TEXT FLY WITHIN THE BOOK ONLY

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY
OU_152304
UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

PHILOSOPHY

(THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY)

EDITED BY

SYDNEY E. HOOPER

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

SIR ERNEST BARKER	JULIAN S. HUXLEY	SIR W. DAVID ROSS
C. D BROAD	HAROLD J LASKI	BERTRAND RUSSELL
WILLIAM BROWN	LORD LINDSAY	L. J RUSSELL
A C. EWING	JOHN MACMURRAY	N. KEMP SMITH
M. GINSBERG	H H PRICE	CLEMENT C J WEBB

VOL. XXII.—1947

LONDON:

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, W.C.

1947

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXII

PAGE

ARTICLES

ACTON, H. B.—The Marxist Outlook - - - - - - - - - - - 208
BARNES, W. H. F.—Is Philosophy Possible? A Study of Logical Positivism - 25
BASSON, A. H., and O'CONNOR, D. J.—Language and Philosophy: Some Suggestions for an Empirical Approach - - - - - - - - - 49
FORSYTH, T. M.—Aristotle's Concept of God as Final Cause - - - - - 112
GALLIE, W. B.—Is "The Prelude" a Philosophical Poem? - - - - - - 124
HANDCOCK, W. D.—What is Represented in Representative Government? - 99
HARTLAND-SWANN, J.—Descartes' "Simple Natures" - - - - - - - 139
HUGHES, G. E.—An Examination of the Argument from Theology to Ethics - 3
KNEEBONE, G. T.—Philosophy and Mathematics - - - - - - - - 231
LITWINSKI, L.—The Psychology of "Mine" - - - - - - - - - 240
[redacted]entific World-Outlook - - - - - - 105

DISCUSSIONS

CROXALL, T. H.—*Man's Inner Condition: A Study in Kierkegaard* - - - - 252
INGE, W. R.—*The Perennial Philosophy, by Aldous Huxley* - - - - - 66
WALSH, W. H.—*R. G. Collingwood's Philosophy of History* - - - - - 153

PHILOSOPHIC SURVEYS

Philosophy in France.—H. B. ACTON - - - - - - - - - - - 161
Philosophy in Italy.—G. DE RUGGIERO - - - - - - - - - - - 71

NEW BOOKS

ALLEN, E. L.—*The Structure of Life* (E. S. Waterhouse) - - - - - - 184
ALLEN, E. L., POLLARD, F. E., and SUTHERLAND, G. A.—*The Case for Pacifism and Conscientious Objection: A Reply to Professor G. C. Field* (Helen Wodehouse) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 277
ALLEN, WARNER.—*The Timeless Moment* (W. R. Inge) - - - - - - 170
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME XIX: *Analysis and Metaphysics* (D. M. Emmet) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 169
BARLOW, K. E.—*The State of Public Knowledge* (M. H. Carré) - - - - 185
BRIGHTMAN, E. S.—*Nature and Values* (W. H. Walsh) - - - - - - 177
BROWN, WM.—*Personality and Religion* (E. S. Waterhouse) - - - - - 182
CARRÉ, M. H.—*Realists and Nominalists* (F. C. Copleston) - - - - - 73
DEWEY, JOHN.—*Problems of Men* (L. J. Russell) - - - - - - - - 173
DUFFY, JOHN.—*A Philosophy of Poetry* (based on Thomistic Principles) (H. D. Lewis) - 167
EBENSTEIN, WM.—*The Pure Theory of Law* (G. W. Keeton) - - - - - 74
EDEL, ABRAHAM.—*The Theory and Practice of Philosophy* (T. M. Knox) - - 271
FINK, ZERA S.—*The Classical Republicans* (M. H. Carré) - - - - - 77
FOSS, MARTIN.—*The Idea of Perfection in the Western World* (Helen Wodehouse) 268
FRANK, ERICH.—*Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth* (E. S. Waterhouse) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 184
GRAJEWSKI, MAURICE J.—*The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus* (Thos. Corbishley) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 272
HAMID, KHWAJA ABDUL.—*Ibn Maskawaih* (A. S. Tritton) - - - - - - 270
HAWKINS, D. J. B.—*A Sketch of Mediaeval Philosophy* (M. H. Carré) - - 81
HOCKING, W. E.—*Science and the Idea of God* (E. S. Waterhouse) - - - 181
HOSPERS, JOHN.—*Meaning and Truth in the Arts* (E. F. Carritt) - - - 283
JENNINGS, J. G. (ed.).—*The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha* (E. J. Thomas) 275
JOHNSON, MARTIN.—*Time, Knowledge and the Nebulae* (G. C. McVittie) - - 84
KYDD, RACHAEL M.—*Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise* (B. M. Laing) - 92
LAIRD, *the late* JOHN.—*Philosophical Incursions into English Literature* (W. B. Gallie) - 178
LAMONT, W. D.—*The Principles of Moral Judgment* (A. C. Ewing) - - - 265
LUCE, A. A.—*Berkeley's Immaterialism* (D. G. C. Macnabb) - - - - 87

CONTENTS

PAGE

McMAHON, A. PHILIP.—*Preface to an American Philosophy of Art* (E. F. Carritt) 78
Mill, John Stuart.—On Liberty, and *Considerations on Representative Government*, ed. with an Introduction by R. B. McCallum (A. C. Ewing) - - 264
NAHM, MILTON C.—*Aesthetic Experience and Its Presuppositions* (E. F. Carritt) 76
ORTON, WM. AYLOTT.—*The Liberal Tradition. A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom.* (H. B. Acton) - - - - - - - - - - 171
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1945–46 (G. H. Langley) - - - - - 282
Proceedings of the 18th Indian Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1943 (D. A. Rees) 273
RAFI-UD-DIN, MUHAMMAD.—*Ideology of the Future* (A. S. Tritton) - - - - 270
RUSSELL, BERTRAND. —*A History of Western Philosophy, and its Connection with political and social Circumstances from the earliest Times to the present Day* (C. D. Broad) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 256
SMITH, N. KEMP (ed., with Introduction).—*Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (B. M. Laing) - - - - - - - - - - - - 279
SPELTZ, GEO. H.—*The Importance of Rural Life according to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (T. Corbishley) - - - - - - - - - - 272
UBBELOHDE, A. R.—*Time and Thermodynamics* (E. A. Milne) - - - - - 187
USHENKO, A. P.—*Power and Events* (Wm. Kneale) - - - - - - - - 272
VAHID, SYED 'ABDUL.—*Iqbal. His Art and Thought* (Laurence Housman) - 170
WATERMAN, CHAS.—*The Three Spheres of Society* (H. B. Acton) - - - - 171
WEBB, C. C. J.—*Religious Experience* (E. S. Waterhouse) - - - - - - 185
WELDON, T. D.—*States and Morals* (J. D. Mabbott) - - - - - - - 82
WHEELER, OLIVE A.—*The Adventure of Youth* (R. I. Aaron) - - - - - 79
ZUURDEEG, W. F.—*A Research for the Consequences of the Vienna Circle of Philosophy for Ethics* (G. E. Hughes) - - - - - - - - - - 280

CORRESPONDENCE

ACTON, H. B.—Susan Stebbing Studentship - - - - - - - - - 287
POPPER, K. R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 191
TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY - - - - - - - 286

INSTITUTE NOTES

"ANALYSIS" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 192
CHANGE OF TITLE TO "THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY" - - - - 288
LECTURES AT THE INSTITUTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - 96

MISCELLANEOUS

ARTHUR STANLEY EDDINGTON MEMORIAL LECTURESHIP - - - - - - 97
GRADUATE FELLOWSHIP IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CAROLINA - - 1
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY IN ROME - - - - - - - 1
LOCAL CENTRES: A CHALLENGE - - - - - - - - - - - - 193

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THEOLOGY TO ETHICS. GEORGE E. HUGHES, M.A. 3

II. IS PHILOSOPHY POSSIBLE? . . A STUDY OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM. PROFESSOR W. H. F. BARNES 25

III. LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH. A. H. BASSON & D J. O'CONNOR 49

IV. DISCUSSION: THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY, BY ALDOUS HUXLEY. THE VERY REVD. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., LL.D., F.B.A. 66

V. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY . . 71

VI. NEW BOOKS 73

VII. INSTITUTE NOTES 96

GRADUATE FELLOWSHIPS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

The University of North Carolina offers for the academic year 1947-48 a number of graduate fellowships in philosophy, approximately seven (Kenan Fellowships and Williams Fellowships). The stipend is $750.0. Applications should be addressed to: The Graduate School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

Representatives of fifteen nations met from November 15th to 20th in the Senate Hall, Rome, for the first international Congress of Philosophy to be held after the war.

A lively debate took place between the exponents of the two main trends in existentialist philosophy, and between them and the critics of existentialism. Speakers on this subject included Jaspers, G. Marcel, J. Wahl, V. Jankélévitch, R. Le Senne, M. Blondel, J. Benda, and N. Abbagnano.

Discussions of Marxism and kindred doctrines were held mainly by Italian philosophers—A. Banfi, G. Della Volpe, G. Ferretti, U. Spirito and others—and reflected the revived struggle in the field of political ideals and practice. The issue Communism-Christianity presented itself as not liable of conciliation or compromise.

A third subject proposed for discussion was "epistemology and analysis of language."

Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED, LONDON AND WOKING

Between Man and Man

MARTIN BUBER

"Five Essays by a distinguished philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jerusalem, developing his theme of 'I and Thou,' and applying it to the principal questions of personal and social life. A stimulating and moving book."—*Times Literary Supplement.* 12s. 6d. net

A Preface to Logic

MORRIS R. COHEN

"This admirable book should be read by students and teachers alike and in every field."—*The New Statesman.* 8s. 6d. net

The Comforts of Unreason

A STUDY OF THE MOTIVES BEHIND IRRATIONAL THOUGHT

RUPERT CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS

A book for the general reader, it deals with the genesis and practice of common or garden unreasonableness in normal human beings. The author, who is a keen student of Educational Psychology and the Psychology of Language and Reasoning, is giving a number of broadcasts on this and allied topics. 12s. 6d. net

The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis

OTTO FENICHEL, M.D.

A standard work, it contains not only the wealth of clinical material found in the author's earlier book, *Outline of Clinical Psycho-Analysis,* but also the psycho-analytic doctrines presented in a systematic and comprehensive manner. 35s. net

Our Inner Conflicts

KAREN HORNEY, M.D.

Dr. Karen Horney is the author of a number of psychological works, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, Self-Analysis,* etc.; she is now Dean of the newly-formed American Institute for Psychoanalysis. In this book she writes for the ordinary man and woman and shows how they can themselves go a long way towards alleviating their own mental troubles. 10s. 6d. net

ROUTLEDGE, KEGAN PAUL

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL XXII. No. 81 APRIL 1947

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THEOLOGY TO ETHICS

GEORGE E. HUGHES, M.A.

IT is not infrequently said that the true justification of moral beliefs lies in theology. I wish here to examine precisely what is meant by this contention, and by what arguments, if any, it can be substantiated.

The view I am examining is not that the only valid reason for *doing* what is right is a theological reason (e.g. the fact that God wills it); as if we could know independently of theology what was right, but required a theological motive to make it reasonable to do it. It is rather that the very fact *that* it is right is logically dependent on certain facts of a theological nature; or, to express the matter otherwise, that from certain theological propositions it is possible validly to draw certain conclusions in the form of propositions which state what I ought to do, and that this fact is the source of the validity of these latter propositions.

This, however, is not yet a sufficiently precise account of the theory in question, since it might cover a number of different contentions, some of which I think may be reasonably maintained, while others, I think, may not. I propose to work towards a clearer formulation by considering certain arguments which have been advanced in order to deny outright the very possibility of arguing validly "from theology to ethics"; for I do believe that these arguments prove *something*, and rule out certain theories as untenable.

The chief of these arguments may be summarized as follows:[1]

1. It is only theological premises of a certain nature which can be at all plausibly held to yield ethical conclusions; and upon examina-

[1] Some of these arguments are taken from an article entitled "Ethics and Belief in God," by Dr. A. C. Ewing (*Hibbert Journal*, July 1941), but I have arranged them in my own way.

tion these theological premises are found actually to be based upon *ethical* propositions. The argument from theology to ethics is therefor circular, since it is idle to pretend that we are deducing B from A if in order to establish A we have to assume that we already independently know B. This may be elaborated in several ways. Thus:

(*a*) We cannot deduce our ethics from belief in *any* kind of God, but only from belief in a *good* God. This implies the truth of at least one moral judgment independently of theology.

(*b*) We may try to deduce what we ought to do from what God wills. But we can only discover what God wills by deciding first what is right and then arguing that it is the will of God because God is good. Otherwise the will of God is arbitrary, and not moral at all, and therefore cannot provide a foundation for ethics.

(*c*) The argument from revealed theology may be similarly criticized. We cannot, e.g. accept the Christian revelation as setting a moral standard unless we recognize previously that Christ was morally good.

2. A similar conclusion may, it is also urged, be reached by examining the moral predicates. The concepts for which these stand are, it is argued, *sui generis*, any reduction of them to terms which are other than distinctively ethical being impossible; and therefore, while it is possible to derive one ethical proposition from another ethical proposition, it is impossible validly to draw any ethical conclusions from premises none of which are themselves ethical.

3. The practical value of an argument from theology to ethics, even if valid, would also be questioned. For it would be urged—

(*a*) That we know the truth of at least *some* moral propositions more certainly than we know the truth of *any* theological ones; and

(*b*) That the mere fact that something is good makes it worth pursuing, whether there be a God or a future life or not; that this fact may be an operative motive in action; and that theological beliefs are therefore not even psychologically necessary for moral action.

The last argument (3) need not detain us long; nor do I think it is usually as seriously advanced as the other two.

3(*b*) may be admitted to be true (and even to be an important fact of which it is highly necessary and salutary that certain theological moralists should be reminded), and yet regarded as irrelevant to the present inquiry, which is a theoretical inquiry into the *grounds* for certain beliefs and is not concerned with the question of whether a knowledge of these grounds is psychologically necessary for action in accordance with the beliefs in question.

And in reply to 3(*a*) it seems sufficient to point out—

(i) That even if this statement is true of most people, it is doubtful whether it is *universally* true.

(ii) That in any case it seems more accurate to say merely that most people *have a stronger conviction* of the truth of some moral propositions than they have of any theological ones; and strength of conviction is not the same as the certainty of the truth of that which is believed.

(iii) That the argument as stated is an argument merely against theology's being the *ratio cognoscendi* of ethics (and not against its being its *ratio essendi*). Now if this is all that the argument claims to be, then, like 3(*b*), it is irrelevant to our present inquiry; whereas if it claims to be establishing something about the *ratio essendi* of ethics, then it may be pointed out that from the fact that A is less certainly known than B it does not follow that A is not the *ground of the truth of* B.

Arguments 1 and 2, however, are of a more serious nature, and may well be considered together, since their essential point is the same. They present us, in fact, with a dilemma, viz.: In any argument from theology to ethics, *either* (i) the premises are not ethical, and in that case they do not warrant ethical conclusions; *or* (ii) the premises *are* ethical, and in that case they depend for their own proof on ethical propositions of the kind which figure in the conclusion, and the argument is therefore circular; in either case the argument is invalid. This criticism of the argument from theology to ethics I shall take leave to refer to in what follows as the "argument from the Autonomy of Ethics."[1] It seems to me that it is valid against some forms of the argument from theology to ethics, but not against all.

A person who claimed to be arguing from theology to ethics might be doing any one of a number of different things.

1. He might merely be contending that while he knew the truth of *some* moral judgments independently of theology, yet there were others whose truth he could not know except on the basis of theology (e.g. his "duties to God"). This argument might proceed by denying the validity of the argument in the second branch of the dilemma; it might maintain that, while it was necessary to assume *certain* moral propositions in order to establish the theological premises, yet these are not the *same* moral propositions as those which figure in the conclusion. This contention is, I think, quite unobjectionable, but it is, after all, from our point of view a most unimportant one, since a person who maintained it could scarcely be said to be basing his ethics on theology; the most he could be said to be doing is basing

[1] I do not wish to suggest that this type of argument could be employed only by someone who believed in the autonomy of ethics, but a person who so believed would be most likely to use this argument, and I therefore take this as a convenient way of referring to it.

some of his moral beliefs on premises some of which are theological. Nor do I think that the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics is designed to repudiate such a procedure; and I imagine that even the strictest upholder of moral autonomy, provided he were also a theist, would not take exception to it, at least in principle.

2. A person who argued from theology to ethics might, however, be contending that while he understood, without any help from theology, what it was for an action to be right, etc. (i.e. he understood the meaning of the moral predicates), yet he could not know *at all* what actions were right, etc., except on a theological basis; but that on that basis he *could* know. This is a more important contention than the last, and one which is, I think, not as uncommon as might appear on first reflection. (E.g. it is not uncommon to find people who assert that all our duties are either duties to God or duties to our fellow-men, and that the latter are derived from the former; yet many who hold this would, I think, admit under examination that they knew what "being a duty" was, independently of theology.) A person holding this view could perhaps not be said in the strict sense to be basing his *ethics* on theology, yet he would at least be basing his *morals* (in the sense of his code of action) on theology.

This position can, however, be shown to be invalid thus. What its adherents must be saying is something like this: that from the fact that A possesses the theological characteristic X we can infer that it also possesses the non-theological ethical characteristic Y. But such an inference is possible only if we previously accept the premise that everything which possesses X also possesses Y; and this is an *ethical* and not a theological proposition in precisely the same way as the proposition that all disinterested acts of benevolence are morally good (even when the phrase "disinterested act of benevolence" is given a purely psychological analysis) is an ethical and not a psychological one. This criticism is simply an application of the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics.

3. An "argument from theology to ethics" might, however, be claiming to do something more important than either of the previous two theories. It might be claiming to give a content to the ethical predicates by an argument from theological premises. The previous theory (2) began by accepting, e.g. the notion of moral duty, but held that the answer to the question, "What actions are our duty?" was of the form, "All actions which possess the characteristic X," where X is some theological characteristic. The present theory holds that the very notion of being morally obliged is derived from a theological source (and similarly with other moral terms); yet it claims that it is dealing with the perfectly ordinary moral terms as they are commonly used.

We must firstly be careful to see precisely what this theory does

state. For a person who claimed to be holding it might in fact merely be stating in a slipshod way the previous theory (2). For he might be contending that theology tells him not merely *what* he should do, but also *why* he should do it; and by this he might mean simply that theology tells him not only that he should do A, but that the reason why he should do it is, e.g. that it is in accordance with the will of God, and whatever is in accordance with the will of God ought to be done. But in this case he is merely holding that in addition to telling him what particular actions he ought to do, theology tells him what in general he ought to do. He has done nothing to show that the "ought" is itself a theological notion.

But the meaning which in strictness this theory ought to bear is that the correct analysis of the ordinary moral predicates is an analysis in theological terms. And this may be confidently denied. For it seems clear that people who hold no theological beliefs both understand the notion of moral duty and believe that they have moral duties; whereas if the notion of duty were essentially a theological one, they either would not understand it, or, if they did, would deny that they had any moral duties.

4. But someone who claimed to argue from theology to ethics might be advancing a theory just as important as the last, yet quite different from it; namely, the theory that it is possible validly to argue from theological propositions to a set of propositions about human beings and their conduct, whose predicates are not identical with the ordinary *moral* concepts of "good," "bad," "right," "wrong" and "duty," yet which are *normative* just as "purely moral" propositions are. I propose to devote the rest of this discussion chiefly to examining this theory in greater detail and to inquiring to what extent it escapes the criticisms which proved fatal to other theories.

I shall first of all contend that this last-mentioned theory is a more adequate expression than those which preceded it of what most "theological moralists" in fact hold. For they at least hold that certain actions are "sinful," and others the reverse;—though perhaps not all theologians would allow that *any* human actions are the reverse of sinful. (A difficulty of a linguistic nature arises here, because there does not seem to be a satisfactory English antonym of "sinful." The terms "righteous" and "holy," which spring to mind most readily, are neither of them altogether satisfactory. But I believe I can make the points I wish to make, either by referring to the term "sinful" alone, or by referring to "sinful" and its opposite as "the terms of religious approbation and disapprobation";—though our use of this phrase must not be taken to mean that these terms are to be analysed in terms of the approval and disapproval of the person who uses them.)

Now of this term "sinful" two relevant remarks may here be made:

(*a*) It is a concept which corresponds in the theological sphere to the concepts "morally wrong" and "morally bad" in the ethical sphere.[1] And like these latter it is *normative* and *authoritative*. I.e., if an action is sinful it is presented to us, no less surely than if it is morally wrong, as *not to be done*; and it is so presented not merely with the sanction of power, but with a claim to *authority*, for no more than the term "morally wrong" can the term "sinful" be regarded as equivalent to "forbidden or disliked by X," even where X is a deity of however great power.

(*b*) It is equally clear, however, that the term "sinful" does not have the *same* meaning as either "morally wrong" or "morally bad," or indeed as any purely *moral* term whatsoever. For a person who did not believe that any theological propositions were true would not believe that any actions were sinful, whereas as we have previously said he might believe that some actions were morally wrong. It is certainly true that the word "sinful" is sometimes used simply to mean "morally *very* wrong," but I think that those who so use it would admit, if pressed, that they were using the word loosely, and that in the strict sense to say that an action is sinful is to say either something more than or something different from saying that it is morally wrong; something, moreover, which is necessarily connected with certain theological facts. It seems clear, therefore, that the analysis of "sinful" must be at least partly in theological terms.

But here a difference of opinion may arise:

A. It may be held that the correct analysis is in *solely* theological terms, and not at all in ethical ones.

B. It may be held, on the other hand, that the correct analysis is in terms some of which are theological and some of which are ethical. And this contention might take either of two forms:

(i) One might try to distinguish between a normative and a non-normative element in the analysis of the term, and hold that the normative element was ethical and the non-normative theological. Let me try to explain what I mean by an example. Let it be granted that an intemperate act may be defined as an act which is concerned with the bodily pleasures and which is wrong; and an unjust act as one which is concerned with the distribution of goods and which is wrong.[2] Then I call "being wrong" the normative element in each

[1] With which of these terms it is more nearly analogous I shall not here enquire, since to do so would involve a discussion of the whole question of the relation between the terms "morally wrong" and "morally bad," which would be out of place in this context.

[2] I do not wish to suggest that these are adequate definitions of intemperance and injustice (they are in fact obviously defective); I use them merely in order to illustrate a logical point.

definition, and "being concerned with bodily pleasures" and "being concerned with the distribution of goods" the non-normative elements; and it may be held that the normative element bears precisely the same meaning in each case, the non-normative elements being the *differentiae* which distinguish intemperate and unjust actions as species of the genus "wrong actions"; and furthermore that the normative element is a purely ethical concept, and the non-normative an empirical (or at least a non-ethical) one in each case. In a parallel way this theory holds that a sinful action is to be defined as an action which is concerned with the agent's relation to God and which is wrong (or in some similar terms), the term "wrong" bearing the same meaning as in the definitions of intemperance and injustice, and the term "being concerned with the agent's relation to God" being the non-ethical *differentia* which characterizes sinful actions as a further species of wrong actions.

I do not propose, however, to spend time discussing this theory, since it is in essentials the same as a view which I have previously mentioned and dismissed as unimportant (theory 1, pp. 5–6). I mention it here only to distinguish it from the next theory, with which it might otherwise be confused, viz.:

(ii) The view which holds that the *normativeness* of the concept of "sinful" (that in virtue of which it is analogous to "wrong," not e.g. to "unjust") is partly of a theological and partly of an ethical nature.

The two theories with which we shall be concerned are therefore those which I have numbered A and B (ii).

Before I try to discuss each more carefully, there is one preliminary criticism to be considered, a criticism which if valid would make either theory untenable. It will be said: if any proposition of the form "X is sinful" is to be binding on me in any sense in which we are interested here, it must present me with an *"ought"* (or, more accurately, an "ought not"); now the very notion of an "ought," it will be said, is simply the notion of moral obligation. Or, to put the matter otherwise, if I am not *morally* bound, I am not validly obliged at all; nor can anything *added to* my being morally obliged in any way modify the obligatoriness of that which I am obliged to do.

It can at least be shown, however, that it is not necessary to hold this view. For in the notion of moral obligation we can distinguish between the bare notion of obligation and the fuller notion of obligation of a specifically *moral* nature. Now the bare notion of obligation (or of an "ought," or an "imperative") is simply that of the prescription of something as "to be done," where there is some valid reason why it is to be done. It is important to stress this last point,

that whatever is to be done is "to be done" for some reason; there must, that is, be some *ground* of the obligation; and it is my contention that it is the nature of the kind of ground on which X is prescribed as "to be done" which determines the kind of obligatoriness (moral or otherwise) which X possesses.[1]

Now that there are different kinds of grounds on which an action may be prescribed as to be done seems to me clear. But when I thus speak of there being different grounds of obligation, I do not mean merely that different classes of things are obligatory, nor do I mean what a person who held Ross's theory of *prima facie* duties would mean if he referred to "previous acts of my own," "previous acts of other people," etc., as different grounds of moral obligation: I wish to refer to what, e.g., the grounds of all of Ross's *prima facie* duties have in common (viz. their being grounds of specifically *moral* obligation) and to contrast this with, say, being an *aesthetic* ground of obligation. For it seems to me that there is an "aesthetic ought" (e.g., "this line (in a picture) ought to curve to the right, not to the left"; "I ought to take up a respectful attitude to this work of art") as well as a "moral ought"; and that what distinguishes them is not a difference in the bare notion of obligatoriness (which is identical in both), but a difference in the kind of ground on which the obligation rests, a difference which gives rise to a different kind of obligation. Now if we can thus distinguish between aesthetic and moral obligation, maintaining that aesthetic obligation *is* obligation, yet without the necessity of reducing it to moral obligation, then we can similarly distinguish religious obligation without the necessity of reducing it to moral obligation either.[2]

Now one important type of theory (which seems to me a plausible

[1] Kant also says this. For after distinguishing his three types of Imperatives, based on different kinds of grounds, he goes on to speak of the "marked distinction" between them "in the *dissimilarity* of the obligation of the will" (*Grundlegung*, p. 41). But Kant is quite sure that even Hypothetical Imperatives *are* imperatives; and "all imperatives are expressed by the word *ought*" (p. 36). Kant does not, of course, go on to work this out in the way I have chosen to do here.

[2] I may remark here that my argument at this point does not depend on an acceptance of the view that there ever *is* such a thing as a valid aesthetic obligation. We can distinguish two questions: (*a*) Is the notion of a (non-moral) aesthetic obligation a *self-consistent* one? (*b*) Granting that it is, do such obligations ever in fact arise? Even if the answer to (*b*) be in the negative, the answer to (*a*) may still be in the affirmative. All that is required here is the admission that the notion of an obligation which rests on aesthetic grounds and is not to be analysed in moral terms is a *self-consistent* notion. If this is admitted, then it follows that the notion of obligation is not such that all obligation must necessarily be moral obligation, and that therefore the notion of a distinctively religious obligation is not a self-contradictory one. And this is all that I am concerned to maintain here.

one, though I do not wish to enter into a defence of it here) holds that the ground and basis of any obligation—that from which it somehow[1] derives its bindingness—must be some kind of *value*.[2] This might be elaborated by saying that subjective value (i.e. that value which belongs to things which are merely *valued*, without necessarily being regarded as *valuable*) gives rise to "Hypothetical" obligation, aesthetic value to aesthetic obligation, either moral value or what we may perhaps call the "human values" in general (e.g. happiness, affection) to moral obligation, and religious value to religious obligation.

If this theory is accepted, then the issue between the views which I have numbered A and B (ii) may be alternatively stated thus: that A holds that theological or religious value—that characteristic value which the religious man attributes to God and derivatively to other religious objects—is completely *sui generis*, and in particular contains no ethical elements; while B (ii) holds that it is to be analysed partly in terms which are distinctively theological and partly in terms which are ethical.

Corresponding with A and B (ii) respectively, we may distinguish two main forms of the argument from theology to a system of normative propositions about conduct,[3] which I intend to call I. The *Pure* form, and II. The *Mixed* form of the argument. To a consideration of each of these I shall now turn.

I. *The Pure form of the argument.*

The three main and inter-related characteristics of this argument are: (*a*) it employs theological but no ethical premises; (*b*) it offers an analysis of "sinful" and its opposite (the terms of religious approbation and disapprobation) in exclusively theological terms; (*c*) it regards "religious value" as completely *sui generis*, and not at all derived from ethical sources.

The following remarks do not claim to be more than a very brief attempt to construct and comment on such an argument; to examine

[1] "Somehow"—because there are several forms of the theory.

[2] Whether this theory is in general true or not, it is worth stating here, since a person who believes in distinctively religious obligation will almost certainly try to base this obligation on some value-characteristic possessed by God. And in any case, whether I should accept this theory without qualification or not, I should at least wish to maintain (in common with most moral philosophers) that value is *one* of the things which can give rise to an obligation.

[3] I use this phrase rather than "an argument from theology to *ethics*" or "to *morality*," because the predicates of the propositions I refer to are not the ordinary moral predicates, and it may be urged that the terms "ethics" and "morality" should be used only with reference to propositions expressed in the ordinary moral terms.

it in detail and to inquire into the reasons advanced for its premises would be a very lengthy labour.

1. It is obvious that a necessary premise for the deduction is the proposition that God exists. But it is equally necessary for the deduction that God should be of a certain nature. For the contention we have previously noted on p. 4 (viz. that *any* kind of God will not do; it must be a good God) is amply justified; but not necessarily, we add—and if the present form of the argument is to hold, then *necessarily not*—a *morally* good God. Still, it is a *good* God that we require, although the goodness he possesses may be no more akin to moral goodness than say aesthetic goodness is. As to what we should *call* this theological value-characteristic there is little doubt; it is *holiness*.

Now we may inquire whether there is any "argument for the existence of God" which will lead us to belief in a God of this nature. And of the arguments known to me, even admitting that all are valid, only one appears to be capable of serving our purpose here, and that is the "argument from religious experience." For consider: the Moral Argument is clearly out of court in this context, since we are not admitting any ethical premises. The Metaphysical arguments may lead us to believe in the existence of a God who is infinite, omniscient, self-existent, powerful, the first cause of all finite beings, but scarcely in a God who is *holy*. We are left with the argument from religious experience; and in fact it does appear to be the case that it is the occurrence of experiences of a distinctively religious type which have given rise to the conception of a *holy* God. It may be noted here, however, that this argument is not a *causal* one; it does not, that is to say, begin with certain experiences, considered simply as events in the history of a mind, and argue to the existence of God in order to account for their occurrence. It is rather a claim that what is called religious experience is of its nature *cognitive*, or at least has a genuinely cognitive aspect as well as an affective one; it may, indeed, include the contention that the feelings which occur in religious experience (at least in its more "genuine" forms) are to be regarded merely as consequent upon the cognition of an object of a certain kind (viz. God).

If this argument be admitted as offering valid grounds for belief in the existence of God, and if it be also admitted, as I think it must, that the Object of religious experience is cognized as *holy* (for otherwise we should not call the experience a religious one at all), then we may raise the question: Is this property of holiness, which is recognized in religious experience, of a distinctively theological nature, or is it capable of analysis in non-theological terms? And, although it would require a lengthy discussion to establish it, the answer to this question seems to me clear: it is that the property in question *is*

of a distinctively theological nature and is not capable of complete analysis in non-theological terms. But whether it is wholly and exclusively theological, or on the other hand contains some *moral* elements, is a question to which I find it peculiarly difficult to return any definite answer; considerable evidence from the testimony of those whose religious experience seems to be best authenticated might be adduced to support either view; and in any case I shall be dealing with both alternatives, the former in the present section and the latter in connection with the Mixed form of the argument.

2. Two addenda to the last-mentioned contention may here be made.

(*a*) I do not wish necessarily to exclude other "proofs of the existence of God" from *playing a part* in the establishment of the existence of a holy God. It would be perfectly consistent to maintain, e.g. that the Argument from Design establishes the existence of an intelligent deity who is the creator of the universe, and then to argue on the basis of religious experience that this *same* deity is also holy. My contention is merely that the conception of God as *holy* must derive from religious experience.

(*b*) The argument which tries to maintain that God may be known to be holy through a *revelation*, cannot in fact do this apart from the argument from religious experience. For even supposing that I previously believe in a "metaphysical" God, and that the prophet through whom the revelation comes appears with unimpeachable testimonials of his commission by such a deity, then he may indeed teach me that God is holy in the sense that he may teach me to use the *word* "holy" when I speak of God. But if holiness is the kind of property which we have referred to above, how can he teach me to *understand* that God is holy except by either directing my attention to religious experience and pointing out what is therein cognized, or making me recognize the distinctive characteristic of holiness in his own message? In either case the appeal is ultimately to religious experience.

3. Two remarks may here be made about the property of holiness:

(*a*) It is, as we have previously remarked, a *value*-characteristic. This mode of expression may, however, seem objectionable, and its objectionableness points to a difference between the way in which this value is ascribed to God and the way in which other forms of value are ascribed to other objects. The objectionableness arises, I think, because with the notion of a "value-characteristic" we normally associate the notion of "passing a value-judgment on" an object, and this suggests that we adopt towards the object the attitude of "sitting in judgment on" it and testing it by some standard which we have grasped and understood. And this, clearly, is what we can never do in the case of God; when we assert that God is holy

we are certainly not passing a value-judgment on God in this sense. It would be better, indeed, instead of speaking of passing a value-judgment on God, to speak of the *recognition of a worth* possessed by God; a worth, moreover, which, while we can recognize it *as* a worth, we can never measure or fully grasp. (It is just this conjunction of the ability to recognize God as possessing this worth or value, and the inability to measure it by any standard we can understand, which seems to be the source of religious awe.) Yet that holiness *is* a value-characteristic we must maintain and emphasize.

(*b*) Not only so, but, if the testimony of religious experience is to be accepted, then holiness must be regarded as the *highest* of all values. It need not necessarily be held that *any* object which possesses the property of holiness is more valuable than any other object which possesses any other kind of value-characteristic; but it must at least be held that if there exists a God who is holy, then in virtue of *his* holiness he possesses a very much higher degree of value than anything else whatsoever. It may be objected that God cannot be compared in this way with other things; but, e.g., all mystics are agreed that their experience of God makes them rank everything but God as trivial in comparison with him; and this does presuppose the possibility that a comparison can be made.

4. Suppose, then, that it is admitted that there is a God who possesses this attribute of holiness which is completely *sui generis* and not to be analysed in ethical terms, and that in virtue of his possession of it he is supremely good, then two questions arise: (*a*) How can this fact give rise to an "ought" for me? and (*b*) What is it that I ought in this sense to do? The former of these questions is philosophically the more important, and with it we are at the heart of the problem.

5. How does the holiness of God give rise to an "ought"? First of all let us be quite clear that it *is* the *holiness* of God which gives rise to the obligation. And this can be seen by thinking of a deity who was, say, the omniscient first cause of the world, but not holy; I think it is clear that from the existence of such a God no obligation would follow. And if in addition God is conceived of as a *person* who is *morally* good, then at most (*a*) there is introduced into the world of our relationships one more person, towards whom we may have duties in the same sense and of the same kind as we have towards our fellow-men even if there is no God; and (*b*) God's will (if we can know it) may be a *guide* to what is morally right, but the obligation does not derive from him. If, however, God is *holy*, and actions are not merely right and wrong, but sinful and the reverse of sinful, then it seems possible to maintain that the will of God is not a mere guide to what, quite independently of him, is in itself sinful; but rather that on the other hand it is the relation of the

actions to the holy God which makes them sinful or the reverse, and which is the source of the obligation to avoid the former type and to do the latter.

But this does not answer our present question, viz. *How* does this holiness, this supreme worth, of God give rise to the *obligation*? And to this question I do not see how any *ultimate* answer can be given. For if the proposition that the holiness of God gives rise to an obligation is true, then it is *necessarily* true; and equally certainly it is a *synthetic* proposition—for let God be as holy as he may, let him announce his will however clearly, add, if you will, that if I do not obey him I shall suffer eternally, yet none of this is *equivalent* to my being under an obligation to do anything. Now how such a synthetic necessary proposition can be conclusively proved I do not see. For it cannot be proved by analysis of its terms, since it is synthetic; nor by any kind of induction, since it is necessary; while an attempt to deduce it from some such proposition as that the existence of value is in general a source of obligation merely moves the problem one stage back, since this proposition, if true, is itself synthetic and necessary. One resource remains, not indeed to give an ultimate proof of, but to give plausibility to the contention in question, and that is to try to show that the derivation of religious obligation from the holiness of God proceeds on the same principles as the derivation of other forms of obligation from *their* grounds, and urge that they therefore all stand or fall together.

Consider first "aesthetic obligation." I am aware that this is an unfamiliar term, but to me it seems clear that I have a duty to act in a certain way with respect to works of art which I recognize as aesthetically valuable;[1] a duty which may be roughly indicated by saying that I ought to "respect" them (e.g. I ought to adopt a certain mental attitude towards them when I am in their presence, I ought not wilfully to destroy or deface them, etc.). And if I were asked what was the ground of this obligation, I should reply that it was simply the aesthetic value of the object; this aesthetic value which it possesses puts a certain claim on my behaviour. But this proposition also is synthetic; the possession of aesthetic value by the object is by no means identical with, nor does it contain as part of its analysis, my being under an obligation to respect it; and *how* the one gives rise to the other seems to me ultimately an unanswerable question

[1] I use the term "aesthetically valuable" rather than "beautiful," because, while "beautiful" is admittedly often used simply to mean aesthetically good, it is also often used to refer to a quality which is not identical with aesthetic value simply; a quality which, e.g. a Botticelli Madonna possesses to a markedly greater degree than El Greco's "Laocoon," though this fact does not mean that the former is aesthetically better than the latter. Neglect of this ambiguity seems to me to be a common source of confusion in discussions of aesthetic questions.

(unless we simply say, as before, that value is the kind of thing which does give rise to an obligation, which is no answer at all).

There is a similar situation in the case of moral obligation. Suppose it is admitted that the fact that I have made a promise imposes on me an obligation to fulfil that promise; still this does not explain *how* from the past fact the present obligation arises. Once again, if we are to hold that the making of a promise imposes an obligation, we have either to accept this as an ultimate synthetic necessary proposition which can be *seen* to be true, or else derive it from some more ultimate proposition which is itself synthetic and necessary. (It seems to me, incidentally, that an examination of this relation between the grounds of an obligation and the obligation itself is as important a task as any which ethics has to perform.) In the case of morality, however, this more ultimate proposition cannot be altogether parallel with the more ultimate proposition I suggested in the case of aesthetics; we cannot, i.e. say that our moral duties to X derive directly from the moral goodness of X, since this would entail holding that we have no duties to people who are not morally good, and this does not appear to be the case. Whether the source of moral obligation is still some value-fact, though the relation between them is more indirect, I shall not here inquire.

If the foregoing account is accepted, and if we are prepared to accept these synthetic necessary propositions in the spheres of aesthetics and ethics, then we can have no reason *a priori* to reject them in the theological sphere. The proposition that the existence of a holy God imposes a claim on me appears to be no different in form from, and to offer no more difficulties than, the proposition that the existence of an aesthetically valuable work of art imposes a claim on me, or the proposition that my having made a promise imposes a claim on me.

We may note here that in one way the religious obligation is more nearly allied to the aesthetic than to the moral one—in that it is grounded directly in the value of the object towards which the obligation lies; whereas in moral obligation, as I have previously remarked, it will not do to say that I have duties to good men but not to bad ones. But two important qualifications are necessary: (*a*) While the modes of derivation of aesthetic and religious obligation are similar (viz. from the value of an object to an obligation towards that object), the values in each case, however, are strikingly disparate. Holiness is immensely superior to aesthetic value; and it would at least usually be held that *moral* value approached more nearly to holiness in point of sheer value than aesthetic value did. (*b*) Whereas aesthetic claims seem to be merely claims on *some* of my actions, on *some* of my attitudes, for *some* of my time, and only on a limited aspect of my mind or personality, theological claims

would usually be held to be claims on my whole self, on all of my actions and for all of the time that I exist.

6. Suppose it is accepted that the existence of a holy God is connected necessarily though synthetically with an obligation resting on me. Can we say anything about the content of that obligation, and about how it is connected with propositions such as "This action is sinful"? It seems to me that the most plausible line of argument is as follows:

(*a*) It may plausibly be contended that when an obligation towards a certain object is derived from the value of that object itself, then the claim which that object legitimately makes on us is a claim to our attention and respect *in proportion to the degree of value which that object possesses.* If, then, there is a God and he is holy and his being holy means that he possesses goodness to an immeasurably higher degree than any other object or person, then the claim which he legitimately makes on us in virtue of that holiness is, according to the above-mentioned principle, it may be contended, a complete and all-embracing claim to that which at a lower level we are content to call our "respect," but which at this level we can more appropriately call our "devotion" or "love." In this way, it may be argued, we can establish what may be called the *basic religious obligation*, viz. the obligation to love God.

(*b*) If we add the further theological premise that all men have been created by God and have a certain divine element in them, then it may be argued that if we love our fellow-men because of this divine element in them and because of their relation to God, then in so doing we are actually expressing our love towards God. In this way it might be held that a further religious obligation (to love our fellow-men) may be established by *derivation* from the basic religious obligation to love God.

(*c*) It is usually said by theologians that our religious obligation is to do the will of God; and we may inquire how this conception of the will of God fits into the scheme we have been describing. It seems to me that the following approach is the best. To say simply that X is the will of God is not in itself equivalent to, nor does it in itself appear to entail, that I ought to do X. It may, however, be argued that I cannot be said to love God in the full sense in which I ought to love him, unless I in fact do his will; and this means that we derive the obligation to do the will of God from the basic religious obligation to love God, which in turn we have derived, as previously indicated, from the holiness of God.

We may further ask how we know what *is* the will of God. And there appear to be two possible methods of determining this:

(i) By *revelation.* It is noteworthy that most of the "higher religions" have in fact proclaimed some specific "revelation of God

to man," and have contended that one purpose of this revelation is to teach men what the will of God is.[1] Now provided that sufficient evidence is adduced to convince us that the revelation in question is a genuine one, this method of determining the content of the will of God appears to be a perfectly valid one; for in that case the prophet through whom the revelation is made is merely reporting to us a fact which he is specially qualified to know; and to this procedure (the acceptance of "expert testimony") there is no objection in principle.

(ii) By arguing that whatever is a fulfilment of the basic religious obligation to love God or (if we accept the argument in (*b*) above) the derived religious obligation to love our fellow-men, must be in accordance with the will of God.

(*d*) To what do the predicates of religious approbation and disapprobation (sinful and its opposite) apply? Conformably with all that has been said up to now, it might be held that a sinful action could be defined either as an action which is not in accordance with the will of God, or as an action done from some motive opposed to the motive of love towards God. I think, however, that a religious man would consider either of these definitions an unsatisfactory account of the nature of sinfulness, since they contain an inadequate recognition of the extent of the claims which the supremeness of the goodness of God makes. For they appear to limit these claims either to the doing of certain actions or to acting from a certain motive; and, it would be argued, these claims are really that we should be a certain kind of person; they are claims, that is, not only on certain aspects of our selves and our activities, but on our *whole* selves. To love God fully, it will be said, to give him the complete devotion which is his due, is a matter not merely of feeling certain emotions towards him or of doing certain actions, but of being a certain kind of person, a kind of person from whom such emotions and such actions will naturally flow. The predicates of religious approbation and disapprobation, therefore, will be held to apply *primarily* to *selves;* and this is why theological accounts of sin abound in metaphors such as "stain" and "defilement." In so far as a man's self or character fails to come up to the standard which is set by the conception of devotion to or love towards God, to that extent *he* may be said to be a sinful person. Derivatively, indeed, certain actions may themselves be said to be sinful, but these will be held to be those which are *motivated* by some sinful element in the agent's character. The complete derivation of a proposition of the form "Action X is sinful," therefore, will be, on this account, from the holiness of God to an obligation to become a certain kind of person,

[1] I am aware that orthodox Christianity does not hold that this is the *main* purpose of the Christian revelation.

a person whose nature is defined by reference to the conceptions of devotion to God and readiness to do his will; from this to the conception of a sinful person, and a sinful element in a person's character; and thence finally to the obligation not to do the acts prompted by the sinful elements in one's character.

This more complicated derivation has two merits: (i) It does greater justice to the all-embracing nature of the divine claims, which seems to be implied in the testimony of religious experience to the supremeness of the worth of God. (ii) It explains the consistency of the occurrence in religious literature of the notion of sin as a stain on or a defilement of the soul, and the frequent expression of the religious experience known as the "conviction of sin" by such words as "I am a sinful *man*," rather than "I have done sinful actions."

II. *The Mixed form of the Argument*

This form of the argument (*a*) accepts certain ethical premises; (*b*) holds that the conception of holiness contains certain moral elements; (*c*) holds that the analysis of the predicates of religious approbation and disapprobation is partly in ethical terms.

A great deal of what I have said in discussing the Pure form of the argument will also be relevant here, and I shall therefore deal with the present form more briefly.

1. Let it be supposed that the truth of certain moral propositions can be known and their meaning understood independently of theology. It does not matter on what precise grounds they are held to be known. These moral propositions will state, e.g., that certain actions are morally right or wrong, and these predicates will be understood to bear an exclusively *secular*, non-theological meaning; let it be supposed, e.g., that when I say that an action is right I am affirming that it possesses some property in virtue of its relation to the system of human relationships in which we stand to our fellowmen.

2. For this argument, no less than for the Pure form, we shall require the premise that there exists a God who is holy. It will not be sufficient to know that God is *morally good*; for the obligation which I owe to any moral being, *qua* moral, however good in the moral sense he may be, appears to be the same in *kind* as that which I owe to any other moral being; the argument, in that case, therefore, would merely enable us to add to the actions already recognized as morally right a further class of actions which are right in precisely the same sense—and the argument wishes to do more than that.

The Mixed form of the argument, therefore, must also maintain that God is holy; but it maintains that the recognition of God as holy contains as one of its elements the recognition of him as morally

good, though it also includes more than that, viz. the recognition that he also possesses a non-moral, distinctively *religious*, value-characteristic.

How is the existence of such a God to be established? The "moral argument" is not automatically excluded in this context, as it was in the case of the Pure form of the theory; but if the moral argument establishes the existence merely of a morally good God, it does not seem to be *sufficient*. We should therefore require either a combination of the moral argument and the argument from religious experience; or else the argument from religious experience alone, provided that it is held that one element in religious experience is a cognition of the moral worth of God.

Remark 2(*a*) (p. 13), on the Pure form of the argument, may be taken, *mutatis mutandis*, also to apply here.

3. If it be held that there is a God who possesses this property of holiness which is a complex property containing both the element of moral goodness and the element of non-moral, exclusively *religious*, goodness, then, as in the case of the Pure form, and for the same reasons, it may be argued:

(*a*) That in virtue of his holiness (though differently conceived in this case) God is supremely good.

(*b*) That this holiness of God gives rise to an obligation for us.

(*c*) That the basic religious obligation is to love or have devotion towards God, this love or devotion being understood in terms of "being a certain kind of person," and the conceptions of a sinful person, a sinful element in a person's character, and a sinful action being derived as before.

(*d*) That the expression in practical activity of this love towards God is doing the will of God.

In this case, however (the Mixed argument), the religious obligation which I owe to God is held to arise *both* from the fact that God is a moral being *and* from his possession of non-moral religious goodness; if I omit either of these, it will be said, I am left without the distinctive character which religious obligation possesses.

4. Let us now try to combine the "purely moral" conception with which we started (remark 1, p. 19) and the conception of religious duty to God at which we have more lately arrived. Let us begin with the former, and see what happens to it when we add the latter to it. The first thing which happens may be described as a "widening of our ethical perspective," i.e. an extension of the system of relationships within which our duties lie; for we now conceive of the system of human relationships with which we started as merely one element in a wider system of relationships which contains as its most important member, not our fellow-men, but God. And secondly, concurrently with this widening, even the sphere

within which our purely secular duties were found becomes, if I may so express it, "theologized." And this happens in the following way. I recognize as my primary religious obligation the obligation to love God, and this, as we have seen, involves doing the will of God. What is the content of the will of God? The Mixed form of the argument enables us to argue thus: God is morally good, and therefore among the things which he wills are those things which are morally right (though their being morally right does not depend on their being God's will). I can therefore now see those actions which I began by regarding merely as morally right, as actions by doing which I can fulfil the will of God. And this is to regard them in quite a new light; for it means that their performance is regarded not merely as the discharging of a secular duty, but as the fulfilling of the religious obligation to love God; and it carries the consequence that their non-performance is not merely morally wrong but *sinful*, since if I recognize that any action is the will of God then that in me which urges me not to do it must be a sinful element in my character.

5. It is not likely that it would be maintained, however, that our *only* religious duties are to do the actions which we can recognize independently to be morally right. To love God, or to do the will of God, seems clearly to involve doing more than this—e.g. performing acts of religious devotion, in the ordinary sense of the term. And such actions would, on the view we are considering, be held to be obligatory in precisely the same way as the actions which can be recognized as right independently of theology; in particular, they would not be regarded as less stringently binding because the obligation to do them cannot be derived from secular morality. And this is because this view regards the whole system of human and divine relationships as indivisibly *one*, and therefore all relationships within that system as involving a relation to God, and all obligations as being religious obligations. The difference between the two classes of actions is merely that if we regard the world of merely human relationships as the *whole* world, there remains a valid obligation to do the actions which belong to the one class, but no obligation to do those which belong to the other; but this, the present view maintains, is a *wrong* way in which to regard the world.

Defence of these arguments against the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics (see p. 5)

1. Each form of the argument (Pure and Mixed) yields as its conclusion a system of propositions about human beings and their conduct; these propositions, moreover, are *normative*, in that they are genuine value and obligation-propositions. They are to be

distinguished, however, from the ordinary, commonly accepted "moral judgments," in two ways:

(*a*) Their predicates are not the ordinary moral predicates (morally good, morally right, etc.) but predicates which can be understood only in (at least partly) theological terms. According to the arguments we have outlined, therefore, even if the same action is held to be, e.g., both morally wrong and sinful, yet to say that it is sinful is to say something different from, or at least something more than to say that it is morally wrong.

(*b*) The *extension* of the terms of religious approbation and disapprobation is not identical with that of the terms of *moral* approbation and disapprobation respectively. For in particular there is a class of actions (viz. those concerned with the discharge of our "religious duties" in the ordinary sense) to which neither praise nor blame is due from the purely moral point of view (i.e., if no theological considerations are taken into account in deciding whether they ought to be done or not), yet which may certainly be regarded as sinful or the reverse. And at least in the case of the Pure form of the argument (and perhaps in the Mixed also) there is likely to be a considerable revisal, or even reversal, of the approbation or disapprobation which would normally be bestowed on actions on moral grounds alone, when the transition is made to a theological point of view.

Now whether we call such a system of propositions an *ethical* (or moral) system or not seems to me very much a matter of terminology. If we restrict the term "ethical" so that it refers only to propositions whose predicates are the ordinary moral predicates, then clearly we shall *not* call this an "ethical" system. But if we use the term to cover all propositions which state a valid obligation of whatever form, and based on whatever type of ground, and all genuinely normative value-propositions, then we *shall* call it an ethical system.

2. My purpose here, however, is not to determine which is the more appropriate use of the term "ethical," but to try to show that the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics is not a valid cricitism of the theories I have recently been examining. It *would* be a valid criticism if the conclusions which these theories attempted to establish were simply the normally accepted system of moral judgments whose predicates were the ordinary moral predicates. But in fact, as I have just pointed out, this is not the form which their conclusions take.

Let us examine the two branches of the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics. The first argues that if the premises of an argument are not ethical, the conclusions cannot be ethical either. But what the Pure form of our argument sets out to show is that from certain value-propositions there may be derived certain norma-

tive propositions about conduct; and it claims (*a*) that these value-propositions do not require any *moral* intuition or the presupposition of any *moral* judgments in order to be known, but that they can be known through the recognition in religious experience of a distinctive kind of value; and (*b*) that the normative propositions which figure as its conclusions are not *moral* propositions in the ordinary sense, in that their predicates are to be analysed in theological and not in moral terms.

The second branch of the argument from the Autonomy of Ethics urges that if any of the premises are ethical and the conclusions are also ethical, the argument is circular. Now the Mixed form of our argument does admittedly employ ethical premises. But its conclusions are not simply moral judgments in the ordinary sense; they are not, therefore, themselves presupposed in the premises, and so the charge of circularity may be met. The conclusions are in fact what we might call theologico-ethical propositions, since their predicates are held to be analysable partly in moral and partly in religious terms; and for the establishment of such propositions it is entirely reasonable that both ethical and theological propositions should occur among the premises.

Conclusion: Limitations of the foregoing discussion

Apart from its sketchiness at many points, my argument has had certain definite limitations in its scope, which, since they could not be remedied except by elaborate independent discussion of the points at issue, I shall do no more than merely indicate in conclusion. It is, however, on the outcome of such further discussions that final judgment on the contentions that I have dealt with must rest.

1. The first and most important limitation is indicated in my title. My discussion has dealt solely with the arguments *from* theology. But clearly in order that either of the two chief views with which I have dealt should be completely established, the arguments *for* their theological premises would have to be examined in detail. In particular, the argument from religious experience would have to be inspected thoroughly, both as to its general validity, and as to the precise nature of the content of religious experience. And on this latter point, in particular, the issue of whether the Pure or the Mixed form of the argument is to be preferred will very largely turn. I merely remark here that an argument from religious experience need not (and I think should not) be an argument merely from *my* religious experience. I have a perfect right to take into account the experience of others, provided that they can convey the nature of that experience to me; and this means that much of the most important data for such an argument will be drawn from the writings

of those mystics (*a*) whose religious experience bears evidence of "genuineness," and (*b*) who have brought a careful and critical analysis to bear on their experience.[1]

2. If the Mixed form of the argument is held, clearly some further account must be given, if the argument is to be complete, of how the moral premises which it employs, and which it holds to be valid independently of theology, can themselves be established. This is again a subject for an independent inquiry.

3. The whole question of the synthetic necessary connection between the ground of an obligation and the obligation itself, and especially the synthetic necessary connection between *value*-propositions and obligation-propositions, requires to be dealt with much more thoroughly. That such a synthetic necessary connection exists I have little doubt; but *how* it is to be established I do not see. I content myself here with the following comment: There appear to be four possibilities with regard to this question. Either (*a*) no such connexion is possible, in which case I do not think that *any* kind of obligation, moral or otherwise, can be established; or (*b*) that such a connexion exists can simply be immediately seen to be the case, in which event I see no more difficulty in accepting a relation of this nature in the theological than in the moral sphere; or (*c*) some ultimate justification of some general proposition connecting value with obligation is (contrary to the suggestion in the body of this discussion) possible; and if such a proposition is quite general it will apply in the theological just as much as in the ethical sphere; or (*d*) it may be found that it is possible to demonstrate such a connexion, but also to prove that it holds only in the ethical and not in other spheres (e.g. by pointing out some relevant difference between these spheres). Only in the case of (*a*) or (*d*) would the arguments we have chiefly considered be invalidated.

[1] I do not mean by this to suggest that a philosopher who is using a mystic's experience in order to construct an argument from religious experience to the existence of God must necessarily accept the mystic's own interpretation of his experience as valid; but the more careful and critical the mystic's account of his experience is, the better position will the philosopher be in to grasp the nature of that experience and to assess what value it may possess for the construction of such an argument.

IS PHILOSOPHY POSSIBLE?

A Study of Logical Positivism[1]

PROFESSOR WINSTON H. F. BARNES

§ 1

THE present situation in philosophy is paradoxical. On the one hand, thinking men and women all over the world are exclaiming that, while science has made sufficient advance to satisfy all our material needs, what we most need, and must find if we are not to suffer shipwreck, is a new sense of values, a new religious awakening and a new orientation towards life, in short a new philosophy. On the other hand, many professional philosophers are coming to hold the view that philosophy has had its day, or rather that it never in any proper sense had its day, because it is not a rational enterprise but a mistake, an illusion, a farrago of nonsense, "a muddle arising out of the complexities of language." A new inquiry which goes by the name of Analysis and resembles logic more closely than any other existing discipline is at once to give the quietus to philosophy and to reign in its stead. The modern philosopher cries, with Faustus, "Sweet Analytickes! 'tis thou hast ravished me." I will not prejudice your minds at the outset by recalling where the study of analysis led the Doctor of Wurtemburg.

Those who are thus forthrightly sceptical about philosophy and group themselves under the ægis of analysis are themselves divided into a number of sects. One and all, however, are relentless in exposing the weaknesses of philosophy, zealous in proselytizing and deadly in expounding their new technique which combines scholastic subtlety with modern scientific realism. They represent in fact a modern scholasticism loosely grouped round the dogma: "We pursue logical analysis, but not philosophy," though, by a curious paradox which demands scrutiny, some of them say: "Philosophy *is* analysis."

To examine the claim of analysis to have exploded the pretensions of philosophy seems to be incumbent upon a philosopher once at least in his lifetime. In doing so it will be well to avoid supposing the question to be as simple as both sides in the controversy have sometimes made it out to be. I may add that, like a true philosopher, I am not in any fear that the question will appear simple to you by the time I have finished speaking. I have hopes however that it will be

[1] An Inaugural Lecture delivered on April 30th, 1946, under the title "Scepticism and Analysis," from the Chair of Philosophy in the Durham Division of the University of Durham.

clear. Scepticism about philosophy is no new thing, as we shall see, and there is much to ponder in Hazlitt's remark that

> metaphysical truth has fared like the milk-white hind,
> the emblem of pure faith, in Dryden, which
> Has oft been chased
> With Scythian shafts and many winged wounds
> Aimed at her heart, was often forced to fly,
> And doomed to death, though fated not to die.[1]

Metaphysics is the heart of philosophy, its most vital and sensitive organ. If the heart can resist attack, how much more the other organs? Attempts have been made in the past to destroy philosophy by anthropology, by psychology and by many other types of crude and undigested science which I forbear to mention. Analysis is not even the first attempt to destroy it by the study of language. Horne Tooke, who tried everything else, tried also to dispose of metaphysics by etymology, a procedure which a contemporary metaphysician characterized as "this farcical mummery."[2] There is, one must admit, a touch of the absurd in the idea that the study of language is going to put an end to people asking philosophical questions. Nevertheless, we are not entitled to *assume* that the undertaking is absurd without producing proof. It will not suffice to appeal, as some "defenders of the faith" have done, to the centuries of philosophizing from Plato to Whitehead, to the great European tradition, to the *philosophia perennis*, to the natural metaphysic of the human mind. The argument from tradition is of all arguments the weakest. Even great traditions have their closes. Nor would it be proper to dwell, as I am tempted, on the delights of philosophy,

> Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose
> But musical as is Apollo's lute,

though it does indeed afford endless delights to those who pursue it: or to stress how the mere setting one's mind to meditate on such subjects as God, freedom and immortality is, to use Plato's expression, a "periagoge," a turning of the spirit away from the *trivia* of everyday life to more enduring realities. If philosophy is not the rational enterprise it claims to be, its tradition is hollow, its delights are illusory, and its liberating influence an escape into a realm of fantasy. If it is rational, all these other virtues will be added to it.

§ 2

Before examing the claims of analysis let us cast an eye over the causes of scepticism about philosophy. A man may distrust the scope

[1] Hazlitt: *Collected Works* (ed. Howe), Vol. II, pp. 283–4.

[2] Again Hazlitt, who regarded himself to the end of his days as primarily a metaphysician.

and orbit of philosophy because he feels poignantly the insignificance of man in the universe, a state of mind reflected in the lines by a modern poet:

> We pieced our thoughts into philosophy,
> And planned to bring the world under a rule,
> Who are but weasels fighting in a hole.

Or the scepticism may spring from incredulity when confronted with the philosophers' conclusions, as in the gentle irony of this eighteenth-century undergraduate, later to be famous as a poet:

> The Term is now begun again, & I have made such a wonderful progress in Philosophy, that I begin to be quite persuaded that black is white, & that fire will not burn, and that I ought not, either to give credit to my eyes or feeling; they tell me too, that I am nothing in the world, and that I only fancy I exist: do but come to me quickly & one lesson of thine, my dear Philosopher, will restore me to my Senses.

Or again, consider this description of philosophy by an Elizabethan poet:

> A *Science* never scientificall,
> A *Rhapsody* of questions controverted;
> In which because men know no truth at all
> To every purpose it may be converted:
> Iudge then what grounds this can to others give,
> That waved ever in it selfe doth live?

These are poets speaking. We cannot demand that they justify their scepticism before the bar of reason. Yet reasons are implicit in what each says. The modern poet implies that there are limits set to what man can know by the subordinate position he occupies in the universe. The philosopher Kant gave reasons, when he attacked metaphysics, for what the poet Yeats feels instinctively to be true. The eighteenth-century poet rejects philosophy because, tested by common sense, it is obviously false. Thomas Gray (for it is he writing as an undergraduate to Horace Walpole) would, had he lived to-day, have found a kindred spirit in Professor Moore, whose philosophy consists very largely in defending the beliefs of common sense against the attempts of other philosophers to impugn them. The Elizabethan poet does give his reasons for distrusting philosophy and very good reasons they are: it is unscientific, and philosophers themselves cannot agree about the conclusions.

Fulke Greville has always been regarded as a philosophical poet or, if you prefer it, a poetic philosopher. It forces itself upon one's attention that the moment scepticism about philosophy becomes explicit and states its reasons it becomes itself philosophy. This fact, "the paradox of scepticism," is peculiar to philosophy. Reasoned scepticism about science or theology does not involve one in holding doctrines that could themselves be properly described as scientific

or theological. This conclusion is confirmed if we turn from the poets to the thinkers.

The sceptics of the ancient world were men who denied the possibility of knowledge altogether, thus making it as impossible for a man to know that he has two hands as to know that his soul is immortal. So obviously repugnant is this scepticism to common sense that it was regarded in its day, and has ever since been regarded, not as a denial of philosophy but as itself an extreme philosophical doctrine. In the Middle Ages scholastic scepticism asserted that truths concerning the destiny of the soul, the nature of God, and the freedom of the will were revealed to faith but could not be established by reason. Clearly, however, to say to reason "Thus far, and no farther, shalt thou go" is to hold positive philosophical doctrine. In the modern world, when the empirical method of natural science had firmly established itself, the sceptic Hume implied that there could be no such thing as philosophy, because there are only two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of matter of fact and knowledge of mathematics (in which no doubt he would have included logic had he lived two centuries later and seen the unification of mathematics and logic in the work of Whitehead and Russell). His words are famous:

> If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[1]

The books of divinity and school metaphysics are still with us: and Hume is accounted one of the great philosophers. So hard is it to evade the paradox of scepticism! In principle the scepticism of Hume failed because the account of the world that he gave made it consist of nothing more than the individual's sensations, supplemented by imagination; and this account makes not only philosophy impossible but also natural science and everyday knowledge.

To this talk of a "paradox of scepticism" it may be objected that, when thinkers who deny philosophy are called philosophers, the word is used merely because philosophers and sceptics alike are in relation to philosophy, the one by practising it, the other by not practising it and by further saying that it cannot be practised. It would be a very odd use of the word if this were so. Nevertheless we should have to consider it possible if any parallel could be quoted. I cannot think of any parallel. We should not call Henry Ford a historian, even if he had given reasons for his assertion that "History is Bunk." But perhaps the summary answer to this objection is "Read the books of the great sceptics: if what you read there is not philosophy, what is

[1] Hume: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section XII, Part III.

it?" Now, of course, the modern sceptics have a reply to this challenge, namely, "Analysis." They would say, I think, that the sceptics of the past, in particular Hume, whom they regard with great reverence, have been analysts, and that they have, as it were, slipped into philosophizing because they were not as careful and thorough about analysis as they ought to have been and lacked the modern logical technique. They would go further, I think, and say that all the great philosophers, except perhaps Hegel whom they despise as much as they reverence Hume, have to some extent been analysts.

Their position is not simple, but it is quite reasonable and might be put in this way: "If you pursue analysis properly you will not be discovering anything you did not know before, but you will be finding out the meaning of certain things you already know: and as a matter of fact traditional philosophers have pursued this kind of analysis, but they have made the mistake of thinking that they were making discoveries by it, and also have mixed their analysis up with attempts to answer questions to which there is no answer." Traditional philosophy then is a blend of two elements. According to which is selected for attention the analyst will say either (*a*) "Analysis is not philosophy, or (*b*) "Analysis is philosophy." If he has approached the problems through mathematics and logic, he is likely to say the former; if he holds a Chair of Philosophy, he may find it much more politic to say the latter. Both statements are right, because once we grasp what they are driving at we see that they say the same thing. Now these two statements, assuming them to be made in the same language, contradict one another and therefore cannot both be true. But they are both true. Therefore they cannot be in the same language. In fact, of course, they are not, because the word philosophy does not mean the same thing in the two statements. If we want to answer the question "Is philosophy possible?" we have got to invent two new words to do the work of the one: and say (*a*) "Speculation"—or whatever you like to call it—"is not possible"; (*b*) "Analysis is possible."

I think you will agree with me that this is a good piece of reasoning, and, as I cannot remember having seen it in any analytical philosopher I hereby make a present of it to any one who cares to use it. On second thoughts, however, I think it may well be a recollection from one of them. For

> Who that shall point as with a wand and say
> "This portion of the river of my mind
> Came from yon fountain?"

However that be, I have used this argument not merely to expound to you the philosophy of analysis, but to illustrate it. For this

argument is itself an example of a type of argument much used by the analytical philosophers.

Good as the argument is, there are two points to be considered. Firstly, everything hangs on the validity of the distinction between the two kinds of philosophy, the analytic and the speculative or non-analytic. If it turned out that these were not two different activities, the argument would fall to the ground. Secondly, granting that there is analysis which is possible, and some other philosophical activity—call it speculation—which is not, can the analytical philosopher demonstrate that speculation is not possible without using that method which he has stigmatized as speculation? If he cannot, he is still caught in the "paradox of scepticism."

§ 3

The philosophers of analysis are what William James called "tough-minded" philosophers. Where before in philosophy "all was conscience and tender heart," all is now gleaming intellect and logical acumen. They abound in logic, and yet are full of paradoxes. They profess clarity[1], but "write a language of their own that darkens knowledge." They lack natural piety in the face of the universe; they would "pluck out the heart of its mystery" and anatomize it. The theories of other philosophers are so much grist for their mill and they grind them in their analytical machinery until they are the pure bread of logic.

It would be a fascinating task to trace the influences which have gone to the development of this philosophical outlook; in particular, the sensationalism of Berkeley and Hume and the positivism of Comte and Karl Pearson. The final impetus, however, came from the growth of mathematical logic. Ever since Zeno's puzzle about Achilles and the tortoise the existence of infinitely large and infinitely small quantities had been a philosophical scandal. Matters were made much worse by the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus by Newton and Leibniz. Here were mathematicians reasoning about infinitely small quantities and getting the right answers. It was useless for Newton's contemporary, Berkeley, to say:

> Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.[2]

For there obviously was reasoning about infinitesimals. The problem was solved in the nineteenth century by the mathematician, Weier-

[1] "We strive for order and clarity, reject all dim vistas and fathomless depths." *Die Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung.* Der Wiener Kreis. (Vienna, 1929.)

[2] *Commonplace Book,* rechristened *Philosophical Commentaries,* ed. A. A. Luce, page 113, entry no. 354.

strass, who showed how the operations of the differential and integral calculus could be carried on without bringing in infinitesimals. Assertions about infinitesimals had been satisfactorily replaced by assertions about quantities of an unobjectionable kind. Suppose that this could be done for all the abstruse concepts of higher mathematics so that it could in principle all be translated into terms of simple arithmetic, involving only the whole numbers and the fundamental operations. This is the sort of thing that was being done in the philosophy of mathematics at the end of last century. At the same time logic was being developed in terms of concepts closely related to the basic arithmetical ideas. Fastening on the belief that the logical ideas were the really fundamental ones, Russell and Whitehead, in their great work *Principia Mathematica*, attempted the reduction of mathematics to logic.

Even if I were competent I could not here find time to expound the doctrines of mathematical logic. I am concerned only with their impact on the philosophy of analysis. I will give one trivial illustration of the kind of way in which a statement involving a mathematical notion can be reduced to, or analysed into, a statement involving only logical notions. Take the statement: "Not three people are to be saved." It contains the number 3, a mathematical notion. It can be analysed into the equivalent statement: "If x is to be saved, and also y is to be saved, and also z is to be saved, then x is identical with y, or x is identical with z, or y is identical with z." This is a statement in which the mathematical idea, 3, is replaced by the letters x, y, z, which are logical variables. The form of the new statement also has the advantage of showing what the original statement conceals that nothing is really said about anybody in particular.

"Metaphysics," said the American philosopher Charles Peirce, "is the ape of mathematics." This principle of mathematical logic was very soon transplanted into philosophy. It can best be described in non-technical language as the principle of "replacing dubious entities by indubitable ones." It calls for a little explanation. "The government" is a dubious entity, compared with the indubitable entities Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin; a nest-building instinct is a dubious entity compared with the actual building of nests by birds: in a sense, it may be said, a table is a dubious entity compared with the actual brown patch you see and the hardness you feel.

All the philosophers of analysis make use of this principle in one form or another. We can divide them into three main sects, in roughly chronological order, except that the earlier ones persist alongside the later ones. I propose to consider them in the chronological order; and I shall be surprised if it does not appear as we pass from one stage to another that, while we seem to be moving

farther away from traditional philosophy, we are in reality only making a wide circle in order to return to it enlarged and refreshed by our wanderings.

§ 4

First, the Cambridge analysts, Russell himself, Moore, Broad, Stebbing, did not reject speculative philosophy outright. They had their doubts about it and they left it alone, preferring analysis. Their position might be summarized thus: "Metaphysics, as traditionally pursued, has been the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality and its method has been deduction. As so envisaged the business of metaphysics is to 'justify' our common sense beliefs, i.e. to find reasons for our belief in a material world, in other people, etc.; or, if the reasons are not forthcoming, to substitute for these beliefs other beliefs for which reasons can be provided and to provide the reasons.[1] But metaphysics in this sense is a highly dubious undertaking. For we *know* by common sense or science that there is a material world and that there are other people, and that the world has existed for a great many years past, and this knowledge requires no further justification. On the other hand, neither common sense nor science tells us that there is a God or that we shall live again after we die, but it is, to say the least, exceedingly doubtful whether philosophy can tell us. What philosophy can do and had much better do is to tell us *what exactly we mean* when we say that there is a material world and that other people exist. This it can do by analysing the propositions in which these pieces of knowledge are expressed."

Let us glance first at the negative contention. It consists in railing off a certain area of fact from the philosopher on the ground that common sense has full rights of ownership. I will say nothing of the difficulties about determining which propositions are guaranteed by common sense and which are not, except to mention that Professor Moore's method is to ask himself whether he knows the proposition in question and, if he finds himself sure that he does, to accept it as stamped with the hall-mark of common sense: a habit we all have but not one regarded as specially philosophical. The first desideratum, it would seem, is to provide a rational criterion for determining whether a proposition is sterling common sense or "base speculation." Until this is done the negative contention of analysis is bottomed on a mere *ipse dixit* of the philosopher and has no more claim to be rationally debated than the poet Gray's laughter at philosophical parodoxes. This need was felt and supplied, as we shall see, by the successors of the Cambridge analysts.

[1] "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." F. H. Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, p. xiv.

Let us turn now to the positive contention, that the proper business of philosophy is not to investigate the truth or falsity of propositions but to analyse propositions already known to be true. The ideal method here would be to illustrate the different way in which a speculative and an analytical philosopher would deal with a particular philosophical problem. As this would take far too long I forego it and content myself reluctantly with a brief and abstract statement of the point at issue. Let the question be our knowledge of the material world, and let it be agreed by both philosophers that, if I am indeed now seeing my hand, there is no doubt that my hand exists. The traditional philosopher might raise doubts about the apparently indubitable statement "I am now seeing my hand," and he might conclude by asserting that it was false and that the truth was that "I see certain 'handy' sensations and believe that there is a material object in some relation to them." The analytical philosopher, accepting the truth of the assertion "I am now seeing my hand" as guaranteed by common sense, might nevertheless analyse this proposition into the proposition "I directly see certain 'handy' sensations and believe that there is a material core in some relation to them."

At this point, I think, one is much more likely to exclaim "Tweedledum and Tweedledee" than to express surprise at the revolutionary character of the analytical method in philosophy. There are two comments I want to make: Firstly, the reasoning of the traditional philosopher is not deductive, like the reasoning in mathematics, nor inductive, like the reasoning in the natural sciences: it is not deductive, because it does not by asserting its premiss come to assert a conclusion, but it asserts its conclusion by denying its apparent premiss: it is not inductive, because it makes no appeal to observation or experiment. How tempting then to say that it is not reasoning at all but is analysis of the language we use and does not lead to any new knowledge! Secondly, the analysis of the analytical philosopher, if regarded as the analysis of the proposition, is a fake. As actually performed the analysis proceeds not by examining the proposition but by examining the situation to which the proposition refers and then framing another proposition which more exactly describes the situation. If you ask someone who has made a statement "What do you really mean by that?" you are not asking him for something you imagine his words mysteriously to contain, as water contains hydrogen and oxygen, nor for a description of the mental confusion under which you suspect him to be labouring: what you want him to do is to look at the facts more carefully and make another attempt at describing them better. This is an important point and I can put the matter in another way by pointing out that there is a fatal ambiguity in the expression "finding out

what a proposition means." There is (*a*) finding out what *x meant* by the proposition *p* (where *x* may be someone else or myself at some previous moment): and (*b*) finding out what I mean by the proposition *p*. The former is a historical investigation, and is properly described as finding out the meaning. The latter is a philosophical investigation, and, as we shall see, is really finding out the facts. The failure in practice to separate these two things, which follows from the failure to distinguish them in theory, is what has made so many philosophers bad historians of philosophy.

If we return now to our two philosophers it is difficult not to feel that they are of the same mind and hold the same conclusion. Yet they differ in holding, one, that ordinary language is inconsistent with this conclusion, the other, that it is not only consistent but that that is what it says. I am strongly tempted to agree with both: and, since they contradict one another, there must be something wrong somewhere. Without going into detail I will suggest the solution. In philosophizing about this or any other problem we become aware of elements in a typical situation which common sense is not aware of, and for which consequently the language of common sense makes no provision. We are led thereby either to invent new words or to use existing words in new senses. If more than one analysis is under discussion still more words will be needed. However adequate from the point of view of ordinary usage an expression may be, it is vague relative to the different philosophical analyses which may be given of the situation to which it refers. It is quite plausible to maintain, therefore, that it is consistent with any one of these analyses, that is, of course, with the propositions in which these analyses are expressed. At the same time it may suggest one of the analyses rather than the others; not in the sense that we could have derived this analysis from studying the expression, but in the sense that, when confronted with the different analyses, we feel that the ordinary expression would be less strained if we decided to go on using it to cover the facts which that analysis claims to reveal than if we decided to use it for any of the other analyses. For example, another analysis of what is happening when I am seeing my hand is that I am not indeed seeing all my hand, and not indeed seeing all of the surface of my hand, but that I *am* actually seeing part of the surface. It is plausible to suppose that the expression "I am now seeing my hand" suggests this analysis more than the analysis that I am having sensations which are not actually part of my hand. The traditional philosopher, therefore, who rejects the assertion "I am now seeing my hand" is really rejecting it because it *suggests* misleading analyses, inconsistent with the analysis he accepts. The analytical philosopher, in accepting it, does so because it *asserts* nothing inconsistent with the analysis he accepts.

We may conclude our examination of the Cambridge analysts by noting that the analysis they practise is not the analysis they preach: and their practice is better than their preaching, since they practice real, not linguistic, analysis, analysis of fact, not of language. We may give provisional assent to the doctrine that so regarded analysis is philosophy, if not the whole of philosophy. But whereas the traditional philosophers pursued it, assuming without thinking that they were doing real and not linguistic analysis; and the Cambridge analysts pursued it thinking that they were pursuing linguistic and not real analysis; we must pursue it recognizing explicitly that it is real analysis involving as its consequence a linguistic refashioning of our ordinary language to express the new elements revealed, which renders it easily mistaken for linguistic analysis. Linguistic analysis does exist, as for example, when I say "'This is a sashmaray' means "This is a French lugger-rigged coasting vessel,"' but it involves merely equating expressions as they are used in ordinary language. It is the business of makers of dictionaries, not makers of philosophies. Finally, these analysts do not overcome the "paradox of scepticism," for they do not give reasons for thinking speculative philosophy to be impossible, they merely shy away from it. This cannot be said of the next group of philosophers we have to consider, who in all respects deserve the name which they have taken unto themselves, the Logical Positivists.

§ 5

The older positivists of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, Mach, Karl Pearson, were averse to metaphysics, and were interested chiefly in formulating the necessary conditions to which the universe must conform if natural science is to be possible. They ended up by maintaining that the universe consists entirely of sensations, a position which is "arrant metaphysics." The logical positivists, Carnap, Schlick and Neurath of Vienna, with followers in this country and the United States, approached the matter from the point of view of language, and asked the question: To what conditions must an assertion conform in order that it should make sense? They first distinguished between the propositions of mathematics and logic that can be true no matter what is the case, such as "$2 + 2 = 4$" and "Everything is what it is and not another thing," which they tended to regard as tautologies, though highly valuable and instructive ones, and propositions which are true or false according to the actual state of affairs. Concerning these latter propositions, which they called, and we may call, empirical, they formulated the now famous Principle of Verifiability, which may be stated as follows: "The meaning of any assertion consists in the observations that would verify it. If it could not be verified or falsified by any observa-

tions, it is nonsense." This is the translation into logic of the metaphysical principle that nothing exists except the data of sense. Whereas the traditional positivist would conclude that "I am seeing my hand" cannot be true since there are no such things as physical objects and a hand is a physical object, and the truth lies in the fact that I am having sensations of a "handy" character: the logical positivist would say that "I am seeing my hand" is perfectly true but needs to be analysed entirely into assertions about my actual and possible sensations. It begins surely to be clear that to every traditional theory about our knowledge of the external world there corresponds an analytical version. This is some confirmation of my contention that they are really saying the same thing. The hope that analysis is going to put an end to "the rhapsody of questions controverted" seems slight indeed! It is easy to see now why it cannot. The principle of analysis is that of replacing dubious entities by indubitable ones. Before we can apply this principle we must know what are the indubitable entities. By appealing to common sense, and following common sense, the Cambridge analysts accepted certain propositions as true and thereby committed themselves to accepting certain kinds of entities as indubitable, e.g. material things and other people's minds. We saw that common sense is an inadequate criterion. The significance of the principle of verifiability is that it lays down that the only indubitable entities are the data of the senses. On this view the Government is a dubious entity relative to Mr. Bevin, but Mr. Bevin himself is a dubious entity relative to the really indubitable entities, viz., what we actually see and hear of Mr. Bevin. The principle, therefore, seems to give us quite precise instructions on how to analyse. At the same time it holds out the fascinating prospect of enabling us to decide in quite a simple way whether any assertion we hear or read is sense or nonsense. I am afraid, however, that it is in no better case in this respect than the Cambridge analysis.

Let us see how it works. The assertion "There is a God" is rejected as nonsense, since no one supposes that it can be verified or falsified by any observations that could be made. The assertion "There is a desk in the next room" is accepted as sense because it can be analysed into assertions about observations that could be made to determine its truth or falsity; e.g. if I were to go into the next room, I should see a shiny brown expanse, and should feel sensations in my fingertips if I were to stretch out my hand. If we think we mean more than this, we are like the small boy who thinks that his £5 is somewhere in the stronghold of the bank, when in reality all that is meant by the statement that he has £5 in the bank is that, if he went into the bank he would see certain entries in ledgers and if he were to write a cheque for £5 it would be cashed. For the logical positivists the universe, like the banking system, exists on credit. We shall find,

I think, that certain statements we normally accept as true cannot be cashed on this theory.

Equivocation sets in with the account to be given of an assertion such as "There is some one in the next room." The logical positivist is compelled to say: "When I say there is some one in the next room, I mean there is a human body in the next room: and when I say there is a human body I mean that there are certain shapes to be seen, noises to be heard, and sensations to be felt by stretching out my hand." I am irresistibly reminded of that famous divine, Mr. Thwackum, in *Tom Jones:* "When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." The answer to this kind of talk is: "My good sir, that may be all you mean by it but it is not all that I and other people mean by it." The answer of the logical positivist to this objection would be: "In so far as you *think* you mean more than this, you resemble the man who says 'There is a God,' and you talk nonsense." Now it is to me a highly significant fact that a man who begins by saying that talk about God is nonsense should end up by saying that talk about other people is nonsense. It is confirmation from a most unexpected quarter of the not obvious but profoundly true fact that I no more see the grief that gnaws another man's heart than I see the eternal blessedness of the Almighty. It might be said: "No, but you do observe the tears, the look, the drooping shoulders, which evidence his grief." So be it. The question then is whether anything I observe is evidence for or against the existence of God: the claim that to assert the existence of God is meaningless has been given up. Let us make the smallest possible claim and say that there are certain feelings men have which incline them to belief in God. I do not see how anyone can deny this. Then these feelings stand in the same sort of evidential relation to the existence of God as the tears, the look, the drooping shoulders do to the existence of the man's grief. I do not say they are equally good evidence: I only say that they are evidence. The positivest may say: "What you mean by grief *is* the look, the tears, the drooping shoulders: and, if you really have these feelings you speak of, what you mean by God is simply these feelings. I don't have these feelings, so that it is nonsense for me to say that there is a God."

It is abundantly clear from all this that not even by combining the principle of analysis with the principle of verifiability can you scotch metaphysical statements such as "There is a God." The argument I have stated summarily really represents a change which took place in the mind of Carnap, the leading logical positivist, over twenty years. For the essence of the Principle of Tolerance, which Carnap has recently introduced, is that questions such as "Does God exist?" are not meaningless, but neither are they

questions of fact: they are questions as to the choice of language. We often say that Christian and atheist do not speak the same language: Carnap's principle of tolerance makes the statement literally true: for it amounts almost to saying that the answer to the question "Does God exist?" is "Yes, if you have the word 'God' in your language: no, if you do not."[1] I should not be in the least surprised if Carnap were to come out very shortly with a principle of preference, to the effect that some languages are to be preferred to others.

