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AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW



OCTOBER
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
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
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
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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 27 OCTOBER 1948 No. 1

COALITION FOR PEACE

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

FROM the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, over-enthusiastic advocates of the United Nations emphasized its function as a guarantee of peace and failed to explain that if the guarantee were ever to be reliable the organization would have to develop the opposite and much less palatable function — it would have to fit itself to make war. Actually, of course, the Charter not only specifically authorized wars against aggression but pledged members to take part in them. Its authors did not expect that the long shadow in which mankind has always lived could be obliterated at one stroke, but hoped that it might be reduced. They therefore did not "outlaw" war as such, but tried to arrange that any future aggressive force which might appear would be inferior in strength to forces already assembled to deal with it. Thus a potential aggressor might be induced to stay his hand, or if he did not, might be defeated — in the one case at the risk of war, in the other by war.

The present risk of war, however, comes not so much from the possibility that the Charter must be enforced as from the lack of means to enforce it. The obligation of United Nations members to support the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter still exists; but all efforts at Lake Success and Flushing Meadows to match this obligation with preparations for action have been thwarted. The work of the Security Council, which must make decisions involving enforcement, has been stalemated by the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto. So has the work of its two all-important committees. The Military Staff Committee, which was to have forearmed the Council by arranging the military contingents to be supplied to it by members, has been prevented from making any significant progress in that direction; and the Atomic Energy Commission, on which the

world's eyes were fixed in desperation and hope, has suspended deliberations, having failed to find a way to regulate the production of fissionable materials which would satisfy the western requirement for airtight international controls and the Soviet requirement that controls must not violate the secrecy veiling all the operations of a police state. To intensify the risk, the members of the United Nations left in this anomalous and exposed position have not concerted any substitute measures of their own to tide over the organization's present inadequacy.

In other words, a prescription for warding off aggression and a plan of the surgical steps which would be required to remedy it have been written out on paper; but the prescription has not been filled and the instruments for an emergency operation have not been assembled. Furthermore, the friends of a possible victim have not agreed what to do if the bacilli of the old, old plague suddenly become active while the doctors are talking. All of which means that if a showdown comes under present conditions, loyal members of the United Nations will find themselves no better able to carry out their agreement to meet force with force than members of the League of Nations were able to deal with Japan's aggression in Manchuria, Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia or Hitler's aggression in Poland.

At San Francisco one heard it said often that the United Nations could not survive defiance by one of the Great Powers; the machinery of the organization would grind to a stop and the whole fabric would crumble to pieces. Americans who helped draft a Charter which gave the veto to nations bearing the main responsibility for enforcement did not ignore this possibility; but they also knew the hazards of going too far in curtailing sovereignty, given the need of getting the measure both accepted (here Wilson's 1919 failure counted heavily) and lived up to. They may also have felt incompetent to legislate for a certain type of future emergency. As Gladstone said of a similar decision by other men who framed a Constitution without inserting in it a formula for dealing with secession, "such a question could only arise for any practical purpose at a time when the foundations of the great social deep are broken up, and when the forces brought into unrestrained play are by far too gigantic to be controlled by paper conventions." [1]

[1] William E. Gladstone, August 26, 1891; quoted in John Morley's biography, v. 1, p. 707 (London: Macmillan, 1905).

Nevertheless, when the Roosevelt Administration began studying international organization problems intensively in 1942, it assumed that the veto should apply only to decisions involving the use of force or leading directly to the use of force. This attitude was modified somewhat at Dumbarton Oaks and again at Yalta, but not to the extent that Generalissimo Stalin thought, or later pretended that he thought. Indeed, a major crisis arose at San Francisco over the radical change in the Yalta formula (already a compromise) demanded by Mr. Gromyko on June 1, 1945. Secretary Stettinius, with President Truman's approval, staked the continuance of the Conference and the whole future of the United Nations on a demand, carried to Marshal Stalin personally, that the veto must not apply to the initial steps designated in Chapter VI for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Although that fight was won, the American delegation still were apprehensive over the Soviet attitude, and succeeded in getting all the "Big Five" (Soviet Russia of course included) to undertake not to use the veto "willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

Since then, world relationships have steadily deteriorated. Efforts to solve the major postwar problems by a process of negotiation and compromise have failed. In view of this, American officials and Congressional leaders like Senator Vandenberg have modified their ideas about the effect on national interests and national safety of some of the most rigid shibboleths of national sovereignty. Today the United States is on record as wishing to free the whole procedure of Chapter VI from the veto and as seeking some practicable way to mitigate the absolute right of veto even in connection with decisions involving force. For example, the American delegation at Lake Success has favored a program of forceful sanctions, free from possibility of veto, against violators of atomic warfare controls. And in the Pan American treaties signed recently at Rio de Janeiro and Bogotá we agreed on a series of steps against an aggressor in this hemisphere, running from severance of diplomatic relations to war, to be invoked by vote of two-thirds of the signatories (a commitment modified only by the proviso that no signatory may be called on to take the final step of providing armed forces without its own consent).

Yet even at San Francisco there was an answer to the criticism of the smaller nations (and of many individuals) that the Great

Power veto condemned the United Nations to futility in precisely the most dangerous crises. For even if a Great Power did wreck the United Nations as a formal organization by committing or protecting aggression and then taking cover behind the veto, there would remain a group of members who presumably would not forget their obligations simply because the prescribed method of carrying them out had been blocked. In looking about for an alternative method, too, they would find themselves substantially better off than members of the old League of Nations had been in the life-and-death crises at Geneva. For they would have not only a political coördinating organ, the Secretariat; they would also possess what the League did not, a military planning organ — the Military Staff Committee — and it would have assembled in advance the elements of a powerful international police force. This force would be ready for use, though minus, of course, the contingent promised by the aggressor. No one would expect it to be able to deal conclusively, by itself, with the full forces of the aggressor. But it would be prepared for the first phase of hostilities, which the new weapons have made crucial; and it would commit the nations represented to the use of their full forces as the struggle progressed.

The group thus committed would almost surely include the United States. This would be vital for all nations who remembered the American attitude in 1914 and 1939. Both times the United States had been plainly menaced, at only one remove, by the war of aggression just beginning; yet each time it had failed to throw itself into winning that war at the start, but instead had waited until its natural allies had been all but defeated.

One reason why the present situation is so dangerous is that although in theory the faithful U.N. members might form a coalition in a crisis of the sort described, they do not have the encouragement of possessing ready instruments for action and the potential aggressor does not have the discouragement of knowing that they possess them. Our sad conclusion must be that the ability of the United Nations to deal with a Great Power aggressor has diminished somewhat since the Charter was signed three years ago. For in these three years the capacities of the Security Council and its committees under existing rules have been fully explored; and what really determined aggressor would be deterred by what has been revealed?

Unless they are reconciled to the prospect of meeting aggression

piecemeal, and to the penalties that such improvidence exacts, loyal U.N. members must find a legal method to make the Charter work beyond the roadblock of the veto. Needless to add, they should choose whatever adequate method is least provocative to members differently disposed. They cannot remove the roadblock. The conditions under which the veto may be used cannot be changed while the present Charter exists; and the present Charter cannot be changed while the veto exists and the Soviets stand ready to use it.

There are two exits from this impasse. Members who are determined not to let the attitude of certain other members block them from carrying out the purposes of the United Nations can change the Charter even at the cost of changing the organization's universal character. That is, those who desire to modify the use of the veto in specific circumstances can insist on calling a general conference to revise the Charter and form a "world government," driving out in the process members who will not agree to the changes. This is a counsel of despair and should certainly be avoided.

A more constructive and less provocative course, it seems to me, would be for members who are unhappy over the deficiencies of the present U.N. procedure to undertake that they themselves will carry out the obligation to resist aggression even beyond the point when a veto prevents the Security Council from telling them that they must. Thus they will bring into being, formally and at once, the coalition of loyal members which has always existed in embryo, and which some of us at San Francisco thought of as a virtue of the United Nations that would more than outweigh the handicap of the veto through the period of the organization's growing pains. This "coalition for peace" will be open to all members; but only those who are willing to prepare seriously for collective action against aggression will join.

II

Those who wish to form the coalition for peace find all the encouragement and authority they need in Article 51 of the Charter, which states that members retain their inherent right to act in self-defense, either individually or in groups, "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The way thus stands open

for them to agree, voluntarily and in advance, to act together if the foreseen circumstances should arise.[2]

They might make the commitment in one of two ways. A general protocol might be adopted, as suggested above, open to all United Nations members. Signatories would register their willingness to participate in joint defensive action when, say, 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council, including 4 of the 5 permanent members, vote that aggression has occurred; and they would specify some simple procedure to supplement the Security Council procedure beyond that point. Alternatively, groups of members could work toward the same result by stages, in a series of regional treaties after the example of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, and the West European security pact signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948.

Either method of supplementing the Charter machinery would be legal under Article 51 and within the spirit of the Charter as a whole. Significantly, however, Article 51 does not form part of Chapter VIII of the Charter, dealing with regional arrangements, but stands as the last article in Chapter VI, dealing with threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Its position there emphasizes its character as a sort of optional reinsurance clause for the protection of all members in case the enforcement measures set out in the preceding articles (including the preparation of military forces and of plans for using them) should fail.

The protocol would have much the same aim as the Geneva Protocol which was drawn up in 1924 to make the Covenant of the League of Nations "work." The specific problem then was to integrate steps for the compulsory settlement of disputes and plans for joint action against aggression with the League's disarmament program, which obviously could not be even discussed intelligibly until nations had reason to feel more secure. The Geneva Protocol failed of ratification; and that, as some saw then and many see in retrospect, was a turning point in the fortunes of the League (and of the world). The present problem is simpler because the Charter is more precise than was the Covenant. What is needed is for members of the United Nations to reaffirm their willingness to do in a specified case what they have said they should do in all cases, and to make ready for doing it by

[2] *Cf.* the author's article in *The New York Times Magazine*, Sunday, September 14, 1947; later expanded in "The Calculated Risk" (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

preparing an emergency procedure paralleling the last stages of the projected United Nations procedure.

The supplementary procedure could and should be extremely simple. The protocol would itself define the point at which it was to be considered applicable and fix the method by which its provisions would be brought into operation. The first could properly be done in the words of Article 51, quoted above, describing the emergency which would arise if the Security Council failed to act in face of armed attack on a member; the second could be done by providing that the protocol would become automatically operative when the specified Security Council majority had voted to act but had been thwarted by the veto. Or there might be agreement that when the stated conditions arise the signatories of the protocol shall at once be canvassed by one of the Great Powers, and as soon as a stipulated majority (say two-thirds) has been found ready to act, all shall be bound to act. If a more deliberate method seemed advisable, the General Assembly or the Little Assembly (if it is continued) might be given the responsibility of deciding, when the Security Council reaches the roadblock, whether or not resort should be had to the protocol, and could be authorized to declare it in effect by a two-thirds vote. This would maintain the principle of collectivity — an undeniable advantage, even though Article 51 foresees the need to abandon it for certain crises.

The protocol would of course make clear that it in no respect impairs the signatories' rights and obligations under the Charter. It should state that the governments concerned look upon the United Nations as a living organism and are confident that in time it will develop capacities of its own to enforce its principles and purposes. In any event, the Charter laid down minimum not maximum obligations of membership; nations which are willing to increase the efficacy of their undertakings on behalf of peace and security are free to do so.

There remains the mechanism of enforcement. The phrase usual in mutual assistance pacts is that each signatory shall go to the aid of a member state which is the victim of armed aggression, "with all the assistance within its power." In the present case, however, the signatories of the protocol would need to begin discussions at once regarding its implementation. They should allocate to a military staff composed of representatives of the principal military Powers concerned the same forces and facilities

which they would have allocated to the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations if that body had been permitted to function.

III

Many will feel that since there now exists a West European defense organization as a result of the Brussels Pact of March 17, we shall naturally make it the basis for whatever supplementary security arrangements are called for by the deadlock in the United Nations and the growing tension with Russia. The Brussels Pact has indeed created a cohesive group with which to negotiate conveniently; it includes the two Great Powers which must form the basis for any defense scheme in Western Europe; and it must have been in the minds of the 64 Senators who by voting for the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948, empowered the Administration to favor the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter," and our association with such of them "as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and affect our national security. Under authority of the Vandenberg Resolution, moreover, the United States Government is already collaborating *de facto* with the Brussels Pact group, having sent Major-General Lemnitzer and other American officers to sit as observers with the military committee which is one of its organs.

Despite these apparent advantages, we should not decide as a matter of course that the Brussels Pact is the best starting point for accomplishing the long journey which lies ahead.

The Brussels Pact covers a number of fields in which the United States and many other nations will not wish to assume responsibility. Thus Article I provides that the signatories "will so organize and coördinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the coördination of production and the development of commercial exchanges." Article II provides that they will make efforts "to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries;" also that they will "conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security." Article III provides for the promotion of cultural exchanges.

Further, the Brussels Pact omits many democratic European nations which are menaced by aggression, among them some for whose safety the United States feels particular concern. Several of these — Eire, Portugal, Austria and Finland — are not members of the United Nations because Soviet Russia vetoed their applications; another, Switzerland, did not apply for membership, more because she did not wish to court a Soviet veto than because she is unwilling to reconsider her traditional neutrality. There seems no legal reason, however, why states which are still outside the United Nations should not undertake voluntarily to live up to certain of the standards of membership. The question is whether they would be more likely to want to do this in a regional agreement based on the Brussels Pact, which contains varied economic, commercial and social obligations, or in a general underwriting of the Charter's mutual assistance obligations. My guess would be that in view of the prevailing desire not to offend Soviet Russia unduly they would choose the latter. This would certainly be true of Sweden, who joined the United Nations in November 1946 and whose real aim is to remain neutral between the Soviet Union and the west in all circumstances. Apparently she does not think that the obligations of U.N. membership jeopardize this aim; but she would be most unlikely to increase them by a pact which did not stand open to all members of the organization, the Soviet Union included. Though Norway and Denmark consider Sweden's trust in neutrality quite unrealistic, they have a strong sense of Scandinavian solidarity; if they are to be persuaded to ignore Swedish protests and enter a defensive union, it will not be one which could have hardly any other *raison d'être* than resistance to Russia.

Italy, bound by the Peace Treaty and not yet a member of the United Nations, is a special case. She must be careful not to give any excuse for the Soviets to allege that she is breaking the letter of the Treaty (as we must be careful also), remembering that the *casus belli* in the treaties between Soviet Russia and her satellites is any illegal action by a former member of the Axis. Whatever guarantee against aggression Italy receives, and whatever reciprocal obligation she assumes, must be worked out with special care for that fact. However, Moscow would be hard put to it to prove that Italy's assumption of certain United Nations responsibilities conflicted with her duty as an ex-enemy state; for the Soviet Union tried to get other ex-enemies such as Hungary and

Bulgaria admitted to United Nations membership, and what would not have been a violation for them would certainly not be a violation for Italy.

Nations on the periphery of the Continent like Greece and Turkey, where we are spending great sums of money in an effort to increase their capacity for self-defense, would come into a broad arrangement more naturally than into a group centering on the Atlantic. The psychological effect of our course of action on East Europe must also be considered. Nations under Soviet domination cannot at present be expected to join; but it would be an error for us to exclude them even by implication.

In this connection Britain has a special interest which interests us as well. Some Britishers have criticized the League of Nations and the United Nations for their alleged tendency to break up the British Commonwealth. Mr. L. S. Amery, who has served both as Minister for the Colonies and Minister for Dominion Affairs, is one of those critics. As he puts it, Geneva gave Dominion statesmen a chance to utter "appropriate platitudes" without forcing them to substitute real international obligations for the Commonwealth bonds which simultaneously were being loosened.[3] Without arguing this debatable point, I might note that in any event Commonwealth solidarity might be better protected if Britain, having decided that she must enter into a special defensive pact, assumed her new obligations on a general rather than a regional basis. For a pact supplementing the Charter and open to all United Nations members might gain the adherence not only of Canada, whose Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, strongly supports some such course in any event, but also of other Dominions, who might feel it natural enough to reiterate their Charter obligations but would hardly be minded to give a special guarantee to specific distant states. Whatever the new arrangement, Britain should come into it with enthusiasm, bringing with her as much of the weight of the Commonwealth as possible. To facilitate this we ought to favor a general rather than a geographical engagement.

The Brussels Pact is a valuable achievement in itself, and signalizes a rapprochement among certain states which are a necessary part of a wider defense agreement. But from the American viewpoint, and in the eyes of various other states, including some that belong to it as well as some that do not, it

[3] "Thoughts on the Constitution." London: Oxford, 1947, p. 126.

does not provide a satisfactory basis for the additional security measures that the present world crisis seems to demand.

IV

And what of Soviet Russia? One can imagine circumstances in which even against her will she would choose to sign a protocol against aggression rather than face a period of lasting isolation. The chances of this happening under present conditions seem next to nil. All the more reason for us to do nothing which unnecessarily affronts her. And certainly we do not want to do anything which adds unnecessarily to the present disabilities of the United Nations. By stressing "unnecessarily" I do not mean that we should appease Soviet Russia by allowing the present condition of international unpreparedness to continue, or that we should maintain the roster of United Nations members at any price. But in deciding our action we should choose the course least open to proper Soviet objection and least likely to make her quit the United Nations entirely. She might, of course, do that in any event, whether or not we take any initiative. But if she resigned from the United Nations because we tried to make the Charter itself work, she would not only be placing herself on the losing side of a great moral debate but she would be repudiating her own attitude toward similar efforts to make the Covenant of the League of Nations work on the eve of the last war — efforts which her propagandists often recall in order to glorify Soviet consistency and heap scorn on British and French weaklings.

A fair critic reads with conflicting emotions today the speeches made by Maxim Litvinov while he was Commissar for Foreign Affairs and especially in the period from Hitler's arrival in power through the British and French capitulation at Munich. We admire Litvinov's intellectual virtuosity, the liveliness of his argument and the correctness of his diagnosis of the strangulation of will which was ruining the League. But when we recall the Soviet-Nazi pact of August 23, 1939, and how Moscow ignored its own nonaggression pact with Poland when a few days later that country became the victim of Hitler's flagrant aggression, we are entitled to speculate what the Soviet action would have been if the two chief western Powers had been directed through preceding years not by Baldwin and Chamberlain, Laval and Daladier, but by strong-willed men like Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle. The sphinx who knows the answers to the ifs of history

gives no reply. Litvinov's outraged sarcasm may have been meant to sting and shame the western nations into wars from which Russia would at the last moment hold aloof. But we certainly have no right to assume that this would have happened.

On March 17, 1936, Litvinov made one of his most impassioned addresses to the Assembly of the League of Nations on behalf of effective collective security.[4] In the preceding 18 months Germany had violated the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and Italy had invaded Ethiopia. Now Germany was violating the Locarno Pact. The Soviet Foreign Commissar said: "One cannot fight for the collective organization of security without taking collective measures against the violation of international obligations." And he concluded: "We believe that the true adherents of peace are entitled to submit their scheme for the organization of European peace no less than those who violate treaties. We are in favor of establishing the security of all peoples of Europe as against the half-peace which is not peace, but war." Later, in Geneva on July 1, Litvinov ridiculed the League's inadequacies to deal with aggression and argued strongly against those who favored weakening it further by emasculating Article 10 of the Covenant, or throwing it out entirely, in a desperate effort to win the adherence of additional states. Of that project he said bitterly: "In other words, let us make the League safe for aggressors. I say we do not want a League that is safe for aggressors." Such a League would become a "philanthropic institution," a "debating society." The Covenant must be made "explicit and stronger." It must define aggression. Obligatory economic sanctions against aggressors must be continued. And obligatory military sanctions should be added. If that were not attainable, he said, "all continents and, for a start, at least all Europe [should] be covered with a system of regional pacts, on the strength of which groups of states would undertake to protect particular sectors from aggression; and the performance of these regional obligations should be deemed equivalent to the performance of the covenanted obligations and should enjoy the full support of all members of the League of Nations. These regional pacts should not supersede the League Covenant, but supplement it, otherwise they would be nothing but prewar groups of alliances."

[4] "Against Aggressors. Speeches by Maxim Litvinov." New York: International Publisher Co., 1939.

At the time, Germany's repudiation of the Locarno Pact being the latest in the series of aggressive moves which had been horrifying Europe and ruining the League's prestige, the Soviet Foreign Commissar stressed his approval of regional pacts. Today Soviet Russia would probably find less to resent in a general pact against aggression than in a pact of West European nations supported by the United States. The general pact would be open to all, herself included, and would apply to situations in all parts of the world, not just to an area where she is suspected of aggressive designs. The West European pact, though purely and only defensive, could operate against nobody but herself, the only Great Power in a position to menace the independence of that area.

If those who find the Soviet arguments of 1936 decisive today begin to put the Soviet remedies of 1936 into effect, will the Soviet Union resign from the United Nations, taking her satellite group with her? Perhaps. The Russians have shown by their insistence on the absolute veto that they no longer want (if they ever did) an effective international enforcement agency. We must weigh the risks and consequences of a new effort to make the United Nations such an agency against the risks and consequences of allowing it to continue in a position at least as unsatisfactory as that to which the League of Nations had degenerated when Litvinov spoke — only three years, significantly, before history justified his words and the Second World War began. As I have written elsewhere, the present risk of war seems to me to come chiefly from allowing the world to continue in a twilight zone where one side assumes that collective security exists and the other counts on taking advantage of the fact that it does not. The danger that Soviet Russia will deliberately choose to make war on the west does not at the moment seem so strong as the danger that the credulity and arrogance to which all dictatorships are prey will mislead her as to the limits of our tolerance and that in her ignorance she will commit an act so little different from aggression that we shall inevitably adopt counter-measures, with unpredictable results. A prudent course, then, all other considerations aside, would be to put Stalin on notice that we and others are determined and able to meet force with force.

What if, meanwhile, the Soviet Union offers guile rather than force? How, for example, should we respond if the Soviet delegates at the General Assembly in Paris this autumn try to forestall western moves to strengthen the Charter by bringing for-

ward a disarmament scheme of their own or some version of the Litvinov nonaggression pacts? We should test their sincerity, I should think, by welcoming their initiative and asking very simple questions. Would disarmament on paper be implemented by inspection and control machinery on the spot, as proposed for atomic weapons in the Atomic Energy Commission's report? Would nonaggression pacts include provisions for more effective enforcement machinery than provided now by the United Nations, without which they would be meaningless?

V

Even broader considerations than those so far mentioned speak for a move to strengthen the United Nations as a whole rather than to underwrite a group of its members. In the first place, the commitments of the United States under the Charter are general, not regional. Secondly, we should take advantage of the fact that we have a good cause — the best cause of all, peace — and that many nations everywhere may be expected to rally to it. Thirdly, the difficulty of defining a "region" in a way which will be satisfactory under varying world conditions is very great.

In the minds of some observers regions tend to form or divide with amoebic dexterity as the desirability of including this or that nation varies with changes in the political climate. Thus one version of the so-called "Atlantic Community" which has been discussed takes in Italy on the Mediterranean but not Greece on the Mediterranean, Sweden on the Baltic but not Finland on the Baltic, Switzerland in the Alps but not Austria in the Alps, and, if I recall rightly, Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific. This tortures the term "region" out of all meaning.

It seems to me preferable to set standards of conduct rather than standards of geography. The United States is a World Power, with world-wide interests. One of them is peace, which in the most primary terms of international organization means protection of the peaceful against aggression by the warlike. We should welcome as a partner any peace-loving state which is willing to assume and able to fulfill defense obligations on a reciprocal basis. Under the Charter we already have a responsibility for helping to protect states with such qualifications, wherever they may be situated. The only novelty would be that under the proposed underwriting agreement the obligation to execute this responsibility would come into operation when

something less than all the members of the Security Council voted that it should.

The American people still have great hopes for the United Nations and want to do anything reasonable to make it a success. They might accept a plan to make the Charter fulfill its purposes even more willingly than they would agree to guarantee certain individual nations. The latter course is entirely legal under Article 51, and it would be much better for the United States to take it than to do nothing. But the general protocol would benefit the United Nations as a whole at the same time that it met the particular requirements of the situation in Europe. Even though certain nations held aloof, it still would protect the universal character of the United Nations; whereas a series of regional pacts might in time overshadow the organization's universal character and aims. The Vandenberg Resolution left the choice of methods open. It recalled the world-wide interests of the United States by reaffirming its unreserved devotion to the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter. And in informing the President of the sense of the Senate that the United States should associate itself with groups of nations in support of the Charter, it not only referred to "regional" arrangements but "other collective arrangements" as well.

In England, recently, Mr. L. S. Amery, already mentioned, has been criticizing the United Nations as inimical to the British Commonwealth and suggesting that it be replaced by several limited special groups. Now the terms "regional organization" and "world organization" certainly are not mutually exclusive; but the thesis that they are is one which American isolationists have argued in the past. Their method was to try to defeat the conception of an international organization with the wholly inadequate conception of hemispheric defense. The recent attempt in Congress to hamstring ERP by withholding agreed appropriations revealed that our isolationists are not so powerless as they supposedly were after our experience in two world wars. We may take a cue from Mr. Amery not to encourage American isolationism by favoring any basic security arrangement which aims to be less than universal.

The United States has of course long been a member of the important organization of 21 republics in the western hemisphere. A year ago at the Conference at Rio de Janeiro, and later at Bogotá, the American republics assumed a more specific

collective obligation than ever before to oppose aggression and agreed to act by a two-thirds vote, that is, free of the possibility of veto by any one state (a significant step, despite the proviso that a signatory would not be called on to use its armed forces without its own consent). The Brussels Pact created another nucleus of comparative stability in a very uneasy world; and an underwriting now of its five member nations by the United States and Canada would add immeasurably to its importance and strength. The procedure could be extended by the formation of other special groups, with many interlocking memberships.

The ideal goal seems to me to be different from this, and no harder to attain. A general pact open to all United Nations members willing to accept its specific obligations, and entered into from the start by the most powerful members of the Brussels Pact and the organization of American states, would achieve all that a limited security pact could achieve, and much more besides. It would be evidence that among some of the strongest members of the United Nations there was a new determination to make the Charter come alive in its full integrity. It would not merely underwrite the safety of those brave enough to risk something in order to gain more for themselves; the same act would underwrite the United Nations itself.

If as a matter of practical politics we find we can do no more, let us by all means help to form a series of special groupings for peace. And in that event let the first of these groups to receive our guarantee of help be composed of the democratic nations of Western Europe which stand today in the shadow of a new aggression. But before we conclude that this must be our maximum effort let us see whether we cannot lay the basis for a coalition for peace that is potentially as wide as the membership of the United Nations. Let us not presume that only ill is concealed in "the giant mass of things to come." Our action today can be evidence of a hope that the full goal can be achieved ultimately, and perhaps the very reiteration of that hope can itself bring the day a little nearer. Here is a challenge worthy of the men who will write the next chapter in American foreign policy.

THE ATOM BOMB AS POLICY MAKER

By Bernard Brodie

IT IS now three years since an explosion over Hiroshima revealed to the world that man had been given the means of destroying himself. Eight atomic bombs have now been detonated — assuming that the three "atomic weapons" tested at Eniwetok were in fact bombs — and each was in itself a sufficient warning that the promise of eventual benefits resulting from the peacetime use of atomic energy must count as nothing compared to the awful menace of the bomb itself. The good things of earth cannot be enjoyed by dead men, nor can societies which have lost the entire material fabric of their civilization survive as integrated organisms.

Yet the dilemma nevertheless faces us that the enforcement of tolerable behavior among nations will continue for an indefinite time in the future to depend at least occasionally upon coercion or the threat of it, that the instruments of coercion against Great Powers will most likely be found only in the hands of other Great Powers (who can dispense with them only by acknowledging their readiness to forfeit whatever liberties they may happen blessedly to possess), and that those instruments appear fated, largely because of those same imperfections of our society which make power necessary, to include the atomic bomb and perhaps other comparable instruments of mass destruction.

Individuals may retreat from this dilemma behind a barrage of high moral protestation, usually combined with glowing predictions of a better world to be. Such retreat is rendered doubly sweet because it is more often than not accompanied by applause, especially from the intellectual wing of our society. But the nation as a whole cannot retreat from the problem, and those who desert simply leave the others to think it through as best they can.

The impact of the atomic bomb on United States policy has thus far been evidenced most clearly in the almost frantic effort to secure the adoption of a system of international control of atomic energy. It is difficult if not impossible to find an historical precedent for the eagerness with which this nation has pursued an endeavor which, if successful, would deprive it of the advantages of monopoly possession of a decisive military weapon.

To be sure, the monopoly is bound to be temporary, but that has always been true of new weapons, the monopoly possession of which has usually been jealously guarded for as long as possible. The United States is even now behaving in the customary manner concerning all new weapons other than those based on the explosive release of atomic energy, a fact which in itself sufficiently demonstrates that the exceptional American position on atomic energy control is based on something other than national generosity. That "something other" is of course a well-warranted fear of living in a world which morally and politically is little different from the one we have known but which in addition is characterized by multilateral possession of atomic weapons.

But the fear which engendered the pursuit of international control also provoked the resolve that any control scheme must contain within itself practically watertight guarantees against evasion or violation. That was and remains a wholly reasonable resolve, but its inevitable consequence is that it greatly reduces the chance of securing the requisite agreement. Two years of work by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission have resulted in some illumination of the problem but almost no progress towards a solution. American initiative in securing formal suspension of the activities of the Commission is a plain acknowledgment of that fact.

But where does that leave us? It leaves us, for one thing, with the unwanted bomb still in our hands, and, so far as we know, still exclusively in our hands. It leaves us also under the compulsion to go on building more bombs, and better ones if possible. We must continue our search for a workable *and secure* international control system by any corridor which reflects even a glimmer of hope of success, but we must also begin to consider somewhat more earnestly and responsibly than we have thus far what it will mean for the nation to adjust to an atomic age devoid of international controls.

The ramifications of that adjustment process are legion, but certainly they involve above all a continuing reconsideration of the effects of the bomb upon our plans for the national security. For those to whom "national security" appears too narrow a concept for an atomic age, there are at least three observations that might be made.

In the first place, as the world is now organized, and as it now operates, American security is for all practical purposes synony-

mous with world security. It is no longer a question whether our political leaders understand that to be the case, though there is much evidence that in the main they do so understand. It is simply that we have reached a stage where large-scale war without American participation borders on the inconceivable. Secondly, national policy, which is perforce concerned primarily with national security, is the only policy upon which we as citizens can hope to exercise any direct influence, and it is our only channel for affecting international policy. Thirdly, the projects of policy planners are much more likely to prosper if they conform at least occasionally to aspirations which the man on the street fully shares and understands. To him, and to the politician who serves him, the security of the United States is supremely meaningful and important. World security, on the other hand, is an abstraction which gains meaning — at least meaning sufficient to induce him to pay a price for it — only to the extent that he is persuaded that American security is enhanced thereby. The difference may seem superficially a semantic one, but it is more than that. It affects very profoundly the question of the kind and degree of risks one will accept and the character of the price one will pay to achieve security. It certainly affects the basic method by which we proceed to our goal.

Lest we adopt too patronizing an attitude towards the convictions of the layman or the politician, let us consider for a moment the propositions, however dimly he may perceive them, upon which those convictions rest. At least four such propositions may be listed, all of which are basically unaffected by the existence of the atomic bomb.

I. International organization at its existing level of development is obviously inadequate to guarantee either world or American security. This fact explains and partly justifies the preoccupation of most students of international relations with procedures for developing and improving existing bases for international coöperation. But exclusive preoccupation with such ends leaves a large gap which it is inexcusable to ignore, and that for a reason which provides our second proposition.

II. It is clear from any dispassionate and realistic appraisal of the forces at work in international relations today — the kind of appraisal which it is the first responsibility of the specialist in the field to provide — that a highly reliable and effective mechanism for the collective guarantee of security can hardly be deemed to

lie within the range of conditions reasonably to be expected within our time. At any rate, the degree of probability is not high. The atomic bomb makes that circumstance more tragic, but it does not otherwise alter it. However much the mechanism described deserves working for, it is certainly a matter of ordinary prudence to take heavy insurance against failure or even against too slow a rate of achievement.

III. Whatever our predictions concerning the future of international coöperation, they must take into account the following basic dilemma: The pursuit of security against war — the objective which takes precedence above all others in the modern world — is not inevitably identical with the pursuit of smoother and more intimate international coöperation, the two being especially divergent where the latter holds out little promise of significant success. Where conciliation fails, one must take steps which may make that failure more certain and more complete. Where the opponent refuses to reason, one can only appease or threaten. There are wide variations in the flexibility and subtlety with which the statesman may either appease or threaten, and the degree of skill which he brings to his task is supremely important. However, it is in the main true that appeasement tends to encourage further unreasonable or "impossible" demands; while the threat or warning, however effective at the moment, tends to wound the opponent and to stimulate in him the desire to be less vulnerable to threat in the future. Nevertheless, the statesman may at any time be faced with a choice between these two alternatives and these alone. He will do well to guarantee for himself in advance the maximum of freedom of choice *between* them.

IV. For the purpose of threat or warning, adequate national strength is indispensable. The statesman who possesses it can choose whether to appease or warn; the one who lacks it can only appease. As General Eisenhower so neatly put it, strength is required to coöperate, weakness can only beg.

II

In a world in which none of the Great Powers felt threatened by one or more of the others, we could expect to see a salutary neglect of security devices resting on the above propositions. But it is clear from the recent behavior of our Government that it feels itself exposed to a threat from the Soviet Union, and it is

almost equally clear that the measures which it is pursuing in response to that feeling of exposure enjoy the broadest popular support. Moreover, some of those measures undeniably entail aggravation of the tensions between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Is it possible to look past the difficulties of the moment to see the basic reasons for that concern?

A senior American naval officer told this writer not so long ago that "American strategic calculations concerning the requirements of *great* wars must envisage the Soviet Union as the opponent, if for no other reason than that she is the only foreign Power whose defeat would require great exertions on our part."

That is a good, simple working rule for an admiral. It recalls the old doctrine of the "natural enemy." It reminds us also that there would still be a problem to concern us even if the Soviet Union were something other than what it is; and that the fact that the power system of today is a bipolar one has dominant implications of its own. The main trouble with a bipolar system, as a colleague has so tersely put it, is that the target is all too unambiguous. The admiral's statement reminds us also that concern with security is a concern with possibilities, and not necessarily with high probabilities or certainties.

Nevertheless, if the reason which the admiral gave were the only one which counted, there is no doubt that our attitudes and our efforts concerning security would be profoundly more relaxed than they are. There are special reasons residing in the character of the Soviet state (or, if one insists, in the difference between our two systems) and in the events resulting from that character (or difference in characters) which account for the special dangers and the present acute degree of tension.

There is not space here, or competence on the part of the writer, to permit any analysis of the character of the Soviet state or of Soviet-American relations during the past three years. Nor is such analysis necessary for our purpose. All we need to guide us are a few general observations which will be obvious when pointed out but which may nevertheless strike the reader as having some flavor of novelty.

First of all, one might suggest that students of international relations have perhaps muddied the waters unduly by a somewhat excessive concern with Soviet motives, particularly with the question whether the motives behind Soviet obstreperousness, and worse, are primarily defensive or aggressive. That is not to

argue that motives are unimportant. Nor is it to complain that motives are always difficult if not impossible to fathom, which is certainly true. The psychoanalyst is obliged professionally to reach conclusions about motives, and it is noteworthy that his interpretations usually differ from those of the person whose behavior he is examining. What is being suggested here is simply 1, that the act may dwarf in importance, so far as counteraction is concerned, the motive from which it leaps; and 2, that a motive which stems from convictions which we cannot appreciably influence or alter by any reasonable acts on our part ceases thereby to be of much operational significance to us.

The significance of the facts that the Soviet Union is a police state and that its organizing ideology posits among other things the necessity of world revolution has been sufficiently elaborated elsewhere. But a point which is generally overlooked and which is of at least equal significance is the following: the distinctive ideology being all-pervading, it quite naturally includes a special interpretation of previously existing patterns of international relations. That fact means, among other things, that the reassuring analogies which one can draw from western history concerning long periods of amicable relations between states of widely differing ideologies are of much diminished relevance. In almost all those instances we find ministers who otherwise represent the most widely differing persuasions holding a common approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, a common respect for the rules of the game.

Those rules, we are often told, elevated hypocrisy to the status of a first principle. "A diplomat," as the old saw goes, "is an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country." But there is another aphorism to the effect that hypocrisy has at least the merit of giving lip service to virtue. The "hypocrisy" of western statesmen has frequently enough been self-deception. The constant appeal to higher principles in the instruments of diplomacy has almost always been something more than window dressing. The margin of difference between declaration and performance, though wide, nevertheless had limits which the statesman well understood and upon which he could base his expectations. It is a common pattern in all civilizations that behavior falls short of the aspirations reflected in the norms, but the norms are not thereby bereft of importance.

