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No. VIII. TURKEY

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TURKEY

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EDITORIAL PREFACE

MANKIND has been making history very rapidly in the last thirty years. Since the World War, particularly, social developments and political revolutions have been so numerous as to be almost bewildering. The intelligent public, naturally, has a great interest in these things, as it has also an imperative need to be reliably informed about them.

It is always difficult for the public to obtain an accurate bird's-eye view of the individual States which make up the world. The existing standard histories are long, and for the most part deal with events and movements which already belong almost to the remote past. On the other hand, many admirable books dealing with current developments are apt to ignore, or to treat too scantily, the previous development, which may have been continuous for a thousand years.

The object of the present series is to present, in a reasonably moderate compass, the complete story of the development of the States of the world, from their origin to the present day. While, however, due attention is given to origins and to the continuity of the life of each people and of each State, it is recognized that the interest of the public is, quite reasonably, in the present epoch and in the last thirty or forty years. These volumes, therefore, emphasize recent history, but always in relation to the historic tradition and development of the past. The books are each written by an authority, among the younger historians for the most part, who is or has been in intimate touch with the subject or with the people with which he deals. The general editor is not responsible for particular views or opinions that they may put forward.

R. B. MoWAT.

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INTRODUCTION

AT the end of the Great War Turkey lay beaten, defenceless, at the mercy of the Great Powers. At last it seemed that the " sick man "—as the Czar Nicholas I had personified the Turkish Empire as early as 1853—was in reality upon his death-bed. The Ottoman Empire was virtually dissolved. Much had broken away even before the War ; more went during the War. Now, with the cessation of hostilities or soon afterwards, the Allies controlled Constantinople and the Straits, the Italians were in Adalia, the French in Cilicia, the Greeks in Smyrna. And, perhaps worst of all, Turkey was in a condition of internal collapse. Everything appeared to indicate that Turkey was to be partitioned ; and that, although government over what remained might be left nominally in the hands of the Sultan, his government would be permanently under the tutelage of the Western Powers.

But appearances belied themselves. True, the Ottoman Empire as an empire was broken, and its head, the Ottoman Sultan, descendant of men who had ruled over Turkey since the thirteenth century, did not long survive it. The Ottoman Empire was dying, but a new Turkey was in the throes of birth. Something quite unexpected was happening. Under the influence of Western ideas over a few Turks the country was changing from a decaying Oriental empire into a national, centralized, homogeneous state on approved Western lines. The paradox was that in order to Westernize, Turkey had first to fight the West. Something similar was happening in Russia : in order to adopt Western industrial technique Bolshevik Russia made herself the

enemy of every Western nation. The resulting antagonism, suspicion and hysteria, in both cases, present their own problems. But both Russia and Turkey succeeded in escaping Western political domination. What was it that enabled defeated and defenceless Turkey to make so startling a transformation and recovery ? How did the change take place ? How far are the changes permanent ? Such questions as these the study of the history of Turkey will help us to answer.

IMPORTANT DATES IN TURKISH HISTORY

Eleventh Century : Seljuk Turks spread through Asia Minor and set up there a Seljuk Sultanate.

Thirteenth Century : Coming of the Ottoman Turks (about 1230-40) from Central Asia under their leader, Ertoghrul. They aid the Seljuks and settle in Asia Minor.

1307. Osman, son of Ertogrhul, becomes an independent ruler. Gradual growth of the Ottoman Empire at expense of the Eastern Empire (Constantinople).

1356. Capture of Gallipoli. Ottomans extend their conquests to Europe.

1389. Battle of Kossovo. Defeat of Serbs and their allies.

1396. Crusading army defeated at Nicopolis.

1402. Battle of Angora. Bayezid defeated and captured by Timur the Tartar. Tartars overrun Asia Minor.

1413. Mohammed I gradually rehabilitates the Ottoman Empire.

1444. Battle of Varna. Defeat of Hunyadi and Cesarini.

1453. Mohammed II captures Constantinople. End of Eastern Empire.

1512-20. Selim I conquers Syria, and Egypt.

1520-66. Soliman I, the Magnificent.

1522. Conquest of Rhodes.

1526. Battle of Mohacs and conquest of Hungary.

1529. Siege of Vienna. Soliman forced to withdraw.

1534- Capture of Baghdad. Sea power develops. Ottoman Empire at its height.

1566 onwards. Decline of the Ottoman Empire.

1673 and '75. John Sobieski of Poland defeats the Turks.

1683. Turks besiege Vienna. Sobieski relieves the city. Turks driven back.

1686. Budapest lost by the Turks.

1718. Peace of Passarowitz. Austria gains Hungary and (temporarily) Belgrade and parts of Serbia.

1768-74. Disastrous war with Russia, ending with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji.

1804-30. Serbian Struggle for Independence.

1805. Mohammed Ali makes himself master of Egypt.

1821-32. Greek Struggle for Independence.

1854-56. Crimean War.

1861. New Kingdom of Rumania.

1875. Risings in Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Bulgaria.

1876. Abdul Hamid. Midhat Pasha's Constitution.

1877. War with Russia.

A.D.

1878. Congress of Berlin. Independence of Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro recognized. Bulgaria divided into two parts under Turkish suzerainty.
1881. Council of Ottoman Public Debt created.
1885. Bulgaria united.
1898. German Kaiser's tour in Ottoman Empire.
1908. Young Turk Revolution.
1909. Attempted counter-revolution. Deposition of Abdul Hamid.
1911-12. War with Italy.
1912-13. Balkan Wars and loss of much Turkish territory.
1914 (28th October). Turkey enters the Great War on the side of the Central Powers.
1918 (30th October). Armistice of Mudros.
1919 (15th May). Landing of the Greeks at Smyrna.
(19th May). Mustafa Kemal lands at Samsun. Organizes opposition in Asia Minor, which is later centred at Angora.
1920 (28th January). The National Pact adopted.
(23rd April). The Grand National Assembly inaugurated at Angora.
(10th August). Treaty of Sevres.
1920-22 (September). War with the Greeks.
1922 (nth October). Armistice of Mudania with Allied troops still on Turkish territory.
(1st November). Abolition of the Sultanate.
1923 (24th July). Treaty of Lausanne.
(29th October). Turkey declared a Republic.
1924 (3rd March). Abolition of Khalifat.
1925. Revolt of the Kurds.
1925 (25th November). The Hat Law.
1928 (3rd October). Adoption of Latin characters.
1932. Turkey joins League of Nations.
1934. Balkan Pact.

NOTE ON SPELLING OF TURKISH PLACE-NAMES

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic a number of place-names have been changed. Among these are :—

Constantinople	..	..	Now	called	Istanbul.
Angora..	..	..	. .	,,	,,	Ankara.
Smyrna	..	. .	..	,,	,,	Izmir.

PART I

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

TURKEY

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE OTTOMANS

THE Turk is, comparatively speaking, a new-comer in the region to which he has given his name. That region —Asia Minor or Anatolia—had a long and illustrious history centuries before the Turks had been heard of. Much of this history lies in the field of the archaeologist and the ethnologist; and some idea of the age of Asia Minor may be gained when it is remembered that Semitic colonies were in existence at the middle of the third millennium B.C., that the Hittite race, known to the writers of the Old Testament,[1] was ruling over a great part of Asia Minor and Syria from about 2000 to 1200 years B.C., and that the Troy of Homer in North-West Asia Minor is but one amongst the sites of nine successive cities. Asia Minor saw many phases of fortune after the fall of the Hittite Empire—a Phrygian kingdom, incursions and settlements of Greeks, the rule of Persia under Cyrus and Darius, the conquest by Alexander the Great, son of Philip of Macedon. Alexander, who imposed a military autocracy over the warring cities of Greece, included Asia Minor in his empire, along with new lands he won from the Danube to the Ganges and from the Oxus to the Nile. But Alexander's empire broke up after his death, and much of it, including Asia Minor, passed

[1] Gen. x. 15 and xxvi. 34.

under the sway of Rome, which brought her own ordered civilization while maintaining the heritage of Greek art and culture.

After the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West in the fifth century A.D., and the invasions of Goth, Teuton and Lombard, Constantinople remained as the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, which included Asia Minor. But the wild tribes of Central Asia continually threatened the eastern frontiers, while the Slavs broke into the European provinces. Constantinople was to be the foe of the Turk. Another development of great importance fordftie future was the rise of the Mohammedan religion in Arabia in the seventh century A.D., which sent out the Arabs as a conquering people across the old Roman provinces to the shores of North Africa and Spain in the West and over the frontier of Asia Minor in the East. These Arabs set up the empire of the Khalif of Baghdad, the ruler of the Moslem world. So that henceforth in Asia Minor the Eastern Roman Empire of the Christians bordered upon the new empire of the Mohammedan Khalif.

To recall these events in the history of Asia Minor before the arrival of the Turks will help to emphasize two points: first, that the Turks themselves who came in two main bodies, the Seljuks in the eleventh and the Ottomans in the thirteenth centuries, moved as part of a series of migrations that mark the history of Europe and Asia; second, that in moving into regions already occupied since the dawn of history the Turks imposed themselves on already existing peoples, and soon their racial identity became merged in that of the people they found.

The complicated history of Asia Minor may thus be summed up as being a series of migrations, and the rise and fall of successive empires and lesser powers.

Just as successive waves of people swept into Britain during its early history—Celts, Romans, Angles, Saxons,

Norsemen, Normans—and many different governments rose and fell, so in Asia Minor something similar happened. Still more, Asia Minor was the battle-ground between East and West; geographical conditions were unfavourable to permanence, in that the central mountains and plateaus are wild and arid, while the western coasts are fertile and climatically favoured. Successive peoples were thus tempted to go on the move in search of better land or new pastures.

But in spite of these many changes, no conquering race ever entirely expelled or exterminated the race which it found in possession. Thus to-day there are perhaps real Turks by race among the Turkomans of Turkestan, that is outside Turkey. The Anatolian peasantry of Turkey, on the other hand, are descended from the previous people of Asia Minor, settled there long before the coming of the first Turks. The actual Turks who passed into Asia Minor, though they were strong enough to impose their language and religion on the inhabitants, were too few in number greatly to affect the racial strain. Turks freely intermarried with women of other races. And so to-day the Turk, the inhabitant of Turkey, is not as some might imagine a Mongoloid or Tartar savage, but a man in physical characteristics not in any marked degree different from the inhabitants of Western Europe. " Probably the nation as a whole has no more of Tartar blood than the American nation has of Norman."[1]

The Turks originally were warlike nomads who made their way westwards from the steppes and deserts of Central and Eastern Asia. With Mongols, they filled the r61e of " the Scourges of God," when from time to time they broke loose in devastating passage among the people of Europe and Western Asia. By the sixth century A.D. the Turks were in what is still called

[1] Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent,* p. 18.

Turkestan ; but there was continual pressure from other bodies behind, and numbers were pushed out into Persia or Khorasan as the power of the Arab conquerors waned. Here in the eleventh century they settled and formed the Seljuk Empire, including in it many of the lands of the Khalif—Baghdad, Syria, Egypt, and parts of Asia Minor. Before the actual establishment of Turkish rule alongside the nominal Khalifat, the Khalif had lost most of his temporal power and retained only a general respect as pontiff of Islam. Many Turks had come into the empire of the Khalif, either as captives or as mercenary soldiers employed by the Khalif. The Seljuk Empire, which took its name from an early Turkoman chieftain, was one of considerable administrative efficiency and justice. It reached its height under Melik Shah, who died in 1092, and with his death his empire began to break up by reason of civil war between his sons. [1] The Seljuks inherited the power of the Arabs. The Khalif of Baghdad was now only a shadow. The Seljuks, who had adopted Mohammedanism, infused new, more virile blood into Islam.

The Seljuks had already proved their prowess in defeating the Emperor of the East, Romanus Diogenes, at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, and so opening the way into the Anatolian provinces of the empire. The Turks penetrated far into Asia Minor. One of the Seljuks, Kilij Arslan, made his capital at Nicaea, where he defeated the first bands of Crusaders in 1096. When the main armies of the First Crusade arrived Nicaea was captured. At this time the Greeks of the Eastern Empire—the successors of Rome—were able to regain a number of their lands and castles in Asia Minor. Later Konia (or Iconium) became the capital of the new kingdom, still nominally subject to the Grand Seljuk of

[1] At the time of the First Crusade. Saladin pointed out that this lack of unity was the cause of the Crusaders' success in capturing Jerusalem in 1099.

Persia.[1] But the Sultanate of Konia was virtually independent, and was to last about two centuries. It was the first Turkish kingdom in the territories of Asia Minor, the future "homelands" of the Turk.

With the coming of the Seljuks to Asia Minor the peace which had been temporarily restored by the Eastern Emperor of Constantinople was destined to come to an end once more, and a further interval of fighting was to ensue. A period of struggle between East and West was beginning. In 1095 the First Crusade was launched, and the crusading armies from Europe passed through Asia Minor on their way to the capture of Jerusalem from the Mohammedan. But in spite of interference from the crusading armies—Konia was occupied temporarily by Godfrey de Bouillon and again by Frederick Barbarossa—the Seljuk Sultanate remained of considerable importance. Under the great Prince Alaeddin in the first half of the thirteenth century were 1 built the fine mosques in Konia which still testify to the i magnificence of Seljuk rule.

[1] This kingdom of Konia is sometimes known as the Sultanate of Rum. The term "Rum" having been applied by the Mohammedans to the Byzantine Greeks of the Kastern Roman Empire who called themselves Romans, the same term came to be applied to their territory in Asia Minor which was occupied by the Seljuk Turks.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

EARLY in the thirteenth century fresh Turks appeared in Asia Minor. TrTeseTwere the Ottomans who were to build the great Ottoman Empire. The way was already prepared for them : the power of the Eastern Empire of Constantinople[1] was weak, and its territories in Asia Minor were open to attack, while the remainder of Asia Minor had been largely Islamized by the Seljuks. The Ottomans were driven westwards by the Mongols, for the steppes of Asia still had large nomad forces ready to sweep like a scourge over more settled lands. Under Jenghiz Khan the Mongol hosts poured over Asia, threatened Konia, and defeated the South Russian princes. Later under a grandson of Jenghiz they imposed their yoke on Russia, profoundly altering its history ; and Jenghiz the conqueror saw his armies victorious from the China Sea to the banks of the Dnieper.

The Seljuk Sultans of Konia resisted the Mongol hordes, and, as the story goes, the Sultan Alaeddin was one day hard-pressed near Angora, when the intervention of an unknown body of horsemen turned the fortune of the day in favour of the Seljuks. These horsemen were led by the Turk Ertoghrul, whose son, Osman or Othman, was to give his name to the Ottoman

[1] Constantinople was itself in the hands of new rulers—Franks from Western Europe who, with the assistance of the Venetians, had seized it from the Greek or Eastern Emperor, during the Fourth Crusade, in 1204. Parts of Asia Minor, ruled from two centres, Nicaea and Trebizond, were still in the hands of the Greeks. They regained Constantinople from its Crusading conquerors in 1261, and held it until it fell to the Turks in 1453

Empire, destined to be ruled by a succession of princes unbroken in the male line from Ertoghrul right down to modern times.

As a reward for their services, the Ottoman Turks were established upon lands belonging to the Seljuks, and Ertoghrul became a kind of frontier guard between them and the Greeks of the Eastern Empire. Remaining loyal to their Seljuk overlord, Ertoghrul and his son Osman added to their lands. But the kingdom of Konia broke up into a number of separate emirates, and after the death of the last Seljuk Sultan of Konia, Alaeddin III (1307), Osman became an independent ruler. This marked the beginning of an independent Ottoman Power, and it is said that Osman in a dream foresaw the greatness that was to befall his offspring.

Osman was a redoubtable warrior and the Ottoman Power grew at the expense of that of the Greek Empire of Constantinople. Greek castles were attacked and captured, and handed over for keeping to Turkish leaders. In 1326 Brusa surrendered, and later Orkhan, son of Osman, seized a number of other cities, including Nicaea. The capture of Brusa and Nicaea was effected without regular siege. By capturing neighbouring castles and ravaging the fields on which city life depended, and interrupting commercial communications between citizens, the Turks were able to bring about their surrender. Sometimes, too, Greek emperors sought the aid of the Turks in their domestic disputes.

Before the death of Orkhan in 1359, therefore, the new Ottoman Sultanate was a powerful, strongly-governed state in the north-west corner of Asia Minor. In his reign, too, the Janissaries were organized. During the lifetime of Orkhan his son crossed to Europe—actually there had been an invitation for aid against the Serbs from the Greek Emperor—and made a raid into the Balkans. Previous raids across the Straits had been made, but this one had more lasting effects. In 1356

Gallipoli on the European side of the Straits was seized and made a Turkish stronghold. Already, across the Bosphorus, the Eastern Empire of Constantinople was faced by the dangerous foe which was eventually to bring about its downfall.

Probably Constantinople would have fallen to the Turks much sooner than it did, had not the Turks been turned against the Serbs in the Balkans, and then, later, temporarily overwhelmed by Timur and the Tartars. The Turks, who soon made Adrianople their centre in Europe, found elsewhere in Europe fiercer and stronger opponents than the Emperor's troops in Constantinople —the Slavonic peoples of Serbia and Bulgaria, the Vlachs or Wallachians of what was later to form part of Rumania, the Magyars of Hungary, and the Poles. But, for a time, the Ottomans continued unchecked. In 1364 Louis I, King of Hungary and Poland, in alliance with the princes of Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia, attacked the Turks near Adrianople and was defeated, v Eleven years later the armies of Murad marched northwards, compelled the ruler of Serbia to pay tribute and to send horsemen to the Ottoman armies, while the Sultan accepted the daughter of the Bulgarian ruler as pledge of peace. Meanwhile the Greek Emperor was powerless, and recognized Sultan Murad as his Suzerain. At the same time the Ottoman power was extended by marriag and purchase over some of the remaining Seljuk emirate of Asia Minor, and a little later Bayezid or Bajazet reduced all that was left of the Seljuks. Thus the Ottoman power was expanding in Europe and Asia, at the expense of Christian and Mohammedan alike. In fact, it is a mistake to think of the Turks as fanatical apostles of Islam : rather, their motives in conquest appear similar to those of Christian powers, namely political security and command over commercial routes.

In 1388 another Balkan alliance took place, and an Ottoman army was overwhelmed. Upon this Murad

sent an army northwards which subdued Bulgaria, **but** the Serbian king, Lazarus, still undaunted, met the Sultan Murad and his army on the plain of Kossovo. At this battle (1389) the troops of Lazarus—Serbs, Hungarians, Moldavians, Wallachians—were heavily defeated. Murad was assassinated by a treacherous Serb, and Lazarus, taken captive, was slain by the outraged Turks. On the field of Kossovo Bayezid, who succeeded Murad, had his own brother Yakub executed, so inaugurating the practice of the killing of brothers 'o remove rivals and thereby secure the succession to :he throne. Barbarous as the custom was, it did largely secure the Ottoman Empire from the dangers of civil strife among relations.

Bayezid continued to conquer and also to consolidate his position, in both Europe and Asia Minor. Peace terms were sometimes cemented by marriage alliance between Christian and Moslem; for example, the Greek Emperor, John Palaeologus, married one of his daughters to Murad, and Bayezid after Kossovo took to wife a sister of the new Serbian king, son of Lazarus.

Bayezid turned his attention to Constantinople, **but** was interrupted by the coming of a crusading army. Hungary was Catholic, and now that Hungary, and not only races of the Greek Church, was attacked, her king, Sigismund, was able to get assistance against the Turk from the Catholic West. From the courts of Europe came many famous knights, and once more there was talk of rescuing the Holy Land from the infidel Turk. A great army marched south and sat down to besiege the Turkish fortress of Nicopolis on the Danube. But the Westerners took to women and wine ; they were over-confident. Meanwhile Bayezid himself came against them. After a bloody battle (1396) the Crusaders were defeated and their army dispersed, and the Sultan had the Christian prisoners butchered by the thousand in revenge for the great loss which the battle had caused

to the Turkish army. Bayezid turned to the conquest of Greece, and his troops pushed as far as Athens.

Successful as he had been in Europe, a great catastrophe was in store for Bayezid in Asia, a catastrophe which was to hold up for a period the development of the Ottoman Empire. After another attempt had been made to capture Constantinople, and while the Christian States of Europe were regarding Bayezid as the scourge of the world, a scourge arrived for Bayezid himself—Timur the Tartar (or Tamerlane).[1] From Central Asia came a new Mongol host, which overthrew the Turkisl army at Angora in 1402, and captured the Turkisl Sultan himself.[2] In the year following the battle the troops of Timur overran the whole of the Turkish lands of Asia Minor, and restored a number of the petty princes to their former possessions. For the time the Ottoman Empire had collapsed.

But though Timur is one of the greatest conquerors of history, the new Mongol invasion was temporary in its effect. Turkish vitality was not destroyed nor did the efficiency of the Turkish military machine disappear. European Turkey was still there and held firm. Mohammed I, who became Sultan in 1413, after a period of civil war with his brothers, in a few years regained his father's possessions. Turkish power was rehabilitated mainly by a policy of moderation and friendly interchanges with the Greek Empire and the Balkan States and also with Venice. In Asia the petty principalities, which had raised their heads under Timur, were reduced to allegiance. And the next Sultan, Murad II, was sufficiently strong to make, in 1422, an attempt on Constantinople.

During the reign of Murad II, however, the Christians

[1] Timur was a rival to Bayezid in cruelty. He is said to have buried alive 4,000 Christian Armenians who bad fought for Bayezid. Creasy, p. 46.

