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THE CENTURY SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, *Editor*

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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IN MEMORIAM

CLARENCE G. DITTMER

1885–1950

Student—Colleague—Teacher

Collaborator—Friend

Preface

WHAT WAS SAID in the preface to our third edition could be repeated almost verbatim in this preface to our fourth edition. It is becoming tragically clear that wrenching change and recurrent crisis will confront at least another generation. But it is still true that "whatever is to come must be projected inevitably from the institutions and relationships now existing, and students still must be made aware of the elements of the culture in which they live."

We have continued in this edition our effort to present a comprehensive and balanced analysis of the significant social problems of contemporary American life. The sequence has been little changed, and much of the material included in earlier editions has been retained. Nevertheless, several of the chapters have been almost completely rewritten—notably those pertaining to race relations and population; and all have been brought up to date. Some have been combined to provide space to introduce two entirely new chapters—the one considering the social problems of urban life, the other those of rural life.

In addition, an appendix has been included, relative to the mechanics and interpretation of statistical materials. Since statistics have come into such great importance in recent years, a practical working knowledge of their construction and use is more than ever necessary. It is hoped that this brief and nontechnical description of statistical method will prove helpful in making statistical materials intelligible to the student of elementary sociology.

If the student garners a few clear and sound impressions about the issues being fought out all around him, and about his own part in those issues, our most important purpose will have been accomplished.

THE AUTHORS

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SOCIAL PROBLEMS

1. The Background of Social Problems

THERE ARE TWO aspects to personality, the *I* and the *We*. It is hardly possible to think of the one without at the same time including the other. Nevertheless, we generally find ourselves viewing life's situations from the *I* point of view, especially when we are confronted with what seem to us extremely perplexing *personal* problems—the problem of finding the sort of work that satisfies our special aptitudes and interests and pays us a sure and adequate income; the problem of establishing ourselves in a happy relationship with others; the problem of keeping pace with what a constantly changing world exacts of us. But, at the same time, we cannot escape thinking of these problems in terms of *We*. It is the consciousness of our membership in an aspiring and achieving social group, and of the potential praise and blame of our fellows, that impels us to put forth our best efforts. Even then we have moments when it seems that our utmost powers are inadequate.

Likewise, in the lives of nations and of peoples there come tense times —trying periods of unrest and of great change, periods that call for earnest and far-seeing leaders, for wise decisions, and for decisive action. We are today living in one of these periods.

Many times, especially during the past two thousand years, the peoples of the Western world have gone through such periods of social upheaval and vast social change. It was one of these periods that crumbled the morally bankrupt Roman Empire and swept civilization into the Dark Ages. It was another of these periods that broke the spell of medievalism and gave rise to the modern state, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. It was another such period that developed the democratic philosophies, established popular government in these United States, crushed monarchy in France, and abolished slavery. The opening of the twentieth century marked the beginning of still another period of major social upheaval, perhaps the most severe and far-reaching ever experienced.[1] The changes

[1] Roscoe Lewis Ashley, *Our Contemporary Civilization* (1935), pp. 36–45.

of this period not only go to the very foundations of Western civilization, but they are shattering the traditional patterns of human relations in the Orient. As recent war-torn years have shown, even the First World War was but an incident in our present period of sweeping change; it was but the beginning of a world-wide struggle among peoples, nations, and ideas to gain a dominant position in the new era that is sure to emerge as life becomes adapted to the enormous changes now taking place.[2]

Each of these great epochs of history altered the social structure of nations and, in part at least, transferred from one group to another the responsibility for directing the affairs of men. In general each epoch tended to center an increasing amount of authority within reach of the common people. While these changes in the social structure and in the source of authority were the more obvious, they were perhaps of less real significance than the changes in the ideas and the ideals of the people. In fact the *ideas* and the *ideals* changed, clarified, and gathered strength before the old forms and structures gave way to the new.

The review of these great changes in social thought which ushered in each succeeding epoch cannot be more than hinted at in our present study.[3] But it is important here to remember that with each succeeding period came increasing consideration of the *general welfare.* Little by little, in most civilized countries, the old idea that the individual citizen existed for the welfare of the government and the ruling class, gave way to the idea that the primary function of the government should be the furtherance of the general welfare of the people; the *ideal* of equal opportunity and equal justice to all gradually uprooted the ideas of "divine right," special privilege, and arbitrary authority.

While the Western world has in the past thus struggled through great and perplexing problems, never has it been confronted with as comprehensive and complicated problems as it faces today. Furthermore, the experience of the past offers only indirect aid to understanding and grappling with the large-scale problems of today. It is little wonder, therefore, that so many of our thinkers and writers view the present-day situation with profound apprehension. Some see in the modern trend the symptoms of moral decay that characterized the declining days of the Roman Empire or of the French Empire prior to 1793.[4] Some feel that the unprecedented development and expansion on the *material* side of culture has already reached a crisis, and that further progress is hardly possible until the *nonmaterial* culture, especially the *spiritual* forces which form the sound

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 46–73; Harold Rugg, *The Great Technology* (1933).

[3] The student who is interested in this phase of the subject will find the following books of interest and value: Harry E. Barnes, *Contemporary Social Theory* (1926); J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923); Charles Ellwood, *History of Social Philosophy* (1938).

[4] H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization;* G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America;* G. LeBon, *The World in Revolt.*

basis of human relations, have had a chance to grow and develop accordingly.[5]

What, then, is the outlook? Is it true that our modern culture, which includes the civilization of which we Americans are so proud, is top-heavy with materialism and heading for a fall? Are we certain that the strain and stress of our times and the seeming ruthless disregard for the old standards are true symptoms of national decay, or may they be merely the evidence of "growing-pains" and thus a healthy promise of the development of a better social order? Whatever the future may hold, we cannot escape the obligation of directing our best thought and our most earnest efforts toward the conservation of progress and the improvement of the common welfare.

Even though the problems of today are more numerous and more complicated than those which faced the generations of the past, we are in a better position to cope with them than were the people of any other period. No other generation has been so well equipped with the social sciences, or had such quick and effective means of communicating ideas to every man, woman, and child in the population. May we not hope, therefore, that a better understanding of society, and of the great changes that are taking place in it, will help us to understand better our present-day problems and point the way to sound policies in dealing with them? But just what is the nature of this thing which we call society? What is its relation to culture? What is the nature of the vast changes which mark this age as being the most baffling age of all history? What is the nature of the difficulties confronting mankind today? What is the relation of sociology to the study of social problems? We must have answers to these questions if we are to understand the backgrounds of present-day social problems. To this end it is important that we have a common interpretation of the terms and concepts generally used in sociological studies.

SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL GROUPS

We have already used the word *social* a number of times, but it is so often used loosely that it is necessary to make clear our meaning. Frequently it is used in the sense of being separate from and in contradistinction to the *individual* and *personal*. "In its largest sense it denotes that which pertains to the collective aspect of humanity, to society in its widest and vaguest meaning. . . . Again, *social* may mean what pertains to immediate intercourse, to the life of conversation and face-to-face sympathy —sociable in short. . . . In a third sense the word means *conducive to the collective welfare,* and thus becomes nearly equivalent to *moral,* as when we say that crime or sensuality is *unsocial* or *antisocial.*"[6] However, in

[5] Graham Wallas, *The Great Society* (1917); Raymond Fosdick, *The Old Savage and the New Civilization* (1927); Roscoe Lewis Ashley, *Our Contemporary Civilization* (1935), pp. 567 ff.

[6] C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), p. 4.

none of these meanings is the term *social* set over against the terms *individual* and *personal* any more than the *whole* is set against one of its *parts.* It is the last meaning referred to in the quotation above—"conducive to the collective welfare"—that comes closest to our interpretation of the term: relationships, and products of relationships, that are believed to foster and promote *group life,* and to insure *group survival.*

Some sort of group life has ever been essential to survival, and for this reason the group has always taken a hand in the shaping and directing of the life of its individual members. From the very beginning *group selection* has had an important part in the creating of what we call *human nature.* Down through the ages the life of the individual has been circumscribed by an ever-expanding group life, and those individuals whose lives were not in accord with what was believed to be the best interests of the group were speedily killed, exiled, or shut off from contact with their fellows. This constant weeding-out process has tended to make man increasingly social. If group life could remain static, if it could cease expanding and cease becoming more and more complex, we would doubtless soon be rid of those individuals whose propensities are *antisocial.* However, it is the very nature of healthy group life to grow; and this growth exacts of the individual an ever-rising standard of social qualities. Often this growth produces shifts in the standards and requirements of the group, so that what was once condemned or disapproved may later be encouraged and rewarded. Today, because of the growing complexity of relationships and the increasing interdependence, group selection takes on new and more far-reaching characteristics.

Simple Group Life. Glancing back over American history we can see how the society in the United States has expanded from the simple group of colonial days to the complex and interwoven nation of today. In pioneer days the family was held together by the home. The home was the center of practically all social life, and family ties and loyalty to the home were the chief basis of appeals to action in behalf of either the community or the colony. But the dangers and the hardships of pioneer life brought increasing emphasis upon broader coöperation, and people began to think actively in terms of the welfare of their settlements and towns. The towns then became the dominant unit of community life, especially in New England. While they were supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the colonial governments, they were in fact practically independent, and were often resentful of, even opposed to, the orders from the colonial governors. Town loyalty became very intense, even to the extent of excluding from the town "strangers" and "foreigners" whose occupations or family connections might be suspected or unwanted. People from other towns and other settlements were treated with much the same suspicion and aloofness that are often accorded the Oriental or South European immigrant today.

These early colonial and pioneer settlements were virtually self-sufficient.

They raised all their own food, made all their own clothing, and had their own respective brands of religion; each household provided its children with whatever education was felt necessary; the town meetings and the town board of selectmen made the laws and regulations that were imposed upon the inhabitants, affecting even the minutest details of their lives. Those were days when social life was indeed personal. The treatment accorded the poor, the sick, or the orphan depended to a large exent upon how the community regarded the particular individual and his family. If he came from a "good" family and belonged to industrious, pious folk, he might receive the kindly, neighborly consideration that he needed; if, however, he "had no family," or belonged to people known to be "idlers," or if he was careless about attending church or happened to differ in belief from the rest of the community, then the assistance given was apt to be meager. The treatment accorded the offender and the insane was likewise personal and severe. When whipping-post, stocks, or branding iron seemed too mild, the culprits were "run out of town." Life in such communities was indeed simple. There was no complex division of labor; the government was direct and understood by all; there were no experts or specialists, no daily papers or magazines laden with advertising to make people dissatisfied with their drab existence or to lead their interests away from the slow-moving life of the town.

These small, self-sufficing, painfully personal pioneer communities typify what we have called *simple group life.* While the patterns of social life developed there were especially characteristic of pioneer days, they have left an indelible impress upon American culture; and to no small extent they remain a part of and influence our attitudes and conduct even today.

Expansion of Group Life. Had it not been for the independence of the colonial groups, and their developing opposition to the dictates of the colonial governors, it is doubtful if the Revolutionary War would ever have taken place. But this common opposition to outside interference in local affairs furnished the stimulus for the expansion of social life. It was the appeals to the local loyalties that brought the colonists together to fight for the cause of liberty. Gradually the local loyalties expanded into State loyalties, and the States began to share with the local communities the interest and the thinking of the people. The emphasis on States' rights clearly indicated that the social mind had not yet grasped the idea of nation, nor did it appreciate the attempts of the Federal Government to share obligations and services with the States.

Then, the different sections of the United States began to absorb the loyalty that for a time had been given to the States. The contrast in social and economic life between the States of the North and those of the South gradually crystallized and became a severe strain on the efforts to create and develop a national life. In the North, because of the more rapid industrial development, localities and States had largely become subordinate

to national loyalty; but the South still believed in States' rights, though much sentiment had been transferred to the section. It took the War Between the States, and a long and trying period of reconstruction, to make these United States really conscious of national unity and national interdependence. It is too much to say that this expansion into a solid national life is entirely complete; there is still no little evidence of sectionalism. Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition of the fact that we are living together not as States, but as a nation. Many of the functions that were only a short time ago regarded as belonging exclusively to the States are now being urged upon the Federal Government: regulation of business and trade, uniform labor legislation, adequate provisions for social security, raising the standards of educational opportunity, suppression of crime, meeting the problems of unemployment, promoting conservation of natural resources, insurance of bank deposits—these are but a few examples of this tendency.

Even before nationalism has been fully achieved, there looms upon the horizon another great expansion—*internationalism.* Since industry and commerce depend upon the natural resources which are so unevenly distributed among the nations of the earth, and since communication and travel have thrown the peoples of the world into closer contact with one another—to say nothing of the recurrence of global warfare and the grim potency of atomic energy—there has been a growing consciousness of the inadequacy and the futility of national isolation. But can we melt down our national loyalties into the common mold of an international society? The melting down of the lesser loyalties was by no means easy. Each expansion was purchased at a great cost; each was entered upon with grave misgiving, with reservations, and in the face of "irreconcilables." However, these great expansions of social life are now practical realities. Must we not, therefore, in spite of the patterns of group life in the world scene today, expect that an international society will some day also be a reality? [7] Certainly the need for it is already apparent.

It should be borne in mind that the expansion of social life not only has a direct causal relation to social problems, but also is a troublesome factor in the achievement of sound and timely adjustments of those problems. Our thinking has by no means kept pace with the expansion of our social and economic contacts and relationships. Consider the incongruities of our present-day tendencies to judge social conduct of individuals in this motor age by standards and ideals that were suited to saddle-bag days, or our vain efforts at controlling modern economic life by principles designed to meet conditions of the eighteenth century, or our pathetic attempts to grapple with the menacing problems of international affairs in terms of the cracker-box ideas of "Main Street."

Relation of Expansion to the Functions of Group and Social Life.

[7] Roscoe Lewis Ashley, *Our Contemporary Civilization* (1935), Ch. XV.

While each expansion was made at the expense of the smaller cycles of social life, claiming some of the interest, service, and loyalty that formerly were centered exclusively in the smaller cycles, the smaller cycles nevertheless have not disappeared. They have indeed been modified, but they continue to be of fundamental importance. Each type of group has certain functions that cannot be absorbed or completely transferred to larger groups. Thus, for example, the functions of the family have been greatly modified, as we shall see when we come to study the problems of family life,[8] but the family still remains a primary and fundamental group. The neighborhood and the community have also been radically changed, but they too still retain many important functions. No two neighborhoods or communities are alike. Each presents a variety of circumstances and problems different from all others, making it necessary for the State and the nation to leave much to be done by these smaller groups in order that social life may be better adjusted to the local needs. But just which functions should remain the prerogative of the smaller groups, and which functions would be better performed by the larger groups? These questions underlie many of our social problems and constitute an important issue in many of the major social adjustments.[9]

Perhaps nowhere are the effects of expansion of *social* life more dramatically evinced than in the small-town and rural communities of America. Here, more than anywhere else, we see the "minds that were made up" in the "good old days" frantically struggling against the demands of the expanded economic and social life of today. Scarcely a generation ago these small towns and villages held practically a monopoly sway over fairly well-defined trade areas; today not only are they in competition with the towns and villages of neighboring trade areas, but even more do they feel the competition of the larger cities and of national advertising. It is no longer necessary for people to be satisfied with the meager and inefficient services of Main Street. Likewise, a generation ago the countryside was dotted with the little one-room schools and neighborhood churches designed to serve the less expanded social life of that day. Fortunately these one-room schools are rapidly disappearing and education is moving into well-equipped consolidated schools that serve a wider area and more nearly meet the educational needs of expanded social life. But to a large extent the little churches still remain, many of them abandoned or opened for services only now and then. The religious life either finds expression in more distant churches that are better equipped and more modern, or gives way to the many other absorbing interests that expanded social life affords.[10] The effects of expanded group life in other aspects of national

[8] See Chapter 13.

[9] "Our Cities, Their Role in the National Economy," Report of the National Resources Committee (Washington, D.C., June, 1937).

[10] See Walter Burr, *Small Towns* (1929); Hornell Hart, "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," Report of Hoover Committee on Recent Social Trends (1933), I.397 ff.

life are perhaps less obvious than in the small-town and rural communities; but they are of no less influence.

Relation of the Social Life of Expanding Groups to the Individual. The group, as we have already noted, circumscribes and to a large extent directs and shapes the lives of its members. However, not all aspects of group life exert equal pressure upon the individual; some aspects affect him more directly and more intimately than others. This fact becomes more evident as group life expands and becomes more and more complex.

Even in the family the individual is not the center. He is more concerned with certain family functions than he is with others; some obligations and privileges come closer to him and affect him more directly than do others (Fig. 1). Likewise in each of the larger areas of social life the individual cannot escape being somewhat affected by even the most remote factors

THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE EXPANSION OF GROUP LIFE




FIG. 1

and conditions. But he is more interested in and more concerned about those matters closest to him, and which he feels most keenly and sees most clearly. Thus, he may not be actively interested in a playground for his neighborhood if his children are already grown. He may not like the ugly billboards that clutter the vacant lots, but he is not generally much concerned until a billboard stares into his windows. He may not be much interested in liquor control, being neither a drinker nor the son of a drinker. As owner of an automobile he is strong for good roads. He is interested in the impending coal strike because he would be out of em-

ployment if the mill did not receive its regular supply of coal. He is opposed to unrestricted immigration because he is convinced the foreigner would take his place at a lower wage, and he would have to hunt a new job or sell his car. A generation ago his parents came to this country from Germany; he is, therefore, interested in international relations affecting Germany, but he is little interested in what happens in China.

So it goes. No two individuals are affected just alike by the configuration of social relationships. Matters that one individual feels are inconsequential and remote to his interests may be considered of first importance and fundamental to another (Fig. 1). For this reason it is difficult to get the *whole* public behind movements for social reform. The major task of the leaders of such movements, therefore, consists in presenting the needed changes in such terms as will bring them as near home as possible to each individual, so that he will feel that he *can* and *must* do something about them. This task is by no means easy. The average citizen is already bewildered with the thousand-and-one "important issues" demanding his interest and support.

WHAT IS SOCIETY? [11]

All this group life is nicely interwoven into a *system* that we call *society* —"any group of people united together more or less closely by sentiments, ideals, traditions, customs, folkways, and mores which define the interests and purposes of the people belonging to that group." [12] Society, then, is the product of association; it is the fruit of group life. Society constitutes the whole fabric of group life and interrelationships—it is our *social inheritance.* We are members of society to the same extent that we are affected by the utmost expansion of group life. "Self and society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion." [13] We cannot, therefore, conceive of society as something apart from individuals and groups; but we cannot thereby conclude that each individual and group is a true reflection of the whole of society. Professor Cooley likened society to a picture that is made up of so many square inches of painted canvas.[14] Each

[11] The term *society* is often used loosely. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for the word *mankind* or the word *humanity.* Often it is used to indicate leisure-class pretenses. It is frequently used instead of the word *association* or the word *organization,* as in The Society for the Friendless, or The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Then, too, it is often used to indicate various groups, as in American Society, German Society, and New England Society, or to indicate various group aims, as "sympathetic society," "socialistic society," "despotic society," and "acquisitive society."

As to the origin of society there are numerous theories—for example, the so-called "social-contract theory," the "social-organism theory," and the "political-animal theory." But whatever the theory, no one doubts the existence of society.

[12] J. L. Gillin and F. W. Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology,* 3rd Ed. (1930), p. 16.

[13] C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (1910), p. 5.

[14] C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), p. 3.

square inch of canvas represents an individual or a group. If we take up and examine these bits of canvas one at a time, we see that each reflects something that is characteristic of the picture; but the whole theme of the painting, its organization and structure, is not thus made apparent. We must view the canvas as a whole, each square in its proper place, to understand fully and appreciate what it is all about. Thus, if we center our attention upon individuals and groups, we cannot get an accurate view of the *system* and *organization* that make up society.

Similarly, when we view society as a whole we see that it is composed of four outstanding and closely interwoven fundamentals: *groups, uniformities, standards,* and *institutions.*[15] The chief difference between the complex society of today and the society of the past is to be found in the changes that *time* and *progress* have made in these fundamentals. Furthermore, it is in these fundamentals that the roots of the present-day social problems are embedded. Consequently, if we are to understand fully the nature and scope of the great problems of society today, we must study them in relation to the structural fundamentals of society.

Groups and Their Relation to Society. We have thus far considered the rôle of group life in human affairs, the development of American society through the expansion of the simple group life of pioneer days, and the position of the individual with reference to the cycles of expanded group relationships. However, if we are to understand the forces at work in present-day social life, we must examine more in detail the nature of the groups that compose present-day society.

Broadly speaking, social groups may be divided into two general classes: (1) the *primary* groups, those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and coöperation—the family, friendship circles, neighborhood clubs and play groups, all groups that "are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual";[16] (2) the *secondary* groups, those with which the individual becomes identified through his participation and association in the expanded and more impersonal social and economic life—labor organizations, business and industrial associations, civic, religious, and welfare bodies, political parties and movements, learned societies, federations of women's clubs, and the thousand-and-one other "organizations," "associations," "movements," "federations," "leagues," and "blocs."[17] Many of these secondary groups are channels through which like-minded primary groups find a broader and fuller expression.

The primary groups have an important rôle in present-day problems of social adjustment. It is through them that the emotional attitudes of individuals are so largely formed, and old customs, traditions, prejudices, and ideals are passed along from one generation to the next. Each of these

[15] E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology,* 3rd Ed. (1938), Pt. X.
[16] C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (1920), p. 23.
[17] Gillin and Blackmar, *op. cit.* (1930), p. 155.

groups is a culture-carrier and strives to perpetuate certain social characteristics. Consequently, each is somewhat different from the others. This difference is often the basis for unhappy and troublesome intra-community situations. Since a community is made up of a number of neighborhoods, it is necessary that all of them coöperate in order to secure better schools, improved health service, better housing, wholesome recreation, efficient and economical government, and sound plans for future growth. Such cooperation, however, is more the exception than the rule in American communities. Intergroup opposition, prejudice, and hatred hamper community development, thwart needed adjustments, and bring about waste of community resources probably more than any other set of causes. Such unfortunate rivalries among these lesser groups are by no means of recent development; they have always been conspicuously characteristic of American society. However, they take on a deeper significance as social life expands and becomes more complex.[18]

While the primary groups have been to a large extent a *constant* in American life from the beginning, the great majority of the secondary groups are of recent origin. The few that are more or less of traditional origin have "swapped saddles," so to speak. Modern labor organizations, for example, are quite different from the craft guilds of earlier times. The Industrial Revolution—the introduction of machinery, the growth of science, the development of inventions and discoveries, and the improvements in means of communication and transportation—created an altogether new basis for the organization of society. Instead of royalty and nobility dominating a *static* and *stratified* society, we have the financier and the capitalist holding the prestige and power in a *dynamic* and *fluid* society. Instead of a population that is fixed to the locality where it was born, we have a mobile population that freely and quickly flows from region to region. Instead of the jack of all trades and the self-sufficient community, we have an ever-increasing specialization, in respect to both persons and regions, resulting in an increasing interdependence.

It is this new setting that has recast the old secondary groups and given rise to a multitude of new ones. It is possible now for like-minded individuals and those specializing in a given field to unite and form strong organizations for the protection and advancement of their interests. In fact it is these *interest* groups which matter most today.

Individuals engaged in almost every phase of human endeavor—such as miners, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, artists, doctors, lawyers, bankers, social workers, craftsmen, laborers, or farmers—have organized into very definite interest groups. And, to no small extent, the contribution which they are making to society as well as the benefit they receive in turn are in proportion to the effectiveness and strength of their organizations.

[18] Walter Burr, *Small Towns* (1929), Ch. III.

It is the expanding and the intensifying of the interest groups that furnish us with cause for both our highest hopes and our gravest misgivings regarding the outcome of the great changes taking place in society today. They inspire us with our highest hope, because it is only through group action that progress can be made today. They give us cause for apprehension, because group conflict is waged with more devastating weapons than were known to the men of any other day.

Uniformities and Standards. A society tends to produce uniformities and standards, *i.e.*, to spread its culture and achievement so that its benefits and responsibilities are felt by all its members in varying, yet definite, degrees. Interest groups are the greatest vehicles for the dissemination of uniformities and standards. With each expansion of groups, with each improvement in travel and communication, with each advancement in science and knowledge, the drive to wipe out old cultural differences and attain new standards becomes greater. How quickly the benefits of science are disseminated is illustrated by the rapid spread and use of the new discoveries in the field of medicine. A few years ago, two scientists in Toronto discovered insulin, an effective treatment for diabetes, and in less than a year physicians all over the world were relieving thousands of those suffering from that dreaded disease. Inventions, too, spread with amazing rapidity. Witness the swiftness with which the automobile has displaced the horse on our roads; note how, in hardly more than a score of years, the radio has taken possession and brought concerts and speeches within hearing of even the most isolated!

When such facilities and advantages become recognized elements in the culture of a group or a people so that their possession or use is expected of all its members, we say that they have become elements in the *standard of living* of that group or people. What we term *the American standard of living* will vary from group to group in American society. But nowhere is the American standard of living limited to merely the crude necessities of life; in addition it includes the social refinements, the personal training, and the domestic equipment which an American citizen can justly be expected to have. When individuals or families are unable to reach this more or less definite standard, they are "hard up," "poor," "needy," or "disadvantaged," and call forth social concern.

In order to appreciate how the great advances in science and social thought have spread, we need only to compare the *standard of living* of the working-man's family today with the standard of living of the same class of working-man's family of but a generation ago. To be sure, as we have indicated, the struggle to maintain and to advance that standard of living is getting sharper. But the aim of democratic society is ever directed to the task of bringing uniform advantages to all. Hence, wherever a family, a neighborhood, or a community is "backward"—not in a position to enjoy these uniform advantages—social agencies are directed

to the task of removing the obstacles and developing the resources. This is forcefully illustrated by the manner with which the millions of unemployed and their families were extended public relief throughout the years of the depression. Even on relief they generally enjoyed a higher standard of living than was usually enjoyed by the self-supporting worker of fifty years ago working on a full-time job. Extensive changes in Federal and State laws were made in later years, to raise permanently the standards of public assistance for both the needy and the dependent, and to increase the security of the average, normal family by such measures as old-age annuities, unemployment compensation, and minimum wage scales. Technological development and social conscience have converged to a remarkable degree to bring a better life to an ever-growing portion of our citizens.

Institutions. Social institutions represent the crystallization of methods of guiding and controlling social relationships. They are firmly rooted in the past, and tend to test conduct and social relations by the dictates of precedent rather than by scientific experimentation. We might say that they are the rigid, bony skeleton about which the flesh of our social system grows. Society could no more function without them than the muscles of our bodies could function without our bones.

There are scores of social institutions, great and small, but in general they group themselves about a few pivotal fields of human relations.[19] Thus marriage, the home, and divorce are some of the most important institutions pertaining to the family and the relations of the sexes; the church is the outstanding institution for instruction and service in the field of religion; around the function of government are clustered numerous institutions, such as the courts, the legislative bodies, and the military; in the realm of education are the schools, the libraries, the museums, the newspapers, and the universities; in the field of economic relations are the institutions of money, banking, stock and produce exchanges, and markets; in the field of health and welfare is an ever-increasing number of institutions, such as hospitals, clinics, health centers, orphanages, homes for the aged, and colonies for the feeble-minded; and in the field of recreation there is also an increasing number of institutions, such as the park and playground, the theater, the motion picture, the radio, the dance hall, the tavern, and the press.

It is at once apparent that the study of social problems must concern itself to a very large extent with those conditions and changes which affect the social institutions.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF SOCIETY

As we have indicated, it is the nature of healthy group life to grow and to spread the benefits of civilization as evenly as possible through the en-

[19] C. C. Taylor and B. F. Brown, *Human Relations* (1926).

tire population. But growth and improvement are not the result of blind drifting. They come from *socializing* the attitudes and aims of individuals and groups in society. By *socialization* we mean the directing of human motives toward giving to "even the least" of the members of the social whole the benefits of cultural development. Socialization is thus practically the opposite to *aloofness, selfishness, greed, exploitation,* and *profiteering.* It causes the individual and the group to *feel* their *oneness* with the social whole. It builds within the individual and group a *sentiment*—a conscience—with respect to sustaining the ideals, standards, institutions, and welfare of society. In brief, what society regards as *moral, i.e.,* good for the whole, becomes the aim of socialized individuals and groups. This being true, the improvement of society rests to a very large extent upon *moral progress.*

Cultural progress is made up of both moral and material progress. In its widest sense it is the development of civilization. "The actual removal of social evils constitutes moral progress; the discovery of principles and the invention of appliances calculated to remove them constitutes material progress." [20] This does not mean that the moral growth follows the same principles that characterize the growth of material progress. Moral progress is a product of *feeling* and *sentiment;* material progress is a product of *thought* and *labor.* Moral progress takes place rhythmically—in spiral cycles, as it were; material progress is a continuous adding of one improvement after another, of one invention or discovery based on the preceding inventions and discoveries. Moral progress is expressed in our attitudes and our behavior toward our fellows; material progress is expressed in our industry and production of commodities. "Moral action aims at the restraint and control of the forces of society, of human desires, prejudices and passion; invention and discovery aim at the control and utilization of physical and mechanical forces." [21]

The moral progress of society, therefore, almost always lags behind material progress, and, because it is based on the feelings and sentiments, and concerned with the functions of social control, it becomes more or less rigidly fixed in the social institutions. Now and then, when moral progress has got far in the rear of material progress, it has attempted to resist the forward movement of "materialism." There is no little evidence that such attempts are being made today. While material progress may thus for a time appear to be checked, it has never been forced backward. "Every age has possessed all the arts of the age that preceded it, and has added something to them." [22]

In every aspect we see society putting forth a continual struggle to improve. Much of this struggle is directed toward harnessing the forces of

[20] L. F. Ward, *Glimpses of the Cosmos* (1915), Vol. IV, p. 6.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[22] *Ibid.*

nature, in order that the struggle for existence may be less harsh, survival more certain, and life more pleasant. But not infrequently the struggle to gain moral progress has been even more devastating and severe. Moral progress has been more a struggle of man with man, and to no small extent it has been a struggle to accommodate social control to the needs of material progress. Historically, most of the moral progress has come about as an indirect result of material progress. Thus, as we shall presently see, the great progress in invention and discovery has made social life increasingly complex; human interests clash at an ever-increasing number of points, thoughts and feelings travel faster and farther than ever before, and close personal relations give way to the vast and vague impersonal. The moral standard of the small and simple community of a generation or two ago is no longer adequate to guide and control personal conduct. A new and *deeper* moral growth must possess the man of today if he is to live a healthy social life. No longer can one code of morals be applied to men and an entirely different code to women. The impersonal society in business, commerce, recreation, and travel demands a common standard for each—a moral sense deeper and more compelling than was needed by individuals in any other age.

It is true that the struggle to improve has expanded with each expansion of group life. Material progress has already swept across nations, and our industry and commerce extend to "the four corners of the world." But our moral progress seems not great enough to reach far beyond national lines. We have only just begun to make progress in the growth of international morality. We still are hardly ready to do unto other nations that which we would have them do unto us!

The Central Purpose of Society. Civilization has ever presented to society two great inequalities—inequality of knowledge and inequality of material wealth. The central purpose of society, guided by its degree of moral growth, has been directed toward the reduction of these inequalities. It seeks not merely to spread the fruits of civilization so that they will extend to each individual, but it is ever alert to encourage the growth of knowledge and to increase the volume of wealth produced.

In the path of this central purpose, society is confronted with many perplexing problems. And it is with these problems that we shall presently be concerned.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Give examples, from your current reading or observation, of serious cultural maladjustment and cultural lag which seem to you to jeopardize the progress of our Western civilization.
2. What reasons have we to be apprehensive lest these conditions prove disastrous? What forces tend to counteract these tendencies?
3. Would Washington, with his eighteenth-century standards, find it easy to stay out of jail, were he to be among us tomorrow morning?
4. Is a "conservative" always wrong, as some people conceive him to be? Is a liberal necessarily right in championing reform movements? Explain.
5. Is there reason to believe we are less moral today than were our forefathers? Or is it probable that our moral standards are higher? Give reasons for your answer, and include examples if possible.
6. Make a list of the major interest groups of your community. With what groups are the members of your family affiliated? Do you notice any effect of these affiliations upon their attitudes and views? Discuss.
7. To what extent are you affected by each of the cycles of expanded group life —the family, neighborhood, community, state, national, and international? In this respect how does your situation compare with that of your grandfather's day? What are some of the major differences?
8. Why are the circles representing the various groups surrounding the individual in Fig. 1 (page 8 of the text) drawn eccentrically around the individual, rather than concentrically?
9. Compare the functions of the home in your grandfather's day with those of the home today. What new institutions have developed to provide the activities once centered in the home? What effect has this change had on the maintenance of family unity?
10. List several primary and secondary groups toward which you feel a sense of loyalty. Toward which type is your loyalty stronger—the primary or the secondary group? What is the relation between primary and secondary groups?

2. Social Change and Social Problems

WE HAVE NOTED that it is the very nature of healthy social life to expand and that of civilization to grow. But this expansion and growth give rise to disturbing social changes, and in dynamic times such as we are living in today such changes shake the very foundation of our whole social structure. They affect each individual and group in society, and since a large part of the population is unable to adapt itself as completely and as rapidly as the times demand, *social maladjustment* results. It is this social maladjustment which gives rise to our major social problems. Hence, if we are to gain an adequate understanding of our present-day social problems, we must study them in the light of the great social changes now taking place.

INDUSTRIAL CHANGES

The Handicrafts. The changes that have brought about most of the causes for social maladjustment are those associated with our industrial system. Down to about 1760, industry was still in the handicraft stage. The simple machinery and tools used in manufacturing were driven by hand-power and owned and managed by the craftsmen who used them. Every master craftsman was a capitalist to the extent that he owned his own tools, contracted for and purchased his own raw materials, controlled his own place of employment, set his own pace of work, and controlled the finished product, which he generally sold directly to a patron whom he knew personally. Working along with the master craftsman were perhaps a few journeymen and a few apprentices; but they owned and used their own tools and shared with the master craftsman substantially the same conditions of work and living. There was not much ground for protracted industrial disputes in those days; the relation of the employer to the employee was most intimate and personal. Likewise, the relation between the producer and the consumer was direct and personal, and there was a minimum of cause for public concern about protecting the interests of

the consumer. In this stage, *labor* was the dominant factor in production; labor controlled the nature and quality of raw materials, the conditions of employment, the speed of work, and the quality and price of the finished product.

The Beginning of the Industrial Revolution. In the last third of the eighteenth century, mechanical inventions began to create great changes in the industrial system. Steam-power, beginning with the textile industry (1785), took possession of the machines and tools and organized them into our factory system. Generally this last period of the eighteenth century is referred to as ushering in the Industrial Revolution. But we can hardly say that the period marked any more than the beginning; the revolutionary changes are still going on with increasing intensity. In other words, we are now in the midst of the Industrial Revolution. The early stage was characterized by the substitution of the machine for the hand-tool, while the present stage takes the form of the replacement of the simpler machines by the more improved, more complex, and more costly machines.

When we examine carefully this great development in our industrial life, we notice that it is in fact a twofold revolution—a revolution in the processes and methods of production on the one side, and a revolution in the nature of ownership and control on the other. On the one hand, we witness the rapid growth and extension of the *factory system,* and on the other hand, we see the transfer of ownership and control to the *corporation* form of business organization. These two gigantic developments have given us most of our great material progress, but they have, at the same time, given rise to our most menacing social problems.

The Factory System. One of the most outstanding features of the factory system is its impact upon the worker. It has practically eliminated craftsmanship, and reduced the worker to a mere manipulator and feeder of machines. The worker of today does not have the stimulus and satisfaction that came to the worker of even a century ago, of placing the stamp of his personality on the product of his own hands. He is a mere cog in the wheels of mass production processes. When he becomes dissatisfied with this, there is little he can do about it, since his place might easily be filled by the employment of women and children, or by new and improved machines.

Another feature of the factory system, which further complicates the problems arising out of the minute division of labor and the destruction of craftsmanship, is the amazing increase in the amount of capital employed per worker.[1] We have noted that before the beginning of the Industrial

[1] "In the manufacture of agricultural implements the capital for each worker has risen from $495 in 1850 to $6,764 in 1920; boots and shoes, from $122 to $2,902; carpeting, from $623 to $5,198; carriages and wagons, from $242 in 1840 to $4,338 in 1920; cotton goods, in that same period, from $708 to $1,979; woolen goods, from $738 to $4,987; paper, from $1,004 to $7,962; tanning and leather goods, from $601 to $9,262; silk goods, from $356

Revolution labor was the dominant factor in production. The growth of the factory system has placed *capital* in power and control; the owner of the industry holds the power to contract for and control the raw materials, the places of employment, the process of production, and the quality and quantity of the finished product. The question is no longer: What is the speed of the worker? but instead it is asked: How fast will the machine work? How much can the machine turn out in a day? The question is not: How long will the worker last? but instead: How long will the machine last? Is it any wonder, then, that society must concern itself, to an ever-increasing extent, with the problems of protecting the welfare of labor? Is it any wonder that labor is restless and ever alert to gain some vantage-point of power where it can wield a more certain control over the means of livelihood?

Furthermore, at no time since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution has the development and installation of machinery been as rapid and as far-reaching in its effects as during the past two decades. The rate of mechanization of American life may be measured with a fair degree of accuracy by the number of patents issued from year to year. From 1790 to 1800 there were but 276 patents granted; for the decade 1851 to 1860 there were 25,087; for the closing decade of the century there were 234,956; for the decade 1940 to 1949 there were 348,536 patents issued—more than a third of a million.[2] The vast majority of these patents relate to the improvement of machines, making them more efficient either in production or in displacement of labor. During the fifteen years prior to 1931, "the industries of the United States installed about $23.00 worth of machinery each year for each man, woman, and child of our population—a total of some $2,500,000,000 annually. In Great Britain the corresponding per capita figure approximated $10.00, in Germany less than $9.00, in India $0.17, and in China $0.05." [3] Capital expenditures subsequently sagged in the depression years and through the 1930's, but regained and indeed far exceeded their former levels during the Second World War.[4]

While this phenomenal development of machine industry has made the United States the wealthiest of nations, it has at the same time created a multitude of serious problems—both national and international. The

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to $4,123; iron and steel, from $669 to $7,082. . . . For American manufacturing as a whole the capital per worker has increased from $328 in 1840 to $4,901 in 1920, that is, about fifteenfold. . . . It is perfectly safe, then, to assume that the invested capital per worker to-day is *at least* ten times as great as it was a century ago." E. A. Ross, "The Case for Industrial Dualism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. XXXVIII (May, 1924), pp. 386–387.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1937* (United States Department of Commerce), p. 794; *1950*, p. 450.

[3] W. H. Rastall, chief of the Industrial Machinery Division, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, United States Department of Commerce. *United States Daily* (March, 1931).

[4] J. Frederick Dewhurst and Others, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), pp. 756–759.

relation of men to machines as well as the relations of man to man have become more complicated, uncertain, and strained. Furthermore, the marketing and using of the vast output of the increasingly efficient machines give rise to no end of vexing problems, such as "overproduction," the shutting down of plants, and the forcing of thousands of workers into unemployment. Since other leading nations are now industrialized, the struggle for possession of world markets complicates immensely the problems of international relations.

Growth of Corporation Control. Hardly less important as a source of social problems is the other side of the industrial development—the growth of *corporation* control and management. We noted that during the handicraft period the relation of industry to the employee and to the consumer was direct and personal. But with the growth of corporation control, this personal relationship disappears. Under corporation management the employee is a mere number, much the same as a machine, and the consumer is merely so much impersonal "active demand." The average stockholder of the corporation is not cognizant of, nor much concerned about, the conditions under which production is carried on, or the welfare of the workers; neither is he concerned about the welfare of the consumer. The chief interests that the stockholder has in the industry are (1) the security and safety of his investments, and (2) the dividends that the industry or business produces. He is impelled *primarily by the profits motive.* Only to the extent that we are able to humanize profits are we able to bestir the stockholders to a consideration of the social consequences of the corporation's conduct.

To be sure, much must be said to the credit of the industrial and business corporation. They have made possible the quick amassing of enormous amounts of capital without which it would hardly have been possible to build our railroads, exploit our vast natural resources, or develop our large-scale industrial and business enterprises. Without these gigantic developments, Americans would have lacked many of the conveniences and commodities that constitute such a large part of the high standard of living so characteristic of American life. Large-scale production and business developed the efficiency and the economy that made it possible to put the fruits of our tremendous material progress within the reach of all classes in the population.

But the great achievements and mammoth organization of modern, corporate industry and big business are gradually destroying the foundation upon which much of our social and economic progress has been made. In most fields, thriving and successful small enterprise is doomed. *Competition,* upon which our national founders depended as a guarantee for equalizing economic opportunity and for securing equality of rights of contract, is gradually fading into thin air. The major lines of manufacturing and business are showing a steady decrease in the number and an in-

crease in the size of establishments. The consolidation of a large number of corporations into huge mergers continues for the purpose of effecting more far-reaching economy of management and lessening the field of competition. Thus the control of industry is gradually shifting from the hands of those who are directly concerned with the processes and operations of industry into the hands of investors—into the hands of those who control the banking interests of the nation.

In 1946, more than 440,000 corporations filed tax returns showing a total net income of very nearly 25 billion dollars. Of these, 994 admitted assets of $50,000,000 and over, controlled more than 56 per cent of the total corporation assets of the country, and received almost one-third of the net corporation income. Manufacturing and public utility corporations together accounted for 423 of these giant organizations, had almost one-third of the total assets, and received about a sixth of the net income.[5] An earlier and more detailed analysis by Wormser indicated that the 200 largest corporations virtually dominated the country's economic life, reporting 40 per cent of the nation's net income, and holding 45 per cent of all the gross assets.[6]

Only a few thousand men control and direct these enormous business empires. Such concentration of power over the savings of millions of investors and over the employment opportunity of millions of workers implies a social trust. Many corporations measure up to this high standard of administration. However, accumulated ills and abuses, wholesale fraud and dishonest contrivance, and utter disregard of public interest characterize much corporation practice. The creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the many other efforts of the Federal and State governments to "put a soul in the corporation" have not been wholly successful.

Social Significance of the Impersonal Relations in Industry. The centralization of the ownership and control of industry and business intensifies the impersonal status of the worker and the consumer. But perhaps of even greater social significance is the restriction it imposes upon the *contracting or bargaining power* of the worker who must market his labor, the farmer who must market his produce, and the consumer whose purchasing power is in the balance. The individual with his guaranteed rights of "freedom of contract" faces the dilemma of bargaining not on equal terms, but on "take-it-or-leave-it" terms. His most effective way out of this quandary is not to act as an individual, but to join his will with the will of a strong organization—to organized labor, coöperative marketing agencies, or consumers' leagues and coöperatives. Only such measures as can successfully threaten the flow of dividends can reach the ears of the

[5] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950* (United States Department of Commerce), p. 440.

[6] I. Maurice Wormser, *Frankenstein, Incorporated* (1931), Chs. V–VIII.

financiers whose one aim is to keep the business or industry "on a paying basis"—paying profits. This explains the fact that recent decades have been so characterized by organized groups, and so disturbed with group conflict.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION

The great industrial and social changes that we have just outlined would not have come about had it not been for the phenomenal development of facilities for travel and transportation. We have seen how group life has expanded, and noted that this expansion has been largely due to startling improvements in the methods and means of transportation and communication; but we need to see these improvements more in detail to appreciate their significance in our study of social problems.

American Hurry and Haste. It was only a little more than a hundred and fifty years ago that the United States began its career as an independent nation. It started with a population of but little more than three million, mostly farmers and villagers scattered along the Atlantic seaboard and the eastern slopes of the Allegheny Mountains. But this little handful of population laid claim to the vast stretch of untamed wilderness beyond the Alleghenies, and they were determined to people it and, later, to create of it a nation that would reach from the Atlantic to the Pacific.[7] To achieve this great aim they had to *hurry:* they *hurried* pioneers to settle the West —they *hurried* to open up the natural resources—they *hurried* to develop their industries—they *hurried* to build cities and they *hurried* to tie the wide-spreading territory into national unity. Thus it was that America became a *hurrying* and *rushing* nation, a nation interested in doing big things quickly. This hurry and rush became a habit fixed in American culture, and even today there is perhaps no characteristic of the American people that is more truly typical of our everyday living. Still, "haste makes waste," and not a few of our most baffling social problems must be attributed to our haste in getting things done.

Development of a National Transportation System. To achieve this rapid development, our greatest need was for population—population to settle and hold our vast new territory, to develop our natural resources, and to build our industries. There was not enough manpower. Hence we turned to inventing and building machines—ultimately machines that would in some cases do the work of hundreds of workers. But success of machine industry depends upon ample transportation facilities. So we hurried to build the only transportation facilities then known to us—highways, canals, and river transports. The Federal Government, the States, and the cities all rushed these developments, and by the end of the first third of the nineteenth century such facilities extended well into the

[7] Bernard DeVoto, *The Year of Decision: 1846* (1943).

Middle West. Then came the invention of the locomotive and the possibilities of a more adequate means of transportation—the railroads.

No other factor played a more important part in the development of our national maturity than did the railroads. No other phase of our national history so aptly illustrates that dominant American characteristic of *hurry* and *haste.*

TABLE 1: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795–1945 *

Year	Miles of Operating Railway	Merchant Vessel Gross Tonnage		Miles of Surfaced Roads	Motor Vehicle Registration	Aircraft Production
		Steam and Motor	Sailing			
1945	239,400	30,245,000	115,000	1,530,000	30,640,000	49,800
1940	245,700	11,355,000	200,000	1,370,000	32,030,000	12,800
1930	260,400	13,755,000	755,000	694,000	26,530,000	3,400
1920	259,900	13,825,000	1,270,000	369,000	9,240,000	330
1910	240,800	4,900,000	1,655,000	204,000	470,000	43 †
1900	192,600	2,660,000	1,885,000	128,000	8,000	...
1890	156,400	1,860,000	2,110,000	106,000	...	...
1880	93,300	1,210,000	2,365,000	96,100	...	...
1870	52,900	1,075,000	2,365,000	92,300	...	...
1860	30,600	870,000	4,485,000	88,300	...	...
1850	9,000	525,000	3,010,000	71,000	...	...
1840	2,800	200,000	1,980,000	64,400	...	...
1830	23	64,500	1,125,000	26,500	...	...
1820	...	22,100	1,260,000	9,600	...	...
1810	...	640	1,425,000	4,200	...	...
1800	...	...	972,000	1,200	...	...
1795	...	...	750,000	62	...	...

* Adapted from *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (United States Bureau of the Census, 1949), pp. 202–224.

† Figure is for 1913. More than 14,000 aircraft were produced in 1918, only 5 years later. Similarly, peak production was about 96,000 in 1944, during the Second World War.

The first railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio, was chartered in 1827, but was not completed until 1830. The first *locomotive* drawn train ran the following year, between Albany and Schenectady, New York. For a time there were many technical handicaps that hampered rapid progress, but by the outbreak of the Civil War these handicaps had been largely overcome and 30,626 miles of railroads were in operation. Table 1 shows the rapidity with which railroad building proceeded. Some of the old settlers are still alive who went West in covered wagons at a speed of from five to

fifteen miles a day. Today one may cross the continent—a distance of over 3,000 miles—in luxurious comfort in less than three days by railway, and at a cost that is well within the means of most of us. This ease and convenience of travel has broken down the *old sectionalism* and has created national unity. But of even greater social significance is the rapid movement of freight, express, and the mail. This has led to specialization of occupation and production and has made each section of the nation interdependent with all other sections. It has destroyed the old, self-sufficing community and made possible the building and feeding of our large industrial cities. Thus many things that we daily use, consume, and enjoy were perhaps only a few days before packed and shipped from the most remote State in the Union.

Development of Ocean Transportation. The same sort of phenomenal progress has been made in ocean travel. The first transatlantic steamship, the *Savannah,* crossed the Atlantic from New York to Liverpool in 1819, in the record-breaking time of twenty-six days. In August, 1936, the Cunard-White Star ship, *Queen Mary,* steamed 3,158 miles from Cherbourg to New York in four days, seven hours, and twelve minutes, an average of 30.01 knots. In 1940 the United States was second only to Great Britain in ocean transportation facilities, the United States having more than 10,000 ships of 100 tons and over with a total capacity of almost 13,500,000 gross tons. In 1939 Great Britain had merchant ships with a total capacity of about 21,000,000 tons. The rapid improvement made in American shipping in the last fifty years is strikingly illustrated in the fact that in 1900 two-thirds of our 3,135 ships of this tonnage were sailing-vessels; in 1947 only 69 of our 13,000 ships of 100 tons or over were sailing-vessels.[8]

Thus we have brought the world to our very door, and have made ocean travel so cheap and comfortable that even the poorest classes find it possible to immigrate to our shores. We have tapped the high-pressure mains of the overcrowded nations, and, as we shall see in a later chapter, our country stands in grave danger of being flooded with immigrants from the lowest economic levels of those nations. Through international trade, commerce, and investments the nations of the world have become closer to one another and more interdependent than were the various sections of the United States even a half-century ago. In spite of political misgivings, the policy of *national isolation* can no longer be accepted as a sound guide for international relations.

The Automobile. Even more phenomenal than the building of the railroads and the development of ocean travel has been the rapid development of the automobile. Here again we notice the prevalence of that dominant American characteristic of hurry and haste. As early as 1875 we were be-

[8] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948,* p. 560.

ginning to look for some means of travel more rapid than the horse.[9] In 1879 a "steam wagon" was invented that made the trip from Oshkosh to Madison, a distance of about a hundred miles, in three days' "working time," and was awarded the prize provided by the State legislature. But it was not until 1895 that motor transportation gave promise of success. In that year four automobiles were made in the United States. The census of 1900 showed that there were about 4,000 motor vehicles in the United States. Then began the large-scale production that has made this a "motor age." By 1915 the annual production had reached almost a million cars. However, after the First World War production began in earnest, and increased rapidly until in 1929 the production of cars, trucks, and busses in the United States alone reached an all-time peak of 5,358,000 for the year, a mark since rivaled but not surpassed.[10] As of January 1, 1941, the United States Federal Works Agency reported 45,376,891 motor vehicles in use in all the nations of the world, approximately one vehicle for every 47 persons. For this same date there were 32,557,954 motor vehicles in use in the United States—seven out of every ten of the world total, and one vehicle for every 3.7 persons in the United States.[11] In 1945 there were 4,148,275 cars and 1,490,300 trucks, or a total of 5,191,220 motor vehicles on farms. In addition, 2,421,747 farm tractors assisted the cars and trucks in the displacement of nearly 11,000,000 horses that had disappeared from the farms since the First World War.[12]

In less than the span of a single generation the automobile became a dynamic factor in American culture. It is, in fact, a recognized essential in the American standard of living. One needs only to visit any of the many State and national parks, or go to any summer resort or winter resort, or take a day off to go fishing, or, better still, try to find a parking space within walking distance of the shopping district, to be fully convinced of this fact.

[9] In 1875 the Wisconsin Legislature passed the following law (*Wisconsin Statutes*, 1875, Ch. 134):

"There is hereby appropriated the sum of $10,000 . . . to be paid to any citizen of Wisconsin who shall invent, and after five years' continued trial and use, shall produce a machine propelled by steam or other motive agent, which shall be a cheap and practical substitute for the horse and other animals on the highway and farm; provided that said appropriation shall not be levied or made until a successful award is made. . . .

"Any machine or locomotive entering the list to compete for a prize or bounty, shall perform a journey of at least 200 miles, on a common road or roads, in a continuous line North and South in this state, and propelled by its own internal power at the average rate of at least five miles per hour, working time.

"The said locomotive must be of such construction and width as to conform with or run in the ordinary track of the common wagon or buggy, now in use, and be able to run backward or turn out of the road to accommodate other vehicles in passing and be able to ascend or descend a grade of at least 200 feet to the mile."

[10] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 487.

[11] *World Almanac* (1946), p. 649.

[12] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948*, pp. 635 and 691.

Hendrik Van Loon aptly expressed the situation in one of his cartoons. He pictures two old men on Mars, looking down upon the hurrying multitude of cars on the earth.

"What are all those people on Earth doing?" asks one of the ancients.

"Going," is the brief reply of the other.

"Going where?" continues the questioner.

"Nowhere—just going!"

But there was a genuine democracy about this "just going." There was nothing comparable to an old, used car for putting all the youths of the community, rich and poor, on a fraternal footing. The parks, the forests, lakes, and streams belonged to the poor as well as to the rich. The poor might travel in an old "Model T," but they got there; and they paid their share of the gas tax that went into building and maintaining their highways. The trailer also became a part of the stream of traffic that was "just going"; almost 2,000,000 trailers were registered in 1946. "Trailer towns" became a problem for many American cities.

Highway Improvement. Along with the development of the automobile has come the rapid building of good roads, most of which have been built in the past thirty years. Since 1930 the combined appropriations of the local units of government, the States, and the Federal Government, for the building of more good roads, has amounted to more than a billion dollars annually. In 1946 the funds disbursed for highway construction and maintenance amounted to more than a billion and a half dollars.[13]

Important as are the other avenues of transportation, the road passing the front door probably touches the lives of people the closest. Surfaced roads have widened the range and frequency of human relations, altered trade areas, improved marketing, and broadened the outlook of both the rural dweller and his city cousin. From East to West, from North to South, over most of the United States we may now traverse in half an hour or less the distance that our forefathers considered a good day's journey with the horse and buggy.

Conquest of the Air. We are constantly seeking a more rapid means of travel. Hardly more than a generation ago the possibility of established airlines of transportation was commonly hooted at; yet as early as 1911, the airplane began to demonstrate its possible usefulness in carrying mail.[14] The rôle of the airplane in the First World War created genuine public interest and confidence in its commercial and military use. The first official airmail route was established May 15, 1918. In 1948 airplanes flew regularly over 130,000 miles of airmail routes in the United States alone. The total

[13] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948*, p. 502.

[14] In September, 1911, Earl L. Ovington was appointed the first airmail carrier, and as a demonstration carried mail from a temporary post office established at the flying field on Long Island at Mineola. During the month he carried 32,415 postcards, 3,993 letters, and 1,062 circulars. The whole experiment was made at no expense to the Government. See *United States Daily* (July 26, 1930).

airplane miles flown with the mail during that year was nearly 322,000,000. Besides carrying the mail, airplanes also flew about 100,000,000 ton-miles of freight and express during that year. In 1926 fewer than six thousand passengers were carried.[15]

Like the development of the automobile, the progress in air transportation has opened many unexpected opportunities for scientific research and discovery. Already, photography, surveying and mapping, meteorology, and many other fields of science have shown almost unbelievable achievements which have stemmed from the progress in aviation. Every advance in transportation brings about compelling changes in the mode of living and demands a rearrangement of the facilities for social control. Progress in air transportation increases the prospect of a world community, yet most of our concepts of human relations have scarcely developed beyond the saddlebag stage!

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION

Hardly less important than the developments in travel and transportation have been the great improvements in methods of communication. These two products of science and invention have paralleled one another: the development of telegraphy paralleled that of the railroads and the steamships; the telephone preceded the automobile by but a few years; and the development of the radio has practically paralleled the development of the airplane, though the popularity and installation of the radio have been far more universal, for obvious reasons.

The Telegraph and the Cable. The first telegraph-line in the United States was put into operation in 1840, connecting Washington with Baltimore—a distance of forty miles. In 1948 the Federal Communications Commission reported 1,676,000 miles of telegraph wire and ocean cable, connecting every community of the whole country with the rest of the world.[16] Events and transactions over the whole world are thus quickly heralded over the entire country, and the people of the nation may read the same news and apply their minds to the same issues, all at the same time.

The Telephone. While the telegraph was of great social significance, it was not the community-builder that the telephone was destined to become. In 1949 there were more than 40,000,000 telephones in use in the United States, more than one telephone for every four persons.[17] About 30 per cent of the farms in the United States are now supplied with telephones.[18] To be sure, the majority of the farm telephones were on "party lines," but this makes it all the more interesting for the women folks, for whom farm life is often lonely and drab. Thus is our population knitted

[15] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* pp. 465, 944.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 457.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 454.
[18] Paul H. Landis, *Rural Life in Process* (New York, 1948), p. 435.

together into closer social and economic life, and years are saved in our productive life by the increasing use of the telephone.

The Radio. Still another great advancement in communication is ripening in the world of science and invention—the radio. From 1894, when Marconi began his experiments with "wireless," to 1903, when the first wireless message was successfully flashed across the Atlantic, the development of radio was slow. In 1904 steamships began to be equipped with "wireless," and press dispatchers began to use this means of flashing news over the world. In 1915 transoceanic telephony was achieved. The engineers of the Bell Telephone Company telephoned to Paris, France, and Honolulu. During the First World War the value of the radio was thoroughly established, and following the close of the war, the radio art and industry in the United States began its phenomenal development.

During the last fifteen years there have been far-reaching improvements, both technical and in public regulation, making it possible to unite virtually the whole world with one gigantic system of communication. In 1949 there were 2,700 broadcasting stations in the world. Of this number, 1,100 were in the United States.[19] Through linking the various stations into chains, we keep in touch with every part of the world.

The swiftness with which the radio has made a place for itself in American culture is amazing. Thirty years ago—so far as the American home is concerned—it was but a crude and imperfect novelty. Today practically three-fourths of the families in the country are equipped with radios. In October, 1950, there were more than 72 million sets in use in some 45,000,000 homes in the United States, almost 53 per cent of the total number of sets in the world. Of this number, at least 5 million sets were in farm homes, approximately four out of every five farm families being equipped with a radio. And, as if to make sure that we did not miss anything anywhere, over 18 million automobiles had been equipped with radio sets.[20]

Practically every ship and airplane now is equipped with both sending and receiving sets. This has been the means of saving thousands of lives, and millions of dollars to American shippers. In recent years the police departments of many of our larger cities have installed special radio equipment enabling them to keep in touch with officers in any part of the city and to direct the capture of criminals. As an aid to law enforcement, the radio will undoubtedly become indispensable.

One of the most important uses of the radio—a use having far-reaching possibilities that are not yet fully developed—is in the field of education. Instruction by radio is now provided extensively by many universities and governmental agencies. A number of schools have arranged regular courses in a wide variety of subjects, including history, literature, foreign

[19] *World Almanac* (1950), p. 756.
[20] *World Almanac* (1951), p. 526; Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

languages, home economics, and physical education; lectures and discussions are given over the radio in much the same manner as in the classroom, and in some cases, students write out their recitations and mail them to their instructor. Various governmental departments, bureaus, and services also use the radio regularly as an educational medium—especially departments of commerce and agriculture, health services, child welfare bureaus, etc. In connection with the public schools the radio has still further possibilities—in music and in physical education, as well as in many of the more academic subjects. Instruction can be given effectively and economically by the ablest specialists, and carefully followed under the guidance of the local teachers in the thousands of schoolrooms throughout the country. To facilitate and guide the use of the radio in the public schools, the Federal Office of Education has appointed a radio specialist to direct the "school of the air." [21] A number of State departments of education, notably that of Ohio, are coöperating in making use of the radio in their public schools.

Even photographs are now successfully transmitted by radio, so that we are not only able to get directly the news, weather and market reports, concerts, church services, lectures, and political speeches, but also to obtain quickly through the press a graphic picture of events happening over the world. Television still awaits the perfection of certain fundamentals before it can have the almost universal coverage now achieved by radio. Nevertheless, the fact that by 1950 there were already more than 9 million television installations suggests that it is making its way into American culture.

The Motion Picture. Another factor in the phenomenal change in American culture during the past third of a century is the motion-picture and sound-films. Scattered through the cities and towns of the United States in 1949 were more than 18,000 operating motion-picture theaters with a seating capacity of nearly 12 million, attracting a weekly attendance of some 80 million persons.[22] Besides furnishing entertainment, they present news reels of events throughout the world in a way that makes them more vivid and more real than presentations by either the radio or the daily newspaper. No more effective medium for spreading propaganda and for aiding education has ever been invented.

In recent years the educational value of the motion-picture and sound-films has become generally recognized. A large proportion of the public schools throughout the United States now make use of educational films, especially in the teaching of geography, health and hygiene, biological sciences, and industrial and vocational subjects. Governmental bureaus and agencies, university extension divisions, State departments of educa-

[21] F. E. Hill, *Listen and Learn* (1937), pp. 122 ff.
[22] *World Almanac* (1950), p. 563.

tion, and many private agencies provide this educational service at nominal cost to the schools and adult-education centers. During the Second World War, the motion-picture was used extensively by the armed forces to facilitate the instruction of men and women in the varied services, both in regard to the arts of warfare and in acquainting the personnel with the character of the lands and cultures they would likely confront in their combat and occupation service.

News and the Press. Augmenting this vast development in communication facilities is a similar development and expansion of the press. Americans, especially, are inveterate readers. In 1949 more than 10,450 newspapers and periodicals were published in the United States—over 1,780 daily newspapers with an average circulation of nearly 52 million, and upwards of 8,675 weekly papers with a circulation of nearly 14 million. Thirty-one of our leading weekly and monthly magazines have a combined circulation of about 80 million,[23] and added thousands of less well-known publications—quarterlies, monthlies, weeklies, and biweeklies—have a total circulation that would reach huge proportions.

But these newspapers and periodicals do not merely carry news, stories, and education: their chief object is to carry advertising. We are told in a thousand different ways how we should spend our incomes—what to eat, what to wear, what cars to ride in, where to spend vacations. Our most private wants are exposed, and we are told in a most intimate and personal way how to supply them. Thus it is that we rush to spend our incomes and to keep substantial mortgages on our future earnings through the "easy credit terms" urged upon us.

Schools, Books, Libraries, Bureaus, and University Extensions. Since the boyhood days of Abraham Lincoln there has been a phenomenal development of educational opportunity—opportunities for home education as well as for formal education in our schools and colleges. About 26,100,000 American children were in public grade and high schools in 1948, and there were more than 2,275,000 students in our institutions of higher education. Of these numbers, approximately 1,080,000 were veterans of the Second World War. Most, of course, were enrolled in colleges or professional schools; yet more than 60,000 were in high schools, while some 12,000 were in elementary schools.[24] Approximately one out of every twenty school-children finishes college, and one person out of every six between the ages of 18 and 22 is enrolled in college. Much of this phenomenal advancement of education is due to two factors: first, to the increased health and vitality of school-children; and second, to the improved educational facilities of rural communities, made possible by consolidation of schools, good roads, and bus transportation of pupils. And yet, in the poorer rural areas of this country there are more than half a

[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 573.

million children between the ages of seven and thirteen who are not in school at all.[25]

While schools are the foundation of our cultural advancement, the opportunities for self-education, for youth and for adult, constitute one of the greatest advances in our educational progress. In the first place, information on almost every sort of subject is now readily within the reach of the individual, no matter where he happens to be located. There never was a time when books were published in such quantities and on such a wide range of subjects and as cheaply as they are being published today. If the classification of the books published can be taken as an index of the interests of the reading public, it is evident that Americans are building a broad foundation for the cultural growth of the future (see Table 2).

TABLE 2: AMERICAN BOOK PRODUCTION, 1950 *

Classification	*New Books*	*New Editions*
Agriculture, Gardening	111	41
Biography	538	65
Business	190	60
Domestic Economy	150	43
Education	209	47
Fiction	1,211	696
Fine Arts	317	40
Games, Sports	153	35
General Literature	510	81
Geography, Travel	211	67
History	456	60
Juvenile	907	152
Law	228	70
Medicine, Hygiene	312	131
Music	88	25
Philology	102	46
Philosophy, Ethics	278	62
Poetry, Drama	453	78
Religion	626	101
Science	499	206
Sociology, Economics	447	68
Technical & Military	366	131
Miscellaneous	262	83
Total	8,634	2,388

* *Publishers' Weekly*, Vol. 159, No. 3 (January 20, 1951), p. 240.

But books are not the only sources of information on the wide range of subjects with which Americans are concerning themselves. Thousands

[25] *Report of the Advisory Committee on Education* (Washington, D.C., February, 1938), pp. 6–18; *School Life* (Washington, D.C., Office of Education, February, 1938).

of pamphlets, reports, and monographs are being published and distributed annually by bureaus and departments of government and by private agencies. No doubt these lesser publications play as important a part in continuous home education as do the books.[26]

Furthermore, it is no longer necessary for the individual to build for himself a large and expensive home library in order to secure these educational opportunities. On every hand are the large public libraries and library commissions, ready to serve his needs through traveling-library facilities. Further augmenting and systematizing the use of all these sources of information are the university extension divisions that are providing individuals and communities everywhere with counsel and advice, organized reading courses, extension classes, correspondence courses, guided club studies, lectures, educational films, demonstrations, and many other educational services.

Rural Free Delivery. Another important means of communication that has been of major importance in the maturing of national life and in spreading intellectual and material advantages to the whole population is the *rural mail service.* Beginning in 1896 with three small experimental routes in West Virginia, the rural mail service now comprises about 32,000 routes operating over 1,440,000 miles. Carroll County, Maryland, was the first county to achieve county-wide mail service, which was accomlished in December, 1899. Today there are few counties in the United States that are not blanketed by daily free delivery of mail. During 1946 the rural mail-carriers traveled more than 437,000,000 miles and served more than a fifth of the entire population of the nation.[27] Improved highways and the automobile have greatly facilitated this great national achievement.

The rural free delivery has enabled the rural population to keep in touch with the world and has been a major factor in breaking down the evil effects of rural isolation. Farm families today subscribe not only to the town weekly and the various farm papers; a large proportion read the daily newspapers as well. Rural mail delivery makes it convenient for them to use the services of the book clubs, free library commissions, governmental publications, and the many educational advantages offered by their State university extension departments. Furthermore, much of the marketing of farm produce and the delivery of merchandise used by the farm family is facilitated by rural mail service. The time and energy thus conserved for the rural population through this service has not only encouraged the development of a more uniform culture throughout the

[26] Especially notable are the bulletins of the universities and colleges, the Federal Children's Bureau, the Federal Women's Bureau, the Federal Office of Education, Federal and State labor and industrial departments, departments of agriculture, Federal and State health services, Federal and State commercial and marketing departments, and the departments of public instruction.

[27] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948,* p. 488.

United States, but has also done much to create a more adequate social organization of agricultural forces.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPROVEMENTS IN TRAVEL AND COMMUNICATION

Perhaps the most outstanding social significance of the developments in transportation and communication which we have just sketched is to be seen in the effect they have had on community life. They have largely destroyed the old community bounds. Formerly, the community was, for the most part, limited to the distance that could be comfortably covered by the horse and buggy in a half-day—a distance of fifteen to twenty-five miles, depending upon the condition of the roads. The building of the railroads began a loosening of the boundaries of the horse-and-buggy community; but it was the automobile that especially hastened community expansion. With the automobile, a day's pleasure or business trip may extend to two hundred miles from home. The telephone and the automobile have, therefore, widened the social and economic contacts to more than a hundred times those that were possible in the horse-and-buggy days. With the airplane, the radius of social and economic contacts may be still further extended, while the radio enables us to gather entertainment and information not only from the whole nation but also from the world.

While the expansion of community horizons has given the individual a broader social, economic, and intellectual view, and raised the standard of living, the machinery for regulating personal conduct and that for controlling group life have not kept pace. Thus the standards of the family, the church, public opinion, and government remain largely where they were a generation or more ago.

The effect of such conditions on the home life of the nation is profound. While life seems to be enriched by our being able to see and enjoy more, the problem now is one of keeping the family together—of keeping the interests of its members united. The ceremonies, regulations, and ideals that served to guide and control our predecessors are far from adequate for the swift tempo of modern life. New means of regulation and control must be shaped to fit the changed conditions. But just what shall these regulations be, and whence are they to come?

Our grandfathers still talk about the old homemade amusements that characterized their social life when they were young, but the automobile and the good roads have largely done away with all these. We discard homemade fun, while we pack the theaters and athletic fields to witness professional artists and entertainers. In the course of only a few years, social life has almost wholly surrendered to commercialized amusements. to a large extent, we have ceased to be original producers, and have be-

come a nation of *onlookers* and *listeners.* Fortunately, many efforts are now being put forth to combat this tendency and to revive, or rather to reorganize, our communities, so that play may again be a spontaneous expression of community life.

Improvements in the facility of transportation and communication are rapidly converting America into an *urbanized* nation. The telephone, the automobile, the bus, and rapid transit have spread our cities to proportions hitherto impossible; but more than this, they are bringing to the rural communities the advantages and the problems of suburban life. Thus *urbanization* is taking possession of the whole population. By "urbanization" we do not mean merely the shift of the population to the city. Urbanization is a social philosophy—"Do as you like to do in a big city, where you are not known"; it is the rule of the impersonal, under which public opinion has little power to control personal conduct.

Our government and laws were not framed to cope with such conditions. Our local, State, and Federal Governments were designed to meet the problems of earlier days, when folks rode horseback over unimproved roads. Now most of the problems of government are motorized. Protection of person and property becomes increasingly difficult under the handicap of antiquated governmental machinery. The open country can no longer be regarded as "too safe to police." If the vice, gambling, and disorderly conduct of the cities and towns are suppressed, we find that we have merely transplanted them into the country, to roadhouses, taverns and cabins. If one State undertakes to regulate marriage and divorce, those who would be inconvenienced by such regulations merely motor across the line into another State where such regulations do not exist. In other words, our governmental agencies for regulation and control have not kept pace with the rapid expansion of community life. But how can these agencies be streamlined to match the rapid changes produced by the development of the means of transportation and communication?

The church and the religious life of the community also have felt the impact of the changes in communication and travel. Most of the religious organizations were designed to serve the old type of community. The little country churches nestled among the pines and the tombstones, as well as the small city "missions," offer little attraction to the young folks of today. There are dozens of counterattractions which compete for the interest that once was given unreservedly to the church. Some who still cling to habits of worship and religious devotion drive past the little open-country church to attend the more spectacular service in the more imposing edifice in town. Others simply turn the dial of their radio to a favorite station from which comes the rich music, the type of service, and the sort of sermon that to them seem more satisfying than what they would get from the local church organization. In either instance there develops an increasing ir-

regularity of worship, and an indifference in regard to church membership. This, to a large extent, explains the decline of the country churches and the decrease in church membership in the rural communities.[28] Likewise the religious life has not kept pace with other aspects of cultural advance. Somehow religious forces also must be reorganized and their methods of appeal recast if they are to meet the religious needs of life in this changing order.

In matters of community health and education there has been more progress than in most of the other social institutions. Especially since the First World War, education and health have moved forward with great strides—and for the most part they have moved forward together. The "little red schoolhouse" so dear to American traditions is, in most communities, disappearing. Good roads and the automobile have combined to create the consolidated rural schools or to carry the child to the town or city schools. To be sure, the curriculum is still far from adjusted to modern needs, but even here there is a growing recognition that changes must be made. The school nurse, medical examination of school children, vaccination, school clinics, dental clinics, special classes for backward children, visiting teachers for crippled children and shut-ins—all these projects indicate that the next generation will start life's work with stronger bodies and a better knowledge of the laws of health than did the children of the past. But with all this, the movement has merely begun; and there is a long way yet to go before these advantages are the heritage of the entire child population.

While the automobile has widened our contacts and enriched our social life in many respects, it is costing many lives. Each year automobile accidents take at least 30,000 lives, injure upwards of a million persons, and cause property damage estimated at more than $1,000,000,000. While the majority of drivers are competent and careful, reckless driving and speeding, especially by irresponsible youths and persons under the influence of intoxicants, cause a large proportion of the fatal accidents. Irrespective of differences of opinion in regard to the liquor question, there is no denying the fact that the enormous changes of the past forty years have placed the issue in a vastly different moral setting. In the horse-and-buggy days drunken drivers seldom endangered the lives of other people; but when a person under the influence of liquor occupies the driver's seat of an automobile in the midst of the congested traffic of our present-day highways, then the issue ceases to be a question of "personal liberty" and becomes a *social* problem of the first magnitude. Furthermore, it is a problem that cannot be met by a public policy and a legal machinery designed to meet the needs of an earlier day.

[28] "Our Cities, Their Role in the National Economy," Report of the National Resources Committee (June, 1937), p. 23.

OTHER SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Changes in the Mode of Living. While the great changes in industrial life and in the means of travel and communication have been major forces affecting our mode of living, there are still other factors of which we should take account. Consider, for example, the hundreds of ways in which electricity serves modern life! Today, practically every city home, and almost a third of those in rural areas in the United States uses electric power.[29] Electric lighting has altered our habits, and the numerous appliances lighten housework and conserve energy and health. Hours of time have been released from household routine for use in widening social contacts, intellectual advancement, hobbies and crafts, and other interests.

In many other respects the average American home presents a marked change from the home of even a generation ago. Comforts and conveniences that were formerly regarded as *luxuries* for the rich are now regarded as *necessities* and *decencies* for all. In both city and country the "modern" dwelling includes running water in the kitchen, inside toilet and bath, screened windows, and—especially in the Northern States—furnace heat. These new elements in the American standard of living have already become fixed in our culture, and the American worker and farmer alike now demand an income that will provide these "necessities." Anything that threatens the attainment of these advantages is at once opposed. This, incidentally, helps to explain our increased opposition to immigrants who have a lower standard.

Improvements in refrigeration are another factor that has made far-reaching changes in our mode of living. In the course of a few years this factor has completely modified our diet. At the same time it has reduced by one-fourth the amount (not the price) of foodstuffs required per person. In other words, it has eliminated much of the waste that formerly was unavoidable in transportation and storage. Fruits, vegetables, and meats now can be kept in storage indefinitely and delivered to the consumer the year round in a fresh and wholesome condition. Thus modern refrigeration is not only recasting our habits of consumption, but it is also forcing radical changes in American agriculture and putting the farmer in a very different economic position.

Consumers' Credit. All these "modern improvements"—and many others which, for lack of space, are not mentioned—would not have changed our mode of living so rapidly had it not been for unprecedented development of *consumers' credit.* Instalment buying, as we know it today, grew out of the financing of automobile purchases and has spread to the financing of purchases of almost every sort of property. Most newly-weds today start housekeeping with more furniture and equipment than their parents were able to obtain only after years of skimping and saving. A small pay-

[29] J. Frederick Dewhurst, *et al., America's Needs and Resources* (1947), p. 147.

ment down and the balance in "easy monthly payments" starts them out with a standard of living that would take years to approach if everything had to be paid for at once. People's apprehension in regard to being in debt is not what it was a generation or two ago. People used to save in order to provide for the future; now they skimp in order to pay the instalments on past purchases. People no longer dread being in debt, but instead they use their credit without stint. In times of prosperity this new *credit culture* produces an almost reckless expansion of our standard of living. But in times of financial depression and industrial shutdown, both debtor and creditor face a difficult situation. People used to look upon bankruptcy as a disgrace; today it is generally regarded as a "business expedient." Unemployment has become a much more serious problem than it was in the days when people generally lived within their incomes. Unemployment relief is no longer regarded as a problem to be met by the local relief agencies; it is now recognized as a national problem and even the Federal Government has to assist the unemployed worker.

Thus we see that the huge social and economic changes of the last century and a half have placed a severe strain upon our whole social structure. Because our social institutions are slow to change, and because such a large part of the population has serious difficulty in its efforts to keep pace with the demands of the times, baffling maladjustments appear. It is with these maladjustments that our study of social problems is concerned.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

We have noticed that social problems are rooted in the social maladjustments caused by social change. But we need to examine these social maladjustments more carefully in order to get an accurate understanding of their nature.

There are hundreds of social problems, big and little. Thus we have the problems of *poverty* and *dependency, crime* and *delinquency, sickness* and *physical handicap, unemployment* and *discontent, ignorance* and *superstition, war, population pressure,* and scores of other social ills that blight and mar the prosperity and progress of society. Some are obvious and clamor for remedial measures, and scores of social-work agencies, public and private, have been organized to remedy this one or that of these obvious social ills. Other problems are less obvious, and creep into our community and national life and sap our group vitality without being comprehended. Some problems respond quickly to the proper treatment. Others require a program of treatment extending over a generation or more.

Volumes have been written on the diagnosis and treatment of each of these social problems. It is now possible to compile an encyclopedia of sociology, similar to the encyclopedia of medicine. Just as medicine has developed its specialized branches of science and service, so sociology has

developed its specialized branches of scientific research and service—of finding ways and means of adjusting the elements of social life so that all may enjoy a larger measure of the fruits of civilization. But in certain phases of social life it is not easy to determine the ways and means of social adjustment. In some fields science has blazed no definite trail for us. Progress in some phases of life has led to confusion in other phases. For example, progress in industry has changed the whole setting of the family and the relationship of worker, employer, and consumer; and progress in communication and travel has rendered our old agencies of social control ineffective and recast the whole outlook of community life.

Primary and Secondary Phases of Change. We cannot achieve progress without social change; but, at the same time, every important social advancement is purchased at the expense of many social maladjustments that become apparent only after a certain degree of progress has been made. Thus, there are evidently two phases or stages in every important social change, and it is necessary that we recognize these phases in our study of social problems: (1) the *primary phase,* which is directly concerned with the problems of rapid introduction of new inventions and discoveries, the sudden shifts of population as in migration or immigration, or the opening-up and exploitation of new resources and new enterprises, and (2) the *secondary phase,* which has to do with the maladjustments created by the progress achieved in the primary phase. Some illustrations will make these aspects of social change more clear.

A few generations ago our forefathers slowly worked their way, with lumbering oxen and covered wagons, to the homesteads of the frontier. Gradually they cleared away the virgin forests that covered the hillsides and transformed them into wide-spreading fields of waving grain and grassland. More settlers came. Then came the railroads and still more settlers, until finally, by the close of the nineteenth century, the last of the attractive free land was taken. Towns and thriving small cities sprang up in the centers of prosperous agricultural communities. The clearing of the forests, the building of adequate schools and roads, and the development of marketing facilities constituted the major problems of this *primary phase* of the rapidly growing population of the "New West." Recently, however, we have begun to appreciate the fact that a *secondary* change was quietly taking place. The clearing of the forests left the loose, fertile soil of the hillsides exposed, and each year the farmers found the land more washed, harder to till, and less productive. The wear and wash of the land drove the more progressive farmers to seek better land, or to give up farming and seek their economic opportunities in the city. Their places were likely to be taken by less ambitious and less successful tillers and toilers. Thus in many instances the vigorous and thrifty community of farm-owners gradually faded into a drifting, indifferent, and sluggish community of farm tenants. What little fertility was left in the soil was

further depleted by the tenant, whose chief aim was to get out of the land as much as he could without putting anything back into it. Many of the communities must now depend upon State aid for the leadership and support of many of their economic and social institutions. Many of the States are even now turning to active programs of reforestation and soil conservation in the hope of rebuilding the fertility that centuries of virgin forests had placed and held there.

Another example is to be seen in the progress of modern medicine. In its primary phase we gave our attention to promoting good health and conquering disease. We faced, and still face, some serious problems in reaching every element of our population with efficient and effective public health education and health service. But we are justly proud of the great achievements we have made. We have practically stamped out many diseases; we have literally cut in half the death-rate of a generation ago; we have lengthened the span of life of the average person until it is now at least sixty-eight years; we are now able to save nineteen out of every twenty babies born until they have passed the critical first year of life; we have added months and years to the productive life of the worker by lessening his days of sickness and adding to his vitality the vigor of good health. This is the *primary phase* of the great change that has come with the advancement of modern medicine. But we are beginning to see that all this remarkable progress in medical science is not entirely an unmixed good. There are some baffling *secondary* aspects that have developed quietly in the changes taking place. In the first place, in our efforts to cut down the death-rate, we are saving thousands who are too weak of mind or body to face the complex and exacting demands of modern life. We have set aside nature's process whereby the fittest survived and the physically weak and mentally deficient for the most part died young. We are faced, therefore, with an ever-increasing burden of providing care and guidance for these subnormal individuals too weak to provide adequately for themselves. Then again, while we rejoice that we are adding so many years to the length of the average life, we are beginning to be aware of the fact that we must make more generous social provisions for the care and treatment of the aged who every year constitute an increasing proportion of the population.

We might multiply our examples to include every sort of major change taking place in society today; but the two we have just analyzed should suffice to make clear the necessity of considering the two phases that characterize all social changes. Problems that appear at first glance to be unrelated are often, after more careful examination, found to spring from common causes growing out of the same primary phase of social change.

It is gradually being recognized that most social ills cannot be considered singly but are merely component parts of larger problems, manifestations of more basic maladjustments. Leaders of social thought realize that ef-

fective remedial measures cannot be worked out without taking into account the adjustments demanded by the more basic problems out of which so many of the more obvious problems grow. Hence an understanding of the nature and causes of basic social problems enables us to understand better the surface problems, and to interpret more accurately the drift of events. It enables us, also, to take a more effective part in the constructive programs of social adjustment.

It is with the basic problems of society that our study is to be concerned, and throughout it is important to keep in mind that *the central problem is that of adjusting our social life and our social institutions so that, as individuals and as communities, we may use and enjoy the largest measure of civilization possible, and promote further progress.*

SOCIOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Sociology is the science that deals with society and its origin, development, forms, activities, and functions. The central purpose of sociology is, first, to understand society; second, to work out programs and policies which direct this understanding toward social betterment. "Sociology studies man in his social relations, as affecting and as affected by association, together with all the products and processes consequent upon such association." [30] It is closely related to all fields of science, and especially to the other *social* sciences—economics, political science, anthropology, history, philosophy, psychology, eugenics, euthenics, and education. It is a general social science and is concerned with the broad field of human associations, while these other sciences are concerned only with specialized phases of human relations. Sociology must use and draw generalizations from the data bearing upon social life furnished by the other sciences.

Sociology, however, not only makes use of the generalizations, principles, and laws revealed by the other sciences, but also extends its methods of investigation and observation into fields untouched by them. It especially investigates the origin, purposes, and results of the social phenomena that have developed out of human association. Only to a limited extent is sociology able to carry on experimentation. Social life and its products require long periods of time to develop and ripen; and it is not possible to place and hold human beings under especially controlled conditions, like animals, for experimental purposes. Consequently, the major experiments of the sociologist are those which relate to the formulation and testing of policies and programs that groups or communities may be induced to adopt tentatively.

The principles that sociologists are able to draw from the mass of data they collect through investigation, observation, and a limited amount of experimentation, furnish the tools with which social progress may be intelligently and purposefully made. Social problems furnish the sociolo-

[30] Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (1930), p. 15.

gists with opportunity for studying human association under various and changing conditions; and the principles that sociologists discover through such study furnish the understanding and the method which are necessary for working out programs and policies of sound social adjustment.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. How has the growth of huge corporations, mergers, and "chains" affected the relations of business and industry to the worker, to the consumer, and to the community? Illustrate.
2. The development of large-scale enterprise has doubtless raised the American standard of living almost immeasurably. How does this new standard express itself in (*a*) the status of women; (*b*) the difficulty in establishing a home; (*c*) increasing our social problems in regard to family life?
3. How has the development of mechanical refrigeration affected the habits and the standard of living of people? Illustrate.
4. Contrast the effect of the railroads and of the automobiles in the spreading of the city population. What was the shape of the city layout created by the railroads? How has the automobile affected the direction of city growth and the trend of city planning?
5. How have good roads and the automobile affected (*a*) the living of the city worker; (*b*) the social life of farm folks; (*c*) the attitude toward local public opinion; (*d*) the use of spare time?
6. Why is it that the local law-enforcement officers are unable to cope more effectively with offenders? What solution would you suggest?
7. It is estimated that nearly a third of the rural children under 21 years of age do not feel the influence of the churches. What reasons might be cited for

this apparent failure of the churches? What are some of the things the churches might do in order to adapt their appeal to the needs of the day?

8. Combined with the influence of the auto, our machine-made and commercialized amusements make us largely a *spectator* people, indulging largely in *passive participation*. How does this influence express itself in other phases of our social life?
9. Is social change *in itself* either good or bad? What is necessary to assure maximum benefits from our new material resources?
10. Is the creative rôle of the individual in cultural change increasing or decreasing? How does he fare as the beneficiary of cultural change? Give reasons for your answers.
11. What are the significant ways in which sociology can contribute to the solution of social problems?

3. Group Conflict

ONE RESULT of rapid changes in any society is conflict. If those changes enhance the prospects of life and of living, population may increase and penetrate areas traditionally acknowledged to be its neighbors'. Encroachment upon the pastures or hunting-grounds, upon the source of raw materials, or upon the trading areas of neighbors excites hostility and leads to conflict. Rapid changes within a group act as a selective agent in breaking the population into classes. Those who respond to the changes most quickly, and adapt themselves and their habits to the new situation most completely, become set off from the others in interests, attitudes, and culture patterns. Clashes inevitably arise between these divergent groups. Customs become modified. Old relations are strained. Between group and group emotional reactions develop that lead on to conflict.

For the great majority of mankind group struggle is today, and so far as history throws any light upon the question always has been, the inevitable accompaniment of contacts between people of different traditions and culture. History is full of the story of wars and battles. The earliest portions of the Hebrew Scriptures picture the struggle between alien groups. The earliest literature of the Greeks presents a picture of individual combat and group wars as making up a very great proportion of life. These great struggles between what we now call national groups still go on.

However, with the growing complexity of human life, with the dividing of people by different interests and occupations into various classes, the group struggles of the present day have been greatly multiplied. In addition to the struggle of ethnic and cultural groups, nationalities, and races, we have the struggle between different classes in the same society. Some of these class struggles are survivals from previous times. For example, the conflict between clergy and laity is a historical survival. So also are the conflicts between peasant and noble, between learned and unlearned, and, to a degree, between those who have and those who have not.

Here in the United States the ferment of social change is altering the composition of groups and classes and rearranging their positions in the social structure. However, the change in this country follows a very differ-

ent pattern from that of the Old World. Class lines in the Old World have been more fixed by traditional arrangements that have existed since the days of feudalism—"once a peasant, always a peasant." There is, therefore, much more of a foundation for class solidarity and discipline. In America, there are no traditional *closed* classes, except perhaps the Negro and the "poor whites" of the South, remnants of the stratified structure of slavery days. For the most part, in this country, all classes are *open,* and the individual may readily pass from one class to the other or may even belong to several at the same time. It is, therefore, not easy to secure the class solidarity and permanency that the closed-class pattern makes possible. At least in political theory, the United States is perhaps the closest to being a classless social structure of any in the world. However, in reality the economic and occupational differences create much class differentiation in this country. On this basis we observe a marked shift in the composition and function of the classes in American economic life: in industry, the craftsmen no longer can dominate the labor situation; the salaried class has become a larger and stronger element in the population; management has become smaller but more powerful; likewise, agriculture engages a smaller element in the population but is stronger politically and better organized.[1] These are not the only groups that are maneuvering for positions of greater influence and control in the changing social order. But because of the open-class situation, their maneuvers cannot depart far from the *public* interest; indeed, they must have the support of public opinion in order to attain their objectives. The public, therefore, becomes the umpire in the conflicts between the groups in democracy. Unless the public is kept informed as to the actual facts that underlie the contentions of the various groups, its attitude is likely to be based on prejudices compounded from propaganda, leading to further instability and uncertainty.

SOME OUTSTANDING GROUP CONFLICTS

To set forth the many group conflicts in modern life would require volumes. Consequently we shall select certain of the more outstanding forms of group conflict and first examine them in an introductory survey before studying them more in detail in later chapters.

Conflict Between Labor and Capital. The economic struggle for advantage between the employers of labor and the laborers themselves is a development consequent upon the Industrial Revolution. In a former day when the employer and his men worked in the same shop and at the same work there was no division of interests between the two. With the introduction of machinery and the use of large amounts of capital in the productive process, all this is changed. Often the stockholders who furnish the capital are not acquainted even with the manager of the business. There is no longer that personal touch between employer and employed that once

[1] Louis M. Hacker, and Others, *The United States, A Graphic History* (1937), pp. 167 ff.

existed. The stockholder is interested chiefly in his dividends; the bondholder in his interest; the manager in satisfying these two groups and at the same time keeping his labor as contented as possible. Labor in many cases does not know anything about the conduct of the business; it knows only what it hears as to the amount of profit that the business pays; it knows what wages it receives and frequently feels that the distribution of the concern's earnings is not fair. Moreover, the conditions under which the laborers work are frequently determined not by conference of employer with employee, but arbitrarily by the employer; and sometimes these conditions are bad for the laborer. Therefore it is easy to see that in the development of our great industrial and commercial civilization the interest of the owners of great industries and the interest of the employees are not always the same. Consequently we have those industrial conflicts which we know as strikes and lockouts. Frequently an industry is for a time paralyzed by a struggle that cannot be settled by agreement between the two contending parties. Indeed, the industrial conflicts are perhaps the most costly to both belligerents and the public of any of the various types of group conflict. Thousands of families suffer, homes are disrupted, hatred develops, frequently violence occurs, and even national interest is jeopardized. In such a case there is war within the body politic between conflicting classes of society. Table 3 shows the trend of strikes in the period from 1920 to 1949:

TABLE 3: STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920–1950 *

Year	*Strikes*	*Number of Workers Involved*	*Man-Days Idle because of Strikes*
1920	3,411	1,460,000	... No data ...
1925	1,301	428,000	... No data ...
1930	637	183,000	3,320,000
1935	2,014	1,120,000	15,500,000
1940	2,508	577,000	6,700,000
1945	4,750	3,470,000	38,000,000
1950	4,700	2,300,000	38,500,000

* *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (Bureau of the Census), p. 73; Bureau of Labor Statistics news release (January, 1951).

Race Conflicts. Race conflicts in the United States are struggles chiefly between whites and Negroes, whites and Orientals, or Jews and Gentiles. The attacks of the whites on Negroes in the South, sociologically speaking, grow out of the disturbance of the status of the two races consequent upon the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln and the final issue of the War Between the States. So long as the inferior position of the Negroes was established by law and common consent, there was no question as to the relationship of the two races. However, upon the political eman-

cipation of the Negroes the question of the relationship between the two races became critical. Habit, custom, and tradition had fixed in the mores of the people of the South the inferior status of the Negroes. When they were given political equality after the close of the War Between the States, naturally friction between the races developed. National, state and city interracial committees are now being formed, and serious efforts are being made everywhere to adjust the difficult problems of race relations in an equitable manner.

The root of conflict between the whites and the Orientals on the Pacific Coast is somewhat different. Fundamentally it is economic in its nature, although social considerations enter also. So long as the Chinese and Japanese immigrants were content to take the part of servants in the household there was no trouble. When, however, they began to launch out in the economic field on their own account, and with their lower standard of living were able to compete successfully with their white neighbors in industry, agriculture, and business, then it was that trouble began. Their "foreign" family standards, their low standards of living, their custom of working on Sundays, their insistence that their children should attend school with white children, and the rising social status that economic success brought in its train, aggravated the situation. The occasional marriage of a white woman to a Japanese or a Chinese, while not of great significance, served to excite the imagination of the whites with fear of social equality, much as it has done when Negroes intermarry with the whites.

With the increase of the Jewish population of the United States, especially in our large cities, some resentment of the Jews has appeared. Generally the Jews around whom the difficulties develop are immigrants accustomed to a lower standard of living in European countries. They colonize in our large cities and enter into competition with the American workers and with American shopkeepers. In addition to this fundamental economic pressure certain customs and traditions mark them off as a people apart. Where, as in America, the Jews are not discriminated against politically, educationally, or economically, many adopt the standards of living of the country, join the labor unions or organize new ones, accept the native standards of business, adopt the customs of their new homeland and rapidly assimilate with the people of the country.

Religious Conflicts. In Asia and Africa, where the Mohammedan culture comes in conflict with the Christian and the Jewish, intense religious hatreds arise and conflicts occur. In India this clash occurs between Hindus and Mohammedans; in Turkey, before the organization of the Turkish Republic, it occurred between Mohammedans and Christians.

In a country of religious freedom, such as in the United States, where all religions are given equal opportunity and none special privileges, conflict tends to become competition, violence tends to give way to the subtler conflict, and the outcome is the adjustment of all religions to the demands of

the people. The more active and flexible religious organizations tend to borrow and adapt to their purposes ideas and practices that have commended themselves. Under such conditions the fierce religious conflicts die out, the tolerant spirit spreads, and those religions which most effectively commend themselves to the beliefs of the people survive while others fade away.

Cultural Conflicts. Another type of group conflict is represented by the conflict of different cultures. By the culture of a people we mean all those ways of doing things, points of view, customs, traditions, and habits which make up the warp and woof of everyday life and thinking. For example, consider the difference in culture between the American Indians when the whites came to this country and that of the whites. There was little difference in the agricultural techniques of the colonists and the Indians. But there was a vast difference between the methods of government, religion, personal and group ideals, and traditions. The Indian had no weapons except the bow and arrow and the stone hatchet, or club. The white man brought with him the gun, which had developed out of the discovery of gunpowder. The religion of the Indian was a sort of animism culminating in the concept of the Great Spirit, Manitou. The white man's religion was the result of a long period of development. While the Indian's theology was chiefly a mythology, the white man's religion was based upon certain dogmas that he held to be of absolute validity. The Indian had no sacred book; the white man had his infallible Bible, and a definite set of traditions had grown around his religion, as well as definite practices in the celebration of its rites. The Indian's government was a government based upon blood-relationships, real or assumed. It was in the hands of clan and tribal leaders. The white man's government was based upon written instruments tracing back to the Magna Carta of King John. Its basis was not blood-relationship, but residence within a given geographical area. Moreover, economically, while the Indian practiced agriculture, he lived chiefly by hunting. Naturally he could not understand why the white man insisted upon robbing him of his hunting-ground. On the other hand, the white man had passed much beyond the hunting economy; he felt that the Indian used the land wastefully and therefore that he himself had a right to use it more efficiently.

This brief outline of the culture of the Indians as compared with that of the white men perhaps gives one a clearer notion of the conflict that inevitably ensued. Subtly working in the white man's mind was the opinion that his culture was superior to that of the Indian, and that therefore the latter deserved no consideration at his hands. The Indian, on the other hand, felt as we would feel, should invaders with a different culture settle upon our borders and proceed to divest us of our rights, to crowd us out of our land, and to subject us to their will. This was a conflict of culture.

The unrest in Oriental countries at the present time is largely the re-

sult of the conflicts of culture. China and India, with their long history and proud culture, feel that they are superior to the men who bring to them the materialistic culture of the West, with its physical science and its emphasis upon highly organized industry. On the other hand, the white man who has invaded these Eastern countries has a sense of his superiority. No wonder, then, that long-separated cultures which come into contact excite a high degree of emotion among the people included in either culture. The natives of India, while they recognize the important contribution made by the British Government, are stirred to their depths by the manifestation of what they believe is a sense of assumed superiority on the part of the whites.

THE GENESIS OF GROUP CONFLICT

Group conflict may sometimes be the result of the personal ambitions of an individual; but usually underneath such ambitions lie great currents of human feeling stirred by the consciousness of certain differences and the threatening of interests considered vital.

Economic Disturbance. Frequently class conflict arises out of the introduction of certain economic and industrial changes. Great economic disturbance occurred in the history of England when after the Black Death of 1348, which swept off from a third to a half of the people of England, the old relationships between the lords of the manor and the serfs or vassals were seriously disturbed. The feudal system began to break down, and new methods of agriculture had to be introduced. Because of the demand for woolen goods, sheep-raising became more profitable than ordinary farming, while at the same time it was easier to secure attendants for a flock of sheep than cultivators of the soil. The common lands of whole villages were enclosed to make sheep-runs. Large numbers of peasants were reduced to misery; and class conflict slumbered until it broke out in movements of one sort or another, often culminating in bloodshed.

Later, the change from domestic to factory industry in England created a rift in the solidarity of the social population. Large numbers of the hand-weavers were driven to starvation, while factory-owners amassed great fortunes by the exploitation of their workers. Naturally a class psychology arose on the part of the worker as well as on the part of the employer. The old status of inferior and superior growing out of the feudal relationship, once established, resulted in little or no conflict because the relationships were personal, clear-cut, and generally accepted. The new class consciousness generated by the Industrial Revolution, because interests were no longer identical but conflicting, had a very different effect. The Industrial Revolution had created a vast new supply of goods and income over which no class had a clearly established claim, and the classes began to assert themselves as effectively as they could to secure the right to as large shares as possible.

A similar growth of class consciousness appears whenever there is radical change in economic arrangements. Thus, in the United States the growth of great corporations with absentee ownership and the consequent separation of owner and worker in personal acquaintanceship led to the growth of class consciousness and class conflict. Strikes and lockouts resulted. While a number of experiments in resolving the intensity of the conflict have been tried—such as welfare work for employees, stock ownership by employees, shop committees for the adjustment of grievances, plans for joint control over conditions of work and rates of pay and more recently a mounting resort to governmental mediation and regulation—the clash of interests between owners and workers has not yet been allayed.

Changes in Culture. A difference in the culture of groups within a given population often results in conflict. When William the Norman conquered England and several thousand of his retainers became the overlords of the country, the elements of a new culture were introduced into that land. A new language became the official language; a somewhat more highly developed religion was introduced by the conquerors; the status of the conquerors was superior and they made their superiority felt by their subordinates. For a generation or two the consciousness of differences between the conquerors and the conquered was very sharp. Frequent clashes occurred. A process of adjustment began, which in the course of centuries was virtually completed, and class consciousness based on this cultural and ethnic difference disappeared.

When immigrants from another country arrive in large numbers, differences in culture are soon recognized. Hence, in the United States, when large numbers of the Irish arrived in the early part of the nineteenth century, culture differences between them and the people already settled here were recognized on both sides. Later, with the coming of large numbers of Italians with different customs and traditions, a different language, and a different standard of living, the older inhabitants again became conscious of the intrusion of an alien culture and dubbed these people "Wops" and "Guineas." Thus, differences in culture form the basis of an attitude of superiority toward newcomers, and increase the difficulty of assimilating the immigrant into our culture. This consciousness of difference in culture also accounts for many of the difficulties in forming labor unions in those industrial groups in which there are large numbers of immigrants of different nationalities. Labor leaders find it very much more difficult to present a united front when cultural differences interfere with understanding and coöperation. Such cultural differences also affect progress in schools, health programs, the development of recreation, housing, and many other social problems.

While most of these conflicts due to differences in culture do not break out into open violence, they are none the less conflicts in the social process. They retard social unification, prevent people of different cultures from

looking at things in the same way and uniting for common purposes. They constitute one of our chief social problems.

Religious Innovations. Often religious differences give rise to more or less sharp group conflict. The conflict of different religions is not here referred to, although such conflicts are an inevitable result of the contact of different religions in a common area. However, within a given area changes are constantly taking place in the development of any single religion. This is illustrated by the large number of Mohammedan sects, the different varieties of Buddhism, the orthodox and liberal varieties of Judaism, and of Christianity. Rooted as most of these innovations are in social conditions, and constituting as they do a response on the part of a few leaders to changed conditions in the lives of people, these religious innovations frequently lead to terrific group conflicts within a given organization. Consider, for example, the upheaval, which historically has been called a revolt, brought about by the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and the surrounding countries. All of us are familiar with the results of that upheaval. It disturbed the social solidarity of Europe for centuries and remains even today a basis of frequent conflict. The Lutheran Reformation was only one of a series of innovations that have disturbed the peace of the Christian Church from the first centuries of the Christian era up to the present time. Perhaps the latest to develop is that rather fundamental division which has come about in the strife between the Modernists and the Fundamentalists in Protestant Christianity.

Assumption of Group Superiority. The most fundamental cause of class and group conflict is the attitude of superiority on the part of one class, or group, toward another. It may be pride of race, of nationality, of culture, of religion, or of political system. It may take any one of a number of forms. As long as it is conceded by all people that there are higher and lower orders of social classes, and the relationships of these classes have become stabilized, there is very little danger of conflict growing out of superiority and inferiority. However, let democracy or a doctrine of equality enter into the minds of men as it did in the Western world in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and these stabilized relationships between the higher and lower classes receive a rude shock, class consciousness develops, and class conflict is probable. As indicated above, the conflicts going on in India and China and all the Eastern world at the present time are reactions against this attitude of superiority on the part of the representatives of one kind of culture toward those of another. Moreover, in subtler ways this attitude of superiority appears in any given social group. Consider the gulf fixed between the common people of any State and the educated classes. Too often the educated people, especially those with higher education, feel superior to the common run of mankind. They show this feeling; they look with some degree of contempt on the untutored workingman, or the unlettered legislator. The educated specialist looks with impatience upon the

ignorance of most people in matters that are commonplace to him, and allows his irritation to affect his whole attitude toward the common people. The latter reciprocate by regarding him as a strange kind of being, quite unlike themselves, and by way of compensation may dub him a "highbrow" or "snob."

The same attitude of superiority appears among the rich with regard to the poor. Too often the man who has been successful in accumulating wealth looks down upon those who have not as inferior creatures.

RESULTS OF CLASS AND GROUP CONFLICT

Out of this clash between classes and groups certain important social results appear, some socially good, and some bad.

Good Results. There is no question that certain socially good products have come about as a result of group conflict. The early struggle of tribes and groups of people resulted in the selection of those who were fitted to survive in a given situation. In that early period of group conflict, war favored the survival of the superior. "Superior" in this case must be taken to mean the class, group, or individual best fitted to survive the particular situation. That superiority was not, of course, unalloyed, and there were evil by-products even in that early day.

Even among modern groups something of the same good social results grow out of conflict. The superiority of a given culture often is demonstrated in violent conflict. Today, however, conflict is more on the basis of applied science and ideals than on the basis of physical strength or of mental ability. The inevitable result of conflict, no matter how severe it may be, between groups and classes, is either the imposition of certain elements of culture upon the conquered, with perhaps some modification of the culture of the conquerors by infiltration from the dominated culture, or a compromise between two rather equally matched groups and the integration of opposing views. As illustration of this point consider what happened in the Norman conquest of England and what happened after the Protestant revolt in Germany. One would suppose that a conquest as thorough as that of the Norman conquest in England would have had the result of overwhelming the culture of the Saxons and Danes by that of the Normans. But that did not occur. The core of Anglo-Saxon law, the language of the country, the religion, and the customs and traditions remained largely those of the conquered people. To be sure, they adopted certain elements of the culture that the Norman conquerors brought over from France. But after two hundred years there had come about an amalgamation of the two cultures into a *new* culture, composed of Anglo-Saxon culture as a base with some modifications introduced by the Normans.

One would think as he reads of the intense conflict between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants following the Reformation that no modification would be possible on either side. One who reads the history after the

first burst of hatred had died down, however, learns that this was not true. The Council of Trent in fact introduced various modifications for the Roman Catholic church, taking over certain suggested reforms that constituted what has been called the Counter-Reformation. In other words, the Roman Catholic church attempted to capture some of the "thunder" of the Reformers. Moreover, within two generations after the Reformation had started, the reformed churches took over certain of the Catholic ritual and a large part of the Catholic dogmas and incorporated them into the creeds of Protestant Christendom.

Many other illustrations of this process of compromise and adoption of elements from the opposing culture might be cited.

Evil Results. Certain evil products have appeared as the result of class conflict from the earliest period of history until the present time. One of the most outstanding of these is *the riving of the social solidarity* consequent upon class or group conflict. Open struggle brings to expression all the hidden hatred and suspicion that lie at the base of conflict. The gulf already opening between classes is made deeper and wider for the time being. Take for example the conflict between the North and the South in the War Between the States. The consciousness of difference that had been growing for nearly a century became sharpened and fixed as a result of that great struggle. The resolution of each side for the time being was stiffened. After nearly a century the gulf between the North and the South has been only partially bridged. Misunderstanding between the two sections is still easily excited. It is true, however, that the lapse of time heals old sores. In the end social integration will probably take place.

Another evil result of class conflict is *waste of effort.* Consider the useless words spoken, the fruitless efforts spent, on sectional divisions over public questions in the United States. How much more constructive measures could have been adopted in our political problems in the United States these past eighty years and more, for example, had the issues not been confused by the memories of the hatred and strife of the War Between the States! How fruitless is much of the strife between Fundamentalists and Modernists over dogmatic problems! How much constructive coöperation has been prevented by the strife between the Roman Catholics and Protestants in this country! How much money has been spent by both labor unions and employers in maintaining their respective so-called "rights" in the industrial conflict! These class conflicts have drawn "red herrings" across the path of progress and have diverted the attention of men from problems of greater social importance, which needed settling so badly. There is no question but that class conflict means enormous waste of effort.

Another immediately evil result of class conflict is *the weakening of the bonds that hold us to some of the old loyalties,* such as the family bonds, church bonds, and patriotism. Perhaps this is not wholly evil. Perhaps

this means in the end the creation of a finer loyalty to family, church, and state. Nevertheless, immediately it has decidedly disastrous results upon these social institutions. How frequently religious disputes cut across family lines and dissolve family loyalty! Some of these evil results appear in the divorce statistics in the cases of families established by the marriage of Protestants and Roman Catholics, or of Christians and Jews. Many times these age-old conflicts result in the disruption of a family.

Consider the effect upon religion—Christian, Jewish, Mohammedan, or Hindu—of race antipathy or class conflict. A good example is provided by what happened in the Second World War. Consider the predicament in which the Roman Catholic church was placed, with its adherents ranged on both sides of the great conflict. No less difficult was the dilemma of many of the Protestant churches, who had adherents on both sides. The church as a whole is in a peculiarly difficult situation in our industrial conflict. Which side shall it take in that strife which has risen over labor questions? Shall it hold with the property-owner, the employer, the capitalist, or shall it take the side of the worker? It requires wise statesmanship to steer the ship of church in the troubled waters of industrial conflict.

The First and Second World Wars alike have shown us the difficulties for thousands of our immigrant citizens and their families in maintaining loyalty to the country of which they are citizens rather than to the country from which they or their parents have come. Our German-Americans and more recently our Japanese- and Italian-Americans have been in a very difficult situation. They loved both countries, the old and the new. The war period was a time of severe testing for many of them. In all these ways great class and group conflicts produce results that in their immediate aspects are evil.

FACTORS THAT MITIGATE GROUP CONFLICT

In the previous paragraphs it was suggested that group conflicts ultimately are settled one way or another. Let us now consider the devices which mitigate the sharpness of the conflict and tend to bring about compromise and adjustment.

In the Economic Field. In the economic field new inventions giving opportunity to rise from one class to another, wide distribution of ownership of property, and rapid industrial development providing a chance for energy and genius and steady employment lessen class and group conflict. Moreover, provisions for safeguarding the welfare of workers, such as health-insurance, old-age and unemployment insurance, or other devices that lessen the hazards to health, security, and employment, tend to ameliorate the conflict between classes. Agencies providing for those who are unfortunate, and devices for settling disputes between industrial groups or between nations cut down the occasions for conflict and mitigate the struggle. As we look back over history, we see how many of the great

group and class conflicts could have been avoided had there been an appeal not to prejudice but to scientific investigation and a fair and full presentation of unbiased facts. The probabilities are that the First World War would not have occurred had there been some impartial investigating body that could have studied the facts and presented an unbiased report. Many industrial disputes would not occur were there clear understanding on the part of both sides of the facts with reference to each side of the conflict. Science applied to all these fields and to many others may yet solve class conflict.

In the Social Field. Widespread educational opportunity giving the chance to all who are capable of profiting by it is, in the long run, a mitigating influence on group conflict. That is the justification for the provision of education suited to the needs of the people which has been made by the United States.

Another mitigating factor in the social field is the shifting of attention to new social values away from emotional prejudices and hatreds. For example, shifting attention to service to one's country, or to his city, frequently solves present conflict. As people widen the range of their interests, taking in philanthropy, art, literature, civic virtue, or any other great social enterprise, class conflict resting upon elemental emotions tends to be dissolved and to disappear.

Widening political opportunity, giving everyone a chance to share in government to the extent of his capacity, tends to lessen the ancient strife between the privileged and the unprivileged. The coming of a democracy while bringing new sources of class division and strife, closes the gulf between ancient classes. Where, as in England and America, the humblest citizen by the exercise of his talent may rise to the highest office, the significance of the ancient political classes disappears.

Moreover, equality before the court and the law, an ancient dream not yet fully realized, so far as it is achieved softens the asperity between classes. Once the peasant had no rights before a court, that his lord was compelled to recognize. In theory each man today is equal before the judge. In actual practice this has not always held true. The man with money or influence sometimes still has the advantage. The setting up of the public defender, *viz.*, a lawyer to defend the poor man against charges brought against him in the court, is a movement in the direction of equality before courts of law. Legal-aid societies, which provide lawyers for anyone who is sued for a small sum or to whom is owed a small sum, are moves in the same direction.

Finally, socialized religion—that is, religion suited to the needs of the common man and adapted to the social problems of the day—is another factor ameliorating group and class conflict. Could all religions unite, the conflicts and struggles that have marked the history of dogmatic Christianity would fade away!

If this brief survey of the significance of group and class conflict has any value, it makes clear to us how these conflicts arise, how certain of them are inevitable, and how constantly there are working in human society certain forces and influences that mitigate their severity, lead to compromise, and increase the unity of the various groups. The real problem is how to bring about the union of different cultures and different groups of men devoted to contradictory principles and practices, with the least evil results and with the ultimate combination of all that is socially useful. Cooley has pointed out that these conflicts tend to become less personal by reason of the fact that men's loyalties are organized increasingly across different classes. A man is not only a Republican or a Democrat, for example, but he may be an employer or a laborer; a Protestant or a Roman Catholic, an educated or an ignorant man; a Negro or a white. Group conflict is one of the inevitable results of social evolution. With the development of communication and transportation, men become more fully acquainted with each other and in more diversified ways, groups learn to appreciate each other's culture, and the fundamental basis of class strife tends to be mitigated.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Explain why in the Middle Ages *inferiority* and *superiority* in social status did not create class conflict, while today the ostentatious assumption of superiority by any class results in resentment by those who, by inference, are inferior.

2. Bearing in mind that education tends to make a group more articulate, what effect does universal education have upon class conflict? What is the ultimate effect on the standards of the entire group? Give examples.
3. What is the effect on class consciousness if the social structure is such that it provides unqualified opportunity for the individual to pass from laborer to capitalist?
4. List factors (1) increasing and (2) decreasing class consciousness in industrial relations at the present time. What is your appraisal of these factors?
5. What is the basis of the conflict between the two divisions of organized labor: between the American Federation of Labor, on the one side, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, on the other? Why is the fight between these two divisions of labor so bitter?
6. Explain the following statement: "In general, the growing complexity of interests tends to increase the number of conflicts between groups and to decrease the severity of these conflicts."
7. Name two of the most severe group conflicts that are evident in your community, and show in each case: (*a*) what is the issue of the conflict; (*b*) which groups are the challengers or initiators of the conflicts; (*c*) what are the methods used by each against the other; and (*d*) what is the basis of the claim of each to public approval?
8. Are the issues and goals of group conflict always apparent and clearly defined, or are they often obscured by appeals to patriotism, social justice, honor, and interwoven with prejudices? Give two illustrations.

4. Patterns of Race Conflict

GENERALLY PROBLEMS of race relations have been referred to as "the race problem," and too often the inference has been that the trouble is confined to allegedly problematic races, while the white race—or to be more exact, the Nordics—are the ones annoyed and bothered. Looking at the subject thus befogs the real issues—and worse, vexes and offends "the other fellow" to the point where the relations between the races become increasingly tense. There are many problems that involve race relations—standards of living, community building, education, politics, industry, public recreation, travel conveniences, citizenship, and business. To lump all of them together and to speak of them collectively as "the race problem" is merely to reveal an emotional attitude in regard to race relations. Careful research, thoughtful study, and sound judgment—all are essential to progress in human relations in any and every field. So long as questions of race relations rest upon an emotional basis there is no answer to them, other than what has been too generally characteristic—hysteria and mob violence.

THE BASIS OF RACE FRICTION

Present-day scholars classify the world's population in three general race groups: the Caucasoid, the Negroid, and the Mongoloid. Each of these divisions immediately calls up in the mind's eye certain basic characteristics of each race, and makes it easy to visualize the typical white person, the Negro, and the Oriental. Human beings, however, exhibit a very wide variety of physical characteristics; so racial lines are not always easy to draw. Many groups (like the peoples of India or Egypt, for example) must be placed more or less arbitrarily as members of one race or another. In order to make the classification more serviceable, therefore, the races are further classified as to *subraces*. These are smaller groups having some broad likenesses among themselves, which set them apart from the rest of the race. Thus, within the Caucasoid race, five subraces are now recog-

nized: the Nordic, the Alpine, the Mediterranean, the Armenoid, and the Ainu (a small group in northern Japan). Similar subrace classifications have been made within the Negroid and the Mongoloid racial groups.

Nevertheless, the biological traits of mankind are far more generally alike than they are unlike. Everywhere, men have the same general bodily proportion. Everywhere, men have a complex system of vocal cords, by which they communicate more or less abstract ideas to one another. No other animal has a hand at all comparable to man's, which is made distinctively effective by the position and flexibility of the thumb. All these traits serve to set all mankind apart from any other species of life. Even the differences in intelligence between one group of mankind and another are not so great as many people suppose. In fact, the differences are greater between the members of the same race than they are between one race and another. Repeatedly, experience makes it clear that intelligence and special capacities depend upon environmental factors as well as upon native abilities.

The biological traits upon which racial groupings are based, then, are chiefly external and relatively minor. The color of the skin, of course, is the most obvious and generally used basis for placing an individual as a white, a Negro, or an Oriental. Other characteristic differences commonly observed are the variations in the shape of the nose and of the skull, the color and texture of the hair, and the slant and color of the eyes. Some of these differences enable us to distinguish racial origins fairly accurately, while others are less dependable; but the important thing to remember is that *race is simply a classification of people, based upon differences in certain obvious inheritable traits affecting the external appearance of different groups.*

At first thought, it might seem strange that such superficial differences should be so important as a basis for the sharp friction that often exists between races. Yet every group has a certain distrust of anything unlike itself. We as individuals feel something of the same uneasiness when we are in the presence of deficient or malformed persons. Even the disfigurement or absence of bodily members may cause some strain in the contact between individuals—the presence of scars or infections, for example, or the loss of limbs. We feel much more comfortable among people like ourselves, those who think and act and look as we ourselves do. It is exactly the same with groups of people. Group loyalties are built around common experiences, common activities, common appearances. Race cleavages get their start in this way; and they soon become strengthened by the very differences in experience and activity which they themselves create between the races.

When members of one race migrate into the midst of another race *recognized* as different in *cultural background* and *physical characteristics* there results a complication of human relations that soon begins to express

itself in one way or another. If the number of the migrants is relatively small, they may be accepted with curiosity and more or less indifference; but as their numbers increase, this attitude of indifference gives way to a growing race prejudice; and this prejudice persists just as long as either the cultural or the physical differences remain recognized by either of the races.[1]

With the increased number of "strange" people struggling for a living, for power, for position, and for prestige, there develops in the native population a feeling that the culture and prestige of its own people—their "position," their "dominance"—is being threatened by the "trespassing" race. *Hence, in all the social institutions and in those aspects of social life where social prestige is expressed and recognized, the "color line" becomes definitely drawn.* The one race comes to regard the other race as being inferior, or undesirable, and possibly both. The race claiming superiority resents any effort on the part of the other race to assert social equality or to compete with the members of the "dominant" race for social position and prestige. Furthermore, the "dominant" race, while assigning lower social status to the "inferior" race, finds it easy to justify exploitations, and to erect a double standard of justice—one standard for the control of the relations between its own members, and another standard to regulate the relations that its members may have with the "inferior" race.

Whenever the "inferior" race refuses to accept the rating of inferiority, and demands recognition as a social equal and a right to share the prestige of the "superior" race, then it is that trouble begins. The "superior" race insists that the "inferior" race "must keep its place," and it is seldom satisfied with lawful, orderly measures in enforcing its demands on the "inferiors." Such measures are too slow of action, too impersonal, too deliberate, to satisfy the emotions of jealousy, fear, and hatred that boil over when the prestige of the race is at stake. Impassioned force is substituted for orderly justice, and the mob metes out its quick, violent, terrorizing vengeance as a warning to the other members of the "inferior" race, that they must either "keep their place" or perish.[2]

The hierarchy of status implied in the concepts of "inferior" and "superior" in the field of race relations is rooted most directly in the development of the biological sciences. Race itself is a biological concept; it has no other meaning in contemporary anthropology. Indeed, the term is losing its precise meaning—and much of its significance—as the anthropologists continue their research into the cultural and physical heritage of the human race as a whole. But the science of biology, which emerged as a distinct study perhaps two hundred years ago, was primarily concerned with *classifying* the varieties of living things. Man himself, as a species, was classified further according to type or race.

[1] Jerome Dowd, *The Negro in American Life* (1926), p. 424.
[2] J. E. Cutler, *Lynch Law* (1905).

When the theory of the evolution of species was formulated, postulating the development of existing types from more primitive parent stocks, it was an easy (though mistaken) deduction that the various races represented variable degrees of evolution from lowest to highest. Thus, one race came to be regarded as "inferior," another "superior," according to the convenience of the theorist and the dictates of the period. Here, too, is the origin of the vicious ideology of racism, a fanatical assertion of the superiority of one's own race and of the determination to keep it "pure" whatever the cost might be to the other fellow's race. The white race having been the most powerful during this period, the theory found its earliest growth among the whites. "It was valuable," say the Roses, "in justifying slavery and imperialism. It bolstered the ego of the poor white man who had nothing to be proud of but his race. It led to wars between nations, and to the destruction of the objects of culture that were not the products of the allegedly superior races." [3]

Present-day anthropologists and students of ethnology are agreed that racial differences cannot be interpreted as implying that some races are superior to others in intellectual capacity, enterprise, morality, and physique. "The answer to such criticism," says Kroeber, "is first of all that racial inferiority and superiority are by no means self-evident truths. Secondly, the belief in race inequalities is founded in emotion and action and then justified by reasoning. That is, the belief is rationalized, not primarily inferred by pure reason." [4] Anthropologists and ethnologists agree that they have not come across any valid proof that would establish the innate superiority of the Caucasoid race.

THE PROBLEM OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

To deny the validity of racism is not to say that the concept is of no significance. To the contrary, it is well known that some of the most vicious aspects of the Second World War were rooted deeply in fanatical race hatreds. Less well recognized, perhaps, but equally true is the fact

TABLE 4: PRINCIPAL MINORITY POPULATION GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940 *
(total population, 132,000,000)

Group	*Approximate Number*
Negroes	12,865,000
Jews	5,000,000
Indians	334,000
Japanese	128,000
Chinese	78,000

* Sixteenth Census, *Population*, Vol. II, Part I (U.S. Bureau of the Census), p. 19.