Let us return for a moment to the principle of verifiability as applied by the early logical positivists. It not only makes nonsense of metaphysical statements such as "There is a God": it makes nonsense equally of moral judgments such as "It is wrong to steal" and aesthetic judgments such as "Hamlet is a better play than Maria Marten in the Red Barn." Truly, their little finger is thicker than Hume's loin! For this is havoc indeed. Like Mr. Jourdain, who was surprised to find that he had been talking prose all his life, we are pardonably surprised to find that we have been talking nonsense.

The logical positivist mitigates the paradox by distinguishing between two uses of language, the scientific by which we talk sense and the emotive by which we talk nonsense. The nonsense is not useless. It serves to express our feelings and to change other people's feelings. On this view, an argument about morals or religion or literary merit is not a rational proceeding whereby A endeavours to change B's mind and vice versa: it is a homiletic proceeding whereby A endeavours to change B's heart and vice versa. I am far from believing that it is not this latter: but I do not admit that this excludes it being also the former. The disjunction "either scientific or emotive" springs from the wide-spread modern heresy that "the scientific is the rational and the rational is the scientific," which has produced a semi-paralysis in the sphere of conduct and an unprecedented timidity in the sphere of speculation.[2]

[1] Russell points this out in an article on Logical Positivism in the first number of a journal *Polemic*, page 11, and adds: "I agree that many questions have turned out to be linguistic although they were not formerly so regarded, but I think this is not so often true as many logical positivists suppose."

[2] The view is not new. "You masters of logic ought to know (logic is nothing more than a knowledge of *words*, as the Greek etymon implies) that all words are no more to be taken in a literal sense at all times than a promise given to a tailor. When I expressed an apprehension that you were mortally offended, I meant no more than by the application of a certain formula of efficacious words, which had *done* in similar cases before, to rouse a sense of decency in you, and a remembrance of what was due to me! You masters of logic should advert to this phenomenon in human speech, before you arraign the usage of us dramatic geniuses." Charles Lamb, in a letter to Thomas Manning, of February, 1801. *Letters of Charles and Mary Lamb*, ed. E. V. Lucas, 1935, Vol. I, page 249.

It is the principle of verifiability that is used to distinguish sense from nonsense. This gives rise to the following paradox. The principle itself is not, like the propositions in mathematics and logic, a tautology. It must therefore be an empirical proposition, and it will only be sense if it is itself verifiable. Yet is is clearly not verifiable. If it is not verifiable then the logical positivists are in the self-contradictory position of maintaining a principle which condemns itself as nonsense. I, in maintaining that the principle is false, thereby allow it to be sense, not nonsense, and commit myself to the view that there is at least one proposition which is not verifiable,[1] and yet is not nonsense.

I am grateful for this logical argument against the principle of verifiability, but even had it not been forthcoming I would have rested my case against it on the ground that it asks me to believe that Plato's *Republic*, St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*, St. Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are works compounded out of statements having no meaning, and not the reasoned wholes they set up to be. It is true that logical positivists try to mitigate the paradox, some by maintaining that sense keeps breaking in amongst the nonsense, others by maintaining that, like poetry—which, I need hardly say, is nonsense—these works are valuable as literature. These are desperate expedients. If philosophy is dead, to call it literature is simply to insult the corpse.

I confess that I was for a long time puzzled how to explain to myself why this characterization of so much of human endeavour as nonsense was feeble and misguided. Once perceived, however, the explanation is quite simple. Sense and nonsense constitute an opposition which, like the opposition, sanity and insanity, fall under the more generic opposition, rational and irrational. If a man is mad, you expect him to reveal a breakdown of reason. That was why Hamlet puzzled the court at Elsinore and continues to puzzle the critics. "If this is madness, there is method in it." If you read philosophy, believing it to be nonsense, you will be driven to say "If this is nonsense, there is method in it." If one studies the development of Greek philosophy, how the Socratic questioning unfolds itself in the idealism of Plato and is elaborated in the architectonic of the Aristotelian treatises: if one follows out the interpretation of the fundamental Christian ideas in Origen, Tertullian, Athanasius and St. Augustine: and if, finally, one sees how St. Thomas, in his

[1] It is important to remember that there is a wide and a narrow use of the term "verifiable." In the wide sense, in which it means "capable of being supported or weakened by evidence," the principle of verifiability is true and is itself verifiable: in the narrow sense which the logical positivists give to it, in which it means "having its whole meaning in data of the senses," it is not, and the paradox arises.

Summa Contra Gentiles, weaves into one complex but ordered structure the products of both movements: the impression throughout is not of the breakdown of reason but of its absolute and unquestioned sovereignty.

I would have been content to rest the case for pl losophy here, secure in the knowledge that the attempt of the logical positivists to condemn philosophical propositions is unsuccessful and ends up in contradiction, and that the great philosophical masterpieces proclaim aloud their rationality when confronted with the positivist challenge. Unfortunately, there is a third group of analysts whose doctrine offers a way out of these difficulties.

§ 6

Logical analysis, in these last philosophers, bears a considerable resemblance to psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis showed that in a great deal of madness, there *is* a great deal of method: that in many diseased states of mind, the mind does not so much break down as go off on a wrong track. The third group of analysts have been called Therapeutic Positivists.[1] For them philosophy is a disease, induced by linguistic cramp. The symptoms are being puzzled when all is clear, and asking for more ultimate explanations than any you get. The cure is: Analysis, performed under the guidance of a skilled analyst. Here then is a form of analysis which has good hopes of avoiding the paradox of scepticism. Its adherents can say: "I do not give you a criterion, a theory of what is sense and what is nonsense. I formulate no theories. But bring me a metaphysician and I will cure him." In practice, the therapeutic positivists depart considerably from this ideal. As well as treating patients for Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge, they write articles expounding their methods of treatment, in the course of which they resort to what looks suspiciously like argument. It is also a curious fact that their old patients are more intent on becoming therapists themselves than on simply enjoying life free from the perplexities of philosophy.

How could one test out the truth of this claim? It might seem that the most convincing test would be for a speculative philosopher, known to be suffering from tertiary metaphysics, to submit himself for treatment. However, I do not think that, even if this were done and the patient emerged "cured," i.e. having ceased to worry about philosophical problems, this would be other than very slight evidence in favour of the view. I say this because I see no reason why techniques should not be devised for curing people of a great many

[1] By Mr. B. A. Farrell in his articles "An Appraisal of Therapeutic Positivism" in Mind, Vol. LV (1946), pp. 25–48 and 133–150.

activities which are highly desirable and highly rational. The mere fact that one can be cured of an activity, i.e. can be changed from ardently pursuing that activity into lacking all interest in it, cannot throw any light upon the question whether the activity is a rational one.

It is unwise, therefore, of these analysts to stress too much the therapeutic character of their analysis. In fact their so-called therapy is quite different from that of the psycho-analyst. For not only is the *end* of the treatment the cure of a disease of reason, but the *method* of treatment consists in an appeal to the reason. If the patient is not as clever at logic as the analyst—or perhaps if he is cleverer—there is grave danger of his not being cured. The logico-therapist can quite legitimately turn round on his patient and say: "The reason you aren't cured is that you are too stupid." A medical man who said this would be struck off the register. If metaphysics were really a disease the simple cure was long ago discovered by Charles Lamb when he wrote to his friend Manning: "Nothing puzzles me more than time and space, and yet nothing puzzles me less, for I never think about them."[1]

I am afraid that this notion of analysis as a branch of medicine, though fascinating, is a red herring. If the therapeutic positivists prefer to argue their views with individuals one at a time rather than to a large audience, it is not because they are treating these people, it is because they are engaging in close reasoning and the only way to do this effectively, as every Oxford tutor knows, is to take your victims one at a time. Naturally, the therapeutic positivists do not willingly admit that they are engaged in reasoning about philosophy. They are haunted by the paradox of scepticism. Wittgenstein, who inspired logical positivism, never fell into its error of trying to formulate a general criterion for distinguishing sense from nonsense. He was content to say at the end of his *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*:

> My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
> Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

The logical positivists disliked the obscurantist tone of this peroration, and they set to work, in defiance, to justify the saying of what Wittgenstein had said could not be said. They were led in the process to make many valuable contributions to the theory of language, but, as we have seen, they were not able to prove that any proposition in philosophy is nonsense. The therapeutic positivists

[1] *Letters of Charles and Mary Lamb*, ed. E. V. Lucas, Vol. II, p. 90.

have given up trying to show that philosophy is impossible, and have concentrated more and more on unravelling the complexities of particular philosophical problems with a view to showing that there is no answer to them. In the process they have come to acknowledge that the philosophers' statements are not nonsense. These statements, though verbal, have a real point. They illuminate the ultimate structure of facts.[1] On the other hand, philosophers who contradict one another *both* illuminate the structure of facts, so that, though philosophical disputes are well worth studying, there is no simple answer to the question at issue.

To illustrate their technique I will borrow an analogy from a recent writer who has gone carefully into their arguments.[2] Suppose a game in which there is a rule that one may stop the ball with the hand and a rule that one may not hold the ball in the hand. Then a question might be raised: Is catching allowed? A might argue: It is allowed because it is stopping the ball. B might argue: It is not allowed because it is holding the ball. The contentions of A and B are not arbitrary: both can produce resemblances on which to base their case. For catching in some respects resembles stopping the ball and in some respects resembles holding the ball. Yet the very fact that there are resemblances on either side makes it arbitrary to plump definitely for one or the other.

Apply this to the philosopher. The philosopher who says that we do not know that material things exist is making us aware, by recommending a new linguistic expression, of the resemblances between knowing I am seeing my hand and being almost certain that I can see a ship on the horizon. The philosopher who says that we do know that material things exist is not merely repeating what common sense says but is making us aware, by recommending a return to the ordinary linguistic expression, of the resemblances between knowing I am seeing my hand and knowing $2+2=4$, which resemblances are not present to the ordinary user of the language.

The conclusion of the therapeutic positivist is that, once these dual sets of resemblance are fully grasped and the see-saw in favour of using first one language and then the other has expended itself, the desire to ask the question "Do I really know that material things exist?" will have disappeared. What the analysis has done is to provide a more detailed description of that which is described as knowing my hand exists. Philosophical questions are really disguised demands for descriptions of this kind.

I have no wish to deny that an analysis of this kind may take place, and may yield this result. I must add, however, that it is an

[1] See an article entitled "Philosophical Perplexity," by John Wisdom *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1936-7, p. 73.

[2] B. A. Farrell, op. cit.

analysis which reveals new elements in the object of the analysis, and so is real and not verbal analysis; and this kind of analysis has always been regarded as a part of philosophy. It is true that the question "Do I really know that my hand exists?" on this view admits of no answer Yes or No; and must be replaced by the question "What exactly *is* knowing that my hand exists?" Philosophy, as an ultimate inquiry, has a particular propensity to reformulate its questions, before it can answer them. But this reformulation of its questions is not peculiar to philosophy. People used to ask "How can men exist hanging upside down at the Antipodes?" Are you going to say that physics and astronomy have not answered this question merely because it had to be reformulated to be answered properly? Suppose that, in answer to the question "How do I know that God exists?" I received a wholly convincing proof that God did not exist and at the same time an equally satisfactory account of why many people came to think that He did, can I claim that my question has not been answered? I should certainly no longer be inclined to ask the question: and I should not merely be "cured" of asking it, I should have good reasons for not asking it. It is true, of course, that I asked a theological question and received not the theological answer I expected but a philosophical answer. The reason is that theology, like the sciences, natural and social, like history, like all inquiries except philosophy, is a closed inquiry. It assumes that God exists in order to pursue its inquiries: it is no part of its business to ask whether God exists or not.[1] Just as the zoologist assumes that animals exist: as the economist assumes that men acting from economic motives exist; and as the mathematician assumes that numbers exist. Philosophy is the only open inquiry, because it makes no assumptions before commencing its inquiries (though of course it makes assumptions, or hypotheses if you like, in the course of arriving at its conclusions), and because there can only be one inquiry which makes no assumptions. Since it makes no assumptions it cannot be defined by reference to a particular subject matter or a particular method. It can only be defined as "the inquiry which makes no assumptions." For all these reasons, philosophy is not committed to defending any traditional set of questions. Is philosophy nonsense? is itself a philosophical question: and the answer, whether Yes or No, is philosophy provided it gives

[1] It is sometimes urged by the critics of the Neo-scholastics that Scholasticism is not entitled to be called philosophy, since it accepts the existence of God on the authority of revelation. The Scholastic answer, if I understand it rightly, is that one of the planks in its philosophy is that revelation is one avenue to knowledge. The defence is complete. To believe what is revealed is natural disposition: to believe that what is revealed merits belief is philosophy. Whether the natural disposition is right, or the philosophy good, is another matter.

its reasons. For the same reasons it has no unchangeable subject matter. When Aristotle, at the beginning of the twelfth book of his metaphysics, says "The inquiry is about substance," he is not telling us what metaphysics is, he is beginning to tell us what *his* metaphysics is. When he ends the book by saying "The inquiry is about God," he has completed in outline the sketch of his metaphysics. For the same reasons the inquiries which Descartes, Spinoza and Kant pursued about the method of philosophy are themselves, quite strictly, philosophical inquiries. For the same reasons, analysis is philosophy because it gives reasons for wishing to reject certain questions as nonsense and to replace them by different questions. There is no way out of the paradox of scepticism. In supposedly asking the question: Is philosophy dead and should King analysis reign in his stead? I have really been asking: Is the philosophy of analysis true? I have criticized its methods and presuppositions. This has in turn involved me in rejecting a good many of the philosophical conclusions of the analytical philosophers. It would be equally true to say that I rejected their method because I had in my mind the right method or that I found what was the right method by rejecting their method. It would be equally true also to say that I rejected their method because I found that it led to wrong conclusions, or that I rejected their conclusions because I found that their method was wrong. All this is true because I set out with no preconceived notions of method or conclusions, except the suspicion that it was not so easy as supposed to put an end to philosophy.

Still, if analysis is a good philosophy, some of the most important questions of philosophy, such as Does God exist? and Is the soul immortal? can be answered only by the process of reformulating them which takes away a lot of their interest for us. If this were the truth, philosophy would still be a rational and a necessary inquiry, and I have no doubt that you would find me still pursuing it. Since, however, I regard the methods preached and practised by the analytical philosophers as unsound, and have presented arguments for the opinion, I have no reason for thinking that these questions and similar ones cannot be answered in more or less the form in which they are asked. On the other hand I cannot assume that all those questions called philosophical *can* be answered without reformulation. I can, as a philosopher, but try to answer them in a spirit of open-mindedness and truth-seeking.

§ 7

The philosophers of analysis have rendered great service to philosophy, in uncovering problems of logic and language which had long been only half-recognized by philosophers. Any future philosopher

will neglect them at his peril. Nevertheless, I believe we can now see that their tenets are properly to be regarded not as sovereign principles destructive of philosophy but as precepts of limited jurisdiction within philosophy. You will not have failed to notice that many of my arguments have been such as would satisfy the analytical philosopher. When asked to say whether analysis was philosophy or not I replied by refusing to say Yes or No, and instead distinguished between analytical and speculative philosophy, a thoroughly analytical procedure. Valuable though the distinction was at that stage of the argument, I have no hesitation now in saying what would have been misleading had I said it then, viz. that analysis as understood by the analysts is not one kind of philosophy, the other kind being speculation, it is simply a defective version of what philosophy, properly considered, is. Analysis, as described by the analysts, is bad philosophy. Philosophy, properly understood, is best described as philosophical or speculative analysis.

I can best give an account of philosophical analysis by referring in turn to five principles we have found in the analytical philosophers, which, interpreted *à outrance* are fallacies, but moderated are of value.

(1) The first may be called the linguistic fallacy. It consists in supposing that analysis is verbal. Philosophical analysis is real analysis. I do not deny that some philosophical disputes may be based on verbal confusions. But the pursuit of real analysis will in time drive us to this conclusion, where it is so; whereas the pursuit of linguistic analysis is likely to blind us to any real differences which do exist. Moderated, the principle is: "Do not suppose that there are always real differences corresponding to verbal differences."

(2) The second fallacy may be called the empirical fallacy. It consists in supposing that all analysis must be in terms of the data of sense because nothing else exists. On the contrary, the analysis of such a proposition as "He returned the book" would be primarily in terms of intention and will, neither of which are directly observed through the senses. There are actual existences such as other minds and their operations, and structural relations within our sensory experience, which are no less real than the data of the senses. Moderated, the principle is: "Pursue analysis as far as possible in terms of the data of sense before bringing in other entities."

(3) The third fallacy may be called the mathematico-scientific fallacy. It consists in supposing that the only methods of discovering anything new about the universe are deduction, as employed in mathematics, or observation and/or experiment, followed by induction, as employed in science. It is this belief that lies at the back of the linguistic fallacy also, and makes it easy to conclude that philosophy must be concerned with language. Philosophy is neither

deduction like mathematics and logic, nor induction from observations like the natural and the social sciences. It resembles the former in not needing to make special observations or experiments, the latter in observing more carefully phenomena within the reach of every one with a view to extracting from them the most general features of experience. This is the business of philosophical analysis. Moderated, the principle becomes: "Be slow to believe, and zealous to test, generalizations based on philosophical analysis."

(4) The fourth fallacy may be called the fallacy of "sinning against the light." When we attempt to analyse the true nature of anything or any activity, which admits of being better or worse, we can describe it as it is at its best even though we never experience it at its best. By considering man as he is, we can form some idea of what he would be at his best, if all that he had it in him to be were realized. In considering such questions as "What things are good?" or "What do we mean by 'good'? "; "What actions are our duty?" or ' What do we mean by 'duty'?", we are not condemned to rest content with our thoughts as we find them the moment we take up the investigation. Our philosophical thought is a prolongation of our moral thought. This is why the accusation that the moral philosophers arguments are really homilies to make us better has some truth in it. This is why also they are not merely homiletic but also revelatory. The opposition between the scientific and the emotive use of language breaks down when we come to analyse the purposive activities of human beings. Moderated, the principle becomes: "Form your ideal conception only after the most thorough examination of the actual instances."

(5) The fifth fallacy may be called the fallacy of indifference. The therapeutic positivist regarded the typical philosophical question as ending up with a number of resemblances on one side inclining the mind to say Yes and a number on the other side inclining the mind to say No. The assumption is that one cannot rationally go either way. Is this assumption correct? I think not: and I shall try to say why it is not, and why it is that the only form in which it can be admitted is the moderated form: "Weigh carefully the resemblances on both sides before deciding whether it is possible or not to pronounce one way or the other."

First let us note that questions that lead to this position are not peculiar to philosophy. They present themselves also in science. Is *Euglena viridis* a plant or an animal? It resembles plants in containing chlorophyll and having holophytic nutrition, and animals in possessing a flagellum and not having a cellulose cell wall. It is plausible to say that there is no answer to the question: but I confess I am not sure that this is the right solution. Are viruses animate or inanimate? I do not think it is made impossible ever to decide on

rational grounds that they are animate merely because they resemble the inanimate in being obtainable in crystalline form, and I do not think the biologists think so. Take a less technical example. There are certain creatures from the Isle of Man which resemble cats in many respects, but resemble guinea-pigs in having no tails. Must I not call them cats? Or, if I do, is it a purely arbitrary extension of the word? Or are they not, as I believe, and I am sure you believe also, really cats?

I am maintaining that the refusal to commit one's self, because there are features inclining one to say Yes and features inclining one to say No, is not always the rational attitude and may frequently be the irrational attitude. When a judge has to decide a case in the light of statutes which do not obviously cover the case, there is, to be sure, an element of arbitrariness in his decision, but the process is, taken as a whole, essentially a rational one. There is a right and a wrong decision. If there were not, the whole system of Appeal Courts would be absurd. Their *raison d'être* lies in the assumption that a more careful examination of the facts by cleverer men better versed in the law may afford reasons for reversing the original decision. The procedure is not dissimilar in theological controversy. The interpretation of the fundamental Christian doctrines is a rational process, granted the initial data. Fundamentally the same kind of reasoning is found in administration, and in personal conduct, though the principles we use sit more loosely to us and the "resemblances" that incline us are less determinate.

All these people—the judge, the theologian, the administrator and the man who faces his daily problems of conduct—draw conclusions, though faced with conflicting considerations. Philosophy resembles this kind of reasoning more than it resembles the reasoning of science. It is foolish as some philosophers have done to exalt this type of reasoning, and the all-embracing nature of their subject, in order to depreciate science, by regarding this latter as a kind of rule-of-thumb affair, too limited in its scope to be called rational at all. But it is equally absurd to identify the methods of science with the workings of the human reason. The excursions of famous scientists into the realms of philosophy are sometimes marred by the fact that, having escaped from the rigorous control of scientific method they imagine they have left the domain of reason for that of fancy. This is, however, a more entertaining and less destructive error than that of some of their colleagues who imagine that the problems of conduct and administration can be solved by the scientific method.

That all the higher activities of reason, except science and mathematics, have no rational foundation is an error due to submergence in the things of sense, which results from surrendering in despair the ideal content of life, which itself is strangled and gasps for breath

without faith. The attack on reason by philosophers is made in the name of logic. "Logic," as Samuel Butler said, "is like the sword. Those who appeal to it shall perish by it." I have tried to answer logic with logic, and have been led in the attempt into philosophy. This is not to mind a defect. Philosophy is not to be reduced to logic, as the philosophers of analysis suppose. But there is this much truth distorted in what they say, that philosophy is logic's true self, and the greatest illogicality is a false philosophy. Nor is philosophy science. Analysis, properly understood, is an essential part of philosophy. In the wider sense I have given to it, it includes generalization within the field of common experience by the imaginative recall of that experience. It bears some resemblance to the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, I have felt justified in using the word analysis of it, because it bears ever greater resemblance to the procedure which Kant described and practised as analysis. It is employed in ethics, epistemology and logic. By itself it cannot solve the great metaphysical problems of God, freedom and immortality, which are not, as sometimes represented, isolated problems to be solved by gnawing at them like a dog at a bone, but are simply three outstanding cruces which tend to confront every philosopher who attempts a system of philosophy. The fruits of analysis in many fields must be generalized, the generalities united in some sort of system and the system tested by application to other fields, for the construction of a metaphysic. For the task of speculative philosophy is, starting from the phenomena—the conclusions of science, the prepossessions of common sense, and the deliverances of faith—to formulate a coherent and comprehensive account of the universe in its general outlines. If philosophical analysis is, as I have argued, a genuine method of discovery whereby there can be revealed new facts which justify the reformulation of the statements in which the phenomena first present themselves to our minds, the road to metaphysics is not barred and we may still believe the words which My Lady Philosophy addressed to the philosopher Boethius when she appeared to him in his prison cell:

> I will show thee the way which shall carry thee home, I will give thy mind wings to be raised aloft, so that, thrusting aside all distress of mind, thou mayest return in safety to the home of thy fathers, under my guidance, by my pathway, and borne on my wings,[1]

[1] Boethius: *Philosophiae Consolatio*, Book IV, Prose 1.

LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

A. H. BASSON and D. J. O'CONNOR

> If Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Dacotan he would have had to adopt an entirely different logic or at any rate an entirely different theory of categories.
>
> MAUTHNER: *Kritik der Sprache*, Vol. III, p. 4.

I

PREOCCUPATION with *language* is a notable feature of modern philosophy. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the influence of language on thought, and particularly its influence on philosophical thought, is a leading topic of philosophical discussion in this century. Every philosopher of any note, no matter what his general interests may be, has found it necessary to define his attitude to this problem. The attitude usually adopted consists of an admission that language does have a great influence on thought, and on philosophical thought in particular. More accurately, it is claimed that the structure and grammatical categories, and perhaps the vocabulary, natural to a particular language, *determine* the lines of thought and speculation open to any thinker who uses that language (Note 1). This determination is unimportant in many cases, because the results of our thinking are usually subject to check by appeal to empirical facts. In philosophical thinking, however, no such check is available by the very nature of the case. Accordingly, we cannot tell if the difficulty or apparent insolubility of a philosophical problem is due to the problem itself, or simply due to inadequacies in our language. In a different language, so it is suggested, the problem which is difficult for us might very easily be solved. Indeed, there might not then *be* any such problem, or its solution might be self-evident in this other language. This is the moderate attitude to the language difficulty in philosophy, and it is fair to say that it is almost universally adopted at the present day. In some circles it has acquired the prestige of an indisputable dogma.

A somewhat more extreme view is put forward by those who assert that *all* philosophical problems are results of the inadequacy of language. They hold this view because they believe that statements, or rather *apparent* statements, may be grammatically correct, and yet, at the same time, meaningless. Such statements, assumed to have meaning because they are grammatically correct, generate

insoluble "philosophical" problems. The main preoccupation of those who adopt this view is to construct a language in which philosophical problems do not occur, simply because they are excluded by the grammatical rules of the language. No attempt to construct such a language has yet proved successful, although this may be due to the fact that the initial thought necessary for such an attempt has always been carried out in languages of the Indo-European family, usually English or German.

We have now distinguished a moderate and an extreme view of the influence of language on philosophical thought. The moderate view claims that the difficulty of *some* philosophical problems may be due *partly* to ineffectiveness of the language we use in trying to solve them. In addition, the sorts of problems which arise and naturally present themselves to the thinker, may in part be determined by the language in which the thinker thinks. The more extreme view claims that philosophical problems are *wholly* products of the structural characteristics of a language. Evidently the extreme view implies the more moderate, and consequently disproof of the moderate view would be disproof of the more extreme. The contrary does not hold, of course. Proof of the moderate view would not amount to proof of the extreme view, although it would justify serious examination of the latter. In what follows we shall confine our attention to the moderate view, namely, the claim that the difficulty of some philosophical problems and the occurrence of others may be a direct result of the nature of the language we use.

II

The view that the structure of a language determines partly or wholly the nature and direction of philosophical thought in that language, is itself something of a philosophical curiosity. It is a curiosity because, unlike all the other claims and attitudes of philosophers, it seems to be open to empirical enquiry. There are more than seven thousand different languages now in everyday use. These languages differ widely in grammar, syntax and vocabulary. Surely it is pertinent to enquire if the usual philosophical questions can be posed, and the usual philosophical arguments expressed, in some of these languages which differ most widely from our own. Surely it would reflect on the philosophers' claim if no relevant differences were found. And if relevant differences *were* found, surely it would be very important for philosophers and logicians to know how these differences were connected with the differences of grammar, syntax and vocabulary. In spite of these apparent facts, and in spite of the further fact that it is now almost equivalent to blasphemy in certain circles to suggest that linguistic problems

may have nothing whatever to do with philosophical problems; in spite of all this, not the slightest attempt appears to have been made by philosophers to verify their hypothesis in the usual way. No philosopher has even attempted to give reasons why it should not be so verified.

There may, however, be good reason for this. Clearly, a proper estimate of the relevance, value and methods of such an attempted verification, as well as the attempt itself, would call for a rather rare combination of talents and knowledge. The present writers do not know of anyone possessing the required qualifications of aptitude and profound scholarship both in modern philosophy and logic, and in modern linguistics. They do not even know of anyone claiming these qualifications who has also found it worth while to investigate the matter. Accordingly, while aware of many deficiencies in themselves, particularly on the philological side, they decided to open the question and see what is in it. In the course of the enquiry it soon became clear that philosophers, as usual, were not at all sure of what they meant when they talked about the relation of language to philosophy. Consequently, empirical investigation does not seem to be relevant in any simple and obvious way. Nevertheless, its relevance is still a question which can only be decided by considering what sorts of enquiries might be relevant. Furthermore, it is now most desirable that philosophers should become familiar with the matter and methods of comparative linguistics, if only to avoid making silly and misleading remarks. Examples of silly and misleading remarks are, "the grammatical structure of a sentence may not be a true guide to the logical structure of the proposition for which it stands," and "statements may be grammatically correct, and yet meaningless." Professor Ryle, a singularly able and by no means dogmatic thinker, says, "Expressions of the same grammatical patterns are used to express thoughts of multifarious logical sorts" (Note 2). This may be so, of course, but it is desirable to know what you mean by "grammatical pattern" as well as by "logical sort." Strange as it may seem, grammarians are concerned with actual usage; and they try to obtain by induction from actual usage, *rules* for deciding whether an apparent statement is meaningful or not. Their rules are imperfect because the subject matter is so complex. Philosophers, in so far as they try to determine meaning or lay down rules for deciding meaningfulness, are trying to do just what the lexicographer and grammarian are trying to do, only they omit the preliminary trouble of acquainting themselves with the facts. We suspect that when philosophers talk about grammar and grammatical patterns, they mean "the grammatical rules and categories laid down seventy years ago, and which we learned at school." They believe these grammatical rules and

categories to share the infallibility of a Papal pronouncement *ex cathedra*. The belief is quite unfounded.

This general point of view has no doubt had a good deal of influence in establishing a now popular but quite unverified belief that the "structure of language" (in some unspecified sense of that ambiguous phrase) is an important determinant of the logical "structure" of thought. And some philosophers have not been slow to assume, though they have not always made their assumption explicit, that the undoubted *fact* that we can speak and write in alternative *languages* has some relevance to the truth of the *hypothesis* that we can think in alternative *logics* (Note 3). But whether they say that linguistic structure *determines* logical structure, or like Dr. Wittgenstein (Note 4) that it *conceals* logical structure, a great many philosophers are agreed that language is important to philosophy, even if they are not very certain how it is important or how that importance is to be demonstrated.

III

There seem to be several methods by which the relation between linguistic "structure" (such as it is) and philosophy might be investigated. A desirable preliminary would be to study several widely differing examples of the seven thousand languages available, in order to discover their several structures and the differences between them. This kind of study is found to be peculiarly difficult, and the results would, in any case, need to be expressed in a special symbolism. Philologists usually study the comparative grammar and syntax of a closely related family of languages only. The technical terms they develop in the course of such a study is appropriate only to the particular family of languages studied. There is indeed a tendency to adopt terms from Latin grammar, but this is undesirable because such terms acquire a new sense in the course of transference. A few attempts have been made to supply a universal symbolism for comparative analysis (Note 5), but these can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. Consequently, comparative syntax in the wide sense cannot at present be undertaken, simply because there is no basis for comparison. There is an opening here for those in the philosophical world who are adept at constructing symbolisms.

Failing this preliminary, it might be useful to compare the general tone and preoccupations of the philosophies native to different languages. Or we might compare philosophies of the same tradition, but worked out in different languages. For example, it would be instructive to make a close comparative study of the mediaeval philosophers of the Aristotelian school who did not use Indo-European languages. Avicenna and Averrhoes wrote in Arabic;

Maimonides in Hebrew. Their interpretations of Aristotle were both profound and individual, and it would be interesting to know if any of these individualities can be traced to peculiarities of syntax and grammar in the Semitic languages. Indeed, these philosophers would serve admirably as test cases for verifying the hypothesis that Aristotle's logic and metaphysics is the natural result of Indo-European linguistic structure, because in this instance we have adequate controls, namely the Scholastics, who wrote in Latin. The present writers have been unable to trace any work done in this particular direction.

In the other connection it should be possible to compare, not only different linguistic expressions of the same philosophical tradition, but also entirely different traditions. There are many Oriental systems of philosophy, and these could be compared with one another, and with philosophies in the European tradition. There are, of course, European scholars who specialize in Oriental philosophy, but their interest in the subject seems usually to be a scholar's interest and not a philosopher's. Moreover, they are not commonly familiar with the current problems and controversies of European philosophy.

A variation of these lines of approach, which does not call for such extensive scholarship, would be to undertake a critical examination of translations of classical works of European philosophy into non-Aryan languages. Clearly there is a very wide field of enquiry open in this direction, and it is impossible to decide *a priori* what might be discovered. In any case, surely it is not too much to expect of philosophers who profess an interest in problems of languages, that they should acquire a working knowledge of one or two non-Aryan languages, so as to familiarize themselves at first hand with the possibility of expression in such languages of philosophical problems which may or may not be generated by peculiarities of Indo-European grammatical and syntactical structure (Note 6).

IV

After some consideration the present writers found it desirable to set aside for the time being all the approaches so far suggested. Their decision arose partly from consciousness of lack of the necessary knowledge, and partly from the thought that some more definite information is required as to the value of such enquiries, before the work entailed by them could be justified. In order to satisfy themselves on this latter point, they determined to canvass the opinions of a number of professional philologists on a specially limited aspect of the question. To this end a communication was drafted in the following terms:

"Certain contemporary philosophers have suggested that the so-called *metaphysical* problems are a direct result of inadequacies in the structure of language. They suggest that the *linguistic* (i.e. grammatical and/or syntactical) form of a sentence is not always a true guide to the *logical* form of the proposition which it expresses or represents, and consequently sentences may be constructed which are linguistically correct but which either do not express any proposition at all (i.e. are strictly speaking nonsensical) or express propositions whose *logical* form cannot be derived from the *logical* form of the corresponding original proposition, although the linguistic forms of the sentences can be derived from the linguistic forms of the corresponding original sentences. The exact meaning of statements of this kind is not altogether clear but the following is a fair outline of the problem.

"(i) One sentence of a certain linguistic form may express or represent two or more propositions of *different* logical forms. This may result in errors of *at least* two kinds as follows:

"A sentence S(A) may be the linguistic expression of two or more propositions $p(a_1)(a_2)$ . . . having different logical forms. It may be possible by a linguistic operation to construct another sentence S(B).

"(*a*) There may be only *one* proposition $p(b_1)$ corresponding to S(B) although S(A) expresses two or more propositions. In this case we may be led by analogy of the valid logical operation $p(a_1) - p(b_1)$ to assume the validity of similar operations $p(a_2) - p(b_2)$, $p(a_3) - p(b_3)$ etc. In this case, $p(b_2)$ $p(b_3)$ . . . will not exist and S(B) *interpreted as representing* these fictitious propositions will be *meaningless*, though it will have meaning if it is *interpreted as representing* $p(b_1)$.

"(*b*) There may be for each member of the class of propositions $p(a_{1\,n})$ expressed by S(A) a corresponding class of propositions $p(b_{1\text{-}n})$ expressed by S(B). In this case, because there is only one *linguistic* operation representing n logical operations there will be considerable danger of inferring, e.g., $p(b_2)$ from $p(a_1)$ etc., and such inferences will, of course, be invalid.

"(ii) The difficulty may be generalized as follows: suppose we have a class of propositions of logical form A, and a corresponding class of sentences of linguistic form *a*. Suppose there is a *logical* operation (O) which transforms propositions of form A into propositions of form B and a corresponding *linguistic* operation (*o*) which transforms *sentences* of form *a* into sentences of form *b*. Then *b* sentences will represent B propositions. Now suppose we define a further class of propositions (A_1) such that operation (O) cannot be applied to them. Suppose these propositions also to be represented by sentences of form *a*. Then by the linguistic operation (*o*), (*ao*) = *b*, and there will be a class of *b* propositions which will

not express any propositions. Such sentences are *empty* or meaningless sentences of the type referred to in (i)(*a*) above.

"Now it has been suggested that all *metaphysical* sentences are *empty* or meaningless sentences and though they *appear* to have meaning, this is because linguistic form is not always a true guide to logical form.

"It will be observed that the foregoing definition does not establish the existence of empty sentences in any particular language, and in general we would expect languages exhibiting different grammatical and syntactical forms to have different philosophical problems (if all this is true) subject to the following proviso: the difference in linguistic form between language A and language B must be such that some propositions of different logical forms must be expressed by the same linguistic form in A and different linguistic forms in B. If this were so, we might expect a philosophical problem to exist in A which does not exist in B.

"As the main body of Western philosophical speculation has been carried on through the medium of languages of the Indo-European family it has been suggested that the structural similarity of these languages has determined, to an unknown extent, the nature of the problems which have arisen in Western philosophy. This suggestion is, prima facie, a plausible one but no evidence has ever been offered in support of it. It can be confirmed or refuted only, if at all, by an examination of the main points of difference in linguistic structure between languages of the Indo-European group and the non-Indo-European language groups. Such an examination requires the collaboration of philologists and philosophers.

"It is, of course, of great importance to philosophy that some attempt should be made to verify this suggestion, because if it could be shown to have any foundation, philosophers would have to make very considerable changes in the direction of their enquiries."

In order to give our correspondents a guide to the kind of information required, several questions, both general and particular, were asked. As will be seen, the particular questions were about *logical terms* and the various uses of the verb *to be*. We afterwards found that the *logical* questions do not seem to be very important or relevant. Certain problems which do appear to be relevant were not considered, and these will be mentioned in the sequel. The text of our questions was as follows:

"We would accordingly be glad of your opinions on the questions set out below. It is not required that the answers should be detailed or that any features should be noted which are, in your opinion, clearly irrelevant to the problem as we have outlined it. We would however like to ask that, where an important feature of linguistic structure is noted, a simple illustrative sentence should be quoted,

together with two English translations, one idiomatic and the other a point-for-point transverbalization of the sentence to show the features of syntactical structure.

"(1) What are the main grammatical and/or syntactical features of the non-Indo-European languages with which you are most familiar, and which are, so far as you are aware, peculiar to the languages in question?

"(2) Are there any other grammatical and/or syntactical features of the languages which though not peculiar to them are, nevertheless, not found in languages of the Indo-European group?

"(3) The following class of linguistic expressions is of special logical importance. Do expressions of this type in the languages in question exemplify any features of the type referred to in (1) or (2)?

(A) Quantifiers.
- (*a*) (Universal), 'all,' 'any,' 'every,' 'no,' etc.; e.g., no men are mortal.
- (*b*) (Particular), 'some,' 'most,' 'a few;' e.g. some men are tall.
- (*c*) (Singular), 'the,' 'this,' 'that.'

(B) The verb 'to be' used
- (*a*) As a logical copula.
  - (i) Predication: The leaf is green.
  - (ii) Class-inclusion: All men are mortal.
  - (iii) Class-membership: The tree is an oak.
  - (iv) Identity: George VI is king of England.
  - (v) Formal implication: Wisdom is valuable.
- (*b*) In an existential sense; e.g. God is.
- (*c*) In any other sense peculiar to the languages in question

(C) Logical relations.
- (i) Disjunction: 'or.'
- (ii) Conjunction: 'and.'
- (iii) Implication: 'if . . . then. . . .'
- (iv) Negation: 'not.'

"We realize that it is not unlikely that, in a good many languages, no significant features of the types mentioned above, will be found. A 'nil' report will, however, be just as valuable for our purposes, as it is of as much importance to us to know that no differences exist in the case of any particular language as to know of differences which do exist in other cases.

"It may be that other points of importance not set out above will occur to you. If so, we would be glad if you would mention them. We would be glad of any references to philological works which you think are particularly important."

The information obtained as a result of this inquiry was drawn

from more than twenty languages, representing twelve language families other than Indo-European. Much of the evidence was curiously barren, but some was remarkably suggestive. We now attempt to summarize the information we have, and then draw some conclusions.

V

Of the *general* information, the most important was to this effect:

(1) The word "structure" has some very misleading associations which make it a dangerous word to apply to language. When we talk of linguistic structure, we are referring to the relations between linguistic terms or units. These terms or units are not at present defined with sufficient accuracy to enable us to put much meaning on the phrase. For example, one of our correspondents informs us that "the linguistic terms used by philologists are not properly defined (and it is difficult to see how they can be). So the terms 'grammatical feature,' 'syntactical feature,' 'sentence,' etc. used by you are really without definition. I think that perhaps your term 'grammatical and/or syntactical feature' should really be replaced by some such term as 'semantic feature' (a bad name), defined roughly as 'linguistic feature not solely connected with the sound-aspect of a language.' . . . For surely you must take account of lexicography as well as grammar and syntax, since in many languages, particularly those such as Chukchee, which tend to incorporate the noun into the verb, there can be little real distinction between grammar and lexicography." Another correspondent states, "The structure of every language is the result of an historical development in which logic has played no part. Languages are not developed according to the rules or principles of grammarians. Such rules and principles are artificial and unreal. They have been defined as a *post mortem on usage.*" Of course, no philosopher would dispute the truth of these statements, but far too many appear to ignore their implications.

(2) The unsatisfactory state of linguistic terminology, together with the tendency to apply (or misapply) to other languages, the grammatical terms and categories proper to Latin, tends to make differences of structure appear much greater than they really are, or may even induce an apparent discrepancy where no discrepancy really exists. Thus, another correspondent tells us, "Finnish infinitival and participle constructions as analysed by grammarians appear totally different forms of expression from anything used in the English language. In fact they have very close parallels in English and can often be translated almost literally. The effect of this is that Finns and Englishmen cannot merely say exactly the same things, but can often say them in much the same way." This

kind of fact, together with the fact that translation is possible, tends to indicate the essentially isomorphic nature of languages, rather than the opposite. What is lost in translation is the emotive aspect, and there is as yet no indication that philosophical problems are untranslatable. It may be, of course, that they are sometimes untranslatable, and this fact, if it were a fact, would indicate the essentially emotive character of philosophical statements. Nevertheless, no evidence has, so far as we know, yet been produced to support such a thesis. There have been plenty of arguments a priori but no facts.

(3) The connection between grammatical and logical form is obscure. Philologists tell us that grammatical form is not self-evident, and philosophers tell us that logical form is not self-evident even if the grammatical form is known. It is not clear how philosophers can claim to discover logical form unless it is connected in some way with grammatical form. In any case, no examples have come to our notice, of languages where certain logical forms *cannot* be exhibited in sentence-form, although in ordinary speech the logical form is often allowed to remain implicit. In this connection, one eminent philologist has summarized his conclusion in these words: "The diversity of modes of expression in no way entails a greater or less degree of ability to indicate the fundamental logical distinctions, e.g. determination, definiteness and indefiniteness, conjunction, disjunction, hypothesis. Some categories are *normally* left implicit with zero-forms but the point I would stress is that all the languages named appear capable in an emergency of making the logical formulation explicit. It seems then that, so far as anything at all can be said on this point, logical form *can* be exhibited by grammatical form in any language, but this is not always done, mainly for reasons of brevity and convenience in expression."

(4) One of our correspondents who has had experience in studying Berkeley and Hume in the medium of Twi (an Akan language of the Gold Coast), informs us that the usual Berkeleian and Humeian problems and their connected arguments can be expressed in this language. This is so in spite of the fact that Twi possesses three different verbal forms corresponding roughly with the different uses of the English verb *to be*. The difficulty of such translations is mainly due to verbal inadequacies in Twi, notably the absence of abstract expressions. This deficiency is of much greater importance than any differences of grammatical or syntactical structure (Note 7).

VI

The particular information obtained is summarized as follows:

(1) *Quantifiers:* Generally speaking the Semitic languages use

nouns for universal quantifiers, e.g. "totality of men" for "all men"; "nought of men" for "no men." A number of languages have no means of expressing "no" or "not" directly, e.g. Ancient Egyptian, Finnish, Arabic; and some languages have a special negative form of the verg, e.g. Ancient Egyptian, Finnish, Tamil. One of our correspondents writes, "Many languages do not make such a clear cut distinction as English between 'some' and 'any,' but all I have surveyed can at a pinch distinguish between an unspecified particular and a no-matter-which particular." The word "some" is expressed in Finnish by a partitive genetive, e.g. "Buy some bread." (This is reminiscent of a usage in some Indo-European languages, e.g. γεύσομαι τοῦ οἴνου, and is probably not a very unusual construction.)

(2) *Articles:* Even within the Indo-European family there is considerable diversity in the usage of definite and indefinite articles. English, Latin, Greek and Swedish all show different methods of expression. There are no special features in non-Indo-European modes of expressing "definite descriptions." Changes of inflexion are sometimes used, e.g. Finnish, "Give me the bread" (accusative case), "Give me some bread" (genitive case).

(3) *The verb To Be:* Some very interesting and possibly important information was supplied to us on this topic. Most interesting was the large number of languages which make a sharp distinction between the existential "is" and the copula. Semitic languages have in general no copula, but Hebrew and Assyrian both have a special word for "exists." Malay (an Austronesian language) is similar to Hebrew in this respect. Tibetan uses "yin" for the copula and "yod" for existence, but a sentence like "That hill is high" might use either word according to sense and context. In Ancient Egyptian the copula is omitted unless it is modally qualified; and in general it seems to be the rule rather than the exception to omit the copula. Perhaps this should not surprise us in view of the fact that the relations between the referents of "green" and "leaf" in "the green leaf" and in "the leaf is green" is the same. There are several languages which have more exact means of expressing the various nuances of the English verb "to be." Even inside the Indo-European family, Spanish and Portuguese distinguish accidental and essential modes of existence by means of the separate verbs "ser" and "estar." Outside the Indo-European family, Hungarian uses "van" and "vannak" for "is" in the existential sense, and also when the sentence answers a question "How?" or "Where?" but not when the question is "Who?" or "What?" Twi has three separate verbs for the "is" of existence, the "is" of predication (i.e. class-membership and class-inclusion) and the "is" of identity. Tamil, which omits the copula, has two verbs for "existence," namely,

"undu," which implies existence in a general sense ("such things exist," "there are some sheep on the hillside") (this is also a case where "some" or "any" is expressed by a verb), and "iru," which implies existence in a particular sense in a certain location or context ("my brother is in the house," "my sheep are in the next field"). Each of these verbs has a separate negative form ("illai" for "undu" and "alla" for "iru"). In addition to these distinctions, Tamil has a further verb, "āgu," which is used somewhat in the manner of the German "werden," except that it is not used like "werden" to express the passive voice.

(4) *Logical Constants:* Little information was forthcoming on this topic. Except for the references to negation quoted above, there seem to be few forms peculiar to particular languages (Note 8).

VII

The main points may now be summarized. (1) There is considerable confusion in grammatical terminology and classification. Nothing has been done towards classifying the seven thousand odd languages that exist, or towards classifying their semantic features. It is therefore rash to assume that what we, with our school knowledge of grammar, take to be the grammatical structure of a sentence, *is* the grammatical structure in any important sense of the phrase. Consequently, *if* philosophical problems arise from this sort of confusion, it is more correct to say they arise from *ignorance of grammar*, than it is to say they arise from the misleading character of grammatical structure. (2) If grammatical structure, in some appropriate sense of that ambiguous phrase, can *never* be said to be a reliable guide to logical structure, it is difficult to see what *can* be. (3) Divergence of grammatical categories is not necessarily a guarantee of divergence of structure. (4) Philosophical works have in fact been translated without losing their essential character, at least so far as we can judge. (5) Quantification and logical constants do not seem to present much of interest, but the development of the ideas of entailment and causal connection might prove a useful subject for study. (6) The verbs "to be" and "to exist" exhibiting a number of interesting variations which might well be reflected in philosophical discussions. To these six we may now add three other points which are of obvious importance, but which were not included in our enquiry. These are: (7) The expression of *tense* in various languages is extremely diverse, and has different uses. In primitive languages generally, little if any distinction is made between spatial and temporal remoteness. This is obviously an important matter, and could easily have a bearing on the many philosophical problems connected with Time. (8) The expression of the first-personal pro-

noun, and (9) expression of the distinction between appearance and reality, both require investigation. All three of these points are famous sources of philosophical disagreement.

VIII

It is clear that no definite conclusions can be drawn from our scanty evidence, partly because of the great bulk of material which remains unexamined, partly because of the exceedingly unsatisfactory state of linguistic science, and partly because of the three omissions mentioned. With this in mind, however, we can say that absolutely no evidence exists at present to support the hypothesis that philosophical problems are partly or wholly due to inadequacies of language. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that a "better language" might solve our philosophical problems for us. This leads us to reflect on the initial problem. When philosophers say or hint or imply that their problems are linguistic, they certainly seem to be suggesting that a better language might avoid these problems, or that other languages might produce other problems. *If* they mean this, it is their business to produce evidence for such an assertion, either by producing examples in existing languages, or by constructing artificial languages. The first is more necessary than the second, because it would be too strange if, although the problems could not arise in some artificial language, they all arose in every natural language. It would lead us to doubt the adequacy of the artificial language rather than that of the natural languages. If the philosophers do not mean all this, it is most desirable that they should say just exactly what they do mean, and do so in some less confusing terms.

Before leaving this matter it is desirable to say a little more about the connection between grammatical and logical form. It is maintained that grammatical structure is not always a true guide to logical structure, and therefore the former is *never* a reliable guide to the latter. Modern logicians tend to contrast themselves with traditional logicians in this respect. Aristotle's mistake was to believe that all propositions have the same logical form. He did not believe that grammatical form was a true guide to logical form, since grammatical forms were various even in the Greek language of his time. Consequently Aristotle did not believe that grammatical form was *always* a true guide to logical form, but he did believe that a particular grammatical form, namely, the subject-predicate form, *was* a true guide to logical form; and that *all* propositions could be expressed in this form. Modern logicians appear to differ from Aristotle only in believing that there are several grammatical forms which are true guides to logical form. They agree with Aristotle

in trying to reduce different grammatical expressions to an arbitrarily selected set, and they differ from him only in so far as their set contains several members, whereas Aristotle's set contains only one member.

It appears that something must be postulated as a guide to divergencies between grammatical and logical form. A guide very often adopted consists in the appearance of philosophical problems. If philosophical problems appear, this indicates divergence of grammatical and logical form, if not, not. Now if this is *postulated* it amounts to a *definition* of the kind of divergence at issue. Such a definition cannot be questioned in the ordinary sense; we can only ask if it is a fruitful one. It would be fruitful if languages could be constructed able to express everything except philosophy. Many attempts have been made to construct such languages, but none have proved satisfactory. They have not been satisfactory because those who construct such languages have proceeded simply by ignoring or omitting those features of grammar and syntax which are most closely connected with philosophical problems. These are, as we have noted, the verbs "to be" and "to exist," the first personal pronoun, the expression of tense, and the distinction between appearance and reality. In Mr. Russell's object-language, for example, all these are omitted. Mr. Ayer's sense-datum language includes the first-personal pronoun, but since it occurs in the same way in all his sense-datum statements, it cannot be said to form a necessary and significant part of his language. The logical languages of Professors Carnap and Quine omit all reference to tense.

In the result it is hardly surprising that the relevant philosophical problems cannot be expressed in such languages, and other problems, as it were *genuine* pseudo-problems, do arise from the inadequacy of these languages as means of expression. The problem of the speckled hen, and the difficulty about the movements of the observer (Note 9) are well known examples of such pseudo-problems. They arise simply from the inadequacy of these artificial languages as means of expression, as compared with the natural languages. The artificial subject-predicate language of Aristotle suffered from similar deficiencies.

We conclude that, although it may be true to say that philosophical problems are *connected* with linguistic inadequacies, it is very misleading to say they *result from* such inadequacies. In the first place linguistic structure is not fixed and immutable. On the contrary it is essentially flexible. In the second place it is putting the cart before the horse. It would be much less misleading to say that linguistic inadequacies are consequences of unsolved philosophical problems. Modern philosophers have observed that any philosophical problem which can be stated in language is reflected

in language. This is obviously true, but it is false to conclude that the problem *is* nothing but the reflection. On the other hand it may be that philosophical problems exist which have no connection whatever with linguistic inadequacy, although it is by no means clear what *sort* of solution such problems would demand. After all, the solution of any general problem, particularly a non-empirical problem (mathematical problems, for example), is reflected in the development of a new and "more adequate" notation. We do not therefore say that all such problems are pseudo-problems and *results of* notational inadequacy.

In addition to this, it seems that artificial languages cannot be developed in isolation from any natural language. New notations must be alterations, improvements, additions to the language in use. To suppose otherwise was the very mistake of the classical systematic philosophers. A new notation may be developed to solve a philosophical problem, but it is clearly beside the point to develop a notation which merely avoids the problem altogether. This is the trap awaiting those who insist that philosophical problems are simply results of notational inadequacy.

Finally, we may point out that a natural language must be capable of expressing incompatible propositions, and not only incompatible *factual* propositions, but also incompatible propositions *of logic*. The structure of a natural language is thus not determined by logical considerations. It is determined, in so far as it is determined at all, by *philosophical* considerations. Because philosophers have ignored linguistics ever since the invention of Latin grammatical terminology, it is not surprising that this terminology now misleads them. There is no systematic means of expression in linguistics at the present time, and this would seem to be an important field for philosophical enquiry. We would however suggest that those philosophers who intend to pursue the matter should take their subject seriously, at least to the extent of acquainting themselves with the results gained in modern linguistic science. Perhaps they would then find themselves able to return once more to a sincere appreciation of philosophical problems, instead of offering cheap and easy methods of ignoring them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We wish to express our deep appreciation of the help we received from the following philologists, several of whom expended considerable time and trouble in trying to make their side of the matter clear to us: Dr. G. Bargery, Mr. F. G. Blandford, Dr. R. E. Burnham, Professor W. E. Collinson, Professor G. R. Driver, Miss E. M. Frost, Dr. A. H. Gardiner, F.B.A., Mr. E. R. Hughes, Professor E. Lewy, Mr. G. S. Nimako, Dr. A. S. C. Ross, Professor F. W. Thomas, Mr. H. Gordon Ward.

PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

I. It is suggested that *language* may have an unknown influence on thought, particularly philosophical thought. There are two attitudes to this suggestion, one moderate, one extreme.

II. The possibility of an *empirical investigation* of the problem is considered. Such an investigation may or may not be relevant, but it is at least desirable that this should be determined. Only in this way can we decide *what* sort of investigation will settle the question, and only in this way can we see what sort of question it is.

III. Several possible lines of approach are considered, namely (1) study of comparative grammar and syntax, (2) study of different expressions of the same philosophy in different languages, (3) comparison of different philosophies native to different languages.

IV. The lines described in III have to be set aside for certain reasons. The text of our inquiry addressed to philologists is given. Opinions are asked for on some general and special aspects of the question.

V. Replies bring to light the following general points: (1) Linguistic science is not sufficiently well developed for us to be able to talk without ambiguity, of the *structure* of a sentence. (2) Apparent differences of structure are sometimes created by the misleading linguistic terminology in use. (3) The connection between grammatical and logical form is obscure. It is not clear how the latter is discovered even if the former is assumed to be known. (4) Lack of abstract terms seems a greater obstacle to translation than difference of structure.

VI. Information is given about the expression of quantification, being, existence and logical constants in various languages. There are striking variations in the expressions of the various meanings of the verb "to be."

VII. The information in V and VI is summarised. Three additional matters of importance are noted: (1) tense, (2) the first-personal pronoun, (3) the distinction between appearance and reality.

VIII. There is nothing to suggest that a "better language" might solve philosophical problems. In the matter of grammatical and logical form, modern logicians do not appear to differ from Aristotle in any significant way. The insufficiencies of some modern artificial languages are noted. We conclude that linguistic inadequacies result from unsolved philosophical problems, not vice versa.

NOTES

1. Perhaps not "determine" in the strict sense, since if this were so nothing could be done about it. There is the same sort of ambiguity here as in Hume's principle of association. It is a gently persuasive force rather than a necessary connection. It then seems that the sort of philosophical problem at the bottom of "determination of thought by language" is the same as is at the bottom of "determination of thought by association of ideas."

2. *Philosophical Arguments, an Inaugural Lecture*, Oxford, 1945, p. 9. Our remarks must not be taken as a criticism of the substance of Professor Ryle's lecture.

3. Compare some very interesting remarks by Dr. Waismann, "Alternative Logics," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1945–6.

4. "Language disguises thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognised," *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 63.

5. See Jesperson, *Analytic Syntax*, and the references quoted therein.

6. Professor Broad made this suggestion some years ago. (*Proc. Arist. Soc. Suppl.* Vol. XV, p. 113.)

7. Purely verbal difficulties of translation are discussed by Mr. I. A. Richards, *Mencius on the Mind* (London, 1932).

8. There is a discussion of the development of the ideas of implication and causal connection in Chinese thought in Mr. E. R. Hughes' *The Great Learning and The Mean in Action.*

9. The "Speckled Hen" problem was invented by Professor Ryle. It is discussed by Mr. Chisholm (*Mind*, N.S. 204, p. 368), and appears to be a peculiarity of languages which lack any means of expressing the distinction between appearance and reality. The other problem is similar. It is briefly expounded by Professor Price in his criticism of Mr. A. J. Ayer's "Foundations of Empirical Knowledge," *Mind*, N.S. 199, p. 292.

DISCUSSION: *The Perennial Philosophy*[1]

The phrase *philosophia perennis* is said to have been first used by Leibniz. It has been adopted and freely employed by the Catholic Neo-Thomists, for whom it means a development of the Aristotelianism, modified by strong Neoplatonic elements, which Arabian scholars transmitted to the first Renaissance in the West. It claims also to be a return to the early Christian philosophy of religion, a fusion of Hellenistic and Jewish thought, the latter itself a syncretistic religion with many Persian and other borrowings. The controversy, directed against various modern philosophies, has been conducted with great ability by such writers as Gilson, Maritain, Sheen, Watkin, Dawson and D'Arcy, whose books would perhaps have received more attention from independent thinkers, but for the suspicion which surrounds apparent attempts to revive the methods and inhibitions of the medieval schoolmen.

There has been a parallel movement in the Orthodox Eastern Church, represented in Russian by Frank, Bardyaeff, Solovioff and Lossky. These writers are more Platonic and more fearlessly mystical than the Thomists. Origen in the East has more weight than Augustine.

The phrase *philosophia perennis* has also been annexed by the American Wilbur Urban, in his very able book *The Intelligible World.* The Great Tradition, as he calls it, is above the opposition between realism and idealism. It rests on the ultimate inseparability of value and reality. Our standard is what man recognizes as value when his life is fullest. *Ens est unum, verum, bonum.* Historicism turns the absolutes of religion into the relatives of an evolutionary process; psychology and biology reduce faith to an instinct in the service of life. Modernism has ended in a philosophy of illusionism which includes science itself. Permanent presuppositions are turned into gratuitous assumptions, and enduring postulates into plain prejudices. A certain emancipation from slavery to time is, as Bertrand Russell says, essential to philosophic thought. And yet we cannot, with Whitehead, refuse to consider the space-time problem in relation to values. Bergson and others pack time, or space-time, with meanings and values which do not belong to them, and this is the only thing that gives to modern doctrines of emergence the apparent intelligibility which they seem to have. We have no right to endow time with a *nisus*, to replace the old idea of providence, and even to become the begetter of the Deity. There is no element of direction in space and time. Space and time are only the warp and woof of the canvas on which we draw our pictures of ponderable and measurable things. The intelligible world is non-spatial and non-temporal. If mutual externality is the condition of things in the world of sense, mutual compenetration is the character of the spiritual world. If we regard reality as a realm of values, phenomenal and noumenal may be translated into instrumental and intrinsic. May we not think of eternity as a mode in which we express absolute value? The solution of the riddle of space and time, if there be a solution, lies outside space and time.

With all this I heartily agree. But when Urban tries to relate the modern postulate of human perfectibility and universal progress with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the principle of Carnot as the French call it, it seems to me that he is as little successful as all others who have attempted

[1] *The Perennial Philosophy.* By ALDOUS HUXLEY. (1946. London: Chatto and Windus. Pp. vii + 358. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.)

to reconcile two contradictory theories of process in the cosmos. He holds, rightly in my opinion, that ultimately the time process is irrelevant to value, because value can neither come into being nor pass out of being. But he cannot give up the notion that the world is somehow getting better and better, and refuses to allow that entropy means the ultimate vital and physical extinction of the universe. "To speak for the universe in terms of narrow and abstract predictions of physics and astronomy is to betray a bias of mind that is provincial." I agree that "there is no such thing as an entropy of value." But I cannot agree that we can accept a theory of "progress, with its notion of destiny, which makes of history an unique and individual whole," nor that evolution involves the idea of a universal *nisus*. Like Herbert Fisher, I can find no evidence for a unique *nisus* in history. Nor, if we pack the time process with intrinsic values, can we agree with Bosanquet that "for a philosophy that knows its business, the law of degradation makes no difference." Bosanquet, of course, has no use for this time-philosophy. William James suggests that "the last expiring pulsation of the universe's life may be, I am so happy and perfect that I can stand it no longer"—perhaps the silliest remark ever made by a great man. I do not think that Urban is really doubtful about the philosophy which he expounds; but the problem of time has not yet been solved. Science seems, once again, to be resolving itself into mathematical symbols. But mathematics knows nothing of irreversible processes, nor of a *nisus* which controls cause and effect. Sir James Jeans' mathematical God, whether he is x^n or the square root of minus one, must be puzzled by the perishing universe which is the "moving image" of the unchanging. It is certainly puzzling to those who do not think that subjective idealism is a legitimate road of escape. Eddington admitted that he could see no way out of the dilemma.

And now we have a book by Aldous Huxley, duly labelled *The Perennial Philosophy*. The development in the thought of this brilliant writer towards a spiritual religion was already apparent in his *Ends and Means* (1937). He is now quite definitely a mystical philosopher. The same tendency is manifest in other independent thinkers. To myself, as is natural, it appears as one of the very few encouraging signs in the dismal age in which our lot is cast. But the perennial philosophy, for Huxley, goes much further back than Thomas Aquinas, further than Origen and Plotinus, further than St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel. It is the philosophy of India, and of the whole mystical tradition, which is fundamentally the same in all countries and behind all creeds. So at least our author thinks.

There is more than one way of studying history. We may describe it as a series of attempts to establish a decent and civilized life, interrupted and sometimes destroyed by periodical senseless wars. Parochial squabbles wrecked the two most gracious civilizations in history, those of ancient Greece and medieval Italy. The same fate now threatens the Renaissance civilization of Europe, which may or may not be now engaged in co-operative suicide.

But history may also be the biography of ideas. From this point of view we may ask whether there has been a perennial philosophy, as old not as the human race, but as the higher religion, and whether we can assign a date for its appearance. Strangely enough we can answer the latter question.

The most important period in the history of religion is not the first century of our era, but the middle of the last millennium before Christ. Almost at the same time a higher type of religion appeared in China, India, Persia, the Hellenic cities, and Palestine. The Upanishads, followed by Buddha, Laotze and Confucius in China, the spread of Zoroastranism in Persia, the Ionic philosophers and Pythagoras among the Greeks, and the later Hebrew

prophets, mark a new era in human thought. When we compare the theology of Jeremiah, Micah, and the later Psalms with that of the so-called historical books, we must admit that we are not dealing with the same religion. It is, as Christopher Dawson says, a spiritual change of profound significance, the discovery of a new world of absolute and unchanging reality. The later prophecy has its culmination in the Gospel of Christ, "the prophet of Nazareth in Galilee."

The wind of the Spirit bloweth where it listeth, and we need not discuss why this unique revelation took place at this particular time. But one fact seems to be well established. The flowering times of humanity follow the fusion of two cultures. In Greece the northern invaders mixed with the "Pelasgians." Hebrew thought was deeply affected by the Exile. Arabian philosophy flourished at the two ends of Islamic conquest, in Spain and Persia. Indian thought has been fertilized by the Aryans and by later invaders. Kabir is claimed as a co-religionist both by Moslems and Hindus. That Christianity is a syncretistic religion there can be no doubt. Isolation always tends to produce stagnation.

Even in the Catholic Church there was a good deal of what the Greeks called theocrasia, until dogma and cultus froze. The birthday of Mithras the Invincible Sun became the birthday of the Sun of Righteousness. The December Saturnalia are still honoured with plum pudding and yule logs, and by presents of a turkey to Bob Cratchit. The Isis of Apuleius, the Queen of heaven, took kindly to her promotion to be *μήτηρ θεοῦ*. In Cyprus there is a church dedicated to Panagia Aphroditessa, the Blessed Virgin Aphrodite. The *Aencadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas, alma Venus,* like many gay young women, has become ultra-respectable in her old age.

But these accommodations must not be too long deferred. There is no give and take now between Moslems and Hindus in India, nor even between separated branches of the Christian Church. And yet it may not be too late, if both sides realize that their unwillingness to learn is doing them both harm. It has been said that Christianity and Buddhism are both suffering from their refusal to respect each other. Radhakrishnan's stimulating book on Eastern and Western thought gives a long list of European and American writers who have acknowledged great obligations to Indian philosophy, and this writer himself, like Rabindranath Tagore, has not studied European philosophy in vain. Much, however, remains to be done, and, as Huxley sees clearly, the rapprochement must be through mystical religion, the communion of the soul with God, which is religion in its essential foundation.

The perennial philosophy, says Huxley, is the metaphysic that recognizes a divine reality substantial to the world; a psychology that finds in the soul something similar to or even identical with divine reality; an ethic that places man's final end in the knowledge of the ground of all being. Such knowledge can be won by those who fulfil the conditions upon which alone it can be gained. It is a faculty which, as Plotinus says, "all possess but few use." Only the pure in heart and poor in spirit can come to unitive knowledge. All the exponents of the perennial philosophy agree that man is a kind of trinity composed of body, soul, and spirit. The distinction between soul and spirit is much emphasized by St. Paul, whose *pneuma,* as the Greek Fathers recognized, is almost identical with the Platonic *nous,* and, as Huxley insists, with the Indian *atman.* Christianity, he says, has been overlaid by an idolatrous preoccupation with events and things in time, regarded as intrinsically sacred and divine. The mystics have gone some way towards liberating it from this unfortunate servitude to historic fact. Modern idolaters of progress prefer an impossible existence on dry land to love, joy and peace in our native ocean (p. 107.)

The way of life may be summed up as charity, the marks of which are disinterestedness, tranquillity and humility. That disinterestedness, or as Huxley used to say non-attachment, as the root and flower of religion, is also the creed of Walter Lippmann.

Another important distinction is that between intellect (in the scholastic sense) and reason, between *nous* and *dianoia*. Neglect of this distinction had led to much ignorant censure of "Greek intellectualism," encouraged by modern pragmatism.

The doctrine of an evolving God, with a passionate concern not with eternity but with future time, has coloured not only such popular philosophy as that of Wells, but that of Alexander and other leaders of thought. It is not Christian. Bosanquet vainly protested that to throw our ideals into the future is the death of sane idealism. The temptation has been too strong. The future, as Anatole France says, is a convenient place in which to store our dreams.

The eternal Now is a consciousness; the temporal world is known, sustained and perpetually created by an eternal consciousness. Eternal life "stands in the knowledge" of the Godhead. Popular religion has forgotten eternity and occupied itself with events in time. "Into the yawning void thus created flowed the tide of political idolatry; of which the practical consequences are total war, revolution and tyranny." (p. 278.) In the words of William Law, whose greatness Huxley appreciates, "religion in the hands of self serves only to discover vices of a worse kind than in nature left to itself. Pride, self-exaltation, hatred and persecution, under a cloak of religious zeal, will sanctify actions which nature left to itself would be ashamed to own."

This book, enriched by copious and well chosen quotations from the masters of the spiritual life, is probably the most important treatise on mysticism that we have had for many years. But many will think that it is more Buddhist than Christian. Crucial questions suggest themselves. Was the Christian revelation a mere disclosure of timeless truths, or do happenings in time affect supertemporal reality? Is the conflict with evil a real battle, still undecided? Is the growth of soul into spirit rightly described as self-noughting—*ich bin entworden*, as the German mystics said? Many of the Christian mystics have used this language. "Leave nothing of myself in me," Crashaw makes St. Teresa pray. But surely personality is enlarged, not transcended, as we advance in the spiritual life. Personality must be preserved, Plotinus says. δεῖ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι. In the spiritual world, as he pictures it, we are transparent to each other, because there is no longer anything that separates us. But this does not mean that we are no longer ourselves.

The question comes to a head when we consider our relations to our "even-Christian," as Julian of Norwich puts it. "Until we put an end to particular attachments," Huxley says in p. 122, "there can be no love of God with the whole heart." Is this true? There is, we remember, a text in the Gospels in which Christ bids us "hate" even our parents as the condition of being his disciples. If Christ ever said this, it is an example of the hyperbolical language which he permitted himself, like other popular preachers, to use without fearing that his words might be misunderstood. A cloistered contemplative might be free from particular attachments; but is this a counsel for persons living in the world? Can we love God without loving our brother also? And do not many of us arrive at the love of God through the purification and intensification of family and conjugal affection? What do we mean by the love of God? For myself, it means homage to the attributes of Love or Goodness, Truth and Beauty, in which the divine nature has been revealed to us, and gratitude for the response to private prayer, of which I have sometimes, less often than I could wish, been conscious. But the kind of

isolation which some of the extreme mystics seem to recommend would be for me a fatal impoverishment of my spiritual life. "Do I wish to know anything except God and myself? Nothing," so Augustine once says. It is not true, unless we expand our notions both of God and self far beyond our customary use of the words. The negative road, if followed exclusively, leads to Nirvana, not to the Christian heaven or the intelligible world of the Platonists. The spiritual life, as lived on earth, must be a double movement of withdrawal and return.

There is one other curious feature in this book which may or may not have a vital connexion with Huxley's philosophy. He has studied psychical research, and believes that "laboratory tests" have established the reality of some beliefs which fifty years ago would have been stigmatized as foolish superstitions. He now believes not only in telepathy but in clairvoyance or second sight, miraculous cures, the power of predicting the future, and even in levitation. Three "mystical phenomena," as they used to be called, are in his opinion on a lower level than spiritual religion, and are therefore, I suppose, irrelevant to the philosophy of mysticism, but on the material and psychical plane he believes them to be real. He speaks as a man of science, and would regard my incredulity as mere obstinacy; but though I try to keep an open mind about telepathy, of which I am still quite unconvinced, I do not believe a word of all the rest. Either Christina Mirabilis and Home, the medium, flew without wings, or they did not. If they did, the law of gravitation is unreliable. If they did not, no doubt seeing is believing, but intelligent people may sometimes see things that are not there. I know of a case when two detectives flew howling from a ghost which was, literally, only moonshine. Crookes was an honest man and a real man of science, but he was not necessarily exempt from hallucinations. He chose as the motto for his coat of arms, *Ubi crux ibi lux*. His friends amended it to Ubi Crookes ibi Spooks.

I think Thomas Huxley would have spoken severely to his grandson.

W. R. INGE.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

AFTER an interruption of seven years I take up once again my surveys of Italian philosophy. Many things have happened in the interval, but it is perhaps too soon for them to be susceptible of calm philosophical reflection. The problems that most interest the cultured public to-day are those of existentialism, of historicism and its limits, of German romanticism, and, more generally, of Germanic culture in relation to new spiritual orientations.

The interest in existentialism is due, at least in part, to the fact that it is the philosophy in fashion. But there is in it nevertheless a depth of seriousness that is not overlooked. The tragedies of recent years have placed in the foreground the problems of immediate existence, of human personality and its place in the world, which the preceding idealistic philosophy had too easily absorbed in an impersonal and trans-subjective view of the spirit and its universal values. And, as has often happened in the course of history, there has resulted a reaction of individuality, in its most irrational and vital expressions, against the pretensions of reason to dominate it from above, and imprison it in the net of its concepts.

But if, in this regard, existentialism represents a just demand, which can exercise a beneficial influence on philosophical thought, yet to many its claim to represent a new era in philosophy seems excessive. Its value is only that of an episode. Hence some interpreters of contemporary thought have been drawn to limit the importance of the new movement.[1]

To the historicist conception Croce, who is its most noted representative in Italy, has given the finishing touch with two volumes, which constitute the liveliest and most up-to-date expression of his thought.[2]

In the first of these, on history as thought and as action, in contradiction to the irrationalism and activism of Nazi and Fascist doctrines, he has reaffirmed his own peculiar rationalism, which makes the highest values of the human spirit immanent in history. And in the following work, on the characters of modern philosophy, he has collected some historical-philosophical essays with the intention of demonstrating how some of the principal currents of modern philosophy contribute to the historicist conclusion.

But it has appeared to some that the Hegelian principle of the identity of the rational and the real, which informs Croce's historicism, is too optimistic a formula, and gives rise to a too harmonistic and retrospective view of the real, leaving those rational demands that are the most effective spur to human activity still unsatisfied and at war with empiric reality. The writer of this Survey has constituted himself interpreter of such demands "beyond historicism" in a recent book.[3]

Of late years there have arisen some lively discussions on the philosophy

[1] Of the vast existentialist literature it is sufficient to mention here some of the most significant works: U. Abbagnano, *La struttura dell'esistenza*, Turin 1939; E. Paci, *Pensiero, esistenza e valore*, Milan 1940. On the other side: L. Stefanini, *Il momento dell'educazione*, Padua 1938; G. de Ruggiero, *L'esistenzialismo* (appendix to *Filosofi del novecento*, Bari, 2nd ed., Translated into English with an introduction by Rayner Heppenstall, London, Secker and Warburg, 1946).

[2] B. Croce, *La storia come pensiero e come azione*, Bari 1938, several times reprinted; *Il carattere della filosofia moderna*, Bari, 1942.

[3] G. de Ruggiero, *Il ritorno alla ragione*, Bari, 1946.

of Kant and on the leaders of German romanticism, some participants taking the view that it is to them that is to be attributed the primary responsibility for the Nazi aberrations. Now there are undoubtedly, especially in romanticism, irrational and pathological tendencies that contain in themselves the germs of future degeneration. And in a book by C. Antoni[1] these tendencies are traced to their source in the pre-romantic phase of German thought. But to conclude from this as some Catholic writers have tried to do, that the whole of the great German philosophy ought to be proscribed, is to risk throwing away the baby with the bathwater. A critical revision of the problems of the Kantian philosophy and of romanticism, which tried to avoid the two excesses of unconditional adherence and of equally unconditional repudiation, is contained in the two volumes with which de Ruggiero in recent years has concluded his history of philosophy.[2]

Studies in the history of philosophy in Italy, although impeded by the disorder of the libraries caused by war, have not been wholly interrupted. In addition to the works already mentioned, by Croce, de Ruggiero, and Antoni, an essay on Schelling deserves mention, by Susanna dal Boca, a young student who had already in a preceding volume on Leibniz given proof of great vigour of thought, and who in this second book has been able to bring to a conclusion a profound inquiry into the origin, evolution, and involution of Schelling's thought. Unfortunately, this writer, who was one of the most promising hopes of Italian philosophical history, died prematurely when little over thirty years old.[3]

Finally, among the thinkers who have lately given evidence of originality, I must mention L. Stefanini, who made his first appearance some years before the war with a vast work in two volumes on Plato, and who has recently published some very suggestive writings in which he has tried to temper certain idealistic motives, tinged with contemporary Italian philosophy, with Catholic spiritualism.[4]

The translation of Sir David Ross's book on Aristotle, long postponed on account of the war, has been recently published.[5]

[1] C. Antoni, *La lotta contro la ragione*, Florence, 1942.
[2] G. de Ruggiero, *Da Vico a Kant*, Bari, 1940; *L'età del Romanticismo*, Bari, 1942.
[3] S. dal Boca, *La filosofia di Schelling*, Florence, 1943.
[4] L. Stefanini, *Arte e critica*, Milan, 1945.
[5] W. D. Ross, *Aristotele*, Italian translation, Bari, 1945.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

Realists and Nominalists. By MEYRICK H. CARRÉ, Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol. (Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. vi + 128. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

In his preface Mr. Carré points out the "unhistorical procedure" involved in omitting from a study of the development of philosophy all consideration of the mediaeval period. This unhistorical procedure is indeed less common than it used to be, not only because it is generally recognized that the so-called Fathers of modern philosophy, men like Francis Bacon and Descartes, were, in spite of all claims to novelty, closely linked in some respects to Scholastic thought, but also because the labour expended on research into mediaeval philosophy in recent times has revealed the variety and vigour of mediaeval thought and has placed in a clear light the general pattern and lines of development of that thought. Such a caricature of mediaeval philosophy as that given by so great a thinker as Hegel (dependent, of course, on earlier, and unreliable historians) is scarcely possible to-day. It is, however, true to say, I think, that the work devoted to mediaeval philosophy by British scholars in the universities of this country has been comparatively slight, in spite of the fact that Britain produced several of the most prominent mediaeval thinkers, e.g., Duns Scotus and Ockham, and it is indeed astonishing that no one in this country has hitherto thought it worth while to edit a modern text (let alone a critical edition) of the commentary on the *Sentences* by William of Ockham. It is, then, all the more gratifying to anyone who is interested in mediaeval philosophy to find a lecturer of the University of Bristol publishing a book on certain aspects of that philosophy.

Mr. Carré's book is devoted to the development of the discussion on universals in the Middle Ages (though he does not treat his theme in a narrow and exclusive fashion) and he has chosen to pursue his aim by considering the views of four eminent men, St. Augustine, who, though not, of course, a "mediaeval," exercised a profound influence on mediaeval thought, Peter Abaelard, the great dialectician of the first half of the twelfth century, who dealt a death-blow to ultra-realism, St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest systematizer of the thirteenth century, and William of Ockham, whose critical thought anticipated the position of philosophers much later in time. Mr. Carré has gone, so far as he was able, to their actual texts, and his book is evidently the fruit of much painstaking work: one admires his courage in undertaking the work, and his book should indeed, as he hopes, "serve some inquirers who wish to reconnoitre the frontiers of a new country." Whether one agrees or not with all the interpretations given by Mr. Carré, he has certainly written a useful and valuable book. He may not convey much new information to specialists, but he does not set out to do so, and in any case specialists in mediaeval philosophy are more or less rare birds in England.

The author has clearly endeavoured to penetrate the thought of the philosophers with whom he deals within its historical context (for example, though incidentally, he realizes that Augustine's theory of the *rationes seminales* is not a statement of specific transformation or modification, but a philosophical answer to a problem of Scriptural exegesis); but I should suggest that he has not made a sufficiently sharp distinction between different types of realism. According to Mr. Carré, Abaelard made a formidable breach in the Platonic and Augustinian citadel of thought, and in a sense this is true;

but the exemplarism of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure by no means involves the type of ultra-realism which was Abaelard's primary object of attack, i.e., the theory that within the members of a species there is one essence or substance, *numerically* identical in all the members. It is quite possible to maintain the Christian Neo-platonism of Augustine without maintaining the first theory of William of Champeaux, and Abaelard himself, though a determined opponent of the early mediaeval type of ultra-realism, did not deny exemplarism or the Ideas in God. Augustinian exemplarism is certainly not open to a charge of pantheism, whereas Abaelard was only correct in pointing out that early mediaeval ultra-realism led logically to pantheism or monism, since if one is going to assert the existence of a *numerically* identical humanity in all men, corresponding to the universal concept, one should logically go on to assert the existence of a numerically identical substance in all substances or of a numerically identical being in all beings. I do not mean to imply that Mr. Carré does not realize the distinction between Platonic realism, Augustinian realism, and the early mediaeval form of ultra-realism, nor that one could not gather the distinction from his book, but it seems to me that this important point might have been made much clearer than it has been.

A few further criticisms. The use of the word "form" is occasionally ambiguous, since the author sometimes speaks of special forms or special natures, using phrases which would lead one to suppose that he is talking about specific forms, whereas in reality he appears to be speaking of accidental forms. Again, though Aquinas certainly held that in man there is but one specific form, the rational soul, which is the principle of life and sensation as well as of intellection, he certainly did not hold that the mind of man is "an organic composite of mind and body," nor did he hold that the mind "divided from its body ceases to be a mind," though he maintained that the disembodied human soul is not a "person," in his technical use of the term.

Mr. Carré points out in conclusion that the old issues are perpetually being revived in various shapes and guises. Ultra-realism of a sort may be discerned behind the Race-theory, for instance, in which the universal, the race, is made practically the sole subsistent reality, individuals being little more than accidental and unimportant modes. On the other hand, we may add, the maintenance of the rights and value of the individual human personality involves "moderate realism," since, if the concept "man" has no objective reference to an essence realized in each individual, no adequate philosophic reason can be given for anything resembling a "kingdom of ends." Mr. Carré, being no Nominalist, would doubtless agree.

(On p. 60 the last word of the first line of the final paragraph should be "though" instead of "through," while in the final paragraph of p. 81 "effected" would seem to be a misprint for "affected." The *De Potentiis Animae*, attributed on p. 83 to Thomas Aquinas, is rejected as unauthentic by both Mandonnet and Grabmann.) F. C. COPLESTON, S.J.

The Pure Theory of Law. By WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. (The University of Wisconsin Press. Pp. xii + 211. Price $2.50.)

Professor Ebenstein has written the most complete exposition of the Pure Theory of Law, the characteristic product of the Vienna School of Law, of which Kelsen was the chief ornament, which has yet appeared in English. The author is himself an able and enthusiastic member of that school which, as he points out, has caused intellectual storms "from Belgrade to Tokyo," yet he is scarcely correct when he suggests (as he does at the beginning of his

exposition) that the Vienna School has received little attention in the United States or England. On the contrary, the references to it in legal literature are frequent and increasing. All our modern writers on Jurisprudence, and a number in the United States, have paid attention to it, and some have been deeply influenced by Kelsen, perhaps because, as Professor Campbell has pointed out in a recent review of this book (*The Modern Law Review*, April, 1946, pp. 88–92), there are many important points of contact between the Vienna School and the Austinian School of Jurisprudence, more especially in the form in which the Austinian doctrine is presented by Holland. It may also be that there is another, and deeper reason for the present popularity of the Pure Theory of Law. Its most formidable rival is the sociological school, whether in its Continental or in its American form. Sociological jurisprudence implies, however, at least approximate agreement upon the ends of social organization. It means, in the last resort, the elaboration of the writer's own conception of social organization and of social justice. And as these are times of acute sociological cleavage, sociological jurists are apt to reach conclusions varying as widely as those of the naturalists in earlier times. Accordingly, the separation of the form of law from its sociological content, and the apparent certainty of method of the Pure Theory have a strong appeal. To put it another way, the Pure Theory may be applied as easily to legal systems such as those of England or the United States, as to Hitler's Germany or to the Soviet Union.

The legal philosophy of Kant has given birth in modern times to two quite distinct schools of legal philosophy—that of Stammler, with its central conception of a natural law with a varying content, and that of the Vienna School. It is the work rather of Stammler than of Kelsen which has been neglected by Anglo-American jurists, possibly because some of his work is obscure and even more remote from Anglo-American habits of juristic thought than that of Kelsen. It is perhaps too much to hope that some American colleague of Dr. Ebenstein will now do for Stammler what he has done for the Vienna School. It would seem probable that this book will long remain for the ordinary student the necessary introduction to the Pure Theory of Law, as developed in the writings of Kelsen, Verdross, Weyr and others.