[2] This notable incident is reflected in some famous European literature, namely Marlowe's *Tamburlaine the Great* and Racine's *Bajazet.*

of South-Eastern Europe found a new champion in John Hunyadi, the famous knight of Hungary, who defeated the Turks on numerous occasions, and is said to have celebrated a victory by cruelly staying his prisoners as a spectacle during a banquet.*" In 1444 a ten-years' peace was signed between Hungary and Turkey, and Murad, apparently weary of action, lbdicated in favour of his son. Urged on, however, by the Pope and Cardinal Cesarini, who used the argument that it was not necessary to keep faith with infidels,[1] Hunyadi agreed to fight again, and with Ladislaus, King of Hungary, and the Cardinal Cesarini, marched against the Turks. Upon this threat Murad himself returned and overthrew the Christian army at the Battle of Varna (1444),on the coast of the Black Sea, Both the Hungarian king and the Cardinal perishing in the fight. This settled the Balkan resistance for a time, though in Albania Scanderbeg successfully resisted the Turks. In 1448 Hunyadi was again defeated in another battle on the famous field of Kossovo. A few years after the death of Murad, his son and successor, Mohammed II, laid siege to Belgrade (1456). Here Hunyadi, aided by a brave old monk, John Capistran, who headed a band of crusaders, gained his last triumph. He drove back and routed the Turkish army, saving Belgrade and for the time closing the way across the Danube into Hungary.

Mohammed II, a cruel but able and talented man, earned the name of "Conqueror" by his success in capturing Constantinople, which had so long stood out igainst the attacks of Turkish armies. In preparation "or the siege Mohammed built the fortress of Romeli Hisar not far from the city, and a garrison was established o take toll from passing vessels. The Turks bombarded he triple line of the land walls of the city with their

[1] The same argument was used by the Turks on another occasion. Creasy, p. 88.

cannon, but the last Greek Emperor, Constantine Palaeologus, made a brave defence. The Turks realized that it would be necessary to supplement attack fron the land side with attack from the harbour. This wouk divide the limited Christian forces inside the city. But the harbour of the Golden Horn was barred by a chain, and by ships to defend the chain. To overcome thi. difficulty, and because his own ships had been defeated, the Sultan had a number of boats drawn over a specially constructed causeway from the Bosphorus overland to the upper waters of the Golden Horn. Building a battery here, Mohammed was now able to bombard the citj simultaneously on two sides. Inside the beleaguered city there was dissension between Venetian and Genoese auxiliaries, but the Emperor himself with the tenacity of despair strove to infuse courage into the defenders

At last before the fourth assault of superior numbers by land and sea the city fell. The Emperor himself was struck down. The Turks poured into the city : many oJ its inhabitants were killed ; many more were seized as slaves. Even the holy walls of San Sofia did not save the terrified multitudes who filled it in hope of sanctuary; and the great edifice of Justinian, the metropolis of the Eastern Church, was converted into a mosque.[1]

So it was that, after a siege of fifty-three days, the Imperial capital, head of the old Roman Empire in the East, passed finally in the year 1453 into the hands oi the Turks. Spectacular as its fall was, the importance of the final loss of Constantinople should not be magnified. It was the last remaining Imperial stronghold; its dominions had long since fallen under Turkish sway Europe had not been moved to any special action *by* its peril, though some assistance was sent from Venice and Genoa. Venice had shown some little apprehensior

[1] The earlier church, built by Constantine the Great in 326 A.D. had been destroyed by fire. Justinian rebuilt San Sofia in *tb* sixth century.

nd, in the outcome, this was justified, for Turkey now ecame a sea power, and Venetian commerce was idangered by Turkish control of the Eastern lediterranean. The effect of Turkish success may have hown itself in Europe in another way. The peril in which Constantinople had evidently stood for some time probably had some influence on the intellectual revival called the Renaissance in Europe, since it caused Greek cholars to move westward to find the security they eared to lose at home. But the fall of Constantinople o the Turks did not make a complete change in the life of the Greek inhabitants. After the first barbarity of ts capture was over Greeks were allowed to live freely, cassured of their liberties and the free exercise of their religion, and the Sultan proclaimed that fugitives might freely return without fear to live as they had lived before. And, indeed, they were not merely Greeks who came to inhabit the Ottoman capital, but also Turkomans, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbians, men from all parts of the Sultan's dominions.

In addition to his capture of Constantinople, Mohammed strengthened his position in the Balkans by completing the annexation of Serbia and Bosnia, but as narrated above, Hunyadi had driven him back from Belgrade and Hunyadi's son, Matthias Corvinus, who became King of Hungary, also inflicted some reverses on the Turks and held them at bay. In Albania, too, Scanderbeg, who had once served the Turks, made himself independent, but after his death the country was subdued. The Crimea was conquered, and handed to a Tartar Khan as a tributary province. Mohammed nursed a project for a conquest of Italy. The Turks pushed westward towards Venice, and the Venetians were compelled to make peace. An attempt to storm Rhodes, held by the crusading Order of St. John, failed, but the Turks landed in Southern Italy and captured Otranto, massacring the inhabitants. This new career of conquest,

however, was cut short by the death of Mohammed in 1481, and the attack on Italy came to nothing.

There was something of a pause during the reign the next Sultan, Bayezid II (1481-1512), in the tide conquest, though there was fighting in Styria with th German Emperor Maximilian, in Moldavia with th King of Poland, and the Venetians were defeated at sea The reign was disturbed for a time by the rivalry of Jem brother of Bayezid, who desired to seize the throne Jem sought aid from the Knights of Rhodes, but the behaved treacherously and held him prisoner, sendin him to one of their stations in the South of France. The French king, Charles VIII, took him over, and the placed him in the hands of the Pope, Innocent VIII The Christian Powers received money from the Sultar for holding his rival, Prince Jem, while at the sam time they discussed with Jem himself the idea of using him to attack the Turkish Empire. The next Pope Alexander Borgia, opened negotiations with the Sulta, as to the sum to be received for Jem's death. Meanwhil Charles VIII invaded Italy, entered Rome, and demande that Jem should be handed over. But Jem died suddenly and Borgia poison was suspected. Apparently there was no honest prince in Christendom to deal fairly with Jem ; all were eager behind his back to gain his brother' gold. It is worth while to remember this story who any comparison is made between Turk and Christian.

Selim I, called the Grim, became Sultan by deposing his father Bayezid through a successful revolt of the Janissaries. He had his brothers and nephews put to death, and then began a reign marked in particular be war and conquest. He suppressed by massacre the Shiah heresy which had been growing up in parts of Asia Minor, spreading there from Persia.[1] Then, turning

[1] Compare the Massacre of St. Bartholomew—the slaughter a Protestants in Paris later in the same century. Selim also considered a general massacre of Christians. Von Hammer Purgstall, p. 364

against Persia itself, after an arduous series of marches he defeated the Persian Shah and occupied his capital, Tabriz. He had a number of the most skilful Persian artisans sent to Constantinople. Selim annexed Kurdistan and Diarbekir, but was prevented from attempting the conquest of Persia by the discontent of his soldiers, which compelled him to desist. Next, he turned to Egypt.

Egypt was held by another Islamic Power, the Mameluke Sultans, who also held Syria and so bordered on the Ottoman Asia Minor. Mameluke means " owned," " a slave," and the dynasty originated with Turkish slaves introduced as a bodyguard by a successor of Saiadin in the middle of the thirteenth century. When the dynasty of Saiadin came to an end the Mamelukes occupied Saladin's empire of Egypt and Syria. They were violent, but brave and able, repulsed the Mongols and Tartars, and made their capitals of Cairo and Damascus homes of civilization.

Selim marched in 1516 against the Mamelukes and defeated them near Aleppo. Overcoming all opposition, Selim proceeded southwards, defeating the Mamelukes again near Cairo in a terrific battle, and then occupied Cairo itself. Street fighting and massacre followed; Selim treacherously executed many who surrendered, and Egypt was made a Turkish province. In addition to Egypt and Syria, Selim also acquired the Mameluke authority over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It is commonly said that Selim received from the last Khalif at Cairo the spiritual authority handed down by the former Khalifs of Baghdad,[1] and that thus the Turkish

[1] After the fall of the Baghdad Khalifs before the Mongols in 1258 a continuation of their dynasty was set up in Cairo, and enjoyed titular authority under the protection of the Egyptian rulers. It is doubtful whether Selim himself attached much importance to the title of Khalif, and the Egyptian Khalifat had fallen into decline. Selim seems rather to have aimed at Pan-Islamism by force. On the whole question, see T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate,* chaps, xi and xii.

Sultan became not only head of the great Ottoman Empire, but also head of the Mohammedan religion—in India, Asia and Africa, wherever the traditional Khalifat was recognized. There appears, however, to be no contemporary evidence for the story of the transference of the Khalif's power. The title of Khalif had been used by earlier Ottoman Sultans. What gave him prestige in the Mohammedan world would seem to have been Selim's guardianship of the holy cities, Mecca a]id Medina.

Selim's wars are noteworthy because they were fought, not against the Christian West, but against otlrer Mohammedan Powers. He seemed to aim at uniting once again the Moslem East, and during his eight years' reign (1512-1520) he did in fact nearly double the extent 'of the Ottoman Empire.

The next Sultan, Soliman I (1520-1566), who earned from the West the name of " Magnificent," was *in* the East a fair rival to the great European figures of the sixteenth century, rulers like Charles V, Emperor ,of Germany and King of Spain, Francis I of France, and Henry VIII and Queen Elizabeth of England. The wars in Italy between Charles V and Francis I were matched in the campaigns of Soliman, while the exploits of the Elizabethan seamen against the Spaniards found a counterpart in those of Turkish admirals in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. The sixteenth century was a great century in the history of the world, marked by Renaissance and Reformation, by the consolidation of national states and by the struggles of empires.

The greatest wars of Soliman were against the Powers of the West. In 1521 he marched against the Hungarians, took Belgrade and made it into a Turkish fortress. The next year saw Soliman's attack upon the Island of Rhodes, the stronghold of the crusading order of the Knights of St. John. After a brave defence of nearly

five months the Knights, realizing that their fortress must ultimately fall, accepted honourable terms offered them by Soliman, and left the island in the hands of the Turks, where massive walls, gateways and buildings of the Knights may still be seen..

Fighting had now become essential to the stability of domestic government in Turkey. The unruly Janissaries had to be employed, and to have opportunities of booty. The next campaign was directed against Hungary. The Christian King of France was by no means above negotiations with the infidel, and therefore encouraged Soliman in order to distract the attention of France's enemy, the Emperor Charles V. In 1526 Soiiman marched northwards with an army of 100,000 men and three hundred guns.[1] At Mohacs he defeated Louis II of Hungary. The king himself fell in this battle, thousands of his men were captured, and Budapest was occupied. The defeat at Mohacs turned Hungary, for long the bulwark of Europe, virtually into an Ottoman tributary province.

The monarchy in Hungary was still elective and lay in the hands of the great nobles, and it was the jealousies of these nobles which in no small degree helped the Turks in their success against Hungary. After the defeat of Mohacs John Zapolya was chosen king, and the Turks left. But it was clear that Zapolya's position depended upon Turkish support. Soiiman had to defend Zapolya against Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and brother of the Emperor Charles V, who claimed the Hungarian throne (he was brother-in-law of Louis II) and headed a party of Hungarian nobles. This led to a renewed invasion of Hungary by Soliman in 1529, the reoccupation of Budapest, the restoration of Zapolya, and the siege of Vienna, the capital of Ferdinand. While the Turkish troops were laying waste the countryside in

[1] **Creasy, p. 165. Creasy says that at this time the artillery of the Ottomans was far superior to that of any other nation.**

their advance preparations were made by the Austrians to defend Vienna. The Turks encircled the city with an immense army and made numerous assaults. The inhabitants, however, reinforced by German and Spanish troops, made a spirited defence. The weather grew worse and with it the Turkish troops grew discouraged. After a siege of less than three weeks Soliman was compelled to withdraw and return to his own domain.

Again in 1532 Soliman marched north and approached Vienna. But this time Charles V himself was ready with a great army, and the Sultan was not tempted to risk an open engagement. In the next year peace was made, Hungary being divided between the two claimants, Ferdinand and Zapolya. Peace, however, could not be permanent. An alliance between Francis I[1] and Soliman set the Emperor Charles V between two fires. France gained certain judicial and economic privileges. Another campaign gave advantages to the Turks, and in 1547 Ferdinand agreed to the payment of a yearly tribute to the Sultan. Most of Hungary remained in Soliman's hands, and was now governed by Turks. A live-years' truce was agreed to, but at its termination hostilities recommenced and continued without definite result. In addition to his Western campaigns Soliman fought several times on the Asiatic frontier against the Persians and in 1534 he took Baghdad. Such campaigns gave valuable respite to Europe/

During this period, too, Turkey was developing as a sea power, and her ships became the terror of the Mediterranean. The Turks used the corsairs or Barbary[2] pirates as auxiliaries to harry the ships and coasts of Christian lands. Perhaps the greatest of these was

[1] An early example of French policy in seeking alliances on Germany's Eastern frontier. The Reformation movement made progress through the preoccupation of Charles V with the Turks.

[2] The name seems to be derived from the Berbers, the chief inhabitants of the North African region comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli.

Khaireddin, called Barbarossa[1] by the Christians, who was the son of a coasting trader, and came from Mitylene. Of mixed descent, Turkish and Greek, Barbarossa was by turns mercenary soldier and pirate. North Africa, overrun in the seventh century by trie Arabs, was now weakened by disputes between local rulers, and was a ready prey. Moslem and Spaniard came into conflict in this area, for the Spaniards having forced the Moors out of Southern Spain regarded dominion in North Africa as necessary to Spanish expansion. Barbarossa seized Algiers from the Spaniards. He found it wise, however, to appeal for recognition and support to the Sultan, Selim *h.* The Sultan recognized him as ruler of Algiers, subject to Turkish overlordship, and so Algiers came to be included in the Ottoman Empire. Barbarossa added Tunis to his conquests. It was, however, captured from him by the Spaniards. In 1574 Selim II reduced it and it became a Turkish province. In 1553 other Turkish coxsairs had captured Tripoli, and so the greater part of North Africa came under Turkish suzerainty. The connection between Constantinople and these North African lands was often rather weak, being sometimes maintained by the payment of tribute or presents to the Turkish Sultan by the local rulers. On one occasion Barbarossa defeated the combined fleets of the Emperor, the Pope and Venice under the famous Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria. Turkish seamen ravaged the coasts of Spain and Italy, and conquered the coasts of Yemen and Aden as far as the Gulf of Basra, and right down to the nineteenth century the corsairs of these North African ports were a menace to legitimate shipping in the Mediterranean.

Soliman as a man and ruler was marked by great personal qualities. In the main he was wise, just and generous. And although his reign proved to be a climax in Turkish history, he left behind him a great empire,

[1] The origin of this name appears to be doubtful.

an empire whose territorial limits had all **but** been reached. The Turkish dominions in the time of Soliman made up a Mediterranean Empire, comprising North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Asia Minor, Greece, the Balkan Peninsula, and parts of Hungary and Russia. They " comprised all the most celebrated cities of biblical and classical history, except Rome, Syracuse and Persepolis. The sites of Carthage, Memphis, Tyre, Nineveh, Babylon, and Palmyra were Ottoman ground ; and the cities of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Damascus, Smyrna, Nicaea, Brusa, Athens, Philippi and Adrianople, besides many of later but scarcely inferior celebrity, such as Algiers, Cairo, Mecca, Medina, Bassorah, Baghdad and Belgrade, obeyed the Sultan of Constantinople." " An empire of more than forty thousand square miles, embracing many of the richest and most beautiful regions of the world, had been acquired by the descendants of Ertoghrul in three centuries from the time when their forefather wandered a homeless adventurer at the head of less than five hundred fighting men."[1]

[1] **Creasy, p. 197.**

CHAPTER I I I

THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

IF, at this point, we pause to examine the institutions which made possible the acquisition and administration of the great empire whose development has been described in preceding chapters, we shall find that there were two main sources of these institutions. Both were alien to Western civilization. One was the nomadic stock-breeding way of life of the tribes of Central Asia whence the Turks had come. The other was Islam, or the religion of Mohammed, which the Turks had adopted. The Turkish Sultan, at first the military leader of the tribe, took also the title of Khalif, and became head of both Church and, State. He was an irresponsible and absolute monarch. The only restraint upon him lay in the commands of the Koran, the holy book of Islam. To carry out his will the Sultan chose ministers or viziers, their chief being known as the Grand Vizier.

The nomadic way of life consists in a planned series of movements from pasture to pasture in order to find the necessary food for the animals, and the nomadic community consists of the tribesmen, their trained animals such as dogs, horses, camels, and finally the flocks and herds themselves, whose flesh and milk can be used as food and whose bone and hide, hair and wool can be employed for many useful purposes. Such nomadic communities, disciplined and made strong in their wanderings, are liable to cause trouble when they come into contact with more settled populations. What has happened so many times in history is this: from some

cause, perhaps climatic, perhaps some failure in vegetation, or perhaps the growth of population or attack by some other people, the nomad becomes a warrior and sets out to subdue the lands of the more settled peoples who impede his progress. In this way the Turk came to Asia Minor, and in course of time from herding cattle he turned to governing an empire. But the method employed was similar. Nomadic empires " treat the majority of their sedentary subjects as ' human cattle ' who are to be periodically milked and shorn and are to be kept in order by a ferocious repression at the first symptoms of insubordination, but otherwise are to be allowed to live their own lives in their own way."[1]

To control the " human cattle " a number of watch-dogs are required. For this purpose the Turkish Empire carefully trained slaves, selected them for administrative and military offices, yet kept them absolutely dependent for life and property upon the government of the Sultan ; and it was on the training of these slaves that the efficiency of the Empire depended.[2] The virtue of the system was that advancement depended upon ability, not upon birth or wealth. In the Sultan's harem, too, the women were slaves, often of different race, and thus the very rulers of the Ottoman Empire were the sons of slaves.

The slaves were recruited in various ways : from prisoners of war, from the slave dealers, and from tribute children forcibly taken from their parents, at first exclusively from Christian parents. Such children, the

[1] **Toynbee and Kirkwood, p. 20.**

[2] **The slave system is described in detail in Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire.* (1913.) He quotes a number of sixteenth-century descriptions by Italians who knew Constantinople. Sometimes there has appeared a tendency for the power of the ruling dynasty to pass into the hands of the slaves. For example, the Mamelukes, or slaves, in Egypt became rulers. Also in India, where Islam was imposed by nomad invaders, there was a series of slave kings at Delhi.**

Turks argued, were, being converted to Islam, thereby saved from hell. The slaves were carefully selected according to the purpose for which they were intended.* Those intended for administrative work—we might say, the civil and higher military service—were given an intensive training, including a literary education and military and athletic exercises. Then, starting with minor posts in the service of the Sultan, some would pass into the household cavalry, others into more responsible positions, and thence in some cases to the most important civil or military posts in the Empire. The other slaves—those not selected for the higher services—were given hard manual labour to develop their physique, before the fittest were drafted into the famous corps of Janissaries, the standing army of the Ottomans. The Janissaries lived under strict discipline, were not allowed to marry, were to avoid all luxury and spend their time in military exercises. These rules, however, came to be broken frequently, and so the morale of the corps eventually declined.

Thus with the aid of its carefully-trained slave civil service and slave regular army, assisted by feudal levies among the free Moslem landholders, and sometimes, too, by Christian contingents, the great Empire of the Ottomans was administered. Part was ruled by the central government which appointed pashas to rule the provinces or vilayets, made up of smaller divisions or sanjaks under pashas of lower degree. The pashas or governors of provinces often ruled in great splendour. Appointments were generally annual, and gained by bribes. The governors recouped themselves by exactions ; thus corruption and oppression of the inhabitants were frequent. As is usually the case with large empires, there was considerable difficulty in maintaining from the

[1] **The selection and training of the slaves offers a remarkable parallel to that suggested for the " Guardians " and " Watch-dogs " in Plato's *Republic*.**

centre an efficient check on governors and officials in **the** provinces. The other part of the Empire paid tribute, but was largely self-governing under the suzerainty of the Sultan: such for a time was the government of the Kingdom of Hungary, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the Tartar Khanate of the Crimea. The Barbary States (Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli) were under semi-independent governors. Mecca was ruled by the descendants of Mohammed under the Sultan's suzerainty. In addition, in the provinces there was an hereditary land-owning class in some ways comparable to the feudal nobles of Medieval Europe, though the Turkish land-owners had less prestige and power. Generally the Turkish feudal landowner had received his land for services renojered in helping to conquer the land, and in return for its po?s7s^iolrh'e^TO''required to bring a certain number of armed followers when summoned to take part in one of the Sultan's campaigns.

Turkish law and social life rested on the religious principles of Islam, which the Turkish tribes had adopted before they settled in Asia Minor and built up the Ottoman Empire. Islam, which signifies submission to the will of God and is the name Mohammedans give to their religion, is held to be a divine revelation given to the world through Mohammed, a seventh-century Arab, regarded as the last of a series of prophets commencing with Adam and of whom Christ was one. The doctrines and practices of this religion are based on the Koran, regarded as the word of God revealed to Mohammed, and upon the traditions of Mohammed's words and way of life. Passages in the Koran deal with the duties of religion, such as acceptance of belief in one God and in Mohammed as His prophet, and certain duties obligatory on the believer ; a recital of the creed ; performances of divine worship five times a day; fasting; giving of alms; pilgrimage to Mecca, if the believer is able to make it. Islam, too, involved a legal system, because Mohammed

himself acted as a judge and **left** behind some **of his** judgments in **the** Koran, while others were handed down by those who heard them. The religion of Islam was supported by land given by the Sultan and private individuals. Thus financial support was gained for the mosques and the charitable and educational establishments of the Church. The legal system depended upon Islam in that judges and jurists were trained by the Church, and were subject to the Mufti, himself appointed by the Sultan.