The Communist philosophy explicitly and systematically re-

jects the previously accepted norms of international conduct. The principle of expediency in the approach to the existing pattern is not simply indulged in, it is avowed and exalted.

The final and conclusive point relevant here is that the Soviet Union is a military state if not a militaristic one. Welfare, in the form of consumers goods and services, is subordinated to military requirements to a degree which also has probably never before been approximated in modern history — certainly not in Nazi Germany, which vaunted "guns before butter." While the milder kinds of Socialists have often been pacifists, no real Communist philosopher from Marx to the present has ever had the slightest use for pacifism. Marx, indeed, and Lenin too, took frequent occasion to bend their matchless scorn upon it.

The points just stated are not matters of opinion. They are the kind of conclusions which any normal intelligence operation provides, except that the factual evidence which supports them is far more abundant and incontrovertible than is usually available to the intelligence officer in his general run of problems. It is the kind of evidence upon which policy, as distinct from hope or yearning, must be based.

These conclusions do not point to the inevitability of war. They do point, however, to a policy the realization of which will at each recurrence of crisis serve to persuade the Soviet leaders that the expedient solution is the peaceful one. Such a policy would no doubt also serve to reduce the frequency of crises. For the saving grace of the Soviet philosophy so far as international relations are concerned is that, unlike the Nazi ideology, it incorporates within itself no time schedule. Hitler had to accomplish his ultimate goals not only within his lifetime but within his years of vigor. The Soviet attitude appears to be much more opportunistic. The Soviets may be unshakably convinced that ultimately there must be war between the Communist world and what they call the "capitalist" one. Since that conviction is a cardinal doctrine of their faith, we can probably do nothing within the present generation to alter it. What we can do, however, is to persuade them each time the question arises that "The time is not yet!"

III

The problem to which we now return is the problem of how to accomplish this act of persuasion in an atomic age, when the

already precious objective of peace is made immeasurably more precious by the immeasurably enhanced horror of the alternative. However, since preoccupation with the horror has brought us nothing positive thus far, and offers exceedingly little promise of doing so in the future, it is time for a shift to a more sober position. There are a large number of questions pressing for an answer, and consideration of many of them requires appraisal of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war — and hence of international politics — rather than as a visitation of a wrathful deity.

No doubt the first question concerns the effect of the atomic bomb upon the basic power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Postponing for a moment such qualifying considerations as stem from our present but admittedly temporary monopoly, we see at once that one of the most fundamental changes created by the atomic bomb is that it makes possible *for the first time* decisive military action between the two great centers of power.

In a brilliant study published during the recent war, Professor William T. R. Fox based much of his analysis of Great Power relationships on the proposition that a war between the Anglo-American bloc on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other would be almost inevitably bound to result in a stalemate, and that common recognition of this fact by both sides would powerfully influence (presumably for the better) relations between them. His explanation follows:

> The pressure which either the Soviet Union or the Western powers can bring to bear upon the other in its main centers of power is surely much less than is implied by the statement that the two are the strongest forces in the world. Not only are the points of direct contact few and inaccessible but the centers are widely separated. The armed power of each can be effectively carried only part of the way to the other. American control over the seaward approaches to the New World will in any foreseeable future render a transoceanic operation by the Soviet Union impossible. The massive superiority of its land army should on the other hand discourage the Western powers from attempting a large-scale amphibious operation against hostile shores controlled by the Red Army.[1]

That proposition was not only true at the time of writing, but it could also be argued that no conceivable evolution of the instruments of war then publicly known could have significantly

[1] "The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and The Soviet Union — Their Responsibility for Peace." New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944, p. 102.

modified it. To be sure, strategic bombing was gradually developing in effectiveness, and the striking range of bomber aircraft was slowly but steadily increasing. However, with the experience of World War II, none but extremists could argue that strategic bombing was sufficient unto itself for winning a war against a great nation. Moreover, despite the increasing range of bomber aircraft, there were a variety of technical reasons, quite impressive in the aggregate, to support the conclusion that a comprehensive program of strategic bombing over what might be called intercontinental distances would not become practicable "in the foreseeable future." That conclusion assumed, of course, an evolutionary improvement in known types of bombs and incendiaries, roughly approximating in magnitude the developments of the preceding score of years. At any rate, it was as nearly certain as any military prediction can be that a conflict between the two major centers of power would be a prolonged one — comparable in duration to the two world wars — and not promising the same finality of decision achieved in each of those instances.

The atomic bomb has changed all that. Unless the number of atomic bombs which it is possible for any nation to make in, say, 10 years' time is far smaller than the most restrained estimates would indicate, there can no longer be any question of the "decisiveness" of a strategic bombing campaign waged primarily with atomic bombs. Also, for a variety of reasons which cannot be reviewed here but which are readily available elsewhere,[2] distance no longer presents the same kind of barrier to effective strategic bombing with atomic bombs that it does with chemical bombs. With atomic bombs, planes already in military service could effectively attack from bases within the continental United

[2] See especially "The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order," edited by Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 34–40; also "The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services," by Bernard Brodie and Eilene Galloway, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 (Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress), p. 42–45. The reasons why the same plane can be effective over much greater distances with atomic bombs than with chemical bombs concern basically the intricate relationships between such factors as the amount of bombs which a plane can carry over any given distance, the total military effort expended in carrying it over that distance, and the tolerable rate of loss of attacking planes. Since the atomic bomb does enormously more damage than an equivalent load of chemical bombs, the cost per sortie which is acceptable with atomic bombs is also proportionately greater — great enough, in fact, to include 100 percent loss of planes on successful attacks. The greater acceptable cost; the fact that the plane itself need not be retrieved (whatever the arrangements made for the rescue of the crew); and the additional fact that a single atomic bomb, whatever its weight, is always a sufficient payload for any distance which the plane is capable of carrying it, will have the effect of at least doubling the maximum effective bombing range of any plane of B-29 size or greater.

States important targets in the Soviet Union, which the same planes could not do if they carried only chemical bombs. Thus, there is no absolute necessity to wage great campaigns merely to secure advanced bombing bases. Finally, it is difficult to see how the decisive phases of a war fought with substantial numbers of atomic bombs could be anything but short.

The corollary of the point made in the previous paragraph is that the atomic bomb has deprived the United States of what amounted almost to absolute security against attack upon its continental territories. Its naval supremacy was sufficient to guarantee it both against direct invasion of hostile land forces and against enemy seizure of bases close to our frontiers for large-scale bombing attack. A potential enemy might count on token raids, but nothing more. America's invulnerability was akin to that which Britain enjoyed through the centuries until the perfecting of the submarine on the eve of World War I. The language which Francis Bacon applied to superior sea power in his own time, that it might take "as much or as little of a war as it liked," still largely held for the United States, alone among nations. But with effective intercontinental bombing available to any enemy who holds in substantial numbers the tools already in our hands, that treasured position is gone. The atomic bomb has in military effect translated the United States into a European Power.

However, though Heaven is lost, not all is lost. There is still the issue of superiority to contend with. Three questions especially concern us. Is clear and conspicuous military superiority possible in an age of atomic bombs? If so, is it possible for the United States to maintain it vis-à-vis its major rival? And what will be the political consequences of an effort to maintain atomic superiority?

It is not possible in a few paragraphs to do more than outline the nature of the problem contained in each of these questions and perhaps to indicate the fallacy of certain prevalent suppositions concerning it. Let us take the third question first.

There has long been a fashion among academic specialists in international relations to deprecate as futile and worse the quest on the part of any nation for military superiority over its rivals. As the argument runs, the attempt is bound to provoke a similar pursuit on the part of the rival, the net result being an armaments race which inevitably results in war. Historical support is of

course not lacking, especially if the historical instances be chosen with discrimination. The prevalence of this doctrine has had a great deal to do with our frenetic pursuit of international control of atomic energy at almost any cost, including the cost of neglecting to consider any possible alternatives.

There is of course an important element of truth in the idea. But there is also much taken for granted in it which is not true. It is not true, for example, and has not been true at least since the industrial revolution began, that the so-called Great Powers have been on an approximately equal footing in terms of their ability to compete in the production of those instruments of war that really counted. It could be said, for example, that it was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which made the Pacific phase of World War II possible, for it assured to Japan something much closer to naval parity with the United States than would have been anywhere near her reach in any real building competition ensuing from the absence of such a treaty. The Treaty did avoid for a time a "costly" naval building competition. But was not the war with Japan immeasurably more costly? And would Japan have dared embark upon a war against an America boasting a naval power which was — as it easily could have been, without any untoward strain upon the American economy — two or three times her own?

General propositions should not be pushed too far, including the one just stated, but there is much cant in the field of international studies which needs to be brushed out. Those to whom armaments competition appears disastrous as well as wicked are somewhat inconsistent when they look back nostalgically on the relatively peaceful nineteenth century and on the marvelous rôle played by Great Britain in helping to preserve that peace. They will speak vaguely of Britain's invulnerability as a contributing factor, as though that invulnerability were something handed down from on high. It was indeed Britain's invulnerability at home which enabled British statesmen to play such an active and on the whole beneficent part in helping preserve the peace of Europe, but it was not simply the accident of the Channel which made Britain invulnerable. It was her clear-cut naval superiority over the Channel and adjacent seas, *the impairment of which Britain would not brook*, which gave her that enviable position.

Returning again to the atomic bomb, the issue is not whether

our country ought to seek to maintain its present superiority in atomic armaments but whether it has any chance at all of succeeding in such an effort. It has been argued by some (including at one time the present writer) that it was in the very nature of atomic armaments that the kind of clear and decisive military superiority that was feasible in the past — conspicuously in the case of naval armaments — could no longer be realized. The argument was based fundamentally on two considerations: first, that there was "no defense against the atomic bomb," and second, that when a nation had enough bombs to overwhelm its opponent in one surprise attack and was willing to make such attack, it would make little difference whether its opponent had two or three times the number.

There is now reason to believe that the situation is not so simple as all that. A great deal depends on the total number of bombs which it will be possible for the various Great Powers to make in any given period of time. Clearly, a three to one superiority in numbers of bombs would mean one thing if the numbers of bombs on each side were numbered at most in the scores or hundreds, and something quite different (and much less significant) if they were numbered in the thousands. Information which would enable private citizens to make intelligent estimates concerning rate of bomb production has not been made public, but there appear to be hints in various quarters that the maximum feasible rate of bomb production is substantially less than was being generally assumed two years ago. It is also clear that the richer of the known deposits of uranium and thorium are much more accessible to the United States than to the Soviet Union.

One may also assume that the enormous technological lead which the United States has over the Soviet Union — and which shows no conclusive signs of diminishing — is bound to mean a great potential advantage for the United States in the design of the instruments for using the atomic bomb. The bomb by itself has no military utility. It must be delivered to the target in some kind of vehicle which, unless it is a free-flying rocket, is subject to various kinds of attack. Marked superiority in the vehicle or in the means of shooting down the enemy's vehicles may be no less important than superiority in numbers of bombs, especially if those numbers are something less than gigantic. If those several types of superiority are concentrated on the same side, the dis-

parity in atomic fighting power may be sufficient to warrant comparison with outright monopoly.

The Soviet Union has been able, with the assistance of German technicians, to build several types of jet-propelled fighters, and she has also built several large bombers patterned after our B-29, some models of which were impounded by her during the war. But a few German technicians are not going to make the difference between a backward technology and an eagerly progressive one. Our lead in types of aircraft, in the ordnance of combat aviation, and in anti-aircraft matériel should, or rather *could*, be as great during the next 20 years as it was in the recent war. The only question is whether we will make the necessary effort to keep in the lead in our military technology. That the Soviet Union will spare no effort within her capabilities to overtake us goes without saying.

We are often told that our *monopoly* of the atomic bomb is a wasting asset. It is, to be sure, in the sense that some day it is bound to end and we are constantly getting closer to that day. But is our *superiority* similarly a wasting asset? In one respect, at least, we know that it is not, for our fund of bombs is increasing steadily during the period in which the Soviet Union remains without any. On the day that the Soviet Union produces its first bomb, we will have many more than we do at present. What happens thereafter depends on a large number of variables. But looking forward from the present, we may say with a good deal of assurance that our present superiority in atomic armaments will increase considerably before it begins to wane, that it may continue to increase even after the Soviet Union is producing bombs, and that it may be a long time in waning thereafter. At any rate, we know that merely to distinguish — as is usually done — between the monopoly period (in which we are safe) and the post-monopoly period (in which we are lost) is not enough.

One might incidentally point out that it is easy to be oversubtle concerning the political consequences of our present monopoly of the bomb. The duty of the intellectual to get behind the obvious too often betrays him into ignoring the obvious or even denying it. We have heard a good many references to the fact that the atomic bomb, being a weapon of mass destruction, is not really handy for diplomatic manœuvring. We have been told also that since we would never use it against cities inhabited

by friendly peoples, it would not help us one whit in stopping Soviet armies from overrunning Western Europe. The latter observation happens not to be strategically correct, since the destruction of *Russian* cities and industries would make a great deal of difference in the ability of the Soviet armies to overrun Western Europe, or to maintain themselves in that area if they got there. But the fact remains that the atomic bomb is today our *only* means for throwing substantial power immediately against the Soviet Union in the event of flagrant Soviet aggression. The Soviets may underestimate the power of the bomb (as may, indeed, our own military leaders), but they cannot be entirely oblivious of that fact. If they choose war now it will be either because they underestimate the bomb even more grossly than they appear to or because they would rather face the hazard now when our bombs are few than later when they are many.

Concerning the effects of the atomic bomb upon our military organization and strategic plans, we must recognize first of all that, to paraphrase Clemenceau, the matter is much too important to be left to the generals — or to the politicians either for that matter. Formulation of security policy demands anticipation of probabilities with due regard to what is politically possible or feasible. But consideration of the latter may too easily degenerate into preoccupation with what is politically safe. Political leaders, moreover, have neither the time nor the inclination to preoccupy themselves with the long-term significance of changes in military technology, and rarely the competence to make anything of it if they do. They must rely upon the advice of their military aides, who belong to a profession long recognized as markedly conservative — though it is easy to exaggerate the degree and character of that conservatism — who have vested service and personal interests which influence them consciously or unconsciously, whose talents are not primarily dialectic, and who are saddled with tremendous responsibility. The responsibility powerfully reinforces the conservative tendencies already present as a result of nurture and training. We are therefore not likely to find military leaders, or the civilian officials whom they advise, accepting readily upon the advent of some revolutionary military device that drastic adjustment which free and objective inquiry may indicate as necessary or at least desirable.

It is a little startling, some three years after Hiroshima, to find the military departments of our government still apparently un-

prepared to think in terms of what strategic effects are to be expected from the use of any given number of bombs. The national safety will of course demand close secrecy concerning conclusions reached, but in this instance there is reason for believing that "security" is concealing the absence of thinking rather than the import of the ideas derived. For example, in the paper prepared by the War Department in March 1947 on "The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on National Security," there is a reference to something called a "significant" number of bombs. The meaning of "significant" is then explained only as indicating that number of bombs which would "provide an important military capability."[3] The military profession is not the only one which habitually betrays itself with catch phrases, but when we think of the absence of logic usually inherent in such sacrosanct phrases as "balanced fleet" or "balanced force," we cannot be too optimistic about the precision of thought behind the "important military capability."

We know that one bomb will not win a war against a major Power, since it took two to produce the surrender of an already defeated Japan. The same may reasonably be held to be true of five or ten. But there appears to be little idea anywhere what number would be "significant" and even less conception of how many it takes to make the weapon "decisive." Much will of course depend on how the bombs are used, but then the significance of the whole issue is that the number available and the estimates concerning the capabilities of that number will in large part govern the way in which they are used.

It is not easy to extrapolate the strategic effectiveness of atomic bombs from the experience with strategic bombing gained in the recent war. There are too many differences, besides that of magnitude of destruction per bomb or per plane, between bombing with chemical bombs and attacking with atomic bombs. It is not even a simple matter to determine the factor of increase in power of the atomic bomb over an equivalent load of chemical bombs. But we do have enough data to provide the basis for some intensive research which might throw some light on the problem. What we need to know is: "How many bombs will do what?" And the "what" must be reckoned in over-all strategic results rather than merely in acres destroyed.

[3] The War Department Paper was published in the Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 already cited. The specific reference above is to page 67 of the Bulletin.

The evidence is presumptive only, but nevertheless impressive, that our military planners are thinking of an atomic bomb which is an "important military capability" but nevertheless only an ancillary rather than a decisive weapon. The chief danger is that the inevitably transitory nature of the conditions presumed will not be recognized sufficiently or in time. Regardless of what the Soviet Union may accomplish in the field, our own production of atomic bombs is proceeding apace, and the justification for regarding the weapon as an ancillary one is bound to evaporate as our stockpile accumulates.

IV

If we consider national defense policy in its broader aspects, and look beyond the period of American monopoly of atomic weapons, we see that recognition of the loss of American invulnerability to overseas attack and expectation of quick decisions in the event of war will no doubt entail a violent wrench to our defense traditions. Preparedness in the old sense of the term, which meant mainly provision for great expansion of the military services and of military production after the outbreak of hostilities, will appear even less adequate than it has been charged with being in the past. What will that mean for the costs of military preparedness?

Unquestionably the costs will increase, as they have already begun to. But we should not assume that the restraints which have always operated on the growth of military budgets will become inconsequential. There have been no systematic studies of the various factors governing the size of military budgets. It is obvious that periods of international tensions generally stimulate increases in military expenditure, and historians have dwelt on the scale of the armaments races preceding the two world wars. But they have scarcely considered the significance of the fact that in each case the extent of the arming, though large in comparison with more tranquil periods, was relatively small in contrast to the expansion of the war period itself.

We are speaking here partly of ordinary human inertia, even under circumstances where war appears imminent, and in so far as that inertia can be relied upon to be both pronounced and universal it should definitely enter into our calculations. But there is more to the matter than simple inertia. Wartime economies are characteristically fat-consuming. Both the toleration

of them by the public and the physical possibility of maintaining their inordinate pace depend on the fact that they are temporary and recognized to be such. If there is to be fat to consume it must first be accumulated. In other words, even from the point of view strictly of defense needs, war economies can be inaugurated too soon as well as too late. And if the relevant comments of General Eisenhower while he was Chief of Staff of the Army can be taken as representative, that fact is recognized by the military themselves.

There is also the problem of avoiding military expenditure which is improvident not only because it is too large but also because it is misdirected. We have heard much, for example, of the business of dispersing our cities as a defense against atomic attack. It is clear that such dispersion would result in a tremendous loss of fixed and sunk capital and, in all probability, in a less efficient spatial arrangement of industries than previously existed. Thus, even if one should make the wholly untenable assumption that wholesale dispersion of our cities and the losses resulting would be tolerated by the public, the project might still appear to be militarily wasteful. A great many combat airplanes could be provided with what it would cost to disperse even a relatively small city. There is no doubt a margin for the dispersion of key industries and services which would not loom large in terms of the economy as a whole but which would nevertheless have important security results. If so, the accomplishment of that objective should remain a maximum as well as a minimum goal.

These observations are of course not very reassuring to those who, like the present writer, deplore the necessity of spending on military protection even so substantial a portion of our national income as we are spending today. The limits referred to are fairly flexible and we are still far from having reached them. And what will occur in this country when the conviction settles upon it that the Soviet Union is producing atomic bombs is the big question of the future. But the error for which we are now paying was after all perpetrated some three centuries ago, when Galileo was permitted to escape burning. Our problem now is to develop the habit of living with the atomic bomb, and the very incomprehensibility of the potential catastrophe inherent in it may well make that task easier.

PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY

By James Reston

LATE in the summer, in the heat of Washington and the presidential campaign, the Research Division of the Republican National Committee produced a tart little document entitled: "Democratic Duplicity and Appeasement in Foreign Policy Administration, 1935–1947." This was a compilation of carefully selected statements by the book-writing New Dealers, all designed to suggest that Roosevelt and Truman were clumsy appeasers who, by their mistakes, were more or less responsible for the melancholy state of world affairs today. If one were to read this or listen to some of the lower-case campaign speeches culled from it, one might conclude that the Republicans, if elected, would reverse Democratic policy on practically every front. The truth of the matter is, however, that on almost every basic foreign policy issue likely to come before the 81st Congress next January the chances of a continuation of the present policy are pretty good.

Four fundamental questions are likely to arise early in the new Administration, and these will undoubtedly determine the course of American foreign policy throughout 1949. These questions are:

Will the Congress approve an executive agreement (or will the Senate ratify a treaty) associating the United States with a Western European defense pact under the United Nations?

Will the Congress approve an extension of the European Recovery Program at approximately the same rate of expenditure and under more or less the same administrative establishment as prevail at present?

Will the Congress approve new legislation to increase the rearmament of the United States and, particularly, to authorize the President to transfer arms to other countries?

Will the Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives, accept American participation in the International Trade Organization and carry on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program of past Democratic administrations?

These are not the only questions that will be waiting for the legislators when they finish their political fun and games this

autumn, but these four will probably decide the trend of American policy at the mid-point of the century. The background and prospects of each are therefore worth exploring.

1. *Will there be a political security arrangement between the United States and Western Europe?*

Last spring, in the closing weeks of the Congressional debate on the European Recovery Program, many persons in Washington recognized that the *economic recovery* of Europe and the *military security* of Western Europe were inseparable. It is a political maxim among American cabinet officers that the Congress will deal with only one major foreign policy question at a time, and for that reason the ERP was pushed ahead on its own. But the more the ERP was debated, the more people recognized, even on Capitol Hill, that unless the fear of aggression were removed in Western Europe, economic recovery could not be achieved and progress toward an effective international mutual aid economy in Western Europe would be slow.

For example, when American officials began discussing specific economic recovery projects with European governments under the ERP they immediately ran into questions which were not primarily economic but political and military. So long as there was fear of war, insufficient European capital would venture to revitalize necessary industries. So long as fear existed, nations hesitated to build roads that might be used as paths of invasion. So long as the atmosphere was tense, men and money, badly needed for recovery projects, had to be diverted to military requirements. The whole ERP objective of a self-sufficient, cooperative Western European economy was consequently hampered.

As soon as the ERP was passed on Capitol Hill, therefore, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett began discussing how to supplement the ERP with a similiar program of military and political coöperation between the United States and Western Europe. The result of this was the adoption by the Senate of the so-called Vandenberg Resolution which supported, in general terms, the principle of American participation in a group security arrangement with other nations. The problem of security and the means of dealing with it were well defined and outlined in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on the Vandenberg Resolution. That report

included, among other things, the following significant remarks:

> The Committee believes that association of the United States with regional or other collective arrangements as affect its national security will help protect this country and help prevent war. The great power of the United States must be thrown into the scales on the side of peace. . . . The committee considers the principle of self-help and mutual aid followed in the European Recovery Program equally applicable in the field of security. . . . The Committee is convinced that the horrors of another world war can be avoided with certainty only by preventing war from starting. The experience of World War I and World War II suggest that the best deterrent to aggression is the certainty that immediate and effective counter-measures will be taken against those who violate the peace. . . .

From this language it was assumed in some quarters that the Foreign Relations Committee was supporting an important and, for the United States, revolutionary principle. The Committee was believed to be saying, in effect: "The best way to deal with the insecurity of Europe, the fear of aggression by the Red Army, is to make clear in advance that if that army violates the peace, it will be confronted by the military might of the United States. . . . And the way to make that clear to the Russians is for the United States to join with other nations in a mutual defense arrangement under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter."

Though the Senate debated the Vandenberg Resolution and passed it with only four dissenting votes, it would be misleading to assume that the Senate was consciously accepting all the commitments that may be suggested by some of the language of the Foreign Relations Committee's report. The debate was perfunctory to say the least. It was conducted in the closing days of the spring session of Congress, just before the Philadelphia presidential nominating conventions. Senator Vandenberg himself emphasized that adoption of his resolution was in no way a commitment, but was merely an expression of the "sense of the Senate." Before anything effective was done to implement the ideas behind his resolution, he said, the Europeans themselves would have to devise a self-help and mutual aid security plan, and negotiate it with the executive branch of the government, which would then, in turn, bring it back to Capitol Hill for study and Congressional approval.

It was on this assurance that a harassed Congress, eager to get away to the scene of the presidential conventions, passed the Vandenberg Resolution. It is true that the Senate did say that "the power and influence of the United States must be thrown

into the scales on the side of peace," but it did not actually throw that power in and it did not take any specific commitment to do so. It conceded that the best deterrent to aggression was the *certainty* that *immediate* and *effective* countermeasures would be taken against aggressors, but it did not provide that certainty of immediate and effective countermeasures.

All that can safely be said, therefore, is that a Republican-dominated United States Senate has shown that it is aware of the need of American power to bolster the security of Western Europe, and thinks it sees, through an expansion of the regional arrangement plan — first defined by the Editor of this magazine — a way to deal effectively with it. The question now is what the new American administration will do when the Congress reassembles next year.

It is known that both President Truman and Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, approve the objectives of the Vandenberg Resolution. There is also reason to believe that John Foster Dulles, who is likely to be Secretary of State in a Dewey administration, favors the association of the United States with a Western European regional security pact *for a limited period of time;* but just when such a proposal will be presented in specific terms to the Congress will undoubtedly be determined by events between now and next February.

One of the Republican arguments in recent weeks has been that, if elected, Mr. Dewey will be in a position to make a fresh start in the negotiations with the Russians. Presumably, therefore, the Republicans would not attempt to push through Congress at once a defense pact which is opposed so violently by the Soviet Union. If, however, there is no sign of a change in Soviet policy, and if continued attempts at reconciliation fail, there is little doubt that a Republican administration would proceed with some kind of mutual defense pact. It probably would not go beyond the commitment taken by the United States under the inter-American defense system, but it undoubtedly would go that far; and the general feeling in Washington is that a Republican executive would get the support of the Congress, particularly in 1949 when the unity of the Party and the power of patronage are likely to be strong.

2. *Will Congress increase the pace of American rearmament and give the President authority to transfer arms to other countries?*

The general feeling in Washington is that, unless there is a

radical change in Soviet policy, the Congress will answer the above questions "Yes." On the assumptions — both widely accepted in Washington — that Soviet policy will remain about the same, and that Mr. Dewey will be elected, there is little doubt that the new Administration will base its policy on a strong military and naval establishment, working actively with the Western European nations.

It is not common, even for the economy wing of the Republican Party, to argue in favor of economy at the price of national security. It is not likely, either, that any new Administration will be eager to start off, after 16 years in opposition, by increasing the size of the manpower draft into the armed services. Early in 1949, therefore, the new Administration is likely to be confronted with alternatives that are similar to those that faced President Roosevelt late in 1940 and early in 1941. It will have to decide whether it is in the best interests of the United States to raise a large military establishment with a large standing army or to supplement a modern but moderate army with allies supplied with American equipment. This is, in effect, the old lend-lease question on a smaller scale, and unpopular as that question is among Republicans, the leaders of the Party concede that it will have to be faced in one form or another. Either the arms will have to be manufactured and placed in the hands of a large American army, or they will have to be manufactured here and divided between a smaller American army and our allies overseas.

This question came up in the most direct way last spring as soon as Mr. Vandenberg and Under Secretary of State Lovett moved from the general discussion of security to the specific problem of implementing the Vandenberg Resolution. It was not solved then for practical reasons: first, there was no balanced supply of arms to send abroad; second, there was no joint Western European plan of defense; third, the President had no authority to transfer to other countries arms needed here by the American Army; and fourth, it was an election year.

Since then, a limited draft has been passed and new appropriations for the military establishment have increased the pace of the nation's rearmament. Also, military and political conversations have been started both in Washington and London on the self-help and mutual aid defense programs necessary for the protection of the western world. By the turn of the year, these programs will be ready for study by the new Administration.

If by that time the world situation is about the same as today, there seems little doubt that the President, whoever he is, will seek — and get — authority to transfer arms to those nations whose security is held to be essential to the defense of the United States. The President will not have that authority when he comes to power. He will have the right, as he now has, to transfer "surplus property" to other nations, but there is very little surplus property available, certainly not enough to bolster materially the weak nations west of the Oder.

3. *Will the European Recovery Program be extended for another year at approximately the same rate of expenditure?*

The answer to this question by leading Republicans and Democrats alike is again in the affirmative. Both parties are committed to the continuation of the ERP principle in their party platforms. The nation's policy in Western Europe is based on it, and in view of the Soviet Union's violent opposition to the program, few members of the major parties in Congress are willing to abandon the Western European nations to placate Moscow. If there is a new Republican Administration, the general feeling in the capital is that the chances of carrying through the program at the present rate of expenditure will be enhanced. That Administration will be under the most careful scrutiny both at home and abroad. Governor Dewey is on record as supporting the program, and is not likely to start off by crippling a program that is widely supported by the electorate.

Also, it is felt that Mr. Dewey will certainly get far more cooperation from Chairman John Taber of the House Appropriations Committee than any Democratic president could hope to get. Mr. Taber was among Mr. Dewey's strongest supporters in the fight for the Republican presidential nomination. He is known to respect Mr. Dewey's administrative ability and his sense of economy. In the fight over the first appropriation for the ERP, Mr. Dewey quietly interceded with Mr. Taber to accept the compromise that was acceptable to Senator Vandenberg and the Senate, and there is reason to believe that, if anyone can persuade Mr. Taber to take a broader view of the objectives of the ERP, Mr. Dewey is the man who can do it. Indeed, this relationship between Mr. Dewey and Mr. Taber is regarded by many persons in Washington as one of the strongest arguments for a Dewey administration. The New York Governor has had occasion to help Mr. Taber politically in the past. By all public statements,

Mr. Dewey is far more enthusiastic about the ERP than Mr. Taber, but while Mr. Taber is extremely jealous of his rights and independence as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, there is reason for believing that he will listen sympathetically to Mr. Dewey's arguments, if the latter is president when the renewal of the ERP goes to Capitol Hill.

There is, however, more than one Dewey in this picture. When the ERP was passed, a committee of Congress — the Joint Committee of Foreign Economic Coöperation, the so-called ERP "watchdog" committee — was established to supervise the operation of the act. The acting head of that committee is Charles S. Dewey, former banker, real estate operator, and Congressman from the Ninth Congressional District in Chicago. Mr. Dewey calls himself agent-general of the watchdog committee and has been in Europe most of the summer checking on the progress being made under the act. Much will depend on the report he brings back and presents to his committee and to the Congress. If he finds that the administration of the act is good and that the recipient nations are making progress with their self-help and mutual aid programs, his testimony will assist those who wish to continue the act into its second year. If he does not — if his report sustains the arguments of his friend, Mr. Taber, who is also a member of the watchdog committee — then the rate of expenditure in the second year may very well be reduced accordingly.

The record of the present administrators of the ERP under Paul Hoffman, and the record of the Marshall Plan nations by the end of the year, are also likely to have considerable effect on the size of the second year appropriations. In the first few months of his administration, Mr. Hoffman was well behind schedule in his ERP procurement program, and if he has not demonstrated by the end of the year that all the money appropriated was needed for useful and productive expenditure, that fact again will have important bearing on the second year appropriations.

But despite the prospect of victory by the Republicans, who in the past have been loud champions of private enterprise economics and rigid economy in overseas spending, it is not likely that they will start any serious movement to scuttle the ERP or make its recipients adopt Republican Party economics as a condition of continued aid. Governor Dewey has taken the position that the United States should not seek to impose our economic system on those receiving Marshall Plan aid, and he is likely to

follow this line against any who might seek to reopen this question next year.

If, however, there are changes in the administration of the ERP in Washington and abroad, nobody will be very much surprised. It was the Republicans who insisted that the administration of the ERP be divorced from the Department of State and that Mr. Hoffman and his staff at the Economic Coöperation Administration be given a great deal of power and autonomy. If the Republicans are in power next January, the chances are that the State Department will regain some of the power the Republicans insisted it should not have. Then it will be *their* Secretary of State and *their* ambassadors dealing with the situation, and that, of course, in a political world, makes a difference.

4. *Will the Congress extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and approve participation by the United States in the International Trade Organization?*

The Trade Agreements Act, as amended by the 80th Congress, will remain on the books until June 30, 1949, and will undoubtedly be sent to the Congress for extension in April or May. The chances are that the question of United States participation in the ITO will be debated at the same time, and both are expected to be strongly opposed.

There is no basic issue in the realm of foreign policy on which there has been such a marked party split as over the Trade Agreements Act. This act was introduced in 1934 and has come before the Congress six times. With the single exception of 1943, when there was little normal trade between nations and the tendency was to follow the wartime leadership of President Roosevelt, a majority of Republicans have voted against the act in both houses. The record on this is instructive, for on the question of the tariff many influential Republicans differ fundamentally from Governor Dewey, who has consistently supported the bill. The Senate votes on the first five tests of the act were as follows:

1934	Democrats: for, 51; against, 5
	Republicans: for, 5; against, 28
1937	Democrats: for, 56; against, 9
	Republicans: for, 0; against, 14
1940	Democrats: for, 41; against, 15
	Republicans: for, 0; against, 20
1943	Democrats: for, 41; against, 8
	Republicans: for, 18; against, 14

1945	Democrats: for, 38; against, 5
	Republicans: for, 15; against, 16

In these same years, the record in the House of Representatives showed the same pattern:

1934	Democrats: for, 269; against, 11
	Republicans: for, 2; against, 99
1937	Democrats: for, 278; against, 11
	Republicans: for, 3; against, 81
1940	Democrats: for, 212; against, 20
	Republicans: for, 5; against, 146
1943	Democrats: for, 193; against, 3
	Republicans: for, 163; against, 26
1945	Democrats: for, 205; against, 12
	Republicans: for, 33; against, 140.

These figures indicate how solid Republican opinion has been against the act ever since the beginning. They show that with the exception of the war year of 1943, the GOP consistently opposed the act; that on no occasion in a peacetime year has a majority of the Republicans in either house gone along with the Administration, and that the majorities against the bill have been almost unanimous.

The figures as they stand may well be misleading. The opposition to the program is certainly not now so great; indeed, there are undoubtedly a majority of Republican Senators who support it; and Senator Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado, the key figure on this question in the upper house, has himself changed considerably and is now at least in favor of the principle of the act. Nevertheless, 205 Republicans in the House last spring voted against a three-year extension of the act, requested by the President, and only 16 favored it. And while the House was finally persuaded by the Senate to accept a compromise bill extending the act for one year, 218 Republicans originally voted in the debate to give the Congress a veto power over any tariff changes that did not come within limits established by the United States Tariff Commission.

On this question, therefore, there is likely to be trouble. With memories of a generation of criticism of the Republican rôle in putting over the Smoot-Hawley tariff when they were last in power, Mr. Dewey and his colleagues in the Executive will undoubtedly attempt to demonstrate that the high-tariff tendencies of the modern Republican Party have been curbed and

that the Trade Act and the ITO will go forward with Republican support.

This will take some doing, however, and much may depend on the parliamentary skill of those who have to deal with the problem next spring. The high-tariff bloc in the House will certainly argue that the ITO should be sent to Congress as a joint resolution for study by the Ways and Means Committee, which is generally regarded as being hostile to the proposition. The international trade section of the State Department will undoubtedly argue that, like the FAO and the International Maritime Consultative Organization, American participation should be sanctioned by treaty, ratified only by the Senate. Either way, however, these two pieces of legislation are likely to meet opposition which will not be easily removed even by a new administration in its honeymoon days.

Nevertheless, what is remarkable in looking forward to the possibility of a new Republican administration with safe majorities in both houses of Congress is that the question of the tariff is virtually the only major foreign policy issue of which it can be said: "Here is a point where the Republicans differ from the Democrats and where they may block, if not reverse, the trend of the past few years."

So far as the executive branch of the government is concerned, there is no fundamental foreign policy issue — not even China, despite all Governor Dewey has said — on which American policy is likely to be reversed by the advent of a Republican administration. Indeed, probably the most astonishing single fact in American political life today is that the leaders of the two major parties can agree on fundamental foreign policy questions more than on anything else. They cannot agree about housing, labor, prices, or the rôle of government at home, but they can at least agree fairly well on the use of American power and influence abroad.

PERSONAL GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO

By Frank Tannenbaum

FOR a half a century up to 1876, the one political certainty in Mexico was that any government, regardless of party or announced purpose — good, bad or indifferent — would be overthrown. Only two governments in all this time lasted through their allotted periods, and even these only because they had the good luck to defeat numerous efforts to overthrow them. Almost every part of Mexico at one time or another threatened to set up a separate government, and the miracle is that only Texas carried the threat to fruition. Entire regions were independent of the federal government for years at a time.

The Díaz régime produced the great political miracle in modern Mexico — stability. It is probably true that the Díaz régime was no more just or free from violence than the previous improvised administrations. But it did keep order. At least everyone knew where the power rested — in the person of General Díaz. By controlling the army he controlled the country. It was under this régime that Mexico became a nation with a sense of destiny and coherence. An extensive program of development of railroads, ports, telegraphs and so on was possible, and this in turn contributed to political consolidation.