[3] Arnold and Caroline Rose, *America Divided* (1948), p. 24.
[4] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (1923), Ch. IV, p. 59.

that one of the most persistent areas of group conflict in the history of our own country is that of race conflict. Whites and nonwhites have clashed almost from the time the first explorers and settlers set foot on American shores. Indeed, the resolving of that first clash—between Indians and whites—still remains as part of the unfinished business of our contemporary democracy! The circumstances and development of conflicts between the whites and specific nonwhite racial groups in America have varied considerably. But the basic patterns of conflict and the underlying motivations have shown a remarkable conformity to the principles we have just been discussing.

The American Indians. The Indian has a unique position in the annals of American interracial struggle. He was present in force, probably numbering a million persons in North America alone, when the whites arrived in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The whites, then, were definitely in the minority; and the relations between the two racial groups in that early period were more nearly on a plane of equality than they have ever been since. The objective of the whites then, as always, so far as their relations with the Indians were concerned, was to derive profit to themselves through trade. But the white settlements were small, and were sponsored by corporations of various European countries. So each of the settlements was constrained to maintain amicable relations with the surrounding Indian tribes at the peril of arousing disastrous opposition both from the Indians themselves and from rival European trading companies. Moreover, the North American Indian seems not to have been highly organized; his tribes were relatively small, and the flame of independence burned high among both tribes and individuals. As a result, European settlers in the North American continent never were successful in their efforts to dominate the Indian by enslavement.[5]

Thus were the patterns of Indian-white conflict set for the centuries which followed. Until about the time of the Revolution the Indian tribes were able to hold their own, and to maintain their tribal autonomies. They commanded respectful dealings from the comparatively small individual colonies which then existed. Indeed, for nearly a century thereafter, till 1871, the United States maintained the fiction of dealing with the tribes as sovereign "nations." Hundreds of treaties were concluded, even though the terms were harshly drawn and even more harshly administered to deprive the Indians of much of their land and freedom. It was a losing battle for the Indians, however; they were no match for the rapidly growing numbers and material power of the whites. So the whites (perhaps emboldened by the existence of a very strong military establishment at the end of the War Between the States) finally asserted their domination by adopting a policy of outright segregation of the Indians on

[5] Clark Wissler, "Contributions of the American Indian," in *One America*, Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, Eds. (1945), p. 585.

reservations, imposed by sheer force. Yet that very isolation, coupled with the legal claims arising from the treaties of the centuries before, gave the Indians a tough core of group solidarity that makes them a vexing problem to the country today. There has been no real capitulation in terms of race consciousness; and we have certainly not assimilated the Indian into our culture. Nor does it appear that we shall ever do so until we are prepared to grant them the same right to work out their own destiny that we insist upon for ourselves.[6] Until that time comes, it is likely that the issue, in terms of relations between the two races, will remain deadlocked. There is no real incentive for the Indian to accept our culture, nor to compromise his own.

The Chinese and Japanese. There are hardly more than 210,000 Chinese and Japanese in the United States at the present time—about 80,000 Chinese and 130,000 Japanese. Thus they form a very small portion of our total population. Yet taken together, even though historically their migration to our shores came at quite different periods and under differing circumstances, they present one of our most difficult problems of race contact. Both are Mongoloid, and as such have physical characteristics that distinguish them readily from the Caucasoid. Their cultures are notably different than our own; and in both cases circumstances have forced both the immigrants and their American-born progeny to cling to the Oriental traditions to a large degree, a fact which has served further to retard the assimilation of these groups into American life. Both entered the country with much the same motivation that inspired most other immigrant groups: they came in response to the perennial American demand for an abundant labor supply, and of course hoped to better their lot in doing so. Both, at first, were welcomed for the help they gave in developing our resources; and both were respected for their industry and thrift. But their numbers increased rapidly, and the opposition to them expressed itself effectively almost as quickly. The result was that the immigration of both Chinese and Japanese was cut off abruptly; and in both cases we have today a comparatively small group almost completely segregated from the rest of the population, clinging gregariously to their own culture patterns, and highly self-conscious in terms of racial and cultural difference.

The Chinese were almost unknown in the United States until 1850. Beginning in that year they came in great numbers, settling principally in California and attracted primarily by the sudden burst of activity there following the discovery of gold. They did not long participate directly in the rush for gold, since the whites soon saw to it that such prerogatives were reserved to themselves. Competition in mining led to sharp clashes almost immediately; and as early as 1852 a State tax was levied on alien

[6] Byron Brophy, "The American Indian and Government," in *One America*, Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, Eds. (1945), p. 449.

miners. This restriction at first bore lightly on the Chinese, because they were willing and able to perform functions very much in demand by the whites. They were principally farmers, laborers, and small shopkeepers who catered to the needs of the white settlers. Somewhat later, Chinese labor was highly acceptable during the War Between the States; and more especially its contribution in the task of constructing the western portion of the first transcontinental railway in the late 1860's is well known. Nevertheless, as the numbers of Chinese increased, friction between the races grew sharper. Indeed, some effort had been made to check the exodus from China as early as 1868 by denying the right of United States citizenship to Chinese immigrants. But the restriction was not an effective deterrent, and the feeling against the Chinese mounted higher as their numbers continued to pyramid even after the railroad was completed. Organized labor became more insistent in its protest; whites suffering from the sharp rise of unemployment in the 1870's resented the competition for jobs; and the Chinese shared the same burden of discrimination as all other nonwhite groups in the rise of racism and the cry for "white supremacy" that followed the War Between the States. The issue had become so sharply drawn by 1880 that the Chinese government agreed to some curtailment of the numbers of Chinese to be admitted. The agreement was soon abrogated by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited the immigration of *any* Chinese labor. Such a highly discriminatory Act was unprecedented, and was made possible by the fact that the government of China was weak and far from united. China and her emigrants in the United States, after a gesture of protest, could do little but capitulate.

Strangely enough, however, that very weakness probably has served, in the long run, to reduce both the hardship experienced by the Chinese immigrants and the animosity toward them by the dominant whites in the United States. To be sure, the Chinese have suffered the familiar disabilities arising from segregation. Like most immigrant groups do, they settled together in colonies; and even today, substantially the whole Chinese American population is centered in the Chinese sections of only eight of our largest cities. But the immigration of Chinese was stopped so soon and so abruptly that Chinese men heavily outnumbered Chinese women—a condition which still exists—and the total number of Americans of Chinese descent has continued to decline. So the pressure of race tension, while very considerable at times, has been, generally speaking, both local and diminishing.

The course of international affairs in the years since 1882 also has tempered the American hostility to the Chinese. Our government allocated its share of indemnities arising from the Boxer Rebellion to the financing of Chinese students in American colleges and universities; China sided with the Allies in the First World War; and the aggressive policies of

Japan in the "China Incident," culminating in their surprise attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941, served further to arouse American tolerance for the Chinese. And in the United States, strong family ties and the policy of settling their community problems and differences through their own agencies have helped the Chinese as a group to adjust themselves to American life in ways acceptable to the preponderant majority group. All in all, the drift of public opinion was so decisively favorable to the Chinese that early support for relaxing the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1944 came from California, the State that had spearheaded the move for exclusion some sixty years before. It is true that the Chinese still suffer from discrimination; but it is likely, as the Roses say, that the "attitudes of white Americans have become favorable to the Chinese more rapidly than the Chinese themselves have been ready to take advantage of." [7]

The Japanese are unique among our immigrants as a center of racial conflict in that they are the only substantial group in which the country —the *nation*—from which they came has retained a direct and effective interest from the very beginning of their migration. They are as "Oriental" as the Chinese—there is no physical difference to distinguish them positively; and as such they have been definitely marked for discrimination by the dominant group here in America. Nevertheless, their numbers are small, and it is probable that the relations between the whites and the Japanese as well as the Chinese would have been much less tempestuous than they have been, had the Japanese immigrants not been caught in the tension of international politics in the Far East since the turn of the twentieth century. In other words, racial conflict in this case has been made an adjunct of national rivalry.

The Japanese entered the United States first in large numbers after 1885, following the decision by the government of Japan to permit the emigration of Japanese workers. To a large extent, they were encouraged to come to fill the demand for cheap labor which had been supplied by the Chinese prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. As such, of course, they came into direct competition with the native white American labor; and the response was immediate and decisive. Agitation for barring Japanese immigration culminated in the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan in 1907, by which the Japanese government agreed to stop the migration of its nationals to America. But the provisions of the agreement were circumvented by such subterfuges as classifying the emigrants as students, merchants or professionals (who were outside the restriction terms), or permitting women to emigrate as brides of men already here, or encouraging the emigrant to return to Japan briefly, marry, and return to America with the newly acquired spouse. Various retaliatory restrictive measures, such as denial of United States citizenship and of land title privileges proved ineffectual, and the Japanese were categorically denied fur-

[7] Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 44. See also Brown and Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–323.

ther entry into the United States in 1924. Although that Act checked the net immigration of Japanese to the United States, a considerable flow of Japanese between Japan and America continued in the "nonimmigrant" classes, those mentioned a moment ago—students, merchants, and religious, political, and professional persons.

Strong bonds with the "mother country" were maintained by considerable numbers (including, for example, the practice of sending children to Japan for their education), and there was an increasingly pronounced tendency of the Japanese to band together in tight Japanese settlements in the United States. As a result Japanese-Americans became increasingly suspect as tension between the two countries grew during the Japanese aggression in China in the 1930's. Thus the racial conflict between Japanese and Americans were complicated by the world animosities which burst forth in the Second World War; and the antagonism broke with full fury after Pearl Harbor, when Japan joined forces with the Axis powers. Rightly or wrongly, *all* Japanese-Americans were immediately regarded as enemies, real or potential. First and second generation Japanese were relocated, for security reasons, away from their settlements in coastal and other strategic areas.

Much has been said regarding the justice of this action; our chief interest here is simply to note the intensity with which interracial conflict will express itself when the differences between the races become associated with other sharp clashes of group interest. Yet many of the older Japanese immigrants and the younger Americans of Japanese descent accepted such opportunity as was given them to affirm their identification with "The American Culture": even in the midst of active hostility there remained at least some basis—however small—for constructive working out of differences between the racial groups. What the future holds, in the light of the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the subsequent administration of Japanese affairs under American guidance, and the position of Russia and the United States in Far Eastern politics, remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that the status of the Japanese in the United States more than of any other immigrant group has been—and remains—uniquely influenced by international political affairs.

The Jews. The Jews, of course, are not a race. Ethnically, they are one of the many Mediterranean groups within the Caucasoid race. The stereotypes of physical features commonly regarded as Jewish are *not* racial characteristics, despite the fact that pronounced physical similarities are a primary consideration in racial classification. Rather, the Jew as we know him today is the product of extraordinary religious and political cohesive forces which have conspired for at least twenty-five centuries to maintain a biological isolation and inbreeding. This has preserved what probably were in the beginning only minor and local traits which could have been paralleled by many contemporary groups. Had the Jews not been domi-

nated by an intense cultural self-consciousness, it is likely that their stock would have long since disappeared along with countless others, in the welter of cultural and biological cross-fertilization that always takes place, the world over.[8]

The cultural unity of the Jews has been partly self-generated, partly imposed by the groups with which they have come into contact. As a minority group throughout the centuries, they have been the focal point of complex and bitter controversy, and hedged about by all sorts of discriminatory law and custom. Their very group solidarity made them suspect; and their industry and acumen presented keen competition for their adopted countrymen everywhere. On the other hand, the resulting opposition and discrimination necessarily drove the Jews to band together, if only as a means of self-protection.

The Jews have a long history in America, there having been perhaps 2,000 in the States at the time of the American Revolution. They came first from Spain and Portugal, and later till about 1880, mostly from Germany. Czarist Russia expelled nearly 2,000,000 of them during the years between 1880 and 1920. This later influx probably first set the stage for anti-Semitism in the United States, partly because of the numbers involved, and partly because the entire culture of eastern Europe, unlike that of western, contrasted sharply with that of America. As a result, America was highly conscious of her "immigration problem" by 1910; and the Jews—because they tended to remain in the cities and were to be found in all walks of life and competing for jobs in virtually every line —bore an undue share of the adverse public opinion. Opposition became especially pointed during the First World War, when Imperial Russian sympathizers accused them of instigating the Communist revolution in Russia. European intolerance of the Jew was thus transplanted to America.

Anti-Semitic prejudice and misinformation continued to grow during the following decade, and was effectively unleashed in full force during the subsequent depression of the 1930's. There was no other tangible or dramatic explanation for the depression; so the thesis that powerful Jewish business interests caused the slump and Jewish "radicals" and Communists aggravated the resulting unrest, gained wide credence. Such attitudes provided fertile ground for the vicious racism projected by Hitler's Nazi Germany—a policy which, in obviously much milder form, found its counterpart in the sharp increase in organized anti-Semitism in the United States.[9] Unlike other major racial or cultural minority groups, the 5,000,000 Jews in the United States have not yet been the object of *legislative* discrimination. But evidence of increasing economic and social

[8] William Howells, *Mankind So Far* (1945), pp. 241–242. See also Simon Dubnow, "Jewish Autonomy," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1937), Vol. 8, p. 391.

[9] Rose, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–40.

discrimination in private life, based upon the presumption of motivations hostile to other groups within the nation, presents a sinister potentiality that must give pause to every thoughtful American citizen.

The Negroes. By all odds the most serious problem of race conflict in the United States is that between the Caucasoid and Negroid races—the whites and the Negroes. Several reasons for this fact readily suggest themselves, probably the most obvious being that of sheer size of the numbers involved. Approximately one of every twelve Americans today is a Negro. The physical features of the Negro are more distinctive than are those of our other minority racial groups; the contrast between Negro and white is usually striking and unmistakable, so that members of both races are readily and repeatedly made aware of the cultural as well as the physical differences between them. The history of the Negro in the United States is longer—and certainly more varied—than that of any other minority group, except that of the Indian. But unlike even the Indian, the Negro has always had an integral part in the culture of the whites; he has always had a major rôle in the day-by-day activities and thinking of the whites. And finally, we are all well aware of the tremendous changes in the status of the Negro, from slavery up to at least a degree of civil equality with other full American citizens. The present position of the Negro stems from so many diverse factors that have been so interwoven with the history of the nation as a whole, and is still so much involved in so many of our major social problems, that we must examine this area of race conflict more closely.

THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES

It was comparatively much easier to fuse the many nationalistic cultures of our foreign-born white population than it is to harmonize the two race cultures that are of our own making—*i.e.*, the culture of the American whites and the culture of the American Negro. Undoubtedly the difference in these two American-made cultures constitutes the most persistent and real basis for our problems of race relations. It is, in short, our homemade cultural difference, more than difference in the physical makeup of the white and the Negro, that creates the problem.

From the time "Angele," the first Negro slave, was landed on the Virginia coast in 1619 to the close of the War Between the States, we, the people of the United States, were engaged in the development of two very different types of culture—one for the white man and the other for the Negro. Slavery existed in the West Indies for more than a century before it was introduced into the United States, and many of the slaves came to the United States from the West Indies, though many more were brought directly from Africa by Dutch, English, French, and Spanish ships, and later by the colonists themselves. Slavery existed in all the colonies.

But the trend of the economic development in the colonies and the

climatic conditions finally led to the concentration of the bulk of the slave population in the Southern States. After the major work of clearing the land had been completed, and the population had turned to more intensive agriculture and the development of industries, slavery became unprofitable in the North and only a few of the more well-to-do families could afford to maintain them as servants. Traffic in slaves finally disappeared from the Northern States, and "by the time of the adoption of our Constitution, it had been legally terminated in all the Northern States except Delaware." [10] Thus for almost a century prior to the War Between the States, slavery had been concentrated in the Southern States, where extensive agriculture and single crops were the rule, and where the climate made it less expensive to house and care for the slaves. Had the Negro remained an economic asset to the North, as he did in the South, it is doubtful if emancipation would have come as early as it did.

Slave Culture. A brief examination of the slave culture and the social system that fostered it will help to make clear the bearing they have on the current problem of race relations. We must remember that the Negroes were brought to America and marketed in much the same manner as were domesticated animals; and substantially the same policies governed their treatment as governed that given to livestock by plantation-owners and livestock-breeders. Hence the whites came to regard the Negroes in the category of "black beasts," treating them kindly so long as they were obedient, faithful, and productive; using the lash when they were sullen, disobedient, treacherous, or unproductive.

They were given no more share in the white man's culture than was given to the mules and oxen. Because they were ignorant, and had no knowledge of the technique of agriculture, they were worked largely in gangs in the fields, and only the more favored and more apt were trained for servants about the house of the owner. They were not schooled in farm management. They were not even concerned with managing their own households; everything was provided for them; all thinking was done for them. There was no future, no "rainy day," no social position, no expanding standard of living—nothing of the sort to stimulate the initiative or arouse the ambition to self-development and personal attainment. Their owners did all the worrying, planning, providing, managing, and directing.

Like the child who is ever in fear of a flogging, the slave quickly learned that a lie would sometimes "save his skin," and little wonder that he became quite an adept at "spinning appropriate yarns"—it was nothing more than an indication of his ability to adapt himself to the requirements of survival. Then, too, the Negro is no less endowed with an impelling curiosity than is the white man. It did not take the slave long to note that his owner was enjoying good things to eat, wearing a watch, drinking mint juleps, and smoking cigars or a pipe. He possessed much the same urge that

[10] Dowd, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

we may every day notice in normal children—to sample or examine the things that grownups seem to enjoy. Consequently the Negro slave found it convenient to develop a habit of "sneaking things" or "toting." This is a cultural trait not at all foreign to the white race, especially when compelled to live under conditions of restraint and oppression.

Another prominent feature of the slave culture is that which relates to the family system and moral development. Here also many writers have gone back to the "primitive nature" of the Negro for explanation. This is hardly necessary, nor is it likely to prove valid. Slavery gave to the Negro a family system altogether different from that of the white owner. Pure monogamy, chastity, and a deep sense of family unity were not compatible with slavery, in which Negro women were not only valued as servants and field-hands, but perhaps even more as breeders. Added to this were the living conditions, which became as deeply rooted in slave culture as did any other factor. The little one-room cabin (by no means non-existent even today) without a glass window, with only an open fireplace for heating and cooking, and with practically no furniture, housed not only single families but often several other adults, male and female. There was not sufficient privacy to permit of the development of any high standard of morality.

When suddenly the Negro found that he was a free man, he continued to look upon his accustomed cultural background in much the same way as the whites looked upon theirs. He was not conscious of the severe handicaps of three centuries of habits formed under slavery. To a large extent he continued to live as he had always lived—any other way was foreign to him. Nor could he be expected to change rapidly. The whites looked upon these cultural twists with much misgiving and even alarm, whereas they had not thought of them as being much out of place in a slave. Many writers have attempted, in a more or less sympathetic way, to explain that such characteristics belong to the nature of the Negro. But it is hardly necessary to go to Africa to find explanations of, or foundations for, cultural warp and twist. The shiftlessness, lack of foresight, easy-going nature and indifference still characteristic of so many Negroes are traits that could only be expected to develop out of the slave culture we have just described.

Emancipation and the Period of Reconstruction. Let us recall at this point the principles of race relations that we outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Here were two races with widely divergent cultures: one a free culture and the other a slave culture, one the culture of the white race and the other the culture of the Negroes. So long as Negroes remained in slavery there was little race friction. Slavery fixed the status of each race so that there was not even the semblance of competition for prestige, place, or power. The white race, though in many places a minority race, was dominant. Every item of the slave culture unfitted the Negro for self-government, to say nothing of sharing the responsibilities and prestige of the whites. *The whites of the South did not hate the Negro*—on the con-

trary there was often a profound affection for the "Ol' Uncle Mose" and the colored "Mammy." Nevertheless, the whites regarded the Negroes as vastly inferior beings. The Southern prosperity rested upon Negro shoulders, and the whites recognized this fact; but at the same time, most of the whites sincerely believed that the Negroes would starve to death if allowed to manage things for themselves—that they were by nature incapable of self-direction.

Then, suddenly, by the Emancipation Proclamation and the subsequent Constitutional Amendments, this fixed status was swept away, and the Negro was made a free man. Legally, at least, he was on a par with his former owner—he was at liberty, despite his slave culture, to compete for power, place, and prestige with the white man and his culture.

The whites of the North expected the Negroes at once to rise to the occasion, take the reins of government, and exterminate all white opposition that stood in their way. That is what they (with their background of free culture) would have done, had they been enslaved and oppressed, and they imagined that the Negro felt the same way about the matter. They looked on, but to their utter amazement nothing very dramatic was happening. They could not understand why, unless it was because the Negro was being intimidated and was afraid to act. They did not understand, and many to this day do not understand, why a people will not always discard an inferior status and adopt at once a superior one even when given the chance. The Negro might imitate the white man, but he could not feel at home in doing so—not until he had completely freed himself from the habits of thought, the standards of conduct, and the concepts of responsibility and duty that had become "second nature" to him during the two hundred and fifty years of slavery. Consequently, he remained inert and, to a surprising extent, satisfied with the status to which he had become accustomed.

Thus, not fully understanding the true situation, the Northern whites began a campaign designed to establish the Negro in his newly granted rights. It was a campaign hardly less humiliating and terrorizing to the Southern whites than were the campaigns of the Northern armies while the war was at its worst. The armies had shattered the hopes of the Confederacy and had wrecked Southern prosperity and reduced them to wretched poverty. But now, as if to add insult to injury, the Northern whites were intent upon compelling them to recognize the Negro as their social equal and to share power, place, and prestige with their former slaves. To the Southerner this meant the surrender of white culture to the culture of the Negro—that inferior, "beast" culture which we have just briefly described. Thus it was that the problem of race relations began to take on the fierce and horrifying aspects of race conflict, though the major alignment was not as much against the Negroes as it was against the activities and aims of the Northern whites.

The Northern whites launched their ill-advised campaign on two different fronts: (1) through establishing and conducting schools for the Negro, and (2) through sending political delegates and organizers, now known as "carpet-baggers," to lead the Negroes into rebellion against the Southern whites and to establish the Negro in power politically. While the motives back of the educational drive were no doubt largely sincere and honest, the motives back of the carpet-baggers are now agreed by historians to have been corrupt, scheming, and exploiting. Most of the carpet-baggers were personally motivated by desires to share the spoils that might easily be had by "advising" the ignorant Negro office-holders. Then, too, many of the schools were used by the carpet-baggers as propaganda centers, and the Negro was not given the instruction he so much needed. Incidentally, the Republican party saw in the movement the possibility of gaining the Negro votes, and thus perpetuating that party in power. Against these movements the Southern whites threw every power and resource at their command.

It was not so much the founding of Negro schools that aroused the bitter resentment of the Southern whites; rather, it was especially the aims and activities of the carpet-baggers. Living, as they were, surrounded by a Negro population that far outnumbered their own; knowing the intensely emotional nature of the former slave; and knowing how ignorant he was of public affairs, and how incapable he was of self-direction—knowing all this, the Southerners could not help regarding the activities of the carpet-baggers with deep concern. They had faith and confidence in the Negro taken individually; but they dreaded what he would do under the spell of mob psychology, and under the leadership of unscrupulous carpet-baggers. It is impossible to describe the horror and fear that gripped the whites at the prospect of Negro dominance under such leadership. Consequently, the bitterest part of the War Between the States was fought during these terrible first few years of the period of Reconstruction. And this, it must be admitted, the Southern whites won!

When the carpet-bag regime had been driven from the South, the whites of the South acted quickly to protect themselves and white dominance from future "invasions," and to work out policies of race relations that would insure supremacy of the white free culture. We shall deal with these policies more fully in Chapter 5; it is sufficient here to point out that the Southern whites have employed every possible legal and social device to maintain "white supremacy" and to avoid social competition with the Negroes.

The Twentieth Century. Following the conclusion of the carpet-bag regime, and even well into the twentieth century, the Negroes remained under almost complete subjugation of those who insisted on "white supremacy." Racism, as described earlier in this chapter, supplied the emotional and intellectual basis for the policy of "keeping the Negro in his

place"; and, lacking experience, training, or outside support, there was little that the newly liberated Negro slaves could do to better their position. To be sure, there was some migration of Negroes from agricultural to urban areas in the South, and some few drifted northward. But for the most part, the South resumed the position in the national life it had had before the War Between the States. The area remained dominantly agricultural. There was some industrial activity, but it was not to be compared with the rapid development of industry in the North during the same period.

In a sense, the establishment of the doctrine of "white supremacy" in the South was a hollow victory. What little skill the Negroes had developed under slavery—there were perhaps 100,000 Negro mechanics in 1865, building and maintaining the plantation equipment—was driven into disuse. Such industrial opportunity as opened up was reserved for the whites, not necessarily because they were more competent, but because they were *white*. Negroes generally were driven back into the agricultural economy that had characterized the prewar South, adapted somewhat to meet the new conditions imposed by the Emancipation. The old techniques of cotton raising, wasteful of soil fertility and manpower alike, made it impossible for the South to progress, chiefly because there could be only a slow accretion of capital resources. Moreover, efficient production of goods requires the existence of well-trained, experienced workers; and both training and industrial experience were denied to the Southern Negro.

The period during and following the First World War brought notable change to the economy of the South. Industries of the North, faced with a shortage of labor due to war demands and the concurrent shrinkage of cheap immigrant labor, beckoned to Southern Negroes and reduced the labor surplus in the South. Industry itself moved South, too, to take advantage of the existence of cheap labor and other factors favorable to low production cost. As a result, large numbers of rural Southern Negroes migrated to the cities of both the North and South. But the gain for the Negro, at least in the South, was only moderate. Industrial jobs still fell mostly to the whites; the Negroes generally were permitted only the hardest, dirtiest, most unskilled and lowest paid jobs that were available. Indeed, they still were almost completely incompetent to assume any other rôle, so effectively were the color lines drawn in the matter of schooling as well as in other areas. The Negro was luckier in the North, because color lines there were not so sharply drawn, and prejudice yielded to the more urgent demand for labor.

The depression which began in 1929 was especially disastrous to the progress of the Negro in the United States. Employers in the North and South alike were prone to lay off their Negro workers first, in favor of the white laborer. Labor unions, which had never been particularly sympa-

TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEGRO POPULATION, 1860–1950 *
(expressed in per cents)

Census Year	*Negro Population in Southern States*	*Urban Negro Population*	*Rural Negro Population*
1860	92.2	—	—
1890	90.3	19.8	80.2
1900	89.7	22.7	77.3
1910	89.0	27.4	72.6
1920	85.2	34.0	66.0
1930	78.7	43.7	56.3
1940	76.9	47.9	52.1
1950	68.4	61.2	38.8

* W. S. Rossiter, *Census Monographs* (United States Bureau of the Census, No. IV, 1922), p. 124; 1930 data from *Negroes in the United States, 1920–1932*, p. 3; 1940 and 1950 data from Bureau of the Census releases.

thetic to Negro workers as members, encouraged this policy. And as the pinch become more acute, white workers became increasingly willing to take jobs that formerly had been relegated to the Negro. As a result, the urban Negro's position became more and more difficult. And if the urban Negro fared badly, the rural Negro—especially in the South—was indeed desperate. Southern agriculture still was tied basically to cotton; and "King Cotton" became exceedingly sick during the depression. In the face of the collapse of foreign trade and the drive for "self-sufficiency" among the nations, American cotton exports virtually disappeared. Even on the domestic markets, new substances have appeared to compete with cotton for common usage, such as nylon, rayon, and other synthetic materials. And finally, the cotton industry is itself becoming increasingly mechanized, as notably illustrated in the development of the cotton picking and chopping machines. All these influences meant reduced employment opportunity and lower income for the rural Southern Negro. It was estimated in 1940, for example, that no less than 500,000 cotton farming tenants had already been displaced by machines alone; and the number continues to grow. Somewhere between 2 and 5 million individuals already have been affected by the declining labor market in cotton.[11]

Not all of the displaced tenants are Negroes, of course; but the displacement results in a surplus of labor and a mounting competition for jobs in which the Negro is likely generally to come off second-best. The notorious "share-cropper" system thus has produced an effect long foreseen by those who have studied the agricultural trend of the South: large numbers of illiterate and impoverished tenants have been stranded in an area whose depleted soils make recovery a Herculean task. And the Negro, still the

[11] Maurice R. Davie, *Negroes in American Society* (1949), pp. 77–78.

victim of sharp discrimination, bears the brunt of the problem. Even the alleviative programs of benefit payments, through the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and other agencies, have done little to lighten the burden, since the payments have been made not to tenants but to land owners; and the tenants have been deprived not only of the payments for reduced acreage, but of their status as tenants as well.

The Second World War had a tremendous impact upon the status of the Negro in American life, the full force of which is not yet measurable. To be sure, the Negro made some positive gain as a result of the First World War; but the conditions then were not so impelling. The period of direct participation by the United States was much longer in the Second World War, and the war effort was far more intensive and all-embracing. The demand for labor, then, was much more sustained. Negroes found wider job opportunity, and more frequent—and longer—association with whites as fellow-workers. Governmental policies and stipulations guided the relations between workers and employees to a very large extent. Negroes and other minority groups benefited especially by the activities of the national Fair Employment Practices Committee, which was set up to combat racial and religious discrimination in employment of workers on government contracts. While the agency was only temporary and undoubtedly only partially successful, it performed a positive service in giving some recognition to minority groups; and its effect is being felt still in the existence of many similar State agencies. Labor unions, too, are becoming more receptive to the demand that Negroes be admitted to membership, even though many of the unions have shown much reluctance to demand equal pay for Negroes and whites despite the fact that a differential is bound to reflect unfavorably upon the wage of the white as well as the Negro.

The Negro and the Future. Lest our discussion up to this point give the impression that the future of the American Negro is necessarily bleak, let us stop for a moment to review his present accomplishments.

Undoubtedly one of the most encouraging factors has been the steady rise in the educational attainments of the Negro. Beginning in 1865, when probably 95 per cent of the Negro population was illiterate, the proportion of Negroes with at least some rudiments of formal education has risen steadily. By 1940, only 10 per cent of the Negroes over twenty-five years of age had no schooling at all, while at least 65 per cent of the children between five and twenty years of age were attending school. To be sure, the quality of instruction has not been comparable with that of the whites in the South. Segregation still is the rule in Southern schools; school terms for Negroes still are notably shorter; their classes are larger; and their teachers are far less well trained and paid than the whites. But Negroes both North and South are increasingly better equipped to assume a more

effective position in the economic and political life of their communities and of the nation as a whole.

Vocational training, developed first in the agricultural field at such schools as Tuskegee and Hampton, has expanded to the point where Negroes in considerable numbers now are training for, and entering the professions. Thus, in the United States in 1940, there were some 66,000 Negro school teachers; 2,300 more teaching at the college level; 3,500 physicians, 1,600 dentists, and 7,200 nurses; and more than 1,000 lawyers, judges, and justices.[12] Again, these groups are hedged about with many onerous restrictions based on racial discrimination; but the fact that Negroes already have such a substantial core of trained persons among their numbers suggests that the Negro is giving a good account of himself.

Perhaps the most obvious indexes of the progress of the Negro are to be seen in the transformation of his economic and material conditions. Less than a century ago, when the American Negro began his climb out of the depths of slavery, he had almost no property and his training was only such as qualified him for work in the fields or for domestic service. Just before the Second World War, some seventy-five years later, there were almost 175,000 Negro farm owners, practically all of whom were located in the South. More than a fifth of the 3,150,000 Negro family units owned their own homes, as compared with a little less than a half for the whites, although it is true that the average value of the homes owned by Negroes was far below that of the whites. Negro service establishments—barber shops, beauty parlors, shoe repair and shining, tailoring and cleaning—numbered more than 27,000 in 1939 and did a gross business in excess of $36,000,000; while almost 30,000 retail stores—chiefly groceries, meat markets, restaurants and taverns—grossed more than $70,000,000 the same year. At the close of the Second World War, there were 12 Negro-owned banks with combined assets of about $15,000,000; and the National Negro Insurance Association, through its 46 member companies with combined assets of about $60,000,000, carried about 2,700,000 policies.[13]

Probably less tangible, but certainly not less significant, have been the gains of the Negro in terms of political and civil rights. These gains have been of special significance in the South; and, as suggested earlier in this chapter, they resulted very largely from the pressure of the Federal Government during the Second World War. But the roots lay even deeper, in the activities of militant organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union, and of the more conservative National Urban League and the Commission on Interracial Coöperation (later reorganized as the Southern Regional Council). These organizations, notable among others, have

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 119–121, 218.

battled for decades—chiefly in the States and the local communities—giving legal aid to victims of discrimination, publicizing abuses, pleading for fair dealing, striving to avert or to mitigate outbursts of violence in the contact between the races. The result has been a marked growth in the Negro vote, first at the national level and in later years in State and local elections. Rose predicts that Negroes will vote freely in the South within a quarter-century—but adds "there is certain to be a period of crisis and violence while the change is going on." [14]

That the Negro has made tremendous gains in the twentieth century and more especially during the past decade, can scarcely be denied. But just because the bulk of his progress *has* been so recent, it still is exceedingly tenuous. Cultural differences between the Negroes and the whites in America remain great; and they cannot be diminished by legal or political act *alone*. Much depends upon the course of economic conditions in the years that lie immediately ahead. If prosperity continues fairly general, and job opportunity remains plentiful, it is likely that the position of the Negro will continue to improve, even if slowly. The Negro himself will become better fed, better housed, better educated; and the contacts with the whites will be more satisfactory and conducive to the development of mutual respect between the races.

But what if jobs become less plentiful, and the whites once more begin to feel the active competition of the Negro for economic opportunity? It is doubtful that the political rights of the Negro could even be maintained—let alone expanded—in the face of such economic adversity. It must be remembered that in the last analysis race contact is a matter of working relations between individual members of the races at the *local* level; the rights and duties that go into everyday life are for the most part determined by local opinion, by local ordinances, and by local enforcement—whether of law or sentiment. And it is at this level that changes come most swiftly in response to current popular demand. Our best assurance that conflict between the races will continue to diminish, then, lies in the preservation of sustained economic prosperity, which carries with it the opportunity to provide jobs, advancement, and security for all segments of our population.

A PRESENT-DAY WORLD PROBLEM

America is not alone in her struggle to overcome the conflict that arises from the existence of race difference. The Dutch currently have an active problem in their relations with the native population in Java and the French in Burma; the bitter clash between the Negroes and various European nationals in Africa has been accompanied by exploitation and discrimination that far eclipses what exists in the United States. The more recent "racial" policies of Nazi Germany, and the clashes in the Near

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

East, though more nearly religious and political, nevertheless both have had close similarity to racial struggle to the extent that the sense of physical difference has been exploited to justify brutal domination. And the problems of establishing order and amity in Asiatic countries are complicated immeasurably by the understandable Oriental suspicion of the white motivations. Everywhere, then, the races are in competition with one another; and the basis for struggle can be found very largely in the assumption of superiority by one group which is denied by another.

But the American problem of extending to her racial minorities a guarantee of a right to share fully in American democracy is itself a world problem in a very real sense. The United States today is a world power, and is undoubtedly the fountainhead of the democratic way of life.

The ideal of democracy, if it is to be extended, must make its strongest appeal to the areas of the world in which nonwhite population predominates—notably in Africa and Asia. It is true that historically we of the United States have an enviable record in our comparative lack of political imperialism. Our granting of autonomy to the Philippines, our insistence on the "Open Door" policy in China and our handling of the Boxer indemnities, our disinterest in African imperialism, and our occupational policies in Japan have served immensely to build our prestige amongst the nonwhite peoples of the world. But what if we ourselves deny full participation in our democracy to our own nonwhite minorities? Actions necessarily speak louder than words; and other people are likely to view with deep concern the extension of a political power—or even a system of government—that perpetuates such discrimination and the exploitation it implies. And such concern will most surely be capitalized by antidemocratic forces everywhere.[15] Unless we can put our own house in order, therefore, we may well find ourselves in the tragic position of having betrayed our democratic heritage—losing it not alone for ourselves, but for the world.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Is there any race prejudice in your community? Explain why such prejudice appears (or does not appear) to exist.
2. Under what conditions does race friction develop? How great a part do the emotions play?
3. To what extent is race prejudice based on inherited differences between the races?
4. How would you explain the fact that we have made so little progress in assimilating the American Indian into our society?
5. Why has the feeling of the whites in the United States been so much more bitter toward the Japanese than toward the Chinese, despite the fact that both are "Oriental"?
6. What factors have conspired to make the Jews be the object of so much racial discrimination even though they are not, in fact, a race?
7. What are the chief features of the culture that developed in the Negro population under slavery? Contrast the slave culture with that of the Southern whites.
8. Why were the Negroes so slow to take advantage of their rights after the declaration of emancipation?
9. To what extent has the status of the Negro since the period of the First World War been linked with the extent of economic opportunity? Is economic competition a significant factor in determining race friction?
10. What evidence is there that the Negro is making progress toward social and economic independence?
11. What *is* the race problem? Why are American interracial policies of peculiar significance in contemporary world affairs?

5. The Dynamics of Race Relations

WE HAVE ALREADY reviewed something of the nature and extent of race conflict in the United States. In considering the patterns of such conflict, we have seen that it has not been confined solely to Negro-white relations, even though such relations must engage our primary attention. Negroes constitute a large segment of our total population; and the lines of discrimination between Negroes and whites are sharp and woven extensively into the pattern of our national life. Other racial groups have posed quite different problems for the people of the United States, chiefly because their numbers have been smaller and the circumstances of their entry and participation in American life were substantially unlike those surrounding the Negroes. Nevertheless, those problems often have been as intense as those regarding the Negro. Feeling against Orientals, for example, ran high for many years even before the Second World War; and not more than three generations ago, feeling was so strong against the Indians that it gave rise to the old saying, still heard occasionally, that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." There can be little question, however, that the rôle of the Negro has given us the most persistent and searching challenge to our ideals of democratic equality as applied to minority races.

Whatever the ultimate course of race relations in the United States may be, it is certain that those relations will find their chief expression in the daily lives of individuals. Whether one race is to be subordinated to another, or whether all racial stocks are to be accorded opportunity to develop according to their talent—every citizen of the country will have ideas and habits that will govern his dealings with everyone else. And those habits and ideas will contribute to the ultimate patterns of American democracy. Let us remember, too, that ideas and habits tend to change continually, in response to shifting needs, interests, and circumstances. So it is desirable now to examine briefly the conditions existing in the various fields where racial interaction occurs. A satisfactory adjustment of the interests

of the races depends upon an understanding of the issues underlying the events and practices of daily contact between the races.

FACTORS IN RACIAL INTERACTION

Major currents of thought and the fields in which the patterns of interracial policy are being shaped can be summed up in perhaps nine categories: (1) There are those people who believe that the most obvious way to handle the problem of race contact is the best—let us eliminate such contact altogether by some form of *isolation,* removing the minority race group by colonizing its members, establishing reservations, or encouraging them to migrate to a State or to States which will eventually be exclusively inhabited by that race alone. (2) At the other extreme, there are others who contend that *amalgamation* offers a ready and comparatively simple means of wiping out the "color line" by encouraging intermarriage between the races. (3) Still others, in between, concede that our racial minorities are here to stay, but insist that those minorities must "keep their places" and acknowledge white supremacy. Thus arises the demand for what has been (and dominantly still is) the framework of race relations in the United States—namely, *segregation and discrimination.* (4) Unfortunately, segregation and discrimination necessarily depend for their existence, to a variable degree, upon the *use of force,* since (as might well be expected) the resulting inequalities are continually being challenged. To be sure, force is not always in evidence, but it appears frequently enough that it must be considered an integral part of the process of segregation itself; and its consequence is so serious that we should well mark its character and cost. (5) A more hopeful approach, in accordance with our democratic theory of life, lies in the direction of *education and interracial coöperation.* Such a policy serves to soften race prejudice by equalizing educational opportunity and by developing a social organization that will enable the races to live and work together in harmony. (6) *Political action* is certainly a vital factor in the determination of interracial policy. Since time immemorial it has been used by dominant racial groups to assert their own rights and to circumscribe those of the race groups they have subordinated. Conversely, in recent years, it has proved to be a powerful instrument in the United States for removing some of the legal disabilities earlier imposed upon minority groups. (7) *Economic opportunity,* granted or withheld, is of major importance as a determinant of race relations. All groups are highly conscious of their own self-interest in this matter; they will fight to retain what they have of it, and struggle to expand it when they think they need more. Economic resource also is normally an important vehicle for achieving higher levels in other aspects of life, such as education, religion, or standards of living. (8) Many have felt, probably rightly, that *health* is a major consideration in race relations; and considerable progress has been made in improving the health

conditions, especially among our Negroes. Cleanliness and good health breed self-respect; and all three raise their possessor in the estimation of his associates—regardless of race. (9) Finally, *the rôle of the churches,* always a deeply significant force because of the universality of religion, is of special importance—again more particularly with respect to Negro-white relations because of the peculiar position the churches have had in the cultural history of the Negro in America.

There is no unity of opinion in any of these aspects of race relations. Conflict in some of them is especially bitter, either locally or at the State or national level. But it is certain that rapid change is currently everywhere present.

ISOLATION

The most obvious approach to the problem of race relations is to remove the contact between the races—to *isolate* one race from another, so that in effect there will be no proximity at all between the races. Such a program might be accomplished by *colonization* of one race or another in other parts of the world, by establishing *reservations* within the country where the races are in contact, or by setting up a *free state* as a means of securing "separate but equal" economic and political status for the members of each race.

Colonization. Many early leaders of the American democratic movement viewed race diversity as a stumbling-block to the progress of popular government. And of course the sharpest diversity existed with reference to the Negro. As a result, it was proposed that a colony be established on the west coast of Africa, where the American Negroes might be sent and allowed to work out their own salvation. Thomas Jefferson, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster were among those who most ardently supported this program. Even President Lincoln, during the War Between the States, advocated the colonization of the Negroes who came into the custody of the Federal Government. Congress appropriated $600,000 for this purpose, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish colonies on the islands off the coast of Haiti.

Perhaps the most significant movement for colonization was headed by a Jamaican Negro, Marcus Garvey, promoter and organizer of the Universal Negro Improvement Association. He was often referred to as the "Negro Moses." In 1921 this organization fitted out its own ships and sent to Liberia, Africa, a staff of engineers, carpenters, health workers, community planners, and other specialists to plan and lay out "ideal communities" to which colonists might later be sent. However, the movement got no further. Not only did it fail to win support from the whites, but it created disaffection among the Negroes themselves by championing the *black* Negro over the mulatto. Nevertheless, it did arouse considerable race pride; and one might justifiably date the Negro's present-day racial self-

consciousness and militancy from the spirit engendered by that movement.[1]

A plan such as that promoted by Garvey might mitigate the problem of Negro-white race relations by making it possible for the dissatisfied and embittered Negroes of the United States to find a "haven of refuge." If rightly managed, it might prove a real opportunity for those who entered into it. But it is not likely that such a plan would noticeably reduce the Negro population in this country. The assumption that all Negroes are oppressed and unhappy, and thus looking for a "Moses," is of course unfounded. The fact that millions of Negroes, both in the North and in the




FIG. 2

Data adapted from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1950, p. 37.

South, are making rapid economic, educational, and social progress militates against colonization as a practical solution to the problem of Negro-white race relations. This would apply equally well with reference to any other of our minority racial groups.

Reservations. For more than a hundred years the United States has sought to handle her American Indian problem through the medium of reservations. From the beginning of the white conquest of the continent, the Indians had been driven farther inland, but had never fully capitulated. As the odds against them increased, however, they accepted treaties which offered them economic help and exclusive use of restricted lands in return for their renunciation of claims to the land from which they had been driven. There was to be opportunity for the Indians to "live their own lives" in much the same way that it was expected the Negro colonists

[1] Maurice Davie, *Negroes in American Society*, pp. 452–454.

would do—and with almost as little cultural contact as was inherent in the remote colony.

But there have been difficulties. Land remaining to the Indians dwindled both in volume and quality, even though it was expected that the Indians would support themselves chiefly by agricultural pursuits. Contrary to expectations, too, the Indian has not "vanished" but is actually increasing in numbers; and the pressure of population on the available land resources already is being felt. This is especially true since economic assistance has been distinctly limited, so that the equipment necessary for proper use of the agricultural land has not been available. The territory occupied by the Indians is an integral part of the United States, which has led necessarily to more or less intervention by the whites in the affairs of the reservation. The administration of Indian affairs has not been of the best; and the Indians have been repeatedly deprived, by fraud or bad policy, of much of their most valuable remaining resources. Finally, too, confinement to reservations has not eliminated contact between the races; and it is interesting that sharply hostile attitudes still are not uncommon between Indians and whites in areas close to the border of the reservations.

Clearly, then, the idea of establishing reservations is impractical as a basis for working out suitable relations with any of our racial minorities. The vast tracts of unoccupied or sparsely occupied lands that made possible the creation of the Indian reservations are no longer to be had. But even if lands were available, it would not be possible to force or persuade entire racial groups to live under such arrangements without taking away from them the large measure of liberty they now enjoy. Our short and unhappy experience in resettling a portion of the Japanese-Americans within our borders during the Second World War was further testimony to the futility of singling out even comparatively small racial groups for separate existence. And the wholesale "resettling" undertaken in European countries in recent decades demonstrates beyond a doubt that no policy or program that must depend upon sheer force for its success can really succeed. Certainly it is contrary to the inspiration of American democracy, which has basically sought to resolve differences in culture or interests by means of coöperation of all the segments of the population in common social enterprise.

Free States. The distinctive characteristic of the Free State as compared with a colony or a reservation as a basis for working out race relations is that residence in such an area would be wholly voluntary. It is based upon the apparent tendency of races to seek out their own kind as neighbors. Persons seeking to capitalize this tendency contend that if we would encourage the shift of population when it appears to be taking place, sooner or later large areas will be inhabited primarily by a given race that will, as a result, inevitably take over almost entirely the economic, political, and social life there. Eventually, then, we would have a State (or States)

that would still be on a par with all the other States, yet having equal but separate power and identity and serving primarily—if not exclusively —the interests of but one race.

The idea is subject to the same practical limitations as that of the colony or the reservation. Even the "voluntary" nature of the isolated Free State is more apparent than real, for although large numbers of individuals of competing races migrate, we cannot expect that *all* will do so, willingly. Indeed, migration within the United States during recent decades, far from being *mass* migration, has been of *individuals* of every race; the concentration of any given race in any particular area of considerable size is diminishing rather than increasing. Even if it were otherwise, there still would be problems of race contact, because there would necessarily be at least some intercommunication between the races as a whole, and between individual members of the separated races. No group in the modern world can live entirely unto itself; no "State" can be entirely self-sustaining. And finally, one may justifiably question the likelihood that separate facilities available in a Free State would long remain equal.

AMALGAMATION

In direct contrast with isolation as a basis for dealing with the problems of race contact is *amalgamation*—the biological fusion of one race with another. It is possible that if we just "let nature take its course," racial differences will disappear; and some feel that therefore we should be thinking in terms of a social order in which the population is of a single, homogeneous racial stock.

Those who advocate the amalgamation of the races assume that all races are equals and that, if given the same environment and the same social and economic opportunity, their attainments would be the same. Some biologists are of the opinion that the result of such a racial mixture would be beneficial. Conservative scientists, while granting that races differ, do not interpret this difference as signifying that one race is superior to another. There is, indeed, no reliable evidence to prove that any race is inherently inferior to any other race in native ability. The range of intelligence, from very dull to genius, is far greater between individuals within each race than it is from one race to another. Moreover, it cannot be shown positively that interracial breeding is detrimental to the native ability of the offspring. Anthropologists have established the fact that no "pure" race exists anywhere in the world today. The physical traits identified with major racial groups today are a result of long ages of cross-breeding, in which many characteristics have been fused—or in some cases entirely engulfed, leaving no trace.

Insofar as American life is concerned, the process of amalgamation is of interest chiefly in regard to the Negro and white races. Despite the commonly expressed aversion to the idea, there already has been a large

degree of mixing of white "blood" with that of the Negro. Estimates of the proportion of persons of mixed racial origin now classed by the Bureau of the Census as "Negro" range from the 15 per cent reported in 1920 (when the Bureau last enumerated mulattoes) to more than three-fourths, based upon studies made by reputable anthropologists. But it is commonly agreed that Negro-white miscegenation, both marital and illicit, is decreasing. Currently, a distinctive "Brown race" is developing, chiefly as a result of the selective process among those now classified as Negroes. Prestige goes to the lighter skin, even in that group—and those of lightest skin are known to "pass" from the Negro to the white side of the color line in large numbers every year. How long it would take to obliterate all trace of race difference between the Negro and white in the United States cannot be known. Linton has estimated that it might come about in as little as two hundred years; other estimates run as high as six thousand years.

Intermarriage between whites and Negroes is controlled at the State level; and 29 States, chiefly Southern and Western, prohibit interracial marriage—some even proscribing marriage between whites and Indians and Mongols. Interestingly enough, however, even in the 19 States where interracial marriage is perfectly legal, it occurs quite infrequently; such statistics as are available indicate that not more than 3 per cent of marriages are with whites. Moreover, the trend if anything seems to be declining; public opinion—and probably personal choice—evidently is strongly against it among both Negroes and whites.[2] The record suggests that the daughters of whites do not often accept Negroes in marriage, even when they are at liberty to do so; and Negroes themselves are evidently far more concerned with economic security and civil rights than they are with interracial marriages.

The prospect of amalgamation of other racial groups in the United States does not present the acute problems that arise in regard to the Negro, because the characteristic racial differences are not so great, the social distance between the races is very much smaller, and the numbers of the other groups, notably the Indians and the Orientals, is almost negligible relative to the total population. There are some legal barriers to interracial marriage with such groups, but they are not as extensive as those confronting the Negroes. It is interesting, too, that in the case of the Indians as with the Negroes, the trend is rather away from mixed marriages, even though white Americans are often found proud to have some "Indian blood" in their heritage.[3] While the Jews have entered the United States in very large numbers, they have never presented problems of intermarriage notably more acute than those posed by other immigrant nationality or religious groups.

[2] Davie, *op. cit.*, Ch. 18.

[3] Brown and Roucek, *One America*, p. 22; Arnold and Caroline Rose, *America Divided*, p. 30.

SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION

Segregation, in itself, is not necessarily a deplorable condition. It is, in fact, a normal social process by which individuals and groups separate themselves from one another on the basis of one or more characteristics in which similarities and differences occur. Thus, it is to be expected, for example, that doctors or lawyers will band together on the basis of professional interest; recreational, religious, and economic groups form as a result of parallel—or opposing—interests. Even men and women are necessarily separate from one another in much of their activity as a result of their differing biological and social functions. Immigrant groups have commonly banded together, both in our large cities and in more rural settlements, partly to make their adjustment to their new environment easier, partly to preserve amongst themselves their "Old World" traditions. Segregation must therefore be regarded as a natural grouping of individuals which is often quite unconscious in its beginning, and in fact desirable to the extent that it makes possible greater group solidarity and more effective cooperation among those of like experience or talents.

Segregation takes on quite a different character, however, when it is *enforced*—especially when it is applied to race difference. Racial segregation is usually rationalized on the basis of expediency. Its apologists point out that the differences in culture or language or appearance are so great between the racial groups that separation is desirable to avoid misunderstanding and conflict. In our democratic society, the objective is said to be to provide "separate but equal" opportunities for individual members of each race *in association with others of their own race, exclusively.* The idea is that if each racial group has its own social life, its own social institutions, its own economic activities and opportunities, there will be little if any competition—and friction—between one race and another.

The concept is alluring, but not borne out by actual circumstance. Seldom, if ever, can divergent peoples living in close proximity long retain a complete racial autonomy. Their daily activities and requirements compel a certain degree of contact and interdependence, one with another. Thus, for example, even under conditions of slavery the American Negro was not entirely set apart from the dominant race. There was frequent contact between the white slave holder and his Negro slave; the slave ministered to the personal wants of the master and his family; the economic power of the master was based almost entirely on the productivity of the slave; and of course there was extensive interbreeding between the races. It is clear, then, that racial groups in close proximity, even when culture difference appears at first sight to preclude any association at all, will most often be found on closer inspection to be very much involved in each other's activities. And attempts to keep the races separate, to *compel* segregation, suggest that active competition exists—that one race group

is trying to assert or maintain its advantageous position in the relationship.[4] This was, as we saw in Chapter 4, the basis of the struggle to establish "White Supremacy" in the South after the War Between the States.

Segregation such as this is far more inclusive and rigid than the more voluntary types of segregation we touched upon a moment ago. It involves setting up and maintaining separate schools, separate churches, separate public recreation equipment, separate lodges and other social activities, separate public transportation facilities, separate private services like hospitalization, merchandising, restaurants, and barber and beauty shops, even separate public drinking fountains and rest rooms. It forbids members of either race making use of the facilities provided for the other race. At best it creates growing estrangement between the races, because the lack of contact necessarily leads to ignorance and suspicion of each by the other. At worst, it leads to discrimination, and exploitation of the segregated race by the dominant race—and to violence.

It is an open secret that the "separate but equal" provisions of segregation policies are more apparent in the breach than in the observance, and that while segregation itself presumably implies restriction for both races it actually operates to keep the race upon which it is imposed "in its place." As we shall presently notice, separate provisions are more commonly unequal than equal, whether they be schools or churches or facilities for maintaining health. Separation necessarily requires that two distinct agencies or services must be maintained in virtually every phase of life to serve segments of what is essentially one population unit. Such a program is expensive in any terms, and more particularly in present-day urban life where the minimum requirements of daily living are relatively complex. The tendency therefore is for the services available to the dominant race to be maintained at the expense of the quality of service available to the other. Almost inevitably the dominant race very soon regards itself as superior; and the discrimination against the "inferior" group is further expressed in terms of sharp restrictions on political and economic opportunities.

Segregation, then, is not a static condition, or device that can be taken up or laid aside as a means of handling the problems of race contact. It is a social process whereby certain policies and rules are formulated and put into effect. But neither the process nor the policies it creates are uniform and constant; they are subject to the same elements of social change that apply to any other phase of human association. Segregation as applied to race relations implies a conflict of interest and a competitive struggle between the races to influence the terms of segregation—the one race to preserve its advantage, the other to reduce the severity of its disadvantage. Moreover, segregation is definitely undemocratic to the extent that it bol-

[4] See Louis Wirth, "Segregation," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Science*, Vol. 13, pp. 643–646.

sters inequality of opportunity. Whether it is expedient in the light of our American historical development and in the present state of general misunderstanding and prejudice that exists between the races may be a matter for honest difference of opinion. But of this we may be sure: segregation cannot be maintained indefinitely in a rapidly changing world such as we have had since the First World War without open violence, or at least serious damage to our democratic way of life. The submerged elements in our population are in an increasingly strong position to assert their grievances; and unless their case is heard, tension and overt action is bound to mount.

It should be remembered, of course, that race segregation does not pertain alone to the Negroes and whites, although in the United States it is most apparent between these races because the Negro is by far our largest racial minority group. The policy of setting up Indian reservations is essentially a policy of segregation—and, incidentally, one the wisdom of which now is being seriously questioned. Indians, Orientals, and Negroes alike have been subjected to many legal disabilities in matters of citizenship and civil rights. The Jews have not been discriminated against by law or official policies; but there can be little doubt but that they are commonly barred from resorts, housing accommodations, and even job opportunities by policies of private individuals and firms. Nor is segregation solely an American problem. In its severest form it has existed for centuries in the caste system of India, while the Jews have been confined periodically to the ghettos of Europe since the Middle Ages. Currently, especially sharp cleavage exists between whites, Negroes, Boers, and Indians in South Africa.

THE USE OF FORCE

Segregation and discrimination are apparent even in the administration of justice. Force, both legal and extralegal, is widely used to maintain the relative disadvantage of the subordinate races. Many of the laws themselves are discriminatory, limiting the rights of the minority races, for example, in such diverse matters as transportation, the use of public services, voting, real estate tenure, and educational privileges. And the disabilities such laws impose are made even more severe by the way the laws are administered. Similarly, many customary patterns of interracial behavior are made effective by extralegal use of force, ranging all the way from rebuke and threat of physical pain to "death at the hands of persons unknown." None of our minority races are exempt from such abuses; but again the experience of the Southern Negro affords our clearest example of the operation of these practices.

Police, Courts, and Penal Agencies. Until very recent years, the police forces of the cities and rural areas of the country have been exclusively

white. Even today, the number of colored police is very small, and some States in the South do not use them at all. Regardless of color, the police have nowhere been reputed to be of outstanding intelligence, or to have had adequate training for their job; but the situation in the South, which continues to be our most backward area, has been especially unsatisfactory, and the condition is particularly unfortunate as it affects the problem of race relations in that area. Recruited as they generally are from among the less privileged segment of the white population, they are sharply conscious of the potential competition of the Negro population both economically and socially, and are likely to be jealous of their own advantage as *whites*. Unfortunately, they are not always aware of the importance of their public trust as officers; and as a result, they frequently perpetrate many petty tyrannies in their dealings with the Negroes they are policing. The Negroes are not in a position to protest the treatment they receive at the hands of the police. Indeed, the word of the arresting officer is not likely to be questioned as against that of the Negro, since the officer—being white—is tacitly regarded as being the guardian of "White Supremacy" as well as of the public safety.

The Negro's experience with the courts of the South is not apt to be happier than that with the police. When the offense charged against him involves the person or property of a white, the penalty is usually sure and severe. The majority of Negroes, being generally of low economic status, share the same disability which confronts the poor of any race when they try to obtain competent legal counsel. Negro lawyers are very few in number; and while white lawyers may appear in defense of accused Negroes, they appear most commonly in cases involving Negroes as both plaintiff and accused. Here again the matter of race enters in: a Negro convicted of an offense against a Negro usually is not dealt with as severely as a white convicted of harming another white. Whatever the motive may be—whether the Negro is regarded as "childish," or whether the offense is not considered so serious—the net result is that the Negro offending a fellow-Negro gets off more easily, is freer to continue his depredation, and contributes substance to the popular idea that Negroes are more quarrelsome or more criminal than other segments of our population. Negro complainants against whites are rare, and do not get much sympathy from the courts.

And finally, the Negro committed to a penal agency in the South generally is subjected to harsher terms of incarceration than is the white. Segregation usually obtains in this phase of race relations, too—and operates to the disadvantage of the minority race in much the same way as it does elsewhere. Negroes are assigned to hard tasks, are subjected to poorer living conditions and severer treatment, and have less prospect of early release than the whites. Their guards, like the police, are whites and of such status in the economic and social scale that they feel both

resentment and contempt for the Negro in general and for the Negro convict in particular.[5]

Lynching. No-one can say how much extralegal force is exerted upon individuals in minority groups to compel compliance with the personal demands or group values of the white race in America. The obvious expediency of silence on the part of the abused person, and the extensive isolation which exists in areas where the problems of race contact are most serious, makes it impossible to estimate the extent of minor physical violence entering into the enforcement of "the color line." But we have ample evidence that there is undoubtedly much more of it than is commonly supposed, in the fact that the violence reaches lethal proportions in the phenomenon of lynching.

Lynching as we know it today is the killing of a person by a group of people acting without legal authority and without legal determination of guilt. "Guilt" does not necessarily imply that the person has committed a crime, nor even that the person has actually done the act that he is accused of. Indeed, it has been established in many cases that the victim was guilty of nothing more than of being of the racial group of which he was a member. Unlike ordinary murder, lynching is ostensibly carried out in the name of maintaining public policy; the inference is that the victim is guilty of transgressing the established practices of the community.

Nearly 2,000 persons have been lynched since 1900, approximately 90 per cent of them being Negroes. Contrary to popular belief, lynching has not been reserved solely—or even primarily—to deal with offenders accused of rape. This is true, regardless of race. Even among the Negroes lynched, murder and homicide has been the charge in only two-fifths of the cases since 1882, with rape or attempted rape alleged in not more than a third. Case histories of lynchings repeatedly show very trivial charges (such as window-peeping or "insubordination"), often unsubstantiated; and even the more serious charges are not infrequently renounced or proved false in subsequent investigation.

Lynching was not always linked so closely with race friction as it is now, but became increasingly so after the War Between the States. In its origin and early manifestation, lynching was characteristic of frontier or isolated communities. There, people were virtually obliged to "take the law into their own hands" because formal agencies of law either did not yet exist or were too remote to deal effectively with local disorder. The practice persisted in the South following the Reconstruction period, but with this significant modification: it became *an open defiance of established law and legal processes rather than a substitute for nonexistent governmental agencies.* It was, and continues to be, avowedly a device for striking terror into the Negro, and maintaining "White Supremacy."

[5] See Arnold Rose, *The Negro in America* (1948), pp. 176–182.

Lynching is most apt to occur in isolated and backward rural areas—not so much for lack of available protection from the law as from the gross poverty of the areas themselves. Lack of resources, lack of skill or training, lack of community enterprise puts *all* the inhabitants on an equally miserable plane, and makes the single fact of color difference alone seem important to the "poor whites" as a basis for asserting their superiority. Fortunately, the economic revival of the South in recent years, sketched in Chapter 4, has been making itself felt even in these areas; and the number of lynchings appears to be steadily diminishing. There is some evidence that lynching is being practiced more secretively than formerly, because it now incurs unfavorable publicity, and the Federal Government has shown a disposition to insist on greater equality of protection under the law. But there is no doubt that the infiltration of the radio and the movies, the penetration of surfaced highways, and the slow but perceptible improvement in educational levels, combined with the awakened conscience of the more enlightened elements in the South are playing a vital part in the abatement of lynching.

Race Riots. Race riots are much less frequent than lynchings; yet even more than lynchings, riots are characterized by clear-cut defiance of law and police authority. They occur most commonly in urban rather than rural areas, and involve mass action on both sides. There can be no question, under such circumstances, of the presence of governmental agencies; in fact city police and even State militias often are hard pressed to bring a riot under control. In a sense, the riot does not appear as bestial as the lynching. *Both* sides are fighting, both sides are in danger, both sides get hurt; at least it is not the pack against the lone victim. On the other hand, of course, just because more people *are* involved and the struggle takes place in urban settings, the damage to individuals and property is necessarily far greater in the case of riots than of lynchings. Moreover, the injury sustained on either side or by any individual caught in a riot has no necessary connection at all with guilt, as is ostensibly true in the case of lynching.

Race riots and lynchings are similar in that they both stem from racial prejudice and racial competition. Usually underlying both there is an infraction—real or presumed—of established custom or ordinance, or competition for jobs or job preferences. Race riots, however, usually result from impersonal causes. For example, friction may occur in the use of public facilities for recreation or transportation—not on any particular day or in any particular instance, but over a period of time; similarly, the gradual infiltration of a minority race in securing housing in areas or neighborhoods considered "off-bounds" by the majority race is a perennial source of interracial tension. Race riots, then, are not likely to flare up spontaneously; they are a result of cumulative strain between the races.

Civil authority is more and more aware of this fact; and many cities in which such strain has appeared have set up interracial committees which have successfully anticipated and reduced the tension before it reached explosive proportions.

EDUCATION AND INTERRACIAL COÖPERATION

Relations existing between race groups are greatly influenced by the attitudes brought to the contact by members of the respective races involved. We have here in America an instrument that can be invaluable in raising the tone of race relations: the existence of universal, free, public education. Its effectiveness is so great because it affects basic patterns of behavior early in the life of the individual, when his prejudices are at a minimum.

Education at Primary Levels. For the nation as a whole, the situation in the elementary schools is encouraging. The schools generally are doing a good job in providing reasonably equal opportunity to all the children of the country, and inculcating the basic democratic ideals of equality and fair play which are our heritage. Unfortunately, however, our attention must again be turned primarily to the South, where our greatest volume of race contact exists, and where educational policies still follow the patterns laid down by the traditional insistence on "White Supremacy." It is true that segregation has increased in Northern areas following the growth of the Negro population there in recent years. Part of this separation arises from the fact that Negroes there, as elsewhere, have been housed in localized areas and have necessarily taken over the educational facilities within those areas; but part, it must be admitted, has resulted from mass demonstrations by white citizens and student bodies against Negro enrollments in "mixed" schools. Nevertheless, the quality of instruction accorded the Negroes in the North has not been far behind that available to the whites. The President's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947 summed it up in these words:

> It is the South's segregated school system which most directly discriminates against the Negro. This segregation is found today in 17 southern states and the District of Columbia. Poverty-stricken though it was after the close of the Civil War, the South chose to maintain two sets of public schools, one for whites and one for Negroes. With respect to education, as well as to other public services, the Committee believes that the "separate but equal" rule has not been obeyed in practice. There is a marked difference in quality between the educational opportunities offered white children and Negro children in the separate schools. Whatever test is used—expenditure per pupil, teachers' salaries, the number of pupils per teacher, transportation of students, adequacy of school buildings and educational equipment, length of school term, extent of curriculum—Negro students are invariably at a disadvantage.[6]

[6] *To Secure These Rights,* the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (1947), pp. 63–64.

The tragedy is not altogether onesided. Another Presidential investigative body that same year made the point that the maintenance of two parallel school systems must reduce the quality of *both*, "especially . . . when the States least able financially to support an adequate educational program for their youth are the very ones that are trying to carry a double load." [7] And of the regional poverty of the South, there can be little doubt. The seventeen Southern States and the District of Columbia have approximately two-fifths of our school children, but only one-fifth of the total tax-

TABLE 6: YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED BY NEGRO AND WHITE ADULTS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1940 *

Years of Schooling	*Per Cent of Negro Adults*	*Per Cent of White Adults*
None	10	1
1 to 4	31	6
5 or 6	22	10
7 or 8	20	36
9 to 11	8	17
12	4	17
13 to 15	2	7
16 or more	1	5
Unknown	2	1

* Sixteenth Census, *Population*, Vol. II, Part I (U.S. Bureau of the Census), p. 41. Adapted.

bearing wealth of the country. For example, Mississippi spends less per child for education than any other State, even though in percentage of total income spent for that purpose, she stands ninth from the top among the States, outranking even New York in this respect. But New York spent some $4,100 per classroom unit, as against Mississippi's $400.[8] We might well conclude with the President's Committee on Civil Rights that "the cost of maintaining separate, but truly equal, school systems would be utterly prohibitive in many of the Southern States"; but there may be some disagreement in regard to their recommendation that "the extension of the federal grant-in-aid for educational purposes . . . seems both imminent and desirable." [9] The segregated school is likely to continue for many years to come, and it is questionable whether such assistance would necessarily reduce the inequality of service between the races or increase the determination of the Southern States to work toward that goal.[10]

Education at Higher Levels. In the light of the situation we have just considered regarding the primary schools of the South, it is to be expected

[7] *Higher Education for Democracy*, A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education (1947), p. 34.

[8] *To Secure These Rights*, p. 63.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[10] See Arnold Rose, *The Negro in America*, p. 288.

that the sharpest discrimination in the matter of higher education for the Negro should also be found to exist in the South. Negroes in the South are quite generally excluded from the advanced school facilities used by whites; and the schools provided for the Negroes are of notably inferior grade. Of the 17 agricultural and mechanical colleges for Negroes—supported in part, incidentally, by Federal aids—only 10 were fully accredited by the Southern accrediting bodies in 1947, and *none* of them was approved by the national Association of American Universities. Similarly, of more than 100 Southern Negro colleges and universities, only 4 were approved by the Association.[11]

Thus far, most of the higher education accorded Negroes in the South has been of the vocational type, whether at the secondary or collegiate levels. The reason for this is obvious enough, with a little reflection. Such a policy was quite in accord with the Southern tradition of dependence on Negro labor. The Negro in making himself more useful was to enhance both his own position and that of the South. Booker T. Washington, founder of Tuskegee Institute, took this view and exerted tremendous influence in persuading both whites and his own race that economic proficiency rather than the achievement of "equality" of political rights was the most expedient objective for the Negro under existing circumstances. But the policy has not been unchallenged. W. E. Burghardt DuBois, a Negro born and educated in the North, took the opposite view, and for years led the fight for equality of opportunity in education as well as in other matters.

The growth and character of academic training for Negroes in the South has been, generally speaking, discouraging. As late as 1945, only 12 Negro colleges and universities were reported to be offering postgraduate work, and none were prepared to grant anything more than the master's degree. This meant that aside from the training of teachers, the Negro schools of the South were unable to develop any of the professional personnel so urgently needed by the Negro race. In very recent years, there has been some loosening of the segregation practiced in the professional schools of the South. Under pressure largely from court decisions, some of the States have begun to open the "white" schools to qualified Negroes on the professional level. The experience with this move, it may be added, has generally been gratifying; and it suggests that as public opinion accepts the feasibility of such changes in policy, segregation may be relaxed at lower levels—in the undergraduate schools, and even in time in the vocational and secondary schools as well.[12]

The South is not alone in its policy of discrimination against minority races in the matter of providing higher education for the younger generation. To be sure, the record in the North is much less discouraging; yet

[11] Davie, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–161.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 163–166.

even in this section there is a notable degree of exclusion. Some of the well-known private institutions have barred both Jews and Negroes in practice if not in principle. Public institutions, too, have frequently resorted to similar tactics to keep their minority group enrollments at a minimum, especially in the professional schools. Orientals and Mexicans experience much the same disability in the West; and our Indians are severely handicapped by the generally inferior quality of primary education provided in the reservation schools. And finally, of course, the minority group student, once he does achieve his educational goal, finds himself everywhere not only isolated from his less fortunate brothers but barred from the full participation in community life to which his training would normally entitle him. Whatever freedom and equality of opportunity he may have experienced in school is to a very large extent lost when he steps back into the discrimination everywhere apparent in daily life.

Interracial Coöperation. We may properly regard the problem of interracial coöperation as being essentially one of *adult* education. The improvement of our agencies for the formal training of the young is not alone sufficient to assure the development of equitable status and opportunity for all our citizens regardless of race. The twist and strain of everyday life, the pressure of practical situations, and the subtle influence of selfish interest of community factions or of the individual himself tends to continually modify the judgments formed in the early years of a person's life. It is necessary, then, to keep a critical eye on the social attitude that is being fostered among the adult members of white and minority races in their association with one another. Onesided presentations of questions affecting human relations; substitution of flimsy opinion for facts; emphasis on difference instead of likeness; tirades on inequalities instead of frank examination of mutual problems; getting the dollar-sign in front of the service ideal—to the extent that these practices are reflected in our everyday racial contacts, to the same extent we may expect our problems of race relations to become more difficult and more menacing. Without wholehearted coöperation it is hardly possible to correct the harmful tendencies that create race friction, or to strengthen the bonds of association by sympathetic understanding. It is only through such coöperation that a healthy public opinion can be created and the press and radio be made to reflect a saner and more just attitude in the treatment of questions relating to race relations.

The development of interracial coöperation as a policy, in its beginnings, was left very largely to local communities to apply as they saw fit. Perhaps the first organized effort to promote it was that begun by the Y.M.C.A., directed chiefly toward educating people to an appreciation of the true nature of the problems of race relations. Other more recent groups include the Commission on Interracial Coöperation, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.), the Na-

tional Urban League, the clergy in the various church bodies, women's organizations, and the semiofficial commissions of the various states. Through such organizations much has been accomplished to stamp out lynching and other lawless activities that were directed chiefly against Negroes. They have given encouragement to Negro education, in colleges, and in the home education of adults through public health nurses, home and farm demonstration agents, and traveling libraries.

Of particular value in the promotion of interracial coöperation was the development of local interracial relations committees, particularly under the auspices of the Commission on Interracial Coöperation mentioned above. These committees were semiofficial bodies composed of an equal number of members from each race—appointed, as a rule, by the mayor. Characteristically, they concerned themselves with labor-management problems, recreational policies and provisions, housing, newspaper policies, school relationships, and medical care. Such local organizations have now become commonplace; and the commission was reorganized in 1944 as the Southern Regional Council. Still composed of members of *both* races, it operates to improve the well-being of *both* races in these matters.

Comparable committees in the North are usually much less official, and are frequently affiliated with the National Urban League (which is, however, by no means exclusively a Northern organization). In addition to these permanent bodies, cities from time to time set up temporary commissions, made up of members from both white and minority races. Generally these temporary commissions are appointed for the purpose of investigating specific incidents or conditions and making recommendations for the organization and development of a permanent policy and program of interracial coöperation.

The effort to cultivate interracial coöperation is not confined to relations between Negroes and whites. Similar objectives are sought by other organizations concerned with the other racial minorities we have been considering, and they operate at the national, State and local levels. Among such organizations, one might mention the Japanese-American Citizens League, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and the Association on American Indian Affairs. Moreover, the governors of many of our States have taken notice of the problems of race contact, and have appointed more or less permanent Committees on Human Rights which investigate and make recommendations regarding racial problems both on the State and local community levels.

POLITICAL ACTION

Political action has long been the source of bitter controversy in matters of race relations. There are those, probably still in the majority, who would deny the vote to minority races, even while granting them other rights of citizenship in variable degrees. Many feel that most individuals

of those races are not yet, and perhaps cannot be, sufficiently indoctrinated in democratic ideals and ways of living. Others express fear that if the minorities are given the privilege of voting, they will somehow dominate the majority race, or at least by their racial cohesiveness secure more than their just share of the benefit of government services. Still others recognize the highly emotional character of race prejudice, and suggest a more indirect political action policy, one of securing rights and services gradually by pleading their case before existing voters and their representatives. The argument is that it is better to gain fewer rights, more slowly if need be, and retain the good will of the majority than to force advancement at the expense of aroused antagonism. At the other extreme are those who maintain that it is only as the minority group gets the vote that it will secure the full measure of the other perquisites of citizenship. They contend that the *denial* of the right to vote has long been a powerful means of subjugation, and the *securing* of that right is essential not only to gain self-respect, but to gain the effective respect of others.

The President's Committee on Civil Rights probably comes close to the fair position in these words:

> Government action alone, whether federal, state, local, or all combined, cannot provide complete protection of civil rights. Everything that government does stems from and is conditioned by the state of public opinion. Civil rights in this country will never be adequately protected until the intelligent will of the American people approves and demands that protection. Great responsibility, therefore, will always rest upon private organizations and private individuals who are in a position to educate and shape public opinion. The argument is sometimes made that because prejudice and intolerance cannot be eliminated through legislation and government control we should abandon that action in favor of the long, slow, evolutionary effects of education and voluntary private efforts. We believe that this argument misses the point and that the choice it poses between legislation and education as to the means of improving civil rights is an unnecessary one. In our opinion, both approaches to the goal are valid, and are, moreover, essential to each other.[13]

What Is a Minority Group? Generally we consider a minority group to be a group of people having a common physical characteristic, a common nationality or racial identity, a common interest or background, *and a certain degree of consciousness of their own similarities.* But it must be remembered that any given minority has only a few qualities that bind it together; its members will not be alike in all things. Thus, for example, a Japanese definitely belongs to a racial minority group in the United States. Yet there are nationality differences between him and the Chinese; and even among the Japanese themselves there are rich and poor, professional and unskilled, educated and ignorant, farmers and urbanites, Protestants and Roman Catholics. In short, there are many cleavages that

[13] *To Secure These Rights,* The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights (1947), p. 103.

create "minorities" *within* the minority; and in this case they link the Japanese with other minority groups that have nothing at all to do with the fact that the individual himself is a Japanese. He will unite with Japanese only insofar as their interests *as Japanese* are concerned; and his interest as a Japanese is determined very largely by the *degree to which consciousness of his Japanese characteristics is thrust upon him.* This is a matter of vital importance in considering racial discrimination along political lines, because such discrimination itself helps to create the "minority problem."

From what has been said, it is evident that all of us are members of one minority or another; a "majority" is really only an aggregation of a number of minorities having a similarity of opinion regarding a question that concerns them all. Most of our racial groups as such have the voting privilege, although there is a variable degree of discrimination in the matter. The Jews are not discriminated against at all in the United States, so far as legal citizenship and the franchise are concerned. The Indians have been voting as citizens since 1924, although the privilege obtains only at the national level when the Indians remain on their reservations. Chinese aliens have been eligible for full citizenship in the United States since 1943; alien Japanese still are barred from it, but native-born Japanese are not. All of these groups (except the Jews) are small, and have little effect on the total vote on national issues. Their influence—and problems—are chiefly of local character. The Negroes are of course by far our largest racial minority; and by virtue of their large numbers, their political fortunes are much the most important in terms of both racial and national well-being. It is to that group, therefore, that we must again turn our major attention.

The Negro and the Franchise. The Negro was granted full citizenship rights by the Federal Government after the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution were ratified by the States in 1865, 1868, and 1870 respectively. Whether this was a proper handling of the problem may be a source of disagreement. Certainly it was hateful to the Southern whites, as shown by the events which followed. Undoubtedly the move failed to accomplish its purpose in the beginning because it was too far at variance with existing circumstances and public opinion. It was too much to expect the untutored exslaves to assume the full duties of citizenship at once, and too much to ask of the paternalistic whites to accept the erstwhile inferiors as equals. Nevertheless, had the issue not been joined and the legal slave status not been wiped out completely at one blow, it is questionable whether the Negro would yet have achieved even legal citizenship status. Booker T. Washington was probably on solid ground when he expressed the belief that politics and the holding of office were too largely emphasized in those early years.[14] But the abrupt enfranchise-

[14] Quoted by Jerome Dowd in *The Negro in American Life* (1926), p. 508.

ment of the Negro was very likely a case where legislation had to run ahead of public opinion to break the deadlock which had existed since before the War Between the States was fought.

Nevertheless, the practical achievement of full citizenship status by the Negro has been a long, and often bloody, struggle; and it is by no means complete today. The whites of the South have been especially determined that the Negro should not vote; and they have resorted to every technique available to block him—by open violence, by threat and intimidation, by trickery, and by direct legal discrimination. Among the latter were the well-known "grandfather clauses," which denied the voting privilege to any person (or his descendants) not eligible to vote in 1866. An even more effective device has been what is called the "white primary" law, which provided that only white persons be allowed to vote in primary elections selecting candidates for office. Variations of these laws remained on the books of Southern States for decades, and have only in recent years been declared unconstitutional by the courts insofar as they apply to national elections. A third unique and still effective measure of exclusion has been the poll tax, by which every voter must pay a tax of one or two dollars annually to secure the voting privilege. Such an amount, while obviously not large, is a real barrier when total annual cash income is miserably low and when, as is often the case, it must be paid for a number of years preceding the current election. Another technique has been the discriminatory administration of laws requiring property, literacy, or "good moral character" as prerequisites to voting. The legality of such laws is not easy to challenge; and legal proof as to their abuse is hard to assemble. On the other hand, they are not altogether satisfactory as deterrents to voting since they are dependent on local and individual administration—neither of which can be wholly relied upon to keep "undesirable" applicants in check without disturbances. A final device that might be mentioned here is the county unit system, used in Georgia and upheld by the United States Supreme Court early in 1950. Under this system candidates are chosen not by direct, state-wide vote but by counties, each county being entitled to from 2 to 6 votes. This procedure effectively disfranchises the voters concentrated in urban areas, since the highest weight a county can carry is only 6 votes, while sparsely settled rural areas (where the voting is more easily controlled) carry a minimum of 2 votes in the selection of the candidates.

The Consequence of Disenfranchisement. How effectively the Negro has been excluded from the privilege of voting can be seen most clearly in the operation of the poll tax, which is used in seven of the Southern States. In the four presidential elections between 1932 and 1944, at least three times as many of the adult citizens in non-poll tax States voted, compared with the citizens of the poll tax States. Moreover, the congressional Senators and Representatives from the poll tax States gain their positions by the

vote of less than a third of the number of people voting in other States. This is especially sobering when we remember that even in a sharply contested election, the total vote in "free voting" States rarely if ever reaches 75 per cent of the total number entitled to vote. When, as in the poll tax States, an election is determined by an average total of perhaps 30,000 votes, the election can be swung by controlling a comparatively small block of votes. Thus, Southern congressmen manage to keep themselves in office term after term; and their resulting seniority gives them heavily disproportionate power in congressional committees. In 1944, there were 18 such congressmen from the seven poll tax States with tenure of at least twenty years; and these 18 congressmen were chairmen of 17 of the 47 standing committees in the House, and 10 of the 33 in the Senate.[15] It is true that the poll tax excludes at least as many "poor whites" as Negroes; but even for the South as a whole, it was estimated as late as 1947 that hardly more than an eighth of the adult Negroes were qualified voters.[16]

The effect of such a situation is hard to overestimate. Long-term representatives of the South can hold their seats in Congress by appealing to the prejudice and interests of the Southern minorities that are entitled to vote. Usually exponents of the *status quo,* they are apt to oppose any proposals for bringing law into line with economic and social change. Moreover, they can do this effectively even on national issues because of their control of vital congressional committees—which, in turn, determine almost entirely the nature of bills presented on the floor for legislative action. And of course the State and local machines that keep the national representatives in office perpetuate similar policies at the State and local levels. As it affects the circumstance of the individual Negro, it means poorer schooling for his children, poorer or fewer health facilities for his whole family, the forced acceptance of burdensome employment and housing terms, and of course the pernicious stamp of political inferiority as a "second class citizen." And white candidates for political office take note of such matters at the peril of being labeled "nigger lovers" by the oligarchy in power.

Political Action and the Future. No segment of our daily activities can be wholly divorced from another; and this is true of politics as well as the economic or social phases of living. Despite the still-strong hold of racism in the political thinking of the country (and especially in the South), it is being undermined by changes in other phases of our national life that are changing public opinion in this matter. The steady, if slow, improvement in the quality and extent of education is making for fuller realization of each other's problems by larger segments of the white and colored population. The growth of labor union activity, and the more tolerant policies of the unions themselves in regard to race contact, is showing that the "poor

[15] Stetson Kennedy, "3.2 Democracy in the South," *Survey Graphic* (May, 1944).
[16] Davie, *op. cit.,* p. 275.

whites" and the Negroes have some mutual interests despite their traditional hostility. The greater mobility of both white and colored populations prompted by the Second World War has thrown the races together more, and on the whole probably has created at least as much tolerance from the increased contact as intolerance. There can be no doubt that the racial policies of the Federal Government, through the agency of the Supreme Court and by its increased control over interstate commerce, public welfare, and industrial activities, has acted as a stimulus to reduce the provincialism of *every* section of the country in regard to race. And finally, the projection of the United States as a leading power in the field of world politics has made our domestic policies more open to world scrutiny as we assume our rôle as the "bulwark of democracy."

All these factors are influencing our public opinion mightily; and there is every reason to suppose that political action in the field of race relations will continue to increase in importance. Already it is significant that when Negroes have secured and used a degree of voting power, their status in the community has improved noticeably in terms of better health and educational service, better housing facilities, better work conditions, less discrimination in the administration of justice.[17] If our analysis of the nature of minority groups is sound, the removal of political discrimination will prove an important factor in the reduction of race consciousness; minority interests will tend to develop *across* race lines.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

The economic resources available to any group of people, whether a nation as a whole or the individual family unit, is a very important factor in the welfare and potential progress of that group. To be sure, economic affluence does not assure that the persons so blessed will necessarily use it to best advantage. Obviously, however, it requires the expenditure of considerable economic wealth to provide what is regarded in modern life as the minimum of goods and services necessary for social and political well-being. People must have at least a reasonable satisfaction of the basic needs —food, clothes, and housing—and access to such services as health protection, education, police and fire protection, as well as opportunity for participation in the intangible satisfactions of community life. Without these, people necessarily are not really free to develop to the best of their capabilities.

Every minority group has been subjected to more or less economic underprivilege. Even the white immigrants from the various nations of western Europe—closest to the dominant American culture and racial stock—have found their early adjustment difficult. Language differences, lack of familiarity with American customs, and, to some extent, their very

[17] Davie, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

status as newcomers, have usually served to keep the new immigrants at a disadvantage for a generation or two.

Racially, the Negroes have suffered the severest handicap in terms of limited economic opportunity. They were brought to America in the beginning almost purely for economic exploitation; and they have had tremendous obstacles to overcome in their effort to be free of the discrimination that has persisted even to the present day. Negroes have always been the major source of unskilled labor in the South; and they have been illiterate, untrained, and without effective organization for improving their lot. As a result, they have always been assigned the dirtiest, the hardest, the most unskilled, often the unhealthiest, and the lowest paid jobs that were available. The better jobs have been reserved to the whites—supervisory jobs, mechanized jobs, jobs in the newer and more progressive industries. Labor unions until recent years have most generally not welcomed Negroes as members, although today some of them are adopting less discriminatory policies. So the Negroes have had little incentive to seek training for additional skills. The policies of segregation and educational discrimination we discussed earlier in this chapter have operated to intensify the economic poverty of the Negro, who still remains probably our most underprivileged large minority group. There are signs of improvement, as educational standards rise and the plight of the Negro becomes better recognized; yet even the "prosperity" of the Second World War period brought little *relative* economic improvement for Negroes as compared with other segments of the population, either in industry or agriculture. The very backwardness of the Negro continues to act as a brake upon the economic progress of the nation, more particularly of the South, because the skills necessary for high productivity are lacking in this considerable portion of the labor force.

Other groups have not escaped economic discrimination. Orientals have met sharp objection to their competition with whites, and Jews frequently are denied job opportunities if their origin is known to prospective employers. Even our Indians have suffered, though more indirectly, in that the educational and economic policies adopted on the reservations do not equip Indians to enter readily into economic pursuits outside the reservations. Nevertheless, these groups have not fared so badly as the Negroes, as a whole. Prejudice against them has not been as inclusive or as sustained as in the case of the Negro, nor has their own background so completely unsuited them for entering into the competitive American economy. The cultural heritage of both the Japanese and the Jews gave them initiative and an understanding of trade, so that they have been quite successful in establishing small businesses, many of which have grown to large proportions. The Chinese and Jews have long had such high regard for learning that they have commonly proved highly capable in professional pursuits.[18]

[18] Arnold and Carolina Rose, *America Divided,* pp. 78–84.

All of these outlets still are very largely closed to Negroes, due to the limited educational opportunity available to them, and to their own extremely low economic status. There are many Negroes in the professions, of course—and interestingly enough, more than half of them today are teachers; but their numbers among 13,000,000 Negroes still are not large, and Negro businesses present a still less impressive record.[19] Together, they reflect the especially sharp discrimination under which the Negro labors, and the difficult task that lies before him.

HEALTH

The problem of maintaining satisfactory health conditions among our minority groups is significant chiefly because it suggests once more the intimate relationship which exists between racial discrimination policies and the conditions of daily living which affect the population as a whole, irrespective of color lines. Disease is no respecter of color; and once rampant, it cuts down persons of all races, no matter whether they live in segregated or privileged neighborhoods. The maintenance of satisfactory health standards in the community depends not only on effective public health services, but upon personal hygiene—and the knowledge and the economic means on the part of *everyone* to maintain it.

Racial difference in matters of health are strikingly illustrated in the condition of the Negro in comparison with that of the whites. Measured by any standard, it is readily apparent that the Negro is definitely in an inferior position. The death-rate among Negroes in 1940 was about 14 per thousand population, as compared to 8.2 among whites; Negro life expectancy was generally about ten years below the white. Death-rates among Negroes from infectious diseases are commonly as much as two or three times that among the whites. Negro mortality is nearly 60 per cent higher than the white, while stillbirths are more than double and maternity deaths are about three times those occurring among whites. In 1940, there was hardly one Negro physician for every 3,500 Negroes in the United States (the ratio in the South being about 1 to 5,000), even though 1,500 is considered the maximum ratio for safety and the national figure stood at one physician for about 750 inhabitants. As late as 1945, there were only about 1,100 Negro public health nurses, less than half of them located in the South, where more than 10,000,000 of our 13,000,000 Negroes were living.

Reasons for these conditions are not hard to find. The restriction of educational facilities available to Negroes means that the general Negro population, especially in the rural South, still practices many of the superstitions regarding health that were everywhere prevalent a generation and more ago. And the extreme difficulty that the Negro experiences in seeking professional training can only mean that the few Negroes who are trained

[19] Davie, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–121.

cannot provide even the minimum of competent medical care that is needed. Consequently, for example, Negro childbirths are commonly attended only by midwives, many of whom have only "practical experience" by way of training. The quality and extent of medical care, of course, varies widely between urban rural areas and the Northern and Southern sections of the country; but even in the Northern cities, presumably the most favored, racial segregation of hospital patients is not uncommon.

High death-rates from infectious diseases can be ascribed to a large degree to poor housing conditions. While this is a hardship by no means borne solely by minority groups, it unquestionably rests most heavily upon them. The Southern rural Negro typically lives in a small, flimsy cabin—overcrowded, poorly heated, and with primitive sanitary provisions. The city dweller fares better in some ways, but in others not so well. Where urban Negro residential areas are sharply delineated as to boundary, the rentals become excessive even while the housing facilities provided deteriorate to levels that menace not only health but life itself. Thus, Negroes living in Chicago's "black belt" average 75,000 per square mile, while Baltimore huddles the 20 per cent of her population that are Negroes within only 5 per cent of her residential area.[20] Such intensive crowding almost inevitably means high rent, close proximity, poor sanitary facilities, and great exposure to disease, to say nothing of "getting on one another's nerves" for lack of privacy, and the attendant likelihood of physical strife. Sex delinquency is likely to rise under such conditions, which of course encourages syphilitic infection. The plight of the Chinese in San Francisco's "Chinatown" is comparable; the living conditions of immigrant nationality groups in the tenement areas of our large cities are only little better.

THE RÔLE OF THE CHURCHES

The church, taken as a whole, has a unique opportunity and responsibility in the matter of race relations. Its tradition is one of universality and impartiality, which gives it a degree of objectivity unparalleled by any other social institution. Moreover, its historic insistence on the inherent worth of the individual has frequently made the church organization the spearhead of demand for changes in social and economic relationships to reduce injustice and oppression. It is true that the church has not always been consistent either in its demands or its position; but the inconsistencies may well be ascribed to influences that have deflected church policy from its basic inspiration.

The church has frequently been the medium through which groups or individuals have made their adjustment to a bad situation in this world by hope of a better lot in the next. On the other hand, it has also given much tangible assistance to the needy and oppressed by the distribution

[20] Davie, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

of charity, by care for the sick and disabled, and even by provision of recreational and creative outlets at times and places that they were not otherwise available. And this is nowhere more clearly discernible than in the development of the Negro church in the years since the War Between the States. Segregation has been the rule, and still is prevalent although some changes are being made by a few denominations. But that same segregation has made the Negro's church almost completely *his own;* and because it lent itself to a wide variety of activities he has found in it an effective relief from the more onerous aspects of discrimination which he has experienced in his political and economic life.

The community churches were extremely helpful to the millions of Negroes who migrated northward during and after the period of the First World War. The neighborhood Negro churches in Northern cities usually were the clearing agencies for such services as emergency relief for the sick or transient, housing, employment, and recreation when other public and private agencies were not available. More recently, of course, other agencies have taken over many of these functions. The churches could never have undertaken the job permanently. But they did demonstrate the necessity for meeting these needs on a community basis, and bridged the gap till other agencies could be built up to handle them adequately.

There can be little doubt that the church has done much in the past to unite and lift the spirit of minority groups—more particularly, again, of the Negroes. Whether it will continue as a broad focal point for the activities and loyalties of the race remains to be seen. There are signs of degeneration, caused probably by the fact that the Negro church especially still is dominated by characteristics developed in a primitive, rural society. If new leaders are forthcoming, leaders conscious of the problems of urban life and of the changing status of the Negro himself, the church can retain its unique position as spokesman and agent for the race in its adjustment to modern life. The nation-wide organization characteristic of many of the church denominations might well be a distinct asset in such a development, because it will help to reduce the power of local prejudice in much the same way that the Federal Government has hastened the reduction of economic and political discrimination against minority races in individual States.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Which among the various factors discussed in this chapter do you regard as being the most important in determining the character of racial interaction? Defend your judgment.
2. What is the basic weakness of all attempts to avoid race friction by isolating the races from one another?
3. What special circumstances account for the unfortunate history of our Indian reservations? Might we look for some improvement, or is it likely that the whole approach should be abandoned? Justify your opinion.
4. If one accepts the position that amalgamation of the races is not necessarily undesirable from the biological point of view, is it true that no valid objection can be raised in opposition to it?
5. Does the idea of amalgamation between whites and Negroes seem any more abhorrent to you than, for example, amalgamation between whites and Orientals? How do you feel in regard to amalgamation between members of races *other than your own?* Explain your position.
6. What is the nature of segregation? Is it necessarily objectionable? How does it usually operate when it is applied to relations between races?
7. Show how race discrimination asserts itself in the administration of justice.
8. What differences are there between a lynching and a race riot? In what ways are they alike?
9. What is the extent of discrimination in providing higher education for minority races in the South? In the North? What is the real tragedy of the segregated school system?
10. Why is it necessary to sustain a program of *adult* education with regard to race relations? Outline such a program for your own community, and show what outside agencies, if any, you would utilize.
11. If it is true that "all of us are members of one minority or another," why do such acute minority problems occur in our political life? Can the intensity of such problems be reduced? Defend your opinion.
12. List and characterize the chief devices used to disenfranchise racial minorities. What are the consequences of disenfranchisement (a) upon those disenfranchised? (b) upon the political life of the nation as a whole?
13. Show the inter-relation between educational and political discrimination and the economic position of a given racial minority group. Might this correlation be extended to include the group's experience in regard to matters of health?

14. What is the position of your church with reference to race contact? Are persons of all races accepted as *members* of any one congregation? Are they admitted as *fellow-worshippers* at church services? Are persons of some races more acceptable than others? How would you explain the conditions you have noticed?

6. The Social Threat of War

WHEN THE CURTAIN first rises on the stage of history, men are fighting. The myths and hero tales imbedded in the early literatures of peoples celebrate the heroic deeds of warriors on battlefields. Even back beyond the written literature, since archæologists have dug the ruins of old cities and explored caves and camping sites, we know from the battle-axes and other implements of warfare, from the cleft skulls, from the weapons buried with the deceased hero, that mankind had learned the art of warfare. There may have been an idyllic period in the history of mankind. So far, however, there is little evidence of it. True, the stone implements found among the remains of paleolithic man do not seem to be as well adapted to warlike purposes as those of neolithic man. Nevertheless we know that, whatever weapons he had, with them he succeeded in slaying animals as large as the elephant, which would seem to indicate that with them he might also have slain his fellow-men. Whatever the truth about the antiquity of warfare, for at least fifteen or twenty thousand years man has been engaged in the grim business of making war upon his fellows.

PEACE AND WAR A PROBLEM IN SOCIALIZATION

With the dispersion of the races and peoples of mankind from the cradle of the human race, wherever that may have been, differentiation between groups set in. With the separation of groups differences of language, customs and traditions inevitably arose. Within the past two thousand years of history have occurred the differentiations in language and other elements of culture characteristic of the Latin peoples, even in so narrowly confined a region as southwestern Europe. Given the longer periods of time since man first appeared in Europe, it is not difficult to understand how enormous changes took place in what may have been an original single culture. These changes would enable us to account for the differences in the cultures of the different groups, which when they later met, would make them alien to one another. The points of concentration of popula-

tion were determined by economic resources, such as wells in the desert, hunting and fishing grounds, pasture-lands, and fertile valleys. The conquest over nature and greater control over the food supply cut down mortality and stimulated population growth. With the growth of population, inevitably groups came in contact with each other. Peoples with different cultures coming into contact with one another and competing for access to natural resources often came to blows.

It must not be concluded, however, that the struggle was solely a struggle for survival, as it is among all other forms of life. The idea that population pressure has been the chief motivating force of intergroup conflict even among primitive peoples has been modified in recent years. The desire for plunder has been a potent factor, since it has afforded a means of getting something for nothing. Similarly, the development of slavery, by which one group can be compelled to do the hard work of another in return for mere subsistence, has put a premium on the capture of members of outside groups or tribes. Both of these motives arouse a sheer lust for power or a desire to dominate for the sake of easier living, quite apart from any acute pressure of population upon the resources available to support it.[1]

Furthermore, we must remember that in the early history of mankind all social relationships were based upon kinship bonds. One who was related by blood either in fact or by fiction was a member of the group, therefore a friend. In the struggle for existence the qualities of courage, resourcefulness, invention, agility, and cunning were developed. Along with these qualities, however, the struggle for existence also produced between members of the group kindliness, sympathy, and mutual helpfulness.[2] But such mutual aid did not extend to those outside the group except under extraordinary circumstances; broad human sympathy developed very much later than sympathy for kin.

The results of these various conditions were conflict and war. Sometimes one group drove out the other, which then moved on to other places. At other times when the strength of the two contending parties was nearly equal, treaties seem to have been made, as well as some kind of a working arrangement for the occupation of the same territory. Resulting from both conquest and treaty settlements sometimes assimilation of culture occurred, occasionally amalgamation of the two groups took place by reason of intermarriage, and finally such union of both stock and culture as made these groups one people came about. This we call "socialization." An illustration is provided by the probable history of the twelve tribes of Israel. It is quite likely that the people of Israel were the result of such amalgamation of various groups and the resulting socialization that came about by living together in a common area, sharing the same culture, and finally develop-

[1] Alvin Johnson, article on "War," in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. XV, pp. 331–334.

[2] P. A. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution* (1904).

ing common institutions and a common political system. That the socialization was not complete is shown by the fact that in the later history of the people of Israel a political division took place between the south and north areas of Palestine.[3]

THE BASES OF PRIMITIVE AND MODERN WAR

Despite the enormous contrasts that readily suggest themselves between the tribal, hand-to-hand fighting of primitive times and the mass assault of whole peoples against one another in present-day war, there still are certain basic similarities in the background of both types of conflict. Not only are the fundamental urges for power and booty which were mentioned a moment ago still present, but the underlying problems of socialization still prevail.

The patterns of intergroup competition and intragroup coöperation are basically the same as they have always been. Whether the group be large or small, its members become interdependent, one upon another. The individual finds that he has greater security and can enjoy the use of a greater variety of goods and services if he shares the work of life with others. As a result of this interdependence between members of the group, there develop feelings of loyalty to the group as a whole, a solicitude for its security and continued ability to function. Anything that seems to menace that community of interests from the outside will at once arouse the antagonism of its members toward the potential enemy. It is, in effect, a *segmental* socialization. The world never was—and is not yet—a complete, single unit. There are all sorts of cleavages, racial, class, religious, occupational, as well as economic and political, which create opposition among social groups. Each of them arouses loyalties which are intense enough, in many cases, to create strong feelings of group difference and conflict, even within a small community of people.

The problem, then, is to harmonize the objectives and loyalties of the various competing groups so that compromise can be accomplished on higher planes than those of sheer violence. Yet curiously, the problem becomes more complicated as the conflict grows sharper and more inclusive, since local or internal differences become submerged in a common enterprise against any force threatening from the outside; and any partial sympathies that may have extended to other groups or peoples are destroyed. Thus, in war, be it among primitive tribes or among modern nations, internal group solidarity becomes greater, intolerance of the outsider becomes more intense, hope of reasonable settlement of the points of difference diminish. The longer a struggle continues, the more likely it will be to destroy the possibility of peaceful coöperation between the contestants even after the hostilities have ceased.

In modern times, however, we have an increasing emphasis on economic

[3] Louis Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible* (1912).

resources as the basis of social life. Similar at its root to the ancient hunger for watering-places, hunting-grounds, pasture-lands, and arable soil, the competition for natural resources at the present time is much more varied in its objects by reason of the fact that we can make use of many resources that once were unusable, so that natural resources supply very many more human wants than they supplied to primitive man. There are scholars who insist that all wars have had their root in economic desires. That, however, is too narrow a view. Cultural wants have increased enormously with civilization; consequently the demand for natural resources that can minister to these wants has greatly expanded in modern times.

With nations taking the place of tribes, political ties and political ambitions have wider scope. The emphasis upon group aims and rights is perhaps even more intense than with a primitive tribe. Political doctrines have been developed to justify political aims and purposes. Moreover, the political ideas have been integrated with cultural and economic desires, binding all these interests together in a doctrine of political sovereignty, and providing for war a justifying ideology that was lacking among primitive people. The economic aims are still there in full force; the cultural aims have not disappeared, but all these are tied up into a consistent system by the political scheme ordered and glorified by political doctrine. This characteristic of modern states has given a new basis for war by shedding on it the glory of a complex of social aims and purposes.

Moreover, through civilization populations have multiplied, means of communication have increased, transportation has been developed, and inventions have given man control over his world to an extent never before seen in the history of mankind. All of these things have multiplied conflicts by bringing into closer contact the various nations of mankind. With a distinct national consciousness and national pride, and with increased possibility of contact, conflicts were inevitable.

The *nation* still is our largest effective political agency; and we become sharply aware of its complete influence over most of the other phases of our lives when we travel from one country to another. It determines the laws under which we live and supplies us with our protection both at home and abroad; our movements are freest within the national boundaries; culture elements of language, custom, and historical tradition are largely defined by identity with the nation. Thus, it is to be expected that our loyalties are strongest to the nation to which we owe our allegiance; and *all* of us are compelled to be citizens of *some* nation.

On the other hand, no nation is self-sufficient. It must import many of the things it uses; it must depend on foreign markets to absorb its own surplus products; the giant industries often are fed by foreign materials, and in many cases are owned by business organizations which know no national allegiance. The result is obvious: it is no longer a matter of mere "contact" between national groups. Rather, our economic life has almost com-

pletely transcended political boundaries, even while our loyalties still are confined to national groups. Thus, we find ourselves confronted with many problems of a world community, while our largest social unit, the nation, still is only a segment of the whole society. We have, in effect, a network of global relationships beyond the power of even our largest nations to deal with conclusively. The likelihood of friction and conflict therefore reaches enormous proportions.[4]

Making a bad matter worse, also, is the fact that modern inventions have given a new destructiveness to war. Science has made its contribution by providing a knowledge of the processes of nature and applying our knowledge of these things to destruction, so that today war is a more deadly serious matter than ever before in the history of the world. This development of science in the interest of warfare has reached a point, with the development of the atomic bomb, such that the mind of mankind has been overwhelmed by the social disaster attendant upon war. Unquestionably the most urgent of all our social problems today is the problem of maintaining peace, and how to achieve collective security among all the peoples of the world.

THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR

The tremendous and catastrophic drama of the Second World War is completely without historic parallel. It therefore is extremely difficult for us, without the benefit of historical perspective, to analyze fully either its nature or its implications. However, it has given us a realization of the meaning of "total war" which even the First World War failed to instill; and from it we may detect some of the more important lines of social disaster which "total war" portends.

Mechanization. The First World War was only partially a war of machines. There were many refinements of the traditional implements of war; but the instruments still were chiefly *weapons,* whose effectiveness depended very largely and directly upon the use made of them by the individual soldier himself. Consequently, the strategy and tactics of warfare still remained essentially as they had been for centuries. Yet, two new elements made their appearance in that war which were to have a profound effect upon the character of the Second World War: tanks and airplanes. The airplane remained largely a military novelty throughout that war; and while its effectiveness was considerable, very few even among military experts foresaw its importance in the years to follow. The tank was a vital factor in breaking the stalemate of the trench warfare; yet it was a far cry from the relatively crude affair of that war to the monstrous cannon-mounted seventy-ton tank of the Second World War.

The great strides in airplane, tank, and transport design together conspired to make the Second World War conspicuously a war of movement.

[4] Kimball Young, *An Introduetory Sociology* (1937), pp. 85–87.

The swift hammer blows that felled the north countries and more especially the strong lowland countries to the south—Holland, Belgium, and France in campaigns lasting only a very few weeks—gave force to the concept of *blitzkrieg,* or "lightning war." It was said that in all these campaigns, German combat forces of less than 50,000 men were actively engaged at any one time. But this is hardly a full statement. The fact is that machines were substituted for troops to a very high degree. Airplanes and tanks, especially, are fearfully destructive even though operated by a mere handful of men. But they require servicing, just as any other machinery does; and tremendous ground and technical crews are necessary to supply and repair them under battle conditions. Thus, the later thousand-plane bombings over Germany were said to require the active coöperation of about a half million persons, even though probably not more than five or six thousand aviators actually flew in such raids.

The development of mechanized warfare also depends heavily upon the industrial system, from which it stems. As equipment has grown larger and more complex, it demands the application of larger amounts of labor power, and larger and more complex outlays of capital goods. Thus, the soldier of our Revolutionary army was maintained by the efforts of one or two civilians, while by the year of 1865, it probably amounted to three or four; but in the Second World War, it was estimated that it required from fourteen to twenty workers to back each member of the combat forces. Putting it another way, money costs of each battle-death rose from perhaps 75 cents in Caesar's Rome, to $3,000 in Napoleon's time; the cost was about $21,000 in the First World War, and exceeded $50,000 in the Second World War.[5] This is understandable when one realizes that the character and mass of military requirements is such that armies no longer can depend much on forage to keep them going in the field.

Regimentation. Such an enormous undertaking as modern, mechanized war clearly cannot be organized in a short span of time, nor can it be done without far-reaching sacrifices by whole populations. Vast as has been the expansion of productive capacity of the world since the development of the Industrial Revolution, there simply is not enough resource for both war and "business as usual." Both the industrial equipment and the natural resources must be marshaled to keep the war machine going; and since the security of the nation is the most basic need of all, provision for civilian needs necessarily is reduced to the barest essentials of life.[6] It is clear, too, that such a condition is not peculiar only to the period of actual combat. In the years just before the Second World War, the total *yearly* world expenditure for war purposes rose from about $3,800,000,000 in 1932 to perhaps $17,600,000,000 in 1938. The approximate annual expenditures of the principal nations is detailed in Table 7. With the advent

[5] J. H. S. Bossard, "War and the Family," *Sociological Review* (June, 1941), p. 339.
[6] Horst Mendershausen, *The Economics of War* (1940), pp. 85–95.

of actual warfare, the portion of national income used for war purposes has been estimated to rise as high as 70 per cent.[7]

To achieve such concentration of effort and production, the governments of the various nations assume increasingly broad control over the lives of their citizens. Each specifies ever more closely the nature of production, the conditions under which people may buy things for their own use, digging deeper into the income of the private citizen by levying new taxes, directing the type of work a person shall do, and the terms upon which he

TABLE 7: NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF THE WORLD, 1932–1938 *
(in millions of dollars)

	1932	*1933*	*1934*	*1935*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*
World total (60 countries)	3,783	3,962	5,031	8,776	12,976	15,468	17,581
United States	677	540	710	911	964	992	1,065
Britain	426	455	480	595	846	1,263	1,693
France	509	678	582	623	834	909	1,092
Germany	253	299	381	2,600	3,600	4,000	4,400
Italy	270	241	263	778	916	573	526
Russia	282	309	1,000	1,640	4,002	5,026	5,400
Japan [a]	199	253	271	296	305	1,129	1,755
China	93	108	112	93	95	95	95

* Adapted from *Information Service,* Vol. XVII, No. 33 (October 15, 1938).

[a] It later became apparent that Japan had been preparing for ten years prior to her surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, hence this report would hardly reveal her true war budget.

shall perform his duties.[8] Prices are fixed arbitrarily, credits are controlled sharply, and commodities are rationed in various ways—all with a view to reducing civilian consumption, creating large national stock-piles of goods or materials which cannot be produced or imported in time of war, and making the nation strong in military power. If ever war was a spontaneous expression of instinctive antipathies or pugnacity, it cannot be so regarded today. War has become a deadly and calculated enterprise of competing nations and touches directly the life of every individual in the world.

Universality. Enough already has been said to indicate the complete inclusiveness of the demands of the modern war machine. Yet one other aspect of modern warfare was clearly shown in the development of the Second World War. The areas of battle, and the objectives of military attack have been expanded to include whole countries. Even in the First World War, the actual roar and destruction of battle took place in com-

[7] Stuart Chase, *The Road We Are Traveling, 1914–1942* (1942), p. 50.

[8] This process was developed earliest and probably most ruthlessly in Germany. See Henri Ernst, *Hitler Over Europe* (1934), Ch. V.

paratively small areas. Radio still was not available for civilian use; airplanes had a very small range of flight and small bomb capacities. Thus, areas relatively close to the battle zones still were fairly safe from attack and destruction. Today, whole peoples may be subjected to assault of propaganda and misinformation, a psychological "softening up" process which confuses and makes them easy prey to the swift annihilation of *blitzkrieg* tactics.

Moreover, if wars are made by nations as a whole, the bitter sting of defeat now is felt by nations as a whole. Where armies formerly foraged on the countryside over which they traveled, today the whole national area is seized upon and exploited to the highest possible degree, so great is the need for material and equipment in modern war. Thus, the Second World War witnessed the wholesale plunder of nation after nation: Whole populations were moved away as forced labor to man the factories and fields of the conqueror; capital wealth was removed from shops and office-buildings; reserves of goods and raw materials were confiscated for the use of the invaders; even the commercial stocks of consumer goods were plundered by ingenious systems of monetary subterfuge.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this new universality of war is the very fact that it *is* universal. No class of people or geographical area is exempt from paying tribute to the Juggernaut. The profit of war to the "war-monger" fades to a wishful dream as factories collapse and ships go down *the world over*. The very frightfulness and completeness of the ravage of modern war may prove impelling enough to assure a determined effort in the years to come to establish a really effective system of international conciliation and control over world resources. Indeed, such a development *must* come about. The only alternative is anarchy and eventual mass suicide of the human race itself.

THE MENACE OF MODERN WAR

We have just seen that modern war alters greatly the political and economic life of the nations. Increasingly, war casts its shadow even over groups of people who have no part in it and who in some cases have not prepared for it at all. The full effect of war, however, is not to be measured in quantity alone—that is, in its widespread destruction of life and wealth. Nor is it to be measured wholly by the objective changes that war brings about in the patterns of economic and political relationships. War also sets in motion new forces and attitudes that affect the course of human development quite as really as the more obvious changes which we have just been considering. Indeed, their effect may be more crucial than that of the others, since they affect the very fiber of individual human beings.

Injury to the Biological Quality of the Race. Few would deny that warfare calls into military service and combat the best manhood that a country can muster. Military, naval, and air service requirements are well

known to be high; the selectivity is from the best on down through the less capable, as the war continues. Thus, the sifting process tends to shield the poorer specimens from the caldron of war, while the better stocks are thinned by death and disability.

Apologists for war insist that it is a counterpart of the continual struggle that occurs in nature, and that like the natural struggle it results in the "survival of the fittest." It would appear that war tends to result rather in the survival of the *least* fit, insofar as it takes its heaviest toll among the "fittest" *of both sides.* Nor is the analogy between war and the struggle for survival in nature quite valid. It is true that the species compete with and prey upon one another, and it is also true that the weaker yield to the stronger. But nowhere in nature do we find anything approaching the mass struggle *within a given species* to parallel human warfare. It is questionable, to say the least, whether fitness among humans is rightly measured in terms of adeptness at self-destruction. It has been well remarked that man's worst enemy is—himself.

The unfavorable selectivity of war is not confined to men, but reaches out also to affect women in a similar fashion. The destructiveness of battle in terms of death and disability results in a distinct unbalance of numbers between the sexes. This unbalance, moreover, is heaviest within the age group upon which, normally, rests the major responsibility of propagation of the race. Many of the "fittest" women of child-bearing age must therefore face the alternative of remaining unmarried and childless, or marrying less desirable men than they would otherwise consider. Not only does such a situation have unfavorable biological implications, but also it creates new dangers of unhappiness and maladjustment within the marital relationship. As a result, both the biological heredity and the social training of the oncoming generation are likely to suffer.[9]

While these observations are true among all nations engaging in war, they vary in intensity in specific cases. Every war is different from every other war; and this applies to the biological aspects as well as the military and material phases. Long wars clearly will have a more devastating effect than short ones, and those entailing much hand-to-hand fighting will exact a greater toll than those which are characterized more by strategy and movement. Moreover, the effect may vary between the different nations competing in the same war. Obviously, the relative power and equipage of the competing nations will be reflected in their respective losses; the nation upon whose soil the fighting takes place is likely to pay a higher toll in civilian lives; and offensive war is usually more costly in battle casualties than defensive.

In the Second World War, the people in conquered areas were subjected to wholesale removal from their homelands. Millions of families were broken by internment, forced labor, or extended retention of military pris-

[9] Bossard, *loc. cit.*, pp. 342–344.

oners of war, while still other groups (especially Poles and Jews) seemed singled out for virtual extermination. The loss of life in actual combat during the first year of the war was remarkably small; yet as the war continued, it became clear that it was to be a war of men as well as of machines. The total biological cost of the war, including the toll of shock and maiming consequent upon aerial warfare, will not be known for many years to come.

Threat to the Cultural Heritage of the Race. Modern warfare is so completely devastating and utterly ruthless that it negates virtually all of the standards and ideals by which the human race has struggled to the levels of civilization that we now have at our disposal. The destruction of historical landmarks, churches, libraries, and public buildings, as epitomized by the so-called "Baedeker bombings" in England, necessarily shocks the fundamental sense of continuity and security of the people who experience such catastrophe. On the other hand, the "scorched earth" policy, by which retreating countrymen destroy anything that might be of possible value to the enemy—factories, warehouses, dams, bridges, crops, and even in some cases the fertility of the soil itself—may well have even more cataclysmic effect upon those who execute such destruction. In such cases they are called upon to put the torch to their own homes and properties. How, under circumstances such as these, can people retain their everyday ideals of industry, thrift, and charity which they have lived by and taught to their children? Indeed, the family itself—the primary object of all social and economic activity—is torn asunder; and principles and aspirations give way to the primitive device of traveling with the pack and exploiting the opportunity of the moment as a sheer matter of survival.

On the positive side, mankind fares no better when confronted with the reality or even the *possibility* of warfare. We have already spoken earlier in this chapter of the all-inclusive nature of modern war. This regimentation permeates governmental activity both in peacetime preparation for war, and in war; and the process is likely to become increasingly oppressive so long as war remains an active threat. The policy of "guns for butter" which Hitler proclaimed prior to the Second World War, a policy of bending every thought and effort toward preparation for war in time of peace, necessarily must be matched by *every* nation—however "peace-loving" it may be—if it is to preserve its independence and security.

The cultural sacrifice which such a policy entails is enormous. The individual becomes simply a pawn of the State, with his life's activities prescribed and his training pointed wholly toward making him an efficient agent in the work to which he is assigned. Science is advanced primarily in the lines in which it can be of service to the State, while the subject matter of letters and the arts suffers even greater degradation. Scientific laws cannot be altered; but historical fact, the emotional possibilities of letters and the arts, and the principles of the social sciences can be twisted, falsified, and regimented beyond truthful recognition. Lacking free access to

impartial sources and intercourse with the world outside the nation, whole populations thus are indoctrinated with the bigotry of national aggrandizement; and they are easily whipped into misguided and fanatical service to the State and the purposes of its leaders.

Such a setting provides fertile soil for the growth of *militarism,* which is the domination of all other classes in society by the professional warmaker, or the soldier class motivated by the logic of *rule by force.* Unquestioning and unwavering obedience to those in authority is the first law of military efficiency. Undoubtedly, such discipline is necessary so long as a nation must defend itself by force of arms. Nevertheless, the wholehearted support of large numbers of men in military service results in a tremendous concentration of physical power in the hands of the military hierarchy; national resources tend to be channeled more and more to meet the personal desires of those leaders. The armed forces become the favored class; and the ideals and objectives of the nation as a whole become more and more those insisted upon by the military leaders. The show of force naturally is alarming to neighboring countries, who thus are constrained to follow suit. Tension between nations inevitably increases, and competitive armament takes place; and one of them eventually must spring at the other, to justify the steadily mounting burden of preparedness. Thus militarism, whether it be predatory or not, is a particularly dangerous development in society. At best, it breeds only suspicion, while it drains the best resources of a country. At worst, it provides the means of exploitation by one class of all others, and sets loose progressively more severe destructiveness and carnage.

Increase of Friction between Classes. The integration of the economic life incident to the prosecution of war is not without its beneficial results. One of the few clear-cut gains of wartime industrial activity is the great increase of productive efficiency. The scarcity of labor which arises from the induction of large numbers of workers into the armed forces, and the need for vast amounts of equipment, impel a greater economy in the use of labor power and a greater reliance upon machine power. New technological processes, new materials, and new types of products are developed with intense rapidity under the urgency of war needs. Thus, out of the First World War developed notably the widespread use of assembly-line production, greatly improved engine design, and the phenomenal growth of the airplane and radio industries. Similarly, it became evident even while the Second World War was still in progress that many new plastic materials, new fuels, new synthetic substitutes, and radically new automotive design would be available for civilian consumption following the war.

Such developments unquestionably have a wholesome effect insofar as they tend to break down the lines of class distinction within society. When vast quantities of goods of uniform design are made available at comparatively low cost, the consumption habits of the classes become more nearly alike. It becomes easier for the shop hand to emulate the office worker and

for the stenographer to assume much of the manner and appearance of the society girl. Competition tends, to some extent, to be based more on native abilities and less on superficial distinction and advantage.

Such gains, however, are dearly bought; and one may well question whether the quickening of the rate of social change brought about by war is worth the cost. With greater productivity resulting from mechanization stimulated by war, comes also a reduction in the demand for labor. Yet as the armies are disbanded, the supply of workers is greatly increased. Employment and wages therefore tend to decline sharply soon after the war emergency is past. Depression is the inevitable effect, sooner or later; so that the great mass of people in the end are no better off than before, despite the low cost and wide variety of new goods which are the products of the war-time developments. The employers, on their part, are forced to reduce their overhead; and business organization becomes more centralized—and more powerful. As a result, we have class lines being drawn more and more sharply: the unemployed becoming increasingly resentful of the apparent advantage of the propertied groups, the latter in their turn becoming more fearful of the growing unrest and radical spirit of the underprivileged. Within the industrialized nations in the period between the First and Second World Wars there was a steadily mounting bitterness of class toward class. The rise of the dictatorial States, both communist and fascist, showed clearly the ruthlessness with which either side will attempt to gain superiority over the other.

WAR AND THE ATOMIC ERA

Our analysis of the character of modern warfare is based upon study of war as it has been known. But every war is different from every other war. Enough was said in contrasting the nature of the First World War with that of the Second World War to show how much more inclusive and destructive the latter was than the former. It was mentioned that the tank and the airplane were new in the First World War. Neither was exploited fully then—that was left for the Second World War. Similarly, at the very close of the Second World War—and probably hastening the cessation of hostilities—was the introduction of the atomic bomb. Undoubtedly, should we be engaged in total war again, the character of that war would be completely different from anything the world has ever known.