One of the obligations placed on the Mohammedan was the conversion of unbelievers, and this very easily led to the jihad or holy war for the forcible conversion of the unbeliever. But although the Arab followers of Mohammed had been fanatical conquerors, under the Turkish Sultans much toleration was shown to other beliefs. The popular idea of a continuous religious war between East and West, Mohammedan and Christian, is a misleading generalization. During the Crusades neither Christians nor Mohammedans were united among themselves. Right through the period of growth of the Ottoman Empire the bitter rivalry between the Roman Catholics of the West and the Christians of the Greek Orthodox Church of Constantinople prevented any real combined opposition to Turkish advance. As we have already seen, too, in the sixteenth century, the " most Christian " King of France, Francis I, was in alliance with the Turks against the Emperor of the Germans, Charles V, and earlier, the conqueror of Constantinople, Mohammed II, had had his portrait painted by the Venetian, Gentile Bellini.

Thus we need not be surprised to find, within the Ottoman Empire, the existence of numbers of people who were not Mohammedan by religion. Such groups were known as " millets," and they could not be locally defined as their members might be scattered over the **whole empire. Although the name** was **not, perhaps,**

technically applied to the Mohammedans themselves, they also formed a group comparable to a millet living under Islamic law. The Millet-i-Rum comprised all the Sultan's subjects who were members of the Orthodox Christian Church, and its head was the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Armenians, Jews and Roman Catholics were similarly organized. And these different " millets " were left very much to themselves so long as they were obedient and paid the tolls levied on them. In addition, there were certain colonies of foreign merchants, subjects of foreign Powers, who were granted a certain degree of autonomy within the Turkish Empire.

Thus, to form a right conception of the institutions of the Ottoman Empire, we must understand clearly how they differ from those of a modern Western state such as we are familiar with ourselves. The military power of the Ottomans had embraced peoples of different race, different religion, and different outlook and occupation. The one link common to the whole was the Sultan's government. There could be no approach to the Western idea of equal citizenship before the law in a nationally uniform state. But human beings will not indefinitely allow themselves to be treated like cattle. As soon, therefore, as the different peoples in the Empire became politically conscious, or when the central government of the Sultan began to fail, trouble was bound to arise. The military organization,, necessary for conquest, was in peace time a burden. The nomadic institutions which had made the Empire possible, were, when once it had been constructed, not sufficient to protect it against outside interference and internal decay.

CHAPTER IV

THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

IT is always difficult to account in convincing terms foi the decline of a great empire. During its development, while still young and poor, the embryo empire seems strong enough to overcome its enemies and shows its vitality in its power of growth; when its growth is achieved, and wealth and power gained, decline appears to set in, and wealth, strength and experience do noi suffice to overcome difficulties which youth would easily have surmounted. There is about the rise and decline of an empire something of the inevitability of the biological process of life : birth, youth, age, decline and death.

So it was with the Ottoman Empire. The reign of Soliman the Magnificent marks a climax, and henceforth the story is one of decline. So far as we can group them together the causes of decline would seem to be: (1) failure to find any satisfactory or natural frontiers; (2) the great size of the Empire, which rendered difficult its administration ; (3) internal decay, marked in the main by the breakdown of the system of selecting the slaves and their consequent inefficiency, coupled with the insubordination of the Janissaries; (4) a decline in the character and ability of the Turkish Sultans, coincident with (5) the rise of able leaders amongst hostile powers like Austria and Poland ; (6) the appearance of a great rival in Russia; and finally *(7)* the growing restlessness and political consciousness of subject races which began to look westward, and in so doing came

under the influence of the idea of nationality. Perhaps, however, we should call these things characteristics of decline rather than causes. The Turkish Empire was a military one: and it would seem that a great military machine cannot stand still. It must go forward or back. Limits to its extension, sooner or later, it must surely find, and when this happens decline seems likely to set in.

Extension of Turkish conquest failed to find satisfactory boundaries within which the empire could be consolidated. The defeat of Hungary at Mohacs brought the Turks face to face with the much stronger Christian Powers of Austria and Germany. The failure to capture Vienna was a check which, when we look back, appears symbolic. Here was a bulwark for Europe; its counter-attacks and the ceaseless stirrings of conquered Hungarians and other Balkan peoples caused a steady drain on Turkish resources. Again, extension of the Empire eastwards, and southwards with the conquest of Egypt, meant pushing into inland Asia in search of a satisfactory frontier, and the fighting of many wars with the Persians. And the very size of the Empire, although it added rich provinces, caused an increasing strain on finance and upon the administrative capacity of the capital. Moreover, the mere physical fact of distance and hence of difficulty of communication should by no means be forgotten. It is one thing to acquire provinces by military expeditions ; it is another *to* administer them from, and to keep them in constant touch with, a distant government.

The internal decay of the Empire shows itself most clearly in a change in the character of the slave civil service. These slaves, as we have seen, had been carefully selected, and their sons were not allowed to follow the career of their fathers. In *this* way the efficiency of the service was ensured by the training of its recruits in a hard competitive school where merit alone brought reward, and at the same time the growth of a hereditary

bureaucracy was prevented. It was, however, scarcely to be expected that-such-a-system could last indefinitely ; neither the children of officials nor free Turks themselves were likely to approve of seeing themselves debarred from all political and military careers. It was in the second half of the sixteenth century that the change in the system came! The Sultan was compelled to allow the enrolment of the children of the slave officials in the service, and with this change came decline in efficiency.

Similar laxity affected the Janissaries. Their power and privileges as a successful army were great; outsiders begged to have their children admitted ; and regulations became more and more relaxed. With the increasing warfare the body of Janissaries grew ever larger and more powerful, so that in time of peace it became a menace to ordered government and even to the Sultans themselves.

The Janissaries extorted sums of money at the accession of new rulers ; they raised frequent mutinies in Constantinople ; they appointed their own favourites to high office in the Empire and executed them when they lost favour. They even, on more than one occasion, took the lives of Sultans. With growing corruption, the corps became inefficiently officered, and improvements in the art of war were neglected, so that the strength of the Turkish army began to fail behind that of other nations. The bribes they extorted depleted the Imperial treasury.

Thus the corps of Janissaries, the greatest military weapon in the making of the Turkish Empire, became in course of time one of the main causes of its decline.

The deterioration in the character of the Sultans is shown in the lives of those who followed Soliman. Selim II earned the name of " Sot " ; Murad III spent much of his life in debauchery ; and Mohammed III was over-fond of the easy life of luxury in the capital. Little of importance marked this period, save the capture

of Cyprus by the Turks from the Venetians in 1571. The Venetian commander was barbarously executed. Venice, Spain, and the Pope combined against Turkey, the allied fleets under Don John of Austria winning a great victory at Lepanto (1571). But the effects of this naval battle were comparatively slight. Besides this, there were wars with Persia, Austria and Hungary, Janissary mutinies, and interference in government by the women of the harem. Capitulations, or commercial agreements with a number of Western Powers were made about this time, including one in 1580 with England, the first British Ambassador to Turkey being sent by Queen Elizabeth, who sought the help of the Sultan against the threatened Armada of Spain.

The last warrior Sultan was Murad IV (1623-40), who suppressed internal disorders by a widespread terror, and fought the Persians, recapturing from them Baghdad. The next twelve Sultans, however, until we reach Mahmud II early in the nineteenth century, possessed little individuality, and generally lived shut up in the seraglio, or palace, abandoning themselves to vice. Government was left to the grand viziers, and the Ottoman Empire was fortunate to have for a time an able Albanian family, whose members were stern but just and efficient rulers.

In 1669, after twenty years of effort, the Turks were successful in taking Crete from the Venetians. Soon afterwards a dangerous enemy appeared : the Cossacks of the Ukraine successfully appealed to Turkey for aid against Poland ; and a Polish noble, John Sobieski, who was to prove himself a most able general, defeated the Turks in 1673 and again in 1675.

In 1683 the Turks, under a grand vizier, made an expedition northwards and laid siege to Vienna, thinking that it was a good time to attack Austria because of the opposition aroused by the persecution of the Protestants in the part of Hungary under Austrian control. The city

of Vienna was unprepared. Nevertheless the citizens made a brave defence, and held their own until the arrival of Sobieski, now King of Poland, who had sworn to aid the Emperor. He came, and with his Polish army, assisted by some German contingents, completely routed the Turkish army, seizing their camp, their artillery, their ammunition and their oxen. Thus, for a second time, Vienna was saved from the Turks ; and this time defeat for the Turks meant the loss of much of their territory in Europe. Austria, Venice, and Poland formed a league, under Papal patronage, to prosecute the war, and they carried it on until 1698. Budapest was retaken in 1686, Belgrade in 1688, and although there was a slight Turkish rally and fresh fighting, the Turks could not withstand the great general, Prince Eugene of Savoy, who now led the Austrian troops against them. The Turks were heavily defeated at the Battle of Zenta (1607), and peace was made in 1699 at Carlowitz. This peace was important because Turkey admitted the intervention of outside Powers, notably England, whose mediation was accepted in making the peace. However, after renewed hostilities the Austrian army under Prince Eugene again took Belgrade in 1717 (it had been previously retaken by the Turks), and by the Peace of Passarowitz. in 1718 Austria gained all of Hungary, Belgrade and part of Serbia. Belgrade and the Serbian districts were restored to Turkey by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, and the Turkish frontier in Europe was fixed very much as it was to remain down to the time of the Treaty of Berlin. The Turkish armies were never again to be a military danger to Europe, though Turkey herself was long to prove a source of dissension between the Great Powers.

The rise to importance of Russia during the seventeenth century presented Turkey with a new and dangerous power on her borders. As early as the ninth century a Russian fleet had appeared at the Golden Horn and threatened Constantinople. Several later attempts

were made, which shows that **while Constantinople was** still Greek it was coveted by the Russians. But the **early** Russian states were overwhelmed in the thirteenth century by the Tartars, and both Kiev and Moscow were destroyed. It was only very gradually that the Russian princes (later Tsars) of Moscow threw off the Tartar yoke and made the Russian Empire. Eventually Russia and Turkey were bound to clash, for Russian power was extending southwards towards the Black Sea, where the Tartar Khanate of the Crimea was subject to the Sultan. And there was no love lost between Tartars and Russians. The Tartars of the Crimea sacked Moscow in 1571, while the Russian Cossacks harried the Turkish frontiers. Previously the Russians had attacked Astrakhan with the idea of building a canal between the Rivers Don and Volga, but the attack failed. In 1696 Peter the Great of Russia took Azov from the Turks, and so gained a place on the northern shore of the Black Sea, It seems that Russia's ambition to possess the Black Sea ports, and with them the command of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, was already taking shape. But no decisive action took place during the first half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, in war Turkey more than held her own.

The question of the succession to the Polish throne, and the intrigues for the partition of Poland by Prussia, Austria and Russia, later involved Turkey in further trouble. Poland, Austria and Russia all being her neighbours, any trouble arising between them was certain to affect Turkey. And in addition Catherine the Great, the Russian Tsarina, had vaulting ambition. In the war of 1768-74 the Turks suffered severe reverses. Russian armies beat the Turks in Georgia and the Crimea, and in 1771 the Crimea was conquered by the Russians. Meanwhile, off Greece the Turkish fleet was burnt by a Russian fleet which had sailed round from the Baltic. Finally, in 1774 the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji was **signed.**

It was a most humiliating event for the Turk, and shows how far the decline of his Empire had gone.

By this treaty the Tartars of the Crimea and the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia became practically independent. The Imperial title of " padishah " was conceded to the Russian Tsars. The Black Sea and the Mediterranean were made free for both countries. Turkey was to pay an indemnity to Russia.

Russia was now definitely a Black Sea Power. In addition, the so-called " Eastern Question " may be said to date from this time.[1] For, on the basis of certain clauses in the treaty, Russia henceforth claimed to protect all adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church (from which the Russian Church had sprung in the tenth century), and so assumed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey. This claim by Russia was to involve her in serious difficulties with other Powers. Thus henceforth Russia came to be popularly regarded as the natural protector of the Greek Christians. But Russia was not content. Soon afterwards she annexed the Crimea and Kuban, thus overcoming the last of her old Tartar enemies, and Catherine herself made a triumphal journey to her new territories. The Russian frontier on the West was now the Dniester and her territory stretched right along the Black Sea coast to the Caucasus. Catherine had still more ambitious schemes—stretching to the complete partition of Turkey — but Russian success

[1] **" The beginning of the ' Eastern Question ' is by some dated from the first appearance of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula ; by others from the entry of the Turks into Macedonia, and subsequently into Constantinople. Its modern phase may be said to begin with the decadence of the Turkish Empire in the eighteenth century. This decadence had as its external result the encroachment r' Austria and Russia from the north, and the constantly increa" intervention of Western Powers which felt their vital interr be affected ; while internally the weakening of the central' admitted a growing consciousness of nationality among races, and a desire, as opportunity offered, to throw *of* yoke and to attain independence."—*Peace Handbor' Question,* p. 3.**

had aroused the fears of other European Powers, and Catherine was fortunate in being able to extricate herself without their intervention. For the time the plans of Russia were interrupted.

Meanwhile the internal condition of the Ottoman Empire was going from bad to worse. Already the Barbary States, Syria, Egypt and Baghdad were virtually independent. In Asia Minor there was much disregard of the Imperial claims by tribal chiefs and feudal families. Also in European parts of the Empire local rulers and officials often paid little respect to the Sultan's government in the capital. It seemed almost as though Turkish Constantinople would fall to the Russians in the eighteenth century as Greek Constantinople had fallen to the Turks in 1453.

Another and a very important factor in the decline of the Ottoman Empire was the clash between its corrupt institutions and the desire for reform introduced when some of its subjects, the " human cattle," began to look to the West for their ideas. There were communities of Christians within the Ottoman Empire, and trade tended to pass into their hands, and some of them visited Western parts. Thus Christian Greek subjects of the Sultan and Western merchants resident in Turkey began to draw the Empire into contact with the West. The Greek subjects of the Sultan in coming into contact with the West learned Western languages, and to them for this reason the Turkish authorities had to turn for interpreters and negotiators in framing their treaties with foreign powers. Turks themselves had been occupied with war and conquest; now that the day of military triumph was passing they had to depend on Christian

fects to fill many of the offices of state.

stern ideas had also penetrated into Russia,[1]

should not be over-emphasized. The culture of Catherine urt in eighteenth-century Russia is in striking contrast arity of the revolt of Pugacheff, a peasant **and** * Volga.

where another Eastern Christian Westernizer, Peter the Great, had introduced what he had learned in Holland and England. Striking results had not been long in following the reorganization of the Russian army. Within a century Turkey had been badly worsted by Russia, and had had to agree to the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Humiliated by defeat at Russian hands, the Turks set themselves *to* adopt something of the Russian method, and they started with what naturally seemed to them to be most important, namely military organization. The young officers, in order to learn their tactics and strategy, had to acquire a knowledge of Western languages, and at the same time they became acquainted with Western social and political ideas. Here was another channel through which Western ideas could penetrate into Turkey, and it provides an explanation why in the future young officers were so frequently to prove revolutionaries, from Enver Bey to Mustafa Kemal.

The long European wars of Napoleon diverted the energies of Turkey's enemies into a struggle for existence against the French conqueror. Turkey herself could not escape from the war. She fought the French when Napoleon invaded Egypt, but Napoleon was checked in Syria. Later she fought Russia, and this provoked an English attack upon Constantinople. Napoleon and the Russian Tsar made peace and talked of partitioning Turkey, but Turkey was saved by the war in Europe from conquest and partition. Later, too, loans to Turkey caused the governemts of citizens who had made such loans to be anxious for the preservation of Turkey.

Afterwards what saved the Ottoman Empire from speedy disappearance was the fact that no one of the Great Powers of Europe was prepared to see Constantinople pass into the hands of any other of them. Russia, apart from her interest in the Christian subjects of Turkey, aimed at the control of the Straits, her outlet to the Mediterranean. Austria feared that Russia, if Russia

proved victorious over the Turk, would be a still more dangerous neighbour than Turkey herself. England feared that the advance of Russia might endanger communications with India. The theory of the Balance of Power, developed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, did not admit of the passing of Turkey into the hands of any one Power.

Some attempts were made at internal reform, but such attempts were faced by the opposition of vested interests in the old institutions. Mahmud II (1808-39), in spite of every kind of difficulty and danger, destroyed the Janissaries by firing on them with cannon when they had collected together in revolt, and by burning their barracks. He replaced them with disciplined national forces, imposing service on his free Moslem subjects. Mahmud also substituted direct Imperial government of the provinces for their government or rather misgovernment by feudal lords, chiefs or self-seeking officials. He regularized the system of taxation. The first official printing press was established. Mahmud discarded the turban, adopting in its place the fez. He also took to wearing European clothes, and ordered his officials to do likewise. Such reforms, however, could not produce speedy results.

To add to the difficulties of the Ottoman Empire, national risings now began to take place among the subject peoples in its European territory. At first they were against the tyranny of the Janissaries and not against the government of the Ottomans. Kara George led the first Serbian struggle of 1804. The Serbs, as Greek Orthodox Christians, received support from Russia in their struggle for independence, and by an agreement between Russia and Turkey in 1826 at Akerman were granted internal autonomy, while Russia was to exercise protection over them. At the same time Serbia was to pay tribute to the Turkish Sultan as suzerain. It required another armed intervention by Russia, however, before

these terms were carried out by the Turks, and Serbia became virtually independent under an hereditary prince (1830). Finally, Serbian independence was recognized at the Congress of Berlin, 1878.

The Greeks, who rose in revolution in 1821, like the Serbs, owed much to Russia. Already in the time of Catherine the Great the Russian fleet had appeared in the Aegean and organized a revolt during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74. The revolt failed and was followed by terrible massacres, but national sentiment was reawakened under the influence of the French Revolution, and literary revival encouraged interest in the glories of Greece. The fascination of the classic past of Hellas brought men like Byron into the fray. A revolutionary organization was founded, and with the aid of branches outside Greece, for example at Odessa, it prepared for revolt by collecting funds, engaging in propaganda, and distributing arms. In 1821 the struggle for independence began. Massacres took place on both sides. The Greeks of the Morea tried to exterminate the Moslems; as reprisals, Christians were killed in Europe and Asia Minor, while the Great Powers of Europe intrigued with one another for a favourable position. Russia and Austria looked askance at revolutionary movements, though they were enemies of the Turk. Canning, the English Foreign Secretary, followed a policy of fair play for struggling nationalities. Finding himself unable to suppress the revolt, the Sultan sent for the aid of Mehemet Ali Pasha, who, as Governor of Egypt, had introduced Western military reforms into the Egyptian army. Mehemet Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, with a disciplined Egyptian army and fleet, entered the Morea and defeated the Greeks. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Western Powers were still going on with a view to securing Greek autonomy without engaging in war with Turkey, when the English, Russian and French fleets came into contact with and destroyed the Turkish

and Egyptian fleets at Navarino. This led to war between Turkey and Russia and the defeat of the Turks. But the other Powers interfered in the making of the peace, and in 1832 Greece became an independent kingdom. To restore order, however, in a country rendered chaotic by revolt and war was no mean task, Ottoman government had gone ; another must be put in its place. The Powers decided on monarchy, and brought in a Bavarian prince to be King of Greece.

The declining years of the Ottoman Empire saw scarcely a moment's peace. Mehemet Ali, virtually independent in Egypt and estranged from Constantinople, sent his son Ibrahim to attack the Turks (1831). Ibrahim conquered Syria, marched into Asia Minor, defeated a Turkish army at Konia, and began to threaten the Turkish capital itself. Turkey had to call upon her enemy Russia to save her—for Russia did not wish to see a new and powerful ruler like Ibrahim installed at Constantinople—and the presence of a Russian army near Constantinople and the intervention of the other Western Powers brought about a temporary settlement. Eventually in 1841 Mehemet Ali was restricted to his Egyptian territory, where his rule was made hereditary under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Turkey still depended upon the protection of the Great Powers, and once more Russia had been prevented from gaining control over Turkey.

In the Crimean War, the right to protect Greek Orthodox Christians, which was claimed by Russia, was the immediate pretext for hostilities. At the Holy Places of Palestine there were quarrels among the monks, some being Roman Catholic, others Orthodox. The former had the support of France, the latter of Russia. This ecclesiastical controversy easily developed into a struggle for influence between France and Russia. It was believed that the Tsar did not really want peace ; he spoke of the Ottoman Empire as the " sick man " of Europe, and

made proposals to the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg for the partition of Turkish territory. Turkey declared war on Russia (1853), and in the following year both England and France entered the war on the side of Turkey. The war was in the main fought out in the Crimea, and lasted until 1856, when Russia was brought to agree to terms.

By the Treaty of Paris of 1856 Russia abandoned her claim to interfere in Turkey and to protect the Christians ; and the Black Sea was opened to commercial ships of all countries, while it was closed to all warships. The independence of Turkey and the integrity of her territory were henceforth to be respected by the parties to the Treaty.

But although the conclusion of the Crimean War had left Turkish territory practically untouched, Turkey was soon to suffer further losses. Russia had followed up her anti-Turkish policy not only with regard to Serbia and Greece, but also the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. These principalities had long been tributary to the Turks and their princes had been subject to Turkish authority. But by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 the principalities, while remaining under the suzerainty of the Sultan, came *to* have their affairs interfered with by the Western Powers. A European Commission sat in Bucharest, and the outcome, although the Western Powers did not really desire it, was a union of the two principalities under one prince in the new state of Rumania.