The revolution of 1910 returned the nation to chaos. Between 1910 and 1930, the country was either torn by revolution or in active preparation for revolution. The local *caudillo* reappeared and the federal government did not dare challenge him for fear that he and his friends — or he and the government's numerous enemies — would prove stronger than itself. The governments lived upon sufferance. All the astute ruthlessness of Obregón and Calles, with the deliberate killings of leaders of any uprising, was required to give the political situation a semblance of stability.

Even under Cárdenas there was a revolution, and that was as late as 1938 — a revolution by a man who may be said to have been the last of the revolutionary *caudillos*, Saturnino Cedillo. He was a semi-literate man who had risen to power in local fighting, unillumined by any political doctrine except a greed for personal aggrandizement. At one time, during the Cristero rebellion, he

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had control of more than 8,000 men who belonged to him, and whom he had armed and brought into the field. He had a certain kind of loyalty to his own, but was completely ruthless. He traveled, even on horseback, with armed guards with sawed-off machine guns right behind him, and his automobile, in which I once rode, was crowded with arms, machine guns and ammunition — a fort on wheels. I heard him say one day to a man who had some grievance, "I ought to have you strung up." In the state of San Luis Potosí his will was the law, the rule and the way. There was no authority to which an appeal could be addressed, for even the federal government, unless it wished to stir up a rebellion, preferred not to interfere too much. The governor of the state, a nondescript little man in black, with a squeak in his voice, once said when I asked him who he was, when he made an unexpected visit to the home of Cedillo, "Who, me? I am the governor of the state. It is a job the old man gave me." Such a situation made rebellion inevitable, and revolution the natural beginnings of any election. As it turned out in this case, Cedillo rose in rebellion and was finally killed in the mountains.

In the election of 1940, when General Avila Camacho succeeded to the presidency, there was active talk of an uprising, and only the strength of General Cárdenas and the well-known policy of the United States Government to give implicit support to the government in power prevented a revolution. This violence evidenced the narrow basis upon which Mexican government rested. The relative peace of the last 20 years may be taken to mean that the purpose of the Constitution of 1917 to strengthen the government has succeeded. It brought into being the agrarian and labor organizations upon which the government could fall back in time of crisis.

II

But it is still true that the army is the chief source of the government's power. As President Cárdenas once expressed it, "When the land belongs to the villages, the government will also belong to them, but now the government depends upon the army." That day may come, but it has not yet; and it has not because the very machinery of the government is self-defeating. The government of Mexico is the president. There is no other way of expressing it. If the president is not strong enough to be the government, then he is overthrown, as was Ortiz Rubio.

Or if he is not strong enough to be the president, then the real power is some *caudillo* — the great man who can and does control the government. In recent history, that was Calles. He did not wish to be a *caudillo* in the beginning, but was forced into the position of dictator to prevent the recurrence of chaos. The leaders accepted his will because he could enforce it, and that settled the matter.

I recall meeting a general in charge of troops in one of the northern states one day in a train. We were on the way to Tehuacan, where Calles, long after he had retired from the presidency, was recovering from an illness. I asked him where he was going, and he replied, "Well, yesterday I saw the president in the City of Mexico, but now I am going to see *el mero Jefe*" — "the real chief." And that was that. To prove that he was in control, Cárdenas found it necessary to put Calles on a plane and ship him out of the country.

The president is the government, and all discussion of Mexican politics must assume that fact. It is possible to discern other trends, and the day may come when this will no longer be true. But for the time being, the president has in his hands the military, political, administrative, legislative and judicial power. The legislature takes its policies and its laws from the president, and there is and can be no effective opposition in the Congress. The judiciary takes its views from the administration. All one has to do is to read the decisions of the courts under the Carranza, Obregón, Calles and Cárdenas administrations in matters of land and labor to be convinced that the court reflects, as a matter of course, the political predilections of the head of the state. He is the effective chief of the administration, and the members of the cabinet are simple instruments of his will; and if he is an energetic and hardworking man, he keeps track of even the minutest details of their labor. He is also the active head of the army, and it is he who decides where and at what post this or that general is to be placed. The total pattern is such that nothing within the political or governmental realm escapes his control, and all decisions, even of minor importance, are made by him.

In a subtle sense, the mass of the rural population, Indian or mestizo, illiterate or schooled, expects the president of the country to play the part of the great father. There is an implicit submissiveness, a bending of the head, which unconsciously forces upon the president the exercise of arbitrary power. Only the

president can make a final decision. No other power is final, no other authority is absolute. He who would govern must also rule, or he will not be able to govern. Like every father, he must rule personally, in detail, and cannot delegate his authority. If he does, he will risk losing it. Men, big and little, will sit for weeks in the antechamber to be heard over a detail that any clerk might have disposed of. But the clerk is a poor shadow of the great father, and so is the member of the cabinet. The personality of the president must be part of every minor transaction between the rural folk and their government — time matters not at all. Years may be spent in securing an audience just so as to have the judgment come from the only source where authority is not only political, but also moral. It is in this situation that administration breaks down.

Like a good father, the president cannot say no, and if he does, the no is not final. Surely the father's heart can be mellowed, his kindness reawakened, his true virtues as the father of his children brought to bear upon the issues in hand. These issues are so small, so unimportant, and the president is so great and so all-powerful, that only bad advisers stand in the way of his doing the justice the people ask for. And if he refuses, then he is no true father, he is no true leader, he governs arbitrarily and without moral authority. He is a stepfather, a tyrant, a usurper, a villain, or he has no power, being a tool of unfriendly and inimical forces. It becomes essential to drive him from office. There is no alternative between personal government and revolution. Inefficiency, corruption, cruelty — if personal — are all acceptable. What is not acceptable is the cold, impersonal, efficient government. Compliance is not important, the promise is. The people will wait, if they are not denied.

Traditionally speaking, the president of Mexico must be able to do everything he wants to, or he will be unable to do anything he wants to. He either has all power or no power; there is no middle ground. The constitutional formula for a division of powers among the legislative, judicial and executive is merely a formula. And this is so because, outside of the army, there is really no effective body politic that the government can rest upon.

The administration — that is, the president — must be its own architect of political security. The government is unstable except in so far as the president can stabilize it, and all of his efforts are bent toward giving it permanence by surrounding it

with friends in every office, every post, every organization, every significant grouping. Those that he cannot control are enemies. If he cannot control his friends, they too become enemies. In effect, he manages all of the political life of the country. The charge that Díaz had puppets in the state governments was true enough. This has always been the case, but it is now easier, legally, than ever before for the central government to determine who can be elected, who can stay in office if elected, and who is to be removed if it becomes desirable that he should be removed. The cause can always be provided, the machinery to eject the undesirable official is permanently available, and the fiction of state sovereignty remains a fiction as always. The Constitution of 1917 has made it simpler for the president to be a dictator than it used to be. It has always been necessary.

III

The organization of the P.N.R. (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario*) by Calles in 1928 merely facilitated what was already a sanctioned if not a sanctified practice. Under the Constitution, the Senate has the duty of deciding upon the legality of a state government, or of breaking off all federal relations with the state; and the Senate, therefore, ultimately decides who has been elected governor. But the Senate, like the governor of a state, is also a creature of the president, and the permanent committee of the Senate, which acts when that body is not in session, is hand-picked by the president. It is he who finally decides who has been elected governor of the state. The question of the legality of the state government comes before the federal government in many ways. Most frequently the question comes before the federal government because two and sometimes three governors, each with his own legislature, claims to have been elected by a huge majority. As the local legislature must decide who has been elected and then must have the count accepted by the federal government, it always follows that each candidate for state governor has his own legislature elected with him. After the election, two or three state legislatures each announce that their candidates have been elected, establish themselves as near the state capitol building as possible, organize a government, and bombard the president, the secretary of the interior, and the Senate with telegrams announcing their candidate's election. It is a little difficult to believe that three candidates have all been

elected for the office of governor at the same time. It therefore falls upon the permanent committee acting for the Senate to make the decision as to who was really elected. But the permanent committee is the arm of the president, and the president, therefore, really makes the final decision. Once the issue has been settled, the local military chieftain is instructed to see to it that the properly certified governor is permitted to take office, and to enter the state capitol building. The president has to make the decision. If he did not, there would be civil war in the state.

I recall one instance in Aguascalientes, after an election for governor, when the president happened to arrive there. He was met by a large crowd in an organized parade, armed with banners, demanding that its candidate be recognized, insisting that he had been elected. There was much shouting and yelling, and the president heard many strong words and speeches on his way to the state capitol building. Finally, after settling down in the state capital for a while, he came out on the balcony and made a statement to the people in the square below. He said that the central government had no interest in the local election except that a good man be elevated to the office of governor. Two men could not both occupy the governor's chair at the same time, and if the candidate the crowd was clamoring for had really been elected by a majority, he would see to it that he was put in office in spite of the fact that the other man had already been declared legally elected. But if the man they were opposing was really the properly chosen official, *he would take the responsibility of keeping him in office.* To keep the peace, the federal government must choose the local governor, and be prepared to enforce its decision, as there is no other authority which could enforce its will, or even the will of the majority, without a test of arms.

There have been many instances when within one year the federal government removed a number of governors. Thus in 1935 the Senate removed the governors of Sonora, Sinaloa, Guanajuato and Durango. President Alemán has removed six governors in the last two years. The governors, in spite of the federal system established by the Constitution, are the instruments of the president. And it is further clear that this is so because it is the only way of minimizing the prospect of rebellion.

The continuous fence-building so essential to the preservation of the president's political power takes another form. The president controls the election of the members to the Congress and

the Senate. No one can be elected to either without his consent and approval. I have seen a man who thought himself elected senator, and whom everyone else thought to have been elected, arriving in Mexico City, flushed with victory, living in the best hotel, spending money freely. Then suddenly I saw him crestfallen, moving out of the hotel, counting his pennies. "What has happened?" I asked. "The old man thinks I was not elected." "What are you going to do?" "The old man has given me a good *chamba*. He has made me collector of customs in Matamoros. He really is a good person and knows what is best."

The technique is a simple one. The Senate and Congress each pass on the credentials of their own newly-elected members, and they seat the right persons. The Senate and the Congress have to be hand-picked. They are an essential tool in the effective political control of the country. If the members of Congress were not controlled by the president, it would be impossible to govern in Mexico, except by sheer and unattenuated dictatorship. This way there is some semblance and, in effect, some measure of democratic politics even inside so highly centralized a government.

The same course occurs with members of the House of Congress. A friend of mine in Mexico, a young and devoted attendant of the president, told me one day that he wanted to be a member of Congress. I asked him if he had talked with the president. "Oh, yes," he replied. Two months later I learned that he had been elected. "Tell me exactly what happened. I want to know how you were elected." "Well, it was this way. We had an election but my opponents stole all my ballots." "What did you do?" I queried. "Well, you can't go before the committee without ballots so my friends and I sat down and made up the ballots. We knew everyone had voted for me." "And you were elected?" "Yes, unanimously." Two years later he had been elected senator. I said to him, "I hear you have been elected senator." "Yes," he replied, "unanimously." This is a verbatim report. He could only be elected at the will of the president, as was everyone else.

It is not that there is no electoral machinery. There is. Nor is its greatest shortcoming the cumbersome manner in which it is administered. The difficulty lies in something else. It lies in the absence of an effective independent political conscience and organization upon which a government can rest. The government, to survive in peace, must devise its own party, its own governors,

its own members of Congress. The alternative is chaos and rebellion. It is not necessarily true that this system in the hands of a good man is less representative of the interests of the people. It may be in a sense democratic, but it does not rest upon effective suffrage. It is no one leader's fault. It is not even the fault of any one historical period. Nor is it suddenly and easily remediable.

It will not be easy for the reader to understand the significance of these controls unless he recognizes them as part of the technique for passing on the administration from one president who can complete his term to the next incumbent in office. If the machinery were to break down, the next election would be settled by violence and civil war. It is really an instrumentality for the maintenance of internal peace. I am not sure that the Mexicans themselves appreciate this fact. The behavior is automatic and determined by tradition, and it operates upon a kind of political "instinct" or intuition. But that is the function it serves. The most important decision that the president has to make, and that fairly early in his own administration, is who is to be his successor. Someone has to make that decision, and he who can make it becomes the effective head of the government. If the president cannot or will not do it, then he will either be faced with a revolution or become a mere puppet of the group surrounding the new candidate.

I am not even sure that the decision has to be formalized until fairly late, but there arises a kind of implicit commitment which everyone "in the know" understands. Watching Mexican politics closely, one begins to discern the drift of the new alignment by noting changes in the cabinet, and asking: Whose friends are they? What is true of members of Congress and the cabinet is true of the army. Who has been promoted, or retired? Who has been shifted in command from one post to another? All are evidences of political manœuvring. An unreliable general is suddenly shifted to another state in which the president feels absolutely sure of the lower officers. The general knows it and his hands are tied. It used to be customary for the general to move with his own troops. He had raised them and trained them, and they were his people. It took three unsuccessful revolutions after 1920 and the purging of hundreds of army officers before the principle could be established that the troops a general commanded did not belong to him, and that he could be moved without them. It was one of the essential conditions to the peaceful succession of power

IV

The election campaigns, speeches and propaganda are part of the play for the alignment of the popular opinion for or against the prospective candidate; and, at the same time, they tend to strengthen the conviction that the right candidate has been chosen. A political campaign in Mexico is in the nature of make-believe. The candidate who has official approval is certain of election. Tradition and popular expectation ask for a campaign and for General Cárdenas, for example, the period of the campaign was an opportunity to travel into every corner of the country and visit the humblest villages in the mountain regions. But the election itself is never in doubt. The opposition candidates have, in spite of an active campaign, no expectation of being elected. They know that their people will probably not be permitted to vote; that if they do vote their vote will not be counted; that, if counted, and sent into the final test in the national Congress, it will be disregarded; and finally, that if elected by some strange accident, they could not govern. An opposition candidate, elected to the presidency, could not if he took power even name his own private secretary. In fact, the election is decided before the voting takes place. It is decided by those who are going to count the votes officially, and their count was determined before they were entrusted with the privilege of going through the motions.

What, then, is the purpose of the opposition candidates, parties and campaigns? The answer, I think, is clear: it is to build up moral justification for a revolution. No one is fooled by the process. No one expects the opposition to win. No government has ever lost an election unless it was first driven from office by force. What the opposition does expect is that it can so work on the popular discontent, so stir up political passions, so confuse public opinion that it can win the allegiance of large masses of people to its side, and especially that of the army. There is always some hope that parts of the army can be won over — sometimes the whole army, or nearly the whole army, as in the electoral campaign of Obregón against Bonilla in 1920. If the army can be won over, or if a part of the army can be won over, then the electoral campaign may have helped to provide the moral environment within which the rebellion can be successful.

Luis Cabrera has suggested that there have been more than a

thousand pronunciamientos between 1812 and 1921, but only three revolutions. The distinction is important. The military uprising is an electoral device, a way of changing the authorities in power, of driving out one government and replacing it with another. A peaceful election is frequently regarded as an evidence of imposition. When the government is strong enough to assure the election of the official candidate without violence, as in the case of the long Díaz régime, it is a sure sign of tyranny. A rebellion has, therefore, the respectable dress of an attempt to give the opposition a chance to secure office. The fact that, if successful, it will play the same preponderant rôle as the actual government in electing the next preferred candidate, is beside the point. If there had been no rebellion, the government in office would have perpetuated itself by imposing a chosen candidate. Rebellion, therefore, is an accepted instrumentality in an electoral campaign. If it does not occur, it is sometimes due to the fear that the United States will take sides with the government in power. That was certainly the case in the election when Almazán was defeated for the presidency.

But while rebellion is an electoral device, revolution is an accepted instrument of social and economic change. This kind of revolution may have the approval even of the conservative elements in Mexico. An illegal revolution, which ultimately becomes legal because it succeeds in imposing its desires upon the nation by force and rewriting the law to fit its program, is considered necessary "in such countries as ours." The political philosophy of Mexico is saturated with the belief in violence, both for electoral purposes and for social change.

The official government party, regardless of the various names which have been given it by the different governments, is in effect the recognized electoral machinery of the administration. Although other parties are in existence, free speech is unrestricted, and political activities and organizations go on, the effective electoral control is organized by the government through this new instrumentality, and it has tended to reduce violence in political elections. If there were no official party, the elections would no more reflect popular suffrage than they do now. But they would be less free from local violence. The party in power — that is, the group that made the revolution in 1910 and retains its hold in office — has found a medium to carry on the government without having to fight a new revolution over every presi-

dential election and face civil strife in every state at every local election.

The political outcome of the revolution has, clearly enough, greatly strengthened the power of the central government and of the president. The one single government-party system is merely additional evidence of the fact. It has given the presidency an officially sponsored agency to deal with Mexican politics. The older Díaz tradition of control by disregard of the law — for it has been truly said that the Constitution of 1857 was forgotten in his personal administration — has been replaced by a constitutional mandate to control the state governments. The creation of an officially sponsored party has facilitated the control of Mexican politics.

To some extent, the difference between the old system of Díaz and the present one is the difference between open and secret control. Both the constitutional provisions and the government party system tend to make the centralized control of the political life of the country matters of greater public knowledge, and to that extent tend to make them a more conscious part of the life of the nation. Their very legality and publicity tend to have a restraining influence upon the too arbitrary use of the powers at the president's disposal. With all of their shortcomings, these changes must be recognized as, on the whole, a stabilizing and democratizing influence in Mexican political life.

V

The Mexican complex is such that the alternative to highly centralized power is anarchy; and, for the time being, anyway, the revolution has tended in the direction of centralized temporary power. The one clear gain, politically, is the principle of no reëlection. Obregón tried for reëlection but was assassinated, and that, perhaps, was the last attempt in that direction for a long time. The president can, within limits, perpetuate his policies by throwing his influence toward the election of his successor; in fact, as we have noted, he must do so. But he cannot succeed himself or, as things stand, be a candidate again at any time.

This change has not eliminated the army from politics, but it has to some extent changed the character of the army's participation. The individual general probably can no longer impose himself upon the nation because he happens to have a group of friends who will follow him in battle. But as long as the central govern-

ment has to use the army for its own political purposes in controlling the states, the army is bound to possess great political influence, and no man could come to the office of the presidency against its will.

But a significant new influence has come into being, politically speaking, in the form of the organized labor unions and the agrarian communities. These have given the government a wider base in the populace, and this change is especially important for its latent implications. In a crisis, as was shown at the time of the De la Huerta and Escobar rebellions, the labor unions and the agrarian communities, especially the latter, proved of very real military value to the government. The rebels found that they could hold only the land they physically occupied, for the agrarian communities were hostile to them and actively supported the government. These two new institutions are, however, bound hand and foot by the government.

It is hard to see how the agrarian communities can emancipate themselves. The government's participation, especially in the large coöperative *ejidos*, is such that it has, in a measure, replaced the old plantation owner. The Banco Ejidal extends credit to these communities between the crops. It does not pay wages. The credit is a weekly allowance to be repaid out of the crop. The profit is divided between the members of the *ejido*. But the bank must, for its own safety, have a degree of supervision which makes the federal government an integral part of their every activity. Presumably, in time — but not at any visible time — these communities will accumulate enough savings to become their own credit agency. They could then become an independent influence in politics. For the time being, they are part of the governmental machine, but nonetheless they have given the government a wider base than it had before.

Something of the same is true of organized labor. There is no independent trade union movement of any consequence in Mexico. There are a few unions that have outlived government opposition, but they are not strong or numerous. The great movements in labor were not self-sustaining — in the time of Calles the C.R.O.M. (*Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana*) was a child of the Obregón and Calles governments, and the C.T.M. (*Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos*) was a creature of the later administrations. The government has financed, protected and nurtured the trade union movement as a stick to lean upon, or

to be used against its political enemies in and out of the country. But the stick is only as strong as the arm that wields it. The trade union movement may, in time, become politically independent. Today it is important chiefly as the vehicle of the politics of the administration, that is, the policies of the president. The unions and the *ejidos* serve one important function; they give the president a seeming, and in a measure a real, support in the populace. That has political significance for the future.

But with the widened base for the government, there has come an increase in the range of its responsibilities. The federal government has both by constitutional mandate and by legislative provisions assumed a supervising interest over all mining, the moving picture industry, commerce, banking, the electrical industry, public health, public education, labor, land distribution and agricultural credit through the *ejidal* bank. In addition, there are other activities which are now largely in the hands of the federal government, such as road building, aviation, the railroads, the oil industry, coastwise transportation, the tourist industry, telegraphs, and through the control of labor or credit, textiles, sugar and cotton.

That is, the centralized government has assumed the burden of managing the greater part of the economy of the nation. The president has become the arbiter of the economic activities of the people. The burden of governing is infinitely greater than it was when the revolution began, and the political instrumentality has not grown to equal the new burdens. The idea of a directed economy has taken increased hold of the government, while the character of the political machinery has changed but little in comparison to the new administrative responsibilities. Nor has the efficiency of government nor the integrity of the bureaucracy kept pace with the increased powers of the government over the national economy. There is even some reason to assume that the older habits of petty graft have increased with the newer opportunities. It is no accident that the prevailing political mood in Mexico is cynicism. Graft had a kind of traditional sanction when most of the economy of the nation was in foreign hands, when government officials shared through special favors some of the profits of private concerns. But when the government itself is the major entrepreneur, through direct or indirect control, the problem is different. The growth of that kind of selfless public service which the situation demands is not in sight.

The political disequilibrium in Mexico lies in part in the nature of the tax system. Most of the tax collected goes to the federal government. The states receive a pittance and the municipalities even less. It thus turns out that all other political units in the government are dependent upon the federal government for favors. I have seen towns build their schools with their own hands, and then sit around for years waiting for the state or federal government to give them the money to buy the windows or doors which they could not make, or even send a delegation a hundred miles to see the governor or even the president in Mexico City for the same purpose. What is true of the school is true of a bridge, of a pipe for a water system, of an engine to turn a mill. There is really no prospect of Mexico possessing a vigorous democratic government resting upon a broad popular base unless the flow in income from taxes is redirected so that the towns, the municipalities and the states can enjoy financial independence. This is probably the change most essential to Mexico's welfare, but it is the one least likely to occur.

This analysis should not be thought to be an unfriendly comment on the presidential powers. The executive must be strong in Mexico, or Mexico will face revolution. The alternative to a strong president is rebellion. The alternative to political decisions made in detail and enforced by the president is decisions which no one can enforce. The fact of the matter is that the president must decide because no one else's decision will be accepted. The older tradition that the king rules has survived in modern dress: the president rules. He rules rather than governs, and must do so if he is to survive in office or if he is to keep the country at peace. The issue, in political terms, is the absence of effective political opposition. All opposition presumes eventual revolution. If and when there develops in Mexico the tradition of "his majesty's loyal opposition," loyal to the government, even if opposed to its policies, then it may come about that party government rather than personal government will become the rule. But that day is still a long way off.

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE BRITISH COLONIES

By Britannicus

UNTIL the decade before the last world war, British policy in the colonies had aimed chiefly at the establishment of order, the extension of the rule of law, the control of abuses, the creation of sound administration, the practice of justice and the supply of essential public works, such as roads. This was thought the proper preparation for self-government. The abolition of colonial status was the long-range objective. "Development" was largely left to the administrators on the spot. Sometimes they were helped to pay for their administration by a grant-in-aid from the British Treasury; but, in the main, they raised the revenue they needed by indirect taxes and provided only the services which could be paid for from that revenue. The Government of Britain laid down broad principles of policy, but the local governor, who enjoyed a wide discretion, could do little for health and educational services and even less in developing the economic resources of the territory.

Economic policy in those days was based on free access by all nations to raw materials, free markets and non-discrimination, all without regard for the interests of the indigenous people. There was little regulation or control of economic development. Such enterprise as came about was often wasteful and inefficient and not infrequently led to exploitation of materials and human beings, particularly in the areas of non-European settlement. British achievements in the field of colonial administration were considerable, and in many areas colonial governments protected native rights and regulated the incursion of alien enterprise. But the prevailing economic conception of the period was expressed in terms of concession hunting and the opening up of territories for the production of minerals and all the raw materials wanted by the expanding industrial economies of Europe and America. The plantations founded by foreigners not infrequently disturbed the native economies profoundly. Intolerable labor conditions were often permitted in enterprise designed to meet the demands for cheap commodities. Some of this enterprise brought railways, roads, markets and further opportunities for investment, but the whole picture was one of intolerably low standards of living,

famine, disease, ignorance and inertia side by side with exploitation, depressions, primitive methods and unscientific operations in general.

This was the stage often described as economic imperialism. Under it, colonial governments were only too glad to receive what revenues such enterprise produced, but wealth was drained from the territories and the profits of production, enterprise and trade were enjoyed elsewhere. Savings were not put back into the colony for its further development. The basic social problems of ignorance, poverty and disease remained unsolved. The Missions provided some schooling and health services, but local governments, divorced from public control and responsibility, were satisfied if order was maintained and sufficient revenues raised so that a grant-in-aid from the mother country would not be needed. Policy was expressed in terms of liberalism — justice and order in the place of tribal war and savagery. Economic planning was not considered the concern of governments. It was thought that the building up of self-governing colonies was prejudiced by metropolitan aid and interference, and it was strongly held that the varied collection of territories could not be governed by directives from the center. Thus it was that except in the Far East, the government constructed only the minimum of essential public works. Commerce and industry and often the provision of public utilities were left to private capital; and not even very much private capital was attracted to Africa, because of the great obstacles which nature offered to development there.

II

It was against this economic background that the neglect of the British colonies came to be measured. Anyone who claims the right to find fault with the degree of development which had taken place up to the Second World War must, however, remember that in tropical and sub-tropical areas the whole environment usually has to be controlled and transformed to make life tolerable. The problems of pests and diseases, of water and soil conservation, are immensely formidable in tropical conditions. And programs of development must continuously struggle against the conservatism and inflexibility of the native peoples. In fairness, too, we may note that the poverty, social maladjustment and neglect of the people's welfare are greater in many sovereign states than in comparable British colonies.

The depression which began in 1929 made intervention by government in economic matters essential, and the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was an expression of the fact that economic planning in the colonies was needed on a scale which could not be met by the private entrepreneur. Its purpose was to promote collaboration with each territory in order "to promote commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom," and it appropriated £1,000,000 a year for economic development. The Act did not relay detailed instructions from London to the colonies, but limited itself to approving broad general lines of expansion.

It is unnecessary to record the inadequacies of the 1929 Act. Although colonial needs were imperative, the capital sum made available by the Act was never used in any single year. Projects were not begun because recurrent costs could not be met by colonial governments, which were suffering heavily from the collapse of prices and markets. Nevertheless, many useful things were done. The Colonial Office created an economic department, and some colonial governments began to think in terms of colony-wide plans for economic activities as well as social services.

By the time the Second World War came, when investigations into troubles arising in some of the colonies revealed the degree of poverty and social misery which afflicted them, it was obvious that the colonial governments would have to take a hand in planning economic development. It was clear, too, that the government in London would have to give assistance, and that the aid would range from technical advice to "pump priming" loans and grants. It was in these circumstances that Parliament enacted the 1940 Act, providing £5,000,000 a year for ten years, and a further £500,000 a year for research.

The new Act envisioned a balanced and comprehensive plan of development and authorized the making of "schemes for any purpose likely to promote the development of the Resources of any Colony or the welfare of its people." Thus the laissez faire attitude to the colonies came to an end. In pursuit of its primary object — "to promote the prosperity and happiness of the peoples of the Colonial Empire" — the Act was designed to stimulate both social and economic ten-year plans. It also made possible the creation of central services in the Colonial Office, and widened research and put it on a new basis.

The funds made available under the Act were insufficient, how-

ever, and another Act of 1945 increased assistance to a total of £120,000,000 for ten years, and permitted expenditure up to £17,500,000 in any one year, of which not more than £1,000,000 might be for research. This ampler provision made it possible for territories to contemplate long-term and large-scale schemes of development of public works, social services and agriculture and also to consider very broad regional schemes in matters such as health and communications which transcended local boundaries. It enjoined the colonial governments to include in their plans schemes drawing on their own resources and capacity to raise loans, and directed them to maintain proper balance between welfare services and economic development.

In recent years flexible and realistic programs for the succeeding ten-year period have been prepared for almost every British colonial territory. They have been conceived in the territory, and generally have been worked out by the local government in consultation with its peoples and with competent technical advisers. It has been necessary to devise new methods of handling plans for development, for they must not only be "colonial," in the sense that they are an expression of the ideas of the people in the colony, but they must be supported by local money. Thus, of 17 ten-year programs now under consideration in London involving £176,000,000, it is estimated that £69,000,000 will come from local revenues and £51,000,000 from local loans. There can therefore be no question of London imposing its plans, or attempting to weaken the financial responsibility of the colonies. It cannot call the tune, for it does not pay the piper. The rôle of the Colonial Office is limited, but it must satisfy itself that the principles of the schemes are sound, that the program is one of balanced development and that the individual projects are well conceived. For this purpose a specially created Colonial Economic and Development Council advises the Secretary of State. Its duty is to consider the problems of each colony as a whole, to point out the fundamental needs and suggest how best to meet them, and to advise upon the relative priorities for development schemes. The Council likewise studies the possibilities of large-scale development and the requirements of the entire region of which the colony is a part.

III

It has sometimes been said in criticism that, in the allocation of

funds under the 1945 Act, social welfare has received greater consideration than economic development. But such things as a supply of pure water, information about nutrition, preventive and social medicine, technical and trade education are vital factors in economic activity. In any case, the balance as between one kind of expenditure and another has been preserved, for it would be useless to build up social services without at the same time expanding production and wealth so that the services could be sustained when self-government was realized. Nor should the growth of self-reliance and responsibility in a territory be weakened by too great a dependence on external aid. Consequently, the programs of most colonies are a mixture of measures calculated to increase wealth, manpower and social amenities, to open up new resources and to extend the taxable capacity of the individual to sustain the ever-rising standard of living.

The Act has also encouraged regional planning in such fields as health, communications and power, as well as a larger measure of collaboration between contiguous colonies or the colonies in a region. In addition it has stimulated international regional planning in both social and economic matters, and increasingly associated the colonial peoples with it. The technical advisory system of the Comptroller in the British West Indies, the Interterritorial Organization in East Africa and the Caribbean Commission are but several examples of the progress already made in this direction.

In the last few years the whole field of colonial research has also been surveyed — medical, agricultural, social and economic — and much new work begun. New knowledge is being applied to great advantage in the work of the administration and technicians in the field, as well as in the utilization of products from the colonies. The Colonial Office has also established many new services such as geological and topographical surveys for charting the resources of a territory, arrangements for technical institutions and universities, welfare services for colonial students in Britain, better public relations, and training of the administrative and technical staffs, including those born and recruited in the colony. Thus there has been set up machinery through which Britain is attempting to stimulate the development and welfare of the 60,000,000 people in her dependent territories, some of them still backward socially, and each with its individual and complex problems.

The development schemes are principally concerned, on the economic side, with roads, ports, railways and other transport facilities, water supplies, irrigation, soil conservation and improvement of agricultural methods, the supply of power and fuel, eradication of pests, wiping out of diseases of plants, animals and human beings. General commercial expansion was deliberately avoided. At this stage local governments should be concerned simply to provide the basic utilities and services on which all other economic activity depends. It should be noted, however, that many colonial governments have had to reduce their programs because of postwar shortages. Some ambitious plans have had to be adjusted to the actual resources of machinery, materials and finance likely to be available as the work proceeds.

There has also been much political progress. Nearly all the colonial institutions have been overhauled in recent years, and there is better representation in local government, more responsibility and greater participation by colonial peoples in the local services. But though political progress in the colonies based on ideas of popular consent has been widely achieved, it is also recognized that political freedom should ideally march hand-in-hand with economic advancement. Democratic rights for vast peasant populations too preoccupied with winning a livelihood from the soil are only too apt to prove an empty boon. True progress is achieved only insofar as people can exercise those rights; in short, insofar as those rights march with the standard of living. But such a conception also requires that more and more of the people of the territory qualify to serve in the administrative and technical services of the country, receive suitable trade and technical instruction, and understand and coöperate with the government in the shaping of the programs. Through such participation, the peoples of the colonies know that their country is being developed for their own well-being.

A few figures of the grant already made by the British taxpayer might be given. Under the 1940 Act, £6,000,000 was allocated for agriculture, forestry, veterinary services and fisheries, £4,200,000 for communications and transport, £2,700,000 for housing and land settlement, £6,500,000 for water supplies and irrigation and £450,000 for industrial development and public utilities. Under the 1945 Act, another £3,000,000 has been allocated for agriculture, forestry, irrigation and drainage. This money will be used for new works and services and represents one of the first install-

ments of the £120,000,000 allocated under the 1945 Act. To these sums must be added £150,000,000 from local colonial revenues and loans, a fact which indicates the coöperation of the colonies themselves in the development and welfare programs.

But the Colonial Office does not hold that the provision for colonial development under the Act of 1945 is enough. Existing production must be expanded and new enterprise created. In the past, private enterprise has for a variety of reasons failed to fill the bill in most colonies. Little local capital has been available for new enterprise, and the poverty in the territories has made them insufficient markets for industry. There is, of course, a variety of enterprise already operating in the colonies; they supply a large measure of the world's requirements of rubber and cocoa, and much of its fibers, vegetable oils, sugar and tropical fruits. In recent years there has been great expansion in the production of commodities such as groundnuts from Nigeria, hardwood from West Africa and tea from East Africa, to mention only a few; and expansion of rubber output in Malaya has been remarkable. There are many important projects in train under private enterprise, such as a big transport project in West Africa, new sugar factories in Jamaica and British Guiana, mining extensions in Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, British Guiana, Nigeria and the Gold Coast, oil refining in Trinidad, timber production in West Africa, Gold Coast, East Africa and British Guiana, and manufacturing industries in Nigeria, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia.

But something more than the efforts of private enterprise are necessary if full economic development in the dependent territories is to be assured. Today there is demand for almost all commodities which can be produced in the tropical and subtropical regions where most British colonies are. The difficulties hampering production can be surmounted only slowly and at great expense of time and materials. They include problems of water supply, bush clearance, soil infertility and disease over vast areas. The available labor is often scarce, inefficient and suffering from ill health. There is a lack of the accumulated social capital, *e.g.* roads, waterworks, schools, hospitals, and so on, which we take for granted in Europe and the United States. Many local customs and habits, and local conventions in regard to land holding and so on, are obstacles to large-scale undertakings. And finally, there is a lack of scientists — agriculturists, engineers,

doctors, veterinary officers, geologists — and of capital goods like machinery and steel, and of consumers goods to encourage production. It is understandable that private enterprise should be deterred from any but the easier and more lucrative schemes.

If private enterprise cannot fill the bill, then government must do so. The Overseas Resources Act was adopted last year for the promotion of enterprise, whether public or private. Under it, twin development corporations have been set up: a Colonial Corporation with borrowing powers up to £110,000,000, and an Overseas Food Corporation with borrowing powers up to £55,000,000. The former corporation will either itself, or in association with a colonial government, or in partnership with private enterprise, or by employing a public or private concern, expand or create new enterprise in any colony, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the local colonial government. The corporation will be less concerned with utilities and public works — these normally fall to the local government, though the Corporation is not forbidden to undertake them — and more concerned with commercial, industrial, agricultural and mining ventures. The Overseas Food Corporation, whose operations extend to a wider field than colonies and whose production covers food and ancillary products, may be employed as a public agency when the Secretary of State and Colonial Government are satisfied that more efficient and economic operations are possible in the colonies under that body.

Already, it is responsible for the groundnuts scheme in East Africa, a highly mechanized operation in vast wastes of tsetse-ridden land, where railways, ports, roads, schools, housing, medical services, workshops and training centers have all to be created. The capital of this great public enterprise will exceed £27,000,000. Such development requires the close coöperation of the local government, for it is the colonial government which must see that minimum standards of welfare and employment are observed, and that the project is consistent with the larger social policy of the territory. This particular scheme has been much discussed and consequently need not be described in detail, but we may note that it should be the forerunner of other comparable projects. Some which are very interesting, though smaller, are already under consideration.

To pave the way for these projects there has been much reconnaissance by the Colonial Office, in coöperation with local govern-

ments. For instance, a special committee on primary products has studied the long-term interests of the territories, the present and prospective world needs, the desirability of increasing foreign exchange resources for their expansion, and so on. Missions have been sent to make on-the-spot investigations in the production of such foods as rice and associated crops in West Africa, Borneo and British Guiana, and of groundnuts in West Africa. Studies of coal deposits have been made in North Borneo and Labuan, and of phosphates in Uganda. Working parties have visited colonies to advise on increasing the efficiency of certain industries. A commission has investigated settlement and development possibilities in British Guiana and British Honduras. Surveys of central and eastern Africa have been made from the air, using methods of radar control; photographs of great expanses of territory provide data for accurate mapping of regions not previously charted.