What the full effect of atomic warfare might be can only be guessed at. On August 6 and 9, 1945, two single atomic bombs accomplished the virtual destruction of two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bomb exploded over Hiroshima is estimated to have killed about 80,000 persons and seriously injured almost twice that number—nearly 60 per cent of its total population, all told—and destroyed two-thirds of the city's 90,000 buildings including 42 of its 45 civilian hospitals. Nagasaki, a city of about 250,000 population, fared no better, with nearly 74,000 persons

officially reported killed, and a like number injured or missing. "If such a bomb were exploded in New York harbor," says one responsible authority, "the blast would demolish buildings for half a mile. The radioactivity would settle from the water cloud over virtually the entire metropolitan area. For miles it would become uninhabitable."

It was very soon recognized that the completely devastating effect of the bombings showed clearly that the application of atomic energy to warfare would change military and naval strategy tremendously. Coupling atomic bombing with the increased speed and flight range of rocket planes and the development of guided missiles, quick and almost total destruction can be leveled at targets within enormous areas. Even naval procedures must be revised sharply, since slow-moving, huge battleships and destroyers are not likely to survive long against such opposition. It is true that occupation by ground forces will still be necessary to subjugate an enemy. But the terrific desolation caused by the atomic bomb, and the radioactivity it releases, will make the maintenance and movement of such forces immensely difficult. Indeed, most of our responsible military leaders themselves look forward to an atomic war gloomily, because they know, as has been dramatically said, that "the flag of the conqueror may well wave over nothing but ruins." Our political and scientific leaders likewise have expressed grave fear that full-fledged atomic war may lead to virtually complete destruction of the civilization we have so painfully built up through the generations.

So momentous were the issues surrounding the development and use of atomic energy that steps were taken to secure at least a degree of control over them even before the bombs were released over Japan. An advisory committee of nuclear physicists and government officials long associated with the development of atomic energy was appointed by the President to counsel as to what domestic and foreign policies should be established. Since Great Britain and Canada had combined resources with the United States in the project, they were consulted in laying down broad proposals for international control of atomic energy. These proposals later were agreed to by other major powers, including China, France, and the U.S.S.R. (Russia), and indeed were adopted as the basic objectives of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. It was agreed that (1) basic scientific information should be freely exchanged between all nations; (2) atomic energy should be controlled insofar as control is necessary to assure that such energy should be used for peaceful purposes only; (3) the use of atomic weapons should be outlawed as an implement of national armament; and (4) "effective safeguards," including inspection, should be applied to prevent the nations from secret perversion of atomic energy to military purposes.

The implementation of these objectives has been extremely difficult, however, for both political and practical reasons. Some of the major na-

tions had the ability to produce atomic energy while others did not; and there seemed no way to secure positive assurance that a potential aggressor nation would in fact abide by any international agreement of this sort. The issues focussed sharply on the proposals of the United States and the U.S.S.R., since these were the only major nations still capable of waging "total war"; and the U.S.S.R. did not actually have the "secret" of producing atomic energy. The United States proposed that a world atomic development authority be empowered to perform the basic work of producing atomic energy, with licensing of derivatives to the various nations for peaceful purposes, and that any abuses in the use of atomic energy for belligerent purposes was to be punished at once by all the remaining nations, acting together through the UN—waiving appeal to the Security Council.[10] The United States proposed also to release its basic atomic information as this system proved its effectiveness; in the meantime it would produce its own stock—in diminishing amounts—of atomic weapons. The U.S.S.R., having no atomic energy and presumably fearing the power at the disposal of the United States, demanded immediate destruction of existing bomb stocks and cessation of their manufacture, as evidence of good faith on the part of the United States. Further, they refused to bind themselves by the decisions of the UN Atomic Energy Commission as to what constituted violations in the production of atomic energy, and would agree to submit to only limited inspection of atomic energy programs by that body.

The issue seemingly has revolved around two basic factors: mutual distrust by the two major powers as to the objectives of national foreign policy, and the fact that one of them had the bomb and the other did not. Whether the acquisition, claimed by the U.S.S.R. in 1949, of the ability to produce atomic energy will facilitate progress in the negotiation for effective international control of atomic energy remains to be seen. Certain it is that the achievement of such international coöperative control will come only by mutual forebearance and concessions by both sides. In the last analysis, the concept of national sovereignty, insofar as it involves the unlimited right to determine policies for controlling atomic energy, must be relinquished. The alternative is an atomic armament race, with atomic war—and, likely, universal destruction—the ultimate outcome.

If that conclusion seems overdrawn, then consider only what the effect of such a race itself might be. One of the physicists close to the initial development of the atomic bomb states the prospect in these words:

> The only alternative to world control is to take measures to reduce the damage that an atomic attack might do. This would mean giving up our cities and spreading people, industries, and defenses around the countryside. There is no way of estimating the cost of this in dollars and in the disruption of our economy. But it would certainly bring regimentation approaching if not equaling that of a to-

[10] The "veto power" of the UN Security Council is explained below, page 126.

talitarian state. Merely preparing for atomic war would destroy civil and economic liberties and poison the American way of life.[11]

The choice is not easy. Coöperative world control of atomic energy will involve large concessions—and risk, since even world control itself cannot guarantee that no secret war preparation will be made. But it offers *the only possibility* for a working agreement such that the peoples of the world may have an opportunity to preserve and develop their own ways of life. It is unfortunate that atomic energy was applied first to destructive purposes, overshadowing the tremendous peacetime benefits that are possible in medical treatment, the development of vast electrical power, and the expansion of research resources. But the issue is joined, and it must be met.

THE CONTROL OF WAR

The world-wide scope and utter destructiveness of modern war has led in our generation to a growing conviction that the process of settling disputes by resort to war must be checked.

Early Attempts to Secure the Peace. Treaties and compromises have characterized group relationships from a very early period of history. Early civilized societies like the Greek city-states found it important to provide methods for settling their differences and for combination in the face of a common enemy. There resulted the Amphictyonic Council. With the rise of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire these movements for peace were made unnecessary because of the so-called *pax Romana.* In the Middle Ages, however, again occurred attempts at international arbitration. Frequently also among the feudal overlords disputes were arbitrated by bishops or archbishops, by the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, by the King of France, and by the Pope. In fact, the church took the lead in the development of arbitration between political powers. But these early procedures seem to have had very little influence upon our own measures to preserve or restore the peace between the nations.

The Hague Conference. The most important modern development before the First World War was the Hague Conferences. The first one met at The Hague in 1899 on the motion of Nicholas II of Russia. It failed to achieve any limitation of armaments, but did result in three conventions and three declarations, each of which was to be a matter for separate ratification. The first convention provided for the pacific settlement of international disputes and instituted a Commission of Inquiry and a Permanent Court of Arbitration accessible at all times to contracting powers. The second convention was a formulation of the laws and customs of war on land, with the intent of defining them more precisely and of laying down

[11] William A. Higinbotham, "Splitting the Atom," in *Atomic Challenge* by William A. Higinbotham and Ernest K. Lindley, p. 18 (Headline Series No. 63, Foreign Policy Association, 1947).

certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far as possible. The third convention adapted to maritime warfare the principles of the Geneva convention of 1864. The declarations attempted to prohibit the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons and by other similar new methods, to prohibit the use of projectiles containing asphyxiating or deleterious gases, and to prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.

The second Hague Conference convened in 1907 through the initiative of President Theodore Roosevelt, although the honor of summoning it went to the Czar, who called the first conference. Certain improvements of the Permanent Court, which proved to be the most fruitful work of the first conference, were made, the most important of which was the restriction upon employment of members of the Permanent Court as counsel in cases before it. Some agreement was reached as to the matter of opening hostilities, the laying of automatic submarine contact-mines, the status of enemy merchant ships at the commencement of hostilities, certain restrictions on naval capture, others dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals in war on land as well as at sea, and the creation of the International Prize Court. The conference recommended that a third peace conference be called within a period corresponding to that which had elapsed since the preceding conference; but that conference was never called, by reason of the outbreak of the First World War.

The World War Interlude. The most effective effort to preserve the peace in the period between the First and Second World Wars was the League of Nations. The League was generally linked with President Wilson's name, largely because he was its chief proponent; yet the idea of the League and its characteristics were derived from many sources. It was to be essentially a voluntary association of free and independent States, to deal with the important phases of international relationships. There was to be active coöperation in matters pertaining to their common welfare, such as in labor policies, "the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs," freedom of trade, the control of epidemic disease, the "just treatment of the native inhabitants" of colonies and mandated areas, and "the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which control of this traffic is necessary in the common interests." [12] As a further means of maintaining international peace and security, a Permanent Court of International Justice was instituted, which was to arbitrate disputes brought before it by member nations. The League was to function through an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat; the Assembly being largely an open forum, the Council dominantly the policy-making body, the Secretariat serving chiefly as a continuously functioning administrative agency. The League was in no sense a governing body, since the member States retained their inde-

[12] Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

pendent autonomy; and membership was wholly voluntary and could be terminated after due notice had been given. Its decisions required unanimous vote; and any State dissatisfied with the decisions of the League or the Court could renounce the decision by withdrawing from the organization.[13]

Dominant political opinion in America was opposed to the League and the motives behind it. Criticism centered especially on Article 10, which stated:

> The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Moreover, Article 16 stated, in part, that when such aggressive action had been committed, certain economic sanctions or boycotts should be imposed on the offending State; and further, that "it shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerning what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." The United States people were not pleased with the results of the Versailles Treaty, to which the League became attached and for which it seemed a guarantee. The United States, of course, did not enter the League; and while there were many other reasons for the failure of the League, the aloofness of the United States doubtless was an important contributing factor. The League accomplished a great deal in promoting international coöperation; yet as a means of preserving the peace, it never took a militant stand; and by 1939 its power had been quite thoroughly discredited.

Many other proposals were made, and activities were carried on in behalf of peace in this period, but the movement toward war was as inexorable as it was unsuspected by most people. During the first decade following the First World War, many conferences were called to "disarm" by mutual agreement, to scrap obsolete materials and forgo new construction; yet they failed, basically, because the nations refused to consider any other basis for such a reduction than the maintenance of "parity" of power. Revelation of the intrigue among the Allied powers regarding the "spoils" to be divided following the war, and the influence of international investment and government finance as a cause of war,[14] led to demands for "neutrality" laws, "conscription of capital," and "nationalization of war industries."

One of the most powerful influences substantiating such a position developed with the exposure, about ten years following the First World War,

[13] W. R. Sharp and G. Kirk, *Contemporary International Politics* (1940), Ch. XXII.
[14] See, for example, Walter Millis, *Road to War* (1935).

of the nefarious activities of the "armament ring." To be sure, trading with the enemy was nothing new; but never before had it reached such proportions and apparent brazenness. Similarly, it was shown that patents and designs pertaining to armament were exchanged by the armorers of the competing nations; that international distrust and consequent demand for increased armament were deliberately instigated by manufacturers of arms; that the companies were controlled by large financiers whose holdings transcended national boundaries, and whose profits were derived in the last analysis from the purchases of friend and foe alike.[15]

The result of these revelations was that American public opinion was swung still further toward isolationism. The United States Congress, reflecting public sentiment, began enacting laws that should assure our neutrality in the foreign struggles that seemed ever surer to come. From 1935 even into 1940, our attitude was distinctly one of withdrawal from world affairs, and a determination to keep clear of what was regarded as other people's profit-making wars. How inadequate such measures were in dealing with the basic causes of war, of course, has been borne out by subsequent developments.

The United Nations. The United Nations organization, which emerged in the months immediately following the Second World War, was a distinct improvement over the League of Nations. Its founders had the benefit of the experience of the League, and so were able to avoid some of the mistakes that were made in organizing the League. It achieved in fact what the League had hoped for but never accomplished, the membership of *all* the major powers of the world. That inclusiveness was assured by the early entry of the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Russia)—both conspicuously absent in the old League. Like the League before it, the UN provides the regulation and adjustment of peacetime relations between the member nations. Already the UN has functioned actively in this area through the operations of such subsidiary agencies as UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the Economic and Social Council, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, and the World Health Organization. It also has provisions for applying economic sanctions to discourage aggressive actions of recalcitrant nations in much the same way that the League could, although whether such sanctions will be more effectively applied remains an open question. But there are perhaps

[1] For fuller detail, see H. C. Englebrecht and F. C. Hanighen, *Merchants of Death* (1934); or George Seldes, *Iron, Blood, and Profits* (1934). How much of such illicit traffic in war supplies took place during the Second World War era is unknown. There is considerable evidence to support the belief that the policy of "appeasement" may have been in part, at least, impelled by a concern for the preservation of business interests. For example, the connivance of England in aiding the Spanish insurgents in 1936, and the United States trade with Japan during the first four years of Japanese penetration into China are hard to explain in terms of international justice.

two important differences between the League and the new United Nations.

First, it does not require unanimous consent of its members for the UN to act. The UN is so organized that major questions of policy are settled by eleven member nations, represented on the Security Council.[16] Five nations are permanent members of this Council: China, France, Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. (Russia); the remaining six are elected for a period of two years from among the representatives of the other member nations. *Policy* decisions by this group require agreement of all the permanent members plus two of the remainder—a majority, that is, of which five must be all the permanent members. Thus, only five votes must be unanimous—not the UN as a whole or even the Council as a whole. This "veto power" unquestionably is very effective in matters felt to be important by any one of the permanent members of the Council; potentially it can vitiate the whole UN organization. Nevertheless, it provides a better chance for agreements than if unanimous consent were necessary. Moreover, in *procedural* matters, considered less important by the members, a simple majority of *any* of the Council members is decisive.

The other matter is perhaps still more important, even though less has been accomplished directly. Provision is made in the UN charter for the eventual development of international policing forces. It is true that no such force has been recruited, and its potential use still is sharply limited. Nevertheless the fact that such a force has been agreed to in principle by all the major countries is important when we consider that the UN is not a governing body. Similarly, it is hoped that the existence of the UN will provide the necessary framework for world control of atomic energy. Both problems together are involved in the effort to provide world security; and both must be solved by international discussion and agreement.

From what has just been said, one might justifiably question whether the UN will be adequate to deal with the problem of controlling war. Indeed, many felt almost from the beginning that the UN is foredoomed to failure, and that the best policy to pursue is for each of the major nations to be strong enough to deter the others from aggressive action. Others, with some justice, take the opposite view—that world government is the only way to prevent future warfare between nations. The course of events since the founding of UN seems to give weight to both positions. The "cold war" was essentially a struggle by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to maintain a position of national power—both militarily and politically—even at the expense of great peril to the very life of the

[16] The UN as a whole functions through two bodies, of which the Security Council is one. The other is the General Assembly. This latter is a deliberative, advisory body consisting of representatives of all the member nations of the UN. It has the power to *recommend* to the Council any course of action or subject for investigation. It cannot commit the UN to any course of action or policy; but it gives nations not represented on the Council a chance to be heard.

UN organization. The "will to agree," so vital to the success of a coöperative venture like UN, was much less evident than the will to immediate self-preservation.

It must be remembered that the UN is simply a working agreement among sovereign nations—nations that have surrendered not at all their right to govern domestic territories and only to a very tenuous extent their right to determine their own foreign policies. As long as that working agreement exists, there is the possibility that the "will to agree" can be expanded by peaceful, democratic processes. Let us well mark the alternatives: The independent quest for national security leads to militarism within each and every nation; and we have already considered the vicious circle of warfare that militarism engenders. On the other hand, "world government" is far more easily envisioned than achieved. The objectives and governing processes of existing nations, even the major nations, are so varied that a mutual, orderly submission to a super-power could hardly be secured. Under present circumstances it would have to be imposed by force—warfare—which would necessarily contradict the very objective for which presumably it was being imposed. It would seem that the only feasible course is to strengthen the "will to agree" by seeking out maximum points of agreement. In the long run, the self-preservation not only of individual nations but very likely of mankind itself will depend upon it.

The Basis of a Durable Peace. Our brief survey of the problem of war seems to suggest that certain factors are of considerable importance in the establishment of a durable peace.

First, it should be evident that some sort of international government must be established, to control the affairs of all the independent nations insofar as those activities affect the relations of the nations with each other. Moreover, this body necessarily must have the power of compulsion to make its decisions binding upon the nations. Whatever the shortcomings of the League of Nations may have been, the Second World War made clear that the nations must relinquish their rights to independent action in matters involving the security of one another.

Second, there must be a realistic approach to the problem of force. We cannot depend alone upon the good will or the finer impulses of the people of any nation; nor can any of the "United Nations" retire to a policy of isolation as was done following the First World War. We have seen too clearly how disastrous the sudden seizure of power by an unscrupulous group can be to the rest of the population—both domestic and international—to permit the possibility of such a *coup* to remain.

Force also must be controlled indirectly, in terms of international accounting of industrial production and foreign trade. The years prior to the Second World War showed great changes in the character and amounts of the foreign trade of the various nations—changes which pointed plainly to policies of war preparation; yet no authority existed that was powerful

enough to check those activities. *The use of force is both necessary and inevitable in any type of social organization.* But the instruments of force have reached such power and character that their use must be rigidly controlled, as is the use of any other dangerous instrument or agent.[17] *Force must be used judiciously and kept in the custody of responsible authorities;* and this can be assured only by close and implicit coöperation of all the nations of the world.

Third, the soundness of the measures thus far proposed can be assured only insofar as democratic principles are extended over *all* the fields of human relationships.[18] The basic inspiration of democracy, of course, is the equality of every individual with every other, an equality of privileges, duties, and voice in the determination of the rules by which the group shall live. It provides for the free and continual adjustments of differences between classes of the gross inequalities that are bound to spring up between them when one or another threatens to seize the reins of control for its own advantage. Whether it be in matters of politics or of economics, of religious or racial differences, the democratic recognition of the underlying equality of the members of the group and the determination to preserve the unity of the larger group by compromise, provide the only certain way to maintain peaceful relations. As soon as these democratic principles are violated and various groups become oppressed, then the relationship is maintained only by exerting force, and, sooner or later, resentment is bound to reach explosive, revolutionary proportions. The process is the same, regardless of whether we are considering local organizations or the world community of nations.

Fourth, we must see to it that we develop competent and responsible leadership to direct the course of affairs in the future. The combination of competence and responsibility is imperative to assure that the concentration of power that has become characteristic of modern life shall not be perverted to antisocial uses or to the aggrandizement of a particular group or class. The special training of personnel for government service has long been practiced in various countries and has in recent years had some attention in our own country. This is a distinct advance as a means of assuring capable administration. But no economic or political system of life, not even the democratic, is in itself capable of guaranteeing equitable relationships. *It is rather the spirit of the people and of its leaders that give life and character to the social structure.* It occasionally happens, of course, that the spirit of the people and the leadership it has are at loggerheads. Leaders, to put it another way, may gain their position of leadership by deception, or by taking advantage of the confusion or indecision of the people in times of distress. In that event, as we have become so tragically aware,

[17] Nicholas Doman, "The World We Approach," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (July, 1942), 222:96 ff.

[18] See Harold Laski, "Democracy," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* V, pp. 76–84.

the consequence can be disastrous to both the home people and even the world at large.

The concentration of power in the hands of but few leaders now is an accomplished fact. It no longer can be otherwise, even if we would have it so. It therefore is imperative that those who are entrusted with the direction of that power shall really reflect the will of the people they lead. The best assurance of a wise selection is an alert and well-informed world citizenry, since it is fair to assume that the overwhelming majority of people desire not war, but peace. In the light of world history, it is only natural that we should feel no little apprehension as a result of the pyramiding of national and world policy-making into the hands of fewer and fewer leaders. But let us remember that there is no necessary connection between mass, and the individual's, freedom. The citizen of the United States of today has lost none of the essential freedom that was enjoyed by his great grandfather in 1789.[19] As a citizen of the world, he will gain still more freedom to the extent that the democratic processes are given more universal application in the free expression of the people's will and choice of their leaders.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant by the statement in the text that peace and war are problems of socialization? Is the mobilization of the national unit toward the war psychology also a problem of socialization? Explain.

[19] Doman, *loc. cit.*, p. 101.

2. What would you say to the statement that modern science has made war more likely to occur?
3. Why has the maintenance of peace become more imperative than ever before?
4. How does the business of equipping and supplying modern military and naval units affect the character of war? How does it affect the problems of world peace?
5. What happens to the "four freedoms"—free speech, free press, free religion, free assembly—when a nation prepares for, or engages in war? How is the educational system affected?
6. What are the effects of modern war upon the biological quality of the population?
7. Poison gas was not used extensively in the Second World War (even though large quantities of it were manufactured), because it was not easy to avoid harming one's own troops and because of the danger of retaliation by the enemy. Might the atomic bomb similarly prove to be more of a threat than an actively used weapon?
8. What factors caused the failure of the League of Nations in dealing with the circumstances which led to the development of the Second World War?
9. Describe the framework of the United Nations. What are its more promising features? Its weaknesses?
10. What appear to be the fundamental requirements for establishing a lasting peace?

7. The Nature of the Population Problem

MAN, ONE OF the most slowly multiplying of all earth's creatures, has, nevertheless, increased with such astounding persistence that he alone has peopled the whole earth. Other forms of life can live only in such areas as naturally provide them with the requisite means of subsistence. They may increase only up to the limit of the naturally available food supply plus certain geographical limits set by range of temperature, humidity, and altitude. Beyond this, a ruthless struggle for existence in competition with their fellows and with representatives of other forms of life for the same food and space kills them off. They have no course other than that of effecting biological variation through evolution: the formation of a new and differing variety capable of existing outside the mother area and under a new set of conditions. But "man is nature's rebel" He alone has been able to defy her and fit her for his purposes rather than to change himself to meet her whims. He has learned to consider himself the Lord of Creation because of this superiority and because of the ceaseless multiplication that has placed him in control of the whole earth and of all its forms of life. Even though races are represented by biological differences some of which have demonstrable survival values for certain climatic conditions, such as the pigmentation of the skin in the tropics, any race can adjust itself to life anywhere on the planet. Man can protect himself from the tropic sun or clothe and house himself to withstand the northern cold. If the proper sort of food be lacking, he will import and store it. Against enemies and pests he has provided protection. If a Panama Canal cannot be dug because of the ravages of yellow fever, he conquers the mosquito that bears the germ. Man storms nature's barriers and presses ever forward.

I. INCREASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE

Natural selection and the struggle for existence make up a far more

terrible fact than we of the twentieth century are able to realize. In order that life should survive at all, it was necessary for nature to provide each species with powers of multiplication concomitant with its death-rate.

Conditions of life for the lower forms of life are such that the maturing and survival of the young depend upon a favorable combination of environmental accidents. Given a favorable medium in which to develop, favorable humidity and temperature, and protection from enemies, the young life may get started. Once it is begun, more accidental combinations determine its continued survival, maturation, and further reproduction. Nature can only guarantee continuity through a most prodigious reproductiveness. The higher the form of life and the greater the amount of protection that can be guaranteed by the parents, the lower the birth-rate can safely be, and the lower it actually is. Each species, then, has a birth-rate that, if unhindered, would swamp the earth, but which actually no more than insures the perpetuation of the species without any very marked increase except as the balance in a territory is disturbed. This balance is, however, maintained only by an utterly ruthless natural selection and struggle for existence.

The Persistency of Human Increase. What about the human animal? Few forms of life breed more slowly, and yet none has spread more persistently. In none has the survival-rate been so large. The offspring of a single pair, unhindered, might also cover the face of the earth in a comparatively short time. Granted that there was need of this fecundity in the case of our primitive ancestors, is there still need of it in this day of highly assured survival? *The answer is that man's fecundity, which once was our survival guarantee, is now the root of a most pressing social problem.* Man has succeeded in domesticating many plants and animals. He feeds them the proper foods and surrounds them with such measures of protection as will guarantee the maximum amount of multiplication and survival. Nature does not produce such crops as are found in our grain-fields. The animal packs of the forest have no such survival-rate as the herds of our barns and pastures. But man is not interested in their survival for further reproduction, but for immediate consumption. Of the wheat grown, but a very small fraction is saved for seed. Of the sheep and cows and swine raised on our farms, the major portion find their way to our stock-yards. Were this not so, but a few generations of domestication would produce a most serious plant and animal overpopulation. Man is in a similar position. He is a *self-domesticated* being. He has arranged for himself far more and much better protection than he has afforded the animals he has domesticated. But to what end? Merely that of survival! *He is an end in and of himself!* He is not weeded out as are food-plants and animals. Every child born is surrounded with every possible life assurance for the sole purpose of being brought to physical maturity and in turn becoming a breeder himself.

A PROBLEM OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND

The population problem is in the main but another aspect of the universal problem of supply and demand. Physical existence of course depends on the supply of standing-room on the earth and on the available supplies




FIG. 3

Data adapted from *Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1948* (Office of International Trade), pp. 588–589.

of natural resources thereon and therein contained. Naturally a direct relationship exists between the number of people (consumers) and the amount of space and natural resources. While man cannot increase the amount of the material resources of the earth except in the line of directive and selective use and breeding, he can increase their availability. There was just as much iron in the world in the days of Pithecanthropus as there is today, but he knew neither how to get it nor how to use it if he had it. For him, since it was not available, it practically did not exist. Till an improved and inexpensive process of extracting aluminium from clay was invented in the laboratory by a student at Oberlin College in Ohio, the supply of aluminium was strictly limited, though it was in existence in unlimited quantities in the earth. Human life, in fact all life, depends upon the supplies of the bases of life. These are: sufficient and suitable standing-room for the operations of life; sufficient and suitable natural resource materials for food, clothing, shelter, and protection; and

further resources for the production of the tools whereby these and the refinements of life can be produced.

The demand for these possessions of Mother Earth seems to be insatiable. Man's wants are not limited to mere subsistence, as is rather uniformly the case in the plant and the animal world. Man is not satisfied with a full stomach, a comfortable lair, and a mate. There is no limit to the standard of life to which he may aspire. He does not demand the impossible of the scientist in bringing into existence new goods and larger supplies, but he does demand a share of newly created wealth as it becomes available. He may talk of "the simple life" and of "the good old days," but he does not want to live them. He speaks of "oversupply" and of "glutting the market," but there is no supply over and above what he could and would use. It is not that too much has been made available for the use of man, but that too much has been produced to make available for general use by means of our existing system of distribution. It is doubtful that we could produce more than we can consume. Over a period of time, whenever a larger supply is in sight, either an encouraged birth-rate provides increasing numbers to consume it, or an increased share for each raises the standard of living.

Man wants not only subsistence but also a guarantee of the same for the future. He wants the prestige and power conferred by possession of greater stores, and hence more power and security, than his fellows. As soon as he has subsistence, he wants better subsistence—and with it, leisure. It is this "plus" element that distinguishes human from animal life.

THE SUPPLY OF AND DEMAND FOR HUMAN BEINGS

Man's insatiable demand for consumption goods is further complicated by his fecundity and the tendency for populations to increase in number rather than to remain stationary. We thus are compelled to strike a balance between two variables—a changing supply of consumption goods and a usually increasing number of consumers. The former, the increase of goods or the increased availability of goods, is usually accomplished only with difficulty and increased exertion, and depends on the stage of social and technical development at which the group has arrived. The latter, the increase in the number of consumers, presents no problem at all, because at the present time in practically every advanced civilization we face the problem of checking the natural increase of human beings.

Before the coming of the whites to the North American continent, that continent was already showing signs of population pressure. This was evidenced by the chronic warfare waged between native tribes and by other checks to population increase. We are told that for the Indian's manner of life twenty-five square miles of territory was required to supply the needs of the individual. Today, in the period of advanced production that has replaced the Indian's hunting-and-finding economy, this same country is supporting not one individual to twenty-five square miles, but nearly fifty

individuals to one square mile. The geographical area is unchanged, but man has progressed; he has learned to make available materials and forces that were denied to the original inhabitants of the area. Furthermore, this much larger population is able to live in far greater security and comfort, and there are evidences that a still larger population can be accommodated. We are justified in concluding that, for any given stage of technique, and within a given geographical area, there is a supply of human beings that will function with the maximum efficiency and to the maximum advantage of all. This is the point of most favorable balance between numbers of people and available supply of consumption goods. The sociologist calls this *the point of optimum numbers.*

The balance, or optimum of numbers of human beings is not a static condition that can be achieved once and for all. It is complicated by the development of science and man's steadily growing power of increasing the availability of natural resources. We are fond of the saying that the railroad "opened the West." It is equally correct to say that the railroad made available supplies of natural resources and standing-room which in turn made possible the support of more human beings. Every invention increasing the availability of economic goods makes possible a larger local or world population. It may be, however, that the populations of the areas affected will choose rather to maintain the same numbers at a higher standard of living than to support a larger number at the old standard of living. In India, at least, one of the effects of British occupation has been the introduction of commerce, industry, and more efficient agricultural methods. But the Indians have used the resulting surplus mainly in supporting an increased population, rather than in raising the general standard of living. In Japan the opposite has been the case. It is true that serious population pressure is present, but this is because Japan has used a large part of her increased productivity to raise her standard of living. Having accomplished this higher standard of living, having experienced it, she is now striving to maintain it. Were she to drop back to the old standard of living, the present numbers could easily be maintained.

The problem of optimum numbers, then, is the problem of securing and maintaining for any given stage of social advance the best man-land ratio. Either too small or too large a population will produce less per individual, and consequently result in a lower level of subsistence than a population which keeps a proper balance between men and resources.

There is no problem of more vital significance. Unlimited breeding with the certainty of untimely and unnecessary death results in economic, social, and biological waste. Unlimited breeding with normal survival dooms the standard of living. Unlimited breeding from the scrubs in the human stock invites disaster. National prosperity does not depend on mere numbers, else China would be the most prosperous nation on the face of the earth. As it is, she is the poorest. National prosperity depends

on the proper balance between men and the available means of subsistence. Furthermore, it depends upon the *quality* of that manpower. There is a vast difference between a nation of half-starved coolies and a nation of vigorous and intelligent workers.

We have made great strides in learning how to use and aid nature; in learning how to insure crops and to eliminate waste in the processes of production; in controlling water-supply; in deriving power from new and unexpected sources; in producing synthetically certain materials of which Mother Nature has been somewhat niggardly; and in perfecting processes for the extraction of materials that Mother Nature has compounded with others. At present we are looking for more and more easily accessible stores of nitrogen, and the time may come when we shall easily extract it from the air. The time may come, also, when the problem of power will be as easily solved. We cannot afford, however, to gamble in futures. Furthermore, not even our wildest conjectures as to what the synthetic chemists can do for us warrant the optimistic belief that we need take no account of the numbers of the population. After all, the amount of the earth's surface is limited, and likewise standing-room and space for crops, factory buildings, and channels of communication. All we can hope to do is to utilize what is present with increasing economy and intelligence. As invention and discovery make available new and unknown sources of supply, human beings will be here to take advantage of them and, if desirable, to increase up to the new point of diminishing returns and thus establish a new optimum in numbers.

If we are to maintain a population that is optimum with regard to number and the standard of living, we shall have to consider most carefully the law of diminishing returns as it applies to the human consumers and producers of this world's goods. The basic materials from which these goods are made are strictly limited, even though man's ingenuity is not. Man's fecundity, relatively, is not limited. On the one hand, we must look forward to making the best possible use of the finite world in which we find ourselves. On the other, we must see to it that this world of ours is not swamped with more human swarms than it can well accommodate.

EARLY APPEARANCE OF THE POPULATION PROBLEM

The population problem has been present since the beginning of human society, and with good reason. As a matter of fear of too few for safety or of too many for comfort, it was perhaps more keenly felt, though less clearly recognized, in the beginning than it is today. At least our present situation is less precarious than that of primitive man, with his ineffective methods of coping with the forces of nature and the constant danger in which he lived. There was continually with him the desire for the extra fighter and producer and at the same time the fear of the extra mouth to feed. Attitudes have varied with periods because time's changes have brought

with them now the need for encouragement and now the desirability of the discouragement of population increase. Times of plenty and times of scarcity are reflected in the varying attitudes toward the problem. Periods of pessimism and of optimism alternate. The unfortunate thing is that societies forget the experiences of the past and are apt to imagine each time that they have discovered the final truth of the matter.

PRACTICES PRODUCING INCREASE

The practices that have been in vogue for the increase of the human population are too numerous to catalogue. Early groups made a general practice of killing the males captured in war and retaining the females as secondary mates. This increased the potential productivity of the conquering males without a corresponding increase in the number of food-consumers. Premarital intercourse was often tolerated in order that females might demonstrate their fertility before being taken as permanent mates. The barren woman was thus excluded from the marriage market. Early marriage defeats its purpose in that with it is apt to come early sterility, but it does have the effect of increasing the number of generations to the century. The Chinese father has one major desire, and that is to see his sons married and fruitful at as early an age as possible and to hold, if Heaven be so kind, his grandchildren in his arms before his death. With regard to his daughters, his main interest is to replace them in the home with daughters-in-law. Persecution of the bachelor and elimination of the barren woman have been found effective in some times and places. The prestige of parenthood and the elevation of motherhood have had their effect. It is interesting to conjecture what are the actual numerical fruits of the occasional Presidential letters to the parents of exceptionally large families. There can be no question that social recognition of this sort might be eagerly sought in certain social strata in which it is not highly desirable to encourage the birth-rate. At any rate, these letters do bolster up large-family prestige. Society is remarkably sensitive to family-size traditions, and standards as to what is expected of a couple are fairly effective. These large-family and early-fertility traditions take the form of social sanctions enforced in the main through public opinion and religion. Nazi Germany did much to encourage child bearing even to the extent of condoning illegitimacy.

PRACTICES PRODUCING DECREASE

So long as the patriarch holds life-and-death authority over his children and his female possessions, he is at liberty to accept or reject the children with whom his wife or wives present him. The practices of infanticide and abortion are natural concomitants. Prostitution is common where marriage is too long postponed either because of economic necessity or in deference to public opinion. It also follows social degeneration. Both late

marriage and prostitution are effective in cutting down the general birth-rate. The encouragement, and sometimes the elevation, of celibacy and virginity have the same effect. They are deleterious in that they more often discourage fertility among those who are fitted for parenthood than among those who are not. An almost universal practice has been that of the persecution of undesirable groups. Unfortunately, when this method is used, the persecutors are apt to be very poor judges of desirability. Spain rid herself of her Moors, Jews, and heretics, thus eliminating at the same time skilled workmen, traders, and thinkers. It is interesting to note that in old Japan emigration was a capital offense, while the new Japan is committed to a policy of finding an outlet for her surplus population. Finally custom and tradition, in the social approval of small families and the general astonishment expressed over families of "good old size," keep the family size down as effectively as under different conditions they keep it up. Of course, social approval implies some method or means whereby its desire can be accomplished. This may be found in the postponement of marriage or in the various more or less modern contraceptive devices that have for their purpose the control of conception. Fortunately infanticide and abortion are no longer as common as they formerly were. This is due to the fact that they are no longer as necessary. Instead of destroying infants after they are born, it is now customary to prevent their conception. Unfortunately knowledge of this more modern technique is under strict legal ban in most States and is more a possession of the upper than of the lower classes.

BASIS OF PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

The need of the time is the mother of morals and of socially recognized programs. We rationalize that which is opportune, socially approve it, and accept it into the body of our mores. Society has possessed plenty of population attitudes and agencies, even programs, that were no more than the blind application of pragmatic tests. Indeed, the world does not yet possess a national group with a carefully thought out, scientifically derived, and consciously applied population theory, aim, and program. It is possible that the ancient Spartans came closer to having and practicing such a program than any other people has ever done. We may say further that existing populations are in the main the accidents of natural evolution. Of these the most fearsome and grotesquely haphazard has been that of peopling the United States with the representatives of every race, nation, civilization, religion, political persuasion, and social and economic stratum in existence.

As has already been intimated, while there were population attitudes and practices among primitive men, there were no population theories in the accepted sense of the term. Blind, groping practices were rationalized and accepted. Children were born and must have died in tremendous num-

bers. Life was hard and existence precarious. War was the normal state, and famine lurked ever near. Under conditions such as these it is not strange that the normal population need should be for larger numbers. The problem was mainly that of replenishment. It is entirely logical, then, that the usual policy of primitive peoples should be one of encouragement. We do find cases, of course, of favorably located groups in more or less definitely limited areas, *e.g.*, small oceanic islands, where the problem is less a matter of maintaining numbers than of maintaining food supplies. Here practices are resorted to for the purpose of curbing numbers, but such cases seem to be exceptional.

As man progresses, life becomes more secure. Violent and unnecessary death decreases in amount and the older practices become less necessary. It is at this point that the modern population problem begins: the problem of adjusting numbers to the potential food supply. Man has never been able to rid himself entirely, however, of the many fears engendered in the childhood of the race. Today as then, in the popular mind numbers and security seem to go together; there is an eternal fear of group extinction.

We are prone to take the short-time and opportunistic view, forgetting that environmental conditions are in constant flux. We will not remember that the words, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," were uttered to a very small boat-load of survivors from a certain well-known marine disaster. We insist on continuing the attempt to replenish already overreplenished areas. A Chinese sage said to a *young* and *growing* people, "Of the three great evils, the greatest is to die without posterity." The same dictum, however, still operates as a sanction in the same country in its *old age* and *exhaustion* from overpopulation.

MALTHUS AND MALTHUSIANISM

Unfortunately the uninformed are in the habit of referring to any attempt to cope with the population problem as "Malthusianism" in much the same manner as they refer to evolution as "Darwinism." Population theories are no more Malthusianism than modern astronomy is astrology, or chemistry, alchemy. These sciences have progressed far beyond the limits of their strange beginnings, and so also have population theories outgrown the limited vision of Malthus and the closing years of the eighteenth century. It is not that Malthus has been discredited; he has been superseded. We have traveled with, but beyond, him.

Both Darwin and Malthus based their studies on the knowledge of their day, added their bits, enunciated their theories, and rested their cases. No one would have the temerity to suggest, as the use of their names would sometimes indicate, that there the matter stopped; that there is no more to the theory of evolution, for instance, than was set forth by Darwin nearly a century ago.

Since Darwin's day we have discovered additional facts, but the biologi-

cal organism in the physical evolution of which he was interested has not changed perceptibly. Social evolution, however, proceeds very much more rapidly than physical evolution, and the social life of today is very different from that of Malthus's time. The purely biological phenomena underlying his theory remain the same, but the more important conditioning social phenomena do not. Therefore any modern follower of the doctrines of Malthus must reckon with certain social and psychological factors that had not then appeared.

It would seem almost like a waste of time to go into detail over the Malthusian theory of population were it not for the fact that, during the century and a half since the first appearance of that famous document it has gone through such numerous printings and such continual discussion. Almost at once Malthus found himself the center of a heated controversy, which has not yet abated.

What was the astounding statement that could attract so much and such continuous attention? Simply this: *Populations tend to increase faster than material sustenance can be increased and be made available for them.* It was the law of chronic want for, or scarcity of, material goods. It was merely a statement of a fairly regular tendency for populations to outgrow the food supply *unless checked.* This thesis was explained, expanded, and defended, and a wide range of facts was presented for its proof. Into such detail did Malthus go that his *Essay on the Principle of Population* has justly earned the title of "the book everybody talks about and no one reads."

His Three Main Propositions. Malthus took his stand on three propositions:

1. Population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.
2. Population invariably increases where means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks.
3. These checks, and the checks that repress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

Malthus recognized that "the first of these propositions scarcely needs illustration"; it is a self-evident fact. Since living implies subsistence, life is limited thereby. With regard to the second, he felt that he had made a very conservative statement by adding the latter portion. He felt that while there might be extreme cases where populations do not keep up to the level of the means of subsistence, they are so unusual as to have no effect on the general application of the law. It is the truth or falsity of this second statement that is the crux of the entire population problem. The third proposition is of negligible importance. We are interested, of course, in the checks to undue population increase, but these checks vary, as we shall see, with times and periods. We might easily accept Malthus's classification of restraints, but we would have to reinterpret them in terms of our

own time. We find no difficulty in accepting his three propositions, but we do find some difficulty in accepting all that he said about them.

The Unfortunate Corollary. A corollary to these three propositions lay in the recognition of the tremendous reproductive powers of all forms of life. Plants bear seeds by the dozens, fish lay eggs by the thousands, animals bear their young in litters, and poor indeed would be the form of life that was prepared by nature to no more than double itself in a single generation. And yet Malthus asks us to consider what would happen if only this were to be the accomplishment of the human race. Given subsistence in sufficient amount, any normally healthy group could easily double its numbers with each generation; it could, in fact, do more. Suppose families of a dozen were the prevailing size and there was no problem of food supply. Making liberal allowance for deaths, a group could quadruple in size in one generation. From this Malthus draws the conclusion that population *tends* to increase by geometric ratio, or by doubling. Noticing the difficulty with which the food supply is increased, he deduces that subsistence *tends* to increase by arithmetic ratio or by mere addition.

Whether or not this corollary is true or contains truth, it is particularly unfortunate that Malthus made the statement, for this is the peg on which most of the opposition to his theory has been hung. It has been comparatively easy to cite cases in which the population has not increased according to a geometrical ratio, and in which the food supply has increased at very much more than an arithmetical ratio. America is the stock example. In spite of our tremendous population growth, the standard of living has certainly increased more rapidly. It has made little difference that Malthus said only that, other things being equal, there was a *tendency* in this direction. Here we have a statement, and on this statement he has been universally attacked. It is similar to the use that has been made of the monkey in refuting Darwin.

The Rise of Neo-Malthusianism. It would be improper to pass Malthus by without mentioning the Neo-Malthusianism that followed. Let it not be thought that this movement, which might quite properly be regarded as having instigated modern birth-control, met with his approval. Careful scientist and keen analyst that he was, he was nevertheless a clergyman, and repudiated, in accordance with the clerical opinion of the time, any tampering with the Divine plan once the sacrament of marriage had been effected. Having called the attention of the world to a serious social problem, he stopped short of a practical solution. His "positive checks" are merely a statement of some of the unfortunate things that happen to societies under conditions of population pressure. Societies will never willingly use them. Social programs always exist for the purpose of conquering them. His "preventive checks" are particularly useless in a normally virile society. Continence in marriage and indefinite postponement

of marriage with chastity are ideals difficult of attainment in actual practice. His followers, still using his name, sought means of limiting the number of births that were no part of the original Malthusian hypothesis.

FOOD-SUPPLY FACTORS AND POPULATION GROWTH

The new lands that were available at the beginning of the nineteenth century are nearly exhausted. The populations of the world have flooded into the supermarginal areas and only those which are at or near the margin remain. It is easy enough to estimate the area of our own unused Western plains, and the vast interiors of South America, Africa, Australia, and Asia. To be sure, we can find plenty of mere area, but we may be equally sure that if the areas have been left they are no Gardens of Eden. If they had been, they would be populated at the present time. Indeed, two students of the present situation have estimated that no less than 93 per cent of the world's land surface lacks at least some of the factors necessary to satisfactory yields of food production.[1] Their reasoning is summed up in Table 8. The land remaining in disuse suffers certain handi-

TABLE 8: EFFECT OF VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF FACTORS LIMITING WORLD FOOD PRODUCTION *

Combination of Factors	*Land Area Adapted to Food Production*	
	Acres	Per Cent
Sunlight	35,700,000,000	100
Carbon dioxide *and sunlight*	35,700,000,000	100
Adequate rainfall *and carbon dioxide, sunlight*	15,500,000,000	43
Reliable rainfall *and adequate rainfall, carbon dioxide, sunlight*	12,200,000,000	34
Temperature *and reliable rainfall, adequate rainfall, carbon dioxide, sunlight*	11,400,000,000	32
Topography *and temperature, reliable rainfall, adequate rainfall, carbon dioxide, sunlight*	7,400,000,000	21
Soil *and topography, temperature, reliable rainfall, adequate rainfall, carbon dioxide, sunlight*	2,600,000,000	7

* From Frank A. Pearson and Floyd A. Harper, *The World's Hunger* (Cornell University Press, 1945), p. 49. By permission.

caps owing to which it has not yet been brought into use. Much of it perhaps can be made to produce, and no doubt some of it will be brought into use—but only at greater cost and hence with decreased profit.

[1] Frank A. Pearson and Floyd A. Harper, *The World's Hunger* (1945), p. 48.

In Europe there is little expansion area available. In Asia more intensive cultivation, if that be possible, and the utilization of her sparsely populated areas will be hardly sufficient to raise the standard of living of her already teeming millions to a humane level. The interior of Australia is largely arid. The major portion of South America is tropical. For Africa we cannot prognosticate the future. It is sufficient to conclude that the world's possible increase of agricultural area is very strictly limited. Supposing that it could even be doubled, and this is sheer conjecture, what does that mean to a world population which is capable of doubling in a single century? The problem is serious.

Land Situation in the United States. In the United States, with an area of 1,903,000,000 acres, it was estimated in 1940 that 1,061,000,000, 56 per cent, are in farms, but that of this amount only 530,000,000 acres, 50 per cent are improved, that is, in crops, fallow, or used for farmstead or pasture. The remaining 531,000,000 acres are unimproved, probably handicapped land. In other words, but 28 per cent of the land area of the United States is under improved cultivation. It is believed that the 530,000,000 acres reported in farms in 1940 represents about the limit to which we can expect the total farm areas to go. Analysts at that time concluded that there should be some readjustment of lands included—recommending that some 80,000,000 acres should be returned to grass or forest, while an approximately equal number could be made newly available by clearing woodlands and cutover lands more suitable for cultivation, and releasing lands now withheld from active production by public or private agencies. It was estimated that the 321,000,000 acres actually under cultivation in 1940 might be expanded to a total of perhaps 460,000,000 by similar methods: by cultivating idle land, reducing crop failures, redeeming forest areas, drainage and irrigation.

Increase in Area and Increase in Productivity. From the estimates given above it is seen that we cannot even double our present agricultural food-bearing area; we can increase it by but 32 per cent. However, our recent agricultural policies, including the retirement of submarginal land, the encouragement of soil conservation, and the development of better breeding and husbandry methods, have set in motion factors whose full impact on productivity has not been realized. It is felt that these influences will more than offset the fact that the new land itself, measured by older standards, is probably less productive than the land already being cultivated. Taking all these items into consideration, it has been estimated that on the basis of the agricultural methods and resources presently at our disposal, we can look forward to the possibility of increasing our agricultural productivity by about 50 per cent through the use of new lands alone.[2]

The Problem of Preserving Soil Fertility. The soil itself, once it is brought into use, is not a static possession. Its value changes with use.

[2] J. Frederick Dewhurst, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), pp. 599, 611–612.

We mine its fertility as we mine our mineral deposits, but with this difference: the fertility of the soil can be restored, while the riches of our mines, once extracted, cannot be replaced. So long as our country was sparsely populated and there was free land for all for the taking, we thought little of allowing individual families to operate farms of thousands of acres by the most wasteful methods. These farms produced bumper crops, but we have already seen their virgin fertility disappear. It was mined—squandered because a young and optimistic people refused to consider the future. The nineteenth century for the Western world was a mad holiday of spending; the twentieth century is being compelled to count up the costs. Even to maintain the *status quo,* to say nothing of supporting a larger population at a higher standard of living, we must exert ourselves tremendously. It is not merely a matter of continuing to use the same old land in the same old way. We must invent means of maintaining soil fertility, which is extracted by every crop that is grown. We have, as our warning, the fact that the virgin fertility of the soils of the Old World long ago disappeared. By the most strenuous efforts and by methods most repulsive to our Western tastes, that soil fertility has gradually been restored. Many of these older countries have for centuries been overpopulated and gaunt from starvation. Unless we succeed in maintaining our soil fertility and continue to accelerate food production, we are faced with one or both of two alternatives: a decreased population or a diminished standard of living.

The Prospects of Intensive Cultivation. While we can undoubtedly maintain the fertility of our soil, it is a question how far we can go in increasing the productivity of already fertile land. One may see in New England mile upon mile of tobacco-fields all growing under canopies, and truck-gardens of but ten to twenty acres so intensively cultivated and so carefully fertilized that their operators under favorable conditions can make more money than the Western farmer on his 160 acres. It is not difficult to imagine all land as intensively cultivated as this, but not all land is so strategically located with reference to markets. In the province of Chihli in North China families exist—but merely exist—on the product of a single acre of land. But this too is a process subject to the law of diminishing returns. It cannot be continued endlessly.

There is little doubt but that increasing the intensity of cultivation holds more promise of expanding food production than does increasing the extent of land cultivated. New land now can be brought under cultivation only by draining, by irrigation, or by clearing. All of these procedures are laborious and costly, and the quantity of land that can thus be made available is, for practical reasons, relatively small. On the other hand, considerable progress has been made in recent years in improving the yield of acres already under cultivation by means of intensified use of manures and commercial fertilizers, mechanization, and the development of new

animal and plant stocks. The introduction of hybrid corn, for example, increased the per acre yield of corn approximately 30 per cent, while careful selection of cotton seeds, together with better cultivation methods, almost doubled the per acre yield of cotton in the twenty year period prior to 1942.[3] But the persistent question is: how long can we keep producing at a substantially increasing ratio? Sooner or later, the point of diminishing returns is bound to be reached; populations cannot go on endlessly expanding at a constant rate for the simple reason that the production of food cannot do so. It is necessarily a little disturbing to us in America to learn that for all our large-scale, mechanized farming our per acre yield of basic crops such as grains, rice, potatoes, and sugar is only slightly more than that of Asia, where small farms and human labor are the rule: 1,058 dry pounds per acre as compared with 1,046.[4]

Food from Other Sources. Our emphasis on the land as the main source of man's food supply may be questioned by some. After all, since about three-quarters of the world's surface is under water, perhaps we might well look to the rivers, lakes, and seas for additions to our sustenance. The sea, especially, is largely unfathomed. Who knows but what the depths might yield as yet unknown edible "fruits"? Indeed, in some parts of the world, sea-foods already form an important element in man's diet. Unfortunately, however, the idea can be nothing much more than an idea. Fish, like any other living thing, require food; and adequate supplies of food for them can grow only in the relatively shallow waters where the light and warmth of the sun can penetrate. The portion of the ocean fulfilling these necessary conditions has been estimated as being probably not more than a twentieth of the total area, and the annual catch of fish in such areas at about the equivalent of one pound of dry food per acre.[5] Any substantial increase would have to be accompanied by increasing both the fish and food stocks in the water areas suitable for their growth. Some advance has been made along such lines, chiefly in pond culture; but the possibilities, so far as the total addition to the world's food supply is affected, are distinctly limited. The importance of sea foods probably will remain high only in relatively restricted areas where their consumption already provides significant portions of the protein diet.[6]

Similarly, the dream of armchair chemists looking toward the development of synthetic foods in capsule form must remain a product of the imagination alone for some time to come. Aside from the physiological nature of man's assimilative processes which require bulk as well as nourishment, the very process of synthesizing food is both complex and costly in terms of material and power. Thus far, synthetic nutrients have been

[3] Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 612–613.

[4] Pearson and Harper, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.

[6] See John D. Black and Maxine E. Kiefer, *Future Food and Agriculture Policy* (1948), pp. 331–334.

used chiefly to replace those lost in large scale food processing, as in "enriched" flour, or "irradiated" milk.[7] Whether atomic energy will eventually supply the power or ingredients for increasing synthetic food supply cannot be foreseen. It is likely, however, that even atomic energy will long remain a form of power much too expensive to compete seriously with agricultural production of foodstuffs.

The Problem of the Margin of Safety. In conclusion we must face the problem of the margin of safety. Do what man will, Nature does not always coöperate with him in the production of crops. She sometimes withholds the requisite humidity, and again deluges us with it. She sends us biting frosts and scorching winds. We are compelled to fight pests, and sometimes the game is a losing one. It is the experience in a certain section of the country that if a farmer can depend on one bumper crop in four, he can survive. This being the case, we must figure on a margin of safety or surplus to carry us over the lean years. This is the trouble in the Orient today. The standard of living is based on the expectation of a normal crop each year. So low is the standard of living that it cannot be reduced without the most serious consequences. We read of their famines, but forget that a famine with them would be merely a crop failure with us. It is not a difference in the character of the phenomenon, but a difference in its social consequences. A famine is merely a crop failure without a sufficient margin of safety.

Maintaining the margin of safety, then, depends not only upon producing adequate foodstuffs, but also upon judicious consumption of the food that has been produced. Progress will come only as *choice* is possible in the use of resources. Part of the resource must be reserved as insurance against disaster; part must be used to improve productive techniques. The rest can go to contribute directly to the standard of living of the population. But the standard will be determined to no small degree by the numbers of the total population who are to share in the distribution of the consumable goods.

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN POPULATION GROWTH

Plant and animal populations, except when domesticated, are affected in their rates of increase entirely by external factors. Human populations alone are affected in addition by another set of factors that are *internal* or spiritual in nature. These are the social and psychological causes which exist because man is man, because he is a thinking being and capable of self-domestication. The lower animals are creatures of their environment and are subject to the laws of rigid and arbitrary natural selection. Their natural environment both makes them and breaks them. Man alone is capable of purposeful progress; of setting his course and mapping out his

[7] Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (1942), pp. 63–64.

own destiny. The lower animals are creatures of blind and highly fixed instinct, while man has supplemented instinct with social habit.

Only man is able to appreciate an *optimum-numbers* concept. Human societies alone are capable of programs that have for their object the balance of population; of either speeding up reproduction or reducing the excess and weeding out the unfit; of facing the problem of numbers before it has arrived. The pack, in a sort of blind fury, will fall upon and destroy a wounded member. Fowls in the farmyard will fly at and peck at the individual of the flock that behaves queerly. This is, however, but a blind and instinctive reaction. Man has at his disposal much more effective agents.

Social Restraints and Encouragements. Restraints and encouragements of a non-material nature run the whole gamut from the most incidental social approvals and disapprovals embedded in custom and tradition to the strictest sanctions that may be found in law and religion.

We have, for instance, very definite styles in the size of families. These styles change; they vary with time and place even within the same nation. Furthermore, different styles exist within the different social and economic strata of the same general population. In New York City what would be considered as normal on Park Avenue or Riverside Drive would be thought a very poor showing by the denizens of the Lower East Side. At the present time a couple producing four children are thought to have fully met their social obligation, while no surprise is expressed if there be but two. "Four children! What a nice family!" or "Six children! You certainly have a job on your hands!" are the commonly heard reactions that indicate to us what society expects. Our colonial ancestors would have remarked, "What? only ten! My mother had sixteen."

Styles in the size of families have long been on the side of decrease in practically all of the more civilized nations of the world. There was a time when the terms *spinster* and *old maid* carried more of a stigma than they do at the present time. Our modern women have the same right to "single blessedness" that men have had. Homemaking is no longer their only possible career, and the young woman of today does not speak of herself as a "bachelor girl" with any sense of apology.

Public opinion goes much farther than merely setting styles in the size of families. It determines all those factors which have to do with securing a mate and establishing a family. It limits the relations between the sexes before marriage, the degree of freedom that each shall enjoy, the range of choice in finding mates, woman's sphere, the age at which and the conditions under which marriage may be contracted, the standard of life that must be maintained, the respective duties of husband and wife, and the social values and ideals connected in general with the home and family life. All of these affect the span of the generation, the marriage-rate, and

the rate of genetic increase. We are scarcely conscious of these regulators. They seem to us to be merely reflections of things as they are. But we obey them.

Public opinion is usually remarkably sensitive to changes in the material conditions on which it is based. Population pressure, a disappearing frontier, a threatened standard of living, easily may encourage stricter marriage taboos, while increasing prosperity and economic security may work in the opposite direction. Custom may, however, be so deeply embedded and firmly intrenched as to defy change and time. This seems to have been the case in China for a thousand years. Family styles have remained unchanged in the face of every catastrophe that overpopulation has wrought.

Legal and Religious Sanctions. Sometimes society has not been satisfied with control through slow-moving, easy-going public opinion, and the laws of God and man have been called upon to furnish the penalties and rewards necessary to accomplish the task. Accordingly we have sanctions now approving and now severely penalizing the killing of offspring. The Spartans used it to insure a vigorous citizenry. The Chinese have used it in the main in the case of female infants as an economic measure, while with us in America it is a major crime. Bachelors have in various ways been penalized, reproduction has been rewarded, and parenthood has been subsidized. In some countries birth-control clinics are operated, or at least tolerated by the State. In America it is against the law in most States for a physician to give counsel on the subject. We even question the right of the physician to allow the hopelessly defective infant to die. It has been in the past, but fortunately is not at present, a fine ethical question in the case of childbirth when both mother and child could not be saved, as to whether the physician's main duty was to the mother or to the child. Should the mother be sacrificed that the child might live, or was the mother's life the main consideration? Prostitution is usually deplored. Illegitimacy is frowned upon, and the unmarried mother is made to feel the burden of her sin. In about half of the States there are sterilization laws for cases of certain types of insanity and of feeble-mindedness, but with the exception of California they are fairly inoperative. In some States medical examination is required in order to secure a marriage license. In general, however, society either remains quiescent or frowns upon any and all attempts to control by law the reproduction of even the unfit.

The hand of religion is seen in all matters affecting morals, but more especially in those having to do with sex. Here its pronouncements are made in no uncertain voice, and woe betide the trespasser! In general, however, its sanctions have to do with the protection of the marriage vow and the family tie. It encourages marriage, and, where it speaks at all on the subject, seeks to insure and increase reproduction.

Personal Values. Not only by custom and tradition, by law and religion is the birth-rate influenced, but also by the individual's manner of life. A

low standard of living, poverty, and economic hopelessness unfortunately do not discourage fertility. Where these conditions obtain, whether it be in a nation or in a social stratum, we are apt also to have a high birth-rate. Perhaps we should call it thoughtless marriage and hapless reproduction. Fortunately (or unfortunately) a high death-rate is apt to obtain in the same areas. Where a fairly high standard of living is endangered by marriage, we find marriage postponed and economy practiced in the bringing of children into the world. This seems to be the first economy adopted where the standard of living is high enough to be worth fighting for.

Democracy, social opportunity, education, and the advantages that go with them discourage unrestricted multiplication. This is not because selfishness and love of ease are thereby bred, but because these conditions breed foresight and caution. They result in the heedful replenishment of the population rather than in heedless reproduction and consequent overpopulation.

II. The Quality of the Population

Social welfare does not relate to the mere numbers of the social population but to the *quality of the individuals composing it,* as well. The quality of these individuals depends partly on their training and partly on the social and physical environment within which they develop. It depends in part also on their heredity; on the inborn traits and characteristics that predetermine how much or how little training an environment can profitably give them. These two determiners, environment and heredity, make the individual what he is. The study of the first set of factors is called *euthenics,* and the study of the second, *eugenics.* Children are born into the world who are normal or defective, healthy or ailing; some are abounding in vitality and very active, while others are weaklings. Just as we find them born to be tall or short, fair or swarthy, so we find a group of mental differences. Some are always dull no matter what advantages surround them, and others are quick-witted and keen even if unschooled. We may notice also a great number of special aptitudes for some particular type of work or mental activity, but it is difficult to assign these definitely to heredity, in spite of the fact that it may be impossible to discover any factor in the environment that might have produced those abilities.

Children are not merely born into the world in general, but each into a particular environment. The content of each child's mind, his training for life, his habits and attitudes, and even his physical health and vigor are either determined or limited by the environment. Seeds sown in stony and in fertile soil develop differently. So it is with children, whose environments, such as city and village, town and open country, villa and hovel, tenement district and restricted residential suburb, leave their imprint on the unfolding human being.

HEREDITY OR ENVIRONMENT, WHICH?

There can be no question that heredity and environment working together make the individual what he is. But which is the predominant force? Which plays the more important rôle? This question has been argued interminably but to no avail. Naturally the biologist sees the importance of heredity, while the professional social worker, who is mainly interested in improving environments, answers the question in the light of *his* work. The sociologist doubts that the question can as yet be answered. He carefully avoids a bias in either direction. The two forces work together inextricably. Each is necessary to the other; each is incomplete without the other. He refuses to waste his time defending either against the other. He demands, however, that each be fully recognized.

The old illustration of the potter and the clay serves us well here. It requires good clay and a good potter to make the finest porcelains. Clays are of various grades. Some are good only for the most clumsy jars, while others are suitable for the finest vases. Potters have varying degrees of skill. If a skilled potter is given poor clay to work with, we may expect only as good a product as can be made with that material. If the best clay is placed in the hands of a clumsy potter, we shall likewise merely get the best job that he can do. Heredity is the clay. It is the basic material with which the potter (environment) has to work. Good heredity and good environment make the best combination, but either is handicapped by a deficiency in the other, and neither can completely triumph over the other. We can say only that the basis of individuality is in the inherent quality of the individual and that this is played upon by stimuli supplied by the environment, the finished product being thus produced. To produce a fine vessel we must start with good material, but it must be worked upon by a skilled potter as well. And which of the two is really responsible for the excellence of the finished product? To answer is to argue in a circle. Anyone who will consider for a moment the careers and development of individuals he has personally known will find it difficult to explain what has actually happened in terms of heredity and environment.

THE ADVANTAGE OF GOOD HEREDITY

The advantage of good heredity is the advantage of a good initial start in life. As yet the hereditary factor is not so well understood as that of environment, and in democratic America we are apt to hold it a bit under suspicion. Here men have risen from the ranks to positions of power and honor. We hail the self-made man. We hold that the boy "who has the stuff in him" can and will make his mark. In one sense this is a recognition of the fact that America furnishes an environment which makes such achievements possible. In another sense, it admits that he must be made of "good clay" to begin with. Heredity is *original* capacity. It can be either

limited or developed by environment *but it cannot be changed.* It is not democratic. Good heredity is more like an aristocracy. Favorable environment may be the result of chance, but good heredity is a favorable bond of connection between the generations.

Heredity cannot be improved by training or environment, since we transmit acquired characteristics to future generations to but a very small extent if at all. *Heredity can be improved only by selection.* Animal-breeders know that no amount of scientific feeding will make a scrub produce anything but scrubs. They know that a superior herd must be bred from a "blooded" ancestry. Luther Burbank, the plant-wizard, did not produce his marvels by the cultivation of his plants, but by planting acres of specimens and searching for the hereditary variations that most nearly represented the type he was trying to evolve. From these he continued the process, selecting and reselecting, till at last the new variety had appeared and its heredity was proved pure. For seed purposes farmers select only perfect ears of corn and use only the perfect kernels from the main body of the ear. Seed houses supply pedigreed seeds, and some of the most valuable services of our agricultural colleges have been in the direction of improving plant and animal breeds through selection. In other forms of life we know the value of good heredity, but in human life, since we are human beings, we have been loath to apply the same findings to ourselves.

There are hereditary strains in any village in our country that are marked by generation after generation of superiority, mediocrity, or inferiority. Any community, large or small, if carefully studied will show definite strains of defective inherited traits. Any case worker in any charitable organization in the country knows that he is dealing with family strains rather than with individuals. He knows that many of the strains are inherently inferior and that in working with them he seldom effects a complete rehabilitation. The best he can do is to improve the environment, keep such individuals under continual supervision, and make them as efficient members of society as their inherent inferiority will permit. Undoubtedly the greatest disillusionment of the young social worker comes when he discovers that among the great majority of his clients, in normal times, improvement is limited by capacity; and that the lives of the unfit represent a permanent problem so long as the breed continues.

The advantage of good heredity is the advantage of a normal or superior physical and nervous organization. It lies in the absence of an original handicap. It is the advantage of being so constituted that good environment will be able to produce good fruits. Heredity sets the limits for possible future development, while environment offers the opportunities for such development.

We cannot go into the problem of the mechanism of heredity. For our purposes we will have to accept it as a fact. A person's heredity represents a linkage of selves, a linkage of the past with the present. It is a continuous

thing. Every time a child is born, certain characteristics of his ancestors reappear in his body. Many additional characteristics lie dormant in his germplasm but may reappear in the bodies (somatoplasms) of his children. The individual's chief importance, genetically, is as the agent of a line of physical heredity, a combination of traits that will be passed on by him to future generations. He is the custodian of hereditary quality. The only way to get rid of poor quality is to prevent its reappearance. The best way to insure high quality is to encourage its continuity.

THE ADVANTAGE OF GOOD ENVIRONMENT

Some plants represent dwarf varieties. It makes little difference how carefully we train them or what supports we give them on which to grow. They are dwarfs and will remain so. The support may hold them a bit straighter and give them more room to spread, but at best they are dwarfs that have been given a good chance. Other plants are climbers and will climb if given the opportunity. If we fail to provide the trellis they will twist about on the ground in an effort to perform their normal function, but they will never grow as large and as luxuriantly as they would have done if the support had been provided. The dwarf was a dwarf to begin with and the other a climber. The support merely represents an opportunity. It is environment. *The advantage of good environment is the advantage of a favorable opportunity to develop, but no amount of opportunity will make a climber out of a dwarf.*

There is a limit to the amount of water that a sponge can absorb. There is a similar limit to the amount of opportunity by which an individual can profit. It is wasteful to give a dwarf vine a ten-foot trellis. Similarly it is wasteful to force a boy through a college training that he is incapable of absorbing. In the case of the human being the waste is more serious, since we force him into a sphere where he will never fit and prevent him from taking the place in society where he really belongs. Overprivileging is thus as serious a mistake as underprivileging and has produced for us a vast army of "white-collar" misfits.

From birth till death, environment is at work influencing physical, mental, and social development. At birth and before, the physical health of the infant depends in large measure on the health and care of the mother. During infancy the physical development of the child is determined by its feeding and care. Many individuals are physically handicapped for life because of the ignorance or neglect of their parents. The fond mother who puts "just a wee drop of coffee" in her infant's milk is showing a bit of misplaced love, and little wisdom. The child brought up in a home of poverty where proper nourishment and clothing are impossible does not get a fair start in life. So on through life the habits of the individual, the conditions of sanitation under which he lives, his diet, clothing, and housing, the amount of exposure and strain that he endures,

the hygiene that he practices, the climate that he lives in, and his opportunities for healthful living in general determine his physical development. Some are born physical weaklings, and some are born robust. Good environment cannot make a healthy man, but it can make him as healthy as his original endowment allows.

Men are born with various grades of native ability, but their mental patterns come from their social environment. Their degree of socialization depends on the habits and attitudes of mind that society implants. Both the uncouth tenement and the home of refinement, the slum and the residential section, the street and the playground, the railroad tracks and the park, the back alley and the summer camp, the alley gang and the boys' club—all are making our future citizens. Every child approaches adult life indelibly stamped with the environment that has furnished him with his personal habits and his social ideals.

THE INSURANCE OF QUALITY

We cannot control the reproduction trends of a people, but we can direct their choice of mates and prevent breeding from obviously defective stocks. Thus far we have made many and varied attempts to control quantity and have done little about the control of quality.

Who Are the Inferior? Before we can tackle the problem of improving the breed we must know who are the inferior. This is no task for the tyro. It must not be left to the reformer or to the statesman. It is a question for the biologist and the psychologist to answer; and when they feel reasonably sure that they know, the sociologist can begin to build a program. We know that there is a vast amount of inferiority, but we do not know how much of it is due to environment and how much to heredity. Hence, we do not know whether to tackle it from the standpoint of euthenics or of eugenics. We visit our slums and stagnant villages and wonder why these people are there. Have they been produced by their environment or have they themselves produced it? We note all too frequently a certain type of laborer at work. He, like the horse, has his physical strength to market. We talk with him and note the dullness of his face, his lack of any specific training, and the emptiness of his mind. Why is he so? Is he inherently inferior, or has he suffered from the effects of an underprivileged environment? We visit our schools and note that the children have been sorted out according to their mental ability and assigned to special classes. One class is for the slow ones, and special teachers are provided who excel in their ability to deal with them. Another class is for the exceptionally bright students, who have been thus placed by themselves in order that they may advance as rapidly as their superior ability permits. But why the difference? Why has one group a higher intelligence quotient (I.Q.) than the other? Is it innate, or is it merely because the inferior students came from inferior environments? We may go to our prisons, workhouses, reformatories, hos-

pitals, asylums, schools for the feeble-minded, and other institutions for the socially or physically defective; here we certainly can find a congestion of the inferior. If we go to the judge, to the juvenile court, and to the social worker, we shall find among their charges many of low intelligence who, nevertheless, are still a part of the body politic.

The unfit, then, are those people who have been so handicapped by either heredity or environment that they are not normally efficient members of society. They are the ones who are unable to stand the strain of normal competition, social and economic, with their fellows. There are two possible root causes of their inferiority, heredity and environment, and two possible points of approach to the solution of the problem, eugenics and euthenics.

The Euthenic Program. The euthenic program has for its object *the provision of such an environment that each individual will have the opportunity of developing up to the limit of his latent powers.* To do anything else is social waste and economic folly. Therefore, even though we are not making the best of the heredity that we have, what can we do to improve the environment and at least bring every individual and class up to the limit of his or its potential ability?

First, we may take for granted that in a country as resourceful as our own, and one in which great fortunes are so numerous, *there is no possible reason why any normally efficient man should earn less than a normal subsistence wage.* If his work is worth anything at all to society, it is worth enough to make it possible for him to maintain himself and his family at the minimum standard of efficiency and decency at least. We know what kinds of food, and how much, he and his family should have, what housing conditions, what clothing, and what insurance and incidentals. It is easy to estimate the minimum for social and physical efficiency. When so many are maintaining standards far in excess of this level, even to the point where their consumption habits are detrimental to their physical and social health, why should there be any excuse for poverty except among the physically unfit? This, of course, is primarily a problem of the distribution of social wealth, but it results in the serious handicapping of many otherwise normally endowed families and individuals.[8]

Second, *those who are so handicapped or inefficient that their labor is not worth a day's full pay certainly should be the wards of the State.* At present we provide "homes," hospitals, and other institutions for the hopelessly defective and dependent. This is as it should be. Society should not tolerate idleness or too low pay for the normally efficient, and it should assume the burden of responsibility for the demonstrably unfit, whom it has either allowed to be born such or has produced in the unfavorable environments that it maintains. There is a large volume of unskilled labor that is unskilled simply because of the lack of training, but with them we

[8] *Your Income and Mine* (New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 20, 1938).

are not here concerned. There are many others who can do unskilled manual labor but can never be normally efficient workers because of some inherent deficiency. These prey upon society, keep our slums going, and furnish a considerable proportion of the next generation. It would be cheaper in the long run for society to assume the burden of responsibility for these. Society should not, of course, keep them in idleness, but should assure them a decent minimum standard of living in return for whatever work they are able to do. It will be possible for society to limit the reproduction of the classes thus segregated.

Third, *continue the present program of improving the social environment.* Slums pay dividends only to the owners of tenements and cost society huge sums. Playgrounds, recreation centers, and directors cost money, but they cost far less than alley gangs and their products. Clean streets, sanitary precautions, breathing-spaces, fresh air, and sunlight are more necessary for the poor, who have not the means to live in restricted areas, than for the rich. Education should be for life and should be adapted to the needs of the individual and his probable future. Latin grammar is fine for the boy who has prospects of entering Harvard, but of little use to the boy who can look forward only to learning a trade and becoming an efficient, skilled workman. We should not tolerate a condition that allows any normal boy to leave our school system till he is definitely fitted to earn a living. Girls may be prepared to earn their living too, but it is even more important that they be taught to be homemakers. If the native ability of an individual is so low that he cannot profit by such an educational opportunity, he should undoubtedly become a ward of the State.

It may be objected that it is useless to provide conveniences and comforts for many of the poor, since they do not want them and do not know how to use them. They clutter up the fire-escapes of their tenements in spite of the fact that their own safety demands access to them. We are told of cases where porcelain bathtubs have been used for the storage of fuel. The conclusion is that it is useless to try to improve their condition, that we might as well leave them as they are in their dark, crowded, and unsanitary quarters. We can answer that so long as we do leave them there they will never learn the better way. People who have spent the major portion of a lifetime in such quarters and under such conditions have become inured to the handicaps of their environment and will not easily change. But their children need not continue the life. They can be reached and changed. Through the children the lives of the parents can also be modified. We shall never attain the goal in either city or country by adopting the *laissez-faire* policy.

The Eugenic Program. The logic of the euthenic program is self-evident. That of the eugenic program is still under fire. While the majority of our biologists are convinced of the existence of hereditary inequalities and of the hereditary character of many types of inferiority, there

are those who refuse to recognize anything but the environmental factor in the production of differences between individuals. Some even contend that latent genius is present in every man, and that it merely remains for society to discover and develop the latent power. Certain it is that much potential genius is allowed not only to lie fallow and undeveloped, but to be smothered out as well. If this be true, well and good. Our duty is to press the euthenic program to its logical conclusion. But whether it be true or not, the purpose of the euthenic program is to make the best of the material in hand. If it be false, then we may use the eugenic program for the purpose of improving the material itself.

The sociologist is inclined to the belief that the biologist knows what he is talking about and is disposed to canvass the field and see what can be done about the improvement of the human breed. But, we are reminded, human beings cannot be bred like cattle. We are human beings, God's handiwork, the climax of creation. You cannot breed human beings for intelligence and physical superiority as you can breed Jersey cows for milk or Leghorn hens for eggs. This is true. The home cannot be supervised as the barnyard is. Further, society does not want the standardization for which the plant-breeders and animal-breeders strive. It might be possible to breed human beings for specific physical and mental qualities, but a standardized race would hold out a most uninteresting prospect.

In the eugenic program we are interested for the present only in the process of breeding out the unfit—of getting rid of the scrubs in the human stock. If we can do this in the course of a century, we shall have done well. This one problem is sufficient to command all of our attention and ingenuity. We do not know definitely as yet who the inherently unfit are, but as they are designated to us by the expert, there are certain things that can be done.

Thus our first problem is that of intelligently motivating marriage and mating. This must be accomplished in the main through popular education, though we may turn to legislation for the prevention of certain unquestionably undesirable types of union. There are many agencies that can be used for the purpose of creating popular sentiment on the subject: preaching, teaching, writing, lecturing; drama, art, literature. One difficulty has been that so few of our writers, teachers, and preachers were themselves sufficiently well informed on the subject. The process is slow, but public sentiment is already changing. Of course it will be impossible ever to rationalize marriage completely. But it is not necessary to allow the emotions to run wild even in the matter of mating and marriage. There is no reason why the choice of a husband or a wife should not lend itself to as careful and intelligent consideration as the selection of a profession.

Obviously, the approach outlined above is ineffective in cases of antisocial individuals and individuals who are so defective as to be incapable

of appreciating their social responsibility in this matter. Morons are not sensitive to social sanctions and are inherently lacking in the possession of normal inhibitions. Their sex urge is feebly controlled. Society will have to be safeguarded against individuals such as these, and normal individuals deserve such assistance as the State can give. Therefore, the State necessarily will have to deal with such inherent misfits in more formal and direct ways, among them the following:

1. All persons of definite hereditary taint, whether it be feebleminded-ness, epilepsy, or physical deformity, should be registered. License to wed may quite properly be withheld from certain classes of inherent defectives such, for instance, as morons.

2. Let us have adequate provision for the care and supervision of the defective. This would include special classes for defectives within the school system so that they can develop to their greatest efficiency. It would involve the custodial care of many more than are now the wards of the State, together with the building and manning of many additional institutions for their care, and, where necessary, their segregation. It might well include the establishment of industrial or agricultural colonies where many of the less seriously handicapped could live a life as close as possible to the normal and partially support themselves.

3. Let us have sterilization in exceptional and undisputed cases for the present, and let it be more widely practiced when we know more about heredity. At present twenty-seven States have sterilization laws applying to the insane and the feeble-minded. In the past these laws have not only been remarkably inoperative, but have been also aimed in the main at insanity, which is of minor importance in comparison with the feeble-mindedness that has been allowed to breed on unheeded. A beginning has been made, however. California stands at the head of the list with a record by 1941 of more than fifteen thousand sterilizations, while all the twenty-seven states together had authorized nearly 47,000 sterilizations by 1948.

It should be added that modern scientific sterilization requires but a very minor operation in the case of the male. For the female it is more difficult, but not serious. It does not incapacitate for either physical or mental efficiency. Marriage and normal marital relations are possible; but such unions are sterile. In many cases it would be cruel and inhuman to doom adults, sexually mature but mentally perhaps twelve years old, to sex segregation in institutions or on farms where they would spend the reproductive years of their lives in isolation from the opposite sex. Provided they are sterilized, society can allow them to mate and live as family pairs without danger of their perpetuating their defect.

It will be noticed that this program makes no attempt to breed for a specific type; it does not invade the sanctity of the home, nor does it attempt to dictate the selection of mates. It merely attempts the isolation of

the inherently unfit. It is a process of breeding the unfit *out* of society rather than one of selecting certain desirable traits and breeding only from them. If we do this in the next century, we shall have accomplished more than is at present in sight. The problem of *breeding out* is ours; that of *breeding up* may well be left to another generation.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant by an *optimum* supply of human beings? How can an optimum population be maintained?
2. What was the Malthusian position? Was it tenable? Do you think it has deserved all of the attention that has been given to it? Restate Malthus's three points in terms that you think would be acceptable today.
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages among human beings of a potential rate of increase far in excess of that which can survive?
4. What is the official attitude of your church toward birth-control?
5. In your particular group, when and under what conditions may young people marry, and what is considered the normal family?
6. What is the agricultural situation in the United States, and what are the prospects for future increase in the supply of farm produce?
7. What is the relation of heredity, environment, and personal choice in the making of social adjustments by the individual? In this day of complex living and of increasing demands for dexterity rather than physical strength, would you say that the environmental factors are making larger or smaller demands upon eugenic selection? Explain your answer.
8. Is the self-made man necessarily superior? Why, or why not?
9. How would you detect what have been called the "overprivileged, white-collar misfits"? What policy would you pursue relative to their training and propagation?

10. Which is the better method of dealing with serious hereditary defects, *segregation* or *sterilization*? Why?
11. Is a more liberal attitude regarding birth-control socially desirable? If so, how should the dissemination of information as to technique be controlled and administered? If you believe it socially undesirable, give your reasons for objection.
12. List the objectives of a sound euthenic program.
13. List the objectives of a sound eugenic program.
14. Discuss the relative feasibility of eugenic and euthenic programs in the light of current social thought.

8. Population Shift and Composition

WE HAVE AT our disposal but one means of increasing the total human population of our world. This is by *genetic increase* or surplus of births over deaths. This type of increase is affected by a host of factors that make it slow in some areas and rapid in others. It also varies according to stage of culture and civilization. These matters were discussed in the preceding chapter. We now turn our attention to local increases and decreases in population that are due entirely to small- and large-scale shifting and to resulting problems of composition and distribution.

Writers on the subject use the convenient term *movement* of population in two senses. The first is *numerical* and refers to movement in terms of increase or decrease as such. The second is *spatial* and refers to shift, or the movement of people or populations from one locality to another. In this chapter we shall be speaking chiefly of spatial movement, and treating the numerical movement as a by-product.

I. MAJOR OR INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENT

History records innumerable cases of population movement from one geographical area to another. The Bible furnishes some of the earliest of such examples in the wanderings and varied fortunes of the Children of Israel. Population pressure, in the form of famine, forced them to find refuge in Egypt, where they were welcomed much as America welcomed the first influx of immigrants from Europe. While there they increased in numbers to such an extent that they became a menace to the established economic order and the Egyptians were compelled to take strong measures against their further increase. This brought about their final emigration from that country and the problem of finding a new area in which to settle. In the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers populations were seething caldrons of humanity competing with each other for the land that was the chief means of subsistence. The conquest of one group by an-

other sometimes meant the very nearly complete extermination of the conquered and the repeopling of the area by the conquerors.

Even before the time of Christ the Chinese people found it necessary to build a tremendous wall, extending for thousands of miles across valleys and plains and following the ridges of mountain chains, for the purpose of protecting themselves against foreign invasion from the north. Similarly, the Japanese exhibit remarkable variations in physical type, from the hairy Ainu of the north to the sleek and diminutive inhabitants of the islands to the south. Siberia, Korea, various Chinese areas, and the South Sea Islands have made their contributions and have left their imprint. Because of the smallness of the Island Empire her culture, except for that of the backward Ainus, is one; but even so it is not indigenous to the soil.

We are more familiar with the major movements that determined the present distribution of European population. These include the advance of Roman arms, depredations from the north, retaliations from the south, and the various invasions by North African and Asiatic hordes. They also include all more modern attempts at colonization in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Indeed, the most impressive movement recorded by history is that of the steady migration to the North American continent by representatives of every race and nation on the face of the globe. Looking at the races and nations of the world in this light, it is easy to see that there exists nowhere today a single pure (original) race. We are a mixture of racial stocks; and modern means of communication are accelerating the process of cross-breeding among these stocks.

TYPES OF POPULATION MOVEMENT

Ever since there have been populations, there have been population movements. About the prehistoric movements we of course know nothing except that they inevitably took place. We are able to recognize the periods of the Piltdown man, Neanderthal man, and Cro-Magnon man. Each in turn disappeared and was replaced. These early movements, when man was peopling the earth, cannot be designated as conscious and purposive migrations. They were *wanderings,* mainly, in as yet unoccupied territories, in quest of better food supplies and in response to changing climatic conditions. They were slow movements, which we might designate as peaceful penetration. They preceded the dawn of history and scattered man to all quarters of the globe.

Instinctive wandering has brought about its own cessation. As soon as any area has become completely populated, its people are under the necessity of either competing with each other for the possession of the soil or turning pioneer and discovering new fields for their surplus numbers. People have another alternative: they may become inventors and discoverers and thus find new and improved methods and resources for sup-

porting their increased population within the same territory. Thus does instinctive wandering change into *conscious movement.*

When the Children of Israel came to Egypt they brought their depleted possessions with them. When they departed they left *en masse,* taking their greatly increased movable possessions and forced donations from the Egyptians. They wandered, an entire migrating population, for more than a generation seeking a permanent location. When the Mongolian hordes invaded Europe in response to the pressure behind them, it was no mere advance of a conquering army. It was a mass movement of an entire people with all their goods and chattels. Nor were these expeditions accomplished in a few years, for whole lives were lived on the move. Wives, children, slaves, goods, tools, and even flocks and herds were taken along, which of course made rapid advance impossible. It was not a matter of transplanting individuals and families, but entire populations. The earlier movements were of this sort. They were population movements in the literal sense of the term. Another typical movement of this sort was that of the Goths. They spent two hundred years en route to Rome. Young men and women started that famous journey whose descendants several generations later finally finished. Invasions of this sort are not necessarily for conquest, though fighting is usually present. In the main they represent the advance of a swelling tide of humanity that cannot be stemmed.

Movement for the purpose of *conquest* is apt to be of quite a different sort, and is best illustrated by the growth and spread of the Roman Empire. Here the way is prepared by armies and fleets, and the result may be merely the subjugation of populations for purposes of trade and tribute, or the establishment of colonies as well.

Colonization is another type of population movement, one that is more familiar to our generation. In this case, an entire population does not pull up stakes and move, but a new group is selected out of the old and, as a new population, is transplanted to a new environment. Thus it was that the *Mayflower* came to our shores.

Contrasted with these types of population movement, all of which are still more or less in operation in different parts of the world, we have a much more modern form that has been made possible through progress in means of travel and transportation, and which constitutes one of the main problems of modern civilization. It is that which we designate as *emigration* and *immigration.* Americans are apt to see but one aspect of the problem, that of immigration; but we must not forget that behind every immigrant coming to our shores, and thus creating a problem, is the problem of emigration in the country from which he comes. The two are complementary problems and, perplexed as Americans are over what to do with the surplus numbers arriving, more perplexing still are the problems of emigrant countries regarding what to do with the surplus numbers they are producing. In this more modern form of population shift we have

not a mass movement of greater or smaller magnitude, but an individual or family migration to a new home. It would seem as though this would, of necessity, be a slow process; but the nineteenth century migration from




FIG. 4

Data adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1938*, p. 97; *1950*, p. 99.

all parts of the world to the North American continent presents a phenomenon in comparison with which the hordes that overran Europe sink into insignificance. It is with this type of movement that we are mainly concerned here.

It must not be understood that these various types of movement are distinct and mutually exclusive. A mere *wandering* may grow into a mass movement. Conquest may be present, colonization may result, and individual immigration may follow it up. In the peopling of the American continent we start with colonization. The movement to the West represents wandering, conquest, and colonization. Since 1820 our numbers have been extensively augmented by individual and family immigration.

The vast population movements occasioned by the Second World War and the attendant period of revolution and intense nationalism eclipse all other movements in history for sheer speed and size, to say nothing of the more bestial aspects of such forced migration. In the 1920's, more than 2 million refugees are estimated to have fled Turkey and Russia and been naturalized by various countries of western Europe after negotiations through the League of Nations. Hitler expelled some half million Jews and other "non-Aryans" from Germany prior to the war; but the real upheaval occurred during the war years, when it is estimated that at least

20 million persons became dislocated as "colonists," prisoners of war, or forced laborers in German-dominated Europe alone. The number of refugees in China resulting from the Japanese invasion is unknown, but conservative estimates place it at from 3 to 5 millions. The granting of independence to India led, in 1947–1948, to the exchange of more than 11 million Moslems, Hindus and Sikhs, with more than 4 million additional remaining unsettled. Here, however, as in the case of the establishment of Israel, the intent was not one of exploitation; it was an attempt to reduce friction of minority groups within adjacent, newly established sovereignties. By 1948, the total number of persons still classed as displaced was estimated at about 850,000, comprising mostly persons who could not —chiefly for political reasons—be repatriated. Their disposition continued to pose serious problems, which were being approached so far as possible by negotiations between the International Refugee Organization of the UN and various member nations.[1]

PROBLEMS OF EMIGRATION

The problems of emigration precede the problems of immigration. Hence we must consider first the reasons why men leave old environments and seek new homes. We must start by recognizing the strong pull of home ties—the fact that men do not easily uproot themselves and start life anew amid unfamiliar scenes. Familiar paths are pleasant paths. "Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home," so long as it provides reasonable security and means of subsistence. Social habit and personal loyalties retard migration. The urge is indeed a strong one that will cause a man to decide to transplant himself and his family to a new environment, there to make over his life, fearfully adopting the new, regretfully discarding the old, adjusting himself to new articles of consumption, new activities, new methods of production, a new tempo of life, different means of recreation, new ideas, and a new way of living, thinking, and reacting.

No mass movement occurs so long as conditions at home are favorable. We do not know why the Goths started on their invasion of South Europe, but it is a reasonable surmise that they were either forced out by population pressure and insecurity at home or lured by the prosperity that lay before them. The Mongolian invasions of Europe occurred at a time when the Chinese were strong enough not only to keep the Mongolians out of China but also to encroach on the territories that the Mongolians already held. Usually we find both pressure from behind and lure ahead stimulating these great movements. Colonies are not made up from the successful and the satisfied of the mother-population. Dissatisfaction may arise because of political, religious, economic, or social conditions in the homeland. Often it is a combination of the four. Europe was often guilty of re-

[1] See Eugene M. Kulischer, "Displaced Persons in the Modern World," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 262 (March, 1949), pp. 166–177.

cruiting her colonists from among her paupers and law-breakers. It was a good way to get rid of them. For the emigrant it represented an opportunity for a new start in life, a new prospect that could not be worse than the old. Even when colonies are well established, as in the case of English colonies in India, it is not easy to go. It is the lure of luxury, higher remuneration, and a higher social position that causes men to make the break with home ties. Consider the strength of the urge that was necessary to persuade thousands of families, bound for America, to embark in frail sailing-vessels on a perilous voyage across an uncharted ocean to the stern and rock-bound coast of a little-known continent peopled with savages. Consider the urge that would be necessary to persuade *you* to pull up stakes and move to another country, renouncing old loyalties and espousing alien dress, customs, manner of life, language, and even ideas! People may do this in order to escape death or imprisonment or in response to a consuming religious impulse; but whatever the stimulus, it must be strong.

Emigrants do not represent a cross-section of the populations from which they depart. They are not the successful and secure of their respective communities. Neither do they represent the lowest types, the ones who have not sufficient initiative and strength of purpose to be willing to pay the price for the new start in life. They are those who feel that they have much to gain by making the move, that the price they are paying in breaking home ties will be compensated by the advantages they will gain in the new environment. Invading hordes did represent a cross-section of the home population, but modern emigration does not.

The causes that produce migration, whether group or individual, exist both within and outside the individual; but in either case they are more or less closely connected with population pressure upon the means of subsistence. The climate and soil may prove such as to make the struggle for existence unduly hard. Climatic changes and the failure of natural resources may endanger continued existence. Populations may increase to the point where survival itself is endangered—where the share that goes to each individual is so small as to render life precarious.

Those who are not under the compulsion of adjustment to external natural forces are the victims of clash with the dominant social organization. This may be economic, political, religious, or social; it is usually a combination of all. Men feel that they are being unduly exploited, resent the indignities heaped upon them, chafe under the restrictions they must bear, and dream dreams of a new life in the country to which they expect to migrate. They are "underdogs"; and as such they will get out. Even these social maladjustments may frequently be traced to the conditions of overpopulation that breed them.

So long, then, as a condition of *optimum numbers* obtains within any population, there will be little thought of or need for emigration. But when the point of diminishing returns has been reached and the pressure

of numbers is felt, we may expect both the people and their rulers to cast about for means of reducing the surplus numbers. Thus, emigration from Europe has been in waves, sometimes inundations and sometimes but a normal flow. It is interesting to note that the volume of emigration from Europe or from any given country has been closely correlated with conditions of economic prosperity and business depression on both sides of the Atlantic. Prosperity in America has acted as a lodestone, and depression at home has been an expulsive force. Similarly, it is undoubtedly a fact that if our Western States had been as open to Asiatic immigration as the Atlantic Coast was to Europeans from 1850 to 1914, we would now have a preponderantly yellow population in that section of our country.

Emigration is no solution of the problem of population pressure, even in countries which have reached the point where such pressure is acute. At best it is but a temporary relief. It is like dipping water out of a tank that is filling too rapidly rather than reducing the inflow by turning off the spigot. We have already seen the amazing rapidity with which the populations increase, and their ability to populate their own territories without outside aid. Unless we break down all barriers and allow free movement of all populations to all parts of the world, thus equalizing the pressure in all parts and reducing the population problem to one single world problem, we can only solve the problems of pressure by attacking them in the respective countries in which they arise. If European or Asiatic populations are reproducing with too great rapidity, their only salvation lies in the direction of cutting down on home production rather than finding foreign outlets, for such foreign outlets substantially already are glutted. This is, for example, the fallacy of Hitler's demand for *Lebensraum* for the expanding population of Germany.

Emigration, then, represents the attempt to find temporary relief from excess numbers. It is indicative of underlying problems of economic and social maladjustment, however, which are not solved by emigration. The country from which the migrants depart usually is not compelled to face the problem of selecting those who go. The best risks stay, and those who have not met with success leave. Even in case of religious and political persecution it is the dissenters—the socially disapproved—who emigrate. This last class of *émigrés* may and often does represent a really superior element in the social population, but such elements do not leave unless driven out.

PROBLEMS OF IMMIGRATION

The problems of immigration are complementary to the problems of emigration. Both movements take place in all countries, but either one or the other predominates; only one of the movements constitutes a problem in any one country. In the main the older and more densely populated countries are the emigrant nations, while the newer, more prosperous, and less densely populated ones face the problems of immigration. As such,

countries to which immigration takes place are relatively young, vigorous, progressive, and prosperous. The standard of living is comparatively high, and greater equality of social and economic opportunity exists. They are magnets attracting the underprivileged of the world. We must not forget that they are also apt to be countries of rapid natural increase, since conditions are favorable to early marriage and large families.

Three problems are faced by countries receiving immigrants in large numbers. They have to do with *numbers* or too rapid increase, *quality* or the type of immigrant coming, and *culture* or the type of social life produced by a mixture of widely divergent cultural elements.

So long as no barriers exist, population exchange between countries will continue as fast as transportation facilities permit and until equalization of pressure has been attained. This includes the equalization of the standard of living and of economic opportunity, but the equalization is apt to be a one-sided affair. The emigrant country, already reproducing with too great rapidity, is merely protected against the danger of lowering her standard, while the immigrant country will receive surplus numbers till her standard of living and opportunity has been reduced to such a point that she is no longer a force of attraction. Any population desiring to maintain a high standard of living or to insure a rising standard must consider the problem of the balance between probable numbers and potential food supply. It must safeguard itself against too rapid genetic increase, but even more against an inundation of immigrants who are usually adults at the reproductive age and of large family stocks.

Unrestricted and undirected immigration is automatically selective. Neither the best nor the worst physical and mental types are attracted; nor does the immigrant represent the average. He is apt to be drawn from the lower middle classes and as such is not representative of the stock from which he comes. This is not the case if the motive force impelling him is political or religious persecution at home and promised toleration abroad. Such a situation has often resulted in the expulsion of the finer elements of a population. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule. More commonly, immigrants are in search of better economic opportunity, and as economic opportunity in emigrant nations improves, progressively lower cultural and economic types emigrate.

It is idle to hope that the immigrant will ever completely discard the loyalties and social values of his youth. One may go far in changing his children, but so long as he has them out of school hours, the traditions of the fatherland will continue to germinate. So long as communities are predominantly German, Italian, or Jewish, they will retain the complexion of the cultures from which they sprang and persist as focal areas for their spread. For us in America, this is no idle fear. We have German, Scandinavian, French, and other communities that have retained their distinctive characteristics since long before the War Between the States.

They have retained their native languages, customs, and traditions. They even operate their own schools, and both teach and worship in a foreign tongue. If our desire is to produce a cosmopolitan culture, free and unrestricted immigration is the surest road. But if we wish to preserve a distinctive American culture, immigration must be carefully controlled and the newcomer must be guided into becoming a *participating* member of American life.

Immigrant countries are faced with the problem of what the immigrant will do to them as much as with that of what they will do with him. It is a serious problem which cannot be set aside with a mere emotional reaction and idealistic sentiment. It is a practical problem of shaping the type of civilization in which we wish to live.

THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

It is incorrect to say that America has been peopled by immigrants. The original settlers were colonists; it was not till the year 1820 that immigration reached sufficient proportions to be recognized as an important factor in the peopling of the continent. Strictly speaking, the colonial period ends with the recognition of the new republic by England in 1782. Between that time and 1820, when the first immigration records were systematically collected, it has been estimated that approximately 250,000 immigrants came in, but still mostly from the United Kingdom and from North Europe. After 1820 three general periods may be recognized: the old immigration, which lasted till approximately 1880; the new immigration, which lasted till the First World War; and the period of restriction, which we entered at the close of that war.

The first period (1820–1880) was one of unparalleled activity in opening up, settling, and exploiting the resources of the new continent. Immigrants were welcome because they were helpers in this vast project. Looking at the matter in terms of decades, we find that during the first decade of the period (1820–1830), less than 150,000 entrants came, while during the last decade (1870–1880), the number had risen to nearly 3,000,000. Most of the more than 10,000,000 immigrants who came to America between 1820 and 1880 were from North and West Europe. They were people of customs and traditions similar to those in America, and created no insurmountable problem due to different cultural backgrounds. The majority of them were either farmers or craftsmen of one sort or another. Comparatively few of them were wholly unskilled laborers. They fitted into our national life, most of them taking up their work where they had left off in the old country.

The period was not without its problems, however. It was a period of chaos—with control, for the most part, in the hands of the individual States. Transportation facilities were a scandal. The newcomers were exploited both on leaving and on arriving. They huddled in slums. There

was little effort directed at selection, and hence there were included an undue number of paupers and criminals. Indeed, by the beginning of the period, European countries already had begun a systematic "dumping" of their paupers and criminals on our shores. Moreover, many were diseased and entirely ignorant, and there were no adequate means for their reception. Intervals of prosperity were periods of immigration increase and relative harmony; but times of business depression and immigration decrease were marked by waves of antagonism and hatred directed against the "foreigner"—the latest newcomer, whoever he might be.

During this first period the million-mark was attained only in a decade of time; but during the period that followed (1880–1914), it was six times accomplished in a single year. Up to 1900 it fluctuated around a half-million; but from then till the First World War it soared. The character of immigration also changed. No longer were the immigrants coming from North and West Europe, but from South and East Europe. Unskilled

TABLE 9: THE SHIFT IN THE SOURCES OF IMMIGRATION, 1860–1910 *

Immigrant Arrivals in Each Decade

Country of Origin	1861–1870 Number	1861–1870 Per Cent	1881–1890 Number	1881–1890 Per Cent	1901–1910 Number	1901–1910 Per Cent
All countries	2,314,824	100	5,245,613	100	8,795,386	100
United Kingdom	1,042,674	45	1,462,839	28	865,015	10
Germany	787,468	34	1,452,970	28	341,498	4
Italy	11,725	0.5	307,309	6	2,045,877	23
Austria-Hungary	7,800	0.3	353,719	7	2,145,266	24
Russia	2,512	0.1	213,282	4	1,597,306	18
All others	462,645	20	1,456,494	27	1,800,424	21

* Norman M. Kastler, *Modern Human Relations* (1940), p. 326.

laborers predominated. They came from vastly different cultural strains, and with far greater difficulty adapted themselves to the new environment. They filled the slums, congested the cities, did underpaid manual labor, filled almshouses and prisons, created a serious strain on charity organizations, and made more difficult the maintenance of order. Undoubtedly one of the primary factors creating these new conditions was the passing of the frontier, about the year 1890. The flow of immigrants to the western farm lands was stalled; and immigrants in increasing numbers were compelled to seek their opportunity in the cities, where the native-born were necessarily more conscious of their presence. America finally began to realize the seriousness of her immigration problem.

The significance of the frontier in American life can hardly be overestimated. Older men and women now still living can remember the days of the covered wagon, before the palatial, air-conditioned Pullman which

now transports us farther between sunrise and sunset than they could travel in a month. What but a few decades ago was unbroken wilderness, with grazing buffalo and wandering tribes of savages, now teems with cities, factories, and prosperous farms. Horace Greeley's advice, "Go West, young man! Go West!" was heeded by millions, immigrants and native born alike. They went West. They grew up with the country. They took advantage of the exceptional opportunities offered them. Free land was to be had for the taking. Rich natural resources were there for the exploiting. The only capital needed was youthful vigor, a clear head, a sound body, and a willingness to work. The world was theirs. All over this country are scattered great fortunes that had their foundation in an unparalleled early opportunity. The result was a tremendous impetus to the growth of population.

Yet, the disappearance of the frontier was such a gradual affair that it was not appreciated till it was all over and readjustment to a new situation was already under way. The American people, who had developed in the presence of unlimited resources and who had developed modes of activity and types of mental attitude in accordance therewith, only gradually came to the realization of the fact that the old order had changed and that a new type of struggle for existence faced them. The frontier that had molded them was gone, and a new set of factors was in operation. Freedom to move on was a thing of the past, and with it the attitudes which it bred. We see the slackening of expansion reflected now in the reduced rate of population increase, the decreasing number of acres per individual, the decreasing expansion of the food-bearing areas, and the increase of land values and of food prices. It is not surprising, under such conditions, that the continued influx of immigrants should be a cause for a growing demand for more stringent control over their admission to our country.

The third period in our immigration history, that of restriction (1914–*present*), took shape during and immediately following the First World War, when we realized that a new high tide of inflow was imminent as a result of the widespread hardship imposed upon European peoples by that conflict. Even the "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan was scrapped, while Chinese immigration—only since 1944, and chiefly as a token of good will—is granted to one hundred annually. European nations were put on a quota determined on the basis of the number of their nationals already in this country. The desire was not to discourage immigration from North Europe, which was already represented by large numbers here and hence was allowed large quotas, but to discourage immigration from the South and East European peoples. The actual administration of the law has been defective in many respects. It has been fumbling and inconsistent. American-born women, wives of foreigners, have suddenly found themselves and their children debarred. Families have been broken. British subjects whose children happen to have been born in Abyssinia have

found that their children must come in under the Abyssinian quota and that if this quota was closed and the British quota was open, the parents were welcome, but the children were not. Furthermore the law has had the effect of encouraging the smuggling of immigrants across our long borders, and once they gain access to our country there is little hope of discovering them. Be this as it may, a law as drastic as this requires time for adjustment, and it has had the effect of greatly reducing the numbers of immigrants entering.

During the past century and a quarter, more than 30,000,000 immigrants, or the equivalent of about a fifth of our present population, have entered our country. Newcomers need to be fed, clothed, and housed. But even more important to us, they are different from ourselves in many respects; and no matter how different they are, if we admit them both we and they must look forward to the time when they will be citizens and able to stand in equality and with the right to vote alongside the purest colonial blood of the country. We have all too recently discovered that this we have not been doing. We have welcomed them as cheap labor, but deplored their outlandish ways, low standards of living, and teeming undernourished families. We have not realized that they were becoming an integral part of our national life, that they set the standards for large sections of the country, that they often were *used* for the control of elections, and that they accomplished a virtual transplantation of foreign cultures into our midst. Of course, we should have no quarrel with such transplantations provided we can assimilate them and select those elements which fit our purposes. We can undoubtedly learn from many nations. What we should avoid is the possibility of our being swamped.

II. Composition and Distribution of the American Population

Viewed from a distance, populations present a remarkable dead level of similarity. They are human beings, male and female, old and young, pigmented and unpigmented. But they are like a regiment on parade. Viewed from the reviewing stand, the regiment looks like a throng of duplicates. Functioning as a group they are of interest, but one has the feeling that they would be monotonous as individuals. Each soldier is similarly uniformed and equipped, he carries himself rigidly erect, keeps step, and acts in unison with all the others. We know, however, that in spite of careful selection and training, each soldier is an individual. Taken in their own setting and in clothes of their own choice, these individuals have vast differences in temperament, ideals, habits, and mental and physical characteristics. They come from widely varying environments; they possess different aptitudes, likes, and dislikes; and they represent unlike problems to their officers. It is much the same with a group of students in a class. The

students have been selected out of the population at large because of their similarity in respect to educability. They come very largely from the same social class in society. They hope to qualify for professional work of some sort. They are in the same age group and are living much the same daily round of life. Here we should have almost the maximum of similarity, but still great differences exist. Each has a dominant interest, a type of mind, a degree of physical energy, an amount of mental ability, and certain social values.

When populations are subjected to closer scrutiny, we find that their differences extend far beyond the more obvious age, sex, and color variations. They are like varicolored mosaics forming a large variety of patterns. *On the composition of the social population depend, to a remarkable extent, the social characteristics of the group.*

Distribution is the companion problem of composition. While we speak of our American population of more than 150,000,000 and of our continental land area of about 3 million square miles, we are faced with the fact that this population is very unequally scattered. In 1920 our population density was 35.5 to a square mile. Today it is over 50; but this means little when we consider that densities in the various States, based on 1950 census returns, vary from Nevada's 1.5 to about 750 in Rhode Island. In the Mountain States (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada) there is only one individual to each 108 acres, or 5.9 persons per square mile of land, while in the Middle Atlantic States (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) there is one individual for every 2.1 acres, or 300.1 persons per square mile. Thus the distribution of individuals reveals a ratio of better than 50 to 1 in the two areas. Excluding the Middle Atlantic area with its Greater New York congestion, we find that the New England States now show only 4.4 acres per individual, which represents a 25 to 1 comparison with the Mountain States.[2] Together with the social composition of the population, then, *the physical proximity in which people live* is a determiner of group attitudes and activities.

SEX COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

Nature has so arranged matters for us that in general from 104 to 106 males are produced to each 100 females. This ratio is called the masculinity rate. Males are produced slightly in excess of females, perhaps to even matters up by the time reproductive maturity has been reached. From both the biological and the sociological standpoints it is desirable to have an equal distribution of the sexes at maturity. The best interests of society demand it.

In the United States in 1920 there were six States that showed, as the effect of distribution and not of excess of births, more females than males

[2] Computed from *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1950), p. 5, and Bureau of the Census releases, 1951.

in the total population. At the same time there were four States in which the males were at least 20 per cent in excess of the females. In the case of Nevada, the excess was 48.4 per cent. For the country as a whole there were 104 males to each 100 females in 1920. In New England there were only 98.5 males to each 100 females; but as one moved west the ratio increased till it reached its maximum (115.7) in the Mountain States. In the Pacific States it was 113.9. (See Fig. 5.)

By 1940 the situation had changed considerably. Nevada was the only State in which the preponderance of men recalled the traditional masculinity of the West, the ratio being 123 males to 100 females. At the other extreme, the number of States in which there were a higher number of women than of men increased to fourteen, two of them being west of the Mississippi river. North Carolina returned to a slight preponderance of men in contrast with the situation there in 1920. (See Fig. 5.) The Mountain States still were most masculine among the divisions, having 108.2 males for each 100 females. The unbalance, however, was less extreme in all parts of the country than in former decades, the ratio for the country as a whole being 101.1 in 1940 as compared with 104 in 1920 as mentioned a moment ago.


The ratio between males and females also varies with the predominant industry or occupation, nationality composition, and density of population. Among the foreign-born whites in the United States in 1940 it was 111.1 as against 101.2 for native whites of native parentage. Among the Negroes, women outnumbered men by a considerable margin, the rate being 95 males to 100 females.

In 1940 the rural nonfarm population had 103.7 males for every 100 females and the farm population had 111.7, but the rate was only 95.5 in the urban sections.[3] Of ninety-two cities with populations of 100,000 or more, only twelve had more males than females, and these cities are predominantly either heavily industrial or Western. In the older and longer-established countries, other things being equal, we are apt to find an even distribution of the sexes; while among the new, growing, and dynamic populations the balance is more likely to be seriously disturbed. Pioneers need their women folk, but they need also an excess of men. The hard work of the lumber camp precludes the presence of women. Women are less necessary on farms nowadays than men, and hence we find them flocking to the cities to take advantage in office and shop of the opportunities there to be had. In Nashville, Tennessee, a center of commercial and governmental services, the rate for men is but 86.2, while in Gary, Indiana, famed for its steel industry, it is 108.3.[4] In migratory movements men predominate over women.

[3] Sixteenth Census of the United States, *Population*, Vol. 2, Table 1, p. 9 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1945).

[4] *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1948), pp. 23–24.

RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES BY STATES: 1920 AND 1940






FIG. 5

The upper figure shows the distribution for 1920; the lower, that for 1940. Early returns of the 1950 census indicated a continuing trend away from a preponderance of males; even Nevada reported an excess of males less than 14 per cent. Based on data in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 36.

What are the effects of this disturbance of the balance between the sexes? Either male or female traits will predominate. In either case—a superabundance of bachelors or a superabundance of spinsters—normal social organization is impossible. We have no striking examples of predominantly female communities, but the Western frontier has shown us what to expect when men are not bound by home ties. Such populations are in a constant state of flux. They are restless and unsettled, they are prone to quick and ruthless exploitation in order to "get back home" to "God's country." Law and social restraints are weak and morals are low, though vices are apt to be the open and aboveboard vices of strong men rather than the petty ones of weaklings. But "women make homes and the home favors stability and the sense of responsibility."

AGE COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

Civilizations, nations, and communities vary in age and are affected thereby much as individuals are. Young communities are apt to be active, dynamic, and pushing, while older ones move more slowly and are more conservative and "settled down." Communities also vary as to the predominant age of the individuals composing them. Just as communities may be predominantly male or female, so they may be made up of an undue proportion of the old or the young or the middle-aged. Older communities having little contact with the outside world are apt to possess a normal distribution of the various age groups, but young, dynamic, and active communities frequently give evidence of a more or less serious disturbance of the balance.

Age distribution is affected from within by all the factors that affect the marriage-rate, age at marriage, the birth-rate, and the various mortality-rates. Numerous births and early and numerous deaths will result in the flattening out of the population pyramid, while smaller families and longer lives will make it steep.

The decline in the size of the American family, together with the increasing success in saving and prolonging life, is changing the age composition of the population. This is clearly indicated in Table 10. It is

TABLE 10: A CENTURY OF POPULATION TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, BY AGE GROUPS *

(expressed in per cents)

Age	*1880*	*1940*	*1960*	*1980*
Under 5 years	13.8	8.0	6.7	6.1
5 to 19 years	34.3	26.5	22.2	19.6
20 to 44 years	35.9	39.0	37.6	33.9
45 to 64 years	12.6	19.7	23.3	26.0
65 and over	3.4	6.8	10.2	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census release (1941).

estimated that the persons over 65 years of age will, by 1980, constitute over 14 per cent of the total population.

The factors that bring about migration from one area to another result in making the pyramid irregular and unbalanced. Just as cities attract more women than men, so they attract people in early maturity. "Fished-out" communities lose not only their men, but also those in the flush of life.

RACE AND NATIONALITY COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION

In considering race and nationality compositions, the fact must be recognized that primarily these rest on different foundations. Race is a *biological* fact. We most commonly distinguish between races by color, which is their most evident distinguishing feature, but more scientifically by a large group of physiological variations, such as color, cephalic index, cross-section of the hair, and facial angle. Nationality is a *social* fact. A given nationality may belong to one racial group or another, but it is distinguished as such by its social inheritance in language, religion, government, and other social institutions. It would be difficult to determine how many nationalities there are on the face of the earth, since political affiliations are continually changing.

The history of the world has been one of racial and national contacts and combinations but, with a few exceptions, most nations today represent one predominant racial and national strain. The United States is the most outstanding exception to the rule. It presents one of the most complex large-scale ventures in combination that the world has yet seen. Racially the United States is about 10 per cent colored. Roughly, one-tenth of its population belongs to races of such marked difference that full coöperation is impeded. (See Table 11.) Moreover, our colored elements are not evenly distributed. The Orientals are more or less concentrated on the Pacific Coast and the Negroes in the South. In the "Black Belt" we find the percentage of Negroes in the total population varying from about 45 in Mississippi to 10.7 in Texas. In seven of our States the population is 25 per cent or more Negro. The Negroes and Orientals to a considerable degree represent elements injected into the body politic that, while *in* it, are not *of* it.

The United States Bureau of the Census has made the practice of classifying our population as native white of native parentage, native white of mixed parentage, native white of foreign parentage, foreign-born white, and colored. There are not many nations that would find it worthwhile to enumerate their populations under these divisions. The mass of their populations would fall under the first head and "native white (black, or yellow) of native parentage" would imply a long succession of generations of such parentage. In America it is a distinction to be able to trace one's ancestors back to the American Revolution or to the landing of the *Mayflower*. In England the Norman Conquest takes the place of these events. In China one may trace his ancestry back to the time of Christ or

TABLE 11: POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BY RACE AND COLOR, 1940 *

Race	*Population*	*Decennial Increase, 1930–1940*	*Males Per 100 Females*
All classes	131,669,275	7.2	100.7
White	118,214,870	7.2	101.2
Native-born	106,795,732	10.9	100.1
Foreign-born	11,419,138	18.3	111.1
Negro	12,865,518	8.2	95.0
Other races	588,887	—1.4	140.5
Indian	333,969	.5	—
Chinese	77,504	3.4	—
Japanese	126,947	—8.6	—
Filipino	45,563	.8	—
All others	4,904	—16.7	—
Region			
North	76,120,109	4.2	100.4
South	41,665,901	10.1	99.6
West	13,883,265	16.7	105.7

* Sixteenth Census release (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1941).

before. In comparing our country with other countries it is startling to learn that only about three-fourths of our entire population is native and of native parentage, but it is even more astonishing to learn that but 63.7 per cent is native white of native parentage. *And what does native of native parentage mean?* Not a native ancestry for five hundred years, or even a hundred years, but for one generation, or about twenty-five years. A person's grandparents may have been born in Germany, later settling in Milwaukee where their children were born and brought up amid German customs and traditions. He (the grandson) may attend a German church and speak German familiarly among his friends and English with a foreign accent; but for the purposes of the United States census he is native and of native parentage.

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

Lack of space prevents the complete discussion of all, even of the important, factors entering into this very complex problem of the composition and distribution of the social population. In the end we shall have succeeded in little more than indicating the character of the problem and its special intensity in the United States.

In what has preceded we have suggested the problem of density distribution and its effect on the social life. A part of this problem is the ratio existing between our *rural and urban* populations. In the census of 1950 it was revealed that the urbanization of the United States had proceeded

to such a point that now about 64 per cent of our population dwells in incorporated places of 2,500 or more inhabitants, a substantial rise from the 1940 figure. In 1880 some 70 per cent of the population was rural. In 1930, 49.1 per cent of our population lived in places of 8,000 or more; while in 1830, a century earlier, there were but twenty-six cities of that size in the United States, and in them lived but 6.6 per cent of our population. We are rapidly becoming a nation of city-dwellers and this is vitally affecting the character and quality of our social life.

Marital condition is an important composition factor. The prevailing impression is that, with the high cost of living and the advancing standard of living, there has come an indefinite postponement of marriage and an increase in the proportion of our voluntary celibates. The fact is, however, that the married portion of our population has been increasing slowly for decades. In 1890, 58.3 per cent of the men and 68.2 per cent of the women over fifteen years of age were or had been married. By 1950 the percentages for these two groups had increased to 73.8 and 80.4 respectively. Moreover, this high percentage of marriage has persisted despite the reduction since 1920 of the influx of immigrants with early-marriage traditions. The reason, no doubt, is that we are as a nation growing older; and the male predominance of frontier life is disappearing. Yet it is significant that even in 1940 the percentage of unmarried women in the West was the lowest in the nation, while at the same time the disproportion of men was the highest. On the other hand the New England States had the highest percentage of unmarried women—and the lowest ratio of men to women, 97 per 100 women. The South likewise showed a low percentage of unmarried women, the figure being conspicuously lower than that of the North, and comparable to that of the West. This situation probably reflects the absence of the disturbing influence of immigration, and may be caused in part also by the high proportion of Negroes living in the South. Rural nonfarm communities are more married than urban, yet farm men are less married than urban men. The reason for this is that farming requires a disproportionately large number of male laborers; farm women are the most married group of all, at 71.1 per cent. It is highly favorable to find such a high percentage of marriage in general; but that 55.8 per cent of all males twenty to twenty-four years of age and 31.6 per cent of the females of the same age group were still single even in 1950, in the midst of the sharp upsurge of marriage encouraged by the Second World War, indicates a trend toward later marriages. We have advanced the age of marriage, but in time we *do* get married.[5]

Our *illegitimacy* rate is much lower than that of Europe, and may reflect our proneness to marry or our resort to contraceptives. It is higher in the South than in the North, and in the East than in the West. Among the Negroes it is far in excess of that among the whites.

[5] Bureau of the Census releases, 1951.

With regard to *illiteracy,* the showing of the United States is excellent in comparison with some countries and a national disgrace when compared with others. Naturally the influx of tremendous numbers of foreigners and the existence of a vast mass of underprivileged Negroes affects the rate adversely. Nevertheless, since they are here, their degree of illiteracy affects that of the whole body. While the amount varies widely with geographical location, nativity, color, occupation, and class, 3.7 per cent illiteracy was reported in 1940 among those twenty-five years of age and over. For native whites it was only 1.3 per cent, but for the foreign-born it was 12.2 per cent, and for Negroes, 10 per cent. It was higher also among rural than among urban populations. By 1947, only 2.7 per cent of our population over fourteen years of age was unable to read and write.[6] Thus, better educational facilities and the declining number of foreign-born are gradually raising the literacy of our population.

Finally, what about the composition of the population with regard to its *quality?* No problem could be more difficult to handle, because we have as yet no adequate measures of quality and the census helps us very little. On the one hand we are a nation that is going to school as never before, but on the other an alarming proportion of our youth is dropping out as soon as (and often sooner than) the law allows. We do not know how many of these are forced out by economic necessity and how many are the unfits for whom an education is an impossibility. Certain it is that the number of our low-grade and defective mentalities is alarmingly high.

COMPOSITION AND THE VOLUME OF POPULATION

The composition of the population also is related to the very volume of the population itself, in which striking change has been taking place during the past century and a half. During that time there has been a phenomenal *decrease in the birth-rate* in most civilized countries, and an even more marked *decrease in the death-rate.* Together they have resulted in a very rapid increase in population despite the smaller number of children born per parent. Let us therefore briefly take note of these developments, so that population trends can be approached with fair perspective. All too commonly, for example, the decline of birth-rates has given rise to fears of race suicide, fears of national degeneration and much solemn warning. The reduction of death-rates we have hailed as evidence of advancing civilization. The growth of population has stirred pride, spurred patriotism, and conferred a sense of security—but seldom has lulled our fear of the possible evil results of a decreasing birth-rate. In the popular mind they are apt to be treated as separate facts rather than as an A — B = C proposition.

The Trend of the Birth-Rate. Unfortunately, until fairly recent years most countries have not considered the official recording of births of suf-

[6] *World Almanac* (1951), p. 582.

ficient importance to provide for it. In some European countries we have fairly accurate church parish records. In Sweden there are records going back to 1750, while those for France date from the Napoleonic period. Massachusetts, having begun her enumeration about 1840, has the longest American record. In America, however, even yet the registration of births is a matter that is entirely in the hands of the States.

Such figures as we have for the earlier periods of European and American experience indicate clearly that the trend of birth-rates has been downward, especially since about 1875. From a rate of 35.7 births in each 1,000 population in the decade from 1751–1760, Sweden reduced her fertility by less than 3 to 32.8 a century later; but by 1931–1938 the rate had dropped to 14.3—a reduction of about 60 per cent in perhaps seventy-five years. England, the United States, and Germany alike have more than halved their birth-rates since the Franco-Prussian war, while France herself reported a decline from 25.5 births per thousand population in 1870 to 14.7 in 1937. Italy has been among the slowest of European countries to reduce her supply of children. Yet the campaigning in Italy and in Germany during the decade of 1930 to stimulate the birth-rates had a

TABLE 12: BIRTH- AND DEATH-RATES IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: 1915, 1935, AND 1946 *

	Birth-Rates			*Death-Rates*		
Country	1915	1935	1946	1911–1915	1935	1946
Australia	27.1	16.6	23.6	10.7	9.5	10.0
Austria	18.4	13.2	15.9	20.0	—	13.4
Chile	38.6	34.1	32.1	28.9	24.9	17.1
Denmark	24.2	17.7	23.4	12.8	11.0	10.3
England & Wales	21.8	14.7	19.1	14.3	11.7	11.5
Finland	25.4	18.5	27.6	16.1	—	11.7
France	11.3	15.2	20.6	19.3	15.7	13.3
Germany	20.4	18.9	16.0	17.7	11.8	12.1
Italy	30.5	23.3	22.4	19.3	14.0	11.9
Japan	33.1	30.0	25.3	20.0	16.8	17.6
Netherlands	26.3	20.2	30.2	12.8	8.7	8.5
New Zealand	25.3	16.1	25.2	9.2	8.2	9.7
Norway	23.6	14.6	22.5	13.4	—	9.2
Scotland	23.9	17.8	20.3	15.7	13.2	12.6
Spain	30.8	25.7	21.3	22.1	15.5	12.8
Sweden	21.6	13.7	19.6	14.0	11.7	10.5
United States	25.1	16.8	23.3	13.9	10.9	10.0

* Compiled from *Births, Stillbirths, and Infant Mortality Statistics, 1935* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1937), p. 6; *Mortality Statistics, 1936* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1938), p. 4; and *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1946* (Public Health Service, Natl. Office of Vital Statistics), Part I, pp. 215–218. Latest German figures are for 1943.

negative result in Italy and was only moderately successful in Germany.[7] The rates of birth are not universally low; but the tendency is quite generally toward somewhat lower birth-rates, despite the striking rise that occurred in the years immediately following the Second World War.