There was trouble in i860 in quite a different part of the Turkish Empire. The Druses—a tribal sect—in the Lebanon (Syria) massacred the Christians, and this led to French interference and a temporary occupation. The result was that the Lebanon was given a Christian governor, who was to be chosen by the Powers with the consent of Turkey.

Bulgaria, too, was awakening. The Bulgarian people

were **peasants,** and **they** had **been completely subject to** foreign control. They were governed by the **Turks.** Their Church was in the hands of the Greeks, and was under the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople. It was thus to the interest of both Turks and Greeks to suppress Bulgarian nationalism. Nevertheless, nationalistic ideas crept in through the medium of Bulgarian merchants living abroad.

Agitation turned first to the ecclesiastical question, and growing excitement between 1870 and 1872 led the Turks to allow the Bulgarians a National Church, with its own head, the Bulgarian Exarch.

Revolutionary outbreaks also took place, complicated by agrarian trouble between Moslem landowners and Christian peasantry. In 1875 risings occurred in sympathy with outbreaks in Montenegro,[x] Herzegovina and Bosnia. The atrocities of the Bulgarians led to Turkish reprisals, and the terrible massacres of the following year turned European opinion once more against the Turks. In England Gladstone condemned them with voice and pen. Russia seized the opportunity so offered to strike once more at Turkey (1877). Rumania supported Russia, and this time no other Powers came in on Turkey's side as they had done in the Crimean War. After severe fighting on both sides, early in 1878 the Russians aided by Rumanians and Bulgarians, occupied Sofia and Adrianople and pushed on towards Constantinople. Terms were made at San Stefano (March, 1878), but at this point England interfered to propose a congress of the Great Powers, which met in Berlin. The Congress of Berlin (July, 1878) modified the Treaty of San Stefano. The independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was now recognized. Bosnia and Herzegovina were put

[1] The Slav people of Montenegro, though technically within the Turkish Empire, had always maintained their independence secure in the mountains. They were ruled by their **own** prince-bishops.

under Austrian control. Bulgaria was divided: one part was to be autonomous, though under Turkish suzerainty, the other, known as Eastern Rumelia, was to be under Turkish rule, with a Christian governor. In 1885, however, Bulgarian nationalists brought about the union of the two Bulgarian divisions under the German prince, Alexander of Battenburg, who had been called in as prince of the autonomous part after the Congress of Berlin.

CHAPTER V

FROM ABDUL HAMID TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE GREAT WAR

FROM the accession in 1876 of Abdul Hamid II down to the Great War the history of Turkey is in the main the story of the further break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and at the same time of the attempt to establish a form of constitutional government in Turkey. Both were largely the result of the infiltration of Western ideas. The idea of nationality encouraged the growth of the new Balkan States at the expense of the Ottomans, while the desire to reform the internal government of Turkey led reformers to turn to Western models of government. As early as 1830 a prominent Turk stated: "I am convinced that if we do not hasten to imitate Europe we must resign ourselves to return into Asia."[1]

Since the end of the eighteenth century various reforms, particularly in military matters, had been introduced. Mahmud II crushed the Janissaries in 1826. Turkish ambassadors returned to Constantinople from Western Europe with new ideas. Stratford Canning, British Minister in Constantinople, by reason of the influence he gained with the Turks, also served to further reform. Under such influences the Sultan Abdul Mejid issued a great decree of reforms—the Tanzimat of Gulkhaneh (1839). The Tanzimat aimed at securing legal and orderly government. As a result reforms were introduced into the army and the administration, and a number of schools were established. But perhaps most

[1] Quoted in Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, p. 135.

interesting was the declaration of the equality of all Ottoman subjects of whatever race or creed.

It was, however, no easy matter to carry out such reforms in face of vested interests and the inertia of Islam. Many Turkish patriots began to think that a still more radical change was necessary before there could be lasting improvement. The opposition, the "Young Turks" or Liberals (as opposed to the Old Turks or Conservatives), led by Midhat Pasha, brought about the deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876. His successor, Murad V, proved incapable of governing. After a reign of three months he too was deposed. The oldest male of the dynasty, according to the law of succession, was now called to the throne by the Young Turks. The new sultan was Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). It looked as though Turkey was at last to gain a constitutional government. Midhat was a man who had proved his ability in provincial administration. He aimed at setting up a parliament and at replacing absolutism by ordered government.

From Abdul Hamid Midhat gained the grant of a constitution. But there was no good will on the Sultan's part. Midhat himself was soon dismissed (in 1884 he was strangled), and although a parliament did actually meet in 1877, it was dissolved in the next year by the Sultan's order. The war with Russia, which was settled by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, enabled the Sultan to make himself absolute once more.

In turning his back upon Western constitutionalism Abdul Hamid was taking a conservative line—contrary to that of Midhat and the Sultans since Mahmud. "The Empire must be made, not more European, but more Asiatic. In the development of Islamic spirit to form Islamic unity it would find new strength."[1] Thus Abdul Hamid began to exploit the possibilities of his title as Khalif; he would avoid the leading-strings of

[1] **D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans*, p. 361.**

constitutional monarchy by emphasizing his position as "Commander of the Faithful," that is, of all Moslems. His propaganda for the Khalifat was, helped by "modernism" itself. Railway and steamship made it easier for pilgrims to visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, holy to Islam, of which, as the pilgrims were not allowed to forget, Abdul Hamid as Khalif was supreme head.

But the position of Abdul Hamid was no easy one. Long wars had drained the resources of the Ottoman Empire, and the Empire itself was still breaking up. In 1881 France occupied Tunis, and in the same year England occupied Egypt as the result of disorders there. Foreign bondholders clamoured for payment. The Sultan was obliged (1881) to assign to the service of the national debt six sources of revenue, and to hand over their collection and administration to European representatives—the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. In the latter part of his reign, however, Abdul Hamid found one friend, the Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Turkey came more and more under the influence of Germany. Twice the German Emperor and Empress visited Constantinople, on the second occasion adding to their visit a conducted tour of the Holy Land arranged by Thomas Cook and Son. German officers, trained German soldiers and German commercial travellers traversed the Ottoman Empire. Germany's share of Turkey's imports grew. In 1903 German financiers were given the right to hold the largest share of the capital in the construction of the projected Bagdadbahn—a railway from Constantinople to Baghdad. Such a railway might divert the commerce of India and the East. It would control the copper of the Taurus Mountains, and the tobacco, fruits, cotton and wool of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. While speaking at Damascus in 1898 the Kaiser declared: "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans who, dwelling dispersed throughout the East, reverence in H.M, the Sultan Abdul

Hamid their Khalif, may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be, their friend."[1]

Both Armenia and Macedonia provided the Sultan with problems with which it was most difficult to deal, particularly difficult because they were partly caused by, and always brought, the intervention of outside Powers. Armenia, geographically ill-defined, belonged partly to Turkey, partly to Russia. But coming of an old race, Armenians were also to be found in other parts of Asia Minor. There were many in Constantinople, largely because of Armenian aptitude for finance and commerce. This aptitude brought them hatred—comparable to that of Christian for Jew. Added to this was the fact of Armenia's belonging to a Christian Church, not Greek Orthodox, and yet not definitely Catholic. And now the Armenians—like Slavs, Greeks, and Rumanians —were becoming agitated by nationalist movements. What was worse, the Powers were disposed to interfere on their behalf. Great Britain, for example, in the Cyprus Convention of 1878, which assigned the island to British administration, arranged for the protection of Christian minorities in Armenian districts. A Turkish minister declared that the way to get rid of the Armenian problem was to get rid of the Armenians.

Revolutionary agitation and the extortions of Turkish tax-gatherers led to resistance. The Kurds—members of a neighbouring Anatolian nationality—supported by Turkish regulars were set to work suppressing the trouble in 1894. Massacres and frightful outrages were perpetrated. By December, 1895, 50,000 are said to have perished. Russia would not act—Britain hesitated to act alone. In 1896 6,000 Armenians were massacred in the streets of Constantinople.[2]

[1] Quoted in Marriott, *The Eastern Question,* p. 386.

[1] The figures are from Marriott, *The Eastern Question,* p. 401. The horrors of the Armenian massacre are vividly told by the Rev. E. M. Bliss, *Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,* based on **the** accounts of Armenian missionaries in Turkey.

Macedonia offered another, perhaps even more complex, problem of conflicting nationalities. This area, ruled by the Turks for five hundred years, is a strange conglomerate of races. " Macedonia," says Luigi Villari, " has for two thousand years been the ' dumping ground ' of different peoples and forms, indeed a perfect ethnographic museum."[1] Its mountains made conquest and absorption difficult. The Greeks desired to include it in a new Hellenic Empire. The Bulgarians put forward their claims, which in the matter of race were strong. Serbs, too, argue that the greater part of Macedonia was originally conquered from them. Rumanians are also found scattered in groups in different parts of the territory. The new independent Balkan States played upon the nationalist sympathies of their compatriots inside Turkish Macedonia. The Turk, to maintain his governing position, played off one race against another, and the peasantry suffered from the extortions of the tax-gatherers and also from the depredations of brigands. From 1893 to 1903 there were political assassinations and insurrections. With head-quarters at Sofia, a " Macedonian Committee " put forward the scheme of a separate and autonomous Macedonia with its capital at Salonica. Nothing came of the scheme. But in 1903 there were serious risings. The Ottoman Bank at Salonica was blown up, and there was much loss of life and property owing to the disorders. The Turks replied in their usual way by massacre and the destruction of villages. At this the Powers intervened and attempted to impose a scheme of reform, aiming at the policing of the disturbed district by foreign officers. But the difficulties were too great for effective settlement.

Meanwhile Abdul Hamid protected himself by the usual methods : rigorous censorship of the Press, the prohibition of " seditious " literature, and the free use of a secret police. The Sultan forbade, for example, the

[1] Luigi Villari (editor), *The Balkan Question,* p. 121.

words " Macedonia " or " Armenia " to be spoken in public or to appear in any printed matter in the Empire. Thus the Turks themselves were often quite ignorant of the problems of their own country. The Sultan knew well enough that he was being plotted against. The movement for constitutional reform which had failed in 1878 was not dead. Underground the Young Turks were steadily working for change. The Committee of Union and Progress was formed. Many leading Young Turks had to go into exile, but their work was continued from centres abroad. Journals published in Cairo, Geneva, Paris, and London were spread throughout the Empire in spite of the efforts of the secret police.

The Turkish revolutionaries may be compared to the Russian. They spread their ideas through every possible underground channel. Young intellectuals who had gained a veneer of Western ideas and had read of the overthrow of. a despotism by the French Revolution were impatient of the weakness and inefficiency of the Turkish despotism. Particularly did this apply to army officers, who possessed a measure of Western education. They came into contact with German military men, and made their own comparison between Germany and Turkey.

There were sincere Turkish Liberals, but it was the military men who carried through the revolution. " Looking back on this revolution across seven years of its consequences we see plainly enough that it was inspired far less by desire for humane progress than by shame of Osmanli military decline,"[1]

The revolution which broke out in 1908 sprang from Macedonia, which was one of the most dangerous parts of the Sultan's dominions, and was therefore a place where the army would be most likely to listen to schemes for a stronger and better administration. The leaders, Majors Niazi Bey and Enver Bey, had occupied themselves

[1] **D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans*, 1915.**

in spreading revolutionary propaganda there. **The** argument was that the disasters threatening the Ottoman Empire were due to the evils of Abdul Hamid's despotism, and that those evils would disappear if Midhat's constitution of 1876 were revived. The revolution began on 22nd July at Resna under Niazi Bey, and the following day at Salonica Enver issued a proclamation demanding a constitution.

The army was prepared to march on Constantinople to enforce compliance. The Sultan, however, did not dare resist openly. Instead he issued a decree restoring the constitution of 1876, and gave orders for arrangements to be made for the election of members of parliament. Other reforms, among which were the abolition of the spy system and the censorship, were announced soon afterwards.

The revolution had proved, apparently, a remarkable success. It was almost bloodless; it was universally well received. At Constantinople large crowds carrying banners acclaimed the Sultan and the constitution. Even in Macedonia a magical change appeared to have taken place. The Greeks of Monastir welcomed the constitution. At another place, on the news being proclaimed, Greek Metropolitan, Turkish Mufti and the Bulgarian priests embraced one another amid popular applause. Those who a week or so before had been at each other's throats now fraternized.

On 10th December, 1908, the parliament met. Out of its 250 members 140 were representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress. In Constantinople the ten candidates of the Committee—five Turks, two Greeks, two Armenians and one Jew—were all elected. Members were also sent from Arabia, and in addition there were Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and Jews among the members.

But it was too good to be true. The Macedonian problem was not solved. Once more the Christian

nationalities began to quarrel. Their demands, too, were greater than the committees of Young Turks were prepared to satisfy. In addition there was unrest in Arabia and in parts of Anatolia. The Young Turks were learning that a European system could not be introduced all at once into an essentially Asiatic empire.

Although the success of the Young Turks had been welcomed as a sign of Liberalism in many Western countries, there were two—Austria and Bulgaria—which regarded it with alarm. If the Ottoman Empire were to be regenerated it might compel Austria to evacuate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Sultan's nominal suzerainty over Bulgaria might be transformed into a reality. Austria and Bulgaria, however, acted first. Austria declared the annexation of the two provinces, and Bulgaria declared her independence. The Turks could do little more than protest to the Powers, and it was arranged that Turkey should be otherwise compensated for her losses.

Most serious of all, however, was the growing conflict among groups in the Turkish parliament. The Committees of Union and Progress exercised power behind the scene over both cabinet and parliament, and to this the Liberal Union, representing in the main the subject nationalities, objected. This led to conflict and the overthrow of the Committee in the capital. The Sultan took advantage of the confusion and effected a counter-revolution. But the Committee at Salonica refused to compromise. Troops were sent to Constantinople and the rising there was quelled by force.

The result was the deposition of Abdul Hamid by the National Assembly, that is, both houses of the parliament, senate and chamber, sitting together. He was sent into confinement at Salonica, and his brother, Mohammed V, was made Sultan in his place. But, although the Committee of Union and Progress had triumphed, the ensuing period was not happy. The great difficulty of

dealing with the subject nationalities remained, and the Young Turks used the weapon of force as Abdul had done before them. ' They even went so far as to foster the Pan-Islamic ideal, which meant turning back along the road of reaction. Indeed " the system of government remained the same, viz. absolutism disguised as parliamentary rule."[1]

Nor was Turkey to be allowed a period of peace in which to adjust herself to the experiment of parliamentary government, for the next few years saw almost uninterrupted hostilities : war with Italy in 1911-12 ; the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 ; the Great War.

Tripoli was all that now remained of the Ottoman power in North Africa, and Italy had for long had hopes of acquiring it. The advent of the Young Turks to power frightened Italy, somewhat as it had frightened Austria and Bulgaria. Italy found her policy of economic penetration of Tripoli obstructed as a result of Turkish political change. German intrigue in Tripoli was also suspected. So Italy thought it time to act. In 1911 she presented an ultimatum demanding that she should be allowed to occupy Tripoli subject to the Sultan's suzerainty and the payment of an annual tribute. This was followed by Italy's declaration of war. Owing to her naval supremacy, Italy found little difficulty in occupying the coast towns of Tripoli, Bengazi and Derna, but she could make little headway in the interior, for the Arabs supported the Turks. However, in the next year Turkey was threatened by the Balkan coalition, and was therefore forced to make peace by agreeing to Italy's demands.

The remarkable thing about the Balkan War of 1912-13 was, not that there was war, but that it was a war undertaken in common by old enemies against the Turk. Their conflicting interests in Macedonia had previously kept Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece apart.

[1] Mears, *Modern Turkey*, chap. xxi.

But all alike saw themselves threatened by the Young Turk revolution. M. Venizelos of Greece worked for united action. In Macedonia things seemed to be getting worse instead of better. As the Bulgarian Prime Minister, M. Gueshoff, had pointed out, it looked very much as though the Turkish government was following a policy of extermination.[1] Bulgaria and Serbia first allied together. Then Greece joined in, moved by Turkish economic interference and the refusal to give up Crete where there had long been friction between Greek and Moslem. Next came Montenegro. ,'

The Powers tried to prevent war, but in vain. Montenegro declared war on 8th October, 1912, after an ultimatum demanding for Macedonia administrative autonomy under Swiss or Belgian governors had met with no response from Turkey. The other affected states also came into the war. The Bulgarians won remarkable successes in the field, capturing Kirk Kilisse, winning the five days' battle of Lule Burgas, sending one army as far as the Chatalja lines which defended Constantinople, and another to invest Adrianople. The Serbs defeated the Turks at Kumanovo and Monastir. Salonica was surrendered to the Greeks. Thus Macedonia was overrun by the Balkan allies. An armistice was signed at Chatalja on 3rd December by Turkey and Bulgaria. The armistice was adopted by the other bejligerents.

A conference of the belligerents was held in London and the ambassadors of the Powers tried to mediate. Success was almost achieved, when Enver brought off a *coup d'dtat* (January, 1913) in Constantinople. He shot dead the commander-in-chief, changed the leadership of the Government, and so brought about a renewal of the war.

But Enver's attempt to relieve Adrianople was defeated, and the city was taken by storm by the Bulgars

[1] I. E. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League,* pp. 8~io.

and Serbs. The Greeks captured the fortress of Janina, but Greeks and Bulgarians were beginning to quarrel among themselves and skirmishes took place between the troops. On 30th May Turkey signed, in London, a treaty whereby she ceded to the Balkan Allies all the territory lying north of a line between Enos (at the mouth of the River Maritza) and Midia, and in addition the Island of Crete. The Powers determined that Albania should be an autonomous principality.

However, the Balkan problem was not to be solved so easily—merely by placing all the weight of the solution on Turkey. Serbia was still shut off from access to the sea. The Balkan Allies could not agree upon the distribution of the spoils of Macedonia. Bulgaria[1] attacked Serbia. Greece supported Serbia. Atrocities were committed on both sides. Rumania also attacked Bulgaria. The Turks came in, and under Enver retook Adrianople. The Bulgarians were hopelessly beaten, and by the Treaty of Bucharest (10th August, 1913) had to surrender territory to Rumania, Serbia and Greece. Moreover, Bulgaria had to allow Adrianople and the Kirk Kilisse district north of the Enos-Midia line to return to Turkey. The ensuing dissatisfaction of Bulgaria was an important cause of her joining the Central Powers in the Great War.

The Balkan problem was, however, by no means settled. No one who studies the history of Turkey and the Balkans can fail to reflect that Europe had been fortunate to avoid for so long the outbreak of the general catastrophe of 1914. Again and again the "Eastern Question" had brought the Powers to interfere, either by mediation or by force. Sooner or later the rivalry between the Great Powers caused by the clash of political

[1] This attack was made after the resignation of M. Gueshoff as Premier of Bulgaria. He declares that the Bulgarian attack on the Serbs was due to the army. He regards it as a "criminal act," and speaks of this "impious fratricidal struggle." See Gueshoff, *The Balkan League,* **p. x and pp. 89-94,**

and economic interests, as exemplified in the handling of affairs in the Balkans and the Near East, was almost certain to lead to war.

That Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers may be explained. Germany had been the friend of Abdul Hamid ; and the Liberalism of the Young Turks had given place to reaction, indeed to an attempt to follow Abdul's pan-Islamic policy. Turkey, too, had introduced German officers. At the end of 1913 General Liman von Sanders came to Turkey to take up an important military position. Enver relied upon German help to rehabilitate Turkey after the Balkan Wars of **1912-13.**

The presence in Turkish waters after nth August, 1914, of the German warship, the *Goeben*, which had escaped from the Mediterranean, also influenced the Turks, who were annoyed by the action of the British; in commandeering two warships being built for Turkey) in British yards at the outbreak of the war.

The Slav states of the Balkans, too, were a source of danger both to Turkey and the Central Powers. Anything like a Balkan alliance would hinder Germany's policy of economic expansion. It would cut the line of communication with Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway. Germany's rivals, England and France, were accused of a grabbing policy in India and North Africa. But, most of all, Russia with her age-old desire for Constantinople was the enemy of Turkey. " Are we," the Turks asked, " to remain idle while our natural allies are at war with Russia—our sworn, irreconcilable, and eternal enemy ? Will not victory for the Triple Entente be to us a sentence of death ? " " The national ideal of our nation and people leads us, on the one hand, towards the destruction of the Muscovite enemy,
natural frontier to our Emp
unite all branches of our ra
religious principles urge ui

world from the power of the unbelievers, and to give independence to the followers of Mahomet."[1]

Thus the Young Turks in 1914 aimed at Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism. To secure the former they must strike at Russia, who in the Caucasus and Central Asia governed peoples who spoke Turkish languages. To further the latter they must fight Britain, the ruler of the Indian Moslems.

The Allies offered to guarantee Turkey's integrity in return for her neutrality. Germany could offer territory in the Caucasus. Enver, the "would-be Turkish Napoleon," was for war.

Turkey took the first hostile step on 28th October, 1914, in bombarding Russian Black Sea ports, but it was not until 5th November that England and France declared war on Turkey. Turkey's first step towards the realization of her wider aims was the declaration of the Jihad, that is, that the war to be undertaken was a holy war. The decisive importance of Turkey joining in the struggle lay, however, in her forming a barrier across the way of munition supply to Russia, and secondly in her drawing away the military strength of the Allies. Thus Germany could use Turkey for her own ends, through Liman von Sanders, now Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army. Turkey moved first against the Russians in the Caucasus. Turkish and Russian armies confronted each other in this region until the Russian Revolution caused the break-up of the Russian front. By way of Sinai an abortive attack was made on the British on the Suez Canal.

