-love apart, as separate though alike supreme principles of our nature, a separation which in effect makes conscience objectless and unreal, and reduces self-love from the position of the practical reason to that of an animal instinct of self-preservation.

While benevolence, self-love, and conscience thus stand

over against each other, according to Butler's moral psychology, in unexplained relation and unreconciled competition for supremacy, athwart them all comes 'the love of God.' His sermons on this topic are the most interesting part of his writings. It would appear from the accounts of his life that he had some tendency to find in mystical piety an escape from the limitations of a philosophy inadequate to the expression of the spiritual life; and certainly in his sermons his thoughts seem to breathe more freely, and his intellectual pulse to be less sluggish, when he can adopt from the received language of religion ideas for which the philosophy of the time could scarcely afford legitimate place. But the conception which thus inspires him, though it may make his view more adequate to the reality, is a further element of confusion in it. According to his general doctrine, reason and feeling remain asunder as separate parts of our compound nature. The love of our neighbour is treated throughout, even when its end is said to be something so general as the public good, as an 'affection' with the constitution or creation of which reason has nothing to do. The office of reason is merely to consider how the benevolent propension may be best satisfied on the whole. It calculates the means to an end given independently of it. But over and above the virtuous affections, according to Butler, there is an affection for these affections, *as they are thought upon.* The merciful man loves mercy. This must be an affection which reason not only directs but creates, and with which it remains in absolute fusion. Its object, as Butler describes it, is nothing sensible. It is evoked indeed by the contemplation of such goodness as we actually experience among men, but is only satisfied by the idea of the perfect goodness that is in God. It takes us not out of ourselves; it is as much our own as the most vulgar appetite; yet through it 'our will may be lost and resolved up into God's.' Such 'resolution' or 'resignation' of the will is the parent of all high thinking and acting. It carries with it hope and fear and love in their purest spiritual form; it involves all virtue, for it is the recognition of the divine order of the world which it is our privilege to enact.

The above is quite a fair condensation of Butler's language on this high theme. Yet here we find strangely reappearing, in the midst of a moral theory adapted to the psychology

according to Locke, a conception which is none other than that of the beatific vision; of Spinoza's *Amor Intellectualis*; of the Platonic idea of good, the contemplation of which is the final goal of love, and which, once seen, transforms the actions of men to its likeness. How is such an intrusive conception to adjust itself to its surroundings? The love of perfect goodness, or God, if real, can clearly hold no second place in the nature of man. Is it to be added as one more 'superior principle' alongside of the other three to which that title has already been given? or is it one in which the other three are reconciled? We may say, indeed, that the intellectual love for goodness, as such, can be only another form of 'conscience,' as the faculty which approves or disapproves of actions; that in this new form 'conscience' is no longer liable to the dilemma that it either is void of an object with reference to which it may approve and disapprove, or finds one in personal pleasure, for it has the required object in the idea of completeness, which, as reason, it presents to itself, and which, as desire, it seeks to realise in action. We may say, further, that the 'love of goodness' includes at once self-love and the love of our neighbour, which in it become identical with each other; for in its perfection, according to Butler, it means the resolution of the individual will into the divine, which is a will for the good of all men; and when this consummation is attained, since the will is the self, consciously to love and live for God must be consciously to love and live for at once one's-self and humanity. We have but to take one step more to discern that this resolution of the love of self into the love of others or of goodness, is not a result suddenly or exceptionally achieved, but that man, as self-loving, or an object to himself, *i.e.* as rational, ever tends to inform the world which his desires constitute or create with a unity like his own; that thus he becomes the author of custom and law, of families, nations, and states, which make the good of one the good of all, and the interest in which is identical with the interest in one's self. If this be so, the weakness that seemed to attach to conscience in its abstraction, as an inert faculty of judgment, is done away. It need no longer be wailed over, in Butler's language, as that which, 'if only it had strength, as it has authority, would rule the world.' As the self-seeking reason which creates order as its own expression, it has actually constructed the system of the social and moral world, which, though the consciousness of it

in the individual be but as a remote unheeded voice, yet works through him when he seems to be following his own lust and imagination.

In saying this for Butler, however, we are crediting him with a unity of system which is not in him. He was content to leave the moral nature a cross of unreconciled principles. To trace them to a unity, either of source or of result, was impossible to one who presupposed the psychology of Locke, unless on condition of ignoring the true character of their opposition. By reducing the idea of duty, and the love of God and man, to a disguised selfishness, he might have done it, but from this his religion saved him. His value as an ethical writer is due to the same cause which makes his speculation perplexed and self-contradictory. A shallower and narrower view of the moral life would have fitted more neatly into the received theory of knowledge of the soul, which alone he had at command. Popular philosophy was too strong for him. Its division of the soul into reason and feeling as mutually exclusive 'parts,' its doctrine that the reality of spiritual processes may be known by observing what goes on 'within one's own breast,' are incompatible with any just view of the process by which the actual moral world has been created, and which it involves; for it is of the essence of this process that, in a true sense, the whole is in every part of it, and the 'heart' of the individual, though the deposit of its results, belies the source whence they come.

Man reads back into himself, so to speak, the distinctions which have issued from him, and which he finds in language. In this retranslation he changes the fluidity which belongs to them in language, where they represent ever-shifting attitudes of thought and perpetually cross each other, for the fixedness of separate things. He has suffered, and said 'I feel'; has contrived means to escape his suffering, and said 'I think'; but it has been the 'I' that has felt as well as thought, and has thought in its feeling. Otherwise the suffering, itself transitory, could not have been retained as a permanent object of consciousness, and, as such, named. The man, in suffering, has at once distinguished the suffering self from, and held it in relation to, himself; *i.e.* has thought. In other words, the feeling has been that of a subject reflecting on himself, and in no other form can man know it. But

the privilege of self-consciousness brings with it the privilege of self-deception. It is only as fixed by relation to a permanent subject, that passing acts and sufferings are substantiated in language, but as thus substantiated they seem to have a separate reality of their own apart from this relation. Then, when man has reached the further or philosophic stage of reflection on self, when he begins to ask himself what his own nature is, he observes and classifies them as he might things in the outward world, in fancied separation from the self-conscious activity in virtue of which alone they are there to be observed. They are put on one side as 'feelings,' thought or reason on the other, and it is asked what is the function of each according to our inward experience. The feelings are taken as they are given in this experience, which means, since this experience is an intelligent one, that they are taken as already formed by thought, or (in technical language) as already subject to the categories. Thus, as constituents of knowledge, they are assumed either to be copies of, or to be themselves, permanent cognisable things. As sources of moral action ('passions' or 'emotions'), they are taken to be either permanent objects of consciousness, or to be consciously caused by such objects, or to involve the idea of them.[1] Of intelligent experience itself no analysis is made, and hence it is not seen that, thus taken, the feelings are already transformed from the merely natural or animal state, that they already involve reason, and that it is only because they do so that we can have an intelligent experience of them. So much having been unawares assigned to the feelings, and it being assumed that what is done by them is not done by reason, there remains no office for reason but in speculation to combine them, and in action so to adjust them in relation to each other and the natural world, as to secure their being pleasant on the whole; or, as Hume announced in a formula that sticks to one, 'reason is and ought to be only the slave of the passions.'

Hume had the true philosophic instinct of consistency, and the ambition to do for the unsorted principles of the current ethics what Copernicus had done for the intricacies of the Ptolemaic astronomy. In him the doctrines of the popular philosophy are made consistent with themselves, and

[1] One or other of these alternatives it will be found that Hume assumes, in the case alike of the emotions and the direct passions.

thoroughly worked out. For that very reason, probably, his doctrine has never been itself popular, since to make such philosophy consistent with itself is to make it offensive to the 'heart,' to destroy its adaptation to the many sides of practical life, to render it unavailable as rhetoric. His greatest and only systematic work on philosophy, 'The Treatise of Human Nature,' fell, as he tells us, 'dead-born from the press,' and has always been better known in Germany than in England. Yet it is absolutely the last word of the philosophy of Locke. If in any of its doctrines as to knowledge or virtue it has been considerably added to or modified by the subsequent disciples of the same school, this result, however practically desirable, has only been attained at the cost of speculative confusion and inconsistency.

Good and evil, according to Hume, always mean pleasure and pain, either as actually felt or as anticipated. Pleasure and pain, again, are ultimately impressions on the bodily organs, or, in Hume's technical language, impressions of sensation. Of these 'copies are taken by the mind,' called ideas; and as thus copied, the primary impressions of sensation give rise to 'impressions of reflection,' to the 'direct passions' of desire and aversion, hope and fear. These, again, may be copied, or converted into ideas, by memory and imagination, and so cause new impressions of reflection. Meanwhile there is gradually formed the idea of self, which means simply 'that succession of related ideas and impressions of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness.' This causes a further modification of the 'direct passions.' If the object which excites them be one closely related to or forming part of ourselves, there result 'indirect passions'; of pride, if the direct passion be desire or hope; of humility, if the direct passion be aversion or fear. In like manner, 'ideas' of other 'thinking persons' having been copied on the mind, if the object exciting the direct passion be one closely related to some other thinking person, there results the indirect passion of love or hatred. In these indirect passions, however, the direct passions, though qualified, are not lost, but intensified.

These passions, according to Hume, either as simple or as complicated with each other, and having their range indefinitely extended by sympathy and the association of ideas, are the causes of all the actions of men. Reason neither has anything to do with their constitution, nor can it conflict

with them. It gives nothing, originates nothing. As in regard to knowledge it merely has to do with the relation of given 'ideas' to each other, either in the way of agreement and disagreement or of cause and effect, so in regard to action it merely has to calculate the means to a pleasure that is desired or hoped for, and discover the cause of a pain that is disliked or feared. The mere passion can never be either reasonable or unreasonable, and is always the ultimate cause of the action, which, however, may become unreasonable through a mistake in some mediate judgment. The will is merely a passion consciously related to an act.[1] Because a mere passion, it (and through it the act) is determined as necessarily by pain or pleasure as any so-called physical effect by its cause. Since neither in the one case nor the other has the cause any compulsive power in relation to the effect, this necessity in the operation of passion is quite compatible with the 'spontaneity' of which we are conscious.

So much for an account of the way in which we do act. How do we come to speak of a way in which we ought to act, of rights and obligations? The answer is quite consistent. Pain and pleasure are the primary causes of vice and virtue. 'By a primary constitution of nature' certain characters and passions, and certain acts as the expression of character and passion, 'by the very view and contemplation produce a pain, and others, in like manner, excite a pleasure.' It is solely in virtue of this pleasure or pain which character or acts excite 'upon the mere survey,' that they are either virtuous or vicious. The pain and pleasure 'are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence.' The faculty through which they are felt is the moral sense. A further question, however, arises: Are the pain and pleasure under consideration primary, and therefore unaccountable, or can they be accounted for by any uniform property in the acts and passions, the mere survey of which excites them? Hume adopts the latter alternative. It is always the pleasure or pain caused mediately or immediately by the act or passion that makes us feel pleasure or pain in the survey of it; *i.e.* that makes it virtuous or vicious.

[1] The will, with Hume, is 'the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of the body or perception of our mind.' Since, according to him, only a passion can give rise to such new motion, the result is that stated above.

There are many acts, it is true, arising from obedience to laws, which the moral sense approves, and which yet cause no apparent pleasure to any one. These are acts 'artificially virtuous.' The selfishness of man, as Hobbes had said and Hume agreed, made the state of nature unbearable. Thus laws, states, and sovereignties were formed, which, though a limitation on the pleasures of each, secure a maximum of pleasure for all. An act of disobedience to law, therefore, though causing no pain in itself, is disapproved by the moral sense, because known to be in conflict with an institution the maintenance of which is known to be the condition of the greatest pleasure consistent with the limited generosity of men. If the pain resulting from the act of disobedience seem at first too indirect and remote to account for our sense of disapprobation, we must remember the influence of 'sympathy with a general uneasiness,' such uneasiness as is caused by violation of law, and of the artifice of politicians in fostering that and kindred sympathies. No such explanation is needed with regard to acts 'naturally virtuous.' These are acts which cause immediate pleasure to the doer or to others, and, in consequence, excite pleasure on the contemplation. The contemplator of the act, it is to be observed, whose moral sense is gratified by it, is always supposed by Hume, as by his disciple Adam Smith, to be other than the doer of it; the special reference to one's own acts, which other writers had ascribed to conscience, being thus precisely reversed. As, in order that an act may cause satisfaction on the contemplation, the pleasure arising from it must be not exceptional, but general, the contemplator regards not the pleasure which it produces, or is calculated to produce to himself, which may be unlike its effect on others, but that which it produces to the doer or those connected with him, this being one which appears uniform to the spectators of the act, though it may be quite otherwise to the doer himself. In brief, its pleasantness makes an act or character virtuous; not, however, directly, but through the medium of a further pleasure arising on contemplation of the first. In other words, the pleasure which makes an act virtuous must not be one arising from it merely in this case or that, but one generally associated with it in the contemplation of a being who 'looks before and after.'

This system is perfectly neat and easy. It is the necessary result of the Epicurean principle, *ἐν τῷ πάθει ὁ κανών*. But

it raises awkward questions. The virtue of an act or character, according to it, is nothing in the act or character itself, any more than sound or colour, or other 'secondary qualities,' are in things themselves. Their '*esse*' consists in the '*percipi*'; and that not a '*percipi*' by the doer of the act, or the owner of the character, but by others. As Berkeley had previously shown, a mere feeling gives nothing beyond itself. It represents no quality in things, though, on reflection, we may refer it to such a quality as its cause. Thus the mere feeling of satisfaction in the beholder, which constitutes an act virtuous, represents nothing in the act itself. The quality in the act itself that causes the 'moral' feeling, is the pleasure known to result from it to the doer or to others. This pleasure, not the virtuousness of the act—not, that is, the other pleasure which it causes upon the mere survey, and which supposes it to have been previously done—is the actual motive to the doer for doing it. To represent the virtuous act as done because it is so, or 'for virtue's sake,' is either nonsense, as supposing that to be the motive of the act which can only follow it, or else means that the act is done for the sake of the impression it makes on spectators, *i.e.* for reputation's sake.

We must cease then to speak of an idea of duty as a possible motive to or even restraint upon action, if we mean anything more by it than a regard to reputation, and to this only as a source of pleasure. It will not help us out of the difficulty to say, that the fulfilment of duty is itself a pleasure to the good man, and thus, like any other pleasure, an object of desire, and in consequence a motive of action. Something must have induced the man to do his duty, before he could find pleasure in doing it. What was this? Not any idea originated by the reason, for of that the psychology of Locke does not allow, but a desired good or pleasure, which must have been either a simple sensuous impression, or the result of such impression. When the act has been done and been found to give pleasure to others on the contemplation, it may be done again for the sake of the pleasure to himself, which the doer derives from this secondary pleasure, *i.e.* from the satisfaction of his own love of approbation, and this he calls finding pleasure in doing his duty. How then, according to Hume, are we to account for our doing acts unpleasant in themselves 'from a sense of obligation'? Simply thus; such acts are obligatory as being 'artificially virtuous' in the sense

explained above. It is not, however, for their obligatoriness that we do them, but from a sense of interest, more or less distinct, and desire for ultimate pleasure, strengthened by a sympathy with the feeling of society about them, which makes their omission painful.

The virtuous act, then, being never done for the sake of its virtue, which is a quality relative to the contemplator, not to the doer, but always either to obtain a pleasure or avert a pain, whether immediate or remote, the question arises, How is vice possible? The viciousness, according to Hume, of an act, like its virtue, lies not in the '*esse*' but the '*percipi*.' It is vicious, because it gives pain on the contemplation, and the reason why it does so, is that in the doing, or its results, it causes pain or prevents pleasure to the doer or to others. How is such an act possible, on the supposition (necessary to Hume's philosophy) that every act results from the desire for pleasure, or aversion to pain? The only answer can be, that the particular present pleasure is an object of stronger desire than the general and more remote; and that the pleasure desired is always one's own, though through the action of sympathy it may sometimes involve that of others. If, then, the present pleasure happens to be inconsistent with the more general or remote, or one's own with that of other men, a vicious act ensues. If the doer of it asks, 'Why should I not prefer the present pleasure, which I violently desire, to the remote which I scarcely desire at all, and my own pleasure to another's?' the answer must be, 'You inevitably do so prefer it, and the phrase *ought* or *ought not* does not express any relation of the act to you, but its relation to the beholders.' In short, we must get rid of the notion that it is essential to a vicious act to be done in conscious violation of the law within the doer's self, which he is free to obey. A similar purgation must be applied to our notions of the selfish and unselfish. If a selfish act means one done from an idea of one's own general good, then no acts are selfish. If it means one done for the sake of some pleasure accruing from it to one's-self, then all acts are selfish. The distinction between the selfish and unselfish, in fact, only finds its way at all into Hume's system at the cost of marring its unity. Selfishness is treated as the opposite of benevolence, or the desire for the happiness of others, and the latter, he sometimes admits, must be taken as 'an original

principle of our nature,' not to be reduced to the desire for pleasure or aversion from pain. Sympathy, however (another 'principle of our nature' which does duty whenever it is wanted), may be represented as identifying the pleasure of another with one's own, and will thus account for acts, which, as not done for one's own pleasure *merely*, may be called unselfish.

Such results may be unlovely, but they are the logical consequence of a psychology which, separating reason and feeling, regards feeling as the sole originator of action, and reason as its minister. Adam Smith only made them more palatable by disguising them, by introducing more 'original principles of our nature,' such as the sense of propriety, and giving a further loose to the already indefinite range of 'sympathy.' Though Hume's original statement of them, in scientific simplicity, met with little recognition, they were virtually the received doctrines of the educated classes in France and England during the last century. Adapted to the requirements of public spirit, and illogically modified in the adaptation, they have become, under the name 'Utilitarianism,' the permanent practical theory of men of the world. In confused conflict with other principles, more elevated perhaps, but less able to account for themselves, while the appeal is still to the 'heart,' they have been wrought into the rhetoricised philosophy of the press, the pulpit, and the platform, to become the source of much undemonstrative agony at the times when speculation comes home to life.

So far then the claim of the modern spirit to enjoy life *with understanding* results in the conviction 'I always do what pleases me because it pleases me, and it is impossible that I should do otherwise.' Unfortunately this result comes into necessary conflict with its other claim to be free. The burden of moral obligation is got rid of in the philosophy of Hume, but only to be replaced by that of natural necessity. Man does as he pleases, but so does a horse out of harness; the pleasure in each case is, or naturally results from, a natural sensation. He acts spontaneously, as the horse when it races 'from emulation'; not under compulsion, as a horse when it is driven. He has 'ideas,' as well as impressions, he *knows* what will please him, but it is as the ass knows his master's crib. He has a natural sympathy, which makes another's pleasure as his own, but dogs show the same

in the chase. 'Interrogate consciousness' which way you will, according to Hume, make the primary principles as many as you will, they still 'answer mere nature.' Such an answer, however, gives the lie to the very impulse that caused the question to be asked, too strongly to be acquiesced in. Unless man had consciously detached himself from nature, no 'Treatise of Human Nature' could have been written. He would not be trying to account to himself for his own moral life, even by reducing it to a natural one; would not be asking what nature is to him or he to nature, if he were merely the passive receptacle of natural impressions, and not at the same time constructive and free.

There is of course some justification for regarding the knowledge of nature in the received way as simply an analysis of a given material, though the critical philosophy has shown that, inasmuch as nature can only be known under categories supplied by thought, even in this knowledge we are not properly receptive, but constructive. But in seeking to know the moral world, man is dealing with a world which he has made for himself. No one asserts this more strongly than Hume, when he is maintaining the 'artificial' character of the most essential social virtues. Everything that makes human life human, the institutions by which 'Relations dear, and all the charities Of husband, son, and brother first were known'; which create honour and dishonour, loyalty and disloyalty, justice and injustice; which make it possible to die for one's country or be false to it; to sacrifice one's self to a cause or a cause to one's self, to defraud the fatherless and widow or befriend them,—all these the animals know not. They are not primary but derived, not given by nature but constituted by man. We say, indeed, that laws are not made, but grow. This, however, merely means that they are the expression of previously existing relations. These relations themselves are only possible to a being that can consciously make new conditions for itself, and is therefore not properly 'natural.' The 'natural' is determined to motion either from without, or if (as in the case of animals) from within, yet by a principle within which it cannot distinguish from and present to itself. The development of man, on the other hand, necessarily implies that he is determined by a self at once individual and all-capacious, like nothing in nature, and which he can detach from its actual condition to present to himself

as a form for which a new content, a power for which a new realisation, may be won in the future. The moral world, therefore, cannot be truly known by an imaginary analysis of 'natural' feelings and faculties. To know it must mean to re-construct it in thought, *i.e.* to take the bare principle of self-consciousness, which has alike made our feelings what they are, and set us upon knowing them, and follow its gradual realisation in actual morality.

It was not, however, from any explicit discovery of the radical flaw in its method that the natural philosophy of man got into difficulties, but from the action within it of the free self-consciousness which it really expressed, but ostensibly ignored. The great name which represents this action is that of Rousseau. His philosophic nurture was solely that of the school of Locke. Of other philosophy his ignorance was either absolute, or at least the secondary ignorance of antipathy. 'I abhor Spinoza,' he said of himself, and the abhorrence of Spinoza meant an abhorrence of the whole system of thought which absorbs sentiment in reason. But in him the philosophy of feeling became the food of a spirit which dealt with it in a way quite unknown to the healthy men of the world, who discussed the difference between their 'impressions of reflection' with the same calmness as the distinct flavours of the wines of Burgundy and Bordeaux, to which they assimilated them. It was now the heritage of a brooding eremite, subject to no vows of abstinence or obedience, and whose hermitage was the world. This, however, was the legitimate, the necessary fate of a system which, itself the product of a high-wrought self-consciousness, pronounced the self 'a succession of sensations'; and which, while it reasoned upon the world of duties and obligations, derationalised it by making the satisfaction of an appetite or a sentiment its origin and end. Self-consciousness believing itself to be a mode of passion, becomes passionate, and, as such, wilful, exclusive, indecent, defiant of gods and men, 'savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust.' The simple passions, on the other hand, wrought by this self-belying self-consciousness into a system which, if not a harmony, must be a discord, become morbid, contradictory, 'in having still in quest to have.' The man who, in following the mere motion of nature, has asked himself the question, 'Why should I not?' has proved that he is not the child of nature by the

most fatal gift of thinking humanity. Henceforth he is at once self-asserting and self-condemned, insolent and unhappy. If his pleasure is merely that of the most gifted of the animals, his misery is a peculiar and absolutely original privilege. The 'Confessions' of Rousseau are thus not to be regarded merely as the expression of an idiosyncrasy. In virtue of his idiosyncrasy and genius he stood to the philosophy of feeling in the same relation in which the great men of action are said to stand to their several ages. He expressed it in its clearest essence and its fullest force, and, at the same time, to the eye of the historian of philosophy, he wound it up. It has retained, indeed, as we have already said, a permanent hold on popular thought, but, since Rousseau, philosophy proper has left it behind, and is interested in it only as an element in the past, which it has itself absorbed. The 'good, sound, roundabout sense' of Locke has its legitimate child in the sentimentality of Rousseau, and this sentimentality in indecency; but the grave of them all is the recognition of the constructive energy of reason. It was because this recognition, though but in abstract glimpses,[1] had forced itself on the introspective gaze of Rousseau, that he was a heretic among the contemporary *philosophes*, yet contributed directly to the new birth of speculation that was gathering shape in the brain of the remote professor at Königsberg.

On his sentimental and indecent side, Rousseau does not outwardly differ from other French *philosophes*, save that his sentiment is more real and his indecency less gross. But in him,

> 'An apprehension clear, intense,
> Of his mind's work, had made alive
> The things it wrought on; I believe
> Wakening a sort of thought in sense.'

Or rather the thought that is always in sense, as man knows it, had in him attained the utmost intensity of self-consciousness, yet still believing individual sentiment to be its sole source and object, it became monstrous as a drunken god. Instead of recognising in the objective world of art and of religious and moral institutions its sole adequate realisation, it sought to find it in mere personal feelings, where yet its misery proclaimed that its rest was not. Thus it grew loud in its

[1] See, in particular, the first part of the *Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard.*

licence, and glorified itself in grossness. For true art it substituted that which modern newspaper critics call the 'photography of passion,'—not, however, of simple passion, for that, properly speaking, has no features by which to be photographed, but of passion warped and subtilised by a misdirected self-consciousness. In this aberration, it became the fountain of the modern poetry of indecency, which, if denounced by the popular philosophy, can always reply to it with a stone from its own sling. If mere feeling has a value or reality, if, as that philosophy supposes, it is the ultimate spring of our inward life, why should not all its varieties be photographed in their nakedness? *De sensibus non est disputandum.* If that which is to you a stink is to me a savour of delight, why should I not utter my delight before all Israel and the sun, shaking a puny fist at all who would silence me? Custom is against me, but is itself the child of sense and sympathy: my altered sense, winning a new sympathy, may beget another custom. A different philosophy indeed might answer that art has no meaning except as the realisation of an idea of perfection, to which sense only supplies the material; that to represent the passions in naked simplicity is impossible, for as such they are at once dumb themselves and indescribable, nor can the attempt to do so produce anything but the mean or the monstrous; that not in themselves, but only as absorbed in will or thought or spiritualised nature —only either as issuing in heroic act, or as making way in collision with each other and destiny for a peace that is not in them, or as breathed into the life of nature and from it taking beauty and repose—are the passions fit material for art at all; that thus not passion but the 'high reason of his fancies' makes the poet.

Such an answer, however, the philosophy that makes 'reason the slave of passion' cannot give. Nor can it supply any effective defence of established manners against the wilfulness of self-conscious sentiment. Such sentiment finds itself girt about with the results of what its masters have taught it to call 'artifice,' whose domain seems to reach further and further back as reflection extends itself, till the 'natural virtues disappear.' For this artifice it cannot satisfactorily account. The free principle of construction, which is the source of the 'artifice' of morals, is the same as that which, converting simple passion into self-will, comes into

inevitable collision with its own artificial creation. Just because it is a principle of construction it is also one of negation, and from the war in the members which results there is no escape, till from the denial of the authority of an alien law it goes on to deny its own mere individuality, and to find its own expression in the law which it had before resented. To this double denial, however, the philosophy of Rousseau was inadequate. Custom lay upon him with a weight, not 'almost' but altogether 'deep' as the moral life. No sentiment could comprehend it; the reason which underlay it could be 'envisaged' by no definite act of imagination. His antithetical logic did not allow him to conceive that the very individuality which he hugged was unreal, except so far as generalised by the relations to others which custom embodies. But self-consciousness, when it has reached such strength as it had in Rousseau, will tolerate no 'mystery.' That to which its logic is inadequate, that which it cannot rationalise, is alien and a bondage. The coil of custom, therefore, was to be shuffled off, and nature left to herself. The dearest ties of family were to be got rid of as much as the swaddling-bands which restrain the free motion of infancy. Some moral desert was to be found or created, where the pure personality might develop itself in mere abstraction.

Rousseau thus became the father of Jacobinism. The philosophy of feeling which to Hume had been the vindication of absolutism, had by a necessary process recoiled upon itself. Feeling having been pronounced the sole principle of action, had turned out inadequate to account for law and morality. 'Artifice,' itself unaccounted for, had been introduced to account for them, but to it feeling, being really self-consciousness under the limitations of sentiment, could not adjust itself, and proceeded to assert its admitted supremacy by tearing artifice to pieces. Before the trumpet-blast of natural right 'temple and tower went to the ground.' Burke pleaded the ancient rights in vain, though with a power which has made all subsequent conservative writing superfluous and tedious. Notwithstanding his violence and one-sidedness, he had so much of the true philosophic insight that he almost alone among the men of his time caught the intellectual essence of the system which provoked him. He saw that it rested on a metaphysical mistake, on an attempt to abstract the individual from his universal essence, *i.e.* from

the relations embodied in habitudes and institutions which make him what he is; and that thus to unclothe man, if it were possible, would be to animalise him. He saw this without any of the qualifying haze which makes ordinary men 'moderate' except when their private interests are concerned, and let fly at the delusion with a speculative fury which to unspeculative persons at the time, who feared Jacobinism for their estates, seemed almost inspired, but has led persons of the same sort since to pronounce him mad. He did not indeed reflect, as a deeper philosopher might have done, that there is a wisdom in the world wiser than the world itself wots of, and that the wild outburst of wilfulness, which seemed to be tearing up the clothes of humanity, was really powerless to destroy, and was but refashioning the old order into one that reason could more easily recognise as its own. The present generation can see this result, but speculatively seems little the wiser for it. The fabric of European society stands apparently square and strong on a basis of decent actual equity, but no adequate rationale of this equity is generally recognised. The hedonism of Hume has been turned into utilitarianism, the Jacobinism of Rousseau into a gentle liberalism, but neither *ism* could save the 'culture' of England, in the great struggle between wilfulness and social right across the Atlantic, from taking sides with the wilfulness. Whatever might be the case practically, it had not learnt speculatively that freedom means something else than doing what one likes. A philosophy based on feeling was still playing the anarch in its thoughts.

Burke was not a prophet, and died protesting against the inevitable. He saw the rottenness in which the 'metaphysics' of the eighteenth century resulted, but had nothing with which to replace them. The practical reconstruction of moral ideas in England was to come, not directly from a sounder philosophy, but from the deeper views of life which the contemplative poets originated, from the revival of evangelical religion, and from the conception of freedom and right, which Rousseau himself popularised, and which even in his hands had a constructive as well as an anarchical import. These three influences, however superficially unlike, have yet this in common, that they tend to rid the consciousness of its self-imposed individual limitations. The man to whom nature has become human, who has recognised either

a kingdom of God or a power of eternal death within him, who has found in a free state not a mere organisation for satisfying his wants, but an object of interest identical with his interest in himself, such an one has escaped by the true '*solvitur ambulando*' from the hard lines within which sophists would confine him. He has already for himself answered the question whether it is he that is natural, or nature that is unconsciously spiritual; has practically decided that he is not the passive result of outward impressions, but self-determined, and therefore partaker of the divine infinity; has universalised his individual self up to the measure of the universe of man's affairs. But he still needs the theory of his own greatness. If in a theoretic age like ours such a theory is not achieved, the very fulness of moral and artistic life only thickens the speculative chaos.

In England, it was specially Wordsworth who delivered literature from bondage to the philosophy that had naturalised man. This may at first sight seem a paradoxical statement of the relation between one known popularly as the 'poet of nature' and a system which had magnified 'artifice.' It is not so really. It was because the natural philosophy of man, anatomising him into an aggregate of passions served by intelligence, had ignored the principle of construction, regular at once and free, within him, that as it reduced morals to artifice, so it reduced art to a device for producing agreeable sensations. It could as little account for the device as find any law of beauty in its results. For some time, however, it might disguise its incompetence. While the plastic arts alone, or even epic and dramatic poetry, were in question, it might shelter itself under the sonorous absurdity that man is an 'imitative and inventive species,' to whom the artificial copying of sensations has a pleasure of its own. For a criticism of the beautiful, while the fingering of sensations still retained some freshness of interest, the 'I like' and 'I don't like,' under many variations, might still do plausible duty. Even in this region of art, however, the rise of a real artist, who has reflected on his art, of one who, like Reynolds, was conscious of an ideal, 'which eye had not seen nor tongue spoken, which he was always labouring to express, but must die at last without expressing,' made the theory of mere taste and imitation palpably inadequate. The re-awakening of the lyric interest in nature with that intensity of self-reflection

which belonged to Wordsworth, gave it the final quietus. It was a proof not to be gainsaid that nature was something more to man than nature would herself explain. The natural man is the passive man, and it is not to the passive man that nature has herself passion, much less beauty and greatness in her passion, but to the creative.

The creative power in Wordsworth had neither a wide range nor a happy spontaneity. But it was deep and strong, and thoroughly understood its own depth and strength. With the nameless poetic inspiration,

> 'The spirit that like wind doth blow,
> As it listeth, to and fro,'

such understanding might be scarcely consistent; but it supplied an inexhaustible fund of antagonism to the philosophy which wrapped the soul up in a 'sensual fleece' against the universe, and an art which only set it free by artifice. He knew the wealth of his own spirit, giving when it received and receiving when it gave; that it had kindliness to waste on stocks or stones or the vacant air, yet fed itself in passiveness; that through eye and ear it drank the soul of things, yet in doing so came to that which was its own. Thus for him the fusion of the outward and inward was already consciously achieved, and thought released from self-imposed bondage to the metaphor of impression and the abstraction of individuality. It was not 'within his own breast' that he had read what he was, but in the open scroll of the world, of the world, however, as written within and without by a self-conscious and self-determining spirit. To say this of him is, of course, saying no more than that he was a true poet, and poets quite as true might not have effected the practical revolution in thought which he did. That which specially fitted him for this work was the explicitness with which, in contemplative detachment, he recognised the nature of his own power and wrought its creations into definite ideas. A fuller or more rushing inspiration might have been less able to account for itself or appreciate its own philosophic import. As it was, he clearly saw that the philosophy resting on the mere passivity and individuality of man gave no room for his own poetic achievement, and met it with the answer of a *fait accompli*:

'His verse was clear, and came
Announcing from the frozen hearth
Of a cold age, that none might tame
The soul of that diviner flame
It augured to the earth.'

It was not, however, properly an augury, but an interpretation. It led man up to the recognition of his own greatness, as universalised by communion with nature and intercourse with his kind. It was conversant, not with subtleties of the imagination, but with the great, the obvious, the habitual, with the common earth, the universal sky, the waters rolling evermore, the abiding social powers that lift man out of his animal self, and render him 'magnanimous to correspond with heaven'; with these restored to the ancient glory that belongs to them in their intelligible relations, but from which the prone and poring gaze of a false philosophy had during a century of conceit been diverted. Hence the clearness and strength of the new utterance; hence the response more free and full than itself which it elicited from Shelley; hence, too, the value which it still retains in a society that mistakes sophistication for thought.

An evangelical Christian will commonly sum up his objections to philosophy in the statement that the philosopher does not know what sin, or, by consequence, what the righteousness of God, is. There is a sense, no doubt, in which this is true of philosophy in every form. To believe is not the same thing as to account for one's belief, any more than to be an artist or to be moral is the same thing as to give an account of one's art or morality. Thus the practical religious experience, in vibration between its two poles of conscious sin and foretasted righteousness, is distinct from that interpretation of the experience, as not a mere unaccountable feeling of individuals, but a necessary result of the manifestation of the divine spirit in time, which it is the office of philosophy to give. But as the interpretation presupposes the experience, so, unless interpreted, the experience is liable to self-limitation and self-deceit. It is only a false abstraction of one from the other, reducing religion to an emotion and philosophy to a formula, that brings them into antagonism. The high function claimed for philosophy by Plato, Spinoza, or Hegel, seems ridiculous or blasphemous to an ordinary man, because he thinks of it as a mere intellectual exercise of this or that

person's brain, which may be pursued in as complete independence of religion as a geometrical problem. Regard religion in the same way as the experience of this or that individual 'heart,' and it must seem not necessarily to result in any philosophical theory of itself. Regarded, however, in their truth, in that fulness of their tendencies and relations which can be seen only in the history of thought, while religion is found constantly interpreting itself into philosophy through a middle stage of theology, philosophy on its part is seen to be the effort towards self-recognition of that spiritual life of the world, which fulfils itself in many ways but most completely in the Christian religion, and to be thus related to religion as the flower to the leaf.

The formulæ of the self-recognition, however, may be inadequate to the life. They may confine instead of expressing it. Such was the relation of eighteenth-century philosophy—the philosophy *par excellence* in popular apprehension —to the religious life as it had been actually realised by mankind. It was not merely, as theoretical, a different attitude of the spirit from the religious life, as practical; it was incapable of a theory of that life. Its 'moral sense,' however construed, could account for nothing beyond distaste at an observed predominance of unsympathetic over generous passions, or regret for a mistaken calculation of the balance between possible pains and pleasures. Between such distaste or regret, and the consciousness of sin, the chasm is immeasurable. It is of the very essence of this consciousness, as exhibited in the history of religion, to be quite independent of definite acts of vice. It is the consciousness of an infinite vacancy only possible to a being capable of an infinite fulness, and either this must be accounted for, or the whole history of religion from St. Paul downwards erased. Only if we recognise in man a spirit properly infinite, because an object to itself, but which has gradually and with perpetual incompleteness to realise its infinite capacity, does this form of religious experience, of which all other forms are modifications, become explicable. We then understand the spiritual hunger which, trying to satisfy itself with 'works of the law,' with a special and limited righteousness, does but quicken the consciousness of vacancy, till it opens the soul to the anticipatory appropriation of that righteousness of God, which is being gradually enacted in the world. When

in western Christendom the spiritual form of religion began to emerge again from the shell of ecclesiasticism, it naturally resumed to some extent the Pauline vesture. A spiritual religion is of necessity a religion of the individual, and as such it was recognised at the Reformation. With this recognition St. Paul's language regained for a time some of its meaning. But how does the individual interpret himself? As a succession of pains and pleasures gathered into unity, or as the dwelling-place of a spirit that filleth and searcheth all things? On the answer given to this question depends, in an age of reflection, the possibility of reading the New Testament in any of its original significance. Among the countrymen of Luther, the latter interpretation was never wholly lost sight of; but it was otherwise in England. When, in the last part of the seventeenth century, upon the final triumph of individual right, there came the great outburst of personal enjoyment theorising upon itself, the logic of limitation and exclusion silenced the groanings unutterable of the spirit. For a century or more it had its way. When the consciousness of sin, with its corollaries, again took hold on men's minds, it came into inevitable collision with the current philosophy. 'The dislike of men of taste to evangelical religion,' which John Forster wrote a treatise to remove, rested on a deeper ground than any eccentricities in the religion, or any misapprehension of it on the part of men of taste. It had a real connection with the outcry from men of the same sort against the new lyrical poetry. Each arose from the impossibility of adjusting the conception of man as a bundle of tastes, and therefore passive, to the real activity of his spirit.

If man as an artist, and man as himself a hell or heaven, practically contradicts the philosophy that would confine him within the dark chamber of passive sense, not less certainly, though in more familiar ways, does he do so as a citizen. It is the very familiarity of the contradiction in the latter case that makes it possible for it to be ignored. A theory like Hume's, which derives society and social obligation from passions served by artifice, owes its plausibility to the assumption of the passions as already related to a conscious self and other thinking persons. Only as thus related can they issue even in the most primitive social bonds. The assumption escapes notice, because the utmost investigation of 'one's own breast' can never show them to us in any other

character. The relation really presupposes the action of a principle for which sensation, as passive and merely individual, cannot account, but this action, from its very primariness, from its involution in the simplest possible intelligent experience, is ignored, and the formation of civil society, as of personal character, explained as a process of necessity, not rational, but natural. Against such a necessity, however, self-consciousness, when wrought to a certain pitch of intensity, inevitably rebels; and the issue of the rebellion is the recognition of its own work in the system which before oppressed it. Rousseau, as we have seen, represents the rebellion, and in him also the recognition first appears. It was involved in his conception of the state as the result of a *volonté générale*. This will is distinct, as he conceived it, from the *volonté de tous*. It is always rational and for good, however imperfectly actual government and law may express it. It is the *moi commun* from which alone the individual derives the capacity for right, freedom, and duty. As thus in the individual, but not of him, as beyond him in such a way as to be an object of his reverence and love, yet constituting his moral and rational self, it reconciles the three principles—love of self, love of our neighbour, and love of God—which Butler had left asunder. It is a valid principle of construction for that human world of which social relation and self-consciousness are the correlative differentiæ. Its recognition means that the individual man, after detachment from implicit unity with the social organism into an imaginary self-isolation, has again found himself in it with a new consciousness of its origin and authority. It is true that in Rousseau himself, this conception is only 'shot from a pistol.' It would not, any more than Butler's highest ideas, adjust itself to a logic which treated the 'universal' as a fiction of thought. He saw that the *moi commun* was the only possible basis for free society, yet the current logic forbade him to regard any such community as other than a kind of invention. Hence his derided doctrine of the Social Pact. Instead of recognising the *moi commun* as the primary principle, whose operation, however immersed in sense, will alone account for the transformation of animal wants into abiding affections, and thus for the family or any other form of society, he treats it as the result of a contract among 'individual egos,' which yet manifestly presupposes it. Notwithstanding this contradiction,

however, and with all its lack of logical apparatus, Rousseau's conception was a power that would work. The quickened consciousness of national life, whose era dates from the declaration of American Independence, has taken from it a form, and given it a reality. The German revival in the days of the 'Tugendbund' was perhaps the clearest proof we have yet had that the modern spirit is being schooled out of its individual egoism, but that revival has reproduced itself, though in more questionable shapes, in all the countries of Europe. Even the English epicureanism has felt the change. To its formula of the 'greatest happiness,' as the object of the moral life, it has added, 'of the greatest number.' If this be construed (as, to secure consistency, it must be) to mean merely that the individual, in living for his own pleasure, is to take account of the pleasure of others as the condition of his own, it is, of course, no essential modification of the doctrine of Hume. But the modern English utilitarian is generally better than his logic. In defiance of Hume and Bentham, he distinguishes higher and lower pleasures by some other criterion than that of quantity, and takes as the object to which 'expediency' is relative a 'good of others,' which involves his own. He is not practically the worse for failing to perceive that to live for such an object is to live, not for the attainment of any sum of agreeable sensations, but for the realisation of an idea, of which the philosophy that starts from feeling can give no account.

'Not practically the worse,'—but man, above all the modern man, must theorise his practice, and the failure adequately to do so, must cripple the practice itself. Hitherto, except from a school of German philosophers, which did not make itself generally intelligible, no adequate theory has been forthcoming, and hence that peculiar characteristic of our times, the scepticism of the best men. Art, religion, and political life have outgrown the nominalistic logic and the psychology of individual introspection; yet the only recognised formulæ by which the speculative man can account for them to himself, are derived from that logic and psychology. Thus the more fully he has appropriated the results of the spiritual activity of his time, the more he is baffled in his theory, and to him this means weakness, and the misery of weakness. Meanwhile, pure motive and high aspiration are going for nothing, or issuing only in those wild and fruitless outbursts

into action, with which speculative misery sometimes seeks to relieve itself. The prevalence of such a state of mind might be expected at least to excite an interest in a philosophy like that of Hegel, of which it was the professed object to find formulæ adequate to the action of reason as exhibited in nature and human society, in art and religion.

REVIEW OF E. CAIRD: 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.'

At last we have in English a book which will tell anyone, accustomed to philosophical reading and who will read it with attention, what it was that Kant had to say, how he came to say it as he did, and how it has happened that what he said has had such a different significance for different inquirers who have followed him in the same field. For many years past there has been considerable curiosity among us on the subject, but very little to satisfy it. Kant, indeed, is frequently referred to in our philosophical books; in those succinct solutions of the great problems of the universe, which our monthly periodicals supply, his name, at least, generally appears; but the statements about him are seldom based on textual quotation, and if put together would form a puzzling medley of contradictions. Nor is this difficult to account for. To most readers 'The Critique of Pure Reason' is among the most repellent of books. As is well known, it was written in a hurry by a man too much absorbed in a novel inquiry to think of literary effect. Its style is bad, not merely from the constant and often inconsistent use of technical terms, but from the bad structure of the sentences, from its failing to put the emphatic words in the emphatic places. It can, indeed, almost everywhere be ultimately understood, which is more than the present writer would venture to say of Hegel's logic in the form in which it is preserved to us; but on the other hand it is not relieved by those luminous passages of pregnant meaning with which Hegel tempts us along. It must be read continuously and frequently if it is to be read with profit, and even the student who has the patience so to read it will find himself constantly baffled by

seeming contradictions, to which, until the appearance of Professor Caird's book, he might have long sought the key in vain.

The current English conceptions of Kant have had a curious history. The last generation took its notions about him chiefly from Coleridge; and though Coleridge, if he would have taken the necessary trouble, might have expounded him as no one else could, he in fact did little more than convey to his countrymen the grotesquely false impression that Kant had sought to establish the existence of a mysterious intellectual faculty called reason, the organ of truths inaccessible to the understanding, on the strength of which such an ecclesiastical dogma as that of the Trinity might be intelligently accepted. From Sir William Hamilton English 'culture' absorbed Kant's opposition of *a priori* and empirical truth in its most misleading form. It came to be supposed that the essence of Kantism lay in the doctrine that truths respecting number and magnitude, because their contradictories were inconceivable, could not be derived from experience; and this doctrine was met by interminable refutations, all virtually anticipated by Kant's own assertion of the 'empirical reality' of space and time. It is, again, chiefly as transmitted through Hamilton that Kant's antinomies have become familiar to us, and that he has come to be taken as the great authority for a doctrine which sets 'phenomena and noumena' over against each other as two worlds, one knowable, the other unknowable; a doctrine which can appeal for justification, no doubt, to many statements of Kant, but which, as commonly presented to us, is a sort of ossification into a fallacious antithesis of what with him is the vital play of two opposing tendencies of thought, constantly shifting their relations, but unable to arrive at a complete adjustment. The really prolific element in his system, the view of the 'noumenon,' which he calls the ego, as the source of the categories, and thus at once of the order of phenomena and of our knowledge of it, and again as itself constituting an intelligible world of ends freely pursued, is meantime entirely overlooked. It thus becomes possible for Professor Mansel to extract from Kant an 'agnostic' apology for the acceptance of ecclesiastical dogma, on the ground that our necessary ignorance of God, as a noumenon, justifies our belief in miraculous perturbations of phenomena. There may

be an irony in the history of opinion as in other history, and perhaps it is an instance of it that a philosopher whose central conception was that of the necessary ordering of phenomena in relation to a single thinking principle, and who among his formulæ for expressing such order emphatically adopted the 'in mundo non datur saltus' and 'in mundo non datur hiatus,' should be turned to account for the vindication of a position which to him could only mean that the 'noumenon' reveals itself in annulling the order in which it is implied and apart from which it has no reality.

Kant having fared thus hardly in England at the hands of his professed disciples, it was not to be expected that opponents should help to a right appreciation of him. He committed the unpardonable sin of asking what were the conditions under which an intelligent experience is possible, a question which, in being asked, implies that the conditions sought for cannot themselves be the product of a generalisation based on experience. Therefore he is set down as a 'metempiric,' and it is forthwith supposed that he professed to 'evolve intuitions out of his own consciousness,' to be conversant with 'a world beyond experience,' to know things by some inner light independent of experience and observation. It happens also that the term 'transcendental,' in a very precise and restricted sense, constantly appears on his pages, and that he applied it to his own theory. Accordingly he is set down as a 'Transcendentalist,' and all the loose connotation of that term, as it is now dyslogistically employed among us, is thought to be applicable to him. Yet, on the other hand, his constant assertion of the strict correlativity and commensurability of experience and knowledge cannot be kept quite in the background, and his 'agnosticism' seems to fit as well into Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory as into Dr. Mansel's. There naturally results among those inquirers who have not leisure to unravel Kant for themselves, an impression that he must have been an incoherent thinker; on the one hand misled by the seemingly unalterable character of certain beliefs, on which the 'discovery' of hereditary transmission had not yet thrown light, into the assumption that they were independent of experience; on the other, aware of the futility of every effort to arrive at instructive propositions, except through the medium of experience, and thus constrained to admit the restriction of

possible knowledge to the world of phenomena. The nature of the problem with which he dealt, and the unity of his system, are thus alike misapprehended. It is not understood that his doctrine of '*a priori* forms' of experience refers, not to subjective beliefs, but to those relations of phenomena which are necessary to the existence of a knowable objective world, and that no discovery as to the hereditary formation of our habits of memory and expectation, which presupposes those relations, has any bearing upon it. The connection, again, disappears between his assertion of the regulative, and his denial of the constitutive, use of reason; between the sense in which he held 'metaphysics' to be involved in all knowledge, and the sense in which he regarded them as illusive.

To be thus half understood is a worse fate for a philosopher than to be wholly ignored; and all those who, without being Kantists, appreciate the necessity of an assimilation of Kant to any true progress in philosophy, will be grateful to Professor Caird for having made such an assimilation possible to every genuine student. He has done his work with admirable lucidity and completeness, and as it only could be done by one who has passed through Kant to a position beyond, from which the permanent conquests of his philosophy can be distinguished from the residua left in him by the doctrine which he was superseding. The title 'Hegelian' is rather wildly thrown about nowadays, and has naturally fallen into some disrepute. No one who by trial has become aware of the difficulty of mastering, and still more of appreciating, Hegel's system, would be in a hurry either to accept the title for himself or to bestow it on another. We shall not, therefore, describe Professor Caird as an Hegelian, but it is clear that he has very much made Hegel's point of view his own, and it is from this that he undertakes the exposition and examination of Kant. He opens with an Introduction which explains the problem Kant proposed to himself, how it necessarily arose out of the previous history of philosophy, and how this history again is but a further expression of the spirit of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The whole process is treated as leading up to an explicit and reasoned 'conception of that unity of thought with its object' which our author considers to be involved in experience. Such a conception he holds to be throughout implicit in the Chris-

tian consciousness. Its justification and development is the special work of philosophy,—of the critical philosophy *par excellence* only because this brings into clearer relief than its predecessors the question which had been at issue throughout. But while Kant carried this work on by a very long step, he left it incomplete, and, in effect, pronounced it incapable of completion. The reasons for his doing so it is the chief object of the critical, as distinct from the expository, part of Mr. Caird's work to disentangle and discuss.

We are all familiar with the opening question of the 'Critique,' 'How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?' The meaning of this, to quote Mr. Caird, is 'Simply this—How can the individual mind get beyond itself? How can we *know?* I can well understand (Kant seems to argue) how analytic propositions are possible; how the mind, when it has once possessed itself of certain conceptions, can analyse them, or break them up into their parts. But in so doing it is merely dealing with itself; how can it go on to add to its own conception of objects? How can the mind throw a bridge between itself and objective reality? How can it form a new synthesis and bind elements together which are not already given to it in combination, with the assurance that they are so combined in the objective world? We find, as a matter of fact, that it has actually done so, for we are continually making judgments in relation to objects, and in these judgments binding together ideas which by no means imply each other, or can be got by mere analysis from each other. But what is the value of this process? How is what we call experience possible? What validity can be ascribed to our knowledge of objects when, on the very assumption that they *are* objects, the impossibility of knowledge seems to be involved? It is the office of criticism to discover the value of knowledge by scrutinising its genesis. If we can trace the process whereby knowledge is attained, we shall be able to see on what it rests, and thereby to determine its validity, and the limit of its validity—to determine whether it is trustworthy in regard to all the objects it seems to disclose to us, or only in relation to some of these and not to others.'

Such is Kant's new statement of the question; but 'In a sense' (as Mr. Caird continues), 'Kant's problem is simply the oldest of all problems, and the age of criticism begins with philosophy itself. Philosophy, in its very dawn, pre-

supposes a disturbance of the unity of man's life, a division and discord between the individual and his world, a spiritual revolt against custom, tradition, and opinion, and an attempt to test them by a new standard. Philosophy is "nothing if not critical"; it is an analysis of all things with a view to a higher synthesis which shall no longer be instinctive or habitual, but rational. It begins in doubt and wonder, which disturb the peace of ignorance, and its goal is the peace of knowledge. But at first, and in the earlier philosophies, there is an imperfect analysis, and therefore in them there can be only an imperfect synthesis. The difficulty cannot be solved, because it has not been fathomed. The apparent failure of philosophy in spite of real progress is explained, when we observe that the progress is not simply towards better answers to the question asked, but quite as much towards the deepening and enlarging of the question. For until the seeming contradiction has been stretched to the utmost, it cannot be reconciled; until the problem has been stated in its most dangerous form, all solutions of it must be partial and inadequate. They must leave after all an inexplicable surd, like the matter of Aristotle, which simply indicates a place left vacant by the logic of the system. If Kant prepared the way for a better philosophy than that of his predecessors, it was because he took up the problem at a more advanced stage after the failure of the individualism of Locke and Leibnitz, as well as of the universalism of Spinoza. He asked at first sight a harder question, but it turned out to be a question that could be answered.'

On the unavoidableness of the question here spoken of, Mr. Caird afterwards writes as follows: 'As a matter of fact, nature ceases to be a mere external existence for us, when we have discovered its laws. As a matter of fact, God ceases to be a mere blank name for the absolute power and unity that embraces all things, when we receive into our minds the Christian idea of his nature. But still, even after this process, self, the world, and God have the aspect of three elements, which we find together in our minds, but which are connected by no necessary relations, or at least by relations which are felt only and not understood. Hence this immediate and unreflected consciousness in all its forms is still exposed to the shocks of doubt, a doubt that may assail even the reality of its objects. The consciousness of self may be

turned against the consciousness of an external world, or the consciousness of an external world against the consciousness of self, so long as they are not seen to be necessary to each other. Or, again, the finite consciousness may be opposed to the consciousness of the infinite, and either may be used to suppress the other. The Spinozistic Pantheism, that reduces the world and the finite spirit to an illusion, is but the opposite counterpart of the Positivist denial of the possibility of knowing God.'

'So soon as such doubts arise, the empirical method ceases to be sufficient, and philosophy becomes a necessity. For the empirical method must presuppose its objects as given, and given independently of each other. It must take God for granted, if it is not to treat the religious sentiment as an illusion. It must take the external world for granted, else it has no fact before it for science to examine. Philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to draw the lines that connect all these objects in one system of belief, and to show the impossibility of admitting one of them without, in some sense, admitting all. Its aim is to undermine and cut away every standing ground for scepticism, by showing the reciprocal implication of all the principles on which the world as an intelligible world must rest. It must, therefore, distinguish itself from the ordinary opinion or common sense of men by two marks—it must raise into clear consciousness what is latent in common sense, the laws and the principles that underlie our common experience and knowledge; and secondly, it must bring its thoughts together, and discover their mutual relation, instead of passing from the one to the other and forgetting each in turn. For the consciousness that dwells in parts and not in the whole can never estimate the parts properly; or rather, each part is to it for the moment as if it were the whole. Thus the different elements of truth stand each supported by its own isolated weight; they do not support, and it is even well if they are not turned against, each other. But the ultimate test of each truth, a test which at the same time fixes the limit of its validity, lies in the exhibition of its relation to other truths in a system. Thus philosophy is a kind of reasoning in a circle; but this is no argument against it, for it is the circle beyond which nothing lies. The ultimate unity of knowledge must be that in which all the elements of knowledge are reflected into each other,

in which the parts cannot be apprehended except as merging themselves into the whole, and the whole cannot be apprehended except as necessarily differentiating itself into the parts.'

We have quoted these passages by way at once of indicating Professor Caird's point of view and of drawing attention to the great merit of his style, but we have done so under an inward protest, for it is essentially unfair to so well-woven a treatise on so difficult a subject to detach fragments from the whole. The Introduction (of 120 pages) is the only part of the work with which it would be at all proper to deal by the method of extracts. If not intrinsically the most valuable, it is the part which the general reader, if he has any preliminary culture in philosophy, is most certain to enjoy. It will depend on his prepossessions whether he is more attracted or repelled by what is pretty certain to be called the 'theological colouring' which it bears. Believers in dogmatic theology will object to find the 'ancilla' put in place of the mistress. Those, again, who are still unconvinced of there being intelligible questions with which the 'empirical method' is not qualified to deal, will perhaps be less open to conviction when they find the identity of the questions with which theology and philosophy severally deal as plainly avowed as their several modes of dealing with them are distinguished. If we are satisfied, on the other hand, that however heterogeneous philosophy and religion may be—and to confuse them would be almost, though not altogether, as absurd as to confuse philosophy and morality—yet philosophy and theology are related simply as the critical and uncritical methods of dealing with one and the same question, we shall be grateful to Mr. Caird for having kept the thread of identity so constantly in view.

Having stated, as above, the general problem of philosophy and Kant's 'Critical' version of it, Professor Caird devotes the rest of the Introduction to a consideration of Cartesianism and its modification by Spinoza (a subject with which he has lately dealt more at large and most luminously in the new issue of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica'), of the English philosophy which found its last word in Hume, and of the philosophy of Leibnitz, as so many imperfect contributions to the great work of philosophy, understood as we have seen that he understands it. Each had its onesidedness. Spino-

zism resolves all finite existences into the unity of God, instead of explaining their relation to that unity, and, at the same time, is so far false to its own principle of unification that it leaves thought and extension as two attributes of God, standing in no intelligible relation to each other. The 'individualism' of the English school ends in a doctrine which treats all universal relations as fictitious, and the *de facto* sequence of feeling upon feeling as the sole reality. Leibnitz, or at any rate the Wolfian interpretation of Leibnitz, comes to a virtually equivalent result by reducing the unity of the world to 'an external and mechanical composition of unrelated elements.' This onesidedness was to be overcome by a truer conception of the relation between thought and reality, for which the question raised by the 'Critique of Pure Reason' prepared the way. It is impossible, however, by a summary sketch to do justice to Mr. Caird's review of the progress of philosophy from Descartes to Kant, which if it has any faults has only those which arise from its being itself a summary. In attempting to do so we should merely ring the changes on those 'isms—Dualism, Individualism, Monadism—which Mr. Caird only uses as symbols of well-explained modes of thought, but which it is the misfortune of a summary view that it should be necessary to use at all.

It is in Leibnitz and Hume that we first come to close quarters with Kant. On the former Professor Caird rightly bestows special attention, for the doctrines of Leibnitz formed the permanent atmosphere of Kant's mind. His reading of Hume in middle life no doubt helped to determine the mode in which he absorbed and transformed them; but it was upon them, as we find in the 'Critique' no less than in his earlier writings, that his mind constantly worked, and there would be a better case, at any rate, for describing him as a corrected and developed Leibnitz than for putting him in such a relation to anyone else. Leibnitz's doctrine, whatever its actual shortcomings, was essentially prolific. Mr. Caird exhibits its strength and its weakness with remarkable skill, and it is perhaps this part of his work, together with the account of Kant's 'pre-critical period,' during which the digestion of Leibnitz was going on, that the mature student of Kant will find most instructive. Nothing of the kind, so far as we are aware, has hitherto been attempted in English. When we understand what the questions exactly were that a philosopher

put to himself, and how he came to put them as he did, we are more than half-way towards understanding the answer; and, as Mr. Caird shows, it is through Leibnitz especially that we must seek this intelligence in regard to Kant. Leibnitz's wavering distinction between necessary truth, of which the knowledge is regulated by the principle of identity, and truths of fact of which our knowledge—for ever imperfect—is regulated by the principle of sufficient reason, determines the question which Kant asks as to the possibility of extending knowledge by analytical judgments; a question which, answered in the negative, compels him to regard mathematical truths and the formative principles of science as synthetical, and so leads on to the further question as to the nature and origin of the necessity which he still finds in them. As Kant himself points out, his 'synthetical unity of apperception' answers the same question in regard to the nexus of matters of fact which the 'pre-established harmony' was invoked to meet. Leibnitz's doctrine of sense, again, as confused thought—confused in such a way as to make us represent the world as an order of things in space and time—though Kant explicitly rejects it, is, in fact, rather elaborated than superseded by his doctrine of space and time as forms of sensibility under which alone experience is possible, but which prevent what is true of phenomena from being true of things in themselves, and knowledge from reaching the totality which it seeks.

On this connection of Kant with Leibnitz Professor Caird throws much new light; and it is interesting to remark by the way how, as he shows, in the transition from the Leibnitzian doctrine, before reaching the point of view represented by the 'Critique,' Kant halted for a brief interval in the position which most of his English assailants have never left. Having outgrown the Wolfian logic and its confusion of self-consistency with truth, having satisfied himself that no progress in knowledge was to be made by the analysis of given conceptions, he was for a time content to say (as appears from a treatise of the year 1766) that experience of an actual, but intrinsically unintelligible, sequence of phenomena teaches us all that we know, and that the office of metaphysics is only to warn us against the pretence of knowledge otherwise founded. He had not yet approached the further question, how the sequence of phenomena comes to

be transformed into such an experience as renders knowledge possible. It did not take him long, however, to become alive to the necessity of this question,—a necessity which, for better or worse, most of those who undertake his refutation still do not see,—for two years later, in a treatise which Mr. Caird summarises for us, we find him beginning that reconsideration of mathematical knowledge with which the twelve years' gestation of the 'Critique' began.

We have nearly reached our limit of space, and have yet scarcely noticed the main body of Professor Caird's work—his detailed statement and criticism of Kant's final doctrine in regard to the world of knowledge. And, indeed, from the nature of the case it is difficult to say anything to the purpose about it without writing something nearly as long as the original. We find no holes to pick in it; and a statement that it contributes more to an understanding of the central questions of philosophy than any other treatise which this generation of Englishmen has produced would perhaps be ascribed to the partiality of a reviewer with whose views it happens exactly to correspond. On one point, indeed, we anticipate little difference of opinion—viz. the singular felicity of Mr. Caird's statement of the Kantian doctrine. He has wisely followed the plan of keeping this statement quite apart from the criticism which at each stage he applies to it. The reader thus gets the benefit of a simplification at once full, accurate, and unbiassed. Perhaps, indeed, an old student of the 'Critique,' conscious of having struggled long and not always successfully with its obscurities and verbal inconsistencies, might be disposed half-grudgingly to pronounce the simplification too complete. That Mr. Caird throughout extracts the essence of Kant with great precision is, we think, indisputable; but he would probably himself admit that in many cases he might be confronted with passages which would with difficulty be fitted into his interpretation. This, however, is merely to say that his work does not fully serve the purposes of a Kant commentary. If any Englishman 'fated,' as Kant says of himself, 'to be a lover of Metaphysic,' though able to boast few of her favours and indifferent to literary reputation, feels drawn to undertake such a commentary, he will find that there is still enough for him to do.

On the value of Mr. Caird's criticism, though there will

scarcely be a doubt as to the perspicacity and literary skill which it shows, opinions will differ according to the speculative tendencies of the reader. It has the advantage or disadvantage of not being external criticism. It is based on the principles which Kant himself was the first to assert. Its objections are not to his idealism, but to that incomplete development of his idealism which is shown by his partial retention, after all that he had shown of the action of thought in the constitution of experience, of that antithesis between the world of experience and the world of ideas which he inherited from Leibnitz. To this incompleteness is to be ascribed, for instance, what is most readily and reasonably objected to in the 'Aesthetic'—its separation of pure from empirical intuition. This part of Kant's system had been worked out, as Mr. Caird shows, before the inquiry represented by the 'Analytic' was entered upon, and it thus allowed to intuition as such what according to the 'Analytic' could only belong to intuition as determined by understanding. Hence it treats as two kinds of intuition (or, as Mr. Caird uniformly and perhaps wisely renders it, perception), alike given *to* the understanding, what should rather be treated, from the point of view reached in the 'Analytic,' as two stages in that operation of the understanding which is necessary to constitute any intuition or perception whatever. In like manner the exhibition in the 'Dialectic' of the impotency of thought in dealing with such objects as the soul, the Cosmos, and God, turns on the retention of certain absolute antitheses —between things as we know them under relations, and unrelated things in themselves, between the form and matter of thought, between idea and reality—which give way before the application of the principles admitted in the analysis of experience. In his examination of these antitheses, as forming the basis of the 'Dialectic,' Mr. Caird's work is specially interesting and suggestive, and incidentally supplies the reader with what is in effect an account of the transition from Kant to Hegel.

REVIEW OF J. CAIRD: 'INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.'

THE very merit of this book makes it an exceedingly difficult one to review. It represents a thorough assimilation by an eminent Scotch theologian, who is also known as a most powerful preacher and writer, of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Religion.' At the same time, it is quite an original work—original, if not with the very highest kind of originality which appears but once or twice in a century, yet with that which shows itself in the independent interpretation and application of a philosophical system very remote from our ordinary ways of thinking. An Englishman, to whom the language and prolix technicalities of Hegel's own writings—or rather of that ill-organised compilation of notes of lectures in which alone his doctrine is preserved—form a barrier to profitable study, will here find the essence of what he had to say on the most interesting of all subjects faithfully presented by a master of style. Those incidental, pregnant sayings, indeed, which bear the most characteristic stamp of Hegel's genius are, of course, to be found nowhere but in Hegel himself. Except for their absence, however, a student who wished to learn what Hegel had to say about religion would not, we think, lose anything of importance by taking Dr. Caird as his interpreter. At the same time, he would have the advantage of finding the chief current questions in regard to our knowledge of God and the relation between religion and morality treated with much force and freshness from an Hegelian point of view.

But it is the business of a reviewer, before he criticises, to give some notion of the book which he reviews, either by a condensation of its contents, or by collecting the cream of it in the shape of short selected passages. And this cannot be

done with a book like the one before us, of which the argument does not admit of condensation and which is all cream. The space at command can be more usefully occupied in trying to ascertain the ground of a certain unsatisfactoriness which the reviewer, while going a long way with the author, still finds in the doctrine set forth by him, and which is likely to be felt still more strongly by other readers. For this purpose it is in the first place desirable to select a passage which shall represent the author's view; but from a book of 358 pages, in which no words are wasted, it is not easy to do so. Dr. Caird, indeed, in several passages summarises with admirable skill the doctrine which throughout underlies the Hegelian theology, and to a reader already acquainted with it any one of these passages sufficiently represents the whole. On the other hand, the language used in these summaries is necessarily more or less technical, and it will require a perusal of the whole book—perhaps a repeated perusal of it—so to familiarise most readers with the way of thinking which it expresses as to enable them to seize the full meaning of any representative passage. As a condensation of the whole argument, however, is from the nature of the case impossible, the reviewer has no alternative but to quote the fullest statement of its main thesis that he can find, with every apology to the author for presenting so imperfect a view of his case, and with a warning to the reader that here 'a part is' not 'worth more than the whole.'

As such a statement we select the following, where Dr. Caird is explaining the sense in which, after Hegel, he adopts the 'ontological proof' of the existence of God:—'In a former chapter I attempted to point out the self-contradiction ultimately involved in materialistic theories of mind, viz. that in making thought a function of matter they virtually made thought a function of itself. In other words, they make *that* the product of matter which is involved in the very existence of matter, or which is the *prius* of matter and of all other existences. Neither organisation nor anything else can be conceived to have any existence which does not presuppose thought. To constitute the existence of the outward world, or of the lowest term of reality we ascribe to it—say in "atoms," or "molecules," or "centres of force"—you must think them or conceive them as existing for thought; you must needs presuppose a consciousness for which and in which

all objective existence is. To go beyond, or attempt to conceive of an existence which is prior to and outside of thought, "a thing in itself" of which thought is only the mirror, is self-contradictory, inasmuch as that very thing in itself is only conceivable by, exists only for, thought. We must think it before we can ascribe to it even an existence outside of thought.

'But while it is true that the priority of thought, or the ultimate unity of thought and being, is a principle to doubt which is impossible, seeing that, in doubting it, we are tacitly asserting the thing we doubt; yet it must be considered, further, that the unity thus asserted, when we examine what it means, is not the dependence of objective reality on my thoughts or yours, or on the thought of any individual mind. The individual mind which thinks the necessary priority of thought can also think the non-necessity of *its own* thought. There was a time when we were not; and the world and all that is therein we can conceive to be as real though we, and myriads such as we, no longer existed to perceive and know it. All that I think, all objective existence, is relative to thought in this sense—that no object can be conceived as existing except in relation to a thinking subject. But it is not *my* thought in which I am shut up, or which makes or unmakes the world for me; for in thought I have the power of transcending my own individuality and the world of objects opposed to it, and of entering into an idea which unites or embraces both. Nay, the unity of subject and object, of self and the world which is opposed to it, is implied in every act of thought; and though I can distinguish the two, I can no more divide them or conceive of their separate and independent existence than I can think a centre existing without or independently of a circumference. In thinking myself, my own individual consciousness and an outward world of objects, I, at the same time, tacitly think or presuppose a higher, wider, more comprehensive thought or consciousness which embraces and is the unity of both. The real presupposition of all knowledge, or the thought which is the *prius* of all things, is not the individual's consciousness of himself as individual, but a thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all individual selves and their objects, of all thinkers and all objects of thought; or to put it differently, when we are com-

pelled to think of all existences as relative to thought, and of thought as prior to all, among the existences to which it is prior is our own individual self. We can make our individual self, just as much as other things, the object of thought. We can not only think, we can think the individual thinker. We might even say that, strictly speaking, it is not we that think, but the universal reason that thinks in us. In other words, in thinking we rise to a universal point of view, from which our individuality is of no more account than the individuality of any other object. Hence, as thinking beings, we dwell already in a region in which our individual feelings and opinions, as such, have no absolute worth, but that which alone has absolute worth, is a thought which does not pertain to us individually, but is the universal life of all intelligences, or the life of universal absolute intelligence.

'What, then, we have thus reached as the true meaning of the ontological proof is this, that as spiritual beings our whole conscious life is based on a universal self-consciousness, an absolute spiritual life, which is not a mere subjective notion or conception, but which carries with it the proof of its necessary existence or reality.'

Even those of us who are most in agreement with Dr. Caird's view cannot read and ponder this passage without an uneasy sense that it is little likely to carry conviction. Men unbiassed by Positivism or materialism or the current materialistic theology will still suspect that there is some intellectual jugglery about it. Though unable to put their finger on the precise cause of failure, yet, when they come to think again for themselves on the old difficulties as to the relation of God and the world, they will feel that they are none the forwarder for it; that they cannot extract an answer from it to the questions which really beset them. In this respect the particular passage before us is, we think, a fair example of the whole book, and the book itself a faithful representation of the Hegelian theology. Hegel's doctrine has been before the world now for half a century, and though it has affected the current science and philosophy to a degree which those who depreciate it seem curiously to ignore, yet as a doctrine it has not made way. It may be doubted whether it has thoroughly satisfied even those among us who regard it as the last word of philosophy. When we think out the problem left by previous inquirers, we find ourselves led to it

by an intellectual necessity; but on reflection we become aware that we are Hegelian, so to speak, with only a fraction of our thoughts—on the Sundays of 'speculation,' not on the weekdays of 'ordinary thought'; and even if we silence all suspicion as to the truth and value of the 'speculation,' we still feel the need of some such mediation between speculative truth and our judgments concerning matters of fact as will help philosophy to come to an understanding with science, and either to answer those questions of 'Whence' and 'Whither' which the facts of the world suggest to us, or explain why they are inexplicable. The effect upon us, therefore, of such a book as Dr. Caird's, faithful as it is to the philosophy which it follows, and high as is the value of such a presentation of that philosophy to the English reader, is to make us feel the need still more strongly of a reconsideration of certain points in Hegel's doctrine, which are a stumbling-block to the ordinary thinker and force Hegelians themselves to allow a distinction between the exoteric and the esoteric in their spiritual life, against which some of the most weighty of their master's sayings might be invoked.

Perhaps all these points would be brought under review by an inquiry into what Hegel, and Dr. Caird after him, mean by thought as distinct from what we commonly mean, or suppose ourselves to mean, by it, and into the reality of that which is thus designated. It is no doubt the preconceptions as to the nature of thought which we bring with us to the study of Hegel that put the most effectual barrier between his doctrine and our minds. And we suspect, on the other hand, that, however widely his own conception of the nature of thought may have been removed from that inbred in most of his readers, it was yet impossible for him to present the absolute reality of the world to himself as thought, without introducing into his conception of that reality certain determinations which are really inappropriate to it. In the absence of any positive predicates by which the absolute could be defined, certain attributes of thought as we know it, which can in truth be no longer attributes of such thought as could be identified with the absolute, were tacitly allowed to take their place. If thought and reality are to be identified, if the statement that God is thought is to be more than a presumptuous paradox, thought must be other than the discursive activity exhibited in our inferences and analyses, other than a parti

cular mode of consciousness which excludes from itself feeling and will. As little can it be the process of philosophising, though Hegel himself, by what seems to us the one essential aberration of his doctrine, treats this process as a sort of movement of the absolute thought. But when we have said that thought, if it is to hold the place which Hegel gives it, must be something else than we take it to be when we seek to ascertain its nature by 'looking into our own breasts,' we are bound to make it clear how a truer conception of it is to be obtained. Till this is done more explicitly than it has yet been done by the exponents of Hegel, a suspicion will attach to his doctrine among those best students of philosophy whose prime wish is to know throughout exactly where they stand. And the chief fault we should venture to find with Dr. Caird's book is that it does not make up for this shortcoming. As a follower of Hegel he must and does hold that the objective world, in its actual totality, is thought, and that the processes of our intelligence are but reflections of that real thought under the conditions of a limited animal nature. But he does not sustain himself at this point of view. It may be that no one can; but till it is done our idealism, though we may wish it to be 'absolute,' remains merely 'subjective.' Dr. Caird's reader will be asking, from page to page, what, after all, this thought is which seems to be and to do anything and everything. Instead of being duly directed for an answer to an investigation of the objective world, and the source of the relations which determine its content, he is rather put on the track of an introspective inquiry what and how he can or cannot conceive. And he will rightly refuse to believe that an examination of his own abilities or infirmities of conception can help him to understand what God is or what the world is as it is for God.

Thus in the passage quoted the appeal certainly seems to be made merely to thought as a subjective process, and hence its unconvincingness. The ground alleged for holding 'that it is not we that think, but the universal reason that thinks in us' is still our ability 'to make our individual self, just as much as other things, the object of thought'; or, again, it is the fact that 'in thought I have the power of transcending my own individuality and the world of objects opposed to it, and of entering into an idea which unites or embraces both.' Now the reader is sure to look with suspicion on the jump that is

made from what is thus presented to him as his process or power of thinking, though 'it does not pertain to him individually, but is the universal life of all intelligences,' to an 'absolute, spiritual life,' which, as God, must at the same time be or make the reality of the world. It will seem to him that, throughout, an unwarrantable inference is being drawn from the power of conceiving to the reality of that which is conceived. He will charge the author with confusing essentially different propositions: the proposition that a thing is only conceivable by thought—which he will say is an identical one, for by thought we mean the faculty that conceives—with the proposition that the thing only exists for thought; the proposition, again, that no object can be *conceived as existing* except in relation to a thinking subject, with the proposition that it cannot exist except in that relation. He will think that he traces this fallacy through the whole passage. Our power of transcending in thought our own individuality is no proof, he will say, of the reality of a universal intelligence, nor would a universal intelligence, if it existed, be at the same time the reality of things, any more than our own intelligence, from which its existence is inferred, carries with it the reality of the objects about which it thinks.

Now we are far from suggesting that this criticism would be just. Dr. Caird shows elsewhere that he would be very well able to deal with it. But it will inevitably recur, and will prevent the acceptance of that view of the relation between God and the world which he would wish to establish, until it is made more clear that the nature of that thought, which Hegel declares to be the reality of things, is to be ascertained, if at all, from analysis of the objective world, not from reflection on those processes of our intelligence which really presuppose that world. To say that it is the *prius* of things is, after all, only relatively true. It is true as a correction of the assertion that things are the *prius* of thought, but may in turn become as misleading as the assertion of which it is the corrective. What Hegel had to teach was, not that thought is the *prius* of things, but that thought *is* things and things *are* thought. And the only effectual answer to such criticism as we have supposed to be called forth by Dr. Caird's way of putting his case lies in an appeal, not to those processes of the discursive understanding which are what the reader inevitably takes to constitute thought,

but to things. To assume, because all reality requires thought to conceive it, that therefore thought is the condition of its existence, is, indeed, unwarrantable. But it is another matter if, when we come to examine the constituents of that which we account real—the determinations of things—we find that they all imply some synthetic action which we only know as exercised by our own spirit. Is it not true of all of them that they have their being in relations; and what other medium do we know of but a thinking consciousness in and through which the separate can be united in that way which constitutes relation? We believe that these questions cannot be worked out without leading to the conclusion that the real world is essentially a spiritual world, which forms one inter-related whole because related throughout to a single subject. And the same process will help us to understand our own inveterate supposition to the contrary. It will show us that it is due to an abstraction and confusion incidental to a certain stage of our intelligence; an abstraction by which we detach certain relations from the totality of the world, a confusion by which, having designated these relations as 'matter,' we assume an independent entity corresponding to that name and opposed to that spiritual activity on which the relations that constitute matter, like all others, really depend for their existence. But when we have satisfied ourselves that the world in its truth or full reality is spiritual, because on no other supposition is its unity explicable, we may still have to confess that a knowledge of it in its spiritual reality —such a knowledge of it as would be a knowledge of God—is impossible to us. To know God we must be God. The unifying principle of the world is indeed in us; it is our self. But, as in us, it is so conditioned by a particular animal nature that, while it yields that idea of the world as one which regulates all our knowledge, our actual knowledge remains a piecemeal process. We spell out the relations of things one by one; we pass from condition to condition, from effect to effect; but, as one fragment of truth is grasped, another has escaped us, and we never reach that totality of apprehension through which alone we could know the world as it is and God in it. This is the infirmity of our discursive understanding. If in one sense it reveals God, in another it hides him. Language which seems to imply its identification with God, or with the world in its spiritual reality, can lead to nothing but confusion.

From the distance at which most readers will consider our criticism of Dr. Caird, if they consider it at all, the difference between author and reviewer will no doubt appear insignificant. It comes to this, that in his method, though not in his conclusion, we think he has been too much overpowered by Hegel. We suspect that all along Hegel's method has stood in the way of an acceptance of his conclusion, because he, at any rate, seemed to arrive at his conclusion as to the spirituality of the world, not by interrogating the world, but by interrogating his own thoughts. A well-grounded conviction has made men refuse to believe that any dialectic of the discursive intelligence would instruct them in the reality of the world, or that this reality could consist in thought in any sense in which thought can be identified with such an intellectual process. It may not, indeed, have been of the essence of Hegel, but an accident explicable from his philosophical antecedents, that his doctrine was presented in a form which affronted this conviction. That there is one spiritual self-conscious being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression; that we are related to this spiritual being, not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self-consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world; that this participation is the source of morality and religion; this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach. It still remains to be presented in a form which will command some general acceptance among serious and scientific men. Whoever would so present it, though he cannot drink too deep of Hegel, should sit rather looser to the 'dialectical' method than Dr. Caird has done. In saying this the present reviewer is aware that he runs the risk of conveying an impression which he is as far as possible from wishing to convey. He recognises Dr. Caird's book as the most valuable of its kind that has appeared, one which it would be far beyond his own ability to produce. But he thinks that a yet more valuable result may be obtained if Dr. Caird is spared to return upon his work with undiminished power after some ten years of independent study and meditation, and to recast it in a freer form, working to the same end from a beginning more likely to commend itself to the exoteric world, and by a method less liable to misapprehension.

REVIEW OF J. WATSON: 'KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS.'

THIS work may most summarily be described as a sequel, and a very valuable one, to Professor Caird's 'Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant.' It falls into three parts. In one the author examines criticisms hostile to Kant that have appeared since the publication of Professor Caird's book; partly those of Dr. Stirling and Mr. H. Sidgwick, dealing directly and solely with Kant, partly the objections which Mr. Arthur Balfour has brought against the doctrine which he calls Transcendentalism, a doctrine which he constructs, perhaps not unfairly, but by the exercise of a large liberty of interpretation, as much out of statements of Professor Caird about Kant, and out of other recent writings not specially relating to Kant at all, as out of the statements of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' itself. In this connection Professor Watson has occasion to expound afresh, and in his own way, that part of the 'Critique' which relates to the so-called 'principles of pure understanding.' In another part of his work, he examines the systems of Mr. H. Spencer and the late Mr. Lewes on those points where they may seem to come into competition with critical idealism. Finally, he offers his own suggestions, which are very much in the spirit of Professor Caird, as to the sources of incoherence and incompleteness in Kant's theory.

The present reviewer is probably too much in agreement with Professor Watson on the subjects dealt with in the book to be a very competent reviewer of it. Less sympathising critics, however, are likely to agree that it is written with clearness and precision; that the author is thoroughly impregnated with the doctrine which he expounds, and makes it as plain as it can be made without becoming other than it

is; that he often puts the points at issue between the different critics of Kant, as well as between those who may fairly be called Neo-Kantians and their opponents, with much force and felicity; and that anyone interested in the controversies to which it relates will be likely to have a better understanding of their essential bearing for having read it. The points touched are always vital points, and what is said of them is always to the purpose. Nor, on the whole, does the tone and temper of Professor Watson's polemic afford any ground for objection. It would be well if it were possible—but it scarcely is possible—for a critic of a great philosopher, in replying to another critic whom he thinks wrong, to avoid the apparent assumption of superiority implied in telling his opponent that he has failed to understand or appreciate, or has missed the point of, the author in question. Professor Watson keeps much more free from such language than most controversialists, but perhaps not free enough to avoid causing some irritation to the writers from whom he differs. It is the inevitableness of this irritation as an incident of controversial writing—an irritation not likely to render those who experience it more open to conviction—that suggests a doubt whether in any case the cause of philosophic truth is likely to be served by the method of answer and rejoinder. The independent statement of opinion without apparent reference to other contemporary opinion from which it differs, though it may give rise to some confusion of issues, is perhaps more likely to lead to a profitable result. In regard to Kant, at any rate, when once the controversial interpretation of his doctrine has begun, it is impossible to see where the debate is to close. Expositions of his meaning as far apart as those of Dr. Stirling and Professor Watson can alike find textual justification. It comes to be a question of the extent and direction in which we are to 'develop his meaning'; whether we are to understand him according to the letter of statements which he undoubtedly makes, but which we may be inclined to regard as survivals of a way of thinking which it was the true result of his philosophy to set aside, or according to what may seem to us the spirit of his more pregnant passages. This is not said, of course, in depreciation of the study of Kant, in whom no one can quarry for himself too deeply, but in doubt as to the profit to be derived from those disputes over the interpretation of him

which have been so rife in Germany, and of late have been passing into England. It is a great gain when such a writer as Professor Caird sets forth the theory which he has extracted for himself from Kant; it is a gain when anyone else extracts ore of intrinsic value from the same mine. But it would be a considerable drawback if the energy and temper of philosophical writers came to be wasted in discussing the meaning of a great master who, overcharged with new thoughts which he took little pains in stating, and for which the current language of philosophy did not afford a statement ready-made, by no means always stated them consistently.