The Trend of the Death-Rate. No less astonishing than the downward trend of the birth-rate has been the decline of the death-rate. Statistics on mortality have been longer and more accurately kept by most countries than those on nativity. Almost without exception the death-rates reveal a striking diminution during the past century. In the period from 1858–1862 to 1935–1939, Sweden cut her death-rate from 19.9 to 11.7, while France reduced hers from 23.4 to 15.6. During the same period the rate in England and Wales declined from 21.9 to 12.0, while Germany's dropped from 25.1 to 11.9. Even such divergent countries as India and Russia showed appreciable gains in the shorter period from 1888–1892 to 1935–1939, with their records standing at 29.1 to 23.8 and 35.8 to 19.6 respectively. It must be remembered, however, that these gains do not reflect a growing longevity so much as they indicate a greater control over premature death. Life expectancy at age forty is not appreciably higher than it was a century and a half ago, even here in the United States.[8] The gains have been made chiefly in the reduction of infant mortality, and in the control of epidemic diseases.

The Significance of these Trends. Taken together, the general decline of birth-rates and of death-rates has necessarily led to a sharp increase in the population of the world. The population of the world, now estimated at about 2,317,000,000, has probably doubled during the past century and a half.

Offhand, the sharp decline in the birth-rates might seem to justify the prediction that there will be a time, not too distant, when children will be too few to assure the continuance of the human species. This, however, is as absurd as to forecast a world population of many billions in the near future on the basis of the probable continuance of the present rate of population increase. Even France, for whose future dire predictions have been made from time to time by reason of the sharp decline in her birth-rate, had an estimated population in 1948 of 41,500,000. This is a drop of less than half a million from the 1940 figure, despite the casualties of the Second World War and the absence of at least a million of her young men for some four years as prisoners of war in Germany. Birth-rates have a tendency to adjust themselves to death-rates and living conditions. Where life is precarious, high birth-rates are offset by high death-rates. Where the birth-rate is high, the death-rate is apt to be high. In newly opened countries or communities enjoying rapid expansion, this need not be the case.

[7] Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (1942), p. 152.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 217, 243.

We may have the phenomenon of a high birth-rate and a comparatively low death-rate; but this is due to the existence of possibilities for rapid population expansion. As soon as life becomes stabilized, it is impossible to have any very wide discrepancy between the two. There is at least a tendency, though vague, uncontrolled, and often misunderstood, for societies to produce no more babies than are needed. This tendency, however, is mainly in evidence in the more prosperous, advanced, and dynamic groups; and, even there, it shows a definite lag behind the actual demands of group survival.

In terms of population composition, it is readily seen that the decline of the birth-rate and of the death-rate both tend to make our existing population both larger and older. To begin with, if fewer people are dying, then obviously more remain among the living. And a moment's reflection will suggest that the lower birth-rate results in fewer individuals in the lower age brackets, which means that the average age of the total population must rise. Incidentally, however, we probably must look for higher death-rates in the years that lie just ahead, because the sharp reductions in the number of births and deaths of infants also have contributed substantially to the decline of our death-rate during the past forty or fifty years. As a result, the death-rate must rise somewhat during the next twenty years as the larger mass of older people approaches the period of advanced age when deaths still remain high.

The observation we have just made—that the death-rates of the future will doubtless rise again despite our habit of expecting continually lowering death-rates—helps one to realize that the behavior of birth and death-rates has a more complicated effect on the composition of the population than might appear at first thought. The fact is that in our discussion up to this point, we have been considering only *crude* vital statistics. That is to say, the birth-rate has been considered simply as the number of births occurring annually per each 1,000 of the population. Similarly, the crude death-rate is reckoned as the total number of deaths per each 1,000 of the population. But let us remember that within the total population are all sorts of people—of different racial and national origin, of various religious faiths, of widely diversified economic status. Some live in the country, others in small towns, and still others in the open-country; many are married, fewer are single, still fewer are divorced or widowed. Cutting across all of these considerations is the fact that the age of the population ranges from the new-born to the very aged.

When the crude statistics of birth- and death-rates are further considered on the basis of these various classifications, it very soon becomes evident that the decline in birth- and death-rates is far from uniform. All sorts of interesting differences begin to appear. The decline in each of the rates varies with the special characteristics of particular segments of the popu-

lation. Thus, for example, in the United States the census reports and numerous special studies quite universally show that the white race has lower birth- and death-rates than the Negroes and other minority racial groups; the native-born than the foreign-born; those from north and west Europe than from south and east Europe. Country dwellers have higher birth-rates than the urban, and tend to live longer; and those in the high income groups have lower birth-rates and live longer, generally, than those in the lower brackets. The married tend to live longer than the single, divorced, or widowed. Early marriage tends to encourage higher birth-rates than when families are established later; and Roman Catholics tend to have higher birth-rates than Protestants.

As one examines the problem further, even these categories do not give a completely accurate portrayal of what is happening within the various groups of our population. Cross-classification leads to greater refinement. For example, the well-to-do among the Negroes have lower birth-rates and live longer than those less affluent, Negro or white; a country-bred Protestant group might well show a higher birth-rate than an urban Roman Catholic group even of comparable economic status.

In the quest for an accurate forecast of what we might expect as to the composition of the future population, one is driven to ask how many are there within the various classifications and subclassifications, and what is the trend of the proportions? The answer is, of course, that we do not know for sure; the statistical data are not complete enough nor even understood enough to warrant much more than a guess as to what the trends will be. But of this we can be sure: the increase in numbers is neither uniform nor even altogether universal; and the differentials in trend of increase necessarily foreshadow what groups shall be the inheritors of the earth.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. List the earlier types of population movements preceding our modern migrations, and the primary motives of each, so far as we have been able to interpret them.
2. What distinguishes our modern emigration and immigration from those earlier movements?
3. List (1) *favorable* and (2) *unfavorable* influences of past immigration on American life.
4. What groups or organizations in America favor immigration? What groups oppose it?
5. Briefly trace the development of our immigration policy. Why has the trend been toward increasing restriction?
6. What are the reasons for the absolute exclusion of the yellow races from the United States? Is it because of the difference in color?
7. Why are the nationals of northern and western Europe given such liberal quotas in our immigration law?
8. What would happen under a condition of unrestricted immigration? What would happen if we restricted all immigration but eliminated all tariff barriers to international trade? Under which arrangement would there be the greater security?
9. Why do we apparently have relatively few conspicuously "self-made" men among the present younger generation?
10. Where might one find predominantly male communities? What problems are created when a proper balance between the sexes is not maintained? Where is the shift most pronounced today?
11. What is the racial composition of the United States?
12. Is your community made up predominantly of home-owners or of renters? How does this affect the nature of community life?
13. What changes are taking place in the composition of the population of your State? Are these changes reflected in your immediate community? What are the causes of these changes, and how do the changes affect the nature of the social life?
14. What are the trends in the birth-rates and death-rates of the world? How will these trends affect the composition of the world's population in the future? Defend your conclusion.

9. Social Problems of Industry

IN AN EARLIER chapter we turned our attention to the vast social changes that are rapidly taking place in our industrial society.[1] We observed how the Industrial Revolution—still going on with increasing momentum—has made *capital* the dominant factor in our economic relations and has widened the gap between the employer and the employee. We remarked how the close personal relations that once existed between manufacturer and worker have given way to the *impersonal*—placing the laborer in much the same category as the machine, a commodity to be bought and sold in the market at a price determined by the economic law of supply and demand. We saw how the old concepts of "equal opportunity" and "freedom of contract" are being revised in terms of *group action* and *public regulation,* which are becoming more and more prevalent. With these facts in mind, we may now focus our attention to some of the major social hazards that grow out of this revolutionized industrial life.

CONFLICT BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR

The most alarming and perhaps the most evident social hazard of modern industrial life is to be seen in the bitter and wasteful conflict being waged between capital and labor. On the one hand, we see many employers—the owners of industries, mines, railways, and business enterprises—combining into associations, mergers, and holding-companies to effect a greater efficiency of management, to control prices, and to facilitate their struggle to keep the upper hand on the labor market. On the other hand, we see organized labor growing in strength; extending its fields to include every type of worker; becoming more and more class-conscious; getting better educated, better disciplined, better equipped financially, better able to bargain with the employers—in recent years even under the protective arm of the Federal Government.

[1] Chapter 2.

We cannot here consider in detail the tactics used by the opposing sides in the struggle over the *right to organize* and the question of *recognition of the union*. It must be admitted, however, that these two issues form the pivotal centers of present-day industrial conflict. These are the issues upon which the success or failure of the other issues largely depends, since the individual worker is no match for the corporation-employer in bargaining about terms of employment. It is a mistake, moreover, to think that the struggle has been terminated by the activities of the Government in recent years with reference to labor organization. It is true that beginning in 1933 Congress passed a number of far-reaching laws, which we shall discuss presently, that greatly facilitated the organization of unions. But the assistance was *only* facilitation: basically, it simply reduced some of the traditional legal barriers to unionism and provided the machinery for establishing recognition of a union as the bargaining agent for the employees of a given plant. There was nothing in the laws that made labor organization, or its recognition, mandatory; and in 1947 nearly two-thirds of the industrial wage-earners still were unorganized.

TABLE 13: ESTIMATED UNION MEMBERSHIP, 1950, BY UNION TYPES

Type of Union	*Total*	*A.F. of L.*	*C.I.O.*	*Independent*
Total	14,682,800	8,596,800	4,040,800	2,045,200
Craft	1,071,000	860,600	. .	210,400
Amalgamated Craft	7,488,200	6,272,000	200,700	1,015,500
Industrial	5,596,100	1,070,700	3,706,100	819,300
Locals Directly Affiliated with National	527,500	393,500	134,000	...

Behind the growth of industrial conflict lie the uncertainties and discontent that grow out of the great industrial changes: the growing trend toward the introduction of elaborate automatic machines, which displace every year tens of thousands of laborers; the rising value of this capital, which every year commands a larger voice in the shaping of industrial policies; the centralization of opportunity for employment and livelihood into the hands of fewer and fewer men who control the large corporation wealth; the disappearance in fact, if not in theory, of the guaranteed rights of "equality of opportunity" and "freedom of contract." The struggle of workers, therefore, at bottom, is a struggle to gain a measure of control over industry—a struggle for a job, for *property rights* on the job, for security of the job (comparable to the security of investments), for a larger share in the wealth produced by the job.[2]

The individual worker—union and nonunion alike—seeks (1) to secure a wage that will provide for himself and his family "a decent standard of living"—a standard that is by no means stationary, but ever advancing

[2] William H. Kiekhofer, *Economic Principles, Problems, and Policies* (1951), p. 133.

and expanding; (2) to secure improved working conditions that will give him protection against uncertainties of employment; (3) to secure a shorter working day to enable him to enjoy a larger measure of the fruits of his labor and to liberate him from the mechanical drive and speed increasingly set by machine industry; (4) to secure protection from the health hazards; and (5) to provide for old age.

The position of the *public* in regard to these issues in labor disputes is a shifting one. The traditional attitude was one of hands-off and of leaving such matters to "private initiative" and "rugged individualism." But a decade of severe economic distress prior to the Second World War forced the American public to do some rethinking. As we become better acquainted with the actualities of the interdependence of all the various groups in our economic life, we see that these aims of the worker are intertwined with the economic stability and general prosperity of the entire population. Wholly aside from the humanitarian considerations and social justice, and looking at the wage-earners merely as consumers of the products of our farms and factories, we are forced to the conclusion that low wages, long hours, irregularity and uncertainty of employment, hazardous working conditions, and inadequate provisions for retirement not only destroy the workers' prospects for a decent standard of living, but jeopardize the economic security of the whole nation. Not long ago the success of a business or industry was measured almost solely by the *profits* it paid to the investor. Today the measure of success is rapidly shifting from profits to *wages and working conditions.* Profits are not as effective as wages in distributing purchasing power. The raising of the American standard of living depends more upon wages and working conditions than upon the payment of big profits. As a pioneer nation, our problem was one of *production;* as a matured nation, our problem now is one of *distribution.* It is safe to conclude, therefore, that the public is today more interested in the basic aims of the labor movement than it has been at any time during the more than sixty years of modern unionism.

Labor relations today are vastly different from what they were in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when modern unions were getting a foothold in American industries. Indeed, the relative position of the opposing sides today is quite unlike what it was in the 1920's. Prior to the passing of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, labor unions were in a comparatively weak position. Three major conditions combined to put them at a disadvantage: (1) organized employers were in a stronger position legally and had used various devices such as company unions, blacklists, labor spies, subtle antiunion propaganda, and even physical violence against union organizers, to keep the control of the labor market in their own hands; (2) union leadership was weak and in many instances corrupt and racketeering (still an ever-present danger); it was often con-

tent to raise wages at the expense of unorganized workers and consumers; it was dominated by craft unions, though technical change had rendered craft unionism obsolete in many major fields; (3) the depression further weakened the unions when unemployment made it impossible to keep up the payment of membership dues or to keep up morale. By 1933, union membership had dropped to almost the 1914 level, *i.e.*, about three million members.

Many important changes occurred in United States labor relations, beginning in 1933, as a result of the change in administration and the introduction of the "New Deal" program. This was an especially significant development, since prior to that time the Government had entered into the field of labor relations only piecemeal and exercised its authority spasmodically. Moreover, the legal tradition was largely opposed to any sort of labor organization, even though it long had been plain that unionism was necessary to a fair degree of equality in bargaining power between employers and workers. For at least a century the common law had been invoked to stifle organization of workers on the ground of "conspiracy"; and it had been given added force by the application of the Sherman Act of 1890 to proscribe unions on the basis of their being "in restraint of trade." Even the Clayton Act of 1914 had proved of little value in liberating labor from that restriction. By 1933, then, the time was ripe for a revision of our policies in regard to industrial conflict. Unemployment was widespread; the unions were obviously fighting a losing battle; employers themselves—both individually and as a group—were quite incapable of dealing effectively with the steadily mounting spiral of depression; and the public grew ever more fearful of the consequences of continued economic hardship and insecurity. So it was that despite the conservative tradition of governmental policy with regard to industrial relations, an almost completely new approach was undertaken by the administration.

The first important innovation in the development of the new governmental policies came with the National Industrial Recovery Act of June, 1933. This Act was intended primarily to improve standards of competition and other business relations by formulating codes of fair business practices to which business and industry were expected to conform. It also included the highly significant and well-known "7A clause," pertaining specifically to labor and providing, substantially, that:

(1) . . . employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) . . . no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.

These provisions were opposed bitterly by many employers, with a result that strikes became rampant as workers attempted to force the code authorities to live up to the spirit of the clause rather than merely to the letter. The President then appointed the National Labor Board, which was to deal independently with that portion of the Act. The company unions, which in many cases were established by the employers just prior to the National Industrial Recovery Act, were tacitly approved in some instances, and the matter was one of a number of points of friction that grew up between the Code Authorities and the Board. The Board, on its part, took a liberal view in interpreting the Act; and, so far as it had the power to do so, the Board insisted on free elections among the workers, absence of counter-measures against union members or union organizations, and complete acknowledgment of the authority of the union as the bargaining agent of the workers. The Board, however, had no clearly defined legal status or authority, so that the Code Authorities and recalcitrant employers alike disregarded its findings and "orders." Although the Board later was reorganized in an attempt to remedy these shortcomings, the labor sections of the National Industrial Recovery Act still remained chaotic in their status when the whole Act was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in May, 1935. Nevertheless, the problems encountered and the policies adopted in this period were of inestimable service in the formulation of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

The National Labor Relations Act (often called the "Wagner Act"), as originally enacted, provided that employees of an establishment might select, by means of a majority vote in a "fair election," the group to represent their interests in bargaining with the employer. The National Labor Relations Board, created by the Act, had the power to set up the machinery for the enforcement of the Act in all industries and businesses affected by interstate commerce—except the railways, served by an agency of their own, the National Mediation Board. The National Labor Relations Board had the power to hold elections of employees or to determine in some other satisfactory manner whether any labor organization had a majority. It also had the power to determine the appropriate bargaining unit—whether it should be the whole plant, the company, a craft, or a subdivision. In addition, the Board ruled upon complaints of "unfair labor practices" which the law specifically forbade. Among these provisions were the following: (1) employers were not to refuse to bargain collectively with the authorized representatives of their employees; (2) employers were forbidden "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the application of their right to bargain collectively; (3) employers were not to encourage or discourage membership in any organization by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any te[redacted]condition of employment"; (4) employers were not "to dominate [redacted]re with the

formation of any labor organization or to contribute financial or other support to it"; and (5) employers were not allowed "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act."

The agents of the Board acted in the capacity of both prosecutor and judge, and could appoint the necessary legal assistance to take and present the evidence against employers. The Board selected trial examiners to hear the evidence and charges presented by both sides, and *full consideration was to be given to the evidence and complaints presented by both sides.* This *complete* hearing was then reviewed by the Board before it issued its decision. The Board could dismiss a case or issue an order to the offending employer or union requiring compliance with the decision. When the Board found that the employer's actions had caused losses to the worker, it could require him to make good those losses. Thus it could require the reinstatement of discharged employees, either with or without pay for the lost time.

When an employer refused to comply with its orders, the Board could appeal to the United States circuit court for an enforcing order. Similarly, the employer could appeal to the appropriate Federal court for an injunction against the Board's order, if he felt that the Board had not been fair. The court reviewed the Board's findings, and if they were supported by the evidence, it issued a court order demanding compliance with the order of the Board. Violation of the court's orders were punishable under contempt-of-court proceedings.

The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (commonly called the "Taft-Hartley law") amended the National Labor Relations Act, and greatly changed the spirit of the latter Act even though it left much of the original law intact. Labor organization had grown strong during the years that the National Labor Relations Act had been in effect—due partly to the opportunities for organizing which the law afforded, partly to the unprecedented economic activities of the period. Employers had always protested the National Labor Relations Act as being "one-sided"; and public opinion following the Second World War swung in their favor as strikes, shortages of goods, and steadily mounting prices made it seem that unions had forgotten their responsibility to consumers.

The Labor-Management Relations Act was essentially a union-curbing measure. The concept of "unfair labor practices," limited under the National Labor Relations Act to unfair practices of *employers,* was expanded to include unfair practices of *unions* as well. Thus, unions (1) were forbidden to coerce either workers or employers in their efforts to increase their membership; (2) they were not to resort to "featherbedding" (forcing employers to hire workers or pay wages for work not actually done); (3) they were not to refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith with their employers; and (4) secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes were

barred. The bargaining process itself also was hedged about with many severe restrictions. Chief among these were that (1) a "cooling off period" was required in that 60-day notice was to be given by either side before calling a strike or a lockout; (2) injunctions were to be invoked to prevent work stoppages—especially in the case of industries involving national health or safety; (3) the closed shop—one in which only union members can be hired—was outlawed, while the union shop—one in which new employees must join the union—was surrounded with limiting conditions; and (4) unions were required, as a prerequisite to securing the services of the National Labor Relations Board, to file financial statements and other reports to the Board, including affidavits that their officers were not members of the Communist party. The National Labor Relations Board no longer functioned as both prosecutor and judge of cases brought to its attention; it became purely a judicial body, the investigating, prosecution, and enforcement functions being given over to the General Counsel's office, set up by the Act.

What the ultimate effect of the Labor-Management Act of 1947 will be, of course, will depend primarily upon the decisions of the courts, and the strategy of both employers and unions in their approach to the provisions of the Act. It is significant, however, that even though the spirit of the Labor-Management Relations Act is almost a complete reversal of that of the National Labor Relations Act, the laws taken together show an unmistakable trend toward increasing governmental intervention. It is recognized that elimination of industrial conflict is probably too much to hope for; yet increasingly it is insisted that the public has a vital stake in maintaining a degree of industrial peace, and the demand is for more responsible leadership on the part of the adversaries. There is no longer any question but that a national agency acting in the interest of the public must be clothed with the authority to adjudicate industrial disputes and promote orderly relations between capital and labor.[3]

THE PROBLEM OF WAGES AND HOURS

The Problem of Wages. There are at least two income hazards that are ever-present causes for anxiety in the average wage-earner's family: (1) *adequacy of the income* for meeting the needs of a growing family and for giving them the necessities and comforts regarded as essential for "the American standard of living"; and (2) *regularity of income* to enable the family to get along without alternating periods of deprivation and plenty.

When we speak of *adequacy of income* it is not the *money wage* that we have in mind, but it is what the money wage will buy. It is the *real* wage—

[3] For fuller accounts of the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act, see C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1941), pp. 940–958, and pp. 1035–1051 of the 1948 supplement. See also Foster R. Dulles, *Labor in America* (1949), pp. 376–381.

the *purchasing power* of the wage—that we are thinking about. Almost always wages lag behind price advances. Indeed, it is this lag of wages which gives rise to a large part of the industrial unrest and labor disputes. Wages usually fall as prices come down—and fall faster and farther. By the time




FIG. 6

Based on data from *Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936* (United States Department of Labor), p. 694, and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950* (United States Bureau of the Census), p. 280.

retail prices have reached the lowest point, the income of the worker has either stopped because of loss of employment or has been seriously reduced by outright cuts in wage rates or acceptance of part-time employment.

Adequacy of income, in the last analysis, means little in most cases unless the income is received with a fair degree of *regularity*. It might almost be said that regularity is an important determining factor in the adequacy of income. It is plain that income can be much more judiciously used if it is certain to be available from week to week and month to month. The individual then is able to budget his expenditures, to plan his occasional purchases with relation to the resources he has, and to anticipate such items as taxes, insurance premiums, or installment payments by setting aside for these obligations comparatively small portions of the income as it is received. On the other hand, if the income is irregular, then the budget becomes of little value. The individual, in effect, is reduced to a condition comparable to that of the primitive tribesman who faced feast or famine, depending on the luck of the tribe in the hunt. Irregularity of income leads to borrowing and impairment of credit, to impulsive and wasteful purchasing, to unstable living, and to improvidence with regard to future

needs. As a result, even though the total income might be sufficient for a fair standard of living under normal circumstances, it might well be inadequate under the abnormal conditions incident to irregularity of work and life which uncertainty of income entails. In other words, a smaller total income, if assured as to its regularity, generally is more satisfactory in promoting the welfare of the worker and his family than one that is considerably higher but of uncertain duration.

The matter of regularity of income also is significant in the struggle between employer and worker, which we have just discussed. The dispute over wage rates is understandable enough. It is directly to the interest of employers to keep wage rates low and for the workers to secure as high rates as possible. But, owing to seasonal employment, poor management, or high turnover of labor, high wage rates do not necessarily result in large earnings over a period of time. And the confusion of wage *rates* and *earnings* often arouses much public impatience with the demands of workers. This is especially true in the case of the building trades, transportation, and mining, which affect the public more or less directly. Daily wage scales for workers in these occupations are comparatively high; but the work is so seasonal that the workers are idle for as much as a third or a half of their time. The result, obviously, is that the annual earnings as a rule are not conspicuously large. Moreover, as we saw a moment ago, wage rates, and even average annual earnings, mean little if the income itself is received irregularly. Thus, we are confronted with the problem of irregularity of employment; and this problem is itself so important that we shall consider it separately in the following section.

In any consideration of the adequacy of wages, moreover, it is well to keep in mind that *the struggle in America is not a struggle for existence; it is a struggle for standards.* The wage-earner not only wants to live in better houses than the workers lived in a generation ago; the public and the law also *require* it and largely *arrange* it. Health regulations, fire protection, and civic pride have forced better housing in most cities. Most wage-earners of the cities now are provided with city water, sewage-disposal, garbage-collection, sanitary conveniences, and paved streets. The worker not only *wants* to give his children a better education than he received; the law *requires* it and makes it difficult for the child to secure any employment that would be of much assistance to the family income. Lack of shoes, clothing, or food is no longer adequate excuse for a child's remaining out of school. If the parents cannot provide these necessities, the school or someone else will. In almost every phase of family life the American standard of living demands more than was demanded a generation ago.

The wage-earner who is the head of a family, and must maintain that family on the "decent" standard of living, faces a difficult task in that the wage he receives is not altogether a *family* wage. Society, in its other phases, has recognized the family as the fundamental unit; but industry and busi-

ness enterprise generally have developed wage systems based upon the bargaining power of the individual, not upon the needs of the family. The nonfamily men and women, and children have been—and still are—competitors in the labor market with the man who is the head of a family. The tendency of this competition is to pull the wage scale downward toward the point where it is sufficient to meet the needs of the nonfamily worker but not sufficient for maintaining the family man on the same plane as his fellow-workers who "enjoy single blessedness." When the wage is decreased, the retrenchments made by the *nonfamily man* may be an inconvenience; but the retrenchments that must be made by the *family man* amount to this inconvenience multiplied by the number in the family—which often means want, suffering, working mothers, undernourishment, exposures, sickness, and lapse of insurance. This fact, however, has not seemed to block marriage seriously. It is either taken for granted that the sacrifice is "a part of the game," or blind faith is placed in the false assumption that "two can live as cheaply as one." Undoubtedly, however, the failure of the wage to maintain for the married man the standard of the nonfamily worker is a cause for *some* of the increase of divorce and family desertion.

Many employers oppose recognizing these "sentimental factors, which are foreign to sound economics," in setting wage rates; they insist that competition in the labor market is the only sound basis for an economic wage. Nevertheless there seems to be a growing sentiment that recognizes family hazards under such a competitive wage and considers these hazards as a part of the costs of production: if not chargeable to industry, they are charges to society at large. The income tax has recognized the family as a unit, and to some extent the problem of financing the family, by allowing exemptions for the dependent members of the household. Indeed, the Canadian government now provides monthly cash payments for virtually all families having children under 16 years of age, the amount varying with the number and age of the children. Most of the social-insurance and compensation provisions of the various States, which provide for employee compensation in case of retirement, death, or accidents, recognize the family as a unit and adjust benefits on the basis of the size of the family that is directly dependent upon the wage of the wage-earner. Many of the labor unions maintain mutual insurance funds for strike benefits, unemployment, and sickness and provide for payments in accordance with the family needs. In practically all discussions and controversies over what constitutes "a fair wage" this problem of financing a wage-earner's family occupies the center of interest. There seems to be a definite trend toward lifting the "fair wage" from a scale set entirely by the nonfamily worker to a scale dictated to a larger extent by the family needs.

The Problem of Hours. An adequate wage implies "a fair wage for a fair day's work." It is based upon the assumption that any kind of job that

is worth hiring someone to do, day in and day out, is worth at least a living wage for the worker and his dependents. Living wages are not easily determined in every case, of course; but it is clear that the wage paid must be high enough to persuade the worker to keep on the job; and from the social point of view it should be high enough to assure that the worker and his dependents will be normal, reasonably healthy and happy members of the community.

But what is a fair day's work? Before the Industrial Revolution, it was generally considered to be from dawn till dark; and when industrial production began, the traditional fourteen- or even sixteen-hour day was carried over into factory and mine. The results were disastrous. It is one thing to work long hours at farming or shipping or fishing, where operations are simple even though physically wearisome, and where there are intervals when relaxation is possible. It is quite another matter to work at noisy machines in rooms that often are poorly ventilated and badly lighted, and where the rhythm of untiring machines permits no relief from the need for alertness and agility. It has been said that it took England at least two generations to recover from the toll of accidents and poor health that resulted from the unrestricted expansion of industry at the turn of the nineteenth century.

It is obvious, then, that hours of labor must be set with due consideration for the nature of the work and the welfare of the worker. When it became apparent that long hours entailed serious losses of life, limb, and health, there began a steady pressure by various groups toward reducing hours to more satisfactory levels. The Federal Government as early as 1840 set the length of the work day at ten hours for government work, although a twelve- or fourteen-hour day still was general at that time. Shortly after the War Between the States, there was a concerted move toward the eight-hour day among union workers, who in varying degrees have retained that gain through the years, while the general average settled between nine and ten hours. Many studies in years past have suggested that the shorter day actually resulted in more production, up to a point, as well as reducing costs by curtailing accidents and health hazards. So in recent years the question has been raised as to whether further shortening of the work day might be even better; and before the Second World War, there was considerable pressure to set six hours a day and five days a week as the standard work period. Widespread unemployment, moreover, gave force to the proposal in that the shorter work period would tend to "stagger" the work and create jobs for more workers.

How far we can rightly go in curtailing hours of labor, however, presents a real problem in both economic and social policy. Insofar as a shorter day increases production or reduces the *costs* of production, there can be no question of its desirability. Yet the question is not altogether an

economic one. The desire of workers to cut down the number of hours of work is based upon the perfectly natural inclination, which all of us share, to exert themselves as little as necessary to get the things they want. And the point of view is not without some degree of social justification. If the machine is to replace the need for labor power, it would seem that labor itself also should share its benefit in terms of reduction of effort. But still more evidently, an individual with some time and energy remaining after the work day or work week is over, is likely to be a better citizen than if he were completely exhausted. He will be in better health and spirits, and his attitude will be reflected in more wholesome family relations and in more bonds of common interest and experience between parents and children. Moreover, such a worker is in a much better position to enter into the social life of the community and to participate actively as a member of its organized activities of various sorts. To be sure, added leisure also gives more time for the individual to get into trouble, which may well suggest that more active guidance will be needed for the agencies meeting leisure time needs of the community. But the worker with both leisure and energy remaining after his work is done is likely to be a better informed citizen than he otherwise would be, capable of voicing intelligent opinions and casting a really considered ballot.

Nevertheless, how far we are justified in reducing hours beyond the point where such reductions are economically gainful, is a question which necessarily raises strong differences of opinion. When production actually begins to diminish, then the reduction of hours begins to place a burden somewhere. The employer must be willing to accept less income from his investment and his managerial efforts, the worker must take a reduction in his cash wage, or the two somehow must share the costs. A rise in prices basically is futile as a general policy, since it reduces purchasing power of wages by encouraging high prices all down the line; and we already have seen that workers as a rule receive an income that is hardly adequate to what we have come to consider a fair standard of living. Employers can be expected to protest that the added burden of reduced hours is unbearable; and to some extent, they are quite justified in their position. In the first place, we cannot expect to share what does not exist. Thus, if we arbitrarily increase employment by cutting hours, production is not increased; and the total product then must be shared by a larger number of people. Furthermore, even though no increase of employment is anticipated, continued shortening of hours necessarily results eventually in a smaller production—which means smaller income and less money available to pay out in wages. To this extent, labor perhaps must regard the reduction of hours itself as an item in a higher scale of living, for which it may be compelled to make some financial concession. And, finally, such a situation puts the employer at a distinct disadvantage in competition with other producers.

The company that operates with minimum labor costs can easily outbid the one that has high costs, because it can offer the goods at lower prices and has greater resources to use on promotional schemes to extend its markets.

The question of wages and hours, then, becomes basically a question of distribution of income. This is a matter which concerns no isolated group of workers or their employers alone, nor can it be adjusted by direct bargaining between the two groups. It concerns all of us, together. The relations between industries and territorial sections of the country are so closely enmeshed that no particular segment of them can work out their own salvation alone. It thus becomes a matter of public concern; and broad policies must be devised to strike a fair balance among the interests of capital, labor, and public welfare.

Legislative Action. Recognition of the importance of the problem of wages and hours to the public welfare is reflected by the persistent effort to secure legislative protection for the workers in these matters, despite the many obstacles and complicating factors attendant upon such action. The right of governmental agencies to regulate the working conditions of their own employees never has been questioned; and both Federal and State bodies have limited the work day generally to eight hours. Similarly, the right of governmental units to specify the work conditions on work done by contractors in governmental service also was early established and has been exercised quite extensively. The control over private enterprise has been much more difficult to accomplish, although the States have been experimenting with laws regarding hours and wages for at least sixty years. Early laws attempting to shield the health and safety of workers by reducing hours of labor usually were nullified by Constitutional guarantees of "freedom of contract"; yet they were more successful in occupations such as transportation where public safety was shown to be involved. Laws regarding wages were even less successful than were those applying to hours, since they were still more clearly a challenge to the right of free contract.

Nevertheless, under the pressure of unemployment and the severe unbalance of both income distribution and bargaining power that became apparent during the depression years following 1929, the demand for government action in the field of protective labor legislation grew apace. The result was that under the plea of public necessity and emergency, fairly comprehensive public policies developed during the New Deal period. The National Industrial Recovery Act marked the initial entry of the Federal Government into the field of direct regulation of wages and hours in private industry. Under the Act, the various Code Authorities (trade or industrial associations) fixed wage and hour scales for their respective industries. The general point of departure was a forty-cent minimum hourly wage rate and a forty-hour week; but adjustments were made to compensate for prevailing geographic variations in labor conditions. Women, ap-

prentices, and handicapped workers were completely exempt from the operation of the Code regulations.

The operation of the Federal power over wages and hours faltered for a time with the rejection of the National Industrial Recovery Act by the Supreme Court in 1935. But just as it had paved the way for the passage of the National Labor Relations Act to cope with the problems of industrial conflict, so also did the National Industrial Recovery Act lay the groundwork for the subsequent and more comprehensive, more satisfactory system of control which was to be expressed in the Fair Labor Standards Act. This Act, often called the "Wage and Hour law," was passed in 1938 and was designed, as President Roosevelt expressed it, "to put a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours." It provided a minimum hourly wage of 25 cents for the first year, 30 cents till 1945, and 40 cents thereafter (a goal which was, in fact, achieved in 1944 and raised by act of Congress in 1949 to 75 cents per hour, effective in 1950), while hours were to be scaled down by 1940 to a standard basic work week of 40 hours.

There were many exceptions and qualifying features in the Act which sharply limited its effectiveness. Wages scales were to be adjusted to local conditions, taking into account price levels, prevailing wages, and union-management wage scales. The 40 cent "floor under wages" proved woefully inadequate during and immediately following the Second World War. The forty-hour week placed no limit on hours actually to be worked, but was to be the point at which wages were to be increased to time-and-a-half overtime levels.

Nevertheless, the arrangements written into the Fair Labor Standards Act probably were as satisfactory as any that could be devised, taking into account the immense diversity then prevailing in wage and hour schedules from one section of the country to another. Such problems as the lower wages of women and of part-time or handicapped workers, and the low wages and long hours so prevalent in the South, together with the seasonal fluctuations in various industries and the fundamental differences in living standards and variation in skill of labor from one geographic section and class of workers to another, made the administration of such a law a colossal undertaking.

The most serious shortcoming of the law undoubtedly is that it excludes large classes of the working population of the country. Executives, salesmen, professional persons, and transportation workers are excluded; but these in general have fairly satisfactory conditions of employment. On the other hand, agricultural workers, sales clerks, and domestic servants also are excluded, and these groups obviously include many workers who are in need of such protection. These exclusions undoubtedly were based on both economic and political considerations, since extensive changes in these fields necessarily would result in widespread economic readjustments that could not be accomplished without drastic effects upon the price

structure. Altogether, it is estimated that probably 14,000,000 workers—about a third of the total number in the country—are covered by some phase of the Act.[4]

THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment is a condition in which a person, able and willing to work and normally dependent upon his earnings to provide the necessities of life for himself and family, is unable to obtain gainful employment. There is probably no fear that hangs more heavily over the head of the average worker than the fear of losing his job. There are, to be sure, a considerable number who are chronically unemployed, the men who "won't work," hobos, tramps, and "psychopathic personalities." While many of these may have started their shiftless habits through failure to find proper vocational placement, most of them are victims of other social or personal ills than those connected with our changing industrial life. Our discussion of the hazards of unemployment, therefore, is not so much concerned with these industrial derelicts. Our chief task is to see the hazards that confront the great body of workers who are capable of and desire steady employment.

The reorganization of industry and the introduction of labor-saving machinery are important causes of much unemployment—either for a short period during the reorganization or installation of the machines, or for a long period owing to complete displacement of labor by the machines. But just how many workers are every year forced out of work through this cause, we cannot say. However, we do know that since the First World War—on farms and in mines and factories—labor-saving machinery has displaced more workers than during any equal period since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Undoubtedly this was a considerable factor causing widespread unemployment following 1929. In this displacement the traditionally skilled workers have generally suffered more than have the unskilled; though the unskilled are generally the first to be "laid off." The new automatic machine requires but little skill or training to be "fed," and the unskilled workers, even women and children, can easily become machine-tenders.

Some employment is casual, offering steady work perhaps for a few hours or for a few days and then offering nothing for a while. The work of the longshoremen and dock-hands in the shipping industry is of this sort. The men work hard while there are ships to load or unload; but ships are not always in the harbor, and the amount of work depends upon the number and size of the incoming and outgoing cargoes. Likewise, many small industries provide a fringe of this haphazard type of employment. Many

[4] For a fuller account of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see C. R. Daugherty, *op. cit.*, pp. 837–852.

of these workers could doubtless find more steady employment, but there seems to be a fascination about this type of work which holds them, and




FIG. 7

Norman M. Kastler, *Modern Human Relations* (Little, Brown & Company, 1940), p. 104. Data from Harry Jerome, *Mechanization in Industry* (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934), p. 217.

they seem to live in constant expectation that "next week will be a busy week." The casual nature of the work makes it difficult to dovetail these occupations with other employment that would provide work during the time now wasted. Casual employment not only makes the income uncertain and inadequate for the families depending upon it, but it also has a demoralizing effect upon the worker himself.[5]

Other industries are seasonal in nature and can furnish employment for only a certain part of the year: like the clothing industry, harvesting, and lumbering. These industries are responsible for much of the unemployment that is characteristic of normal times, and the thousands of workers in these industries constitute a major part of what is now called the *labor reserve.* In the canning industry, for example, the number of workers employed during March is but 18 per cent of the number employed in September; in the brick and tile industry, the winter months employ but 61.4 per cent of the number employed during the summer; and much the

[5] Lascelles and Bullock, *Dock Labor and Decasualization* (1924), Chs. V, X.

same situation is characteristic of the building trades, the manufacture of ice, and many other industries. As yet there is no adequate system of labor exchanges to alleviate this hazard, much less to prevent it.

Some employers have used unemployment as a tool for keeping down wages and for controlling the activities of their employees. They realize that the fear of losing the job is a powerful weapon in their hands—and they have used it. But these practices cannot be said to be ethical, nor do they create public goodwill. In the end they are costly to the industry that resorts to them. They create not only a dissatisfied working force but also public opinion unqualifiedly resents them.[6]

Thus we see that even under comparatively normal conditions, unemployment is a distinct social hazard. But the most serious aspects of the unemployment problem are not those of normal times but the longer and more trying periods of *industrial depression.* Industrial depressions are rather regularly recurring periods—following periods of unusual prosperity—when industries close down, prices tumble, and credit is difficult to obtain. Many theories have been offered in the past to explain the occurrence of business cycles. These economic and social dislocations have been attributed to such causes as overproduction, underconsumption, overexpansion of credit, cycles of optimism and depression of the public mind, dislocation of business enterprise due to war, the tariff, or to technological changes in industry. Some have even suggested that these cycles are due to natural cycles of change in the weather, variations in sun spots, or caprices of the planets.

Whatever the cause may be, it is true that throughout American economic history there have been alternating periods of prosperity and trying years of depression, unemployment, and slow recovery. Indeed, we have had more years of depression and hard times than we have had of prosperity.[7] Moreover, our periods of business and industrial depression appear to be increasing in severity and duration, if not in frequency. As a result, the business cycle idea itself is being questioned; and it has been argued that these fluctuations are in response to long-time influences which transcend even the business cycle. If this be true, we are confronted with a challenge to some of our most fundamental tenets of social equity and economic distribution. That such may be the case is suggested in the fact that "lack of sound social and economic planning" has in recent years been regarded by many as a significant cause of unemployment. Acceptance of this point of view reduces the business cycle idea to being hardly more than a poor excuse for public negligence, a sort of rationalization for traditional *laissez-faire* concepts that leave such matters as employment and trade to personal liberty and private initiative. At any rate, the experience of recent years, and especially of the decade prior to the Second

[6] D. L. Hoopingarner, *Labor Relations in Industry* (1925), pp. 281–282.
[7] H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (1938), p. 753.

World War, has taught us that unemployment *is a public problem.* It cannot be left to private business to find a solution. Furthermore, we have learned that it is not a problem belonging wholly to the local community, or even to the several States individually; it is *a national* problem. Therefore the Federal Government has had to take a leading rôle in the shaping of the program and providing the machinery for dealing with the major aspects of the unemployment problem. This is, indeed, almost a complete reversal of the traditional American policy in regard to such matters.

As late as 1932 we in the United States still were trying to handle the problem of unemployment essentially on an emergency and local basis. It is true that specially organized committees and boards were handling the situation with considerable adroitness, and the relief of the unemployed and their dependents was, generally speaking, both adequate and well distributed. Yet "relief" naturally was not forthcoming till the unemployed individual had quite exhausted his resources; and all efforts to stimulate reëmployment were largely futile. Standards of living were reduced, insurance policies were dropped, families "doubled up" to conserve heat and rent, bank accounts dwindled, if indeed they were not lost completely through the widespread failure of banks in that period, and debts mounted to the limits of creditors' willingness or ability to advance loans. And along with such retrenchment went the psychological hardships that attend unemployment: worry, reduction of skill, impairment of health, loss of self-respect, a withdrawal from ordinary social contacts with friends and neighbors.

Nevertheless, we had made considerable progress beyond the techniques which had been used during depression periods prior to the First World War. The old indiscriminate soup kitchens and bread lines were largely gone. Employment facilities, though still far from being efficient, at least were fairly well coördinated; and employers were coöperating with them so far as circumstances would permit. Demoralization of the unemployed probably was as little as ever could be expected under such restricted policies pertaining to remedial effort. But unemployment and its attendant distress grew steadily worse, and President Hoover insisted throughout his administration that the intervention of governmental agencies, and particularly those of the Federal Government, should be kept at a minimum. Consistent adherence to such a policy had one benefit, at least: it proved quite conclusively that more aggressive action was imperative.

Under "New Deal" guidance, the Federal Government in 1933 began a distinctly new approach both to the relief of the distressed, and to the matter of stimulating reëmployment. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration was set up at once to attack both of these problems together. Private agencies were not driven out, but neither were they helped, in most cases, as they previously had been to some extent. Instead, a vast program of Federal public relief assistance was inaugurated, operating through State

and local *public* agencies, and simultaneously extensive work programs were projected, notably the Civil Works Administration, the Public Works Administration, and later the Work Projects Administration, the National Youth Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Of most lasting character and worth, however, undoubtedly has been the development of the United States Employment Service and of the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act, both administered by the Social Security Administration of the Federal Security Agency. The two agencies have worked in close coöperation, and together they constitute the most comprehensive approach yet made by the Federal Government to the problem of unemployment.

Under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, the United States Employment Service was greatly expanded, both in the scope of its services and in the number of its offices. Since 1948, these offices have been operated by the several States, but financing is by the Federal Government, contingent upon agreement of the States to maintain certain minimum standards of equipment, personnel, and policy prescribed by the Federal agency. All of the States have taken advantage of this opportunity; and the effectiveness of the work of these offices is enhanced by the fact that the unemployment compensation payments are cleared through this agency. Close touch thus is maintained with the unemployed worker, and it is possible to put him in touch with employment opportunities as they develop, as well as to reduce greatly the likelihood of payment of such benefits after the worker secures new employment.

The framework for the provision of unemployment benefits set up in the Social Security Act is comparatively simple, chiefly because the bulk of the details and administration of unemployment compensation is left to the several States. The Federal Government levies a payroll tax of 3 per cent on employers of eight or more workers who are employed for a period of not less than twenty weeks in any year, the amount of the tax having been stepped up from 1 per cent at the time the Act went into effect in 1936. The coverage thus excludes the seasonal workers to a large extent, as well as those in small enterprises. In addition, certain other large segments of labor are excluded, among them being farm labor, domestic or home employees, government workers, and most forms of quasi-public service such as charity, scientific, or educational organizations. These exceptions approximate the exemptions made in the Fair Labor Standards Act pertaining to wage and hour practices, and, as in that case, the limitation doubtless was inspired by both political and economic considerations.

The administration of the Act is driven into the jurisdiction of the several States largely by the expedient of tax remission. In States having suitable systems of unemployment compensation, the employer paying the Federal tax may deduct up to 90 per cent from that tax to pay his State tax for the same purpose. The portion paid to that State in turn is remitted

to the United States Treasury, and the sum is earmarked for that State as a reserve or fund from which the benefits that may become payable in that State are paid. The remaining 10 per cent is paid to the Federal Government directly by the employer and goes into the general funds to offset the Federal costs of administration of the Act. Obviously, it is to the interest of each State to enact such laws, in order to recapture for its own use the bulk of the payments by the employers within the State. The resort to such seemingly roundabout procedures was taken to assure the constitutionality of the Act; and of course the national scope was sought to remove the competitive disadvantage which such payments would create, were the more progressive States to impose purely State systems upon employers within their borders engaging in interstate trade.

All the States have enacted acceptable laws and are now providing unemployment compensation protection for large portions of their workers. There are wide variations in the exact provisions among the States, both as to coverage and as to benefits.[8] Some of the States, for example, include workers in businesses employing less than eight workers, and include some of the occupations excluded by the Federal minimum basis. Benefits vary as to amount, length of payment, and length of the waiting period that must elapse before the worker is eligible for benefit payments. Another important point of difference is whether each employer should maintain separate reserves, or whether the funds should be pooled for the whole State. There are advantages either way. But in both cases there undoubtedly will remain necessary provisions for reducing payments by employers who stabilize their working staff and so reduce the uncertainty of employment. This is one of what may be regarded as the two primary objectives of the Social Security Act, the reduction of unemployment by supplying an incentive to employers to regularize their employment—the other being, of course, the direct benefit of the compensation payments to the unemployed worker himself.

The Social Security Act obviously cannot eliminate unemployment. No one agency can do that. And as it stands, the Act still leaves much to be desired, both in coverage of employed workers and in the amounts payable. Furthermore, the Federal Government assumes no responsibility for the care or placement of the definitely unemployable classes such as the aged, disabled, deficients, or transients, who were thrown back to the care of local and State groups in 1935. It is still too early to judge fully of the effect of the Federal Government's direct entry into the field of employment problems; but we have every reason to be confident that at least it will afford a means of distributing the financial burden of unemployment

[8] For a fuller account of the provisions of the Social Security Act as they relate to unemployment, the State variations, and fiscal and administrative problems, see William Wandell, "Unemployment Insurance," *Social Work Year Book*, 1949, Margaret B. Hodges, Ed., p. 512.

among the whole population, as it should be borne, and of mitigating the acute distress that traditionally has befallen the unemployed worker and his family.

THE PROBLEM OF OLD AGE

Not least among the social hazards of modern industrial life is old age. In the early days, before machinery came into use, the worker with his own tools set his own pace of work. Whether one man could do more or less than another did not materially interfere with his having a part in producing things. The older man found his pace of work and did what he could. He had the satisfaction of feeling that he was at least useful and could be independent and largely self-supporting.

With the development of modern industrialism all this has changed. Industry today calls for maximum efficiency on the part of labor. This is essentially a demand for the worker who is still in his youth or in the prime of life. Since he "must have experience," he is not wanted much before he is 25 years of age. He then has about 25 years of fairly certain economic opportunity in normal times. But even before he has reached 50 years of age he is facing increasing difficulty in holding his own in the labor market. The pace set by the machine is a pace that only the strong can endure; and even they do not endure for long periods of time.

In 1932 a study was made of the employment policies of selected manufacturing establishments representing the major branches of American industry. This study revealed 31.7 per cent of the establishments as having a maximum age limit beyond which no employees are hired. These establishments represented 28 per cent of the total number employed in all industry. Some industries had a maximum age limit as low as 40 years. In many others, notably the steel industry, the maximum age for hiring new workers was between 40 and 46. In the other industries covered by the study there was no definite maximum hiring age, but in practically all these plants employment managers stated that requirements of the job determine the age policy, and in most cases they admitted that not many men over 50 would be employed, except in cases requiring especially skilled employees where it would be impossible to secure young men.[9] Furthermore, the opportunities for gainful employment for the older worker grow leaner each year. The 1890 census showed 73.8 per cent of the men who were 65 years of age or over were gainfully employed; the 1910 census showed 63.8 per cent still drawing pay; the 1930 census revealed 54.7 per cent employed, and estimates for 1938 ranged from 15 to 31 per cent of these older workers as still clinging to their jobs. Nor is it merely the policy of employers that is more and more discouraging to the older worker. Both organized labor and the public generally also seem to be more concerned about getting the older worker out of the labor market

[9] *Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1936,* p. 456.

than they are in finding creative employment for him. To an increasing degree, therefore, the industrial worker has a narrowing span of years in which he may find opportunity to use his earning capacity to the fullest extent.

The plight of the older worker in modern industry is strangely out of line with the trends in the social population. We noted, in our study of the composition of the population, that the proportion of the older age groups is increasing.[10] Whereas, in 1860, only 2.7 per cent of the population of the United States were 65 years of age or over, in 1947, 7.5 per cent, or about one person in thirteen, was in that bracket. The growing proportion of "ripe old age" is, of course, due in large part to the shrinking of the birth-rate and improvement in health services. As time goes on we shall have larger proportions of people living to years extending well beyond those usually occupied with gainful employment.

The industrial worker thus faces a strange and disconcerting paradox. He is cheered by the prospect of many more years of health and vigor than were accorded any previous generation of workers. On the other hand, he is pushed off the payroll long before he has reached a reasonable retirement age. Such a situation at once raises a serious question: Is the industrial worker—especially the unskilled and semiskilled worker—able to earn and save enough money during this narrowing span of years to maintain the coveted American standard of living through the years of uncertainty that stretch on beyond the maximum employment age?

Despite the unfavorable conditions which we discussed earlier in this chapter relative to wage levels, there nevertheless are some who have insisted that there is no reason why the working-man should not be able to save enough to take care of himself in old age. They do not see why society or the State should be concerned about old-age pensions or plans for the care and treatment of the aged. It has been estimated, however, that two-thirds of the savings of the American people are made by the 2 per cent of the population with income of more than $10,000 a year.[11] Even in the presumably prosperous predepression year of 1928 when there were more than 53 million persons with savings accounts, the average account amounted to only $534. More than a third of the nonfarm families have been unable to save anything at all; and during the depression years following 1929, there were many industrial communities where as many as a quarter of the families were destitute or on relief. Growing old under such circumstances is, to say the least, not encouraging.

Being unable to gain the feel of social security through savings, the industrial worker has turned extensively to various types of life insurance. From 1911 to 1935, the number of weekly premium-paying industrial

[10] Chapter 8.

[11] Income and Economic Progress (New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 1, 1936), p. 15.

policyholders increased from 8,000,000 to 17,000,000. As a rule, however, such insurance pays little more than the burial expenses of the insured, or at best provides the beneficiary of the wage-earner with but a few hundred dollars. The weekly premium itself is a commentary on the meager resources of the average worker and affords the least protection per dollar expended because collection costs and cancellations are high. "Building an estate through life insurance" has the same limitations as the savings account: the family man with an income of less than $2,000 a year—which includes nearly half of our urban incomes [12]—simply cannot afford it. Moreover, the small life insurance policy offers little as a potential source of security for the assured or for his beneficiary. It can hardly serve them both.

The plight of the discarded industrial worker, then, is pressing a greater responsibility upon our public and private agencies for working out a satisfactory and adequate program for social security. It is plain that the individual worker generally is unable to save enough during his working years to provide for his old age. And for various reasons, he cannot look to his children for much help, as was often the case in former years. Our population is increasingly urban, and there is little room for aged parents in the modern home. Living costs and standards have risen to such an extent that these extra persons in the household create a strain on the family purse that few younger families can sustain. Even in rural areas the growth of tenancy and of mechanized farming makes the old folks, especially old men, less serviceable and more difficult to accommodate than was the case a generation or two ago.

Traditionally, almost the only alternative which old people had, if care could not be given them by relatives, has been the poorhouse (now euphemistically called the "county infirmary" or "county home"). Its limitations are obvious, being reflected in the opprobrium with which such institutions and their inmates alike still are commonly regarded. Their utility always has been kept at a minimum, both in the types of service they have rendered and in the numbers they have served. It is significant, too, that male inmates have outnumbered female inmates quite consistently by approximately two to one. It appears that older women are more useful and acceptable to the modern family life than are older men. At the same time, since men usually are regarded as the breadwinners, such an unbalance of men in the county homes gives added emphasis to the contention that the aged wage-earner presents an especially troublesome facet in the general problem of the care of the aged.

Public outdoor relief, or assistance to the needy living in their own homes, also has been niggardly and grudging, even for the aged. To this general situation, however, there is one important exception. The United States has always been the most generous nation in the world in its benef-

[12] J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), p. 69.

icence for the veterans of military service. Thus, during the fiscal year 1939–1940 alone, about $127,500,000 was paid to nearly 160,000 veterans and 58,000 veterans' survivors of the Spanish-American War, and nearly $28,000,000 to some 2,381 veterans of the War Between the States and 50,141 dependents of deceased veterans.[13] While ostensibly the pensions have been regarded as a form of deferred payment for services previously rendered, it nevertheless is true that such bounteousness has had an important part in mitigating the destitution of the aged.

As the needs of the aged dependent grew more urgent, however, they commanded attention among the more sensitive individuals and groups in society as a whole; and private agencies have tackled the problem with rising vigor, especially since the turn of the twentieth century. Many private homes for the aged have been set up by religious, fraternal, charitable, and labor organizations; and various systems of financial benefits have been devised to supplement the work of such homes, especially by the fraternal organizations. Indeed, the growth of more adequate and humane public systems of pensions and institutions may be ascribed in large part to the pioneering work done by these private groups. Cities began to pension their superannuated policemen and fire fighters, and teachers were provided with retirement funds by many cities and States, some on the basis of length of service, most of them on a contributory basis. The Federal Government in 1920 created a system of old-age retirement for its employees. And finally the movement for a universal system of old-age retirement benefits took shape in the various States following the First World War. Alaska was the first to put such a plan into operation in 1927, with six States following its lead the next year. At the close of 1934, the year before the enactment of the Federal Social Security Act, twenty-eight States, four territories, and the District of Columbia had passed legislation for old-age pensions. Most of these State laws followed the same general pattern. All were *enabling* acts, none being State-wide or mandatory with the counties. Some permitted the counties, cities, and other local units of government to provide such a pension fund without aid from the State, while most of the States assisted the local governmental units setting up pension systems by assuming from a third to a half of the annual cost. Most of the laws based the pension award on proof of need, and set the age of eligibility at 70. In most instances, $30 per month was the maximum allowance, and a limit was set upon the amount of property which a pensioner might own.

The very similarity of most of the old-age pension plans enacted by the States during the early years of the New Deal foreshadowed the coming of the Federal act covering these phases of the problem of social security. Indeed, by the time that President Roosevelt appointed the Committee on Economic Security in 1934, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the

[13] Irene Grant, "Veterans," *Social Work Year Book, 1941*, R. H. Kurtz, Ed., p. 578.

Federal Government would take some action in the matter. The later State acts were fashioned with a view to the probable requirements of such an act; and when in fact the Social Security Act was passed by Congress in the following year, the adaption to the Federal system was hardly more than a formality for many of these States.

The section of the Social Security Act pertaining to the provision for the aged includes two types of benefit payments: noncontributory public assistance for the aged dependent, and contributory old-age annuities for superannuated wage-earner. The two types will both be necessary permanently; but it is expected that the scope of public assistance requirements will stabilize at much lower levels as the annuity benefits develop to the full limits of their potential effectiveness. The first type of assistance substantially is a matching plan, by which the Federal Government undertakes to assist the States by transferring from Federal funds sums approximately equal to the sums granted by the several States to their aged poor. In addition, the Federal Government provides half the cost of administration incurred by the States. In return, the Federal Government makes various requirements as to standards of assistance and administration, including provision for appeal and fair hearings for those denied assistance by the State boards. The State must grant such assistance to needy persons at not less than 65 years of age, at which age the Federal grants become effective, while the matching provisions obtain for medical service and up to a maximum of $50 total monthly cash benefits in each individual case.

Of much greater interest and importance for the aged wage-earner from a long term point of view, is the system of old-age and survivors' insurance set up in the Social Security Act. The Act is not universal in scope, although under the terms of the 1950 amendments to the Act, the coverage was extended to include an estimated 10,000,000 workers not formerly covered, notably regularly employed agricultural labor and domestics. Under this system, *employers and workers alike* each pay a 1½ per cent tax on their payroll or earnings, respectively, up to $3,600 annual earnings per employee. (The tax is to be 2 per cent after 1953.) These payments are credited to the account of each worker, the sums being invested by the Secretary of the United States Treasury. Subsequently, at 65 years of age the worker who retires from active employment is to be eligible to receive a monthly payment or annuity. Moreover, the wife (65 years of age or more) and children (under 18 years of age) of a retired worker are entitled to monthly benefits equal to one-half that of the worker's; the widow past 65, or at any age if there are one or more children under 18, is entitled to monthly benefits equal to three-fourths of the deceased worker's, with each child similarly entitled to one-half, as when the father is living.

The amount of the payment is computed on the basis of the worker's earnings and his family status; but by the terms of the Act, the monthly benefit may not be less than $20, nor more than $150. Death benefits de-

pend upon individual circumstances. If the worker involved dies before he reaches the age of 65, and no monthly survivors' benefits are payable, his estate is paid a lump sum on the basis of his earnings since January 1, 1937, the date that the Act became effective. If he dies after he is 65, then his estate is paid a lump sum on the basis of his earnings subsequent to January 1, 1937, less deductions for the amount he has received in monthly benefits. Clearly, if the worker or his survivors live long enough, they actually will receive more than their normal share, since the benefits are paid as long as the assured live.

These are the major aspects of what is perhaps the boldest attempt, from point of sheer mass, ever made to achieve collective security by any nation. There are many minor provisions for applying the Act to specific instances and groups, and of course there are many serious problems, shortcomings, and criticisms of the Act which cannot be considered here.[14] Enough has been said, however, to suggest that the traditional public policy in the United States in regard to the aged has been modified greatly. It is to be hoped that the problem of security for the aged can be reduced further, as time goes on, by refinements in the application of the principles of the Act.

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[14] For fuller exposition of these and other provisions of the Social Security Act, see articles on "Public Assistance" and "Social Insurance" in the *Social Work Year Book, 1951,* or *The 1950 Social Security Act, with Explanation* (1950).

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What changes in industry have given rise to the modern industrial conflicts? What social hazards result from these conflicts? Have any social benefits been gained from these conflicts? Discuss.
2. What are the arguments for and against outlawing strikes?
3. What is group bargaining? What are the advantages and disadvantages of group bargaining? Is it likely that labor would obtain the same advantages by bargaining as individuals? Explain.
4. What are the main provisions of the National Labor Relations Act? How did the operation of this law affect the problem of industrial relations?
5. Of what significance was the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, amending the National Labor Relations Act? Defend your judgment.
6. Why is the discussion of wage levels so often confusing or misleading?
7. What is meant by the terms "living wage," and "decent standard of living"? Can American economic resources support a high standard of living for the working population?
8. Is it true that shorter work-days must result in lower wages to the individual worker? Defend your point of view.
9. What are the difficulties facing the attempt to control wage and hour problems by legislative action?
10. Describe the chief provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. What appear to be its principal shortcomings?
11. What are the causes of unemployment? What causes are due chiefly to the individual worker? What causes grow out of faulty industrial organization?
12. List what you regard as the major social hazards resulting from unemployment.
13. Is governmental action regarding the problem of unemployment really necessary, or are workers and employers shifting their own responsibilities to someone else's shoulders?
14. What three approaches to the problem of unemployment were taken by the government under the "New Deal"? Briefly describe and evaluate each.
15. How does the progress of modern industrialism affect the social security of the older worker? What is the trend of industrial policies in regard to the maximum age at which new workers are hired? What is the public's attitude in this matter?
16. About what proportion of the people you know in this age group are self-supporting entirely? What proportion are partially self-supporting? What proportion are totally dependent?
17. What public measures have been taken to assist the aged?
18. Describe the provisions of the Social Security Act that pertain to the aged.

10. Social Problems of Industry (continued)

IN THE PREVIOUS chapter, we discussed social problems of modern industrial life as they affect practically all of us directly, in one way or another. Questions of industrial conflict, unemployment, wages and hours, and old age touch each one of us whether as workers, employers, or consumers. But there are other problems, less direct and less inclusive, which nevertheless are serious and merit our consideration. Chief among these, perhaps, are matters of industrial accidents and sickness, vocational adjustment, the place of women in our industrial framework, and the problems attendant upon the employment of other marginal groups of workers such as children, Negroes, and convicts. Such are the problems to be dealt with in the present chapter.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND SICKNESS

Extent. One of the oldest, most persistent, and in many ways most troublesome of the social problems raised by modern industrialism is that of accidents which hurt, cripple, or even kill the worker on the job. Yet the average individual who has no direct contact with work conditions in factory, office, mine, or commerce seldom is aware of the tremendous human costs of the high standard of living he enjoys as a result of our industrial development. To be sure, he reads of the spectacular mine disasters, train wrecks, factory explosions, fires, or the like that take a heavy toll of life in no time at all. On fairly rare occasions, such calamity descends upon his own community, so that he has first-hand—and memorable—experience of what they entail in human misery and property loss. But the total cost of industrial accidents, the day-in-and-day-out toll exacted as a part of the price for our enormous economic production, far exceeds the average individual's comprehension.

For that matter, *no one* knows exactly what the frequency or cost of industrial accidents may be, because it is impossible to derive accurate and inclusive definitions. When, for example, is a worker to be accounted as

injured? Everyone agrees, probably, that a worker who is incapacitated for a week or more can be considered as injured. But what if he is able to return to work in a day or two? Or if he suffers only a badly cut finger but is able to resume work as soon as the wound is dressed? And suppose a worker suffers a brain concussion, as sometimes happens, as a result of a blow on the head, and resumes work within the hour—but later suffers complications that result in a long illness or even death? It must be clear, then, that estimates of the extent and costs of industrial accidents are very largely *guesses,* based on what one chooses to include in his reckoning.

Nevertheless, the record of accidents is startling enough. It is true that accidents necessarily vary considerably from year to year, depending upon the extent of employment and the *speed* of industrial operations. There also are long-term trends which, generally, show a slow decline (considering the larger number of workers and resulting increase of *exposure* to accidents) due to the improvements in preventive measures. Yet in continental United States in recent years the estimates run between 15,000 and 20,000 fatal accidents per year in industry, and from one to two million nonfatal accidents serious enough to result in loss of time and to afford

TABLE 14: DISABLING WORK INJURIES, BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP, 1949 *

Industry Group	*Deaths and Permanent Total Disabilities*	*Permanent Partial Disabilities*	*Temporary Total Disabilities*
All industries	16,600	79,400	1,774,000
Agriculture	4,700	15,200	320,100
Mining and quarrying	1,100	3,000	65,900
Construction	2,400	7,300	173,300
Manufacturing	2,500	19,200	359,300
Public utilities	400	600	26,000
Trade, wholesale and retail	1,600	7,900	319,500
Railroads	700	3,200	42,100
Miscellaneous transportation	900	6,000	119,100
Service, government, and miscellaneous industry	2,300	17,000	348,700

* Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* p. 206.

basis for claims for compensation. Many interesting comparisons and correlations have been made in an attempt to dramatize the human costs of production, to give us an idea of what they mean in terms of common experience. For example, a million tons of coal is said to cost the lives of about four miners; and industrial fatalities have exceeded battle deaths even in time of war. However that may be, it is sobering enough to realize that *two lives are sacrificed every hour, night and day,* to keep us supplied

with the things we want, while the interval between nonfatal, but more or less serious, reported accidents is a matter of but a few seconds.

Industrial sickness and occupational disease are even less tangible and less appreciated than are industrial accidents. Estimates are hard to make, since obviously there is no satisfactory general test for the degree of a worker's efficiency or for the extent to which his inefficiency is a result of impairment of health on the job. It is significant that no exhaustive studies or estimates have been made, comparable to those in the field of accidents. Moreover, the legislative measures pertaining to health hazards lagged far behind those relating to accidents, both as to coverage and as to extensiveness. It is true that under the stimulus of the Social Security Administration in recent years, protection against both industrial accidents and occupational diseases has developed rapidly. All of the States now have set at least some requirements regarding industrial health and safety. But the fact remains that so far as tangible measurement of the incidence of health casualties in our industries is concerned, we are only on the fringe of an appreciation of its magnitude. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say that all things considered, the economic loss from industrial health hazards probably is as great as—if it does not exceed—the burden of industrial accidents. Daugherty places the man-days of labor lost to American industry by reason of sickness at about 250,000,000 annually, with cash losses to employers and workers together in the neighborhood of $5,000,000,000.[1]

Causes. The causes of industrial accidents and sickness are many and varied. They are necessarily woven one with another in actual life circumstances, so that in any given accident or illness one is likely to find a host of contributory factors which provide the setting for, or lead up to, the disaster. For example, a worker may lose a finger at a lathe, apparently due to his own carelessness. But other factors are likely to be found present upon closer study: the shop may be working long hours, or overtime; the lighting may be poor, or the man's vision may prove to be defective. It may even be that the worker is untrained or temperamentally unsuited to the job—that he took the lathe work as a makeshift because his regular trade afforded no opportunity for employment at the time. It is easy to see, then, that we often cannot place the blame for an accident at just one point. Nevertheless, it is well for us to review the various causes and call to mind some of the principal factors that go to make the problems of industrial safety and health so hard to grapple with in actual practice.

Among the direct, contributing causes of industrial illness, one of the most important is that of *dust* and *fumes,* either of which may be an irritant or a poison to the lungs, membranes of the nose, or even the skin. In most cases, their effect is not immediately apparent; and this constitutes one of the chief difficulties in combating their menace. Akin to these, but gen-

[1] *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1941), p. 114.

erally less disastrous, are the industrial processes that involve *extremes of temperature, humidity* or *aridity,* or even of *air pressure.* In the case of air pressure, of course, disaster will overtake the diver or the tunnel worker who rises or descends too quickly between his work and the normal atmosphere. Then there is the *danger of infection,* either through open wounds, or from lesions directly caused by such substances as *acids, oils,* or *dyes.* In some occupations, such as those involving meat-cutting, or the handling of chemically active substances like *phosphorus* or *radium,* the danger can be serious enough to menace life itself. And finally, there are those hazards which are common to both the health and safety of the worker: such matters as *poor lighting, poor ventilation, poor adjustment* of machines or benches to the stature of the worker's body, *monotonous* motion, or *cramped* positions.

TABLE 15: INDEMNIFIED INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS IN WISCONSIN, 1949 *
(total indemnity paid, $6,997,586)

Agency Group	*Cases Settled*		*Indemnity Paid*	
	Number	Per Cent of Total	Average	Per Cent of Total
Total	26,615	100.0	$ 263	100.0
Electrical Apparatus	103	0.4	1,463	2.0
Dusts and Vapors	294	1.1	631	2.7
Machines	2,813	10.6	479	19.3
Vehicles	2,433	9.1	439	15.3
Boilers, Pumps, and Pipes	103	0.4	430	0.6
Conveyors and Elevators	824	3.1	419	5.0
Working Surfaces	3,885	14.5	273	15.1
Hand Tools	2,062	7.7	241	7.1
Miscellaneous	12,910	48.5	168	31.1
Extremes of Temperature, Light, etc.	577	2.2	117	1.0
Hot and Corrosive Substances	611	2.3	90	0.8

* Adapted from data supplied by the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin.

Accidents which menace the safety of the worker obviously are more sudden than are the disasters which directly threaten the health of the worker. It must be borne in mind, of course, that the very existence of health hazards is an important cause of accidents; and accidents, in turn, may result in permanent ill health. Thus, the worker weakened by long and repeated exposure to dust, fumes, or poisons, sooner or later must be caught up by his own diminishing efficiency; and if resulting accidents are not fatal, they very often maim or create permanent invalidism. Aside from the condition of the worker himself, however, there is an infinite number

of causes of industrial accidents. Among the commonest of such causes are the poor lighting, ventilation, and monotonous and fatiguing bodily movement which were mentioned with reference to health hazards; breakage of tools, machines, or the materials upon which they are being used; falling objects and insecure footing; exposure of gears, pulleys, levers, conveyor or power belts and chains or other moving parts of tools and machines; noise, speed, rhythm; and long hours of labor which result in fatigue and inattention. In addition, circumstances often produce "freak" accidents that no one could foresee and that are very unlikely to recur. Yet such accidents may as easily result in serious losses.

So much for the more obvious and immediate causes of disabilities and illness in employment. But our problem is further complicated by the fact that there are many more subtle and complex conditions surrounding economic activity that are more difficult to ascertain and deal with. Consider, for example, the worker himself. He is not an automaton but is subject to all the failings to which the flesh is heir, as well as its capabilities. He should, of course, "pay attention to what he is doing" when he is on the job, and especially when he is tending a machine or performing some other hazardous task. But he *doesn't* do it at all times, just because he is a human being and not a machine. His actions are subject to emotions as well as to reason and habit. If things do not go right, he may lose his temper and throw caution to the winds. He may be worried about financial problems, sickness, or some grievous affliction among the members of his family. He may be untrained or temperamentally unsuited to the job and actually fear the machine; on the other hand, he may be so *well* habituated to the job that he takes chances from sheer overconfidence. Finally, he may be the victim of poor living conditions, his health impaired not by the requirements of the job but by the existence of poor diet, poor housing, improper habits of life.

When we enter upon the matter of living conditions among workers as a potential determinant of industrial safety and health, we are in a category where individual and social responsibility are joined. The individual worker has very definite obligations to society to use his income wisely, to live temperately so as to be capable of performing his day's work with reasonable efficiency, and to shoulder his fair share of the problems of the community in which he lives. But in many cases, too much is expected for too little. Long hours of labor, meager wages, and inadequate training put the worker at a tremendous handicap even though he be determined to live "according to the rules." As we saw in the previous chapter, these adverse conditions confront the average worker more often than not; and to that extent, society itself is at fault to a greater degree than is commonly recognized for the frequency and severity of industrial accidents and sickness.

"Society," of course, is a broad term, and includes workers as well as em-

ployers, public officials, and consumers. Each of the four must assume its share of the responsibility as a class. As we have seen, workers have an obligation to keep themselves as fit for their jobs as possible. Employers must bear the lion's share of responsibility for the *immediate* causes of industrial accidents and occupational sickness among their workers, inasmuch as they control almost entirely the physical equipment their workers use and to a somewhat smaller degree the terms and rules under which they work. Public officials have the responsibility to enforce legal regulations and standards regarding conditions of employment. Consumers are responsible to the extent that by their patronage they voice their desires as to the objectives of production, indirectly giving tacit assent to the policies of the companies whose goods they buy.

It must be remembered, however, that we cannot retain such sharp distinctions between workers, employers, and consumers in actual practice. Any single individual at one time or another plays all three rôles. Most of us have to work for our living, and more often than not we work as employees. Yet we all occasionally hire someone to work for us, to repair our houses or automobiles, perhaps, or to give us some other special service which we cannot perform for ourselves. Obviously all of us are consumers of one another's products. So in the last analysis all of us together, in our dealings with one another, are directly instrumental in shaping the terms of our economic life and formulating the collective attitudes toward the group problems that arise from those relationships.

It is argued that employers, being bent on maximum profit, necessarily will try to buy cheap and sell dear—the purchase and sale of labor being no exception. The critics thus point out that proper safeguards for workers are expensive and so tend to reduce profits, and that employers will not take these precautions unless driven to do so by organized pressure of labor-unions or by governmental authority.

There is some truth in this position. The old *laissez-faire* philosophy which reduced legislative restrictions to a minimum and unloosed the force of unlimited competition compelled people to fend for themselves as a matter of economic survival. As a result, the employer who attempted to protect his workers actually was at a competitive disadvantage, since he was assuming costs which other producers were throwing on the workers themselves; and so he could not sell as cheaply as could his competitors.

However, the argument that capitalism alone is to blame for the vexing problem of industrial accidents is not sound. The assertion that competition was ruthless is true enough; yet the unbalance of bargaining power between individuals had not become acute until perhaps the period following the War Between the States. The legal disabilities that came to be so onerous for the workers as accidents became more numerous and severe were not strictly a "capitalistic" device but had roots in the common law extending far back into the Middle Ages. Moreover, it was no mere co-

incidence that comprehensive provisions for injured or diseased workers came slowly. Medical and surgical assistance for the afflicted was not impressive till the last quarter of the past century, when anaesthetics and antiseptics were discovered and began to come into general use. And finally, it must be admitted that "accidents will happen," regardless of the ideology under which economic activity takes place. It is as illogical to blame capitalism for *all* industrial accidents as it is to blame that system for accidents which result from errors in judgment or lack of caution on the highways or in the home itself. Consequently, regardless of the economic system under which a society may function, there inevitably will be problems of devising means for assuring health and safety to its members and care to the victims of disease and accident.

Remedies. The most natural thing to do when one is confronted with any kind of danger is to try and remove the source of the danger; and this is substantially the policy that has been pursued in regard to the menace to health and safety developed in modern industry. Thus, the early legislation regarding hours of labor, which we noticed in the previous chapter, was in part an effort to reduce accidents. The menace of open gears and the old-time shaft and belt power transmission was soon evident; consequently, early legislation called for suitable guards to shield them. Later, as the matter of safety was studied more carefully, further refinements were added, such as those regarding lighting, ventilation, guard rails, and sanitary facilities.

Accidents and disease, however, continued almost unabated; and it became clear that other measures were necessary, both to assure the enforcement of the safety laws, and to provide some sort of assistance for the incapacitated worker. While the laws provided penalties for nonconformity, nevertheless they had to be enforced to be effective; and adequate enforcement without large numbers of inspectors was impractical. So while restrictive laws still are a very important phase of the campaign to reduce the hazards of accidents and sickness, they had to be linked with incentives more powerful than mere punitive fines to make them effective; and as casualties among workers mounted, the problem of their care became more insistent. The two problems were linked together into a very ingenious system of "workmen's compensation" laws which we shall presently consider.

Prior to the development of the compensation laws about the only practical way the worker had for securing relief from the distress arising from industrial injuries was by suing his employer in the courts. Such a procedure, however, was not in the least effective in most cases. The body of common law that had developed pertaining to this remedy through the centuries provided only that the employer have "reasonably" safe equipment and personnel in his shop. The worker was expected to be aware of the risks he was assuming when he agreed to work for the employer, and to

shoulder the responsibility for negligence on the part of himself or his fellow workers insofar as their activities affected him. Obviously the chances for collecting damages under such conditions grew more remote as industry became more complex. "Reasonableness" can become a very vague concept when applied to industrial practices and conditions that have become less uniform; and workers themselves knew less and less about the details of the risks they assumed and were compelled by necessity to accept work conditions and fellow workmen as they found them. Moreover, the condition was not altogether satisfactory even to the employer. Even though he *usually* went scot-free under these laws, his civil liability nevertheless was unlimited; and the *occasional* success of the worker in securing a judgment created a constant and sometimes disastrous threat to the financial solvency of the employer. The workmen's compensation laws, although they were at first regarded with considerable suspicion by both workers and employers, have proved to be of distinct advantage to both by reducing these hazards. The worker is assured of some protection, while the employer's liability is placed within fixed limits; and in most cases both of them are spared the losses and uncertainties of long and expensive court proceedings.

The first compensation laws were enacted in Germany in 1884, followed by those of Great Britain of 1897. They were introduced into some of the States in America early in the present century; but it was not until 1911 that New York and Wisconsin passed the first laws to stand the test of constitutionality in the courts. All the States now have some sort of compensation provisions for their workers, although the inclusiveness and effectiveness of many of the States' provisions still leave much to be desired.[2] As might be expected, the laws have found their fullest development, with but few exceptions, in the industrial States of our North and East.

In general, the objectives of these laws are to provide compensation for injured workers according to fixed schedules of benefits and injuries to be covered. Usually there is a waiting period before benefits begin—in the case of nonfatal injuries, the period varies from one day to as much as two weeks. Benefits also vary, but in general they include medical care, compensation for wage loss, and frequently assistance in rehabilitation if the worker is rendered incapable of his regular job but is able to do something else. In the case of fatal accidents, the benefits are paid to the victim's survivors or to his estate, sometimes in a lump sum, sometimes over a period of years. In any case, the benefits thus paid are limited in duration and amount.

Settlements sometimes are made by the employer or his agent (usually a casualty insurance company), or they may be fixed by a State board or com-

[2] For a short comparative discussion of the variations in the State workmen's compensation laws, see Marshall Dawson, "Workmen's Compensation," *Social Work Year Book, 1941*, R. H. Kurtz, Ed., pp. 609–613.

mission (or, in a few States, by the court); but the private settlement also is subject to approval by the State agency. Benefit payments are financed entirely by employers; and these funds are raised in various ways, but always in accordance with insurance principles. Employers may insure directly with approved insurance companies or pay their premiums to a State fund. Larger employers sometimes are permitted to segregate some of their own resources for this purpose. Another point of variation pertains to whether the premiums are kept separate for each employer or are pooled for all the employers together. In either case, however, the payments of individual employers are assessed on the basis of their accident records.

The compensation laws appear to be economically sound from every point of view. They release the worker from the major portion of the financial burden of accidents, yet the benefits are small enough that malingering is reduced to a minimum. They provide sufficient incentive for the worker and employer alike to avoid accidents, for the former to assure his wages, for the latter to reduce the payments he must make to maintain his reserves. In the long run, moreover, when all competing employers approach the practical minimums of accident experience, then the price of their commodity tends to rise to offset their costs. This, too, is defensible, since the consumer should expect to bear the full cost of the goods he buys.

There are many shortcomings of the laws, as is so generally true of the various types of social legislation. One of the most serious, undoubtedly, is that there are no Federal standards of coverage or benefits, since the laws still are enacted and administered entirely by the States. As a result, the usual problems of interstate trade arise, the employers in the more progressive States being put at a competitive disadvantage. Benefits are generally very low and of short duration, and the waiting periods are too long in most cases. Coverage is much too narrow, since whole categories like agriculture and home employment are exempt, and the laws apply only to employers of many or at least several persons. Moreover, the problems of industrial *diseases* have hardly been touched. Most of the States—thirty-nine in 1948—make some provision for this type of disability, but in many the list of compensative sicknesses is distinctly limited. Nevertheless, with all their shortcomings, the workmen's compensation laws have greatly mitigated the hazards and suffering arising from industrial accidents.

THE PROBLEM OF VOCATIONAL ADJUSTMENT

Still another perplexing aspect of modern industrialism is the ever-growing problem of vocational adjustment: the problem of finding the right sort of job and of adjusting the worker to it. This problem has become more and more apparent with each advance of machine industry and with the continued increase of specialization in industry and business.

In this, as in the other problems of modern industrialism, American public opinion has been slow to abandon the traditional doctrines of

rugged individualism. The pioneer regarded each individual as "the architect of his own fate," and it was felt that any young man with ambition and the will to work could achieve success in "this land of opportunity." There still are many influential people who believe that opportunity for success is as great today as it was in the day when farms and forests could be had for a few cents an acre. Opportunity, they say, is even greater today than at any time in the past, and there is an abundance of "room at the top" in every business and profession.

The exponents of this all too hopeful doctrine overlook the fact that the "top" is every year getting narrower; that business and industry are rapidly integrating, and every year sees the business and industrial establishments growing larger in size but fewer in number. Even the field for independent executives is getting narrower, and to an increasing extent the men who a generation ago would have risen to be "captains of industry" must now be content to become the efficient, specialized hired experts of corporations. But now, even as in earlier days, the great majority of the working population cannot expect to become executives, or even hired managers—and it is with this rank and file of the working population that we are here chiefly concerned. It is with them that the hazards of vocational adjustment have a real meaning and are an ever-present threat.

We might group these hazards of vocational adjustment into two general classes: (1) the hazards of finding the specialized occupation suited to the individual boy or girl, and of getting the proper education and training required for success in it; (2) the hazards that grow out of the improvement of processes and methods of industry and the invention of labor-saving machinery—processes and machines that displace human skill and do the work of thousands of hands. The first group of hazards involves the problem of vocational guidance and training; the second group involves the even more difficult problem of vocational rehabilitation, of helping people to begin anew, perhaps late in life—after having learned one trade—and develop skill in and become adjusted to another occupation.

Vocational Adjustment of Youth. In former days there was not much question about what the young man or young woman would do for a livelihood. It was generally taken for granted that the boy would follow in the footsteps of his father, and the girl would marry and become a homemaker. If the father was a craftsman, the boy was expected to become an apprentice, then a journeyman, and finally a skilled artisan himself. The son of a professional man or merchant generally entered the office or business of his father, and it was expected that eventually the young man would carry on the enterprise when the older man retired. When our country was still predominantly agricultural, the farmer's boy—when he was ready to "make his own way"—either purchased a part of the old homestead from his

father or moved on to the West and homesteaded for himself, in either case effectively settling the question of choosing a vocation.

For most young men and women, the problem of finding an occupation no longer is simple. Only a very small percentage—even of the farmer's children—follow the parental example. In the rapidly changing industrial life of today such a plan would not be possible for the majority, even if it were desirable. Not less than one out of every two of our boys and girls drop out of school before completing high school, because their parents are too poor to keep them in school, or because they cannot make a success at the college-tuned curriculum of the modern high school, or because they are overanxious to earn their own money. Consequently, most of our girls and boys, through an awkward trial-and-error process, seek among the confusing and changing multitude of narrow, specialized occupational niches of modern industry and business the jobs that seem to pay best. They are not willing to accept reduced pay with an opportunity to learn a trade or to become skilled in a specialized occupation that offers some future advantages. The fifty to seventy-five cents per hour paid for unskilled, common machine hands looks large to them. The employer may need skilled workers and may offer attractive apprenticeship opportunities, but the average boy or girl looks at the present rather than the future. What skill they happen to acquire—if they are fortunate enough to acquire any—they get in the course of drifting from one job to another. In this process many become "floaters," workers on the job today and gone tomorrow. Many become dissatisfied with their lot, feel embittered against the "capitalistic system" which they think keeps them down, and develop a sort of religious zeal in a "war on capitalism." Thus we see that the "blind-alley" jobs of unskilled labor—jobs which the average boy or girl can do as ably as men and women—stand in the way of the vocational guidance and training which would cut down the hazards of occupational adjustment.

By the opening of the present century the seriousness of the problems growing out of the failure of thousands of new workers to find satisfactory vocational adjustment began to be recognized. Forward-looking educators and employers began to discuss the prospects of developing vocational guidance as a new profession. "By vocational guidance is meant the provision of expert advice as to what vocations offer most promise of successful permanent employment based upon a careful examination of each candidate and a knowledge of available opportunity." [3] The first vocational guidance bureau was opened in Boston in 1908 by Dr. Frank Parsons, and on the basis of accomplishments of this first bureau the National Vocational Guidance Association was organized.

Vocational guidance has developed into vocational *counseling* and *coordinating*. Vocational counseling, as defined by the National Vocational

[3] Dale Yoder, *Labor Economics and Labor Problems* (1933), p. 149.

Guidance Association, is "the process of assisting the individual to choose an occupation, prepare for, enter upon, and progress in it." During the past few years there has been increased recognition of the value of this service. Vocational schools have led other educational institutions in giving specialized attention to this problem, though universities, high schools, and many grade schools have been attempting to meet the situation by assigning members of the teaching staff to this task in addition to their regular teaching duties. Similar attempts are being made by social welfare agencies, guidance centers, hospitals and churches, business and industrial organizations, and even labor unions. It must be admitted, however, that as yet no really sound and effective plan has been developed; much of the advice and counseling amounts to little more than guesswork. Much research has yet to be done before a sound system of vocational counseling can be developed.[4]

The slowness with which sound vocational counseling has developed and the growing intensity of the need for such a service have provided almost unlimited opportunity for the quack and the cheat. Thousands of job-seekers, including many who are apparently intelligent and well educated, are the victims of such organized frauds. It is amazing and pathetic to see them awaiting their turn to have their careers revealed to them by an "expert" who "reads" their palms or "deciphers" their handwriting, or who employs some other pseudo-scientific device of "psychoanalysis" that may create a more professional impression but in fact has no more validity than crystal-gazing, astrology, phrenology, numerology, or any other clairvoyant trick. Not far behind this group of quacks and cheats are the so-called "schools" which promise to prepare the desperate job-seeker for profitable employment in a skilled occupation "in a few short lessons, on an easy payment plan." Many States have attempted to control or prohibit such exploitation by licensing private counselors and requiring correspondence-study schools to meet the standards prescribed by the State department of public instruction. But even in the face of these legal safeguards, millions of dollars are annually filched from gullible job-seekers.[5]

Vocational Adjustment of Adults. The reorganization of industry and the introduction of labor-saving machinery every year throw thousands of workers into the unhappy quandary of rebuilding their occupational footing and of starting anew to work up to a satisfactory wage income. Must the worker, then, go to school perennially in order to be prepared to make the shift from one trade or occupation to another? If so, there is need in most States for some far-reaching changes in the educational machinery—changes that would provide a program of *adult* education suited to the

[4] For a fuller discussion of current progress in vocational counseling, see Donald E. Super, "Guidance and Counseling," *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, Margaret B. Hodges, Ed., pp. 223–229.

[5] Ella Woodyard, *Culture at a Price* (New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1940), recounts firsthand experiences with correspondence schools of various types.

needs of the working population, one recognizing the problems of vocational change.

TABLE 16: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES PER MILLION OF POPULATION FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, 1850 AND 1930 *

Occupation	*1850*	*1930*
Agriculture	103,568	85,294
Boiler makers	68	407
Boot and shoe workers	5,644	2,482
Clerical occupations	4,369	49,805
Coopers	1,884	92
Electricians	†	2,283
Harness and saddle workers	982	62
Iron and steel workers	528	6,731
Millers and millworkers	1,199	316
Paper and pulp mill workers	128	1,094
Rubber factory operatives	7	896
Sailors and deck hands	3,044	527
Wagon and coach makers	673	34
Wheelwrights	1,323	†

* *Monthly Labor Review*, pp. 1,017–1,018 (November, 1933).
† None listed.

Historically, the first great adjustments of artisans to the growth of mechanization came in the textile industries. Thousands of weavers found their trade taken from them by the introduction of machines, and most of them had to turn to other occupations for earning a living. Not many years ago printing was dependent upon the typesetters, but the invention of the linotype machine shattered this aspect of the printers' trade. Glassblowers until a few years ago produced most of our glassware; but now the Owens Bottle Machine does the work of thousands of glassworkers. Machinists have seen the same sweeping changes come into the rapidly growing machine industry; and many have had to be content with becoming tenders of huge automatic machines, or becoming repairmen in garages. Only the better educated could step up into the professional class of machine designers and mechanical engineers. Telegraph operators have been displaced by the installation of automatic machines that transmit messages from one typewriter to another. The adding-machines, billing-machines, tabulating and recording machines have lessened the need for thousands of bookkeepers, clerks, and office help. Almost every aspect of business and industry furnishes us equally striking examples of labor displacement.

Trade unions were at first opposed to the introduction of labor-saving machines; but they soon realized that such opposition was futile and not in harmony with progress. Most of the trade unions today offer no open re-

sistance to these changes, but attempt to influence them in such a way as will insure the job for the union worker and keep the wage from falling. Unions have done—and are still doing—a great deal to bring about occupational adjustments for their members. But generally the methods used by trade-unions have not been favorable to the full use of machines—they have been more often directed toward restriction of output.

Doubtless the expansion of vocational schools, the development of scientific vocational guidance, and the organization of a comprehensive system of employment bureaus will not only aid the new worker entering industry, but will eventually become the route by which the displaced worker can find satisfactory reëmployment. There must be a closer relationship between the school, the employment bureau, and industry in order that industrial changes be better understood and the worker properly prepared for occupational readjustment. The employer must give consideration to the laborer's problem, and not proceed as though the fate of the displaced worker is no concern of his. Many employers are doing more than their just share in facilitating vocational changes—and are finding that it pays in the long run. But unfortunately many other employers still are either indifferent or opposed to policies aiding readjustment which, they say, are "dictated by the bosses of organized labor." In fact, some industries have found the introduction of labor-saving machinery "a means of emancipating themselves from the grip of organized labor," and for this reason refuse to consider a program of rehabilitating their employees. Doubtless a sound public policy must be formulated before full coöperation of all employers of labor can be had.

Some cognizance has been taken of this problem by both the State and Federal Governments, in their vocational rehabilitation services. The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 provided Federal funds for the use of the States in expanding their vocational educational programs, the allotments being made on a matching basis. The scope of Federal assistance was further extended under the Social Security Act. These allotments, however, have been directed chiefly at rehabilitation of *incapacitated* workers, and mainly among those who, it is felt, can be restored to normal earning capacity. At best, only a fraction of workers eligible for such assistance have taken advantage of it, largely because the maintenance of the workers and their families during the period of retraining remains their own responsibility in most cases. The problem of the *displaced* worker has hardly been touched at all by these measures.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

Extent. Probably no other phase of labor problems has had more attention in public discussion than the entry of women into gainful employment. The trend was sensed and regarded with some curiosity before the First World War; but the presence of large numbers of women in "war

industries," coupled with the rapid demobilization of the troops following that war, brought the matter more sharply to the attention of men, who have continued to regard themselves ever since as being confronted with a new source of competition for their jobs. The employment of women is not a new phenomenon, however. As far back as 1880, one person in seven gainfully employed was a woman. The proportion had risen to about one in five by 1910, which was substantially the situation ten years later, just after the First World War. In 1940 the figure stood at just under one in four, and later was increased to one in three by the demands of war industry, although subsequently the proportion dropped almost to prewar levels. Moreover, the proportion of employment among women has been approximately the same as the proportion of women among the total number of employed persons.

Nevertheless, the *number* of women employed has increased greatly since 1880. The comparatively small rise in the proportion is more startling when we take into account the fact that the population also has been growing. Moreover, men always have been employed to a much higher degree than women, the figure having hovered around 80 per cent during that period; yet among men, the proportion actually is falling slightly, owing to the growing industrial and public assistance policies of retiring industrial workers at earlier ages. Thus the contrast becomes more impres-




FIG. 8

Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* pp. 172–173, and *Annual Report on the Labor Force, 1950* (United States Bureau of the Census), pp. 3 and 15.

sive, considered numerically. The number of women employed increased from about 2,650,000 in 1880 to about 17,000,000 in 1947, a gain of well over 600 per cent; while among men, the numbers only trebled during the same period, increasing from approximately 14,750,000 to about 45,000,000.

Women are to be found in almost all the occupations today, being excluded from a few such as mining, steel manufacture, or construction work chiefly because such work is physically incompatible with the welfare of women. Domestic and personal service in 1940 engaged about three employed women in ten, while clerical jobs of one sort or another occupied about two more. Manufacturing took a somewhat smaller proportion, but more than agriculture, trade, and the teaching profession, each of which occupied about one in ten. Most women gainfully employed are young, about 60 per cent of them in 1940 being under 35 years of age. More than 85 per cent of the employed women in 1940 were white, while about 15 per cent were Negro.

Development. Women have always had an important part in the productive work of the world; but from primitive times down to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution their work was largely of a *domestic* nature: it was performed in or about the home. They performed much of the agricultural labor, as, indeed, they still do in areas where agriculture itself has not yet become mechanized. They prepared and stored most of the food supply and did the spinning and weaving. They not only bore the children but gave them much more of their early education than they now do. The average home required but little from the outside, either in things consumed or in equipment used. The husband and wife, together with the grown children, actually produced most of their own living. The chief industries outside the home were fishing (in coastal areas), agriculture, and commerce; and these activities were engaged in dominantly by men, as they still are, since they required strength and stamina beyond the average capacity of women.

The coming of the factory system and the growth of modern business enterprise have removed from the home the major part of its productive work, placed that work in an altogether different setting, and created a new set of social relationships. Women were deprived of their economic value in fulfilling their traditional rôle of keeping the home together as a "going concern." Moreover, since more of the things the family needed were bought, there developed a greater need for cash expenditures.

It was only natural, in the light of the new conditions created by the Industrial Revolution, that women should follow their age-old occupations out of the home into the factory. This was especially noticeable, for example, in the case of textiles, which was one of the first great "large-scale" industries to develop. The work was comparatively easy, although tedious and to some extent hazardous. Nevertheless, even in the early development of industry, there was a direct clash of interest between men and women. The technical developments began to make their impact felt in many of the crafts and industries which formerly had been carried on by men. Displacement of labor in such fields began to appear very early in the history of the Industrial Revolution; and the combina-

tion of lack of labor organization and the tremendous drive for increased production to meet the demands of foreign markets put the workers at a disadvantage. Unorganized workers could do little to forestall the pressure for long hours of work and low wages; so the mite which the employed women added to the family coffers of individual workers was both necessary and welcome, even while the competition which the employment of women afforded was a contributing factor to the desperate problems confronting the workers. It was, indeed, a "vicious circle."

It has already been suggested that women have always been more or less of a "drug on the market" of labor supply. While they have always done useful work, the fact is that until the domestic activities gave way to such a large extent to the expansion of factory production, a *price* had not generally been put on their work; and they never were considered an appreciable supply of employable labor. Consequently the system of economic production for exchange had grown up with the labor supply limited mostly to men. And when large numbers of women began to enter the labor market, the inevitable result was that conditions of labor grew steadily worse. This process still is going on to a considerable extent, although there are mitigating factors, such as an expanding labor market and the restriction of labor supply by means of legislative action and the growth of unionism among the workers themselves.[6]

Present Conditions of Work. As might be expected on the basis of the background of the employment of women in industry, the conditions under which women have worked have never been favorable. The abundant supply of potential women workers has been a powerful factor in keeping their wages low, and the terms of work, such as hours and shop conditions, have been largely what employers saw fit to provide. While hours of labor are being increasingly restricted by legislation in regard to products made for interstate and local consumption alike, the laws are far from uniform, and many are of very limited scope. Despite legislative protection, wages still are extremely low for women generally. Various studies indicate that women's pay lags behind men's by as much as one-third or even one-half, even for services that are more or less comparable; and women's wages vary widely between geographic sections and between races, as do men's.[7]

There are other vital factors, however, that still operate against women workers, even though the conditions of women in industry have improved greatly since, let us say, the period before the First World War. It still remains true, even in the face of legislative protection, that it costs more to employ women and that women themselves are *able* to work for less than are men. Regarding the costs of hiring women, it is well known that absenteeism, or days absent from the job, is higher among women. This is

[6] See Mary van Kleeck, "Women in Industry," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XV (1937), pp. 451–456.

[7] See C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1941), pp. 217–218.

due partly to their biological makeup, partly to their tendency to tire more easily, and partly to the fact that many women have other duties at home, whether they have homes of their own or whether they live with their parents. These factors suggest further items of higher costs in employing women: more rest periods, more rest rooms and sanitary facilities, and better conditions of ventilation and lighting are needed to keep fatigue and disability at a minimum among women than among men. It is also well known that the majority of women stop work at, or soon after, marriage; hence the costs of labor turnover are higher. The very fact of legislative restrictions on the hours of labor for women also increases the unit cost of machinery and plant upkeep, since they are idle for a greater share of the time. Granting these points, however, it is doubtful whether the lower wages that prevail among women are wholly justifiable. It would seem that in most jobs employers would prefer hiring men if the costs to him were equal; men are steadier, require less consideration, have long-time interest in their jobs.

The unfavorable position of women workers is further intensified by the conditions surrounding women as a group. We have already noticed that women enter employment much less permanently than do men. Most young women expect to marry; and this, coupled with the fact that so many machine and light assembly jobs require a minimum of training, makes for much competition among women for the comparatively unskilled jobs. Many women are only partially self-supporting, inasmuch as they may draw on other members of their families for assistance. Furthermore, even those that are wholly self-supporting often can get along on a smaller cash income than men, due to their common ability to cook and sew for themselves—although it is likely that a goodly portion of those who do such "light housekeeping" in addition to a day's work "on the job" are driven to it by the very fact that their wages are small. And lastly, women undoubtedly are generally more conservative than men, being less inclined to band together to improve their own conditions.

The Problem of "Equal Pay." Our discussion of the reasons for women's wages being substantially lower than men's even for comparable work may help to throw some light upon the problems involved if we are to try to provide "equal pay for equal work." This slogan long has been an expression of the opinion of many, that women should not be penalized with lower wages for reasons of sex alone. It also is offered as a "solution" for the problem of competition of women with men in the labor market, it being argued that if we raise women's wages to a parity with men's, then large numbers of women will be forced out of employment due to employers' general preference for men if other conditions are equal.

It must be remembered that women *do* constitute a substantial *labor reserve,* which is tapped only under special conditions. As was stated earlier, our labor economy was built on the premise that men constitute the

bulk of the paid labor supply. If, then, we raise women's wages "equal" to men's, the result must be that more women will be attracted to enter the active labor market. That is to say, the supply of labor will increase relative to the demand for its services, and the scale of wages for *all* workers will decline. The only way it can be avoided is by legislative and union restrictions on the supply of labor; the alternative is "equally" *low* wages for all workers, men and women alike.

It is not at all certain that women have displaced men in industrial employment. It is true that in some lines of work such a development seems to be taking place. But much of that displacement can be as reasonably laid to the introduction of machinery itself. Many displaced workers are absorbed by new industries, of course; but the gradual and steady rise of unemployment through the years has been too consistent and unrelated to the fluctuations in the employment of women to warrant general claims that the employment of women has driven men out of work. The problem of unemployment, at which the "equal pay" proposal is leveled, is too much a product of our general economic dislocation to be explained categorically by the employment of women in industry.

Improving the Conditions of Work. Efforts to improve the conditions of employment of women have taken a somewhat different route from those designed to improve the working conditions of men. Men have used their unions and group bargaining in matters relating to wages, hours, and days off. Women do not seem to be so successful in developing strong labor organizations. Hence they have not been able to wield organized force to protect their best interests or to obtain industrial advantages. The National Women's Trade Union League has been an active force in building up unions wherever possible and in promoting the legislation that would strengthen the position of women in industry. But the membership of women in these labor unions is small compared with the total number employed. Even with the ever-ready assistance from the men's organizations, it is hardly possible for the organized women workers to affect materially the working conditions of women in industry.

Consequently, the most effective efforts for improving the industrial outlook of women workers have been directed at obtaining *legislation* and *public action*. This means, of course, that the legal provisions regulating and safeguarding the employment of women will vary widely from State to State, and the effectiveness of such measures depends to a large extent upon the degree of education and the strength of public opinion relative to working conditions for women in the various States.

In general these public measures fall into three principal classes: (1) measures directed toward establishing a minimum that would not be oppressive, by limiting hours of work or establishing minimum wage-rates; (2) measures directed toward improving working conditions and obtaining the facilities and adjustments for meeting needs of women workers—

rest-room facilities, seats, and safety equipment; (3) restrictive measures directed toward excluding women from those occupations which are most detrimental to their health and well-being.

Twenty-four States by 1948 limited, in one or more industries, the work day for women to eight hours, ten others had a ten-hour day, while only five had failed to make at least some provision in this matter. Seventeen States regulated home employment. Eighteen States prohibited or restricted night work for women, while twenty-six had minimum wage laws for women, and nine required equal wage rates for men and women. All the States had mothers' aid laws, although their inclusiveness varied widely; yet all but one had been approved by the Social Security Administration for Federal participation.

Gainful Employment and the Status of Women. One of the most interesting by-products of the employment of women in industry, from the social point of view, is the impact of such employment upon the status of women in present-day society. It is a matter which must be approached with some caution, however, since we are apt to generalize too freely and credit the economic opportunity of women with more benefit than is its due. Stern has well pointed out that "throughout history class lines have cut across sex lines with the result that women of the ruling classes have enjoyed privileges denied to the men as well as the women of the submerged classes; within each class, however, women have been at a disadvantage as compared with the men." [8]

Of all the classes of women, the women of the middle class undoubtedly have benefited the most from the Industrial Revolution. It was they who formerly were burdened with the bulk of comparatively easy, yet essentially monotonous, household tasks of cooking, canning, weaving, and sewing which were taken from the home and placed largely in the factory. Lower-class women, relieved of the domestic tasks at home, nevertheless had to follow them into the factory because their husbands—farmers and artisans, largely—were being harassed by other phases of the Industrial Revolution, and the need for additional cash outlay to supply their daily needs increased. To the extent that they contributed to the family's maintenance financially, the women of the lower classes began to command more respect than formerly from their husbands, since their assistance was more visibly indispensable—and measurable. The middle-class women, however, found their husbands capable of "supporting" them, since their share of the benefits from the technological advance was larger. So for the first time in history, there arose a large "leisure class": a considerable segment of women largely released from drudgery and given a world of opportunity for self-expression. Whether that opportunity has been well used cannot be stated in final terms. There has been a good deal of lost

[8] Bernard J. Stern, "Woman, Position in Society," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XV (1937), pp. 442.

motion and time-squandering in what has been termed competitive consumption—"keeping up with the Joneses"—and a good deal of frustration in trying to keep busy about something that at least seemed worthwhile. On the other hand, the great leaders among nineteenth century women who advocated legal, political, and social liberties for their sex as a whole, were dominantly women of the middle class. It was they, too, who for the most part led the many groups seeking social reform during the same period: they looked toward better care for children, toward temperance, toward better hospital care and improved treatment for dependent and deficient classes generally. Many have sought "careers" and contributed much to the arts and professions and sciences, as well as to the more practical world of commerce and politics.

Women as a whole also have found in the effects of the Industrial Revolution an economic equivalent and alternative to marriage, which gives them much greater independence in their dealings with men in general and potential husbands in particular. As a result, more of the "bonds of matrimony" have come to be the silken cords of inclination rather than the iron chains of necessity! [9]

THE COMPETITION OF SUBSTANDARD WORKERS

Unfortunately, women are not the only group of workers that is able to compete with men who, by tradition, as husbands and fathers, have been the "breadwinners" for their families. The average wage-earner is expected to maintain our "American standard of living"; but there are various other types of workers who, like women, are able to compete for his job on less than even terms. The presence of such groups in the labor market increases the supply of labor available to industry, and so threatens both the wage rates and work conditions in the whole field. Thus they are called *substandard* workers, since they work under conditions and for wages below the levels generally considered necessary to maintain "average" or normal living conditions for themselves and their families. Among these we already have considered the direct competition of Negroes, for example, who by reason of their traditional status and lack of organization, have been able to enter industry and secure jobs in preference to the white workers.[10] Still other groups of this nature which create distinct social problems are children, home workers, prisoners, and "casual" labor—and in the latter group we may classify the so-called "poor whites." Only the first three will be discussed here, however, since the casual worker is usually an agricultural rather than an industrial wage earner.

The Employment of Children. To some extent the employment of children in industry followed the same patterns of development as did the employment of women, which we have just discussed. When we re-

[9] See Chapter 13.
[10] Chapter 4.

member that the universal education we attempt to provide for our children here in the United States has not always been universal, we realize that child labor is hardly a problem of modern origin. When hand labor was prevalent, every pair of hands was at a premium; and children were not exempt. Indeed, they learned most of their practical knowledge by actually doing things and by imitating their parents at work. So when the Industrial Revolution developed, it seemed to some but a reasonable step to put the children to work, earning while they were learning. Furthermore, it had been felt for long that "the Devil finds work for idle fingers" —especially, it seemed, among children. We still find in some sections of our country a considerable abhorrence of leisure time and recreational activities.

In 1910, the census reported nearly 2,000,000 employed children between the ages of ten and fifteen years, or about 18 per cent of all the children in that age group. By 1940, there were only 250,000 child workers fourteen and fifteen years of age, who constituted about 5.2 per cent of the total number of children of those ages. In 1910 at least one worker in twenty was a child not more than fifteen years of age; by 1940 there was on an average hardly one such child among two hundred workers. Much of the sharp drop doubtless reflects an absolute reduction in the number of employed children; but it must also be noted that probably a considerable part results from the failure to list employed children from ten to thirteen years of age in the 1940 census. Most children are agricultural workers; and it is precisely that group that is least affected by more stringent labor legislation.

Boy workers quite consistently have outnumbered girl workers through the years by at least two to one, a situation explained by the fact that child labor has been and still remains largely a rural phenomenon. The ratio reached still sharper odds by 1940, when the figure was almost four to one, which suggests that the girls are profiting more than the boys by the reduction of child labor. It is true that a very large part of the girls are employed in agriculture, too; but farming traditionally is a man's job, and it is felt by many that farming is best learned "by experience." Thus among all children reported to the Bureau of the Census as gainfully employed in 1940, more than two-fifths of the girls and almost three-fourths of the boys were working on farms; yet of the total of about 148,000 rural child workers, about 127,000 were boys and only about 21,000 were girls. Neither boys nor girls were engaged in manufacturing in any appreciable numbers. Boys greatly outnumbered girls as clerks and operatives, about 30,000 to 1,600; but more than 22,000 of them were listed as newsboys and messengers. At the other extreme, as may be expected, girls predominate in domestic service, the comparison being upwards of 15,000 to 1,600. More than 8,000 boys were employed as laborers in scattered occupational fields, as against less than 300 girls. Both were to be found in hotel, restau-

rant, and grocery service to some extent, although again boys were more numerous, about 4,900 and 1,800 respectively.[11]

The cold figures of child employment do not give a very adequate picture of the evils of child labor. Everyone will agree that children need the discipline of work and responsibility as a part of their training for adult life later on; but the work and responsibility they are expected to shoulder should be *commensurate with their years.* Thus the moral hazards for boys in street and messenger service are high, as are those for girls in domestic and restaurant service. In both cases the children are placed in adult situations requiring maturity and judgment which obviously children cannot be expected to have. There are also the physical costs of child labor. Industry and agriculture are probably the chief offenders here, since they require long periods of repetitive application to the job, often under conditions of abnormal posture, whether it be cramping or stretching to use oversize equipment. None can gauge the loss entailed by the limitation of education resulting from child employment, nor the ill effect upon the progeny of the child worker who reaches adulthood in poor health and in ignorance. Economically it seems an ironic commentary that there should be any child labor at all at times when millions of adults go unemployed; and it is questionable whether even the employer of child labor gains much in the long run. If one were to count the losses from high labor turnover, excessive accidents and sickness, and spoilage of materials, together with the damage to consumer goodwill, it is unlikely that the child worker is an asset to his employer.

Despite the evident costliness of child labor from virtually every point of view, the struggle to remove or even to control it has been a long and difficult procedure. Moreover, contrary to common belief, the matter has not yet been fully adjusted. There are various considerations and groups which still oppose regulation that might be really effective; and even the developments during the "New Deal" period left many loopholes for lax administration of such legislative provisions as were made for Federal control over the matter. Employers commonly are opposed to Federal acts; farmers as a rule have been dead set against any restriction of the labor of children in agriculture; many political leaders are jealous of the apparent encroachment of the Federal Government upon the domain of States' rights; and even religious bodies have expressed fear lest government reach too far into the sphere of family relationships.

The control over child labor still remains largely in the hands of the individual States, and, as one might well expect, the legislative provisions pertaining to child labor have varied widely regarding hours of labor, age of children protected, industries covered, educational minimum requirements, health standards, and work conditions. It long has been clear that

[11] Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: *Population,* Vol. 3, The Labor Force, Table 65 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1943).

child labor legislation to be effective must be of a Federal nature, to meet the problems presented by interstate competition; but the development of Federal control has been very slow. There has been the active opposition to such control which we mentioned a moment ago; and the opponents have had in the past an effective weapon in the question of the constitutionality of such acts. The Congress attempted such measures first in 1916, as an act to regulate interstate commerce, and again in 1919 by imposing a prohibitive tax; but both acts were declared unconstitutional. A constitutional amendment, putting regulation of child labor in the hands of the Federal Government, was passed by Congress in 1924 but still remains unratified by the necessary number of States. The National Recovery Administration codes (which defined fair business practices) generally ruled out child labor in industry but left the problem untouched in agriculture; and the whole National Industrial Recovery Act was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1935.

The Fair Labor Standards Act has gone farthest among the Federal acts regulating child labor, providing that no child under sixteen years old may be employed on articles of interstate commerce. It quite generally excludes children from fourteen to sixteen years of age in mining, processing, and manufacturing industries, and prohibits those under eighteen from engaging in specified hazardous occupations. However, the effectiveness of the Act will become apparent only as policies become established through the years. There are broad exceptions regarding employment of children by their parents; and in other cases, considerable authority rests with the Wage and Hour and Public Contract Divisions of the Federal Department of Labor to determine the limits within which child labor shall be deemed socially acceptable and at what point such employment becomes detrimental. Under such conditions it is clear that policies still are likely to be fixed on the basis of the personal bias of administrators or the pressure exerted by partisan groups. Moreover, the emergency demand for labor during the Second World War led to a sharp increase in the employment of children, and the extent of child labor after the war remained considerably above prewar levels. Thus, the Bureau of the Census estimated early in 1948 that more than 600,000 fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children were then at work—almost three times as many as had been reported only eight years earlier.[12]

The Home Industries. We used to hear a great deal about the "sweatshops" and of the exploitation of women and children by the "sweated" industries. Not so much is said any more about those old survivals of domestic industry; but because the furor has subsided does not mean that industrial work has disappeared from the homes and tenements. Attempts at licensing and inspection have improved some of the worst aspects of

[12] Elizabeth S. Johnson, "Child Labor and Youth Employment," *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, Margaret B. Hodges, Ed., p. 93.

it, but the "sweating trades" are still with us. In spite of efforts to improve them, they are still a menace to and a blight upon the health and welfare of thousands of women and child workers.

In general, there are two types of "sweating." (1) The small shop, set up in a tenement or dwelling-house, where the subcontractor crowds in the necessary machines and employs the women of the neighborhood to come in and do the work under his direct "supervision." The typical sweat-shop of this sort is small, poorly lighted and ventilated, usually insanitary and with no adequate sanitary equipment. (2) The other, and now more prevalent type of "sweating," is the subletting of the work to be done in the homes of the workers. In this way the worker is assisted by all the available members of the family who happen to be at home nights. The homes are often small, overcrowded, neglected, and poorly lighted. Sickness in the family is generally more of a reason for taking in work than for withholding it—and the consuming public does not know the difference between a garment made in a sick-room (with the aid of the diseased) and a garment made under "strictly sanitary" conditions!

The first type of sweat-shop is gradually disappearing, as a result of enforced legislation regarding standards of places of employment, and the demands made by the organized clothing workers. But the work done in the homes, where no inspector has an opportunity to set standards of cleanliness, lighting, and hours of work, is where the problem offers resistance to solution. Under such conditions the worker legally is an independent contractor rather than an employee; and on this basis he is not protected by factory and other labor laws. Thus in large cities and their slum areas it is easy to obtain the labor of women and children on contracts for "home work," especially in the neighborhood of factories and businesses which are irregular or seasonal in their employment, and where the efforts of almost every member of the family are needed to supplement the small income of the father.

The manufacturing of artificial flowers, finishing of gloves, millinery work, making garters, picking the meat out of nuts, making men's neckties, stringing beads, hemstitching, finishing children's clothes, hemming aprons, sewing and working buttonholes on men's suits—these are a few of the things that are furnishing "opportunity to work in the home."

The National Consumers' League, the National Federation of Women's Clubs, the State and National health agencies, and numerous other groups have helped to educate the public to demand the abolition of the "sweated" industries. The National Consumers' League has furnished its label to mark goods that are made under approved conditions, so that the consumer might be guided in his choices. But the consuming public seldom looks for more than the price tag. Hence the chief means of controlling this type of work is through legislation, employing the police power of the State to protect the public health and welfare. In some States the minimum-wage

law has been employed to take away the abuse of low wages in these home industries. But such industries continue—and continue largely as parasites, exploiting the labor of women and children. It is in the inaccessible home that working conditions are perhaps more unfavorable to the workers and more costly to the public health and welfare.

The Use of Prison Labor. The employment of prison inmates at productive labor has been a source of bitter controversy ever since it first began to take shape about a century ago. Prior to that time, prisoners usually had been forced to do hard but not very profitable work, such as crushing rock, splitting wood, or picking oakum. Indeed, even these tasks were a marked improvement over the early nonproductive effort required for purely disciplinary purposes, such as the crank or the treadwheel. As the machine gained perfection, it appeared quite logical to move machines into prisons and set up shops for the prisoners to work at more productive jobs. There was a good deal to recommend the practice, since it helped to remove the tedium of prison life and made prison discipline easier because men could feel some pride in such work; it gave prisoners some training or experience that would be useful to them after they were released; and by selling the product of such labor it was possible to reduce the cost of prison maintenance for the taxpayer. Moreover, when small wages were paid, the prisoners were able to contribute at least something to the support of their dependents or to build a reserve to help reëstablish the convict himself when he was released.[13]

Various systems were worked out by which prisoners could be worked profitably, and many of them still are used. Under the *contract* system, for example, contractors supply materials and machines, while the State provides buildings, power, light, and guards and receives from the contractor a stipulated fee for the labor of the convict. A variation of this arrangement is the *lease* system, wherein the contractor takes complete custody of the prisoner in return for a fee to the State. The *State use* system provides for production *and use* of the prison-made goods by the State itself, while the *public account* system provides for production *and sale* of the prison-made goods by the State.

Some of these arrangements have appeared to be more satisfactory than others; but regardless of their relative acceptability, there has been persistent opposition to any sort of prison labor at all. Extremists still challenge the idea on the ground that convicts should go to prison for punishment and not to make a living. They argue that prison life should be made as severe as possible; and they are quite right in their belief that enforced idleness is one of the cruelest forms of punishment. The unsoundness of such a policy, however, is shown by the fact that brutality breeds only resentment; and the discharged prisoner reëntering society with a "chip on his shoulder" is not likely to make a satisfactory social adjustment.

[13] J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology* (1945), Ch. XXV.

There are other sound objections to prison labor, however, even apart from the ill effect upon prisoners of some of the more unsatisfactory systems such as the contract or lease systems. The most valid contention, no doubt, is that prison labor competes with free labor. If the goods are sold on the open market, they can undersell goods made by free labor, since the production costs are so much lower. Even when the goods are not sold, the prisoner still competes with the free laborer, since his products otherwise would have to be bought by the State in the open markets. It is true that the total amount of prison labor is very small, compared to the number of free workers. In 1940 there were only about 83,500 employed convicts in Federal and State institutions, while there probably were more than 49,000,000 free workers.[14] The difficulty is that the products of this prison labor tends to segregate in *certain types of industry,* though the tendency has been curbed in recent years. Thus in 1923 more than one-eighth of all the jute bagging was made in prisons, a fifth of the twine and rope, and nearly a third of the linen; but by 1940 the production of cordage and twine, brooms, and stamped and pressed metals led the list, with only 6.5, 2.5, and 2.2 per cent, respectively, of what was produced by private industry.[15]

The problem of prison labor is far from settled. It is quite generally agreed that some sort of productive work among prisoners is desirable. The payment of wages also is receiving increasing support. It generally is felt that the States should use the products in their own institutions so far as possible and that when prison-made goods are offered for sale, they should be offered only at current market prices. Laws also have been passed requiring labeling of prison-made goods. To some extent, the growth of prison schools has provided a valuable *alternative* to economic production and has been a factor in the steady decline of the percentage of prisoners engaged in economic production. Nevertheless, there still has remained the general problem of the competition of prison-made goods with the free; and that competition has been felt in interstate trade especially by those industries in which prison labor has been centered. The Congress of the United States therefore passed two acts, the Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 and the Ashurst-Sumner Act of 1930, under which the respective States are permitted to establish their own policies regarding the prison-made goods of other States, and Federal authority is extended to forbid the shipment of prison-made goods into States that choose to forbid their sale within their borders. Not all the States have elected to exercise this privilege, however; so a Federal law was passed in 1940 that forbids the shipment of prison-made goods among the States.[16]

[14] Richard F. Jones, Jr., *Prison Labor in the United States: 1940,* Bulletin 698 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1941), p. 1.

[15] L. N. Robinson, *Should Prisoners Work?* (1931), pp. 55–57; Jones, *op. cit.,* p. 24.

[16] C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1941), pp. 827–828.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Are industrial accidents increasing or decreasing? Why? Do you think it would be possible to prevent all accidents in industry? Why, or why not?
2. How have the compensation laws given impetus to the apparent increase in industrial accidents?
3. What are the health hazards of modern industry? Why is it more difficult to obtain compensation for a case of occupational disease than it is to do so for an accident that causes a similar loss of wage?
4. To what extent are employers responsible for the industrial hazards to the safety and health of the worker? The workers themselves? Society as a whole?
5. What has been done in the past to reduce the hazards of accident and ill-health in industry?
6. Describe (*a*) the theoretical bases for the compensation laws; (*b*) the manner of operation of the laws. What criticisms have been made of them?
7. It is commonly observed that industry today favors the younger man. Why is this true? Does it mean that young men and women now have finer opportunities for success than ever before?
8. Why is the problem of selecting and finding an occupation so hazardous today? What relation has this problem to industrial unrest and "radical movements"?
9. Why is it that the average boy and girl are not willing to accept lower pay at the start even if by so doing they are given an opportunity to enter a skilled occupation or gain promotion? What program would you suggest to guard the new worker against "blind-alley" jobs?
10. Why is it that so many workers are compelled to change their occupations in middle life? What hazards confront the worker in making these changes? How can he be aided best in making such occupational readjustments?
11. What is a substandard worker? Give examples.

12. What is the extent of the employment of women in gainful occupations? Is the trend in the direction of increase or decrease of gainful employment of women?
13. What occupations are women entering in the greatest numbers? What relation does their gainful employment bear to the work that women have traditionally had to do?
14. Compare the ages of women and men who are gainfully employed. How do you account for the difference?
15. Enumerate the chief hazards that grow out of married women's seeking employment outside the home.
16. "The wage paid for a given grade of labor should depend entirely on the *value of the service rendered,* and should be paid alike to all performing that service, irrespective of age, sex, or marital condition of the worker." Do you agree? Show why, or why not.
17. What has been the effect of gainful employment of women upon the status of women in society?
18. What is the extent of child labor in the United States today? How would you explain the fact that boy workers outnumber girl workers about two to one?
19. From the social point of view, are the deleterious effects of "boy labor" any more or any less important than those of "girl labor"? Give reasons for your answer.
20. What legal safeguards does your State provide for the protection of children in gainful occupations?
21. What issues are involved in the protest of free labor against convict labor? What justification is there for prison labor? How would you resolve these conflicting interests?

