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The **ASIATIC REVIEW**



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THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

JANUARY, 1943

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THE INDIAN SITUATION
SOVIET ASIA
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THE ASIATIC REVIEW

JANUARY, 1943

PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

1866-1942: INDIA THEN AND NOW

BY THE LORD ERSKINE, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

THE seventy-fifth anniversary of the first meeting of the East India Association falls in the year 1942. It was therefore determined by the Council that the occasion should be marked by the reading of a paper surveying the progress of India during the past three-quarters of a century, and showing in what manner the activities of the Association have helped to influence the course of events.

Personally I would have much preferred that the task of implementing this decision should have been placed in other hands than mine; for the majority of the members of the Association have spent a far greater portion of their lives in India than I have, and, besides, I do not pretend to any specialized knowledge of the sub-continent outside the boundaries of the Madras Presidency.

However, it was represented to me by our invaluable and persuasive Honorary Secretary, Sir Frank Brown, that, owing to my family connection with the early history of the Association, it was almost incumbent on me to agree to his invitation. He had extracted from the records the facts that my great-grandfather, Lord Kellie, who, as Colonel Erskine, had a distinguished military and political career in India, was the first Chairman of the Council, and that my maternal great-grandfather, Lord Shaftesbury, of Factory Act fame, served as one of the original Vice-Presidents. This line of argument did not really convince me that I was the proper person to read this paper; but as it is difficult to counter Sir Frank's wishes on any matter connected with the Association, I felt compelled to fall in with his desires, though I am well aware of my limitations for so important a duty.

THE "G.O.M." OF INDIA

No survey of the part that has been played by our Association would be complete without much more than a passing reference to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, who was in truth our real founder. This gentleman, a Parsee, was born so long ago as 1825, nor did his life come to an end until he had attained the ripe old age of ninety-two. His career was remarkable. He was the first Indian to become a Member of the Imperial Parliament or

to be appointed a Royal Commissioner. Finsbury was the constituency which elected him in 1891 to support the Gladstonian interest, and the Royal Commission on which he sat was that presided over by Lord Welby on Indian Expenditure.

Mr. Naoroji's life was spent in agitating for reforms of every kind, and most of the causes that he had at heart have long since triumphed. He was always a convinced advocate of constitutional methods, nor did his faith in the justice and honesty of British intentions ever falter, though in his later years he seemed to harbour a sense of frustration. It was unfortunate that he passed away only some two months before the Montagu Declaration was made, for had he lived till August, 1917, he would certainly have realized that his country's feet were firmly set in the path of self-government, and that all his arduous and sustained labours to that end had been crowned with success.

Although for two generations a leader of Indian political thought and a power in the Congress Party of his day, Mr. Naoroji never had much opportunity to show his capacity as an administrator. But he was Diwan of Baroda at a critical period in the history of the State, and during the few hectic months he held the post proved himself well worthy of so responsible an office.

In the early years he made frequent use of our meetings as a sounding-board for his ideas; but with the passage of time his views became rather too advanced for the somewhat conservatively inclined membership of the Association at the beginning of the present century, and a rift developed that was never completely healed. But now that the perspective of the politics of those days has become more clearly defined, it is meet that we should pay a sincere tribute of admiration and respect to one who ever held high the torch of progress and whose life will serve as an inspiration and a guide to succeeding generations of his countrymen.

ADVOCACY OF REFORMS

At this point it may be suitable to recall the objects for which the East India Association was formed in 1866, when Lord Lawrence was Viceroy, as set out in Article I. of the Rules. This Article reads as follows:

The East India Association is instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally.

It will no doubt be agreed that this definition covers an all-embracing field, and, looking back on the proceedings of the past seventy-five years, it would appear that the intentions of the founders have been fully carried out. Every aspect of Indian life has, at various times, received the meticulous attention of our Association. We have always been advocates of sound reforms, and have usually been well ahead of contemporary public opinion on such matters. It is in no way an exaggeration to say that the Association has taken a leading part in all the multitude of controversies concerning the social, political, and industrial progress of India.

A few instances of the subjects that were discussed in the early days of

our existence may be of interest; for it is probable that the advanced views then put forward will be surprising to this generation. It is doubtful if many members realize that so long ago as 1867 a paper was read by Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee with the modern-sounding title of "Representative and Responsible Government for India." This paper, as might have been expected, produced an animated and vigorous debate; but the discussion was also notable for the very generally expressed view that one of the main aims of the British Administration should be to prepare the ground for Indian self-government on liberal lines. This was surely a subject on which the ideas of many of the members present were in advance of the public opinion of the time.

Famine relief seems to have been a perennial topic of these early meetings, and there can be little doubt that the deliberations on this subject, attended as they were by the foremost men of the period, acted as a spur to a somewhat supine and lethargic Government. That famous engineer, Sir Arthur Cotton, read papers dealing with this matter in 1867 and 1868. He was a man of great ability, with a considerable gift of caustic speech. And in one of the discussions, when complaining of the red tape and lengthy minuting which in his opinion was delaying the construction of reservoirs, he was moved to coin the telling phrase, "If India could have been irrigated with ink, the famines would have been stopped long ago."

It should be added that, owing to his eccentric business habits, Sir Arthur was not a particular favourite of the Madras Government of that era. But I was delighted to be able to make amends for any troubles he may have experienced when, in 1936, I had the honour of unveiling at Dowlaiswaram, on the banks of the Godavari River and looking out over the rich rice-fields his genius had brought into being, a statue to him that had been subscribed for by the public in recognition of his outstanding services to the district.

However, I do not conceive it as part of my duty to epitomize all the discussions of the Association. Such a course would certainly weary all those who are here today, and fail absolutely to present any coherent picture of the progress of India during the past seven decades. Suffice it to say that all the many and important problems which arose during the period were minutely dissected at our meetings, and we may be sure that public opinion both in England and India has been moulded and activated in no small degree by our proceedings. Indeed, the Association may well be proud of the part it has taken in lighting up the Indian scene and in helping to sweep away that colossal ignorance of India that was for so long prevalent amongst such large numbers of all classes in this country, and which, even today, has not been entirely dispelled.

THEN AND NOW

Vast indeed are the changes that have taken place in all aspects of Indian life since the East India Association was founded. Let us examine the course of events.

In 1866 the sub-continent had just recovered from the effects of the mutiny of the Bengal Army; the Crown had lately taken over the Govern-

ment from the hands of the East India Company; the last of the internal wars had been fought, and under a unified control, achieved for the first time in history, the stage was set for a general advance to better things. It is not only in matters political that India has been transformed since that date. Possibly this aspect of affairs is the least worthy of notice, though it is the main theme of most publications. Many observers will be of the opinion that the improvement in the condition of the people is of greater importance.

At the time when our Association was formed communications were primitive. Only about one thousand miles of railway had been completed, compared with more than forty thousand today; while even such roads as there were often became impassable. There was little traffic between district and district, dacoits infested the highways, disease was rampant, famines were frequent, and education for the great mass of the people totally lacking.

The country was wholly agricultural, and its great mineral wealth was still lying almost unsuspected beneath the soil. As a field for human endeavour the sub-continent offered a prospect unparalleled in history. Nobly have many devoted men, both British and Indian, laboured in that field, nor have their efforts been without reward.

The progress of medical science has been astonishing. Plague, cholera, and smallpox have had their worst terrors removed, while malaria, that exterminator of ancient civilizations, can now often be eradicated if enough money is spent on preventative measures. But let it not be forgotten that in 1866 the causes of most of these diseases were quite unknown. It was not till 1906 that officers of the Indian Medical Service found that plague was transmitted through the agency of the rat flea, and the name of Sir Ronald Ross will ever be revered for his discovery that the anopheles mosquito was the carrier of malaria.

Hospital facilities are today available on a scale undreamt of seventy-five years ago, though even now much remains to be done in this respect; nor would anyone pretend that the public health services are perfect. The fears of an intensely conservative population in regard to inoculation and vaccination have largely disappeared, with the result that there has been a very considerable diminution in the rate of mortality.

FAMINE PREVENTION

But it is in the conquest of famine that the most spectacular advance has been made. At the commencement of the period of which we are speaking some of the most terrible famines in the history of India occurred. Being dependent for its rainfall on the monsoon, India is always in danger of a bad harvest, for if the rains fail, as they so often do, great tracts of country produce no food.

Luckily, it is rare for the monsoon to fail everywhere in the same season, and the improvement in communications now enables the surpluses of the prosperous Provinces to be brought to the aid of those that are destitute.

The great irrigation schemes that have been undertaken have also removed all fears of scarcity from many populous river areas, while from

across the sea thousands of tons of cereals can be carried in ships and distributed among the needy. Every Province has its famine relief fund, and it has become an obligation of the Government to see that the people do not starve. It will be agreed that there is now very little loss of human life in famine years, but unfortunately it remains impossible to prevent the destruction of large numbers of domestic animals, and the loss of their flocks and herds still inflicts severe hardships on the population.

It would no doubt be fitting to look a little more closely into the irrigation schemes of the past seventy-five years, for their ameliorative influence has been of the very first order. It is not generally realized that the area under irrigation is far larger in India than in any other country in the world. If tanks and wells be included, no less than fifty million acres of Indian soil receive water from artificial sources; the next biggest acreage being the twenty millions in the United States of America.

I feel emboldened to claim that in this subject the Madras Presidency has led the way. The lower reaches of the Cauvery have been irrigated since the dawn of history, and Tippoo Sahib of Mysore, some sixty years before our period begins, had himself laid plans for a reservoir on the same river near Seringapatam; a conception that was actually brought to fruition in the time of the late saintly Maharaja, who was for many years a Vice-President of our Association.

Since 1866 great strides in the provision of waterworks have been made all over South India. In Tanjore, at the mouth of the Cauvery, the ancient anicuts have been extended. The magnificent Metur Dam in the Salem district forms a lake nearly forty miles in length. The Periyar project on the Travancore border has long been completed, and many other schemes are now in hand. The Kistna Delta has received attention, and even Sir Arthur Cotton's famous enterprise on the Godavari has been enlarged.

Aided by the establishment of a settled and unified Government, the genius of man has brought the abundant rainfall of the Western Ghats to spread prosperity in the arid plains of the Coromandel.

Another benefit has resulted from the damming up of the waters. Cheap electricity has proved a blessing to South India. The turbines at Metur and at the Pykara Falls in the Nilgiri Hills now supply power to factories in Coimbatore and the surrounding districts, while the modern advantage of electric light is to be found in a growing number of villages in the Tamil country. This is a development that would have astonished our great-grandfathers; it has transformed the countryside and enabled flourishing industries to take root far away from any coalfield.

Moreover, the use of dams for the production of electricity has eased the difficulties of finance. No longer need we depend solely on the added produce of the soil to pay for the supply of perennial waters. Revenue can be obtained from the sale of electricity. This fresh source of profit will in future enable many otherwise uneconomic schemes to be undertaken, not as mere famine relief works, but as remunerative investments for the State.

It may be thought that I have dwelt unduly on the position of the Madras Presidency. But my excuse must be that the works I have men-

tioned are all personally familiar to me. It is, of course, not only in the South that great schemes have been launched. It is only necessary to mention the Sukkur Barrage and the Ganges Canal Systems to demonstrate that the North has been in no way behindhand in the initiation of these enterprises. It has been well said that the true benefactors of the human race are those who can make two blades of grass grow where only one grew before; and India owes to her engineers a debt of gratitude that is beyond repayment.

EDUCATION

In the field of education much progress has been made. Elementary education for the masses, almost non-existent seventy-five years ago, has become really widespread. Practically every Province has its university, the larger Provinces having several. The standards of these institutions are high, comparing favourably with their counterparts in Great Britain.

There are some who hold that too much money is spent on universities. It is said that one of the most difficult problems of modern India has been caused by the creation of a class of educated unemployed, and it is certainly true that, up to the outbreak of the war, a large proportion of those who took their degrees found difficulty in obtaining posts that they considered suited to their scholastic attainments. It cannot be denied that of late years the number of unemployed graduates has increased considerably.

But India is changing. From a mainly agricultural country it is fast becoming industrialized, and as this process continues there will arise a growing demand for men who have had the advantage of a university education. The war is likely to accelerate this tendency, for India has, to a large extent, been thrown upon her own resources for the provision of supplies and munitions of all kinds. As a result a great expansion of industry is taking place. It is to be hoped, therefore, that a solution of this problem is in sight.

INDIANIZATION

Ever since the Crown took over the Government from the East India Company, one of the chief demands put forward by reformers has been that more Indians should be employed in the higher posts in the public services and in the Army.

At the date when our Association was formed the members of the Indian Civil Service were, with a minute number of exceptions, all British; the judiciary in its upper ranks was staffed almost exclusively by Europeans; nor was it possible for an Indian to obtain a King's commission.

All this has now been altered. Since 1925 over half the recruits appointed to the I.C.S. have been Indians, while British-born subjects of the King-Emperor no longer form a majority even amongst the judges of the highest courts in the land. In fact, all the administrative bodies in the sub-continent, including the Viceroy's Executive Council, are now very largely in the hands of Indians themselves.

As regards the Army, King's commissions have been granted to Indians for the last two decades, and an Indian Sandhurst is flourishing at Dehra Dun. Since the outbreak of the war other centres for training

Indians for commissions have been formed, and recently an Indian officer has been appointed to the command of a battalion in the field. The immense expansion of the Armed Forces is bound to result in a great increase in the number and status of Indian officers; while the brilliant fighting qualities displayed by all ranks of the Indian Army, in whatever theatre of hostilities they have been engaged, have shown the world that there are no better soldiers in existence than those who come from the ancient land of Hindustan.

A considerable improvement is to be noted in the position of women in the body politic, and an enormous advance has been made in the field of their education. On questions of public health and on all matters connected with the welfare of their sisters, female social workers and politicians are most active. Moreover, their views are now heard with attention and respect. This is not to say that much change is as yet to be observed in the average village, but in the Presidency towns and other large cities real progress has lately occurred, and with the march of time the example set in the bigger centres of population will surely spread throughout the length and breadth of India.

AGRARIAN QUESTIONS

No sketch of the history of the past seventy-five years would be even approximately complete without some mention of the situation in regard to land tenure. No doubt the Permanent Settlement introduced by Lord Cornwallis into Bengal and portions of Madras was a notable betterment of the then existing position. At that time it was essential to engender a feeling of security amongst the landholders, as the wars and exactions of the preceding period had resulted in a general lack of confidence. But many now consider that the men who formulated that policy were mistaken as to the legal position. They appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the English system of land-ownership was also indigenous to India, and there is little doubt but that the class which may for convenience be called the tenantry was then deprived of certain of its former rights. Later legislation has therefore tended towards the provision of greater security of tenure for the actual cultivators of the soil, and it is broadly true to say that no ryot can now be evicted from his holding so long as he continues to pay the land revenue.

The age-old question of rural indebtedness has also received consideration, and the setting up of agricultural co-operative societies and banks has been fostered by the various Governments. Legislation preventing the alienation of land to non-cultivating castes has also been passed in some Provinces.

LAW AND ORDER

The achievements of the police should not be lost sight of, for it must be confessed that in the middle years of the nineteenth century internal conditions in India were of a disturbed character. Dacoity was an everyday incident and murder a commonplace event. Transport of any importance was always accompanied by an armed guard, and well within living memory all traffic using the roads at night had, in many districts,

to proceed in convoy under an escort of constables. But difficulties that must at times have seemed almost insuperable were gradually overcome, and today those who have occasion to pass along the highways can do so in safety, without fear of being molested and robbed. The maintenance of law and order is a necessary basis of all civil progress, and in the successful performance of their strenuous and often dangerous duties the Indian police have made no mean contribution to the advancement of the country.

But the very peace and security enjoyed under the protection of the British Crown has brought a fresh problem in its train. The consequence of the improvement in public health and the cessation of internal war has been a vast increase in the number of the population. According to the last census, no less than 388 million people now inhabit India.

From this cause, and from the operation of the Hindu laws concerning the descent of property, holdings are being split up until they become too small to be economic. The extension of irrigation will no doubt provide more cultivatable land, and it may well be that the growth of industry and commerce will enable a portion of the surplus population to be absorbed in other occupations than agriculture; but it will be clear that the astonishing and continuous multiplication of the people presents a problem for which no real solution has as yet been found.

THE INDIAN STATES

This survey would be incomplete without mention of the remarkable progress that has been attained by the leading Indian States; though it should be remembered that their inhabitants are not British subjects and that the Rulers are quite independent of the Government of India as regards the internal affairs of their territories. In many cases their Administrations now compare favourably with those of the Provinces of British India, and the welfare of their peoples has become the chief concern of the most noted of the Princes. The immense efforts being made by the Indian States to further the victory of the United Nations in the present world conflict are beyond all praise. As always in times of trouble, the devotion and loyalty of the Princes of India for the King-Emperor shines like a beacon through the gloom of war.

POLITICAL ADVANCES

Having set out shortly, and I fear quite inadequately, some of the more obvious directions in which the social conditions of India have improved since 1866, let me dwell for a few moments on the political and administrative developments that have taken place.

At the commencement of the Association's career the Government of India was autocratic, and its untrammelled power extended throughout British India. The Administrations of the Presidencies and Provinces were completely subordinated to its sway, nor could they, technically, spend a pie without the sanction of the supreme Government. All the revenues of British India went directly into the coffers of the central treasury and were then doled out again to the Provinces without much

regard for their individual needs, as the most aggressive and influential of the local Governments were always able to extract a greater share of the contents of the common pool than were their less persistent brethren.

It soon became plain that this excessive centralization was a hopelessly unwieldy method of dealing with a country the size of Europe without Russia. Therefore in 1870 Lord Mayo took the first step towards a redistribution of powers. In that year the administration of many departments was transferred to the local Governments. Fixed annual grants were given them, and at the same time they were permitted to raise minor local taxes. This system, in its essentials, remained unchanged till the advent of the Reforms of 1921.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century there arose amongst the leaders of Indian thought an ardent and understandable desire to take more part in the government of their own country. The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885, and, though it was then in no way hostile to the Raj, its avowed object was to achieve political reform. In fact, as the years went by a greater urge towards self-government was felt by an increasing number of Indians.

Slowly at first, and perhaps rather uncertainly, the Imperial authorities responded to the novel conditions. A first advance was made in 1892. The Morley-Minto Reforms saw the light in 1909, and they were followed some twelve years later by the Constitution that took its name from Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu. Finally, the Government of India Act of 1935 was piloted through the House of Commons by Sir Samuel Hoare.

This is the instrument under which India is administered today, though the Federal Constitution which it envisaged never came into being, and the operation of autonomy in certain Provinces has had to be suspended for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter here.

But a glance at the provisions of the Act will show how marked was the political advance on which it set the seal. The Provinces, no longer in any way subordinate to the Central Government as regards their own affairs, became self-governing units in an All-India Federation; Cabinets responsible to elected Legislatures were set up; the franchise was placed on a wide basis, and in truth the electors obtained control of their own destiny.

THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

Whether the British type of Parliamentary democracy is the best form of Government for India need not be argued here, for the form of the future Constitution has now, by the Amery-Cripps proposals, been made an Indian responsibility.

But doubts have been expressed as to whether a country where caste is so strong a principle, and in which so many cultural and religious differences exist, is a suitable field for this particular system, however well it may work in Anglo-Saxon and other allied communities. Nevertheless, since the day when Lord Macaulay penned his famous minute the spread of English education has made the adoption of British institutions seem natural and even inevitable to Indian statesmen. At any rate, we in these islands may feel proud that our methods of government have commended

themselves to the acute minds of the leaders of so old and celebrated a civilization.

My task is ended. But the story of the progress of India in the years between 1866 and the present day might well fill many volumes; it is not easily compressed into one short paper.

Let me conclude by expressing the hope that the partnership of England and India may long continue, to the mutual benefit of both countries, and by wishing every happiness and prosperity to that fascinating land, for which those of us who have had the honour of serving her will ever retain an abiding affection. .

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING to celebrate the completion of the seventy-fifth year of the Association's existence was held at the Royal Society's Rooms, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W. 1, on Wednesday, September 30, 1942. Lord Erskine, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., read a paper entitled "1866-1942: India Then and Now." Sir Atul Chatterjee, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., presided.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said that the meeting was a great occasion in the history of the Association, and members could congratulate themselves that Lord Erskine had agreed to address the Association on its achievements during its long life and on the progress which had taken place in India in different directions during this period.

Lord Erskine then read his paper.

The CHAIRMAN said that Lord Erskine had compressed into a bold outline all the salient features of the changes which had taken place in India during the last seventy-five years. He did not think that the task could have been better done by anyone. He personally had no observations to make in regard to the contents of the address except that he wished to pick a bone with Lord Erskine when he said that in irrigation Madras had led the way. There was a record of a dam having been built for a reservoir for water in Western India in the time of Asoka before the dawn of the Christian era, and that reservoir held good for 400 years, was repaired and lasted for another 300 years, and was then repaired and put into use again in the Gupta period. Further, there were in Northern India canals built for irrigation purposes in the Muslim period, and, although Madras had done wonderfully well, he thought the claims of Northern and Western India should also be recognized.

He would like to read a letter which the Hon. Secretary had received from the Rev. Herbert Anderson, who was for many years associated with Christian missionary work in India and particularly with work in the villages, regretting his inability to attend. He wrote:

"Yes, you say correctly, there will be few in the audience with my experience—birth in India in 1864, two years before the Association was founded; a journey to England in 1869 by sailing vessel, taking six months; a voyage to India in 1886 by a B. and I. steamer, taking six weeks; and in 1937 a delightful aeroplane experience, Croydon to Calcutta in six days. Now I await the thrill of a journey there in six hours! Why not?

"Had I been able to speak, my theme would have been the Indian villager—how vast his change in life and outlook, in self-respect, in service for others, and under Mahatma Gandhi's widespread religious and political influence, his love for his Motherland, and in a determination that he and his fellow-villagers shall not be

despised or overlooked in any future condition of political independence the war may bring. I should like, too, to have touched on another theme, which in the community struggle and storm of today is not noted. A living, united and free national life for India can be based hopefully only on ethical and spiritual foundations accepted and shared by the majority of the peoples concerned. We have to start making such a basis out of the great faiths of India—Hindu, Islam, and Christian. India, as Raja Ram Mohan Roy said, is incurably religious, and politicians who despise or neglect India's religious mentality are building on sand.

"I return Lord Erskine's most valuable paper. The Indian villager knows the truth, more surely than the University product, of what he emphasizes. India's debt to Britain is a Kohinoor of material treasure.

"May I add mine to the gratitude that will be expressed to you personally for your aid in helping India and Britain to know and love one another."

The CHAIRMAN continued: A great change had taken place in the face of India in the last seventy-five years. He remembered the thrill he had as a small boy of seven or eight when he first visited Calcutta; but the Calcutta of those days was very different from the Calcutta of today. The same might be said of Bombay, which he first visited fifty years ago, and of all the other great cities and towns of India. This immense change had been mainly brought about by the development of industries. Thirty-three years ago he had the honour of reading a paper before the Association on the need and methods of industrial development in India. Now the many changes which Lord Erskine had described had come about.

This development had brought new problems connected with labour regulations and the housing of labour; there was a growing conflict between urban and rural interests, and there were many problems to solve which did not exist when the Association was founded, and it was to the credit of the Association that it was continuing to deal with such problems as they arose.

With regard to the social changes, marriage customs had been very considerably modified, and the position of women had changed a great deal more than Lord Erskine had mentioned, at least in Northern India, where, in the speaker's view, it had been completely revolutionized. Then there had been important changes in education. Finally, there was a new spirit amongst the men and women who were described under the heading of "depressed classes." He did not think they would remain depressed any longer because they realized themselves that they had their own human rights and also their human duties.

Another aspect was the immense development which had taken place in the modern Indian languages. In 1866 most of these languages were in swaddling clothes; there was a good deal of poetry, but prose literature (which was started in Bengal and Northern India by the efforts of Gilchrist and William Carey in the very beginning of the nineteenth century) was still in the early stages, and certainly nothing like what it was today. This wonderful development could certainly be ascribed to the cultural connection between Britain and India.

Cognizance must also be taken of the changes in the last seventy-five years in the Indian attitude towards European or Western civilization and institutions. In 1866 there were two different strains in India in this respect. There were the men and the very few women who had imbibed Western education; according to them everything Western was good and should at once be adopted in India. There was, however, the other section of the population which did not like Western ideas and were opposed to the adoption of anything Western. Now there was a synthesis of the two, and it was realized that the two civilizations each had its own good qualities and that Indians should assimilate whatever good there was in Western institutions and in Western science for the improvement of India and her people without abandoning the essentials of their own civilization. It would be recognized from Lord Erskine's excellent paper that vast changes had taken place in India in this period, and these changes were now progressing at a much more rapid rate than at the beginning of the period.

For a long time Dr. John Pollen was the Honorary Secretary of the Association, and kept it going by personal endeavour and attention for many years. His daughter, Lady Craw, would have liked to have been present and spoken at the meeting, but had been prevented from coming. Dr. Pollen came from the Western part of India and belonged to the Chairman's own service.

Sir AZIZUL HUQUE (High Commissioner for India) was very grateful to Lord Erskine for his résumé of the work of the Association and for associating with it a picture of Indian life over the last seventy-five years. While they looked back with gratitude for all that had been done, they looked forward to the next seventy-five years, and probably more, in solving the problems which were coming and to the creation of a bond of understanding between England and India for which the seventy-five years just gone had laid the foundation. He believed that the task of the Association would be to discover ways and means of solving these problems and how to keep an understanding alive.

Lord Erskine had said that at the beginning of the period communications were primitive and that there was a lack of inter-district communication. This might be true of Madras, but it was not true of his own Province and a large part of Northern India, for it was well known that from the time of Sher Shah there had been broad trunk roads from north to south and east to west. Long before the present day a great religious reformer began his journey in Bengal and traversed the whole of India, and went to the south and the furthest west of India.

While he realized—and he particularly emphasized that fact—the great work which had been done in the past, he also realized the great responsibility which had been thrown upon India, and he looked forward to the day when the face of the millions of villages of India would be changed. It was the village background, the man behind the plough, who had to be looked after. He was perfectly certain that in that task the East India Association would play a great part as the repository of knowledge and experience of men who had seen and served his country, and it would be the medium through which would pass the thought of this country and of India.

Sir JOHN HUBBACK (late Governor of Orissa) wished to add his tribute to not only the matter of Lord Erskine's paper, but especially to the miracle of compression which he had performed. He had put forward the view, very rightly, that it was one of the functions of the Association to dispel the colossal ignorance of the people of Britain in regard to India, and he would add to the word "ignorance" the word "indifference." After the war we in England should know a great deal more than we did of the United States of America and of Russia and China, and whatever might be the future of India after the war, those who had not had the opportunities of learning about India should endeavour to do so.

Lord Erskine had laid particular emphasis on the work done by doctors and engineers. He had dwelt on the enormous part played by engineers in laying the spectre of famine. The date at which the paper commenced immediately brought to his own mind what was probably the worst famine in a great many ways that India had known, at any rate during the time of the British rule—that in the Province of Orissa, which was still remembered. Lord Erskine's remarks regarding supine and lethargic governments did unfortunately apply to the people who were responsible for mitigating the troubles of that famine, but he (the speaker) thought the lesson had been learnt. In 1918 there was a failure of the monsoon almost widespread over the whole of India. Early in the following year, 1919, like the Chairman, he was then Revenue Secretary to a Government, and had had very little experience of famines, and, like the Chairman, he had prepared for something on the scale of the previously known famines. But when it came to the point (he was concerned with Bihar and Orissa) there was nothing approaching the trouble which was anticipated. This was largely due to the work of the engineers in the previous thirty or forty years.

With regard to the work of the doctors, forty years ago people had no approach to medical science except in the headquarters of districts and to some extent in the headquarters of the sub-divisions. Some twenty or thirty years later there was not merely a medical institution every fifty miles, but one every ten miles, a reasonably good dispensary, while the hospitals had improved out of all knowledge. He remembered inspecting a dispensary of this class, and the doctor told him that the out-patients asked, whatever their disease, for "needle" medicine, so that any idea that injections were things to be frightened of had even then broken down. The doctors had done wonderful work.

Lord Erskine and the Chairman had both laid emphasis, very rightly, on the

industrialization of India. This was a process going on rapidly and was certainly to be welcomed, but he hoped, as an old revenue officer, that in the future it would be realized that the chief industry of India was agriculture and was likely to remain so for many years to come.

In conclusion, Sir John echoed the lecturer's good wishes for India, but he trusted that, unlike the last twenty years, in the next twenty years after that the best brains in India would no longer be required to concentrate very largely on constitutional matters, but would be available for the social and economic advancement of India.

SIR PHILIP HARTOG noted that Lord Erskine had stressed the importance of the Indian universities. He (the speaker) saw recently a statement by an Indian politician that every university was "a power-house of politics." It was sometimes said that the British policy had been to keep down Indians, but if that had been the aim the universities would never have been created, because the teaching in the universities and the schools made every educated Indian acquainted with Burke's speeches on the American revolution and the writings of men like John Stuart Mill. This showed that the real aim, of which Sir Thomas Munro spoke, and of which Macaulay spoke before he went to India, was that India should be educated for her own self-government, and this aim was always in the mind of the great British administrators.

One of the great difficulties in primary education in India was that it had been thought that primary education was not needed by the peasant, and that was a view which was held by the peasants themselves. In a recent book on Russia it was stated that the great stimulus to literacy in that country, apart from the Government action, had been the creation of enormous industrial and engineering schemes and the need for educated artisans, who received a higher wage than uneducated persons. It was a mistake to suppose that everyone in Russia was paid the same wage. There was no doubt that the progress of industry in India would mean a stimulus to education, but he also bore in mind what was said in the remarkable Linlithgow Report, in which Sir Frank Noyce had taken so prominent a part—that the future of Indian agriculture depended largely on the progress of education. If it was desired that two blades of grass should grow where one grew at present, the Indian peasant would have to be taught better methods.

In conclusion, Sir Philip said that in his surveys of this subject he had formed the opinion that England had nothing to be ashamed of in what she had done for Indian education.

MR. YUSUF ALI wished to pay his tribute to the quality of the paper which had been read and also to the importance of the subject. When it was remembered that at the present time India was almost silent as far as we in this country were concerned, and when it was further remembered that there had never been a time when India was more alive and more anxious to understand the world and to make her contribution to the progress of the world, it would be seen how important it was that these subjects should be discussed by people of knowledge and of discretion. He believed that in the near future, whether after the war or even during the war, the impulse of events would create conditions for progress in the mental outlook of India. He saw it here amongst the few Indian students in this country, and he got glimpses of it in his correspondence from India, which, unfortunately, got less and less on account of war conditions; he saw at every point in Indian life that there was a question, a desire to look to the basis of things and a determination to thrash out for India a policy which would make her stand boldly forward as one of the great countries on which the future of the whole world depended. That spirit should be fostered and guided as far as possible, and materials should be placed before the Indian people so that they might evolve for themselves a policy of progress and of understanding with the rest of the world.

Professor H. H. DODWELL said that the paper and discussion left him little to add, but there was one point he would like to mention—the question of social reform. This was peculiarly important because so far as could be seen it was intimately linked up with the political form which India would in future assume. If the regions within which representative institutions had prospered were considered it would be

found that they had only prospered where society was in a peculiarly fluid form. They prospered in this country where it was possible for any man to pass throughout the whole succession of classes, and that was true, not merely today, but true in the nineteenth century and true in the eighteenth to a limited degree, and true in the sixteenth and seventeenth when there was a succession of nobles habitually taking to trade as a regular natural part of their occupation. It was found in the United States, where there was an even greater fluidity of society than we possessed, and in the Scandinavian countries; but where there was a socially rigid system the most admirable institutions in the world might be introduced but they would not flourish; they did not flourish in countries such as Italy, Spain, France or Germany, and in none of them did they take root properly, mainly, as he believed, because of the rigidity of the social system.

It seemed to the speaker that there was a most intimate vital connection between the fluidity of society and the question of whether representative institutions would or would not work, so that the question of social reform in India was one of abnormal importance for the future of the country.

There was one other remark he wished to make, and that was that in the many years during which he had studied the history of India it had become more and more evident that modern India had been built up by the co-operation of the two peoples, and that co-operation was the real keynote on which modern India was based and had been built up—just that spirit which formed the basis of the Association.

Bishop EYRE CHATTERTON wished the facts such as those contained in Lord Erskine's paper could be brought home to the bulk of the people in England, because he found that they were utterly ignorant of India, and inclined to be indifferent. He remembered the shock he had when he read that Mahatma Gandhi had told a body of religious leaders in London that the worst day that ever dawned for India was when the British went there. Thinking over that statement, he remembered over fifty years earlier hearing a very distinguished Indian lecturer, who wrote a book entitled *The Oriental Christ*, say that the very best day that ever dawned for India was the day that the British landed. He would like to have that brought home, not only to the people here, but to the Indian people who did not know what had been done for their benefit.

In 1930 the Church of England in India ceased to be the Church of England in India and became the Church of India, Burma and Ceylon. He did not know how many realized how strange was the history of the Church of England in India. It was in the year of the Battle of Waterloo that after a tremendous amount of difficulty India received its first English bishop and saw the beginning of a new era. Bishop Middleton was disappointed by his reception; the creation of the see had been brought about largely by a three-hour speech in the House of Commons by Wilberforce. He had an enormous task to fulfil with only a handful of chaplains, the total number of Christians in India at that time being calculated at about 700,000, mostly Roman Catholics. Today the Church of India, Burma and Ceylon had sixteen bishops, over one million members, and the total number of Christians in India was over seven million, so that there was a tremendous contrast between then and now.

People in England and America were prepared to think that the British in India had done very little good, and it should be brought home to them what India was, what India is, and what all knew India would be.

Mr. K. KURIYAN said there were two points to which he wished to draw attention: one was education, mentioned by the Chairman and amplified by Sir Philip Hartog. A great deal of the education which was created in India was also due not only to the colleges but to the large number of private bodies who had laboured in the cause of education. The lecturer said that the educational institutions compared favourably with standards in this country; that statement would have been correct up to ten or fifteen years ago, but he had an uneasy feeling that there was a tendency for the standard to deteriorate.

The second point was that, due to the far-sighted wisdom of Mr. Montagu, India became a member of the League of Nations. At that time India was neither a self-governing state nor had she sovereign status; but she was admitted to the League, and

that was an event of great political importance—a point to which the lecturer had not referred. It was true that the League had failed and the tragedy of the present war was the measure of that failure. The deficiency in India's status was more than made up by the quality of the delegates who represented her in Geneva. The lecturer had mentioned some great names, and the speaker wished to mention a few: Lord Willingdon, Lord Lytton, the Aga Khan, and a galaxy of others; and no one spoke in her name with greater authority or was listened to with greater respect than the public servant and scholar who was occupying the chair that afternoon.

Lord ERSKINE, in reply, thanked the audience for the way in which his paper had been received. At one time he had thought they might be about to enter into a competition as to which Province started irrigation, but no doubt they could call it "quits" because it was true that some of the tanks in other parts of India were just as old as those in Madras!

It had been said that agriculture would remain the leading industry of India; he was sure it would, and he hoped that no administrator would think that India could be made into a lop-sided industrial country. It had always been astonishing to him that when students got a certain amount of education they almost always wished to leave the country and go into the towns. People who worked in factories must have food, and surely the greatest industry in the world must be that which provided food for the world's inhabitants. He hoped that in the India of the future some of the graduates would spend their lives in the country districts and help to elevate conditions in the villages, for although the towns had changed it would be agreed that many of the villages were still in the same rut. The villages must be altered; there must be improved sanitation and better education. He looked forward to the same advance being brought about in the villages as had occurred in the towns during the last seventy-five years.

Sir FREDERICK SYKES proposed a hearty vote of thanks to Lord Erskine and to the Chairman. They were very proud in the Association that so much had been done to help forward an understanding of what India was and is in this country. Much had been done, but much more was needed. It was important that we in London should do what we could to clarify various problems throughout the world. The Indian problem was at present one of the greatest of these, and we should make it our duty to try to educate opinion on the subject.

Lord Erskine had read an excellent paper and given a good lead. The speaker thought it would be very helpful if it could be broadcast both for home listeners and also in the United States of America, where it was also most important that the public should understand the Indian problem.

The lecturer had touched on a great variety of subjects, some of which had been taken up in the discussion. As the hour was late there were only two which he would like to mention. Lord Erskine had said that the village in Madras had not progressed as rapidly as he would have hoped, but the speaker thought that the village in the Bombay Presidency had progressed considerably. The rural life of India was a highly important factor, and the movement in the villages should be helped.

The second point where he would disagree was in what he had said about industrialization. To whatever extent industrialization increased in India it would have very little effect upon the great mass of the population, which was entirely supported by agriculture.

Education, sanitation, famine relief, engineering had all had rightful praise, but a service which had not been mentioned was the Indian Civil Service, both Indian and English. These men did very wonderful work, and deserved great support and credit. It was hoped that they would go forward in the new era with a realization of what had been done in the past would achieve from the foundation of that past an even greater future. That wish also applied to India as a whole. With practical understanding and good-will, the new era could be made to be greater than the old.

The vote of thanks was accorded by applause and the meeting adjourned for tea.

RECEPTION TO INDIA'S REPRESENTATIVES AT THE WAR CABINET

A RECEPTION was given by the Association on Friday, October 9, 1942, at the Imperial Institute, South Kensington, to meet Colonel H.H. the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., and the Hon. Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K.C.S.I., the representatives of India at the War Cabinet. Some 250 guests assembled. Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, president of the Association, was in the chair, and was accompanied on the platform by the Marchioness of Willingdon, Lady Sykes, Sir John Anderson, M.P. (Lord President of the Council), Mr. L. S. Amery, M.P. (Secretary of State for India) and Sir John Woodhead.