So far as Professor Watson's controversy is with Mr. Balfour, it does not relate very closely to the interpretation of Kant. This is not said at all disrespectfully to Mr. Balfour. It is, perhaps, rather an advantage that his concern is not so much with the exact comprehension of Kant's doctrine as with the extraction from him, or from those who have lately appeared in England as his exponents, of answers to questions which Mr. Balfour rightly thinks require to be answered in order to the establishment of a philosophical 'creed,' a doctrine as to the truth of things. It is a real service to those whom Mr. Balfour unkindly, though not with intentional unkindness, calls 'Transcendentalists,' to force them to consider whether and how they can answer these questions, whatever their exact relation to Kant. Professor Watson's book, whether it be thought a sufficient answer to them or no, is at least a tribute to the cogency with which they have been put.

The first of these questions (the one dealt with by Professor Watson in his first chapter) relates to the assumption which Mr. Balfour supposes Kant, or the 'Neo-Kantians,' to make, that some part, at any rate, of what claims to be existing knowledge is really so. According to him ('Defence of Philosophic Doubt,' pp. 90, 91), the transcendentalist first 'postulates . . . that he gets some knowledge, small or great, by experience,' and then proceeds to argue: 'Whatever fact or principle I can show to be involved in that experience—whatever I can prove must be, if that experience is to be—of that you must, in common consistency, grant the reality.' A principle so proved is said to be 'transcendentally deduced,' and it is the validity of that deduction in the

cases of causation and the existence of a persistent world that Mr. Balfour more particularly calls in question. The transcendental philosophy, he thinks, fails 'to show that the trustworthiness of these far-reaching scientific postulates is involved in those simple experiences which everybody must allow to be valid'; the failure being proved chiefly by an appeal to the fact that ordinary persons have the experience without even being conscious of these principles. Failing in this, 'it may still show by its searching analysis all that is implied in the existence of nature, as we ordinarily understand nature, and of the sciences of nature, as we are taught to accept them; but it cannot show either that such a nature exists, or that our accounts of it are accurate; it cannot, in other words, supply us with a philosophy adequate to our necessities.'

Anyone who has assimilated Kant can anticipate the direction which Professor Watson's answer to such objections must take. It will consist in pointing out that they disappear with an acceptance of the first principle of the Critical Philosophy, a principle which Mr. Balfour may have good reason for rejecting, but which in his book he seems rather to ignore. Just because, however, it is so alien to him and to most of his readers, it is to be expected that Professor Watson's answer, which turns upon its re-assertion, will have little effect. Mr. Balfour writes as a sceptic —though apparently with the ulterior view of making room for a religion on the nature of which, in such a connection, he does not care to dwell—but, as Professor Watson puts it, he 'has not carried his scepticism so far as to doubt the correctness of the ordinary dualism of intelligence and nature.' If, as Kant held, 'understanding makes nature,' (nature in the sense of a single objective order of phenomena, as distinct from 'things in themselves'), to ascertain the forms under which alone an order of nature can be understood is to ascertain laws of nature itself. The question whether 'such a nature exists'—such a nature as the only one that can be an object of knowledge or understanding must be—becomes unmeaning. We may inquire, indeed, whether any given analysis of the forms or relations under which alone an order of nature can be known (Kant's own, for instance) is correct and sufficient; or, again, whether 'our accounts of nature are accurate' in the sense of whether

particular phenomena are really connected in the way in which they have hitherto been reported to be connected by the representatives of particular sciences. But supposing the relations under which alone nature can be known, or events connected in an objective order of experience, to have been correctly ascertained, there can be no further question whether nature really exists under these relations. If we insist, indeed, on some of Kant's statements, we may suppose him to have held that there were 'things in themselves' which might produce different phenomena from those hitherto or now produced; but the question is not of sensations as produced by 'things in themselves,' but of their connection in a knowable order of nature. Kant's problem is to ascertain exhaustively the functions of understanding, which are necessarily exercised in so connecting them. If he has done so—if he has, in this sense, answered the question: How is knowledge possible?—there can, from his point of view, be no further question whether 'such a nature exists' as that which is thus known. The functions of understanding through which nature is known are the functions through which, as a nature, it exists. Nor is it to the purpose to argue that no intellectual function can be necessary to experience, which 'many intelligent beings, and the transcendentalist himself during the earlier part of his life' (to quote Mr. Balfour), are unaware of exercising. If it were a question of particular facts experienced, it would no doubt be absurd to speak of anything as necessarily involved in experience which many persons are not conscious of experiencing. But the question is how there comes to be for us that one connected order of facts which we call the world of experience; and there is no absurdity in holding that certain synthetical functions of understanding must be exercised in order to the presentation of such a world, which the individual only becomes aware of after long analytical reflection.

We have given this part of Professor Watson's argument in words which are not his, from finding a difficulty in doing justice to it either by abridgment or by quotation. In order to make the way clear for a reply to Mr. Balfour's criticism of Kant's doctrine as to substance and causality, he proceeds to draw out in his own words, and in an abridged form, but with close reference to the original text, the connection between the theories of 'pure intuition,' 'pure conception,' and

'pure judgment,' and then 'the proofs' of the principles of judgment. This part of his work is much to be commended to Kantian students. In the process he has occasion to notice the points on which he is at issue with Dr. Stirling. These are chiefly questions of interpretation, on which, from the inconsistencies of Kant's language, there can be no final decision. The meaning which Professor Watson extracts is doubtless the better meaning; but as a matter of simple 'Kant philology' it does not follow that the better meaning is to be adopted. If, with Dr. Stirling, we take Kant's doctrine to be that sense first gives us a knowledge of particular facts, while understanding, with its categories, comes after, and makes this special knowledge universal and necessary, we can certainly find passages to justify the interpretation. It is the one which probably most readers of ordinary intelligence carry away from the 'Critique,' and which has led them to think it a piece of wasted labour from beginning to end. They can get along well enough, they think, with knowledge of a high degree of generality and probability; and, unless something more is sought, the whole transcendental apparatus seems, by its own showing, to be superfluous. It is difficult, indeed, to believe that Kant can have had any other view in his mind than that which Dr. Stirling ascribes to him when he wrote his account of the distinction between the 'Wahrnehmungs-Urtheil' and the 'Erfahrungs-Urtheil' in the 'Prolegomena' (§§ 18 and ff.). But on the other side we may set such passages as the following from the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (p. 134, ed. Hartenstein): 'As all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on the categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness—*i.e.* all phenomena of nature—must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the categories.' As Professor Caird has said, 'no possible interpretation can make of Kant a self-consistent writer'; but, as he well adds, 'it is the business of a critic to point out how Kant separates himself from his predecessors and prepares for his successors; and, while recognising his inconsistencies, to note clearly the direction in which he was tending' ('Journal of Speculative Philosophy,' xiv. 126).

Interpreting him on this principle, Professor Watson will

not admit him to have meant that we first perceive facts without exercise of understanding or application of the categories, and then through that application come to know the facts as constituents of a necessary system. The 'Critique,' in Professor Watson's words, 'is not a phenomenology, but a metaphysic, . . . an analysis of the logical constituents of our actual knowledge, not an account of the temporal stages by which the individual and the race advance to knowledge of the highest kind. . . . When he is leading up to his own theory, and simply stating the facts he has to explain, or when he is criticising the dogmatic theory of his predecessors, Kant naturally speaks as if sense immediately reveals to us special objects or events. From the philosophical point of view, however, sense he conceives of as the faculty which supplies to us the isolated differences which thought puts together and unites into individual objects or connections of objects. The "manifold of sense" is, therefore, simply that element in knowledge which supplies the particular differences of known objects, and these differences, of course, vary with the special aspect of the known world which at the time is sought to be explained. In the axioms of perception, for example, in which Kant is seeking to show that individual objects in space and time are necessarily extensive *quanta*, the special fact of knowledge to be explained is the apprehension of objects as made up of parts forming individual aggregates. These parts Kant regards as directly perceived or contemplated. The "manifold" may be the parts of a line, the parts of any geometrical figure, or even particular figures regarded as constituents of more complex perceptions; or, again, it may be the parts of individual objects in space. But in all these cases the particulars, as due to sense, are, when taken by themselves, mere abstractions; they are, in fact, not even known *as* particulars apart from the synthetic activity of imagination as guided by the category of quantity. To have a knowledge of the parts of a line, or the parts of a house, as parts, is to know at the same time the combination of those parts. But the combination of those parts takes place for us only through the act by which we successively determine space to particular parts, and in that determination combine them. Thus, in the knowledge of the line, there are implied both the particular element of sense and the universal element of thought. We

do not *first* perceive the line, and *then* apply the category, but *in* perceiving the line we apply the category. And as in all recognition of objects in space we necessarily determine the particulars of sense through the schema, as silently guided by the category, we may express this condition of our knowledge in the proposition, "All percepts are extensive *quanta*." This proposition, therefore, rests upon a discrimination of the elements which we are compelled to distinguish in explaining how we know any individual object to be a unity of parts; it is not a proposition which we acquire by reflection *before* we know objects to be extensive *quanta*. Observing that all external objects which we can possibly know must be in space, and having seen space to be a necessary form of thought, we can say axiomatically that every percept is an extensive *quantum*; but this proposition is not one which *precedes* the knowledge of objects as *quanta*, but one which is required to explain the fact of such knowledge. . . . Its necessity is implied in our actual knowledge, and philosophical reflection merely shows it to be there' (pp. 155–59).

We have previously noticed the main point in Professor Watson's controversy with Mr. Balfour. The latter having objected to the critical philosophy that, however successful in its analysis of what is implied in the existence of nature, as we ordinarily understand nature, it fails to show that such a nature exists, Professor Watson replies in effect by an appeal to the Kantian principle that 'understanding makes nature.' To anyone who accepts this principle, 'the dualism of nature and intelligence,' on which the objection in question turns, has disappeared. Perhaps most readers may be as little disposed to accept the principle after reading Professor Watson as before; but he may at any rate convince us that an attempt to deal with Kant which virtually ignores it is not to the purpose. In like manner to anyone who understands Kant in the sense in which Professor Watson understands him, Mr. Balfour's remarks on the principles of substance and causality, however acute in themselves, must seem to be quite inappropriate to Kant. Combining what Kant says in proof of the 'principle of the permanence of substance' with the much-fought-over 'refutation of Idealism,' Mr. Balfour understands Kant to assert the permanence of substance in a sense equivalent to the permanence of matter. Arguing pro-

visionally, as a sceptic in philosophy, on behalf of the 'Idealistic' view that there is in nature nothing but a succession of conscious states, he objects equally to the doctrine of the permanence of substance and to the supposed identification of substance with matter.

'Though change may have no meaning out of relation to that which is "not-change," this "not-change" by no means implies permanent substance. On the contrary, the smallest recognisable persistence *through* time would seem enough to make change *in* time intelligible by contrast' ('Defence of Philosophic Doubt,' p. 113). Thus, apparently, Mr. Balfour holds that, while no change is possible except on the part of some object that persists throughout the change, the various objects so changing need not be connected in one world, but may be absolutely detached from one another. On any other supposition the one world would clearly be related to all the changes of the several objects in the same way in which Mr. Balfour conceives each of these to be related to its changes, as the substance permanent throughout all of them. But such a supposition of the disconnectedness of objects is, from the Kantian point of view, incompatible with their being objects at all. The same 'unity of apperception,' through which alone any 'manifold of sense' is presented as a single object, necessarily connects all objects in a single world or nature persistent throughout all changes. To a Kantist, therefore, the question of the permanence of substance must seem to be settled against the possibility of there being in nature nothing but a succession of states, conscious or other, by the first principle of his master's view of nature. Mr. Balfour's polemic should be directed against that first principle, which he scarcely seems to notice, if it is to be more than a criticism of a terminology which, as he happily expresses it, 'has the peculiarity of being technical without being precise.' As it is, it seems to come too late. The inevitable Kantian answer is that which Professor Watson puts as follows:—'As there are no things except those which are constituted by the activity of thought in relation to the impressions of sense, *all* change must be equally a relation of a manifold of sense in time to thought; and hence no change whatever can take place apart from relation to the one time in which all impressions occur. On any other supposition our knowledge would have no continuity, but would be broken up

ıto fragments. The very same reasoning, therefore, by hich the knowledge of something as persisting through a mited time is explained also establishes the knowledge of ›mething absolutely permanent—*i.e.* existing through all me' (p. 203).

This article would run beyond reasonable limits if we ›ught to follow Professor Watson in his explanation of those ıtements of Kant which have seemed to Mr. Balfour to mount to an identification of the permanent substance with ıatter, and to imply that it was an object of perception or henomenal thing. No one can blame Mr. Balfour for not aving spent more pains on the disentanglement of language oubtless more technical than precise; but Mr. Watson has › show that he has not spent enough. He has not duly disnguished between the *ego* as the source of the category of ıbstance and the category itself; or, again, between category, schematised category, and intuition. For the student f Kant, however, these distinctions are of great interest; ıd this part of Mr. Watson's seventh chapter, especially if ›ad in connection with the account of the 'schemata' in ıap. iii., will be found to throw much light on one of the ırkest parts of the 'Critique.' Perhaps, however, it is more ıstructive for such a student than effective in answering the uestions which Mr. Balfour wants to have answered. The ıpposition that, according to Kant, 'the permanent' is an bject of perception is, indeed, very directly met by the statelent (duly justified) that, while 'the permanent is implied in ıe fact that we have perception, it is not itself a per-›ption. . . . Substance can only be said to be an object beıuse it is the universal condition of there being an object for s' (p. 214). But the question of the relation between subıance and matter, according to Kant; how it is that, hile it would be untrue to his mind to identify substance nd matter, it would yet be true to say that there were material ubstances, and, indeed, that the only substances which ould be spoken of in the plural were material; this quesion is not dealt with by Professor Watson quite so explicitly s might be wished. The materials for an answer are all ıere, but the reader does not easily find the answer itself. Cantists themselves may be content with the distinction etween the 'conception' of permanent substance and the intuition' of something corresponding to it, which, as it

clearly cannot be of successive ideas in time, must be of the mutually external parts of space—*i.e.* of matter. But such an answer will scarcely come home to those for whom Mr. Balfour writes, unless translated into something less technical and more direct than we find in this part of Mr. Watson's book. The further question remains whether the 'Refutation of idealism,' of which, as taken by itself, Professor Watson's explanation seems convincing enough, will quite bear that explanation if it has to be forced into consistency (which we are inclined to think needless) with the passage on idealism from the 'Prolegomena' (§ xiii., remark 2). Professor Watson, with much ingenuity, endeavours to read the two passages together, taking the point of that from the 'Prolegomena,' as much as the point of that from the second edition of the 'Critique,' to lie merely in the assertion of the externality of objects as distinguished from the sequence of our impressions through their determination by the form of space, but as none the less existing for us only in consciousness. Thus interpreted, neither passage is inconsistent with any idealism but such as would reduce external objects to transient feelings or subjective states. But while this is the natural interpretation of the 'Refutation of idealism' in the 'Critique,' it is certainly not the natural interpretation of the passage from the 'Prolegomena.' We can hardly doubt that, when Kant wrote the latter, the externality of objects which he was asserting against the idealists meant for him not merely or chiefly their determination by the form of space, but their relation to 'things in themselves' affecting our sensibility. On this point, Mr. H. Sidgwick seems unanswerable. But is there any great difficulty in supposing that the ghost of 'things in themselves,' which was disturbing Kant's intellectual vision when he wrote one passage, was in abeyance when he wrote the other?

Our limits of space are nearly reached, and we have not yet noticed much more than half of Professor Watson's book. His exposition of Kant's doctrine of causality is probably the most instructive, at least for English readers, that has yet appeared. In substance the same as Professor Caird's, it has the advantage that, having been written since the appearance of criticisms upon this by Dr. Stirling and Mr. Balfour, it avoids a temptation into which Professor Caird seems to have fallen of making Kant too consistent with himself. We shall

do it most justice by quoting a passage which summarises the result:—'". . . It is universally admitted," says Kant, in effect, "that we have experience of the real sequence of particular events. This I assume as a fact, and proceed to account for it. Now I deny that we can know any objects except those coming within consciousness and referred to a single self. But if we seek to account for real sequences from mental states coming one after the other, without seeking any aid from a universal and necessary form of thought, we must prove order in events or real sequences simply from the succession of those states. There is, then, no sequence except a purely arbitrary one: for our mental states, apart from a combining or synthetical self-consciousness, have no order in them. In other words, we cannot, unless we presuppose a necessary and universal form of thought, explain how we could ever have had the experience of a real or invariable sequence." So far, therefore, from holding that perception gives us a knowledge of real events, which are *afterwards* connected by the understanding, Kant argues that we should never have any knowledge of *events* as real at all unless the understanding *had been* at work—although in the first instance only blindly or unreflectively—in constituting the connection of events' (p. 232).

With this quotation we take leave of Professor Watson, leaving unnoticed what is likely, perhaps, to be found by many the most interesting part of his book—the account of Kant's 'Metaphysic of Nature,' as gathered from the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (a treatise too generally neglected), and the contrast drawn between 'this critical explanation of nature and the empirical explanation of it as given by Mr. Spencer.' It would be impossible to do justice to the latter part of the book except in a further article.

FRAGMENT ON IMMORTALITY.

THERE can be no proof of the 'immortality of the soul' (in the only sense of the doctrine in which it is true), any more than there can be proof of the 'existence of God.' You can only prove the posterior by the prior, the part by the whole. But the 'immortality of the soul,' as = the eternity of thought = the being of God, is the absolute first and the absolute whole. To deny the 'immortality of the soul' in this sense is to maintain the destructibility of thought, and this is a contradiction in terms, for destruction has no meaning except in relation to thought.

As a determination of thought, everything is eternal. What are we to say, then, to the extinct races of animals, the past formations of the earth? How can that which is extinct and past be eternal? They were determinations of thought, and it was part of their essence, as such, to be stages in a process. The process is eternal, and they *as stages in it* are so too. That which has passed away is only their false appearance of being independent entities, related only to themselves, as opposed to being stages, essentially related to a before and after. In other words, relatively to our temporal consciousness, which can only present one thing to itself at a time, and therefore supposes that when A follows B, B ceases to exist, they have perished; relatively to the thought, which, as eternal, holds past, present, and future together, they are permanent; their very transitoriness is eternal.

The living agent, man, then, like everything else, is eternal as a determination of thought.

What then is the meaning of death? It is the transition by which the highest form of nature, *i.e.* the highest realisa-

tion of spirit, short of its realisation in itself, passes into a perfectly adequate realisation, *i.e.* a spiritual one.

. . . . . .

He lets the world have its way; not from the hopelessness of the sceptic or the indifference of the epicurean, but because he knows that his own way, however lamely and blindly he pursues it, is yet that to which all the world's ways converge, and that it is the way that leadeth unto eternal life.

ESSAY ON CHRISTIAN DOGMA.

At a time when every thoughtful man, accustomed to call himself a christian, is asking the faith which he professes for some account of its origin and authority, it is a pity that the answer should be confused by the habit of identifying christianity with the collection of propositions which constitute the written New Testament. That this identification is misleading—that it not only imperils the faith by making it rest on an untenable dogma, but puts out of sight the vital essence of things necessary for salvation—we may satisfy ourselves by asking the simple question, was St. Paul a christian, or was he not? If he was a christian, he was so not only without any acquaintance with this collection of propositions as such, but in spite of ignorance (this is the necessary inference from his own language) of the facts of our Lord's life prior to his death, as detailed in the synoptical gospels, and with no developed consciousness of the theosophy which forms the basis of the fourth, or of the doctrines found in the canonical epistles other than his own. Christ, according to his own language, was made known to him by revelation, but by such a revelation, judging from his own description of its effects in the epistle to the Galatians, as might be vouchsafed, without a voice from heaven, or a light above the brightness of the sun, to any like spirit brooding on the bare facts of the death and resurrection of the divine son of man. The doctrine of 'inspiration,' in that sense according to which every scriptural proposition contains some absolute truth, from which trains of dogmatic reasoning may be deduced, is indeed but an accident of that enfeebled christianity which is all that mankind has yet been able to assimilate. Men, like Luther, in whom the christian consciousness has been manifested in its strength, have, whatever their own statements, been virtually independent of it. It has taken the place in our time which was filled before the

Reformation by authoritative tradition and the infallibility of the church.

The semi-regenerate man craves for positive declarations. He cannot, like the unregenerate, remain acquiescent in mere convention, nor yet on the other hand can he find an answer for all questions in the intuition of his own reason, as St. Paul did in the Christ that was 'revealed in him,' nor yet, like the modern philosopher, can he recognise in the dialectic of unsatisfied inquiry and endless contradiction that energy of thought which answers all questions by the discovery that they are its own making. Thus, when the spiritual community of christians was hardening into the visible church, when the vision of the risen Lord, in whom all things were made one and all oppositions reconciled, had faded from the believers' eyes, men began to feel the want from time to time of some fresh assertion to silence the objections, some new dogma to harmonise the contradictions, which the 'heresy' or controversy of each generation engendered. Appeals to New Testament scripture, in the relation which it then held to the thought of the christian, could not satisfy the want. Its canon was scarcely fixed, conventional interpretation had not then, as now, transformed the immediate apprehension of divine things, which it expresses, into a connected system of dogma, its language was elastic enough to admit of any variety of spiritual and esoteric senses, and hence the Gnostic could find confirmation in it for his theosophic dreams, no less than the orthodox believer for his practical rule of faith. Authoritative tradition, accordingly, came in to furnish the palpable standard which the interests of popular belief required. Its position was first asserted and defined by Tertullian, who may so far be regarded as the father of catholic theology. 'Non ad scripturas provocandum est' is the manly utterance of his conviction that the scripture did not furnish those distinct doctrinal statements which he needed for controversial purposes, and which the modern controversialist, with the theological mist of eighteen centuries between him and it, vainly fancies that he can find there. But what scripture could not do, in that through its spirituality it was weak in the service of the carnal understanding, the voice of the church, coarsely articulate, did. In Christ, it was argued, there did indeed dwell the fulness of truth; this he had communicated to his apostles, and they to the

churches which they had founded. Where the truth was ambiguously expressed or imperfectly explained in the canonical scriptures, the consent of the apostolic churches, conveyed through their bishops, might suffice for its establishment or interpretation.

Such was the origin of the creeds, whose value it would be idle to depreciate. It is true, on the one hand, that they were but the authoritative declaration of a majority; but, on the other, they served to gather up the various elements of the christian consciousness, as represented by various churches, and thus preserved christian truth, in a dogmatic form indeed, which did not properly belong to it, yet still in its entirety, as opposed to the partial apprehension of those who made *αἱρέσεις* of their own. The point, however, for us specially to observe is that in the age of creeds, christian truth has reached quite a different phase from that presented to us in the writings of the New Testament. It is not that the creeds assert anything that may not be deduced with tolerable fairness from those writings, but they convey it in a different form, and the difference, primarily one of form becomes one of substance. In them christian truth is no longer the immediate expression of the highest possible spiritual life; it has become a theology, which inevitably reacts on the canonical writings, whose deficiencies it was originally introduced to supply. Tradition, of the doctrinal sort, if it is to retain any definite shape amid the changing influences which govern human opinion, must have not only a recognised mouthpiece, but some written documentary basis on which to fasten itself. Hence the tradition of the christian church, though, according to the original theory expressed by Tertullian, it had its source in oral communications of Christ to the apostles, and was thus independent of the written scriptures, of which it was the necessary complement, soon came, by an insensible instinct of self-preservation, to affiliate itself to them, and to refashion the parent after the supposititious child's likeness.

The ordinary dilemma, that the doctrine of the creeds either is to be found in the New Testament or is not, is as inappropriate as dilemmas generally are, and simply evinces on the part of those who propound it an ignorance of the real laws of spiritual (or even vital) activity. It is to be found there, or not to be found there, just as the stalk is or is not

to be found in the root, and the flower in the leaf; or, to keep to illustrations more nearly 'in eodem genere,' as the abstractions of the Aristotelian metaphysic are, or are not, to be found in the concrete philosophical life of Socrates, and the British constitution according to De Lolme in Magna Charta. Christianity, on its first entrance into the world, whatever else it may have been, was not, in the natural sense of the word, a theology. By theology we understand a connected system of ideas, each qualified by every other, each serving as a middle term by which the rest are held together. The theological consciousness, if we may use the term, is a consciousness which approaches its object, God, through the medium of such a system of ideas. Christianity, in its simplest primary form, is involved in the divine consciousness of Jesus and in that of St. Paul, the spirit and work of Jesus standing, no doubt, in a relation of essential priority to the spirit and work of Paul, but implying the latter as their necessary complement. Now this consciousness of the divine, as it existed in these two parents of our faith, was essentially an immediate consciousness. It was one which penetrated to its object, as was then said, by revelation, as we should say, by intuition, without the intervention of any system of ideas. It was, therefore, according to the definition we have given, no theological consciousness, nor could its utterances constitute a theology.

To exhibit this distinction in detail would carry us beyond the limits of an essay, nor are we disposed to seek to penetrate the ideal vesture which shrouds from us the historical figure of the son of Mary. It is better to say vaguely but simply, that to no form less than divine could that vesture have adjusted itself, than to construct a shape, on Parisian models, as hopelessly disproportionate to it as was the Jewish phantasy of a carnal, conquering Messiah to the reality made manifest at Golgotha. Still, taking St. Matthew's Gospel as the least coloured reflex of our Lord's teaching, we may ask ourselves what are the essential elements of the consciousness there presented to us. We are met first, in the Beatitudes, by a sense of the infinite greatness of the human spirit in itself, apart from external accessories. It is the poor, the mourner, the persecuted for righteousness' sake, it is these emptied of all fulness that comes from without, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, having nothing yet possessing all things, to whom belongs the kingdom of heaven. This

sense of the greatness in nothingness of man as such, with its corollaries of self-abnegation and aversion to hypocrisy, forms the main purport of the Sern on on the Mount. It reappears, under altered phases, in the constant reference to the Father in heaven, whose spirit is our heritage, whose perfection is to become man's; in the use of the title 'Son of man' by him who had not where to lay his head; in the proclamation of a kingdom of heaven for which the pure activity of man's spirit was the sufficient and the only qualification. Placing itself in antagonism to Jewish pride, to Jewish anticipations of the Messiah, to the powers of this world in general, it led of necessity to the crucifixion. Then the grain of seed fell to the ground, and having died, it abode not alone. It gathered new elements for itself, and sent forth a new growth in the belief in a risen Lord.

This new growth, stunted and dwarfed, as there is reason to believe, in the conception of the original apostles, so spread abroad its branches in the thought and preaching of St. Paul, that in them all mankind might find rest. Those who imagine it an exhaustive account of christianity, to say that it consists in the moral teaching of Jesus, would do well to ask themselves, what christianity would have been without the teaching of St. Paul, and in what sense this teaching can be said to be derived from that of Jesus. Whatever be the true rationale of the sudden transition from Paul the eager persecutor, to Paul the ecstatic preacher of Christ—whether or no it is to be accounted for by the supposition that from the first the idea of a divine justifier, in antagonism to the Jewish apparatus for working out the Jew's own justification, had taken such hold on his mind as to awaken that deepest hate, which is but the deepest love as yet unrecognized by its subject—it is certain from his own words that the new consciousness which came into being as he journeyed to Damascus was simply self-evolved, or, what is the same thing, communicated by an immediate revelation. God revealed his Son in him; whether in the body or out of the body he knew not, he *saw* the Lord Christ. Then he had no need to confer with flesh and blood. He did not 'go up to Jerusalem to those which were apostles before him,' from whom alone he could have learnt what the actual teaching of Jesus had been. His intuition of Christ was complete in itself, and through his eyes christian men have since looked upon their Lord. What

hen was the nature of this intuition? In its simplest ex-
ression it was the presentation to the inmost consciousness
f a living person, the second Adam in whom all humanity
vas embodied, in whose death all men died to be all made
live in his resurrection. Such a presentation was the
xtinction of Judaism, as of 'a frail and feverish being,'
vhich sought by privilege and ordinance to fence itself against
hat death which is the gate of the true life; it was the birth
f faith in a new sense, as of the spiritual act by which the
ndividual appropriates, is 'clothed upon by,' the being of
he Son of God, who is the new man.

We have thus traced in outline the glad tidings of Jesus,
nd the 'mystery' revealed to St. Paul, but we do not yet
nd ourselves on the ground of dogmatic theology. We are
ealing throughout with an inner spiritual life, which does
ot indeed remain inarticulate (it finds such utterance as
onstrains all human thought to its obedience), but which yet
ives no account of itself. It is essentially unreasoning, there-
ore unscientific, therefore not theological. It is quite true
hat in St. Paul's epistles there is no lack of keen, if not very
orrect, argumentation. Some of them, the epistle to the
Romans in particular, are cast in a dialectical form which
as probably been the occasion of the popular notion that St.
Paul was a cogent reasoner. But it appears on examination
hat his reasoning, whenever valid as such, is polemically
irected against the Jews and judaisers. His reconstruction
f the spiritual fabric, his positive view of God, man, and the
vorld is, as we have seen, intuitive, and cannot really be fitted
nto the argumentative mould. One is sometimes asked with
grave face by a representative of the class of men who 'have
ifficulties,' whether one finds the reasoning in 1 Cor. xv.
2 and 13, satisfactory. The only answer is that in such a
assage there is properly no reasoning at all. St. Paul did
ot mean, with all 'the foolishness of preaching,' to infer
irst the resurrection of Christ from that of mankind, and
hen that of mankind from that of Christ. But it belonged
o that 'foolishness of God,' which in him had superseded
he wisdom of man, that, accepting the traditional story of
Christ's resurrection, he should see in the risen Lord all man-
ind made alive, and that conversely, looking abroad on men
ead in trespasses and sins, he should see in them an ideal
uickening of body as well as soul, which must have been

realised in their perfected head. On the one hand the Son of God, alive with his Father, but submitting to death in the flesh, to be quickened in the spirit; on the other, man dead in the flesh, but finding in that death, since the Son of God partook of it, the entrance to the same Son's resurrection; these are the two 'moments,' whose interaction, each passing into the other, formed the consciousness of St. Paul. He had no need to prove the truth of either by the other, or of both by extraneous arguments. In his own daily experience they were given in mutual involution. He 'bore about always in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in his body.'

Hitherto, then, christianity is a work, a life, an experience. It is still as far from being dogmatic as are the Shakespearian dramas from being a system of poetics. But in this state of immediate intuition it could not long remain. How it came to pass that, under the empire of Tiberius, in an obscure corner of the earth, there was lived a life which, as represented in tradition, became the absolute form of human life for all time, so that in it the world has ever since been becoming new, is a question not lightly to be answered. For the present we may content ourselves with the fact, and with the remark that already to St. Paul this life, perfectly human and perfectly divine, is in one sense a thing of the past, though in another to be lived over again by himself in the present. The life of Jesus himself was, if the expression may be allowed, an absolutely original one. If we know anything of him, we know that it was no derived or secondary mission that he asserted. Whether Son of God or Son of Man, he was so by a direct title of his own, not, as his followers were, by a mediated heritage. As the Jews said of him, 'he bare record of himself.' St. Paul, on the other hand, bears record of Christ, 'by whom he had received grace and apostleship,' not, it is true, of a dead, not of an historical Christ, not of a Christ after the flesh, yet still of a person who, though now living at the right hand of God, had at a definite time been 'made of a woman, made under the law.' With St. Paul, however, the past historical existence, the determinate individuality of Christ, are so overshadowed by his spiritual presence, by his ideal 'filling of all things,' that the former elements tend to vanish altogether, as we know that they actually did in the gnosticism based on Pauline teaching. The perfect fusion

of the ideal exaltation with the historical reality of Christ is effected in the gospel which we call St. John's. The ideal glory of Christ there takes the form of an eternal existence in the bosom of the Father, as the word which from the beginning had God for its object, and was the full expression, the exhaustive predicate, of him (ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος). But whereas with St. Paul this glory invests the historical Jesus solely in that act by which, if we may say so, he ceases to be historical, the act of his resurrection (Rom. i. 4), with John it is manifested in the whole series of acts which make up his visible life on earth. The Christ of the synoptical gospels, though conceived of the Holy Ghost, is yet born and reared like other men. He 'grows in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.' His teaching, though it culminates with those utterances which provoked the crucifixion, begins merely as the echo of the Baptist's cry, 'Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand' (Matt. iv. 17). The Christ of the fourth gospel, on the contrary, is from the first the complete reflex of God in human form. 'The word was made flesh and dwelt among us,' and this incarnation was but the exhibition to human eyes of the eternal indwelling of God in the natural universe, of the light which had from the beginning shined in darkness. Whatever historical value we may ascribe to the narration of this gospel, it is certain that it is but the manifestation in detail, and in the phenomena of a bodily life, of this idea announced in the proœmium.

Have we not here then, it will be asked, christian dogma ready-made? We still answer, no. The Christ of the fourth gospel is still a present Christ. Though the word, in whom the worlds were made, he is yet a being whom the writer carries about with him in his own life; whose creative power, whose communion with the Father, he realises in his own experience, even as St. Paul 'filled up that which was behind of the afflictions of Christ in his own flesh.' 'He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do likewise.' 'I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you'; 'The world seeth me no more, but ye see me; because I live, ye shall live also'; such are the words by which the writer makes the apparently parting Lord express his full and eternal presence in his disciples. The consciousness of such a presence, though it may gather into itself all the highest modes of thought which the philosophy of the time furnished, does

not constitute a dogma. It does not belong, like dogma, to the sphere of reasoned, or authorised, opinion, but to that of intuition or inspiration, which rejects authority, admits not of a reason why, because itself its own witness and its own demonstration.

It is not to be denied, however, that the view of Christ given in the fourth gospel is of a kind which could not fail to pass at once into the dogmatic form. Transcendental at the same time and detailed, calling upon the christian consciousness to realise not merely, as did the Pauline doctrine, the death and resurrection of Christ, but the manifestation in the particularities of earthly life of the eternal word, it strained the power of immediate apprehension to a degree which the ordinary christian even of that day could not sustain. It inevitably soon lost both its immediateness and totality, and broke into a series of separate dogmas, either rationally inferred or established by authority. Christianity, from being the special inspiration of a few poor men, had come to embody, and in a certain sense to overbody, itself in a great society, from which the wise men and scribes of this world were not excluded. To such men it could no longer present itself simply as a life to be lived. In that character it was to them, even more perhaps than to us, wholly out of reach. Coming into the world in the fulness of time, it found on every hand points of contact with the facts and ideas of the age. One man would see in it the needful delocalisation of religion corresponding to the absorption of national polities in the omnipresent empire of Rome. To another it would convey that idea of inward peace for which the self-introspective spirit of the later empire, debarred from outward activities, was painfully seeking. The theosophist, turning facts into abstractions, would see in Christ the final æon, in which the world, originally projected by God out of himself, after passing through a series of ascending æons, finally returns to conscious union with its author. The practical man, on the other hand, putting inspiration into rule, would deaden Christ into such a system of moralities as was shadowed forth in the later stoicism. But while in these and other modes christianity carried out its mission of drawing all men to itself, in each of them we find it a theory or rule of action, no longer, in the sense in which it had been, an immediate intuition. The product of genius, when the genius

itself has passed away, may hold its ground, may remodel opinion, as a dictum of common sense, or a formula of philosophy, but it is no longer what it was to the genius with which it originated. So the christianity on which the catholic church, in the proper sense of the word, was founded, and which through that agency has since been recasting the world, was not the christianity of Christ himself or of St. Paul. It was a translation into the terms of the formulating intellect of acts and utterances, now contemplated in the past, but which had once been the outcome of a present experience. It was an establishment on authority of truths which to their first forth-tellers had been conscious revelations from God. In one word, it was dogmatic.

Its transition into this form, though, as we have seen, a necessary result of the impotence of the human spirit to sustain itself at the level to which it had been raised in Christ, seems to have been occasioned proximately by the struggle with gnosticism. From the first the living stream of christian experience, though holding that onward course of which the successive flood-marks are the epistle to the Romans and the gospel ascribed to St. John, had been stagnating by the way into pools formed on the one side by Judaism, on the other by philosophic systems. The popular habit of regarding the writings of the New Testament as a body of doctrine pitched into the world all at once has caused this fact to be generally overlooked. Yet an examination of these writings themselves might satisfy us that they came into being as successive assertions of the fulness of christian life against a cotemporaneous stiffening of it either into Jewish ordinance or gentile philosophy, even if we had no direct evidence of this stiffening process in the writings of the apostolic fathers and the records preserved in Eusebius. Such an antagonistic purpose, in both directions, may be, as is now generally admitted, traced in the fourth gospel. On the one hand, against the judaiser it proclaims Christ as the true paschal lamb, to whom the whole Jewish religion had borne merely a typical relation, and in whom, therefore, as the reality at length made manifest, that religion had been at once completed and abolished. On the other hand, against the gnostic or docetist it asserts the identity of fact and idea, of the earthly and the heavenly Christ. Not only had man been divinised in idea; not only had the world, in the thought

of the systematising philosopher, reached the crowning æon, in which it found reconciliation with the absolute God; this divinisation, this reconciliation, had been realised in the facts of human life, in that work and consciousness of Christ which the writer believed himself to be daily renewing in his own experience. The fourth gospel is thus, if we may say so, the gospel 'par excellence,' the gospel at its highest potency and in its finest essence. It presupposes all the rest of the Bible, and the whole development of gentile philosophy, and wraps them up together in the form of a spiritual life, such as has never since been realised. The answer which it gave in this form to heresy could only be given again in the form of dogma. It, therefore, and not the Apocalypse (as the accidental position of the latter at the close of the canon has strangely led people to imagine) is the last voice of primitive christianity.

Dogmatic christianity is on a level with the 'heresies,' whose march in each age it has stopped as being a theory, which, however practical in its purpose, is yet not a life. It claims to be above them as being adequate to the full compass of the christian life, of which it is the intellectual formulation, whereas each 'heresy' corresponds to but a single phase of that life; and, further, as constituting the truth for all men and all times, on which, therefore, a catholic church could be built, whereas 'heresies' are but the expression in christian terms of passing modes of thought, which can but furnish the sandy foundation of a sectarian fabric. In speaking of it as the foundation of the catholic church, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by our own phraseology. A certain solidification of christianity into dogmatic form was necessary, before it could become the unifying principle of a permanent society claiming to be co-extensive with, yet distinct from, the world. On the other hand, such a society must have been already in existence before that establishment by recognised authority could be possible which is necessary to the full idea of dogma. The letter of scripture alone could not furnish this authority, for, not to mention that scripture must have already been formulated before it could afford a basis for formulæ, it is only from its recognition by the church that scripture itself derives authority in the dogmatic sense. It could only be furnished in its full palpable validity when the christian society had been compacted by external power, *i.e.* after the establishment of christianity as the

imperial religion by Constantine. But already in the latter part of the second century there was enough outward organised communion among christians partially to serve the purpose. 'Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum sed traditum,' is Tertullian's test of apostolic tradition, and through it of orthodoxy. It is an illustration at once of the crystallisation of the christian life into doctrines, which in his time had taken place, and of the means employed for consolidating these doctrines into a body of catholic theology. The relation in which orthodox dogma stood then to gnosticism, and in the following century to arianism and the kindred heresies, may fairly be taken as typical of the position it was afterwards to occupy.

The tendency of gnosticism was to evaporate the practical moral purport of christianity. By the aid of a sublimated cosmogony, compounded from the mythologies and philosophies of the heathen world, it got rid of the difficulty which the claim of christianity to constitute an absolute beginning 'de novo' presents to the philosopher, and reduced it to the position, in modern language, of a phase in the development of the world. At the same time it tended to wipe out of the christian revelation the one essential feature, that it makes the reconciliation of the world with God in Christ not merely a transaction *ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*, but something which has been and still is to be realised in a moral human life. To resist this tendency catholic dogma came to the aid of scripture, and if, in so doing, it inevitably put a veil between us and the canonical writings which prevents us from reading them as they were at first read, it has yet preserved for us an idea of christian life, 'witnessed and kept,' if not realised by the christian church, which is our sole title to reckon the 'least in the kingdom of heaven greater than John the Baptist.'

The tendency of arianism was in one respect just the reverse of gnosticism. It was not the moral but the metaphysical side of christian doctrine which it lowered, and we owe it to the firm front opposed by orthodox dogma that christian doctrine is still a thing of the present. One need not be an orthodox trinitarian to see that, if arianism had had its way, the theology of christianity would have become of a kind in which no philosopher who had outgrown the dæmonism of ancient systems could for a moment acquiesce. The common characteristic of all such modern philosophy

as is not either sceptical or materialistic is, that it makes human thought potentially divine. Whether or no this philosophy be actually generated from the dogma of the church, it is at least certain that between this dogma and itself it finds merely a difference of form, easily to be smoothed over by religious feeling, while from arianism it would recoil as it does from those prevailing representations of the atonement which are of arian origin.

From the dust and mist which these controversies had raised christianity emerges, not indeed a new religion, but a formed theology. It entered on the second century as the tradition of a spiritual experience, which had been realised and might be realised again. In the fourth it presents itself as the statement in definite formulæ of certain relations subsisting in the Godhead, and certain transactions issuing therefrom. These relations and transactions are not indeed without concern for man. He has to place himself towards them in an attitude of unquestioning acquiescent belief, and as believed they involve his redemption. But they are wholly outside his personal spiritual experience. 'Certum est, quia impossible.' They are 'mysteries,' but no longer 'open' in the sense that they can be entered into; truths which, as 'revealed' not to the understanding of the believer, but to an impersonal church, may act indirectly on the consciousness, but can never form part of it. The orthodox representative of the Nicene council believes on a Son of God of one substance with his Father, but he no longer, as such, dies the death and lives the new life of Christ. He believes that the manhood has been taken into God, but he is no longer conscious of a kingdom of God within him.

As we trace the development of the dogma involved in the Nicene declarations, we find the primary experience of St. Paul and the twelve vanishing more and more into the past. The development is effected by a process of negation and abstraction which gradually effaces from the image of Christ all marks of a personality possible within the limits of human life. The Nicene council had not gone the length of determining the relation between the person of the only-begotten Son and the human nature of Christ. It did not absolutely exclude the conception of an education in time of the man Jesus, consummated by the identification, whether in his baptism or his resurrection, of this man's person with the eternal

word. The human nature might be the divine person in becoming, and whatever difficulties such a view might involve, it at least afforded an apparent adjustment between the dogma of the logos and the tradition of a Christ, who had grown in wisdom and stature, and lived the common life of all men. By the condemnation of the nestorian heresy it was definitely excluded, and with its exclusion so many further features were wiped out from the representation of Christ's life as a concrete intelligible reality. Under the refusal to apply the title θεοτόκος to the virgin was covered a virtual separation between the divine and human persons in Christ. Jesus of Nazareth was not divine from his birth, but had attained to that moral perfection in which by God's good pleasure the attributes of the Son and the worship due to the Son had been transferred to him. To admit such a view of the final unification, as opposed to the primary unity, of Christ and the word, would have been to admit that it was not God himself who was born and died and rose again. The mission of christianity, therefore, required its exclusion, but the dogma which excluded it necessitated in its turn a further abstraction from the attributes of the historical Christ, a further contradiction to the possibilities of experience. If Christ was the incarnate word, in the sense that in him the divine person was completely present from his birth, how are we to conceive of those human attributes in virtue of which he was heard and seen and handled? The natural tendency is to reduce them to a mere fleshly mask which at once hid the indwelling God from the apprehension of men and gave them the means of communicating with him. Not through a human soul, the form and essence of man, but through a human body only, as a collection of accidents, which may attach to another essence without essentially changing it, has the word been made manifest unto men. Here we are already in the fatal maze of the monophysite heresy. 'Ingemuit christianus et eutychianum se esse miratus est.' The rationalising intellect has escaped Scylla to be lost in Charybdis. In its desire to hold together the facts of Christ's life and the Nicene dogma of his divinity, it fell into the nestorian heresy, which emptied the dogma of its value in relation to universal thought. It then abandoned half the facts in order to retain the dogma in its fulness. Still seeking to give some account of the facts that remain, and which

might seem compatible with the presence of a full divine consciousness in Christ from the beginning, it again mutilates the dogma. It repeats the intellectual sin of the docetists, for if the flesh only of Christ be human, his life is not really the life, nor his death the death of a man. The manhood has not in its essence been taken into God; humanity is still unredeemed; we are yet in our sins.

The dogmatic barrier against these subversive importunities of the intellect is the declaration which Pope Leo elicited from the council of Chalcedon, the declaration of two natures in Christ's person. This marks the final rupture between christian dogma and the personal experience in which it originated. With the previous doctrines as to his person, the traditionary facts of our Lord's life may have been difficult to reconcile; before this doctrine they vanish, as facts, altogether. Two natures imply a double consciousness, and the facts of a life which is the expression of a double consciousness are no facts at all. They are unintelligible, and therefore unmeaning, miracles. Other facts, apparently miraculous, may be accepted on the ground that they admit of an explanation as yet unknown to us. But according to the dogma of Chalcedon, which we have shown to be the necessary consequent of its dogmatic antecedents, an explanation of the facts is given, and an explanation which renders them nonentities. The process of negation is now complete. Of Christ's life, as a series of occurrences enacted in this world of space and time, no concrete representation can henceforth be formed, no intelligible predicates can henceforth be applied to it. It has become a collection of names, with which no presentations to sense or imagination can be made to correspond. Reflection has triumphed over intuition, theology has devoured its parent. The dogma whose birth and growth we have traced relates primarily to the person of Christ, but its investigation may help us to answer the question, What are the characteristics of dogma generally? How is it to be distinguished from other products of the thinking spirit?

I. It presupposes an immediate intuition, and it is in its relation to this intuition, as at once retaining its limitations while it reduces its concrete object to an abstraction, that its first characteristic is to be found. As the Messiah in whom the prophecies were fulfilled, Christ was an object of direct apprehension to the first disciples; as the second Adam, in

whom the wall of partition between Jew and gentile, between man and God, was broken down, he was presented to the spiritual imagination of St. Paul. We have seen how the impossibility of retaining this primary intuition, as such, when the first access of spiritual ecstasy was over, combined with the danger of its evaporation into a gnostic theosophy, led to its content being fixed and formulated in the articles of a creed. This constitutes a change in its form. What was at first presented to the believer as a datum of his own experience is now presented to him through the medium of an authoritative declaration. It is thus in a state to be dealt with by the reflecting intellect, which soon supplements the change in form by a change in substance. Reflection elicits the oppositions of thought involved in the creed, such as that between the growing Jesus and the word complete from eternity. This necessitates a new declaration in which some abstraction is made from the matter of the original intuition. The process is continued, till nothing but the empty shell of the presupposed experience remains. Yet this shell helps to make dogma what it is. As the original experience related to a person presented under the ordinary conditions of personality, so the predicates involved in the dogma, though inconsistent with such a personality, yet continue to be applied to it. As the object of intuition, like all other such objects, seemed to be immediately given from without apart from any qualifying or conditioning action of the subject, so the dogma, though evolved by reflection, is not regarded by the subject as in any sense its own product, but as something offered to it by an unknown God. An illustration may be drawn from that early stage of Greek philosophy in which its abstractions still retained the mythical form. By us the air of Anaximenes, the fire of Heraclitus, are seen to be creations of a thinking spirit, seeking to reduce nature to a unity like its own. We see that to the fire and air of the philosophers attributes are assigned incompatible with our experience of them 'in rerum natura.' But in the eyes of the philosophers themselves they were as immediately presented to the senses as the real elements whose names they bore; they exercised as personal an agency as these elements were supposed to do according to the nature-worship of the early mythology. In like manner the Christ of dogma is an object of intuition become abstract, but not ideal. He is presented

to the spirit, not as its own true form objectified, but as wholly external to it. The confinement of his earthly reality, though the attributes assigned to him involve its entire negation, still clings to him. He does not yet fill all things with the fulness of the idea.

II. The second characteristic of dogma is expressed in the dictum, not invalidated by the questionable authority on which it has lately been presented to us, 'No church, no dogma.' We have seen how dogma originates in an appeal to the consensus of the apostolical churches. On this basis it continues to rest, for though it gradually affiliates itself to the writings of the New Testament, whose want of definite formulæ it was at first its mission to supply, yet these writings are themselves offered to the acceptance of the believer, on the guarantee of the church. 'Ego vero,' says Augustin, 'evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicæ ecclesiæ commoveret auctoritas.' This 'note' of dogma is indeed the necessary corollary of the preceding one. The intuition and the idea are each, in different ways, their own evidence, but the dogma has lost the certainty which belongs to the immediate presentation without having been appropriated by thought as part of its own self-consciousness. It can neither pass unchallenged as a simple datum of experience, nor, when challenged, can it appeal either to its intrinsic necessity, which would be to nullify the free grace of its revealer, or to a 'verifying faculty' of the believer, which would be to substitute light for the darkness which dogma is to dispel. It accordingly appeals to the church, as an outward and purely objective authority, without asking who authorises the authority. Just as in a certain stage of philosophy ideas, as belonging to the subject, are tested by 'facts,' without its being observed that of the existence of these very facts the subject is the coefficient, so dogma, the representative of intuitions which reflection has transformed, is referred to an authority only different from its own, because not yet mediated by reflection.

III. A third characteristic explains itself. The dogmas, as such, in their primitive state, are not wrought into a system. To bring them into a relation of antecedence and consequence to each other, would but be preliminary to asking the reason why for dogma altogether, and this again would be to begin the modification of its immediate objective validity.

Taking the above to be the determining characteristics of dogma, as it appears in the fifth century A.D., we have next to inquire how it has been affected by later intellectual movements, and what is its relation to the speculative philosophy of this age. The last-mentioned characteristic vanishes first. Its suppression is due to the schoolmen, the parents of systematic theology in the strict sense of the term. They allow free play to the rationalising intellect in its action on the dogmatic material, but they apply no criticism to this material. They accept it as something given and authoritative. The order of a syllogistic series may be substituted for the inconsequential utterances of a creed, but the ultimate premiss is the statement of a 'what' which admits of no 'wherefore.' In some of them, in Abelard for instance, we may catch glimpses of the freer rationalism of later times. But these were anticipations beyond the developed philosophy of the age. The proper scholastic attitude is expressed in the well-known words of Anselm, 'Maximæ est negligentiæ si non studemus quod credimus intelligere.' The 'credere' comes first; it gives the substance without any interposition of the 'intelligere,' which adds a form. Reason merely follows, binding into sheaves and threshing out the grain of the harvest which belief has gathered from the church. 'Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.'

In scholasticism, therefore, thought holds the same relation to its theological object as in uncritical philosophy it holds to the nature of things. As philosophers prior to Hume and Kant treated things as immediate data of which thought has to discover the necessary connection, unconscious that it is thought itself which supplies this connection, so the scholastic theology assumes the dogmas without question, and by the aid of equally unquestioned forms of thought elicits their mutual dependence. They receive in consequence a new transmutation as members of a system, by which they are still farther removed from their primary source in spiritual experience. Thought spins the web, but is ignorant that it spins it out of itself. On the contrary the web seems to be wrapped round it by the divine hands of the church. The result is such a conscious entanglement in the yoke of bondage, holding back the believer from free intercourse with his Lord, as provoked the spiritual revolt of Luther.

'Justification by faith' and 'the right of private judg-

ment' are the two watchwords of the Reformation. Each indicates a new relation between the spirit and outward authority. 'Faith' in the lutheran language is raised to a wholly different level from that which it had occupied in the language of the church. It no longer means merely the implicit acceptance of dogma on authority for lack of which the 'infidel' was out of the pale of salvation. As with St. Paul it expressed the continuous act, in virtue of which the individual breaks loose from the outward constraint of alien ordinances, and places himself in a spiritual relation to God through union with his Son, so with Luther faith is simply the renunciation, by which man's falser self, with its surroundings of observance and received opinion, slips from him, that he may be clothed upon with the person of Christ. The ghost of scholasticism no doubt still haunted Luther, and led him astray into disquisitions on the relation of faith to other virtues. But according to his proper idea, faith was no positive, finite, virtue at all. It was the absorption of all merely finite and relative virtues, as such, in the consciousness of union with the infinite God. 'Christus est mea formalis justitia.' Faith is merely the efficient by which this righteousness, or the consciousness of it, is conveyed to the individual soul.

Such is lutheranism on its practical side, as supplying a new principle of life. We see that it implies a penetration behind the veil of scholastic syllogisms, sacerdotal polity, mythological Christology, angelology, demonology; a reversion to the spiritual experience of him who had first learned Christ in his universality. It restores the primary fulness of the intuition, which had become abstract and empty in its dogmatic evolution. Again mankind, dead in the first Adam, is seen to be made alive in the second. Again the spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God, as mysteries which Christ has opened. Again the handwriting of ordinance, which is contrary to us, is blotted out. Again the reconciled conscience moves freely in a redeemed world.

Man then, it might seem, according to the lutheran view, as identified with the Christ in whom all things are made one, should draw dogma within the region of his own self-consciousness, and fusing the limits of its mere objectivity, convert it into a proper inmate of the spirit. But theory never keeps pace with experience; nor is a new principle of

inner life at once able to give a sufficient speculative account of itself. With the substance of the church's dogmatic teaching the lutheran could not break for an instant. It was the medium by which alone he could approach that Pauline experience, in the appropriation of which to himself he found peace. And, conversely, as soon as he began to reflect on this appropriated experience, it would necessarily articulate itself in the formula which the church had preserved. At the same time he could not accept dogma, as offered to him on outward authority in its scholastic complexity. To do so would be to thrust himself again into the old entanglement, to build anew the barrier of alien matter which had been destroyed between the spirit and God. The temporary escape from this dilemma is the acceptance of dogma, but the acceptance of it on the warrant of private judgment. Thus vanishes the second of its characteristics, specified above.

Among the later schoolmen we find the question of the relation between reason and belief emerging into distinct consciousness. At first the rationalisation of dogma had gone on without the reason claiming for itself anything more than an instrumental office. When Anselm raises the question 'Cur Deus fit homo,' the fact of the incarnation on the one hand, the divine attributes on the other, are taken as 'believed'; reason merely shows how the fact results from the attributes. During the reign of the realistic logic, the determinations of philosophy were sufficiently accordant with those of theology for the former to appear merely as the handmaid of the latter. But the growth of nominalism disturbed this relation. Duns Scotus specially raises the question, 'utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium, aliquam doctrinam specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam non possit attingere lumine naturali intellectus.' He could only answer it in one way. The knowledge of 'substantiæ separatæ' (by which he seems to mean absolute substance) with their 'propria' is unattainable by us 'ex puris naturalibus.' The knowledge of the trinity is such a knowledge, and therefore presupposes a supernatural revelation. To Occam the same antagonism presents itself more strongly. His doctrine of the mere subjectivity of universals, 'nullum universale est aliquid existens quocunque modo extra animum,' is in obvious antagonism to the doctrine of the trinity. His

doctrine of the limitation of possible knowledge to the sphere of intuition, excludes the natural knowledge of God. 'Nihil potest naturaliter cognosci in se, nisi cognoscatur intuitive. Sed Deus non potest cognosci a nobis intuitive ex puris naturalibus.' All theological ideas, being thus rejected or unattainable by reason, are relegated to the 'determinatio ecclesiæ propter cujus auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari.'

Reason and belief are thus brought into contact, and reason is suppressed. Protestant theology, in its proper form, attempts their reconciliation. It refuses to treat the matter of belief as something which stands over against the spirit, demanding to be accepted, under infinite penalties, on the strength of church authority. The new meaning which it gives to 'faith' implies a new meaning of dogma. 'Faith' is a certain condition of the spiritual consciousness. Dogma is the expression of this consciousness in terms of the understanding, and at first it seems to the believer as unalterable, as inseparable from himself, as the consciousness which it expresses. He dwells mainly on the doctrines most immediately generated by the attitude of faith, such as those of sin and grace, which stand at the head of the lutheran, as those of the trinity and incarnation stood at the head of scholastic theology. These 'find' him. They are ideas thoroughly fused with his self-consciousness, and, thus appropriated, they obtain a like unquestioning acceptance for the doctrines bound up with them in the system of the church. But this is a standing-ground which the polemic of theologians, who cling to the 'beggarly elements' of authority, will not suffer him to retain. Mistrusting reason, they torture it by the obtrusion of mysteries which it cannot assimilate, but which yet it seems impossible to reject without an abandonment of the principles of christian life. The consciousness of a degradation not acquired but inherent, of its removal by the assumption of the degraded nature into the Godhead itself, of a consequent reconciliation between the alienated man and God, and a free efflux of divine grace in the elevation of the individual's life, these are the vital elements of the christian's experience. But they have their dogmatic expression in those 'mysteries' of original sin and the incarnation, which again involve the paradoxes of guilt without free agency and the presence of a double consciousness in Christ. How is the christian to retain at once his experience

and his freedom, when the embodiment of his experience thus holds free thought in bondage?

Popular protestantism has embraced the alternative of abandoning the freedom. It accepts the mystery as guaranteed to it by authority, nor is it of any interest to the reason whether the authority be that of the church or that of miracles. The maintenance of the former may be more consistent with historical fact, for, as we have seen, dogma has no existence except in so far as it is developed by the church; while the reference of dogma to an era of miracles, supposed to have come to an end before the formation of an ecclesiastical system, allows of the removal of a good deal of surplusage from it as an ecclesiastical overgrowth. Authority of either kind remains necessarily alien to our own self-consciousness, and the acceptance of it thus restores 'the spirit of bondage again to fear.' The only popular theory which has sought to retain in freedom the fulness of the christian experience is that of the 'inward light.' It recognises in the truths of revelation the highest utterances of the reason that is in every man, and thus rids them of their mere objectivity. But it refuses to formulate; it will not fix the relations which the various doctrines are to hold to the individual, but leaves them to 'find' him as they may. This constitutes its insufficiency. It rests on the notion that intuition is the sole or ultimate activity of the spirit, that the immediate experience of the christian can remain such, and not strive to reflect itself in definite ideas. But Proteus will not so be bound. The individual, consciously or unconsciously, will formulate the christian experience, and left to himself, will formulate it inadequately. Released from the dogma of the church, he will make a dogma of his own, which will react upon and limit the experience. His fathers, though themselves 'ascripti glebæ,' have subdued a wide region to his use; but, instead of appropriating it, he laboriously tills a little plat of his own, as much in bondage to the soil as they were.

Christian dogma, then, must be retained in its completeness, but it must be transformed into a philosophy. Its first characteristic, as an intuition become abstract, must vanish, that it may be assimilated by the reason as an idea. The progress of thought in general consists in its struggle to work itself free from the mere individuality and outwardness of

the object of intuition. The thing as sensible, *i.e.* as presented in an individual moment of time and space, must become the thing as known, *i.e.* as constituted by general attributes. Again, from being supposed to be known only so far as it exists, it must be understood also to exist only so far as it is known. Christ, as an object of intuition, must undergo a similar process. To the twelve apostles he was a visible person, and, as such, a saviour of the Jews only. By St. Paul he was known under those attributes which gentile (at least Alexandrian) philosophy had learnt to ascribe to the spirit or wisdom of the world, and as such he became the Christ of the gentiles. These attributes, however, were still referred to the historical Jesus. He was the reality of which the idea involving the attributes was the objective reflex. To the modern philosopher the idea itself is the reality. To him Christ is the necessary determination of the eternal subject, the objectification by this subject of himself in the world of nature and humanity. At first sight the two modes of apprehension might seem mutually exclusive. If the idea of the philosopher is the truth, it may be said the intuition of the philosopher must be delusion. On examination, however, it will be found that there is a sense in which the idea is at once the complement of the intuition and its justification.

Intuition implies limitations which are the less narrow as the intuition is less sensuous. The apostolic intuition of Christ before the resurrection was merely sensuous, and therefore confined to the limitations of judaism. Christ was carnally, and by force, to restore the kingdom to Israel. From the Christ of St. Paul these sensuous limitations were wholly removed. In his risen form he is an object solely to the spiritual intuition, and to it can be represented as filling all things. Still the identification of the Son, in whom the world is reconciled to God, with Jesus of Nazareth (and this is the very essence of the Pauline intuition) necessarily confines and confuses the idea of the former. It confines it, for while it ought to include, as the idea of God's 'alterity,' the divine unity of the natural as well as of the moral world, no rhapsody of imagination can present this cosmos as involved in the consciousness of a man who walked the earth. It confuses it, for when fixed in dogma and reasoned upon it leads to the hopeless irrationality of ascribing a double

consciousness to Christ. But substitute for the intuition the philosophic idea, and the confinement and confusion vanish. That evolution of dogma, which, as we have seen, emptied the intuition of Jesus of its content, constitutes a gradual determination of the idea of God as an object to himself. This idea becomes more concrete as the intuition becomes more abstract. God has died and been buried, and risen again, and realised himself in all the particularities of a moral life.

Thus the intuition finds its justification, at the same time that it finds itself to be not final or absolute. For if all human attributes, not in mutual exclusiveness but in their totality, may be ascribed to God, then that religious sense which presents its object to itself in outwardness and under limitations, has its place in the life which is assimilated to the divine. The true philosopher can find room for the saint, though not the saint for the philosopher. He drinks the juice of the wine-press which others have trodden. He roams at large in the heritage which his fathers won but might not explore. He sees that which the prophets of the past in vain desired to see: he sees through their eyes that which they saw not themselves. His 'ideology,' which the dogmatist anathematises, enables him at once to retain dogma in its essence and to account for its form. The eternal objectification of God in the world has for its temporal side the realisation of the divine unity in the perfect art of living. The development of this art consists in the gradual application to wider spheres of a type first realised under special conditions. So the christian life, in its primary exhibition, was perhaps only possible under the peculiar circumstances of Galilee during the Roman dominion. Its apparent ossification into authoritative formulæ was a necessary condition for the fulfilment of its mission as a permanent and universal religion. So long as it retained its primary form of a personal experience, it was liable to indefinite modification and mutilation according to the personal tendencies of different times and situations. Every man might make it his own, but in so doing, in appropriating it to his particular needs, might lose that universal element in it which should have raised him above himself and bound him to mankind and God. Embodied in a church and articulated in a creed, it retains its essential identity, while with the

gradual development of the thinking spirit it rises to a more adequate conception of itself. It is this elaboration of its speculative side which brings it into new relations with the intelligible world, and it is this which orthodox dogmatists denounce. They build the sepulchres of the prophets whom their fathers stoned. They laud the memory, they persecute in the name, of men who themselves suffered for doctrines now recognised as catholic and orthodox. They proscribe the rational evolution of the content of that dogmatic system which has itself been rationally evolved from the acts and utterances to which it appeals. Therefore they are witnesses against themselves that they are the children of them that stoned the prophets. Like them, in their zeal for the truth once delivered to the saints, they shut the door upon that power of infinite expansion in virtue of which alone it can claim to be absolute truth at all.

LECTURES ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

EXTRACT FROM LECTURES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

The conversion of Paul.

Gal. ii. 15–21.—Belief in Jesus involves a breach with the law: therefore, if nonconformity to the law makes men sinners (as the Jews regarded the uncircumcised), belief in him makes us as much sinners as the Gentiles. This brings us to the question of the sort of revelation involved in 'Paul's conversion.' The sense in which he believed in Christ was conditioned by the antagonism which he felt and showed to the christian teaching before his conversion. His belief involved negatively the abandonment of all claim to distinctive righteousness, and positively the duty of preaching a universal gospel to the gentile as well as the Jew. This belief is identical with life by faith in the Son of God, and this is identical with the life of Christ *in* Paul himself. This life, further, arises immediately out of, or is the positive aspect of, death *to* the law, which again is death *through* the law (produced by it). Another expression for this 'life' is 'righteousness,' or 'righteousness of God' (just as another expression for 'death' is 'condemnation'). 'The righteousness of God' means the perfect relation of man towards God. Just as the wrongness of the relation between man and God can only lie on the side of man's consciousness, so the change by which the relation is set right can only be a change of man's consciousness; a change by which the consciousness of alienation from God becomes the consciousness of adjustment to the divine will. Hence 'the righteousness of God' subjectively considered (or 'ex parte hominis') is 'peace' and 'reconciliation'; just as the opposite state is one of conscious alienation, which, by a transfer to God of man's consciousness

about him, is also spoken of as a state of being under God's wrath.

To understand how the law wrought death in Paul, a death which suddenly passed into a new life, is to understand his conversion, as described in this epistle. We must think of him, while in act and speech 'exceedingly zealous for the traditions of his fathers,' as yet the subject of that inward conflict, the recollection of which caused him to write the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans. (It is an extraordinary delusion to suppose that that chapter describes the state of the christian in the condition of Paul's experience *after* conversion.) In this state he was seeking to attain the 'righteousness of God' by doing the 'works of the law.' That effort, as he afterwards thought, involved a contradiction. Man can only attain the righteousness of God in virtue of the presence of God in him. But the Jew's effort after perfect conformity to the law was an effort to 'establish his own righteousness.' Really the Jew's effort, just so far as the Jew thought it successful, meant a self-satisfaction which effectually prevented the inward communication of God. This is one effect of the law, the effect on the ordinary Jew; it may be called a death or alienation, but is not a conscious alienation, and probably not referred to here by Paul. Such a state *cannot* be suddenly changed into a new life. It was another mode of death by the law that Paul experienced before his conversion. He had found that he could not establish his own righteousness; the law of God seemed to command without giving power to execute; thus its only effect was to give the knowledge of sin, which Paul tended to identify with sin itself. The notion of sin to him is so much that of conscious alienation from God that knowledge of sin and sin almost coincide; *e.g.* 'the strength of sin is the law'; and cp. Rom. vii. 7, 9, 13, 14. Reflection on the perfectness of the law only made him more conscious of the carnality of the flesh, which was not of himself, yet which seemed to drag him down. The conflict as represented in the epistle to the Romans ends in a conscious split in his nature; 'I do that I would not.' Thus the law was the source of death as awakening the consciousness of the carnal separation from God, of moral paralysis, the consciousness of being under a curse or condemnation. 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' *i.e.* the body to which, as

the seat and source of sin, death (or separation from God) attaches.

It is easy to understand how one burdened with this consciousness would at first seek to overcome it by more abundant zeal for the law. Across this zeal came the preaching of Christ by Stephen; the preaching of him as the true Messiah, who had borne the penalty of the law because he had declared that the privileged Jewish worship of God was to give place to a universal and spiritual worship, and whom God had declared to be the true Messiah by raising him from the dead. It was because Paul saw that the acceptance of such a Messiah involved the falsehood of the Jewish idea of righteousness, as consisting in the special observance of a special law, that it provoked him. But the conception of the Messiah as manifested under conditions of the extremest carnal humiliation, and as bearing the penalty or curse of the law, suddenly took a new character when his own consciousness of the burden of those conditions, and of being under that curse, came to a head. He found that that conception was just what he wanted. The subjection of the Son of God to the death in which he found himself was his own deliverance from it, as showing that God was not the giver of an external law which could not be obeyed, but a God who communicated himself to man under conditions which had seemed to separate from him. Thus the death wrought by the law, wrought by it, though spiritual in itself, owing to the relation in which it stood to our carnal nature, through the participation of Christ in it becomes death 'unto the law'; that is, the deliverance of man from the attitude in which he stood to God as servant to taskmaster, and the substitution for this of the consciousness of communion with God (Gal. iv. 3–7). This deliverance from the law has two aspects, corresponding to the two aspects of the 'works of the law.' It is the extinction of the imaginary legal righteousness of the Jew; it puts an end to 'works' as the Jew understood works. On the other hand it is the condition of the true fulfilment of the law. The substitution of the consciousness of the presence of God as 'working in us' enables us to fulfil the law through love, as it could not be fulfilled when regarded as imposed from without.

Being 'under the law' is, with Paul, equivalent to being 'in the flesh.' The carnal man is the selfish man, and the

Jew, 'going about to establish his own righteousness,' feeding his pride on the consciousness of his separation from other men, is living 'after the flesh' almost in the sense of living selfishly. But the man who has passed out of this pride into the state of bitter humiliation described in Rom. vii., is still in bondage to the flesh, because, owing to his sensuous nature, he presents God to himself merely as an external law-giving power. As from the death under the law, so from 'the flesh' (or 'body of this death') Christ delivers us by sharing it; sharing, that is, not in actual vice, but in the consciousness of alienation from God.

The spiritual revulsion, the deliverance from the death which he was conscious of carrying about and with him, came to Paul under certain accidents of vision and ecstasy on his journey to Damascus, when he recognised God in the crucified Jesus whose claim to Messiahship had provoked him. As the negative side of this revelation was the extinction of legal righteousness, its positive side was the mission to the gentiles. A controversy may be raised as to the objective reality of the appearance of Christ to Paul. What is objective reality? An actual picture on the retina and agitation in the tympanum of the ear? The only available evidence of this would be that of his companions. If the others had heard and seen what he did, then we should say that it was not merely that his state of mind affected his nervous system, but that there was some physical operation on his sensitive organs. As to such evidence we cannot say much; there is a discrepancy between Acts ix. 7 and xxii. 9. The question being thus understood, if there was such a picture, at any rate its only meaning and reality arose from the ideas associated therewith, a state of mind of which we have certain knowledge, whereas there is no corresponding evidence about the objective reality. Without those associated ideas the sensuous impression was practically nothing. Thus the true objective reality lay in the truth of those ideas as to law and grace, which truth was proved by the success of Paul's apostleship to the gentiles. Thus, though he appeals to the vision of Christ, yet he says the 'seal' of his apostleship is found in the congregation which he founded.

EXTRACT FROM LECTURES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

The Pauline conception of justification by faith.

What is the meaning of the expression 'righteousness of God' (δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ)? Is it (1) the righteousness of which God is the author? (2) that of which he is the subject, which is his attribute, though it may be communicated to us? (3) that of which he is the object, the perfect relation of man towards God? (4) that which he requires, 'integritas quæ Deo satisfacit'? Δικαιοσύνη in man towards other men is that relation in virtue of which he stands fair and square towards them; perfect reciprocity in dealing between him and them; or again, perfect correspondence between the individual and the laws of society. In δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, for 'other men,' or 'laws of society,' God is substituted. It is the perfect relation between man and God; adequacy to the divine idea; correspondence between man's and God's will, the opposite of ἁμαρτία.

In 2 Cor. v. 21 (τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ) the perfect relation is represented as subsisting between the Father and the Son, the 'righteousness of God' being fully realised in it. This is opposed to 'sin,' or alienation on our part. Through the Son's being 'made sin for us' (comp. 'being sent in likeness of sinful flesh,' Rom. viii. 3,) the spirit of adoption is communicated to us, and we are able to partake of that perfect relation which has from eternity subsisted between the Son and the Father. Thus we become the 'righteousness of God in him.' Every relation may be regarded as a quality of either of the subjects between which the relation subsists. Thus righteousness, as the conscious correspondence of man to the divine idea, is indeed a quality of man, but also, in a way, of God; *i.e.* the divine idea carries with it the necessity of man's conscious correspondence to it; God, as δίκαιος, must make man righteous. On the side of God, there is no change in relation; God is always δίκαιος towards man; the question is, how is man to become δίκαιος towards God? Thus the 'manifestation of the righteousness of God' means the placing of man in a new condition, which

is done by a divine act; so that God is not only 'just,' but a 'justifier.' He is not only δίκαιος towards man, but puts man in that condition in which he is δίκαιος towards God. Thus δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, the perfect relation between man and God, comes to be, on man's side, a relation of which God is the author, δικαιοσύνη ἐκ θεοῦ (Phil. iii. 9,) and is thus opposed to ἰδία δικαιοσύνη (Rom. x. 3).

There are two ways in which this δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ on man's side may be realised; (1) ἐξ ἔργων νόμου (by 'the works of the law'), and (2) ἐκ πίστεως (by 'faith'). In this epistle Paul certainly regards (1) as not in itself impossible, notwithstanding Galatians iii. 2. If man could fulfil the works of the law, he would be 'just before God,' he would have 'become the righteousness of God.' In one sense, no doubt, Paul regards the 'doing the works of the law' as itself 'carnal'; but this is only on account of that 'carnality' in us which makes the attempted fulfilment of the law a καύχημα ('whereof to glory,' Rom. iv. 2). That is Israel's 'stumbling-stone' (Rom. ix. 32). Thus the attempt to follow after the law of righteousness is the way not to attain it. It perpetually defeats itself by breeding the self-conceit which separates from God. If in the epistle to the Galatians the unattainability of righteousness seems at first sight presented as a defect in the law itself, this is not so in the epistle to the Romans. Comp. vii. 14, 'the law is spiritual, but I am carnal'; and it is my 'carnality' that makes the law work death to me. It is not the spirituality of the law that is at fault, but its power to overcome my carnality. Hence it is clear that by 'law' Paul does not mean 'ceremonial.' It is the moral law in the highest and purest sense, of which he regarded the Jewish as the most perfect expression. It is the law which commands every man to do good, and promises blessedness to him if he does (ii. 10), but does not enable him to do it; a law which is common to those who 'have not the law' with those who have it (ii. 14). The ἄνομοι are those who are without the law in its specific Jewish form (comp. 1 Cor. ix. 21); but the ἄνομοι in this sense are not ἄνομοι ἁπλῶς, but have a law in themselves and are condemned by it, as he goes on to show in ii. 14 foll. The gentiles are condemned by the fact that they partially do the law, and thus show that it is written in their consciences. The words, 'when the gentiles, which have not the law, do by

nature the things contained in the law,' do not imply that they do all the works of the law. They 'show that they have the work of the law' (comp. Gal. vi. 4, *τὸ ἔργον ἑαυτοῦ*), the works which the law enjoins in their principle or unity, 'written in their hearts.' Thus all alike, Jew and gentile, are under the law. The law is wholly just and good in itself, but it cannot give life, and the impotence of it to give life lies in its relation to our flesh; and as thus related, not only is it impotent to give life, but in a sense it causes sin.

'The law is the power of sin' (1 Cor. xv. 56). 'The law is spiritual, but I am carnal' (Rom. vii. 14). 'The law was weak through the flesh' (Rom. viii. 3). The 'flesh,' or 'the body of this death,' is the source or seat of sin and its consequent death. *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν=κατ' ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν* (1 Cor. iii. 3). The *σαρκικὸς ἄνθρωπος=ψυχικός* (1 Cor. ii. 14; comp. xv. 44). There is sin without the law (Rom. v. 13; ii. 12); the result of the law is that sin takes the form of 'transgression' (*παράβασις* or *παραπτῶμα*), and thereby becomes 'more exceeding sinful'; the consciousness of it is intensified, and thus openness to the 'righteousness of God,' which is of grace, is produced. From Gal. iii. 19 and Rom. v. 20 it appears that the law was intended to promote, not to prevent, transgressions. It is in this sense that it is a 'schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.' (In this connection two notions are in his mind, neither of which is expressed by the word 'schoolmaster'; (1) the *παιδαγωγός* was a slave; (2) his office was not to teach, but to restrain merely). The purpose of it is to 'shut up all alike under sin,' that they may be capable of receiving the promise in Jesus Christ (Gal. iii. 22, 23). This 'historical' view of the function of the law appears in Rom. v. 12 foll. From Adam to Moses was a *régime* of *ἁμαρτία* which was not yet *παράβασις*. Adam's 'sin' was indeed a 'transgression,' because committed against a command. It was the occasion by which 'death passed upon all men'; but (death and sin being perfectly correlative, and sin the sole cause of death) it would not have so passed unless all had sinned. Thus before the law 'sin was in the world,' inherent but not 'imputed'; not yet a transgression, because there was no law.

The reason why the law, though spiritual in itself, yet 'kills,' why its only function is to make sin more conscious of itself by giving it definite form and actuality as *παράβασις*,

is to be found in σάρξ ('flesh'), 'the law of sin in our members.' In Romans vii. that which ineffectually strives with the flesh, wishing, but unable to do what it wishes, is νοῦς ('mind'). Not until it has become a principle according to which we walk, or habitually act, according to the state described in ch. viii., is it called πνεῦμα ('spirit'). Yet in Gal. v. 17, a struggle precisely corresponding to that described in Rom. vii., and issuing in the same moral paralysis, is spoken of as going on between σάρξ and πνεῦμα. This struggle, however, as presented in Galatians, is between two principles not belonging to this or that man, though this or that man may be a seat of the struggle between them. They correspond to the 'first man' and 'second man' of 1 Cor. xv. In the individual, the spirit in that state in which it is still paralysed by the antagonism of the flesh (a state from which it emerges through Christ's 'condemnation of sin in the flesh') is called νοῦς. The distinction between νοῦς as human and πνεῦμα as divine is maintained in this sense, that νοῦς in this stage does not yet recognise itself as divine; thus, though a possibility of πνεῦμα, it is opposed to it. 'Flesh' again, with Paul, though to each individual it means his own 'outward man,' his 'members,' is yet a single principle personified in Adam; like the spirit, it is in the individual but not of him.

The most exact expression for that 'which lusteth against the spirit' is φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός (the 'carnal mind'). It is not the body (though Paul associates the evil principle with it), not animal appetite, but the mind, the self-consciousness, which makes these its object and lives for the body, that is enmity against God. This is already death in itself; the law makes it full consciousness of death. The law does this at the same time that it holds out the apparent promise of helping towards the 'righteousness of God.' In this sense the law might be said to deceive. But as this is no fault of the law in itself, but only of the law in relation to the φρόνημα σαρκός in us, it is properly the latter, or sin, that works the deception. Sin is represented as an assailing power gaining a 'vantage-ground' from what seemed to be a defence (Romans vii. 8–11).

St. Paul's view in this passage clearly is that the φρόνημα σαρκός does *not* 'remain in them that are regenerate.' (See the ninth Article.) Comp. Rom. viii. 2 with vii. 23. It is crucified with Christ (Rom. vi. 6; Gal. v. 24). 'The law of

sin and death,' from which 'the law of the spirit of life set him free,' is the same as the 'law of sin in his members.' The essence of the Pauline view is so to identify the believers with Christ as to regard their death unto the flesh in order to live after the spirit as already complete in Christ's death. The difficulty of this view has led men to regard Christ's death as *for* us but not *in* us. Christ died for us, not we in him and he in us. But Paul never presents Christ's death as a substitution for ours in the sense that we need not die as well. Christ's death is *for* us in two senses. (1) We being dead under the curse of the law, the Son of God, in order to save us from the consciousness of being apart from God, had in some way to put himself in that condition too; to put himself under the curse of the law and thus die too. How he could do this, how he could share our flesh without sin, how he could even be made sin in principle or possibility without actual sin, is a great difficulty. But such is the Pauline view. (2) Death, which the law produces, becomes death 'to the law' that we may 'live unto God.' It only becomes so because the Son of God has shared it. The man, dead through the law, dead as conscious of alienation from God, finds that the Son of God has partaken of this death. The death then takes a new form. Instead of being separation from God, it becomes the emptiness which is ready to be filled with God; the crucifixion of personal desire and pretension in order to the reception of communicated life.

Is not this, it may be said, a juggling with the double meaning of 'death'? How can moral death be the beginning of spiritual life? It must be remembered that the 'moral death' which Paul describes in the seventh chapter as the result of the action of the law in relation to the flesh, is not a state of habitual indulgence in sin. It is a state in which the consciousness of sin is at its height, but the habit of wrong-doing at its minimum. To a man in this state, to whom the flesh presents itself as an impassable wall between himself and God, the Son of God is presented 'in the flesh,' within the wall, and at once the wall is broken. The Son has shared his flesh and his death, and thus 'condemned,' or broken the power of, sin in what seemed its necessary seat, the flesh. Death, caused by the flesh and the law, becomes death to the flesh and the law. Sometimes he is spoken of as dead to them, sometimes they are spoken of as dead to him.

It is essential to the deliverance that this death is not the individual's own act, but the act of the Son of God putting himself in his place; but this is a substitution within the man, not without him. The Son's putting himself in man's place means that he becomes the 'quickening spirit,' which is Christ in him (Rom. viii. 9, foll.; 1 Cor. ii. 16; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Gal. i. 16; Eph. iv. 22; Col. i. 27).