11. Social Problems of Urban Life

CITIES ARE ALMOST as old as civilization itself. Indeed, the very word *civilization* reflects an ancient belief that urban society and the development of culture are practically synonymous; the words *civilized, civilian, citizen,* and *city* all are derived from the same root. Primitive peoples very early learned the advantages of communal living, and archæologists have discovered many evidences of semipermanent settlements of considerable numbers of people in widely diversified localities. Excavations in the Punjab region of India have revealed that as long as five thousand years ago a very high urban culture existed there, with two-story dwellings, regularly platted streets, and even covered sewerage systems.[1] Almost as old are the ancient Egyptian cities, such as Memphis and Thebes —the latter being estimated to have had a population of about 500,000 at its height.

More familiar to us in the Western world, probably, is the development of the Greek city-states, which took place approximately twenty-five hundred years ago. Although none of them were large, even by ancient standards (Athens being the biggest, with perhaps 150,000 inhabitants), they were clearly integrated, independent, and functioning political entities. The achievements of the ancient Greeks in the arts and sciences, so well known to us today, were the achievements of *cities*—not of a nation or an empire as we think of them today. The Roman Empire itself, on the other hand, developed from unpropitious beginnings at Rome. The location of the "Eternal City" had little to suggest the future importance of the settlement, there being no harbor, and no minerals or arable land immediately at hand. Nevertheless, its leaders displayed such tenacity and unique governing talent that the town dominated an ever-widening area surrounding it; and the resulting tribute and administrative activity laid the groundwork for an imperial city which supported at its height perhaps a million people, and maintained paved streets, elaborate provisions for

1 Thomas Adams, *Outline of Town and City Planning* (1935), p. 42.

water supply and sewerage disposal, public baths, and even highly organized systems of police and fire protection.

The dissolution of the Roman Empire put the cities of Europe into eclipse for at least five centuries, down through the tenth century. The assault of the peoples from the north and east that hammered at the communities and territories of the Empire shattered the security of urban centers, and deprived them of the possibility of maintaining trade and their very life blood—the procuring of food and other materials essential to urban existence. Many of the towns which had thrived during the heyday of the Empire—even including London, in England—virtually disappeared, while the population of Rome itself, by 1377, was reported to have dwindled to about 17,000 persons. It is true that subsequent centuries, roughly the eleventh to the eighteenth, brought a substantial revival of city life as a result of such factors as the Crusades and the following eras of discovery and scientific development. But it can fairly be said that cities did not recapture their ancient cultural dominance till the impact of the Industrial Revolution began to make itself evident toward the close of the eighteenth century.[2]

THE CITY AND MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The great cities of today could not exist without the immense productivity of modern industry. Every square mile of the city contains at least *twenty* miles of paved streets; and along each of these miles of streets lie miles of pipes and wires to supply the inhabitants with the basic utilities regarded as necessary to present-day urban life—telephone wires and cables, street lighting systems, water and gas pipes, sewerage and drainage mains, power lines to supply electric energy for homes, stores, institutions, and factories. Every one of the structures thus served, moreover, contains a similar complex aggregation of service lines and fixtures to bring these various utilities to convenient points for the inhabitants to use. The construction of the edifices themselves, too, requires an enormous supply of building materials, from foundation cement to roofing; and the gigantic skyscrapers, so characteristic of larger cities in the Western world, are equipped with heating, cooling, and ventilating systems, elevators, glazing, flooring, and decoration that simply could not exist were it not for a high degree of mechanical precision and physical productivity. No less vital to the being of the modern city, and equally dependent upon modern technology, is the provision of adequate means of rapid transportation—whether by steam, electricity, or the gasoline engine—to provide sustenance, mobility, and safety for the citizenry. Even the tiny electric light, which we take so much for granted, is vital to the safety and feasibility of urban community life and represents a tremendously complicated productive system both in its fabrication and its operation.

[2] W. B. Munro, "City," in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, pp. 474–476.

While the growth of the modern city is highly correlated with the fruition of the Industrial Revolution, we must also recognize that the Industrial Revolution was not the sole causal factor in the rapid urban development of the past century and a half. Let us recall briefly, in turn, the causes of the Industrial Revolution itself. Obviously, the technical knowledge required for the design and construction of power machinery was accumulated through long centuries of scientific research and discovery. But hardly less significant were the political developments preceding the Industrial Revolution. The painful and faltering ascendancy of modern nations had at last provided the security necessary for the growth of large urban centers; the nation had done away with the petty tyrannies of the feudal overlords as well as the local defense restrictions which confronted older cities individually. That security, moreover, was also extended to both land and sea trade channels, so that the economic base for city growth was greatly enhanced. Equally significant, too, was the emergence of the *laissez-faire* philosophy, a revulsion from the older Mercantilism which had restricted enterprisers and municipalities alike. To be sure, the gain from unbridled "free enterprise" was dearly bought; but there can be little doubt that the energies thus set loose were essential to the subsequent rapid growth of cities.

A final element making possible both the Industrial Revolution and the growth of large cities was the increase in agricultural efficiency during the eighteenth century. This is a factor commonly overlooked; and it seems paradoxical, at first thought, that the advancement of agriculture should pave the way for the dominance of the city. A moment's reflection, however, reminds us that foodstuff is the prime essential to life itself; and when men must devote most of their time and resource to the production of food, there will be little surplus to support people engaging in other activities. Such was the case, in fact, quite universally until well into the eighteenth century; and while the science of agriculture has grown enormously since 1800, the improvements in plant and stock breeding and in methods of cultivation, together with more aggressive attitudes on the part of farmers, created significant agricultural surpluses in produce and labor supply in the century preceding. This was especially true in England, where the Industrial Revolution had its strongest early development.[8]

It must be remembered that the effect of the Industrial Revolution did not burst suddenly upon the cities in full force. Manufacturing techniques and the products of industry developed relatively slowly; and the impact of technical developments has really been unfolding continually for the past century and a half. Indeed, we cannot rightly infer that the full effect of the Industrial Revolution is measurable even today. Nevertheless, the sheer growth in the size and number of cities since the year 1800 readily

[8] Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (1942), pp. 316–317.

suggests the enormous economic resources released by the Industrial Revolution. Thus, New York City—now the largest city in the world with more than 7.8 millions—was in 1800 only a fair-sized city of 79,000. In the same interval, Berlin has increased from about 170,000 to 4.2 million; London, from 959,000 to 4.0 million; Rome, from 153,000 to 1.2 million; Birmingham (England), from 71,000 to 1.0 million. Within the past century, such cities as Chicago have sprung from 30,000 to 3.6 million; Melbourne (Australia), from 39,000 to 1.0 million; Los Angeles, from 1,600 to 1.9 million; Buenos Aires, from 76,000 to 2.3 million. And even since 1900, Detroit has increased its size more than sixfold, from 285,000 to 1.8 million; Shanghai, almost eightfold, from 457,000 to 3.5 million; Tokyo, more than threefold, from 1.8 million to 5.8 million.[4] Here in the United States, in 1790, there were but 33 cities—none having as many as 50,000 inhabitants; and they




FIG. 9

From *Our Cities* (National Resources Planning Board, 1937), p. 1. 1949 figures from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950* (United States Bureau of the Census), p. 11.

included less than a twentieth of the total population of the country. Today, about a third of our people live in cities of over 100,000 population, with another fifth living so close to these cities as to be, practically speaking, thorough-going urbanites.[5] While other countries do not show such a spectacular shift, the trend is almost everywhere in the same direction.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

[5] *Our Cities*, Report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources Committee (1937), p. 1.

Indeed, it is significant that economic considerations have come to determine both the location and growth of cities. Matters of defense or politics have been subordinated to the industrial and commercial factors.[6]

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN CITY

Before we turn to our consideration of the problems of urban life, it is desirable to get before us some idea of the structure and function of the modern city. Structurally, the city has been defined as "a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals." [7] Functionally, it has been well said that "cities are the focal points in the occupation and utilization of the earth by man." [8] But these are highly formalized concepts, and give us little appreciation of the vibrant social environment in which most of us live, and from which almost all of us—city-bred or country-bred—derive our habits and standards of life. Still another authority probably has come close to a meaningful definition of the city in terms of social process. "Cities," he says, "are people, churches, banks, politics, buildings, traffic and sewage. They are everything we are. The newest cities are old in human experience, and the oldest are constantly renewed." [9]

A moment ago it was said that the Industrial Revolution has given the modern city certain traits that are different from those of cities of earlier cultures. That this is true will be shown in more detail in the pages which follow. But it must not be forgotten that modern technology has not made itself felt uniformly, nor even universally. Some areas—notably Russia, India, and the Orient—are still dominantly agricultural; and their cities do not display the characteristics of cities as we know them in the West. Generally speaking, they still follow the ancient pattern of self-sufficient entities drawing their support from, and in turn serving, fairly well-defined areas. Our own concern here will be with the characteristics of the city as influenced by our own Western culture. Such cities are highly interdependent, being so completely products of the commercial and industrial developments of the past century and a half. Their very interdependence gives them a degree of similarity which creates much the same characteristics and problems, wherever those cities may be located.

Economic. Enough has already been said to suggest that every city must have an economic base. The size and character of any city will be determined by the amount of agricultural produce and the foodstuff available to support it, and by the nature and extent of the goods and services

[6] Munro, *op. cit.*, pp. 476–477.

[7] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (July, 1938).

[8] Chauncy D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman, "The Nature of Cities," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November, 1945), p. 7.

[9] Robert B. Mitchell in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November, 1945), Foreword, p. viii.

which the city is equipped to supply to the area from which it draws its sustenance. Underlying all of this exchange, of course, is the existence of adequate transportation facilities. Indeed, transportation is implied in the very concept of trade; and no city can grow beyond the limits imposed by the available means of transport. So it is that the great cities of antiquity were located on navigable bodies of water; water-borne shipping has always been—and still is—the cheapest to be had.

But the modern city has special characteristics that have resulted from additional factors in contemporary economic life. Above all else, modern cities exhibit an intensive use of land area that was unknown anywhere prior to the Industrial Revolution. The old cities of the Orient, based as they are largely in an agricultural economy, are not nearly so highly centralized as ours; shopping and manufacturing areas are interspersed with residential areas. While there is some specialization from one section of the city to another, there is no highly developed "downtown" area comparable to that so common in our Western cities.

Whence the difference? The pattern probably was set primarily by the use of steam power, both for manufacture and transportation. Steam power cannot be used far from the place where it is generated; so economy lay in the development of larger and larger factory units for manufacture. This, in turn, led to a high concentration of workers within the area immediately surrounding the factory; and the crowding of living quarters so close together created the slum areas that have persisted even into our own day. Paralleling this industrial growth was the development of commercial organization. As goods became more plentiful and diversified, markets became more complex and competitive. The effect, moreover, was cumulative. Manufacturing and merchandising units became larger and larger—and the congestion became ever greater. The more recent improvements in transportation and the extensive use of steel for structural purposes has merely accentuated the result. The use of the telephone, the development of small electric and gasoline power units, and the flexibility of transportation afforded by the automobile have brought about some decentralizing. But the Gargantuan cities of the present day still reflect the strong centralizing influence of the use of steam power in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.[10]

The development of fast, safe, and cheap transportation on both land and sea, following the substitution of steam power for stagecoach and sailing vessel, has had tremendous force in shaping the development of the modern city. In a sense, it has made the economic base of the modern city as broad as the economy itself. Markets for many items now are world-wide; any given city literally draws upon world trade on a very large scale in satisfying its needs and, *vice versa,* commonly sends one or more of its own products to the four corners of the earth in return. The division of

[10] Thompson, *op. cit.,* pp. 318–322.

labor so evident in modern manufacture has been extended to the whole local community. The vast array of personal services so readily available within the urban community—such as barber shops and beauty parlors, dry cleaning and laundering establishments, restaurants and hotels, tailoring and dressmaking—still are based, in the long run, upon some dominant world service by the community, be it entertainment (as in Hollywood), automobiles (as in Detroit), manufacturing or trans-shipping (as in Chicago), or any other service or combination of services. Whatever their political differences may be, the mass of people who have been touched by the Industrial Revolution, and city dwellers especially, are economically citizens of the world indeed!

Social. If any single word could be used to describe the social life of the modern city, that word would probably be "impersonal." Individual desires and choices are reduced to a minimum, and the contacts between one person and another are so brief and specialized that people seldom really know even their associates. The city dweller's life is largely governed by the clock, from the time he arises early enough to get to work—perhaps via the 7:38 bus or train, another impersonal obligation!—at a specific time. His work day is usually mechanized, or otherwise performed according to quite exacting standards that allow but little self-expression. His leisure time is most often spent in reading periodicals and books, or in viewing the latest movie that "everybody" is talking about, or in some other experience that is being shared by perhaps millions of others in hundreds of other cities or towns. Even his direct contacts with other individuals—work associates, those who render services to him, or members of his family—are extremely limited and segmental. The office or shop worker seldom sees anything of his fellow workers "after hours"; man and wife cannot fully share each other's daily experiences or problems, being so completely separated for most of the day; even parents and children see little of one another from morning till night. And each, in his own way, is using the multiplicity of goods and services offered by the city in highly standardized and impersonal ways.

The economic factors that have given the modern city its physical characteristics also have influenced profoundly its social life. The mechanization inherent in the industrialism of the present day has intensified the division of labor. Specialization has in turn narrowed the occupational interest and function of the individual to such an extent that only a fraction of his potential talent is utilized. The intensive use of land areas within the limits of the city has resulted in such a sheer massing of people that anything more than a most casual acquaintance even with "nigh dwellers" is virtually impossible; the term "neighbor" has lost any real meaning in city life. The enormously increased efficiency of transportation facilities has not only torn individuals loose from any sustained interest in a given locality, but has made available (and even necessary) a veritable welter of

goods and services. The acceleration of exchange and the resulting dependence on money as the medium to accomplish that exchange has standardized not only the goods offered in trade, but also the personal relationships involved in the exchange. Mass production has, in effect, produced a *mass society.*

What has just been said must not be taken to imply that the social characteristics of the modern city are without their benefit for the urbanite. The impersonal mass society affords the individual a degree of freedom which he cannot have in the smaller, more agrarian community. He is no longer circumscribed in his thought and action by individuals with whom he has little in common except physical proximity. The diversity of the urban environment gives him access to a wide variety of social contact from which he can seek out, to a fair degree, others like himself in tastes or interests. There is a mobility, both in the spatial and social sense. One can attend the church or theater or museum or social gathering of one's liking; and he can expect to rise or fall in the social and economic scale much more upon his own merit than upon his family standing or lack of it. Similarly, the intricate variety of jobs in the city gives the individual a chance to seek a type of work that will be compatible with his own temperament and training.

Nevertheless, the development of the urban mass society is not without its costs. Mobility brings with it transience. If the individual gains in anonymity, he also loses in identity. The groups with which he is associated are themselves so specialized and unstable that they can give him little of the recognition and security that everyone normally must have. This is as true in the job experience as in the social life. The loneliness and isolation confronting the individual in the large city is well known; and it is the source of a large portion of the personal disorganization found among urban inhabitants.

Probably the most disastrous effect of the urban mass society, socially, has been its influence upon the character of the family. Family life in the city has been robbed of most of its traditional social and economic functions. Factories have made the family almost entirely a *consuming* agency: it is no longer a *working* unit. Also, the intense use of land in the city has exerted a strong pressure in reducing the size of the family dwelling. The two together produce a severe strain upon the cash resources of the family; and as might well be expected, the urban birth-rates are notably smaller than those of the rural areas. The city still is a consumer of people; it is not yet replenishing the population it draws from the hinterland. Even the time-honored social functions of family life—religious experience, instruction of the young, recreation, sociability—are now to a very large extent centered outside the home; and this itself may well be a contributing factor in the personal disorganization of which we spoke a moment ago.

From the existence of the mass society springs the development of

secondary group life and controls. As we have just seen, the individual living in the city no longer feels the compulsion or the security of association with other individuals in his immediate environment. Neither his family nor his neighborhood means as much to him as they did formerly in terms of identity and conformity. Urban life has become much too swift-moving, impersonal, and fragmented for the informal primary group controls to remain completely adequate. Consequently, life in the city is marked by dependence on law and a great variety of voluntary secondary groupings to assure a measure of conformity and complacence by the individual. Criticism and opinion are much too slow to assure compliance by the individual in the city; the specific requirements and penalties provided by law are easily understood and applied. And on the less compulsive side, the great variety of voluntary associations—fraternal, religious, recreational, cultural, occupational, political, welfare, or community service—afford for the individual a means of satisfying, to some extent, the gregarious needs formerly met within the family and neighborhood circles.

It is to be noted, however, that this transfer is by no means universal. The family and neighborhood still are fairly stable in the less transient city areas—those sections where individual dwelling units still predominate. And membership in secondary groupings seems to be directly correlated with ascent in the economic scale.[11] Unfortunately, it is in those areas where overcrowding and underprivilege are greatest that these secondary associations are fewest—and where crime and delinquency flourish best.

Political. It is evident that so large and complex an aggregation of people as is to be found in the modern city cannot be expected to operate even tolerably well without some sort of regulation. The inability of the individual to stand alone in today's world is never so well illustrated as by the position he has in urban life. His most personal needs—food, water, clothing, shelter, and security—are available to him only by grace of cooperative effort; and each one of them must be of a quality that will be satisfactory by standards assuring health and safety for that individual. In short, there must be "rules of the game," established by authority competent to enforce the rule; and that authority affects the urban individual most intimately at the local, or municipal level of government.

Very practical questions readily arise in regard to the proper limits of the authority assumed by government in the name of the welfare and safety of the citizenry. What, in effect, is public business, how shall it be administered, and what is the proper balance between regulation of service rendered by private enterprises and performance of service by government itself? Let us consider, for a moment, the hazard of fire. There now is general agreement that government should provide fire protection, even though not so long ago this need was filled by private fire-fighting companies. But if there is to be fire protection, how far should the government

[11] Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society* (1949), pp. 280–287.

go in *preventing* fires? Arson has long been a crime; but if we are really going to prevent fire, we must also take precautions against allowing rubbish to accumulate, or permitting poorly planned or constructed housing to be built, or harboring dangerous manufacturing processes or storage of inflammable materials in densely populated areas. But all these precautions obviously limit individuals in their right to do with their property as they see fit! Fire fighting, moreover, requires the maintenance of efficient equipment and personnel, and even the strict regulation of highway traffic under conditions of emergency—still another restraint on individual "rights" in the name of public welfare and safety.

The struggle between individual freedom and governmental activity has been going on for centuries, of course; but the modern rise of urban life has greatly accelerated the movement toward the assumption of more responsibility by government. Thus, cities now provide public educational facilities (in some cases even at the college level), safeguard health, create parks and playgrounds for recreation, administer assistance for the aged and the indigent. Not infrequently, municipalities own and operate various utilities such as water, gas, electricity, and transportation systems; and even when these services are privately provided, the quality of the service and the charges to be made are closely regulated by government authority. Many of the standards of public service and administration are set by State or Federal Governments; but the actual performance of these duties is done in large part by the local government.

Such extensive activities on the part of city government necessarily means that public business is *business,* in a very literal sense. City governments obviously must function through agents, so that large numbers of citizens are employed, from the highly trained technician or professional person on down to the most unskilled laborer. The municipality not only renders many services "free" to the citizenry (as for example police, health, and fire protection), but also sells others at a price set according to the service rendered, as in the case of the utilities. It likewise buys large quantities of supplies, such as coal, printed material for records, equipment for the maintenance of public buildings and parks, highways, police and fire protection. It contracts for the construction of public buildings such as schools, museums, libraries, administrative halls, police and fire stations, as well as highways and bridges—to say nothing of negotiating for the necessary sites upon which to erect these various structures. And finally, like any other agency, it must pay its way; and the collecting of taxes and the financing of civic enterprises makes the fiscal operations no small part of the total governmental function.

In order to facilitate transaction of public business in the urban community, cities are given corporate status—a concept, incidentally, that has come down to us from the Romans. That is to say, a city operates like any other legal corporation; it is endowed by law with a legal personality, em-

powered in this instance to do in the name of all its citizens the things necessary to further their common interest. Thus, a city *as a city* can own property, buy and sell goods and services, even sue and be sued. In addition, it has broad powers of *eminent domain,* by which it can acquire land or other property rights necessary to promote its own interests. This is essential, of course, to assure the possibility of acquiring land for school sites, parks, police and fire protection, highway construction or widening, or slum clearance as the needs of the city develop or change. It is significant, however, that the city always derives its powers from a larger unit of government—primarily from the State in our country, although the Federal Government also has certain interests in city affairs. Cities thus must conform to the requirements of external authority, even though they are granted certain rights to enable them to fulfill their obligation to the larger governmental unit. This restriction of the political freedom of the city has for centuries been a source of sharp conflict between local and State interests and continues to be so, frequently, even in our own United States at the present time.[12]

The rapid growth of our larger cities in recent decades has led to a labyrinth of political authorities, partly due to the growth of public functions, partly to the nature of our political structure. Metropolitan areas frequently envelop formerly neighboring towns which continue to retain their old political identity; town and county governments similarly persist even though the land area may become integrated into the growing city in fact if not in law. Almost a quarter of our metropolitan areas even straddle State boundary lines, with a result that different parts of the same urban area are governed by different State law. And when new public services develop, it is commonly the practice to set up special districts or authorities—with autonomous political and tax power—to perform the service. Such, for example, are school districts, sanitary districts, sewer districts, library districts, health districts, park districts, forest preserve districts, and water districts. As a result, there is serious duplication of service and confusion of jurisdiction—despite the fact that the everyday life of the average citizen is carried on regardless of political boundaries, to say nothing of the course of disease or of the activities of the underworld.[13]

Nor is it to be wondered at that there is political favoritism. Officeholders commonly abuse their public trust in winking at evasions of the law; it is easy to cover up questionable "deals" in the award of contracts for public service; there is great temptation to give patronage of one sort or another in return for promised or implied support at the polls. Some of our strongest boss-ridden political machines have had their taproots in metropolitan urban areas. Nevertheless, charges that municipal services are excessively wasteful, corrupt, and costly generally have not been proven. The

[12] Munro, *op. cit.,* pp. 479–480.
[13] *Our Cities,* p. 67.

evidence suggests rather that public enterprises are, on the whole, at least comparable in cost to those conducted privately.[14] Indeed, we need only recall that the fraud and extravagance that does exist in public affairs results from collusion between dishonest public officials *and* unscrupulous private individuals and business organizations that seek to enlarge their profits at the "public trough." The guilt is by no means onesided.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE MODERN CITY

Our survey of the characteristics of the modern city already has suggested some of the problems that arise in urban communities. All cities are confronted with problems of crowding, of impersonal relations amongst the citizenry, of confusion in the administration of public business. Differences from one city to another will appear, of course, dependent upon the size of the community as well as upon its history and function. Obviously, a city of 10,000 inhabitants in the agricultural setting of the Great Plains will have much simpler problems than metropolitan cities like Philadelphia or Chicago, where the lives of millions are centered. A suburban village having urban status by virtue of being incorporated is not to be compared with cities like Albany (New York) or Washington, D.C., which are dominated by governmental activities; nor can we rightly lump the southern mill town, with its paternalistic patterns, and the intensely impersonal dealings of a financial and industrial center like Pittsburgh. Nevertheless, so great is the transportation and communication facility of our society that the impact of the urban way of life is felt quite sharply even in the rural areas of our nation.[15] Cities, then, vary more in degree than in kind in regard to the problems they face. With these reservations in mind, we can examine in more detail a few of the difficulties encountered by every fair-sized city in the handling of its public affairs.

Traffic. Probably more generally than in any other country in the world, cities in America have developed a characteristically high degree of centralization. Almost without exception, our cities have "downtown" areas which contain the major commercial and industrial activities, surrounded by adjacent slum areas, with "better" residential sections fanning out on the periphery depending on the geographic characteristics of the area. This pattern, moreover, seems to hold true quite commonly, regardless of the size of the city. The larger cities have more intense geographic concentration of offices, stores, factories, and even living quarters; skyscrapers are taller, factories and apartment houses are larger than those in the smaller towns, but the layout of the community is much the same in either case. The reasons, of course, are not hard to find. We have already noted the centralizing effect of the application of steam to industrial processes. That influence was felt in full force in America, because most

[14] Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.*, p. 362.
[15] See Chapter 12.

of our large cities have grown great under the aegis of the Industrial Revolution. Military considerations, walled boundaries, and tight political controls so necessary in former periods when cities were fighting for their very life against outside invasion, were virtually unknown in America. American cities were making almost a completely fresh start, and were free to develop with a minimum of obsolescent material and social restraints. Consequently, the matter of transportation was, from the beginning, the chief determinant of urban growth in America.

Unfortunately, adequate provision for the future requirements of transportation agencies was not made in those early days. In some few cases, notably Washington and Philadelphia, there was an attempt to provide networks of wide boulevards; but even these could not anticipate future growth and special needs. So as a general rule, the traditional rectangular "gridiron" pattern of city blocks was continued, and streets generally were kept at widths which then seemed quite reasonable, but have since proved far too narrow even in outlying residential sections. Nevertheless, most of the early transportation was by means of *public* vehicles, so the problem of cramped space developed only slowly. The succession of horse-drawn busses and cars, cable and electric cars, steam railway suburban trains, and electric subway and elevated trains below and above the streets kept fairly well abreast of the need for carrying people to and from their daily work. But all these modes of increasingly rapid transit also made it possible to concentrate *more* people into a relatively small work area, drawing them from ever-widening residential areas. And these added hundreds or even thousands of workers expected quick transportation within quite restricted periods of time—a situation which produced the now well-known problem of "rush hour" traffic.

The acute congestion of traffic in the streets of our larger cities undoubtedly has been caused by the phenomenal growth of the use of the automobile as a means of urban transport since the period of the First World War. To be sure, the vast number of privately owned automobiles has helped to make the population more mobile. The pressure on public transport systems has been relieved appreciably, and people can cover considerable distances to and from relatively inaccessible areas in a fairly short time when roads are not too heavily traveled. But the effect of the automobile has been preponderantly in the direction of accentuating traffic problems in our modern cities. While the automobile has made possible some dispersion of industrial and commercial activities to neighborhood areas, it has more notably contributed to the concentration of those activities in central zones. The old pattern of centralization created by the character of steam power has remained essentially unchanged. And the practical problems of accommodating millions of individually operated automobiles are tremendously increased. The steadily growing size of cars has still further intensified the problems created by sheer numbers. Factories and

stores are confronted with a demand for vast "parking lots" to store the automobiles of customers and employees during the hours when the machines are not in active use. The public streets likewise are jammed with the bulky, individually owned cars parked at curbs and in operation in the traffic lanes; and the problem is not made easier by the fact that most of the operators of the vehicles now are more or less occasional drivers whose understanding of and obedience to traffic regulations are—to say the least—far from uniform.

There has been no lack of imagination or effort on the part of engineers and city administrators to meet the traffic problems posed by the automobile. Streets have been widened, sometimes at enormous cost, and wholly new boulevards channeled to break the congestion created by narrow or irregular thoroughfares. Specific streets have been designated "one way" or "arterial" to permit greater speed with a higher degree of safety, with additional stop signs or lights to guard the more dangerous intersections. "Belt lines" and "county loops" have been set up to divert "through" traffic as much as possible from unnecessary travel through the commercial and industrial sections of the cities. Off-street parking facilities have been expanded to increase the space available for moving vehicles. Even car manufacturers have tried to increase speed and safety of driving by providing such devices as stop and other signaling lights, greater acceleration and braking power, and easier manipulation.

The traffic problems of the modern city, however, continue to grow more acute. All the developments we have just reviewed have served, in their total effect, simply to multiply the number of traveling units that can be handled by the urban street system; they have intensified the centralized organization of city life. The more cities increase their services to the citizenry, the larger become the downtown office and store buildings, and the sharper the competition for space by the people who must go to those areas to meet their own personal needs. Sooner or later, we shall have to equate the advantage of expediting urban traffic against that of reducing the need for such travel. The cost of modern urban travel is staggering, if we consider the time spent by millions of people each day in "bucking rush-hour traffic," the frightful toll of human life and limb and the *material* losses occasioned by traffic accidents, and the expense of providing and policing the highway facilities for rapid travel.[16] Already many communities are becoming aware of the possibility—if not the necessity—of decentralizing the functional aspects of community life by encouraging the development of small units of business and industry to serve their people in more local areas.

Housing. Perhaps the most important single aspect of urban life is the condition of the homes which the city provides for its citizens. After all, the family is the very core of our society; and the circumstances under

[16] *Our Cities,* pp. 58–59.

which the family's members live determine to a very large degree the values and habits that people will develop. It is true that poor housing does not necessarily mean that the children who live in dilapidated houses or poor neighborhoods will be badly reared; nor can we fairly say that a child in superior circumstances will himself necessarily have capacities and behavior patterns superior to those of less fortunate youngsters. But the evidence definitely points to such a tendency. The youth from the slums who "makes good" does so under great handicap; he is much more exposed to conditions breeding poor health, poor morals, and poor social and vocational training than is the child from the home having adequate space, light, heat, cleanliness, and surroundings. Crime, vice, disease, and illiteracy consistently show higher incidence in areas where poor housing prevails than in sections where families are housed in adequate dwelling units. Moreover, cities actually spend more to serve slum areas; studies have shown that in localities where poor housing exists, police, fire, health protection, and other necessary services cost more than in other sections. Municipal expenditures in such areas exceed the revenues many times over.[17]

Despite the high social and economic cost of poor housing, urban dwellers probably never have been adequately housed. Historically, space was always at a premium in the walled city-state, and people were compelled to live in cramped quarters. Even in the United States, the industries developing from the use of steam power required workers to live close to the factories: and multiple-unit housing—tenements, rooming houses, and flats—was the rule. At the present time, probably not more than half of our urban population lives in single-unit dwellings; and the proportion decreases rapidly as the size of the city becomes greater.

At least as serious as the crowding of many family units into small areas is the lag in supplying enough *new* quarters for a growing population or to replace dwellings lost by destruction or deterioration. It has been estimated that to supply the reasonable housing needs for the people of the United States, not less than a million new home-units will be required *each year* for at least a decade. Yet our record is far from assuring that such needs will be fulfilled. In the decades between 1919 and 1939, we averaged a little less than half that much, while during the depression years just prior to the Second World War hardly more than a quarter-million housing units were produced annually. During the five-year period of the war itself, about a million and a half permanent units were built; but their location was determined largely by the wartime housing needs of defense industries. Inflated price levels and the opposition to government housing programs kept construction still well below the needs of the country even after the war was over.[18]

[17] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, p. 240.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 234–236.

As might be expected, the continuing shortage of housing also has had a damaging influence upon the *quality* of housing. It is nevertheless astounding that as late as 1947, a Federal housing survey indicated that probably about 4 million of our 24,500,000 urban homes lacked private bath and toilet facilities, and well over twice as many did not have central heating systems.[19] The full import of such figures, however, is not realized until one translates them into specific terms of the overcrowding, filth, and darkness of the individual tenement houses in our larger cities, where hundreds of thousands of those cities' population find "home" in terms of *rooms*—rooms which are shared with other persons and even with other families.

Generally speaking, the American family needs more and better housing than it now has available. The reason for the shortage is basically that good housing still is a very expensive commodity; and the average American income is not sufficient to purchase the sort of housing that is considered "good" by present-day standards. For the most part, the construction of housing units has not yet lent itself to large-scale operations. Building materials are expensive, and labor costs are a very sizable item in the total cost. "Mass production" in the prefabrication of housing, for all its promise and publicity, simply has not proved practical; only a very small fraction of postwar housing has been of this type. In addition, there are appreciable expenses in housing construction, quite apart from the actual cost of building. Land values have been subject to speculative influences, and are often excessively high; the cost of borrowing the necessary capital—interest—is a major item when, as is usually the case, the customer does not have enough savings to make a substantial payment when the house is built; and real estate taxes continue to mount, due to the rising price levels and the expanding services rendered by the municipal government which such taxes, primarily, support.

Since the cost of building new houses continues to be so high, it is not surprising that private contractors cater mostly to prospective buyers who are in the upper income brackets. Thus, most of the new housing through the years has been built for the most prosperous third of our population. And there are those among us who believe that such a situation is not altogether objectionable; they point out that eventually the new housing comes on the market at lower prices, within the reach of other persons with lesser purchasing power. It is argued that in this way, the well-to-do bear the brunt of depreciation, and the accessibility of housing "filters down" to meet the needs of the rest of the population.

There is some merit in the "filtering down" idea; indeed the middle third of our family units get most of their housing through this process. But the trouble is that the "filtering" simply does not operate fast enough to serve the needs of the entire population. Houses have not been built

[19] Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

in sufficient numbers to meet the ever-expanding housing demands of a growing population. The long-term rise in price levels keeps the price range even of older housing much too high for a large portion of our people to buy until the houses have deteriorated in serviceableness from sheer age and hard use. As a result, at least a third of our population at any given time is living in definitely substandard structures. The fight against the slums has been almost universally a losing battle; and the situation grows more critical as our cities become older and more crowded.

The perennial and steadily mounting difficulty experienced by the individual in trying to achieve suitable housing has made some sort of collective action imperative. Industrial housing was provided by the Pullman Car Company for its employees at Pullman, Illinois, as early as 1885, and coöperative ventures have been undertaken by various groups in the years since, both in the United States and in other countries. Such projects, however, have been chiefly of interest as experiments. They have had varying degrees of success; and at best, from a quantitative point of view, have only slightly scratched the surface of the continuing problem of providing housing units fast enough and reasonably enough priced.

The Federal Government has struggled with the housing problem ever since the days of the "Great Depression." Beginning with the establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1932, its activities have been designed to stimulate production by providing insurance for funds expended for housing, to protect the equity of small home owners against deflated values or high interest charges (as with the Home Owners' Loan Corporation), and to provide at least some publicly owned housing for the poorest of the distressed lower third of our population living under slum conditions. The last of these programs was begun under the Housing Division of the Public Works Administration in 1933, partly as a means of providing employment for workers otherwise unable to find jobs in private industry.

The achievements of the Federal Government in developing a sound housing program have not been impressive. Many changes in the laws were proposed, and a few were adopted during the fifteen years that followed. It is true that large numbers of housing units were provided for an estimated 8,000,000 wartime migrants during the Second World War; but many of the units were improvised from existing housing, and nearly all were of flimsy construction and of little permanent value. Even the postwar Veterans' Emergency Housing Program of 1946, which many people hoped would be a symbol of a nation's gratitude to its returning Servicemen, proved abortive and was abandoned the following year. The fifteen-year effort was so sluggish that in 1948 it was reported that the total of low rent housing which Federal agencies had then facilitated, or would under existing arrangements make possible, was less than a half of one per cent

of the total existing housing.[20] Even under the more liberal provisions of the 1949 Housing Act, provision was made for only about 135,000 additional units of public housing annually—hardly more than a tenth of the estimated total need. Some 1,400,000 nonfarm housing units were undertaken in 1950, an all-time peak level. But let us remember that most of them were being produced for the upper two-thirds of our population. The other third continues to be served by substandard housing or our very meager public housing programs.

Public housing programs have met with widespread opposition, and only halfhearted public support. Opponents have insisted that public housing "will cost the taxpayers money"; that it will take properties off the tax rolls and thus tend to raise tax rates on taxable properties; that it will compete with "free enterprise" by reducing the market for housing. None of these contentions is borne out in fact: the projects are self-liquidating; public housing units, while not taxed, pay a fair levy for the public services they utilize; and "free enterprise" never has catered notably to the lowest income groups for whom the public housing units are intended. In a more positive sense, too, the removal of slums which frequently precedes the erection of public housing units tends to reduce the total cost of community services which we saw earlier are highest in low tax-value slum areas. Nevertheless, opponents of public housing measures have used their arguments to good advantage in influencing both legislators and public opinion. Proposals for expediting housing production by government regulation or building programs repeatedly have been blocked or effectively crippled, so that government influence in the field of housing remains at a minimum.

No doubt much of the opposition to governmental action in regard to housing is both selfish and dishonest. Politicians sometimes sell their positions of public trust for financial support by private individuals in election campaigns. Land owners do not want to forgo their chances for speculative gains. Real estate owners naturally want to be unhampered in their quest for maximum profit from the sale or rental of housing units. Producers or distributors of building equipment likewise seek unrestricted opportunity to charge as much as the market will bear for their products. Self-seeking contractors and labor leaders will try to block the losses apparent to them in the reduced construction costs resulting from large-scale building operations. Such high disregard for public welfare is thoroughly reprehensible.

There is, however, a large group of citizens who *honestly* question the advisability of increasing governmental intervention in the housing crisis. Many, of course, are resentful of "big government" in any matter which they feel is primarily of private concern. Others are doubtful of the ability

[20] *Social Work Year Book, 1949,* p. 238.

of government agents to do a competent job. But probably most are simply indifferent, and see no need for government action in the matter of housing because they are ignorant of the extent or nature of the housing problem. To be sure, most of them grumble about the high cost of buying or building a home, or about high rentals and gouging landlords. Yet they pay those exorbitant fees without effective protest, not realizing that the remedy lies in the same methods as those by which other housing problems already have been handled with some success. There are safety and sanitation codes, for example, and building inspectors to enforce them. These protective measures sprang into being as a result of a need for them, and are now generally accepted as necessary. In the absence of effective equality in bargaining power between private individuals, governmental intervention is necessary to prevent the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger.

The solution of our housing difficulties, therefore, probably is a matter chiefly of increasing public information. The need for government action is perfectly clear to most impartial persons familiar with the problem; but neither the majority of the people nor their leaders are at present prepared to face the task confronting them. Fortunately, however, some State and local governments already have begun to take positive steps to secure more housing for the citizenry. Unquestionably public support for their activities will grow as citizens become better informed as to the nature and objectives of public housing agencies.

Public Safety and Welfare. Of most immediate concern to the modern city among its problems, of course, are the direct, personal services rendered by the government to its citizenry. All of us are more or less familiar with the public safety and welfare activities of the local government—police and fire protection, the maintenance of the public health, the care of the aged dependent, the sick, and the destitute. Few of us, however, fully realize how much change there has been in the relationship of government agencies and the citizens, or how much increase there has been in the services performed by the various governmental agencies even within the past few decades. Cities in 1948 spent about $370,000,000, or almost 10 per cent of their total revenues, for police service, somewhat more for health and sanitation, a little less on public welfare, and some $280,000,000 for fire protection.[21] Our local governments spent fifteen times as much for public safety in 1942 as in 1890, little more than 50 years before; eighty times as much for sanitation and health, and more than thirty times as much for public welfare.[22] Table 17 shows in some detail both the enormous increase in the amounts expended by all local governments during this period, and significant changes in the percentage distribution for which the tax dollar is spent.

[21] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* p. 371.

[22] *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945,* U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1949, p. 315.

TABLE 17: OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1890 AND 1942 *

Type of Service	*1890*		*1942*	
	Millions of Dollars	Per Cent	Millions of Dollars	Per Cent
All Services	415	100	5,301	100
General Control	61	14.6	498	9.4
Public Safety	40	10.	635	12.
Highways	84	20.2	547	10.4
Sanitation and Health	3	.7	252	4.8
Hospitals, Public Welfare, Correction	30	7.2	972	18.2
Schools and Libraries	139	33.4	2,128	40.2
Recreation	3	.7	89	1.8
Other	55	13.2	171	3.2

* Adapted from *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1949), p. 315.

Mere figures alone, however, do not reflect adequately the tremendous expansion of personal service available to the average person from his local government. Indeed, the increase of amounts spent may well be considered a product of the growth of urban population, the rise in price levels, and the larger number of metropolitan cities quite as much as of increased or improved services. But we are apt to take many characteristics of modern city life for granted, and assume that people always have had abundant public resources at their disposal. Such assumptions are not well founded; and it may well be worthwhile to review very briefly some of the more spectacular developments in the public services which are so much a part of modern urban life.

The representative of government most familiar to the city dweller of today is probably the policeman. The citizen looks to the police for protection against assault or depredation, for leadership and direction of crowds and emergency conditions (whether it be "handling traffic" or clearing up the havoc of disaster), and for an almost unlimited variety of information regarding the community and his own relationship to it. The police, moreover, are commonly charged with the responsibility of seeing that the many public regulations are complied with by various private business enterprises such as taverns, hotels, dance and amusement halls, and restaurants. Another major—though sometimes highly intangible—function of the police in more recent years is the growing concern for the preventive aspects of maintaining the peace, looking toward the reduction of ob-

scenity, delinquency, and vice by the skillful building up of cordial relations with the public.

Such widely diversified functions are of comparatively modern origin. The "night watch" is of ancient origin, it is true. Its chief function at first was to stand guard over the community against the outbreak of fire and the approach of the outside marauder. If trouble developed, they aroused the able-bodied citizens available to deal with it as the occasion demanded. Full police protection by a night-time force in the modern sense did not begin in America till the end of the eighteenth century; and full time, unified day *and* night policing was not set up even in such cities as New York and Boston till scarcely more than a century ago. As late as the turn of the present century, candidates for the police force were chosen mostly on the basis of weight and brawn; their chief job was to harry the disorderly and apprehend, as best they could, the patent malefactor.

More colorful, perhaps, has been the development of protection against fire. It is a far cry from the day when every citizen was required to provide his bucket and service in establishing the fire "bucket brigade" to our modern fire fighting equipment manned by full time, paid firemen. In the first quarter of the past century, fire was being fought with hand-powered suction pumps and hoses of leather which often were used to convey water from one engine to another. The establishment of permanent piped water systems and the perfection of steam water-pumping fire engines about 1850 marked a distinctive improvement in fire fighting equipment. But even then, fire fighting was still largely a precarious matter; full-time, paid public fire departments did not develop extensively in American cities till after the War Between the States.[23]

Today, of course, motorized equipment has replaced the more romantic fire-horse; chemicals are used as extensively and in many cases far more effectively than water; improved roads and communication make it possible to use fire fighting equipment in the protection of lives and property over much wider areas than formerly. And even though volunteer fire fighting forces still are common in smaller communities, they are usually well trained and equipped to handle most of the fire fighting problems they are likely to encounter in their communities. Moreover, local and State laws have been enacted to reduce fire hazards by setting up safe codes for building construction, electric installations, storage of inflammables and explosives, and other preventive measures. As a result, fire losses in the urban American community, though still high as compared with other countries, are far below what they were even a half century ago.[24]

By far the most dramatic change in the service of city governments during the present century has occurred in the field of public health. During the closing years of the nineteenth century, many significant discoveries

[23] Edwin O. Christensen, *The Index of American Design* (1950), pp. 47–48.
[24] *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 4, p. 263, "Fire Protection."

had been made regarding the causes of sickness and the remedies that could be applied to reduce illness and death-rates. But for the most part, city health departments still were committed to rendering what now seems desultory and ineffective service. Some attempts were being made to keep water supplies clean, and to prevent adulteration and contamination of foodstuffs; but much of this activity was based on empirical observations regarding "cleanliness" and reduced death-rates. Similar considerations inspired quarantine and fumigation regulations for certain diseases that had been observed to be contagious, while the importance and means of proper sewage disposal were almost completely disregarded. Even vital statistics were not well kept; many older people today have difficulty in establishing their right to secure old-age benefits simply because births in their generation were so poorly recorded.

Even so brief a sketch brings into sharp focus the tremendous contrast with today's public health service. The discoveries of the last decades of the nineteenth century regarding microbes and their direct and often deadly effects on human well-being led to subsequent discoveries as to how to combat these organisms. New health regulations and services sprang up rapidly; water supplies came to be scientifically tested and treated to guard against contamination; milk supplies were increasingly subjected to pasteurization; sewage disposal became a major concern; the newly uniformed "Whitewing" street sweepers of New York and other metropolitan cities came almost to be the symbol of the new emphasis on the general need for cleanliness, both community and personal. Campaigns were launched to drain the swamp areas, equip living quarters with screening, rid the cities of rodents and other germ-bearing vermin. Child welfare education has grown steadily, reducing enormously both infant mortality and the crippling effects of diseases so prevalent among children of a generation or two ago. Hospitals have become truly service agencies rather than—as formerly—places of last resort where most who entered, died. Dispensaries, traveling clinics, and visiting nurses now minister to young and old alike, combatting disease directly and effectively, and carrying a message of self-help to the citizenry in matters of preventing disease and maintaining good health. State and Federal health agencies have provided invaluable assistance and stimulation in the development of public health service; but in the last analysis, the task of implementing the program has remained in the hands of the local units of government.

In similar fashion, local governments in recent decades have greatly increased the variety and improved the quality of other services to the citizenry. The poorhouse is no longer the sole or primary answer of government to individual problems of old age, disability, or dependency. The orphan asylum fortunately is no longer the inevitable fate of the child of parents unable or unwilling to care for him. The unemployed no longer must depend on the "soup lines" so characteristic of nineteenth century

charity in urban areas. Vocational rehabilitation and family welfare services—both private and public—have all but closed the doors of poorhouses to any but the aged. The poorhouse more and more is being reserved for the care of the aged, infirm dependent for whom little else can be done. Children of deceased or improvident parents now are being placed in individual family homes, or aided in their own homes wherever possible. And the unemployed now can expect insurance payments or, at need, the sustained help of trained and understanding caseworkers. In short, the comprehensive network of public welfare services we find operative so generally around us today is, for the most part, a product of the social security program which grew out of the "Great Depression" of hardly a generation ago. Again, as in the case of public health service, the growth of these new relationships between the individual and his government has been paced to a very large extent by State and Federal agencies. Yet the actual rendering of the service is generally done or at least implemented by the local unit of government.

It is obvious that the tremendous expansion of public safety and welfare services of local governments has been necessitated by the growing complexity of modern urban life. There is an ever-increasing need for assistance to the individual to enable him to function effectively and with a fair sense of well-being. Fortunately the steady rise in the productivity of our economic system has been coupled with a common acceptance of the idea that government power and expenditure should be increased to provide for the security of the people. But the many agencies of government, after all, are only institutions—the framework for organized, collective effort. Their effectiveness, in the last analysis, depends upon the people who man them, the competence and integrity of the personnel in government service.

We hear much of the extravagance and inefficiency in the administration of city government—the graft that occurs in the letting of contracts for city buildings or streets, for example, or in the apparent overbuying of land or equipment for municipal use. We even hear, although less frequently, of the evils of gambling and vice, the best-known examples of the existence of corruption of government agents. Reprehensible as these matters are, however, how much more disastrous, potentially, are the favors that permit industries to pollute our water supplies, or winking at fire codes in the construction and use of public and private buildings, or ignoring the sanitary codes in the erection or operation of hotels, apartment houses, restaurants, or even individual homes, or the persistent and willful violation of ordinances intended to safeguard the purity and cleanliness of our foodstuffs and milk supplies! We are, indeed, apt to underestimate the insidious influence of political favoritism and special privilege in the ordinary function of our city enterprises.

To point the danger is in large part to suggest the remedy. The more

direct expenditures of city governments for public safety and welfare increase, the more we must insist upon the obtainment of trained, competent persons of sound judgment and conviction who will not use their trust, or allow it to be used, for purposes of personal expediency. The very antithesis of such a concept is the presence of the political appointee in government service—the person who is awarded his job by virtue of prior service to an individual or political "machine," who has no practical knowledge of, or competence in, the job he holds, and who necessarily will place the interest of his patron above that of his fellow-citizens in order to retain his job.

If we are to have increased services from our city governments, we shall have them most economically and efficiently if we will seek out qualified persons to do the job—and be willing to pay fairly for the quality of service we demand. Adequate salaries paid to city officials will repay dividends abundantly by making it possible to secure capable individuals to fill the posts, to keep them there, and to reduce to a minimum the threat of graft and bribery which thrive best among underpaid and undertrained employees in any business, public or private.

Recreation. Recreational activity is found in every living society, and was engaged in even by prehistoric peoples. But no other culture has produced the abundance or variety of play activity that is to be found in the average American community. Movies, radio, dance halls, taverns, sports, magazines come readily to mind; less commonly thought of and perhaps less commonly accessible are such things as libraries, museums, community and youth centers, parks, community-sponsored musical and dramatic programs, playgrounds, swimming pools and beaches. Altogether, probably between 15 and 20 per cent of the total national income is used for recreational activities of one sort or another; and of course most of this is spent in the city.[25]

The reasons for the development of such a galaxy of recreational opportunities as has just been suggested are not hard to find. The same expanded productivity of modern industry which made possible the expenditure of more capital for recreational ventures also gave people more leisure time in which to seek their pleasure. Smaller homes and surrounding yards compelled people to join forces with their neighbors in community activities of one sort or another. Interestingly enough, the growth of *public* concern for the character and amount of recreational facilities seems to have sprung from much the same sources as the growth of public health service: the crowding and filth of the slum areas of our cities prompted social workers and others at the turn of the present century to urge the establishment of playgrounds, gyms, and similar recreational agencies to help in the development of healthy bodies among underprivileged children. Subsequently, of course, the demand for greater public activity in

[25] Gist and Halbert, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

the field of recreation received sharp impetus in the various emergency periods of our recent history—notably the two World Wars, and the intervening period of depression beginning about 1930.[26]

It can hardly be said that the average American community lacks for recreation, in terms of the variety and extent of entertainment that is offered by both private and public agencies. The real problems arise in getting an adequate distribution of the *right kinds* of recreation. Commercial agencies pose the most serious difficulties. We must remember that commercial attractions are provided only at a direct financial cost to the person who patronizes them: he must have the price of admission, or he cannot participate. As a result, large segments of the population are deprived of such opportunity for enjoyment—the young and the aged, for example, or the unemployed and their families during periods of depression when they have much unoccupied time. Moreover, commercial enterprises are operated primarily for profit. And since recreation is primarily a release from the ordinary strains and inhibitions of life, the profit will tend to be greatest for him who supplies the quickest and biggest "release." Unfortunately, such objectives are not always socially acceptable. The tendency, under competitive conditions, is for the standards to be set by the least principled competitor allowed to continue in operation. As a result, municipal authorities must be constantly vigilant in regard to the appearance of such defections as obscene literature or entertainment, gambling and vice, and tavern violations of ordinances pertaining to closing hours and illegal sale of liquor to minors. It is not hard to imagine the consequence when government agents become lax or corrupted in the administration of their duties in regard to commercial recreation.

Not all privately promoted recreation is on a commercial basis, of course. Churches, lodges, service clubs, private welfare agencies, and even business houses frequently have extensive programs of recreation for their members, guests, employees, or particular groups of underprivileged persons. Similarly libraries, museums, and historic sites are usually maintained wholly or in large part by private agencies. The contribution of such enterprises to the total well-being of the community is inestimable. Nor is it to be inferred that all commercial recreation is inherently to be deplored. To the contrary, *most* operators of profit-seeking ventures in the recreation field seek to comply with the standards of decency and fair play set up by the community. Generally speaking, too, they provide a large measure of wholesome recreation to the major portion of the city's population that can well afford to make a direct payment for such service.

The need for publicly sponsored recreational programs, however, is being recognized increasingly. The recreation program for children has long since passed beyond the mere provision of playgrounds. More and more, the schools now being built include gymnasiums which are used both

[26] *Social Work Year Book, 1951*, p. 424.

to augment the children's training and to house many of the leisure time activities of adults. The dense population of the more congested areas in the large cities has made necessary the creation of park strips for family outings, and recreational centers and supervisory personnel are being provided to encourage organized community play. Some of these are found in sizable parks, while others are located in closely settled neighborhood areas. All are intended to serve the particular needs of the various types of people within the community, regardless of race, religious affiliation, age, sex, or social or economic status. Such an inclusive program can be undertaken most effectively by the community acting together, through its government.

Providing extensive public recreation, however, is not accomplished without administrative difficulties. The average citizen is all too often prone to accept service from his government while complaining bitterly at the necessary rise in the tax burden. Frequently, too, the recreation program is so broad that special financial authority must be provided, or it extends beyond the geographic limits of the city. In either case, there arises the need for developing city-county coöperation and often even State legislative action to make such expansion legal. Until such an organization is accomplished, there is frequently a good deal of friction between county and city officials regarding police authority, the hiring of personnel, the sharing of the financial burden, and even the right of particular citizens —urban and rural residents—to share in the use of a given service. Finally, the need for comprehensive and long-range planning is perennial—planning not only the physical outlay in terms of park space and recreation buildings, but for the citizenry and its needs. Due account must be taken of existing agencies and their services as well as of the particular needs of specific groups of people within the community or neighborhood. And once again, the effectiveness of the program which emerges will depend almost entirely upon the competence and integrity of the people in positions of public trust and authority.

Education. About 40 per cent of the public expenditures of the urban centers today are for educational purposes, the largest single item in the average city's budget. Most of this is used to provide "public school" education for the young, up through the high school years; but in recent years the larger cities have been supporting "city colleges," junior colleges, vocational schools, and various special training and cultural programs for the adult population as well. The administration of education has always been primarily at the local level in the United States, whether urban or rural; and for the most part the citizenry has shown a readiness to accept the considerable tax burden which a reasonably adequate educational program for its children has entailed.

It cannot be said, however, that the educational policies and agencies have functioned altogether smoothly. To the contrary, the very fact that

the school system is locally controlled and supported makes it especially subject to the many cross-currents of particular "special interests" and opinion in the community. Moreover, people probably feel more competent—and privileged—to enter into such controversy than perhaps any other phase of local affairs, since it is *their* children whose welfare is at stake, *their* ideas that are to be preserved; and haven't they themselves vivid recollections of *their own* school experience?

Among the more familiar problems of the city educational system are those pertaining to the maintenance of the schools themselves—the buildings and the teaching personnel alike. The rapid shift of urban population from one city to another and from one section of a given city to another makes it difficult to place schools where they are most needed. Old schools must be abandoned as residential areas yield to commercial or industrial use, or to public enterprises like parks, or new governmental buildings; probable trends of population movement and growth must be anticipated in planning both the size and location of new schools before the acquisition of the necessary land becomes excessively high. Moreover, the design of the building itself must be adapted to the changing curriculum and community functions imposed upon the modern school as compared with that of a generation or two ago. And all these matters must be dealt with within the legally prescribed limitation on the debt that can be incurred by the community for educational purposes. Nor has it been easy to maintain adequate and competent teaching staffs. The local school has felt an especially sharp impact from the steadily broadening occupational opportunities open to women. It follows, of course, that the public school teaching profession will not be particularly attractive to young men and women choosing their life work. Salaries paid to teachers are traditionally low, and increasingly heavy demands are made upon the average teacher in terms of teaching loads and community service, and often even in matters of personal deportment. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of experienced teachers have abandoned the profession during the past two decades, in favor of the higher wage scales and greater personal freedom that beckon in other occupations.[27]

Less generally recognized is the character of city life itself as it affects the educational service of the city's schools. Interested as people are in the welfare and training of their children, they are not always in a position to know or recognize the influence of politics upon the administration of the school system. Economically, education is the biggest single public business of local communities. Moreover, the schools commonly are operated under separate budgets and financed by separate tax assessments, which makes those who guide school policies more or less a "law unto themselves." Even more important, the schools are concerned with the minds of the rising generation—with not only the economic thinking of

[27] See Chapter 14.

the future, but with the social standards and the political perspicacity as well. Thus the stakes are huge; and the sinister threat of corruption, favoritism, and special interest is especially dangerous to the local school system. Yet this heavy responsibility is entrusted to elected school boards who may or may not have appropriate qualifications for the job they assume! The lure of private gain to be had in the purchase of sites or the letting of contracts for school construction is ever-present; even the repair and servicing of buildings already in operation is a privilege that can be reserved to board members' friends, or others who make attractive "side" offers for the contracts. Still more vicious in its potentiality is the power of special interests in selecting the personnel of the school system or the content of the curriculum. All too frequently teachers or administrators are chosen —or rejected—not so much on the basis of their competence as upon their "connections," political, religious, or social. Inferior or insufficient teachers and schools are not uncommonly provided for "submerged" racial or nationality groups within the community, either as a means of maintaining the submergence or simply because those groups are not effectively represented on the board. Certain subjects may be included in —or deleted from—the curriculum not on the basis of community well-being but on that of the desire or power of selfish or misguided groups to impose their will upon the individuals who make up the board; indeed the board itself may be made up of persons who represent dominant special interests rather than the community itself.

If any one aspect of city government is more important than any other, it is unquestionably that of education; and it is here that the integrity and competence of those in power are most imperative. Yet tragically enough, it is among the areas of civic enterprise in which such qualities are least effectively assured.

Political Reorganization. The amelioration of the various public problems of the modern city must be accomplished, in each case, by some form of community action. And in the last analysis, that requires the use of government, since government is the only instrument we have which all of us can use together to work toward our common welfare. But paradoxically, present-day municipal government itself is a major problem. The framework of city government was laid in days when the functions of government were relatively few and easily defined. Our cities have done remarkably well, all things considered, in keeping abreast of the rapidly mounting complexity of demands made for public services. They have done it largely by creating new departments, districts, authorities, or other specific-purpose agencies to handle new conditions or needs as they arose. But the result has been a welter of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions, since there has been little concerted attempt to define public policy comprehensively, or to facilitate full coöperation between the various agencies concerned with local public service.

The need for more central authority in the administration of municipal business is clear. There should be a single source of policy and action—whether by city managers, commissions, or even the traditional mayor and council pattern—to avoid the obvious wastes of duplication. And the geographic basis for government action must be expanded to keep pace with the expanding geographic region that is directly involved in the daily function of the city as a whole. Finally, a well-integrated tax program is necessary to finance governmental activities in such a way that the burden of taxes will be borne equitably by the citizenry.

Reorganization can be sought in a variety of ways, probably in combination according to the specific needs of the individual community. Most obvious, of course, is the merger of individual government units, be they contiguous cities or villages, suburbs, or even town and county units. Less drastic, and often equally effective, are the federation of local governments, or the drawing up of multilateral agreements to meet problems common to all the units involved. Some benefit flows even from pooling all special-function "districts" in the area under one administrative and financial control. Still other problems, notably those pertaining to policing, highways, water supply, public education, and welfare are probably best met by expanding State and Federal relations with the local government. There is danger in the latter proposals, because local communities tend to become increasingly dependent on larger units of government—and lose their initiative and prerogatives in the bargain.

The real difficulties attendant upon political reorganization, however, are centered primarily in getting public support for it. The average citizen is indifferent to the welter of local problems of government; he has much more definite ideas about what should be done in State and national affairs. Yet that indifference may be more apparent than real; vested interests are more apt to play a part in the average person's political thinking in local matters than in State or federal. He is much more likely to have a friend or relative in one or another of the many agencies of city government, or perhaps his own work is dependent at least in part on city contracts—and on keeping "right" with neighbor Jones, who has "influence" in the City Hall.

There is evidence that the power of the oldtime political machines and their bosses is breaking up. The restriction of immigration and the rise of inclusive labor unions have reduced the number of destitute or otherwise distressed who will sell their vote for a helping hand; and the increase of Federal activity in such matters as social security, relief administration, and housing finance has curtailed the use of local public funds to control the ballot. But reorganization efforts still founder upon the fact that economic, religious, or fraternal ties commonly make citizens reluctant to support any proposal that involves change. Even women are finding it difficult to "clean up politics," since sooner or later they are likely to

find the cleaning process affects the advantage of their own menfolk—and themselves.

THE FUTURE OF THE CITY

Nobody knows what the future holds for the course of urban development. None can prophesy even the fundamental requirements of what we must provide in terms of urban services. One of our most urgent questions, for example, arises in the consideration of military protection. Are our large cities indefensible in the presence of the atomic bomb? And if so, must we decentralize our population, or can we hope to resolve our danger by the development of effective political equivalents of warfare? *Can* we decentralize and maintain our productive efficiency, and is decentralization a sure guarantee of security from atomic attack?

In considering such matters, we are soon beset by new questions, as yet unanswered, regarding the full potential of our new technology with reference to reshaping our city life. We are intrigued by suggestions that whole cities can be built and maintained underground, or that transportation problems can be met by superhighways, or massive self-contained skyscraper units, or wholesale daily exodus from urban centers by air transport or helicopters. But how can we really assess the practical worth of such ideas, or the ultimate potentialities of our technical resources? Indeed, do we know what we ourselves want—in what direction we would move, granting that any one of several alternative courses might be equally feasible in working to create "the city of tomorrow"?

Back to the Land. There are those who maintain that the answer lies in abandoning the city. They note that many individuals already have achieved great personal security and satisfaction by resorting to limited farming operations in areas just outside the city. From this, they deduce that the rest of us could profitably do the same thing. A moment's reflection, however, suggests that such a program is highly unrealistic. The individual "gentleman farmer" still depends heavily upon the services of the nearby urban center, since the high degree of coöperation that has made possible our extraordinary industrial productivity simply cannot persist in the relative isolation of open-country living. Indeed, the return to small-scale farming would greatly reduce the productivity of our agricultural enterprise itself. Cities have always been the focal point, the matrix of social change; and without the existence of people living and working together, the very basis of emergent leadership is lost.

Decentralization. Less extreme, and in many ways more realistic, are those who insist that the real weakness of the city lies in its gigantic size. They point out the tremendous losses that arise from cramped living quarters, from traffic congestion, from lack of space for recreation and the resulting high costs of poor health and excessive delinquency—all problems that we have been considering earlier in this chapter. Moreover,

there are military considerations that make the large city especially vulnerable because of the enormously complex operations necessary to maintain millions or even hundreds of thousands of people in such relatively small areas—electric power, fuel and gas, water, sewage and garbage disposal, and the prodigious quantity of food and other supplies that must be shipped into the city every day if it is to survive.

The remedy, they contend, is apparent and readily at hand. They would have us abandon our sprawling and overgrown cities and turn to the development of the small town as the focal point for our community life. The existence of small electric and gasoline power units makes it possible to accomplish most of our productive processes in relatively small manufacturing establishments. The products can be moved to marketing centers or assembly points for further manufacture by means of our highly developed and versatile transportation system. Even the complex and large-scale business operations necessary for directing the flow of goods and transferring title to them can be handled by relatively small business administrative units, thanks to our facilities for almost instantaneous communication.[28] Moreover, there is little doubt that most of the infiltration of urban service into the rural areas is taking place through the medium of the small town. The encouragement of the growth of such communities will therefore stimulate rural demand for city products, while giving urban dwellers greater access to the wholesome influence of the open country.

Persistence of the Metropolis. It does not seem possible that our metropolitan cities, such as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles, can continue to grow much larger. When cities reach a population size approximating a million, they begin to develop problems of administration and physical operation that can be met only at great expense; and as the size grows larger, the cost of necessary *changes* to meet these problems becomes almost prohibitive. Consider, for example, the development of "Radio City" and of the UN buildings in New York. They have eliminated some—but by no means any appreciable part—of that city's "blighted" areas; but the cost has been enormous, and in one case borne by international cooperation! Yet we certainly are not likely to abandon our metropolitan centers lightly, despite whatever logical reasons there may be to favor such a course. Indeed, it is doubtful that we could do so, even if we would. The metropolis represents vast outlays of invested capital on the part of people both individually and collectively; and abandonment would mean declaring those properties and physical plants worthless. Obviously, the great majority of property owners could not afford to take such losses and move elsewhere to start life anew; nor could the government itself underwrite such a colossal undertaking.

Moreover, there still are positive advantages to be gained from sheer

[28] Thompson, *op. cit.*, Ch. XX.

size that cannot be had where aggregations of people are smaller. Some industrial processes—notably steel, shipyards and shipping, and automobile and airplane manufacture—require large processing units and large labor supplies. Various personal services such as libraries, hospitals, special professional talents, comprehensive newspaper and other publishing facilities function best when they can draw support readily from highly concentrated population. It is easy to suggest that our highly developed transportation network counteracts such advantages; but practically the movement of goods already taxes our transportation facilities heavily, and fast travel for individuals still is costly in terms of both time and money. It is true, of course, that large cities are prime bombing targets; yet many of them have survived concentrated attack. And some experts already are suggesting that fear of reprisal and other practical considerations may very well inhibit promiscuous use of the atom bomb in future military strife.

It is most likely, therefore, that while our biggest metropolitan areas may not grow much larger in the future, our smaller large cities will continue to grow in size. As the population of the country increases, people still will look to the great urban centers for the goods and services they require. The metropolis, wherever it may be, still sets the pace for the economic, social, and political life of the region it serves. It has always done so; and there seems no conclusive reason to believe that it will not—or even should not—do so in the future.

Government and the Urban Community. Regardless of the size or character of the urban community of the future, we can be sure that the rôle of government will be increasingly important. Whether the city be of 5,000 inhabitants or 5,000,000, it is plain that the individual citizen, acting alone, cannot assure his own health or safety. The efforts of private operators have definitely proved unequal to the task of providing such services as universal schooling, police and fire protection, street maintenance and repair, or proper control of water supply and sewage disposal. On the other hand, private interests have often waxed prosperous at the expense of the community, taking advantage of the inability (or disinclination) of the people as a whole to defend the public welfare. Altogether, the situation is well stated in the following words:

> True liberty is as consistent with the reasonable discipline of disorderly conditions in civic growth as it is with the discipline of disorderly individuals. If the public had had a sound idea of liberty, most of the harm that has come to cities in their periods of rapid development would have been prevented. Incidentally, if this idea prevailed at present there would not exist the continued toleration of slum districts and the erection of buildings that are likely to degenerate into slums; the lowering of values in residential neighborhoods as a result of the indiscriminate construction of stores and apartment buildings in wrong places; the creation of impediments to traffic circulation on streets through overbuilding on the land. . . . What has been chiefly lacking has been the prevention of abuses of property

rights in the initial stages of development. . . . To be successful, the planning of communities must be rooted in the principle that land should be developed for healthful use and in the interest of the community as a whole, not for the purpose of speculation and in the financial interest of a few.[29]

It is too much to ask that all individuals, acting separately, can and will operate unanimously in favor of community welfare. There must be *community* decision and action; and that necessarily must come through government. And at the risk of repetition, it is well to recall that government administration is only as good as its administrators. There is urgent need for competent men and women in local government posts, persons trained in government processes as well as in the particular field in which their specific responsibility lies, and of unquestionable integrity in the performance of their duties. There is equally urgent need for an alert and enlightened citizenry, willing to pay the cost of securing such administration. Only thus can we hope to attract and retain capable personnel for municipal jobs and to minimize the corruption and inefficiency which otherwise inevitably creeps in. Local government today is far from being as efficient as it should be; nevertheless it is the only instrumentality by which the urban citizen can achieve a satisfactory community life for himself and his family. It is to his interest, therefore, to concern himself with the nature of his city's political machinery and the personnel that operates it.

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[29] Thomas Adams, *Outline of Town and City Planning* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1935), pp. 145–147. Quoted by permission.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show the antiquity of cities. Why did modern cities fail to achieve power comparable to that of ancient cities till within the past two centuries?
2. How did the Industrial Revolution affect the character of city life?
3. Show the importance of political developments to the growth of modern cities.
4. Sketch the effects of the peculiarities of steam power in the early development of modern American cities.
5. What is meant by the statement that modern city dwellers are economically citizens of the world in deed?
6. List the gains and the losses from the development of "mass society" in modern urban life.
7. It has been said that men generally have gained maximum collective security in today's city, but individually are confronted with almost unparalleled insecurity. Defend or attack this idea, giving reasons for your position.
8. What is the relation between city and State governments? What are some of the legal powers possessed by the city?
9. Describe the usual physical pattern of American cities. Why are American cities so highly centralized?
10. How has the use of the automobile affected traffic problems in your home town (or in the town you know best)? What is being done there to handle those problems?
11. Is there any correlation between poor housing and personal disorganization? and social disorganization? Explain.
12. Indicate the extent of the shortage of suitable housing in the United States. What reasons might be given to explain such a serious housing shortage in a country as rich as ours?
13. What attempts have been made to expedite housing construction in recent years? What degree of success has been achieved?
14. Sketch the history of urban police and fire protection.
15. Indicate and account for the tremendous growth of city health services since 1890.
16. Is the growth of city public safety and welfare service in recent decades really necessary? Show why, or why not.
17. What are the shortcomings of "commercialized recreation"? What impediments hamper the development of public recreational facilities?
18. Do the people in your home community feel that there are "too many frills" in the program of the local schools? Explain the probable reasons for the prevailing feeling.
19. List the members of your local school board, and their experience. Do you think they are particularly well qualified to handle the educational problems of the community?
20. What is to be gained from political reorganization within the government of the city? Why are people so generally antagonistic to such change?
21. Do you agree with the idea that great cities like New York, London, or Chicago are made obsolescent by the coming of the "atomic age"? Defend your position.
22. Why is government likely to be important in shaping the course of future urban government?

12. Social Problems of Rural Life

CITY LIFE IN the United States has grown so dominant and so attractive that we are apt to lose sight of the great number of people who still remain on the farm. Yet, until about the time of the First World War, city dwellers were actually in the minority. Even today, about 40 per cent of our citizens are rural dwellers, and farm workers number at least a sixth of our gainfully employed persons.

In America, as everywhere else, the whole social order rests squarely upon agricultural productivity. Obviously, all of us have to be fed and clothed; and these basic needs are supplied, to begin with, from the products of the farm. If farming methods are inefficient, then more of us must occupy ourselves with farming; but as we learn how to secure greater returns from the soil, more of us can turn our energies to other tasks. We can then produce a much wider range of things to make ourselves happy and comfortable. The development of farming efficiency in America has contributed much to the steady rise in our standard of living. That efficiency has been a result of several conditions peculiar to our American history.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RURAL LIFE

Our first settlers brought with them the agricultural techniques with which they were familiar, but they left behind them most of the old-world social relationships which surrounded farming, particularly those of European countries. To be sure, even their farming methods underwent change, because many of the animals and plants they brought with them perished in the new environment. Some of the early colonists leaned heavily upon the bounty of the Indians during the first years; and the subsequent addition of such Indian crops as maize, potatoes, peanuts, tomatoes, chocolate, and tobacco to our staple products is well known. Far more important, however, is the fact that the colonists migrated in protest against the social, economic, and political restraints of the old-world homelands. As applied to agriculture, this meant that each individual farmer was to

have full possession of the land he worked, and the product derived from it. There were to be no lord-and-peasant system, and no burdensome State tax or church tithe to reduce farmer income to a pittance. Such freedom, of course, was made possible by the fact that large tracts of fertile, virgin land were available virtually by taking possession and settling upon them. So the immigrants of centuries, down to about 1890 when "free land" disappeared, became independent and prosperous farmers, with a minimum of interference from the outside.

As a result of the conditions which surrounded the development of American agriculture, private property rights were naturally of uppermost importance. An almost unrestrained individual enterprise prevailed in farming, comparable with the "laissez-faire" practices which attended the early growth of industry. The farmer could plant what he pleased, and sell as much as he could raise. It was assumed that the individual farmer could —and would—keep his farm operating at maximum efficiency, in order to profit most.

Still more significant, however, has been the almost complete lack of class consciousness and solidarity among our farmers. Each individual farmer "minds his own business," with a minimum of coöperation with other farmers who may even produce the same crops. Our farms still are dominantly operated by their owners, so that there is a very strong conservatism in rural areas. The farmer distrusts any change which may seem to reduce his control over the property he owns. So farmers seldom unite to increase their bargaining power against other groups in our national life. To be sure, there have been many specific instances of farmer organization and demands, such as the campaign for railroad regulation, the recurring attack on monopoly and high tariff in industry and commerce, or the unceasing call for lower interest rates and cheaper money.[1] But such demands nearly always have been of specific nature; so that when issues were compromised, the unity of action among farmers disappeared.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF RURAL LIFE

On the human side, as we have just seen, American agriculture is operated by individuals who are acting on their own initiative and in their own interests. Farms generally are not larger than what can be operated (or managed) by a single farmer and his family. Each farm is a complete producing unit (except occasionally for some of the larger machines like threshers, which may be owned by several farmers together), and every farmer makes his own decisions as to what and how much he shall raise, and plans his work to suit his own convenience.

The nature of the product itself, however, gives agricultural production

[1] Even though the majority of farmers are owners, farmers are also a "debtor class," generally speaking, due to the necessity for borrowing money to pay for their farms, or to finance crop production from one season to another.

still other characteristic features. Most farm production is extractive—that is, the product is "extracted" from the soil directly (as with grain or cotton), or indirectly (as with meat or dairy products). The weather obviously plays an important part in determining the yield, as does the fertility of the soil. And lastly, the products of the farm are necessarily standardized. Thus, the individual farmer cannot hope to increase his market by "building a better mouse trap," so to speak. As an individual operator, his only chances to increase his income are by more efficient farming methods, or by increased acreage.

The results of the application of science in improving farm efficiency have been truly amazing. Indeed, we have experienced an *agricultural* revolution during the past hundred and fifty years that closely rivals the much better known "*Industrial* Revolution." It has been said that as late as the turn of the nineteenth century—

> . . . Farmers here and abroad were still employing largely the techniques of 3,000 years before. Plows were wooden, crude. In many areas hand tools were favored over plows in preparing soils for seeding. Cotton and corn were planted by dropping seed and covering it with a hoe—much as suburban gardeners of today plant radishes, endive, or sweet corn. Small grains were sown by hand. Cultivation and harvest were performed largely with hand methods. . . . In 1787, the year the Constitution was framed, the surplus food produced by 19 farmers went to feed one city person. In recent average years 19 people on farms have produced enough food for 56 non-farm people, plus 10 living abroad.[2]

These enormous gains have been made in several ways. Animals and plant life are bred to yield a much better return than formerly, due to our greater understanding of heredity. We have learned to control parasites, so that losses by disease and destruction have been sharply reduced. Our knowledge of chemistry has given us a better appreciation of the need for soil fertilizing, and of the importance of adapting particular crops to certain kinds of soil and climatic conditions. The development of mechanical invention also has been exceedingly important. The effect of the cotton gin upon the value of the cotton crop is well known, and the recently developed cotton picker may prove to be similarly revolutionary. Gang plows, reapers, binders, threshing machines, silo fillers, milking machines, and tractors—to list only a few—all have played an enormous part in increasing the effectiveness of a day's work by an average farmer. And the development of methods of canning, preserving, refrigerating, and freezing have greatly reduced losses from spoilage, thus making possible a fuller effective use of what has been produced. Great as have been the changes in farming methods, the cost of the new methods and equipment has not yet been so great as to crowd out the "small producer," as it has in the case of industrial expansion. As a result, the individual farmer still

[2] "Technological Trends in Relation to Agriculture," from the *Report of the Subcommittee on Technology to the National Resources Planning Board* (1937), pp. 97 and 99.

remains independent, and is still jealous of surrendering any part of his control over the activities on his farm.

It has never been easy for American farmers to secure the financial assistance they need for efficient farming. Their difficulty has been due partly to the uncertainties inherent in agriculture, and partly to the individualism of the farmers themselves, which we have just mentioned.

Most short-term farm loans are based on what the farm is expected to produce. Yet many agricultural risks are almost unpredictable. Weather conditions defy any sort of accurate long-term prognostication. Storms and drought are both destructive, and both are largely unheralded. Disease or parasites may attack farm animals or crops at any time. On the other hand, long-term loans are usually for farm land or equipment purchase, both of which are tangible and measurable. Yet it is difficult to foresee the *value* of either land or equipment, even five or ten years in the future. So naturally investors hesitate to lend money to farmers for long periods, except at high interest rates.

Nevertheless, the farmers' own lack of organization is also a factor in their financial difficulties. The Scandinavian countries (Denmark particularly) have demonstrated what farmers can accomplish *as a group*. Where risks are shared by an organization of responsible farmers, then investors naturally are more liberal in their lending policies. The chance for loss from one particular farmer's failure is greatly reduced. Farmers themselves can bargain for favorable terms better as a group, because the volume of the business the group transacts is more appreciable, and the costs of placing the investments are smaller.

In the United States, it is true that coöperatives have made substantial gains in recent years, and in special fields like citrus fruits and dairy products they market a substantial portion of the total produce. But at the end of the Second World War, coöperatives handled probably not more than a sixth of the cash crops, and the great majority of our farmers still were independent producers, despite the more than 3,000,000 memberships in marketing coöperatives.[3] Various governmental programs also have been instituted to assure the farmers of fair prices for their produce; but none have proved altogether satisfactory. They are uncertain in their operation, being subject to the vicissitudes of general economic conditions and Congressional action; and they depend upon the voluntary participation of individual producers who still decide the nature and extent of what they will undertake to raise. Thus, practically speaking, collective control over the amount of produce placed on the market still is almost completely lacking. Low market price for agricultural produce—which im-

[3] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, pp. 612 and 656. Allowing for duplication in memberships, the number of *persons* doing business through coöperatives may be less by as much as one-third to one-half. See Kolb and Brunner, *A Study of Rural Society* (1946), p. 163.

plies an oversupply in the market—generally tends to increase the amount offered for sale. Such a state of affairs is a direct contradiction of sound economic principles.

RURAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Life in the typical American farm community is usually quite democratic. That is to say, there is little difference in the social standing of the farm laborer and the farmer he works for, or of the tenant and the farmer who owns his own farm. They often work side by side, as in harvesting; and they may belong to the same church or grange society. Of course, there are notable exceptions. For example, in the Hudson valley of New York State, the Dutch settlers built up a lord-and-peasant manorial system, and class lines between rich landholders and small farmers and tenants are still quite sharp. And, as we saw in our study of race relations, the presence of distinctive minority groups frequently creates sharp cleavages in rural community life. Ready examples come to mind in the Negro-white relations in the South, or in the Japanese-white relations in the West. The share-cropper system peculiar to the South also brings about a high degree of class stratification even quite apart from racial differences. But mostly, the people in American farm communities get on together as equals much better than city people do; there is much less apt to be the sharp contrast of rich and poor, of employers and workers, of professional persons and laymen so common in urban life.

The tempo of rural life is much slower than that of city life. Things do not happen in such variety as they do in towns, and they don't happen in such rapid succession. So people can adjust themselves more easily to what does happen, and with more assurance. They have more time to make their judgments, and their ideas of right and wrong are more stable. The country dweller is governed much more by the opinion of his neighbors, because as a rule rural people cannot move around so easily. Everybody knows everybody else; and each individual worries about what others may think of what he does. The city man, on the other hand, can much more easily bolster up a poor reputation by going into a new community where he is unknown.

The Rural Community. In spite of what has just been said, however, the rural community does not consist merely of a self-contained aggregation of individual farm families and their homes within a small locality. Nor is it confined to the limits of the village or town around which the farm homes usually cluster. Rather, the rural community includes both farm homes *and* the village or town center which serves them. The services of the town are at the farmer's disposal. At the same time, the rural town depends primarily upon supplying the needs of the farmers for its own prosperity. So we shall be reasonably correct if we say that *the rural community is an extensive, rather sparsely settled farming area, whose eco-*

nomic and social interests cluster chiefly around a village or town within that area.

The boundaries of the rural community as we have just defined it should not be thought of as hard and fast lines, like the boundaries between nations, or the boundaries between city and country at the "city limits." They are very elastic and indefinite, because there are really *many* boundaries. For common supplies, such as groceries, rural people "shop" in a comparatively small area—perhaps no farther than the nearest crossroad store; but a hospital or furniture store must cater to a larger number of people, because individual people use such services much less frequently. So it often happens that rural families go to one town for their staple supplies, and to others for, let us say, their medical needs and their library books. The area which any given agency will serve depends upon the number of people needed to support that agency; and the limits of the area become the boundary for the community *in regard to that particular service.* Thus, there is no such thing as a clear-cut, unified rural community. Community interests overlap, and make community boundaries indefinite.

The place where people think of themselves as "living" usually indicates the location of most of their community interests and activities; but such a community is never completely self-sustaining. The town, for instance, does not consume all the products of the nearby farms, nor does it produce all that it sells to the farmers. Farmer and townsman alike rely for their existence upon the coöperative efforts of society as a whole. The individual farmer's town—the focal point of the "rural community"—serves as a sort of connecting link between the farm and the city. It gathers the products of individual farms for shipment to manufacturers and consumers. At the same time, it is a distributing agent for the products and services of the cities. Through the economic and social agencies (such as stores and offices, movies, newspapers, schools, churches, and banks) of the small town, the cities offer their goods and services to the people who live on farms in the open country.

The Effect of Improvements in Communication. We have long communicated with one another by word of mouth, and by the printed page. Roads and vehicles for transportation of persons and supplies have existed since far back into antiquity. Modern communication, however, is quicker and more abundant than the world has ever before known, and it has vitally affected the nature of present-day rural life as well as that of the city.

Telephones and the radio virtually have annihilated both time and space, so far as oral communication is concerned. The majority of farmers still do not have telephones; but most of them are not far away from one. On the other hand, rural homes preponderantly *do* have radios, since the original investment and the cost of upkeep are small. And although the radio is generally a matter of one-way communication, it is a tremendous factor in broadening the horizons of activity and ideas. Farmers are more

and more compelled to match their old ways of doing and thinking against new ones. The farmer, like the town dweller, is made at least a passive participant in the affairs of the world beyond his own community.

The enormous development of hard-surfaced roads in recent years has greatly changed the character of the rural community. This has been made possible by the parallel development of the automobile. Together they made for rapid, cheap, and continuous transportation—both for the farmer himself, and for those who would serve him. The growth of traveling libraries, of traveling clinics, of consolidated schools and churches, of effective rural public health service and county organization—all these, and many more, we can trace back directly to the creation of good roads and swift, reliable vehicles of transportation. With the advent of efficient snowplows, even the winter months have lost most of their terror for farmers in the North.

Modern communication facilities have also brought about a great invasion of rural life by city standards of consumption. There has been a transfer of many of the farm home activities to the workshop of the city. The baking, the milling, the churning, and the canning—all of them are done much easier by large-scale machine production than they can possibly be done by the laborious hand processes necessary in the farm home. Similarly, ready-made garments seem much more economical than home tailoring; and coal and oil supply heat much easier than the hand-produced woodpile. Most of the machinery now used on our farms simply could not be produced in any way on the farm itself, or even at the old-time village blacksmithy. Thus farming, in addition to being a way of life as it so long has been, has become a craft which the farmer plies in order to gain a cash income. The farmer today more than ever must sell what he produces for cash, to buy the things he needs in order to live.

The intrusion of urban service and ideas into rural areas, then, undoubtedly has broken down much of the old-time unity of farm community life. Country people do not know each other's business quite so well, and there is much more opportunity than formerly to do as one pleases. Farm people are becoming like their city brothers in matters of dress, home equipment, food consumption, recreational activities, and even production and marketing techniques. Nevertheless, the character of agricultural production still requires that farmers live in relatively isolated homes and small communities, where primary neighborhood relationships remain prevalent. In this sense, the distinctive characteristics of the rural community are not being submerged by urban influences.

THE RURAL HOME AND FAMILY

The farm home traditionally has been regarded as the cradle of our American traits of self-reliance. From the very beginning of our history, individuals have staked their claims on tracts of land, and worked their

farms on a family basis. Even to the present time, the size of the farm is determined very largely by the amount of land the individual farmer and his family can cultivate. Farmers are commonly banded together in cooperatives in an effort to control *marketing;* but the rural home and family still remains the normal *producing* unit, the "factory" of American agriculture.

The individual farm home, then, is the most important social agency in the rural community. And because the farm and home together are comparatively isolated from others, there is rather more self-sufficiency in both the economic and social activities of the rural family than of the urban family. As a result, the loyalties and interests of family members are centered much more fully in the activities of the family as a whole in the country than in the city. The farmer and his wife are more interdependent in their work, because the farm and the home are in the same location. The children (of whom there are, as a rule, substantially more than in the urban family) likewise are thrown on their own resources in satisfying their recreation and companionship needs, since it is not always easy for neighboring children to range from one farm home to another.

The effects of such a situation are probably both favorable and unfavorable. Certainly the influence of parents on their children must be stronger in terms of perpetuating the ideals, attitudes, and customs of the elder generation. The children tend to accept and imitate the patterns which they find at hand; and in the absence of other competitive examples, the beliefs and manners of the parents become strongly ingrained in the offspring. Moreover, the work of the farm enterprise is so diversified and abundant that the rural child is expected very early to share in the responsibility of keeping the farm going. Thus, in performing such duties as he is able as he grows older, the rural child develops habits of self-reliance, regularity, and industry, and learns at an early age the satisfaction of coöperating with others in a "going concern."

On the other hand, the patriarchal position of the farmer as head of an isolated household can lead to unfortunate consequences. The parent may abuse his authority in imposing his will upon that of the child, since there is little the child can do by way of protest or escape. The amount and kind of work laid upon the child, especially in more backward communities, frequently is so heavy as to impair the social and physical growth of the child. And even under favorable circumstances, the very security that the child experiences in the rural home frequently makes him unwilling or unable to achieve an acceptable adjustment to new demands which are almost inevitable when he is confronted with changes later in life.[4]

Yet the rôle of the farm home is changing, just as surely as is that of the city home. The improvement of transportation and communication has greatly altered the service of the rural home to its members. Farm peo-

[4] Paul H. Landis, *Rural Life in Process* (1948), p. 310.

ple can get together now more easily than they could twenty or thirty years ago. Where a radius of ten or fifteen miles used to be the common limit of ordinary travel, a radius of twenty-five or thirty miles now is not unusual; and the *areas* included have consequently increased manyfold. Thus, educational and religious activities have been transferred in large part to the district school or the community church, the programs of which have expanded impressively in recent years. Recreation is more readily available in the diversified offerings of the nearby towns—movies, school programs, libraries, the public playgrounds, parks, and entertainment programs. Moreover, *informal* groups can be brought together more often and from wider areas; more people with specialized interests are within easy reach of one another, so they can congregate for those particular purposes. The various members of the farm family, then, get about and satisfy their desire for companionship and group activity *as individuals and outside the influence of both home and family.* In addition, even the chores and household drudgery, formerly so characteristic of the farm home are being reduced as rapidly as modern devices and services penetrate into the rural areas. And in this connection, the development of scientific farming itself also is reducing the burden formerly placed upon the farm home. High productivity and the use of labor-saving machinery require a smaller work force to keep the farm operating, and fewer individuals for whom personal services must be provided by the farm home.

It will be seen that the farm home and the urban home alike are confronted with external forces which threaten their unity and stability. Both are being influenced by community agencies which have taken over many of the services and functions formerly performed by the home itself. The process necessarily has gone farthest in urban communities, both because the high concentration of population has made possible a large degree of interdependence, and because farming still requires that farm families remain dispersed upon the land. Nevertheless, rural homes are increasingly subject to the process of "urbanization"; and the *rate* of change in the character of home life today probably is even more rapid in the country than in the city.

RURAL EDUCATION

Fully half of the nation's children still receive their elementary education in rural schools, even though well over half of the total population of the nation resides in urban areas. Yet, important as it is in shaping the lives of tomorrow's citizens, the rural school is confronted with a number of serious limitations. Despite the fact that the preponderance of our grade schools and high schools are rural (more than 80 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively), they were sustained during the Second World War period by only three-eighths of our total national expenditure for primary and secondary schools. More than half of the public school teachers were in

rural schools; but salaries paid to rural teachers have always been notoriously low. Although rural people generally are devoting a larger portion of their income to education than city people are, the rural children are getting poorer preparation for life than are urban children. The fact is that less is being spent for the training of our children in the country than in the city; the country has higher birth-rates, and less taxable wealth to sustain the necessary schools. Indeed, Kolb and Brunner observe that the relative disadvantage of the country school is greater now than at the time of the War Between the States—and that the situation grew worse in the period between the World Wars.[5]

Probably the largest single factor in the backwardness of the rural school is the persistence of the district school. Nearly two-thirds of the rural schools have but one or two rooms, with a small portion of them having two teachers. School terms are commonly shorter than in the bigger schools, largely because the schools themselves are in backward areas, where finances are meager and the children are needed to help in the planting and harvesting activities of the farm. The small available funds make it impossible for the district to hire competent or well-trained teachers. As a rule, the enrollment in the district school is so small that there are only a few children of any given age. As a result, the teacher must divide his or her time into very short periods in order to instruct the pupils in *all* the grades in *all* the basic subjects. Moreover, group activities and organized play are almost impossible for the same reason—there are too few children of similar age to join in effective teamwork toward any objective. Indeed, playgrounds are usually small, if present at all, and recreational equipment is limited. And finally, transportation facilities are often so poor that absences are frequent among the pupils. All-in-all, the opportunity for a satisfactory learning and socializing experience is not available to the pupil in the average rural district school.

The Consolidation Movement. In order to reduce some of the shortcomings of the local rural school, two or more districts may pool their resources, and build *one* school to serve all the children within the area thus united. Such an arrangement gives rise to the "consolidated" school, of which there are now perhaps about 25,000 in the rural communities. The advantages are obvious. Distances are greater, of course; but transportation is usually provided by a school bus. The school building is bigger, and better equipped. Not one, but several teachers can be hired; so the individual pupil can have longer and more personal tutoring. Better teachers can be provided, because higher salaries can be paid. The existence of more students makes possible larger classes, and greater opportunities for extracurricular group activities.

Nevertheless, there are certain obstacles to consolidation. Parents frequently express concern regarding the matter of transportation. Busses

[5] Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 434–438.

commonly serve both high school and primary pupils alike, so that the youngsters must wait for the older students at the end of the day. In other words, there is idle time; and if the school happens to be located in town, there is a good possibility that the children may fall into bad habits or among poor companions. Some contend that the exercise and discipline of the daily walk to school is of more value to the character of the pupil than bus transportation. Many parents also object to the type of instruction and activities which is likely to occur if the consolidated school is located in a town or village, saying that such education "spoils" their children for rural life. And some parents even champion the small, one-room school itself, arguing that the contact between pupil and teacher is more personal even if briefer, or that the pupils develop traits of self-reliance and concentration from the circumstance of having to work in the midst of the distractions so prevalent in the small school.

Even granting that consolidation may be advisable, there is the inevitable question as to where the school should be placed. Aside from the jealousy between districts, there is competition between the open country and the village as possible sites for the proposed school. There is also the natural reluctance to incur new debts for new buildings, when old ones still seem serviceable. This is especially true when, as is commonly the case, the district school has been the focal point for a wide variety of local community activities. Many people regard the bus transportation system as being both hazardous and too expensive. And finally, American people everywhere hesitate to give up local control over the school system. They believe that centralized control offers too much chance for mass propaganda and domination by the privileged few.

Rural Adult Education. It is not necessary to labor the point that the school is not the sole agency contributing to the education of the rural inhabitant. Youth and adults alike gain ideas and judgments through many other channels. Among the more obvious, of course, are the radio, the movies, the newspapers and the pictorial magazines. But even the churches play an important part—sometimes quite directly when they maintain parochial schools. Library service, too, has increased significantly in rural areas during the past twenty or thirty years, being supported by local organizations or in many instances by direct taxation and supplemented by the creation of the state traveling libraries. Once again, it is probably well to recall in passing that much of the present-day effectiveness of these various instruments has been made possible by the phenomenal development of transportation and communication facilities.

Adults are served very effectively by the work of the Agricultural Extension Service, an organization established in 1914, and operated jointly by the United States Department of Agriculture, the State agricultural colleges, and the counties. Although the Extension Service also sponsors many activities among rural youth (notably the teachers of agriculture in rural

high schools, and the 4H clubs among the younger children), its chief function is to bring information as to farming techniques and farm home management directly to the farm family. This is done by means of lectures, demonstrations, "institutes," and the distribution of innumerable pamphlet and bulletin materials. Farm women are taught how to keep house efficiently by the home demonstration agents, while county agents advise with individuals and local group leaders relative to farm and community problems. In recent years, the Extension Service has expanded its interest in the development of community planning, probably as a result of its service in administering the national assistance programs among farmers prior to the Second World War. Something of the extent of the activities of the Extension Services is suggested by the fact that in 1944 the employed staff exceeded 9,000 persons, who served at least 96 per cent of the nation's counties at a cost of nearly $37,000,000.[6]

The public school system itself is being used increasingly to keep rural adults abreast of current technical changes in farming. In some sections, there is an additional awakening to problems of rural illiteracy, brought about by the Second World War and the new interest in the welfare of minority groups, chiefly the Negroes.[7] But the services offered adults by the public school system still are chiefly vocational—whether in the cities or in the country. Undoubtedly those offerings could well be expanded to include more general informative and cultural lectures and courses of study. In Wisconsin, for example, local organizations commonly make use of the resources available at the State university by sponsoring such programs in coöperation with the university's Extension Division as well as the Agricultural Extension within the College of Agriculture.

There are problems of rural education, however, which neither the improvement of the local school system nor the development of facilities for adult education can meet alone. It is not likely that the rural community will ever have a sufficiently rich tax-base to provide the funds for really adequate rural education. Nor is it at all clear that the rural area *should* bear this entire burden, when we remember that the rural community still produces a surplus of population which migrates to the city. On the other hand, if rural education is to be subsidized by economically richer elements in our society, still other serious problems spring up. Shall the subsidy be of the local school by the State, or shall the States themselves be subsidized by Federal aid? In either case, the local rural community stands to lose much of its jurisdiction over the curriculum and administration of its schools. And even this aspect of rural education needs the earnest attention of urban and rural people alike. Now that urban standards so largely dominate our modern life, it seems clear that rural children must be given a clearer understanding of the processes of urban society than they have gotten in the traditional rural school curriculum. Whether they

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 485.

[7] See Chapter 5.

are to migrate to the city, or whether they are to remain on the farm, rural youth will be dealing more directly with their "city cousins" than did any previous generation. It will obviously be to their advantage to be able to meet the requirements of the city on at least fairly equal terms.

RECREATION

The problems apparent in the rural recreation of the present day stem very largely from the influx of urban standards into the rural community. It is true that mechanization has sharply reduced the close association between work and play that formerly was so apparent in the corn-husking and the quilting bees, threshing activities, and barn raisings. But many of the types of recreation that have been traditionally a part of rural life have been retained to a very large degree in some sections. Programs for special holidays or commemorative days like Christmas, Washington's and Lincoln's birthday celebrations, Memorial days, the Fourth of July, Hallowe'en, or Thanksgiving harvest festivals have been developed more in elaboration than in kind during the past fifty years. The old-time charades have been replaced by community theatrical performances, while the neighborhood singing club has become the community orchestra or the high school band; and the local sand-lot athletic teams now compete in county or even State-wide tournaments. Communities throughout the country have made good use of the new leisure and modern facilities for transportation in adapting traditional rural recreational patterns to present-day conditions of living. Indeed, they have done much, in many cases, to *restore* a considerable part of the folk dancing, singing, and story-telling that for a time seemed doomed to fall victim to the commercial recreational devices such as the phonograph, the radio, and the movies.

The impact of commercialization, however, poses more serious problems in rural recreation than the mere competition with older types of play. The very mobility of the population which has resulted from the development of the automobile and good roads has broken down the close family and neighborhood controls that formerly existed in country life. More especially, the young are much better able to seek their pleasure in the anonymity of the more remote community where they are not known—and where, often, the restrictions upon commercial enterprise may be more lax. It must be remembered that the primary objective of commercialism is *profit;* and in the field of recreation, unfortunately, the greatest profit is apt to go to the enterpriser who most completely flaunts the community's standards of propriety. The local community faces a hard and continuous task in its attempt to control the distribution of lurid "pulp" magazines, or to combat the low-grade movie or radio program, or to check the insidious influence of the unscrupulous tavern keeper, dance hall operator, or tourist camp proprietor. Taverns, dance halls, and tourist camps are usually regulated by government units larger than that of the local neigh-

borhood, and are patronized by urban people as well as those in the local area. Effective control is therefore hard to maintain, since responsibility is divided and identity of patrons and public interest alike is vague.

The attractiveness and pervasiveness of commercialized amusement in the rural community is a distinct challenge to those who seek the adaptation of traditional rural recreational patterns to modern rural life. Even granting competent and imaginative leadership, it is extremely difficult to secure active support for projects that necessarily require some sacrifice and coöperation. Community activities of this sort presuppose the existence of strong group solidarity and a conviction that they are worth the personal effort they involve. The presence of "ready-made" amusement, catering as it does to the desires of the individual alone, tends to dissipate the inclination to join forces with others in *community* ventures.

RURAL HEALTH

There is little doubt but that the natural conditions surrounding rural life are conducive to healthful living. The sparseness of population and the consequent relative lack of exposure to contagious disease makes epidemic a rare phenomenon in the country. The daily routine of farming makes for regularity of habit and provides bodily exercise, both of which the city dweller often lacks. The average farmer spends much more time out of doors than the city resident ordinarily does—and the air he breathes is freer of soot, smoke, and germ-laden dust. And of course when food is produced on the farm, the farmer has the advantage of both freshness and abundance. It is these considerations that the city person usually thinks of when he dreams of some day "having a little place in the country." Of course, many urbanites already have these advantages to a greater or lesser degree; but so far as the average person is concerned, the natural conditions of the country are superior to those in the city.

Other conditions, however, tend to make the farm a relatively *un*healthy place to live, in comparison with the city. As in the matter of education which we have just discussed, low income and the isolation of the farm home impede the adoption of many of the devices and services that have been developed to improve health in the city. Running water and sanitary sewage and garbage disposal are available in all the cities and larger towns in America; but in the country they must be provided by the individual farmer, who in many instances cannot afford them or may not see their advisability or necessity. Similarly, suitable refrigeration of food and proper heating and ventilating of the home are often notably lacking in rural areas, due to the expense of installing the necessary equipment or to the limited income of the family. Diet, too, is commonly unbalanced because shopping is not convenient or refrigeration is not at hand.

Sickness presents special problems in the rural community, largely because the rural population has a disproportionate number of very young

and very old; and both age groups require more medical service than does the middle age group. Hospital facilities in rural areas probably are not more than half what they should be, there being hundreds of rural communities that practically have no access at all to local hospitalization.[8] The kindly old "country doctor," so well-known in days gone by, is not now nearly so much in evidence as he used to be. There are, in fact, fewer doctors serving rural areas than formerly, and their average age appears to be rising.[9] It is true that there are commonly more doctors and much better medical facilities in nearby towns than formerly, and good roads and quick communication make them more easily reached by the person living in the open country. On the other hand, medical fees have risen sharply, both for office and home calls. As a result, illness often is neglected until it becomes critical—or even disastrous. The situation is well summed up in the following words:

> Rural health facilities suffer primarily because of the higher cost of providing them, and on the other hand the poorer incomes to support them. In rural areas the occupancy of even the limited number of hospital beds that are supplied is not high due to cost and inhibitions of the people. Medical personnel currently much prefer to be associated with a clinic and to have the opportunity to specialize, of which neither preference is widely available in rural practice.[10]

To be sure, the unfortunate conditions of rural health are being attacked by various agencies. Health columns in magazines and newspapers are educating rural people in the principles of good health. More and more rural counties are providing nurses and even doctors to render medical service to the isolated and needy. The Agricultural Extension system arranges lectures and demonstrations on health matters for rural people, and offers many suggestions for "modernizing" the farm home at a minimum of expense. Private companies are producing cheap and simple devices for pumping, lighting, heating, and sewage disposal, which help make the conditions of daily living on the farm more healthful. Community hospitals are being built with increasing frequency, as a result of coöperation between forward-looking local citizenry and their Federal Government, under the Federal Hospital Act of 1946. But the situation is far from satisfactory. The cost of sickness in rural areas, as in the cities, is unpredictable and likely to be very heavy where it does strike. It is increasingly clear that the financial burden of medical care must somehow be borne by the citizenry as a whole. Private insurance plans have not met the need thus far, largely because farmers as a class have fallen outside the list of "preferred" occupations and the rates remain high. Some sort of governmental assistance probably is inevitable. The choice lies in the extent and means of aid—whether through State and local assistance to voluntary plans, or

[8] Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

[9] Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 493.

[10] "Economic Information for Wisconsin Farmers" (University of Wisconsin Extension Service, College of Agriculture, 1950), Vol. 21, No. 2, 3, p. 2.

through a comprehensive system of national compulsory health insurance comparable to the other assistance patterns already established under the Federal Social Security Act.

THE RURAL CHURCH

Among the social agencies playing their part in rural life today, the rural church is second only to the public school, as measured in terms of buildings, membership and attendance, and income. Yet it has probably the most uncertain position of all. In the past, it had a tremendously important influence in people's lives. As long as community life remained mostly local in scope, the rural church assumed great importance as the source of both spiritual and worldly guidance. The pastor was frequently the best educated person in the community, so that his word passed as "law" not only in matters of conduct and religion, but in almost every other field as well. Meetings for divine worship at the church also provided the nucleus for the social gatherings of the community. There were few other occasions in the old-time rural community when people could come together and enjoy one another's company. Church leaders recognized this function clearly in later years, so that the "Church Supper" and the "Box Social" became popular recreational events in the rural community.

More recently, the prestige and leadership of the rural church has not fared so well. In most sections, rural church membership is declining slowly, or at best only holding its own. In the open country, two churches are being abandoned for every one that is being started, while in the villages, the numbers are about equal.

The reasons for this crisis in the power of the churches in rural communities are not hard to find. Foremost, perhaps, is the expansion of easy transportation and communication facilities. To some extent, open country dwellers are joining village churches, where pastors are better trained and services are better organized. But there is evidence that the village and small town church is not filling the country resident's need for religious expression, since village church membership is not rising notably as open country churches go out of existence. It is a mistake to suppose that improved roads will necessarily strengthen the position of the rural church, either in the village or in the open country. As someone has well said, "Good roads lead up to the church door all right, but they keep right on going." And there can be no question but that the movies, the radio, and other forms of commercial recreation create sharp competition for the church as a community center.

Probably more fundamental, however, has been the growth of scientific knowledge and its dissemination among the farm population. Freer access to the schools, public lectures and forums, and the libraries opens up new lines of thinking and sources of information. This is especially sig-

nificant insofar as it facilitates the application of the scientific approach to agriculture. In the absence of accurate information about them, the natural processes so vital to farming are mysterious and readily ascribed to supernatural forces. Moreover, the inherent isolation of the farm tends to accentuate the insignificance of the individual farmer in comparison with the uncontrolled natural forces surrounding him. Under such conditions, church-going provides both comradeship for the individual and a means of making peace with the natural and supernatural world upon which he feels so dependent. It is significant that at the present time the most dynamic religious sects in rural areas are those that minister primarily to the least progressive and least secure elements in rural life: the more undeveloped geographic areas, and the least privileged population groups, notably tenants and migratory workers. Yet these are the least likely to provide a basis for stable church organization.[11]

Within the churches themselves, still other conditions militate against effective church leadership. Sectarian lines (between Baptists and Methodists, for example) are very persistent; so that as church membership wanes, individual congregations become quite impoverished. Consequently, the ministers are poorly paid, and they come to look upon the rural pastorate as being only temporary. Sometimes they must serve as many as five or six congregations in order to earn a living at all. Taking notice of this trend, some of the larger church bodies have appointed special commissions to study the position of their church in rural areas, and to formulate plans for effective remedies. In some instances, efforts are being made to merge similar denominational churches, or to reduce interchurch competition in other ways. Many church colleges and even a few of the State universities have instituted special courses of study and conferences for church leaders in rural communities.

In the last analysis, much of the success or failure of the rural church rests with the rural pastor. His problem is to integrate the teachings of his church with the life of the community in which he is serving. In order to gain the confidence and respect of the laymen in that community, the pastor must know the people he is dealing with, be familiar with their customs and traditions, and understand their practical, everyday problems. If he is to do all this, it is plain that he will need some knowledge of economics and sociology, and even of agricultural subjects as well as being well versed in religious matters. It is not necessary for him to be a farmer, or even to have been reared on a farm; but he must be able to study his community to learn what it needs, and then enlist the help of other local leaders or of outside agencies to meet its requirements. Only thus can the churches retain a commanding position among the social agencies serving the rural community.

[11] Landis, *op. cit.*, pp. 347–352.

FARM TENANTS AND FARM LABOR

The ultimate concern in the analysis of any social group presumably is the well-being of the people themselves. Social agencies such as we have just been considering after all exist to serve the inhabitants of the area in which those agencies are located. And in rural life, the condition of tenants and farm laborers presents by far the most serious problems.

Farm Tenancy. The extent of farm tenancy rose for at least a half century, from the time that the Bureau of the Census first took notice of the conditions of farm tenure in 1880. At that time, tenants were found to be operating 25.6 per cent of the farms of the nation; and the percentage rose to 42.4 in 1930, just before our farm economy reached its lowest level. Following the readjustments of the early "New Deal" period, tenancy began to decline by 1935, initiating a trend which was accentuated by the agricultural prosperity of the decade following 1940. These are, of course, national figures; the regional and racial incidence of tenancy has always varied widely. Thus, for example, in 1945 only 3.7 of the farms in New England were operated by tenants, while the State of Mississippi was at the other extreme with almost 60 per cent of its farms tenant operated. Mississippi had almost 265,000 farms, more than 45 per cent of which were operated by whites; yet nonwhite tenants outnumbered the white by almost 3 to 1. Only a scant third of the whites were tenants, while more than four-fifths of the nonwhites were in that category. Nearly 1,200,000 of the nation's 1,850,000 tenant farmers in 1945 were located in the Southern States.[12]

Tenancy is not necessarily an evil. To the extent that it is a step toward ownership, for example, it presents no serious problems in the matter of agricultural welfare. As land has grown more valuable and equipment more expensive, it has been considered quite reasonable that one should have to go into debt to acquire a farm. The advance from laborer to tenancy to mortgaging to ownership was called the "agricultural ladder." In this way, a young man normally could expect to own a farm by the time he was middle-aged. It must be admitted, however, that until very recent years the "ladder" has been increasingly harder to ascend.

Yet even when tenancy is to be of prolonged duration, it still can be a quite satisfactory basis for farm living. Indeed, many tenants *prefer* to farm on a rental basis, because it permits them to engage in extensive farming or to expand their operations with a minimum capital outlay. If long-term leases are provided, and the tenant is given a chance to exercise his own judgment in the management of the farm and to expect an equity in whatever improvements he makes in the capital equipment of the farm, neither the farmer nor the land he works will suffer.

[12] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949,* pp. 624, 626.




FIG. 10

Farm ownership comes later in life now than in 1890, and tenancy persists longer. Adapted from United States Census, 1930, *Agriculture*, Vol. IV, p. 311, and 1940, *Agriculture*, Vol. III, pp. 328–329.

Unfortunately, however, such conditions do not commonly exist in the United States. The expansion of our rural economy has been so rapid that no comprehensive safeguards have been set up to protect either the tenant or the land. The existence of abundant land led to a disregard for conservation measures, while the expanding economy of the nation as a whole created the general feeling that anyone with ambition—industrial worker or tenant farmer alike—could "get ahead." But the results of this point of view have been seriously detrimental. The tenant on a given farm, seeking to build up his own capital wealth, usually has no interest in maintaining the fertility of the soil or in keeping up the farm buildings or equipment. His objective has been rather to produce as much as he could with as little outlay as he could. In other words, his policy has been to "mine" the soil and farm equipment until it became unprofitable, then if possible move on to newer, less debilitated areas. An inevitable corollary is that tenants most frequently do not participate fully in the life of the community because they are very likely to move away in a year or two. And absentee landlords, for their part, also are indisposed to support these agencies, which add nothing directly to their share of the income from the farm. Thus, as tenants move about, they and their children are served by religious and educational facilities that are of inferior quality; and the political life of the community is dominated for their own interests by the more permanent residents. Such conditions, of course, are starkest among the sharecroppers of the South, who—regardless of whether they are white or nonwhite—typify tenancy at its worst in the United States. As a rule

they have no written agreement with the owners of the land they work, and no jurisdiction over planting or marketing. Moreover, they are usually heavily indebted to the landowners; and because they have but meager education and are almost voiceless politically, they have little chance to improve their lot by their own effort. Probably the most likely channel for meeting the problems of the farm tenant is that of action by the Federal Government. A presidential committee investigating conditions of tenancy made fundamental recommendations as a result of their findings as long ago as 1937; but as yet, no positive action has been taken by the Congress. The tenant-purchase program set up that year under the Farm Security Administration, while encouraging in its results, has been chiefly experimental; it has reached only a very small fraction of tenants in need of assistance.[18]

Farm Labor. Bad as they are, however, the conditions among farm tenants are generally better than among farm laborers. The tenant has at least a semblance of security during the crop season. He has a roof over his head, and a certain degree of identity within the community. However desperate his lot may be, he still has some claim upon the farm owner. The average farm laborer, on the other hand, is highly transient: his employment may last for a few days to a few weeks, after which he moves on. The employer of farm labor has no continuing responsibility to his employees. Farm labor usually is abundant, and has no legal protection comparable to that provided for urban labor; so its wages and living conditions are generally inferior.

As with so many other segments of our population, however, it is dangerous to portray a single farm labor type as characteristic of the whole group. Some four classes of farm labor have been distinguished among our estimated 4,000,000 farm laborers, though the number in each group is highly variable. The *"hired man"* not infrequently remains with his employer the year 'round. He is probably the type most commonly visualized as "farm labor"; but he is in reality the least typical. The *resident* farm laborer does not live on the farm, but remains in the community "hiring out" when and where he can. *Casual* farm workers are those who supplement their income from other, more regular occupations by seeking temporary jobs in peak agricultural seasons. *Migratory* workers, whether single persons or whole families, follow the seasonal demand for farm labor from one section or crop to another, and have probably the most precarious existence of any type of labor. Thus, the "hired man" living on a farm in the northern or eastern section of the country is much better off than the migratory laborer of the West, just as the northern tenant in general is in a far better position, say, than the cropper in the South. But the "hired man," a laborer, also is likely to be doing much better for himself than the cropper who is, technically, a tenant.

[18] Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

The problem of farm labor, however, lies much deeper than the question of the relative position of laborers and tenants. Indeed, both tenants and laborers are suffering from much the same developments taking place in our agricultural economy. The growth of specialized farming, together with the rise of mechanization and large-scale operations, has led to a reduction in the total demand for labor in agriculture, and at the same time increased its seasonality. The mechanical cotton picker, for example, already has made itself felt in this respect, even though its full impact has not yet developed. Many a small tenant has been forced off his farm by the fact that his labor no longer is sufficiently needed to warrant full time farm occupancy. These former tenants, with little training for any other work, have mostly swelled the ranks of hired labor. The situation is still further aggravated by the variability of the urban labor market. Seasonality, labor displacement, and other irregularities in industrial employment force many industrial workers to seek jobs in rural areas. Thus far, the demand for this accumulating surplus of labor has been woefully inadequate as compared with its supply, except for the brief labor shortage during the Second World War. It is not uncommon that the agricultural worker can find employment for only half his available time. As a result, we seem to be developing a condition of permanent poverty among a large segment of the workers within the agricultural economy.[14]

The remedy for the conditions under which farm labor lives and works is fairly clear, but not easy to achieve. To be sure, certain alleviative measures can be instituted, such as providing social security benefits for farm workers comparable to those now available to most urban employees —a start toward which, at least, was made in the 1950 Social Security Act. Wide use of written labor contracts, and the provision for fair minimum wage rates and job conditions will help. There has been some attempt to unionize farm workers, but the effort has not been very successful. Aside from the opposition of local employers—a vital factor in some sections of the country—the union technique is not well adapted to effective use among agricultural workers. The period of employment is usually quite brief, and the workers themselves are highly transient and financially unable to build up the necessary "war chest" for the union.

Underneath all these problems lies the fundamental fact of labor surplus, stemming from high rural birth-rates, and labor displacement both on the farms and in the cities. Ironically, too, even the increase of farm income tends to militate against the farm labor group, in that it leads to better farm efficiency, greater mechanization and productivity—and less employment opportunity. Undoubtedly the only effective approach to the problem of the surplus worker is the attempt to stabilize our economy at "full employment" levels, with continuing opportunity to bring the manless job and the jobless man—whether urban or rural—together.[15]

[14] Landis, *op. cit.*, pp. 444–447.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 459–460.

GOVERNMENT AND THE FUTURE OF RURAL LIFE

Although there are fewer direct evidences of governmental activity in the country than in the city, the farmer probably takes a more lively interest in government affairs than does the city dweller. Yet curiously enough, perhaps no other class of people is so suspicious of governmental activities as the rural population, or so jealous of its local sovereignty. This attitude is a natural outgrowth of the isolation and the individualism of the farmer. He does not want his traditional freedom eclipsed by the expansion of centralized governmental authority. To a large extent, he still shares the Jeffersonian idea that the best government is the one that governs least. However, the scope and extent of governmental service to the farmer are already much greater than most people realize.

The county government is the chief unit for maintaining the public peace. It tries those suspected of many types of crime, and punishes the lesser offenders. It usually administers the relief of the poor and the care of deficients, as well as many of the agricultural policies and benefit allotments of the larger units of government. It frequently exercises considerable direct control over the school system. And finally, it is an important link in the maintenance of the highway system.

The State government is perhaps the most active of all the governmental units in serving the farmer. It coördinates many of the functions of the county, such as the county health service, the educational system, and the relief of the poor. It is also the administrative agent for many of the services of the Federal Government, especially those which are allotted through the Agricultural Extension system. On its own initiative, the State government promotes conservation of the soil and other natural resources within its borders. It performs many technical services for the farmer, such as combating diseases and pests of farm crops and livestock, and setting standards of quality and measures in marketing. It supervises the maintenance of the state highway system, and regulates the in-state service and rates of the public utilities and conveyances, such as railroads, trucks, busses, telephones, and electric power.

The service of the Federal Government to the farmer is, generally speaking, much less direct than that of either the State or the county. It must not be inferred, however, that it is less important. Indeed, an examination of the activities of the United States Department of Agriculture alone should make one realize that this agency is a dynamic pacemaker for the lesser units of government. In addition, the Federal Government assists in the construction and maintenance of roads and waterways, and in the control of flood waters. It regulates the interstate traffic and freight rates of the railroads, and controls the tariff policies pertaining to our international trade. The expansion of the post-office activities to include RFD service has proved a tremendous factor in breaking down rural isolation.

All these services, however, are largely static, and reflect the traditional

philosophy that government should be the servant of free and independently operating individuals—not their counselors. Such a position assumes that the individual not only knows his own best interest, but that he is able to match his powers successfully against all the economic, social, and natural forces that surround him. Our present review of the problems of rural life suggests that the individual farmer today is caught in a net of circumstances very much beyond his own power to control.

Beginning about the turn of the century, governmental and agricultural leaders saw that farmers would need more positive and constructive help from their government. The matter was first brought to public attention probably in 1907, when President Theodore Roosevelt appointed the Commission on Country Life to study the problems of the rural population. Seven years later, in 1914, the Agricultural Extension Service was established to help the individual farmer derive maximum benefit from the scientific findings of the Department of Agriculture, and to adjust himself to the new conditions emerging from a commercialized and mechanized world.

The deepening depression that followed the First World War for about two decades demonstrated quite conclusively to the farmer that, despite his traditional independence, he could not hold his own against the rest of the world without help. Millions of farmers—including a fair proportion of farm *owners*—were driven to accept direct relief assistance in addition to various financial arrangements to ease the burden of debt they were carrying. They were desperate not only as individual citizens, but as members of bankrupt local communities. The States and even the Federal Government were obliged to "lend a hand" to help prostrate individuals and their social institutions back to their feet. But the problem was more than one of mere relief, or even recovery. It was clear that bold steps had to be taken to revise the older arrangements leaving major public policies to local control. So it was that State and Federal Governments, functioning to a large extent through the local agencies, encouraged the growth of cooperative marketing, and stimulated the move to conservation by underwriting crop reduction programs. Significant steps were taken to improve the scope and quality of educational systems, especially through the State aids. Public recreational facilities were expanded, while some attempt has been made by localities, with the support of the State governments, to regulate commercial recreational ventures. Public relief concepts were broadened to include rehabilitative services. All these were, in a very real sense, devices projected to help the farmers to help themselves.

Much remains to be done, as our consideration of some of the major problems of rural life suggests. Experience has shown that the farmer is peculiarly dependent on his government to improve his lot, since it is his most effective vehicle for united action. There is, of course, the danger of "centralized control." But if State and Federal Governments have formi-

dable power to determine public policy, they still are, in a democracy such as ours, highly responsive to local public opinion—especially in rural areas, where special interests and strong economic groups do not dominate.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What conditions in American colonial history made it possible for the farmers of America to become so commonly the owners of the land they tilled?
2. How would you explain the lack of class-consciousness and group solidarity among American farmers as compared with the farmers of other nations?
3. In what ways does the production of agricultural goods differ from the production of manufactured goods?
4. Indicate the nature of the "agricultural revolution" of the past century and a half.
5. Why is it hard for farmers to secure the financial credit they need? What steps might be taken to meet this situation?
6. Are the relations between farmers and farm laborers comparable to those between industrial employers and their employees? Defend your opinion.
7. What is a rural community? How are its boundaries set? Contrast the rural community with the urban community.
8. Show the effects of urban influences both upon the farmer himself and upon his community.
9. Compare the services of the rural home with those of the urban home. Are urban and rural homes becoming more alike as time goes on? Defend your judgment.
10. List five problems commonly confronting the rural school.
11. To what extent can the consolidation of rural schools reduce the problems you

observed in Question 10? Take whatever view you believe most tenable and defend it.

12. What problems of public policy and administration are raised by the modern recreational demands of rural people?
13. What dangers to healthy community life lurk in the rise of commercialized recreation and amusement? Show why the rural community is increasingly subject to these dangers.
14. Why is it that the farm is "a relatively *un*healthy place to live, in comparison with the city"? Cite five considerations to support the point. List five measures that are being, or can be, applied to reduce the rural disadvantage.
15. Suppose you were the pastor of a rural church. Outline a plan you would follow by which you would try to make your church of most service to the community.
16. Would you say that the *conditions* of tenancy should be of greater concern than the *extent* of tenancy? Defend your position.
17. Show why the farm laborer, as contrasted with the tenant, presents special problems to the life of the rural community. What problems do tenants and laborers have in common?
18. What measures might be taken to improve the economic and social position of the farm tenant? Of the farm laborer?
19. How would you explain the increase of government services in rural areas in recent years despite the traditional self-reliance of the rural people? Is there any danger in the changing character of governmental activity in behalf of rural dwellers? Give your reasons for the position you take.