The PRESIDENT welcomed H.H. the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, who was accredited as representative of the Indian States to the War Cabinet, and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, who was accredited as representative of British India. He did not think there could be two more devoted representatives from India to keep the Government advised of feeling in India, of what was happening, and to give help in the conclusions to which they would come on this amazingly important problem of India. His Highness was a great soldier and statesman, and had a great knowledge of the Indian States in his capacity as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes; he was also the ruler of one of the great Indian States. Apart from all that, they would wish to welcome him as the nephew of his great uncle, "Ranji." He said "great uncle" in the sense that "Ranji" was a great man in this country. He was one of the first to welcome himself (Sir Frederick) when his appointment as Governor of Bombay was published many years ago.

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar had had some thirty years' experience in the service of India and of this country. He had served in many positions and now had come to the War Cabinet. They were delighted to see them both and were sure that they would be of the greatest assistance in giving sound advice regarding the Indian problem at this very critical juncture.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Mr. L. S. Amery) thought that very few words were required from him in addition to that which the Chairman had said in welcoming the two distinguished guests. Between them they represented the whole of what was essentially an inseparable India. The importance of the Indian States was, perhaps, not always fully realized in this country, where so much more was heard of the immediate political activities and disturbances of British India; but it was worth remembering that the States covered not only nearly one-quarter of the population of India, but not far from half of its whole area. The territories covered by the Indian States extended almost unbrokenly from His Highness's territory on the West coast to within a few miles of the Bay of Bengal, and, with only comparatively small gaps, from the extreme north of Kashmir to India's southernmost promontory. It was impossible

to conceive of India's railway system, aerial communications, and, indeed, her Customs system working effectively unless British India and Indian India co-operated. That co-operation was contained and harmonized by the fact that the same person represented the Crown in its relation to the Indian States as represented them in the person of the Governor-General of British India. In the future self-governing India that co-operation would have to be secured, like the Constitution itself, by free agreement; the harmony would have to be from within and not from without. His Highness had shown himself to be a keen professional soldier who, but for the call of his country, might be with his regiment, which had won undying renown on the battlefields of Libya. When fate took him away from his career as a soldier he threw himself with equal zeal, not only into the good administration of his own State, but also into the interests of the princely body, and it was as Chancellor of that body that he was in England in the War Cabinet.

Of Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar's career Mr. Amery would not say more than Sir Frederick had already said. He had had a long and honourable career in politics, administration and in the councils of Madras, his native Province. He had been present at many successive Round-Table Conferences and was a member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Council, and a vitally important member for the last three years of the Viceroy's Executive Council.

Between them they brought a vast volume of experience, knowledge and ability to bear, and no more fitting representatives could be found to watch over India's interests when discussed as part of the general strategy of the war by the War Cabinet, or to convey back to the Government of India and to the Crown representatives on behalf of the Princes the bearing of all that happened in the War Cabinet upon India's safety and upon her fortunes.

Colonel H.H. the MAHARAJA JAM SAHEB OF NAWANAGAR said that his main object in addressing the meeting was to say that there was not only a noisy India of which everybody had heard, but there was also an India which believed in co-operation, and which believed in doing its level best with the rest of the Empire to push this war to a final and successful conclusion. It had just been said that the greatest thing about his State and himself was the fact that he had succeeded a great statesman and a great sportsman, and he was trying to live up to that ideal. One could not play cricket alone; there had to be ten other members of the team, no matter how much of a star one might be. The game could only be won by co-operation, and it was in that spirit that he appealed to his hearers to play the greatest game of life and to beat the most tyrannical and most powerful enemy the world had ever known. If they would join him he could assure them that they would do their best, not only for Indian India, but for British India. It could only be accomplished by team-work, and he had been taught team-work by "Ranji," his predecessor.

What the Secretary of State had said was perfectly true. He would rather be in the Libyan desert with the Rajputana Rifles than in the most beautiful and luxurious hotel in the world's greatest city, but he was doing the next best thing in serving his King-Emperor from behind the lines.

The men in khaki showed that India was sound at heart, and that India would never let the King-Emperor down; they must stick to that India which would see them through.

His Highness said that he would not talk about politics because, first and foremost, he was not a politician; but he would say this, that in spite of whatever people might have said in India, the first desire there was to win this war. Then whatever little squabble there might be should be amongst themselves. There were quarrels in families, but they did not bring in outsiders, and he was present to say that they did not want outsiders; let them finish with the "little yellow Japanese" and with the Hun first, and then their little quarrel amongst themselves—and let the better man win that too!

Sir Frederick Sykes was Governor of Bombay when he himself was very young, and it was difficult for him to speak in front of Sir Frederick and such men as the Secretary of State and so distinguished a Governor in India as Sir John Anderson. The Secretary of State evaded making a speech by saying, "There is nothing more for me to say," but he would like to remind him that he must speak of India in future. They were a holy trinity, and there could not be a holy trinity of two; Mr. Amery was the middle figure which divided Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar and himself, but he also united them, and in future he should not be allowed to get away without making a speech. He made a very good one in the House of Commons the day before. In him His Highness found one in whom the ideal was to serve. It was common to speak of the Commonwealth of the British Nations, but he would prefer to say, "Serve our Empire," because allegiance was to the Emperor, therefore it must be an Empire, and as far as he was concerned "Empire" it should be.

In conclusion, His Highness begged his audience to remember that there was a good India which far exceeded the noisy India; the quiet India, the loyal India, the co-operating India was nineteen-twentieths of the whole of India. He was not speaking as a Hindu, a Muslim or as a Christian; he was speaking as an Indian, which contained all. "God bless you, and co-operate with us to the best of your ability."

The Hon. Sir A. RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR said that this was not the first occasion on which the East India Association had done him the honour of inviting him to be a principal guest at a party, and his pleasure was all the greater in responding to this warm welcome.

Much had been heard of British India which was thought to require explanation. He had had an opportunity of viewing the situation from the inside, and he could emphasize what His Highness had said that, whereas there was some trouble—which no one could deny—the best section of the population was determined on one thing, that the war should be won. Intellectualists, the common people, politicians and those who followed more honourable professions were equally assured that if the war went against the United Nations all the hopes and aspirations for a free and united India, and an India to rank in equality with the British Commonwealth of Nations, would turn to dust and ashes, and they need not dream of anything but abject slavery at the hands of the foe. That had sunk into the mind of every Indian, and he was present to reiterate

that, if there was a belief that there was any large majority of the Indian people who were prone to the Axis, it was a profound mistake. Many people thought that owing to what had happened in Malaya, Burma and the Far East there might be a chance of the people becoming sympathizers of the Axis; but apart from the fact that the foundation of that was wrong and had been contradicted by the statesmen of his country, and apart from the fact that there was no excessive fifth column activity in those parts of the Empire occupied by the Japanese, there was not the slightest likelihood of such a contingency arising. There were very few people in India who had any sympathy for the Axis Powers.

In illustration of this point Sir Ramaswami spoke of a reception which he attended just before leaving India, arranged by the student community of Madras, with whom he was in the closest touch, and an invitation to speak to whom he never refused. Over 1,000 students were gathered together, and he told them that he was going on behalf of the Government of India as a representative of that Government, freely chosen by the members, to the British War Cabinet, and the message he should convey, not only from the Government, but from the students, was that there was no one in the country, young or old, who was not keenly desirous to see that the Allies won the war. He said, further, that they heard a good deal of political controversies, discussions on the future of their country, and the immediate present of their country, but whatever these discussions might be and whatever these controversies might be, he would tell England that there had not been any slackening of the war effort, that thousands and thousands were pouring into the army and navy, and there were more applications than could be absorbed, having regard to the limitations of munitions, training and other factors which had to be taken into account. The old differences and limitations which were supposed to exist between martial and non-martial classes had been wiped out during the war, and today Madras was second only to the Punjab in the numbers which had joined the ranks of the army.

In view of the fact that he was addressing an intellectual section of the community, he said, further, that this recruitment of the army was not merely from the ordinary peasant class, who were recruited as sepoys, but that hundreds of young men were applying for commissions from the middle classes, young educated men, which was a revolution. Further, he told the students that the position in the federation of nations which they wished to possess at the end of the war would be assured, not by the politicians, but by the young men who were joining the army, applying for commissions, joining to fight for their country and to establish the freedom of their country. This statement was cheered to the echo. Today men were coming forward from all sections of the community and from all sections of the Province to join the fighting forces. There were troubles, there was no use blinding their eyes to that fact, but there was also no use in over-painting the black side of the picture, or to think only of one aspect of the Indian question, because there were many aspects to view, and there were other vistas and aspects of the Indian problem which he and his colleague had to emphasize.

Sir Ramaswami hoped to place before such audiences as he might meet,

and before the Secretary of State and other statesmen of this country, what he believed the reasonable section of his countrymen desired at the present time. Everyone was talking of ending the deadlock, of reopening negotiations, of finding solutions. The desire for such solutions was honourable, but there was no use in ignoring the realities of the situation, of being over-sentimental. These two extremes of masterly inactivity and sentimental precipitancy must be avoided; both were dangerous to the progress of his country, and both were dangerous to the war in which we were now engaged; and if any step could be made, avoiding extremes, and if he could be of any help either in the War Cabinet or outside, he felt his task would be done.

He could not say much about the War Cabinet for obvious reasons, but he could say this: it had been one of the greatest of privileges which had been extended to them to watch the Prime Minister at work, to watch other members from the Dominions at work, and he would like this to be known and conveyed to his country if possible: that no secrets had been kept from the Indian members of the Cabinet, and they had been treated as equals. Whatever their weight might be in the Cabinet, it was a personal matter, but no difference had been made between English and Indian members of the Cabinet.

He would place his ideas of the solution of the present problems before the Secretary of State. He did not wish to say anything about that, but generally it was that there could be no great solution which would work a miracle, nor a charm which could "transmogrify" the situation. The problem was too difficult for that kind of solution; it might solve one problem and create ten others even more dangerous, but, apart from that miracle, there might be certain ways and means by which the situation could be improved.

The speaker believed, and his political philosophy had been based on the fact, that perhaps the solution by stages was more desirable, more likely to be of permanent value and benefit to the country than any sudden solution. He had acted on that belief, and what he had told the Secretary of State was based on that. He was a believer in the words:

"Lead kindly light. . . . Lead thou me on. . . .
The night is dark, and I am far from home.
I do not wish to see the distant path;
One step enough for me.
Lead thou me on."

There was one step which he thought his countrymen could take at the present time, and if they worked in the spirit of that prayer they might be able—they would be able—to do a great deal to save the situation, and an even larger bulk of the population would be fully on their side. Most of them were and would continue to be, whatever happened.

With slight adjustments here and there during the war period, and with the promise after the war which the Secretary of State reiterated in his recent speech on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and which was capable of no qualification or misunderstanding, he felt that India and Great Britain would pull through this war with India fully co-operating in the victory for which they hoped and prayed.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (Sir John Anderson) said that after five years he had forgotten how to speak on Indian affairs, but he would never forget India. After the impressive speeches which had been delivered, there was very little for him to say, but this reflection did occur to him, that it was one of the outstanding characteristics of the East India Association that it brought together a large number of men and women who had devoted large portions of their lives for a long period of time to the affairs and the interests of that great country. This was a thought which must unite them all, looking as they did to the welfare of that country and its people, that it was inconceivable that India as they knew her, and in spite of the subtle influences at work and the ripples on the surface, would ever be overwhelmed by revolutionary forces.

The War Cabinet was happy to be collaborating with the Indian representatives, and he would join with them in expressing the confident hope that, when they had achieved what must be the immediate aim of overthrowing the tyranny of Hitlerism, they would be able to unite in finding the solution which we in this country were obliged to help to find for India's problem, and that a brighter day would dawn for that great country and for the whole world.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND CULTURE

BY LORD HAILEY

I DO not intend to deal with the attention given to Oriental tongues in the schools and colleges of India or in those parts of the East for which Great Britain has been responsible. I am not going to canvass again the merits of Macaulay's famous minute and of Bentinck's decision of 1835. I shall perhaps cause thereby some disappointment to those who find this so engaging a topic when debating Indian issues, and who are convinced in their own minds that India would be a happier place today if her politicians and her scientists had to confine themselves to Persian or to Sanskrit or, at all events, to some of the Indian vernaculars. But the task which I have set myself actually leads me in other directions. I am concerned, in short, not so much with what the Oriental peoples ought to know of the English language and literature as with what the English themselves ought to know of Oriental culture.

It might seem at first sight that, so far as India at all events is concerned, this matter is now ceasing to be one of great concern to us. I remember someone remarking—I think that it was the late Sir Denison Ross—how different might have been our attitude towards the problems of Arabia and the Mid-East if our English educationists had not been so obsessed with the value of the study of Latin and Greek in building up the character of British youth as to forget that Europe owed much also to Arabic culture and that Islam was still a force of some importance in the modern

world. One might perhaps also add a suggestion that it would have been of some advantage to our relations with India in the past if the Oriental languages had been allowed to invade some part of the position occupied by classical studies in our educational system, and if a knowledge of the East had been as helpful to the candidates for a history degree as, shall we say, an intimate acquaintance with the decisions of the Diet of Worms. But these are speculations only, and in any case those who controlled our educational policies in the past will have such heavy charges to meet on the Day of Judgment that there is no need to add fresh articles of indictment now. School authorities to whom the history of the British Empire itself is a matter of indifference, if it is not indeed to be actually avoided as disreputable, can hardly be expected to show even a passing concern for the affairs of the Orient. It is more relevant to ask why we should seem to attach importance to Oriental studies in this country today, when we seem to be approaching the end of a period in which, to borrow the picturesque language of the poet, we "held the gorgeous East in fee."

CHANGING RELATIONS

Now, it is true that our political relations with India have greatly changed in the last generation. There will inevitably be changes, differing perhaps in tempo rather than in direction, in our relations with Burma and Ceylon also. But change will not end there. We cannot limit our view of the future to alterations in our relations with countries whose administration has hitherto been controlled by us. No one could doubt, for instance, that we shall be entering on a different type of connection with China. It will be one which, we hope, will be more intimate than the attitude of "good neighbour" which it has been our object to maintain of recent years. I need not prolong the list further. The changes to which I have referred constitute in themselves the argument for the need of establishing closer cultural relations with the Orient. The loosening of our political ties with those peoples who have hitherto been dependent on us makes it all the more necessary to substitute links of another kind with them. The development of our friendship with China will be clearly assisted if we can give her proof of the value we set on it by taking measures to promote among our own people the study of her language and culture.

The point which I am making rests, as you will have appreciated, on two somewhat different arguments. Let me examine them in more detail. I take, in the first instance, the position in regard to those countries of which we have hitherto had political control. I can imagine that many may be somewhat sceptical regarding the actual value to us of extending our cultural contacts with the peoples of these countries or the advantage to be gained by a study of their languages, their literature and their arts. Such knowledge might, they will say, be of assistance to an administrator; but we have to envisage a future in which the Europeans in the civil services will be limited to a small number engaged for technical or professional qualifications, and possibly only for a short period.

But I would myself ask in return what kind of picture we actually have in our own minds of the general relations which will exist in future

between these countries and ourselves. I am not referring here to the exact form which our constitutional relations will take. If some Indians do not like the term "Dominion," and others dislike the word "British Empire," and others even look askance at the idea of belonging to a British Commonwealth of Nations, I do not myself wring my hands in despair at such intransigence. I myself prefer the old forms. They have a tradition which appeals to me and of which I am proud. But I recall a passage from a speech delivered by Lord Milner in 1919:

"The word Empire," he said, "and the word Imperial are in some respects unfortunate. They suggest domination, ascendancy, the rule of a superior state over vassal states, but as they are the only words available, all we can do is to make the best of them, and to raise them in the scale of language by a new significance."

It may well be that the peoples now dependent upon us will feel that the old forms do not pay sufficient credit to their newly achieved autonomy. But it is the will that lies behind a constitutional form that matters, not the form itself. If we are assured that they will be united with us in some conception of common citizenship and a common obligation to defend the ideals of civilization to which we have introduced them, we may be content to leave it to the constitutional craftsmen to devise with them the form in which that relationship should be expressed. The point I wish to put to you is that in a connection of this kind, where the racial ties and traditions which bind us to the existing Dominions are wanting, and the only dynamic link will be supplied by a mutual spirit of good-will, it seems more than ever necessary that we should not neglect any of the means which can minister to a common interest and understanding.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN INDIA

One such source of understanding exists in the use they make of our own language and our literature and our legal and political institutions. Time may bring some change in the form of these political institutions, but I doubt whether even the strongest impulses of nationalism will greatly affect the position occupied by the English language. It is for most of these peoples a vehicle of national unity. But take also their side of the question. It would not conduce to their self-respect or to the promotion of a sentiment of partnership with us if they had cause to feel that their language and their culture had no interest for us, or only such interest as the chance scholar or the philologist might have occasion to display.

It is possible that it may appear to many Englishmen that there is some exaggeration in this argument. They are not perhaps themselves very sensitive to the influence of literary or æsthetic interests, or at all events not conscious of the extent to which such interests count in the lives of other peoples. We have, they would say, made a contribution peculiarly our own to India. Other nations might perhaps have shown a keener æsthetic appreciation of her literature and her arts. But we shall have left with her, as a permanent enrichment, the legacy of our tradition of the Rule of Law, of liberal thought, and of respect for the social institu-

tions of other people. If this does not suffice to bring us her good-will and co-operation, then we shall not secure it by subsidizing a study of her languages or attempting to increase the number of those who can appreciate her arts.

There can be no question of the reality of the contribution we have made. But what I may describe as national gratitude is something much more elusive than the obligation which one individual may acknowledge to another. It is, in particular, liable to become very attenuated when a period of political disturbance or racial alienation has intervened. Our own history will have shown us that the recipient of benefits of this nature is seldom as keenly conscious of their value as the donor. For the donor to press them on the notice of the recipient is not likely to improve relations with him.

THE VALUE OF CULTURAL INTERESTS

Again, is it true that purely cultural interests do not really count for much in making for better understandings between nations? Whatever may have been our own judgment on this point, there are other nations which have shown no doubts about it. It is characteristic of the French attitude on the subject that when Napoleon invaded Egypt his expedition included a band of scholars whose task was to interpret to the world the memorials of Egypt's past. France has always attached the highest importance to the maintenance of close cultural relations with Syria and the Middle East, and it is indeed to this that she has looked as the chief support of the influence she has sought to maintain in those quarters. No more significant illustration of the French view on the subject can be found than the interest shown by Marshal Lyautey in the arts and the historic monuments of Northern Africa. Again, the labour and the expense undertaken by Holland in the study of the culture and the indigenous institutions of the Netherlands East Indies has not been due to a purely academic interest; it has been recognized by her as possessing a definite political value. I recall again in Lord Curzon's book on the *British Government in India* a passage which seems to me to have a pointed bearing on this issue. The care of India's historic and religious monuments was, he says, to him a labour of love; but he adds:

"I am told by those who have visited the country since my day that I am much more likely to be remembered for having preserved these monuments from decay than for having sought to remedy abuses or to breathe fresh life into the administration."

Should anyone still ask for arguments based on less imponderable grounds, I will add this. It is not, of course, the fact that we have used our political powers to give to British firms trading in India, Ceylon and Burma any preferential position over their competitors, either of foreign or of native origin. Such preference, moreover, as our export trade has enjoyed (and it is by no means considerable) has been fully balanced by the advantage enjoyed by the products of these countries in the home market. But both British manufacturers and British trading firms will have to face a future in which not only will local industries have been greatly stimulated by the war, but the new governments may seek to use

their powers to give active support to domestic commercial undertakings at the expense of those of external origin. In a recent debate in the Legislature at Delhi the representative of the British commercial community in India, when speaking of the adjustments which might follow as the result of the Declaration of March last, said that his community would ask for no exceptional privileges and no special measure of protection. But it is nevertheless clear that if our exporters and our commercial firms trading in the East are to hold their position, they will need all the assistance they can derive from establishing cordial personal relations with those with whom they have to deal.

TRADE RELATIONS

This aspect of our future commercial activity has lately received much attention from those interested in the post-war restoration of British trade. Perhaps the most pertinent evidence I can quote of the anxiety felt by the representatives of commerce on the subject is to be found in the memorandum issued last month by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce. It deals primarily with the selection and training of personnel to visit overseas markets and of those in responsible positions at home having contact with buyers abroad. It looks forward to the creation of a "*merchant corps d'élite*" specially equipped both technically and in the "intangibles of commercial behaviour"—a very pregnant phrase. It deplores the ignorance in this country of the habits and ways of life of other people. It holds that if sales representatives travelling overseas are to be versatile and receptive of other peoples' ideas, a knowledge of the language of the country visited is essential. The memorandum adds that it is equally essential to have a knowledge of its history, and, moreover, its history must be seen not from the standpoint of our own textbooks but from the point of view of the overseas peoples themselves. Let me add to this one observation of my own. Whatever may be the technical qualification of our trade representatives, even using that word in the broader sense which the Association rightly attaches to it, there can be no question of the additional advantage they would enjoy if they also had a common meeting-ground with Asiatic peoples in an interest in their art and culture. That is of particular value in dealing with members of communities whose own customs do not always give as free opening for ordinary social intimacies as that of European peoples. This view has been fully endorsed by members of commercial houses of great standing in the East with whom I have discussed this question.

I said that I intended to speak first of our relationship with the Oriental peoples who are still politically dependent on us, and would deal afterwards with those belonging to independent States. But so many of the conclusions at which I have arrived will apply to the latter also that I need not perhaps pursue their case further. For there still remains an important question which must be answered. If we accept that it is essential to give more systematic attention to the study of the languages and culture of the Oriental peoples, are there adequate facilities for such study in this country? Do we make full use of such facilities as exist? Let me disavow any intention of joining those who conceive that the best way of promot-

ing our national interests is to belittle our national performances. Even, moreover, if we should desire to make comparisons between what has been done to promote Oriental studies by Great Britain and by other nations, it would be necessary to show some care in discriminating between the interest shown by individuals or private bodies and that shown by the State, and one should, indeed, further discriminate between steps taken by Great Britain and those taken on their own initiative by the Indian or other Governments.

BRITISH ORIENTALISTS

We have produced Orientalists to whom the Eastern peoples themselves admit a profound debt for their contribution to the knowledge of their language, their history and their culture. Nor was Oriental study left entirely to private effort. Warren Hastings, himself well versed in Persian and Arabic, founded in 1781 the Calcutta Madrasa, mainly for the study of these languages. It is interesting to note that this followed his failure to persuade Oxford University to establish a Persian professorship. In 1784, in company with Sir William Jones, who added a scholarly knowledge of Sanskrit also, he established the Asiatic Society of Bengal. In 1801, Lord Wellesley founded the college at Fort William for the training of civil servants in the languages, law and customs of India. This brought Bengali for the first time within the pale of official recognition. In 1804, Sir James Macintosh, Chief Justice of Bombay, instituted the Literary Society of Bombay, with the object, as he stated, "of investigating and bringing together what could be discovered of the East so as to form a contribution to the thought and learning of the West," and the society afterwards received the support of those distinguished Governors, Jonathan Duncan and Mountstuart Elphinstone. In the year 1824, also, the Royal Asiatic Society was established in London, and began its long career of service to Oriental culture. In 1894, the Government of India, at the instance of that accomplished scholar Sir Charles Lyall, instituted the great Linguistic Survey of India.

The record of scholarly interest in the study of Indian languages thus goes far back, and it has contained many distinguished names. The example set by Sir William Jones was followed by many men in the Government services, who combined scholarly pursuits with their administrative duties. But the inducements offered to such pursuits were not sufficient to create any considerable body of Oriental scholars outside the services. Today we are faced with the fact that the progressive reduction of the British element in the Eastern services has already diminished the source which supplied in the past a large number of those interested in Oriental studies. We must realize that this source is likely to be further reduced as time goes on. If so, we shall lose one of the most substantial of the interests which have helped to keep alive the institutions which exist for the purpose of these studies. We shall lose it, that is, unless it is supplemented or replaced by a stimulus coming from some other direction.

Let me consider, then, the case of these institutions. They are partly academic, partly in the nature of cultural societies. Among the latter the Royal Asiatic Society claims first place, if only for its long and distin-

guished history. The India Society was founded in 1910 to promote a better understanding of Indian culture, especially her arts. The Royal Empire Society, the East India Association, the Royal Central Asian Society and the Indian branch of the Royal Society of Arts has each in its own way ministered to the interest in the culture of the East, but they are not specifically devoted to questions of Oriental scholarship. In academic circles, Oxford and Cambridge provide some facilities for Oriental studies, but the only institution exclusively devoted to them, and fully equipped for the purpose, is the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Its history affords an interesting illustration of the attitude of British authorities towards these studies. There were Chairs for the teaching of Oriental languages and history at University College and King's College, London, as far back as 1826; but from 1852 onwards the Royal Asiatic Society consistently pressed for more organized support for studies of this character. Its efforts were unavailing, though it had the support of men like Max Müller, Charles Trevelyan and Monier Williams.

THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES

In 1887 the Royal Asiatic Society did, however, succeed so far that a school for modern Oriental languages was started at the Imperial Institute. This venture secured some help from a private donor, but its activity was limited and it went into liquidation in 1902. The question of Oriental teaching had meanwhile become part of the history of the University of London as a teaching university. As soon as it was reconstituted in 1900 the Royal Asiatic Society returned to the charge, and pressed it to create a Faculty of Oriental Languages. It was not, however, till 1908 that, at the instance of the University, a deputation headed by Lord Reay approached the Treasury with a request for a Government grant for the foundation of an Oriental School. The deputation spoke of the superior facilities for these studies in Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg, and added that it was not creditable that there should be no Oriental School in the capital city of Great Britain, which had such important relations with the East. This invidious comparison seems to have stung the Government to action. It showed, indeed, no indelicate speed, but in 1910 the Secretary of State for India appointed a committee to consider plans for the School, and as it included Lord Cromer and Lord Curzon it was obvious that something more was now intended than the "evading action" which it seems the normal function of Government committees to assist. Such subsequent delays as occurred between that date and 1917, when the School commenced operations, was indeed due mainly to difficulties regarding its site and building. The Government contributed to the latter, but such endowment as the School has is due to the energies of an influential Appeal Committee, which approached the City of London with the object of raising an Endowment Fund of £150,000.

Today the School, as part of London University, draws its chief support from the latter, so that the State does contribute to it indirectly by virtue of the sums made available to the University through the University Grants Committee. But such direct assistance as it receives from Govern-

ment sources is not from the British Treasury, but from grants made by the Indian and Colonial Governments.

My own connection with the School no doubt makes me somewhat of a partisan in its interest. As a partisan, I am distressed at the tribulations through which it is now passing at the hands of the Ministry of Information. The situation will be clear to you if I mention that the buildings of the School, specially designed and equipped for teaching purposes, stand, like a Naboth's vineyard, in most convenient proximity to the building occupied by the Ministry. I will say no more. But partisan or not, I believe that the School is an asset of Imperialist importance. I feel, in view of what I have said regarding the part which cultural relations can take in giving us ties with the Eastern peoples, it is entitled to the full support of the British Government. I appeal, also, to our great commercial houses to recognize the value it may have for them in helping to train that "*merchant corps d'élite*" to which the Association of British Chambers of Commerce has referred.

REORGANIZATION OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

If I ask for this support it is because I believe that the time has come when Oriental studies should be reorganized on a wider basis. It is not enough to have a school for teaching languages or history. We need those larger endowments which would make Oriental studies a worth-while pursuit and open larger opportunities to those who pursue them. The recent urgent call upon us to organize interpreter courses in the Oriental languages for the Army and Air Services revealed to us that the country is woefully deficient in scholars qualified for this purpose. We have only been able to comply with this demand by placing an almost unbearable strain on our existing staff, but we have done so because we felt that we alone were able to repair this most serious gap in our military provisions. But the country needs more than this. It needs a centre where scholars from the Orient visiting this country can be sure of a welcome, and from which they can carry back with them the feeling that the study of their culture counts for something with us. They should find there the congenial social surroundings in which they can form friendships which will ensure that they in turn will give an answering welcome to all those, whether scholars or not, who visit their own country.

Finally, we need a centre where all the cultural societies interested in the East can find a home, and where means exist for promoting in the British public at large a keener appreciation of Eastern art than it can gain in the frigid atmosphere of our museums. I am not so much a partisan of our Oriental School as to feel that it can itself constitute the centre for this purpose. It may be only part of it, but in some form or another that centre should be created.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a joint lunch-time meeting of the Association and the Royal Empire Society, held in the Society's Assembly Hall on Thursday, October 15, 1942, the Marquess of Zetland, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., presiding, Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., gave an address on "The Importance of the Study of Oriental Languages and Culture in this Country."

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the meeting, said that the elements of a successful lecture were in the first place a subject of live interest to the audience and in the second a person who was a master of his subject, and both these were present that day. It was within measurable distance of half a century that Lord Hailey had joined the Indian Civil Service, and he had occupied in rapid succession posts of steadily increasing importance ranging from the Commissionership of Delhi to Governor of the Punjab, and two successive periods as Governor of the United Provinces. On his return to this country he accepted the Directorship of the African Research Survey, and in connection with that he produced a volume to which the adjective "monumental" might be applied. In addition to his administrative duties in India Lord Hailey always took a wide view of the peoples and the country in which he found himself and steeped himself in their culture, his achievements in that sphere being recognized by honorary degrees in several universities, both Indian and British. He was now Chairman of the governing body of the School of Oriental and African Studies in this country.

After Lord Hailey's lecture,

Mr. L. S. AMERY (Secretary of State for India) said that the admirable paper which Lord Hailey had just read raised a subject of enormous importance and interest—namely, that of the part which language and a study of the literature of other people could play in international and inter-empire relations. In that matter English people on the whole had been singularly negligent and insensitive in the past, and Lord Hailey had drawn a contrast between them and the French. There was no nation in the world prouder of its language than the French; in fact, they felt that only those who could speak or read French were really civilized. That pride of language had kindled in the French some understanding of the pride and interest which other peoples took in their languages, and also a sense of the value of the study of other languages. It was surely time that the British, even if only on grounds of international understanding, devoted more time and trouble to the study of other languages, and in particular those Oriental languages with which her history had brought her into contact.

It was a great thing that, under the influence of Macaulay, English thought and English literature had become domestic to India, but there was an equal amount to be said for the work of Warren Hastings in encouraging interest in Indian languages and culture. The present was not the time for a one-way traffic in literature or ideas. There was much that we could gain as well as much that we could give in sympathy and understanding by paying to Eastern languages the attention which ought to be paid to them on a much larger scale than had been the case hitherto. He hoped that after the war these things would be thought of by English people in an entirely different spirit from that which the rather materialistic nineteenth century had thought of them. England was entering upon a new millennium. The new world might be a hard, difficult and stern one, but it would be a world of immense opportunities, and not least on the side of culture.

Sir ATUL CHATTERJEE remarked that after the masterly analysis which Lord Hailey had given in his usually incisive style there remained little for him to add. But he would like to mention just two points. The first was in connection with the reference Lord Hailey had made to the possible and probable political changes between England

and India. Whatever those changes might be, it was not conceivable that Indians would cease to study Western culture, literature and science because they had now become a part of their own civilization. That being the case, was it desirable that European people should cease to take an interest in Oriental culture?

The second point was that, considering the great stake which this country had in the East, and particularly in India, Indians were inclined to feel that England had done little in the way of studying the culture and art of India. Lord Hailey had mentioned how much a small country like Holland had done in that respect. He had often wondered why Britain had not come up to that standard. He did not wish to deprecate what English scholars had done for Indian culture; as a matter of fact, a very vast amount of work had been done in the subjects of Indian philosophy, history and art by British scholars, and that work was still going on. But very little had been done by the State towards that end. Mr. Amery had said that something should be done after the war. He would like to ask, "Why not during the war?" The expense involved would be trivial compared with the cost of the war, and if it were done it would impress the people of the East very much indeed.

Professor R. L. TURNER (Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies) said that if he referred to India in particular, which was his own country, and to Indian languages, he wished to emphasize that what he said would apply equally to other languages and cultures of the Orient.

Lord Hailey had mentioned in his list of scholars the name of Sir Charles Lyall, who had instituted a Linguistic Survey of India. In that connection he would like to mention the name of the great man who had carried out that survey, Sir George Grierson. He had often pondered on what influence Sir George Grierson had had on the relations between this country and India. For thirty or forty years his home in Camberley was a place of pilgrimage for students and scholars visiting this country; in fact, he was the "grand old man" of Indian study in England and his influence in drawing together cultured Indian opinion and English opinion was almost incalculable. The question in his mind was how England was going to produce other scholars of that kind to follow in Sir George Grierson's steps.

There did exist in English universities certain facilities for the studying of Eastern languages, but up to the time of the founding of the School of Oriental and African Studies the modern languages of India were not studied to any high degree, the only instruction being very elementary, and it was obvious that if the study of the language of any nation was confined to the elementary stages it was impossible to obtain any insight into the culture of its people. Since the foundation of the School in the University of London there had been gathered together a staff of prominent teachers who conducted teaching and research to a very high standard indeed. That staff had been in existence since 1917, but he had found that the vast majority of the students had not been his own countrymen, but Indians. That had been a disappointment, because that was not the main object of the founding of the School.

Quite recently the Government, with great foresight, had established a number of scholarships in Oriental languages of one year to eighteen months' duration. The immediate object was of a military nature, but there was an ulterior and more important reason—namely, that it was necessary there should be Englishmen who knew something of the languages of the Oriental countries with which England would have dealings after the war. The languages to be taught to those obtaining these scholarships were: Japanese, Chinese, Turkish and Persian, and he wished, in the presence of the Secretary of State for India, to draw attention to a notable omission in the list—namely, the Indian languages.

Dr. S. G. VESEY FITZGERALD said that all present realized that the re-establishment of British influence in the East was not merely a matter of reconquest of the temporarily lost territories, and they were grateful to Lord Hailey and Mr. Amery for their inspiring leadership. He did not propose to speak on the cultural side of the question with which he was personally connected further than to suggest that some knowledge of Hindu and Islamic personal laws was as essential to an understanding of Indian cultures as a knowledge of the English Constitution to an understanding of our own culture. He denounced the widely accepted half-truth that "the only

proper place to learn a language is in the country where that language is spoken." It would be equally true to say that a physician could only learn medicine at the expense of his patients, and a lawyer could only learn law at the expense of his clients. But both professions insisted on a sound theoretical training as a preliminary qualification. Practical experience was essential, but it was more valuable when it was preceded by a sound theoretical training. It would usually be found that men who had acquired their knowledge of a language entirely by practical experience, though they might be very fluent, were not always very correct, and the speaker instanced the case of a distinguished officer thirty years ago of whom it was said by the late Sir Abbas Ali Baig that he spoke Gujarati exactly like a native of Gujarat except that he had abolished all the genders! Moreover, to acquire a real knowledge of a language by practical experience without theoretical training was a much slower business than it need be. Other considerations in favour of a preliminary language training in England were also cogent. It was not possible for an Englishman on arrival in India to sink himself in the country as he could, e.g., in France in peace-time by becoming a paying guest in a French family. He could not get away from speaking English, and he had also much other work to do which prevented his giving an adequate share of his time to language study. Such knowledge as he acquired tended to be limited to so much of the vernacular as was necessary for conversation with those who did not know English (usually his own subordinates) and limited also in vocabulary to the field of his particular employment. Whatever might have been the case in the past, this would not be good enough in the future.

The under-valuation of language teaching in certain quarters was largely due to an insufficient appreciation of the enormous improvement which had taken place in the teaching of modern languages in England during the last thirty or forty years, an improvement in which the teaching of Oriental languages had had its full share. Today we had a large staff of teachers in constant association, able to evolve a common technique. In many subjects we were already able to have teaching conducted by English teachers aided by vernacular-speaking assistants; and it was obviously desirable that this system of twofold instruction should be extended. We were also able to make full use of modern mechanical aids to learning such as the radio-gramophone, which, when properly tuned, had certain advantages even over the living voice in that it might be made to repeat a phrase an indefinite number of times and at varying speeds. We had also the great advantage of the new science of phonetics, a science whose value (no matter what old-fashioned teachers might say to the contrary) was now fully established. We had had ample evidence from students, from the officers under whom they had served, and from the general public that the student trained in the new methods started with a better appreciation of the language and spoke it better than did their predecessors before these methods came into operation. Finally, the speaker said it had been suggested that the multiplicity of Indian languages was a reason why we should not give a grounding in any of them until a man arrived in India and it became certain what language he would have to speak. But the same gentleman who had recently voiced this counsel of despair had admitted that "Hindustani" was in addition to English a *lingua franca* for all India, and it was surely better that men should learn to speak the common basis of Urdu and Hindi as an educated Indian would speak it rather than the horrible lingo known by various nicknames in different parts of India in which there was no first person singular and no auxiliary verbs! Moreover, modern-language teaching was not only teaching of a particular language, but teaching in the methods of learning languages; and pupils had testified to the fact that methods acquired in the study of one language—for instance, Hindi—had proved valuable to them afterwards in the acquisition even of a language of entirely different stock, such as Brahui.

Professor DANIEL JONES said he had been extremely interested in phonetics since they were first applied to languages in India, China and Africa. It had been his experience that when a man studying a language of India could manage to pronounce it in the same way as an Indian would pronounce it, he got on with his Indian friends far better than if he pronounced it with an English accent. It was one thing to speak a foreign language with an English accent and quite another to speak it as a native would speak it. The object of phonetics, therefore, was to give the student

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such training with his mouth and tongue as to render him capable of doing this. He would like to emphasize that the phonetic system was extremely practicable.

The Rev. W. E. H. ORGANE (Editorial Superintendent, British and Foreign Bible Society) expressed his approval of the project put forward by Lord Hailey. He would have liked to have added to Lord Hailey's list of distinguished scholars the name of William Carey, who went out to India 150 years ago, was the first or second Professor of Bengali at Fort William, and who had translated the New Testament into thirty-four Indian languages.

As a result of the work of his Society the New Testament had been translated into all the main Indian tongues. To take one example, the New Testament had been translated into Telugu in such a way that it had become a standard example of how that language should be written. It had been found most helpful in the training, for instance, of young Indian commercial men.

The CHAIRMAN said that he agreed most heartily with the conclusions which Lord Hailey had reached at the close of his lecture. It was surely anomalous that in the metropolis of a great Empire there should be no centre where a man might go and steep himself in the languages and cultures of other countries. All honour was due to those societies who had endeavoured sporadically to inculcate in this country an interest in Oriental culture and languages, but there should be in London a recognized centre where people could study the languages of Oriental countries.