Other schemes are being worked out by the local governments. The Nigerian Government set up the Cameroons Development Corporation as a public enterprise to take over the former German-owned estates and is developing the production of bananas, palm oil, rubber, tea and cocoa. A publicly-controlled mineral prospecting company has also been formed in the Cameroons. In the Gold Coast, the government has set up a public industrial corporation with a mandate to establish or assist secondary industries. A Government Industries Board covering six industries has emerged in Kenya and the government-owned coal mines at Enugu in Nigeria continue to expand. In Tanganyika, the government has associated itself with a private company in a £500,000 project to set up a meat-canning factory; and the Uganda Government is proceeding with the major hydroelectric development of the Owen Falls at the source of the Nile.

Economic development over so wide a field needs the supervision and technical assistance of special organizations in London as well as in the territories themselves. It is for this purpose that the Colonial Economic and Development Council keeps an eye on the over-all picture. The Colonial Office also maintains expert advisory committees and research organizations in every section of public affairs. And besides the central help and supervision in London there is collaboration in certain regions between the British territories themselves, and also between Britain and other colonial Powers. International technical conferences have been

held in the Carribbean. An international medical conference was held at Accra in 1945, and a veterinary conference at Dakar in 1946. A conference on plant diseases was held in Brussels in 1947, one on education in London in 1947 and one on nutrition in Paris in 1947. Talks with France have already been initiated on price policy, inter-colonial trade, and common development plans.

IV

This, briefly and in broad terms, is the economic work which Britain is doing and encouraging in her dependent territories. Various aspects of the subject have not been dealt with in this résumé, such as the selection, training and refreshing of men in the Colonial Services and the means whereby the vivid experiences and problems of the bush are brought into the Colonial Office itself. The British Government hopes that the nationalist aspirations of the colonial people are being directed into responsible and constructive channels. Britain has accepted the task of joining with the colonies as a partner in building an economic foundation on which democracy will stand secure. Self-government in Ceylon, in India and Burma is the triumph of her policy and the fulfillment of her trust.

Integration of the colonial economies with the British economy is by no means a new kind of exploitation. There is no desire to dominate them, nor do the colonial peoples think of abandoning the old ideal of self-government for a new economic dispensation. But it is unmistakable that economic development in the colonies turns largely on the social and economic health of Britain; and at the same time, it is apparent that expansion of production in the colonies can help overcome some of the shortages in foodstuffs and materials in Britain. In short, common planning is to the advantage of both. Its success will depend to a great extent upon the degree of confidence and good-will which the colonial peoples feel for the program. That is why methods of consultation must be used and plans must be made subject to agreement by the colonial peoples, acting through their own governments. This approach is not likely to achieve quick and spectacular results. Plans imposed upon people from above, supposedly for their own good, seem faster and are more striking; but the method of democracy works better in the long run. That is the spirit which animates British colonial policy.

"REËDUCATION" IN GERMANY

TEACHING GERMANS TO TEACH THEMSELVES

By William F. Russell

GERMANY is a wreck. In a recent visit to Munich, for example — a city which I knew as well as I know New York — I could not tell where I was. But the schools are going full blast. If you get up early enough you see the streets full of boys and girls with book knapsacks on their backs, and late in the afternoon you see them going home. They are not so badly dressed and they look pretty well fed. Not many school buildings escaped damage. Paper and pencils, pen and ink are scarce, and there are not many books — but the Germans never depended much on textbooks anyway. Non-Nazi teachers have been found, principals and superintendents have been appointed, and the Germans are going at the business of education in their thorough way, with all children in school for long hours and about 25 percent more school days a year than we have in America.

Among the German school people there is a good deal of talk of school reform, and no little evidence that the interest is genuine. The superintendent of schools in Munich showed me a chart of a new organization and explained that all children now study together up to ten years of age before being divided into what we would call vocational and college preparatory groups; all must stay in school until the age of 14, and then for some there is part-time school and part-time employment. School committees in Wiesbaden and Berlin told me in detail how they were "democratizing" their education to avoid errors of the past. In Stuttgart, rubble was being ground to make concrete blocks for a new Teachers Institute, which was to combine some five former normal schools and would train teachers of elementary schools and teachers of high schools in the same classes under identical conditions. This is a radical reform for Germany, where teachers for the well-to-do have always kept apart from the teachers of the common people. And there are new-type tests specially constructed for German pupils, modern educational films for the villages, committees for the revision of the curriculum and textbooks, and so on.

There were sporadic efforts to change German education in the past, and just after the last war various experiments were tried; indeed, there is hardly an innovation for which a precedent could not be found in some German school or in the writings of some German educator. But the fact is that the current reform was started not by Germans but by the American Military Government. The Germans seem to be taking it up. The question is — what will come of it?

Even in the first enthusiasm of V-E Day it was apparent that all too much of the talk about wiping out war and hatred by changing schoolbooks and teaching international peace and good will was optimistic, to say the least. There were plans for sending thousands of American teachers to Germany to exorcise the devil of militarism from the German soul; there was talk of bringing thousands of German teachers to the United States. UNESCO stated confidently that "wars begin in the minds of men;" and from that premise the path ran straight to the conclusion that we can have peace by teaching it in the schools. Some went on to plan for one single history book, to be translated into all languages, and taught in all schools of the world. Admirable hopes — but not a basis for our national safety. Certainly Germany's neighbors will not entrust their safety to such plans — and I think it is correct to say that no one in AMG has any intention of doing so. The top men in the program of German education of AMG know Germany and know their business. They include the President of the University of Indiana, the Commissioner of Education in Connecticut, a professor of Teachers College, Columbia University, who for 30 years has specialized in German education, the former superintendent of schools of Madison, New Jersey, and the principal of the high school of Portales, New Mexico.

AMG is in Germany for three main purposes: 1, to keep order; 2, to put Germany sufficiently on her feet so that she can carry on without subsidy from the American taxpayer; and 3, to change Germany from a country that has been a menace to the world into one that can be lived with in safety. So far as education goes, fulfilment of the first aim merely means keeping the children off the streets and occupied. The second and third are the important ones. What part can "reëducation" actually expect to play in the attainment of these objectives?

II

Prior to the war, Trizonia produced food enough to provide only from 1,000 to 1,200 calories per person. Immigration from the Russian Zone and the countries to the east has greatly increased the population. Western Germany will be able to feed herself only if the population is greatly decreased, or if agriculture is greatly improved, or if sufficient raw materials and manufactured products are exported to match imports of goods. It is unlikely that large-scale emigration will be encouraged; increased agricultural and industrial production provides the only acceptable solution.

Increased agricultural production is possible. Agricultural experts in AMG were greatly surprised to find German agriculture so backward. For instance, it is the habit of the peasants to harrow the oats only once, whereas by harrowing twice the yield could be increased 40 percent. German farmers habitually plant tiny potatoes whole, and refuse to slice large potatoes for seed, though this would greatly increase the yield. The German Higher Agricultural Schools and Experiment Stations have long known how to improve German farming, but their knowledge is not used. AMG is on the right track in its encouragement of agricultural education, farm extension work, adult education in the villages, youth work along the lines of the 4-H Clubs and Future Farmers of America, community forums, traveling motion pictures. Its short and resident courses in agriculture for young farm men and women along the lines of the University of Wisconsin People's College and the Danish Agricultural Schools are also promising.

Increased industrial production is likewise possible. Here again, AMG experts in industrial education were surprised to find that the vaunted mechanical skill of the Germans is little in evidence. Americans in Germany have difficulty in finding mechanics who can repair an automobile, a radio or a piece of household equipment. A high degree of technical ability is found among a few skilled workmen, but apparently the ordinary workmen have had very limited training. Thus AMG is properly emphasizing industrial education and trade training, and gearing the type and quantity of this education to future industrial needs. Hesse is now developing the fur industry which formerly was centered in Leipzig (now in the Russian Zone) and youth are being trained

for this trade. Many other industries are being developed and appropriate training provided. The programs in home economics, nutrition, child care, public health and public health nursing, dentistry and social service help promote economic welfare by cutting down absenteeism and by ensuring better use of available food and equipment. These services could profitably be augmented.

It may be that in time it will prove profitable to tie American efforts closer to the German universities and the higher technical colleges, but at the moment the value of such action appears to be doubtful. It was discouraging to note the attitude of many of the university rectors, deans, professors and leaders of the higher technical institutes in Germany, whose sense of social responsibility seemed to be bounded by the ambition to develop erudite learning and pure research, with little or no concern for the needs of the people. The educational theories popular in certain American university circles foster this aloof attitude and taken in the German complex of ideas are likely to do harm. For many years to come, it would seem wiser to center attention on agricultural and industrial education in the schools, on adult education and extension work, and on every means of applying the advanced techniques already known.

III

The second major objective is much more ambitious. For the third time in about a century and a half the Americans are trying to build a new social order. That was the goal within our own country at the time of the formation of the Constitution — witness the motto on the reverse of the Great Seal of the United States: *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, a new order of ages. It was also the goal of the occupation of the Philippines, 47 years ago when the first American teacher landed in Manila. It is now the purpose of our occupation of Germany. I suppose that I have recently talked with some 500 Germans either individually or in groups. They seem to be as civilized and charming as any people you would meet anywhere. A group of 30 advanced German students, with whom I met for an evening in Berlin, had not the slightest idea why anyone in the world could possibly fear people like themselves. Professors, school people, government officials and their wives were equally puzzled. They had nothing to do with starting the war. "It was the American bankers who had loaned

money to Hitler." Not one felt any personal responsibility for what had gone on. People in Munich — only ten miles from Dachau — claimed to know nothing about the atrocities. They had had nothing to do with the Nazis. Some of these people were obviously telling the truth; and others, possibly, were saying what they had come to think was the truth.

Nevertheless, we Americans know that equally charming and irresponsible people approved the *Reden* of Fichte, were led by Bismarck, followed the Kaiser, and sank to the depths of cruelty and sadism under Hitler. You have only to stand in the gas chamber of Dachau, look at the incinerators, regard the evil paintings on the walls, and stand over the ashes of 238,000 martyrs to know that a new social order has to be built in Germany before her people can be set free.

Why is it that charming, educated people can collectively and periodically go crazy, set the world in flames, invade, conquer, and enslave their neighbors? That is the critical question.

This tenderness to despotism is a product of the political cast of mind and habits of the German people, and of their sheep-like psychology. The Germans seem to have no political idea other than of a government and society so centrally controlled that if a mad man, or an evil man, or even a Utopian, gains power in it, he has all the agencies of social control immediately at hand. It is true that the American Zone in Germany is divided into five states or *Länder*; but the constitutions of the five are almost alike, and orders go down from OMGUS to the five local organizations. Hesse is the size of New Jersey and Bavaria of Virginia; and on the local level there is no local rule and community spirit.

The Germans live in villages; no farmer lives on the land that he tills, and I am told that except for the church and activities associated with it, the peasants might as well be living in the isolation of a ranch country. AMG officials say that it is extremely difficult to stir up local interest. If anybody wants anything, he thinks immediately of going to the state. Schools are run by the state according to state laws. Taxes are collected by the state, and teachers' salaries and all other school expenses are met by the state. I did meet with some school committees, especially in Wiesbaden, Munich and Stuttgart; but each meeting resembled an American school superintendent's staff conference rather than what we know as a "board of education" meeting representing parents and local citizens.

We must begin with the fact that the Germans lack fundamental ideas of political science. They have no glimmering of the idea of government of checks and balances, with certain delaying processes. Americans have learned that sometimes evil men come to power, sometimes weak men, sometimes hasty dreamers, and that it is better to have powers so divided, and processes of government sufficiently time-consuming, that the wicked and the visionary cannot quickly exercise great power. The objective of the framers of our government was a system that would be as efficient as possible under a good man, but not easy for a bad man to run away with.

It is unfortunately true that this idea of decentralization has never taken root among the Germans. Indeed, the theory has eluded some Americans. Following my lectures to university and school audiences in a number of German cities, I was regularly asked the same questions, which were based upon certain articles that had recently appeared in American magazines. Apparently the Germans had heard a good deal of the shortcomings of American education, and I was asked searching questions about the shortage of teachers, the sub-standard educational conditions in Mississippi and Arkansas, unequal conditions among the states and within certain states. I took a good deal of time to answer these questions carefully, pointing out that it was easily within the power of the American people to correct such conditions and make educations equal from North to South and East to West. I explained the discussion of education in the Constitutional Convention as revealed by Madison's Journal, pointing out that apparently the Founding Fathers considered education to be properly included in the General Welfare Clause, that most of the early Presidents had included in messages to Congress a federally supported — and possibly controlled — system of common schools, but that the American people had never chosen such a course, preferring, unconsciously perhaps, to sacrifice some equality to liberty. I tried to make clear that even today we are still searching for a formula which will permit federal subsidies to education upon some basis which the people believe will keep the minds of their children free from the possible control of a tyrant. Unlike an American university president who had recently told the Germans that American education was a poor example for Germany to follow, I insisted that we are proud to have such a system. My German audiences listened with courteous attention

and, perhaps, real interest to this doctrine that decentralization is a source of strength. Unfortunately, the practice of local self-government was no part of their experience.

Would the Constitution of the United States have worked had the American people not previously been accustomed to self-government? As it was, at any rate, the American people had run their own local affairs for a century and a half prior to the adoption of the Constitution — about the same amount of time that has elapsed since. They had built roads, drained the swamps, educated the young, cared for the poor, ill and aged, and kept the peace. This experience in local self-government had given reality to the provisions of their constitution.

The German people must acquire a habit of self-government before they can safely be set free. It is sometimes proposed that the way to accomplish this end is to put courses on government in the school curriculum. Some think that the critical need is university lectures on government, and even an Institute of Political Science. If, however, our American experience points the way, it would seem more promising to begin by helping the German people set up habits of self-rule in their small villages and towns, and in communities within their cities. This would provide a point of view from which, at a later date, the idea of a non-authoritarian central government might be grasped.

It will be exceedingly difficult to start local self-government in Germany, and many years will be needed before the idea takes hold. But this is the time to begin the effort. AMG is on the right track, I believe, in its emphasis on community councils and its attempt to stimulate local initiative. It is trying to enlist the interest of parents in such activities as school lunches, playgrounds, recreation activities, service to displaced persons, care of children, the ill and the aged, community choral and dramatic societies, music, repair and expansion of school buildings, pupil aid, clean-up drives and the like. The objective is to make parents come to realize that by their own collective and organized efforts they can influence the progress of their children, and that they are responsible for the kind of education the children receive.

Examples of local initiative in school problems in America have relevant suggestions for AMG's task. For instance, the public schools around New York City, a few years ago, started the Metropolitan School Study Council. Some 50 to 60 school dis-

tricts decided to pool their resources and make a joint study of ways of improving their schools. Board members meet with board members, superintendents with superintendents, principals with principals, and specialists on particular problems with their opposite numbers. A headquarters staff is now maintained, and a large number of research studies and local programs of action have been undertaken. Similar School Study Councils have been formed in other cities. Such councils could be started in Germany, and possibly some German communities could be associated with some of the American Councils. Close and practical contact with some American schools might be a stimulus to the actual practice of self-government — which is the only way to learn it.

IV

The final object of attack of the American effort must be the sheep-like psychology of the Germans. Nearly a half-century ago, Dean James E. Russell, in his book "German Higher Schools," pointed out that the Germans were directing the bulk of their educational effort to the production of God-fearing, self-supporting, obedient subjects of the Reich. He showed that the method and spirit of all schools below the university level were intended to produce conformity: the need for a leader. He showed that the few — mostly the children of the classes — then had a chance to learn to lead in the university and other high schools (in the German sense of the term), but that the majority were supposed to be obedient followers and nothing more.

A generation later, Dr. Thomas Alexander, now the able head of education in OMGUS, recorded the same situation in his book, "Prussian Elementary Schools." He made extended visits and took stenographic records of many hundreds of lessons. He found the same formal, disciplinary, memoriter type of teaching, with all power vested in the teacher and the pupil drilled only to follow and obey. He reported that he visited nearly 400 classes before he heard a pupil ask a question, and then it was something like "What time is it?"

The German people are noticeably self-disciplined. When something is *verboten* it is *verboten*. It is doubtful that one would see fingerprints on a wet-paint sign in Germany. But the trouble is not that the Germans obey; other people obey, as is witnessed by the orderly conduct of the British in a queue. The difficulty is that part of the German people are taught only to obey, never

to vary, never to lead; and these people, the greater part of the nation, come out of school looking for a Fuehrer and are uncomfortable and unhappy if they cannot find one.

No one objects to obedience and discipline. The danger comes when that is the sole purpose of the school. The particular problem of reëducation is to break the school lockstep. This cannot be done by exhortation; it can take place only if different educational practices are substituted for those now used. As long as the teacher gives a sentence and the pupil must repeat it, as long as lessons are assigned and pupils must learn them verbatim, as long as all pupils march in line and stand when the teacher enters, as long as a pupil tips his cap to the teacher as to his superior officer, you will in that country have the psychology of leader and follower. The prospects for self-government will be poor.

It is unfortunately true that if many Americans were to go into a German school — or an old-style Japanese school, or a modern Soviet school (assuming they could get behind the iron curtain) — they would say, "This is the kind of school that I should like to see at home." For just as it seems reasonable to some people to regard the world as flat, it seems sensible to think of the mind as a muscle, which can be "strengthened" by exercise in some hard and preferably useless task. The results of science are slow in their effect on "common sense;" the work of modern psychologists and educational researchers has not penetrated the educational thinking of many laymen. We know from the research of Thorndike — and others among his followers — that little general effect results from teaching. In good teaching you aim at a particular and specific result. There are special ways to achieve obedience and conformity, and there are other special ways to develop a critical faculty. People able to govern themselves must learn not only to obey but also to reason and judge for themselves. In a society safe and worthy to be free, teaching which produces a willingness to lead, as well as a willingness to follow, must be given to all.

Germany does not need a lot of lectures on modern teaching procedures. She needs experimental work in her schools, in order to see what aspects of modern educational procedures can best be applied to the concrete circumstances which exist in Germany. There must be trials of many types of school methods and procedures, with careful measurement and assessment of results. A pattern tailored to fit the Germans must be evolved.

American education can be of service in this phase of the work. Experimental work has been carried on in various school systems in the United States, under practical conditions in typical situations. There is no reason why similar experimental work could not be started in certain schools in Weisbaden or Stuttgart, with interchange of experts, and comparison of results. The results of such experimentation could then find their way into the Teachers Institutes and into the programs of retraining teachers in many places in Germany. The program would take time, but obviously a new social order in Germany cannot be built in a day. Lectures in universities might give the illusion of rapid progress, but work in the schools themselves will give quicker results in the long run.

If this analysis of the German problem is correct, then, as I have suggested, there must be some modification of the ideas that a good many Americans hold regarding the nature of the task of reëducation of the Germans. Such projects as textbook revision to eliminate "hatred" and promote "understanding," teaching of good will, development of world citizenship, interchange of students and so on, while worthy are not central to the problem. The two major objectives of education are to teach the Germans to use better methods in the shop and on the farm, and to train them to accept individual responsibility. Improved agricultural and industrial production can be obtained by educational work in the communities. Individual responsibility can be fostered by the development of local government and local initiative. The schools can play an important part in both efforts. Educators in Germany will profit greatly by closer ties with the American agricultural and industrial colleges. School systems in German localities will know better what local self-government means if they can establish ties with individual American town and city school systems, and German schools can gain much knowledge of how to break down the formality of their schools by coöperating in projects of the type now carried on by many schools in our country.

The crux of the problem is to encourage communities to control and operate their schools. The establishment of local initiative and responsibility is more important than anything else. If local self-government is practised on the schools, it will normally be taught in the schools. That is the way to produce a generation which will know that it cannot hand over its mental, moral and political responsibilities to a Fuehrer.

EMPHASIS ON CULTURE IN THE FRENCH ZONE

By Percy W. Bidwell

THE Germans must be "reëducated;" on this the occupying Powers are unanimous. At Potsdam in 1945 they agreed that education in Germany should be controlled, with the aim of eliminating Nazi doctrines and making possible the development of democratic ideas. Each Power has subsequently proceeded to carry out the agreement in its own way. Each has initiated reforms in the methods and content of instruction in schools and universities in its own zone and, with varying degrees of thoroughness, has "denazified" the teaching and administrative personnel. In these endeavors the educational officers have naturally tended to transplant the pedagogical methods and principles which experience in their own country has shown to have produced good results.

Each occupying Power recognizes that the reëducation of the Germans must be more than skin deep. It is not merely a matter of changing curricula and textbooks. An attempt must be made to transform the outlook on life, the *Weltanschauung*, of millions of adolescent and adult Germans, and if possible to convert aggressive nationalism into a spirit of peaceful coöperation. For support of this broader and deeper purpose each of the four Powers has developed a cultural program supplementing its educational reforms. These programs, even more than the school reforms, reflect the national ideals of the sponsors. Characteristically, the French program is marked by a sincere belief that learning and culture can produce civilized men, coupled with an anchor to windward in the form of strict economic controls.

In their attack on the problem of reforming German education the French have been faced with the lack of teachers and textbooks, inadequate buildings and shortage of teaching materials common to all the zones. Like other occupying Powers, the French have eliminated from their schools practically all of the textbooks introduced during the Nazi régime, substituting for them new books written by German émigrés in the United States or by Germans in Switzerland. In printing new textbooks the

French have done an admirable job both as regards quantity and quality. As of April 1, 1948, the presses in the zone, some of them working on a 24-hour schedule, had put out 8,500,000 books to supply a total enrollment of about 1,000,000, or 850 books per 100 students. In the Russian Zone the figures were 800 books per 100 students, and in the American Zone only 160. The textbooks now issuing from presses in the French Zone are excellently printed, on good paper. Naturally the students are on the alert to detect anti-Nazi propaganda. When I asked a group what they thought of the new books, one replied, "We know that the Nazis had falsified and distorted German history. We don't know whether the new histories are false or true. We need time to consult the source materials for ourselves."

Before the war there were in the French Zone about 18,000 teachers in primary schools; at present the number is about 13,500. In secondary schools the number of professors has fallen from 3,600 to 3,200. Yet in both types of institutions the number of pupils exceeds very considerably the prewar figure. Denazification procedures are partly responsible for the present shortage of teachers; 75 percent of the former teaching staff in the zone were suspended on the ground of membership in the Nazi Party or in affiliated organizations. Gradually, however, the majority of these officials, after having been examined by a denazification commission, were restored on probation. On this point a French report reads as follows: "It is undeniable that all Germany was nazified and that the fact that a German belonged or did not belong to the Party does not indicate automatically whether he should be condemned or whitewashed." The French Department of Justice and the secret police took care of teachers and adminstrators who had criminal records, as well as those who had been leaders in the Nazi Party. Denazification committees in the provinces, composed of approved Germans, examined the credentials of the remainder, pronouncing sentence according to the gravity of their offenses. Many teachers who had been thus purged of the Nazi taint were allowed to resume their work. But the Direction de l'Education Publique has ruled that no instructor or professor who had been a party member could occupy an administrative position under the new régime, or could enjoy his former statutory rights as a government official. Hence, he can be dismissed at any time on order of the Military Government.

In brief, the French policy was to restore the bulk of the teaching personnel to their former positions but to keep them under very close observation. An official report states: "It seemed wise to make use of trained teachers who had been rendered docile by the events and who would feel themselves continually threatened by possible dismissal, who would be anxious about their daily bread and that of their family. They would be forced, not to direct the German youth on the road of true democracy — they would be incapable of that — but to teach them the elements of education, how to speak, how to read and write and to perform simple arithmetic."

II

The French educational officials in the zone seem to have little confidence in their ability to change the attitudes, or reform the outlook on life, of adult Germans. With respect to the German youth, *i.e.*, those who are now in the secondary schools and the universities, they are somewhat less pessimistic. As a matter of fact, the French educational officials are conducting, as are similar officials in the other zones, various sorts of activities for the German youth and organizing conferences in which French students participate. They are also putting out a number of attractive periodicals, in German, designed particularly for young people. The emphasis in all of this work is, of course, laid upon democratic outlook on life and on the reintegration of German culture with that of France and Western Europe.

Something can be done, the French believe, to change the outlook on life of young Germans of high school age and beyond, but they expect to accomplish the most solid results in the primary schools, among children who have never experienced the indoctrination of the Hitler régime. The occupying authorities, however, cannot deal with German children directly. They must work through German teachers. Consequently, they lay great emphasis upon the training of teachers for primary schools, the *Volksschule*. At present they have in operation about 20 training schools for primary school teachers. These schools are of two classes, preparatory schools which give a four-year general education and normal schools which provide a two-year professional training. From the latter the French turned out last year about 1,000 well-trained teachers, competent to give a new and democratic point of view to the pupils under their charge.

The new system of teacher training constitutes a sharp departure from the methods of the Hitler régime; it also differs considerably from the system in force under the Weimar Republic. Under the Nazis, the training of teachers, carried on principally in the universities, not in specialized teachers' training institutions, was largely indoctrination. Before 1933 teachers had been trained in specialized institutions which, however, were accessible only to students from middle class and upper middle class families. In order to make access to the teaching profession easier, thus broadening the social base of the German educational system, the French have abolished all fees for instruction in their teachers' training institutions, and they furnish board and lodging to the prospective teachers without cost.

Administration and instruction in the teachers' training schools are exclusively in the hands of Germans. The French, however, maintain in each institution one or more *lecteurs français*. They are specialists in German language, literature and cultural history, and are selected with attention to personal as well as professional qualifications. They give instruction in the French language and literature and in addition observe the conduct of affairs in the schools and report to the French educational authorities. In addition to 120 *lecteurs*, all of whom are holders of university degrees, there are 150 *assistants* – candidates for degrees in French universities — engaged in similar work but in less responsible positions. Thus, without actual intervention in educational affairs, the French authorities are able to keep informed on the character of instruction and to check anti-democratic tendencies.

I recently observed the operation of the French policies in four teachers' training schools — in Grumbach, Gengenbach, Worms and Alzey — and at the University of Mayence. I attended classes and also had opportunity to talk with both teachers and pupils without French officials being present. From these visits and interviews I gained the impression that the German teachers and administrators support the policies which the French have introduced. They are particularly appreciative of the efforts which the French administrators have made to secure suitable buildings for instruction and for living quarters. In present-day Germany, where building materials of all kinds, as well as furniture and school equipment, are practically non-existent, what the French have accomplished seems almost miraculous. For

the new schools they have taken over buildings previously used as convents, military barracks, and even in one case a fortress built more than 100 years ago which had been lying vacant for more than 20 years. Although not ideally designed for their present purposes, these buildings have been thoroughly renovated and now seem to be adequate for their purposes.

The students seem well pleased with their educational opportunities. Their quarters are crowded according to American standards, and their food meager and unappetizing; nevertheless, they are much better off than when they were living at home with their families. I was interested to learn that the rations allowed to the students at these institutions were considerably above those of the normal German consumer, in some cases equivalent to what was allowed to patients in hospitals and, at the university, equivalent to that for heavy laborers.

A feature of French educational policy which meets with considerable resistance on the part of the Germans is the introduction of competitive examinations for entrance to the new teachers' training institutions, and the universities as well. Recognizing that it would be impossible to accommodate all of the young men and women who wish to enter the new schools, the French decided to select only the best qualified. They fear also that many of the thousands of students now crowding into the universities, in all the zones, will be unable to find employment in their chosen professions. They don't want to be responsible for creating an intellectual proletariat which might support a new Nazi movement. But competitive entrance examinations represent a break with German tradition. Previously, all students who had obtained their so-called *abitur*, on completion of their secondary school work, were eligible for entrance to the university and to professional schools. Now the young people who are rejected lose face in their home communities.

The French innovations meet with opposition from officials of the *Länder* governments. Objecting to the democratizing effects of the new schools, they would prefer to see the teaching profession in the zone remain a somewhat exclusive occupation. They also object to the secularization which the French have introduced. The teachers' training schools are not "confessional" schools, that is, they are not operating under any religious auspices. They are neither Catholic nor Protestant.

The French educational authorities take justifiable pride in

their accomplishment in opening in May 1946 the ancient University of Mayence (founded in 1477 and closed since 1915). With a student body of 6,000 and 175 professors and instructors, the new university is considerably larger than Freiburg and Tübingen, in the French Zone, and the third largest in all Germany. The French military authorities have displayed remarkable energy and ingenuity in adapting for university purposes buildings designed by the Nazis for the use of antiaircraft forces. In repairing war damages they have employed for almost two years a large force of workers, including 600 prisoners of war and several hundred students. They have broken with German tradition by providing living quarters for 800 students. In the dormitory system, and in the concentration of living quarters and lecture halls and laboratories in an area of 15 or 20 acres, the administrators of the University of Mayence, partly by force of circumstance and partly by conscious intent, are developing an institution which resembles far more a British or an American university than other German or continental universities.

The assistance of the French Military Government was particularly valuable in bringing together the teaching staff, which includes many professors formerly at the Universities of Berlin and Breslau, now in the Russian Zone. There are also professors from France, Switzerland, England, Hungary and the United States. The appointments were, of course, made only after careful scrutiny of previous political affiliations.

At the university, as well as in the teachers' training institutes, the French Military Government has encouraged all sorts of contacts with French and other European universities. For example, they have helped to organize summer sessions in which several hundred French students, men and women, have attended lectures with an equal number of Germans. They have also made possible during each week of the academic year the visits of distinguished foreigners, teachers, journalists and publicists, as well as military men. In addition, the cultural program includes the *Instituts Français* which provide reading rooms and courses of studies in the French language and literature, as well as art exhibitions, lectures and concerts of a high order of excellence.

III

In deciding to lay particular emphasis upon educational and cultural activities, the French occupation authorities seem to

have given careful consideration to the peculiar characteristics of their zone and to the best utilization of the resources at their disposition. There are no great possibilities for economic development in the French Zone, particularly since the Saar Basin with its steel and iron industries and its coal mines has now been incorporated into France. Furthermore, France itself is short of capital equipment and consequently is in no position to make the necessary investments for industrial rehabilitation and expansion.

On the other hand, the French are well equipped to undertake a program of reëducation and cultural development in their zone, a borderland area with whose population they have had close relations for several hundred years. Educated people on both sides of the border are bilingual. The Germans along the Rhine and in Baden have traditionally had great admiration for French art, French literature and French music. In the French universities, moreover, there is available a considerable number of competent Germanists, teachers and writers who have devoted their lives to the study of German literature and German political and cultural history. From this group the French Military Government has been able to draw competent administrators and teachers who are optimistic about the prospects for reorienting German thought away from the distorted ideology of the Nazis and turning it to the humanistic ideals of French culture.

Many of the officials of the Direction de l'Education Publique fought in the war, others took an active part in the resistance movement in France. Some had undergone cruel hardship, even torture, in German concentration camps. One of the most competent administrators in the zone, highly respected by the Germans for his energy and his fairness, was rescued, half-dead, by American troops from under a pile of corpses. None of these men harbors any illusions about the Germans; yet with characteristic realism they recognize how urgent and important is the job of reforming German thought and feeling, and they don't let hatred or vengeance interfere. The French educational officials seemed to have established easy and natural relations with the German teachers and professors under their supervision. All of the French officers whom I met spoke German easily, correctly and idiomatically. Among the French officials, also, there are a great many with German names, probably indicating that their families originated in Alsace and Lorraine.

The French do not expect to accomplish a revolution in Ger-

man thinking all at once. They have in mind a 20- or 30-year program. Simply to train a new corps of teachers for primary schools will take ten years. The results of their activities in making the German population better acquainted with the literature and art of France and other countries will not be evident for many more years. To the more nervous and impatient Americans it may seem that all this has little direct relation to producing a peaceful and democratic society in Germany. The Americans, and the British also, seem to have much more confidence than the French in reactivating political parties and in direct propaganda through the press and the radio. It is possible, however, that the French are on the right track, and that they understand better than we the virtues of an indirect approach to the problem of German reëducation. They appreciate also the importance, in establishing better political relations between the French and German populations, of getting them to meet for common enjoyment and improvement on the non-political ground which art, music and literature can supply.

As far as I could judge, the German population in the French Zone is highly appreciative of the French cultural program. After a decade of moral and intellectual isolation enforced by the Nazi régime, they heartily welcome the concerts, art exhibitions and lectures which the French provide. The Germans, however, resent French economic policy which in many ways is in sharp conflict with the reëducation program. French economic policy, harshly and briefly stated, is to make the zone support itself, and if possible to contribute something to French recovery.

The French admit that they are pursuing a tough economic policy. They are strictly rationing food and clothing, and as yet are doing little towards rebuilding cities where war damage created a great shortage of housing. They admit also that the presence of large numbers of occupation troops and civilian employees, with their families, constitutes a great drain on the limited housing and food resources of the zone. They are keenly aware of the conflict between these economic policies and their cultural program. The educational officers, in particular, foresee increasing difficulty in opening German minds to the new cultural ideas as long as the standard of living remains depressed and as long as opportunities for getting a better living seem so remote.

ALASKA, FULCRUM OF POWER

By John J. Teal, Jr.

MANY thousands of years ago, when the oceans were shallower by several hundred feet because of sea water withdrawn to form the ice caps, Alaska, connected to Asia by a land bridge 500 miles wide at its narrowest, was one of the crossroads of the world. Westward across this bridge travelled the horses and camels which were to play a significant rôle in the history of Asia; eastward came the people who formed the aboriginal population of the Western Hemisphere. But the melting of the ice caps and the submergence of the bridge brought this two-way traffic to a halt. Alaska became one of the forgotten corners of the earth. Down to our own time the territory has been known but to a few people, and its furs, gold and fish have aroused only sporadic interest.

Alaska is near the center of the earth's land mass, which contains all the Great Powers and about 90 percent of the population. Now a global war, and the advent of the air age, have made it again one of the most important areas of the globe. Although the United States has been reluctant to admit its value, the war convinced Americans that their northern territory is not a worthless "lump of ice," nor even a land where adventure and the strenuous life will produce fortunes, but rather a contiguous part of their own country, strategically situated at the new air crossroads of the world. War did more in six years to awaken this new appreciation than did 50 years of devoted work by the apostles of the north. But though the strategic importance of Alaska is now readily admitted, and President Truman's recent recommendation of statehood for the Territory focussed attention upon it, little has been done to make use of the potentialities of the region.

Nearly everyone has seen one of the maps which superimpose Alaska upon the United States in order to demonstrate the size of the Territory: it is one-fifth as large as the 48 states together, and reaches on the map from Charleston, South Carolina, to Los Angeles. But it is more revealing to measure Alaska where she stands, or, if we are to slide her about, to do so in her own latitude. We may note that while Alaska is closer to Maine than is Eureka,

California, it is only 56 miles from the Soviet Union, and 716 miles from Paramoshiri, the former Japanese naval base now held by the Russians. Ketchikan, Alaska, is several hundred miles closer to the Panama Canal than is Hawaii, and at the same time lies several hundred miles closer to Paramoshiri. Point Barrow, Alaska, is more than 200 miles closer to Berlin than is New York, and more than 500 miles closer to Moscow. The direct routes from the United States to the Orient pass over Alaska, and the Territory is nearer to the world power centers than is the United States proper. It is better located for the defense of the Panama Canal and the west coast than is Hawaii.

If we were to slide Alaska across the earth in her own latitude and set her down in the North Atlantic we would find that she stretches from Newcastle, England, to the airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador, and that her territory covers Iceland and southern Greenland. Alaska would not profit by the transposition, for without the warm Pacific currents her agricultural possibilities would diminish and many of her ice-free ports would be frozen for months. As things are, at any rate, her capital, Juneau, is in the same latitude as Dunbeath, Scotland; Anchorage, the same as Bergen, Norway; Fairbanks, the same as Risback, Sweden; and Amatignak, the same as Dunkirk, France.

Alaska is a land of geographical variety and, indeed, of vivid contrast. Through the middle, from the Bering Sea 1,500 miles to the Canadian border and thence 800 miles further into British Columbia, flows the Yukon, one of the longest navigable rivers in the world. To the north the Yukon is roughly paralleled by the Brooks Range, which begins in the Yukon Territory and extends toward the Bering Straits. This is the region of sparsest population and least development, and its climate varies from the intense summer heat and winter cold south of the Brooks watershed to the perennial cold of the tundras and the rolling prairies of the Arctic slope. Although largely unexplored, the area is known to be rich in mineral resources such as gold, tin, coal and oil, but its main industries now are fur-trapping, reindeer herding and coastal fishing. In the entire area there are no connecting highways; transportation is by means of airplane or dogsled.