One of the main difficulties of Continental legal philosophy, from the Anglo-American standpoint, is its close association with philosophy in general, and its reliance upon philosophical terminology, as compared with the stricter legalism of Anglo-American writers. For this reason, Dr. Ebenstein's first chapter, dealing with the philosophical basis of the Pure Theory is particularly valuable, inasmuch as it helps to bridge the gap for the Anglo-American reader, although even then, it is not altogether easy reading. For example, the following sentence (p. 31) is likely to prove difficult for the English lawyer: "The Pure Theory of Law subscribes to functionalism because that theory asserts, in an advanced form, the Kantian priority of epistemology to ontology; as a theory it represents the 'triumph of pure thought over the substantial object,' which is now no longer treated as having intrinsic qualities but is resolved into the objective validity of logical relations."

Chapter V, dealing with the results of a "Steps-and-Stairs" Theory of Law, founded mainly upon the writings of Merk, is particularly valuable: though a recent reviewer (Dr. Friedmann in *The Law Quarterly Review*, January, 1946, p. 99) has questioned whether in strictness this can be regarded as "pure theory of law" at all.

The Pure Theory of Law represents the most recent and most determined search for certainty in legal thought. Its method is to seek the purely legal norm, stripped of all non-legal material, and to present a picture or rather

an analysis of a legal system as a series of legal norms of descending magnitude, deduced successively from the fundamental norm, or initial hypothesis, which must be assumed or presupposed, since it cannot be enacted. The basic norm is the principle to which all legal phenomena can be attributed and by which they can have their status in law defined; but as has often been noticed, the discovery of this basic norm is an extra-legal process. At this point the Pure Theory must depend upon sociological considerations as the determining factor in the selection between one possible basic norm and another. Once the basic norm has been selected, however, the position of any actual legal rule within a legal system can be deduced with quasi-mathematical precision.

There are some misprints and a few inconsistencies in the text which can no doubt be attributed to the difficulties of war-time publication. There will be an opportunity for removing them when, as is certain, this book goes to a second edition.

G. W. KEETON.

Aesthetic Experience and Its Presuppositions. By MILTON C. NAHM, Bryn Mawr College. (Harper Brothers. Pp. 516 + 35. Price $4.50.)

It is with some misgiving that I try to fulfil my undertaking to review this book, since I am bound to confess that there is much of it I have not understood. This might be my fault or the author's; but a third and more alarming possibility remains. Can the American and British idioms of the English language be so far diverging that a reader of either country would feel less confident of understanding a philosophical book in the other idiom than in, say, French, German, Italian, or Greek?

There are few pages in the book without a sentence which I had to reread at least once; and I was not always successful. Nor was this usually due to the difficulty of the thought. Such a complaint ought to be justified, but, as the sentences in question are usually long, their quotation would be impossible in a review. I will merely give, out of some twenty-five which I have specially noted, two of the shortest and therefore least obscure: "ateleological aesthetic follows a course delineated by the same Plato whose theory of the essence of beauty culminates, once the complex demands of historical speculation are laid upon it, in mysticism" (p. 90), "to the ends of the activity in question no longer pertain the slightest implication of lack of seriousness" (p. 284). Merely verbal surprises are less serious, but symptomatic of the puzzling idiom which I deplore, and more quotable. One of the commonest words in the book is "implicated," which sometimes means "logically implied," sometimes "more or less connected." "Integral" and "integrally" are a constant source of difficulty, e.g. "the discontent integral to aesthetic experience" (p. 178). "Distributively" seems to mean "severally." We meet such phrases as "it shows a similarity of Plato's hypothesis" (p. 222); the words "former" and "latter" sometimes seem to need transposition; we find "inhere to," "rule from," "bifurcation between," "avails his art of," "mutual desires" (= common). Some of these may be slips of the pen or printer's errors (of which an unhappy example certainly occurs in the note on p. 261); I suppose, e.g. that "footless errand" should be "bootless" (p. 277). But, if so, such proof-reading is inconsiderate.

All this detracts lamentably from what should be the value of a book on Aesthetics written with an uncommon combination of learning in the history of the subject and in contemporary psycho-physics. The author's conclusion is that the work of art (for he does not consider natural beauty) is a symbol

of the artist's mood, and, as such, apt to communicate it to others. I think he somewhat underestimates the resemblance of this theory to that of Croce, overlooking that whereas he himself is concerned with the "presuppositions" (biological, anthropological and cultural) of aesthetic experience, Croce is interested solely in that experience itself. Indeed the criticism of Croce is somewhat cursory and confusing, for (on page 94) we are told that "for Croce intuition is the first stage of philosophy of spirit and presupposes but is not presupposed by practical, theoretical and economic activity." Croce and Collingwood, however, are justly criticized for their violence to linguistic usage in calling the artist's intuition "the work of art," a name usually reserved for the medium of communication.

The author is well aware that the destruction of rival theories does not prove his own; but many he does annihilate convincingly, and indeed pronounces such detailed obituaries upon them that his work is an encyclopaedia of aesthetic errors. His general thesis of the nature of works of art is to me acceptable, but his suggestion that such works have their ultimate value as encouraging us to action and his account of the biological and cultural origin of certain symbols are not convincing. There is pessimistic art which is good but not encouraging. I enjoy the play *Hamlet*, but I never regarded the man as a "leader" (the biological herd-symbol). If light were for all western civilization a cultural (not artificial) symbol of immortality I should expect Satan to be radiant.

I have not attempted to conceal my regret that the writer of a book so potentially valuable should not have maintained the clear and concise style of which he shows himself capable, as at the top of page 76, at the bottom of page 116, and the top of page 158, each of which adequately states what has been very obscurely elaborated in some scores of preceding pages.

E. F. CARRITT.

The Classical Republicans. An Essay in the recovery of a pattern of thought in seventeenth-century England. By ZERA S. FINK. (North-western University, Evanston, U.S.A. 1945. Pp. xi + 225.)

Men of the Renaissance imitated the ancients in many areas of literature and art. They were especially fond of reaffirming the political notions of Plato and Aristotle, of Polybius and Cicero. In seventeenth-century England the admiration for the practice and theory of the ancient commonwealths promoted the belief in the virtues of republicanism, and this scholarly influence lent force to the contest with the monarchy. Professor Fink describes the views of a number of writers who drew upon Greek and Roman models in the course of advocating schemes of mixed government. Some of these writers proposed that the monarchy should be abolished. A further brilliant example of republican rule was presented by the constitution of Venice, and many eulogies of the Most Serene Republic were published. The parallel that was frequently cited between the Venetian system and the government of ancient Rome recommended the system to English thinkers. The sentiments of Machiavelli, whose *Discourses* were translated in 1636, also infused republican ideas. The *Discourses* owed much to Polybius.

Classical influences entered deeply into the elaborate structure of Harrington's *Oceana*. Professor Fink rightly distinguishes the fundamental place occupied by law in the intricate plan of *Oceana*; and he points out that here Harrington appealed to the practice of the ancients. The central figure in *The Classical Republicans* is, however, Milton. The mind of the grand prophet was steeped in classical precedents, and from the early pamphlets against

episcopacy to *The ready and easy way* of 1660 he summoned ancient parallels at every point to enforce his argument. Professor Fink affirms that through all the changes of his political outlook he was constant to the beliefs that mixed governments are best and that an aristocracy of wisdom should dominate the State. It is well to discern the continuity of principles in the political pamphlets. But Professor Fink's concern for the classical features in Milton's opinions does not allow him, I feel, to notice sufficiently the historical circumstances that produced a striking revolution in the poet's attitude towards the popular element in government. The disillusionment had little to do with the view that the fall of the Roman republic sprang from plebeian encroachments. And the perpetual grand council proposed in *The ready and easy way* has very slender connection with popular sovereignty. It must be added that the author presents an admirable survey of Milton's political ideas, within the limits which he sets himself.

Classical republicanism did not die with the Restoration. Henry Nevil's *Plato redivivus* and Algernon Sydney's *Discourses concerning government* proclaim its continuing spirit. Of these writers and of others, not omitting Disraeli, the author of this excellent contribution to the history of ideas gives good accounts.

M. H. CARRÉ.

Preface to an American Philosophy of Art. By A. PHILIP MCMAHON. (University of Chicago Press. Pp. 179 text, 180–194 notes and index.)

This is a difficult book. Words are defined in unusual senses, the style is nebulous and the arrangement is discursive. The introduction (pp. 1–12) offers an apology for the title, certainly necessary but not very acceptable. There follows (pp. 13–102) an attack on idealist philosophy, of which idealist aesthetics are said to be rather the basis than the result. But the criticism of idealism most emphasised is that it is not American, is even un-American, "undemocratic," and in fact comes from Germany, to which it is said to be "appropriate," a country recently defeated in a war against the United States who are now "a major power." "A philosophy of art worthy of Americans should not impugn the normal impulses of a rational human, and therefore social being." To be "consistent with American traditions" is therefore "a distinction rather than a limitation." "There exists no moral obligation or political demand that would compel Americans to accept an illogical theory of art."

The criticism of idealist philosophies begins with Descartes and ends with Hitler. Hegel and Croce and Collingwood are not discussed. This is followed by a more tolerant account of the "Classical Explanations of Art" (pp. 102–49), which "have a direct relation to basic American insight" in their "moral idealism and intellectual naturalism."

In the last thirty pages we come to "Contributions to an American Philosophy of Art." Art is strongly distinguished from "aesthetics" which is used to mean beauty. "A work of art presents an organized pattern of sensory data and it is a product of technique. The senses for which such an object offers occasions of ordered experience are chiefly those of vision, touch, equilibrium, and direction. The way in which these data are composed as matter of a form secures for them, as a rule, a high degree of temporal persistence." Music and poetry are excluded from "art" on the ground that their products are physically transient and that when we go to an "art-museum" or "art-school" we do not expect to meet them. No more concrete examples are given of art than "Greek sculpture and architecture," but it seems that the arts of plumbing and drainage must be included. The ex-

cellence of such products is (*a*) "logical," i.e. the degree of "order" introduced into the "data," (*b*) "ethical," i.e. their subservience to human welfare, (*c*) historical, i.e. their record of the "beliefs by which their makers lived," (*d*) "aesthetic," i.e. "affection" or "enjoyment" in the widest sense. The last is neither peculiar nor indispensable to works of art. Yet if asked in what the excellence of the *Primavera* or a Chardin or a Vermeer consists, I cannot help thinking we should only name its aesthetic qualities.

Finally, I confess that I never discovered the spiritual homogeneity claimed by the author for Americans. Perhaps because I only spent a year in the U.S.A.

E. F. CARRITT.

The Adventure of Youth. By OLIVE A. WHEELER, D.Sc. (University of London Press, 1945. x + 212. Price 6s.)

It is regrettable that philosophers, speaking generally, no longer concern themselves with educational problems, but prefer to leave this field to the "educationists." In so doing they neglect the precept and shining example of Plato who thought such problems very much their concern. Certainly in this period of great educational changes when what we do now must deeply influence the life of tomorrow, it seems to be the philosopher's especial duty to ponder upon the proposed changes and to comment on them.

The work here under review provides an excellent introduction to educational problems; it is a compact, well-balanced examination of the whole field of education at the present moment as it applies to adolescence. The author's wide acquaintance with the practice of education and her long study of its theory make her a very competent guide. Her discussions of the various difficulties which now meet teacher and administrator are very effective and very persuasive.

One of the author's fundamental convictions is that education must be child-centred. Unless this principle is borne in mind education can very easily become exploitation—exploitation of the child in the interest of industry in the case of the so-called vocational training of trade schools; exploitation in the interest of party, a social class or a political party; exploitation in the interest of a religious sect; or even, finally, exploitation in the interest of selfish parents. In all these cases education fails in its purpose. Its true purpose is to prepare each individual child for as full and as abundant a life as it is possible for him or her to live.

Education must be child-centred in another sense; it must take into account the whole child and *all* his needs. It cannot, therefore, confine itself to book-culture, nor to intellectual training in the ordinary sense. It cannot neglect a training in skills, technical training in a non-vocational sense, and again a training of the emotional life and of the moral life. Moreover, the child is not isolated. He is growing up in a society which on the one hand provides him with a rich inheritance and, on the other, demands much from him. He has to be trained to value his inheritance and to meet the social demands.

The period under consideration in this book is adolescence, that is roughly 13 to 17. The author thinks it a period of "four major life-adjustments." Dependence on parents ceases, obedience to parents ceases to be the criterion of morality and "a morality of co-operation," the author thinks, comes in its stead. The youth begins to feel independent and this is associated with the first great adjustment—the finding of a vocation. Secondly, there is a new adjustment to the other sex, for a mate has to be found. "Thirdly, there are new social emotions, preparing the individual to assume the responsibilities of citizenship. Then there are also new or intensified aesthetic and religious

emotions, the prelude to the fourth great adjustment—the finding by the individual of a religion, a moral code or a working philosophy of life." (p. 142).

In some form or other every boy or girl has to meet the challenge of these four adjustments, but the response is different because the children vary. They vary in intellectual endowment, in special aptitudes and in temperament. And there must be provision for these variations. Accordingly Professor Wheeler proposes a course in which due attention would be given to a basic curriculum which all children should follow, whilst also many alternative courses would be provided, only some of which would be taken by any one child, according to its interest and aptitude. She even ventures to list the items in the basic curriculum: (*a*) health education, (*b*) training in thinking and in the clear expression of thought (*c*) guidance in choosing a job, (*d*) social training, (*e*) appreciation of art, (*f*) moral and religious training.

I have no space in which to follow the details of the various chapters. I should have wished to discuss in particular the argument of the fourth, dealing with the main lines of development during adolescence, the seventh, dealing with juvenile delinquency, the ninth with co-education, boarding schools, examinations, and so on, the eleventh concerning the curriculum, and lastly the fourteenth, with its very wise treatment, as I think, of the difficult question of religious education.

I shall confine myself instead to one or two general remarks. First, I wish the author had given greater attention to the problem of rural education and to the whole matter of the relation between urban and rural schools. Secondly, she has brought out a point which is undoubtedly very true, namely, that the educational ideal in a secondary school is very different from that, say, in a university. Especially now that secondary schooling is for all and not for the few who would in many cases go on to the university, the end of the one is not the end of the other. It is admittedly very difficult to say what the end of university life at present is, but the philosophy of education which lies behind it still sets as its ideal the pure love of learning and the disciplined, and frequently arduous, search for knowledge. Now this cannot and ought not to be the ideal in the secondary school. Professor Wheeler is surely right when she sets before us a philosophy of secondary school education which is inspired by another ideal, namely, preparation for life. Consequently the angle of approach must be different. The only comment I would make here is that even at the secondary school level, the love of learning for its own sake should still be a subsidiary ideal. This will help to save us from schools which concentrate on "social" and "useful" subjects and which completely neglect genuine mental discipline. Professor Wheeler, of course, understands this need, as the second item in her proposed basic curriculum makes clear. But less competent exponents of the new philosophy of secondary school training may and do neglect it with disastrous results.

The last point I wish to make is that Professor Wheeler demands almost too much from the teacher in one respect. It is good to see her emphasis on the importance of the teacher, and on the high seriousness of his calling. But I wonder whether we can expect of each teacher "a direct insight into the meaning of life" (p. 207). There must be very few who have this direct insight. What of the rest of us? Are we to be excluded from the great profession of teaching?

I can heartily recommend this book to the attention of philosophers.

R. I. AARON.

NEW BOOKS

A Sketch of Mediaeval Philosophy. By D. J. B. HAWKINS. (London: Sheed and Ward. 1946. Pp. 148. Price 6s.)

The author of this little work has performed a notable feat. He has surveyed the vast career of mediaeval philosophy from Boethius to the renaissance in 130 pages and has contrived with admirable skill to present a lively sense of the leading doctrines and movements. A glance at the course of the narrative will indicate the measure of his achievement. He considers first the sources and aims of scholastic thought, referring to several positions assumed by philosophy in relation to theology in the Middle Ages, positions that were considerably more varied than some people suppose. The work of Boethius is next described. There follows a chapter on the systems of Erigena and of Anselm. In the third chapter the rise of the controversy over universals and the theory of Abelard are related; and a section is given to the teaching of the universities. The next chapter is crowded with the story of the recovery of Aristotle through the Arabs and the Jews. The tale now passes to the high period of mediaeval philosophy and reviews in successive chapters the work of St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus. The chapter on Aquinas is naturally longer than the others and presents the most difficulties to an innocent reader. Mr. Hawkins manages even to include accounts of the ethical and political views of the Angelic doctor. Chapter VIII treats of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and includes a valuable reference to the empiricism of Durandus. It passes on to the terminism of Ockham; after which the narrative, for the first time, tends to become a catalogue of names. The final chapter describes the sterile repetitions of later scholasticism and its fatal divorce from the new philosophy. There is a useful bibliography.

An historical sketch must expect the querulous chant with which an anthology of poetry is inevitably received, that it leaves out this or that favourite passage. I will not waste words on any compliant of this nature over Mr. Hawkins's sketch; on the contrary, I think it is wonderful to see how much he has worked in of the essential development of mediaeval reflection without threatening the inexpert reader with indigestion or giddiness. Whether he is writing a paragraph on Averroes or on the exemplarism of Bonaventura or on the Five Ways of St. Thomas, Mr. Hawkins penetrates with the easy lucidity of a master of his subject to the main issue. Pedantry will demand a change of emphasis here and there, or request a little clarification at one point or another. And since in a review pedantry must be allowed a fling I will add a few questions that have arisen in the course of the pleasant reading of the book.

Can the later Averroists and the Ockhamists all be fairly described as rationalists in the modern sense of the term (p. 14)? Many of the fourteenth-century Ockhamists advocated fideism. Is it not a little disproportionate to lay such weight on the ontological argument of the *Proslogion* to the exclusion of the reasoning of the *Dialogue on Truth* and of the *Monologion* (p. 29)? Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion* requires to be understood in the light of the Augustinian perspective developed in the earlier works, especially in the light of the doctrine of the relation of necessary truths to being. In describing the philosophy of St. Thomas would it not be better to begin with the metaphysical principles rather than with the theory of knowledge (p. 77)? The doctrine that knowledge and being are correlative rests upon the metaphysical principles. The account of Thomist knowledge on p. 79–80 might, I feel, mislead the student, especially the reference to *principia per se nota*. The important consideration is "*habitus ille principiorum est acceptus a sensibilibus*." Scotus's teaching on *ratio formalis* (p. 104) remains to the present reviewer obscure, even after Mr. Hawkins has explained it.

But instead of pursuing these queries I would like to quote many delightful utterances that enliven the pages of this book. I must confine myself to proclaiming that I think it is the best brief survey of mediaeval philosophy in the English tongue.

M. H. CARRÉ.

States and Morals. By T. D. WELDON. (London: John Murray, 1946. Pp. xi + 302. Price 9s.)

This is a useful and timely book. Nothing has been written in English since Bosanquet's work in 1899 which deals with the philosophical issues in politics with the same sense of the importance of theory and of its relevance to fact.

Mr. Weldon first divides theories of the State into "Organism" and "Machine" theories. The Organism theory makes the State fundamental and men its instruments; the Machine theory makes men fundamental and the State their instrument. The Machine view is subdivided into the Force theory and the Democratic (or Consent) theory. The former name is misleading since all States exercise force. The essential difference depends on whether the force is used "as the means whereby a comparatively small number of people impose their will on a more or less reluctant majority" (p. 98) or whether the force expresses the will of the majority. Mr. Weldon then goes on to exhibit the political philosophies of the classic European authorities as examples of one or other of these views. He concludes from this examination that any one of the three "definitions" of the State can be logically worked out with complete consistency. Therefore none is *theoretically* superior to any other. So far, political theories are like geometries, Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Each is internally self-consistent, and consists of the working out of the implications of one or more postulates. The next step is that of application. Which definition best describes actual States? In putting the issues in this order and in his actual arguments from this point onwards, Mr. Weldon is breaking new ground, though observers at Yalta, San Francisco, Paris, and New York may well feel that only some such theory as his can explain the present international *impasse*.

He maintains that none of the three definitions fits all actual States. No actual State now exemplifies the Force theory (and perhaps none ever did). Actual States do exemplify both the Organic and the Consent theories. But these theories are incompatible with each other. Thus there can be no one political philosophy. Why is there this dead-end? It is because the Organic and the Consent theory rest on two incompatible *moral* beliefs about the value of the individual. Any basic political theory is ultimately a moral theory. But since the opposition is between two moral views, it is useless for the upholders of the two views to argue with each other. No man ever changed his basic moral beliefs as a result of argument. Nor is it sensible for one group to regard the behaviour of the other as immoral or wicked. Both groups are moral but have different moralities. We should feel towards Russian or German State-worshippers as we feel towards Quaker conscientious objectors. Nor is it wise to try to impose a form of State on men who hold the moral beliefs appropriate to the opposite form, or even on men who have not yet clearly recognized the moral code appropriate to the form in question.

Finally, Mr. Weldon maintains that moral values are relative and that all conflicts between basic moral beliefs are insoluble. Just as there is no one political theory which fits all the facts, so there is no one political theory which is "right" or "ideal." We, in democratic countries, must get on as best we can with Organic States (their citizens and governments). We must not

abuse or upbraid them. We must not try to alter them or even hope to convert them. For such a hope would imply that we were right and they were wrong. An upholder of the democratic theory is doubly debarred from "exporting" his form of government, because this interference with the moral standards, the free choice, and the self-determination of the citizens of other States is contrary not only to the relativity of moral values but also to his own moral standards of freedom and self-determination. Recognition of this final *impasse*, Mr. Weldon thinks, would make for toleration, would diminish senseless recrimination and the attempt to foment revolutions in other lands, and would promote understanding in international relations. It also shows just why world-states (or federations including "organic" and "democratic" member-states) are forever impossible.

In this analysis, the Force theory is given short shrift. But it might be shorter still. If political theories are to rest on moral foundations, the Force theory since it is a-moral is ruled out of court. No actual State exemplifies it; and in my view, the two authorities quoted as upholding it would be able to complain. Hobbes seems clearly to hold a Machine view. The State exists to guarantee security to individuals. Accepting his Machine hypothesis we might well argue against him that the powers he gives his Sovereign (monarch or assembly), including the power of determining its own successor, are much greater than is necessary. To speak of the "Marxist State" as a Force State is of course literally accurate since Marx did say the State was the means by which the masses were exploited by the few. But it is misleading, since Marx held that the necessary controls should be exercised by an association of producers' organizations and such an association would be in a much truer sense "the Marxist State."

There seem also to be dangers in calling the other species of the Machine theory "Consent" or "Democracy." The Force theory treats the State as the exploitation of some citizens in the interest of others. The alternative to it should be the theory which regards the State as force exercised for the benefit of all individual citizens without distinction. Democracy may be the best means to this end, but it is not an infallible means. The exploitation of a minority by a majority would be a Force phenomenon. Democracy is subdivided by Mr. Weldon into Radical Democracy (such as that of the U.S.A.), which rests on abstract human rights, equality, and law, and Individual Democracy which recognizes and fosters differences in human individuality (the tendency in Great Britain). This again seems to me less fundamental than the differences of interpretation of "the benefit of all individual citizens" which mark off the major split in democracies to-day. Some States recognize liberty (liberties, or private enterprise, or voluntary co-operation, or choice of profession, or freedom of conscience, or freedom of speech) as one of the most important ends which Government should promote (though of course such "promotion" would have to be mainly negative and to appear as protection or respect or guarantees). Other States concentrate on such "benefits" as housing, health, education, comfort, social security (where of course "promotion" can take very positive forms) at the expense of liberty wherever this seems required.

Mr. Weldon's view that fundamental political conflicts are moral conflicts seems convincing and his corollaries concerning tolerance and the export of political systems sound. But there should be less ready agreement with the view that moral standards are wholly relative and that therefore there is nothing to choose, morally or philosophically, between the Organic and the Machine theory. He himself makes several solid points against the Organic theory, and many of them would be felt even by citizens

of Organic States. Does any citizen of an Organic State really believe that morality is exhausted by what the State commands? Nor does he really believe that he is not only entitled but morally obliged to treat non-members of his State as mere tools, with complete disregard of their interests. The Organic theory requires both conclusions. It also requires inequality to the extent of sacrificing ruthlessly whole classes of individuals within the State; Mr. Weldon even suggests at one place that it requires slavery (p. 74). Perhaps some of the more fanatical controllers of Organic States may have said such things and even acted as if they believed them. But it is difficult to feel convinced that our contrary view is a mere consequence of our democratic traditions. For even Germans were ashamed of Belsen and of the pogroms of 1938. On the Organic view their shame would be both unjustified and inexplicable. Moreover the Organic view, so far as it rests on a moral conviction concerning the relation of individual to group, does not lead to *State* supremacy but might equally lead to Church or Trade Union supremacy. These bodies, as Rousseau saw, have "general wills" in relation to their members. To achieve or justify State supremacy, the Organic theory must either, like Rousseau, destroy the other associations (i.e. adopt the Force theory) or plead (like Aristotle with his theory of self-sufficiency) that the State is a better instrument for satisfying individual needs than they are (i.e. adopt the Machine theory).

A final difficulty is that the Organic theory cannot be worked out coherently. Its basic concept, "national interest," can be analysed or illustrated or applied only in terms of individual interests. Those Germans were wise who decried reason and philosophy. The Organic theory can retain its distinctness and its vigour only for those who refuse to think. It is in fact, like primitive animism, a superstition (though a very natural superstition).

The value of Mr. Weldon's book, especially for students and non-professional philosophers, is little affected even if these criticisms are well-founded. Such a book should convince the reader that its problems are real and important; it should stimulate him to think about them and provide him with a clear and ordered set of arguments and issues to consider. All this Mr. Weldon has done.

J. D. MABBOTT.

Time, Knowledge and the Nebulae. MARTIN JOHNSON. (Faber & Faber Ltd. 1946. Pp. 189. Price 12/6.)

This book deals with the nature of time and of scientific knowledge from the point of view called by Dingle "Modern Aristotelianism," E. A. Milne's kinematical relativity being expounded and defended. It is important firstly because E. A. Milne in a foreword gives it his blessing so that it must be accounted a serious contribution to the theory, and secondly because it is the first account of kinematical relativity written by a physicist. Before, however, philosophical deductions are drawn from a theory of mathematical physics it is first necessary to look at it closely as mathematical physics. This we shall attempt to do and we shall have occasion to point out that much of the argument of the book turns on the vagueness with which the terms used are defined and on the, apparently unconscious, introduction of arbitrary assumptions into the mathematical structure.

The Introduction and Part I are mainly philosophical in character and are written in such a highly allusive manner that they may be fairly said to contain more assertions than reasoned arguments. But three clear-cut points do emerge: Firstly it is suggested that the unquestioning identification of the

time-variables of atomic and of macroscopic physics may be illegitimate. Secondly causal laws must be replaced by "functional dependance" which "means that the physical behaviour is found to be describable by a set of variables, the magnitudes of which under given conditions are relatable to one another by mathematical form: manipulation of this form therefore permits, if certain of the variables move over a range discovered by observation, that certain others may be inferred to have definite magnitudes." The first of these points is a pertinent speculation, the second is an admirable basis for all mathematical physics. But the third point, which is the cornerstone of Johnson's treatment, is of much more doubtful value. It concerns the communicability of knowledge: laws must be expressed in such a manner that one observer can communicate them to another. So far so good, but it is next claimed that a necessary condition for communicability is that the signals sent between observers in transmitting scientific knowledge must have a constant velocity. This, it is alleged, is an epistemological requirement though a moment's reflection will show that such is not the case. I daily communicate scientific knowledge to my students using as my signal a sound wave which travels with a variable velocity depending on the temperature of the air in the room and on the prevailing air currents in it. Or I may use a letter as my signal which travels with speeds varying from zero to, say, sixty miles an hour during its journey. The only case in which, in fact, knowledge is never communicated is between the ideal Lorentz observers considered by Johnson who signal to one another by means of light which travels with a constant velocity. In other words Johnson is arbitrarily assuming that a constant velocity of signal is required for communicability and restricting the term "scientific knowledge" to mean the information which could be so communicated.

In the first chapter of Part II we have an excellent account of the mathematical derivation of the Lorentz transformations of special relativity and of their applications in electromagnetics. But here again we find an unconscious preliminary assumption coming into play. Johnson has earlier defined coordinates but there is nothing in the definition which compels him to combine them according to Pythagoras' theorem as he now proceeds to do. His x and y might just as well be latitude and longitude on the earth's surface in which case the combination $x^2 + y^2$ has no invariant meaning. The arbitrary assumption that space is Euclidean has crept in unawares. In Einstein's treatment this assumption, together with that of the constant velocity of light, are working hypotheses and no more. Still more important is Johnson's omission to mention Einstein's assumption that *for each observer* spatial and temporal measurements are the results of independent operations. Yet it is precisely this feature that constitutes the difference between special and kinematical relativity.

The next chapter contains an account of general relativity which does not bear out the promise of its predecessor. What indeed is to be thought of a treatment which omits all reference to the cardinal feature of the theory, the element which distinguishes it from all other theories using a space-time representation of events—Einstein's gravitational equations? In his discussion of the expanding universes, Johnson dismisses the work of the last twenty years as "misspent ink" and reverts to a chapter of the "Mathematical Theory of Relativity" written by Eddington in 1924 at a time when he, in common with other relativists, had not considered the possibility of a "non-statical" space-time. When speaking of the "curvature of space," Johnson shows that he is confusing the common-sense meaning of the term "curvature" as "amount of bending" with its technical meaning in Riemannian geometry where it is

merely another name for the Riemann-Christoffel tensor. He has himself provided the escape from the resulting paradoxes through the notion of "functional dependance." The so-called "curvature of space" is that mathematical function which expresses the dependance of the average pressure and density, velocity and acceleration of matter in the model universes, on the time and therefore on one another. Moreover Johnson seems to believe that different *theories* are required to construct the Einstein, de Sitter, Eddington and other model universes. All these are special sub-cases of a particular case of *one* theory—general relativity. The particular case arises from the working hypothesis that the system of the nebulae can be regarded as spatially homogeneous and the sub-cases correspond to different time-dependances of the velocity and acceleration of matter and to different initial conditions in its distribution, compatible with the homogeneity requirement. An analogy may make Johnson's standpoint clearer. He is in the position of a writer on Newtonian planetary theory who, in the first place, never mentions the inverse square law of gravitation but discusses only the "curvatures" of the possible elliptical, parabolic, etc., orbits, and who, in the second place, thinks that a separate *theory* is needed in each case to show that the path may be an ellipse or a parabola or a hyperbola.

After this melancholy display, the persevering reader passes on to an excellent account of Milne's theory of equivalent observers and of his remarkable theorem in pure mathematics that the Lorentz transformation between coordinates is independent of the particular method of assigning coordinates used in special relativity. Firstly, time-variables need not represent a physically measureable time but simply a time consisting of an enumerable set of instants. Secondly distance-variables are not independent of this "enumerable time" but are assigned as follows: Let an observer A send out a light-signal to another observer B at the instant t_0, in A's enumeration let it be reflected by B and return to A at the instant t. Then A says that B's distance is $r=\frac{1}{2}c(t - t_0)$ where c is a constant conventionally agreed to between A and B. All this is unimpeachable pure mathematics: the difficulties begin when it is regarded as mathematical physics, little mention of which will be found in Johnson's book. There is firstly the crucial requirement that observers can regraduate their clocks, i.e. choose a new enumeration of instants related by some mathematical function to the old. As Johnson shows, this means that two or more equivalent observers can regard themselves either as at mutual rest (the dynamic time-scale) or as in mutual relative motion (the kinematic time-scale) according to the rate at which their synchronised clocks work. There is however nothing in the definition of equivalent observers (pp. 85-86) which prevents me from regarding myself and the driver of an approaching bus in whose path I stand, as equivalent. Hence by agreement with the driver we can make our watches go at a rate which makes the distance between me and the bus a constant and saves me from being run over. No kinematical relativist has (prudently) carried out this experimental verification of the theory: it is merely arbitrarily asserted that the bus-driver and I are not equivalent observers.

More serious still is the fact that in astronomy the displacement of spectral lines in the light emitted by luminous bodies and called a Doppler shift is a very common phenomenon. Portions of the solar surface, stars of our Galaxy, as well as the nebulae exhibit it. All these manifestations of the phenomenon can be correlated on the basis of the concept of relative velocity "in the line of sight" provided that relative velocity cannot be transformed away by time or space transformations. The expanding universes constitute the particular application of the concept to the nebular system. But in Milne's theory only Doppler shifts exhibited by the nebulae are considered and relative velocity

has no meaning. By a suitable choice of time-scale the observers on all the nebulae can regard themselves as mutually at rest. When such a scale is in use, the Doppler shifts observed become inexplicable and a new "principle of nature" has to be invoked to account for them. It is that radiation frequencies and the energy of an atom are constant on the kinematic time-scale. Such a notion might well be thought to require much supporting argument: Johnson merely states (p. 108) that "there seems reason to believe" in it. Its effect is to dissociate the Doppler shifts exhibited by the nebulae from all others.

Secondly, there are the mutually contradictory mental characteristics which must be attributed to the observers themselves. On page 122 they are "mere recorders of the reception and despatch of signals," elsewhere they are "not human beings" and "automata." Yet on page 85 they are found to be familiar with graphical methods, with the idea of a mathematical function and with the methods of manipulating such functions. They are so lacking in scientific curiosity that they never construct two clocks working at different rates—the equivalent of the regraduation of one clock—to find out if their description of nature is altered according as they look at one clock or the other. Yet they are technicians so transcending human engineers that they can despatch signals to, and receive them from, the Andromeda nebula. Can it be that kinematical relativity is, after all, science as it would appear to these strange creatures and not as it appears to a being with the mental equipment of man?

The last chapters of the book are philosophical in character and reviews in a brief and allusive manner the ideas on time of Bergson, Ward, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Russell, Kant, Whitehead, Broad, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, McTaggart and Plato, all in thirty pages. In conclusion, there are two appendices one of which is devoted to Milne's acceleration formula which is called "gravitational" though it can only be reconciled with the ordinary meaning of this term by asserting that the constant of gravitation is, in fact, a variable with time. Application of the formula to the motion of Mercury does not account for the motion of the perihelion any more than did the Newtonian theory. Johnson however follows Milne in suggesting that it should be applied to the elucidation of the shapes of the spiral arms of nebulae though no verification by an appeal to observation is forthcoming.

In thus criticizing kinematical relativity, we do not wish to suggest that Milne's *method* is illegitimate in mathematical physics. Newtonian mechanics, Dirac's theory of the electron, general relativity all start in the same way as does Milne, by laying down certain initial postulates and developing their mathematical consequences. Where Milne's theory diverges from the others is that, when these consequences are found to be contrary to experience and observation, the initial postulates are not abandoned or re-formulated. Let us in conclusion answer Milne's *cri de cœur* in the foreword where he says "that the structure he (Johnson) describes is substantially free from errors of argument I am convinced. But physicists seem to demand something more." Undoubtedly they do, and what they ask for is that the deductions from a theory should neither be in flat contradiction with experience nor that they should require the importation of ad hoc hypotheses to account for phenomena already adequately incorporated into the scientific scheme. G. C. McVittie.

Berkeley's Immaterialism. By A. A. Luce, M.C., D.D., Litt.D. (Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. Price 6s.)

Professor Luce, already well known for his writings on Berkeley, holds the chair of Moral Philosophy at Trinity College, Dublin, where Berkeley was

a fellow. As he writes he looks out on the same Dublin mountains on which Berkeley looked, and with the same conviction of their sensible reality. This book is no mere pious exercise in cool and critical evaluation of a distinguished predecessor, like Professor Broad's *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*. It is the work of a convinced disciple, presenting and defending the teaching of his master to a generation misled by many misinterpretations of it, but living at a time when the conception of material substance is already wearing thin and the trend of thought in physics, in literary and aesthetic criticism, and to a lesser degree in Christian Theology, portend its final disappearance and the acceptance of Berkeley's immaterialism.

In philosophy itself, Professor Luce thinks, the signs are less clear. Philosophers, and particularly professors, are represented as confining themselves for the most part to "silent sympathy" with immaterialism, oppressed by a natural fear of being misunderstood by their scientific colleagues (p. 159). Professor Luce, we feel, is setting them a stirring example of outspokenness, an Irishman's challenge to English indecision and compromise, and to Scottish caution.

The sub-title of the work is "A commentary on his (sc. Berkeley's) 'A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.'" The author contends that that work contains a full and complete statement of Berkeley's case for immaterialism, and presents a view which Berkeley never modified. It appears also to be the author's conviction that this view is free from any inconsistencies, and that the arguments are all sound and together make up a complete and unanswerable case. Few philosophers are likely to agree with this. It is a large claim to make on behalf of any philosopher, however great, original and perspicacious, who was not also divinely inspired.

The Introduction gives a short sketch of Berkeley's life, designed to dissipate misconceptions of the man; Chapter I deals with misinterpretations of his doctrine. The Introduction aims at presenting him as "a normal man of flesh and blood in constant and fruitful touch with the real world," describes his diplomatic work and his attempt to found a college in America, and discusses the order and mutual relations of his philosophical writings. "The false Berkeley . . . of legend and textbook tradition, . . . the long-haired and languishing visionary . . . " is unrecognisable in this short biography.

In Chapter I the author maintains that Berkeley was not (*a*) a Christian Scientist, (*b*) an acosmist, (*c*) a pantheist, (*d*) a pampsychist, (*e*) an idealist. The last two are the commonest and, though most excusable, according to Professor Luce, the most misleading misinterpretations. A pampsychist, Professor Luce tells us, is one who believes that nothing exists except mind. But Berkeley maintained a "dualistic immaterialism," maintaining that two sorts of objects exist in the full and proper sense (or senses) of the word "exist"; minds and ideas. Ideas are not, according to Berkeley, what Descartes thought they were, mere modes of the existence of mind, though Berkeley did perhaps begin by thinking of them as such, as indicated by the passage from a private notebook, quoted by Professor Luce on page 23, which he admits to be pampsychist:

> "Nothing properly but persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist, all other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons."

Professor Luce's point could perhaps be put by saying that Berkeley's final view was that minds are the only substances, but not that only substances exist.

Conversely, an idealist should be a person who believes that "all is idea" (p. 26). But Berkeley maintained that both ideas and spirits exist, and most

emphatically that spirits are not ideas. Kant, we are reminded, was probably the first to label, or libel, Berkeley as an idealist in his *Refutation of Idealism* where the account he gives of Berkeley's view, of which Professor Luce quotes a sentence, is, according to him, "not even a burlesque" and "must have been derived from hearsay" (p. 26). More important and less dubious is the contention that Berkeley was not "the father of modern idealism." Modern idealists "distrust the senses and exaggerate the powers of the human mind"; they "regard man's mind as determinant of knowledge, constitutive of reality, imposing its forms and categories, like creative spirit moving on the formless deep." "There is nothing of all that in Berkeley." We must grant to Professor Luce that Kant was wrong in saying that Berkeley held that "objects in space are mere products of the imagination," and that Berkeley differs from modern idealists in regarding the Divine mind and finite minds as distinct existences, and the object known as having an existence independent of our knowing it. But if anyone chooses to call Berkeley an "idealist," meaning thereby that Berkeley believed that nothing exists except minds and their ideas, I do not see why he should not do so, providing he gives notice of his meaning.

The body of the work consists of an exposition of the arguments of the "Principles," including the "Objections and Replies," in the order in which they were written, doing full justice, perhaps sometimes more than justice, to the "tactics" and "dramatics" of the book. The exposition is for the most part just and inspiring. I shall comment only on those portions of it with which I am not in full agreement.

My first and greatest quarrel with Professor Luce is that I do not share his complete satisfaction with Berkeley's account of the existence of material things when not perceived by any finite spirit. It seems to me that Berkeley is not consistent in his views, and that Professor Luce does not face this inconsistency. In Section III of the "Principles," Berkeley says of his table, "If I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it." It's existence, as Professor Luce says on page 64, is perceived existence or perceivable existence. Tables do not cease to exist when not perceived. Their existence consists in the fact that they are perceptible. The same view is put forward in Section LVIII on the reality of the unperceived motion of the earth. But in Section VI Berkeley says "so long as they (sc. the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth) are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit." But if existence, as he has said, can mean perceptibility, this simply does not follow; so long as they are in principle perceptible (like the motion of the earth) they "exist," and there is no need to suppose the Eternal Spirit to save them from non-existence. Neither in his treatment of these two passages in Chapters 5 and 6, nor in his treatment of the objection from perpetual annihilation and creation in Chapter 2, do I find Professor Luce resolving this inconsistency. There is much vague and inspiring talk about "climbing with Berkeley to the heights," "taking a bird's-eye view of the perceptual situation as a whole," "passing in thought from my microcosm to God's macrocosm," and "providing a home for the perceptible." But this talk seems to me to fail to meet the difficulty. I would further urge that no discussion of this question can be complete without consideration of the passage about creation at the end of the third dialogue. This passage is only mentioned by Professor Luce in his Introduction (p. 10), where it is described as "more or less new," but not indicating a change of doctrine. There is no discussion of

it. But the passage is crucial. Hylas objects to Berkeley's account of unperceived existence as existence in the mind of God, on the grounds that all things exist from all eternity in the mind of God, so that the existence on which they enter at their creation, their temporal created existence, must be of another kind. Philonous replies:

> "May we not understand it (sc. creation) to have been entirely in respect to finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed that they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which he then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a *relative*, or *hypothetical* existence if you please."

This position is clear and intelligible; but it involves the rejection of the view, suggested by Berkeley in several passages, that the existence of material things, in the ordinary sense of "existence," when not perceived by finite minds, consists in their being perceived by God. The gardener means by the existence of the tree, when not perceived, temporal created existence in the space-time order. This existence, Berkeley now admits, must be the "hypothetical" existence of perceptibility. The Eternal Spirit is still required as the cause of the form and pattern of the perceptible, but not as its "home." It is the "decree" of God, not his ideas or perceptions, which gives existence to sensible things.

My other quarrels can be more briefly stated. In Chapter 8 Professor Luce defends Berkeley's difficult argument in Section XXIII of the "Principles." He says that Berkeley here argues that "imagined existence is perceived existence imagined." This may be what Berkeley ought to have said, or part of what he said. But I still think that Berkeley was mistaken when he said that it is a manifest repugnancy to conceive books or trees existing unconceived or unthought of. Berkeley here surely means that it is the fact that I conceive them which makes it self-contradictory to say I conceive them existing unconceived. This is a way of arguing often adopted by idealists of the kind from whom Professor Luce distinguishes Berkeley. It is a fallacious way of arguing. It is self-contradictory to say that I conceive something which is conceived by nobody, but not to say that I conceive of something as having existed before I conceived it, or that I conceive of something which would have existed even if I had not conceived it. Let even Berkeley be allowed to talk nonsense sometimes; this piece of nonsense does not affect his main position; do not let us try to torture it into sense.

Professor Luce several times says that the question whether matter exists is a question of fact. "This is no question about a mere concept or category, or a point of view, or the use of terms; fundamentally it is a question of fact . . . ." (p. 157). He also says "Matter . . . is rather a way of thinking than a thing thought" and "Nothing in *rerum natura* corresponds to the term." Now to say that it is a question of fact whether matter exists, suggests that "matter exists" is a significant proposition, and that the question is whether it is true or false. And Professor Luce suggests that it is false because neither inspection of the perceptual situation nor the researches of physicists reveal any such thing as matter. But surely Berkeley's contention is that the term "matter," in the sense of a corporeal substratum, and the term "exist," as used in connexion with it, have no meaning at all. And Professor Luce does seem to recognize this, at times very clearly, in Chapter 5 on "The Meaning of Existence." If this is so, on Berkeley's view, the question of fact is whether we can attach any meaning to the word "matter," not whether, having attached a meaning, we can discover something such as we mean.

Chapter 10 is concerned with Berkeley's account of the distinction between the real and the imaginary. Professor Luce rightly supports Berkeley in saying that when in an actual case we wish to draw the distinction we make no use of the abstract conception of matter; we turn to certain empirical tests based on the familiar order of experiences. But surely it must be admitted that Berkeley's account of what these tests are is very far from being an adequate one. It is not merely "lawlessness," faintness and inconstancy that mark the delusion. An hallucination might perfectly well be very regular in its occurrence, very vivid, and very steady, and yet remain an hallucination. It is rather the kind of laws which it obeys which mark it as a delusion. Appearances connected with others in our own experience and that of other persons by the laws of motion and the laws of perspective are appearances of real material objects; appearances connected with others in our own experience and that of other persons by these laws and by the laws of refraction and reflection of light are illusory appearances, but still appearances of real things; they are, for instance, images, mirages, reflections; appearances connected by physiological and psychological laws only with other appearances in our own experience, and with those experiences of other persons which constitute states of our own bodies, are hallucinations.

Berkeley's contention that "outness" or distance is not seen but inferred might also with advantage be recognized as a dubious one, rather than left to be accepted on the authority of the prophet.

It is only on the subject of our knowledge of other minds that Professor Luce admits an inadequacy in Berkeley's treatment. "Whatever the reason, his treatment is summary and sketchy; he does not take the issue squarely on its merits . . . ." Few would deny that this puzzling problem becomes even more puzzling if we accept the *esse est percipi* principle, and should have been given more extended treatment by Berkeley.

Professor Luce ends his book with an interesting Appendix on "Immaterialism to-day," where he suggests that the views of modern physicists show that the notion of matter is on its deathbed, if not already dead. He well says, "A laboratory experiment, however far-reaching its conclusions, starts from objects of sense, ends with objects of sense, and establishes facts about objects of sense, working throughout by reasoning based on perceptions of sense . . . " and asks how, if that be so, the concepts of subatomic physics can be concepts of *matter* in any sense of the term not applicable to the things we touch and see. The supposed unobservable entities inferred from what we can observe have lost their credibility as they have become shorn of the time-honoured abstract qualities of solidity, impenetrability, indestructibility, and simple location in three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time. They must either be regarded as unknowable agents or sources of energy, of whose intrinsic nature we can know so little that scientists are well-advised to say they "are what they do," and metaphysicians may without absurdity suppose them to be thoughts or volitions of an infinite Spirit; or else they must be regarded as mere symbolic entities, logical constructions out of their observed effects, no more concrete and no more "material" than the centre of buoyancy of a ship. It would be interesting to know which view the fact of the atomic bomb would seem to Professor Luce to support; he mentions it in a footnote as, in some way which he only describes as painful, bearing out the truth of his argument.

To end on a note of commendation, of which this book deserves more than I have space to give, Chapter 2 gives a short but admirable account of Berkeley's views on abstract ideas, and the important truth they contain, though we should have welcomed a more extended examination of the

nature and necessity of "concrete thinking." Chapter 5, on the meaning of existence, shows an understanding of and sympathy with the grounds of the *esse est percipi* principle, which if the reader once share, he will never again be troubled by such realist arguments as appear for instance in Professor Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*. Finally in Chapters 4 and 19, Berkeley's doctrine of our notion of spirit is expounded in a manner that shows once for all the falsity of the accusation that Berkeley allows an "abstract idea" or "a priori concept" to enter his philosophy by the back-door, under the alias of a "notion."

D. G. C. MACNABB.

Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise. By RACHAEL M. KYDD. (Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. ix + 196. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book is devoted chiefly to an elucidation and examination of Hume's treatment of the intrinsically important and long-discussed question of the part played by reason in the determination of conduct, although the author declares her main interest is in the general problem and not in Hume. The latter's problem and discussion are first shown to be rooted in the controversies and speculations of his own and preceding times. Post-Reformation philosophers, feeling the need of a basis for morality other than Revelation, had by Hume's time all come to believe that in one way or another morality depended on reason; yet the interpretation of this position was a matter of much dispute and there was urgent need for a critical examination of the opposing approaches to the problem. This is where Hume steps in. The author then proceeds to a detailed consideration of the relevant sections of the *Treatise*, which she analyses with care, patience, and sympathy in order to bring out the practical influence of various kinds of judgments—demonstrative theoretical and practical judgments and empirical theoretical and practical judgments. At several points, it is worth noting, she has to admit the force and merit of Hume's arguments. At the same time, I think that a reader may find difficulty with some of the author's argumentation, such as the *Black Bess* argument; for, as the issue is one concerning the influence of demonstration on conduct, it seems that something else is involved in desiring the specific horse *Black Bess*.

The author is to be commended for dealing with a side of Hume which has been somewhat neglected in comparison with his epistemological theory and for giving the philosophical public such a study as this. It has its limitations due to the express isolation of a specific problem, the consequence being that Hume's doctrine of the Passions and his theory of Belief are not elucidated even though they are closely linked to his moral theory; indeed he himself declares that belief is "almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions" and defends his doctrine of belief by the plea that it "may give us a notion after what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions." It is a pity that the nature of the problem of reason and conduct is not more fully elucidated at an early stage in the book because (1) most of the discussion is of purely factual matters, (2) it is not until the last chapter that reference is made to a more specific problem concerning the relation of reason to *moral* conduct, (3) there remains doubt about the nature of practical judgments and moral judgments respectively. The author's examples, such as going on a Mount Everest expedition, in the discussion of the influence of various kinds of judgments, are concerned with matters of fact and do not raise a moral issue, although they do raise a practical one. Hume himself does emphasize the distinction in several passages, one im-

portant one being quoted by the author; and the point of his criticism of Clarke and others is that fitness and unfitness is a factual affair. According to Hume "morals have an influence on the actions and affections . . . morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions" (Everyman Ed., pp. 166, 167). The term thus cannot signify actions themselves or be another name for conduct; the important thing lies in the signification of such words as laudable or blamable, merit or demerit, virtue or vice, or in general by ethical terms; and for Hume such terms are quite distinct from such terms as reasonable or unreasonable, true or false. This distinction removes some of the sting from his much criticised, and to many odious, statement that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions: that view is expressed in a passage where he is dealing with a question of fact and is followed by the Third Book with its exposition of his moral theory, the consequence being that the passions in their operation, hence actions, and hence reason itself come under the restrictive influence of *morals*. The general trend of his argument is to deny that "reason" is in any way inherently ethical in character or that there is any necessary connection between what is rational and what is moral. There is a good deal of evidence from experience that "reason" may be employed for vicious action as well as for virtuous and that thus it is ethically neutral. Those who object to Hume, whether Ethical Idealists, or the author herself who, following Spinoza, suggests the idea of "a passion to act rationally for its own sake," are, I suspect, reading into "reason" an ethical, in addition to a factual, character. It needs to be emphasized that what seems to be in dispute is the nature of "reason." This is the challenge thrown out by Hume. If his attempt to define the role of reason by analysing the factual side of conduct does not of itself permit of the conclusion that the role is a factual one and a factual one *only*, and if this conclusion rests much more on an assumption that if reason enters into "morals" it must be capable of causing desire and hence action, his line of argument may be unsatisfactory, but his challenge, only tentatively taken up by the author in her last chapter, remains.

B. M. LAING.

Books also received:

University Pamphlets by various authors: *The Mind of the Modern University, The Christian in the Modern University, The Place of a Faculty of Theology in the University of To-day, Halls of Residence in Modern Universities, "Vocational" and "Humane" Education in the University, Work and Vocation, Religion in the University, Calling all Freshmen, Universities under Fire, Christianity's Need for a Free University, The Foundations of a Free University, Objectivity and Impartiality*. London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1946. 1s. each.

T. D. WELDON (Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford). *States and Morals. A Study in Political Conflicts*. London: John Murray. 1946. Pp. xii. + 302. 9s. net.

WARNER ALLEN. *The Timeless Moment*. London: Faber & Faber Ltd. 1946. Pp. 245. 10s. 6d. net.

JOHN LAIRD. *Philosophical Incursions into English Literature*. Cambridge University Press. 1946. Pp. 223. 12s. 6d. net.

BERTRAND RUSSELL. *History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with, Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1946. Pp. 916. Price 21s. net.

THOMAS HOBBES. *Leviathan: or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. Edited with an Introduction by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. lxvi + 468. 8s. 6d. net.

PHILOSOPHY

JOHN LOCKE. *The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter concerning Toleration.* Edited with an Introduction by J. W. Gough. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. xxxix & 165. 8s. 6d. net.

J. S. MILL. *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government.* Edited with an Introduction by R. B. McCallum. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. lv. + 324. 8s. 6d. net.

ERNEST A. PAYNE. *Henry Wheeler Robinson.* A Memoir. London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd. 1946. Pp. 212. 12s. 6d. net.

JOHN SOMERVILLE. *Soviet Philosophy.* A Survey of Principles. New York: Philosophical Library Inc. 1946. Pp. xii + 269. 3 dollars 75 cents.

CHARLES E. RAVEN, D.D. *Religion and Science: A Diagnosis.* (L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture No. 16) delivered on May 1, 1946, at Bedford College. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. 16. 2s. net.

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Indian Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1943. Editor: Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan. Pp. 289. No price quoted.

Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica. Milan: Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. January, March, August, October, 1945; March 1946.

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie. Naarden, Holland. August 1946.

RUDOLF KAYSER. *Spinoza: the Life of a Spiritual Hero.* With a Preface by Albert Einstein. Translated by Amy Allen and Maxim Newmark. New York: Philosophical Library. 1946. Pp. xix. + 326. 3 dollars 75 cents.

MICHAEL POLANYI. *Science, Faith and Society* (Riddell Memorial Lectures, Eighteenth Series, University of Durham). London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. 80. 2s. 6d. net.

V. N. DEVARA, B.A. *Theory and Practice of Philosophy.* Kalahastri. Chittoor Dist.: V.N. Devara. 1945. Pp. 68. Price 2 Rupees.

MERLE W. BOYER. *Language and Religion in the Light of the Analysis of Signs.* Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago. 1946. Pp. 20. No price quoted.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. *A Study in History* (Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D. C. Somervell). Oxford University Press (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs). 1946. Pp. xiii + 617. 25s. net.

W. D. LAMONT. *The Principles of Moral Judgement.* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1946. Pp. xxi. + 225. 15s. net.

C. LAMBEK. *Four Essays: Time and Reality, Objectivity, Logical Coherence, Antagonisms in the Individual.* Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard, International Publisher. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. 108. 7s. 6d. net.

R. C. K. ENSOR. *Some Reflections on Herbert Spencer's Doctrine that Progress is Differentiation.* The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford May 28, 1946. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. 28. 1s. 6d. net.

W. F. ZUURDEEG. *A Research for the Consequences of the Vienna Circle Philosophy for Ethics.* Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon N.V. Pp. 244. No price stated.

MARTIN FOSS. *The Idea of Perfection in the Western World.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, O.U.P. 1946. Pp. 102. English price 8s. 6d. net.

IMMANUEL VELIKOVSKY. *Cosmos without Gravitation.* New York and Jerusalem: Scripta Academica Hierosolymitana. 1946. Pp. 24. No price quoted.

NEW BOOKS

ANDREW PAUL USHENKO. *Power and Events.* (An Essay on Dynamics in Philosophy). Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press. 1946. Pp. xxi. + 301. English price 20s. net. (Oxford University Press).

MUHAMMAD RAFI-UD-DIN. *Ideology of the Future.* Published by the Author (Prince of Wales College, Jammu). 1946. Pp. v. + 561. No price quoted.

HENRY N. WIEMAN. *The Source of Human Good.* Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 1946. Pp. vii. + 312. English price, 20s. net. (Cambridge University Press).

CHARLES BERG. *Deep Analysis. The Clinical Study of an Individual Case.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1946. Pp. 261. 12s. 6d. net.

KH. ABDUL HAMID. *Ibn Maskawaih.* A Study of his *Al-Fauz al-Asghar.* Published by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore. 1946. Pp. 130. Rs. 2·8.

SOREN KIERKEGAARD. *Works of Love.* Translated by David F. Swenson and Lillian Maruin Swenson. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. xiv. + 317. 18s. net.

SIR EDMUND WHITTAKER, F.R.S. *Space and Spirit* (Theories of the Universe and the Arguments for the Existence of God). London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons. Ltd. Pp. vii. + 149. 6s. net.

REV. LEONARD HODGSON. *Biblical Theology and the Sovereignty of God.* Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. 28. 1s. 6d. net.

REV. E. L. ALLEN, FRANCIS E. POLLARD, G. A. SUTHERLAND. *The Case for Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.* London: The Central Board for Conscientious Objectors. 1946. Pp. 72. 2s. 9d.

J. G. MCKENZIE. *Nervous Disorders and Character.* London: George Allen & Unwin. 1946. Pp. ix. + 94. 5s. net.

A. R. UBBELOHDE. *Time and Thermo-Dynamics.* Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. vii. + 110. 6s. net.

A. H. SMITH. *Kantian Studies.* Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. vii. + 196. 15s. net.

ARTHUR PAP. *The A Priori of Physical Theory.* Morningside Heights, New York: King's Crown Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. x. + 102. English price 13s. 6d. net.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER. *A History of American Philosophy.* New York: Columbia University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. xiv. + 646. English price 25s. 6d. net.

JOSEPH L. BLAU (Editor). *American Philosophic Addresses, 1700–1900.* New York: Columbia University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. xii. + 762. English price 38s. net.

WALTER FALES. *Wisdom and Responsibility.* An Essay on the Motivation of Thought and Action. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. vii. + 166. English price 14s. net.

BRICE PARAIN. *L'embarras du choix.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1946. Pp. 200. 180 fr.

F. H. CLEOBURY, Ph.D. *God, Man and the Absolute.* A Study of the bearing of philosophy on Christian Theism. London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd. Pp. 150. 15s. net.

INSTITUTE NOTES

A course of lectures on "Contemporary World-Outlooks" was given in the Michaelmas Term, 1946. It is proposed to publish these lectures in a book entitled *Philosophies of To-day*, which will contain a chapter by Bertrand Russell under the heading "My Own Philosophy." When the book is ready, a notice to this effect will be inserted in the Journal.

If members have back numbers of the Journal for which they have no further use, perhaps they will kindly write to the Institute giving details. Arrangements might then be made for them to donate such copies towards restocking libraries on the Continent.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. WHAT IS REPRESENTED IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT? W. D. HANDCOCK, M.A., B.Litt. 99

II. ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF GOD AS FINAL CAUSE. PROFESSOR T. M. FORSYTH 112

III. IS *THE PRELUDE* A PHILOSOPHICAL POEM? W. B. GALLIE, B.A., B.Litt. 124

IV. DESCARTES' "SIMPLE NATURES." JOHN HARTLAND-SWANN, B.A., Ph.D. 139

V. DISCUSSION: R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. W. H. WALSH, M.A. 153

VI. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE . . 161

VII. NEW BOOKS 167

VIII. CORRESPONDENCE 191

IX. INSTITUTE NOTES 192

ARTHUR STANLEY EDDINGTON MEMORIAL LECTURESHIP

LAST year an appeal was launched to provide for the founding of an Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lectureship to commemorate Eddington's life and work, by providing for lectures on some aspect of contemporary scientific thought considered in its bearing on the philosophy of religion, or on ethics, and to be delivered periodically in Cambridge, or elsewhere, and to be published. The Foundation Trust Deed has now been completed, and the following four Trustees have been appointed:—Professor Sydney Chapman, F.R.S., representing the Royal Society; Professor C. D. Broad, Litt.D., F.B.A., representing Trinity College, Cambridge; Dr. Kathleen Lonsdale, F.R.S., and Dr. W. H. Thorpe, representing the Society of Friends. Mr. Howard Diamond, A.C.A., 45 St. Barnabas Road, Cambridge, is Honorary Treasurer and Secretary to the Trustees.

The Fund is still open, and approximately £1,000 is now needed for its completion. It is hoped that the first lecture on the Foundation will take place towards the end of the present year.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXII. No. 82 JULY 1947

WHAT IS REPRESENTED IN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT?

W. D. HANDCOCK, M.A., B.Litt.

IT is an odd thing that after two and a half centuries' experience of representative government—if we take the 1688 Revolution as our starting point—we have still no very certain or coherent theory of what it represents. The easy-going eighteenth-century idea that their own sense of political responsibility and the ties of political sympathy uniting them to the people at large enabled representatives chosen from among the "natural" leaders of the nation adequately to fulfil their representative role, despite the meagre measure of choice exercised in their denomination; and the rather later notion that the function of a representative system was to reflect the class structure and dominant interests of the nation, have both failed to survive criticism at the hustings, and the spread of political consciousness associated with the rise of democracy. Modern ideas identify representative government with self-government, and insist on applying to it Colonel Rainboro's dictum that "the poorest he (or she) that is in England hath a life to live, as the richest he." On the subject of what representative government represents there may nowadays be distinguished two views; what may be called the popular, or hustings view, and the academic theory, which, while different in form, preserves the same general character as the hustings view.

The hustings view is unqualified majoritarianism. Representative government is government by the will of the majority. Certain ideas underlying, or associated with this view may profitably be distinguished. The most important is that of individual right. Majoritarianism is no respecter of tradition, or birth, or inborn talents, or acquired experience; it is no respecter of persons at all, only a counter of them. In its view there is no species of authority that gives one person or class of persons the right to push others around; everyone,

indeed, has a presumptive right not to be pushed around. The admitted exception to the presumption proves the rule; the authority that can and must be accepted is the right of a majority to will what it wills even over the opposition of dissentient minorities and individuals. This is democratic rule, and must be accepted whithersoever it may lead, and it has led a long way from its starting-point. The corollaries that follow from this rule are that extensions of the suffrage are everywhere good; that no government or act of governmental authority that has not the warrant of a majority under universal suffrage has more than provisional right; that no government not based on universal suffrage is solidly and permanently founded, and that governments so based are; and that the most "logical" system of representative government is that which, within the unit of government, gives the most precise effect to the majority principle. Associated with these ideas is an even profounder vein of sentiment; the feeling that good government is popular government, that successful measures are those which show the deepest insight into the conditions and feeling of the country as a whole; and this finds expression in the belief that political wisdom and authority ascends upwards, that the source of governmental inspiration is the people, that to be popular, in a literal sense, is for government the receipt which will infallibly make it both wise and strong.

It is not difficult to riddle majoritarianism with criticism. But criticism in the past has not had much effect on it; and indeed it is always difficult to kill a major organizing idea by criticism, even if the criticism reaches its root, which perhaps has not been the case in the present instance. Literally, self-government is anarchism, no government at all. If right means anything, majority right means nothing; moral questions are not mathematical ones, and a majority may have the power, but no tenable argument can demonstrate its right to override the right of minorities and individuals. Nor does counting heads always save breaking them; there are things that minorities will not stand from majorities, and force is not always with the majority. As J. S. Mill wrote from under the shadow of the hedonistic calculus, "one person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests." Majoritarianism affords no indication of the unit within which majority right is supposed to prevail; on its own terms it applies as much to a chance collection of Englishmen and Russians, black men and white men, as to a historic nation or province, such as Ireland or Ulster; or in another direction, it makes no distinction between a historic church and a claret-club.

Nor does popular government stand up any better to analysis. Great Britain combines the longest effective tradition of constitutional government with universal suffrage, and in this country, if anywhere, evidence of popular control should appear in the working

of representative government. Yet from the standpoint of the average citizen it amounts to little more than that approximately once every five years he is given the opportunity of voting for one of two or more persons belonging to organized sets of persons known as parties, each of which puts forward, as an inducement for his vote, its proposals or programme for the government of the country in the future, particularly the next five years. Unless he belongs to a relatively small politically active minority, he has had no share either in the choice of the persons for one of whom he is to vote, or in the drawing up of the programmes. It is true that the latter will have been composed with an eye on him and his like, but they are most probably calculated to as little as can be expected to keep him quiet, or as much as he can be expected to stand; and under any form of government he may well get as much attention as this. The candidates proposing themselves for his suffrage will be more concerned with their party's programme, or with their own ideas, than with his. With the casting of his vote his participation in political processes, which is supposed particularly to distinguish the representative form of government among others, ceases in the main for another five years. From time to time remedies have been proposed to strengthen and increase the popular participation in government; closer control over party policy by party congresses, proportional representation or the alternative vote, the referendum, and stricter control over representatives. None of these has made an effective conquest of the jurisprudence of democracy, and their lack of marked success suggests a lack of vitality and realism in the principle which dictates them. In the Weimar Constitution of the German Republic, described by Mr. A. J. P. Taylor as a "text book constitution for the Professor of Political Science," the attempt to apply the majority principle was made with Teutonic thoroughness. The weakness of the resulting governments opened the way to Nazism.

The academic view is that what is represented in representative government is the national or the general will. The theory is variously stated. In its more extreme form it postulates a unitary general will, not perhaps necessarily distinct from individual wills, so that the number of wills in the society is the number of individuals plus one, but as fully a will as individual wills, and underlying and subsuming them. More moderate views, while admitting the interdependance and common conditioning of individual wills, deny that these justify the postulate of a common will, and are content to think of the general will as no more than a common form of expression of individual wills. Summarizing very broadly, the grounds on which the general will is alleged may be brought under two heads; the historic process, which deals wholesale rather than retail with

men; moulds societies, creates standing communities of interest, prejudice, sympathy, antagonism and aspiration; and mass-produces individuals even to the flavour of the time and place in their characters, rather than being itself the product of individuality: and the moral and social nature of man, which makes us members one of another in the fullest and profoundest sense, and which in each individual finds adequate polarization only in the idea of a good common to his fellow members of society with himself. These factors constitute the basic unity of the state, and condition the expression of individual wills. In representative government what is important to be represented is these common elements in the social life, rather than individuality as such; and in the context particularly of current political issues, the machinery of representative government is looked on primarily as a means of elucidating and clarifying them. The policy which expresses them is a true expression of the wills of the members of the society. This seems to be the view of representative government dominating the recent discussion of the subject by Sir Ernest Barker.

The general will theory represents a considerable and important advance on majoritarianism. It recognizes the significance of history for political theory. Majoritarianism is, in origin and intrinsic character, pre-historical and pseudo-scientific. It admits only one reality in the processes of social life, the individual will; conceives it as a self-contained entity; and knows only one way, counting, of dealing with it. It is a view which makes history the accident of individual decisions, and the historical interpretation of individual character meaningless. Secondly, the general will theory indicates the unit within which self-government is a reality, the unit within which solidarities of the kind referred to above in fact exist, or can reasonably be anticipated. Thirdly it provides the basis of a theory of political obligation, which majoritarianism cannot do; by insisting that personality, in the sense of the full life of a man, cannot be achieved in a society of self-contained and self-regarding individuals, it makes it intelligible why the individual should obey an authority outside of himself and not wholly referable to himself. Fourthly, it provides a more realistic criterion of the machinery of representative government than the mathematical one of majoritarianism; its purpose is to maintain a relation of lively responsiveness between society, conceived as a system of integrated interests, beliefs, desires and sympathies, and the organs of its government.

But as an answer to the fundamental question about representative government, the question, namely, what it represents, the general will theory cannot be regarded as satisfactory. In one sense it is too historical; it confounds the present with the past, and swallows up politics in history. The historian, regarding past epochs,

when time has eroded inessentials and knit together division, can look on their conflicts as moments, simply, in the unfolding of a single process, expressions of a single national will; but at the time of their enactment the ends are all open, the conflicts are real, and it is the condition of their dialectical resolution that those taking part in them should regard them as real. Thus, when it is wanted to supply the answer to an urgent political problem the general will is not there. It may be said that if not present *in esse*, it is present *in posse*, that it is ascertained through the processes of the constitution. Argument here tends to be circular; on the one hand constitutions are to be framed to elicit the general will; on the other, although at the time of the conflict no general will exists, decisions arrived at through constitutional process are to be regarded as decisions of the general will. A view put forward by Professor MacIver, in his *Modern State*, distinguishes between the "General Will not so much the will of the State as the will for the state," and the support of the constitution, the Will of the People, the Ultimate Sovereign, which really governs, and the Legislative Sovereign, which presumably reigns, but does not govern. Lord Lindsay enunciates the sovereignty of the constitution as the expression of the settled will of the community as to its mode of living and proceeding. It is not easy, however, to distinguish between willing in the constitutional context, and willing in any other political context. Even rigid constitutions, where the distinction corresponds to formal hypothesis, grow by constitutional conventions, and at times show a quite improper flexibility. So far as concerns the British constitution, it seems proper to remind the proponents of this class of theory that *'il n'y en a point!'*. Constitutional law is the same as any other law. The element of permanence about it is due, not to the mobile factor of will, but to stable factors of tradition, circumstance, and purpose, which incidentally would seem solid enough to sustain that "necessary minimum of Natural Law" which Francois Gény postulated. Will theories face an inescapable dilemma. Either there is a unitary general will, in a real and not merely in a metaphorical or illustrative sense, or there is not. If there is not, we are left with individual wills, and in explaining the constancy of what is, by definition, the free and mobile factor in social process, we must look for stabilizing factors; the social nature of man, historical tradition, standing circumstances and permanent needs; and distinguish these from the wills which they condition. Otherwise we confuse factors whose role in the social process is essentially different. The general will theory belongs, in fact, to the mythology of politics, not that it does not convey very important truths, but that it is not true itself.

The root of confusion is that the general will theory is attempting

to answer, not the questions arising from its own fundamental conception of social reality, but those suggested by the atomistic individualism which it superseded—the question, namely, by what right the State overrides the sovereignty of his own will with which the individual is born. It is trying, as it was with Rousseau, to find the form of an association in which the individual is as free as he was before. Historically, however, the general will theory marks the transition from the conception of a pre-social state, in which men, as Bentham put it, merely conversed together, without forming permanent social ties, to the view, which the whole body of speculation, and of historical and anthopological study since has confirmed, that however far back we go historically we do not reach a pre-social state, and however far we carry our analysis of human nature, we do not succeed in emptying it of social content. It follows from this that man is born, not free, as Rousseau said, but in chains, caught in social ties, bound by rule, subject to authority. The authority to which he is subject is not accidental, or purely arbitrary, it is the authority of things as they are; and the principle of human freedom lies, not in the repudiation of authority, which is anarchism in principle and impossible in fact, pure errancy of will, nor in the attempt to reduce authority to present will without understanding how it arises and what it is there for, but in the ultimate power of the will to make things as they are things as they might be—a power that to be effective must be exercised according to circumstances, and since circumstances are in continual flux, is bound to the labour of Sisyphus. As Professor Collingwood has written, "The rational activity which historians have to study is never free from compulsion, the compulsion to face the facts of its own situation. The more rational it is the more completely it undergoes this compulsion. To be rational is to think; and for a man who proposes to act the thing that it is important to think about is the situation in which he stands. With regard to this situation he is not free at all . . . The freedom that there is in history consists in the fact that this compulsion is imposed upon the activity of human reason not by anything else, but by itself."[1] Authority is a social fact; no authority is intrinsically legitimate, and therefore none intrinsically illegitimate. What legitimates or condemns it is the use to which it is put.

The supererogatory anxiety to prove a right to authority has resulted in the will theory's misconceiving the fundamental nature of the State. Green's well-known dictum—which, incidentally, had the distinction been current in his time, would have been applicable to society, not the State—has to be reversed. Force, not will, is the basis of the State. Mightless right makes no State; on the other

[1] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 1946, p. 316

hand rightless might may do. A state is justified by works, and to do them it must work. Government corresponds to permanent necessities of man's condition. Two elements only are essential to the State—power, and the ability and willingness of power to govern. Willingness can usually be taken for granted. The elements of power vary according to the conditions of the society; from military prowess, the ownership of many flocks, the reputation of special intimacy with the Gods, through hereditary position and possessions, to the control of large economic undertakings or of formidable propaganda organizations. Power politicalized, that is power that has taken on the job of government, is already becoming transformed; it is adding increments to itself as recognition of its function is established, and it is enlarging its own purview. The binding in of outside sources of power to the organization of governmental power—as they develop, and as occasion offers—so that on the one hand, the instrument of power may be secure, and on the other, power may learn to take responsibility—or alternatively, the breaking of power that cannot be used for government—this is the practical task of State-building and State-maintenance. It has nothing necessarily to do with the will of the people, except in circumstances where the will of the people—which in less pretentious terms means that of popular political organizations—represents both solid and usable political power.

As to the job of government, its content depends entirely on circumstances. Its form can be defined along traditional lines as the maintenance of law and order, so long as it is remembered that law and order has a concrete content, and that government can break its teeth trying to maintain one kind of law and order, and establish itself unchallengeably in maintaining another. A safer definition is perhaps the maintenance of the necessary uniformities, understood in relation to the time and the place, things and people as they are. It is because its task is the maintenance of uniformities that government needs force, and needs—not necessarily a monopoly of force, which in concrete terms is impossible—but as much force as will comfortably cover the jobs actually in hand or in immediate prospect. The filling up of the form of government with the content of policy and measures can perhaps be conceived, but it cannot practically be approached in terms of carrying out the will of the people, or, to substitute again a less pretentious but more realistic phrase, in terms of carrying out people's wills. Government cannot be carried on in defiance of people's wills, nor, for any length of time, without their support. But people's wills are conditioned by their circumstances, as often unconsciously as consciously, and what represents them is not what they will say in answer to an open question, but what they prove to want of the alternatives practically before them.

It is on political leaders—acting with more or less responsibility as the maxim that responsibility should follow power has been given effect in the government—that they depend for knowledge of the feasible alternatives, that is, for knowledge of their own wills. The job of government is, therefore, to be directly defined by the necessities of the given social situation on the one hand, and its possibilities on the other—again given things and people as they are. For the practising politician it lies between the extremes of the least that will keep people quiet and the most they will stand. It is the specific expertize of politics to discern these limits. Between them there is room for everything from ruthless and tyrannical exploitation of class or popular passion and greed to the leadership which by realization of the best possibilities of the time prepares the way for a better. Outside of them is the field in which labour the idealists who sow and tend the aspirations towards which the future can be shaped by a new generation of politicians working in new circumstances, and the as-yet unrecognized social forces and changes whose effects, in one generation, so often mock the hopes of its predecessor. Government must operate within the limits of the politically possible, and within those limits it must also accomplish a job, or it will come to grief, and have to give place to another—a clique of revolutionaries in possession—the phrase is Louis Madelin's —to a Napoleon, a Nicholas II to the embarrassed phantom of a Kerensky, and ultimately—not by processes of constitutional right —to a Lenin, a Weimar Republic to a Hitler. Political power is thus socially conditioned. It arises from the circumstances of its time, is supported or tacitly accepted because it accords with the facts and needs and ideas of its time, and passes when it persistently misconstrues its time. The prejudice against accepting the definition of the State as force arises from considering force in too abstract a light; from a failure to realize that what must, in the nature of things, be intended is social force, which cannot transcend, and must to some extent be subdued to the medium in which it works. Yet the notion of political authority must also be precise; it is the power to impose upon men's wills, sanctioned by sufficient penalties; in Duguit's brutal phrase[1] it is the axe of the executioner, and the sabre of the gendarme. Force is the instrument of government; yet it is in the exercise of a wise, and ultimately of a necessary foresight, that, as Rousseau says, the holders of force seek in general to convert their force into right. In the measure that they see and do the jobs to be done they succeed, and force gathers to itself consent, which multiplies its efficacy and eases its tasks. This constitutes a pragmatic right, which lasts as long as it continues to be earned. On the other hand, the abdication or surrender of a force which is adequate to its job is,

[1] Léon Duguit, *Traité de Droit Constitutionnel*, 1921, vol. 1, p. 395.

on the part of the holder of the force an abdication of the duty he has set himself; it is also a denial of the legitimate expectations, which amount to pragmatic rights, of the governed; and is contrary to the principle of government, which is that the instrument of government must be preserved.

We return to our original question, what is represented in representative government? The answer imposed by what we have already said is of a simplicity almost as engaging as that of the small boy who was asked to comment on the Emperor's new clothes. What is represented in representative government is opinion organized as force. One of the most quoted of dicta is Hume's statement that all government rests on opinion. We need not dispute its truth; while noting, however, that minds less acute than Hume's have drawn the corollaries that all and any opinion serves as a basis for government, and that government does not reach its logical term until it is based on all opinion. All government is therefore in some measure representative. In the instances of so-called despotic government which Hume quotes, where the circles from which government draws its positive support are restricted in relation to the much wider circles which it has only to take care not too far to antagonize, government, which functionally is care of the public thing, is representative only in a limited sense, since its function and its principle of structure are out of line. It becomes virtually representative in so far as it identifies itself with popular interests and feelings; and in politically undeveloped communities may, in fact, provide a more real representation in this way than could be afforded by electoral machinery. Whether, therefore, virtual should be changed into formal and actual representation, is a question to be decided by the probable consequences, in the light of actual facts and circumstances, rather than on general principle. Constitutionalism, to justify itself, must signify a higher power of government than that which precedes it, or is in possession; either in the sense of integrating further bodies of solid and reliable opinion with the existing instrument of government, or in that of widening and sharpening the government's perception of the jobs to be done, which in practical politics is not so very different a thing. It was within this range of ideas, under Tudor aegis, that constitutionalism in this country began its effective career; and such conceptions may not unfairly be said to have limited the successive extensions of the franchise under the Reform Bills of the nineteenth century. Nor, on the face of things, need it be said that those of the twentieth century have disregarded this principle, except that franchise extension has now been carried as far as it can be, and, in politics, at any rate, when there is no longer some inconsistency about the practical application of a principle to keep its spearhead foremost, what lies behind the point is apt to be

forgotten. It is, however, a fallacy too widely accepted, or at any rate too rarely challenged, that increments of voters invariably bring accessions of wisdom and strength to government.

The normal idea of representative government is of one in which popularly elected representatives play a leading part. One form of this is Parliamentary, as distinct from cabinet and party government. In this the principal part of power lies with the representatives themselves, not as members of parties dividing both Parliament and electorate, but in their quality as representatives. A near cousin is where parties are local and sectional, and transitory, rather than national and permanent. This form of government fulfils neither the idea of government, nor that of representation. It is not fully government because it is not continuously concerned with the public thing, but with steering between sectional or party and personal interests which by hypothesis make no pretence to be national. It is not fully representative because there is not, in local and sectional parties, anything relevant to government to represent. Government is concerned with national interests and policy, and with sectional interests only in so far as they form part of the national whole. Under the circumstances of Parliamentary government, government has to be achieved in spite of, rather than through the representative principle, and this form of government is useful only as a transitional and educational stage in the preparation for the governmental role of bodies of opinion too strong or too obstreperous safely to be left out in the cool. It proves, sometimes, a luxury beyond the means of a society anxious to embark on a career of self-government. Professor Namier's studies of the workings of eighteenth-century parliamentarism throw a searching and valuable light on this subject. Broadly speaking, before 1688, government was in the hands of the King, and party was opposition. After 1688 in theory the position was the same, but in practice the increased strength of Parliament meant that if government in any real and full sense was to be possible, Parliament had to be more than a check on government, it had to be part of government itself; and the period up to the fall of George III's personal government in 1782 is more even than a period of transition, it is a period of experiment, until the lines of a solution of the problem began to emerge. The solution was, of course, cabinet and party government. But the elements of this solution were not historically prepared in 1688. Party was still predominantly connexion, based on personal and local ties. Professor Namier shows how this situation affected government. To secure steady support from parties and groups whose constitutive principle was not policy but interest, "corruption" was essential. It was the only way in which the power to follow a policy could be secured. It played the same part in the working of eighteenth-century parliamentarism

that party organization and discipline play to-day. It was, in fact, operated without any particular sense of shame. The recipients of favour were not inordinately selfish or grasping men; indeed, on clear issues of national honour and interest they were as capable as anyone else of rising above considerations of self. But Parliament did not conduct its daily business on the basis of the public interest, because the parties which conducted elections to it were not extended to that basis. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same may be said of the parliamentarism of the Third French Republic, and of the Weimar Republic in Germany.

The way out of this impasse was pointed by Burke in his famous definition of party in the *Present Discontents*. "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed." This defines the soul, but not the substance of party. Party, in the sense in which it is an effective instrument of government under representative democracy, is a union of interests on a national scale, professing principles of national well-being. The Elder Pitt's principle of popularity, and the Younger's intuition for political and parliamentary management had to be clothed upon Burke's conception, and the conditions of politics changed by the passing of the Reform Bill, before party could play its present part in government. As party functions to-day, almost its least important aspect is that it is an association, an organization of people who happen to feel the same way about the public thing. If that were its essence there would be dozens of parties, and new ones would spring up every day. Primarily, party is an instrument of power. Its development in England has been almost wholly under the sanction of hard compulsions of power, and it is to this fact that the strength and quality of English government is largely due. Party government has been grafted on royal government, that is on the form of government in which power and visible responsibility are at their maximum. The simplicity of pattern has been maintained; the power content changed. The first aim of party was to wrest control of policy from the monarchy. Since they cut their second teeth, parties in this country have been coalitions more or less united for practical ends, and the first practical end, governing the formative phase, was this. The battle was not won at once; indeed very much the reverse; in the early stages of party government monarchical power was in the background, ready to take advantage of mistakes, or signs of irresponsibility in parties and their leaders to re-establish its own power. When a return to royal government had ceased to be among the political possibilities, the place of this threat as a sanction for unity and responsibility, was taken by the struggle of "ins" and "outs." The clear public advantages of the public and legal com-

petition for power secured its retention. Power, in terms of political mechanics, implies unity; responsibility, division, the threat of power in the background if irresponsible courses are followed. It is to this elementary political mechanics, rather than to any inherent dualism of the English mind, the division of Church and chapel, of country and town, of possessing and non-possessing classes, of the contrast of conservatism and progress, that the constant tendency towards a two-party structure is due. In the Third Republic and under the Weimar constitution, thanks largely to the influence of "democratic" ideas, State power was not sufficiently concentrated, nor responsibility clearly enough defined to produce comparable results, and bad government was the consequence. Secondly, party is an instrument of propaganda. It seeks to make opinion, rather than to represent it. Its core is a group of men with ideas and ambitions for government, with their hands on the levers of power in a great propaganda organization, with the prestige of party traditions at their service, anxious to snuff out rivalry, determined to maintain discipline and unity, but sure, as government is, provided it can deliver the goods, of loyalty and support, and even of acclaim, because party has come to be recognized as the instrument of government, through which alone things can be done. So far as party is representative—that is of opinion which is there, as distinct from opinion that it makes—it is so indirectly, and because it is an instrument of popular power, rather than of set intention. It becomes representative because its leaders cannot afford to let any issue or grievance ferment unheeded in the public mind. To do so is to present opportunities to the opposition party, or to potential rebels within the leader's own camp. Its sensitiveness and its discrimination in this respect—its skill in determining issues of genuine and enduring importance, its refusal to stake its existence on others, or to take up any in such ways as seriously to prejudice the public weal—these provide the test of a party's statesmanship, in the first place, and of its democratic serviceability in the second.