He wished to mention a deduction which he had drawn from a somewhat cryptic statement made by Lord Hailey in his lecture. He had rather gathered that the Ministry of Information were casting greedy eyes upon the buildings which were the premises of the School of Oriental and African Studies. If indeed it were true that any Government department was trying to acquire the building of the School, it would be a most glaring example of the extraordinary procedure of which Government departments, with well-meant officialdom but with grave lack of understanding, were so often guilty. He hoped that the misgivings expressed by Lord Hailey would prove to be unfounded.

The indifference of the British people to the languages and culture of those Oriental countries over which they held sway had, in fact, had the gravest political repercussions. That indifference was regarded by Indians as contempt, and there was nothing more calculated to give rise to bitter feeling between the two countries than that. Moreover, how was it possible, without some study and appreciation of the dialect of particular people, to understand their attitude towards men and things? How was it possible to understand the real nature of the gulf which divided the Hindus and Muslims without an acquaintance with the dialects, traditions, social customs and religious thought of the two peoples?

He wished to express to Lord Hailey his most sincere thanks for his lecture, and in so doing he was sure that he was echoing the feelings of all those present.

Major-General Sir FREDERICK SYKES, in proposing a vote of thanks to Lord Hailey and to the Chairman, said that the importance of the subject of Lord Hailey's lecture could not be over-estimated. It was most important that in the future Englishmen, official or non-official, should have some knowledge of the culture of the areas to which they were going. It was true that there were a vast number of languages in India. But this should not be a deterrent; his own simple efforts at Hindustani had always been understood by the Bombay people, and in Sind he had not needed an interpreter at all. He thought that everyone should support the educational programme suggested by Lord Hailey.

The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation, and Lord HAILEY, in acknowledgment, said that he always thought the real value of a lecture lay, not so much in what it gave to the audience, but in what it taught the lecturer. His own value in giving the lecture had been little more than to provoke a really good discussion.

INDIA TODAY

BY SIR M. AZIZUL HUQUE, C.I.E.

(High Commissioner for India)

To the average mind on both sides of the Atlantic, India today is often a puzzle and a problem. With undoubtedly a genuine desire at the present time in the British Commonwealth and among the allied nations to understand India, she is more often misunderstood than understood, and appears a perplexing, if not a baffling, problem. At times the West is prone to view events and things in India from its own angle of vision with all its subconscious faith and beliefs in Western institutions—shall I venture to say, at times with its own prejudices in favour of the Western world order. We also sometimes meet with specimens, both curious and queer, of opinions and conclusions among those who speak or write about India—some from a distance of many thousands of miles, some based on what the telegraphs and the wireless tell about India, some after a few weeks' hurried travel or stay in India, and some even amongst those who should have known India better. India today thus remains a puzzle or a mystery, at best a romance, and too often people come to know more of what strikes the West as absurdities, or beliefs and institutions incomprehensible to the Western mind. Thus India, with all its background of cultures and races, with all its chronicles of the past and its achievements of the present, escapes attention, and those who want to know more have often to remain satisfied with the rope trick, or the elephants and the tigers, or the pageants.

India today is the inevitable logic of all her yesterdays; to know India of today one must know India of yesterday, and this is where the average man is the most ignorant. The history of India goes back to a period remoter than any other known chronicles of human history. Much of it is not yet known or fully known, but what is known is enough to show that at least 5,000 years ago there was a great civilization in and near the Indus Valley, when men built cities, constructed and planned buildings, laid out roads, drainage channels and public wells, used wheel transport, knew the use of metals, and grew grain and corn. This civilization has bequeathed to us painted potteries, engraved stamp-seals, inlaid shells and metals, and other features of a developed social and economic life, and in many ways gives us indications of considerable refinement and art among the people.

I shall not ponder long today over this civilization of the Indus Valley, or the relics of probably one of the earliest civilizations of the world—the Dravidian civilization. History is still blurred as to the many details of the life and struggle of those ages, but it was undoubtedly an age of a great civilization and culture.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN IMMIGRATION

We get thereafter a few blank pages in the book of India, and then come across a great horde of humanity from the Central Asian regions,

rightly called by the Arab geographers Ummulbilad, or the mother of countries. We do not know why they came out, but they came and settled down first in the fertile belts of Northern India and thereafter spread over the whole country. We find the smoke of hymnal fires mingled with the chorus of Vedic chants over the whole continent of India, from the foothills of the Himalayas to the forests of the Nilgiris. The philosophy of the Vedas rose up and later gathered strength, till with the march of time it evolved a synthesis of its own.

Life in this period was no doubt devoid of many things we love and like today, but this absence does not necessarily mean that the people felt any such social, political or economic needs as we feel today. There was no elaborate code of crimes and no intricate civil or municipal laws. The joy of life was there, though not the hectic speed of the world today. More than the worldly features of the human story, ancient India attempted to find a solution of the eternal problems of life, and out of these strivings and efforts arose the ethics and philosophy of ancient India, dissertations on and pursuit towards the attainment of the great ideal, the spirit eternal, towards which life in all ages and time has been a perpetual striving-after. But let this not be taken to mean that ancient India meant only religion and philosophy. It developed many features of a civilized social and political life, with many arts and graces, many splendours and prosperity of a vanished past, and no less also of wars and conquests, or alliances and manœuvrings.

To comprehend the life of that age we have to know why the king, the symbol of the people and representing the country, appears often as a mystic or an ascetic. We have to find out how the ancient village community lived a happy and even prosperous life generally in isolation from the rest of God's world. We have to explore how men, renouncing worldly pursuits and the pleasures of life, were able to discharge their responsibilities of social life and to be of service to humanity; how social needs were well served through efforts to gain *Moksha* or *Nirvana* through penance or privation. Whether the Sakas or the Huns came, or the armies of Alexander or Darius invaded the land, the stream of India's life was not much affected; in fact, the conquerors either came and went or settled down as integral components of the life of India. However paradoxical it may seem, there was recognition of human right in spite of caste laws. All that the country needed for its industry and trade quite well prospered with hereditary trade guilds; each village had its trade and manufacture, its potter, carpenter, blacksmith and weaver. Three hundred years before Christ, Megasthenes left an account of this past India :

"The people of India are remarkably brave; they are also remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to a law suit, so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements."

A synthesis was thus reached in the life of India, first arising from the Vedic hymns, through the Upanishads, and later the mediations of Buddha. The other side of this human history is still to be found in the great epics of ancient India, in the edicts and pillars of Asoka, in the annals of the Mauryas and the Guptas, the Palas and the Sungas, the Pallavas and the Chauhans, in the caves of Ajanta and Ellora, in the

stones and temples of South India, in the relics of Taxilla, Nalanda, Sarnath, Sanchi, Rajgirh and Pataliputra.

But soon after a disintegration set in, a disintegration which upset the human balance, and with it came all kinds and varieties of speculation, imagination, theories, and notions of life and social order. Caste laid down more of disabilities than responsibilities, and human rights were determined through the accident of birth and parentage. The king soon became a tyrant, and logic yielded place to dialectics. Into that welter of disintegration marched in another new spirit of man—a dynamic equalizing spirit—the spirit of Islam.

THE MUSSULMAN EMPIRE

Unfortunately this period of India's history is even more unknown and misunderstood than its immediate past. What is known is often a little anatomy and no physiology of history. And in this case we suffer as much from some scholars of eminence as from persons who claim to speak with authority. We open the book of a distinguished historian of the last century and we are told that the history of the Mussulman Empire in India is about the driest in the world and a blank chapter in India's history barring a few wars and proper names. We anxiously turn over the pages of a recent book of a distinguished administrator and we note that the Moghul rule in India is a chapter which has disappeared into a dead past without any impress on India's life. I have no time—and probably I should lose my balance even if I had the time—to take further notice of such writers, who are unfortunately often the most forward with their views about the Indian problem; they are the last persons to speak of India or to know India, and such writings have created more difficulties for us in India.

As we look at this perspective, we find that at the time the Mussulmans came the disintegration of India's life was so complete that the entire social, economic and political life was convulsed by internal feuds, quarrels and controversies. The many states into which India was then divided were far too busy in their quarrels to be able to mobilize their resources to fight against an invasion from outside, or to combine together for purposes of any concerted plan of resistance. And it is a recorded fact in history that in many places the advent of the Mussulmans was welcomed by the people.

With the establishment of Muslim rule a new India was born. First came the organization of India as one political entity and one state. Just at the time the Mussulmans came, there was nothing known of India as one country. The Mussulman rule gave it the shape of one country and gave India the name of Hindustan.

Under the ægis of the Muslim kings and rulers a new synthesis began in Indian life. It broke up the rigidity of caste laws and created a new social order. By a divine coincidence the first Muslim dynasty was a slave dynasty, teaching the lesson in a caste-ridden country that all men are equal and a slave can be a king. In the train of this new system came the rise and development of arts and literature, mathematics and medicine, architecture and engineering. Roads, bridges and irrigation canals were

constructed; industry, trade and commerce flourished greatly, and provincial barriers were broken down. The entire administration, judicial and revenue, was organized on a planned basis; schools and colleges were established and thrown open to all classes and creeds. The sacred literature of the Hindus, the ancient scientific and literary treasures of India were translated. The vernacular literatures of India received their new life. As a symbol of the unified life for India as a whole, a new language combining the best of all was evolved upon local foundation. In the organization of governmental machinery there was no distinction of caste or creed; some of the highest military commands were in the hands of the Hindus; oppressive revenue collectors were summarily replaced without distinction of creed or race; jagirs and endowments were given to mosques and temples; men of letters of all communities were equally patronized. Let it not be forgotten that much of what India is today was due to the pioneer work of the Muslims, and the story of Muslim rule is a glorious chapter in India's history. Let us at least remember in appraising Muslim rule in India that it was an age when steam was not discovered, and let us not forget how Galileo was under menace of torture and inquisition when Muslim India was building the Taj Mahal, that dream in marble.

Too often the Muslims are represented as a people coming from outside India and forcibly converting the inhabitants. Let us then for a moment ponder over the fact that the great saint of Islam in India, Khwaja Mainuddin Chisty, settled himself amidst the Aravalli ranges in the heart of Rajputana, the seat of the many Rajput chiefs whose valour and heroism are immortal in Indian history—and without any army, far away from the seat of Muslim kings. And this is not the only instance. Far away in the wild forests of the Sundarbans, or of Sylhet, in the Deccan, and various other places, there still stand the lasting memorials of these heroes of Islam. For over five centuries, if not more, the Muslims ruled in places like Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Lucknow, Golconda, Bijapur and Ahmednagar. Yet the Muslims are even today a minority in those very places.

INDIA REVITALIZED

Under the Muslims India's past was strikingly revitalized, often resurrected, and certainly infused with the dynamics of another great culture. A new synthesis came in the life of India with the impact of the new on the life of the old. It was no idle fancy of the architect which preserved with care the ancient Bata Briksha within the Mogul fort at Allahabad. For centuries the hymns of the Vedas were chanted side by side with the Muezzin's call to prayer on the hilltop at Multan. The blue waters of the Ana Sagar still looks across the Hindu place of pilgrimage of Pushkar on one side and the Muslim saint's resting-place at Ajmere on the other.

But again in the march of time there came another period of disintegration, soon after the death of Aurungzeb in 1707. The Moghul Empire was broken up; the capital was the scene of intrigues and treasons; provincial rulers rose in rebellion; the kings at Delhi became mere puppets in the hands of others, often with most tragic stories. With the decay of

Mogul rule India had to fall from outside, while a well-organized army from the west coast, divided into many bands, carried on their campaigns of pillage and plunder all over the country. Inevitable disorders and lawlessness arose all over the land. The disintegration was so complete that the people of India did not know how the Moghul Empire collapsed or when the British came. At times I feel that the British themselves did not realize that they had come to India until a clash came in the days of the Mutiny. But the British gradually established their rule, and today it is a new India combining the East with the West. India today is the result of this new impact and of Britain's efforts in India for a century and more. What India will be in the future is part of the new world which was born as a result of the last war and which is reshaping itself in the stress of the present war.

BRITAIN'S WORK

Let us briefly indicate the work of Britain in India. It has created a new social order, transcending caste barriers, and this has taken deep root in the soil of the country. Municipal and rural self-governing bodies are now firmly established all over the land, and parliamentary institutions have functioned remarkably well and are still functioning in some places in spite of some limitations and difficulties. Modern industries have developed to such an extent that India today has been able to rise equal to the multiple needs of a modern war. In spite of occasional reports that we see, the rule of law is firmly established. There has been a phenomenal growth of organized public opinion, in spite of certain features which we ourselves are anxious to rectify. Hospitals, dispensaries and public health institutions are now well planned and organized, and reach the highest standards. A system of public education has been well devised, and with that system there has been a complete reorientation of social and political perspective. India today is a part of the modern world, with the benefits of all that the modern age can confer. India, with an awakened national consciousness, is now claiming her right to freedom, to full self-expression and self-determination.

For all these and many other measures for public benefit, the British have been responsible. As I look at the history of India, with its records of thousands of years, my feelings are those of gratitude for what has been done by the British, and the marvel is that so much has been accomplished within such a short space of time on all the background of what India was in the eighteenth century. I see round my country the undying imprints of British workers for over a century—the doctors, the educationists, the engineers, the geologists, the archaeologists, the industrialists, the bankers, and many others.

PROBLEMS OF THE DAY

But behind this story of progress and development, of Britain's proud record of achievement, India is now facing other problems. She feels that there has been an amount of inevitable clash by the infiltration of Western life and thought, that she has marched away from a good deal of her own past. We have produced eminent graduates in arts and sciences, and at

times some Indians have probably come to know the English language, literature and history better than some Englishmen; but we feel that probably in the process we have not taken enough care of our own literature, our own history and our own culture. We have learned to take a dip in a modern bath tub, but have forgotten our swim in the crystal clear water of our majestic rivers.

The rapid industrialization of India has led to the inevitable agonies which it always brings in its train, and the growing occidentation—if I may be permitted to use that phrase—has brought in the decadent condition of our agriculture. This has unfortunately been the course of history in every country, and one notices the same picture in the history of England following the years of the industrial revolution. The decadence of British agriculture until the last war is a recorded fact in history, and it is only in this war that nation-wide efforts are being made to create a balance between industry and agriculture. In India, too, we have had the same process.

We, however, are in a slightly more advantageous position—namely, we can always blame the British rule for all these drawbacks. The tragedy is complete when looking at the inexorable logic of events which occur with equal force as much in a free country as in a country ruled by others. To some extent this seems to me a general tendency, and often we too readily hold the British responsible even when there is a little fracas between an isolated Hindu and an isolated Muslim leading to a communal riot. Sometimes the magnitude of our problems so overwhelms us that even if we do not blame British rule we do the next best thing—that is, we take shelter behind fate and destiny. But we need not be too harshly judged for this attitude. For a century or more our duties have been discharged by others, and it has necessarily created the psychology of holding others responsible for what we deem to be the debit side also. Probably if England by some accident of circumstances had been ruled by another people in the years following the industrial revolution, the English people would have forgotten their gains and would have blamed others for their losses.

However that may be, whether we look to the natural course of events in the modernization and industrialization of the country, or we take the line of blaming everyone else except ourselves, the fact remains that India today is gradually becoming conscious of her problems, still more conscious that we have too long blamed others and not settled down to solve our own problems that face us all round. I have no doubt that this phase of blaming others will soon pass away and we shall begin our task and our responsibilities in a new attitude of mind.

LINKING PAST AND PRESENT

Let me enumerate a few of our pressing problems. Travelling along the mighty Ganges in a steamer in comfort and convenience, and with speed, we still see the beautiful panorama of hundreds and thousands of country boats of different shapes and sizes, with sails of all colours, but oftentimes passing far off on the river to save themselves from the back-

wash of the steamers hurrying past. In the glow and colour of the sun just rising above the horizon we say: "Is this fleet of country boats, which still provides food and shelter to many thousands and the most convenient transport over our magnificent waterways, going to be an incident of the past and to pass away for ever? Is it necessary that it must be so, or should we strike even now a balance between the modern mechanical means of transport and our ancient boats and carts?" While furnaces are blazing and great industrial factories are rising up, our village crafts are slowly dying out. While international trade is prospering, the vast bulk of our agricultural population has not been able to get a full share of that prosperity. While our towns have grown and we are taking pride in our new cities, with picturesque palaces, macadamized roads, telephones, telegraphs, laboratories and showrooms, there stand in the background the villages with their millions existing on a bare subsistence level, their agonies often drowned in the din and bustle of the city life with all its political excitement and passion of the day, and its constant clash of personalities. We have now become more city-minded and have left our villages, just as you have done in England and Scotland. Today we are asking the question: Must this be a necessary feature of our new life? We have more than 40,000 miles of railways, but should our waterways be dead or dying? We have built bridges of high engineering skill, but should our drainage channels be gradually choked up, creating unhealthy conditions in the countryside? We have many thousands of men and women passing the matriculation examination year after year, going through university courses, getting university degrees in arts and sciences, but should they immediately afterwards face the problem of unemployment? We have the problem of the moneylender and indebtedness, the land system and tenancy rights. We have to face the problem of malnutrition and, if our monsoon fails, that of the food supply of millions of our people. And we are today thinking how we may be able to solve these problems facing our social and economic life. With these overwhelming difficulties before us we face the future. Too often we have caught the glamour of the West, but have we learned the lesson of British history, that men have fought their battles inch by inch to come to the present state of evolution?

Fortunately a new spirit is in the air, and all over India there is a growing tendency to take a realistic view of life. We are thus realizing that by inexorable logic we must pay some penalty somewhere, and we cannot have all gains and no losses. We are therefore trying to evolve a new harmony and a new synthesis which will blend the past and the present and bring about a meeting-ground of the East and the West. I do not know when we shall succeed, but I am sure when that day comes you will find that Great Britain, her work and record in India, will be ever living in my country, and that British work in India will be as much an integral part of India's life as the Hindu and the Muslim cultures have been in the past. In the reconstructed world of tomorrow we shall be most valued partners, workers and collaborators in the British Commonwealth.

That is how India today is approaching India in the future. Today I look at the map of India that is hardly ever absent from my mind's

eye. I see a great land mass broadening and ever broadening, rising and ever rising upwards from the deep blue waters of the Indian Ocean, till it meets its crown in the snow-covered heights of the Himalayas. It gives me an impression of great age, of great dignity and of great wisdom. In the panorama of the past I see the Hindus and the Muslims together evolving the culture of India. I see the present and I realize the gifts of the British to India's life. I gaze into the future, and the map of India again gives me the same inspiration, and I find in that picture the Dravidians and the Aryans, the Hindus and the Muslims, the British and all others sharing in the glory that is to be India. India today lives under that inspiration and that ideal. I pause and look to the plains with their teeming millions and varieties of the landscape and scenery. I sometimes see the controversies, the travails and agonies—even the storms and landslides. I lift up mine eyes unto the hills again, and I remember the kind Providence who has kept India in her past and the present with all her glory and grandeur, and will keep her in her future. I am assured that, whatever may be the story of the plains today, men will turn to the summit of the mighty Himalayas—the symbol of great wisdom, great dignity and great patience.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on Thursday, October 29, 1942, when Sir M. Azizul Huque, C.I.E., High Commissioner for India, read a paper on "India Today." The chair was taken by Mr. H. Wilson Harris, Editor of *The Spectator*.

After the paper had been read by the author,

The CHAIRMAN said that Sir Azizul, in his wise and eloquent words, had given the meeting a comprehensive picture of India set in a spacious framework. In the distinguished position he held as High Commissioner for India he was no doubt compelled to be discreet, and he had refrained from touching on more than the surface of certain questions which occupied the main field of attention in India today. He himself, as Chairman, was subject to no such limitations. His limitation came rather from an ignorance of the facts of Indian history and philosophy such as were completely familiar to the author. But in the course of his career he had acquired some smattering of facts and the beginning of convictions about India, and he would like to make one or two observations on current events. It would be a strange thing if they met to discuss India and ruled out those subjects which were uppermost in all their minds.

Many present would have read the recent correspondence on India in *The Times*, and in particular, perhaps, a letter which, he thought, initiated the discussion, from Sir George Schuster, who was prevented from being present on that occasion by a public engagement. There were two points in Sir George's letter to which he wished to refer; with one of them he was in wholehearted agreement; from the other he with some diffidence dissented. Sir George had taken the strongest exception to the suggestion that we should take or refrain from taking a certain line in India because of the impression it would make upon American opinion. It seemed to him (the Chairman) that that was a principle which could not be over-emphasized. Again and again in human affairs people who did not know quite what to do were told that they must do something—for an often inadequate or thoroughly bad reason. He hoped that mistake would be avoided in this case.

The opinion of Sir George Schuster, which he could not share, was that it would be advantageous to have a conference of the United Nations on the future of India. He saw grave objections to such a course. India's future was a question to be settled between India herself and the rest of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was a subject which must be dealt with with great wisdom, restraint, and knowledge, and he did not believe that knowledge existed among their Allies to the necessary degree. Whilst he shared to the full the universal admiration for Russia's astonishing military achievements, he doubted whether the presence of Mr. Molotoff, for example, in a conference on India would be helpful. Regarding a possible Dominion Conference, he felt rather differently. Since the next step in India was that she should assume a position of full equality among British Dominions, if anyone thought it advantageous for representatives of the other Dominions to bring their experience and wisdom to the conference table he saw no reason why such a proposal should be resisted.

As to the next step, he wanted to make one or two observations in the hope that they might form the basis of subsequent discussion. He believed that they should certainly advocate the completion of the Indianization of the Viceroy's Council, and that the remaining portfolios, notably those of Finance and Home Affairs, should be entrusted at once to Indian members. He hoped that some active place might be found in the administration of India for such men as Mr. Rajagopalachari and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan. Then there was the question of the impending appointment of a successor to Lord Linlithgow. Even if the negotiations could be settled by some dramatic mission from this country to India (and he was grateful for what Sir Stafford Cripps had done), there must be contacts on the spot spread over a sufficient period for confidence to be established and an understanding reached on both sides. He was not going to be invidious enough to suggest the name of a possible Viceroy—that room was full of potential Viceroys—but he must be a man of sympathetic, flexible, courageous, and imaginative mind.

SIR ALFRED WATSON said that if the Chairman contemplated settling the question of India in a council with representatives of the British Commonwealth, he must tell him that there was a very strong feeling in India as to the manner in which certain members of the British Commonwealth of Nations had handled the Indian problem in the past, and nothing would be more certainly resented in India than a representative, say, of South Africa sitting upon a tribunal to decide the future of India.

Sir Azizul was an old friend and an old controversialist, but never before had he admired so much his poetic vision of the India of today. Were there time he would challenge his fascinating picture of the past and of the present in almost every one of its sentences. On the historical side he (Sir Alfred) no more accepted the survival of a few humane precepts engraven on stone as evidence of the existence of an enlightened civilization than he was persuaded by the existence of the splendid teachings of the Christian faith that any nation had ever accepted them as the basis of its Government. Nor did the eloquence of Sir Azizul blind him to the fact that behind the splendid façade of Muslim rule in India lay the miseries of an enslaved people. When, in pursuance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, he, figuratively, took ship from India he would expect as he ascended the gangway to find Sir Azizul treading hard on his heels, followed by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru bringing up the tail of the procession in the spirit of renunciation urged by them all upon the British.

As to modern conditions in India, he challenged directly the picture of the decay of agriculture. India was feeding 50 million new mouths which had been added to the population during the last ten years. Did that suggest a falling off in the production of the land? With his own eyes he had seen millions of acres redeemed from the deserts that past misrule had created. He had seen the area under wheat, cotton, jute, and especially sugar, vastly extended. He had watched the work of the conservators of the forests designed to prevent the soil from being denuded. He had witnessed the experiments made with new seeds, artificial manures, and modern machinery to add to the productivity of the land. Far from decaying, the agricultural production of India was greater today than at any period in the past.

Some of them might have sentimental regrets that the machine age, with all its evils, was coming to India as to other countries. Its spread was inevitable if its popula-

tion was to live. But need India make the mistake of blighting the land? The warning was on the wall. Admittedly she had made a bad beginning, but that could be recovered. India, if she would, could profit by the failures of others. Others had had to learn in the field of hard experience. She need not have the same purgatory to pass through. She could, if she would, control the demon of the machine.

He shared neither the lecturer's vision of the past nor his dread of the future. He saw India emerging as a great nation taking its due place in the leadership of the East. But that destiny would only be achieved if India turned from the contemplation of the past and fixed its gaze on the dawn of a new day.

Mr. CHINNA DURAI said that the picture which he had gathered from Sir Azizul's lecture was that ancient India was grand, and India under the Muslims was grander, but, if he understood him aright, India under Great Britain was grander still. That was his picture. But he listened the other day to a talk given at Cambridge by Mr. Krishna Menon, who could not find a single good word for Britain. From the word "go" it was bitterness against Britain throughout. As for himself, he knew nothing of the India of the past, nor did he know very much of the heyday of Muslim glory, not having *lived* in those remote periods, but he did know this, that he had lived under the British régime, and whatever influences had played upon him had been those of Britain. Therefore he was, he could say, a product of Britain, and he was not the only isolated person who could say that.

The Chairman had deplored that Sir Azizul had judiciously ignored the political problem. Sir Alfred Watson, however, in his able observations, had pointed out that to a great extent the prevailing misconception and misunderstanding about Britain's relations with India had confused the picture, and he laid stress on the extent to which Britain had brought grandeur and comfort and solace to India. It was in the midst of all this that he (Mr. Chinna Durai) thought of the demand of Congress directed against Britain to quit India. In view of all these contacts, stretching over nearly 150 years, contacts which had admittedly been to the benefit of India, he, if he had any say in the matter at all, would not be in such a hurry to say to Britain, "Quit India!" After all, the British benefits to India did remain, and no words or writing could take them away. He felt that, as Longfellow put it, just as man is to woman, "useless each without the other," so India without Britain would be useless, and Britain without India useless also.

Mr. A. H. BYRT declared himself an incurable optimist about India, and said he was glad to find the lecturer of the same mind. It was true that there were difficulties in the Indian situation. To one of them Sir Azizul alluded when he spoke of the occidentalization of India. An outstanding example of that was afforded by the late Mr. Montagu, who went to India to inquire what should be done for her constitutional advance, but by the time he reached Bombay had already settled the matter in his own mind and then went on to coerce everybody whom he had to consult in India into acceptance of his ideas so that he might foist them upon Parliament as the Government of India's. That attitude was still typical of many people. The Statutory Commission which went to India in 1927 issued a grave warning and sharp rebuke to people who endeavoured to inflict their Western political ideas upon India, and it was interesting to hear Lord Simon, in the House of Lords recently, condemn the same process, particularly mentioning Mr. Montagu by name.

The Indian reactions to these well-intentioned but misguided efforts to force British occidentalization upon India found their extreme expression in Mr. Gandhi's efforts totally to eradicate the influence of modern civilization from India. The real situation was that pictured by Sir Azizul Huque when he showed India still to be in the process of cultural and political evolution, which had been going on since the most ancient times. Indian civilization was the oldest of which traces had been found. We talked of our civilization largely being based upon Greek philosophy. But the Greeks derived inspiration from the contemporary culture of India. Some twenty years ago the Finance Member of the Government of India proposed to devote a Budget surplus to the establishment of a trust fund for archaeological research. If his plan had been followed a great deal more than was known would have been discovered about ancient history. The

more Indians knew of their past the greater the pride they would take in it, and the greater their pride the greater would be their inspiration to labour so that India might once more become a centre from which ideas welcome to all nations might flow.

Mr. LIONEL AIRD, speaking as a guest, said that already in the present discussion there had been brought in the problem of the Indian national movement. Every national movement tended to feed itself upon memories of the past. It was a movement of revival, and it seemed in many ways a misfortune that it should be taking place in that form in India today. The revival of the national movement of India had meant a revival of interest in two different strands of culture, and so the solution of so many pressing Indian problems, especially social and economic problems, was complicated by the pull of two different cultural pasts. Of course, if they were optimistic, he hoped, with the author, that solutions would be achieved by a fusion of the two streams. But part of that revivalism was an obstacle in the economic field in another way. Consider the great problem of improving Indian agriculture. Agricultural production had immensely increased, but Sir Alfred Watson had mentioned 50 million additional mouths to feed, and he might have mentioned that the number since 1880 was 140 million, a larger addition to the population in sixty years than the present population of the United States. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that there was a very great social problem, and here again there was the pull between the forward-looking elements of the population, who thought in terms of collective farms, and the other school, who were devoted to peasant worship. Mr. Paul Lamarine Yates, writing about agriculture in Europe, gave as one of the three obstacles to agriculture, peasant worship, and that was an obstacle in India today.

When the war was over all the great social problems which existed in India would be still there, and added to them would be the immense problems of readjusting Indian industrial and other life, the same sort of problems which had to be faced in Europe after the last war. If in addition to these immense problems India was to be also a political problem, he was inclined, in contemplation of the prospect, to be a pessimist. That was one reason why, with diffidence but still with conviction, he expressed the earnest hope that something should be done to break the back of that political problem before the war ended.

Sir AZIZUL HUQUE, in reply, said that he did not think Sir Alfred Watson had quite understood him. He had never said that Indian production had decreased. Perhaps Sir Alfred Watson would understand him if he said that their agriculture had decayed.

Sir ALFRED WATSON : You are thinking of jute solely.

Sir AZIZUL HUQUE denied that he was thinking solely of jute. Take the Province of Bengal alone. It showed improved production, but was its agriculture in a prosperous condition? At one time it was more than self-sufficient in its sugar crop. Today sugar came into it from outside. Yet it had millions and millions of trees for date sugar. About 1820-25 vast amounts of sugar were obtained from the Province of Bengal. Why had that completely gone? There was the standing fact that between 1820 and 1840 Bengal sent the largest amount of sugar to the British Isles. He challenged Sir Alfred Watson to deny that.

The CHAIRMAN : The debate to which we are looking forward cannot take place now. It has to be properly staged. (Laughter and cheers.)

Sir AZIZUL HUQUE, continuing, said that he did not dispute for a moment that statistics might be a most deceptive method of arriving at the facts. But if Sir Alfred Watson said that 50 million additional people had to be fed, it was necessary to find out how much additional acreage had come under cultivation. Again, transport had to be considered. If Sir Alfred Watson said that transport in Bengal was as important a factor as it was before, he could only note his opinion, he could not agree with it. What Sir Alfred had said about the past might be correct in his view. India was thinking not only of the past, and that was why in his paper he had stressed the importance of economic rather than of political questions.

He thanked Mr. Chinna Durai for his remarks. He said that he knew only

India today. After all, a country's past played an important part in its future destiny. Every schoolboy was taught the history of England. The men who had made the British Empire were constantly brought to the minds of the young. The young were reminded of the ideal which had inspired this country in the building up of its greatness. Indeed, he wondered whether at times there was not in England too much veneration for the past. He recalled that when the Houses of Parliament assembled for a new session the vaults were still searched in view of a possible Guy Fawkes.

He was grateful also to the other speakers and to the Chairman. His paper was simply an attempt to show how modern India was shaping. What should be the remedy for her present troubles it was for others to discover. But it was well at times to know what India was really thinking.

Sir FREDERICK SYKES, M.P., in proposing a vote of thanks, said that they had been sailing over very deep waters that afternoon, sometimes calm and sometimes a little choppy. But when conditions had become at all troubled the Chairman had given a gentle diplomatic touch to the rudder, which made everything easy again! They were much indebted both to him and to Sir Azizul Huque for a very delightful afternoon.

The lecturer had described the past of India in a poetic way. It was fascinating to be brought to think of India's past, and in doing so Sir Azizul Huque had driven yet one more nail into the coffin of that ignorance from which this country and most others suffered with regard to India.

Too much stress could not be laid upon the necessity for all the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations to understand the Indian problem. And, although the final responsibility must be ours, it was almost equally important for America to understand it. Everybody should know how anxious we are to find a solution.

He congratulated the High Commissioner on the skill with which he had condensed and simplified such a vast theme, and agreed with him in his plea that to understand the present and deal with the future we must have a sound knowledge of the past.

The complexity and difficulty of the Indian problem had again been shown by the Cripps Mission. Everybody admitted that. The Cripps Mission showed, too, the immense lengths to which we were willing to go to render the position less dangerous to the cause of the United Nations. Why did the Cripps Mission fail? Why was it that so generous an offer was not accepted? The crux of the situation was to be found in the opposing claims of Muhammadan and Hindu, of which the historical aspect, so clearly depicted by Sir Azizul, was very important; and in its scale affecting some 400 million people.

THE INDIAN CRISIS: MUSLIM VIEWPOINTS

BY PROFESSOR SIR HASSAN SUHRAWARDY, O.B.E., M.D., D.SC., LL.D.

THE difficulties of the Indian political problem and events leading to the present crisis are too well known to require any attempt on my part at restating them. My purpose is to present the Muslim points of view. I wish to say at once that the statements which I am going to make are objective and are the results of my personal observations and contacts, particularly during my stay in India while on leave early this year. My private and personal views must not be taken in any way to be connected with my official position.

At the present moment the overriding necessity of the world is to muster together all material and moral forces and co-ordinate them in a whole-hearted effort to vanquish the forces of evil and enslavement. The

solution of the Indian problem is a vital factor in securing this end. The ideal, however, is not only to win the war but to lay the foundations for winning the peace. Such efforts cannot be left until the end of the war. The principles of the future political system of India have to be decided immediately, so that the necessary steps can be taken to make India ready to fit into the New Order, with a strong China and Russia in the map of Asia. Instead of an embarrassing post-war liability on Great Britain or the British Commonwealth of Nations, India should be an asset whose friendship and co-operation would be valuable to the United Nations.

Co-operation has to be established between His Majesty's Government and the people of India by mutual consent as between equals, for a purpose which the people of India consider worthy, and which has been clearly expressed through organized public opinion. It is no use prolonging negotiations in directions where past experience has shown that nothing but failure is likely.

THE CONGRESS PARTY

I wish to recall the fact that the Congress movement was started in 1885 with the object of achieving political reform for the peoples of India by constitutional means. It was a "National" Congress, and its nationalist ideals attracted many thoughtful and educated Indian Muslims. Between 1918 and 1925 we find the brothers Maulanas Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali prominent in it; but they realized their helplessness in stemming the tide of anti-Muslim tendencies in the organization and left the party. Today we find Mr. Khaliquzzman Chowdhri, formerly Congress Dictator in the United Provinces, working with Mr. Jinnah, who was himself at one time a Congress man.

From an organization which was critical of, but not hostile to, the British Raj, the Congress has passed through many stages reaching to passive and now active non-co-operation, and has sponsored the claim to complete severance of the British connection. At the present moment, with the most important sea bastion of India in the east in enemy hands, and her sea and land frontiers in the east and the west threatened by well-equipped, resourceful and ruthless enemies, the Congress leaders have thought it proper to launch a campaign of disorder and sabotage inside the country, which has brought about interference with communications and other hindrances of the war effort.

The Congress organization long ago ceased to be national. It is dominated by a highly educated caste Hindu oligarchy, many of whom are militant, and others are Fascist totalitarians who want to grasp governing power in their own hands. These tendencies were clearly demonstrated when after April 1, 1937, for the best part of two and a half years, seven of the eleven Provinces of British India were under Congress rule as autonomous Provinces.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

The All-India Muslim League was organized in 1906 with the object of giving special attention to the political interests of the Muslim community. It is by far the best organized and most influential exponent of

Indian Muslim public opinion, and has attained dynamic force under the presidentship of Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, called Al 'Kaid-el-Azim (the great leader) by Indian Muslims. The importance of the Muslim League in the political picture of modern India has not been presented in its true perspective.

The Prime Minister's speech on September 10 showed that the Congress is far from being the exponent of the political opinion of the whole of India. It is not even the exponent of the views of a united Hindu India. The fifty millions of the scheduled castes, the millions belonging to the important Hindu Mahasabha, the thousands of the Hindu Liberal Party, are not included in it. The single organized political party in India with the greatest number of adherents is not the Congress, nor the Hindu Mahasabha, but the Muslim League, and the 'Kaid-el-Azim enjoys the fullest confidence of his followers. The Muslim League has the backing not only of the intelligentsia, but of the masses. In support of this statement, the results of the by-elections in Muslim constituencies of the Central and Provincial Legislatures in India since January, 1938, may be quoted. In fifty-six such elections forty-six seats have been captured by the Muslim League candidates and three only by the Congress. The remaining seven seats were won by Muslims belonging to no party. The Natore by-election in Bengal a few months ago was significant. In spite of the popularity and power of the Chief Minister, Mr. Fazlul Haq, inside the Bengal Legislative Council, his candidate was defeated by the Muslim League supporter, because Mr. Fazlul Haq had made coalition with the Congress parties and has been in conflict with Mr. Jinnah.

The League has united Shias, Sunnis and other sects, and as a progressive Muslim political body has done away with the need for the prop of the mullah and the mufti—priest and theologian—as a political instrument. The Congress, on the other hand, has utilized the medieval religious fanaticism of the Hindus as well as of Muslims for political purposes. In the Bijnor by-election the Congress Muslim workers were dressed in the green Islamic colour, carried the Islamic flag with the crescent and star, and raised the cry of "Allah-o-Akbar" at their meetings. The Muslims certainly place loyalty to Islam above everything else, but the Muslim League executives, realizing the true spirit of Islam, have abstained from following the Congress methods.

Mr. Jinnah is just as anxious as Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, or any other Congress leader to serve the interests of India, independent of the trusteeship of Britain, and to see her strong and self-governed. But with his clear, analytical, and practical mind Mr. Jinnah has taken full cognizance of events in Europe and the world situation, and has realized that India has to be independent of Britain, but is not to be put under the yoke of some other Power, be it European, American, or Asiatic, or, for that matter, under that of the Hindus of India.