Thus death, according to Paul's experience, has two sides; death *under* the law or *in* the flesh becomes death *to* the law and the flesh; but only through Christ's participation in it. Through that participation, through God's putting his Son in our place, the death becomes a resurrection, the beginning of a new life. The Son is the spirit. His presence in the flesh, his revelation in the man, means that a new mind takes the place of the 'mind of the flesh,' even within the flesh. Thus as we are in Christ and he in us, the 'righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us'; the righteousness of God, the perfect relation between us and God, which we might have attained under the law, if we could have fulfilled the law, but which we did not attain because the attempt to fulfil the law, as an external ordinance, defeats itself, is communicated to us in principle, and we have now to re-enact it in our conduct in a new way, namely as knowing that God 'worketh in us.' This knowledge renders the life in the spirit, though the walk to which it leads consists of acts outwardly like those enjoined by the law, wholly different from the life under the law. 'It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me.' The life, already perfect in Christ, the sanctified life, or spiritual walk, already complete in that consciousness of adoption which comes of the recognition of Christ as dying under our conditions, *i.e.* in the flesh and under the law, complete in it as the necessary effect in the cause, is to be gradually exhibited in our walk. This is our 'sanctification.' We cannot 'walk after the spirit,' that is, in consciousness of the communicated mind of God, so long as his will is presented to us externally as 'a letter.' We receive this life in principle by appropriating or 'putting on' (Gal. iii. 27) Christ through faith. The annihilation of personal pretension, which is effected by the operation of law on the conscience, becomes, by the manifestation of the Son of God, bearing the curse of the law, the reception of God, reconciliation with him, the

establishment of his righteousness (*i.e.* the consciousness of a perfect relation with him) in us. This is our 'justification.'

To the legal consciousness, to the man who has been living under the law without fulfilling its requirements, there seems to stand a long score against him in the account of God. He is under 'condemnation.' Till the score has been blotted out, he cannot be reconciled to God, and hence cannot receive the spirit, which is the sole possible source of new life. The score is blotted out by the death of Christ, regarded as a sacrifice (Rom. iii. 25; v. 1, 9 foll.; 2 Cor. v. 19). Is the sacrifice his suffering, as a penalty, or his perfect obedience? Because salvation is of grace, every condition of it must be the act of God; must be of him working for us and in us, not of ourselves. There *is* a condition on our part, namely faith; but this is the negation of self-assertion, the simple receptivity of God. To Paul, humanity in its perfection, or as it is to be, is gathered up in the Son of God, the second man, as in its temporary corruption it was gathered up in Adam. Thus in the work of the Son the whole work of our salvation, as a transition from death to life, from sin to righteousness, has been completed. In him all died (died as the consequence of sin and under the penalty of the law) unto sin and unto the law, and all live, live in the spirit, as he is the spirit; live in freedom, as having the mind of God for an inward principle, not an outward restraint. This death and life in principle or in idea have to be actualised in our walk; but the possibility of such actualisation in our walk depends on their previous achievement in principle, on the deliverance from the burden of that exclusive personality which brings with it the sense of responsibility, while at the same time it finds itself powerless to do that for which it feels itself responsible. Man cannot get to God till he knows that God has already come to him; cannot escape the bondage which consists in the consciousness of God as an external lawgiver, until God presents himself to him as under the law which seems to separate him; cannot fulfil the law in loving his neighbour until he knows that God has loved him and his neighbour with an equal and prevailing love.

The difficulty in this conception of the work of Christ is that it seems to imply, since man is bound in sinful flesh and liable to the penalty of the broken law, that the Son of God, in order to that identification of man with himself which is

his reconciliation with God, should also take the fleshly nature, which is the principle of sin, and bear the penalty of the law, that is, endure the consciousness of an alienation from God, which was in itself impossible. The difficulty is essentially the same as that which meets the philosophers, who regard humanity as a manifestation of God. Admitting that the sin of humanity means its incompleteness, and is in perpetual process of disappearing, yet how should the complete manifest itself in the incomplete? How should God empty himself of himself in order to a perpetual re-filling? The great point is to have an expression of the fact, though the how and the why be unanswerable. The theological conception involves the further difficulty which arises from the idea of the manifestation of God in humanity as having taken place once for all at a certain time and place. Yet this way of conceiving the idea has, as a matter of fact, been the source of its power over mankind. Paul puts the paradox without mincing in the words, 'he became sin for us, who knew no sin.' That is, he became sin in its principle and source, that is the flesh, who knew no actual sin, had not the consciousness which comes of broken law (Rom. vii. 7). Hence the crucifixion of his flesh was 'death unto sin.' 'He that is dead,' through the extinction of that which is the seat or source or organ of sin, is so set free from sin that he is constituted righteous. This indeed is involved in the 'dying' of 'one for all.' In Romans viii. 3, the expression is modified; 'in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin.' Thus man, being in sin and consciousness of God's wrath (which means his own alienation from God), finds the Son of God putting himself in the same condition; finds God coming near him in his sins; so far from 'imputing his trespasses' he finds that he is putting his Son into the state which results from these, in order to deliver man from them; and thus, as in the Son, he is delivered from condemnation. He is saved from the evil conscience, which means conscious separation from God, and is the true penalty of the broken law. The perfect obedience of Christ becomes his, so that he starts fair for the new walk, conscious of God, not as angry with him for breach of the law, but as helping him. 'Christ is the end of the law.' 'Much more by the obedience of one shall the many be made righteous.'

This is the main notion of the 'substitution' of Christ in

Paul; a substitution not external to us, but which holds just so far as we are in Christ and Christ in us. But as there is a more external view of the penalty for the broken law, so there is of the death of Christ which delivers us from that penalty. To the legal conscience, the penalty of non-fulfilment is regarded as apart from the act or state of non-fulfilment, as suffering of some sort superadded. To remove the apprehension of this suffering it is that the propitiatory sacrifice is instituted. From this point of view, in order to attain 'the righteousness of God,' there must not only be perfect obedience (this we attain as partakers of Christ's obedience), there must also be satisfaction for sins that are past. This is undoubtedly the requirement of the legal conscience.

The 'righteousness of God,' as equivalent to the perfect relation between man and God, can undergo no change *ex parte Dei*. On the part of man's consciousness it is interfered with (*a*) by the sense of merited condemnation, (*b*) by the supposition that God is careless of sin, owing to the apparent 'remission of sins that are past' (*πάρεσις τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων*, Rom. iii. 25). Of course those who experienced the first could not also be liable to the second, and except in this passage the latter notion does not appear. From the first man is relieved by the appearance of the Son of God as taking upon him our sins. This implies not only his being 'made of a woman,' and thus taking on him flesh which is sin in principle, but also his being 'made under the law,' and thus bearing its penalty in his death. He thus relieves the conscience from the sense of having so deserved God's wrath as that communion with him was impossible. As relieving conscience from this burden, his death is a 'propitiatory sacrifice.' Then the question (for us moderns) arises, did Christ, in his death, really undergo God's wrath, as represented by the *quantum* of suffering adequate to what is due for the sins of all men? or did he merely relieve the smitten conscience from the sense of God's wrath by bringing God near to it in reconciliation even under its sinful conditions? Once put the question in this distinct form, and we must admit that the latter is the only moral view; but to Paul it did not present itself in this distinct form. The latter view expresses the spirit of his doctrine; and against the former it may be truly urged that his whole conception of the scheme of the world implies that 'while we were

sinners God loved us,' and that his wrath against us was only on the part of our conscience, and that Paul nowhere speaks of the Son as meeting his Father's anger, nowhere quantifies the penalty due to sin. On the other hand he certainly did regard Christ in the crucifixion as bearing the curse of the law, and so bearing it as that henceforth we should be exempt from it (Gal. iii. 13; Rom. iii. 25, 26). He holds it, further, to have been such a payment of the penalty required by the law as vindicated God's righteousness against the second supposition mentioned above. 'For God to have justified man (*i.e.* given man such a consciousness of a satisfactory relation to God as can alone set him free to walk after the spirit) without a previous payment of penalty due for past sins, would have been incompatible with justice': such is clearly the drift of Rom. iii. 26. Upon this the religious moralist will rightly say that the penalty of sin is inevitably borne in the consciousness of alienation from God which it produces; that there is no other penalty but this, which is untransferable; and that the only deliverance from this lies in the transformation of that consciousness of alienation from God (through the abandonment of personal pretension) into the consciousness of his love. Such a transformation Paul had himself experienced according to chaps. vii. and viii., the condition of it to him having been the manifestation of God in Christ under the circumstances which seemed to separate from God, his manifestation in the flesh and his death to sin in the flesh. Thus, though he did think of the death of Christ as a death in which the penalty of sin was paid, his essential thought of it was as of a death 'unto sin,' in which we ideally partake, while at the same time, by the new consciousness of God's mind towards us which it gives, it enables us gradually to actualise this ideal death unto sin as a new 'spiritual walk'; and his thought of the death of Christ as a payment of the penalty passes into the latter thought, which is what really gives his doctrine its great moral value.

As there are passages which convey the notion that Paul represents God as treating Christ as other than he is, so there are passages which convey the notion that he represented him as treating man as other than he is, as imputing to him a righteousness which he has not (*e.g.* Rom. iv. 5). God, it is supposed, punishes Christ in the

character, which does not really belong to him, of a sinner, that he may be enabled, compatibly with his justice, to treat man as being what he is not, namely righteous. We most nearly approach the Pauline notion of imputed righteousness when we say that it is a righteousness communicated in principle, but not yet developed in act. Just as God makes Christ sin in principle, so he makes us righteous in principle, with the difference that in the former case the principle could not be actualised, in the latter case it is evermore being actualised. The subjective side of justification is the deliverance from condemnation (Rom. viii. 1), from the sense of hopeless alienation from God, which is effected by the thought of God having lovingly come near us in our sins, a deliverance which is the condition of the 'new walk.' Its objective side is identification with Christ, our participation ideally (in the sight of God) in his death unto sin, of which the condition on our part is merely faith; in other words, that we do not refuse it, but open ourselves to it.

The distinction which popular theology draws between 'justification' and 'sanctification' does not, in that form, occur in Paul. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 30, *δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις* ('righteousness and sanctification and redemption'). He constantly indeed implies a distinction between righteousness realised, and righteousness in principle, but mainly by a difference of tenses. The same terms are applied indifferently to one and to the other: comp. Rom. v. 9, *δικαιωθέντες* with *δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται* of v. 19; and viii. 24, *ἐσώθημεν*, with v. 9, *σωθησόμεθα* (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 2 and Eph. ii. 5). The meaning of 'faith' as the condition of justification on the side of the believer varies from the simple hearing (*ἀκοὴ πίστεως*, Gal. iii. 2) or receiving of the gospel, which is the beginning of the christian life, to that faith in the Son of God by which the christian lives (Gal. ii. 20): just as there is the difference between the communication of Christ in principle and in actuality, so there is a difference, in the case of faith, between the initial act of the christian life and the faith which is said to 'work by love' (Gal. v. 6). In all its shades of meaning it still expresses the attitude of moral receptivity, but varies according to the object received through it, viz. Christ's death, or the whole spiritual life of Christ.

We cannot understand the importance which Paul attaches

to the 'hearing of faith' and the 'imputation of righteousness,' except in relation to the judaic conception of a righteousness to be attained by works. We must suppose a man seeking 'glory, honour, and immortality,' by the works of the law, fearing tribulation and anguish if he fail to do these works. Such a man finds that he cannot do them; the motions of sin remain quickened into clearer consciousness by opposition to the law; he thinks of God as his enemy; there lies on him the load of great transgression, the due penalty of which must prevent his starting fair on the new life; to him Christ's death appears as the penalty paid, he has only to abandon his own pretension and accept God's promise by faith, and he is set straight with God, justified, reconciled. To such an one the 'hearing of faith' is a relief from the sense of wrath. Or again one may think of the case in relation to the zealot for the law, who believed himself to be fulfilling the law, and prided himself on partaking in the exclusive privilege (in the sight of God) of the chosen people. To such an one the ἀκοὴ πίστεως, the adoption of the belief in the Messiah crucified by the privileged people, meant an abandonment of the old fleshly religion (fleshly because exclusive and self-assertive), and the acceptance of a religion as a gift of God to all men. Hence the 'hearing of faith,' as the central act of the new spiritual life, had to Paul an importance it can hardly have to us. To us the important thing is the new walk itself, which to Paul is the appropriation or the realisation in ourselves of the life of the risen Christ.

But then, if we take 'faith' in the fuller sense as the 'faith that works by love,' which love is the fulfilling of the righteousness of the law, what becomes of the antithesis between faith and works? The true contrast between faith and works is twofold.

(1) The distinction (valid for Paul rather than for us), between the acceptance of the gospel as the message that God has sent his Son to save *all*, and the view of the zealot for the law. (2) The distinction (valid for all time), between the individual working as from himself, and working as from God that worketh in him. The former is the only 'working' opposed by Paul to the true fulfilling of the righteousness of the law, which is called νόμος πίστεως, *i.e.* the fulfilment of the law as from God that worketh in us. Just as Paul talks of the life in the spirit as the fulfilment of the δικαίωμα

νόμου, so he speaks of justification as δικαίωσις ζωῆς; that setting right of the individual with God (a change on the part of the individual, not of God), which is the condition of the life that consists in consciousness of communion with God (Rom. v. 18). The same notion occurs v. 10, the walk according to the spirit being a communication, according to Paul, of the risen life of the Son. Thus faith, as the subjective condition of such justification, which in its turn is the condition of the spiritual walk, is the fulfilling of the law (iii. 31).

The next point to be considered is the account given of the new life, its gradual fulfilment and realisation, in chapter viii. In this chapter justification is especially presented as δικαίωσις ζωῆς, 'justification of life.' The principle of this new life is the presence of Christ as the 'new man,' in antithesis to the Adam or 'old man,' in the individual and in his personal self-consciousness, *i.e.* his spirit. It is the life in which the self-consciousness recognises itself as a communication of God practically, in the new walk which is the fulfilment of righteousness. The principle of self-consciousness is what he calls the 'inward man' (ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, vii. 22), and 'mind' (νοῦς, vii. 25). Really it is the spirit of God, but at that stage in which it is described in Gal. v. 17, as still struggling with the flesh, weak, and impotent to overcome it. Hence, as the consciousness of the individual is weak, Paul generally calls it not 'spirit' (πνεῦμα), but 'mind' (νοῦς). The condition of its seeing that it is the communication of God is the manifestation of God in his Son. This manifestation delivers the spirit from its bondage, and starts it on the new life, of which the main manifestations are (1) freedom, (2) love. Apart from the eighth chapter of the Romans, the passage which gives Paul's views in the most concentrated form is 2 Cor. iii. 17, foll. 'The Lord is the spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is' (*i.e.* where the Lord is manifested as the spirit) 'there is freedom.' Comp. Gal. iv. 4, 5, 'God sent forth his Son . . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons,' and John xv. 15, 'the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; I have called you friends.' In Gal. v. 13, the connection of freedom and love is brought out; 'use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another.' Comp. the whole of 1 Cor. xiii. The aspects of spiritual freedom may be gathered up by con-

trasting them with the different forms of bondage to which it is opposed. (1) What Paul speaks of in Gal. iv. 3, as bondage to 'the elements of the world' (*τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*). As instances of this bondage he gives the observance of days and months and times and years; and to submit to Jewish ceremonialism he denounces as equivalent to returning to nature-worship. (2) Bondage which consists in fear. It is produced by the law, as a system of moral commands presented from outside, with no strength to obey in those to whom it is presented. The deliverance from this bondage of fear is the communication of the divine spirit presented as an inward principle, not as external (as it had been presented by the law). (3) Bondage of ignorance; the bondage of the slave who 'knows not what his lord doeth'; who has no spiritual insight into the mind of his master.

With Paul, freedom is specially the antithesis of that sort of bondage which is presented in the epistle to the Corinthians, viz. the freedom of those who have the spirit, 'searching all things, yea, even the deep things of God' (1 Cor. ii. 6, foll.) This knowledge of God, which consists in the communication of the spirit, is the open vision of God in contrast with the veiled vision of Moses, which the Jews had, whose glory was 'to be done away' (2 Cor. iii. 7, foll.) Still the word *κατοπτριζόμενοι* (2 Cor. iii. 18) conveys the notion of a limited vision. The face to a believer is unveiled, but there is a contrast between the beholding the face of God as 'through a glass' (1 Cor. xiii. 12) and the vision that is to be.

This brings us to the next great point to be noticed about the spiritual life, not yet fully realised even in the ideal man. Though in many places Paul speaks of adoption as already complete, yet sometimes, as in Rom. viii. 23, he speaks of it as incomplete; 'waiting for the adoption;' there still remains a deliverance of the body to be achieved. The spirit till then is merely a 'first fruit' (*ἀπαρχή*, viii. 23), or 'pledge' (*ἀρραβών*, 2 Cor. i. 22). Again in 2 Cor. v. 2, foll., he speaks of the distress of the body, the deliverance of which consists in being 'clothed upon with the house that is from heaven.' In 2 Cor. iv. 7, he says, 'we have this treasure in earthen vessels'; and in 1 Cor. xv. he speaks of the resurrection of the body wrought through the spirit, which is Christ. Till the final deliverance, the attitude of the chris-

tian is one of hope (Rom. viii. 24). In Gal. v. 5, the 'hope of righteousness' represents the 'waiting for the manifestation' of Rom. viii. 19, and the 'waiting for the adoption' of Rom. viii. 23; 'we look for righteousness as the object of our hope.'

The delivery from the 'bondage of corruption' (Rom. viii. 21), must not be confused with that from bondage to the flesh (*φρόνημα σαρκός*, the self seeking principle). There seem to be three senses of the word 'death' in Paul, two moral and one physical. (*a*) Death *in* sin, Rom. vii. 9, &c. (*b*) Death *unto* sin, or with Christ, 2 Cor. iv. 10; Rom. vi. 8, 11, &c. (*c*) Death of the body, which is indeed the result of sin, but from which death unto sin does not, at least immediately, save us (Rom. viii. 10). So conversely with the word 'life,' which implies (*a*) being alive without the law (Rom. vii. 9): (*b*) alive unto God &c. (Rom. vi. 11, 13; Gal. ii. 20): (*c*) future (physical) life (Rom. vi. 8; viii. 11.)

Does Paul really keep these meanings apart, *e.g.* in Rom. viii. 10, 1 Cor. xv. 22? The body, as the 'natural body' (*σῶμα ψυχικόν*), or the 'earthly man' (*ἄνθρωπος χοϊκός*), is the seat and source of sin, which is the cause of death, of death to the body in which sin has its seat (Rom. v. 12; vii. 24). In 1 Cor. xv. 22, all, it is said, die in Adam, because all sinned in him. But Adam stands for the 'earthly man,' and this, again, is equivalent to the sensuous nature, or the body. 'Physical death' and 'sin,' being alike the results of the 'fleshly' or 'bodily' nature, came to be blended; though strictly, according to Rom. v. 12, physical death and sin are not co-ordinate results of the flesh; sin is the direct result, and through it physical death. The crucifixion of Christ's body is regarded as, in idea and principle, the deliverance from the fleshly nature or 'earthly man' for all men, and thus from the consequences of that nature, (1) sin, (2) physical death. As in him, by faith, we are already, by imputation, the 'righteousness of God' (2 Cor. v. 21), henceforth 'the spirit is life because of righteousness' (Rom. viii. 10); *i.e.* because we have become the 'righteousness of God' in Christ, the communicated spirit, which is at once Christ's and ours, acts in us as a source of life, of 'walking according to the spirit'; a 'justification of life,' in virtue of the life within us of the risen Christ or the spirit, is being wrought in us. Christ's rising thus primarily

means for us deliverance from sin, as appears from 1 Cor. xv. 17. But, though death is the result of sin, Christ's condemnation of sin in the flesh, though a deliverance from the 'fleshly mind' (*φρόνημα σαρκός*), does not as yet carry deliverance from death. The figure in 1 Cor. xv. 56, representing sin not as the cause but as the 'sting' of death, gives us a formula to express the continuance of physical death after deliverance from sin, which is lacking so long as sin is represented as the cause of death (*cessante causa, cessat et effectus*). Death remains, but without its sting. But the destruction of death, even though its sting has been drawn, is part of the work of Christ yet to be fulfilled (1 Cor. xv. 26).

Paul's idea of death is affected by two Jewish notions; (*a*) that without the body there is no life in the full sense, no participation in the kingdom of God; (*b*) that the death of the body is the penalty of sin. The second gives place to the truer notion, that *φρόνημα σαρκός*, the self-seeking reason, or reason as taking an end to itself from the lower nature, *is* sin in principle; but the Jewish idea is not quite lost. In Paul it derives a meaning from the fact that the body seems the channel of communication with the world of human society, through which the disorganisation of that society caused by sin is brought home to the 'regenerate' individual. Thus a death of the body, caused by sin, seemed to be constantly going on. Of course it is not really through the body, as the animal organism, that this sin makes itself felt by the saint; nor is the dissolution of the body in any way the result of sin; but this does not affect the essential truth of Paul's view of the necessary incompleteness of the saint so long as he is in the world. The first view survives in the notion that the work of the quickening spirit is not complete without the raising of the body. Paul's doctrine on this point commends itself to the conscience of most christians, because by the 'unbodied spirit' they understand something out of relation to the world. Some constituents of human worth, they think, would be wanting to such a spirit. The glorified body represents to them those relations, which make us what we are as men, in some higher form.

'Moral life' is a process in which we become less and less mere parts of the world, determined by natural influences, but not thereby less related to the world. That

relation to it which consists in understanding, and love determined by understanding, gradually takes the place of that which consists in animal affection. The 'glorified life' must be thought of as the completion of this process. A renewed 'embodiment,' if it means anything, would be but a return to that condition in which we are but parts of nature, a condition from which the moral life is already a partial deliverance.

The resurrection of the believer, with Paul, is constantly assimilated to the resurrection of Christ. It is part of the same 'quickening' work. Hence arises a difficulty. While the resurrection of Christ is only the quickening of his body, since Christ was subject to no 'deadness in sin' from which to be quickened, on the other hand our resurrection in and with Christ is essentially a rising again from sin, and the quickening of the body yet to be achieved is merely a sequel of this. According to 1 Cor. xv. 17, had Christ's body not been quickened, the effect to us would have been, not the non-resurrection of the body, but the absence of spiritual resurrection; we should have been 'yet in our sins.'

How is this to be explained? In the case of Jesus, according to Paul's notion, since the 'quickening spirit' or 'spirit of holiness' already constitutes his personality, the spiritual quickening is *ipso facto* complete. For him, as perfectly holy, having 'known no sin,' just as for the christian, so far as he is perfectly holy, there only remained the quickening of the body. But that quickening of the body was the effect, and at the same time the *ratio cognoscendi*, of the indwelling spirit. In so far as the raising of Christ's body was at once the effect and sign of his perfect spiritual life, this spiritual life is spoken of as a resurrection; it is identified with its most striking effect. In participating in the spiritual life of Christ, as the ideal christian does, we are said to share his resurrection. There still has to be achieved that final effect of the quickening of the spirit, namely the deliverance from the 'bondage of corruption.'

EXTRACT FROM LECTURES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

The Incarnation.

i. 14. ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο ('the word became flesh').

'Became flesh' does not mean 'became human,' took for the first time a human nature distinct from the divine, which yet in combination with it formed 'one person,' Christ. The word, according to this evangelist, is true man, no doubt, but is so from eternity: see iii. 13; vi. 38, and 62; iv. 26; viii. 58; xiii. 19 (ἐγώ εἰμι); and compare 1 Corinth. 15, 47. The general idea of 'flesh' in the Pauline epistles and the fourth gospel is determined by its opposition to 'spirit.' Primarily it is the animal element in man, sense and appetite, or the objects of these. But in man sense and appetite are not what they are in animals. They are not so, because they take a new character through the action of reason (the divine principle) upon them. Appetite becomes a source of pleasure sought for by the self-seeking and reflective principle; sense becomes a source of delusion in virtue of the knowledge-seeking principle, which takes the first impressions of the senses for the truth. For a mere animal there is no selfishness and no delusion, because it has not the reason which renders alike selfishness and self-negation, delusion and true knowledge, possible. In the New Testament 'flesh' generally means sense and appetite *as these are for man, i.e.* false intellectual interpretations of sensation, and sensual pleasure selfishly sought; in other words, delusion and vice. From this again it comes to mean human nature as subject to delusion and vice, human ignorance and selfishness. 'Flesh' thus comes to be treated as a principle of evil antagonistic to the spirit; see iii. 6, viii. 15 (where it is spoken of as the source of delusion) and Gal. v. 17. It is in the primary sense that the word becomes flesh, that is, as becoming the object of sense, or apprehensible to the senses; which implies also (though this notion is secondary in the fourth gospel) that he shares sense and appetite: comp. Heb. ii. 14, καὶ αὐτὸς παραπλησίως μετέσχε τῶν αὐτῶν, *i.e.* αἵματος καὶ σαρκός. The incarnation is a manifestation to those whom otherwise sense renders blind to God; a manifestation which to those who are thus blind is the condition of knowing

God in spirit. The fleshly manifestation by no means constitutes spiritual knowledge of God, but is the needful preliminary to this with 'fleshly' men. (See 1 Epist. of John, iv. 2; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Rom. ii. 28.)

The prevailing view with Paul is that the 'flesh' separates from God; prevents the divine law from entering the man as a principle of action; so that the effect of law upon those in the flesh is to give knowledge of sin, which thus becomes 'more exceeding sinful.' This fleshly barrier between man and God is broken by the manifestation of the Son of God under conditions which seemed to separate from God; the manifestation 'in the likeness of sinful flesh' (Rom. viii. 3). By this 'sin is condemned in the flesh,' almost in the sense in which it is said in this gospel that the 'prince of this world is judged' (xvi. 11); in the sense that sin is exhibited in its true nature in relation even to the flesh; shown not to be the true law of the fleshly existence; to be that which God does not intend to prevail in the flesh. To 'take flesh' is one thing; to take flesh (as the subject and object of sense, and the source of appetite and want) *in the relation in which this stands to man*, is another. If 'flesh' really cannot be assumed in the latter sense except as sinful (a source of sinful interests), Paul cannot think of the Son assuming it *as sinful*: hence he only says 'the *likeness* of sinful flesh.' Yet to 'take flesh,' unless it is taken as determined by relation to that which is primarily the self-seeking principle in man, is not to become a 'man like one of us.' Nor is it consistent with the thoughts of Paul or the author of the fourth gospel to speak of the 'word' or 'Son' as having become a 'man like one of us.' The most that Paul says is that 'he was found in fashion as a man' (Phil. ii. 7 and 8). The passages which come nearest to the subsequent theological view are Heb. ii. 18 and iv. 15; but a person 'tempted like as we are, yet without possibility of sin' is not a man like one of us: not a man of the only sort with which we are acquainted.

Doubtless the 'Son of God' was to Paul, as more clearly and definitely to the writer of the fourth gospel, 'perfect man'; but (*a*) not in the sense expressed by saying that he was a 'man like one of us'; (*b*) not so in virtue of being sent 'in the likeness of sinful flesh.' He is so as the 'ideal man,' man as an object to the mind of God, and thus already, from eternity, for God, what we are becoming through that change

'from glory into glory,' which Paul considers to be going on in believers through the operation of the spirit of God (2 Cor. iii. 18). The sending of the Son 'in likeness' is the condition of our becoming thus changed, but it is not in virtue of it (according to Paul's view) that the Son (the 'heavenly man,' the 'second Adam,' the 'lamb slain from the foundation of the world') becomes 'perfect man.' In order to become 'man' he does not need to take the 'body of our humiliation' (Philipp. iii. 21), though he does so out of the fulness of his grace and condescension. He is man already in that 'body of his glory' to which he returned, carrying by anticipation all believers with him, upon his deliverance from the 'body of humiliation.' It is, perhaps, not easy to prove that Paul thought of 'the body of his glory' as belonging to the Lord from eternity; but there are certainly no traces of the contrary view, that this 'body' first comes into being at his resurrection. The ascription of it to the Lord from eternity would be quite natural to one who identified the Son with the 'Angel of the presence,' through whom the glory of God was manifested under the old dispensation and whom cotemporary Jews spoke of as the Shechinah. *σῶμα τῆς δόξης* naturally means 'the body belonging to his glory,' and his glory is that which he receives from full intercommunication with the Father, of which the incarnation is in some way an interruption, and hence a *κένωσις* (Philipp. ii. 7).

In the fourth gospel the 'flesh' which the word becomes is thought of specially as having been, till he took it, the source of ignorance. In becoming flesh, he does not so much assimilate himself to us in that which had hitherto been the source of violations of the law (as in Paul's view) and which henceforth is ceasing to be so, as become 'apprehensible to our senses' (xiv. 9, *ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακε τὸν πατέρα*). The incarnation is thus of a kind with the miracles, as it is characteristic of this gospel to regard them, viz. as 'signs' (*σημεῖα*), manifestations to sense, which are granted indeed out of condescension to human weakness, but which it still is a weakness to require (iv. 48; xx. 29). The manifestation of the word in the flesh is the preliminary condition of communication with God through the spirit; but not only is it not itself that communication, but the word must withdraw from the flesh before that communication can take place; (vii.

39; xvi. 7). His glorification (also called his 'lifting up') is the 'giving up' (*παράδοσις τοῦ πνεύματος*, xix. 30), in which the spirit (which is the word) returns from the world (xvi. 28; xvii. 11), in other words from its tabernacle in the flesh, to the Father, in order to come back to the believers as the indwelling spirit (xiv. 17 and 18). While with them, he could not be in them: while present to sense, he could not communicate himself spiritually. We cannot understand the 'becoming flesh' as equivalent to becoming man, without supposing that the word was understood by the evangelist to cease to be man when he withdrew from the flesh, as according to the evangelist he undoubtedly did when he 'gave up the ghost' (*παρέδωκε τὸ πνεῦμα*). Σάρξ, 'flesh,' is not convertible with *σῶμα*, 'body.' Every 'flesh' is 'body,' but not *vice versa*. See 1 Cor. xv. 38–44, *σὰρξ ἀνθρώπων, πτηνῶν, σώματα ἐπουράνια*; Philipp. iii. 21, *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως, τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης*; Rom. vii. 4, 5, *ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . ὅτε ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*; Coloss. i. 22, *ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*; ii. 11, *τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός*; Eph. ii. 15, *τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ καταργήσας*. Σάρξ in the fourth gospel carries with it *ψυχή* as the principle of animal life; x. 11, 15, 17, *τίθημι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων*; so xiii. 37, 38; xv. 13; xii. 25, *ὁ φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολέσει αὐτήν*; xii. 27, *ἡ ψυχή μου τετάρακται*. Such 'troubling' of the soul as is mentioned in the last passage is to be distinguished from the troubling of the 'spirit' (xi. 33, *ἐνεβριμήσατο τῷ πνεύματι*; xiii. 21, *ἐταράχθη τῷ πνεύματι*). Ἐμβριμᾶσθαι, according to the examples, can hardly be understood of anything but indignation; an indignation of which the divine principle in Christ is the subject (comp. iii. 36, *ὀργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ*). What is he indignant at? At the carnal mind which required a sign, and could not believe in an eternal life overcoming death without it (xi. 24, foll.)? Can this be reconciled with v. 15 (*χαίρω δι' ὑμᾶς, ἵνα πιστεύητε, ὅτι οὐκ ἤμην ἐκεῖ*)? The cause of indignation must in any case be connected with the sight of Mary weeping and the Jews weeping with her. Meyer thinks the latter is the special provocation, the hypocritical sympathy of these Jews with Mary, who were all the while full of hatred against him. Other views are that it was the power of death; unbelief of the sisters; unbelief of the Jews; or the reflection that he had not been able to prevent this calamity. It may be that

his spirit is indignant at human weakness; at the 'mortal yearning' expressed by the weeping, which at the same time in virtue of his 'flesh' or 'soul' he cannot help sharing, just as in xii. 27 he cannot help a momentary shrinking from death.

There is a special difficulty as to the meaning of 'flesh' in vi. 51, 'the bread which I will give is my flesh, &c.' The 'living bread' is first identified with the person of Christ; 'I am the bread of life' (v. 48); then apparently with his 'flesh,' which he gives or surrenders, but which (according to the ordinary meaning of 'flesh') is by no means his person, and which in v. 63 is specially distinguished from the 'life-giving spirit,' as that which 'profiteth nothing.' The life-giving spirit of v. 63 must be that which is intended by the life-giving bread of vv. 50 and 51, and it is opposed to 'flesh.' Again in v. 56 ('he that eateth my flesh, &c.') the 'eating my flesh, &c.' constitutes the 'dwelling in me and I in him'; and such dwelling of the believer in Christ and of Christ in the believer is equivalent to the communication of the spirit, which again consists in love and knowledge (see xv. 4 and 9; xvii. 23; 1 Epist. iii. 23, 24; iv. 16). Can the 'flesh,' then, here spoken of be the flesh or bodily life which Christ lays down in death (x. 15; xv. 13)? Of this it might indeed be said that it was 'given for the life of the world,' but this is not the person of Christ, which, as dwelling in the believer, constitutes eternal life. The giving up of Christ's life in the crucifixion is, indeed, according to the evangelist, the condition of the communication of the spirit, but the flesh or bodily life given up is opposed to the spirit, so opposed to it that while it remains the spirit cannot be given.

The only possible conclusion is that though in the 'flesh and blood' spoken of there is a reference to the death of Christ, yet they here represent not that which died on the cross, but his spirit or true person, which was sacrificed or devoted from eternity in a manner of which the death on the cross was only a sensible sign. Thus here 'my flesh' means 'my sacrificed person'; that person which came down to do the Father's will' (vi. 33, 38, 50, 58; comp. iii. 13), and did it more sensibly in the physical dying upon the cross; the 'lamb slain from the foundation of the world.'

The disciples, like 'the Jews' (v. 52), understand him 'carnally,' and find the saying 'hard' (v. 60). To them he

makes explanations, while to the Jews he had only repeated the scandalising utterance in a more scandalising form. 'What and if ye shall see the son of man ascending where he was before?' he says to the disciples; 'if you regard my person in this limited sensuous way, if you understand the 'flesh' I have spoken of as literally what you can see and handle, what will you say if you see me ascending up where I was before, and thus showing perfect freedom from this flesh; showing that it is the 'heavenly man' of which I would have you 'eat and drink' in order to eternal life? That in virtue of which I shall thus ascend, that which is alone the life-giving bread for you, is the spirit which alone quickeneth, while the flesh, of which you think I am speaking, profiteth nothing. In the words that I have spoken (in the preceding discourse), that is, in the mind which those words convey,[1] the mind given up to doing the Father's will, lies this quickening spirit: but the condition of receiving it is that faith which some of you have not.' Why then is 'flesh' introduced in v. 51, if it is to be understood of the spiritual person of Christ, and not of his flesh in the proper sense? The commentators generally take it either of Christ's body given up on the cross, or of his earthly or sensible manifestation generally. The answer seems to be (1), that as out of the assimilation of the person of Christ to 'bread from heaven' arises the presentation of the process of appropriating his person (comp. Gal. ii. 20) under the figure of eating, so out of this again arises the presentation of the spirit thus appropriated under the figure of flesh and blood. (2) The devotion of Christ's spirit or person which the believer is to share in and make his own, has its 'sign' in the crucifixion of his body and the shedding of his blood. In vv. 51 and foll. there is a blending of the 'sign' and that which it represents. The crucified flesh and blood shed are presented as that which the believer has to appropriate, subject to the explanation in v. 63. Just as in xix. 36 the crucified Jesus is spoken of as the antitype of the lamb (comp. 1 Cor. v. 7) which was eaten at the passover, so here the flesh and blood, which represent his devoted spirit, are to be in figure eaten and drunk. (3) There may be a reference to the eating bread and drink-

[1] For the 'words' of Christ in the sense of the mind they convey, as equivalent to the spirit through which he dwells in believers, comp. iii. 34; vi. 68; viii. 47; xii. 47; xv. 7.

ing wine in the Lord's supper, as representatives of Christ's body and blood. Whether we accept such reference or no, really depends on whether we take the words to have been actually uttered by Jesus or no. If they were so uttered, he cannot have meant to convey a reference to a rite which had not yet been instituted. All that could plausibly be held would be that participation in his devoted spirit was represented verbally under the same figure under which it was afterwards represented by an act at the last supper. If we take the words not to be an historical utterance of Jesus, we may suppose that the evangelist, the eucharistic rite being in existence as a symbolical eating and drinking of Christ's body and blood, at once availed himself of it as a figure to express the spiritual union with Christ, and by so doing sought to give a higher and more spiritual significance to the rite.

Just as the person of Christ in this gospel always appears as simply the divine word, or spirit, or 'son of man which is in heaven,' though he has for the time come down from it, not as a person made up of this *and* a 'reasonable human soul,' so there is no mention of his birth or growth. On his first appearance in the gospel, he is already all that he ever is during the time of his manifestation to sense. Supernatural knowledge appears in i. 49; comp. ii. 25 and vii. 15. The explanation of this is the complete and constant communication of the Father's mind to him (viii. 26; xv. 15). All his acts are done with a complete consciousness of the divine plan to which they belong, the plan of sensible manifestation to men. So far as these imply a separation from God, such as is implied in the incarnation as such (comp. xiv. 28; xvi. 28; xvii. 5 and 11) and in acts like the prayers of xi. 41, 42, and xii. 27, 28, the separation is for man's sake; and though the evangelist will not represent it as unreal (to do so would be inconsistent with his great purpose of showing that a manifestation of God in the flesh had taken place once for all) he does represent it as accompanied on the part of Christ by the consciousness of a complete participation of the divine glory. The 'glory' is eternally shared by him with the Father, yet the participation has been suspended in order that he may return to it. If it is said that these are incompatible propositions; that the 'humiliation in the flesh' could not be real, if the 'divine glory' was the eternal possession of the Son and therefore not to be suspended; the

answer is that such incompatibility is necessarily involved in the conception of God's manifestation of himself in the world and in the moral self-abandonment which is the completion of all the processes of the world, as an event that once took place in time.

On the importance which the evangelist attached to the reality of the fleshly manifestation of the word, compare 1 Epist. i. 1, foll., where we have a more emphatic assertion of what is stated in the gospel i. 14; compare also 1 Epist. iv. 2. The 'docetism,' however, which these passages have in view is not one which denies a distinct 'reasonable soul and human flesh' or manhood, which in combination with the word becomes the person Jesus Christ, but one which denies the reality of the manifestation in the flesh of the pre-existent Jesus Christ. The evangelist had before him two tendencies, the prevalence of either of which would have prevented christianity from becoming what it has actually, in its best form, become, a means through which unphilosophical men have come to think of and worship God under the attributes of perfect moral life. One was the tendency to regard Jesus simply as the true Messiah, as Son of God and Son of man, in a way differing in degree but not in kind from David or the prophets; the saviour of the Jews and of that enlarged Israel to which believing gentiles were admitted, who had wrought miracles and been raised from the dead, but was not God manifested for all men. The other was the gnostic tendency to interpret the story of Jesus into a process of 'becoming,' by which a philosopher might explain to himself the relation of God to the world, or the transition from absolute to relative existence. If these two tendencies had been left to go on apart, in virtue of the former christianity would have become merely a higher and purer form of that which mahometanism afterwards became; while the latter would have been one more theosophy, which would have had no lasting effect on the moral and religious life of men. If christianity was to be in any sense a religion for all time and all mankind, it was essential (1) to substitute for the gnostic development of things as they are, through a series of æons half mythological and half metaphysical, out of a God who does nothing and of whom nothing can be known and said, the simple idea of God manifesting himself, and manifesting himself fully only, in the moral life of complete self-devotion.

(2) If, again, this idea was to take hold on men, it must connect itself with the belief in the events of a life actually lived on earth, and find expression in a society free from all conditions of place or nation or ceremony, and held together merely by common thought about God. These results are attained by the combination of the two tendencies spoken of; a 'chemical combination,' one in which each takes a new and higher form from contact with the other. Thus combined, they yield the belief that God, having always manifested himself in nature and providence, manifests himself finally and completely in Christ, as, in the first place, having lived in the flesh a life of complete unity with God and abandonment of self, and, secondly, continuing to live in a mode of which this life in the flesh was a condition, in a spiritual society in which all men should be drawn to him and to God through him. Of this belief, already virtually the belief of Paul, the detailed application to the story of Jesus is furnished by this gospel, to which, therefore, it is equally essential that the reality of the sensible miraculous acts, especially the resurrection, ascribed by the Jewish disciples to Jesus of Nazareth, should be asserted as against the gnostic interpretation of them into eternal but not historical processes (an assertion put most emphatically in the words 'Jesus Christ has come in the flesh'); and that, as against the Ebionites, the person to whom the acts were ascribed should be regarded as the eternal word or spirit, still operative in the christian society, so that the 'cultus' of Jesus may amount to the worship, through love and knowledge, of God as a spiritual being, immanent in the moral life of man.

The words 'tabernacled among us' (ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, i. 14) further illustrate the mode in which the evangelist conceived the incarnation. The 'flesh' is a temporary resting-place of the word or spirit, in which he dwells with us; which the spirit must occupy, but from which it is equally necessary that he should withdraw, in order to his communication to men. To the 'flesh' of Jesus are transferred the conceptions which had been attached to the tabernacle, especially in the mind of the prophets and later Jews. (See Levit. xxvi. 11, 12; Ezech. xxxvii. 27; xliii. 7; Ecclesiasticus xxiv. 8, 9, where 'wisdom' is spoken of; Rev. vii. 15; xxi. 3. Comp. also John ii. 21; 1 Cor. iii. 16; Col. ii.

9; and for the notion of temporariness attaching to 'tabernacling,' 2 Cor. v. 1). As in the tabernacle the 'divine glory' was behind a veil, so the revelation of God through the word, so long as the word remains 'in flesh,' is behind a veil, which the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews (x. 20) regards as broken in Christ's death; just as our evangelist identifies the glorification of Christ, the full manifestation of his glory, with his return to the Father in death, which is the condition of his return to us in the spirit (vii. 39; xvi. 7). The veil of his flesh must be broken in order that Jesus may enter into his glory. He enters into it for us, and enables us to enter with him ('that where I am ye may be also,' xiv. 3), which is the same thing as God's entry into us through the spirit, because through his putting off the flesh which he had assumed we are enabled to put it off too, to break the barrier which it presents to the spiritual communication of God. There is, no doubt, a difficulty about the view of our participation in Christ's death, which Paul represents as the condition of his living in us, and equally about the connection between the death of Christ's flesh and the new spiritual life in us, according to the view of this gospel; because the 'flesh' means different things in relation to us and in relation to the eternal Son. In relation to us it means 'selfishness,' in relation to him not. How should Christ's putting off of the flesh enable us to put it off, and thus to become 'born of the spirit' (iii. 6), when our putting it off means really something quite different from what it can have meant to one to whom it was no impediment to communication with God? There is no sufficient logical answer to this question. The possibility of identifying that death to the flesh on our part, which is the condition of being born of the spirit, with Christ's death on the cross, arises (*a*) out of the view of Christ's death in the flesh as the 'sign' of his eternal self-sacrifice, and (*b*) out of the unconscious blending of the 'sign' with the thing signified.

In the words 'we beheld his glory' (*ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ*, i. 14), does the writer mean to represent himself as an eye-witness of Christ's life on earth? What sort of 'beholding' is intended? a *θεωρία νοητική*, as one of the Fathers calls the Baptist's sight of the spirit 'descending like a dove,' or as sensuous as the 'handling' of 1 Epist. i. 1, would seem intended to be? What is the 'glory'? It must

mean the glory exhibited in the incarnate life of the word, if the 'beholding' is sensuous, the beholding of the apostles, with whom the writer means to identify himself. Yet how can this be, if the 'glorification' of Christ is identical with his withdrawal from the fleshly life to the Father in his death? In asking such questions, we are introducing distinctions which were not present to the mind of the evangelist, distinctions the presence of which would have rendered the writing of the gospel impossible. Two kinds of sight are included under the term *θεωρεῖν* and *ὁρᾶν*. Comp. xiv. 19; xvi. 10, 16; and xiv. 9 with i. 18; 'no man hath seen God,' yet 'he that hath seen Christ hath seen the Father.' This cannot mean 'hath seen the Father sensuously,' since the Father cannot be so seen. Yet as little can it mean that he that hath seen Christ sensuously hath seen the Father spiritually. The seeing of Christ, then, must mean a spiritual sight, an intellectual apprehension of him, which is not merely speculative, but also moral, *i.e.* leading to action. In xiv. 19, 'yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more, but ye see me,' 'see' (*θεωρεῖ*) in the first clause cannot mean the same as 'see' (*θεωρεῖτε*) in the second; but it does mean the same as 'see' in xvi. 10 and 17. Again, what is the meaning of 'ye shall see me' (*ὄψεσθε*) in xvi. 19? It may be taken of a sensuous seeing after the resurrection, but, if so, it conveys a different notion from 'ye see me' (*θεωρεῖτε*) in xiv. 19, which must represent that continuous state of beholding which is different from an event or events of sensuous seeing. There is a like ambiguity about the 'glory.' If it is not sensible, the incarnation is unmeaning. Yet only upon the withdrawal of Christ from the flesh does the 'glorification' take place. If the 'glory' is that which the believer sees after the word has ceased to be sensible, how can his becoming sensible be a manifestation of his glory?

The 'sensible glory' is glory exhibited in the 'signs' (xi. 40, *ἐὰν πιστεύσῃς ὄψει τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ*), but only for those who believe are the 'signs' such an exhibition. In the other gospels belief on the part of the person upon whom the miracle is wrought is the condition of its being wrought. It is not so here; it is not meant that Martha's belief is the condition of Lazarus being raised, but that the raising of Lazarus, if she believed, would be to her, what it was not to the Jews, a 'sign' of the glory of God. But a 'seeing'

thus conditioned is not a sensuous seeing, nor the 'glory' a sensible glory. It is not to be supposed that the evangelist was distinctly aware that he was using the same word in different senses. Undoubtedly he held that the 'word' became apprehensible to the senses. If we could have asked him whether by the 'sight of Christ' he meant merely a way of thinking about God, he would have said 'No.' Still it is a 'sight,' according to him, which only a way of thinking renders possible. So far as sensuous seeing goes, the Jews see as much of Christ's glory as the disciples; yet not of them would the evangelist say 'they beheld his glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, &c.' This, it will be said, means that to see Christ we must have the 'eye of faith.' Well, but this at any rate implies that to the mind of the evangelist 'seeing' depended on 'believing,' not 'believing' on 'seeing'; which again implies that the 'faith' of which he speaks is not, and does not include, acceptance from others through tradition of the so-called 'reports of their senses.' Yet such acceptance is what people mean by 'faith' when they make it a part of faith to believe on the authority of the gospels, or on any other authority, that miracles were really wrought. The 'faith' of which the evangelist speaks is the practical consciousness of God, which overcomes the selfish will (called 'the world' in 1 Epist. v. 4; comp. John v. 44). Such 'faith' enables the believer to see the 'glory of the only-begotten' by reading aright the 'signs,' or manifestations to sense, of the word or spirit, which to 'the Jews' (though, in respect of the relation to sense they were the same to them as to the disciples) were no manifestations at all; and the sight of the glory again gives a higher character to the 'faith,' transforms it into consciousness of a 'sonship of God' partaken in by all believers, through which 'faith' becomes 'love' (1 Epist. iv. 16; John xvii. 26).

This is the evangelist's view. We, looking back, may hold that it was 'faith' which led to the supposition of the signs having been granted, and was as well a condition of their being read aright, and that such an opinion does not detract from the character of christianity as a revelation, since it merely means that God reveals himself through a state of the human mind to which under certain conditions a belief in miraculous events is incidental, instead of through the actual occurrence of such events. To the evangelist,

however, the occurrence of such events seems essential, though (*a*) faith is not derived from them, but is the condition of the right interpretation of them, and (*b*) the highest faith can dispense with them. See xx. 29, 'blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed,' a passage which, like the whole account of the appearances at the resurrection, brings into the strongest contrast the evangelist's belief in the fact of a sensuous manifestation of God in Jesus (which he does not scruple to put into the most paradoxical form, *e.g.* the body which Thomas feels violates all the known conditions of body, v. 26), and his counter-judgment that only in and for the spirit can God be manifested at all. The value of Thomas's experience lies, not in its sensuous character, but in the consciousness of God which he attains through it ('my Lord and my God'), and which he *should* have attained without it. It is because the evangelist blended, or (if you like) confused, the sensuous seeing and the spiritual cognition, while yet he makes the latter the one thing needful, that this gospel has filled the special function of presenting the highest thought about God in language of the imagination, and has thus become the source of the highest religion. All religion (as distinct alike from thought and morality) consists in the presentation of the objects of thought under the forms of imagination. The value of the religion depends on the adequacy of the imagined form to the object thought of (to which it never can be quite adequate). To think of God, and to give expression or realisation to the thought in moral life, that is our first and eternal business; but that is not distinctively religion. For religion to exist, we must in some mode imagine God, and the most nearly adequate imagination of him is as a man in whom that which seems to be the end of moral discipline and progress has been fully attained, viz. the union of the will with God, perfect unselfishness, the direction of desire to ends which one rational being can consciously share with all other rational beings. Such a 'man' would not be man as we know man, because the conditions of human existence in this world are such that this end can never be completely attained. Thus the religious imagination of God as Christ has to become the imagination of him as a 'glorified' Christ; a Christ such as Jesus of Nazareth was potentially, not actually; a Christ 'put to death in the flesh,' but alive and giving life in the spirit.

In other words, though the religious imagination may require, as historically it did require (whether it does is not so certain), (*a*) a belief in the manifestation of God under the ordinary conditions of an individual human life as its starting-point, it equally requires that this belief should pass into (*b*) a belief in a person now spiritually present to and in us. This transition is specially represented by the 'gospel according to John,' which retains (*a*) but has its permanent value in the transformation of it into (*b*).

FRAGMENT OF AN ADDRESS ON THE TEXT 'THE WORD IS NIGH THEE.'

(Rom. x. 8; Deut. xxx. 14.)

It has been sometimes remarked that if all the New Testament had been lost to us except some half-dozen texts, the essence of christianity would have been preserved in these, so that out of them everything in it that is of permanent moral value might have been developed; and if there can be an essence within the essence of christianity, it is the thought embodied in the text I have read; the thought of God, not as 'far off' but 'nigh,' not as a master but as a father, not as a terrible outward power, forcing us we know not whither, but as one of whom we may say that we are reason of his reason and spirit of his spirit; who lives in our moral life, and for whom we live in living for the brethren, even as in so living we live freely, because in obedience to a spirit which is our self; in communion with whom we triumph over death, and have assurance of eternal life. In this thought to St. Paul, as to us, lay the one sole and sufficient evidence for religion, or, more properly, it constituted a religion which was its own evidence. The belief in miracle was not its source but a mode, to him a natural mode, in which it found expression. Theologians, scarcely able to compass the thought, have tried to find in this expression of it a proof of its truth, and the inevitable failure of this procedure has combined with that misinterpretation of the connection between the natural and moral, which has hitherto accompanied the growth of physical science, to diffuse a suspicion that the thought itself is unwarranted or unmeaning. Even those who resist the suspicion, yet prove its influence by seeking shelter in authority, 'emotion,' or possible unknown secrets of nature, for a belief which has no real defence but its intrinsic truth. I propose

therefore to consider whether we are rationally entitled to the conception which was the kernel of St. Paul's christianity and which still seems the only foundation for a religious morality. In doing so it is best to avoid taking advantage of the language which has grown out of the conception for the purpose of commending the conception itself; or at any rate not to allow ourselves in the use of it till we have found whether prevalent ways of thinking, which logically render it unmeaning, have reason on their side or no.

Of late years philosophical controversy has taken a direction which brings it more closely home than ever before to the practical, personal life of those within the range of its influence. It is quite true that men who would express their theological beliefs in seemingly almost contradictory ways may yet be morally and spiritually at one, nor is anything more mischievous than the tendency to turn a moral terror to account for the purpose of interfering with or hindering the natural course of philosophical opinion. But when the old questions about God, freedom, and immortality are being put by each man to himself in the direct and popular form which they have now assumed, as questions bearing upon his own life, it is idle to deny that he is a different man according to the answer which he gives to them. Is there a character which he may and ought to form for himself, irrespectively alike of what he is inclined to, and of what is expected of him? is there a God with whom, as the imperfect with the perfect, yet as spirit with spirit, he may converse? is he partaker of an eternal life, so that what he is, and not merely what he has done, is untouched by physical death? these are questions which a man may perhaps answer affirmatively with little practical result, but which he can scarcely answer in the negative without serious effect, not necessarily on his outward course of action or on the character which he presents to other men, but in the long run on the inner life, on the character which he would present to one who could see it from within, and which he can scarcely help regarding, in spite of his creed, as alone of eternal value. Yet the arguments in favour of the negative answer are, it must be admitted, more obvious and readily apprehensible than those on the other side. A writer who would meet them satisfactorily has to go farther back than men without leisure or faculty for much consecutive thinking are able to go with

him. Hence on the part of some, to whom their practical acceptance seems to empty human life of what is highest and most beautiful in it, we find a tendency to trust merely to authority for their resistance; a fatal mistake if the authority is external, the authority of a book or a person or convention, for once let the conflict be presented as one between reason and authority, and just those nobler elements of character which it is feared that popular materialism will undermine will be enlisted in its defence. Yet there is a certain sort of authority to which, for a man who has not time to be a philosopher, when the question is one which touches the theoretic foundation of his practical creed, the appeal must lie. It is the authority of what he is apt to call his conscience, the authority of his own moral nature. Of this, however incompletely it may be actualised in himself, he in a sense feels the possibilities, unless selfish interests have closed the avenues of his heart, through sympathy with the higher life of society about him. It is an ultimate fact of which the true interpretation is all-important, while an explanation of it, in the sense of a reason why it is so, is sought to no purpose. Yet it is not like a fact in nature, which remains the same, interpret it how we will. The danger is lest a false or misapplied philosophy should teach us to interpret it amiss. It is rather like such power over nature as is dependent on our understanding it aright. Or, more precisely, it is a fact which in each of us exists as a possibility of which the full realisation is impeded by a false interpretation of it. Hence the practical danger, and the need of so much, and only so much true philosophy as will enable us, while giving the methods of physical science their due, to understand what there is to which they do not apply.

There is a conception to which every one who thinks about himself as a moral agent almost instinctively finds himself resorting, the conception variously expressed as that of the 'better,' the 'higher,' the 'true' self. This conception, I believe, points the way to that true interpretation of our moral nature, which is also the only source of a true theology. All systems of ethics either directly or indirectly depend upon it. They either recognise it as their governing idea, or avail themselves of it where it has been ostensibly ignored or set aside. They cannot do otherwise without ignoring what is distinctive in that of which they seek to

form a theory. For what is a moral action? Whatever else it may be, it is at least an action determined by desire for an object which is not merely presented to the agent, but which he presents to himself as his own end. The action of a machine or an animal is neither moral nor immoral, because on the part of the agent there is either no consciousness of an end or no consciousness of a self which makes the end its own. The same is true of actions done by a man either under compulsion, or instinctively, except so far as through some action properly moral or immoral he is accountable for subjection to the compulsion, or for the formation of the instinct. Now to act for an object which I present to myself, or make my object, is to identify myself with it, and thus to desire to be something which I am not, but which I conceive myself as able to become. Moral action, then, as determined by such desire, is an expression at once of conscious contrast between an actual and possible self, and of an impulse to make that possible self real; or, as it is sometimes put, it is a process of self-realisation, *i.e.* of making a possible self real.

There may probably at first seem to be something offensive in the doctrine that the 'possible self,' the realisation of which is the source of all action that can properly be called moral or immoral, is God, and that in our identity with it lies the true unity with God. Before it is rejected, however, let it be understood. On a first hearing it may seem to imply that God does not actually exist at all, but is a mere name for an empty ideal of what each of us would like to become. This is a misapprehension, which a better understanding of the relation between actual and possible will remove. That which from the point of view given by our ignorance and want is merely possible, from a truer point of view is actual; and conversely that which to us is real, is in truth only the possibility relative to what, if we knew more, we should know to be real. The present reality of the self, when we speak of trying to become something which we are not, with which its possibility, as a subject of desire, is contrasted, consists in what each of us in any stage of development happens to be. Only so far as my present condition is thought of as reality, does that which I seek to become appear a mere possibility. From another point of view the present condition is the possibility, to which the correlative reality is the more perfect man resulting. To anyone who understands a

process of development, the result being developed is the reality, and it is in its ability to become this that the subject undergoing development has its true nature. The actual at any stage of the process is not; while that which at any stage is, we have to call the possibility of that which is not.

Thus if the ever new desire to be something other than I yet am, which is the source of the moral life, is determined by laws, different indeed from those of nature but not less definite and inviolable, the end to which it is relative, though in contrast with any stage of the moral life it as yet is not, is still the truly real, while the apparently real is no more than its possibility.

To say then that God is the final cause of the moral life, the ideal self which no one, as a moral agent, is, but which everyone, as such an agent, is however blindly seeking to become, is not to make him unreal. It *is*, however (and this may seem at once more presumptuous and less reasonable) in a certain sense to identify him with man; and that not with an abstract or collective humanity but with the individual man. Let us consider in what sense. An assertion of identity, it must be remembered, not only admits of but implies difference or change. There is no meaning in the statement that the pen I now hold in my hand is identical with that which I observed some minutes before, unless reference is made to the difference between the times of observation. When we speak of the identity of the body in youth and age, we have in view the sameness of organisation determining a constant flux of material. Wherever unity of principle or law runs through any process of change, there the different objects which result from the process at its several stages have a real identity with each other, though they be as different as the oak from the acorn or the complete animal from the embryo; and on the recognition of the difference depends the significance of the assertion of identity. We need not be frightened then from the doctrine that man is identical with God on the ground that it makes God 'no more than' man. On the contrary, such identity, unless further specified, would be compatible with God's being so far more and other than man as to be of no more concern to him than Epicurus held his Gods to be. The whole force of the doctrine lies in the interpretation of the identity claimed for man with God as an identity of self with self. The acorn

is in possibility identical with the oak, but the oak is nothing to the acorn. That is, the acorn has no consciousness which its virtual identity with the oak affects. The identity exists, not for it, but for a consciousness to which oak and acorn are alike relative. But in the process constituting the moral life according to our interpretation of it, the germ and the development, the possibility and its actualisation, are one and the same consciousness of self. That in virtue of which I am I, and can in consequence so set before myself the realisation of my own possibilities as to be a moral agent, is that in virtue of which I am one with God. Does not this, it may be said, imply the ascription to God, not indeed of merely animal passions, for unless the animal consciousness is a self-consciousness, the animal is not identical with God in the sense in which man is, but of what is worse, human selfishness and sin? Undoubtedly it implies that but for the identity of consciousness between man and God, man would not be a sinner, for the condition of sin is that consciousness of self in which this identity consists. But the source of selfishness and sin is also the source of that which overcomes sin. Sin is the effort to actualise one's possibilities in that in which they cannot be actualised, viz. in pleasure. It is gradually being overcome, while perhaps it seems to be gaining strength, in the moral discipline which directs the same effort after self-realisation into a truer way of attaining its end; and this discipline lies in the perpetual sense of failure and disappointment, in the remorse and despair, in the self-contempt and self-reproach, of which only a self-seeking subject is susceptible. Thus through 'mortal yearnings' we ascend towards a higher object; through influences born of self-consciousness the presentation of a self satisfied by that which cannot satisfy is superseded as the moral motive by that of a self actualised in a life like itself eternal. Sin then, in itself, though not for the consciousness of the sinner, is no final reality, but only the possibility of this adequate actualisation of self in which it is overcome; and in saying that God is this adequate actualisation, the final reality to which all our possibilities are relative, we have said that in him sin as sin is not, but only sin as overcome. At the same time (and this truth is complementary of the other), but for his communication of himself to us in possibility, as our self, we could not be sinners.

Our formula then is that God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities, the completion of that which, as merely in it, is incomplete and therefore unreal; that in being conscious of himself man is conscious of God, and thus knows that God is, but knows what he is only so far as he knows what he himself really is. Before we approach the consequences of such a doctrine, certain inevitable objections to it must be met. It will be said in the first place that the self of which we speak is a mere fiction of speech, a verbal abstraction mistaken for a reality. The reality is a thread of consciousness, *i.e.* a succession of feelings. Among these are included some of a particular kind, derived perhaps from experiences of resistance, at any rate having a psychological history, which we call states of self-consciousness. By a familiar process of logical abstraction we detach one factor of these states from the rest, and call it the self. Meanwhile a like logical process has brought us to think of there being one substance to which all the phenomena of feeling may be referred as attributes, and we find a designation for this abstract substance in the self, which is in fact a residuum from our descriptions of one sort of these phenomena. Those again who would not admit that our personality can thus be explained away, would yet protest against what they would call the false anthropomorphism of ascribing to it an existence beyond the limits of the human experience which is our only warrant for saying that there is such a thing. They find it indeed to be characteristic of our inner life that it is not a mere succession of feelings, but that its present state is what at any moment it is only in virtue of being consciously a modification of the same subject as its past. This, they would say, is a primary fact of human experience, just as on the other hand the existence of matter or force is a primary fact in our knowledge of nature, and, because primary, inexplicable. But though we cannot explain it, they would add, we know what it is not. Personality is a characteristic of the limited, relative, antagonistic life of each of us. To talk of a universal self, even of mankind, is only legitimate so long as we understand that it is an abstraction of what is alike in the infinitely various personalities of separate men; and if there really were such a self, to identify it with God would be as absurd as to hold that man, the creature of a day, is the

universe. We might with at least as much reason say that matter is God, and with so much more plausibility as there is a better case for deriving personality from matter than matter from personality. In fact our most searching inquiries leave personality and matter over against each other, each irreducible to the other. To identify God with either would be to leave the other as a limitation on his being. The only course which does not land us in contradictions is to admit that we have no reason to suppose, or rather that we cannot suppose, though we may talk of doing so, any personality but that with which our individual experience makes us acquainted, and of which the attributes are as incompatible with an absolute being as are those which experience of nature reveals to us. We may amuse ourselves with guesses about a great personal demon, as about a single primitive force; but God, if he is to be God, can neither be such a demon nor such a force. Either there is no God, or God is the unknown.

There is much in this language which represents a lower stage of reflection on our knowledge of the world than that which modern philosophy may fairly claim to have reached. To say so offhand indeed may naturally seem presumptuous, while fully to justify the statement would involve an inquiry beyond our present limits. All that can be here attempted is a summary view of the position from which any inheritor of Kant's inquiries may deem himself entitled to start. It has become a commonplace among us that all which we know consists of phenomena and their relations, but the true import of this doctrine is seldom realised. In its common application, it tends rather to hinder us from recognising the function of thought in the constitution of the known world, than to deliver us from oppression by the outsideness and beyondness under which we have learnt to figure the relation of that world to ourselves. Yet if it means anything, it means that the world, which alone we know or can know, consists in relations to consciousness and in relations of those relations. Space, time, matter, motion, force, are not indeed modes of consciousness, but apart from consciousness they would not be. We use words without meaning when we talk of a time when as yet consciousness was not, of an endless space without a mind, for time and space alike are abstractions from relations between phenomena. They are creatures of reflection upon related presentations to consciousness which can

be related to each other only in virtue of their equal relation to a single subject of the presentation. Neither the relations of succession and externality, nor the empty forms which we construct by abstraction and substantiation of them, are possible except as resulting from the unity of a thinking consciousness. To speak of a time before such consciousness, of a space outside it, is to say of it what can only be said of a phenomenon related to other phenomena in time and space; and if it were such a phenomenon, there could be no phenomena so related, for the condition of their relation is such an equal presence of thought to each, as is incompatible with its being here not there, there not here, after or before any of the elements which it combines as successive. . . .

[*Unfinished.*]

THE WITNESS OF GOD

'Christ our passover is sacrificed for us: therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.' 1 Cor. v. 7, 8. (*Read also the previous part of the epistle.*)

In the chapter from which this text is taken, St. Paul has been speaking—hurriedly as of a thing not to be dwelt upon—of a case of incest which had occurred among the Corinthian christians. Earlier in the epistle he had rebuked them more at large for the contentions among them, for the judaic or anti-judaic partisanship which, here as elsewhere (Gal. v. 20), he traces to the same root of carnality as what are commonly called sins of the flesh. 'Whereas there is among you envying and strife and divisions, are ye not carnal and walk as men?' All the while, it seems, they were boasting of their privilege as 'spiritual,' as 'free,' as 'wise in Christ.' St. Paul fully admits their privilege. Ideally they were the temple of God, and the spirit of God dwelt in them, communicating a wisdom which the natural or carnal man could not receive. They had the mind of Christ, in virtue of which they might search all things, even the deep things of God. In the risen Lord, whose was the earth and the fulness thereof, all things were lawful unto them. All things were theirs, whether the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come. Yet the very assertion of the privilege, as the Corinthians asserted it, belied it. They made it a ground of conceit, of selfishness, even of sensual licence, and in so doing showed that it was not actually theirs. In the exaltation of their new deliverance they were losing the moral result which gave that deliverance its specific value.

The essential opposition, according to St. Paul's conception, between the wisdom of God which he preached and the religions which it was to supersede, lay in its character as at

once a gift and a universal gift. It was thus opposed alike to the gentile and Jewish religions, and to the wisdom of the world. The gentile religions were inventions of men, 'changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things.' In the nature of the case they were exclusive. They rested on fictitious systems of priesthood or caste or local worship, limited by time and place, by national superiority, even by the forces of nature. Those who lived under them were not yet properly moralised. They had not realised their spiritual community; or, in Pauline phraseology, they were in 'bondage under the elements of the world.' Nor had the Jews escaped this bondage. They had lived under a system which was indeed, in one sense, the gift of God, as having a special pædagogic purpose in his counsels. The law was properly a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ; but in so far as its temporary disciplinary character was lost sight of—so far as it was made a ground of national exclusiveness, and its observance a matter of personal pride—it cut its votaries off from the righteousness of God, which is essentially a derived, communicated, and universal righteousness; not of works, but of grace; not for a peculiar people, but for all men. They were living, not in the freedom and self-abandonment of the spirit, but in the exclusiveness and selfishness of the flesh. Nay, as observing days and months and times and years, they were like the heathen nature-worshippers, under the elements of the world. Their religion was not properly a moral one, but still determined by nature and sense.

The 'wisdom of the world' was weighted by a like burden of the flesh. Its fault did not lie in its aspiration, or in any inherent impotence of man to know the things of God. On the contrary, 'that which might be known of God'—his intelligible nature—'was manifest in man' (Rom. i. 19), if man would but open his eyes to see it: and the effort to know him fully in whom were hid the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, as St. Paul tells us of himself, was the labour of his life (Phil. iii. 10; Col. ii. 3.) But the aspiration after knowledge and God is one thing, the aspiration of self-conceit another; and, in the eyes of St. Paul, the intellectual movement of the gentile world had been of the latter sort. As the Jew, going about to establish his own righteousness,

had not attained unto the righteousness of God, so the Greek, seeking for a wisdom which should be his own discovery, not a revelation of God's spirit (1 Cor. ii. 10), had lost at every step what he seemed to be finding. The wisdom which he gained was in word, not in power. It had no power over his will. It helped him not to attain to the new life, to the emancipation from sense, to the resurrection of the dead. On his heart, in the study of his poets and philosophers, as upon the Jew's in the reading of Moses, the veil remained—the veil of self-regard and sensuous judgment. Poring on himself, and looking askance at his fellow, his face was not open to the glory of the Lord, and hence was not changed into its image. When that glory was manifested in a body of humiliation, in the baseness of the cross, blinded by the shows of flesh, he could not recognise it. It was foolishness to him. If the princes of this world crucified the Lord of glory, its wisdom—or, as we should say, its enlightenment and cultivation—had been no wiser. It had taken sides with the princes, and thought scorn of the crucified. Till its own flesh had been crucified—till it had ceased to be a wisdom of the world, *i.e.* a self-seeking wisdom, and become a wisdom of God, it could do no other.

To this vain wisdom of the world, as represented by Greek enlightenment; to its self-righteousness, as represented by the zealous for the law; to its sensual religiosity, as represented by the impure worships described in the first chapter of the epistle to the Romans, St. Paul opposes the wisdom, righteousness, and sanctification which Christ 'is made unto us of God.' Can we penetrate behind the cloak of theological artifice with which this language has been overlaid, to a meaning true, permanently, and for us?

Christ is to St. Paul, essentially, if not solely, the crucified and risen one. Whatever he knew of the life of Jesus of Nazareth—and there is no reason to think that he knew anything of its details—was, at any rate, absorbed and lost in his contemplation of the finishing act by which it became purely spiritual and heavenly—of that death unto sin in virtue of which Christ lived eternally unto God. The death and rising again of the Christ, as he conceived them, were not separate and independent events. They were two sides of the same act—an act which, relatively to sin, to the flesh, to the old man, to all which separates from God, is death;

but which, just for that reason, is the birth of a new life relatively to God. This act, again, though St. Paul doubtless identified it upon its several sides with the crucifixion of Jesus upon Mount Calvary, and his resurrection on the third day, was not to him an historical event, in the past now as beforehand it had been in the future. Though they are not St. Paul's own words, yet it is quite in his spirit to say that Christ was slain from the foundation of the world. Christ was that second man, who is the Lord from heaven. He was God's power and God's wisdom. God was in him, so that what he did, God did. A death unto life, a life out of death, must, then, be in some way the essence of the divine nature—must be an act which, though exhibited once for all in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, was yet eternal —the act of God himself. For that very reason, however, it was one perpetually re-enacted, and to be re-enacted, by man. If Christ died for all, all died in him: all were buried in his grave to be all made alive in his resurrection. It is so far as the second man, which is from heaven, and whose act is God's, thus lives and dies in us, that he becomes to us a wisdom of God, which is righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. In other words, he constitutes in us a new intellectual consciousness, which transforms the will, and is the source of a new moral life. In considering how this is, we shall find the practical realisation—and with it the explanation and necessity—of that conception of the resurrection as eternally wrought by God, which might otherwise seem abstract or mystical.

The wisdom of the world comes to nought, because it puts its own pretension between itself and God. It will not die that it may live. It will not renounce the sensual view of things and cancel the conceit which grows from this view, that it may open itself to the true knowledge, which can only be received as a revelation of God. This wisdom represents the mental state of what St. Paul calls the carnal or natural man. It is overcome by the exhibition in Christ of that other mental state, in which self is renounced that God may be known. This is the mind of the spirit. If it were a condition, however, which the individual could attain by his own effort, it would merely be the glorification of the wisdom of the world. It would be a self-renunciation which would be the acme of self-seeking. On the other hand, presented

as the continuous act of God himself, as the eternal self-surrender of the divine Son to the Father, it is for us and may be in us, but is not of us. Nay, it is just because not of us, that it may be in us. Because it is the mind of Christ, and Christ is God's, in the contemplation of it we are taken out of ourselves; we slip the natural man and appropriate that mind which we behold. Constrained by God's manifested love, we cease to be our own, that Christ may become ours. We are conformed to the image of the Son, we receive the spirit of adoption, we have the wisdom of God.

Thus that which Stoicism could not do, 'in that it was weak through the flesh,' is achieved in Christ. The true wisdom which comes with self-abandonment is attained without neutralisation by personal pride developed in the process of attainment. To him who thus gains it, it means a change of ideas, a new view of the world, which gradually refashions his life. 'Old things are passed away, behold all things are become new.' Even upon the natural world he looks with altered eyes. It is no longer to him a field for complacent curiosity to roam in, but the first stage of God's revelation of himself. He finds the whole creation groaning and travailing after God; dying because it cannot contain him, yet waiting for, and leading up to his manifestation. (Rom. viii. 19, 22.) Much more in the conception of the moral life, as the process in which Christ's death unto the flesh that he might live unto God is evermore repeated, has he a new key to unlock its secrets. Thus receiving Christ as his wisdom, and in the new consciousness thus constituted, he is redeemed from the bondage of sin, redeemed from the curse of the law, because he is redeemed from himself. The bondage of sin is that which no discipline, no reformation of the habits, no observance of the law can break. The observance of the law carries its own curse, which is this, that the very act of its fulfilment breeds a new selfishness, and with it a new sin. From this curse there is no redemption but in the substitution of Christ, the new man from heaven, for the old. Our mind must become Christ's, as Christ is God's. Our very self-consciousness, crucified with him, must cease to be our own. Only then can our works, as being of God that worketh in us, work out the true salvation, the deliverance from the self-seeking self. Thus we gain a righteousness which is not after the law, even the righteousness of God; which, be-

cause it is of God, unlike the self-elaborated righteousness of the Jew, instead of exalting men in conceit against each other, blends all in a common society of the redeemed. Thus finally we are sanctified. Bearing each other's burdens, as brethren in the Lord, we fulfil the law. The blood of sprinkling is upon us, the crucified and risen Christ is in us. The self-abandoning self-consciousness, which knows itself as of God, 'flows through our deeds and makes them pure.'

In the above I have tried to reproduce with as much exactness as modern phraseology admits of, and without any conventional use of theological language, the essence of St. Paul's belief in Christ. So soon as we are brought face to face with it, the question inevitably suggests itself—Is not this conception of an eternal act of death into life, manifested in Christ and to be shared in by us, a mere piece of doubtful metaphysics, so hard to be understood that christendom, since St. Paul's time, has been busy in explaining it away, reducing the eternal act into a merely historical one, and the substitution of the new man for the old within us to a forensic substitution without us of Christ's merits for our sins, of the penalty which he bore for that due to us? If the conception has some metaphysical truth, what is its relation to life? In what does the man who has it, and with it (according to our interpretation of St. Paul) the wisdom of God, differ practically from the man to whom it is unmeaning? Do we not, in making righteousness and sanctification issue out of such a conception, reduce these themselves to mere ideas or empty phrases?

To this I answer, that all moral action begins from ideas. If it did not, the effort to persuade men should cease tomorrow. To say then that Christ, as the wisdom of God, is an idea, or form of intellectual consciousness—and what else can St. Paul mean when he says that Christ is the spirit, which God gives us (1 Cor. ii. 10; 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18)?—is the very reverse of reducing him to an impotent abstraction. An idea may indeed, to use St. Paul's phrase, be in word, but it may also be in power. It is in word only, if we regard it as our own invention and glory in it as such; it is in power, if it is the communication of God, and as such received by us. Now this consciousness, of which the presence in us is the presence of Christ—this perpetual withdrawal from sense and self-regard into God—just because it is the presence of

Christ, is the communication of God. It does not thus cease to be intellectual, a mode of thought, an idea. St. Paul constantly speaks of it in terms appropriate to the intellect, such as 'wisdom' and 'knowledge.' But it is a mode of thought which is from eternity, which is of God, not of us, of which we may partake but which we do not originate. Therefore it is 'in power.' It is metaphysical, if you like; or, as St. Paul puts it, it is of faith. It has no representative in the world we see, as we see it. No life that we can live is a full expression of it. St. Paul himself, having already in some sort the mind of Christ, yet counted not himself to have attained it. To know Christ and the power of his resurrection was still a goal towards which he had to struggle. (Phil. iii. 10, &c.) Yet the very condition of the struggle, if it was to be other than the fruitless warfare with himself which he had experienced under the law, and which had only taught him to know sin, was that he should know the resurrection from the fleshly life to be already his in Christ, his in the counsels of God, in the divine idea. This knowledge was the 'earnest of the spirit' (2 Cor. v. 5). Without it all his effort, as it quickened the feeling of self, would have deepened the feeling of alienation; with it, as the things behind were forgotten and the old man daily died, a virtue not his own was being wrought into his life—he was becoming the righteousness of God (2 Cor. v. 21).

In this lay the demonstration of spirit and power (1 Cor. ii. 4). In his own body he bore about the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be manifest therein. But there was another body, which was his as it was Christ's, the body of christian fellowship, where he found such reality of demonstration as mere introspection could not give. Here, too, the stigmata of Christ were graven; here the ministration of righteousness was 'writ large,' not on stone, but on tables of the heart and with the spirit of the living God (2 Cor. iii. 3). In the christian society a new life was being really lived. To this evidence, not to his visions and revelations, St. Paul constantly reverts; and it is one good for all time. For the truth of any practical idea the only possible evidence is its realisation. As the primary christian idea is that of a moral death into life, as wrought for us and in us by God, so its realisation, which is the evidence of its truth, lies in christian love—a realisation

never complete, because for ever embracing new matter, yet constantly gaining in fulness. All other evidence is fleeting and accidental, but this abides. Tongues cease, prophecies fail, knowledge—the mere unrealised idea—vanisheth away; but charity never faileth: and in the higher life of the christian society we may recognise it and make it our own. Amid the luxury and fretfulness, the strife and vainglory, which so noisily surround us, we are apt to ignore it, and thus, while the foundations of practical truth are in debate —while some are requiring a sign, others seeking the wisdom that is in word, others asking who will show them any good —we miss the demonstration which lies nearest us, which may become as near as consciousness itself. Who is there that has not known a simple, self-denying christian, and known that if he would, he might become like him? Perhaps, wrapped closely in the fleece of conceit, we think lightly of such an one. He is not clever, or he has awkward manners, or a mean appearance. His bodily presence is weak and his speech contemptible. Yet his daily life is to him, as it might be to us if we would assimilate it, that sufficient evidence of God's quickening spirit, for the lack of which perhaps we are all the while passionately bewailing ourselves. In little, and on a narrow stage—no wider, it may be, than the duties of a sickly teasing household can afford—he is exhibiting that power of the resurrection which still sends healing to the broken-hearted, deliverance to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind; which sends the missionary to the heathen, the preacher to the poor, the honest student to his struggle with the delusions of sense; because it is the spring of that charity which seeketh not her own and rejoiceth in the truth.

Thus the church has been the witness of Christ in another than the conventional sense: not as the depositary of a dogma reflecting but faintly that original intuition of the crucified and risen one, in the light of which the blind Saul saw the barrier between Jew and gentile, between man and God, disappear; but as the slowly articulated expression of the crucified and risen life. The original intuition, depending, as it seems to have done, on peculiar personal and historical conditions, could never be reproduced in its native form and force. It had to be translated into other terms, which might make it available for men who could not only see through

the eyes of the Jewish and Greek enlightenment of their time. In this altered state it constantly required new supports of the understanding, and suggested new deductions, which have gradually constituted the theology of the church. I do not dispute the value of this theology. Most men, who think on such matters, are so steeped in it, that they cannot read St. Paul intelligently at all, without translating him into its formulæ; and to them it commonly affords that intellectual expression without which they could scarcely sustain themselves in the christian life. But we must not confound the formula with the reality. Dogmatic theology is quite other than the christian life, quite other than the practical idea on which that life rests. The result of their confusion has been that while men such as Spinoza, who had more real hold on the idea, and better understood the spiritual import of the christian resurrection than the dogmatic theologians, have been reckoned, and driven to reckon themselves, aliens from the christian church, the simplicity of the idea itself has been so lost in artificial schemes of salvation, that, apart from these, men cannot recognise it. Thus, to say that the christian life issues from the idea of a denial of self, as eternally wrought out by God but to be renewed by us, and that just because it so issues, it is a life justified and sanctified, though really a return to the simplicity of Christ, seems to many pious men a substitution of moral philosophy for christianity proper. It is not thus that they account to themselves for the work of the quickening spirit in and around them. On the other hand, there are men of pure life, holding heroic warfare with the sensual acquiescence of conventional religion, to whom such a statement seems only a refinement on theological fictions, which they reject. Our prime concern, however, is not with the word, not with the theory of either sort of men, but with the power; and this is the power of a present and spiritual resurrection. In their flesh, *i.e.* in their common affections as transformed into a hunger for God or goodness, the life of Christ is here and now manifest (2 Cor. iv. 11); though with the understanding they thrust it far from them; though the one sort externalise it in a miraculous transaction or event, and the others cannot find in it, thus externalised, the source of their own zeal for man. If we are sincerely sighing for a witness of God's work in

man, the denial of it in word will matter little to us when the affirmation is present in power.