These characteristics of party are common to all democratically based governments, be their inspiration Communist, Fascist, or simply democratic. The difference in practice between the older and the newer democratic traditions is in the degree of freedom accorded to opposition. In judging the practices of other states, we should perhaps consider our own position and theirs. It is only since the eighteenth century that the practice of impeaching fallen ministers and of regarding opposition as a misdemeanour, if not a crime, ceased in this country; and liberty of the press and of assembly are of even more recent date. We flatter ourselves, perhaps, if we attribute this result to the development of democratic traditions, and not to the establishment in general acceptance of our régime,

the bringing of practically the whole of the population within the discipline of responsible party, the consolidation of a public opinion which voluntarily and spontaneously performs the more onerous duties of a censor in checking irresponsible and dangerous discussion. The position of States in which monarchy is discredited, the leadership of the landed classes no longer acceptable, the middle classes neither numerous, nor organized, nor politically trained; in which, in short, natural elements of political power are lacking, and in which instruments of government in the shape of disciplined parties have been barely, and often by desperate means established, is very different from our own. The first requisite of government is an instrument of government; and these, when established with difficulty, should be judged, it might seem—and at that somewhat indulgently—by the more ordinary canons of government—whether they have in them the promise of law and order, of founding a régime, and securing some stability of economic and political relations, rather than by the canons appropriate to a special and highly developed form of society and government. If quarrel we must over government, let us quarrel because governments are bloody, tyrannical and ineffective. Similar caution and consideration of the really relevant factors might not inappropriately be urged in the context of the many proposals for the substitution of constitutionalism for administrative régimes within the Empire which are at present, or are likely to be brought before us. Conscious and courageous political realism never fails of its reward. In the framework of an accepted régime, working on the basis of a public opinion trained within the discipline of experienced and responsible parties, constitutionalism has the advantages of a settled provision for public order, a power of peaceful change, and a responsiveness to new needs such as perhaps other forms of government do not have in the same measure. Apart from such conditions, its merits are few, and its weaknesses all too patent. That it claims to be representative is no public advantage if all there is to represent is interest, and irresponsible and fickle opinion. Canning, Professor Temperley tells us, held the view that the very uniqueness of our liberal institutions was a prime cause of our strength; that the course of wisdom lay in preserving them ourselves, but not in seeking to spread them elsewhere; and that Europe would not benefit from the imposition on its history of the different results of our own. The century that has passed seems to have confirmed this judgment, and to recommend it to our consideration in our present circumstances. Meanwhile government is necessary everywhere in the world, and the high-road to its becoming representative government—since we attach importance to this result—is, as this paper has sought to show, that it should aim primarily only at being good government.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF GOD AS FINAL CAUSE

PROFESSOR T. M. FORSYTH

DURING my student days at Edinburgh I became particularly interested in Aristotle's doctrine of God as Final Cause. Concern with other problems and periods of Philosophy, along with many years of teaching in most of its branches, has kept me from ever writing anything down on the subject except in the very briefest way. But it has always seemed to me to claim fuller attention than is commonly accorded to it. That Aristotle's conception, however independently it was worked out, owes much to the philosophy of Plato appears to be beyond question. The design of the present article is to relate Aristotle's view on the subject with that of Plato. I will first state Plato's allied doctrine; then, after indicating Aristotle's criticisms of Plato, so far as relevant to the subject, summarize his argument for his own position; and, lastly, consider the significance of the concept concerned.

PLATO'S KINDRED DOCTRINE

Plato's doctrine—as stated more especially in the *Timaeus*,[1] though other Dialogues are fuller on certain points—may be expressed as follows.[2]

First of all a distinction must be made between what always is and has no becoming and what is always changing—ever coming into and passing out of existence—and has no permanent being. The former is known by thought or reason, while the latter is perceived by the senses and apprehended in judgments based on sense. Further, all change or becoming needs a cause or agent (*αἰτία*) of some kind. Now the sensible world or visible universe shows order and pattern, and must therefore be fashioned on the model of what is abiding and changeless. It can, accordingly, be represented as the work of an eternal creator, whose nature it reveals, just as that of the artist or craftsman is shown by his handiwork. This eternal

[1] Whatever distinction may be drawn between Plato's teaching in the Academy and the immediate tenor and purpose of this or of other Dialogues, I take it as indubitable that these give, in certain doctrines repeatedly stressed, an authentic presentation of Plato's philosophy.

[2] A short statement of Plato's cosmological theory was contained in a previous article of mine—"The New Cosmology in its Historical Aspect: Plato, Newton, Whitehead" (*Philosophy*, Vol. VII, No. 25, January 1932). What follows is on the same lines, but is concerned rather with the theological implications.

being that is the cause—or ground, which is at once cause and reason—of all becoming is hard to discover and to make intelligible to the human mind. Moreover, any account of the production of the image or likeness (εἰκών) of the intelligible in the sensible can at best be only the most likely one.[1]

The reason for the existence of the ordered world of becoming or cosmos can best be expressed by saying that the maker and father of the universe, being supremely good, desires that it too should be as good as possible. Hence it exhibits not only the regularity of pattern and the uniformity of movement that might belong to a material system set up and kept going by mechanical impulsion, but also the kind of action peculiar to mind, namely movement from within and with an aim. It is endowed with life and soul as well as body, and displays reason along with necessity.[2]

Soul prior to body.—The principle that, while body and soul are coextensive and coeval, soul is by nature prior to body, is stated in other dialogues besides the *Timaeus*. Plato maintains that soul is the cause or origin (ἀρχή) of motion inasmuch as it alone is self-moved, whereas body is only or at least primarily moved by soul or mind. Thus in the *Phaedrus* it is contended that what moves anything else, as one body moves another, but is itself moved by something else, has not the character needful in the real source of motion. This can be found only in that which moves itself and is ever in motion. But this is the very nature and the true definition of life and soul; therefore soul and not body is the beginning of motion.[3] Similarly in the *Laws* it is argued that soul is prior to body, and is the only real cause, inasmuch as the primary source of motion must lie in that which is self-moving, i.e. whose motion is internal or spontaneous, while all external motion or causation can only be secondary. In short, the ultimate principle of motion resides not in material forces of any kind, but in the activity characteristic of mind or soul, such as that of desire, thought, and feeling.[4]

The medium or vehicle for the manifestation in the sensible world of the intelligible reality which is its model or pattern (παράδειγμα) is twofold, namely time and space. Plato defines time as the moving image of eternity. The eternal reality has no distinction of before and after or past, present, and future; but its abiding nature is expressed in the world of becoming in the endless sequence of changes which are numbered or measured by what is most enduring and most uniform in it, namely the movements of the heavens. Time is indeed, as Aristotle more expressly says, just this numbering

[1] *Timaeus*, 27d–9d. [2] 29d–30c; 34b–c.

[3] *Phaedrus*, 245c–d; cf. *Philebus*, 28–30, where soul or mind is shown to have the essential nature of a cause.

[4] *Laws*, X, 895e–7b.

or measuring of motion. By its means there is conveyed a representation of the everlasting activity of the creative cause.[1]

Space, again, is defined as the receptacle (ὑποδοχή) or matrix of all changes or processes that make up the sensible world. It is the permanent basis of all sensible qualities, which are fleeting images appearing in it. It is not a void in which things move, but rather an indeterminate medium wherein the intelligible forms or ideas are represented as on a screen (or reflected as in a mirror) in endlessly varying images or appearances. These appearances in their outward or objective aspect constitute what is called matter. Space is thus identifiable with body or matter, not as implying the reduction of matter to geometrical figures or to inert particles with no inherent motion, but as the vehicle, along with time, for the whole process of becoming which is set up as the expression or embodiment of mind or soul.[2]

Reason and necessity.—While the one ultimate source of all motion is self-moving soul, and the true cause or reason of the existence of the world and of the order which it displays is the desire of the best, there is in it an element of chaos or disorder such as implies another factor in conflict with the wisdom that tends towards the good. This cause or principle running counter to reason Plato calls necessity. The creation of the world or the ever-changing process of becoming is due to the interplay of reason and necessity. Order comes out of chaos according as necessity is overruled by reason and persuaded to work towards the best.[3]

The mythical Demiurge creating the world out of primal chaos

[1] *Timaeus*, 37c–8c.

[2] 48e–53c. Cf. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 199–206.—Aristotle also looks upon space as a kind of receptacle or container; but he dissents from the identification of space and matter, which he finds in Plato's statement, on the ground that this involves defining body or matter by reference to its spatial form (*Physics*, IV. 4, 212a 20; 2, 209b 11).

[3] 46c–e; 47e–8a. Cf. J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues*, p. 75.—There are difficulties of interpretation here, especially as to the precise relation of necessity to what Plato calls adventitious or subsidiary causes (συναίτια), I take them to be essentially identical. This is not to say that the distinction of reason and necessity is that of mind and matter viewed as quite independent existents; for mind or soul is the only real cause. It is the distinction between mechanism and purpose, that is between the aimless and random ("errant") operation of natural sequence, which Plato calls by the name of chance, fate, or necessity (ἀνάγκη), and the spontaneity or freedom implied in working for a desirable end or good, which he identifies with law and reason. In modern terminology it is the distinction between "the processes of nature" and their "control through knowledge." But I think the difference between matter (or body) and mind is ultimately one with this difference between mechanism and purpose or necessity and freedom. (This was suggested in a short paper of mine published in the *South African Journal of Science*, vol. xiv, "Note on the Relation between Mind and Body"; cf. *English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development*, p. 203 ff.).

at the beginning of time is thus Plato's imaginative representation of the universe as being the expression of mind and purpose, and not the outcome of mere chance or the blind operation of mechanical occurrence.[1] This is the cardinal principle of Plato's philosophy, implied if not expressed in a whole series of dialogues. What Plato calls necessity as opposed to reason means the discordant action and haphazard relations that are inevitably involved in the adjustment of particular natures and individual wills, which only gradually attain harmony or unity. It signifies, therefore, the necessary conditions implied in there being a process of becoming at all.[2] The so-called intractability of matter denotes the difficulty attending the control of untoward conditions of any kind in the interests of the good, the true, and the beautiful. The persuasion of necessity by reason is the progressive overcoming of evil by good, the direction of impulse by thought, the replacement of force by law.[3]

Relation to the Theory of Ideas

Plato's doctrine is not so definitely expressed as is Aristotle's in terms of final cause. But its underlying principle is the Idea of the Good.[4] The main problem concerning Plato's conception is that of the relation of the ideas or forms to the cause or origin of movement. That Plato fully appreciated the need of relating the forms, with their culmination or union in the idea of the good, to the movement involved in the process of becoming, or, more definitely, to the activity of mind or soul as the cause of motion, is seen in more than one of his dialogues. This is perhaps already indicated in the *Phaedo*,[5] where Socrates is represented as finding proof of the

[1] Plato's distinction in the *Timaeus* is therefore the same as that which Socrates is represented as making in the *Phaedo* (98–9); cf. also the passage in the *Laws* already referred to. Skemp (*op. cit.*, p. 21) makes an interesting reference to *Sophist*, 265, where "the 'demiurgic' work of God is distinguished from the workings of *φύσις ἄνευ διανοίας*."

[2] A somewhat similar principle is expressed by Tolstoy in *War and Peace* when he says: "If we allow that human life is always guided by reason, we destroy the premise that life is possible at all."

[3] Cf. the article in *Philosophy* mentioned above.—That the opposition of necessity and reason does not imply a principle of evil wholly independent of the good—although the possibility of evil is involved in the very conditions under which particular finite creatures can alone realize the good—seems an essential aspect of Plato's thought. This is indicated in his statement that for the most part necessity is subservient to reason.

[4] Though the Idea or Form of the Good is explicitly mentioned only in the *Republic*, where (509b) it is said to be above both being and knowledge as their source or condition, the principle of the Good none the less dominates all or most of Plato's thought.

[5] Esp. 74–6, 78–9. The relation becomes still clearer by connecting the argument for immortality in the *Phaedo* with that of the *Phaedrus* (in the passage referred to before).

immortality of the soul in its connection with the ideas; but it is more evidently implied in later dialogues.[1]

The final outcome of Plato's metaphysic seems to be that the ideas are *not* abstract and independently existing entities, in which nevertheless concrete things and events somehow participate and thereby have movement imparted to them. They are expressions of the nature of the eternal reality which is the mind or spirit, supremely wise and good, that is the ground of all being and becoming. Although Plato may never actually identify God as the ultimate source or origin of movement with the Idea of the Good,[2] they are in principle identifiable inasmuch as this idea, form, or essence is that which seems to be the truest and most comprehensive expression of the nature of reality and of the meaning of existence.

Plato represents God as creating the world on the pattern of the ideas or forms which are eternal and changeless principles. This does not mean that these forms or principles are independent of God,[3] but that they are the expression of the being and nature of God. The infinite and eternal reality manifests itself in a world of process or becoming, which exhibits ceaseless change as particular things come into and pass out of existence, but at the same time contains order and principle that proclaims its origin in mind and reason.

Thus the universe, although ultimately timeless and changeless, may be represented in thought as involving a process or movement in space and time in which a formless, indeterminate[4] matter or stuff takes on in varying ways and degrees the impress of the eternal forms. As related to one another in the one world or cosmos the changes in particular things can in some measure be explained as though constituting a system or series of causes and effects of a mechanical kind. But such material or mechanical causation, although it expresses the conditions under which things act or changes in things occur, is subordinate to ultimate causation. The ultimate cause or ground of all change and becoming is eternal being. The

[1] Skemp (*op. cit.*, pp. 16–18) quotes in full a passage from the *Sophist* (248e–9d) which clearly has this implication.

[2] See Skemp (*ibid.*, p. 115).—C. Ritter upholds the identification (*The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, pp. 374–6).—In his treatment of the theory of ideas Ritter reiterates (e.g. pp. 111–13, 184) the conception that its essential meaning is the assertion of the objectivity of knowledge—that the distinction of truth and falsity depends on the principle that knowledge as such is knowledge of reality, and that the idea, therefore, *is* reality. The theory of ideas is thus Plato's answer to subjectivism and scepticism, as his doctrine of self-moving soul is his answer to materialism and mechanism.

[3] Nor again that they are, properly speaking, made by God, as the language of *Republic*, 596–7, might suggest.

[4] The ideas as numbers express the determinate ratios or proportions which constitute the essential natures of different things by giving limit or definite character to what is indeterminate or limitless.

eternal reality, which is to be identified with mind or soul as distinct from body or matter, creates or causes all things by its presence in all existence as an inherent impulse towards the perfect form or ideal unity that is the Idea of the Good. God, who is one with the Good, is thus both the originator of the movement in the universe and its end or final cause.

Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine

On this subject only the points relevant to the matter in hand call for mention, however brief, but they are typical of Aristotle's critical treatment of Plato's philosophy.[1]

In his *Physics* Aristotle contends that what primarily imparts motion—the first movent—must itself be immovable. It must be characterized not as the self-moved but as the unmoved.[2] He maintains, further, that movement cannot be regarded as having a beginning or ending, since the existence of movement and process is bound up with the existence of time. Time is definable as the number or numbering of motion. But there cannot be a time when time was not or will not be, and if there is always time, motion must also be eternal or everlasting. Plato in the *Timaeus*,[3] he says, asserts the creation or origination of time together with the cosmos. But "since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment is a kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time."[4]

In the *De Anima* Aristotle says that Plato in the *Timaeus*[5] seeks to give a physical account of how the soul moves the body through being itself in motion.[6] But, since all movement proper is reducible to movement in space, this would imply that the soul is likewise in space.[7] The activity in the soul that originates movement is desire, while desire is moved by its object as a realizable good, which is itself unmoved. What is moved in space is the bodily organ, which is the instrument of desire producing motion in the body or the living being as a whole.[8] Moreover, while Plato takes the soul as the source of movement, he regards soul as originating, like time,

[1] A recent publication on the subject, which I have not had an opportunity of seeing, is H. Cherniss's *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, vol. i.

[2] *Physics*, VIII. 5, esp. 258b 4–10; cf. *Metaphysics*, 1012b 31.

[3] *Timaeus*, 38b.—In his *Metaphysics* (1071b 32) Aristotle says Plato holds that movement is eternal, but does not show why or how.

[4] *Physics*, VIII. 1, 251b 10–28. The passage is quoted from the Oxford translation.

[5] 35a ff.

[6] *De Anima*, I. 3, 406b 26.

[7] 406a 16.

[8] III. 10.

with the creation of the heavens, which implies the existence of some prior cause.[1]

In his historical survey in the first book of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle says that Plato took the ideas or forms, which he held to exist apart from sensible things, as the causes of things inasmuch as they are their essences, or express their essential natures, without which they have no existence at all.[2] But such formal essences can neither cause change or movement, which requires some efficient cause, nor indicate the end or final cause of anything. They cannot contribute towards either the knowledge or the existence of particular things without being themselves in the things.[3] This criticism is repeated and amplified in subsequent books.[4] Aristotle rejects in particular the conception of the ideas as models or exemplars, which are copied in the creation or production of anything: an agency or active cause, and that only, will suffice. The forms, he always insists, are, as such, inherently incapable of originating any movement.

Against any suggestion that the idea or universal is more real than the particular or exists apart from and independently of it Aristotle maintains that all existence is individual, that the universal is realized only in the particular, and taken by itself it is an abstraction from concrete individual being. It is a "such" (τοιόνδε), not a "this" (τόδε τι).[5] Even if it be granted that the universal idea is necessary for knowledge and can serve to make things intelligible by way of concepts and definitions, it is impossible ever to define the individual because of its unique difference from other individuals.[6]

Aristotle's criticisms of Platonic philosophy are notoriously difficult to comprehend and estimate. In the present connection the essential points are firstly, that Plato—implicitly if not explicitly—recognizes, as we have seen, that the ideas or forms are causes or originators of movement only as being aspects of the working of spirit upon and within particular things; and secondly, that such causation involves at once the power of attraction inherent in ideal ends and an impulse or aspiration toward the ideal resident in individual beings or souls.[7]

Aristotle's Argument for his own Position

Aristotle's doctrine and the main trend of his argument may be stated very briefly as follows.

[1] Cf. *Metaphysics*, 1072a 2.
[2] *Metaph.*, I. 6.
[3] I. 9.
[4] E.g. XIII. 5; cf. 1032b 23–34a 8.
[5] VII. 13.
[6] 1036a 2–6, 1039b 28–40a 7.
[7] Cornford (*op. cit.*) in commenting on the general purport of the *Timaeus* makes the same point, and notes the similarity to Aristotle's position in spite of all differences.

Matter and form = potentiality and actuality.—Being or existence (τὸ ὄν) exhibits both change and order. All change is process or movement from a certain possibility or potentiality to actualization. Such actualization is always the becoming determinate of what is, by contrast, relatively indeterminate. It consists in a matter or material of some kind taking a determinate, or rather a more determinate form.[1] Matter as distinct from form is nothing but the potential relatively to the actual. In short, matter is potentiality, form is actuality or actualization. For example, the acorn is potentially the oak, the bronze or marble is potentially the statue, feeling and disposition are potentially the volition or deed; and similarly the mind or soul is the form or actuality of the body. Whether in the products of nature or of art there is no matter without form, no form apart from matter. Each is alike an abstraction from the concrete existent (τὸ σύνολον). Likewise potentiality and actuality are in all cases distinguishable from but relative to each other.[2] The union of matter and form would be impossible if they were two quite distinct things that had to be externally brought together. But they only express in terms of static fact what is involved dynamically, or in terms of time and change, in all becoming as a process from the potential to the actual. This, then, is the logical implication of the fact or the concept of change, without which it cannot be made intelligible.

Further, being or existence cannot have a beginning in time. Since change or process is one of its aspects, it can have neither beginning nor ending in time, inasmuch as time and change are inseparable. Nor can time itself have a beginning or ending in time; for there can be no time before which time was not, nor time after which time will not be.[3] Moreover, change or process of any kind needs a cause of the change. Each particular change may in some degree be explained in terms of efficient causation or temporal antecedence and consequence. But this gives only an endless regress of causes with no first cause or ultimate explanation, no real origin of movement. Nor is anything explained by positing at the beginning of the world process a mere potentiality of existence, or again of

[1] The potential is never mere abstract or unlimited possibility, the possibility of anything whatever, but is always concrete possibility. It is the possibility of some definite actuality, and is indeterminate only relatively to further and more determinate actualization.

[2] *Metaphysics*, IX. 3, 6 and 7.

[3] 1071b 7; cf. the passage in the *Physics* quoted above.—This may not preclude the conception of time's being ultimately merged in eternity, though Aristotle says nothing to that effect. In Plato's statement in the *Timaeus* time (χρόνος) and eternity (αἰών) seem to be at once related to, and contrasted with, each other; and perhaps Aristotle's may be said to have the same implication.

order and development. Such a mere potentiality, whether as the existence of nothing or as a primordial chaos, cannot supply any origin of movement. For the potential always presupposes the actual in one form or another.

Priority of actuality.—In the last resort, then, actuality is prior to potentiality. The primacy of the actual is apparent whether it is considered with reference to thought or knowledge, or to existence in time, or to essential nature. For, in the first place, any potentiality can be known only through the actuality which it becomes; e.g. the capacity of seeing, or again of being seen, by the actual seeing or being seen. Further, although any particular potentiality precedes the corresponding actuality in time, it becomes actual only by means of some precedent actuality; e.g. the seed becomes the corn, but it comes from existing corn. Similarly, all coming to know by learning, instruction, or argument depends upon prior knowledge in some shape or other.[1] Lastly, the reality or essential nature of anything consists in its actualization or full development, since this is its completed form and the end for which it exists; e.g. the child exists to become the man, and the power of sight is for the sake of seeing, not seeing for the sake of having sight. Thus priority belongs essentially and necessarily to the actual.[2]

The ultimate *prius* of all change or process must, therefore, be an eternally complete actuality. This is the only possible first cause or prime mover. Such a cause—which moves without being moved, since it is itself the source of all movement—is not the first term in an infinite regress. Its action is not temporal, like that of finite or transient causes, but is eternal or timeless activity.[3]

Now what alone can move though it is itself unmoved is not merely a material or efficient cause but a final cause, or rather a cause that is both efficient and final.[4] Its action is not merely that of impulsion, but also that of attraction. For it moves as the end or ideal to be attained, and in this way causes the ceaseless change in things and their development from potentiality to actuality. "It is the object of desire and the object of thought that move without being moved."[5] They call forth the effort to realize and to apprehend. And what alone can and must move the thought and the desire of all beings is that which is truly intelligible and supremely desirable.

Such a cause, whose action is activity without change or movement—an "activity of immobility,"[6] as it has been named—is the

[1] Cf. *Anal. Post.*, I. 1.

[2] *Metaph.*, IX. 8.

[3] XII. 6; cf. 1072a 25.

[4] It is also formal cause as defining the nature of eternal being or ultimate reality; and indeed material cause too, for, as none of the four causes taken alone can explain the world process, so the true cause unites them all.

[5] XII. 7, 1072a 26; cf. the passage in the *De Anima* referred to above.

[6] *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας* (*Eth. Nic.*, VII. 14, 1154b 27).

eternal actuality which alone explains the whole process of becoming. It is the one perfect and fully determinate form that informs all things, each after its own kind and in its own degree. In such a being or reality there is no matter distinguishable from form, no potentiality without actuality, no distinction of thought and its object or intelligence and the intelligible,[1] but only eternal realization. This is God. In an almost hymnic passage[2] Aristotle defines the being and nature of God as consisting in a life of eternal and perfect activity and blessedness, everlastingly self-realizing and self-apprehending, and worthy of the fullest wonder and adoration. And so God moves the world or causes all things as the goal of all aspiration or the object of yearning love (*κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*).[3]

Value of the Principle Concerned

The concluding chapters of the culminating book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*[4] are, when taken as a whole, worthy of comparison with the greatest and best passages in Plato's *Timaeus*[5] and other dialogues. They are a marvel of concise and masterly statement, evincing a deep conviction of insight into truth, and expressing with the sureness born of long and laborious inquiry the significance of the principle asserted. They reaffirm his conception of the relation of his philosophy to the doctrines of his predecessors,[6] namely, as at once uniting and explaining, and thereby transcending them. Wherein, then, lies the value of Aristotle's ultimate principle?

The concept of final cause makes possible the interpretation of things in terms of their ends or their ultimate significance rather than, or as well as, of their means or conditions. As Aristotle always insists, anything is defined by its end or completed nature. Material or efficient causality by itself would mean explaining the higher or more developed by the lower or less developed. By bringing together, as Aristotle does, efficient and final causality it is possible, in principle at least, to provide—as Plato already desiderated in the *Phaedo* as well as the *Timaeus*—a cause that is also a reason because it signifies a goal and a purpose.[7] Thus God's causality is at once efficient and final causality. This is Aristotle's restatement or reinterpretation of the Idea of the Good.

The same explanatory principle is involved in Aristotle's doctrine of the primacy or priority of actuality. All change and development

[1] XII. 9, 1074b 35 (*νόησις νοήσεως*=the unity of knowing and known or subject and object).

[2] 1072b 14–30. [3] 1072b 3.

[4] XII. 6, 7, 9 and 10.—Ch. 8 may well be an insertion to deal with its special topic, though it is not altogether irrelevant to the general subject.

[5] E.g. 29d–30b, embodying, as it has been put, "the basal thought of Plato."

[6] Already stated in Book I and implied throughout.

[7] Cf. Whitehead: "All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value."

in things signify a transition or passage from the potential to the actual, a process in which a material of one kind or another takes on a further determinate form for which it already has a certain potentiality. In the universe as a whole the material as distinct from the formal factor or principle is expressed in the concept of primal or primordial matter (*πρώτη ὕλη, materia prima*). This principle has a definite value as a limitative concept denoting pure potentiality or pure passivity (formless matter) as a counterpart of pure activity, which is the nature ascribed to God. But it is a suppositional and not an actual substrate underlying all the changes of nature. What alone is real besides the process or movement itself is not an indeterminate matter or substance (*τὸ ὑποκείμενον*), but the complete actuality which the process presupposes. Thus, while all process or development in anything is ultimately determined by its end or goal, yet the end or completed form is already pre-existent in the individual agent or organism as the impulse to its realization, and in the whole universe of reality as the eternal actuality which is God.

That the primary movent or mover, which is the ultimate agent in all change and process, is itself unmoved, and that there can be only one such original source of movement (*τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*, the *primum mobile*) means quite definitely that God is one and changeless. It is sometimes taken, along with Aristotle's characterization of God's activity as an "activity of immobility" and again as the "thinking of thought," to imply an impassive self-contemplation that is far removed from any concern or interest in the world of finite beings. But this is not really warrantable. No doubt Aristotle's statement is inadequate to the whole truth of the matter. For one thing thought, taken alone, is not adequate to the requirements of the nature of ultimate reality.[1] But the principle that the absolute reality is in one aspect the union of thought and existence or subject and object is indefeasible. Moreover, in his conception of God as eternal being Aristotle depicts, as we have seen, not only a goal or object of aspiration or an exemplar for finite effort and striving, but a life or activity that comprises all, and much more than all, that is best and highest in human experience. Such a God can be nothing else than an indwelling spirit whose presence in all things moves then to the realization of ideal values and whose nature consists in this very presence and self-communication. Thus God is neither only at the beginning nor only at the end of the world process, but is its life and soul—and its body too—all through.

In the last chapter of the book of the *Metaphysics* referred to Aristotle touches very briefly on the question of the immanence

[1] This has been shown conclusively by Bradley among other thinkers.

or transcendence of God.[1] He asks whether the presence of the good —the highest good—in the universe is to be conceived on the analogy of the general or leader of an army or of its order and discipline; and he answers that it seems necessary to regard it in both ways. In other words, God is at once transcendent and immanent—transcendent as the unconditioned ground of all existence and the ideal goal and standard of perfection for individual finite beings; immanent as the yearning in every creature for further fulfilment and fuller self-realization.

Aristotle's philosophy is expressed in different terms from that of Plato; but in its culminating principle the theology of the philosopher-scientist is not very different from that of the philosopher-poet. Rightly understood, the thought of the one as of the other can be definitely said to point toward, however far it falls short of clearly expressing, the great doctrine that God is Love. And their statement anticipates in no small measure the profound words of Spinoza: "He who loves God cannot desire that God should love him in return";[2] and again: "The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself," with the corollary "The love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same."[3]

[1] XII. 10, 1075a 11–24.

[2] *Ethics*, V. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, prop. 36 and cor.

IS *THE PRELUDE* A PHILOSOPHICAL POEM?[1]

W. B. GALLIE, B.A., B.Litt.

Is *The Prelude* a philosophical poem? It is, of course, many things besides: it is an autobiography; it contains profound reflections on psychology, education and politics; and there are passages of an almost purely lyrical character. Does it also contain *philosophical poetry*?

On this question, the critics of Wordsworth are divided. Coleridge and Raleigh answer Yes; Arnold, Bradley, Dr. Leaves, from their different points of view, agree in answering No. I believe that the first answer is right, although it has usually been supported by the wrong reasons. I believe the second answer to be wrong, although many of the arguments that are supposed to lead to it are in themselves sound enough. Those who say that *The Prelude* is not a philosophical poem, usually mean that it does not offer a coherent system of philosophy—that it expresses an original outlook and a personal wisdom, but that the only systematic philosophy in it comes at second-hand from Hartley or Coleridge and contributes not at all to the poem. And this is largely true. But the mistake is, to identify philosophy with system, philosophizing with "a philosophy." This is a mistake that has been repudiated again and again by many of the greatest philosophers, from Socrates and Plato to Locke and Kant and others.

I shall argue that *The Prelude* achieves philosophical poetry, because in it Wordsworth grapples with philosophical problems—problems which arise out of the story of his own early life—which are actually forced upon him by the poem itself; and because he tries to answer these problems in a way which would be possible only in poetry.

I shall not try to show that the peculiar greatness of *The Prelude* lies in its philosophical achievement. On the contrary, I believe that its greatness lies, like that of all Wordsworth's successful poetry, in its passion, its humanity, its conscientious realism. But these very qualities led Wordsworth, whenever his thought reached a certain level of generality, to feel the inadequacies of certain of our categories—both metaphysical and moral—as commonly used. He had not the ingenuity to replace these categories by a new system. But the impact of his poetry made them shake, and he is a philo-

[1] Throughout this article I am much indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of my friend, Karl Britton.

sophical poet because he makes us feel them shake and because he himself well knew that they were shaking, and was able to make some suggestions as to the form that the new categories might take. It would be idle to claim that in the last task Wordsworth was uniformly successful. But success in philosophy is always a relative matter, and a philosopher may have done a great deal if he has made us think even a little differently, not by presenting new facts to our notice, but by inducing us to shift the emphasis and orientation of some of the basic notions we use in everyday life. And this much can, I think, be claimed for the philosophy of *The Prelude.*

This is the claim, I believe, which Coleridge and Raleigh made for Wordsworth. But they expressed it in terms which left them open to important criticisms from the other side. I shall try to state the claim in a different way and shall consider what I believe to be the philosophical element in *The Prelude* under the following heads: (1) How the central philosophical problem of *The Prelude* arises from its autobiographical theme; (2) The analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer to the problem; (3) The originality of his answer; (4) The part played by poetry in achieving his answer; (5) Its verification and its applicability to other problems.

(1) *How does the central philosophical problem of* The Prelude *arise from its autobiographical theme?*

The Prelude, Wordsworth tells us, was intended as a stock-taking of his poetic powers, an interim task to aid him in selecting the subject of his main work as poet. His initial question was, quite simply, how could he give of his best as a poet? Unable to answer the question thus posed, he turns back in a kind of despair to some of his earliest memories, and these by the intensity of delight and wonder they awaken in him, renew his confidence and brace his mind for further efforts. But Wordsworth finds something puzzling, paradoxical even, in this experience.[1] His present renewed confidence in his powers lies in a "calm existence," a tranquility of mind and steady direction of purpose which enable him to range, disinterestedly, gratefully, in the appropriate artistic sense conscientiously, over the whole field of his experience. But the intense, spontaneous responses of his childhood stood in complete contrast to this "calm existence"; they were a succession of impressions, gathered accidentally, enjoyed without reflection, by-products of the muscular zest and petty selfish aims of childish consciousness. Further, his recollections were made up of "discordant elements," a confusion of delight in beauty, pride in energy, awe before the unknown, terror, pain. The contrast of past and present puzzled him and led him to a second problem. There appeared to be two opposing

[1] See *The Prelude,* Bk. I, lines 340–56.

elements in poetic inspiration; on the one hand the spontaneous receptivity and response characteristic of childhood and on the other hand the self-mastery, the calm of mind, the conscientiousness of the mature artist. How could these be brought together into a satisfying and productive harmony? This is perhaps the central problem in every artist's self-discipline, and it is one on which Wordsworth had some profound and original things to say. But no sooner is it posed than it is seen to be but one case of a wider problem, that of the active happiness, responsive and responsible, of every good man. For this ideal, no less than that of poetic activity, requires a discipline which can reconcile and harmonize the discords of spontaneous impulse and response. It is not of himself only or of other poets and artists that Wordsworth writes,

> Ah, is there one who ever has been young,
> Nor needs a warning voice to tame the pride
> Of intellect and virtue's self esteem?
> One is there, though the wisest and the best
> Of all mankind, who covets not at times
> Union that cannot be—who would not give,
> If so he might, to duty and to truth
> The eagerness of infantine desire?[1]

Such perfect union of spontaneity and discipline may be impossible, but Wordsworth knew from his own experience—from his own happiness quite as much as from his achievements as a poet—that in his life something like it had taken place. This led him to look for the external, as well as the internal, conditions in his own life, which had made this possible. Inspired by his own glimpses, he asks:

> Why is this glorious creature to be found
> One in ten thousand only? What one is,
> Why should not millions be?[2]

But, recalling the circumstances that had specially favoured his own happy development, he sees part of the reason:

> . . . Were it otherwise,
> And we found evil fast as we find good
> In our first years, or think that it is found,
> How could the innocent heart bear up and live?[3]

And this line of thought is supported by many darker musings on the actual lot of humanity, on the stultification of its powers under the tendency,

> Of use and custom to bow down the soul
> Under a growing weight of vulgar sense,
> And substitute a universe of death
> For that which moves with light and life inspired,
> Actual, divine and true.[4] . . .

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. II, lines 19–26.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIII, lines 88–89.
[3] *Ibid.*, Bk. VIII, lines 308–11.
[4] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIV, lines 158–62.

and on the effects of poverty and labour in excess which

> From day to day pre-occupy the ground
> Of the affections and to Nature's self
> Oppose a deeper nature. . . .[1]

This last sentence is of particular interest. In its curious antithesis between Nature with a capital and a "deeper nature" not so dignified we have one of Wordsworth's most striking attempts to effect that kind of shift in our categories which he believed was necessary for an adequate statement of the *possibility* of happiness. Nature with a capital is that "eternal nature" of which he writes in the letter to John Wilson: to render men's feelings more consonant to "eternal nature" is the supreme moral function of poetry, and to live our lives in consonance with it is Wordsworth's conception of happiness. The other, "deeper nature," the universe of death, the use and custom that bow down the soul, are Wordsworth's version of the problem of evil. Now when philosophers face this problem they all too often give us answers which "dispose of it"—e.g. by showing how the amount or the prospects or the possibilities of happiness far outweigh in a final balance those of misery. Such a final balance is of course highly problematical. In *The Prelude,* with his thoughts guided by the thing he knew most about—his own job and duty as a poet—Wordsworth gives an answer of a more modest and useful kind. As a poet, his most pressing interest was not in the justification of his work, but in its method; and as a moralist drawing his wisdom from the discipline of his art, he was interested primarily not in any transcendental assurance of happiness (or justification of misery) but in the *way* of happiness (to use a religious phrase) or (if the phrase be preferred) the *art* of it. In particular, he wanted to discover what part, on the one hand, men can contribute from their own inward resources towards finding and holding that way ("to what point and how, the mind is lord and master") and, on the other hand, what men must receive in aid, stimulation, infection, "grace" from sources outside themselves—from other human beings and from nature.

Here is the central philosophical problem of *The Prelude*:—Wordsworth's version of the problem of "the true end of man." His answer to it is at once normative and interpretative; it is an attempt to show the reality of certain "may-bes" in human experience with a view to convincing us that these are, in the ethical sense, "must-bes." The central "may-be" is the possibility of human happiness conceived in terms of a certain discipline or way. ("What one is, why may not millions be?") The central "must-be" is not issued in an imperative. Wordsworth had this much in common with Plato as a moralist, that he makes the essential moment of

[1] See *The Prelude,* Bk. XIII, lines 198–201.

morality one of recognition—in Wordsworth's case the recognition "that from thyself it comes, that thou must give, else never canst receive."[1] And he believed that to *show* this truth was the only way to make men better.

(2) *The analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer*

Throughout *The Prelude* Wordsworth's thought moves freely between the three planes I have distinguished. He uses his own personal problem to raise the general problem of artistic self-discipline; and his insights into this second problem provide him with an analogy which he applies to the problems of moral happiness. But on each and all of these planes his thought never leaves the world of common day. His findings, even when relating to the subtleties of poetic creation, are expressed always in intelligible, too often in banal, language. In general, the terms of his problem are familiar to ordinary reflection; and for verification of his conclusions Wordsworth can appeal to "that knowledge which all men carry about with them."[2] The only apparent exceptions to this rule are the celebrated descriptions of "visiting of imaginative power."[3] What relation, it may reasonably be asked, have these strange experiences to anything that conduces to the happiness of ordinary men? To this Wordsworth could have answered as follows. These "visitings of imaginative power" were the experiences of a poet, and were of a quite unusual intensity, depth and suggestive power. They were therefore untypical of ordinary experience. It may nevertheless be possible for the ordinary reader to have some inkling of what they were like; and Wordsworth supplies some very revealing details of their perceptual and motor backgrounds. And secondly, for his main purpose in *The Prelude*, Wordsworth is not so much concerned with the operation of imagination—the way it works on its object—as with the felt effects of its visitings and the moral power and influence they leave behind. Now, from this point of view, it matters little whether imaginative experience be original and creative, as with the poet, or received from others, as with the rest of us. It is not therefore necessary to enter here into a full account of Wordsworth's theory—or rather his various sketches of a theory—of the imagination as an original power. It is enough to notice that Wordsworth was interested in the imagination as a *revealing* power, rather than as a shaping and creative power. Its peculiar virtue (he suggests) does not lie precisely in what it reveals,

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XII, lines 276–277.

[2] This phrase is taken from Wordsworth's Preface to the 1802 Edition of his poems.

[3] See, in particular, *The Prelude*, Bk. II, lines 294–322; Bk. VI, lines 592–640; Bk. VII, lines 619–49; Bk. XII, lines 208–335; Bk. XIV, lines 28–111.

but in the fact that the insights given are always incomplete and so leave us with a sense of "something to pursue," of "something evermore about to be," and a sense of how little "we know both of ourselves and of the universe." Thus the chief moral effect of such visitations is to give our minds renewed appetite and vigour, to call up our powers for further exploration and verification.

So much by the way of defence of one part—and that the most easily misunderstood—of the analogy by which Wordsworth develops his answer to his main philosophical problem. But precisely what part do imaginative experiences play in achieving and maintaining that artistic self-discipline which will foster, control and reconcile the wayward, irresponsible element in inspiration? Wordsworth saw clearly that these two elements in his own inspiration required one another. But he also had very definite views as to the kinds of experiences and sentiments which, in his own case, had been most effective in bringing them together. These were, first, the sentiment of gratitude—a generalized gratitude towards the past which kept him constantly aware of the debt he owed and of the return due from him for the unusually lively sensibility, the enthusiasm, and the tenderness which it was his privilege as a poet to enjoy. Secondly, there were those rare, unpredictable "spots of time" in which imagination reveals "the hiding-places of man's power," challenges us to recognize "our destiny, our being's heart and home," convinces us "that whatsoever point we gain, we yet have something to pursue," and yet leaves us "as if admonished from another world." The cultivation of the habit of gratitude and the habitual re-living in memory of such spots of time give us the essence of Wordsworth's poetic method; they are the factors which energize "recollection in tranquility." And they interpenetrate and re-enforce one another in various ways. Thus gratitude to the past not only gave rise to Wordsworth's admiration of the "mystery of man" as revealed in childhood, it contributed a great deal to his imaginative interpretation of Nature as "leader-on," as inviter and educator, and it also helped him to see (as in the experience described at the close of Bk. XII) the first germs of the integrating activity of imagination in a moment of childish terror and in a child's "trite reflections of morality." But the two factors can best be understood by considering the distinct contribution which each makes. Thus the felt effects of imaginative visitations inspire the creative, ambitious side of the required self-discipline; they provide a challenge to further effort, a realization of the apparently infinite possibilities of human experience and of the sorry little we usually make of these. Gratitude, on the other hand, provides the conscientious aspect of artistic self-discipline, its filial sense of debt to the experienced past and to received tradition and its almost parental sense of respon-

sibility for the spontaneous, wayward, in themselves vulnerable and even self-destructive elements of poetic inspiration.

Wordsworth showed unusual artistic wisdom in preferring his "cult of memory" to a more direct quest of inspiration. His cult of memory is only one form of artistic self-discipline; but its two principles of gratitude to the past and habitual re-living of imaginative visitations could be generalized, I think, to provide maxims relevant to most of the arts. Certainly, his cult of memory provided Wordsworth with the discipline *he* needed, and his originality as a moralist—the way he shakes and alters our general conception of morality—lies in his application of its two principles of gratitude and imagination to the whole moral life of man.

But before considering how Wordsworth deals with his wider problem, we must examine the part he ascribes to Nature in the achievement of his own poetic self-discipline. For he was to carry his conclusions on this point also into his wider moral philosophy. Let us put the question quite bluntly. What did Nature mean to Wordsworth? In many of his poems Nature stands simply for whatever he perceived and loved in the external, extra-human world. But when Wordsworth wrote of Nature in relation to the general problem of human happiness and morality he often meant something very different. He meant by it the fact that certain extra-human objects can give us that

> . . . prepossession, without which the soul
> Receives no knowledge that can bring forth good,
> No genuine insight ever comes to her.[1]

Nature, so conceived, is a moral agency. Sometimes it seems as if Wordsworth is ready to identify Nature with a local tradition—the simple and rustic life of the Lakes. But this identification is premature and in many other passages it is clear that his notion has a far wider generality. Sometimes it seems as if Wordsworth were really speaking of the influence of actual human beings—parents, friends, teachers. But again, what is intended is not an identification but an analogy, and an analogy of which Wordsworth was particularly fond. It is significant that the famous passage on the mother's influence on her child ("Blest the infant Babe . . .")[2] occurs in the middle of a series of descriptions of how Nature surrounds the infant with invitations, encouragements, challenges and admonishments. And the similarity Wordsworth found between "Nature's gifts" and the effects of human love at its strongest and purest is by no means a far-fetched or sentimental one. For the response of a child (and not of a child only) to each of these, is seen in a disposition to look

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. VIII, lines 325–27.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, lines 232–65.

for further beauty, to move out into the world confidently and hopefully, to feel generously, to think and plan with courage. Both Nature and the mother enable the child to feel himself "an inmate of this active universe":

> For him, in one dear Presence, there exists
> A virtue which irradiates and exalts
> Objects through widest intercourse of sense.

It is in this passage that Wordsworth describes how the child "drinks in the feelings of his mother's eye"—as though there were a direct communication of feeling. Is it any more fanciful to claim that there is similar communication from external nature to the child? At all events, it is an obvious fact that we can come to love a place because its beauties lead us to look for further beauties, to acknowledge those we see with gratitude, and to feel at home amongst them. In describing in great detail the moral effects of such experiences, Wordsworth was only retelling more fully what every poet, indeed every man of feeling, has known since humanity began.

Nature, then, for Wordsworth when he is philosophising, means the fact that the extra-human world can have an incalculable moral effect on man. What is original in Wordsworth's thought is the notion that human happiness at its best arises out of a peculiar co-operation of this external nature and man's own inner nature; out of Nature's gift and man's response.

(3) *The originality of Wordsworth's answer*

Wordsworth's conception of the availability of Nature's gifts provides in one respect an interesting parallel to the Christian doctrine of the availability of grace. On either doctrine man must give—must make an original, peculiarly human response—if he is to receive. The required response, on Wordsworth's theory, must be made in terms of gratitude and imagination; on the Christian theory in terms of repentance, obedience and love of God. A striking difference between the two theories is seen, however, when we pass from the availability of Nature's gifts or of grace to the accounts of how men actually receive them. Here Wordsworth might be described as a "naturalistic predestinarian." He felt himself specially *chosen* because Nature's gifts had been made available to him in quite an untypical way. And in so far as he thought of himself as a "dedicated spirit" this was because of a "bond" which he *himself* had not chosen to embrace. Still less does the infant choose to "drink in the feelings of his mother's eye" and thus experience "the filial bond of nature that connects him with the world." On Wordsworth's view the *moral person*, the subject to whom we can significantly apply moral predicates, the subject who can choose, is a result of that

"prepossession" which is brought about by the *actual* impact of Nature's gifts on a human being. Unless they arise out of that prepossession, what we commonly think of as moral predicates are something else—legal predicates for instance. Morality for Wordsworth presupposes the *actual experience* of happiness; and this on the one hand is a natural occurrence since it derives from causes and conditions which are not in man's power to choose or control, and on the other hand is "Nature's Invitation"; for once these conditions have been realized, men can feel Nature as something to follow, to cultivate, as something demanding a self-giving in return, a moral response that is *genuine* because it has a self-accepted standard. These causes and conditions which are beyond man's power to choose or control Wordsworth finds partly in "external nature"—in the actual, sensible presence of beauty and grandeur—and partly in that "prime and vital" principle which lies, Wordsworth tells man,

> In the recesses of thy nature, far
> From any reach of outward fellowship,
> Else is not thine at all.[1]

This is his version of "From him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have." But on Wordsworth's view "the prime and vital principle" is never called out at all in many human beings, and that through no fault of their own; their lives, from birth, are harnessed to "the mean and vulgar works of man." In others it is crushed out by the weight of custom and routine. It is only those who have known true happiness who can be judged morally.

Wordsworth's claim that moral categories apply only within certain conditions which are realized (we must suppose) comparatively rarely in human life can be considered either a revolutionary or a retrograde one. It appears to cancel that universality—that recognition of moral personality in every human life—which was the signal contribution of Christian ethics. Wordsworth by contrast seems nearer to the "aristocratic" realism—the blunt acceptance of fundamental moral differences between men—which we find in most Greek philosophy. But Wordsworth's intention was, of course, the exact opposite of this. His aim was to show (to apply a fine saying of Meredith's) how men are kept from having souls in *this* world. Seen in this light his conception of Nature's gifts, which at first seems so much narrower and more exclusive than the Christian notion of grace, turns out perhaps to be a more just, generous, compassionate and practical one. If there is anything harsh in Wordsworth's moral attitude (at any rate as expressed in *The Prelude*) it lies in his refusal to identify his feelings with those of

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XIV, lines 216–18.

the "lost," to slide from a recognition of the *fact* of suffering to some kind of exaltation or justification of it. This was an issue Wordsworth had faced in life. Had he returned to France during the terror, he tells us,

> Doubtless, I should have then made common cause
> With some who perished; haply perished too,
> A poor mistaken and bewildered offering—
> Should to the breast of Nature have gone back,
> With all my resolutions, all my hopes,
> A poet only to myself, to men
> Useless.[1] . . .

A strangely original prophet of duty, Wordsworth set his face in the opposite direction—to explore and enjoy and make known to men (in language all men might understand) the way of happiness.

What then is Wordsworth's conception of happiness, and how do his two principles of gratitude and imagination contribute to it? In the first place (as I have suggested) he does not think of happiness as something to be achieved only with the full insight, the final revelation. He thinks of it as something essentially incomplete and yet at the same time self-justifying. It contains its own self-renewing inspiration and its own discipline and admonishments. Secondly, this happiness is to be found in the very world that is the world of all of us. It originates in the filial bond that connects us with this active universe: it arises out of that grand elementary principle of pleasure in which all creatures share.

Yet such happiness is not complacency, either moral or intellectual. It gives rise to the active compassion of The Wanderer who "could *afford* to suffer with those whom he saw suffer"; and it is the happiness of the man who wrote the Ode to Duty. Wordsworth, of course, does not put forward his "theory" of happiness systematically. But its effectiveness as a moral principle can, I think, readily be seen in Wordsworth's applications of its two main components—gratitude and imagination. Gratitude, in itself a pleasurable emotion, provides, on Wordsworth's view, a constant nursing-ground for a good will; not only because it keeps us in mind of all that we owe in so far as we have become moral beings, but because it conduces both consciously and—perhaps with even greater effect—unconsciously to automatic habits of right moral action. Wordsworth wrote of his sister ("And yet I knew a Maid . . .") as one whose "*life* was gratitude." But a life so conceived lacks something, lacks something morally—a bracing element which Wordsworth claims only imagination can contribute to the moral life. Parts of this contribution we have already considered in connection with artistic self-discipline—the challenge to intellectual effort, the sense of an

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. X, lines 229–35.

unlimited field awaiting human exploration, and a humbling recognition of how feebly we respond to this challenge and opportunity.

But the exercise of imagination has other more direct and obvious bearings on the moral life. For imagination alone can reveal, and when revealed keep constantly real in our minds,

> Those mysteries of being which have made,
> And shall continue evermore to make
> Of the whole human race one brotherhood.[1]

In the same way only imagination can reveal those usually unsuspected beauties, harmonies—and we might add problems—in Nature which engage artists, poets, scientists, but which, when most strikingly manifested,

> men least sensitive see, hear, perceive,
> And cannot choose but feel: . . .[2]

In general Wordsworth would claim that imagination reveals man's highest good, incompletely in respect of its objects (for these are inexhaustible) but in its exercise as completely as we can conceive.

But does Wordsworth claim that gratitude and imagination together comprise his "way of happiness" and together give us a moral principle under which all other moral principles, sentiments, duties, can be subsumed? Or does he simply claim that they are moral principles of the first importance whose characteristic operations have generally been misunderstood or ignored? To judge from the summing up we find in Bk. XIV Wordsworth makes the former —wilder—claim. And this is, I think, a sheer mistake on his part; for, to take but one example, how can insight into fairness (surely an essential ingredient in morality) be subsumed under either gratitude or imagination? This mistake, however, which would be damaging to a "systematizing" thinker, is not really important in an original thinker who is trying to shift, or re-orientate, some of the basic categories of our thought. Had Wordsworth contented himself simply with emphasizing his two great principles, he would still, I claim, have made a revolutionary contribution both to morals and to the metaphysics of the mind.

(4) *The part played by poetry in Wordsworth's answer:*

Could not Wordsworth's conclusions as to happiness and morality have been reached by ordinary philosophic reflection? I do not know. What I do know, and what we can all see if we read *The Prelude* as it is written, as a whole and not as a series of reflective

[1] See *The Prelude*, Bk. XII, lines 85–87.
[2] *Ibid.*, Bk. XIV, lines 84–85.

lyrics linked by skipable commentary, is that poetry—the actual occurrence of unmistakable, sometimes incomparable poetry—plays an all-important role at every stage of its argument. We have seen how Wordsworth *uses* poetry to raise his initial problem as to his own calling and duty as a poet. In illustrating his own poetic method (*The Prelude* illustrates rather than explains or defends his cult of memory) Wordsworth again makes use of poetry in a yet more obviously necessary way. Similarly, without the poems of gratitude with which *The Prelude* abounds it would be hard to grasp all that Wordsworth means by the word gratitude and almost impossible to understand how his feelings for Nature related to his feeling for traditional life. And is it conceivable that any abstract description of the lasting effects "imaginative visitations" could compare with Wordsworth's account of what he "saw" in the Simplon Pass or with the passage on the imagination which precedes it? In applying the lessons of his own poetic self-discipline to the wider moral field, Wordsworth is, admittedly, often very prosy; but in describing his sister as one whose life was gratitude, and in his best accounts of the monstrous confusions of city life and of the individual dignities of men and households he gives us something which probably only poetry could give.

Once it is granted, therefore, that in intention (however inadequately conceived) and in effect (however incomplete) *The Prelude* is philosophical poetry, it is easy to see how its poetry helps to make, not simply to express, its philosophy. But I think that something more than this can be claimed for *The Prelude.* I would claim that it contains masterpieces of argument. The posing of its initial problem in Bk. I is an example. The central passage of the Retrospect (Bk. VIII, lines 293–339) is another. But quite the most remarkable is the conclusion of Bk. XII. What do these amazing paragraphs tell us? How does their argument proceed? Their formal structure could, I think, quite easily be traced out—and we should find some gaps in it. But we should find also, in some hundred and eighty lines of the most moving poetry ever written, a condensed statement of Wordsworth's view of how imaginative experience contributes to the foundation of morality. In the marshalling of arguments, the selection of terms, and in the judgement as to what consequences shall be drawn and what premises made explicit, it is an incomparable intellectual achievement. Can we see what factors in Wordsworth's poetic technique and vocabulary were of special assistance to him here? In broad outline, I think we can.

We may begin by considering how difficult it is to handle argument, especially abstract argument, in poetry. The poet lacks (or the exigencies of verse prevent him from using) many "logical words"

which would help in delimiting his field of discourse and in summing up conclusions and condensing them for the next step forward, and so on. Because of this, Wordsworth is twice compelled to confess the inadequacy of his statements;

> I see by glimpses now . . .
>
> and I would give,
> While yet we may, so far as words can give. . . .

And these confessions, while logically adding nothing to the argument, add a great deal to the intensity with which we are made to feel its hesitating, jerky, but superbly dramatic advance. For somewhat similar reasons Wordsworth has to resort to repetition. The beacon and the naked pool, for example, are referred to three times in this passage; but they re-enter the argument each time with a distinguishable purpose and effect. They are first presented as features in a scene that was naturally fitted to call out imaginative experience; they are next considered as elements in a typical imaginative experience, and they are considered lastly as instances of, or carriers of, that power which such visitations leave behind. This repetition is not simply for illustrative purposes. The purpose of the passage is to make us feel the peculiarly integrating effect of every imaginative experience. The abstract words by which we try to describe or analyse this effect are, inevitably, very inadequate. They lack precision, and precision is wanted here. But by his trick of repetition Wordsworth makes his whole concern with the moorland scene work in our thought, and work at three different levels of generality; he makes us feel it on the move and catch it on the rebound. And in this way an apparent defect in the poet's vocabulary is turned into a surprising asset.

In arguments of this order Wordsworth's use of abstract words is unequalled by any other English poet. How often do not the nouns —nature, man, society, life, joy, power, base, object, influence, sense, thing, sight, and the adjectives—common, general, individual, ordinary, abstract, single, greatest, least, occur with a quite transfiguring wealth of meaning in *The Prelude*! Another aspect of this verbal mastery which contributes so much to Wordsworth's philosophical achievement is his use of verbs which possess both a practical (manipulative or motor) and a logical meaning: work, hang, unite, build, dispose, lead, follow, substitute, annul. Of course not all Wordsworth's uses of abstractions are equally happy. But an inspection of this part of Wordsworth's poetic armoury makes it hard to doubt that he possessed something of "the genius of a great philosophic poet."

(5) *The verification of Wordsworth's answer and its applicability to other problems*

How are the statements of an *original* moralist (i.e. one who attempts to shift our use of certain moral and metaphysical categories) to be tested and verified? I do not know; and although it seems to me perhaps the most important philosophical question that exists (as important for philosophy and for understanding what philosophy is as for practical life) I do not know of a single contemporary philosopher who has seriously considered it or at least has offered a helpful answer.

In this situation I shall consider only two points, which are certainly relevant to such verification although they by no means comprise it. First, then, an original moralist—a Plato, a Spinoza, a Wordsworth, a Nietsche, a Bergson, a Schweitzer—must express his view *forcibly*; he must, as it were, screw our moral vision round in the direction he wants us to look even if he does not persuade us that we ought to keep looking in that direction. Wordsworth, through his use of his own poetry, seems to me to succeed in this first task better than any of the thinkers I have just mentioned, Plato alone excepted. But, secondly, we must feel in any moralist who asks us to re-orientate our whole moral outlook, that he is thus far being "reasonable" in that, in Cartesian phrase, he has made the widest possible reviews of all relevant moral issues and that his own original view takes cognisance of these. It is in this respect that Spinoza, Bergson, and Schweitzer are such impressively persuasive moralists. They write as men of profound and masterful culture—moral, artistic, intellectual. And here Wordsworth, by contrast, falls short. He seems narrow and provincial. But it seems to me that it was not Wordsworth's moral experience and sympathies that were narrow, nor the range of his moral insights (glimpses), but his powers of generalization and of re-applying generalized results. Within his own chosen range Wordsworth's generalizing power was both bold and exact, and his power of producing "individual forms in which are embodied universal ideals and abstractions" perhaps unrivalled. The trouble was that he did not apply his results widely enough. But there are, I think, a number of moral and metaphysical issues to which Wordsworth's conception of the true end of man could be applied with immense benefit to-day: notably the problem of evil, the problem of how moral ideals can become (and remain) operative in political institutions, and the moral problems involved in the acceptance of scientific standards of truth. Wordsworth, of course, said some illuminating things on each of these issues, but his thoughts on them never went far enough. It was not, as Dr. Leavis has suggested, "lack of material" which kept Wordsworth from developing his philosophical poetry; it was the fact that his

philosophical powers were determined by—and worked only when fed by—his own personal poetic interests, compulsions, intuitions.

This defect is perhaps inevitable in a philosophical poet: but it is matched in Wordsworth's case by an asset which is of more than compensating value. The best philosophical poetry of *The Prelude* not only expresses philosophical thinking, but in an uniquely intimate way embodies it—creates the struggle of thought, raises its problems and antitheses, focusses the struggle of thought, and advances it to original conclusions. More than this, Wordsworth's characteristic method of thinking makes us aware of a corresponding defect in familiar philosophical methods when these are applied in morals or the metaphysics of the mind. For these methods almost inevitably fail to show us mind "on the move" or happiness and morality "in the making." In as much as it indicates a way of overcoming this defect *The Prelude* deserves, I think, the description which Coleridge applied (in anticipation) to *The Recluse* as a whole —"the *first* and *only* philosophical poem."

DESCARTES' "SIMPLE NATURES"[1]

JOHN HARTLAND-SWANN, B.A., Ph.D.

IT is one of the unfortunate habits of great philosophers to leave behind them unclarified points of doctrine which give headaches to those anxious to view their systems as coherent wholes, and often lead to considerable confusion, or even contradiction, in attempts at critical exposition. An outstanding example of this is furnished by Descartes' treatment of "simple natures."

To interpret what Descartes really meant by simple natures as described in the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*,[2] and to integrate this with what he said in his published works (where they are not mentioned as such) is by no means an easy task—as the differing views of various critics clearly indicate. One has only to compare, say, the expositions of Chevalier, Boyce Gibson and Keeling to see that there is little unanimity of opinion as to the actual connotation of simple natures, their proper role in the Cartesian metaphysic, their terminological equivalents in the *Meditations* and *Principles*, and their ontological as opposed to epistemological status. Many critics, as Dr. Keeling complains, have seen fit "to discuss them when treating of his (Descartes') method, and omit all reference to them thereafter."[3] To make any comprehensive attempt to sort out this critical *Verwirrung*, however, would require considerable space. What I shall do here, therefore, will be to state the problem as simply as I can and then offer a solution in the light of the evidence available—although I admit that short of recalling Descartes from his grave there can *be* no final solution.

I may remark at the outset that I am of the opinion that one of the reasons why simple natures were never mentioned after the

[1] Paper read to the Jowett Society, Oxford, May 22, 1946.

[2] *Reg.* vi, AT. x, 381–4 (epistemological aspect); *Reg.* xii, *ibid.*, 418–27 (ontological aspect). This division into "epistemological" and "ontological" aspects is merely an exegetical expedient, since the original texts do not permit of an exact correlation in the sense implied by this modern description. It is indeed no easy task to decide exactly how "absolute" terms, each of which "in se continet naturam puram et simplicem" (*Reg.* vi), are to be related to the simple natures described in *Reg.* xii. It is dubious whether, on Descartes' own premisses, what is epistemologically absolute can be univocally correlated to what is ontologically simple, and what is epistemologically relative to what is ontologically complex. But unless such a correlation is achieved there is little coherence between the simple natures of *Reg.* vi and those of *Reg.* xii. (The abbreviation "AT." refers to the 12-volume edition of Descartes' correspondence and works edited by MM. Adam and Tannery.)

[3] *Descartes*, p. 236.

Regulae is that Descartes considered they would not bear the weight of the structure of his innatism (which, strictly speaking, should have been erected on them exclusively), and this conclusion seems to be reinforced by consideration of his intuition of the idea of God—a point to which I shall revert later. At all events, after the *Regulae* "simple" natures are no longer discussed; instead we are asked to attend to "true and immutable" natures, which are in some cases undisguisedly complex.[1] Further, some of these true and immutable natures or *essences* (which in theory should be, and according to the methodological presuppositions of the *Regulae must be*, reducible to *simpler* elements) have to be regarded as *basal units* to enable the epistemological processes, leading to valid metaphysical conclusions, to take their proper course. Let us endeavour, however, to tackle the problem from its commencement.

From a general philosophical aspect there are two main points of interest in regard to the simple natures of the *Regulae*:[2] (1) the method of their cognition; (2) their ontological status. The first point involves the troublesome question of "innate" ideas, and I do not think that it can now be seriously questioned that the Cartesian position (especially as finally laid down in the *Notae in programma quoddam*) implied falling back on some sort of mystical illumination of the intellect in order to avoid the "contamination" of sensory aid in the origination of the many concepts requisite to cope with experience. The following is to be noted, however. In 1628—the assumed date of the *Regulae*—Descartes' doctrine of innatism was but at the beginning of its long and somewhat erratic career, and at this period there is still room for the "understanding" to abstract from sense-data in its pursuit of truth. "Ad rerum cognitionem duo tantum spectanda sunt, nos scilicet qui cognoscimus, et res ipsae cogno-

[1] Cf. Letter of June 16, 1641, to Mersenne. "Par le mot *Idea*, j'entends tout ce qui peut être en notre pensée, et . . . j'en ai distingué trois sortes: à savoir *quaedam sunt adventitiae*, comme l'idée qu'on a vulgairement du Soleil; *aliae factae vel factitiae*, au rang desquelles on peut mettre celle que les Astronomes font du Soleil par leur raisonnement; *et aliae innatae, ut Idea Dei, Mentis, Corporis, Trianguli, et generaliter omnes quae aliquas Essentias Veras, Immutabiles et Aeternas repraesentant*" (AT. iii, 383). Commenting on this passage M. Gilson remarks: "L'idée innée proprement dite . . . nous livre une 'vraie et immuable nature,' c'est-à-dire une essence dont la définition s'impose nécessairement à notre pensée" (*Commentaire*, p. 328).

[2] I shall be dealing more or less exclusively with the simple natures *per se* of *Reg.* xii, and for reasons which will become, I hope, progressively apparent. The so-called epistemological characteristics of simple natures, of which examples are given in *Reg.* vi and which are called "absolute terms" ("ut . . . independens, causa, simplex, universale, unum, aequale, simile, rectum . . ."—AT. x, 381)—these present little difficulty if viewed as "ultimate limits to formal analysis" (Keeling), that is, in the context of Descartes' methodology. The philosopher himself, in the same rule, makes it quite clear how an "absolute" term can become a "relative" one, and *vice versa*.

scendae. In nobis quatuor sunt facultates tantum, quibus ad hoc uti possimus: nempe intellectus, imaginatio, sensus, et memoria. Solus intellectus equidem percipiendae veritatis est capax, qui tamen juvandus est ab imaginatione, sensu, et memoria, ne quid forte, quod in nostra industria positum sit, omittamus" (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 411). When, in the same rule, the intuiting of simple natures comes to be discussed this preliminary methodological directive comes into play. These "entities," it will be remembered, are divided into three groups—those that are purely intellectual, those that are purely material, and those common both to intellect and matter—and within the last group are included the common notions or *vincula* for relating the other simple natures to each other (*ibid.*, 419). Now while the first group (e.g. knowing, doubt, ignorance, volition) is apprehended by a direct intuition of the intellect, unaided by any corporeal image, the second group (e.g. figure, extension, motion) appears to require sensory aid for its apprehension, while the third group (e.g. existence, unity, duration *plus* the common notions) may be apprehended either by the intellect alone or with sensory aid (*ibid.*, 419–20). This point is important to bear in mind since most critics, arguing in the context of Descartes' later theory of innatism, tend to treat simple natures as all on a par, not only ontologically (which may be correct) but from the point of view of their cognition too, which is only justifiable if the doctrine of the *Meditations* (where the ideal "equivalents" of the simple natures of the second and third groups are declared innate as well—*Med.* iii. AT. vii, 44–5) is openly recognized as replacing the more "primitive" teaching of the *Regulae*. Unless that doctrinal modification is signalled and accepted as transforming the cognitional status of the simple natures of the second (and also the third) group, then no critic is justified in treating all simple natures on the same epistemic level (i.e. as corresponding to representative innate ideas). So much for the first point.

I come now to the second point of interest concerning simple natures—namely their ontological status (if indeed they have any). And it is precisely here that critics fall out or talk at cross purposes. Dr. Boyce Gibson, for instance, devotes some attention, in his comprehensive volume on Descartes' philosophy, to the status of simple natures, but almost entirely in the context of theory of knowledge, and without bothering once to cite or discuss the examples furnished by Descartes himself. For him the problem appears to be: is a simple nature a concept or a proposition? And to this, after a well-reasoned analysis of the relationship between intuition and deduction in Cartesian method, he replies: a simple nature is really a concept, but it can only be affirmed as simple by means of a proposition.[1] Dr. Keeling, on the other hand, makes a sustained (though not I fear

[1] *The Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 162. Cf. the whole discussion, pp. 154–63.

wholly satisfactory) endeavour to get to grips with the ontological status proper of simple natures. Acting specifically as Descartes' interpreter (in the context of the *Regulae*) he writes: "All these natures (i.e. every nature in any of the three groups) are indispensable for knowledge. For our knowledge is to be of this *actual* world, and the actual world is made up of complex unities composed of these ultimate natures, and these unities would not exhibit the various characters they do if there were no simple natures of just these kinds. This seems to be what Descartes particularly desires to emphasize."[1] Later on, when developing his own viewpoint, Keeling maintains that simple natures are "ontal elements," "actually constitutive of extra-mental reality," and that there is an exact "correspondence between the *a priori* innate principles and concepts that give form to our knowledge" and these ontal elements.[2] In short, although Descartes' "standard" world consists purely in spirit-substance and body-substance and their modes (e.g. knowing, willing, doubting are but modes of *res cogitans—Princ.*, i, 48), Keeling appears to opt for an entification of simple natures in an extra-mental world which can only consist of diversified and configured (but essentially homogeneous) extended substance. But apart from the difficulties of reconciling this entification with Descartes' fundamental ontology, we have still to account for the simple natures of the *first* group which cannot, by their very definition, belong to "extra-mental reality" since they are *only* found in minds or mental operations! Are we to assume then that what Keeling really means is that simple natures are constitutive of both mental *and* extra-mental reality, according to their classification? This alternative, as we shall see, still raises serious difficulties, and, equally with the former, invites the attention of Occam's razor. Another view—which might "save the appearances" of simple natures as ontal elements—is to assume that they are indeed all extra-mental but inhabit some world of subsistents, analogous perhaps to that world of the modern realist where universals and their kin have their sublime if somewhat mysterious habitation.[3] This third alternative, savouring of Neo-Platonism, is not unattractive in view of Descartes' inherently realist and at times semi-mystical orientation, and seems at first sight to interpret the original doctrine of *Reg.* xii tolerably well. I say "at first sight" deliberately. For when the catalogue (unfortunately somewhat

[1] *The Philosophy of Descartes*, p. 70.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 236 n. 1, 264 n. 4. It is of course possible that I have failed to grasp what Dr. Keeling really means to imply—but I have felt compelled to take the terminology he uses at its face value.

[3] I must not be taken to insinuate that Dr. Keeling *himself* envisages simple natures as inhabiting some subsistent world. I am merely trying to examine any hypothesis under which it may be possible to pin down their ontological status.

abbreviated) of simple natures is perused carefully and we find that "common notions"—the *vincula* of knowledge—equally with figure, extension, motion, existence, unity, duration, etc., are simple natures, it looks as if entification on this basis becomes extraordinarily precarious, and as if "ontal element" is not the happiest term to employ—at any rate if it is to designate *all* simple natures indiscriminately. For what are these "common notions" in actual fact? Dr. Keeling likes to describe them as "relations," paraphrasing Descartes' own description of them[1] into neat terms such as "likeness" and "diversity." But later on, when the same critic is analysing simple natures out of the *cogito*-situation, these *vincula* or relations become *principles* (such as those of causation, sufficient reason, and non-contradiction). And indeed these "principles" not only tie up with the "eternal truths" of *Princ.* i, 48–9 (as we shall see in a moment), but also seem correctly to express the meaning of Descartes' own words in *Reg.* xii.[2] But when all is said and done, have we not—at least so far as these *vincula* are concerned—moved out of the sphere of ontological essences and back to mere concepts or logical principles, either furnished to or abstracted by the mind that it may therewith order experience? We may go further. *Every* simple nature cited by Descartes himself—whether of the first, second, or third group—is surely in point of fact a *universal*, an empirical or *a priori* concept—either abstracted by the mind from sensuous data, innately in the mind, or, to approach Kant's position, imposed by the mind on the facts of experience to give them rational interpretation. Now it is quite true, as more than one critic has stressed, that we have no right to assimilate Descartes' doctrine to that of Kant; the father of modern philosophy was *not* an idealist: that seems clear enough. But are we justified in pressing simple natures into the realist scheme of Descartes' published philosophy? Dr. Keeling thinks we are. "Descartes' 'innate ideas,' " he writes, "are so far preparatory of Kant's 'Categories of the Understanding.' But whereas Kant's 'Copernican hypothesis' effectively prevents us ever from knowing whether our cognition represents the structure of ultimate fact (and cannot therefore be taken as being a knowledge of extra-mental reality), it is of the very essence of Cartesian epistemology (viz. of the theory of representative perception, enforced by God's certification of what is 'clear and distinct') to maintain a correspondence between the *a priori* innate principles and concepts

[1] ". . . communes illae notiones, quae sunt veluti vincula quaedam ad alias naturas simplices inter se conjugendas, et quaram evidentia nititur quidquid ratiocinando concludimus. Hae scilicet: quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se; item, quae ad idem tertium eodem modo referri non possunt, aliquid etiam inter se habent diversum, etc." (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 419).

[2] *Vide supra*, n. 1.

that give form to our knowledge, and the simple natures actually constitutive of extra-mental reality."[1] If this claim be studied in the context of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, difficulties spring up on every side. In these works the ontological ultimates are: (1) God or absolute substance; (2) spirit-substance with its plurality of selves and their modes; (3) body-substance with its various modes. Nothing else. The articles in the first book of the *Principles* which may be said to refer to simple natures in their new garb point the issue for us. In *article* 58 Descartes' anti-scholastic bias compelled him to declare that universals (*cf.* the second and third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii) have no existence outside our thought. "De même le nombre que nous considérons en général, sans faire réflexion sur aucune chose créée, n'est point hors de notre pensée, non plus que toutes ces autres idées *générales* que *dans l'école* on comprend sous le nom d'universaux." In *articles* 48 and 49 he had definitely stated that "common notions" or "axioms"[2] (*cf.* the *vincula* of *Reg.* xii) were merely "eternal truths" having their seat in our minds but no existence outside our thought, i.e. (presumably) *no extra-mental reality*.[3] In the former article (48), however, curiously enough (and in apparent contradiction to arts. 58–9) the more general "categories" (of which *substance, duration, order* and *number* are cited as examples and which would formerly have belonged to the third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii) are declared to be "res" (or to have "quelque existence"—French version) and to "range through all classes of real things."[4] Nevertheless, as the article goes on to make clear, only two ultimate classes of real things are recognized—namely, intellectual

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 264 n. 4. This passage should be compared with a former statement relative to "Awareness of Sensible appearances," e.g. "Complexes of sense-ideas (are) analysable into simpler ideas or sensa (but never into simple natures, for these are purely conceptual and non-sensory)" (*ibid.*, p. 162). If complexes of sense-ideas are not to *some* extent analysable into the simple natures which they represent, how, one may ask, is the "correspondence" referred to above to be maintained? Cf. Descartes' own remarks on this very point: ". . . si judicem aliquam figuram non moveri, dicam meam cogitationem esse aliquo modo compositam ex figura et quiete; et sic de caeteris" (*Reg.* xii, AT. x, 420). If this be taken in conjunction with the methodological directives of *Reg.* xii already referred to, I do not see how it is possible to maintain that simple natures are "*purely* conceptual and non-sensory" *unless* we concentrate exclusively on Descartes' later doctrine of innatism. But there, as I said, simple natures as such are never mentioned at all.

[2] "Cum autem agnoscimus fieri non posse, ut ex nihilo aliquid fiat, tunc propositio haec: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, non tanquam res aliqua existens, neque etiam ut rei modus consideratur, sed ut veritas quaedam aeterna, quae in mente nostra sedem habet, vocaturque communis notio, sive axioma" (*Princ.* i, 49. (AT. viii (i), 23)).

[3] Always saving of course their possible inherence in the mind of God.

[4] Haldane and Ross thus happily translate "ad omnia genera rerum se extendunt."

and material—and *perception, volition,* etc., on the one hand, and *extension, figure,* etc., on the other (previously cited as simple natures of the first and second groups in *Reg.* xii) are declared to be *modes* of the two ultimate substances respectively. Further, what we just called the more general "categories"—namely substance, duration, order and number (the common natures of *Reg.* xii)—are in *art.* 55 themselves too, with the exception of substance, called *modes* of thinking or extended things. That is to say, duration, order and number are merely convenient concepts for giving verbal expression to the various aspects of the two ultimate types of reality, and in no way differ from things that endure, are ordered or numbered, i.e. do not represent separate entities. Ignoring the categorial confusion in Descartes' handling of the term "substance,"[1] it looks that, if we are to accept Keeling's hypothesis, we must equate ontal "element" with "mode," which it seems scarcely justifiable to do since the two fundamental Cartesian substances are themselves irreducible ontological ultimates (except in so far as there is a plurality of selves in the spiritual world)—and when we come to consider "relations," "common notions" or "axioms"—all packed into the third group of simple natures in *Reg.* xii—it is, as I have already said, harder still to give elemental being to these abstract principles. On the other hand, it is only fair to recognize that Descartes' own inconsistent exposition allows of more than one interpretation of his views on concepts and universals—and quite apart from the *Regulae.* For instance, his discussion of essence, in the context of his ontological argument for the existence of God, leads him to insist in *Med.* v

[1] Substance, the only "genuine" category mentioned, should not, strictly speaking, have been lumped together with duration, order and number, since the latter are all modes of substance. On the other hand, it is perfectly consistent to maintain that all four are (or can be) equally concretely exemplified in things that (spiritually or materially) are substantial, endure, are ordered or numbered. In point of fact, *art.* 48 and the articles immediately subsequent to it are compact of terminological confusions, which are heightened rather than reduced by any attempt to correlate them (the articles) with the doctrine of the *Regulae.* Dr. Keeling tries manfully to interpret *art.* 48 in terms of simple natures (*op. cit.,* p. 100), but admits that Descartes has got confused about "common notions," and himself somewhat inconsistently declares (*contra* Descartes) that existence, duration, diversity and unity are common *notions,* when what he should have said (to be consistent with *Reg.* xii and his own original interpretation of it) was that existence, unity and duration were common *natures* of the third group (i.e. common to both intellect and matter) and that "diversity" was a common notion proper (i.e. a relation or *vinculum*), even though of course it also belonged to the same group. Of course, all this sort of criticism, it may be asserted, is mere hair-splitting. True enough! But unfortunately the very attempt that has been made (and vainly made in the present writer's opinion) to fit simple natures into the scheme of Descartes published works compels one to a somewhat pettifogging analysis if the incompatibilities of the case (viewed in an ontological context) are to be made clear.

that the "true and immutable nature" of a triangle cannot be reduced to my thought, for the simple reason that it "resists" thought—remains the same whether I think it or not. Between this statement and the implications of *Princ.* i, 58–9 there is obviously a discrepancy (of which he himself seemed unaware) deriving from a clash between his desire to establish a stable and hence non-mentally dependent real structure in the universe, and his simultaneous preoccupation to discard the naïve realism of scholasticism with its otiose entification in the realm of universals. And overshadowing both these tendencies was his doctrine of the eternal verities, which, though eternal and having their seat in human minds, did not exist on account of any inherent necessity, but merely because God so willed. . . .

From this analysis it is, I hope, obvious what difficulties beset any attempt either to define accurately the ontological status of simple natures, or to co-ordinate what, from one aspect or another, appears to be their ontological status in the *Regulae* with the reality-structure of Descartes' published works—without sliding back into mere epistemological distinctions. Boyce Gibson's somewhat elliptical treatment, therefore—unsatisfactory as it may seem to the student desirous of receiving a detailed explanation of everything he can find in Descartes' writings—seems pragmatically justified in view of the insuperable difficulties encountered if simple natures be considered outside the formal structure of knowledge and the method of scientific analysis. The truth of the matter is, I think, that Descartes himself, owing to epistemological preoccupations (themselves coloured at times by a semi-mysticism), never achieved full mental clarity as to the ontological status of the various components of his knowledge-structure. The "ideas" of the *Meditations*, unlike the intuitions of the *Regulae*, were not all suited to discrimination into absolute terms representative of simple atomic elements, and any attempt to effect such a discrimination would have meant compiling utterly useless catalogues of every cognitional facet of perceived objects. Descartes therefore, understandably enough, exercised himself primarily with the causal explanation of ideas—what they represented or misrepresented—rather than with their analysis into irreducible elements, and seemed satisfied if he had shown that, due to being clear and distinct, their natures were "true and immutable," quite irrespective of their primitive simplicity. So soon as we start trying to fit simple natures into the scheme of the *Discourse* or *Meditations* we involve ourselves in confused speculation. Thus the self, Boyce Gibson claims, is *not* a simple nature;[1] the self, M. Cheva-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 135. Boyce Gibson reaches this conclusion in the context of considering the original intuition of the self which (as Descartes himself was to insist to Burman (AT. v, 153)) contained implicitly the intuition of God. In point of fact the self *does* appear in isolation at first "due to the defensive

lier maintains, *is* a simple nature.[1] Dr. Keeling, consistently enough I suppose,[2] breaks down the *cogito* into a plethora of simple natures (all presumably "ontal elements") which include the "relations" that are equivalent to the fundamental principles required for the Cartesian proofs of the existence of God and material bodies.[3] Descartes himself, with commendable discretion, makes no attempt to indulge in any such analysis, even though he admitted that the fundamental axioms of logic could not be given metaphysical validity prior to the *cogito*-intuition.[4] He is, in point of fact, wholly preoccupied with ideas as such, complex though some of them are. The mind has received its furniture from God and the cataloguing of that furniture and the dissecting of it into its irreducible elements seems no longer greatly to concern him once the guiding principle of clearness and distinctness has been laid down; what is necessary is to establish the linkage between mental content and what it represents in the world of spirit, or misrepresents in the world of matter. "Simple natures" yield to the more comprehensive term "true and immutable natures," and these represent the essences of things—even if, as in the case of the triangle, the exact ontological status of that essence is never clearly explained, and is indeed confused by the doctrine of universals in the *Principles*.[5] The epistemological approach to exist-

and sceptical attitude which the method of doubt has compelled us to adopt in the face of a possibly alien universe"; but by leaning on what this critic calls the "method of expanding implications" we are able to transcend the (mere) self-intuition and thus attain God. "The finite is driven by the logic of its own being into the infinite." This procedure, however, as Boyce Gibson admits, "plays havoc with the theory of the self as substance" (*ibid.*, p. 105); and it also, I may add (despite the justificatory evidence for it in Descartes' own writings) complicates still further any attempt to interpret the self in terms of simple natures.

[1] *Descartes*, p. 214, e.g. "Cette première vérité (sc. le *Cogito*) répond exactement aux exigences de nos règles formelles et elle leur fournit un contenu réel: en effet, nous avons là précisément une connaissance immédiate, c'est-à-dire intuitive, d'une nature simple (le *je* comme sujet pensant) . . ."

[2] I.e. consistently with the passage in *Reg.* xii dealing with necessary and contingent relationship (AT. x, 421–2).

[3] These are, first, "the thing" which is "I," "existence," "thinking"; second, the various *vincula* of knowledge expressed in the form of four principles, namely (*a*) necessary relation of attribute to substance, (*b*) causation, (*c*) sufficient reason, (*d*) non-contradiction. These principles, Keeling contends, are "extracted" from the *Cogito*-situation, and at the same time give the latter its structure (*op cit.*, pp. 100–2).

[4] Letter of June or July, 1646, to to Clerselier (AT. iv, 444).

[5] The only satisfactory explanation of triangularity, on the basis of Descartes' own declarations, would be that God, on whom its essence depends, somehow holds it in equilibrium (1) in his own mind (as the Neo-Platonists held), or (2) in some timeless and spaceless aspect of the created universe, or (3) merely in all human minds whether or not those minds were capable of making the necessary effort within themselves to grasp its essence.

ence *via* essence—utilized (albeit in different ways) in both the ontological proof of God's existence and the proof for the existence of the external world—might have availed itself, one would imagine, of a reference to simple natures if they would have really been a help rather than a hindrance to the processes involved. But if we examine Descartes' explanatory remarks concerning the first proof in the Second Replies and the "geometrical" appendix thereto, we find that it is in fundament the *concept*[1] of a supreme Being that contains within itself the idea of necessary existence, and in the next line he talks of "nature or concept" as if the two terms were interchangeable. In effect, it is a necessity of thought which compels existence to be contained within the concept of a supreme Being. If, on the other hand, we accept the hypothesis of M. Koyré and others who (in order to subvert Kant) insist on a relation of entailment ("convenance") between God's essence and existence we have still to ask by what device one conglomeration of simple natures (that is, if the defining attributes of Deity can properly be called such) can entail the presence of another simple nature: existence. The problem obviously bristles with difficulties, quite apart from any consideration of Kantian criticism. Indeed, whenever the idea of God is at stake Descartes feels compelled to insist on its absolute *simplicity* and *indivisibility*,[2] and precisely to overcome the objections of those who would derive it from finite ideas, analyse it away into its constituent parts, and then claim with Gassendi[3] that these parts were anthropomorphically extracted from the sensuous world. A consideration of the (first) *a posteriori* proof illuminates the question from another angle. Its cogency depends again on the unicity and irreducibility of the idea which God himself has imprinted on my mind, and although now the *existence* of God depends on a fundamental causal principle, it seems clear that the (to us) complicated idea of God would tend to lose its internal stability if one started to dissect it into its component parts on any other basis than their being the qualifying attributes of the supreme Being.[4] Lastly (while we are still on the question of the true and immutable nature of God), if we accept Boyce Gibson's theory

[1] *II*[as] *Resp. Rationes etc. more geometrico dispositae* (AT. x, AT. vii, 166).