To the south the Yukon is roughly paralleled by another mountain chain, the Alaska Range, which borders the North Pacific and finally swings out for a thousand miles through the

temperate zone toward Japan. This is the area of greatest population, with fertile farmlands, rugged mountains, rolling prairies and tundra, and forests of giant spruce. The southern portion contains the only Alaskan glaciers. The climate ranges from the year-round moderate temperature and heavy precipitation of the area touched by the warm Pacific currents to the intense temperatures and slight precipitation of the interior. Served by only 500 miles of single-track railroad and about 3,000 miles of highway (about as much as there is in Rhode Island), it is rich in every type of resource from salmon to gold, from croplands to timber. The productive possibilities are enhanced by three features endemic to Alaska — the permanently frozen substrata which prevent crop loss by drought, the long day of the growing season which induces cabbages, for example, to grow as large as medicine balls, and the ice-free condition of the long southern coast and the availability of deep-water harbors. It is estimated that three-quarters of Alaska's 80 billion board feet of marketable timber grow within two and a half miles of salt water. Her abundant wealth is not inaccessible.

II

Interest in the region was first displayed in the United States in the decade preceding the Civil War, when American expansionists sought to consolidate the whole continent under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine. New England whalers, and several scientific parties, had become acquainted with the area and had spoken of it in glowing terms. In 1865 the North American Telegraphic Association, seeking to lay a cable to Europe, sent an expedition north to test the feasibility of a route across the Bering Straits, but this project was abandoned in 1867 following the successful laying of a transatlantic cable.

During the Civil War, Russia was the Union's most constant friend. At its conclusion, the Tsar, short of cash and overburdened with land, wished to prevent his Crimean enemy, England, from taking his undefended North American colony. Overtures were therefore made to the American Secretary of State and a clear title purchase was arranged for $7,200,000. Charles Sumner pushed the appropriation through the Senate, despite accusations of irresponsible extravagance, and the shrewd bargain was sealed. Seward renamed the country from the native word *Al-ay-es-ka* meaning "great land." It was popularly called Seward's Icebox

and Seward's Folly, but Seward, an advocate of Manifest Destiny, was unperturbed. He spoke of assimilating the whole North American continent from the North Pole to the Isthmus into an American Union and, with strategic insight, envisaged an impenetrable defense ring circling through Alaska, Greenland and Panama. In a speech at Sitka in 1869 he foresaw the day when Alaska would join the Union "ultimately as a state or many states," and warned British Columbia not to interfere with Alaskan interests. But apart from occasional discoveries of ore, Alaska was forgotten until the feverish days of the '96 Gold Rush, when her modern era began.

Contemporaneously, the United States defeated Spain in a three-month campaign and became a World Power. Protection of the far-flung commitments resulting from that war required either a two-ocean navy, or means of shifting a one-ocean navy quickly from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The Panama Canal made the passage possible, and the Canal, guarded by bases in the Caribbean and Hawaii, became the fulcrum of our military policy and remained at the center of our military thinking until 1941, in spite of ominous indications that the policy did not fit the facts.

Meanwhile, American interest in Alaska waned, notwithstanding the dramatic Harriman project to build a railroad through Alaska, under the Bering Straits, and across Asia to Europe. Few American strategists kept sufficiently abreast of the new developments in warfare to perceive the necessity of moving the fulcrum of power northward. Among the few who did was the martyred prophet of the Air Force, Brigadier-General "Billy" Mitchell, who said, "I think it [Alaska] is the most important strategic place in the world. . . . In an air war, if we were unprepared Japan could take it away from us first, by dominating the sky and creeping up the Aleutians. . . . Japan might well seize enough of Alaska to creep down the western coast of Canada. Then we would be in for it." In the Four Power Pacific Treaty of 1921 we bartered our right to fortify the Aleutians for a promise from Japan that she would refrain from fortifying her Pacific islands, newly acquired under mandate.

Japan was aware of the strategic value of Alaska, and during the next 20 years, with little hindrance from the United States, explored its islands and coasts, assisted by Germans under Captain Fritz Wiedemann. After the Nazi nonaggression pact with

Russia, other Germans helped Russia fortify the Kommandorskie Islands close to Attu, travelled through Alaska as "tourists," and, incidentally, listened to Nazi propaganda refer to Alaska as one of the great reserve territories of the Nordic race. Throughout all this Americans remained apathetic until, in 1942, the prophecies of General Mitchell began to be borne out and the awakening came.

Air warfare has in the last seven years exorcised the illusion of American isolation and shattered the traditional concept of oceanic security. "Security" now has meaning primarily in relation to defense against northern or trans-polar attack. Improvements in radar and instrument flying, coupled with the discovery that Arctic aviation is confronted with fewer natural hazards in the polar regions than further south, have prompted strategic study of the area. A base in the extreme north of Greenland would bring Moscow, Berlin and London within an identical 2,400-mile range. At the same time, an air base in this glacier-free part of Greenland could be coördinated with Alaskan fortifications only 1,700 miles away to intercept attacks from any possible enemy. However, since Greenland does not belong to the United States, the problem of protecting ourselves at that point is largely a task of the State Department. In Alaska, we can do what we wish; and the extent to which we develop its possibilities will to a considerable extent determine our security.

Northern warfare, especially in wilderness areas, presents a series of special problems. For a properly-equipped invader, winter is the most favorable season for attack, especially against an enemy unprepared in bases, equipment and supply lines. Flying conditions are at their best then, since there is a minimum of wing icing, and frozen lakes and rivers may be utilized as airfields and highways. The vast areas of muskeg are frozen solid to support ground operations, and the mosquitoes have disappeared. However, in the extreme cold men rapidly become exhausted, and casualties are greater than at any other season, since a wounded man freezes unless he is aided immediately. No fox-holes can be dug into the ground in the face of tank attack, nor can a mine field be effective against tracked vehicles when covered with 18 inches of snow. Strong reserves must be available.

Neither invader nor defender in Alaska, in its undeveloped condition, can expect to live off the land. Each must depend upon

long supply lines, and for the invader, at least in the primary stages, this would require air supply, a factor which, in limiting his equipment to light tanks and artillery pieces, would place him at a temporary disadvantage. However, an invader would presumably make a well-planned surprise attack, using specially trained men. Seizing those bases best suited to his purpose, he would destroy all others, and bring up reinforcements until his position was consolidated. Then he would turn south. A defender would be in a hopeless predicament without air bases, adequate highways and railroads for supply, and a local economy to supplement military stocks.

Advanced and well-integrated air bases are the only successful defense against such an invasion. But unless these bases were constructed with a view to offensive purposes, they would, in the event of war, represent but a dispersion of forces and a waste of time and material. In the air age, offense is the only defense. According to General Spaatz, "Provided with bases close to the Arctic area, an enemy could attack the most important cities of the United States, and inversely, American bombing forces located close to the 65th parallel of north latitude could carry out reprisals of the same nature against the most important centers of population of any possible enemy."

Should Russia challenge the United States, it seems likely that the initial surprise attack would be delivered across the Arctic through Alaska, and be directed toward rapid destruction of our industrial centers. The lessons to be learned from the experience of Germany and Japan have, one imagines, convinced the Soviet dictatorship that our industrial power must be knocked out at the source if the U.S.S.R. is to have a chance of victory. Russia does not have a navy to launch a sea-borne invasion, nor do we have the numbers or strength to fight Russia on land in her own territory. Though the Soviet Union would make full use of its land power in Western Europe, and no doubt elsewhere, we could get at Russia only by air. Aerial combat would probably be decisive — and it would center over Alaska.

The present condition of our defenses in Alaska is indicated by the Alaskan Command's bald prediction that one enemy battalion could take the territory with little effort. We have neither Navy nor Army combat units stationed there, and all of our bases suffer from a lack of communications and of readily available strategic materials, such as oil. The present population and

economy are incapable of supporting a military establishment. It has been logically argued, however, that the situation would quickly be greatly improved were Alaska to be admitted as a state. Statehood would make her eligible under the Federal Highway Act for assistance up to $16,000,000 annually, as compared with her present expenditure of $1,000,000 for maintenance work. Under the Adams Act Formula of 1906 she would also receive $90,000 annually for agricultural experimentation, as compared with the present sum of $45,000. She could also expect to collect revenues from her present tax-free resources, such as the $55,000,000-a-year salmon industry; virtually no profits taken from Alaska are put back at the present time. With such funds for development, and with full representation in Washington, Alaska could hope to attract colonists in considerable numbers. Contrasted to our present method of allocating insufficient funds from the Army and Interior Department budgets, this would be an inexpensive way to prepare for the defense of the region.

Alaska today has a population of about 90,000. The territory could easily support a far larger population and might indeed contribute to the world's food supply. There are 300,000,000 acres of sub-Arctic tundra, a large part of them in Alaska, available to agriculture with a minimum of clearing, though of course communications by rail and road would have to be developed. Alaska's wide grazing lands, heavily covered with native grasses, grains, hay, root crops and other forage, in the Aleutians as well as on the mainland, can support numbers of sheep and cattle. Animals native to the north and requiring no stored winter fodder might be domesticated, as Vilhjalmur Stefansson has suggested. The Lomen Reindeer Company has produced millions of tons of a meat almost indistinguishable from beef.

Meanwhile, Russia is busily fortifying her Arctic areas, with especial emphasis upon the Chukotsk Peninsula region adjoining Alaska. In the fatuous days of the Russo-German nonaggression pact, Alaska's delegate to Congress, Anthony Dimond, warned that ". . . we are fully justified in considering all the military air bases and fortifications of the Russians in eastern Siberia and the Bering Strait region as having been established with a view to a possible conflict with the United States." German perfidy postponed any such use, but did not make it impossible forever. The strategic value of the Arctic has long been recognized by

Russian leaders. The U.S.S.R. early conducted aerial polar explorations and has pushed a program of Arctic development which has resulted in the establishment of modern industries and a number of large cities, often built by slave labor. The Soviet Union has also pioneered in the use of a northeastern passage along the shores of the Arctic Ocean.

During the war we supplied our Russian allies with war planes ferried through Alaska and Asia. Soviet pilots and technicians became as familiar with Alaska as did our own soldiers, and toward the end of the war Soviet troops were practising amphibious landings in the Cold Bay region. The United States was never permitted to study Siberian topography and military organization in similar detail. We do at least know, however, that the Russians have airfields and port installations along the north coast of Asia, and that they operate the most northerly airline in the world west along the Arctic coast to Anadyr on the Bering Sea. At Shemya and other positions convenient to East Cape they have expanded the construction of powerful air bases which clearly show the extent to which the Soviets are committed to a polar strategy. The Russian demands upon Spitzenbergen, and overtures to Iceland, point in the same direction.

III

From these strategic considerations emerges the fact of our dependence upon Canada. To reach the Panhandle, and to go from there to northern Alaska, we must cross Canadian territory; and all air operations from Alaska circle over Canada. The interdependence of United States and Canadian interests has been recognized to the extent that Canada has retooled her war machine to coincide with ours, that military experts have been shared by the two countries, and that together they have carried on joint experiments in the north, such as Exercise Musk-ox.

Our purchase of Alaska, which met with the approval of the British Government, lengthened the border which we hold in common with Canadians by 1,400 miles. If there was apprehension in Canada, it was felt mostly by the Hudson's Bay Company which controlled the northwestern territories and opposed any development which might cause a scarcity of fur-bearing animals. Such worries were unfounded, however, because Alaska was promptly forgotten by the United States. So complete was our neglect that in 1868 the citizens of Sitka, fearing a native up-

rising, turned to Canada for protection after their appeals had been ignored in Washington. Canada sent a warship, which shamed us into belatedly sending one of our own. Later, the citizens of Valdez, in protest over lack of government representation, asked to be annexed to Canada. In 1887 a religious persecution prompted a Canadian minister to lead his native parishioners to Alaska where they founded the successful colony at Metlakatla. Such episodes caused no friction between the two countries, but the manner of the settlement of the poorly defined boundary between the Alaskan Panhandle and British Columbia in 1903 sharply offended Canadians. President Theodore Roosevelt was a great deal less than tactful in his announcement, in advance of the decision of the boundary commission, that he would not refer the issue to neutral arbitration. Lord Alverstone, the British member of the commission, voted with the Americans against the Canadians, and although the decision did indeed seem justly based upon the Russian title to the disputed territory, there was no mistaking the fact that British action throughout was prompted primarily by the desire to strengthen Anglo-American friendship. The episode had much to do with bringing to a head the Canadian demand for full control over the conduct of Canada's foreign relations, and the further development of Dominion status. There was a rather inglorious postscript to the affair in 1919, when an American colonial expert at the Peace Conference of 1919, George Beer, proposed to cede the Alaskan Panhandle to Canada in return for certain British withdrawals in the Caribbean. This brought American misunderstanding of the realities of Canada's foreign relations to a climax, but the flurry caused by the episode was short-lived, and heralded the advent of a more discerning attitude all around.

The outbreak of the Second World War, and the Japanese advance toward Alaska, suddenly awoke the United States to the need for a military supply road through Canada to our northern outposts. At first the Canadians balked at the idea of such a highway, for fear that unless we were active participants in the war we would not send out enough men to make sure that it could not fall into Japanese hands. Events reassured them, however, and the Alcan Highway was built, but not through the MacKenzie area, rich in natural resources, as the Canadian proponents of northern development had hoped. Instead it connected a series of air bases on the Northwest Staging Route

and travelled over a rough terrain with little except scenic value.

The need to supply the highway with oil brought about some development of the capacities of the Norman Wells district, and led to the building of the inadequate Canol pipeline to Whitehorse. This, too, travelled over rough terrain instead of through the Yukon trough to Fairbanks, Alaska's communication center. The decision to pipe the oil south toward the United States rather than north toward our Alaskan airfields seems to have been dictated by interests not quite connected with winning the war against Japan or developing Alaska. Nevertheless, the initial steps of opening up the territory have been taken, and Canadians now look forward to the development of their northwest apace with Alaska's development. The community of interests seems likely to guarantee coöperation and continued friendly relationships between Canada and the United States.

Unfortunately, the theme to which any forthright analysis of Alaskan problems must return is the danger of an aggressive move by the Soviet Union in this region. Alaska's present feeble defenses offer unnecessary temptation to Soviet strategists. Granting statehood to the Territory is the best and least expensive method of strengthening the defenses of the area, but the process will take time. Two concrete steps which would guard the safety of Alaska, and give an impetus to its development as well, should be taken at once. The first is the concentration there of strategical and tactical combat air units, and of approximately two highly trained regiments of ground troops. The next is the construction of certain highways which are necessary for supply, in particular in the Fairbanks-Nome area, and the building of a railroad from Fairbanks to the States. The new economy of statehood, if granted, would then consolidate these defenses and provide us with a strong northern bastion. Nature offers many obstacles that we shall have to overcome if such a program is to be completed rapidly. But since there is every indication that Soviet Russia considers northern warfare feasible, they are a challenge that we must accept.

FRENCH LABOR DIVIDED

By Walter Kerr

HISTORY repeats itself in the French labor movement with a regularity that is both comforting and discouraging. It is comforting because it is easy to understand. There is no reason to be confused, nor any excuse for a misinterpretation of events that take place. It is discouraging because French labor's short periods of unity and strength are followed by times of disunity, weakness and strife when labor leaders fight labor leaders, unions fight unions, and the people are caught in the middle.

This happens to be one of the lean years. It came about quite logically. The crisis developed slowly, and suddenly on the night of December 19, 1947, France's great labor organization, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) of 6,000,000 men and women, was split wide open into two labor federations comprising perhaps 4,500,000 between them. The rest joined small autonomous unions or tore up their union cards. What had happened was that the Communists had seized control of the CGT, and the non-Communists, unable to influence CGT actions, had walked out to form their own organization. They called the latter the CGT-Force Ouvrière (Workers' Strength) to distinguish it from the Communist-led CGT. Today the CGT has about 3,000,000 followers and Force Ouvrière has about 1,500,000.

This was not the first time that the federation had been torn apart. The struggle between Communists and non-Communists had gone on for years; and twice before — in 1921 and 1940 — the CGT had been divided because the two could not work together. Nor does the analogy between the events of 1921, 1940 and 1947 end there. In all three cases the reasons for the split were the same, the leaders of the opposing factions were the same, and the results were pretty much the same. The story goes back many years to a dispute between men who believed it was necessary to use organized labor as a political weapon and others who tried to keep it free from political influence. Since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the growth of Communist parties that followed the First World War, the struggle has been waged between Communists and non-Communists. To Communists, the CGT has been a useful instrument in the war between the

classes. To non-Communists it has been a defense organization to look out for the standard of living of its members in terms of wages, prices and working conditions.

If at times the two worked together for tactical purposes, there was never a reason for the observer to suppose that at last unity had been achieved. Immediate aims may sometimes have been identical for short periods; but ultimate objectives were far apart, for the Communist always sought above all a revolution that would turn his land into something like the Soviet Union and the non-Communist always thought most of higher wages, shorter hours and a better life for his family. The whole story could be told in biographical terms about the top Communist labor leader, Benoît Frachon, and the leading non-Communist, Léon Jouhaux. Both are veterans of the fight. They have worked together, quarreled, divided, reconciled their differences and quarreled again. They worked together in 1920, divided in 1921, joined forces in 1935, split in 1940, came together again during the German occupation, and in 1947 broke apart for the third time. But this has been no simple clash of personalities, no dispute over the means of achieving the same objective. It has been a struggle between two conceptions of the meaning of organized labor; and the victim has been the unity of the movement.

II. THE BACKGROUND

Trade unionism became stabilized in France about 1905, and in 1906 the CGT held a congress at Amiens at which a charter was adopted containing the principle that all social problems could be solved outside of politics and that organized labor must be divorced from politics. This was the belief in the country at the time (unlike the views held by labor organizations in other parts of Western Europe), and both young Jouhaux and young Frachon grew up with this credo. The fear of German victory in the First World War, however, and the success of the Russian Revolution awakened doubts whether politics was a weapon that could be ignored. The French Communist Party was formed, and rivalry broke out between Frachon, the Communist, and Jouhaux, the non-Communist. After a long internal dispute, the CGT cracked under the strain; in 1921 the Communists were expelled from the organization.

At the time of this first split the CGT numbered about 2,-

000,000 members. When the smoke had cleared away, this was what had happened: it was found that 400,000 had followed the politically-alert, hard-working Communist faction into a new organization called the CGTU (*Unitaire*), 350,000 had stayed behind with Jouhaux, 50,000 had started an anarcho-syndicalist union, and more than 1,000,000 had withdrawn from the whole labor movement. In other words, half the rank and file, trained in the belief that politics was an evil, preferred to get out rather than stay in to fight for what they believed in. From that moment the state of conflict between the CGT and the Communist-led CGTU was permanent, with the former showing political independence but generally leaning toward the views of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) or the Radical Socialist Party. In this rough-and-tumble fight Jouhaux showed considerable ability and Frachon suffered because of the political objectives which his party assigned him. By 1935 Jouhaux's CGT had become by far the more powerful. Frachon acknowledged this when the Communists decided to form a Popular Front with Socialists and Radical Socialists, and he took steps to bring his followers back into the Jouhaux federation.

The Communists came back into the fold in 1936 under terms which Jouhaux dictated. In the presence of Walter Schevenals, then general secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, they opened the books of the CGTU and revealed that its membership had shrunk from 400,000 in 1921 to 178,000. In contrast, the CGT could boast of an increase in the same period from 350,000 to 600,000. On this basis, Jouhaux gave the Communists only two seats on the new eight-man National Confederal Committee, the ruling body in any French labor organization.

Now there was a united federation of 778,000 members and the Popular Front Government was in power. The strengthened CGT went to work and obtained astonishing results in a short time. The system of sit-down strikes was inaugurated, and proved successful. By the end of the first year, the CGT was collecting dues from 4,000,000 men and women, more than at any time in its history. The 40-hour week was won. Workers in the provinces got equal pay with workers in Paris. The wages of women went up. The first collective bargaining agreements were signed.

A more spectacular victory was the concession of paid holidays, wrung from nervous employers. In 1937, 5,000,000 more

men and women were taking holidays at management's expense than ever before and the hotel business at seaside and mountain resorts was turned upside down. This gold rush, however, did not last any longer than gold rushes usually do. The year 1938 was one of economic crisis. The war was coming on. The CGT could not keep it up, and the young membership was getting tired of paying its dues. Mr. Schevenals says that by the end of that year the 4,000,000 members had shrunk to 800,000 and that in 1939 the 800,000 dropped to 600,000. This was the situation when the Soviet Union signed its pact of friendship and nonaggression with Hitlerite Germany, just a few weeks before Germany and France went to war. The news tore France apart and the CGT with it. One night Jouhaux called in Frachon and ordered him to disavow the Soviet-German pact or get out of the CGT. Frachon asked for two days in which to think it over. On the third day he refused to take any action, and that afternoon he and his followers were expelled from the CGT for the second time.

Five months later France was overrun by the German Army and the occupation began. From then on there was no longer any question of a labor organization or a split. There simply was no organization. It was not until the summer of 1941 (when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union) that Frachon's followers began to think of active resistance. It was not until about the same time that Jouhaux and his men felt they had a chance to do anything. In the early period only a few union leaders did much that is worth recalling. One was Christian Pineau, now Minister of Transport, who three times was parachuted into France on underground missions and under the name of "Garnier" started resistance work that was effective. After early 1942, however, others took heart, among them Frachon, Jouhaux and Jouhaux's young protégé in the labor movement, Louis Saillant, now secretary-general of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In later years Saillant became head of the Committee of National Resistance (CNR), succeeding its wartime presidents, the late Jean Moulin and Georges Bidault, until recently Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For a while the old enemies worked independently, still harboring the mutual distrust and suspicion that had been made so acute by the signature of the Soviet-German pact. Common sense and the need for collaboration, however, eventually com-

bined to bring them together, somewhat as they had joined forces again in 1936. In April of 1943, during a secret meeting at Perreux, an underground CGT was founded. In the new confidential National Confederal Committee (CCN) each side was allotted four seats and two secretaries-general were named, one Frachon, the other Jouhaux. Once more there was a CGT, and for the second time Communists and non-Communists were united.

III. AFTER THE LIBERATION

With the liberation the reconstituted CCN came into the open and was enlarged to include six men from the Communist following of Frachon and six from the non-Communist following of Jouhaux, which during the war had worked under the name of Force Ouvrière. A thirteenth man, Pierre Lebrun, who was supposed to be neutral, was named to keep the peace. Jouhaux soon found out, however, that Lebrun always voted with the Communists and that Jouhaux's friend, Saillant, did so with suspicious regularity. The result was that the Communists controlled the highest committee in the organization by the comfortable margin of eight votes to five. In self-defense Jouhaux kept his Force Ouvrière as a unit within the CGT and published a weekly newspaper distinct from the CGT organ. The old dispute of 1921 and 1940 was still alive, though for a time it was kept quiet and there were hopes that another split could be avoided.

Neither Frachon nor the French Communist Party leadership was content, however, with control of just the CCN. If they had been, their power would not have lasted long. When the occupation ended and police pressure was lifted, they went after the leadership of every union and to a large extent were successful because they had better discipline, were better prepared and had a clearer understanding of their objective. Early strike committees were turned into union committees. There was work to be done, and it had to be done fast. A whole new organization was being started. That meant rapid elections in industry-wide federations and departmental trade-union bodies. By 1946 Jouhaux and his Force Ouvrière were unable to challenge the supremacy of their rivals. The Communists had gone into the war by being expelled from the CGT. They were to come out of it in the driver's seat. How did it happen? Non-Communists are still trying to find the answer, but the most reasonable explana-

tion has been given by Robert Bothereau, one of the leading founders of Force Ouvrière. In a recent booklet entitled "Le Drame Confédéral" he says that the Communists simply worked harder, and that anyway it was an unfair fight because the non-Communists honestly aimed at syndicalist unity while the Communists never forgot that their real objective was to take over the movement.

Regardless of the cause, however, by 1946 Frachon was running the CGT, and it now was a powerful movement of 6,000,000 members, greater than ever before. Its quick victories in the early days of the liberation, including the establishment of factory committees with a voice in management and the nationalization of several important industries, gave it great prestige. From this time on the Communists might possibly have held the organization together, but they could have done so only by surrendering the principle of the Communist Party that organized labor is a political weapon. When it suited the Party, before the spring of 1947, to work for higher French production, the CGT worked for higher production. When it suited the Party to base the labor program on higher wages, the CGT worked for higher wages.

There was no consistency outside of the consistency of Communist Party tactics, and the inevitable outcome was mounting dissatisfaction within the labor ranks. First the postal workers, seeking gains which the Communists were not prepared to support at the time, withdrew from the movement. The railroad workers followed suit. Small unions broke away. Throughout 1947 there was widespread uneasiness in the CGT and by the end of the year it was too late to assuage it. Against this background the Communists decided to sponsor a general strike in November and December, calling for wage increases that already had been granted in part by the Government and ignoring the protests of the Jouhaux faction which pointed out that the Communist motives were entirely political. In the face of considerable opposition from the rank and file, the crippling strike was announced. Jouhaux and his friends protested. Frachon went ahead regardless; factories were closed down without union balloting; irresponsible elements seized the opportunity for sabotage that cost some lives.

Jouhaux went to the radio on the night of December 2 and used his influence to break the paralyzing strike which had

alarmed public opinion and which he contended had been ordered without consulting the workers. On December 3, 6 and 8 he met with government representatives, hoping to win a few more concessions so that the stoppage could be called off. Finally at 7 o'clock on the night of December 9 the Communist strike committee gave up the fight and accepted the terms it had refused on November 30. "The trade-union movement," says Jouhaux, "was literally murdered by this adventure. Workers deserted the ranks of the CGT by the thousands, the only means they had of protesting against methods they knew were senseless and contrary to their interests."

On December 18, Force Ouvrière met again to see what could be done. The following day Jouhaux abandoned his effort to keep his troops within the CGT. He had no more troops. They had quit the CGT. There was nothing left for him to do but to join them on the outside and organize a new federation. "An unwillingness to share the responsibility for a deed they had had nothing to do with," he wrote afterward, "was stronger than the reasonable arguments we made in favor of unity."

IV. FRENCH LABOR TODAY

Thus it was that a CGT of 6,000,000 members went to pieces in just a little over one year. Today it is struggling to keep the 3,000,000 men and women who decided to stay within its ranks or who had no choice.

Jouhaux's Force Ouvrière held a constituent congress last April, merged with a few autonomous unions, and went about the disagreeable and difficult task of creating a new organization. It had no money, no buildings or meeting halls, and no material with which to work. It had to collect its following, issue new cards, found county councils in the 90 departments of the country, start or rebuild its industry-wide federations, and at the same time carry on enough syndicalist action to prove to the workers who joined it that it was a force which intended to stay in business. All this was complicated by the fact that in France an individual cannot join the CGT or Force Ouvrière; he comes in with his union or not at all.

While Jouhaux worked, Frachon was, of course, not idle. Whenever a union voted to join Force Ouvrière, the CGT organized another made up of the minority that preferred to stay with the CGT. Thus today both have federations in all the 35

recognized trades and both claim to represent a majority of the workers in a given industry. The warfare between them has been carried on over a wide front, and it is a fair guess that neither is particularly satisfied with the results. The CGT has lost 1,500,000 to Force Ouvrière; but Force Ouvrière, for all its handicaps, had hoped to pick up far more than that.

It is hard to say what will happen in the next year or two, but there are two definite forces at work which should be remembered. The first is the desire of the leaders of both factions to see the split healed once again. Jouhaux deplores the division and says his men will come back when they can be sure to be free from Communist influence.

The second is the bad tactical situation in which Force Ouvrière finds itself. Unsupported by any political party, without funds, believing in straight syndicalist action, it came to the conclusion some months ago that it was to the best interests of its followers to check the inflationary spiral in the country. It therefore abandoned immediate demands for higher wages and went along with a middle-of-the-road government in an effort to knock down prices. The Communists, of course, pressed their wage claims, and this spring and summer there has been a struggle between the two lines of thought. If prices had gone down enough to help the working man, Force Ouvrière might have come out of it with colors flying. Unfortunately for Jouhaux, they did not.

It is equally true that the CGT has its tactical problems, above all those created by requirements of the party line, which insists that the Marshall Plan for European recovery is an American capitalist trick. But high wages are sound propaganda and help to offset this unpopular argument.

It may be that in the end this situation will lead once more to a repetition of the previous history of French labor, and that the CGT which has been disrupted three times in less than 30 years will unite for the third time. Much will depend on the international situation and the possibility of a general settlement between the east and the west.

TRIAL BALANCE IN JAPAN

By W. I. Ladejinsky

THERE are many signs of the disappearance of the feudal militaristic régime in Japan and the emergence of a new order of liberal democracy — a strange and startling manifestation in the east. How real is the change which the signs proclaim, and how lasting will it be? No one knows. But the Occupation has lasted now for three full years, and the time has come to strike a trial balance of its accomplishments and to interpret some of the clues which indicate the reaction of the Japanese people to the efforts to fashion a democratic, middle-class, peaceful Japan. For the course ahead must now be plotted in some detail.

The aims of the Allied Powers were to destroy entirely the military power and potential of Japan, to weaken the institutions that might nurture militarism, and, if possible, to create institutions and attitudes that would prevent its revival. The Potsdam Proclamation stated the objectives in almost deceptively simple terms: "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."

The aims were spelled out in the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," sent to General MacArthur on August 29, 1945 (announced September 22, 1945). This document, the first major directive to him as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), called for a thorough military, economic and spiritual demilitarization of Japan. Not only was the country to be physically disarmed, but "Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed." To this end, "Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade." This in turn called for a recommendation significantly affecting the future economic development of Japan: "To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combina-

tions which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry." All these objectives were to be achieved through the existing governmental machinery, which included the Emperor. But the Post-Surrender Policy made it very clear that the Emperor and the administrative apparatus were there by the sufferance of the United States, and would be retained only if they served the purposes of the Allied Powers.

It remained for General MacArthur to formulate the concrete terms of these objectives and to carry them out. His discretion and judgment were given wide rein: "You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission." What General MacArthur did with this authority constitutes the history of the Occupation. It is worth noting here that he was not merely the instrument of a policy drawn up in Washington, but to a large degree determined the policy that was followed. Since much of the character of the Occupation flowed from his interpretation of the Potsdam Declaration and the Post-Surrender Policy, here is an instance when an individual played a major part in the shaping of history. And whatever the judgment of the future historian on the American occupation of Japan, it seems clear that the original objectives and their implementation by General MacArthur bear the mark of a liberal and democratic approach.

II

The immediate task was the demilitarization of Japan. At the time of Japan's surrender her fighting power was shattered and her navy virtually wiped out, but she still possessed a tremendous military organization — several million men under arms, and more than 11,000 aircraft of all types. The liquidation of this machine, including the war industries, commenced the morning after the surrender. In less than a year, the first objective of the Occupation had been attained. Not a shred of Japan's former fighting strength is now in evidence. SCAP's job of demilitarization has been so thorough that it may be asserted dogmatically that within the foreseeable future Japan cannot possibly become a threat to her neighbors, unless, of course, the Allied Powers openly or tacitly agree to her rearmament.

"Beating swords into plowshares" is now a common process in Japan. This does not mean, however, that war-mindedness has necessarily been eliminated. Though many Japanese know now

that war, or at any rate unsuccessful war, does not pay, a really peaceful outlook does not come overnight to a nation after decades of swashbuckling militarism. If it comes, it will be as a result of long-range constitutional, economic, labor, agrarian and educational reforms. These have been called a species of American "political evangelism." Yet it is by no means impossible that the scoffers are mistaken and that the reforms will turn out to mark the end of the Meiji and the beginning of the democratic eras in Japan.

The heart of the attempt to democratize Japan lies in the new constitution. There was no alternative to drawing up a new one. The power of the oligarchy rested on a set of economic and cultural forces, but it was the Meiji constitution that provided their legal framework. To have left it unchanged would have perpetuated the totalitarian structure of Japan. The new Constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and became effective May 3, 1947. The preamble gives its revolutionary flavor:

> "We, the Japanese people . . . do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. . . ."

This in turn rests on the principles of limited monarchy, popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, parliamentary government, ministerial responsibility, decentralized administration and a comprehensive bill of rights. The bill of rights includes "the right and the obligation to work" and the right of the workers "to bargain and act collectively," and goes far beyond the guarantees of the American and the unwritten British constitutions. Its unique feature (Article 9) is the renunciation of war and prohibition of armed forces. It is not surprising that a member of the Liberal Party observed with some asperity that Japan might even be denied United Nations membership if she were totally disarmed.

The constitution has been criticized as too sophisticated for the present rudimentary conditions of democracy in Japan. Would it not have been better, it is asked, had the constitution been based more clearly upon a few established liberal principles, and the process of amendment made more rigid so that quick change would not be possible? American critics openly have taken

exception to the new constitution on the ground that it is not a product of Japanese thought, but of the ideas of General MacArthur and his experts, and hence will not survive the Occupation. Japanese critics have guardedly expressed the same idea. But the criticism is really beside the point. No doubt the opponents of liberal democracy in Japan will try to take advantage of the liberal provisions of the constitution for the very purpose of overthrowing it. Yet all the reforms of SCAP are in a sense alien. If the Japanese were to move toward democracy, the nature of the road which leads there had to be staked out, and if this were not done by guidance from outside it would not have been done at all. The Japanese can amend the constitution as they deem fit, but if it is amended out of all recognition, so that it is virtually abolished, we shall have a plain sign that the old set of militaristic and imperialistic masters is back in control. The provision of the constitution renouncing war is not as Utopian as it may seem at first glance, and has real merit to thoughtful Japanese. It does not jeopardize Japan's national security. The Japanese are pragmatists, and know that the world situation will for a long time be such that Japan will be very likely to receive protection against an aggressor.

The dissolution of the Zaibatsu ("money clique"), the family holding companies that controlled so much of the wealth of the country — banks, ships, mines, factories and land — was one of the basic objectives of the Occupation. The task was described by General MacArthur on November 6, 1945, as an effort to "permit a wider distribution of income and of ownership of the means of production and trade," and to "encourage the development within Japan of economic ways and institutions of a type that will contribute to the growth of peaceful and democratic forces." The Holding Company Liquidation Commission was set up as the repository of all the assets of the holding companies subject to dissolution, amounting to 400,000,000 shares worth 25 billion yen at face value. The proceeds of the sale of these assets, minus amounts due in taxes and to creditors, are to be turned over to the Zaibatsu in the form of government bonds, non-negotiable and non-transferable for ten years. HCLC is now in process of disposing of these securities, and success in distributing them among many small holders is an acid test of the plan. To date the answer is not encouraging. Only about 24,000,000 shares, or 8 percent, have been disposed of. Many

people are in no position to buy securities, while those with ready money are not familiar with the stock market, or prefer to speculate in commodities or buy tangible property.

In order to forestall a return to the monopoly pattern, so peculiar to Japan's rise as an industrial power, with a new set of Zaibatsu taking the place of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda and Sumitomo families, SCAP has devised the anti-monopoly and the deconcentration laws. The first bans private monopolies, participation in international cartels, interlocking directorates, and the ownership of more than 10 percent of the stock of competitive companies. The Deconcentration Law aims to establish a reasonable basis for the competition and freedom of enterprise through the elimination of those concentrations of economic power which stifled efficiency as well as competition. It seeks to eliminate "the companies which not only would be subject to the Anti-Monopoly Law but would also be so powerful as to prevent any effective administration of such law." The law provides for a set of standards that will determine which enterprises are subject to deconcentration, and an American Board of Review has been created and is now in the process of passing on appeals. Out of approximately 93,000 corporations, some 325 major companies, which control from two-thirds to three-quarters of Japan's industries, were originally designated as enterprises that might be affected by the deconcentration law. To date, 194 companies have been released as not representing excessive concentrations of economic power. The final outcome of the program depends, of course, upon the treatment of the remaining companies.

General MacArthur is opposed equally to the principle of private monopoly and to socialization, and his unyielding support of all the anti-Zaibatsu and anti-monopoly measures is motivated by his desire to eradicate the former without fostering the latter. His attitude was made quite clear in his New Year's message (January 1, 1948) to the Japanese people:

> Only through its [Zaibatsu] dissolution could the way be cleared for the emergence of an economy conducive to the will of all the people — an economy embodying the principle of private capitalism based upon free competitive enterprise.

The fact remains, however, that the application of the deconcentration law has run into difficulties. In certain quarters in the United States the reorganization program is considered

merely an attempt to pulverize Japan's economy in order to satisfy the whim of theoretical planners, and the legislation has also been the target of bitter opposition in Japan. The original task is not made easier because influential circles in Washington perceive a conflict between deconcentration of excessive economic power and economic recovery. Secretary Royall, of the Department of the Army, stated the problem in these words in San Francisco on January 6, 1948:

> The dissolution of the Zaibatsu may present in itself no serious economic problem, but extreme decentralization of industry, while further impairing the ability to make war, may at the same time impair manufacturing efficiency . . . of Japanese industry, and may, therefore, postpone the day when Japan can become self-supporting. Such is our dilemma . . . deconcentration must stop short of the point where it unduly interferes with the efficiency of Japanese industry.