It is in christendom that, according to the providence of God, this power has been exhibited; not indeed either adequately or exclusively, but most fully. In the religions of the east the idea of a death to the fleshly self, as the end of the merely human, and the beginning of a divine life, has not been wanting; nor, as a mere idea, has it been very different from that which is the ground of christianity. But there it has never been realised in action, either intellectually or morally. The idea of the withdrawal from sense has remained abstract. It has not issued in such a struggle with the superficial view of things, as has gradually constituted the science of christendom. In like manner that of self-renunciation has never emerged from the esoteric state. It has had no outlet into the life of charity, but a back-way always open into the life of sensual licence, and has been finally mechanised in the artificial vacancy of the dervish or fakir. We are not on this account to assume, as hasty and passionate theologians would do, that God reveals himself to man in some other form than reason, or that he suddenly set up the christian church as a miraculous institution owing nothing to the other influences of the world, within which all is light, without it all darkness; within which he works unto salvation, without it not at all, or only to condemn and to destroy. Such an assumption is a short cut to conviction which finally leads, as we have daily proof, through a weary round of unbelief. Christianity is cheaply honoured, when it is made exceptional: God is not wisely trusted when declared unintelligible. 'Such honour rooted in dishonour stands; such faith unfaithful makes us falsely true.'[1]

God is for ever reason; and his communication, his revelation, is reason; not, however, abstract reason, but reason as taking a body from, and giving life to, the whole system of experience which makes the history of man. The revelation, therefore, is not made in a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a process of which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of which the

[1] 'His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.'
TENNYSON, *Elaine*.

gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life. In the nations outside christendom, as a matter of history, this complement has not been vouchsafed, or only in the most limited and elementary way. Hence the idea of death into life, which is the seed of the divine in man, has there lain barren. It has continued bare 'grain.' God in his wisdom has not yet given it a body. Yet is it the same seed which, as sown in Jewish prophecy and Greek philosophy, was the germ of the life of christendom. The shortcomings of Greek philosophy are, indeed, obvious enough. They distinguish it essentially from christian philosophy (though the advocates of a thoughtless religiosity would involve both in a common condemnation), inasmuch as the latter has a far higher form of practical spiritual life for its basis. But we must not confound the genuine philosophy of Greece with that wisdom of the world which St. Paul knew to be foolishness with God. It differed from this as much as nowadays the faithful quest after hidden truth differs from the dialectic with which the enlightened man of the world flatters his own conceit and confutes his neighbour's; and to include it under St. Paul's condemnation would be as unfair as to apply to the prophets his view of the carnality of Jewish religion. Greek philosophy, like Jewish prophecy, was essentially a struggle upwards from what seems to what is, from sense to reason, from the flesh to the spirit. One as much as the other issued from an active idea, which is not to be regarded as unchristian, but as an undeveloped christianity. Each too had its practical or social side. If St. Paul all over the Roman world, where he carried the gospel of Christ, had not found, by river-sides or elsewhere, places 'where prayer was wont to be made,'—social prayer, prayer to God in spirit and truth, which is the true continuance of prophecy—where now would have been christian worship? If, again, there had not survived, under the organised selfishness of the empire, the idea of self-sacrificing citizenship, which the communities of Greece had originated and its philosophy expressed and expanded, where now would be christian fellowship? The glory of christianity is not that it excludes, but that it comprehends; not that it came of a sudden into the world, or that it is given complete in a particular institution, or can be stated complete in a particular form of words; but that

it is the expression of a common spirit, which is gathering together all things in one. We cannot say of it, lo, here it is, or lo, there; it is now, but was not then. We go backward, but we cannot reach its source; we look forward, but we cannot foresee its final power. We do it wrong in making it depend on a past event, and in identifying it with the creed of a certain age, or with a visible society established at a certain time. What we thus seem to gain in definiteness, we lose in permanence of conviction; for importunate inquiry will show us that the event can only be approached through a series of fluctuating interpretations of it, behind which its original nature cannot be clearly ascertained; that the 'visible church' of one age is never essentially the same as that of the next; that it is only in word, or to the intellectually dead, that the creed of the present is the same as the creed of the past.

It is doubtless true that the system of practical ideas, or of life resting on ideas, which we call christianity, though its roots are as old as mankind, would not exist but for definite past events and actions and personal influences, and that among these some far outweigh all others in importance. There came one who spake as never man spake, yet proclaimed himself the son of man, and was conscious in the very meanness of human life, in its final shame of death, of the communication of God to himself, and through him to mankind. There came another, who, bringing with him certain 'metaphysical' conceptions, the result of the philosophy of the time, found them in this man, whom death could not hold, suddenly become real: who in spirit, yet with a light above the brightness of the sun, saw manifested in him that which Philo and the stoics knew must be; even the heavenly man in whose death all barriers were broken down, that all in the participation of his life might be equal before God. 'The riches of the glory of this mystery' he preached among the gentiles, even 'Christ in them the hope of glory.' Thus, in sober ecstasy, with visions and revelations and speaking with tongues—in upper chambers, where men breaking bread at their common social meals felt that Christ was among them, and that it was his body they were breaking and communicating—by the foolishness of preaching he founded the christian churches. In a generation or two the intuition of the present Christ, which Paul even in his

lifetime seems to have been unable to convey to others as it was to himself, had faded away. In its stead came the belief in past events, or in present mysterious transactions, external to the man, which had to be stated in a creed. For the spontaneous brotherhood, conscious of itself as one body, and that body Christ's, even as the mind that dwelt in it was 'the Lord the spirit' himself (2 Cor. iii. 17), there arose a regulated and increasingly artificial society, in which the voice of the spirit was represented by the authoritative utterance of a bishop. For the breaking of bread at the social meal, in token of that self-abandoning fellowship of each with the other as members of Christ's body, which was the perpetual renewal of his sacrifice,—for this sacrament of pure sociality—was substituted an exceptional communication of his body to the individual, no longer purely moral, but dependent on material conditions, and mediation of the priest.

Thus Christ, if I may use the expression, was gradually externalised and mystified. The miraculous overpowered the moral and spiritual, as much as in the view of St. Paul the moral and spiritual overpowered the miraculous. In this way, while the christian religion gained in immediate power over the world and adapted itself to men, whose apprehensions were too gross for the Pauline intuition, its finer essence, which could draw to itself all knowledge and all goodness, was overlaid with signs and wonders and mysteries to which, in the long run, both knowledge and the highest goodness must find themselves alien. Yet, when it might be thought that the life of Christ must already have ceased to be a spiritual presence and become a wonder of the past—more, probably, than two generations after St. Paul had gone to his rest—there arose a disciple, whose very name we know not (for he sought not his own glory and preferred to hide it under the repute of another), who gave that final spiritual interpretation to the person of Christ, which has for ever taken it out of the region of history and of the doubts that surround all past events, to fix it in the purified conscience as the immanent God. The highest result of ancient philosophy had been the conception of the world as a system of thought, related to God as his word or expression, *i.e.* as the spoken thought is related to the man. This conception, however, great as it was, did not present God under moral

attributes, nor did it bring him near to the conscience of the individual. But in Christ, the writer whom the church calls St. John saw this divine thought manifesting itself in human life as truth and love, and that not merely or fully through a past visible existence—though such existence had been vouchsafed as 'a sign'—but through a spirit which should dwell in men, drawn out of the world, won from sense and the flesh, for ever. The presence of this spirit was the presence of the Son, so that the perfect knowledge and love which subsisted from eternity between the Father and the Son might be reproduced in men as the knowledge of God and love of each other. 'I will not leave you orphans,' says the Christ of St. John to his disciples, 'I will come to you' (xiv. 16, 17). He thus comes, as the context explains, in the spirit of truth. In this spirit they are with him, where he is, even in the presence of God (xvii. 24), and the love wherewith God has loved him is in them, even as he is in them. Those who have been able to receive this saying, in the spiritual sight of Christ have seen the Father; in worshipping Christ, they have worshipped God under the attributes of personal intelligence and love. Him whom they have not seen with the bodily eye or heard with the hearing of the ear, whom they have not approached through evidence of their own senses or through transmitted evidence of the senses of others, they have yet believed and loved, and in loving have rejoiced with joy unspeakable and full of glory. Such believing love, once wrought into the life and character, 'not in word but in power,' can survive all shocks of criticism, all questions as to historical events. It will not indeed despise such questions. Rather it will welcome them, as setting it free from accidental supports, and teaching it to know itself. It needs no evidence of the presence of God, or the work of Christ the spirit, for it is that presence and work itself. It *is* the crucifixion of the flesh, it *is* the new life, it *is* the resurrection of the dead.

'This is a hard saying,' it may be replied; 'who can hear it?' A God who made us and knows us, as from without; a Christ who at a certain time did certain miraculous acts on our behalf, and who now, having left us certain commands, is at the right hand of God exalted, to return again at some future time and judge us according to our obedience to his commands,—these, it may be said, are intelligible objects.

There are strong grounds for believing in them, and as believed in they influence our actions through fear, and hope, and gratitude. But an immanent God, a God present *in* the believing love of him and the brethren, a Christ within us, a continuous resurrection,—these are mere thoughts of our own; they are not 'objective;' if there is nothing else to constrain and restrain us, we are left to ourselves.

Present limits do not allow of such language being considered in detail. A little reflection may show us that we cannot really get outside thought or ourselves, though thought may find that it is not merely its own, and the self lose its selfishness. It is in himself and in his thought, which yet is in the truest sense a revelation, and a revelation through christian influence, that each one of us finds God, if he find him at all. In those who deem otherwise of thought and the self,—who must put God at a distance, or into a mystery, in order to recognise him; who hold that a revelation which is not through signs and wonders, is no revelation at all,—it is not religion but logic which is at fault. Just so far as they make their own the christian doctrine of the indwelling spirit, whose quickening, enlightening, interceding power *is* the presence of Christ, even as Christ is God, they are superior to their own logic. So long, however, as their dependence on it seems to themselves to continue, they will need evidence of God's operation in past or present miracle, in an inspired book or in sacraments, and it is matter of thankfulness that the cogency of such evidence should be what it is. Let no one rashly tamper with it. Rather let us make our own calling and election sure. Let those of us who are seeking, and perhaps intellectually finding, a nearer and surer witness, take heed that it be to us not in word but in power. Let us beware lest, like the enlightened christians of Corinth, professing to be spiritual, we be found carnal.

St. Paul, as was observed at the outset, does not bid these men renounce their claims to 'spirituality,' but act according to it. He bates no jot of his ideal gospel. The sense of the discrepancy between the idea and its realisation, which the care of the churches forced on him, only moves him to a reassertion of the idea as alone giving impulse to the realisation. Even to the Galatians, bewitched with Jewish ritualism,

it is still, 'we live in the spirit; *therefore* let us walk in the spirit' (Gal. v. 25). Let our actual conduct be spiritual, even as is our ideal life. So to the Corinthians, translating the spirit's privilege into vain-glory and licence, it is still, 'All things are yours, *but* ye are not your own; therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his' (1 Cor. iii. 22; vi. 19, 20). From the prison (to the Philippians) the voice is still the same, 'God worketh in us: therefore let us work out our own salvation with fear and trembling' (Phil. ii. 12, 13).

This work, which is at once God's and our own, and in which therefore his presence is witnessed not with signs from without, but with demonstration from within, is summed up in the one word, charity, or christian love. Mere knowledge puffeth up, as St. Paul says, but charity edifieth. Charity, that is to say, is constructive. In the temple of christian fellowship, where no man seeks his own, but every one another's good; in the fabric of true knowledge, which without figure of speech is the work of the same spiritual yearning; charity is building a presence-chamber of God, which, though filled with his fulness, may yet, so far as the same charity is in us, be no other than the chamber of our own heart. No one, it is often said, doubts of his own existence; nor does any one practically doubt of the correlative existence of God, though the notion of such existence is compassed with difficulties of language and logic which lead some to deny it in word. But as it is little for me to know *that* I am, unless I know *what* I am, so the mere consciousness of God, to which upon analysis we find that the speech even of the 'atheist' testifies, is bootless if it is merely that of an unknown power beyond oneself. Is this a loving and understanding, a reconciled and reconciling power? That is the question, and it is a question to which the one abiding answer is the life of charity. In anticipation indeed, or by 'an earnest of the spirit,' it must be answered to begin with, in order to render that life possible; and this preliminary answer, as it came to St. Paul's converts in a sudden light of intellectual conviction, so to us, who have had a christian education, should be furnished by ideas which have lain about us from our infancy, and which later reflection ought to have made intelligently our own. It is ill for us, if in youth, by looseness of talk or deed, we let our hold on them slacken

for an instant. But their mere retention as ideas is impossible. Their power must give them a body in labour for truth and the brethren, or it will cease to be, and with it will vanish the presence of which they are the first disclosure. Amid a world of forgetfulness and decay, in the sight of his own shortcomings and limitations, or on the edge of the tomb, he alone who has found his soul in losing it, who in singleness of mind has lived in order to love and understand, will find that the God who is near to him as his own conscience has a face of light and love.

There is a danger, as I am painfully aware, lest, after all, this should seem 'a tale of little meaning, though the words be strong'; lest this realisation of the idea of a loving God, which is to prove its truth and power, should seem very remote from reality. How, it may be asked, is this life of charity to be attained, either in its more obviously practical or in its more philosophic form? What likeness to it has the easy life we lead here, or the after life of respectable citizenship, which, as cut out for us by circumstances, we are likely to lead for the rest of our days? Few of us have faculty or opportunity to be philosophers or missionaries or preachers to the poor, and if we had, is it certain that we should find ourselves much nearer the ideal life? Would not each of those high callings turn out to be an affair of habit, very much like any other; requiring peculiar gifts, no doubt, yet apt to be debased by egotism in proportion to the success attained by these gifts?

Such language has a partial truth, and it is a truth which is likely to come near home to young men, who have been shaken in the simple faith of childhood, but have as yet learnt little from the discipline of life. Conscious of this, apprehensive of that most fatal scepticism which attends the reaction from an ideal found to be hollow, and knowing too well with how little of personal example he can enforce his words, a teacher here will be apt to speak seldom, and below his conviction, of the possibility in common action of renewing the self-sacrifice of the eternal Son. Yet the least experienced among us must know that it is not in the outward cast of a life, but in the way of living it, that the spirit of a man is shown, and that there are those about him in whose character, though with no outward mark of distinction, and perhaps under a surface of yet unconquered weaknesses, the

love of God and the brethren is the ruling power. All he has to do is to share in the higher spirit of such men. He need not make a rush after the heroic, or seek to jump out of his circumstances. The end to be attained is indeed infinite; but he need not therefore vainly try to swell his own effort to a like infinity, for it is already attained for him. The sacrifice has been offered, the goal has been won. God is for ever perfect light and love. It is for us, under the limitations of a petty human life, to take such personal hold on this perfection as may fit us for its fuller communication when, in his good time, these limitations are taken away. To do this requires, doubtless, much thought and prayer and travail, but not a revolution in our surroundings. We may be doing it here and now, if (in the words of the text) 'with sincerity and truth' we keep the christian feast. Let us consider, finally, for a moment the special application of these words to ourselves,

It will at once be understood that 'passover' here means the paschal lamb. Under this figure Christ is several times presented to us in the New Testament: probably so in the verse of the Revelation which speaks of the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and in the Baptist's utterance, 'Behold the lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world'; certainly so in the passage of St. John which applies to Christ the rule as to the paschal lamb, 'a bone of him shall not be broken,' and in that of the first epistle ascribed to St. Peter, which speaks of the 'blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, foreordained before the foundation of the world.' It is necessary further, in order to understand the full force of the text, to remember that the paschal lamb was not only sacrificed, but eaten, and that the eating of it constituted the paschal supper or feast. As then the sacrifice of Christ is presented under the figure of the slaying of the lamb, so our continuous participation in his sacrificed person is presented as the keeping of the feast. The sacrifice is already made—made for us from eternity; the lamb has been slain from the foundation of the world; but we have to perpetuate the sacrifice in ourselves. We are, as it is put under a like figure elsewhere, to eat the flesh of Christ, as the Jews ate of the sacrificed lamb. Christians are in some way to make the person of Christ their own. They do this, the feast is kept for ever by the chris-

tian society, in the life of charity. The conditions on our part, as individuals, of joining in the feast are sincerity and truth. These are the unleavened bread without which we may not feed upon the lamb, but with which we may: and even in our life here, secluded from great achievements of beneficence, they may surely be ours.

By 'sincerity' (*εἰλικρίνεια*) here is to be understood, I think, perfect openness towards God; that clearness of the soul in which nothing interferes with its penetration by the divine sunlight. Given this openness on our part, Christ, the revealed God, will gradually find his way into our souls, not in word but in power. We must be clear from vice, clear from self-indulgence, clear from self-conceit. How imperfectly do we attain this clearness, yet how can we wonder, till we attain it, that we lack the witness of God? We talk, perhaps, half-sorrowfully, half-complacently, of the demoralising, or unchristianising, tendencies of modern life. Opinion, it is said, is fundamentally unsettled; science keeps encroaching on the old faith; the lineaments of the God whom our fathers worshipped are blurred by philosophy; and meanwhile an enlightened hedonism seems competent to answer all practical questions. It is no fault of the individual if, amid such influences, he loses the thought of God's presence and the consciousness of his love, which indeed can only be retained by taking refuge in mysteries or going out of the world.

This is the foppery of men who want new excuses for old sins. It is still our sins and nothing else that separate us from God. Philosophy and science, to those who seek not to talk of them but to know their power, do but render his clearness more clear, and the freedom of his service a more perfect freedom. His witness grows with time. In great books and great examples, in the gathering fulness of spiritual utterance which we trace through the history of literature, in the self-denying love which we have known from the cradle, in the moralising influences of civil life, in the closer fellowship of the christian society, in the sacramental ordinances which represent that fellowship, in common worship, in the message of the preachers through which, amid diversity of stammering tongues, one spirit still speaks—here God's sunshine is shed abroad without us. If it does not reach within the heart, it is because the heart has a

darkness of its own, some unconquered selfishness which prevents its relation to him being one of 'sincerity and truth.'

I cannot now trace in detail the forms of this selfishness, nor is there much use in doing so. They are manifold, doubtless, but their source is simple, and subtlety is wasted in their unravelment. The grosser among them, I hope, are little known among us—that, for instance, which the world lightly calls looseness, and which religious people are apt to call impurity. Neither the term of extenuation nor that of reproach fully expresses the baseness of that hideous wrong against Christ's body—the body of human fellowship—which outrages it in its tenderest part. Let no one dream that he can be guilty of such wrong, and yet find the loving presence within him, of which that fellowship is the true conveyance. If he has been guilty of it but once, let him be sure that if he would have deliverance from its moral result, he must indeed seek it carefully, and with tears. Most of us, however, have perhaps more to fear from a more refined self-indulgence, from habits of luxury or indolence, and from nameless desires after all things sweet and pleasant, which because they do not issue in overt vice are counted harmless, but which yet, as in our heart of hearts we know, keep us off from God, and from that pure self-renouncing spirit which is his manifestation among men. Probably we surround them with a fence of intellectual self-excusing jugglery, which may in time become impenetrable to the assault of that higher reason which speaks through our own conscience, and through the doctrine or example of all the great teachers of mankind. To this jugglery, however, we may have one answer always ready. Prayer is a wish referred to God, and the possibility of such reference, save in matters of mere indifference, is the test of the purity of the wish. Can we then, let us ask ourselves, pray to God with an enlightened conscience for our continuance in the habit, or for the satisfaction of the desire in question? If not, let us pluck them off, and cast them from us. To do so, indeed, may be the work of years; but once let the higher resolve be in force, and the discipline of life will gradually neutralise or transmute the passions which thwart the single mind.

Another cloak of darkness which the soul hugs in exclusion of the light of God is self-conceit. In an 'intellectual

society' every one knows this, as he knows the plague of his own heart. It is something very different from that which is often ill denounced as 'intellectual pride,' but which is really the proper virtue of those who are not children of the bondwoman but of the free. Such pride, indeed, is no other than the aspiration of reason to attain its fulness in God, which is the only source of true religion. Yet who that knows anything of such aspiration does not know also how perpetually it is crossed by the importunities of the pitiful earthly self, claiming credit to itself for the aspiration? Only by the consciousness that we are 'workers together with God,' since the best we can do for ourselves has been done for us by him, and by the consequent growing absorption in great ideas and great causes, can this haunting presence be laid. The higher, indeed, the effort with which it associates itself, the more readily is it got rid of. It prefers baser company, and generally where is least intellectual aspiration, there is most intellectual conceit. Is it not so with us? In this place how much cleverness, and more conceit of cleverness, goes to how little true spiritual achievement. The reason is plain. We stand by the water, but it is not our real mind to drink. Our vocation keeps us in the presence of the best thoughts of the greatest men. We are, or may be, conversant with the sifted wisdom of the ages. We are in the highway and mid-current of spiritual progress. Yet are we not ourselves standing still, or moving in a trivial round of intellectual luxuries? Is not our heart shut against the voice that calls us out of ourselves, and busy with the idol of its own self-decoration? How much of our real interest is going to the quest after truth and God, how much to the attainment of skill in writing clever articles and saying 'good things,' which have no result but to make our brethren offend, and to surround ourselves with an atmosphere of irreverence and unreality over which God's spirit broods in vain? He that seeketh findeth what he seeks; and if in reading and thinking we look merely for a testimony to our own cleverness, we shall find probably what we seek, but no higher witness. We know that egotism has to be outwardly suppressed, if ordinary good fellowship is to be possible. Much more must it be mortified and raised again to an altered life, if we would attain the fellowship of the Son, and with it the spirit of adoption and the truth which makes us free.

If this riddance of selfishness had to be complete before we could have any share in the christian feast, any participation in the eternal sacrifice, we might indeed despair. We should be like Saul, still struggling with a body of death, of which he could not be relieved under the law. But for the christian, as we have seen, the sacrifice is already complete in God, and is being gradually re-enacted in the true charities of life, in a church invisible, but operative all around us. In it the spirit already dwells with us, and is striving to be in us. Each weakest effort on our part is answered by his prevailing motion. If we do but open our hearts at a single point, the spiritual water and blood will find an entrance, will purge our egotism and complete the sacrifice. In this confidence, 'as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing,' we shall go freely on our appointed way, knowing that it may become to us a discipline of God, and that there is no way so beaten but that things true and honest and just and lovely may be found in it. The christian ordinances are at hand for our refreshment, and if we are wise we shall not neglect them. We cannot afford to individualise ourselves even in respect of outward symbols. We do wrong to ourselves and them, if we allow any intellectual vexation at the mode in which they may be presented to us to prevent us from their due use. If we are really seeking to live as members one of another in the general assembly of the first-born, why do we not gladly approach the table where in the simplest of all rites that mutual membership is expressed? We shall not value such expression the less, because to us it is only an expression. It is in the hidden life of the christian society, as we hold—in pureness, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in love unfeigned —that the true table of the Lord is spread, and his cup for ever flows. Here is the bloodless altar, the continued sacrifice, because here is the perpetual agapê, the communion of good-will. To this spiritual feast, in which the God-man gradually imparts himself to the soul, the 'holy communion' of bread and wine is related as a mode of speech to thought. As seasonable utterance is needed to give strength and definiteness to a thought, to bring it back to the individual when he has almost lost it, to quicken the consciousness of its being shared by others; so may this ordinance strengthen and refresh the thought of our common spiritual interest in God. Its primitive social character we cannot

indeed recall, any more than the ecstatic vision of Christ among them which was granted to the early disciples; yet still to us, if with hearts pure of vice and humbly set on living loyally as christian citizens, we partake of the symbolic supper, without vision or miracle or mystery, but in moral power, God in Christ—a loving and understanding God—may be known in the breaking of bread.

FAITH.

'We walk by faith, not by sight.'—2 Cor. v. 7.

For the word translated 'faith,' as used in the New Testament, it would be impossible, according to any fair method of interpretation, to assign a single meaning. Between its various senses a connection can no doubt be traced, but from faith, as the simple recognition of the claim of Jesus to be the Messiah—the sense in which it is commonly used in the Acts and often in the gospels—to that faith which, according to St. Paul's conception, is the communication of the divine spirit, and by which Christ, as the revealed God, dwells in our hearts, there is an interval which no single definition can cover. But difficult as it would be by any one formula to represent all that the word conveys, even as used by St. Paul alone, it is less difficult to state what it does not convey. Throughout the New Testament, as has often been pointed out, its meaning is never determined by that opposition to reason, on which it might almost be said that its whole force depends as used alike by theologians and men of science in the literature of the day. Whatever may be the validity of this opposition in itself, as applied to the interpretation of the New Testament it is a misleading substitute for the truly scriptural antithesis between faith and sight. 'Because thou hast seen, thou hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed,' says our Lord to Thomas according to the story in the fourth gospel; and under the same idea throughout that gospel we find the true or highest faith represented as that which by a purely spiritual act takes Christ, as the manifestation of God, into the soul without waiting for conviction by sensible signs. Such faith is typified in Nathaniel, who accepts Christ as the Son of God by an immediate spiritual recognition in response to that by which Christ recognises him—who knows as he is known—

and who in consequence is promised under a figure an ultimate intuition of some free commerce between God and the perfected man. It is typified again in the Samaritans who believe Christ on his mere word, and in the 'nobleman' to whom our Lord says by way of trial, 'except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe,' but in whom he discerns the higher faith which can accept the simple word 'thy son liveth.' Contrasted with it is the hardness of heart which asks for some sign, as convincing as the miraculous manna, that it 'may see and believe.' Those who so ask, instead of a sign are told of the necessity, in order to true spiritual life, of that participation in Christ's self-surrendered will which is figured by the eating his flesh and drinking his blood. When some of the disciples, understanding the figure literally, murmur at the hard saying, they are only warned more emphatically against the 'carnal' mind which, as it had prompted the demand for a sign, so likewise prevented a true understanding of Christ's words. 'It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh'—or, as we might say, the satisfaction of the senses—'profiteth nothing. The words that I have spoken, they are spirit.' Being spirit, they could only, to use St. Paul's phrase, be spiritually discerned. 'The natural man'—the man who walked by sight, not by faith, and therefore required a sign—could not receive them. They were foolishness to him.

It is characteristic, no doubt, of the fourth gospel that, while thus opposing the sensible to the spiritual and representing the highest faith as independent of signs, it yet insists on the sensible evidence which God gave of himself as manifested in Christ. The words with which the Johannine epistle opens—'That which we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled of the word of life, declare we unto you'—have a softened echo throughout the gospel. 'The word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory.' 'This beginning of miracles did Jesus, and manifested forth his glory.' To Martha, hesitating to have the stone removed from her brother's grave, Jesus says that 'if she will believe, she shall see the glory of God'; and again to Philip, 'he that hath seen me hath seen the Father.' Thus an accommodation is effected between the traditional belief in Jesus as the Messiah, who had proved his Messianic office by miraculous signs, and the consciousness of God as a spirit

revealed not in signs but in the faith of the spiritual man. Faith in its highest form did not need to wait for miraculous signs; where it was wholly wanting, no such signs could create it; yet they had been granted out of mercy to those who, though not of the world, were still in it. Even then, it was only an antecedent faith that could read them aright as a manifestation of eternal truths, as an utterance of the word which was from the beginning. To the unbelieving, to those who sought honour one of another, not that which cometh of God only, they remained mere wonders, not a medium for the spirit that quickeneth.

With St. Paul the freedom of faith from dependence on sensible signs is still more marked. With St. John, as we have seen, the relation of faith to miracle is not indeed that of effect to cause: faith is rather the condition of the significance of the miraculous sign: still the sign elicits and strengthens a faith already there. Those who believe see, and seeing believe more fully and surely. In St. Paul we do not find even such secondary dependence of faith upon miraculous evidence. The relation of signs to faith is rather that of an effect. He regards faith as making its sign in the 'manifestation of the spirit and of power' among the christian congregations, but he never treats anything sensible as its source or even its occasion. It works from within outwards: it is not conveyed within from any source external to itself. Its source is the spirit of God, and itself is that spirit, as conveyed to us in the form of an earnest or first-fruits, under such limitations as the earthly tabernacle, the bondage of corruption, still imposes. Of the mode of conveyance, as he conceived it, St. Paul tells us little. 'Faith cometh by hearing,' by the spirit of God, as revealed in one man, awakening an answer from the same spirit, hitherto silent, in another. On the import of the message conveyed, as a promise of deliverance from sin and of the reconciliation of men with God, and through him with each other, he insists much. For signs by which the divine authority of the message should be attested, as distinct from its import, he does not seem to have seen the necessity. He had indeed 'received,' as he tells us, the traditional account of our Lord's last supper with the disciples; of his announcement to them of 'the new covenant in his blood'; of his death for our sins; of his burial, and resurrection on the third day. How

much else he had received of the tradition afterwards embodied in the gospels we have no means of knowing. But he never appeals to any miraculous events of our Lord's life, not even to the resurrection, as evidence, in the sense which later theology has attached to the word. He does not demand our faith in certain truths 'above reason' on the ground of miraculous proofs of divine authority given by a revealer of these truths. The resurrection of Christ is to him not evidence of a revelation, but the thing revealed. The death of the believer to sin, which becomes a new life unto God, he regards as part of the same process by which Christ died and rose again—a process continued in the mighty deeds wrought in the christian congregation, and to be completed in the deliverance of the 'creature itself from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.' All is one continued 'ministration of the spirit,' an unveiling of God in the world and in the consciousness of man. That is the only revelation of which St. Paul knows. Faith is not an acceptance of such revelation upon evidence: it is the first stage of the revelation itself, of which love and knowledge are to be the completion. It is the awakening of the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father, but which has still 'no language but a cry.' It is opposed indeed to the 'wisdom of this world,' but is itself the first communication of what St. Paul calls the 'reason of Christ,' which again is identified with the 'spirit that searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.'

Though most of us have been hearing and reading St. Paul's words from our childhood, language of this kind is apt to strike us as unmeaning. It seems as if we could not reduce it to statements which should be either speculatively true or have any practical bearing on our own lives. Thus we either leave it aside altogether, or translate it into terms which have become the current coin of theological controversy, but in which its native significance is more or less completely lost. St. Paul's theology, founded on a personal experience in the light of which he interpreted the relations of man to God, inevitably changed its character in becoming a popular creed. Such terms as forgiveness, reconciliation, and salvation, instead of representing experiences of the believer, processes of his spiritual life, came to represent certain divine transactions, in which the believer had no personal part, though

through faith he had the benefit of them in the acquisition of final happiness. The death and resurrection of Christ ceased to be looked upon as perpetually re-enacted in the surrender of the fleshly self and the substitution for it of a new man in the moral life. They became past events by which certain blessings had been obtained for us, or divine testimony given to an authority claiming our obedience. The identification of the believer with Christ was no longer realised through a consciousness operative in the christian society, but was supposed to be effected in some mode, mystical not moral, by the sacraments. The gift of the spirit, instead of being understood as that recognition of an eternal relationship between God and man which carries with it a new insight into the things of God and a new energy of love, was reduced to a supernatural agency guiding the utterance of certain men and the government of the church.

Just in so far as what had been according to the Pauline view the realities of the christian life were relegated to a region of mystery external to the christian himself, 'faith' too sank to a lower significance. With St. Paul it is the consciousness of the life hidden with Christ in God as it becomes under the conditions of another life which we now live in the flesh—*in* the flesh, as he would say, but not *after* the flesh. Faith is no more faith in this sense, when the life of Christ is no longer regarded as one which the believer in any real sense himself lives. It becomes merely the condition upon which the benefit of a certain 'opus operatum' is extended to him. The nature of this condition has been conceived in various ways, implying various degrees of true moral value. Having come to be understood as no more than an acceptance of the authority of the church and obedience to its rules, it was restored by Luther to the meaning of an assurance of sonship in Christ, founded on personal experience. This was so far a gain, but it did not carry with it—most christians would say that it would have been pernicious if it had carried with it—any change in the view of man's redemption as achieved by past historical events. The death and resurrection were not interpreted into present realities within the experience of the believer. They continued to be looked upon as mysterious transactions, in their intrinsic nature incomprehensible, by which forgiveness and salvation had been obtained for us; and in consequence the re-

sults thus obtained could not be regarded as properly processes of the moral or spiritual life. In ordinary protestant theology forgiveness is still something else than the moral act of putting off the old man; salvation something else than putting on the new. That forgiveness and salvation should be regarded not as something earned by the individual for himself, but as the free gift of God, is no doubt an essential point in the gospel which St. Paul preached. On any other view it would be another gospel, which, indeed, as he might have said, would be not another but no gospel at all. But a free forgiveness, an unearned salvation, need not on that account be other than states into which by the self-communication of God the human spirit is brought; and we are nearer to the mind of St. Paul when we consider them as such states which, in the life of faith or life according to the spirit, become ours, than when we look on them as external blessings, won for us by the crucified and risen Christ, and which faith is the condition of our appropriating.

Did not St. Paul then, it will be asked, regard the death and resurrection of Christ as 'objective' facts, events which had taken place quite independently of any change in his own mind, and in virtue of which he, or any one else who would believe, might be justified and saved? Undoubtedly he did; but his attitude towards them was not that of a man believing certain events to have happened upon evidence. He seemed to himself to die daily and rise again with Christ, and it was this moral and personal experience that gave reality in his eyes to the supposed historical events, bringing the forgiveness and reconciliation which were involved in Christ's death and resurrection within the sphere of his own consciousness, and leaving no room for faith in the secondary sense of an acceptance of certain propositions as true upon trust. To him therefore that difficulty did not exist which theological controversy inevitably raises for the modern mind. The difficulty is shortly this.

On the one hand, we are called upon to regard faith as the condition of our attaining the highest spiritual life, as that which makes the difference between the man who is as God would have him to be and the man who is not. If we are honest with ourselves, we shall admit that something best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and his to us, of his gracious mind towards us, working

in and with and through us, of our duty to our fellow-men as our brethren in him, has been the source of whatever has been best in us and in our deeds. If we have enough experience and sympathy to interpret fairly the life of the world around us, we shall admit that faith of this sort is the salt of the earth. Through it, below the surface of circumstance and custom, humanity is being renewed day by day, and unless our heart is sealed by selfishness and sophistry, though we may not consciously share in the process, there will be men and times that make us reverentially feel its reality. Who can hear an unargumentative and unrhetorical christian minister appeal to his people to cleanse their hearts and to help each other as sons of God in Christ, without feeling that he touches the deepest and strongest spring of noble conduct in mankind? So far the office which theologians assign to faith seems to be one which we have the strongest moral warrant for allowing to it. But, on the other hand, the object of faith is declared to be the work of Christ, consisting specially in the incarnation by which he took on him our nature, in the death by which he purchased the forgiveness of sins, and the resurrection by which he opened to us the gate of everlasting life. These were events, continuous no doubt in their effects, but which took place in an historical past. Faith accordingly, as having the work of Christ for its object, is regarded as necessarily involving the belief that propositions, asserting the actual occurrence of these events, are true. The saving faith, on which protestants insist, is doubtless held to imply much more than such an acceptance of certain propositions; but though much more, it cannot, according to the common conception, be less than this. A belief, not different in kind from the belief that Cæsar was murdered on the Ides of March, must be an integral part of it, if its object is the work of Christ in the sense above explained.

The faith then which is supposed to be demanded of us as christians involves two elements, which, to say the least, are wholly different; on the one side, a certain intellectual assent of a kind which, if the propositions assented to concerned any other events than those purporting to convey a divine revelation, we should say could make no difference to the heart or spirit or character—call it what we will—which is alone of absolute value in a man; on the other side, a

certain attitude or disposition which belongs distinctively to this 'inner man' and gives us our worth as moral or spiritual beings. The deepening of the conception of faith in the Lutheran theology only brings this discrepancy into clearer relief. The more strongly we insist that faith is a personal and conscious relation of the man to God, forming the principle of a new life, not perhaps observable by others, but which the man's own conscience recognises, the more awkward becomes its dependence on events believed to have happened in the past. The evidence for their having happened may be exceedingly cogent, but at any rate the appreciation of it depends on processes of reasoning which it would be a moral paradox to deny that a man may perform correctly without being the better, and incorrectly without being the worse. It has often been asked whether we can seriously suppose a man to be condemned in the sight of God for misunderstanding a proposition in divinity; and though the question may have been irreverently put, there can be but one answer to it. It is not on any estimate of evidence, correct or incorrect, that our true holiness can depend. Neither if we believe certain documents to be genuine and authentic can we be the better, nor if we believe it not, the worse. There is thus an inner contradiction in that conception of faith which makes it a state of mind involving peace with God and love towards all men, and at the same time makes its object that historical work of Christ, of which our knowledge depends on evidence of uncertain origin and value.

It will perhaps be said that our assent upon historical evidence to those articles of the creed which relate to the miraculous events of Christ's life is different in kind from our assent to any other statements of remote history asserting that certain events have happened, just because the events, which the two kinds of statement severally purport to relate, are entirely different. When events are said to have happened as a medium of God's revelation of himself to man, it is not by an intellectual process of estimating evidence, but by our convictions about God and by what our hearts demand of him, that we are determined to believe or disbelieve their reality. Thus the faith which accepts the truth of the gospel story, and that which, as an assurance of God's love, renews the inner man and seeks to impart itself to all mankind, form one homogeneous process. The con-

sciousness of sin is already the promise and potency of faith. It determines the soul to believe the narrative which tells how the Son of God took on him our nature and obtained our free forgiveness. The same longing after God, which welcomes the record of this revelation, having received it, becomes that satisfied love which is faith in its highest form. Now in this view there is no doubt truth, though it scarcely warrants that inference from the source of belief in a supposed event to the reality of the event which christian apologists are apt to draw. It is true, no doubt, that it has not been on historical evidence that any one has ever been brought to believe in Christ to the saving of his soul. To most of us it is under the name of Christ that all thoughts of God have come since first we were capable of them. God, so to speak, has been incarnate to us, has died and risen again for us in the person of Jesus, ever since there has been for us a God at all. Thought first becomes definite in language, and it is in the language which the creeds furnish that the bare consciousness of God which is involved in the consciousness of ourselves—the yearning after him which is inseparable from the impulse to fulfil ourselves—has become a working theory of the relation between God and man. Hence the great concern of the best christian teachers has been, and when they are wise enough to stop their ears against the clamours of scepticism still is, not to win assent upon the evidence to the miraculous narrative of the gospels —an assent in most cases already secured by habit, and otherwise scarcely to be obtained by argument—but to bring their people to enact in their own hearts and lives the work which the creeds rehearse; not to convince them that Christ was miraculously born and died and rose again, but so to affect them as that they shall die and rise again with him and live as those to whom their sins have been forgiven and the gate of eternal life thrown open. The mode of inner life, which is thus recognised as alone giving spiritual value to the acceptance of the historical record of Christ's work, has already in germ been the determining cause of its acceptance by those, from St. Paul downwards, who have not like ourselves learnt their religion in its language. There has been some spiritual process going on in them, such as the conflict described by St. Paul in Rom. vii. between the law of his mind or reason and the law of sin in his members, which has

made the acceptance of the gospel narrative seem a divinely-revealed deliverance, but which was after all the natural parent of the seemingly altered life that followed the acceptance. The feeling of helpless alienation from God through the flesh, from which St. Paul found sudden relief in the recognition of Jesus as the Son of God in whom, sent in the likeness of sinful flesh, God had condemned sin in the flesh, itself gave reality to the message which brought the relief, and which enabled it, surviving in principle though altered in form, from a spirit of bondage to become a spirit of adoption. There have been many in all ages, whether nursed in christianity or no, whether they have been left unacquainted with the New Testament or whether it has remained to them not an unknown or incredible but an unmeaning tale, to whom at some crisis of their lives the record of St. Paul's deliverance has come as life from the dead. The account of his case is also the account of theirs. A new man has been forming in them, the sign of its presence being perhaps the more conscious antagonism of the old or a more wilful adherence to some mode of life or rule of action which has long ceased to satisfy; but till it has received some assurance of divine recognition and help, it is weak from ignorance of its proper strength and is merely a source of inward unrest. In the gospel history, as interpreted by St. Paul, it finds the needed assurance. It does not wait to balance evidence or curiously investigate the sources of the history. It seems to have passed from bondage into a glorious liberty, and that through an announcement of facts received from without: yet in truth, there is no break of continuity between the new life and the old. It was from the old sense of bondage that the announcement which brought deliverance derived at once its character and its certainty. The faith which accepted it was also the faith which interpreted it. The faith which accepted and interpreted it was also the faith which had inwardly demanded it; and the faith which demanded, accepted, and interpreted it is also the faith which lives and works upon it.

The practical christian faith, thus formed and sustained, is thoroughly at one with itself. It is not in it, but in the current theological conception of it, that there lies the contradiction of which I have previously spoken. An assent to propositions upon evidence is no intrinsic element in it, nor

that on which it ultimately depends. Its object is not past events, but a present reconciled and indwelling God. Its interest in the work of Christ is in this as a *finished* work; *i.e.* in present relations with God which Christ's work is thought to have rendered possible. It is no doubt historically conditioned; but it is not on an intellectual estimate of its own conditions that it depends for being what it is. Without the christian tradition it would not have been what it is, but a judgment as to the authenticity of that tradition, though it has hitherto followed from it almost as a matter of course, is not essential to it as a spiritual state. It is upon the formation of a theory about faith that it comes to be regarded as necessarily dependent on assent to propositions concerning past events. Controversy compels the faithful to justify their faith. In its true nature faith can be justified by nothing but itself. Like the consciousness of God and of duty—of which indeed it is but another mode—it is a primary formative principle, which cannot be deduced or derived from anything else. Any apparent derivation of it is inevitably a circular process. This, however, is what the understanding is slow to admit. It seeks for an explanatory antecedent of faith just as it might of any event in nature. Hence as christian theology supervened on christian faith, the latter, pressed for its reason why, could only appeal to the ostensible facts embodied in the tradition of the church; which was in effect to ascribe its origin to an assent given in the past to a certain interpretation of certain events, while in truth both interpretation and assent were the result of the faith supposed to be derived from them. Faith thus came to found itself, or rather to suppose itself founded, upon dogma: *i.e.* upon propositions representing neither demonstrable truths of science, nor ultimate conditions necessary to the possibility of experience and knowledge, nor formative ideas of reason, nor imperatives of morality, but either miraculous transactions, or deductions from and explanations of those supposed transactions. Nor could the process of theorising upon its origin fail to react upon faith itself. It was not that one man was accounting for the faith of another, but that the faithful were adjusting their faith to the demands of their own understanding. Hence dogma, a theory of faith as originating in miracle, has come to be regarded by those, whose faith is really a certain disposition of the spirit towards God and man, as part and parcel of their faith itself; and though zeal for dogma is often related

in inverse proportion to the power of faith in the higher sense, yet the latter cannot but suffer from disturbance of a doctrine which has for ages been the accepted compromise between the consciousness of God and the importunities of the understanding, and which has wrought itself into the language and institutions of all the churches.

Why then, it may be asked, except out of wilful mischief, should the supposed dogmatic basis of faith be disturbed at all? It is admitted that faith, as the spiritual source of the christian life, is the highest condition of human character. Why, for the sake of rectifying what is at worst a speculative mistake into which christians have generally fallen as to the genesis of their faith, should we run the risk of making that condition more difficult to reach or to maintain? The answer is, that an inquiry into the relation between the life of faith and the order of the world is not one as to which it rests with the good pleasure of certain curious persons whether it shall be undertaken or no. The human spirit is one and indivisible, and the desire to know what nature is and means is as inseparable from it as the consciousness of God and the longing for reconciliation with him. The scientific impulse on the one side, and the faith that worketh by love on the other, exhibit the same spirit in different relations. It is only some mistake that we make as to the origin or office of either that brings them into apparent competition. The scientific impulse goes on its own way and yields its own result. It traces the determination of event by event in a series to which it finds neither beginning nor end; so that to those who have fancied that, if the course of events could be followed by memory far enough back or by a prophetic vision far enough forward, it would lead us to a divine act of creation or completion, science seems to make God disappear. An antecedent in time which has itself had no antecedent, a consequent in time which should have no further consequent, are found to be impossibilities; and though it is a mistake to identify the causation of any phenomenon with its antecedent in time, yet it is vain to seek for it elsewhere than in conditions, of which each is itself conditioned and, as related to sense, sensibly verifiable. A proposition which asserts divine causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning. Science is thus within its right so long as it merely rejects all imagina-

tion of an intrusion of the supernatural within the natural, or of a limit where the one ends and the other begins. It is another matter when it goes on to assume that there is nothing not natural. In such an assumption it is, so to speak, belying itself, for no one has yet succeeded in showing how for a being which was only a part of nature a science of nature should be possible, or how the thinking subject, apart from which nature itself would not be, should be itself natural. Science is therefore misunderstanding its own origin and office when, not content with showing the 'supernatural' to be a mere phrase to which no reality corresponds, it seeks to apply the same process to the spiritual. Its own existence is a witness to the reality of the spiritual, though this, just because it is the source of knowledge, cannot be one of its objects. The true lesson which it teaches is that God is not to be sought in nature, nor in any beginning or end of nature, but in man himself. It warns us against trying to make statements about God as we might about any matter of fact which, in the strict sense, we know, but it does not touch that relation of the inner man to a higher form of itself of which the expression is to be found, not in the propositions of theology, but in prayer and praise—the prayer which asks for nothing, the praise which thanks for nothing, but God's fulfilment of himself—and in that effort after an ideal perfection which is the spring of the moral life.

But while science, rightly understood, leaves to the spiritual life all the room which this on its part, when rightly understood, requires, it is seldom that the pursuit of science leaves leisure for a true philosophy of what science is and implies. The man of science is apt to deny the existence of, or at least our concern with, anything which is not strictly an object of science or matter of fact. As the moral life cannot be altogether ignored, he misinterprets it into a natural history, and in so doing, though he cannot make it what he understands it to be, he runs the risk of lowering its ideal. Meanwhile the theologian co-operates with him in error by insisting on that misconception of the basis of faith which brings it and science into competition on the same ground. He will have it that faith stands or falls with the admission or rejection of certain propositions concerning matters of fact, concerning the causation of events, which are strictly within the domain of science and which *it* must inevitably

reject. The man of science is ready enough of himself to assume that the spiritual is no more than the supernatural, which he has always found to be a refuge for ignorance. When he hears the theologian telling the same tale, and talking glibly of some 'projection of the supernatural within the natural' as the origination of faith, his prejudice is confirmed, and he naturally supposes that faith is merely one of the modes of ignorance, which he has to clear out of his way. Hence arises that conflict between religion and science which nowadays is on the tongues of all and in the hearts of many, a conflict for which the champions on both sides are fond of telling us that there is no real ground, while they are alike maintaining positions which, so long as they are held, render it simply unavoidable. It is by no means therefore a piece of mere intellectual wantonness to disturb the faithful in that theory of their faith which they have come to think inseparable from faith itself; to inquire whether faith, as a spiritual state, is necessarily dependent on assent to those propositions concerning ostensible matters of fact, which form the basis of theological dogma. Such inquiry is necessary for the vindication of faith itself, and even for its presentation in its properly scriptural character. It is as presumed to be so dependent on miracle that it has come to be opposed to reason in a manner foreign, as we have seen, to the faith of the New Testament, while conversely that opposition to sense, which is its characteristic in the New Testament, tends to disappear. If faith were really belief in the occurrence of certain miraculous events upon transmitted evidence of the senses of other people, its certainty would after all be merely a weaker form of the certainty of sense. Such a faith is neither intrinsically worth maintaining, nor in the long run can it maintain itself, against the demands of reason. Reason will not be kept at bay by being told that certain truths are above it, when these 'truths,' if they are anything at all, are propositions concerning matters of fact to which from their nature the principles regulating all knowledge must be fully applicable. Under different relations, or in different modes of itself, reason is the source alike of faith and of knowledge. It is but put at strife with itself when in its character of faith it is supposed to claim an assent which, as the source of the effort after knowledge, it must seek to set aside.

A full justification of the statement that reason is the source alike of faith and of knowledge would carry me too far from my present purpose, which is to enforce the practical nature of faith. What it is intended to convey is something of this sort. Reason is self-consciousness. It is only as taken into our self-consciousness, and so presented to us as an object, that anything is known to us. Thus everything that we know is known to us as a constituent of one world, by the other constituents of which it is necessarily determined. Hence arises the conception of what we call the uniformity of nature, a conception which, though it may be only formulated and articulated at a comparatively late stage of scientific reflection, is really involved in all knowledge whatever. In conceiving of a nature or 'objective world' at all, we necessarily conceive it as uniform. If we assert a suspension of its laws, a break in its continuity, to have taken place even in a single case; if we maintain so much as the possibility of an intrusion or 'projection' of extranatural agency within the natural; though we may be willing to stake our life upon the proposition or more truly upon some moral or spiritual interest which we wrongly suppose it to involve, we are none the less saying what is intrinsically unmeaning; for we are affirming the existence of knowledge and nature, and at the same time denying the principle in virtue of which alone knowledge is possible and there is for our consciousness such a thing as nature. But though reason is thus, in the sense explained, the source of our knowledge of nature, it can never give completeness to that knowledge or in consequence find in nature an object adequate to itself. Nature remains to us an endless series in which the knowing of anything implies of itself something further to be known. Yet the assurance of there being a reality, one, complete, and absolute, has been the source of that very knowledge which cannot become a knowledge of such reality. Through it alone a nature—the cosmos of our experience, as Mr. Lewes well calls it—has arisen for us. It is involved in the presence of reason in us, as our self-consciousness, as the consciousness of a subject which is at once the negation and the unity of all things; which we do not know but are, and through which we know. As in us, this rational self-consciousness supervenes upon sense, and it is because the data of sense are the materials which it makes into a knowledge,

that a margin always remains to be known beyond what it can know, and that thus it cannot know the absolute. But, though communicated to us in a mode which does not allow of its being itself in a strict sense known, it keeps before us an object which we may seek to become. It is an element of identity between us and a perfect being, who is in full realisation what we only are in principle and possibility. *That* God is, it entitles us to say with the same certainty as that the world is or that we ourselves are. *What* he is, it does not indeed enable us to say in the same way in which we make propositions about matters of fact, but it moves us to seek to become as he is; to become like him, to become consciously one with him, to have the fruition of his Godhead. In this sense it is that reason issues in the life of faith.

An objector here may naturally ask, how, if we do not know what God is, we can seek to become as he is. Does not the limitation we admit to the possibility of knowledge make faith too, in the sense described, an impossibility, or at any rate reduce it to a vague aspiration,

> 'The desire of the moth for the star,
> Of the night for the morrow,
> The devotion to something afar
> From the sphere of our sorrow?'

Now, in the first place, it may be noticed that some limitation to our knowledge of the object of faith is implied in the very idea of faith. If we knew God as we know anything else, if his nature had been revealed to us by miraculous evidence of a kind with that which convinces us of matters of fact, then would faith be no more faith. As St. Paul says of hope, which is but another name for faith, 'we are saved by hope, but hope that is seen is not hope.' In a certain respect there is a correspondence between faith, as the practical consciousness of God, and the artist's consciousness of an ideal. The ideal which governs the production of a work of art—whether it be the ideal of an imitation of nature, or of something so far removed from this as I should suppose a musical composition to be—is not in the proper sense an object of knowledge to the artist. It is not anything which he could adequately describe in words. He can but gradually, and never completely, define the ideal by means of the work in which it is to some extent realised. It thus appears that an object of consciousness may be in the highest degree

operative—not upon us, but in and through us—and in that most proper sense real, which yet is not known, but can only come to be known indirectly or piecemeal through the gradual results of its operation. It will be observed further, that such an ideal object does not exist apart from the consciousness of it. It is not what we suppose an external thing to be, there ready-made before and independently of our being aware of it. It exists only in the consciousness: yet any consciousness of it that the artist could call his own or that he could express—not in a description beforehand, but in his most finished work—falls far short, as he would tell us, of the ideal itself. The ideal exists in his consciousness, yet not in its full reality, for if it did it would no longer be an ideal. There is an identity between it and his consciousness of it; otherwise it would not exist for him at all. Yet it must be more and other than his consciousness of it, or that consciousness would not be of an ideal.

By help of this analogy it may be understood how there may be a consciousness of God, which is not a knowledge of him of a kind with our knowledge of matters of fact, and yet is the most real, because the most operative, of all spiritual principles; a consciousness not definable like an ordinary conception, but which defines itself in a moral life expressive of it; which is not indeed an external proof of the existence of God, but is in principle that existence itself, a first communication of the Godhead. Such consciousness has in manifold forms been the moralising agent in human society, nay the formative principle of that society itself. The existence of specific duties and the recognition of them, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the moral law and the reverence for it in its most abstract and absolute form, all no doubt presuppose society; but society, of a kind to render them possible, is not the creature of appetite and fear, or of the most complicated and indirect results of these. It implies the action in man of a principle in virtue of which he projects himself into the future or into some other world as some more perfect being than he actually is, and thus seeks not merely to satisfy momentary wants but to become 'another man,' to become more nearly as this more perfect being. Under this influence wants and desires that have their root in the animal nature become an impulse of improvement ('Besserungstrieb'), which forms, enlarges, and re-casts societies; always

keeping before man in various guise, according to the degree of his development, an unrealised ideal of a best which is his God, and giving divine authority to the customs or laws by which some likeness of this ideal is wrought into the actuality of life. I cannot here attempt to trace even in outline, as a philosophy of history should do, the process by which God's revelation of himself in the human consciousness has thus issued in the institutions by which our elementary moralisation is brought about; or to show how upon this process there has supervened another in which the consciousness of God has come to distinguish itself from these its partial and changing results, and to recognise itself alone, in opposition to any outward law of state or church, as the manifested God, his communication of himself in spirit and in truth. We are born, so to speak, into a world in which these processes have already been carried so far, in which the consciousness of God has already so far embodied itself, that the problem of faith for us is rather to overcome the selfishness and conceit which prevent us from taking into ourselves individually the revelation of God which is everywhere about us, than to develop that revelation more fully. It is our very familiarity with God's expression of himself in the institutions of society, in the moral law, in the language and inner life of christians, in our own consciences, that helps to blind us to its divinity, and emboldens us to claim the right to please ourselves unabashed by its presence. Yet if thus, by refusing to recognise it, we turn the light that is in us to darkness, how great is that darkness! In the higher forms of the christian religion the spirit of man has reached that stage—sometimes called by mystics the reign of the Holy Ghost—in which the consciousness of God is a consciousness of him, no longer as an outward power, but as one with itself, as reconciled and indwelling. If it becomes so perverted in us that, having ceased to look for a God outside us, we will not recognise him in ourselves and in that which our conscience reveals to us, we are committing the true sin against the Holy Ghost, a sin unpardonable, in the sense that it shuts us out from the higher life, the life of correlative self-reverence and self-abasement, of self-sacrifice and self-development, the life of faith.

The enemy which religion, *i.e.* a God-seeking morality, has now to fear, is not a passionate atheism. Such atheism

is often a religion which misunderstands itself. It is seeking after God, but in the hurry of irritation against the ignorance and fear which call themselves religious, it cannot recognise its object under the old name. It may limit and distort the spiritual life, and yet leave the spring of its nobility untouched. Not from it is our danger, but from the slow sap of an undermining indifference which does not deny God and duty, but ignores them; which does not care to trouble itself about them, and finds in our acknowledged inability to know them, as we know matters of fact, a new excuse for putting them aside. It is this which takes off the native beauty from the fair forehead of a child-like faith, and leaves, not the scars of a much-questioning and often-failing but still believing search after God, whom so to seek is to find, but the vacancy of contented worldliness or the sneer of the baffled pleasure-seeker.

It is indeed no new malady. While 'the flesh lusteth against the spirit' it must always be at work, and may be as prevalent in an age of orthodoxy as in an age of doubt. But we know it best and have most to fear it in the form which it takes from the temper of our own time. Most of us, I should suppose, who have felt the influence of modern culture at all, must have felt that it has been giving at any rate great opportunities to this enemy of our spiritual life. Everything has had a history, we have learnt complacently to say. The notions of God, of duty, of an ideal life have been constantly shifting. They have 'developed,' and that is vaguely taken to mean that they are transitory phases of a force moving we know not whence or whither. 'We are children of nature, the offspring of circumstance; nature and circumstance may be left to make us what they will, so long as we take our fill undisturbed of such pleasures as they put in our way. A perfect being whom we cannot know, an absolute law which we cannot describe, are clearly no concern of ours.' So, more or less articulately, we are apt to argue; and though the divine consciousness in us, which is necessary even to the possibility of our so arguing, cannot thus be wholly suppressed, it is prevented from duly actualising itself, and we are left in a state of moral triviality than which the darkest despair of doubt is far more noble. Even though we bear up against the deadening influence, yet as criticism compels us to discard, one after another, 'the fair humanities of old

religion,' the anthropomorphic formulæ in which we have been used to express to ourselves the presence and action of God as an external person moulding nature to his purposes and intervening in it when and how he will, our spiritual life cannot but feel the change. It lacks the means of utterance and communication. We know not how to speak of divine things to each other; we are estranged from the sympathies of the christian congregation. Yet 'still the heart doth need a language'; and, unable to use the old or to make a new one, it loses the energy which free exercise and expression are needed to sustain. Our moral standard indeed may not suffer. We may persist grimly in the walk of duty and refuse to acquiesce in the attitude of disbelief, but 'the fire so bright, the love so sweet, the unction spiritual' are ours no longer.

It may seem more easy to show the inevitableness of this state of mind than a way of deliverance from it. No deliverance indeed is to be looked for from without. No discovery in nature, no 'glimpses of the unseen,' no revived force or recognition of authority, will bring us help. Faith is not to be saved by anything that would supersede faith, but only by its own faithfulness; and it will be so saved if, through the trial to which in the criticism of its supposed dogmatic basis it is subjected, it learns more clearly to recognise its native divinity, the God that worketh in it, and its proper independence of external support. Thus finding in itself the revelation which it seeks in vain elsewhere, it does not cease to be, rather it becomes again, what in essence it was to St. Paul. It is in his spirit, I venture to think, that we may reason thus with our doubts. 'You complain that by searching you cannot find out God. No eye can see, or ear hear him. The assertion that he exists cannot be verified like any other matter of fact. But what if that be not because he is so far off, but because he is so near. You cannot know him as you know a particular fact related to you, but neither can you so know yourself; and it is yourself, not as you are, but as in seeking him you become, that is his revelation. 'Say not in thine own heart, who shall ascend into heaven or descend into the deep,' to find God in the height of another world or in the depths of nature? 'The word of God is very nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart.' It is the word that has been made man; that has been uttering itself

in all the high endeavour, the long-suffering love, the devoted search for truth, which have so far moralised mankind, and that now speaks in your conscience. It is the God in you which strives for communication with God.

> 'Speak to him thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
> Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'[1]

Not as to the sensual ear, nor necessarily through the stinted expression of verbal signs, but as a man communes with his own heart, you may speak to God. Though you know not what you should pray for as you ought, yet the spirit itself maketh intercession for you with groanings which cannot be uttered. Look not for an external answer to your prayer. Your prayer will be its own answer, even as the virtuous action is its own reward. Prayer indeed, if of the right sort, is already incipient action; or, more properly, it is a moral action which has not yet made its outward sign. It is the determination of desire by the consciousness of God, and is an incident of that process which, as the effort to realise a conception of absolute law, to fulfil our true vocation, to develop humanity, to enact God in the world, constitutes the morally good life. Neither the prayer nor the life is a means to anything beyond itself. Each has its value simply as the expression or realisation of the divine principle which renders each possible. To ask for a verification of your idea of God before you pray, or for a proof of the existence of an absolute moral law before you deny yourself in obedience to its command, is to deprive yourself of the benefit of the only proof or verification which the nature of the case admits. You cannot find a verification of the idea of God or duty; you can only make it. God is not something outside and beyond the consciousness of him, any more than duty is outside and beyond the consciousness of it. The true verification of the consciousness is the life of prayer and self-denial which expresses it. Though the failing heart cries out for evidence, at the worst live on as if there were God and duty, and they will prove themselves to you in your life. The witness which God has given of himself in the spiritual history of mankind you will in this way make your own.'

Whether such language will carry much meaning to those to whom I speak I cannot but feel doubtful. But I can only say to them what I say to myself, and offer them the thoughts

[1] Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism.*

in which, amid much misgiving and frequent failure of heart and will, I still find assurance. Even if the truth of such thoughts be accepted, the difficulty of making them available for the daily food which human weakness requires still remains. They may suffice for us while reason is strong and the temper calm, but when

> 'Our light is low,
> When the blood creeps, and the nerves prick
> And tingle, and the heart is sick,
> And all the wheels of being slow,'[1]

we need another sustenance, the support, as we should be apt to say, of something more 'objective' and tangible. It is idle to ignore the reality and inevitableness of this demand, nor, though we may anticipate a time when it will be rather met by the sympathies of a society breathing the christian spirit than by the propositions of an anthropomorphic theology, will this anticipation give us much practical help, since the needed sympathies are at present scarcely to be found except among those to whom they seem dependent upon such a theology. To those therefore who find themselves, not indeed even seemingly detached from the eternal basis of faith, but to a certain degree weakened and distressed in their spiritual walk by inability to adopt the received dogmatic expression of christian faith and by consequent estrangement from christian society, I must frankly confess that there is no present compensatory support which I can indicate. I can but make a few suggestions for lessening the danger and loss which cannot be wholly avoided.

In the first place, let us not make the estrangement wider than it need be. Inability to adopt the creeds of christendom in their natural sense—and in any other sense they are best left alone—need not disqualify us from using its prayers. A creed is meant to serve either as an article of agreement with other men, or as a basis of theological argument; and from each point of view there are objections to using its words in any other meaning than that which they are ordinarily understood to bear. But in prayer we need not ask whether our words are such as would be understood by others in the same sense as by us or whether they convey a correct theological conception. They are not meant to be heard of men. 'He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the spirit.' So long as our prayers express the effort after a higher life, recognised as proceeding from, and only to be

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, L.

satisfied by, the grace of God, the theological formulæ in which they are clothed are of little importance. In the prayers of the christian church, issuing as they do from a consciousness to which the death in Christ to sin and the new life in him unto God, a free forgiveness and the indwelling of the spirit, represented spiritual experiences, we have modes of utterance which in the development of the same consciousness—and it cannot be developed without utterance —we may properly make our own. The fact that others who use them have beliefs as to historical occurrences which we do not share, need not prevent us from sharing with them what is not the expression of an historical belief but of a spiritual aspiration. Such participation is of the more value when it becomes part of a general co-operation in that active life of the christian society, in which the prayers of the congregation find their proper complement. It is often for want of this co-operation that faith, as a spiritual principle, tends to languish in those to whom the traditional dogmatic expression of it has become impossible. Such persons are much too ready to acquiesce in isolation as a necessary result of their opinions. It is rather the result of an obtrusion of their opinions, with which vanity and impatience have much to do. The days of tests and declarations, except for clerical functions, are over, and it is surely a weakness, when we are not pressed for our opinions, to make so much of them to other people, or to ourselves, as to be excluded or to exclude ourselves from joining in a common activity, the spirit of which we inwardly reverence and would gladly make our own, while in separation we are almost certain to lose it. It is one of the misfortunes of our life here that it tends to make us overrate the importance of opinions as compared, I do not say with mere outward conduct, but with the practical principles of the inner life; and even though as a matter of theory, we avoid this mistake, yet our position and employment allow us few openings into that active life of charity in which christian faith is most readily realised. Even here, however, in our intercourse with each other, there are opportunities for us 'to bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ'; nor, because much of our intellectual activity is the result of mere curiosity or emulation, should we forget that there is such a thing as a pursuit of truth, in principle identical with the striving after God whic

animates the moral life. Those of us to whom university life is merely an avenue to the great world, would do well betimes to seek opportunities of co-operation with those simple christians whose creed, though we may not be able exactly to adopt it, is to them the natural expression of a spirit which at the bottom of our heart we recognise as higher than our own. In the everyday life of christian citizenship, in its struggle against ignorance and vice, such opportunities are readily forthcoming. It will be rather, it is true, on the fringe of the church that such work will lie. For some of the deeper charities, so to speak, of the christian society, such as ministering to the spiritual wants of the sick, speculative differences may for the present necessarily disqualify us. But there remains a large range of christian activity, from which our excommunication will be our own fault. In it, if we will exercise the needful restraint, if we will curb our conceit, and watch our tongues, and keep aloof from temptations to controversy, we may still have some experience of that fellowship with the saints which is necessary for our daily sustenance in the life of faith.

Meanwhile, if the present distress must still for a time continue, if the cheerfulness and brightness of faith should still seem necessarily to disappear along with the abandonment of that dogmatic expression of it which criticism invalidates, let us be all the firmer in refusing any compromise with our lower nature. It is not the reality of God or of the ideal law of conduct that is in question, but the adequacy of our modes of expressing them. We may be passing through a period of transition from one mode of expressing them to another, or perhaps to an admission of their final ineffableness. Whatever we do, let us not make the difficulties of the transition an excuse for concessions to the spirit of self-indulgence. If doubts come thick, and we have ceased to look for any rending of the heavens to remove them, so that our faith in God no longer brings the old joy and peace of believing, let us rather ask ourselves what right we have to be happy than seek our happiness in pleasures where, because we are capable of God, we cannot find it. Faith in God and duty will survive much doubt and difficulty and distress, and perhaps attain to some nobler mode of itself under their influence. But if once we have come to acquiesce in such a standard of living as must make us wish God and duty to be illusions, it must surely die.

FOUR LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION.

LECTURE I.

THE period of which I am to speak is one of the most trodden grounds of history. It has not indeed the same intense attraction for an Englishman which the epoch of 1789 has for the Frenchman, for the interest in one case is purely historical, in the other it is that of a movement still in progress. Our revolution has long since run its round. The cycle was limited and belonged essentially to another world than that in which we live. Doubtless it was not insulated; its force has been felt throughout the subsequent series of political action and reaction, but the current along which European society is being now carried has another and a wider sweep. In the one we are ourselves too thoroughly absorbed to contemplate its course from without. From the other we have emerged far enough for our vision of it to be complete and steady.

But though this is so, and though the period in question is perhaps more familiar than any other to historical students, it may be doubted whether its character has ever been quite fairly exhibited. By partisans it has been regarded without 'dry light,' by judicious historians with a light so dry as not at all to illustrate the real temper and purpose of the actors. In reaction from the latter has appeared a mode of treatment, worked with special force by Mr. Carlyle, which puts personal character in the boldest relief, but overlooks the strength of circumstance, the organic life of custom and institution, which acts on the individual from without and from within, which at once informs his will and places it in limits against which it breaks itself in vain. Such oversight leaves out an essential element in the tragedy of human story. In modern life, as Napoleon said to Goethe, political

necessity represents the destiny of the ancient drama. The historic hero, strong to make the world new, and exulting in his strength, has his inspiration from a past which he knows not, and is constructing a future which is not that of his own will or imagination. The providence which he serves works by longer and more ambiguous methods than suit his enthusiasm or impatience. Sooner or later the fatal web gathers round him too painfully to be longer disregarded, when he must either waste himself in ineffectual struggle with it, or adjust himself to it by a process which to his own conscience and in the judgment of men is one of personal debasement.

It is as such a tragic conflict between the creative will of man and the hidden wisdom of the world, which seems to thwart it, that the 'Great Rebellion' has its interest. The party spirit of the present day is ill-spent on it. Neither our conservatism nor our liberalism, neither our oligarchic nor our 'levelling' zeal, can find much to claim as its own in a struggle which was for a hierarchy under royal licence on the one side, and for a freedom founded in grace on the other. But if our party spirit is out of place here, not less so is our censoriousness. As our critical conceit gets the better of our political insight when we judge of the political capacity of a nation or class by the roughness of its ideas or the bad taste of its utterances, so it masters our historical sense when we treat the enthusiasm of a past age as simulation, its unscrupulousness as want of principle, and the energy which regards neither persons nor formulæ in going straight to its end as a selfish instinct of aggrandisement. Yet, again, we do but dishonour God and the rationality of his operation in the world, if, by way of cheap honour to our hero, we depreciate the purposes no less noble than his own which crossed his path, and find nothing but unreason in that necessity of things which was too strong for his control.

It will be my endeavour in speaking of the short life of English republicanism to avoid these opposite partialities, and to treat it as the last act in a conflict beginning with the Reformation, in which the several parties had each its justification in reason, and which ended, not simply, as might seem, in a catastrophe, but was preliminary to a reconciliation of the forces at issue of another kind than could to an actor in the conflict be apparent. If I seem to begin far back, I must trust to the sequel for vindication.

The Reformation, we know, opened a breach in the substantial unity of christendom, or rather brought to view in a new form one as old as the conflict between the spirit and the flesh. Such a breach lies deep down in the constitution of man, as a spirit self-determined and self-contained, yet related to a world which it regards as external and its opposite, and so related that from this world it receives its character, nay, in the proper sense, its reality. Outward ordinances were in St. Paul's eyes fleshly and alien to the spirit. Yet had they been the spirit's schoolmaster, and in outward ordinances it was fain in turn to embody itself when it went forth to recast the world in a christian society.

The christianity of the west remained till the Reformation essentially a christianity of ordinances. The opposition of church and empire, of ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction, was not in any proper sense an opposition of the spirit and the world. The church and its law had not yet been questioned by the reason, and hence their authority had not been recognised as rational. The obedience rendered to them was that of the servant rather than of the son. The Christ who ruled through them was still a 'Christ after the flesh.' The two swords which Peter showed to Jesus were taken by medieval fancy as emblematic of the double sovereignty of church and state, and indeed fitly represented the sameness in kind of the two powers. Each was a carnal weapon, nor was there any essential distinction between the objects to which each was applied. Neither touched the spirit, or rather the spirit was not in a state to be conscious of the wound. To the higher intellects of the time, like Dante, the co-ordination of the two seemed an evil, for under the name of a separation between the spiritual and temporal was covered an antagonism of sovereignties equally temporal. The one thwarted, supplemented, combined with the other in the same sphere of outward relations. Together they built up the firmament of custom and ordinance, which the boundless spirit had not yet learned to feel as a limitation.

The Reformation, however, had a history. Not only was it struggling into life during the whole fifteenth century; it was the result of the same spiritual throes which long before had issued in movements superficially most opposite to it; in the impulse to find in Palestine the Christ whom ordinances had hidden, in periodic revulsions from recognised and com-

fortable usage to monastic poverty and contemplation, in the scholastic effort to rationalise and thus reconcile to the spirit the dogmas of the church. All these movements, however, the church, as an outward authority, had been able to direct. She had been general of the crusades, had stereotyped monasticism into a ceremonial discipline, and had kept the schoolmen to the work of spinning threads of which she held the ends. Thus the very effort of the reason to break its shell had complicated its confinement. As it was growing more conscious of its inward rights, the institutions in which it had to acquiesce were becoming more artificial, and the dogmas to be accepted by it more abstract. The result was such a conscious entanglement in the yoke of bondage, holding back the believer from free intercourse with God, as provoked the spiritual revolt of Luther.

'Justification by faith' and 'the right of private judgment' are the two watchwords of the Reformation. Each indicates a new relation between the spirit and outward authority. 'Faith' in the Lutheran language is raised to a wholly different level from that which it had occupied in the language of the church. It no longer means the implicit acceptance of dogma on authority, for lack of which the 'infidel' was out of the pale of salvation. As with St. Paul it expressed the continuous act in virtue of which the individual breaks loose from the outward constraint of alien ordinances, and places himself in a spiritual relation to God through union with his Son, so with Luther faith is simply the renunciation by which man's falser self, with its surroundings of observance and received opinion, slips from him that he may be clothed upon with the person of Christ. The ghost of scholasticism, no doubt, still haunted Luther, and led him astray into disquisitions on the relation of faith to the other virtues. But according to his proper idea, faith was no positive, finite virtue at all. It was the absorption of all finite and relative virtues, as such, in the consciousness of union with the infinite God. Again the spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God, as mysteries which Christ had opened. Again the handwriting of ordinances contrary to us was blotted out. Again the conscience moved freely in a redeemed world.[1]

[1] [This passage, from 'Justification by faith,' occurs in the essay on Dogma, above, pp. 178–179.]

How was this new consciousness of spiritual freedom and right to be reconciled with submission to institutions which seemed to rest on selfish interest or the acquiescence of the animal nature? How was the dominion of God in the believer's soul to be adjusted to his dominion in a church which restrained the operations of his spirit, and in a state which only honoured him with the lips? Such was the practical question which the Reformation offered to European society. Raised first and in its rudest form by Münzer's anabaptists, it worked with more subtle influence in all the countries which felt the Reformation. The opposition between the inward and outward, between reason and authority, between the spirit and the flesh, between the individual and the world of settled right, no longer a mere antithesis of the schools, was being wrought into the political life of christendom. It gives the true formula for expressing the nature of the conflict which issued in the English commonwealth.

This conflict was rightly regarded by the higher intellects that took part in it as but a stage in a vaster one of which all christendom was the area; as a completion of the Reformation, a struggle against the catholic reaction. In the special form which it assumed in England we shall find the reason why the course of religious, and indirectly of political development, with us has been different from that which obtained severally in protestant Germany, in France, and in southern Europe. It is only by considering the modes in which the spiritual forces brought into play in the Reformation had their relations adjusted elsewhere, that we can appreciate the nature of their collision and reconciliation in England. These modes may be summed as respectively jesuitry, the divorce of the secular from the religious, and the complete assimilation of the religious to the political life of states. The power by which the catholic church met the new emergency, the new demand for personal spiritual satisfaction, was, speaking broadly, jesuitry. So long as human life remained in that 'wholeness' which is health, there was no room for such an agency. The catholic of the middle ages had no thought of a spiritual world beyond that presented to him in the outward institutions of the church. His sins were sins against some established ordinance, which the upholder of the ordinance could absolve. But with the awakened conscience of a spiritual world, apart from all

ordinances, to which the soul in its individual essence for good or evil was related, came a new need of spiritual direction. Where the reason was strong enough to be a law to itself, this direction was found in the Bible as interpreted by the individual conscience. Where the authority of the church retained its hold, it could only do so by regulating the most secret intricacies of personal experience, and by meeting the importunities of personal fear or aspiration by an answer equally personal. Through the jesuits, as educators and confessors, it was able to do this. It supplied an elaborate mechanism through which the individual might work out his own justification in disregard of recognised outward duties. The protestant idea of an inward light, to whatever extravagances it might be open, stimulated the sense of a universal law which the inward light revealed. Hence it has issued, as among the quakers, in a far-reaching zeal of cosmopolitan philanthropy. Jesuitry, on the other hand, is the ruin of all public spirit. It satisfies the individual soul and reconciles it to the church by casuistical devices which give the guise of reason to the interested suggestions of personal passion. In saving the soul it ruins nations, not because it proposes a higher law than that of which the kingdoms of this world are capable, but because it makes salvation a process of self-seeking no other than the satisfaction of the hunger of sense. In southern Europe jesuitry had its way. Sometimes it might justify the tyrant, sometimes (as in France under the League) the tyrannicide; but it was equally antagonistic to rational freedom. Acting on the ruler, it derationalised the state, which came to be, not the passionless expression of general right, but the engine of individual caprice under alternating fits of appetite and fear. Acting on the subject, again, it gave him over to private interests in the way either of vicious self-indulgence or of the religious zeal which compounds for such indulgence. The creature of the jesuits is no longer spontaneously loyal to the institutions under which he is born, nor yet has he, like the puritan, a new law written on his conscience which he is to enact in society, but he has a transaction of his own to negotiate with a power wielding spiritual terrors. He may be either rake or devotee, but never a citizen, as the Spain and southern Germany of the seventeenth century too plainly testified.

Thus directed, then, the conflict between inward and out-

ward interest ends in such a supremacy of the former as gives the state over to caprice and undermines the outward morality which forms the moral man. So far as catholic countries have escaped, or recovered from, such a result, they have done so by the gradual obliteration or confinement within strict limits of all personal interest in religion. The Romance nations, it has been often remarked, have not the same instinct of spiritual completeness as the Teutonic. They are not distressed by the spiritual divorce which is implied in leaving religion and morality as unreconciled principles of action. Thus in some of them we find a political and social interest growing up in complete independence of the church, and organising itself with a rational regularity which the protestant politician, constantly thwarted in schemes which he deems secular by religious intrusion, may sometimes be disposed to envy. Religion, meanwhile, is regulated, and the agencies such as jesuitry by which it might interfere with secular life are carefully watched. Under such regulation it is left to itself. To the citizen it becomes a mere ceremonial. His attitude towards it is simply passive. At best it does but fill up the vacancies of his social life or comfort him in his final seclusion from it. The devout become a class by themselves, estranged from the activities of civil life. Only for them and for women, as the passive element in society, is religion a permanent influence. Wherever in catholic countries, under the influence of the revolutionary revival of the last century, the reorganisation of society has been achieved, it has only been under the condition of this confinement and passivity of religion. In France, as the source of this revival, the condition has been most fully realised. It is the natural sequel, indeed, of the compromise of interests effected by Henry IV.

To the Germans, as to every other nation, the quickened christianity of the Reformation brought not peace but a sword. Their religious wars, however, were rather brought on by crowned violence and the ambition of the house of Hapsburg than the result of any strife of principles involved in lutheranism itself. The protestantism of North Germany, growing up under the protection of princes, from the first blended with the existing institutions of the state. It escaped internal rupture, and had not seriously to fight for existence till the time of the thirty years' war. It then

owed its preservation, not to itself, but to the sword of Gustavus and the diplomacy of Richelieu, and Germany emerged from the war in such a state of wretchedness and exhaustion, that popular religion was in no condition to assert itself against princely patronage and control during the 'constituted anarchy' which followed the peace of Westphalia. This circumstance, acting on the German instinct of comprehension, prevented the antagonism of the secular and religious from developing itself in the lutheran countries. The German, with his speculative grasp, has no difficulty in regarding church and state as two sides of the same spiritual organism. To him each expresses an idea which is the necessary complement of the other, and each alike commends itself to his reason. How little the reality of either church or state may correspond to the idea, how powerless in action may be the permeating strength of German thought, an Englishman needs not to be told. But it is important to observe the effect of this union of strength with weakness, of the faculty of intellectual fusion with moral acquiescence, in reconciling the freest spiritual consciousness to secular limitations, and in healing the breaches of religious strife. All that we associate with the term 'sectarian' is for good or evil unknown in Germany. The conflict of reason and authority has not indeed ceased among the countrymen of Luther. It has its wars and its truces, its conquerors and its victims; but its arena has been the study and the lecture-room, not the market-place or the congregation.

The Reformation in England begins simply with the substitution of royal for papal power in the government of the church. If Henry VIII. had left a successor capable of wielding his sceptre, English religion would scarcely have grown up, as it has done, in the bracing atmosphere of schism. During the minority of Edward, a form of protestant episcopacy, unique among the reformed churches, grew up with a certain degree of independence, while at the same time ideas of a different order, whose mother was Geneva, were working undisturbed. The Marian persecution, while it strengthened the influence of the aggressive Genevan form of protestantism on England, completed its estrangement from the state. Thus when 'anglicanism,' episcopal, sacramental, ceremonial, was established by Elizabeth, it had at once to deal with an opposite system, thoroughly formed and

nursed in antagonism to the powers of this world. This system is, so to speak, the full articulation of that voice of conscience, of the inner self-asserting spirit, in opposition to outward ordinance, which the Reformation evoked. In this light let us consider its action in England.

The lutheran doctrine, as we have seen, brings the individual soul, as such, into direct relation to God. From this doctrine the first practical corollary is the placing of the bible in the hands of the people; the second is the exaltation of preaching. From these again follows the diffusion of popular education. The soul, admitted in its own right to the divine audience, still needs a language. It must know whom it approaches, and what it is his will to give. But as the intercourse is inward and spiritual, so must be the power which regulates it; not a priest or a liturgy, but the voice of the divine spirit in the bible, interpreted by the believer's conscience. Religion being thus internalised and individualised, preaching, as the action of soul on soul, becomes the natural channel of its communication. It is the protestant's ritual, by which the heart is elevated to the state in which the divine voice speaks not to it in vain. Education, again, is the means by which the individual must be rendered capable of availing himself of his spiritual independence.

A people's bible, then, a reading people, a preaching ministry, were the three conditions of protestant life. The force which results from them is everywhere an unruly one. With the English, who have neither the acquiescence nor the comprehensive power of the Germans, it at once, to use the language of a German philosopher, 'stormed out into reality.' It demanded and sought to create an outward world, a system of law, custom, and ordinance, answering to itself. Not only is the law of the bible to be carried directly and everywhere into action; whatever is of other origin is no law for the society whose head is Christ. An absolute breach is thus made between the new and the old. Those who by a conscious, deliberate wrench have broken with the old, and lived themselves into the new, are the predestined people of God. Outside them is a doomed world. They are the saints, and their prerogative has no limits. They admit of no co-ordinate jurisdiction which is of the world and not of Christ. The sword of the magistrate must be in their hands, or it is a weapon of offence against Christ's people.

Such a system soon builds again the bondage which it began with destroying. Originating, as we have seen, in the consciousness of a spiritual life which no outward ordinances could adequately express, it hardens this consciousness into an absolute antithesis, false because regarded as absolute, between the law of Christ and the law of the world. The law of Christ, however, must be realised in the world, and thus from this false antithesis there follows by an inexorable affiliation of ideas, a new authority, calling itself spiritual, but binding the soul with 'secular chains,' which from the very fact of its sincerity and logical completeness, from its allowing no compromise between the saints and the world, is more heavy than the old. It behoves us to note well these conflicting tendencies to freedom and bondage, often almost inextricably convolved, which puritanism contained within itself. It was the temporary triumph of the one tendency that made the commonwealth a possibility, and the interference of the other that stopped its expansion into permanent life. The one gave puritanism its nobility during its period of weakness while it struggled to dominion; the other made its dominion, once attained, a contradiction in fact which no individual greatness could maintain.

Puritanism, in the presbyterian form, had obtained supremacy in Scotland, while it was still struggling for life in England. In execution of its principle that a system of positive law was to be found in the bible, so absolute and exclusive as to leave no room for things indifferent, it not only established an absolute uniformity of church government and worship, but made itself virtually the sovereign power in the state. Without scruple or disguise it pursued 'the work of reformation' by conforming under pains and penalties the manners and opinions of men to a supposed scriptural model. In England, though the theory of puritanism was the same speculatively, its position was happily different. No one who believes that the scriptures are to be looked to, not for a positive moral law, much less for a system of church polity and ceremonial, but for moral impulse and principle, can sympathise with the doctrine, which at first was the ostensible ground of puritan opposition to the church of England, that whatever scripture does not command, it forbids. In contrast with this, the position of the early protestant bishops, that the true rule for matters of church

polity is practical expediency, if it fitted less aptly the interest of its maintainers, would seem to represent the higher wisdom that gives the world its due, and recognises the continuity of custom and institution which builds up the being that we are. Compared, indeed, with such pedantry as that of Cartwright, the great puritan controversialist under Elizabeth, the 'judiciousness' of Hooker becomes real philosophy. But in the confused currents of the world it is not always the party whose maxims are the more rationally complete which has the truer lesson for the present or the higher promise for the future. The reforming impulse, the effort to emancipate the inward man from ceremonial bondage, was with puritanism rather than with the church. Judaic itself, it yet broke the pillars of judaism. Its limitations were its own, and happily it had no chance of fixing them finally in an outward church. Its force belonged to a larger agency, which was transforming religion from a sensuous and interested service to a free communion of spirit with spirit, and just for this reason it kept gathering to itself elements which its own earthen vessel could not long contain.