The Dardanelles campaign 6f the Allies (1915) was in accordance with the idea of striking at Germany by the East rather than by direct attack on the Western front. The attempt to open the Straits, and so to divide the Turkish Empire would, if successful, have greatly

[1] *Peace Handbooks : Turkey in Europe*, p. 58. Quoted from a Turkish circular to the provinces after the beginning of war.

shortened the war. It would have made possible the supplying of Russia with munitions, and so have raised her morale, perhaps preventing collapse and revolution. But the Allied attacks failed ; a sound piece of strategy was marred by a series of errors in execution.

During 1915 the Central Powers were very successful in the Balkans. Bulgaria joined them, tempted by Austrian offers of Serbian territory. Thus Serbia was between two fires. The Austro-German armies seized Belgrade, crossed the Danube, and pushed south. The Bulgarians, advancing from the east into Southern Serbia, cut off the Serbian rear. As a result all Serbian territory was conquered, and Germany secured direct railway communication with Turkey via Belgrade—Nish —Sofia. French and British troops had been sent to Greek territory in an effort to help Serbia, but all they could do was to hold Salonica as a base, and here they remained for the next three years.

While Germany had thus extended her control from the North Sea through the Balkans, and so across the Turkish Empire, that Empire was open to attack by the British at two points, Mesopotamia and Palestine. British forces which were landed at Basra to safeguard the oilfields near the Persian Gulf extended their operations. Although the first attempt to capture Baghdad failed, and the British force shut up in Kut was compelled to surrender (29th April, 1916), Baghdad was finally captured on nth March, 1917, and the British secured possession of Mesopotamia.

Early in 1916 the British troops in Egypt advanced across the Sinai Desert, laying a railway and a pipe-line for water. Proceeding to an invasion of Palestine, they attacked Gaza, but were repulsed (March and April, 1917). In July General Allenby took over command, made careful preparations, and advanced. After two attacks he captured Jerusalem on 9th December. Colonel Lawrence was successful in bringing about the spread of

the Arab revolt in Mecca right up to the neighbourhood of Damascus, so harassing Turkish lines of communication. This prepared the way for Allenby's advance in 1918 into Syria. The Turks were driven back and Damascus and Aleppo captured.

The hour of defeat for Turkey had all but come. At long last the Allied occupation of Salonica was to prove effective. Greece under Venizelos had joined the Allies in 1917. Now with the aid of Greek troops the Franco-British forces attacked and crumpled up the Bulgarians. On 29th September, 1918, an armistice was signed. With the defeat of Bulgaria the Allies gained the Berlin—Constantinople Railway, and Turkey was exposed to direct attack on her capital. At this point the Turks opened negotiations, and the Armistice of Mudros was concluded on 30th October. It was only a few days before Turkey's collapse was followed by that of Austria.[1] Exposed to attack on the south and with her defences on the Western front weakening, Germany herself was compelled to sue for peace.

[1] The Austrian Armistice was signed on 4th November.

PART II

TURKEY IN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER VI

TURKEY AND THE VICTORIOUS ALLIES

DEFEAT in the Great War made it appear that at last the end of Turkey as a separate independent state was at hand. The Ottoman Empire was shattered. The parts of Turkey remaining around Constantinople and in Asia Minor were impoverished and overstrained by the effect of war. National resources were depleted by loss of men and capital. Political and economic organization were deranged. Certain other factors, it is true, were in Turkey's favour. Some of her lost provinces, for example, had been a burden rather than an asset, and their loss was an advantage in that men and money required for their defence would now be saved. The victorious Allies, too, were not united, and their failure to agree on a common policy made concerted action against Turkey difficult or impossible. In addition, Russia under her new masters—the Bolsheviks—was hostile to the Western Powers, and was, therefore, willing to encourage Turkey in opposition to those Powers.

But at first the future looked very black for Turkey. She had to wait for, and accept without question, the will of the Allies. Some Turks hoped for a mandate to be given either to England or America, but actually the Allies were already bound by agreements made during the War to a division of parts of Turkey among themselves.

The Allies, however, did not act quickly in the matter of making and imposing final terms of peace upon the Turks. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30th October, 1918, and *it* was not until nearly two years

later that a serious attempt was made at the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, to clear up the Turkish situation. The delay in imposing a peace settlement during Turkey's prostration at the conclusion of the War gave to the Nationalists of Turkey the opportunity to organize resistance. The delay itself was due in some measure to the pre-occupation of the Allies with the problems of Europe ; but it was also partly the result of the clash of Allied interests in Turkey, which made a consistent policy against her impossible.

Four secret agreements concerning Turkey had been made among the Allies during the Great War. The Constantinople Agreement (1915) between England, France and Russia sanctioned Russia's old aim, the acquisition of Constantinople. By the secret Pact of London (1915), arranged between Italy, France and Russia, Italy was to receive certain territories in Asia Minor, including a share of the Mediterranean region of Adalia, and upon these conditions Italy entered the War. The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between England and France related mainly to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and provided for the establishment of independent Arab states and for zones of influence under the control of England and France. Another understanding—the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement (1917)—was largely responsible for Italy's hope of acquiring Smyrna, and thereby of gaining control of Western Asia Minor. Thus it is clear that long before the successful termination of the War the Allies had planned a settlement which amounted to a virtual partition of Turkey. It was upon the basis of these agreements that the Allies made the Treaty of Sevres.

Before the Treaty of Sevres, however, parts of Turkey had been already occupied by the Allies. Constantinople and the Straits were under their control. Cilicia passed from British hands to French. Certain towns were garrisoned : Konia by the Italians, who had landed at

Adalia, Samsun by the English, Brusa by the French. Most important of all was the landing of the Greeks at Smyrna.

The reasons for the Greek occupation of Smyrna were somewhat complex. The Italians were pressing for the realization of their hopes as expressed in the Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, and the Allies feared that they might not wait for a peace treaty but would seize Smyrna out of hand as they had seized Fiume in Dalmatia. At the same time the Greeks had dreams of a restored Greek Empire in the Mediterranean, and the Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, used his influence over Mr. Lloyd George to such an extent that the Allied Powers agreed to the sending of Greek troops to Smyrna. It was claimed by the Allies that interference was necessary to prevent disorder and to secure the safety of Greek and other minorities, and the terms of the Armistice of Mudros were invoked. Thus it was that on 15th May, 1919, the Allied fleets supervised the landing of the Greeks in Smyrna, an event accompanied by atrocities on the part of the Greeks, giving rise to trouble for the years to come. The excuse for the landing was a bad one, for it was subsequently found that the Allies had been wrongly informed. The outcome was the fanning of the flame of Turkish nationalism, for almost at the same time Mustafa Kemal, the future Turkish President, managed to leave Constantinople for Asia Minor to organize resistance.

Actually, then, before the making of a "peace treaty between Turkey and the Allies, events in Asia Minor were already moving in such a way as to make impossible for the Allies the realization of the terms of peace which they intended to impose on the Turks. But this was not clear at the time. The Greeks were advancing in Asia Minor, and meanwhile in Europe the work of diplomacy was going on. Early in 1920 conferences met in London, and in April at San Remo, for the making of peace terms. Finally the Turkish representatives, after their objections

had been set aside, had to accept at Sevres (10th August, 1920) the terms of peace as set out by the Allies.

Although, as things fell out, the Treaty of Sevres was not destined to be put into operation, its clauses are of importance. Some writers see in them a startling example of the imperialism of the Western Powers. Mr. Lloyd George, however, took quite another view. He described the Sevres Treaty as aiming at " a policy of releasing all non-Turkish populations from Turkish sway. . . . If we allowed Mustafa Kemal or any man of his type to break down that policy Europe would have failed dismally in its duty,"[1] Turkey was virtually confined to Asia Minor. Constantinople was left to the Sultan, but the Straits were to be demilitarized and placed under the control of an Allied commission. Thrace was given to Greece, also certain islands, and the exercise of power over Smyrna and its neighbourhood was placed in the hands of the Greek Government, subject to a plebiscite after five years. The Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were handed to mandatory powers. Armenia was declared an independent state, and a commission in Constantinople was to prepare a scheme for the autonomy of the Kurds. In addition, the capitulations (agreements giving special rights to foreigners residing in Turkey) were confirmed and enlarged. At the same time a Tripartite Agreement took place between England, France, and Italy, " recognizing the respective special interests of Italy in Southern Anatolia and of France in Cilicia and the western part of Kurdistan bordering on Smyrna."[2]

[1] 24th June, 1920. Quoted in Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference,* vol. vi., p. 31.

[2] Quoted Mears, p. 637. If the Western Powers are criticized - for their imperialistic policy towards Turkey, it must be remembered that the Treaty of Sevres was not actually as drastic as had originally been intended, for Constantinople was left to Turkey. Turkey, too, had entered the War on Germany's side after following a policy of duplicity towards the Allies, had caused the Allies great loss, and could scarcely, therefore, expect to escape lightly. See Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy,* 1914-1925, p. 177 and chap. ii.

It was clear that the Government of the Sultan was powerless to resist the victorious Allies. The acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres by his representatives appeared to indicate that at last Turkey had been reduced to impotence.

CHAPTER VII

MUSTAFA KEMAL

IN the moment of weakness appeared the *deus ex machina*—Mustafa Kemal. The personality of this Turk fills the history of post-war Turkey to such an extent that it is no exaggeration to speak of the Turkish revolution as a Kemalist renaissance. Driven to despair by the weakness of the Sultan in face of the Allied demands, and by the acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres, Kemal organized Turkish nationalist resistance in the heart of Asia* Minor. The Ottoman Empire perished in the war and its aftermath ; but through the military and political genius of Kemal Turkey was reborn in the shape of a new Republic.

From his earliest years Mustafa Kemal had to make his own way, and had given proof of his ability and independence. He was born in 1880 in Salonica, of humble parents, and it was of his own will that he entered a military school. Here his ability enabled him to pass on to the higher grades of education, and a knowledge of French introduced him to the writings of Voltaire and Rousseau. As in the case of so many young Turkish 'fficers, Mustafa Kemal became, in opposition to the rule : Abdul Hamid, a radical and revolutionary. From 's time his career became exciting. While at college vas denounced by the spies of the Sultan, imprisoned 1 time, and then sent away to Syria. Here, and in ->ean Turkey, he played a revolutionary part and *zed* secret societies. Back with the army in a in 1907, he came into touch with the Young But already Kemal was impatient of having to

take a subordinate position, and consequently did **not** fall in easily with the plans of the revolutionaries. Consequently he stood outside the inner circle. Though as an officer he took a part in the events of 1908 and 1909, as yet his position was not one of political importance.

Kemal increased his reputation as a soldier during the war of 1911 in Tripoli against the Italians, and also in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. But he was angered by Enver's introduction of a German military mission for the reorganization of the Turkish Army, and in order to put him at a safe distance Kemal was, sent to Sofia as military attache[1]. Enver was jealous and afraid of the bold and outspoken soldier who might become his rival, and with the outbreak of the Great War it was in face of Enver's opposition that Kemal left Sofia to take up a command.

It was during the Gallipoli campaign that Kemal emerged as a great military figure. His ability to organize and to inspire the troops with his own energy and determination as well as his personal fearlessness in danger—aided perhaps by a certain element of good fortune — brought him success. The British and Dominion troops at the Dardanelles failed when a brilliant victory was in their grasp, and it was to Mustafa Kemal more than to any other man that the successful Turkish resistance was due.

After the departure of the Allied troops from the Dardanelles Kemal was sent to the Caucasus front, and won some successes against the Russians. But the Russian front was already weakening, so relieving the Turks of much anxiety in that quarter, and Kemal was sent down to Syria (1917). Kemal, however, could not agree with the German General, von Falkenhayn, and resigned his commission. Enver found it impossible to deal with so difficult and yet so able a man, and Kemal was sent to accompany the Sultan's heir, Vahadin, on a visit to German headquarters on the Western front.

Here Kemal met the Kaiser, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but the critical Turk did not conceal his lack of confidence in a successful outcome of the German plans.

At the death of the Sultan, Mohammed V, Kemal saw an opportunity. The new Sultan was the prince whom he had accompanied to the German front, but although Kemal was called to Constantinople for an interview, he could not persuade the Sultan to give him a position of real authority. Instead, on the advice of Enver, Kemal was sent to Syria. Here things were becoming desperate in face of Lawrence and the Arabs, and all that it was possible for Kemal to do at this stage was to prevent a complete debacle. This he was successful in doing. He restored order and organized retreat upon a prepared line to the north of Aleppo.

Meanwhile, with the signing of the Armistice, political demoralization fell upon the Turkish capital. The leaders of the Young Turks Party fled.[1] Kemal was called to Constantinople, but his efforts to stimulate the Sultan and his ministers to action failed. The Sultan dissolved the Parliament, and it became obvious to Kemal that there was nothing he could do in the capital. Action, if action there was to be, must be organized elsewhere.

Kemal himself has described the condition of the Ottoman Empire in its last days, and what made him decide to aim at the foundation of a new Turkish State. The Sultan, he says, was only concerned with his own life and position. By his weakness the nation was deprived of its head. Yet many well-disposed and informed Turks, by force of habit and religion, thought any attempt to save Turkey independently of the Sultan to be inconceivable,' They thought, too, that it was quite impossible to resist the Allies. The ultimate fate of Turkey, therefore, Kemal argues, would have been partition.

[1] Enver was later killed by the Bolsheviks while attempting to found a Turkish emirate in Bokhara.

" The Ottoman Empire, Independence, Sultan-Khalif Government were no more than vain words. . . .

" In this situation there was only one resolution to make, to create a new Turkish State based upon national sovereignty and rejoicing in complete independence without reserve."[1]

Ironically enough, it was the Sultan's government that gave Kemal his chance. He was sent over to Asia Minor as a military inspector to supervise the forces there and see to the maintenance of order. Thus he gained an official position in the very place where organized action was possible. From the date of his landing at Samsun, 19th May, 1919, commences the Turkish National Revolution.

[1] From Kemal's historic speech in 1927. Quoted by the Anadolu Ajansi.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION

THE Turkish Capital and Government were under Allied control and parts of Asia Minor were occupied by Allied troops. It was therefore necessary for Mustafa Kemal to form a new political organization—the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia[1] —and also to organize armed opposition to the forces already occupying Turkish territory. Thus there were several national fronts : against the Greeks in Western Asia Minor ; against the French assisted by Armenian auxiliaries[2] in the south ; and against the new State of Armenia formed with English aid partly on Turkish and partly on Russian territory. Against the Italians in the south-west there was no organized front.

At first, of course, Kemal had to act in secret. After landing at Samsun he moved to a distance from this place to avoid suspicion on the part of British forces which were in the town. Gradually, however, Kemal's plan took shape : the establishment of a new state in Asia Minor,'independent both of foreign interference and of control by the Ottoman Sultan in the capital. He began to circulate to the military and civil authorities memoranda pointing out the danger to Turkish independence involved in the weakness of the Constantinople government and the necessity for a new

[1] Anatolia and Rumelia refer to Turkish territory in Asia Minor and Europe respectively.

[2] There were Armenians scattered in various parts of Turkey, besides those in the provinces on the Russian frontier.

national representative assembly in Asia Minor which could act without restraint from foreign Powers.

To further his plans, Kemal convoked a Congress at Erzerum on 23rd July, 1919. He was chosen as President, and a proclamation was drawn up declaring the principles of national unity, and determination to resist any attempt at foreign aggression or the imposition of mandate or protectorate. This Congress produced a national organization, before its close setting up an Executive Committee composed of Kemal, Rauf Bey, Raif, and several others. At this Congress, too, Kiazirn Kara Bekir, the general commanding troops of this district, who had received orders from Constantinople to arrest Kemal, declared that he would support the Nationalist cause.

On 4th September another Congress met at Sivas and reaffirmed the declarations of Erzerum. This Congress sent to the Sultan a lengthy telegram commencing with a respectful preamble, in which they begged their Imperial Sovereign, at a moment when the fate of the Ottoman nation was in the balance, to take heed of the Nationalist movement and to protect the country against disturbance and danger. The telegram declared that Turkey should surrender no part of her territory to Armenia, and that if the European Powers had any goodwill towards Turkey they should immediately withdraw their forces from such places as Adana and Smyrna. In addition, the Sultan was urged to appoint worthy ministers and to expedite elections, so that Parliament should meet as soon as possible.

After the Congress of Sivas the Standing Committee of Nationalist leaders, of which Kemal was head, took up its headquarters at Angora. It must be remembered that Kemal's Nationalist movement was still an unrecognized group, and Angora made convenient headquarters because its inaccessible position rendered it secure from attack. To reach Angora from Constantinople to-day (1934) still

requires an all-night journey along a single-track railway across a desolate stretch of arid and mountainous country. Angora, then, was shut off from outside interference. At the same time, its position was a central one, either for operations against the Greeks on the west or the Armenians or Kurds on the east. It was, too, in rail and telegraphic communication with Constantinople and Smyrna.

Meanwhile a change of government took place in Constantinople and negotiations were opened with the Kemalists, but their demands did not prove acceptable to the Turkish ministers in the capital. A general election, authorized by the Sultan, was held (December, 1919), and resulted in the election of a majority favourable to the Nationalist cause. The place of meeting of the new Parliament now became a question of prime importance. The natural place was in the capital, but Kemal knew that there the Parliament would be under the influence of the Allies. But many of the newly-elected members were eager to meet legally under the Sultan in the legal capital. Kemal was unable to prevent their going ; nevertheless, before they went, at a preliminary meeting in Angora, he had succeeded in bringing about the acceptance of what came to be known as the National Pact. This might be termed a Turkish Declaration of Independence. And when on 28th January, 1920, the National Pact was legally adopted by the Parliament sitting in Constantinople, it appeared that at last the Nationalist Movement was recognized constitutionally and that its aims would be achieved.

The National Pact states clearly that:—

> " It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every other country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible, and that it should be

possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

"For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters."[1]

Although the Allies had allowed the meeting of the Turkish Parliament in Constantinople, they were becoming disquieted by the signs of growing audacity on the part of Turkish forces. The French troops had suffered repulse in Cilicia, British troops were being withdrawn from the Caucasus and parts of Anatolia, and this was encouraging the Turks. To the Allies the National Pact was the last straw. In order to establish a Turkish government more subservient to their wishes they marched troops into Constantinople, seized the public buildings, and arrested a number of Nationalists, who were deported to a British prison camp in Malta. Since those deported included some of its members, of whom Rauf Bey was one, the Parliament dissolved itself. Damad Ferid, who was opposed to the Nationalists, was now restored as head of the Sultan's government, and once more the Nationalists became a revolutionary body, outlawed in the wilds of Anatolia, v,'

But the action of the Allies did not check Turkish Nationalism. The Greek landing at Smyrna fired the Turks to resistance; the Allied occupation of Constantinople fanned the flame. It made obvious—what had long been clear to Kemal himself—that the Sultan's government was under the influence of the Allies and was powerless to head a national movement of resistance. Hence Turkish Nationalists had now to choose between their allegiance to the legal Sultan and their duty of defending their country against foreign aggression. The Allies failed to realize that in humiliating Constantinople they would strengthen Angora.

Mustafa Kemal now seized his opportunity of calling

[1] The National Pact is quoted in full by Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 630.

to Angora a representative assembly which could take upon itself the responsibilities of government. The reconstructed Parliament met on 23rd April, 1920, and took the name of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In a message sent at the time to M. Millerand Kemal stated that the Nationalists at Angora regarded the Sultan as a prisoner of the Allies, and that consequently the government in Constantinople could have no real authority. For the time being at least the real government of Turkey was to be sought for in Angora.

The Grand National Assembly chose from among its members a Council or Executive to form the government or ministry, and the President of the Assembly was also to be President of the Council. Mustafa Kemal was elected to fill these positions. Other members of the Nationalist government were Feuzi Pasha, Ismet Bey, Bekir Samy Bey, Jamy Bey, Ismail Fazyl Pasha, Yusuf Kemal Bey, Hakky Behij Bey and Dr. Adnan Bey. Several other National leaders, including Fethi Bey and Rauf Bey, were in the prison camp in Malta, and so were not members of the first Kemalist government.

In attempting to draw up a more formal scheme for a constitution the Committee entrusted with the task was faced with a problem of some delicacy. There were two conflicting points of view : first, the Grand National Assembly was regarded as a provisional instrument of government, and some of those who held this view, especially Moslem ecclesiastics, desired the insertion of a clause providing for the restoration of Sultanate and Khalifat when once Nationalist objectives had been secured ; second, the Grand National Assembly was regarded as a final form of government to take the place of the old government of the Sultan. Kemal, with his usual insight into the practical, cut short the discussion of the theoretical issue by declaring that it could not be decided while circumstances were so difficult and while the actual Sultan was a traitor to the nation.

Eventually the Grand Assembly passed a constitution or " Law of Fundamental Organization " (20th January, 1921). This proclaimed that sovereignty belonged to the nation which delegated its power to the Grand National Assembly. This Parliament or Assembly was to be a single chamber of deputies to be elected every two years by manhood suffrage. In future Ministers of the Government were to be appointed by the Assembly from among its own members—instead of being chosen by the Grand Vizier, himself the choice of the Sultan—and the President of the Assembly was to be President of the Council or Executive of Ministers.

While the working out of a new form of government was taking place at Angora Nationalists were not allowed to work unharassed. The Sultan's government at Constantinople could use the prestige of religious authority —in that the head of the government was Khalif as well as Sultan—to stir up the Turks against Kemal. Religious; belief was made an instrument of propaganda. *Ini* addition armed bands were organized and regular troops sent against the Nationalists, and Kemal and a number of his associates were placed under sentence of death.