It is for this reason that the action of the Congress contrasts with that of the Muslim League, which holds that the war effort is not to be embarrassed and that full co-operation in the fighting forces and in the production and supply of munitions is to be maintained. To the fighting forces in the present war the Muslim community has contributed nearly

35 per cent. in the Army and 88 per cent. in the mercantile marine and over 80 per cent. in the Royal Indian Navy. Before the war the Muslim proportion in the Indian Army was still greater.* The following extract from Mr. Jinnah's speech at New Delhi on September 13 is illuminating. He said :

" Britain generally is not recognizing the importance of the Muslim League. If I ordered the League not to co-operate and to embarrass the war effort we could give 500 times more trouble than the Congress Party is giving today. . . . Even if this civil disobedience movement succeeded in paralyzing the British power, the only result would be that a foreign aggressor could seize the country, and India might be broken into pieces."

The Muslims realize that the British came as traders, became merchant princes, and then by force of circumstances gradually took the position of administrators and rulers, and have gained experience in working democratic forms of government in Oriental and African countries. Any other nation that comes to India will come by force of arms, and exercise conquering rule over the vanquished. The Muslims have no wish to be the subjects of experiments by hitherto inexperienced European masters like the Germans, or Asiatics like the Japanese. I have personally seen how the British have implemented the democratic system of government in Western, Central, and Northern Africa. The Muslims of India also realize that the British have introduced modern sanitary improvements, established public health measures, developed irrigation and great engineering projects, and given a new turn to agriculture and industries in India. But they are apprehensive lest, in spite of their dual heritage of Indo-Saracenic culture and civilization and great tradition of working democratic institutions, they should be denied their just rights.

FEARS AND HOPES

The position taken by the Muslim League is consequent on the bitter experience of twenty-eight months' rule by the Congress in more than half the British Indian autonomous Provinces. This experience convinced the Muslims of the need for ensuring preservation of their distinct cultural and educational standards, to plan their own economic life, preserve their traditions, and exercise freedom of worship. They claim the right to live their own lives without interference and to enjoy political self-expression. Safeguards in the way of concessions, such as weightage and communal representation, are repugnant to the self-respect of the Muslims, besides being a source of legitimate irritation to the Hindus. Apart from securing their special rights and privileges in the Provinces, the Muslims also desire to escape from domination by a central Government of India, which under the Federal plan of the Act of 1935 would be predominantly Hindu. The Government of India in their zeal for appeasement of the Congress have tended to forget the legitimate claims of the Muslim people. In the recently enlarged Executive Council of the Governor-General there are only three Muslim members out of fifteen, a proportion equal to that of the British members, who represent a total population of only 135,000

* See Appendix A.

people. If the 136,000 Anglo-Indians are added, and also the 7¼ million Indian Christians of all denominations, the total will not go beyond 7½ million people. Yet on a population basis the Christians have equal representation on the Executive Council of the Governor-General to 94½ million Muslims.

CONTRASTS IN OUTLOOK

While the Muslim League is no less nationalist than the Congress Party, it has a sense of values with an international outlook as a result of the democratic foundations and practice of the social system of Islam, which does not find any place for the cult of *Herrenvolk* and race superiority which has permeated both the German and Japanese philosophies of life, and finds its prototype in the practice of the caste system and exclusiveness and social non-co-operation of the Hindu *bhadra* *logue*.

Social co-operation is a keystone of democratic government. The Muslims preach and practise the equality of all believers of the faith of Islam and receive into the central structure of their society all Muslims, including converts from the non-caste Hindus, so traditionally despised and condemned by their proud Brahmin and Kshatrya rulers. There is no prejudice against intermarriage nor any colour bar. In the mosques and shrines all worship side by side. Neither wealth, birth nor calling nor trade has precedence. Nor is there any difference between the Arab and the non-Arab. Goodness is the only criterion of worth. Verse thirteen of the forty-ninth chapter of the Koran declares: "The most honoured with God is the one among you who is the most devout and righteous."

Hinduism presents a different picture. The orthodox Brahmin from Maharashtra or from Southern India will not give his daughter in marriage to a high-caste orthodox Kulin Brahmin from Bengal nor eat the same food. The Muslims feel that they cannot obtain social co-operation nor economic justice from the Hindu oligarchy, who deny common justice to the non-caste Hindus and practise exclusiveness even amongst Brahmin septs.

As a result of the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi, the progressive State of Travancore threw open the doors of temples for worship to non-caste Hindus. But this concession was restricted in such a way that non-caste Hindus could only enter the temples at prescribed hours—after the caste Hindus had finished their worship. For the non-caste Hindus the worship had to be conducted by priests who could not, on grounds of supposed contamination, minister to the spiritual needs of the high-caste Hindus. After the non-caste worshippers left the temples had to be washed, fumigated, and purified, according to orthodox ritual, at State expense.

INDIAN MUSLIMS A NATION

The intermixture of races and cultures in India has been very great, but she assimilated and absorbed every one of the invading elements that came and made their home in her soil. The Muslims of India, however, unlike other immigrant settlers, have been able to preserve their identity, because from the first decade of the seventh century to about A.C. 1800 there was a constant and varied stream of Muhammadan immigrants—

Arabs, Afghans, Turks, Persians, and Mongols. These elements not only supplied recruits for the armies of the independent Muslim kingdoms and states, and administrators and high officials of government, but it was also from these sources that India was refreshed by new groups of artists, artisans, traders, merchants, poets, saints, and preachers. They caused continual regeneration and gave vigour and new life to the followers of Islam in the remotest corners of India, providing a pattern on which the culture and thought of Indian Muslims have been based. The blend of Arab, Persian, and Turkish cultures shows itself in the food, dress, manners, refined industries, arts and crafts of India; the Indo-Saracenic style of architecture; the Mogul paintings; the enamelled and inlay work, Mina, Jamdani, Kalabattoo, Kinkhwab, and Jamawar shawls—these are a few of the many examples of this influence. Like the British nation, who are made up of many elements—Anglo-Saxons, Picts, Scots, Welsh, Danes, Norwegians, Normans, Huguenots—these various strands brought together feel and think themselves as one people; they suffer together and fight and endure together for common values and ideals. The Muslim community of India, therefore, stands as one nation.

It is true that the Indian Muslims have resemblances common to the inhabitants in general; but they possess distinctive characteristics as Muslim nationals. In the same way a certain amount of similarity in dress, food, and manners and customs exists amongst European nations, but this would not justify transferring, say, Belgium to the French or part of the Netherlands to Germany. Nations are united in groups that they form themselves on the ideals for which they wish to work together. The United Nations are committed to uphold the independence of small nations in Europe, and they cannot apply some other standard between the Hindus and Muslims of India. The food in the different Provinces may be slightly different in its flavour and taste, but the ceremonial foods (e.g., *pilau*, *'kaurma*, *kifta*, and *'kalia*), the dress (*aba*, *'khaba*, *ammama*, *pairahan*, and *'kurta payjama*), the ideals and standards of culture are alike for all Muslims throughout India. Linguistically, they speak allied provincial dialects, but Urdu is their lingua franca. Let there be no mistake about this linguistic and cultural unity and identity of spiritual values and ideals, to break which in recent years determined and insidious attempts have been made under one excuse or another, and notably during the existence of Congress ministries.

“Urdu” means “camp” or “cantonment” in Turki, and springs from the intermixture of the languages of the races that came from Western and Central Asia with those of Hindustan. Hence Urdu is sometimes called “Hindustani.” It is an indigenous language of India, and Hindu scholars and poets have made great contributions to it. It contains a large percentage of Turki, Persian, and Arabic words, and provides the common medium of expression of thought and understanding of ideals for the Indian Muslims particularly. This is due to the fact that the Muslims of India study Arabic and Persian to understand their religious practices and cultural needs by reference to the original sources, and it has strengthened the practice of democratic principles of Islam in India, and binds the Muslims together as one nation.

CLAIMS ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The Indian Muslims have a special claim on the British Government, which replaced the Muslim suzerainty 150 years ago. With the advent of the British a transformation came into the lives of the Muslims. As the political authority of the British increased, and their power was more and more consolidated, disintegration and degeneration of Muslim military and civil power followed.

"Muslims were withdrawn from Government positions which had been their privilege to enjoy for centuries under the patronage of their own rulers. Persian as their official language was discarded in 1837 and English and the vernaculars of India put in its place. Government positions of *Qadi* and *Qadi-ul-Qudat* were abolished in 1864, with a consequent effect upon the administration of Muslim law."*

Shorn of power and deprived of wealth and the loaves and fishes of office which carried influence and economic prosperity, the Indian Muslims presented a pathetic spectacle. In commerce and trade the British replaced the Muslim merchant princes, and the products of the mills and factories of the British Empire replaced the hand-made arts and crafts and goods in which the Muslims excelled. The trade routes by sea and by land, once dominated by Muslims, ceased to be in their hands. Today in many parts of India Muslims are the tillers of land and the hewers of wood, the labourers behind the plough, the operators in the factories and at the looms. The bankers, the money-lenders, the landowners, the owners of mills and workshops, and those in high positions of influence in the machinery of the Government are overwhelmingly non-Muslim. The gross disparities upon which the demon of broken fellowship rests have to be overcome and a higher standard of comfort is to be made possible in the homes and in the lives of millions of God's creatures.

For the first half of the 150 years of British rule it was the policy of Government to look upon the Muslims with suspicion and to favour the Hindus, and for the Hindus it was very easy to adopt the English system of education, manners, and customs to replace *aba*, *choga*, and the ceremonial dress of the Muslim for English dress, and to discard Persian and learn English. The Muslims thus remained sullen and crestfallen. They became more and more poverty-stricken and discontented. Misdirected by bad leadership under the influence of disgruntled and ignorant mullahs who were burning with misguided religious zeal, the Muslims banned English education and Western institutions as un-Islamic. There was general decline until, from the sixties, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan devoted his great personal powers, imagination, and cultured mind with zeal and enthusiasm to lead the Muslims to accept the new order brought by the impact of Western ideas, to awake to the true spirit of Islam, and to find their salvation through enlightenment and education. With the collaboration of a small band of kindred spirits, he founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875, which in 1920 became the now famous Aligarh Muslim University. The All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference, founded in 1886 by Sir Syed for the promotion of Western

* *Islam Today* (Indian Section). Faber and Faber.

learning amongst the Muslims, continues to hold conferences annually in different cities of India, and the special educational and cultural needs of Muslims are examined and appropriate resolutions passed.

The Western impact before which the Muslims of India had crumbled and disintegrated has caused them during the last seventy years to revive, being no longer a prey to the dead weight and withering blast of fanatical and ill-educated mullahs, but as up-to-date progressive citizens of the world. The younger generation of Muslim India are quite within their rights in demanding a fresh orientation of their environment and beliefs. Hence the demand for "Pakistan," which is so much in the news. The following observations of a young British officer justify such feelings:

"My first year of Indian service had been spent at Bareilly in the United Provinces, where only one man in five is a Muslim. The regiment was suddenly transferred across the Indus to Kohat. I found myself still in British India, but as though in a foreign Muslim land, and the full Muslim flavour of it all gave me a thrill of pleasure and excitement that I have never forgotten. These are the emotions of a Christian; it can be realized what the Muslims of my regiment, born and bred in Hindu India, must have felt, and what a realization of loss they must have experienced."

LITERACY

Much has been made of the educational deficiencies of the Muslims as a reason for their not being given a due share in Government administration and British business undertakings. It is well known that in many of the activities which serve to influence public opinion the Hindu takes the lead. The arguments and pleas of the Press, almost entirely controlled by the rich Congress Party, have greatly obscured the issues. The viewpoints of the Muslims have either gone by default or been presented to the public in a distorted manner.

On account of the unfortunate circumstances I have mentioned the Muslims in the past were deficient in English and general education and lacked the necessary qualifications for employment. But today the comparison between the figures of literacy for Hindus and Muslims, based on Census reports, does not show a very great disparity on a population basis. In 1931 the figures were:

MUSLIMS.—64 per 1,000 or 6·4 per cent., 10·7 per cent. being male and 1·5 per cent. being female.

HINDUS.—84 per 1,000 or 8·4 per cent., 14·4 per cent. being male and 2·1 per cent. being female.

The 1941 figures are not yet available, but there must have been a marked improvement. In 1932-1937 (*vide* the eleventh Quinquennial Review of Education, p. 242), Muslims formed only 24·7 per cent. of the population of British India, but Muslim students were 16·1 per cent. of the school population. The growth and increase was, therefore, more than in proportion to the Muslim population. Muslims, men and women, have competed successfully at competitive examinations, have been recipients of the Government of India's State scholarships, and with others have studied at famous British universities or at universities on the continents of Europe and America, and have won marked distinctions. In

politics many Muslim women have taken an honourable share. Begam Shah Nawaz of Lahore acquitted herself remarkably well during the Round-Table Conference in London, is a Parliamentary Secretary in the Punjab, and is serving on the India National Defence Council. Mrs. Zobeda Ata-ur Rahman is Deputy-President of the Legislative Council in Assam, and Mrs. Ijaz Rasul in the United Provinces. The lady representative in the World Congress of Faiths in London a few years ago was a distinguished Muslim graduate. The Muslim Women's Students Federation recently held successful sessions at Delhi and at Nagpur. The new spirit of self-esteem and the spiritual forces working within have set the feet of Indian Muslims on the path of a grand and splendid future.

"AKHAND HINDUSTAN"—UNDIVIDED INDIA

A great propaganda cry has been engineered on the allegation that the Muslim community and their leader, Mr. Jinnah, are attempting to divide a united India into separate portions. The Congress and Mahasabha cry that they want an "*Akhand*" India ("*Akhand*" meaning "undivided") is entirely misleading. No one who has visited India can deny that, socially and according to cultural standards, India is already sharply divided. At every railway station where food and refreshments are served there are separate Hindu and Muslim restaurants, separate Hindu and Muslim tea-stalls, and even the drinking-water offered to the travelling public is labelled for Hindus and Muslims separately. While Muslims and Christians do not object to taking the water or eating the food served by a Hindu, the food and water of Hindus must be prepared and served by Hindus only, and that by caste Hindus. One has only to travel from Karachi to Shillong, or Peshawar to Madras, or from north to south, or east to west, anywhere throughout India, to see the striking difference in food, in dress, in appearance, and in personal names of the Muslims and Hindus. Colonel M. L. Farrar, who has given thirty-four years' service to India, makes the following remarks:

"In any town in India a Muslim may live in what is called a 'Muslim quarter' or a street where a large number of Muslims live, but as often as not he has only to leave his front door to find himself among people whose every thought runs counter to his, whose clothes have a different cut, whose hair is differently trained, and whose standards and habits and ways of life draw a sharp dividing line between him and them."*

Further, for the last 150 years, from the time of the East India Company's rule, British India has been grouped and regrouped into various Provinces for administrative convenience, without regard to definite geographical boundaries or linguistic considerations, and there are large numbers of independent Indian States. On April 1, 1937, the Government of India Act, 1935, came into operation, and from this date British India has been grouped into eleven autonomous Provinces. The Muslims do not wish to divide a united India; on the other hand, their proposal contemplates a union of the eleven Provinces into, say, five groups, based on certain well-known principles, such as identity of cultural standards and

* *Whither Islam*, p. 178. London: Victor Gollancz.

a common linguistic link. All that the Muslim League wants is that in North-West and North-East India certain Provinces, each preserving their autonomous status, should be allowed to combine of their own free will to form a State having the status of a Dominion. This could be decided on a plebiscite, but the principle should be accepted now, leaving the actual details of the Amery-Cripps proposals to be worked out after the war is won.

In North-West India, Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province would form one block with the port of Karachi. In North-East India the Bengal Presidency and the settled districts of Assam would similarly form another block with the ports of Calcutta and Chittagong. In these States Mr. Jinnah offers statutory safeguards to the non-Muslim minorities on a basis of reciprocity by obtaining similar safeguards for the Muslim minorities in the Hindu majority Provinces in Western, Southern, and North-Central India. Mr. Jinnah comes from the Bombay Presidency, where the Muslim population is less than two millions out of a total of nearly twenty-one millions. He must have satisfied himself that the interests of the Muslim community in his own Province will be adequately safeguarded in his scheme.

The Census of 1941 reveals the fact that the Indian Muslims are found in preponderant numbers in North-Western India, where $22\frac{1}{2}$ millions live in the contiguous Provinces of the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier, and British Baluchistan. Similarly, in the north-eastern area nearly 37 millions of Muslims live in the contiguous Provinces of Bengal and Assam. This population is not static, but progressively expanding, which gives additional importance to the claims of this great community. I quote the following extract from Sir Frank Brown's letter in *The Times* of September 9 to prove my point:

"Conflicting statements have been made as to the growth of the Muslim population. It has advanced [in the last decennial period] from 77,000,000 to 94,250,000, while the Hindu growth has been relatively less marked from 238,000,000 to 255,500,000—a figure including some 49,000,000 of depressed classes outside the pale of the caste system. Since 1881 the Muslim percentage of population has risen from 19.7 to 24.2. The figures I have given make allowance for the separation of Burma from India in 1937."

Sir Frank's figures are for the whole of India. In British India there are 81 million Muslims out of a total of 295.8 millions, making a percentage of 27, while that of the Hindus is 64.5. The relative figures for the whole of India are: Hindus 65.6 and Muslims 24.2 per cent.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE

The Muslims have a special genius for administrative responsibilities. They have justified their selection and given undoubted proof of their ability in any position of trust and executive authority in which they have been placed. Apply any standard you like, the proportion of Muslim good officers in permanent services and in important political appointments are no less high than that of any other community. As to the contention that large numbers of the Muslims of India are erstwhile Hindu converts, why,

then, should they not have the same intelligence and ability as the Hindus? But this is only propaganda. The Muslim nationals have been badly treated, and yet have shown undoubted ability in high office and in academic circles. A reference to the teaching staff of various colleges and universities in India will show that not only as lecturers, but also as readers and professors, Muslims are among those prominent in academic circles. This is all the more creditable because of the serious handicap, political and economic, from which the Muslims have been suffering. Their renaissance is due to the liberal English education and Western cultural contacts, in which they found so much in common in moral foundation and tradition.

Let me now summarize the claim for acceptance of the principle of separate Muslim States. It is based on—

(1) The numerical strength of the Muslim population and its concentration in certain areas, though some followers of Islam are scattered in every part of the sub-continent.*

(2) Identity of cultural standards and ideals, and the common linguistic link.

(3) The Muslim tradition and genius for practical administration on democratic lines.

(4) Their special claims on the British Government as having replaced the Muslim Empire of India.

PAKISTAN: WHAT DOES IT SIGNIFY?

The Pakistan plan, not in the early forms, but as sponsored by Mr. Jinnah, as far as I can make out, will provide the Muslims with independent States under the Statute of Westminster. They will have the right to their own flag, their own independent existence, to choose their own representatives in the Dominions of the British Commonwealth and in foreign countries, and to conduct their own foreign relations. The Muslims will be free to plan their own economic life, preserve their traditions, develop their culture, observe freedom of worship, and enjoy political self-expression. The advantage of a Dominion over a completely severed independence from the Commonwealth of British Nations is that, in addition to enjoying independence, a Dominion receives in time of need adequate naval and military support, such as is now being given to Australia, and it has the right to secede from the Commonwealth if and when it likes. The details for working the independent Muslim States will be determined after the war is won. The boundaries have to be settled and the areas allocated. Whether or not they are to be co-termini with enclaves will then be decided; but the principle has to be accepted and guaranteed now.

Mr. Jinnah envisages the course followed in the evolution of the Union of the Commonwealth of Australia and that of the Dominion of Canada. The Muslim States will first function as separate and independent units in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and, if and when found feasible, confederate as equal partners by mutual consent with other parts of India and with other Dominions. There will be no difficulty in guaranteeing the maintenance of free trade in India. The matter depends on reciprocal arrangements and goodwill. Plans for sea and external land customs, a central machinery for the control of Indian continental communications,

* See Appendix A.

excise and taxes at unified rates, and for other forms of modern good government can be formulated and adjusted with the consent of the parties concerned.

The Pakistan which I have explained does not contemplate amalgamation with any foreign kingdom nor with Indian States, but proposes the union of autonomous Provinces only in British India. Therefore, the interpretation that the word "Pak" is made up of the first letter of the three countries which it is contemplated to unite—namely, Punjab, Afghanistan or Afghan border countries (North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan), with the State of Kashmir—is not Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan. Nor does the Pakistan movement as envisaged by Mr. Jinnah require any uprooting of associations and ties of homeland which have existed for generations by an interchange of populations from the Hindu majority Provinces to the Muslim majority Provinces. What, then, does the Pakistan movement mean and signify?

Pakistan is the planned symbol and exposition of certain facts. It seeks human decency and social progress for millions without distinction of creed, caste, or colour. It is by no means an aggressive movement against any community or political party; rather it is a protective and defensive movement. Its root causes lie in the social injustice and selfish exclusiveness of that great evil, the caste system of the Hindus. The Muslims and the Christians alike are considered by the Hindus to be so impure, their very shadow so defiling, that they are not allowed to enter the kitchen of an orthodox caste Hindu, much less to prepare his food or to handle it. Even today the orthodox Hindu sweetmeat and refreshment vendor will keep a jar full of water in which his non-Hindu clients have to drop the coins in payment of their purchases. The food is not handed over to the customer, but the purchaser has to produce a receptacle or put out his outstretched hands, into which the packet containing the food is dropped by the vendor without touching the purchaser.

The Muslims and Christians are known as *melachhyas* by the orthodox Hindus. The meaning of this term is "unclean, impure, dirty." The process of conversion of a Muslim or a Christian back to Hinduism is called *shuddhi*, which means the process of cleansing or purifying. Yet Islam makes cleanliness a part of godliness. Physical cleanliness and spiritual purifications are linked together. Ablution is necessary before offering prayers. Prayers cannot be offered in a state of physical impurity. The worshipper must be clean in body, wear clean clothes—decent, though it may be simple. It is for the purpose of removing this misrepresentation of being called impure or dirty that the term "Pakistan" has been used. This compound word is made up of "*Pāk*," which in Persian means "pure or clean," with "*Istan*" of Sanskrit origin, meaning "the land of." Therefore, Pakistan means "the land of the pure or clean." Our Hindu brethren in the parts of India concerned will be quite welcome inside it as possessing full rights of citizenship.

THE PUNJAB POSITION

The difficulty in implementing the scheme of Pakistan in the North-West block lies in the objections recorded at Delhi in March, 1942, to the

Cripps proposals by the spokesmen of the Sikh community. It numbers in all 5·7 millions. The total population of the Punjab is $28\frac{1}{2}$ millions, comprising $16\frac{1}{4}$ million Muslims and $3\frac{3}{4}$ million Sikhs. It may be pointed out that most of the Sikhs of the Punjab live in the area south-east of a line following the Sutlej River up to Ferozepore, and from there the railway line passing by Amritsar and Gurdaspur to the River Ravi.

The Sikhs are a virile race with a fine spiritual background. They have played a gallant part in many wars, and it is expected that they will show the characteristic clear thinking and broad-mindedness of brave people. The original spiritual revivalist movement of Guru Nanak has unfortunately assumed a political character in later years, and it is one of the tragedies of history that there has been antagonism between the Muslims and the Sikhs when there is so much common in their spiritual background and faith. It is for the leaders on both sides to find the compromises and concessions which will enable them to successfully work the scheme. It seems to me a concession to the combined Sikhs and Hindus of a fifty-fifty representation with the Muslims of the Punjab would be a good gesture.* In any case, if, after careful consideration, the Sikh community are not satisfied that with the constitution of the North-West Dominion under the Pakistan scheme their present influential position in the Punjab and the whole of India will be much improved, they could form an enclave to include the majority of the Sikh population, and by treaty rights safeguard the interests of the majority living outside the enclave.

HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY

I express the earnest hope that what I have been saying will not be regarded as unduly critical of the great Hindu community. In my private and personal capacity I have the privilege of counting many warm friends amongst Hindus of all shades of political opinion. I recall in affectionate memory many high-caste Hindu gentlemen, past and present, leaders in thought, culture, education, commerce and industry, whose guidance I have had the honour to receive and whose co-operation, kindness and hospitality I have enjoyed.

I am, indeed, as Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan has testified, a great advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity based on mutual forbearance and cultural interests. There can, however, be no true friendship and goodwill without a mutual recognition of equality. Those who may be advanced in education and easy circumstances should encourage every facility for those whom they regard as economically and educationally backward. Different communities should allow each other to maintain their own identity and treasure their own traditions. One community should not try to overpower, stifle, or efface the other, but help to develop its special culture and genius.

The beauty of a bouquet or of a garden is in the blending of flowers of different colours, each providing a special contribution of its own. Cannot the sub-continent of India be a *Rajistan* of the Indian Princes, a *Pakistan*

* See Appendix B.

of the Muslims, and a *Hindustan* of the Hindus, united under a great Pan-Indian conception of confederate nationalism?

APPENDIX A.

FIGHTING FORCES IN INDIA.

The following figures of the fighting forces in India, according to each community, are corrected to February, 1942 :

		Percentage of—	
		Population.	Contribution to the Army.
Muslims		24·2	34·7
Hindus		65·6	41·1
Sikhs		1·3	10·4
Gurkhas (from Nepal)		—	8·3
Others		8·9	5·5

The Muslims form nearly 88 per cent. of the Mercantile Marine and over 80 per cent. of the Royal Indian Navy.

APPENDIX B.

POPULATIONS, 1941.

PAKISTAN : NORTH-WEST BLOCK.

	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Hindu.</i>	<i>Muslim.</i>	<i>Sikh.</i>
Punjab	28,418,819	7,550,372	16,217,242	3,757,401
Sind	4,535,008	1,229,926	3,208,325	31,011
British Baluchistan	501,631	44,623	438,930	11,918
N.W.F.P.	3,038,067	180,321	2,788,797	57,939
Total	36,493,525	9,005,242	22,653,294	3,858,269

PAKISTAN : NORTH-EASTERN BLOCK.

	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Hindu.</i>	<i>Muslim.</i>	<i>Sikh.</i>
Bengal	60,306,525	25,059,024	33,005,434	16,281
Assam	10,204,733	4,213,223	3,442,479	3,464
Total	70,511,258	29,272,247	36,447,913	19,745

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A JOINT meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Central Asian Society was held in the hall of the Royal Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W. 1, on Wednesday, November 4, 1942, with Mr. Godfrey Nicholson, M.P., in the chair. Professor Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, O.B.E., M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., read a paper entitled "The Indian Crisis: Muslim Viewpoints."

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said that Sir Hassan Suhrawardy would speak with the authority and prestige of a distinguished career. He began life

as a member of a distinguished Muslim family of Bengal, and cut out for himself a career in medicine, being a graduate of Edinburgh University. He had wide political experience; he had been a member of the Bengal Legislative Council, and frequently took the chair as the elected Deputy President, being the first Muslim to hold such a position in India; but he was better known for his work in Calcutta University, of which he was ultimately Vice-Chancellor. He won general esteem and affection for his intellectual abilities and statesmanlike qualities during his tenure of that office. One episode in his career showed that he was not only academic, for on a famous occasion, within the memory of some of those present, he saved Sir Stanley Jackson, then Governor of Bengal, from assassination. Later he became a member of the Bengal Public Service Commission, and since 1939 he had been Adviser to the Secretary of State in this country. So much for the authority with which he could speak on political questions. He was speaking as a Muslim, and was known as a devout and practising member of that community.

Sir HASSAN SUHRAWARDY then read his paper.

The CHAIRMAN congratulated the lecturer on such a clear, well-thought-out, and well-read discourse. Sir Hassan had done the whole nation a real service because what was needed in this country today was first-hand knowledge about India. Owing to the war, few of those present had been to India for some years, and events were moving so quickly that the stage had been reached when it was facts, not theory, which counted.

These facts must receive careful attention, for Sir Hassan was not an irresponsible politician "on the make," but a man of sincerity and standing, and spoke with authority. The first of the three main facts which the speaker deduced was that the Hindu-Muslim political cleavage was very real. There was an ill-informed but large school of thought which said that Hindu-Muslim political cleavage was a stalking-horse used by British imperialism as an excuse for not handing over India to extremists. Secondly, there was a great and growing Muslim resurgence, a risorgimento which they welcomed with all their hearts. It had been a source of regret to students of Indian affairs in this country that for perhaps 200 years the Muslim community had been undergoing a form of cultural submergence. We remembered the achievements of the Mogul emperors, with their great military feats, great artistic, great architectural works (which still existed); and if there was to be a revival of that creative spirit which made Muslim rule so glorious in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries all would welcome it. Thirdly (which appeared to him as a British politician as the most important), the Pakistan idea had come to stay, and it would be a factor of prime political importance for this generation, which would ignore it at its peril.

Some Pakistan schemes entailed redistribution of population, some were based on the principle of zoning, some on separate non-contiguous Muslim States; but they all had one factor in common—that Muslim participation in an all-India organization must be founded on their significance and importance as autonomous national States and not on a numerical basis. If that was accepted, it was a totally new factor in the Indian picture. To himself, he must confess, any idea of separatism appeared retrograde. India was one; the unity of India was the greatest gift which Great Britain had given her, and any step backwards from that was a disaster.

There were many difficulties in the way: Where was self-determination to end? Did it not open up a vision of an India divided into an infinitude of small States, with an infinitude of minority problems? India was composed of a very large number of races, and the problem of mixed populations was not new—we had suffered from it in this part of the world too! Since the last war Europe had suffered from it very severely. Trying to make frontiers on ethnic considerations had not been a success. He saw the difficulties, perhaps, too clearly; on the other hand, he admitted that before true Indian unity could be achieved the various elements must achieve their own internal and separate unity. He could mention the example of Switzerland or the Holy Roman Empire, which bound together all forms of government, languages and races, and was for hundreds of years a potent force in European civilization.

Whatever the outcome of the Pakistan movement and what he had called the Muslim resurgence, we in this country welcomed it; it was a sign of vivid life, and any promise of renewed contributions by Muslim culture and civilization was to the good.

SIR STANLEY REED, M.P., said Sir Hassan used one term which was of more than passing significance when he said the case of the minority communities was not generally appreciated in this country or abroad. The term "minorities" needed clarification; during the Second Round-Table Conference figures were produced, and not challenged, to show that what were called the minorities embraced a majority—52 per cent.—of the population of India. It was true that the position of these "minorities" had to some extent gone by default, but why? Surely because neither in Britain, nor the Dominions, and especially in the United States of America, these large and very important Indian communities had not been at pains to make their case understood. The other side in Indian politics had been advocated with great energy and persistence, and not always with a strict regard to the facts; the Muhammadans had scarce been heard. However, so far as Britain was concerned, the inner meaning of the Pakistan movement had been so lucidly stated by Sir Hassan, and with such objectivity and fairness, that there was no longer excuse for ignorance.

Viewing the Pakistan movement in relation to India as a whole, considerations arose in regard to the status of the Provinces vis-à-vis the Centre which had a vital bearing on the future. Those relations had undergone marked changes. He could remember the days when the hand of the Central Government was so heavy on the Provinces that the local Government could not raise the wage of a chappassie a rupee a month without sanction. He was then known as the arch-decentralizer. Now the wheel had turned full circle, and the Provinces were so independent that he was becoming something of a centralizer. He was not alone in thinking that the centrifugal forces, always strong in India, had gathered such force that the unity of India, a matter of vital importance in this changing world, was imperilled. It was a tragedy that the great Act of 1935, which visualized a yet truer unity through the association of the Indian States in the Federal Government, was never brought into full being; but they could not go back; they must look forward.

There was one word used in the declaration of policy which Sir Stafford Cripps took to India which attracted little attention, yet was of the greatest significance. From the day when it was adumbrated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report until 1935, Indian polity was thought of in terms of Federation; the Declaration substituted the term "Union." That was not a mere question of phraseology; it connoted a new idea. The Federation suggested an all-powerful Central Government ceding certain powers to the Provinces: Union, the Provinces, autonomous in themselves, ceding certain powers to the Union Government. The meaning became clearer if they abandoned for all time the use of the misleading term "Provinces" and called these great administrative units what they really were—States. With all respect he would ask the great Muhammadan community to consider whether the powerful forces underlying the Pakistan movement, forces which the Chairman rightly said marked the welcome resurgence of the community, could not be secured by such a union of States, with their full autonomy, yet linked in an India whole for the common purposes of defence, foreign relations, customs and cognate subjects.

However, he was old enough not to try and teach other folk their business. The Muslims felt passionately on the subject of the ideas embodied in the term Pakistan; it was a force which had come to stay and must be reckoned with in any development of the Indian Constitution. At the same time he would, with all respect, ask the Muhammadans to consider this aspect of the question—whether it was not possible to preserve the spirit and substance of Pakistan in a Union of States which, whilst safeguarding the minorities, would leave unimpaired something which was infinitely precious—the administrative unity of India in the face of a threatening world.

Mr. ST. JOHN PHILBY thought Sir Hassan had treated a most delicate subject with such tact and gentleness that those who were not aware of the general lines of the Indian problem would scarcely realize that there was any controversy to consider. Sir Hassan said a good deal about Congress and about the Hindus, and he thought it

transpired from what he said and the way he said it that he had a feeling that he might have dealt rather harshly with them. They had to be very careful indeed in discussing this Indian question to be fair all round and realize that Congress had played a greater part and a more successful part in bringing about the situation in which the British Government had come forward with an offer of independence to India than any other party whatsoever. In its demand for independence Congress had the united sympathy of all the other parties, and it was very important to realize that all the political parties and all bodies or individuals who could be taken as representing Indian political opinion had been demanding independence for India. Therefore they should be very careful not to say too much against Congress; it was to Congress and to the Muslim League, in the first instance, that the British Government only a few months ago sent out Sir Stafford Cripps to present its proposals for the settlement of the Indian problem, and both the Congress and the Muslim League rejected them. He admitted that the reaction of the Muslim League to the decision of the British Government was different from the reaction of Congress, and the Muslim League was entitled to be absolved from any responsibility for the results of the deadlock; that rested upon the Congress and the British Government, because the deadlock arose out of their inability to settle their quarrel on friendly lines. The Congress leaders were no longer in a position to present their case for the world's judgment; they were in prison, and Mr. Churchill had said what His Majesty's Government thought about Congress. What he said was that it was a political party centring round a machine supported by manufacturing and financial interests. Was that a very grave condemnation of any political party? Would not the same definition fit the Conservative Party, of which Mr. Churchill was the leader, or any other of the great political parties?

Whether India was to have independence or not was settled, but let them not be tempted to say that the inability of the Hindus and Muslims to agree on the Pakistan issue absolved the British from the obligation to keep the promise to give independence to India. The Pakistan proposal was new; it would not have arisen if India had been made independent twenty years ago, but the Muslims had had time to realize that if independence was given to India under present conditions it would mean that they were perpetually subordinated to the Hindus. They looked for ways and means of evading that fate, and discovered Pakistan, which was not yet ten years old; but it was a principle which had taken root and which for all practical purposes was decided, whatever one might think of it. The Muslim people had every right to self-determination; nobody would deny them that right, and if it was put to the Muslim population whether they wished to form a permanent subordinate element in a Government with a Hindu majority, or have a Government of their own, no one could doubt what the result of the voting would be. That result would have the sympathy not only of the Muslims of India, but of the Muslim populations of all the other countries of the world. That position must be accepted, and it could be regarded as a case which had been decided.

Sir LIONEL HAWORTH said there were two things which were stated about the Pakistan movement—one, mentioned by the Chairman, that it was not, as was said, part of the strategy of the British Government to make its own situation easier, nor was it a temporary movement by the Muslims in the political game. Reading the *Proceedings* of the Round-Table Conference of eleven years ago, this was clear. It would be remembered that Mr. Fazil Huq, on behalf of H.H. the Aga Khan, made a statement, authorized by the Muslim delegation, saying that the delegation had taken up and given assent to some of the recommendations of the sub-committees on the distinct understanding that the position of the Muslim community would be effectively safeguarded in the future Constitution of India. This was an answer to the suggestion that the British had raised the Hindu-Muslim difficulty.

With regard to the temporary nature of the demand for Pakistan, this also was contradicted eleven years ago. Throughout the Muslims were asking for security. Lord Strabolgi in an article admitted that it was the most serious problem of all, and it had become more serious with the passage of years.

When the Joint Select Committee made its final report they made two statements, one that although there were no parties in India they were confronted with the age-

old antagonism of Hindu and Muhammadan, and that the two communities represented not only two religions, but two civilizations. With regard to Pakistan, the Select Committee said that it would have to be recognized that if free play were given to the forces which would be set in motion by an unqualified system of parliamentary government, the consequences would be disastrous to India, and perhaps irreparable. The Muhammadans agreed with the general idea of Federation; they only wanted security. Mr. Jinnah, in a recent statement, alleged that although many safeguards were provided to protect the interests of minorities in the Provinces, nevertheless some Provinces made every effort to suppress the language and customs of Muslims, and that the differences between the two were deep-rooted.

The growth of the idea of Pakistan could be seen in the results of the elections. In the general elections of 1936-1937 the Muslim League gained a very small percentage of votes. It was a new movement; nobody understood it, but in the elections which had taken place since the League had gained many more seats. Many leading members of the Muslim community had recently joined or expressed their agreement with the Muslim League. It was a growing movement, not a dying one.

Sir ERNEST HOTSON said that Sir Hassan's paper gave a very comprehensive, clear and temperate expression of the Muslim point of view, but he felt—and thought probably a good many others felt—that they did not really know very much more than they did before. Sir Hassan finished on a cheerful note, suggesting that the result would be a confederation or union of Hindu and Muslim States in India without breaking up its unity. At the same time many other pronouncements which had been made, and even some parts of the paper, suggested that Pakistan meant the breaking up of India into a number of different parts.

Other speakers had emphasized how immensely important it was that India should remain united. From a political point of view he did not see how that could be questioned. From an economic point of view it seemed at least equally essential that India should remain one. How could the two points of view be reconciled? Sir Hassan mentioned the schemes for dividing India into regions, and if they were sure that the Muslim League, both Mr. Jinnah and the other supporters of Pakistan, were prepared to accept one of these regional schemes, which would include possibly a redistribution of frontiers between the Provinces and, at all events, a grouping of Provinces, he was sure everybody would welcome such a scheme without hesitation.