From the puritanism of Cartwright to that of Milton is a long step upwards; it answers to the descent from the anglicanism of Hooker to that of Laud or Heylin. The 'Polity' of Hooker, under an appearance of theological artifice, covers a statesmanlike endeavour to reconcile the protestant conscience to the necessities of the state and society. The anglicanism of Laud was simply the catholic reaction under another name. The political change corresponded to the theological. Elizabeth had ruled a nation. James and Charles never rose beyond the conception of developing a royal interest, which religion should at once serve and justify. Thus there arose that combination, by which the catholic reaction had everywhere worked, of a court party and a church party, each using the other for the purpose of silencing the demand for a 'reason why' in politics and religion. Charles and Laud alike represent that jesuitical conscience (if I may be allowed the expression) which is fatal to true loyalty. As Milton has it, 'a private conscience sorts not with a public calling.' Such a conscience may be true to a cause, as Charles and Laud were doubtless, from whatever reason, both true to the cause of a sacerdotal church. But it dare not look into the law of liberty, or con-

ceive the operation of God except in a system of prescribed institutions, about which no questions are to be asked, and in the maintenance of which cruelty becomes mercy and falsehood truth. Through the policy of the fifteen years which preceded the Long Parliament, a policy sometimes outrageous, sometimes trivial, the same purpose runs. The promulgation of the Book of Sports, the torturing of writers against plays and ceremonies, the persecution of calvinism, the suppression of the lectureships by which the more wealthy puritans sought to maintain a preaching ministry uncontrolled by the bishops, all tend to divert the human spirit from the consciousness of its right and privilege to acquiescence in what is given to it from without. Whether this diversion were effected in the interest of court or sacerdotalism, whether the head of the sacerdotal system were the old pope or 'my lord of Canterbury,' 'lineally descended from St. Peter in a fair and constant manner of succession,' mattered little. The result, but for puritan resistance, must have been that freedom should yield in England, as it had yielded in Spain and South Germany, and was soon to yield in France, to a despotism under priestly direction, which again could end only in the ruin of civil life, or in its recovery by the process which relegates religion to women and devotees.

The body of protestant resistance, however, had no organic unity but that of a common antagonism. Already there was in existence a sect, not yet directly opposed to presbyterianism, but created by the demand for a more free spiritual movement than that system allowed of. The men commonly reckoned as the authors of independency or congregationalism, an influence which more than any other has ennobled the plebeian elements of English life, bore the fitting names of Brown and Robinson. That the brownists were a well-known sect as early as 1600 is shown by the healthy hatred of Sir Andrew Aguecheek, who 'would as lief be a brownist as a politician.' It was in 1582, when the puritans were discussing the propriety of temporary conformity, that Brown wrote his treatise on 'Reformation, without tarrying for any,' and by way of not tarrying for any in his own case, took to preaching nonconformity up and down the country. After seeing the inside of thirty-two prisons as the reward of his zeal, he betook himself to Holland, carrying a congregation with him. This he afterwards left, and it does not seem

certain whether the subsequent brownist congregations were directly affiliated to it. Certain views of church polity, however, were current among them, which formed the principles of independency in later years. The chief of these were the doctrine of the absolute autonomy of the individual congregation, and the rejection of a special order of priests or presbyters. Each congregation was to elect or depose its own officers, the officer who should preach and administer the sacraments among the rest. When the number of communicants in a congregation became too large to meet in any one place, a new one was to be formed, but no congregation or sum of congregations was to have any control in regard to doctrine or discipline over another.

Such a system of church government may not in itself be of more interest than others. As giving room for a liberty of prophecy which the rule of bishops or a presbytery denies, its importance was immense. This appears already in Robinson's disavowal of the pretension to theological finality. Robinson, driven from England by episcopal persecution, had formed a congregation at Leyden. Here, in regard at least to the reformed churches of the continent, he gave up the strict separatist doctrine of the original brownists, 'holding communion with these churches as far as possible.' In 1620 the younger part of his congregation transferred itself to America, where it founded the colony of New Plymouth. His well-known exhortation to them at parting breathes a higher spirit of christian freedom than anything that had been heard since christianity fixed itself in creeds and churches. 'If God reveal anything to you by any other instrument of his, be as ready to receive it as ever you were to receive any truth by my ministry; for I am verily persuaded the Lord has more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word. For my part, I cannot sufficiently bewail the condition of the reformed churches, who are come to a period in religion, and will go at present no farther than the instruments of their reformation. The lutherans cannot be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw; whatever part of his will God has revealed to Calvin, they will rather die than embrace it; and the calvinists, you see, stick fast where they were left by that great man of God, who yet saw not all things. This is a misery much to be lamented, for though they were burning and shining lights in their time, yet they penetrated

not into the whole counsel of God, but were they now living, would be as willing to embrace farther light as that which they first received. I beseech you remember, it is an article of your church covenant, that you be ready to receive whatever truth shall be made known to you from the written word of God. Remember that . . . for it is not possible the christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness, and that perfection of knowledge should break forth at once.'[1] It is as giving freer scope than any other form of church to this conviction, that God's spirit is not bound, that independency has its historical interest.

During the period of Laud's persecution the difference between the presbyterian and independent order of ideas could not come prominently to view. The court and sacerdotal party would recognise no distinction but a greater or less violence of opposition to the ceremonies enforced by the High Commission, and to the arminianism and Sunday sport, which were the great means, one inward, the other outward, of evaporating the consciousness of spiritual privilege and strength. The so-called puritans were mostly of presbyterian sympathies, but their ministers, though under frequent suspensions, adhered to their benefices. They were obliged, indeed, by statute to use no other than the established liturgy, but no statute then existed, like that passed after the Restoration, requiring absolute agreement of opinion with everything contained in the liturgy. The attitude of temporary conformity under protest might therefore be a legitimate one for a puritan minister; at any rate it was the one commonly held. A certain number, however, insisting like the original Brown on a nonconformity that would tarry for no man, formed separate congregations, and these were known as Brownists. Their only chance, however, under Laud, was either to keep in absolute hiding or withdraw to Holland or New England. If there were many of them in England at the meeting of the Long Parliament, their presence was due to an order in council of 1634, a strange instance of the blindness of persecution, which prohibited emigration to New England without royal licence.

In the Long Parliament, at the time of its meeting, the only recognised representative of independency was young Sir Harry Vane. He was not, indeed, properly of the inde-

[1] [Neal, *Puritans*, i. p. 477, Ed. 1837.]

pendent or any other sect. Baxter, who hated him as a despiser of ordinances, gives him a sect to himself; but he represented that current of thought which flowed through independence, but could not be contained by it. His ideas are worth studying, for they are the best expression of the spirit which struggled into brief and imperfect realisation during the commonwealth. In his extant treatises, entitled a 'Retired Man's Meditations' and a 'Healing Question,' and in extracts from other writings preserved by his contemporary biographer Sikes, we find, under a most involved phraseology and an allegorising interpretation of scripture, a strange intensity of intellectual aspiration, which, if his secondary gifts had been those of a poet instead of a politician, might have made him the rival of Milton. The account of him by Baxter, who, with all his saintliness, was never able to rise above the clerical point of view, may be taken to express the result, rather than the spirit, of his doctrines. 'His unhappiness lay in this, that his doctrines were so cloudily formed and expressed, that few could understand them, and therefore he had but few true disciples. Mr. Sterry is thought to be of his mind, but he hath not opened himself in writing, and was so famous for obscurity in preaching (being, said Sir Benjamin Rudyard, too high for this world and too low for the other) that he thereby proved almost barren also, and vanity and sterility were never more happily conjoined' (a clerical pun). 'This obscurity was by some imputed to his not understanding himself; but by others to design, because he could speak plainly when he listed. The two courses in which he had most success, and spake most plainly, were his earnest plea for universal liberty of conscience, and against the magistrate's intermeddling with religion, and his teaching his followers to revile the ministry, calling them blackcoats, priests, and other names which then savoured of reproach.'[1]

His zeal for liberty of conscience and disrespect for ministers were early called into play by his experience as governor of Massachusetts. The eldest son of one of the most successful courtiers of the time, he had, when a boy, shown a soul that would not fit his position. 'About the fourteenth or fifteenth year of my age,' he said of himself on the scaffold, 'God was pleased to lay the foundation or groundwork of repentance

[1] [*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, p. 76.]

in me . . . revealing his Son in me, that . . . I might, even whilst here in the body, be made partaker of eternal life.'

In this temper he was sent to Oxford, where he would not take the oath of supremacy, and was consequently unable to matriculate. He then spent some time at Geneva. On his return, his nonconformity gave such offence to the people about court, that the powers of Laud were applied in a special conference for the purpose, to bring him to a better mind. The final result is best stated in the words of a court clergyman:[1] 'Mr. Comptroller Vane's eldest son hath left his father, his mother, his country, and that fortune which his father would have left him here, and is, for conscience' sake, gone to New England, there to lead the rest of his life, being but twenty years of age. He had abstained two years from taking the sacrament in England, because he could get no one to administer it to him standing. He was bred up at Leyden; and I hear that Sir Nathaniel Rich and Mr. Pym have done him much hurt in their persuasions this way.' Already on the voyage he found that he had not left bigotry behind him. He had, according to Clarendon, 'an unusual aspect, which made men think there was somewhat in him of extraordinary.' He seems to have had long hair, a lustrous countenance, and the expression of a man looking not with, but through, his eyes. 'His temper was a strong composition of choler and melancholy.' These 'circumstances of his person,' and his honourable birth, 'rendered his fellow-passengers jealous of him, but he that they thought at first sight to have too little of Christ for their company, did soon after appear to have too much for them.'[2] It appeared notably enough in the matter of Anne Hutchinson, with whom he had to deal as governor of Massachusetts, having been chosen to that office soon after his arrival, while still only twenty-three. This brought him into direct relation to the spirit which the clergy called sectarian, and of which he became the mouthpiece and vindicator under the commonwealth. Let us consider what that spirit was. I have already ventured to describe faith in the higher lutheran sense as the absorption of all merely finite and relative virtues, as such, in the consciousness of union with the infinite God. From this principle, as extravagances, if we like, but necessary extra-

[1] [*Strafford's Letters*, i. p. 463.]

[2] [*The Life and Death of Sir Henry Vane*, by George Sikes, p. 8, Ed. 1662.]

vagances, are derived the fanatic sects of the seventeenth century, antinomians, familists, seekers, quakers. We live perhaps an age too late for understanding them. The 'set gray life' of our interested and calculating world shuts us out from the time when the consciousness of spiritual freedom was first awakened and the bible first placed in the people's hands. Here was promised a union with, a realisation of, God; immediate, conscious, without stint, barrier, or limitation. Here, on the other hand, were spirits thirsting for such intercourse. Who should say them nay? Who could wonder if they drank so deep of the divine fulness offered them, that the fixed bounds of law and morality seemed to be effaced, and the manifestation of God, which absorbs duty in fruition, to be already complete? The dream of the sectary was the counterpart in minds where feeling ruled instead of thought, of the philosophic vision which views the moving world 'sub quadam specie æterni.' It was the anticipation in moments of ecstasy and assurance of that which must be to us the ever-retreating end of God's work in the world. Its mischief lay in its attempt to construct a religious life, which is nothing without external realisation, on an inward and momentary intuition. It is needless to investigate the history of Mrs. Hutchinson's antinomian heresy, which bears the normal type. It expressed the consciousness of the communication of God to the individual soul apart from outward act or sign. Its formula was that sanctification, *i.e.* a holy life, was no evidence of justification; and this again was said to lead to a heresy as to the nature and operation of the Holy Ghost. Practically, perhaps, it was the result of reaction from the rule of outward austerity under which she lived. It must have escaped persecution, had she not employed it (in this, again, anticipating the sectaries of the commonwealth) as a weapon of offence against the puritan ministers. It was the custom in the colony to hold weekly exercises, in which lay people expounded and enforced the sermons heard on Sunday. Mrs. Hutchinson was allowed to hold such an exercise for women, and unhappily soon turned exposition into hostile criticism. This roused the fury of the more rigid professors, who demanded her death as a heretic. Vane protected her, and in consequence, though supported by the Boston people, was superseded by Winthrop in the annual election of governor. This led, soon afterwards, to his return

to England; not, however, before Roger Williams had, through Vane's influence with the Indians, obtained a settlement at Rhode Island, and there, for the first time in christian history, founded a political society on the basis of perfect freedom of opinion. In Rhode Island Mrs. Hutchinson found shelter, but was pursued by the clergy with hideous stories of her witchcraft and commune with the devil. These Baxter with malignant credulity was not ashamed to accept, and to ascribe her cruel murder by the Indians to the judgment of heaven.

I dwell at some length on this story, because it exhibits in little the forces whose strife, tempered but not governed by the practical genius and stern purpose of Cromwell, formed the tragedy of the commonwealth. Here we find the puritan enthusiasm by a necessary process, when freed from worldly restraints, issuing in the sectarian enthusiasm, and then weaning and casting out the child that it has borne. We see the rent which such schism makes in a society founded not on adjustment of interests but on unity of opinion, and may judge how fatal this breach must be when the society so founded, like the republic in England, is but the sudden creation of a minority, and exists, not in a new country with boundless room where the cast-off child may find shelter, but in the presence of ancient interests, which it ignores but can neither suppress nor withdraw from, and in the midst of an old and haughty people, proud in arms, whom it claims to rule but does not represent. In detachment from both parties stands the clear spirit of Vane, strong in a principle which can give its due to both alike, yet weak from its very refusal to obscure its clearness by compromise with either. This principle, which became the better genius of independence in its conflict with presbyterianism, I will endeavour to state as Vane himself conceived it.

The work of creation in time, he held, which did but reflect the process by which the Father begets the eternal Son, involved two elements, the purely spiritual or angelic, represented by heaven or the light, on the one hand, and the material and animal on the other, represented by the earth. Man, as made of dust in the image of God, includes both, and his history was a gradual progress upward from a state which would be merely that of the animals but for the fatal gift of rational will, to a life of pure spirituality, which he

represented as angelic, a life which should consist in 'the exercise of senses merely spiritual and inward, exceeding high, intuitive and comprehensive.' This process of spiritual sublimation, treating the spirit under the figure of light or of a 'consuming fire,' he described as the consuming and dissolving of all objects of outward sense, and a destruction of the earthly tabernacle, while that which is from heaven is being gradually put on. In the conscience of man, the process had three principal stages, called by Vane the natural, legal, and evangelical conscience. The natural conscience was the light of those who, having not the law, were by nature a law unto themselves. It was the source of ordinary right and obligation. 'The original impressions of just laws are in man's nature and very constitution of being.' These impressions were at once the source and the limit of the authority of the magistrate. The legal conscience was the source of the ordinances and dogmas of the christian. It belongs to the champions of the covenant of grace as much as to their adversaries. It represents the stage in which the christian clings to rule, letter, and privilege. It too had its value, but fell short of the evangelical conscience, of the stage in which the human spirit, perfectly conformed to Christ's death and resurrection, crucified to outward desire and ordinance, holds intercourse 'high, intuitive and comprehensive' with the divine.

Doctrine of this kind is familiar enough to the student of theosophic and cosmogonic speculation. Whether Vane in his foreign travels had fallen in with the writings of Jacob Boehme we cannot say, but the family likeness is strong. The interest of the doctrine for us lies in its application to practical statesmanship by the keenest politician of a time when politicians were keen and strong. That it should have been so applied has been a sore stumbling-block to two classes of men not unfrequently found in alliance, sensational philosophers, and theologians who find the way of salvation in scripture construed as an act of parliament. The man above ordinances, as Vane was called by his cotemporaries, was naturally not a favourite with men whom he would have reckoned in bondage to the legal conscience. Baxter's opinion of him has been already quoted. To the lawyers, calling themselves theologians, of the next century he was even less intelligible. Burnet had 'sometimes taken pains to see if I could find out his meaning in his words, yet I could never reach it. And since many others

have said the same, it may be reasonable to believe that he hid somewhat that was a necessary key to the rest.'[1] Clarendon had been more modest; when he had read some of his writings and 'found nothing in them of his usual clearness and ratiocination in his discourse, in which he used much to excel the best of the company he kept' (the company, we must remember, that called Milton friend), 'and that in a crowd of very easy words the sense was too hard to find out, I was of opinion that the subject of it was of so delicate a nature that it required another kind of preparation of mind, and perhaps another kind of diet, than men are ordinarily supplied with.'[2] Hume was superior to such a supposition; 'This man, so celebrated for his parliamentary talents, and for his capacity in business, has left some writings behind him. They treat all of them of religious subjects and are absolutely unintelligible. No traces of eloquence, even of common sense, appear in them.' In this language is noticeable a certain resentment common to men of the world and practical philosophers, that a man whom they deem a fool in his philosophy should not be a fool altogether. From his derided theosophy, however, Vane had derived certain practical principles, now of recognised value, which no statesman before him had dreamt of, and which were not less potent when based on religious ideas struggling for articulate utterance, than when stated by the masters of an elegant vocabulary from which God and spirit were excluded.

LECTURE II.

In Vane first appears the doctrine of natural right and government by consent, which, however open to criticism in the crude form of popular statement, has yet been the moving principle of the modern reconstruction of Europe. It was the result of his recognition of the 'rule of Christ in the natural conscience,' in the elemental reason, in virtue of which man is properly a law to himself. From the same idea followed the principle of universal toleration, the exclusion of the magistrate's power alike from the maintenance and restraint of any kind of opinion. This principle did not

[1] [Burnet, *Own Time*, p. 108, Ed. 1838.]

[2] [Clarendon on 'Cressy's answer to Stillingfleet,' as quoted in the *Biographia Britannica* (art. 'Vane.')]

with Vane and the independents rest, as in modern times, on the slippery foundation of a supposed indifference of all religious beliefs, but on the conviction of the sacredness of the reason, however deluded, in every man, which may be constrained by nothing less divine than itself. 'The rule of magistracy,' says Vane, 'is not to intrude itself into the office and proper concerns of Christ's inward government and rule in the conscience, but it is to content itself with the outward man, and to intermeddle with the concerns thereof in reference to the converse which man ought to have with man, upon the grounds of natural justice and right in things appertaining to this life.'[1] Nor would he allow the re-establishment under the name of christian discipline, of that constraint of the conscience which he refused to the magistrate. Such discipline, he would hold, as he held the sabbath, to be rather a 'magistratical institution' in imitation of what was 'ceremonious and temporary' among the Jews, 'than that which hath any clear appointment in the gospel.'[2] Christ's spirit was not bound. A system of truth and discipline had not been written down once for all in the scriptures, but rather was to be gradually elicited from the scriptures by the gradual manifestation in the believer of the spirit which spoke also in them. A 'waiting,' seeking attitude, unbound by rule whether ecclesiastical or secular, was that which became a spiritual church. The application of this waiting spirit to practical life is to be found in the policy of Cromwell.

It would be unfair to ascribe the theory of Vane in its speculative fulness to the independents as a body. It seems, however, to be but the development of the view on which Mr. Robinson had dwelt in his last words to the settlers of New Plymouth; and, so far as it could be represented by a sect, it was represented by the independents. It came before the world, in full outward panoply, in the army of Cromwell. The history of its inevitable conflict with the spirit of presbyterianism on the one hand and the wisdom of the world on the other, of its aberrations and perplexities, of its brief triumph and final flight into the wilderness, is the history of the rise and fall of the English commonwealth. I have yet

[1] ['A Retired Man's Meditations,' (quoted by Forster, *Eminent British Statesmen*, iv. p. 84).]

[2] [Sikes, quoted by Forster, *ib.* p. 81, note.]

to speak, however, of the representation of the wisdom of the world in the Long Parliament.

Before the outbreak of the war, as I have explained, Vane was the only man in the house of commons whose opinions were recognised as definitely opposed both to episcopacy and presbyterianism. In the lords his only recognised follower was lord Brook, known to the readers of Sir Walter Scott as the 'fanatic Brook,' really an eminent scholar and man of letters, who was shot in storming the close at Lichfield in the first year of the war, leaving as a legacy to the parliament a plea for freedom of speech and conscience. The majority of the parliament, however, had no special love for the presbyterian discipline and theology. Their favour to it was merely negative. They dreaded arminianism, as notoriously at that time the great weapon in the hands of the jesuits; they objected to the high episcopacy as sacerdotal, and as maintaining a jurisdiction incompatible with civil liberty. In 1641 a modified episcopacy on Usher's plan was a possible solution of the difficulty. Each shire was to have a presbytery of twelve members, with a bishop as president who, 'with assistance of some of the presbytery,' was to ordain, degrade, and excommunicate. Though the pressure of strife with the king prevented anything being done to carry out this resolution, it probably represented the views even of the more advanced parliamentary leaders; but only, however, as afterwards appeared, on the supposition that the presbyters with their bishop should be strictly under civil control. The worldly wisdom of the Long Parliament was, in the party language of the times, essentially erastian.

As the presbyterian claims mounted higher, this became more apparent. The calling of the assembly of divines, and the adoption of the covenant, might seem to give presbyterianism a sufficiently broad charter of privilege; yet both these steps were taken by parliament with restrictions which showed its temper. The ordinance which called the assembly gave it power 'until further order should be taken by parliament to confer of such matters concerning the liturgy, discipline, and government of the church of England, or the vindicating of the doctrine of the same from false aspersions and misconstructions, as shall be proposed by both or either house of parliament, and no other.'[1] It concludes by providing

[1] [Rushworth, June 12, 1643.]

that 'this ordinance shall not give them, nor shall they in this assembly assume to exercise, any jurisdiction, power, or authority ecclesiastical whatsoever, or any other power than is herein particularly expressed.' This document has nothing revolutionary about it. It is the natural utterance of what Brook pronounced to have been an 'episcopal and erastian parliament of conformists.' This parliament, however, had soon under military necessity to raise a spirit which no episcopacy or erastianism could lay. The divines came to Westminster, according to Brook, all conformists, with the exception of eight or nine independents. They came, that is, from the cooling atmosphere of benefices, and had not yet begun to discuss the liturgy or object to a modified episcopacy. If they came conformists, however, they did not long remain so. Contact with each other, and the applause of London congregations, essentially presbyterian in their sympathies, bred a warmer temper. The introduction of the Scotch commissioners, and the adoption of the covenant, gave spirit and strength to their disciplinarian humour, and in a few months, men who had come to the assembly anxious only for some restraint on episcopal tyranny, were clamouring for the establishment of presbyterianism as *jure divino*.

I have spoken of the adoption of the covenant in England as matter of military necessity. It was the condition of alliance between parliament and the Scotch; without this alliance the year 1644 would in all probability have been fatal to the parliamentary cause. Supposing the Scotch army to have simply held aloof, the royal party would have been so triumphant in the north as to enable the king to advance with irresistible force on Lichfield. Till the parliament had secured it, however, it could not be trusted to stand aloof; it might at any time have been gained for the king by his consenting, as he did too late in 1648, to the covenant. The English negotiators, of whom Vane was the chief, had hoped to secure the alliance by a merely civil league, and when the Scotch insisted on the adoption of the religious covenant, they still succeeded in having the document entitled 'league and covenant,' instead of 'covenant' alone. In later years, as we shall see, they always insisted on interpreting it as a league in virtue of which each kingdom was to help the other in the establishment of what religion it chose, not as binding either to any particular form.

The desirableness of such interpretation is more obvious than its correctness. By the first and second clauses, as they originally stood, the covenanters bound themselves to 'the preservation of the reformed religion in Scotland,' and 'the reformation of religion in England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government'; also to the 'extirpation of prelacy.' After the words 'reformation etc.,' Vane procured the insertion of the qualification 'according to the word of God,' in order to avoid committal to any particular form. To ease the conscience of those who favoured Usher's form of episcopacy, prelacy was interpreted to mean 'church government by archbishops, bishops, their chancellors and commissaries, deans, chapters, archdeacons, and all other ecclesiastical officers depending on that hierarchy.' This modified covenant was taken by the parliament and the assembly at Westminster, and enjoined on every one over the age of eighteen. Practically it was by no means universally imposed even on the clergy; in Baxter's neighbourhood none took it. Still, its operation was to eject from their livings some two thousand clergymen, whose places were mostly filled by presbyterians. A shifty and exacting alliance was thus dearly purchased at the cost of at once spreading loose over the country an uncontrolled element of disaffection to the parliament, and giving vent to a spirit of ecclesiastical arrogance which would soon demand to rule alone. This spirit was not long in showing itself. The Scotch army entered England at the beginning of 1644, and throughout that year the kirk, either by petition or through the commons in England, was pressing for a presbyterian settlement of church government in England. At last the assembly, still under special permission from parliament, was allowed to proceed to the discussion of this question. The first step was to propose a vote in the assembly that presbyterian government was *jure divino*. The only opponents of this decree were the small band of independents headed by Goodwin, the lay assessors Selden and Whitelock representing the erastian majority in parliament, whose only clerical supporter seems to have been Lightfoot the Hebraist. Selden, a layman of vast ecclesiastical lore, had a way of touching the sorest points of clerical feeling. In 1618 he had written his great work disproving the divine origin of tithes, and had been brought, in consequence, before the

High Commission court. There, with the ordinary suppleness of the erastian conscience, he signed the following recantation:[1] 'My good lords, I most humbly acknowledge my error in publishing the history of tithes, and especially in that I have at all (by shewing any interpretation of scripture, or by meddling with councils, canons, fathers, or by what else soever occurs in it) offered any occasion of argument against any right of maintenance *jure divino* of the ministers of the gospel; beseeching your lordships to receive this ingenuous and humble acknowledgment, together with the unfeigned protestation of my grief, that I have so incurred his majesty's and your lordships' displeasure.' The consciousness of debasement does not strengthen one's affection for those who have been the occasion of it, and perhaps Selden's remembrance of his usage by the 'old priest' may not have quickened his friendship for the 'new presbyter.' 'In the debates of the divines,' says Whitelock, 'Mr. Selden spoke admirably and confuted divers of them in their own learning. Sometimes when they had cited a text of scripture to prove their assertion, he would tell them, "Perhaps in your little pocket bibles with gilt leaves (which they would often pull out and read) the translation may be thus, but the Greek or the Hebrew signifies thus and thus," and so would totally silence them.'[2] Whitelock himself opposed much grave law-logic to the claims of the divines, which he quotes at length in his memoirs, but his most satisfactory argument, to modern ears, is the simple one, 'If this presbyterian government be not *jure divino*, no opinion of any council can make it to be what it is not; and if it be *jure divino*, it continues so still, although you do not declare it to be so.'[3] The divines, however, thought otherwise. Presbyterianism was duly voted *jure divino*, and parliament in 1645 was applied to to enforce the *jus divinum* under pains and penalties. That the presbyterian *jus* was *divinum* parliament could never be induced to decide. It was very near doing so on one occasion, when the divines had contrived to bring the question on in a packed house, but by the skill of sergeant Glyn and Whitelock in talking against time the danger was averted. At length, however, under pressure from the Scots and city of London, it established a presbyterian régime. This régime,

[1] [Neal, *Puritans*, i. p. 471].
[2] [Whitelock, *Memorials*, i. p. 209, Ed. 1853.] [3] [Whitelock, i. p. 294.]

never carried out save in London and Lancashire, was the same in kind as that existing in Scotland, except that the 'kirk session' was called a parochial presbytery, and the combination of parochial presbyteries not a presbytery as in Scotland, but a 'classis.' This was referred to in Milton's lines,

> 'To ride us with a classic hierarchy
> Taught ye by mere A. S. and Rutherford.'[1]

It was established, however, with such erastian limitations that while it excluded the independents, it gave no satisfaction to the Scots. The independent principle was violated on two points; both by the subjection of the independent congregation to the 'classis,' and by the method of ordination adopted which recognised the presbyter as of a distinct order, to be set apart by other presbyters, instead of as a simple officer appointed by a single congregation. The thoroughgoing presbyterians were alienated by the refusal to the church of the absolute power of the keys. The offences for which the presbyteries were allowed to suspend from the sacrament or excommunicate were distinctly enumerated, and an ultimate appeal, in all ecclesiastical cases, was given to the parliament. The whole system, moreover, was declared for the present merely provisional. The restrictions at once raised an outcry among the Scots and the presbyterians of the city, and the assembly itself was bold enough to vote a condemnation of the clause giving a final appeal to parliament. A seasonable threat of a *præmunire*, however, from the commons, laid the rising dust in the assembly; but the mounting spirit of the new forcers of conscience was shown in the opposition made to the petition which the independents offered to parliament, that their congregations might have the right of ordination within themselves, and that they might not be brought under the power of the 'presbyterian classes.' It would be tedious to follow the war of committees, sermons, pamphlets, which this request, modest in itself, and more modest in form, excited. The assembly, the city, the Scotch parliament, urged the maintenance of an absolute uniformity. No plea of conscience was to be listened to. To admit one was to admit all. The independent claim was schismatic, and, as such, excluded by the covenant. In the words of a pamphlet of the time; 'to let men serve God

[1] [*On the new forcers of conscience under the Long Parliament.*]

according to conscience is to cast out one devil that seven worse may enter.' The new synod of the city clergy, meeting at Sion House, petitioned the assembly to oppose with all their might 'the great Diana of the independents,' and not to suffer their new establishment 'to be strangled in the birth by a lawless toleration.' The language of the Scotch parliament, addressed through their president to the two houses at Westminster, was specially high and irritating. 'It is expected,' says the president, 'that the honourable houses will add the civil sanction to what the assembly have advised. I am commanded by the parliament of this kingdom to demand it, and in their name do demand it.' The temper in which this demand was made, was shown by a declaration against 'liberty of conscience and toleration of sectaries,' published at the same time by the Scotch, in which, after taking due note of 'their own great services,' they announce that, 'being all bound by one covenant, they will go on to the last man of the kingdom in opposing that party in England which was endeavouring to supplant true religion by pleading for liberty of conscience.' Evidence might be tediously multiplied to show, that if Marston Moor and Naseby had been won by the Scots and the trained bands of the city, the civil sword would really have been applied 'to force the consciences which Christ set free,' at a time when these consciences were at their quickest, to a conformity, if not more oppressive than that exacted by Laud, yet more fatal to intellectual freedom.

Meanwhile the parliamentary erastians had a power at their back, no child of their own, too strong for the Scots and the assembly, and soon to prove too strong for parliament itself. The first note of alarm at this power had been sounded by the wary Scots about the end of 1644. 'One evening,' says Whitelock, 'Maynard and I were sent for by the Lord General' (Essex) 'to Essex House. There we found with him the Scotch commissioners, Mr. Hollis, Sir Philip Stapleton' (presbyterian leaders in the commons) 'and others of his special friends. After compliments, and that all were set down in council, the lord chancellor of Scotland was called on to explain the matter on which he desired the opinion of Maynard and Whitelock. 'Ye ken verra weel that lieutenant-general Cromwell is no friend of ours, and not only is he no friend to us and to the government of our church, but he is also no well-wisher to his excellency'

(Essex), 'whom you and we all have cause to love and honour; and if he be permitted to go on his ways, it may endanger the whole business; therefore we are to advise of some course to be taken for prevention of this business. Ye ken verra weel the accord 'twixt the two kingdoms, and the union by the solemn league and covenant, and if any be an incendiary between the two nations, how he is to be proceeded against. Now the matter is, wherein we desire your opinions, what you tak the meaning of this word *incendiary* to be, and whether lieutenant-general Cromwell be not sike an incendiary as is meant thereby, and which way wad be best to tak to proceed against him, if he be proved to be sike an incendiary, and that will clepe his wings from soaring to the prejudice of our cause. Now, ye may ken that by our laws in Scotland we clepe him an incendiary whay kindleth coals of contention in the state to the public damage; whether your law be the same or not, ye ken best who are mickle learned therein; and therefore, with the favour of his excellency, we desire your judgment in these points.'[1] In reply, Maynard and Whitelock, after much disquisition on the meaning of the word 'incendiary,' one 'not much conversant in our law,' explain that lieutenant-general Cromwell is 'a gentleman of quick and subtle parts, and one who hath (especially of late) gained no small interest in the house of commons, nor is he wanting of friends in the house of peers, nor of abilities in himself to manage his own defence to the best advantage,' and that on the whole, till more particular proof of his incendiarism should be forthcoming, it would be better not to bring the matter before parliament. The incendiarism of lieutenant-general Cromwell really consisted in this, that he had (again to quote Whitelock) 'a brave regiment of horse of his countrymen, most of them freeholders, or freeholders' sons, who upon matter of conscience engaged in this quarrel. And thus being well armed within by satisfaction of their own consciences, and without by good iron arms, they would as one man stand firmly and charge desperately.'[2] Nearly every military success of importance that had been won for the parliament had been won by these soldiers of conscience, and unhappily their conscience was not of a kind that would brook presbyterian uniformity. At the time of the conference at Essex House,

[1] [Whitelock, i. pp. 343-7.] [2] [*ib.* i. p. 209.]

Cromwell, with the help of the persuasive arts of Vane, was moving the parliament, disgusted with the practical inefficiency of its conservative and presbyterian commanders, to measures which would give it an army led by officers mostly of his own training, and fired by that religious inspiration of which freedom of conscience was the necessary condition.

The story of the new-modelling of the army, of the self-denying ordinance, and of the special exemption of Cromwell from its operations, is too well known to need repetition. Two points deserve special notice; one, the long discussion against the imposition of the covenant on the new army, ending in an ordinance of parliament after the army was already formed, that it should be taken by the officers within twenty days, which does not appear to have been ever carried into effect; the other, that the self-denying ordinance, as originally passed by the commons, excluded from military command, during the war, all members of either house of parliament. It would thus have been general and prospective in its operation. In this form, the lords, with judicial blindness, rejected it. The commons then sent it up in a new form, merely discharging from their present commands those who were at present members of either house of parliament. In this form it was passed, and thus when Vane at the end of 1645 carried a measure, declaring vacant the seats of those members who had adhered to the king and ordering them to be filled, the officers of the new-model army were eligible, and elected in large numbers. If the party of the army and the sectaries had not thus gained a footing in the house, the course of history would probably have been very different.

The new-model army went to the war, according to May, the clerk of the Long parliament, 'without the confidence of their friends and an object of contempt to their enemies.'[1] Their outward triumph it is needless to describe; we should rather seek to appreciate the nature of the spiritual triumph which the outward one involved. It used to be the fashion to treat the sectarian enthusiasm of the 'Ironsides' as created, or at least stimulated, by Cromwell. The army went mad, and it was to gain Cromwell's private ends. The prevalent conception of our time, that the great men of history have not created popular ideas or events, but merely expressed or

[1] [*Breviary of the History of the Long Parliament*, Maseres, Tracts, i. 74.]

realised them with special effect, excludes such a view. The sectarian enthusiasm, as we have seen, was a necessary result of the consciousness of spiritual right elicited by the Reformation, where this consciousness had not, as in Scotland, been early made the foundation of a popular church, but had been long left to struggle in the dark against an unsympathetic clergy and a regulated ceremonial worship. The spirit which could not 'find itself' in the authoritative utterance of prelates, or express its yearnings unutterable in a stinted liturgy, was not likely, when war had given it vent and stimulus, to acquiesce in a new uniformity as exact as that from which it had broken. It had tasted a new and dangerous food. Taught as it had been to wait on God, in search for new revelations of him, it now read this lesson by the stronger light of personal deliverances and achievements, and found in the tumultuous experience of war at once the expression and the justification of its own inward tumult.

It is a notion which governs much of the popular thought of the present day, and which the most cultivated 'men of feeling' are not ashamed to express, that the world is atheised when we regard it as a universe of general laws, equally relentless or equally merciful to the evil and to the good. If such a notion, through mere impatience of thought, can dominate an educated age, we may well excuse uncultivated men, who clung close to God, for believing him to manifest himself to his favoured people by sudden visitation and unaccountable events. This was indeed the received belief of christendom at the time of our civil war. The man who was to vindicate a higher reason for God's providence, and to be called an atheist for doing so, was still at Mr. van den Ende's school in Amsterdam. It was in the realisation of the belief by individuals that the difference lay. Where the bible was not in the hands of the people, it could be regulated by priests and ceremonial. Elsewhere it was controllable by state-churches, or by ecclesiastical authority, claiming to be *jure divino* like the presbyterian, and which appealed to popular reason, but to this reason as regulated by fitting education and discipline. Everywhere, in ordinary times, law and custom would put a veil on the face which the believer turned towards God. But now in England the bands were altogether loosed. Enthusiasts who had been waiting darkly on God while he was hidden behind established

worships and ministrations of the letter, who had heard his voice in their hearts but seen no sign of him in the world, were now enacting his work themselves, and reading his strange providences on the field of battle. Their own right hand was 'teaching them terrible things.' Here was the revelation of the latter days, for which they had been bidden to wait. That which they had sought for literally 'with strong crying and tears,' which they had not found in the system of the church, in the reasoning of divines, in the ungodly jangle of the law, was visible and audible in war. There

> 'God glowed above
> With scarce an intervention . . .
> . . . his soul o'er theirs.
> They felt him, nor by painful reason knew.'[1]

Henceforth, whatever authority claimed their submission as divine, must come home to their conscience with a like directness, and this the *jus divinum* of the presbyterians failed to do. This new spiritual force the ministers had left to itself. While they were wrangling at Westminster or settling warmly into the berths which the episcopal clergy had vacated, it had been gathering strength unheeded. At the outbreak of the war each regiment had a regular minister as its chaplain, but after the battle at Edgehill made it clear that the business would be a longer one than had been expected, these divines, according to Baxter, withdrew either to the assembly or to their livings. Baxter himself lost an opportunity which he afterwards regretted, in declining the chaplaincy of Cromwell's regiment, 'which its officers proposed to make a gathered church.' 'These very men,' he says, 'that then invited me to be their pastor, were the men that afterwards headed an army, and were forwardest in all our charges; which made me wish I had gone among them, for all the fire was in one spark.'[2] The news of the battle of Naseby, however, so far stirred Baxter, then living at Coventry, that he must needs join his old friends, and for two years he moved about with the army, as chaplain to Whalley's regiment which had been

[1] ['My own East!
How nearer God we were. He glows above
With scarce an intervention, presses close
And palpitatingly, his soul o'er ours!
We feel him, nor by painful reason know!'
BROWNING, *Luria.*]

[2] [*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, p. 51.]

formed out of Cromwell's. The sectarian spirit he then found too strong for his mild piety to control. 'We that lived quietly at Coventry did keep to our old principles; we were unfeignedly for king and parliament; we believed the war was only to save the parliament and kingdom from papists and delinquents and to remove the dividers, that the king might return again to his parliament, and that no changes might be made in religion but with his consent. But when I came to the army among Cromwell's soldiers, I found a new face of things which I never dreamt of. The plotting heads were very hot upon that which intimated their intentions to subvert church and state. Independency and anabaptistry were most prevalent. Antinomianism and arminianism were equally distributed.' Hot-headed sectaries in the highest places, Cromwell's chief favourites, were asking what were the lords of England but William the Conqueror's colonels, or the barons but his majors, or the knights but his captains? 'plainly showing that they thought God's providence would cast the trust of religion and the kingdom upon them as conquerors.' Of some of these dangerous men, particularly of Harrison and Berry, then reckoned Cromwell's prime favourites, Baxter gives a more particular account. Berry 'was a man of great sincerity before the wars, and of very good natural parts, affectionate in religion, and while conversant with humbling providences, doctrines, and company, he carried himself as a great enemy to pride. But when Cromwell made him his favourite and his extraordinary valour met with extraordinary success, and when he had been awhile most conversant with those that in religion thought the old puritan ministers were dull, self-conceited men of a lower form, and that new light had declared I know not what to be a higher attainment, his mind, aim, talk and all were altered accordingly. Being never well studied in the body of divinity or controversy, but taking his light among the sectaries, he lived after as honestly as could be expected in one that taketh error for truth.' 'Harrison,' says Baxter, 'would not dispute with me at all, but he would in good discourse very fluently pour out himself in the extolling of free grace, which was savoury to those that had right principles, though he had some misunderstandings of free grace himself. He was a man of excellent natural parts for affection and oratory; but not well seen in the principles of his religion; of a sanguine

complexion, naturally of such a vivacity, hilarity, and alacrity as another man hath when he hath drunken a cup too much; but naturally also so far from humble thoughts of himself, that it was his ruin.'[1]

One day, during the fight at Langport, Baxter happened to be close to Harrison just as Goring's army broke before the charge of the Ironsides, and heard him 'with a loud voice break forth into the praises of God, as if he had been in a rapture.'[2] Such a temper could only be moderated by one who shared its raptures, its wild energy, its scorn of prescription, and who yet had the practical wisdom, the wider comprehension, of which it was incapable. Such a one was Cromwell, a tumultuous soul, but with a strange method in his tumult. The old notion, that this method consisted in a persistent design of personal aggrandisement, may be taken to have been dispelled once for all by the publication of his letters and speeches. That he was a genuine enthusiast, that he was perfectly sincere in the sense that his real ends were those that he professed, that his own advancement was not his object, but merely the condition or result of his getting work done which others could not do, this is the only theory that will explain the facts, if we include among the facts his own language at times when there can have been no motive for insincerity, and the impression which he made on his contemporaries, not when they looked back on his acts in the light of personal grievance, but at the time when they were done. The life-long hypocrisy which the opposite theory ascribes to him is incompatible with the personal attraction which a revolutionary leader must exercise if he is to do his work. In Napoleon, though he did not so much lead a revolution as turn revolutionary forces to military account, there was no touch of hypocrisy. His hard selfishness and his zeal for the material improvement of European life were equally explicit. The assertion, however, of Cromwell's unselfish enthusiasm is quite consistent with the imputation to him of much unscrupulousness, violence, simulation, and dissimulation, sins which no one has escaped who ever led or controlled a revolution; from which in times like his no man could save his soul but by such saintly abstraction as Baxter takes credit for to himself, and Mrs. Hutchinson to her husband, which in aspiration to heaven leaves earth to its chance.

[1] [*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, p. 57.] [2] [*ib.* p. 54.]

When Baxter was with the army he found that 'Cromwell and his council took on them to join no religious party, but to be for the equal liberty of all.' This account corresponds with the conception of Cromwell's views to be gathered from his own letters. His relation to the sectaries was the same practically as we have seen Vane's to have been more speculatively. Without any of Vane's theosophy, he had the same open face towards heaven, the same consciousness (or dream, if we like,) of personal and direct communication with the divine, which transformed the 'legal conscience' and placed him 'above ordinance.' Having thus drunk of the spring from which the sectarian enthusiasm flowed, he had no taste for the reasonings which led it into particular channels, while he had, more than any man of his time, not indeed the speculative, but the political instinct of comprehension. In this spirit he entered on the war, where it soon took practical body from the discovery that 'men of religion' alone could fight 'men of honour,' and that the men of religion, once in war, inevitably became sectaries. To him, as to his men, the issues of battle were a revelation of God's purpose; the cause, which in answer to the prayers of his people God owned by fire, had the true *jus divinum*. The practical danger of such a belief is obvious. To Cromwell is due the peculiar glory, that it never issued, as might have been expected, in fanatic military licence, but was always governed by the strictest personal morality and a genuine zeal for the free well-being of the state and nation.

His extant letters, written during the first years of the war, written, be it remembered, by a farmer-squire, forty-four years old, simply exhibit a man of restless and infectious energy, gathering about him, without reference to birth or creed, the men who had the most active zeal for the common cause and promoting of religion, and gradually, as the work of these men grew in importance and was more visibly owned by God, asserting their claims in a louder key. In their tone they sometimes recall the man who some years before, in a parliamentary committee of enclosures, had defended the cause of some injured countrymen of his with so much passion and so 'tempestuous a carriage,' that the chairman had been obliged to reprehend him. Among the most frequent topics are the discouragement of his soldiers by the want of pay and supplies (to be borne in mind with reference

to subsequent history), his anxiety for godly men and the offence he was giving by the promotion of men of low birth or sectaries. A letter to his cousin, solicitor-general St. John, may be taken as an instance. It was written during the period of feeble management that preceded the self-denying ordinance, before Vane had got the upper hand in the house.[1] 'Of all men I should not trouble you with money matters, did not the heavy necessities my troops are in, press upon me beyond measure. I am neglected exceedingly! . . . If I took pleasure to write to the house in bitterness, I have occasion. . . . I have minded your service to forgetfulness of my own and soldiers' necessities. . . . You have had my money; I hope in God, I desire to venture my skin, so do my men. Lay weight upon their patience; but break it not! . . . Weak counsels and weak actings undo all! all will be lost, if God help not! Remember who tells you.' In the same letter he says, 'My troops increase. I have a lovely company; you would respect them, did you know them. They are no "anabaptists"; they are honest sober christians; they expect to be used as men.' Of the way in which this 'lovely company' had been got together we have such indications as this in a letter[2] to the Suffolk committee. 'I beseech you be careful what captains of horse you choose, what men be mounted. A few honest men are better than numbers. If you choose godly honest men to be captains of horse, honest men will follow them. . . . I had rather have a plain, russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman, and is nothing else. I honour a gentleman that is so indeed.' In another letter[3] he says, 'It may be it provokes some spirits to see such plain men made captains of horse. It had been well that men of honour and birth had entered into these employments; but why do they not appear? Who would have hindered them? But seeing it was necessary the work must go on, better plain men than none; but best to have men patient of wants, faithful and conscientious in their employment. . . . If these men be accounted "troublesome to the country," I shall be glad you would send them all to me. I'll bid them welcome. And when they have fought for you, and endured some other difficulties of war

[1] [Carlyle, *Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, No. xvii.]
[2] [*ib.* No. xvi.] [3] [*ib.* No. xviii.]

which your "honester" men will hardly bear, I pray you then let them go for honest men!' Writing to a rigid presbyterian general, who had got the ear of the Earl of Manchester, and had suspended an officer for unconformable opinions, he says,[1] 'The state in choosing men to serve it, takes no notice of their opinions; if they be willing faithfully to serve it, that satisfies. . . . I desire you would receive this man into your favour and good opinion. I believe, if he follow my counsel he will deserve no other but respect from you. Take heed of being sharp, or too easily sharpened by others, against those to whom you can object little but that they square not with you in every opinion concerning religion. If there be any other offence to be charged upon him, that must in a judicial way receive determination.' I will quote extracts from other letters of Cromwell, as illustrating the temper in which he won his victories, and his view of them as the consecration of a new military church, having claims that were not to be put by. One is from a letter written just after the battle of Marston Moor,[2] to his brother-in-law, colonel Walton, who had lost a son in it. 'Truly England and the church of God hath had a great favour from the Lord, in this great victory given unto us, such as the like never was since this war began. It had all the evidences of an absolute victory gained by the Lord's blessing upon the godly party principally. We never charged, but we routed the enemy. . . . God made them as stubble to our swords. We charged their regiments of foot with our horse, and routed all we charged. . . . Sir, God hath taken away your eldest son by a cannon-shot. It brake his leg. We were necessitated to have it cut off, whereof he died. Sir, you know my own trials this way; but the Lord supported me with this, that the Lord took him into the happiness we all pant for and live for. There is your precious child, full of glory, never to know sin or sorrow any more. . . . Before his death he was so full of comfort that to Frank Russell and myself he could not express it, "It was so great above his pain." This he said to us. Indeed, it was admirable. A little after, he said one thing lay upon his spirit. I asked him what that was? He told me it was that God had not suffered him to be any more the executioner of his enemies. . . . Truly he was exceedingly beloved in the army of all that knew him. But

[1] [Carlyle, *Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*, No. xx.] [2] [*ib.* No. xxi.]

few knew him; for he was a precious young man, fit for God. You have cause to bless the Lord. He is a glorious saint in heaven; wherein you ought exceedingly to rejoice. Let this drink up your sorrow; seeing these are not feigned words to comfort you, but the thing is so real and undoubted a truth. . . . Let this public mercy to the church of God make you to forget your private sorrow.' The other quotation is from the conclusion of his account of the storming of Bristol, addressed to the Speaker of the house of commons;[1] 'All this is none other than the work of God. He must be a very atheist that doth not acknowledge it. . . . Sir, they that have been employed in this service know that faith and prayer obtained this city for you. I do not say ours only, but of the people of God with you and all England over, who have wrestled with God for a blessing in this very thing. Our desires are that God may be glorified by the same spirit of faith by which we ask all our sufficiency, and have received it. It is meet that he have all the praise. Presbyterians, independents, all have here the same spirit of faith and prayer; the same presence and answer; they agree here, have no names of difference; pity it is it should be otherwise anywhere! All that believe have the real unity, which is most glorious; because inward and spiritual, in the body, and to the head. For being united in forms, commonly called uniformity, every christian will for peace-sake study and do as far as conscience will permit. And for brethren, in things of the mind we look for no compulsion but that of light and reason.'

With such a spirit and such a cause, with a leader who could so express it, and as it seemed manifestly owned by God, the army rested victoriously from its labours in the field by midsummer 1646. For the next year it was looking on, with an impatience that gradually became unmanageable, while the presbyterian majority in parliament was contriving its suppression. The leaders of this majority were, on the one hand, the lawyers, Holles, Glyn, and Maynard, on the other, the military members, such as Sir Philip Stapleton, who had been removed from their command by the self-denying ordinance. The motives of these men were a mixture of zeal for presbyterian uniformity, fear of unsettling the monarchical basis of government, and animosity to the army, as sectarian,

[1] [*ib.* No. xxxi.]

democratic, and generally irreverent to dignities, or, in their language, dangerous to gentry, ministry, and magistracy. The ministry and magistracy of the city backed them, vigorously worrying parliament every week with statements of church grievances. In December, 1646, the lord mayor in person presented a petition, complaining specially of the contempt put on the covenant, and of the growth of heresy and schism, the pulpits being often usurped by preaching soldiers. To cure these evils they pray that the covenant may be imposed on the whole nation, under penalties; that no one be allowed to preach who has not been regularly ordained, and that all separate congregations be suppressed. In answer to this parliament passed an order against lay-preachers, to be enforced by local magistrates, an order not very likely to be effective, when the preachers were soldiers. A glimpse of what was going on is given by an extract from Whitelock's Memoirs (ii. 104) of about the same date: 'A minister presented articles to the council of war against a trooper, for preaching and expounding the scripture, and uttering erroneous opinions. The council adjudged that none of the articles were against the law or articles of war, but that only the trooper called the parson "a minister of antichrist;" for which reproach they ordered the trooper to make an acknowledgment; which he did, and was one night imprisoned.' In contrast with this lenience of the council of war may be placed a declaration of the provincial assembly of the London ministers, which after a denunciation of twelve specific heresies, winds up with the following résumé:[1] 'We hereby testify our great dislike of prelacy, erastinianism, brownism, and independency, and our utter abhorrency of anti-scripturism, popery, arianism, socinianism, arminianism, antinomianism, anabaptism, libertinism, and familism; and that we detest the error of toleration, the doctrine that men should have liberty to worship God in that manner as shall appear to them most agreeable to the word of God.' Edwards, in his 'Gangrena,' published while this storm was at its height, had been even more minute. He enumerated a hundred and seventy-six erroneous doctrines then prevalent, distributed among sixteen sects, and appealed to parliament, taking warning from the example of Eli, to use coercive power for their suppression, or to put an end to a tolera-

[1] [Neal's *Puritans*, ii. 265.]

tion, 'at which the dear brethren in Scotland stand amazed,' and which is 'eclipsing the glory of the most excellent Reformation.' To us this agitation has its comic side. To Milton, a competent judge, it was serious enough;

> 'Men whose life, learning, faith, and pure intent
> Would have been held in high esteem with Paul,
> Must now be named and printed heretics
> By shallow Edwards and Scotch what d'ye call.'

To the sectarian soldiers, who had been fighting, not for a theory of parliamentary right, but for a spiritual freedom which the sacerdotal establishment had not allowed, 'who knew what they fought for, and loved what they knew,' it represented a power which threatened to rob them of all for which they had shed their blood. The danger was at its height when the Scotch army was still in England and the king in its keeping. If the king had then closed with the presbyterian offers, he might have returned to London and directed the whole power of parliament (which had still Massey's soldiers at command), the presbyteries, and the Scotch against the sectarian army. A new and more desperate civil war must have followed, to end probably in a reaction of unlimited royalism. Charles, however, with all his ability, had not enough breadth of view even to play his own game with advantage. He would play off the two parties against each other, without committing himself to either, trusting that while they tore each other to pieces, Montrose's army and the 'Irish rebels,' with whom he had already a treaty, would come in and settle the business in his favour. Thus while he was still with the Scotch, or even before, he was tampering unsuccessfully with Vane and the independents, till at last the Scotch got tired of him, and having received their arrears of pay from the parliament at the beginning of the year 1647, returned back to their own country.

During all this interval, Cromwell was at his place in parliament, watching events. His position was a strong one. The quartering of the army in the midland counties prevented any sudden advance of the Scots on London, and the election of several of his military friends, notably his son-in-law Ireton, to the vacant seats at the end of 1645, established a regular communication between the army and parliament. Among the old members his supporters were chiefly Vane, Marten, and St. John, men in several respects antipathetic to

Cromwell and each other, but for the present held together by a common antagonism. Vane's interest was for freedom of opinion on deep religious grounds. So far he and Cromwell were at one; but Vane had qualities, as appeared in the sequel, which unfitted him to lead a revolution when it took military form. He was reputed physically a coward; he had none of the rough geniality which gives personal influence at such times; military interference and the predominance of an individual were specially abhorrent to him. Marten was of a rougher type. In the earlier stages of the war he alone had avowed republicanism. He was the wit of the house of commons, the one man of the time whose recorded speeches can be read with pleasure. Presbyterian uniformity Marten hated with a hearty hatred, but he was avowedly void of religious feeling, and thus out of sympathy with the moving spirit of the time. On him, even less than on Vane, could Cromwell have any personal hold. In August, 1643, when the house was censuring Mr. Saltmarsh, a minister who had urged that if the king would not grant the parliamentary demands, he and the royal line should be 'rooted out,' Marten vindicated him, saying that 'it were better one family should be destroyed than many.' Upon this, we are told, there was a storm in the house, and many members 'urged against the lewdness of Mr. Marten's life, and the height and danger of his words.' The indignation was such that he was committed to the tower for a time, and did not resume his seat for a year and a half. St. John was an erastian lawyer, who had pleaded for Hampden in the ship-money business, and was now about head of his profession. There was a darkness both in his skin and his character, which in contrast with his intellectual light won him the nickname of the 'dark-lantern.' He was strong for liberty of conscience, but had a lawyer's belief in the necessity of monarchy, and would always take the shortest road to his end. With him Cromwell's friendship was personal, and like all his personal friendships, lasting. He was the practical link between the enthusiasm of the military saint and the wisdom of the world. In concert with these men, Cromwell had anxiously watched and hastened the negotiations for the withdrawal of the Scotch. Their withdrawal, however, and the removal of the king in parliamentary custody to Holmby, though it simplified the dangers by which the cause was

threatened, by no means removed them. During the first half of 1647, the presbyterian managers were pressing forward their two projects of a reconciliation with the king and the disbanding of the army, necessary for the success of their cause. Their plan for dealing with the army was to send part of it to Ireland, under Massey and Skippon as generals, of whom one was a creature of their own, the other a strong presbyterian; to disband the rest, with the exception of a few regiments that could be managed; and to retain no one except Fairfax above the rank of colonel, a restriction aimed specially at Cromwell. Votes to this effect passed the house in the spring of 1647, not apparently without great pressure from the city, which was constantly presenting petitions against the army and lay preachers, roughly enforced by mobs of apprentices. But meanwhile the army had got a parliament of its own. The several troops in a regiment elected each a representative to form the regimental council, from which again one member was delegated to join the general council of the army. The president of this council seems generally to have been Berry, one of Cromwell's special friends, whose character we have heard described by Baxter. The army had thus a regular organisation of opinion, and henceforward came to regard itself and to act as the true representative of the 'godly interest' in England, sanctioned by a higher than parliamentary authority. At first its demands were modest enough. They were all ready to go to Ireland, if only Cromwell and Fairfax might lead them; they were ready to disband so soon as they should get their arrears of pay and be secured by an act of indemnity against punishment for offences committed during war. The nominal difficulty at last was about the arrears of pay. Parliament would only agree to pay arrears for eight weeks, and the army asserted its claim for at least fifty weeks. Meanwhile the militia of the city had been placed in trusty presbyterian hands; the king had accepted provisional (with what insincerity his correspondence showed) the preliminary presbyterian propositions, and pressed for a personal treaty. The lords so far assented to this as to vote that he should be brought to Oatlands, in the neighbourhood of London. If once this had been done, he would have been in direct communication with interests hostile to the army, and the fusion of royalism and presbyterianism would for the time have been

complete. Holles and his friends thought the prize was within their grasp, and against the discreet advice of Whitelock pressed the disbanding. The tone of the army grew higher, till one day at the beginning of June, news was brought to the parliament that a troop of horse, under one cornet Joyce, had appeared at Holmby and demanded the king of the commissioners. 'The commissioners,' in the words of Whitelock, 'amazed at it, demanded of them what warrant they had for what they did; but they could give no other account but that it was the pleasure of the army.' The king afterwards asked them for their commission. Joyce answered, 'that his majesty saw their commission; the king replied that it had the fairest frontispiece of any he ever saw, being five hundred proper men on horseback.'[1] On the same day that this happened, Cromwell had ridden out of town with one servant to the quarters of the army, just in time to escape forcible detention by Holles's friends. The plot now thickened. The army had a general rendezvous at Triploe Heath, and greeted the parliamentary commissioner who met them there with cries of 'justice! justice!' Thence gradually moving towards London, they sent up articles of charge against Holles and ten other members, for obstructing the business of Ireland, and acting against the army and the liberty of the subject. During two months they waited for the execution of their demands, sending parliament a reminder now and then, but maintaining perfect self-restraint. Holles and his party, on the other hand, showed all the precipitation of weakness. Under their management the authorities of the city got together a loose army of militiamen, of which the command was given to Massey, and organised the mob of apprentices, which finally put so much pressure on parliament that the speaker and many members of both houses took refuge with the army. This was the turning-point. The army, now under parliamentary sanction, easily walked through Massey's lines, and quartered in the suburbs. The city was in a panic. 'A great number of people attended at Guildhall. When a scout came in and brought news that the army made a halt, or other good intelligence, they cry "one and all!" But if the scouts reported that the army was advancing nearer them, then they would cry as loud, "Treat, treat, treat!"'[2] The corporation,

[1] [Whitelock, ii. 154.]

[2] [*ib.* ii. 189.]

its cheap vaunts at an end, sent resolutions to the army in favour of 'a sweet composure.' In calm indifference to its good words and its bad, the army on August 6 marched through London, 'in so orderly and civil a manner, that not the least offence was offered by them to any man in word, action, or gesture.'

The king, now in the hands of the army, had been following its movements, and when it finally established its headquarters at Putney, he was allowed to live in considerable state at Hampton Court, with his own attendants, but under the guard of Colonel Whalley, Cromwell's trusted cousin. Here he stayed till his flight to Carisbrook in the Isle of Wight, in the following November. Those who explain Cromwell's life by its result, as a long scheme for his own elevation, suppose that during this period he carried on private negotiations with the king, first perhaps with the view of restoring him to power under his own direction, but afterwards to lure him on to destruction; that with this object he encouraged him by vain hopes to refuse the proposals of parliament, and finally to escape from Hampton, whence by some mysterious means he was guided to an asylum of Cromwell's own preparing at Carisbrook. Such a view is expressed even in the panegyric of Marvell, written on Cromwell's return from Ireland in the summer of 1650;

'What field of all the civil war
Where his were not the deepest scar?
And Hampton shows what part
He had of wiser art,

Where, twining subtle fears with hope,
He wove a net of such a scope
That Charles himself might chase
To Carisbrook's narrow case;

That thence the royal actor borne
The tragic scaffold might adorn.'

In this, however, as in other cases, history is really less personal and mysterious than is commonly supposed. Cromwell and Ireton doubtless negotiated personally with the king during the summer of this year, but it was on the basis of a public program for resettlement agreed to by the army and communicated to parliament. At the same time the parliament, still presbyterian in feeling, was submitting to the king, in conjunction with the Scots, propositions the

same in substance as those which he had rejected when with the Scotch army at Newcastle. One of the essential points in the army's scheme, of which more will be said afterwards, was that it allowed the use of the Common Prayer, and provided against the compulsory imposition of the covenant. The parliamentary scheme, on the other hand, was conceived in the strict presbyterian sense. When the proposals of the army were publicly presented to Charles in the month of July, he treated them in a way which set the heart of the army against him once for all. Cromwell and Ireton, however, continued to treat with him. They simply wanted to keep him from closing with the presbyterians, not having made up their minds to any further step, while he strangely fancied that he was cajoling them and playing off the army against the parliament. They did not, while treating him with all respect, for a moment lower their tone with him. They would not consent to kiss his hand, and the king himself complained that no promise of favour or decoration could affect them. Their perfect explicitness is witnessed by two opposite authorities, both good, and both on different grounds unfriendly to Cromwell, by Berkley the king's confidant, and the wife of colonel Hutchinson. By the middle of September they had given up all hopes of him. It is a well-known story that Charles sent a letter to the queen, sewn in the skirt of the messenger's saddle, in which he said that the army and the Scots were both courting him, and that he should close with the party that bid fairest, probably with the Scots; that Cromwell and Ireton having secret information of this, sat drinking, in the dress of common troopers, at the Blue Boar in Holborn, where the messenger was to put up; that there they seized him, ripped up the skirts of the saddle, and found the letter. This story has received many embellishments, such as that the letter said that Cromwell and Ireton were expecting a silken garter, but would find a hempen cord, but is probably in substance true. There was no need, however, of any such mysterious discovery to satisfy Cromwell and Ireton that the king was playing a double game. With that inability to conceal exultation in his own artifice which was one of his most curious characteristics, he told them so plainly, while they pronounced no less plainly that God had hardened his heart.

While these negotiations were going on, the sectarian

enthusiasm of the army was becoming rapidly republican, and worse than this, the republican was but one mode of the 'levelling spirit,' the spirit of resentment against 'gentry, ministry, and magistracy' in general, which might at any time break into flames. The soldiers had their own printing-press from which pamphlets, voted seditious by the parliament, were constantly issuing. Cromwell and Ireton, at the prayer-meetings of the army, which they were in the habit of attending, could feel its pulse, and tell when the beating of the heart was no longer controllable. They were clearly neither of them republicans of deliberate purpose, but some time during the autumn of 1647 they found that the only way to control the levelling impulse was to yield to the republican. It was probably because they had thus made up their minds that things must be worse before they were better, that they allowed the king a liberty at Hampton, of which he availed himself to come to an understanding with Capel, Ormond, and Lauderdale for a combined royalist rising in England, Ireland, and Scotland. On November 8 he escaped from Hampton, and made for Carisbrook. He preferred this asylum to Scotland under a notion, for which there was clearly some foundation, that he had an interest in the army, and that Hammond, the governor, might be wrought upon.

During the month of October, Cromwell in his place at Westminster was pressing forward the propositions of parliament to the king, and in doing so, he found himself in opposition to the small party of thorough republicans, which consisted chiefly of the newly-elected officers of the army. This has been reckoned a piece of his duplicity, as he must have known, it is said, that the king, relying on his interest elsewhere, would reject the propositions and thus make a final breach with the parliament. It is to be observed, however, that he supported them on two conditions, one that a clause should be inserted securing liberty of conscience, the other that a limit should be put to the duration of the presbyterian government. The real key to his conduct in this crisis, as throughout the subsequent history, is his desire for such a reconciliation of parties as would at once prevent government by a faction and secure the 'godly interest.' With this object he sought, without breaking wholly from the moderate presbyterians, to commit parliament to such a

policy as would conciliate the milder spirit of the army. The strength of the levelling spirit, which made such conciliation essential, was soon formidably apparent; only the courage and persuasiveness of Cromwell could have held it down. On November 15 the dangerous regiments were ordered to a rendezvous at Ware, where Fairfax and Cromwell met them. A 'remonstrance' was read by Fairfax to the troops. It recited their old demands for pay and indemnity and for the calling of a new and free parliament; these Fairfax said that he was willing to support, if the soldiers would promise perfect obedience to his orders. This satisfied all the regiments but one, which showed signs of mutiny. Cromwell then rode along its armed front, looking the men literally in the face. Eleven, whose looks he did not like, he ordered out of the ranks. The men acquiesced. Three were then tried on the field and condemned to die. One only, however, was shot, and the rest pardoned. Thus at the loss of a single life the plague of mutiny was for the time stayed. The secret of the good temper of the army was a renewed assurance that their leaders would not again imperil the cause of the Lord's people by 'carnal conferences' with his crowned enemy.

The king was followed to Carisbrook by four bills, which formed the ultimatum of the parliament. They represent the predominance of independency in the house, which the efforts of Cromwell and his friends had at last attained. They make no more mention of religion, but simply secure the supremacy of the commons. These Charles rejected, while at the same time, swallowing his zeal for bishops and liturgy, he signed a treaty with the Scots, which, at the price of the establishment of presbyterianism, secured him a Scotch army to deliver him from the sectaries and restore him to London on terms that would have made him virtually irresistible. This was the beginning of the end. On January 3, 1648, Cromwell writes to Governor Hammond, evidently in high spirits: 'The House of Commons is very sensible of the king's dealings, and of our brethren's (the Scots), in this late transaction. . . . It has this day voted as follows: 1st, they will make no more addresses to the king; 2nd, none shall apply to him without leave of the two houses, upon pain of being guilty of high treason; 3rd, they will receive nothing from the king.' Henceforth there could be but two

alternatives. Either the new royalist rising would prevail and restore a short-lived tyranny of presbyters to end in a longer one of priests, or it would fail, and on its wreck be established a military republic.

LECTURE III.

In the last lecture I followed the course of events to the time when it became clear that a military republic was the only possible alternative for an unconditional triumph of Charles. Whether this republic should be more or less exclusive, depended on the possibility of bringing the English presbyterians to an understanding with the erastian or independent party in parliament, and both to an understanding with the army. During the spring of 1648 we find Cromwell, true to his instinct of comprehension, working for this end, and rewarded by all parties with jealousy for his pains. He had a conference at his house, Ludlow tells us, 'between those called the grandees of the house and army, and the commonwealth's men.' The grandees of the house would probably be the original members of the Long parliament who might be of erastian or independent sympathies, such as St. John, Nathaniel Fiennes, one or two uninteresting lords, and perhaps Vane, who was not a declared republican. The commonwealth's men, not grandees, would be members elected to fill up vacancies at the end of 1645, such as Ludlow himself, Hutchinson, and Thomas Scott, officers of the army, but not of Cromwell's training. Marten, though in standing a grandee, headed this republican party. The grandees, according to Ludlow, with Cromwell at their head, 'kept themselves in the clouds, and would not declare their judgments either for a monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical government, maintaining that any of them might be good in themselves, or for us, according as providence should direct us. The commonwealth's men declared that monarchy was neither good in itself, nor for us. That it was not desirable in itself they urged from the eighth chapter of the 1st book of Samuel, where the choice of a king was charged upon the Israelites by God himself as a rejection of him.' That it was not good 'for us' was proved 'by the infinite mischiefs and oppressions we had suffered under

it and by it; that indeed our ancestors had consented to be governed by a single person, but with this proviso, that he should govern according to the direction of the law, which he always bound himself by oath to perform; that the king had broken this oath, and therefore dissolved our allegiance, protection and obedience being reciprocal; that . . . it seemed to be a duty incumbent upon the representatives of the people to call him to account for the blood shed in the war . . . and then to proceed to the establishment of an equal commonwealth, founded upon the consent of the people, and providing for the rights and liberties of all men.' So elaborate an utterance of republican formulæ did not look like conciliation, and finally, says Ludlow, 'Cromwell took up a cushion and flung it at my head and then ran downstairs; but I overtook him with another, which made him hasten down faster than he desired.'

He was not more successful with the presbyterians, whose leaders he got to confer with the independents, and whom he afterwards addressed in the city. 'The city,' according to a contemporary presbyterian writer, 'were now wiser than our first parents, and rejected the serpent and his subtleties.' The presbyterian zeal in fact, as it boasted of itself, would learn nothing by events. During the summer of 1648, while the army under Cromwell and Ireton was trampling out the royalist risings and scattering the intrusive Scots (no longer led by Lesley), Holles availed himself of the absence of the military members to return to the house and regain his majority. Under his direction, and at the pressure of the city, negotiations in the exclusive presbyterian interest were reopened with the king. These led to concessions on his part, only made to gain time, which at last, in the beginning of December, in a house of two hundred and forty-four, were voted a sufficient basis of agreement. This vote made the final rent between military and parliamentary power, and Vane, who more than anyone else dreaded this rent, resisted it to the utmost. Marten, however, was already bringing up Cromwell from the north, and Cromwell a few days before had given voice to the 'great zeal he found among his officers for impartial justice on offenders.' Soldiers full of the same zeal were already in the suburbs. The day after the vote was passed, colonel Pride 'purged' the house of the 'royalising' members; within two days Cromwell appeared in it arm in

arm with Marten, and the military republic was virtually established.

It is needless to repeat the story of the king's trial and execution, or tell how his judges wore all the dignity of men who believed themselves in the sight of God and the world to be violating the false divinity of consecrated custom that a true divinity might appear, or how Charles, after a few bursts of misplaced contempt or passion, yet at the last, in Marvell's words,

> 'Nothing common did or mean
> Upon that memorable scene,
> But with his keener eye
> The axe's edge did try;
>
> Nor called the gods, with vulgar spite,
> To vindicate his helpless right;
> But bowed his comely head
> Down, as upon a bed.'

The new government, in the exhilaration of sudden success, and conscious that its strength lay in the awe which it inspired, 'went on roundly with its business.' Considering its position, however, it kept its hands strangely free from blood. It had the temptation, generally so fatal in times of revolution, of feeling irresistible force at its command for the moment without the least guarantee of permanent stability Yet its severity was confined to inflicting banishment and confiscation on fifteen magnates who had been prominent in the second war, to imprisoning a few others, and to killing Hamilton, Holland, Capel, and colonel Poyer. Of these, Capel alone, according to the ideas of the time, could have hoped for a better fate, for he alone was exempt from the charge of treachery, but the very greatness of his character, as Cromwell with his usual explicitness stated, made it necessary for the commonwealth that he should die.

Meanwhile the purged house of commons was constituting itself a sovereign power. Only such members were readmitted to it who would declare dissent from the vote that the king's concessions afforded a ground of settlement. First and last about a hundred and fifty members seem to have been admitted on these terms. Two days after the king's death the lords sent a humble message to the commons inviting them to a conference on the condition of the state. The commons took no heed of the message, which was re-

peated several times, till February 6, when they responded by a vote that the upper house was 'useless, dangerous, and ought to be abolished.' The next day 'kingship' was abolished by a formal vote, and soon afterwards the executive government was delegated to a council of state of forty members, to be nominated yearly by the commons. The accessories of republicanism were arranged mainly by Marten, who clearly did his work with glee. At his instance the old 'great seal' was broken, and a new one made with the arms of England and Ireland on one side, and a 'sculpture or map of the commons sitting' on the other. Under this new seal, and under oath to 'the parliament and people,' the judges were to hold their commissions, which six of the twelve agreed to do. A new coinage was also issued with a cross and harp and the motto 'God with us' on one side; the arms of England between a laurel and palm, with the legend 'Commonwealth of England,' on the other. At the same time the royal statues were all taken down, and on the pedestals was inscribed with the date, 'Exit tyrannus regum ultimus.' All these were the devices of Mr. Henry Marten. A more serious business was the issue of an 'engagement' to the new government. This, though at first promulgated in a severe retrospective form, was finally reduced to a promise of fidelity to the 'commonwealth, as established without king or lords.' Without taking this engagement, no one was to have the benefit of suing another at law, 'which,' says Baxter, 'kept men a little from contention, and would have marred the lawyers' trade.'

The question whether Charles deserved his death, is one which even debating societies are beginning to find unprofitable. His death was a necessary condition of the establishment of the commonwealth, which, again, was a necessary result of the strife of forces, or more properly, the conflict of ideas, which the civil war involved. At first sight, indeed, it might seem the result merely of accident, or at any rate of personal action and character, of the military talent of Cromwell, of the nature of the army which he got together, of the parliamentary animosities begotten of the self-denying ordinance, of the foolish confidence of Charles in his ability to shatter the two parties against each other, and lastly of the resolution of Cromwell in self-defence to command the situation. Beneath the confused web of personal relations,

however, may be seen the conflict of those religious ideas which I have spoken of as resulting from the action of the Reformation on the spirit of christendom. On the one hand was the *jus divinum* of a sacerdotal church; not simply appealing by ritual or mystery to the devout, but applied at once to strengthen and justify a royal interest. To this was opposed the *jus divinum* of the presbyterian discipline, resting, not on priestly authority, but on the popular conscience, yet claiming to be equally absolute over body and soul with the other. Their antagonism elicited the *jus divinum* of individual persuasion, a right hitherto unasserted in christendom, which, while the old recognised rights were in the suspense of conflict, became a might. In the rapture of war it felt its strength, and a master-hand gave it the form and system which it lacked. The ancient order, too weak to regulate or absorb it, tried blindly, while it was still armed and exultant, to crush it, and itself necessarily fell to pieces in the attempt. But this might of individual persuasion, though in a revolutionary struggle it could conquer, was unable to govern. It was a spirit without a body, a force with no lasting means of action on the world around it. Even at the present day its office is to work under and through established usage and interests, rather than to control them. Much less capable was it of such control, when it was still in the stage of mere impulse or feeling, with none of the calm comprehension which comes of developed thought.

When it first faced the world in organic shape as a military republic, it already presented practical contradictions which ensured its failure. The republic claimed, and claimed truly, to be the creation of the impulse of freedom, yet it found nothing but sullen acquiescence around it; it spoke in the name of the people, not half of whom, as lady Fairfax said, it represented; it asserted parliamentary right, though parliament had been 'purged' (nearly clean) to make room for it; it was directed by men of a 'civil' spirit, and had civil right to maintain, while it rested on the support of armed enthusiasts, who cared only for the privilege of saints. It was, in fact, founded on opinion, the opinion of a few, brought to sudden strength and maturity, as it might have been in an Athenian assembly, by debate in and about the parliament and in the council of the army, but which had

no hold either on the sentiment or the settled interests of the country. In the counties which throughout the war had served as the screen of London, those, that is, which formed the eastern association, together with Buckinghamshire and Berkshire, it seems to have had a certain amount of genuine support. Here the influence of Cromwell and his immediate friends, in Berkshire especially the influence of Marten, was strong; and the sentiment emanating from London, through the pervasive action of sectarian preachers was quickly felt. Even here, however, the sympathy was with the new government as a source of religious reform and protection of tender consciences, rather than as republican; and close at its doors the commonwealth had evidence of a different feeling, not only opposed to it, but on which it could not hope to work. In the spring of 1648, before Cromwell took the field, when the whole country was simmering with insurrection, the parliament had been specially troubled with a movement under its own eyes, of which Whitelock has given a particular account.[1] A petition from Surrey was brought up by some hundreds of the petitioners in person, that the king might 'forthwith be established on his throne, according to the splendour of his ancestors.' The petition was not presented to the commons till the afternoon, 'when some of the countrymen, being gotten almost drunk, and animated by the malignants, fell a quarrelling with the guards, and asked them "why they stood there to guard a company of rogues." Then words on both sides increasing, the countrymen fell upon the guards, disarmed them, and killed one of them'; till more soldiers were brought up, and the countrymen dispersed. About the same time there was a 'high and dangerous riot' in the city, which began in Moorfields about 'sporting and tippling on the Lord's day,' contrary to the ordinance of parliament.[2] For a whole day the rioters seem to have been masters of the city. They seized the lord mayor's house, and took thence a 'drake.' With this they 'possessed a magazine in Leadenhall,' and then 'beat drums on the water to invite the seamen for God and king Charles.' The next day a couple of regiments crushed the tumult. All the time a general lawless riot was spreading over Kent, got up by malignants, who circulated a rumour that the parliament meant to hang two men in every town.

[1] [Whitelock, ii. 313.]

[2] [April 10. Rushworth, vii. 1051.]

If such things could happen where the parliament could make itself felt most quickly, we may imagine the popular condition in regions where there was the same ignorance, the same liability to panic, the same tendency to tippling and gaming not on Sundays only, for malignants to work on in the interest of 'God and king Charles,' and where no voice from the republican headquarters ever penetrated. 'The inconstant, irrational, image-doting rabble,' as the proud republicans called it, which, when the king was being brought from Newcastle to Holmby, had thronged his path to be touched for the evil, which eagerly bought up fifty editions in twelve months of the Eikon Basilikè with the picture of the king at his prayers, was constant enough in two feelings, of which the republicans would have done well to take account, a reverence for familiar names, and a resentment against virtues which profess to be other than customary and commonplace. It was at once the merit and the weakness of the commonwealth's men that they irritated these feelings at every point.

> 'Before them shone a glorious world,
> Fresh as a banner bright, unfurled
> To music suddenly;'[1]

and they could not wait to attain it by slow accommodations to sense and habit. They believed that God through them was 'casting the kingdoms old into another mould,' and in the pride of triumphant reason they took pleasure in trampling on the common feelings and interests, through which reason must work, if it is to work at all. In the writings of Milton, the true exponent of the higher spirit of the republic, we find on the one hand a perfect scorn of the dignities and plausibilities then as now recognised in England (which makes him the best study for a radical orator that I am acquainted with), on the other, a free admission of the sensual degradation of the people, which estranged them from a government founded on reason. In the latter respect there is a marked contrast between the language he held at the beginning of the war, when 'he saw in his mind a noble and puissant nation rousing itself like a strong man after sleep,' and the language of the 'Eiconoclastes,' where he admits that the people 'with a besotted and degenerate baseness of spirit, except some few who yet retain in them the old English

[1] [Wordsworth, *Ruth.*]

fortitude and love of freedom, imbastardised from the ancient nobleness of their ancestors, are ready to fall flat and give adoration to the image and memory of this man, who hath more put tyranny into an act than any British king before him.' To him, throughout, the puritan war had seemed a crisis in the long struggle between the spirit and the flesh, a great effort to reclaim the spirit from 'the outward and customary eye-service of the body,' and a system of political asceticism was its proper result. Such a system to its believing supporters was the commonwealth. Its claim was not gradually to transmute, but suddenly to suppress, the feeling of the many by the reason of the few; a claim which all the while belied itself, for it appealed to popular, and even natural right, and which implied no concrete power of political reconstruction. It was a democracy without a δῆμος, it rested on an assertion of the supremacy of reason, which from its very exclusiveness gave the reason no work to do.

The great interests of the nation at that time may be taken as the landed, the mercantile, and the clerical; and the republic at starting might reckon on hostility from each of them. With the landed interest it dealt at once too severely to have its friendship, and too lightly to crush it. If it had adopted a sweeping measure of confiscation, as other revolutionary governments have done, and as it did itself in Ireland, it might have settled the soldiers on the confiscated lands, thus easing itself of their too obtrusive support, while it established a permanent interest in its favour over the whole country. As it was, the land was only confiscated in a few special cases, when it was given to the various grandees of the parliament, in reward of services, and in return for money spent on the public behalf. The ordinary gentry who had been in arms for the king, 'delinquents,' as they were called, were allowed to retain their estates on payment by way of composition of some part of the income. They thus retained their old means of influence, along with a memory of a grievance to intensify their natural royalism. Nor was the trouble got over once for all at the foundation of the commonwealth. The composition paid on the estates was one of the chief sources of revenue, and when, through a Dutch war or the like, the republic was short of money, delinquents were hunted out who had hitherto escaped. Thus the sore was kept running, and if the humbled gentry, like

colonel Poyer of Pembroke, were 'sober and penitent in the morning,' they were also like him often 'drunk and full of plots in the afternoon.' Their meetings for horse-races and cock-fighting were reckoned nurseries of disaffection, and the best security against them was that secrets sworn to over the bottle were not generally well kept.