The economic purge offers the same dilemma. Many of the men who ran Japan's war machine were among the ablest business leaders of the country, according to Mr. Royall, and "we cannot afford to sterilize the business ability of Japan." The fact is that the elimination of excessive concentration of economic power as planned by SCAP should increase industrial efficiency and aid Japan's economic recovery. Excesses of some phases of the economic purge can be corrected without endangering the effort to free Japanese industry from a monopolistic straitjacket. But if Mr. Royall's statement is to be interpreted as foreshadowing a decision to soft-pedal the Zaibatsu reform on the ground that it prevents economic recovery, then the resurgence of the great Japanese monopolies and all they stand for may follow.

III

From the outset the Occupation was aware of the need for reconstructing the labor movement of Japan. The sole guidance for action was the broad reference of the Initial Post-Surrender Policy to the desirability of stimulating the development of free labor organizations. SCAP gave substance to this aim with vision, energy and promptness, through the promulgation of such basic legislation as the trade union, labor relations adjustment, labor standards and employment security laws, and the establishment of a Ministry of Labor. The trade union law guarantees workers the right to join unions of their own choosing

and to bargain collectively with employers; the right to strike is part of the new charter of freedom. The labor relations adjustment law provides machinery for settling disputes under the auspices of Labor Relations Committees. The labor standards law for the first time sets up adequate safeguards for working conditions, and the employment security law is intended to eliminate the labor boss system and to provide for democratic recruiting and employment practices.

A lusty and vigorous trade-unionism has sprung up almost overnight. In less than three years Japan has come to have more than 32,000 labor unions with a membership of nearly 6,600,000, as against a peak membership of 420,000 in 1936. The spontaneity with which Japanese workers created local unions testifies to their need for them. The mushroom growth, however, produced trade unions that are strong in numbers but weak in leadership and lacking in understanding of union functions and democratic procedures. Moreover, trade unionism in Japan is growing up under extremely difficult economic conditions. Collective bargaining has resulted in many wage increases, but inflation has largely nullified these gains. Labor unrest is serious. SCAP has stated that "strikes, lockouts and other work stoppages which are inimical to objectives of the military occupation are prohibited. Mediation and arbitration of labor disputes which are not inimical to occupation objectives are responsibilities of the Japanese Government." There has been a recent tendency to frown upon strikes for higher wages not only because they interfere with military objectives of the Occupation, but because they presumably seriously impede the economic recovery of the country. Should this become a stated policy, then every strike in inflation-ridden Japan can easily be put into that category. Whatever gains were made toward economic recovery through the unwilling acquiescence of a highly political-minded working class would be offset by the loss of prestige of the Occupation, as well as by the strengthening of undesirable political elements. The workers, caught between a spiraling cost of living and the denial of the right to strike, might well turn to the Communists for militant leadership.

In stopping the threatened general strike of February 1947, General MacArthur issued the following reassuring statement: "I have taken this action in a dire emergency and do not intend otherwise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given labor

in the achievement of legitimate objectives. Nor do I intend in any way to compromise or influence the basic social issues involved." In July of this year General MacArthur sent a letter to Premier Ashida advising him that "no person holding a position by appointment or employment in the public service of Japan or in any instrumentality thereof, should resort to a strike or engage in delaying or other dispute tactics which tend to impair the efficiency of governmental operations." This was immediately made the basis for an order by the Cabinet. The question of strikes by government workers is admittedly a difficult one, but it is not likely that SCAP, which has contributed so much to the rise of the labor movement, will succumb to the pressure to revise the existing legislation further in order to "put labor in its place." Occupation labor officials and responsible Japanese labor leaders know that Japanese labor unions have many shortcomings, but responsible trade unionism cannot be fostered by regressive labor legislation. Its development is a long-range process in any country, and particularly in Japan, where labor leaders, employers and the Japanese Government, as well as the workers, must be made to understand the fundamental concepts of free trade unionism.

IV

If the ultimate fate of some of the reforms of the Occupation is still in the balance, the agrarian reform, at any rate, is plainly a success, and will be completed, in its main aspects, in the course of this year. The old system of land ownership in Japan helped keep a huge tenantry — two-thirds of the farm population — in poverty. The landlords were the autocrats of rural Japan. For years before the war thoughtful Japanese recognized the need of reform, but practically nothing was done about it. General MacArthur's order to the Japanese Government of December 9, 1945, to take measures to insure that those who till the soil shall enjoy the fruits of their labor marked the beginning of the emancipation of the Japanese tenants.

The two principal aims of the Land Reform Law promulgated on October 21, 1946,[1] were to enable the majority of the tenants to become owners of the land they cultivated and to improve farm tenancy practices for those who remained as tenants.

[1] *Cf.* William M. Gilmartin and W. I. Ladejinsky, "The Promise of Agrarian Reform," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1948.

In effecting these changes, the Occupation is attempting to strengthen the forces that create a stable, middle-of-the-road, petit-bourgeois society. The entire emphasis, therefore, is on small private holdings. The Communists and the landlords, for quite dissimilar reasons, have been opposing this type of reform, but with no success. The Government has already purchased from the landlords most of the land earmarked for sale under the program (4,500,000 acres), and the tenants have already purchased 75 percent of this land from the Government, on very favorable terms. Sound credit and taxation systems must be instituted for the protection of the new owner-cultivators. Though the landlords have lost economic power, they still possess much prestige and influence, but the farm unions and the land commissions are beginning to supply new rural leadership. Today, the old and new forces are sharing responsibility in rural Japan — a noteworthy crack in the seemingly unbreakable cake of custom of the Japanese village.

Changes in the system of Japanese education are necessary if reforms such as these are to be integrated into the life of the Japanese people. The American Education Mission which visited Japan in early 1946 drew up recommendations, which have since become the keystone of Japan's educational system. They provide for the extension of compulsory education from six to nine years, legalize coeducation, establish equal educational opportunities for both sexes, abolish discriminatory practices in universities, decentralize control of the Ministry of Education, transfer responsibility for local school matters to the local school boards, and introduce new curricula and new methods of teaching.

Neither the history nor the make-up of the Japanese people justifies the assumption that they are incapable of assimilating so radical a change in the system of education. The relative ease with which the Japanese can be reëducated is best illustrated by the introduction of the idea of Emperor-worship. For 300 years before the Restoration of 1868, the Emperor was a poor, ignored, lesser lord; emperors were assassinated, were forced to abdicate, and never exercised actual control. The real ruler was the shogun. But then an elaborate propaganda, carried on primarily through schools and the Shinto temples, created the image of a divine Emperor, and in half a century the ruler who had for years been utterly neglected was accepted as God. Of course, the Occupation alone cannot bring about the acceptance of the pres-

ent reform, and as Mr. William J. Sebald, Deputy for the Supreme Commander, said last November, "The new school system is being introduced by the Japanese Government in the face of tremendous odds." It is hampered by a dire shortage of teachers, the destruction and deterioration of thousands of school buildings, and a shortage of paper and textbooks. Persons unfavorably disposed toward the program claim that Japan cannot afford it, and the insistence that the Japanese budget must be balanced may serve as pretext for reducing necessary appropriations.

The intangible obstacles, which even a balanced budget and an ample treasury could not remove, are more serious. No school system can be better than its teachers. More than 100,000 teachers and educational officials in Japan have either resigned or been purged, and the remaining 300,000, though perhaps not opposed to the new program, were trained under a totalitarian system and undoubtedly retain some prewar ideas about education. Years of effort will be required to reorient them. In short, the new system of education is only a blueprint.

What is true of the teachers is true of all the bureaucrats, officials and politicians who were raised under the old traditions, but who are now the direct agents of democratization of Japan. The outstanding militarists and imperialists have been weeded out, but hundreds of the old leaders and members of ruling cliques, and a bureaucracy steeped in tradition, are still in positions of influence. The chances of the emergence of a forward-looking leadership depend upon the development by the new institutions of a new set of vested interests and new sources of power and prestige. As we have noted, new leaders are being bred by the land reform; and the rise of trade unions will have a similar effect. The emergence of a middle class, which will in turn produce a new crop of politicians, journalists and intellectuals who are dependent upon it and who will show loyalty to it, is perhaps the most important factor in the growth of democracy in Japan. Its growth depends upon whether the monopolies in industry and finance are broken up, and on the economic rehabilitation of the country. A full stomach does not guarantee democracy, but democracy certainly does not thrive on an empty one.

V

The economic situation in Japan has improved since the

surrender, but the recovery has been too slow to halt the inflationary spiral. Inflation can be avoided after war only in countries capable of converting their economies swiftly to meet peacetime demands at home and abroad. Not even the victorious Powers could avoid varying degrees of inflation, and a war-ravaged Japan, shaken by defeat, the loss of overseas possessions and foreign trade — the key to her economic stabilization — could not possibly escape it. Nonetheless, more positive measures might have prevented the economic crisis from reaching so sharp a pitch. The Governments of Higashi-Kuni, Shidehara and Yoshida procrastinated, shifted responsibility for their shortcomings to the Occupation, and insisted upon treating a very bad case of inflation as if it were a sympton of deflation. Not until the advent of Katayama's Social-Democratic Cabinet was a real effort made to introduce a semblance of order into Japan's economy. The Occupation laid down the policy that in order to forestall disease, unrest and starvation Japan had to be provided with a minimum sufficiency of food, and imported a total of 3,800,000 metric tons of foodstuffs from the United States at a cost of $500,000,000. The Occupation also took measures leading to an increase of agricultural production, and to the restoration of the fishing industry, including Antarctic whaling.

SCAP's intervention in the field of industrial production and finance was only nominal during the first year and a half after the surrender. It had received contradictory orders on the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's basic directive to General MacArthur (dispatched November 8, 1945) stated: "You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy;" but in a subsequent paragraph General MacArthur was told to see to it that "Japanese authorities . . . develop and effectively carry out programs . . . to avoid acute economic distress . . ." and, in the event the Japanese authorities failed to do so, that he should "direct them to take such measures as in your judgment are necessary." The growing economic crisis in Japan settled the question, and forced the Occupation to take a stand on problems of foreign trade, rate of exchange, reparations, levels of production and degree of American financial assistance. If Japan is to be removed from the relief rolls, on which she now draws about $400,000,000 a year from American taxpayers, and put on her own feet, she must be given access to markets overseas. In a re-

cent speech Under Secretary of the Department of the Army William Draper estimated that Japanese exports must increase "to almost seven times the present level before they can pay for food and raw materials necessary to provide a tolerable standard of living for the Japanese nation." This implies a generosity of treatment and unanimity of understanding among the Allied Powers that, to say the least, had best not be taken for granted.

VI

Such are the attempts to translate the aims of the Occupation into reality. It is the tale of a moderate middle-class revolution, designed to create a stable system of capitalistic democracy. The changes that have been made have so loosened the fetters that held the Japanese people that reactionary forces would find it difficult to tighten them again. The American occupation has rendered an historical service in daring to give new direction to the economic and political arrangements of the defeated country. Such reforms as the widespread ownership of land, the recognition of the right of labor to economic security, and the measures for the control of disease and improvement of public health so effectively carried on by the Public Health and Welfare Section of SCAP, have given tangible evidence to the common people of Japan that we are actively espousing a new way of life and not merely opposing the old. It is this that distinguishes the American occupation of Japan from the occupation of other defeated countries by victors in wars, past and present.

The road upon which the Occupation has set the Japanese is sound and promising, and the Japanese have gone a considerable distance along it in the last three years. But a generation must pass before we can know how deeply its spirit has been accepted and how lasting its effects will be on Japan. The economic rehabilitation of Japan is essential to the strengthening of the social reforms introduced by the Occupation. There must be a degree of economic well-being at least as great as was possible under the old régime. The reforms do not inhibit the fullest utilization of Japanese labor, managerial skill and indigenous natural resources; nor are they of a kind which would prevent extension of American credits sufficient to cover imports of raw materials and the cost of new capital equipment, as well as the investment of foreign capital.

But we must face the fact that even if the economic climate

is favorable, the reforms may not be wholeheartedly accepted. And here we touch on a crucial problem. In the past, the keynote of government and society was authoritarianism. The spirit of Japanese culture has been communal and disciplinary. Tradition and group opinion, not individual initiative, have been the mainsprings of Japanese behavior. There is no reason to believe that the cake of custom is so hard that it cannot be broken, for the Japanese were amenable to indoctrination in other times, and are more open to it now. The overwhelming defeat shook the established political and social order to its foundations and shattered many illusions, chief among them the belief in the unique mission of the Japanese people. The fact is that the Japanese are a practical and imitative people, and large groups are willing to follow a set of principles used by the country which is apparently the most successful in the world. But though the balance of forces in Japan's society after three years of the Occupation favors the sloughing off of the worst excrescences of Japanese feudal life, the Japanese people have not themselves fought for these democratic reforms. They have been a gift. The Japanese can make them their own only by using them. The processes of democracy are not simple, and the Japanese cannot hope to employ them successfully without much further guidance. But the military occupation as we have known it need not continue much longer. If the Allied Powers are satisfied that the military structure of Japan has been dismantled (and there is no doubt that it has been), if the auxiliary military guarantees for the future have been fully secured, and if, as has been sufficiently demonstrated, the purely police problems are small and the overt opposition negligible, then there is no reason why the military occupation, in its present form and extent, cannot be terminated shortly.

What will be needed is an Occupation which emphasizes training in running the newly established institutions. Now that we have taken the Japanese nation in tow, we cannot abruptly set it adrift; the main effort of education has only just begun. This is a task for an Occupation made up primarily of experts, advisers and teachers. American aims in Japan and the novel meaning imparted to them by SCAP constitute a test of the universality of certain western precepts. The future of Japan as a useful member of the society of nations depends upon America's determination to continue aid and counsel to the Japanese.

THE CHOICE IN THE RUHR

By William Diebold, Jr.

THE economic geographers' maps show a black smudge running along both banks of the Rhine from just north of Cologne almost to the Dutch border. Loosely called "the Ruhr," after one of the eastern tributaries of the Rhine, this area provided one-third of the steel and two-fifths of the coal and coke produced in continental Europe (excluding Russia) before the war. Coal and steel are sources of power, and in a world where power is centered in national governments the decision to put the Ruhr under international control is momentous.

That decision had two professed purposes and a tacit one. As a means of ensuring against another German attack on the west, international control of the Ruhr has a good chance of success. As a means of getting the maximum economic benefit from the Ruhr for the whole of Western Europe, it is of dubious value and risks self-defeat. The third purpose, so plain that it has not needed expression, is to solidify and strengthen the western nations. This accounts for taking the decision now and gives grounds for running the risks that international control of the Ruhr will entail in the future.

Early in June representatives of the United States, Britain, France and the Benelux countries meeting in London made recommendations to their governments on five questions concerning Germany: a procedure for creating a government in the western zones, an outline of a security régime to guard against a renewal of German aggression, principles for the international control of the Ruhr, association of Benelux representatives with decisions on German matters, and provisional arrangements for minor changes in the western frontiers of Germany. Within a few weeks the governments accepted the recommendations and the first steps were taken toward establishing a German government in the western zones. At the same time other discussions continued about Western Germany's share in the European Recovery Program. Thus the agreement to internationalize the Ruhr — "a statement of principles" to be followed by a more detailed agreement — is set in its logical framework.

But politics explains more than logic about the Ruhr Agreement. France, seeking security, coal, and a guarantee that she

will continue to rank above Germany in European politics, has consistently sought some kind of international control of the Ruhr. American and British official opinions were divided. For some time the fear that such a step would hinder German economic recovery dominated policy. More recently, concern for European coöperation and the desire to minimize Russian influence in Germany led to some change in views. The issue was decided at London instead of being postponed, because Britain and the United States wanted to get French acceptance of the creation of a western German state, or pseudo-state, and expansion of production in the western zones. Had the United States and Britain gone ahead with such a program in the Bizone without French consent, the process of political coöperation among the Western European Powers and the United States would have been set back, perhaps indefinitely. Naturally the compromises on which it is founded have left their marks on the Ruhr Agreement, not only in its precise terms, but in its ambiguities and its silences. The way international control of the Ruhr works depends very much on how firmly all sides have accepted these compromises and, even more, upon whether there is agreement and not misunderstanding about their substance.

II

"The resources of the Ruhr shall not in the future be used for the purpose of aggression but shall be used in the interests of peace. . . . Access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr . . . [shall] be in the future guaranteed without discrimination to the countries of Europe coöperating in the common economic good." To achieve these purposes the six-Power Agreement creates an International Authority for the Ruhr made up of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany. The Authority will operate primarily by deciding how much of the coal, coke and steel produced in the Ruhr is to be exported. It will have the right to demand information and make on-the-spot inspections so as to know what is going on and whether its orders are being obeyed. The Authority will not own or manage the mines and mills of Ruhr, as the French had proposed, nor will it say what shall be produced, or in what quantities. Iron, chemicals, machinery and other products outside the three named in the Agreement will not fall within its jurisdiction.

The Agreement distinguishes a "Control Period" during which "the Occupying Powers concerned exercise supreme authority" and the indefinite future thereafter, when Germany presumably is autonomous. During the control period the Authority's decisions are to be carried out by the occupation authorities, afterward by the Germans. Should the Germans not carry out the Authority's decisions it may recommend to the governments represented "the application of the necessary enforcement measures." The German Government is to be given a hearing before the measures are applied.

The Germans will have no vote on the question whether their Government "is in default on its obligations" as a result of not carrying out the Authority's decisions. Nor have they a vote in security matters. Otherwise Germany will cast three votes on the Authority, along with Britain, France and the United States. Each Benelux country will have one vote. Decision will be by simple majority (whether of votes cast or total votes the Agreement does not say). However, "until the contracting Governments decide otherwise, the representative of Germany shall be designated and the vote for Germany exercised by those Powers which share the responsibility for the economic administration of that part of Germany which includes the Ruhr." Most commentators have taken this provision to mean that Britain, France and the United States will each cast one of the three German votes. That would give the American and British bizonal officials control of the Authority, with 8 out of 15 votes. But the provision may mean that the German "vote" is to be cast as a unit, by agreement among the United States, Britain and France.[1] If that agreement had to be unanimous there might be important issues on which the German vote could not be cast and, if the Benelux countries agreed with the French view of the matter, the Authority would be at an impasse. Not the Ruhr economy but the Ruhr Authority would stop running.

Whatever voting arrangements are established, it seems clear that the most fundamental issues on which the French differ from the Americans and British cannot really be settled by balloting but will require the same kind of compromises that gave the Ruhr Authority its life.

[1] If there should not be a fairly complete economic merger of the French zone with the Bizone, the provision might also be read to mean that the British and Americans control all three of the German votes.

III

As a security measure, the Ruhr Agreement is part of a larger framework outlined in another part of the London Agreement. Occupation "until the peace of Europe is secured," continued disarmament and demilitarization of Germany policed by international inspection are the main features of this system. The way is left open for industrial control and the occupation of key areas as well. The Ruhr Authority is a kind of advance installment on the more comprehensive system, since it will carry out inspection in a crucial area of the German economy and, by its allocation of coal, coke and steel for domestic consumption, will have the power to prevent any sizable German rearmament.

There is plainly no threat of independent German aggression while the country is occupied. But as if to make doubly sure the Ruhr Agreement specifies that the occupation authorities will take necessary disarmament measures and particularly mentions the power to deny Ruhr steel, coal and coke to industries prohibited or limited on security grounds. After the control period the enforcement powers will be transferred to whatever security agency is set up, and provision will be made for the Ruhr Authority to coöperate with that body. If no such body should be created, the powers would be exercised by the Allied representatives (without the Germans) on the Authority.

We are here at one of the major compromises underlying the Ruhr Agreement. Most articulate Frenchmen were not satisfied by the security measures proposed by Secretary Byrnes when he put forward the draft Four-Power Pact in 1946: disarmament policed by inspection and backed by mutual guarantees against German aggression. The French wanted these and more, especially some kind of control over heavy German industry. The prevalent American and British opinion has been that emphasis on industrial controls for security would lead to a permanent damping down of German production with serious consequences for the economy of Europe.

The Ruhr Agreement meets the French thesis to the extent of creating an international régime for the most important products of Germany's key industrial area. The Authority will have adequate powers to prevent large-scale German rearmament. Of itself, however, the Agreement does not limit German economic activity and industrial development and could be used to pro-

mote them. Production and management are deliberately left in German hands. Coupled with the disarmament and inspection system envisaged in the other parts of the London Agreement, and with the system of defensive pacts emerging in Western Europe, the arrangements for the Ruhr seem, from an American point of view, to be wholly adequate to prevent German aggression, provided a majority of the western allies adhere to the purpose of keeping Germany disarmed. It is that proviso, too, which worries the French who remember the assurances they were given after 1918. But the qualification is unavoidable. No machinery or formal arrangement can prevent German rearmament unless the western Powers will use the machinery. Nor is elaborate machinery necessary. Large-scale rearmament cannot be clandestine. What was lacking in the thirties was not knowledge of what the Nazis were doing, but the will to do anything about it.

Admitting that the Ruhr Agreement fell short of the French proposals, Foreign Minister Bidault told the National Assembly: "In our view, this is the first time that substantial guarantees for the security and prosperity of France and Europe have been given." The Assembly accepted the Agreement since its rejection "would lead to a regrettable weakening of the understanding [*entente*] among friendly Powers whose constant coöperation is today the surest guarantee of peace." The resolution urged the French Government to press its case in the continuing negotiations, and to seek the expropriation and international management of the Ruhr mines and basic industries, and a long occupation of Germany, the troops to be withdrawn only after guarantees of peace had been negotiated and key areas occupied.

IV

The immediate problem in the Ruhr is production. The output of coal and steel is much farther below the prewar rate than in the rest of Europe. The United States has pressed for the revival of German industry largely on the ground that it is essential to European recovery. The case will be proved when German goods begin flowing to other Western European countries and they, in turn, find a market for some of their products in Germany. The Ruhr Authority may play a part in this process.

During the next few years, however, the Authority's freedom of movement is limited by several provisions of the Agreement. The Authority's allocation of Ruhr coal, coke and steel between

domestic use and exports must be consistent with the recovery programs of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation. In carrying out the Authority's decisions the military governors must adhere to the existing agreements among the contracting governments regarding the allocation of coal and coke such as the sliding scale arrangement under which France gets increased shipments of these products as German production goes up. Another provision seems to subordinate the Authority's decisions to the terms of the bizonal merger and the bilateral agreement covering ECA aid to Germany. How much power this gives the United States to set the limits within which the Ruhr Authority can move is not altogether clear.

Together with the voting arrangements that seem to give the bizonal authorities a majority, these provisions make it likely that the Ruhr Authority will not have a great effect on the conduct of the German economy in the next few years. The crucial decisions will continue to be made by the bizonal authorities within the framework of the European Recovery Program. By virtue of its financial responsibility for Germany, the United States will have the dominant voice. Still the influence of the Ruhr Authority cannot be wholly discounted. Through the Agreement France and the Benelux countries acquire a position and a right to express their views on the allocation of Ruhr production, which may not be without its effect on the decisions of the American and British authorities. Nor can one overlook the difficulties that may arise from adding one more piece of administrative machinery to the complex that already exists.

Broader questions underlie these issues: Who is to take the crucial decisions about Germany's contribution to European recovery? Will the OEEC acquire the strength to overrule the bizonal authorities? Within the United States Government, who will carry more weight, General Clay — whose orders and reponsibility run in terms of Germany — or the State Department and ECA which tend to take a broader view? If recovery decisions are made on a broad basis, the Ruhr Authority may gain in importance. Mutually satisfactory compromises over Ruhr issues are more likely to be reached if policy on Germany is made in the perspective of Washington rather than of Berlin or Frankfurt.

V

The long-term economic effect of the Ruhr Agreement can run

in either of opposite directions. Combined with the development of the OEEC, the Agreement may become a useful instrument of European economic coöperation. Used as an instrument of economic nationalism, the Ruhr Authority can become a device for giving the western victor countries the usufruct of the old enemy's chief industrial treasure and control of a powerful competitor. No doubt both these elements will appear in the future history of the Ruhr Authority. "Coöperation" has become a magic word that wards off critical analysis. It has been easy to assume that applying so attractive a formula as "international control of the Ruhr" would surely benefit the whole European economy. Perhaps it will, but not automatically. The experiment may also damage Europe's economy.

The Ruhr Authority is "to make the division of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German consumption and export, in order to ensure adequate access to supplies of these products, taking into account the essential needs of Germany." Access is a problem of scarcity. Now, international allocation of scarce coal and steel is crucial to recovery. But later, when this time has passed and supplies are plentiful or demand falls, access will no longer be an important issue. Before the war one did not hear complaints that foreign countries were unable to buy what they wanted from the Ruhr. On the contrary, a more common objection was to the competition of German heavy industrial products.

Nor is Germany likely to be reluctant to export in the future. A unified Germany would count heavily on the export of Ruhr coal and steel which before the war accounted for from 60 to 75 percent of the whole country's exports of these products. A truncated Western Germany with an enlarged population and smaller food production will be even more hard pressed for foreign exchange to buy its necessary imports. Once foreign financial aid has ended only exports can fill the gap. After the present period of shortages, that hard taskmaster, the need for foreign exchange, is likely to assure the countries of Europe and the rest of the world access to Ruhr products without the help of the Ruhr Authority. (Latent powers of allocation would have sufficed for exceptional circumstances; for instance, if Germany were able to keep borrowing abroad in amounts large enough to reduce substantially the pressure to export or if for political bargaining purposes the German Government were willing to pay the price of withholding exports.)

The Ruhr Authority may turn out to be more concerned with checking the flow of German goods into world markets than with assuring it. Germany's principal European competitors in the manufacture of steel — Britain, France, Belgium and Luxembourg — have a majority of votes on the Authority. Once surplus steel-making capacity begins to appear, and particularly if depression threatens or occurs, the pressure will be very strong on these governments to protect the markets of their own producers by curtailing Ruhr exports. Nor need one suppose that only a depression will lead to the Ruhr Authority's taking on a restrictive function. A cartel dominated Europe's steel industry before the war. The forces that created it will again be felt even in nationalized industries. If as seems likely their activities receive the assent or active support of governments that they had before, the Ruhr Authority is almost certain to be used as a weapon to strengthen the cartel. Once a major force in the cartel, the German steel industry will in these circumstances be a weak partner on whom the burden of compromises among the others is likely to fall. Unless one supposes that the Ruhr mills thus shut down (or at least cut off from foreign markets) are the least efficient in Europe — and that is not the way cartels usually work — the result will be that the European economy as a whole will suffer. Of course a cartel may dominate Europe's steel industry without the help of the Ruhr Authority, but since one of the great aims of cartels is to have their decisions enforced by governmental edict, the risks are great that the Authority will often work quite contrary to its professed purposes.

The cartel example is just one illustration of the many ways in which the Authority's apparently limited powers may extend its functions. Under another provision, for instance, the Authority is to prevent the Germans from using "artificial measures or discriminatory practices which would distort the movement of Ruhr coal, coke and steel in international trade, except for measures of protection approved by the International Authority." On its face this seems to give the Authority extensive powers over German commercial policy. In making its export allocations, the Authority will continually pass judgment on the whole German economy, as the Agreement requires it to take "into account the essential needs of Germany." In the immediate future the question will be how much coal, coke and steel must be left in the Ruhr for the German economy to function at the level required by the

European Recovery Program. Later, when foreign financial aid has ended, export markets will be part of Germany's "essential needs." Not only direct exports of coal, coke and steel, but retention in Germany of enough of these products to permit the export of machinery, metal products, chemicals and other items will help to pay for imports. If the Authority allocates exports among foreign countries (the Agreement is silent on this point), the direction trade flows will affect Germany's ability to pay for imports of its "essential needs," as long as many currencies are not generally convertible. Implicit in every one of these calculations is an assumption about the living standards of the Germans and the character and level of activity of the whole German economy.

The Authority will shape the German economy not only by the absolute quantities of Ruhr products it allocates for export, but also by the relative proportions of coal and steel it requires to be exported or kept for domestic consumption. Some Frenchmen have argued that it would be better for Europe if the Ruhr were to concentrate on exporting coal, leaving to others a larger share of steel-making than they had before. The Ruhr Authority could enforce such a view simply by setting so high an export quota for coal that steel-making in the Ruhr would have to be curtailed. Security and national advantage probably have more to recommend this course in French eyes than consideration of Europe's economic needs.[2] American and British opinion has generally assumed that there is no convincing economic reason for such a shift, and that large-scale production of steel in the Ruhr is essential to European recovery. Fairly early in its career the Ruhr Authority will have to settle this issue. Otherwise members of the Authority frequently will be at cross purposes, and continuing suspicions of each other's motives will further jeopardize the experiment.

Assuming that the French thesis is refuted, the implication will be that the Ruhr should be a thriving center of heavy industry if Europe is to produce as much as it can — as it must if it is to become self-supporting. For reasons with which we must have the greatest sympathy, it will be hard for any French government to accept this conclusion. Only if France can be per-

[2] The main lines of an economic argument that have been touched on by various Frenchmen are that technical developments have made it economical to bring the coal to the iron as a general practice; that before 1918 the Germans favored Lorraine for the location of steel mills; that much of the Ruhr's heavy industry was subsidized in one way or another; that the Germans held their position in world trade through dominating the steel cartel.

suaded that the checks placed on Germany are adequate for security will that acceptance be given willingly. Unwilling assent, leaving France a permanent minority on the Ruhr Authority, will cause constant trouble and weaken the bonds of western union. But concessions to the French view that result in lower production in the Ruhr will also weaken the western union by perpetuating some of the damage the war and the Nazis inflicted on Europe's economy.

The existence of so fundamental a dilemma adds to the skepticism — indeed, pessimism — one must feel about the possible effect of the Ruhr Authority on the European economy. Partly because of the mixed motives that led to the Agreement, partly because of the opportunities that will arise to substitute limited national interests for the broader European interests, it will be easier for the Authority to go wrong in important decisions than to keep right.

There are, however, at least a few factors that may restrain the Ruhr Authority from going too far with policies likely to restrict productivity in the Ruhr. By all odds the most important is the widespread recognition that the Ruhr can make its maximum contribution to the economy of Europe only if the emphasis is on stimulating production. The best chance of this view's being translated into action lies in the development of economic program-making on a West-European basis. Not only is that the proper context for judging the Ruhr's function, but among the OEEC nations are some not represented on the Ruhr Authority who have less to fear from German competition and more to gain from larger and more numerous sources of supply.

The second factor checking an exploitative and repressive use of the Ruhr Authority is public opinion in the United States and Britain. The experience of the interwar period should suffice to show that the people of these two countries are unlikely to tolerate over a long period arrangements which seem to them unfair, even to a former enemy. The consequences would be felt in the unwillingness of their governments to go very far in enforcing such arrangments. If they are not to be self-defeating, the Ruhr Authority's policies must plainly further the general European interest and not just the separate interests of member states.

The third brake on a repressive policy is the attitude of the Germans themselves. "You can't dig coal with bayonets." In the long run the Ruhr Authority can be fully successful only if it is

acceptable to the Germans. Undoubtedly a major motive of the Americans and British in rejecting French proposals for international management of the Ruhr mines and smelters was to avoid giving every dispute between labor and management, every haggle between producer and customer, the color of a national issue and making it thereby less tractable. Reduced consciousness of "the foreign masters" will help, but acceptability will depend also on how heavily the Authority's hand lies on the economy of the Ruhr and, most of all, on what the Germans think they get out of it.

The decision to create a West-German government, followed by currency reform and the Berlin crisis, seems to have pushed the Ruhr Agreement into the background of German thought. Although some German intellectuals have advocated internationalization (and socialization) of the Ruhr as a price Germany should pay for readmission to the Western European comity, it seems certain that the predominant reaction will be unfavorable. Communists and Christian Democrats alike are already exploiting the Authority's obvious vulnerability to nationalist propaganda. A statement issued at Duesseldorf on June 5 by the Minister Presidents of the Bizone *Länder*, the mayors of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, German representatives from the French Zone, and spokesmen for heavy industry expressed opposition in relatively moderate terms. While agreeing that the Ruhr should make its maximum contribution to European recovery, and should never again threaten the peace, the statement denied that international control was the way to achieve these ends. If there had to be international surveillance, it should be applied — with German participation — to all the important centers of Europe's heavy industry.

How much support the Ruhr workers would give the Authority in return for prosperity and fair treatment remains to be seen. Probably a policy of high production and a generous estimate of "the essential needs of Germany" will help, but Europe's political climate is likely to be even more important. Too "soft" a policy might only convince the Germans that the west's need of them will command any price they choose to ask. Somehow the Ruhr Authority — and behind it the victor Powers in their peacemaking — will have to try to find policies which while not cozening the Germans to the point of frustrating the purposes of the Agreement still recognize the need to reconcile the Germans.

One would like to think that the Authority's best chance of success lay in convincing the Germans that it was truly pursuing a "European interest" in which they shared. But there is no warrant for such optimism. To try now to say what gods the Germans will follow in the next few years, much less decades, is to stare at a blank wall. By depriving the Germans of full control over the Ruhr, internationalization reduces the ability of a future German government to make a deal with the Russians (the Germans have less to offer) and offsets some of the hazards to the west should such a deal be made (the Germans cannot deliver). While the Ruhr Authority lasts, Germany's chance to become once more an independent Power in Western Europe depends on the willingness of the United States and Britain to see that happen.

France faces a crucial decision. She can try to use the Ruhr Authority to keep Germany permanently in a subordinate economic position, or she can consent to the growth of a strong Ruhr economy in the control of which she has a voice. The former course will almost certainly lead to trouble for the European economy and for inter-allied relations. Perhaps France can only be persuaded to the latter course by an American commitment to help her with arms and men if there should ever be renewed German aggression. Otherwise, since the Ruhr Authority can be successful in fostering the maximum economic contribution to Europe only with the willing assistance of the Germans, the United States may find itself in the position of fostering the growth of German power *against* France. That would be a dangerous result, since there is no evidence of the emergence in Germany of democratic and liberty-loving forces strong enough to run the country. Without such a development an independent German Power cannot be made a bulwark of a western bloc without betraying the principles which give that bloc its meaning.

POSTWAR STRAINS ON THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

By Nicholas Mansergh

HAS the British Commonwealth of Nations been fundamentally weakened since 1939? Certainly it has suffered contraction of territory through the secession of Burma. Its military position in Asia has been weakened by the transfer of power in India, and its position in the Middle East has been damaged by the withdrawal of troops from Egypt and Palestine. It has sustained heavy loss of economic resources by destruction in war and by expenditure in the waging of war. These are injuries, some of them formidable in character, whose final consequences cannot yet be foretold. But not all are to be taken at their face value. Was not, for example, a discontented India as much a liability as an asset to the Commonwealth in 1939? Moreover, the lasting consequences of wartime changes on the position of the Commonwealth are best judged not by an analysis of economic or territorial loss, but by their impact upon its essential nature. The Commonwealth's contribution, said Field Marshal Smuts, "in human qualities of balance and moderation, good sense, good humor, and fair play are of a very special character. They are worth more than scores of divisions and without them divisions must ultimately fail." This may seem paradoxical at a time when the thoughts of men are again preoccupied with the analysis of tangible material strength. But it remains true that no assessment of the position of the Commonwealth in the postwar world can neglect these human and political factors, for it is on them, for good or ill, and not upon its organization of power or its capacity to wage war, that the Commonwealth is founded.

The drafters of the historic 1926 Report on Imperial Relations implicitly recognized that a Commonwealth whose member states "were autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs," could not be a centralized Commonwealth. Its unique character emerged only with the transfer of power from the center to the circumference. Thenceforward coöperation has depended not upon the working of central institutions designed to produce it, but directly upon

the existence of a common sense of purpose, a common outlook among the member nations. It was because of this fundamental reliance upon an indefinable sense of community that the 1926 Imperial Conference remained of the opinion that "nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British Empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried."

But if the Commonwealth has had no constitution and no common council with powers sufficient to produce a concerted, still less a common foreign, economic or defense policy, this is not to say that the existing central machinery, mainly advisory in character, has had no important rôle to play. On the contrary, it was for long the accepted view that the underlying unity of the Commonwealth would be sustained and find expression through frequent meetings of the Imperial Conference. But in fact no Imperial Conference has met since 1937, and the tide of opinion in the Dominions is not wholly sympathetic to its revival. Is this to be interpreted as a sign of the weakening of the fundamental Commonwealth link? Some Empire statesmen, notably Mr. Menzies, leader of the Opposition in Australia, believe the answer to be in the affirmative. To them, lack of formal consultation at the highest level is the ominous symptom of a drift toward disruption.

This question of cardinal importance, though not susceptible to a categorical, factual answer, may best be approached from a rather different angle. It was the confident belief of the makers of the new Commonwealth that no common cause would suffer through the exercise of full sovereign powers by each of the member states. How far have events justified their confidence? Since the end of the First World War the Dominions have played an ever increasing rôle in foreign affairs. If their separate representation at the League of Nations in 1919 was questioned, none doubted when the United Nations came into being that they were fully sovereign states pursuing their own foreign policies in the light of their own interests. In the original list of signatories to the League Covenant the Dominions were grouped together in order of seniority; while in the Charter list this grouping was discarded as if to dispose of any idea that the Commonwealth

countries comprised a unit in foreign policy. But what is really important is not the superficial change in practice, but the spirit that lies behind it.