13. The Family in Transition

THE ORGANIZATION and control of the sex life of individuals is probably one of the oldest and most primary problems society has faced. For sex represents a perpetual urge that not only *must be* but *is* gratified. It is a primary biological function, in and of itself demanding outlet and expression. It is preserved in all its intensity by natural selection in that the most highly sexed are apt to pass on this character to the largest number of offspring, whereas those deficient in this respect permit their deficiency to die with them. The fact that sex life, in, of, and for itself, as a companionship and "play function," is the primary motive might as well be faced and accepted. Offspring or the perpetuation of the group is distinctly a by-product. Seldom indeed are unions formed, either temporary or permanent, that have for their avowed and honest purpose procreation alone. The scramble for mates and sex prerogatives is and always has been potent with disharmony, jealousy, hate, intrigue, exploitation, and brute force. Wars between nations have been fought over the respective rights of contending monarchs to an individual desirable woman. Fights, often to the finish, between individual men all too often result from the same cause. Nor can we say that the possibility of conflict from this cause is limited wholly to males; females have been known to indulge in fierce hair-pulling frenzies to gain sole rights to some male. If mere procreation were the motivating factor one mate would do nearly as well as another; but where sex partnership is concerned, marked differences are recognized.

Thus to the individual the outstanding fact is sex and the happiness and satisfaction and sense of "completion" resulting from normal sex life. To society, however, the individual's happiness and sense of "completion" in this respect is no more important than in any other department of his life. Society is interested only in keeping him sufficiently satisfied to be amenable to social control, and if more attention is paid by society to this function than to others it is because it has greater socially disruptive possibilities. To society the by-product, children, is the main concern. Society

is interested in perpetuating itself and is profoundly interested in the preparation of its members for future citizenship and carrying on. Of course, individuals *do* desire children. They plan for them before they are born and devote their lives to them when they have come into being. Mother-love and father-love are very real human attributes, perhaps the finest and highest sentiments the human being is capable of. Still, they are the products of the mating instinct rather than its producer. The basic fact is that "male and female made He them"; and the higher the animal in the scale of creation the more definite the differentiation between them, and the more definitely sex life and procreation, though interdependent, become separate facts. While societies and individuals desire children, in the modern world they seldom desire them in unlimited numbers. They always do desire, however, the best conditions of life and surroundings for the number that they consider adequate.

Thus is society squarely faced with a complicated problem that is always the same, though time and place through social change may alter its aspect. The first phase of the problem is that of regulating and guaranteeing the sex life of individuals. The only way of avoiding the disorder that results from the fight for females is to lay down certain rules for the members of the group which will guarantee a fair and equal chance for each Jack to have a Jill. The powerful may be able to indulge in polygyny, while the poor and the downtrodden must console themselves with polyandry; but still strict regulation is there, and absolute promiscuity is not evident even in the most savage tribes. The march of civilization has always been in the direction of monogamy or the equal apportioning of mates, since under normal conditions the numbers of men and women, at maturity, tend to be equal.

The second phase of the problem is concerned with the by-product, or children. Society is interested in insuring itself or guaranteeing its perpetuity. Children, therefore, must be born in adequate numbers. But this is not enough. Society must guarantee that these children will reach maturity properly nurtured and prepared for the duties of adulthood. Thus the problem boils down to one of satisfying individual desire and social demand. The solution of the problem has been found in the institutions of marriage and the family. Throughout all ages these twin institutions are found. Their organization and technique may and do vary widely between times and civilizations; but the fundamental purpose and the problem to be solved are always the same.

THE PROBLEM OF MARRIAGE

Marriage is the institution that regulates and legalizes the acquisition of a mate (or mates or a share in a mate, as in the case of polygyny and polyandry) to have and to hold in undisputed possession within the limitations imposed by the social order. The rules of the game may vary all

the way from capture and purchase to the most conventional forms of romantic wooing. The necessary formalities prior to the legal recognition and social sanction of the union may vary all the way from gifts to the bride's parents and a community powwow to a medical examination, a marriage license, and the taking of vows. But whatever the rules and forms may be, they are usually enforced with the greatest rigidity, having behind them the sanctions of public opinion, law, and religion. Nonconformers are liable to the severest social ostracism, the condemnation of religion, and legal censure. Few other contracts open to the individual are hedged about with such a variety of safeguards so jealously maintained.

Society further regulates the sex side of life by a host of social, legal, and religious taboos on all varieties of sex expression except those legalized in marriage. Many extramarital sexual practices are considered dishonorable, some are seriously illegal, and most of them are branded as wicked. The aim of society seems to be not only to guarantee, safeguard, and regulate the securing of a mate but also to reduce to the minimum all other sexual experience.

Ideally every individual has an inherent right to normal sex life on the attainment of biological maturity. Both physical and spiritual health and welfare demand the normal exercise of this function. Practically, however, society has an equal right to control, postpone, or even deny this function in the interest of health and heredity and social welfare. Where venereal disease is involved the right of the individual concerned is overbalanced by his danger to others. Where bad heredity is manifestly present society has the right to refuse a handicapped by-product—defective children. Society has also the undoubted right to regulate the age of marriage—that is, of biological maturity—primarily to prevent child marriages and the exploitation of immature young women. Society has also forbidden marriage within certain degrees of kinship.

Our American ideal is that a young man shall not marry till he has proved his economic independence and is able, unaided, to undertake the support of a wife and potential family. This is a fine democratic ideal firmly grounded in our individualistic philosophy. The family thus assumes no responsibility for the sex life of the budding adult except on the side of repression. It is a case of "watchful waiting" on the part of parents, during which time anything can and many things usually do happen to the repressed and inhibited individuals watched. With the advance of Western civilization, the rise in the standard and the cost of living, the heightened intensity of competition for opportunities to earn a living, and the lengthening periods of preparation for the professions, it is not strange that young men find it increasingly difficult to marry at a relatively early age. The higher a young man's aim in life (provided he is not subsidized by wealthy parents), the more difficult it is for him to marry in his twenties. The intervening years spell cruel inhibition for the vast majority, subli-

mation with sorry mental twists for some, and ruinous substitutes for altogether too many. These substitutes, while they may in and of themselves degenerate and be degenerate, are ruinous chiefly because of the social attitude toward them and the frame of mind in which they must be indulged. Love can be a fine and ennobling thing only so long as society allows one to think of it in those terms. When both parties face the certainty of ostracism and censure if discovered, a fine thing is turned into one that is sordid and the mental state resulting is of greater danger than the physical indulgence.

The postponement of marriage till the late twenties or even into the thirties for many of our young men and women, especially those preparing for the higher walks of life, has a menacing side that our very prudery makes it difficult for us to study. The causes of this dilemma are founded in our mores, which change but slowly, always lagging behind the demand and never giving in till forced to do so. They are determined by all the complexities of modern economic organization, which takes no thought of paying a beginning wage sufficient for the needs of two. If our mores change slowly we may expect changes in the very bases of remuneration to change even more slowly. The situation that we face cannot be legislated out of existence, nor can business and industry be changed to meet its demands. We can evolve out of it through the education of public opinion, but that is a slow process at best. In the meantime there is a tendency for the double standard of morality to give way to a single standard which is less than that formerly demanded of women. One hears more and more of temporary monogamous matings of convenience in our cities. These may and often do bear all the earmarks of true love and fidelity; but in the long run, such are our mores, it is the woman who still pays the price.

The problem of marriage, then, is the problem of making it possible for sound individuals to marry at the normal time. Where this opportunity is not present substitutes must be and are found. Sex is a fact and its complete sublimation is more a surface appearance than a reality. Where normal sex life, defined by society as marriage, is either delayed or denied a host of socially disapproved substitutes appear. The outstanding substitute is prostitution, which has been called "the oldest profession in the world." This "profession" is not always clandestine. Some societies have licensed and even operated it in the interest of the chastity of the rest of their females and in response to male demand. Where it is socially disapproved and outlawed the clandestine professional makes her appearance and plies her trade. The volume of illegitimacy bears testimony to only a a small part of nonprofessional illicit intercourse between the unmarried. Other substitutes reach through the whole field of so-called "unnatural" practices or "perversions" and on into the field of pornographia and other substitutes. So delicate is the sex balance of life, so far is its reach beyond

the mere physical act into the very nerve-fiber and spiritual life of man, that most substitutes are probably undesirable if not actually dangerous.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY

The family is probably the oldest social institution known to man. It is the mother of most other social institutions. It has played the leading rôle in the civilization and socialization of man; and there is little evidence that its day is past and that the time has come to relegate it to the museum of anthropological curiosities. The family, however, has existed in many and various forms, each representing an attempted adaptation to the needs of the time and the place. It has undergone many changes; man in his history has tried every possible experiment with it. It is well not to lose sight of this fact in the presence of seemingly new proposals. It is well to remember also that a marriage or a family institution within a given culture does not represent merely restrictive taboo but also the positive sex morality of the group.

With regard to the family in its most primitive forms, Miss Goodsell wisely concludes,

> We must admit that primitive society has rendered very real service to civilization. It has regulated the relations of the sexes in such wise as to avoid promiscuity, which would have retarded, if not prevented, the development of a body of customary sex morals and the organization of stable family life. The primitive family itself, however unsettled by frequent divorce and divided by polygamy, yet afforded a more or less permanent refuge for men and women from the disordered conditions of life and a nursery for the helpless young who might otherwise have perished. Then, too, the family preserved and passed on to the rising generation those technical skills by means of which primitive man was fed, clothed and housed. Thus a store of knowledge indispensable to life was conserved and very slowly increased. Finally, in so far as the primitive family upheld and inculcated the moral traditions and customs of the group, it rendered valuable service in helping to lay the foundation stones of a more idealistic conception of human relations than primitive man had even dimly perceived.[1]

And the job is not finished. The family is still, in spite of its inadequacies and apparent failures, the foundation-stone on which civilization still builds.

The ideal of the family in Western society is that it is a monogamous and permanent partnership sexually exclusive "to have and to hold, for better or for worse, till death us do part." When marriage is contracted and a family thus inaugurated it is not considered either by the contracting parties or by society as a mere trial or experiment, with possible dissolution in the offing. All parties concerned assume that love so true and deep can result only in a true and permanent union. Fidelity, loyalty, and coöperation are taken for granted. A home is established and within it two living as one will bear and rear children, nourishing them and train-

[1] Willystine Goodsell, *Problems of the Family* (1928), pp. 22–23.

ing them for the duties of citizenship and of the family life that will in time be theirs. No ideal could be higher. Woman is no longer a chattel. She is a voting partner. Man is no longer allowed to be a tyrant. The rights of both women and children are protected by law. The sanctity of the home is protected by law. Infidelity is severely punished both by law and by public opinion.

Gillin well sums up the social function of the family. He says:

> It is evident . . . that the family represents the unit of social order. Within it people are trained for the larger social life. Not only are they schooled in the art of producing wealth and trained in the rights of property, but also in the duties and privileges of individuals in association. Here they receive the elements of religious training, for it is in the home that the beginnings of all forms of culture appear. Politically the family and the state are entirely separated so far as civil rights and duties are concerned, yet the home gives instruction in political life. It is here that questions of public policy are discussed and members of the family receive their early training in political opinion. It is in the family that the first ethical ideals are imparted, and socialization is begun. Modern child psychology is re-emphasizing and explaining in scientific terms the wisdom in the old adages. "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it," and "Give me a child until he is seven years old and you can have him all the rest of his life." From the very first moment of his existence the child is conditioned by his experiences. In the home the child receives his first conditioning. His responses made there are likely to become fixed as habit patterns which determine his conduct through life. In spite of many influences which have lessened its influence upon the child, it (the family) still stands as the primary social group in the process of creating a social being.[2]

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE FAMILY?

The institution of the family, with the finest ideals in the world behind it, is in operation and is working, fortunately, with marked success in at least the majority of cases. Still we hear the rumblings and creakings of the machinery, see the high percentage of disaster, and wonder if the whole thing is about to crash. The trouble with marriage and the family today is not new or different. A necessary institution keyed and adjusted to the tempo and conditions of a past generation finds itself in the whirlpool of rapid modern change. There is nothing new about this and perhaps nothing particularly serious. We take such maladjustments for granted in education, government, and economics. But when it comes to marriage, the family, morals, and sex we like to think of them as inherently right, settled once for all, and incapable of maladjustment. Mistakenly, we prefer to think that something is wrong with us rather than with these ancient institutions.

The social trend of the modern family may here be briefly summarized.

Decline of Parental Authority and Family Loyalty Clearly Evident. In this age the old yoke of authority by parents is no longer tolerated by

[2] Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (1930), pp. 187–188.

the younger generation. Influence undoubtedly still is exercised by parents over children, but it is a much sugar-coated and becloaked affair in comparison with that of a century ago. Perhaps this is well. It may be due partially to the fact that today so many of our elders are parents of children much better educated than *they* are. The children in our modern schools are frequently in possession of more adequate elements of information along certain lines than their parents are. And long before maturity they are well aware of the fact. It has been cleverly remarked that the modern family has become a democracy, wherein each member has his vote and there are never any majorities. At any rate one feels in many homes that it is the parents who are "to be seen and not heard" rather than the children. It would be hard to find the old family loyalties that were the rule but a few generations ago. They do not exist because the family seems to have ceased to exist as a unit; independence of the individuals composing the family has increased. Opportunities for employment make it possible for even adolescent sons and daughters to have independent incomes of their own. It is possible for sixteen-year-old daughters to serve notice on their parents that if the latter do not like their friends and actions they will rent a room and pay board elsewhere. No longer do we find the common family purse. Where children do not contribute to their own support they are very apt to be the recipients of independent allowances, which they spend as they please.

Loosened Family Ties. The family seems to have lost much of its former unity, its central position in the life of the individual, the economic and social interdependence of its members; many of its loyalties, common interests, common amusements, and traditions. The expression "It's just like one big family" has lost much of its former significance. We no longer have "big families," and in the small ones each member is an individual with his own interests, activities, circle of friends, and frequently his own allowance or income. The home has, with some justification, been likened to a filling-station with parking-space attached. It has been called the place where one goes when he has no other engagements. Of course this is a bit farfetched; but it is a long cry from the old family unit and unity to that which exists in the family of today, membership in which means a vastly different thing on the surface. It is a question, however, how vitally important these modifications are. If we can demonstrate that a smaller unity has been exchanged for a larger and that new loyalties have taken the place of the old, we are merely discovering that the social order does change. For the present, we are sure only that we are in a period of change that is still one of maladjustment. If these family ties loosen we must find substitutes for them. These substitutes have not yet adequately demonstrated themselves.

Reduction of the Family Function. The family was formerly pretty much of an independent and self-sustaining social and economic unit. It

produced its own amusement, social life, cultural stimulus. These were simple but eminently healthy. They were a coöperative product. It was an economic producer as well. Every member of the family was a producer. The family produced goods that the family consumed. In this modern day of large-scale factory production of everything from amusement thrills to canned corn, one or more members of the family produce salaries and with these goods are purchased that were formerly produced at home. Good or bad, this condition will not be changed so long as modern commercialism can supply the demand better than the home can.

Training for Life and Citizenship Seems Increasingly to be Taken Care of Outside the Home. The new school, the socialized church, and dozens of State and private programs are either entering the home or working with the child outside the home. The effect is to standardize the influences that form the character of the child and to distribute them more equitably rather than to leave them to the haphazard influence of a multitude of individual homes and pairs of parents. One would not think of disbanding the Boy and Girl Scouts, discontinuing the social work of settlements, schools, and churches, or dismissing family case workers, probation officers, visiting teachers, and visiting nurses. Activities of this sort have come into being because there was a demand for them. Still they definitely encroach on the former functions of the home.

Instability is the final indictment. We still take it for granted that marriages will endure; but an alarming proportion of them survive for less than five years. Furthermore, the home itself, in the old sense, is disappearing. Domiciles of a highly temporary nature are rapidly taking the place of former family seats of generations' standing. We are rapidly becoming a nation of renters. In the more congested areas of our large cities, the home has become a cubicle in a vast pile of brick and stone—a single cell in a honeycomb. There is undoubtedly much virtue in the ownership of a home and the sense of stability and belonging which results therefrom; but modern economic organization of life makes that impossible for the many.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SITUATION

What are the changes in the social environment that have produced such marked changes in the family? The number is legion, and they include all those which have gone into the making of the new economic, political, and social life of our time. Most of these were discussed earlier; but let us review them briefly here. Consider the new communication that has given us a wider range of association; the new industry that, among other things, has taken production from the home; the new education that assumes a much wider responsibility for the child; socialized religion, which saves lives for the here as well as for the hereafter; and the revolutionary new freedom of women. Each of these changes stands in first magnitude

in and of itself. Each thrusts up social problems of the first order. Each affects every other social institution, and together they, in their own change, affect the family, compelling it to readjust itself to the new conditions. It is not conceivable that the family or any other institution could continue to function without change in the face of such marked change in all departments of life surrounding it.

We must conclude that the present disorganization of the family, which we are prone to define in terms of the family of the past, is the normal result of the tempo of the time. We must recognize also that the changes indicated above are fundamentally desirable and good. Who would return to the simpler and more restricted life, even if he could? Who would limit the work of either the church or the school? Who would consider the disfranchisement of women? Who would reinstate the old family, even if it did seem to possess greater stability? The social problems of the family and of other social institutions are not problems of innate goodness or badness. They are merely problems of the adjustment of fundamentally sound institutions to the needs and conditions of the time. The family, in some form, is here to stay. Communal breeding and rearing of children is an idle dream. Marriage is a necessary form of the social control of mating and can be made to work. Our problem is not one of destroying outworn institutions but of reconditioning very valuable machinery.

THE BROKEN HOME

In view of these tremendous strains upon the family ties, it is not surprising that a certain number of marriages should result in failure. Both the number and proportion of broken homes have been rising steadily in recent decades. The home may be broken by the death or incapacitation of either the breadwinner or the home manager. It may also be broken by desertion or divorce. Among these causes those pertaining to divorce and separation [3] probably are the most baffling from the social point of view. The problems of death and sickness, after all, are a concern chiefly of medical science; and we already have seen that marked headway has been made in saving life and ensuring health. Desertion, sometimes called the "poor man's divorce," frequently is resorted to because legal divorce is too expensive. It is a curious fact, however, that a large proportion of desertion is only temporary and may be even recurrent, with the recalcitrant spouse returning to his family after a more or less extended period of "French leave." Sometimes, of course, desertion occurs only technically, since it actually represents an agreement between the parties involved.

[3] Separation is really a partial divorce, which gives legal recognition to the fact of "separation from bed and board." The principals remain legally married, however, and do not have the legal status of separate persons, as do those who are awarded absolute decrees of divorcement. Some States require a year of legal separation as a requisite to granting a divorce decree.

In any case, the deserter of the family, whether it be the husband or the wife, is one who is not playing the game; and desertion generally is branded with all the stigma that the word implies. Divorce, however, presents problems that are not so clearly defined; and it is necessary at this point to review the various aspects of the matter more fully to gain a better understanding of them.

THE PROBLEM OF DIVORCE

Divorce is a method society has set up whereby the mismated may find legally recognized release. If we grant that divorce is ever and under any circumstances justifiable, then we must defend formal legal procedure for the purpose of bringing it about.

Is divorce a moral issue? For answer let us turn to the church, the keeper of morals and the defender of social values. Among the Hebrews, as we have seen from the Old Testament, divorce was not only recognized but the only grounds necessary seemed to be the husband's dissatisfaction with his wife. Even so, it was not as easy as ancient biblical citations might seem to indicate.

For instance, in present-day China about the same amount of freedom exists in theory. In fact, however, the husband thus giving his wife a bill of divorce knows that he has her family to deal with and his village knows that it will have to answer to her village. If the wife's family is socially or politically more powerful than that of the husband there is little likelihood that he will send her away, for if he does he will have to reckon with the consequences of an enraged family and the possibility of starting a village feud. It is entirely possible, in that land of eternal compromise, that the elders of his village will persuade him out of the course if they fear that they cannot see the affair safely through.

The New Testament also recognizes divorce, but greatly restricts it. Woman's position is safeguarded, and divorce can be had but "for the one cause"—that of unfaithfulness in the marriage relation. The teachings of Jesus himself on this point are perfectly clear.

> And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? trying him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. But Jesus said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this commandment. But from the beginning of creation, male and female made he them. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. And in the house the disciples asked him again of the matter. And he said unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband and marry another, she committeth adultery.[4]

[4] Mark X: 2–12.

The "one cause" is elsewhere mentioned in the later Scriptures but some students of the Bible are of the opinion that it represents an interpolation and not the original thought of Jesus. There is no question that Jesus considered divorce immoral and forbade it except for the one possible cause of unfaithfulness.

How have the modern churches interpreted the teachings of Jesus? What is their attitude toward divorce? The answer is that you can find anything you please from a strictness almost transcending that of the New Testament to those churches which will solemnize any marriage and ask no questions not required by the law. We have on the one hand marriages that require papal authority for their annulment and on the other hand "marrying parsons" who specialize in *re-unions*. One of the Ten Commandments enjoins us not to commit adultery. Sociology would recognize in this a fundamental and necessary law of social control. But does the person who remarries commit adultery? The theologians answer both yes and no. Indeed the Pope does not issue a divorce at all; he merely announces that the marriage never existed, while at the other extreme many churches are only interested in whether or not a license to rewed has been legally issued.

Since the church has been unable to decide the matter, we are scarcely justified in considering divorce as a moral issue. The Roman Catholic church stands opposed, but most of the Protestant churches support recognition of a legal procedure. We can all agree that divorce may be *immorally used* by individuals who find in it a means for legalized promiscuity. This, however, is an expensive process and not a course open to the man of even average means. A comparatively small portion of the volume of modern divorce is of the front-page-scandal type. Society should welcome any aid from religion in increasing the sanctity of marriage but should deplore the inflexible attitude that makes adjustment impossible even where eminently desirable.

Is, then, divorce merely a matter of social expediency? For the sociologist it is this. He is interested in the economical and efficient functioning of social institutions. He is interested in the success of the family. Hence he is interested in divorce which may be either a safeguard in exceptional cases against rank injustice, or an opportunity for lax sex relations. He does not question that legalized divorce has proved itself a desirable safety-valve. He may and does question the various legal technicalities surrounding it—making it in some commonwealths a "nickel-in-the-slot" affair, and an impossibility in others. He is more interested in the volume and conditions of divorce than in the fact of divorce. Accordingly we shall discuss divorce from the standpoint of its effect on society and lay aside its moral and religious aspects.

Is divorce evil, or is it caused by evils? When we say that we shall discuss

divorce from the standpoint of its effect upon society we must hasten to admit that we are not yet sure whether divorce is a cause or an effect—whether the legal recognition of divorce and the character of the divorce laws tend to accelerate the divorce-rate or whether there are other social conditions in operation that weaken the home ties and result in increased recourse to the divorce courts. If the former, then divorce is, in and of itself, an evil; but if it is the latter, divorce is but a symptom of underlying social maladjustments that call for remedy. It may well be that society will discover that truth lies in both directions, that the ease with which divorce can be secured affects its frequency, as do also the unfortunate conditions that reduce the stability of the home.

WHO ARE DIVORCED AND WHY

The popular impression, gained largely from the newspapers, is that the large volume of divorce is of the Hollywood, Reno, and Paris sort. This is far from the truth, for the mass of divorce takes place in the great middle class of society and is accorded but scant publicity by the press. It




FIG. 11

Based on data from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1938,* p. 95, and *1950,* p. 63; *World Almanac, 1951,* p. 441.

is this divorce which has increased in volume at such a rate as to cause consternation. This being the case, it is important that we should know what conditions surround this middle class and its divorce-rate. Who are these people? Where do they come from? What is their religion, occupation, and social condition? If we can answer even a part of these questions we shall understand better the problem of divorce.

Divorce is high where social change is rapid. Individual insecurity tends to make people restless, unwilling to make sacrifices for an uncertain fu-

ture, unable to retain the stabilized convictions that are necessary in meeting the responsibilities of family life. Sustained adversity is a serious strain on family ties; and, as time goes on, family members begin to blame one another for conditions that none can do much about. Under such conditions, the differences in points of view become irreconcilable, and divorce can be expected to rise.

TABLE 18: MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX AND GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS: 1940 *
(expressed in per cents)

Geographical Division	*Marital Condition and Sex*							
	Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
United States	33.2	25.8	61.2	61.0	4.3	11.5	1.3	1.7
New England	36.0	31.9	58.2	55.3	4.8	11.4	1.0	1.3
Middle Atlantic	35.3	29.5	59.7	58.3	4.4	11.3	.6	.9
East North Central	32.2	25.0	61.8	62.2	4.5	10.9	1.5	1.9
West North Central	33.4	25.7	60.8	61.6	4.5	11.1	1.3	1.7
South Atlantic	33.5	25.8	61.8	60.7	3.9	12.1	.9	1.3
East South Central	30.9	23.5	64.0	62.7	4.1	12.3	1.0	1.5
West South Central	30.3	21.8	64.1	64.2	4.3	12.0	1.4	2.1
Mountain	33.7	22.4	60.2	65.0	4.2	10.5	2.0	2.1
Pacific	32.7	21.0	60.2	62.6	4.2	12.8	2.9	3.7

* *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* pp. 47, 48.

Divorce seems to follow the emancipation of women and the extension of educational opportunity. Here again it appears to accompany change. No one would be willing to argue that since the according of equality to women has been accompanied by divorce, they should therefore be relegated to their former status. It may be that the emancipation and education of women has made them less quiescent under male dominance, less willing to suffer petty tyrannies of the past. If this be the case, then the increase in divorce is but a by-product in the new adjustment taking place between the two sexes.

Divorce seems to follow economic prosperity and a rising standard of living. This too is difficult to understand unless we concede that economic prosperity gives rise to many new and additional interests outside the home. The father is more and more completely absorbed in the demands of his business and finds release on the golf-course rather than in the more simple pleasures of the home. The wife is released from many former household duties and enters an outside sphere of activity completely foreign to that of her husband. The children have their school and the many organized activities that occupy their time and attention outside the home and are little connected with the interests of their parents or with each

other. Shall we call this the loosening of home ties, or shall we merely remark that this too is but a stage in the adaptation of home life to new social and economic conditions? If the latter, then divorce is here also but a symptom and a by-product.

There is more divorce in the city than in the country. On the basis of what has been said this is understandable, for the country is more conservative than the city and city life moves at a much more rapid pace. In the city there are more outside distractions to draw the various members of the family apart and to lessen the importance of the home to each.

TABLE 19: MARITAL CONDITION OF THE POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, COLOR, AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE: 1940 * (expressed in per cents)

Sex and Marital Condition	*Color*		*Place of Residence*		
	White	Nonwhite	Urban	Rural Nonfarm	Farm
Males	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	33.2	33.5	32.6	31.4	36.4
Married	61.3	60.0	61.8	62.7	58.3
Widowed	4.2	5.5	4.2	4.6	4.5
Divorced	1.3	1.0	1.4	1.3	0.8
Females	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	26.0	23.9	27.4	22.6	24.3
Married	61.2	58.5	58.1	64.5	66.3
Widowed	11.1	15.8	12.4	11.6	8.8
Divorced	1.7	1.8	2.1	1.3	0.6

* Sixteenth Census, *Population* (U.S. Bureau of the Census), Vol. 4, Part 1, pp. 17–20.

Divorce is more common among Protestants than among Catholics. This, of course, is due primarily to the fact that the two communions exert different social pressure in this matter. It is doubtful if one could prove that Catholic unions are happier in general than Protestant unions and hence result in less divorce. Divorce is simply less available to the one than to the other.

More divorces are granted to women than to men. This was not formerly the case, for the very sufficient reason that divorce was a male prerogative. However, does the present situation indicate that, given a new freedom, the women are proving a less stable element in society, or that more husbands fail to make good? Probably neither. There is enough of the old chivalry remaining for most men to allow their wives to initiate the action, whatever the causes that bring it about.

Divorce varies with occupation. There are occupations that exert more strain on the family life than is the case with others. Certain occupations

presuppose more temperament than others and attract the more high-strung and emotional types. Other occupations take the husband away from the home for longer or shorter periods and thus break into its even tenor. Divorce is low for farmers, but it is high for actors, showmen, commercial travelers, musicians, and physicians. This situation does not reflect on the character of those occupations in which divorce rates are high. It merely reflects the effect of occupation on home life, with a resulting degree of instability.

Divorce seems to reach its maximum about the fifth year of married life. If a couple can weather the storms of the first five years, the chances for the continued success of their venture are greatly increased. This is due to the fact that family life requires an immense amount of readjustment. Each party to the contract must learn to get used to the matrimonial harness. In an economic system within which it is difficult for a young man to undertake the responsibility of a wife and family before he is twenty-five years of age, habits become settled and readjustment to the new relation is made with increasing difficulty.

Divorce is twice as frequent in homes where there are no children. Perhaps this is fortunate, since we are mainly concerned about divorce as a home-breaker and in its effect upon the children. If there are no children to be thus handicapped, society can better afford to allow the contracting parties to make a new start. The child is the stabilizer of the home—the central interest that binds parents together. It is the child who gives the home its real purpose. It is around the child that the divorce problem centers.

What can we conclude from this brief résumé? We have seen that divorce has been a concomitant to social progress and economic prosperity and that it varies with the varying stability of the home. Shall we therefore defend divorce and conclude that it is necessary to continued social well-being? Or shall we conclude that it is an unfortunate by-product in a period of rapid social change and frenzied readjustment? We certainly shall not attack divorce on moral and theological grounds. But we must view with apprehension the large number of broken homes, the children left without normal home environments, and the general indication of a weakening hold of the home and family life on the individual.

CAUSES OF DIVORCE AND GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

There is a vast difference between the *causes of*, and the *grounds for*, divorce. By *causes* we mean the real, underlying reasons. It is for these that the sociologist is seeking. It is only by discovering them that the problem can be solved. By *grounds* is meant the legally recognized technical bases demanded by the courts. In the State of New York there is but one legally recognized ground. It is adultery. Therefore applicants for divorce

must either admit or pretend this cause if they wish separation under the jurisdiction of that State. In another State no divorce is granted for any cause whatsoever, and accordingly those desiring divorce must become residents of another and more liberal community. The other extreme lies in the granting of divorce for such a trivial cause as "incompatibility of temper." In all there are at least thirty-six different grounds for divorce recognized by the various States of the Union, but no one State recognizes all of them.

The study of court records gives little light on the real causes of divorce. While collusion between the parties concerned is illegal, it is undoubtedly true that very few divorces are granted where either the husband and wife or their legal representatives do not agree on the grounds that will secure divorcement with the least publicity and pain to all concerned. It is interesting to note that adultery as a ground has been steadily decreasing for nearly a century, while cruelty and neglect to provide have been on the increase. This is probably due to the fact that the latter grounds (or excuses) carry with them less social stigma and not that spouses are becoming more faithful on the one hand, or husbands more cruel and less provident on the other.

While we believe that the welfare of society demands that divorce be legally possible, we deplore the two extremes represented by the divorce laws and practices of certain of our States. In some it is either an impossibility or a near-impossibility, and in others so easy as to permit separation on slight provocation. Where divorce is too difficult or expensive to obtain we pay the price in desertion and philandering. Thus, if divorce is impossible and home conditions are intolerable, then another way around the difficulty will be found. On the other hand, if divorce is easy it stands as an ever-ready solution to any petty squabble. It has been the experience of most domestic relations courts that comparatively few divorces are really justified. They all have small beginnings, which grow and become magnified. If the parties concerned can be brought to unburden themselves completely to a sympathetic third party, reconciliation can often be effected. Unfortunately there exists a class of shyster lawyers who batten on marital incompatibilities and make the most of them. It would seem to be true that too easy divorce breeds divorce, and that too difficult divorce defeats its own ends. The divorce laws of the United States are a hopeless tangle. It is even possible for a man to be legally divorced from his wife in one State, and at the same time to be legally wedded to her in another. He may find himself in the uncomfortable position of being the lawful husband of one wife in one State, and a bigamist in the next.

THE FRUITS OF DIVORCE

The primary and immediate result of divorce is the broken home, and most of the fruits of divorce are the result of this unfortunate break. The

child who is brought up with but one parent is handicapped, for he needs the influences of both father and mother. He is brought up with the consciousness that all is not well, that one parent has been wronged by the other or that both *have not played the game,* that he is differently situated than other children are. The lessons of love and sympathy between parents are absent from his life. Often each parent appeals to his sympathy as against the other. If the child be motherless because of divorce, he loses the softening influences of that companionship during the major portion of the day. If he be fatherless, he misses that part of his training. Such a child is fortunate indeed if he does not grow up with a complex of one sort or another due to the unnatural or incomplete environment in which he is reared. On the other hand, it must be admitted that it might be better for some children to have but one parent, rather than to live in the discord caused by the continued union of the two that he has.

There seems to be a startling correlation between broken homes and juvenile delinquency. It is easier for a child from such a home to go astray. This may be due to the fact that he has insufficient supervision or it may arise from the fact that his delinquency is a defense reaction to the unnatural situation. Recent studies indicate that although not more than a fourth of our homes are broken, they account for at least a third to a half of our juvenile delinquency—the extent varying with age, sex, and racial and national stock.[5] This effect upon the child, whether actual or potential, is the chief product of the broken home that troubles us.

No less serious, but unfortunately not so commonly recognized, are the consequences of divorce to the divorced persons themselves. The tug and strain between parents of children has already been suggested. But even when there are no children, the price of marital freedom for those who seek divorce is high. Clearly, when a home is broken by divorce, the whole chain of habits and social relationships is broken for both of the divorced people. The sexual readjustments incumbent upon both the man and the woman are obvious. Similarly all the rest of the intimate details of daily living must be reorganized, with each of the divorced persons being forced to "live alone and like it." Such a necessity is, in effect, a serious crisis in the life of the individual; and a profound sense of loneliness is likely to result. Inevitably, too, there is a lingering sense of failure which is not easy to throw off. In addition, there are the hard problems of finance—whether alimony is to be paid, how much, and for how long. The payment of alimony is a burden upon the husband, who is then forced to maintain two establishments. The wife often is confronted with earning her own living comparatively late in life, and not infrequently for the first time. Friends of the couple most often "take sides" in favor of one or the other of the principals, with a result that many confused situations are bound to occur in planning social functions. Society still ostracizes the divorced

[5] Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society* (1943), p. 333.

person to some extent; and frequently the divorced man or woman is forced to extremes of conduct, and acceptance of associates of questionable character in the struggle to restore a sense of his or her own importance.

THE STABILIZATION OF THE FAMILY

Our outstanding problem is that of increasing the stability of the family insofar as this is desirable. This stability can be increased, in the main, by measures that safeguard marriage and entrance into family life. So long as marriage is a haphazard affair we must look for haphazard results; we have no reason to believe that wedded life can make misfits any less unsuited to one another. Likewise, so long as we have no uniform divorce policy, forbidding it absolutely in some areas and allowing it for the most trivial of causes in others, we know exactly what to expect—and our expectation is being realized.

Nevertheless, the solution to none of our social problems is simple. It is difficult, as we have already seen, ever to place the finger on even an approximate single cause. Most problems have a wide range of interrelationship and cause, and hence call for a wide range of readjustment in order to effect cure. Boiled down, the cures for most of our social problems are remarkably similar. Every step in the direction of general social efficiency and harmony will react on every individual institution, promoting harmony and efficiency therein. The remedy for many ills of social maladjustment lies in the direction of correcting individual maladjustments wherever we find them—a general attack all along the line.

To be more specific, we offer the following suggestions in regard to the stabilization of the family:

Education for marriage and family life. We start with education because we consider it the true starting-point. What we shall have to say about it is but part and parcel of the larger program of education for social life in general. Its effect would be felt not in the family alone but would carry over to every other department of life as well.

Is it not strange that the social sciences still play so slight a part, generally, in our educational system? A study of the curricula of American schools from grade schools to colleges reveals the fact that the study of social life plays an exceedingly minor rôle. Language, literature, history, and the exact sciences form the bulk of the educational offerings. No respectable school is without its definite requirements for graduation in each of these fields, whereas courses in the social sciences are more apt to be in the "elective" group. The great majority of our institutions of higher learning have done very well in meeting the new demand, but in the lower schools this vast field of training has begun to come into its own only in very recent years. If the youth of our nation is to be ready for the duties of citizenship and of family life it will be necessary to begin to acquaint them with the requirements of social life at an early age.

Regarding the twin institutions of marriage and family, could anything be more important than information in this field? What does the average youngster know of the deep social significance and importance of either? His attitude is apt to be either one of sloppy sentimentality or one of licentious eroticism. Beyond this, marriage and the family are just taken for granted as things that are and always have been. We plunge our youth into marriage without warning, without preparation, inadequately informed, to sink or swim, and to make port as best they can. No wonder many of them fail to reach the harbor!

It is true that an increasing number of our schools are offering courses dealing broadly with the subject of marriage and the family. The matter has hardly gotten beyond the experimental stage, however; and already many problems have come to light even in the presentation of such materials. First of all, there is the perennial problem of imposing new courses upon students whose curricular requirements already are overburdened —whether the student be collegian or grade-schooler. Parents and administrators of schools alike look askance at courses dealing frankly with matters of sex and family relations, since students bring a wide range of religious and social backgrounds to the classroom discussions. This is true even in our colleges and universities, where presumably those who conduct the courses are reasonably well qualified to teach them. At the lower levels of the educational system the difficulty becomes even greater. Aside from the necessity of dealing with less mature pupils, there is the additional problem of assuring the existence of enough properly equipped teachers—persons well versed in the psychological characteristics of adolescents, and themselves sufficiently familiar with the nature and functioning of family life. In the grade schools, where the great majority of teachers are unmarried women, that difficulty necessarily becomes especially acute. Nevertheless, to acknowledge the difficulty of meeting the need is not to accept a problem as insoluble. The need for adequate sex and marital education is impelling; and ways must be found to meet it even if the first objective must be the attainment of an enlightened public opinion which will support the development of such training as a legitimate function of our educational system.

Raising the marriage and family ideals is a direct by-product of the educational program. Romantic love is a pleasant diversion but a poor foundation for permanent wedded happiness. No problem is more complex than that of the adjustment of two lives to the strain of living together day by day as one person. Marriage is more than a sex exploit, and the family is more than a necessary evil. Let the veil be lifted, and more healthy ideals will obtain; a life partnership will then appear as an even more desirable consummation but also as a contract not to be entered upon too lightly.

The conventional prerequisites for marriage presently are those of love

(a condition of emotional instability between two individuals of opposite sex); chastity, which is not overly stressed; and economic competence and independence, which may or may not be present. The popular ideals in the case of the family are higher. They include love (of the enduring sort), fidelity, honor, confidence, and absolute and unending coöperation. In our schools we provide domestic science for our girls in order to make them better housekeepers and manual training for our boys in order to prepare them for earning a living, but we have scarcely begun to prepare them for the life that starts with the most solemn covenant to "love and honor, to cherish in joy and sorrow, in health and sickness, in prosperity and adversity, to be faithful and never to forsake" one another. The ideals of marriage, on the emotional side, are high enough. On the practical side they must be expanded. Present-day ideals surrounding marriage too often take no thought whatever of what is to follow through the years.

Uniform marriage laws might be made to prevent many unfortunate unions. We definitely need, as has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, not only stricter scrutiny of applicants for marriage licenses and regulation of the license to wed, but even more we need greater uniformity among the various States. As already indicated elsewhere,[6] these would include permission (legal or parental or both), physical and mental examination of both applicants, and due notice or legal banns. The purpose of uniform marriage laws is not negative, that of preventing marriage, *but rather to aid marriage and to insure the proper marriage to each other of those suitably mated.*

A right-about-face on the part of a large section of the Christian church. In theory the church sanctifies marriage. If the church really takes seriously the vows it administers it will not administer them indiscriminately to all who apply on presentation of due license to wed. One church marries only its own members and these must be communicants in good standing. It is therefore commonly accused of narrowness and intolerance. It is a fact, however, that it thereby strengthens the power of the vows thus taken and does not cheapen itself. What greater travesty than that of the solemn dignity and beauty of the church wedding of two individuals to whom the office is but dignity and beauty, a bit of lovely pageantry symbolizing their joy; who do not and cannot join in the religious spirit of the moment? The churches might well reserve their sanctification for those who definitely accept it as such. For the remainder the purely civil marriage is logical. Civil marriage need not be unlovely. It can be decked with all the trappings desired. Let the ceremony stand, however, for what it honestly is.

Uniform divorce laws and a socialized divorce court. We believe that this is placing the emphasis where it belongs. The most important step is preparing individuals for married life. The second is that of getting the right people wedded. The third is that of correcting the mistakes that still

[6] Chapter 7.

may have been made. This is the work of the divorce laws and courts. With regard to law chaos exists. There is no uniformity. The widest possible gulf separates the legal standard of South Carolina and Nevada in regard to divorce. Uniformity is both logical and possible; and neither extreme is desirable. Divorce should be available but only after the most serious consideration. Just as we have juvenile courts for the consideration of that highly specialized problem, so we should have courts of domestic relations prepared to consider these even more complicated problems of the family. The ordinary divorce trial with its attendant publicity and duplicity is eminently bad for public morals and a danger to the institution of marriage and the family.

We need a more careful study of justifiable grounds for divorce. The matter of separation should receive as careful attention as the matter of marriage. Society has decided that marriage should not be entered into lightly. It is even more necessary that it should not be terminated lightly. It has been said that marriage is a "gamble," that it is a "lottery." This is the case only when it is entered upon unthinkingly, and when either or both parties to the contract are unwilling to play the game honestly, to give as well as to take, and to make a real effort toward its success. Divorce should be legally possible, but not so temptingly easy as to constitute an invitation to enter lightly into marriage.

Until society, the State, and the church look marriage and the family frankly in the face, recognizing the fact that they represent the union of human individuals rather than of either devils or angels, and prepare these entirely human individuals for both the duties and delights awaiting them, the "gamble" will continue.



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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the social purpose of the family? Of marriage?
2. Is polygamy in and of itself immoral and wicked? If so, why? If not, do you nevertheless deplore the practice? Why, or why not?
3. Consider the case of your own home: Where do you live, and why? What common interests do the members of your family share? In what common occupations do they engage? What are the individual interests and occupations not thus shared? Can you justify the continued existence of your home? What necessary and legitimate functions does it perform?
4. Do you plan to marry, have a family, and establish a home? Of course you do; but, frankly, why?
5. Would you, if a man, be willing to have your wife economically independent of you, with a professional career of her own, and from her own income hire cook, nurse, and maid to care for your home?
6. What would you, if a woman, think of the idea of swapping places with your husband, leaving him home to care for the house and children and yourself earning their support? Would you trust him with your children?
7. Why is it that we consider divorce a social problem? What is the problem? Is it that divorce is immoral or that it is antisocial?
8. State the attitude toward divorce (*a*) of the early Christian church; (*b*) of the Roman Catholic church; (*c*) of the Protestant churches; (*d*) of the State; (*e*) of public opinion.
9. Are the legal grounds for divorce an accurate index to the actual causes of divorce?
10. Why are the great majority of divorces granted to women?
11. What are the real social causes of divorce?
12. Are modern education, and all the other agencies that make for increased individualism, also increasing divorce?
13. Has woman's winning of a place for herself in the world—economic independence, intellectual equality, equal opportunity, and suffrage—resulted in happier or unhappier homes? More or fewer divorces?
14. We have suggested education as a factor in solving the problem of divorce and the unstable family. What should the young man and the young woman be taught? Work out a program.

14. Social Problems of Education

THE ADJUSTMENT OF the individual to society has always been one of the major problems claiming the attention of social groups. The social pattern is not inherited; and the growing child must not only be trained regarding the modes of conduct approved by the group, but he must also be fitted so far as possible to take an active and useful part as an individual in the society of which he is a member. Education may therefore be defined as the process whereby the young individual is adapted to the group pattern of conduct and whereby his natural powers are developed in ways that will enable him to take an active part in group life.

EDUCATION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

Primitive peoples devised various methods for the accomplishment of these purposes, among them being folklore and story-telling, taboos, community opinion, and ceremonialism.

In the *folklore* of primitive peoples commonly are found explanations of the physical universe, hero tales of great leaders, personal experiences, and glimpses into the mysterious world of the spirits, all charged with an emotionalism and set forth with a dramatic eloquence calculated to impress and to inspire the young listener. In this manner not only are the ideals of the group passed on and rekindled, but modes of action successful in the struggle for existence and for social prestige are commended from the personal experiences of the raconteur. The subject-matter of folklore may be mythical or mundane; but the social effects are in every case the same—to instruct the listener in ideals and modes of conduct.

The tales of the heroes to be found in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* reveal the ideals and patterns of action held by the Greeks of that day, and abound in stories that were used for the inculcation of such ideals and actions in Greek youth. The stories found in the early books of the Old Testament are largely hero tales of the early Hebrews. How the blood of Hebrew

youths must have leapt at the story of Samson in his lone-handed fight with the Philistines! How they must have chuckled as, about the fireside or on great occasions in the life of the group, the story of Jacob with his dependence upon God, his sly cheating of Esau out of his birthright, and his clever manipulation of affairs to overreach his father-in-law Laban, were told with all the art of the story-teller! The folklore of our American Indians provides many stories of similar import.

Among primitive peoples, *taboos* constitute one of the most effective means of impressing upon the younger generation the rules of social conduct. Many of these survive in our superstitions of the present day. The taboo widespread among primitive peoples against eating the sacred animal is an illustration. The taboo against women approaching the men's house, against revealing the secrets of the men's society to the women, forbidding the man to see the face of his mother-in-law, the ban upon doing things in any other way than that which had come down by tradition from the past, are all illustrations of educational measures of enormous effect upon the conduct of youth.

The pressure of *public opinion* is a mighty influence on the conduct of all people, and in primitive groups this is usually exercised by the elders. The young and the inexperienced always stand in awe of the dogmatism of age, and when this dogmatism is backed by tradition as it usually is in primitive groups, all other opinion tends to defer to it. Slogans and proverbs are everywhere familiar and subtle tools of age in molding the conduct of the young.

The reiteration of group ideals and beliefs is accomplished for all sections of the population and among practically all groups by some sort of *ceremonialism.* In primitive societies the rites of initiation for boys and girls at adolescence are perhaps the strongest ceremonial influence in the education of the young. The consuming desire of children is to become men and women. The rites are surrounded with an atmosphere of secrecy and solemnity that gives them great power. Among the Australian aborigines the ceremonies consist of very elaborate preparations, instructions by selected guardians who accompany the boys, an impressive series of dramas during the initiation exercises, and the undergoing of severe physical pain for the purpose of testing the self-control of the lad. Concerning these ceremonies, Howitt says:

> The intention of the ceremonies is evidently to make the youths of the tribe worthy members of the community, according to their lights. Certain principles are impressed upon them for their guidance through life—for instance to listen to and obey the old men; to generously share the fruits of the chase with others, especially their kindred; not to interfere with the women of the tribe, particularly those who are related to them; not to injure their kindred, in its widest sense, by means of evil magic. Before the novice is permitted to take his place in the community, marry, and join in its councils, he must possess those qualifications which will enable him to act for the common welfare. . . .

In the ceremonies mentioned, with few exceptions, there is a similar mode of assembling the meeting for initiation, the making of a circular earthen mound, the removal of the boys from their mothers' control, the knocking out of the tooth, the investment in some tribes of the novice with a man's attire, the formation of a new camp by the women, and the showing of the boy to his mother, with the severance of her control over him by a formal act, and finally the period of probation under severe conditions. I have elsewhere referred to the belief inculcated as to the existence of a great supernatural anthropomorphic Being, by whom the ceremonies were first instituted, and who still communicates with mankind through the medicine-men, his servants.[1]

The efficacy of these various methods of primitive societies in the education of children and youth is attested by all travelers who have observed them. The pressure of the established patterns of conduct and belief is so great that it is only the exceptional child or youth who does not habituate himself to these group ideals and patterns. He who refuses to conform is exiled or put to death and thus disappears as a disturbing influence.

EDUCATION IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

Why Primitive Methods Are No Longer Adequate. In highly civilized societies conditions of living are so much more complex that the primitive means of social control that we have just considered tend to fall short of their purpose. They are inadequate for our modern conditions. Although still used, their effectiveness is much less than in a simpler society. The home still serves as an educational institution but with lessening influence. Group traditions survive, and impressions are made on sundry ceremonial occasions even now, but everywhere the close adherence to group patterns is breaking down and variant forms of conduct are appearing. Family ties are loosened, children are less restrained, and regard for the aged is less than in a primitive society.

The individual, in short, is rapidly tending to become anonymous; and one of the principal reasons for this is the *increasing size of the group.* Practically all modern civilizations, and particularly that of the United States, comprise large populations spread over a wide area, a state of affairs that was never present among primitive men. Modern means of communication and transportation, as has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, have enabled a nation of one hundred and fifty million people to become a society as truly as the primitive tribal group of a few hundred—with the important difference, however, that the face-to-face relationship which enabled all members of the tribe or village to know one another personally is no longer present in the larger society. As a result, the rigid uniformities of conduct made possible by education in a limited group through personal contact are no longer possible.

Moreover, the points of contact between individuals—economic, political, and social—are much more numerous and complicated. There is

[1] Howitt in *Sourcebook for Social Origins,* W. I. Thomas, Ed. (1909), pp. 231–232.

in modern society a *greater variety of interests* for the individual than was possible in more primitive groups. Division of labor has reached an unprecedented development. Functional classes have arisen that were rare under primitive conditions. Interests are organized in more definite groups over a much wider territory.

The *rapidity of change* characteristic of modern social life is a further reason why the old methods of education no longer suffice. Society is no longer static. It is necessary that new situations be evaluated at once. These evaluations cannot often be the result of long-continued testing and inculcation. Because of the size of territory and the rapidity of change, it is impossible for the group to standardize the reactions to new conditions and to maintain control of them, approving some and effectually disapproving others. Educational means have had to be devised to make the individual adaptable to these changes.

Coincident with these changes in modern social life has come the *enlargement of the social horizon.* While the inherent urges of our children are the same as those in the primitive child and youth, the surroundings are different. In primitive societies these urges and impulses were constantly under an effective control. About the child and youth constantly were kindred persons who were closely observant of his conduct and ready to bring effective pressure against any variation. The patterns of conduct presented to him were those upon which there was agreement by the whole group. Today the youth who leaves his home, whether for business or for education or for pleasure, meets with a varied assortment of patterns. Thousands of alternatives surround him from which he may—in fact, *must*—choose. Hence the inhibitions that guarded primitive childhood and youth are largely loosened; and incorrigibility, disorderly conduct, truancy, and delinquency, to say nothing of breach of propriety, have become frequent among the children and youth of our present day.

The Purposes of Modern Education. From the social point of view, the purposes of modern education are much the same as those of education among primitive societies. In either case, there is the attempt to condition the individual to the requirements of the group in which he lives and to train him, as well as might be, to shoulder his share of the work and responsibilities inherent to group life. The education of young men and women in democratic societies, however, probably is unique in the attention it gives to the welfare of the individual—not simply as a group member, but for himself alone. This has been made possible by the greater economic security of modern living and the transfer of much tedious and dangerous effort from the human being to the machine. Thus we may say that the basic purposes of modern education are to help the young to adapt themselves to the circumstances of life in such a way as will enable them to bring the world of things and of men to their service, and to enable them to contribute better adjustments in social relationships. Such purposes will

require that we undertake various types of instruction, among which the following are fundamental:

1. *Understanding the universe.* It is possible for the youth of today to know more about the nature of the universe than did the wisest man of a thousand years ago. Indeed, within the past two hundred years there has been greater extension of knowledge concerning the world in which we live than there was in all the previous experience of the human race. All of our applied science, our machinery, our control over nature, is based upon such knowledge. Moreover, the happiness of the individual himself, his freedom from fear, his ability to control the forces of nature, his sense of order, depend in large part upon his being furnished with the knowledge that modern science has brought regarding the natural world in which he lives. Only by understanding this universe of physical things and natural forces can he find the answers to the deep questions that arise to plague him, and only by such understanding can he make use of them most efficiently for his own and for his fellow's needs. The record of all these achievements modern education attempts to hand over to the child and the youth.

2. *Understanding society.* Modern education likewise endeavors to give to the child and youth our recent gains of knowledge concerning the world of men and their institutions. The history of the past, and our knowledge of prehistory, give us a picture of how man has dealt with his situation in the world during the last thirty millennia. Never before has he needed so much to know the history of man's institutions, of his ideals, and the fundamental principles upon which social welfare is based: the ways in which groups act and react toward one another. Social relationships are so complex today that unless the youth understands something of their nature and the conditions on which society depends, he cannot be a really intelligent citizen. The possibilities of friction are so much multiplied, and the men and the groups with which he must deal are so much more numerous than ever before, that such knowledge of social relationships and phenomena as we possess must be a part of his equipment. How shall he judge of the value of the family today unless he knows something of its past? How shall he appraise our economic relationships unless he understands how they operate and how they have come to be what they are? How shall he help prevent the international frictions and disagreements that lead to war unless he understands how they develop and the processes by which misunderstandings can be obviated? Hence education tries to hand on as much of our social knowledge as possible so that the youth may know how to adjust himself to society with the least possible friction and with the greatest efficiency.

3. *Formation of social values.* Modern education further attempts to present to the developing mind of youth certain social values. It is evident at once that we are here face to face with the problem of determining the

very objectives of society itself. Historically, society generally has placed above all else the need for a high regard for the wisdom and judgment of the elders and for conformity to the traditions and customs handed down from the past. It has, on occasion, demanded complete subservience to the will of the leaders of the group, whether military, religious, economic, or political. In our own society, of course, we try to free the young from the fears and superstitions that have enslaved men through the ages and to inculcate such ideals as honor, honesty, loyalty, and concern for the general welfare. We are trying, though often not too consciously or successfully, to fulfill those purposes of education which unite freedom for self-development with a corresponding service to the group in return. Whatever the goal that is to be sought, however, education has as one of its functions to impart to the young an understanding of what society expects of them and what they may expect of society.

4. *Development of social usefulness.* Since the family has been superseded as the institution to train people to make a living, and since the shop has given way to the factory, it seems to be incumbent upon the school to prepare its students to be economically useful. This purpose, however, has not been everywhere recognized, and is realized only in part even now. The movement for vocational schools and vocational guidance is a recognition of this purpose in modern education. Our colleges and universities similarly are adapting their curricula to meet the needs of the wide variety of technical and professional skills so essential to modern life.

It must be borne in mind constantly, however, that specialization can become something of a menace to both the individual and society itself. One cannot attain maximum usefulness, in most instances, unless he be fully aware of the dignity and the function of his occupation *within the social pattern as a whole.* He may find employment difficult to obtain if his specialization is so great as to restrict his adaptability; and without proper perspective, he may fall easy prey to manipulation by misguided or unprincipled leadership.

5. *Preparation for living.* And finally, the young must be given some training in the matter of "getting the most out of life." This does not necessarily mean, of course, that education should present patterns for "the good life," as ideals that the young should strive for in later years. Such matters, after all, are so much influenced by individual temperament, by regional and class—and even religious—environment that generalizations would be futile. Nevertheless, there are many practical problems of every-day living in which the individual needs a store of accurate information. Thus, for example, it is as much to the individual's interest as to society's that he should have a knowledge of the functioning of his body, methods of preserving health, and the adjustments necessary to promote physical efficiency. There are also many practical problems of family and marital adjustments which our schools have begun partially

to recognize by instituting courses of study in both colleges and high schools on marriage and family problems. A further need that still remains largely unrecognized pertains to budgeting and purchasing and other problems of private finances of the individual. We have too long stressed the need for making a living and left the individual consumer to the wiles of merchandisers and creditmen, apparently assuming that once having earned his living, he "naturally" will know how to spend it to his best advantage.

SOME PROBLEMS OF MODERN EDUCATION

Obviously the modern school system does not function perfectly. It is as new as our modern industrial civilization. It is not surprising if, emerging little more than a hundred years ago, it has not been perfectly adapted to our rapidly changing situation. What is said about its problems is in no sense a criticism of the army of devoted men and women who are administering it and are no less concerned with its problems than the sociologist. All of us have a stake in it, since it is such an important social institution, and every one of us should thoughtfully consider these problems in the hope that together we may more perfectly adjust it to the needs of our children and youth.

School Mortality. 1. *Extent.* The United States undoubtedly is the best-educated nation in the world. Our schools are more numerous, better equipped, and better attended than those of any other country. In 1946, with a total population of about 144,000,000, we had at least 31,000,000 individuals going to a school of one sort or another—more than a fifth of our entire population. Illiteracy, too, had been reduced to about 2.7 per cent for the nation as a whole by 1947, and the proportion of illiterates

TABLE 20: SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1946 *
(figures are in round numbers)

Type of School	*Enrollments*
All schools	30,927,000
Kindergarten and primary grades	20,000,000
High schools	6,227,000
Vocational schools	2,228,000
College and professional	1,557,000
Correspondence schools	536,000
Normal schools, teacher colleges	120,000
Vocational rehabilitation (disabled)	101,000
Nurse-training schools (1940 figure)	97,000
Training schools for delinquents	22,000
Schools for mental deficients	21,000
Schools for the deaf	13,000
Schools for the blind	5,000

* Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949.*

from 14 to 24 years of age had been reduced by that same year to about 1 per cent.[2]

More than four out of every five of our children 17 years of age and under are in school; but it is well known that large numbers of them drop out of school at an early age. For example, let us trace the group that started to school in 1935. There were 3,623,589 of them in the first grades of the public schools that year. By the time they were in the eighth grade, their numbers had been reduced to 1,679,782; and only 1,032,420 reached the last year of high school. Graphically, their history is recorded in Table 20. It will be noticed that the number actually increased between the eighth grade and the first year of high school, a phenomenon that occurs

TABLE 21: PROGRESS OF THE PUPILS ENROLLED IN THE FIRST GRADE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1935 *

Year	*Grade*	*Number of Pupils*
1935	1	3,623,589
1936	2	2,557,589
1937	3	2,484,558
1938	4	2,402,617
1939	5	2,295,060
1940	6	2,176,133
1941	7	2,099,791
1942	8	1,679,782
1943	9	1,897,750
1944	10	1,519,638
1945	11	1,236,883
1946	12	1,032,420

* *Biennial Survey of Education, 1944–1946* (Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, 1947), Ch. 1, p. 10, Table 11.

every year, probably marking a flow of elementary parochial school graduates into the secondary public school system. Even so, only about a million students actually graduated from the public high school in 1946. The total enrollment in our schools of higher learning in 1946 included about 1,675,000 persons, while only about 135,000 were granted degrees.[3]

2. *Why children quit school.* There are many reasons which explain the child's failure to stay in school. Some of them may be directly traced to the fault of the teachers or to the school administration. But the efforts of the school frequently are thwarted by ignorant, indifferent, or even greedy parents—parents who view the child's present earning power with more concern than they do his future success in meeting the problems of living. Often, too, parents and teachers alike fail to understand the child and make bad matters worse by scolding, shaming, and ridiculing him.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, p. 114.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 121.

In other cases ill health, defective vision, bad teeth, and many other noticed or unnoticed physical defects prevent the child from putting his best effort and spirit into his school work. He gets discouraged and falls behind, finally quitting school at his first opportunity. We have already noted that the home no longer affords employment for the members of the family, and there are many attractive opportunities for earning spending money, many outside attractions to pull and tug at the child's interests. Getting in the habit of thinking and following these outside interests absorbs his time and attention from his school work, and he gets out of step with his class, becomes dissatisfied, and marks time until he can quit school. Adolescence itself brings impulses and ideals that often result in loss of interest in school. Almost every child who drops out of school does so as a result of a unique combination of reasons; yet most of these reasons can be removed if properly studied and thoughtfully considered.

Environmental factors also play their part in reducing the child's interest in school. Every study of problem children in school shows clearly that the *homes* from which the children come often poorly prepare them to receive full benefit from the school. Many parents do not coöperate with the school; they do not understand the home surroundings necessary to make the child's educational process a success. *Industry and business* go their way without considering what are the effects, direct and indirect, of their policies upon the development of childhood and youth. Few business men and industrial leaders ask themselves how much they are responsible for the failure of the schools. If, however, the wages paid do not provide for a decent home, is not part of the failure in the production of citizenship due to industry? Or if licensing and regulation of commercial recreational agencies is rendered ineffectual by bribery or lobbying, may we not lay some of the responsibility for poor citizenship training at the door of business? Moreover, the *neighborhood* conditions often draw the growing boy and girl into the coils of demoralization and destroy the effects of the educational process. We have not yet fully accepted the fact that one of the responsibilities of a city is to provide for proper use of the leisure time of boys and girls. *Conservatism* is also partly responsible for the failure of childhood and youth. The older people often fail to remember the feelings of childhood and youth; they become harsh, repressive, unsympathetic with the youth and his house of dreams. Finally, *the school itself* must shoulder part of the responsibility for its failure. The very fact that it is a system, more or less inelastic, attempting to train great masses of young people, and including among its teaching body many who are ill-prepared to deal competently with the problems of childhood and youth, shows that it cannot shift its responsibility entirely to family, neighborhood, and business.

The Education of Special Classes. In the beginning our educational system proceeded on the theory that all children should be given the same

education. Experience has shown us, however, that education should be adapted, so far as possible, to the particular situation of each child. For example, there is the crippled child, the mentally deficient child, and the superior child; and there is the large group of adults whose education has not been adequate.

1. *The physically handicapped child.* The education of the physically handicapped child presents many difficulties. The number of seriously crippled, fortunately, is comparatively small. Yet that very smallness of numbers presents pedagogical problems, since the handicaps of each pupil are likely to be somewhat different from those of every other. Providing adequate instructional and medical care necessarily is costly; and the parents, most often, are not in a position to contribute much to offset those special costs. Fortunately, all of our States are now making provisions whereby these children can have the best medical and surgical care that modern science affords. However, their school life is bound to be interrupted unless care is taken. After even the best has been done that science knows, perhaps some physical disability will still remain. The child's impaired condition may have set him back so far that he has become discouraged, or his disability may have made him conspicuous and the object of rough jokes or of too much pity by other children. This is especially

TABLE 22: NUMBER OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1948 *

Handicap	*Children (under 21)*	*Adults*
Orthopedically handicapped	1,000,000	7,000,000
Deaf and hard of hearing	3,000,000	6,000,000
Speech defective	3,500,000	2,500,000
Blind and visually defective	67,000	180,000
Epileptic	300,000	500,000
Cardiac	500,000	3,500,000
Total	8,367,000	19,680,000

* Lawrence J. Linck, "The Crippled," in *Social Work Year Book: 1949* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1949), p. 158.

true, probably, in the case of children suffering from poor sight or hearing, since they *appear* to be like other children. Their condition is not easily discovered; and in many cases the children themselves are unaware of their handicap, because they assume that *everyone* has similar trouble. Consequently the child falls behind and may be considered a dullard, even though in reality he may be exerting extraordinary effort and ingenuity to get on as well as he does, with what he has to work with. Modern educators, however, have not forgotten the disabled child, and many of our city school systems have made special provision for them. Special busses may gather them up and take them to and from the school-room; equipment suited to

their impaired condition is often provided; special teachers are employed in some places to give attention to these pupils so that they can "catch up." If means are provided whereby the child can compensate for the disabilities that he suffers, often his social development will go on quite as steadily and as hopefully as that of the normal child.

2. *The mentally handicapped child.* It is important that special attention be given to mentally slow or emotionally unstable children in the schools. Special classes or special rooms where the work is adapted to their deficiencies have been established as experiments in the attempt to keep them in school as long as they can profit from it and to relieve them from the results of competition with brighter children. The "opportunity room" (as these experimental rooms are called) is proving to be the salvation of many of these children who in former days became thoroughly discouraged and dropped out or who became delinquent. With them the training must be as individualized as possible, to make use of whatever abilities they may have for the practical purposes of life, and for the enrichment of their own personality. Jessie Taft describes the problem of the dull-normal child in these words:

> He is not allowed by law to leave the public school when it gets beyond him, yet to face failure, ridicule, reprimands, day after day, is something that human nature cannot do without efforts to escape from so unbearable a situation. The child will either run away in body or in spirit. He is bound to gain a sense of importance somehow—if not by good conduct, by bad. He will take refuge in sullenness, indifference, or in more active, aggressive attempts to counteract the boredom and inferiority of his position. If he cannot shine in school, he can perhaps become the terror of the neighborhood. There is only one possible treatment for this type of child, and that is to offer him legitimate avenues of successful expression. If school or work offers him a chance to act successfully, he will seek social approval, just as he apparently sought social disapproval before. All you need to do to prove this statement is to put such a child into a school that gives him work in which he can succeed. He becomes the simplest of case problems. His energy goes over into useful activity and drains off from the unsocial channels.[4]

3. *The superior child.* The superior pupil often presents grave difficulty in the school if there is a rigid system of promotion, or if he is held back by the poorer pupils in the class. Experiments are being tried nowadays to require more of these superior students and to advance them more rapidly. Says Wile concerning the superior child:

> The superior child is a potential asset to the community. Is it not, then, to the community's best interest to develop him to the point of fullest self-expression and greatest service? While no prediction can be made as to the part an individual superior child may play in the guidance of his generation, it is undoubtedly true that these children, as a group, will provide nearly all of the leaders in art and science, in the professions, and those who, by creating new ideas and ideals, must contribute to the progress of civilization. Such children are too few for the school system to neglect them. The time-marking system for these bright, capable, natural

[4] Jessie Taft, *The Problem Child in School* (1925), pp. 69–70.

students is mentally harmful and, viewed socially, is responsible for a far greater loss to the community than can ever be atoned for by attempts to raise the mental achievements of children of inherently inferior mental powers. School progress is checked and mental growth retarded, with disastrous results to themselves and to the community when these vigorous minds are permitted to remain idle or to work at half speed. Most careful thought should be spent upon the needs of the superior child, for by modification and adjustment of the curriculum it is possible to weave an educational program more in harmony with his mental pattern.[5]

4. *The adult.* Finally, there is the problem of the education of adults who as children have been denied the opportunities of the school system. How frequently it happens that because of economic needs or because of dissatisfaction with the schools, the boy or girl leaves as soon as possible and takes a job! After the stress and strain of adolescence have passed, they sometimes awaken to the need of further education. They realize all they have missed, and with proper encouragement they are ready to make sacrifices in order that this lack of education may be made up.

The exploitation of adults' consciousness of need for additional training has made rich many of the numerous commercial correspondence schools in the United States. It also accounts for the great success of the university extension divisions in this country. Moreover, the United States Armed Forces Institute during the Second World War developed an extensive correspondence study program of general and vocational education for young adults then serving in the armed forces; and it proved so invaluable that "USAFI" has become a permanent agency within the military establishment. For the most part, correspondence study courses are of practical or vocational value; life's experiences have made the student keenly appreciative of the opportunity for such training. However inadequate some of these courses may be, doubtless they have provided in a way an answer to the deep need felt by many adults to whom the local school system has not given sufficient training for life.

The vocational school movement in some of our States and the promotion of industrial education by the Vocational Education division of the United States Office of Education are doing much to meet the educational needs of our urban adult population. A comparable service is being performed among the farmers of the nation by the United States Department of Agriculture through its Agricultural Extension Service and the Home Demonstration agents.

Colleges and universities increasingly are serving special occupational groups through summer institutes or short courses designed to give particular groups of people new insight into their work or to acquaint them with current developments in their respective fields. Town Hall Associates, the American Association for Adult Education, the Office of Education, and others are sponsoring forum and discussion groups for consideration of

[5] I. S. Wile, *The Challenge of Childhood* (New York, 1926), pp. 141–142.

the broad social, economic, and political problems of both the nation and society as a whole.[6]

Maintaining the School System. The demands for service made upon our public school system have become increasingly varied as our living conditions have grown more complex and we have become more aware of the differences in the individual needs of school pupils. To meet these demands, many new developments have been made necessary in terms of school equipment and policies; and more adequate training for the teachers themselves has become imperative.

Unfortunately, however, the physical and human resources available for the tremendous task of educating our children have not been sufficient in volume or quality to do the job as it should be done. American public schools always have been largely under the control of local authorities; and as a result the quality of teachers and of schools has varied sharply, being highly responsive to local pressures and conditions. This was illustrated clearly in the effects of the depression years following 1929. School budgets were slashed, equipment was allowed to deteriorate, and new school building virtually stopped in many localities. The length of the school year was commonly reduced, and many schools were closed altogether. Specialized courses and services were abolished for the sake of economy. Worst of all, perhaps, the teachers themselves were subjected to sharp reductions of already low salary scales, while requirements for employment were raised because of the oversupply of teachers available under reduced operating schedules.

While it is true that notable gains have been made in some of our backward areas, the years since the depression have not brought striking improvement. The Second World War period further aggravated the school maintenance problem in that school equipment necessarily could not be adequately serviced or replaced, and teachers were called upon for many extra nonteaching services despite steadily rising overloads in their teaching schedules. Consequently, thousands of active and potential teachers found work conditions and wage scales in war industries much more attractive than those in teaching. It was estimated that some 350,000 teachers, in a total work force of about 825,000, abandoned the teaching profession in the period between 1940 and 1947. The resulting shortage was met by such expedients as increasing the number of pupils per class and temporary licensing of inadequately trained persons as teachers. The conditions surrounding the teaching profession have since improved to some extent, but not sufficiently to attract the necessary numbers of capable and well-trained teachers.

The menace inherent in this situation is graphically portrayed in the following words:

[6] Mary L. Ely, *Why Forums?* (1937).

When you have read this book, . . . think for a moment about what you have just done. Actually you have done something very difficult, though you are so used to it that it seems easy. You had to be taught to do this, and probably many teachers struggled with you before it could be said that you could both read and understand what you read. You owe those teachers a great debt. *They gave you the key to freedom.*

There are other teachers, now, in your neighborhood, who are trying to give this key to other children. They are tired, discouraged people. Some will leave teaching this year for jobs that have a shorter work day, which are decently paid, which offer a better standing in the community and a more normal private life. Unless the present trend is reversed, more will leave next year, and the available replacements will be fewer and worse prepared. The sad truth is that able young people are avoiding this profession.

Every year thousands of normally intelligent youngsters finish their schooling unable to do what you have just done—read and understand a book. In overcrowded classes, with overworked teachers, with textbooks that are too few and too old, they will not have grasped the key.

This is the crisis in American education. It is here, it is real, and it is dangerous beyond words.

As a nation we have joined others in a desire to realize the four freedoms. But there is a fifth freedom more fundamental than any of the others, and this is FREEDOM FROM IGNORANCE. The ignorant man is the easiest prey to want and fear. Freedom of religion means little to him, and a free press means nothing, for even if, technically, he can read, he cannot understand what he reads. He is a danger to himself, to you, to this country, and to the world. . . .[7]

Higher Education. The colleges are commonly accused of turning out young people equipped for nothing in particular and apparently lacking the training or inclination to analyze situations and to adapt themselves successfully to life. The development of intelligent leadership, which is conceived as the aim of a liberal college education, as distinguished from the more specialized training of the professional or technical school, seems to have suffered under the present system.

Whereas college education used to be the privilege of a small class having a similar cultural background and to a large extent similar ambitions, the present situation finds the higher institutions crowded with students of all classes, with varying economic and social antecedents, and with widely divergent ideas, often quite vague, as to what they wish to do with their newly acquired learning. The magnitude of this problem becomes apparent when we discover that the enrollment in such institutions has increased nearly eightfold since the turn of the century, there being 1,882,505 students in 1947 as compared to 237,592 in 1900.[8] The heterogeneity of the new student population, especially at the great universities, has found the institutions unable to create the social and psychological solidarity that was formerly the heritage of college students.

The greatest problem facing the modern college is to stimulate intel-

[7] "The 5th Freedom," a message publicized on book jackets by The Macmillan Company, in coöperation with The Advertising Council (1949).

[8] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948*, p. 135.

lectual curiosity and the development of mental initiative on the part of the average student. Experiments are now in progress in various parts of the country in regard to methods of instruction; touching the alteration of the curriculum; orientation courses; psychological and social distance tests; vocational guidance and closer faculty advice. It is apparent that the problem must be seriously considered both within the colleges and without, if the possibility of a very grave waste of time and money on the part of an important part of the population at a crucial time of life is to be avoided.

More than half, or 950,000, of the college students in 1947 were veterans of the Second World War, most of whom were assisted financially under the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act, generally known as the "G.I. Bill of Rights." [9] But this does not mean that the upsurge of college enrollments will be temporary. There was no "recession" of student numbers in the years following the First World War; and there are many other influences at work today that will tend to keep enrollments at higher levels than before the Second World War. So the educational problems of our institutions of higher education are likely to continue to be acute.

Academic Freedom. Education is not the panacea for all the ills of society that many people seem to believe it to be. Educators especially are prone to overestimate the power at their command, contending that primarily through the medium of education we can develop the kind of society we think is right. It must be conceded that the educator has a tremendous opportunity—and responsibility—to mold the thought of the rising generation. But there are subtle and powerful influences upon the educational system itself, determining what sort of precepts shall be presented and how the ideas that are learned will be expressed in terms of social values and conduct. The fortunes of education and educators in continental Europe during the Second World War brought home to us with awful force the realization that education is not a major power in its own right. It is rather a *tool,* which is used by society or some special group within it to project the objectives such groups may seek. It has been made clear anew that it is imperative to preserve the right of free inquiry and expression if the influence of the educational process is to be exerted for the cultural enrichment of the human race.

The dangers to academic freedom are not always malicious or the result of selfish interest on the part of those who would have a hand in determining what shall be taught or who shall teach it. Sometimes the materials involved are controversial in nature; sometimes the "facts" of the study involved are open to variable interpretation; sometimes there is a sincere belief that certain types of knowledge, even if sound, would be disastrous in their social effects if generally known or utilized. Thus the question of censorship appears in determining educational policy. Shall we, for ex-

[9] *Ibid.*

ample, prohibit the study of the Bible, or of communism, atheism, or evolution in our schools? There are many who honestly believe that these "subjects" should be barred from our curricula. Yet can we arrive at a complete understanding of history, philosophy, or biology if we omit them? And where is the balance between social expediency, real or supposed, and the fundamental necessity for unrestricted inquiry and research?

On the other hand, there are problems in regard to how many and what sort of required subjects we must find a place for in our curricula and what sort of qualifications we shall demand of our teachers. Over and above the traditional "three R's" we have come to require by law the teaching of such things as agriculture, health, citizenship, and "coöperation." To be sure, such requirements are defensible to the extent that students—especially at the secondary and primary levels—are not competent to make their own choice of studies. An increase of required courses probably is inevitable as a result of the growing complexity of the world with which the young must be made familiar. But when such requirements, as sometimes happens, result from pressure politics or special interest groups of one sort or another, then clearly we are on the road to perverted use of the educational process. And since education, after all, is what we make it, society as a whole must keep a vigilant watch over the system and those who would use it to their own selfish purposes.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Can you trace to stories told or read to you, or read by you, in childhood and youth any of your social ideals and social attitudes?
2. Can you cite from your own experience any teachers and any subjects in school that were injurious to your social development? Any that affected your social conduct favorably?
3. What conditions of modern life have arisen that have impelled the formal organization of the educational processes?
4. Outline and discuss briefly the purposes of modern education, adding to those purposes listed in the text any others you may believe important.
5. What are the major reasons for children's quitting school?
6. What educational problems are presented by the handicapped child? Why is it also true that the *superior* child may require special handling?
7. What do you understand "socialized" education to be?
8. Could socialized education serve as an aid in adjusting the problems of the family? If so, in what ways?
9. Outline a program for the promotion of adult education that you think your community needs. What agencies would you interest in carrying forward this program?
10. What trends or tendencies in our present economic and social life make it increasingly imperative that we should give more thought in our educational preparation to the intelligent use of leisure time?
11. What is "academic freedom"? Why is it so important that such freedom be preserved? To what extent, if any, should teachers be restrained in the exercise of this privilege?

15. Religion and Social Problems

WHY IS RELIGION A SOCIAL MATTER?

RELIGION IN ITS simplest and most scientifically acceptable definition is *a belief in the supernatural* in relation to man. A church is the institutionalized form of a system of beliefs pertaining to the supernatural, embracing a system of devices by which its members hope to utilize the power of the supernatural. Investigators have found no stable society, present or past, without religion. In some form or other it is the cultural property of all social groups. And, whatever their supernatural ingredients,

TABLE 23: DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION, BY RELIGIOUS FAITH * (estimates based on most recent information from various sources)

Faith	*Membership*
Total	1,849,000,000
Christians	682,000,000
Confucians and Taoists	351,000,000
Hindus	230,000,000
Mohammedans	209,000,000
Buddhists	150,000,000
Animists	136,000,000
Shintoists	25,000,000
Jews	15,000,000
Miscellaneous	51,000,000

* Adapted from *The World Almanac, 1937*, p. 431.

the forms of religious beliefs and the rituals of religious observances are in large measure the product of the group and are passed down the generations as part of the social heritage. When men worship together or hold beliefs in common with other members of a group, not only the individual but also the group is conceived of as standing in a special relation to the

supernatural. Therefore the content of religious belief, and especially the manner in which it is translated into action affecting society, are social matters. Indeed, religious cults now and again become attached to socially unacceptable standards of behavior, and the State feels it must intervene. Very often, too, religion has been linked with the State itself, a combination that may easily lead to oppression and exploitation. Apart from its dynamic possibilities for good, then, religion itself may create problems of social policy. Sociologically, we are vitally interested in the effect of religion on the individual's social conduct and welfare.

There is no reason to believe that the power of religion is of negligible importance in our modern American society. Institutionalized religion as represented by the church is far from insignificant either materially or spiritually. The total number of church members in the United States according to estimates made by the Federal Council of Churches for 1949 was about 76,000,000, divided among 256 denominations. If the number of persons who have been baptized, all nominal adherents, and all those who in the supreme test of life or death turn to a particular communion were included in the count, undoubtedly the total would rise to at least 90,000,000. One must not forget, however, that many of these are only

TABLE 24: CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950 * (principal denominations)

Denomination	*Approximate Membership*
Total	75,600,000
Roman Catholic	27,800,000
Baptist	16,300,000
Methodist	10,500,000
Lutheran	6,100,000
Jewish Congregations	5,000,000
Presbyterian	3,500,000
Episcopalian	2,400,000
Disciples of Christ	1,700,000
Congregational Christian	1,200,000
Latter-Day Saints	1,100,000

* Adapted from *The World Almanac, 1951,* pp. 481–482.

nominal adherents. The total expenditures for the year 1942 were more than $800,000,000, while six years earlier the value of church edifices stood at $3,412,000,000.[1]

At first glance it may appear odd that religion should deserve a place in a consideration of social problems at all. Yet there is not an organized religion in the world that takes no cognizance of social life, or which con-

[1] J. F. Dewhurst, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), pp. 327 and 713.

tains no trace of social idealism. From a primitive tribe like the Manus of New Guinea to the semicivilized ancient Semites, and the modern nations under Hinduism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, or Christianity, there is not one the religion of which does not bear upon social relationships.[2] Organized religion has always concerned itself also with the affairs of men living together. The explanations of this phenomenon are various.

Self-Preservation. Religion as part of the social heritage cannot be self-perpetuating unless it rests on the basis of a healthy social group. One of the primary reasons for the interest of religion in social affairs, therefore, is *self-preservation.* To primitive man, regard for the supernatural is closely linked with group welfare. On the observance of this taboo or of that ceremony depends not only the health and prosperity of himself and his family, but also the preservation of his whole society from epidemic pestilences, from the failure of rain necessary for the pasturage of his flocks, and from the hostility of enemies—or at least the victory over enemies in a conflict. Religion played a direct part in man's economic and social welfare for a very long time. It was considered vital to his existence. His individual welfare depended on the welfare of his group. The welfare of his group depended on the help of what he considered superhuman beings. Hence the vital import of religion in his scheme of things. Religion was necessary to the preservation of himself, his family, and his group. Any interest or activity of the individual, therefore, that tended to crowd out consideration of the larger group, since it meant hazard not only to himself but to the group, was to be controlled by religion in the interest of all.

How unfortunate for both religion and for society that the larger aspects of that close connection between religion and social welfare are not recognized as of great importance in modern life! Sex morality, for instance, has always been a matter of intense concern on the part of the Christian church. The same amount of attention has not been given to the other bodily functions as to those connected with sex. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that, consciously or not, religious leaders have realized that absorption in the affairs of sex is the one activity which may claim the whole of the individual to the total exclusion of social purposes. Hence the insistence upon chastity and continence. Obviously control of such affairs cannot safely be left to the individual conscience or will power. In the long run, group pressure to enforce a moral standard is far more effective than mere individual exhortation. So the church has supported, built up, and strengthened the group attitudes on sexual morals at all points, thereby acquiring an automatic lever to turn the individual soul toward the supernatural.

[2] See Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea;* Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites;* Hastings, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics,* articles "Confucianism," "Hinduism," "Buddhism."

The other social policies of the Christian church can be explained on the same basis. A stable family, which has always been one of the primary concerns of the church, is necessary to the future of organized religion because it is through the family that the individual receives his first contact with religion. The home circle is the unit of community religious feeling. Unless the fires of belief are kept brightly burning on the domestic hearth, the strong white flame of religious passion will become a smoldering smoke-pall to be eventually dissipated.

The church has frowned upon antisocial conduct—of which stealing and lying in one or another of their forms are the most prominent examples—because its prevalence means acute social maladjustment. In the scramble for material things spirituality is lost. Hence the Christian church's early hostile attitude toward private property and the taking of interest. The same is true of the church's attitude toward war—favorable when war seems to be the means of spreading religion, as in the medieval Crusades or in the contemporary stand against totalitarianism, opposed when war threatens to disrupt spirituality, as in the Truce of God.

Religion Is Socially Generated. Aside from its interest in social life from the point of view of self-preservation, religion takes an active part in the affairs of men because it is in considerable measure the product of men. Although we may believe that religion is divine in its origins, the religious forms and beliefs as they appear objectively are *socially generated and conditioned.* Religion embodies the ideals and hopes of its believers, who are unfortunately obliged to live in a world that is not perfect. And the reason that their world is not perfect is that they have been unable completely to adjust themselves (1) to nature and (2) to their fellow-men. If happiness is the life goal of all men and adjustment is only another word for happiness, we must bear in mind that for the normal individual these two aspects of complete adjustment, social and material, are interdependent. Adjustment to the material environment without adjustment to the social environment, even when it is possible, is only half-happiness; and half-happiness is unhappiness. Religion is a means to surmount the maladjustments of this life. Reality is always beset with difficulties, but religion also attempts to transcend reality, and to solace the soul fatigued by the troubles of reality. If, therefore, religion is to be of any help or comfort to the individual in his quest for happiness, it cannot ignore the social environment, adjustment to which is essential for the individual's happiness.

The Christian church also has an obligation to face the social problems of the day because many of these modern social problems the church has created by setting up standards of social conduct at variance with the selfish and egoistic motives of men. Therefore it has a responsibility for their solution that it cannot escape. Was it not Jesus Himself who set up the ideal of the Kingdom of God in which men should live as brothers? Was

it not St. Paul who said that "in Jesus Christ there is neither male nor female, bond or free, but all are one"? It was another of His followers who said: "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" The church has set up ideals of social conduct and standards of social relationship, and by that very fact has created some of these problems. Were it not for the religion of brotherhood, would it be so clear that the enslavement of one man by another is unjust, or that the economic exploitation of one man by another is unrighteous? Economic change may destroy slavery on the ground of unprofitableness, but not on the ground of social injustice.

Religion a Means of Social Control. The Christian church has often found itself entangled in the affairs of a society because it has been used by those in power as an *instrument for regulating action.* Thus at times when the church sanctioned the belief that political power was foreordained and sent by God, kings and nobles could, while posing as God's lieutenants on earth, command their inferiors to do what best suited their ends. Religion has sanctioned wars such as the Crusades, persecutions such as the Huguenot massacres, torture such as the Inquisition. It has also given its sanction to political ideals, as in the American colonies; to the alleviation of poverty in its encouragement of charity; to art, as in the cathedrals of Europe; to education, as in the medieval monasteries. Whenever people have been led to believe that religion was favoring a certain social movement, it has been easier to enlist their coöperation. These efforts have been both worthy and unworthy from the social point of view, but whenever the church has been the tool of those working for the social good or for self-interest, it has of necessity found itself in the midst of social life.

In short, religion has also been *historically interested in social affairs.* The Christian church and prophetic Judaism, out of which the church sprang, concerned themselves with social problems. Social justice, slavery, infanticide, exploitation of labor, an honest day's work, the subjection of women, sexual vice, marriage and the family, have all occupied the attention of both the Jewish and the Christian churches. No one who studies the writings of the great Hebrew prophets can overlook their interest in social problems. One cannot read the Gospels or the Epistles of Paul and of other New Testament writers without seeing that, in spite of the fact that the return of Jesus was expected in a short time, they nevertheless are concerned with the application of the Gospel to social relationships.[3]

Religion as a Means of Emotional Release. It would be easy to show that the emotional satisfaction possible through religious exaltation has both good and evil social results. Religion has had and should have a connection with the problems of social adjustment. Even for the solution of

[3] Louis Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible* (1912).

such problems, the emotional aspect of religion is not without its value. Because it serves to resolve the emotional strain of doubt and indecision for the individual in a crisis—such as mortal combat with a wild animal or a human enemy, or such as occurs when a new set of circumstances not familiar to the individual by experience arises and results in uncertainty as to the proper course—it also serves the group in times of fateful decisions, of great peril to the group, of uncertainty and doubt as to what course to pursue in dealing with great perplexities. Appealing to superhuman beings for help, or going through certain ceremonies, relieves the strain of suspense and provides through action a channel for the release of the pent-up emotions of the members of the society.

Consider, for instance, the ceremonies engaged in by members of our various American Indian tribes before going on a buffalo hunt, or entering on the warpath against an enemy. Or watch the solemn activities of the tribe in a time of drought as it makes supplication to the superhuman beings for the much-needed rain. Or again, think of the historic instances of appeal to the deity for help in times when great epidemics of disease were threatening the people, or when an enemy was hammering at the gates of the beleaguered city. In every case religion served to provide outlet for a highly charged emotional state in the group.

RELIGION AS A POWER IN SOCIETY

Whatever power religion may exert in society, either for good or for evil, is due to the emotional and intellectual appeal that it makes to the individuals coming under its influence. Only in rare instances has religion been able or willing to exert any actual direct physical power. As between intellectual and emotional power religion has most frequently resorted to the emotional, not only because its appeal and its influence are wider, but also because in the last analysis emotion is at the root of religion. People believe in God, if they really do, because they have *felt* His presence and His existence; they want to believe in Him and feel that they cannot do otherwise, any intellectual evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. Once having felt the emotional power of religion they may enlarge upon or rationalize their experience with their intellect, but its essence is emotional. Such is the power of religion on the individual. Thus, in explaining the survival of religion, it has been observed:

> As a scientific explanation of the universe religion has lost its old dominion. As a philosophy giving meaning to the universe and to the social relations it has only begun to come into its own. Its chief function has ever been, not explanation, but action. It has been a faith primarily, having only enough mythology attached to give an excuse to the rational faculty for action. Therefore, it has survived, because it has provided man with a working hypothesis on which to adjust himself to the universe and the world of Nature to him. It is the expression of man's faith that there is a way whereby he can bring under his control and for his purposes the

forces about him. That faith has released for experiment the energies paralyzed by fear and doubt. Oftentimes the means used were not adapted to his purposes, but the drive of religious faith was still there to find another and better way.[4]

The influence that religion may wield in society is dependent upon the ability of a particular religion to stir the emotions of a number of individuals in a group and to focus them upon some social objective. Organized religion, manifested in the churches of the various faiths and sects, is best able to do this because of its facilities—buildings, machinery of ceremony, and organized memberships schooled in the specific things that they are to believe. Thus organized religion has control over certain social sanctions without which the solution of our social problems will be much delayed, if not indefinitely postponed. Through its pulpit it has a platform of public instruction and discussion the like of which does not exist in any other organization.

Considering only Western civilization and more particularly the American branch of it, a difference is to be noted between the present position of the Christian church and that which it has occupied in the rather recent past. The paradox of the present situation in regard to religion is, as Lippmann puts it,[5] that we have ceased to believe without ceasing to be credulous. The point is that a large number of the so-called enlightened members of the population no longer believe all the doctrines of the Christian church, but they have not given them up. The diffusion of scientific knowledge has made it difficult, for the time being at least, for many persons to believe in the supernatural at all, or at least in the same manner as their forefathers.

Granted that the church is one of our most important influencers of public opinion because of its contact with large groups of people, the question arises as to how it is to hold and influence these groups now that many of its followers no longer feel it is the direct intermediary between them and God. Reference to the Bible, for instance, is becoming less effective as a coercive to action for a growing number of people. The traditional emotionalism of many of the churches frequently does not appeal to the average educated man who has become interested in science, in reality one of the most coldly intellectual, nonemotional entities in the world. The uneducated and those who do not do their own thinking are apt to follow the lead of the "enlightened," or to fall into indifference because they find no appeal in the old religious attitudes.

It is obvious, then, that the church has a hard row to hoe if it is to keep its members; and without its following, the church is of little importance from the social point of view. The present wisdom for the church would seem to be to arrest the interest of the people by maintaining close contact with the developments of modern life, at the same time emphasizing social

[4] Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology* (1930), p. 326.
[5] Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (1929).

idealism. Happiness still consists in the adjustment of the individual to his material environment and to his fellows. While science may help in the adjustment to the material environment, there is a place for the truly enlightened idealism of religion in the social adjustment of the individual and his fellows.

The spoken prophetic word has not lost its power. It can still, to paraphrase St. Luke, cast down the mighty from their seats and exalt the humble. The churches in their doctrines of sin and repentance have an instrument unequaled in power by which to enforce social behavior. In their journals and other printed materials, the churches have an educational force that cannot be excelled for sanctioning "right" social arrangements. The fear of hell and the hope of heaven do not move as many people as they once did; nevertheless, the church still has power to stir the social emotions of man. Its appeals for sympathy, justice, brotherhood, righteousness, truth, fairness—all these carry emotional content long established. In a word, the social idealism of the Christian church is a power beyond computation.

Limitations to be Recognized by the Church. It is not contended that the church has all the knowledge necessary for solving each social problem. It must take notice of the facts and principles revealed by each of the social sciences. Indeed, we must go even further and say that the church, in its attempt to solve the problems of society, must take into account all knowledge that every science may contribute. It must heed the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, the historian, the political scientist, and the educator; it must likewise take account of the findings of the biologist, the chemist, the physicist, the geologist, and the mathematician. Its own contribution must be social ideals, motives, and sanctions. To it is committed the responsibility of developing in the individual a social attitude and of seeking in every way to realize in social relationships the ideals of brotherhood, of kindness, of justice, and equality of opportunity. The scientist contributes his knowledge of the way in which things operate. The church contributes its ideals of a righteous society and supplies the motives for the realization of these ideals.

Furthermore, the church must recognize that its method is educational. It will secure social changes in the direction of the realization of its ideals by constantly and patiently teaching those ideals and endeavoring to find ways by which they may be realized in accordance with the findings of science. It will not be satisfied until these ideals are incarnated in the customs, folkways, laws, administrative agencies, and public opinion of the community, so that they may be made really effective.

The rapidly changing conditions of urban life in the United States create problems for every church. The great commercial and industrial communities—with their geographic areas serving different purposes and giving us even a physical stratification of the population with little asso-

ciation between those living in each; separating the people into functional groups having clashing interests; growing and changing so rapidly that even one generation sees the old residential areas decay into rooming-house districts with their transient population, with commercial houses, manufactures, and transportation facilities swamping one after another of the former resident sections—put problems of adjustment before the churches. Downtown churches see their congregations crowded out. New economic and social conditions present problems that the old message of the pulpit no longer fits. No longer is it true, as it was once, in these city churches that "the rich and the poor meet together." The old methods no longer command the allegiance of the people. Many a city pastor and board have wondered what is the matter.

No less striking has been the perplexity of the rural church. The improved roads, the motor-car, and the radio have played havoc with the rural churches as a factor in country life. Their young people drift away. Their members young and old no longer find in the church their social center. The activities at the church interest fewer and fewer of the people of the community.

The results of these changes in American life have seriously impaired the social usefulness of the church. Must it not adjust its message and adapt its functions to these changes? Can it find a way to meet a need in the life of the people, as once it did so generally?

PROBLEMS FOR THE CHURCH

Christianity, through its history of almost two thousand years, has frequently been obliged to make readjustments in order to adapt itself more closely to the needs of the people at various periods of history. There have been times of general change in thoughts and belief, of which the present period is a good example. During such times there is an apparent decay of religion. The church becomes adapted to the patterns of thought and of social relationship of a bygone period. These patterns change. But the church changes more slowly, and so maladjustment results. For example, during the Middle Ages the adjustment between society and the church came to a climax at the time of Aquinas. Then feudalism gave way to a social order based on commerce. Newtonian science undermined the accepted notions concerning the nature of the universe. Conceptions of social relationships underwent a change. The church had to readjust her whole framework. For a time chaos reigned. But eventually the church, as always, managed to fill a needful place in society.

Without taking the time to recount the history of Christianity we may call to mind a church made up of outcasts in the first few centuries, a church offering the one example of stability and permanency in the dissolute days following the decline of Rome, a church as the sole source of

education, charity, and art in the Middle Ages, a church as the center of community and social life in pioneer America.

The church at the present time is undecided as to what place it shall occupy in society; and one of the reasons for this is that it has become dissociated from the problems of modern social life. The time has come when it must address itself more directly to social conditions as they exist. The modern man lives in the present. Spiritual leadership is as necessary for this life as it is for the world to come.

It is impossible to name all the problems for which the church has a responsibility. In fact, it is impossible to think of one social problem to which the gospel preached by the church should not apply. If religion is concerned with life, then its application is as wide as life itself. Let us consider three of these problems as typical and perhaps the most pressing at the present time.

Health and Disease. Professor Patten of the University of Pennsylvania once asked the members of a seminar to write on pieces of paper what they thought was the one chief criterion by which to judge the efficiency and liveliness of a church. The different members handed in different replies. Some said that the prime criterion was the amount of money invested in the church buildings; others, the number of people attending the services; still others, the number received into the church; and others again, the kind of preaching that was to be heard from the pulpit. Professor Patten, after reading each of these replies and asking why the writer had chosen that particular one, said that he did not agree with any of them. In his judgment, he said that the chief criterion was the death-rate and the morbidity-rate of the community. Naturally, the members of the seminar were very much perturbed by this reply, and wanted to know his reasons. In answer he said that the chief concern of everyone was to live and to live well. He argued that if you had the death-rate and the morbidity-rate you had the basis for judging what was the attitude of the employers toward the employees, the standard of living of the community, regard for childhood and womanhood, the attitude of the community toward vice and crime, the attention paid to sanitation—and the attitude of the church toward these problems, because, said he, the church in any community can modify any of these things as it wishes, if it will. The astonishment of the members of this seminar shows how little we have connected some of the most vital affairs of life with religion.

Says Wilbur, formerly Secretary of the Interior:

> Our information at the present time, due to the studies of research workers all over the world, is such that we can say that if any well-situated community of fifty thousand people would adopt and put into practical everyday use all that we now know of medicine and science, and all that we have been actually using in the control of many soldiers in war, there would be such an increase in human

happiness and effectiveness, and such a decrease in sadness and inefficiency, that in ten years it would make that city the wonder of the world.[6]

Some day it will be considered as sinful to sell dirty milk as to commit adultery; to work people in places that induce tuberculosis and typhoid as to forge a check, or to steal a neighbor's wash; to exploit one's employees as to hold slaves; to break quarantine as to break into a house; to live in a city with a high death-rate as to live in Sodom and Gomorrah. Why is it not so now? Because we have not connected the church with this vital matter of life and death. From the purely religious viewpoint alone there is morality in good health and the social practices necessary to promote it. By pointing this out and by lending its facilities for reaching and influencing large numbers of people the church can become a vital part of this important social movement and make religion a living force in community life.

The Relations of Capital and Labor. Another problem with which the church is confronted is the relations of labor and capital, or the employer and the employed. The problem is not new but is more pressing just now than ever before. It is at least as old as the New Testament. The problem finds its prototype in the relations between master and slaves in the Roman Empire. The early Christian church had to face that problem. The Christian solution is indicated by St. Paul as follows:

> . . . not in the way of eye service, as men-pleasers; but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as unto the Lord, and not unto men; knowing that whatsoever good thing each one doeth, the same shall he receive again from the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And, ye, masters, do the same things unto them, and forbear threatening; knowing that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him.[7]

Moreover, the early Christian church faced frankly the relations between the hired laborer and his employer:

> Behold, the hire of the laborers who mowed your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth out: The cries of them that reap have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.[8]

In spite of dismal departures on the part of the church and its leaders from these high principles through the centuries of Christian history, there is no question that religion has now and again, both by word and by action, championed the cause of the oppressed against the oppressor; has urged the dignity of labor upon the worker, and the imperative necessity of treating the poor with justice and kindness. In spite of the increasing secularization of the church after the time of Constantine, again

[6] Wilbur, "Health: A Business Asset," *Survey*, p. 679 (March 15, 1926).
[7] Ephesians VI: 6–9.
[8] James V: 4.

and again the spirit of Christianity burst out against the exploitation of the poor and in favor of the oppressed classes. Many of the early church Fathers saw the danger in monopoly and private property. In the Middle Ages the church forbade interest-taking; it condemned monopoly profit, and taught the doctrine of a fair price and a just reward to the laborer. Many of the monasteries emphasized the sacredness of labor, and all of them provided refuge from the inequalities and iniquities of secular society; and all distinctions of rank were obliterated in the common term "brother." The Protestant sects of Reformation and post-Reformation times also emphasized the protest against the exploitation of the poor by the rich, and preached a kind of fraternity of rich and poor in the church.[9]

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that with the breakdown of the medieval domestic economy and the rise of the modern factory system, religion underwent a severe trial. The theological controversies of the post-Reformation period absorbed the energies of the church to such an extent that the church failed to give consideration to the pressing social problems of the day. When almost two centuries later the Industrial Revolution burst upon western Europe, the Christian church was still so intent upon its factional disputes that it could not tackle the problems of the day. Here and there arose noble Christian souls who played their part in the protest against the evils of the new industrialism. The Earl of Shaftesbury, for example, found the expression of his own religious life in attacks upon child labor and the exploitation of women and children in the mines and factories of Great Britain, and did a great deal to start the movement for the regulation of hours and conditions of labor in that country. On the whole, however, it must be admitted that from the time of the Industrial Revolution until recently, the church has expressed very little interest in the strained relations between employers and employees. Supported largely by the employers, the leaders of the church have too often been blind to the sufferings of the poor, with the result that the working-classes in industrial centers have largely been alienated from the church. Too often the church has counseled patience to the workman, has promised reward in another world for the misery of this, without attempting to face the conditions that produce the misery and take a stand against unjust conditions in our social and economic life.

The consequence of this attitude of the church has been that false standards of sin have been established. Some day it will be considered as sinful to exploit workers as to swear, as sinful to do poor work as to get drunk. Perhaps some time we shall all go to confession because we have bought a garment that has been made under unfair conditions. In the struggle between labor and capital in the industrial conflict of the present day, too frequently the churches have felt that the strikers—many of them church members—were dangerous people without taking the pains to try to

[9] Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order* (1921), pp. 378–382.

understand why people would throw up their jobs for a principle, or why good, earnest men,—also commonly members of the churches—looked upon these strikers as vicious and pestiferous persons who must be shown their places. Too often the churches have followed a policy of "Hands off" in any such struggle. As the self-confessed repository of the Gospel of Jesus, the Christian church has plenty of warrant in His words to bring to bear upon these vexed relationships between men a gospel of brotherhood, kindliness, and justice that would go far to settle the struggle between capital and labor. Perhaps she would be rent in twain in the effort, but that would not be the first time she has become divided. Often splits have occurred over much less important matters. Said the late Bishop Turner, of Buffalo:

> The mission of the Church is to foster social justice. She has the power . . . to call a truce in the war between classes of society, to still the angry passions from which the conflict of class interests arises. Hers are not the remedies of the economist, but remedies that go deeper to the root of the evil. In every industrial injustice there is a moral factor, a moral element, and in dealing with this moral element she is at home and no one can deny her competence. The economic cure-all of to-day may be the discarded economic heresy of to-morrow, but hers are the principles of moral justice which never change. It is her prerogative to upbraid the oppressor of the poor, to take her stand as Ambrose did when he compelled the Emperor-murderer to do penance for his sins. It is equally her prerogative to restrain the lawlessness of the oppressed when a lawless course is taken. It is her mission to teach the right use of riches, to inculcate moderation and every kind of sobriety, to rebuke the sins of capital and labor alike and to hold up to all men the divine principles of justice and charity and fair dealing between man and man. It was said recently that our civilization is an economic civilization, that it is founded on material principles and knows only material standards of value. Alas, in common acceptance this is too true. But it is the mission of the Church to make our civilization once more a moral and spiritual civilization, to restore the higher values that one time prevailed and bring justice and charity to reign once more among men.[10]

War. In the early days of Christianity the attitude of Christians was hostile to military service. For a long time no one could be a member in good standing of the Christian church and be a soldier. With the change in the attitude of the Roman state to the church under Constantine, and later with the dominance of the church over the nascent nations of Europe, a great change came about in the attitude of Christians toward war. After the union of church and state the latter became the secular arm whereby the decrees of the church were carried out, especially with reference to heretics. The result was that the church became an apologist for the warrior, and the warlike state. With the growth of nationalism national churches were recognized. The result was that the position of the church of an earlier day became compromised, and war became looked upon as a laudable activity, especially if it was in accordance with the aims of the

[10] "The Mission of the Church," *Columbia* (September, 1924), p. 13.

church. The only exceptions were such Protestant sects as the Quakers, Mennonites, and Dunkers.

During the First World War, while a number of the leaders of the Christian churches had begun to look upon war as a great evil, as a whole the churches, both Jewish and Christian, actively upheld the aims of their respective nations. They were used as foci of propaganda for the aims and purposes of each nation. The Germans, led by propaganda to believe that their cause was just, felt that God was on their side; the Allies, believing that Germany had broken faith with little Belgium and was carrying on a war of aggression, felt that a just God could not feel otherwise about it than they themselves. Both prayed to the same God for victory. One cannot but wonder what an All-wise God thought about the situation. Practically the only religious body that came out of the war with its standards untarnished was the Quakers. Often misunderstood, nevertheless they persevered in bringing to the suffering noncombatants on both sides of the conflict their ministrations of help. They consistently refused to fight but earnestly set about to help those who were in need.[11]

In the Second World War, the position of the churches was quite different from what it had been in the earlier conflict. They were able to profit to some extent by their mistakes of the former period. Even more important, however, the churches had been subjected for several years prior to the conflict to an increasing hostility by the Axis powers; and the outbreak of the war itself found the churches in those countries exposed to active suppression by the military and political authorities. Thus there was a greater bond of unity between the churches of the United Nations and the remnants of those in the Axis nations. The English and American churches alike took a realistic view of the conflict for the most part, acknowledging the need to support the war effort as a matter literally of self-defense, as demonstrated by the bitter experience of the Axis nations' churches, yet insisting that their people look to the causes for which they fought and to the terms of the peace which was to follow. They spoke less of national peril and more of the direct threat to the survival of Christianity itself. The character of the struggle reduced greatly the feasibility of efforts to ameliorate the sufferings of the belligerents, although again some relief was made available to refugees and prisoners of war by the Quakers, the Y.M.C.A., and the Red Cross.

THE CHURCHES DRAW THEIR LINES

The churches cannot influence the decisions that are made in dealing with the problems of society unless they state definitely what opinions are in accord with Christian principles. Some one obviously must interpret and apply the precepts of Christianity to specific social problems. The task is no less difficult for laymen, lacking full knowledge of Christian

[11] L. M. Jones, *The Quakers in Action* (1929).

dogma, than it is for church leaders who are to some extent laymen in the field of social science. The attempt to be definite is surrounded with dangers of partisan bias, incomplete understanding of practical problems involved, and consequent error. Nevertheless, it is an essential part of making Christianity an active force in the relations of human beings with one another; and the various church groups rightly have declared their position from time to time. Interesting comparisons suggest themselves in a study of the following pronouncements by representative churches in the United States.

The Roman Catholic Church. The members of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, acting in behalf of the Bishops of the United States, in 1948 issued a statement which said in part:

Human life centers in God. The failure to center life in God is secularism—which . . . is the most deadly menace to our Christian and American way of living. We shall not successfully combat this evil merely by defining and condemning it. Constructive effort is called for to counteract this corrosive influence in every phase of life where individual attitudes are a determining factor—in the home, in the school, at work, and in civil polity. For as man is, so ultimately are all the institutions of human society. . . .

It is not enough to profess the Christian truths of the stability and sanctity of the marriage bond and to keep in mind the purposes of marriage. The Christian must make his home holy . . . The Christian home must realize the Christian ideal. The whole atmosphere of the home must be impregnated with genuine Christian living. The domestic virtues must be practiced, and family prayer made a daily exercise. It is in the home that the children learn their responsibility to God and in this responsibility their duty to others . . . We strongly commend organized effort to make the home more truly Christian. . . .

It behooves us to see that we enable our schools to work out fully the Christian educational ideal . . . We ask a deeper appreciation of the contributions our institutions of higher learning are making to a Christian reconstruction of society, and we urge a more generous support of their work. For if we as Christians are to do our part in restoring order to a chaotic world, Christ must be the Master in our classrooms and lecture halls and the Director of our research projects. . . .

Christian social principles, rooted in the moral law, call insistently for cooperation not conflict, for freedom not repression in the development of economic activity. Cooperation must be organized—organized for the common good; freedom must be ordered—ordered for the common good. Today we have labor partly organized, but chiefly for its own interests. We have capital or management organized, possibly on a larger scale, but again chiefly for its own interests. What we urgently need, in the Christian view of social order, is the free organization of capital and labor in permanent agencies of cooperation for the common good . . . Government as the responsible custodian of the public interest should have a part in it. But its part should be to stimulate, to guide, to restrain, not to dominate. . . .

We advocate freely organized cooperation between the accredited representatives of capital and labor in each industry and in the economy as a whole under the supervision but not the control of government. . . . A Christian and American type of economic democracy . . . can come only as the fruit of painstaking study and effort to safeguard, in justice and charity, the rightful interests of property

and the rightful interests of labor in the pursuit of the dominant interest of all, which is the common good. . . .

We call upon men of religious faith and principle, both in management and labor, to take the lead in working out and applying, gradually if need be, a constructive social program of this type. For the moral and social ideals which it would realize are their heritage.

The inroads of secularism in civil life are a challenge to the Christian citizen—and indeed to every citizen with definite religious convictions. The essential connection between religion and good citizenship is deep in our American tradition. . . .

We feel with deep conviction that for the sake of both good citizenship and religion there should be a reaffirmation of our original American tradition of free cooperation between government and religious bodies—cooperation involving no special privilege to any group and no restriction on the religious liberty of any citizen. We solemnly disclaim any intent or desire to alter this prudent and fair American policy of government in dealing with the delicate problems that have their source in the divided religious allegiance of our citizens. . . . We stand ready to cooperate in fairness and charity with all who believe in God and are devoted to freedom under God to avert the impending danger of a judicial "establishment of secularism" that would ban God from public life. For secularism is threatening the religious foundations of our national life and preparing the way for the advent of the omnipotent state.[12]

The Protestant Churches. It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that there are upwards of 250 religious groups in the United States. The great majority of these denominational churches and sects are Protestant Christian organizations, with membership lists ranging from several hundred up to several millions. Most of them hold national or regional conferences at more or less regular intervals; and more often than not, these occasions are taken to formulate and publicize statements of their positions in regard to the social problems of the day. In most cases, however, such gestures are largely ineffective, since the groups are small and the opinions expressed usually represent the sentiments of the delegates present rather than that of the membership of the church as a whole. Moreover, the individual church organizations do not have the resources to make a thorough study of the social problems they are considering or to undertake any program of action to make their convictions felt in everyday life.

A number of the larger denominations, becoming aware of their sectarian limitations in applying their ideals to specific social problems, united in 1908 to form the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Representative of the Council's social objectives is its statement, popularly called "The Social Creed," adopted at that time and reaffirmed with minor changes at intervals ever since:

We deem it the duty of all Christian people to concern themselves directly with certain practical industrial problems. To us it seems that the churches must stand—

For equal rights and complete justice for all men in all stations of life.

[12] *The Christian in Action* (National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1948).

For the right of all men to the opportunity for self-maintenance, a right ever to be wisely and strongly safeguarded against encroachments of every kind. For the right of workers to some protection against the hardships often resulting from the swift crises of industrial change.

For the principle of conciliation and arbitration in industrial dissensions.

For the protection of the worker from dangerous machinery, occupational disease, injuries and mortality.

For the abolition of child labor.

For such regulation of the conditions of toil for women as shall safeguard the physical and moral health of the community.

For the suppression of the "sweating system."

For the gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all, which is a condition of the highest human life.

For a release from employment one day in seven.

For a living wage as a minimum in every industry, and for the highest wage that each industry can afford.

For the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be devised.

For suitable provision for the old age of the workers and for those incapacitated by injury.

For the abatement of poverty.

To the toilers of America and to those who by organized effort are seeking to lift the crushing burdens of the poor, and to reduce the hardships and uphold the dignity of labor, this Council sends the greeting of human brotherhood and the pledge of sympathy and of help in a cause which belongs to all who follow Christ.[18]

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America now is supported by some twenty-five denominations and continues to perform commendable functions in the field of social service. Essentially a fact-finding and coördinating agency, it serves to guide the efforts of the member denominations especially in the fields of race, industrial, and international relations and in the techniques of social work administration.

The Malvern Conference, a gathering of English church leaders in 1941 in the very midst of the Second World War, was extraordinary in the lengths to which it went in appraising the fundamental tenets of our traditional economic and political life. One of its basic points of agreement was the following:

There is no structural organization of society which can bring about the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth, since all systems can be perverted by the selfishness of man. Therefore, the Church as such can never commit itself to any proposed change in the structure of society as being a self-sufficient means of salvation.

But the Church can point to those features of our existing society which, while they can never prevent individual men and women from becoming Christian, are contrary to divine justice, and act as stumbling-blocks, making it harder for men to live Christian lives. . . .

In our present situation we believe that the maintenance of that part of the structure of our society by which the ultimate ownership of the principal industrial

[18] *The Church and Modern Industry* (The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America), pp. 17, 18.

resources of the community can be vested in the hands of private owners, may be such a stumbling-block. On the one hand it may deprive the poorest members of the community of the essentials of life. On the other, while these resources can be so owned, men will strive for their ownership for themselves. As a consequence, a way of life founded on the supremacy of the economic motive will remain, which is contrary to God's plan for mankind.

For one or both of these reasons, the time has come for Christians to proclaim the need for striving toward a form of society in which, while the essential value of the individual human personality is preserved, the continuance of these abuses will be no longer possible.[14]

A committee of economists, industrialists, and representatives of labor was organized by the Archbishop of York on the recommendation of the Malvern Conference itself and was able to agree on a report which included these statements, the potential implications of which can hardly be overestimated:

It is vitally important to remember the basic principle that the aim of economic activity is to promote human welfare as a whole, and that the right course may be one which does not produce the maximum of economic wealth. . . .

It must be admitted that the desire to improve one's position in life is not in itself necessarily harmful, nor can we either expect or wish that men should ever cease to aim at benefiting themselves and those closest to them. But we must try to prevent the misdirection of this desire in ways that influence production to the injury of the State or its citizens. . . .

The lack of any participation by labor in the control of production is a manifest sign of the broken fellowship of our economic life. . . .

Far-reaching changes in the present system of land ownership are required. . . . Serviceable ownership must be both subject to discipline if it fails in its stewardship, and also admissible to remedial assistance if unforeseen or natural causes hinder fruitful stewardship. . . .

. . . The essential purpose [of the monetary system] must be to secure that money becomes a genuine register of economic fact, and, so far as it is also a force affecting that fact, is directed by consideration for the public welfare alone. . . . It is therefore urged that the State should control the issue and cancellation of money or credit utilized as money. . . .

A change is taking place in our social life, so great as to deserve the name of a revolution. It is of supreme importance that it should be a Christian revolution. The principles set forth above are offered as a guide and call to Christian revolution.

Such a revolution would not be violent; it would be inspired by a new energy of good-will and be supported by members of all social "classes." But that revolution of good-will is bound to be frustrated, and ill-will with or without revolution must prevail, unless Christians under the impulse of their faith accept the full burden of their social responsibility.[15]

The World Council of Churches emerged from the Malvern Conference in the sense that both were inspired to a large extent by the late William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury. A tentative constitution for the World Council of Churches was drawn up as early as 1938; but due to the dis-

[14] "Malvern and After," *Living Church* (March 4, 1942), p. 12.
[15] *Living Church* (March 18, 1942), pp. 19–21.

ruption caused by the Second World War the organization did not become formal until 1948. Its potential power is suggested by the fact that it drew its support from individuals representing some 140 denominational churches, ranging from ancient Catholic bodies to the Society of Friends and the Salvation Army. The position of the World Council of Churches in regard to social problems is indicated in the following excerpts from the findings and decisions of the Amsterdam assembly:

The world today is experiencing a social crisis of unparalleled proportions. The deepest root of that disorder is the refusal of men to see and admit that their responsibility to God stands over and above their loyalty to any earthly community and their obedience to any worldly power. . . .

Two chief factors contribute to the crisis of our age. One of these is the vast concentrations of power—which are under capitalism mainly economic and under communism both economic and political. In such conditions, social evil is manifest on the largest scale not only in the greed, pride, and cruelty of persons and groups; but also in the momentum or inertia of huge organizations of men, which diminish their ability to act as moral and accountable beings. To find ways of realizing personal responsibility for collective action in the large aggregations of power in modern society is a task which has not yet been undertaken seriously.

The second factor is that society, as a whole dominated as it is by technics, is likewise more controlled by a momentum of its own than in previous periods. . . . It . . . has deprived many societies of those forms of association in which men can grow most fully as persons. It has accentuated the tendency in men to waste God's gift to them in the soil and in other natural resources. . . .

There is no inescapable necessity for society to succumb to undirected developments of technology, and the Christian Church has an urgent responsibility today to help men to achieve fuller personal life within the technical society. . . .

Coherent and purposeful ordering of society has now become a major necessity. Here governments have responsibilities which they must not shirk. But centers of initiative in economic life must be so encouraged as to avoid placing too great a burden upon centralized judgment and decision. . . .

A responsible society is one where freedom is the freedom of men who acknowledge responsibility to justice and public order, and where those who hold political authority or economic power are responsible for its exercise to God and the people whose welfare is affected by it. Man must never be made a mere means for political or economic ends. . . .

Christians should recognize with contrition that many churches are involved in the forms of economic injustice and racial discrimination which have created the conditions favorable to the growth of communism, and that the atheism and the antireligious teaching of communism are in part a reaction to the checkered record of a professedly Christian society. . . .

The Christian churches should reject the ideologies of both communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism, and should seek to draw men away from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives. Each has made promises which it could not redeem. Communist ideology puts the emphasis upon economic justice, and promises that freedom will come automatically after the completion of the revolution. Capitalism puts the emphasis upon freedom, and promises that justice will follow as a by-product of free enterprise; that, too, is an ideology which has been proved false. It is the responsibility of Christians to seek new, creative solutions which never allow either justice or freedom to destroy the other. . . .

In discussing the social function of the Church, Christians should always remember the great variety of situations in which the Church lives. Nations in which professing Christians are in the majority, nations in which the Church represents only a few per cent of the population, nations in which the Church lives under a hostile and oppressive Government offer very different problems for the Church. It is one of the contributions of the ecumenical experience of recent years that Churches under these contrasting conditions have come not only to appreciate one another's practices, but to learn from one another's failures and achievements and sufferings. . . .[16]

Judaism and Social Problems. In 1948, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, through its Commission on Justice and Peace, issued two statements which, taken together, indicate the nature of the social thought current among Jewish religious leaders. The substance of these statements was as follows:

Man derives his worth from the fact that he is created by God in the image of God. This is an unconditional status. It is not dependent on any other circumstance. He may be black, yellow or white; he may worship nature or the spirit within nature; he may be born on mountainside or on the plains. He is still equal in the sight of God. Any differences in his worth are those he creates himself by his utilization of his potentialities through learning and industry. But these are only evaluative differences. They are not essential. In no way do they limit the inalienable rights inherent in man's status as a child of God. . . .

In line with the teachings of the prophets of Israel, management should have a sense of social responsibility even though it pursues a philosophy of free enterprise. Too often in their search for greater profits, giant corporations disregard the rights of employees and consumers alike. The accumulation of vast profits beyond the needs for capital expenditure are socially indefensible. The consumer should benefit by lower prices, the worker by higher wages or some form of profit sharing. . . .

Our religion appreciates the fact that the growth and power of labor unions offer a challenge to the idealism and integrity of their leadership. Arbitrary policies prevail in certain quarters which are not consonant with the general welfare. Some bodies have unfairly restricted the admission of apprentices to their craft; others have practiced slow-down policies in production or have carried on inter-union strife at the expense of management and the public. Such practices should be outlawed. . . .

"Equal access to employment and to union membership should be open to all without distinction as to color, creed, nationality or sex, and the government should insure this by appropriate legislation. . . .

There is no basic contradiction between what is ethically right and what is economically good. Policies which result in the benefit of society as a whole are both materially good and ethically right for the individual employer and those who work for him. Only by promoting the general welfare, may we exalt the Lord through justice and sanctify the Holy One through righteousness . . .

Economic opportunity, political equality, social dignity for our racial minorities can be only partially guaranteed by strengthening our laws and implementing our administrative agencies. The major resistance to necessary changes lies in the moral weakness, in the prejudices and bigotries of many of our citizens. Legal

[16] *Findings and Decisions,* Section III, "The Church and the Disorder of Society" (First Assembly, World Council of Churches, 1948), pp. 39–47.

sanctions, criminal investigations, Federal pressures will never be able to sterilize the seed bed of these prejudices. Since the cause is largely the moral weakness and ignorance of individuals, the remedies must be largely in the hands of our homes, our schools, and our churches.

The difference between the equalitarian promise of the American dream as revealed in our Declaration of Independence and in our Bill of Rights and the inequalities of American practice measures the challenge to the churches and synagogues of the land. . . . Our faith must inspire and sustain us in our endeavor to bridge the gap. . . .[17]

The Social Work of the Churches. It should not be inferred from this presentation of church thought relative to social problems that the various church bodies are engaged primarily in telling other people how to run their own business. To the contrary, with religious beliefs and discussion has been combined generally a very practical expression of brotherhood and service. Indeed, many of the fields and methods of social service work have been pioneered by the religious groups. The origins of our hospitals, our care of the insane, our provisions for the aged poor, the destitute, the widowed, and the dependent child can be traced to movements of considerable antiquity within religious organizations. That they have become more completely *public* services in recent years has come about largely by the fact that church groups had awakened the conscience of people to their responsibilities toward the unfortunate to such an extent that the burden of administration became too large for the churches to carry on alone. Nevertheless Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike still carry on quite sizable undertakings in the field of practical social service.