But Kemal was strong enough to hold his own. He repulsed armed aggression. He received large financial help from other parts of the Moslem world. Collections were taken in schools and mosques. Egyptian children in their schools contributed piastres towards support for the Turkish Nationalists. He replied to attacks made on religious grounds by counter manifestoes issued by religious authorities favourable to the Nationalist cause, and he set up special courts —'' Tribunals of Independence" as they were called—to deal with traitors to his cause. Meanwhile another and a more difficult task was awaiting his attention—the struggle with the Greeks, who were advancing from Smyrna into the interior of Anatolia.

CHAPTER IX

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

THE struggle with the Greeks was virtually a struggle for Turkish independence. If the Greeks had won, a large part of Asia Minor must have passed to them. As it turned out, however, the Turks vindicated their right to Asia Minor as their national "homelands." Behind the Greeks stood the Allies—theoretically it is true at peace with Turkey, but nevertheless using the Greeks as an instrument to impose the Treaty of Sevres. The Allies were naturally very reluctant to start on another war themselves, but this did not prevent their using the Greeks. They had already employed pressure on the Turks in occupying Constantinople after the Armistice, in allowing the disembarkment of the Greeks at Smyrna, and in the second and more rigorous occupation of Constantinople coupled with the deportation of Nationalist leaders to Malta. The Greek offensive of 20th June, 1920, may thus be considered as a further instalment of Allied pressure to bring the Turks to see what the Allies considered to be reason. Although the Greeks attacked a few weeks before the actual signing of the Treaty of Sevres (10th August), it was clear that before the Allies could carry out the provisions of their settlement the Turkish Nationalist forces of Anatolia must be crushed.

The Turks had now to prepare *to* face Greek attacks on several fronts. Although the Turks had been exhausted by the strain of the Great War, the invasion of their country by the hated Greeks was sufficient to give renewed impetus to the Nationalists. The soldiers

who rallied to Kemal's cause were a nondescript lot—ragged, dirty, unkempt. Many were probably undesirable characters—attracted by violence and loot. But there were also men of a better type, ex-officers whom peace had left unemployed and who were eager to find a livelihood in the new army.

The offensive of 1920 gave to the Greeks a number of important towns on the Sea of Marmora—Pandemia, Mudania, Ismid, and, a little inland, Brusa. Another Greek army pressed inward from Smyrna. A third army in Thrace dispersed the Nationalists and captured Adrianople (25th July). Thus in the campaign of 1920 success lay with the Greeks. This, indeed, was to be expected. The Turkish Nationalists had had little time to organize resistance ; they were very short of artillery, and were hampered by lack of transport facilities. The Greeks, on the other hand, were much better supplied. They had large quantities of arms given them by the Allies during the Great War and they had control of three railways branching into the interior from Smyrna.

One of the great difficulties of the Nationalists was their shortage of regular soldiers. For this reason they had to have recourse to undisciplined bands. Nor was the subversive propaganda of Communism lacking. This added another danger to those already surrounding Kemal; the morale of the regular troops might be weakened by contact with the irregulars. Indeed, certain bodies of irregulars collected by the Circassian Rechit Bey, who was a member of the National Assembly, and his two brothers, developed into a semi-independent force sometimes known as the " Green Army." One of the brothers, Etem, sought to play a political rdle. Communist propaganda began to affect the Grand National Assembly, and the Green Army showed itself unwilling to obey orders. Finally, Kemal was obliged to send regular troops to disperse them. Finding opposition hopeless, Etem turned to the Greeks.

The sending of regular troops against the Green Army afforded an opportunity for a Greek attack on the Brusa front at Ushak in the direction of Eskishehir and Afium Karahissar. The possession of either of these towns would give the Greeks control of the Trans-Anatolian Railway. Eskishehir is the junction for Angora. At Inonu, to the west of Eskishehir, however, the Greeks were checked, and finally, after a hotly-disputed struggle, retreated (January, 1921). Here, for the first time in this war, the Turks won a success against the Greeks. It could not fail to raise the morale of the Nationalist forces.

On March 28th the Greeks launched a new attack, again from Brusa and Ushak, against the railway towns of Eskishehir and Afium Karahissar. Afium was captured by the Greek forces from Ushak, but when the northern detachment was foiled at the second battle of Inonu the Greeks had to leave. For the time being the Turks were holding their own.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Nationalists were waging another war in the north-east, against the Armenians. To this people, so long oppressed by the Turks, the Great War had brought both catastrophe and opportunity. With the dissolution of the Russian front in the Caucasus in 1917 separate Armenian states had been established in that region with Erivan as centre. The new state was protected by the Allies, and was declared to be free and independent by the Treaty of Sevres. It was governed by an Armenian political party of nationalist and anti-Turk sentiments.

The Grand National Assembly accused the Armenians of allowing the persecution and massacre of Turks on the frontier of the new state. Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha was put in command of the north - east front, and finally (22nd September, 1920) the Nationalist Government decided upon the invasion of Armenia. Thus the new Turkish Nationalist government turned on the new

Armenian Nationalist state. Those who were fighting **for** their own national rights had no scruple about the suppression of the rights of their neighbours, just as the Bolsheviks, while denouncing imperialism in others, had no scruple about suppressing nationalism in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and could not bear to see the disputed district of Bessarabia passing to Rumania.

The Turks mobilized on the Armenian frontier, repulsed an Armenian attack, and themselves taking the offensive pressed it vigorously. While Kiazim Kara Bekir was advancing on the one hand the Bolsheviks, assisted by Tartar irregulars from Azerbaijan, attacked Armenia on its northern side (8th October). The Erivan government tried, but failed, to gain the co-operation of Georgia. The Turks were still advancing ; on 30th October they took Kars, on 7th November Alexandropol (Gumru).

But the worst factor in the situation for the Armenians was their lack of agreement among themselves. The Nationalist government was replaced by a Social-Democratic Cabinet which arranged an armistice with the Turks. But hostilities broke out again on nth November. Defeated again, the Armenians were compelled to make a second armistice, and this resulted (3rd December, 1920) in the Treaty of Alexandropol. This treaty was followed in March, 1921, by the Treaty of Moscow. The independent Armenia had disappeared. An Armenian Bolshevik government had been set up in Erivan, and Armenia was federated to Bolshevik Russia. The outcome for Turkey was that she regained her territories around Kars which had been included in the independent Armenia, and at the same time she secured direct contact with Russia, who was supporting her in her policy of resistance to the Allies.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, during the course of the war with the Greeks certain attempts had been made at a pacific

settlement of the affairs of Asia Minor. A new cabinet at Constantinople gave a prominent place in its programme to reconciliation with Kemal, stating that it desired the union of all Turks by putting an end to the " duality of power which separated the cities of Istanbul and Ankara like two sisters become enemies."[1] In furtherance of this policy the Constantinople government sent to Ankara a delegation (end of 1920). But the delegation was intended to make Kemal see the futility of resistance to the demands of the Allies. This Mustafa Kemal was not prepared to do, and therefore the object of the conciliatory mission remained unattained.

The Allies were now beginning to reconcile themselves to the possibility of having to modify the Treaty of Sevres. With this in view, they called a conference in London (27th February—12th March, 1921) of representatives of the Allies and of Turkey and Greece. Both Constantinople Turks and Kemalist Turks were called to the conference. But the proposals there made were satisfactory neither to the Turks nor to the Greeks. With this the Allied Governments, seeing that their attempted mediation was proving a failure, washed their hands of the affair and declared that they would remain neutral with regard to the Turco-Greek War.

The Greeks launched a new attack on 10th July, 1921. They met with rapid success. Kiutahia fell, and both Ahum Karahissar and Eskishehir were captured, so giving the Greeks command of the Anatolian railway. The Turkish troops now retired and reformed behind the Sakaria River, their line lying roughly parallel to the railway. With the river and waste land placed between them and the Greeks, the Turks now had to strengthen themselves to hold their new position which covered Angora itself. In this moment of crisis the Grand National Assembly bestowed on Kemal the title of

[1] Quoted in Deny and Marchand, p. 100. Istanbul and Ankara are the new names given to Constantinople and Angora.

generalissimo, and gave him, for a period, the powers of a dictator.

In August a fierce battle began. King Constantine[1] himself was with the Greek troops, and issued a proclamation with the words "To Angora!" The Greeks advanced to the river and attacked the Turks, and for three weeks the battle was hotly contested. The Greeks fought for the realization of their Hellenic idea; the Turks were struggling for the existence of their people. Even the peasant women of Anatolia were engaged, carrying up ammunition on their shoulders. Their action is commemorated by one of the statues on the monument to Kemal erected in Angora. Kemal himself was in the battle again and again. Once more under his personal example Turkish troops held firm. At last the Greeks were compelled to abandon their offensive, and to retreat to their old position covering Afium Karahissar and Eskishehir. It was as a result of the victorious outcome of the Battle of the Sakaria that the Turkish Assembly conferred on Kemal the name of Gazi, which signified conqueror of infidels.

But although Kemal's victorious defence of the Sakaria marked a turning-point in the war, it was some time before this was definitely clear. For a moment active operations were at an end. An uneasy year of preparation for a renewed battle followed. The Turkish victory, however, convinced the Allies that the Nationalist government was really a power to be reckoned with, and led to an attempted mediation in a conference at London (March, 1922). But the Turkish Nationalists were in no mood for compromise, and the attempt at mediation ended in failure. Meanwhile, too, Italy and France had been engaged in reaching a separate understanding with Turkey. Italy realized that she was not likely to be able to hold indefinitely what she hoped for in Asia Minor,

[1] Venizelos had fallen from power in 1920, and as a result of a plebiscite in Greece Constantine had been recalled.

and therefore in June, 1921, she withdrew her troops from Adalia, and soon afterwards made a friendly agreement with the Nationalists. France, after the Battle of the Sakaria, sent M. Franklin-Bouillon to Angora, where he arranged a separate agreement between France and Turkey (20th October, 1921). This marked a breach between the Allies in their Near-Eastern policy. France withdrew her troops from Cilicia and left behind to the Turks stores and ammunition, thereby dealing an indirect blow against the Greeks, while Britain still supported the moribund Sultanate of Constantinople. For the Nationalist government the Angora arrangement with France was an important diplomatic success.

The last campaign of the war began in the summer of 1922. On 26th August Kemal, who had made lengthy and careful preparation, launched a strong attack against the Greeks in Afium Karahissar. This was the decisive battle of the war. The Greeks, after fierce fighting, were pushed back. The Turks followed. The Greeks stood and fought at Tulu Punar, but were driven back still farther. Kemal made the Mediterranean his objective, and at Ushak the Greek General, Tricoupis, and his staff were captured. The Turkish forces pushed on towards the sea. The Greeks, completely broken and demoralized, were driven onwards before the advancing enemy. Ravaging and burning the villages as they went, the Greeks fell back to Smyrna. But even here they were unable to rally for a last effort of resistance, and the Turks occupied the town without an engagement (6th September, 1922). The remaining Greek troops were evacuated. A few days later the fire which broke out destroyed a large part of Smyrna. Turks and Greeks accused each other of having set fire to the city. Meanwhile the Greek force in Eskishehir was driven out and defeated near Brusa. Part was captured, part pushec on to the sea and escaped. So ended the war, with the complete collapse of the Greeks.

But although the Turks had driven the Greeks, " bag and baggage," out of Anatolia, there was still a Greek army in possession of Eastern Thrace in European Turkey. Kemal, therefore, moved his troops towards the Straits, with a view to completing the task he had begun in Anatolia. Here, however, he found himself checked. When the Allies declared their neutrality in the Graeco-Turkish conflict in 1921 they had fixed neutral zones on either side of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. At Chanak Allied troops under General Harington barred Kemal's way, and refused him permission to cross the neutral zone to attack the Greeks. It looked as though there would be fighting between the Turks and the Allied troops. The position was rendered more difficult by the withdrawal from Chanak of the French and Italian contingents, leaving the British alone to withstand the Turks. But the British stood their ground, and fortunately armed conflict was avoided. Representatives of the Allies and of the Turks met in conference at Mudania, and after negotiations so delicate that at one point they almost broke down an armistice was signed (11th October, 1922).

The Armistice of Mudania marks a victory for the Turks. It was agreed that the Greeks should evacuate Eastern Thrace, and that this territory should be returned to Turkey. The result of the agreement was threefold. It was the end of Greek aspirations ; it made clear the failure of the Allies to confine Turkey to Asia Minor ; and it hastened the resignation of the British Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, on 19th October.

CHAPTER X

THE VICTORIOUS TURKS: THE END OF THE OTTOMAN DYNASTY

Now that the Turkish Nationalists had vindicated their country's claim to an independent existence, there still remained many important questions with which they were faced. Nominally the government of Turkey was still that of the Sultanate at Constantinople ; actually power lay in the hands of Kemal and his associates. It was necessary, therefore, to decide what the future of the Sultanate was to be.

For a moment that future was uncertain. The overthrow of the Sultanate had not been an avowed part of the Nationalist programme. The Nationalists, indeed, had declared their aim to be the saving of the Sultan from the Allies, and there were still conservative forces in favour of the maintenance of the old form of government. But in the eyes of the Nationalists the Sultanate was compromised by its subservience to the Allies, and it was not in the nature of a man like Kemal to bow to the old authority when he found power in his own hands. Feeling himself master of the situation, therefore, and influenced by the ideas of the revolutionary France of 1789, Kemal awaited a convenient moment to put an end to the Sultanate.

The opportunity occurred when the Powers, in making preparation for the negotiation of peace at Lausanne, sent an invitation to the Constantinople government as well as to that at Angora. Kemal now had the question of abolishing the Sultanate openly discussed in the Grand

National Assembly. Speaking himself for the proposal he declared :—

> " Gentlemen, it is not by more or less academic discussions that one possesses oneself of power and sovereignty. The Sultans seized them by force and confronted the nation with a *fait accompli.* If the nation wishes to possess sovereignty, it must do likewise."[1]

The result was the passing of a resolution (ist November, 1922) reaffirming the sovereignty of the Grand National Assembly. This had the effect of abolishing the Sultanate, although the Khalifat was to remain as a distinct office. Upon hearing that a charge of high treason had been laid against him, the Sultan, fearing for his life, appealed to the British for; protection. General Harington, commanding the British force which remained in Constantinople under the Mudania Armistice, made arrangements for the Sultan to leave the city on a British battleship. His action in departing from Turkey was now regarded by the Nationalists as abdication, and it left them free to organize the government of the State according to their own plans. Thus it was, without the striking of a blow in defence of his position, that the last of the long line of Ottoman Sultans departed from Turkey never to return.

The next concern of the Turks was with the making of a definite peace to take the place of the Treaty of Sevres, which the Allies had been unable to enforce, and the patched-up Mudania Armistice, which had followed the Chanak crisis. A conference was arranged and met at Lausanne (20th November, 1922). Ismet Pasha, Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, headed the Turkish delegation ; Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary in Mr. Bonar Law's Conservative Government as he had

[1] From the Gazi's speech, quoted by Deny and Marchand, p. 124.

been in the previous Coalition Government of Mr. Lloyd George, represented Great Britain. The first conference of Lausanne broke down in February, 1923. Ismet returned to Angora. Meanwhile the *status quo* of the Mudania Armistice remained, with British forces in occupation of Constantinople and the Straits.

A second conference met at Lausanne (23rd April, 1923). This time Sir Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador at Constantinople, was Britain's delegate, and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24th July. Thus it had taken nearly five years after the end of the Great War for a lasting peace treaty to be arranged between Turkey and the Allies. The Treaty was a remarkable diplomatic success for the Turks—the culmination of the victorious war against the Greeks ; the double triumph is well termed the " Turkish miracle."

Most important among the clauses of the Treaty were those dealing with the new frontiers of Turkey, the redistribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, the abolition of the Capitulations and Millets.

Turkey was to hold in Europe Eastern Thrace as far west as the Maritsa River and including Adrianople. Constantinople was to be an integral part of Turkey under the full sovereignty of the Turkish Government; and the Allied troops in occupation were to be withdrawn. A special Straits Convention was arranged to safeguard the use of the Straits both in peace and war; and on both sides of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus there were to be narrow, demilitarized zones. The French had already evacuated Cilicia under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of 1921, and the boundary between Turkey and the French mandated territory of Syria was now fixed. The frontier of Turkey on the south-east, adjoining Iraq, was left undefined, and the dispute between Turkey and Britain over Mosul was not settled until 1925.

The Kurdish territories in Anatolia, which were to

have become an autonomous state under the Treaty of Sevres, were now included within Turkey, and the Kurds were abandoned to Turkish methods of suppression. The Armenian problem was already settled ; the independent Armenia recognized at Sevres had disappeared in blood, its territory apportioned between Turkey and Bolshevik Russia.

By the Treaty of Lausanne a redistribution of the Ottoman Public Debt was effected. During the nineteenth century a large amount of borrowing had been indulged in by the Sultans, and by 1878 the total debt was calculated to equal £250,000,000. In 1881 the Ottoman Government allowed the establishment of a council of foreign bondholders to administer six sources of revenue for the service of the debt. Now that in 1923 Turkey was so much smaller in territory a redistribution of the burden of the debt had to be arranged, so that the territory no longer belonging to the Ottoman Empire should bear its share. Thus to the new Turkish Republic there was apportioned a percentage of the pre-war Ottoman Debt. But the position of foreign bondholders has been far from satisfactory. " Angora has refrained from challenging the rights of the Debt Council in principle, but has contested or suspended them in practice almost entirely."[1] In 1933, however, a new settlement was reached. The total amount of Turkey's indebtedness has been greatly reduced, and arrangements made for resuming service of the debt.

It was partly over the question of the Capitulations that the first Conference of Lausanne had come to grief. These *capitula* or articles had been granted by the Ottoman Government since the sixteenth century to foreign communities resident in Turkey. Judicial privileges permitted foreigners to be largely subject to their own law and courts, and gave a large amount of authority to the foreign consuls in Turkey. By these

[1] **Toynbec and Kirkwood, p. 237.**

means foreigners were assured of a trial in accordance with their own legal code, and it may be argued that the arrangement was also advantageous to the Turks by bringing within their ken Western legal systems. In addition to judicial immunities special commercial and economic privileges had been granted. Business firms were independent of Turkish control. Foreign post offices were set up for the security of mails. Foreigners were also exempt from most of the taxes levied by the Ottoman Government. Obviously, therefore, foreigners living ifi the Ottoman Empire enjoyed a very privileged position, a position, too, that was open to abuse. They might interfere politically, or foreign post offices might be used for smuggling or propaganda. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Capitulations had been freely granted ; they brought to Turkey the advantages of Western trade ; and some guarantee was necessary to foreigners living in a land so distant and different from their own as that of the Ottomans.

But the Turkish Nationalists could not be expected to tolerate any such infringement of the sovereign power they claimed for the State, and thus at the first Conference of Lausanne Ismet stood firm for the abolition of the Capitulations. Eventually, at the second Conference, the Turkish demand was allowed and the system of Capitulations was abandoned.

Another result of Lausanne was the disappearance of the remnants of the Millets. The existence within the Ottoman Empire of non-Islamic populations, such as the Greek Christians, has already been described.[x] These communities or Millets had often considerable autonomy under the ecclesiastical heads. Such organizations were easily affected by nationalist propaganda from outside against the Turkish Government, and, in addition, there was often rivalry between different Christian groups. All this made the position of the central government

[1] Chap. iii.: "The Institutions of the Ottoman Empire."

more difficult, and obviously Nationalists who desired equal citizenship for all and complete sovereignty for the Government could not fail to interfere with the system. The Armenian question, as we have seen, was largely settled. But many Greeks still remained. To solve the problem, a Graeco-Turkish agreement was signed (January, 1923) during the first Conference of Lausanne. The agreement provided for the forcible exchange between Greece and Turkey of Moslem and Greek Orthodox minorities, excepting the Moslems of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Constantinople. Thus by a radical policy the religious and racial homogeneity of Turkey ^s secured. The Kurds formed the only remaining alien element of any importance.

To the Turks it appeared that the Treaty of Sevres had meant that Thrace should be Greek, Constantinople international, Anatolia Armenian, Adana a French colony, Adalia an Italian colony ; that Turkey should be deprived of army and navy ; that the Govegnment should be placed under thewxmtrol of the Allies ; in a word, that Turkey should cease to form a state. Instead, the Treaty of Lausanne had brought salvation—the Nationalist Revolution had barred the way to the Greeks at Smyrna, to the army of occupation near Adana, to the Armenians on the Western frontier. The forces at Adalia had withdrawn. To-day Anatolia western and eastern, Adana, Thrace, Adalia, the Straits, Constantinople belong to Turkey. So do army, navy and the power of government. Turks are their own masters. National unity is realized.[1]

The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished on 1st November, 1922. But the definite form of the new state was not yet achieved. In August, 1923, Kemal transformed his original Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia into the People's Party,

[1] Paraphrased from the Turkish newspaper *L'Akcham* (25th July, 1923), quoted in Deny and Marchand, pp. 132-3.

which was to express through one political **party the** national unity. In October of the same year Angora (Ankara) was proclaimed capital of the new state. On 29th October, after skilful manoeuvring on Kemal's part, Turkey was finally declared a Republic and Mustafa Kemal was unanimously elected its President. Early in the following year, 20th April, 1924, the constitution of the new state was promulgated.

These events, however, are not as simple as they may appear on the surface, and the political system of the new Turkey will call for examination in the next chapter. One further revolutionary act may be considered here, namely the abolition of the Khalifat.