All realized the necessity for security for the Muslims. No one wished to do anything which would imperil that security or deprive them of it, but there remained the problem of the security of the whole of India. If India were to be divided, as some suggested, into independent groups, perhaps hostile to each other, possibly even fighting against each other, and, it might be, seeking for alliances outside India, the result would be disastrous and India would be the chief loser.

He thought Sir Hassan's last words suggesting the possibility of confederation were hopeful, and indicated a course which would be supported with enthusiasm.

Captain L. D. GAMMANS, M.P., thought they should be especially grateful for the paper they had heard that afternoon; it seemed to have brought into the Indian question what was most needed at the present time—a sense of reality. He felt there were two problems in India, though most people did not realize it. The first was the relationship of this country to India, and the second the relationship of Indians to each other. The first question had surely been settled in principle for the last seven years. It had been stated in clear terms that the British Government was prepared to grant India the same independence as the British themselves enjoyed, and what new offer could be, in fact, made to India? We had further said that so far as we were concerned we would accept any form of Constitution upon which Indians could agree.

That brought him to the second problem: What chance was there, in fact, of that unity being realized? It seemed to the speaker that the chances were precisely nil, and they should face up to it. They had heard the attitude taken by the Muslim community, which was that they were prepared to enter into nothing which meant Hindu domination, and they had come out clearly and unmistakably in favour of the

Pakistan proposals. This destroyed what, after all, we had created—the unity of India—but nevertheless it was useless to ignore this implication; neither was it of any use to pretend that the unity of India could be established by some magic declaration or some magic formula.

What was needed most of all at the present time was a clear presentation of the facts of the situation, both in this country and in the U.S.A. At the present time the onus of the deadlock rested upon the British Government. We were told that it was our fault. Perhaps the second thing needed, as Sir Stanley Reed rightly said, was a clear presentation of the Muhammadan case. The Hindu case was very loudly and clearly expounded in this country. We were being told that Mr. Jinnah was nothing more or less than a British “stooge,” that Congress really represented Muhammadan interests, and so on. If the Muslim community wished their case to be heard, he would suggest that they take a little more trouble in its presentation.

These were the facts as they saw them today. Quite frankly, he was pessimistic with regard to the immediate future of India; he thought they might be able to patch up a superficial unity under the threat of Japanese invasion. He would completely Indianize the Viceroy's Council immediately, but whether that unity would remain when the fear of invasion was over was another question. He thought there were some problems in the world which were insoluble; the problem of Europe had remained insoluble for nearly two thousand years. It was those facts with regard to India, the difficulties with regard to India, which needed to be presented far more definitely, far more clearly, far more vehemently, than they had been, in order that they should be understood. It was useless to pretend there was unity in India where, in fact, no unity existed.

Sir HASSAN SUHRAWARDY, in reply, said he was happy to find that there had been more or less general agreement rather than disagreement or any doubt which he had to explain away, but a word here and there might be a help in elucidating the point of view which he wished to bring prominently before the meeting.

With regard to Sir Stanley Reed's remarks (and it was the trend of all British minds) that Indians should be united, and if there was unity then His Majesty's Government would give Dominion status or whatever else the Indians wanted, he was afraid he did not believe in it. Some other difficulty would crop up. This kind of suggestion about unity, he feared, would lead them nowhere. He had been very much impressed by Mr. Amery's observation that independence had to be attained, and not conferred like an honour. He was satisfied that Indians possessed the requisite qualifications. One must be practical, as Captain Gammans had said. Might he point out that Europeans, with their comparative unity of race, culture and religion, had not been united? How could India, backward as she was, be united if that ideal was unattainable in Europe? The deadliest wars ever fought had originated from this great continent of Europe. If we were bound by the Atlantic Charter to uphold the independence of small European nations, there must not be imaginary difficulties in the Indian Muslim and Hindu nationals having separate independent existence and the satisfaction of their own self-expression. Nobody could be entirely independent of everybody else: the United Nations were interdependent, whether Russia, China, the United States or Great Britain. The ideal of the United Nations was to give “little” Belgium, “little” Netherlands, Poland and other conquered peoples their political self-expression without any insuperable difficulties of inter-continental railway, river or canal transport, or excise and customs barriers. There were all the answers against Muslim demands to be found in Europe, and they should be applied with a clear and fair mind to India. The question must be approached in a spirit of humanity.

In reply to Sir Ernest Hotson's point, he stressed the fact that the Muslims did not wish to divide a united India. The division of India existed from the time of the Regulating Act of 1773, when the Governor-General in Bengal was given powers of control over Bombay and Madras. Acts were frequently passed from 1853 onwards which divided up India. All these groupings and divisions were carried out by the British for administrative convenience. The Muslims wished to unite on known cultural, linguistic and geographical bases. The unity of India should not be pressed on the German ideal of a united Europe under the domination of one supreme

Herrenvolk. From Morocco to Malaya the Muslims were the friends of Britain, but the Islamaphobe of the Crusaders had not yet disappeared from Europe.

The present unity of India was an administrative unity achieved by the British for efficiently carrying on military and civil administration by a central Government of India. Remove the controlling authority, and the jarring elements came into conflict. Sher Shah, Mohammad Tughlak and the Emperor Aurangzeb had all sought at different times the same kind of unity. The Pakistan scheme, such as he had explained, would enable both the Hindu and Muslim nationals to live and develop side by side as self-respecting neighbours who on common material and moral understandings would later on have respect and consideration for each other and confederate on a lasting peaceful basis.

General Sir JOHN SHEA proposed a vote of thanks to Sir Hassan Suhrawardy. Sir Hassan was an old and valued friend of his own, and he had indeed performed a great service, for not only had he given a lucid and instructive talk on the Muslim point of view, but he had produced a paper which should instruct public opinion.

AKBAR THE GREAT: ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THE Association shared in the celebration of the four-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Akbar the Great on November 23, 1942, promoted by the British Council, and held in the rooms of the Royal Society, Burlington House, W. I. The Royal Asiatic Society and the India Society also took part.

An exhibition organized by the Fine Arts Department of the British Council included a contemporary drawing of "the Great Mogul," lent by the India Office. Owing to war conditions there could be no exhibit of either of the two MSS. in this country of the Akbar Manuals, written by his intimate friend Abu'l-Fazil. But the owner of one of them, Mr. Chester Beatty, lent a number of the very fine reproductions made for the catalogue of his collection, depicting episodes in the life of Akbar. The pictures were shown in an apartment on the first floor, where tea was served. The meeting in the lecture hall was presided over by Sir Malcolm Robertson, M.P., Chairman of the British Council.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British Council existed primarily to interpret British culture—or what he preferred to call the British way of life—to other countries. They might ask, therefore, what the British Council had to do with the interpretation of Indian history and culture as exemplified in the career of the great Emperor Akbar. The answer was that while their primary business was concerned with the outward traffic from this country, a one-way traffic was not enough. They therefore made bold to interpret their mission as authority for the encouragement in a practical form of the return traffic, in the belief that it was only through a reciprocal commerce of ideas that they could build up that mutual spirit of understanding and tolerance among the nations which was the only secure foundation of real peace.

In the furtherance of this ideal, it was particularly appropriate that what was in fact the Council's first official essay in cultural exchanges with India should be devoted to the commemoration of Akbar the Great. The root of it all was that he symbolized from a former age the unity of India which all her friends would wish to see exemplified in our own times, and that he filled a unique position as the bridge between two great systems of religious and community life.

The Chairman added that he had the honour to read a message from His Exalted

Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar, who was looked on widely as the heritor of the Mogul tradition. It was :

"I am happy to learn of the celebration in London of the four-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Akbar, one of the greatest of the Moguls, who has left an ineffaceable impress on Indian tradition and culture. As the father of Indian unity, Akbar's inspiration still endures."

EQUAL JUSTICE TO ALL COMMUNITIES

Mr. L. S. AMERY, M.P. (Secretary of State for India), said the Chairman had said very truly that the British Council could best fulfil its task of interpreting the British way of life and way of thought to other nations if it conceived of its task as a reciprocal one, and also interpreted the thoughts and ways of others to them. In that respect the Council could have made no better beginning than in choosing for this task the interpretation of two great peoples in the British Commonwealth to each other and to use the occasion of the anniversary of the birth of a great man, who, more than any man in history, has interpreted people's different religion and outlook to each other in a common synthesis.

Akbar was one of the outstanding figures of his generation, and, indeed, of all history. He was without doubt the greatest man of that Turkish race which has produced so many famous warriors and administrators. He was the ruler, and, in the main, the creator of an empire which in military power and wealth equalled, if it did not surpass, those of his great contemporaries, Suleiman the Magnificent and Philip II. of Spain—not to speak of the little island kingdom from which Queen Elizabeth sent the first English envoys to visit his Court. In his person he combined the love of adventure and sport which had brought his grandfather, Babur, from a fugitive exile from a little principality in Turkestan to win an empire in India, with outstanding gifts as an administrator, with an enlightened patronage of arts and letters, and, above all, with a deeply religious outlook and a spirit of tolerance many centuries ahead of his own age, whether in Asia or in Europe. As a soldier and organizer of war, he was one of the first to use to the full the firearms developed during the previous century. As an administrator he was the first to establish an orderly system of government and of revenue over his whole empire, as distinct from the feudal levies of men and exactions of money which had satisfied his predecessors. It was, indeed, his system of land settlement and combination of administration with the collection of revenue which the East India Company inherited, and which was still deeply interwoven into the fabric of that so-called British rule in India, which was, in fact, not so much an alien system of government as an indigenous system developed by the British in India and modified in accordance with British ideas, more particularly by the conception of the reign of law. Under his impulse literature, painting, music and architecture all took on a new development and made his reign an Augustinian age to which Muslim and Hindu alike can look back with pride, Mr. Amery continued.

Akbar's claim to figure among the world's greatest men stands, however, on a higher plane than that of these achievements, great as they were. He stands out as the man who, in an age of passionate intolerance, and in a country where fanatical alien overlords had tyrannized and persecuted the older population, was the first to regard himself, not as a Turk or a Muslim ruling for the benefit of his fellow-tribesmen and co-religionists, but as a ruler of India from whom all its inhabitants could expect equal justice and equal favour, and who was prepared to admit that different religions were only varying methods of approach to the divine reality underlying the created world and, as such, each deserving of respect. As a mere boy of twenty-one he went against all Muslim precedent in India and in the world outside by remitting the *Jizya*, or poll-tax, which Muslim rulers everywhere imposed on their non-Muslim subjects. On the other hand, he equally insisted on the rights of humanity against Hindu religious custom in forbidding *sati*, at any rate against the woman's wish. Both in peace and war he chose for himself able Hindus—like Raja Todar Mall, Raja Man Singh and Rao Surjan—as his chief councillors and associates. The first to break the resistance of the proud and gallant Rajput chiefs, he did so largely with Rajput help, and was prepared, as in the case of his treaty with the Bundi chiefs, to make

generous concession to Rajput pride and spirit of independence. His first and favourite wife, mother of the Emperor Jehangir, was herself a Rajput Princess.

Himself a mystic, overcome from time to time by states of spiritual exaltation and by a sense of the nothingness of this world, he began by endeavouring to understand what underlay the rival doctrines of conflicting Muslim sects. From that he went on to a sympathetic, understanding, but never wholly convinced, study of Christianity as preached to him by such nobly sincere but intolerantly narrow advocates as the Jesuit Acquaviva. In their turn Jainism, with its refusal of all destruction of life, and, even more, Zoroastrianism, with its worship of the elemental power of fire, appealed to his quest for ultimate truth. In the end he was seized with the great, if impracticable, idea of uniting all his subjects with each other in a common religion, purging the dross and selecting the purest elements out of all religions. That he should have decided that he himself was the only true and authoritative exponent of the *tahid ilahi*, the new "divine monotheism," was, after all, not unnatural in an age which could only conceive of authority in terms of autocracy, an age which in Europe was engaged in the struggle between the claim of the Pope to supreme spiritual power over all Christians and the rival claim of monarchs, whether in England or elsewhere, the claim embodied in the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*, to decide the religious beliefs of his subjects. In that light his attempt, impossible as it proved, to reconcile his subjects with each other in a common faith of which he was the supreme repository did not appear so absurd and fantastic as his bitter critics among Muslim biographers, followed by later historians, have made out. In any case, if the actual method adopted failed its purpose, the spirit underlying it was a noble one. I venture, in all humility, to suggest it is that spirit which alone can win once again for India that place in the world which she occupied in Akbar's day. If, in modern terms and on modern lines, the leaders of political India could dedicate themselves to the service of India, placing India first in their thoughts and deeds with the same breadth of view and comprehending charity shown by Akbar, then indeed India's future would be assured.

AKBAR'S EXAMPLE AND THE PRINCES

H.H. THE MAHARAJA JAM SAHIB OF NAWANAGAR said that he felt that the most profitable line he could take was to try and develop from an Indian point of view those great qualities of Akbar the Secretary of State had stressed, and to see whether in India today there were elements which could maintain the good which he achieved and perhaps succeed where he failed.

"Now you must all remember [continued His Highness] that I speak as a ruling Prince. Akbar as an emperor therefore has a particular appeal to us ruling Princes. We stand in India for that tradition of personal rule. How far have we as a Princely Order carried out the spirit of Akbar? I am the first to admit that there have been, and perhaps still are, States in which the rulers have not exercised their powers with the proper appreciation of the rights of their subjects and where, in consequence, the administration has not been as effective and possibly as just as it should. But taken by and large—and I believe that this is the real test—the subjects of the States are probably more happy than their countrymen in other parts of India. The rulers have, on the whole, maintained a good record of justice and impartiality and an interest in the welfare of their subjects, and I believe that in the Princely Order today there is still a firm intention to improve on the past. In the States, too, I think we can claim that religious toleration is of a high order. Communal troubles are, I am glad to say, on the whole rare, and in the villages you will find Hindus and Muslims respecting the observances and sharing in the festivals of each other's religions. As patrons of the arts and real Indian culture the Princes stand second to none. In fact, I go so far as to say that we are perhaps the repositories of the old traditions.

"I appreciate that an occasion like this is not one to introduce politics, but political and cultural development must march together; both must develop from the great traditions of the past and embody the genius of a nation's people. We Princes, while conscious of our own great traditions and the lessons of history, are equally well aware of new tendencies and a new spirit in India. I can assure you we will march with them and foster them. We feel we still have a great contribution to make to

India, politically and culturally. We only hope that the Paramount Power will keep before it the example of Akbar."

ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARTS

Mr. LAURENCE BINYON said it was Akbar's spirit of religious toleration, remarkable not only in his own age and country but in any age or country, which led him in his later years to dream of an eclectic faith to which all, whatever sect or tradition he belonged to, might subscribe, and so in the religious as in the political sphere unite all his subjects. The dream was not fulfilled. Planned to unite all, it pleased none. Yet it was no mere political move; it testified to something deep and persistent in Akbar's nature, which doubled a genius for action and administration with the troubled yearnings of a mystic, seeking, always seeking, for something that, in spite of rare moments of illumination, eluded his quest. Where, among so many different but passionate convictions, so many sincere but opposed claims, where was the Truth? What was the Divine Will, and how could it be discovered? It was the singular complexity of Akbar's nature retaining under all his manifold and immense activities something of the questioning directness and simplicity of a child, which made him so fascinating a figure.

Mr. Binyon then spoke of the artistic and cultural interests of Akbar in an eloquent address which will be given in full in *Indian Art and Letters*. Finally, he described Akbar, whose work remained as "one who stood among the greatest of the sons of men."

THE EMPEROR AND QUEEN ELIZABETH

Sir M. AZIZUL HUQUE, C.I.E., D.LITT. (High Commissioner for India), said that four centuries ago England stood ready at her ramparts to meet the invasion of her shores by another war-lord. Four centuries ago a great Queen made England a leader in the world's affairs; she granted the first charter to the East India Company. Thus began the relationship between Britain and Hindustan, a relationship which had passed through many political and military upheavals, and had today linked together the two great countries in a commonwealth of cultural amity. While Queen Elizabeth was spreading the greatness of Britain over the lands of her island kingdom and the seven seas, Akbar was consolidating his empire in the Indian peninsula and welding together the diverse creeds and people in a common bond.

Except for that southern portion of India called the Deccan, Akbar became master of India. His rule was personal, that of the benevolent father of his people, knowing the intimate details of their lives, and working to establish peace, amity and understanding between the main groups of religion. His empire was a peasant empire. With all her modernities today, India was still a great peasant land. And the prosperity of Akbar's empire was built on that of the peasants of India.

Akbar centralized the administrative power of the government, but did not make of that instrument a machine of uniformity; his revenue system, of which one of the main architects was his Hindu minister Todar Mal—the revenue system on which the British Government of India based the present system—did not apply uniformly all over Akbar's empire.

The victories of Akbar and of Elizabeth in the realms of art and literature, the steps they had built in the upward progress of man's civilization, were more durable, and certainly more beneficial to mankind, than the actual story of the defeat of the Armada or the subjugation of the warring principalities in India. It was but fitting that four centuries later, when England stood to brave the challenge of another war-lord, when England with allied Powers and associated with India was engaged in a bitter struggle to have human freedom and human rights ensured for posterity, at a time when passions of destruction were rife in every corner of the globe, when human culture seemed to be trampled in many parts of the world under the heels of the Nazi-Jap military jackboots, they had met to commemorate the birth of one of the greatest rulers not only of India but in the world, and to commemorate it, not in the sphere of military victories, of physical aggrandisement of one nation over another, but on the hill-top of human culture. Akbar's contribution to language, literature, art, music, had a message for us all, comprehensible to us all, Indians and Englishmen alike. Perhaps the message was that steel tanks and aluminium planes, death-rays and de-

structive gas, were not what man was born for; that man did not discover steam and electricity to manufacture armaments for self-destruction; that progress did not mean fast transportation in the physical sense; nor did it mean the ruthless destruction of human lives by human beings. That was why, amidst men and women working day and night to make munitions of war, carrying supply to the war fronts, the Allied Nations had lost no time in seeking to plan the reconstructed future, and in that great work, greater than ever, greater than military victories, the British Council was thinking a new understanding between India and Great Britain, a new bond of human culture. Not a day too soon had this been done.

THE FUTURE OF INDIA AND THE PRINCES

BY COLONEL H.H. THE MAHARAJA JAM SAHIB OF NAWANAGAR,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., A.D.C.

THE title of this address might lead you to expect me to plunge at once into the deep waters of political controversy. I do not propose, however, to take that plunge. Strange as it may seem, I am cautious by nature. In any case, I think my purpose can be best achieved by looking first to the past, rather than by speculating immediately about the future. By turning to the past we can trace better the consistent attitude of the Princely Order towards constitutional change. It is that consistency that I want to emphasize today.

Orderly political and constitutional progress, as I see it—and I emphasize the word “orderly”—is ultimately the striking of a balance between the surrender and the maintenance of existing individual rights by each of the component elements in the political structure. Each must recognize the rights of the other elements and is under an obligation to respect them. At the same time there is the inalienable right to hold what we have, and to demand that the other elements should recognize our rights. Translated into terms of the Indian scene, the problem can be stated thus: Assuming that the advance must be based on history and is not to be a complete break from it, assuming also that the Princes still have a contribution to give to India and are worth retaining as an Order—I naturally support that assumption with the whole of my being—what do we as an Order retain and what do we surrender? What do we demand as the basic terms of our continued existence, and what are we prepared to give in order to achieve the object which all sane, patriotic, honest Indians desire—a united India with each of its elements contributing its full and individual share?

BASIC CLAIMS

Basically our demands have always been the same. First, the maintenance of treaty rights under the ægis of the Crown, and, secondly, effective and efficient safeguards. I shall deal with these in turn, and in dealing with them I propose to refer you as far as possible to authoritative records and statements, so that you can judge for yourselves that the Princes have spoken consistently and with one voice.

There is no need for me to tell you what the treaties, sanads and

engagements mean to the Princes. They are the *sine qua non* of our existence. We regard the rights, privileges and dignities arising out of them as matters of vital concern. We have stated clearly and unequivocally that while as an Order we endorse the demands for "the constitutional advance of India," any scheme to which the States are expected to be a party "must effectively protect their rights arising from treaties, sanads and engagements or otherwise and ensure the future existence, sovereignty and integrity of the States thereunder guaranteed." The States have solemnly been assured by the highest authorities that their treaties and engagements will be scrupulously respected. Let me quote one or two statements on this point.

(a) Her Majesty the late Queen Victoria gave the following assurance in her famous Proclamation of 1858:

"We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by Us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained. . . . We shall respect the Rights, Dignity and Honour of Native Princes as our own."

(b) In his Proclamation of 1921, His Majesty the late King George V. was pleased to state:

"In my former Proclamation I repeated the assurance given on many occasions by my Royal predecessors and Myself, of My determination *ever to maintain unimpaired* the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India. The Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains *inviolate and inviolable*."

Paragraph 305 of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report is also significant. It reads as follows:

"... We think that the Princes should be assured in the fullest and freest manner that no constitutional changes which may take place will impair the rights, dignities and privileges secured to them by Treaties, Sanads and Engagements, or by established practice."

Similarly, no less a person than Lord Halifax, in a recent speech, stated that—

"... The independence of the Princes is enshrined in solemn treaties with the King-Emperor and as such are only alterable by negotiations. To scrap these or any other treaties unilaterally would be to scrap one of the principles for which we went to war with Germany."

It will be seen that in the demand for the maintenance of treaty rights we have the highest authority for our assumption that this demand should be met.

REQUIRED SAFEGUARDS

With regard to safeguards, these can be divided under four main heads: political, financial, defence and personal. I shall explain these safeguards so that you can see for yourselves how fundamental they are to our existence. The main safeguards I should put briefly as follows:

Political.—(i.) Effective protection of the rights arising from treaties, engagements, sanads, etc. These include the right of territorial integrity, sovereignty and internal autonomy—that is: (a) the right to carry on the Administration within our States without interference; (b) the right of every State to its own form of Government; (c) the right to initiate and carry out the economic and other policies required in the

interests of the States (we realize, of course, that contemporary conditions in the rest of India must in practice be a limiting factor here); (d) the non-applicability of Central or Provincial legislation to the States except by consent; and (e) complete equality of status with other units and freedom from being dominated by any unit or community.

(ii.) All justiciable issues relating to the material rights of the States and the interpretation of treaties and agreements affecting such rights to be settled as of right by arbitration.

Financial.—(a) No direct taxation. (b) No differentiation or discrimination against the States in matters of indirect taxation. (c) All sources of taxation not expressly allocated to the British Government by any State, whether at present tapped or untapped, must remain exclusively with the State. (d) Existing rights of material or contractual character, including those in relation to British India, to be safeguarded effectively; any modification required in the interests of either party should be by negotiation and mutual agreement.

Defence.—(a) The right of the State to protection against external aggression and internal disorder. (b) The right of the State to maintain its own army, both for the service of the Crown and for internal security purposes. (c) The right to receive arms, ammunition and other equipment for such troops.

Personal.—(a) Complete immunity of the Ruler and his immediate family from the criminal jurisdiction of all courts in British India, and the maintenance of the present position in regard to civil jurisdiction. (b) The maintenance in British India of the dignity of the members of the ruling families. (c) Protection of the Ruler and the Government of the States from the dissemination in British India of matter likely to have a subversive effect in the States. Also the protection of the Ruler and the members of his family from slander in British India. (d) Immunity from income tax and surcharge; also from any taxes on specified Government of India securities. (e) The right of exemption from any kind of taxation on lands and buildings situated in British India held by the Ruler as State property. (f) Existing rights and immunities enjoyed under various laws, regulations, notifications and resolutions, etc.

The range of these safeguards can obviously be a matter for considerable argument, just as the range of the safeguards for British interests in India were a matter of very considerable argument at the time of the 1935 Act.

These, then, were the basic demands which the Princes made before the 1935 Act. Under that Act in theory these demands were basically met. I shall not now go too deeply into the technicalities of the Act and the points on which criticism might be lodged from the States' point of view; but theory and practice are very far apart, and the experience of the inevitable course of events in regard to Congress agitation in the States in 1939 led the Princes to reject Federation shortly before the outbreak of the war. The history of that agitation clearly proved that where the authority of the Governor-General and the Crown Representative was vested in one and the same person the maintenance of theoretical safeguards must inevitably give way in the face of practical issues of all-India politics, when it was a question of retaining Ministries in order to see the Act continue working. Further, the States themselves were not satisfied with their position financially under the 1935 Act.

WAR RECORD OF THE STATES

This, then, brings us to the war. At the outbreak of the war the Princes offered the services of themselves and their resources unconditionally to the King-Emperor. The loyalty with which they had offered their services to the King-Emperor in the Great War of 1914-18 was repeated

perhaps even in a greater degree. At the meeting of the Chamber of Princes in 1940 the following resolution, moved by myself as Chancellor, was unanimously adopted :

"The Chamber of Princes requests His Excellency the Crown Representative kindly to place before His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor the firm determination of the Ruling Princes and Chiefs of India to render every possible assistance in men, money and material to His Imperial Majesty and his Government in their heroic struggle for upholding the cause of justice and for maintaining the sacredness of treaties and covenants, and prays that the united efforts of the Empire and the Allies may lead to the early and triumphant vindication of the high principles for which His Imperial Majesty has been forced to take up arms against the enemies."

I shall not do more than give a very brief résumé of the contributions of the States during this war. At the end of September, 1942, the non-recurring contributions from the States amounted approximately to Rs. 326,67,000, and the recurring donations promised stood at about Rs. 37,30,000. I need not refer you to the squadrons of aircraft bearing the names of many of the Indian States, some of which I have had the privilege of visiting since my arrival in this country. Other gifts in kind have been numerous and always useful. Not less remarkable has been the development of the States forces and their employment outside the States. In 1938 the strength of the Indian States forces was roughly 45,000. On June 1 this year the total strength was 78,000—*i.e.*, a 73 per cent. increase. Of these, approximately 17,000 are being employed in British India, thus relieving other units for active service by taking over duties on the North-West Frontier, by providing guards for internment camps and performing other duties. Thirteen thousand are employed overseas. These figures do not include the very large number recruited to regular Indian army units from the Indian States. Looked at from another point of view, in 1939 the total number of Indian States forces units of all categories was 146. There are now 126 units and 50 training units, making a total of 176. Of the former 19 are overseas and 45 on service in British India. One further small point is that four States forces officers were selected for courses at the Staff College, Quetta, during 1941. This, then, is the picture prior to and during the war, during which the Princes have never wavered from their resolution to place themselves and their resources unreservedly at the service of the King-Emperor.

THE CRIPPS MISSION

We now come to the Cripps Mission. The Princes, like everyone else in India, realized that the Cripps Mission was a momentous occasion in which the best was demanded of every patriotic Indian. Our attitude was made completely clear in the resolution which we passed at the session of the Chamber of Princes in March, 1942. This ran as follows :

(a) That this Chamber welcomes the announcement made in the House of Commons on March 11, 1942, by the Prime Minister of the forthcoming visit to India of the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons and expresses the hope that it may help to unite India to intensify further her war effort and to strengthen measures for the defence of her Motherland.

(b) That this Chamber has repeatedly made it clear that any scheme to be acceptable to the States must effectively protect their rights arising from the treaties, engage-

ments and sanads or otherwise and ensure the future existence, sovereignty and autonomy of the States thereunder guaranteed, and leave them complete freedom duly to discharge their obligations to the Crown and to their subjects; it therefore notes with particular satisfaction the reference in the announcement of the Prime Minister to the fulfilment of the treaty obligations to the Indian States.

(c) That this Chamber authorizes its representatives to carry on discussions and negotiations for the constitutional advance of India with due regard to the successful prosecution of the war and the interests of States, and subject to final confirmation by the Chamber and without prejudice to the right of individual States to be consulted in respect of any proposals affecting their treaty or other inherent rights.

I shall be quite frank and say that the whole visit was disappointing from the point of view of the Princes. In the first place, the representatives of the Princes were only seen by the Lord Privy Seal on three occasions. Then take the declaration itself. It is a statement of such immense importance and one the full significance of which is appreciated by very few. From the point of view of the Princes, a fundamentally important point therein is the manner in which it deals with the Crown's treaty obligations to the States—viz. :

“Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements so far as they may be required in the new situation.”

I need not explain to you how disturbing this statement was to the Princes, who have the only too recent memory of events in 1939. Apart from anything else, we Princes feel that our spontaneous and unconditional war effort deserves better than the omission in the draft declaration of the express guarantee of the Crown's obligation to us assured in the declaration of August, 1940. This omission has given a handle to our opponents such as Nehru and others to declare publicly that these treaties must be scrapped, and, in fact, Nehru has recently gone to the extent of declaring that those who talk of treaties with Indian States are “lunatics, knaves or fools.” The declaration makes special mention, quite rightly, of the protection of “racial” and religious minorities. Surely the States are entitled to claim even more than the minorities, and that the solemn undertakings with them must be respected. The reference to these solemn engagements which I have quoted created an impression in our minds that it is proposed to have a compulsory revision of treaty requirements, whether or not the States concerned consent to such a revision. In later elucidation, I admit, we were told that this provision was intended to apply to economic matters of common concern to British India and the States, but this has not been clearly stated in the declaration itself.

PROGRESS IN THE STATES

Sir Stafford Cripps is also known to have voiced in Parliament a commonly made criticism that representative institutions have not been adequately developed in the majority of Indian States. I am conscious that there is widespread criticism of the Princes, not only in India, but outside, on the grounds that we are reactionary; that representative institutions do not exist in adequate numbers or with any vitality in the States; that, in short, unless we put our house in order we cannot legitimately press demands for our continuous existence alongside more progressive and vital

constitutional forms in British India. As I said in my address at the recent celebration to commemorate the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of Akbar the Great, though there have been exceptions, the Rulers have, on the whole, maintained a good record of justice, impartiality and interest in the welfare of their subjects. I believe that in the Princes Order today there is a firm intention to improve on the past. I shall quote the reply I made as Chancellor to H.E. the Crown Representative's address at the Chamber of Princes session in March, 1939, when this question of constitutional reform in the States was a very live issue :

"We fully endorse the view that improvements in the administrations of States should emanate from the Rulers concerned wherever they may be needed. We recommend this course, not as a matter of political expediency, but as a sacred duty resting on us as Rulers. We have more than once given sympathetic consideration to the various aspects of this question, and recognize that our greatest asset is the happiness and contentment of our peoples, and that no possible effort towards this end should be spared by us in ensuring the progress and prosperity of our loyal and devoted subjects. There is a clear distinction, however, between matters relating to improvement in administration and the question of constitutional reforms in the States. We claim that the decision with regard to the form and extent of constitutional reforms in the States must rest solely with the individual Rulers concerned.

"The Indian Princes are not averse to progress in their States, with due regard to local conditions and resources, and the record of development of the beneficent activities in their States is the best proof of their *bona fides*. We deny, however, the right of any party from outside to dictate to us or coerce us in the matter of constitutional reforms within our States. Such short-sighted attempts cannot but retard the pace of evolution in the States, disturb the traditional good relations between the Rulers and their subjects, and create an atmosphere of estrangement between the various regions of this country which is fraught with serious consequences to all concerned.

"There is no greater impediment to good government in a State than the weakening of its Ruler's authority. Yet such a weakening must inevitably result if unjustified attacks are openly made against the established Governments of the States, and even doubt is thrown upon the scope of the Ruler's sovereignty. . . . We can emphatically declare that, God willing, the Indian Princes shall not be found wanting in any reasonable contribution which they may be called upon to make in the discharge of their obligations to the Crown and towards the ordered progress of their States and their Motherland."

As a matter of fact, 90.5 per cent. of the population of our States possess local bodies with non-official majorities. States with 72 per cent. of the total population of the States have legislative assemblies, out of which 35.3 per cent. have a majority of elected members. In order to show that we Princes are not concerned with mere words, I have, as Chancellor, appointed a committee to examine the full implications of the Cripps proposals, and not the least to report on points of internal administration and constitutional practice in which the Princes Order as a whole may be said to fall behind practice in British India.

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

This, then, is the past and present. I think the Princely Order can legitimately claim that it has maintained a consistent, loyal and dignified attitude. Our basic demands are clear, but we have shown that we are prepared to move with the times.

What of the future? We maintain our basic demands. The war is changing things very fast, and it is impossible to prophesy what the next

development on the Indian political stage will be, what new realignment of political parties or personalities there may be (and you will appreciate that in India this is a very vital factor in any discussions regarding constitutional advance), or what the general picture will look like when a Constitution-making body finally gets to work. There are so many factors, both inside and outside India, to be reckoned with, but of one thing you can be sure—that the Princes will continue to maintain the same consistent, loyal and dignified attitude as in the past, conscious of the right to progress of British India, but equally well determined to maintain our own rights. We have at heart, as I have said earlier, that same ideal as other patriotic Indians—a united India—but we equally well hold that we as Princes have an historical and individual contribution to make to it, just as much as the other great elements in the political picture. We demand consideration. We are prepared to give it.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held on Wednesday, December 2, 1942, at the Royal Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W. 1, when Colonel H.H. the Maharaja Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., gave an address on "The Future of India and the Princes." His Grace the DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G., Under-Secretary of State for India, presided.

The CHAIRMAN said the meeting was fortunate to have the opportunity of hearing about the future of India and the Princes from H.H. the Maharaja Jam Sahib. Shakespeare had said that all the world was a stage and each one in his turn played many parts, but few men played as many parts simultaneously as His Highness. He was known in this country as a most up-to-date and enlightened Prince and ruler, as a genial friend and sportsman, as a statesman of note and a representative at the War Cabinet. He was an honoured member of a family which, quite apart from any question of princely status, would always hold an honoured place in the heart of every Englishman. He was a soldier whose regiment had a war record which had never been surpassed by any regiment in any war in history, and, last but not least, he was Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, selected by that body to be its head.

H.H. the MAHARAJA JAM SAHIB then read his paper.

The CHAIRMAN said that His Highness's speech had been very forceful, frank and valuable, and he hoped that his words would reach not only beyond the confines of the room, but beyond the confines of this island to lands where Indian questions were sometimes discussed without the full knowledge of the facts which was desirable.

Sir WILLIAM BARTON was sure that there must be widespread regret in India that the patriotism of the Princes, and especially of their splendid efforts to defend their country, was not recognized by the Congress Party. On that fateful day in August when the Indian Congress decided to fling an ultimatum in the face of the British Government, Mr. Gandhi, speaking to the resolution, attacked the Princes. "They are," he said, "the creation of British imperialism, set up simply with the object of providing an obstacle to Indian freedom," and he adjured the Princes to forget their autocracy, to put their house in order, and to act as trustees of their people, "and let them do it while I am alive, because when I am dead Pundit Nehru will have no patience with them."

Mr. Gandhi's outburst reflected the attitude of Congress towards the Princes. He was not fair to their statesmanship nor sense of justice. Whatever the Princes might

think of the possibility of extending democracy on the British pattern throughout India, they had not stood in the way of Indian self-government. At the Round-Table Conference they certainly helped, and later on they were quite prepared to go into federation. Competent Hindu observers, however, said that the Act of 1935 had placed the ball at the feet of Congress. If during their years of power in the greater part of India they had chosen to trust the Princes, a Congress Government would in all probability have been in power today. But, as His Highness had said, that was not their policy; they tried to coerce the Princes into introducing complete democracy into their States, and at the same time Pundit Nehru and some of his satellites spread a miasma of hate into Indian politics, with the result that there had been a complete deadlock. He thought Congress would find that it would not be easy to eliminate the States. For one reason, the majority of the people in the States had no desire to be dominated by high-class Hindu castes or the people who controlled them. There was a strong body of support for the States in India itself. The Muslims supported the Hyderabad State; if any effort were made to eliminate the Nizam, 90 million Muslims would spring to his rescue. Then there was the Mahratta people, with their martial traits, who would strongly resent any attempt to overturn, say, the Kolhapur State, and the Rajputs throughout India were proud of the record of the Rajput States.

The Muslim organ *Dawn* recently mentioned a conference of representatives of the Hindu martial races which met a short time ago in Delhi and claimed to represent 10 million fighting men. The object of the meeting was to place the position of these particular clans in the Indian Army on a sounder basis, and *Dawn* thought what they were there for was to strengthen the military position of Congress, which was very weak. However that might be, the conference went out of its way to pass a resolution strongly condemning the Congress policy against the States.

In the event of the Government of India or the British Government agreeing to the Congress demand and putting a Hindu Government in power, Mr. Gandhi had said that the Indian Army would be automatically disbanded. The result, of course, would be anarchy, and Gandhi said that he was prepared to hand India over to anarchy; but he could not expect the Princes to agree to that. Why should they hand over their 92 million people to assist him to bring about misery and oppression perhaps for half a century? It must be remembered that the Princes controlled strong forces, which had been trained by competent officers; many of them had been through half a dozen campaigns. The Muslims would spring to arms to protect the Nizam, the Princes themselves would combine, and in the end it would be found that the stronger States would annex India itself and there would be a system of States (small kingdoms, some of quite large size) ruled by Indians instead of the sovietized India of which Pundit Nehru dreamed. He (Sir William) was quite sure that Mr. Gandhi's dream would not come true.

The Princes would play a big part in the ultimate settlement of the fate of India, and they would insist that India should still remain within the orbit of the British Commonwealth.

Sir HARI SINGH GOUR said that two questions were troubling him. The first was with regard to the treaties between the Indian Princes and the British Crown. Some of those treaties were 100 to 150 years old. What did "the Crown" mean 150 years ago? A study of the constitutional history of England would reveal that the powers of the Crown 100 to 150 years ago had been effectively transferred to the British Cabinet. The Crown was the symbol of the British Constitution, but all its sovereign rights were transferred to Parliament. Remembering this, one found the crux of the whole question. The Princes of India entered into a treaty with the British Crown, and they therefore entered into treaties with the British Cabinet. Could the Indian Princes under the treaties prevent the Crown from becoming the mouthpiece of the Indian Cabinet? Had the Indian Princes the right to say to the Crown that, although it was the mouthpiece of the British Cabinet, it should not be the mouthpiece of the Indian Cabinet? That was a constitutional question which was asked in the Joint Parliamentary Committee of some of the representatives of the Indian Princes, and there was no reply. As a student of constitutional history he had not been able to find a reply to the question.