[2] Cf. *Med.* iii: "Unitas, simplicitas, sive inseparabilitas eorum omnium quae in Deo sunt, una est ex praecipuis perfectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo" (AT. vii, 50); *II*[as] *Resp.* "Sed praeterea in Deo intelligimus absolutam immensitatem, simplicitatem, unitatem omnia alia attributa complectentem . . ." (AT. vii, 137).

[3] *Objj. Vae*, AT. vii, 286–7.

[4] It would, I think, have savoured of irreverence if someone had suggested to Descartes that God's nature or essence was composed of a series of "ontal elements" in necessary relationship. The various qualities or attributes predicated of him (Descartes might have retorted) are merely modes of his infinite Being through which our finite minds apprehend him.

concerning the logic of expanding implications[1] and agree that, somehow or other, the idea of God is intuited simultaneously with (or "expands" from) the idea of the self, we are still apt to lose our footing if we turn off from the epistemological path and try to describe the situation in terms of simple natures as ontological ultimates. At all events, the fact remains that all mention of simple natures was consistently avoided in any and every presentation of the various proofs for God's existence.

The same avoidance was practised in the second essence-existence problem cited—namely, the argument for the ontological reality of the external world. In this case there was no question (as there was in the theistic ontological argument) of existence being contained among or entailed by the defining attributes of extension; existence was proved to have application due to the involuntary nature of sensation which God, through his veracity, guaranteed to be caused by external existent objects. Further, extension itself, though quoted as a simple nature of the second group in *Reg.* xii, might equally well, in accordance with the epistemological presuppositions of *Reg.* vi, be regarded as a relative term *vis-à-vis* length, and its defining components (length, breadth, depth) could rightly also be called simple natures. But all such dissection would have merely complicated further an already complex proof. Far easier was the passage from the true and immutable *essence* of extension to its actual God-guaranteed *existence*. But, over and above the manifest difficulties inherent in fitting simple natures into the fabric of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, there is also the question of contemporary terminological confusion to be considered which Descartes, after his study of Bacon's use of the term *natura simplex*, may well have appreciated.[2] Bacon, despite his attempts to shake free, got entangled in scholasticism, and precisely on account of *ontological* preoccupations. It may perhaps not be irrelevant—despite the very different senses in which Descartes and Bacon used the term *natura simplex*—to indicate briefly the latter's confused treatment of this question.

Bacon commences the exposition of his doctrine of "forms" with a somewhat left-handed compliment to Plato. The great Athenian

[1] Cf. note (i) to p. 146 *supra*.

[2] Descartes seems definitely to have read some of Bacon's works (notably the *De Augmentis scientiarum*) and to have been impressed by the Lord Chancellor's inductive method (AT. i, 195, 251). On the other hand, a letter of January 1630 to Mersenne indicates that Bacon's "simple natures" or "forms" will meet the same fate as those of Aristotle, i.e. will be "explained away." Here is the passage in point: "Je vous remercie des qualités que vous avez tirées d'Aristote; j'en avais déjà fait une autre plus grande liste, partie tirée de Verulamio, partie de ma tête, et c'est une des premières choses que je tâcherai d'expliquer, et cela ne sera pas si difficile qu'on pourrait croire; car les fondements étant posés, elles suivent d'elles-mêmes" (AT. i, 109).

is to be commended for having grasped that "forms are the true object of knowledge," but is to be censured for having tried to deal with them as "absolutely abstracted from matter." Thus, to investigate "the form of a lion, of an oak or of gold" is nugatory; but to inquire "the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities"—all this is the proper function of metaphysic or science (*Adv. of Learn.* ii, vii, 5). The Lord Chancellor, however, could not, it appears, decide whether these forms, equivalent to the "simple natures" analysed out of the complex natures exhibited by the sensible bodies of the natural world, were Scotist essences and ontological ultimates, or merely the explanatory *laws* of the *behaviour* of phenomena. Dr. Höffding has summed up this confusion very clearly for us in the context of Bacon's main doctrine of Nature. "If we seek to draw logical conclusions from the doctrine of the hidden process [of Nature], we discover that Bacon's two meanings of the concept of 'form' contradict one another. According to the first meaning (form = simple nature = quality, which constitutes the essence of the thing) we start from the assumption that the qualities presented through perception belong also to the things themselves. According to the second meaning (form = law of the process by which things arise) it is evident that things really consist of atoms and are produced by minute changes which cannot, when taken separately, be perceived. The subjectivity of the sense-qualities agrees with the latter meaning (since heat either in itself or *in ordine ad universum* is motion), while it is in contradiction to the first meaning (where heat, like colour, etc., is *natura simplex*). As Bacon's first meaning reminds us of Plato and the Scholastics, so his second reminds us of Democritus, without, however, being exactly atomistic. It is characteristic of him that the passage . . . to the effect that 'forms' are inventions and *idola tribus*, if by 'form' we do not mean law, occurs immediately after his commendation of Democritus for his exhortation to dissolve Nature into its elements, rather than to set about making abstractions. Here again it is the relation between quality and quantity at which Bacon stops short. Entangled in Platonic and scholastic presuppositions, he could not consistently carry out what was contained in his notion of a continuous process, by which qualitative differences are dissolved into quantitative."[1]

It is possible, then, that Descartes may have taken Bacon's treatment of simple natures as a warning, and decided—even though his own examples of simple natures (*cf.* p. 141 *supra*) had little in common with those of Bacon—to drop all mention of them in his published works, all the more in view of his own anti-scholastic bias. Even motion, which might well qualify as an "ontal element," has to become

[1] *A History of Modern Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 202.

a mere *mode* of extension, however difficult it may be to conceive it as such and yet reconcile this with its lack of fundamental relationship *to* extension. The fact is, not only are simple natures too simple to support the metaphysic eventually propounded, but their ontological status is allowed to lapse entirely and they actually tend to become indistinguishable from ideas or concepts. Dr. Keeling tries (vainly it seems) to stress that simple natures are *not* ideas[1]—yet is forced to admit that later they are "rather confusingly called 'primitive *notions*' "[2] (i.e. in a letter of May 1643 to Princess Elizabeth) and in point of fact this deviation is equally implicit in the *Meditations* and *Principles*. Indeed it seems clear that the more compendious, if less clearly definable entity, the idea has taken over the assets of the *Regulae* and *telescoped*, as it were, in some cases at least, *the mental intuition and the object intuited*. The extent to which divine veracity guaranteed, and divine grace beneficently provided all kinds of ideas—even those of the sensible order necessary for the apprehension of the complex phenomena of the external world and the union of body and soul—precluded the restriction of the objects intuited to a mere assortment of simple natures or complex natures analysable without remainder into simple natures, themselves all clear and distinct. Further, the doctrine of the three distinctions—real, modal and rational (*Princ.* i, 60–2)—and particularly that of the modal distinction, makes the division of *a priori* concepts into three classes of simple natures corresponding thereto, entirely superfluous. The ontological implications of *Reg.* xii have faded, as I said, into purely epistemological distinctions, since the only *real* distinctions now allowed are between spirit-substance and body-substance in the sub-lunar world, and between absolute substance or God and the "secondary" substances thought and extension in the universe as a whole.

I shall now endeavour to sum up this discussion which has tended, I fear, to become somewhat diffuse. The failure of Descartes "to carry simple natures explicitly right through his metaphysics and to work out his theory of them in sufficient fulness" may be, as Dr. Keeling claims, in the main "due to his later interest being dominated by difficulties of an epistemological rather than an ontological character," but if these difficulties be analysed in the context of his doctrine of ideas (with their semi-mystical innate background) and likewise his fundamental ontological distinctions, it seems fairly clear that simple natures would not readily integrate themselves with the completed metaphysic. Their atomic simplicity, in any but a purely epistemological context, was unnecessary, indeed encumbrant, to a metaphysical structure which based itself on *essences* that, complex as they might appear to us to-day, must themselves be irreducible if

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 236, n. 1.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 143 n. 1, *sub fin.*

unwelcome complications were to be avoided and the movement of arguments not compromised. And as Descartes' preoccupation with epistemological explanation increases it becomes more and more difficult to dispose the background of the now supreme ideas into ontologically atomistic elements. The weight of our philosopher's ingenuity is thrown on to accounting for the various key-ideas possessed by the mind. Through the medium of ideas, all in some sense innate, the whole world is interpretable, and ultimately all ideas, or at least our capacity for thinking them, are dependent on God: he is their unique direct cause. Thus it is that—as the *Notae* emphasize—no part of the external world can operate directly on mind, by transeunt action; the scope of sensa reaches only as far as the phantasia, where these sensa (particles of matter in motion) call forth or "occasion" a suitable (purely mental) idea which must have been placed there originally by God as part of the mind's furniture. Thus simple natures, it seems, their ontological status slurred over, become merely concepts (in some cases logical principles), kept stable and immutable by God's will, and are designed to enable man correctly (and in accordance with the law of parsimony) to interpret Nature in her most comprehensive aspect.

When we turn to Cartesian physics, which deals exclusively with matter in motion, we realize that it must of necessity look with suspicion on any "natures" that have ontological reference, in view of its fundamental rejection of the scholastico-Aristotelian system. Bacon's simple natures (or "forms") had a *causal* aspect which Descartes most certainly could not have accepted, since the behaviour of phenomena was solely attributable to the immutable kinetic laws established by God, and even motion, although injected into the universe by God in the beginning, must still, as I have already remarked, only be considered a mode of *res extensa*, the immutable essence of which the physical world was composed.

The policy to be recommended, therefore, is not to attempt to correlate the so-called simple natures of *Reg.* vi with those of *Reg.* xii, but rather to reduce, so far as is possible, the simple natures *per se* of *Reg.* xii to the status of innate ideas which may take the form of universals, categories, or principles of logic. Even this policy, however, does not enable these entities to fit unambiguously into the epistemology and ontology of the *Meditations* and *Principles*, and we can hardly escape the conclusion that there is quite a lot to be said for giving simple natures a wide berth!

DISCUSSION

R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

PHILOSOPHY of history is not a subject which has hitherto attracted much attention in this country. Preoccupation with the methods and achievements of the natural sciences, and distaste for the sort of rationale of history as a whole which Hegel and others offered under the title in the early nineteenth century, have served to make most British philosophers accord its problems only the most casual recognition. It is therefore all the more interesting to find an English writer of unusual powers both of argument and expression, who was himself an historian of distinction in his special field, devoting a large part of his philosophical thinking to the problems of historical knowledge and their wider implications. Unfortunately, R. G. Collingwood was not able to begin the major work on philosophy of history, to writing which, as we are told in the introduction to the present book,[1] he had looked forward for twenty-five years, until his powers were seriously affected by bad health, and he did not live to complete it. But though the full results of his thinking on the subject are lost, we are now able, thanks to the skilful work of his friend Professor T. M. Knox, to study what is in effect an extensive interim report on it. Professor Knox has produced *The Idea of History* largely on the basis of lectures which Collingwood prepared in 1936, supplemented by two essays already published which date from the same period and a certain amount of material from the unfinished *Principles of History* written in 1939. That the result is as smooth and finished as it is—that it reads more like a book prepared for the press by its author than one put together posthumously from his papers—is a tribute not only to Collingwood's powers of writing, but also to the care and good judgment of his editor.

Collingwood was interested in two main questions about history, one wider and one narrower. The wider was the general question of the relations of history to other studies and activities. This was a matter which had exercised him at least since the writing of *Speculum Mentis* (1924), and in which he continued to be interested to the end. As Professor Knox points out in the introduction to the present book, his views on it were by no means the same at all stages of his philosophical career. In his later writings, especially the *Autobiography* (1939) and the *Essay on Metaphysics* (1940), he advocated the view that all knowledge (including scientific knowledge in the narrow sense) has an historical basis, and that all philosophical questions are really historical. This form of historicism, as Professor Knox says (p. xiii), was oddly combined with a polemic against positivism, for its exclusive reliance on history as the type of all knowledge is the exact counterpart of the positivist reliance on natural science, and is open to much the same objections. Again, it was somewhat strange in a philosopher who accused his opponents, in the most downright way, of fostering the cause of irrationalism; for it precluded any enquiry into the ultimate justification of our beliefs. Once we had answered the historical question what had actually been thought at any given period, there was no more to be done: we could only accept the verdict of history with folded arms. This seems to imply that there is nothing to choose between one set of fundamental beliefs and another: a remarkable

[1] *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946. Pp. xxiv + 339. Price 20s.).

conclusion for one who called himself a rationalist to come to. But Collingwood had not always thought on these lines. In his *Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933), which Professor Knox describes as his ablest work and which he himself considered his most finished, he distinguished clearly between historical and philosophical thinking; and though the philosophy of that book was considerably influenced by the notion of historical process (it was, in fact, a restatement of some well-known theses of Hegel's), it was not infected with the historicism which characterized his later writings and which, Professor Knox suggests (p. xvii), may have led him to abandon *The Principles of History* on the ground that no independent (non-historical) enquiry into the nature of historical thinking was possible. There is a strong case here for saying that Collingwood's earlier views were sounder than those he eventually adopted.

An analytically-minded philosopher might well complain that Collingwood devoted too much attention to this issue of the relation of history to other studies, to the detriment of the more generally interesting though narrower question of the nature of historical knowledge itself. To this Collingwood would certainly have replied that the two enquiries cannot be separated; yet it is perhaps legitimate, in a context like the present, to concentrate attention on the one rather than the other. In the rest of this discussion the main subject I shall consider will accordingly be Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge and historical judgment; for his historicism I must be content to refer to Professor Knox's introduction. There is the more justification for this procedure in that it is the theory of history, rather than the historicism, on which *The Idea of History* throws fresh light. Part V (the last third) of the book consists of a series of essays on such problems as the nature of historical evidence and the subject-matter of history; and from this explicit discussion and the comments made in the first four parts of the book (which make up a most entertaining history, written in Collingwood's best manner, of the idea of history itself) his general position can be arrived at quite satisfactorily.

Collingwood was convinced from an early age that history is a form of knowledge which is *sui generis*, and the doctrine he was perhaps most anxious to combat was the positivist theory that historical knowledge could be reduced to scientific knowledge in the narrower sense of the term. Certainly, as Bury had said, history was "a science, no more and no less," if we understood by science a study with principles, methods and a subject-matter of its own. But the historian did not aim either at formulating general laws about human behaviour or at predicting the future course of events. His task was rather to describe and understand past events as they individually happened. And he could achieve this object thanks to the peculiar nature of the subject-matter with which he dealt. The proper material of history was the actions of human beings, and actions could always be regarded from a dual point of view: as events occurring in the physical world, and as the expression of thoughts and purposes. It was this thought side in human actions, according to Collingwood, which made historical knowledge possible. What the historian did was to re-think the thoughts which the subjects of his enquiry had thought, and in so doing to come to understand why they acted as they did. This process was, in Collingwood's view (and this is the most important part of his theory), a single one: it could most certainly not be divided, as has often been suggested, into the two distinct steps of finding out what happened and then accounting for it by reference to general principles. For, in the first place, every historical situation was unique and had to be understood in itself; and, secondly, the very act of re-thinking a thought was one which answered the question "why?" as well as the question "what?" If I knew what Nelson thought at the battle

of Trafalgar, I also knew why he thought it, since to attain the knowledge I must reconstruct the situation in which he acted and put myself in his place. Having reconstructed the situation, I should find the whole train of thought which Nelson went through self-explanatory. And I should do this, apparently, without bringing to bear any *general* knowledge of how admirals behave in sea-battles or of how human beings react to situations of certain types. My ability to carry out this remarkable feat could be ascribed to the fact that the Nelson I sought to understand was not Nelson as a physical object but Nelson as a mind: Collingwood seems to have believed, much as Dilthey did, that minds can understand each other in a peculiarly intimate way. History was properly described as the self-knowledge of mind, and its advantage over the natural sciences as a means of dealing with human beings lay precisely in the fact that it afforded knowledge of the individual. It was because human beings had to be understood as individuals, and because history alone could, he thought, provide such understanding, that Collingwood said in his British Academy lecture on "Human Nature and Human History" (pp. 205–31 of the present volume) that the Science of Human Nature to which Hume and Mill had looked forward must either resolve itself into history or be given up as wholly impossible of accomplishment.

This theory of history can be criticised from various points of view. A Marxist, for example, would probably dismiss it as nothing more than a vain attempt to resuscitate an already discredited idealism. All history, Collingwood says, is the history of thought; and what could be more absurd? But here Collingwood has his answer. He is not saying that human beings act without being affected by the natural conditions in which they live: the thought the historian studies is thought embodied in action, and actions themselves are, from one point of view, events happening in the physical world. What he is doing is denying that the natural background to men's actions has a constant or inevitable effect on them. To maintain that it has, and to try to formulate the laws according to which different physical factors determine what men do, is to acquiesce in historical naturalism; and this, in Collingwood's view, is radically misconceived. Certainly human beings are affected by the material conditions in which they live; but what is important in considering this situation is not so much the external conditions themselves as the attitudes men take up to them. These vary from case to case, and so we cannot speak (as historical materialists, despite their parade of dialectical terminology, in fact do) of a causal determination which is simple and constant.

This is a sound point; but one is left in some doubt as to what exactly it is that Collingwood is trying to express. Is it just that, as Toynbee would say, the fundamental idea with which the historian must work is not cause-and-effect but challenge-and-response? Toynbee's view is certainly anti-materialist, but it is not so clearly anti-naturalist, and one cannot see Collingwood readily acquiescing in the quasi-biological interpretation of human action which it presupposes. But if he does not agree with Toynbee and wants to maintain, as he apparently does, that human action is autonomous in some further sense, that history is what it is because men deliberately make it such, the difficulty is to find a plausible interpretation of this most unplausible thesis. No doubt we should all like to believe that men do in some sense make their own history, and no doubt it is instructive that even Marx thought they would once the communist society was achieved; but to hold that *all* actions are the autonomous product of human reason is scarcely plausible. To say that every action has a thought-side, and thus that all history can be read in terms of purposes, is one thing; to say that it is therefore all rational, in the sense of the result of deliberate thinking, is quite another.

A criticism of a more technical nature might be developed if we asked what account Collingwood has to give of the objectivity of historical judgments. This is (I suspect) the central problem of philosophy of history, and one merit of Collingwood's work is that he brings it well and truly into the foreground. It cannot be said, however, that he anywhere succeeds in offering a plausible solution of it. At times, indeed, he appears to have underestimated its difficulty in a way which is most surprising in one who worked on so obscure a subject as the history of Roman Britain. Thus we are told more than once in the course of the present book that to say that the historian can never reach certain but only probable conclusions, is false; the implication being that Collingwood himself, or any other competent historian, was in possession of historical knowledge which was entirely beyond doubt or question. On p. 262 the following remarkable passage occurs:

> "Many of the present writer's generation, brought up at a time when this proverb [that historical thinking leads to conclusions which are probable only] was accepted by the general opinion of educated persons . . . must be able to recollect their excitement on first discovering that it was wholly untrue, and that they were actually holding in their hands an historical argument which left nothing to caprice, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstration in mathematics."

This certainly makes one rub one's eyes, for even if one accepts the general position that the business of history is in some way to re-think the thoughts of persons in the past, the difficulties of carrying out the undertaking must surely be admitted to be formidable. A glance at the adjacent problem of knowing what contemporaries are thinking will suffice to make this clear. No doubt it is true that there are occasions on which I can know precisely what someone else is thinking; that there should be is a condition of there being any intelligent understanding by one mind of another. But these occasions arise, normally at least, only when a deliberate effort is made by one mind to convey its thoughts to another: when, as it were, a speaker or writer puts all his cards on the table and attempts to make his presuppositions clear. Academic persons concerned in the pursuit of knowledge, and anxious to detach their thoughts from the emotional background in which they arise, no doubt fulfil these conditions fairly often; but it cannot be said that politicians, or even men in the street, do so with comparable frequency. Thus to discover what Stalin, for instance, is thinking now—to discover even the general line of his thought—is by no means easy; it is a matter of weighing evidence, balancing hypotheses, etc., from which it is hard to see a *certain* conclusion emerging. But if knowledge of the minds of contemporaries can be thus difficult, how much more is historical knowledge, where evidence is often defective and where we are apt to work with preconceptions of which we are quite unaware?

Collingwood himself was not unfamiliar with objections of this sort, and he made several attempts to deal with them. One of these occurs in a particularly interesting section of the present book, devoted to an analysis of the process of re-thinking a thought (part V, § 4, pp. 282 ff.). Here it is argued that though an act of thought cannot be repeated *in its context*, it can all the same be repeated: the same piece of thinking which Julius Caesar did can be done by me, the same act of thought can occur in two different mental series. If these contentions can be made out, they clearly go some way towards solving the problem of historical objectivity. In support of them Collingwood asks what is meant when we speak of a single act of thought. How long does one act of thought last? If I think about something for five seconds, turn my

attention elsewhere for another three, and then turn back to the first thing, is that one act of thought or two? If I say one (as I might well do if confronted by suitably chosen examples) and thus allow that an act of thought can be *revived* after an interval, Collingwood thinks his case complete, since he can see no difference of principle between a situation in which I revive an act of thought from my own past (as when I try to write my autobiography) and one in which I revive one from somebody else's (as when I try to write the history of Julius Caesar). "There is no tenable theory of personal identity" preventing my reviving someone else's thought (p. 287), though of course the act I revive, whether it belong to my own past or another's, will not have the same background of emotion and feeling which it originally had. But acts of thought can be detached from their felt background with perfect legitimacy, and it is because they can that history is possible and is properly described as a re-enactment of past experience.

The whole passage in which this argument occurs deserves close study, if only as an example of the author's powers of careful and lucid analysis. An examination of it throws light on various aspects of his theory of history. It illuminates, for instance, his belief that the historian is and must be concerned with what people in the past thought, as opposed to what they felt and experienced emotionally. Feelings and emotions cannot be revived, because they represent experience in its immediacy; I can have similar feelings now to what I had in the past, but not the very same feelings I had then. But thought proper is different from feeling, since though it always occurs in a context of immediacy, it is in its own nature mediate: it transcends the immediate flow of experience, and can accordingly be detached from its background. Collingwood is emphatic that it is not enough to say, as many philosophers would, that whilst I can think the same thought in the sense of the same *thought-content* as Julius Caesar, I cannot revive his actual *act* of thinking; and this is indeed the starting-point of his whole theory. He asks how, if we refuse to agree that acts of thinking can be revived and say only that I can think a thought like Caesar's, we are to avoid the general difficulties of a representative theory of knowledge. But it is not clear that he is right about this. When philosophers speak of thought as mediate, what they are drawing attention to is its universality; and surely what is universal in an act of thinking is not its character as act but its content. And if it is agreed that the content of my thinking can be, not just like, but precisely the same, as someone else's, is not the problem with which Collingwood is dealing solved in principle?

Whether it is or not, I doubt myself whether on either view the problem of historical objectivity is fully cleared up. For there is all the difficulty, in any case, of knowing how I am to get at the actual thought of past ages, to put myself in a position to re-think precisely the same contents as were thought by persons in the past or to revive precisely the same acts. How far, to ask a hackneyed question, do we view the past through spectacles coloured by the present? Collingwood recognized at times that some sort of bridge between past and present was needed; there were ages which any particular historian, or generation of historians, was temperamentally unfitted to understand. But he never quite grappled with the question of principle behind this difficulty. His most direct attempt to deal with it was in his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1935, reprinted here as § 2 of Part V. There he commends Bradley for having seen that we need to formulate a principle by which to judge of historical testimony, but condemns him for making it what he did. Bradley said that we could accept as fact only that which bore some analogy to what we know in our own experience. Collingwood argued that this was unduly subjective and unduly empiricist as a criterion (it was in fact remarkably like

the one adopted by Hume in his essay on miracles), but the substitute he proposed for it was scarcely satisfactory. It was to the historical imagination itself, conceived not as arbitrary fancy but in Kantian fashion as an *a priori* faculty, that we must appeal in the making of historical judgments. And the matter was more or less left at that, without much elucidation either at the time or in subsequent writings.[1]

One cannot but think that the historical imagination here is only another name for the historical judgment, and that nothing is solved by the change of terminology. Certainly the ideal historian might be expected to appeal to criteria which were *a priori* in the sense of being valid for "consciousness in general," not just for the person who appealed to them or the generation to which he belonged; but the question is how far actual historians conform (or indeed can conform) to this ideal standard. It is much to be regretted that Collingwood, who was so acutely conscious of the extent to which thinking generally is historically conditioned, did not devote more attention to the question of the extent to which *historical* thinking is historically conditioned. When Collingwood the historian tried to reconstruct the history of Roman Britain, how far could he claim universal validity for the result? His failure to give this problem the attention it deserves arises, I suspect, from an error in his conception of historical judgment. As I have already pointed out, the central thing in the historian's experience, according to Collingwood, was the fact that one mind came into contact with another; he held that the sort of understanding one mind could have of another was unique and self-intelligible, though not to be attained by any easy means, but only after a laborious scrutiny of evidence of all kinds. But though this account of historical thinking perhaps has more to be said for it than at first sight appears, I cannot myself believe it to be finally satisfactory. Whatever Collingwood says, it is hard to think that the historian does not bring to the understanding of the past some general propositions; and it is precisely with regard to these that the trouble about historical conditioning arises in its most acute form.

To elaborate the point, let us return to the theory of Bradley's to which reference has already been made. Bradley says that we ought to accept as historical fact only what bears some analogy to what we have known in our own experience. The problem he himself had in mind was that of the credibility of accounts of the miraculous, and when he spoke in this context of "experience" he was thinking primarily of the laws of physical nature. But the matter can (and must) be viewed in a wider light. When we try to understand an account of human actions in the past, surely we bring to the task not just a knowledge of the laws of physical nature, but a certain conception of *human* nature too; and that fact is of vital importance if we are considering the question of historical objectivity. Why it is so can be seen if we reflect that such a conception at once ought to be free of historical conditioning if history is to yield valid knowledge, and yet is in many cases demonstrably not so free. Thus we say of this distinguished historian or that that his work is marred by personal prejudices or preconceptions common to his time; we censure Gibbon, for instance, for his attitude to religion. What we are objecting to here is Gibbon's defective appreciation of the possibilities of human nature. Gibbon judged the past in the light of his own conception of how a reasonable man would behave; but that conception was not sufficiently broad to enable him to see that a man might be intelligent and still think religion something more than outworn superstition or useful make-believe.

Now it might be said that the subjectivity displayed by Gibbon here (if

[1] Collingwood's critique of Bradley is elaborated further in pp. 134–41 of the present volume; but the passage throws no fresh light on the historical imagination.

the charge is well made) is one which just cannot be corrected. We think ourselves in a better position to arrive at the truth about the Roman empire than Gibbon; and no doubt we have the advantage of him both in the volume of evidence available to us and in historical technique. But as regards the conception of human nature we bring to the work, we can claim no improvement on him; we can only say our view of it is different from his. This sceptical judgment is one to which Collingwood strongly inclined, no doubt under the influence of his historicism; though how the view is to be squared with what he says about the certainty of historical judgments is not apparent.[1] In a passage Professor Knox quotes (p. xii) from a manuscript written in 1936 we read:

> "St. Augustine looked at Roman history from the point of view of an early Christian; Tillemont, from that of a seventeenth-century Frenchman; Gibbon, from that of an eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen, from that of a nineteenth-century German. There is no point in asking which was the right point of view. Each was the only possible one for the man who adopted it."

But is this conclusion really defensible? Before we accept it I think we should at least consider what it is to which we are committing ourselves. It seems to me that the conception of human nature of which I have spoken, the notion of the possibilities inherent in human beings and of the sort of ways in which (to speak roughly) their minds work, is presupposed not just in history but in the understanding of literature too. And if this is the case, to say that it is in all cases historically conditioned and therefore subjective will rule out literary as well as historical understanding.

Let me try to make the point clear. Suppose I say, as I well may, that *Anna Karenina* is a good novel because it is in some sense remarkably true to life. What I mean when I make this judgment is that I think Tolstoy had a wonderful sense of the possibilities of human nature; that he was able to grasp those possibilities and that I myself can appreciate his skill in doing it. Now would all this be possible if my conception of human nature and Tolstoy's were both nothing but the product of historical circumstances? Should I even be able to appreciate Tolstoy's point of view and use it to enlarge my own ideas? It might be replied that I could, just because Tolstoy stands near to me in time, and because the preconceptions of the nineteenth century are not markedly different from those of the twentieth century. But if this reply were made I could abandon the case of Tolstoy and consider that of some other more remote writer: Milton, or the author of *Beowulf*, or Homer, for example. In all these cases I should claim to find a conception of human nature which had some identity with my own, and I should say that their work was interesting just because of that fact; though I should not, of course, claim to be able to understand the minds, and allow for the idiosyncracies, of each of them to precisely the same extent.

All this seems to show that there is a case for saying that the conception of human nature presupposed in literary appreciation is to some extent free of historical conditioning; and if it is there, it may well be in history too. But that is not to say that the subject is altogether free from difficulties. The paradox about it, I think, is this: that we both bring to the understanding of history and literature a conception of human nature of the kind of which I

[1] Collingwood seems to have oscillated between two views: (1) that history is a genuine re-enactment of past experience, made possible by the power one mind has to grasp and understand the thought of another; (2) that all historical knowledge is historically conditioned, but that this is of no account, since what history illuminates is not the past but the present. The second is I think the later view.

have spoken, and improve our knowledge of human nature in pursuing those studies. Thus when I set out to read *Wuthering Heights*, for example, I start with certain ideas about how human beings behave in certain situations; but in the course of reading my ideas are widened, and indeed it is just in this that the greatness of the novel consists: we are made to feel that there might be creatures like Heathcliff and Catherine, however different they may be from anyone we have met ourselves. And the same applies, in principle, to the reading of history. If I take up Thucydides, I find I am able to understand what he describes from the first because his conception of human nature has much in common with my own; but I also learn something of human nature in the process—from the description of the events at Corcyra, for instance, or from such passages as the Melian dialogue.

So far as this is true, we can say with Collingwood that history does give us an understanding of what human beings are and can do. But it is questionable, all the same, whether we ought to see it as *the* science of human nature (or all that that science can be). The judgments of history, as Collingwood rightly insists, are individual judgments; but unless I am greatly mistaken, there are presupposed in the making of them certain universal judgments, and it is these, only part of the raw material of which is provided by history, which constitute the science in question. In this connection the view held at one time by Dilthey[1] is of considerable interest, that behind all the human studies (history, literary appreciation, sociology, etc.) there lies a more fundamental study concerned with human nature. Dilthey himself called this psychology, but made it clear that it was quite different from psychology as normally understood. In fact it seems that the possibilities of such a psychology or anthropology, as it might more properly be called, must be very seriously considered by anyone who deals with the problem of historical knowledge.

[1] See H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey*, Chapter III.

W. H. WALSH.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

THE last survey of philosophy in France to appear in this journal was published in July 1939. Although the circumstances of the war do not seem to have prevented the publication of philosophical books in France to the extent that they have done so in this country, they have pretty effectively limited their transmission across the Channel until the last year or two. In consequence it is by no means easy to re-establish continuity between the publications of the pre-war period and the rather random trickle of new books now being received by the editor of *Philosophy*. Some useful information on the intervening period is contained in an article by Professor Lalande in the *Philosophical Review* for January 1946 (Vol. LV, No. 1). Readers of this article or of the files of the *Revue Philosophique* will find that in 1940 occurred the deaths of Abel Rey, known for his work on science in the ancient world, and of the philosopher and sociologist Célestin Bouglé. In 1941 Bergson died. 1944 saw the death of Léon Brunschvicg, whose *Descartes et Pascal lecteurs de Montaigne* appeared that same year. Jean Cavaillès, a logician known for his works published in 1938 on the axiomatic method and the theory of groups, was shot by the Germans for his part in the resistance movement. Maurice Halbwachs, for many years associated with the *Année Sociologique* died in Buchenwald in 1945. As for books that appeared during the war, I have not seen Professor Le Senne's *Traité de Morale Générale*, which appeared in 1942. I have seen new books by Professor Léon Robin, one on Aristotle and one on Pyrrho and Greek Scepticism. Those interested in the history of modern thought should not miss Dr. Robert Lenoble's *Mersenne ou la Naissance du Méchanisme* (Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1943). Dr. Lenoble shows how Mersenne was a leading member of a group of thinkers (which included Hobbes and Gassendi) who were endeavouring to create a natural science of mechanics in opposition to the magical and astrological views of leading anti-Aristotelians of the Renaissance. Descartes was with them on this point, and expressed, with a clarity which Mersenne was incapable of attaining, views which, according to Dr. Lenoble, Mersenne had already arrived at. But when Descartes turned from Mechanics to Metaphysics Mersenne hardly understood him, and the other members of the group deliberately refused to go beyond the positive scientific ground which they regarded as their own. Mersenne and his friends were, according to Dr. Lenoble, conscious empiricists, while Descartes, in developing the thought of the *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations*, was deliberately going beyond an empiricism which he clearly understood. Dr. Lenoble makes no extravagant claims on behalf of Mersenne, but in describing his contributions to the thought of his time, he throws a good deal of light on the history of European thought as a whole.

However, it is not works of scholarship like Dr. Lenoble's that have provoked the current interest in French philosophy. Both inside and outside France it is Existentialism that the public want to know about, and it is appropriate that a survey of this character should provide some information on that subject. Existentialism is a philosophical movement that originated in Germany, where its best-known representatives are Heidegger and Jaspers. These two philosophers, in rather different ways, have claimed to exhibit man as he really is rather than as he appears to be under the categories of common sense and science which, they hold, are inadequate to the singularity and concrete-

ness of what is. In their accounts of what man is, they have made use of a vocabulary borrowed in part from the writings of the Danish religious thinker and mystic Sören Kierkegaard (1813–55). In his protests against the superficiality of ecclesiastical Christianity and what he considered to be the slickness and smugness of the official Hegelian philosophy that was so influential in the universities of his time, Kierkegaard called upon men to look honestly within themselves. "There comes a midnight hour" he wrote, "when all men must unmask." If they are honest they will find within themselves a basic dread, giving rise to a sense of despair and sin which can only be overcome, if at all, by the sinner's free choice of Christ. This free choice is non-rational, and is described by Kierkegaard as "paradoxical" and as a "leap in the dark." "To become a believer" he wrote in his Journals, "everyone must be alone with the absurd." Heidegger's metaphysics is largely a development of the notions of dread and despair without the hope provided by the Christian faith, while some of Jaspers' most interesting observations concern the way in which men reveal themselves by the deeds they perform at moments of crisis. French translations of some of Kierkegaard's works began appearing in the thirties. The year 1939 was notable, as regards the spread of interest in these ideas, for the publication of M. Jean Wahl's *Études Kierkegaardiennes* and of a translation of some of Heidegger's shorter writings under the title of *Qu'est-ce que la Métaphysique?* Since then there has been a growth of interest in Existentialism among French philosophers and literary men. M. Sartre's well-known plays, novels and philosophical works have appeared since 1938, as have those of Mademoiselle Simone de Beauvoir, of M. Georges Bataille, and of M. Albert Camus. It should not be overlooked, however, that M. Gabriel Marcel, who is a Catholic, has, in books and plays from as far back as his *Journal Métaphysique* in 1930, been developing ideas which have important affinities with those of Kierkegaard. By far the best short introduction to French Existentialism as a whole that I know of is M. Paul Foulquié's *L'Existentialisme* in the series *Que sais-je?* published by the Presses Universitaires de France and costing about three shillings in this country.

It is the Existentialism of M. Jean-Paul Sartre that has caused the greatest stir. His strictly philosophical writings are: *L'Imagination* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1938): *Esquisse d'une théorie de l'émotion* (Hermann, 1939); *L'Imaginaire* (Gallimard, 1940); *L'Être et le Néant* (Gallimard, 1943); *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme* (Nagel, 1946); and his introduction to some selections from the writings of Descartes in a series entitled *Classiques de la Liberté* published by Editions des Trois Collines in 1946. Some of his plays and one of his novels have already been translated into English. Like Heidegger, and like some of the Greek philosophers, Sartre holds that there are different sorts of being, and he distinguishes between being in-itself and being for-itself. The former is fundamental and is free from all relation and negativity. It is described as "opaque" and "massive," and in so far as there can be no reason *why* it is, it just *is*, and is thus "de trop," or absurd. When there is consciousness, there is being for-itself, and it is in consciousness that negation arises. "L'homme est l'être par qui le néant vient au monde." The being of conscious beings i.e. of selves is, as M. Sartre describes it, extremely precarious. In the first place, selves are dependent on their bodies. In the second place, any reality that conscious beings have is in the objects they are conscious of, not in themselves. Consciousness is essentially related to that of which it is consciousness, and the nature of selves is inseparable from the world in which they arise. I never succeed in seizing myself, but always something other than the self I sought to seize. If I succeeded in becoming a being in-itself I should cease to be conscious and should cease to possess the relational and negative characteristics of what is for-itself. I am constantly

aiming at becoming what I cannot be without destroying myself. Therefore "La réalité humaine est souffrante dans son être."

M. Sartre has a good deal to say about how each one of us lives in a private world the contents of which depend in large part upon our personal aims. Other people, however, inevitably disturb our privacy, and we cannot help regarding them as trespassers on our domain bringing danger with them. It is from the eyes of others that we come to such knowledge as we can obtain of ourselves, but we learn in this way much that we should prefer not to know, and in any case others know us through our bodies as objects in *their* world. This causes us shame. This situation infects even the love of one person for another. It is a condition of selfhood that we can never love without conflict. "Ma chute originelle, c'est l'existence de l'autre." Tied as we are to our bodies and to the objects that form our world, and sunk in the original sin of being other than—and so in conflict with—those we love, we are capable, it might be thought, of little that is positive. According to M. Sartre, however, to be human is to be free. He tries to show that this follows from the very nature of consciousness. The arguments are not easy to follow, but rest upon the nature of what is for-itself as a type of being that is not, like what is in-itself, cut and dried and just what it is and nothing else. M. Sartre talks about "self-transcendence" in a way which is reminiscent of Bosanquet, and which probably betokens their common interest in Hegel. He also argues that however limited we may be by our situation, it always depends upon us ourselves how we react to it. Not to make a choice is a form of choosing, and it is impossible for anyone to escape from choosing by any lapse into inactivity or habit. The lapse or habit will be his choice. Our consciousness of the inevitability of choice M. Sartre, following Kierkegaard, calls anguish. There is no one or nothing that can save us from this anguish, since it is we alone that must make the choice, though we sometimes try to evade consciousness of our lonely anguish by following fashion or by supporting our choice on the commands of a deity or on the demands of an ideal system of values. The state of thus endeavouring to shut our eyes on our freedom M. Sartre calls "bad faith." He holds that there is no God, but even if there were, it is still the worshippers who decide that he is worthy of worship. Similarly, moral codes have no power to impose themselves on men. It is men who choose whatever code it is that they acknowledge. The argument here is reminiscent of Jeremy Taylor's observation in the *Liberty of Prophesying* that a man cannot escape from his duty of acting in accordance with his individual conscience by resting on authority, since he must choose the authority to rest on. M. Sartre further maintains that, since man is free, there is no such thing as human nature. Man is what he does. As an artist, by employing his techniques, creates a picture or poem, so any man, by the series of his choices, creates his life. Indeed, M. Sartre goes so far as to say that a man is responsible for his sentiments and emotions, since it is through his acts that they are built up and brought into play. Talk about being driven this way and that by conflicting desires is just one of the manifestations of "bad faith." "Quand je délibère" he writes, "les jeux sont faits."

Does each man, then, make his own morality? This, I feel sure, is M. Sartre's view. But, as I understand him, he endeavours to overcome the anarchism that would seem to be involved in such a theory by pointing out that men are aware of other men in as primary a way as they are aware of themselves, and that in choosing and acting each man is, whether he admits it or not, affirming an ideal of what a man should be and do. "In making his choice," says M. Sartre, "a man is choosing mankind."

It is not possible in a survey such as this to offer reasoned criticisms of M. Sartre's theories. Criticism worth the name must follow a much more adequate exposition than I have been able to put forward here. But I should

like to make a number of rather dogmatic comments. M. Sartre, in my opinion, writes carefully and well. His whole range of technical terms, however, derives from Hegel, from Kierkegaard, and from contemporary German philosophy, and he shows no acquaintance with the methods of conceptual sanitation introduced by the logical analysts. It may well be that in consequence there is much profundity that remains unenlightened, but it is certain that M. Sartre shows a rather alarming lack of linguistic sophistication. Professor A. J. Ayer, in his articles in *Horizon* in July and August 1945, has dealt very drastically with these shortcomings, and there is no need for me to pursue this aspect further. But I hope that the brief summary that I have given of M. Sartre's leading ideas makes it clear that they cannot all be dismissed as nonsense, in any non-technical sense of that fashionable word. For one thing, his writings raise important questions about the relation of epistemology to ethics—questions hardly touched on in this country since Wollaston wrote in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, since belief in God and in fixed moral standards has certainly much diminished in recent years, what more important topic can there be than the consequences that the unbeliever should draw from his unbelief? Again, M. Sartre discusses individual moral action as distinct from moral rules with a pertinacity I do not find in other writers on ethics. He also makes many striking observations on emotions, motives and the will. In an interview recorded in *Paru* (December 1945, No. 13) he said: "J'avais à coeur de dissiper les malentendus que les gens qui lisent mal répandent parmi ceux qui ne lisent pas." We should be careful not to allow the literary claptrap that has resulted from misunderstandings of his works to conceal from us the things of importance he has to say.

The books I have received since traffic with France resumed are extremely diverse in character. First there is M. Matila C. Ghyka's *Tour d'Horizon Philosophique* (Gallimard, 1946). This is intended for those who wish to consider in fairly general terms the main philosophical outlooks of our time. Philosophy, according to M. Ghyka, is concerned with the questions whence? whither? why? and science with the question how? He divides philosophical questions into a group about knowledge, with the idealist and realist types of answer; into a group about attitudes towards life, which may be individualist, social and collective, totalitarian, or mystical; and into a group about "systems of the world," which may be religious (like Christianity) or philosophical (like Idealism) or both (like Buddhism). M. Ghyka himself is an idealist with a liking for Buddhism and Pythagoreanism. He is much impressed by Eddington, and considers that modern physics has made materialism untenable. He is quite right, I think, in saying that dialectical materialism, as upheld in Soviet Russia, has a vitalist tendency, but he fails to observe that M. Deborin, whom he quotes to this effect, was taken to task for going too far in that direction. M. Ghyka's book is impressionistic rather than ratiocinative. It is, however, very readable, as the following passage may indicate. "Here arises the problem of Siamese twins or monsters of the 'two-headed calf' type. The latter, of course, seldom survive birth. The New York Zoo, however, had a two-headed snake for quite a long time. The authorities had to separate the heads to keep them from fighting, and to feed them separately to prevent the alimentary canal from being choked. In spite of these precautions, the two heads one day fought one another so savagely that one swallowed the other and the monster expired. There were in this case two personalities from the point of view of volition, but one common physiological personality as regards appetite for food and sex (the shocking complications can be imagined)."

M. Charles Mayer, in his *L'Homme ne vaut que par le Progrès* (Éditions de la Maison Française, New York, 1945), is a metaphysical materialist and an

upholder of the values inherent in a well-managed industrial capitalism. He is aware that the fact of evolution is in itself no explanation of morality, and he endeavours to escape the pitfalls into which Spencer and Huxley have fallen, by the argument that the basis of morality must be that which is peculiar to the human race, viz. the ability to improve or progress. By this I think he means the human achievement in handing on a culture. If, however, cultures may be judged good or bad, M. Mayer appears to have fallen into another pit very like the one he managed to skirt round, but even so, he may well say there are advantages, since the company to be found in it, including as it does Aristotle, is so much better than what is in the other.

M. Brice Parain's *L'Embarras du Choix* (Gallimard, 1946), is the first of the philosophical works to appear in a series entitled *Espoir* under the editorship of M. Albert Camus, an existentialist novelist and philosopher whose novel *The Outsider* is fairly well known in this country. According to the brief advertisement which explains the purpose of the series "nous sommes dans le nihilisme," whence we can only hope to emerge by refusing to close our eyes to the difficulties that produce it. Contributors are to be free to stick in the pin and turn it round as much as they like even if they don't think anything will come of it. M. Parain certainly takes his chance. He believes that in France (as well as elsewhere) there is too much talking and teaching that is fundamentally idle in the sense that the talkers and teachers do not really believe that there is any truth that can be stated or transmitted. He therefore proposes a drastic reform of the French educational system. He would cut out what he calls "culture générale" from the secondary schools and confine teaching there to the French and a foreign language and to mathematics, along with gymnastics, sport and technical training. The products of such a system, thinks M. Parain, would be healthier, both physically and mentally, than the products of the present system, and less inclined to worry about the meaning of life at an age when they have not the equipment to consider the matter with profit to themselves or others. He also thinks that the present system produces more "intellectuals" than the country can carry. It seems to me that M. Parain is too easily inclined to make a contrast between life and literature and that he insufficiently stresses the positive advantages of literary and historical training. It may well be, however, that more people receive such training than are capable of profiting from it.

Another new series published by Gallimard and entitled *La Jeune Philosophie*, is designed to publish the work of young authors attempting their first philosophical essays. How it is that a French publisher can undertake such an admirable plan and publish five new books in quite a short period at a time when English publishers increasingly insist on established names and popular subjects, I do not know. Of this series I have received Jean Pouillon's *Temps et Roman*, Michel Sora's *Du Dialogue Intérieur*, and Jacques Havet's *Kant et le Problème du Temps*. M. Pouillon's interesting book deals with the definition of the novel as a work of art and with the analysis of its types. This involves him in discussions of consciousness, imagination and of time. By way of illustration, he analyses the procedure of a number of French, American and English novelists. I was particularly interested by his discussion of the different relations which novelists may take up to the characters they depict: "vision avec," in which the novelist takes the position of the character as he lives; "vision par derrière," in which the novelist looks at the life of the character as something complete and finished (as a thing "en soi," in Sartre's terminology); and "vision de dehors," in which the character is looked at as far as possible as an object in the physical world, in the manner of so-called realist novelists. M. Sora's book, so far as I can understand it, is about how we can reconcile the adequacy of a morality that demands our recognition

with our freedom of choice. "The saint," he writes (p. 98), "is the man who has found the solution of the problem of man, this problem being: 'how to live like a tree, without ceasing to be a man.' " M. Havet's careful discussion of Kant's theories of time is particularly noteworthy for the attention given to their ethical relevance. M. Havet considers that the common criticism that moral acts, on Kant's showing, must be non-temporal, is invalid, since Kant in effect held that there is, besides the time of phenomena, another time in which the activities of the transcendental self take place.

There are a number of rather important books on the history of philosophy. The one I have found most interesting is M. Georges Friedmann's *Leibniz et Spinoza* (Gallimard, 1946). It is well known that Leibniz corresponded with Spinoza on some occasions between 1671 and 1676, and actually met and discussed with him during his stay in Holland in this latter year. According to Ludwig Stein, Leibniz's ideas had not been formed before this meeting, but developed thereafter under Spinoza's influence until in the eighties Leibniz came to be severely critical of Spinoza. There is very little polemic in M. Friemann's book, but he shows, by a detailed and intelligent use of the texts, that prior to 1676 Leibniz had already sketched in outline the views which subsequently became those of the Monadology, particularly the theory of the universal harmony. Leibniz admired the subtlety of Spinoza's thought and read and annotated the *Ethics* in detail. But he disagreed with that even more than with the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, and in the course of his disputes with the Cartesians was quite prepared to use the argument that Cartesianism must be bad because it was a step on the road to Spinozism. M. Friedmann thinks that it was mainly if not only on psychological matters that Leibniz was really influenced by Spinoza. He also thinks that Russell and Couturat have exaggerated the extent to which logical considerations led to the formation of Leibniz's system. Another work of value for the study of seventeenth-century thought is Volume XVI. Cahier II of the *Archives de Philosophie* (Beauchesne et ses fils, Paris, 1946), which consists of Father Joseph de Finance's *Cogito Cartésien et Réflexion Thomiste*. This book is especially interesting for an acute discussion of the "Cartesian Circle." Before his death, Professor Abel Rey had completed, though he had not finally revised, volumes 4 and 5 of his *La Science dans l'Antiquité*. Volume 4, *L'Apogée de la Science Technique Grecque* (Éditions Albin Michel, Paris 1946, 190 francs), has now appeared. Besides chapters on acoustics, optics and physics, it contains an extremely useful chapter on Hippocrates and a history of Greek mathematics from Hippocrates to Plato. This is a useful book, but purchasers should make sure that pp. 309–12 (part of the index and part of the table of contents) are not missing from their copy as they are from mine. In *Le Dualisme dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie et des Religions* (Gallimard, 1946, 85 francs), Mademoiselle Simone Pétrement endeavours to show that both in religion and in philosophy monism and dualism are a matter of degree, but that there is a tendency for religious and philosophical innovators to be dualistic and for their followers to move towards monism. This is a well documented little book likely to be of most interest to those with theological interests.

In conclusion I must mention that I have received No. 1 of a new periodical called *Deucalion*, edited by M. Jean Wahl (Éditions de la Revue Fontaine, 250 francs each number). It is very well printed and produced. This number contains some articles on Existentialism and suchlike, an extract from a book by the late Jean Cavaillès on Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* (the whole book is to be published before long), an article on microphysics by Louis de Broglie, and translations of writings by Hamann and Giordano Bruno. It is to be the policy of the journal to print articles by writers who are not philosophical specialists as well as by those who are.

H. B. Acton.

NEW BOOKS

A Philosophy of Poetry (based on Thomistic principles). By the REV. JOHN DUFFY, C.S.S.R., M.A. (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1945. Pp. XI + 258. Price, $2.75.)

A phrase that occurs towards the close of this book gives the best impression of its purpose—"a tentative exposition of what we think St. Thomas might have said on the nature of poetry" (p. 195). The author has been very successful in correlating the rare and scattered pronouncements of St. Thomas about poetry with the general principles of the Thomist system, and he combines with his close acquaintance with medieval thought (the book is extremely well documented) a lively interest in the main problems of art and philosophy today. But the book would have been improved if the author had allowed his mind to play more freely about the principles of Thomist philosophy. More attention might have been paid to some outstanding difficulties, such as those which beset the attempt to convert an essentially subjectivist view ("goodness is what all things seek"—p. 23) into a realist one by regarding existence as a perfection ("in the degree that everything is actual, however, to that degree it is perfect"—p. 24). The theory that "every being is one true and good" (p. 25) is accepted too uncritically; so is the distinction between "logical" and "ontological truth."

The view of poetry that emerges from this study of St. Thomas naturally lays the main emphasis on intellect. It is, indeed, admitted that in art (distinguished from other forms of goodness because it turns on "love of the knowledge of the thing rather than love of the thing," p. 39), there must be "deep knowledge of individual things as individual" (p. 134), the poetic presentation of individuality being sharply opposed to "the clarity of demonstration, which deals in the essences of things" (p. 233). But the author has a highly rationalized view of the individual, and, in consequence, the process of artistic creation is conceived, not as a symbolic presentation of reality in that aspect of it which the mind is least able to exhaust, but in terms which barely distinguish it from the more discursive processes of thought. Much that is eminently sensible is said about meaning in general, and the discussion of "words" in Chapter VIII is excellent so far as it goes. But the author will have none of the view that art involves some special intuition, and is very bewildered (Chapter III) by adoption of that view by another recent Catholic writer on aesthetics, Maritain. He comes thus to regard all art as a process of making more specific and determinate "what is already known in a general way," and of doing so in conformity with a "complexus of rules in the universal reason" (p. 162). "A universal scheme of values" is in this way "contracted to the individual experience" (p. 161), and the "searching intellect," after many "gropings", is able to discover the ideas and images which will give final embodiment to an earlier "indistinct precontaining of possible beauty" (p. 171). When completed, the "poetic artefact" "principles delight in others," but its "primary end," and "the most distinctive mark of aesthetic experience (is) the resting of the will, or fruition" (p. 52) in contemplation of a work completed "in correspondence with the mind" (p. 139).

In this process, described in elaborate detail in the text, there can be discerned undeniable features of artistic experience, but they are altogether distorted, the "groping" and "searching" of the artist being in fact an effort to achieve, in far less deliberate and systematic ways than Dr. Duffy envisages,

the progressive illumination of a reality apprehended, not in any abstract way, but as concrete and particular from the start.

This general misconception of the nature of art, and assimilation of it to the "phenomenon of 'problem-solving' " (p. 171) which is best typified by science, leads to some very doubtful views. Among these are the suggestion that inspiration is most effective when deliberately sought, the presentation of the poet as searching the dictionary for the right word (that must surely be very rare in the case of good poetry), and the denial that the best of a poem can ever come first or spring fully formed into the mind of the poet. There is also a hankering after a moral criterion of art, and it is insisted, in true Platonic style, that the more we draw away from sensible reality the higher we rise in the hierarchy of genuine beauty (pp. 149–151). Most astonishing of all is the belief that the sounds of words have not much to do with the worth of a poem (pp. 206–210), or that, at best, they add some "accidental beauty" to the beauty of the poem as meaning—"the reader can entirely prescind from this external physical beauty, and the poem is not essentially affected" (p. 207). What the author seems most anxious to avoid is the positivist view of art as mere exclamation or evocation of feeling. But surely the actual or imagined sounds of words can be thought to give meaning in a special way. In combination with overt meaning they symbolize something that could not be otherwise expressed. One wonders here what account the author would give of music. Dr. Duffy also argues, apparently in support of the view that rhythm is not among the essential features of poetry, that the rhythm of poetry is in any case the same as the rhythm of prose, and that the only important distinction to draw is that between artistic literature (in effect poetry) and "useful verbal artefacts" whose end is to give, not "fruition" or delight, but information. There is much to query here. But it must suffice to note that where the symbolic nature of art is fairly discerned there can be seen to be a most important difference, even if ultimately a difference of degree, between poetry and fine prose, the former being supreme artistically because it is more completely symbolical.

These matters are brought to a head in the treatment of "obscure poetry"—Chapter X. It is reluctantly admitted that there may be something in Eliot's dictum that there is "a logic of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts." But little heed is paid to it. And, while admiration is not withheld from Eliot's obscure poetry, the writer "wonders, however, whether the meaning could not be given with equal splendour in another way, and with less exasperation to the reader" (p. 240). A poem which fails to present "a unitary meaning to the intellect" (p. 239) can only have "fragmentary" beauty, and it tends to degenerate into "frivolous dissipation," yielding at best some pleasure akin "to that which children find in the incantation of rhythmical and dimly-understood verses" (p. 241). But the latter is not so unimportant artistically as is assumed by the author. He appears to miss altogether the special significance of recent "obscure" poetry, and the failure may well be thought symptomatic of the general inability of the Neo-Thomist philosophy to lay hold on the more creative factors in the spiritual crisis of our times.

But while the book appears thus to be wide of the mark in respect to its main contentions, the author manages to say a great deal incidentally that is of considerable interest to students of aesthetics. This is said concisely and sometimes with distinction of style. The book will have a special appeal to those who still think that art can be rationalized. For these reasons it is all the more unfortunate that the proofs should have been very carelessly corrected. There is a quite extraordinary number of misprints.

H. D. Lewis.

NEW BOOKS

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XIX. "Analysis and Metaphysics." (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1945. Pp. 288. Price, 15s. net.)

This volume contains the Symposia read at the first Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association held since before the war. Professor Price's Inaugural Address "Clarity is not enough?" gives us something in the way of a stocktaking. He makes a brilliant defence of "clarificatory philosophers" (from Socrates onwards), but acknowledges a certain narrowness in the pre-occupations of the clarificatory philosophers in the years before the last war. We are faced with a consumers' demand for a reasoned "world-outlook." Once disabused of the idea that a "world-outlook" must be an attempt to establish existential conclusions from wholly *a priori* premises, we may turn again to consider the possibility of constructing one. The Symposium on the "Causal Argument for Physical Objects" deals hardly, if at all, with the "causal argument," but with a view of Dr. Ewing's which might be called the "Argument from Successful Prediction." Dr. Ewing argues that there is a high degree of probability for the existence of physical objects, since successful predictions of future experience are based on the belief. But as the other symposiasts show that such successful prediction would work equally well on phenomenalist, idealist and realist assumptions, we are not much further on. Dr. Ewing holds that physical objects are groups of unsensed sensibilia. Professor Price points out that this means that the physical world must be immensely complicated. Such complication doesn't deter Professor Price; on the contrary, he rather likes it. But he shows that the description of a group of sensed sensibilia must include the *place from where* appearances appear. Phenomenalists must therefore reckon with a spatially ordered system of points of view.

In the Symposium on "Verifiability" Mr. Mackinnon asks whether there must not be certain presuppositions which give the context within which empirical verification is possible. Dr. Waismann shows that he does not substantiate the claim that these are the Kantian categories; but I take Mr. Mackinnon to have been simply maintaining the Kantian principle, that we make *some* demands on any phenomenon which is to be considered "objective." Mr. Kneale makes the suggestion (which he recognizes may appear "reactionary, not to say Fascist") that the Subject-Predicate form (in a highly generalized sense) may prove necessary for any statement of empirical fact. Dr. Waismann's paper shows that the "principle of verification" is becoming more flexible than it appeared to be in pre-war discussions. The paper contains most interesting discussions of the "open texture" of certain empirical concepts (necessitating an infinite number of sense datum statements for their conclusive verification); of the context of language as helping to determine what we see as a "fact"; and of the way in which different kinds of statements belong to different strata, each stratum having its own kind of logic. We should like to hear more about these "strata" and their "logics" from Dr. Waismann.

In the Symposium on "The Alleged Metaphysics in Plato's *Republic*" Mr. Brown claims that the distinction between the Forms and sensible things is not a metaphysical distinction, but merely a distinction between concepts clearly and less clearly understood. Professor Field and Mr. Orr have little difficulty in showing that, wherever metaphysics may be in contemporary philosophy, they are there all right in the *Republic*. In the ethics Symposium, "Intention, Motive, and Responsibility," Professor Barnes and Dr. Falk between them make clearer the sense in which a motive enters into an intention, and Dr. Falk has some good things to say on how far we can be held responsible

for our motives. The discussion of "responsibility," particularly in Professor Barnes' and Dr. Duncan Jones' papers, is somewhat hampered by holding too tightly to the etymological association of the word with "answering questions."

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

Iqbal. His Art and Thought. By SYED 'ABDUL VAHID, B.Sc., B.A. (Oxon). Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf. Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. (Agents: Luzac & Co., 46, Great Russell Street, London.) Pp. xv + 265. 14s.

Except to students of Philosophy, the name of Iqbal, the Muslim poet and philosopher (1873 to 1938) is scarcely known in this country, though he studied under McTaggart at Cambridge (1905 to 1908) and in 1922 received a Knighthood from the Indian Government in recognition of his great eminence and popularity among his co-religionists, both as a poet and a thinker. But in the rapprochement between Eastern and Western thought in Religion and Philosophy, which has taken place during the last fifty years, Iqbal is a significant figure; and while the cult of Theosophy was drawing many minds on this side of the world eastward, Iqbal, without renouncing the Muslim basis of his earlier training, turned, as his mind matured, decisively toward such Western thinkers as Fichte, Bergson, and Einstein.

Fundamentally a pragmatist, and basing his philosophy on the belief that life is real and not merely an illusion, he opposed the doctrine of Unityism, which he characterized as escapism, and even attributed to this doctrine the decadence which has infected Eastern civilization in general, and brought about the subjugation of its peoples to European domination. He taught that the Ego is an eternal principle; that the source of creation is an individual existence with definite powers of perception and volition; that for the operation of those powers this source of all life has divided itself, in the world of phenomena, into Self and unself: and that through a process dependent on this division, every individual self is capable of evolving into a state of perfection which is full freedom; having reached which state, it finds union with God, who is Himself the one perfect freedom embracing all.

The writer of this life of Iqbal considers him the greatest of all Muslim philosophers, and that his like has not been seen for a thousand years. If a study of Iqbal's philosophy, presented in verse and prose, can substantiate such an estimate, this book, which gives a pleasantly discursive résumé of his life and teaching, is an important one for English readers.

LAURENCE HOUSMAN.

The Timeless Moment. By WARNER ALLEN. (Faber & Faber. Pp. 247. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Warner Allen is the most versatile of our men of letters. A good classical scholar, a proficient in French, Spanish and Italian, an Acting Wing-Commander, high up in the Ministry of Information, Foreign Editor of the *Morning Post*, Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, an expert on wine, author of two excellent detective novels and of *Italy from End to End*. And now he comes before the public with a learned and very interesting book on the philosophy and psychology of mysticism.

The philosophy of his book is Neoplatonic. But its readers will be more interested in Mr. Allen's psychology than in his metaphysics. For he writes of a personal experience. At the age of about fifty he had a sudden and vivid spiritual illumination which has had a permanent influence upon his inner life. The experience came as a flash of light. This is quite normal. We remember

Plato's "leaping spark"; St. Paul's vision on the road to Damascus; St. Augustine's record of his illumination, and the *funkelein* of the German mystics. We are apt to think that this sudden irruption into consciousness must have been prepared for by anxious searchings of heart. Sometimes this is plainly true; but St. Paul, for example, does not tell us that the heroic death of Stephen, which he witnessed, prepared him for a complete change in his view of Christianity. These stirrings of the soul are partly subconscious. It does not seem to be common for the mystical vision to appear for the first time in middle life to a man who is fully occupied in strenuous external activities. This gives an additional interest to Mr. Allen's experience.

The author is fully convinced that the vision of God belongs to the spiritual not to the psychical plane of experience. But he is keenly interested in occult psychology. After reading Dunne's *An Experiment with Time* he is half inclined to believe in precognition, and to think that some curious dreams which he describes may possibly have had a more than accidental resemblance to events which happened later. Like our psychoanalysts, he is disposed to take dreams seriously. For my own part I entirely refuse to believe in precognition, and I do not think that my dreams throw any light on my character. Those who are struck by what look like anticipations of future events seldom count the frequent misses as well as the rare hits. I once dreamed that the winner of the Derby had been revealed to me. Not being a betting man I did not avail myself of the knowledge; the horse, like the Portuguese in the Great War, "also ran." I have read a pathetic farewell letter which my mother, as a young girl, wrote to her parents. She dreamed that she saw her tombstone with a date upon it, and the date was approaching. She lived to be eighty-three. However, my incredulity is ceasing to be fashionable.

These doubts do not affect the value of the book. We are grateful to the author for describing so fully his experience of the "inner light." He has given us one more proof that mysticism is not mere *schwärmerei*, and that those who have had this experience are not seldom men and women of unquestionable sanity and practical ability, who have shown themselves well qualified to take a prominent part in active life.

W. R. INGE.

The Three Spheres of Society. By CHARLES WATERMAN. (London: Faber and Faber. 1946. Pp. 294. Price 12s. 6d.)

The Liberal Tradition. A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom. By WILLIAM AYLOTT ORTON. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. xiv+317. Price $3.50.)

The first of these books is in the main a discussion of the changes in the organization of our own society which the author thinks should be made in order to secure the benefits that Anthroposophy has to offer. Anthroposophy is a system of ideas formulated by Rudolf Steiner about the beginning of the present century. According to Steiner mankind, in developing scientific knowledge and becoming individualized, have lost much of the spiritual wisdom of the past and most of the fellow feeling with which less individualized primitive peoples are endowed. It is the aim of Anthroposophy to revive the languishing spiritual wisdom and to reinvigorate the human sympathies without either abandoning the benefits provided by natural science or encroaching on the rights of individuals.

Whatever doubts may be held about the existence of some specially profound Ancient Wisdom, there can be none as to the sickness into which industrial civilization has lapsed, and it is now pretty clear that the techno-

logical excellence of a society does not necessarily connote excellences of other kinds. Mr. Waterman's book is therefore timely. Following Steiner, he holds that the three distinct spheres of society are the economic, the political and the spiritual, and that moral confusion must arise if conduct appropriate to one only of these spheres is practised in the others. The proper function of the political power is not to operate economic enterprises nor to organize churches and schools, but to secure justice for workmen, managers and consumers, for parents, children and teachers. This involves the maintenance by the state of minimum standards of nutrition and housing and the protection of human rights generally. Mr. Waterman thinks it possible for an economy to be developed in which private ownership is retained in appropriate fields but rendered legally conditional upon satisfactory performance of social functions. Should the basic industries come under public control, any attempt to operate them by political methods would be unlikely to succeed and would be undesirable in any case. Industry can be most efficiently and humanely run by those who spend their lives in the actual process and should therefore be controlled by the managers, workmen and consumers subject to a freely negotiated national plan. The spiritual life of our society depends upon the free efforts of individuals and will decay if subjected to economic or political control. It is thus desirable for cultural organizations to spring from and be financed through the free choice of their members. Thus Mr. Waterman thinks that state controlled education is dangerous to freedom and suggests that a more active system might be promoted if the state paid to those parents who so wished a capitation fee that would enable them to contract out of the state system and contribute towards a style of school which they considered more adequate.

It will be seen from this summary that Mr. Waterman has endeavoured to look at our society without prejudice and that his suggestions cut across the party alignments. He suggests, rightly, I think, that the present schemes of nationalization are susceptible of development in widely differing ways, and he urges the importance of preventing bureaucracy and promoting flexibility. He considers that in the future trades unions will have to play a less defensive and more positive role in the running of industry. He also suggests that the time has come for the influence of consumers to be more closely organized than it has been hitherto. On all these topics he makes concrete and frequently ingenious proposals. I do not suppose that all of them are practicable, but none of them is silly. Most politicians and civil servants are too absorbed in necessary drudgery to have time to read books like this. I hope that any of their friends who read Mr. Westerman's book will find opportunities of imparting its contents to them, omitting or stressing Anthroposophy as strategy requires. The result should be a loosening of prejudice and some release of imagination.

Whereas Mr. Waterman directs his principal efforts to showing how the aims he believes in might be achieved, Professor Orton gives his main attention to an analysis and historical sketch of the liberal philosophy which he approves. The core of liberalism, he holds, is the search for a form of society in which men can be free, since freedom is essential for mental health and is in any case desirable for its own sake. Freedom is threatened whenever the state power, becoming too ambitious, claims to judge all the activities of society. Hence liberals, while they accept the need for an organized secular coercive power, hold that its sphere of justifiable activity is limited by natural law, and that the good of mankind is best served by the constant endeavour to keep state power to a minimum. Professor Orton holds, as did Lord Acton, that a tyrannical democracy is worse than a tyrannical individual or oligarchy,

and he obviously expects little good from the rule of the masses unless they can be restrained by reason and religion. This, of course, does not detract from his liberalism, since the enfranchisement of the whole population is quite a different thing from the liberal belief that each individual has natural and inalienable rights which no government ought to interfere with. Professor Orton holds that all men are created equal but that this proposition is only true in a religious sense "which sees in each individual the embodiment of a purpose that goes beyond all secular objectives" (p. 56). He is much impressed by nineteenth and twentieth century Papal formulations of the natural rights of family and property, and considers that the Roman Church is a genuinely liberal influence. But here, surely, his judgment is at fault, since the Roman Church advocates and would endeavour to enforce a special form of family organization irrespective of the directions in which freely thinking individuals may wish to transform it, while St. Thomas borrowed from Plato's *Laws* (Professor Orton regards the *Republic* as "one of the most horrible books ever written") not only part of his natural theology but also the illiberal advocacy of religious persecution which he displays in the *Summa Theologica*. As to property, when Professor Orton is criticizing Professor Laski he writes: "Indiscriminate talk of property or ownership is now practically meaningless" (p. 112). This dictum, if true, applies equally to Pius XII.

Consistently with his general position, Professor Orton is an opponent of nationalism and imperialism and an advocate of free trade. "The role of liberalism," he says, "is to forestall the catastrophic phase of change" (p. 305), and he therefore urges the advantages of changes secured by compromise. He stresses the value to a liberal society of an effective conservative party. "To flatter the masses by indiscriminate abuse of conservatism and all its works is no true service to liberalism" (p. 34). Like Mr. Waterman, he thinks that the interests of consumers need fuller protection than they are getting, but unlike him he does not seek for ways of achieving freedom for the operatives of industry during their working time. Indeed, I feel bound to say that Professor Orton is more vigorous in denouncing the faults of mass democracy in general and President Roosevelt in particular than persuasive or specific in proposals for developing liberal practice. It is true that all fanatics are fools and some are dangerous, but Professor Orton's gracefully written and learned book would have been better had it provided a more specific prescription for the nervelessness into which liberalism seems in danger of degenerating.

H. B. ACTON.

Problems of Men. By JOHN DEWEY. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1946. Pp. 424. Price $5.)

"There is probably no better way," says Professor Dewey, "to realize what philosophy is about when it is living, not antiquarian, than to ask ourselves what criteria and what aims and ideals should control our educational policies and undertakings" (p. 143).

For education is, as he says in another paper, "*the* outstanding means by which union of knowledge and the values that actually work in actual conduct is brought about" (p. 165). Philosophy of education is thus "ultimately the most significant phase of philosophy."

To say that this has been his conviction throughout his long and active career is not just to say that he has always been more interested in education than in philosophy. The point is that he believes that philosophers ought to be concerned with the vital issues and problems of their age. Hence the

title of this collection of essays, most of them written during the last ten years, *Problems of Men*. Problems of living men in the age in which they are living. From this point of view it is misleading to speak of "the perennial problems of philosophy." There are important connexions between the issues of today and those of other periods in the past; but this does not mean that the issues of today are those of the past. Our issues arise out of our situation, and must be studied in our situation. Light from the past no doubt we can get; but we shall not get it by assuming that our issues and problems are just those which men have always faced.

The first thing philosophers have to do then, in Professor Dewey's view, is to see the problems of the present age under the conditions of the present, and to tackle them from the point of view of the present. And he complains that many philosophers fail to do this, and busy themselves instead with traditional problems which have lost their urgency and vitality.

The central issue, according to him, concerns the place and function of scientific method in modern society. During the last three hundred years, that method has been used with increasing range and success, over a field wide but essentially limited. It took its rise when certain inquirers broke down the barriers that had been erected between theoretical studies and mechanical pursuits, between interest in ends or final purposes and the study of material processes; and it has been to an increasing extent technological, so that today the possibility of some piece of scientific research often depends on the possibility of constructing some complicated piece of apparatus. Science has become thoroughly contemporary; and while it would be untrue to say that no research would be entered on by a scientist unless it promised some direct practical outcome of use to modern society, it would be true to say that new researches result in the transformation of the old problems, that inventing and handling apparatus forms an essential part of the technique of research, and that at every stage an essential part of the reports of progress takes the form of statements that if you do so and so with such and such a piece of apparatus you will get such and such result. It is true also that this characteristic of scientific research has led to a closer partnership between scientists engaged in research and technicians seeking new devices for producing effects in the workaday world.

In this way science has contributed greatly to social change. Many of the changes brought about through science have been beneficial. Many have been harmful. We are no longer tempted to speak enthusiastically, as Henry More did in the seventeenth century, of the great goodness of God for giving man the blessing of being able to fight with modern weapons, instead of leaving him, like an ignorant savage, to "be at it with fisticuffs"; though we should recognize that the processes which made the use of modern weapons possible have also made possible a life very largely free from insecurity, pain and drudgery, and opened out possibilities of a fuller and wider life. No one is more clear than the thoughtful scientific worker, about what science and technology could do for society, in contrast with the use society has actually made of them.

As Professor Dewey sees the situation, the objectionable features of the whole development are due just to the limitations of the field over which the new methods have been applied. "Many of the remediable evils of the present time are due to the unbalanced, one-sided application of the methods of inquiry and test that constitute everything that has a right to the name 'science' " (p. 11). They have not been applied with any degree of fullness to the institutions and processes of society itself, or to the determination of ends and values. "Scientific method affects the conditions of life only

through the medium of institutions to which scientific inquiry is *not* applied" (p. 7).

For him, then, this is the vital issue of the present day. How is it that this new method, so fruitful in results in certain fields, with effects at once so beneficial and, through its one-sided application, so harmful in society, has not been extended, modified and adapted to a study and a transformation of social values and social processes? What might be the consequences if this extension were made?

These are the basic questions which his philosophy seeks to answer. In the papers in this volume he deals with different aspects of them, now in relation to school and university education, now in relation to the working of democratic processes and to social planning, now in relation to the determination of values, now in relation to the notion of subjectivity in experience.

The views he has to controvert are views to the effect that scientific method is by its very nature inadequate for certain types of problem. There are e.g., people who make a sharp separation between matter and mind, and in consequence between material things and interests on the one hand and spiritual interests on the other, and hold that scientific method is adequate only to a study of the former. They hold that science is competent to deal with the temporal and changing, with facts, but that values are eternal and cannot be discovered by experimenting with them or by collecting facts about them. These people are apt to view with dismay the prospect of technology providing more and more for the material interests of human beings, and so inciting to a blurring and a forgetting of spiritual interests. In the evil effects of technology on society they see the natural result of an overstress of material interests. They are apt to assert that our material progress is outstripping our moral and spiritual discipline, and to endeavour to call a halt to the former, while men are brought back to the latter. Some wish to strengthen the authority of an authoritative church, the divine instrument for the revelation of values to men; some, like President Hutchins of Chicago University, contrast science and technology with liberal and humane studies, and some would even go so far as to relegate vocational training to special schools, cutting them off from any contact with what is liberating (p. 32). Mechanical and utilitarian pursuits are here once more held to be lower and less worthy of spiritual beings than liberal studies.

All this for Professor Dewey is retrograde. It represents a viewpoint which had to be rejected by the early scientists, before they could make progress with their studies; and, he holds, it will have to be rejected today, if we are to make progress with the study of society, and to hope to solve our social problems. To say that the evils arise because our material and technological progress has outrun our moral discipline is to put the emphasis on the wrong place. What has to be dealt with is not technology in the abstract, but technology "as it operates under existing political-economic-cultural conditions" (p. 163). It would thus be more correct to say that the evils arise because our scientific and technological progress has outrun our social institutions. And, comments Professor Dewey, "here, and not in science, whether pure or abstract, is where materialism as the enemy of the humane is to be found, and here, not elsewhere, is where attacks should be directed." Let the humanists attack the habits and institutions which cause the technological applications of science to work with harshness on such vast portions of the population, and we shall believe "their concern for humane values is honest, instead of a device, deliberate or innocent, for maintaining

some form of institutionalized class interest. *Human is as human does*" (p. 163).

Associated with this view of his opponents is a separation between means and ends, and stress on ends-in-themselves that are not also means. The determination of ends-in-themselves is here cut off from the processes by which the adequacy of means to ends is determined. But if there are no ends which are not also means, as Professor Dewey holds, then there is only one type of determination of ends; and "there vanish all . . . grounds . . . for holding that moral ends are not, in theory, capable of the same kind of 'objective' factual determination as are technological ends" (p. 15). It is this view which has led him to be charged with having a philosophy of "progress without a goal"; but the charge is emotional rather than based on an intelligent understanding of what he is contending for. He certainly does not stand for the slogan, "Let's go somewhere," without any idea of where. He stands for the application of scientific method, developed and transformed in the process, to the determination of moral and social ends that are also openers up of and means to further ends; and this means that the progress he is seeking is a controlled and directed progress, each new achievement making possible and pointing the way to further steps beyond. It is precisely *not* "progress without a goal"; but the goal is of a much more complex kind, much more related to the actual conditions of life, than the goals, often indeed Utopian, of the upholders of absolute and eternal values.

A third view which Professor Dewey finds prominent in modern thought is the view that values are not capable of any kind of intelligent discussion and determination, since they are an expression of purely subjective attitudes. This view, he says, is bound to cause many people to turn to the authoritarian theological view which agrees that ultimate ends cannot be discovered by men, but asserts that they are determined by supernatural authority (p. 10). He speaks (in 1944) of "the discouragement I have experienced lately in connexion with discussion of value" (p. 273). He feels that "little headway is being made in determining the questions or issues fundamentally involved." And I think that the fundamental point lies in this doctrine of subjectivity, together with the contrast between propositions about values and propositions about facts as being different sorts of propositions, and not merely propositions about different sorts of facts. He would like someone to defend this view. "I can think of nothing more likely to be clarifying in the present confused state of the subject than an explicit statement of the *grounds* upon which it is assumed that propositions about values are *not* propositions about space-time facts, together with explicit discussion of the *consequences* of that position. If a question were raised about the relation of geological propositions to astronomical propositions, or of meteor-propositions to comet-propositions, it would not occur to anyone that the 'problem' was other than that of the connexion between two sets of facts. It is my conviction that nothing would better clarify the present unsatisfactory state of discussion of value than definite and explicit statement of the reasons why the case is supposed to be otherwise in respect to value" (p. 279).

This raises the whole question of the distinction between subjective and objective in experience, and of the concept of something intrinsically private. If man is essentially a part of the world, then his processes of inquiry and of forming conclusions, and his evaluations, are as capable of scientific study as any other processes occurring in the world.

I have said enough to indicate the range of Professor Dewey's articles, and the kind of view for which he is contending. The articles were all

written in the last ten years, with the exception of the one on "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality," written, he says, "half a century ago." They are arranged into four parts, not chronologically, but within each part each leads naturally to the next. The parts are entitled respectively "Democracy and Education," "Human Nature and Scholarship," "Value and Thought," and "About Thinkers." The thinkers dealt with in the last part are James Marsh, William James, and A. N. Whitehead. The articles in the third part, except the old one just mentioned, are all reprinted from the American *Journal of Philosophy*. These articles are more technical than those in the first two parts, and involve points raised by other contributors to the journal. The first two parts are of most topical and general interest. They show Professor Dewey at his best as a writer. They are clear, direct and incisive. The whole volume is to be welcomed, as an important contribution to the discussion of modern problems. It is a live volume, dealing with live issues.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Nature and Values. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, New York, 1945. Pp. 171. Price $1.50.)

In this short book we are offered a new discussion of a very old subject the issue between materialism and idealism, or, as the author prefers to express it, between naturalism and personalism. All human experience is marked by a sense of conflict and division: when we survey the situation in which we stand we are confronted immediately by the apparent dualisms on the one hand of matter and mind, on the other of fact and value. How are we to deal with this conflict? Should we declare, as some do, that the dualisms are unreal, the product of nothing more than verbal misunderstanding? Should we, alternatively, regard them as ultimate, insisting, as Descartes did, on a two-substance theory of reality? Or should we attempt to reduce the two worlds to one, claiming either that mind and values can be understood in terms of nature, or that nature itself can be interpreted as a manifestation of mind?

Dr. Brightman is an unrepentant metaphysician and a convinced idealist. With the positivist thesis that the clash between naturalism and personalism is a sham battle he will have nothing to do. The positivist, he argues, is not an impartial spectator in this conflict but very definitely a fighter on one side: positivism is itself a form of naturalism. And here I cannot help thinking that Dr. Brightman is right. What the positivist asserts, in effect, is that the criteria of knowledge and reality accepted by natural scientists should be regarded as having universal validity. But this is precisely what is in question between naturalism and anti-naturalism. What worries most of us is just the point whether the scientist can be regarded as having the last word to say on all topics. And it is distrust of the omnicompetance of science, the feeling that human actions in particular cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the use of scientific methods, which lead us to consider alternatives to naturalism, such as the theory which Dr. Brightman advocates. But if we are to find a philosophy of this type superior to that which the naturalist offers, we must be shown that it does justice to the strength as well as the weaknesses of its opponents. The defect of the present book, which certainly has its merits as an introduction to the subject, is that the author does not state and answer the case for a nature independent of mind in the way he should. He defines personalism as "the belief that the universe is a society of conscious beings, that the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, and that

there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being" (p. 114), relying mainly on Berkeleian arguments to establish the position. But he does not seem aware of the serious paradox involved in the statement (p. 123) that nature *is* mind. As Hegel saw, even if we are to assert ultimately that nature and mind are one, we must recognise immediately that they are opposites: that so far from being identical with mind, nature is its antithesis or "other." No idealism which fails to allow a relative independence to the world of nature is likely to carry conviction. And the question whether we can make sense of this notion of the relative independence of nature is the question whether idealism is in the last resort a tenable philosophy.

W. H. WALSH.

Philosophical Incursions into English Literature. By the late JOHN LAIRD, F.B.A., M.A., D.Lit. Ll.d. (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1946. Pp. 223. Price 12s. 6d.)

When a philosopher makes incursions into literary criticism any one of four things may be expected. The philosopher may try to show how, working in their own way with imaginative material, certain poets, dramatists and novelists have expressed attitudes to or valuations of life similar to those reached, through more abstract and systematic reflection, by himself or by other philosophers. Some of Santayana's writings are obvious examples. Or, having settled his own opinions on the principles of artistic criticism, the philosopher may turn back to certain works of literature to exercise the canons and principles involved in his general aesthetic: Croce's studies of Shakespeare, Ariosto, etc. seem to me examples. Thirdly, we may expect from a philosopher criticism that specially stresses the background factors—historical, social, ideological—in a literary artist's work: for example J. S. Mill's excellent study of De Vigny. Lastly, we may expect a philosopher to concentrate on the explicitly philosophical arguments or presuppositions in certain works of literature, to examine and appraise these and suggest their relevance or irrelevance to the artistic value of these works. The late Professor Laird's volume of literary essays falls into the fourth of these classes. The preface tells us with engaging modesty that the author, in spite of having had "some experience in writing and lecturing on philosophy" is "in matters of literature only an amateur." Very naturally, therefore, in writing on (among others) Sterne, Wordsworth, Hardy, Bridges, Professor Laird is chiefly interested in their "philosophy"; and in this way he has utilized his great professional competence as a philosopher to make a real though limited contribution to literary criticism. Such a contribution can be judged from two standpoints. Does it add anything of value to the *principles* of literary criticism—to those parts of literary criticism which overlap with the philosophy of art? Does it help the "common reader" to appreciate better *as works of art* the works selected for criticism? In the case of Professor Laird's volume the answer to the first question is: only a little, and that chiefly by suggestions that are never carried very far. The answer to the second question is a most emphatic Yes.