II

To understand the attitude of the Dominions toward separate and collective responsibility in foreign policy, it is useful to remind ourselves of one or two of the stepping stones on the road to full decentralization. The first and familiar one was the Locarno Pact of 1925 when the United Kingdom undertook responsibilities from which the Dominions were specifically stated to be free unless they wished otherwise, which none of them did. Ten years later, as the menace of Nazi aggression loomed ever larger, the attitude of the Dominions toward Britain's policy in Europe remained the same in form. There was, on their part, a studious determination to undertake no formal commitments or responsibilities, but it was coupled with a growing conviction that in the event of war they would be ranged on the same side as the United Kingdom because their interests as free peoples coincided and because, too, they shared a deep sense of community.

The Imperial Conference of 1937 was the last meeting of the Prime Ministers of all the Dominions (except Eire) before the war. Their attitude toward formal responsibilities in Europe remained unchanged, but as a result of what they heard in London their predisposition toward isolationism was profoundly modified. The new approach may best be summarized in the words of Mr. Mackenzie King, who remarked that Canada would take part in any war "against the forces of evil," not as part of the British Empire, but because the British Empire was ranged on the side of "the forces of good." This view of imperial relations, with its implication that the issues on which the Commonwealth was united were issues which transcended specifically Commonwealth interests, was one which still enjoys general acceptance throughout the Commonwealth, finding expression today in a devotion to the ideal of the United Nations that has survived every disappointment. But if in the prewar period Dominion opinion distinguished more clearly "the forces of evil," after 1937 their view of the right policy to be pursued was no different in essentials from that of the United Kingdom. This is a point of some importance. Today the argument is often heard that if

the Commonwealth had had a common foreign policy in 1938–39 the war might not have taken place because Hitler, confronted by such an array of force, would have hesitated to attack Poland. This is extremely doubtful, but even more dubious is the assumption that a common foreign policy for the Commonwealth would have differed in any material respect from that of the United Kingdom. There is no indication that any of the Dominion Prime Ministers pressed Mr. Chamberlain to take a more resolute line toward Germany in 1937, or later, nor that any of them challenged the wisdom of pursuing a policy of appeasement to all reasonable limits and beyond. On the contrary, it seems that General Hertzog, then Prime Minister of South Africa, greatly encouraged Mr. Chamberlain in his chosen course. The signature of the Munich Pact was hailed with general acclaim in all the Commonwealth countries. Taking the picture as a whole, therefore, it is clear that had the Commonwealth pursued a common foreign policy involving specific commitments for all its members, it would have differed in no fundamental respect from that which the United Kingdom pursued upon its own responsibility.

The course of events in 1939 did, however, expose some weaknesses in the machinery for the discussion of foreign policy which have not since been wholly removed. The guarantees given to Greece, Rumania and Poland in the spring of 1939 were not underwritten by any of the Dominion Governments. About the all-important Polish commitment, which was hurriedly entered into to check an imminent onslaught on that country, the Dominions were informed, but not consulted, because time did not allow of that being done. Yet as the sequel showed, the guarantee to Poland involved a decision which was of as great concern to the Dominions as to the United Kingdom. This incident, not without parallel, prompted misgivings, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, where it is still felt to have exposed a serious defect in the machinery of intra-Commonwealth consultation. It lies behind the Australian desire to obtain a greater voice at the formative stage in policy and not merely to be confronted with the necessity of dealing with consequences.

The separate responsibility of the Dominions in foreign policy has been more widely extended during, and particularly since, the war. One reason for this has been the great expansion in their diplomatic representation overseas. So long as Dominion repre-

sentation was confined to one or two foreign capitals, the Dominions were hardly in a position to interpret events independently of the Foreign Office in London. The position, however, is very different now with Canada represented in 24 foreign capitals and Australia in ten. The more active Dominion participation in foreign policy, coupled with the existence of more effective machinery for putting individual Dominion policies into practice and taken in conjunction with the decline in formal coöperation at the center, has sharpened doubts about the continuing strength of the sense of common purpose. Not merely is there no common foreign policy, but even on important issues like Palestine there are conflicting policies. Nor are the Dominions, despite their relatively increased strength, any more prepared than before the war to undertake specific commitments of an exclusively imperial character. Their formal obligations of a general character are undertaken by them as U.N. members.

All this was convincingly illustrated in the debates on the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1946. It may well be that the Mediterranean, which in Bismarck's day had been, in his words, "the spinal cord" of the Empire, is so no longer; but nonetheless, and with good reasons, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have displayed a marked interest recently in the balance of power in the Mediterranean area and particularly in the disposal of the former Italian colonies in North Africa. There the troops of all the Dominions campaigned in the World War, and there, if anywhere, it might be supposed that they would be prepared to undertake explicit responsibilities. But what happened? As Mr. Attlee explained in the debate in the House of Commons, the Dominions were consulted about the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and, with the stated exception of Canada, they commented upon the proposed policy of the United Kingdom Government, which took their comments fully into account. But they did not record any formal views or decisions about the policy to be followed, nor were they asked, nor did they wish, to share the responsibility for it. That rested with the United Kingdom Government alone.

Dominion aversion to formal responsibilities is widely misunderstood both as to cause and consequences. But by itself it is liable to give a most misleading picture of the measure of Commonwealth coöperation. It is indicative of an approach, of a political psychology, not of an ultimate objective. It is

not because relations within the Commonwealth are so loose, but because they are so intimate that specific commitments, recorded views, and even formal consultation are felt to be so wholly out of place. What happened in 1939 was a most remarkable testimony to the unity of outlook and purpose which informal consultation can achieve in the face of a threat transcending exclusively Commonwealth interests. In the light of that experience the view is strongly and, in the opinion of the writer, rightly held that to state the extent of mutual obligation in written or specific form would seriously weaken the connection between the United Kingdom and the older Dominions and reduce its value to each one of them. Definition could only restrict the area of coöperation. As things stand, there is no formal obligation on the part of any Dominion, except Ceylon, to come to the assistance of the United Kingdom in the event of unprovoked aggression. But no one for a moment doubts that in such circumstances the aggressor would be confronted by a united Commonwealth, as in 1939.

III

To judge the cohesion of the Commonwealth, however, only by its ability to unite effectively in common resistance to the challenge of a powerful aggressor is not enough. Its effectiveness in day-to-day coöperation, its contribution to the maintenance of peace, must also be taken into full account. And it is here that a new approach to Commonwealth affairs, which bears closely upon the question of its inner cohesion, most clearly emerges. The dominant trend in the later war years was a growth in regional responsibilities. The breakdown in the communications on which the Commonwealth so greatly depends, the isolation of some parts of it — particularly the Pacific Dominions menaced by the Japanese while United Kingdom and many of their own forces were heavily engaged in other theaters — all served to reinforce the conviction that the nations of the Commonwealth must play a greater part in formulating policies of direct regional concern to them. This view was provocatively expressed by Field Marshal Smuts in his self-styled "explosive speech" to the Empire Parliamentary Association at Westminster in November 1943, when he commented on the difference in approach toward the self-governing and the non-self-governing Empire. The fact that decentralization in the self-governing parts of the

Empire went side by side with a high degree of centralization in the dependent Empire seemed to him an anomaly. He felt it could be best corrected by encouraging the Dominions to assume greater responsibilities in relation to the colonial territories lying within their area of interest. If for South Africa itself this policy has always presented many difficulties, now enhanced by Dr. Malan's doctrine of "apartheid," which accentuates the fundamental differences in the approach of the Union of South Africa and of the Colonial Office toward the African peoples, the area of regional interest remains, and must remain, continental. Whether imperialist or nationalist, South Africa thinks in terms of economic expansion to the north just because she is so vitally concerned, in view of her predominantly African population, with economic and political developments in African colonial territories administered by European Powers. What happens there must sooner rather than later have its repercussions within her own borders.

In the Pacific Dominions, Field Marshal Smuts' words were assured of a cordial welcome. The Canberra Pact of 1944 expressed the determination of Australia and New Zealand to coöperate not only in defense, but also in all problems of common concern in the southwest Pacific area. It is not too much to say that it embodied a new concept of the Commonwealth, a concept in which the Dominions will play a decisive part in the formulation of regional policies, and, as a result, have a much larger voice in the framing of Commonwealth policies as a whole. Dr. Evatt's view is that Australia should be the spokesman of the Commonwealth as a whole in the Far Eastern area, just because she is the member of the Commonwealth most interested in the future of that area. The 1947 Commonwealth Conference, held at Canberra to discuss the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty, represented a notable endorsement of this view, for it was the first time that a Commonwealth conference on an issue of major importance had been held in the capital of one of the Pacific Dominions.

What has happened in the Pacific finds a parallel in North America outside the Commonwealth. By her adherence to the North American Defense Pact in 1940 Canada entered into formal regional commitments on the North American continent, and by the renewal and extension of it in 1947 she made this a permanent feature of her policy. This was partly because, as Mr.

Mackenzie King explained, with the coming of polar warfare Canada had not, as hitherto, to look only to the east and to the west, but also to the north; and there her interests and those of the United States coincide.

The emphasis placed on these regional interests of the Dominions throws into relief the widely dispersed nature of their responsibilities in the postwar world. Even if one thinks only in terms of the older oversea Dominions, leaving aside for the moment both Eire and the three new Asian Dominions, it is clear that geography makes impossible any close coördination of detailed policy. There are, and must continue to be, many matters in which a Dominion has a particular interest but in which few, if any, of her partners have any direct concern. More important, there are obviously issues which because of their regional character affect the Dominions in different ways and therefore make it difficult to secure a coincidence of view. This is an important fact, for it suggests that it is not any weakening of the sense of community but the rapid development of the power and responsibilities of the Dominions which accounts for their more independent postwar contributions to world affairs. A comparison between the predominantly one-voiced Commonwealth of prewar years and the many-voiced Commonwealth of today is fatally easy yet profoundly misleading.

IV

There remains the question whether a growing concentration on widely dispersed regional interests, even if it springs, not from any lessening of the sense of community, but from an extension of the power and responsibilities of the Dominions, will weaken the Commonwealth connection. And that brings one back to the natural counterpoise which the central or common institutions of the Commonwealth might be expected to exert. But do they? As has already been noted, no Imperial Conference has been held since 1937, though there have been several conferences of Prime Ministers. Fundamentally, the Commonwealth depends upon the sharing of common ideals and fundamental common purposes. If they did not exist, the whole system would break down. But on the assumption that they do exist, clearly there must be some machinery through which they may be fertilized and ultimately find expression in action. That machinery is a highly elaborate system of informal inter-government consulta-

tion, vastly improved during the war years. By means of it, an opportunity is given for full and frank discussion on any issue in which the various governments are interested. Its apex, once the Imperial Conference, has recently been provided by the more informal Dominion Prime Ministers' Conferences. One was held in the spring of 1944, another in the spring of 1946, and another is due to take place in October 1948. Throughout, the emphasis has been placed on their informal character. The assembled Dominion statesmen had come to London in 1946 to have an informal exchange of view; they were not concerned with reaching decisions on particular points, but rather with reviewing the whole field of imperial relations, of foreign policy, and of defense, with a view to formulating their own policy in the light of the discussions in London.

Of the value of these informal discussions there seems no doubt. Mr. Mackenzie King, in an address delivered to both Houses of Parliament at Westminster in May 1944, remarked that while the Commonwealth had not a visible war cabinet or council sitting continuously in London, it had "what is much more important, though invisible, a continuing conference of the Cabinets of the Commonwealth. It is a conference of Cabinets which deals from day to day, and, not infrequently, from hour to hour, with policies of common concern. When decisions are taken, they are not the decisions of Prime Ministers, or other individual Ministers, meeting apart from their own colleagues, and away from their own countries. They are decisions reached after mature consideration by all members of the Cabinet of each country, with a full consciousness of their immediate responsibility to their respective Parliaments." This endorsement of the existing machinery was coupled with a warning against any attempts to improve the machinery of Commonwealth coöperation, in such a way as might appear to limit the freedom of decision of Commonwealth countries, or of forming a separate Commonwealth bloc. "Let us beware," said Mr. Mackenzie King, "lest in changing the form we lose the substance; or, for appearance's sake, sacrifice reality."

Mr. Mackenzie King's satisfaction with the existing machinery for Commonwealth coöperation was shared by his colleagues at both the Dominion Prime Ministers' Conferences, but has not passed unquestioned. During the war and since, the opinion has been voiced that, in a world where the Great Powers are becoming

greater, the Commonwealth countries simply cannot afford the luxury of uncoördinated foreign policies pursued in the light of their own individual interests. This theme, developed against the broad background of world affairs by Field Marshal Smuts in November 1943, and by Lord Halifax at Toronto in January 1944, was related more specifically to the practical problems of Commonwealth coöperation by Mr. Curtin before his visit to London in 1944 and, more recently, by Mr. Menzies. With his eye always fixed on the Pacific area, Mr. Curtin advocated the formation of a Commonwealth Consultative Council, served by a Commonwealth Secretariat drawn from all the member nations of the Commonwealth. His proposals aimed to coördinate the foreign and defense polices of the Commonwealth more closely, so as to enable the Dominions to have a say in the formative stage of policy. But to this plea for a superficially modest improvement in machinery, and even more to the spacious pleas of Smuts and Halifax for the grouping of the Commonwealth countries so that together they might form a third Great Power, coequal with the United States and the U.S.S.R., there was a cool response. In Canada, indeed, it was definitely hostile, for the feeling prevailed that any steps toward a more centralized Empire were steps along "the road to yesterday." So strongly was this felt that Mr. Mackenzie King at Ottawa firmly repudiated the proposals which Lord Halifax had put forward. He argued on the one hand that the formation of a closely integrated Empire bloc would be not an aid but a barrier to the achievement of world peace; on the other, that the competition in power between the great victor states was likely to produce, not peace, but a third world war. Fundamentally, he opposed all measures toward Empire centralization on the ground that they would limit the freedom of action of the Dominions.

All this is worth recalling because it is easy to lose sight of political realities in discussing the precise measure of Commonwealth coöperation that is possible or desirable. One of those realities is the fact that any degree of centralization would serve to make the Commonwealth relationship a matter of acute internal controversy both in Canada and in South Africa. After all, however well devised, machinery is of little value unless it is suited to the outlook of those who have to work it. That is why, for the past quarter of a century, the Commonwealth countries have consistently placed their faith in decentraliza-

tion. It has been their belief that by this policy the broad supranational basis of the Commonwealth may be preserved; the greatest contribution by its member nations to the building up of a world order made possible; and the sense of Commonwealth community deepened by free coöperation for purposes that transcend strictly Commonwealth interests.

This emphasis placed by the older Dominions upon the need for decentralization has been accentuated by the entrance into the Commonwealth of the new self-governing Dominions in Asia. Their addition to the number of member states has materially strengthened the predominant centrifugal forces, and it is difficult indeed to conceive of a centralized Commonwealth in which they would form an integral part. To what extent in other respects they will tend to modify the character or structure of the Commonwealth can hardly be judged yet. It is, however, likely that these new Dominions in Asia will bring to the surface certain constitutional problems.[1] For India and Pakistan, dominion status was used as a device by which the transfer of power might be quickly effected. But in the longer view, it may well be questioned whether the forms of dominion status correspond with the political realities of the relationship that at present exists, and is likely to continue, between the Asian Dominions and the rest of the Commonwealth.

A quarter of a century ago, Mr. Lloyd George, confronted with the task of reconciling Irish national aspirations with the unity of the British Empire, decided in favor of dominion status. The history of those intervening 25 years has suggested that the decision rigidly adhered to by the United Kingdom Government was not the correct one. Like India and Pakistan, Ireland is a Mother Country which had not evolved toward dominion status, but had reached it in one revolutionary step. The symbolism of dominion status was not congenial to her, for it was a political concept appropriate to circumstances and traditions quite other than those which prevailed in Ireland. Conformity to a dominion pattern, in which there existed no appropriate place for a nationally self-conscious Mother Country that felt no spontaneous loyalty to the common Crown, has resulted only in straining relations between the United Kingdom and Eire. Of more far-reaching importance, it also modified the whole pattern of the

[1] These are considered in detail in my article on "The Implications of Eire's Relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations," *International Affairs*, January 1948.

relationship between the overseas Dominions and the United Kingdom in a way that may not have been altogether helpful. With these lessons in mind, therefore, we may conclude that, if the Union of India and Pakistan decide to remain within the Commonwealth, some form of association may be adopted, similar to that external association which is now, in fact, the link between Eire and the British Commonwealth. It would correspond most closely to political realities. If so, they will be nations associated with the Commonwealth, not using its symbolism (for that is something that lies outside their national tradition), but sharing in its broad common purposes and participating in that process of discussion through which they are given effect. And whatever may be the precise relationship between the Commonwealth and the new Indian Dominions, the precedent established in the case of Ceylon suggests that both parties will welcome a greater degree of definition than exists between the older member nations of the Commonwealth.

V

The emergence of the new Indian Dominions in place of an Indian Empire whose external policy was controlled from London underlines the redistribution of power that has taken place within the Commonwealth itself since 1939. The United Kingdom has been relatively weakened both by the losses sustained during the war and by the development of new weapons which make her more vulnerable than ever in her history. On the other hand, the overseas Dominions, and particularly Canada and Australia, have been correspondingly strengthened from the impetus given to their industrial development and agricultural production by the pressing needs of the war and postwar years. This redistribution of strength should rightly carry with it a redistribution of responsibilities. Here there has been a time lag. Both the Dominions and the United Kingdom have been preoccupied with their regional responsibilities, and that has led to neglect of some matters of common and urgent concern. The recognized need is now for concerted action, taking into account the strategic resources and position of the member nations, and stimulated either by a Commonwealth Conference or by a series of conferences between the member states interested in particular regions. Dr. Malan has proclaimed his preference in principle for such regional conferences within the Commonwealth,

and it is easy to see that in practice a series of conferences covering issues of regional concern could serve a most useful purpose, though their full success would seem dependent upon a concluding general conference at which all the member nations are represented. The realities of the postwar position and their implications for the Commonwealth as a whole have still to be assessed. Some such assessment will be the broad responsibility of the Commonwealth Conference now expected to assemble in London in October. It will be given particular urgency by the need to consider in some detail the attitude of the Commonwealth toward Western Union.

When, in 1943, Field Marshal Smuts originally advocated closer association with the democratic states of Western Europe, he underlined as a fundamental condition the retention and maintenance of "our sovereign status." This emphasis was in full accord with thought in the Dominions, which conceive most naturally of a union in Western Europe leaving each member state master in its own house. But in actual practice it may well be that, as the number of coördinating authorities in Western Europe multiply, what is natural and appropriate within the Commonwealth is not in all respects well suited to this new relationship. Central machinery for coöperation may prove essential when coöperation is in the early, formative stages, as it is today in Western Europe. And the reverse holds good too. Just as the informality of the Commonwealth system may as yet have little relevance for Western Union, so too the formal instruments for coöperation in Western Europe may have few lessons for the Commonwealth. Developments in the institutional field in Western Europe are, therefore, not likely to be paralleled by corresponding developments within the Commonwealth; and this in itself suggests that the Commonwealth system may not be one that can usefully be imitated at this stage in building up a world order. Where fundamental unity of outlook does not exist, but has to be deliberately and carefully created, it would be overoptimistic to suppose that the assistance of well-devised machinery can be dispensed with.

The underlying strength of the Commonwealth is that it is united by a conception of a world order which transcends exclusively Commonwealth interests. It is this, reinforced by a will toward friendly coöperation, that constitutes the most impressive assurance of its present and future cohesion. For

whatever the appearances at international conferences may seem to indicate, the Commonwealth countries are probably more closely knit today than at any other time in history. The Communist challenge is something which no Dominion is prepared to disregard. Even those groups, like the Nationalists in South Africa and some sections of French-Canadian opinion, who questioned whether the war against Hitlerite Germany was not another "imperialist" war, will have no such doubts about any future war brought about by Communist aggression. Their own interests and their own way of life are too closely and evidently involved. All this is relevant, also, to Eire, who decided to remain neutral in the 1939–45 war, but who now participates as one of the 16 nations under the European Recovery Program and has always been profoundly anti-Communist in outlook.

But while common resistance to aggression is indispensable, it is not enough. The Commonwealth countries recognize that the first aim of their policy must be the preservation of peace, and they have welcomed Britain's participation in Western Union because they recognize that the building up of a league of free peoples within the broad framework of the United Nations is the most practical means of attaining it. Inevitably, any union with Western Europe which would involve loss of the United Kingdom's freedom of action overseas or leave it unable to fulfill the rôle outside Europe which it has played in the past, must raise profound misgivings for the Dominions.

Yet to regard the crystallization of Britain's dual personality in international affairs as bringing to the surface an acute tension between the rival claims of the overseas Dominions and of Western Europe is to see the whole in a false perspective. Some immediate difficulties may loom large, but what is fundamental and what makes a solution at once desirable and practical is the fact that the consolidation of Western Europe could only safeguard the Commonwealth by building up a barrier against any aggressor on the Continent. Here its interest coincides with that of the United States. This is a final and all-important factor in the position of the Commonwealth today. As a result of the war and of its aftermath, the Commonwealth countries and the United States are more closely linked than ever before. The development has been helped by the existence of a common language, but it is conditioned by more fundamental considerations, and enhanced by the challenge which now confronts both alike.

SOUTH AFRICAN SWING-OVER

By Edgar H. Brookes

IN MAY last, the Union of South Africa went to the polls to decide, in the last analysis, whether it would entrust its government for a new period to Field Marshal Smuts and his United Party. This was not a decision for or against liberalism: it was a decision between racial tolerance and good will on the one hand and a reactionary color policy on the other. To the complete surprise of all concerned the Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties — the coalition opposing Field Marshal Smuts — managed to secure a majority of five over all other parties in a House of 153. No leading politician or political observer in South Africa predicted this result. It came as a surprise not only to Field Marshal Smuts and his followers, but to the successful Nationalists as well. Dr. Malan, the newly appointed Prime Minister, took several days to form his Cabinet, so little prepared was he for power.

Does this change of government mean a permanent swing-over in South African politics? Will the new Government be able to maintain itself in office? At present it holds 79 seats out of 153 in the House of Assembly, but only 12 seats out of 44 in the Senate. So far as the House of Assembly itself is concerned, the successful parties polled considerably fewer votes than Field Marshal Smuts and his supporters. The small majority which they obtained in the Assembly was one of the consequences of the system by which rural constituencies may return a member on the basis of a total voting population as much as 30 percent below that of an urban constituency. As the Smuts supporters were strongest in the towns and the Malan supporters strongest in the country districts, it happened that a minority of voters elected a precarious majority of members.

The position of the Senate is important. Dr. Malan has the right to ask for a dissolution of the Senate within 120 days of the dissolution of the House of Assembly. Such a dissolution would alter the figures very much in his favor, but he would still not have a working majority in the Senate. It has been calculated that an immediate dissolution would give him 22 seats out of the 44. After the sensational results of the general election it would be a bold man who would prophesy about South African

politics, but at the time of writing it does seem pretty certain that Dr. Malan will not avail himself of this opportunity for an immediate dissolution. If he does not, the present Senate will continue in existence until the expiration of its normal term of office, toward the end of 1949, by which time Dr. Malan hopes that his position in the Senate Electoral Colleges will have improved. The Electoral Colleges consist of members of the House of Assembly sitting with members of the Provincial Council of the province concerned, and Provincial Council elections are due to be held early next year. Dr. Malan is therefore likely to have to work with a strongly hostile Senate during the next two sessions of Parliament. This is a safeguard against drastic constitutional changes. It will be remembered that in the Union of South Africa nearly all constitutional changes can be effected by a simple majority in each House of Parliament on the basis of the British system. The constitutional safeguards of the United States of America, the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia are missing.

In these circumstances, South Africa has a chance of reconsidering its position. Dr. Malan may in any case be forced to an early election and if he fails materially to better his position in the Senate he will have no alternative. Many political observers think that a second election will take place during the next 12 months. In the nature of the case it can hardly be expected that the masses of rural voters who went against Field Marshal Smuts in May last will swing over to his side. But there were some ten or twelve seats where the Nationalist majorities were very small, and where their success was due entirely to the "floating vote," mainly English-speaking. If these constituencies reverse their decision, Field Marshal Smuts will again be in office.

II

To decide whether or not this is a likely development, we shall have to consider why the coalition of Dr. Malan's Nationalist Party and Mr. Havenga's Afrikaner Party won the election. The major reason was that in the rural constituencies there was a very deep distrust of the United Party's color policy. Skillful Nationalist propaganda has linked it with the name of the Rt. Hon. Jan H. Hofmeyr, Field Marshal Smuts' acknowledged lieutenant, who advocates a color policy more advanced than that of many of his colleagues in the United Party.

To understand these issues of color and the part they have played in this election and may play in the next one, we must summarize the situation in South Africa. About 2,500,000 white South Africans have to discover a method of living in peace with a non-white population between three and four times their number without surrendering whatever is real in the values of the western civilization which they profess. That is South Africa's problem. There are, of course, striking analogies between it and the question of the Negro and his future in the United States, but the real difference is the fact that the white man in South Africa is in a very decided minority. The American reader will visualize the position in South Africa better if he regards it as a problem not of the United States of America, but of the State of Mississippi with the Negro population trebled and with no external government like the Federal Government of the United States to increase confidence by its overwhelming majority of white citizens.

The non-white population of South Africa is made up of many strata. There are the Indians, relatively few in number, concentrated very largely in one province, Natal, and able to exercise a political pressure out of all proportion to their numbers through association with Mother India, now virtually an independent state. There are the people of mixed race, to whom the term "colored" is usually confined in South Africa, numbering more than 800,000, concentrated mainly in the western Cape Province, speaking in general only the languages used by the white man (English and Afrikaans) and assimilating the ways of living of the poorer strata of the white population. And there are the Africans. The Africans are divided, not only tribally — the writer was once intimately associated with a college in which nine African languages were spoken — but also by the stage of development they have reached. Many are illiterate; some are educated; a few are highly qualified men holding degrees of reputable universities. South African policy has improved markedly during the nine years of Field Marshal Smuts' last administration, particularly in its provision for education, but broadly speaking the disability of the color bar remains. No man of color may be a member of Parliament; in practice all the higher posts and most of the lower posts of the public service are reserved for white men; the non-white groups find the higher posts in industry closed to them and professional opportunities

largely restricted to what they can do among their own people.

Victories are won here or there on detailed points which, both individually and together, may be of great importance. A medical school is thrown open to non-whites on equal terms with whites, their education financed by government scholarships; a school feeding scheme is made applicable to children of all races; a great American missionary is assisted by public funds to found a school, named after Jan Hofmeyr, for training non-whites as professional social workers. New powers are offered to the local government bodies which operate in the Native Reserves. Appropriations for African education are separated from the tax resources of the Africans and drawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. All these developments are good: taken together they form an impressive record of progress during recent years. And yet the main citadel remains not only uncaptured but unscathed. The color bar is still the color bar. The man of color is still an inferior citizen. His color still means that the facilities provided for him, even if they are equal in theory, are always inferior in practice.

It must not be supposed that Field Marshal Smuts' followers include many men prepared openly to advocate the repeal or even the serious modification of the color bar. Those who feel strongly on this point are a disorganized and scattered minority. Intellectually they are a powerful minority and they have many friends who admire their forthrightness without themselves being willing to go so far. A large section of the daily press is sympathetic to them. Certain weekly or monthly publications of considerable influence support them. But politically they are weak. The Nationalists showed an insight as unerring as it was unscrupulous in exploiting the fact that a man in high political office, Mr. Hofmeyr, who up to the present has been Field Marshal Smuts' designated successor, was, judging from his public utterances, most sympathetic to this liberal point of view.

As a practical statesman and as one who realizes the possibilities and the impossibilities of the South African situation, Mr. Hofmeyr has not committed himself to anything more than a mild program of reform, and to this program Field Marshal Smuts is equally pledged. It includes not only the improvement of the local government of the Africans in their own areas, but particularly the recognition of the African as a permanent urban dweller, with a permanent part in the industrial system,

to be treated as such, to be given certain opportunities of freehold ownership in urban areas, more adequate consultation, greater opportunities and, above all, to be dealt with in a spirit of friendly collaboration rather than regarded as a potential menace.

This mild policy has been far too liberal for the Nationalists and, as it would appear, for the bulk of the rural population of South Africa. Sentiment and emotion have been exploited to the full, and with these the economic factor that the higher wages offered in urban industrial employment have somewhat reduced the amount of labor available for the farms. The Nationalist propaganda has stressed the need for white supremacy and has argued that Field Marshal Smuts and Mr. Hofmeyr, particularly the latter, are a danger to it.

III

It is difficult to convey to American readers exactly what the Nationalist outlook is like. We may indeed say that there are two Nationalisms. The bulk of the Party leaders and particularly Dr. Malan are conservative, so conservative as to be reactionary, but they are constitutionalists with a due sense of responsibility and an intention not to go too far. Behind them is a semi-Nazi section of the Party, greatly influenced by European Fascist ideologies, willing to follow, if necessary, methods of direct action, and prepared to impose an even stronger white dictatorship on the non-white population. At present Dr. Malan can keep his unruly extremists in order. If he were given a substantial majority in both Houses, their pressure would be too strong for him. There is much in common between the older Nationalist attitude and certain attitudes to be found in the American Deep South. Boer generals, if not as common as Southern colonels, have been pretty common. There is the same loyalty to the lost cause and to the flag that may not be flown. On the other hand lynching is unknown in South Africa and there are few South African Bilbos. "Hypocrisy," it is said, "is the homage that vice pays to virtue." Most Nationalists think it necessary to clothe their propaganda for white supremacy in terms that have some faint liberal, humanitarian flavor. Perhaps they deceive themselves. The two sections have found a common slogan in the term "apartheid" (that is, the policy of separation). During the election they were unable to define this term with any exactitude. It is clearly in conflict with any real industrial

development in the Union. Nevertheless it was used with great effect in the election.

Since the new Government assumed office, one of its Ministers has stated publicly that he would see to it that no more native artisans were trained. This statement was met with nation-wide protests, including some from moderate Nationalists, and has since been modified to the extent of supporting the training of native artisans for work in native areas, which accommodate some half of the African population. Another Minister has stated that the Native Military Corps will be disbanded and no more Africans used in the Army. These are evil omens in the early days of a government depending on a precarious majority. "If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

A considerable number of English-speaking South Africans voted for the Nationalist or the Afrikaner Party. Many of these votes were obtained by open appeals to color prejudice. Other voters expressed by their vote their dissatisfaction with controls, with the United Party's taxation, with bureaucratic muddle and delay. They followed the traditional British outlook of "giving the other fellow a chance." This floating vote is most unlikely to remain Nationalist. The discontent and lack of political stability which lies behind it explains the loss of a sufficient number of seats to make all the difference. But the great swing-over of votes was due clearly and undoubtedly to the color prejudice in the rural districts. One of the tragedies of the election was Field Marshal Smuts' own defeat in the country constituency of Standerton. His return to Parliament for the Transvaal urban constituency of Pretoria East has partly counteracted the impression made by the Standerton defeat. The old warrior, at the age of 78, is going back to lead the Parliamentary Opposition and to fight those things against which he has been struggling for so long. Field Marshal Smuts first took office as a young man in the old South African Republic of Paul Kruger, just about 50 years ago. In the interval between 1898 and 1948 he has been in ministerial office for 28 years, and Prime Minister for 14 years. In the course of the half century of his public life he has been a daring enemy of the British, and their most effective friend; he has taken an active part in three wars, not to mention one or two general strikes and a rebellion. He helped to reshape Europe after the First World War, and assisted in the settlement of Ireland. He has written books, moved among

learned men, as Chancellor of the University of Cape Town has conferred an honorary degree on Her Majesty the Queen, and has himself been elected to the life office of Chancellor of his old university of Cambridge. He has been, and is, a statesman, a fighting soldier, a noted mountaineer, a botanist, a philosopher, a founder of the League of Nations, one of the architects of the United Nations, and its first notable victim.

IV

Speaking of the United Nations, it seems necessary to review the position of South Africa on the two issues which have formed the subject of discussion before that august body. The first is the problem of the Indians in South Africa. On this point the new Government cannot be expected to make any substantial concessions. It is doubtful whether it will dare to agree to any kind of consultation with India. By so doing it would arouse a storm among its own supporters. The moderate Indian group which was in close touch with Field Marshal Smuts and was trying to pave the way to consultation between India and the Union has been put in an impossible position. The more extreme groups, having carried out a policy of passive resistance against the Smuts Government and contributed in some measure to its downfall, have adopted a more quiescent attitude to Dr. Malan, to whom, indeed, they sent a telegram of congratulation on his appointment, one of the most striking pieces of political ineptitude on record. Dr. Malan has no reputation as an international liberal statesman to look after and, short of duress, will do absolutely nothing to remedy the present situation. His party is committed to repeal the Smuts franchise law which the Indians rejected as not liberal enough, and to extend the restrictions of land purchase to the Cape Province.

What of South West Africa? This is the second issue on which South Africa has been indicted before the United Nations. Dr. Malan is not likely to be even as conciliatory as Field Marshal Smuts in this matter. He has already initiated discussions with a view to the European population of South West Africa being represented in the Union Parliament. He has hopes of winning that vote, a majority of which is at present against him.

There are a few factors about the South West African issue which should be understood by critics of the Union and which hold good irrespective of what party is in power in South Africa.

It is not always realized that the boundaries of the Union of South Africa are geographically and economically impossible ones, and that the country has never reached the limits which nature seems to have intended for it. There is not only the question of South West Africa: there is the question of the British "High Commission Territories," and of Southern Rhodesia. The South West African issue cannot be considered entirely apart from these. To abandon the Union's claim to South West Africa is, in a large measure, to abandon all hope of the Greater South Africa toward which many sections of Union opinion aspire.

The High Commission Territories, which are under direct British control through the British High Commissioner, consist of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. Basutoland is surrounded by Union territory, and completely dependent economically on the Union. It was once a part of the old Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but was disannexed at the request of the Cape Colonial Government in 1884. Swaziland has had intimate associations with the Transvaal, and is bounded on three sides by Transvaal territory. More than half of its land is owned by European farmers of South African stock. The Bechuanaland Protectorate is bounded on the south and east by the Union, on the west by South West Africa and on the north by Southern Rhodesia. It has no seaport and, like the other High Commission Territories, is in the South African customs union.

From every economic and geographical point of view these territories should be administered by the Union, and the South Africa Act of 1909, which embodies the Union's Constitution, made provision in its schedule for their future administration under Union control. The difficulty in the way of incorporation is the active hostility of the African population, particularly in Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, to the Union and to what is felt to be its illiberal policy toward Africans. To force the issue would be to put Great Britain in a most humiliating position, for she has given pledges to the population of the territories and yet could not resist such action without the danger of losing the Union from the Commonwealth. Every argument of courtesy and statesmanship, therefore, lies in the direction of leaving things for the time being as they are.

There are not wanting those who accuse Field Marshal Smuts of lack of vision and energy in not insisting on the incorporation of these territories and formally annexing South West Africa

during the war years, when he could have made almost any terms with the outside world, and when Russia was quietly annexing three full member states of the League of Nations. Field Marshal Smuts behaved with complete constitutional correctness, which has not reaped him very rich dividends in international circles.

The incorporation of Southern Rhodesia is a different question. Here we have a self-governing colony which a quarter of a century ago deliberately rejected by referendum the policy of incorporation in the Union. It can hardly stand forever alone. It often looks toward the north, but what would it gain by joining the huge native area of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland? The Zambezi has always been a goal of South African ambition. It may yet be that terms can be found which will induce Southern Rhodesia to enter the Union as a voluntary partner.

Before leaving this subject, we should note that one small area of South West Africa, the port of Walvis Bay — incidentally, the only really good harbor on the whole coast of South West Africa — is Union and not mandated territory, having been annexed to the old Cape Colony in 1884.

V

People sometimes speak of the South African "boom." This is not altogether a fair description. The banks have been much more restrained in issuing credit than they were after the First World War. Behind the commercial banks stands the South African Reserve Bank, a semi-governmental institution, which alone may issue notes, and which exercises a considerable influence on the other banks. The Reserve Bank, notwithstanding the recent loan of £80,000,000 in gold bullion to Great Britain, still has more than the legal minimum cover of gold behind its issues of paper currency. Inflation of the crude type is almost impossible under present conditions. The public debt of the Union is not excessive, and all but £13,000,000 of it is internal.

The gold mines of the Witwatersrand are slowly declining in output, and this decline is likely to be marked after 1950. The recent discoveries of gold in the northern portion of the Orange Free State will, however, according to competent authorities, compensate for this change, and there is not likely to be any decline in the total output of gold in South Africa for many years to come, by which time the position in manufacturing industries should have improved greatly.