The royalist squire, when he was not at a cock-fighting, would often have his loyalty fanned by an excluded episcopal clergyman whom he had taken as his chaplain. A large number of the clergy, as we have seen, had been driven from their livings by the imposition of the covenant. A fifth of the yearly income of their several benefices was set apart for the benefit of their families (an example not followed at the ejectment of St. Bartholomew's day), but the excluded clergy themselves were liable to be driven from their old parishes, and would generally take refuge with the royalist gentry. It would seem indeed that under the commonwealth, which, in England at least, was true to its principle of toleration, there was nothing to prevent an episcopalian clergyman who would recognise the republican government from being presented to a living or from using the Common Prayer in his church. Some residue of the old assembly still sat at Westminster, to examine men who presented themselves for ordination or induction to livings, but they had no power to compel such presentation, and there is no sign that they were uniformly resorted to. From passages in Baxter's life we may infer that many moderate episcopalians, men, that is, who were in favour, according to the technical language of the time, of compresbyterial, as distinct from prelatical, episcopacy, held benefices under the new régime. Still there were no doubt numbers of excluded 'prelatical divines' about the country, and while they were natural enemies of the commonwealth, the presbyterian ministers were not its friends. Whatever was not sectarian in it, was erastian. Its very existence they reckoned a violation of the covenant, and, if its abolition of kingship could have been borne, its refusal to give the presbyteries a coercive jurisdiction, its declared intention to remove all penal ordinances in matters of conscience, they could not brook. They refused to read its ordinances from the pulpit, as had previously been done, they prayed openly against it, and turned the monthly fast into a general exercise of disaffection. The parliament on its part issued stringent in-

junctions that all ministers should subscribe the engagement of fidelity to the commonwealth, and finding that the monthly fast had become a 'fast for strife and debate,' it declared its abolition and appointed fasts of its own on special occasions. The ministers, however, 'condemned the engagement to the pit of hell' and shut up the churches on the new fast days. According to Baxter, as a general rule only the sectarians and the old cavaliers, who were seldom 'sick of the disease of a scrupulous conscience,' would swallow the engagement. He not only refused it himself, but circulated letters against it among the soldiers, 'barking monitories and mementoes,' in Milton's phrase. Yet he seems to have been left undisturbed, nor except at the universities do we hear of any penalties for the refusal of the engagement being inflicted. The parliament knew that the presbyterian pulpit was the most powerful lever of popular opinion in the country, and showed a magnanimous patience in dealing with it. It put out declarations, promising protection to the ministers in their benefices, and a maintenance of all ordinances that had been made for reformation in doctrine, worship, and discipline, except such as were penal and coercive. At last it passed an order that state affairs were not to be discussed in sermons, and appointed a committee to receive informations against such as disregarded it. The beneficed ministers, however, stimulated by missives from the Scotch kirk, now in arms for Charles II., continued, says the gentle Mrs. Hutchinson, to 'spit fire out of their pulpits,' and even the rout of their allies at Dunbar, though it made their tongues less dangerous, did not make them more smooth.

The reason of the case is obvious. It is the true nemesis of human life that any spiritual impulse, not accompanied by clear comprehensive thought, is enslaved by its own realisation. Presbyterianism at the beginning of the war had been a struggling impulse, noble, but not understanding its own nobleness. It had now, with success, hardened into an interest; its inarticulate idea had become a shallow, though articulate formula; and it was seeking to suppress the spiritual force in which it had itself originated. The genuine commonwealth's men, on the other hand, were still in the stage of the 'unbodied thought.' They announced principles. In practice the presbyterian clergy should be supported and well paid, but universal toleration must be maintained, and tithes were

declared judaic and objectionable. The offensiveness of such principles did more to provoke the clergy than the excellence of the practice, which Baxter, at least, was obliged to confess, did to conciliate them.

The best illustration of the real feeling of the republican clique in London towards the preaching presbyterian royalists is to be found in Milton's treatise on the 'Tenure of kings and magistrates,' written just at this crisis, when he was in constant communication with the chief commonwealth's men. 'Divines, if we observe them, have their postures and their motions no less expertly than they that practise feats in the artillery ground. Sometimes they seem furiously to march on, and presently march counter; by-and-by they stand, and then retreat; or if need be, can face about or wheel in a whole body, with that cunning and dexterity as is almost unperceivable, to wind themselves by shifting ground into places of more advantage. And providence only must be the drum; providence the word of command, that calls them from above, but always to some larger benefice. . . . For while the hope to be made classic and provincial lords led them on, while pluralities greased them thick and deep, to the shame and scandal of religion, more than all sects and heresies they exclaim against; then to fight against the king's person, and no less a party of his lords and commons, or to put force on both the houses was good, was lawful, was no resisting of superior powers; they only were powers not to be resisted who countenanced the good, and punished the evil. But now that their censorious domineering is not suffered to be universal, truth and conscience to be freed, tithes and pluralities to be no more, though competent allowance provided, and the warm experience of large gifts, and they so good at taking them, yet now to exclude and seize on impeached members, to bring delinquents without exemption to a fair tribunal by the common law against murder, is to be no less than Korah, Dathan, and Abiram. He who but erewhile in the pulpits was a cursed tyrant, an enemy to God and saints, laden with innocent blood, is now, though nothing penitent, a lawful magistrate, a sovereign lord, the Lord's anointed, not to be touched, though by themselves imprisoned.'[1] When we reflect that the men of whom this was written were the most active and popular section of the beneficed

[1] [Milton's Prose Works, ii. pp. 45 and 6, ed. 1848.]

clergy, and that the other section, the accommodating episcopalians, had been covertly hostile to the parliament all along, we shall appreciate the estrangement of the ideas, that were ruling for the time, from the average sentiment of the country. The only agency through which the government could now hope to work on this sentiment was that of the independents and sectaries, who were unbeneficed, and even the support of the independents was not very hearty, for independency in the larger towns was becoming an 'interest,' while that of the sectaries might at any time become unmanageable.

The republic, having thus to reckon on open hostility from the clergy, and on a deeper hatred, tempered with fear, from most of the gentry, had no countervailing influence with the commercial class. This class, which never loves experiments in government, took its political tone largely from the presbyterian preachers; and in the city, as we have seen, gave great strength in the crisis of 1648 to the royalist reaction. The financial necessities, moreover, of an armed republic aggravated the offence of its moral and spiritual innovation. Hitherto the army had been supplied with provisions by a system of free quarter. Its leaders had been quite aware of the popular grievance which this system caused, and which only its admirable discipline prevented from being far greater. The removal of it had been a constant topic in the documents issuing from the army-council; but this implied the introduction of new and heavy taxation. The purged parliament, however, had spirit for the work, and quickly imposed an 'assessment' of 90,000*l.* a month (more than 1,000,000*l.* a year). Such a burden was sure to be a permanent source of complaint, but for the present the impressive display of restrained power, with which the new government had begun its rule, and the apprehension that it might be the only present alternative for a worse rule of levellers, had made the city more civil. At the special instance of Cromwell and Vane it advanced money on security of the tax, and the lord mayor, with other city magnates, was placed on the committee of assessment. A prompt suppression of a levelling mutiny by Cromwell, in May 1649, seems for the time to have composed the commercial mind, and a few days after a great banquet was given by the city to the parliament and officers of the army, remarkable chiefly

for the description of it by Whitelock, which indicates that in one respect at least, good taste, superior to that of our times, went along with puritan gravity. 'The feast was very sumptuous, the music only drums and trumpets, no healths drunk, nor any incivility.' The mercantile interest was further conciliated by an act passed soon afterwards (the beginning of legislation which was gradually to transfer the carrying trade of the world from the Dutch to the English), to the effect that no foreign ship should bring merchandise to England except such as was of the growth or manufacture of the country to which the ship belonged. Still the breach between the high spiritual endeavour on which alone the republic really rested, and the aspiration of the smug citizen who left such endeavour to his minister and to Sundays, was too great for orderly and vigorous administration to fill. The condition of this administration, moreover, was that Cromwell should keep its enemies at a distance.

With such dangerous elements all around it, the household of the republic was by no means united in itself. It rested on a temporary coalition between three sets of men, between whom as we have seen there was no real love; the genuine commonwealth's men, a section of the 'grandees of the parliament,' and the leaders of the army. The 'grandees of the parliament' had, with scarcely an exception, kept their hands from the death-warrant of Charles. They recognised the new order of things partly to avoid a breach with the army, partly from fear of presbyterian ascendency and an unchecked royalist reaction. So far as they looked ahead at all, they probably contemplated a re-establishment of monarchy in the person of the duke of Gloucester, the late king's youngest son, whom the parliament had in its keeping. This at least was the case with Whitelock, who was in his way a representative man. On the new council of state (of forty), which included seven peers or eldest sons of peers, five baronets, four knights, and some temporising lawyers, this section had a numerical majority. On the other hand, the stiff republicans were in a decided minority on the council. Only ten regicides were upon it, and from these must be deducted Cromwell and one or two officers whom he could command, and who were not republican on principle. The most eminent of this section were Marten, Bradshaw, Ludlow, and Scott. Bradshaw, a special friend of Milton, had presided at the trial of Charles,

in a high beaver hat lined with steel, with the composure, according to Milton, of a man with whom the trial of kings had been the business of life. He was afterwards president of the council of state, where Whitelock, a rival and perhaps jealous lawyer, complains that he did not understand the nature of his office, and made long discourses of his own that no one wanted to hear. Scott had been an officer in the new-model army, but seems already to have been jealous of Cromwell, being one of those men with whom hatred of the 'rule of a single person' was a principle of life. In later days, when Monk was supreme, the restoration inevitable, and the republicans fleeing, he stood up in parliament and said that, though he knew not where to hide his head, yet he must say that not his hand only but his heart had been in the execution of Charles. As might be expected, the restoration brought him the honour of martyrdom for his cause. Ludlow was a man of the same temper. His qualities were clearly much valued by Cromwell, and there seems to have been more real friendship between them at this time than Ludlow, looking back upon it from his exile at Vevay in the light of subsequent events, was willing to admit. Marten alone had some touch of the modern French republican about him. We have seen with what zest he arranged the more sensational incidents of the commonwealth. When the motion for the abolition of the house of lords, as 'useless and dangerous,' was being discussed, he proposed to substitute the words 'useless but not dangerous.' On another occasion, it is said, in drawing up a republican document, he spoke of 'England being restored to its ancient government of commonwealth,' and in answer to an objection that a commonwealth never before existed in England, quoted a text which had always puzzled him, where a man blind from his birth was said to be 'restored' to the sight he *should have had.* Under cover of this gaiety, however, and of a life reputed to be lewd, Marten had a strong republican enthusiasm, which he carried with him to his death through an imprisonment of twenty years.

These republicans, one would suppose, must have felt the uneasiness of their position. They had been the first to appeal from the unpurged parliament to the army. Ludlow, indeed, in his memoirs professed to have been shocked when Cromwell, in the spring of 1647, whispered to him in the house

that Holles and his party would never leave 'till the army pulled them out by the ears'; yet by his own confession a few months later, during the treaty of Newport, he urged Ireton to put force on the parliament before Ireton himself was prepared to do so, and Marten had done the like with Cromwell. To the army they had thus appealed, but to the army, now that they were successful, they no longer meant to go. Its enthusiasm was not theirs. They had too much of the ancient Roman in them, Marten, perhaps, rather of the ancient Greek, to sympathise with the 'foolishness of Christ' as it was presented in the army. It was not in them that men, whose pastime was preaching and being preached to, who discovered strange lights in their bibles to interpret strange events, could find a natural leader, but in one who in his private prayers would 'throw himself on his face and pour out his soul with tears for a quarter of an hour,' who never went into battle without a text to feed on, who sang psalms as he led them to victory.

The army, though it had no representative of its peculiar spirit on the council of state except Cromwell, was the real constituency of the republican parliament. It contained dangerous elements over which parliament had not the least control, and which might at any time overturn the parliamentary system. These may be summed up as the spirit of simple military arrogance, represented by Lambert, the levelling spirit represented by Lilburne and Wildman, and the 'Fifth Monarchy' spirit represented by Harrison. Lambert appears to have had the most conspicuous military talent of any of Cromwell's officers. In the critical spring of 1648 he held an independent command in the north of England. He showed great skill in hanging on the skirts of Hamilton's army before Cromwell joined him, and afterwards headed the pursuit. At Dunbar he led the fatal attack on the Scotch right wing, and next year when Charles was marching to Worcester, hung on his flank with cavalry, as he had before done on Hamilton's. But as soon as he was off active service, he became mischievous. Vain, restless, and of extravagant habits, he perpetually chafed alike against Cromwell's control and the authority of the parliament. He alone of the leading officers had never obtained a seat in parliament, and thus never became habituated to its civilising influence. Mrs. Hutchinson, while including him and Cromwell in the same condemnation, admits that there was this difference,

'that while the one was gallant and great, the other had nothing but an unworthy pride, most insolent in prosperity and as abject and base in adversity.' The term 'leveller,' then as now, was very loosely and ambiguously applied. According to Mrs. Hutchinson, who is a good authority on this point, the nickname was originally given to a 'certain sort of public-spirited men,' who, when the presbyterian and independent factions were at their hottest, 'declared against the ambition of the grandees of both and against the prevailing partiality, by which great men were privileged to do those things for which meaner men were punished. Many then got shelter in the house and army against their debts, by which others were undone. The lords, as if it were the chief privilege of nobility to be licensed in vice, claimed many prerogatives, which set them out of the reach of common justice, which these good people would have had equally belong to the poorest as well as to the mighty.' 'But,' continues Mrs. Hutchinson, taking a turn at philosophy, 'as all virtues are mediums and have their extremes, there rose up after under the same name a people who endeavoured the levelling of all estates and qualities, which these sober levellers were never guilty of desiring.'[1] This account corresponds with the tenor of the petitions which we read of as presented to the republican parliament by 'levellers.' They are simply a continuation of the agreements and remonstrances issued by the council of the army during the agitation of 1648, which in the main no doubt expressed the mind of Cromwell and Ireton. Their demand is for reforms, which for the most part stood over for nearly another two hundred years, till they began to be carried out by the 'purged parliament' of 1832. With minor variations according to circumstances, they pray, firstly, for a cheap and expeditious process of law, to be the same for all, with no exemptions in virtue of tenure or privilege; the laws to be written and in English; secondly, the abolition of all feudal courts, payments, and privileges; thirdly, the maintenance of the clergy by some other method than tithes, which, let us remember, were not then commuted, but were a perpetual source of carnal dispute between the clergy and the farmers; fourthly, the removal of monopolies, custom-duties, and excise, and the imposition of equal taxation; fifthly, the abolition of imprisonment for debt; all

[1] [*Life of colonel Hutchinson*, ii. 125; ed. 1885.]

estates to be liable for debt, and the rich not to turn prisons into places of protection; sixthly, the establishment of perfect freedom of conscience; and seventhly and lastly comes the demand, which presented the real difficulty, the dissolution of the sitting parliament, with provision for calling a new one at regular intervals.

This, we shall agree, is a sufficiently large and reasonable programme of reform. Sometimes farther details appear, of a kind which show a curious forecast of modern legislation, such as the establishment of registers of mortgage and the sale of lands. The rational desire for reform, however, which these petitions indicate, was always liable in the army to pass into a spirit of mutiny and disaffection, or into an ecstatic revolt, such as constantly appeared in those times against the clothing, literal and metaphorical, with which custom has covered the nakedness of human life. The grand mover of the mutinous spirit was John Lilburne, the object of Marten's well-known joke, that if he were the only man left in the world, John would quarrel with Lilburne and Lilburne with John. His obligations to Cromwell were of long standing. In a tract published in 1647 he says to Cromwell, 'You took compassion on me when I was at death's door, and in 1640 set me free from the long tyranny of the bishops and the Star chamber.' (In 1640 no one will suppose that Cromwell's sympathy was other than disinterested.) 'I have looked on you,' he proceeds, 'as the most absolute, single-hearted great man in England, untainted and unbiassed with ends of your own.' He did not long continue, however, to use this language. He had made himself useful to Cromwell in the matter of the self-denying ordinance by showing up certain scandals in connection with the earl of Manchester and other officers of the original army. This made him many enemies, one of the obscurer of whom prosecuted him for damaging his character. The case was decided against Lilburne, who was called on for heavy damages. He appealed to the parliament, and its disregard of his appeal was the beginning of a long series of grievances, accumulating in intensity as grievances do, and gradually drawing within the circle of his animosity every one who declined to make his vindication the sole object of political action. Cromwell and Marten seem really to have done what they could to help him, but he would not wait to be helped. From time to

time a parliamentary committee was appointed to consider his case, but before anything could be done, there would appear some violent pamphlet of his against parliament and its grandees in general, for which he would be lodged in the tower. 'Jonah's cry,' 'The oppressed man's oppression,' 'The just man's justification,' 'Jugglers discovered,' are among the titles of his tracts, all most trenchantly written, that appeared during the military agitation which culminated in the rendezvous at Ware. Because Cromwell would not break on his account with 'the grandees of the parliament' and the more worldly-wise of the officers, he became one in Lilburn's eyes who had bartered his high calling for the glory of the world. His supposed machinations were exhibited in a pamphlet published during the first months of the commonwealth, under the title 'The hunting of the foxes from Triploe Heath to Whitehall by five small beagles'; the foremost 'beagle' being Lilburn. It strongly illustrates the freedom of discussion allowed in the army, which indeed was the condition of its peculiar enthusiasm, that this and other seditious manifestoes from the same hand, such as 'England's new chains discovered,' had apparently unchecked circulation in it, and that at a time when a strong leaven of mutiny was at work. At three different places in the spring of 1649, in London, at Banbury, and at Salisbury, while the 'five beagles' were happily under lock and key in the tower, the troops broke into open revolt. Through want of leaders, and the swift energy of Cromwell, the revolt was suppressed without bloodshed, and of the captured mutineers, altogether some two thousand in number, only five were shot. It is a fact probably unique in military history, that the one who was shot in London was carried to the grave with military honours, followed by the whole body of troops quartered about the city with the 'levelling' badges in their hats. The fact is unique because the army also was unique, being not a mercenary machine, or even an embodiment of patriotic impulse, but an armed organisation of opinion.

Contemporaneously with this outburst of mutiny, the levelling spirit had taken another direction, sufficiently peaceable, but equally tending to sap the foundation of a government resting on opinion. 'In April of the year 1649,' says Whitelock,[1] 'the council of state had intelligence of new

[1] [iii. p. 17.]

levellers at St. Margaret's Hill, near Cobham in Surrey, and at St. George's Hill, and that they digged the ground and sowed it with roots and beans; one Everard, once of the army, is the chief of them.' A few days after Everard was brought before the general. He said that he 'was of the race of the Jews; that all the liberties of the people were lost by the coming in of William the Conqueror, and that ever since the people of God had lived under tyranny and oppression worse than that of our forefathers under the Egyptians. But now the time of deliverance was at hand. . . . And that there had lately appeared to him a vision, which bade him arise, and dig and plough the earth, and receive the fruits thereof; that their intent is to restore the creation to its former condition. . . . That they intend not to meddle with any man's property . . . but only with what is common and untilled; . . . that the time will suddenly be that all men shall willingly come in, and give up their lands and estates, and submit to this community. . . . For money, there was not any need of it, nor of clothes more than to cover nakedness. . . . As their forefathers lived in tents, so now it would be suitable to live in the same,' with more to the like effect. 'I have set down this the more largely,' adds Whitelock, 'because it was the beginning of the appearance of this opinion, and that we might the better understand and avoid these weak persuasions.' This 'persuasion,' 'weak' though it might be, was simply an expression of that individual consciousness of spiritual capacity and right, which had been strong enough to pull down an ancient church and monarchy, and was now tearing off the encumbrances by which, as it seemed, ages of selfish activity had clogged its motion. It was the sectarian enthusiasm, seeking wildly to withdraw itself from secular, as it had already done from religious ordinance. Ultimately clothed and in its right mind under the form of quakerism, it was to serve as a permanent protest against the plausibilities of the world, and to supply a constant spring of unconventional beneficence to English life. Even in this rude agricultural form, which it took among the diggers on Cobham Heath, it was perfectly peaceable. 'They would not defend themselves with arms, but would submit unto authority, and wait till the promised opportunity be offered, which they conceived to be at hand.' Their existence, however, showed that the enthusiasm which

had created the commonwealth was taking the inevitable course which made it useless as a support for any civil government whatever.

A kindred impulse to theirs, moreover, was at work in high places of the army, where it did not forswear the use of a carnal sword. Major-general Harrison was now directing his course by a verse in the prophet Daniel, which promises the kingdom of the world to the saints of the Most High, and was looking to the Rump parliament to introduce this kingdom with all speed. If their factions and worldly interests prevented them from doing so, Cromwell, he held, by some method above that of civil government, could and would. It was not for a constitutional theory or a pagan republicanism that he had been fighting, but for a dominion of grace, and he would not long be still while grandees of parliament, whom God had never owned in war, wrangled over the legal adjustment of his mercies. Overton, the governor of Hull, was the most eminent of those who shared his view, which, however, was but the legitimate doctrine of the military saint.

During more than two years, from the midsummer of 1649 to the autumn of 1651, the republican oligarchy was able to shut its eyes to the real situation. The military spirit was absorbed in the conquest under Cromwell of Ireland and Scotland, and the English royalists, hardly recovered from their crushing failure at home, were watching the fortune of war in these other countries. The only chance for the permanence of republicanism was that it should avail itself of this interval to establish itself on a more popular basis, and initiate practical reforms. If it had had the will or ability to do so, the levelling clamour, which with the return of the army was sure to be heard again, would have had nothing in popular sentiment to appeal to. The name of a 'free parliament' had been made to English ears, by the very men to whom it was now a word of ill omen, the familiar symbol of good government. The interference with the ordinary course of justice by special courts and parliamentary committees was a grievance that everyone could understand. An ecclesiastical anarchy, such as the journal of George Fox the quaker exhibits to us, was a scandal that came home to the parochial mind. In an ordinary parish, a presbyterian clergyman would be in possession of the benefice, to attempt

an irritating but ineffectual discipline and haggle over tithes, while in the same place there would be a knot of 'common-prayer men' with an excluded minister at hand to stimulate their zeal, and a congregation of baptists or independents, who, now that their friends were in power, would see no reason why their enemies should be beneficed. In the absence of any settled rule, each party might hope by local faction or intrigue to get the tithes for itself, and meanwhile would resist the payment of them to its adversaries.

The only hopeful line then for the commonwealth's men to take would have been to provide for the election of a new parliament by reformed constituencies, to abolish all criminal prosecution not sanctioned by the common-law, to reform chancery and simplify legal process, and to resettle the church on some plan that would admit at least the independents and the 'moderate' or anti-prelatist episcopalians, and substitute a fixed salary for tithes. Whether this line was practicable for them is another question. They had no hold on popular feeling; a powerful Scotch army, with the young king in its keeping, was in the field against them, and the presbyterian clergy were praying for its success. Under such circumstances there was much plausibility in Henry Marten's argument that their 'commonwealth was yet an infant, of a weak growth and a very tender constitution'; and therefore his opinion was, 'that nobody could be so fit to nurse it as the mother who brought it forth; and that they should not think of putting it under any other hands till it had obtained more years and vigour.' Marten, however, had forgotten that the true mother of the republic was not the Rump parliament, but the army, whose maternal discipline, unless some foster-parentage could be found in popular interests, would be too much for the child as soon as it sought to take a way of its own.

The essential difficulty of the situation was aggravated by the oligarchical temper which it bred in the republican leaders. With the best of them this temper took that higher form which appears in Milton's complaint,[1] that when God has given the victory to a cause in the field of battle, 'then comes the task to those worthies which are the soul of it, to be sweat and laboured out amidst the throng and noses of vulgar and irrational men.' Even in this form it cannot face facts, for it is

[1] [*Tenure of kings and magistrates.*]

not this pride of exclusion but the higher pride, which can possess itself in sympathy and comprehension, that represents the divine reason in the world. But the pride of protected intellect, once clothed with political power, soon passes into the jealousy of a clique. So it was within our memory in France under the Orleanist régime, and so it was with the leading spirits of the Long parliament. They mistook the success of their military administration for a real faculty of government, and hugged power for its own sake, in the mood of a self-conscious aristocracy of virtue. If this was the case with the best of them, a more vulgar kind of self-interest was sure to prevail among the rest. Thus, though their administration was singularly pure, they got credit even among their best friends, if Milton's 'Second defence' may be taken as expressing his real mind, for a spirit of faction and obstructiveness.

The one man among them who seems really to have comprehended the situation, was Sir Henry Vane. Shrinking from the touch of military violence, he had withdrawn from parliament after Pride purged it, though the purgation was specially in his interest, and had only been induced to join the council of state at the pressing instance of Cromwell. He at once saw the need of popularising the government, and stirred the question of new elections. A committee for considering the question seems to have been constantly sitting during the first year of the commonwealth, with Vane as its chairman, which reported at the beginning of 1650 in favour of a new parliament of four hundred members, and a rearrangement of constituencies. A corresponding resolution was voted by the house, but no bill was introduced, and meanwhile Vane's energies were absorbed by the management of the wars with the Scots and the Hollanders. On this, as on the other pressing questions, parliament could never get beyond the stage of resolutions. It resolved to deal with the question of tithes, to provide for popular education out of ecclesiastical funds, and to simplify the law, but no actual legislation was achieved. Thus by the autumn of 1651 it could take credit for an effective administration of war and finance, and for the introduction of a preaching ministry and schoolmasters into Wales. Towards facing the hostile forces which only slumbered around them, towards meeting the demands of the enthusiasm of reformation to

which they owed their temporary power, they had done absolutely nothing. On September 6 they heard the speaker read Cromwell's account of the battle of Worcester, 'a mercy' of which 'the dimensions are beyond my thoughts,' 'it is for aught I know a crowning mercy.' Cromwell, meanwhile, was riding up to London with a look which Mr. Peters, his chaplain, interpreted, or afterwards believed himself to have interpreted, to mean that he would be king of England yet. At Aylesbury he was met, on behalf of the parliament, by St. John and Whitelock, both special representatives of the lawyer's desire for 'settlement,' and 'government by a single person,' with whom, especially with St. John, he had long discourse. On the 16th, we read in Whitelock, he took his seat in the house, and there is the significant addition, 'the parliament resumed the debate touching a new representative,' also 'of an act of oblivion and general pardon, with some expedients for satisfaction of soldiery and the ease of the people.' The question of settlement was now in the hands of one who would not allow it to tarry.

LECTURE IV.

In the last lecture we saw that the immediate result of Cromwell's presence in the house after his return from Worcester was the revival of the questions of a new election and a general settlement, which, during the last two years the republican oligarchy, with its head in the bush, had not chosen to face. In pressing these questions Cromwell was true to the instinct of comprehension which had governed his course throughout. It appears from the Memoirs of Berkley, who had been the chief negotiator with him on the king's behalf in the summer of 1647, that he was then convinced of the difficulty of establishing a government on so narrow a foundation as was afforded either by the army or an oligarchical parliament. His project at that time was to restore the king on the condition of his calling a new parliament, from which he declared royalists should be excluded. This forms the basis of the propositions which the army offered to the king, while he was still in their keeping, and which, with expansion and variation according to circumstance, were pressed upon parliament during the following

year. They provide that the sitting parliament should come to an end within a year; that afterwards a parliament should be summoned every two years, to sit for not less than a hundred and twenty, or more than two hundred and forty days; that members should be taken away from the decayed towns, and representation awarded to the several counties according to the amount of taxation. No one who had borne arms for the king was to be eligible to parliament for five years. The old privy council was to be superseded by a council of state, of which the members for the next seven years were to be agreed on at once; after that they were to be nominated by parliament. The coercive jurisdiction of bishops was to be abolished; the use of the common prayer and the taking of the covenant to be alike voluntary. Subject to these conditions the king was to be restored, and a general act of oblivion was to be passed, with power to parliament to except certain persons, not more than five in number, from its benefit.

This document was supposed to come directly from the hand of Ireton, who was more at his ease in composition than Cromwell. As Cromwell says in a letter of this period to his daughter, Ireton's wife, he writes to her rather than to her husband, 'for one line of mine begets many of his.' 'In these declarations and transactions of the army,' says Whitelock,[1] 'colonel Ireton was chiefly employed, or took on him the business of the pen.' He was 'of a working and laborious brain and fancy, and set himself much upon these businesses, wherein he was encouraged and assisted by lieutenant-general Cromwell, his father-in-law. Having been bred in the Temple, he had a little knowledge of law, which led him into the more errors.' If Ireton, however, held the pen, the scheme, we may be sure, was Cromwell's no less than his, and a more statesmanlike plan of reconstruction it is difficult to conceive. If carried out in its completeness it would have given England at once a genuine parliamentary government and a free national church. Two centuries of government by borough-mongering and corruption, of church-statesmanship and state-churchmanship would have been saved. Charles, as we have seen, rejected it, and began his game anew. No such opportunity for reconciliation could ever occur again, but Cromwell's purpose remained the same,

[1] [ii. 162.]

though his mode of executing it varied with events. The anxiety for a settlement which should reconcile the old interests with the new enthusiasm is the key to his subsequent conduct. The reconciliation, for reasons which I have sufficiently described, was, in fact, impossible. The new piece would not fit the old garment. To us, looking backward with historical calmness, it seems well that it would not, for the enthusiasm adjusted to the interests would have been poetry translated into prose. That of which it is the essence to be motive, negative, abstract, would have become fixed, positive, and concrete. The sudden palpable reconciliation of the spirit and the flesh, apparently, perhaps, a spiritualising of the flesh, would have been really a carnalising of the spirit. The hopelessness, however, of the pacification which he contemplated was the tragedy of Cromwell's later life. In the stress of protecting the 'godly interest' against itself, 'worldly mixtures' inevitably came to prevail over the pure spiritual fire. To the saints he seemed in serving the Lord's people to lose his own soul, and his conscience was too sympathetic not to shrink under their judgment. Its burden, perhaps, found voice in his exclamation on his death-bed that 'he knew he had been in grace *once*.'

There were certain qualities and beliefs in Cromwell, well known in their outward character, which have won for him *par excellence* the title of hypocrite. Looked at from the inner side, which the preservation of his letters enables us to see, they appear as the plastic medium through which an honest purpose of conciliation worked, and for lack of which the same purpose was inoperative in others. The ultimate spring of his conduct was a belief, wrought to special strength in the formation and triumphant leadership of the sectarian army, that he was the chosen champion of the despised people of the Lord. In the realisation of this belief, it was his habit (in modern language) to wait on events, and to surrender himself to temporary sympathy with men of the most various views. That this sympathy, though sometimes unctuous and exaggerated in expression, was yet perfectly genuine, is proved by its evident infectiousness. Nor was it really deceptive. There is no sign that he ever committed himself to the positive maintenance of the doctrines of the men to whose sympathy he appealed. On the contrary,

there is evidence that the protection of the godly interest in its freedom of conscience, by whatever means might be available, was the only line of conduct to which he ever committed himself, and to this he was faithful throughout. He caught eagerly at every element in the character or belief of those with whom he had to do, which might be turned to account for the furtherance of this end. When it ceased to further it, it lost his sympathy. The interpretation which the men whom he thus treated naturally put on his conduct was that he sought to use them for his selfish purposes. But it was just the qualities which ruined his reputation with the less compliant of his contemporaries and with posterity that enabled him to do his work. For his reputation he cared little, for his work much. What we call waiting on events, he called a recognition of the 'outward dispensations' of God. His belief that this guidance was divine made him at once more bold and more free from selfish regards in following it. There is a touch of nature in a letter of his to Oliver St. John, written just after his rout of Hamilton's army.[1] 'Remember my love to my dear brother, H. Vane. I pray he make not too little, nor I too much, of outward dispensations. . . . Let us all be not careful what men will make of these actings. They, will they, nill they, shall fulfil the good pleasure of God; and we shall serve our generations. Our rest we expect elsewhere; that will be durable. Care we not for to-morrow, nor for anything.' This utterance, fresh from the heart, explains the subsequent alienation of Cromwell from Vane and the high republicans. He had the fatalism about him without which nothing great is achieved in times of political crisis; the consciousness of a divine work that must be done through him, though personal peace and honour were wrecked in the doing. They were men of theory and principle, 'brave men and true,' but with a sense of what was 'due to their own reputation,' or, to speak more kindly, men who would sacrifice themselves or a nation indifferently to the maintenance of what might merely be a formula. In these days of playing at heroes among the 'inferior races,' such men, perhaps, receive less credit than is their due, nor is it my purpose to measure the man of principle against the 'man of destiny,' who may be a political gambler, but merely to indicate their inevitable

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* No. lxvii.]

collision. If Cromwell had been a political gambler, he would not have been always showing his hand, nor should we have the strange collection of impromptu letters and speeches, speeches of which 'he could not recall four words' after they were spoken, which let us see into the workings of his soul.

In the last lecture I showed that during the interval between the final break of the independents and army with the king, marked by the vote of no more addresses at the beginning of 1648, and his setting out for the extinction of Hamilton, Cromwell was labouring for such a reconciliation of parties as would gain for the inevitable commonwealth a more general support than that of the professed republican clique. The equal impracticability of presbyterians and republicans, or, if we like, their equal devotion to principle, made reconciliation impossible, and the republicans for the time triumphed. Strong in a text of scripture, in a theory of right borrowed from the municipal republics of Holland and Switzerland, they shut their eyes and had their way. Cromwell knew well to what such a spirit must lead, and his irritation at it once broke out in a conversation with Ludlow. 'They were a proud set of people,' he said, 'only considerable in their own conceits.' For the time, however, he had to leave them to their conceit, that he might crush the common enemy. During the campaign, the direction in which the logic of events, of 'outward dispensations,' was leading became more apparent, and the sense of it pervades his letters. The rapture of successful war brought back to him the old enthusiasm, the consciousness of being the chosen leader of the saints. The righteous judge, he thought, had been appealed to in battle, and had shown which cause was his 'even to amazement and admiration.' 'Surely, sir,' he writes to the speaker after the rout at Preston, 'this is nothing but the hand of God; and wherever anything in this world is exalted, or exalts itself, God will pull it down; for this is the day wherein he alone will be exalted. It is not fit for me to give advice . . . more than to pray you, and all that acknowledge God, that they would exalt him, and not hate his people, that are as the apple of his eye, and for whom even kings shall be reproved.'[1]

The prosaic meaning of these new 'dispensations,' we

[1] [*ib.* No. lxiv.]

shall say, was that the military excitement against the royal 'delinquent' had become uncontrollable, that Hamilton's invasion, instigated and aided by the royalist presbyterians in England, had rendered their fusion with the commonwealth's men impossible, and that the republic must represent the latter party and the army alone. This was no doubt the final judgment which Cromwell's practical insight had unwillingly arrived at. But we do not really understand this judgment or its consequences, till we appreciate the 'wondrous alchemy' of the enthusiasm with which it was fused and molten in Cromwell's own mind. The whole mental process is exhibited in a letter to Colonel Hammond, written when it had become clear that the presbyterian majority in parliament were determined to treat with the king and restore him to London. Its object was to induce Hammond to disregard the impending vote of parliament, which (as we have seen) would have been ruinous to the cause of free conscience, and to give the king up to the army. 'You say,' he writes, 'God hath appointed authorities among the nations to which active or passive obedience is to be yielded. This resides in England in the parliament.' Then comes Cromwell's reply to this view; 'Authorities and powers are the ordinance of God. This or that species is of human institution, and limited, some with larger, others with stricter bands, each one according to its constitution. But I do not therefore think the authorities may do *anything*, and yet such obedience be due. All agree that there are cases in which it is lawful to resist. . . . The query is whether ours be such a case.' In answer to this query, Cromwell commends to Hammond three considerations; 'first, whether *salus populi* be a sound position; secondly, whether in the way in hand' (*i.e.* by the proposed treaty), 'really and before the Lord, before whom conscience has to stand, this be provided for; or if the whole fruit of the war is not like to be frustrated, and all most like to turn to what it was, and worse. . . . Thirdly, whether this army be not a lawful power, called by God to fight against the king upon some stated grounds; and being in power to such ends, may not oppose one name of authority, for those ends, as well as another name, since it was not the outward authority summoning them that by *its* power made the quarrel lawful, but the quarrel was lawful in itself. . . . My dear friend, let us look into providences; surely they mean somewhat.

They hang so together; have been so constant, so clear, unclouded. Malice, swoln malice against God's people, now called 'saints,' to root out their name; and yet they' (the saints) 'getting arms, and therein blessed with defence and more! I desire he that is for a principle of suffering would not too much slight this. . . . Not the encountering difficulties makes us to tempt God; but the acting before and without faith. If the Lord have in any measure persuaded his people, as generally he hath, of the lawfulness, nay of the *duty*, this persuasion prevailing on the heart is faith; and acting thereupon is acting in faith; and the more the difficulties are, the more the faith. . . . Have not some of our friends, by their passive principle, . . . been occasioned to overlook what is just and honest, and to think the people of God may have as much or more good the one way than the other? Good by this man against whom the Lord hath witnessed; and whom thou knowest!'[1]

That the enthusiasm of this letter is sincere it would be hard to dispute; that it might be a dangerous cover for self-deceit, not less so. That in Cromwell, as a matter of fact, it was an expansive element, in which a sympathy with the 'waiting spirit' of the sectaries, such as was necessary for their guidance, went along with a prevailing zeal for the '*salus populi*,' and a clear judgment of its needs, is the only interpretation that will explain the history as a whole. To the guidance of a man possessing such a strange compound of qualities, it is due that our great religious war ended not simply in blood, but in a real step forwards of English society.

'God's providence and necessity, not his own choice,' as he solemnly said, having forced him to pull down monarchy and put the republic in its place, he once more pressed forward his plan for a general adjustment of interests under a new parliament. The possibility of a settlement, however, which should secure the 'godly interest,' was very different now from what it would have been if Charles's spleen and superstition had permitted him honestly to come to terms in 1647. Then Cromwell had hoped by restoring the king with a council, which might have been under his own direction, to obtain that unity of initiative under a familiar name, which, important at all times, is specially necessary when order is to be rebuilt out of a chaos of factions heated with civil war.

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* No. lxxxv.]

Henceforward there could but be two alternatives. The familiar unity might be obtained, as it was ultimately to be at the blessed Restoration, but only at the cost of an absolute suppression of the 'godly interest': or an unfamiliar unity might take its place, but only on the condition of its maintenance by a hand that could hold the sword, and a temper that by either force or sympathy could control the sectaries, a condition which death might at any time remove. The military ecstasy, however, was still strong upon Cromwell, and he had a spirit for the work. In Whitelock's journal of February 25,[1] not quite a month after the execution of Charles, we read, 'From the council of state Cromwell and his son Ireton went home with me to supper; where they were very cheerful, and seemed extremely well-pleased; we discoursed together till twelve o'clock at night, and they told me wonderful observations of God's providence in the affairs of the war, and in the business of the army's coming to London and seizing the members; in all which were miraculous passages.' Cromwell had yet to learn that the providence on which he waited wrought by a longer method, because it had a wider comprehension than was dreamt of in the puritan philosophy.

In the following spring Cromwell was appointed to the command of the army that was to conquer Ireland. Thence he was recalled in the summer of 1650, and shortly afterwards was sent into Scotland. Thus till his return from the battle of Worcester in September 1651, he had no chance of pressing his projects of conciliation and reform at the headquarters of government. Such glimpses as we have, however, of his civil activity during this period show a constant tendency in the same direction. It was he who prevailed on Vane to join the council of state, and obtained a modification of the engagement to suit Vane's views. Thus to restore to the government the ablest civilian of the time, who had a special dislike for military domination, was a strange course if it was his object to clear the way for himself, but a most natural one if his object was general conciliation. Again, in the summer of 1650, when it was proposed to send the army under Fairfax into Scotland, and while Fairfax, 'being hourly persuaded by the presbyterian ministers and his own lady, who was a great patroness of them,' was doubting of the justness of the war, and finally resolving to lay down his com-

[1] [ii. 540.]

mand, Cromwell was foremost in urging him to retain it. The memoir-writers of the time, interpreting events by the jealousy of later years, treat Cromwell's earnestness on this occasion as simulated, a piece of the 'great subtlety with which he now carried himself,' but what its object might be, if it were simulated, they do not explain. If his object were personal aggrandisement, it is unaccountable that he should go out of his way to put the command of the army in the hands of another. If on the other hand it were a general settlement, it was quite natural that he should seek to conciliate the presbyterian interest to the commonwealth, in the person of the man who alone combined presbyterian sympathies with toleration of the sectaries.

But though Cromwell, during this period, was quite free from the thought which Mr. Peters attributed to him, 'that he would be king of England yet,' still the impatience for an establishment of a 'free church of saints' in a free state, and the 'heat of inward evidence' that he was himself the man to achieve it, was growing constantly stronger in him. He led his army into Ireland, as Joshua into Canaan, and his last letter to the parliament, as he was setting sail from Milford Haven, offered to their consideration the removal of penal statutes that enforce the consciences of honest conscientious men. His conquest of Ireland, and afterwards of Scotland, was achieved in and through a constant fire of enthusiasm. 'It was set upon some of our hearts,' he writes after the storm of Tredah, 'that a great thing should be done, not by power or might, but by the spirit of God. And is it not so, clearly? That which caused your men to storm so courageously, it was the spirit of God, who gave your men courage, and took it away again; and gave the enemy courage, and took it away again; and gave your men courage again, and therewith this happy success.'[1] During his brief sojourn in London between the two wars it appears from a dialogue with Ludlow[2] that his thoughts were running on the need of swift reforms, especially of the law, and that he 'was feeding on' the hundred and tenth psalm; 'The Lord shall send the rod of thy strength out of Zion. . . . Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power; in the beauties of holiness, from the womb of the morning.' The experience of the Scotch campaign, full, as he conceived,

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* No. cv]

[2] [*Memoirs*, p. 123; ed. 1751.]

of miraculous passages, was not likely to temper his consciousness of a divine mission. 'There may be a spiritual fulness,' he writes to the general assembly of the kirk,[1] 'which the world may call drunkenness, as in the second chapter of the Acts.' In such spiritual fulness he lay on September 2, with a sickly, half-starved army about Dunbar, in the face of an enemy double in number and apparently commanding his position, yet sure, as he says, that just 'because of their numbers, their advantages, and their confidence, because of our weakness, our strait, we were in the mount, and in the mount the Lord would be seen, and that he would find a way of deliverance for us.' Through 'an high act of the Lord's providence' Lesley made a false move, and the way of deliverance was found. 'It is easy to say,' he writes to parliament after the victory, 'the Lord hath done this. It would do you good to see and hear our poor foot go up and down making their boast of God. But it's in your hands, and by these eminent mercies God puts it more into your hands to give glory to him; to improve your power and his blessings to his praise. . . . Disown yourselves and own your authority. . . . Relieve the oppressed, hear the groans of poor prisoners in England. Be pleased to reform the abuses of all professions; and if there be any one that makes many poor to make a few rich' (a hit at the lawyers), 'that suits not a commonwealth.'[2]

It was this exhilaration of energy in the Lord's work, not a vulgar ambition of kingship, that shone in Cromwell's countenance as he rode up from Worcester a year later, and that made him press, as we have seen, on the first day when he resumed his seat in the house, for measures of settlement and reform. 'Peace hath her victories,' as Milton wrote to him at this time, 'no less renowned than war,' but they were to be won not in days but in centuries, and by the energy not of feeling but of thought. He had a temper, he once said of himself, that 'caused him often to overact business,' and his trusted 'son Ireton,' in whose 'working brain' the same plans were combined with a more cautious and calculating temper, was no longer at hand to restrain him. He had died at his post in Ireland three months after the battle of Worcester; his death, we are told, 'striking a great sadness in Cromwell.'[3] 'No man could prevail with him so much or

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* No. cxxxvi.] [2] [Carlyle, *ib.* No. cxl.]
[3] [Whitelock, iii. p. 371.]

order him so far as Ireton could,' but there is no reason to think that had Ireton lived he would have altered, though he might sometimes have checked, Cromwell's career. If Cromwell had died when Ireton did, he would have died like him in the full odour of republican sanctity, and his subsequent breach with the republicans was due to his pressing forward the army project of reform and reconstruction which had first taken shape in Ireton's brain. In his letter to the parliament after Dunbar he professed a desire (a notable instance of his frankness) not to 'precipitate them by importunities' in the work of settlement, and he was true to his profession. For a year and a half, however, from September 16, 1651, to April 20, 1653, he loyally endeavoured to rouse the republican oligarchy to the necessities of the situation. If his importunity was not pressing, that of the people was, and it was clear that the parliament must give some practical 'reason why' for its existence, or lose its prestige. Petitions from the country were constantly coming in, all conceived in the 'levelling' sense which I described in the last lecture. Their general burden is that tithes may be either abolished as levitical and Romish, or gathered into a common treasury, and then some part of them applied to the maintenance of a godly ministry in each county; that those 'drunken, malignant, scandalous, and profane ones,' that go under the name of ministers, be put to work for their living; that justice may be given, not bought, and all matters of *meum* and *tuum* determined free, yet by a written law; that some check may be put on the swarms of lawyers, attorneys, and solicitors, nourished with the bread of oppression by long and tedious suits. Sometimes they wax eloquent, hoping that 'justice may come down like a mighty stream, free for the poorest to resort unto, too strong for the richest to divert.' The Rump parliament meanwhile, not, we may fairly suppose, considering its previous inaction, without pressure from Cromwell, showed great activity in appointing committees to consider grievances, and in pressing resolutions, which if carried out would have made English law more cheap, and English land more free, than it has ever been since. There was no result however in the way of effective legislation, and the old conviction of the army, that it was the true parliament and judicature of the nation, was beginning to revive. At the end of 1650 letters were read in

the house, 'that officers of the army by commission from Lambert did determine controversies between party and party; wherewith the people were much satisfied with the quick despatch they received with full hearing.' At the same time petitions were circulating in the army for reform of abuses and a new parliament, in the same tone which had prevailed when the army had before (in the year 1648) been in direct contact with the civil power. The real fact was that the parliament was once more face to face with its true, its sole constituency, the military saints, with whom its conceit of antique republicanism would avail little, unless it could realise in the hard world of 'interests' the reforming enthusiasm which had created it. Such realisation, if possible at all, was clearly impossible to an oligarchy which had always been unpopular and was becoming factious.

We have not the means of tracing in detail the conduct of Cromwell during this crisis. It is clear that he made no secret of his thoughts. In November 1651 he obtained a vote of the house that it would put a term to its sitting, but only one so remote as November 1654. The next question necessarily was, how should the new election, and the general work of reconstruction, be regulated? That it would require rigorous control in the presence of the royalist gentry and the angry presbyterian clergy, was abundantly clear. Was this control to be in the hands of the Rump oligarchy, disunited, estranged from the army, incapable of swift and secret action as a deliberative assembly must be, or in the hands of a single person who had a name of terror and hope, and to whom the heart of the army was as his own? This was the real question at issue, and at the end of 1651 we find Cromwell, at a conference which he invited between the grandees of parliament and the officers, explicitly stating it. It was as impossible for him now, however, as it had been on a like occasion in 1648, to bring about an understanding. The great lawyers of the house generally were in favour of government by a single person, but only St. John seems to have shared Cromwell's views as to who the single person should be. Whitelock was in favour of restoring monarchy in the person of the duke of Gloucester. To the enthusiasts of the army the very name of monarchy was blasphemy against Christ, whom they were expecting shortly to restore the kingdom to the saints. The theoretical republicans of

the Rump were in favour of constituting themselves a permanent body on the Venetian model, only filling up vacancies as they should occur.

In this dead-lock of conflicting jealousies and opinions the year 1652 passed away, the only vigour being shown in the prosecution of the Dutch war and the settlement of Scotland. Cromwell's views were well known, and one day when in debate he spoke of Mr. Marten accidentally as '*Sir* Harry,' Marten interrupted him by saying with a low bow, 'I always expected when your majesty became king, you would make me a knight.' He was clearly most unwilling, however, to break with the parliament, which he had absolutely in his hands, and if its leaders could have been induced, recognising their weakness and swallowing their formula, to invest him with a temporary dictatorship, he would have kept them at peace, as he alone had hitherto done, with the army, and worked with them constitutionally for the settlement of the nation. As it was, there are indications that he controlled the discontent of the army as long as he was able. Lambert's vanity had been rudely affronted by the Rump, and his busy brain was brewing mischief. Harrison was becoming impatient for the inauguration of the 'fifth monarchy.' The military saints were finding, as Cromwell afterwards expressed it, that 'all tenderness was forgotten to the good people, though it was by their hands and their means that the parliament sat where it did.' 'The reformation of law,' he adds, 'was a thing that many good words were spoken for; but we know that many months together were not sufficient for the settling of one word, "incumbrances."'[1]

By the beginning of the year 1653, Sir Henry Vane, who had hitherto been organising victory for Blake, had become alive to the danger of military domination, which he specially dreaded, and was pressing forward a bill for a new parliament. It was upon this bill that the final rupture with Cromwell took place. In its chief features it corresponded with the petitions of the army and levellers which had been rife in the agitation of 1647–8. There was to be a parliament of four hundred members, who should be distributed among the counties according to wealth and population. In the boroughs there was to be a uniform rental qualification of householders; in the counties such a property qualification

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* Speech I.]

as should exclude tenants subject to control. There was to be a freehold qualification of 40*s.*, a copyhold of 5*l.*, and a leasehold of 20*l.* annual value. This system of distribution and qualification was afterwards adopted by Cromwell, except that he substituted for the property qualifications the uniform, and very high, one of 200*l.* of real or personal estate. Cromwell's objection to the bill was that it gave the existing members the right both of sitting in the new house without re-election and of deciding on the admissibility of new members. In other words it constituted the Rump a many-headed dictatorship, to regulate the work of reconstruction. To this he opposed a plan of his own for delegating the resettlement to an assembly of notables, to be specially summoned for the purpose; a plan which we may readily admit was merely meant as such a screen for his own dictatorship as would satisfy the demands of the 'fifth monarchy' or republican officers. As usual he behaved with perfect explicitness. On April 19 he had a conference of members of parliament and officers of the army at his lodgings, and urged the importance of an immediate dissolution and a convocation of notables. St. John was the only civilian who supported him, but according to his own account the meeting closed with an understanding that Vane's bill should not be pressed. Next morning the conference was renewed, but in the presence of only a few 'parliament men,' of whom Whitelock was one. The sequel is best described in his words.[1] 'Cromwell being informed during this debate that the parliament was sitting, and that it was hoped they would put a period to themselves, which would be the most honourable dissolution for them; hereupon he broke off the meeting, and the members of parliament with him left him at his lodgings and went to the house, and found them in debate of an act, the which would occasion other meetings of them again, and prolong their sitting.' This was Vane's bill, which he was pressing through its last stages, in disregard, according to Cromwell, of the pledge given the night before. Colonel Ingoldsby brought word to Cromwell of what the house was doing, 'who was so enraged thereat, expecting they should have meddled with no other business but putting a period to their sitting without more delay, that he presently commanded some of the officers of the army to fetch a party

[1] [iv. p. 4.]

of soldiers, with whom he marched to the house.' The rest of the story is too familiar to need repetition. It is noticed, however, that he did not introduce the soldiers at once, but sat quietly in his place, till the motion was put from the chair, 'that the bill do now pass.' It was then, at the last moment, *i.e.* at which it was possible to stop the establishment of a permanent oligarchy under the forms of law, that he broke into a violent speech, which ended with his calling in the soldiers. His conduct at this crisis, as throughout his public life, corresponded exactly to the account which he gave of it himself. Into parliament, as into battle, he carried the 'waiting spirit' in which the sectaries believed. He trusted for guidance to a sudden inspiration interpreting the necessity of events. At last, at the critical point, just when he saw Lesley making a gap in his line at Dunbar, 'the spirit of God was strong upon him,' he would no longer consult 'flesh and blood,' but took the decisive step. The dissolution of the Rump was clearly inevitable so soon as it broke with and sought to defy its armed constituency, which, as Cromwell had always maintained, was an equally legitimate authority with itself, and far more truly representative. The violence of manner with which Cromwell turned it out and locked the door, of which, says Whitelock, even 'some of his bravadoes were ashamed,' is quite unique in his history, and doubtless aggravated the difficulty of subsequent reconciliation with the commonwealth's men. The best explanation of it is a remark in one of his private letters; 'I have known my folly do good, when affection (passion) has overcome my reason.' It is a curious trait in his character, that when wrought up after much hesitation to a decisive act, of which he saw the danger, he gave the loose to that boisterous vehemence for which he had early been noted, but which he could generally suppress. The same trait appears in his behaviour at the signature of the death-warrant of Charles.

He had now to grapple with the question which the Rump had fingered in vain. The Lord's people were to be saved from themselves, and the interests of the world so reformed and adjusted that it might yield them fit habitation. The task, as I have shown in the previous lectures, was in the nature of the case a hopeless one. The claim of the saints was at once false and self-contradictory; false, for the secular world, which it sought to ignore, had rights no less divine than its own;

and self-contradictory, since even amongst the most sectarian of the sectaries it was constantly hardening into authority hostile to the individual persuasion in which it originated. 'That hath been one of the vanities of our contest. Every sect saith, "Oh, give me liberty." But give it him, and to the best of his power he will yield it to no one else.'[1] Cromwell's labour, however, was not wholly in vain. During five years, by the mere force of his instinct of settlement, his commanding energy, and that absorbing sympathy miscalled hypocrisy, which enabled him to hold the hearts of the sectaries even while he disappointed their enthusiasm, he at least kept the peace between the saints and the world, secured liberty of conscience, and placed it on ground which even the flood of prelatical reaction was not able wholly to submerge. But while protecting the godly interest, he was obliged more and more to silence its pretension. A gradual detachment from the saints, and approximation to the ancient interests, was the necessary policy of his later years.

The dissolution of the Rump caused no derangement of administration. As captain-general in a council of officers, Cromwell directed all officials to continue their work, and summoned a body of notables to act as a constitutive assembly. The change was generally acceptable to puritan sentiment. 'I told the parliament,' said Cromwell afterwards, 'what I knew better than anyone else, because of my manner of life, which took me up and down the country, thereby giving me to know the temper of all men, that the nation loathed their sitting. I knew it, and when they were dissolved, there was not so much as the barking of a dog, or any general and visible repining at it.'[2] The addresses of congratulation which came in from all parts of the country quite bore out this statement. It was not from the pagan republicanism of the commonwealth-clique that Cromwell had difficulty to apprehend, but from the smothered fire of the fifth-monarchy men, with whom the necessities of settlement compelled him to break. This soon became apparent in the assembly of notables. They elected an executive council, of which Cromwell was an ordinary member, and for five months all went smoothly along. Then the fifth-monarchy enthusiasm, represented by general Harrison, and stimulated by anabaptist ministers who met with him 'at one

[1] [Carlyle, *ib.* Speech III.] [2] [*Ib.*]

Mr. Squib's house,' became unmanageable. It fell foul of 'ministry and magistracy,' demanding the simple abolition of tithes and of the court of chancery, and the establishment of the judicial law of Moses, to be administered 'according to the wisdom of any man that would interpret the text this way or that.'[1] This led to the resignation of the assembly, whether under pressure from Cromwell it is difficult to say, but certainly with his good-will. Henceforth he let it be known explicitly that the world must have its due and settled interests be maintained. A few days after the council of state presented him with an 'instrument of government,' establishing a protectorate with a free parliament, to be elected according to the original scheme of Ireton, Vane, and Cromwell himself. Under this instrument he ruled for about four years, when 'the petition and advice,' passed by his second parliament, took its place, which did not materially alter the system, but put it on a parliamentary basis.

The protectorate must have the credit of having been at least perfectly true to the great end of settlement, and of having been, however arbitrary, yet perfectly honest in its arbitrariness. It was quite free from the jugglery with recognised names and institutions which is the chosen device of modern despotism. The three points of the Cromwellian programme—restoration, so far as might be, of the old constitution, reform of the law, and the protection of the godly interest—were really inconsistent with each other, for to restore the constitution was impossible without a restoration of royalism, and the restoration of royalism meant the subjection of the godly, while a reformation of the law, not resting on a constitutional basis, hung only on the thread of a single life. His effort, however, to govern constitutionally was genuine and persistent. Two conditions he always announced as fundamental, the sovereignty of the protector, and the maintenance of liberty of conscience. The protectorate was 'what he would be rolled in the grave and covered with infamy sooner than give up.' It was for a liberty of conscience, he always said, better than episcopacy or presbyterianism had allowed, that the army, the true national representative, had shed its blood. To surrender it would be to violate his most sacred trust. Subject to these two conditions he would give parliament its way, but

[1] [Carlyle, *ib* Speech XIII.]

in the first the republican minority, in the second the presbyterian majority, would not acquiesce. One of his parliaments imprisoned Biddle the socinian, the other was very near burning poor James Nayler, the quaker, but finally let him off with putting him on the pillory and boring through his tongue. In both cases Cromwell interfered. The final breach, however, with each of his parliaments was due to its insisting on a discussion of the basis of government by a single person. To tolerate this, in the presence of royalist plots, sanctioned by a proclamation in Charles Stuart's name for the assassination of 'the base mechanic fellow, Oliver Cromwell,' and of fifth-monarchy men who were gathering arms to fight for 'king Jesus' under the standard of the tribe of Judah, would have been 'to let all run back to blood again.'

He was thus constrained to carry out the reform of law, and the settlement of religion, by the method of ordinances of council, most of which were subsequently confirmed by his second parliament. In this way he reformed chancery and simplified legal procedure. As regarded the church, since the dissolution of the assembly, there had been, as I before explained, no regular system, but the only recognised way of becoming eligible for a benefice was through presbyterian ordination, though it was probably not uniformly resorted to. For this Cromwell substituted a board of ordination, representing presbyterians, independents, and baptist preachers alike, and containing a certain number of laymen. No one was to have a claim to levy tithes till approved by this board, which seems, however, to have had power to delegate its authority to subordinate boards in the provinces. Other county boards were established for 'detecting and rejecting scandalous, ignorant, and insufficient ministers.' An ordinance for the more equal distribution of church property completed the ecclesiastical reform.

This scheme was liberally worked, and except to the believers in the necessity of episcopal 'succession,' for which Cromwell had no bowels, opened a wider door than has been open since. It appears that episcopalians in Baxter's sense, and arminians, had now access to the benefices, though the ordainers might sometimes be more severe with them than with others. Even the high prelatists, so long as they kept free from plots, were allowed to form congregations and use the common prayer, which had never been the case under

the presbyterian régime. Of the fidelity of Cromwell to the work of reformation and godliness, which he had undertaken to reconcile with a general settlement, the best evidence is the eye-witness of Baxter and Burnet; both were royalists, and Baxter, at least, personally unfriendly to Cromwell.

The unruliness of the elements which Cromwell had wrought into a system of rational government became sufficiently apparent at his death. My limits do not allow me to trace minutely the course of events which led to the restoration. For some time a triangular contest went on between the junto of officers, headed by Fleetwood and Lambert, which Cromwell had kept in hand to the last, the court party of real statesmen, such as Thurloe and Whitelock, who supported Richard Cromwell, and the republicans headed by Vane and Scott. The slumbering fanaticism of Fleetwood once more broke out into a zeal for a dominion of grace. He allowed the officers, whom Cromwell had kept at their commands at a distance, to get together in London, and collogue with the more violent clergy. Henry Cromwell, watching events from Ireland, saw what was coming and warned Fleetwood in a tone worthy of his father's son. Fleetwood, however, was deaf to such advice, and finally combined with the republicans to overthrow Richard Cromwell and restore the Rump parliament. The republicans, however, though they did not scruple now any more than they had done in 1648, to apply to the soldiers for support, could not long agree with them. The Rump soon took courage to cashier the dangerous officers, and afterwards, at the request of Monk, who was advancing from Scotland with an army purged of enthusiasts, removed their regiments from London. The situation was now at Monk's command. The presbyterians, still in possession of most of the pulpits, began to reassert their claims, and Monk, a man without ideas, combined with them as the stronger party. After a brief saturnalia of ordinances against quakers and sectaries, they listened to the fair promises of Charles Stuart, and gave themselves over to a king who was already a papist, and a court which had but one strong conviction, that presbyterianism was no religion for a gentleman.

Thus ended, apparently in simple catastrophe, the enterprise of projecting into sudden reality the impulse of spiritual freedom. Its only result, as it might seem, had been to pre-

vent the transition of the feudal into an absolute monarchy, and thus to prepare the way for the plutocracy under feudal forms which has governed England since the death of William III. This, however, is but a superficial view. Two palpable benefits the short triumph of puritanism did win for England. It saved it from the catholic reaction, and it created the 'dissenting bodies.' If it seems but a poor change from the fanatic sacerdotalism of Laud to the genteel and interested sacerdotalism of modern English churchmanship, yet the fifteen years of vigorous growth which Cromwell's sword secured for the church of the sectaries, gave it a permanent force which no reaction could suppress, and which has since been the great spring of political life in England. The higher enthusiasm, however, which breathed in Cromwell and Vane, was not puritanic or English merely. It belonged to the universal spiritual force which as ecstasy, mysticism, quietism, philosophy, is in permanent collision with the carnal interests of the world, and which, if it conquers them for a moment, yet again sinks under them, that it may transmute them more thoroughly to its service. 'Death,' said Vane on the scaffold, 'is a little word, but it is a great work to die.' So his own enthusiasm died that it might rise again. It was sown in the weakness of feeling, that it might be raised in the intellectual comprehension which is power. 'The people of England,' he said again, 'have been long asleep. I doubt they will be hungry when they awake.' They have slept, we may say, another two hundred years. If they should yet wake and be hungry, they will find their food in the ideas which, with much blindness and weakness, he vainly offered them, cleared and ripened by a philosophy of which he did not dream.

LECTURE ON LIBERAL LEGISLATION AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.

THAT a discussion on this subject is opportune will hardly be disputed by any one who noticed the line of argument by which at least two of the liberal measures of last session[1] were opposed. To the Ground Game Act it was objected that it interfered with freedom of contract between landlord and tenant. It withdrew the sanction of law from any agreement by which the occupier of land should transfer to the owner the exclusive right of killing hares and rabbits on the land in his occupation. The Employers' Liability Act was objected to on similar grounds. It did not indeed go the length of preventing masters and workmen from contracting themselves out of its operation. But it was urged that it went on the wrong principle of encouraging the workman to look to the law for the protection which he ought to secure for himself by voluntary contract. 'The workman,' it was argued, 'should be left to take care of himself by the terms of his agreement with the employer. It is not for the state to step in and say, as by the new act it says, that when a workman is hurt in carrying out the instructions of the employer or his foreman, the employer, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, shall be liable for compensation. If the law thus takes to protecting men, whether tenant-farmers, or pitmen, or railway servants, who ought to be able to protect themselves, it tends to weaken their self-reliance, and thus, in unwisely seeking to do them good, it lowers them in the scale of moral beings.'

Such is the language which was everywhere in the air last summer, and which many of us, without being convinced by it, may have found it difficult to answer. The same line

[1] [Summer, 1880.]

of objection is equally applicable to other legislation of recent years, to our factory acts, education acts, and laws relating to public health. They all, in one direction or another, limit a man's power of doing what he will with what he considers his own. They all involve the legal prohibition of certain agreements between man and man, and as there is nothing to force men into these agreements, it might be argued that, supposing them to be mischievous, men would, in their own interest, gradually learn to refuse them. There is other legislation which the liberal party is likely to demand, and which is sure to be objected to on the same ground, with what justice we shall see as we proceed. If it is proposed to give the Irish tenant some security in his holding, to save him from rack-renting and from the confiscation of the results of his labour in the improvement of the soil, it will be objected that in so doing the state goes out of its way to interfere with the contracts, possibly beneficial to both sides, which landlord and tenant would otherwise make with each other. Leave the tenant, it will be said, to secure himself by contract. Meanwhile the demand for greater security of tenure is growing stronger amongst our English farmers, and should it be proposed—as it must before this parliament expires—to give legal effect to it, the proposal will be met by the same cry, that it is an interference with the freedom of contract, unless, indeed, like Lord Beaconsfield's Act of 1875, it undoes with one hand what it professes to do with the other.

There are two other matters with which the liberal leaders have virtually promised to deal, and upon which they are sure to be met by an appeal to the supposed inherent right of every man to do what he will with his own. One is the present system of settling land, the other the liquor traffic. The only effectual reform of the land laws is to put a stop to those settlements or bequests by which at present a landlord may prevent a successor from either converting any part of his land into money or from dividing it among his children. But if it is proposed to take away from the landlord this power of hampering posterity, it will be said to be an interference with his free disposal of his property. As for the liquor traffic, it is obvious that even the present licensing laws, ineffectual as some of us think them, interfere with the free sale of an article in large consumption, and that with the concession of 'local option' the interference would,

to say the least, be probably carried much further. I have said enough to show that the most pressing political questions of our time are questions of which the settlement, I do not say necessarily involves an interference with freedom of contract, but is sure to be resisted in the sacred name of individual liberty, not only by all those who are interested in keeping things as they are, but by others to whom freedom is dear for its own sake, and who do not sufficiently consider the conditions of its maintenance in such a society as ours. In this respect there is a noticeable difference between the present position of political reformers and that in which they stood a generation ago. Then they fought the fight of reform in the name of individual freedom against class privilege. Their opponents could not with any plausibility invoke the same name against them. Now, in appearance—though, as I shall try to show, not in reality—the case is changed. The nature of the genuine political reformer is perhaps always the same. The passion for improving mankind, in its ultimate object, does not vary. But the immediate object of reformers, and the forms of persuasion by which they seek to advance them, vary much in different generations. To a hasty observer they might even seem contradictory, and to justify the notion that nothing better than a desire for change, selfish or perverse, is at the bottom of all reforming movements. Only those who will think a little longer about it can discern the same old cause of social good against class interests, for which, under altered names, liberals are fighting now as they were fifty years ago.

Our political history since the first reform act naturally falls into three divisions. The first, beginning with the reform of parliament, and extending to Sir R. Peel's administration, is marked by the struggle of free society against close privileged corporations. Its greatest achievement was the establishment of representative municipal governments in place of the close bodies which had previously administered the affairs of our cities and boroughs; a work which after an interval of nearly half a century we hope shortly to see extended to the rural districts. Another important work was the overhauling the immense charities of the country, and the placing them under something like adequate public control. And the natural complement of this was the removal of the grosser abuses in the administration of the church,

the abolition of pluralities and sinecures, and the reform of cathedral chapters. In all this, while there was much that contributed to the freedom of our civil life, there was nothing that could possibly be construed as an interference with the rights of the individual. No one was disturbed in doing what he would with his own. Even those who had fattened on abuses had their vested interests duly respected, for the house of commons then as now had 'quite a passion for compensation.' With the ministry of Sir R. Peel began the struggle of society against monopolies; in other words, the liberation of trade. Some years later Mr. Gladstone, in his famous budgets, was able to complete the work which his master began, and it is now some twenty years since the last vestige of protection for any class of traders or producers disappeared. The taxes on knowledge, as they were called, followed the taxes on food, and since most of us grew up there has been no exchangeable commodity in England except land—no doubt a large exception—of which the exchange has not been perfectly free.

The realisation of complete freedom of contract was the special object of this reforming work. It was to set men at liberty to dispose of what they had made their own that the free-trader worked. He only interfered to prevent interference. He would put restraint on no man in doing anything that did not directly check the free dealing of some one in something else. But of late reforming legislation has taken, as I have pointed out, a seemingly different direction. It has not at any rate been so readily identifiable with the work of liberation. In certain respects it has put restraints on the individual in doing what he will with his own. And it is noticeable that this altered tendency begins, in the main, with the more democratic parliament of 1868. It is true that the earlier factory acts, limiting as they do by law the conditions under which certain kinds of labour may be bought and sold, had been passed some time before. The first approach to an effectual factory act dates as far back as the time of the first reform act, but it only applied to the cotton industry, and was very imperfectly put in force. It aimed at limiting the hours of labour for children and young persons. Gradually the limitation of hours came to be enforced, other industries were brought under the operation of the restraining laws, and the same protection extended to women as to young

persons. But it was only alongside of the second reform act in 1867 that an attempt was made by parliament to apply the same rule to every kind of factory and workshop; only later still, in the first parliament elected partly by household suffrage, that efficient measures were taken for enforcing the restraints which previous legislation had in principle required. Improvements and extensions in detail have since been introduced, largely through the influence of Mr. Mundella, and now we have a system of law by which, in all our chief industries except the agricultural, the employment of children except as half-timers is effectually prevented, the employment of women and young persons is effectually restricted to ten hours a day, and in all places of employment health and bodily safety have all the protection which rules can give them.

If factory regulation had been attempted, though only in a piecemeal way, some time before we had a democratic house of commons, the same cannot be said of educational law. It was the parliament elected by a more popular suffrage in 1868 that passed, as we know, the first great education act. That act introduced compulsory schooling. It left the compulsion, indeed, optional with local school-boards, but compulsion is the same in principle, is just as much compulsion by the state, whether exercised by the central government or delegated by that government to provincial authorities. The education act of 1870 was a wholly new departure in English legislation, though Mr. Forster was wise enough to proceed tentatively, and leave the adoption of compulsory bye-laws to the discretion of school-boards. It was so just as much as if he had attempted at once to enforce compulsory attendance through the action of the central government. The principle was established once for all that parents were not to be allowed to do as they willed with their children, if they willed either to set them to work or to let them run wild without elementary education. Freedom of contract in respect of all dealings with the labour of children was so far limited.

I need not trouble you with recalling the steps by which the principle of the act of 1870 has since been further applied and enforced. It is evident that in the body of school and factory legislation which I have noticed we have a great system of interference with freedom of contract. The hirer of labour is prevented from hiring it on terms to which the

person of whom he hires it could for the most part have been readily brought to agree. If children and young persons and women were not ready in many cases, either from their own wish, or under the influence of parents and husbands, to accept employment of the kind which the law prohibits, there would have been no occasion for the prohibition. It is true that adult men are not placed directly under the same restriction. The law does not forbid them from working as long hours as they please. But I need not point out here[1] that in effect the prevention of the employment of juvenile labour beyond certain hours, amounts, at least in the textile industries, to the prevention of the working of machinery beyond those hours. It thus indirectly puts a limit on the number of hours during which the manufacturer can employ his men. And if it is only accidentally, so to speak, that the hiring of men's labour is interfered with by the half-time and ten hours' system, the interference on grounds of health and safety is as direct as possible. The most mature man is prohibited by law from contracting to labour in factories, or pits, or workshops, unless certain rules for the protection of health and limb are complied with. In like manner he is prohibited from living in a house which the sanitary inspector pronounces unwholesome. The free sale or letting of a certain kind of commodity is thereby prevented. Here, then, is a great system of restriction, which yet hardly any impartial person wishes to see reversed; which many of us wish to see made more complete. Perhaps, however, we have never thoroughly considered the principles on which we approve it. It may be well, therefore, to spend a short time in ascertaining those principles. We shall then be on surer ground in approaching those more difficult questions of legislation which must shortly be dealt with, and of which the settlement is sure to be resisted in the name of individual liberty.

We shall probably all agree that freedom, rightly understood, is the greatest of blessings; that its attainment is the true end of all our effort as citizens. But when we thus speak of freedom, we should consider carefully what we mean by it. We do not mean merely freedom from restraint or compulsion. We do not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is that we like. We do not mean a freedom that can be enjoyed by one man or one set of men

[1] [At Leicester.]

at the cost of a loss of freedom to others. When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them. When we measure the progress of a society by its growth in freedom, we measure it by the increasing development and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to social good with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed; in short, by the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves. Thus, though of course there can be no freedom among men who act not willingly but under compulsion, yet on the other hand the mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom. In one sense no man is so well able to do as he likes as the wandering savage. He has no master. There is no one to say him nay. Yet we do not count him really free, because the freedom of savagery is not strength, but weakness. The actual powers of the noblest savage do not admit of comparison with those of the humblest citizen of a law-abiding state. He is not the slave of man, but he is the slave of nature. Of compulsion by natural necessity he has plenty of experience, though of restraint by society none at all. Nor can he deliver himself from that compulsion except by submitting to this restraint. So to submit is the first step in true freedom, because the first step towards the full exercise of the faculties with which man is endowed. But we rightly refuse to recognise the highest development on the part of an exceptional individual or exceptional class, as an advance towards the true freedom of man, if it is founded on a refusal of the same opportunity to other men. The powers of the human mind have probably never attained such force and keenness, the proof of what society can do for the individual has never been so strikingly exhibited, as among the small groups of men who possessed civil privileges in the small republics of antiquity. The whole framework of our political ideas, to say nothing of our philosophy, is derived from them. But in them this extraordinary efflorescence of the privileged class was accompanied by the

slavery of the multitude. That slavery was the condition on which it depended, and for that reason it was doomed to decay. There is no clearer ordinance of that supreme reason, often dark to us, which governs the course of man's affairs, than that no body of men should in the long run be able to strengthen itself at the cost of others' weakness. The civilisation and freedom of the ancient world were shortlived because they were partial and exceptional. If the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves, we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the apparent elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the many, and in ranking modern society, founded as it is on free industry, with all its confusion and ignorant licence and waste of effort, above the most splendid of ancient republics.

If I have given a true account of that freedom which forms the goal of social effort, we shall see that freedom of contract, freedom in all the forms of doing what one will with one's own, is valuable only as a means to an end. That end is what I call freedom in the positive sense: in other words, the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good. No one has a right to do what he will with his own in such a way as to contravene this end. It is only through the guarantee which society gives him that he has property at all, or, strictly speaking, any right to his possessions. This guarantee is founded on a sense of common interest. Every one has an interest in securing to every one else the free use and enjoyment and disposal of his possessions, so long as that freedom on the part of one does not interfere with a like freedom on the part of others, because such freedom contributes to that equal development of the faculties of all which is the highest good for all. This is the true and the only justification of rights of property. Rights of property, however, have been and are claimed which cannot be thus justified. We are all now agreed that men cannot rightly be the property of men. The institution of property being only justifiable as a means to the free exercise of the social capabilities of all, there can be no true right to property of a kind which debars one class of men from such free exercise altogether. We condemn slavery no less when it arises out of a voluntary agreement on the part of the enslaved

person. A contract by which any one agreed for a certain consideration to become the slave of another we should reckon a void contract. Here, then, is a limitation upon freedom of contract which we all recognise as rightful. No contract is valid in which human persons, willingly or unwillingly, are dealt with as commodities, because such contracts of necessity defeat the end for which alone society enforces contracts at all.

Are there no other contracts which, less obviously perhaps but really, are open to the same objection? In the first place, let us consider contracts affecting labour. Labour, the economist tells us, is a commodity exchangeable like other commodities. This is in a certain sense true, but it is a commodity which attaches in a peculiar manner to the person of man. Hence restrictions may need to be placed on the sale of this commodity which would be unnecessary in other cases, in order to prevent labour from being sold under conditions which make it impossible for the person selling it ever to become a free contributor to social good in any form. This is most plainly the case when a man bargains to work under conditions fatal to health, *e.g.* in an unventilated factory. Every injury to the health of the individual is, so far as it goes, a public injury. It is an impediment to the general freedom; so much deduction from our power, as members of society, to make the best of ourselves. Society is, therefore, plainly within its right when it limits freedom of contract for the sale of labour, so far as is done by our laws for the sanitary regulations of factories, workshops, and mines. It is equally within its right in prohibiting the labour of women and young persons beyond certain hours. If they work beyond those hours, the result is demonstrably physical deterioration; which, as demonstrably, carries with it a lowering of the moral forces of society. For the sake of that general freedom of its members to make the best of themselves, which it is the object of civil society to secure, a prohibition should be put by law, which is the deliberate voice of society, on all such contracts of service as in a general way yield such a result. The purchase or hire of unwholesome dwellings is properly forbidden on the same principle. Its application to compulsory education may not be quite so obvious, but it will appear on a little reflection. Without a command of certain elementary arts and knowledge, the individual in modern society is as effectually crippled as by the loss of a

limb or a broken constitution. He is not free to develop his faculties. With a view to securing such freedom among its members it is as certainly within the province of the state to prevent children from growing up in that kind of ignorance which practically excludes them from a free career in life, as it is within its province to require the sort of building and drainage necessary for public health.

Our modern legislation then with reference to labour, and education, and health, involving as it does manifold interference with freedom of contract, is justified on the ground that it is the business of the state, not indeed directly to promote moral goodness, for that, from the very nature of moral goodness, it cannot do, but to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible. It does not indeed follow that it is advisable for the state to do all which it is justified in doing. We are often warned nowadays against the danger of over-legislation; or, as I heard it put in a speech of the present home[1] secretary in days when he was sowing his political wild oats, of 'grandmotherly government.' There may be good ground for the warning, but at any rate we should be quite clear what we mean by it. The outcry against state interference is often raised by men whose real objection is not to state interference but to centralisation, to the constant aggression of the central executive upon local authorities. As I have already pointed out, compulsion at the discretion of some elected municipal board proceeds just as much from the state as does compulsion exercised by a government office in London. No doubt, much needless friction is avoided, much is gained in the way of elasticity and adjustment to circumstances, by the independent local administration of general laws; and most of us would agree that of late there has been a dangerous tendency to override municipal discretion by the hard and fast rules of London 'departments.' But centralisation is one thing: over-legislation, or the improper exercise of the power of the state, quite another. It is one question whether of late the central government has been unduly trenching on local government, and another question whether the law of the state, either as administered by central or by provincial authorities, has been unduly interfering with the discretion of individuals. We may object most strongly to

[1] [Sir William Vernon-Harcourt.]

advancing centralisation, and yet wish that the law should put rather more than less restraint on those liberties of the individual which are a social nuisance. But there are some political speculators whose objection is not merely to centralisation, but to the extended action of law altogether. They think that the individual ought to be left much more to himself than has of late been the case. Might not our people, they ask, have been trusted to learn in time for themselves to eschew unhealthy dwellings, to refuse dangerous and degrading employment, to get their children the schooling necessary for making their way in the world? Would they not for their own comfort, if not from more chivalrous feeling, keep their wives and daughters from overwork? Or, failing this, ought not women, like men, to learn to protect themselves? Might not all the rules, in short, which legislation of the kind we have been discussing is intended to attain, have been attained without it; not so quickly, perhaps, but without tampering so dangerously with the independence and self-reliance of the people?

Now, we shall probably all agree that a society in which the public health was duly protected, and necessary education duly provided for, by the spontaneous action of individuals, was in a higher condition than one in which the compulsion of law was needed to secure these ends. But we must take men as we find them. Until such a condition of society is reached, it is the business of the state to take the best security it can for the young citizens' growing up in such health and with so much knowledge as is necessary for their real freedom. In so doing it need not at all interfere with the independence and self-reliance of those whom it requires to do what they would otherwise do for themselves. The man who, of his own right feeling, saves his wife from overwork and sends his children to school, suffers no moral degradation from a law which, if he did not do this for himself, would seek to make him do it. Such a man does not feel the law as constraint at all. To him it is simply a powerful friend. It gives him security for that being done efficiently which, with the best wishes, he might have much trouble in getting done efficiently if left to himself. No doubt it relieves him from some of the responsibility which would otherwise fall to him as head of a family, but, if he is what we are supposing him to be, in proportion as he is relieved of responsibilities in one

direction he will assume them in another. The security which the state gives him for the safe housing and sufficient schooling of his family will only make him the more careful for their well-being in other respects, which he is left to look after for himself. We need have no fear, then, of such legislation having an ill effect on those who, without the law, would have seen to that being done, though probably less efficiently, which the law requires to be done. But it was not their case that the laws we are considering were especially meant to meet. It was the overworked women, the ill-housed and untaught families, for whose benefit they were intended. And the question is whether without these laws the suffering classes could have been delivered quickly or slowly from the condition they were in. Could the enlightened self-interest or benevolence of individuals, working under a system of unlimited freedom of contract, have ever brought them into a state compatible with the free development of the human faculties? No one considering the facts can have any doubt as to the answer to this question. Left to itself, or to the operation of casual benevolence, a degraded population perpetuates and increases itself. Read any of the authorised accounts, given before royal or parliamentary commissions, of the state of the labourers, especially of the women and children, as they were in our great industries before the law was first brought to bear on them, and before freedom of contract was first interfered with in them. Ask yourself what chance there was of a generation, born and bred under such conditions, ever contracting itself out of them. Given a certain standard of moral and material well-being, people may be trusted not to sell their labour, or the labour of their children, on terms which would not allow that standard to be maintained. But with large masses of our population, until the laws we have been considering took effect, there was no such standard. There was nothing on their part, in the way either of self-respect or established demand for comforts, to prevent them from working and living, or from putting their children to work and live, in a way in which no one who is to be a healthy and free citizen can work and live. No doubt there were many high-minded employers who did their best for their workpeople before the days of state-interference, but they could not prevent less scrupulous hirers of labour from hiring it on the cheapest terms. It is

true that cheap labour is in the long run dear labour, but it is so only in the long run, and eager traders do not think of the long run. If labour is to be had under conditions incompatible with the health or decent housing or education of the labourer, there will always be plenty of people to buy it under those conditions, careless of the burden in the shape of rates and taxes which they may be laying up for posterity. Either the standard of well-being on the part of the sellers of labour must prevent them from selling their labour under those conditions, or the law must prevent it. With a population such as ours was forty years ago, and still largely is, the law must prevent it and continue the prevention for some generations, before the sellers will be in a state to prevent it for themselves.

As there is practically no danger of a reversal of our factory and school laws, it may seem needless to dwell at such length on their justification. I do so for two reasons; partly to remind the younger generation of citizens of the great blessing which they inherited in those laws, and of the interest which they still have in their completion and extension; but still more in order to obtain some clear principles for our guidance when we approach those difficult questions of the immediate future, the questions of the land law and the liquor law.