Three of the essays deal with the philosophy to be found in certain novels; in *Robinson Crusoe*, *Tristram Shandy*, and the novels of Dickens. The thesis that Crusoe is "a highly philosophical romance," a "*tractatus theologico-politicus*," is racily and convincingly expounded; and, as in other essays in the volume, Professor Laird brings out very clearly the degree to which in eighteenth-century England a popular author could not only possess, but expound at length, "a philosophy." Usually the philosophy was Locke's, with a few individual adornments; but it was Locke genuinely assimilated and

intelligently applied to the multifarious problems and interests of daily life. This point is illustrated again in *The Shandean Philosophy*, one of the most delightful essays in the book. Sterne was so great a humorist that he could create humour of a kind one would naturally consider the preserve of professional philosophers, since it arises from the oddities of philosophical uses and intentions. "It was a constant vexation to my father that my mother never asked the meaning of a thing she did not understand. That she is not a woman of science, my father would say, is her misfortune—But she *might* ask a question." By contrast with Sterne, Dickens was a very unsubtle humorist. But he had a capacity to reproduce, exaggerate, distort (and at times beautify) the English language as used in streets and homes and pubs and prisons, which is unequalled in any other writer. That such a master of language should have been attracted by the would-be-logical illogicalities of much "low" discourse was inevitable; and Professor Laird begins by giving us some interesting suggestions for the Weller-Gamp-Curdle-Bailey junior anthology of logical and philosophical solecisms. Dissatisfied, however, with this approach to *Philosophy in the Work of Dickens*, Professor Laird breaks off to examine, very usefully, what Dickens meant by the word "metaphysical" (he usually meant psychological) and who it was that Dickens attacked so furiously under the title of "philosophers" (he meant popular expounders of "Manchester" political economy). But why, the reader may wonder, this presupposition that there is a "philosophy" to be found in the works of Dickens? Professor Laird explains that his quest arose from a remark thrown out by G. F. Stout, that "there was a great deal of excellent philosophy in Dickens and that it would be well worth while examining it seriously and in detail." And at the end of Professor Laird's essay the reader may well ask himself: what *could* Stout have meant? My suggestion, though it may be quite off the mark, is as follows: that Dickens illustrates, better than any other writer, the wide variety of ways in which our "verbal behaviour" can be logically at odds with the rest of our behaviour, and yet (in the novelist's vision) be seen to "fit in" with the rest of our behaviour perfectly well. This kind of insight into the varieties of human inconsistency is obviously a main source of Dickens's strength as a portrayer of characters; and it is by means of it, I think, that, in spite of the crudeness of his explicit moralizing, he has a "philosophy of man" to impart.

Two of his studies in English poetry, *Pope's Essay on Man* and *Hardy's The Dynasts*, show Professor Laird as an incisive, indeed a somewhat severe, philosophic critic. The philosophical content of the *Essay on Man* proves to be flimsy and vague (for the most part clumsy borrowings from Bolingbroke) and, in spite of the unfailing radiance and crispness of the couplets, weakly—even sloppily—stitched together. The philosophical content of *The Dynasts* is more serious: Professor Laird evidently believed that the philosophy expressed in this poem was not only a muddle but a dangerously pretentious muddle. By applying to it some quite simple distinctions—between determinism, fatalism and predestination—and by pursuing these (and the unfortunate Hardy) unwaveringly, Professor Laird produces a model of what I should call "popular philosophy," i.e. real philosophy expressed through examples that are certain to interest, and are likely to have baffled and confused, a wide circle of intelligent *non*-philosophers. On the other hand, Professor Laird's very success in this essay may leave some readers wishing that he had gone further. The "mechanistic monism" implied in *The Dynasts* may well be a philosophical muddle; but surely it contributed something quite essential to a work that has great artistic value. (One might compare the way Hardy used more limited scientific conceptions in some of his novels;

e.g. that of the interaction of man and his environment in *The Return of the Native*, or that of a biological stock's decline in *Tess*.) Surely there is a very important problem here, and one on which we might expect a philosopher to throw some light: namely, in what way or in what sense can a "background" philosophical or scientific idea be said to be essential to the *subject* of a poem or novel, and hence, presumably, to the peculiar success of the artist's expression of that subject?

Four of Professor Laird's essays deal with poets who were evidently among his favourites: Wordsworth, Shelley, Browning and Bridges. Professor Laird brings out very clearly why Shelley *had* to think out a metaphysics, and why in reading him we should try to remember what that metaphysics was; but from the elucidation offered of Shelley's conception of "the constant pattern or eternity of measured motion" I, for one, formed a far higher opinion of Professor Laird's powers of intellectual sympathy and patience than of Shelley's gifts as a metaphysician. Professor Laird's examination of Browning's theistic beliefs, queries and quandaries seemed to me more rewarding, whilst his discussion of Browning's philosophy of love, especially as illustrated in Fifine at the Fair, I found excellent. (In this connection a small error should be corrected in any future edition: On p. 169 a stanza from *By the Fire-side* is wrongly attributed to *Any Wife to Any Husband*.) Professor Laird discusses the main arguments of *The Testament of Beauty* carefully, unsparingly, but with a just and friendly respect. He puts his finger on the weakness of Bridges's philosophy: it is too bookish, and in particular too bookish to give life to a philosophical poem. The essay on *Wordsworth and Natural Piety* is somewhat disappointing. It opens most promisingly with a close examination of the three passages in which the phrase "natural piety" occurs, and with the suggestion that in these Wordsworth meant by it something very different from that "reverent joy in nature" with which Alexander equated it. Had this line of th[illegible]ht been developed, it might have led to a useful discussion of Wordsworth's philosophy of the *will*, and in particular of the self-dedication of the will ("I made no vows, but vows were then made for me," etc.). But Professor Laird rejected this promising starting-point, and was content to anatomize the various strands in Wordsworth's poetic response to nature. In so far as this can be done without reference to Wordsworth's central moral beliefs, it is well done; but something better could have been expected.

Two essays stand somewhat apart from those I have discussed. The first in the book, *Shakespeare on the Wars of England*, is a rather shapeless anthology of Shakespeare's dicta on the moral issues and problems peculiar to war. The other, *Concerning Dr. Isaac Watts*, is a really excellent monograph; for sheer literary interest it seems to me the best essay in the volume. The great hymn writer is shown to have been in his youth a considerable lyric poet. There are interesting indications of how "O God our help in ages past" evolved from a clumsy paraphrase of the first five verses of the 90th Psalm, and how, in general, Watts regarded his craft as a hymn writer and paraphraser. Professor Laird remarks shrewdly that "even in an unchurchly age like the present, the hymn is the form of verse most familiar to the public, and does more than any other form to shape the public taste." But Watts was more than a poet and hymn writer; in his later years he produced moral and metaphysical essays, a useful text-book of logic and a volume of sermons many of which, Professor Laird surmises, must have been heard since from many pulpits. His metaphysics took the form of a revised Catesianism, and from his defence of Descartes' account of the soul Professor Laird cites the following gem. "A poor young creature in the lowest rank of life being once

asked what she supposed her soul to be, after a little musing replied, 'My soul is my think,' whereby it is plain she meant her power of thinking." The choice of this sentence—itself so beautifully revealing of eighteenth century social and philosophical manners—seems to me to typify Professor Laird's merits as a literary critic: deep love of his subject, wide learning, constant good sense, a kindly and kindling humour—qualities, the combination of which is as rare among philosophers as among literary critics, but which are found together on almost every page of this delightful volume.

W. B. GALLIE.

Science and the Idea of God. By WM. ERNEST HOCKING. (Humphrey Milford. 1945. Pp. ix + 124. Price 9/6d.)

The skeleton outline of Professor Hocking's book is this. If science rules that God must not interfere in the working of the world it investigates, that is equal to surrendering the whole realm of nature and history to the undivine forces which contend there. On the other hand, to admit divine control seems to carry us back to the realm of miracle. Hence we get the incompatible demands that God must not intrude and yet must act. To assess the situation Professor Hocking examines what he calls the experiment of getting on without God, in the spheres of psychology, sociology and astro-physics. With regard to the first of these, the discussion is mainly upon the merits of the cure of souls from the purely psychological and from the religious standpoints. As concerns the second, the issue is the adequacy of a humanistic sociology. In both cases the weakness of the lack of the religious standpoint is indicated. It is in the third sphere that the true place of God is clearly indicated. Curiously too, it was here that men first sought to banish God. How God enters may be explained by "an imperfect analogy." Professor Hocking says: "Light projects a motion picture on the screen. The activity of the figures and objects on the screen is causal. The light does not interfere with that action; it does not contend with any of the powers there active. It sustains the whole panorama of events. If it ceases, there are no causes and no agents at all on the screen. They all depend on it, and it is not one of them."

The depth and often brilliance of the argument is ill served by such a summary as the above. It is reminiscent of Whitehead's view that the physical world is transformed by the "consequent" nature of God. In Whitehead's words God "saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing which can be saved. . . . He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness."

The first conflict of science and religion, which followed the Renaissance, ended in science taking the physical, religion the spiritual world. This compromise lasted till first the geologists and then Darwinism, reached conclusions incompatible with the theology of the day. The bitter wrangling of the latter half of the nineteenth century led to a belief that science and religion were opposed. With the twentieth century the compromise was renewed by the recognition that Genesis was not Christianity and, on the part of the scientists, by a readiness to see that religion was not simply dogma. It was held that religion was no more opposed to science than was art. Each could work out its conclusions in its own sphere. That is the state of things which Professor Hocking thinks cannot now remain. The solution he suggests is to enable us to envisage a world-view in which religion and science can share. If both sides are willing, that should be possible. It may be, however, that many scientists will

be content to remain mentally as well as actually in their laboratories, and show interest only in what lies in the recognized sphere of cause and effect. It may also be that many religious people will still demand that God manifests himself in miraculous intervention. In that case the deadlock remains. If, as religions of all kinds hold, God is the ground of reality, there is no reason why God should be required not to intrude in the causal sphere. But Newton, himself a deeply religious man, gave the rule that no more causes of natural things are to be accepted than such as are true and sufficient to explain these things. It would seem, then, bad method, to invoke supernatural causes when natural causes are sufficient. Moreover, experience shows us that there are uniformities and regularities in the universe which are constant. Even those who pray for certain kinds of weather, would hardly pray for a snowfall in the heat of midsummer! The religious man may therefore assume that the sphere of cause and effect is settled by the conditions of creation and that it is not for him to ask for its reversal, any more then he would ask to be physically immortal. The idea of a God who does not intrude in nature does not mean necessarily that God is banned from his own handiwork, but that he has, one might almost say "contracted out"; in other words having chosen his equation, he abides by it in working it out.

The notion that science orders God out of Nature which he created, is as needless as is the idea that God, having laid down his own ways of working, is to be persuaded by our petitions to revise them. If science is content to pursue its course, recognizing that the method it adopts neither affirms or denies divine purpose in the world science explains, and if religion is content to respect the rights of science in its own sphere, there is no need for controversy. Yet this is a bifurcation of experience which can hardly be final, even though it may be a working compromise. The merit of Professor Hocking's book is that it makes an honest and practical attempt to suggest a more permanent solution. If we seek, as in the end we must, a world view in which science, art, morality and religion can share, we must look for something which will serve, as Professor Hocking's suggestions serve, to indicate a more synoptic standpoint and a more general harmony.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Personality and Religion. By WILLIAM BROWN, M.D., D.Sc. (University of London Press. 1946. Pp. 195. Price 9s. 6d.)

This book forms a revised and abbreviated edition of the writer's *Mind and Personality* published in 1926 and out of print. He has incorporated in it some chapters from that book and also from his *Science and Personality*, published in 1929 and out of print. In both cases, however, the matter has been revised. The title does not limit the contents, though it does indicate that religion is more in evidence here than in the preceding volumes.

Dr. Brown defines psychology as the science which studies the sequence of the mental processes in the individual, a definition on the lines of that of James Ward. It is, however, surprising that Dr. Brown apparently adheres still to McDougall's list of fourteen instincts and corresponding emotions. He refers to the latter as an important theory as to the relation between instinct and emotion. Mention is made of McDougall's *Social Psychology* and his *Outline of Psychology*, but not of the *Energies of Man* in which McDougall dropped the specific connexion between instinct and emotion and modified his general treatment of the subject. Moreover, the whole instinct psychology has suffered a sharp set-back since the days of McDougall's earlier books. Under the circumstances, it seems strange that in re-writing this

chapter from the former book, the author did not take advantage of the opportunity of embodying the changes in the judgment of most psychologists regarding McDougall's doctrine of instinct, but reprints the whole list exactly as before.

Suggestion is defined as "the acceptance of an idea by the mind especially by the so-called subconscious mind, independently of adequate logical grounds for such acceptance." This is very similar to McDougall's definition of suggestion. It limits the process, however, to human ideas. Suggestion is, of course, part of the group life of animals also, as a process needful for group preservation. It is the means by which a group, animal or human, is unwittingly moved towards common activity, feeling and in its degree, knowledge. Even when considering human susceptibility to suggestion there is no need to limit the process to ideas. Human activities and emotions are largely influenced by suggestion.

In his treatment of magic Dr. Brown seems unduly influenced by Frazer. He refers to Frazer's view that magic preceded religion and that the deeper minds perceived the inefficacy of magic and turned to religion. But what we know of primitive races suggests that such a cleft between magic and religion could not exist. Their attitude is not "either magic or religion," but "magico-religious." That is true of many even to-day who are far removed from the primitive mentality. Dr. Brown does indeed criticize Frazer for trying thus to explain religion in terms of magic, but he tells us that "Magic launched science," that it is an element of practical science rather than of religion. But sorcery, or black magic, is certainly no ancestor of science, whilst sympathetic or "white" magic is not an attempt at scientific understanding. The man who dials a telephone number has no idea how he gets his call through. He knows there is an explanation, but for him it is enough to go through the prescribed movements and await a reply. The savage who thinks that by a certain ritual he gets a desired result acts similarly. When the telephone refuses to work, the caller assumes something has gone wrong and dials again or gives it up. Exactly the same thing applies to the savage when his magic fails him. Magic and religion cannot be separated in any satisfactory way at the earlier stages of thought.

Such points of criticism are, however, incidental. The main topics of the book are well treated. Personality is rightly distinguished from individuality. It has a universal element which transcends the individual. Dr. Brown has a true sense of the importance of the religious factor in individual and social life, the lack of which was so great a drawback to Freud's contribution to psychology. He hesitates upon the ascription to God of personality on the ground that he is above personality as we know it. Perhaps he would like Lotze's saying that God was personal but it was difficult to say if we were. Yet the only analogy that helps us to understand the nature of God is that of our own highest achievement, personality, and surely, used as analogy, it is more to the point than to speak of Power or the Absolute, or even the Numinous, to use Otto's term from *Das Heilige*, which by an oversight in revision apparently, we are told has "recently" been translated into English. But the sincere and thoughtful working out of a wide subject which Dr. Brown affords us, is more than compensation for small blemishes of this type.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. By ERICH FRANK. (Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. x. + 209. Price $2.50.)

This book, which contains six lectures given at Bryn Mawr College, deals with some of the perennial problems of the philosophy of religion—The Nature of Man; The Existence of God; Creation and Time; Truth and Imagination; History and Destiny; and Letter and Spirit. To each is appended a full selection of explanatory notes and wide references which indicate a vast amount of reading. In some respects these are the most valuable part of the book, as in the main Dr. Frank's treatment of his subjects, whilst competent and well expressed, is an exposition of a Christian philosophy of religion. That is in no sense to depreciate it. The notes range over so wide an area and bring in tribute from so many sources and, moreover, are so well documented, that his eruditon must be encyclopaedic who finds nothing fresh here, and is not sent looking up new points indicated. There is a full index to aid the quest.

One owes a debt, then, to Dr. Frank for what he says and for what he has so widely gathered. There is a strain of mysticism in much of what he says. For example "Existence of God can be only an analogy of existence. For the existence of God infinitely transcends our thought, our will, and even our belief. And it is precisely in this transcendence that God and His existence can be grasped by us." Or again, "Creative freedom makes man aware of the fact that whatever he may do of his own free will is at the same time an ultimate necessity." That seems a paradox, if not a contradiction, and Dr. Frank admits that creative freedom cannot be verified by reason, as freely as did Kant. Modern philosophy, he declares, has failed to establish freedom through positivistic or rationalistic postulates, but adds that in the experience of Spirit, the Christian finds a new meaning of freedom. For the Greek it meant liberation from the senses, for St. Paul the liberation of man from the narrowness of his ego. It is one of the most interesting features of these lectures that Dr. Frank finds in St. Paul much more than a theologian, a philosopher with a new view of truth. Not all will agree that religious thought can illumine metaphysical issues, but at least it must be said that Dr. Frank puts forth a good case for his thesis.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Structure of Life. By E. L. ALLEN. (London: Nisbet and Co. 1945. Pp. 202. 8s. 6d.)

This is not an easy book to describe in a brief review. Dr. Allen, who is lecturer in theology in the University of Durham, divides it into ten chapters and fifty sub-headings, and the general subject is Christian ethics, but not in any sense treated in the usual text-book manner. Concern is rather with the conflicting loyalties, the state, industry, society, and the Christian laws of life. There is a width of treatment which makes it hard to summarize the book as a whole. There is nothing hackneyed. Dr. Allen is not a systematic expositor, but he is often an original one. For example, he argues that Marxism has the outlook of the Old Testament despiritualized. In both man is thought of as bound up with his environment, and community, which for Marx means class. At the same time he also links Marxism with Cartesianism, from which it takes the sharp separation of matter and spirit, though subordinating the latter to the former, and fathers itself on Spinoza whom it discovers as a materialist!

The main outline of the book is on these lines. The world to-day has not the sharp sense of absolute distinctions which our fathers possessed. It

tends to see grey, not black and white. Dr. Allen holds that an absolute ethic is found in the New Testament, and expounds its nature and development. Naturally he must then indicate the sub-types of Christian ethics, Catholicism, Protestantism and "Sectarianism" though the last is used in a somewhat restricted sense. After a further development of the questions involved, the book closes with practical applications of Christian ethics as concerns the family, society, and freedom. Never tedious, often suggestive, Dr. Allen is readable without effort, and comprehensible without a dictionary. What more can we ask of such a book?

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Religious Experience. By C. C. J. WEBB. (Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 70. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is the public lecture delivered in Oxford in 1944, printed with a bibliography of Professor Webb's published work, and presented to him by a group of friends and pupils on his eightieth birthday in 1945. Professor Grensted, who succeeded Professor Webb in the chair of the philosophy of the Christian religion at Oxford University, writes a bibliographical foreword of an interesting and indeed intimate kind.

C. C. J. Webb has been for many years the foremost philosopher of religion in this country, and this short book is enough to show that even in his eightieth year, he has lost none of his clarity or force. He begins by indicating the way in which the connotation of the term "experience" has widened. It is not so very long ago that it carried merely the suggestion of sense experience. Professor Webb credits the British Idealists with the recognition of the reality of religious experience. Without wishing to detract from anything due to these writers, it should be said that as good a claim might be made for William James and his school, who certainly ought not to be omitted in this connexion. For Professor Webb religion is an experience of ours, but that is in no way inconsistent with its being a revelation of God, and what is more, the initiation of the commerce between man and God is the work of God. Though the main interest of the lecture is in the Christian revelation, there are other revelations. The knowledge given by revelation cannot be separated from that which comes in other ways. All religious truth is revealed, but all is addressed to the reason of man. Nor can we accept any part of revelation as by its nature infallible. "I can recognize infallibility nowhere, in Pope or Church or Bible." To this one might, I suppose, add reason also, for many claim its infallibility, meaning, for the most part, the infallibility of their own type of reasoning!

To those acquainted with the philosophy of Professor Webb, the book will afford a brief "refresher course" of those things which he most consistently believed and sought to demonstrate. To others, it will be, amongst other things, an object lesson in succinct and unambiguous expression of certain fundamental truths, the product of a mind of rare quality and a pen of expressive ability. Should this prove the last of Professor Webb's contributions to his subject, which one sincerely hopes it will not be, it will be the worthy completion of a distinguished life spent in sincere search for truth.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The State of Public Knowledge. By K. E. BARLOW. (London: Faber and Faber. 1946. Pp. 112. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The main doctrine of this vigorous essay is that our common technique of thinking is inadequate to the claims of the life within us. The compelling call

of the time is the need to refashion the frame of our public philosophy and to recognize the indwelling forms of biological and personal experience. Our social beliefs and organization suffer grievous distortion owing to our failure to comprehend and to provide for the characteristics of life.

The thesis is approached by way of a scrutiny of the foundations of knowledge. It is agreed on all hands that knowledge is dependent on the senses but recent work in physiology and psychology has offered new information relating to the functioning of the senses in the task of constructing public knowledge. Physiologically acts of perception are accompanied by internal as well as external nerve impulses. There are delicate references to inner sense-organs in the muscles as well as to energy coming from beyond the body, and both outer and inner schemes of impulses are organized into extraordinarily complex systems that function as wholes. A number of different senses are integrated in the process, each having their own internal and external systems. Psychologically the chief point is that apprehension refers to a field or system; the object of attention is apprehended in relation to its field. Further, the examination of primitive awareness reveals that perception is welded with action from the beginning; the mind imposes appearances on its data in accordance with its interests.

The argument passes at a leap to the process of fashioning symbols by which the systems of private images becomes means of public intercommunication. From elementary verbal signs to the clock-time, the weights and measures of physics, the human mind is engaged in fabricating public frames of references, bringing a common and neutral order into personal observation and behaviour. Now modern conceptions of knowledge, which are dominated by physics, have fastened certain conventions upon our public modes of interpreting experience. They have imposed upon the texture of our thinking the notions of atomic analysis, of quantitative structure and of equivalent causation. It is true that these methods of thought have recently been shown to be inappropriate within physics, and to be even less applicable to the territory of physiology. Yet our social ideas are largely controlled by these points of view.

In the course of Mr. Barlow's argument so far a number of valuable suggestions have been brought forward. He does not allow himself more than a bare and selective sketch of primitive knowledge and the account of the formation of the symbol, the process that Kant names schematization, is particularly abbreviated. Some important words, for example, "knowledge," seem to be used a little loosely. But the conception of "frames of reference," intermediaries between man and the illimitable universe of the unknown is enlightening.

The concentration on the physical frame of reference results in the sustained endeavour to make our knowledge fit our experience and our experience and behaviour fit our knowledge. But our experience is far wider than our knowledge. A long passage from Fabre serves to suggest that despite the wonderful plasticity of human consciousness man is moved by deep impulses that are continuous with the universe of life. In face of the mechanistic frames of reference that govern our thought we should do well to nurture and promote the indwelling patterns of life. At this critical point Mr. Barlow, after quickening the reader's expectation by the epistemological discussions of the earlier sections leaves him suspended. Some passing observations on spontaneity and on the interdependency of the living creature and its habitat are nearly all that we are offered. Instead the argument reverts to the social frustrations that have followed from our one-sided frames of public thought. And the proposal to trace to the philosophy of physics the manifold political

and economic disturbances that are mentioned, requires considerably more justification. The positive recommendation that emerges in the final section is the view that reason and policy must build upon the free life of the family. It is to be hoped that Mr. Barlow will develop the hints that he has put forward in this stimulating little book.

M. H. CARRÉ.

Time and Thermodynamics. By A. R. UBBELOHDE. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 105. Price 6s. net.)

This modestly written and unpretentious little book, by the distinguished professor of physics at Belfast, is offered as a contribution to "scientific humanism," by which the author means the integration of knowledge in philosophy. This the author considers as a third function of natural science, separate from its two recognized functions of the advancement of pure knowledge (satisfaction of curiosity) and the advancement of the welfare of mankind. (I think that all three aims can be better summed up in an older-fashioned formula, that the objects of science are to help man to live the good life and to see into the mind of God.) With this purpose in view, the author eschews any full exposition of thermodynamics, even in non-technical terms (he has published previously a separate work on these topics) and confines himself, generally speaking, to value-considerations which emerge in thermodynamic contexts. But he permits himself descriptions in fresh, unhackneyed language, of the roles of the first two Laws of Thermodynamics, illustrating his arguments from the steam-engine, evaporation, the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, and more especially radiation. His comparative examples, of the relative degrees of occupancy of the differently-priced seats in a cinema and their build-up of a steady state, and the varying influx and efflux streams of customers to a restaurant at different hours of the day and their relation to the percentage of tables occupied, are entertaining and truthful; though the author nowhere even hints that a steady state is not necessarily a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, possibly because his own studies have not been in the domain of astrophysics, where such a distinction is both proper and necessary. But the wit of the author makes one forgive some of the shortcomings of his science, as for example where he remarks that "had the eighteenth century known the oxides of nitrogen as well as it knew sulphur-dioxide, (the smell of which has been known from the time of Homer), it is arguable that the Cock Lane Ghost would have disappeared with a nitrous rather than a sulphureous smell."

Philosophers may be most interested in his chapters on radiation equilibrium, and what he calls the *Primacy of Vision*. He rightly points out that for an observer placed in a black-body chamber (which may in a particular case be a white-hot furnace) the observable universe would just cease to exist. The pencils of radiation reaching his eye would all have precisely the same composition, as regards intensity, frequency-distribution and the like, and no discrimination of objects in the enclosure would be possible, even were they the mocking idols heated by Babylonian stokers of his actual illustration. Since perception by vision depends on the non-equilibrium nature of the radiation used, its occurrence is associated with interchanges which must always result in increases of entropy, and so with a natural "time-direction." It is a sobering thought, after all the energy philosophers have expended in analysing the nature of sense-data, and whether they imply "real" objects, that every portion of the universe is tending to a state in which no sense-data of an optical kind can any more be perceived.

So much for what is good in the book. There is a serious mistake on p. 14, where the author gives the "rest-energy" of a mass m as $\frac{1}{2}mc^2$ (c being the velocity of light), whereas it is actually mc^2. It is not the fact that the actual energy is double what Ubbelohde quotes that is important; it's the haunting suspicion that the author has harboured a false analogy with the kinetic energy $\frac{1}{2}mv^2$, and that accordingly the author has entirely failed to appreciate the relativity doctrines on this topic. In actual fact, this book is quite antiquated in what it says about the relationships of time, energy, entropy and the fate of the universe, and is no reliable guide to recent research on these subjects. To begin with, the author opens with a section entitled "Farewell to 'personal' time," ignoring the discovery by kinematic relativity (the subject of more than one article in PHILOSOPHY) that the Lorentz formulae of relativity can be deduced purely from the observer's personal awareness of the passage of time and an analysis of the method of perception of point events by light; but the time-scale in which the Lorentz formulae hold good, namely t-time, is not that of our ordinary dynamics, τ-time, given by the logarithm of t. In the second place he nowhere faces the fact that the world-wide conservation of energy is strictly speaking incompatible with special relativity, in which energy ranks with momentum as having its measure dependent on the frame of reference; the difficulty is resolved by kinematic relativity, in which energy is a four-dimensional scalar, taking the same value for all fundamental frames of reference, i.e. whatever nebular nucleus in the expanding universe is chosen as observing-headquarters. In the third place, his arguments on the reversibility of time fall to the ground as soon as we realize we are living in an expanding universe: the precise sequence of positions and velocities of a particle cannot naturally be retraced unless the velocity of every particle in the universe is likewise reversed, as is shown by the form of the equations of motion is absolute or t-time; reversibility in history is only possible in the ephemeral τ-scale, in which the galaxies constituting the universe are treated as at rest. Lastly, it is time that both philosophers and men of science ceased to accept what is called *heat-death* as the fate of the universe as a whole. That is a relic of the obsolescent Einstein finite universe, which is not strictly relativistic. On kinematic relativity, the universe though spatially finite contains an infinity of galactic systems, the overwhelming majority of them having only just (at our *present*) been created. Each system itself ages and suffers increase of entropy, but there is no sense in speaking of the age of the universe as a whole, and there must be an unending sequence of worlds *now* at an arbitrarily early stage in time, capable of being the scene of an evolutionary process. This is the conclusion to which kinematic relativity is led when it does not shelve the meaning of time, but starts with an analysis of the before-and-after relation for the individual. The Second Law of Thermodynamics as Ubbelohde says, holds good for only isolated portions of the universe; but it loses its significance for scientific humanism if we confine attention to limited portions of the universe.

The author concludes with an interesting chapter on thermodynamics and life, wherein he favours the view that living organisms may be continually effecting processes which result in local entropy decreases at the expense of rather greater entropy increases in the surroundings: "living beings would then be parasites on the entropy fund of the universe." This metaphor puts the thing the wrong way round: it would be more correct to say that living beings would be living on an overdraft! I ought to add that the author's thermodynamic balance-sheet on p. 37 is the clearest exposition I have ever seen of the meaning of Carnot's treatment of reversing one heat engine to make it drive another.

E. A. MILNE.

NEW BOOKS

Books also received:

Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1945–46 (New Series, Vol. xlvi). London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. Pp. 266. 25s. net.

KATHLEEN FREEMAN. *Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1946. Pp. xiii + 486. 25s. net.

GEORGES FRIEDMANN. *Problèmes humains du machinisme industriel*. Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1946. Pp. 381. 230 fr.

MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY, LL.B., Ph.D. "Borrowings in Roman Law and Christian Thought." Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America. (Reprinted from *The Jurist*, Vol. vi, No. 4, Oct., 1946.) Pp. 22. No price quoted.

P. ROMANELL. *Croce versus Gentile*. A Dialogue on Contemporary Italian Philosophy. New York: N.Y.: S. F. Vanni. 1946. Pp. 72. No price quoted.

MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY, LL.B., Ph.D. "Relativism in American Law." Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 20th Annual Meeting*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 28, 1945. Pp. 10. No price quoted.

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1945. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1946. Pp. 484. $1·75.

MARTIN BUBER. *Between Man and Man*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Kegan Paul. 1947. Pp. viii + 210. 12s. 6d. net.

YELVERTON DABERN. *The First Christian*. In 3 Parts: 1. Galilee. 2. The Era of Our Lord. 3. The New Age. Printed and published for the author by Rush and Warwick (Bedford) Ltd. 1946. Pp. 220. 3s.

WILLIAM GERBER. *The Domain of Reality*. New York: King's Crown Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1946. Pp. x + 81. English price, 8s. 6d. net.

FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J. *Arthur Schopenhauer, Philosopher of Pessimism*. No. 11 in the Bellarmine Series. Published by the Jesuit Fathers, Heythrop College, Oxon. Distributors: Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 1946. Pp. xi + 216. 12s. 6d. net.

A. B. WOLTER, O.F.M., M.A. *The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy). Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1946. Pp. ix + 204. No price quoted.

The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha. A collection of historical texts translated from the original Pali and edited by J. G. Jennings, M.A., C.I.E. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. cvii + 679. £2 2s. net.

RALPH BARTON PERRY. *Puritanism and Democracy*. New York: Vanguard Press. 1944. Pp. xviii + 688. 5 dollars.

KAHLIL GIBRAN. *Tears and Laughter*. Translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited by Martin L. Wolf. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. xii + 112. $2·75.

KAHLIL GIBRAN. *Spirits Rebellious*. Translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited by Martin L. Wolf. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. vi + 121. $2·75.

MAHARAJ RANA SIR UDAIBAN SINGHJI. *Eastern Light of Sanatan Culture*. Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co. (1933) Ltd. London: W. Thacker & Co. 1946. Pp. xii + 364. 12s. 6d.

PHILOSOPHY

HUME'S *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.* Edited with an introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A., Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Second Edition, with Supplement. London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1947. Pp. xi + 249. 10s. 6d. net.

The late PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH, M.A., F.B.A. *The Legacy of the Ancient World.* Third Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Macdonald and Evans. 1947. Pp. xx + 550. 21s. net.

The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XX. "Logic and Reality." London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd. 1946. Pp. 232. 21s. net.

MAURICE MAETERLINCK. *The Great Beyond.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Translated by Marta K. Neufeld and Renee Spodhem. Pp. 226. 3 dollars.

G. N. DHAWAN, M.A., Ph.D. *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi.* Bombay: The Popular Book Depot. 1946. Pp. xvi + 354. Price Rs. 8/8.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER. *A Digest of Purposive Values.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1947. Pp. 100. $2·50.

KEWAL MOTWANI. *India: A Synthesis of Cultures.* Bombay: Thacker & Co. 1947. Pp. xx + 319. Rs. 7/14.

ALEXANDER BRYAN JOHNSON. *A Treatise on Language.* Edited, with a critical essay on his philosophy of language, by David Rynin. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. ix + 443, English price, 26s. 6d. net.

BARON ERIK PALMSTIERNA. *Rifts in the Veil.* London: Andrew Dakers, Ltd. Pp. 96. 5s. net.

H. D. LEWIS. *Morals and the New Theology.* London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1947. Pp. 160. 7s. 6d. net.

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Volume xxvii, 1946. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1947. Pp. 207.

MATTHEW M. DE BENEDICTIS, O.F.M., M.A., Priest of the Immaculate Conception Province. *The Social Thought of Saint Bonaventure. A Study in Social Philosophy.* (A Dissertation for the Doctorate of Philosophy.) Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 1946. Pp. xv + 276.

A. N. WHITEHEAD. *Essays in Science and Philosophy.* Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University. 1947. Pp. 347. Price, $4·75.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

February 2nd, 1947

DEAR SIR,

May I reply on a point of fact to Professor Field's review of my book, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Vol. XXI, No. 80 of your Journal)? Professor Field mentions on page 275 Plato's *Politicus* as "a dialogue which Dr. Popper, except for one or two casual references, ignores." But upon looking over the references in only my first two chapters on Plato (chapters 3 and 4 plus notes), I find 25 references to 20 different passages of the *Politicus*. These passages bear mainly on my interpretation of Plato's views on the relation between the primitive and the ideal state, criticized by Professor Field on p. 274. I suppose that what Professor Field wanted to censure in the above-quoted passage was not that I ignored this dialogue altogether but merely that my references to this dialogue, in connection with certain other problems, were not as frequent as he could have wished.

Yours faithfully,

K. R. POPPER.

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE,
HOUGHTON ST., LONDON, W.C.2

(The Editor has submitted the above letter to Professor Field, who has replied as follows:

"Dr. Popper's statistics are, of course, perfectly correct, and I am sorry if I gave a misleading impression. Perhaps I should have spoken of 'references to one or two points' instead of 'one or two references.' On considering the length of the references, as compared with the space given to passages from other dialogues, I think that, with one possible exception, the adjective 'casual' is justified."—EDITOR.

INSTITUTE NOTES

ANALYSIS

The journal *Analysis*, which has not been published since 1940, will reappear in October, 1947. There will be six numbers a year, at an annual subscription of 10s. 6d. (U.S.A. $2.12). Orders should be sent to the publishers, Basil Blackwell, Broad Street, Oxford. Other communications should be sent to the editor, A. E. Duncan-Jones, The University, Birmingham 3.

Members will receive in due course a syllabus of the lectures arranged for the Session 1947–8.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[*Suggested*]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD-OUTLOOK. Dr. F. Sherwood Taylor	195
II.	THE MARXIST OUTLOOK. Professor H. B. Acton . . .	208
III.	PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS. G. T. Kneebone, Ph D. .	231
IV.	THE PSYCHOLOGY OF "MINE." Leon Litwinski	240
V.	DISCUSSION: MAN'S INNER CONDITION: A STUDY IN KIERKEGAARD. T. H. Croxall	252
VI.	NEW BOOKS	256
VII.	CORRESPONDENCE (Xth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, Etc.)	286
VIII.	INSTITUTE NOTES	288

A CHALLENGE

Members are reminded that from the beginning the Institute has encouraged the formation of Local Centres. In those cities possessing a University or University College, it is suggested that members living in the vicinity should form a group and approach a member of the teaching staff of the department of philosophy to act as their guide and leader in the study of Philosophy. In places where there is no University, it is suggested that Reading Circles should be formed and competent leaders elected. It is well to remember that there are excellent commentaries on many of the great classics in philosophy.

For these enterprises it is essential that energetic members of the Institute in various places should take upon themselves the task of organizing such Local Centres and Study Circles. Before the war there were active Centres in Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield, but recently they have not all been functioning, and there is room for expansion.

The members of the Institute are scattered throughout Britain. Intending organizers of Local Centres will, on request, be supplied with the names and addresses of members living in their neighbourhood.

S. E. H

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXII. No. 83 NOVEMBER 1947

THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD-OUTLOOK [1]

DR. F. SHERWOOD TAYLOR

I

THE scientific world-outlook is something quite different from natural science. The word "science" in its legitimate modern usage represents both a kind of knowledge and the method of obtaining that knowledge. By "science" we may mean an objective body of facts and relationships concerning the physical world and arrived at by the scientific method of observation and reasoning—preferably quantitative observation and mathematical reasoning: thus we may say that the law of constant proportions is a part of the science of chemistry. But we may also use the word science to denote that scientific method which I have just mentioned: thus I may say that *science* is the key to the investigation of nature—or that some inaccurate or biased piece of work is *unscientific*. Science, in either of these senses, does not contain any world-outlook, for it is quite impersonal. Thus science in the first sense consists of certain statements and relationships *e.g.*—that sulphur is yellow, that Jupiter has eight satellites, that all solutions of acids in water conduct electricity; while the scientific method indicates the manner in which from the data of our sense-impressions we can infer statements and conclusions, such as the above, which will be found to represent the phenomena correctly. But a *scientific world-outlook* means something different, because it is a *world*-outlook, the attitude of a man or woman towards the whole of that of which he or she is conscious. Pure science, strictly interpreted, has not gone very far in its study of man and his world; so the scientific world-outlook in so far as it differs from science itself, is the scientist's response to and hypothetical explanation of that which has not yet been

[1] Series: *Contemporary World-Outlooks* (I).

elucidated by science. Science describes the world in terms of number, weight, and measure, and embodies summaries of the descriptions it makes in the form of so-called scientific laws. These afford only a mass of summarized data: the human mind has to integrate these summaries by referring them to some supposed reality, and by such integration, with interpolation to fill the gaps and extrapolation to transcend the limits, it forms the scientific world-picture. Such a world-picture evidently contains an element which is not science in its strictest sense, and a scientific outlook or "world-view" is commonly taken to include even more than a picture—more than integrated data—and to afford grounds for decisions as to conduct. A scientific *world-outlook*, then, implies some connection between science and the making of judgments, of decisions, concerning what is to be accepted and what rejected; and it is scarcely necessary to labour the point that the actual decision, choice or interpretation implied in an "outlook" cannot be a part of science itself, and does not merit the confidence we place in the conclusions of science.

The data and conclusions of science are distinguished from other data and conclusions by two chief features, community and certainty.

The data that science records and summarizes are common to all men, not only through their free publication and diffusion, but through their very nature. Statements based on affective and conative experiences cannot necessarily be understood by those who have not had such experiences: works on mystical subjects, for instance, may have intense meaning for one man and seem complete rubbish to others: but a scientific work is wholly intelligible to anyone who takes the trouble to learn the terms: there is nothing in it of an esoteric character even though there be only three people that can follow its reasoning. It may be obscure through subtlety or complexity, but it is wholly accessible to any man with a good enough head. It is without party, race or creed; the Russian, the Indian, and the Englishman are on the same ground and talking the same language as long as they stick to pure science—though not, perhaps, when they form their scientific outlook.

Even more important than the community of science is its certainty. The scientific man's first business is to record observations as truly and as accurately as possible. He knows that nothing he can record (except enumerations, *e.g.* that A has ten fingers) is perfectly accurate, but he knows how much error to expect in each observation and does not take his results to be truer than they are. The public does not always appreciate this factor of experimental error, and is apt to think that our data and conclusions about expanding universes are known with the same accuracy as those

that concern expanding steam-pipes. But, be this as it may, it is fair to say that the data that are admitted into science are scrutinized with care.

To ensure accuracy, however, there is required not only technique of observation, but also freedom from bias, which, though it is unlikely to lead to deliberate falsification of scientific observations, may operate by leading to the unconscious or semi-conscious ignoring of observations unfavourable to a theory, or the selecting of those that are favourable. This bias is difficult to eliminate: few men, even in science, are without their hobby-horses, and complete self-knowledge and honesty is so high a quality that we need not be surprised to find it rare. But scientific papers are published, and are open to free criticism; the pet theory of one man is the chosen target of another. There may be cases where scientific opinion as a whole has a prejudice in favour of or against certain views, in which case it may be difficult for opponents of these to find a hearing, but generally there is an anxious striving to supersede or improve upon the old.

Thus as far as the facts of science are concerned, we are justified in having a reasonable confidence in their correctness. As far as the conclusions of science are concerned (where we cannot check them ourselves) we may have some confidence in their being the most probable deductions *from the data employed.* But we must remember the words of the witness's oath—"truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." He would be a bold man who would claim that the scientific account of some complex process, e.g. the motion of Mars, or the functions of the kidneys, was nothing but the truth and nowhere in error; the best that could be claimed would be that the account corresponded closely with the observations, but never that it had said the last word or would not be superseded by wider generalizations. But this after all is true of all knowledge of individual things. We may with more reason ask what claim the conclusions of science have to be *the whole truth*—by which, of course, I mean the whole of the truth that could be known by man about the subject with which they are concerned. The conclusions of science are inductions from scientific data. I am not going to launch myself on the deep water of a discussion of the validity of induction, further than to say that I am convinced that no conclusion arrived at by induction can be more than probable—though in some cases so probable as to differ infinitesimally from certainty. But I would dispute the claim of scientific conclusions to be the whole truth, rather on the ground that they are not always drawn from a representative selection of the available data. In the case of the motions of Mars we need not complain of this; in considering the physiology of the kidney we may perhaps question the attempt

to express the phenomena of life in terms of physics and chemistry (*i.e.* of the non-living), as omitting the principal feature of the subject—namely that it is living matter. But if the subject discussed were the human brain or even some aspect of sociology, then an explanation in terms of what science can observe—external changes—a motion of matter—might be a very partial one.

We may think then that the conclusions of science are likely to be accurate and unbiased, but to be true accounts only of those aspects of things which are the subject of scientific observation.

Now what is the characteristic outlook of scientific men on the nature of things? Necessarily the scientific man has the greatest confidence in scientific data and is prone to characterize what is known from reasoning about such data as "fact," and to regard all other conclusions as "speculation" or "conjecture." He will construct his world-outlook according to the positivist attitude of science. Taking his stand upon the known he will proceed to nibble away the unknown, never extending his view beyond the immediate problem, beyond that which he can infer by the reasonings of science from data which have been already ascertained in that way. Thus the scientist's world has no conscious metaphysics; yet everyone (except perhaps the mathematician) *must* have a metaphysic, must assume that some things are real and some things are seeming, that some argumentations are valid and some fallacious. The scientist does not attempt any *a priori* decisions in such matters. Indeed he concerns himself very little with them, because his criterion of success is simply that *his science should work*. If his habit were to build up, as Descartes hoped to build up, long chains of pure reasoning culminating in otherwise unsupported conclusions, it would be very important to know if his assumptions and reasonings were sound. But, actually, scientists do not believe in reason. Every stage in an investigation is checked by experiment, that is, by a trial designed to discover whether the conclusions he has so far drawn by reasoning about the class of phenomena that he is studying are, in fact, true (*i.e.* predict what will occur); and mere reasoning supported by no experimental check carries very little weight. This, I think, is why the scientist is in general so little interested in philosophy. All he wants is to predict phenomena correctly. He may be treating matter as a hard, massy, and impenetrable reality one day and as a tissue of mathematical equations the next. He may make assumptions about it which seem contradictory or impossible—all is one to him as long as they lead to laws which afford him correct knowledge of what is going to happen to a system under certain conditions. The method works (*i.e.* corresponds to observed facts), because every stage of the reasoning is certified by the facts, which is all that he cares for. Most characteristic was the

remark of Sir J. J. Thomson: "Well, of course, I have always thought that the chief value of any theory was as a basis for further experiments."[1] This verification of reasoning is the backbone of scientific certainty, and where it is impossible the man of science is very much at sea.

The scientist sees the whole world as the product of the interaction of a small number of kinds of entities, which are either particles or quanta of electro-magnetic waves, under the influence of gravitational, electrical, and magnetic forces. He has gone some of the way towards explaining the behaviour of matter in terms of these particles and their combinations—atoms, ions, molecules, and assemblages of molecules. At the root of all this are any number of unsolved problems—how are gravitational, electrical, and magnetic forces related? How is a wave related to a particle? etc., etc., but these fundamentals he justifiably omits. As Newton says: "To derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena and afterwards to tell us how the properties and actions of all corporeal things follow from those manifest principles, would be a very great step in philosophy even though those principles were not discovered."

Thus all scientific explanations lead in the end to a question, and there will be always another question to ask. This the scientist can and should frankly accept. But the average scientist is not always so clearly aware of what he does not know and is apt to think of his world-view as more complete than it really is. But given the assumptions of these fundamentals, and waiving the question of the nature of his ultimate entities, his analysis of non-living matter in terms of them is remarkably sound and fruitful, and it is progressing at a great rate. This analysis is extremely *useful* and it gives us a far clearer picture of the physical world than can any other method, but it can never be a total explanation. We can analyse our brick until we come to the vast ultimate energy that lurks in the heart of it. As we pass from stage to stage—mass to crystal, crystal to molecule, molecule to atom, atom to electron, proton and neutron, so one loses the brick one knows and everything one knows about it, till one reaches a statement which employs nothing imaginable, but is just a tangle of equations. But these equations are not mere subtleties of the mathematical mind—for the atomic bomb, worked out by these means, confirmed their validity with a voice of thunder on the day when it was first tried in New Mexico. These equations are not mere subtleties about matter, they are *a* truth about it, but not *the* truth about it. Science then tells us important things that we could not otherwise know; and we may ask ourself what is the characteristic of the scientific account

[1] *Sir J. J. Thomson, O.M.*, Lord Rayleigh. Cambridge 1942. p. 141.

of the world. Science is almost always giving us a dynamic picture of the activity of a thing. Even a tree is always seen in action, pumping up water, making itself out of the air and water and light, crowding out its neighbours, reaching for the sun; nay, even a stone is viewed in its action, in the way that it became stone, in the interplay of its atoms and molecules, in the potential activity of its chemical properties. Here, I think, is the essential quality that science has made us see in the world. By science we see the world as perpetual activity; not a single tiny particle, but is in constant action. We see the whole of this complexity of motion maintained by the high-grade heat-energy of the stars running down to low-grade heat-energy—and irreversibly. It is a picture strangely resembling in principle (though utterly different in detail) the neo-Platonic universe, with God, the source of all motion, transmitting through the heavenly bodies a stream of influence activating everything on earth and finally becoming extinguished in matter; to-day we see the same activating stream of energy pass from the heavenly bodies to us and thereafter become irrecoverably lost.

But the wonder of this picture must not blind us to its incompleteness. The ultimate entities remain unexplained, perhaps inexplicable, and there are other *lacunæ*. Thus the scientist's picture of non-living matter is admirable, but when our survey of his world-view passes from the non-living to the living there is a gap. There is at present no convincing theory to explain the difference between the living and non-living—to show how a kind of matter can reproduce and maintain itself under changing conditions. Metaphysicians may argue whether life *could* be elicited from the non-living. That is the sort of question that science never asks. Instead of disputing concerning the *a priori* possibility of producing the living from the non-living, science initiates the research which shall lead to the trial of the crucial experiment. It is trying to analyse the process of living into its simplest elements and it will try to imitate them. The chemical technique of complex molecules, though rapidly advancing, is still so inadequate that science is not yet in a position to try any crucial experiment, but organic chemistry is creeping towards it by many paths. It has not yet succeeded in this task, and it has no assurance of ultimate success; but the research is what Bacon called an "experiment of light," which, whether it succeeds or not, enlightens us.

Here, where knowledge is lacking, the gap is temporarily filled by this "scientific outlook." Tacitly, the greater number of scientists will not assume, even as hypothesis, that there is in the world any entity that could not be explained in terms of the particles and forces recognized or to be recognized in physics and chemistry. Science has given us no reason for denying the existence of some-

thing we might call a "vital principle," but science will not adopt it even as a hypothesis until all other explanations fail. This attitude, which is no more than methodological, is commonly taken as a denial of the existence of any such principle; and indeed such a denial is a part of the normal "scientific outlook," though no part of science, strictly interpreted.

In passing from the study of plants and of other animals to that of man, there is a similar discontinuity. We are each conscious of a world of sensations, images, concepts, utterly sundered from anything which we have been able to study in the world of the non-living and of the lower-organisms. In what form is this mental world depicted in the "scientific outlook?" There is nothing absurd, of course, in an attempt to study the human mind and its activities by scientific methods. Anything which can be described in such a way that its regularities can be discovered and recorded is a fit subject for the scientific method, and the science of psychology takes as its material some part at least of these consciously-experienced mental phenomena. The results have not been negligible, and we can formulate some fairly accurate laws about the lower aspects of mind, (*e.g.* sensation) and some useful generalities about the modes of response of human beings to certain conditions of environment. But science is concerned with the relations between classes, and the mental content of human beings is so very different that it is scarcely possible to classify it except in large and ill-defined categories; thus it would seem that, for this reason alone, the scientific treatment of human mental operations could not advance very far.

Furthermore science can only deal with determined sequences of cause and effect. Some schools of thought have made the assumption that physical determinism applies in the realm of mind, in order that they may bring that realm within their scientific world-picture. But this is a distortion of that experience on which all science is ultimately based. We have direct experience of freedom of will, and the onus of showing this to be illusory is on those who advance the theory of physical determinism. It should seem then that the operations of the human mind should be excluded, in great measure, from the ambit of science. Here the "scientific outlook" finds its difficulty. Is the scientist to continue in his positivism and maintain that until other entities than those of physics and chemistry are demonstrated, he will abide in the theory that the operations of the human mind are caused by physical and chemical changes determined in the same manner and to the same extent as the other phenomena that those sciences have studied? If so, he is assuming two hypotheses that are very unlikely, the illusory character of freewill, and the production of thought by

a complex machine. But if he does not, he must either abandon a wholly scientific outlook on the world, or greatly enlarge his conception of science. Thus the positivistic scientific method leads to a choice between materialism on the one hand and a belief in a principle of mind, additional to the principles of physics and chemistry.

Both of these are scientific procedures. The materialist assumes as a hypothesis that the whole of his experience is explicable in terms of particles, waves, and forces: the non-materialist, likewise that a further entity must be assumed, for the study of which there is at present no scientific technique.

Now scientists are men and citizens who have to make judgments, choices, decisions, and take action accordingly. In these decisions and actions they are generally concerned with human relationships, private, national, or international. These are not at all easily handled by the scientific method. We hear for instance of the "scientific management" of businesses and other institutions. Is there really a science of management, which is largely a matter of social relationships? "Scientific management" is, I take it, management in which conduct is based on the regularities to be found in accurately ascertained and statistically presented material concerning that business. Such management is obviously the better for basing itself on the most accurate information obtainable and on the rules of interdependence that have hitherto been found to apply to the matters of its concern. But if the analogy with natural science is pushed too far and the human units are treated as if they were *determined* by these rules the method will fail. The usefulness of the scientific method in such matters is, therefore, limited in practice by the proportion of the subject matter that can be handled by science to the portion that cannot. So we may say, generally, that the statistical methods of the sociologist have their value but that the human will is influenced by so many factors that the establishment of laws of human behaviour is at best a doubtful and approximate task. Moreover experimental verification of sociological conclusions is very difficult or in most cases impossible, for conditions cannot be varied at will for purposes of experiment. Thus the scientist finds pure science failing him when he studies the problems of human relationships and he has to fall back on his "scientific outlook" as a guide. Too often, the outlook of the scientist on human problems differs from that of the common man merely by ignoring spiritual and ethical values which are, in fact, of prime importance in determining human conduct. The ignoring or even opposing of these factors in human conduct does in fact characterize the outlook of the materialistic scientist.

The materialistic scientist who bases his judgments and choices upon a materialistic world-view will be led thereby to certain

ethical and political attitudes which may differ very widely from those of the non-materialist. Before we examine this variety of world-outlook we may ask ourselves whether it is in any sense the scientific outlook. I do not think that materialism, as a pronouncement about the world, is any part of science, for it is obvious that science cannot pronounce concerning that part of experience which it has not studied. It arises, no doubt, from the positivistic scientific method, from the proceeding always from the known to the unknown, yet it departs from that method by dogmatizing about matters concerning which it has no scientific data; and it is in fact impossible to make good the claim that materialism is a logical consequence of scientific observation and reasoning.

But, we may ask, is materialism, if not *de jure*, at least *de facto*, a part of the scientific outlook? Are the majority of scientists materialists? To this question it is hard to give an answer; no doubt a questionnaire addressed to men of science would be much better evidence than my guesses. I should, however, be inclined to say that the majority of scientists, while not being convinced or dogmatic materialists, adopt materialism, at least as a working hypothesis. They would, I think, regard it as improbable that there is anything that could be called a soul or spirit, and would regard our experience of such as a mere abstraction, an *ens rationis*, a thing of the mind, incapable of existence apart from a material body. Very few of them, I venture to think, could give good reason for their opinion. To people occupied with things of the mind it seems as if all matter were an aspect of mind; to those continually occupied with matter, as are scientists, it seems that everything is an aspect of matter. I think then that, *de facto*, materialism is to-day a part of the scientific outlook. It is often said that, at the present time, science is becoming less materialistic—that the hard, massy particles of Lucretius, Newton, and the Victorians, have become something more like the centres of force postulated by Boscovitch. It is true. Matter as solid inert lumps has been replaced by matter as intense activity and a storehouse of stupendous quantities of energy. Matter is no longer the element of Earth but the element of Fire. We may feel that this newly discovered activity is akin to the activity of mind, but this feeling is, I think, an error. Matter may perhaps seem less unlike mind to-day than it seemed fifty years ago; but a field of force, a portion of curved space or whatever we now regard as the essence of matter seems to me as incapable of producing thought as was the massive impenetrable lump of the early atomists. I do not think that the development of physics is at all likely to relieve our difficulties—to establish or demolish materialism—except in so far as it has destroyed the illusion that we know what matter is.

If then materialism is characteristic of the outlook of scientists to-day, to what results is it leading, and likely to lead? The scientist is becoming an important person: he does not remain in the laboratory and classroom, but is beginning to be found in councils of state, guiding the nations.

The scientist can try to aid our governments in two ways, by telling them how to do what they want to do, and by telling them what they want to do. The first is the legitimate function of applied science, to enable man to put his desires into action; but in doing this the scientist finds that he has provided things, some of which he, as man himself, feels to be good, others of which he feels to be bad. Here are two words, *good* and *bad*, to which the materialist may find it hard to apply a meaning. What does the scientific materialist consider to be good? He obviously can admit no absolute values; yet if he admits of any choice of conduct or any decisions he must choose those which conduce to some end. It is not at all clear what end the scientific materialist will choose; but, roughly speaking, it is likely to be that which he, a materialist, wishes for himself. There is at the present time a very influential body of materialistic persons—scientists, technicians, and others—who feel that science or some rational process based on observations should be able to guide them in a choice of a system of conduct to be adopted not only by themselves, but by everyone else. Any system of conduct that is not mere convention is designed to bring about some end and we are led to ask what end the materialistic scientist can wish to bring about. It should be clear that science, being a mere classification and ordering of abstractions from sense-impressions, cannot possibly say that anything *should* or *ought* to be done: in selecting a desirable end the materialist must be reduced to the guidance of his personal preferences. There is, of course, no reason why he should desire anything "good" for humanity, yet in general he does so; partly on account of an early training based on the Christian ethic, but chiefly, I think, because the scientific heroes and revolutionaries of the past, whom he takes as his models, have done so. If, then, he desires that humanity should enjoy good things, he can only wish for man what he himself regards as good; he wishes that men should be as he wishes to be. He therefore desires for them health, education, a scientific outlook such as his own, increased physical comfort and security, but he is quite unable to name any higher good that could be sought by those already in possession of these not very lofty or satisfying goods, which moreover are means and not ends at all. The difficulty does not in fact strike him just because he *is* a scientist and, as such, concentrates on the immediate problem. "Plenty of people lack these goods: very well," he says, "let us go ahead and find means to provide them." How will he provide them?

First, he must carry out research into the *best* methods of production —but here's that word best again. What are the best methods? For the materialistic scientist they are the methods of highest efficiency, those that produce the greatest quantity of goods of a certain type with the least expenditure of power and labour. The human factor does not enter into this criterion. If work along the conveyor-belt gives the "best" results, then men and women should be organized and persuaded to work in this fashion. The cottage industry of low efficiency carried out in the warmth of the family association is abhorrent to him. His ideal is really the machine: thus the remedy for human ills seems to him to be organization—the forming of the unit of humanity into a machine, *i.e.* a system functioning according to the laws of its designers and uninfluenced by the wills of its unitary parts save in so far as they are prepared to will the community's will and think the community's thoughts. Such, I think, in outline, is the plan of the materialistic scientist for humanity. He is not really interested in the individuals, but in the structure they form. It scarcely occurs to him that man, once provided for, will feel a fearful void of the spirit, worse than any physical hunger, a hunger which nothing that science can provide is likely to satisfy.

The world-outlook of the materialistic scientist scarcely takes any account of ethics. What *ought* people to do? The scientist cannot get an "ought" from science, but he can find one in his own mind—the ancient one "they ought to do what I want them to do"—in other words, fall in with my plan to make an efficient human machine. Accordingly we hear a good deal from such men about the duty of co-operation with the state or community—all very familiar in the Europe of recent years.

But the more philosophic and reflective scientists see through this and require some *rational* foundation for an ethical system. Attempts to invent a system of scientific ethics have been made by evolutionists from Herbert Spencer to Mr. Julian Huxley. Man is to aid the evolution of himself and his institutions by guiding them in a direction indicated by that which they have hitherto taken. Man has progressed and should continue so to progress. The difficulty of this view lies in the discovery of any ethical principles underlying this progress. In 1900 we seemed to be progressing toward universal brotherhood, equality of opportunity and regard for truth—all a long way off, but much nearer than a century before. To-day after a quarter of a century unequalled for bloody cruelty, oppression, and falsehood, we are forced to doubt the existence of any necessary law of ethical progress. Further, we are beginning to realize that there is no reason whatever why the materialistic scientist should desire the good of humanity, and I suspect that the next quarter-

century will show the scientists of the less sentimental races to be outgrowing this illusory benevolence.

But I also hope that the next quarter-century will see a different development. I hope that the scientists will see that it is not unscientific to refrain from attempting to apply the scientific method to phenomena which are clearly not susceptible of scientific treatment, namely the higher levels of human mental activity, the regions of those far-reaching integrations that are found in our aesthetic and ethical judgments. I hope that they will realize—possibly through that metaphysical reasoning to which scientists are so averse or even, perhaps, through experiments (such as those of J. B. Rhine) which will perhaps be further developed—that there are operations of mind that are so completely severed from those of matter as studied by science as to require an absolutely new technique for their study and new principles for their explanation. Then I think we may find scientists pursuing the truth about the external material world by the methods that have proved so successful, and applying it to purposes decided upon by the methods that have likewise proved successful, namely those of religion. When I commend this solution to audiences of scientists I am met by two objections. Someone commonly says that the ideas of religion—e.g. the idea of God—are just syntheses of the various irrational values that may have been established in my brain as a consequence of my glandular make-up, early complexes of associations and so forth. Others ask me which of the many religions is going to determine our ethics. Everyone can, of course, make his own personal reply to such objections, but I would say "Let the same attention be given to religion as is being given to science, the same effort to arrive at religious truth by any religious method, as is given to arriving at scientific truth by the scientific method, and these questions will solve themselves."

The Christian ethic remains in the opinion of most people, including the majority who never enter a church, the perfect way of life, and nowhere is the description "a true Christian" anything but the highest praise. But this way of life, this ideal, has become separated from the common outlook, which is to-day a debased form of the scientific. Those who ask the question "Why should I adopt this way of life? What guarantees its validity?" find an answer which does not link up at all with their way of thinking. The language and symbology of religion seems dead to them—"It was all so long ago, we know so much more than they did." The language and concepts of theology are still largely scholastic and thereby very foreign to modern thinking: the consequence is that Christianity is no longer regarded as rational, but as emotional—something you practice because you enjoy it and don't practice if you don't . . .

To my mind, the only hope for the world is the incorporation of the religious, philosophical, and scientific outlooks in a single comprehensive view, and I would say emphatically that this incorporation has not been accomplished and that its accomplishment is the most immediate and urgent of tasks for those who wish men well.

Let me recall what happened in the thirteenth century. A new source of knowledge and a new mode of thinking was imported into the Western world by the translation of the texts of the Greek writers of antiquity, notably Aristotle. This enormously enriched science and philosophy: the Church after some hesitation embraced this new learning. The philosophy of Aristotle, when applied to the Christian revelation, suggested a great number of new questions about religion and modes of answering them: the result was the great system of Catholic theology that we have to-day. Now we are confronted with a much more difficult but not an impossible task. If the scientist will enlarge his world beyond that of the materialist, and adapt his methods of thinking constructively, not destructively, to the ethical and religious field, he will find new questions to ask and new answers, and the consequence will be, not the abolition of ethics as is threatened by materialism, but the restatement of perennial truths in terms which will be clearly understood and warmly accepted by the modern world.

THE MARXIST OUTLOOK[1]

PROFESSOR H. B. ACTON.

BY a "world-outlook" I mean a systematic account of the nature of the world which claims, by showing the place of man in the scheme of things, to indicate the point and purpose of his life. The theory of the world is often called a metaphysical theory and the theory of conduct an ethical or moral theory. In my opinion the clarification and criticism of world-outlooks is a fundamental part of philosophy. Indeed, I hardly think that philosophy would have existed as something distinct from science or poetry but for the tendency to attempt some explanation of the world as the scene of human endeavour. When Kant referred to "the inevitable problems of pure reason" about "God, freedom, and immortality," he was referring in a summary way to the fundamental philosophical task of analysing and criticizing world-outlooks, a task that may be undertaken even by those philosophers who do not believe that any world-outlook is or could be adequate. It is clear, of course, that the civilized religions, since they seek to show how human conduct fits in with some Divine Plan or Cosmic Conflict, have world-outlooks. It is, however, misleading to look upon religions and world-outlooks as the same thing, as some people do. For in ordinary usage religion involves belief in supernatural beings and conduct regulated in the light of this belief, but according to some world-outlooks (e.g. that of Spinoza) there are no supernatural beings, while according to others (e.g. Epicureanism) beings may exist deserving that description but human conduct need take no account of them.

Marxism is such a non-religious world-outlook. Its theory of the world is known as Dialectical Materialism and its theory of human purpose as Scientific Socialism. It is the official world-outlook of the Soviet Union where it is taught in schools and universities and arouses in the students, we may suppose, at least as much interest as the Scriptures and Catechism do in England. Although some of the most important works in the Marxist literature were written in this country, not many academic philosophers here have taken much account of them. During the last twenty years, for instance, translations of philosophical works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin have been published here, but few, if any, of them have been reviewed in the philosophical periodicals. Nor, so far as I am aware,

[1] Series: *Contemporary World-Outlooks* (II).

have the philosophical journals discussed works by English Marxists such as Mr. T. A. Jackson's *Dialectics* or Professor Haldane's *Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences.* Very few contemporary Russian works of Marxist philosophy have been translated into English, and the surveys of Russian philosophy which appeared in *Philosophy* from time to time in the years before the war, were necessarily too brief to convey a clear idea of Russian developments in Marxist thought. Thus, apart from Dr. Popper's excellent discussion of the sociological and ethical assumptions of Marxism in his *Open Society and its Enemies* and one or two articles by Mr. E. F. Carritt and Professor Macmurray and some brief references in Mr. Berlin's *Karl Marx,* the philosophical content of Marxism has been almost entirely neglected in this country.[1] On the other hand, economists and political theorists have written a good deal about the economic teachings of Marxism so that there is little point in providing yet another summary of these. In what follows I shall therefore particularly stress the doctrine of Dialectical Materialism which provides the setting for Scientific Socialism and shall examine the latter in the light of its moral theory. In the space at my disposal I shall only be able to indicate what I take to be salient, and much that is important will necessarily be omitted.

Dialectical Materialism

It is well known that Marxists claim to be materialists and in what follows I shall first attempt to show what they mean by so describing themselves. It should be noticed at the outset, however, that the word materialism is frequently used in a moral sense to stigmatize those persons who selfishly aim at material goods and luxuries. I need hardly say that it is not in this sense that Marxists regard themselves as materialists although, as we shall see later, they do apply their materialist theory to the moral sphere.

The first thing that Marxists mean when they call themselves materialists is that they believe the material world exists independently of anyone's perception of it. That is, they hold the view of perception which philosophers to-day call Realism. This, however, does not distinguish them from most of the world's inhabitants, since it is only in philosophical circles that realism is ever doubted. The possibility of doubting the independent existence of the material world arises when we reflect on illusions of sense such as perspectival distortions, mirror images and the effects of disease or drugs, and

[1] Since writing this I have seen Mr. G. A. Paul's *Lenin's Theory of Perception. Analysis.* Vol. V. No. 5. August, 1938; and there has appeared in *Polemic* (No. 6, November-December, 1946), Professor Sidney Hook's critical article entitled "The Laws of Dialectic."

conclude that they show that we do not immediately perceive physical objects themselves but rather their effects on us, since a perceived spheroid cannot be identical with a material sphere, nor a face perceived behind the mirror be identical with the one in front of it, nor a dog perceived as yellow be identical with a living dog known to be white. Some philosophers have thence been led to argue that since our immediate knowledge is of something in ourselves rather than of material objects outside us, any knowledge we may have of things outside us, must be based on our immediate knowledge of what is within us. When, however, the attempt is made to show how, from knowledge of our own experiences we can reach to knowledge of material things, these philosophers have found difficulties. In the first place they say that while we can be quite sure we are seeing a particular coloured shape or hearing a particular sound, we cannot be quite so sure that the material cause exists outside us since we sometimes suffer from hallucinations. Might not the whole of our perceptions, indeed, be a monstrous hallucination? How can we prove that they are not? In the second place, puzzles arise as to the nature of the material things that cause our perceptions. Before we begin thinking about what happens in perception we believe that colours, shapes, and sounds exist in the material world just as we perceive them. But philosophical arguments are brought forward to show that whatever physical colours or sounds may be, and whatever may be the boundaries of physical things, they must be very unlike the sensations of them we have within us. Philosophical enquiry leads us to modify very considerably the commonsense notion of the matter that we have regarded as existing independently of us. In the third place there are those who argue that the task of coming to a knowledge of something beyond our perceptions and causing them is bound to be hopeless since the very notion of something inexperienced which causes our perceptions is absurd. According to these philosophers, material objects must be features of our experiences, not things-in-themselves that cause them. On this view, to say that a cherry exists is to say that such and such sensations are being or may be had. It is, in J. S. Mill's words "a permanent possibility of sensation." This view is known as Phenomenalism.

The most sustained discussion of these matters from a Marxist standpoint that I know of is in Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*[1] which he completed in London in 1908 and published in Moscow in 1909. By "Empirio-Criticism" Lenin means the phenomenalist theories of perception and knowledge developed by Ernst

[1] Translated into English by D. Kvitko as Vol. XIII of the *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, London, 1927.

Mach[1] and Richard Avenarius and kindred thinkers. Some of Lenin's fellow members of the Social Democratic Party had been attracted by these views which they thought consistent with the Marxist philosophy. Lenin thought they were not and wrote his book to demonstrate this.

What positive arguments then does he put forward in favour of a realist theory of perception? His most important argument, I think, is that no amount of philosophical argument can weigh against the philosopher's own practice when he eats his meals and talks to his friends. The phenomenalist or idealist conducts himself in much the same way as the naïve realist does and therefore, according to Lenin, his deeds belie what his arguments claim to show. On page 17, Lenin says that Diderot came close to the view of contemporary materialism "that arguments and syllogisms alone would not suffice to refute materialism, and that it is not a question of theoretical argument," and on page 113, after quoting with approval Plekhanov's remark that belief in the existence of the external world is an inevitable *salto vitale* (vital leap) in philosophy, he writes: "From the standpoint of life, practice ought to be the first and fundamental criterion of the theory of knowledge. It inevitably leads to materialism, brushing aside the infinite inventions of professorial scholasticism." It may be remembered that Descartes, in endeavouring to prove the existence of the material world from his own existence and experiences laid some weight upon the "teachings of nature," and that since his day various philosophers have regarded the independent existence of a material world and of other selves as unassailable Principles of Common Sense. Lenin, I am sure, would not have quarrelled with this language, but I think he would have insisted that it is not merely a question of listening to nature's promptings but also of acting on them. We have an irresistible tendency to believe in the existence of a material world but it is because we have come successfully to act on it that we are justified in taking it as the basis of our theorising. Thus, in perception we leap in thought from our sensations to a material world that causes them and when we come to act we constantly find material things and people who respond. We therefore divide our theory from our practice if we adopt an idealist or phenomenalist theory of perception, and this is either foolish or dishonest.

The phenomenalist, of course, will reply that Lenin, in appealing from theory to practice, assumes without argument that practice can only be understood in realist terms. In fact, however, the phenomenalist would continue, we mean by practice the having of certain organic sensations (say, feelings of effort), in association

[1] His best known work on perception is translated into English as *The Analysis of Sensations*, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1914.

with certain non-organic sensations (say, the set of tactual and visual sensations we call a paint brush), followed by changes in certain other non-organic sensations (say, changes in the colour of the bookcase from brown to cream). It is an elaborate business to describe practice in such terms but, the phenomenalist will say, there is in principle no difficulty in accounting for practice within a phenomenalist theory. There is no divorce between his theory and his practice. What he is doing is giving a different account of what material things are and what practice is from that given by the realist. He is involved with material things as much as the realist is, but while the realist regards them as things-in-themselves that cause our sensations the phenomenalist regards them as groups of sensations and gives a different account of what changing them is. And the phenomenalist claims that his account is a better one than the realist's, since the realist brings in things-in-themselves which are never directly experienced at all, while the phenomenalist confines himself to entities which are directly experienced and which therefore cannot be subject to any doubt at all, viz. sensations.

Lenin does not, in any writings of his that I have seen, directly answer this phenomenalist account of what practice is. He does, however, bring against phenomenalism some arguments which, in my opinion, show some of its weaknesses. On pages 24–25 of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, in discussing Mach's account of phenomenalism, he points out that Mach, in giving his account of material objects in terms of sensations, is forced to refer to the brain and organism of the percipient. But to deny that a material world exists beyond the sensations and experience and yet to admit that the sensations are in part determined by the conditions of an organism is, Lenin holds, quite inconsistent. He admits, however, that the phenomenalist will say that the brain itself is a complex of sensations, and if not a complex of actual sensations, then of possible ones which, as Mach says, would appear to someone observing my brain "with all the necessary physical and chemical appliances." At this point Lenin abandons pursuit of the argument. The principle behind it, however, seems to me to be a sound one, viz. that if we try to specify the conditions on which the sensations that are supposed to make up physical objects exist, we are inevitably drawn into admitting the existence of physical objects not themselves sensations, and thus into admitting that sensations depend on material things. Stout puts the point forcibly in his article entitled *Phenomenalism*[1] when he says that the conditions of actual or possible sensations "always involve physical factors which have not themselves been analysed into sensations actual or possible."

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. New Series. Vol. XXXIX. 1938–39, p. 16.

Lenin also argues against phenomenalism that it is inconsistent with the scientifically established view that the physical world existed before there were conscious beings to have sensations of it. If the material world consists of sensations and sensations depend on living organisms then the material world could not have existed before there were living organisms, and the scientific account of the development of the world is a dream. (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, pp. 52–62). Avenarius[1] had tried to avoid this difficulty by introducing the notion of an imaginary spectator, but Lenin, quite rightly, it seems to me, will not accept this way out. If from the beginning of things there has been a God who constantly observes everything, the difficulty, of course, disappears. But Mach and Avenarius are required by their own phenomenalist theories to regard the notion of God as just as non-empirical and therefore inadmissible as that of material substance.

It seems to me, therefore, that Lenin was right in rejecting phenomenalism. What form of realism, however, does he in consequence accept? I am afraid that we cannot find in his or in the writings of Marx and Engels anything approaching a satisfactory realist account of perception. Engels writes (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 40–41): "The influences of the external world upon man express themselves in his brain, are reflected therein as feelings, thoughts, instincts, volitions . . ." According to Lenin our perceptions are "images of the outer world," and he writes of "a reality which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations . . ." (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 78, p. 102). He also (op. cit. p. 197) rejects a suggestion of Helmholtz that sensations are not copies but symbols (Helmholtz really means *natural signs*) of material things. "If sensations are not images of things but only signs or symbols, which have 'no resemblance' to them, then the materialist starting point of Helmholtz is completely undermined; the existence of external objects becomes doubtful, for signs or symbols quite possibly indicate imaginary objects, and everybody is familiar with instances of such signs or symbols." There is no time for us to examine these statements in detail and so I can only remark dogmatically (a) that the Marxists clearly allow themselves to slide from the contention (which I agree with Dr. Samuel Johnson is justified) that practice shows all accounts of perception opposed to realism to be fantasies rather than genuine theories, to the very different contention that the theory of perception is virtually completed when we have shown that perception involves a "vital leap" and (b) that realism is consistent with many other views of the relation of sensations to physical objects than that they copy

[1] Lenin discusses with approval (pp. 48–50, p. 67) Professor Kemp Smith's article, "Avenarius's Philosophy of Pure Experience," *Mind*, Vol. XV. 1906.

them. What is involved in the notion of materiality and how sensations are related to material things are questions to which Marxists, as far as I am aware, have given little attention. No doubt they regard them as practically unimportant.

The second thing that Marxists mean when they call themselves materialists is that the existence of matter preceded that of mind and that mind arose out of matter. Engels describes this in his *Ludwig Feuerbach* as the theory of "nature as primary." In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (p. 26), Lenin puts the view in the following way: "Materialism in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as the *prius*, regarding consciousness, reason, and sensation as derivative, because in a well expressed form it is connected only with the higher forms of matter (organic matter)." Those who hold that mind is prior to matter assume according to Engels, "world creation in some form or other," and therefore those who maintain the primacy of matter deny the existence of a Creator. Thus Marxist materialism is atheistic.

Marxists philosophers, however, do not embark on detailed criticism of theistic arguments. Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach*, gives a brief account[1] of the development of the notion of "the one exclusive god of the monotheistic religions" from the dream apparitions of primitive man, much as Tylor and Spencer had done. In this way atheism is established by showing how the notion of God can be explained in natural terms as a projection of human desires and illusions. If we object that even if the notion has arisen in that way it does not follow that there is no divine reality corresponding to it, the Marxist will stress the phrase of Lenin's quoted above that materialism is "in full agreement with natural science." Marxists, I think, are positivists to the extent that they consider the only reliable knowledge of the world is that obtained by the methods of the sciences, although, as I have shown, they reject the phenomenalism that generally goes with this view. In the *German Ideology*, for instance, Marx and Engels write:[2] "When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of activity loses its medium of existence."[3] Here, it is true, Marx and Engels are particularly concerned with human society. But in his *Anti-Dühring* (*Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, translated by Edward Aveling, pp. 39–40),

[1] Pp. 30–31.

[2] P. 15 of the English translation which forms volume XVII of the Marxist-Leninist Library, published by Lawrence and Wishart.

[3] In a letter to Engels dated July 7, 1866, Marx refers to Comte's "positivist rot," and writing to Professor Beesly on June 21, 1871, he says "I as a Party man have a thoroughly hostile attitude towards Comte's philosophy while as a scientific man I have a very poor opinion of it." But I think his objections to Comte were (a) to the political proposals, (b) to the religion of humanity, and (c) to the theory of gradual, i.e. non-dialectical, development.

Engels writes: "That which still survives of all earlier philosophy is the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is subsumed in the positive science of Nature and history." There is no God because the sciences do not reveal one.

I can hardly undertake, in the course of a summary account of Marxism, to examine this view that there can be no reliable knowledge of the world except what can be erected on the basis of our ordinary perceptions and introspections by the methods of the sciences. I will therefore confine my remarks to the following two comments.

1. Contemporary religious apologists, it seems to me, are perhaps unnecessarily chary of meeting positivists and materialists on their own ground, since there is nothing absurd about having recourse to scientific methods in the attempt to support some of the components of religious belief. The existence of supernatural beings, for instance, is something which properly attested miracles might render probable. Religious apologists to-day, however, tend to regard the appeal to miracles as "materialistic" in some derogatory sense. To believe in the existence of some supernatural being on the evidence of a sufficiently impressive physical demonstration, seems to me, however, to be only reasonable. What would be open to criticism would be to assume that the moral pronouncements of such a being had authority in proportion to its power. This would be to bow down to strength and worship it. Miracles, however, would in my opinion, provide a basis for that belief in supernatural beings without which religion does not thrive, and defenders of a religious world-outlook would justifiably stress their importance and rightly rejoice if they could obtain evidence that miracles had occurred. In his *Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences*, p. 147, Professor Haldane writes: "I do not see why a dialectical materialist should reject *a priori* the possibility of such alleged phenomena as telepathy and clairvoyance." To this I would add that I do not see why a dialectical materialist should reject *a priori* the possibility of survival of the "soul" after bodily death. It would have to be decided, of course, what sort of evidence there would have to be to render such a belief probable,[1] but a good deal of thought and research has, I believe, already been devoted to this intricate question. According to the Marxist, of course, if a "soul" were thus discovered it would be material. For, according to Lenin,[2] "The sole property of matter—

[1] In the *Dialectics of Nature* (Lawrence and Wishart, 1941, pp. 297–310), Engels, in criticizing the credulity of Russell Wallace and Crookes, correctly points out that empiricism can be carried too far, and that the genuineness of new mediums may be reasonably suspect, if most mediums of the past have been shown to be fraudulent.

[2] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 220.

with the recognition of which materialism is vitally connected—is the property of being *objective reality*, of existing outside of our cognition."

2. The Marxists do not merely proclaim the sovereignty of scientific method, they also argue that our justified confidence in it is due to its being a unification of theory and practice. "Before there was argumentation there was action,[1]" writes Engels. He considered that the refutation of Hume's scepticism and Kant's agnosticism is "practice, viz. experiment and industry.[2]" In this last passage he also says that our theories about things are proved correct when we can make the things and put them to our purposes. The argument, I think, is that theories are things that might be framed while we sit in an armchair and think, and if we don't get more active than this the theories are not likely to have much relation to the facts. In order to verify theories we must do more than just sit and think, we must make observations and experiments. This is practice in a sense in which sitting and thinking is not. Finally, we really understand the things about which we are framing theories when we can make and use them. This last is practice in yet another sense. It seems to me important to distinguish these various stages or meanings of practice, since a theory can be verified without the last stage of practice[3]—the making and using—arising at all. For in the first place, the structure of something can be understood without there being any need or desire to make it. And in the second place something might be understood that could not be made by human beings at all, as, for example, a sun. I make these remarks because Marxists, as it seems to me, tend to lay inordinate stress on the relation of science to industry.

The third main element in Marxist materialism (the first two are epistemological realism and the view that matter existed before mind in the absence of a Creator) is its claim to be dialectical. To explain in full what this means would involve an excursion into the history of philosophy for which there is no space here and so I confine my account to the barest minimum.

Dialectical materialism is contrasted by Marxists with the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. According to Engels,[4] eighteenth century science still worked largely with notions built up in the science of mechanics and failed to take account of

[1] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, pp. xv–xvii.

[2] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, English translation, 1935, p. 32.

[3] None of the meanings or stages of practice mentioned in this paragraph is identical with practice as the "vital leap" or "animal faith" which leads to epistemological realism. I think, however, that Engels regarded these as continuous with it. See *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 32–33.

[4] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 36–37.

what is peculiar to the chemical and biological sciences but rather tried to "reduce" these to mechanics. If I understand the position correctly, dialectical materialism does not merely admit but emphasizes that in the passage of time novel types of entity have come into being based upon those that already existed, but with features not reducible to those of their generators. This view is closely akin to the theory of Emergent Evolution advocated by Lloyd Morgan (a writer known to and quoted by Lenin) and Samuel Alexander.[1] That this is the Marxist view is, I think, shown by some curious remarks about matter and consciousness made by Lenin on pages 205–07 of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* Lenin was quite sure that without brains there would be no thinking and even accepted the expression that thinking was a "function of the brain." But he objected to a statement by Dietzgen that "the intangible idea is also material and real" with the remark: "But to call thought material is to make an erroneous step, is to confuse materialism and idealism" (p. 205). It seems likely that by this and a similar statement on p. 207, Lenin means that consciousness, while based on the existence of brains, is not reducible to a series of physical and chemical changes, but has some unique characteristics not to be found elsewhere. If I am right, Lenin is criticizing the theory named by Professor Broad Reductive Materialism in favour of the theory he calls Emergent Materialism, according to which, "mentality is an emergent characteristic."[2]

From what has already been said it will be seen that dialectical materialism is an evolutionary theory according to which from time to time in the processes of change, a gradual accumulation of differences is suddenly succeeded by the emergence of something quite new, I have illustrated this by reference to the emergence of life and consciousness, a topic which naturally interests everyone. The Marxists held, however, that sudden transformations of gradually accumulated changes into a new character may be observed in detail in the various parts of nature. According to Mr. Shirokov's *Textbook of Marxist Philosophy*,[3] (p. 267): "Quantitive changes at a determined stage lead inevitably to changes of quality. Solid iron may be heated in greater or less degree and still remain a piece of iron. However, when the heat reaches a certain point it causes the iron to melt and enter into a qualitatively different state. Capitalist

[1] Referred to by Professor Haldane (*The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences*, p. 150), as "the only academic philosopher in England whose system has any serious affinity with Marxism".

[2] *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 610.