The Khalifat, the religious headship of Islam, had been held by the Ottoman Sultans. When the Nationalists put an end to the Sultanate they arranged that a purely spiritual Khalifat should remain, the holder to be elected by the Grand National Assembly. This new office was given to Abdul Mejid, heir of the deposed Sultan. Historically, however, the Khalifat was not a spiritual power: the early Arab Khalifs were temporal rulers of the Arab Empire. But the Sultan Abdul Hamid had perceived the possibility of increasing his prestige as Ottoman Sultan by emphasizing the religious importance of his position as Khalif. By enlarging upon the greatness of this position he could win the support of Moslems in India, Russia and China, where Moslems were living under non-Islamic governments.

Thus the support of world Islamic opinion which the possession of the Khalifat fostered might well have been a reason for the maintenance of the office even by a Nationalist government. But there were difficulties. In 1920 the last Sultan used his religious position to condemn the Nationalist movement as being contrary to religion. And while Moslems still inclined to regard the Khalifat as a temporal power, the Khalif might perhaps prove a rival to President Mustafa Kemal, though

personally Abdul Mejid had been favourable to the Nationalists.

Perhaps the Khalifat was regarded as having no real purpose in a state becoming increasingly secular in its principles ; more probably Kemal regarded it as a possible centre for monarchical and religious feeling.* Whatever the reason, on 3rd March, 1924, the Grand National Assembly voted the abolition of the Khalifat, already decided upon by Kemal himself. On the following day, Abdul Mejid, dispossessed of position and rank, left the country with his retinue and household. Thus the Ottoman dynasty passed out of history, Turkey ceased to be the centre of Islamic authority, and Islam itself lost its unifying leadership.

[1] See P. von Mikusch, *Mustapha Kemal*, p. 350. Certain of the Turkish Nationalists, less radical than Kemal, and therefore alarmed by his policy, had made friendly advances to the Khalifat —such men were Rauf Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, Refet Pasha, Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, and Ali Fuad Pasha.

PART III

THE NEW TURKEY

CHAPTER XI

REPUBLIC OR DICTATORSHIP?

" THE Turkish State is a Republic," So reads the first article in the Constitution of Turkey.[1] And if one were to take at its face value all that the Constitution states, one might well believe that Turkey was not only a republic, but a more real democracy than the western democratic states of England, France, and the United States.

" Sovereignty," the Constitution continues, " belongs without restriction to the nation."

" The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises Sovereignty in the name of the nation."

" The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the government and may at any time withdraw power from it."

" Every Turkish citizen over the age of eighteen possesses the right to vote at legislative elections."[2]

" The Grand National Assembly itself executes the holy law ; makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws ; concludes conventions and treaties of peace with other

[1] The Constitution of Turkey (1924) quoted in full in Toynbee and Kirkwood, Appendix. There have been some subsequent amendments of the Constitution.

[2] This applied to men only, and in 1931 the age was raised to twenty-one. The Constitution was again altered in December, 1934. to permit Turkish men and women to vote at the age of twenty-three.

states ; declares war ; examines and ratifies laws drafted by the Commission on the Budget; coins money ; accepts or rejects all contracts or concessions involving financial responsibility; decrees partial or general amnesty; mitigates sentences and grants pardons; expedites judicial investigations and penalties ; executes definite sentences of capital punishment handed down by the courts."

Thus, apparently, Turkey is governed by an elected single-chamber parliament. The new buildings of the Grand National Assembly stand in Ankara for all to see. Elections take place in two stages. Turkish citizens by their votes choose electors, who in turn proceed to the election of deputies. Parliament is elected for four years. The President holds office for the same term of years, and may be re-elected. He may preside, on ceremonial occasions, over the Assembly, and may also, in case of need, preside over the Cabinet, but he may not take part in the discussions of the Assembly nor may he vote. The principles of self-government, too, are actually set down in a written constitution. France and the United States, it is true, possess written constitutions, but England, the most democratic of all, has none. Has the new Turkey, then, succeeded in introducing almost ready-made a system which took centuries to grow in England, and which in turn Italy, Germany, and Russia have tried and failed to imitate successfully ? Is the new Turkey, in short, really a democratic republic ?

The answer, of course, is " no." Names and forms are. often deceptive. Foreigners frequently fail to understand how England, nominally a monarchy, can be in fact a democracy. But people are gradually getting accustomed to the use of names which mean one thing but serve to cover something quite different. Russia, for example, is termed officially the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics; but there is, in most matters of importance, a centralized control over the so-called

republics from Moscow itself, and the apparently democratic system of the Soviets is *little* more than window-dressing. All power lies with the Communist Party, to a large extent in the hands of one man, Stalin. Behind the republican facade stands dictatorship. Therefore one need not be unduly surprised if one finds something more than meets the eye in the government of Turkey. For the elections of 1927 " the Government published a list of candidates for the constituencies, and they were all elected—a very practical simplification of the electoral system of representative government."[1]

The picture presented to a Western mind by the clauses of the Turkish constitution is one of well-disciplined electors using the power of reasoning beloved by John Stuart Mill and nineteenth-century Liberals to make a choice and elect representatives to carry out the popular will. A little reflection, using as a basis our knowledge of Turkish history, will show that such a picture is false. There is no democratic tradition in Turkey, where for centuries absolute Sultans ruled without reference to the popular will. Democratic ideas were exotic, and familiar only to Turks who had come into contact with Western countries. Such ideas were alien to the majority of Turks. Midhat's constitution of 1876 was withdrawn almost as soon as granted. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 raised great hopes, but the Committee of Union and Progress put a military oligarchy in the place of the Sultan and used the same old tyrannical method of government. The use of force is something which cannot be dispensed with in a day. Again Russia affords an example ; the tyranny of the Tsars has been replaced by a government which takes a new name but uses many of the old methods of tyranny.

Nor does one necessarily impute either praise or blame when one tries to discover what really lies behind

[1] Sir Telford Waugh, *Twkey, p.* 272.

the democratic veil of Turkey. Consideration will show that it is really impossible at present for either **Turkey** or Russia to work a democratic system of government, and for similar reasons. The great mass of the people is uneducated ; many arc even illiterate. In both countries the people arc rude and simple peasants ; their daily toil absorbs their energy, and they have little time left for the study of politics. Even in England, where there has been universal elementary education for half **a** century, political understanding is not all it might be ; little is to be expected, therefore, in countries where the first steps in popular education have only recently been taken.

Difficulty of communication in large or undeveloped countries is another obstacle to democracy. Parts of Turkey are still without road or railway, and communication, even where the means exist, is painfully slow. Obvious difficulties leap to mind : that of keeping members of the Assembly in touch with their constituencies, and that of communication between members themselves in discussing or attempting to formulate policy.

Another factor in the situation is that successful democracy presupposes a degree of toleration probably itself based on a certain level of economic security. Parties must agree to differ. But in the case of both Russia and Turkey such agreement could scarcely be tolerated, because in both cases the party in power has won its position only after a period of bitter conflict which has made disagreement with the government equivalent to treason to the state. Until the passions of conflict have had time to subside, open and honest criticisms arc difficult or impossible. The victorious **party** fears for its position : it dare not tolerate opposition **or** even criticism.

In Turkey, too, as in Russia, the revolution **was** overshadowed by the personality of one man, and his

influence could not be expected sudden! ,' to disappear when victory was won. Mustafa Kemal became a pre-eminent figure, a national hero. To the simple peasant he is a figure of almost superstitious awe. The peasants say : " All that the Ghazi orders is for our good, so we do what he wishes."[1] His success in defeating and driving out the Greeks gave him both popularity and power. He was responsible for victory ; his, too, has been the guiding hand ever since in the government of Turkey. Without his indisputable personal influence the democratic machinery of the new Turkey would probably not have been constructed ; it certainly would not have worked. *In* this matter popular report, which regards Kemal as one of the modern dictators, is actually very near the truth. Stalin in Russia holds no position in the government ; he is merely Secretary of the Communist Party. Yet his picture appears in every public place and in the houses of the people. His words are quoted and carry more weight than those of any other Communist leader. He is rightly regarded as the real power in Russia. It is somewhat similar with Kemal. His portrait appears in public places in Turkey. His statue dominates the main street of the capital, much as Lenin's tomb commands the Red Square outside the Moscow Kremlin. In his public speeches he outlines the future policy of Turkey. The social and economic changes are regarded as springing from his mind. His least word commands respect and fear. In spite of the fact that Turkey is nominally a republic and that Kemal disclaims *the* name of dictator, there can be no doubt where power lies in the new Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal, too, is both President of the Turkish Republic and at the same time leader of the dominant political party. Here there is a close similarity between the position of Kemal and that of Mussolini. Both have used the sentiment of nationalism to build up a strong

[1] **D. von Mikusch, *Mustapha Kemal*, p. 356.**

political force, Mussolini first formed little groups, during the early period of the Great War, to agitate for Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies. He thought that by war Italy's position might be made more important. After the conclusion of the war these groups were organized to form the Fascist Party, which enabled its leader to become prime minister and dictator of the Italian State. In Turkey, after the Great War, Kemal formed the Association for the defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. His object was to win for Turkey the rights of a nation. When the victory over the Greeks was won Kemal transformed the Association into a political party to support him in the Grand National Assembly.

In two things Kemal has shown himself stronger than Mussolini. The Fascist leader, before he gained power, talked of abolishing the Monarchy and the Church ; but both remain in Italy to-day. Kemal did not talk of these things ; but as the successful leader and general of the Turkish Nationalists he put an end to Sultanate and Khalifat and made Turkey both a republic and a lay state.

Kemal's avowed aim was to found a homogeneous party which should unite the nation. More than once in ids speeches the Gazi declared : M The nation has suffered much from the conflicting political passions of parties. In other countries political parties are constituted to defend the interests of classes. But there are no classes in Turkey ; the interests of persons of all trades and professions are in harmony. All are children of the people ; therefore the whole nation can well enter the Party of the People."[1] Thus Kemal formed during 1923 his new party — the People's Party, or, as it was called after the declaration of the Republic, the

[1] Speeches at lzmit and Balikessir, 18th January and 17th February, 1923. Quoted by the Anadolu Ajansi on which these remarks concerning the People's Party are based.

People's Republican Party. The Party declared its aims to be :—

1. To serve as a guide to the people in the exercise of national sovereignty by the people and for the people ;
2. To make efforts to modernize the state ;
3. To achieve the recognition of the supremacy of law in Turkey.

Nor was the term " people " to design any particular class. " All individuals who accept equality before the Jaw are a part of the people. Such are those w ho recognize no privilege, either of person, of family, of class, or of group,'*

The People's Party, with its representatives dominating the Grand National Assembly, has been Kemal's instrument in carrying through the great social and economic changes which have characterized the new Turkey. Its method has been not to construct a definite programme of its own, but to wait for the Gazi himself to suggest necessary reforms. Kemul is a unique figure. Without his restless energy one could scarcely imagine the existence of the " new Tuikcy." His adherents claim that his party was the first revolutionary political paity in the post-war world to adopt as its principle the harmony, of interests instead of the class struggle.

National unity, however, is an ideal rather than a reality. Criticism and opposition, although kept under by repressive measures, are by no means absent. On more than one occasion opposition of a dangerous nature has appeared in the Grand National Assembly itself. There were many who feared the concentration of power in Kemal's hands and foresaw the dangers of dictatorship.

The methods employed by the Turkish Government for suppressing opposition are similar to those used by other dictatorships. In December, 1923, special Tribunals of Independence were established comparable to the Russian Cheka and the later Ogpu. These Tribunals

had as their object the trial of treason charges and could easily be used to perpetrate the most arbitrary acts against any opponents of the Government. The Tribunals showed their teeth in their treatment of the Press. In Istanbul editors of three leading newspapers were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment. Their offence had been the publication of a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister from two non-Turkish Moslems, one of whom was the Aga Khan, asking for consideration to be given to world Moslem opinion in any action to be taken with regard to the Khalifat. The publication of this letter was taken to imply criticism of the Government, hence the punishment of the editors. In 1924 further attacks on the freedom of the Press took place. During the Kurdish rebellion of 1925 a number of papers were suppressed, and one editor was summoned before the Tribunal of Independence at Ankara and exiled to a remote part of Anatolia. The sudden expulsion of the Greek Patriarch, head of the Greek Church, from Constantinople, and Kemal's act in declaring his own divorce, otter other examples of the use of arbitrary power in the new Turkey. The Greek Patriarch was expelled on the ground that he was an " exchangeable " Greek. This led to a dispute between Turkey and Greece, and the latter appealed to the League of Nations. The dispute was finally settled by the resignation of the Patriarch and the election of another.

Kemal had proved successful in overcoming all resistance when he made Turkey a republic. But resistance had been overcome only to appear once more. It was two-fold in character. It came from Nationalists and Liberals who feared Kemal's personal power, and also from reactionaries who desired to prevent change and reform.

Kemal desired a National Party which should embrace the whole nation. " The public and the whole world are to understand," he said, " that so far as I am concerned

there can be no question of being politically neutral or standing above all parties. I declare adherence to the Republic, and that is also the creed of the People's Party. That Party is the protagonist of intellectual and social progress, and I cannot imagine that there can be any Turk who holds any other opinion on this vital point. Hence there can be no rival programmes and no rival parties. The People's Party embraces the whole people, and its programme is the programme of the entire nation. I say expressly that it is a question of honour with me to remain both Party leader and President of the State."[1]

But in spite of this declaration another party was formed to go into opposition in the Turkish Parliament—The Party of Republican Progress. It was Jed by many who had been prominent in the struggle for national independence, Rauf Bey, Refet Pasha, Dr. Adrian Bey, Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, and AH Fuad Pasha. Fear of dictatorship moved them. "The new party is' a dagger that has been unsheathed in the name of democracy," declared a leading Constantinople newspaper.- The new party was strengthened by deputies who deserted the People's Party, and became so strong that in 10,24 the leadership of the Cabinet was placed in the hands of Fethi Bey, who was sympathetic to the new progressive part v.

Events which followed showed (dearly enough the danger inheient in political life in Turkey and the need for a strong hand in control. Proceedings in the Grand National Assembly became lively in the extreme. Sometimes revolvers were flourished, and on one occasion a member was shot. The commandant of Kemal's bodyguard assassinated a member of the opposition at dinner. Although the assassin was subsequently killed in

[1] D. von Mikuhcb, *Mustapha Kemal.* Ouott'd from his speeches, p. 357.

[2] Quoted by D. von Mikusch, p. 358. See also Halidd Edib, *Turkey faces West,* pp. 218-220.

resisting arrest, the whole affair naturally **enough cast** suspicion on the President himself.

The rising of the Kurds in 1925—partly religious and partly political in character—gave Kemal a splendid opportunity to use the heavy hand in suppressing opposition. Fethi Bey was compelled to resign. Ismet Pasha, a strong supporter of Kemal, took his place. Tribunals of Independence were set up to try those accused of offences against the Government. The Press was censored. Arrests and executions took place, even of those, having parliamentary immunity. Many were banished or found it wiser to flee. Among these were Rauf Bey, Dr. Aclnan Bey, and his wife, HalidtS Edib. AH these had played a prominent part in the struggle for independence, and the latter was one of the pioneers in the Turkish women's movement. At one time she had been condemned to death by the last Sultan along with other revolutionary leaders, including Kemal himself. But sentimental reasons did not move Kemal, and the Party of Republican Progress was suppressed. What is of supreme interest " is the change of a democratic state of five years' standing into a dictatorial one without either altering its form or even closing the National Assembly."[1]

Since then the Turkish President has maintained a strict discipline over the one existing party—The People's Party. " As party leader he nominates the candidates who are to be voted on, and since there are no other names brought forward, only representatives of the People's Party are elected. Any member who is inclined to be restive, or whose conduct outside of Parliament is not quite irreproachable, or who even shows a lack of zeal and industry in his constituency, is not nominated again." * By such means Kemal is able to maintain his own position as based on the Constitution.

[1] Halidi' Edib, *Turkey faces West,* p. *221.*
[2] D von Mikusch, *Mustapha Kemal,* p, 305.

Opposition showed itself again, however, in an unconstitutional form in 1927, when a plot against the President's life was discovered. Investigation indicated that many supporters of the Party of Progress had been involved. The question became one of high politics. A trial was held. Even Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha and Ali Fuad Pasha were accused, but were acquitted. A number of executions followed, the victims including many leading men among the Young Turks who were still in the country. Another to die was Arif Bey, an old comrade and personal friend of Kemal.

Recently another experiment in the formation of an opposition in the Grand National Assembly has been made. In 1930 Fethi Bey returned from Paris, and after consultation with Kemal resigned his post as ambassador to become leader of a new political party—The Liberal Republican Party. A public meeting was held in Smyrna which resulted in some disturbance. The new party made an appearance in the Grand National Assembly. But public opinion was still unready for open discussion and criticism, and it was not long before the new party was dissolved by its founder. At the elections of 1931, however, arrangements were made for *the* allocation of a number of seats to " Independents."

Local government is partly elective, but the central government maintains control. Kach of the sixty-three vilayets is supervised by a vali, or governor, who possesses extensive powers and is appointed by the central government.

In addition to the clauses in the Constitution which determine the democratic forms of Government, the Constitution also affirms in emphatic terms the liberty of the subject.

" All citizens of Turkey," it is declared, " are endowed at birth with liberty and full right to the enjoyment thereof. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offence or injury to others."

" Inviolability of person ; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of Press ; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association ; freedom of incorporation are among the natural rights of Turks."

What has been said above will indicate how much these formal declarations are actually worth. But if they do not correspond with the facts as we find them to-day, they may perhaps be held to point out an ideal for the future. What is most interesting about them is that they show clearly the influence of eighteenth-century ideas. There is a curious time-lag in Turkish political theories. They are Western theories, not of the twentieth century but of the eighteenth. They are the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence of 177b, and of the French Revolution. And when it is pointed out that in '1 urkey the theory does not lit the facts, it is only fair to remember that the Americans of 1776, while solemnly declaring their belief in the equality of man, at the same time maintained the black man in slavery, and that in revolutionary France " liberty, equality and fraternity " brought the terror and the guillotine.

Fnough has been said to show that the present government of Turkey, while it is republican in name, in actual fact is a dictatorship. The real power lies in the hands ot the (ia,'i, Mustafa Kemal. One cannot read the Dictator's mind ; one *can* only judge by his deeds and his words. In form, at least, he has created a Republic. He did not allow himself to take the title of Khalif, though this was suggested to him. He has been at pains to work through the parliamentary machinery. He does not denounce democracy, as does Mussolini. His educational policy will put the future of Turkey in the hands ot young men and women acquainted with Western ideas. It may be that in the future the democratic forms of to-day will become a reality.

CHAPTER XII

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

THE new Turkey is characterized not merely by political but also by far-reaching social and economic changes. Intense nationalism combined with suspicion of foreigners is, paradoxically enough, co-existent with a tacit recognition of the superiority of Western civilization. The influence of Western political philosophy on Turkish constitution-building has been noticed already ; but everything has been and is being done to " Westernize " Turkey as quickly as possible in other ways as well. Hence the overthrow of Ottoman and Islamic institutions and tradition, and the adoption wholesale of Western dress, customs, law, machinery.

The explanation of these changes is partly to be found in the character of the Gazi - President himself. His is a restless, active disposition. " He must be on the stage, a unique actor perpetually astonishing the world."[1] Kemal has speeded up a number of changes which might have taken place eventually even without him. But the popular idea that Turkey has changed overnight from an Eastern into a Western nation is, of ermine, superficial. The process of reform is neither so new nor as yet so deep as the popukir journalists' account of the changes would suggest. Just as in Soviet Russia then- is, beneath the veneer of Communist terminology, a dcgier of continuity in important respects--dictatoiial government and terrorism, for example between the new Russia and that of the Tsars so in "Turkey we can trace the beginnings of Kemal's reforms in the nineteenth century.

" Westernization " had already begun. It is possible, too, that reform might have come more easily and more naturally if it had been allowed to come more slowly. " Whether the recent reforms could have been carried out by other than terrorist methods is a question to be seriously considered. And there is no doubt that they were bound to be carried through, but whether in three years or in thirteen or thirty years, no one can tell."[1]

The extreme nationalism of the new Turkey is a natural result of the long struggle, after the Great War, for independence. Western ways might be adopted, but Kernal would prove in so doing the equality of Turks and Westerners. " They shall know that we are as good as they are ! They shall treat us as their equal! Never will we bow our heads to them ! "[2]

So Kemal spoke during the struggle for independence, but it is not surprising that something of this attitude should persist even after the conclusion of peace. Thus it is still true to say that the fundamental principles of the new Turkish State are: first, the complete independence of Turkey, political and economic ; and secondly, the creation of a homogeneous Turkish nation. The Nationalist ideal is that of a sovereign State, not an empire ; to such a degree is this idea carried, that some of the greatest Sultans of Ottoman history are branded for their imperialistic and Pan-Islamic policies.

It was only to be expected that the Sultanate, as the governing institution of the Ottoman Empire, would disappear with that Empire. But the abolition of the Khalifat, though effected partly for political reasons, has been shown by subsequent events to have been part of a wider policy in regard to religion. The mere fact that the Khalifat was abolished showed clearly enough that the new Turkey was abandoning of its own free will

[1] Halide Edit), *Tut Key faces West, p.* 223.
[2] Halide Edit), *The Turkish Ordeal,* p. 149

pretensions to the religious headship of Islam. It can scarcely be supposed that Mustafa Kemal himself holds any religious belief. At all events, his policy has been consistently directed towards making Turkey a lay State. Religious courts have been suppressed, ecclesiastical seminaries have been closed and their endowments taken over by the State, and the monasteries and religious corporations have been likewise abolished. Thus the curious visitor to the Dervish head-quarters at Konia can no longer witness the dance of the Whirling Dervishes. Instead he can visit their mosque as a museum—one of the curiosities of history. To some extent Turkish has replaced Arabic as the language of the mosques. Religious teaching has been abandoned in the schools. Men are free to adopt whatever religion they may choose or no religion at all. In 1928 the clause in the Constitution which stated, " The religion of the Turkish State is Islam," was removed. Turkey finally became a lay state.