His Highness had very rightly pointed out that as an Indian he hoped for the

march of democratic ideals in the country. He was for the establishment of Dominion status in India. How was the establishment of Dominion status consistent with the safeguarding of the rights of the Indian Princes? The more a nation was democratized, the more was democratized the lives and principles of all members of the community. Privilege and the privileged classes were inconsistent with the modern conception of democracy. He realized that the Princes had a moral claim upon the people of India, that if there was a democratic Constitution in that country the rights and privileges of the Princes should so far as was possible be safeguarded, but if the Princes thought they would be able to maintain, preserve and safeguard their mediæval rights, in spite of the establishment of a democracy, there would be a conflict of democracy *versus* mediævalism and mediæval princely rights.

His Highness was perfectly right in saying that the rights of the Indian Princes should, as far as possible, be safeguarded. As far as His Highness and himself stood upon the moral platform he would be at one with him and the Indian Princes generally that their rights should be respected and as far as possible safeguarded, but that was the limit. India must advance, and that had been most clearly pointed out by His Highness.

H.H. the JAM SAHIB, in reply, thanked Sir William Barton for his speech. Certain political parties said that the Princes were a British creation, but the Princes were not a British creation; they were Indian India. But British India was a British creation.

With regard to Sir Hari Singh Gour's question regarding the treaties, he had wasted his time if anyone thought the treaties were 100 or 150 years old. Queen Victoria affirmed the treaties in 1858 before she became Queen-Empress; when she became Queen-Empress in 1877 she affirmed the treaties again; in 1901 King Edward VIII. did so; in 1911 King George V. did so; and they were reaffirmed as recently as 1921. If the treaties were 100 years old and the Princes had so wished, there would have been no posts or telegraphs in India today. The Princes had always been willing to advance and sacrifice themselves for the whole country's interest. Sir Patrick Cadell, who was present in the meeting and had served in Indian States for a number of years, could confirm that Indian India did not stand in the way of the progress of the whole Motherland. The railways connecting British India ran through the States, and if the Princes had wished to stand on their mediæval rights there would have been few railways running from one part of British India to another.

The internal supremacy which the Princes demanded was not only in their own interests. They accepted a certain authority, but considered it more than enough, although even today a certain amount of delegation might be required in the interests of all. They were prepared, and had been prepared, to give up their internal sovereignty entirely, but he was not sure that his people (meaning the population of all the States) would be so well off. They would be taxed, and he did not think the 95 millions would be so keen on democratization as some thought. Were they trying to force them to have a progressive Government? He had given up the municipality in every town in his own State except the capital, and had been trying to give that up for the last four years, as the people did not want it. In the other towns there was no municipal organization because the people did not wish to tax themselves. The British were democratic, but he did not know that democracy had been so successful that the Princes should give up everything they had.

Sir Hari Singh Gour also asked whether the Crown could transfer its authority. There was a Crown Representative in India and he had a Political Adviser. The Executive Council had nothing to do with the States. The Governor-General and the Crown Representative were one and the same person, and he dealt with the States as Crown Representative. The gentleman who dealt with the States on behalf of the Crown was the Crown Representative's Political Adviser.

Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., in proposing a hearty vote of thanks to His Highness for his lecture and to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire for presiding, said that His Highness had said much about the treaties which bound the Indian States to the King-Emperor. We did not enter this war for any benefit to ourselves or to promote our own interests; we entered the war because of solemn pledges we had undertaken with our Polish allies. Our participation in this war, the efforts we were making and

would still have to make, would be in vain if we were not determined to hold to solemn engagements.

He was an optimist in regard to India in spite of everything. The Princes loved India, the common people of India of every sect and creed loved India, and those who had gone to serve in India had also grown to love India. The Jam Sahib, who bore a very honoured name in this country, did not need any words to assure him of the pleasure it had been to listen to his talk. Sir John wished to tell him how glad all were to know he was here to sit with the members of the War Cabinet when it was deliberating on imperial affairs.

The vote of thanks was accorded by applause, and His Highness made a brief acknowledgment.

(Close of the Proceedings of the East India Association.)

REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIAN CONGRESS MOVEMENT

BY THE REV. NORMAN GOODALL

“THE Second World War has many disasters to record; but in no field of political endeavour has its influence been more untoward than in the field of Indo-British relations.” Thus writes Sir Frederick Whyte in a recent descriptive pamphlet on India.*

Not the least of these “untoward influences” has been the violent breaking of those contacts which have hitherto made for understanding, if not for complete sympathy, between large sections of responsible opinion in this country and the main trend of nationalist feeling in India as represented by the Congress movement. “Nationalist feeling” is not something peculiar to Congress. It finds explicit and even violent expression in Mr. Jinnah’s utterances. It is a familiar theme of spokesmen of the Hindu Mahasabha and may be heard with varying degrees of emphasis in the claims of Liberals and Moderates or in the statements of the All-India Christian Council. But, as a matter of historic fact, a determining part in shaping Indian thought and feeling on the subject has been played by the National Congress movement, and few students of Indian affairs can envisage any long-range solution either of Indo-British relationships or of India’s internal disunity while leaving Congress out of account. For this reason it is the more to be regretted that some of the finest minds in India are now completely insulated from that large body of thought in this country which is persistently grappling with the vast issues at stake in the Indian problem. What is here to be regretted is not simply the cutting-off of Congress leadership from *sympathetic* thought elsewhere. It is the complete isolation of that leadership from all those disciplines and corrections which arise from unfettered contact and argument based on goodwill and mutual respect.

It will at once be urged that this insulation has been self-induced. The

* *India: A Bird’s-eye View*. Royal Institute of International Affairs. November, 1942.

break was precipitated by actions which left the British Government no option in the matter. I accept this fact while deeply regretting that the insulation has become as complete as the Viceroy's recent decision has made it. Such a situation nevertheless remains one of those "untoward" events and disasters for which all of us are the poorer. And it lays upon those who still want to see contemporary problems resolved, not by temporary expedients, but by long-range judgments, a special responsibility for ensuring that certain facts and assessments are not finally obscured in the heat of conflict or indignation. In this brief article I address myself to two such considerations concerning the Congress movement.

I believe it is of the greatest importance to realize how profoundly this movement has spoken to the idealism of great sections of Indian life, especially to successive generations of students. Whatever our verdict may be upon its political aims or methods, we ought to recognize the significance of its appeal to many of the best minds and hearts in India. It has liberated capacities and kindled aspirations of a kind which are of critical relevance to the future well-being of the country, and the direction of these newly released forces into positive and constructive channels should be regarded as a primary task of statesmanship as well as the concern of all true friends of India.

I was in India in 1937-38, at a time when the movement had in some ways reached its zenith. I was not there as a partisan. My work made it imperative that I should achieve relationships as impartial as possible with all movements and communities. For months I toured village India as well as many urban areas and centres of learning. I was received in scores of places by groups representative of many different communities and I engaged in discussions with all sorts of people. And I soon had to recognize that whenever I saw the *khadi* cap (the common "badge" of the Congress devotee) I was sure to meet a certain "aliveness" of thought and feeling which was of the greatest significance for all who were trying to understand the deep, creative forces of our time.* This judgment on the movement's potency cannot, of course, be finally separated from a verdict on the rightness or wrongness of its policy, but even in itself the judgment is one which carries important consequences. Party organizations come and go; the popularity of leaders waxes and wanes. But from time to time there arise movements which demand attention and respect even when they provoke disagreement. When—as in the present instance—leadership is removed or temporarily discredited and the organized framework of a movement collapses, it is the more important that positive action should be taken to deal with the forces it has released and the aspirations to which it has spoken. To go on wrestling with the long-range problem of India's

* Incidentally, this same experience together with careful reading and discussion, at that time, on the record of the Congress Ministries leaves me with considerable uneasiness about the manner in which opinion in this country has recently accepted the verdict that two and a half years of Congress administration can be summed up as a "nightmare for the Muslims" or an ominous illustration of the "tyranny of a Hindu Raj" over minorities. I seriously question whether contemporary judgment in 1937-8-9 would have borne this out. I grant that the state of Muslim feeling on this matter in 1942 is a serious symptom to reckon with, but it will not be dealt with radically by too easy acceptance of unhistorical explanations.

political future or even to seek an interim solution of its immediate problems without attempting to speak constructively and sympathetically to the vast body of now leaderless idealism which Congress has influenced is to allow "untoward influences" to distort the real nature of the task which lies before us.

A second feature of the Congress movement, which is of more abiding significance than the temporary fortunes of any party, is the conviction and hope it has created in regard to the fundamental unity of India. To speak at the present moment of the unity of India may sound pathetically irrelevant to the most obvious and disquieting facts. I am not ignoring those facts nor am I endorsing the exaggerated claims of Congress to "speak for all India." What I am contending is that part of its power to touch much deep and earnest thought in India has lain in its perception of certain fundamental unities which may yet prove of greater significance than the stubborn diversities now attracting attention.

One of the many paradoxes presented by India lies in the presence of infinite diversity set within a strangely unifying context. Admittedly an observer's mood on this subject fluctuates considerably, but again and again, not least in face of baffling contradictions, the instinctive comment arises, "This is India" or "This is Indian"; not "This is"—some sectional aspect of India's life. As Vincent Smith says in the *Oxford History of India*: "India beyond all doubt possesses a deep, underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that produced either by geographical isolation or by political suzerainty. That unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners and sect."

It is, of course, a fact of history that in its origin the Congress movement specifically appealed to this underlying unity, and attempted to build upon it a political superstructure which would intersect purely communal interests. In face of the present situation it would be folly to pretend that this aim has been achieved, though justice should be done to those elements in the movement which still reflect the original intention. I refer here not only to the presence within its membership of such responsible Muslims as the Congress President but to the strong appeal of the movement to large numbers of the Depressed Classes and to many members of the Christian community.* Apart, however, from the limited success with which

* In the prevailing atmosphere of exaggerated communal awareness, Mr. Churchill, in his speech on September 10, 1942, seriously overlooked this undoubted measure of inter-communal sympathy with Congress. At the time of which I have already spoken—1938—the enthusiasm of the Depressed Classes or Scheduled Castes for the movement was very marked, especially in South India. Dr. Ambedkar, whose name had already been much before the British public, was unknown to the Scheduled Castes in the south. Again and again I tested this fact and found no awakening response at the mention of his name. It was to Congress more than any other party that these folk were looking for amelioration of their lot. I discussed this point with Dr. Ambedkar, and he admitted that he knew as little of the Depressed Classes in the south as they did of him. I mention this, not to discredit Dr. Ambedkar in any sense, but to illustrate my contention that the appeal which had reached these classes was less the purely communal one than the attraction of a movement which was to some extent over-reaching communal divisions. There is evidence that this wider appeal continued to be operative until a very recent date—though I admit that Congress leaders have tended to claim more for it than the facts have warranted.

this political objective of an inter-communal party has been pursued, one of the most significant things Congress has done has been to awaken in countless minds the realization that there is a fundamental Indian unity which has its roots not in some vaguely pervasive "atmosphere" but in clamorous human needs and stark economic necessity. Scarcely any other country in the world displays more poignantly the grim spectacle of poverty in the midst of plenty, and for better or for worse Congress has stirred in men's minds the conviction that a remedy for age-long problems of poverty, indebtedness, unemployment, land tenure and agricultural reform is to be found not by the competing or even parallel activity of *sections* of India's life but by the large-scale unified replanning of society. It is on this sort of basis that the unity of India has been envisaged. Whatever errors and exaggerations have marred its presentation, it lies on an entirely different plane from that on which talk of communal rivalries or the infringement of cultural traditions and religious liberties is relevant. The formal pronouncements of Congress have repeatedly declared that a politically unified India must provide for "the free exercise of religion, freedom of conscience, and the protection of the culture, language and script of minorities." In these and other matters it has always assumed the continuance of a rich diversity, but it has seen this diversity flourishing alongside an increasing recognition of that unity within which the most persistent basic needs of all Indians would be met.

In this conception I believe there has often been an over-simplification of many important factors. In the preaching of such a gospel of unity, Congress leaders have no doubt succumbed to intolerance and impatience, but that the doctrine has—for valid reasons—gone deeply into the thoughts of vast numbers of Indians is one of the many facts which ought not to be overlooked at this time when its most notable exponents are tragically out of contact with fellow-thinkers in India and elsewhere.

At no point does this plea become more important than when consideration is being given to the claims of Pakistan—an issue which, it is quite evident, must demand increasing attention. In so far as Pakistan represents a genuine concern to safeguard the cultural, religious and racial heritage of large sections of the inhabitants of India, it ought not to be impossible ultimately to find some adjustment between this conception and that approach to the unity of India for which Congress stands. But if Pakistan envisages a radical increase in the economic and political separateness of great sections of India from one another, then—apart from the inflammable possibilities attending a new segregation policy—there is much ground for fearing that it represents a violent reaction to a standpoint contrary to important political and economic convictions which are seen to be increasingly relevant to world unity as well as Indian unity. In its origin the Pakistan national movement as founded by Mr. Rahmat Ali in 1933 was so emphatically of this latter kind as to cause the gravest misgivings.*

On the other hand, Sir Hassan Suhrawardy has expounded a modified

* It proposed a division of India into eight independent "nations" and conceded the right of independent nationality to "Sikhs, Christians, Dravidians and Depressed Classes."

Pakistan which at least diminishes these dangers, takes for granted that measure of economic inter-relationship which can be assured by free trade between the respective units, and looks forward to the re-creation of a new type of unity under some form of "confederate nationalism." This represents, I believe, a considerable modification of the plan originally implied when the Muslim League formally adopted Pakistan as its objective in 1940. It would be a help to all who are trying to understand the main issues involved in these discussions if we could know whether other prominent Muslims—including Mr. Jinnah himself—really identify themselves with this more liberal view of the matter. While much would still need elucidation, we might at least begin to see possibilities of common ground in the political idealism of both these great sections of India's life.

INDIA: PARTITION OR UNITY

BY STANLEY RICE

EVERYONE sympathizes with the Indian aspiration for self-government; no one has yet found a way to its realization. Hindus demand a wholly Indian Government, not in any future, but in the immediate present—here and now. They have promised to respect the rights and claims of Muslims as well as their faith. There is to be no interference with mosques and (presumably) with the endowments of mosques; Muslims are to enjoy the protection of the Islamic law, their own marriage customs and their own culture. Unfortunately we have been witnesses how easily human promises are broken, how the most solemn pledges can be disregarded, and how they can be evaded without going so far as complete repudiation. The Muslims, being in a minority of one to three, look askance at any scheme which gives the Hindus a clear predominance in the Government, and they have their own scheme for the virtual separation of two parts of India—the Punjab with Sind and the North-West Frontier Province on the west and the predominantly Muslim province of Assam with part of Bengal on the east. These Provinces, they suggest, should be federated under the name of Pakistan.

The principal objection of the Hindus is that, far from unifying India, which should be the goal of any National Government, the proposal tends to split India in two. For consider first the geography. It is about 1,500 miles from Delhi, in the south-east of the Punjab, to the confines of Assam, and how can States so far apart become really federated? The Provinces of the Punjab, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province, on the one hand, and those of Assam and part of Bengal, on the other, do not contain very much more than a half of the total Muslim population. I have not been able to obtain precise figures, but the 1941 Census gives these results: The total population of the first group is about 35 million. The Muslim share of these is about 22 million. In Bengal and Assam the total population is about 70½ million. The Muslim share is about 37½ million. Thus the total affected would amount to about 59½ million. Hence, a considerable portion of the Muslim population would not come into the Pakistan scheme. How then would Islam as a whole benefit? Would they be really any better off?

Apart from this, the Hindus being, as I have said, in the majority of three to one, are bound to have a majority in the Central Government. If federation were to come about on those lines it would mean that the Muslim State or States would be subject to the criticism and, in federal subjects, the interference of the Central Government, which, as we have seen, must be largely, if not predominantly, composed of Hindus. But, in fact, it is not always clear what is meant or implied by Pakistan. If federation with India as a whole is not contemplated or only distantly envisaged as a desirable

goal, much as was Macaulay's vision of self-government for India, then, if it means anything, it must mean that the Muslim States are to be independent entities, forming as it were enclaves, though very large ones, on either side of the North of India; they would be self-supporting, for no State has any claim on another unless it is linked up with or affiliated to another. This, however, opens up a prospect fraught with some danger.

The land approaches to India are just in these two very regions. It is true that the north-east frontier has always been regarded as impregnable, and that nearly all defence has been concentrated in the north-west. If the Punjab be granted a separate existence, as it had in mediæval times, the whole defence of the country against outside aggression would be controlled by Muslims, and by hypothesis the Central Government of Hindustan would have no real say in the matter, whether there was a Defence Minister or no. The functions of any such official would be confined to sea and, to some extent, air, with a land army of greatly reduced size and effectiveness. For we are learning that even overwhelming superiority on either element or on both is not sufficient. You must have a land army as well. And the core of that land army is at present the Muslim population of the Punjab. This is not to forget the splendid fighting qualities of the Sikhs, nor the potentialities of Jats and Dogras and Rajputs as fighting material, to which might be added the Marathas of Bombay and some of the races of Madras. There might be an enclave of the Sikhs, who number some 4 million, but they would be surrounded by superior numbers in an autonomous Muslim State.

The Hindus cannot forget that, throughout history till the coming of the British, Muslims have poured in through the passes of North-West India. The Turks under Mohammed Ghori, the Afghans who produced the Lodi dynasty, the Central Asians under Babur, all came by that gateway. Islam is loyal to Islam. It may be objected that we are living not in the eleventh, nor in the sixteenth century, but in the twentieth, when conditions have changed entirely. Though there are occasional clashes, generally arising out of some quite trivial incident, for the most part Hindus and Muslims live amicably side by side. They work together, they trade together, and if they do not generally cultivate the land together, they seldom interfere with one another's operations. They do not eat together because of Hindu caste restrictions, and as they follow different faiths they obviously cannot worship together. The Hindus have their own special university at Benares, the Muslims theirs at Aligarh. Incidentally, it may be remarked that if Pakistan is to be the centre of Muslim culture, that university would have to be transplanted, since it would otherwise remain in Hindustan, the country which is *par excellence* Hindu. That by the way. The Pakistan scheme depends upon the continuance of goodwill between the two communities, and that we know from other sources is a very uncertain quantity. If the Muslim States be federated with the rest of the country it is easy to see how differences with the Central Government might arise, which would in effect be a Hindu-Muslim clash on a major scale. Such differences might arise on questions of defence or on any other federal subject, such as customs, or even out of some commonplace murder. If, on the other hand, these States are to be wholly independent, the danger might easily become even greater. For the Muslims would hold the key of India's front door, with their own co-religionists on the other side clamouring to be let in. Once that door were thrown open there is no telling what might happen. It has often been said, especially during the controversy over the Government of India Act, that if the country were given over to Indians to govern according to their own wishes, Pathans and other Muslims from the North-West Frontier and the Punjab would swoop down on the country, as in the days of Ala-ud-din Khilji and other famous leaders. The result in such a contingency would be civil war, for there is little doubt that the Sikhs and the Rajputs would put up a doughty resistance. But with the door wide open, or even ajar, there would be a temptation to Afghans and to the Border tribesmen to come in and take their fill. Such arguments can easily be pooh-poohed as fantastic, but we must always remember that Islam's first loyalty is to Islam—loyalty to country only comes second. This is not to cast any aspersions on Muslim good faith; there is no doubt that Muslims as well as their Hindu brethren do mean what they say. As

things stand at present, there is every reason to suppose that things would go smoothly at first. But this generation cannot last for ever, and he is foolish who does not look forward and try to make provision against future possibilities. It may be argued that the same danger would arise if the scheme proposed by the British of a Federation or that of a National Government sponsored by the Congress were to come into force. But the danger would be far less. In either case, whatever might be the eventual composition of the Central Government, the great community of nearly 100 million Muslims must be granted a considerable share in it. It would be in the interests of such a Government to work in harmony for the good of the country as a whole. That, however, would not be the case if two separate States called Pakistan were to be set up, neither having part or lot in what we may conveniently call Hindustan. It would then be a case of every State for itself and the devil take the weaker. There can be no doubt that the creation of Pakistan would lead to what a recent writer calls "eventual partition." When a country is thus separated from another with which it has ties of blood, ties of language, ties of culture, it always tends gradually—very gradually, if you like—to diverge in customs, to some extent in speech and in other ways. That has happened in the United States as well as in all the great Dominions of the British Empire. There is little reason to think that things would be different in India.

I write as a European spectator of a difficult situation. I hold no brief either for Hindu or Muslim, and my sole object is to present what seems to me the outline of the case as it would appear to a Hindu. As things are at present, the main obstacle to a settlement seems to be on the part of the Mussulmans the fear that they would be swamped in, and eventually unfairly treated by, any National Government, especially in one in which Congress held a leading share, and on the part of the Hindus the fears and dangers inherent in the scheme of Pakistan.

JAPAN IN JAVA

BY DR. H. J. VAN MOOK

AMONG the Axis radio services there is probably none which speaks with more voices and distributes more "deliberate misinformation" than the Japanese.

If it has less cynicism than the German propaganda machine, it enables us, by its glaring contradictions and its very transparent boasting, to glean from it a more definite idea about conditions in occupied territory than the more subtle distortions of the true facts, which Berlin practises, would allow.

On the other hand, direct news from the Japanese-occupied area in South-East Asia is, as yet, much more scarce than underground information from Europe. As a result, the picture that can be drawn concerning conditions in the co-prosperity sphere must necessarily consist of mere outlines; the knowledge of local and personal events, which lends a vivid ghastliness to our impressions of down-trodden Europe, is mostly lacking in the Far East.

The image that Japan tries to impress upon our minds, upon the minds of the Japanese, and upon those of the various subjected populations, is roughly adapted to what she considers most effective. The United Nations must be convinced that the Japanese are acting as a first-class civilized Power, and that their work of reconstruction and conciliation is both

astonishingly effective and completely successful. The Japanese at home must believe that all those conquered riches will be theirs to relieve the burden of more than ten years of war and privation, and that the armed forces of the Empire have shattered all the combined might of the enemy. The indigenous inhabitants of South-East Asia must be taught, at the same time, that Japan is unconquerable and superior in every respect, and that she has come, at her own chosen time, to spend light, liberty and prosperity.

When we now try to bring reality into focus with regard to the Netherlands Indies we realize that the truth is very different and that the picture is changing continuously. We must first give a short sketch of the country as it was at the time of the invasion.

Although the standard of living of the masses would be considered low if judged by European or American examples, there was a well-distributed measure of simple sufficiency and happiness according to Oriental appreciation. Both famine and violent epidemics were unknown. Justice was dispensed with a high grade of integrity. Thought, speech and travel were more free than in most Asiatic countries. Modern education, although still far from universal, was rapidly expanding and of a very high quality. All this, however, was founded on a delicately balanced economy, of which a carefully adjusted home production, abundant transport of all types, and a flourishing export industry were the main pillars. Native institutions and languages were protected, cultivated and gradually adapted to modern exigencies; religious feeling was scrupulously respected, and religious clashes were practically unknown.

The war and the invasion, of course, brought a considerable amount of destruction. As far as that destruction was deliberately applied by the Government and the armed forces, however, unnecessary hardship was avoided. The industries, workshops, power plants and means of transport, which might be of value to the enemy, were wrecked; machinery for food production and for the production of commodities, essential for the life of the masses, were not touched, except by the incidental destruction in actual fighting. A complete "scorched earth" would only have caused immeasurable suffering for the Indonesians; the Japanese already had access to the necessary quantities of war materials—except oil and, to a certain extent, tin and bauxite—and foodstuffs in Indo-China and Thailand. The administrative services, the educational and health officers, both Dutch and Indonesian, remained at their posts. If the Japanese had acted fairly towards the population there would still have been unavoidable hardship through the disruption of trade and transport, but the difficulties would probably not have been too excessive.

Announcing the liberation of the country the Japanese, however, started to disrupt the whole fabric. By interning most of the Dutch officials they wrecked the administration. By closing down the greater part of Dutch business they stopped half the economic activity and threw millions out of work. By forbidding the use of the Dutch language, and trying to substitute their own extremely difficult language, they abolished every form of secondary or higher education. By cutting down agricultural prices and spoiling the monetary situation by the introduction of

worthless paper money they confused even local trade and despoiled the small farmer, who is the backbone of the community.

It may be supposed that the Indonesian civil service and the village headmen are loyally trying to carry on. The Japanese have frequently announced that they are substituting Indonesians for the interned Dutch officials and a number of Indonesian civil servants. But their military government continues everywhere, and, according to their own statements, they are preparing to send about five times as many Japanese officials to the country as there ever have been Dutch officials before. And these Dutch officials were for the greater part born and bred in the Indies.

In the political and cultural sphere the same disruption is evident. The Netherlands Indies, where an Indonesian nation was slowly emerging, have been split into several governments. Communication between the various subdivisions, and even within the larger islands themselves, is strictly controlled and made troublesome and expensive. In the parts of the Archipelago, where tribalism was still a living memory, the retrograde influences of Japanese occupation must be serious; such a policy of *divide et impera* probably suits Japan's purposes. Justice and hygiene have rapidly deteriorated; the callous soldier has replaced the careful and sympathetic civil servant. An intensely religious people is forced to acknowledge the Emperor of Japan as a major, if not as the supreme, deity; a fine, original civilization is corrupted on borrowed Japanese lines.

Although the Japanese are continuously announcing prodigies of restoration, the constant repetition breeds doubt. Moreover, their policy seems to be to present the partial resumption of existing activity as Japanese creations and achievements. For people with an intimate knowledge of the country the record is far from impressive.

Apart from these troubles of their own making, their greatest handicap is lack of sea and motor transport. This prevents them from maintaining large garrisons in the islands; and the smaller the number of soldiers, the more brutal the methods of enforcing the new order. The constant attrition of their shipping by the action of allied air and naval forces, in the Solomons and around New Guinea, and by American submarines in the Western Pacific, constantly increases these difficulties.

The realistic and thoughtful Indonesian will have realized long since that the Japanese invasion is an unmitigated evil. Hard times are ahead of him in these months before the main rice crop will come off in May. Oppression will increase with the number of Japanese; even his closely protected tenure of the soil will be threatend by avid Japanese settlers. His helpfulness extends both towards his compatriots and towards the wives and children of prisoners of war and internees, irrespective of creed or colour, but he has plenty of troubles of his own. His horizon has narrowed to the limits of his village and his daily worries, but in his memory and his imagination the picture of liberation and resumption of the former development will grow clearer and more desirable every day. And his desire to throw out the invader, the cause of all this wretchedness, will grow until it can explode into action.

The Japanese have nowhere succeeded in making themselves understood or appreciated, where they came as conquerors and masters. Korea

is seething with the hatred of them today. The Indonesian is extremely sensitive of human values and relations; he will soon have learned to abhor the invader.

In all this misery of concentration camps and poverty and want and brutal repression there is, however, one bright spot. The common suffering will remove whatever barriers still remained in the understanding between the various races—Indonesian, Dutch and Chinese—who already understood and appreciated each other so well. When victory comes, let us look to it that none of them will have suffered in vain.

THE JAPANESE POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*

By PETER HUME

IN speaking of so wide and multifarious a topic, I find myself in some confusion. Partly it is, I confess, my own failure to synthesize the voluminous material available on my subject and my few scraps of personal knowledge. In that respect, the fact that I have no coherent picture to present to you is my fault. But I have also an excuse: I plead that the confusion which I find myself in is not wholly my fault. It arises, I think, partly from the incredible difficulty of pinning down any of the actions of Japan in the occupied territories, and especially the actions of the Japanese Army, and saying: "That is policy; that, on the other hand, is just an example of drunken bestiality." So let me make it my object to be purely illustrative, to produce for you by quotation or by anecdote a few scraps of evidence of these things: what the Japanese claim to be doing, what I think many of them mean to do and what, in point of fact, all too many of them do do.

Let me now make my first quotation from a story told by Mr. Chancellor, of Reuter's, in a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society a little while ago. He says: "My friend, Mr. Hallet Abend, correspondent for the *New York Times*, told me that General Matsui, who commanded the Japanese forces during the terrible butchery at Nanking, admitted to him that the Japanese Army is probably the most undisciplined army in the world today. One day last year, when he called at the headquarters of Lieut.-General Tada in Tientsin, he was greeted with insults and threats by the sentries. The General, explaining away this unpleasant incident, said, 'Mr. Abend, you must realize that these young soldiers are just wild beasts from the mountains.'" That, mind you, is an example of Japanese generals speaking about their own troops.

In the past ten years the distinction between what civil officials—of the Foreign Office, for instance—said, and I think in some cases actually meant, and what the Japanese Army in the field did, was more marked still. However, with the advent of Mr. Tani to the Gaimusho and with the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry, we may perhaps assume that "the running dog of the militarists," as Chungking is succinctly inclined to call the Tokyo civil power, will have less difficulty in keeping up with its masters. There is, after all, less of a "third power" problem now, though it is interesting to speculate whether the German and Italian authorities are any more successful now than formerly in protecting their nationals and their property from the ravages of their ally's army. I remember the case of one elderly Austrian in Peking, who, taking a practical rather than a moral view of the Anschluss, said to me in 1938: "It's fine; before, when the Japanese stole or smashed my property, I had to go to the German consulate and say, 'Please, I know I'm only an Austrian, but do you mind asking the Japanese not to loot me?' Now I can bang my fist on the consul's

* Report of an address delivered at the China Institute in London.

table and say, 'I am a German citizen, and I demand that you give those damned Japs hell.' "

Of course, the sad and significant part of the story is that no representations could get more out of the Japanese than a "So sorry for you" from a civil official, and a continuance of the army on its own sweet way. All indications are that full alliance has done nothing to improve that situation for Germans or Italians, and I am sure it is safe to lay down as the first principle of Japanese policy, in occupied areas or anywhere else, that it is Japanese policy pure and simple. There has been a lot of talk in this country about the Japanese being hangers-on of Fascism, almost servants of Hitler. The fact that the policies of the two countries are highly similar by no means shows, when those policies are aggressive, that they are co-operative.

The similarity is, of course, startling, and with the tightening of Hitler's grip on occupied Europe, becomes more topically obvious with every day's news. The atrocities and mass slaughters of Poland and Ukraine parallel Korea and Nanking; the conscription of European workers parallels the mass deportations of Chinese labour to Manchuria; the ruthless harnessing of all means of production to the machine of the conqueror, and the Communist label tagged to all who dare resist, these are the basic principles of both the aggressors. Both, too, have shown (in the past—it is wearing thin in places now) an almost superstitious reverence for ideals—in words. In many respects Japan's announced policy for Manchukuo, for instance, sounds like a plan for Utopia. So does the long and pompous document by which the Japanese surrendered their extraterritorial rights in that country four years ago. In so many cases, in fact, we in the democratic countries have lagged behind, while Japan, like Germany, has been able sophistically to set herself up as the prime mover in reforms which we all agree are necessary in the world. The trouble, of course, is that the aggressor Powers, having laid fine ideals on a plate, as it were, for public view, then proceed to interpret those ideals in their own perverted way, claiming that since they thought them up they can be the leaders in their execution and judges of the methods to be used. It is astonishing how many people in the past have been fooled by that, and have failed to look past the high-sounding phrases to the brutal facts of grab and graft that are the reality.

To take a concrete instance—the abolition of extraterritoriality. The British Government—undoubtedly in all sincerity—took the lead fifteen years ago. But the slow process did not at once mature, and it was left to the Japanese to "scoop the world" by producing in 1938 a complete and, as I have said, admirably phrased treaty which, on the face of it, put into effect the principle for which the democracies had striven.

It is hardly necessary to say that the whole thing was a fake, as far as the grandiose "independent" constitution of Manchukuo. You have, in fact, only to read past the treaty itself to its supplement to find such equivocations as this:

Among the Agreed Terms of Understanding, the more important items are as follows: that the Manchukuo Government shall not levy any charges in recognizing the establishment of juristic persons as stipulated in the Supplementary Agreement "A" (*i.e.*, Japanese) and also shall safeguard the benefit of reduced rates relating to tax at present enjoyed by the recognized juristic persons; that the Manchukuo Government shall, as a general principle, establish advisory bodies in places where Local Committees have hitherto existed in order that the local authorities of that locality can ascertain the opinion of residents within the South Manchuria Railway Zone in respect of such local administration as directly affects the welfare and interests of such residents; and that the Manchukuo Government shall pay annually "a share of expenses of the educational work for Japanese subjects conducted by Japanese within the territories of Manchukuo."

In any case, the true trouble goes deeper still. What it really amounts to is that the country is in the military occupation of the Japanese, that the shadow Government is wholly Japanese-controlled, and that the *Herrenvolk* of Asia have never had the least intention of altering that position.

What is true of Manchuria is true of all the occupied parts of the Far East. The Japanese come to "bring peace to the Far East," to liberate the Asiatic peoples from the white man's yoke. Some people in the victim countries believe these protestations; so once did some people in the West. Many propaganda-fed Japanese believe that that is in fact what they are doing. Around the whole dirty picture there is a misty fog of benevolence, reform and legality. Disillusion comes too late.

That is what is now happening in Malaya. The Japanese descended on a prosperous land with a parrot-cry of slogans which were bound to appeal to the people. "Asia for the Asiatics." Why not indeed? We are not to expect the ordinary Malay, say, to be able to reason out the truth behind this slogan, to realize that the comparatively high standard of living afforded him by British administration was endangered. It was the Japanese who had the idea, the moral token, which people somehow find necessary to strengthen them. We had none; only the negative propaganda of pointing out the material benefits enjoyed by the people of Malaya and of calling the Japanese liars. That is not dynamic. The Japanese slogan is. And though we know the slogan is a lie and a deceit, we should not be too ready to assume that others know that too.

And when the Japanese did come to Malaya, what did they bring? In the first place, judging from the accounts we have got through, they did attempt peaceful measures to harness the country to their war machine. They gave the people of the country the titles of the offices which the British had always held before. It does not matter that they had no intention of giving them the authority of those offices. The title—the apparent access of dignity—is enough in the first instance to make the people feel that here is a benevolent reformer. It is only gradually that people—first the title-holder himself, then very slowly filtering through to his compatriots—realize that all is not as it seems. As a short-term policy it is most effective in a politically uneducated country.

Fortunately though, as far as the United Nations are concerned, there is in Malaya at least one factor to accelerate the failure of that policy. That is the presence of great numbers of Chinese, who, in their knowledge of what has happened in their homeland in the past five years, are not inclined to take the Japanese protestations at their face value. And what is more, they, in so far as they have been in touch with China's struggle, have a dynamic cause of sufficient force to give them a positive background for resistance. Again judging by reports we have so far had, they have resisted successfully enough to break down this Japanese goodwill policy very quickly. They have been called Communists by Mr. Suzuki, who leads the Japanese civil administration, and some have been shot as Communists in Penang.

This "non-co-operation" by the Chinese has been followed, tragically for the people of the country, but necessarily, by the terror methods with which the aggressor always tries to break, but seldom succeeds in breaking, resistance. And although this resistance is largely in the passive form of non-co-operation, I think we may say that by the suffering they have brought upon themselves, these Malayan Chinese, like their kinsfolk in occupied China, are fighting our battle and helping us to beat Japan.

Another thing, of course, which tends, wherever the Japanese go, to break down their policy of peaceful enslavement is the behaviour of the Japanese Army. There are two aspects of this. One I do not want to talk about much is the incidence of atrocities—such things as have happened in Nanking and Hongkong. We have all heard plenty about those atrocities, and I do not think anybody now discredits the thoroughly authentic accounts that have come from many sources. They are only on the shortest view "policy," and therefore it does not seem within the scope of this talk to dwell on them.

One thing I would say, though, is that they cannot be dismissed as heat-of-battle excesses. You will have read, and I myself have been able to authenticate, all too many cases where there was no battle to provide the remotest excuse. In Kaifeng, for instance, I was told by a Catholic missionary that it was not only the division which captured the town that followed its fighting with excesses. The same story was repeated by every division that went through—to or from the front—and by the second-line garrison troops, who were hardly concerned with battle at all.

The other and more long-term aspect of the army's behaviour is the systematic

looting, the corruption, the drug-smuggling activities of the garrisons and the special service officers, who carry on the politico-military administration of the occupied areas. In the recent Chekiang-Kiangsi campaign, for instance, the towns and countryside were ruthlessly stripped by specially detailed squads of everything that could conceivably be of value to Japan, from scrap-iron to bandages from mission hospitals. That was not individual looting; it was undoubtedly part of a definite policy of grab ordered from on high.

Then there are the carpet-baggers, the army of civilians, *ronin* or ruffians they call them in Japan, who are allowed to follow up the army and to live under their wing in order to steal from occupied territories a living by any means they think fit. All the expenditure they need is bribes to the Japanese special service section. A lot of statistics have been released about these men.

There are, for instance, now some 100,000 Japanese children in Peking alone, which implies an adult population of 200,000 to 300,000; and in 1940, out of 2,240 Japanese establishments in business in Peking, 500 were brothels. In Taiyuan nearly half of the Japanese shops were such establishments. One can quote innumerable lists of this sort of thing. It is a means by which Japan gets rid of her most undesirable characters, so that they shall prey on the people of the occupied territories rather than on the Japanese themselves. It is also a means by which the Japanese special service officer is able to enrich himself by what are almost directly Chicago gangster methods—*i.e.*, that the *ronin* are permitted to chuck any Chinese out of his business and to refuse to pay rent, provided they keep in with the special service officer concerned, which tends to mean 10 per cent.

That brings me on to the main trade of many of these people, which is, of course, opium; or, rather, probably less opium than the stronger drugs, such as heroin, which are more profitable because more concentrated.

There has been a lot talked about the systematic Japanese plan to demoralize the Chinese populace by giving them opium, but I am inclined to think that demoralization is probably only a secondary motive. I think the prime motive behind the undoubtedly extensive drug activities in China is desire for profit. The army and the *ronin* are able to make probably more and quicker profits out of drugs than out of anything else.