[3] Translated by A. A. Moseley, revised and edited by John Lewis, Gollancz. The last three parts of this book were prepared under the auspices of the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy.

enterprises though they may be on a big or little scale yet have their higher and lower limits of magnitude. Complete capitalist planning as between all industries is too big a task for capitalism. From the other aspect a capitalist undertaking can by no means be as small as it likes." Scientists who profess the Marxist philosophy have collected many examples of this process of the transformation of quantity into quality, as they call it, but I do not think that they would have thought it worth while to do this unless they were seeking for some cosmic justification of their belief that to look forward to a sudden transformation of human society was "scientific." The juxtaposition of solid iron with capitalist planning in the passage quoted above suggests this.

Marxists regard it as a merit of their view of evolution that it does not merely emphasize, as non-Marxists do not, the sudden emergence of novelty, but also explains how it is that development takes place at all. According to Marxists the motive force of all change and development is an internal contradiction in what changes. Lenin in his *Philosophical Notebooks*[1] writes: "In its proper meaning, dialectics is the study of the contradiction *within the very essence of things*." He also refers to "*the mutually exclusive* and opposed tendencies in all the phenomena and processes of nature (including spirit and society)" as "the identity" or "unity" of opposites.[2] The identity or unity of opposites, he holds, is only transitory, "the struggle of the mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as movement and evolution are." Engels[3] gives the simple case of movement of a particle as an illustration. "Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at the same moment of time being both in one place and another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it." Other examples given by Engels and Lenin are: the plus and minus signs in mathematics, positive and negative electricity in physics, the class struggle in the social sciences. All change, then, occurs through contradiction or opposition. Evolutionary change, according to the Marxists, takes place through a process they call "the negation of the negation." Process A is opposed by its contradictory not-A, and, let us suppose, A is *succeeded* by not-A. Not-A, in its turn, however, will be the pole of a further opposition and so will be succeeded by its opposite, A. This second A, however, will not be merely the first A reinstated, for the first A was the opposite of a not-A that had not yet replaced it, while the second

[1] Quoted by Generalissimo Stalin in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, p. 9 (*Little Stalin Library, No.* 4. Lawrence and Wishart, 1943).

[2] Note on *Dialectics* (printed at the end of the English translation of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*), p. 323.

[3] *Anti-Dühring* (*Handbook of Marxism*, ed. Emil Burns, pp. 256–57).

A is the opposite of a not-A which has already replaced the original A. The outline of this conception was clearly put by the late David Guest[1] when he wrote: "that development takes place in a kind of spiral, one change negating a given state of affairs and a succeeding change, which negated the first, re-establishing (in a more developed form, or "on a higher plane" as it is often expressed) some essential feature of the original state of affairs." Engels[2] gives the example of a grain of barley planted in the ground. This is "negated" by the plant that succeeds it. This in its turn, however, is negated (the negation of the negation) by its own decay. "As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten, twenty or thirty fold."[3]

We learn from Engels's *Anti-Dühring* that Dühring criticized Marx's use of the principle of the negation of the negation on the ground that it is used as "the midwife to deliver the future from the womb of the past," and, indeed, objected to the whole Marxist theory of contradiction in the nature of things on the ground that contradiction, negation, etc., are logical terms with no application at all to the material world. As a teacher of philosophy, and so, according to Lenin, a "scientific salesman of theology,"[4] I feel some sympathy with Dühring on this issue. As to the negation of the negation, Engels's answer in effect was that Marx did not use that principle as a premise from which to conclude that socialism must come out of capitalism, but found, from an empirical examination of social trend and structure, that that was the pattern they in fact displayed. And as to the contradictions and oppositions, Engels was quite sure they existed in nature as a whole as well as in human society. He assures his readers, however, that the three principles of dialectic (the union of opposites, the transformation of quantity into quality, the negation of the negation) are only very general laws which find embodiment in very different ways in the different spheres to which they apply.[5] If, then, these principles cannot be used as premises of scientific arguments, and if the particular laws of natural development have to be discovered by the ordinary empirical methods known to non-Marxist scientists,

[1] *A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism* (Lawrence and Wishart, 1939), p. 44.

[2] *Anti-Dühring* (*Handbook of Marxism*, p. 262).

[3] St. Paul held a dialectical, though not perhaps a materialist, philosophy, as may be seen from I *Corinthians*, xv, e.g. "So also is the resurrection of the dead: it is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power: It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body."

[4] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 297.

[5] *Anti-Dühring*, (*Handbook of Marxism*, p. 266).

their positive use in science must be slight.[1] Outside the social sciences, Marxist scientists seem to proceed much as non-Marxists, except that the former, unlike the latter, find it a cause for satisfaction when they can show that the results of scientific research can be fitted into the dialectical scheme. Since, however, the dialectical terms such as "contradiction," "opposition," and "negation" are used in an extremely vague and elastic manner, there is naturally little difficulty in securing a fit. As I have already suggested, Marxists are primarily interested in social themes and seek for the dialectic in inanimate nature mainly in order to sustain and enhance their faith in the dialectical march of history.

There is a further element in the Marxist dialectical theory which must be mentioned before we pass on to make some comments on the theory of Scientific Socialism. "To the metaphysician," says Engels, "things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay;" for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other."[2] This passage shows that metaphysical thinking, as explained by Engels, is thinking which considers things (a) as though there were no contradictions or oppositions in them and (b) in isolation from one another. I have already remarked on (a), so it remains to comment on (b).

I said earlier that Marxists accept the positivist thesis that the only knowledge we can get of nature is what can be obtained by scientific methods, and I have also suggested that the Marxists' emphasis on contradictions in non-human nature is not a very serious matter since Marxists themselves hardly suggest that scientific research can be advanced only by employing dialectical categories. Indeed, Russian Marxists have sometimes said as much. Mr. Stepanov, for example, speaking of two opposed points of view on dialectics says: "From one of these, dialectics is a method which should be used for knowledge of nature and society, inasmuch as

[1] The editor of the *Correspondence of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846–95: A Selection with Commentary and Notes*, (Lawrence and Wishart, 1934), thinks otherwise: "The enormous growth of technique and of the natural sciences in the Soviet Union, the decay of technique and of the natural sciences in capitalist countries, have revealed the conditions in which a full and consistent application of dialectical materialism to research in the natural sciences is possible and can be carried out on the widest scale." p. 115.

[2] *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, pp. 31–32.

the use of it leads to fruitful results. From the other point of view, all the fundamental relationships of the real world are given in advance in the ready-made conditions laid down in the dialectical philosophy of Hegel. The study of actually existing things can at the very most afford only additional verification of what are essentially *a priori* assertions."[1] Most of Mr. Stepanov's colleagues, however, dissented, we are told, from his views, which they stigmatized as positivist and mechanistic. They, for their part, appear to hold that it is not dialectically materialist for scientists to stick to their own methods and researches and leave others to talk about dialectics. Such a course would be dangerously departmental and abstract. As Mr. Mitin, who was one of Mr. Stepanov's critics, puts it: "Dialectical materialism is against one-sidedness in science, it insists on the examination of natural phenomena in all their connections and interactions."[2] The thinking of those who fail to observe this precept is described in the same article as "mechanistic-metaphysical." Is this more than to say that scientists should interest themselves in border-line problems and aim at syntheses? When it is Marxist *scientists* who speak, I do not think that they mean more than this. But I think Marxist *philosophers* do mean more than this. The latter, I think, accept the Hegelian view that "the truth is the whole," in the sense that no single proposition or group of propositions is true except in relation to all other propositions and groups of propositions. In the light of this view of theirs, I think they would regard my remark that notions of contradiction and opposition seem to be more properly applicable to the social or human sphere than to the natural sciences, as revealing a hopelessly metaphysical or mechanistic point of view.

Scientific Socialism

According to Lenin, it was Marx and Engels who showed "how to carry materialism into the domain of the social sciences."[3] One thing that this means is that Lenin regarded Marx and Engels as the first to apply scientific methods to the social sciences. Whether he was right in so regarding them we need not discuss, but we must examine a further introductory statement he makes on the application of materialism to the social sphere. "Consciousness in general," he says, "reflects being—this is the general position of *all* materialism. It is impossible not to see its direct and *inseparable*

[1] Quoted in *Basic Trends in Soviet Philosophy*, John Somerville, *The Philosophical Review*, May, 1946. pp. 251–52.

[2] *Twenty-five Years of Philosophy in the U.S.S.R.*, M. Mitin. *Philosophy*, 1944. p. 80.

[3] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 290.

connection with the position of historical materialism, that is, that social consciousness *reflects* social being."[1] Lenin reinforces this with a further argument. "Materialism generally recognizes the objectively real being (matter) as existing independently of mind, sensation, experience, etc. Historical materialism recognizes social being as existing independently of the social consciousness of humanity. Consciousness here and there is only an image of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, ideally exact) image of it."[2] Now it seems to me worth saying at the outset that historical materialism, the theory that the spiritual life of society merely reflects already existing social relationships, by no means *follows* from the theory that matter existed first and mind arose from it later. The latter theory alone prescribes nothing about what mind, once it does exist, can do. It may well be that without bodies there would be no minds. But it requires a distinct argument to show that embodied minds, once produced, can only image their social situation. Lenin's other argument is that society exists independently of individual minds and is therefore a material existent which they "reflect." I have already mentioned that Lenin uses the word "matter" in a very wide sense to stand for *anything* that exists independently of mind—what he calls "objective reality." It can now be seen that this usage of his leads him to think he is saying more than he really is saying when he observes that social being is independent of social consciousness. From this it only follows that social being is material if "material" is used in this unusually wide sense of "objective reality." In this wide sense of the word "material" it would equally follow that minds other than my own are material, a form of statement which, as we have already seen, Lenin refused to commit himself to. It is also the case that a metaphysical idealist, who believed that all matter was basically mental might nevertheless consistently hold that the development of human society depends, not on the minds of men, but on their methods of production. That is to say, just as there is no necessary inconsistency in combining a materialist philosophy of nature with the belief that human minds are the main driving force in social change, so there is no necessary inconsistency in combining an idealist philosophy of nature with the belief that men's methods of production are the prime force in determining the nature of society.

However, while Marxists do use the fallacious argument that materialism in the realm of non-human nature involves social materialism, that is by no means their main argument for historical materialism. Historical materialism is advanced by means of much more direct arguments. The most successful of these, it seems to me, is that sketched out by Marx in his *Theses on Feuerbach*. Prior

[1] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, p. 278. [2] *Ibid.* p. 281.

to his own day, Marx held, materialist thinkers saw how man was subject to natural and social influences upon which his happiness or misery depended, and they put forward plans showing how to ameliorate the conditions of man by changing those influences which caused his misery. Thus Robert Owen showed how faulty social and industrial arrangements caused unhappiness and crime and indicated, both in argument and by example, the sort of changes that would educate men to virtue and happiness. But this, Marx suggests in the third of his *Theses on Feuerbach*, is to ignore two fundamental points. In the first place this sort of procedure really assumes that there are two parts of society, one part consisting of those who might reform society, the other part consisting of the society to be reformed. More than this, the assumption is that there are reformers outside the society who, like gods, can put it right. But reformers are necessarily in society, and so, in the second place, it is necessary to ask how it can happen that anyone should want and try to reform his society. The pre-Marxist materialist reformers forgot that "circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated." This line of argument was pursued further by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* where he argued that the Utopian socialists had omitted to consider why it was that their admirable schemes for social improvement which commended themselves to the "reason" of enlightened eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers, were prepared at that time and, "reasonable" as they were, provoked laughter and opposition from those who might have implemented them. There surely must be some forces in society which both led to an outburst of Utopian theories and also prevented them from being put into practice on any decisive scale.

In my opinion these arguments are sound. Marx and Engels have formulated the very important social truths (a) that all members of a society are subject to its social forces, (b) that not all social changes that appear desirable are, in that society, practicable, and (c) that only those social changes are practicable which can be linked with a sufficiently powerful existing social agency. These are truths which men of affairs have acted on for centuries, but this does not detract from the scientific importance of formulating them. The contribution of Marx and Engels to our understanding of this aspect of society is most valuable, particularly if we compare it with the roughly contemporary statements of Comte that the evils against which he, like Marx and Engels, protested, could be removed by setting up a "Spiritual Power" that would unite society. However, these truths alone do not constitute historical materialism. For to (a) must be added the vital corollary that the fundamental social force which determines all the rest is the method of production

operating in the society, and further propositions have to be added to the effect that social evolution advances through class struggles and that within our own society the force to which schemes for its beneficent transformation must, if they are to succeed, be linked, is the proletariat. When these truths are understood, says Mr. Stalin, "Socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science."[1]

Clearly, I cannot pretend even to touch on the theme of Scientific Socialism without saying something about the way in which the means and conditions of material production are supposed to determine both the forms of society and the spiritual productions of mankind. The crucial passages from the *Critique of Political Economy* and the *Anti-Dühring* have been so often quoted that it would be idle for me to reproduce them yet again. For a very clear and brief statement I would refer those interested to Marx's letter to P. V. Annenkov of December 28, 1846, and to the *German Ideology*. In the first, Marx says that society is "the product of man's reciprocal activity," and goes on to argue that they cannot behave towards one another as they choose, since they are born into a society with its ways already established. What has determined the ways we find are "the productive forces won by the previous generation." In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels have more to say about the "productive forces." What distinguishes men from animals is that they "*produce* their means of subsistence." In order to produce their means of subsistence they must use their hands and, later, such tools as they can devise. In working with their hands and tools they necessarily come into contact with one another in ways which the work they are doing and the tools they are handling will determine. Their life and their acts are the same thing, and as they work with others, so their life will be. Important among the means of production will be, of course, their language, without which complicated social tasks would be impossible. The discovery of a new way of producing their means of subsistence (e.g. the taming of wild animals) will change their mode of working and so the way in which the individuals fit together will be a different one, and the structure of the society will have altered. They will then have a different mode of life, act differently, talk differently, be different men. "Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process."[2]

[1] *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (*Little Stalin Library, No.* 4), p. 15.

[2] *German Ideology*, p. 14.

When a theory seems obviously true to some intelligent people and obviously false to others, it is probable that the contending parties have a different understanding of the point at issue. Now I think there is some misunderstanding about the point at issue in the materialist conception of history. If a people change their way of getting their living then consequential changes are inevitable, for the very simple reason that they will find themselves in different situations which will call for different conduct. When, for instance, a pastoral people commence agriculture, sooner or later arrangements will have to be made for keeping people from trampling the growing crops and so a control over land will develop different from anything that had obtained before. At the risk of some measure of sophistication we may say that agricultural society requires a different law and morality from those which exist in pastoral society. It is not possible to start agricultural production without at the same time organizing access to the land and its protection from those who might damage it. The hunters and the farmers must arrange their conduct towards one another. Thus, to say that a change in methods of production will cause a change in law and morality is uncommonly like a tautology. It is not so much that the one change brings about the other as that the change is all really one change. It is also part of the same change that farmers will think differently from hunters. They will think more of seeds and harvests and less of spoors and camping grounds. All this, I suggest, is undeniable, and it is this that is rightly asserted by the upholders of the materialist conception of history.

Then what is being denied by those who deny the theory? What opponents of the theory are denying, I think, is the proposition that the only way in which a society's law, morality, and thought is changed is by changes in its means of production. It is possible, they argue, for the law of a society to be made more subtle, for its morality to be made more rational, for its thinking to become more effective, even though no new tools are discovered or no new means devised of using the old ones. They argue further that some thinker (say an Egyptian mathematician) might invent a device (say a means of measurement) which will be used to improve the methods of production (say the remarking of constantly flooded land), and so demonstrate the power of thought over production. Marxists, when faced with this type of argument do not contest it. Rather do they say that to deny it would be undialectical. The means of production form the basis of society but the superstructure of thought and morality are not inert, but in their turn interact with the basis from which they spring. Once we get to disputing which of various social "factors" is "predominant" there will be no end to argument as Plekhanov pointed out in his *Materialist Conception*

of History. Marxists tend to argue, however, that it is the spur of need and the urge to help on our productive resources that lead men to elaborate their labor or develop their science. In this, however, I think they exaggerate. Genuine products of the nineteenth century as they were, Marx and Engels were quite convinced that life is work. So, of course, it was and is for many. But there are few for whom life is nothing but work, and at both ends of the social scale there are people for whom it contains little work at all. On what grounds is it then maintained that it is the working period that necessarily determines the whole nature of the life? The ground that may be offered is that without work (production) life cannot be maintained. But it by no means follows from this that the working period is the sole determinant of man's nature. I think it is this mistaken view that leads to the widely held Marxist theory that science is the child of industry. It is undeniable that craft and industry have been important factors in the development of the natural sciences. But what Veblen calls "idle curiosity," an activity of leisure rather than of industry and pursued for its own sake alone, is equally necessary for the growth of science as we know it.

There is a further element in the view sketched out in the *German Ideology* which, it seems to me, is often lost sight of. This is the pronouncement made in the sentence I have already quoted: "Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life process." In this passage, I think, Marx is stressing not so much the materialism of his view as its concreteness. His point, as I see it, is that the man who thinks is the same man as the man who works, loves, and eats, so that to consider his thoughts apart from his other activities is to consider them in the abstract and not as they really are. Furthermore, according to Marx to consider human nature apart from the real activities of men at a given time and place is also to make a misleading abstraction. Just as there is no thought that is not part of some man's life process, so there is no human nature that is not the nature of given men living in definite ways. This part of the *German Ideology* is advocating an empirical approach to the study of human society untrammelled by preconception about what is and what is not "natural" to mankind. The contention, I suggest, is sound irrespective of Marx's views on the supreme influence of work. Indeed, although I distinguished between work and leisure activities in order to counter what I regarded as Marx's exaggeration, this distinction itself should not be erected into a falsifying abstraction. In our own society, it is true, we make a sharp distinction between working and leisure *time*, but within each period of time there may be activity both of the work and of the leisure type, instrumental activity and activity for its own sake. In some

other societies not even the times are divided.[1] The mistake, I suggest, is, having distinguished them, to regard one as causing or determining the other.

The primary aim of socialists has been to set up a form of society free from the economic injustices of the prevailing social order. Their opponents have generally replied that, while the injustices may be mitigated, they cannot be removed because they are rooted in fundamental elements of human nature. Socialists frequently counter by maintaining that human nature is different from what the defenders of the present order say it is and that men will work for the public good as well as for private gain. Marxist socialists, however, do not take part in this sort of argument at all. In their view capitalist society is by its own operations producing within itself a new society which will ultimately remove the economic injustices by transforming the order that creates them. The moving force arises in the industrial system itself which requires for its working a proletariat who are at present exploited but who will inevitably decide to control the system themselves. It follows therefore that the way to obtain a socialist order is to work with the proletariat to that end. They are the existing social force destined to establish a socialist society.

I should like to make the following comments on the view thus inadequately sketched.

1. It assumes that there are social trends which proceed even though no one deliberately aims at producing them. In this, I think, Marxists are correct, since there is no reason to suppose that the result of many different and conflicting aims will be the achievement of any single one of them. Marxists also think, however, that they know in general what the course of social development will be. Such confidence, I should have thought, is not justified. How can we assess its value? In the same way, I suggest, as we assess the confidence of any putative scientist—by seeing whether his predictions and experiments come off. Marxists, when confronted with this challenge, point to Russia. The existence there of a socialist state (though not yet of a communist order of society) does demonstrate for those who needed it, that an economic order other than the capitalist is possible in our time. But it is a long way from this to a new order of society for mankind. The scientific value of the long term theory would be greater if by means of it Marxists had been better able than non-Marxists to predict a short distance ahead on more confined matters. I doubt, however, whether Marxists have shown themselves much better social prophets than non-Marxists. It may be said, of course, that they are unable to obtain enough information on which to use their general principles in order

[1] Professor L. J. Russell called my attention to this.

to make short-term restricted prophecies. This may be so, but it still remains that their account of the long-term social trend is a guess, though perhaps a happy one. As such, of course, it plays its part in determining the future, as one of the ideas that contribute to history's making.

2. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Marxists are right in believing that they have a scientific understanding of the processes of history and can descry its main future trend. How, then, can this knowledge affect human conduct and morality? According to Marx and Engels, "freedom is knowledge of necessity." Before we know the laws of physical nature we do not control nature but are controlled by it. When we understand natural laws we can foresee some of the future and act on the world in ways which serve our purposes. Similarly, so long as we are ignorant of the laws of social development social events appear to us as arbitrary and unforeseeable, but once we have a scientific knowledge of social forces, once we "grasp their action, their direction, and their effects," we can "subject them more and more to our will."[1] This parallel between the knowledge that gives us control over the physical world and the knowledge that gives us control over society is plausible, but I suggest, misleading. For the "we" who, through knowledge of natural laws control nature and are to that extent free, are mankind as a whole, a set of beings distinct by their possession of reason, from the world they are controlling. But who are the "we" who by their knowledge of social laws, are to control society? Marx himself has taught us not to regard ourselves as outside society. It is therefore important that we should be clear about who does the controlling, and who is controlled when we have a social science to guide our actions. Auguste Comte thought that the social scientists should control the rest. The Marxists clearly wish to say that society will understand and so regulate itself. In fact, however, there will be some people who claim to know the direction society is taking and will like it, and there will be others who won't think society is going that way and in any case won't think it a desirable way. The result as Marxists anticipate, is struggle, and if they have predicted well, the control will be by the proletarian victors until all have come to see the necessity of the process. The difference between Marx and Comte is not so great after all. Both are exponents of government by social scientists[2] and both, I think, tended to think that the way to choose a social ideal is to find

[1] Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, p. 73.

[2] Cp. Lenin, "Those who are really convinced that they have advanced science would demand not freedom for the new views to continue side by side with the old, but for the substitution of the old views by the new ones." *What is to be done?* p. 14.

what the society is moving to and want that. We are asked in effect to bow down before the future conqueror whose advent we may delay but cannot prevent.

3. It is characteristic of Utopian thinking to criticize the present in terms of an ideal future but to give only perfunctory attention to the means of passing from the present bad to the hoped-for better condition. Undoubtedly the Marxists have improved on the Utopians in this respect by showing that reforms can only be carried out by men who know how to make use of the possibilities inherent in their society. It seems to me, however, that the leading Marxist thinkers have given far too little thought to the moral problems involved in movement towards a classless society. Engels[1] says that each class has its own morality and Mr. T. A. Jackson, expanding this point, writes: "In a class-divided society there are and must be *as many positive moralities as there are classes.* That is why class struggles in their full development permit of no compromise: that is why they must be fought out to a finish."[2] In consequence the existence of any morality that transcends classes tends to be questioned or at least its efficacy is denied. And both Engels and Marx stigmatized as "petit-bourgeois" Proudhon's attempt to show how moral principles ought to apply in the economic sphere.

In the first place, when it is said that different classes have different moralities, there are two different things that could be meant. It could be meant (a) that the different classes in question recognize neither the same moral principles nor agree in their application to particular types of situation or (b) that the same moral principles are recognized but there is considerable difference of view as to what action is in accordance with them; (a) it seems to me is obviously false and (b) obviously true. But it by no means follows from (b) that class struggles must "be fought out to a finish," if by this is meant that neither party has any obligation to the other. It is true that conditions of repression may justify war with the oppressors, but the resort to war, on any system of morality, requires justification not only in terms of the extent of the oppression but also in terms of the possibilities of other methods of settlement and a reasonable forecast of the outcome for all the parties. Generally when contending parties claim that they have no moral principles in common what they really mean is that they do not propose to observe moral principles in the struggle they are engaging in. The adoption by any group of this attitude cannot but debase the moral currency. It is in fact the appeal to force rather than to reason, the open invitation to an all-in fight. It assumes that men can associate and yet have no moral relationship to each other. I cannot believe

[1] *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 50. [2] *Dialectics*, p. 363.

that this is seriously maintained, whatever may be done at times of stress and passion.

In the second place, however, Marxists are clearly right in holding that to preach moral generalizations about love and fellowship can have little effect on the moral problems of our time. It is not so important to tell us *that* we should love our neighbours as to tell us *how* we can do so. The conclusion I draw from this, however, is not that there are no moral principles valid for all men, but that intelligent efforts should be made to agree on what content can be given to them in circumstances that differ so extensively from those holding when our moral codes were formulated.

PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS

G. T. KNEEBONE, Ph.D.

"Philosophy is one: and when we treat of Aesthetics, Logic, or Ethics, we treat of philosophy as a whole, although for convenience of exposition we may fix our attention upon a single aspect of this indivisible unity."—CROCE[1]

THIS essay is an attempt to take stock of what has been done by those who have worked on the foundations of mathematics and to suggest, very inadequately in so short a space, what may be a satisfactory approach to this subject for one who is not an expert in it. The subject is one that neither mathematicians nor philosophers can any longer afford to ignore, but in the technicalities of which they may not be very interested.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a few mathematicians turned aside from the actual development of mathematics and began to examine critically what had already been discovered. As time went on, other mathematicians also took up this examination of the foundations of their subject, and to-day there exists quite a considerable literature. It is true that none of the major theories that have been put forward has won general assent; but nevertheless we can distinguish certain fairly definite trends in the general development of ideas.

This field of study, in which we inquire into the nature and validity of mathematics, may conveniently be referred to as "mathematical philosophy" although, as we shall see, its boundaries are by no means well defined. The different schools are most easily distinguished by their answers to the question "What is mathematical knowledge, and how is it obtained?" and this may be regarded as the fundamental question of mathematical philosophy. But as soon as we have formulated it explicitly we see that it does not lie within the province of mathematics at all; it is a philosophical question, and is logically prior to mathematics. To answer it properly we should have to consider first the wider question "What is knowledge?" and then we could base our answer to the narrower question upon the answer already given to this.

The inability of mathematics to determine its own nature should not be looked upon as a defect, for it is common to all isolated branches of knowledge. Philosophy is a unity, and no part of it can be fully understood except in relation to the whole. The mathematician is fairly safe in ignoring philosophy as long as he is content

[1] Croce: *Estetica* (4th edition, p. vii).

merely to develop the formal consequences of definite assumptions, whether these are drawn from experience or arbitrarily postulated, but as soon as he becomes interested in wider problems it is necessary for him to change his point of view and to become a philosopher in the more restricted sense.

The principle of the unity of philosophy has a two-fold application to mathematical philosophy. In the first place, as we have already said, mathematical philosophy itself does not exist as an independent subject. It consists of those portions of philosophy that deal with mathematical knowledge, arbitrarily collected for convenience. It is in fact a compendium of results, classified according to their subject-matter; but each of these results is only completely itself in its proper context in the whole system of philosophy.

The second application of the principle is to mathematics itself. Mathematics is not an independent subject, and it cannot be separated completely from other subjects such as logic and physics. Indeed, any breaking up of thought into subjects is artificial, and no sharp boundaries exist. It is nevertheless often desirable, and even necessary, to think in terms of distinct subjects; and when we do this we should regard mathematics not as a separate subject but as a common constituent which is present in varying degrees in a number of subjects. We may find it helpful to think of the various branches of science as spread out in a kind of spectrum, ranging from the comparatively unmathematical sciences of pure classification at one end to mathematics proper at the other. We do not mean this illustration to be taken literally, and we certainly do not wish to suggest that every subject that is partly mathematical finds a place in a single series; but the image may help us to understand how the traditional subjects are obtained by selecting stretches of the spectrum—the inexact sciences, the sciences of measurement, mathematical physics, applied mathematics, pure mathematics, etc. Such divisions are useful up to a point, but it is a mistake to suppose that the names correspond in any way to absolute distinctions.

What is it that distinguishes this peculiar mode of thought that we call mathematical? Mathematical thought is not a special mode of thought carried on by a separate mental faculty. The mathematician thinks in the same general way as other men, and he is distinguished only by the kind of problem with which, as a mathematician, he is concerned. Thus the distinction is extraneous and empirical; in making it we are reasoning inductively from the nature of the activity of recognised mathematicians. This does not mean, however, that our inquiry is philosophically worthless. We examine the current distinction between mathematical and non-mathematical thought, trying to see what it really amounts to and to what extent

it is reasonable and conformable with our philosophy. In this way we may hope to deepen our insight into both the nature of thought as a whole and also the nature of mathematics. We thus test our philosophical outlook and our conception of mathematics against each other, in order to assist the development of both.

We cannot hope to give an adequate definition of mathematics in a few words; for mathematics has grown up over a long period of time and is still developing. Our conclusions must be taken as suggesting, rather than completely specifying, its character in the light of present knowledge. At best we can give an answer which is appropriate at present; an answer which will remain adequate in the future is quite impossible. Kant thought that the entities of mathematics—numbers, geometrical figures, etc.—owed their reality to the fact that they could be constructed in intuition. We could thus have synthetic knowledge of them *a priori*, and we could also apply this knowledge to phenomena. This was no doubt a very reasonable view of mathematics as Kant knew it, but it is no longer adequate; for we are now familiar with other systems of geometry on an equal logical footing with that of Euclid, and mathematicians work with all kinds of abstract systems that bear no relation at all to experience.

A slightly old-fashioned view of mathematics is that it is a science of pure quantity, and this is still partially true. But it is hardly sufficient as it stands, as "quantity" must be interpreted in so wide a sense that it loses most of its significance. In modern mathematics the importance of the concept of order is comparable with that of quantity in the narrow sense. It is therefore perhaps advisable to say that mathematics is concerned with structure rather than with quantity. A piece of pure mathematics is an exposition of formal relations between abstract entities, and one of the chief tasks of the mathematician is to disentangle the logical connexions between these formal relations. We have here one of the most distinctive characteristics of modern mathematical thought. The theorem of Pythagoras, for example, was formerly thought of as a property of the space of common experience. It was strictly deduced from a few self-evident properties of this space, and was therefore itself certain. But to-day the points of Euclidean space itself are conceived as merely abstract entities, connected by certain postulated formal relations. The "space" is an abstract model; and we may interpret it as an approximation to physical space, as the artificial momentum-space of a single dynamical particle, or as any other system that has the same structure. From this point of view, the mathematical theorem is no longer Pythagoras' theorem itself, but the fact that this is deducible from the Euclidean axioms.

The natural direction of development of mathematics is from the

more concrete to the more abstract. Thus Euclidean geometry began as a collection of properties of actual space, set out in a logical system. Then it was seen that this space could be used as a model for other kinds of system, and ultimately the spatial conception was reduced to just one interpretation among many of an independent formal scheme. This process of abstraction, of picking out the common structure of very diverse systems and focussing attention upon it alone, is what we mean by mathematical thought. The study of formal systems themselves, without reference to any interpretation, is the most mathematical intellectual activity of all, and we may call it pure mathematics. Pure mathematics is thus a kind of extreme case. We shall find it convenient to consider it briefly by itself, bearing in mind all the time that it can only be fully understood and appreciated when it is seen in relation to mathematical thought in the widest sense.

Mathematics, in the above sense of pure mathematics, has a dual nature. It is at the same time both a calculus, or tool with many and varied applications, and also an artistic creation of purely aesthetic value. We cannot afford to neglect either aspect.

We meet the use of mathematics as a calculus, in rudimentary form, in elementary algebra, where the same equation may be used to solve countless particular problems. In higher mathematics, whole theories are capable of receiving many interpretations. In a sense, mathematical knowledge is the poorest of all forms of knowledge; for the degree of abstraction is such that only a few external relations between the entities are left. This same characteristic, however, also accounts for its great richness of application. Since everything but structure is disregarded, the same mathematical theory may be used to represent very diverse concrete systems. These systems may differ in any way, provided only that they have the same structure. A simple instance of this is afforded by the real numbers, which may be applied to every kind of measurable quantity. Less simple instances will occur readily to the mathematician or physicist.

An elegant piece of mathematics can give great aesthetic satisfaction to one who fully appreciates its structure. This satisfaction is really delight in perfection of form and is closely akin to that which is given by some of the music of Bach. Complete abstraction from everything else reveals purity of form.

Historically, much of modern mathematics has been derived by actual abstraction from more concrete systems; for example, the theory of vectors. Other parts have been devised as abstract theories from the beginning, with little or no reference to anything outside mathematics; for example, Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers. In the first case mathematics is more of a calculus than an artistic

creation; in the second it is more of an artistic creation than a calculus. Usually the development of mathematical theories is very complex, being the result of the co-operation and opposition of many mathematicians with different points of view. It is philosophically rather unprofitable to examine in great detail the actual forces and motives that have determined the historical development of mathematics.

These general remarks may be amplified by considering in turn each of the three well-known schools of mathematical philosophy.

Logistic.

It would be difficult to overestimate the historical importance of the movement that began with the investigations of Peano and Frege and culminated in the publication of *Principia Mathematica*. An entirely new field of research was opened up, and all later developments in mathematical philosophy have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by this movement. The intention was to reduce mathematics as far as possible to logical terms, and the thesis of *Principia Mathematica* is that mathematics is simply a branch of logic. An elaborate logical calculus is constructed, and it is proposed to rewrite all mathematics in this symbolic language.

Although this attempt has been fruitful in many ways, and research in the subject is still going on, the actual conclusions of Russell and Whitehead have not been widely accepted. The reason why they are unacceptable is not so much that the system contains occasional formal weaknesses as that the whole programme is too artificial. To take only one example, we cannot help feeling that the definition of the cardinal number three as the class of all triads is most unnatural. It would be more in accordance with common sense to say that three is a common property that characterizes the class of all triads; and we do not wish to go against common sense unless we are forced to. If we can build our mathematical superstructure on a comparatively unsophisticated logical foundation so much the better.

The concept of logic that is presupposed in the *Principia* is too narrow, and this has led to the encroachment of grammar and syntax upon territory which properly belongs to logic and philosophy. The logical structure of actual thought is far too complex to allow of reduction to an algebraic symbolism. For some purposes mathematical logic is a very useful tool, since it enables us to fix our attention upon certain kinds of logical connexion; but it is then only a tool, and we must be careful not to identify it with logic itself. It is in fact a kind of formal algebra; and as such it is a part of mathematics, not something prior to mathematics. The elaboration of the formal calculus is a mathematical undertaking, like the

elaboration of every other formal calculus. Its application to logic, and the determination of its value and its limitations are then tasks for the philosopher. The logical connexions to which mathematical logic applies are necessarily external connexions, since we have abstracted from all content, and they often concern language rather than logic. Thus the kind of logic considered in the *Principia* is far from all-embracing.

Formalism.

The Formalists have maintained that pure mathematics is concerned with the formal manipulation of symbols, and this view is substantially correct. It may be remarked, incidentally, that the idea that Hilbert taught that mathematics is just a game played with meaningless marks on paper is a popular misconception. What he really did was to distinguish carefully between the construction of the formal calculus and an application of this calculus, in which meanings are given to the symbols; and he found it convenient to confine the name "mathematics," or "pure mathematics," to the formal construction.

"Formal axiomatic systems must necessarily be supplemented by intuitive systems, since only these can guide our selection of formal systems, and when the formal systems are given only the intuitive systems can indicate how they are to be applied to actual situations."[1]

The Formalists' conception of mathematics is, however, too static. They propose to reduce the various branches of mathematics, one by one, to strict axiomatic form, every step in the derivation of a theorem then being carried out according to definite formal rules; and when any such branch has been cast into this form, and proved to be free from contradictions, it may be regarded as finished. In reality however, the whole body of mathematics must be conceived as continually evolving. Those parts which have been studied in the greatest detail naturally lend themselves to a higher degree of formalization than those which are more rudimentary, and at any given stage in the development of mathematics each branch should be formalized to the appropriate extent. While it is perhaps in some ways desirable that we should have an ideal of complete formalization before us, such an ideal only serves to point out a direction of advance and is not itself attainable. We must also bear in mind that every part of mathematics is connected with every other part, and that the development of a new theory may suggest a new way of looking at an elementary theory which had previously appeared to be fully understood and incapable of further improvement.

[1] Hilbert & Bernays: *Grundlagen der Mathematik*, I, p. 2.

In order to avoid formal contradictions of the kind that gave so much trouble in *Principia Mathematica*, Hilbert proposed to give an actual proof of the consistency of his system. This proof was to use only "finite" arguments—that is arguments of a special elementary character, whose validity can hardly be doubted. Even without Gödel's formal proof of the impossibility of realizing this programme, it is clear on general grounds that the procedure is not very satisfactory. For how, except by arbitrary decision, are we to decide which methods of inference can be accepted immediately and which need justification?

The whole question of freedom from contradiction in mathematics needs to be reconsidered. It is natural to ask whether formal consistency is sufficient in itself to make a mathematical theory valid, and to what extent it is an essential characteristic of mathematics.

The successive removal of contradictions plays an important part in the development of thought in general, as may be seen very clearly in natural science, where the fundamental concepts are defined afresh every time it becomes apparent that they are inconsistent with one another or with the results of observation. But an essential element in mathematical thought is abstraction, and the more we abstract from specific content the less opportunity there is for contradictions to arise. In a purely formal system the only kind of contradiction that can occur is the external contradiction "A and not-A." But since the system is already entirely formal it involves no concepts that can be redefined, and the contradiction results not in progress but in deadlock. Since finality has already been reached there is no further room for contradictions, and if they occur they are simply an indication that the system is imperfect.

Freedom from contradiction is thus an essential property of the fully-formalized ideal theory. But in practice very few branches of mathematics approximate at all closely to this formal ideal, and freedom from contradiction accordingly loses its absolute character. As long as mathematics still involves non-formal elements, the development and elimination of contradictions are important elements in its evolution.

Intuitionism

The Intuitionists have proposed to assign limits to the legitimate methods of procedure in mathematics, allowing only constructive definitions and inferences. Their idea is not so much to justify the final system by a "finite" proof of its consistency as to develop the system itself by "finite" methods alone. For instance, in order to establish the existence of a mathematical entity that satisfies certain specified conditions it would be necessary to define a process that enables us to construct such an entity—as, say, the process used

for extracting square roots in elementary arithmetic enables us to construct a number whose square is 2.

Such restrictions, however, make the subject very complicated. There are familiar theorems of ordinary mathematics that do not satisfy them, and in such cases a single theorem may have to be replaced by a number of partial equivalents. We now know that it is possible to go surprisingly far in Intuitionist mathematics, but even so the subject can hardly be regarded as an adequate substitute for ordinary mathematics.

Intuitionism should perhaps be looked upon as an attitude or an outlook rather than a system. If "existence" in mathematics is understood in too wide a sense, the subject can easily degenerate into a mere playing with words or symbols; the theory of transfinite numbers, for example, comes dangerously near to this. The introduction of Intuitionism was a reaction against this kind of extravagance. Such a reaction was healthy and desirable, and mathematics must never lose sight of the Intuitionist ideal; but in spite of its value as a reaction, Intuitionism cannot become a positive philosophy of mathematics. As we said with reference to Formalism, the bounds of thought cannot be fixed in advance; and both Formalism and Intuitionism violate this principle.

Conclusion

It will be seen, then, that while we cannot accept the conclusions of any single school, yet equally we cannot dismiss any of them as unimportant. Each school has made valuable contributions to mathematical philosophy, and mathematics can never go back to its state before the publication of the researches of Russell, Hilbert, and Brouwer. But although each theory of the nature of mathematics contains much that is valuable, none enshrines the whole truth; and it is because they all claim a certain finality that they are unacceptable. There is no finality in this kind of inquiry, and although the great mathematical philosophers have stated their conclusions dogmatically (as anyone must who has a theory to expound) they would doubtless all wish to see the inquiry carried beyond the point at which they have left it.

Our own conception of the nature of mathematics—and one which we think many contemporary mathematicians would accept—is that mathematics is concerned with structure and each mathematical theory is a formal scheme which displays a particular kind of structure. Any particular kind of structure is best investigated by means of an axiomatic model, but in choosing our axioms we are always guided by a more intuitive knowledge of the kinds of structure that are interesting, significant, and of widespread occurrence. Mathematical thought, understood in a wide sense, differs from

other varieties of thought only in its subject-matter; like them, it continually evolves, and the criteria by which its validity must be judged are in the last resort general philosophical criteria. Mathematics cannot be separated from philosophy, and it can never be understood properly in isolation.

We have raised a number of problems but not discussed any of them in detail. There are many such problems, each of which needs to be treated at length, and it is impossible to deal with them in a brief essay of this nature.

The judgment that finality is unattainable in philosophy applies, of course, to critical research as well as constructive, and any criticism of mathematics and mathematical philosophy can itself only be tentative. But "whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent."

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF "MINE"

LEON LITWINSKI

Summary: (1) Property a psychic link. W. James on self and mine. (2) Acquisition and conservation in the light of expectation. (3) Expectation in philosophy and psychology. (4) Baldwin and property. (5) Bentham. (6) Why acquisitions are conserved. (7) Property as the basis of expectation and as witness of foresight. (8) Possessive pronouns. (9) Animals and children. (10) Property viewed objectively by Petrucci and subjectively by Bentham.

(1) Throughout the following article I propose to consider the phenomena of acquisition and of possession, taken in their widest sense, i.e. comprising the acquisition and conservation of wealth, both material and non-material.

"Tell me—one might say—what you possess by way of lodging, furniture and tools, clothing, provisions and reserves, knowledge and ideas, relationships, links and attachments, etc., and I shall tell you exactly who you are."

"If you own nothing of all this, you are nothing."

One is somebody in the proportion of material and moral goods one possesses.

This is the reason why W. James could say that the *self*, taken in its broadest sense, envelops all that a man can call *his own* (*Précis de Psychologie*, p. 228).

The notion of *expectation* (in French *attente*, in Latin *ex-pectare*, i.e. to look out for, in German *Erwartung*, in Italian *aspettazione*, *attesa*) leads us to a revision of our ideas upon the ultimate character of a fundamental link in man's activity.

In the application of this notion of expectation to the links which the *self* creates and entertains with the outside world, taken in its most varied aspects, we shall try to remain within the boundaries of contemporary psychology. We shall undertake to demonstrate that the classic notions, as they appear in the handbooks and summaries on psychology, such as memory, interest, attention, etc., may easily be applied and verified in the instances taken from real life, as selected by us.

In his study on personality, Ch. Blondel justly took his inspiration from this idea of W. James's. According to Ch. Blondel (*Traité de Psychologie*, p. 534), the "self" never appears without bringing "mine" in its wake. My men, my workers, my soldiers, we talk of them all as though these beings were ourselves, incorporated in us.

(2) To devote one's attention to "mine" is in fact to understand the essence of personality. I propose to do so here with a view to extrac-

ting a clearer picture of the phenomenon of acquisition, both material and non-material, among men.

I say material and non-material, for although as a rule we confine ourselves above all to material possession, it is evident that both ideas and objects can be equally well acquired and conserved, can be worked upon, transferred and abandoned. The *acquisition* of ideas is nothing else than their perception. Ideas may correspond either to concrete objects or to abstract ideas.

We say: "I have abandoned all my youthful illusions," which means: "I have detached myself from ideas I once cherished."

As I have satisfied myself that my ideas were wrong, dangerous, ridiculous, I am no longer linked to them, they have become foreign to my soul, I do not expect any good to accrue from holding them any longer.

This, therefore, is clearly a question of a *link of expectation.*

As to the conservation of ideas, it depends upon the memory in so far as we are gifted with the aptitude of *reproducing* them.

In short, it is by way of perception that one acquires ideas and it is through the memory that one conserves them.

Just like a household, a shop, a workshop, or a business, memory tries continually to organize itself within its mental scope, by putting things in order, avoiding over-crowding, advancing to an objective, economizing efforts, and struggling for an easier existence. With this end in view, certain ideas, certain relationships, are abandoned, must give way to others, are substituted, removed, or consigned to oblivion, just like material things that have grown too old, or have become useless, depreciated or dangerous.

The acquisition of material objects, of ideas, of relationships, whether due to sensorial experience within which our organic activity takes place, or due to our social experience within which our will-power is set in action on a large scale, always implies a *selection.* This selection is ruled by *interest* which governs it both at the moment of acquisition and during the period of conservation, in the latter working through ideas about the future, as based upon past experience. We direct ourselves through the mechanism of *attention.* According to Ebbinghaus (*Précis de Psychologie*), our attention becomes voluntary as soon as it becomes *provident.* It is the absence of all voluntary choice that explains the puzzling embarrassment of the man who comes unexpectedly into a legacy, or the comic element in winning the first prize in a lottery, a situation often quite grotesque and which has been made excellent use of by the novel, the film, and the theatre.

The *milieu* in which man leads his existence admits of three essential elements, in the presence of which he must continually act and react. These elements are: climate, nourishment and society.

Bound to maintain his thermic equilibrium, on pain of extinction, man has recourse to nourishment and clothing. He does not find them always freely within reach. At the lowest stage of his evolution, man contents himself, to this effect, with establishing essentially unstable relationships of simple *appropriation* (detention, occupation). As his activity goes on developing, he transforms such relationships more and more into those of *possession* (stage of growing providence). And as social life advances and crystallizes, individual possession becomes coupled or more or less protected by social acknowledgment, and is called property.

The term *property* corresponds, therefore, to the most developed stage of the phenomenon with which we are dealing here. Property is consequently more complex than appropriation or possession, since it is the more provident and the least precarious of the three. It is also the most varied. We may, for instance, be proprietors or owners of objects that we have never appropriated. In the paper published in 1913, I pointed out the different aspects of this problem. ("Qu'est-ce que la propriété" in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Paris, 1913.) I analysed therein the indispensable conditions under which *appropriation, acquisition, possession,* and *property* are liable to appear.[1]

It is in this laboratory of "mine" that the work is unceasingly carried on to which we owe all that constitutes our personality. This personality is a result of our inborn tendencies, our preferences, our character, or absence of character.

We surround ourselves with objects, ideas, links, and incessantly we go on increasing or diminishing their number or their intensity. The different things attached to "mine" are not felt ours equally to the same extent. In our conscience we elaborate a hierarchy of their relative values. We prefer a building of bricks to one of wood, our mother to our mother-in-law, honour to money or vice-versa. There are ideas that we cultivate, and ideas against which we protest or defend ourselves.

Everybody knows the contempt of Diogenes for objects with which others greedily strive to surround themselves. He used to walk bare-footed all the year round, slept wrapt up in his only cloak, and used a barrel for his dwelling. He is said one day to have seen a child at a well drinking water out of the hollow of its hand. "This child shows me that I am still keeping superfluous things," exclaimed Diogenes, and smashed the bowl he had used for drinking. Diogenes set most value on spiritual acquisitions. A miser, on the contrary,

[1] From the juristic point of view, possession, i.e. the fact of exercising power over an object, is, under certain conditions, generative of the right of property. In this sense, to possess is equivalent to exercising a real right over an object, it being immaterial whether this right has been recognized or not.

grows to be enslaved by the very objects which he heaps up around himself, utterly at a loss to know what to do with them. For him life becomes a burden, a load that is often unbearable.

Socrates, visiting one day the soukhs of Athenes, cried out joyfully: "How many things there are that I simply don't want!"

The position is the same if, after having observed the links of expectation that attach us to material objects, we turn to the world of spiritual ties, and to the world of social ties.

Our minds gather such a wealth of ideas and knowledge that we are unable to classify. Our faculties are overburdened. The mind is so to speak congested and confused.

On the other hand, it may be that the mind is so bare of ideas that for lack of associations we can retain very little in it.

The social relations we entertain may become so numerous, intense and absorbing that we can no longer follow them up. Relationships, which were once cordial and vigourous, relax after a time, become stale and tiresome. If we think of the worldly life we are tempted to say with Talleyrand that life would be easy to bear were it not for its pleasures.

There are others, however, who for lack of social ties become recluses, hermits and strays.

Between these two extremes is the perfectly balanced man whose rule is "nothing too much," who suffers from neither excess nor want of objects, ideas, or social ties.

(3) Up to now we have dwelt above all upon the *extent* and *intensity* of the phenomenon of acquisition and conservation among men.

Let us pass on now and consider more particularly the psychological nature of the link that attaches the self to the outside world.

The nature of this psychological link was first revealed by Bentham in his "Principles of the Civil Code" (Part 1, Chapter VIII), published some 125 years ago. It is true that in his study on property conceived as a link of expectation, Bentham confines himself to links between man and the objects of the outside world. In a couple of pages Bentham defines these links by the concept of expectation, unaware that the concept in question, far from being applicable exclusively to the material objects of the outside world which are tied to their holder, possessor or proprietor, can be extended to every important class of new objects or ideas, and in fact creates a category not only in the Aristotelian sense but also in the sense given to this term by J. M. Baldwin (in "The Origin of a Thing and its Nature," *Psychological Review*, 1895). In English philosophy and language this notion of expectation is, however, familiar also to some predecessors of Bentham's, such as Shaftesbury, Hume and T. Reids. (I have found it, incidentally, even in Senecca.)

After Bentham, it was used by J. Mill, Baldwin and Ward. Hume employed it in his theory of causality, and Mill in his considerations on the uniformity of nature and his theory of probability.

In France, Lalande in his "Vocabulaire de la philosophie" (1926) merely states that it was Pierre Janet who first used the term, expectation, in his courses at the Collège de France, particularly in his "Analysis of Tendencies" (1907) and in "The Evolution of Memory and the Notion of Time" (1922), and that he gave it the following technical significance as regards the psychology of reaction:

"Expectation is quite a special activity which plays a considerable part in a great many psychological facts, especially in the construction of duration and time. In order to understand this activity it is necessary to recall the various stages of activating a tendency (the activation of a tendency), the principal ones being latency, erethism, wish, effort, consummation, triumph . . . Expectation consists in maintaining this tendency towards the stage of erethism, in inhibiting all kinds of derivation and disposition towards a rash consummation. This difficult work brings about tiredness and emotions, and gives occasion to many neurotic disorders."

In colloquial French the word "attente" (expectation) is used in the case of expectation based upon a promise. One *expects* a thing that one believes to be probable.

In Germany, the notion of expectation ("Erwartung") is found in Leibnitz in the form of cognition, and Kant conceived it as an empirical prevision or prescience of analogous cases. Among German psychologists and philosophers, Wundt regards expectation as a state in which our attention is projected not in relation to an actually present impression but rather in relation to a future impression or eventually in relation to a plurality of possible impressions (*Grdz. Ph. Psych.*, III, 346).

For Lazarus, expectation is a kind of predisposition, a "Bereitschaft zur Apperzeption" (*Leben der Seele*, II, 31).

According to Nahkowsky, to expect is to anticipate a future result "durch die denselben voraneilenden Reproduktionen" (*Das Gefühlsleben*, p. 96).

For Cornelius, each experience is part of a "Erwartungszusammenhang" (*Einl. in d. Philos.*, p. 152).

Stöher visualizes expectation as predisposition towards a movement—"Bewegungbereitschaft" (*Psych.*, p. 350).

(4) Among contemporary psychologists J. M. Baldwin has given to the notion of expectation the position due to it as a fundamental attitude of man's mind.

In the work referred to above, Baldwin distinguishes two fundamental attitudes that arise from the contemplation of an object—the retrospective attitude, and the prospective attitude. Baldwin

maintains that all mental contents play a double function in mental life. Hence two attitudes throughout man's progressive development.

In so far as we conform to acquired habits, we display a retrospective attitude; in so far as our mental content has not been entirely used up in pursuing these habits, it originates an expectant or prospective attitude. So that, Baldwin concludes, the ultimate conception of reality calls in the aid of a category capable of reconciling these two attitudes in one way or another.

According to Baldwin, *expectation* is the term by which this composite attitude towards reality should conveniently be called. Mill described it, in the case of the outside world, as a "permanent possibility of sensation." Put in more adequate words, it is the voluntary control of a memory series so as to reproduce reality, or truth, in its original aspect under the constraining pressure of the conditions governing the limitation of activity.

Thus, the present value of a thing consists largely in the future services we expect it to be able to render, and this is neither more or less than what it has performed in the past. So that the conception we form in our mind of a thing is made up both of its past career and of our expectation as regards its future career.

If Baldwin had been acquainted with Bentham's theory of property —for we presume he was not so—he would have readily agreed with Bentham, and consequently with the development we are giving to the latter's theory, i.e. we acquire a thing, and idea or social link, simply because we think it capable of a future career and in view of the interest we have in it.

Baldwin, however, did not take this step towards the phenomena of acquisition and conservation, though he realized its importance. He simply states, with regard to property, as follows: "Psychologically, the 'acquisition impulse, or instinct,' as it is called, seems to be very deeply rooted and to require recognition. Its existence is a refutation of the view which makes property rights conventional, or artificial. Its utility, from the general point of view, is so great—extending into all details of personal life from the earliest period—that its survival and evolution would seem to be simply a great sociological fact" (*Dic. of Ph. and Psych.*, p. 360).

(5) As to Bentham, he has not enquired deeply into the notion of expectation. Indeed, I do not know he chanced to hit upon it. Bentham is known to have experienced great difficulty in expressing his conceptions in words. He was unable to create an organized whole out of the mass of scattered notes accumulated haphazard in the course of his observations and reflections.

Is this a serious, an irretrievable defect? Be this as it may, the practical Bentham found a solution for giving expression to his fruitful ideas.

Bentham was undoubtedly weak in the art of demonstration, but he *did have ideas*, which after all is what really matters. In addition, he had a passion for travelling. He visited France, Switzerland, Germany, Russia. When in Switzerland, he made friends with E. Dumont, a member of the Representative Council of Geneva, who excelled in literary composition. Bentham gave him his notes, and thanks to Dumont these were eventually published under the title "Principes du Code Civil."[1]

(6) But let us revert to the notion of expectation in its relations with the acquisition of material or non-material things, intended for a more or less long and stable conservation. And let us submit it to a closer analysis.

It is generally considered that appropriation springs from a very deep-rooted tendency, but man does not appropriate things, nor does he acquire relationships, or ideas, without *discrimination*. Such is the case already with primitive men, and with the child. Suffice it to examine the pocket of a small boy. Here you will come across an already more or less organized system of acquisition. The interest of the boy presides over the selection of his little treasures. Protected by his parents, as a general rule, a child does not think about clothing or, except for sweetmeats, about food. Of these he is assured thanks to his guardians. His attention is directed towards things which have a meaning for him but which he does not easily find within reach, or which for one reason or another he is being systematically refused. It is considerations of this kind that are at work in his mind at the moment of his performing an act of acquisition with a view to future possession, and it is also from that moment that a link of expectation is established between the *self* and the object, now qualified as "mine." It is interest guided by the mechanism of attention that plays its rôle in the act of acquisition.

Now, once the thing has been acquired, thanks to one method of appropriation or another—the thing may have been seized, stolen, found, received, bought, etc.—it happens that its possession makes us regret the wish to have it.

"Nothing but the struggle pleases us—says Pascal—never the

[1] In Macaulay's *Works*, I came across the opinion expressed by the great English historian on the relation which existed between Mr. Bentham and M. Dumont. "The raw material," says Macaulay, "which Mr. Bentham furnished was most precious; but it was unmarketable. He was, assuredly, at once a great logician and a great rhetorician. But the effect of his logic was injured by a vicious arrangement and the effect of his rhetoric by a vicious style. His mind was vigorous, comprehensive, subtle, fertile of arguments, fertile of illustrations. But he spoke in an unknown tongue; and, that the congregation might be edified, it was necessary that some brother having the gift of interpretation should expound the invaluable jargon . . . M. Dumont was admirably qualified to supply what was wanting in Mr. Bentham" (Vol. V, p. 613).

victory . . . We never seek for things, we seek to find again *the* thing!"

Why, then, do we keep things nevertheless, and why do we conserve them once the need or the desire for them has been gratified?

The reason is that our needs, our desires, our passions, are rhythmical just like so many other things in nature (day and night, summer and winter, etc.). It is because from past experience we know that our needs come to life again, that they repeat themselves. It is because the things we covet in life (with the exception of air, for instance, which owing to its abundance is, we feel, worthless as an object for appropriation) are either limited in number or scattered about, or rare, or not to be found in nature, or in the world. It is for all these various reasons that acquisition, through the objects it aims at, goes beyond the present moment, and survives so to speak in the form of conservation of varying range and duration.

We keep a pen-knife not because we are tied up to it like to our body, but because we know from past experience that it may come in useful later on.

We keep up our relations and social links because we reckon to profit by them in the future.

We preserve our knowledge and ideas, often acquired only by dint of great exertion, because we know that they will be needed, that they will have to be resorted to for help.

In short, we expect future services from all these different things, which, however, does not prevent the links attaching these things to our consciousness from being in perpetual movement. They tighten or relax, according to the requirements of life.

(7) Our objects, our fellow-men, our animals, our knowledge, our ideas, our relations, all of them are for us so many bases of expectation, provided that we can, by our own means or otherwise, get possession of them or conserve them, whether with or without help from the protection of society, in its different forms (customs, laws, etc.).

But the origin of appropriation does not depend solely on the abundance or scarcity of things. It depends equally on the degree of man's foresight.

A study of the links of expectation relating mankind to things or other beings, reveals considerable differences as to the degree of foresight between individuals and also between whole races or peoples. Thus it has been possible to say that the yellow races live in the past, the black ones in the present, and the white in the future.

The faculty of projecting our *self* towards the future is the most important of all psychic functions from the point of view of biology, in the evolution of man towards the conquests of civilization.

The barometer of foresight, registering varying degrees in the exercise of the faculty of foresight among different individuals, or different peoples or races, reveals at the same time our different capacities in the struggle for existence, our capacities to persist and to survive.

"All that 'we have been'—remarks Blondel—has often only an aesthetic or historical interest for us; alone 'what we shall come to be' has an actual and living interest. In time, as in space, it is natural for us to look ahead. In order to look back, the mind, like the body, has—so to speak—to turn round, in a kind of forced flexion. The consciousness is, therefore, concerned above all with 'what I am going to do' and with 'what I am going to be'; in this respect the past is for the consciousness simply an enquiry office where it can get information on this point. It is for the morrow that we live" (p. 551).

The mother dreams of her child's future. She thinks herself justified in expecting a great deal of that future, far more when her child is still a baby than she will later on when he has grown up into adolescence, or attained his majority. The hard realities of existence will see to the extinction one by one of the mother's day-dreams—dreams sprung from the purest and most disinterested love. "What will he become?" asks the mother, bending lovingly over her baby's cradle. "Composer, President of the Republic, Pope, Bishop, Minister, Physician?" He persistently sings out of tune, maintains a peculiarly stubborn indifference to sounds and noises—he will be no Chopin. The Republic is swept away by a monarchist revolution—baby will not be President. Baby grows up into a young man. He becomes engaged to a girl—he cannot now become Pope or Bishop. Another Minister has been assassinated. It is becoming positively habitual—he must not take up such a dangerous career. He fails irremediably in his leaving examination—he won't become a Physician. But, on the other hand, he is very obedient, never discusses orders—he becomes a soldier. Willy-nilly, Mother resigns herself to her fate. She is appeased.

The career of men, as compared with that of women, being richer in events and possibilities, and consequently richer in expectations, parents generally attach greater importance to the birth of sons than to that of daughters.

Herbert Spencer, in his analysis of the sentiment of love, finds that the sentiment of possession plays a part in it. The two lovers *belong* to each other, they claim each other as a kind of property.

The question is sometimes discussed whether it is better to love or to be loved, a distinction which corresponds exactly to the Aristotelian one of active pleasure as opposed to passive pleasure. From the point of view of the relative strength of expectation, one may

reply that the point is rather *to love each other mutually*, for, in that case, love becomes two-sided instead of being one-sided. From the point of view of security in love, there exists then assurance and counter-assurance. Jealousy in love comes from lack of sufficient security.

Let us consider an example of disappointed expectation.

I have bought a tool because I expect it to be of use to me.

The possession of this tool is the basis of my expectation that I shall be able to make good use of it in case of need. This is part of my thought projected towards the future.

To my feeling of expectation, as regards my tool, is associated a more or less strong, and a more or less actual feeling of uneasiness, since I may lose my tool, or I may be deprived of it as a result of theft, etc., against which, on the other hand, I am protected by law, by the teaching of the Church, by an insurance policy, by the care of watchman, by the vigilance of my dog, etc. All these guarantees and precautions taken together constitute in my mind a certain degree of security, of which my tool is the object. But all of a sudden, the thief in connivance with *my* watchman succeeds in stealing my tool, in depriving me of it. Thus my legitimate expectation of my being able to make free use of it in case of need comes abruptly to an end.

In the rather clumsy terminology of Bentham, to steal is to commit a serious offence against the sentiment of legitimate expectation, justified by the actual possession of an object in a society that is organized from the point of view of security.

To be unwilling to give back, wholly or in part, an object lent is likewise an attack upon the sentiment of expectation, although apparently a less grave one than that outlined above.

Not to be able to do it, or to delay doing it, or to hesitate in doing it, is an attack of similar nature, but deserving less blame than those in the above instances.

Deceit, treachery, lack of loyalty, fidelity, etc., represent another series of cases where attack is made upon psychical facts, such as confidence or faith.

A child's confidence in its mother is absolute and deep. This confidence need not be safe-guarded or guaranteed either by the society or otherwise.

In saying "*mère*" (mother) the French child acknowledges in principle a state of parentship. In saying "*maman*" (*my* mother) it expresses more than that. It lays an affectionate stress upon it, it accentuates the existence of a link of expectation of quite an exceptional security. Its conscience, its instinct tell the child that it may rely upon its mother in all circumstances. The attachment of the mother for her child constitutes for the latter a firm foundation,

the rock on which it bases its expectation projected towards the future.

But this gratuitous confidence expressed in a serene (because strong) expectation may in certain circumstances also be of quite a general character, i.e. an entirely superficial expectation, without analysis, without reflexion, almost without consciousness.

(8) The French say "*mon*sieur," "*ma*dame," "*ma*demoiselle," without first measuring or weighing either the social status of the person thus addressed or the significance of the fact that they come upon him, or her, for the first and perhaps also for the last time.

One would say that thanks to a simple possessive prefix, added without too much discrimination to a "sieur" or to a "dame," they wish to extend the range of persons to whom they owe and pay a tribute of respect, thus including them in the great family of their respectable fellow-men or women, worthy of confidence. Incidentally, they also say "mon Dieu" (my God), although at times they use as well "bon Dieu" (good God).

In times of yore they favoured, in France, the expression "*mon*-seigneur" (my Lord). This was a somewhat more precise formula. While establishing the link with the ego, it took care to accentuate at the same time, the difference in status, dependance and hierarchy.

"*Mon* général," in the language of a sergeant addressing himself to a general, ultimately means to say that he regards himself as "belonging" to the former. But this same general, in addressing himself to the sergeant, does not call him "*mon* sergent," but simply "sergent." If he ever calls him "*mon* sergent" (my sergeant), this is when he talks about him to someone else and wishes to emphasize the fact that this particular sergeant serves under his orders. In this case, however, we are no longer in the field of general relation-ship among members of a determined society. We are rather in the domain of social relations in a special hierarchy.

(9) Is it possible to speak of expectation among animals? Does the animal world also evince the phenomena of attention, memory, abstract thinking, etc.?

The psychologists and sociologists are not as yet in agreement on this point, or else make reservations. It must be admitted that, on the whole, man is ill-placed for understanding exactly what in fact is going on in the brain of an animal. It is already very difficult to understand and to judge the mind of a child, or of a savage. And sometimes it is simply a mistake to try to interpret animal mind in terms of human mind.[1]

If the sentiment of the ego, the sentiment of personal identity,

[1] For more detailed development of possession in animal psychology, see my "Is there an Instinct of Possession?" (*The British Journal of Psychology*, July 1942).

the consciousness in short, does form the primary and fundamental *condition* of the phenomena of acquisition and of conservation, with which we have been dealing above, it is obvious that such highly evolved phenomena are not to be observed among living animals, whether gregarious or otherwise.

In order to trace the phenomena of *mine*, it is above all necessary that the *ego* be constituted.

Now, animals have consciousness, but they have no consciousness of their consciousness.

As regards the child, he at first talks of himself as of an object. At first he does not know himself as a subject. He has no clear consciousness of himself. His ego is built up gradually, and only when this process is achieved the notion of his ego crystallizes up in his consciousnesss.

(10) Contrary to Petrucci,[1] Bentham looks upon property subjectively, i.e. from insight. Writing a treatise on the "Principles of Civil Code," Bentham, curiously enough, does not make any striking contribution to the legal theory of property as commonly understood, but he puts forward a conception of high psychological interest. Unlike many others, he does not see in possession simply an exercise of physical power over an object but an exercise of psychical power as well, the power of foresight. It is true that we do not possess anything on the moon because its riches are out of our grasp. But it is equally true that man would not possess anything on the earth also if he were completely lacking in the power of expectation which is the psychological key for the explanation of the phenomena which are the object of this paper.

[1] According to the author of the *Natural Origins of Ownership* (Brussels, 1908) property is a natural fact responding to the necessities of adaptation and applicable also to the animal and vegetable worlds (pp. 1 and 3, Chapter VI, and conclusion, p. 219). Thus for Petrucci, every object must be considered as the true owner of the space it occupies.

DISCUSSION

MAN'S INNER CONDITION

A Study in Kierkegaard

An article on Kierkegaard appeared in PHILOSOPHY of July 1941, by Miss Dorothy Emmet, in which, among other topics, she deals with the twin subjects of Despair (*Fortvivelse*) and Dread (*Angest*), in that writer's philosophy. All that is involved in those two great concepts is, of course, beyond the scope of a short article. I desire only to sketch so much of them as will enable me to meet some of the points Miss Emmet raises.[1] The two principal books in which Kierkegaard expounds these concepts are, respectively, *Sygdommen til Døden* (Sickness unto Death) and *Begrebet Angest* (The Concept of Dread).[2] Chronologically, and indeed logically, they come in the reverse order. I have taken them the other way round only for my present purpose.

It is well known that Kierkegaard had a well-defined and progressive scheme of authorship, in which he unfolds his existential philosophy step by step. In approaching these books, therefore, it is necessary to take account of the point he had so far reached. In his two previous books, *Frygt og Bæven* (Fear and Trembling) and *Gjentagelsen* (Repetition),[3] he had come to the confines of a great subject—Sin. He had not entered upon that subject. He had discussed the possibility of a "teleological suspension of ethics," but only (as he himself elsewhere says) as "a transitory phase which again vanishes, or remains outside life as something altogether irregular."[4] "In *Fear and Trembling* sin was used incidentally to illustrate the nature of Abraham's sacrifice, but no further."[5] Now, however, he wants to take up the subject of Religion in a fuller sense, and since, as he says, "Sin is a decisive expression for the religious mode of existence,"[6] he must needs now discuss sin. Existential inwardness is, moreover, specifically described in the *Philosophical Fragments*; so that the way is open on all sides for advance.

What is Sin? Its place and meaning in man's psychological make-up are discussed in *Sickness*. Its history (in so far as it has one) and its origin are the theme of *Dread*. Taking the former first, it is clear that the only place in which sin exists is in the self, so Kierkegaard goes right back to the root question, what is the self?[7] It is spirit. "It is a relationship which relates itself to itself." Does the self create itself? No, it is created by another Power, and therefore is a "derived, constituted relationship," a relationship which relates itself to its own self, and in doing so, relates itself to this Power. Within this cycle of relationships, however, there is, in man's very nature, disrelationship; and this disrelationship is precisely what Kierkegaard calls, *Fortvivelse*, and which is usually translated Despair. It is, says Kierkegaard, "the 'sickness unto death' of which Christ spoke on the occasion when He

[1] For fuller treatment I would refer my readers to Chapters 4 and 5 of my *Kierkegaard Studies*, shortly to be published by the Lutterworth Press. Also to my article in *The Times Literary Supplement* of March 19, 1946.

[2] Samlede Værker, Vols. XI and IV respectively. Both are translated by Dr. Walter Lowrie (Oxford and Princeton respectively).

[3] Samlede Værker, Vol. III. Translated by Payne (Oxford) and Lowrie (Princeton).

[4] *Uvidenskabely Efterskrift* (S.V., VII, 254) = *Unscientific Postscript*, 239.

[5] Op. cit., S.V., VII, 240; *Postscript*, 255.

[6] Loc. cit.

[7] *Sickness*, 17 *et. seq.* = S.V., XI, 143 *et seq.*

raised Lazarus from the dead."[1] The theologians call it sin. That all men should be in the grip of despair sounds a dreadful situation, and yet despair is, in a sense, man's glory; it is the very state which distinguishes him from the beasts. It implies that man is a free spiritual being, living *sub specie aeterni*; and the reason that no man is exempt from this sickness is because it is related to the eternal in him.

There is a kind of despair which is despair about something external to the self, such as misfortune, loss, or (to use Kierkegaard's own example) not being Caesar when one ambitiously wants to be Caesar. But this is not what Kierkegaard is primarily referring to in *Sickness*; though a glance at it will help us to see what Kierkegaard's *Fortvivelse* essentially is, as set forth in that book. "Despair is not," he says elsewhere,[2] "something which may happen to a man, like fortune or misfortune. Despair is a disrelationship in his inmost being—so far down, so deep, that neither fate nor events can reach it, but can only reveal the fact that it—was there. . . . Fortune and prosperity can conceal it; misfortune and adversity on the other hand, do not, as a man thinks, make him desperate, but only reveal the fact that he—was desperate. In so far as we speak otherwise, it is because we carelessly confuse the highest concepts. That which really makes a man despair is not misfortune, but the fact that he lacks the eternal. Despair is to lack the eternal."

It is only putting the matter a different way, when Kierkegaard says, in *Sickness*, that in the very fact that a man despairs of *something*, he is proved to be really despairing of himself. Because he did not become Caesar, or retain what he lost, he cannot bear to accept himself as he is; cannot bear to see himself *sub specie aeterni*, i.e. without any self-deception; cannot, in short, endure to be himself. And this puts him at odds, not only with eternity, but with the Power which constituted him as it did. He may even, in this now open despair, want to be rid of that Power. But such a wish never gets rid of the disrelationship; in fact it only emphasizes it, and embitters the soul. In other words, the disease "sickness unto death" is only made worse.[3]

Behind this concept *Fortvivelse* or Despair lies another. Despair is a sickness in the self or spirit, as we have seen. Just as a man may have a presentiment of bodily sickness, so the spirit may have a presentiment of this spiritual sickness, and this presentiment Kierkegaard calls *Angest* (modern *Angst*) or Dread. This he deals with in the book *The Concept of Dread*.[4] Readers of Kierkegaard are aware that "dread" is an inadequate translation, because, as Lowrie says,[5] "it fails to indicate the uncanny apprehension of some evil impending, something not purely present, but to come." It is a presentiment and premonition. About what? About nothing; nothing, that is, that lies outside ourselves; nothing that is as yet potentiated within ourselves either. This nothingness, however, is no metaphysical concept. It has reference to man's psychological state, and to that alone. It points to an inner condition which has vital practical consequences. It deeply affects a man's personal *Existens* (in Kierkegaard's sense), and indeed his eternal salvation to boot. Everyone therefore has an interest in the subject which is by no means a metaphysical interest. Indeed, it is the passion of this interest which is the rock "upon which metaphysics founders," as Kierkegaard elsewhere says.[6]

[1] John xi. 4. [2] *Works of Love*, 34 = *Kjerlighedens Gjerninger*. S.V., IX, 53.

[3] To epitomize a great author is always difficult, and sometimes shameful; the more so the greater the author. A man may well hesitate therefore to epitomize Kierkegaard, of whom Reinhold Niebuhr writes (*Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 195): "Kierkegaard's analysis of the relation of anxiety to sin is the profoundest in Christian thought."

[4] Just as *Angst* lies behind *Fortvivelse*, so the subject matter of *The Concept of Dread* lies behind that of *Sickness unto Death*. The latter deals with the despair which is sin, the former with Original Sin, which lies behind, and is the history of, actual sin.

[5] *Kierkegaard*, p. 73. [6] *Repetition*, p. 34 (*Gjentagelsen*, S.V., II, 212).

When, therefore, Miss Dorothy Emmet, in the article above referred to in PHILOSOPHY, says (and she is apparently quoting Heidegger's opinion), "*Angst* is the fear of metaphysical insecurity," she is, I think, on the wrong track, and Heidegger too. There is, it is true, a certain sense in which Miss Emmet's further words from the same context, "the individual is poised above absolute nothingness," may be regarded as a correct expression of another part of Kierkegaard's teaching. When, for example, a man has "ventured far out" (as Kierkegaard puts it) into the unknown and fathomless seas of faith, he may (speaking in a picture) be said to be poised over nothing; though in that case the nothing is everything. But that is not the nothingness of dread, and such an idea is as irrelevant here, as Miss Emmet's metaphysical Nothing.

Equally irrelevant is Miss Emmet's description of "absolute Nothing" as "quite distinct from logical negation, which, as every reader of Plato's *Sophist* knows, is a form of determination." Kierkegaard's "nothing", it is true, is distinct from logical negation also. But Plato is discussing not-being (*τὸ μὴ ὄν*) as theory *in abstracto*, much as Hegel discusses *Seyn*. Kierkegaard, on the contrary, is speaking existentially and *in concreto*, describing an actual psychological state of every man. Indeed, Miss Emmet's reference to the *Sophist* suggests, in itself, that she is approaching the matter from a wrong angle; and I would respectfully and kindly commend both to her and Heidegger the words of Parmenides, quoted in the *Sophist*:—

οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαῆς, φησίν εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα[1]

Man finds himself (so I condense the essence of Kierkegaard's position) possessed of spiritual freedom; a freedom which, while it places him on a high pinnacle far above the animals,[2] yet makes him, by its very height, ever in danger of falling into the dismal abyss where he loses both his freedom and himself. Freedom, therefore (without which such a fall could not happen), while it is man's glory and pride, fills him with dread (*Angst*). He is well aware how immanent the possibility of a fall may be, just because he knows that, already, within his own soul, there exists the disrelationship which Kierkegaard calls despair; a disrelationship both of the self to its own self, and of the self to the Power that constituted it. And the self is only cured of this sickness, transferred to the realm of freedom and health, and given back its *redintegratio in statum pristinum* when, "by relating itself to its own self, and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."[3]

How wide of the mark then is Miss Emmet when, in the same article I am quoting, she tells of an experience of her own by which she seeks to prove, not that she is in dread of losing her spiritual freedom and so potentiating despair within herself, but to prove that, in this said experience, she found herself using the word Nothing in the sense of a "logical distinction." She is, moreover, wide of the mark, as regards Kierkegaard's present meaning, when she says "Metaphysics starts, according to Heidegger, from the realization (sc. that a man has a 'radical insecurity of being'), and asks why anything should be at all, rather than Nothing. For if there were only infinite possibilities of the Nothing, the self could not exist." Excellent metaphysical speculations, no doubt, but nothing to do with Kierkegaard's meaning in connection with Dread; as irrelevant as Mr. Joseph's quite true statement

[1] *Sophist*, 237. [2] As we saw earlier that Despair places man above the beasts.
[3] *Sickness*, 19, 216 (*Sygdomnen*, S.V., XI, 144, 272).

for discussion in a Greats paper (also quoted by Miss Emmet): "In a world where everything were possible, nothing would be probable."

Kierkegaard's chief concern is with personal freedom and not metaphysics. Necessity, in the grip of which the speculative philosophy lay bound, Kierkegaard must needs repudiate; for Dread and Despair, in his sense, imply freedom, and indeed owe their existence to the possibility of a misuse of freedom. At bottom it is the nothingness of mere possibility that causes Dread. In the *Physics*, Aristotle defines κίνησις as a movement from possibility to actuality, actuality being higher than possibility. In the case of Despair this is not so. Actual despair is in a lower scale than the possibility of despair. Indeed the latter is a sign, not of debasement, but of exaltation. To be rid of Despair, one must, says Kierkegaard, choose it. That is, recognize it, accept it as a fact, and then, by an act of one's own free will, make the leap of faith which enables a man to overcome it.

All this does not mean that Kierkegaard holds the Pelagian view about *liberum arbitrium*. In *The Concept of Dread* he speaks of *libertas indifferentiae* as "an absurdity of thought," a "something which does not exist." There is, he argues, no freedom unless one chooses the good and not the evil, and this is to choose oneself. To choose the evil is to be not-free, and guilty. Hence freedom is not, as with Kant and others, the antithesis of necessity, but of guilt.

T. H. CROXALL.

NEW BOOKS

A History of Western Philosophy, and its Connection with political and social Circumstances from the earliest Times to the present Day. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Pp. xxiii, 895. Simon and Schuster. New York.

Even if I possessed (which I do not) the requisite knowledge of the various philosophers treated by Lord Russell and of the general historical background which he describes, it would be quite impossible to give in a reasonably short space a detailed criticism of this immensely long book. I shall confine myself to the following two points. I shall give a brief sketch of the ground covered, and then I shall give an account of the plan which Lord Russell says that he had in mind in writing the book and an estimate of his success in carrying out that plan.

(1) *The ground covered.* The book begins with a short Introduction, in which the author gives a preliminary account of what he means by "philosophy," followed by a sketch of European history from 600 B.C. to the present day. This ends with the statement that social cohesion is a necessity, that it has never yet been maintained by merely rational arguments, and that it remains to be seen whether there can be a social order not based on irrational dogma and not involving more than the irreducible minimum of constraints on the individual. The latter is the ideal of liberalism.

This is followed by a chapter on the rise of Greek civilization. Then come chapters on the Milesian School, on Pythagoras, on Heraklitus, on Parmenides, and on Empedocles. Great importance is attached to Pythagoras as the first to introduce a mixture of mathematics and mysticism into European thought. Parmenides is said to be the first to base metaphysical principles on the logical analysis of propositions. Russell ascribes the beginnings of the notion of persistent substances to attempts to answer Heraklitus without going to the extreme advocated by Parmenides.

A short chapter on Athens in relation to culture intervenes between those just mentioned and chapters on Anaxagoras, on the Atomists, and on Protagoras. Russell thinks that Greek philosophy begins to deteriorate after Democritus by becoming too anthropocentric.

So we pass to a chapter on Socrates, of whom Russell remarks later in the book: "As a man we may believe him admitted to the communion of saints; but as a philosopher he needs a long residence in a scientific purgatory." It is alleged that there is ". . . . something smug and unctuous about him, which reminds one of a bad type of cleric." (I am tempted to adapt the retort which Lincoln made to the persons who told him that General Grant drank too much whisky.)

After a chapter on the influence of Sparta and of myths about Sparta, a city which Lord Russell dislikes, come six chapters on various aspects of the philosophy of Plato, a person whom he dislikes still more. The antipathy seems to be based primarily on political grounds, and secondarily (I suspect), on annoyance with the almost uninterrupted stream of praise which Plato has received from scholars throughout the ages. The chapters in question deal in turn with the sources of Plato's opinions, with his Utopia, with his theory of Ideas, with his theory of Immortality, with his Cosmogony, and with his Theory of Knowledge. Among the *obeer dicta* I may mention the statement that "Plato was hardly ever intellectually honest" (p. 78). After this one is a little surprised to find the statement on p. 127 that the *Parmenides*

"contains one of the most remarkable cases in history of self-criticism by a philosopher." I suppose this must have been one of Plato's rare lapses into intellectual honesty.

There follow five chapters on various topics in Aristotle's philosophy. Lord Russell dislikes Aristotle if possible more than Plato, but for different reasons. For Plato he has a kind of reluctant admiration; for Aristotle, as revealed in his Ethics, and his Politics, he has a hearty contempt. "To a man with any depth of feeling it" (the *Nicomachean Ethics*) "cannot but be repulsive" (p. 173). "I do not agree with Plato" (on the state) "but, if anything could make me do so, it would be Aristotle's arguments against him" (p. 189). Apart from these emotional antipathies, Russell's main objection to Aristotle is that certain of his logical and metaphysical theories, which Russell regards as false or inadequate, had a harmful influence on logic and metaphysics when Aristotle was made into a kind of philosophical Pope by St. Thomas. The topics treated in these five chapters are Aristotle's Metaphysics, his Ethics, his Politics, his Logic, and his Physics.

The next chapter deals with early Greek Mathematics and Astronomy. It pays a high tribute to the intellectual greatness of Euclid's *Elements*; and it asserts that the merit of the Copernican hypothesis (originally suggested by Aristarchus of Samos), as compared with the theory of epicycles developed by Hipparchus and perfected by Ptolemy, was not its *truth* but its greater simplicity. (This of course presupposes that the relational theory of motion can be accepted as completely satisfactory.)

There follows a purely historical chapter on the Hellenistic world, which forms an introduction to chapters on Cynics and Sceptics, on the Epicureans, and on Stoicism. As regards Epicureanism, Russell remarks that it was "a valetudinarian philosophy, designed to suit a world in which adventurous happiness had become scarcely possible." There are some good remarks on the ethical doctrines of the Stoics. "There is . . . an element of sour grapes in Stoicism. We can't be happy, but we can be good; let us therefore pretend that, so long as we are good, it doesn't matter being unhappy." (p. 269). Again, Russell points out that, since modern drugs and modern methods of "third degree," as practised by the late German and the present Russian government, can reduce any man to docility, "the will is . . . only independent of the tyrant so long as the tyrant is unscientific."

Between the last of these chapters and one on Plotinus, which concludes the account of Ancient Philosophy, comes a purely historical chapter on the Roman Empire in relation to Culture. Russell likes Plotinus and gives a very sympathetic account of his philosophy. "Among men who have been unhappy, in a mundane sense, but resolutely determined to find a higher happiness in the world of theory, Plotinus holds a very high place . . . . Like Spinoza, he has a certain kind of moral purity which is very impressive." I think it ought to strike Russell as odd that a man like Plotinus, who was steeped in Plato's works, should have had such a reverence for Plato if the latter were what Russell represents him as being.

The second Book is concerned with what Russell calls "Catholic Philosophy," i.e., philosophy in the period between St. Augustine and the Renaissance. It is largely concerned with general history of Europe. The first chapter deals with the religious development of the Jews; the second with Christianity during the first four centuries after Christ; and the third with three great Doctors of the Western Church, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine. "Few men," says Russell, "have surpassed these three in influence on the course of history" (p. 335). The fourth chapter is devoted to a detailed account of St. Augustine's

theology and philosophy. Russell rates St. Augustine very high as a pure philosopher. Though he disagrees with St. Augustine's theory of time, which is in essence that time is subjective and therefore depends on created beings, he considers it to be a brilliant philosophical achievement. He points out that St. Augustine anticipated both Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* and his answer to Gassendi's alternative argument *Ambulo ergo sum*. Russell gives an interesting summary of the argument of *The City of God*. He says that both St. Augustine and Karl Marx took over the Jewish theory of world-history, past and future. The former adapted it to Christianity, and the latter to Socialism. Russell provides an amusing dictionary of equivalents between the main categories of Jewish and Communist eschatology.