The welfare work of the Roman Catholic church in the United States is administered chiefly through the diocesan "Catholic Charities" organizations, there being 98 such agencies, and the work is adapted to the needs of each diocese. Child welfare activities occupy a major place in the work of the Catholic Charities. In 1947, nearly 20,000 children were placed in foster homes, and more than 42,000 other children were cared for in 369 institutions. There also are about 92 Catholic day nurseries operating at the present time. The Society of St. Vincent de Paul, an organization of Roman Catholic laymen, sponsors extensive activities in the field of family problems, having reached more than 260,000 individuals in a variety of services in 1947. There are about 250 institutions caring for at least 20,000 aged dependents, and more than 800 hospitals and medical centers with bed capacity totaling nearly 100,000.[18]

Quite similar to the Roman Catholics in their long tradition and closely knit church organization, the Jewish charities are highly organized; yet

[17] "Judaism, Management and Labor," and "Judaism and Race Equality," statements issued by the Commission on Justice and Peace of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1948.

[18] *Social Work Year Book, 1949,* pp. 86–89.

they are distinctive among all the religious groups in the lengths to which they go in caring for their own church members who are in need. Thus, although the total Jewish population in the United States is only about 5,000,000—70 per cent of whom live in the 11 largest cities of the country—there are Jewish central agencies in more than 300 of our cities, serving some 800 communities. In 1947, there were some 87 Jewish family welfare agencies in the United States and Canada, and about 75 per cent of their services consisted of nonfinancial assistance and counsel. Similarly, child care was provided by 61 agencies, with major emphasis on care for children in foster homes rather than in institutions. Direct financial assistance to families has declined in recent years because of the increase in governmental aids to dependent persons and the general economic prosperity of the country; and the institutional care of children is being discouraged because of the general agreement that children are best cared for individually in family homes. Yet the Jewish and family welfare services in 1947 involved the expenditure of nearly $12,000,000. A strikingly large sum—more than $140,000,000—was raised that same year for overseas relief as a result of the hardships experienced by the Jews in the Second World War. Jewish inmates in public homes for the aged are notably few, since Jewish social service is so comprehensive. There are about 70 private Jewish homes for the aged, sheltering upwards of 6,000 aged persons. There are in the United States and Canada some 40 Jewish general hospitals, in addition to 22 other hospitals offering more specialized services.[19]

The Protestant church group is distinctive in that it does not have the institutional framework of either the Roman Catholic or the Jewish churches, and its numbers are divided by denominational lines. Its approach is more evangelical and probably more adaptable and exploratory. It has not wholly neglected the field of social service, as is shown by the fact that there were in 1948 upwards of 300 Protestant hospitals, while there were in 1948 more than 300 Protestant homes for the aged. It is likely that as a rule Protestant social welfare activity has been expressed more fully in the support of secular agencies. Nevertheless, Protestantism shares with other churches, and perhaps expresses more militantly than the others, the recognition of the pastoral opportunity of social service work—holding that the equilibrium and stability of the individual served is the ultimate function of all the welfare activities of the church.[20]

THE NECESSITY OF THINKING

It must be recognized that such utterances and activities do not represent the united or even the universal sentiment of leaders within the churches. We may fairly assume, however, that they do represent the opinion of those who feel that the churches should take an active part in

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 262–267.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 358–365.

the solution of social problems. They are the individuals who are making an honest attempt to answer a question that cannot longer be evaded: What, if any, is to be the place of religion in the social order of the future?

That the organized form of religion, the church, will be called upon to make radical changes is being prophesied by many reasonable thinkers. Whatever changes may take place, it is safe to say that religion will not disappear, nor will the organization of religion fade from our culture. Judging from the experience of the past, it is man's nature to be religious, although perhaps not always in the sense in which professional churchmen define the word; and it has always been the characteristic of the followers of religions, when living in society, to organize.

Assuming, therefore, that religion seems destined to have a place in the social order of the future, whatever it may be, three possibilities stand out: (1) no change will be made; (2) the present Christian church will adapt itself to the changes in social life; (3) an entirely new form of religion, presumably better adapted to the needs of society, will evolve.

We may dismiss the first possibility as containing the seeds of its own downfall; it will dream itself into extinction or be driven to some social backwater by the rising tide of change. Between the last two choices, it would seem, in view of the fact that it is already a firmly imbedded part of our culture pattern, that the present religion through adaptation holds the greatest possibilities. It will be considerably quicker and more effective socially to reshape the old religion, difficult as such a program may seem, than to undergo the spiritual upheaval of making ourselves a new form of belief. If a new religion grows up in our midst, it may in time prove itself fitter than the old forms. But for the time being, the present organization seems capable of infinite possibilities for the social good. The ideals of our own religious tradition, shorn of their dogmatic trappings, are at least the equals of any others. The efforts of the church to adapt itself to the social needs merit the serious attention of all champions of the social good.

The burning words of Amos, Hosea, and Micah, of Isaiah and Jeremiah, the penetrating utterances of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, cannot be stifled. However men may seek to keep apart their business, their politics, and their religion, it cannot be done. Life is an all-embracing entity and includes all the various phases of man's thought and activity. Slowly but surely as we try every other remedy and see it fail, and as we perceive the depth and meaning of religion for daily life, an increasing number of men are becoming convinced that the age-old struggle of humankind with the circumstances of life cannot be solved except by the application of the principles of the great leaders and prophets of mankind to the problems that arise. War will not be prevented by a balance of power alone. The economic struggle will not be settled by a stalemate of force. Inevitably, we shall fail to solve these problems unless we come to look upon each other as brothers whose struggles and whose difficulties are com-

mon and whom we are willing to meet on common ground in a spirit of fraternity, fellowship, and helpfulness. The Sermon on the Mount has not lost its power. St. Paul's pregnant utterance that "God has made of one blood all men for to dwell on all the face of the earth" has a significance for our social relations. The Golden Rule of Jesus has a meaning for both employers and employees that needs only to be applied in order to settle difficulties. Paul's statement that our bodies are the temples of the Holy Spirit cuts deep into our disregard of health measures. Jesus' saying, "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword," cannot be ignored in the presence of international misunderstanding. The Apostle's question, "He who loveth not his neighbor whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" goes to the root of human selfishness and has a relevancy to the problems of social and economic relations of man.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Why are we interested in religion as a social problem?
2. Why is mankind universally religious in the broad sense of the term?
3. What is your opinion of the statement that "religion is an opiate to put to sleep the social aspirations of the downtrodden"?
4. What is the difference between religion and the church?
5. In your opinion, may an individual who is not connected with a church have a socialized "personal religion"? If so, how? If not, why not?
6. Explain the basis for the church's interest in social problems.
7. To what extent have the churches entered upon the practical application of religion to the problems of public welfare?

8. Explain the modern belief that the church should stay out of politics. Can you reconcile this with our contention that the church should face social problems?
9. What are some of the difficulties of establishing a unified church sentiment in regard to social problems?
10. How did the position of the churches with respect to their attitude toward war differ in the Second World War from what it had been in the First World War?
11. Defend, or attack, any one of the statements of the various church groups regarding their approach to social problems as quoted in the text.
12. Secure from the pastor of a church of your own denomination a copy of its most recent statement similar to those referred to in the previous question, and analyze it.
13. Make a list of five suggestions that you would offer for making the church more helpful socially.

16. Problems of Disease and Public Health

IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH FOR EFFICIENCY AND HAPPINESS

IMAGINE A GIGANTIC weighing-scales constructed on the principle of a druggist's balance. Into the pan of one side pile enough dollars to represent the value of all our material assets in this country—mines, railroads, farms, live stock, timber, manufactured goods of all kinds, houses and their furnishings, factories, and all other items of our wealth. Into the other pan pour enough dollars to represent the value of our 150,000,000 inhabitants considered only as economic producers. At first thought many of us would expect the material wealth of the country to outweigh by far the economic value of the people. But according to conservative estimates, the pile of dollars representing the value of the people would be five times as great as that representing all the material assets of the country combined. Our national wealth in material goods in 1929 was reckoned as being nearly 400 billions of dollars; the total vital assets were estimated as more than $1,500,000,000,000.[1] So from the strictly economic viewpoint national health is of the greatest importance.

Moreover, a human being is also one of the most expensive things we produce. Consider first only the time it takes to grow a man or a woman in comparison with any of our domestic animals. Swine attain maturity in seven or eight months from birth; cattle and horses in two or three years. It takes fourteen or fifteen years for a child to come to puberty and a fifth of a century to come to full physical development. In most countries the young are not considered to be mature enough to vote before they are from eighteen to twenty-three years old. Next, consider the cost of rearing a child. Dublin has estimated that in a family with an annual income of $2,500 a year, the cost of rearing a child to the age of self-support, including food, shelter, clothing, education, etc., is $7,238. If one includes interest on

[1] L. I. Dublin, *Health and Wealth* (1928), p. 6; Evans Clark, *Internal Debts of the United States* (1933), p. 9.

capital and makes allowance for the cost of those who do not survive the age of eighteen, the amount rises to somewhat more than $10,000.[2]

However important good health is economically, that is not the whole story. "Life is more than meat and the body than raiment." Life is not to be measured in dollars and cents, but in happiness, which is the excess of the satisfactions and joys of existence above its dissatisfactions. The importance of the organic basis for existence has been aptly expressed in the remark that whether or not life is worth living "depends upon the liver." With occasional exceptions, health is the foundation of human happiness. And a sound mind in a sound body has been the ideal of seekers after efficiency since the time of the Greeks. There is good evidence that health is a major basis of human progress and that lack of it is one of the predisposing causes to national decay.[3] Other things being equal, good health makes for physical efficiency, bodily comfort, a sense of well-being, and develops energy, alertness, and keenness.

Health, then, is the great desideratum; upon it depend the achievement and the happiness of men. The energy for creative enterprises depends upon it; the joy of existence is rooted in it; the inventiveness that perfects our civilization is closely related to it; the hope and ambition that drive us to service for our families and our communities have some vital relation to it. On the other hand, sickness and death bring many evil results. Poverty follows in their wake; crime breeds where sickness and death-rates are high; hopelessness and despair, laziness, and broken homes follow in the train of sickness and death.

EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICAL INEFFICIENCY

Death-Rates. Deaths that are caused by pathological conditions of the organism—in other words, deaths not due to old age—are regarded by the medical profession as largely avoidable. Since at present by far the largest percentage of all deaths are due to abnormal causes, the mortality-rates of a country show the degree to which disease control has progressed. Death-rates are expressed in terms of the number of deaths per 1,000 of the population. In the registration area of the United States for 1948 the death-rate was 9.9, while by that year the average expectancy of life was 67 years for the population as a whole, with variations ranging from 58.1 for nonwhite males to 71 for white females.[4] Mortality also varies in the different countries of the world; the lowest rate recorded in 1946 was 8.5 in the Netherlands, while the highest was 17.6, in Japan. Table 12 (page 181) shows death rates for various countries at intervals since 1911, and

[2] Dublin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[3] Irving Fisher, "National Vitality, Its Wastes and Conservation," *Report of the National Conservation Commission* (Senate Document No. 676, Sixtieth Congress, second session, 1909), III: 739–741.

[4] *Vital Statistics of the United States: 1948* (United States Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics), Part II, pp. xxxiv, xliii.

illustrates the decline in mortality that took place in practically all countries during the first part of the present century. Furthermore, the death-rate ranges higher in the city than in the country; the death-rate of the colored people greatly exceeds that of the whites; that of the poor surpasses that of the rich.

Death-rates have been decreasing during the last few centuries. In London during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was between 40 and 50, while between 1680 and 1720, a period of epidemics, it rose as high as 80. In Havana, Cuba, following the American occupation, the death-rate fell from over 50 to about 20.

The *infant death-rate* has fallen much more than the adult, the number of infants who died in the first year of life having declined in the United States from 100 per 1,000 live births in 1915 to 32 in 1948.[5]

With the exception of the Japanese, the various *colored races* in the United States have a substantially higher death-rate than the white population. While the white death-rate in 1940 stood at 10.4, the rate among the Negroes was 13.9; it was 14.4 among the Indians, and was highest, 15.4, among the Chinese. The Japanese death-rate was lower than that of the whites, the figure being 6.7 per 1,000.[6] The situation undoubtedly reflects the tremendous influx of Japanese women during the years from 1900 to 1920, when their numbers increased *approximately 2,750 per cent,* from 872 in 1900 to more than 24,000 in 1920, reducing the acute unbalance in the number of Japanese men—whose number rose from about 23,000 in 1900 to 72,000 in 1920. The number of American-born Japanese accordingly rose sharply from about 4,000 in 1910 to almost 80,000 in 1940.[7] As a result, the Japanese population in the United States in 1940 still was unusually young; and death-rates correspondingly were lower than for a more balanced distribution of age groups. Heart diseases are the greatest killers among both the white and the colored races in the United States; but tuberculosis continues to account for a disproportionately high death-rate among the colored races, as does nephritis.

Decrease in mortality-rates varies with different diseases. The death-rate from tuberculosis in England is only one-third of what it was seventy years ago. The death-rate from typhoid fever has been decreasing very rapidly in recent years. Another disease that has shown a remarkable decrease in death-rates is smallpox. Between 1846 and 1870 in Prussia the death-rate per 100,000 from smallpox was 24. In 1874 vaccination was made compulsory, and as a consequence, the rate fell during 1875 and 1876 to 1.5. In 1793 during the epidemic of yellow fever in Philadelphia one-tenth of the

[5] *Ibid.*, p. xxxviii.

[6] Figures computed from *Vital Statistics of the United States: 1940* (United States Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics), Part I, p. 176, and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949,* p. 13.

[7] Sixteenth Census, *Population* (U.S. Bureau of the Census), Vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part I, United States Summary, p. 19.

city's population died within six and one-half weeks. Since the discovery that this disease is transmitted only through the mosquito, it has practically disappeared in America.[8]

TABLE 25: DEATH-RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1945 *
(selected causes, per 100,000 population, registration area)

Cause of Death	*Year* 1900	1915	1930	1945
Tuberculosis (all forms)	194.4	140.1	71.1	40.1
Diseases of the heart	137.4	163.9	214.2	321.5
Pneumonia and influenza	202.2	145.9	102.5	51.8
Cancer and other malignant tumors	64.0	80.7	97.4	134.5
Diphtheria	40.3	15.2	4.9	1.2
Typhoid and paratyphoid fever	31.3	11.8	4.8	0.4

* *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (Bureau of the Census, 1949), p. 48.

Every decrease in the death-rate means lengthening of life, the prevention of needless expense, greater economic usefulness and the increase of human happiness. Health has been called "a purchasable article," i.e., by wisely spending money we can cut down the incidence of disease.

Ill Health. On the basis of a number of investigations it has been found that there is a fairly definite percentage of the population, ranging between 2 and 3 per cent, that is at all times incapacitated on account of sickness. An additional 2 to 4 per cent feel the effects of illness but continue to work. On this basis, it is fair to say that at least 6,000,000 people at any given time are more or less ill. Each day at least a million and a quarter of our 60,000,000 gainfully employed persons are not able to report for work owing to sickness. An equal number of less seriously ill are, but should not be, at work.

According to Farr, the English statistician, for every death there is annual average sickness of two years. To put it another way, for each death per year there are two persons sick throughout the year. This would mean that there are 3,000,000 persons on the sick list all the time, or an average of about thirteen days of sickness per capita.[9]

In 1908 *tuberculosis* in all forms caused the greatest number of deaths of any disease. Forty years later *diseases of the heart* stood first, the tuberculosis rate having fallen and the rate from diseases of the heart having steadily risen. Other diseases that have increased are cerebral hemorrhage, and cancer and other malignant tumors. Influenza and pneumonia following it have a very irregular graph. Deaths from these diseases fluctuate more than those from any other.

Accident-Rates. In 1948 the number of deaths due to *accidental or undefined external causes* was 98,001, or about 67 per 100,000 of estimated

[8] Fisher, "National Vitality," *loc. cit.*, pp. 624, 625.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 625.

population. Of these 32,259, or a rate of about 22.1, the result of automobile accidents, constituted the largest group.[10]

Economic Loss Due to Sickness. Louis I. Dublin, statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, has estimated that the total annual cost of sickness in low wages, reduced production, and medical expenses is about $2,250,000,000. He also estimated that the total capital value of preventable deaths, based on a capitalization of the average expectancy of earnings for the deceased, is something more than $6,000,000,000 each year.[11]

TABLE 26: TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR MEDICAL CARE *
(all figures in thousands of dollars)

Service	*Total*	*Sources of Funds*			
		Patients	Governments	Philanthropy	Industry
Physicians in private practice	1,090,000	1,040,000	—	—	50,000
Dentists in private practice	445,000	445,000	—	—	—
Secondary and sectarian practitioners	193,000	193,000	—	—	—
Graduate nurses, private duty	142,000	142,000	—	—	—
Practical nurses, private duty	60,000	60,000	—	—	—
Hospitals: operating expenses	656,000	278,000	300,000	54,000	24,000
Hospitals: new construction	200,000	—	100,000	100,000	—
Public health	121,000	—	93,500	27,500	—
Private laboratories	3,000	3,000	—	—	—
Orthopedic and other supplies	2,000	2,000	—	—	—
Glasses	50,000	50,000	—	—	—
Drugs	656,000	656,000	—	—	—
Organized medical services	29,000	7,790	16,000	210	5,000
Totals	3,656,000	2,885,790	509,500	181,710	79,000

* Final Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, *Medical Care for the American People* (University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 14. With a few minor exceptions, the data apply to the year 1929. They are probably representative of any normal year of recent times.

How Much Is Preventable? It is now known that we can prevent about 45 per cent of the deaths and save that proportion of the waste which sickness and early death involve. Doubtless the better sanitation of our cities,

[10] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 74.
[11] L. I. Dublin, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–10.

the hygienic control of our water and food supplies, have had much to do with the lowering of death-rates from certain gastric diseases and from certain other diseases that are water-borne or food-borne. Much yet remains to be done, however, to make available for the preservation of human life the knowledge we have. Our statistics have not yet enabled us to discover how much of the sickness and ill health and death is due to overfatigue in work. That much of it is so produced, however, is indicated by the fact that in England under sickness insurance much greater regularity in attendance upon industry has come about since the worker has had access to the physician without paying a fee. That economic conditions are closely related to infant sickness and death is indicated by the studies of the Federal Children's Bureau in a number of our American cities. These studies show that as the wage of the father increases, the infant mortality steadily decreases.




FIGURE 12

Based on data from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950* (United States Bureau of the Census), p. 76.

While we have not by a long way yet approached the conquest of the diseases we now know how to prevent, we are making progress. We have lengthened the average duration of life from 40 years in 1880 to 55 or 56 years in our cities. For the registration area of the United States the life-expectancy of a baby born in 1901 was 49 years; now it is about 68 years. We cut the infant-mortality rate by nearly two-thirds in the years between 1920 and 1948. We have almost wiped out typhoid fever in the cities of the North. Since 1900 the death-rate from tuberculosis has been cut by four-

fifths. The death-rate from diphtheria dropped from 43.3 per 100,000 in 1900 to 0.4 in 1948.[12]

PRESENT METHODS OF DEALING WITH DISEASE

So long as he did not know the nature of disease and so long as magical notions constituted his only science, man could not hope to overcome the ills of life. If he was of a philosophic mind, he explained them as the inevitable fate of life; if he was religiously minded, he accepted them as inscrutable acts of Providence, somehow intended by God for his own betterment. Well it was for him if he obtained a philosophy of life that, so long as he could not remedy these ills, gave him the will to meet them with high courage. For how long man wrestled with these problems without hope of overcoming them is indicated by the fact that only two centuries ago did medicine become to a fair extent scientific. Indeed, *modern* medicine, with its hope of finally triumphing over man's ancient enemies, disease and ill health, had very little promise of success until the triumph of the germ theory of Pasteur. Consider the methods that we have today to assist mankind in its struggle with disease! Perhaps the following will suggest an adequate picture of the present situation:

Physicians, Dentists, and Nurses. In 1946 there were about 83 physicians per 100,000 population in the United States, a decrease from 173 in 1900. In addition there were about 50 dentists per 100,000 population in the same year.

Both medical doctors and dentists are quite irregularly distributed, being concentrated chiefly in the larger cities; and some parts of the country have very much larger numbers in proportion to population than others. While there is a doctor for every 1,200 persons in the United States, the ratio varies sharply from one State to another, the figure ranging from about 1 for 640 in New York State, to 1 for about 1,920 in Mississippi. The distribution also varies greatly between city and country: urban centers have a doctor for each 525 persons, whereas towns of less than 5,000 have but one for every 1,350. Open country areas are still less well served, there being instances of whole counties being without a physician. Dentists gravitate toward towns and cities even more than do the medical doctors; yet their service to the rural areas appears to be more adequate than is that of the physicians. On the other hand, their distribution among the States varies even more sharply than does the distribution of physicians, there being in 1946 more than four times as many dentists per 1,000 population in New York than in Mississippi.[13] Since the medical profession has

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, pp. 74, 79. J. F. Dewhurst, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), p. 246.

[13] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, p. 302; *see also* J. H. Kolb, *A Study of Rural Society* (1940), p. 603.

become more highly specialized, it has also become somewhat commercialized. However, their uneven distribution and the fact that some people prefer one doctor to another, suggests that there is little correlation between available medical service and the need for it in a given area.

The *nurse* is as necessary today as the physician. In 1946 there were probably about 345,000 graduate nurses in the United States.[14] Graduate nurses have increased since 1900 more rapidly than either physicians or population. There is much evidence to indicate that the supply of nurses, were they properly distributed, is adequate for ordinary peacetime requirements at the present time. However, the distribution of nurses is as uneven as the distribution of doctors and hospitals. The nurses are concentrated in large cities, leaving the rural sections rather poorly supplied. A study some years ago showed that in ten representative States the cities of 500,000 and over had 43 per cent of all the nurses in those States, while cities of that size contained only 32 per cent of the total population of these ten States. On the other hand, places under 10,000 had only 14 per cent of the nurses and 42 per cent of the population.[15] The number of nurses' training schools has been growing very rapidly, having increased from 11 in 1879 to more than 1,270 in 1946.[16]

Formerly the nurse was only a private-duty nurse or a hospital nurse. Today various other kinds of nursing have developed, such as the visiting-nurse, the school nurse, the dispensary nurse, the tuberculosis nurse, nurses employed in stores and factories, and the public health nurse. Airline hostesses also are nurses.

Unfortunately, most of these nurses are still concentrated in the cities. With the growth of the movement for the county nurse, an increasing number have been made available to country people.

Hospitals and Clinics. The modern practice of medicine makes a hospital almost necessary. Hospitals in recent years have grown both in numbers and in number of beds provided. In 1920 there were approximately 4,000 hospitals for community use, but by 1949 the number had increased to nearly 6,600. The bed capacity had increased from 311,000 to about 1,440,000 during the same period. To put the matter on the basis of population, in 1920 there was one bed for every 340 persons, while in 1949 there was one for every 104 persons.[17]

The distribution of hospitals is quite uneven. Facilities are not provided in proportion to the amount of illness. However, from 1920 to 1940 the percentage of counties in the United States having hospitals for general community use increased from 44 to 58. Distribution with respect to popu-

[14] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, p. 302.

[15] Peebles, *A Survey of Statistical Data on Medical Facilities in the United States* (Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, Publication No. 3), pp. 30–32.

[16] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 117.

[17] *World Almanac, 1951*, p. 439.

lation is very uneven. For example, while in the North Atlantic States in 1928 there was one bed for community use for every 198 people, in the South Central States there was only one bed for 508 people. Wisconsin had the most adequate provision, with one bed for 154 persons, while South Carolina had the worst, with one bed for each 749 persons.[18] Ten years later, it was reported that an eighth of our people lived in areas where hospital bed capacity was as low as 1.5 per 1,000 population; most of them, moreover, lived fifty miles or more from any considerable hospital center.[19]

Almost three-fourths of our hospitals are owned by independent associations, churches, individuals, and partnerships, while the remainder are owned by governmental units. However, governmental agencies provide nearly three-fourths of the bed capacity and render from 85 to 97 per cent of the duties of all hospital service for nervous, mental, and tubercular patients.[20]

Scattered throughout the country, especially in the larger cities, sometimes connected with hospitals, sometimes separate, are a number of *dispensaries and clinics* to which people can come for advice and treatment. Thse people do not need a bed and are what are known as "ambulatory cases."

There has been a very great increase in clinics and health centers since 1910. At that date there were about 600, including out-patient departments, while by 1937 there were more than 6,000. It is estimated that at least 50,000,000 visits are made annually to these institutions. They are maintained by hospitals, private health and governmental organizations, commercial and industrial establishments, schools, colleges, trade unions, courts, prisons, and charitable agencies. Out of 2,500 of these studied in 1923, 42 per cent were conducted by governmental agencies.

These clinics are of many varieties. It is estimated that there are about 700 tuberculosis clinics in this country. In 1940 there were about 3,000 clinics for venereal disease. In the same year there were about 400 mental clinics. Because of the recognition of the importance of heart-disease, cardiac clinics have grown up. In 1928 there were 187 of these.

Owing to the discussion of the cost of medical care, group clinics under private medicine have developed, especially in the Middle West. There is no accurate estimate of their number, although one authority estimated there were 220 such clinics in 1926, mostly in the Middle West.

In certain of the large cities pay clinics have risen, which charge approximately the cost of the services rendered. The movement seems to have begun in Massachusetts.[21]

[18] Peebles, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–48.
[19] *Social Work Year Book, 1941*, p. 328.
[20] Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
[21] Peebles, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–45.

TABLE 27: MEDICAL SERVICES NEEDED AND RECEIVED *
Units of Medical Service Received per 1,000 Individuals in Families with Specified Incomes Compared with Services Needed to Meet Standards of Good Medical Care.

Unit of Service	*Service in Families with Specified Incomes (Number per 1,000 Individuals)*						*Services Needed to Supply Medical Care*
	Under $1,200	$1,200–$2,000	$2,000–$3,000	$3,000–$5,000	$5,000–$10,000	*Over* $10,000	
Home, office and clinic calls (physicians)	1,931.9	2,045.9	2,296.7	2,741.4	3,621.4	4,734.4	5,649.5
Hospitalized cases	59.4	52.4	59.4	63.1	79.3	98.0	107.0
Days of hospital care	927.9	666.7	757.4	604.2	840.3	1,200.8	1,384.7
Dental care (persons over 3 years of age)	117.9	184.6	247.5	309.4	446.0	622.0	1,000.0
Health examinations	83.2	68.0	69.1	82.2	121.7	234.0	941.9
Immunizations	68.5	49.2	50.9	59.6	84.3	120.2	185.3
Refractions or glasses	24.5	24.6	39.6	53.8	89.6	159.7	175.0
Home and office calls (secondary) practitioners and cultists	154.6	139.1	230.4	231.1	459.0	569.2	——

* Data on services received, based on 38,668 white persons in 8,639 families surveyed for twelve consecutive months, 1928–1931. From the Final Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, *Medical Care for the American People* (University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 8.

Medical Social Service. What is known as medical social service arose partly out of the abuse of hospitals and dispensaries by people who could afford to pay, but who were claiming that they were unable to do so, and partly out of the realization that disease is often the product of the conditions under which people live and work, and that cure depends upon the change in the family and in working conditions which have brought on the illness. The present movement goes back to the establishment of such service in the Massachusetts General Hospital in 1905. By 1946, about 1,000 agencies—including at least 700 hospitals—employed at least 4,000 medical and psychiatric social workers.[22] Medical social service represents one more extension of human effort to control the conditions that produce ill health and to bring about cure by adjusting social conditions to that end. It is the application of social case work to the healing of disease. It is a recognition that ill health is the product not only of germs, but also of the

[22] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, p. 314.

physiological disfunction which comes about by subjection of the human organism to bad social conditions in the widest sense.

Health Centers. By the health center we mean any room or building in which health information is given with the purpose of teaching people how to keep well. Frequently clinical examination occurs there, but this is chiefly for the purpose of interesting those who come in the matter of health and providing a means whereby health education can be disseminated. No treatment is given in the health center; and if the need of treatment is discovered, the person is referred to his family physician, or to a hospital or dispensary. Frequently the health center is the starting-point from which the public health nurse gets her clues as to what people she should follow up and give further information. The health center is only one more method devised to teach people the value of health and hygiene.

Social settlements and some welfare associations have seen the importance of public-health instruction. The Red Cross, after the First World War, took up health centers as one of its main activities; boards of health in a number of our States have developed them; and a number of private organizations, such as antituberculosis associations, frequently have organized them and stimulated interest in public health in this way. Often they go under other names, such as child health clinics, or child welfare clinics. Several hundreds of these have been established, some of them giving extensive medical and educational service and others giving only general health information.

Public Health Departments. In this brief survey of the agencies already at work for the conservation of the health of the people, the public health departments, local, State, and National, should not be neglected. The nation spent more than $2,000,000,000 for its public health service in 1948, about three-fifths of that amount being spent at the State and local level.[23] Three-fourths of the people of the United States today are protected by some degree of full-time public health service; but probably not more than one in twenty-five has what is now regarded as adequate minimum public health protection.[24]

The duties of the local public health officers vary widely in the different States. The chief duties of the local officers are the enforcement of the quarantine regulations, sanitary laws, and other regulations affecting public health. However, in the larger cities, the health department frequently has a wide program for the promotion of health as well as the enforcement of laws and regulations. Often they hold clinics of various sorts for the discovery of disease. In some of the cities a large force of nurses works under the Department of Health. Often the city Department of Health has laboratories for the purpose of testing water, food, and milk, and for the microscopic examination of specimens sent in by physicians.

[23] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,* p. 227.
[24] *Social Work Year Book, 1949,* p. 383.

The State health department serves chiefly to coördinate the health activities of the localities within the borders of the State, holding the local boards to certain minimum standards of service, and supplementing financial and technical limitations of communities as necessary. It promotes public appreciation of the problems of health by preparing and distributing pamphlets, organizing clinical demonstrations, and recording statistical information regarding the health of the State. It specifies the minimum requirements for milk and water supplies, performs many laboratory and inspection services for both localities and individuals, checks on local sewage disposal systems, and in some instances takes a hand in setting the minimum standards of training and proficiency to be required of local health officials. The State boards, moreover, are to a considerable extent the agencies through which the Federal Health Service makes its findings and suggestions effective.

As the spearhead of the public health service in our country stands the Federal Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency. It originated from the marine hospital service that was established by an act of Congress approved July 16, 1798. The original purpose of this service was to furnish care for sick and disabled seamen in hospitals, either those maintained by the United States or civilian institutions with which contracts might be negotiated. Interestingly enough, that service was financed by assessing a fee of 20 cents per month for each seaman. The amount was collected from the masters of American ships entering port from abroad, and was deducted from the seaman's earnings.[25]

The present functions of the Public Health Service, as laid down in the amended Public Health Service Act of 1944, include primarily:

1. Administering Federal laws pertaining to quarantine, pharmaceutical products, and interstate waters polution.
2. Conducting research in regard to human mental and physical ailments.
3. Developing public health measures for preventing or reducing disease.
4. Administering Federal grants-in-aid for State health services, for hospital construction, and for research or training programs related to special problems of health.
5. Promoting public health education.[26]

In any consideration of public health service it should be noticed, however, that many such services are rendered by agencies not under the jurisdiction of health departments. This is true of both the State and Federal Governments. The administration of workman's compensation laws, for example, has a profound influence on the health of the individual; and many of the functions ordinarily performed by the State Department of Public Welfare and of the Industrial Commission have important health implications. At the Federal level, we need point only to such agencies

[25] Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
[26] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, p. 385.

as the Division of Vital Statistics of the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Labor Standards and the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, or to the many and diversified services of the Department of Agriculture or of the Federal Security Agency, to realize that concern for the public health permeates the whole structure of government.

Private Health Agencies. In addition to public agencies supported out of public funds, there are many private agencies promoting health in one way or another, such, for example, as the antituberculosis associations in various States, the National Anti-Tuberculosis Association, the associations against cancer, the heart associations, the Child Welfare League of America, the Red Cross, and many others too numerous to mention. Most of these actively carry on propaganda in the interest of public health. Then there are the factories and large stores in cities, great industrial plants, and other business concerns that have found it to their financial interest to provide hospitals, nurses, and out-patient clinics for their employees. In addition to these some of the insurance companies, like the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, send out people to give addresses and publish many bulletins in the interest of public health. In fact, so far has the health propaganda gone that the manufacturers of various products have capitalized the health slogan in their advertising. For example, we hear of "health bran," "health bread," "health underwear," "health toothbrushes," and "health soap."

OTHER MEASURES NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF HEALTH

While the modern health movement and modern medicine have delivered many from age-long fear, needlessly premature death still sweeps off millions. While death ought to occur at the end of a long and useful life, a welcome end to the outworn machine, today most of us die untimely deaths. Infants, youths, and men and women in the flush of maturity still perish with life unfulfilled. Moreover, in spite of all the health propaganda, millions spend their lives in sickness and consequent inefficiency. How shall the knowledge now available to the scientists be made the common property of all? How shall the people be provided with the facilities they need in time of sickness? What can be done about the majority of deaths and sicknesses that we do not yet know how to prevent? These are some of the unanswered questions regarding health which challenge this generation.

Scientific Eugenics. The science of eugenics has two aspects: (1) negative eugenics, which means the elimination through the lack of breeding of the dysgenic stock, and (2) positive eugenics, which means the cultivation of sentiments and ideals that will lead the thoroughbreds to mate only with thoroughbreds and rear adequate families. Eugenicists have suggested that it is possible for society consciously to develop ideals in individuals which will make them shrink from a marriage that promotes degeneracy. Edu-

cation along the line of positive eugenics, it is believed, will lead to discrimination in the matter of marriage much more generally than is practiced today. Young people contemplating marriage should very seriously consider the hereditary background of their prospective mates. If there is a history of insanity, epilepsy, or feeble-mindedness in the ancestors, he who takes the risk is guilty of making a reprehensible choice. This may seem shocking to young, romantic love. Proverbially, love is blind; and this may indeed be the reason why so many young people fail to take into consideration the heredity of their prospective mates. Modern education has the responsibility of opening their eyes to these important considerations.

On the side of negative eugenics much more strenuous steps must be taken to control the propagation of the incapable than are now to be found in any country. In none of our States have we made provisions for the segregation of the feeble-minded to the extent of as much as one-tenth of the number supposed to be present in the population. Furthermore, consider the responsibility of those who by reason of inherited weakness bring into the world children who, in turn, all their lives suffer from weakness and disease. Some day perhaps even the foundation of good health will be considered a eugenic matter. Education on the importance of the hereditary basis of good health ought not to be impossible, because many of these people who produce weakling children have minds capable of understanding the importance of this subject. When there is patent weakness in the ancestry, should they take the risk of bringing into the world those who all their life long will suffer from the defective constitutions handed on to them by their parents?

Public Hygiene Measures. Eugenic measures are for the benefit of posterity. There are other measures, however, that affect the present generation. Hygienic measures based upon our present knowledge as to the prevention and cure of sickness may be realized either through public hygiene, quasi-public hygiene, or personal hygiene. In recent years great advances have been made in all these matters. Streets are cleaned much more effectively than ever before. Sanitary water supplies have been provided in wide areas. City health departments are watching food supplies, regulating quarantine, attending to garbage-disposal and sewage as never before. Nevertheless, much remains yet to be done. There are still cities whose supply of drinking water comes from contaminated rivers and lakes. Because of the agitation of ignorant people, quarantine regulations are not as strictly enforced in some places as they should be. While some cities are providing vaccines of various kinds for the prevention of such diseases as smallpox, typhoid fever, and diphtheria, in some places there is still a determined fight against the use of these preventives. City health departments and State departments of health have still enormous reaches of territory that must be covered more effectively than they are today. State health departments have a serious problem in the struggle to prevent

people from contracting diseases while on their summer vacations. Many of the resorts ignore the simplest elements of sanitation. Many a man comes back from his vacation with the germs of typhoid lurking in his system from the water that he drank. The sanitation of the villages and the open country is still in its infancy.

To various State departments also fall the problems connected with the sanitation of factories and other places in which people work. Upon these conditions depends the health of innumerable persons. While many of the States have been working on this problem in various parts of the country, a large number of our States still make very little provision for the protection of the health of the worker in industry. The whole problem of industrial hygiene is just in its infancy. What shall we say of the labor of women just before and soon after childbirth? Studies have shown that the numbers of still-births and of deaths of infants soon after birth have been very greatly increased by improper guarding of the mother in factories at that period.

Only a few of our States have provided an adequate compensation law for industrial accidents. The figures often cited indicate that an enormous amount of disability arises from such accidents. Furthermore, traffic conditions on our roads and streets must be more carefully regulated and our people taught the importance of safe driving, else the number of accidents from the automobile is bound to mount.

Again, the lack of proper housing laws and tenement-house regulations in many of our cities is a distinct menace to health. Cities and States must more carefully regulate the building and repair of houses before the death and sickness rates incident to unhygienic housing conditions can decrease very materially. The houses of an astonishing number of our American cities still contain dark rooms, in which breed all kinds of disease germs.

While the standards of the medical profession have been rising rapidly in the last few years, there is much yet to be done. There are still to be found medical schools turning out practitioners inadequately trained and some of them of such low character that it is impossible to expect them to bring honor to the profession. Too often the members of the medical profession are so engrossed in the practice of medicine as a business, instead of as a profession, that, instead of seconding with all their power the work of the State and city departments of health, the work of private associations for health education, the multiplication of nurses and other agencies for disseminating health instruction, they are found in the opposition. Perhaps the time will come when more of them than now will find their chief aim to be that of putting themselves out of business by assisting in the program of health education and prevention.

The extensive use of patent medicines, the presence everywhere of quacks of every sort, and the rapid growth of various methods of non-medical healing are symptomatic of the great work that still needs to be

done in the education of the public on public health matters. How little the man on the street knows about the nature of disease and the methods of preventing it! How little impression modern science has made upon him is shown by the fact that thousands of charlatans and quacks live upon the people who prefer them to our regular physicians. Truly, the doctor has his job of public health education cut out for him in the face of the dense ignorance that exists and the belief in these occult practices. If they but had eyes to see it, the doctors have before them in these things a challenge to their best efforts to promote health education. As a whole they are a self-sacrificing and charitable group of men. Very few of them turn away the person who cannot pay; yet too many of them do not realize that public health education, instead of ruining their practice from the commercial point of view, would send thousands to them who now buy patent medicines or go to the quacks.

Much as needs to be done in the line of physical health, how much greater is the need with regard to mental health! Physical hygiene has a start; mental hygiene is in its infancy. Only a little while ago insanity was looked upon as a doom, not a disease. Fortunately, that attitude has changed among those who are familiar with the nature of the various forms of insanity.

How far our mental hygiene is behind physical hygiene is shown by the fact that very few people consult doctors for their mental difficulties as compared to those who consult physicians for their physical troubles. Among the populace generally insanity is still looked upon as something dreadful and inexplicable. Enough is known, however, at the present time to enable us to prevent part of the terrible inroads upon the mental health of the people that the various forms of insanity are now making. In some States we have mental hygiene associations, the purpose of which is to instruct people as to the nature of their mental maladies; but how few they are, and how few are the people whom they reach! Insanity still is generally looked upon as a disgrace that must be hidden. Only a few of our States have provided mental clinics to which people can come for consultation, and yet the number of insane people increases steadily. The number will continue to grow until we learn how to teach people the elements of mental hygiene, the signs of mental disturbance, and the fundamental nature of the disease.

Personal Hygiene. Important as are these various measures of community hygiene, they are insignificant in comparison with personal hygiene. You talk in vain to a man who has no ideals of personal hygiene, when you try to educate him to community hygiene, because your effort has no soil of experience in which to root itself. The difficulties of the public health educator, whether he be doctor, nurse, public health department head, or representative of a private health agency, are primarily due to the fact that the individuals to whom he appeals do not have ideals

of personal hygiene. Of what value is it to have pure drinking water supplied to the city if the consumer drinks it out of a glass used by a typhoid patient? What signifies it that inspection of the milk supply be ever so good if the mother feeds it to her baby from an unclean bottle? Of what value are quarantine regulations against contagious diseases if the mother whose child is quarantined believes that every child ought to have these diseases when he is young? And how surely are the results of hygienic laboratories negatived by the personal habits of vicious, gluttonous, and bibulous persons!

Our habits of eating from childhood to old age are of the very greatest importance in the preservation of good health. The death-rate of babies has been cut since we have learned better ways of infant feeding. For adults it is an old saying that "we dig our graves with our teeth." One of the lessons that every man and woman has to learn in growing older is the importance of controlling the appetite for food. Moreover, some individuals can digest certain kinds of food that others cannot. Consequently, one of the great movements of the present day for the preservation of health is careful attention to the hygiene of nutrition. Moreover, sound bodily health depends upon the *proper elimination of the wastes of the body.* Improper elimination of waste means the poisoning of the whole system. Many of us who are sick have poisoned ourselves as a result of our failure to recognize the importance of this matter.

It must be confessed, however, that part of our self-poisoning is direct rather than indirect. Numerous poisons we come to use habitually. Perhaps the greatest of these is *alcohol.* Could we do away with the abuse of alcoholic liquors the probabilities are that we should very greatly decrease the amount of sickness and ill health, both physical and mental. Taken in any considerable quantities alcohol seriously interferes with various physiological functions; it is probably a contributing factor in the production of some forms of insanity, as well as several other important diseases. It is a well-known fact that our larger insurance companies inquire particularly about the drinking habits of the applicants for policies.

Other narcotic drugs, such as morphine, heroin, veronal, and cocaine, since they are habit-forming drugs and lead to the demand for ever-larger doses, are inimical to good health. Often the habit of taking these drugs grows out of the abuse of drugs by the physician for the alleviation of pain rather than attacking directly the causes of the disease; sometimes it is started by patent medicines. These drugs therefore are rather carefully regulated by both the United States Government and the various units of the public health service, from Federal to local. However, the real solution of the drug habit is an alert appreciation by each individual of the importance of remaining free from the clutches of such a habit. Beware of the headache tablet and the patent medicine that has any of these habit-forming drugs in its composition!

A poison of less importance, which nevertheless may be injurious to health if taken into the system in too large quantities, is tobacco. Closely related to tobacco are certain other stimulants widely used, among them coffee, tea, and cocoa. Like tobacco, however, they are probably not particularly injurious for the normally healthy person unless used to excess.

Another measure of personal hygiene is *proper exercise.* Man in his development has been an active creature. Today large sections of our population are sedentary. The automobile has done more than anything else to bring about physical inactivity. We drive to our offices and then have to play golf in order to secure exercise. The recreation movement of the present time is a vital necessity to good health. Participation in sports should be encouraged as a public health measure. The activity connected with outdoor sports stimulates circulation of the blood and activity of the organs that eliminate waste from the system, and tends to promote good health. While we laugh at the golf enthusiast and the old men who join walking clubs, we have to admit that every device that gets men away from their chairs and into active games promotes sound health and lengthens life.

Social Hygiene. In every life there are two primary urges—the urge for food and the urge for a mate. Both may be abused and such abuse destroys good health. While the abuse of food and sex have many other social ramifications, our concern here is the relationship of sex to health. Men and women are naturally so constituted that the normal exercise of the sex function is as compatible with good health as is the normal use of food. While it is contended by some that many physical and mental ills are the result of the denial of the normal exercise of the sex function, most medical authorities believe that such denial is not of serious consequence if the individual can find equivalent expression of his love-life in challenging social projects. How often have we seen those who have not married find satisfactory expressions of their love-life in devotion to children, in the care of those who are helpless, and in active concern for the disadvantaged! People differ in self-control as in other matters, but social policy cannot be based upon the ability of the weak. It must be built upon a policy that will have regard for the health of the people. Whatever debates there may be with regard to sexual conduct from other points of view, there is no question that from the standpoint of health irregular sexual relations are of the very greatest menace. Upon such practices depends the spread of *venereal disease,* which causes tremendous losses every year. No method has been devised by which it can be insured that sexual relations outside of matrimony will not result in disease.

So serious is *syphilis* that many life-insurance companies will not issue a policy to a man until four or five years after he has been pronounced cured. This disease often leads to insanity, paralysis, apoplexy, softening of the brain, and locomotor ataxia. Moreover, it is serious in its effects

upon unborn children. The terrible ravages of syphilis are beyond computation. Blindness of the new-born is a disease often caused by *gonorrhea.* It has been estimated that 15 per cent of all the cases of blindness in the United States have been caused among innocent children by this disease. Also it accounts, we are told, for a large proportion of the major operations upon women. Ill health again is a consequence. How much misery it has caused in human history and how much it is causing at this present moment, no one can compute.

It is impossible to say how widespread such diseases are, because many cases are dormant at any given time, and because the treatment for both syphilis and gonorrhea is increasingly successful. The reporting of such diseases is required of physicians in every State in the union; but many physicians have been quite lax in this regard. Unfortunately, too, many victims of the disease have resorted to the use of nostrums and "self-cures" rather than seeking counsel of competent medical persons. It has been estimated, however, that probably 1 person in 10 is, or has been, a victim of venereal disease, while perhaps 3,500,000 are afflicted actively at any one time.

In recent years, considerable progress has been made in diagnosing and treating venereal disease. The Venereal Disease Control Act of 1938 provided for a Division of Venereal Disease (later the Venereal Disease Bureau) within the United States Public Health Service. Congress provided some $15,000,000 for the first three years' activity of the Division, and the State and local agencies matched the Federal appropriations approximately 2 to 1. By 1946, it was reported by the Public Health Service that the annual cost of venereal disease to all branches of the government was about $28,000,000. Nevertheless, the rate of infection still remains enormously high; it was estimated in 1946 that there are some 250,000 new cases of syphilis and 1,200,000 of gonorrhea each year—more than of any other communicable disease except measles and the "common cold." While science is making great gains in the treatment of venereal disease, especially by the use of penicillin, prevention still remains the best policy; the use of prophylaxis as a means of control of the diseases among the population as a whole is manifestly impossible.[27] However we view the matter, there is no question that sex hygiene is one of the most important aspects of personal hygiene.

Education in social hygiene has also grown greatly since the First World War. Forty per cent of the high.schools of the country have instituted some instruction to the pupils in sex hygiene. Whereas before 1918 only two States required notification of venereal diseases, now every State and the District of Columbia have this requirement. This again shows that public attention has been focussed on the problem. In spite of these signs of increased interest, however, there are serious problems still to be faced.

[27] *Social Work Year Book, 1941,* p. 427; *1947,* p. 501; *1949,* pp. 492, 493.

People easily get tired of hearing about any one subject and lose interest unless continued attention is given to enlisting interest in new ways. Nevertheless, the importance of this phase of personal hygiene is well expressed in the following words:

> If the relative importance of the several phases of modern public health is analyzed, it will be apparent to any impartial observer that social hygiene should take first place. It involves not only the prevention of that group of diseases transmitted by sexual contact, in which is syphilis, the greatest killing and disabling disease, and gonorrhea, probably the most prevalent of the serious diseases which afflict the race, but it is related directly to many other phases of life. Social hygiene is concerned with character formation; it influences mental health to a profound degree; it is a most significant factor in marital happiness; in short, social hygiene influences more directly our whole social system and guides more intimately the whole trend of our civilization than any other phase of public health.[28]

Health Insurance. An adequate program of health protection, both financial and medical, for the individual has developed very slowly in the United States. Every important country in the world, except China, India, and our own, has some sort of program of health insurance under governmental auspices. Pioneered by Germany in 1883, the governmental administration of health insurance spread over all Europe, with the exception of Spain and Italy, by 1933; and by 1941 there were 26 governmental systems of compulsory health insurance throughout the world. Russia and Great Britain have gone farthest in this regard, being the only countries in which such protection is *universal.*[29] We in the United States have persistently refused to take any concerted action in the matter, despite the undisputed need for it revealed by the findings in the five-year survey made by the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care.[30] The fact that we are the only advanced country in the world without such a system undoubtedly is due to our individualistic tradition. The medical profession regards the movement as an infringement on its professional status, while insurance companies fear the loss of business, and many employers regard it as being a burden too costly for them to assume and still maintain a favorable competitive position.

The essential features of compulsory health insurance plans are much like other phases of the social security program, which we have examined more fully in earlier chapters.[31] Moreover, the objectives of health insurance are quite like those of the other types of protection, being designed to help those who are least able to help themselves, to distribute the burden of misfortune more equitably, and to increase the security of the individual and thus stabilize society as a whole.

[28] "Social Hygiene and Public Health," *Journal of Social Hygiene* (January, 1927), p. 19.

[29] C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1941), p. 798; J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (1937), pp. 553, 561.

[30] See *Medical Care for the American People* (The Final Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, 1932).

[31] See especially Chapters 9 and 10.

In general, the health insurance programs provide for cash benefits, usually a percentage of the worker's wage, and for varying amounts of medical service, including professional, hospital services, drugs, and medical supplies which may be either unlimited or to the extent of stipulated values. The benefits normally extend for a maximum period of about six months in any one year, with longer or chronic cases being taken care of under other arrangements. In the case of women, maternity benefits usually are provided, with the same privileges being extended to wives of insured workers. Death benefits, to offset costs of last illnesses and funeral expenses, also are included, as a rule to a value of about six weeks' wages. In almost all systems, contributions are required from workers, employers, and the State in varying proportions, since it is felt that all three have an interest in maintaining good health and that all three have it in their power to assist directly in bringing about more healthful conditions of life. Workers' contributions, however, are kept at a minimum, on the ground that their earnings already are extremely limited as a general rule. All the systems, save those of Russia and Great Britain, are limited in that they apply only to low-paid, employed persons and their families and exclude one or more classes even of those workers. The agricultural laborer is most commonly excluded from these systems.

The United States, as has already been said, has been reluctant to institute such programs for its people. Instead, we have relied chiefly upon the governmental agencies to provide the minimum essentials of preventive and remedial medicine and upon private organizations to supplement that work by special research and health services. Nevertheless, there have been certain significant developments in the field of health insurance. Larger companies are commonly providing blanket protection for their employees and their families through group insurance policies. Many of them also have medical staffs and equipment within their organizations, which usually are available also to the immediate families of the employees. Physicians and hospitals also are frequently organizing clinical and hospital care on a group insurance basis within local communities. A number of insurance companies, too, are experimenting with health and accident policies offering various degrees of protection, and sold to individuals on the same basis as other types of insurance. Most of the States have included, in their workmen's compensation laws, benefits to workers incapacitated by industrial diseases, although in some cases the diseases are specified within narrow limits. Three States by 1948 had extended unemployment insurance laws to cover time lost by reason of illness. These latter provisions, however, are financed entirely by a direct tax on wages, since employer's contributions to the compensation funds cannot be used for this purpose under the systems as originally set up.[32] The Social Security Act, while it did not include any direct provision for

[32] *Social Work Year Book, 1949,* p. 290.

health insurance as such, made possible a considerable expansion of health service at all levels of government organization.

There have been regular attempts, since 1939, to secure favorable action by the Congress on bills to provide some form of national compulsory health insurance. All have encountered stiff opposition from organized medical and hospital groups, insurance companies and even drug distributors; and for ten years the bills were not even so much as reported out of committee to be put to the vote. However, there is a persistent demand on the part of organized farmers and workers, welfare and public health agencies and others, for some sort of Federal Government action regarding the problems of health security. It may very well be that as the benefits of the other phases of the social security program become more clearly demonstrated and established, the United States will take its place with other leading nations and adopt an integrated system of health protection, service, and insurance.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Indicate the economic and social losses entailed by poor health.
2. Name five social problems that are affected by sickness and death.
3. What changes have taken place in the present century in the relative importance of the various diseases that cause death?

4. What is the relation between reduced infant mortality and declining birth-rates? And the status of women?
5. What bearing does the lower infant mortality have upon population quality? Upon living standards? Explain.
6. How has the disappearance of the old-time country doctor affected the problem of health service in the rural community?
7. How has the development of the telephone, automobile, and good roads affected the health service among rural people?
8. Set down in your own way the different methods now used of (*a*) treating the sick; (*b*) preventing disease.
9. Are these measures adequate to the solution of the problem of disease and untimely death? Why, or why not?
10. Would you favor a system of State medical service, coupled with compulsory health insurance? Give reasons for your position.
11. If medical care were readily available to all, would many people be likely to "enjoy poor health" in the sense that malingering would increase?
12. Outline the chief elements in a program to solve the problem of disease and premature death.
13. What social problems would you expect to solve, partially at least, by such a program?

17. Problems of Poverty and Dependency

ALL SOCIAL PROBLEMS grow out of maladjustments. The rich and the poor have been with us ever since one man was able to control more desirable objects than another. They did not present serious social problems, however, until methods of trading developed to such a point that a market was established for the exchange of commodities and a scale of values was established in the minds of men. Today, with business organized on a world basis, and with certain standards of living established in the customs and traditions of men, poverty has become a stark and naked reality in contrast with riches; and dependency stands out in contrast with independence. Differences in the amount of goods possessed by different people may be of great significance even for those above the poverty line. For those below that line such differences may be tragic.

Poverty may be defined as *that condition of living in which a person, because of either inadequate income or unwise expenditure, does not maintain a standard of living high enough to provide for the physical and mental efficiency of himself and to enable him and his natural dependents to function usefully according to the standards of the society of which he is a member.* Any one living in that condition is below the poverty line of his particular group. It should be observed, however, that what one person regards as poverty might be thought to be quite a satisfactory plane of living by another. A given individual may be considered well-to-do by his associates, while people in the class next above him regard him as a "climber" and treat him with indifference. An office worker may be quite successful among people of his own class; but if he tries to fraternize with the executives of the company, he is more than likely to find the pace much too swift for him. On the other hand, if the executives were to maintain standards of living similar to those of the office workers, they would be regarded as peculiar by the other people of their own position; they would not be maintaining the standards of the society of which they are members. So we cannot refer to any hard-and-fast poverty line above or below which all of us must fall. There are as many lines of poverty as there are classes

within a given society. And what we have said about the tragedy of falling below the poverty line applies with force to any individual hovering about that line, whatever class he may be in.

Dependency in a broad, general sense may or may not be related to poverty or pauperism. The young child is dependent upon its parents, although they may be rich. On the other hand, the child in an orphanage or placed out in a strange family is dependent and may be a pauper. *The only dependency that creates a social problem is the dependency connected with support by some one other than one's natural or legal supporter.* The wife dependent upon her husband for support is a dependent, but constitutes no social problem. However, the wife left without means of support by her husband who deserts, becomes incapacitated, or dies, creates a problem for society. Thus, dependency may be defined as *that condition of life in which one depends upon some one other than his natural or legal supporter for his sustenance, either in whole or in part.*

AMOUNT OF POVERTY

Shortly after the First World War—in 1919—Royal Meeker, then United States Commissioner of Labor, estimated that American families on the average were not fully nourished until their yearly income reached $1,800, a figure still conservative for a family of four. He pointed out, however, that the average income of the gainfully employed in the United States fell well below $1,600; as a matter of fact, it was about $1,350.[1] Just after the Second World War—in 1946—according to the United States Department of Commerce reports, the average income per capita was $1,213; but the average earnings of full-time employees was only $2,357.[2]

Total and average income, however, mean little unless we also know something of how the income actually is distributed. Even at best, it is likely that if an equal distribution of income could be effected without serious impairment of the machinery of production on which all incomes depend, there would be only a small margin for the normal family above the amount needed to maintain a decent standard of living. One of our most explicit indexes as to the actual distribution of income is the report of the income tax returns, released annually by the Treasury Department. In 1947, approximately 54,800,000 individual income tax returns were filed. These returns showed that about two-fifths (43 per cent) of those reporting had incomes under $2,000, and received only 18 per cent of the national income. Almost a fifth (18 per cent) reported incomes of less than $1,000, and accounted for but 4 per cent of the total individual income. At the other extreme, 2 per cent reported incomes upward of $10,000; but

[1] Meeker, "What Is the American Standard of Living?" *Monthly Labor Review* (July, 1919), p. 5.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, p. 284; C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1948), p. 1,012.

more than a seventh (15 per cent) of the reported income fell to those in that bracket.[3]

TABLE 28: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR 1947 *
(54,799,936 individuals reported about $150,295,275,000)

Net Income Classes	*Simple Distribution by Income Class*		*Cumulative Distribution from Lowest Income Class*	
	Persons Filing Returns	Incomes Reported	Persons Filing Returns	Incomes Reported
Total	100%	100%	—	—
Under $1,000	18	4	18%	4%
1 under 2	25	14	43	18
2 under 3	26	23	69	41
3 under 5	24	32	93	73
5 under 10	5	12	98	85
$10,000 and over	2	15	100	100

* Adapted from *Statistics of Income for 1947* (Bureau of Internal Revenue), Part I, pp. 12–15.

However, there is little doubt that such figures fall far short of showing the true conditions regarding the distribution of income. No one is likely to overstate his income to the tax-gatherer intentionally, while millions of workers earned so little that their incomes fell below the minimum exemptions, and they did not file at all. On the other hand, it is true that a considerable number of these reports were joint returns, and millions of family units had more than one source of income. Moreover, there were still several millions of workers in—or just released from—the armed forces in 1946, so that the full measure of their normal civilian earning power had not yet been achieved. Nevertheless, figures compiled for the Twentieth Century Fund in 1947 indicate that about 45 per cent of the nation's 35,000,000 families had annual incomes of less than $2,000, while well over half of the nation's single consumers received less than $1,000.[4]

These are but indications of the actual situation. No one can say exactly what proportion of our people are living on or near the poverty line. From the standpoint, however, of our definition of poverty, certainly we shall be conservative if we say *a third of our people do not have the necessaries of life to enable them to maintain their physical and mental efficiency and to conform to the standards of decency set by the members of their group.* If we think of the standard as one that implies taking advantage of life's

[3] Bureau of Internal Revenue, *Statistics of Income for 1947*, pp. 12–15.
[4] J. Frederick Dewhurst, *et al.*, *America's Needs and Resources* (1947), p. 699.

opportunities for the children, doubtless the proportion of those in poverty would be greater. Lack of recreation, a poverty-stricken social life that gives no outlook beyond the bare necessities, absence of opportunities for those social contacts that enrich personality and inspire a sentiment of patriotic devotion to one's country—these dwarfing conditions prevail in all too large a proportion of our population. From the standpoint of social development and good citizenship these disadvantaged people are in poverty.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF POVERTY AND DEPENDENCY

Statistics of the extent and costs of dependency in the United States have been far more complete since 1933 than they were prior to that time. It is likely, moreover, that public assistance since then has been more adequate to the need than it was at any previous time, even apart from the enormous expansion of the need for such assistance due to the unprecedented and widespread depression of the 1930's. Rubinow has estimated on the basis of rather careful statistics that in 1928 our country was spending through the public relief agencies from $100,000,000 to $200,000,000 a year. In addition, through private agencies we were spending from $60,000,000 to $100,000,000 on outdoor relief, or a total of perhaps $200,000,000 for social work in general. He estimated that this amount was perhaps only one-fifth of 1 per cent of our national income.[5] For the winter of 1932–1933, he estimated that relief mounted to about $1,000,000,000 a year, with only about 10 per cent of this amount being supplied by private agencies.[6]

In 1934, the first full year of "New Deal" policies, not less than a quarter of our population was assisted to some extent, either by direct relief benefits, or by work programs, at a total cost of about two and a third billion dollars. With $3,236,600,000 being expended, the cost of public assistance reached its peak in 1938, although the number of persons assisted dropped to a monthly average of approximately 20 millions. More than half of this huge amount was expended in Works Progress Administration projects, while the Old Age Assistance program accounted for more than a tenth, or $392,384,000, of it, a sum more than ten times what it was in 1934; but the number of aged people so helped rose from 123,000 in January, 1934, to 1,776,000 by December, 1938. As might be expected, public assistance declined sharply during the Second World War, reaching its low point in 1944 and 1945 both in terms of persons receiving help and assistance granted. Significantly, however, the number receiving old-age assistance has risen steadily, even though the assistance given the aged

[5] I. M. Rubinow, "Can Private Philanthropy Do It?" *Social Service Review* (September, 1929).

[6] I. M. Rubinow, *The Quest for Security* (1934), p. 350.




FIG. 13

Annual Report, 1950 (Social Security Administration), p. 6.

dipped somewhat during the war. Subsequent to the war, all categories of assistance (except Federal work programs, which were stopped during the war) resumed their upward trend; and the situation in 1948 is summarized in Table 29.[7]

TABLE 29: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, 1948 *

Category	*Recipients*		*Assistance*	
	Number	%	Amount	%
All	4,670,000	100	$1,736,786,000	100
Old Age Assistance	2,498,000	54	1,132,604,000	65
Aid to Dependent Children	1,689,000	36	364,160,000	21
Aid to the Blind	86,000	2	41,382,000	2
General Assistance	397,000	8	198,640,000	12

* Adapted from *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, pp. 246–247.

What does it mean—no matter whether the cause is the individual's own incapacity or lack of frugality, or social circumstances and economic conditions—that an army of people every year has to depend upon some one other than themselves or their relatives for help? Consider what it means in terms of childhood deprived of opportunities, of sickness that has brought many of these people to need, of the destruction of ambition, of the loss of hope, of despair, of vice, of the sense of futility, and of the lack of self-esteem—the negation of all that is essential to good citizenship. Consider the slums, rural and urban, where these people live and the bad housing in which they abide, the lack of sanitation, the dirt, the squalor, and all that attends such conditions. Picture to yourself also the economic inefficiency that lies back of this dependency. Think of the changing jobs that have marked the history of these dependent families. Consider the hopelessness with which they looked forward to old age, the destruction of aspiration on the part of their children for something better than their parents had, and the denial of opportunity. Then, above this mass of dependents behold the army of the poverty-stricken, who are not so degraded in spirit and who have not lost ambition, but who have fallen just below the poverty line and are struggling against adverse circumstances to attain something of their dreams of prosperity.

Should we not begin to appreciate that the prevention of poverty and dependency is one of the first steps to economic independence and prosperity? If we looked at the matter simply from the standpoint of good business, would we not make an effort to check this enormous drain upon the resources of the financially able? We have great regard for the engineer

[7] "Public Assistance," reprinted from *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Social Security Board, February, 1942); *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, pp. 246–247.

in building bridges, constructing roads, and making machines; we do not seem to realize that there is such a thing as *social engineering*. The application of science to the prevention of human misery, the destruction of homes, and the impairment of human efficiency has only just begun to be appreciated by even well-educated people; it has not yet been thought of by most of our population.

CLASSES AND CARE OF THE DEPENDENT

Perhaps the outstanding classes of dependents are: (1) the dependent children, normal and illegitimate; (2) the mentally defective and diseased; (3) the aged. Let us look at each of these classes briefly in order that we may visualize more concretely the conditions under which these people become poverty-stricken or dependent, and what is being done to help them.

1. Dependent Children. All children by the very nature of their age are dependent upon someone. When their parents or other natural supporters are able to care for them normally, however, the financial aspect of dependency is not important. The only problem then is as to the quality of upbringing that the family is suited to give them. There are problems in such families, of course, but not problems of dependency.

Dependent children fall into several classes. Though a dependent child may have been born in wedlock, his parents may no longer be able to care for him unassisted; or he may have been born out of wedlock and be dependent. With our present social views as to the status of the illegitimate, the latter case is much more difficult to handle. In either case, the child may be classed as a dependent child, even though he is living with one or both of his parents; or he may be an orphan dependent child. In spite of these distinctions, however, the basic problems in regard to dependent children are two: (1) the problem of financial support to enable the child to have the opportunities necessary for his proper development, and (2) the problem of ensuring social surroundings that will provide for the proper mental, moral, and social development of the child so that he may become a useful citizen.

The problem of the financial support of the dependent child is not a negligible item. To bring the progeny of human beings from birth to adulthood costs far more than does the nurture of any other animal. A pig becomes a hog in about three months; a colt matures into a horse in about two years; but it takes twenty years to rear a baby to adulthood. The significance of this prolongation of infancy for the mental and moral development of human beings can hardly be overemphasized. A human being is so much the product of his social environment that it requires a great many years to fix in him the habits and ideas necessary if he is to function properly in human society. At the basis of that, however, is the fact that biologically he matures very much more slowly. These two things

go hand in hand. In the study made a number of years ago by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as to how much it costs to rear a child from infancy to eighteen years of age the conclusion was based upon a study of families with an average income of $2,500. It was found that the cost of rearing a child to that age was $7,250. This figure does not include the cost to the community in providing education and other public services, but the cost to the family alone. It is apparent at once that families with small incomes are much more likely to produce dependent children for the community to take care of than are large-income families. While the lack of money is not the only factor that produces child dependency, it is certain that without adequate family income it is impossible to give the children proper attention, provide education, give them a share in the elements of culture, and generate that self-respect and self-confidence which every child ought to have.

Much more difficult than the financial problem in the case of dependent children is the matter of providing such children with social surroundings that will conduce to their proper development. Even in the best of circumstances, parents themselves often do not know how to handle their children, with a result that in many cases children seemingly with every advantage are poorly adjusted to society and its ideals and standards. Personality of both parents and children is a very important factor in determining the social adjustment of the young, as is shown by the many fine characters that have emerged from childhood environments that appeared to be anything but promising.

When the child is taken, for whatever reason, from the surroundings into which he was born, still other problems arise. In the original family relationships to which he has partially adjusted himself, he has built up certain habits, emotional tone, and mental characteristics, all of which are strained when he is compelled to make adjustments in a new home outside his own family. The foster-parents must be of sympathetic temperament and judgment if the strain of reorganization is to be kept at a minimum for the child. This is especially true in dealing with the child burdened with physical defect or mental abnormality. In such cases, there is need for a proper balance between compassion for the handicapped child and firmness in training him to a maximum degree of self-reliance and healthy social attitudes. Unfortunately, few parents or foster-parents, regardless of their station in life, are capable of providing such care; and as a result, a considerable portion of adult poverty and dependency stems from personality warped in childhood by improper handling of the child's particular mental, emotional, or physical characteristics.

The Illegitimate Child. It is estimated that at least 75,000 children in this country are born of unmarried mothers every year, which means that about one birth in twenty-five in the United States is illegitimate. Not all illegitimate children are dependent children, of course; but the likelihood

of dependency is much greater in such cases; and an increasing number of States are making specific statutory provisions for the care of such children. In 1938–1939, the Social Security Board reported about 8,000 unmarried mothers receiving public assistance for the care of nearly 13,000 children, about one in twenty of all children receiving aid given under the Social Security Act.[8]

Public sentiment condemns most of these innocent children to a position of disgrace, even though the States now are more liberal in the matter of birth registry. Such liberality, however, necessarily releases the father from his just responsibility in many cases, since obviously it is the paternity that remains uncertain. And while, as we have seen, there is greater liberality in public assistance, it still is true that the mother usually is burdened with the support of the child. Even where paternity is established and the father is charged by the court with contributing to the child's support, statistics indicate that collections are discouragingly low.[9]

It is significant, too, that urban surveys have shown that from 40 to 45 per cent of unmarried mothers are also, without question, of such low-grade mentality that it is too much to hope that they can provide their babies with the proper social environment. With low-grade inheritance so common among them, with prenatal and postnatal conditions of care so generally unfavorable, and with economic and social opportunities so limited, it is clear that illegitimate children, as a class, still are destined to a life of hardship, even though important steps have been taken to improve their lot.

Methods of Caring for Dependent Children. Various methods for the care of dependent children have been developed. *The orphanage* is probably the oldest. Such institutions were to be found in the Roman Empire and in early Christianity. The church in the Middle Ages increased the number, and the orphanage continues as one of the favorite church charities down to the present time. While the orphanage may still have a place for certain types of problem children, opinion is now veering away from it. A second method of caring for dependent children is *the almshouse*. While at one time, even in America, large numbers of children were cared for in the almshouse, in 1923 only 1.1 per cent of the inmates of the almshouses of the United States were children. Although no comprehensive study of almshouses has been made since that time, the number of children now cared for in this way doubtless is negligible. A third method is by means of *State schools or homes* for dependent children. In 1938, about one-sixth of the 140,352 institutionalized children in the United States were in such schools. Experience has shown, however, that such institu-

[8] Agnes K. Hanna, "Changing Care of Children Born Out of Wedlock," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 212 (November, 1940), p. 159.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

tions tend to become filled up with children who are nonplaceable. A fourth method of caring for dependent children is *county and city children's homes.* Such homes are apt to be too small and poorly administered for a sustained program of rehabilitation. From the standpoint of dependent child care, they are failures, except insofar as they serve as temporary shelters for delinquent or abandoned children in the larger urban areas. A fifth method is *placing or boarding out.* This method has been in use for a long time; but because of the lack of supervision, the lack of investigation of the homes into which the children were placed, and the lack of close supervision afterwards, until recently it has not generally been a success. Today, however, the placing out of children is looked upon as the most important method of caring for mentally normal dependent children and is now used among about 40 per cent of the dependent children not cared for in their own homes. A sixth method has come into vogue in the present century, namely, the granting of *mother's aid* (now known as aid to dependent children) to the person having charge of the child. If the home in which the child is living and the mother or other person in charge is a fit person to have charge of the child, and if the administration is carefully guarded, this is a very hopeful method of taking care of dependent children. Such aid is now extended to parents of almost a million children, exceeding by a considerable margin the total number of children under foster-care.

Principles of Child Care. In caring for dependent children, whether born in wedlock or of unmarried parents, the following principles have been sifted from years of experience:

a. By reason of the frailty of infants it is important that they be kept with their mothers and breast-fed, if possible, until they are at least six months old. At the present time, after all of the work of the past few years in infant welfare, about 1 in every 25 children born dies before the end of the first year of life. The primary principle, therefore, is to take such measures as will insure the survival of the child.

b. Dependent children should have financial support and adequate care, whether placed in free homes, boarded out, or supported by aid to dependent children. That fundamental principle must be kept in mind. Unless support is adequate to provide for food, clothing, shelter, educational opportunities, some degree of culture, kindness, sympathy, and education —the social purpose of child care will not be served.

c. Unless the child is mentally defective or disabled in some way and therefore constitutes a problem child in a special sense, he should be found a normal family home. Normal children cannot be reared successfully *en masse* in an institution; individual attention and care in the home atmosphere is essential. Moreover, this home must have the elements for successful development of the character if it is to succeed in producing a

useful citizen. The careful investigation that is now made by child-placing agencies and the equally careful follow-up supervision are intended to make sure that the fundamental requirements of good care and treatment are met.

2. The Mentally Defective and the Mentally Diseased. The mentally defective are likely to become dependent because they do not have the mentality to compete with their normal fellows in the struggle for existence. They find their way into almshouses, or are cared for by public outdoor relief or by private agencies, or are sent to State institutions. The insane and epileptic likewise in many cases are incapable of caring for themselves.

In 1929 it was estimated that 8 per 1,000 of the whole population of England and Wales were mentally defective, a figure which probably approximates the situation in our own country as well. In addition it has been estimated that at least 10 per cent of the population of our country are so deficient in intelligence that in the complex conditions of city life today they find difficulty in supporting themselves and conducting their lives in accordance with our social standards. In Great Britain in 1933 *the insane* numbered 3.7 per 1,000 of the population. In that same year 8 per cent of the total pauperism in the United Kingdom was caused by the dependency of the insane and idiot poor. On January 1, 1948, in the institutions for the mentally diseased of the United States were 540,987 persons, or 3.7 per 1,000 of the population. In the United States *epilepsy* is to be found in at least 3 per 1,000 of the general population.

These mentally defective and mentally diseased persons in our population constitute a serious problem that as yet has not been adequately dealt with. Furthermore, in view of the fact that a great many of these people are such by reason of heredity, we have a eugenic problem in connection with them that is of the greatest importance. They reproduce without prudence, and in spite of a high infant death-rate, they bring to maturity more children per family than do other people. They cast upon society an increasing burden for their care. The mental defective and the epileptic are more likely to become parents of illegitimate children, and are vicious in other ways more commonly than normal people; and they must be cared for in some way or else they will perish.

At the present time not more than 1 out of 10 of the mentally deficient is segregated, and probably not more than that proportion of the epileptics. In some of our States we are taking proper care of the insane, except that often they are discharged and are allowed to reproduce children even though they have a history of hereditary insanity. They constitute a great class of economic incapables and socially create problems that are very difficult to handle.

The mentally deficient can be handled from the eugenic point of view

only by some method that will prevent their reproduction. They can be segregated into *institutions and colonies*, where the higher grades can make a living, and some of them can be trained for certain vocations in which they can make their way on parole. Greater numbers could be let out into society after being properly trained if they were sterilized. A great deal of prejudice, however, exists against *sterilization*, and it is not making the headway it warrants. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that sterilization laws relating to the mentally deficient are constitutional.

In the United States we have attempted to take care of the insane in hospitals for those who may be curable, and in asylums for the chronic cases. No widespread effort has been made to sterilize the insane who have a history of hereditary insanity. This should be done, or they should be kept in institutions where they cannot reproduce. On the other hand, of course, not all insanity is inherited. Indeed, we now know that much of it is not congenital and can, in fact, be prevented. For many years we have given a great deal of attention to *physical* hygiene; we now know enough to proceed to a program of *mental* hygiene, which, if it is carried out in wide areas and under proper auspices, will forestall the necessity of sending many people to institutions for the insane.

The epileptics are particularly to be pitied. Many of them, except for a short time after seizure, are quite capable of work and apparently are normal persons. Yet these people find it difficult to hold a job. They suffer loss of self-respect and usually steadily deteriorate in mind. Only a small proportion of them are curable, but they can be made happy and useful. They can best be cared for in colonies in which they can work and in which they can be properly treated for their disease. However, as late as 1935 only ten States had provided special care for the epileptics in colonies, although several other States cared for them separately in institutions for the feeble-minded or the insane. Colony care has also been provided in some States for the insane and the mentally deficient. Such colonies of people working out in the open have proved to be very practicable agencies for handling these mentally defective and diseased people, who constitute a problem that challenges our very best thought.

3. The Aged. Less pitiable only than the dependent child is the old person who is nearing the end of his years and has no provision for his care. He may have been, it is true, a worthless member of society; but more often he will be found to have been a useful citizen who was unable to save for old age, who has been deprived of his friends and relatives, or who in his later years has lost his savings, through misfortune of one sort or another. The problem of old-age dependency has been made increasingly more difficult and extensive in recent years both by the growth in the number of aged people in our population and by the development of new

conditions in our society that make it harder for people to provide adequately for their old age. We still are inclined to believe that the individual should plan for his own future; yet the exigencies of the years since 1929 have made us recognize that the problems of old age, as we have them today, are to a large extent a product of our modern life itself.

It has been remarked frequently that our population is growing older. This does not mean that the period of old age is being extended to more advanced years. It means, rather, that more people are living out a larger portion of the traditionally allotted three score years and ten. In addition for at least twenty-five years prior to 1940, we experienced a steady decline in the birth-rates, so that the numbers of young people constitute a smaller portion of the whole population than formerly. Thus the balance between youth and age is steadily shifting. Persons over 65 years of age made up only 2.6 per cent of the population in 1850; today they exceed 7 per cent of the total. On the other hand, the portion of the population that is under 20 years of age has declined in the same period from a little more than a half to about one-third at the present time.[10] From this situation, it is clear that an increasingly smaller proportion of younger people is confronted with the task of caring for an increasingly larger proportion of their elders. Furthermore, the years of regular employment are shrinking. Industrial requirements today are such that at an earlier age than formerly a man is considered too old to work; while, on the other hand, more of the younger years are spent in preparation for work. In addition, the fact that our population is increasingly urban complicates the problem of old-age dependency. Urban people at any age are much less independent than are rural dwellers. They depend upon one another more directly for the things they need; and there is less opportunity for the aged either to make themselves useful, or even to keep themselves occupied. They find themselves cast aside long before their physical or mental powers have deteriorated beyond the desire for useful activity; and the resulting mental frustrations create a situation hard for both the old people themselves and those with whom they must live.

How Are Old People Cared for in the United States? *a. Savings.* Why should not everyone save for old age? This has been looked upon as the land of opportunity where everyone who wishes can get a job, where good wages are the rule, and where everybody prospers who is not worthless. That is the popular notion. Doubtless some have no savings because they have not saved when they could. Every study, however, that has been made of the aged has shown large numbers who have been unable to save because of small earnings, irregular employment, misfortune, or because of the necessities of caring for other relatives during their best earning days. Thus, savings accounts in 1930 averaged only about $500 despite the three-

[10] See Louis Dublin, "Longevity in Retrospect and in Prospect," *Problems of Aging*, E. V. Cowdry, Ed. (1939); *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 10.

fold rise in the number of accounts from 16 to 53 millions in the fifteen years prior to that time.[11] Twelve years later, in 1942, the number of savings accounts had dropped to about 45 millions, with an average deposit of about $560.[12]

b. The almshouse. The almshouse (or poorhouse) is the last resort of the dependent in the United States. At the present time more than one-half of the almshouse inmates in this country are homeless and helpless old folks. Many—if not most—of them, of course, are not of high social standing. The stigma these give the almshouse renders it in many places abhorrent to respectable old people. However, in some of our States the movement has developed to make them boarding-homes for old folks who are infirm and without relatives or friends, and to improve the physical equipment and the character of the service rendered by the almshouse.

c. Homes for the aged. Church organizations, lodges, private philanthropies, and private individuals have established something more than 1,200 homes for the aged, capable of caring for about 100,000 old people.[13] Many of these homes are of a very fine character. The chief difficulty, however, is that often they have an entrance fee which many people cannot pay, and furthermore they are quite inadequate in number and therefore touch only a fringe of the problem of the aged poor.

d. Outdoor relief. Many old people are provided for by outdoor relief (assistance given them in their own homes), by private or public agencies. If this is carefully administered and adequate, it provides for a class of old people who may have their own homes but have not enough income to care for themselves, and it enables them to continue to live as they have been accustomed to do until the infirmities of old age demand the care of other people.

e. Care by relatives. Care by relatives is the oldest method and by far the best, when it is possible, for the care of the aged dependents. Perhaps a quarter or third of them are cared for in this way, living with their sons, daughters, or other relatives.[14] Sometimes they are able to pay their way, but more often they are serious financial burdens. This situation has been modified considerably by the old-age benefit features of the Social Security Act; yet the problem will continue to some extent so long as there are aged individuals not eligible for such benefits. Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that there are many cases where even partial support or *care* by relatives is impossible. The children may have married and have a family that they consider their first responsibility, or the relations between the old people and the children are not agreeable. Living quarters in urban areas are apt to be small and cramped by the presence of the old parent

[11] Charles Denby, Jr., "Do We Need State Old Age Pensions? Yes," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 170 (November, 1933), p. 97.

[12] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948*, p. 424.

[13] *Social Work Year Book, 1941*, R. H. Kurtz, Ed., p. 239.

[14] I. M. Rubinow, *The Quest for Security* (1934), p. 243.

or other relative; and in most cases, there is little that the older persons, especially the old men, can do to be helpful in the urban home, so that the aged person becomes *psychologically* hard to live with.

f. Insurance. Insurance against the exigencies of old age through endowment and annuity policies is an excellent plan. The method, however, is open to the same limitations as is the program of saving for old age, since it is basically the same approach. Every study of the matter has shown large numbers of people are unable to buy insurance without depriving themselves and their families of the necessities of life. Moreover, three-quarters of the policies are of the industrial type, with a face value averaging only a little over $200; and more than nine-tenths of them lapse or are surrendered before maturity.[15]

g. Industrial pensions. Rubinow in 1934 estimated that not more than 100,000 aged persons of a total of some 6,500,000 were provided for by the establishment of industrial or service pensions.[16] In recent years considerable impetus has been given to the demand for industrial pensions by unions asking for—and in notable cases like the miners and steel workers, securing—pension provisions as one of the terms of employment contracts. However, the likelihood that such pensions can be paid to large numbers of workers is not great. Whatever the contractual agreement may be, to be assured and adequate the pension must rest on long previous service by the retired worker, and on sustained economic liquidity that will make it possible for the company to continue paying. Our industrial history gives little reason for believing that either condition is common.[17]

h. Public service pensions. The best-known form of public service pension in the United States is the armed services veterans' pensions. In 1941, just prior to the Second World War, more than 850,000 such pensioners drew over $433,000,000.[18] Military pensions are noncontributory, being paid entirely from public funds. Doubtless these pensions have kept many old people out of the poorhouse; but as administered they have been a very costly and often wasteful expenditure of public funds.

Since 1920, the civil service employees in the United States Government service have had a contributory (*i.e.,* paid for in part by the employee directly) retirement system which in 1947 was paying about $103,320,000 to some 111,000 annuitants. Similarly, about 117,000 retired State and local government employees in 1941 received approximately $108,110,000 as retirement system beneficiaries.[19] Even taken together, however, the number of the aged covered by these pension systems is comparatively limited.

i. Old-age pensions. With the number of the needy aged increasing and

[15] Charles Denby, Jr., *loc. cit.,* p. 97.

[16] *Op. cit.,* p. 243.

[17] Peter F. Drucker, "The Mirage of Pensions," *Harper's Magazine,* No. 1197 (February, 1950), pp. 31–38.

[18] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948,* p. 231.

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 271, 274.

with the example of old-age pensions in some of the foreign countries, a movement for the enactment of old-age pension laws in the United States resulted in the creation of the Social Security Board (now the Social Security Administration) by Act of Congress in 1935. A considerable portion of its duties pertains to old-age assistance and annuities, and all of the States are operating under this system. Unquestionably it has helped to reduce the bitter experience of want among the aged, and it will do so increasingly as time goes on. As now set up and administered, however, the Act still excludes large portions of our needy aged, since eligibility for assistance is at comparatively high levels, and large classes of the population are not privileged to participate in the annuity system. It is unfortunate that these limitations tend to exclude the very classes that need security and assistance the most. It must be remembered, of course, that a system of such proportions involves many problems, and considerable experience is necessary before it can be perfected. It is reasonable to suppose that, as time goes on, the service of the pension and annuity systems in meeting the problem of the aged dependents will increase in efficiency.

CHIEF FACTORS IN POVERTY AND DEPENDENCY

No one case can show all the factors in poverty and dependency, yet a case reveals the concrete realities of the situation better than statistics. Consider the various factors in the following case history:

John Thomas had come to an eastern city of the United States from Wales when he was a lad of eighteen. He had been brought up in a mining community in Wales, and mining was the only occupation he knew. After landing he went to a mining community in Pennsylvania where he got work in a coal mine. He was sturdy, industrious, and a likeable chap, although he was not especially ambitious and had not many of the social graces. He had had only a common school education but was fairly bright and quick to learn.

At the age of 21 he married a girl of 18, whose family lived in this mining community. Her parents were a rather roving, somewhat ne'er-do-well family. The father was a hard drinker and a common laborer, frequently in debt, sometimes in trouble, and consequently the family lived on the verge of poverty all the time. Her mother was a slovenly woman with a large family. She was not very bright. The home was located in a rather poor part of the community and was poorly kept. A younger sister of Thomas' wife was so mentally defective that she had been sent to one of the state institutions for the feebleminded. Another was an epileptic in the state institution for that class of defectives. A brother who could not get on well in school had become a hard drinker, was sexually loose and became a vagrant. Another brother became a common laborer and lived a hand-to-mouth existence. One sister, who was bright, became a school teacher; and in time she was the chief support of her parents. Two sisters and three brothers had died before attaining maturity—one in convulsions, the others from scarlet fever and diphtheria. One sister, who was rather slow-witted, at an early age had become the mother of an illegitimate child.

John's family, from all that could be learned of his history from his wife, had been a respectable miner's family in Wales. However, in the family there had

appeared a history of three persons disposed to tuberculosis. Two sisters and a brother had died of that disease before John came to the United States. His parents also had died shortly before he left for this country, his father having been killed in a mine accident and his mother dying of an attack of pneumonia. John was well but not robust.

When this family came to the attention of a social agency in a mid-western city, there were five children. The oldest was a girl of eighteen, the mother of an illegitimate child. The next, a boy of sixteen, not very strong and of low-grade intellect, had never been able to get beyond the fourth grade in school. The next was a girl of fifteen who was up to grade in school but not very well and with a tendency to resist parental control. The two younger children were two boys of ten and seven respectively who were weakly, and the older one was behind grade in school.

A strike occurred in the mines where John was working, and he was out of work for a considerable time. For some time he had been somewhat discouraged with mining, his health was not of the best, and he desired to get into some occupation in the sunlight. Therefore he moved his family to a farm some distance away which he rented on shares. With what little money he had been able to save he purchased the necessary animals and implements to enable him to run the place. During the five years on this farm he did quite well and had saved in the vicinity of $2,000. He decided to go west and try farming in a better country. Accordingly he and his family moved to South Dakota, rented a farm for a few years, prospered, and finally bought a quarter section of land, paid down $2,500 and promised to pay the balance, $1,000 per year, plus interest and taxes. He was doing fairly well when in the first year the hog cholera swept off most of his fine herd and left him behind in his payments. The next year proved to be equally as disastrous by reason of a severe drought which left him nothing for his work.

The next year there was a scourge of army-worms which destroyed part of his wheat; and the Hessian fly and the rust hurt badly what was left, so that he had but a small fraction of a crop, and that was of poor quality. That fall when his corn was in blossom a severe hailstorm battered it to the ground, and since he had no insurance, left him so far in arrears that the skin-flint creditor foreclosed on the farm. Discouraged, he sold his stock and farm implements, and after he had paid his debts he had $400 left. With this sum he decided to go to a large city of the Middle West and get employment in a factory. The war was at its height, and at once he got a job at fair wages although he had never worked at anything but mining and farming. This work was common labor in the factory but paid a fair remuneration. The family had moved into a rather poor house in a crowded section of the city so that John could be near his work.

Here again ill luck was his lot. One day his shirt sleeve caught in an unguarded machine, and his arm was so badly injured that he was idle for about five months. His compensation cared for the family during this time, and he returned to his old position without serious disability. In the factory, however, his health began to fail. He contracted a cold which left him with a severe cough which racked him night and day. Moreover, about this time his wife's health became poor and the doctor finally advised an operation. This required much expense, and the household ran down. While the wife had never been an excellent housekeeper, knowing little of how to save or how to prepare food tastefully and economically, they had been able to get along because until the disaster came on the farm John had earned fair wages. Thomas kept to his occupation until a slump occurred and he was let out. Weak and discouraged he sought work without success.

While the mother was in the hospital the oldest girl, in charge of the household, began to go out with an attractive but wild boy of the neighborhood. Her

father warned her of this boy without other effect than to irritate her. The household was neglected, the younger children left without guidance and control except when the father was home. The fifteen-year-old girl did her best to keep the household going, but was not strong, was busy in school most of the time, and could not manage to meet all of the requirements of the task. The oldest girl was sullen and irritated at the other children. She helped little and was gone most of the time from the household on one excuse or another. For a short time she obtained a job in a ten cent store but was out late at night and would tell her father and the children nothing of her whereabouts. After the mother returned home this daughter was found to be pregnant and some months later gave birth to an illegitimate child. When her condition was discovered, the father had gone to the boy with whom she had kept company and tried to persuade him to marry her. Under duress he promised but at once left for parts unknown. The mother was so ill after she returned that she was unable to look after the home. The younger girl, under the strain of the burden that she had been trying to carry, became ill and ultimately had to be sent to a sanitarium for the tubercular. The eldest boy became unmanageable, was taken into juvenile court, and placed on probation. The ten-year-old boy was getting into mischief in the neighborhood; the younger child was so woefully neglected as to attract the attention of the neighbors.

Finally, unable to find work in the community, and discouraged by the difficulties which he faced, and sick, John Thomas set out one afternoon to go to another town in which he thought he might be able to find work. He never came back, and all efforts to find him proved unavailing. A social agency through the neighbors became interested in the youngest child, and another agency made arrangements for the tubercular girl to go to the sanitarium. Finally, in the dire circumstance consequent upon the desertion of John Thomas, the Family Welfare Society took hold of the family.[20]

Let us analyze this case and see the factors that brought this family to need.

Hereditary Factors. Observe that in the family of John Thomas there is a history of tuberculosis. While one cannot say definitely that the predisposition to tuberculosis was hereditary in this family, it is well known that some people resist tuberculosis and others are predisposed to it. The difference seems to be due in part, at least, to inherited characteristics. Even clearer is the inheritance of mental defect on the wife's side. This seems to be hereditary because it appears in the children of the John Thomas family as well as in the family of Mrs. Thomas. From various studies that have been made, especially of dependents, it appears that 25 per cent of the paupers in almshouses, 10 per cent of the public outdoor clients, and perhaps 5 per cent of the dependents served by private organizations are mentally defective. Of all the mentally deficient, it has been estimated that from one-half to two-thirds are such by reason of heredity. In the remainder the condition is due to accidents at birth, prenatal conditions, and the results following sickness or accidents in childhood. The hereditary factors in poverty and dependency can be attacked successfully only by preventing reproduction. For deficients already born, efforts should

[20] J. L. Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency* (D. Appleton–Century Company, 1937), pp. 117–119.

be made to adjust the environment to them so that they can make the most of their meager abilities and contribute to their own support as much as possible.

Industrial Conditions. It will be remembered that a strike in the coal mines was the first step in the demoralization of the John Thomas family. While it is estimated that the average annual losses from this cause are probably only a twentieth of the total losses from unemployment and industrial accidents and disease combined, it remains true nevertheless that the striker loses the daily wage which he would otherwise have. The resulting curtailment of family income and the irregularity of habit which arise while strikes are in progress, naturally tend to disrupt the life of the family and to upset the well-being of each of its individual members.

Adverse Climatic Conditions and Pests. Had it not been for the adverse physical conditions experienced by John Thomas in his farming operations, the whole history of the family might have been quite different. The children reared in the country might have turned out otherwise than they did as a result of their return to the city. He seemed to be doing well when the hog cholera swept off most of his herd and the severe drought left him nothing for his work. Then the scourge of army-worms, the Hessian fly, and the rust destroyed most of his crops. Finally a hail-storm destroyed his corn and left him badly in debt. No one knows the extent of damage caused by climate and natural disasters and the pests that afflict the farmer, but there is no question that it is very large.

Sickness. In this case also we see the physical factor of sickness. Possibly if Mrs. Thomas had remained well and John himself had continued to be healthy, disaster would not have come to the family in the city.

Three-fourths of the cases which come to the charity organization societies come by reason of sickness. When we further consider that in the United States the average member of the population loses thirteen days a year from sickness and that the cost of preventable sickness and death amounts to billions of dollars a year, one can easily see the influence of sickness in producing poverty and dependency.

Unemployment. In the Thomas case, as in so many other cases, unemployment was the final demoralizing step in the family situation. Discouraged by all the sad circumstances that had preceded, and unable to get a job, John Thomas left his family, ostensibly to seek work, and never returned. There are many cases, however, where the man does not desert, but is unable to make a living because he cannot find employment. Next to sickness probably unemployment is the most fertile cause of dependency. Careful studies have shown that unemployment ranges from 2 per cent in the most prosperous times among the skilled workers to as high as 25 per cent in times of industrial depression and among the unskilled laborers.

Until society finds some way by which it can eliminate unemployment, poverty and dependency are inevitable for large numbers of people, es-

pecially those least fitted for the intensive struggle for existence. The unemployment benefit provisions of the Social Security Act are helping to *minimize* unemployment by creating incentives for employers to reduce their labor turnover, similar to the incentives provided in the workman's compensation laws to reduce industrial disabilities. Yet the operation of the Act has resulted chiefly in *regularizing* employment, and to increase to some extent unemployment among the marginal workers—those formerly hired part-time or intermittently—who are the very group upon whom the burden of unemployment rests most heavily.

The Employment of Mothers and Children. The Thomas case provides illustrative material for the effect of the labor of children outside the home. The oldest girl began to work under the pressure of family need. However, freedom from home restraint and subjection to influence outside the home conduced to the loosening of family control and finally led to demoralization.

The employment of mothers and children outside the home demoralizes the family. The children's physical, mental, and moral welfare is neglected when the mother works outside; often the mothers impair their health, and child labor is usually a sign of inadequate income in the family.

Inadequate Education. This case shows also the unhappy results that come from inadequate education. Thomas had no broad foundation educationally and was not trained for any particular skilled trade. He illustrates the abbreviated educational life of American children, especially those of the lower economic classes, the lack of a vocational aim in much of our elementary education, and the consequent blind-alley jobs for himself and his children.

Industrial Accidents. Getting his sleeve caught in an unguarded machine in the factory in which he worked was one more circumstance that diminished the income and discouraged the worker. It is estimated that there are about 15,000 deaths from industrial accidents in the United States every year. A million and a quarter more workers are annually incapacitated, about 100,000 of them permanently, with a financial loss to the nation from such accidents of probably close to $500,000,000 a year.[21]

There are various other causes of poverty and dependency, but these are sufficient to give an insight into the tangled complex of conditions that brings about demoralization of individuals and families in their struggle to make a living. Often these conditions are as inevitable as fate; but sometimes they are the result of the individual's lack of forethought and prudence.

THE SOCIAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY

In the complex conditions of modern society, especially in our cities, it requires careful consideration and adjustment for the individual to find

[21] *Social Work Year Book, 1941,* R. H. Kurtz, Ed., p. 610.

his way from early manhood or womanhood to successful independence. Unless one comes into the world equipped with intelligence and with certain characteristics that produce sound judgment, and unless he is trained to know the complex conditions of the world in which he makes his struggle for life, he is bound to fail. Natural ability must be trained. Out of experience must come lessons for the future. The experience of older and wiser men and women should be heeded by the youth as he starts out on his career.

Our traditional American policy has been to let each man struggle for himself, on the theory that thus the most capable would achieve their ends and the less capable would fail. However, it has been discovered that in this struggle for existence, unmodified by mutual aid and sympathetic help, many who have fine abilities also fall by the wayside. Success or failure in life depends upon the combination of two sets of factors: the natural abilities that have been transmitted to us by our parents, and the way in which these abilities are developed by our education, family experience, and life contacts with others. Our philosophy of "every fellow for himself and the Devil take the hindmost" is not suited to the complex conditions of modern life. Man ought to be able to select better than blind nature. Every effort ought to be made by society to give ability a chance. This does not mean, of course, that we should allow the congenitally defective and incapable to propagate and thus continue their stock. That is quite another matter from giving the capable every chance to make the most of their ability for the welfare of society. Many of our present arrangements, however, do not accomplish that purpose. We allow the degenerates and defectives to multiply with little let or hindrance; we still permit the naturally capable boy or girl too often to struggle without aid, to go into "blind-alley" jobs without advice, to live and work under conditions that invite disease and untimely death. In short, we still quite commonly permit people to be overwhelmed by natural disasters and economic circumstances who, if they were given a chance, might well develop and achieve.

A policy of social engineering is necessary to discover and discriminate between the capable and the incapable, to provide for the incapable protection and direction of their poor capacities (but not permitting them to reproduce), and to give the capable a decent chance to achieve what is in them. While we are attempting it rather blunderingly, we nevertheless are endeavoring to do some of these things through preventive medicine, the care of the sick, mental hygiene, old-age pensions, free public education, various plans to prevent and alleviate unemployment, and taxation systems devised to lay the heaviest burdens of taxation upon those most capable of paying. Much, however, yet remains to be done in the adjustment of *social* to *individual* circumstance in order to enable each person to make the most of his capacities.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Define *poverty* and explain the significant words and phrases in your definition. Do the same for *dependency.*
2. What proportion of the people in the United States at the present time are in poverty? What proportion are dependent?
3. How do you account for the toleration of such widespread poverty and dependency in the United States, which has the greatest per capita wealth of any country in the history of the world?
4. Why is it important that children be protected from subjection to stark poverty? How do you account for the fact that some children who grow up in poverty sometimes make very good citizens?
5. What sort of dependent children should be kept in institutions rather than placed in a good family? Why?
6. How could society prevent the tragedy of want and suffering that results from old age?
7. What factors in producing poverty and dependency seem to you the most important? Why?
8. What is the relation between poverty and dependency, and the success of a program of socialized education?

18. Problems of Crime and Penology

IN PRINCIPLE, THE distinction between what we now call the *criminal* and the *delinquent* is as old as the common law, the difference being determined on the basis of the age of the offender. Under English common law, a child below the age of seven was not considered capable of committing a crime. Later the age limit of the juvenile was raised to twelve, then to sixteen. Today it is generally set at eighteen years. The reason for this distinction was that it was believed that the knowledge of the difference between right and wrong was necessary to commit a crime, and a juvenile was not considered as having reached the age of discretion. Upon this distinction between right and wrong rested the theory of responsibility. Hence, in legal parlance, the *criminal* is, in most of our States, an adult offender above the age of eighteen, while the young offender below that age is a *delinquent*. A criminal, according to our legal notions, may be punished; a delinquent is taken into custody by the court for protection—both for himself and for society.

History shows that often the child actually was treated as an adult criminal, despite the provisions of the common law which limited the responsibility of children. In England, down to a very recent date, children were confined in prison with adults; and occasionally in some parts of our country children are still found in the county jails. However, a little over a century ago some people in the United States began to make the distinction between the criminal and the delinquent. In 1815 in New York City Thomas Eddy, a New York Quaker, and some of his friends began to discuss the importance of erecting a juvenile reformatory so that the children could be taken out of the common prisons. Only recently, after more than a century, could it be recorded that *all* the States now provide juvenile reformatories for their delinquents.

Nevertheless, the criterion of age is not wholly valid as the basis for distinguishing between the criminal and the delinquent. What about the feeble-minded person forty years old but with the intelligence of a seven-

year-old child? Is he a criminal or a delinquent? What shall we say about the adult insane person guilty of a serious offense? Obviously, the legal distinction between the criminal and the delinquent is sociologically inadequate, if indeed not unsound. From the sociologist's point of view, *either a criminal or a juvenile delinquent is one who is guilty of acts believed, by a group that has the power to enforce its belief, to be injurious to society and therefore prohibited.*

Sociologically, the only valid grounds for society's taking from the individual his liberty and subjecting him to a course of treatment are: (1) the *protection of society;* and (2) *reformation,* or training the individual so that he may be a useful member of society rather than a menace. As a by-product of the measures necessary to secure these two purposes, such treatment of the delinquent and the criminal may result in *deterring* others from the same or similar socially proscribed acts. From the standpoint of the social purposes of punishment it makes no difference whether these acts are committed by a juvenile or by an adult.

It is fortunate, however, in view of the traditional attitude regarding the punishment of criminals, that the distinction between the criminal and the delinquent exists. It has made possible even within our ancient legal patterns the introduction of sociological methods of treating the delinquent that suggest changes in the treatment of the adult criminal. Here, again, *a little child has led us.* Perhaps some day observation of the results of the treatment of juveniles will lead us to adopt sensible treatment of adults.

EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

How criminal are we? How can we find out? What does it cost to take care of our criminals and delinquents? Unfortunately, we cannot answer with exactitude any of these questions. In the United States we have official figures regarding commitments to institutions for criminals and delinquents in a given census year, and the *Uniform Crime Reports* record the crime reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the police in our larger cities, which include about half our population. These figures, of course, do not tell us the extent of crime. Many suspects who are charged with crimes are not convicted. Still others are charged with crimes and convicted, but are put on probation or given suspended sentence. In addition, many who commit acts contrary to law are dismissed because of insufficient evidence or for other legal reasons. Large numbers of perpetrators of criminal acts, of course, are not even apprehended. Consequently the figures do not give us an adequate measure of the number of criminal acts committed in any year, or of the number of individuals involved.

It is a startling fact that not less than 1 in every 300 of the total population is committed every year to some correctional or penal institution. In 1946, over 64,000 prisoners were received from the courts by State and

Federal prisons and adult reformatories, which had a total inmate population on January 1, 1946 of more than 140,000. It has been estimated that in our 3,700 local and county jails, upwards of 600,000 persons are confined under sentence each year.[1] Among the latter, of course, are a high percentage of minor offenders; yet the number of serious offenses committed in 1950 was estimated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at 1,790,030. Sellin, in 1933, estimated minor offenses, exclusive of liquor and motor vehicle violations, were in excess of 15,000,000.[2]

The Cost of Crime in the United States. Various estimates have been made of the cost of crime in the United States. None of these pretends to any great degree of accuracy. The Wickersham Commission in 1931 estimated at above $1,119,000,000 the annual *direct* costs of dealing with crime,[3] while annual *total* costs were estimated in 1937 by J. Edgar Hoover, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at between $13,000,000,000 and $16,000,000,000. This latter staggering figure can be easily justified if we take into account such items as the wages of watchmen, the costs of locks and other protective equipment, the losses through fraud, property damage or theft, and the impaired earning capacity of the criminal and sometimes of his victim as well. Whatever be the cost of our struggle with crime, it is unquestionably a heavy burden upon the taxpayer and diverts money from other uses, such as health and education.

The Proportion of Each Class of Crime. Among the nearly 1,800,000 serious crimes estimated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to have been committed in the United States in 1950, murder and manslaughter accounted for about 7,000; rape, 16,500; robbery, 53,000; assault, 81,000; burglary, 412,000; larceny, 1,044,000; and auto theft, 171,000.[4]

Is Crime Increasing or Decreasing? Occasionally, a great furore is raised concerning the increase of crime. This is chiefly "newspaper talk"; the truth being that there are but few statistics that throw light upon the matter. Figures drawn from 220 cities of 25,000 population and over, including about one-fifth of our total population, indicate that from 1931 to 1944 there appeared to be increase in rape, felonious assault, and larceny, while criminal homicide, robbery, burglary, and auto thefts showed decline.[5] It is certain that we get used to crimes with which we are familiar; their commission does not impress our imagination. On the other hand, new crimes impress us to such an extent that we feel there is surely an increase in crime. Furthermore, the newspapers, in seeking for the new and the sensational, convey to the reader the impression that there actually is such an increase. However, if one looks back over newspaper discussion

[1] *Social Work Year Book, 1941,* pp. 37–44; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949,* p. 142.

[2] *Social Work Year Book, 1937,* p. 108.

[3] *National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,* Report 12 (1931).

[4] *Uniform Crime Reports,* Vol. XXI, No. 2, p. 74.

[5] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949,* p. 134.

and comment in other periods, he will find that every so often there has been a "crime wave." So far as one can tell from the figures, it has been

TABLE 30: DISTRIBUTION OF ARRESTS BY OFFENSE, SEX, AGE, AND PREVIOUS RECORD OF OFFENDER: 1950 *

Offense	*Number of Arrests* Total	Male	Female	*Per Cent Under 21 Years of Age*	*Per Cent with Previous Finger-print Record*
All Offenses	793,400	717,200	76,300	15	60
Criminal Homicide	6,300	5,500	800	12	44
Robbery	19,800	18,900	900	28	63
Assault	59,500	53,200	6,300	10	56
Burglary—breaking or entering	43,700	42,600	1,100	41	58
Larceny—theft	66,000	58,400	7,600	27	57
Automobile Theft	18,400	17,900	500	47	56
Embezzlement and Fraud	21,400	19,500	1,900	6	66
Stolen Property, Buying and Receiving	3,300	3,000	300	18	50
Arson	1,000	900	100	16	46
Forgery and Counterfeiting	11,700	10,400	1,300	13	70
Rape	9,300	9,300	—	31	42
Other Sex Offenses	28,300	20,200	8,100	10	47
Narcotic Drug Laws	8,500	7,500	1,000	18	70
Weapons—carrying, possessing, etc.	10,400	9,900	500	17	51
Offenses Against Family and Children	15,200	14,400	800	4	55
Liquor Laws	11,300	9,500	1,800	12	52
Driving While Intoxicated	51,300	49,200	2,100	4	53
Other Traffic and Vehicle Laws	27,900	27,200	700	19	46
Disorderly Conduct	45,400	39,100	6,300	14	55
Drunkenness	178,200	162,200	16,000	4	71
Vagrancy	48,600	41,600	7,000	14	74
Gambling	15,500	14,000	1,500	3	51
All Other Offenses	92,400	82,800	9,700	21	57

* Adapted from *Uniform Crime Reports* (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Vol. XXI, No. 2, pp. 107, 111, and 112.

largely psychological. It is also commonly believed that a crime wave fol-

lows every war. That may be true. The consensus is that there are slight increases in crime rates following periods of war, and that there is a slowly rising amount of criminality, probably due to the fact of our growing urban settlement, with its greater density of population and extent of personal contact.

Repeaters in Crime. One of the purposes of criminal justice and of the punishment of the criminal is to prevent a man who has once been convicted of crime from repeating his act. We call our institutions "correctional" institutions. How well do they "correct"? The Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1950 reported that of about 794,000 persons arrested whose fingerprints were sent to the Bureau by police officials of the country, 60 per cent had been previously arrested.[6] Of the 46,680 felony prisoners released from State and Federal prisons and reformatories during 1946, for whom records were known (among a total of 50,059), "48.9 per cent had had no record of previous commitments, 20.2 per cent had been previously committed to jail or a juvenile institution, and the remaining 30.9 per cent had been previously committed one or more times to a State or Federal prison or reformatory." [7]

These figures represent an enormous failure. More than half of our offenders have been in difficulty before. What a comment upon our methods of treating the criminal! When our universities send home every year from 2 to 8 per cent of the students enrolled because they have "flunked out," sometimes a great cry is raised against the failure of our school system. What if the high schools and the universities flunked half of their students? And yet that is what these figures of recidivism really mean. Half of the criminals in our correctional institutions have "flunked the course" once or more.

It should be remembered, however, that we send to our correctional institutions the failures of our schools and of our communities and then expect those institutions to do what the schools and the playgrounds, the homes, and the probation officials have failed to do. Naturally into our prisons will be sent those who have failed to respond to every other influence to make them good citizens. No more serious criticism should therefore be made of the authorities in correctional institutions for the failure of these cases than is made of the community for not keeping them from going wrong in the first place. Furthermore, these institutions should not be required to release their inmates when it is known that such individuals are likely to repeat their antisocial behavior. Yet in most of our States the criminal law provides for the ultimate termination of the sentence, in most cases at a very definite period, whether the man has reformed or not. This is a great mistake and accounts for a large number of the

[6] *Uniform Crime Reports*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, p. 111.

[7] *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories, 1946* (Bureau of the Census, 1948), p. 94.

recidivists among the inmates of our institutions. These are custodial cases who ought to be kept indefinitely within an institution.

FACTORS IN THE MAKING OF THE CRIMINAL AND THE DELINQUENT

The conduct of every person, including the criminal, is the result, in general terms, of two sets of factors: (1) The native characteristics inherited by the individual from his ancestors, and (2) the various external influences that play upon him as he matures. In order to make more precise the analysis of the factors producing the criminal, we may further divide these two general classes of influence into the following sections: (1) physical environment; (2) physical and mental characteristics of the individual; (3) hereditary characteristics; (4) economic factors; and (5) social factors.

Physical Environment. Early in the scientific study of crime and the criminal it was noticed that *crimes vary with geography, the climate, the seasons, and the weather.* Lombroso believed that he had discovered that the minimum number of crimes against the person occurred in level country, a slightly greater portion in areas that were hilly, and the maximum number in the mountainous districts. On the other hand, his statistics indicated that rape was more common in the level country than in the mountains and hills. Furthermore, he found that the districts of Italy most subject to malaria showed the maximum number of crimes against property. In contrast, those parts of France and Italy where goiter (which may result in cretinism) prevailed had less than the average number of homicides, thefts, and sexual offenses.

It has been observed by certain students that countries with a warm *climate* have a higher rate of criminality against the person, while those in cool climates have a comparatively high rate of crimes against property. Again crimes vary with the *seasons.* In winter crimes against property become more frequent, while in summer the peak is reached in the crimes against the person. This variation of different kinds of crime according to the seasons led to Lacassagne's so-called "criminal calendar." According to this calendar infanticide holds first place in the months of January, February, March, and April; homicide and assaults in July; parricides in January and October; rapes upon children in May, July, and August, with the minimum in December; rapes on adults reached their maximum in June and the minimum in November; while crimes against property seemed to reach the maximum in December and January.

More recently some attention has been given to the relationship of *the changes in the weather* to criminality. Dexter's studies indicated that the number of arrests varied quite regularly with the temperature in any given place. He found that as the barometer fell the number of arrests rose, and suggested that this air pressure may affect the nervous condition of

people. He found that assaults vary inversely with the degree of humidity and explained this on the basis of the depressing effect of a high degree of moisture in the atmosphere. Similarly, he discovered that on the days

TABLE 31: QUARTERLY VARIATION IN VOLUME OF URBAN CRIME, 1950 *
(2,297 cities, total population 69,643,614)

Offense	*Daily Average Offenses Known to Police*				
	January–December	January–March	April–June	July–September	October–December
Murder, Nonnegligent Manslaughter	9.9	9.0	9.8	10.9	9.8
Manslaughter by Negligence	6.5	6.7	5.8	6.0	7.5
Rape	21.0	19.0	22.1	23.4	19.5
Robbery	96.5	116.6	88.1	82.7	99.1
Aggravated Assault	141.1	130.0	141.7	154.3	138.0
Burglary—breaking or entering	690.3	765.4	665.2	648.2	683.7
Larceny	1,688.5	1,612.8	1,708.5	1,697.8	1,733.3
Automobile Theft	297.3	290.2	283.5	285.4	329.1

* Adapted from *Uniform Crime Reports* (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Vol. XXI, No. 2, p. 86.

when the winds are mild, there is a high pugnacity-rate, while during the days of calm and days of high winds, the number of arrests was less. He found that cloudy days showed the fewest number of personal encounters such as attract the attention of the police.

Much more extensive investigations will have to be made, however, before these conclusions can be accepted at their face value. It is now generally agreed that *the effects of these physical factors are indirect rather than direct.* For example, it is not that cold induces sluggishness, which lessens crime against the person, but that the crimes against the person in cold regions and in the cold season are fewer because human contacts are less numerous during those periods and in those countries. Furthermore, crime against property increases in the cold climates and in the cold seasons because of the greater distress.

We may hold, tentatively, that in general the physical environment affects man's conduct largely through its influence on his ways of getting a living, its influences on his recreation, the form of occupation that the climate makes possible, the unemployment and therefore the pressure of need due to seasonal occupations, and through the ease or difficulty with which a living is obtained, due to the richness or poverty of the natural resources and the ease with which the resources can be exploited.[8]

[8] For a more thorough discussion of the factors of the physical environment see J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology* (1947), Ch. 5.

Physical and Mental Characteristics of the Individual. Man in his physical and mental makeup is very much more complicated than any other animal. He has a depth and a breadth of emotional expression impossible to the lower animals. His intellect enables him to discriminate, weigh, and decide a course of conduct in a very much more complex environment than that of the lower animals. His conduct, therefore, more largely than in the case of animals, is the result of his physical, emotional, and intellectual nature. His conduct is not so instinctively determined; his emotions are subject to control by his intellect and consequently find expression in much more devious and complicated ways.

Consider first the *physical characteristics of the individual.* Society has set up certain standards which can be met only by an individual having a fairly well-developed physique. His physical organism must function in certain specific ways in order to meet these requirements. For example, he must have fairly good health; he must be physically well formed and capable of certain economic activities, and his physical appearance must make a reasonably pleasant impression upon those by whom he is surrounded in order for him to get along well economically and personally. If he is not strong enough to work at an occupation that will yield him a livelihood, he is handicapped on the economic side. If he has suffered disablement, either by disease or by accident, it may be impossible for him to hold a job, or he may hold one that pays only a very small wage. Economic pressure may become too great, and he may, by reason of this fact, develop into a thief. Juvenile physical overdevelopment seems to result in sexual maturity before judgment and self-control have developed equally, often leading to sex delinquency.

Recent studies on the endocrine glands, or the glands of internal secretion, suggest a possible relationship between the functioning of these glands and crime. Research has not gone far enough yet, however, to make certain that the lack of proper functioning of these glands leads to criminality.

The chief *mental characteristics of the individual* that seem to have a bearing upon the making of the criminal are mental defect, epilepsy, the insanities, and certain emotional disturbances which are the result partly of inherent tendencies and partly of the individual's reactions to his life's experiences.

Mental defect, or *feeble-mindedness,* as a characteristic of delinquents and criminals has received marked attention in recent years. The figures differ with the examiner and with different parts of the country as well as with the type of crime. There are those who believe that prisoners are not more often mentally defective than those in the general population of the same age and sex; others who believe that prisoners are superior mentally to the free population; and still others who, while admitting that prisoners show a greater proportion with a low I.Q. than nonprisoners, nevertheless

believe that mental defect, although important in individual cases, in the aggregate is of less importance in criminality than the social conditions. Certainly recent studies have made it clear that the mental defective is not, because of his defect, predisposed to antisocial behavior. Rather, his defectiveness operates indirectly. He is less apt to foresee the consequences of his acts. He is often shunned and made fun of by others. He is more likely to feel rejected and frustrated and therefore emotionally disturbed. To compensate, he is more likely to seek to obtain approval and social status by responding to suggestion and serving as a stooge for more capable, but more cautious and more vicious, individuals in a group. In any case, he appears among the inmates of prisons and reformatories in much greater proportions than among the free population.[9]

Epilepsy, probably because of our neglect of epileptics, seems to furnish a disproportionate number of criminals and delinquents. Healy, in Chicago, in a study of 1,000 young repeaters, found 7 per cent that were known to be definitely epileptic, while in the general population, probably less than half of 1 per cent are thus afflicted.

The *insanities* have some importance in the production of criminals and delinquents. The number of insane persons incarcerated is considerably smaller than that of deficients. Nevertheless, extreme mental disorders sometimes lead to quarrelsomeness and the starting of lawsuits. The person concerned feels that he is unjustly treated, has delusions of persecution, and easily becomes a fraudulent person or even a criminal of violence.

Perhaps even more important are the *emotional disturbances* that result from unhappy life experiences in the young. We have no definite statistics on the number of cases in a given criminal population who have been started on their career of delinquency by reason of these emotional disturbances. Recent studies, however, have shown that a great many young delinquents are suffering from mental conflicts and emotional frustrations which have resulted from unpleasant experiences in their lives. These emotional upsets may result from severe repression at home, lack of appreciation by schoolmates, shock from premature sexual experiences, or from the conflict that may arise between natural curiosity and the moral standards of society. Studies in both the juvenile courts and the schools have shown that many "problem" children are suffering from such emotional disturbances.

Hereditary Characteristics. Not uncommonly, one still meets the expression "hereditary crime." Naturally the question arises, can crime be inherited? To speak of crime as "hereditary crime" is a loose usage of terms. Crime is a social manifestation in conduct, while heredity is a biological matter. Crime cannot be inherited in any scientific sense of the term. What is meant by those who discuss heredity in connection with criminality is that certain inheritable physical and mental characteristics

[9] For a more detailed discussion, see Gillin, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–97.

may result in crime if the environmental conditions suggest or encourage such conduct. Among such traits are the inheritance of early sexual maturity with a lag in mental and emotional maturity, nervous instability, and mental defect. It should be remembered, however, that crime and criminality are social concepts, not in any sense biological or inheritable traits.

Economic Factors. Many writers have called attention to the fact that most delinquents belong to the poorer classes, that crimes increase with economic depression and unemployment, and that crimes against property increase in a capitalistic organization of society. There can be no question as to these facts. The question relates rather to the correct interpretation of the facts. Do men steal because they are hungry, for example, and do girls enter a life of prostitution because of need? It is true that some men steal because they are hungry or because their families are in need; and some girls enter a life of prostitution, or that course of conduct which may lead to prostitution, by reason of the pressure of necessity. Unemployment and distress doubtless put upon some individuals a strain that it is impossible for them to bear. On the other hand, some people in the very deepest distress do not commit crime, and some girls in the direst need do not stray from the path of virtue. It is clear, therefore, that in most cases economic factors act indirectly rather than directly. Need becomes a circumstance to which a certain type of individual responds by antisocial conduct.

Whether the economic factors be direct or indirect in their operations, they provide the stimuli under which certain natures give way and break over the "normal" standards set by society. Statistics on juvenile delinquency and child labor show that there is a very close correlation between them. Moreover, certain trades appear to be especially dangerous morally. Street trades especially are menacing to children. Night work in factories provides circumstances that peril the morals of young women. Working boys have a delinquent-rate from two to ten times higher than that of those who are in school. Boys employed in messenger service seem to be especially liable to delinquency. Compelled to enter diverse places at all hours of the day and night, they become habituated to scenes of vice and lawlessness that challenge moral standards; and this often results in disaster. Waitresses in hotels and restaurants, commonly living on the smallest of wages and denied the ordinary recreational diversions, are apt to be easy prey to the solicitations of conscienceless men.

Social Factors. The social circumstances of life affect one's conduct. Like the economic conditions, they are a factor in the total environment in which personality develops. If the social circumstances are of such a nature as to bring out the individual's inherent qualities that are adapted to social life and to inhibit those characteristics which lead to antisocial conduct, experience leads us to believe that the individual will develop

conduct in accordance with the standards of society. It should be remembered that conduct is the outcome of a double set of conditions, *viz.*, the inherent characteristics of the individual himself, stimulated to expression or repression by the circumstances in which he lives.

The social factors surrounding the individual in our society may be classified broadly as follows: the home; recreational agencies; the school;




FIG. 14

C. R. Shaw and H. D. McKay, *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency* (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931), pp. 75 and 106.

the community; customs and beliefs; class; and religion. Frequently social conditions within these areas of social life are inimical to the development of socially desirable personality and conduct. Recall from earlier chapters our discussion of attitudes, group patterns of conduct, and the way in which the conduct patterns of different groups come into conflict in the experience of many persons. In the study of the problem child and the delinquent child, and of the criminal man and woman, the results of these clashing standards upon the allegiance of the individual come clearly to view.

The *home* as the fundamental social institution has an enormous in-

fluence upon the development of the personality of the children. In the case of the immigrant family, it frequently occurs that the children become Americanized more rapidly than their parents and thus a great chasm opens between the social habits and traditions of the children and those of their parents. Often, too, the immigrant home is poverty-stricken; and this condition has a decided effect upon the delinquency of the children even from the homes of the native-born parents.[10] At the same time, children from well-to-do or even moderately situated homes may be overindulged by their parents, and be unable to adjust themselves to the requirements of life when they are no longer shielded by the parental roof. The relations between parents and children are extremely significant. Too strict or too lenient discipline, parental discord in handling the children, or favoritism for one or the other of the children over the others—all have been found by observers repeatedly to play a very important part in the making of the criminal. It is in the home that the behavior patterns are most effectively set; it is there, for better or worse, that children learn the values and attitudes that will find expression in meeting the tests of later life. It is generally agreed today that adult behavior is probably determined much more basically by early conditioning than by the nature of later environmental experience, since the way a person will react to a given situation is governed very largely by the attitudes and habits he brings to it.