This does not mean that Turkey has " done away " with religion. But it does suggest an indifference towards religious belief on the part of the responsible statesmen. Nor does it mean that, as in Russia, an active campaign is carried on against religion, and that atheism is taught to children and made an essential part of the governing political creed.

A comparison has been made between the position of the Turks in the Islamic world and that of the Protestants in the Christian. In the one case the Khalifat has been overthrown ; in the other the authority of the Pope is not recognized. Kemal's policy with regard to Mohammedanism might be compared with that of Henry VIII in England in the break with the head of the Church and the suppression of monasteries. But the comparison must not be pushed too far. *In* England the Roman Catholic Church was replaced by a State Church claiming a large degree of continuity in doctrine and offering its worship as part of the duty of a good

citizen. In Turkey, on the other hand, religion has been separated from the State, and religious belief has been left to the individual.

Perhaps the most spectacular of the reforms was the " Hat Law," passed in 1925, to forbid the wearing of the old head-dress, the fez, and to make some form of European hat or cap compulsory. Long ago Baedeker had warned the traveller in the Near East that " the red fez should be avoided, the hat being nowadays the recognized symbol of the dignity of the European," and Mustafa Kemal was determined that the modern Turk should be as " dignified " as any European. It is easy to point out that what matters most is not what is on, but what is inside the head, and to criticize Kcmal's policy of " wear a hat," " get civilized," or " be hanged or imprisoned." But the fez has been a tangible sign of distinction between Moslem and Christian in Turkey. It divided people ; non-wearers of the fez could get together easily and discuss and criticize. By making all Turkish subjects wear European head-dress Kemal removed this distinction.

The " Hat Law " enriched European hat manufacturers, and allowed one English official to boast that he was able to sell a silk hat to a Turk for more than had been paid for it twenty years before. But the fez had religious significance ; it enabled the pious Moslem to touch the ground with his forehead when at prayer, and ruthless severity was necessary to enforce the wearing of the hat. Nureddin Pasha, who raised his voice in the National Assembly against the reform, on the ground that it interfered with individual liberty as granted by the Constitution, was expelled from the Assembly.

Much more far reaching is the change in the position of women which has taken place. Whereas under the Ottoman Empire and Mohammedan law woman had been subject to man, she has now been put on a footing of legal equality. Women had played their part in the

struggle for independence, and they earned their reward. Under the old regime women in the towns were always veiled in public, and their husbands could divorce them at will. Kemal himself has urged women to abandon the veil, although it has not been prohibited. Already it is an uncommon sight to see a veiled woman in an important city like Istanbul or Ankara, but in the smaller towns many of the women, especially the older ones, still wear the veil.

The adoption by the Turks in 1926 of law based on the Swiss Civil Code gave to women legal rights in society, and has the effect of putting an end to polygamy and the harem. Thus the ideal of the Turkish family is now equivalent to that of the Western family. This is indeed a triumph for Western ideas. Yet it is curious to reflect that Turkey has adopted the European family as a social institution at the very moment when that institution is being questioned in the West itself. Turkey might have imitated the Russian example and made marriage a free relationship instead of a binding tie, but she turned to the West rather than to the Soviets.

To-day the I urkish woman has full educational rights and hei sphere of work is ever widening. She may be a doctor, lawyer, or perhaps a brilliant linguist. She votes in municipal elections, and under the law of 1934 has gained the right to vote for deputies to tin.' Grand National Assembly. Office, factory and simp have their women workers just as they have in Western countries. Modern fashion in dress is spreading. The young woman in Istanbul or Ankara to-day is dressed as she would be in Paris, London or New York. In the rural districts, of course, the emancipation of woman has not yet gone very far. Her life is still one of drudgery.

The legal system of Turkey has been completely altered. The old religious court* were abolished in 1924, and since then a new system of courts has been created, and the old laws have been replaced by new codes based

on those of Switzerland, Germany and Italy. In building up this new legal system the abolition of the Capitulations was an important step. It freed the Turk from any outside interference and vindicated the independence of the national law.

The adoption in 1928 of the Latin alphabet is probably as important in its future significance as the emancipation of women obtained by the Swiss Civil Code. The object of Mustafa Kemal in making the change from the Arabic *to* the Latin characters was to enable as many people as possible to learn to read and write. The Arabic script is most difficult to learn ; its characters were effective more as a system of decorative design than as a system of writing. But the Arabic script had a religious significance ; it was the script of the Koran. With the suppression of the Khalifat and the Islamic law, however, it seemed but a small thing, in its religious aspect, to make the change from Arabic to Latin letters. Thus the change was made, and in one more respect Turkey, in adopting the Latin alphabet, came into line with Western nations.

The change was carried through with great speed, and with methods of compulsion. People under the age of forty-five were called upon to learn the new alphabet within six months, and night schools were provided for the purpose. So eager was Kemal for the reform, that he himself with blackboard and chalk gave lessons in the public streets. It was adult education with a vengeance. Excluding children attending the elementary schools, the number of people able to read and write is said to have increased between 1927 and 1932 from under 700,000 to over two millions.[1]

Kemal is also anxious to replace with Turkish words all words in the Turkish language which are of Arabic or Persian origin.

In addition to making the change in their alphabet the Turks have introduced the international calendar,

[1] Anadolu Ajansi.

international numerals and the metric system of weights and measures.

Education has received every encouragement from Kemal, but it has been devoted to Nationalist ends. Under the old regime education had been largely given in schools attached to the mosques, but the government of Kemal has abolished these schools and secularized education, bringing it all under the control of the State. To serve the Nationalist ideals and to be scientific is the two-fold aim of education in Turkey to-day.

The first of these aims finds expression in the law of 1931 making it compulsory for Turkish children to receive their elementary education in Turkish schools. This struck a further blow at Western interference *in* Turkey. Previously a number of schools had been carried on by foreigners ; in this respect French and American influence was particularly strong in the Ottoman Empire. Certain of the foreign higher institutions of learning, such as Robert College in Constantinople, are still allowed to work, subject to some restriction. Such institutions are extremely valuable apart from their direct educational purpose ; at them the youth of Turkey mixes with those of other, and in the past hostile, nationalities, Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian. The common life of class room and sports field will make for mutual understanding in adult life.

Turkish education prides itself upon being scientific.[1] In the place of the old religious teaching the Nationalists claim to have put the ideal of " the True, the Good and the Beautiful," and they claim that the whole system is based upon scientific truths, paying by this yet another tribute to Western ideas. Arabic and Persian—the " classics" of Turkish education—give way in the curriculum to science, history and modern languages.

Primary education is compulsory and free for both sexes. This is the law, but it must be regarded as an

[1] Anadolu Ajansi, *L'Instruction publiquc en Turguie Repuhlicaine.*

ideal rather than a fact. There is still a shortage **of both** schools and teachers, particularly in the country.[1] But in this respect probably great improvement will take place with time.

The new Turkey also aims at education through channels other than that of the curriculum. Sport is encouraged ; Hoy Scout troops are organized ; and the Government, by encouraging museums, libraries and publishing, aims at widening the range of culture for the masses. One particularly interesting educational development is the attention given to the teaching of history, under the direct encouragement of Kemal himself, who in 1931 founded the Association of Turkish* Historical Studies. This Association has produced a standard history of Turkey for use in schools. Its mission is declared to be " to give to the Turkish nation a general history based upon reality, to the exclusion of the prejudice of religious fanaticism, and to give it its true and rightful place in history."[2] One may doubt the impartiality of a history produced in this way, under official control, and see in it one other example of Turkish Nationalism.

In addition to the work of the Government, a number of voluntary organizations carry on social work in Turkey. The People's Homes organization, with branches in most towns, enables people to meet for educational and social purposes. The Federation of Turkish Sports Clubs, with the aid of a government subsidy, has assisted in the provision of sports fields and in the development of

[1] Sec lialido Edib, *Turkey faces West,* pp. .235-6. In the matter of education, Turkey can be compared with Soviet Russia. In spite of the much-vaunted educational advances in the latter, actually there is tremendous ground to be covered before the educational system even approximates to that of advanced countries. In both cases the cost of armaments is a heavy burden. In Turkey the cost of National Defence is about five times the sum expended upon education.

[1] Anadolu Ajansi. *Etudes Historiques Turques.*

athletic pursuits. The Association for the Protection of Childhood assists necessitous children and mothers, and organizes an annual '* childhood week " for the propagation of its aims. The Red Crescent devotes itself to such social objects as the relief of the victims of fire, drought, flood, earthquake, or other disaster. The Association for Public Instruction, the National Association for Kconomy and Saving, and the Aeronautical League also carry on their several activities.

The economic nationalism of recent years, so common and yet so unfortunate a development, is as characteristic of Turkey as it is of most other countries. The ultimate aim seems to be to make the country independent and self-contained whether in peace or war. Economic interests—the advantages of international trade, the profit of employer, the wage of the worker--must give way to national safety. Fear of outside interference and foreign competition cramp and confine economic activity.

On economic grounds the creation of a new capital at Ankara can well be criticized. During the War of Independence force of circumstances and its strategic importance made Angora the centre of Nationalist resistance. Even after the conclusion of peace the old capital of Constantinople was, for various reasons, unsuitable for the Nationalists. In the old capital there were too many people attached to the old regime, finally, it was decided that Ankara should be the new capital. Kemal does not do things by halves, and in the midst of the Anatolian wilds he has transformed a primitive hill-town into a modern city. He may well be compared with Peter the Great, who built the majestic city of St. Petersburg on the marshes of the Neva. Eor Kemal everything in the new capital has to be of the best—great ferro-concrete buildings, fine roads, tree-lined boulevards. To the traveller Ankara presents a striking and unexpected sight.

Yet it is a tedious journey of some three hundred

miles across an arid desert from the old capital to the new. The new capital has cost a large sum to build. At the same time it has caused a decline in the prosperity of Istanbul by striking a blow at all the interests vested in the old capital. As a port, too, Istanbul has suffered by the imposition of regulations interfering with trade and shipping. The economic loss is obvious, but the new capital is a symbol of the dearly-bought independence of modern Turkey.

The Nationalist policy of " Turkey for the Turks " was partly founded on the belief that the business done by foreigners in Turkey could be transferred to Turks. Commercial and financial aptitude had been found mainly in the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities. These were driven out or confined to Istanbul and restricted in activity, but the Turks themselves have not as yet acquired a capacity for business. This may, perhaps, be a matter of time ; it is too early yet to judge. But the lack of mutual confidence between the Turkish Government and foreign business men is a serious obstacle both to foreign business and to the economic development of Turkey herself.

In modern Turkey, with its population of nearly 14,000,000,' which is small in proportion to the area of the country, agriculture is still the most important industry and a large proportion of the people belong to the peasant class. These peasants are very primitive and accustomed to a low standard of life, and the Turkish Government has shown its desire to improve their lot by pecuniary assistance through the Agricultural Bank, and by encouraging the formation of agricultural co-operative societies. One of the first problems with which the new Government had to deal was the settlement of the Turkish people exchanged for Greeks under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty. In effecting this settlement the

[1] The population is now stated by the Turkish Government to be 18,000,000. See *The Times,* 26th June, 1934.

Government has distributed lands, seed, cattle and machinery, allowing repayment to be extended over a term of years, and it may well be judged that such a policy would strengthen the loyalty of the peasants and rule out the chance of any spread of Communistic propaganda. There is much small holding in Turkey, and security of tenure in itself is a guarantee of social stability.

Some of the principal Turkish crops are wheat, tobacco, nuts, figs, raisins, olive oil and cotton. Grain is produced to feed the population, and tobacco is the most important item in the list of Turkey's exports. More than a hundred thousand planters are occupied in growing tobacco, the best qualities being grown on the Black Sea coast. In 1925 the administration of the Tobacco Monopoly was reorganized, and the profits to the State were very greatly increased.

Western Anatolia produces grapes, raisins and also the famous Smyrna figs. Next to tobacco, fruit is the most important of Turkish exports. Cotton, silk and flax receive special attention from the Government. Stock breeding is also important to the Turkish peasants, and includes the raising of mohair goats. Cotton, livestock, wool and mohair all figure among Turkish exports.

The Government has encouraged agriculture by founding schools, sending agricultural students abroad for training, and by establishing an agricultural institute at Ankara. Near the capital, too, the Gazi himself possesses a farm which has become a model, even though the land there is poor. Turkey's President delights to demonstrate his capacity for overcoming difficulties of ejvery kind. Scientific research in agriculture has been directed towards trying to improve the native crops, and also towards adapting foreign plants to the conditions of Asia Minor. Hitherto Turkish agricultural methods had been extremely primitive. The Government has, however, encouraged modern methods by distributing a number of ploughs and tractors on easy terms. The Government

has also carried out a survey of **Turkey's forests with a** view to employing her timber resources most scientifically.

As a predominantly peasant country, Turkey has never been advanced industrially. The Republican Government, however, with its desire to gain all the advantages of Western civilization, has turned its attention to the problem of encouraging industry. Although Turkey did not adopt the Soviet model of a complete State system of industry, nevertheless the new Turkish Government has followed a policy of considerable State control. The policy might almost be described as one of State capitalism under supreme economic direction from Ankara. The object is avowedly to make Turkey, as far as possible, economically independent of imports from foreign countries by increasing the products of national industries. The State draws revenue from a number of monopolies besides tobacco and salt, and manages the State railways, posts, telegraphs and telephones, the mint, the official printing office, and a number of mines and factories, while industry generally is protected against foreign competition by means of tariffs, quota restrictions, and in certain cases exemption from duty on imported raw materials and machinery.

The last months of 1933 were marked by the Government's drawing up a five - year plan of industrial development. This plan aims at the extension of existing industry and the creation of new industries. The Government uses the Sumer Bank (which has absorbed the previous Bank of Industry and Mines created for the working of Government factories) for the operating of existing Government factories, for the grant of credits to private enterprise, and also for assisting in the establishment of new industries. Four already existing Government factories (producing cloth, shoes, woollen goods, etc.) have greatly increased their output between 1928 and 1933- The increased output is due to the fact that they supply the Government and the home market. The

capital of the Sumer Bank is furnished by the State. The textile industry will be enlarged under the new scheme, the production of the coal-fields will be rationalized, and a number of new industries will be developed. Among the new industries planned are an iron industry, a chemical industry, the provision of electricity for motive power, a paper mill, a ceramic industry, and a mill for artificial silk. The natural resources of the country are also to be developed, including the extraction of gold, oil, sulphur and copper. The fishing and sponge industries, too, will be subjected to modern methods. Thus, it is clear, the Government is extending its control over the whole economic system of the country.

For the inspiration of the five-year plan it is not necessary to look far. The Council of Administration of the Sumer Bank reports :—

> "During the course of 1934, the first year of the five-year plan, our Bank will have completed its investigations and drawn up its projects for the first factories to be founded. The plans for the cotton factory at Kayseri, for which the material will be supplied by the Soviets, are complete and construction will commence during the month of April. In order to ensure a supply of qualified workers, foremen and engineers necessary for this factory, the Bank has sent to Russia 75 stagiaires and a sufficient number of engineers.
>
> "The Bank has also completed the preparatory study of the second cotton piece-goods manufacture to be created at Najli, and the necessary material will be ordered from Russia. We are in contact with the Soviets on this subject."[1]

During the years since its accession to power the Republican Government in Turkey has, for both strategic and economic reasons, devoted a large amount of attention to the development of communications. The railway

[1] Quoted in the *Monthly Circular of the Ottoman Bank*, July-August, 1934.

system was very undeveloped under the old regime, and the Republican Government has greatly extended it, constructing new lines and buying up the old lines which had been built and were being operated by foreign corporations. The policy of railway construction has been financed without borrowing abroad. Thus, gradually, parts of Turkey which for centuries have only been reached by foot, horse or camel are being linked up by railway. To avoid giving a wrong impression, however, it should be pointed out that the Turkish railway system, even on the main Anatolian route, still consists of a single track, and the system is primitive when compared with that of Western European countries, although it might fairly be compared with the railway systems of Bulgaria and South-Eastern Yugoslavia. As yet Turkey has done little to develop the possibilities of the tourist industry. This is somewhat surprising when one thinks of what the Soviet "Intourist" Office has done to popularize conducted tours in Russia.

The Turkish Government established in 1931 a Central Bank which carries out the usual functions of regulating the currency and conducting the financial operations of the Government. In addition, it controls foreign exchange and serves as a clearing house for the trading agreements reached between Turkey and various foreign countries. There are a number of other banks in Turkey, and banking will probably develop along with the needs of industry. The famous Ottoman Bank, founded in 1863, with many branches throughout Turkey and the Near East, is an Anglo-French banking house. It has granted a credit to the Turkish Government, and has had its concession renewed until 1952.

The general position of Turkey's finances appears at present to be satisfactory. Although heavy taxation and economies have been necessary, budget equilibrium has been practically assured. Great efforts have also been made to maintain a favourable trade balance, and

success in this has been achieved. To reach this end many restrictions have been imposed upon trade. So strict have been the regulations that people going abroad have found it difficult to procure even the comparatively small sums of foreign money to pay for their trips. But by these means inflation has been avoided and Turkish currency has been sufficiently protected.

Trade statistics, however, show a great decline in both exports and imports. Turkey imports cotton piece-goods, iron and steel manufactured goods, and machinery. She exports tobacco, fruit, butter and eggs, livestock, cotton, wool and mohair, and other raw materials.[1] Thus, as an exporter of foodstuffs and raw materials, Turkey has been badly affected by the world fall in commodity prices. In spite of the Government's efforts to develop agriculture and industry, the value of her exported produce has steadily declined, which means a corresponding decline in her purchasing power as a nation. This accounts for considerable pessimism as to Turkey's economic future. " Throughout the years 1930 and 1931 general depression prevailed and the immediate future is not encouraging."[2] It would seem, therefore, that economic improvement will depend largely upon Turkey's internal development and in making reasonable trade agreements with foreign states. Although imitation of Western machine technique will bring about increased production, this will carry with it its own problem in bringing Turkish products into the fierce competition of the already overstocked markets of the world.

[1] Turkish exporters are sometimes accused of fraud in trading. Their goods occasionally arrive in bad condition. The Government is urged to maintain strict supervision.—*L'Akcham,* 4th April, 1934.

[2] *Economic Conditions in Turkey ;* Report for British Department of Overseas Trade, p. 15.

CONCLUSION

THE stormy history of Turkey, marked by so much warfare, atrocity and massacre, cannot fail, for many years yet to come, to exert an evil influence over the country's development. The legacy of violence is violence. It is not possible to condone Turkish treatment of Christian minorities in the past, nor Turkish policy of solving the problem by extermination, though it must be admitted that the Turks have, on several occasions, suffered considerable provocation. The massacres of Abdul Hamid's reign, the dreadful massacres and deportations of Armenians during the Great War, the ruthless policy during Turkey's war against the Armenian Republic, and the cruelties perpetrated on British soldiers forced after the fall of Kut to march hundreds of miles into the Anatolian interior—all these things show the Turk at his worst. Nor is Turkey's internal condition yet a settled one. The violent suppression of the Kurdish risings has left its own bitterness behind. The traveller is not allowed to penetrate into the eastern districts of Turkey ; news from these parts is most difficult to obtain ; and so dangerous are conditions in some places that it is said that officials dare not go out after dark for fear of violence.

From the point of view of international politics, however, the final collapse of the long-decayed Ottoman Empire must be welcomed, and the emergence of the Turkish Republic as a strong homogeneous national state makes practically impossible the interference of foreign Powers in her internal affairs. To-day, therefore, Turkey is no longer a bone of contention among the Great Powers as she was before the Great War. Nevertheless, there are

still difficulties. Turkey continues to harbour considerable Anglophobia, for she cannot forget England's support of the Greeks after the Great War. Italy is another source of nervousness. The Island of Rhodes, now belonging to Italy, is such a convenient focus for Italian policy in the Near East, that it is easy to understand the anxiety of the Turks whenever Mussolini makes reference to Italian interests and possible expansion in Asia or North Africa.

Turkey appears to have a genuine desire for peace. Kemal has set his face against imperialist and pan-Islamic ambitions. But this is not all. Turkey is a member of the League of Nations, and was elected to a seat on the Council in 1934. She also took part in the World Economic Congress of 1933 and the Disarmament Conference. In addition, she has taken the initiative in attempts to bring a greater political unity to the Balkans, and took a leading part in the negotiations which produced the Balkan Pact. Most striking has been the improvement in Graeco-Turkish relations. In 1930 both countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration, and in 1933 a further treaty was signed. A Balkan Chamber of Commerce, with head-quarters at Istanbul, has been organized. Early in 1934 Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania entered into the Balkan Pact of non-aggression, and agreed thereby to guarantee each other's frontiers. Although Bulgaria, still hoping for some revision of her frontiers, has not entered into the Pact, it is a considerable achievement that the other four Powers have been able to agree. Finally, official visits have been exchanged, and the Press has referred favourably to the new policy of friendship.[1]

With regard to Turkey's internal policy of " Westernization " it is certainly possible to criticize the methods employed and the haste shown in introducing the changes. But with the general aim—to give Turkey the benefits of Western civilization—there can be no

[1] *L'Echo de Belgrade,* **18th April, 1934.**

disagreement. How quickly this can be done and how far it will be successful is difficult to estimate. Economic development must be slow. Peasants who are still living in huts made of straw and baked earth cannot be transformed overnight. The strongest instrument for change lies in the new educational system. As Mustafa Kemal himself has said, the future of Turkey lies in the hands of its youth.

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