Next come three chapters which are mainly devoted to general history. The first of these describes the main events and personalities of the fifth and sixth centuries. The most important philosophic figure is Boethius, of whom Lord Russell says "he would have been remarkable in any age, in the age in which he lived he is utterly amazing" (p. 373). The next chapter is devoted to Saint Benedict and Gregory the Great, and the next to the Papacy in the Dark Ages. Lord Russell thinks that civilization in Western Europe reached its nadir about A.D. 1,000, and that from that time there began an upward movement which lasted until 1914. But he points out that it is easy for us to over-estimate the importance of Western Europe, and that during our dark ages there flourished the brilliant T'ang dynasty in China and the brilliant Islamic civilization. He describes the work of the chief Islamic philosophers in a later chapter on Mohammedan culture and philosophy. He will not admit that the Arabs were original thinkers, except in mathematics and chemistry. The most that he will allow to them (and to the Byzantines) is that they "preserved the apparatus of civilization" while the West was still barbarous.

The chapter on Benedict and Gregory is followed by one about the life and philosophy of the Irish scholar John Eriugena. Then follow a chapter on Ecclesiastical Reform in the eleventh century and the chapter already mentioned on Mohammedan culture. This brings us to one on the twelfth century and the beginnings of Scholasticism, which contains an account of Abelard and St. Bernard. The next deals with the thirteenth century, which Lord Russell regards as the culmination of the Middle Ages. He describes Innocent III as "the first *great* Pope in whom there was no element of sanctity" (p. 443); he remarks that the Church was saved in this century from the fate which befell it in the sixteenth largely by the mendicant orders founded by St. Francis and St. Dominic; and he reflects that "if Satan existed the future of the order founded by St. Francis would afford him the most exquisite gratification." (p. 450).

The decks are now cleared for a chapter on St. Thomas Aquinas, who is described as "a special pleader" (p. 463), and whose temperament is said to have been "ratiocinative rather than mystical" (p. 460). His doctrines are expounded and criticized in a thoroughly unsympathetic and external way. It is certain that St. Thomas had mystical experiences and that he attached immense importance to them. A philosopher who defended (as St. Thomas does in his tract *De Aeternitate Mundi*) on philosophic grounds the possibility that the world has no beginning in time against those who claimed to disprove it, although he held on the basis of the scriptures that this possibility is contrary to fact, is a good deal more than a special pleader.

The next chapter describes the views of the great Franciscan schoolmen, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam. Lord Russell thinks that

Roger Bacon, who was "encyclopaedic . . . but unsystematic" and who quoted a wealth of authorities in support of his opinion that one should not rely on authority, has been much over-rated in modern times. He regards William of Occam as the greatest scholastic after St. Thomas and as the last of the great scholastics, and he gives a critical account of Occam's views in metaphysics (where he was *not* a nominalist) and in logic (where he *was* one).

This book ends with a chapter on the Eclipse of the Papacy, and one has a feeling that Lord Russell must have breathed a sigh of relief to be at last out of the enchanted wood of the Middle Ages, in which both by temperament and training he is (to quote Housman) "a stranger and afraid, in a world he never made."

Book III, which treats of Modern Philosophy, is divided into two parts. The first covers the period from the Renaissance up to and including Hume; the second that from Hume to the present day. It opens with a chapter on the general characteristics of the whole period. Lord Russell thinks that modern philosophy has been in the main *subjective*, and that the "extreme of subjectivism is a form of madness." (p. 494). Plain men have become more and more influenced and impressed by the success of science as a *practical technique*, but philosophers have only lately been influenced by this aspect of it and have so far mainly considered science as a theoretical doctrine and method. The success of science as a technique, dependent on a closely-knit social organization, has led to a feeling of unlimited power coupled with a loss of all sense of direction. "It assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to perform . . . . Ends are no longer considered, only the skilfulness of the process is valued. This also is a form of madness" (p. 494).

The second chapter deals with the Italian Renaissance. It raises the question: "How much murder and anarchy are we prepared to endure for the sake of great achievements, such as those of the Renaissance?"; and answers: "In the past a good deal, in our own times much less"; but realizes that there is an unsolved problem here.

The third chapter contains a fair and sympathetic account of Machiavelli and his political theories. "The world has become more like that of Machiavelli than it was, and the modern man who hopes to refute his philosophy must think more deeply than seemed necessary in the nineteenth century" (p. 511).

The next three chapters deal respectively with Erasmus and More, the Reformation and the Counter-reformation, and the Rise of Science. The first of these contains an account of More's Utopia, which concludes with a remark on the "intolerable dullness" which Lord Russell thinks would characterize life in it or in any other planned society, real or imaginary (p. 522).

At the beginning of the chapter on the Rise of Modern Science Lord Russell says that "the modern world, so far as mental outlook is concerned, begins in the seventeenth century." The first changes were the ejection of animism from natural science; the rejection of the notion that man is the centre of the universe and that teleological explanations are in place in science; and, notwithstanding this, a growth of human pride in human achievements. Later changes were the rejection of the notion of force as the cause of motion and the abandonment of the absolute theory of space, time, and motion.

The seventh chapter is concerned with Francis Bacon, who is described as "morally . . . an average man, no better and no worse than the bulk of his contemporaries" (p. 542). In discussing Bacon's logic of induction Lord Russell says that the evidence for *ultimate* generalizations remains induction by simple enumeration, and that for this no satisfactory defence exists.

I think that this opinion (whether it be correct or incorrect) tends to make Russell unappreciative of Bacon's great merit as the first person who saw and emphasized the importance of negative instances and exclusion in scientific reasoning.

The next chapter treats of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. Russell remarks that on the whole the power of the state has grown since Hobbes's time even more than Hobbes would have desired. It is true that the state is the only alternative to anarchy; but there are other evils to be guarded against, e.g., the injustice and the ossification which inevitably follow if the government is omnipotent and need fear no resistance. Nevertheless "Hobbes is the first really modern writer on political theory. Where he is wrong it is from over-simplification" (p. 556). He needs to be supplemented by a theory of conflicts between classes within each state, and a theory of international relations.

The next three chapters treat in order the three great Continental philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who occupy the period from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century. Lord Russell is temperamentally very sympathetic to Spinoza and very antipathetic to Leibniz, whilst he does not seem to have any strong emotional reaction towards Descartes. The consequence is that, when the moral characters of these philosophers come under review, Leibniz is extravagantly condemned, Spinoza as extravagantly praised, and Descartes judged with fairness and common-sense.

Russell remarks that "although Spinoza's whole philosophy is dominated by the idea of God, the orthodox accused him of atheism" (p. 569). It seems to me that the orthodox were perfectly correct. The whole of Spinoza's writings are indeed filled with the *word* "God," and I have no doubt that Spinoza quite honestly felt towards the object which he called by that name emotions something like those which genuine theists feel towards God in the ordinary sense. But, if we look behind venerable names and edifying phrases used in extremely Pickwickian senses and if we discount the emotions which they are liable to call up through association, I think we shall find that Spinoza's system is a form of atheism which any theist who is not completely muddle-headed must reject without hesitation.

Lord Russell regards the greater part of Spinoza's metaphysics as false or groundless; has a great admiration for his ethical attitude and maxims; and therefore discusses carefully how far the latter can be logically separated from the former and how far they can be accepted on their own merits.

Leibniz is admitted by Lord Russell to be "one of the supreme intellects of all time," but it is alleged that "as a human being he was not admirable" (p. 581). He is asserted to have "lied about the extent of his personal acquaintance with Spinoza (p.569), and to have had an esoteric system which he developed in his correspondence with Arnauld and suppressed for discreditable reasons. No adequate evidence is produced to enable one to test the first accusation, and the second appears to me to be a mare's nest. He is said to have been "somewhat mean about money," on the ground that, when any young lady at the Hanoverian court married, he used to give her a wedding-present consisting of useful maxims, ending with the advice not to give up washing now that she had secured a husband. As weddings among young ladies-in-waiting must have been pretty frequent, and as Leibniz's salary as librarian was probably quite small and there is no reason to think that he had substantial private means, the conclusion derives little support from the premisses. The advice may not have been tactful, but no one who has read in contemporary memoirs about the personal habits of ladies of rank and fashion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can call it superfluous.

When Lord Russell has exhausted these trivialities he gets down to a serious and valuable examination of Leibniz's philosophic doctrines. He thinks that the classical arguments for the existence of God have been better stated by Leibniz than by any other philosopher, and so he examines them carefully in this place.

A chapter on Philosophical Liberalism follows, and this leads on to three chapters on Locke, one on his Theory of Knowledge, a second on his Political Philosophy, and a third on his Influence. From the general chapter I will quote the following remark: "A philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced country, where it is little more than a clarification . . . of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour and even of actual revolution" (p. 601). Lord Russell considers that Locke's philosophy illustrates the fact that "the most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that reason have been partially true" (p. 613).

Chapter Sixteen is devoted to Berkeley. It begins badly by misquoting Ronald Knox's celebrated limerick, and stating that Berkeley "in later life abandoned philosophy for tar-water," as if that exhausted the subject-matter of the *Sins*. After that Lord Russell gets down to business and seriously discusses a part (though only a part) of Berkeley's doctrine, viz., the contents of the first and the beginning of the second of the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. What comes later he dismisses as 'of minor importance" (p. 648). The discussion is elaborate and interesting, and Lord Russell formulates some of his own views in the course of it.

The next chapter is concerned with the doctrines of Book I of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. The result of Lord Russell's examination of Hume's arguments about causation is this. He thinks that they prove that *either* science is impossible *or* induction rests on an independent logical principle which is incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles. This, he holds, makes a serious hole in pure empiricism. (Lord Russell has never accepted the fashionable and comfortable view that the "problem" of the justification of induction is a pseudo-problem to be *re*solved and not a problem to be *solved*). He remarks that "the growth of unreason throughout the nineteenth century is a natural sequel to Hume's destruction of empiricism" (p. 673). This may be true if it means only that a consistent Humean would have no ground for preferring procedures which are commonly counted as "rational" to others which are commonly counted as "irrational." But I should think that it is certainly false if it is intended as a statement about the actual causation of a prevalent attitude of mind.

The chapter on Hume concludes Part I of Book III. The second part is largely concerned with what Lord Russell calls the "Romantic Movement" and its developments in philosophy and politics down to the present day. It opens with a general account of that movement. Lord Russell holds that it set out to free the individual from social restrictions, many of which were antiquated and oppressive. But it was difficult to keep such a movement from developing into a pretext for excesses of anti-social egoism.

The next chapter deals with Rousseau and his contributions to theology and political theory. I must confess that I share the dislike which Lord Russell obviously feels for the personality and the theories of Rousseau. I heartily agree with Russell's remark that "the rejection of reason in favour of the heart" (in theology) "was not an advance. . . . No-one thought of this device so long as reason appeared to be on the side of religious belief. . . . If I had to choose between St. Thomas and Rousseau I should unhesitatingly choose the saint" (p. 693–94).

The chapter on Kant, which follows, seems to me to be the worst in the book. It is inadequate and inaccurate. The only part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which is seriously considered is the doctrine of space and time in the *Aesthetic*. I should have thought it obvious that far the most important and original part of the first Critique is the *Analytic*, which is not touched upon. It is stated on p. 711 that Kant "gives as an illustration of the working of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because, if we all tried to do so, there would be no money left to borrow." To the best of my belief Kant did not hold that it is wrong to borrow money, and never used the absurd argument ascribed to him above. Lord Russell must have been embroidering on a vague memory of an argument by which Kant tries to prove that it is wrong to borrow money on promise of repayment which one knows one will not be able to make. The plain fact is that Lord Russell thinks, rightly or wrongly, that Kant is not a great philosopher and that his influence has been unfortunate, and that he feels himself dispensed from taking the trouble to expound him adequately and accurately. I am sure that Kant was a great philosopher; but that is neither here nor there. What I complain of is that no-one whose knowledge of Kant was confined to this chapter would be able to understand why Kant has been *thought* by many highly competent persons to be one of the greatest of European philosophers.

Between the chapter on Kant and that on Hegel is sandwiched one on Currents of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. It is argued that the conviction that man is continuous with the irrational animals has raised difficulties for the egalitarians, and that the growth of industrialism and machinery has intoxicated certain men with a sense of power over nature and over other men whom they can use as raw material for propaganda.

Two chapters deal with developments of different aspects of Kant's philosophy by Hegel and by Schopenhauer. The chapter on Hegel contains a clear, and it seems to me a fair, critical account of his main views. In the chapter on Schopenhauer Lord Russell ascribes to him the opinion that the cosmic will is *wicked*. I should have thought that *stupid* would have been a more correct description of it on Schopenhauer's view.

The reader may be surprised to find a chapter on Lord Bryon between the two last mentioned. Lord Russell introduces it on the ground that "among those whose importance is greater than it seemed Byron deserves a high place" as the typical "aristocratic rebel" who eventually influences large sections of society which are by no means aristocratic. Byron has of course always been treated much more seriously on the Continent than in England. The chapter has some acute psychological reflexions and makes very good reading.

This is followed by a chapter on Nietzsche, which seems to me to be admirable. Naturally Lord Russell dislikes him and nearly all that he stood for. But this does not prevent him from treating Nietzsche's views with fairness and comprehension. He admits that Nietzsche admired the capacity to *endure*, as well as to inflict, pain; that he did not worship the state, but the *heroic individual*; that he was *not* a nationalist, and in particular was no great admirer of the *German* nation; and that he was not in principle anti-semitic, though he thought (and who shall say him nay?) that Germany had as many Jews as it could comfortably digest. He admits further that "Nietzsche's prophecies have, so far, proved more nearly right than those of liberals or socialists" (pp. 766–67). Lord Russell says that he would like to refute Nietzsche's ethics, which is profoundly distasteful to him, and this leads to an interesting general discussion of the senses in which an ethical system is open to refutation. The chapter concludes with an imaginary argument between Nietzsche and

Buddha before the judgment-seat of God, in which Russell puts into Buddhas mouth some sentiments which I think that he, as a convinced and radical pessimist, would have unhesitatingly repudiated as pills to cure an earthquake.

A chapter follows, by way of extreme contrast, on the Utilitarians in general and in particular on Bentham and the dark Satanic Mills (James and John Stuart). Lord Russell says that in Bentham's system "belief in equality is deduced from the calculus of pleasures and pains" (p. 776). This is surely a mistake. Bentham asserted the principle "Everyone to count for one and no-one for more than one" as an axiom; he did not profess to prove that a distribution in accordance with this principle would have greater "fecundity" than distribution in accordance with any other, and recommend the principle on that ground.

The next chapter is concerned with Karl Marx. Russell distinguishes three strands in him. He was a successor of the Philosophical Radicals in opposition to romanticism, a reviver of a certain form of materialism, and a system-builder in the Hegelian tradition. (I think we might add that he shared the taste of his race for apocalypses.) In discussing Marx, Russell explains to what extent he himself does and does not accept the "materialist conception of history" as applied to the origin of philosophical theories. He thinks that Marx's main defects as a philosopher were that he was too anthropocentric and that he believed in a universal law of progress.

There follows a very curious chapter on Bergson. It consists mainly of a reprint of an article which Russell published in the *Monist* in 1912. Now it so happens that the main criticisms on Bergson in that article are based on distinctions (e.g., that between act of cognizing and object cognized) which Russell has long since rejected and which he praises Wm. James in the next chapter for having taught him to reject. Certainly Jupiter sometimes nods!

In the chapter on Wm. James, Lord Russell accepts and welcomes the doctrine of the essay *Does Consciousness Exist?* though he gives reasons why the "neutral stuff" should not be described as "consciousness." But he severely criticizes both the transitional doctrine of *The Will to Believe* and the full-blown pragmatic notion of truth to which it was a half-way house.

This brings us to Professor Dewey, who has the great distinction of being the only living philosopher to whom Lord Russell devotes a chapter. Russell thinks that Dewey's most important contribution to philosophy is his instrumental theory of truth. He states and criticizes this, and in doing so gives a brief sketch of his own present view of the nature of truth. He insists that the instrumental theory is one more instance of the defect of anthropocentrism which he has pointed out in so many of the more modern philosophers, "a further step . . . on the road to a certain kind of madness" (p. 828).

The book ends with a short chapter on the Philosophy of Logical Analysis, a subject to which Lord Russell has himself made more important contributions than any one other living writer.

(2) *The Plan of the Book.* The professed object of the book is "to exhibit philosophy . . . as both an effect and a cause of the character of the various communities in which different systems flourished" (p. ix). In accordance with this plan Lord Russell devotes much space to general history in order to display the social and political background of the philosophers whom he discusses. He remarks that, "when an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obviously absurd . . . we should try to understand how it ever came to *seem* true. This . . . enlarges the scope of our thinking and helps us to realize how foolish many of our own cherished prejudices will seem to an age which has a different temper of mind" (p. 39). These general considerations are developed

in rather more detail in the passages in which Lord Russell discusses the "materialist conception of history" as applied to philosophical theories. His view may be summarized as follows. What is called "philosophy" consists of two different elements, viz., (i) questions which are scientific or logical and can be dealt with by methods on which all competent experts are agreed, and (ii) questions of very great practical interest, e.g., human survival of bodily death, where there is no conclusive evidence either way and no real prospect of getting any, but where it is very hard to remain sceptically detached. To the first class of questions social causation is almost irrelevant, to the second it is highly relevant. The prevalent opinions of any age and country on questions of the second kind do tend to reflect certain presuppositions which are embodied in its social and political institutions. But even here *political*, as well as economic, circumstances must be taken into account; and the former cannot be reduced to the latter. A vitally important motive in human affairs is the desire to get, to keep, and to exercise *power over others*. Although wealth is one source of power, it is not the only one; and although power is a necessary condition for acquiring or preserving wealth, it is not desired only as a means to those ends.

How far does Lord Russell keep to his plan? One would expect two things. (1) That the views of each philosopher on questions which are "logical or scientific" would be discussed without reference to his social and political background, but with due allowance for the developments of logical, mathematical, and scientific technique since his time. On the whole this is what Lord Russell does, though I think he makes quite insufficient allowances, particularly in the cases of Plato and Aristotle. (2) That each philosopher's other views would be interpreted and criticized sympathetically with explicit reference to his social and political background, and that a serious attempt would be made to enable the reader to understand how his opinions "ever came to *seem* true." Here it seems to me that Lord Russell has seldom succeeded and has often not seriously tried. Sometimes the temptation to "score off" an ancient or mediaeval thinker by appealing to the tacitly assumed and uncriticized liberal-democratic prejudices of contemporary England and America has proved too strong for Lord Russell's historical conscience. I have the impression that the parts of the book which deal with general history and the parts which deal with the views of particular thinkers lie side-by-side or in successive layers and are not inter-connected in the intimate way which the plan demands.

I think that the almost complete lack of references is a serious defect in the book, though I can see that their presence would have greatly enlarged a volume which is already extremely bulky. The fact is that Lord Russell makes a number of very startling statements and a still greater number of innuendos; that we are provided with no means of checking these, of discovering their context, or of estimating the value of the authorities from whose writings they are drawn; and that the few cases (e.g., the account of Kant's philosophy) which I can check do not encourage me to accept with implicit confidence the very many which I cannot.

C. D. BROAD.

On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government. By J. S. MILL, ed. with an introduction by R. B. McCallum (Blackwell, Oxford, 1946. Pp. lix. + 324. Price 8s. 6d.)

It is very desirable that attention should at this time again be called to what is the classical, or at least by far the best-known, exposition of the

principles on which British "democracy" is based, and the edition provided serves its purpose very well, though I hope that the cheaper *Everyman* edition will soon be again also available. There is, however, very little for a reviewer to say. The editing of a recent work does not of course present the problems of a classical text, and the scope for the editor's ability to display itself is almost confined to the introduction. The latter is, however, an excellent piece of work, clear, comprehensive, well written and thoughtful. One interesting point brought out is that Mill is more conservative than is usually supposed, e.g. he "has eliminated from the territories capable of benefiting from the form of government of which he is treating most parts of the earth and most periods of human history" (p. xxx). The editor seems to have an inclination towards the more conservative side on many points himself, but this does not, I think, spoil his judgement and appreciation of Mill. He thinks that the conclusiveness of Mill's argument in *Liberty* depends on the denial of "original sin": (p. xix).

It is much to be hoped that the new edition will result in the direction of increasing attention to the works edited. Whatever criticisms can be brought against Mill as a thinker apply much more to the rest of his work than to his political thought, and his *Liberty* and *Representative Government* remains by far the best-known clear and succinct defence of the rights of the individual and the cause of parliamentary government. In the closing words of the introduction the editor on the whole judiciously sums up Mill's relation to present-day political problems in these words. "Wherever he is conservative, wherever he accepts a well-established institution or practice and gives it his approval, the British concept of responsibility of ministers, the United States Senate or Supreme Court, the policy of fostering responsible self-government in the Colonies, the principles of the Swiss and American Federations, all these institutions and practices flourish and are accepted to-day after enduring dangers and strains beyond even Mill's most pessimistic imaginings. And wherever Mill was advocating some innovation, competitive examination for the civil service, women's suffrage, proportional representation, these devices are now general or at any rate widely accepted in many lands. Only his safeguards against extreme democracy, his plural votes and exclusions from the suffrage have disappeared in countries where they existed, and have not been established where they were not found before. It is a small abatement from the effectiveness of his foresight, and whether it is any abatement at all from his sagacity is a question which the present age should not answer too glibly."

A. C. EWING.

The Principles of Moral Judgment. By DR. W. D. LAMONT. (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1946. Pp. xxi + 225. Price 15s. net.)

This book must be classed on the whole as an example of positivist ethics, since it insists that we cannot raise the further question whether actual ultimate standards general to the human race ought or ought not to be followed, but I cannot see that despite many merits it adequately appreciates or grapples with the issue between this type of view and non-naturalist objectivism. We seem to have reached a point at which ethical thinkers of the positivist type have so habituated themselves to looking at the matter from their point of view that they either do not think it necessary to trouble much about advancing arguments which will convince the unconverted or greatly

over-estimate the strength of the arguments they do advance. I can only say that it seems to me that what is put forward by the author as the main argument for positivism rests on nothing better than a merely verbal point. He says "if we assert that there is some supreme standard in accordance with which we ought to pass judgments on actions, we are asserting, on the one hand, that the standard is supreme (and that there can, therefore, be no higher standard), and, on the other hand, implying by the 'ought' a further higher standard of judgment in accordance with which we judge our 'supreme' standard (and which cannot then be supreme)" (p. 10). Now does "supreme" here mean what ought to be the standard for men or that standard which men actually follow in their judgments? If the former, it is no doubt redundant to add the word "ought" when you have already said that the standard is supreme, but need the advocate of the view Dr. Lamont is criticizing add it? Cannot his view be adequately stated without doing so? If, however, the "supreme standard" only means the standard actually adopted, it has not been shown that it is illegitimate to ask whether it ought to be the standard, because "ought" is not in that case already included in the notion. On the other hand, when Dr. Lamont goes on to talk of the possibility that it might turn out that there were certain principles which were necessarily presupposed in any moral judgment we could make (p. 12), he is on a path which might perhaps, if followed further, lead him to a quite different position; but, as far as I can see, his argument in Chapter VII, where he does develop the point a little more, though very interesting, leaves the position in this respect distinctly vague. His positivist outlook is also supported by a criticism of Prof. Moore in an appendix, but this would at the most only refute Prof. Moore and not all those who believe in objective value-predicates. Moore's notion that intrinsic goodness would still necessarily belong in the same degree to anything which now has it even if its context were quite different has never been popular even among objectivists.

Dr. Lamont is also influenced by certain arguments which seem to support the view that there is a close connection between emotional attitudes and the concept of goodness; but it does not seem to me that one need be either a naturalist or a subjectivist about good to admit such a connection. Suppose one defined "good" as "what ought to be the object of such attitudes." Then you have a definition that recognizes the connection between ethics and psychology and yet does not reduce the former to the latter. The author himself says, "I am not professing to show that 'good' is to be subjectively defined as 'that which is willed or desired,' for that is not the theory which I hold. I work only on the hypothesis that good has some essential reference to will or desire, and that any definition of it must be compatible with this reference" (p. 97); and one might agree with him in rejecting any "intrinsic theory of goodness which denies that the predication of goodness presupposes any relation in which the good thing stands to something else, namely the ends and interests of a conative subject" (pp. 103–4), without *reducing* the conception to his actual ends, even if we mean by that (as Dr. Lamont does) not what he actually desires at any particular moment, but what he will desire in the long run (p. 105 ff.). Why not a partly ethical and a partly psychological definition? I think that the notions involved in "ought" are those most recalcitrant to a psychological definition, and an ethics might still be non-naturalistic if it renounced the indefinable good but defined good in a way which involved ought. And I am not sure that Dr. Lamont does not really mean to set up a non-naturalist theory of the "ought," only he seems to leave its connection with the good obscure. This, I think, is largely because the chapter in which he deals with it (VII) is much too condensed. It should,

in view of the preceding discussion, have been the main chapter of the book; but even as it stands, it is a very valuable contribution to the subject. The view put forward is, briefly, that as regards content our value judgments are grounded in our desiring and as regards order in our rational nature, i.e. the genuine moral ought comes in when we recognize general principles which imply that the ends of others are just as worthy of respect as our own. Such an approach certainly deserves serious consideration, and should have been worked out in more detail. In particular, what is meant by recognizing that it is obligatory to consider others even if we happen to want much more to prefer our own interests? The tenor of the book would suggest that to determine what we ought to do is only to determine the standard which people generally assume in fact in moral judgments, but if so we get dangerously near the vicious circle that "S ought to be done" means "People think S ought to be done." It is hardly possible for Dr. Lamont to meet the situation in the way in which many positivists do by saying that ought is to be defined in terms of a general feeling of approval, for he explicitly bases the notion of "order" in ethics on reason. Is he, while upholding a naturalist theory of good, at least drawing near to a non-naturalist theory of obligation (a not necessarily inconsistent position)?

I have dealt with these most fundamental questions at a length out of proportion to the space I shall devote to the rest of the book, but I want to emphasize that there is a good deal of interest in it besides the discussion of the topics on which I have touched above. There is, for instance, a development of the notions of equality and liberty as fundamental, an attempt to make rights prior to duties, a particularly interesting criticism from a utilitarian angle of Ross's theory of promises, and in the discussion of determinism an ingenious attempt to prove that the principle that every event has a cause implies that every event has an effect (pp. 196–98). A feature of the book is the extent to which the author makes use of legal arguments to show what ethical standards people use. It seems to me that there is a good deal of danger in this, since even apart from the frequent cases in which the law represents only the morality of a previous generation the majority of moral obligations are not such as are or ought to be enforced by law, so that the non-interference ordered by the latter with certain activities need not imply anything like moral approval. As an example of the abuse of such a legal argument I can take the reply to the contention that, if anything is to be good as a means, this implies the intrinsic goodness of something else to which it is a means (p. 110 ff). The author here actually seems to argue that, because the British law pronounces it legal to take action which will harm others in order to advance your own lawful interests and does not add that the end must be good, therefore judgments as to means do not presuppose judgments as to the intrinsic goodness of ends. Surely all the legal point shows is that those who made the laws thought that it was desirable that people should be left *legally* free to further what they took to be their own interests even in some cases where their action was undesirable. But perhaps I have misunderstood the argument in question.

Taking the book as a whole, I should certainly, while not thinking it particularly suitable to be a general ethical textbook for students, for which purpose I think it was not intended, recommend it to the serious attention of those interested in ethics. There is a refreshing novelty about the line of approach adopted in the book, and it does make a real contribution to the subject.

A. C. EWING.

PHILOSOPHY

The Idea of Perfection in the Western World. By MARTIN FOSS. (Princeton University Press. 1946. Pp. 102. $1.50.)

This is a very able, very difficult little book. Mr. Foss concentrates on his thesis and on the history of his selected Idea, but he finds so much hanging on to that history and showing through it, that his hundred pages are packed tight.

He defines perfection as the conformity of a reality to its concept. A manufactured thing which fully realizes its purpose is perfect. We extend the idea to persons in so far as they are absorbed in some definite purpose: we may speak of a perfect butler or a perfect typist, but hardly of a perfect man. A power-loom that weaves well is perfect; it is not expected to bake bread. The more limited the end, the more appropriate is the concept of perfection.

One outcome or example of this is seen in the way in which pure thought may make perfect systems, detached from the tangles and failures of actual life. Philosophy and theology through the ages have been haunted by the attraction of a complete and rounded whole. Yet if they are to keep their souls they must always turn back to reckon with some rebellious factor, something left out or something "beyond." It is at our peril that we let the idea of perfection take any but a strictly subordinate place. Above all, "a perfect God, a God who in a perfect way fulfils his end, is an irreligious concept" (p. 26), transforming God into an expediency, into a thing.

The Old Testament, says Mr. Foss, never speaks of a perfect God. Its most characteristic word is "kabod," which means force, will, heart:—the creative force of which the world is full. (This is rendered very inadequately in the Septuagint by *doxa*, which means something like prestige; a term rescued by St. Paul when he made it stand for the beautiful conception of the conquering power over suffering, the power of justification and salvation (p. 28), which in our English version is the "glory" of God.) From New Testament times onwards to our own we see a wrestling between this Jewish-Christian thought and the Greek vision of completeness. Sometimes the word perfection is kept but given the new meaning of excellence, surpassingness. This is by no means justifiable; we have "simply an old word used for a new meaning, for which it is not suitable" (p. 30).

> "We use 'perfection' and 'excellence' synonymously because we are not aware any more that perfection is a static completeness and that excellence is a dynamic movement beyond a limit. Perfection emphasises the end, excellence the way. And so we do not become aware of the difference between the totality of conditions on the one hand and the unconditioned on the other. . . . We are in the sphere of an unconsciously growing development, and those who develop generally do not recognise the new that they are shaping " (p. 32–33).

Finally, as in theology, so in aesthetics and in ethics, perfection can never be the keyword.[1] Kant based aesthetics rightly for the first time when he challenged the idea of end and purpose in art.

> "He not only discovered the beautiful as indifferent to end and perfection, but also in the second aesthetic entity, the Sublime, he discovered a sphere which is a repulsion, a destruction and violation of end and perfection, a total negation of these values. . . . The depth of art is a beyond to the world of ends and perfection, a refusal even of this world,

[1] The English reader may find help here in a much easier exposition of a related doctrine:—*The Limits of Purpose*, by J. L. Stocks (Benn, 1932).

in favour of a higher world. Had he followed this idea, he would have found the TRAGIC as the soul of all art" (pp. 60, 63–4).

The greatness of the tragic hero "manifests itself in the beyond which for him is death, and for the spectator resurrection." Likewise in the ethical life, man "does not start with a fixed and limited end, finding his satisfaction in a likewise limited fulfilment. It is an ideal which he lives but cannot put into words, and this ideal is constantly developing, taking new shape in the actions which lead to its realization and driving always beyond the scope of these actions . . . an all-embracing bond which unifies the world and overcomes it" (pp. 81–2). "Self-perfection" would be as misleading a keyword as "greatest pleasure." We come nearer with "service" and "love."

The author seems equally at home with writers of every period from the Greek to our own day, and the present reviewer is incompetent to criticize the history he gives. Yet I believe I could have followed the story better if it could have been presented as a process of the mingling and cross-fertilization of different ideas, each stimulated by the other and each in turn helping to bring something new out of the old. Failing this, if it had to be seen as a mere contest for supremacy, it might have been the contest of mighty opposites. But in fact one protagonist is strait-jacketed by the presentor's continual recalling of it to its most abstract and trivial form, while its opposite is allowed, unfettered, to be a very Proteus.

I find it remarkably difficult to keep the perfection-idea as nearly empty as Mr. Foss would have it. "A power-loom of which the pistons and levers work without any friction does its weaving well and is, therefore, in all regards perfect. . . . It is an ultimate, absolute fulfilment of its concept" (p. 10). But is this true? and what lies behind it? Man's first concept of a power-loom must have been very inadequate and very vague. The idea and the thing developed together, each in turn prompting and taking the lead; the *telos* standing not only for the guiding lines but for the urge forward. "What a power-loom ought to be" breaks through one boundary after another, economizing power or increasing speed or adapting itself to a wider range of skill. In short, the idea of perfection in practical use seems to me to make the transcendence of limits even more prominent than the keeping within them. A perfect butler (most butler-keeping households in England must have felt of late years) must be able to take charge and inspire confidence not only during a dinner-party but during an air raid.

Something like this is the best analysis I can make of the shock of surprise and disagreement I felt in reading p. 29, where Mr. Foss objects to the redactor's choice of words in Matt. v. 48. "Be you therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." "Christ puts before men the sublime request to love their enemies, the most extraordinary request of Christian religion, an overflowing over all boundaries, an excess of love. And just this extreme, this most irrational demand is characterized by the frigid symbol of intellectual balance and order." (The proper word, he thinks, is given in the parallel passage in Luke, "Be you therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful.") Will he find frigidity likewise in later phrases, of a man tense with the imminence of martyrdom:—"He that is near to the sword is near to God, in the presence of wild beasts, in the presence of God—only may it be in the name of Jesus Christ, that we may suffer with him. *All things I endure, since he, the perfect Man, makes me strong.*[1]

However, a writer must describe a scene as he sees it himself, whether as life pressing down the grasp of death or as the fruitful wrestling of the living

[1] St. Ignatius of Antioch to the Smyrneans, *c.* 115 A.D.

with the living. "The critical attitude of this book," says Mr. Foss, "is meant to clear the way for a more elaborate and constructive approach which I hope to publish soon." We shall look forward to this.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

Ibn Maskawaih. By KHWAJA ABDUL HAMID. Pp. 130. Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore. 1946. Rs. 2·8.)

Ibn Maskawaih has been neglected as a philosopher; de Boer allows him some three pages in the *Philosophy in Islam* but is mostly concerned with his ethics while the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* ignores his philosophy. Then in 1945 Mr. Sweetman translated his *al-Fawz al-Asghar* and here is a study of that work. It treats of three subjects, God, the soul, and prophets, the argument moving along familiar lines; the cosmological and ontological arguments for the being of God and proof that the soul is neither body nor form and survives the body. As man is higher than animals, there must be prophets, who are higher than common men, pure souls who descend from God and then rise again to Him carrying with them common men whom they have persuaded by words that all can understand. Philosophers can only rise to Him and cannot tell what they have learned of Him to men of ordinary understanding. The argument is the usual mixture of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism. The author of this little book has done his work well, he has been fair in reporting the views of Ibn Maskawaih, his criticism is usually fair, and he refrains from extravagant laudation. He is wrong in thinking that the doctrine "from the one only one can proceed" was the cause of the adoption of Neo-Platonism by the Arabs. Also much that "dates" is omitted, such as "the power of sight by its fiery rays senses other external fiery rays." No attempt is made to criticize the book in the light of modern philosophy and psychology.

A. S. TRITTON.

Ideology of the Future. By MUHAMMAD RAFI-UD-DIN. (Printed at Jammu; published by the author. 1946. Pp. 561.)

The argument of this book can be summed up briefly. The Creator cannot do other than create. What used to be called matter is now known to be force in equilibrium; this equilibrium is not perfect so there is always change which is the mind of the Creator working towards Himself. There are no gaps in this course of change; the mind of the Creator in matter works against the laws of physics, rises above them and life is the result; the animal works in and against the bounds set by its instincts and, after many false starts, man is the result; man is aware of himself and, in spite of errors and failures, he is on the road to knowing that he is kin to the Creator and will at last share to the full in the beauty of His holiness. The moving force in the world is love and hate is only the obverse of it.

The author criticizes other thinkers. McDougall made man a bundle of instincts but had to use names for man which did not fit this theory. Freud described the activity of man's mind accurately though his foundation was wrong. *The Textbook of Marxist Philosophy* contradicts the master.

There is little new here. Sincerity is evident; one feels that one is reading a disciple of the mystics who were consumed by love to God, though the author teaches that contemplation and prayer are only means to action. The emphasis on creation is common to Muslim thinkers, so is the secondary role given to reason. The use of beauty for the ideal and love as the motive

comes from the mystics. To an Englishman, the term "self conscious" for the perfect man is unfortunate.

The book is too long, the author repeats himself without mercy on his readers; it is a sermon rather than a philosophy. Unfortunately it is marred by mistakes in English, in spelling, and by legions of misprints.

A. S. TRITTON.

The Theory and Practice of Philosophy. By ABRAHAM EDEL. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. 1946. Pp. xii + 475. Price $3.)

This introduction to philosophy, some 230,000 words in length, is meant to provide "basic material for a full year's course." It may interest teachers and students in this country to know what ground an American student is expected to cover in twelve months. After mastering a section on The Nature of Explanation (teleology, causality, mechanism, natural law), the student proceeds to an acquaintance with Empirical or Scientific Method. Here the presiding genius is M. R. Cohen, and the path is smoothed by numerous apt illustrations; but the traveller has to apply his mind not only to discussions of contemporary problems in epistemology, but also to a bewildering variety of theories propounded on these subjects by writers from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day. If he is at all wearied by the effort of assimilating this mixture of historical and argumentative material, he must gain his second wind, because a similar mixture awaits him along most of the route he has still to travel. The third stage of the journey is devoted to Man, and such problems as those of body and mind, and self-identity, have to be tackled along with the views of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and modern naturalists. In stage four the going is easier, if only because the subject, Human Bondage and Human Freedom, is treated more discursively, and the style is more that of the monograph than the text-book; here Mr. Edel does justice to his considerable gifts both as an expositor and as an independent thinker. Finally, an heroic effort is made in 150 pages to expound the idealist and materialist "perspectives" on metaphysics, religion, art, and the realm of "human affairs," i.e. the problems of ethics and politics.

Students capable of absorbing all this material in two or three academic years, let alone in one, are made of sterner stuff than those in my experience. But even if they then learnt from the book the theory of philosophy, I doubt whether it would stimulate them to its practice, or to philosophize for themselves. To read of this "approach" and that "approach" is to be tempted to memorize rather than to be encouraged to think. The book is learned and often acute, but, for me at any rate, it is too massive. It may seem ungenerous, therefore, to ask for more than is there already, but it is surprising, in a work which attempts to be so comprehensive, to read about idealistic theories of art without finding the name of Croce, and to discover that, though philosophies of history from Augustine to Spengler have their place, problems arising from the nature of historical knowledge are ignored altogether. It would be more reasonable to ask for accuracy, but anyone's short summaries of philosophical masterpieces are apt to be often misleading, and perhaps Mr. Edel's statement that journalists are amongst the auxiliaries in Plato's ideal state is a tribute to the respect in which their profession is held in America. In his preface the author speaks of the effectiveness of the *Republic* as an introduction to philosophy; if he had any thought of superseding it, I am bound to say that it is still to Plato and not to Mr. Edel that the attention of my own students will be directed.

T. M. KNOX.

PHILOSOPHY

Power and Events. By ANDREW PAUL USHENKO. (Princeton University Press. 1946. Pp. xxi + 301. Price $4.00.)

Mr. Ushenko wishes to prepare the way for what he calls a "dynamic philosophy" by establishing that the principle of power or potentiality is fundamental in all explanation. He discovers anticipations of his views in the work of Aristotle, Locke, Bergson and Whitehead, but the large sweep of his thought and the free way in which he uses technical terminology suggest that he has been influenced more by the last named philosopher than by any of the others. It is difficult, indeed, to find one clear sense which the word "power" can bear in all the contexts in which he employs it.

The book opens with a chapter on truth in which Mr. Ushenko advocates a "perspective, or conformal transformation, theory" (p. 19). This is supposed to combine the merits of the correspondence theory with those of Dewey's doctrine. It has application in art and philosophy as well as in science: "Conceptual theories inevitably lead to simplification, but the choice of a simplification varies with different objective situations and perspectives . . . We enter here upon the grounds of aesthetics; and the principle of simplicity in nature may be, in the last resort, an artistic truth" (p. 50). The second and third chapters contain the thesis that power is observed, e.g. when we notice that a picture holds together or that a flash has made us blink. This is the most easily intelligible part of the book. With reference to the problem of the speckled hen (which he claims as his own discovery) Mr. Ushenko states that some of the data of perception are determinable (i.e. actually indeterminate) with an "impulse toward specification" (p. 107). The fourth and last chapter is about concepts and formal logic. Here it is argued that "in order to stabilize and organize the pre-analytic dynamics of experience" concepts "must be a priori or pure" and that "formal logic is the science of pure concepts" (p. 252). One section contains a discussion of the paradoxes created by sentences which appear to refer to their own truth or falsity. It is not clear to the reviewer how this is connected with the main theme but the suggested solution is interesting. Mr. Ushenko asserts that "conceptual intuition" has not been convicted of any fault, since the sets of symbols which puzzle us fail in a quite ordinary way to be significant sentences. In support of his view (as expounded previously in an article in *Mind*) he quotes from a letter by C. I. Lewis (p. 266).

WILLIAM KNEALE.

The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. By MAURICE J. GRAJEWSKI, O.F.M., M.A. *The Importance of Rural Life according to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* By GEORGE H. SPELTZ, M.A. (Both published by the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.)

The second of these dissertations will serve as a reminder that the medieval Schoolmen were not exclusively concerned with purely abstract speculations, and that an important test of the validity of any philosophical system is to be found in its applicability to every-day life. As an exercise in what may be described as pure philosophy, Fr. Grajewski's thesis on Scotus is, naturally, of greater importance; but Fr. Speltz's "study in Economic Philosophy" has this to be said for it that it is only by such practical applications that men can hope to build a world safe for pure philosophy.

Duns Scotus has been aptly described as *Doctor Subtilis* and the penetrating analysis of his system has played an important part in the development of Scholastic thought; there are those who believe that sufficient attention has

not been paid to his work. It will suffice here to say that those who are unacquainted with Scotus or have read little of his writings will find this essay a very useful introduction to the literature of Scotism and to his dialectical method, whilst, even for the expert, we believe that this discussion will be of profit. The question at issue, the *distinctio formalis*, is rightly described by Fr. Grajewski as "*the* crux in the philosophy of Duns Scotus," and this investigation is a serious and valuable contribution to a solution.

Of Fr. Speltz's work it can be said that it shows a wide acquaintance, not merely with the writings of St. Thomas himself but also with the history of the period and with later social and economic developments. And there is something refreshing in a passage such as: "A city which has an abundance of food from its own territory is more dignified" (*dignior* = higher in the scale) "than one which is provisioned by merchants." (How much more than one which is inadequately provisioned by them). Again, the modern egalitarian fanatic should ponder the wise words: *Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere.* THOMAS CORBISHLEY, S.J.

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Indian Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1943. Part II. Edited by DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. Pp. 289 + 5.

This volume comprises thirty papers or abstracts, ranging over a wide variety of topics; some are tantalizingly brief, occupying no more than four or five pages. The collection begins with the Presidential Address by P. N. Srinavasachariar, a general survey of contemporary philosophy bristling with such words as "pan-psychist," "personalist," "mentalist" and the like. Of the other items eight deal specifically with Indian philosophy. For most readers of PHILOSOPHY these will not be of primary interest, but that is no reason for being blindly parochial; our first task is the cultivation of our own garden, but we need not deny the existence of our neighbour's next door, or even scorn whatever hints we may get (if we can) by looking over the fence. Lord Russell did well to entitle his recent work *A History of Western Philosophy*: the characteristics of our own tradition stand out the more clearly by contrast with another. For the benefit of students of Indian philosophy, the titles of these papers are "Madhva's Absolute," by H. N. Raghavendrachar (an attack on the usual interpretation of Madhva's philosophy), "Some Problems of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā," by T. M. P. Mahadevan, "Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Buddha," by A. P. Guruswamy (including a comparison of Buddha with Christ), "An Examination of Ramanuja's Criticism of Ego-less Consciousness," by S. K. Saksena, "The Jaina View of Causation," by C. P. Brahmo, "The Concept of Sthayibhavas in Indian Poetics," by D. D. Vadekar (suggesting a parallel with McDougall's theory of instincts or propensities), "Is Madhva a Monist?" by H. K. Vedavyasachar (a vigorous reply to the earlier paper by H. N. Raghavendrachar) and "Buddhism: The Conception of God," by Miss K. Saberwal.

Two papers are devoted to Islamic philosophy, one by M. Umar-ud-din ("Muslim Philosophy—its Scope and Meaning") and the other by Dwight M. Donaldson ("The Beginning of Philosophical Ethics in Islamic Thought"). Both are jejune in the form presented, and neither writer is happy when tracing the development of Islamic philosophy out of Greek: Mr. Donaldson misunderstands Aristotle's treatment of νοῦς, while Mr. Umar-ud-din makes the startling statement that among the topics left unexplored by Greek philosophy were the attributes of God and the immortality of the soul.

The remainder of the collection is devoted principally to European philosophy. The standard of the papers is not, in general, very high, but they have their interest nevertheless. Among the best is that on "Subjectivism in Kant," by S. Sahu, who examines the First Critique and urges with Kemp Smith that strong subjectivist influences were at work in both the Aesthetic and the Analytic, and who does well to refer to the penetrating treatment of the *Ding-an-sich* in Adamson's *Development of Modern Philosophy*. Papers on Bergson are contributed by E. Gathier ("Is Bergson a Monist?"), who attempts unconvincingly to read into *L'Evolution Créatrice* interpretations derived from *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, published a quarter of a century later; and by H. S. Asthana, who writes briefly but lucidly on "Bergson's Ethical Outlook." It is interesting to find this attention paid to a moral theory which, although discussed not long ago by Dr. H. D. Oakeley in *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, has in general been unduly neglected by English Philosophers. R. Das and S. Vahiduddin are both stimulating, the former on "The Nature of Philosophic Thought in Hegel," and the latter on "What is Living and What is Dead in Hegel's Philosophy of History." Dr. Das brings up acute problems confronting the Hegelian dialectic, but skirts the ill-starred definition of philosophy early in the Encyclopaedia *Logic* as "the thinking study of things." Dr. Vahiduddin, rightly criticizing Hegel as Croce does for reading into history some inevitable "Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit," holds nevertheless (as against Croce, whom he does not mention) that in view of the "List der Vernunft" the course of history must be viewed against the background of an eternal reality. While censuring Hegel he demurs equally to Nicolai Hartmann's *Das Problem des Geistigen Seins* (a work of considerable importance if only because of the difficulties it shows to confront a philosophy of history based on an extreme epistemological and ontological realism, thereby placing Collingwood's anti-realist polemic in a clearer light).

W. Lillie gives a study of "The Present Position in Inductive Logic" based principally on the work of Keynes and Nicod, Braithwaite's review of Nicod in *Mind*, Vol. XXXIV, and discussions by Broad of similar date. It is a pity that his references to Nicod are to the French edition, and not to the more accessible translation by Wiener (London, 1930), and that he says nothing of the developments of the last twenty years in the programme and aims of physics, or of the work of Reichenbach or the able contribution made by von Mises in his "Probability, Statistics, and Truth." A similar topic engages D. M. Datta, who writes thoughtfully on "The Logic of Scientific Verification." S. C. Chatterjee ("The Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Error") attempts half-heartedly to defend James, Schiller, and Dewey against the charge of being pragmatists, while J. N. Chubb, who calls his paper "Freedom and Truth," says nothing about politics but puts forward an eloquent plea for a supreme state of mind free from all the limitations of thinking, singing with Goethe (not, he urges, arguing) "Grau ist alle Theorie, Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum." This is the presidential address to the Logic and Metaphysics section. None of the remaining papers is of any great interest, apart from some thought-provoking remarks by Mr. Rajnarain on "Types of Sensory Phenomena in Mystic Life."

In general, the value of these papers lies less in their performance than in their promise, which is certainly there; one's thoughts on putting them down turn rather to the clash of traditions they reflect, Hindu, Islamic, and Western. Matthew Arnold spoke of himself as "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born," but his situation seems absurdly simple when

contrasted with the diversity of courses confronting India in the present century; the future historian will find these papers a fascinating document of her *Geistesgeschichte.* D. A. REES.

The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha. A collection of historical texts translated from the original Pāli and edited by J. G. JENNINGS, M.A. (Oxon.), C.I.E. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 1947. Pp. cxvii + 697. Price £2 2s. net.)

The study of Buddhism has been remarkable for the cataclysmic nature of its progress. First seriously investigated by Burnouf in late Sanskrit documents it became as thus reconstructed largely put aside, except in France, when the Pāli Canon of Ceylon was made accessible. T. W. Rhys Davids through his life-long labours not only made the Pāli Scriptures known, but imposed on them his own conception of the early history of Buddhism. Then came another cataclysm. His devoted wife and fellow-labourer set to work to destroy the whole structure of what we know as Buddhism, not merely the interpretation of Rhys Davids, but also the historical Buddhism of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. This she looked upon as degenerate monasticism, and found the real Buddhism of Buddha so different that she preferred to give it another name, Sakya. Her destructive work, mainly aimed at the views of Rhys Davids, was often effective, but of the rest no more need be recorded than the words of the late Professor E. H. Johnston: "Her constructive formulation of the Buddha's doctrine appears to me to be at complete variance with all we know of Indian thought in the sixth century B.C."

It is thus clear that the way is open for another reconstruction, not of Buddhism as it now exists among its adherents, but of the Buddhism which is supposed to lie behind all its sacred records, and which Mr. Jennings finds to be Vedāntic Buddhism. But he gives us far more than that. In this volume of nearly 800 pages he presents in a careful translation the actual evidence from the Pāli Scriptures and historical works on which his theory is based. It is such a radical reversal of former views that it can hardly be discussed adequately in a short notice, and it is only possible to suggest the general lines that must be pondered and reconsidered.

His sub-title tells us that it is based on historical texts, but this need not be pressed too closely, for there is only one essential date, that of the death of Buddha, and he leaves it undecided whether this was 487 B.C. or sixty years earlier. The latter date is in fact that used by the Ceylon Buddhists, but it agrees neither with that favoured by modern scholars nor with any of the dates adopted by the various schools of Buddhists in India or China. The question of translation is also affected by the fact that the records are full of stories of gods and miracles. The author's scepticism about these is shown by his translating the words for "god" as "spirit," "angel," or "fairy," and in omitting from the text all the passages which narrate miracles performed by the Buddha, his followers, his opponents, and the gods, as being accretions. The omissions are faithfully recorded in the notes or the appendices, so that the reader is never misled.

The most important omissions, however, are found when we come to the doctrine. No one doubts that the belief in gods, in reincarnation, and in karma (retribution for an individual's acts) were current beliefs in Buddha's time. But the author tells us that there is no proof that Buddha himself accepted the existence of supernatural beings. "Mention of them in the

Canon appears to be by way of ornamental addition to enhance the importance of various occasions." So too of reincarnation. That the Buddha believed in rebirth he denies, and so, when in the First Sermon craving is said to be "tending to being again," he suggests that the word in question is perhaps interpolated, "a monkish explanatory addition," but he keeps it in his translation, and makes it mean "recurring." Accordingly, "all definitely transmigrationist phrases and passages have been omitted from the present text and have been placed in footnotes," as being probably additions by later Buddhist authorities, whose view of karma was personal or individualistic.

This last point brings out one of the author's fundamental contentions. An individual cannot suffer for his sins in his next birth, for he will not have one, but there is a "Collective Karma." "It is not one single individual who suffers or who gains by any action whether in this life or in any other; nor is it one soul who passes on a load, heavy or light, or an advantage, great or small, to one other soul brought into some close and mystical relationship with the former; but it is all the world, in each transient generation, that suffers or gains by the deeds, words, and thoughts of every fleeting individuality that manifests for a brief lifetime the phenomenon of separate being." This well brings out the author's claim that his conclusions are definitely his own.

In this fundamental unity of all life we appear to have the reason why the author calls the Buddhism of Buddha Vedāntic. The theories of Vedānta, he holds, had already reached their full development. As in Vedānta there is the One divine substance. He finds it in the words of Buddha at his enlightenment, which he translates freely as, "all things pass away (save the divine substance in which) all things are originated (and of which) all things are compounded." The words in brackets, he tells us, are implicit. They are at least required by his theory. He also finds that the doctrine of *Māyā* or the illusory nature of all phenomena was taught by thinkers of the Vedāntic school, and it would appear that Gotama's teachers Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka imparted to him this philosophy. However, he admits that they may possibly have been Yogis of the dualist Sānkhya school.

It may seem strange that the author after calling Buddhism Vedāntic should say that metaphysics was a region "where the Buddha definitely refused to tread." But he goes further in pointing out two respects in which Vedāntic Buddhism differed from classical Vedānta, not in avoiding metaphysics, but in asserting realism. He holds that, although it is more than probable that Buddha was acquainted with "the ancient Vedāntic theory of *Māyā* (illusion) or idealistic monism," yet he rejected it. To Buddha the world was not illusory, but vividly real. This is scarcely Vedāntic. In the next place the Buddhistic One or the divine substance, unlike the reality-intelligence-bliss of classical Vedānta, was an impersonal divinity, it was "a single divine impersonal force," and yet we are told that though impersonal it does not involve atheism. This touches upon theology, but the immediate question is whether it is Buddhistic. Further, his denial of rebirth does not make it look more Vedāntic. The author thinks that the doctrine of rebirth or personal karma was apparently introduced into Buddhism subsequently to the period of Asoka's Edicts, since Asoka ignores it. Asoka, however, speaks of *svarga*, which is usually taken to mean "heaven." The author gets over the difficulty by supposing that it means not a future heaven, but the present peace of Nirvāna in this life.

These radical novelties can only be properly appreciated in relation to

the texts, and the author has chosen an excellent method of presenting them. They are arranged so as to give a life of Buddha along with selections from his discourses, and thus we get the Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha. The appendices contain supplementary texts and important discussions. The translations from Asoka's Edicts and the Rules for admission to the Order with the regulations for monks are especially welcome.

E. J. THOMAS.

The Case for Pacifism and Conscientious Objection: A Reply to Professor G. C. Field. By Rev. E. L. ALLEN, FRANCIS E. POLLARD, and G. A. SUTHERLAND. (London: Central Board for Conscientious Objectors. 1946. No price given.)

Three essays of 24 pages each are here bound together in answer to Professor Field's *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection* (Cambridge University Press, 1945, 3s. 6d.) which was reviewed in PHILOSOPHY for July 1946.

Mr. Allen, who is Lecturer in Theology in the University of Durham, writes the first, on *Pacifism as an Individual Duty.* (The titles follow those of Professor Field's chapters.) In ethical theory he believes there is little difference between Professor Field and himself, and he endeavours to make all the concessions due. It is true, he says, that the consequences of our acts must be considered; nevertheless they may be considered too much, and the plain man recognizes an honourable disregard of them.[1] It is true that no man's conscience has a right to rest on general formulæ;—the pacifist must face the arguments in favour of the particular war which he confronts, and go through the agony of questioning his principles in the light of the new and concrete crisis. Nevertheless the repudiation of slavery or polygamy "only became possible because individuals dared to arrive at it and to champion it while it was as yet quite an unpopular thesis . . . If a man is called by God to stand apart from his time in order that a new moral advance may one day be possible, what right has he to decline?"

Mr. Pollard, formerly Chairman of the Peace Committee of the Society of Friends, contributes Part II; a very thoughtful and fair-minded essay on *Pacifism as a Policy.* In his final page or two, on the duty of pacifists who constitute a small minority in their own country, he agrees with Mr. Allen:—

> "Every step forward which the human race has taken . . . has had its beginning in the mind of an individual or a small group . . . I have an impression that what our critic is mainly concerned to say is this: You may be right in all your fundamental and long-term views, but when war is upon us are they relevant? Can we do anything else but fight? No one disputes the challenge or the dilemma, but to assent to this appeal is to betray our deepest convictions and to abandon what we believe to be the hope of human good."

Part III, on *Society and the Conscientious Objector,* is written by the Principal of Dalton Hall in the University of Manchester. Many of Mr. Sutherland's students and friends must have suffered for their belief, and I think it has been difficult for him to write impartially. This essay, alone of the three, tends to repeat a note of irritability which undeniably appears here and there in Professor Field's book. Professor Field was a member of a Tribunal for four years, and perhaps did not ask himself often enough

[1] But is it relevant to illustrate from our approval of "the man who is truthful even when it would be distinctly to *his* advantage to be otherwise?" (Italics mine.).

whether if entrants to the fighting services had to justify themselves before a board, they might not produce an equally wearisome repetition of "supposed absolute, universal rules" and "ready-made sets of ideas taken over from other people," (Field pp.10, 6). Mr. Sutherland's references to Tribunals are practically all critical or hostile, and he offers no suggestion (perhaps it is impossible) to help the members in their extremely difficult task of estimating a man's sincerity.

Professor Field reports that by far the larger part of his Tribunal's time was absorbed in the discussion of alternative forms of service. Mr. Sutherland holds that such conditional exemption is illogical if the law provides for unconditional exemption at all. The objector who establishes his sincerity should be unconditionally exempted, while the rest by hypothesis have no claim. But if conditions are to be made, "the situation would have been a lot better than it has been" if the governing principle had always been most-valuable-service and not penalization. I think this is true; but in so far as penalization disappears a corresponding effectiveness of witness will be lost. "Experience in the last war suggests" (writes Mr. Sutherland himself) "that the radical objector who was ready to face repeated sentences of imprisonment rather than serve even in the Non-Combatant Corps, was the only one that the army really respected."[1]

The idea of witnessing for one's cause when one can do nothing else for it, is crucial in the last resort in all three essays. I cannot find that Professor Field discusses it anywhere, but I think he might say that it begs the question; that witnessing is valid only when the act which embodies it is a duty on prior grounds, and that this question of duty is precisely the one under dispute. To take a different example, let an educator believe fervently in the value of gentleness in dealing with children, and let us take the hypothesis that for a particular child in his charge, in an exceptional crisis, gentleness would be the wrong thing. The man has no right to persist in his normal course in order to emphasize the value he believes in, if it involves his failure to help the child. He would be acting irresponsibly;—trying (we might say) to improve upon God's will.

But this assumes that the man we speak of is the only person in charge. Most children are in the charge of more than one grown-up. Is it conceivable that certain situations may be best met by two people acting not merely differently but even along opposing lines? I have been struck by the passage which concludes Mr. Allen's essay:—

> I see no possibility of a simple solution. . . . In the last resort, each man must reckon with his own destiny and his own vocation. That one vocation is to the service of God in maintaining the closed societies of the present I grant. I only urge that there are thousands of voices which will not allow us to forget this, and that there is, therefore, all the more need that some should remind us from time to time that there is another possibility, the service of God in the transmutation of these closed societies into a more open society with something in it of the splendour and power of the kingdom of heaven.

[1] A reviewer must protest against Mr. Sutherland's central comment on conscription. "When men are forced to fight it cannot be held that they are fighting because they think it right; the reason they are fighting is because they are submitting to *force majeure*. . . . They may believe the cause is just, but that is not why they are fighting; they are fighting because the only alternative is heavy legal penalties. . . . Failure to accept this implies a belief that every German soldier is fighting in what is to him a just cause."—That is, with motives A and B both in the field, everyone concerned acts solely from B; and failure to accept this implies a belief that they all act from A.

The novel point here, if it is meant seriously and not as a courteous ambiguity, is the idea that there may be opposition not only between groping consciences but between true vocations; that the soldier and the pacifist may each be doing God's will, or rather that it takes both together to do it. This would be a deepening, and a superseding, of the fairly common view that the nationals of two countries at war have a duty to fight one another. It would go further than the generally accepted view that men whose consciences are opposed, after reflection and discussion, ought to obey them. It would share with both these opinions the danger that reflection and discussion might be abandoned too soon.

At any rate it is an interesting suggestion. I should like to know whether the writer meant it, and should then like to see it debated further.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Edited with Introduction by PROFESSOR NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A. (Nelson & Sons, Ltd., Edinburgh and London. Second Edition with Supplement. 1947. Pp xii + 249. Price 10s. 6d.)

This volume is a second edition of the work first published in 1935, and is evidence of the interest in Hume's *Dialogues* or in the editor's Introduction or in both. The only change effected in the new edition is the inclusion of a supplement containing Hume's brief autobiographical *My Own Life* and Adam Smith's *Letter to William Strahan.*

Adam Smith in this letter remarks that concerning Hume's philosophical opinions "men will, no doubt, judge variously, everyone approving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own." Where the work is written in dialogue form, as is the case under review, still greater scope is given for difference of view because of a desire to identify some one of the characters with Hume himself.

Professor Kemp Smith in his *The Philosophy of David Hume,* published in 1941 between the two editions of the *Dialogues,* puts forward the thesis that "in the *Treatise* Hume, we find, is still maintaining, though in a half-hearted manner, a theistic view of nature; it was only later, in wrestling with the issues discussed in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,* that he came to question and reject it" (pp. 563–64). In his Introduction to the *Dialogues* he identifies Philo the sceptic with Hume and asserts that Hume in that work aimed "a direct attack upon the whole theistic position" or, again, upon the very citadel of religion. This is a defensible view, capable of straightforward argument. What is probably not so defensible and what, in the light of the larger treatment of Hume published in 1941, may have to be regarded as a relic of a past tradition, is the ascription of unpleasant qualities of character to Hume by implication in such statements as that outward deference to current beliefs and practices "was a game" into which he could zestfully enter, or that, while all the time carefully avoiding a direct attack on religion, he made statements which may seem reassuring to the reader but which are "provocative" or are made with mischievous "intent."

Now, in the first place, the latter part of this interpretation requires that other evidence should be written down; Adam Smith's estimate of Hume's character is to be judged "high-pitched," intentionally "provocative," and "generously" vindicating his friend's reputation. In the second place, the editor admits that the "Dialogues" have become a philosophical classic, having acquired a unique place in philosophical literature, and that Hume's

indictment of the older ways of argument is "now but seldom challenged." Kant recognized the main criticisms as unanswerable and incorporated them in the final revision of the *Critique*. Such admissions have a significance which makes the preceding interpretation at least awkward. In the third place, Professor Kemp Smith in his *The Philosophy of David Hume* is at pains to maintain that Hume is not a sceptic, and this would seem to remove one important support in the identification of Hume and Philo. In that work he also gives an interpretation of Hume's notion of belief and of natural belief which could be developed in such a way that the position of Cleanthes is neither so absurd nor so weak as the editor suggests.

As the editor in his Introduction touches on Hume's discussion of Miracles, it may be permissible to make a few remarks. Hume may or may not have had *Faith*; Dempster, a friend of Hume, in a letter to Sir Adam Fergusson (quoted by the editor on p. 22, note 2) says that he had not; but in that same letter Dempster asserts that *Faith* is the only support of the best mode of religion. Hume himself has been criticized for also saying so. In regard to the concluding portion of the Essay on Miracles, "probably the most notorious passage in all Hume's writings" Professor Kemp Smith does offer some defence of Hume, but he takes the passage as a parody of the Calvinist account of how Faith operates. The passage is well known. "So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by *Faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." Along with this I put the following from St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* (Bk. xxii, ch. 5) without comment: "If our adversaries believe not that the Apostles wrought any such things for confirmation of the resurrection of Christ it is sufficient then that the whole world believed them without miracles, which is a miracle as great as any of the rest."

B. M. LAING.

A Research for the Consequences of the Vienna Circle Philosophy for Ethics. By W. F. ZUURDEEG. (Utrecht, Kemink en Zoon N.V. Pp. 244. No price stated.)

This is a book about Logical Positivism, written from an altogether unusual point of view. It is a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Theology in Amsterdam, and the author's main aim is to evaluate the ethical writings of Schlick, Von Mises and Neurath from the standpoint of his own theological position, that of "radical Protestantism."

The first half of the book is purely expository, firstly of the general philosophical outlook of the Vienna Circle, and secondly, in greater detail, of their views on ethics. This account is, as far as I can judge, an accurate one, and certainly its impartiality merits the highest praise. It might usefully be placed in the hands of enquirers who "want to know something about Logical Positivism."

In the second half, which is concerned with criticism and evaluation, what is of chief interest is the extent of the *agreement* which is revealed between Dr. Zuurdeeg's position and that of the Vienna Circle. He writes on p. 159 of an "unmistakable affinity between Positivism and radical Protestantism," and I am sure he is right here and that he is saying something important;

indeed the chief value of his book lies in the way in which he brings out this affinity between two of the major trends of modern thought which on a superficial view seem so diverse. Certainly there are important discrepancies ("it makes a big difference whether we have religion or not"—p. 136 n.) and he has several major criticisms to make, but the extent of the agreement is sometimes quite startling. He is convinced that the positivists have discovered the right *method* in ethics, though he thinks their behaviouristic standpoint vitiates their use of it by blinding them to the essential nature of moral action and moral judgments. (Incidentally, Dr. Zuurdeeg has an interesting analysis to offer of the nature of ethical enquiries, though it is impossible to outline this here.)

The affinities and discrepancies are best seen, however, in connection with his discussion of the Positivists' "world-view." He is convinced that they have such a world-view just as much as he himself has, and that a man's world-view is bound to colour his whole outlook. It is one of his major criticisms of the Positivists that they stubbornly refuse to recognize this, and on this refusal is based their search for a completely "neutral" science, which Dr. Zuurdeeg regards as a wild-goose chase. Scientific objectivity, he believes, is to be achieved not by pretending that we have no world-view, but by recognizing its nature and trying to discount its influence as far as possible. Otherwise we become not *more* but *less* objective, because unconsciously so.

Since the Vienna Circle do not recognize their own world-view, Dr. Zuurdeeg has to state it for them. He summarizes it as "materialism, relativism, naturalism, evolutionism and humanism." He has most to say about relativism ("the contention that there are no absolute values or truths"), and it is here that the extent of his agreement is most clearly shown. Eternal truths, absolute rules, *Reine Vernunft*, moral intuition, a "higher world"—all these are rejected by him just as categorically as by the Positivists. "I do not believe in a higher world," he writes, "but in God, and that is something quite different" (p. 144). "He who worships absolute norms, or the Universal Reason, who believes in the hierarchy of values, defies God" (p. 158). And so in its opposition to all such beliefs the Vienna Circle "does not attack *allies* of faith . . . but secret opponents." Church, Bible, dogma, metaphysics, absolute truths or values, moral dignity, etc. (the list is an impressive one)—all these are "earthly data" and "under the judgment of God" (p. 162). This leads to Dr. Zuurdeeg's main criticism of the Vienna Circle. For, having performed a good work in attacking so many illusions, they find their own point of stability in natural science, and this too is merely an earthly datum, no more worthy of absolute confidence than the rest. Absolute security is to be found only in God, Who *transcends* the world; and it is radical Protestantism alone which makes this clear. The fault of "the radical Neo-positivist philosophy" is, therefore, that it is not radical enough!

This is thoroughgoing criticism with a vengeance. One is impelled to ask, however, whether the acceptance of so much destructive criticism does not itself cut at the roots of Dr. Zuurdeeg's own theological position; on his own premises, is his belief in God any more justified than the positivist's in science? This is a doubt which may legitimately be felt about a good deal of modern theology. Dr. Zuurdeeg would doubtless reply that a theology (a "world-view") is not capable of justification by argument, but is none the worse for that; but is this reply satisfactory? I do not suggest that the starting-point of a man's religion ought always to lie in rational argument; but if a theology cannot turn round and justify itself by rational arguments, I suspect that in the long run it will be found to have no other justification either.

It must be added that it is a great pity that Dr. Zuurdeeg did not have his MS. carefully corrected by someone competent to revise the language. There is scarcely a single page written in correct and idiomatic English; and while this seldom results in actual ambiguity it does make the book unnecessarily difficult to read. There are also more misprints than one can easily forgive.

GEORGE E. HUGHES.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1945–46. (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1946. Pp. 266. Price 25s. net.)

In an important and original presidential address Professor Gilbert Ryle combats the prevailing doctrine that intelligence is a special faculty, manifest in internal acts of thinking such as the consideration of propositions. As against this he argues that intelligence is directly expressed as will in some practical as in some theoretical performances, and need not imply contemplating regulative propositions. Theories of knowledge have concentrated on knowing *that* something is the case, but intelligence also requires knowing *how* to do things. Even purely intellectual activity, such as conducting an argument, consists not merely in knowing rules of thinking, but in ability to apply them. The rules may be known but stupidly applied. Acknowledgement of principles is not the parent, but only the step-child of intelligent application. A problem of knowledge is again discussed in Professor Reid's suggestive paper on "Intuition and Truth," in which he argues that *cognition* is an element in all conscious experience and includes intuition as well as propositional knowledge. Further the latter is not primary, but is dependent on an unique, irreducible act of cognition which is an intuition. No act of moral goodness, e.g., is good because it is an instance of a general moral concept; on the other hand, moral concepts are the result of reflection on moral beings and doings.

Dr. Waismann's "Are there alternative Logics" is an important contribution to logical theory. He maintains that the assumption that there is a single theory of logic embodying the "laws of thought" is not in accord with our present level of knowledge; and discusses (1) the possibility of using sentences in such a way that in certain cases the law of excluded middle does not apply since they can be asserted neither true nor false; (2) what he describes as strong and weak negations which imply truth-distance indicated by such descriptions as "not quite . . ."; and (3) the logic of memory images and sense impressions, which give rise to special problems because of their indeterminateness. Dr. Waismann shows that the language which accurately describes sense impressions has a logical structure different from that in which physical objects are described. It demands a class of propositions to form a single description, the decisive step consisting in comprehending a group of sentences in one independent unit. In a further contribution on Logic Mr. Kneale considers the "sort of truths" that constitute the science, dealing with the problem comprehensively as it appears both in traditional views and in contemporary theories. By elucidating the character of the principles implied in these, Mr. Kneale endeavours to make clear their essential relations, and to show how recent discussions point the way to a more acceptable view.

Mr. MacIver brings a challenge to moral philosophers to embark on an inquiry into the actual moral difficulties confronting the present generation. "Moral philosophy must be more empirical or perish." Fifty years ago there was general agreement among moral philosophers as to what was right. Now

the younger generation have become a society without a moral criterion. They are not without moral seriousness and recognize the difference between good and evil, but they cannot decide which is which and are without any sense of the transcendent. The older moralists fail to help, since they have not remained close to the actualities of contemporary life. The change has its roots in the Industrial Revolution, was nurtured by Marx and Freud, and was speeded up by world events of recent times. It demands inquiry both into actual conditions, and into the influences that have led to them. Such inquiry should be comprehensive, and include historical, sociological, psychological and other studies. I suggest a group of variously qualified thinkers, all "close to the realities," and that philosophers will be grateful to Mr. MacIver if he succeeds in inspiring such a group. Mr. Coddington's contribution on "Punishment" is of especial value as the work of a penetrating mind reflecting on long experience in the administration of law. He seeks to show that in imposing punishment the background is the vindication of law and the correlative social improvement of order, and that in the foreground the choice is generally narrowed to deterrence and reformation.

In his paper on "Causality" Professor Russell gives his answer to the question: Are there any self-evident causal propositions? After examining in detail the views of Ross and Broad he concludes that none of the propositions advanced by either has been shown to be self-evident. In his preliminary remarks Russell states that should this be the case it leaves the question: What is to be said of general principles which cannot be proved or disproved, but which are invaluable guides to investigation and understanding? We look forward to his views on this problem. Dr. O'Connor has presented the results of an analytic study of the concept of "Resemblance." His main purpose is to indicate how problems on universals can be stated with more precision than has hitherto been the case, and of this his analysis of resemblance provides a valuable illustration. Mr. Hardie tries to show how philosophers who have recently discussed "Phenomenalism" have failed to meet Stout's fundamental criticism that it "commits the absurdity of making what is actual depend on what is possible, instead of what is possible depend on what is actual"; and concludes that, until it is met, phenomenalism must for many remain a doctrine which "only philosophers with a long training in absurdity could succeed in believing." In his paper on Whitehead Mr. May argues that Whitehead's speculative philosophy is modelled on the method of postulates, and that his metaphysical scheme is tentative and depends for its truth on empirical verification.

G. H. LANGLEY.

Meaning and Truth in the Arts. By JOHN HOSPERS. (North Carolina University Press. London, Geoffry Cumberlege. Pp. 252. Price 22s. net.)

This is a very modest, sane, and useful book. The virtue of modesty is sometimes strained to a defect. When, after an able discussion *pro* and *con*, we should like to hear the author's own conclusion, we are often put off with a long quotation, not more able, from some writer not more authoritative. This makes the book, if not less useful, less interesting. But it is still a fault on the right side as compared with the hierophancy common in works on this subject. Yet sometimes it is just the hierophant who is quoted (p. 236); sometimes the point illustrated might be taken as agreed (pp. 5, 146).

The author's main effort is to disentangle the ambiguities of those who ask or answer such questions as: "What does this picture (or sonata) mean?" "What does it express?" "What is its significance?" "Is it true?" I found

most instructive the long chapter on "Meaning," and least the short one on "Expression." I cannot help feeling that the book would have gained by a careful analysis of Croce who is only once slightly mentioned. Apart from Croce's epistemological identification of "expression" with "intuition," his formula for beauty as "the expression of emotion" seems very near the author's own view, so far as that is revealed, and his differentiation of expression from "evocative" or "emotive" stimulus is clearer than that here given. It is hardly noticed that people find "meaning," "significance," "expressiveness" in nature as well as in paintings, presumably because of what the author calls "life-values"; but if they are present for some of us in a sunset, it is hard to see why they should not be in the most un-representative art. The artist may mean something by his pattern if it means nothing to others. Here again I think Croce would have been helpful. But the book as it stands is one to be grateful for. E. F. CARRITT.

Books also received:

MAURICE CORNFORTH. *Science versus Idealism.* London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1947. Pp. 267. 12s. 6d. net.

JOHN HOSPERS. *Meaning and Truth in the Arts.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1946. Pp. 252. 4 dollars.

THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L. *Creative Man.* The Romanes Lecture delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, May 20, 1947. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1947. Pp. 30. 2s.

STEVEN RUNCIMAN. *The Mediaeval Manichee.* A Study of the Christian Dualist Theory. Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. x + 212. 15s. net.

H. J. PATON. *The Categorical Imperative.* A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. London: Hutchinson's University Library. 1947. Pp. 283. 21s. net.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. *Ethics.* New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1947. Pp. xiv + 385. 3 dollars 50 cents.

D. DAICHES RAPHAEL. *The Moral Sense.* (Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs). London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. 201. 12s. 6d. net.

W. F. R. HARDIE. *Naturalistic Ethics.* Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy, 1947. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. XXXIII. 31 pp. 4s. net.

RUDOLF CARNAP. *Meaning and Necessity.* A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Great Britain and Ireland: Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. viii + 210. English price 27s. 6d. net.

BERTRAND RUSSELL. *Philosophy and Politics* (The Fourth Annual Lecture of the National Book League). Published for the National Book League by Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. 30. 2s. 6d. net.

ARTHUR LITTLE, S.J. *The Nature of Art or The Shield of Pallas.* London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. x + 264. 8s. 6d. net.

JOHN OULTON WISDOM. *The Metamorphosis of Philosophy.* Cairo: Al-Maaref Press. 1947. Pp. vii + 224. No price quoted.

GEDDES MACGREGOR. *Aesthetic Experience in Religion.* London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1947. Pp. 264. 15s. net.

A. J. ARBERRY, Litt.D. *Pages from the Kitab Al-Luma' of Abu Nasr Al-Sarraj.* London: Luzac & Co., Ltd. 1947. Pp. 29 + 16. 6s. 6d.

H. AND H. A. FRANKFORT, JOHN A. WILSON, THORKILD JACOBSEN, WILLIAM A. IRWIN. *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man.* Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Great Britain and Ireland: Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. 401. English price 22s. 6d. net.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. *Existentialism.* Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library. 1947. Pp. 92. 2 dollars 75 cents.

JOHN OULTON WISDOM. *Causation and the Foundations of Science.* Paris: Hermann et Cie, Editeurs. 1946. Pp. 54. No price quoted.

LECOMTE DU NOUY. *Human Destiny.* New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co. 1947. Pp. xxii + 289. 17s. 6d. net.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. Vol. XXI. *The Philosophy of Being.* Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America. 1947. Pp. 207. 2 dollars.

MAX BLACK. *Critical Thinking.* An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1946. Pp. xv + 402. No price quoted.

THEODORE VAN SCHELVEN. *An Introduction to Definitive Philosophy and Basic Psychology.* Amsterdam: Kosmos Publishing Company. 1947. Pp. 112. No price quoted.

E. F. CARRITT. *Ethical and Political Thinking.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1947. Pp. xx + 186. 10s. net.

AGOSTINO GEMELLI and GIORGIO ZUNINI. *Introduzione alla Psicologia* Milan: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1947. Pp. xvi + 448. No price quoted. (Pubblicazioni dell'Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. Nova Serie, Volume XX.)

MORRIS GINSBERG. *Reason and Unreason in Society.* Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy. London: for The London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), Longmans, Green & Co. 1947. Pp. vii + 327. 15s. net.

R. G. SMITH (Editor). *Scottish Periodical.* Vol. I, No. 1. London and Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd. Pp. 120. 5s. net.

DONALD WILLIAMS. *The Ground of Induction.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1947. Pp. vii + 213. 3 dollars.

MAX HORKHEIMER. *Eclipse of Reason.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. vii + 187. English price 16s. net.

ALLEN WIKGREN, in collaboration with ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL, RALPH MARCUS. *Hellenistic Greek Texts.* Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Great Britain and Ireland: Cambridge University Press. 1947. Pp. xxvi + 275. English price 20s. net.

W. E. HOCKING, BRAND BLANSHARD, C. W. HENDEL, J. H. RANDALL, JR. *Preface to Philosophy: Textbook.* New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1947. Pp. x + 508. English price 12s. 6d. net.

GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism.* New York: Schocken Books Inc. 1947. Pp. xv + 454. 5 dollars 50 cents.

A. C. EWING. *The Individual, the State, and World Government.* New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1947. Pp. viii + 322. English price 20s. net.

BARKER FAIRLEY. *A Study of Goethe.* Oxford University Press. 1947. Pp. viii + 280. 15s. net.

ERANOS JAHRBUCH, 1946 (Band XIV). *Geist und Natur.* Zurich: Rhein-Verlag. 1947. Pp. 570. 27.50 Swiss francs.

ANTON FISCHER. *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis.* Wien: Springer-Verlag. 1947. Pp. vi + 240. 4 dollars 20 cents.

CORRESPONDENCE

XTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

THE Ninth International Congress of Philosophy (Congrès-Descartes), which took place in Paris in August 1937, accepted at its final session the Dutch Government's invitation to meet again in the Netherlands. The Tenth Congress would have met in Groningen, in September 1941, had not the war prevented this. In February 1940 an indefinite delay of the Congress was agreed upon. Only some months later the Netherlands were overpowered. Shortly after Professor Leonard Polak was arrested; he died in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, a victim of an inhuman ideology.

The committee which had constituted itself under Polak's chairmanship agreed to resume their task as soon as circumstances would permit and have decided, in agreement with the board of the preceding congress and the "Institut international de philosophie," to summon the Congress to Amsterdam during the summer of 1948 to meet at a date yet to be arranged between August 15th and September 15th

We now address to the students of philosophy in all countries, which during the last years have served the cause of mankind, a first call. We feel that the Congress will, at this very moment, meet the sympathy and the active support of all those who endorse the idea of humanity and who prefer universal values over particular interests.

The material difficulties, which, at this moment, hamper international relations and traffic, presumably will gradually diminish, in 1948 it will be possible to travel to the Netherlands without too much trouble. The assistance promised in this respect by the section Literature and Philosophy of the UNESCO has been gratefully accepted.

The Congress will reflect as far as possible the philosophical activities during the years since 1937. The board are fully aware of the present situation in philosophy, which is characterized by a predominance of diversity over unity. They accept the diversity without indulging in any illusions of bringing about a unification

They consider a meeting of representatives of divergent currents of thought as highly profitable, provided it is inspired by a desire for objectivity and mutual respect. On the other hand they are anxious to prevent the Congress from becoming merely a fortuitous encounter of these tendencies where, in spite of all objectivity, the impression of a total lack of unity would prevail. In order to meet this danger the choice of a central theme, imposed by the inner development of philosophy as well as the present state of mankind, seemed justified. This theme is given by the ideas of *man, humanity, and mankind*, which are so closely interconnected, that their philosophical clarification cannot be performed without constant mutual consultation.

This central theme borrows its significance from the facts that it points to the common origin, from which the divergent currents of thought may be considered; it indicates a common problem, to which they all refer. In dealing with this theme, we certainly cannot do without the contributions of sciences such as sociology, psychology, psychiatrics, ethnology, and the history of civilization.

The other domains of philosophy will, of course, be present at the Congress besides its central theme; the theory of knowledge, the theory of values, the problems of metaphysics will not be lacking. Wherever possible they will be brought in connection with the central theme, without prejudice to the autonomous treatment of their special problems. For the plenary meetings papers will be invited on the central theme as well as on the other great problems

Provisional subscriptions for the Congress and announcements of short papers to be read in the sections will be very welcome to the secretariate. Especially any suggestions regarding the fundamental idea and its practical elaboration will be gratefully accepted.

Further communications will follow, in order to keep future participants informed on the state of our preparations.

Name and address of the secretary: E. W. BETH, Bern. Zweerskade 23 I, Amsterdam-Z.

(On the receipt of the above letter, representatives of the Mind Association, The Aristotelian Society, and The British Institute of Philosophy, met to consider

how British Philosophy could make a contribution to the Xth International Congress of Philosophy.

Dr. A. C. Ewing, of 69, Hurst Park Avenue, Cambridge, was appointed to represent all three of the above Societies, and he has sent a letter to a selection of British philosophers, informing them of the proposed Congress and inviting them (1) to communicate with him if they intend to be present at the Congress, and (2) to submit their papers to the Secretary of the Organizing Committee, Professor E. W. Beth, Bern. Zweerskade 23 I, Amsterdam-Z.).—Ed.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

Readers of *Philosophy* may be interested to learn that in June of this year the first award was made of the Susan Stebbing Studentship. The successful candidate is Mademoiselle Francoise Chauvet, a French lady who has the Licence ès Lettres of the University of Lyon and hopes to proceed to her Agrégation. She is studying the origins of modern philosophy with special reference to Bacon and Descartes, and will hold the Studentship at Bedford College.

Yours faithfully,

H. B. Acton.

Bedford College for Women
(University of London),
Regent's Park, N.W.1.

INSTITUTE NOTES

Members will have received information concerning the lectures and evening meetings for the session 1947–48.

The 22nd Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, London, W.C.1, on Thursday, October 2, 1947, at 5 p.m. This was immediately followed by an Extraordinary General Meeting at which it was resolved that the name of the Institute be changed to "The Royal Institute of Philosophy."

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.