I pointed out just now that, though labour might be reckoned an exchangeable commodity, it differed from all other commodities, inasmuch as it was inseparable from the person of the labourer. Land, too, has its characteristics, which distinguish it from ordinary commodities. It is from the land, or through the land, that the raw material of all wealth is obtained. It is only upon the land that we can live; only across the land that we can move from place to place. The state, therefore, in the interest of that public freedom which it is its business to maintain, cannot allow the individual to deal as he likes with his land to the same extent to which it allows him to deal as he likes with other commodities. It is an established principle, *e.g.* that the sale of land should be enforced by law when public convenience requires it. The land-owner of course gets the full value, often much more than the full value, of the land which he is compelled to sell, but of no ordinary commodity is the sale thus enforced at all. This illustrates the peculiar necessity

in the public interest of putting some restraint on a man's liberty of doing what he will with his own, when it is land that he calls his own. The question is whether in the same interest further restraint does not need to be imposed on the liberty of the land-owner than is at present the case. Should not the state, which for public purposes compels the sale of land, also for public purposes prevent it from being tied up in a manner which prevents its natural distribution and keeps it in the hands of those who cannot make the most of it? At the present the greater part of the land of England is held under settlements which prevent the nominal owner from either dividing his land among his children or from selling any part of it for their benefit. It is so settled that all of it necessarily goes to the owner's eldest son. So far as any sale is allowed it must only be for the benefit of that favoured son. The evil effects of this system are twofold. In the first place it almost entirely prevents the sale of agricultural land in small quantities, and thus hinders the formation of that mainstay of social order and contentment, a class of small proprietors tilling their own land. Secondly it keeps large quantities of land in the hands of men who are too much burdened by debts or family charges to improve it. The landlord in such cases has not the money to improve, the tenant has not the security which would justify him in improving. Thus a great part of the land of England is left in a state in which, according to such eminent and impartial authorities as lord Derby and lord Leicester, it does not yield half of what it might. Now what is the remedy for this evil? Various palliative measures have been suggested. A very elaborate one was introduced by lord Cairns a year ago, but it fell short of the only sufficient remedy. It did not propose to prevent landlords for the future from making settlements of the kind described. It left the old power of settling land untouched, on the ground that to interfere with it would be to prevent the landlord from doing what he would with his own. We urge on the contrary that this particular power on the part of the landlord of dealing with his property, imposing, as it does, the weight of the dead hand on posterity, is against the public interest. On the simple and recognised principle that no man's land is his own for purposes incompatible with the public convenience, we ask that legal sanction should be withheld for the future from settle-

ments which thus interfere with the distribution and improvement of land.

Such a change, though it would limit in one direction the power of dealing with land, would extend it in other directions. It would render English land on the whole a much more marketable commodity than it is at present. Its effect would be to restrain the owner of land in any one generation from putting restraints on the disposal of it in succeeding generations. It would, therefore, have the support of those liberals who are most jealous of any interference with freedom of contract. When we come to the relations between landlord and tenant, we are on more difficult ground. It is agreed that as a general rule the more freedom of contract we have the better, with a view to that more positive freedom which consists in an open field for all men to make the best of themselves. But we must not sacrifice the end to the means. If there are certain kinds of contract for the use of land which interfere seriously with the public convenience, but which the parties immediately concerned cannot be trusted to abstain from in their own interest, such contracts should be invalid by law. It is on this ground that we justify the prohibition by the act of last session of agreements between landlord and tenant which reserve the ground game to the landlord. If the farmers only had been concerned in the matter, they might perhaps have been left to take care of themselves. But there were public interests at stake. The country cannot afford the waste of produce and discouragement of good husbandry which result from excessive game-preserving; nor can it rightly allow that widespread temptation to lawless habits which arises from a sort of half and half property being scattered over the country without any possibility of its being sufficiently protected. The agreements in question, therefore, were against the public interest, and as the tenant farmers themselves, from long habits of dependence, could not be trusted to refuse them, there was no alternative but to render them illegal. Perhaps as we become more alive to the evil which the ground game act but partially remedied, we shall demand further legislation in the same direction, and insist that some limit be put, not merely to the landlord's power of reserving the game on land let to farmers, but to his power of keeping land out of

cultivation or turning it into forest for the sake of his amusement.

But while admitting that in this matter of game, from long habit of domination on one side and dependence on the other, landlord and farmer could not safely be left to voluntary agreements, and that a special law was needed to break the back of a mischievous practice, are we to allow that in the public interest the English farmer generally needs to be restrained by law from agreements with his landlord, into which he might be induced to enter if left to himself? Is he not sufficiently enlightened as to his own interest, which is also the interest of the public, and sufficiently free in maintaining it, to refuse to take land except on conditions which will enable him to make the best of it? We may wish that he were, we may hope that some day he will be, but facts show that at present he is not. The great majority of English farmers hold their farms under the liability to be turned out without compensation at six months' or a year's notice. Now it is certain that land cannot be farmed as the public interest requires that it should be, except by an expenditure of capital on the part of the farmers, which will not, as a general rule, be risked so long as he holds his land on these terms. It is true that, under a good landlord, the yearly tenant is as secure as if he held a long lease. But all landlords are not good, nor is a good landlord immortal. He may have a spendthrift eldest son, from whom under his settlement he cannot withhold the estate, and upon whose accession to the estate the temporary security previously enjoyed by yearly tenants will disappear. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that yearly tenancy under the present law is not sufficient to secure a due application of capital to the soil. 'The best agriculture is found on farms where tenants are protected by leases; the next best on farms where tenants are protected by the "Lincolnshire custom"; the worst of all on farms whose tenants are not protected at all, but rely on the honour of their landlords';[1] and this latter class of farms covers the greater part of England. Here, then, is proof that the majority of English farmers have either not been intelligent enough, or not independent enough, to insist on those contracts with their landlords

[1] Quoted from *English Land and English Landlords*, by the Hon. G. C Brodrick; Cassell and Co., 1881.

which as a rule are necessary for good farming. They may in time become so, but meanwhile, with the daily increasing pressure on the means of subsistence, the country cannot afford to wait. We do not ask for any such change of the law as would hinder or discourage the farmer from making voluntary contracts with the landlord for the protection of both parties. We only wish in the public interest, which is the interest of good farming, to prevent him from taking a farm, as he now generally does, on terms incompatible with security in the outlay of capital. In the absence of leases, we wish a sufficient tenant-right to be guaranteed by law, such tenant-right as would secure to the out-going tenant the full value of unexhausted improvements. It is only thus, we believe, that we can bring about that due cultivation of the soil which is every day becoming of greater importance to our crowded population.

This protection, which is all that can reasonably be asked for the English farmer, falls far short of that which the most impartial judges believe to be necessary for the peasant farmers in Ireland. The difference between the farmers of the Irish counties may be briefly stated thus. In Ireland, far more frequently than in England, the tenant is practically not a free agent in the contract he makes with his landlord. In England, during the last two or three years, the landlord has often been more afraid of losing the tenant than the tenant of losing his farm. It is comparatively easy for a man who does not succeed in getting a farm on terms under which he can make it pay, to get a living in other ways. Thus in England a farmer is seldom under such pressure as to be unable to make a bargain with a landlord which shall be reasonably to his own advantage. In Ireland it is otherwise. The farmers there are relatively far more numerous, and, as a rule, far poorer. Nearly three-fourths of the Irish farmers (423,000 out of 596,000) hold less than thirty acres apiece; nearly half of them hold under fifteen acres. A tenant on that small scale is in a very different position for bargaining with a landlord from the English farmer, as we commonly know him, with his 200 acres or more. Apart from his little farm the tenant has nothing to turn his hand to. With the exception of the linen-making in the north, Ireland has no industry but agriculture out of which a living can be made. It has been said on good authority that in

many parts of Ireland eviction means starvation to the evicted tenant. This may be a strong statement, but there is no doubt that to an Irishman of the south and west (the districts at present disturbed) the hiring of land to till presents itself as a necessity of life. The only alternative is emigration, and during the recent years of depression in America that alternative was to a great extent closed. Hence an excessive competition for farms, and a readiness on the part of the smaller tenants to put up with any enhancement of rent rather than relinquish their holdings. Under such conditions freedom of contract is little more than a name. The peasant farmer is scarcely more free to contract with his landlord than is a starving labourer to bargain for good wages with a master who offers him work. When many contracts between landlord and tenant are made under such pressure, reverence for contract, which is the safeguard of society, is sure to disappear, and this I believe to be the chief reason why the farmers of southern and western Ire land have been so easily led astray by the agitation of the land league. That agitation strikes at the roots of all contract, and therefore at the very foundation of modern society; but if we would effectually withstand it, we must cease to insist on maintaining the forms of free contract where the reality is impossible. We must in some way give the farmers of Ireland by law that protection which, as a rule, they have been too weak to obtain for themselves singly by contract, protection against the confiscation of the fruits of the labour and money they have spent on the soil, whether that confiscation take the form of actual eviction or of a constant enhancement of rent. To uphold the sanctity of contracts is doubtless a prime business of government, but it is no less its business to provide against contracts being made, which, from the helplessness of one of the parties to them, instead of being a security for freedom, become an instrument of disguised oppression.

I have left myself little time to speak of the principles on which some of us hold that, in the matter of intoxicating drinks, a further limitation of freedom of contract is needed in the interest of general freedom. I say a further limitation, because there is no such thing as a free sale of these drinks at present. Men are not at liberty to buy and sell them when they will, where they will, and as they will.

But our present licensing system, while it creates a class of monopolists especially interested in resisting any effectual restraint of the liquor traffic, does little to lessen the facilities for obtaining strong drink. Indeed the principle upon which licences have been generally given has been avowedly to make it easy to get drink. The restriction of the hours of sale is no doubt a real check so far as it goes, but it remains the case that every one who has a weakness for drink has the temptation staring him in the face during all hours but those when he ought to be in bed. The effect of the present system, in short, is to prevent the drink-shops from coming unpleasantly near the houses of well-to-do people, and to crowd them upon the quarters occupied by the poorer classes, who have practically no power of keeping the nuisance from them. Now it is clear that the only remedy which the law can afford for this state of things must take the form either of more stringent rules of licensing, or of a power entrusted to the householders in each district of excluding the sale of intoxicants altogether from among them.

I do not propose to discuss the comparative merits of these methods of procedure. One does not exclude the other. They may very well be combined. One may be best suited for one kind of population, the other for another kind. But either, to be effectual, must involve a large interference with the liberty of the individual to do as he likes in the matter of buying and selling alcohol. It is the justifiability of that interference that I wish briefly to consider.

We justify it on the simple ground of the recognised right on the part of society to prevent men from doing as they like, if, in the exercise of their peculiar tastes in doing as they like, they create a social nuisance. There is no right to freedom in the purchase and sale of a particular commodity, if the general result of allowing such freedom is to detract from freedom in the higher sense, from the general power of men to make the best of themselves. Now with anyone who looks calmly at the facts, there can be no doubt that the present habits of drinking in England do lay a heavy burden on the free development of man's powers for social good, a heavier burden probably than arises from all other preventible causes put together. It used to be the fashion to look on drunkenness as a vice which was the concern only of the person who fell into it, so long as it did not lead him

to commit an assault on his neighbours. No thoughtful man any longer looks on it in this way. We know that, however decently carried on, the excessive drinking of one man means an injury to others in health, purse, and capability, to which no limits can be placed. Drunkenness in the head of a family means, as a rule, the impoverishment and degradation of all members of the family; and the presence of a drink-shop at the corner of a street means, as a rule, the drunkenness of a certain number of heads of families in that street. Remove the drink-shops, and, as the experience of many happy communities sufficiently shows, you almost, perhaps in time altogether, remove the drunkenness. Here, then, is a wide-spreading social evil, of which society may, if it will, by a restraining law, to a great extent, rid itself, to the infinite enhancement of the positive freedom enjoyed by its members. All that is required for the attainment of so blessed a result is so much effort and self-sacrifice on the part of the majority of citizens as is necessary for the enactment and enforcement of the restraining law. The majority of citizens may still be far from prepared for such an effort. That is a point on which I express no opinion. To attempt a restraining law in advance of the social sentiment necessary to give real effect to it, is always a mistake. But to argue that an effectual law in restraint of the drink-traffic would be a wrongful interference with individual liberty, is to ignore the essential condition under which alone every particular liberty can rightly be allowed to the individual, the condition, namely, that the allowance of that liberty is not, as a rule, and on the whole, an impediment to social good.

The more reasonable opponents of the restraint for which I plead, would probably argue not so much that it was necessarily wrong in principle, as that it was one of those short cuts to a good end which ultimately defeat their own object. They would take the same line that has been taken by the opponents of state-interference in all its forms. 'Leave the people to themselves,' they would say; 'as their standard of self-respect rises, as they become better housed and better educated, they will gradually shake off the evil habit. The cure so effected may not be so rapid as that brought by a repressive law, but it will be more lasting. Better that it should come more slowly through the sponta-

neous action of individuals, than more quickly through compulsion.'

But here again we reply that it is dangerous to wait. The slower remedy might be preferable if we were sure that it was a remedy at all, but we have no such assurance. There is strong reason to think the contrary. Every year that the evil is left to itself, it becomes greater. The vested interest in the encouragement of the vice becomes larger, and the persons affected by it more numerous. If any abatement of it has already taken place, we may fairly argue that this is because it has not been altogether left to itself; for the licensing law, as it is, is much more stringent and more stringently administered than it was ten years ago. A drunken population naturally perpetuates and increases itself. Many families, it is true, keep emerging from the conditions which render them specially liable to the evil habit, but on the other hand descent through drunkenness from respectability to squalor is constantly going on. The families of drunkards do not seem to be smaller than those of sober men, though they are shorter-lived; and that the children of a drunkard should escape from drunkenness is what we call almost a miracle. Better education, better housing, more healthy rules of labour, no doubt lessen the temptations to drink for those who have the benefit of these advantages, but meanwhile drunkenness is constantly recruiting the ranks of those who cannot be really educated, who will not be better housed, who make their employments dangerous and unhealthy. An effectual liquor law in short is the necessary complement of our factory acts, our education acts, our public health acts. Without it the full measure of their usefulness will never be attained. They were all opposed in their turn by the same arguments that are now used against a restraint of the facilities for drinking. Sometimes it was the argument that the state had no business to interfere with the liberties of the individual. Sometimes it was the dilatory plea that the better nature of man would in time assert itself, and that meanwhile it would be lowered by compulsion. Happily a sense of the facts and necessities of the case got the better of the delusive cry of liberty. Act after act was passed preventing master and workman, parent and child, house-builder and householder, from doing as they pleased, with the result of a great addition to the real

freedom of society. The spirit of self-reliance and independence was not weakened by those acts. Rather it received a new development. The dead weight of ignorance and unhealthy surroundings, with which it would otherwise have had to struggle, being partially removed by law, it was more free to exert itself for higher objects. When we ask for a stringent liquor law, which should even go to the length of allowing the householders of a district to exclude the drink traffic altogether, we are only asking for a continuation of the same work, a continuation necessary to its complete success. It is a poor sophistry to tell us that it is moral cowardice to seek to remove by law a temptation which every one ought to be able to resist for himself. It is not the part of a considerate self-reliance to remain in presence of a temptation merely for the sake of being tempted. When all temptations are removed which law can remove, there will still be room enough, nay, much more room, for the play of our moral energies. The temptation to excessive drinking is one which upon sufficient evidence we hold that the law can at least greatly diminish. If it can, it ought to do so. This then, along with the effectual liberation of the soil, is the next great conquest which our democracy, on behalf of its own true freedom, has to make. The danger of legislation, either in the interests of a privileged class or for the promotion of particular religious opinions, we may fairly assume to be over. The popular jealousy of law, once justifiable enough, is therefore out of date. The citizens of England now make its law. We ask them by law to put a restraint on themselves in the matter of strong drink. We ask them further to limit, or even altogether to give up, the not very precious liberty of buying and selling alcohol, in order that they may become more free to exercise the faculties and improve the talents which God has given them.

LECTURE ON THE GRADING OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS.

ELEVEN years ago I was employed for some weeks in Birmingham as the servant of the Schools Inquiry Commission. I shall always look back with pleasure to the time so spent on account of the friendliness with which I was received, both by those directly concerned with education and by others interested in the general intellectual advancement of the Birmingham people. Circumstances have prevented me from keeping up the many pleasant acquaintances which I then formed, but Birmingham has of late held such a leading place in the political life of England that it has not been difficult for me from a distance, through the newspapers, to follow the movement of the community with which I had then, for a short time, the opportunity of mixing. But while there is a pleasant side to the reminiscence, there is also a painful one. I was then looking forward, in common with many of those with whom I associated at Oxford, to a reconstitution, at no very distant time, of the middle and higher education of England, and, as I need not be ashamed to add, if not to a reconstitution of society through that of education, yet at least to a considerable change in its tone and to the removal of many of its barriers. We thus looked forward, it will be said, because, while we knew something of universities, we knew very little of the world outside them. And this is probably true. The high hopes, indeed, which were then entertained, were not confined to young enthusiasts, for they inspired projects embodied in the report of the Endowed Schools Commissioners themselves, and were popularised in Professor Huxley's picture of a 'ladder of learning,' which should reach from the gutter to the universities; but they seem destined to wait a long while for their fulfilment. It is

eight years since the committee reported, and as yet we have seen no adequate results of their labours. It soon appeared that their recommendations were a long way ahead of popular sentiment; or, more properly, that there was no developed popular knowledge or opinion on the subjects with which they dealt, strong enough to countervail the vested interests which the enactment of these recommendations, as a connected system, at least seemed to threaten. They thus did not fall within the very limited range in which practical politicians move. There was no statesman for whom it was worth while, or who had the leisure if he had the inclination, to push the scheme for reorganising our superior education through in detail. The head that conceived it could not also command the hand to execute it. The fortune of English public life has always been celebrated for putting the round man into the square hole, and in this case, having excluded the author of the scheme in question from the possibility of becoming a minister of education, it made him a bishop in the most backward corner of England.

An act giving to an executive commission powers, based on the report of the commission for inquiry, was indeed passed under cover of the excitement about more popular questions which occupied the first years of the Gladstone parliament. It was deficient, however, in some important points. Of these I shall only dwell on the one most directly affecting the subject of which I propose to speak to-night. It made no provision, as the original commission recommended, for the establishment of provincial authorities having power to deal with schools in groups. Now the establishment of such authorities was an integral part of the scheme recommended by the commission of inquiry. It was, in fact, to act as the cement by which the grammar schools of the future, as the commissioners contemplated them, were to be bound together into a connected fabric. Without it their plan for grading schools, as I shall try to show, could not be realised, and the attempt to realise it tended rather to mischief than otherwise. Each school has had to be dealt with by the executive commission separately. Except in one or two cases, there has been no agency which they could bring to bear for establishing any vital connection between one and another. They have been able to frame schemes making one school first grade, another second grade, another third; but these terms,

which represent a valuable reality when the school of lower grade can be made to feed the higher, are apt to imply merely a harassing limitation upon the subjects of instruction, when each school, instead of being one member of an organism, has to act as an independent whole.

The commissioners, as you are aware, drew up certain *curricula* of study as suitable to the three several grades of schools which they had in view. The suitability of these, if the gradation of schools had existed otherwise than on paper, is not in question, but the mistake was sometimes made of trying to enforce them as if it were a reality. Hence, in several places, irritation was caused by what seemed to persons locally interested in a grammar school an unwarrantable attempt to limit its range of usefulness. In this or that school, for instance, Latin was to be required, Greek excluded; an arrangement perfectly rational if the school had really been one in a series regulated accordingly, but for which in the absence of such seriation nothing was to be said. It thus happened that several towns, Bradford, *e.g.*, and Exeter, had to stand up for the power to maintain a classical education when the commissioners proposed to exclude it. That the course of study finally settled for a school has generally been the one best suited to its position, that many foundations, which were quite wasted a few years ago, are now doing useful work, we may thankfully admit. But what is important to point out is that though the grammar school fund of the country is now contributing to meet so much definite demand for education above the elementary as exists among us, it is doing but little to stimulate this demand. It is supplying the various classes of society with the sort of instruction which in the natural course of things they wish for, but it is not helping, or helping only to a very slight extent, to open to the youth of one class the intellectual advantages of that above it. This, if it is true, means that it is only doing what, according to the ordinary law of supply and demand, could be done without it; for all orders of society above the lowest can be trusted to find for themselves the education which the maintenance of their social position requires. The man of business will seldom fail to provide his son with such an education as is found necessary for success in business; the man who deems himself distinctively a gentleman will see that his son has the schooling of a gentleman,

and that at the market price of the article required. That endowments should provide it a little cheaper merely means that parents and children will have a little more to spend on luxuries. Their utility depends on their efficiency in putting the real scholar in place of the mere gentleman, and preventing the limit of class requirements from being the limit of the education open to young men who have special capacity for literature or science.

Little consideration of the state of English society is needed to show that this purpose is very insufficiently served at present. The lines of education at present do not intersect the social strata, but are parallel with them. A boy is sent to the school which the means of his parents or their social expectations determine, and from it he very rarely emerges, except into another of the same sort, till his education is supposed to be finished. There is much education, no doubt, not practical merely, but literary and scientific, which anyone who has once mastered the elementary arts may acquire for himself after school life is over. That it is often so acquired, no one who knows anything of the English middle class would doubt, and an Oxford tutor, familiar with the want of intellectual freshness and self-reliance which often characterises his over-lectured and over-examined pupil, will be prompt to believe that knowledge may often gain in quality what it loses in quantity from being self-developed. But for one man who, having the capacity for the knowledge which is its own reward, breaks the bar which defects of education put in the way of its realisation, there are probably twenty in whom, on account of these defects, the like capacity is wasted; and it is obvious that, as the methods and material of knowledge become more complex with time, the possibility of acquiring it without the help of the schoolmaster becomes less and less. On the whole, without overrating the place held by the universities in the education of the country, we are probably safe in assuming that, when we have taken account of those who find their way to them, together with those who, without entering a university, pass to the great schools of medicine and surgery, or into the skilled services, civil or military, of the state, the margin, left outside, of persons whose education helps them to become men of science or learning will be very small.

Within this privileged area, if my observation is correct,

it is still the case that few Englishmen enter but those who are born to do so. In my own university, during the last twenty years, great change has been made in the direction of rendering the education offered more widely available. Every year, at least one hundred scholarships or exhibitions (ranging from 60*l.* to 100*l.* in value, and tenable for four or five years) are filled up by competition (generally unrestricted). The holders of these need seldom be chargeable to their parents for much beyond the cost of clothes, books, and journeys. Even those who do not obtain them, now that residence within the walls of a college is no longer required by the university, can provide themselves with board and lodging, and obtain the best instruction that is to be had, at a cost of about 75*l.* for the academical year. The restrictions upon the course of study for honours have been very much relaxed. After passing an examination, which it is open to him to pass within eight months of matriculation, the student may choose between six honour schools, and there are only two of these into the reading for which ancient languages enter. All sectarian exclusion, not only in the letter but in the spirit, has disappeared. I am far from thinking that these changes have been without effect. It is partly in consequence of them, no doubt, that the number of students in the university has doubled within twenty years. But the hope on which the Oxford reformers of my generation have fondly fed, of drawing from a stratum of society previously unconnected with the university, has been hitherto unfulfilled. There are exceptions, it is true, and exceptions so satisfactory as to strengthen the wish that they might become the rule. Every year our endowments bring us one or two students, whose parents are so circumstanced that a quarter of a century ago the prospect of a university career for their son would never have entered their horizon, and who are thoroughly fit to make the best of the advantages which the university offers them. A larger number of men, drawn from other classes than those which have hitherto frequented Oxford, come to us now as unattached students, but many of these are too deficient at the outset in the elements of a liberal education (though not more so than some of our rich pass-men) to pursue it with much real profit at a university. They have no title to count as a contingent furnished by the unlearned classes to the ranks of the learned, for learning,

in the higher sense, they give little promise of attaining. On the whole, Oxford is still fed by the classes with whom it is traditional to look to it, the landed gentry, the people of private fortune, the clergy of the Establishment, and the wealthier members of the other professions. The best, perhaps, that can be said for the use of our endowments is, that they often bring university education within the reach of young men whose parents from their social position and traditions would naturally desire it for them, but who could not otherwise afford to give it to them. The recent multiplication of good schools, many of them revived grammar schools, over the country helps in the same direction. The competitors for college scholarships are drawn from a much greater variety of schools now than twenty years ago, and the class which naturally seeks a university education can now, no doubt, much more readily obtain it. But beyond the limits of this class, we shall, with the few exceptions noticed, spread our net in vain.

I shall, perhaps, be told that Oxford experience in this regard is too partial to be trustworthy; that its reputation for extravagant expenditure in some quarters, for ritualism and rationalism in others, is a deterrent to parents of the commercial class; that time is needed to overcome that alienation of the nonconformists, produced by two centuries of exclusion, which survives its exciting cause; and that other universities could tell a different story. To a certain extent this is, doubtless, true; but not, I think, to such an extent as to invalidate my main position. That which, for want of a more exact name, we call the higher education, is, in effect, still only open to those with whom it is a matter of social requirement and expectation. Cambridge, probably, draws to itself (as its past entitles it to do) more sons of nonconformist ministers than Oxford does, but even there they form but a very small contingent; and while it is certain that such ministers have hitherto had great difficulty in obtaining a high education for their sons, it is equally certain that, as a class, they naturally look for it. In other respects, my impression is that those who know Cambridge would give pretty much the same account of it as I have given of Oxford. The university of London has, comparatively, few graduates. Among them are a certain number of teachers who have raised themselves, but not enough materially to

affect our conclusion. Its matriculation examination is in great request; but those with whom it marks the end of their education, not the entrance to its higher stage (and this is the case with most of those who pass it), can hardly count as recruits for the ranks of learning and science. A thorough scientific education for the medical profession is too expensive an affair, in the absence of such scholarships as Oxford and Cambridge provide, to be within the reach of men born in the humbler classes; and, finally, the Scotch universities, where it is true that the average student is of a different order from those commonly to be found at Oxford, draw very little upon England.

We find, then, that Professor Huxley's 'ladder of learning' can as yet scarcely be said to exist, or that, if it exists, it is very rarely mounted. It is not, moreover, in the topmost rung of the ladder that the defect lies. The endowed universities offer assistance (as some say, bribes) to education with a lavish hand. It is true that they do not impose any test of poverty on the holders of their scholarships and exhibitions, and these are sometimes won, though less often than is commonly supposed, by young men who could easily meet the expenses of university education without them. But while it is certain that the imposition of such a test would interfere with one great object which our scholarships at present serve, the fusion of men, most variously born and circumstanced, in one academical autocracy, it is very doubtful whether it would do anything to bring the higher education within the reach of those who do not now attain it. If we excluded from the tenure of scholarships all those who could do without them, we should certainly have more for those who cannot, but probably also, judging from present experience, more than we could find holders for unless we seriously lowered our standard. The dinner would be provided, but the guests would not be forthcoming. Such would certainly be the judgment of those at Oxford who are conversant with the character of the existing competition for our open scholarships, with the average standard attained at our local examination, and with the amount of preliminary training to be found among those who come to us as unattached students. The truth of course is, that the measure of qualified competition for entrance scholarships at the universities lies in the upper classes of those schools which lay themselves out to

prepare for the universities. Only through them can the poor student reach us with such training as makes it really worth his while to come, and this avenue is generally closed against him. Till these schools spread their net wider, the universities may spread theirs as wide as they will, but they will still draw it back empty.

The managers of our great classical and mathematical schools, however, may fairly refuse to be made responsible for a state of things which they cannot help. It is not to be supposed that poor students are knocking at their doors and being repelled. Such students at present scarcely exist save in potency and promise, and it is not with the superior schools that the process of turning promise into reality can begin. If they were at once to alter their system with a view to making themselves available for a wider area of society, they would be throwing away much that they have got with small prospect of its being replaced by anything else. They may naturally wish to make sure that there are boys forthcoming in considerable numbers from schools of inferior grade, desirous and qualified, at the age (say) of fifteen, to enter on a course of preparation for the universities, before they modify their rates of payment, their entrance examinations, their courses of study, in order to meet them half-way. In short, the organisation of schools contributory to those which prepare for the universities on the one side, and on the other the adaptation of the latter to receive promising boys who, unless so received, would be put before boyhood is over to business or a trade, are correlative conditions of which neither can be realised apart from the other. What is being done, and what should be done, towards their joint fulfilment?

I will first speak of one thing, which it is to be feared we must make up our minds cannot be done. In the present state of society we can scarcely hope to bring into such a scheme the great boarding establishments, Eton, Harrow, &c., which have strangely been allowed to take to themselves the exclusive title of public schools. In the first place, they are boarding schools, and education at a boarding school must always be relatively expensive, and thus ill adapted to a class of boys whom we can only win for the higher education on condition of its being inexpensive for the parents. Secondly, it is an essential part of their system that certain studies should be begun from earliest boyhood and certain

others almost ignored, of which the latter must be the chief business and the former quite supplementary in schools that are to do their best for boys whose education ends at the age of fifteen. To the boys who frequent the 'public schools' it is of no importance to become either good writers or good arithmeticians early, and since it is advisable to get the intricacies of Greek inflexions and the rules of Latin syntax into their heads as early as possible, the time spent on arithmetic and writing may properly be minimised for that purpose. Hearing English correctly spoken at their homes, they can wisely defer the practice of English composition till the days of essay-writing begin, and their grounding in Latin makes English grammar superfluous. On the other hand, with boys who, in the natural course of things, will be in an office or workshop before the age at which the fifth form at Eton or Rugby is commonly reached, expertness in writing and arithmetic is the first thing to be thought of. Correctness in writing, and often even in speaking, English is a thing which has to be regularly taught them, and should be taught betimes. There is no justification for troubling them with the grammar of a language, the literature of which they are never to read. Greek, therefore, should not enter at all into their studies, and Latin only on the understanding that some at least will have a chance of continuing its study at a higher school; while if, and so far as, Latin is not taught, English grammar must be.

It is clear, then, that boys coming from a school which had done its best for them in expectation of their education ending at the age of fifteen, could not be assimilated by one which follows the system at present in vogue as preparatory for the universities. They would know much less of some things and more of others than those of the same age whom they would find there. Their ignorance of Greek and deficiency in Latin would compel them to be placed in classes where their real ability would not be elicited. Nor could the great boarding schools be fairly asked to alter their systems. As long as it continues the rule of English life, that a family which has been wealthy for two or three generations should find its way to a country house, and as long as the country clergy form so large a portion of the educated class, so long the education reputed most gentlemanlike will be given in boarding schools, and to them the stream will set from

families in which the continuance of education into manhood is looked forward to as a matter of course. Drawing on such a class, the great boarding schools could not with advantage change their course of study; at any rate, not so as to serve the purpose we are considering. Changes at the upper end I think they might make with much advantage to their existing pupils, changes in the direction of insisting more on mathematics and substituting the severer forms of physical science for composition in Latin and Greek verse with the older boys. But changes at the lower end, in particular the postponement of Greek and the reduction of the time given to Latin, are required in order to qualify their middle region for the reception of a contingent from humbler schools, and such changes would mean a lowering of the educational standard for the class of boys which now frequent them. A certain parental clamour for them, indeed, is sometimes now heard, but it really represents, I believe, only a relaxation of home discipline, and a want of intellectual nerve and fibre, in the quarter whence it comes. Rich parents, who are willing that their boys should shirk intellectual effort, raise an outcry against Greek. Let the present classical system be modified by all means, when a school can thus be made more useful to a new class than it is to the class which already uses it, but not as an indulgence to those who have the leisure and the money, but not the mental or moral vigour, to do this training justice.

We need not much regret, however, that our great boarding schools should not be fitted to take up in the middle the training of boys whose original destination has been a trade or craft, but who can afterwards be brought to aspire to the universities. Such boys will be found chiefly in the larger towns, and the practical question is whether we can so arrange the day schools in these towns as, without neglecting the average wants of the middle class, to elicit from all classes such special talent as is a fit subject for prolonged education, and to give it the chance of obtaining this. Till the last few years it might fairly be said that our grammar schools were doing neither one thing nor the other. They were disregarding the practical wants of the class which formed their natural *clientèle*, and they were not helping to raise special talent from the workshop or the counter to the university. It was with a view of rendering them service-

able for both purposes that the Commission of Inquiry suggested its plan of grading schools, a plan to which, I think, there would be some objections, even if it were carried out as it was conceived, and which there is reason to fear is scarcely being so carried out. Its main features are probably known to you:—'We need schools of the first grade,' the commissioners say, 'which propose to continue school work to the age of eighteen or nineteen; schools of the second grade, which suppose it to stop about sixteen; and schools of the third grade, which suppose it to stop about fourteen. . . . . In a school of the first grade Greek may be taught as well as Latin; in a school of the second grade it is useless to teach Greek as part of the regular course at all. Again, in a school of the second grade it will often be possible to teach two modern languages besides Latin, and to make Latin an important subject; in a school of the third grade it would hardly be wise to attempt more than one modern language in addition to the elements. But that is not the only difference. The boy in the third grade school may work at French and the elements of Latin till he is fourteen; but the boy in the second grade, if he is to learn German also, will probably not wait till he is fourteen to begin it; nor again will the boy in the first grade school wait till he is sixteen to begin Greek. A boy of fourteen will be doing very different work accordingly as he is in a school of one or other of the three grades. For this reason it is not desirable to attempt to combine the work of all three in one school, nor to test the work of schools of the lower grade as a fragment of the work of schools of higher grades. Three different kinds of work require three different kinds of school. Each kind of school should have its own proper aim set before it, and should be put under such rules as will compel it to keep to that aim.'

The case for distinguishing three grades of secondary education could not be better put than in the above, and we must admit it, I think, to be unanswerable. Let us now see how the commissioners would provide schools corresponding to these grades of education.

Taking the Registrar-General's eleven divisions of England, they proposed that in each of these 'a certain number of schools should be assigned to the first grade, a certain number to the second, and the remainder to the third.' 'On the whole,' the report proceeds, 'it is probable that not less

than four boarding schools of the first grade will be required for every million of the population. If for every one thousand people there should be one boy that ought to receive an education of this sort, each of these schools would have about two hundred and fifty scholars. The schools might possibly begin with a smaller number than two hundred and fifty, and might afterwards rise to a larger. But if hereafter the demand appeared to be greater than this number of schools could meet, facilities might be given for the establishment of more such schools.' The most important consideration in determining whether any school should be of the first grade, would be whether it had 'an endowment adequate to diminish the expense to boys of ability selected from other schools.' 'It is for schools of the first grade that endowments are most wanted, since otherwise these schools which are compelled to pay most highly for teaching would be quite out of the reach of the poorer boys, however well fitted such boys may have proved themselves to be for the highest education.' 'To these boarding schools would have to be added day schools, or day and boarding schools combined in one, of the same grade, for towns with population above twenty thousand. A larger proportion than one per thousand of the population might be expected to attend schools of this grade from large towns, inasmuch as the charge for day school education is so much less than that for education in a boarding school.' For the second grade of education it was proposed to make the same provision in boarding schools as for the first grade, but in schools of less size. 'Besides the boarding schools, every town of a larger population than five thousand would want a day school, or a day and boarding school combined, of this grade; and whenever an endowed school was planted near such a town, this would be one of the uses to which it might conveniently be put. Lastly, every town should have, if possible, a day school of the third grade, and to this purpose most of the remaining schools should be appropriated.' 'A school of the third grade should not be allowed to charge a fee above 4*l.* 4*s.*, which would put it out of the reach of the classes for which it was intended, nor below 2*l.* 2*s.*, less than which would not pay for the kind of education required. In the same way the fees of second grade day schools might vary from 6*l.* 6*s.* to 12*l.* 12*s.*, and of second grade boarding schools from 25*l.* to 40*l.* Lastly, the fees of first grade

day schools might vary from 12*l.* to 26*l.* 5*s.*, and of first grade boarding schools from 60*l.* to 120*l.*'

Taking the population of England then at twenty millions, the commissioners would provide for the ultimate establishment of eighty first grade boarding schools, with accommodation for twenty thousand boys. This would be in addition to the previously established schools of the same grade, the so-called 'public schools,' of which more than fifteen could be enumerated, educating probably six thousand boys, and to the first grade day schools of the future.

We must suppose, then, that the commissioners looked forward to an attendance of more than thirty thousand boys at schools of which the studies would be arranged on the supposition that their scholars would be kept there till eighteen or past, the age for entering the university. When it is considered that Prussia before 1866, with a population of less than twenty millions, had forty-five thousand scholars at its gymnasiums and pro-gymnasiums, this expectation may not seem over-sanguine. It should be borne in mind, however, that the proportion of university students to the population in Germany is quite double what it is in England. The anticipation of the commissioners, if fulfilled, would mean that the number of scholars at schools giving a training specially for the universities would be about seven times the number of students now at Oxford and Cambridge. In other words, supposing the length of time spent at these schools to be to that spent at the university as seven to four, the number of students at the universities would be quadrupled if all the boys proceeded to them for whom the commissioners recommended provision to be made at first grade schools. Or, to put the case differently, if in twenty years' time the universities had doubled their numbers, and first grade schools had been established and filled to the number contemplated by the commissioners (without taking account of increase of population), either half the boys in these schools would not be going to the university and yet staying at school till eighteen or past; or, if those not proceeding to the university left school younger, there would be so many more than half who made a different use of the schools from that for which they were instituted.

I do not make these calculations as a statistical amusement, but in order to show how great a change in the edu-

cational customs of our middle class would be involved in the realisation of the commissioners' schemes. To give effect to them in form and appearance will probably not be found difficult. The proposed eighty first grade boarding schools might be established and even filled, but to bring the horse to the water is a different matter from making him drink, and I doubt whether they would really do very much towards raising to the higher learning those who do not now come within reach of it. They would be patronised by those parents, a large and growing class, who desire that their sons should have 'the advantages of a public school education' at a somewhat cheaper rate than that at which Rugby or Clifton supply them, but who have the vaguest idea of what they mean by these advantages. Drawing on such a class and conducted by men trained in the traditions of such schools, they would continue the old system, well suited to those who go on to the university, and not altogether ill suited to those who without doing so remain at school till past eighteen, while in fact only a very small fraction of their pupils would go to the university, and the majority would leave for offices or counting-houses under seventeen. They will thus for the most part, to adopt the language of gradation, be educating second grade boys on first grade principles. The boys in them will only differ in respect of the social aspirations of their parents from those for whom, with a view to their destination and the age at which they leave school, the commissioners recommend the second grade curriculum. Meanwhile, as boarding schools and therefore expensive, as following the Eton or Rugby model and therefore exacting Greek and verse-making early, they would not be well suited (even though, as the commissioners propose, they had exhibitions for the purpose) to carry the *élite* of lower schools on to the university.

I referred at the outset to the 'provincial authorities' for the direction of secondary education, of which the commissioners recommended the establishment. If such authorities had been established, or were likely to be so, there would be more chance of a desirable result from the proposed multiplication of boarding schools. It was suggested that for each of the Registrar-General's divisions there should be a board composed of 'six or eight unpaid district commissioners, appointed by the Crown from the residents in

the division,' and of one paid official commissioner who 'should be at once the inspector of all charities for secondary education in his district, and also, *ex officio*, one of the trustees of every trust for education above the elementary.' Such provincial authorities would be 'charged with the duty of determining in what grade each school is to stand,' and to do this, it would be 'necessary to determine the age at which the boys should be required to leave school, ... to control the fees to be paid, and the subjects to be taught.'

It has probably been owing to the absence of such provincial authorities, and the consequent reference of everything to the commissioners sitting in London, that the process of settling new schemes for the grammar schools has been so slow, and has bred so much local discontent. Certainly their existence, and in particular the existence of the official commissioner for each district, was the condition without which the proposed gradation of schools could not serve the purposes intended. For every group of schools, affording instruction according to each of the grades, there ought to be one pair of eyes which can traverse the whole, and see that the *élite* from the lower grade are carried on, through the middle to the higher, according to a system which makes the most of their time at each stage. Such a pair of eyes the proposed official commissioner, inspecting and examining all the secondary schools of a district, would have supplied. He might have prevented the new first grade boarding schools from settling down into second-rate copies of Harrow and Rugby, and have so regulated the course of study and the examinations for entrance scholarships, both in them and in the second grade schools, as to keep the channel really open, and the stream of picked poor students constantly flowing from the schools which qualify for business to those which qualify for the university. No paper schemes, fixing the subjects to be taught, nor any provision of free education for selected boys, can really secure this end. It depends on the character of the education for entrance scholarships at the first grade schools (a character which cannot be determined merely by a general regulation of the subjects examined in) whether the boys from lower grade schools shall have a fair chance of them as against boys from relatively expensive preparatory schools. It depends, again, very much on the order in which the several prescribed

subjects are taught, on the relation between the time-tables of the different classes, *e.g.*, on the stage at which Greek begins, whether or no the promising boys of lower grade, on elevation to the high school, shall or shall not find themselves at a disadvantage as compared with those who have been in it from the beginning. Without any disrespect to the sort of men whom we may expect to be masters of the first grade schools in question, it may be anticipated that, in the absence of such suggestion and check as wise inspection of the kind proposed, but not realised, might supply, these points would, in general, be settled almost unintentionally in the way least favourable to the flow of promotion from the humbler schools.

I do not know whether the labours of the Executive Commission will end in providing as much accommodation in first grade boarding schools as the Commission of Inquiry recommended. I hear, however, of a good many such being established, or in process of establishment, and I do not hear much of arrangements likely to vitalise their connection with lower schools. In the absence of such connection, and of any effective authority to make it a reality where it exists in name, I cannot think that the investment of our educational endowments in such schools is advisable to anything like the extent proposed. For the development of the higher education among us we have to look, as it seems to me, much more to first grade day schools in the larger towns than to boarding schools elsewhere; and even if the scheme of the Commission of Inquiry had been carried out in its integrity, including the vital nexus which the official district commissioner might have supplied, it would have been found, I think, that while oversatisfying, or not satisfying in the best way, the educational demand of one section of the middle class, it had not done enough to meet the demand of another, from which more contribution to the intellectual life of the nation is to be expected. There is room, I do not doubt, for more boarding schools, giving the higher classical and mathematical training, than we have hitherto had, and up to a certain point I should welcome their establishment; but the class which would chiefly support new boarding schools, charging from 60*l.* to 120*l.* a year, the rate suggested by the commissioners for those of the first grade, would seldom be disposed to keep their sons at school long enough to do justice to the full first

grade curriculum. They would send them to such schools, not for the sake of the studies pursued, but on account of their gentlemanly repute, and would generally withdraw them for favourable openings in business before they were seventeen. The case of such parents would best be met by boarding schools, calling themselves first grade, if they like, (as that term has come into fashion), and charging fees as high as the commissioners suggested for first grade schools, but giving an education corresponding to that recommended for schools of the second grade.

It is one of the inconveniences attaching to the present state of society in England, that all questions of education are complicated by distinctions of class. Other nations may have hard and fast social demarcations, such as the German one between those who may write 'Von' before their names and those who may not; but the subtle distinction between those who claim to be gentlemen and whose claim is conceded, those who claim to be so but whose claim is not yet conceded, and those who do not claim to be gentlemen at all, is England's own. It embarrasses all the schemes of school reformers. Such or such a course of study is settled on logical grounds to be the best adapted for boys who are being educated for a certain kind of career in life. It gets the name of being the education of gentlemen, and immediately the schools which give it are crowded with boys not destined for such a career at all; while others, who have more real aspiration for it, are virtually excluded on social grounds. Another course is projected with a view to a career which has to be entered upon earlier than the other, and requiring different qualifications. It gets the name of being less gentleman-like, is ticketed as 'second grade' (a term which, in the mouths of nine out of ten who apply it to schools, has no educational significance whatever, but purely a social one) and a great part of the boys for whom it is best adapted will not use it; while of those to whom, just because they make less social pretension, it is chiefly left, a considerable number could turn the higher course of study to account.

There can be no doubt that the only rational separation of studies in secondary schools is that on which the distinction between 'Gymnasien' and 'Real-Schule' in Germany rests. The course of instruction in the gymnasium corresponds to that pursued in our own great classical schools, but owing

to the strictness of the examinations which government authorities superintend, and in particular of the 'leaving examination,' which is the condition of entrance to the universities and all the higher civil and military employments, it is more thoroughly and uniformly carried out. A precise account of it will be found in Mr. Matthew Arnold's report. The education of the 'Real-Schule' is intended for boys not looking forward to the universities or to the higher civil service, but to business. Those who enter it are supposed to have had the same preliminary education as those who continue in the gymnasium, an education in which Latin is the most important element, and arithmetic the next. The bifurcation takes place at the point where Greek has to be begun, if begun at all. This point is expected to be reached at the age of twelve or thirteen. If the pupil then passes into the 'Real-Schule,' he learns no Greek, but continues to learn Latin, though the time given to it is much less than in the gymnasium, and decreases as the pupil rises in the school. Additional mathematics, natural science, French and drawing, with chemistry and English (the equivalent of German with us), which seem only to be taught as extras in the gymnasiums, occupy the time gained by the omission of Greek and the restriction of Latin studies. The result is tested by a leaving examination, of which the subjects are, 'divinity, the mother-tongue and its literature, the translation of easy passages from Latin authors, but in general no Latin writing; French and English in translation, writing, and speaking; ancient history, and the history of Germany, England, and France, for the last three centuries; physics and chemistry; pure and applied mathematics, and drawing.' The certificate of having passed this examination is now 'valid for a very great number of posts in the public service, and for a still greater number of posts in the pursuits of commerce and industry employers require it.'

It is true that English life cannot at once assimilate German methods in education any more than anything else, and forgetfulness of this has been apt to lead educational reformers astray. We shall sigh in vain for the possibility of gathering the secondary education of England into two great systems of day schools. The mischievous divorce between boarding school and day school, between boys who, requiring an education essentially the same, must yet seek it

in schools of different social pretensions, we cannot hope wholly to get rid of. But we ought to keep steadily before us the German division of studies, which is the only rational one, and, so far as possible, make our distinctions of grades correspond to it.

In the education of boys, whom there is any hope of ever bringing to read any part of Greek literature, Greek should always be insisted on. But for the boys who would fill most of the new boarding schools, proposed by the late commissioners, there would be no such hope. It is true that in Germany the number of pupils in the gymnasiums (at the time of Mr. Arnold's report) was double the number of pupils in the 'Real-Schule,' and Germany is a much poorer country than England, but this does not entitle us even to dream of a time when in England the number of those for whom the classical education is best fitted will be double of those who would be better trained on 'real' studies. Just because England is so much richer, the attractions of commercial life in it are much stronger, and the proportion of those who seek a career in or through the universities, and in the higher branches of the civil service, to those who seek it in business, will be much smaller with us than with the Germans. Nor, as the race for wealth grows quicker, is the age for entering business, even in the case of those who enter it from wealthy families, likely to become much later than it is now. Supposing that in the future with the more wealthy it ranges from sixteen to eighteen, which is a most liberal supposition, there is still virtually no chance that boys leaving school for business should carry with them any such command of Greek as they could afterwards develop. Latin stands on a different footing. There is more chance of some acquaintance with its literature being kept up, and apart from this, the time spent on its grammar and syntax is saved in the greater quickness with which a knowledge of modern languages and the power of dealing clearly and correctly with one's own may afterwards be acquired. Its retention, moreover, in both the main courses of secondary instruction is the condition of their being combined in their earlier stages, as they are in Germany, and as it would be a great gain that they should be in England. French and German are valuable, apart from any commercial utility, as opening to the future man of business the only literature

other than his own for which he is likely to have leisure. Of the importance of mathematics and physical science it is needless to speak, either to those who have duly studied them or to those who, having failed to do so, find cause every hour to bewail their neglect; and in the one or other of these classes I suppose all educated men may be placed.

Latin, modern languages, mathematics, and natural science, then, as in the German 'Real-Schule,' should be the chief studies in most, I do not say all, of the boarding schools which may be formed out of grammar school funds away from large towns. Latin *writing* should not be much attempted, and the Greek language not at all. In this way the boys who frequent them would get the education which, in view of their future, is best suited to them, and for the higher education nothing would be lost, since there would be ample accommodation elsewhere for those who, so to speak, are born to it, while for those not so born but who may be won to it schools so situated and supported by boarders would never form a suitable avenue to the universities. Let all designation of grades among them, which with us always tends to become merely a designation of social pretension, as much as possible be avoided. The late commissioners, while recommending, as we have seen, the establishment of a great many first grade classical boarding schools, suggested also the establishment of a few which, while first grade, should give only a semi-classical education, an education, in fact, corresponding to that of the 'Real-Schule' which we have just been considering. One such school I know of as already established at Giggleswick, in Yorkshire, which is doing excellent work, and probably there are others. You will find, however, that the programme of studies at Giggleswick does not differ from that prescribed for the middle department of King Edward's school, which would be called second grade. Thus, while the distinction between schools of this kind and those which give a classical training is clear and definite, there is none between them and the schools which may be established under the designation of second grade, except a fluctuating one of expense. The subjects taught in the two sorts would be the same, and it is hard to see what would be gained, as a rule, by promotion from one to the other. It would depend upon special circumstances and upon the merit of individual masters which was really

the higher of the two. It would be possible, indeed, in the absence of any real distinction of studies, to attempt one of ages, by enacting that no boy shall stay in the one sort of school beyond, or enter the other before, a certain age, and that a certain proficiency in elementary subjects shall have been attained in the one before entrance to the other. Some regulation of this kind seems to have been contemplated by the commissioners, and if we could adopt the German plan, according to which all boys, aiming at the secondary education, pass through the same classes in writing, arithmetic, and Latin grammar before separating into the classical school on the one hand and the 'Real-Schule' on the other, it would no doubt have great advantage. But our social distinctions would prevent any such plan from being carried through in boarding schools. The ordinary parent who looked to the first grade semi-classical school for his son would not consent to his receiving his preliminary education at the school called second grade, and this being so, there could be no reason in prohibiting the master of the school, patronised by parents of less social ambition, from keeping his pupils as long as he could induce them to stay. It would be an arbitrary restriction on his power of developing his school.

On the whole I am persuaded that any gradation of boarding schools, apart from the distinction between classical and 'real' or 'modern' schools, will prove an unreality. Nor would this distinction in a proper sense constitute a gradation, as there could be no regular transition from the 'modern' school to the 'classical.' I should like, therefore, to see the scheme of the commissioners, so far as it relates to boarding schools, modified in the result somewhat as follows. In the hope that in the higher education of the future, day schools will occupy a far more important place than they have done, I should not desire to see nearly so many new boarding schools, charging 60*l.* a year or more, as the commissioners contemplate, and of those that are established, I would have the greater number lay themselves out for the 'real' or 'modern' education. Apart from the distinction of studies into classical and modern, let there be no distinction of grades, and as long as a maximum limit, which I would fix very little above the commissioners' minimum, is not exceeded, let the regulation of fees be quite elastic. The merit of the master, the character of the situation, and

the amount of the endowment (the last element being perhaps the least important) should be left to fix the place of each school in the educational scale.

Among the modern schools some would make more of Latin, some less. In the humbler it need not be obligatory at all, any more than in the 'Real-Schule' of the second rank in Germany. Such schools would naturally pass on some of their better scholars to higher ones of the same class. Those boarding schools, as a rule, should be classical which can best afford a large fund for entrance exhibitions, and occasionally, though for reasons already given I should expect but rarely, these might fall to boys transferred betimes from the 'modern' schools.

So much for boarding schools. But just in proportion as I should deprecate their multiplication, and the assignment to them of a classical character, to the extent proposed by the late commission, I should urge the development of classical day schools in the larger towns. In order that our secondary schools may serve the purpose of bringing a liberal education within the reach of those to whom it has been inaccessible or unfamiliar, two things are chiefly necessary, the growth of a sentiment or aspiration in favour of liberal education among the people who have hitherto been careless of it, and such a management of the secondary schools as may make the passage easy from their lower stage to the higher. It is scarcely among the most prosperous of the middle class that the needful sentiment is likely to develop itself most quickly and fruitfully. The attractions of early money-getting are not friendly to it, and where these attractions are strongest, though there may often be a decided wish for the 'education of a gentleman,' a wish which will find its satisfaction in a more or less costly boarding school, there will be little of the instinct which leads to the prolonged pursuit of literature or science. It will more often be found among those who, while feeling the intellectual stimulus which the life of a large town supplies, find no very tempting openings into the life of prosperous commerce. Among such men there has long been a demand, I believe, for a higher education than under the *régime* of unreformed grammar schools there was much chance of satisfying, and of late years with the growth of libraries and literary institutions in the larger towns it has made rapid progress. The day school must

always be much better fitted than the boarding school both to meet and to expand it. Unless I am much mistaken, the masters of King Edward's school would tell us that for many of their most promising pupils a suitable boarding school, one that would really do them justice, is financially out of the question. Probably the nonconformist ministers and the masters of public elementary schools form the most definite nucleus of the unsatisfied instinct after learning that I speak of, and in a less concentrated state it is diffused among the classes with which they chiefly mix. It could only be to quite the cheaper boarding schools, if to boarding schools at all, that the sons of such parents could be sent. These schools could not give them the higher education they are capable of, and, once there, their only chance of getting it would be in an assisted transfer, under any system difficult to manage, to a higher school having exhibitions. On the other hand, with a good system of secondary schools in their native town, they might be started in the right course from the beginning. Those vexatious social and sectarian difficulties, which in the conduct of boarding schools we may execrate but cannot overcome, need not then prevent their admixture with boys most variously favoured by fortune and divided by creeds. From early boyhood they would have the opportunity of entering that sort of intellectual aristocracy, which there is some ground for saying can as yet only be found at our universities, and might be under the eye and influence, if not under the direct teaching, of a high-minded scholar or man of science.

Such impulse towards a liberal education as already exists, or is germinating, below the higher professional class in our large towns would thus be fairly met. At the same time it would be constantly and indefinitely expanded under the influence of an institution giving definite aim and method to all higher educational effort. We are beginning to be aware that if the people are to be made scholars, the scholar must go to the people, not wait for them to come to him. He must sink his pride so far as to offer them his wares in the universally accessible day school, instead of expecting them to seek him out at the boarding school. Perhaps it is one of the first-fruits of university reform that men are now forthcoming from Cambridge and Oxford who will enter, without any of the caste-spirit of the conventional university

man, but with unabated zeal for the knowledge which 'does not pay,' into the educational life of cities. The influence which such men may have in eliciting the latent capacity for learning in the less wealthy middle class, is what we are only just beginning to appreciate. I can myself bear witness that, so far as we are drawing to Oxford young men of promise from classes outside those which we are used to, it is through the action of day education under such men as I have spoken of. It is the day scholars of Birmingham, Manchester, and the City of London school, the day students of the Scotch universities, sent us by professors whom we have sent there, that are bringing hopeful new grist to our mill.

The teacher, however, must have his machinery. It is in part because the graduated mechanism of secondary instruction can be so much more effectively supplied by a system of day schools under common management than in any other way, that I have the most hope of the education of the future from them. The great impediments to such a grading of boarding schools as may make one an effective stepping-stone to another, lies in the inevitable tendency to substitute a social distinction for one of studies, and in the want, as I have put it, of one pair of eyes to overlook the process upwards of promising boys, and see that the arrangement of studies favours it at every stage. Under a system of day education, on the contrary, the social difficulties of combining boys of the same intellectual capacity and aims in the same school are minimised, though not removed; and when schools, representing the several standards, are all in one town, the adjustment of each to the other, through the action either of the head-master of the highest or of some small board of supervision (such as regulates, I believe, the graded schools of Boston), might easily be secured. It need not be said that the King Edward's foundation at Birmingham has always been looked upon by those conversant with the subject as affording almost unique possibilities for the development of a system of graded day education. I believe, however, that every town of wealth and spirit, with a population of some fifty thousand and some nucleus of endowment, may in time provide efficiently for the ascent from the elementary school to the university. Let us ask ourselves finally what the method of ascent should be.

If we were clear of class impediments, there can be no

doubt what the logical gradation of schools would be, and the examples both of Germany and New England point in the same direction. There should first be the elementary schools, laying the same foundation for all alike. These should transfer their *élite* at the age of ten, competent readers and spellers, and expert in arithmetic up to fractions, to a 'middle school,' where they would meet boys who had reached the same standard by education at more select schools or at home. A strict entrance examination should enforce this standard for all. At the middle schools Latin should be the leading study; arithmetic and handwriting, with correct English composition, should come next. Their best pupils should be through them by the age of twelve. The most backward would probably never pass beyond them, and care should be taken, if need be, by partial exemption from Latin, to make them complete in arithmetic and simple English composition before they leave. For those who have done with the 'middle school' before fourteen, the choice should lie between a classical and a 'modern' or 'real' school, such as I have already described. Each should be fenced by a preliminary examination in the leading studies of the middle school, and with this safeguard they should equally welcome boys trained in this school and those who may have shunned it as not sufficiently select. The mixture of these two classes would be a most useful function of the upper day schools. Those who entered the classical school would have an education before them corresponding to that of the existing 'public schools,' except that it would start on the supposition of Greek having not yet begun, and, as I should hope, would omit verse composition for the majority, so as to gain more time for physics and natural science. Experience of Scotch students at Oxford leads to the opinion that neither the postponement of Greek nor the omission of verse-making need prevent the highest success in classical studies at the universities. In regard to the 'modern' school, I need only add to what has been already said about it that, since many boys, entering it from the middle school at the age of thirteen or past, would not stay in it much more than a year, care should be taken to make sure of some real knowledge of mathematics and one modern language being acquired within that period. What reduction of the time for Latin might be necessary for this, experience would show. Sufficient

fees should be charged both for the middle and the upper schools, on the simple principle that people should not have a present made them of what they can well afford to pay for, and the charge for both branches of the upper school should be the same. Free education, however, in all the schools should be liberally granted as a reward for merit in the entrance examinations. In towns like Birmingham, where abundance of endowment renders fees unnecessary, I would still charge them, and apply the overplus to the establishment of university classes, in which, when certain changes that cannot long be postponed have been made at Oxford and Cambridge, the first stage of a university career may be completed.

I have not left myself time to speak of the difficulties which present circumstances, social and other, would put in the way of the realisation of such a scheme, nor of the possibility of adapting it to towns less favourably circumstanced than Birmingham. Here, as you will apprehend, I should find the materials for the suggested middle schools in the four existing lower schools on the King Edward's foundation, while the existing classical and English departments in the central school need not essentially change their character, but only somewhat raise their standard of admission, in order to become the co-ordinate upper schools, classical and 'real,' of my scheme. In towns less populous and with small endowments there could not of course be separate schools of the kind proposed, but the same purpose might be partially served by one school having a lower department for Latin, English, and arithmetic, and an upper department, classical as a rule, but allowing liberal substitution of physical science and modern languages for Greek. Such appears to be the method on which the gymnasiums in the middling German towns are worked. As to practical difficulties, I will only say that, if we keep the logical arrangement of schools in view, we shall find circumstances gradually adapting themselves to it, while if we wait for circumstances to suggest a method we shall find ourselves drifting ever further into a chaos, in which the accidents of birth and wealth will control the intellectual development of our people.

TWO LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SYSTEM OF ENGLAND.

I.

AM to speak to-night of a subject which more closely con-erns a larger number of people than any other with which he politician deals. If we could suppose an agreement ıade between a statesman and a sage that one should make he laws of a nation and the other its schools, there would e no doubt which of the two would have the destiny of the ation in his hands. Yet who among us could say how the chools of England have been made what they are? If the intelligent foreigner' were to set himself to inquire on the ubject, he would probably conclude that they had grown up o one knew how; and though this conclusion might not be trictly accurate, he would find scarcely any one to set him ight on the matter. The higher education of the country ıas been carried on chiefly in endowed schools and colleges, egulated by the will of founders who have been allowed— s I think, unwisely—to exercise through the terms of their equests the most vital of all influences on posterity for an ınlimited time. The working of these institutions has of ourse been constantly modified in practice by the persons rom time to time in charge of them, and on rare occasions ome general law has been passed, such as the University Reform Act of 1852, and the Endowed Schools Act of 1869, or the purpose of adapting them to the wants of the time. Throughout, however, no attempt has been made to introduce ny general system of higher education. The widest range ıas been allowed to the caprice or discretion of individuals, irst in the foundation and then in the conduct of our semi-ıaries of learning. Meanwhile, during the last sixty years, here has grown up a great system of elementary schools, of

which few of us know the history, though it is a history which most effectually, for better or for worse, determines the path of the educational reformer.

Most of us are familiar with the general features of Mr. Forster's Education Act of 1870, and with the manner in which the powers given by it have been acted upon. We are apt, however, to forget that, though that act was the first general law passed by Parliament with reference to the education of the people, the government had been dealing with the subject for many years before. When Mr. Forster undertook a general education act, he had anything but a blank sheet before him. He found the denominational system in possession of the ground, and the range of possibilities open to any particular legislator on the subject proportionately limited. This was the result of more than thirty years of consistent action on the part of the executive, in which parliament had acquiesced, but which it had never expressly, and in a general form, approved. When the constitutional history of our nation comes to be written, one of its most notable features, I should think, will be the fact that a matter of such primary public importance as elementary education was left in the hands of experts and officials of certain departments, without any general law to control or direct them, until an organised procedure had grown up which was too strong for any subsequent legislation to set aside. My object tonight will be to explain how this came about; what was the origin and nature of that denominational system with which Mr. Forster felt obliged to deal so tenderly, and which still reigns undisturbed in Oxford. In another lecture, if your patience is not exhausted (as it is likely to be) by this, I shall consider the merits and shortcomings of the act of 1870, and what there still remains for us to do in order that the children of our poorer classes may have a fair chance in life.

For my historical purpose I must carry you back over a period of sixty years, and ask your attention to what happened at six main epochs, 1816, 1833, 1839, 1843, 1846, and 1853. Public attention had been first seriously drawn to the dangers arising from popular ignorance at the close of the twenty-two years' war, which arose out of the determination of certain classes in England to resist the influences of the French Revolution, and was continued from the necessity of

withstanding the ruinous ambition of Napoleon. England having exclusive command of the sea, the war had been in effect a great agency of protection for British industry, and during it, in spite of the drain to the army, the population increased rapidly. As soon as it was over, and the war prices fell, the natural reaction from a period of artificial inflation set in. Wages fell, employment became scanty, distress, discontent, and disorder were everywhere rife. While the tory government pursued the policy of repression which issued in the famous 'Six Acts,' the reforming minority, led principally by Brougham, were urging the necessity of removing the evils of which rick-burning and machine-breaking were only the symptoms. At the same time that they demanded a reform of parliament, they were training the intelligence of the country to a clear conception of the social reforms to which the reform of parliament was the necessary means, thus setting an example which subsequent generations of reformers would do well to follow. In 1816 Brougham obtained the appointment of a commission which ultimately extended its inquiries to the state of education throughout the country. It found, when it reported in 1818, that the total number of scholars in day schools of every description was 675,000, or one in seventeen of the population. It is now an accepted calculation that the number of children should be one in six of the population. Hence we may infer that in 1818 nearly two-thirds of the children of England were receiving no regular education at all. Of those who were receiving regular education at all, a great many were receiving it in anything but an effective form. About 170,000 were supposed to be in endowed schools, grammar schools and free schools, which were often in a very neglected state. Twice that number (336,000) were in ordinary private schools, where the only apparatus of instruction often was the stick. About 175,000 were in unendowed schools, maintained wholly or in part by private benevolence. These schools were probably the most efficient that were in existence for purposes of primary education, being chiefly such as had been lately established either by the National Society or the British and Foreign School Society. As these societies hold an important place in the development of our educational system, I must say a few words about them.

It implies no disrespect for the established church to

remark that, while in its corporate character it is very slow to initiate movements for improving the condition of the people, it is very ready to take them up when they have been started independently of it, in order to prevent them from taking a direction unfavourable to its corporate interests. It was so in the matter of education. The society first formed was the British and Foreign, the parent of what are known as British schools. It has never been antagonistic to the church, but it is quite independent of it. It was founded in 1808, for the purpose of training teachers and assisting in the building and conduct of schools, on the principle of avoiding the theological questions at issue between the several christian denominations. At the same time it has always been a fundamental rule of the society that in schools assisted by it there should be daily lessons in Holy Scripture. At a time when clerical partisans are apt to raise a cry against unsectarian schools as merely secular, it is well to bear in mind that the oldest unsectarian society for education in England was founded and has always been conducted upon these principles. Three years later was founded the National Society for the education of the poor in the principles of the established church. In the schools founded and assisted by it the use of the church catechism and the teaching of the peculiar religious tenets of anglicanism was to be as essential as was their exclusion from the British schools. These two societies, and the influences which they represented, were actively at work during the fifteen years following the appearance of Brougham's report on education in 1818. The number of children attending day schools increased more rapidly during that interval than during any subsequent period. Having been 675,000 in 1818, it had grown to 1,277,947 in 1833, and while the proportion of scholars to population was one in seventeen at the former date, it was one in eleven at the latter. It had not been without reason that in 1828 Brougham had uttered the famous boast in the house of commons that the schoolmaster was abroad.

It was, however, rather the quantity than the quality of education which had been improving at such a rate. Of the million and a quarter scholars reported as in attendance in 1833, not much more than a fourth part were in British or National schools, and for the efficiency of the rest, there was

no sort of guarantee. Reformers were already aware of the importance of introducing some national system, which, at the same time that it multiplied schools and brought the children into them, should raise the character of the teaching. The great practical obstacle in the way then, as ever afterwards, was the difficulty of settling the relations between the system to be established, and the various forms of religious belief, or more properly the various interests, real or supposed, of different religious bodies. It is thus that we pay the penalty for the unhappy division of the active religious life of England into two halves, one within, the other without, the established church, a division fixed at the 'blessed Restoration,' and which we have come to acquiesce in as irremediable. Out of it arises the 'religious difficulty,' which only seems unreal to those who do not see where it really lies. It is not the difficulty of devising a system of religious instruction, which the parents of all children, likely to use elementary schools, would readily accept. Any practical teacher, left to himself, could carry out such a system any day. It is the difficulty of finding persons in whose hands the management of schools, supported by public money, may be placed; and who will abstain from using them for purposes of ecclesiastical or sectarian aggrandisement. A proposal to entrust the control of them to laymen, unbound by religious tests, would at any time have met with two almost insurmountable obstacles. In the country districts at any rate, it would have been generally impossible to find men qualified and willing for the work, and, had such a plan been attempted, the whole influence of the church would have been directed to setting up schools in opposition to the government. On the other hand, to put state-aided schools really or virtually under the management of the clergy, is to commit a great power, derived from the state, into the hands of men whose chief care would often be to use it as a means for strengthening the interest of the church as against the dissenters. Such a proceeding is inevitably and rightly resented by the dissenters as a violation of the first principles of political justice. The liberal statesmen of the last generation naturally shrank from both alternatives, and in consequence, as we shall see, drifted without intending it into a system which was virtually one of subsidy to the established church, without

having the countervailing advantages of a comprehensive national system.

The first step in this direction was taken in '33. The great act of parliamentary reform had then just come into operation; and it is noticeable that the first year of the existence of the reformed parliament was marked by the first action of the government in the interests of popular education, just as it was in the second session of parliament after its further reform in '67, that the first general law on the subject was passed. Perhaps we shall have to wait for a further parliamentary reform, which shall include an extension of the county suffrage, before that law is so extended as to do for the rural districts what it has begun to do for the larger towns. When we reflect on the smallness of the beginning made forty-four years ago, we shall perhaps be more inclined to wonder that we have gone so far in the time than that we have gone no farther. It consisted in a parliamentary vote of 20,000*l.*, which was administered by the treasury, in the form of grants for school-building, through the two societies, the National and the British, already described. This vote was repeated each year till 1839. So far nothing could be said against the fairness of the arrangement. The National Society represented the strict churchmen; the British the more liberal members both of the church and other denominations. Unfortunately the wesleyans and most of the independents and baptists held aloof from the British and Foreign Society all along, some objecting to the system of state-aid altogether, others to a society with the foundation and conduct of which unitarians had a great deal to do. Thus the method of dispensing the government grant was not unfair, but it was ineffective. It failed to touch the poorest localities, for the principle was adopted of making the grant in aid of building a school proportionate to the sum raised on the spot. The religious bodies who felt unable to act through either of the societies could take no advantage of it; and nothing was being done, either to train teachers or to improve the methods of education in the assisted schools. These considerations induced the whig government of 1839, then represented in the house of commons by lord J. Russell, a name which the friends of unsectarian schools cannot honour too highly, to make a further movement, which for the first time brought

the cause of national education into direct antagonism with the claims of the church.

The scheme of the government included four principal proposals, of which, as often happens in England, the best was abandoned in face of ecclesiastical opposition, while the less good were persevered in, and in effect fixed the lines along which all subsequent action of the government in relation to elementary schools had to move. The first was the establishment of the committee of privy council on education which, under the well-known designation of 'my lords,' or 'the department,' has become so familiar to all concerned in the management of primary schools. 'My lords' are certain members of the privy council, being also members of the government for the time being, and changing with it, who are charged with the administration of the sum annually voted by parliament in aid of education. The labouring oars are held by two out of the four members, viz. the president and vice-president of the council. This committee, which had at first merely to administer 30,000*l.* a year, has grown into a great department of state, dealing with an annual grant from the exchequer of nearly two millions, and exercising a wider and more important discretion than is left to any other public office. Its chief functionary is the permanent under-secretary. Two men, whose names are little known among the people, Sir J. Kay Shuttleworth and Mr. Lingen, acting successively in this capacity, have probably had more to do with the formation of the most important of all public institutions than any other two men in England. Now it is a matter of no slight historical interest that this great office of state was established, without act of parliament, by a mere order in council, *i.e.* virtually, by a decree of the cabinet of '39. From that time till 1870 it administered the annual grant in aid of education (which means that it gradually came to regulate the whole elementary school system of England) without direction from any act of parliament. Its procedure was embodied in 'minutes of the committee of council,' which are in fact declarations by the committee of the rules according to which it intends to act in administering the grant. These minutes are laid before parliament, and it is open to either house to vote an address to the queen in condemnation of them. The commons, again, may give decisive effect

to its disapproval of them by refusing to agree to the annual vote in aid of education. They differ, however, from the ordinary bills laid before parliament, inasmuch as neither house has any power of amending them. While I point this out, however, I must also express my belief that if our school system had been regulated by acts of parliament instead of by these 'minutes of council' prior to 1870, it would have been both less liberal and less effective than it was.

The establishment of this committee of council, then, was the first point in the scheme of '39. Two other changes were the requirement that schools receiving building-grants should submit to government inspection, and the authorisation of building-grants to other schools than those which would make application through either the National or the British and Foreign Society. The first of these changes was an unmixed good; the second meant that the government grant should be made available for schools started by the wesleyans, the roman catholics, and the Jews. This of course was only fair if a denominational, and not a national, system was to be permanently adopted. In the sequel it turned out to be the beginning of the exclusively denominational system which afterwards prevailed, but it was probably intended by the government of '39 merely as a temporary arrangement till the national system, which it had in view, could be carried out.

That it had such a scheme in view appeared from the fourth and best of its recommendations, which finally had to be dropped. This was for the establishment of a normal school, *i.e.* a school for training teachers with a practising school for children attached, which should be under the direction of the state. It was proposed that the religious instruction given in it should be divided into general and special. The general religious instruction was to consist of such general truths of christianity as are common to all the christian communions of England, and was to be given by the ordinary masters. The special was to include instruction upon those questions of doctrine and discipline upon which differences of opinion occur, and was to be given, not by the ordinary teachers, but by a chaplain to the church of England students, and by some licensed minister to those belonging to the dissenting communions. This plan, I avow, has always seemed to me to afford the true basis of a national

system, which should be just, without having the drawback of being merely secular. Its practicability now as in '39 depends on the relative strength of reason and sectarian zeal in the community. As proposed in '39 it was merely meant to apply at first to one normal school, but it was rightly taken as an indication that the government desired to establish common schools for the country, founded upon a basis of religious equality, and was made the ground of opposition to the whole government scheme. The establishment of the committee of council, which might not otherwise have been so strongly resented, was regarded as the introduction of a power destined by degrees to foist the common school system upon the country. One can only wish it had really been so. Its destiny, as it turned out, was to commit the country to denominationalism piecemeal.

The 'drum ecclesiastic' has never been beaten more loudly in England than on occasion of the promulgation of this scheme in '39. The scheme, it will be observed, was not embodied in a bill. It was contained in the order of council establishing the special committee, and in certain minutes afterwards issued by the committee. The liberal government at that time was in very low water. It had been suffering the fate which all reforming governments are likely to undergo, so long as the house of lords continues in its present form. As the political fire in the country died out, the upper house had taken courage to resume its attitude of obstruction. The government, in consequence, was afraid to attempt the execution of its full programme of reform and was thus gradually losing the confidence of its more advanced supporters, while the interests threatened by liberal legislation were becoming constantly hotter and bolder in opposition. We saw the same state of things during the latter years of the Gladstone government. In '39 the excitement of the church, and, I am sorry to add, of the wesleyans against the education scheme, brought the antagonism to the government to a head. In face of the threatened opposition, the best part of the scheme, the proposal for an unsectarian normal school, was withdrawn. This, however, did not prevent lord Stanley, then a recent seceder from the whigs, from moving an address to the crown against the establishment of the proposed committee of council. There was a call of the house on the night when the address

was moved. Lord Ashley, the present lord Shaftesbury, denounced the action of the government as 'hostile to the constitution, to the church, and to revealed religion itself.' Mr. Gladstone, then the hope of the high tories, asserted the duty of the state to provide through the church for the teaching of the orthodox religion. The church orators made merry, in a style with which we have since become very familiar, over the suggested division of religious instruction into general and special. Finally lord Stanley's motion was rejected, and the government saved, by a majority of 5 in a house of 555. In the house of lords an address to the crown in opposition to all points of the government scheme, moved by the archbishop of Canterbury, was carried by a majority of about two to one.

This did not promise well for the future. The government adhered to its plan, so far as regarded the appointment of the committee of council, the right of inspection, and the extension of the building-grants to other bodies than those applying through either of the two societies. But the question remained, in what direction this plan should be worked, whether in the direction of a denominational or a national system. After the forced abandonment of the project for an unsectarian normal school under state direction, and in face of the resolute demand of the church for control over the education of all children not professedly dissenters, the officials who guided the operations of the department might be excused for thinking the establishment of a common school system hopeless. The case might have been different if they could have relied on the support of the dissenters in resisting the claims of the church. The independents and baptists, objecting to all interference with education on the part of the state, stood aloof altogether. The wesleyans would listen as little as the church to any plan which did not leave the instruction of the children of their own body exclusively in their hands. It thus seemed as if to wait for a national system would be to keep the children of England without even the crumbs of learning for an indefinite time, while, in the interval, by helping the denominations in the erection of schools, so long as the guarantee of efficiency afforded by their submission to inspection was insisted on, at least no harm could be done. Even inspection, however, was not submitted to by the church without a struggle. It

was finally agreed that the archbishop of Canterbury should have a veto on all appointments of inspectors for church schools, and in consequence, till the new system was introduced in '70, none but clergymen were appointed to this office, a different staff being employed for dissenting schools, and a third for those of roman catholics. Thus little by little, against the better judgment of those who had led the van of educational reform, and in deference to a zeal for church or sect which was neither for, nor according to, knowledge, the lines were laid for a system under which the state-aid of education became a concurrent (but, in its operation, very unequal) endowment of the sects. Between '39 and '46, the grants dispensed by the committee of council were still confined to purposes of building. They were open, under certain conditions, to any applicants who undertook to provide religious instruction. In fact, however, very few schools were set up except in connection with either the National or the British and Foreign Society, so that the system pursued during this interval did not practically differ much from that of the previous years, except in the exaction of the right of inspection. Since many of the clergy at first refused to admit this right, the applications for aid came in slowly, and up to '46 the yearly amount of the grants had not got beyond 40,000*l.* In the interval one more *bona fide* effort had been made, and that by a conservative government, to lay the foundation of a national system. It failed, and its failure shut the door of hope, for the next generation if not finally, upon those who wish the schools of England to belong to the people rather than to the priest.

So far, it had been the impracticability of churchmen that had appeared as the great obstacle to the adoption of a common system. It was now the turn of the dissenters to show that they were not made of different stuff. The liberal government had given place to the conservatives under Sir Robert Peel in 1841. English ministers are difficult to move except by a 'row,' and in 1842 occurred certain riots in the manufacturing districts which, as he avowed, had a great effect on the mind of Sir James Graham, then home secretary. In the following year he brought in a bill for the further regulation of labour in the factories, along with a provision for the establishment of schools to which the half-time children might be sent. There was a law already in force

requiring children under a certain age, if employed in factories, to spend three hours a day at school, but the inspectors reported that in many places there were no efficient schools for them to attend. Sir James Graham accordingly proposed that, where this was the case, if subscriptions were not forthcoming for the erection of proper schools, a charge should be made on the poor-rate for the purpose. Each school thus built was to be placed in the hands of trustees, seven in number. One of these was to be a clergyman appointed by the bishop of the diocese, and this clerical trustee was in turn to nominate one other. Subscribers to a certain amount were to appoint a third, and the rate-payers of the parish the remaining four. The scriptures were to be read daily, and lessons on them given by the master to all the children except roman catholics. The catechism was to be taught only to those whose parents did not object, and to them only in a separate room and at the beginning or end of the school day, while the children of dissenters might, if it was wished by their parents, have at the same time a religious lesson, also in the school, from a minister of their parents' choosing. The head-master of each school, by a curious provision, was to be appointed (or at least approved) by the bishop of the diocese, other masters by the body of the trustees.

Objection might have been fairly made to this measure on the ground of its partial operation. It was putting an obligation on the factory districts, much for their good, no doubt, but from which the rural districts, where children quite as squalid and ignorant were to be found, were allowed to be exempt. This was in the days of protection, when feeling between town and country, between north and south, was running very high, and it was only natural, though very unfortunate, that the manufacturers should resist the imposition of an exceptional burden on their rates, already heavily charged by the poverty which the landowners' bread-tax produced. There were certain provisions also in the measure which the dissenters might fairly regard as needless concessions to the church. It rested on the principle of religious toleration, rather than of religious equality. On the whole, however, there can be no doubt that if it had been adopted thirty-three years ago, our people would be much better educated, and clerical influence over

education made much more limited than is the case at present. The establishment betimes of the principle that schools should be provided out of the rates, and should be placed in the hand of boards which on the whole represented the rate-payers, far more than counterbalanced the concession to the church. The presence of the parish clergyman *ex officio* on a board of which the majority were elected by the rate-payers would have taught him to use the influence, which no one else can command, as a citizen rather than as a priest. The operation of the measure must soon have been extended beyond the neighbourhood of factories, and by degrees we should have had England covered with schools, not like those which the clergy now call 'their own,' and which, though supported by the state, are legally private property subject to certain trusts, but belonging to the rate-payers and managed by their representatives, to whom the clergy would have soon learnt to give their aid as equals when they had found that they could not be masters.

In an evil hour the dissenters were betrayed into an opposition to Sir James Graham's bill almost as hot as that of the churchmen to the proposals of 1839. From the Free Trade Hall at Manchester there came a cry of hostility which the government was afraid to disregard. To face the resistance of the manufacturers to the bill was hard enough, without a dissenting resistance being superadded. Accordingly, while the clauses relating to the regulation of labour were carried through, the education clauses were abandoned. After a liberal and a conservative government had thus successively burnt their fingers in the attempt to provide education for the people otherwise than by subsidising the churches or sects, it is not wonderful that no other government made an attempt in that direction for another twenty-seven years. When at last it was made in '70, the denominational system had struck its roots too deep and wide to be displaced. By that time the state had expended some 10,000,000*l.* in the building and support of schools, without reserving to itself or to any public body any share in the property or management of them, and these schools sufficed for half the education of the country. It was too late then for the state to do more than to keep in public hands the schools that had still to be established, and even this, as we shall see, it did not do.

I have said that up to the year '70, all the schools to the

erection and support of which the state contributed, were private property subject to certain trusts. They originated in each case as follows. Some clergyman, or dissenting congregation, or body of benevolent persons, would wish to found a school. A site would be obtained for the purpose, and this would be conveyed to certain trustees who became owners of the school; but the committee of privy council would stipulate, as the condition of making a grant in aid of the building, that certain forms of trust-deed should be used, prescribing the mode in which the school should be 'managed.' It was by these 'management clauses,' as they were called, of the trust-deed that the denominational character of most of the schools was secured. Up to '47, they were so drawn as to admit schools of only three sorts, those in connection with the National Society, which would be under the management of the clergy, those in connection with the British and Foreign Society, which would not belong specially to any religious body, and a few not connected with either society, but in which religious instruction was required. Under this system neither the wesleyans, as such, nor the roman catholics received government money for their schools, although, as we have seen, the minutes of '39 were intended to make the grant available for them. They were first practically admitted in '47. The minutes then issued provided for four methods of management. In the case of church schools it was stipulated that the clergyman of the parish should superintend the moral and religious instruction of all scholars, and should have power to use the premises for a Sunday school; and that the government of the school, together with the appointment of teachers, should be vested either in a committee consisting of the clergyman, his curates, and certain representatives of the contributors, being members of the church of England, or, where the population was small, in the clergyman alone. For wesleyan schools a corresponding provision was made, the circuit ministers being substituted for the clergy. In the case of roman catholic schools there was the further restriction that the managing priest should act under faculties from the catholic bishop, and that the other members of the committee should be nominated by the priest, not elected by the contributors. In the case of British or any other undenominational schools, there would be no *ex officio* managers. All

would be elected by the subscribers. But in every case the department required religious instruction to be provided for in the trust-deed.