Recreational programs in recent years have been heralded as a vital device to help in combatting crime; and if properly developed, they can be a strong deterrent to the development of criminal tendencies. There is little doubt that idleness is conducive to criminality, especially among adolescents. The neighborhood gang, often innocent enough in its beginning, is apt to run amuck for lack of guidance to direct its energies into socially acceptable activities. Yet care must be exercised in projecting "directed recreation" programs. Unless recreational facilities are skillfully administered so as to be accepted by individual children or adolescents, or their gangs, they are likely to become simply monuments to what somebody thought was "good for the children." Thus, many youth centers established in recent years have failed because the youngsters would not patronize them on the terms laid down by their elders. Suitable and varied recreational facilities, then, should be provided as a part of a normal social environment, and the child or youth should be free to use them according to his own interest and talent. But the use they make of them, as was suggested a moment ago, will be determined largely by the type of earlier home training they have had.[11]

The relationship of *education* to crime has often been studied. Very

[10] Gillin, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–165; Taft, "Nationality and Crime," *American Sociological Review* (October, 1936), pp. 725, 726.

[11] Paul W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (1949), pp. 148–154.

few college graduates are found in our prisons and reformatories. This may mean either that education results in a course of conduct which does not end in a prison, or it may mean only that those who graduate from educational institutions do not get caught. There are, however, a number of reasons for believing that the ignorant have a higher crime-rate, other things being equal. The uneducated man usually has greater difficulty in making a living. He has to take a lower wage for his employment; usually he does not have as wide a range of employment open to him; he is less likely to have a varied use of his leisure time and therefore may easily drift into bad companionship.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that education in the simple elementary subjects has only an indirect bearing upon the prevention of criminality. It has been found that the type of crime varies with the degree of education. Crimes of violence are more frequently committed by the uneducated, while crimes of skill and cunning, such as embezzlement and forgery, are the crimes of the educated.

Children who do not get along well in school are likely to become truant and to wind up in the juvenile court. Evidently our schools are not yet capable of maintaining the interest of all the children who come to them. Too frequently the children drop out of school from lack of interest and go to work at the first opportunity; and, as we have seen, working children are under special hazard. Too often the schools are built to fit the average student, and too little attention is given to the variant child. The teacher alone, loaded with forty or more pupils, some of whom present special problems, cannot be justly blamed for this unhappy condition; the *school system* itself must shoulder the responsibility for making some delinquents in that teachers are commonly too few in number and too often poorly trained. Nevertheless, more and more attention is being given to suiting the school system and the curriculum to the needs of the individual child. Some schools are introducing rooms for special classes of students, guidance clinics, and visiting teachers whose business it is to follow up the child who is not doing well in school or who presents special problems, to see that adjustments are made in that child's life and that the school adapts itself to his individual capacities and peculiarities in order to produce a wholesome personality. Doubtless many teachers are interested only in their salaries; but increasingly there are glorious exceptions who follow children into their homes and into their community life in order to help adjust the child to the circumstances of school and community. It is being recognized that the chief business of the school is to form social personality. Mere formal education will not always accomplish that purpose.

The influences in *the community* have a great deal to do with the development of conduct. Young children and adolescents alike are highly susceptible to the attitudes and opinions of the community, more especially of their immediate associates. How often when a delinquent is brought to

court the story is told of how he had a good family, and yet had gone astray because of the untoward influences in the community in the midst of which he lives! Sometimes the influences of the community are positively demoralizing. Consider the difficulty that well-intentioned parents have in stemming the effect upon their children of evil influences in the congested district of a great city. The influence of the home is neutralized by the tide of immorality that flows out of taverns, dance-halls, night clubs, and the uncontrolled life of the gang in the alleys, back yards, railroad tracks, or docks of the city. Even when the home is of the best, it has great difficulty in fighting against such influences.

Moreover, consider the influence of *customs and conduct patterns* that are at variance with the traditions, standards, and ideals of the society in the midst of which a new group of citizens may live. Contemplate the foreign-born family, coming with a set of social standards and traditions from another country, yet subject to the standards and traditions that have grown up upon American soil. Their culture is different in many respects from that which they find in this country; their ideals and customs are apt to be quite different. Consider, for example, the contrast between the sex morals of an immigrant from an eastern or southeastern European country and those which are required in an American community. Struggling with poverty in a great American city, the foreign family sees no reason why it should not take in numerous boarders. Consequently, every available space is occupied, and boarders may even sleep with some of the children. As a result, immoral relations are often established, and the culprits are haled into court. The group mores that held matters in hand in the homeland have weakened and the families have not yet acquired the standards of their adopted country. The drinking habits of many people are a fertile source of delinquency and crime. Numerous studies indicate that of the serious crimes of violence from one-third to two-thirds are due to drunkenness.

Moreover, many beliefs that are at variance with the established standard of conduct become current among certain classes and groups of society. Confirmed criminals are usually cynical and bitter. They see no reason why they should be punished for acts that are similar to other acts which are within the law. According to their standard, open assault on a rich man seems less ignoble than the cautious combinations of fraud sometimes practiced by respected citizens. The criminal is subject to the public opinion of *his own class* rather than to that of the general society of which he is a member. Similarly, consider the relative impunity of the practice of taking apples from a tree in the country, as compared to the similar practice in the city of filching fruit from a fruit-vendor's stand.

With the social and economic development of a population, classes inevitably arise, both social and economic, and *class hatreds* are likely to develop unless the relations between these classes are very carefully con-

trolled. In every period of social and industrial unrest, of political or economic oppression, class hatreds are bound to arise. Out of these hatreds develop beliefs and standards of action that frequently lead to violation of law. There occur to one's mind such examples as the violence that often breaks out in industrial strife, the so-called "race conflicts" between the Negroes and whites in some of our great cities and between Orientals and the whites on the Pacific Coast, the religio-racial antisemitic pogroms in certain European countries, and the friction in America between radical and conservative economic and political groups.

Religion is another social factor that must be considered in connection with crime. One would suppose that a religion which has for its basis the love of one's fellow-men would prevent clashes, would produce tolerance, and would make for peace and good conduct. Curiously enough, however, even Christianity has not always been characterized by such standards. Wars have been fought over religious questions; and study of prison statistics indicates that religion does not always have the effect of curbing the antisocial propensities of men. A study made by Aschaffenburg in Germany has shown that in certain countries of Europe Catholics have a higher criminal rate than Protestants, both of them higher than Jews, and all three with higher rates than those professing no religion whatsoever. Aschaffenburg suggests, however, that the economic conditions of the people rather than their religion probably accounts for this curious situation. So it must be confessed that religion does not always curb the evil propensities of men. If religion is chiefly of a ceremonial nature it cannot be expected to have much influence upon conduct. The only religion that seems to have a positive contribution to the problem of crime control is a socialized religion, *viz.*, a religion devoted to social ends and purposes.

When we consider all these conditions surrounding every individual from childhood to old age—realizing that there are great gulfs between the opportunities of different groups, that a considerable number of our population is somewhat defective mentally, and that others lack in education even though good training is essential to good citizenship—we might well decide that it is remarkable that no more become criminal. The marvel is that so few fall by the wayside, considering the few and bungling arrangements made by society to help the individual in the great adventure of adjustment to the requirements of social life.

METHODS OF DEALING WITH THE DELINQUENT AND THE CRIMINAL

The Police. The police and other law enforcement officers are the first persons who deal with the criminal. Their chief functions are to preserve order and to arrest and bring to trial those who disturb the peace.

Until recent years we have had very few police schools in the United States, and consequently most of the men are untrained except for the

practical experience they get on the job. In recent years, however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has embarked on a program of training groups of selected men sent to their school by coöperating local departments. These men generally are relaying the benefit of their training to their fellow-officers in their own communities, often by more or less formally organized classes.

This is an encouraging start, but we still are far from giving our police any special training for their job comparable to that which we give our professional groups or even our skilled tradesmen. The policeman is often appointed because of his friendship with some politician; or if a sheriff, he is elected by popular vote. If a town constable, he may be appointed by the village mayor or elected by the county or town boards. So long as our civilization was a rural or semirural one, almost any man could be a good peace officer. With the growth of our large cities, however, the responsibilities of the policeman have very greatly multiplied. If he is to fulfil his responsibilities, he must be a very much higher type of man; he must be trained for the varied and difficult duties of policing, and should be selected with the greatest care.

The office of policeman is not looked upon with great favor because of the kind of men who have been appointed to it in the past. It has been charged that at the present time the police make as many criminals as they catch. Most of them do not know how to handle juveniles, and it often appears that they do not understand how to get along with adults. Consequently the policeman is the butt of all the jokesters and is a favorite theme for the cartoonist. He is usually pictured as quite stupid, large of person, and fat of head. Yet in this man's hand lies the protection of the person and property of the people of our cities! He must know the law and the court decisions as to what a policeman may do and what he may not do. He may be the bogeyman with which to scare children, or he may be a constructive force among the childhood and youth of his beat. He may be the one to turn the erring feet of youth into the paths of good conduct, or through his bungling and lack of understanding of human nature he may be the means whereby a reckless youth is turned to destruction. He must not only arrest offenders, but he must also discover evidence on which a trial can be based. He must understand criminals and their ways, but he must also understand the psychology of the noncriminal population. A good law enforcement officer can do much to prevent crime.

We have just begun to appreciate the great opportunities and responsibilities he has. Some day he will be selected and trained with much greater care; perhaps then we shall look upon him with as much regard as we give the schoolteacher or the banker. If ever the policeman measures up to the opportunities that are his, he will be one of society's finest agents for the prevention of crime, as well as for its detection and punishment.

The Courts. After a man is arrested, he may be placed in jail to await

trial or released on bond. In due time he comes before the court for his trial. He may plead either guilty or not guilty; if the latter, he stands trial for the charge against him. As our courts are organized at the present time in this country, the trial is a legal battle between the prosecutor and the defender. The judge is pretty much an umpire in a game. He conducts the game according to rules of procedure that in many instances seem quite outworn and technical. The statute covering the offense tells the judge within what limits he may sentence the man if he is found guilty. The jury hears the evidence, and in some States the jury decides what law should be used, as well as what evidence shall be admitted. It decides whether the man is guilty or not guilty and in some States decides the punishment. In other States the judge pronounces the sentence and metes out the punishment. In case the man is acquitted, the whole matter is ended, except for his attorney's fees. If he is convicted, the law provides for appeals on the part of his attorney to the higher court, on the theory that every chance should be given to the man to prove himself innocent.

The courts, then, are the instruments set up by the State to protect the citizens and to bring offenders to justice. On the whole they serve that purpose well. Yet it must be admitted that certain practices of the court make criminals instead of curing them. Consider the effect upon the man charged with an offense and brought before a court, who cannot afford to hire a lawyer but has had to take whatever lawyer the court saw fit to appoint to defend him. Whether he is correct in his conclusion or not, he is likely to believe, when he sees rich men defended by very capable lawyers and himself defended by a novice, that justice is not evenhanded. The delay in bringing to trial the accused, who perhaps cannot get bail and must lie in jail in contact with hardened criminals, frequently corrupts the young offender. Furthermore, consider the numerous technicalities on which skillful lawyers may cheat justice in the case of influential criminals, in contrast with the speedy hearing and the swift punishment meted out to the poor or uninfluential man. Again, what must be the effect of our theory that no matter what the difference in the persons of different criminals, the same crime merits the same punishment? While the jury is permitted to consider extenuating circumstances, and the judge may in the imposition of sentence consider such circumstances, nevertheless a study of the sentences imposed for crimes shows that evenhanded justice is quite impossible under our system. The effect upon the minds of men who feel that they have been discriminated against may be easily imagined. Put yourself in the place of the man who has received a ten-year sentence for a certain crime, when he knows that another man just as guilty of the same crime has drawn a five-year sentence. Those who thus come to feel that they have been unjustly treated may readily develop a grudge against society and turn again to criminal behavior by way of settling their grudge.

Here and there, however, States are making improvements in the courts

which give promise of making them more adequate to their social purposes. Increasingly the courts are making use of clinics in order to study the individual who is on trial. Laboratories to determine how to classify the convicts, and how to fit the treatment more perfectly to the needs of each individual are being introduced in both courts and correctional institutions. Similarly, the juvenile courts more and more have the services of expert psychologists and psychiatrists to aid them in determining what to do with the juveniles who come before these courts. Thus, step by step, science is being introduced into the determination of the nature of the offender in order that the institutions provided by society for his treatment may better perform their duty.

Probation is another device to mitigate the maladjustment of criminal justice to the needs of the individual. We still retain the old theory that the lawmaker should say just what treatment should be handed out to each individual who contravenes a certain law. However, that has worked so unjustly that we have developed a procedure known as *probation* by which the judge is empowered in certain cases to use his discretion as to whether he will send a convicted man to an institution, or whether, in view of all his characteristics and the circumstances surrounding his offense, he might not better suspend sentence and put the man in charge of some one who will give him careful supervision. If probation is carefully used and applied only to those who give promise of doing well at liberty under supervision, and if the probation officers take an active, sympathetic, and wise interest in the person committed to their charge, probation is a most beneficial expedient. The man is saved the stigma of a prison sentence, is put to work, and his earnings are devoted to his family or saved for himself; and, most important, he himself may be redeemed.

In very recent years, too, the States have begun to set up Youth Correction Authorities, which are special State agencies dealing with commitments and probation of young offenders referred to them by the courts. California has even applied this idea to the older offender as well, having set up an Adult Authority in 1944. These agencies also coöperate with local communities to institute crime prevention programs. The creation of such bodies makes possible a more thorough investigation of individual offenders and a better use of rehabilitative resources, while leaving to the courts chiefly the problem of determining guilt.[12]

Juvenile Reformatories were devised to remove from prison juvenile offenders. They are now usually called "training schools." The history of these institutions has not been reassuring. Too often those in charge of them have been men and women without special qualifications for their difficult tasks. As a consequence, they have been largely juvenile prisons. In a study made by Dr. Miriam Van Waters a number of years ago of some twenty-eight girls' industrial schools in the United States, only six were

[12] *Social Work Year Book, 1949*, pp. 41, 282.

found that were doing constructive work. In all these six cases the schools were manned by people who understood children and youth. Under such circumstances they are valuable institutions, because there are children who will fail on probation and who need an institution in which they may be trained.

On the basis of experience we may say that a State must place in charge of these institutions trained men and women who understand young people and who know how to arrange matters in the institution so as to bring a new viewpoint on life into the minds of the youngsters. They must be able to awaken idealism and to get the juveniles to form habits of conduct in accordance with the standards of society. Without capable supervision such as this, juvenile reformatories are worthless and may even be schools for crime.

Adult Reformatories were started in the United States with the establishment of the Elmira Reformatory for Men in New York State in 1876. This was an experiment in applying reformatory methods to young men. It was originally intended only for first offenders who had committed certain offenses. Schools were established to provide elementary education and certain trades. In addition, an attempt was made through military drill and physical exercise, medical service, religious services, and certain classes in citizenship and ethics, to bring before the young men new ideals, to establish new habits, and to prepare them to live as useful citizens after their release. Elmira was copied in a large number of States, in most places with somewhat indifferent success. With a few rather notable exceptions these institutions have turned out to be merely young men's prisons. Here, as in the case of the training schools, the difficulty was that those in charge of them were persons not fitted by native endowment or by training to handle these difficult problem cases.

The Indeterminate Sentence is another method that has been devised to adjust treatment to the individual offender. Unfortunately, the term is a misnomer. It is not absolutely indeterminate but is limited by statute within maximum and minimum lengths of time, the former being reckoned as what the prisoner would have been given in a determinate sentence. The indeterminate sentence, moreover, is invoked only for young first offenders and for certain types of crime. It must be admitted, however, that it has made the retention of men in prison variable, some being retained longer, others for less time than they would have been under definite sentences. Therefore even the limited indeterminate sentence means some social advance. The sentence, however, should be absolutely indeterminate. That is, termination of confinement should depend upon the judgment of those who know the man best and are best qualified to determine when he is fit to go back into society.

Parole, another method of individualizing the treatment of offenders, is closely connected with the indeterminate sentence. While probation

means supervising the offender *before* he is sent to an institution, parole means that *after* an offender has spent time within an institution and has shown by good conduct the possibility of his doing well on the outside, he is released under supervision of parole officers.

Unfortunately, inefficient staffing has greatly curtailed the potential benefit of parole. Without special training for their tasks, parole officers frequently have not understood how to handle the parolees, and they generally have been too few in number to have adequate contact with their charges. Often offenders have been paroled who should never have been admitted to parole outside the institution, and as a consequence this method has not had the hoped-for success. The legal limitations on parole, such as that an offender may not be paroled until he shall have served half of a definite sentence or the minimum of an indefinite, have hampered its usefulness.

In spite of all these drawbacks, however, parole as a method of individualizing treatment has great possibilities under an adequate number of well-trained officers. No one knows how large a percentage of those paroled have done well. Originally the estimates were as high as 85 per cent. The tendency in recent years has been to scale down the estimates, as a result of more careful follow-up and study of parolees. But if 50 per cent, or even a third, of the offenders do well on parole, it probably has justified itself. With carefully selected parolees, with capable and sufficient officers, parole would be one of our most promising devices for the redemption of offenders.

The Prison is our most stringent penal institution. To this institution are committed those convicted of the more serious crimes and those above a certain age who cannot be committed to the reformatory. Its history has been a sad one. Usually the prison is run under the strictest discipline, the rule of silence between the prisoners is common, and frequently the institution is directed by officers who have no special qualifications for the task, either by nature or by training. From the standpoint of reforming offenders and restoring them to society as good citizens, it has been a colossal failure.

In many of our States, the prison is conceived to be an institution for the reformation of the criminal; in others, the theory is that the prison is solely for the purpose of punishing the criminal and then turning him out into society again. If the theory followed by the prison officials is that of punishment alone, then the purpose is to make prison life as disagreeable as possible so as to make certain that the prisoner suffers as much as he made others or society suffer. After that kind of treatment, however, he is likely to go out feeling that he has been mistreated and that he has a right to exact vengeance of a society which has taught him the doctrine of vengeance. Similarly, even under the theory that the prison is for the reformation of its inmates, what must be the effect upon the prisoner's

mind when he is treated so that he feels that society, instead of trying to reform him, is brutally punishing him? Moreover, when first offenders are thrown into contact with hardened criminals, the prison becomes a school of crime. Innumerable cases might be cited showing such results from a prison experience.[13]

Even the highest officer in a prison, the warden, usually has had no special educational background for his work. The lesser officials are still less adequately prepared. Hired for a wage that will not attract many capable men, the guards for the most part are uninspiring, repressive automatons. We shall not have better prisons until we pay as high a salary to a warden as we pay to a university president, and select him as carefully. Perhaps we should not expect that the same standards would be applied to guards and to college professors. Nevertheless, it is probable that until we pick these lesser prison officials with at least as great care as we select high-school teachers, we shall not get far in making our prisons really reformatory institutions.

Our prisons go on year after year failing to reform half, or even more, of the men in them. Too often a prisoner's history is that he comes first into the juvenile court, where he is put on probation. Failing on probation, he is sent to the training school. After release there he finds his way to the reformatory, and finally winds up in the prison. After a certain number of years he can go out into society again (in some of our States, at least, even if he has been sentenced for life), provided he has a history of good behavior in the institution.

We should recognize that in the prison we have two general classes of inmates: (1) those who ought to be subject to custodial care as long as they live and ought never to be permitted outside, and (2) those who have seen the error of their ways and have decided to reform. The latter should be let out into society as soon as they are fit to return. Every effort within the institution should be bent to prepare them for social life. Cutting across both of these classes are those offenders who are such by reason of their native incapacity or by warps in their nature. These we should treat as such, using our best efforts to retrain them for normal life on the outside. Those who cannot thus be retrained should be kept as custodial cases as long as they live.

GUIDEPOSTS FOR THE TREATMENT OF THE CRIMINAL

As we look back carefully over the history of the treatment of the criminal, we see that here society has made one of its most dismal failures. It fails in its detention of the offender before his trial; it fails in its court procedures in trying him. Again it fails when he is sent to an institution

[13] If the student is interested in reading examples of such cases, let him consult Donald Lowrie, *My Life in Prison* (1912), or Victor Nelson, *Prison Days and Prison Nights* (1932).

that is not properly equipped or manned to exert society's pressure to change his way of life. It often fails by putting the wrong person on probation or by releasing the wrong person on parole and by giving improper supervision in either case. It fails also in its retaining the definite sentence for a great many offenders under the law and releasing them whether they are fit to go back into society or not. And it fails in not applying good educational measures and principles to the treatment of the offender whom it is trying to reform.

We are only just beginning to utilize science in the treatment of the criminal. After all, the place to begin on this problem of crime is at the beginning. Here, again, the old saying is true that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. If our researches show that the lack of playgrounds makes for criminality, that slums produce offenders against society, that the school is failing to set the feet of young people upon the right path, that even the church may be failing in the great task of directing young people into the paths of social righteousness, that our economic system frequently drives men into crime, or that certain aspects of our political system promote criminality, then we have the keys to an effective program of attack on the problem of crime. Steadily year by year, as our capacities to do so increase, we must apply the fuller and more accurate knowledge which we develop in psychology, in sociology, in education, in religion, in politics, in economics, to adjusting the conditions of life to each person so as to enable him to function so far as possible to the best of his innate ability.

From our research in heredity we learn that certain people born into the world are unable to function under the present organization of our social life. Eugenics suggests that certain of these people should be selected for non-propagation. If we applied as much good sense and science to the production of our human population as we do to our animals we should mitigate this aspect of the problem in a very short time. The feeble-minded, certain classes of the insane, epileptics, the mentally abnormal, and other defectives challenge us to give our attention to the problem of the racial stock. Some people are less capable of adapting themselves to the social requirements of life than others. Either we must eliminate those incapable of making adjustments, or we must throw about them the protecting arm of society, that is, adjust society's requirements to them rather than make demands upon them that they are incapable of meeting.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the sociological definition of a criminal? Explain the implications of significant words and phrases in your definition. What interests has society in dealing with the criminal?
2. What is the legal distinction between a criminal and a delinquent? Of what value is this distinction in handling the juvenile offender? Might the same principle be extended to certain classes of adult "first offenders"?
3. How extensive is the problem of crime? Is its seriousness to be measured only in quantitative terms? What other losses might well be considered?
4. List and briefly characterize the factors contributing to crime.
5. Would you agree that "we are all potential criminals"? Or is the criminal inherently "unbalanced"? Explain your position.
6. How may a visiting schoolteacher aid in the development of personal attitudes that will prevent delinquency? A child guidance clinic? The church? The Boy Scouts? A playground?
7. Suggest important changes that could well be made in our institutional treatment of the delinquent and the criminal, giving reasons for the suggestions you make.
8. Show the importance of "follow-up" work in reforming the released criminal and delinquent.

19. Factors Affecting Social Adjustment

THE VARIOUS SOCIAL problems we have been discussing are the results of imperfect socialization, meaning by the term *such adaptation of the individual to the requirements of the group in which he lives as makes his conduct conform to the purposes and ideals of that group; and such adjustment of the machinery of the group, including its ideals, its mores, and its behavior patterns, to the capacities of the individuals in the group as to provide the individual with a degree of expression of his basic wishes adequate to enable him to function happily and usefully in his social relationships.* In other words, the *individual* unable to adapt himself to the requirements that the group has laid down for its members creates problems for that group. These may be problems of poverty, of crime, of immorality, of family disorganization, of ill health, or of the breakdown of group solidarity. On the other hand, if *society* has not adjusted its behavior patterns to the capacities of its individuals and has failed to provide in its social institutions and the organization of its life for the less capable members of its group, or if it has failed to provide for the superior members of its group the opportunity to express their fundamental social urges in socially constructive ways, there is lack of socialization.

From the standpoint of social psychology, this adjustment between the individual and his group and between groups within a society depends upon the creation of certain uniformities of patterns of behavior, of feeling, and of relationship. We might say these social uniformities constitute the framework of organized society. They define the limits of tolerance beyond which the individual or minority dare not go if they expect to avoid trouble. Obviously society would quickly disintegrate unless its members respect these social standards and coöperate in their enforcement. As indicated in Fig. 15, there is a *negative* limit to our tolerance, a limit characterized by such ideas as "doing too little," "being too careless," or "failing to provide." There is also the *positive* limit to our tolerance, suggested by such popular expressions as "going too far," "taking the law

into one's own hands," or "disregard of the public welfare." Society has created the *formal* agencies of government to safeguard these limits; and the individual who violates them flagrantly is taken out of society and put where he has time to mend his ways. Perhaps even more significant than the stern clutches of the law which guard society's limits of tolerance, is the power and force of society's *informal* controls. Long before the formal limits of tolerance are reached, the erring one finds public disapproval,




FIG. 15

criticism, and disdain, which make his way lonesome and uncomfortable. He is still in society, but he is in a zone of adverse discrimination. Society grants full freedom only to those of its members who respect the cultural standards; and it saves its praise and rewards for those who contribute to the strengthening and defense of its common interests and aims.

On the other hand, the influence of social change must not be overlooked. Constant modifications of the standards approved by the group are made by insurgents. That is to say, the patterns of behavior in any society are constantly changing by reason of the ideas and attitudes of inventive or rebellious individuals. For example, new facts in science are discovered; and those who possess them first change their own attitude toward an established form of behavior and frequently become centers of influence for their modification. Or perhaps a new philosophy arises. Again, certain individuals are affected by it and lead the way in modifying certain standards of group behavior. Illustrative of these two forces is the enormous change in forms of conduct due to the new science and philosophy of the past fifty years. A new world of ideas has come into being. This new world of ideas has generated new attitudes for individuals by providing a rational realization of the wishes in new behavior frames. The old and approved forms have been extensively modified as more and more of the members of any given group have been affected by these developments. Whether or not the new tendency is socially good, we have here

an explanation of why problems of social adjustment exist, and how maladjustments are brought about.

Nevertheless, established behavior patterns resist the new patterns for a long time with resulting conflict between the attitudes of individuals and the established conduct norms of the group. Illustrations of this may be seen in many fields of human behavior. In the course of American history, a protective-tariff system has come to be looked upon as the cause of American prosperity. On the other hand, in England just the reverse was true; the free-trade policy was looked upon as the cause of its prosperity. Consequently, both in England and in the United States, individuals who were moved to take an attitude contrary to the established tariff doctrine had a terrific battle on their hands. In the South the theory has prevailed that "the Negro should keep his place." The consequence has been that the behavior pattern for the white man was dominance of the Negro, an attitude of superiority, and at the same time kindly consideration for the Negro's welfare. In the North, on the other hand, growing out of the War Between the States and the long discussion of the race problem, the proper behavior for a white man toward colored men was to concede equality of opportunity, at least in the industrial and educational worlds. Consequently, a Northerner in a Southern community was likely to find himself in conflict with the dominant pattern of the group, and likewise the Southerner in the North.

As individuals we may be brought quickly to a clear recognition of our problems, and may as quickly respond to practical plans for adjustment. But when we are dealing with groups, and especially when we are dealing with a whole nation or with groups of nations, our problem of obtaining adjustments is complicated by a number of factors that offer stubborn resistance to adaptation. *The larger the body, the slower it moves*—this is as true in the social sciences as it is in physics. The social scientist must concern himself with these elements which resist movement and adjustment in society, just as the physicist and engineer concern themselves with the friction and resistances that retard the movement and lessen the power of their huge dynamos and giant machines. We must be able to discern the difference between the forces that serve as a balance-wheel of social activities and those which thwart them and resist progress.

At least six major factors should be carefully considered in developing programs and policies for social adjustment: (1) custom and tradition, (2) geographic and physical conditions, (3) economic factors and conditions, (4) biological factors, (5) governmental and political influences, and (6) the spiritual life of the community.

CUSTOM AND TRADITION

One of the most important sets of factors affecting social adjustment is concerned with the *cultural background* of the people who are in process

of adjustment—their *customs* and *traditions,* or their "folkways" and "mores," as some writers have called them.

Custom results from the handing down, from one generation to another, of *ways of doing.* Most of our habits of life, especially habits of consumption, our "standard of living," our manners and social conduct, are governed largely by custom. The difference between the American-born man and his foreign-born neighbor is largely the difference in their social habits or customs. It is difficult to teach adults new modes of doing things; the older they get the more fixed become their old habits, and the more difficult it is to form any new habits that conflict with the old ones. So it is with persuading groups of people to adopt new ways of doing things: the old ways seem so much more comfortable—though they may be less efficient, slower, and perhaps even injurious.

Tradition results from the handing down from one generation to another of loyalties and of *ways of thinking and believing.* Strangely enough, as we come to think of it, most of our concepts of morality, our concepts of ethics, our standards of value, our standards of propriety, and our "guiding principles" are determined by the past. From our birth to our burial, our lives are to a very large degree circumscribed, shaped, and directed by the forces of tradition.

We might liken our present-day culture to an ever-widening river flowing out of the past and on into the future (see Fig. 16). The various twists and turns of this river represent the important turning-points in history. At times its current has been sluggish, shallow, and quiet; at other times, swift, troubled, and noisy—as it is today. At various points in its course it has been joined by tributaries flowing from strange sources, some very ancient and some quite new. Many of the strange and new culture elements of the tributaries quickly fused with the culture content of the main stream; others, it seems, refused to mix with the culture of the main stream, but flowed with the main current like oil and water, or like a substance held in suspension but not dissolving.

Thus custom and tradition form the social foundation upon which group life is based, and constitute a firm cement that binds the present to the past. When we come to a careful examination of the beliefs, the ideals, the social standards, the institutions, and the modes of conduct of the various groups that make up the population of the United States, for example, we find that in varying degrees they reflect the cultural contributions from all the great civilizations that have influenced the history of the Western world—the ancient Greeks, the Jews, the Romans, the Nordics, and the more recent culture of South and East Europe.[1]

The older and the more settled and static a community becomes, the

[1] Charles Ellwood, *The Social Problem* (1919); E. A. Ross, *The Old World in the New* (1914).

more it is bound by the influences of custom and tradition. But even in a relatively new, mobile, and dynamic society, like that of the United States, custom and tradition are tremendous forces that, in one way or another,




FIG. 16

All of the ideals and elements that go to shape and direct the social mind must be taken into account in facing the problems of social adjustment.

act as a brake upon rapid change. People as groups feel much more comfortable in following the beaten paths; they are vexed, even pained, at being forced to accept new views or abandon old habits to take up the new-fangled. No competent social scientist overlooks the fact that social progress

requires the unsettling of people, and, at least in a measure, the supplanting of old traditions and old customs with new ideas and new modes of conduct. Yet only the unseasoned social idealist will fail to recognize the *danger* involved in thus disturbing the old customs and traditions by too radical change. It must be admitted that we do not yet know enough about our social world to blueprint plans for its reconstruction and cast wholly new forms to replace outworn and obsolete patterns of behavior. It is true that we can work toward gradual reform; but the effort must be made a coöperative enterprise, each individual in his own way helping to forge out new adjustments on the basis of our heritage from the past and our knowledge of the particular problem at hand. Any attempt to impose completely new and untried proposals upon society as a whole is bound to arouse a healthy skepticism among its members. Moreover, when an attempt to force such proposals is successful, the result is likely to be a sharp cleavage of groups favoring and opposing it, because the consequences are unpredictable; and in the confusion, there may even be a general dissolution of people's confidence in *both* the old and the new way of doing.

To a very large extent, what we regard as American culture is in fact the New England reorganization of the English customs and traditions. In the New England colonies the Puritan concepts of the English culture were reshaped and reorganized to meet the needs of the pioneer and a slightly different form of government. One of the most interesting phases of American history is that of the influence which that little handful of population in New England has had on the development of American institutions and culture. Though millions of immigrants from North Europe have had a large share in the settling and development of the States west of the Alleghenies, they did not entirely cling to the customs and traditions of their native countries. Instead, they absorbed and carried the New England pattern, somewhat modified, westward with them; and, at least in major outlines, they developed almost a uniform national tradition and culture.

However, with the disappearance of the frontier and the increase of immigration from South Europe, these relatively homogeneous American traditions and customs began to be threatened. The new immigrants did not scatter, but settled in compact colonies in the large industrial centers. There they tended to cling to the old customs and traditions of their native countries, instead of adopting, as did the earlier immigrants, the pattern that had evolved from the New England traditions.

This tendency to perpetuate customs and traditions that are not in harmony with "American ideals" is the chief basis for our objections to the new immigration. We are not inclined to accept "foreigners of this class" as our neighbors or to associate with them unless they are willing to think and act as we do. Consequently we not only close the door to

their coming to America, but we turn our attention to the serious job of making of them "respectable" Americans. Just what we mean by *Americanization* has not been satisfactorily defined, but perhaps the central idea of it was expressed by Abraham Lincoln as "government of the people, by the people, for the people." To be sure, this expression has to be interpreted as applying not only to the State but also to the family, the church, the school, and our industrial and community life. The South European follows the old tradition of his native land in being the head of the house. His wife and children are regarded as his servants, and he feels it his duty to see that they are employed and that he collects and uses their income as he sees fit. The American, on the other hand, takes the point of view that has been expressed in granting woman suffrage and the passage of child-labor laws.

When we undertake to persuade the immigrant to give up his old traditions and customs, we find that it is a slow and ofttimes discouraging task. We want him to live in a house that is painted and fronted by a grass-plot; we insist that he must have floor coverings, curtains at the windows, tablecloth on the dining-room table, and enough bedrooms to permit a reasonable privacy for the various members of the family. All this seems like gross extravagance to many an immigrant, and he hesitates to demand the wage that is necessary to maintain these "luxuries." To be sure, these outward expressions are but a few of the changes that we expect the immigrant to make in his habits of living, but they are perhaps the ones that we stress the most.

But it is not only in the traits of the immigrant that we see custom and tradition retarding the possibilities of rapid adjustment. Many of our own native customs and traditions have to be considered. The rapid progress of science and invention has disturbed not a few of our most time-honored habits and beliefs. For example, not many years ago tuberculosis took a large toll of life each year, and it was discovered that the best way to prevent and cure this "white plague" was to change the old habit of sleeping with closed windows and in heated or poorly ventilated rooms. Somehow we had developed the idea that night air was to be shut out because it was poisonous. It took more than a decade to persuade the American people to change their habits and thus reduce the annual toll of deaths caused by tuberculosis. Then, too, medical science has shown us that frequent bathing is essential to good health and vitality. But the habit of bathing was indeed hard to establish. The first bathtub installed in the United States (1842) was exhibited as a curiosity at a party; and in 1850 Virginia placed a tax on all bathtubs on the basis that they were an extravagant luxury. And even sophisticated Boston required that a doctor's permission be given to those who desired to take a bath in the wintertime, as winter bathing was regarded as injurious to the health. Today we regard regular bathing as one of the essentials to decent living and a

bathroom is almost as essential to the American family as the kitchen.

On the other hand, we must not forget that "old fashioned" ideas often have understandable bases, even in their tendency to persist. In the first example just cited, closed windows keep out health-giving fresh air; yet they also performed functions now done by screening—keeping out malarial and other disease-carrying mosquitoes and insects. In the case of bathtubs, it must be admitted that frequent bathing would have been a Spartan habit in the days of poor heating and virtually nonexistent plumbing facilities; and such primitive conditions still prevail in many sections of our country.

In matters of education the forces of custom and tradition are perhaps the most serious handicaps to the improvement of our schools. The old traditional concept of education was that it was a means of distinguishing the gentleman and the lady from the common folks. Consequently the curricula of the schools were composed of such subjects as Latin, literature, mathematics, astronomy, and other subjects that had no direct bearing on the means of getting a living. During the past half century, however, there has grown a different idea or ideal of education: "the transmission of experience that will make for more complete and efficient living." Vocational schools have sprung up alongside the regular school system, and considerable inroads have been made in the traditional curriculum permitting the teaching of applied arts and industries. Nevertheless, the conflict between the traditional and the new forms of education still constitutes one of the main issues in community life.

In religion, likewise, tradition and custom have played and still play a most important rôle. In many communities the church has been looked upon merely as an institution to be used for Sunday worship and for funerals. Thus religion came to be regarded as a Sunday affair and of more importance for those who were reaching the last milestone of life rather than as a seven-day-a-week influence for the benefit and strengthening of the lives of all. We now see a new movement to make the church serve the social needs of the community and interpret the daily spiritual problems in these days of intensive living. But here, too, we see the old resisting the new with every theological tenet at its disposal.

Among our Puritan forefathers recreation, and especially Sunday recreation, was regarded as a sure sign of utter depravity. Many of our States still have on their statute books numerous "blue laws" that were designed to keep the "unregenerate sinner" in the paths of "righteousness." Dancing and even the "fiddle" were not allowed in the home, and to play cards was to invite open condemnation of the pious. There are many communities that still cling to these ideas of play and recreation. In many communities, not even the public school—much less the parish house of the church—can be opened for dances or even for social festivities. Obviously

proponents of modern programs for community recreation must move with caution and be content with slow progress where people still cling to these old customs and traditions. To ignore or defy these traditions merely leads to community conflict, which retards progress instead of advancing it.

We might multiply our illustrations of the influence of custom and tradition as factors affecting adjustment. What we have said, however, should suffice to make clear the need of considering these forces in developing plans and policies for social adjustment. Needless to say, no two communities are quite alike in regard to the play of these forces on their various social problems.

GEOGRAPHIC AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

It is easy enough to see how geographic and physical conditions affect the social problems in the different parts of the world. The people living at the foot of a volcano will naturally face problems and develop an outlook quite different from those of the people who live on the fertile inland plains of a great continent.[2] People living in the tropics may be expected to develop customs and traditions altogether different from those of people who live in the regions visited by winter, and the problems of the former greatly differ from those which harass the people who must provide for shelter and comfort in the lands of snow and ice.

Even in the United States, geographic and physical conditions must be taken into account in the making of social adjustments. For example, the people pocketed in the isolated valleys of the Appalachians have been shut off for generations from the main highways and currents of social progress. They are still governed largely by the social customs and habits of the first pioneers who crossed the Alleghenies. The development of schools, of ample public health facilities, and of progressive community life is dependent upon the development of improved highways and communication systems that will eliminate barriers and bring the people into closer contact with the forces of social progress.

Again, taking the map of the United States and the records of the Weather Bureau, we are able to chart the zones over which there are frequent cyclones and hurricanes. Yet when we come to observe the communities in these regions, we notice that they build the same sort of farm buildings and live in the same sort of houses that are to be found in the regions less frequently visited by devastating storms. Furthermore, the people in these regions as a rule carry no more insurance against the storms than do the people of the regions where storms are less frequent. Thus every year we read of whole communities being wiped out, schools being destroyed, and thousands of lives being lost. Appeals go to all the people

[2] R. Mukerjee, *Regional Sociology* (1926).

of the nation to assist the Red Cross in aiding the sufferers and rebuilding their homes. It would seem that due recognition of the geographic conditions would greatly assist in the making of more permanent adjustments in these communities.

Similarly, the thousands who live in the lowlands (where, repeatedly, floods sweep away millions of dollars' worth of property and hundreds of lives) still cling to the hope that floods will cease to recur. Not until these people are willing to recognize the geographic conditions peculiar to their region will they be able to make any permanent adjustments that will protect them against future disaster.

A less obvious, but nevertheless significant, influence of climatic conditions is to be observed in the behavior of the Northern population moving into the Southern States. Invariably we hear the complaint that the Southern climate "makes folks lazy." This may be true to some extent; but in larger measure it is due to the Northerners' failure to recognize the influence of climate on habits of living. People from the North invariably take with them their habits of diet and housing. A heavy protein and meat diet, which is necessary to furnish the heat and energy for comfortable and efficient living in the North, becomes a drug to the vitality and efficiency of the individual living in a warm climate. Similarly, the snug cottages with small rooms and low ceilings and with little ventilation provided for above the ceiling may be perfectly satisfactory and comfortable in Wisconsin, but are stuffy and close when located in Mississippi. Healthy and efficient living requires that we regulate our habits and living conditions in accordance with the demands of the climatic conditions.

Failure to take into account the influence of the geographic conditions in social adjustment has been responsible for more waste and delay in the working out of sound policies for community well-being than has generally been recognized.

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

Another set of factors that we must recognize in making social adjustments, whether for individuals or for communities, is the *economic,* that is, the ability of an individual or of the community to pay for the requirements of health, education, and other social advantages prescribed by the American standard of living.[3] Even in as wealthy as nation as ours, there are many communities in which the income is too small to provide the families with the necessities for physical comfort, to say nothing of providing the children with good schools, or supporting a public health nurse or a director of public playgrounds. This is especially true in many of the old agricultural communities where the soil has been depleted and the old population has moved off, leaving the land to less thrifty and poorer

[3] C. R. Daugherty, *Labor Problems in American Industry* (1948), Ch. VI.

tenant-farmers; or in urban areas during long periods of industrial depression and unemployment.

There are other groups and communities in which the annual income would seem to be sufficient to maintain a fairly high standard of living, but in which the forces of commercialization and exploitation absorb so much of that income that the people are unable to provide themselves with the means of progress. Thus many mining communities remain dingy, unhealthy, and backward not from poverty, but because the wealth is not expended in a way that secures to the working population the elements of a high standard of living. For example, the miner may earn $10 to $12 a day and work on an average of 150 to 200 days in the year, or even more; but various discounts are taken from his wage, and often the remainder must be spent for groceries and goods purchased at the "company store" and rent paid to the "company" landlord. The company has no competitor, nor will it tolerate competition. Consequently the laborer is in no position to remedy his unfavorable conditions without moving and changing his occupation, and, as a general rule, he is in debt to the company and unable to find a way of moving his family into a better community. Improvement in the conditions in such communities is largely initiated by organized effort outside of them.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Every individual comes into the world with a certain *heredity*. We behave as human beings because we are human and are descended from a long line of ancestors who were human. Obviously our human heritage determines attitudes both by *limiting* certain actions and by *prompting* certain others. Thus, no normal man has a tendency to swing about the trees by his tail for the very sufficient reason that he has not inherited a tail. On the other hand, all animate beings require oxygen; but human heredity prescribes that this be obtained only from the air, which necessitates the act of breathing through the lungs.

In a deeper sense, however, biology has revealed to us enough concerning inborn tendencies to show us that each individual's social behavior depends somewhat upon the characteristics that have been transmitted to him by his parents through the germ-plasm. Not only are such things as the color of our eyes, skin, and hair or the structure of our teeth determined by heredity; the basic nervous organization of each individual depends upon his inheritance. How much these inborn characteristics or tendencies determine our responses to given situations we do not yet know. We are quite certain, however, that they determine our bents and trends in a fundamental way.

We also behave as we do on account of our reactions to the experiences of life—in other words, because of the effect that *environment* has upon

our inborn equipment. By environment is meant every element surrounding us in life. Obviously the history of an individual's life is largely the account of how his hereditary equipment adapts itself to the stimuli of the environment. Neither the inborn equipment nor the external stimuli can be considered alone in studying the history of any organism.

There is a school of anthropogeographers who maintain that the institutions of mankind and the reactions of individuals are, directly or indirectly, the results of natural surroundings. To what extent this is true we are yet unable to say. There are substantial grounds for belief that our physical surroundings have something to do with the way in which we behave. A number of theorists have attempted to show the importance of the physical environment upon human social behavior.[4] The modern student of social problems, while realizing the importance of physical environment, must avoid giving it too much emphasis.

There are, of course, the normal differences in temperament to be noted among the various racial and nationality groups; and even these differences reflect widely different responses to the social requirements of community life. Social settlement workers, in working with foreign groups, have noticed these differences in temperament and have found it necessary to adapt their programs to them.[5] Efficiency engineers have called attention to the great difference in the various racial stocks in regard to their ability to withstand the effects of monotony in industry. The South European appears to be able to bear up under a strain of monotonous machine operation much longer than the English or the Irish workers. This fact has led to the development of schedules of relief that take into account difference in temperament.

In addition, there are to be noted in almost every community and in different sections of the country *abnormal* biological conditions that are matters of more serious concern than mere differences of temperament. Perhaps we should divide the abnormal elements of the population into two general groups· first, the depleted or drained-out stock that we find in many of the older communities; and second, the feeble-minded, epileptic, and degenerate stock, which is, for the most part, scattered through the population in every locality, and constitutes an increasing burden on our charitable and correctional agencies.

In attempting to develop a program of social adjustment in many of the old communities, we find that the response of the people is slow and weak. Undoubtedly there is some biological basis for this lethargy and indifference. For years such communities have been continually drained of their vigorous and ambitious elements, and only the easily satisfied remained behind to intermarry and perpetuate their traits.[6]

[4] See Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), Chs. II, III, for a critical review of these theories.

[5] See, for example, Jane Addams's classic *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1910).

[6] E. A. Ross, *The Social Trend* (1922), Ch. III.

The chief consideration in regard to the effect of the feeble-minded, epileptic, and degenerate elements of the community upon the problem of social adjustment consists in the increasing attention that this hopeless group requires. Invariably these people constitute the greatest menace to health, morals, and security when they are allowed to remain at large in the community. Consequently, any sound program must necessarily consider the ways and means of safeguarding community life against these unfortunate and undependable groups.

GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES

To an increasing degree Americans are depending upon governmental action as a means of making social adjustments. Yet forward-looking people frequently are discouraged and disheartened by the slowness and inefficiency with which the government moves in matters of social reform. For example, with the development of our improved methods of transportation and travel, our State laws relative to marriage and divorce no longer offer the necessary safeguards to stable family life. Moreover, what one State may attempt to accomplish in regulating marriages and divorces may be defeated by the laxity of other States. Unquestionably the whole problem would be greatly simplified if the Federal Government were charged with the regulation of marriage and divorce. A similar situation is to be found in attempts to obtain a Federal child-labor law, which was declared unconstitutional and left for the States to work out as they saw fit. It is true that the Social Security laws have indirectly improved the conditions of child-labor considerably, but the situation still leaves much to be desired. In the meantime, a proposed amendment to the Constitution, to permit the Congress to regulate child-labor directly, has long lain dormant, having failed to receive ratification by the necessary two-thirds of the States.

Governmental policies also are twisted and perverted by the pressure of various groups seeking to control the policies—or even the processes—of government for their own purposes. Such groups are apt to profess their concern for the public welfare even while they further their own interests; yet the net result often is an increase in the complex problems of balancing group interests for the welfare of all concerned. Thus the revenues derived from one section or group have often been distributed in a way that has provided disproportionate services. For example, as late as 1929 the United States paid out $143,594,000 for pensions for the War Between the States.[7] It is estimated that 98 per cent of this pension fund was expended in the Northern States, while the eleven Southern States, which are not included in the Federal pension system, paid approximately one-fifth of the revenue that went into this fund. Consequently approximately $30,000,000 was drained out of the Southern States in that year alone and expended to build up the prosperity and to take care of the depend-

[7] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1930*, p. 160.

ents of the North. Similarly we have farm blocs perennially seeking approval of various crop subsidy or farm credit proposals, manufacturers clamoring for high tariffs, employers and workers each seeking laws to protect themselves or to restrain their rivals.

The problems of advancing the public welfare also are complicated in some ways by the very processes of democratic government itself. The framers of our Constitution were careful to preserve a maximum of power in the hands of the individual States, with the result that today many functions that formerly were carried on within the States now concern whole regions if not the entire country. For example, the State child-labor laws, which we mentioned a moment ago, are grossly inadequate when the products of the States are sold in competition with other States of the nation. Moreover, we have the general system of functional "checks and balances" in the machinery of government: the tripartite balance of responsibility between the legislative, judicial, and administrative agencies, each body a check upon the others. This device was formulated to prevent the perversion of power by any one group; yet it often results in inefficiency or even minority control, because any one of the three can vitiate even the most reasonable activities of the other two.

When our forefathers framed our government, they based their hope for the future upon the action of the individual voter. Hence, patriots look with dire misgiving upon the fact that our modern elections fail to "get out all the voters" and attribute this failure to vote to indifference, a sense of futility, or even disloyalty. Whatever the reasons for the failure of large portions of our citizens to vote, it is true that their absence from the polls makes it much easier for minorities to impose their candidates and philosophies upon the majority of the citizenry. It has been estimated that in local and State elections, as many as half to two-thirds of the voters do not register their wishes. Thus, a "majority" may be as little as a sixth or a quarter of the total of qualified voters; and especially in local, ward politics it is easy to see that a "machine" controlling as few as fifty active votes often can exert a formidable show of strength. This matter is of special importance, since so much of life today is controlled by government, either directly or by laws affecting the activities of other agencies like industry and commerce.

But to acknowledge the limitations and handicaps of our type of government is by no means equivalent to denouncing the democratic technique as a way of getting our mutual affairs accomplished. Rather, the characteristic feature of our governmental structure is to be accepted and taken into account in every program of social adjustment. The alternative to the democratic way is that of oligarchic collectivism; and the world experience of recent years has taught us nothing if not that we cannot depend on the mystic leader for benevolent administration of governmental agencies. On the other hand, our own tremendous strides in social

welfare legislation and government administration in the midst of world confusion suggests most emphatically that our democratic forms have vitality and resiliency.

Perhaps one of the best indications of the importance of the government in matters of social adjustment is to be noted in the way the States spend the taxpayer's dollar. (See Table 32.) While increasing demands are made on the various units of government—Federal, State, and local—the mounting cost of government has been a growing source of dissatisfaction. Yet slow and clumsy though governmental action may seem, it must be increasingly depended upon to secure those regulations which will obtain protection and service for the population in matters of health, education, occupational adjustment, industrial relations, and social welfare, as well as in the administration of justice.

THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

Finally, a factor that must be taken into account and which to no small extent determines the rate of social adjustment, is the spiritual life of the community. By the spiritual life we mean here *the attitude that people take toward themselves, toward others, and toward their ideals and religion.* Clearly, the lives of nations and communities alike necessarily are influenced very fundamentally by the sort of self-esteem their inhabitants possess. A people that thinks itself "chosen" or especially privileged is likely to be aggressive in its dealings with others, nay, even ruthless! If the society is highly stratified, its dealings among its own members are apt to be similar to the conditions just cited, with the bonds of sympathy and mutual respect limited to members of one's own economic class or social group. On the other hand, a society that is highly democratic and respects the rights of the individual—*any* individual—is much more likely to cooperate wholeheartedly both within itself and with other cultures and nations.

Naturally enough, we associate religion with the spiritual life of peoples. But many of us do not realize fully how important and how varied its influence is upon the particular people involved. For instance, Tawney and Weber have analyzed ingeniously the relation between the individualism and free enterprise which are at the heart of both Protestantism and capitalism.[8] The Protestant emphasis upon "works" (or work) as a means of "salvation" seemed to give religious sanction to the long hours of hard toil so characteristic of early capitalism, while the projection of the individual conscience as law-giver tended to break down the medieval governmental and religious restraints upon industry and trade.

The prevailing religious belief regarding the relation between the present and the future life also shapes the popular attitude toward social

[8] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926).

TABLE 32: EXPENDITURES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1915 AND 1948 *

Type of Service	*1915* Amount	*1915* Percentage	*1915* Per Capita	*1948* Amount	*1948* Percentage	*1948* Per Capita
All purposes	$379,030,094	100.0	$3.85	$10,400,000,000	100.0	$72.96
General government	44,508,417	11.7	0.45	257,000,000	2.9	1.80
Protection to person and property	26,294,691	6.9	0.27	200,000,000	1.9	1.40
Health and sanitation	9,453,673	2.5	0.10	106,000,000	1.0	.74
Conservation of natural resources	16,558,685	4.4	0.17	244,000,000	2.3	1.71
Highways	22,767,766	6.0	0.23	1,990,000,000	19.1	13.95
Charities, hospitals, and corrections	89,189,400	23.5	0.91	622,000,000	5.9	4.36
Schools	145,832,324	38.5	1.48	2,312,000,000	22.2	16.22
Bonus payments to veterans	—	—	—	616,000,000	5.9	4.32
Interest and debt retirement	—	—	—	250,000,000	2.4	1.76
Public welfare	—	—	—	1,602,000,000	15.4	11.24
Unemployment compensation trust funds	—	—	—	1,059,000,000	10.2	7.43
Miscellaneous	24,425,138	6.5	.24	1,142,000,000	10.8	8.03

* *Financial Statistics of States, 1928* (United States Bureau of the Census, 1931); *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950*, p. 361.

problems. If the present is considered only an interlude preceding a future life for the individual soul, then existing evils will be endured without much protest. On the other hand, if people are convinced that future "salvation" depends upon striving for a world more perfect than the one which exists, improvements in social relationships will be hastened. However, the experience and interests of *special groups* of people also are a factor which influence the character of their religious beliefs and practices. For example, a church in a prosperous area is apt to reflect the conservatism of its members, while one in a locality in which acute social problems exist is likely to have more militant policies. And the fact of *organization,* in either case, will itself tend to give force to the attitudes of the people in matters pertaining to social adjustment.

It is increasingly true that we are dependent, for better or worse, upon the activities of organized groups in shaping social attitudes and policies. Whether it be public welfare organization to handle the problems of charity, the promotion of business interests by associations of commerce, the industrial clashes between labor unions and employers' associations, or any one of the hundreds of other organized activities, these same groups are having tremendous influence in determining what sort of adjustments or working relations we shall have with one another. The individual today makes his power felt, as a rule, only by pooling his efforts with those of other individuals in a mutual, common enterprise. Much depends upon the relative strength of the competing forces and upon the quality of leadership they have. Of equal importance socially, however, are the principles and motivating forces *underlying* the activities of these many groups, since it is the objectives of the successful competing groups that will determine, in the end, the sort of social adjustments that will emerge. A certain amount of "self-interest" must always be assumed. It is unsound to expect that organizations, or even individuals in large numbers, will ever exert themselves wholly for idealistic reasons. A more practical approach to the matter is to try to keep the struggle within the limits of socially acceptable behavior and goals.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What are social attitudes? How do they express themselves? How are they formed?
2. List some of the behavior patterns required by the groups with which you are associated, relative to some commonly accepted standard or institution such as church-going, divorce, or women in industry.
3. List three or four worn-out customs, and show how they impede the process of social adjustment.
4. List three or four customs which you consider still of merit, and show how they facilitate the process of social adjustment.
5. Is the inertia of custom and tradition of value at times in the process of social adjustment, or are custom and tradition simply forces that stand in the way of reform? Discuss.
6. What part have geographic and physical conditions had in the development of social life in the United States? To what extent have we overcome the influences of topography and climate? What geographic and climatic conditions still affect our problems of social adjustment?
7. Show how economic factors affect the problem of social adjustment. How does poverty affect the possibility of keeping pace with the progress demanded by social change? Give an illustration that relates to the situation of a single family. Give another illustration that relates to a whole group or section.
8. In how far would you say that apparent inherent differences may be produced by environmental differences, and by differences in custom and tradition, between one nationality and another?
9. Give three illustrations of your own to show how government and politics affect the problem of social adjustment.
10. After considering carefully the social life of your community answer the following: (a) To what extent and in what particulars does *laissez-faire* ("hands off") express the attitude of the community toward social maladjustments? (b) To what extent and in what particulars are coöperation and mutual service coming to be recognized as the proper attitude? (c) What groups or agencies of the community are the chief exponents of each of these policies?
11. Which is more to be feared as a disruptive force in social organization—uncontrolled material changes, or the influence of individual leaders (either radical or conservative)? Explain your position.

20. Philosophies of Social Adjustment

ALL SOCIAL PROBLEMS grow out of *the* social problem—the problem of the adjustment of man to his universe, and of the social universe to man. The maladjustments in these relationships give us all our social problems—disease, poverty, family disorganization, race and group conflicts, crime, mental defect and disease, individual failure, and the breakdown of our social institutions.

It must be clear at the outset, of course, that these maladjustments are not static or unchanging. The character of poverty, for example, has changed immensely since the days of ancient Egypt, or even since the reign of Queen Elizabeth in England. The *problem* of poverty has changed, because the conditions producing it, and the ideas of mankind concerning it, have changed. Slavery was the answer to the problem of poverty till fairly recent times. But as social attitudes began to change, it was seen that slavery itself was a "social problem"—a far from satisfactory adjustment in man's relations with his fellow-man or with his universe. The same is true of all our social problems. They change, just as surely as society itself changes; and maladjustments do not turn into problems till they become generally recognized as such. So the many proposals we shall discuss in this chapter reveal not only a wide variety of social thinking but also something of the kaleidoscopic nature of social change and the problems of adjustment it poses for mankind.

HISTORICAL SOLUTIONS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM

Attempts to solve the problem of man's relationship to his physical and social environment are not new. Ever since he has reflected on the tangles of life, man has been guessing at the causes of the difficulty he experiences in adjusting his social world to the demands of daily living, and he has been devising methods to deal with those causes. In philosophy and theology it has become known as "the problem of evil." When political philosophy arose, it involved the problem of the relationship of the in-

dividual to the political structure. When economics was born, discussion early centered around the relationship of the State to the economic activities of the individual, economic theory swinging from the *Nazionalökonomie* of the Physiocrats to the *laissez-faire* of the Classical Economists and back to limitation of the self-seeking of the individual by the State for the welfare of all. The problem has long been the center of discussion by religious philosophers and Utopians, giving rise to dreams of social organization as widely different as St. Augustine's *City of God* (*circa* 420 A.D.) and Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888). As the scientific method developed, diagnoses and solutions as widely different as those of the economic materialism of Karl Marx and the hereditary determinism of the eugenists took the place of these Utopian dreams.

All these different theories of the origin of the social problem and plans for its solution are alike in one respect—they rest upon *one* explanation of the difficulty, and provide *one* solution of the problem. That each of them contains truth we may admit—but not the whole truth. Life is not so simple that its maladjustments can be understood by one theory, and solved by a panacea. Only modern knowledge with its deeper probing into the nature of man and into the complex nature of his surroundings could make that apparent. Man himself is anatomically a much more complicated mechanism than anyone but a modern scientist could fully realize. Similarly, only rather recently has man begun to understand how very complex is his social being, resulting from the tangled growth of traditions, customs, beliefs, and social organizations produced by the effort of mankind through millennia of endeavors to order its life in this little-understood world. The human mind confronted by the problems of adjustment and self-preservation and without modern scientific knowledge and inventions often sought a short and simple way out. Most of the historic analyses and "solutions" of these problems are the result of the demand of man's mind for clarity and guidance. Let us look at some of these theories.

Religious Solutions. The problem of evil is to be found at the base of every religion. It is probable that religion arose out of man's attempts to solve the maladjustments between his purposes and his environment and from his attempt to explain these maladjustments. What else is the meaning of the rites and ceremonies designed to ward off disease, to promote the growth of crops and the fertility of flocks? How else explain the widespread concept of what we call "sin," however varied may be the content of that concept, whether it be regarded as "folly" (as in Buddhism), as failure to come up to the demands of an ideal (as among the Greeks), or as alienation from God (as with St. Paul)? Evil is there. Everywhere it is lack of consonance between personal ideals and circumstance, whether the personal ideals be those of physical welfare or of spiritual communion

with God. The conception of the origin of evil varies widely. Evil is due to *karma* among the Buddhists, to *Fate* among the Greeks, or to the *sin of Adam* among the Hebrews.

The solution of the problem of evil also differs from religion to religion. Among the philosophical Buddhists the problem is solved by a denial of the natural appetites and the social aspirations, and by absorption in contemplation of Deity until the individual attains Nirvana. In most religions, however, the problem leads to active efforts to affect an adjustment of the individual to the will of God, or to bend God's will to the need of the individual, or both. In Judaism and primitive Christianity the solution lay in the expiation of the sin that had created the maladjustment. However, as the theory that misery is the fruit of sin was put to the acid test of experience, questions were raised that were difficult to answer on the basis of this simple explanation. So far as we can tell from the Old Testament, the first great challenge to the theory came when the Hebrew kingdoms were destroyed by nations that were less "righteous" than the Hebrews. The problem of the individual righteous man, who in spite of his righteousness suffers greatly, is the theme of the profound Book of Job. How can it be that a man who has adjusted his conduct to the will of God, as had Job, must suffer as he suffered? What is the matter with the theory? A similar question arose to plague the Christian apologists over the suffering of the sinless Jesus. They answered it on the basis of vicarious suffering. So far as Jesus himself is revealed in the Gospels He had no complete answer to the question. The conflict between His wish as a young man to live, and His desire to maintain His individual integrity comes out in that cry on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

The puzzling question still remains to vex us when we send millions of youth to death on the field of battle, or when we see millions die of disease, or when we see the honest toiler come down to an old age of want. The answer of religion is still "sin"; but the content of the term has vastly widened to take in the selfishness and ignorance of men in organized society. That the answer of the historic religions has truth, but not the whole truth, is plain in the light of modern knowledge. The conception of religion must be widened to take in the wide reach of what psychology and biology have told us about the nature of man, and what the social sciences are just beginning to tell us about the nature of the social complex in the midst of which man lives. Then perhaps religion may be geared with the social machinery to resolve the conflict between man and his environment, by supplying the motives and ideals that can modify both in the direction of better social adjustment. Thus far, organized religion generally has been too one-sided to serve the larger social purpose, although it has not failed any more completely than most of the other proposed solutions of the social problem. To the contrary, it can be argued effectively

that insofar as it has been honestly and correctly applied, religion has contributed its full share toward creating and advancing those elements in our modern life we cherish most.

Utopian Solutions. Another type of solution is that of the Utopians, who feel that society as now constituted contains the germs of its own failure. For this reason they would throw our ill-functioning social forms and institutions upon the scrap-heap and replace them with a new social order, a system as perfect as the mind of man can make it. Thus, a Utopia is an imaginary society built on the lines of what is held to be perfection. It may be brought forth for various purposes: social reform, as in the case of the Hebrew prophets; emphasis on certain ethical principles, as with Jesus; concrete statement of a great social philosopher's theories, as with Plato; satirization of contemporary social life by comparison, as with More; expression of longings, as with Bacon; or argument for the establishment of a strong centralized church, as with St. Augustine. Whatever the purpose to be served, a Utopia is always the joint product, in varying proportions, of the imagination and the intellect; and the possibility of realizing that purpose can only be approached in accordance with the degree of practicability that the Utopia sets forth.

First in historical sequence come the *religious Utopias.* That such a Utopia should follow the attempt of the early Hebrew prophets to achieve a reformed Hebrew State in the solution of the social problem is not surprising. The concept of a reformed Hebrew State gave way, on the destruction of the Hebrew kingdoms, to a Messianic dream. If the concept of sin and its undesirable consequences was not sufficient to change men's ways, perhaps the painting of the blissful state attainable by the following of religious precepts would be of some avail. The first among the religious Utopians were the later of the so-called "literary prophets" of Israel. With Isaiah (740–700 B.C.) came the dawn of the Messianic hope. Here social reconstruction was to be effected by religious faith through the efficacy of ethical and spiritual forces. His perfect kingdom included a just king, absence of physical ailments, moral and intellectual improvement, abundance in nature, and universal peace. Jeremiah (626–586 B.C.) emphasized the importance of individual religion in attaining social perfection. Ezekiel (*circa* 626–570 B.C.) carried this idea of individual responsibility further, and prophesied the ideal State absorbed in the church. In that part of the book of Isaiah known as the work of Deutero-Isaiah, another Utopia is set forth, depending upon the complete spiritualization of its citizens, including all races, and everlasting. Among all the prophets we are aware of a divine optimism that implies a change in human nature and a recognition of a Supreme Being. Utopia for them was the natural culmination of right living.

Following the prophets we have the apocalyptists who flourished from 210 B.C. to 130 A.D. They are on the whole fantastic where the prophets

had been concrete, imitative rather than creative, and pseudepigraphic, whereas their predecessors for the most part had written under their own names. They deal only with the remote future and their Utopias are attainable only by supernatural convulsions and catastrophes that shall completely wreck the old order and institute a millennium. Their works were written for the most part to steady the faith of the people under oppression. Daniel (166 B.C.) taught that it was the duty of the faithful to wait in resignation for the divinely ordained collapse of earthly affairs, after which Israel would be delivered by supernatural help and have glory forever. The Utopias of Enoch, Ezra, and Peter paint pictures of heaven and hell with assorted fantastic millenniums calculated to cheer the heart of the lowliest Jewish captive in the clutches of Babylon, Assyria, Macedonia, or Rome, as the case might be at different periods. The Revelation of John, the last book of the New Testament, depicts a Utopia preceded by a millennium during which there would be resurrection for the righteous and judgment for the wicked. The New Jerusalem that he described was symbolic of pure spiritual bliss. The apocalyptists are of small value because they wrote only for their own time, gave free rein to uninstructed imagination, and glowingly described an end without offering a means of attainment.

The utopianism of Jesus is embodied in his conception of the Kingdom of God, which is the ideal state of perfect social and spiritual adjustment. He emphasized that its founding was dependent upon love of God and man, and that the practice of this essential prerequisite, and hence the attainment of the Kingdom, was the responsibility of each individual. The Kingdom was both present and future, and its objective was the social redemption of the earth. Love, penitence, obedience to God, humility, freedom from hypocrisy and deceit, freedom from mammonism, devotion, service, and cosmopolitanism are among the essential principles laid down for the realization of this Utopia, which as an ideal at least we may safely say has had more influence in human life than any other.

Faith in God, freedom from lusts, and the practice of Christian ethics are the keystones of Augustine's (354–430) *City of God.* This militant treatise, however, is of little social value, being on the whole rather a poor restatement of the ideas of its predecessors, and concerned less with the ideal society than with the establishment of a hierarchical church.

The only important attempt actually to establish a religious Utopia on earth is that of Savonarola's (1452–98) Florentine theocracy. Coming into control of the government of Florence, Savonarola effected startling reforms through his rigid and Puritanical application of Christian precepts. It was a remarkable testimonial to the results achievable through applied Christianity, but it fell in the end because of its rigidity and intolerance.

Plato (427–347 B.C.) with his *Republic* stands as the model for all *philosophical Utopians.* The *Republic* represents the concrete statement of a

great social philosopher's theories. The search for justice was the keynote, and to effect this highly desirable consummation the Republic was constructed. The Republic was a city-state, an association of ethically minded individuals who accepted the supremacy of the State on ethical grounds. The basic principle underlying the entire organization was the Idea of Good; and in accordance with this principle Plato felt that the individual welfare should be submerged in the social welfare, since the former depends upon the latter. The two fundamental means of attaining the social good, he believed, are: (1) communism, which involved the renunciation of family and property and the submersion of the individual in the group, and (2) ethical education with a view to the selection of leaders and the physical and mental welfare of the citizens. Plato was thus somewhat more practical than the Hebrew prophets; but his Utopia is still impractical because of the fundamental characteristics of human nature. He nevertheless set up an ideal that has affected social thinking ever since.

About the time of what is rather vaguely termed the end of the Middle Ages a remarkable series of circumstances combined to give impetus to a reawakened expression of utopianism in what is known as the *early modern Utopias.* These circumstances were (1) the Crusades, (2) the journeys of Marco Polo, (3) the Black Death (with its consequent labor shortage and the growth of class-consciousness), (4) the rise of the new learning with the entrance of Greek manuscripts into the Western world after the fall of Constantinople, (5) the spread of knowledge due to the invention of the printing-press, (6) the discovery of the American continents, and (7) the introduction of gunpowder. These developments changed considerably the aspect of European life. The spirit of freedom was awakened, enlivening the desire to start afresh and create a new mode of life free from the imperfections of the old. In the religious field this found expression in the Protestant Reformation, and in the social field in a Utopian plea for simplicity in civilization.

The *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, written in 1516 as a satire on the corrupt condition into which England had fallen under the Tudors, because of its realism and constructiveness has given its name to all idealistic solutions of the social problem and has had a wide-reaching influence on social thought. It was based on several principles: (1) The community of property would result in the abolition of class and the equality of all citizens before the law. There would thus be a disdain of material wants, no use for money, no distinction of dress, and elimination of all the attendant evils of selfishness. (2) A ruling prince, elected from an intellectual aristocracy by representatives of the people, would provide wise and at the same time centralized government. Utopia had the city-state form of organization. Equal social opportunity for all was the goal, not an absurd ideal of the absolute equality of all citizens. (3) The family would be State-controlled and supervised, thus insuring the eugenic soundness of off-

spring. (4) Universal and lifelong education would provide for the mental and physical happiness of all. There was to be a six-hour workday in which everyone participated. (5) Religion was pantheistic, reasonable, tolerant, and based on social service.

Francis Bacon with his *New Atlantis* (1623) sought social perfection through science, and attempted to show that knowledge, properly applied, could do away with all the major social maladjustments. For this reason he felt that there must be a communism of knowledge effected through a great endowed city-state college called Solomon's House, which would be an educational, research, and governmental institution in one. Bacon failed to see, however, that science must be responsive to ethical principles; otherwise it tends toward the chaos that our own scientifically inspired civilization is attaining in some places. Note, for example, how Germany subjected all science to the power-mad dictator and his war aims.

Italian utopianism was represented at this period by Campanella with his *City of the Sun* (1623), the principal features of which are: (1) centralized government by an enlightened ruler assisted by Power, Wisdom, and Love; (2) universal coeducation by the visualization method from the third year, with particular emphasis on natural-science; (3) communism of wealth and family; and (4) astrology and the Christian religion for its guidance in matters supernatural.

James Harrington's *Oceana* appeared in England at the time of the rise of Puritanism (1656), and is really a magnified written constitution for the purpose of solving the many perplexing problems facing his country at that time. He pleaded for: (1) the sovereignty of the people through a perfected political government with definite written laws; (2) balance of property through proper economic distribution; (3) governmental devices of (*a*) secret ballot, (*b*) indirect election of officials, (*c*) rotation of officers, (*d*) two-chamber legislative system; (4) religious toleration limited by an established church but allowing liberty of private conscience; and (5) general education of boys for the purpose of perpetuating the principles of government and directing the energies of the citizens.

These are perhaps the most important of the Utopians. Their service has been mainly that of setting an ideal, the value of which has in all cases depended upon their adaptation to social conditions and human nature. The Utopians were all critics of their times, men filled with a "divine discontent" and a desire for social betterment, and men of broad and constructive imagination. If they have been dismissed as "dreamers" it is because they tended to fly too far from reality. Their flight may reflect a frank confession that the affairs of the world were too much for them and may be a deliberate turning to a "dream world" by way of escape from reality. It must be remembered, too, that direct and open criticism is a rare privilege—and one more often denied than granted; so that criticism in many cases had to be veiled in the obscurity of allegory and fanciful

reference to avoid drastic retaliation by established powers. And in every case the Utopian labored under the handicap of the limit on existing knowledge and on the means of securing that knowledge.

Evolutionary Solutions. The scientific movement, which had slowly been developing during the first half of the nineteenth century, had not only introduced new scientific techniques in the shape of quantitative analysis and the inductive method, but also had witnessed the growth of a new attitude among scientists: namely, an increasing consideration of nature as a dynamic process rather than a static group of phenomena. Thus it was that the mutability of organisms had been realized for some time before Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859). In the social field this principle had been sensed in a general way by Adam Smith, who held that the common human desire for self-improvement leads to social well-being and prosperity, a theory he developed in his treatise on *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). Smith's influence was instrumental in transforming economics from a philosophy into a science at a time when social thinkers were becoming increasingly concerned about the economic maladjustment incident to the Industrial Revolution. Godwin, in his *Political Justice* (1793), philosophically explained poverty as the result of exploitation of labor for profit under government protection. The freeing of reason from political interference and the spirit of gain was in his opinion the panacea for social ills. Condorcet, in his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1793), had taken the similar view that improvement in social welfare would accompany human perfectibility. Malthus, with the first really scientific sociological study on *The Principle of Population* (1798), established a precedent in technique and offered startling conclusions that afforded a decided impetus to all subsequent activity in the field. By demonstrating the disparity between the rates of population growth and of the increase of food supply, he launched two fundamental concepts, *the law of diminishing returns* in economics, and *the struggle for existence* in biology.

We mention these writers and their works thus briefly in order to show the change in attitude regarding the solution of society's problems. They represent a groping toward a scientific principle that it remained for Charles Darwin to formulate and set forth in terms of the "evolutionary concept." The essential fact for us here is that Darwin showed that man and the whole of nature alike are governed by the same laws. It was made clear that man, as an organism at least, has developed from lower stages to his present form by the fundamental processes of natural and sexual selection in the struggle for existence.

That this view should be carried over from organic life to social life was only natural. It was Walter Bagehot who, in his *Physics and Politics* (*circa* 1868), first attempted to show that society is also an evolutionary development. John Fiske pointed out, in his *Outlines of Cosmic Philoso-*

phy (1874), that psychic changes have superseded physical in this development. Benjamin Kidd emphasized, in his *Social Evolution* (1894), the influence of religious faith in psychic evolution.

Karl Marx, whose theories are sketched more completely later in this chapter, must be classed among the evolutionary thinkers on the social problem, even though his doctrines do logically and eventually lead to revolution. He advanced the doctrine of *economic determinism* as the basis of social evolution and argued that the solution of the social problem would work itself out only through successive economic stages.

It remained for Spencer to tell the story of society and elucidate the solution of the social problem most completely from the evolutionary standpoint. His theory of the universe is based on evolution. Spencer went to great lengths, both scholastically and in the quantity of his writings, to show that this process goes on in every corner of creation. He argued that, in accordance with all existing forms, social forms and processes also develop according to natural selection and the survival of the fittest. He recognized the social problem as the poor adaptation of man to his surroundings. This is the cause of all unhappiness and friction. The problem is to establish *equilibrium.* Spencer argued that this is possible because human nature is modifiable. Through reaction to external conditions equilibrium is established first with animals, then with man, and finally with society, and this is secured through natural selection by the elimination of nonadapted individuals and social forms. Progress for this reason he regarded as natural and inevitable. The goal is *the ultimate happiness* which means the perfect reconciliation of the individual with social solidarity. Spencer's solution, then, in common with those of all the members of the evolutionary school of which he is the capstone and synthesizer, is to "let nature take its course." Evolution is the law of the universe; and since it is a process of change from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity, *i.e.,* from disorganization to integrated efficiency, improvement is bound to come.

It is obvious that implicit belief in the evolutionary philosophy as represented by the foregoing writers is at least comforting, if not constructive. Remedial measures become merely gestures in the face of fate, which in its own good time will accomplish the desired changes through evolution. This means, as a logical corollary, a placid attitude of "hands off"—*laissez-faire.* But the great criticism of all laissez-faire philosophy is simply that it is not true to experience—social life is much too complex to be so easily explained by one principle. There are too many factors in social maladjustment to allow its eradication solely by the survival of the fittest.

We shall do well, also, to scrutinize the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest," if only because it has been used so often to condone socially ruthless policies or activities by exploitive individuals and groups. Its true meaning and implication should be clearly understood. Standing alone,

the idea implies the presence of an absolute and final measure of fitness, which obviously does not exist in fact. It acquires validity only with reference to specific circumstances: a given form of life or adjustment can be "fittest" only at a given time and place and with regard to the special conditions prevailing then and there. The same form may be quite *un*fit in other times and places. It often happens, too, that further development of the very qualities that made for survival under certain conditions leads to unfitting the group or species for survival as times and conditions change. Indeed, this is the basic reason for the "extinction" of many species and social patterns alike.

Socialistic Solutions. There are two types of socialism at present that have considerable vitality. What has been called *Fabian socialism,* sometimes *guild socialism,* has today a wide following in many European countries and to a lesser extent in the United States, although strictly speaking it is British in origin. In theory it is State socialism, *i.e.,* it proposes that the State or municipality take over certain services and agencies of production, such as municipal utilities, coal-mines, railroads, and other monopolies. In that respect it is not very different from socialism on the Continent before the Russian revolution. On the Continent this kind of socialism is known as *opportunist* or *possibilist socialism.* These terms indicate its method—not by violent measures, but by waiting until the opportunity arrives when State ownership seems to the people to be the only promising way out of a difficulty. It uses the ordinary political machinery to put its principles into operation.

In contrast as to method, not as to aims and purposes, stands the *scientific socialism* of Karl Marx and his followers. Marx himself held the opinion that the capitalistic system holds in its nature the seeds of its own destruction. He believed that monopolistic control of the agencies of production is economically inevitable. But monopolies under capitalistic control operating for profit lead as inevitably to the exploitation of the workers, who alone produce, and result in the end in the overthrow by the workers of the capitalistic regime and in their control of the agencies of production. That is why this type of socialism is sometimes called *revolutionary socialism.* In Marx's mind it was *evolutionary.* The Russian USSR is the first actual experiment in this type of socialism.

In both these types of socialism it is clear that the fundamental basis of the solution is a change in the economic system. The socialists of both types believe that the removal of economic maladjustment is fundamental to all other adjustments. They are hard put to it to explain how their proposed change in the economic system will cure such maladjustments as come about from the biological inferiority of certain stocks. This comes out, for example, in Bonger's treatment of the matter in his *Criminality and Economic Conditions.* While he devotes a chapter to pathological criminals, he says that they are not really criminals and subjects for crim-

inology: criminals are made only by economic conditions. Nothing could better exemplify the one-sided diagnosis and solution of the social problem. It should be said, however, that such Fabian socialists as the Webbs, while stressing the importance of the economic factors in social maladjustment, have a place in their proposals for biology, for medicine, for psychology, and for sociology. While economic reorganization is fundamental, they do not ignore the other factors.

"Practical" Solutions of Social Problems. Those who insist that any solution must be "practical" are likely to reject all such idealistic schemes. By "practical" they mean that in order to solve social maladjustments we must face facts as they are and adopt means that are not too far removed from those with which people are familiar. They insist that "common sense" must dominate those who endeavor to correct evils in our social relationships. They hold that "Rome was not built in a day" and that a new social order cannot be created by any radical change that runs counter to the accepted beliefs, traditions, wonted ways of organization, and customs which are embedded in the everyday life of large numbers of people. One small change after another must be introduced, and thus gradually the whole maladjustment must be remedied.

These people are not likely to become enamoured of any idealistic scheme, such as the Utopias we have just discussed, and are not sufficiently versed in any science to believe that the application of that science may alter the whole pattern of social life. Often they subscribe to some popular stereotype like that of "democracy," "education," "religion," "equality," "justice," "individual rights," or "natural law," or any number of them in combination. Certain ones believe that the protective tariff will solve our problems. Others take just the opposite stand, that free trade will solve our ills. Some may be persuaded that the income tax, or Federal old-age pensions, or government sale of alcoholic liquors will solve the social evils. They, like the idealists, are disposed to think that the root of our social problems is the thing in which they have become most intensely interested. They have made no careful study of all the facts in the complex situation. What facts they have are often twisted to bolster up their beliefs.

In many cases, too, "practical" solutions are supported by groups or individuals for basically *selfish* reasons; by promoting a particular program, they aspire to further their own social prestige, economic interests, or political power, as the case may be. It is true that *some* social good might come of adopting the proposals; but the benefits are likely to be distributed on a one-for-you-and-two-for-me basis, with society as a whole on the "short end" of the contract. This is especially well illustrated by the legislative programs of the various "blocs" in Congress.

Others seem to believe that there is some magic potency in legislation and that anything can be brought about by having a law passed. In many situations the passage of a well-considered law with the proper sanctions

does help. But how often laws are passed containing provisions that are at cross-purposes with the lines intended by the lawmaker, or that run counter to the fundamental social and economic patterns of the time and therefore become valueless! In the Middle Ages laws forbade the taking of interest on money lent. With the growth of commerce based upon a growing money economy rather than upon barter, the tendency was all against such a law. As a result it was circumvented by such devices as "bottomry" and a dozen others, and finally the law had to be changed. Laws on marriage and divorce illustrate the same situation. With changing conditions, old customs and laws give way to those better adapted to the new situation. On the other hand, sometimes laws are far ahead of the changes in sentiments and customs of the people. If not *too* far ahead, they may be one means of hastening the process of social change.

Often these "practical" schemes, whether in the economic, the political, or the social field, are hit-or-miss experiments. People have not taken the trouble to ascertain the facts before they tried the experiment. Frequently those very experiments already have been tried elsewhere. If only the promoters had taken counsel of those who had already tested the proposal! When we cannot know what we should do, we are entitled to experiment. However, so great is the accumulation of knowledge both as to past experiments and as to the factors in a given maladjustment that it is no longer necessary to follow wasteful, inadequate, and antiquated methods of solving our difficulties. As an example, consider how much more efficient is the legislation enacted in a State that has a Legislative Reference Bureau to provide information regarding the results of similar experiments elsewhere than that of those States where no such agency exists. In a great many fields sufficient facts have been accumulated to throw light upon the probable effect of many proposed pieces of legislation and upon the relative efficiency of various methods of solving economic, political, and social maladjustment.

Scientific analysis of many of our social problems has developed to the place where even a new problem can be approached with a fairly high degree of confidence in our ability to ascertain the underlying factors in the maladjustment. A careful investigation would often provide guidance as to the way to solve a difficulty had we the good sense to apply such a method rather than the costly one of rule-of-thumb experiment. Even in our census figures, inadequate as they are for many of our purposes, there lies a great mass of information at the present time too little used. Engineering and medicine illustrate the possibilities of the application of scientific methods to their problems, methods which have saved enormous sums of money and have given results that no amount of the oldfashioned crude experimenting would provide. Without the use of such methods the present-day skyscraper, if possible at all, would be built at very much greater expense and with much less safety. Modern medicine and surgery

would be quite impossible without modern science. Similar methods must be introduced for the solution of our social problems.

ONE-SIDED SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES

Biology with its theories of heredity throws at least some light on why certain families produce leaders and inventors, great thinkers, and captains of industry, while other families generation after generation give us our paupers, insane, mental defectives, ne'er-do-wells, loafers, "cumberers of the ground." It has called attention to the importance of the human stock in the origin and the solution of social problems.

Physiological chemistry has studied the function of the secretion of the various glands of the human body. In recent years, it has been giving attention to the function of the secretions of the ductless glands in regulating the physiological balance of the bodily organism. Certain enthusiasts in this field have held that conduct is the result of the way in which these various glands function. The more conservative scholars, however, judge that much careful study must yet be made before competent statements as to the bearing of gland-functioning on conduct can be decided. Physiological chemists also have made great strides in giving us a better understanding of nutrition and food problems, poisons, allergies, vitamins, and kindred matters.

The psychologists since the turn of the present century have analyzed the working of the human mind as never before. As a result we now have considerable insight into how the human mind works, the nature of the emotions, what intelligence is, and how intelligence, emotion, and action are determined. Especially the students of abnormal psychology, the psychiatrists, have uncovered the genesis and development of those abnormal mental states which lead so inevitably to social maladjustment. Here again there has been a tendency among some of the more enthusiastic to claim that psychology can furnish the solution of all social difficulties. They call attention to the large number of mentally defective or mentally disordered persons among the social failures, and often leave one with the impression that psychology and psychiatry have said the last word on the solution of the social problem. They agree in part with the geneticists in acknowledging that control of the human stock is one answer to social ills. They point out, however, that mental and emotional disorders may arise in cases where there is no known hereditary defect. They also place much more emphasis than the eugenists on the part played in mental disorder by one's experience.

There is a certain school of economic determinists, the Marxian socialists, who believe that all social maladjustment is due to the economic organization. Their panacea is the reorganization of the economic life of society. The present capitalistic organization of society, in their view, accounts for such things as poverty, crime, sexual irregularity, and even

mental defect and disorder. With our economic arrangements based upon State ownership of the instruments of production, they contend, all these evils and many others would automatically disappear. The greed and selfishness of men, now generated and emphasized by our capitalistic system with its stress upon profits, would disappear, and in their stead would appear unselfishness and mutual aid, kindness and coöperation. Here again we have a lopsided explanation of social maladjustment, and a unilateral solution.

Again, there is a class of sociologists who hold that the social circumstances of an individual account for his behavior, making him a good citizen or a social parasite. They tend to belittle the influence of heredity, the importance of psychology, the economic organization of society, and the chemistry of the human body. Their diagnosis of the problem is based upon a one-sided study of social organization in its influence upon the individual. They are as off-center as any of these other special pleaders.

To one acquainted with the progress of the various sciences bearing upon the understanding of human conduct, all of these special approaches are inadequate. Man in organized society is a much more complex being than any of these advocates would have us believe. His conduct is the result of a large number of factors. First, he is an animal. As a biological organism he operates in much the same way as other biological organisms of the same general order of mammals. Like all others he has two great hungers—food and sex. But he is a more complex biological organism than any other by reason of his much more highly developed brain. In a much greater degree than other animals, his conduct is determined not only by instincts but also by reason and social sanctions, such as shame, approval and disapproval, tradition, custom, and prestige among his fellows. Many of these other factors in his conduct conflict with aboriginal instincts and tendencies. Consider the infinitely complex nature of his brain as compared with that of lower animals. How delicate must be the adjustments between the millions of brain cells to insure the coördinated activities necessary to successful human conduct in a highly complex social order like that of the twentieth century! How easily upset is that delicate balance between body and brain, as one can see among the inmates of a hospital for the insane! How necessary it is that the quality of the brain be of a high order in modern society is revealed by the conduct of imbeciles and morons—and it may be added, by the failures of those who are just above the level of the mental defective. Moreover, how upon this delicate organism beat those social contrivances, the product of man's social experience—the ambitions, the ideals, aspirations, standards, customs, traditions, of the group! If the individual quits his group with its wonted complex of social arrangements, as happens in the vast migration movements of the present, there arises a situation that calls for adjustments of the most radical nature, for a high degree of mental plasticity

and originality on the part of the individual. Only the well-integrated personality can meet that situation satisfactorily. The others fail—although they probably would not have failed had they remained in a situation to which they were adjusted.

Consider also the situation in a highly dynamic society, as compared with one in which the situation is changing only slowly. Every swift change in social life demands adjustments requiring a high level of mental ability.

These considerations make it apparent that scientific approach to social maladjustment must be many-sided. The social scientist must take into consideration *all* the facts of the social situation. He must know the nature of the individual as the psychologist and the psychiatrist, as the biologist and the physiological chemist, know him. He cannot ignore economics and politics. He must understand social psychology. He must know his sociology—how human aggregates come together, spread, develop social institutions, organize for various purposes, and control their members. Even then with the synthesis of all the knowledge available he will have difficulty. But only that way lies hope of success.

"PLANNED" SOLUTIONS

Inspired to some extent by the example of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia during the 1920's, and driven by the persistent and increasing economic difficulties of the 1930's, all the major powers of the world have resorted to "social planning" for the solution of their social and economic problems. The main outlines of social planning are everywhere the same. It entails a more or less complete organization of the economic and social life of a nation, the control being exercised by the political machinery of the country. The government becomes the focal point or medium through which the activities of the citizenry are organized to execute as efficiently as possible general plans looking toward a strong nation. As social planning has developed, the life of every individual within the nation has become minutely controlled in the attempt to create national power and unity. And it is precisely at this point that the dangers of social planning arise. Clearly, modern life has grown so complex and the processes of economic production and social contact so huge, that many individuals cannot possibly make effective decisions for themselves. Authority today must be delegated and centralized in order that the social group may function with any degree of success; yet that very fact makes for enormous power in the hands of the leaders and a virtually complete submission by everyone to the will of those leaders. How the common people will fare under such conditions depends upon both the nature of the professed plan to be followed by the nation and the motives and integrity of the leaders, but mainly upon the amount of veto power retained by the voters.

Social planning has been practiced under "communistic" (Soviet Rus-

sia), fascistic (notably Nazi Germany and Fascistic Italy), and democratic types of government in our times. "Communism" and fascism are similar in that the dictator has been the supreme authority, and all other individuals are expected to submit almost completely to the will of the dictator. The individual as such is of value only as an agent of the State, and everyone has a very definite job and status in the service of the State. But beyond this, the two systems are quite different. Under "communism" all productive wealth is owned by the State, and the government itself directs the productive efforts of the people. Fascism preserves at least the semblance of private ownership of productive wealth, even though the governmental control, to all practical purposes, is as complete as under "communism." Russian "communism" has retained a somewhat larger degree of popular control over basic policies than has been accomplished in any of the fascist countries; and the objectives of "social planning" are more directly those of public welfare than are those of the fascists.

We in the democratic countries have turned to social planning more recently than the totalitarian nations. Especially here in the United States, our laissez-faire tradition in economic affairs has made the idea of social planning seem quite foreign to us. Yet we ourselves have resorted to it now and again in emergency, ever since the days when colonists occasionally were driven to rigid organization and discipline as a hard matter of sheer survival amidst the rigors of primitive life. Nevertheless, the social planning of democracy is distinctive in comparison with that of fascism or "communism," mainly as to its purposes and the degree to which the citizenry retains its basic control over the planners. Motives of planning are more clearly those of public welfare, while the delegation of authority is restricted in scope and granted for specific periods of time, and is subject to ratification by legislative or direct popular ballot. Moreover, the means of recapturing that authority and power still remain effective so long as the secret and free ballot and the rights of free speech and assembly are retained. Thus abuses of power or perversion of purposes by the leaders can be more easily noted and corrected in a democracy than in either of the other major systems of government.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It is not likely that we know enough at present to solve *the* problem of how to adjust man to his surroundings or how to adapt the social machinery to each individual so as to give each one a chance to develop whatever capacity he has. Do we know enough of heredity to enable even the most enthusiastic eugenist to say just what stocks should be selected for elimination, just what matings should be made in the interest of race betterment and social welfare? He will insist that hereditary imbeciles should not reproduce, and perhaps indicate a few types of the hereditary insane that should not propagate. But even if the most radical elimina-

tion of the "unfit" were practiced, are we sure that social conditions might not be producing more weaklings and psychotics? Do we know enough of the interrelation of social stress and conduct to enable us to say just what strains should be permitted to different people? The First World War showed us that certain persons can with safety be subjected to much more severe strain than others—a lesson that was well heeded in the Second World War. But how can we pick out each kind beforehand and adjust social circumstance to their capacities? In a general way we know that under certain conditions immigrants have a tendency to be social failures, but we see others who under the same circumstances succeed. It seems that illegitimate children and orphans have a higher expectancy of criminality than the legitimate and nonorphans. Yet there are enough cases to the contrary to lead us to suspect that our knowledge is not yet of that exactitude and certainty to enable us to predict what will happen under a given set of circumstances. Many other examples might be given to show the necessity of further and more exact knowledge before we can expect to do as good a job of social engineering as the bridge-builder does in mechanical engineering. *Research and experiment, then, are the first steps in a scientific attempt to solve social problems.*

Nevertheless, in spite of the great gaps in our knowledge, we know enough to make a beginning. Since we must attempt in the interests of society to solve this problem of the adjustment of man to the world in which he lives, is it not good sense to use all the knowledge we have, rather than highly speculative guesses? If we must experiment, will it not be wise to be guided in our experiments by all that science at present can afford us—*all* the sciences? For example, does it not seem reasonable that one who seeks the improvement of our physical heritage should take into account what biology has discovered as to the hereditary transmission of capacity and defect? So with the other sciences that throw light on the nature of man and of his world. We would not be so foolish as to attempt to build a house without reference to the law of gravitation, or to what is known about the stresses that building materials will stand. The builder takes into account pertinent facts from every science. So is it also in the solution of social problems—the adjustment of man to his world: all sciences must share.

It is clear enough that in general terms the social problems we have discussed grow out of maladjustment of the individual and his circumstances. Either he is by nature and training not adapted to the world in which he lives and is expected to function, or else the universe in which he finds himself is not adjusted to his capacities. One of the great contributions of Darwin to our understanding of the infinite variety of life on our planet was the theory that the production of beings adapted to a given situation came about by a rigid natural selection for death of those not adaptable. Curiously, however, adaptation to the circumstances of life gradually be-

comes artificial. The birds learn to build nests and to migrate from cold to warm climates. Some of the animals burrow in the ground and lay up stores of food. Indeed, as Kropotkin long ago pointed out, animals learn to coöperate through what he called "mutual aid" and thus circumvent a rigid natural selection. Thus wolves hunt in packs, and cattle graze in herds and on being attacked by enemies gather together with horns out and with the calves on the inside of the circle. Cattle, horses, and sheep in a storm gather together in a body, apparently both to conserve bodily warmth and to prevent straying. Moreover, certain animals attach themselves to others as parasites and thus prevent destruction of themselves. In these and other ways even the lower animals to a certain extent bend nature to their purposes.

Man has carried the process of mutual aid and the adaptation of nature to his purposes to a much higher point than that of any of the lower animals. The story of mankind from prehistory to modern civilization has been an account of the progressive development of mutual aid and the conquest of the material universe in a unique degree. The former has given him his sentiments of mercy and kindness, concern for the helpless, the aged, the child, the weak—and tolerance for the socially worthless. The latter has enabled him to spread to all parts of the globe and contrive living conditions and luxuries incomparable to any other being's. His very success in the control of nature has produced some of his social problems. His exploitation of nature's resources has made it possible for him to live and multiply in regions of the earth naturally hostile to man as a mere animal. Millions now can be supported where formerly it was possible, without his modern control of nature, for only hundreds to exist.

Organization of economic life, while making possible the production of undreamed-of quantities of consumption goods, and while permitting the multiplication of population to an unheard-of degree, has not proceeded with equal pace in the distribution of goods in accordance with economic need, and has given little attention to the adjustment of population to economic production and distribution. Man has not progressed in the adjustment of means to social ends as he has in the adjustment of means to economic production. He has not given the same attention to the improvement of the racial stock as he has to the conquest of his natural environment. His sympathetic toleration and aid of the unfit has not been guided by scientific considerations. While he has applied all he can learn from science to the control of nature for his purposes, he has neglected what science has to tell him about the control of the human element. While man long ago abandoned the doctrine of laissez-faire in his struggle with his physical environment, he has continued to deal with human nature largely on that basis. The consequence is that much of human nature is not adapted to the complex conditions of modern life; and man's social organization is not adjusted to secure a race adapted to modern life,

being only partially adjusted to train human beings for successful struggle with its conditions.

On the basis of modern knowledge what is needed, then, to solve these social problems is: (1) measures calculated to produce individuals of such native capacity as can under the proper conditions adjust themselves to the complex conditions of modern life; (2) such adjustment of our social organization as will provide for each individual the opportunity to develop himself to his utmost capacity and to direct his efforts to the highest social purposes.

Implicit in these two suggestions are a number of things: (1) Negative eugenics, *i.e.*, by sterilization, segregation, or educational limitation of the propagation of stock innately unfit to cope with modern conditions of life. (2) Positive eugenics, *i.e.*, promotion of such selection of mates as modern biological knowledge indicates will produce capable children. (3) The perfection of our educational system in the direction of preparing every individual to make the most of his capacities in modern society. Such an educational system probably will have to utilize all agencies that mold public opinion, including not only the school, but also the press, the platform, the screen, the stage, and the radio. Such education must endeavor to reach not only the students in the schools but also the workers and leaders in the active conduct of affairs. It must be depended on so to modify the social ideals, customs, and attitudes established in the mores of the people as to meet the changed conditions of society growing out of new inventions, new knowledge, and new industrial processes. (4) The modification of our political machinery, such as the legislative and administrative agencies, to keep pace with new knowledge and to put into effect the changes made necessary by scientific investigation. (5) Research agencies to explore the fields of human action, motivation, and organization. Much more study must be given to human heredity before we can know just how to control population. We have just begun the probing into psychology, especially social psychology. How little we know about how social ideals are produced, how customs are established, how traditions are formed, and how the individual is affected by the play of social influences upon his developing personality! We have only guesses as to the results of our present institutions—such as orphanages, almshouses, prisons, factories, and even schools, churches, and homes—upon the persons who are under their influence. Great social experiments are going on all about us, but there is very little attempt to learn how they affect the human beings they touch. In short, we do not know enough yet to enable us to say with confidence just what changes ought to be made to solve social problems. (6) Finally, devising methods whereby the results of scientific research may be made the property of the people. Tuberculosis is yielding not to the doctor's knowledge of its nature and how to prevent it, but to the dissemination of that knowledge among the people generally. While

we know enough now about insanity to prevent much of it, mental disorder still occurs partly because the knowledge of how to prevent it is not widely disseminated among the people. Some of us are certain that jails are a social menace, but the people as a whole are quite unaware that there is anything wrong with them. We know enough about sterilization now to enable us to say that some mental defectives can be sterilized with great benefit to society, but the people—and apparently many judges—do not. So with a great many other matters. What we do not yet know we must learn. What we learn must become common property.

These suggestions are not such as will appeal to panacea-hunters. There is no short-cut solution for our social problems, in spite of the number and the vociferousness of the short-cut prophets. If it has taken the long and patient research and experimentation of hundreds of physicists and chemists to solve certain problems of our physical universe, why suppose that the vastly more complicated problem of human relationships can be solved in a day? In that quarter only, however, lies hope. The long and tedious way ahead should appeal to those spirits who yearn for a more perfect social order—the followers of Utopia, those dreamers of the Kingdom of God who can with patience possess their souls. For the rest—those who look for instant remedies, who must find a short-cut to the Kingdom of God—one can only hope that their tribe will not increase.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant in the text by *"the* social problem"? In what sense do social problems grow out of the social problem?
2. How do you account for the one-sidedness of the Utopias described in the text? Why are they so generally impractical?
3. Why are the one-sided explanations of the social problem inadequate?
4. How far would you agree with the statement that "economic maladjustment is the root of all social evils"?
5. Can vital social reform ignore economic inequalities? Discuss.
6. Why should we distrust the "practical" solutions of our social problems?
7. Of what value were the various Utopias if we cannot accept their various solutions of the social problem?
8. What is the nature of modern social planning? What fundamental dangers are inherent in the development of social planning?
9. Show the differences in the methods and objectives of social planning under (*a*) communism; (*b*) fascism; (*c*) democracy.
10. What are some of the problems involved in any effective action proposed to solve a given set of social problems?
11. Why is research so important a step at this time in any attempt to solve our social problems?

Appendix: Measuring Facts and Making Them Clear

STATISTICS SIMPLY ARE numerical records of facts existing in a particular situation, and at a particular time. If, at the present moment, you were to count the money in your pocket, the result of your counting would be a *statistical fact.* It might have immediate value, if you were planning a purchase that required a considerable portion of the money you have. It might also help you in checking whether you had lost any of your cash since you last replenished your supply.

If you counted your money every day and recorded the amount you had, you would then have a statistical *series.* That is, you would have a number of *data* (or numerical facts) about the same kind of thing. These figures would help you to compare your financial condition today with what it was, let us say, a week ago. The knowledge might help you to determine whether you are spending your money too rapidly, or whether you will have enough to last till you expect to replenish your purse again.

Remembering that statistics is simply a means of recording numerical facts, we realize quickly that modern life is filled with statistical data of one sort or another. Time tables for busses or trains really are statistical materials. When you purchase a car, the salesman is very likely to tell you how its service or size or weight compares with the "average" of other similar cars you might consider purchasing. Nearly everything you do, sooner or later, can have some sort of statistical significance.

Among people as a whole, there has long been a similar impulse to count—to examine the nature of the surrounding world, and record what is found. Business houses, churches, clubs—all organizations keep their records to determine their condition at any given time, and to know how

that condition compares with conditions that existed at an earlier time. Obviously, they can better control their present affairs, and plan for future activities, if they know accurately what has gone on in the past.

Governments, too, keep all sorts of records concerning their people and their activities. Such records are kept for much the same reasons: to help understand the conditions that exist and how they came to be, and how to meet the future.

KINDS OF STATISTICS, AND HOW TO READ THEM

Because statistics are so much a part of our everyday relationships, it is well for us to understand some of the basic methods that are used to record and present them. Most of us are confronted at intervals with statistical data that are designed to influence our choice regarding various decisions we have to make. Many of us are called upon at one time or another to render statistical account of our activities, or to back up our opinion by statistical fact. As in our present study, statistics frequently are used to show in brief terms the exact situation that exists with reference to a given situation. So the labor and time of study are reduced greatly if one is able to read statistics quickly and accurately.

The basic plan of all statistical presentation is that of *classification* and *cross-reference.* The means of establishing such a system rests upon *identification.* A given figure must be identified, and placed along with other figures in such a way that each can easily be found and understood. Obviously, then, each figure must be *labeled.* And the labeling is accomplished by descriptions at the edges of the statistical presentation. These labels may appear on any edge of the figure; but in all cases they apply to all the figures in the same vertical or horizontal line.

The individual who has studied algebra is at a distinct advantage in understanding statistical data, because many of the devices used in presenting statistics are borrowed from algebraic practices. The principle just described, for example, he will at once recognize from his experience in plotting algebraic curves. He has drawn his "x" and "y" axes, and located the points for his curve by counting units along both these axes, starting from their intersection—the number of units his problem indicates. This system of vertical and horizontal cross-reference is identical with that used in statistics. Once this idea is understood and mastered, one should have no difficulty in reading statistical materials.

Tables. Tables really are the simplest, yet the most basic of all statistical methods of presentation. They are the most basic, because *all statistical data can be reduced to tabular form.* In other words, all other types of presentation are merely elaborations or pictures of the materials which are first compiled in tables. Tables, then, are really the shorthand of statistics.

Let us now look at any one of the tables in the text. First, it will be

noticed that the table as a whole is labeled. From this, one learns what the general story of the table is to be about. Next, one notices a series of words or classifications at both the top and the left-hand side of the figures presented. Those at the left are called "stubs," and indicate the classification of the figures along the same *horizontal line.* Those at the top, called "captions," indicate the classification of all the figures in the *vertical column* under it. To discover fully the meaning of any given figure in the table, it is necessary to refer to both the stub and the caption.

To make our discussion clear, let us refer specifically to Table 28 on page 390, entitled "Percentage Distribution of Individual Income Tax Returns for 1947." Any figure, taken at random, can be identified at once by tracing back to the stub at the left, and to the caption at the top. Thus, if we take the figure "23," found in the second column, we find from the caption that it refers to income reported, and from the stub that it falls in the $2,000–$3,000 classification. The figure evidently indicates that 23 per cent of the incomes reported in 1947 were between $2,000 and $3,000.

There is, however, one further point to notice with reference to the table. Both captions and stubs are themselves a part of a system of classification. A simple table, like those in Chapter 15, has only one column of figures; but usually it is desirable to classify a given set of units in more ways than one at the same time. Returning to our first example, we find that the tax returns are further classified as to persons filing returns, as well as to incomes. This is a little more complicated; but our original principle holds true. If you will study the lines in the captions, you will see that both items are grouped under the single caption of "Simple Distribution" as contrasted with "Cumulative Distribution." In other words, one needs simply to remember that the full identification is made only when one follows the labels out to the very edge of the statistical series being presented.

The reference to "cumulative" distribution raises another question that may prove a little confusing. The word *cumulative,* however, simply indicates that all the items up to and including the classification being considered, have been added together. Thus, in the example given above, if one adds 4, 14, and 23, he has 41—the figure to be found at the end of this same line. This indicates, in this case, that 41 per cent of *all* the incomes reported were under $3,000.

Graphs. The graph is the simplest form of dramatized statistical data. It is usually very easily understood, because most graphs are not drawn to portray more than one or two series of figures. It is, also, used most commonly to illustrate trends of events over a period of time; and the single line drawn across the graph usually tells its own story very directly and effectively.

The graph, like every other form of statistical presentation, is given its

general heading, to tell the reader what the story is that the graph is intended to tell. The horizontal and vertical lines are labeled with identification similar to the captions and stubs we spoke of in regard to tables. These labels usually appear at the left and bottom of the graph; but they may occur at any edge. Always, however, the labels at the sides indicate the value or amount of the data as they vary up and down, while the labels at the top and bottom place the data in their proper position from left to right. Furthermore, the data are *continuous;* that is, as one moves from left to right, or from top to bottom, he is portraying *more* or *less, earlier* or *later, smaller* or *larger,* or whatever it is that one is considering. The identification of a given figure, as with the table, is determined by its position with reference to both the horizontal and the vertical plane.

Taking Figure 12 on page 370 for our example, we see it is a graph of the death rate of infants under one year of age through the years 1915 to 1948. We notice at once that the data here are intended to show the *decline* of infant deaths during this period of time. To discover the exact situation at any given time, let us arbitrarily choose any point along the line of the graph, say the middle of the figure from either side. Dropping our imaginary lines of reference down to the labels at the bottom and across to the left, we see in this case that, in 1933, there were about 60 deaths among infants under one year of age for every 1,000 births.

Often, more than one line is present on the graph. This is done for purpose of comparison, and should offer no great difficulty for the reader. The different things compared are read in exactly the same terms. One projects his lines from a given point on any line of the graph back to the labels at the edges, and thus obtains his reading.

Charts. *Bar charts* are read in much the same way that one reads graphs. Both are laid out along both horizontal and vertical planes, and the significance of the data represented by the bar is found by tracing to the labels the position of the top (or end) point of the bar. Sometimes (as in Figure 8, page 227, showing the number of employed women), the value of the bar is printed near or at the end of the bar itself. In such cases, there is little to be gained by filling in all the guide-lines, or units of measure in the labels. It should be remembered, however, that this *could* be done; and the length of the bars themselves still is determined by the number of the units being recorded.

Bar charts usually are used for comparing the relative size or extent of similar but disconnected items; but occasionally, they are used also for comparing specific units of a continuous series of items. In this latter case, the close connection between bar charts and graphs becomes quite clear. The bar chart portraying the total immigration to the United States by decades (Figure 4, page 163) might be made a graph by drawing a line connecting the tops of the bars, and then removing the bars. When this

is done, however, one's attention immediately shifts, from the size of immigration in *each decade,* to an impression of the general trend of rapid changes in the amount of immigration *as times goes on.*

Pyramids are a special type of bar chart. They are used chiefly in the study of population and its characteristics. In this type of bar chart, usually two series of data are being compared, each series being considered a whole and separate unit. It is as if each were cut up into a series of bars to represent the relative parts of the whole, and all these segments piled one over another. Each of the two series is a part of one general group, yet each is considered a complete unit in itself. Pyramids are really two bar charts, turned on end and placed bottom to bottom.

Let us turn to a study of Figure 10, on page 294. This is a pyramid representing the trends of farm tenure. Tenants and owners are considered separately, both being classified according to age. The labels between the bars indicate the age group into which the various proportions of owners and tenants fall. The labels along the bottom of the figure indicate the percentage value of the individual bars. The percentage of tenants and the percentage of owners both total 100, tenants and owners being considered as separate parts of the whole group of operators. It will be noticed, too, that two series of figures are presented here, one for 1890, the other for 1940. Thus, there is a ready basis for comparing the *trends* of the age of tenants and owners.

Pyramids are useful in showing at a glance how the parts of a given series divide and compare with one another. They can be used also, as suggested in the pyramid we have just analyzed, to compare the nature of the distribution of such parts among different groups.

The *pie chart* is somewhat similar to the pyramid, but is much easier to read. In this type of chart, the whole series is presented as a single mass (usually a circle, hence the suggestion of "pie" charts). The whole is then divided into various parts, each suggesting, by its relative size, the portion of the whole group represented by that particular part of the classification. Thus, in Figure 3, on page 133, the total world population is represented as 100 per cent. A quarter of the population is made up of the people of Europe, and another twentieth lives in South America. North America accounts for 9 per cent of the total population; Africa, 7 per cent; and Asia, the remainder—54 per cent. The "pie" representing these conditions, it is plain, is divided into five parts; and the size of each part is in proportion to the segment of the whole population it represents.

Pie charts are easily read; but they are not very accurate, unless the extent of the parts is carefully labeled. The reason for this is that the human eye cannot easily evaluate the relative size of angles, especially when many are in close proximity with one another.

Pictographs. The pictograph (see Figure 9, page 245) is a comparatively new type of statistical presentation. It has come to be quite commonly

used, in the years since about 1930, in appeals to the general public. It is basically like the bar chart, and is read in exactly the same way. Its appearance is made different by the fact that the volume of the material being measured is separated into specific units. Each unit is represented by a character or symbol which more or less closely resembles a picture (hence the name *pictograph,* derived from "picturegraph") of the material being considered.

The pictograph has one obvious advantage: it is highly dramatic, and captures the interest of the reader by appealing pictorially to his imagination. Indeed, it can be used very subtly as a means of propaganda, in that it permits a play upon the stereotyped ideas which people already possess. Hence, for example, in a pictograph of nationality stocks in our population, various foreign groups may be portrayed in the pictures as being self-respecting, well-proportioned individuals—or slovenly, physically weak persons whom we would not care to welcome as neighbors. Persons in the upper brackets of income might be represented by expensively attired individuals surrounded by money bags, or by moderately well-groomed, typical American businessmen and women. Thus, to be fair, the pictographs must be planned and drawn with discretion.

The pictograph has one serious limitation, in that it is not easily read *accurately,* as a rule. The reader gets a fairly good *general impression* from the relative number of units or pictures in the series; but, more often than not, he is forced to *count* these units if he wants to obtain definite figures; and fractions of units can only be estimated. Furthermore, the images themselves rarely portray a *single* unit. Each figure usually represents a larger number of units. So, to obtain his final figure, the reader is compelled to multiply the number of figures by the number of units it is supposed to represent.

Maps. The map is a device used to bring out geographic variations in social conditions. Maps are commonly of two varieties: *spot* maps and *shade* maps. The spot map usually is used to show the distribution of the volume of the objects being considered, while the shade map is used most often to indicate a general situation in a given area. In either case, the reader must first look to find the area in which he is particularly interested, then turn to the key given in connection with the map, to discover the meaning or value of the symbol he finds placed in the area to which he is referring.

The map portraying the distribution of Negro population in the United States (Figure 2, on page 82) is a spot map, each "spot" representing a given number of Negroes living in each geographic section of the country. The same data could have been used for a shade map, by devising a system of lines and cross-hatching, each type to represent a given range of population density. Either method could have been used, too, for showing the distribution by states rather than by sections.

The shading of shade maps is usually graduated, to indicate progressive stages of volume (in the case of population, the most thickly populated areas being shaded closest to black), or progressive stages of *unfavorable* conditions.

Average, Percentage, and Index Numbers. We have already discussed the principal types of statistical presentation, so far as their physical appearance is concerned. Not all statistical material deals directly with the units being recorded in the table or figure, however. There are various methods of refining data for statistical presentation, which are often applied before the series of figures are finally made available to the reader. Chief among these are the average, the percentage, and the index number. Data expressed in these terms lend themselves to tabular or graphic presentation in exactly the same way as do the direct summaries of direct counting. They are, in fact, all based upon the same numerical data; but they present the data in a different way, so it is essential that the student understand clearly the significance and technique of these special types of computation.

Most of us, no doubt, are familiar with *average* and *percentage* as means of expressing statistical facts. In order to make the two methods perfectly clear, however, let us go back to our original example—counting our change. This time, suppose the whole class at the present moment were to count what they have in their pockets. Let us say that there are 20 students in the class, and that when each has reported what he has, the combined total of their cash in hand adds up to $15.80. The *average* amount of their holdings will be $15.80 divided by 20, or 79 cents. This represents the amount each would have if the distribution of the money were equal. As a matter of fact, probably no one has exactly 79 cents; but the figure does represent *about* what we might expect any one individual, picked at random, to have. Of course, it may be that someone has a great deal more than the rest—say $4.25. This obviously would raise the average for the whole group. On the other hand, someone else may have only 10 cents, which would tend to lower the average. As the group becomes larger, such wide variations tend to have less effect upon the whole group's average, and the average becomes more accurate.

If we carry this same example a step farther, we shall readily understand the nature of *percentage*. This is simply a means of determining what part of the whole amount a given portion represents, and is computed by dividing the value of that portion by the total amount. In the example we have just used, if each person had the "average" amount, he would have .79 divided by 15.80, or 5 per cent of all the money in the room. The person who actually had $4.25, similarly, would have 4.25 divided by 15.80, or about 20.6 per cent, and the one with only a dime would have .10 divided by 15.80, or .6 per cent.

The value of using averages and percentages in statistical presentations is that both give the reader a simple impression, and one that is

likely to become a part of his working information. Thus, in the case of industrial accident costs (Table 15, page 216), it is easy to see that accidents caused by electrical apparatus are less than a half of one per cent of all the accidents reported; yet the average cost of such accidents is close to $1,500—a sum much greater than any other in the series. Such information is far more serviceable for the average reader than would be, for example, a record of the exact numbers or amounts for each item.

Nevertheless, it is good practice also to indicate the magnitude of the data being considered. Thus, if one is particularly interested in the exact amount in any one classification, it is easy to secure it by multiplying this total by the percentage indicated for that classification. In the example just given, one could derive the amount paid to the victims of accidents involving electrical apparatus by multiplying the total indemnity paid, $6,997,586, by 2 per cent. The resulting figure will be close to true.

Index numbers are best regarded as a special type of percentage computation. They are used to provide a means for ready comparison of data which exist over a period of time.

In computing index numbers, the first operation is to select, from the series of data one is dealing with, the time or the condition which one believes—all things considered—to be the most nearly representative of "normal" conditions. This point is then given a more or less arbitrary symbol of 100, indicating the data existing at that time is considered "100 (per cent) normal." The next step is to reduce the rest of the series to comparable percentages, which is done in exactly the same way that we described a moment ago, with reference to computing percentages.

To clarify this discussion, let us turn to the index numbers of wholesale prices (Figure 6, page 193). A moment's study reveals that 1926 is here regarded as the normal year, as indicated by the note, "Base: 1926 = 100." This means that prices prevailing in 1926 are to be regarded as "normal" or standard in comparison with the conditions recorded in the rest of the graph. Tracing the line to 1935, we see that the index number appears to be about 80. Now let us apply this information to a given commodity, whose price we shall assume follows closely the average for all commodities, which this series represents. Let us say that butter was worth 40 cents in 1926. On this basis, 40 cents is equivalent to 100 per cent; and the price in 1935 would be 80 per cent of 40 cents, or 32 cents. In 1920, it was about 150 per cent of the 1926 price, or about 60 cents.

Index numbers are of value chiefly in reducing a wide range of statistical materials to a compact form, serviceable in making comparison of statistics existing at different times.

THE PRESENTATION OF STATISTICAL MATERIALS

After one has acquired a familiarity with the types of statistical forms, he is then ready to examine more closely the technique of their construction. If one understands something of the mechanics of preparing statisti-

cal data, he is at a distinct advantage. He is better able to appraise the value of statistical materials quickly and accurately. Furthermore, he himself can present data more effectively, either in connection with his work, or in his more personal associations.

The Selection of Materials. Few of us are able to gather our own statistical materials for ourselves. The expense of time and money, in most cases, would be prohibitive even if it were possible to collect the data and tabulate them. We therefore usually are dependent upon someone else, or some organization, to supply us with the statistical facts upon which so many of our opinions and so much of our activity are based. The best that we can do, under such circumstances, is to satisfy ourselves as to the honesty of the person whose figures we accept. We should examine whether he is trained to gather his materials, and whether he is competent to refine the data correctly. Still more important, we should consider the purpose for which he is presenting the results of his activity.

A certain amount of error and personal prejudice is inevitable in classifying statistical materials. The labor and coöperation necessary in assembling data make it impossible, in most cases, reasonably to expect perfect accuracy in statistical treatment. At best, the measurements are only approximately near the true situation in any case.

Few individuals or groups are so foolish as to create data that have no foundation in fact at all; but the refinement of statistical materials in most cases is so complicated that the truth can be easily distorted to suit the desire or prejudice of the person or group who prepares the data. So in considering a given series of statistics, either in forming our own opinion or for use in trying to win others to our point of view, it is well to consider the source of the data, and the motives of the statistician. Data based upon unidentified sources should be regarded with suspicion; and *vice versa,* the failure to identify one's authority weakens one's case in the minds of thoughtful people.

The Choice of Medium. At the expense of some repetition, attention is called again to the fact that statistical data are capable of a variety of treatment, relative to presentation. In examining a given figure, it should be remembered that the use of a graph, a chart, or a pictograph represents someone's judgment as to the most effective way to present the statistical story of the figure. Sometimes that judgment has been poor, or even deliberately deceptive. In other words, any figure should be regarded *critically,* to be sure one catches the true point of the story. It is possible, always, that the statistician has missed his point, or that he has distorted—purposefully or otherwise—the real significance of his data.

Some of the more elementary principles of choice have already been pointed out. If accuracy is desired, the *table* is the most effective vehicle of statistical presentation we have. *Graphs* are especially effective in emphasizing trends of events or conditions, while *charts* are serviceable mostly in

matters of comparison. *Maps,* obviously, are limited to materials where *geographic* factors must be a consideration. The most dramatic and popularly effective method of portrayal is the *pictograph,* although its accuracy is not always of the best.

Clarity of Material. In the actual preparation of tables and figures, several factors are important in determining the success or failure of one's efforts. Above all, the statistician should remember the limits of the ordinary reader's attention and memory. Too much detail is both confusing and tiresome; and the reader will likely lose patience with the material before he has absorbed its meaning. Consequently, both as a matter of courtesy to his reader, and in his own self-interest, the statistician does well to make his tables and figures as simple and as easy to read as possible. The titles, captions, stubs, and all other identification should be full enough to convey their meaning accurately, yet not too involved in their wording. Lettering should be plain and bold, and as large as the limits of space and proportion permit. Superfluous lines in figures should be omitted, since they tend to draw attention away from the center of interest.

In both tables and figures, some sacrifice of accuracy is permissible in the interest of clarity. Classifications are more effective if not too numerous; hence it is often advisable to combine some of the more specialized groupings, or in some cases to omit the more detailed classifications or trends in a series of data. Totals should be placed conspicuously, so that the reader will have a ready comprehension of the magnitude of the data he is examining. Numbers recording the size of a specific classification are well reduced to approximate terms. Fractions of percentages, for example, usually are best raised or lowered to the nearest whole number. Similarly, large numbers are more easily read and remembered if the items are expressed in round numbers. The extent of the changes one makes should be governed by the character of the series he is handling, as well as the kind of readers he expects to reach; but always, the statistician should try to strike a happy balance between detail and simplicity. In doing so, he retains the interest—and respect—of his reader.

Early in this discussion we said that statistics today affect a considerable portion of our daily living. It was also suggested that statistical materials are used widely as a means of influencing public opinion. It is, therefore, desirable to acquire more than a reading knowledge of statistics. In this field, as in reading prose, the mere fact of literacy does not assure that the individual will read intelligently. If he lacks insight and judgment regarding what he reads, he is an easy victim to the treachery of half-truth.

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