The new developments in the Orange Free State are not only of great economic importance to South Africa, but will have their social and political effects. The Orange Free State will cease to be the purely agricultural and pastoral province which it has been for the whole of its existence. New towns will spring up. It seems unlikely that in the late 1950's the Orange Free State will return an almost solid bloc of Nationalists to Parliament.

Unless some unexpected or catastrophic change happens with regard to the world price of gold, it does not seem very likely that South Africa will experience an acute depression. Land values, it is true, are inflated. But prices generally, though considerably higher than they were before the outbreak of war, have not reached fantastic heights. So far as international trade and currency questions are concerned, South Africa does not appear to be in any danger; and, as a great gold-producing country within the sterling bloc, it can reach out hands of friendship to a very large variety of nations.

The accession to power of Dr. Malan has weakened South Africa's position in the international market, but not to any disastrous extent. Mr. Havenga, the new Minister of Finance, is a conservative financier with a good record. Whatever faults the new Government may have as regards its race and color policies, it consists very largely of able men, some of them trained economists, who are not likely to follow policies that will drive foreign capital away from the Union. Though superficially rich, however, South Africa is still essentially a poor country. Wealth is very unevenly distributed. The majority of the African population are poor by any standards, though not indeed plunged in such abject poverty as the poorest groups of India or China. There is much to be done in improving land use and in bringing to the masses of the non-white population minimum standards of comfort and health. If the Nationalists are able to entrench themselves in office and to attempt to carry out restrictive and repressive policies, South Africa will, even in the economic field, experience a great setback. Even the present tenuous majority is a danger in this respect. Nevertheless there is a vitality and a sense of realism which will probably prevent South Africa from going too far along the road to destruction, and among many disappointments one must be grateful for the law-abiding and constitutional qualities of Dr. Malan and some of his Ministers.

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In this doctoral dissertation the author describes in detail the structure and functions of a proposed world organization based on regional groups of contiguous states. The main body of the book was written during the war, and in a postscript added two years later Dr. van Oven considers the projected organization in the light of the world situation, with comments on the U.N.

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A popular and wide-ranging conspectus of the damage mankind is wreaking on its natural resources, particularly in its lust to wage total war.

DER WANDEL DES INTERNATIONALEN KARTELLBEGRIFFS — AMERIKANISCHE KARTELLDOKTRIN UND WORLD TRADE CHARTER. By Frederick Haussmann. Berne: Francke, 1947, 160 p. Sw. Fr. 11.50.

A 25-page lecture on American views about cartels is followed by relevant documents. The author is professor of economics at Upsala College, New Jersey.

THE LAST DEFENSE. By H. J. Heinz and J. Iorgy. New York: Duell, 1948, 194 p. $3.00.

Two psychologists show us how to escape the perils of the atomic age through what they describe as "humane democracy."

DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS. By David McCord Wright. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 220 p. $3.50.

A defense of free enterprise capitalism, under necessary restraints, as the only milieu in which political democracy can flourish.

COMMUNISM AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST. By Fulton J. Sheen. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948, 247 p. $2.50.

A Catholic spokesman tells how the shortcomings of our Christian civilization of the west have opened the door to Communism and suggests what we must do.

DER EISERNE VORHANG. By Stefan Markus. Affoltern (Switzerland): Aehren Verlag, 1947, 154 p.

A review of recent history leading to the conclusion that the earth's population must be redistributed if World War III is to be staved off. The author offers a five-year plan for effecting this program.

The Second World War

CHRONOLOGY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947, 374 p. $4.00.

Based largely on the quarterly wartime chronologies published by Chatham House.

VINGT-CINQ ANNÉES D'AVIATION MILITAIRE (1920–1945). VOLUME II: LA GUERRE AÉRIENNE 1939–1945. By General J. Hébrard. Paris: Michel, 1947, 479 p. Fr. 750.

The continuation of a well-documented work.

U. S. NAVAL LOGISTICS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Duncan S. Ballantine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, 308 p. $3.75.

An official history prepared for the Navy Department.

DEFEAT IN THE WEST. By Milton Shulman. New York: Dutton, 1948, 336 p. $4.50.

Germany's military mistakes in the recent war as set forth by German commanders and others in their diaries, reports, letters and personal interrogations by the author, a Canadian intelligence officer.

LA CAMPAGNE 39–40. By Colonel de Bardies. Paris: Fayard, 1947, 312 p. Fr. 300.

A popular résumé of the military operations in Poland and the west, based in part on official documents of the French armed services.

EL ALAMEIN TO THE RIVER SANGRO. By Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. London: Hutchinson, 1948, 132 p. 25/.

NORMANDY TO THE BALTIC. By Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. Boston: Houghton, 1948, 351 p. $5.00.

Nothing much is added to our knowledge in these two volumes wherein the British commander recounts the military operations in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe in which he participated from 1942 to 1945. Maps in color.

BATAILLE DE NORMANDIE. Edited by René Herval. Paris: Éditions de Notre Temps, 1947, 2 v. Fr. 1,500.

Eyewitness descriptions of phases of the battle, gathered by a Norman historian.

LA BATAILLE AÉRIENNE D'ALLEMAGNE (MARS 1942–MAI 1945). By Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Paquier and Claude Postel. Paris: Payot, 1947, 159 p. Fr. 200.

An expert description and analysis of aërial bombardment.

LA GUERRA AL FRONTE RUSSO. By Marshal Giovanni Messe. Milan: Rizzoli, 1947, 253 p. L. 450.

Messe commanded the Italian Expeditionary Force in southern Russia from July 1941 to November 1942. He here describes the action of his troops and the difficulties that later led to the collapse of the Italian Eighth Army. Illustrations and maps.

GAUDO E MATAPAN. By Admiral Angelo Iachino. Milan: Mondadori, 1947, 321 p. L. 700.

A detailed account of the naval action of March 27–29, 1941, between the British and Italian fleets, by the commander of the latter. Several valuable charts.

WITH THE JEWISH BRIGADE. By Bernard M. Casper. London: Goldston, 1947, 128 p. 7/6.

A chaplain recounts the unit's exploits in the Italian campaign.

THE STILWELL PAPERS. By Joseph W. Stilwell. New York: Sloane, 1948, 357 p. $4.00.

This posthumous work was fashioned by Theodore H. White out of the General's notes, journals and letters for the period from 1941 to 1944 (when he was relieved of his command of the CBI Theater). His pungent remarks on many personages, notably Chiang Kai-shek, show that he came honestly by his nickname "Vinegar Joe."

THE DOUBLE TENTH TRIAL WAR CRIMES COURT. Edited by Bashir A. Mallal. Singapore: Malayan Law Journal Office, 1947, 652 p. (Toronto: Carswell, $12.50).

The horrors of Japanese police methods used against British P.W.'s in Malaya are revealed in this record of the war crimes trial held in 1946 at Singapore.

BEYOND THE LAAGER. By Louis Duffus. London: Hurst, 1947, 168 p. 12/6.

Stories of heroism by South Africans in the late war.

ORGANIZING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOR WAR. By Irvin Stewart. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1948, 358 p. $5.00.

This "Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development" during the war was prepared by its deputy director, now president of the University of West Virginia.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1947–1948. By John C. Campbell. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1948, 592 p. $5.00.

This second postwar volume in the Council on Foreign Relations' annual series carries the story of American foreign policy from early 1947 to the spring of 1948. The narrative is well-organized, objective and factual without being overloaded with detail. The European crisis, developments in the Far East, and the tribulations of the United Nations receive most attention, but economic matters are not neglected, and there is an informative chapter on international civil air transport.

THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL. By Cordell Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 2 v. $10.50.

Mr. Hull, with the editorial assistance of Andrew Berding, retraces his career, with most emphasis, of course, on his nearly 12 years as Secretary of State. There are no remarkable disclosures about his tenure of office, though many important details are

given for the first time. The style is simple, at times almost homely, and reveals a man deeply attached to certain principles and on the whole sure that his policies were the best ones for putting those principles into effect.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF THE WAR, 1941. By Charles A. Beard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, 614 p. $5.00.

Mr. Beard, continuing his attack on Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy (and, in effect, accusing him of forcing Japan to start war on us in 1941), reveals once more his inability to comprehend the "facts of international life" and of the security problems faced by any American government under conditions radically different from those of the Jeffersonian era. The inevitable result is distortion of fact and improper appraisal of motive. It is safe to say that Mr. Beard's thesis will not stand the test of time.

THE SPANISH STORY. By Herbert Feis. New York: Knopf, 1948, 282 p. $3.50

Mr. Feis, former economic adviser in the State Department, tells in some detail of our economic aid to, and pressure on, Spain during the war. We learn who wanted to take what action, and why, and how the conflicting views were resolved. Using captured Nazi documents, he sets the account of our policy against the course of relations among Franco, Mussolini and Hitler, and indicates when the United States was acting on false assumptions. Though the book lacks any final evaluation of American policy, it is a major contribution to our recent history.

THE MAN IN THE STREET. By Thomas A. Bailey. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 334 p. $5.00.

Using the data of the public opinion polls, an authority on American diplomatic history analyzes the changing rôle of our citizenry in the conduct of foreign policy.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE. By J. Rives Childs. New York: Holt, 1948, 261 p. $4.00.

A most useful and readable survey of the organization and functions of our diplomatic service, in particular as affected by the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

JAPAN'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN NAVAL POWER 1897–1917. By Outten Jones Clinard. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947, 235 p. $3.75.

A first-rate monograph in American diplomatic history.

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Harold J. Laski. New York: Viking, 1948, 785 p. $6.50.

Few Europeans have been so well acquainted with the manifestations and motivations of American politics as Mr. Laski, leading theoretician of the Labor Party. With his data it is hard to quarrel, but not with some of the interpretations into which his devotion to Marxian dialectic has led him.

THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY. By James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 434 p. $5.00.

Two lawyers, both well versed in the complexities of the problem, analyze the "social, economic and political implications" of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which they regard as a revolutionary departure from standard American practice.

DESIGN FOR GIVING. By Harold J. Seymour. New York: Harper, 1947, 182 p. $2.50.

An analytical history of the accomplishments of the National War Fund, which from 1943 to 1947 gave aid totalling some $750,000,000 to Allied relief agencies.

WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM. By E. M. Hugh-Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 295 p. $2.00.

A Fellow at Keble College, Oxford, has sought to weave the story of Wilson's career into the fabric of American political and diplomatic history from the Civil War to Versailles. This little volume is in the "Teach Yourself History Library."

JIM FARLEY'S STORY: THE ROOSEVELT YEARS. By James A. Farley. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, 388 p. $3.50.

The Democratic political master mind reveals that he fancied himself not only as king-maker but as heir-apparent.

TOWARD WORLD PEACE. By Henry A. Wallace. New York: Reynal, 1948, 121 p. $1.75.

Mr. Wallace sets forth the foreign policy of his party.

HENRY WALLACE: THE MAN AND THE MYTH. By Dwight Macdonald. New York: Vanguard, 1948, 187 p. $2.50.

The author goes gunning for the third party leader, but sometimes his aim is defective and often his ammunition backfires.

Western Europe

SERVIR. By General Gamelin. Paris: Plon, 1946–1947, 3 v. Fr. 675.

General Gamelin prepared these volumes as a reply to the charges of negligence, and worse, lodged against him at the Riom Trial and by a large segment of world opinion. In Volume II — "Le Prologue du Drame" — he renders an account of his stewardship at the General Staff from 1930 to the outbreak of World War II. His documentation is interesting but incomplete, leaving several large gaps. Volume I — "Les Armées Françaises de 1940" — describes the strength, organization and strategic conceptions with which that Army entered the war. Volume III — "La Guerre" — is the most valuable and vivid, for in it the generalissimo presents, with the aid of hitherto unpublished documents, his version of the conflict up to May 19, 1940. The general impression of the author is of a loyal, diligent but unimaginative military bureaucrat.

MES MÉMOIRES. By Joseph Caillaux. Paris: Plon, 1942–47, 3 v.

The onetime premier of France expresses himself, particularly in regard to such enemies as Poincaré and Clemenceau, with more vigor than modesty. Volume III contains his version of the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco.

LES FRONTIÈRES DE LA FRANCE. By Roger Dion. Paris: Hachette, 1947, 110 p. Fr. 120.

The author analyzes the various types of frontiers — "natural," ethnic, political, etc. — in the large and in the specific, with the aid of maps and photographs.

LA MORT DE L'ÉTAT RÉPUBLICAIN. By Michel Debré. Paris: Gallimard, 1947, 238 p. Fr. 195.

A vigorous plea for a return to the ancient French political virtues, above all a strong state resting on individual liberty.

BATAILLES POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE. By Jacques Duclos. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1947, 479 p. Fr. 150.

The French Communist "line" as set forth by its parliamentary leader in a number of speeches delivered in 1944–45.

L'ARMÉE NATIONALE. By General Germain Jousse. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1947, 212 p. Fr. 120.

An experienced officer suggests reforms in the organization of the French Army.

CHARLES DE GAULLE. By Georges Cattaui. Paris: Aux Portes de France, 1946, 386 p. Fr. 210.

A friendly portrait of the man and a hearty defense of his policies up to 1945.

O MARECHAL DA DERROTA: A CHARLES DE GAULLE, GENERAL DA VITÓRIA. By Oliveira Valença. Oporto: Edição AOV, 1947, 171 p. Escudos 12.50.

A secondary work, based largely on material published in French.

MON PATRON GEORGES MANDEL. By Francisque Varenne. Paris: Défense de la France, 1948, 230 p. Fr. 160.

An appreciation of Mandel, political figure of the Third Republic and inheritor of the Clemenceau tradition, executed by Nazi orders in 1944.

UNTERBEWERTUNG UND ÜBERBEWERTUNG DES FRANC IN IHRER AUSWIRKUNG AUF DIE FRANZÖSISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSENTWICKLUNG VON DER STABILISIERUNG 1926 BIS ZUM ENDE DES GOLDBLOCKS. By Wilhelm Muscheidt. Tübingen: Mohr (French Zone), 1947, 104 p.

A careful study of French financial policy, supported by ample statistics.

DOCUMENTS SUR L'IMMIGRATION. By Louis Chevalier and Others. Paris: Presses Universitaires (for the Institut National d'Études Démographiques), 1947, 233 p. Fr. 150.

Over a dozen essays on specific problems, past and present, of international migration, chiefly as they concern France.

LA BELGIQUE PENDANT LA GUERRE. By Marcel Thiry. Paris: Hachette, 1947, 253 p. Fr. 145.

Episodic, personal impressions.

GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS. By Amry Vandenbosch and Samuel J. Eldersveld. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1947, 150 p. 75 cents.

A well-organized manual, with text of the Dutch constitution as revised in 1938.

ICELAND AND THE ICELANDERS. By Helgi P. Briem. New York: American Scandinavian Foundation, 1945, 96 p. $5.00.

A popular introduction, beautifully illustrated with colored photography.

AMERICAN RELIEF FOR NORWAY. By A. N. Rygg. Brooklyn: Arnesen Press, 1947, 320 p. $1.10.

A detailed account of how it was organized during the recent war.

LA PAIX DES EMPIRES CENTRAUX. By François Charles-Roux. Paris: Spid, 1947, 301 p. Fr. 335.

Though containing no revelations, this volume presents the story of Austrian and German peace negotiations during World War I, based primarily on copies of Austrian documents in the Czechoslovak archives.

GENIUS UND DÄMON. DER FALL DEUTSCHLAND: EIN MANIFEST. By Hans Windisch. Seebruck am Chiemsee (U. S. Zone): Heering, 1947, 228 p.

The author holds that Germany lies between two millstones, that whether they are called ideologies or imperialisms is of minor importance, and that she will be pulverized unless enough clear-thinking Germans develop an interest in, and knowledge of, present-day politics.

DIE DEUTSCHE TRAGÖDIE UND IHRE GESCHICHTLICHEN URSACHEN. By Albert Hegeler. Celle (British Zone): Giesel, 1947, 133 p.

A refutation of Rosenberg's "Myth of the Twentieth Century" and an appeal for a return to basic Christian principles.

DEMOKRATIE: SINN ODER UNSINN? By Rolf Gustav Haebler. Reutlingen (French Zone): "Die Zukunft," 1947, 125 p.

An attempt to instruct the German masses in essential democratic principles by reference to England, France and the United States, and by chiding remarks about Germany's undemocratic past.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT. By Karl Jaspers. New York: Dial Press, 1947, 123 p. $2.00.

A condensed version of lectures delivered at Heidelberg University (1945–47), by a professor of philosophy who has the courage to admit and analyze the nature of the responsibility — political, moral and otherwise — of the German people for Nazism and the recent war.

DER NIEDERGANG DES RECHTS IM DRITTEN REICH. By Wilhelm Püschel. Reutlingen (French Zone): "Die Zukunft," 1947, 125 p.

A popular summary of the Nazis' breaches of legal and constitutional principles, such as restrictions on the regular courts, violations of personal liberty, infractions of international law, etc.

NOUVEAUX ASPECTS DU PROBLÈME ALLEMAND. By L.-F. Aubert and Others. Paris: Hartmann (for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère), 1947, 213 p. Fr. 105.

Essays expressing the French point of view on such insistent problems as the Ruhr, denazification, German youth, reparations and Anglo-American policies in Germany.

GEGEN EINE NEUE DOLCHSTOSSLÜGE: EIN ERLEBNISBERICHT ZUM 20. JULI 1944. By Wolfgang Müller. Hannover (British Zone): "Das Andere Deutschland," 1947, 128 p.

This diary (1941–45), by a Wehrmacht colonel who took part in the attempt on Hitler's life, was published at the instigation of Friedrich Meinecke and throws light on general conditions in the German Army. Other German underground movements are covered by later entries.

DIE BEWEGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFT VON 1800 BIS 1946. By Jürgen Kuczynski. Berlin: Volk und Wissen, 1947, 217 p.

Sixteen lectures by a well-known Leftist writer on labor problems.

L'ÉCONOMIE DE L'EUROPE CENTRALE GERMANIQUE. By René Clozier. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1947, 127 p. Fr. 45.

A factual précis of Germany's economic geography, with charts and maps.

LA SUISSE PARMI LES NATIONS. By René de Weck. Geneva: Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1947, 158 p.

A cogent review of Swiss foreign policy before and during World War II, which leads the author to propose a stronger federal government in Switzerland and that country's participation, with reservations, in the United Nations.

P. C. DU GÉNÉRAL. By Bernard Barbey. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1948, 280 p. Sw. Fr. 22.

This journal, kept by the personal chief of staff of the Swiss commander during the war years (General Guisan), throws an interesting light on the republic's military policy during that fateful period.

TRIESTE. By Jean Martin-Chauffier. Paris: Hartmann (for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère), 1947, 199 p. Fr. 150.

A concise, objective statement of the geographic, economic and political aspects of the Trieste problem and a documented review of postwar developments.

ITALY SPEAKS. By Barbara Barclay Carter. London: Gollancz, 1947, 195 p. 6/.

Miss Carter, after describing the very real contribution made by the people of Italy to Allied victory, enters a plea for a softening of the terms of the Italian Treaty.

FROM THE ASHES OF DISGRACE. By Admiral Franco Maugeri. New York: Reynal, 1948, 376 p. $4.00.

The present chief of staff in the Italian Navy tells of his work before and during the

war, including participation in the resistance movement. Especially useful is his account of the battles at Capes Spada and Matapan, and of the reasons for the failure of the Italian Navy to achieve any glorious victories.

GRAZIANI MI HA DETTO. By Emilio Canevari. Rome: Magi-Spinetti, 1947, 351 p. L. 600.

This is the first in a series entitled "Historical and Critical Studies on the Italian Social Republic," the Nazi-puppet régime that existed in northern Italy from September 1943 to April 1945, with Mussolini as its chief and Marshal Graziani commanding its armed forces (in which the author played a rôle). In Part I of this book Graziani, speaking through Canevari, tells about his prewar campaigns in Libya and Ethiopia, about Badoglio's surrender to the Allies, and about the Army of the Social Republic. Part II contains Canevari's own interpretation of Italian history, while the last 140 pages comprise a documentary appendix.

IL BUONUOMO MUSSOLINI. By Indro Montanelli. Milan: Edizioni Riunite, 1947, 108 p. L. 250.

In this pretended political testament of *Il Duce*, the author gets in many a sly dig at Fascism and at the Italian people who put up with it for 22 years.

TUTTE LE STRADE CONDUCONO A ROMA. By Leo Valiani. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1947, 395 p. L. 900.

A personal account of the organization and activities of some of the partisan forces in northern Italy, by one of their leaders.

MEDITAZIONI DELL'ESILIO. By Francesco Nitti. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1947, 516 p. L. 680.

Opinionated essays by one of liberal Italy's elder statesmen, a former Prime Minister, who lived in France during the Fascist régime.

IL SISTEMA TRIBUTARIO E LE SUE PROSPETTIVE. By Sergio Steve. Milan: Rizzoli, 1947, 158 p. L. 400.

A review of recent Italian tax policies and of current prospects.

LA CITTÀ DEL VATICANO. By Ennio Francia. Rome: Faro, 1947, 222 p. L. 400.

A guide through the Vatican, its history and its hierarchy.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AGAINST THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Avro Manhattan. London: Watts, 1947, 461 p. 18/.

After briefly describing the administrative apparatus of the Church, the author interprets the recent history of the Vatican's relations with the principal countries of the world. He finds that the Church consistently supported Fascist régimes and reactionary forces. There is no bibliography and few footnote references.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND MEN OF MODERN SPAIN, 1808–1946. By A. Ramos Oliveira. New York: Crown Publishers (London: Gollancz), 1948, 720 p. $4.00.

This important work is not a systematic history of modern Spain, but a series of related chapters containing a wealth of material on the country's political and economic evolution since the Napoleonic invasion. Nearly two-thirds of the book deals with the Second Republic, the Civil War and the Rebel triumph. The author is anti-Franco.

ESPAÑA, RUMBO A LA POST-GUERRA. By Agustín del Río Cisneros. Madrid: Aguado, 1947, 379 p. Ptas. 50.

This defense of Franco's policy of "neutrality" during World War II consists, in considerable part, of brief articles published by the author during the conflict.

Eastern Europe

NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS 1939–1941. EDITED BY RAYMOND JAMES SONTAG AND JAMES STUART BEDDIE. New York: Didier, 1948, 362 p. $3.00.

Out of the immense mass of German Foreign Office documents captured by the American First Army, these two historian-editors have selected those which tell the story of the Russo-German flirtation ending in the Nazi invasion of June 1941.

DIE SOWJET-UNION UND DAS DEUTSCHLAND-PROBLEM. Halle (U.S.S.R. Zone): Mitteldeutsche Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1947, 140 p.

A daily summary of the work of the Moscow Conference, with the texts of Molotov's important speeches.

LENIN. BY DAVID SHUB. Garden City: Doubleday, 1948, 438 p. $5.00.

With prodigious industry and a sincere desire for objectivity, Mr. Shub, who knew Lenin and other Bolsheviks in his early days, has pieced together an outstanding biography. Though his style is not exciting, his command of the literature and his understanding of Lenin — as man, theoretician, revolutionist and dictator — is impressive.

LA RUSSIE RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE. BY GRÉGOIRE ALEXINSKY. Paris: Colin, 1947, 268 p. Fr. 280.

A onetime Socialist member of the Duma and associate of Lenin seeks to put the Soviet experiment in its historical setting and explain its apparent success.

RUSSIA'S POSTWAR ECONOMY. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1947, 119 p. $1.00.

A concise survey including a chapter on Soviet foreign trade.

LA PLANIFICATION EN U.R.S.S. BY STANISLAS STROUMILINE. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1947, 228 p. Fr. 125.

The text of the fourth Five-Year Plan, with explanations by a member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

LA LÉGISLATION DU TRAVAIL EN U.R.S.S. BY A. PACHERSTNIK. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1947, 235 p. Fr. 140.

An official summary, by the Minister of Light Industry in the Ukraine, with a shorter section on social security in the Soviet Union by A. Soukhov, Minister of Social Welfare in the R.S.F.S.R.

SOVIET RUSSIA: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE. BY NICHOLAS MIKHAILOV. New York: Sheridan, 1948, 374 p. $3.50.

An unemotional description of Russia's physical, economic and cultural geography, by a leading Soviet authority.

A RUSSIAN JOURNAL. BY JOHN STEINBECK. New York: Viking, 1948, 220 p. $3.75.

This is the unpretentious day-by-day record of what a prominent American novelist recently saw in several parts of Russia. He was accompanied by Robert Capa, 70 of whose telling photographs are included.

TELL THE WEST. BY JERZY GLIKSMAN. New York: Gresham Press, 1948, 358 p. $3.75.

Life in Soviet slave-labor camps recounted by a Polish lawyer, a Socialist, imprisoned after the Russian occupation of his country in 1939 and freed in 1941.

L'ISLAM ET L'U.R.S.S. BY FRANÇOIS DE ROMAINVILLE. Paris: Hermès, 1947, 206 p. Fr. 170.

A rather sketchy survey of the history and present status of Russia's 20,000,000 Moslems and the rôle they might play in Soviet expansion.

LAIN SÄÄTÄMINEN ITSENÄISESSÄ SUOMESSA. By E. H. I. Tammio. Helsinki: Söderström, 1948, 115 p. M. 250.

A short account of the legislative process in Finland, by the secretary of the Diet.

HISTORY OF THE LITHUANIAN NATION. By Constantine R. Jurgéla. New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute, 1948, 544 p. $5.00.

Very brief on the period since 1914.

RED STAR OVER POLAND. By Edward S. Kerstein. Appleton (Wis.): C. C. Nelson, 1947, 174 p. $2.50.

An American correspondent, with a knowledge of the Polish language, goes into the byways of Poland and comes back with this eyewitness report on the functioning of the Communist-dominated régime there.

POLOGNE D'HIER ET D'AUJOURD'HUI. By Louis Brunot. Paris: Raisons d'Être, 1947, 270 p.

In his interpretation of recent Polish history the author is critical of the "colonels" and the London régime but approves of the present government.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By William Diamond. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1947, 258 p. 12/6.

Time and the necessities of Soviet expansionism have not dealt kindly with the author's picture of Czechoslovakia as a country enjoying the best of both worlds.

URAK, POLGÁROK, PARASZTOK. By Lajos Hatvany. Budapest: Révai, 1947, 129 p.

A collection of sociological essays by a professor of Hungarian literature at the University of Budapest. The author sketches the decline of the European middle classes between the two wars with particular reference to Hungary and calls on the bourgeoisie to take the road to Socialism as now practised in Eastern Europe.

BÉKÜLŐ ERDÉLY. By György Kovács. Budapest: Valóság, 1948, 160 p. Ft. 16.

An idyllic picture of the harmony alleged to prevail among the ethnic minorities of postwar Transylvania under the Groza régime, by a pro-Soviet peasant radical.

CRÉPUSCULE DANUBIEN. By Jean Blairy. Paris: Plon, 1946, 243 p. Fr. 90.

Wartime events in Jugoslavia and Rumania treated impressionistically.

GOVORI I STATII 1945–1947. By Dimitar Vlahov. Skoplje: Drzhavno Knigoizdatelstvo na Makedonija, 1947, 226 p.

Speeches and articles, published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the author's activity as a Macedonian revolutionary and lobbyist. Vlahov, an early member of IMRO, later headed the Communist wing of the Macedonian movement and is now president of the Macedonian People's Front and a vice-president of the Jugoslav People's Assembly. Included is material on the Greek problem in connection with the Paris Peace Conference, to which Vlahov was a delegate, and addresses to Slav Americans in America while the author was delegate to the U.N. in 1946.

LES HEURES DOULOUREUSES DE LA GRÈCE LIBÉRÉE. By Léon Marc. Paris: Librairie Le François, 1947, 254 p. Fr. 135.

An eyewitness chronicle of events, based on the author's diary during the early weeks of liberation — October 1944 to January 1945.

IT'S GREEK TO ME. By Willie Snow Ethridge. New York: Vanguard, 1948, 297 p. $3.00.

Mrs. Ethridge went to Greece last year with her husband, a Louisville newspaper publisher who was then American representative on the United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents. This account of what she saw and heard has its grim passages, but for the most part is amusing and lighthearted.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE END OF AN EPOCH. By A. L. Rowse. New York: Macmillan, 1948, 323 p. $4.50.

These pungent essays on British domestic and foreign issues, by an Oxford don and Laborite, originally appeared in various places between 1929 and 1944.

FREEDOM AND ORDER. By Anthony Eden. London: Faber, 1947, 436 p. 15/.

Some 50 addresses, largely on topics of international interest, delivered by the Conservative leader between 1939 and 1946.

BRITISH NATIONALITY: LAW AND PRACTICE. By J. Mervyn Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, 452 p. $8.50.

A legal manual, covering the empire as well as the homeland.

DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINIONS. By Alexander Brady. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947, 475 p. $4.25.

An intelligent "comparative study" of the development of democratic processes in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND WORLD SOCIETY. Edited by Richard Frost. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1947, 204 p. $4.25.

Proceedings of the Third Unofficial Conference on British Commonwealth Relations held at London from February 17 to March 3, 1945.

CANADA: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY. By Edgar McInnis. New York: Rinehart, 1947, 574 p. $6.50.

A readable, illustrated survey for student and layman.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. By Robert MacGregor Dawson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947, 662 p. $5.50.

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A concise survey, based on the available statistics.

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A scientific examination of their economic and social condition.

FRONTIER SPEAKS. By Mohammad Yunus. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1947, 204 p. Rs. 4/8.

A Pathan recounts the history of his people and of neighboring tribes and sings the praises of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his pro-Congress Party movement.

MY INDIAN YEARS, 1910–1916. By Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. London: Murray, 1948, 150 p. 10/6.

The author's reminiscences of his service as Viceroy of India.

The Near East

BUGÜNKÜ TÜRKILI (TÜRKISTAN) VE YAKIN TARIHI, CILT I, BATI VE KUZEY TÜRKISTAN. By A. Zeki Velidi Togan. Istanbul: Arkadas, Ibrahim Horoz ve Güven Basimevleri, 1942–47, 697 p. Ltq 8 (with map).

This is a detailed study of the geography and recent political and social history of the Turkish-inhabited areas in Soviet Central Asia, by a leading authority on that part of the world. It is particularly valuable for the insight it gives into Russian policy and methods. When the book was printed in 1942 the last 150 pages were omitted because of their anti-Soviet slant. But even then the Minister of Education forbade its distribution and later the author was arrested, along with other Pan-Turanians. Though eventually acquitted and now free to participate in the open criticism of Russia permitted in Turkey, he has not regained his professorship.

YAWM MAYSALŪN. By Sāṭi' Al-Ḥuṣrī. Beirut: Al-Kashāf, 1947, 352 p.

An interpretation of French political activities in the Levant by a competent Arab scholar who has had access to new source materials.

LES INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES DU LIBAN. By Pierre Rondot. Paris: Institut d'Études de l'Orient Contemporain, 1947, 148 p. Fr. 375.

An admirable monograph on the historical developments, legal status and the administrative set-up of the religious communities in the Lebanese Republic.

THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS. Edited by L. and H. A. Mangoian. Nicosia (Cyprus): Mangoian, 1947, 245 p. 12/6.

A wide variety of useful information on the island's past and present.

WE NEED NOT FAIL. By Sumner Welles. Boston: Houghton, 1948, 143 p. $2.50.

Mr. Welles, after reviewing the Palestine problem and severely criticizing American policy with regard to it, states the case for a United Nations settlement along the lines laid down by the General Assembly, including partition. Pro-Arabs will not view either his premises or his recommendations as favorable to their position.

BLESSED IS THE MATCH. By Marie Syrkin. New York: Knopf, 1947, 361 p. $3.50.

The incredibly tragic story of the martyrdom of millions of European Jews and the struggle of the survivors to reach Palestine.

PALESTINE: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS. Compiled by Touvia Ashkenazi and Chaim Locker. Pittsburgh: "Kedem," 1947, 241 p. $5.00.

Source material for the period 1914–46, mimeographed but bound.

EGYPT: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS. By Charles Issawi. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1948, 219 p. $4.25.

Despite its brevity and the fact that it was ready for the printer in 1943, this study is of great value for its factual data and its interpretations in a field hitherto almost untouched by treatises in the European languages. The author, formerly professor at the American University in Beirut, is now an official of the United Nations.

ARABIAN DAYS. By H. St. J. B. Philby. London: Hale, 1948, 336 p. 21/.

These reminiscences tell the remarkable story of Philby's transformation from an official of the Indian Civil Service into an anti-imperialist, converted Moslem, confidant and agent of Ibn Saud. He here records his impressions of, and judgments on, two generations of Middle East figures, Arab and British.

INTRODUCING YEMEN. By A. Faroughy. New York: Orientalia, 1947, 123 p. $2.50.

Data on the history, geography and current conditions of a little-known Arab country.

The Far East

BENEATH THE SHADOW. By James Bertram. New York: Day, 1947, 308 p. $3.50.

A young New Zealander recounts, with intelligence and without malice, his adventures in the Far East from 1939 to 1946, such as participation in the defense of Hong Kong, a long period of Japanese captivity (including two years in Tokyo), and a postwar assignment with the Far Eastern Commission.

CHINESE CRACKERS. By Edward Ward. London: Lane, 1947, 187 p. 12/6.

A BBC correspondent's chatty account of postwar events witnessed in Japan, China and Manchuria. Good illustrations.

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A revised version of an excellent little manual first published in 1936, by the General Secretary of the Comité d'Études des Problèmes du Pacifique.

DONALD OF CHINA. By Earl Albert Selle. New York: Harper, 1948, 374 p. $3.50.

A newspaperman's biography of a great newspaperman who, as the adviser of several Chinese governments, was a power in the politics of that country for nearly 40 years. Much of the information in the volume was provided by Donald himself shortly before he died in 1946.

CHINA AWAKE. By Robert Payne. New York: Dodd, 1947, 424 p. $4.00.

In diary form, this young British writer has set down what he saw, heard and felt in wartime China. Though his prose is uneven, it is graphic and will leave the reader almost with the feeling of having been there himself.

A L'OUEST BARBARE DE LA VASTE CHINE. By Alexandra David-Neel. Paris: Plon, 1947, 301 p. Fr. 180.

Affairs and conditions in China's two westernmost provinces, reported by an observer who spent several years there.

TWO YEARS WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. By Claire and William Band. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, 347 p. $4.50.

Though the authors, a British physics professor and his wife, eschew political judgments, this narrative of their peregrinations as refugees among the Chinese guerrillas and as residents in wartime Nationalist China has interesting political implications. They take the unheard-of view that both the Communists and the Nationalists have the same fundamental program for building the New China, and that their differences have arisen almost entirely from fortuitous circumstances.

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The reforms initiated by MacArthur placed in their historical perspective, by one who thinks the Japanese people sincerely desirous of making them work.

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A fact-laden monograph by a former professor of economics at Rangoon University.

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A compendium of data on the economics, social life, culture and administration of Burma and the Netherland East Indies.

L'INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE EN FACE DU JAPON. By André Gaudel. Paris: Susse, 1947, 240 p. Fr. 140.

One who lived in Indo-China throughout the war describes the course of events set in motion by the Japanese occupation. This is by no means the full or final story, but serves as a preliminary account.

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AU PAYS DES BALLILA JAUNES. By André Blanchet. St. Étienne (France): Dorian, 1947, 252 p.

A French war correspondent's account of the confusion prevailing in Indo-China during the first half-year after its "liberation" (1945–46).

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This authoritative monograph, by an official of long experience with the Chinese element in Malaya, is of particular interest in view of the current disturbances there.

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Africa

L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE EN DANGER. By Henry Bénazet. Paris: Fayard, 1947, 318 p. Fr. 160.

Admonitions on the dangers inherent in the rise of nationalism in Tunisia and Morocco and of separatism in Algeria and Madagascar.

SERVICE AFRICAIN. By Robert Delavignette. Paris: Gallimard, 1947, 281 p. Fr. 185.

The first edition of this book, entitled "Les Vrais Chefs de l'Empire," appeared during the "phony war" early in 1940 with certain parts deleted by the military censors. Later, the Nazis suppressed it entirely. It deals in critical detail with native life and its relation to French colonial administration in the prewar era.

LE PROBLÈME DÉMOGRAPHIQUE NORD-AFRICAIN. By Louis Chevalier. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1947, 221 p. Fr. 250.

A statistical analysis, with bibliography.

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A valuable contribution to North African ethnology and psychology, by a Franciscan who lived among the Berbers for 12 years.

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From pre-Roman times through the French conquest.

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A profusely illustrated survey of Madagascar's geography, ethnography and history, emphasizing the French contribution to the island's development.

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A Peruvian diplomat and historian wants Latin America to play a more positive rôle particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

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By Ruth Savord

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
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