These management clauses represent virtually what in catholic countries would be called a 'concordat' between the state and the three great denominations which were willing to take its aid, the established church, the wesleyans, and the roman catholics; a 'concordat' which liberal statesmen were ready to adopt, because, in face of the hostility which these bodies showed to any common system, the only course seemed to lie in doing through them what could not be done in spite of them. To those who wish to see national education treated as a matter of public duty, not as an object of sectarian zeal, the result of such a compromise could not be satisfactory. It became worse from the position taken by those bodies of dissenters, the independents, baptists, and quakers, to whom England has often been indebted for what is best in its public life. In this matter they committed the great error of not accepting the facts of the situation. They first helped to render impossible any plan by which the management of state-aided schools should be kept in public hands, and then refused to take any advantage of the counter-scheme under which the state subsidised the sects. They thus acted in obedience to a rigid theory of voluntaryism. If they had simply insisted on the principle that the state should be above party, and that in giving the largest aid in education to the church which, being the richest, could bid most for it, it was violating this principle, they would have had a great weight of lay opinion throughout the country on their side. Unhappily they took the line that the state should not interfere with education at all. It could not do so, they said, without weakening the sense of parental responsibility. All that was wanted was voluntary effort to awaken this sense, which might then be left to do its work through voluntary association.

No one can help respecting the spirit of this theory. The worst of it was that it did not square with the facts. If all England had been kept within the discipline of the nonconformist churches, and susceptible to the feeling of educational responsibility which had never been lost among them, it might have been applicable, though even then one might have doubted whether a system of education, directed by the

state or by municipal authorities, might not be the best expression for this feeling as existing in the great body of citizens. But in fact, outside the nonconformist congregations, and the best among those of the establishment, such a feeling did not exist at all. In appealing to it as a substitute for government action, the dissenters, as was well said by a writer quite free from clerical sympathies, were 'overrating the extent and quality of the education they could impart; were overlooking the large area where they could not work at all; and were disregarding or denying the great truth that the voluntary principle is inapplicable to education because it is precisely those who need education most that are least capable of demanding it, desiring it, or even conceiving of it.'

The consequence of this error of judgment on the part of the more political nonconformists was that the system of state-subsidies to schools belonging to private bodies, which must under any conditions have worked unfairly, worked more unfairly still. Churchmen are fond of dwelling on the equitableness of this system, of which, they say, the dissenters, if they had had equal zeal and liberality, might have availed themselves equally with the church. Such language comes with rather bad grace from the possessors of endowments producing much more than 5,000,000*l.* annually, who have also all the landed wealth and most of the great capitalists of England on their side. Every one knows that outside the towns and the manufacturing villages, it was simply impossible to raise the money required to meet a government grant, except by the aid of clergyman and squire; nor, if money had been forthcoming for a dissenting school, would it have been possible in most cases to obtain a site. In the rural districts, therefore, the operation of the system of making government grants in aid of voluntary effort was inevitably both partial and unfair to the nonconformists. Parishes where the population was scattered, or the clergyman unpopular, inactive, or poor, or the squire non-resident, or encumbered, or careless of his duties, were left without efficient schools altogether, while in the rest the education was put wholly in the hands of the clergy. In Wales, where the rural population is mostly dissenting, the unfairness was most apparent, but in England also, where the country-folk were for the most part not distinctively attached either to

church or to dissent, there was justice in the complaint that the action of the state indirectly took away from the dissenters the chance of competing with the church for influence over the next generation. In the towns, however, the dissenters, if they would, might have turned the system of concurrent endowment in education to almost equal account with the church, and it was here the determined abstention of some of the most active sects which made the operation of this system more unequal than it need have been. Apart from the church-people and the roman catholics, only the wesleyans were willing, in their denominational character, to take the government grant. The independents and baptists not only would not accept it denominationally; as a rule, they would not support the British and Foreign Society, in connection with which undenominational schools might obtain government aid for their establishment and support. This was left chiefly to unitarians and to liberal laymen of the establishment.

Meanwhile the state subsidies were constantly growing. Up to '46, as I have said, they remained pretty much stationary, being still confined to purposes of building. In that year they were extended to teachers, on the principle that the amount of the grant in each case should depend within certain limits on the efficiency of the teacher as tested by examination, and that a salary of at least double the amount of the grant should be paid to the teacher by the managers. At the same time the pupil-teacher system was introduced, of which the principle was that, if private individuals would provide a school of a certain degree of efficiency, government would pay for five years the salary of a certain number of apprentices to the schoolmaster, and would ultimately give them (on condition of their passing an examination) an amount of help nearly equivalent to a free admission to any training college they might select. Denominational colleges were already springing up, and under this system they multiplied rapidly. Every diocese soon came to have its own; the wesleyans and roman catholics set up theirs; so that by '60 there were thirty-five in England and Wales, to which the state was contributing about seventy-five per cent. of the total cost. The great majority of these were in connection with the church of England, only two being undenominational. These training colleges, thus chiefly maintained by

the state, became the stronghold of the denominational system. Their pupils were often turned out more rigid dogmatists than the ministers of the denomination to which they belonged; and if at this day by a revolutionary measure unsectarian religious teaching were prescribed in all state-aided schools, teachers would not be forthcoming to carry it on, for there are still only five training colleges, those of the British and Foreign Society, which give other than the most definitely dogmatic instruction in the elements of theology to their teachers. The difficulty of giving unsectarian lessons in religion is not, as we are often told, inherent in the nature of the case, but arises from the fact that the great majority of existing teachers have been elaborately trained not to give them.

Thus dispensed, the government subsidy had mounted to 260,000*l.* in 1853. In that year it was further extended. The administration of that day had in view a large scheme by which help should be more readily forthcoming for those districts in town and country which, even with the help already given, were unable to provide efficient schools. This was to be done in towns by a rate, in the country by a capitation grant from the department. It was proposed to require the town-councils of corporate boroughs to levy a rate in aid of subscriptions and the school-pence paid by parents. They were to be allowed very limited powers in the administration of this rate, and the denominational system was not to be interfered with; but an extension in the powers of administration must very soon have followed the obligation to lay a rate, if this had been really imposed. Such a scheme, I say, was contemplated. In the result that happened which had so often happened before. The better part of the government scheme was dropped while the worse was persisted in. The result was the extension for town and country alike of the capitation grant, *i.e.* of the payment direct from headquarters in London of so much for every child in a school under a certificated teacher that had attended 176 days in the year. Under this system the annual parliamentary vote went on increasing till in '60 it reached 800,000*l.* Part of this sum was given in support of training colleges. The rest was being expended under four main heads, either in building grants, or in part payment of teachers, or in grants for pupil teachers, or in grants per

head on the children in attendance. In '62 Mr. Lowe made a change. Under the impression that the state had no sufficient guarantee that it was getting an adequate return for its outlay, he introduced the system of payment by results. Henceforth no payment was to be made by the state for the maintenance of a school except in the shape of so much per head on each scholar who passed a satisfactory examination before the inspector once a year in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Thus more rigorously administered, the annual grants for a time ceased to rise; but in 1869 they had again reached 840,000*l.*

Such was the system which Mr. Forster found established in 1870. Of its practical unfairness in relation to the dissenters I have already spoken, at the same time that I have had to point out how the dissenters had partly to thank for this unfairness certain conduct of their own, honourable in motive but mischievous in result. No clear-sighted man among them in 1870 could doubt, that through the schools, which the state had helped it to build and maintain, the church had gained greatly in power over the poor. Nor does it imply any unfriendliness to religious education to hold that the promotion of this influence was no part of the province of the state, or to regret that in the matter of education it has been gained chiefly by those religious societies, the established church, and the roman catholics, which tend most to magnify the office of the priest. Another objection to the system was that it did not put the saddle on the right horse. Property was not bearing the burden which it ought to have borne when once the principle was admitted, as it had been, that the cost of educating the children of the poor was not to be borne wholly by the poor themselves. The wealth in the west end of London was doing very little to educate the poverty in the east; in the rural districts the squires were leaving most of the burden to be borne by the clergy. In a specimen district examined by the present bishop Fraser in 1860, it was found that the clergy, with about a twelfth part of the income of the landlords, were contributing very nearly as much to the support of schools.

The whole system, in short, of grants from the imperial exchequer in aid of private effort, if it did not tend to deaden, was at any rate doing nothing to awaken the national conscience on the question of education. In an ideal society,

perhaps, the education of all families might safely be left under the control, in each case, of the parents. In the actual state of English society, however, no one pretends that it can be so left, and it is doubtful whether under the modern system of labour in great masses, which draws all who have to work for their living more and more away from their homes, the fate of the children can ever with safety be left solely in the hands of the parents. For individual action in such a matter, however, the proper substitute is not the casual action of charitable persons, but the collective action of society. The whole body of citizens ought to be called upon to do that as a body which under the conditions of modern life cannot be done if everyone is left to himself, but cannot be left undone without the whole body suffering. Now under the system of subsidy to denominational schools no such appeal was made. The ordinary citizen was thus taught to regard the schooling of his own and other people's children as a matter which might properly be left to the zeal of any specially religious people about him. In districts where this zeal was strong, the work was partially done; where it was weak, the work was left wholly undone. Public money was being given for education, it is true, and indirectly every taxpayer was bearing his share of the expense; but so long as the money comes solely from the imperial exchequer, the taxpayer does not directly feel the outlay, and in consequence is apt not to concern himself with its object. Whether any particular district should have a school receiving public money and subject to public inspection or no, was a question which up to 1870 depended solely on the amount of denominational zeal and wealth which the district happened to possess. It was not to be wondered at that a system, so partial in its operation, should have left one half of the children of the country, as was found to be the case in 1870, wholly beyond its reach. Meanwhile that public spirit, which may exist apart from zeal for church or sect, was not being enlisted in the work of education. Instead of ascribing the growth of voluntary schools in England to religion, we should perhaps be more correct in ascribing it to the spirit which will 'compass sea and land to make one proselyte.' There may be the spirit of proselytism with much religion, and there may be religion without the spirit of proselytism. While the zeal for ecclesiastical or

sectarian aggrandisement has been so active among us, fortifying itself in multitudes of churches, chapels, and schools, it may be feared that the religious sense of civil duty, which does its work 'as unto the Lord and not unto man,' has been comparatively languishing. At any rate the school system, which was in exclusive possession of the ground up to 1870, did nothing to elicit it. Till the days of school-boards those good men, of whom there are many and are coming to be more, who cannot work as the agents of any church or sect, had scarcely any opportunity of working at all for the education of the people. To explain what Mr. Forster's act did, and what it failed to do, in the way of introducing a better state of things, will be the object of my next lecture.

II.

In my last lecture I pointed out how the system of government subsidies to denominational schools had grown up as a makeshift. The authors of it had never been really satisfied with it. They adopted it and tried to make it as efficient as they could in face of the opposition with which any attempt at a national system was met by churchmen and nonconformists alike. Worked as it had been by able administrators, in whom every political and ecclesiastical interest was subordinate to the desire of giving the people knowledge, in spite of its shortcomings and its incidental unfairness it had done great good. It had reared up a race of trained teachers, who of all public servants have the most claim on public gratitude, and had spread over the country models of what elementary schools should be. Unless this preparation had been made, a statesman, seeking to introduce a national system, would have found that he had not the materials to work with. At the same time it was idle to ignore the defects of the system. For reasons which I have explained, it only took effect in localities where there was already a certain amount of zeal and wealth enlisted in the cause of education, and was thus apt to be least operative where the need was greatest. Besides being thus ineffective, it was unfair. Practically it told in favour of the church as against the dissenters, and allowed the benevolent to bear exclusively

the burden which ought to have fallen on property generally; and meanwhile it was failing to bring the duty of universal education home to the public conscience.

With the enfranchisement of all householders in boroughs by the reform act of '67, and with the consequent awakening of our politicians to the necessity, as Mr. Lowe put it, of 'educating their masters,' came the opportunity for introducing a national system. The Gladstone government took advantage of it in 1870. It would have been of course impossible for the authors of the education act to ignore or wholly set aside the system which had been hitherto in operation. At the same time they should have been ready to recognise all its faults. Unhappily, they seem only to have looked at one of them. They allowed their attention to be concentrated solely on the palpable fact of its insufficiency for providing schools in the less favoured districts, and in their hurry to remedy this evil, did not consider that the plan which should supply schools most quickly might not, in the long run, be the best for the education of the country.

In 1870 all that the voluntary system, aided by the state, had been able to do was to provide education of guaranteed efficiency for half the children of school age in England. Out of 3,000,000 who ought to have been at elementary schools, there was room for only 1,800,000 in schools under government inspection, only 1,500,000 were on the registers of such schools, only 1,000,000 in average attendance. Of course there was room for endless controversy as to the amount of education which the remaining 1,500,000 were receiving. The majority were probably in nominal attendance at some kind of school or other; but there was ample evidence that their schooling, whatever it was, seldom enabled them to read intelligently or write intelligibly, while in the towns many were running about the streets, and in the villages many were doing field-work without any education at all.

It is clear, I think, that in framing the act of 1870, Mr. Forster's mind was governed by the simple desire to provide efficient school accommodation as quickly as possible. In order to do so he was willing to forego the opportunity of remedying the evils incident to the old system. Whenever that system had been able, or within a given time should

prove able, to supply sufficient school-buildings, it was to be allowed to continue. Only where it failed to do so, was the laying of a school-rate, and, with it, the establishment of a school-board, to be required. On a requisition, indeed, from the municipal authorities of any borough or from a majority of ratepayers elsewhere, an order for the promotion of a school-board was to be issued, even though the school accommodation might be sufficient. It was in that way we got our board here.[1]

If such a requisition, however, was not made, there was to be neither board nor rate in any district till after an inspector had pronounced the school accommodation there deficient, and after a considerable further interval had been allowed in order to see whether voluntary effort would supply the deficiency or no. Applications for building grants under the old system were to be entertained by the department up to the end of 1870. In other words, if a certain amount of money was by that date promised for building a school, the government would guarantee a certain addition to it (amounting generally to nearly half the sum promised), though not a stone had yet been laid. In effect the promoters of 'voluntary schools' may be considered to have had more than two years of government aid in erecting them after the passing of the act. This was a practical invitation to the clergy, who were the great gainers of influence under the system of subsidised voluntaryism, to make every effort to provide school-buildings as quickly as possible wherever they could, in order to save themselves from the interference, to them so obnoxious, of an elected board. They responded to the invitation with energy, and in the country districts, where they could appeal at once to the farmer's terror of rates and to the landlord's dislike of popular self-government, they generally succeeded. Men who would not put their hands into their pockets for the love either of religion or education, were ready to do so, when at the cost of a slight outlay on their own part they could impose a heavy one on their more benevolent neighbours and escape a permanent charge proportionate to their wealth. Selfishness and zeal thus worked hand in hand, and in the villages and smaller towns the requisite school accommodation was generally supplied by voluntary effort. The extension given to the denominational

[1] [At Oxford.]

system by allowing it this needless term of grace may be measured by the fact that at the beginning of '71, when the last application for building grants had been sent in, Mr. Forster reckoned the number of denominational schools, not existing at the time when his act was passed, but in the building of which the government had since pledged itself to assist, at 2,400. These were to accommodate 400,000 scholars, and the government grant in aid of building them was expected to reach 400,000*l.* This estimate, I believe, proved to be a little over the mark, but in effect the villages generally and many of the smaller towns were, to use the favourite phrase of the clergy, 'saved from school-boards'; and, where boards were established, since they have no control over voluntary schools, the sphere of their operations was so far limited. Meanwhile the growth of the schools, of which the state bears half the cost, but which the clergy tell us are the outworks of their system, instead of being stopped, as with a little more firmness it might have been in 1870, has gone on so fast, that the yearly payment in maintenance of church schools had risen from 307,000*l.* in '68 to 680,000*l.* in '75.

Now no one would find fault with Mr. Forster if he had merely refused to interfere with the voluntary schools under inspection which he found in existence in 1870. To have withdrawn the government grant from them, or to have placed them without reservation under school-boards, would have been hard measure to those who had spent money and labour upon them in the faith that they would be left under denominational management. But those who, for the reasons I have alleged, consider the denominational system unjust and, in a certain sense, demoralising, cannot altogether forgive Mr. Forster for having given it in the way described needless opportunity for extending itself. By the invitation and opportunity to extend their system which he offered to the denominationalists, he no doubt got the requisite schools built more cheaply than would otherwise have been the case. The 400,000*l.* of building grant was met by more than a million in voluntary subscriptions, and the same accommodation would have cost more if paid for by a rate. But economy is dearly bought at the cost of fairness and ultimate efficiency. Nor was the term of grace allowed for the further building of denominational schools the only

flaw in the act of 1870. Another great mistake, as I have always thought, was made in taking the parish instead of the union as the school area outside the boroughs. This probably made the act more popular and more readily workable, but its effect was to favour denominationalism at the cost of the real interests of education. If the act of 1870 had directed that the school accommodation of each union should be ascertained, and that, in the event of its being found deficient, a school-board for the union should be established, the operation of the act in the country districts would have been very different from what it has been. Very few entire unions would have been found adequately supplied, and when in consequence the formation of a school-board for the union was ordered, competent and zealous men would have been forthcoming for the work, who, without undue interference with existing voluntary schools, might have exercised a general supervision over the educational wants of the district, planting schools in the best places (so that dissenting children might generally have had a board-school within reach), fairly apportioning the burden of their erection and maintenance, and exercising those powers of compulsion over parents which under the act of 1870 could be exercised solely by school-boards. Unfortunately, instead of the union Mr. Forster took the parish as the area to be dealt with. Each little village was to be separately dealt with. If it had, or if clergyman and squire could provide, schoolroom enough for its inhabitants, it was let alone. No question was asked about its relations to neighbouring and less favoured villages, from which it might be drawing great part of its labour. Thus the few villages where a rate had ultimately to be laid, were commonly those of which the rateable value was small in proportion to the population, the 'open' villages of the old poor-law system. On these the rate often fell with unfair heaviness, and, each having its own board, the work of building and managing the board-schools was left to men by no means well qualified for it. The clergyman commonly held aloof, and in a village, apart from the clergyman, it is generally difficult to find anyone acquainted with educational matters. Hence in the country districts the school-rate excited more odium, while the school-board won less respect, than would have been the case if the union system had been adopted. The clergy were always at hand

to magnify the ratepayers' apprehensions, and thus gain such support for schools under their management as might stave off the introduction of boards. The result has been that while in most of the towns of England school-boards have been established, in the rural districts education has remained almost exclusively in the hands of the clergy. According to the returns of 1876, out of a population of nearly 10,000,000 contained in the metropolis and municipal boroughs of England and Wales, nearly 9,000,000 were under school-boards. Of the remaining 13,000,000, outside the boroughs, less than 4,000,000 were under boards. Of these Wales, where the church has little hold over the country districts, accounts for 360,000, and the large manufacturing and mining villages will account for most of the rest.

So far I have been considering the act of 1870 as supplying an agency for the establishment of schools. Thus considered, it had its good side and its bad. Its good side was the introduction of the rating system, and the facilities which it gave for the immediate establishment of school-boards in towns. Its bad side was the limitation which it virtually put on the system which it introduced, by giving the church schools an opportunity of covering the ground in anticipation of the boards, and by adopting the parish instead of the union as the area of rating and management outside the boroughs. By this limitation a real wrong was inflicted on the dissenters, and in the result, though the building of schools may have been somewhat quickened by the stimulus given to the denominationalists, the progress of education in the country was retarded. I have already explained how the system of subsidised voluntaryism in its operation had inevitably and all along been unfair to the dissenters. The opportunity and strong inducement given for its extension by the act of 1870 aggravated this unfairness. At the same time, since it was only through school-boards according to the provisions of the act that attendance at school could be made compulsory, and since it is through the action of such representative bodies that the responsibilities of education can be best brought home to the conscience of the people, to abridge their sphere of work was to retard the work of getting the children into school and to lessen that public interest in education on which its real progress depends.

It is then, as I conceive, for its failure to make school-boards universal that the act of 1870 may be objected to, rather than for its provisions in regard to religious instruction. These I have always thought fair enough, and it is to be regretted that the nonconformists, having a real grievance, have put it on the wrong ground by objecting to them. If denominational schools were to be continued (as was right) and extended (as was wrong) at all, dissenters could not be better protected, in sending their children to them, than by the 'time-table conscience clause.' This provides that the religious lesson shall be given at a fixed hour at the beginning or end of the school day, and that any parent shall have the right of withdrawing his child from it. It is quite true that the conscience clause cannot prevent church schools, maintained in large measure by public money, from being used as a means for the extension of church influence, but this is an unfairness incidental to the denominational system as such, affording indeed a strong reason against its extension, but not against the special provisions of the act of 1870 in regard to religious instruction. In board-schools it was provided that religious instruction might or might not be given by the schoolmaster at the discretion of the board, but if given, it was to be restricted by the 'Cowper-Temple clause,' which excludes the use of any formularies distinctive of particular religious sects; a rough way of ruling, what is quite right, that the board-schoolmaster shall not use his religious lessons to proselytise in the interest of church or sect. By the famous, but really very unimportant, 25th clause it was provided that a board might, if on the ground of poverty they thought fit, pay the fees on children attending denominational schools, as well as on those attending board-schools.

It has been specially by its antagonism to this 25th clause, and to religious instruction being given by board-school-masters in school hours, that the Birmingham league has become known. This indeed has been only a very small part of its work. But for the action of the league, the act of 1870 would probably never have been passed at all, and certainly would not have been either as good in itself or as efficiently carried out as it was. In its protest against subsidised denominationalism, in its demand that schools supported by public money should be under public management,

in its exposure of the low quality of education even in inspected schools, in rousing the public conscience on the question of compulsory attendance, it claims the hearty sympathy of all friends of education who can distinguish the interests of religion and morals from the interests of the church. Nor is there any meaning in the cry that it favours 'godless education.' It simply demands that in board-schools the religious instruction, which the law now requires to be given at separate times, should also be given by separate persons from those who give the secular instruction. If it were not true that none are so blind as those who won't see, one might expect even young tory churchmen to see that this demand is compatible with the strongest zeal for religious education. As a matter of fact, those who have pressed it at Birmingham have given proof of such zeal by organising a system of voluntary religious instruction in board-schools. Having prevailed on the board to confine its schoolmasters to secular instruction, they formed an association which, on certain days of the week, at the hours set apart by the act for religious lessons, gives such lessons in the board-schools, paying a small rent to the board for their use. As neither church-people nor wesleyans have yet condescended to join in the work, they have not yet been able to provide for religious teaching in all the board-schools. It must be very doubtful, I should think, whether they will ever be able to do so, or whether the undertaking which has been started with so much zeal will be kept as vigorously alive when its originators drop off. A system of week-day religious teaching by volunteers at 9 o'clock in the morning is surely very difficult to keep up on a large scale. But the fact of its being so boldly undertaken is sufficient evidence of the religious zeal of its promoters.

The Birmingham scheme then is in no sense unfriendly to religion. It simply goes on the principle that religious teaching, in regard to which the rate-payers may have the most conflicting opinions, shall not be provided for out of the rate-payers' pocket. If it were everywhere carried out, it may be doubted whether any less amount of religious instruction would be given on the whole than is the case at present. At the same time I think that Mr. Forster was right in leaving it open to the boards to provide religious instruction through their schoolmasters, and that the boards

have been right in so providing it, as they have done almost universally. That the state should be impartial as between the various churches or sects, that public money should not be given for education in such a way as enables one form of doctrine and discipline to strengthen itself against others, this principle I fully admit; and I have pointed out that the system of privy council grants, as carried out previously to the act of 1870 and as needlessly extended by that act, was a practical violation of it. For this reason I should have objected to the power given by the 25th clause to pay fees on poor children in denominational schools, were it not that the money paid under it was a mere 'flea-bite' in comparison with the grants from the department, and that, for the sake of working compulsory bye-laws easily, it was desirable to give every indulgence to the caprice of parents in their selection of schools. But, subject to the principle above stated, the endeavour of the state should be to render its servants, the schoolmasters, as efficient in the work of education, moral no less than intellectual, as possible. Now few of us will doubt that the master of a board-school becomes less efficient for this purpose if excluded from giving lessons on the bible, than if he is allowed to do so. I should even add, though this would be more generally disputed, that it is intrinsically better to have religious instruction given by trained schoolmasters than by volunteer teachers, whose zeal is apt to outrun their discretion. On these grounds, then, and in the belief that where schools are in the hands of a board, there is little danger of their masters using religious lessons for purposes of proselytism, I am glad that Mr. Forster left the boards free in this matter, and that they have generally used their freedom as they have done in authorising such teaching on the bible as shall not tend to make converts for church or chapel.

On the whole, then, the errors of the act of 1870 were errors of omission rather than of commission. It omitted virtually to extend the school-board system, with its powers of compulsion, beyond the towns, it omitted to limit denominationalism to the schools which had been so far established, and finally—a point which has been very little noticed—it left denominationalism undisturbed in its possession of the training colleges. It is a notable sign, either of the strength of the English church or of the weakness of English states-

men, that no repetition has ever been made of the proposal of 1839, for the establishment of a government school for teachers. Excepting those sent out from the five colleges of the British and Foreign School Society, all the teachers of our elementary schools are trained in strictly denominational institutions, which could not exist but for the government grant. Most of them are diocesan colleges of the church of England, which are receiving about 150,000*l.* a year out of taxes, and are making it their special object, as their managers would avow, to turn out their pupils strong churchmen. On what principle such a system can be justified, except by those who consider it the office of the state to propagate the doctrines of the church, does not appear, but there seems a general consent in letting it alone. Its effect in strengthening the influence of the church can scarcely be overrated; and so far as there is real difficulty in providing religious lessons free from any proselytising tendency in board-schools, it arises from there being so few teachers except those trained by the stiffest of churchmen to give them.

We may now take stock of the results of the act of 1870 so far as they have yet appeared. As an agency for getting schools built it has been successful everywhere. The accommodation in schools under inspection has doubled since 1870, and, if we take account of schools in process of building, almost suffices for the fullest attendance that can be wished for. As an agency for bringing children to school it has been on the whole successful in the towns, and a failure in the country. This is very easily accounted for. Up to last year school-boards alone had powers of compelling attendance, and, owing to the shortcomings of the act of 1870, school-boards have seldom been established in the country districts. Where they have been established, the area of selection being the parish, they have generally been in the hands of farmers or others unfriendly to rules which would limit their command of children's labour. In all the boroughs under boards, except one, bye-laws for enforcing attendance at school have been put in force. On the other hand, of the population outside boroughs but under boards, amounting to about 3,800,000, only half in the year '76 had such bye-laws in force. There remain the ten millions which have no boards at all; so that on the whole, more than half the population of England and Wales, up to the

end of '76, had been left without any security against its children growing up in ignorance, except that partially given in manufacturing districts by the factory and workshop acts, and that nominally given in rural districts by an act, never enforced, for regulating the employment of children in agriculture. This being so, it is not matter for wonder that the increase in attendance at school has not kept pace with the increase of accommodation. While the latter has rather more than doubled, the number on the registers of schools had only risen from about 1,500,000 in '69 to about 2,750,000 in '75, and the average attendance from about 1,000,000 in '69 to 1,840,000 in '75. Only about 1,500,000 attended as many as 250 times or upwards (*i.e.* 125 complete days) in the year. As attendance less regular than this, except in the case of authorised half-timers, is incompatible with anything like efficient elementary education, and as the children who ought to be at elementary schools in England are reckoned at about 3,500,000, we cannot flatter ourselves, after all that has been done, that even half our children are learning enough to read, write, and sum correctly. An analysis of the results of the yearly examination would lead us to put the proportion much lower. Of children between 7 and 13 it is reckoned that 2,500,000 should be in elementary schools. In fact, however, less than a million between these ages were presented for examination, of whom only 573,000 completely passed. Of these again only 100,000 passed in the three higher standards, just about a tenth part of those who, if all our children were at school and advanced suitably to their ages, ought to have done so. When every allowance has been made for accident, and for the number of boys and girls who make up for past defects after the 'school age' is over, it must still be true that, while the class of people who could not write their names will soon be extinct, it is the exception among the youth of England to gain even the lowest education that can be counted satisfactory, so much as would enable them to read all English books quickly and intelligently, to write a letter with correct grammar and spelling, and to calculate enough for the ordinary purposes of trade and mechanism.

The explanation of these shortcomings is not far to seek. In the first place, as we have seen, compulsion had until last year been tried over less than half of England, and the im-

proved attendance in the towns had thus been partly neutralised by irregularity in the districts where the schoolmaster had to struggle unaided against the labourer's carelessness and the farmer's hostility. In London, between the spring of '71 and midsummer '75, the effect of compulsory bye-laws had been to raise the average attendance at efficient schools sixty-six per cent. In Birmingham the increase during five and a half years had been actually 150 per cent., a result which the 'agitators' of the league may fairly point to as proof that they can work as well as agitate. In the villages, on the other hand, though the number of schools has greatly increased since 1870, they are often half empty. Nor, when children are being effectually driven into school, as in London and in Birmingham, can we expect those who want driving to show to much advantage in examinations for some years to come. Their parents send them just often enough to avoid a summons and no more. Thus, when the proportion of average attendance to the numbers on the school registers is stated to be seventy per cent. as at Birmingham, seventy-five per cent. as in London, or seventy-nine per cent. as in Oxford (which boasts of a very high average), we must remember that, as the better children miss very few days in the year, there must, on the other hand, to lower the average so far, be a great many who attend little more than half the times when the school is open. This irregularity, mischievous enough in all cases, is specially so to children who, if it be true that quickness of learning is partly in the blood, require extra pains in order to get on at all. Another drag on progress is the inefficiency of the teaching in many even of the inspected schools, an inefficiency due chiefly to their smallness. The principal teachers are no doubt on the whole wonderfully good, but the ordinary parochial school, with from 100 to 200 children on its books, cannot afford to keep more than one teacher of full age. He is helped in his work by pupil-teachers, who, as a rule, are simply boys and girls a little in advance of the better children in the school, and whose want of intelligence and knowledge is a constant topic with the inspectors. With their help he has to conduct the teaching of children in the six different standards, of whom the great majority are in the lower. The grant that can be earned on these being the same per head as on the higher children, interest no less than duty requires the master to give great

part of his time and attention to them. In consequence he has so much less time to spare for the children who have reached (say) standard iv, and whose future progress largely depends on the amount of pains that the master can spend on them. This, in part, explains the fact that standard iv represents the high-water mark of education for most of the children of our schools. In Oxford, where we have no board-schools, but an unusual number of parish clergymen, with each of whom it is a point of honour to have his own school, it is noticeable that in the year '75 only 155 boys and girls passed completely in standards v and vi (a number which must be multiplied by ten before we can say that the state of education in the city is what it should be), and one-third of these came from two schools, unconnected with the church, which alone in Oxford keep assistant masters.

Such are the defects in the practical working of our law of education. So far as they arise from the failure to make attendance at school everywhere compulsory, there is fair hope that they will be remedied by the act passed in the session of '76, an act which represents the mind of the trained officials of the department much rather than that of the conservative party, and which the 'tail' of that party did its best to spoil in the passing. The mind of the officials appears in the thoroughness of its provisions for securing attendance, the mind of the party in its unfriendliness to school-boards. Under the act of '70, as we have seen, where a board was established there might be, and generally came to be, compulsion; where there was no board, there was practically no compulsion. The act of 1876 does its best to prevent the introduction of new boards, and, if the back benches on the conservative side had had their way, would have done much, though in the actual result it has done little, towards the extinction of those already in existence. On the other hand, it introduces a machinery for compelling attendance independently of boards. It places every parent under a legal obligation and penalty to see that his children are instructed. It forbids altogether the employment of any children under ten, and for their employment between ten and fourteen requires a certificate of their having reached a certain standard, not a very high one, of education. Where there are no school-boards, the town-councils in boroughs, and the boards of guardians elsewhere, are empowered to

form attendance-committees for seeing these provisions carried out; and they are not only empowered, but required, to prosecute such parents as violate the act. In districts where they are found to neglect their duty, the education department is authorised to take the matter into its own hands.

These provisions are complicated by exceptions and postponements that seem needless, but there is no reason to doubt that they will have the effect within a certain time of bringing all the children of England to school. By last midsummer nearly all the boroughs without school-boards had established attendance-committees under the terms of the new act, and three fourths of the boards of guardians had done so. With what degree of efficiency these committees are doing their work we have as yet no evidence to show. The clergy are delighted because it seems that the compulsory attendance, for which most of them, unlike the squires and farmers, have long been sincerely anxious, will under the new act be achieved without any further interference from school-boards. The strongest point with those who demanded the establishment of school-boards everywhere, had been that without them it was impossible to compel attendance. Having found in the town-councils and boards of guardians an agency for bringing the children to school, the members of the church party think that there will no longer be a case for extending the board system. They even tried to introduce clauses in the new act by which existing boards might be got rid of, but the opposition was strong enough to reduce these to a form in which they will be generally innocuous. What fault, then, it may be asked, is to be found with the new act? It leaves the school-boards alone where they already exist, and elsewhere provides a machinery which will serve the same purpose without them. What further change is to be wished for?

The answer is that the bringing the children to school is only one of the functions of the school-board; that even this cannot be so well discharged by any other body; and that there are other functions in the way of national education which school-boards alone can adequately fulfil. As regards compulsory attendance, the object should be to introduce it not merely as quickly and with as little annoyance to the poor as possible, but to train the public conscience into

harmony with it. This object is far more likely to be attained by entrusting the work to a body elected for the purpose, if the area of selection be sufficiently wide, than by combining it with the other functions of a town-council or board of guardians. A country board of guardians generally consists of a large proportion of farmers, a small one of clergymen, and a good many magistrates as *ex officio* members. The efforts of the farmers, it may safely be predicted, will be chiefly directed to staving off compulsory education as long as they can. The clergy and magistrates will in time enforce it, but their action will not carry the sympathy of the people with it. The constraint which men will welcome when it comes from their own representatives they will resent when it is applied by those who carry themselves as masters. Hence, though a certain amount of irregular, shirky attendance at school may be exacted from each child, just amounting perhaps to that attendance on one day in three, which is all that the new law requires, no popular interest in the school will be aroused. The duty of educating his children will not be brought home to each man's conscience as one which he owes to his neighbours, and of which his neighbours are entitled to exact the fulfilment; and while this is the case, though the horse may be brought to the water, it is not much that he will drink.

As a mere agency for enforcing attendance, then, school-boards are much preferable to committees of town-councils or boards of guardians. There are other stronger reasons, however, for desiring their introduction everywhere, and the extension of their operations where they already exist. It is through their action only that justice can be done as between the church and the nonconformists in the matter of state-aid to schools, or the standard of education in the state-aided schools seriously raised. Hitherto, it will be remembered, even where school-boards exist, they have no powers of general supervision over the elementary schools of the place. They have nothing to do with any schools but those which they have themselves established. Thus in Oxford, where the ground had been covered by voluntary schools before the board began its operations, its functions have hitherto been confined to sweeping children into schools over which it has no sort of control. In like manner the functions of attendance-committees of town-councils and

boards of guardians, which the last act establishes in places where there is no school-board, are confined to enforcing attendance at existing denominational schools. Now it must be remembered that it is mainly by courtesy that these schools are still called voluntary. They cannot be so called in respect of the attendance of children at them, for attendance is now compulsory, and where there is no board-school there is no alternative to attending the denominational school. Nor can they be so called with much more propriety in respect of the funds by which they are maintained, for when they are efficiently conducted, they may be almost if not altogether independent of annual subscriptions. The government grants 17*s.* 6*d.* on every child that passes a good examination, quite irrespectively of the amount raised from other sources. A child paying 3*d.* a week will yield another ten shillings a year, and this added to the government grant will very nearly cover the expense of its schooling. It is true that owing to irregular attendance and consequent failures in examination, the capitation grant and school pence still generally leave a considerable margin to be covered by subscriptions, but the effect of the new agencies for compelling attendance has still to be felt, and it is probable that every year a larger number of denominational schools will find in the state-subsidy, combined with the payments of children who are obliged to attend them, an almost sufficient maintenance.

The question then arises whether over institutions thus chiefly maintained by state-money and state-agency, the public ought not to have some larger measure of control than that afforded by yearly inspection and the requirement of submission to the rules of the department. I think that it ought, with a view alike to securing the fair treatment of nonconformists and to the increased efficiency of the schools. The position of the poorer nonconformist where no board-school or British school is at hand (and that is generally the case in country districts) is certainly a hard one. The state compels him to send his children to school, and if the church school of the parish affords sufficient accommodation, it will not make a grant to another. He has thus no choice but to use the school which the clergyman calls 'his own' and regards as an 'outwork of the church,' trusting to the protection of the conscience clause. The clergy are honour-

able men, and I do not doubt that the rules of the department, confining the religious lesson to certain times, at the beginning or end of the school day, and requiring free exemption from it for all whose parents make the claim, are literally complied with. But though observed in the letter, their spirit can scarcely be complied with by men who consider it a great part of their office to overcome dissent, and who professedly regard the school as one of their chief agencies in the work. In manifold ways, which cannot be proved in black and white to the officials in London, things are made unpleasant for the child whose nonconformist parents withdraw it from the religious lesson; while, if they do not withdraw it, they may be pretty sure that in many cases it will be trained to sympathies and habits which they dislike. The rapid growth of the sacerdotal temper among the clergy of late years has aggravated the difficulty. It constantly happens that the rural dissenter has either to claim an exemption which deprives his child of religious instruction at school altogether and has besides many unpleasant consequences of less importance, or else to allow the child to be drawn away from the religion of his home. We may call this a sentimental grievance if we like, but it is one which parents of the higher classes would not put up with for a moment.

Since through the policy which I have explained and lamented, schools under clerical management have been allowed to take almost complete possession of the country districts, it is difficult to see how this grievance can be removed without a more complete transfer of these schools to the state, or to provincial authorities, than would as yet be thought justifiable. In time, I should hope, it would be considered that the state, by long continuance of a subsidy to voluntary schools far exceeding the voluntary contributions to them, had fairly bought out all private claims to their use and was entitled to regulate them as it liked. For a good while to come, however, we must be content to leave the religious instruction given in them under the control of the existing managers, subject to the conscience clause, and we must be prepared for its assuming in many cases a still higher ecclesiastical tone than at present. But though the grievance I have noticed could not be removed, it might be somewhat mitigated by an extension of the school-board system, of a kind which I will presently suggest. Before

going on to do so, however, I will explain the other object for which I think such an extension desirable.

The actual educational product of our schools is still, as we have seen, exceedingly poor. The majority of English children are turned out into the world, able indeed to sign their own names, but without anything like a complete command of the elementary arts of reading, writing, and calculating. This failure is no doubt largely due to irregular attendance and to that want of aptitude for learning which results from generations of ignorance. But inefficiency in the schools has also a good deal to do with it. The adult teachers are good, but there are too few of them, and their labour is to a certain extent wasted by ill distribution. Taking all England together we have only one trained teacher to every 128 scholars (a much smaller proportion than is to be found in any country where elementary education is effective), and the powers of the teacher are further wasted, as I have pointed out, by his having to deal in most cases with children of the most various standards of attainment, and being thus prevented from doing full justice to the better ones. In many of the large board-schools in London and elsewhere this evil is avoided. The size of the schools renders it possible to group the children in each school according to their several standards, and to have a separate master for each group. Some of the parochial schools in the great towns are large enough to adopt the same plan to a certain extent, but this is not generally the case. Each parish commonly has its own school, worked entirely without reference to another parochial school a few hundred yards off, and without sufficient teaching power to make the most at once of the few advanced and the many backward pupils. In Oxford, probably, we experience this evil in an unusually aggravated form, but in towns where the parishes are larger great improvement might still be made by a system of working the several voluntary schools in combination. This can only be done by giving the school-board a certain control over their arrangements for secular teaching. Let the existing managers keep the religious instruction still in their hands, and let them have a veto on the appointment of masters, so as to prevent the danger of religious lessons being given by masters whom they disapprove. In all other respects let the schools be handed over to the board, which

will then have the power, in concert with the inspector for the district, when there are several schools within a radius (say) of a mile, to combine the more advanced scholars in one, those of standard iv in another, and so on with the other standards, each group having the undivided attention of one or more masters.

The better distribution of teaching power would not be the only good effect of such an extension of the powers entrusted to school-boards. Both the quantity and the quality of the teaching power would improve likewise. The advocates of the existing system defend it on the ground that it saves so much to the public purse. Some 700,000*l.* a year is being raised in voluntary contributions to denominational schools. If these schools were placed under the control of boards in the manner suggested, the greater part of the subscriptions to them would be lost. The religious instruction, indeed, if it continued denominational, would have to be paid for by denominational subscriptions, but that part of their general expenses which is not met by such subscriptions would have to be defrayed by a rate. This does not seem a very fearful prospect. No doubt the amount to be raised by rate would exceed that which is at present raised by voluntary contributions, for one of our objections to the present system is that it unduly stints the expenditure on teaching power. But if we suppose that the present voluntary contributions have to be replaced by a sum reaching to more than double their amount and to be raised by some form of taxation, what kind of burden is 1,500,000*l.* sterling spread over the whole of England, that fear of it should prevent us from having our children taught necessary knowledge in the most effective way? Now in a good-sized town, with the transfer to the school-board, subject to the reservations mentioned, of all the elementary schools, over and above the better distribution of teaching power, these further advantages would be secured. The adult teachers would be better paid and have a better career before them, there would be more of them, and much more efficient instruction might be obtained for the pupil-teachers than is at present the case. We have seen how low in England hitherto has been the proportion of adult teachers to scholars. It has been kept down by the exigencies of the voluntary system, under which school-managers have been constantly in difficulty about making

both ends meet. A school-board, with rating powers, can afford to be more liberal in respect both of the number and payment of the teachers it employs. It is kept in check, no doubt, by the fear that its constituents may resent an additional penny in the pound; but, on the other hand, it knows that a judicious expenditure on teaching power is sure to result in a larger government grant, which will so far relieve the local purse; and certainly the experience of the school-board elections in London and other large towns a year ago tended to show that the working classes would not answer to the cry for a reduced rate when the rate was for purposes of education. Nor would it be merely the number and pay of the teachers that would rise under an extended board system. Their position also would improve. A town with 100,000 inhabitants ought to employ at least 150 trained elementary teachers. A board employing a staff of this size could properly maintain a certain number of really well-paid teachers, for the purpose both of general supervision and of instructing the more advanced scholars, and arrange a system of promotion, with gradually advancing salaries, from the lower appointments to the higher. At the same time arrangement might be made for giving combined instruction of the best kind to the pupil-teachers of the town. At present the guidance and instruction which the pupil-teachers receive from the principals of the several schools to which they are attached is no doubt most valuable. No one would wish to supersede it, but it needs to be supplemented by teaching of a less fragmentary kind. A board with a large range of schools under its control could arrange for the withdrawal from school work (say) for three months at a time of a certain number of pupil-teachers, turn and turn about, who should occupy the interval in continuous study under a highly skilled teacher.

The plan suggested for extending the powers of the school-board and bringing all elementary schools under its direction would no doubt require to be guarded in its operation by careful supervision on the part of the central department in London. Subject to this, I believe that it could be easily carried out in the larger towns, which have school-boards already, and that it would rapidly increase the efficiency of the education given. It is a notable fact, that whereas in the first year of their existence the board-schools passed 11 per cent. fewer children than were passed in the church

schools, last year they passed 4½ per cent. more. Every succeeding year will probably show a larger percentage in their favour. They began at a great disadvantage. All the neglected children were swept into them, while the existing church schools tended to become rather more select than they had been before. The average of passes in them is still kept down by the constant addition to their number of new schools in the least favoured localities, which it takes a long time to work up, and by the great impediments to the success of isolated board-schools in the country districts. The fact that in spite of all this they are now able on the average to obtain a larger proportion of passes than the church schools, shows a very decided superiority in the efficiency of the board system in those places, like London and Birmingham, where it has worked long enough and on a large enough scale. The case is therefore strong for at once extending it in the larger towns, in towns (say) of more than 20,000 inhabitants. It may be asked, however, whether the advantages which have been pointed out as likely to arise from its extension can be made available to the same degree in smaller towns or the country districts.

I answer that to a certain degree, though only to a certain degree, I think they might. From the nature of the case, the plan of assigning different schools to children of a certain standard of attainment exclusively can only be carried out occasionally and imperfectly in the villages. Still even in the country districts a good deal of preventible waste of teaching power has been caused through the school system being made to conform to the parochial system. A district board, whether for the union or for some larger area, in which the general direction of all elementary schools within the area was vested, would find that much might be done in the way of making adjacent schools fit into each other. Country boys of eleven years old will walk a long way to school and be the better for it, and it would often be possible to maintain in some centrally situated village a school of rather higher level than the surrounding ones, to which boys from these might be sent on, when they reached (say) the fourth standard, with a view to their receiving the undivided attention of a superior master during the last year or two of their school course. The improvement in the pay and position of the teachers, which we saw was likely to result from

the combination of all elementary schools under one system of management in a large town, would in time follow upon a like arrangement in the country, if only the board of management were well composed; as it generally would be, if the area of selection were sufficiently large. For pupil-teachers scattered about in villages, it must be admitted that it would be difficult to provide any joint instruction according to the plan suggested for large towns. On the other hand, a school-board for the union, if it came to be established, would have a function to perform which from the nature of the case is more important in the country than in the town. I have already noticed the trying position in which the rural dissenter is placed with respect to the education of his children. If we had union school-boards, charged with the general supervision of all schools in the district, the grievance might at least be mitigated. As I do not venture to propose any interference with the religious instruction in existing church schools, and as nonconformists would often have no other schools within reach, it would not be wholly removed. Something, however, would be gained if the board saw to the observance, in spirit as well as in letter, of the conscience clause; and by taking advantage of all opportunities it could probably in time make sure of there being a good many schools scattered about in which the religious instruction would be unsectarian.

The points at issue between churchmen and dissenters may seem to some of us of slight importance, but to everyone who cares for the future of his country, everyone whose patriotism is of a higher order than that which finds expression in hooting the Russian czar, the question, with what sort of mental equipment the children of the next generation are to go into the world, must be of supreme interest. Under God, it is to good books and a knowledge of the laws of nature that we must chiefly trust to make them, when they become their own masters, healthy and wise and virtuous. Yet we are still turning them out from school in the greater number of cases without such elementary knowledge as will enable them to read the best books of their own language freely, or to make themselves acquainted with the simplest truths of science. It should surely be the first business of a reforming politician to see whether our schools cannot be made to yield some better result in the future. We have

got the buildings, and we are fast bringing the children into them. The mills are there, and the raw material is being rapidly brought to them, but the finished article is not being turned out as it ought. For an improvement we must trust in great measure, I admit, to time, to individual effort, and to the concentration of public interest on the subject. The amount of intelligent public spirit that has of late been directed to the question is very remarkable. The establishment of school-boards in towns has had a great effect in quickening it; and, no doubt, if we escape a war, which would postpone all social improvement indefinitely, it will rapidly gather strength. But it remains for parliament to remove hindrances to the action of this public spirit, and to give it more thorough command of educational appliances. For this reason I trust that liberal politicians will be urgent in their demand that in all towns of a certain size school-boards, if they do not already exist, shall be established; that union school-boards shall be established for the country districts; and that all public elementary schools whatever, in the manner and subject to the reservations which I have mentioned, shall be brought under the management of these boards.

LECTURE ON THE WORK TO BE DONE BY THE NEW OXFORD HIGH SCHOOL FOR BOYS.

I AM afraid that I have chosen a very dull subject on which to address you this evening. So far as I have observed, the two questions of our time which compete with each other in a reputation for dulness are about the most important that we can discuss. One is the organisation of charity, the other the organisation of schools. It so happens that the subjects are closely connected, for if only the money wasted during the last half-century upon so-called charities, public and private, for which no one in the long run has been better off, had been wisely spent during the same period on a system of properly organised schools, ascending in due gradation from the elementary to the high school, we might by this time have had not only a thoroughly educated but a socially united people. In fact, we have a people which in common phraseology is divided into the educated few and the uneducated many. Much as we may dislike the phrase, we must confess that it represents the truth. Of our people the majority over twenty-one are still uneducated. These have not had the benefit of the efforts made, since the extension of the suffrage in 1867, to make a sound elementary education universally accessible. They are uneducated, not according to any high ideal of education, but in the simple sense that they cannot read well enough to have free access to the literature of their own language, and that they cannot write it clearly and correctly. Even of the rising generation, growing up under a system of something like compulsory schooling (such is the difficulty of educating the children of the uneducated), a large number will reach manhood without having anything approaching to

the full power of reading and writing their own language of which I have spoken. And when we rise above the class of the thoroughly uneducated, we find that our contemporaries have grown up under a system which, through the abuse of grammar school endowments and the restrictions maintained at the universities, kept the benefits of a high education to a privileged few. Until the first university reform act, carried by Mr. Gladstone in 1853, Oxford and Cambridge were practically closed against nonconformists. Their great prizes, the fellowships, were first opened by an act of the Gladstone ministry in 1870. Until opened by an act of the same year, the head-masterships of grammar schools were generally confined to clergymen of the established church, who were able to make regulations (and till recently in many cases did make them) by which the schools were virtually closed against the sons of conscientious dissenters. But this ecclesiastical exclusiveness was by no means the whole extent of the mischief. A barrier of cost was added to the ecclesiastical barrier. Forty years ago a really liberal education was scarcely to be had except at certain schools which had misappropriated the name 'public schools,' such as Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and half-a-dozen others, where it was so costly as to be beyond the means of any but the squires and capitalists and richer professional men. A few of the grammar schools continued to give a high education qualifying for a university career, but the majority through generations of neglect had become either wholly useless, or had sunk into the condition of elementary schools. When the schools inquiry commission reported in 1869, the gross income of the public schools and the grammar schools (which are of course just as much entitled as any to the name 'public schools') in England and Wales was estimated at 400,000*l.* annually. For the purpose of helping boys to obtain a higher education than their parents could otherwise have afforded to pay for (or could have afforded to pay for but for the extravagant system kept up at the universities and public schools), it may safely be said that nearly the whole of this money was thrown away.

The social evils resulting from this state of things have been as lamentable as the generally low level of knowledge and intelligence. Common education is the true social leveller. Men and women who have been at school together, or who have been at schools of the same sort, will always understand

each other, will always be at their ease together, will be free from social jealousies and animosities however different their circumstances in life may be. In every nation, perhaps, there must be a certain separation between those who live solely by the labour of their hands and those who live rather by the labour of their heads or by the profits of capital, between members of the learned professions and those engaged constantly in buying and selling, between those who are earning their money and those who are living on the income of large accumulated capital; but in England these separations have been fixed and deepened by the fact that there has been no fusion of class with class in school or at the universities. At one end of the social scale, the labourers, till quite lately, have been almost without education, and even now it is quite exceptional, though happily it is becoming more common every day, to find an elementary school in which the children of labourers are sitting side by side with the children of farmers and shopkeepers. At the other end of the social scale, the landed gentry, the men of large inherited capital, with the richer clergy of the privileged church and the more successful professional men, have monopolised the miscalled 'public schools.' Within the last thirty years there has arisen a new order of proprietary schools, Clifton, Cheltenham, and the like, very useful in their way, but equally maintaining in practice a strict class exclusion. They are schools for the sons of members of the learned professions and for those commercial men who never appear behind a counter. These schools, however, are quite of recent creation. Till they arose, the class of parents who now use them, together with the great body of shopkeepers, unless by a happy accident they had access to a well-managed grammar school, sent their sons to different sorts of private schools. But between the different sorts of private schools there were and are the strictest social demarcations. Farmers and ordinary shopkeepers will send their sons to one kind, at one rate of payment; richer men of business and professional men to another kind, at a higher rate of payment. The boys sent to the one kind of school will look down with contempt on those sent to the other, and though they may be necessarily thrown together in after life, there will never be that freedom of social intercourse between them that we notice between men who have the same memories of school and college.

Meanwhile, the education given at most private schools, though better for immediate practical purposes than that given at most of the unreformed grammar schools, had nothing of a liberal kind about it. It did nothing to create in its pupils an intelligent interest in literature and science. The result is seen in the fact that the terms 'middle-class school,' or 'middle-class education,' in most people's minds are associated with a certain kind of inferiority. There is no reason in the nature of the case why this should be so. According to the natural usage of terms, the middle class includes all people lying between the aristocracy and great capitalists on the one side, and the labourers on the other. Except in speaking of education we use the term in this sense, and in this sense nineteen out of twenty men in this university belong to the middle class. But the term middle-class school has come to be determined in meaning by opposition to the miscalled 'public schools,' frequented by boys of the upper class and by the select few of the middle class, whose parents, from social ambition or real wish to get the highest education they could for their sons, underwent the expense of sending them to these schools. 'Middle-class education' has come to be understood as the kind of education given in the private schools I have spoken of, which, being divorced from the universities, having no stimulus from government inspection, and being generally conducted merely with a view to commercial profit by the principals, was seldom either of a thorough or of an elevating kind. On the other side the term 'education of a gentleman,' like the term 'gentleman' itself, has acquired a meaning unknown in any other countries. The term would be intelligible if it retained the meaning of a man of a certain lineage, or of a man holding a landed estate according to a certain tenure. It would be intelligible again if it meant a man habitually honourable in feeling, conduct, and speech. But with us nowadays it means neither of these things. It seems chiefly to indicate a kind of manner and tone of feeling acquired by those educated at the miscalled 'public schools,' and borrowed from them with more or less perfectness of imitation by others. I do not depreciate the value of this manner and tone of feeling, but I regret that it should be a mark of social distinction. Whatever is really of value in it should be characteristic of all men of liberal education. It is only because so many men of the

middle class, owing to the bad system I have described, have been shut out from a really liberal education, that the distinction between those who are gentlemen and those who are not is any longer recognised among them. A properly organised system of schools would level up without levelling down. It would not make the gentleman any the less of a gentleman in the higher sense of the term, but it would cure him of his unconscious social insolence just as it would cure others of social jealousy. It would heal the division between those who look complacently down on others as vulgar, and those who angrily look up to others as having the social reputation which they themselves have not, uniting both classes by the freemasonry of a common education.

It may perhaps be objected that my complaint against the school-system of England for having fostered the spirit of social exclusiveness is an unreasonable one, because that system is an effect, not a cause. It did but follow, the objector may say, the existing lines of social stratification in England, and no system of education can do otherwise. I answer in the first place that it did not by any means simply follow the natural divisions of society in England. It created new divisions. By the exclusion of dissenters from the universities and (except under sufferance) from the grammar schools, it introduced a separation, which had no independent source, between those persons of the middle class who belonged to the church and those who did not, and condemned the latter to a position, in some important respects, of educational inferiority. Even in their unreformed state the universities and endowed schools were almost the only avenues to the higher branches of learning. If in individual cases such learning was otherwise obtained, it was by exceptional energy and genius; and though the average of intelligence may have been as high among dissenters as among professing churchmen, eminence in letters and science has been more rare among them. More than this, the social stigma, which in the minds of an unreflecting, perhaps, but still large section of the well-to-do classes attaches to the profession of nonconformity, has been greatly enhanced by their exclusion from the universities and great schools. But even if our school-system had done nothing to aggravate pre-existing social differences, I hold that it was its business in the interest of the common good to modify or remove them. Here was a

public fund producing 400,000*l.* a year applicable to the higher education in the schools, and another fund at least as large applicable to the higher education in our universities. It was the business of the state, as the representative not of classes but of the nation, to see that this money (as might have been the case) should be so applied that something else than the accidents of birth and wealth should regulate the intellectual development of the people. Wisely administered, it might have served to really provide a 'ladder of learning,' to use professor Huxley's figure, by which boys of intellectual promise should have been able to mount, I do not say 'from the gutter,' for that phrase would imply parental neglect, which can never be followed by real success in learning, but from the humblest well-disciplined home to the universities. For the provision of such a 'ladder' we only need an arrangement of schools in certain grades, determined, not by the social position of the boys using them, but by the standard of education given in them, and a free transition by means of scholarships or exhibitions from schools of a lower to those of a higher grade. Speaking roughly, we want three orders of schools distinguished according to the age to which education is continued in each. There are boys, and those the great majority, including all of the labouring class, whose parents cannot reasonably be expected to keep them at school after the age of thirteen. There are others who may be induced to stay till fifteen and sixteen, when they will be put into some business. A few again may stay at school till eighteen, when they will pass on to the universities. Now it is plain to common sense that when a boy's schooling is to be continued till eighteen, it should include different subjects and be conducted on a different method from such as would be desirable if it was to stop at the age of fifteen; if it is to be continued till the age of fifteen it should be different from what it should be if it is to stop at the age of thirteen. In the latter case little more can be done than to make a boy expert in arithmetic, and thoroughly able to read and write his own language. If he would stay on at school another two or three years, he might advantageously attempt mathematics, with Latin or some modern language; while if he would continue at school till the age for entering the university, there would be time for Greek and some natural science to be learnt to some purpose. We thus want three grades of school, each aiming

at a different standard of learning according to the ages to which the pupils continue in them. But there is no reason in the nature of things why the same boy should not successively pass through schools of all the three grades. As a rule, of course, the boy whose school-time continues till he is eighteen will be the son of well-to-do parents, but such a boy might quite well receive his elementary education along with the children of poorer families in a primary school, if he was transferred from it about the age of eleven to a school of higher grade. The only hindrance to such an arrangement, apart from social prejudice, is that at present the primary school, having to receive all comers, may often contain children, unclean in their habits and language, with whom parents of refinement might reasonably object to their children being associated. But as education begins to tell on the poorer classes, we may confidently hope that this difficulty will be removed, and that most of our elementary schools will become, as many of them are already, places to which children might be sent without scruple from the most refined and carefully managed homes. And just as a boy, intended from the outset for the university, might without disadvantage begin his education in the elementary school, so by a wise application of endowments a promising boy, who would otherwise have to be put to manual labour at the age of thirteen, might be lifted to a school which should prepare him for the university. The middle school should be provided with entrance scholarships covering the cost of education in the school, with a trifle over, if possible, for books. The examinations for these should be adjusted to the highest standard of the elementary school, and the age for trying for them should be that at which a promising boy might be expected to reach the highest class of the elementary school. Such a boy, if he won a scholarship at the middle school, would have his education continued for another three or four years. At the end of that time he should be a competent mathematician, and should know either two modern languages, or Latin and one modern language. He would thus be fairly set up for entering on commercial life, or for special training as a lawyer, a doctor, or engineer. If he aspired to the university, there should be scholarships to be tried for at the high school, which would give him free education for another three or four years there. The examination for these should be so arranged that a promising boy

from the highest class of the middle school might hope to win one before he was fifteen. This would carry him on, without cost to his parents except for maintenance, to the gate of the university, where another scholarship would be awaiting, which, with economy, would cover his expenses till the time of graduation.

Now in proposing such a scheme, I am not drawing a fancy sketch out of my own head, which there are no means of carrying out. It is in effect the plan proposed thirteen years ago by H.M.'s commissioners, appointed to inquire into the condition of English grammar schools, in a report drawn up by Dr. Temple. In the actual school endowments of England, at any rate if supplemented by some small fraction of the money now wasted in public charities, there are ample funds for carrying it out. Unfortunately the machinery of provincial authorities, proposed by the commissioners for carrying out their scheme, has never been established. Everything has been left to be done by three or four officials, sitting in London, who have to fight it out with the charity trustees in different places as best they can; and though large reforms have been, and are being, effected, vested interests have been too strong to allow of the 'ladder of learning' being set up, as it might be, all over England. *New* England, however, England across the Atlantic, has been more favoured. The ascending scale of schools, with free access from one to the other, for which I plead, has long been part of the settled political framework of the New England States.[1] In 1642, only twenty-two years after the landing of the pilgrim fathers from the 'Mayflower,' 'the general court of the colony by a public act enjoined upon the municipal authorities the duty of seeing that every child within their respective jurisdictions should be educated.' Five years later a more definite law was passed. This required every township containing fifty householders to appoint a teacher, 'to teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and read,' and every township containing a hundred families or householders to 'set up a grammar school, whose master should be able to instruct youth so far as they may be fitted for the university.' This was the foundation of the public school system of New England which, though

[1] The information given in the text is derived from a report on American education submitted by Mr. Fraser, now bishop of Manchester, to the 'Schools Inquiry Commission' in 1866.

modified by subsequent legislation, has always continued upon the same lines. The 'grammar school' of 1647 is now represented by two schools, a 'grammar' and a 'high' school. By the existing law of the state of Massachusetts, which may be taken as a sample of many others, every township containing 500 families is required to maintain a grammar school, a school in which Latin shall be taught; every township of 4,000 inhabitants a high school, in which Greek shall be taught. It does not appear that this law has been always very effectually carried out, and I do not gather from Mr. Fraser's account that in the most advanced American states, a school of the rank which we should call a high school is maintained in every small town of 4,000 inhabitants. It would be impossible that it should be so. But every considerable town has above its elementary schools a grammar school, and above that a high school, and by means of these every boy of promise in the northern states of America, whose parents are willing to forego the profits of his labour, may rise from the elementary school to one which qualifies him for entrance at the university. In some of the states all the schools from the highest to the lowest give gratuitous education, the cost being met by local rates.[1] In other states fees are in some cases charged, but in the larger towns the high schools have often large endowments (the liberality of rich Americans in gifts to education being something quite without parallel in any other country) which cheapen the cost of schooling, and it does not appear that anywhere a boy is debarred from obtaining the highest education by the price charged for it. In such great towns as Boston, New York, and Cincinnati, the public schools from the elementary to the high school are all open free of charge. There is thus no need to provide for free ascent from school to school by means of scholarships, as I should propose to do in England. The result of this system is that Americans, according to the evidence of all competent witnesses, are, if not the most highly educated, yet the most generally educated nation in the world. In a country of such immense undeveloped material resources, offering such great rewards to the life of industry and commerce, it is not to be expected that so many great scholars and men of science should be found as in Germany and Eng-

[1] In 1865, one eighth of the whole sum raised by taxation in Boston was applied to schools; in New York one ninth

land, but the possession of high scholarship and science has never in America been a class monopoly, as it has virtually been in England. Any American youth, born of thrifty parents however humble, has open to him the highest learning which his country can afford.

I proposed to speak this evening of education in Oxford, and you will be thinking that I have travelled very far afield before approaching this particular subject. Our short review, however, of the waste of educational resources in England generally, will prepare us for considering the deficiencies of our own city, and the example of a system actually established in other Anglo-Saxon communities may encourage us not to despair of a reform among ourselves which would yield like results. Nowhere in England, probably, have the evils, which a well-organised system of schools is needed to meet, been more apparent than in this university town. Take Oxford as it was (say) thirty-five years ago, when those of our citizens who are now in middle life were of school age. The university with its splendid resources and encouragements to learning was practically closed against them, closed against them by a double or treble lock. In the first place they might happen to be dissenters, for even in Oxford, thanks to the leadership of such eminent ministers as Mr. Hinton, whose name is commemorated in the New Road chapel, nonconformity still held its own; and to hold its own under the peculiar discouragement and contumely to which it was subject here, it must have been nonconformity with a conscience and a back-bone. Now a nonconformist with a conscience, at the time I am speaking of, could not even enter the university, much less obtain any of its emoluments. The active hostility of the university to dissent had probably by that time abated a little from what it had been a short time before, when the house of a connection of mine (himself a dissenter) in Queen street, having facilities of communication with the New Road chapel, would sometimes be used as a shelter for undergraduates, anxious to hear some eminent nonconformist preacher in the chapel without being stopped by the authorities of the university. But if active hostility had abated, the old restrictions were still maintained, and till the act of 1853 only a churchman could enter the university. But if the Oxford citizen was a churchman, there was still what was in most cases an effectual barrier to his sending his son to the

university. The colleges had absorbed the university. In order to belong to the university, or to receive any real instruction, it was necessary to live within one of the colleges, and this involved an outlay beyond the means of any but the wealthy. The scholarships attached to colleges largely reduced the expense for those who could obtain them, and it was chiefly through them that the poorer clergy of England were enabled to give their sons a university education; but these scholarships before the university reform act were confined to persons born in certain districts or educated at certain schools, and very few of them would be open to the Oxford citizen. If one were open to him, however, how was he to obtain such adequate classical instruction as would qualify him to obtain it? What schools were accessible to him? Thirty-five years ago the parochial day-schools of Oxford were just coming into existence. During the next quarter of a century they gradually passed under the government system and became what we now see them. It implies no disrespect to their teachers and managers to say that they are not even good of their kind, and that they cannot become so until they are combined into larger schools. It has been a point of honour with the clergy of our small parishes each to have what he calls 'his own' school, and the consequence is that the schools are too small for any one of them to have an assistant master. One master, distracted between the teaching of children in six different standards, can scarcely do justice to any, certainly not to the more advanced pupils. It is but natural therefore that the number of passes in standard vi from the Oxford parochial schools should be, as it is, distressingly small; and we must remember that only those who pass in standard vi can be held to have attained that command of arithmetic, and that freedom in reading and writing their own language, which must be deemed the minimum of education necessary for an intelligent citizen. The parochial schools of Oxford then do not, at the height of their present development, afford the merest beginning of the training necessary for entrance to the university. Much less can they have done so thirty-five years ago, when they were scarcely in being. What other schools then were open to the young citizen in this seat of learning? So far as I know, apart from private establishments, only these, the Magdalen school, Nixon's school, and the Blue Coat school, and an elementary school,

now extinct, maintained chiefly by contributions from the colleges.

What was the condition of Magdalen school at the precise date spoken of, I am not sure. Somewhat earlier it had been much frequented by the sons of the professional men and the more flourishing tradesmen of Oxford. But it never has been properly a public school. It is a school for the choristers of the college, to which the president and fellows at their discretion allow other boys to be admitted. Since I have been resident in Oxford, it has been practically closed against all but the most wealthy of our middle class by the amount of the fees charged. These, I believe, were somewhat lowered on the appointment of the present head-master, but they still, if I am rightly informed, amount to nearly double what we venture to charge for the new high school, where we have been obliged to put the fee somewhat higher than we should have wished in order to make both ends meet. I think we may take it, that since the time when the men now in middle life grew into boyhood, the Magdalen school has practically not been available for the middle class of Oxford. On the condition of Nixon's school during the same period I need not dwell. If it had been much better housed than it was, it could not have succeeded in face of the requirement to give gratuitous education to fifty sons of freemen. Alderman Nixon no doubt intended his foundation for the benefit of the whole body of respectable Oxford citizens. In his time the body of freemen would be coextensive with the body of citizens, excluding immigrants on the one side, and the lowest labourers on the other. Now, only about a tenth part of the burgesses are also freemen. By the municipal reform act, when the municipal franchise was opened to all ratepayers, the freemen as a separate body ought in all reason to have been abolished. Their suffrage should have been merged in that of the ratepayers, and their lands and privileges transferred to the larger body. We owe it to the house of lords that this was not done. The freemen were retained as a separate privileged body, but without any power of organised action through representation. To this is due, among other evils, the useless state of Port Meadow. If it belonged to the burgesses instead of to the freemen, it would long ago have become a valuable property, including a sufficient recreation ground for the whole of Oxford. But for this purpose some outlay is needed, and the

town-council, holding its property in trust for the whole body of ratepayers, cannot legitimately expend its income on improving lands which unfortunately still belong not to the ratepayers but to the small body of freemen; while the freemen themselves, having no means of action except through a mass meeting, are practically unable to stir. Of course this absurd state of things would have been long ago got rid of, but for the importance of the freemen at parliamentary elections. There has seemed a possibility of catching votes by appealing to the dog-in-the-manger feeling which prevails among some of them, to their unwillingness that others should make use of that which has been of no benefit to them; and each party has been afraid of offending them by asserting the obvious justice and utility of transferring their powers and privileges to the whole body of burgesses represented by the town-council.

But what, you will be asking, has Port Meadow to do with Nixon's school? The connection will appear directly. The only way of making Nixon's endowment useful would have been to open its benefit to the whole body of ratepayers. The endowment is not large, only 100*l.* a year: but if once a suitable building for a good middle school had been provided, for which under a good scheme the money would have been readily forthcoming, this endowment might have been usefully spent in providing scholarships of (say) 5*l.* a year each for twenty boys from the elementary schools of the city, to be chosen by open competition. Boys so selected, however humble their parentage, would have been of a kind with which no reasonable parent of the middle class would have minded his sons associating, and they would thus have formed the nucleus of a good middle school for the whole city. As it has been, the indiscriminate admission of freemen's sons to Nixon's school has kept it down to the level of an elementary school, with all the drawbacks of not being under inspection. Parents of the middle class, even if freemen themselves, did not care to send their sons to it, and no wise person, not a freeman, would care to pay a fee for getting his son taught there what might be learnt with more guarantee of efficiency at an inspected elementary school. Until the act of 1870, it is true, the charity trustees would not have had the power to carry out the change that I have suggested in the working of the school, but at any time

since then, in concert with the commissioners in London, they might have done so. As we know, however, nothing has been done. The obstacle, apart from some 'vis inertiæ' which affects us all, has been fear of the political power of the freemen. A suggestion of really reforming the school, which must mean the abolition of the freemen's privilege, would only have been effective if it came from some recognised political leader in the place; but such a leader, if he had made such a suggestion, would have been met at the next election by a cry of outrage upon the rights of the freemen, and the freemen's vote cannot be disregarded. Hence Nixon's school, which for any purpose of helping Oxford citizens to an education preparatory to the university was useless thirty-five years ago, is an even more useless institution now. Before the establishment of schools under government inspection, it may have done some good as an elementary school. But since 1870, at any rate, it has been a complete anachronism. The same is true of the Blue Coat school. This has never aspired in name any more than in reality to be anything beyond a good elementary school. I have no doubt that it has done good work in its time and that it still has a very capable teacher, but what useful purpose can be served by maintaining an elementary school, with none of the guarantees for efficiency which government inspection and regulation afford, side by side with an abundant supply of schools that do offer these guarantees, I have never been able to understand.

It appears, then, that during the whole life-time of our present leading citizens, Oxford has never afforded its sons the chance of rising by help of education from the position of their birth. This shortcoming on the part of the city is the more noticeable, as all barriers on the part of the university have for some time been removed. There are now nonconformist fellows of colleges. I could mention several such at this moment, and some of them are very active and determined in their nonconformity. We have a much respected nonconformist professor, who often preaches from the congregational pulpits of the city. The college monopoly, too, is broken down. Residence in college, with its attendant expenses, is no longer a condition of membership of the university. The son of an Oxford citizen need no longer leave his home to enjoy all the educational benefits which

the university, with its lectures and libraries, its museums and laboratories, can afford. It is true that many advantages are lost by a student who has not college as well as university instruction open to him, but the best college instruction is open to students living at home in the city. The tuition of my own college, which aims at being all that is required for the highest honours, is open to anyone who can pass our entrance examination, at a fee of 25*l.* a year, a fee which a small school exhibition would cover. There is no obligation to incur the expense of living in college. A resident in Oxford need never leave his home, or be at any other charges than for the tuition fee, in order to be a member of Balliol and have all the advantages of the education it offers. Several other colleges, I believe, offer the same privilege, but I am sorry to say that I never hear of any natives of Oxford availing themselves of them. There are now one or two undergraduates of Balliol living with their parents in the town, but the parents in these cases are recent immigrants. The explanation is easy. The schools of the city do not afford the education necessary for passing the matriculation examination of the superior colleges, and the boarding-schools elsewhere, which do afford such an education, are beyond the means of any but the rich.

We have illustrations from time to time of what our young citizens can do, if they have a fair chance. The other day a representative of a well-known Oxford family gained the highest distinction in the final classical school, but he had been prepared for the university by private tuition. Not long ago, a pupil teacher from the Wesleyan school (whether of Oxford origin I do not know) obtained a scholarship at Exeter college. Other pupil-teachers from the same school and from the Central school have entered the university as unattached students with every prospect of doing well. But a pupil-teacher cannot count as an ordinary schoolboy. What we want to see is a school for Oxford citizens of which the ordinary scholars shall be qualified by their school education to enter the universities, and that is what we have so far not had. The actual state of things is this. The university is now thoroughly liberalised. It opens its gates wide to all who have the requisite preliminary training, without which the instruction it has to offer would be thrown away upon them. It no longer limits its members to those classical studies which

may be objected to as not qualifying young men with sufficient directness for modern life. It still requires Greek for the first examination, but after less than a year a student may be entirely free from Greek and devote himself wholly to what are called modern studies, such as history, natural science, and law. Yet hardly any of our Oxford citizens are able to take advantage of what the university thus offers, because hitherto there has been no school, pecuniarily within their reach, affording the preliminary education necessary to qualify for entrance to the university, or at any rate, for a successful career in it.

I do not wonder that in this state of things many of the Oxford citizens should entertain what is yet an unwarrantable animosity to the university. This feeling is partly a survival from the state of things that existed thirty years ago, when, as I have pointed out, the university was virtually closed against the citizens by the university's own regulations. But now all that is changed. So far as the university is still closed to the citizens, it is not by any act of the university itself, but by the omission of the city to provide that education for its sons which would open the university to them. When people, however, are in an unpleasant position, they are apt to be rather sulky, without inquiring precisely whose fault it is that they are in it. The Oxford citizen finds that somehow he has no share in any of the direct advantages which the university has to offer. The fact that he derives considerable material advantages from the presence of the numerous money-spenders whom the university brings here, does not quicken his affection for it; for, to the credit of human nature, a 'cash nexus,' as Carlyle calls it, does not breed affection; even less, perhaps, a nexus of long credit. Nor is a more friendly relation fostered by the careless, though not ill-natured, insolence in which the lusty youth, bred apart in the miscalled 'public schools' and here housed in the collegiate barracks, are apt to indulge. When I reflect on this, and also on the real grievances which the citizens had against the university some years ago, grievances which, like the wrongs of Ireland, leave a sore after the provoking cause has been removed, I cannot wonder at, though I much deplore, the ill-feeling to the university which stills survives in a large class of Oxford citizens. It will only disappear when it becomes a common thing for youths of the middle class in

Oxford, and even for promising boys of the artisan class, to claim their share in the educational life of the university; and that is what a good high school will alone enable them to do.

This is the point upon which, as you will doubtless have divined, my remarks have all along been converging. My friends, I dare say, have often been saying of late that I have high school on the brain. But it is my experience that, perhaps just because education is such a dull subject, it needs a painful amount of iteration to make people really alive to the bearings of an educational question. This must be my excuse for taking advantage of an evening with the Wesleyan Literary Society to call attention to the function which the new high school has to fulfil in our city. I have the more excuse for troubling you with the subject as the Wesleyan body has now for some years maintained a school in Oxford, which has not only admirably served all the purposes of an elementary school, but has also, to a certain extent, filled the place which, according to the New England scheme of education described just now, is occupied by the grammar school. It is the business of the grammar school according to the law of Massachusetts, in addition to the elementary subjects, 'to give instruction in general history, book-keeping, surveying, geometry, natural philosophy, chemistry, botany, the civil polity of his commonwealth and of the United States, and the Latin language.' No boy of fourteen, of course, unless his mind was to be reduced to a state of hopeless confusion, could learn all these subjects, but if they are to be understood as to some extent alternatives for each other, they represent pretty much what is taught in the highest class of the Wesleyan school. A similar place is held by the Central school, and one at least of the parochial schools, St. Frideswide's, as I learnt last week from the results of the examination for scholarships at the high school, competes with them in this class of work. It is clear, I think, that of the three grades of schools above the elementary, which the schools inquiry commission considered necessary in 1868, three years before the establishment of school-boards, one is now sufficiently supplied both in Oxford and elsewhere by the higher kind of public elementary schools. According to the commissioners' scheme, schools of the third grade were to meet the wants of the

smaller shopkeepers, the smaller farmers, and the upper artisans. Boys were to leave them at fourteen. In addition to a thorough English education, they were to teach either Latin or some modern language, elementary mathematics, and some branch of physical science. Now this is just what our Wesleyan and Central schools do, and just what is done by the best schools receiving government grants elsewhere. We do not therefore want a third grade grammar school in Oxford. The want is already supplied. But so far we have not had anything within the reach of any but the rich, corresponding to the commissioners' definition either of second or first grade schools. By a second grade school they meant one that would 'prepare youths for business, for several professions, for manufactures, for the army, for many departments of the civil service,' and would have done with its pupils at sixteen; by a first grade school, one that would prepare for the universities and keep its pupils till they were eighteen or nineteen. Now these grades represent no doubt two distinct functions which schooling may serve, but there is no reason why these distinct functions should not be served by one and the same school, when there is not money enough, as there only can be in the case of large endowments, to maintain separate schools for the purpose. We hope that both may be sufficiently served by our high school, and the scheme of the school has been drawn accordingly. We hope that the best education may be provided in it both for those who will leave for business or the English civil service at about the age of fifteen, or for those who will stay on till it is time to enter the university. Accordingly we divide the scholarships, which we hope to maintain, into two orders. One set of scholarships is to be competed for by boys under twelve. By these we hope to catch the most promising boys from the elementary schools. We hold that, even when these schools are as good as the Wesleyan, the Central, and St. Frideswide's, so good that an ordinary scholar might with advantage stay in them till he is fourteen, their best scholars will gain by being transferred from them to a school where more undivided attention can be given to their progress in Latin, French, mathematics, and English composition. The entrance scholarships of the high school will give such boys the opportunity of concentrating themselves upon these subjects for three years, up to the age of fifteen. At that age,

as perhaps at about the age of sixteen for the less quick boys who have not got scholarships, it will be time for the question to be considered whether they should leave for business or aim at the university. If the parents decide on the latter, the more aspiring course, they will have a chance of being helped by the second order of scholarships which we hope to establish. These are to be tried for by boys under the age of fifteen, and are meant to carry them on till the age for entering the university. And, as you know, the school is already in virtual possession of two exhibitions which will more than cover the cost of the best tuition in the university. One order of scholarships may be considered to give free access to a school of the second grade according to the commissioners' distinction, the other to a school of the first grade, both schools being worked together in one building and under one head-master.

The scheme is no doubt an ambitious one. It may be said that we are counting our chickens before they are hatched, for we have not yet got our scholarships on a permanent footing, but that is a practice to which all people who succeed are in a certain sense addicted. But the scholarships which, largely by the kindness of individuals, we were enabled to offer last week, have elicited results exactly of the kind we hoped for, and I do not doubt that we shall be able to offer a like, if not an increasing number, in succeeding years, until the corporation is able to put them on a permanent footing. Then, just as it used to be said that every soldier in Napoleon's army felt that he carried a marshal's bâton in his knapsack, so every Oxford boy with sufficient energy and intellect will carry the key to the university in his brains. The gain will not be that of one class only, but of all classes. Of course the number of boys who can profit directly by it will be small compared with the whole body of Oxford youth. Those who do so will be chiefly of the middle class, and it will be no slight gain that the jealousies and social separations now prevalent within that class should disappear, as they must do, before a common education. I have no doubt that within a few years the sons of the married university residents will be sent to the school, as their daughters are now sent to the girls' high school, and here at once there will be one odious social demarcation broken down. Parents whose children are taught together

and play together have the deepest of all interests in common, and cannot hold very far aloof from each other. When those children themselves grow up, however different their lots in life may be, a friendship between them is ready-made. If none but the various sections of the middle classes, then, had the benefit of the school, it would be difficult to over-estimate the degree to which the social life of Oxford may be sweetened by its effects. But though the sons of artisans who may enter the school by help of scholarships will be only those of exceptional promise (this morning we elected four to scholarships by way of first-fruits), I believe the indirect result of their admission will be far-reaching. These boys may grow up to be educational missionaries to the class from which they sprung. If such opportunities were more generally offered, we should no longer so often come across workmen of keen intellectual interests and ability, embittered by the feeling that they have been cut off from the means of turning their powers to account. Perhaps not one in a hundred of the soldiers in the French revolutionary armies ever really obtained promotion to the rank of an officer, but the knowledge that the promotion was open to every one gave a spirit unknown before, and a unity higher than mere discipline can produce, to the body of citizen soldiers. So the knowledge among the artisans of Oxford that at any rate no barrier of social exclusion stood between their sons and the highest university education would, I believe, give them a new feeling of reverence for knowledge and of respect for those who can impart it. Perhaps this may be thought a student's flight of fancy, but at least there can be no doubt of the definite and much needed stimulus that will be given to the elementary schools of the city by the opportunity of distinguishing themselves in the scholarship examination of the high school; and of the improvement that will thus result the working classes will have the immediate benefit. Our high school then may fairly claim to be helping forward the time when every Oxford citizen will have open to him at least the precious companionship of the best books in his own language, and the knowledge necessary to make him really independent; when all who have a special taste for learning will have open to them what has hitherto been unpleasantly called the 'education of gentlemen.' I confess to hoping for a time when that phrase will

have lost its meaning, because the sort of education which alone makes the gentleman in any true sense will be within the reach of all. As it was the aspiration of Moses that all the Lord's people should be prophets, so with all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society in which all honest citizens will recognise themselves and be recognised by each other as gentlemen. If for Oxford our high school contributes in its measure, as I believe it will, to win this blessed result, some sacrifice of labour and money, even that most difficult sacrifice, the sacrifice of party-spirit, may fairly be asked for in its support.

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