Not that they do not manage to get their profit from many other things—by their hold on the local administration, by innumerable small taxes which go in general to the army authorities in the place concerned, and by all manner of racket.

Here is a story I got about Peking again. One ingenious Japanese decree orders that all Chinese shops in the city shall buy their stocks from Japanese merchant houses at Japanese dictated prices. All Chinese enterprises, whatever their size or capital, are forced to pay a business tax of 500 Chinese dollars. The trouble is that there are almost too many examples of anything like this, and, as I have said before, and I would like to emphasize again, it is difficult to sort them down into a coherent policy as against a large number of rackets carried out by a large number of unscrupulous men.

What lies behind it all, and what is undoubtedly the basis of Tokyo's policy, is the creation in Manchuria, China and now in the South Seas, of so-called development corporations, mostly financed on a rather bogus basis from Tokyo, which does give Japan and Japan's financiers—the Mitsui and so on—a tight control over the economic resources of the occupied territories. Thus the conqueror can see that these resources are diverted to the one purpose of furthering Japan's aims and swelling the pockets of Japan's industrialists rather than providing any benefit for the people of the countries concerned.

One last thing, and that is about the so-called material benefits—we used to hear a lot about these some time ago—which Japanese administration effected especially in Manchuria. The Japanese, we used to be told, have opened schools, improved the trains, made the trains run on time—like Mussolini in Italy.

I think these benefits need to be looked into a little more closely. The number of schools they have opened, for instance. They have indeed opened many, but what do they teach? All the information I have been able to gather is that they teach the pupils to be good puppets of Japan. Drastic changes are made in textbooks in order

to purify the thought of young China. All courses in Chinese national principles are suspended and the Japanese language becomes a required subject.

Special Japanese language schools sprang up like mushrooms, attended by merchants and clerks motivated by commercial reasons.

After last December all missionary, middle and primary schools in occupied China were seized and put under the puppet régime, which means under the Japanese advisers to that régime. Each school also has its own Japanese adviser. Even Peking's Catholic University was subjected to constant pressure to slip into line with this programme. All students were required to participate in all mass meetings and demonstrations sponsored by the Japanese, celebrating a new attack against their mother country. Japanese paid agents were placed in all schools to act as fifth columnists.

To sum up, I must say again that it is difficult to achieve a coherent idea of what is Japan's policy. You have, in the first place, the announced policy, the grandiose scheme with which many of us on paper would agree. You have, secondly, the policy which one tries to discern through the rackets and army excesses. And that policy is twofold, representing the two dominant interests in Japan. Firstly, it seeks to harness the resources and the man-power of the occupied country to the Fascist war machine which is striving to gain world domination for the power-drunk militarists of the Rising Sun. Secondly, it seeks to ensure that the profits from the exploitation of those resources by forced slave-labour in the victim country go into the pockets of the Imperialist business interests which work hand in hand with, and indeed egg on, the conquest-lusting maniacs of the Japanese armed forces. What in fact is happening is, I am sure, exactly the same as is happening in Europe, and the political exploitation of the Japanese China campaign especially presents the most extraordinarily close parallel to that of the German campaigns in Russia and Poland. In the same way, Japan's labour policy in China and Manchuria presents great similarities to what is going on now in France.

There is, we must admit, behind it all a basic idea that some readjustment of the world's economic structure is necessary. But both Japan and Germany have decided that they will do the readjusting in their own interests. They both have this *Herren-volk* idea, and feel, in many cases quite sincerely, that they are entitled to undertake the rehabilitation of their particular area and must lead it, which means that it must work in their exclusive interest. Incidentally, they find out on putting their policies into practice when they get there, that it is for the individual a very profitable game if you can really be rough with the other fellow. (Applause.)

SOVIET ASIA TODAY

BY VIOLET CONOLLY

THE heavy losses incurred by the Soviet peoples as a result of the German occupation of the Ukraine and of the North Caucasus might have been overwhelming in the first year of the war but for the saving resources of the Soviet Asian hinterland. This great reservoir of land and raw materials, food and industry—a sleeping giant in the 1914-1917 war—has made great and effective strides under Soviet planning. It must be reckoned a substantial factor in the Soviet war effort and faces a post-war future of exciting promise. In the Soviet Far East and in Siberia enormous tracts of country still await the colonist and the pioneer, and development everywhere is relatively recent. But the fact that Soviet Asia is rapidly coming to maturity in an age of intensive mechanization, air transport and modern invention, thus short-circuiting much wasteful primitive production and an unscientific lack of co-ordination of geological resources for modern metallurgical purposes, amply compensates for its long obscurity. The vital exigencies of the Soviet war position have also pushed forward the tempo of development in prospecting, mining and agriculture since 1941.

The Asiatic territory of the Soviet Union forms the great land mass east of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, and includes the entire Arctic coastline of Asia from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait. In the south it extends through the five Soviet Central Asian republics of the Turcoman, the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz and the Tadzhiks to the boundaries of Persia, Afghanistan and China, and overlooks India. Moscow, at once the great Russian and all-Union capital, is thus the centre of the great Eurasian State of Soviet peoples, of which the Asiatic sector is territorially by far the larger part, or more than three-fourths of the entire Soviet Union. There has been no physical expansion of this territory under Soviet auspices—except for the definitive hoisting of the Soviet flag over Wrangel Island in 1925. But from the Arctic coast to the Pamirs many “white spots” have been mapped, and prospecting is constantly proceeding, even in war-time, on a scale of enterprise and finds which suggest a geologist’s paradise. In sharp contrast to its area, the population of Soviet Asia is extremely sparse, and before the present war only represented about 35 million of the 170 million strong population of the Soviet Union. These 35 million, however, form a very interesting cross-section of the great variety of Soviet peoples and languages. Apart from the Russians and Ukrainians, who constitute the basic peasant population of Siberia, the more skilled industrial workers and a high (but diminishing) proportion of the Party officials throughout the whole area, many curious remnants of the indigenous peoples of the Far East and Siberia—Samoyeds, Koryaks, Chukchee—are to be found; there are also the Turki- and Iranian-speaking peoples of Central Asia, the Buriat-Mongolians, the Oirots, the Cossacks of the Urals and Semirechie, the Arabs of the Samarkand region, and many more. Many of these peoples were entirely illiterate before the Soviet régime. Now all have their native schools and, where necessary, alphabets and books have been devised for them. Russian is everywhere a compulsory second language, and reasonably so at the present stage when technical and university education is almost entirely in Russian.

Soviet Asia may be conveniently broken up into three main divisions, differing considerably in extent, climate, resources and population: Siberia, used here to designate the area between the Urals and the Amur; the Far Eastern Pacific Provinces of the U.S.S.R., including Kamchatka and the island of Sakhalin; the five Soviet Central Asian Republics, known in Tzarist days as Russian Turkistan. The second Five-Year Plan (1932-1937) focussed special attention on the rapid development of the Asiatic resources of the Soviet Union. But already from the earliest days of the Soviet revolution, when the aftermath of the German occupation of the Ukraine was a very urgent problem, the creation of the new, less vulnerable industrial centres east of the Urals was decided on by Lenin and his colleagues. As a result of the planned redistribution of industrial capacity which has meanwhile taken place it is estimated that these areas contained in 1939 about a quarter of the productive power of the U.S.S.R., including a considerable percentage of the armament and chemical plants. The exact whereabouts and capacity of many of these factories is naturally a close Soviet secret, but the quality and success of Russian armaments in the present national struggle is high tribute to their output. Many of Soviet Russia’s most important raw materials originate in Soviet Asia and approximately in pre-war days to the following extent: chrome, in which the Soviet Union is normally self-sufficient, 100 per cent.; copper, a deficit metal, even in peace-time, 90 per cent.; lead, 90 per cent.; nickel, 70 per cent.; steel, 35 per cent.; coal, 35 per cent.; aluminium, 35 per cent.; iron ore, 30 per cent.; oil, 15 per cent.; and output is constantly expanding in the Ural-Volga fields and in the Kazakh oil industry of Emba. All Soviet gold and platinum comes from Siberia or Central Asia, and the largest cotton and silk supplies also are produced in Central Asia. This Soviet Asian industrial nucleus since the German invasion of June, 1941, has been a receiving station for the hundreds of plants and their workers successfully evacuated according to plan. Great numbers, possibly reaching millions of the civilian population, including a high proportion of orphaned children, have also found new homes beyond the Urals, and among the hospitable Central Asian peoples in particular. This large exodus from the Ukraine and White Russia was naturally not accomplished under war conditions of transport without unavoidable hitches, congestion and hardships, and especially in the case of batches of fugitives arriving in the already overcrowded industrial cities of Siberia like Chelyabinsk or Novosibirsk. From the dispositions already taken by the Soviet Government

in regard to their homes in European Russia it is apparently intended that the majority of the evacuated citizens will never return. In this way the chances of war may permanently expand the sparse populations of Siberia and the Far Eastern Provinces of the Soviet Union more effectively than the former attempts at organized settlement have done.

Though geographically convenient, the term Siberia has more or less disappeared from the Soviet administrative nomenclature. It is replaced by a number of provinces or *oblasti* (Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk . . .), regions (the Altai, Krasnoyarsk . . .) and the Yakut and Buriat-Mongolian autonomous republics of non-Russian peoples. Smaller minority groups like the Koryak or Chukotsk tribes have emerged from long obscurity and lend their names to new administrative units with all the trappings of self-government inherent in the Soviet federative scheme. But in fact the entire Siberian area forms part of the R.S.F.S.R., the largest of the sixteen federal republics of the Soviet Union. Soviet Central Asia is, of course, not included in the Great Russian Republic; the five separate republics already referred to together contain an area somewhat smaller than half of Europe. The largest city east of the Urals is now Tashkent (population 585,000, or about the same size as Pittsburgh), and in Siberia the largest is Sverdlovsk, a rapidly expanding mining and machine-building city with a population of 425,000 in 1939 (roughly the same as Belfast). Other industrial towns of mushroom growth are Novosibirsk (405,000), Stalinsk (169,000) and Kemerovo (132,980), which reflect the rapid increase in the urban population which has taken place in Asiatic Russia in the last decade under planning. The rural population has not increased with anything like the same rapidity or volume in the same period. Serious difficulties have been encountered by the Soviet Government in their agricultural migration schemes to provide labour for the uncleared lands of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, where natural conditions are harsh and communications poorly developed. Many inducements in the form of tax and grain remissions and free travel permits have been offered by the Soviet Government, but the recruits coming forward to take up these virgin lands have been relatively small and entirely inadequate to the possibilities of development. The peculiar political conditions in the Soviet Union have closed the door to the flood of international immigrants which under large similar circumstances rushed from all corners of the globe to fill the empty spaces of Canada and the United States in their still recent days of colonization. Even in Birobidzhan, the Jewish national province in the Far East, opened to Jewish settlers in a large region of forest and uncleared land by the Soviet Government in 1928, there has been no large-scale migration of Jews from abroad. Agriculturally and industrially Birobidzhan seems to be progressing, but on the international plane, as a "Marxist alternative to Palestine," it has little claim to recognition.

Before the Soviets and their five-year plans an old and rather primitive mining tradition existed east of the Urals, in Transbaikalia, the Lena gold-fields and other isolated places mostly worked by foreign interests like the Urquhart concessions. The establishment of giant metallurgical plants, of an entirely new machine-building industry capable of manufacturing locomotives, tractors, tanks and many other types of the most modern machinery, and the development of a great network of non-ferrous industries, including nickel, copper, tin, lead, tungsten, molybdenum and many precious metals, is almost entirely a Soviet achievement. Many of these important minerals, like the Arctic Circle nickel at Norilsk or the big Kounrad copper mines of the Kazakh Desert, were discovered in remote and uninhabited places where working conditions are incredibly difficult. There was plenty of bungling in the development of these economic plans, as the Soviet Press most vividly describes at times, but things forged ahead, nevertheless, in spite of the time-lags and mistakes. The Urals' mineral resources do not contain first-class coal reserves. But nearly two thousand miles away in the heart of Western Siberia the Soviets have developed the Kuzbass coal-fields, which pre-war statistics showed to be second only in importance to the Donbass in output, to contain good coking coal, and to account for more than 15 per cent. of the Union's annual coal supplies. Based on Kuzbass coal, a heavy industrial area has grown up in Stalinsk, Kemerovo and Novosibirsk, producing chemicals, machinery, metals and armaments. The big engineering-metallurgical towns of the Urals—Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Magnitogorsk and Nizhni Tagil—also use Kuzbass coal to an increasing extent. Newer than Kuzbass is the industrial

region now expanding round the Karaganda coal-mines of Northern Kazakhstan, which are considerably nearer to the Urals' plants than Kuzbass. Owing to the loss of Ukrainian supplies, prospecting for local iron, manganese and bauxite has been redoubled since the war, and, according to the Soviet Press, with good result. The weaker spots in the Siberian industrial development have hitherto been the manufacture of mass-consumption goods, cement and textiles. Analysed retrospectively, it is quite clear that the Soviet aim of providing an alternate basis of heavy industry and armaments, irrespective of the standard of living or comfort of the people or the cost involved, has been abundantly justified by the Soviet capacity for resistance in the present war, after the loss of the older centres of heavy industry in European Russia.

East of Siberia proper lies the Soviet Far Eastern Pacific territory. Here in a still partially uncharted wilderness are vast resources of timber, fur-bearing animals and valuable minerals, including the important Kolyma gold-fields (one of the richest in the Soviet Union), the rich coastal fisheries, where Japan works many leased fishing-grounds, and the coal and oil-fields of Sakhalin. Soviet and Japanese economic interests interlock not only in the leased fisheries and canneries operated by the Japanese on Soviet soil, but also in the coal and oil concessions worked by the Japanese on Sakhalin Island. While Sakhalin oil is shipped by the Soviets for refining to the new cracking plants in Khabarovsk and Nikolaevsk, the Japanese output is almost entirely taken by the Japanese Navy. Though the combined Soviet-Japanese oil output here is not large or less than 1,000,000 tons annually, Sakhalin, as the site of the only producing oil industry in this area, is a much-coveted Soviet possession. A beginning was made under the second Five-Year Plan to terminate the dependence of the Soviet Far East on imported iron and steel and on a series of other manufactured goods. A large plant (*Amurstal*) was built in the new town of Komsomolsk on the Amur, where iron and steel and a number of machine parts are now manufactured. Many light industries (food, cement, bricks and glass, and sawmills) have been established in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka), Soviet Harbour, Nogaevsk and Nikolaevsk, the chief towns of this region. Though there is still much virgin soil and forest in the Soviet Far East, a great deal has been done to develop it in recent years, and especially with a view to defence in the event of war or invasion. Fortifications have been built along the entire length of the Soviet Union's frontier with Japanese-controlled Manchuria and Outer Mongolia; some armaments are reported to be manufactured locally, including aeroplanes, and there is a separate Far Eastern Command of the Red Army, with large forces permanently stationed there. On the seaboard, from Vladivostok to Kamchatka, the ports have been improved, however primitive in equipment many still remain. The development of airways and services is conspicuous in the Far East, though road-building has not made much progress, and few railways have been built during the planned period. Owing to the contacts established during the present war and the active development taking place on both sides of the Northern Pacific mainland, it is unlikely that the Soviet Far Eastern territory and its American neighbour will in future remain the dead ends they have previously been, at least as far as inter-continental communication is concerned. American cargo boats occasionally called with oil or grain at Vladivostok or Nogaevsk; some Soviet flying aces on transcontinental flights have touched at American Pacific aerodromes, and the Soviet and American coastguards, no doubt, watched each other with suspicious eye in the adjacent Big and Little Diomed Islands. Otherwise contact was neither established nor encouraged (by the Soviet Government) between the Soviet and American inhabitants of the Pacific coastal States. During the present war both sides have become too closely aware of each other's existence and interests in this region to suspend relations casually again, though on what exact basis it is far too early to foresee.

In most respects, save the sparseness of population in wide empty spaces, the Soviet Central Asian republics form a sharp contrast to the Siberian and Far Eastern regions of the U.S.S.R. The tundra, forest and steppe of the north give place in the south to deserts and thickly populated fertile oases. The total population of these republics was about 13 millions in 1939, mainly non-Russian people of Muslim tradition. The percentage of literacy, the number of schools and social institutions, and the range of cultural interests of the people have greatly risen since the Soviet revolution. Women have also been officially stimulated to unveil and take an active

part in social and economic life. To a large extent these measures ran counter to the traditional Muslim customs of the country, and aroused the opposition of the mullahs and the older generation of the people. But willy-nilly the new Soviet pattern of life is being gradually established under the leadership of the local Communist parties, which originally contained a considerable, and now diminishing, number of Russian officials and workers. Owing to the rigorous censorship maintained by the Soviet authorities in regard to travel and political news in the Central Asian republics, far too little is known about the interplay of national and Union interests, or in general the working of political machinery in this area. One is on safer ground in asserting that the republics are of unique economic importance to the Soviet Union in peace and especially in war-time as large-scale producers of silk, cotton, copper and of a constantly expanding list of rare metals and other useful commodities like natural rubber (*kok-sagiz*). The most progressive and thickly populated of the republics is Uzbekistan, which covers an area roughly the same size as Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Tashkent, the capital, is also the economic and cultural centre of Central Asia. Its Polytechnic Institute and other training schools attract thousands of students from the Central Asian region, which formerly had no higher educational bodies of its own. On the industrial side, Tashkent has made great progress in recent years and now boasts of a large agricultural machine-building plant, the giant "Stalin" cotton mill, silk, food and other light industries. Uzbekistan grows more than 50 per cent. of the Soviet cotton supplies and, in addition to copper, produces wolfram and molybdenum. To the north of Uzbekistan is Kazakhstan, a much larger and less-developed country, but the main producer at the present time of Soviet copper, lead, nickel, chromium and zinc. In the eastern corner of Kazakhstan is the interesting Altai region, where many rare metals are worked and the most important Soviet lead refineries are located. Merging into the great agricultural belt of Western Siberia with its dairy farms and grain-fields are the fertile black-soil steppes of Northern Kazakhstan, one of the most valuable new food-producing areas of the U.S.S.R., and of particular importance during the present war. Moreover, through the accelerated development of the Kazakh and Kirghiz sugar industries under war pressure, Central Asia has made a substantial contribution to Soviet food resources since the loss of the Ukraine. Though a good start has been made under Soviet auspices to establish a large-scale cotton industry in Central Asia, with mills in Tashkent, Alma Ata, Stalinabad and other towns, the production of cotton fabrics is still mainly concentrated in the old Central Russian mills.

In many respects the Soviet solution of the nationalities problem on the basis of the All-Union Constitution of 1936 and the Soviet federal State still eludes satisfactory analysis, particularly as exemplified by the machinery of government in the five Central Asian republics, owing to the baffling lack of practical information available outside the Soviet Union. Local self-government is confined to relatively minor matters, owing to the wide powers vested in the All-Union Parliament, or Supreme Soviet, and which include the control of foreign policy and defence, foreign trade, the monetary and credit system, and far-reaching powers in educational policy and economic planning. The best analysis of the allocation of powers between the Union and the constituent republics is, I think, found in Sir John Maynard's recent book, *The Russian Peasant*, where he points out, *inter alia*, that the powers of the Soviet constituent republics are inferior to those of "the States of the Federal Union of the U.S.A., of the Provinces of the Dominion of Canada and of Australia, and even of the Provinces of British India" in the present stage of development. In this, as in many fields, Soviet propaganda abroad has overreached itself. The problem is greatly over-simplified; and the inauguration of a bold and intelligent course is often fallaciously set forth as the smooth finale of a very difficult and fluid chapter of statecraft.

EUROPE AND THE TURKS IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES—II

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BYZANTIUM was meanwhile seriously occupied nearer home by a different people of the Steppes. These were the Avars. Recent research places the Avars in the Mongol group of the Turco-Mongol family of nations.* The low level of Avar civilization supports this, for the Mongols were more backward than their Turkish cousins.† The Avars' only contributions to the world were the popularization of the stirrup, unused in Europe before their time, and the production of a few works of art, purely Mongol in design.‡ Otherwise their effort was purely destructive. Despite one great ruler, Bayan (c. 565-602), their empire, which in the early seventh century covered the whole South European Steppe and threatened Byzantium itself, was short-lived; though for two more centuries an Avar kingdom lingered on in the Hungarian plain, to be crushed eventually by Charlemagne.

With the collapse of the Avars, the hegemony on the Black Sea Steppes passed to the Bulgars.§ Towards the middle of the seventh century there was established a kingdom called Great Bulgaria, stretching along all the northern shores of the Black Sea. Its founder was a certain Kubrat, who claimed descent from Attila and his son Ernach, and it included the remnants of the Kotigur and Utigur and other Hunnic peoples who had recently been under Avar domination. This kingdom was short-lived. The Byzantine chroniclers tell us that King Kubrat had five sons,|| four of whom decided to migrate with portions of the tribe. Only the eldest remained where he was with the nucleus of his father's people. One son took his group to Italy, where "Bulgar" villages were recognizable far into the Middle Ages. Another went to Central Europe, settling at first in Transylvania under Avar suzerainty; but his descendants eventually joined up with their Balkan cousins. The best-known portion moved to the Lower Danube, and in 679 crossed into the Balkan peninsula to found the country now called Bulgaria. But the history of Balkan Bulgaria lies outside of our domain here, for the Balkan Bulgars were soon absorbed by their Slav subjects. Within a century and a half they had given up their old Turkish language and their Turkish customs and had become a Slav people. The last and probably the largest

* The exact identity of the Avars is still under discussion. Are they the Jouan-Jouan of the Chinese? Or was Theophylact Simocatta right when he called them the "false Avars" as opposed to the true Avars or Jouan-Jouan? In that case, were they the Hephthalite Huns? See Marquart, *Osttürkische Dialektstudien* (1914); Pelliot, "A propos des Comans," *Journal Asiatique* (1920); Hermann, *Atlas of China*; Minorsky, *Hudud Al-Alam* (1937).

† Orientalists such as Poppe and Barthold show that the Mongol languages are at a much lower state of development than the Turkish. The question whether there was a common proto-Turco-Mongol language is still undecided.

‡ The question of Avar art is well discussed in an appendix to Grousset's *Empire des Steppes*, though I am doubtful if the facts are quite as indisputable as he assumes. It is clear, however, that Avar art was a typical example of the early animal art of the peoples of the Steppes.

§ For the Protobulgars, the best account is Moravcsik's *Geschichte der Onoguren in the Ungarisches Jahrbuch* (1930). See also Barthold's article "Bulghar" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, and Minorsky in *Hudud Al-Alam*; also Zlatarski's *History of the Bulgarian Empire* (in Bulgarian), and Runciman, *First Bulgarian Empire*.

|| They were more probably his grandsons.

part of the Bulgar people moved northward to the Middle Volga, to found the kingdom known in the Middle Ages as White, or Kama, Bulgaria. Its capital, Bolgar, was a huge city, built originally of tents, near the banks of the Volga some 100 kilometres south of the modern town of Kazan. White Bulgaria did not play a spectacular rôle in history, but for five centuries it was a prosperous kingdom. From time to time its armies would carry out raids on the rich countries to the south; but its chief importance was as a commercial centre. In the markets of Bolgar, merchants of all nationalities might be seen—Byzantine, Arab, Scandinavian, Persian, Chinese and the Turks themselves—buying furs or slaves or timber in exchange for their own products. The White Bulgars were converted to Islam about the end of the ninth century. Thenceforward Byzantine diplomats regarded them with suspicion. Their kingdom lasted till the year 1236 (or 1237),* when Bolgar was sacked by the great Mongol general Subotâi and the country was annexed to the Mongol Empire. They are represented today by the Chuvash tribe, on the Volga between Kazan and Kuibishev, and many of the Tartars of Kazan are their descendants.†

The people whose advent caused the break-up of old great Bulgaria were the Khazars, the most remarkable of all the Turkish peoples that penetrated into mediæval Europe. The original history of the Khazars is unknown. Linguistic evidence suggests that they belong to the Western Hun and Protobulgar group of tribes, but they probably did not form part of Attila's Empire but came later to the West.‡ They first appear in recorded history, already as a powerful people, in 626, when their Khagan Ziebel came to interview the Emperor Heraclius at Tiflis and offered him a mercenary army of 40,000 men. By the end of the seventh century the Khazar Empire stretched from the Aral Sea and the Urals to the Crimea, with its centre on the Lower Volga.

The Khazars soon formed a settled state, whose cities were amongst the richest of the time. The first Khazar capital was at Belendjer, on the Steppes of the Terek, north of the Caucasus. This was destroyed by the Arabs in a raid in 722-723, and the Khazar Court moved northward to Itil, in the Volga delta, close to the modern city of Astrakhan. Belendjer and Itil, at first, were merely winter residences. In summer the Khagan used to wander over the Steppes. But gradually Itil became the definite and permanent seat of government. It was a vast city, built mostly of wood, and divided into three parts by the branches of the river. There was the royal city where the Khagan and his Court lived; there was the western city, Sarigshar,§ where the Khazar nobility lived; and the eastern city, Chamlich,|| which was the business quarter and housed the foreign merchants. Other great towns were Semender, at the mouth of the Terek; Tarku, towards the Caucasus;¶ the merchant depôt of Tamartarka on the site of the ancient Phanagoria, at the entrance to the Sea of Azov; and Sarkel on the Don, a city built of stone by Byzantine architects. The Khazars themselves were mainly sheep farmers and market-gardeners; the chief exports of Khazaria were wool, wax, honey and dried fish. But the real source of Khazaria's wealth was that it lay upon the great trade route from the East. All the trade going from China to Europe and from Europe to China during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries passed through Itil and Tamartarka and the Byzantine outpost

* 1236 according to Arab sources; 1237 according to Russian sources.

† The Chuvash dialect seems to be the only surviving member of the old West-Hunnic group of languages, which included the Hunnic of Attila's Empire, proto-Bulgar and, apparently, Khazar.

‡ See previous note. Their tribal customs suggest a more Eastern origin.

§ "Sarigshar" means the "Yellow City." Arab writers often call the Khazar capital "El-Baidâ," the "White City." This is probably due to a misunderstanding. Sarkel was called by the Russians "Bielaveia," the "White City," but it was never the capital. It is to be presumed that the Arabs mixed up the two cities and the two colours.

|| I.e., the city of pines. Was it built mainly of pine wood?

¶ It is possible that Semender and Tarku are two names for the same city. So Marquart thinks. See his *Osteuropäische Streifzüge*.

of Kherson; and both the Khazar and the Byzantine authorities charged a 10 per cent. duty on all the merchandise. Travellers who visited Khazaria were all impressed by the wealth and luxury of the country, and by the elegance of its wooden palaces and pavilions with their convex roofs and their onion-shaped towers.

The Khazar Constitution was very peculiar. By the ninth century the Khagan himself had become a purely ceremonial figure. He took no part in the government of the country, but merely was a symbol of the State. He lived in splendid isolation with his twenty-five wives, each the daughter of a king, and his sixty concubines. No ordinary citizen might look on him, and when he drove through the city the streets were cleared. At first he had been required to die after a fixed number of years; but later he was allowed to await a natural death, when his successor was chosen from amongst his family. When he died his corpse was placed in a mausoleum, built for the purpose across a stream. It was thought that thus the worms would not be able to eat him. The mausoleum, which was called Paradise, had twenty-five chambers, but no one knew in which of them the dead Khagan was laid, for the slaves that laid him there were put to death before they could speak of it. The actual government of the country was carried out by a hereditary viceroy, the Khagan Bey.* A provincial viceroy lived at Semender and another at Tamartarka.

The Khazar religion was equally unexpected. Muslim and Christian missionaries had long tried to win over the Khazars and so increase the influence of the Khalif or the Emperor. Neither made much progress, and in about the year 800 the Khazar authorities suddenly announced their conversion to Judaism. There had been for some centuries Jewish settlements on the Steppes, but they were without the backing of a strong political power. The Khazars calculated that here was a religion of good social standing that did not involve any political embarrassment. All the leading Khazars became Jews, and Judaism remained the state religion so long as the Khazar state lasted. But the Khazars had many subjects of other religions: the army was mainly Muslim, while some of the aristocracy—for example, a viceroy of Tamartarka in the ninth century—were Christian. The law was administered by seven judges—two Jews who judged according to Mosaic law, two Christians who judged according to Church law, two Muslims who judged according to Koran law, and a pagan who judged according to common sense.

Byzantium was in constant touch with the Khazars. They represented the one reliable civilized power on the Steppes; and the Byzantines, faithful to the system of Turkish alliances, regarded their friendship as essential. Ambassadors, merchants and missionaries travelled from Byzantium to Itil, but unfortunately no detailed reports of these voyages have come down to us, except for a brief account of the missionary journey of St. Cyril, the future apostle to the Slavs. St. Cyril had the friendliest possible welcome, and we learn that he held discussions with Jewish rabbis at which the Khagan himself assisted. But, though he specially learnt Hebrew for the journey, his conversions were few in number. Two Byzantine Emperors married Khazar princesses. Justinian II. was given a Khazar bride in 703 when he was a refugee at her brother the Khagan's Court. Thirty years later, Leo III., anxious to cement an alliance against the Arabs, obtained a Khazar princess for his son and heir Constantine. This princess was called before her marriage Princess Chichek, or Princess Flower. She brought new fashions with her to Byzantium, and soon everyone there was wearing a garment called the Tsitsakion, after her name. A century later, the Emperor Theophilus formed a close alliance with the Khazars, directed probably against the nascent power of the Russians. It was at this time that Byzantine architects built for the Khagan the fortified city of Sarkel. This Khazar alliance was not only of value against the Arabs on the Caucasus front, but also did much to preserve Byzantium from attacks by the wilder people of the Steppes. Towards the end of the tenth century the Khazars suffered a series of bad defeats at the hands of the Russians, who in 965 destroyed Sarkel. In 1016 the Byzantines, abandoning their former policy, and desiring to drive a Slav wedge into the Turkish block on the Steppes, sent a fleet to aid a further Russian attack on Khazaria. By 1030 the Khazar state had ceased to

* Constantine Porphyrogenitus calls them the "Khaganos" and the "Pekh."

of any importance. The Byzantines had made a bad calculation. The Khazars' place was soon taken by far fiercer and less agreeable peoples.*

The Khazars at the time of their greatness ruled over several other tribes of Turkish origin—the Burdas, the Kabars and the Bulgars of old Great Bulgaria. But they had other neighbours that they could not subdue. During the first half of the ninth century there passed through Khazar territory, on its migration westward, the tribe of the Magyars or Hungarians.† This, to judge from ample linguistic evidence, was not a Turkish but a Finnish people. However, while they were under Khazar suzerainty, the Magyars mingled with the Turkish tribe of the Kabars, and the Khazars provided as their governors a noble Kabar family which eventually became their royal family; and it is probable that all the Magyar aristocracy was in fact Kabar in origin.‡ Byzantine writers always call the Magyars “the Turks,” and the Imperial protocol speaks of the “Princes of the Turks” when it refers to the Magyar Government.

Close behind the Magyars came the Petchenegs,§ a tribe of undoubtedly Turkish origin. The Petchenegs had previously been an outlying vassal of the Tougkic Empire, and had been forced to move westward by the growth of the Qarluq kingdom in the late eighth century. In the second half of the ninth century they passed through Khazar territory, driving the Magyars before them. By the last decade of the century the Petchenegs were established between the Dnieper and the Pruth. They remained incorrigible nomads and were famed for their savagery. As the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus remarked, and as history showed, they were the one people of whom the Magyars were frightened. Byzantium kept in touch with both peoples, and used to play them off against the enemies of the empire or against each other. In the last years of the century, when the Emperor was employing the Magyars against the Balkan Bulgarians, the latter employed the Petchenegs against the Magyars—so effectively that the Magyars were forced to leave their homes and to cross the Carpathians into the country now called Hungary after them. Meanwhile, the Petchenegs extended their dominion to the Lower Danube. Byzantium, though it regretted the increase in Petcheneg power, was not sorry at the Magyars' move; for it drove a wedge into the heart of the Slav block which then spread thickly from the Baltic to the Ægean. The Magyars, after raiding Western Europe for a century, settled down in their new country and acquired a European civilization mainly Western but largely influenced by Byzantium.

The Petchenegs, however, never settled. Till the end of the eleventh century they roamed over their plains, from the Don to the Danube, occasionally crossing their borders to spread terror and destruction. During the last years of the century they were a very real menace to Byzantium, already distracted enough by the Seljuks and the Normans. But in 1091 a great Petcheneg invasion of the Balkans was stemmed by the Byzantines, with the help of other Turkish allies, at the battle of the River Levernium, where the Petchenegs were so thoroughly defeated that their power never recovered. In Anna Comnena's words, “a whole nation, ten thousand strong, was annihilated on that day.”

* A few years ago it would have been possible to give a far fuller history of the Khazars, based on the correspondence of the tenth-century Spanish Jew Chisdai with the Khazar Khagan Joseph. But the authenticity of this correspondence has always been doubted, and recently has been so seriously challenged (chiefly by M. Gregoire, in *Byzantion*, 1937, in an article called “Le Glozel Khazare”) that it would be rash to place further faith in it. It is, however, just possible that a scientific scrutiny and test of the original manuscripts might re-establish their claim to belong to the tenth century. See Baumgarten, *Aux Origines de la Russie*, Rome, 1939.

† For the Magyars, see Moravcsik's article, cited above; also Hóman and Skefku's *History of Hungary* (in Hungarian), Vol. I. (by Hóman; Budapest, 1928), and Macartney, *Magyars in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge, 1930).

‡ It is possible that the Magyars also mingled with the Onugurs, and that the name Ougre, or Hungarian, came from this source.

§ For the Petchenegs the best book remains Vasilievsky's *Byzantium and the Petchenegs* (in Russian, St. Petersburg, 1872).

The Turkish ally to whom the victory was due was the people known by the Byzantines as the Cumans, by the Russians as the Polovtsians, and by themselves as the Kipchak Turks. Their chiefs, Tugur Khan and Boniak, were received as heroes at Byzantium. The Kipchaks* seem to have come originally from Siberia, from the Upper Obi or the Irtych, and to have formed part of the Kimak group of Turks, close relatives to the Uzes.† They probably travelled westward with the Uzes, remaining slightly to the north-east of them. When the Uzes were weakened by their Balkan invasions, the Kipchaks took their place along the Black Sea coast, and after the elimination of the Petchenegs they were the one great power on the Steppes, ruling them from the Danube to the Volga. But they never settled down, nor did they have any feeling of pan-Turkish unity. We have already seen them fighting for Byzantium against the Petchenegs; they provided mercenaries for King David II. of Georgia to use against the Seljuks; they themselves were always ready to attack the Uzes or the Volga Bulgars or the Khwarezmian Turks. But their lack of any political coherence or any territorial ambition beyond the Steppes kept them from being a danger to the settled nations. If they served further afield it was only as mercenaries; but as mercenaries they were much sought after, for this very lack of ambition. Their loyalty could be trusted. The only settled nation that suffered habitually from their attacks was the Russians, many of whose towns made enclaves into the Steppes. The great Russian epic of Prince Igor tells of a disastrous campaign against the Kipchaks, while in 1204, the year that the capital of Eastern Christendom was sacked by the Franks and Italians, a similar fate at the hands of the Kipchaks befell Kiev, Byzantium's eldest daughter in Russia.

The Kipchak power lasted till 1237, when the Mongol General Subötai broke it in a few short campaigns. Many of the Kipchaks were annihilated; 40,000 families fled westward under their chief, Kután, across the Carpathians into Hungary, where they were baptized and merged themselves into the Magyar people. Those that remained and submitted formed a Turkish nucleus in the westernmost Mongol Khanate, called the Golden Horde by the Mongols and the Russians; but amongst the Arabs the old name lingered, and it was still known as the Khanate of the Kipchak.

I have left to the last the Uzes or Ghuzz,‡ though strictly speaking, their intervention in European affairs dates before that of the Kipchaks. They were already known to Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the mid-tenth century. He remarks that they might some day be useful, as the Petchenegs seemed to be frightened of them—a tremendous tribute considering the reputation of the Petchenegs. At that time they were living to the east of the Khazars, in the Western Asiatic Steppe. During the late tenth century the Uze race broke into two. One branch went southward to Persia, where it adopted Islam. Under its leader, Seljuk, and his successors, Toghrul Bey and Alp Arslan, it rose with startling rapidity to a position of pre-eminence in the South-West Asiatic world. Within a century the Seljuks were established in Syria and Anatolia, and were forcing the Turkish question on to the notice of the whole of Europe. The other Uze branch moved due westward; but its intervention in European politics was brief, and, apart from one incident, of little importance. These Uzes occupied the territory previously owned by the Khazars. The Russian chroniclers first mention them in 1054, coupling them with the Kipchaks. They apply the name of "Tork" to them. In 1065 the Uzes, to the number of 600,000, according to the Byzantine chroniclers, invaded the Balkans, penetrating into the Greek peninsula. But on their return they were overwhelmingly defeated by the Byzantines with an army consisting mostly of Bulgarians and Petcheneg mercenaries. After this disaster the Uze power crumbled. Those of the survivors that

* The best modern account of the Kipchaks is to be found in Rasovsky's articles "Polqvtsi" (in Russian, with a French summary) in the *Seminarium Kondakovianum* (Prague-Belgrade, 1935 onward).

† The Kimaks, like the Uzes, employed an initial "dj" in place of the usual Turkish "y."

‡ For the Uzes, see Barthold's article "Ghuzz" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, and Rasovsky's article "Petchenegs and Turks in Russia" (in Russian) in the *Seminarium Kondakovianum* of 1933.

returned home mingled with the Kipchaks. Others took service as mercenaries of Byzantium.

These latter were soon to avenge themselves terribly on the Byzantines. When in 1071 the Emperor Romanus Diogenes set out in full force to crush the growing menace of the Seljuks, his cavalry consisted almost entirely of Uze detachments. On the eve of the battle of Manzikert their sense of kinship proved too much for the Uzes. In spite of the good pay that they received from the Emperor, they slipped away in the night to join their Seljuk cousins. This defection was the primary cause of the Byzantine rout next day, when the fate of Anatolia and even of Byzantium itself was decided for ever. Thus in the end the time-honoured Byzantine policy of alliance with the Turks against nearer rivals and of sowing discord amongst the Turks themselves proved now to be fundamentally defective. For the Turks were the nearest rivals and they refused to be divided.

Nevertheless, though in the end the Turks were to be the conquerors of decadent Byzantium, earlier on, when Byzantium was the chief guardian of European civilization, the Turkish alliance had been of inestimable value to her, and through her to all the countries of Europe. The Huns at the beginning of the Middle Ages and the Seljuks and Osmanlis at their close, by their actions radically altered the destiny of Europe, but even this alteration was not without its value as a stimulus; and Western Europe should not forget the debt incurred by European civilization to the Turks in the intervening centuries. Byzantium was well aware of this debt. Though the Byzantines might fear and dislike the fiercer Turkish tribes they had a high appreciation of the civilized Turkish nations, such as the Tou-Kie or the Khazars. They admired their culture and their art; they were not ashamed to copy their fashions nor even to intermarry with them. They showed them a respect that they grudged to give not only to the Slavs but even to the Europeans of the West. And we today, when we reflect on Turkish history, should remember with gratitude these early Turkish peoples for their contribution to the civilization of the world.

A LETTER FROM TURKEY

BY E. W. F. TOMLIN

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To have lived in Turkey for a number of months and then to take a short holiday outside its borders (as the author has just done) is to experience some novel sensations. Turkey is neutral; the States situated upon her frontiers—Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria—are either openly at war with the Axis or, like Egypt, the scene of warlike activities. Turkey has signed a non-aggression pact with both Germany and Russia, together with a mutual assistance pact with ourselves. She is thus formally guaranteed both against aggression and, in consequence of a recent extension of the Lease and Lend agreement and the help we are giving her, against unpreparedness. Hence the difference in kind between Turkish neutrality today and that formerly adopted, though with trepidation, by Norway, Belgium, and Holland. Upon first visiting Turkey, therefore, you would expect to find something very like an oasis of peace; to become instantly aware of a slackening of tension; to experience some of the emotions and indulge in some of the habits associated with the almost forgotten, if not always regretted, days of peace. In reality, you will find nothing of the kind. Instead of an oasis of peace you will find a country already bravely coping with many of the inconveniences and deprivations of war. Instead of a slackening of tension you will become conscious, upon crossing the border, of a tension of another kind. Instead of recapturing the emotions of another age you will become acutely and uncomfortably aware that you live in an age of open struggle—economic, political, and cultural. At the time of writing, a country like Palestine is only just beginning to “feel the pinch”; Iraq,

though expensive to live in, still enjoys a reasonably high standard of living; Syria and Iran, having suffered more than the others, are less fortunate, though still far from destitute. Turkey, on the other hand, has been fighting for her material existence ever since the war began, but particularly since the collapse of France. In the ten months that I have lived in Ankara prices have doubled, in some cases trebled. Bread has been rationed, sugar (I observe) is to be restricted, hardware is scarce, and, to take luxury articles, whisky, if obtainable at all, costs about £10 a bottle. On the other hand, the Government has taken such prompt measures to deal with the food situation that the rationing of bread may, I understand, soon prove unnecessary; and similar measures are being adopted to cope with the rise in prices. That the war has affected Turkey's prosperity is obvious; but it would be foolish to underestimate the extent to which wise government and the exertions of a resourceful peasantry have remedied the situation.

Meanwhile, what do the Turks—a nation of warriors—feel about this war? That, I suppose, is the question which most English people, puzzled at Turkey's conduct in recent months, are asking. First of all, it must be remembered that, in order to preserve an attitude of neutrality at this late hour, a country must necessarily undergo considerable and continuous strain. Each new development in the war situation, whether in Russia, Egypt, or even the Far East, is calculated to produce new and often major repercussions in Turkey. There is no military diversion to which her General Staff can remain indifferent, no political speech from which her journalists and spokesmen can afford to withhold comment, no rumour affecting herself which she can dismiss as lacking significance. She must be ever watchful, ever tactful, and always prepared. Thus, hardly a month goes by without the signing of some new agreement, usually commercial but always political in both spirit and consequence, between Turkey and one of the belligerent Powers, which needs forthwith to be balanced by a concession, however nominal, to the other. And this balancing, adjusting, poising has been going on, we must remember, ever since the day when Turkey, not without deliberation, decided to link herself to Britain and France by the mutual assistance agreement. It has been hard going, but she has stuck it. Loyalty between nations is not, and has never been, so common that we can afford to belittle such steadfastness.

It would nevertheless be a mistake—and an exceedingly naive mistake—if we were to attribute Turkey's neutrality solely to her liking for Britain. There are other and more substantial reasons for her continued abstention from war, over and above such negative reasons as that she is still insufficiently prepared. One of these reasons in particular deserves somewhat closer attention than it has so far received. As a neutral country which enjoys the respect, if not perhaps the affection, of the Axis Powers, Turkey is in a far better position to know what is really going on in Europe, and, above all, in occupied Europe, than any other nation in the world. Her embassies and consulates remain as wide open as before, perhaps a little wider. Her journalists and business men can travel where they will. Of the efficiency of her intelligence service there is no doubt. With such diverse sources of information at her disposal, she enjoys not a few opportunities of estimating the war chances and the endurance of the belligerent nations; and she has been engaged upon this interesting task for nearly three years. In these circumstances it is not without significance that, despite the pressure to which she has hitherto been subjected by Germany, and the reverses which the Allied cause has sustained since the collapse of France, Turkey has at no time betrayed the smallest inclination to link herself with Hitler, other than by such minor commercial ties as are compatible with her continued neutrality. She knows just what the New Order means in practice. She knows just what "collaboration" entails. She is near enough to Greece, and not so far removed from Yugoslavia, to realize what is involved by Nazi "liberation." And, aware of all this, she decides, not unwisely, to stay put.

In spite of recent events, then, the Turks remain both as a nation and as individuals extremely friendly to us. This friendship, however it originates, is as near to being genuine as friendship between nations not indissolubly linked by interest can be. I do not mean to suggest that among the Turkish intelligentsia there are no pro-Nazis; there are many—perhaps more than the average Englishman, with his limited range of acquaintance, is likely to realize. But we must distinguish, as the

Turks do themselves, between those who, for some reason or other, want to see Hitler win the war and those who, while preferring that the United Nations shall win, doubt their capacity to do so. The former group, which is largely inarticulate (save through the medium of such pro-Axis papers as *Beyoğlu*), has probably not increased very much since the outbreak of war. The latter, I imagine, tends to vary in size with the course of events. Needless to say, public (which usually means private) opinion is inclined to undergo modification with every major development in the international situation. Although much less unstable than the Arabs in this respect, the Turks are in the habit of reacting to our set-backs more violently, and with a greater degree of distress, than we do ourselves. Indeed, nothing is a source of greater perplexity to our Turkish friends than the attitude of sang-froid displayed by Englishmen, in face of set-backs and disasters. Many a Turk, having confessed to spending a sleepless night worrying about our prospects, cannot understand how it is that, after the series of losses of the last year, we manage to get any sleep at all. Several have not troubled to conceal their opinion that, unless we worry a little more than we do, we shall never win the war; but most are slowly coming to realize that without this sustained attitude of calm we should never have been able to hang on long enough for new and powerful allies to rally to our side.

It is sometimes difficult to realize, though important for that reason to remind ourselves, that, in one sense, Turkey is the centre of the world. She is the centre of the neutral world. There is, of course, Spain; but Spain, lately a battlefield herself, preserves a type of neutrality which, allowing for obvious differences, approximates rather to that of Vichy than to that of Ankara. And in any case the Spanish Caudillo, whether from personal inclination or because he feels obliged to please his late masters, has taken more than one opportunity to express, like Laval, his faith in an Axis victory. Ankara neutrality, on the other hand, is the real thing—honourable, impartial, and, as I said at the beginning, backed by growing strength. To live among such a people in war-time is therefore a unique and exhilarating experience. The strength of Atatürk's revolution was at no time more convincingly demonstrated than now. Most revolutions in history—though we can except our own—have issued, by reason of their inherent instability, in foreign aggression. Even Franco has had his little "coup" in Tangiers, and his eyes are still upon French Morocco. Atatürk's firm refusal to indulge in cheap triumphs of this kind has probably saved Turkey from more than one international quarrel, as it has saved her from premature intervention in the present conflict. Turkey is the one great country which has reason to be proud of her "isolation" (a word usually signifying short-sightedness), whose decision is one of strength rather than of weakness, and whose perseverance in her present course has won her the respect of potential aggressors as well as the gratitude of her friends.

So much for opinion *about* the war. Now for the even more pressing question: "What will Turkey do if attacked?" There answer is very simple. She will fight. She will fight with her accustomed doggedness and, in view of the Kemalist régime which she is obliged to defend, with twice her accustomed valour. That she would cause any invader to regret his action is, I believe, certain. In the event of her territory being overrun, which is not impossible, the idea of surrender would probably never occur to her; and it is highly improbable that among her army or her civil administrators a single Quisling or collaborator could be found. If indeed Turkey were completely surrounded by Axis forces, and direct attack upon her soil were considered superfluous, I do not know what would happen. What I believe is that no nation, however abundant its mechanical resources and man-power, would ever succeed in wholly subduing Turkey. Guerilla warfare, as in Serbia, would thrive on such a scale as to keep an army of occupation in a perpetual state of morbid excitement. The Turkish army is large, well trained, and passionately attached to its soil. It will not be deceived by promises; it knows nothing about "crusades"; you will not persuade it to embark upon servile expeditions against "enemies of civilization." Meanwhile not a moment is being lost to provide it with equipment adequate to its needs. If Turkey can keep out of the war altogether, so much the better. If she cannot, let her try to do so until such time as, fully prepared, she can treat her enemies as they deserve to be treated.

There is, of course, another side to the picture. Fear and distrust of the Soviet

Union, which neither the Russo-Turkish non-aggression pact nor the various Russian assurances with regard to the Straits have succeeded in allaying, is everywhere manifested, though more in private than in public. This apprehension would be a great deal less dangerous if it were subordinated to a fear of Germany; but unfortunately such is not the case. Except among a very small minority, which includes some writers of distinction, it is rare to hear a word spoken in favour of Russia. Anxious that we, and not Germany, shall win the war, the Turks are no less anxious that, in doing so, we shall owe as little as possible to Russia. They are displeased, not that Russia is at war, but that, in spite of her losses, she is still a formidable power. They know Germany as a former ally who, in spite of extravagant promises and equally extravagant successes, finally let them down; whose bombast and self-assurance Atatürk was the first of his countrymen, and perhaps the first among Germany's allies, to see through; whose wiles and cajolings they have been engaged in resisting ever since the rise of Naziism. They know Russia as an age-old enemy. Reasoning like the Poles in 1939, they fear that a Russian invasion would be as much a consequence of active alliance with the Soviet Union as of direct attack; and it may prove a great deal easier to expel your enemies than your friends.

To return to the question of friendship for Britain, the reader may be inclined to suppose that, in order to dispel misconceptions, I have somewhat exaggerated the degree of goodwill which is enjoyed by English people in Turkey today. I will therefore proceed to give him some facts. Nothing has been more successful than the work of the British Council in Turkey, and no work has met with so large a measure of encouragement, both from the general public and from the Government. The Council, organized from Ankara, has established additional centres in Istanbul, Izmir, and Samsun; provided a number of professors and lecturers for the University at Istanbul, as well as teachers for non-Government Turkish schools and *halkevleri* (people's houses); and organized most successful exhibitions of books and photographs throughout the country; and all this, it should be borne in mind, in the space of a little over a year. The demand for teachers of English and books is greater at the moment than the Council, working at full pressure and receiving frequent reinforcements of staff, can satisfy. Lectures on every aspect of British life and institutions are always well attended. This demand for cultural instruction, better appreciated, perhaps, in the provinces than at Ankara and Istanbul, is no freak of fashion. Turkey today is seriously concerned to raise its standard of civilization. And it wants assistance of a concrete and practical kind. Of the numerous books purchased and ordered at the English Book Exhibition held at Ankara last winter the greater number were in character scientific or instructional. Novels, which were expected to have a ready sale, remained practically untouched.

Of this aspect of Turkish life I shall have more to say in subsequent letters. The subject demands much wider treatment than I have been able to give it here. I shall also be concerned later on with the state of Turkish literature and the arts, and with the work of some of the more significant Turkish writers. Here I have thought it best to confine myself to generalities rather than to introduce, for the sake of a false completeness, a number of miscellaneous topics. To claim to analyse in a short space what remains, by reason of its unique social revolution and its peculiar political situation, one of the most interesting countries of the modern world is impossible. All I have tried to do here is to report facts and to indicate tendencies.

SOME ASPECTS OF JAPAN'S SUPPLY PROBLEMS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

BY N. A. J. DE VOOGD

(The author was until the outbreak of war with Japan Consul for the Netherlands in Kobe, and has been resident in Japan for twelve years.)

THE following remarks are mostly based on personal observation during the eight months after the outbreak of the war and partly on information derived from Japanese newspapers and magazines. Needless to say, the latter information has only been used as far as it is confirmed by my own experience and observation before and after the outbreak of the war.

DAILY NECESSITIES

Opportunities for direct observation after December 8, 1941, were necessarily limited. They were mostly concerned with the supply of daily necessities like foodstuffs and clothing. All the essential foodstuffs were rationed, and food queues were a common sight on the streets. Still it would be wrong to expect that the food situation would seriously affect the morale of the Japanese people.

According to official Japanese reports, the production of *rice* in Japan proper for the 1942 season (November, 1941, to October, 1942) was 20 per cent. below the average crop for the last five years. This was largely due to shortage of chemical *fertilizer*; notwithstanding the efforts of the authorities to encourage the fertilizer industry, production in Japan covers only a small part of the normal consumption. Rice crops in Korea and Formosa, however, were rather above the average. Also some rice was imported from Siam and French Indo-China, and negotiations were going on with these countries regarding plans to increase the amounts of such shipments. This would, of course, involve transportation problems, and, pending the solution of such problems, the Government tried to increase the production of substitute foods like *barley*, *rye* and *wheat*. Through lack of fertilizer the production of these cereals, however, remain below the expectations. *Bread* was not obtainable in sufficient quantities, but there was a fair supply of macaroni and spaghetti. Production of *potatoes* and sweet potatoes was also encouraged by the authorities, but owing to transportation difficulties these were practically unobtainable in the big cities.

The supply of *fish* was far below the normal consumption, chiefly due to lack of gasoline and diesel oil for fishing-boats. Measures were taken by the authorities to insure a reasonably fair distribution of probably less than one-fourth of the normal demand. The supply of *beef*, normally imported from Korea and North China, was about one-tenth of the normal demand, and the quality was very poor. *Pork* and other meat were unobtainable. Due to shortage of chicken fodder, *eggs* were extremely difficult to get. Lack of cattle fodder was responsible for shortage of *milk* and butter. A ten-year programme doubling the milk production was formulated in July. This plan was linked with a proposed subsidy for the building of warehouses for storage of cattle *fodder*. There was a great deficiency of *oils* and *fats*. The supply of *soap* was greatly restricted. In June it was announced that this situation would be relieved by the "expected" arrival of coconut oil from the South Seas. There was also a considerable shortage of *soy* oil and *beancurd*, both important elements of the Japanese diet. It was already known before the outbreak of the war that the Japanese had great difficulty in obtaining the necessary quantities of *soya beans* from Manchuria owing to their failure to substitute for the existing free trade agencies a system of central purchasing organs with fixed prices and controlled delivery, which was not popular with the Chinese farmers. In June, Domei announced a smooth supply of *soya beans* from Manchuria; this report was, however, not confirmed by the facts, and its value was belittled by simultaneous reports with regard to experiments for the extraction of *soy* sauce from *sardine* oil. The *sugar* shortage continued; monthly

rations of 360 grams in cities and 240 grams in the country districts remained unchanged. Already before the outbreak of the war sugar production in Formosa had suffered a serious decrease, largely due to lack of fertilizer. According to a report in the newspapers, plans were under consideration for transferring part of the Formosa sugar industry to Hainan in order to secure larger areas for production of rice in Formosa. Up till the end of July import of sugar from Java or the Philippines had apparently not taken place in any considerable quantity. Foodstuffs considered by the Japanese as "luxuries," such as *coffee* and *cocoa*, were unobtainable long before the war broke out. The sale of *tobacco* and cigarettes was limited to two or three brands of the Government Monopoly Bureau, and even these were often difficult to obtain. Even such commodities as were available in good quantities at the sources of production, like vegetables, fruits and potatoes, were difficult to obtain in cities. This was mostly due to restriction of *motor transport*. From September 1, 1941, no gasoline could be used for taxis, buses and trucks (the use of private cars had been prohibited long before that date). Charcoal gas is being used as substitute fuel; though charcoal appeared to be available in sufficient quantities for this purpose, the power and speed of cars driven by charcoal gas is low, which considerably reduces the total motor transport capacity.

From the outbreak of the war Japan has been cut off from her supply of *cotton* and *wool*. The quantities of raw cotton now available in the "common prosperity sphere" are negligible compared with Japan's normal need, even for home consumption. The *rayon* and *staple fibre* industries are influenced by shortage of *caustic soda*, since Japan is cut off from many of her *salt* supply sources, but the production of rayon and staple fibre is still well above the normal home consumption. The quality of staple fibre is gradually improving. The normal production of silk is about four times as great as the normal home consumption, and, though this production has been somewhat curtailed, the surplus production of silk, together with that of rayon and staple fibre, should go far to relieve the shortage of cotton. In the meantime great plans have been published regarding development of raw cotton production in the occupied territories. It seems doubtful, however, whether these schemes can be put into practice. *Clothing* material and clothing were rationed from February 1. At that time an appeal was made to the public to use the clothing coupons mostly for replacing of underwear and to refrain from buying kimono's, coats and suits.

Since charcoal is being used as substitute *fuel* for motor-cars and motor-boats, its supply for domestic use has been greatly restricted, and the monthly ration is scarcely sufficient for cooking purposes; for heating purposes it is wholly insufficient.

The Government has taken various steps to secure at least the minimum supply of daily necessities, partly by establishing *control organs* to regulate distribution, partly by encouraging the production of materials, and specially of substitutes even for such materials as can at present be obtained from the occupied territories.

In general, it may be said that already before the outbreak of the war the supply of daily necessities in Japan was infinitely worse than it is at present in England, and it has since considerably deteriorated. On the other hand, we should never forget that standards are different. Because of her low and simple living standard Japan is not only a formidable competitor in peace time; for the same reason she is even more so a formidable enemy in time of war, and there is no reason to believe that the food situation will seriously hamper Japan's war efforts.

WAR INDUSTRY

It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any reliable information with regard to raw materials for the war industry and other important factors influencing that industry. Owing to abundant water supply, sufficient hydro-electric power was available during the winter and spring of 1942, and restrictions on use of *electric power* have therefore been negligible. Control of the electric power companies and the distribution of electric power were further strengthened. The authorities encouraged the building of new power plants, but apparently the progress of work on new plants was delayed by shortage of *building materials*. The production of *coal* was encouraged in various ways, partly through Government subsidies to encourage the opening of new mines, to improve the quality of coal and to consolidate smaller mines, and

also through official commendation of experts and miners with high records. These measures seem, indeed, to have resulted in an increase of coal production at the mines and of stocks at the mining ports, but transport difficulties apparently hampered a fair supply to industrial centres. Government subsidies were given to mine owners to enable maintenance of low coal prices. The Government apparently realized that the reconstruction of oil production facilities in the occupied territories would require a lengthy period and that the transportation of oil by sea would be difficult. No oil or gasoline were available for civilian purposes. Not much was published with regard to shortage of labour, but it is clear that such a shortage must have been almost certainly produced by the withdrawal of men to the fighting forces, and that this must be an important factor in all industries. Dismissal and retirement of employees were under Government control, and measures were constantly taken for the reorganization of industries to free labour for "defence" purposes. In May some 150 American war prisoners were put to work in the docks at Osaka. Shortage of labour appeared to be most serious in the shipbuilding industry, and in July Welfare Minister Koizumi submitted plans to the Cabinet Meeting to improve the situation. These plans included the recruiting of Korean labourers for the shipyards. Supply of iron ore from Malay and the Philippines is made difficult by war transport problems. Special stress was laid on the necessity of increasing the production of coal to be used for the manufacturing of iron and steel. Leather was unobtainable for any civilian purposes. Rubber production and distribution were under strong control.

There was a general tendency towards Government control of all important industries. This control is left to semi-official control associations, who make joint purchases of raw material and joint sales of goods and manufactures, lend funds and have thoroughgoing control over all economic activities in their respective spheres. Subsidies or bank loans under Government guarantee are granted to important industries like fertilizer, shipbuilding, coal mining and cotton growing enterprises.

Special efforts were made to mobilize all hoarded and idle materials for the expansion of Japan's productive capacity. The Commerce and Industry Ministry requested the co-operation of manufacturers and traders for a nation-wide round-up of all hoarded materials to be held in June, and the Justice Ministry issued a special statement to the effect that it would "not take advantage of the contemplated investigation to expose undercover transactions." Experiments with the manufacturing of substitute materials are going on, even though these materials may at present be obtainable from the occupied territories. The South Manchuria Railway Company, in co-operation with the Japan Fuel Oil Company, is executing a six-year-plan for the production of synthetic oil by direct liquefaction of Manchurian coal. The Formosa Sugar Manufacturing Company is producing butamol as raw material for iso-octane from waste juice of molasses. In Malaya, Japanese experts are said to be producing gasoline and heavy oil from rubber. On the other hand, production of synthetic rubber is being encouraged by the Japanese Army in parts of occupied China. Tyre-cord of satisfactory quality and durability seems to have been made of rayon. Many of these experiments have no doubt little practical value, but it cannot be denied that Japan is actively preparing for the possibility that she may be cut off from her newly gained resources in the South.

TRANSPORT

Probably the most important problem with regard to the supply of raw materials is that of transport from the sources or potential sources in the occupied territories to Japan proper. That the difficulties of this problem are fully realized by the authorities is apparent. During the conference of prefectural governors held at the Home Office in Tokyo in March of this year, Commerce Minister Shinsuke Kishi pointed out that, though the war results would facilitate the establishment of the "common prosperity sphere," it was "too early to expect that the shortage of commodities will be eased as a result of the flow into Nippon of goods produced in the South Sea region. No one will take such an optimistic view if he takes into consideration the fact that Nippon is going to assume economic leadership in East Asia and that the situation centring around marine transportation is far from satisfactory." Writing in the April issue of the Japanese magazine *Economist*, Dr. Kenji Takeuchi, a well-known

economist, stated with regard to the resources now available in the "co-prosperity sphere": "Resources are of little value if they merely exist. They must be present in sufficient quantities and must be such as can be used with comparative ease. In this respect transportation is seen to be of the highest importance."

It is, therefore, only natural that great stress is being laid on shipping facilities and the promotion of the shipbuilding industry. As far as could be observed in Kobe, the regular connections from that port with Shanghai, Formosa, Dairen and Korea were maintained during the period from December 8, 1941, till the end of July, 1942. There seemed to be no regular sailings, however, from or to the Dutch East Indies, Philippines, Hongkong or Singapore. Japanese newspapers boastfully announced the arrival of shipments of various products from the occupied territories in Japanese ports, but never was the impression given that such shipments arrived in any considerable quantities.

State management of all shipping was enforced from March 25, 1942. Steps were taken for the increase of the number of seamen and training of officers. No figures were published in Japan regarding the loss of ships since the outbreak of the war. In the end of May it was officially stated in a committee of the Lower House that less than 5 per cent. of the total tonnage of Japan had been lost at that time, and that these losses had been more than compensated by the capturing of over 220,000 tons of enemy ships, which had already been put in commission in home and foreign waters. These figures make the impression of being very optimistic. We should not forget, however, that Japan's initial position with regard to tonnage was, on the whole, favourable. The war has forced the United Nations to spread their merchant fleet over all the world; whereas at the outbreak of the war the Japanese had available in home waters all the ships they had been using on a world-wide trade, and they have been in a position to concentrate this tonnage on a limited number of routes over comparatively short distances.

The authorities took all possible measures to boost shipbuilding activities and to increase shipbuilding capacity. Such measures included unified control of programmes for the construction of vessels, including dockyards in Korea, Formosa and Kwantung leased territory, standardization of marine engines, adjustment of the wooden shipbuilding industry and increase of labour. The Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., planned expansion of the shipyards at Kobe, Nagoya and Yokohama, establishment of new iron and engine manufacturing factories at Itosaki (Okayama Prefecture) and Heijo (Korea). Similar expansion programmes were prepared by the Uruga Dock Co., Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Harima Shipbuilding Co., and Hakodate Dock Co. There was a general tendency to build new slips and dockyards in out-of-the-way places so that it was impossible to observe or verify shipbuilding activities. It is equally impossible to make even a rough guess at Japan's present shipbuilding capacity. Ambitious plans for the increase of Japan's tonnage to 15 and even 20 million tons were published, but there, again, the problem of transport of the necessary iron ore from sources in the occupied territories to Japan proper arises.

CONCLUSION

The above short notes do not in any way pretend to be complete. They do not even touch all subjects concerned, because about many important fields no reliable information is available. Also no effort has been made to include the great problems connected with Japan's responsibility for providing for the economic needs of the "co-prosperity sphere," partly because the scope is too wide for this article, partly also because such demands will no doubt be sacrificed to Japan's own war needs.

Summing up the present situation, we may come to the conclusion that "even an effective blockade could not starve out the Japanese people,"* but that by hitting at her transport facilities and thereby cutting off her supply of essential raw materials we may seriously obstruct the development of Japan's war and other important industries and thus weaken her war effort. Even so, we should never allow ourselves to underestimate Japan's strength, but prepare for a hard and bitter struggle with a tough and determined enemy.

* Quoted from Hugh Byas, *The Japanese Enemy*, p. 64.

KASHMIR AND THE WAR

BY SIR WILLIAM BARTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

LAST August, when addressing the All-India Congress Committee on the proposal to send an ultimatum to the Government of India, Mr. Gandhi referred to the Indian Princes as a factor in the political situation. "They were," he said, "the creation of British power in order to create differences between British and Indian India. The Congress claims to represent the people of the States who have no differences with the people of India. We are asking for what the States' people want, whatever the Princes may say." In other words, the destinies of the 90 million people in the States lie in Congress hands. A day or two later Gandhi called on the Princes to act as trustees for their people and not as autocrats. "The time for change had come. Let them act wisely while he was alive. When he was gone, Pandit Nehru would have no patience with them."

In response to the implied indictment levelled at them by Congress, many of the Rulers, especially of the leading States, might challenge a comparison between their administration and that of Congress in the greater part of India during the term of office of the latter under the Act of 1935. Were the Muslims in any Hindu State goaded by misrule to threaten revolt as they did in Congress-ruled Provinces? Did Hindus threaten to revolt against their Muslim Rulers? There was nothing of the kind. It is true that there was trouble in Mysore, Travancore and other Hindu States, and in Hyderabad, but this was deliberately fomented by Congress with the object of forcing the Princes to concede to their people the right to elect their representatives to the Federal Government when instituted, in which case Congress felt it would secure a sufficient number of seats to enable them to seize power at the Centre.

The Congress record as exponents of democracy in over two years of office in the greater part of India hardly entitles them to criticize the autocracy of the States. And they know perfectly well that in the bigger and more important States, comprising nearly two-thirds of Indian India and its people, the administration is based on British-Indian models, is reasonably efficient, while in several, notably Mysore, Travancore, Cochin, Baroda and Kashmir, the system of government approaches the standard of constitutional monarchy. One may note that some of the ablest statesmen in India, as nationalist as Congress Ministers—Sir C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar in Travancore, Sir Mirza Ismail in Jaipur, Sir Krishnama Chari in Baroda, Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar in Kashmir, the Nawab of Chattari in Hyderabad—are serving as Prime Ministers in the States mentioned after their names. Their presence and authority should be a guarantee against oppressive rule.

The history of Kashmir in the past half-century furnishes a striking example of the disintegration of autocracy. In the early eighties of last century the Muslim peasantry, who form the vast majority of the population in this Hindu State, were little better than serfs; today they own their land; Muslims are well represented in the services and are able to protect

the interests of their co-religionists; the prosperity of the countryside has a prominent place in the policy of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja.

An outstanding example in this field is the *panchayat* system. These *panchayats* (councils of five) play an important part in village uplift—for example, in encouraging improved methods of agriculture, village industries, sanitation, education, especially in promoting the policy of Government of breaking down illiteracy by means of a system of the teaching of adults. Roads, wells and tanks are constructed under the supervision of these local bodies. They are elected by popular vote and, as a rule, are responsible for a group of villages. Much of the petty litigation of the countryside is decided by them. The system should furnish an excellent training for wider responsibility in public administration.

The Kashmir Legislative Council, known as the Praja Sabha, brings the Government into close touch with the people. It has an elected majority; 6 per cent. of the people vote; it votes the budget, subject to certain reservations, passes taxation bills and generally legislates for the whole State. A recent innovation provides for the appointment of elected members of the Council as under-secretaries to Ministers.

Kashmir has a fine military record. The then Maharaja, on his deathbed, sent a contingent of 2,000 foot, 6 guns and 200 horse, under the command of his son, to assist the British forces during the Mutiny; Kashmir troops later on distinguished themselves in the Black Mountain and Agror Valley expeditions and in the frontier wars of 1897. The State forces did outstanding work in the first World War in Palestine and Africa; 31,000 men in all were enlisted, the largest contingent of all the States. The Kashmir Government spent nearly a million sterling on the troops sent overseas, in addition to investing nearly as much in the war loan.

The part played by Kashmir in the present war will be a splendid chapter in her history. From the outset, His Highness the Maharaja has striven to make his people feel that it is a people's war. In offering all the resources of his State to the King-Emperor he has had the full support of the Praja Sabha. Not content with an appeal to his own subjects, as a leading Rajput Prince he has called on Rajputs all over India, as India's greatest race of fighters, to be true to their traditions and to rally to the flag.

The Kashmir army has important frontier duties to perform; despite this, nearly half its total strength was serving overseas at the end of last year. To maintain the troops abroad at full strength it is necessary to increase the recruits under training; new infantry battalions have been raised to replace those on active service; artillery training centres have been set up. Recruitment of the fighting clans for the Indian Army is being stimulated, and His Highness has offered to allow the incorporation of the two pack artillery batteries in the Indian Army, with the suggestion that they might be expanded into three. Special allowances are made to the families of men serving outside the State. In addition to all this, His Highness has provided eighteen completely equipped motor ambulances.

These measures have naturally involved a heavy increase in the military budget, which stands now at over half a million sterling—more than a fourth of the State revenue. Despite this strain on State finances there has been little relaxation of effort in the social services.

The battery sent overseas won laurels in the Abyssinian campaign, and later at Damascus, for which it was highly eulogized by Sir Claude Auchinleck. His Highness, in October of last year, paid a visit to the forces in the Middle East, including the Kashmir units.

His Highness's people, apart from the support given by their Government to the war, have contributed generously to war funds. The Aid-the-War Committee, over which Her Highness presides, has raised over £10,000; every quarter £3,750 is remitted by her committee to H.E. the Viceroy for the War Purposes Fund. The Kashmir forests have provided large quantities of timber for military use, including about £100,000 worth of walnut half-wroughts for rifle-butt; textiles and other war requisites have been provided.

There are few people in India who do not pray for an Allied victory. Have not Rulers like His Highness of Kashmir and the Princes generally, who are straining their resources to meet the threatened danger, deserved well of their country? Not only have they showed themselves prepared to defend India; they have worked to establish a scheme of Indian self-government within the Commonwealth; they were prepared to help on the efforts of the Cripps Mission. His Highness of Kashmir in particular, as the Prime Minister told the Legislative Council on April 4 of this year, was anxious to help make the Mission a success and to co-operate in framing a suitable constitution for India. One might well challenge the claim of Congress to speak for the people of Kashmir as against their Ruler.

The close co-operation of the Princes in the war will undoubtedly strengthen their military position. It should not be forgotten that among their people the fighting races are well represented. One may recall in this connection that Mr. Gandhi told India that if the British Government obeyed his summons to quit India the Indian Army would be automatically disbanded; the same thing would happen later if, as Gandhi intends, Congress should rule India. The Princes' armies would not obey his ukase. The danger of anarchy might lead the Princes to combine, in which case the destinies of India might lie in their hands. Should this happen, the impatience of Nehru with the Princes might not have the consequences anticipated by his leader!

INDIAN STATES AND INDIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE

(FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

INDIA—promised complete independence after the war if her leaders and peoples agree that separation from her present political moorings will subserve their common interests—already possesses a larger degree of domestic autonomy than many foreign critics appear to realize, or at any rate are prepared to admit. The deep and widespread distrust created by Congress policy, in the Indian States, on the one hand, and among the Muslim population of British India, has, however, been responsible for a setback to the project of a Free Federal India contemplated in the India Act of 1935. For that recession the Congress Executive is accountable, and only a reorientation of the Congress programme is necessary to revive the Federal ideal; the ideal which, despite all that has occurred since the Round-Table Conferences in London, enshrines all the most fervent hopes of every true lover of India. In India, unity, freedom and material progress are interdependent, and it is sufficient condemnation of the characteristically *maladroit* programme of the Congress Party—which at the same time endangers the immediate interests of the United Nations—to say that it imperils all three.

Meanwhile, for the benefit of American commentators whose interest in Indian Constitutional problems still rests on hazy sentiment rather than on precise knowledge, it may be recalled that India already possesses a far larger measure of political, economic and financial independence than is generally appreciated. Leaving aside the Indian States, which are not British territory and whose citizens are not British subjects, Ministries responsible to popular Legislatures are functioning in five Provinces—Bengal, Assam, Orissa, the Punjab and Sind—and in the remaining six are deprived of similar autonomy only because the Congress Party, in the present world conflict against Totalitarian aggression and tyranny, mixing Petainism with petulance, have chosen defeatism as their policy in preference to defence, and have accordingly based their programme of action on the febrile calculation that sabotage, as a short-cut to Indian independence, represents the highest form of statesmanship. The decision to arrest the Congress leaders, and to suppress their subversive plans, was made, not in London, but by the Government of India, of whose fifteen members eleven are Indian statesmen of proved patriotism and insight. Their major preoccupation remains the training and equipment of an Indian army, already 1½ million strong, all volunteers, whose contribution to India's present defence and future freedom has already been great, and will be greater yet, as Japan will soon discover.

India's developing autonomy must not be measured by Constitutional standards alone. Fiscal autonomy—a concession of solid importance—became effective in 1921, and has been so freely exercised that in the interval British exports to India have been nearly halved and Indian industries have expanded their production *pro rata*. In this field India already, for all practical purposes, possesses Dominion status, and the range, pace and direction of her industrial development are now determined in New Delhi, not in London. More recent, but at least equally important, has been India's ability—as a direct result of that "participation" in the war which the Congress Party have so consistently bemoaned and opposed—to repay all but a fraction of her sterling debt, thereby sloughing off her former debtor status. British industrial and kindred investments in India are offset by sterling balances, which are still growing and show every indication of establishing India, in the near future, in the very favourable position of a creditor country, in sharp and startling contrast to her financial position hitherto.

Alluding to a meeting in New Delhi of Ministers of Indian States, convened to consider the broad question of the future of the States in the light of recent declarations of British policy, *The Times* correspondent reports that some of the Princes and their advisers probably envisage a Union of States independent of British India, which for geographical and economic reasons does not look very practical; while others, it is thought, favour the association of the States with British India through some form of loose All-India Federation. With regard to the latter, there is the complication that

whereas conceivably British India might want to take India out of the British Commonwealth, the Princes would certainly want to remain subjects of the King-Emperor. "It is not too much to say," remarks *The Times* correspondent, "that as long as the Princes have a say in their own destiny the possibility of a Union of All-India depends on India remaining a member of the British Commonwealth." He might have added that the possibility of the predominantly Muslim Provinces remaining units of British India hinges largely on the same condition-precedent.

If additional justification were required for loyal adhesion by the British Government to their treaties with the States it is available in the latter's spontaneous and unstinted contribution to India's mobilization of men, money and materials to combat Axis aggression. Evidence has been adduced on this point in previous issues of the *ASIATIC REVIEW*, and there has been no diminution in the efforts made. The war activities in two States—Hyderabad and Mysore—may be taken as typical. In Hyderabad, with a view to associating the public in the districts with the general war effort of the Dominions, 108 district and taluq war committees, predominantly non-official in character, have been functioning since shortly after the outbreak of the war, and their efforts have been amply justified by the substantial contributions thus secured for war loans and funds. In the premier State the public have, in fact, set an example by deciding to suspend all political and communal differences for the war period in order to facilitate complete concentration on the primary task of defence. In Mysore, which recently sent a further contribution of Rs. 6½ lakhs to the Viceroy for Indian naval defence, A.R.P. organization has made gratifying progress, and, as the Dewan recently emphasized, represents a field of activity in which everyone can participate without reference to his or her political and communal views and differences. It is interesting to note that in Mysore the personnel of the Civic Guards includes lawyers, teachers, merchants, officials and technicians, and, it is officially acknowledged, are proving most helpful to the police in detecting certain forms of crime.

The Indian political scene is changing again with some rapidity, aided in part by successful United Nations' operations on all fronts, and there is no reason to abandon hope that ultimately an amicable political settlement will be reached in, and with, India, in which the Indian Princes, as in the discussions which led to the India Act of 1935, will play a constructive part.

CORRESPONDENCE

• 33, CHALKHILL ROAD,
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October 31, 1942.

THE EDITOR, "ASIATIC REVIEW."

SIR,

May I correct an error in the review of my new series for children, *Through the British Commonwealth*, in your current issue? After a charming commendation of "India," Part V. of the series, your reviewer proceeds, "nothing is left out of the picture . . . and all this in some twelve pages of large print and few words." Actually there are twenty-four pages in each book. •

Yours faithfully,
STELLA MEAD.

The views expressed in these pages must be taken as those of the individual contributors. THE ASIATIC REVIEW does not hold itself responsible for them.

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